



MISSION TO

MALI

MALI GOVERNANCE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE:

Final Trip Report Deliverables

- Part 1: Validating the Results Framework & Indicators: A Synthesis Report**
- Part 2: Performance Monitoring Plan**
- Part 3: Program Strategy Concept Paper**

by

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PART 1

VALIDATING THE RESULTS FRAMEWORK & INDICATORS: A SYNTHESIS REPORT

I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

A. Appraisal Background and Purpose

This synthesis report consolidates and analyzes information contained in the individual appraisal reports (see Annex 1) of four teams composed of members of the USAID/Mali Democratic Governance (D/G) strategic objective (SO) Team. These Teams made trips to five of the country's eight regions plus Bamako as follows: Team 1 covering Bamako District and Koulikoro Region; Team 2 covering Segou and Sikasso Regions; Team 3 covering Timboctou; and Team 4 covering Mopti Region. The visits took place over a two week period between March 14-28, 1996. The overall objectives of these visits were to: 1) validate the recently completed D/G Results Framework and its underlying logic; 2) to "ground-truth" the corresponding set of indicators developed to measure achievement of the several intermediate results and overall SO composing the Results Framework; and 3) substantiate the appropriateness of the initial and proposed set of activities that were developed along with the Results Framework.

This ground-truthing or validation exercise followed over four months of intensive strategic planning work undertaken by the D/G SOT in which the results framework, indicators and targets, monitoring, evaluation and reporting (MER) plan, and illustrative activities were developed. The D/G Team was assisted in these tasks by two technical assistance teams over this period, i.e., Thunder & Associates in Strategic Planning; and Management Systems International in MER. While the Mission had sought input from its partners, stakeholders and customers during the preparation of its Country Strategic Plan, including its D/G SO, this had taken place nearly a year earlier, prior to the D/G Team's constitution, and its subsequent refinement of the results framework. Thus, the purpose for the validation exercise and the field trips to the above noted regions was to discuss the refined SO with potential partners and customers. It was intended that, in addition to making possible adjustments to the strategy, indicators and activities as a result of this "reality check," the outcome of the exercise would assist the Team to further operationalize the strategy and finalize appropriate results packages.

B. Appraisal Approach and Methodology

The Team's approach to the ground-truthing exercise was to gain input from a cross-section of international and Malian NGOs (partners) and community organizations and federations (customers) in a significant number of the country's eight regions. It should be clearly noted that there was no attempt to conduct a full-scale, in-depth survey of program stakeholders' views and opinions on the D/G strategy as it was felt that a significant degree of input had been previously obtained over the past two years. Rather, the Team utilized *rapid appraisal* methodology (see Annex 2) targeting implementing partners and customers and the members which composed them. Thus, the Team was more concerned in "gaining a *qualitative* understanding of 'insider's' perspectives than it was in conducting *quantitative* research by 'outsiders.' The results ultimately to be used in the preliminary design and implementation of our applied activities." In this regard, the Team's basic intention was to discover from its potential customers: (i) whether USAID's intended D/G initiative was important

to them; (ii) whether they had ideas about its practicality and feasibility; and (iii) whether they had suggestions as to how each of the intermediate results might be better operationalized and implemented. The principal instrument employed in the rapid appraisal was a questionnaire (see Annex 3) composed of three parts, corresponding to each of the three validation objectives.

The Team borrowed significantly from USAID/Bangladesh and the work it had done in the development of its own D/G strategic objective using rapid appraisal methodology. Our thanks goes to Carl Schwartz of the Bangladesh Mission for his quick response to our request for assistance in this regard.

If there was a single flaw with the methodology used by the Teams in the conduct of this appraisal, it was in the fact that selection of the potential partners and customers for interviews was largely dependent on US PVOs and their recommendations of NGOs and COs with whom we could meet. While a number of Appraisal Teams met with some Malian NGOs and COs that had no relation to US PVOs and their programs, by far the largest number of respondents interviewed were partners or clients of these PVOs. On the other hand, it can also be stated that while our findings may be biased, the methodology also follows closely the logic of the D/G SO Results Framework, that is, US PVOs build the capacity of Malian NGOs who in turn work with and strengthen CO and federation capacity to undertake democratic self-governance and civic action.

A total of 52 interviews with potential partners and customers were conducted by the four teams in the six regions as follows: Bamako and Koulikoro, 13; Segou and Sikasso, 13; Timboctou, 15; and Mopti, 11. These 52 interviews included administering questionnaires to five US PVOs, 12 Malian NGOs, 8 federations, and 27 community organizations. Federations interviewed included: 3 federations of Associations des Parents d'Eleves (APEs) at both the Arrondissement and Cercle levels; a union of 53 village savings and credit associations; a coordinating body for associations working in sanitation and environmental protection; 2 associations of village associations (AVs) undertaking natural resource management activities, and 1 Cercle level cooperative of fishermen. Community organizations (CO) interviewed included: 10 women's associations, 8 village associations, 4 savings and credit associations, 1 community health center association (CSCOM), 1 rural radio station association, and 3 civic groups.

C. Report Structure and Contents

In addition to this introductory chapter, the remainder of this report is divided into chapters on Principal Findings (Chapter II), Conclusions and Recommendations (Chapter III) and Lessons Learned and Design Implications (Chapter IV). Annexes include individual Team Appraisal (Trip) Reports (Annex 1), Rapid Appraisal Methodology (Annex 2), and Appraisal Questionnaire (Annex 3). For those with the time and/or interest, the individual Team Reports provide a wealth of detail which can only be hinted at in this synthesis report. Team 1, Bamako and Koulikoro Regions, were fortunate to have the Mission's Women in Development Officer present at their interviews. Her report is attached as Annex 4.

II. PRINCIPAL SURVEY FINDINGS

While there are certainly significant differences (e.g., cultural, social, economic, urban/rural) between the five regions surveyed (plus Bamako district), the following report provides a consolidated synthesis of principal survey findings. Where it is felt that distinctions between responses made from respondents in the several regions are necessary, they will be noted specifically in the following narrative. As noted above, the following findings are generalizations based on the detail of individual Team reports which are found in the attached Annex 1.

A. Validating the Results Framework

In this section we discuss the logic of the results framework including each of the intermediate objectives from tertiary to primary levels, and ultimately the strategic objective (SO) itself. This will include discussions of the capacity of community organizations (COs), federations, and Malian and international NGOs to undertake the tasks foreseen in the results framework. Although international NGOs are not explicitly mentioned in the results framework, in the operationalized D/G SO, they are intended to play a significant role in NGO capacity building, and in certain cases the direct strengthening of COs.

1. International NGOs

- In addition to US PVOs such as CARE, NEF, Save the Children/US, the Team either met with or heard of other international NGOs with programs assisting community organizations in the several study regions, including the following: AFVP (French volunteers), CECI (Canadian volunteers), Oxfam UK, International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), SOS Sahel & SOS Netherlands, SNV (Dutch Volunteers), DED (German NGO), Helvetas (Swiss NGO), etc.
- A number of these NGOs act purely in a donor capacity (e.g., SOS, Oxfam) while others have their own operational programs (e.g., CARE, DED, CECI, NEF). Among the "operational" NGOs, some work with and through Malian NGOs (e.g., NEF, World Education, CECI), while others directly implement their community-based programs with no Malian NGO partnership (e.g., CARE, DED). Donor NGOs primarily fund Malian NGOs as a means of reaching the community level. They also provide significantly more funding for strengthening the capacity of Malian NGOs than do operational NGOs or international donors.
- In a number of areas (e.g., Timboctou, Koro Cercles) international NGOs (e.g., CARE) were the only non-state development actor working at the grassroots level. In other cases, and with a number of international NGOs (Save/US) working elsewhere, their staffs were entirely Malian.
- It was not actually possible to determine the degree to which those international operational NGOs working with Malian NGOs actually contributed to their strengthening. It can be said, however, that many of these operational NGOs were heavily involved in either building capacity for effective CO and federation management or internal democratic self-governance. NEF and Save the Children were particularly spectacular in this regard.

- A number of these international NGOs were instrumental in supporting their Malian counterparts to become registered and, in several cases, undertook what can be considered true civic action on behalf of the COs they were working with (e.g., Save/US, CARE, NEF); again NEF deserves special mention in this regard.
- Each of these international NGOs had a specific area of programmatic intervention which served as the entry point for their capacity building activities vis-a-vis COs, (e.g., natural resources management, credit and micro-enterprise, primary health care, etc.).
- Each international NGOs that we had the opportunity to talk with in detail (e.g., NEF, Save/US and CARE) felt that our strategy was both appropriate and achievable. In fact, it can be said that NEF is probably the closest to implementing a program which is consistent with our own and, in a number of areas, has probably surpassed our own in terms of both conception and concrete activities. Principal conditions that would be required for successful achievement included significant capacity building interventions for both NGOs and COs..
- Concerning the specific role of international NGOs in our strategy, i.e., as being a primary means for strengthening Malian NGOs, it is one they were either carrying out already (NEF, World Education), or one they could consider (CARE).
- Concerning decentralization, international NGOs felt that it was likely to take place by 1999; and that in the case of NEF, its program had been geared towards increasing CO and federation capacity to meet the new opportunities that would come about with the implementation of the decentralization program.

2. Malian NGOs

- The Teams were pleasantly surprised to find, in each region, a number of Malian NGOs which were actually implementing effective development programs in conduction with COs (e.g., CANEF in Bougouni, Alphalog in Segou, Voldet in Timboctou, and OGES and Walia in Mopti). In fact, they were instrumental in arranging meeting for us with COs in both regions.
- As with their international counterparts, Malian NGOs point of entry into communities and their work in strengthening CO capacity was based on addressing specific development needs of their CO clients (e.g., increasing incomes, irrigated and portable water, improved health care). Sensibilization and training were thus built around their specific development interventions.
- In terms of representing the interests of COs, in most areas Malian NGOs were the only true organizations (along with their international counterparts) which attempted to extend the voice and protect the interests of their CO clients vis-a-vis government agencies and/or commercial and business interests (e.g., BNDA, CMDT).
- Likewise, Malian NGOs saw their primary responsibility as strengthening the capacity of their CO clients. As will be discussed in the following section on validating indicators, they were far more limited in accomplishing this task than their international counterparts due to a lack of training

and the institutional infrastructure (e.g., transportation, equipment, etc.) needed to complement their "bon volonté." Yet, their efforts were impressive, nonetheless, given what limited resources were available. There are sure to be a significant number of other Malian NGOs that we did not meet with similar capacities given the relatively short duration of our visits.

- Malian NGOs were virtually universal in their agreement with our approach and strategy and its likelihood for success. They believe that they are capable of improving their capacity to undertake the strengthening of COs in both democratic self-governance and civic action. They also felt that they had an important role to play, have, in fact, been playing such a role in defending the rights of the COs with whom they work. This includes advocacy and promoting and protecting CO interests at the local level (at the supra-village to Arrondissement levels) and beyond. An interesting example was given by one NGO in which a local chief tried to claim all the best land on an irrigated rice perimeter, but where other AV members, with the NGOs assistance denied this claim and land was allocated equally to all members.

The key to their being able to undertake the role foreseen for them in the strategy was in the capacity building interventions noted and explained in our strategy. As discussed in greater deal below, capacity building in their conception also included sufficient funding to maintain or hire staff, equipment, transport, etc. They also noted that the greatest problem facing community organizations and their capacity to participate in the D/G program was illiteracy. One of the biggest problems seen by both international and Malian NGOs was the growing number of conflicts both within and between COs, primarily over resource use.

- In general the NGOs felt that effective decentralization was possible by 1999 and that it would greatly improve CO participation in local planning and decision-making. One NGO, however, felt that there was a real danger in local communes being captured by political parties and other local elites with no interest in the problems of community organizations. At the same time, they did not think that decentralization had been adequately explained to COs and their members (women being particularly ignorant of the new laws) and that the decoupage was still incomplete and a potential cause for future problems.
- Concerning laws that inhibit the ability of COs and federations to participate as partners in democratic governance, NGOs noted that there was no law that covered village associations (AVs), thus requiring them to either assist them in registering under ordinance 59 which requires a difficult set of conditions to be met; also, there does not exist a specific law for registering federations.

3. Federations

- Surprisingly or not, the Teams discovered and interviewed, or heard about, a range of federations operating in all regions. These included APEs at the Arrondissement, Cercle and regional levels; a federation of women's associations (Mopti); farmers cooperatives at the supra-village, Arrondissement, and Cercle levels (Koulikouro, Sikasso, Timboctou and Mopti) and the Cooperatif de Pecheurs (Mopti Cercle); and natural resource management associations at the supra-village and Arrondissement levels (Mopti).

- The majority of these federations were non-registered; and except for the few (Timboctou farmers cooperative and Mopti Fisherman's Cooperative) that were registered, none were actually registered as federations, but rather as associations of groupements (Molibemu) or AVs (Welde Kelka). This issue is discussed in more detail in section B, indicators, below.
- While not all were effectively undertaking civic action on behalf of their member associations, several of them (COTAPE, UCOVEC, Welde Kelka and Molibemu) had been extremely successful in advancing their interests vis-a-vis the administration (cercle and Arrondissement), a number of government services (e.g., Eaux et Forêt), parastatals (CMDT) and commercial organizations (BNDA). As discussed in greater detail below, however, there are some potentially serious problems with a number of these federations which the D/G SO Team (and other Mission SO Teams) will be well advised to review and incorporate into the various results packages and activities yet to be designed.
- In general, the federations interviewed felt that our strategy and approach were quite appropriate and that the role defined for them in both building member capacity and representing their interests was well taken. One federation (Molibemu) felt, however, that it was only federations which should undertake the civic action-cum-advocacy and representation role, and not NGOs. All federations, as did all NGOs, felt that for the strategy to succeed, they must receive the training discussed in our strategy documents. As with the Malian NGOs, federations also suffered from a lack of funding to engage and/or maintain adequate staff, to buy vehicles and other equipment, etc.
- The federations interviewed believed that effective decentralization could be implemented by 1999 providing government made it a priority, and would increase their ability to engage local government about issues which concerned them and their members. There was concern by one federation that the decoupage into communes was going to perhaps transfer some their member AVs from the same Arrondissement or cercle in to a new commune or cercle, with uncertain results. One of the federations (Molibemu) has been intimately involved in sensibilizing communities about the decentralization laws, and has run into problems with both the administration and political parties over this role. Another (UCOVEC) felt that federations and NGOs were best placed to provide training for COs and their members on decentralization.
- Some federations found existing laws to be constraining. While cooperatives are able to federate under Ordinance 88/62, it is much more difficult for AVs and groupements to do the same as there are no corresponding laws providing for their right to federate. One federation (UCOVEC) stated its inability to register officially was severely constraining its ability to carry out its tasks effectively. The biggest problem, however, lies with the APEs, in that their legal status including the structure from the lowest unit to the national level organization was mandated by law passed under the Second Republic. Thus, individual APEs, whether at the individual school level (comite de gestion), Arrondissement (primary federations) and Cercle (central federation), etc., do not have their own individual registration certificates. APEs also no longer have their own source of revenue, as the previous "Taxe Scholaire" which directly funded individual school running was replaced by the Taxe de Developpement Rurale and Locale (TDRL) which is now managed by the Comite Locale de Developpement (CLD) which is headed by the Commandante de Cercle.

In the case of the Welde Kelka (Mopti), for example, while it is officially registered, and has signed a convention with the Eaux et Foret, the latter does not believe it has the right to sanction member associations or individuals for infringements in the use of forest products. This decreases its legitimacy and hence effectiveness. As discussed in more detail below, only the Molibemu was having difficulties in gaining official registration status. This could be because it was requesting registration as a federation of AVs, rather than as an association of AVs. The delay they have experienced in gaining recognition could be due to the fact that there is as yet no law covering the registration of federations of AVs; or equally likely, the administration was delaying its registration because of the power it saw in this organization.

Also, for many rural organizations there is the additional problem of their relationship to and membership in the Chambre d'Agriculture, a federated structure created and governed by a law also mandated under the Second Republic. Any rural organization -- from farmers and artisanal cooperatives to AVs and groupements -- are automatically a member of the Chambre, whose role and capacity as a representative body is unsure and, in the eyes of many, less than legitimate.

4. Community Organizations

- If there was any doubt concerning the explosion of associational life at the community level, these two trips ably dispelled it. Both the density (numbers) and diversity of COs at the grassroots level has increased significantly since the events of March 1991 in all the regions covered; the biggest surprise in terms of CO growth was in Timboctou where it was anticipated that the rebellion would have severely disrupted community life, including the growth and functioning of COs.

CARE/Djenne, for instance, recently conducted an inventory of COs in the Djenne Cercle which showed 104 COs, not counting traditional associations. In Kolendieba, a women's credit association has some 700 members and a 100 percent repayment rate on credit loans. In the Arrondissement of Bourem (Timboctou) there was one farmers cooperative of some 300 members, numerous AVs working on rice perimeters, associations of fisherman, livestock herders, and commercants, numerous women's associations, and even a charcoal making associations, among others. In the CMDT (cotton) zone, there are literally hundreds of AVs which have been formed to purchase agricultural inputs and to market cotton. According to CAC Mopti Cercle figures, there were a total of 62 village associations, 64 cooperatives, 9 village Tons and 1 coordination des cooperatives (Road Transport) registered with this government agency. Finally, Promotion des Femmes (attached to the Primature) in Timboctou Cercle noted 63 women's associations registered with perhaps double or triple that number which were as yet unregistered.

- COs were engaged in a wide range of public governance activities in all regions including: natural resource management (e.g., Welde Kelka, Molibemu, Ogokana); provision of social services (e.g., APEs in education, women's associations in literacy training); promoting economic growth Koulikouro, Sikasso, Mopti and Timboctou (e.g., AVs, women's associations, savings and credit associations, cooperations); and in conflict resolution (particularly the Ogokana and Welda Kelka in Mopti region).

- COs were virtually unanimous in their praise for our strategy and felt that with sufficient time it could be achieved. A common response was that development takes place at the grassroots level and COs are at the principal actors at this level; therefore they should be supported. In order for them to become partners with local governments however, they would require training and local governments would need to be open to their participation, especially if they were to undertake civic action.
- Specifically, COs felt they were capable of undertaking their activities in a democratic manner with additional training, and many of them felt they were already doing so. Concerning civic action, COs were virtually unanimous in their belief that NGOs, both international and Malian, and federations were best placed to represent their views vis-a-vis government agencies, and commercial firms. A number of them (e.g., the Ogokana) stated that they were already able to deal with government agencies (Eaux et Foret) and have their concerns dealt with seriously.

Several COs specifically noted that while NGOs were best placed to strengthen them and represent their interests, not all NGOs should automatically be thought of as capable or willing to undertake these functions. They also need to be held accountable by donors for their use of funding destined for COs; and that in the statutes of NGOs it should be specifically stated that they would be run in a democratic manner with transparency in decision making and use of funding. **In short, our strategy depended on choosing the right NGOs.**

There was, however, no question that NGOs, whether local or international, were the best means of strengthening COs and thus achieving our strategy. Both government agencies and political parties were seen as either illegitimate or incapable of representing CO interests. Government agencies at the local level, in particular, were seen to suffer from a "crisis" in their credibility vis-a-vis local communities. All COs praised the NGOs which worked with them. A common refrain was "grace a notre NGO ...". In several cases, COs said that their NGO was responsible for giving them hope again and bringing back their youth that had left on the "exodus."

- While many COs were initially unable to identify any laws which constrained their ability to participate as partners at the local level, upon further probing a number of legal constraints were identified. One women's association for instance noted that they were unable to secure loans because they had no legal standing and thus could not provide a guarantee for their loans; only their husbands or mens associations could (which was not totally true). Most of the COs interviewed stated that registration was extremely worthwhile as it provided them with an ability to officially deal with government agencies; to be able to negotiate binding agreements; and, to be invited to seminars, conferences or workshops hosted by government or donors. In short, to be taken seriously. One CO stated being registered was like having an identity card.
- The issue of whether decentralization would be implemented by 1999, elicited mixed responses from our respondent COs. A number of COs commented on the problems associated with the decoupage which has not yet been fully completed in most Cercles. And one CO noted that local elections were slated for 1995 and have been delayed time and again, so one can question whether effective decentralization will actually take place by 1999. And to one degree or another, most COs were worried about the impact that political party campaigning would have on the harmony

in their villages given previous experience, and the preparations which are now being taken in preparation for local elections, whenever they may take place.

In general, however, all COs saw decentralization as a means for increasing their participation in local government matters, although it can also be said that most COs felt there had not been enough sensibilization about how decentralization will work, and whether funds will actually be devolved to the local level.

B. Validating Indicators

In this section, only those findings which call into question or raise additional issues related to a given indicator will be discussed. Many of the issues covered here have to some extent, already been discussed in the preceding section.

1. Voluntary Association

Fundamental to any conception of civil society is that people come together voluntarily to address a common problem or advance a collective interest. The issue of whether individual citizens voluntarily join associations has been one which has been raised in previous documents (see Fox, "A Conceptual Framework for Assessing Local Civil Society" and ARD, "Economic Policy Making in the Sahel: The Case of Mali,") which have been used by the D/G SOT in the formulation of its results framework. The principal concern in this regard, revolves around the case of village associations (AVs) and whether they are actually voluntarily formed and, if so, the nature and structure of their internal self-governance. Because AVs are formed around a "residential" unit, i.e., the village, where everyone is expected to belong by virtue of their living in this unit (obligation morale), it can, in principal as well as fact, be questioned whether they are voluntarily formed. The following are findings in this regard.

- It appears that, except in the case of village associations, individuals had the right to join or not join newly created community organizations (e.g., CSCOM, APE, women's associations, savings and credit associations, etc.); or at the very least not to participate in them without fear of sanction. One of the problems with village associations, it appears, is that their function and responsibilities overlap with that of the traditional village authority, i.e., the chief and his counsel, in terms of acting as an overall multi-purpose development body improving village economic and social welfare. At the same time, membership in AVs are either a morale obligation -- village solidarity -- a response made by AVs in virtually all regions visited; and/or an economic necessity as credit, farm inputs and produce marketing were only provided through AVs; this was particularly true in the CMDT zone and to a lesser extent in OHVN.
- The case of the Ogotkana is particularly illuminating in terms of how an AV blurs the lines between voluntary association and obligatory participation at the village level. The Ogotkana is a traditional form of self-governance employed among the Dogon people dating from pre-colonial times. All members of the community were subject to the laws established by it. This is because the Ogotkana was more than a voluntary association. Although resurrected to manage local

natural resources, it has today taken on its traditional role of "local government" governing all aspects of local community life, including natural resource management.

Because the members of the village community view the Ogokana as a legitimate governing body, however, based on what could be considered a *social contract* among community members, and because it undertakes decision making in a manner agreed to by the citizens, it can be considered as a democratic self-governing association, the overall objective of the D/G SO. In short, there is no difference between the Ogokana as a traditional form of "local government" and the Ogokana as a self-governing association. This contrasts significantly with AVs in other parts of the country where the two are nominally separated, but where the traditional authority significantly influences the governance of the AV.

Both the Ogokana and Welde Kelka have developed rule systems which govern the conduct of members and even non-members as relates to natural resource management. The issue is the degree to which non-members are subject to these rules, and whether they can be enforced and sanctions levied on those who do not comply with the stated rules. In the case of the Welde Kelka, although it has a signed convention with the administration (both cercle and eaux et Forêt), the administration questions whether the Welde Kelka has a legal right to levy sanctions on non-members and even members themselves. On the other hand, although the Ogokana is officially recognized, it does not depend on external recognition, or the lack thereof, to enforce its rules. If members are not willing to abide by the sanctions levied, they are simply excommunicated from the village; a fairly effective way to enforce its rules.

Finally, as discussed in more detail below, both APEs and cooperatives, and to a lesser extent, other rural-based federations, are constrained by a combination of law and practice. Because the APE and the Chambre d'Agriculture were created by legislative mandate, in principle, all parents of school children and all rural people were automatically considered members of these two organizations. While it appears that both organizations have begun to reconstitute their governing boards at the subnational national levels through elections, they are still governed by legislation which structures their internal governance and over which members have no say in how to amend or change them. In the case of the Chambre d'Agriculture, it is largely staffed by government fonctionnaires, while the APE national federation is staffed by unelected personnel.

It is difficult to determine the degree to which cooperatives are still dominated by such government agencies as the CAC, but many of the older ones as well as those which are massed based such as the Fishermen's Cooperative, appear to be operated by leadership which is largely viewed as illegitimate. On the other hand, there are such cooperative organizations as the "Kafojigine" and UCOVEC in the Segou and Sikasso regions which appear to have a great deal credibility vis-a-vis their members and exercise significant autonomy from the concerned state agencies.

2. Associational Autonomy

A second and related issue concerns the associational autonomy of COs and federations from the state, whether administrative units such as the Arrondissement and cercle governments, or

implementing agencies such as the Eaux et Forêt and Centre Action de la Coopératif, or such parastatal bodies as CMDT and OHVN. Furthermore, there are at least two organizations, i.e., Chambre d'Agriculture and the APE structure whose legal status, as noted above, is unclear as they are both organizations which were created by law or decree prior to the establishment of the Third Republic thus confusing their identity as members of civil society. The following are the findings in this regard.

- In general, there is no problem among COs concerning their autonomy from state agencies. The problem with autonomy comes primarily among COs that regroup themselves into higher levels of self-governance, i.e., federations. It does appear that at the lower levels of governance (e.g., Arrondissement and cercle) that APEs are beginning to regain their autonomy; while the situation is less clear at the regional level; and there is still no democratically elected body representing APEs at the national level. In general, our interviews with APEs at both the Arrondissement and cercle levels, indicated autonomy existed in a formal sense, i.e., there was no direct state interference in their affairs. However, because the APEs no longer have a direct source of revenue, they are extremely dependent on the CLD for allocations from the TDRL to run their individual schools or school systems. Thus, the question can be asked as to how autonomous they are without financial independence. This same question can be asked about all civil society organizations.
- The only instance where the Teams saw any indication that the Chambre d'Agriculture may have had any influence in the internal affairs of COs or federations was with the Cooperative des Pecheurs, which stated that the Chambre was its "tutelle." In various documents which the Team has had access to, however, it appeared that SYCOV, the syndicate representing farmers associations in the CMDT and OHVN zones, had extremely close ties to the Chambre d'Agriculture, as well as CMDT administration, including intimate involvement in SYCOV's internal decision-making process. Because, the Chambre was viewed by the vast majority of our respondents as a state, or at least, semi-state organization, this decreased the credibility of SYCOV vis-a-vis its members. In general, however, because of the lack of financial resources, the Chambre has apparently had limited capability to intervene in the affairs of most rural community organizations.

3. Issues of Internal Democratic Self-Governance

This issue covers a number of indicators which measure the ability of COs and federations to undertake their governance activities in a democratic manner. Perhaps the most important issue concerns the way in which the leadership of COs and federations is chosen as well as the way in which decisions are reached. Related issues concern whether COs/federations have statutes and, if so, whether they are followed; and the degree to which the leadership is representative of membership (e.g., gender, age, ethnicity, wealth). The following are relevant findings related to these issues.

- In the great majority of the cases, respondents stated that the leadership of their CO or federation was chosen through consensus and to a far lesser extent by election. However, whatever the method of selection, it normally took place at the COs' or federations' annual general assembly meeting. This same pattern held true with the way in which they made decisions on

organizational matters, i.e., in which consensus was the principal form of decision making mechanism. Whether by vote or by consensus, it is difficult to assess the impact this issue has had on the internal democratic self-governing practices of our respondents. As discussed below, given the traditional relationships among village people, patterns of power, including their asymmetries, that exist in villages are likely to be reproduced within the village associations themselves.

Certainly, it was clear that the governing boards of the vast majority of COs/Federations were dominated by men, in many cases exclusively, providing little or no direct representation of women. Likewise, leadership was drawn, in many cases, from amongst the village elders, and in a significant number of cases (particularly among AVs) from among the village chief's council, whether as honorary members with only symbolic power, or as a full member with corresponding rights. We did not receive the impression that representation was problematic as concerned ethnic composition.

While many villages were relatively homogenous in terms of ethnicity, and thus did not pose a problem for individual COs, even among federations of AVs, there appeared to be a conscious attempt to gain leadership representation by different ethnic groups on the board of directors. Thus, while individual villages were often homogenous in ethnic terms, where villages differed by ethnic group, it was likely that the governing boards of federations would achieve ethnic representation by ensuring that each village was allotted a seat on the board.

- Even where COs and federations were not officially registered, they all had statutes stipulating, at least in general terms, the rule structure and procedures that governed their internal functioning. There were mixed responses concerning the degree to which these statutes were actually followed, however. Alternation of leadership through periodic elections was not universally applied, although in many cases the organizations were too new to actually have required a second round of elections or change of leadership.
- Board meetings and meeting of the general assembly generally took place as scheduled, in many cases more frequently than stipulated. On the other, hand there were a significant number of cases where meetings were not held as scheduled and it was evident that these organizations were suffering from internal dissension and ineffectiveness (see the case of Bankoumana AV in Team 1 report).
- Good governance practices such as transparency in decision making and the management of resources, responsiveness of leadership to members, and the accountability of leadership for their actions, seemed to be generally acceptable with some notable exceptions (see Mopti women's association in Team 4 report). Given the fact that many COs and federations had little direct access to financial resources, there were few examples of the misuse of funds, although there were a number of cases reported.

Where funds were made available to COs or federations directly, it was normally by NGOs who also took responsibility for monitoring their use. Most of the problems that did arise in terms of poor governance practices could be attributed to a lack of true participation of members in the

overall functioning of their organizations. In most cases, this was a result of boards which were dominated by a few strong individuals who made most of the decisions, and/or who were the only members literate within the organization. This happened in women-owned organizations as well as in those which were of mixed gender, although the latter cases were more numerous.

- No COs or Federations that were interviewed had audits undertaken of their use of funds. As noted above, it was primarily NGOs which ensured the proper use of funding coming from external sources, e.g., donors or government. It should be noted, however, that many COs and federations did in fact keep their accounts with accounting ledgers and various back-up documentation.
- Only a small number of COs and federations were found to be undertaking what could be considered strategic planning, i.e., the setting of long-term objectives, determining associated resource requirements and their source, establishing indicators to measure achievement, etc. Those which were undertaking strategic planning had received significant assistance from international NGOs.

4. The Right and Capacity to Undertake Civic Action

Here the indicators were designed to measure the degree to which COs and federations actually undertook some form of civic action, i.e., delivering public services with government support, undertaking advocacy on behalf of member interests, protecting members civil and human rights, vis-a-vis traditional authorities at the local level (below the commune), or at higher levels of governance beyond the commune. In addition, responses indicated the effectiveness of COs/federations in undertaking civic action, as well as the factors which constrained their capacity to do so. The following were the Teams' findings.

- While virtually all COs believed they had the right to undertake civic action, a slight majority stated that they had not actually done so. Where civic action was undertaken, it was primarily at the local level vis-a-vis traditional authorities, or at the Arrondissement level vis-a-vis the administration (Chef d'Arrondissement) or line ministries (e.g., Eaux et Foret) or vis-a-vis commercial organizations (e.g., BNDA, CMDT). Many civic action activities were undertaken with other COs in the same Arrondissement and on an informal basis around specific problems.
- Roughly one-third of the COs interviewed indicated that they were members of some type of federation at the Arrondissement level or beyond. Those that were members were primarily affiliated with APEs, the national federation of community health centers, cooperative or savings and credit unions (e.g., SYCOV, UCOVEC), or the chamber of Agriculture.
- Virtually all COs, however, saw great value in belonging to a federation of COs with similar objectives. Federations provided a means to express their solidarity and to advance shared interests; to network and share knowledge and experiences about technical issues as well their interactions with state and market agencies; and to solve collective problems.

- Most COs believed that their capacity for civic action was dependent on: better organization, communication and coordination among them; decreasing conflicts both within and between COs; improving their understanding of their rights and obligations under the law; lack of civic action skills (e.g., advocacy and policy analysis); and local governments which were not open to their participation in local affairs.
- Slightly more than a third of COs were aware of NGOs or federations undertaking civic action on their behalf at the Arrondissement level or beyond. As noted above, all COs believed that NGOs and federations were the best means for extending their voice and protecting their interests beyond the local level.
- Federations of COs existed in all four regions and a number of them have been particularly effective in representing member interests and defending their rights. Not surprisingly, the prevalence of federations were to some extent a function of environmental and geographic features of the regions. Thus, in the Mopti and Timboctou regions, for instance, a number of the stronger federations were concerned with natural resource management (e.g., Welda Kelka, Molibemu) given the harshness of climate and the degradation of the resource base; or with occupations that centered on livestock raising or fishing.

On the other hand, in Segou, Sikasso and Koulikoro, where climatic conditions were more favorable and farming was more productive, farmers associations and cooperatives (e.g., SYCOV) were more in evidence as was the only example of federation of savings and credit associations (e.g., UCOVEC).. Federations involved in social service delivery (e.g. APEs, CSCOMs) were found to equally represented throughout the country.

- Individual Team reports indicate that federations were involved in a range of civic actions from lobbying local governments for public funds to providing services (e.g., Timboctou Central APE Federation vis-a-vis Cercle government), to decreasing taxes levied on members by the Arrondissement (e.g., COTAPE in Sikasso), to limiting government interference over the management of natural resources (e.g., Welda Kelka in Mopti).
- It should be noted again, that the great majority of federations, and well over half of the COs were not officially registered with government; or in the case of federations of COs they were not technically registered as federations, but rather as associations or groupements of COs. All respondents believed that official recognition was extremely important to their effectiveness as it increased their legitimacy vis-a-vis government and market agencies and credibility among their members.

5. CO and Federation Knowledge of Rights and Obligations

Indicators were developed to evaluate the knowledge of COs and federations concerning their legal rights and obligations. Such knowledge is obviously a requirement if they are to be able to defend their interests and rights vis-a-vis government agencies and market firms, in short, to undertake civic action. While decentralization laws were not intended to be covered in any depth in the validation exercise, as this intermediate result was not one that the D/G team was to take direct responsibility

for, it was evident from our interviews that the ensemble of laws that make up this important area the enabling environment were an area of great concern to our customers, and thus potentially of great importance to the successful achievement of the D/G SO.

- While roughly half the COs and federations interviewed felt that decentralization would be implemented by 1999, it was equally clear that the great majority respondents did not fully understand decentralization objectives, its process, and the impact of specific laws on their ability to participate more fully in local governance matters.
- While the decentralization mission had been to all regions in which interviews were conducted (as reported by CO, NGO and Federation respondents), it was primarily involved in redistricting (decoupage) activities, and not in disseminating information about the decentralization laws and the rights of citizens and their organizations under them. While a number of respondents indicated that they had heard that GREMs and GLEMs had been formed, they were unsure of their role in terms of decentralization operationalization. For those that understood that these bodies were responsible for disseminating information on decentralization, they felt that GREMs and GLEMs had not fulfilled this function, nor were particularly interested in doing so. A number of respondents believed that the inclusion of political parties in these bodies was a mistake as they were only concerned with using them for their own partisan purposes.
- In general, the great majority of COs, and to a lesser extent, Federations, had only a basic understanding of Mali's democratic system, institutions and processes. Those areas where they felt additional understanding was required included: (i) decentralization laws including the electoral code as it would relate to local election; (ii) the Constitution of the Third Republic; (iii) taxation policies and laws related to associations and federations, and the overall rules governing the allocation and use of public funds; (iv) the degree to which government agencies demonstrated transparency and accountability in the use of public funds for social service delivery; (v) civic rights including women's rights; and (vi) citizen rights and participation in public decision-making.
- In relation to laws, policies and regulations governing the types of public governance functions which most affected them (e.g., natural resource management, social service delivery, and promoting economic growth and welfare), COs and federations were either unaware of them or only marginally informed. The most frequently mentioned were: (i) land tenure laws; (ii) laws governing conflict resolution between resource users (e.g., between herders and farmers); (iii) laws on natural resource management; (iv) customary rights versus codified modern law; and (v) policies by commercial banks on requirements for taking and making loans.
- Except for APEs and some of the larger federations, roughly 50% of respondents felt that the lack of literacy and numeric skills were a principal constraint to the functioning of their governing bodies, and by extension to the running of the CO/federation itself. Close to 80% felt that lack of literacy and numeric were a major constraint to the ability of their communities to participate fully in economic, social and political life at the local level and beyond.

- Perhaps the most misunderstood laws related to the registration and official recognition of COs and federations. This includes which government agencies are responsible for administering these laws. As discussed above, both COs and federations view the receipt of official recognition as extremely important to their ability to serve member needs and represent their interests. Specifically, they clearly saw the importance of legal registration as providing them with the right to enter into legally binding contracts with both government agencies and market firms (banks). It should also be noted that even where COs and federations were registered, it was unclear to them (and to the interview teams as well) under which laws and by which agencies they were registered.

6. Validating NGO and Federation Indicators

Malian NGOs and Federations have been highlighted as playing a major role in the implementation of the D/G SO. Their role is a dual one in this regard: building capacity of COs and federations in democratic self-governance and civic action on the one hand; and representing and defending, along with federations, the interests of COs vis-a-vis government and market, on the other. As discussed in section A above, the Teams were pleasantly surprised and impressed with the number and quality of Malian NGOs involved in undertaking both these functions. There are a number of specific findings, however, which will be important in operationalizing the D/G strategy:

- The majority of Malian NGOs interviewed received their funding from international NGOs; a number received direct financing from international bilateral or multilateral donors (e.g., FED, CIDA); and several received subventions directly from various government agencies (e.g., Promotion des Femme, Commissariat du Nord).
- In a number of cases, NGOs are simply used as "pass-through" mechanisms by donors and government to channel grants to community organizations, including helping them to prepare proposals and follow-up or monitor the use of these funds. Where this was the case, the NGO takes a percentage of the donor or government grant (normally 10%) as an "administrative" expense to cover its own costs in undertaking these functions.
- Very few NGOs actually receive funding to implement their own programs with COs. Where this does take place, it is through the funding of international NGOs. In general, NGOs complain that donors are not very flexible in the way they make funding available to them. Little donor funding is provided to improve the institutional capacity of NGOs, including funds to cover salaries, transportation, training, etc.
- Two-thirds of the NGOs interviewed had their main offices in Bamako, however, it is still worth noting that a significant number of regionally-based NGOs exist and appeared to be functioning fairly well.
- A number of the strongest of the Malian NGOs interviewed had their origins in international NGOs that "gave birth" to them (e.g., Walia/IUCN, CANEF/Freedom from Hunger) or have been close partners with international operational NGOs (e.g., OGES, Voldet, CAEB, AMAPROS)

such as World Education and NEF. In one case (Voldet), the NGO was formed by a number of former technical agents laid off by government agencies.

- The actual membership of Malian NGOs is relatively small, i.e., 10 - 30, with little or no representation of community organizations on their governing boards. These NGOs are normally formed by a small number of founder members. Of particular note, board members normally take salaried positions once funding is secured from a donor for a project activity without relinquishing their positions on the governing boards.
- While there appeared to be a significant degree of internal democratic self-governance practiced by most NGOs, including participation of women on their boards and overall participation of members in decision making, the interview teams were unable to definitively verify this, particularly for those NGOs with Bamako headquarters.
- While only two NGOs were actually audited, most of those interviewed followed normally accepted accounting practices with the maintenance of books and records. Donors also expected full reporting on the use of their funds, thus providing an additional degree of accountability. There was, however, little "down-stream" accountability of NGOs to client COs, a concern noted by several COs themselves.
- Members of one regionally based network (e.g., GDRN 5) representing international and Malian NGOs in the fifth region involved in natural resources management was interviewed. Although an informal grouping of NGOs, it was apparently playing an important role for its members in sharing information and knowledge and coordinating regional activities. A number of NGOs stated they were either full members of CCA-ONG or observers, while one stated it was a member of a Groupe PIVOT. Several NGOs (Walia in Mopti and Alphalog in Segou) were also regional representatives (relays) for CCA-ONG.
- Three federations (Molibemu in Mopti, UCOVEC in Koulikoro, and SYCOV in Segou) stated that they were providing capacity building assistance to their members as well as representing their interests to higher levels of administration or vis-a-vis parastatal agencies (e.g., CMDT and OHVN). One federation (Welda Kelka) believed that the civic action function was only appropriately undertaken by federations and not NGOs.
- The executive unit of one federation (Molibemu) actually appeared to be operating as an NGO implementing the programs of the federation's two donors rather than those of the federation. Thus, there was great attention paid to building up the capacity of the federation versus the member COs as a means to ensure effective implementation of these programs.

C. Validating of Proposed D/G Results Packages and Activities

In the process of developing the D/G SO results framework, the Team also identified a number of potential interventions, either in the form of results packages or as stand-alone activities, which it was hoped, would lead to the attainment of related intermediate objectives. In this section we briefly review the findings to the set of questions devoted to this issue.

1. Community Organizations

- The principal constraints identified by community organizations in terms of their ability to carry out democratic self-governance and civic action functions included:
 - The lack of resources (e.g., financial, material and human) to be able to meet the social and economic welfare needs of their members.
 - A lack of understanding or awareness (sensibilization) concerning the larger concept of Malian democracy and, more specifically, related to the laws, policies and regulations which specify their rights and obligation as citizens.
 - A lack of management skills from accounting and financial management to strategic planning and proposal development.
 - A lack of literacy and numeric skills both among board members and the general population; viewed as pre-condition for sensibilization, training and animation to take place.
 - A lack of capacity to undertake civic action, including how to analyze government policies, how to formulate their own priorities and development plans, and how to effectively lobby government agencies. This also includes how to form alliances, whether formal or informal with like-minded organizations to advance common interests.
 - How to overcome internal conflicts within their organizations and between them and other COs, i.e., conflict resolution and management skills.
- Whether explicitly stated or not, all COs made it clear that they were formed for a specific purpose (e.g., to improve the economic welfare of their members, to manage natural resources in their locales, to deliver important social services to their members) and, if unable to carry out the objectives for which they were formed, would not have any reason for existence.
- Literacy and numeric were seen as perhaps the most important initiatives required for their COs in particular and communities in general. But this was tied closely to any training they would receive to improve their capacity in either programmatic areas (e.g., credit administration, school management, natural resource management) or in democratic self-governance and civic action.
- The great majority of COs indicated the need to be better informed about the laws, policies and regulations which determined their rights and obligations vis-a-vis government. This specifically included decentralization. This, a number of COs informed us, could be achieved through civic education.
- The great majority of COs also felt it important to initiate and maintain contacts with their deputies in the National Assembly and with government officials at the Arrondissement, Cercle and regional levels. Concerning political parties, COs were virtually unanimous in wanting to keep them out of their internal affairs.

- All the COs indicated that they would be willing to contribute whatever resources they had available, i.e., unskilled labor, land, in-kind materials, to support, literacy, civic education and animation in their communities.
- In general, COs felt they were capable of acting as partners in democratic governance provided they received the above type of assistance, but that ultimately it would also depend on governments at the local level and beyond to open to their participation, which meant a significant change in their behavior if not attitudes (mentalité).

2. Federations

- One of the biggest problems facing the formation of federations is the lack of an enabling legal environment which easily permits their official recognition and legal registration. This is particularly true for APEs and farmers federations which find existing legislation to inhibit their effective operations. In addition to the legal environment, these and other federation types are constrained by the existing structures of state mandated institutions such as CMDT, the Chambre d'Agriculture, the APE system.
- Additional constraints to federations undertaking both CO capacity building and civic action were a lack of all types of institutional resources including finances, training, equipment and transportation, and permanent staff.
- In the majority of cases, federations were formed to represent the interests of their members vis-a-vis government and market agencies. While there was an equal emphasis on providing members with additional services (e.g., training, credit provision, networking and information sharing), most federations lacked the institutional infrastructure (e.g., paid staff, transport, offices) to adequately perform such functions.
- The biggest need identified by federations in addition to sensibilization and capacity building and an enabling environment to improve management capacity, was adequate funding to permit them to deliver capacity building for their members and provide them with concrete services.

3. Malian NGOs

- While NGOs did not generally see the legal environment as constraining their ability to work with COs, several of them did note that laws were not clear on tax exemptions related to the importation of project commodities and the requirements related to employees payment of INPS contributions. The single biggest legal constraint to their work with COs related to their inability to qualify for bank loans because most COs did and do not possess a legal personality.
- The biggest constraint to NGOs undertaking their role in building CO capacity was the lack of a stable source of finances to operate their programs. This was seen as primarily a result of donors who were not willing to provide medium to long-term assistance to NGOs to implement their own programs as opposed to being used by donors to implement their programs. As such,

little funding went to building an NGOs long-term capacity to plan and implement development programs. It should note that this phenomenon is not unique to Mali.

III. APPRAISAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In chapter III we move from facts and findings to the more subjective realm of conclusions and the recommendations which flow from them. We note again that this validation exercise was not undertaken as a quantitative research effort in which the D/G Teams attempted to remain disinterested outsiders. Our use of the rapid rural appraisal methodology led us to directly engage NGOs, federations and COs, in a frank dialogue concerning their *opinions* about our strategy and intended interventions. We think the approach worked well. While our "sample" may have been somewhat small and biased compared to a more scientifically applied survey, we strongly believe that the majority of what we heard was representative of the situation of similar organizations in other parts of the country. To a Team member, everyone found the appraisal exercise both informative and interesting, and the basis for remaining involved and tracking future SO progress. In fact, as will be discussed below, a number of extremely important findings emerging from the exercise differ significantly from our initial understanding of the milieu in which the D/G program will be implemented, and will thus lead, to a number of major alterations in the way we design our results packages. The following sections are divided in to conclusions and recommendations related to the Results Framework (Section A); Indicators Section B); and Potential Activities and Results Packages (Section C).

A. The Results Framework and Its Underlying Logic

There can be little doubt, based on the responses of those interviewed, that the D/G Results Framework and the logic which underlies it, is both appropriate to its setting and achievable over the longer-term of the strategic plan period. More importantly, it is also implementable keeping in mind a few key principles as activities are subsequently developed. This is not to say that numerous questions and issues were not raised by respondents. However, they served more to highlight and give emphasis to certain aspects of the strategy than to call into doubt its conceptual underpinnings. The following sections discuss some of the more important of these issues.

1. Democratic Governance as an End and Means

Governance has always been the principal focus of this SO, albeit a particular form of governance, i.e., democratic governance. In its most basic conception, governance is viewed as the way in which any social unit -- from an entire society to the smallest local association -- organizes itself to solve collective problems or advance shared interests. Thus, while we have always viewed democratic governance as a **desirable (political) end** in itself, for the majority of our potential partners and customers, democratic governance must also be seen as a **practical (development) means** to meet the social and economic problems that confront them, their families and communities in their daily lives. If there was one single finding that emerged from our validation exercise that stands out among all others, it is the fact that the primary *raison d'être* of the NGOs, COs and federations that we interviewed was to address and resolve a well-defined collective problem or to advance a shared interest as identified by their members or clients. As a means to achieving sustainable development,

democratic governance become a **cross-cutting** strategy contributing simultaneously to each of the Mission's other strategic objectives, while promoting the desirable political end of a democratic Mali.

The conclusion -- one that the D/G SOT has acknowledged from its very beginning -- is that for the D/G strategy to be successfully implemented, recognition must be given to the unalterable fact that community organizations, our primary customers, must be **directly** supported to address the social and economic needs of their members; their *raison d'être*. As it is the Mission's other strategic objectives whose programs address these more material needs, it is clear that the D/G SO must work with and through them to attain its defined results. Conversely, it can also be stated that the likelihood of other Mission teams achieving their own results -- as well as the overall Mission goal of sustainable economic, social and political development -- will depend largely on the ability of the D/G Team to build the capacity of COs and federations to undertake democratic self-governance and civic action. This conclusion thus leads to the issue as to how to achieve integration and synergy of SOs and corresponding results packages and activities on a Mission-wide basis. There are a number of options in this regard which will likely lead to the achievement of this integration of and synergy among the Mission's four SOs. Before presenting them in full, it is important to view COs in the broader context in which they operate.

Community organizations, as previously noted, are voluntarily formed by their members to address a particular, shared governance problem, i.e., joblessness and low incomes; a lack of access to critical social services; and, the poor management of common non-renewable natural resources required to support basic family and community needs. It is precisely these types of community problems to which COs address themselves and to which other Mission SOs are gearing their programs of support. In short, Youth and SEG SOs are concerned with improving the economic and social welfare of Malian communities while InfoCom is concerned with disseminating improved knowledge and practices in these areas as well as that of political affairs. The D/G SO, on the other hand, believes that in order for COs to be able to effectively provide services to members that address these problems, they must be well managed and democratically governed; and, that when necessary, they be capable of defending and advancing the interests of their members vis-a-vis government and market interests. Thus, the principal results to which the D/G SO addresses itself is the building CO capacity in the areas of democratic self-governance and civic action.

The net result of individual SOs pursuing their discrete results will be to target a common set of COs with different interventions, i.e., those aimed at strengthening CO capacity (e.g., technical, management, democratic self-governance) and those concerned with providing concrete programmatic assistance (e.g., micro-credit funding, community school construction, dissemination of improved knowledge and practices). While it may be convenient for each SO to develop interventions according to its own specific needs, the impact on a given CO is to view it "in parts" rather than as a "holistic" organism with multiple functions and needs. The question then becomes whether it is up to Malian COs to integrate these different messages and interventions which ultimately aim to achieve individual Mission objectives or, rather, for the different SOs to integrate their interventions to promote **sustainable community development**, the replication of the Mission's country program goal at the community level. We believe that it is not only appropriate that integration take place at the level of the Mission, it also makes good development management sense.

The following discussion provides three options which, we believe, are most likely to lead to SO integration and the related objective of synergy. They are listed in order of priority.

a) Option 1: Decentralized Approach

This option -- and one that takes USAID/Mali's re-engineering efforts to its logical conclusion -- treats the D/G SO as one of four SOs contributing to the achievement of the Mission's goal of **Mali achieves a level of sustainable political, social and economic development that eliminates the need for concessionary foreign assistance**. Viewed in this light, the achievement of the D/G SO as well as the other three SOs, becomes a by-product in the process of achieving the larger Mission goal. How does this vision translate in practical operational terms? The proposal made here is to **decentralize** responsibility for achieving the Mission goal to *mini country program strategy teams* at the regional (or other geographic defined areas) level and composed of members from each of the four SOs. Within each of these regional teams -- estimated at three to five country-wide -- there would be one or more results packages that aim at achievement of, not individual SOs per se, but rather the larger country program goal. Each SO could thus be treated as something approaching an "intermediate result" with their corresponding set of indicators used to measure overall progress towards the achievement of the Mission goal of sustainable political, social and economic development. Such an approach not only ensures integration and synergy among SOs, but promotes two of the most essential principles of Agency re-engineering, that is, employee empowerment and accountability.

Within each regional program there would be one **cross-cutting** results package that has as its principal objective the promotion of **sustainable community (political, social and economic) development**, the replication of the overall Mission goal at the local level as it is being replicated at the regional level. This cross-cutting results package would include all interventions, from whatever SO, that are intended to work with and through community organizations to improve the capacity of Malian communities to achieve the Mission's sustainable development goal. While this would not be the only results package at the regional level, it is likely to be the only one which cuts across other SOs. Each SO would also likely have other results packages that aim to achieve discrete results specific to that SO (e.g., policy reform, private sector development, government capacity building). There would also likely be one or more **supra or Mission level results packages** that support country-wide objectives that no regional program team addresses itself. This might also include a responsibility for overall monitoring, evaluation and reporting on the individual progress of mini-country program strategy teams.

What are the implications of this decentralization option in terms of Mission structure and the mechanism(s) required to operationalize it? In an ideal world, where the process of re-engineering was just beginning, a decentralization strategy including devolution of powers and finances, would translate into the actual physical relocation of Mission personnel to mini-country program teams in the targeted regions. In the real world, however, with the costs of such a restructuring unknown, and taking personnel considerations into account, such an approach is probably not feasible. In fact, it is not necessary to achieve the desired result of synergy and integration. What is necessary is the constitution of the regional teams, perhaps through formal *charter* (similar to what was undertaken by USAID/Bangladesh and its D/G team) by the Direction Core, empowering them while also holding

them accountable for the achievement of the Mission's country program goal at the regional level. It would then be the responsibility of each regional team to determine the implementation arrangements and mechanisms best suited to the particular characteristics of its geographic area. What would, however, be common to each regional team, is the **cross-cutting results package** designed to achieve **sustainable community development**.

A proposed **mechanism** designed to operationalize this results package has already been briefly discussed with the Regional Contracts Officer/West Africa. It is the engagement, through *assistance instrument*, of a multi-disciplinary implementation teams that would execute, in partnership with the mini-country team, the cross-cutting sustainable community development results package. It is anticipated that a consolidated Request for Applications (RFA) for a Cooperative Agreement (CA) would be issued to solicit proposals from interested parties to implement the cross-cutting results package by targeted region. From this single RFA multiple awards would be made by region or geographic zone targeted by USAID/Mali. Because of the broad range of technical and management skills and expertise required to implement the results package, it anticipated that either a consortium or prime - sub-contractor arrangement would be necessary, although this would ultimately be up to the applicants to decide the most compelling arrangement.

What would be necessary is that the several implementing partners have the capacity to provide training and technical assistance in: (i) a range of technical sectoral or programmatic areas; (ii) a range of generic development management skills; and (iii) in democratic self-governance. The purpose of such training and TA would be to prepare other PVO and NGO partners to build the overall capacity of COs, and the federations they form, to become sustainable community development agents. Technical programmatic or sectoral training would include civic education and action (the technical areas of the D/G SO) and such social and economic sectoral skills and expertise as credit administration, school, health center and rural radio station management, and information and communication approaches to knowledge and practice dissemination. In addition to the provision of training and technical assistance to PVOs and NGOs, the implementing partners would also be capable of providing grants to them to implement programs in collaboration with COs to undertake such activities as: construction of schools, health centers and rural radio stations; initiate micro-enterprise and AIDS education activities; and to establish Community Information and Animation Centers. Whether or not or, to what degree, the implementing partner would undertake MER functions would need to be determined between the mini-regional program strategy teams and the Direction Core. *The principle being proposed here is that capacity building interventions for COs should not be separated from the actual execution of concrete sectoral programs that improve the economic and social welfare of CO members and the larger community itself.*

The advantages of this option are several. First and foremost, it ensures integration and synergy among Mission SOs by forcing individual SO teams to focus on achievement of the Mission goal rather than their individual results. Secondly, it increases the likelihood that the interventions developed individual mini-country program teams are more relevant to the specific needs and conditions of the given region. Thirdly, it would reduce the number of overall management units by consolidating results packages and corresponding mechanisms; particularly those related to improving the social and economic welfare and political participation of Malian communities, i.e., promoting sustainable community development. Fourthly, as a result of decreased management units, results

packages and mechanisms, it would likely decrease overall programmatic and management costs. And finally, by decentralizing and devolving authority and finances to the mini-country program strategy teams, it would empower mission staff and their partners, while holding them accountable for results. In this regard, it is hoped that innovation and risk-taking would be increased.

b) Option 2: Centralized Approach

The alternative approach to that of decentralization, focusses solely on the way in which synergy and integration would be achieved in relation to any intervention which targets working with and through community organizations to achieve individual SO results at the community level. This is essentially taking each of the regional cross-cutting sustainable community development results packages and consolidating them at the **centralized** Mission level. Thus, this **supra or cross-cutting results package** operates on a country-wide basis rather than at the level of targeted regions or geographic areas. In the same vein, rather than mini-country program strategy teams taking responsibility for individual regional results packages, it is proposed that a supra or cross-cutting sustainable community development results package team be formed with membership from each SO. Rather than one RFA with multiple awards by region (the decentralized option), the centralized option would call for an RFA with a single award covering all regions. The functions of the single awardee (CA recipient) would be the same as those discussed above for the multiple awardees responsible for implementing the sustainable results packages on a regional level.

There are advantages and disadvantages of this option in relation to previous option discussed above. In terms of the number of management units and corresponding results packages and mechanisms related to promoting sustainable community development, it decreases them from three to five, to one, albeit a very large results package and mechanism. This is likely to lead to significant cost savings vis-a-vis the multiple results packages and mechanisms of the decentralized option. It is also anticipated that this option will be less disruptive and threatening to the Mission as a whole as it does not entail the significant physical restructuring and mental reordering of staff members associated with the first option.

On the other hand, what is gained in economies in scale through this option is lost in terms of the development of regional specific programs designed to respond to the unique conditions and needs of the region concerned. It will also decrease the ability of the single mechanism to devote the time necessary to identify, select, train and monitor the activities of partner NGOs and PVOs in each of the regions upon which the success of the results package implementation rests. This option is also likely to decrease overall Mission synergy and integration as the focus will remain on achieving individual SO results rather than the country program goal. At the same time there is likely to be less empowerment and accountability associated with this option as the same degree of authority and finances devolved under the first option are not likely to be devolved under the second. This, however, depends on how the Direction Core constitutes the supra results package team and the way in which individual SOs contribute to it.

c) Option 3: A Lead Strategic Objective

Assuming that neither of the two options previously discussed are workable alternatives for the Mission, it is proposed that the D/G SO become the *lead SO* coordinating those interventions, from whatever SO, that aim at improving community welfare through COs. In this regard, the D/G SO would take the lead in designing an overall approach to working with the Mission's PVO and NGO partners to implement a an integrated program vis-a-vis COs at the community level. It is suggested that other SOs that depended on achieving their results through COs would *buy-in* to the services provided by the mechanism(s) engaged by the D/G SO to implement its program. This would first require the D/G SO Team being empowered by the Direction Core as the principal agent responsible for achieving results that depend on COs. It would then likely involve other SOs negotiating with the D/G SO Team over the results to be achieved, the interventions to be implemented and the funding that would be provided to achieve the stipulated results.

To operationalize this option an umbrella-like mechanism, managed by an intermediary cooperative agreement (CA) recipient and responsible to the D/G Team is recommended. In addition to purely D/G activities such as civic education, the holding of dialogue fora, and the establishment of information and animation centers, the umbrella intermediary would be responsible for all capacity building interventions, including training in technical or sectoral programmatic areas related to the needs of other SOs. An issue to be resolved would be whether the umbrella intermediary would also manage the programmatic activities of other SOs (e.g., school and health center construction, micro-enterprise funding) or simply handle related training activities. The D/G SOT and corresponding mechanism would operate on a country wide basis. Funding, including the costs of the intermediary umbrella manager, would come from each of the concerned SOs based upon an agreed upon formula. Monitoring, evaluation and reporting (MER) tasks could also be assigned to the umbrella intermediary or retained by the cross-cutting results package team.

While this option is the least desirable of the three it still provides a number of advantages. First, it continues to treats our partners (NGOs) and customers (COs and federations) in a holistic manner acknowledging that they are concerned both with addressing the practical economic and social problems of their members and representing and protecting their interests vis-a-vis government and market interests at the local level and beyond; and doing so effectively and in a democratic manner. Secondly, it should still have the effect of decreasing the number of individual management units, results packages and implementation mechanisms involved in and delivering services to the same target groups. This should ultimately decrease management burden on Mission staff, lower costs through economies of scale, and lessen confusion among customers who might otherwise be confronted by several partners attached to or funded by different SOs. Finally, it offers one way to ensure a minimum degree of synergy among SOs and the integration of SO Team members.

2. International PVOs

Conclusion: US PVOs with whom the Team interviewed are without exception doing an outstanding job in terms of improving the general welfare of Malian communities. This includes those PVOs which work through Malian counterparts, as well as those which work directly with COs and federations. While our strategy previewed a significant role for PVOs in terms of building the capacity of Malian counterparts, there was a far smaller role seen for them in the direct implementation of our strategy vis-a-vis COs and federations at the community level and beyond. What we found was that in a number of the more remote areas in the country, PVOs and other international NGOs were the only non-state development actor delivering services to Malian communities. At the same time, many of these programs were largely decentralized and autonomous operations managed, in many cases, entirely by Malian staff. It should also be acknowledged that not all PVOs have the capacity and/or mandate to strengthen Malian NGOs, particularly in the areas of democratic self-governance and civic action. While the D/G Team still feels strongly that building a cadre of strong Malian NGO intermediaries is a discrete objective of this SO, it is also necessary to acknowledge the direct role being played by *indigenizing* US PVOs in grassroots development. The obvious conclusion is now to find a way to maintain the D/G SO *principle* of strengthening and working through Malian NGOs while accepting operational realities.

Recommendation: While the focus of the D/G SO should still be in implementing its strategy through Malian NGOs and strengthening them where appropriate by US PVOs, it is also necessary to find a means for incorporating those US PVOs with a solid track-record in strengthening CO capacity. The first step should be to develop criteria for the selection of those PVOs which will be funded to implement the D/G strategy. This would include a means to prioritize PVOs in terms of their role in the program. Certainly those PVOs which work with and through NGOs, including capacity building would be the first priority. Those which do not should be encouraged to do so, if they want to receive program funding. An interesting alternative and one which is consistent with D/G SO principle of sustainability, would be for US PVOs that want to participate in the D/G program to develop *an exit strategy* which includes spinning off those geographically defined project offices responsible for implementing their country program in a specific area. The spin-off would ultimately lead to the creation of a new Malian NGO. As many PVOs and other international NGOs have already indigenized and decentralized their programs at the regional level, this strategy just takes the phenomenon to its logical conclusion. It also recognizes the fact that many of the strongest Malian NGOs have their origins in and were created by international NGOs.

Recommendation: Secondly, it also needs to be admitted that **forced** partnerships between US PVOs (or international NGOs) and Malian NGOs have not worked well in the past, particularly in terms of the capacity building role that PVOs were supposed to provide to NGOs. Most PVOs with operational programs view their principal responsibility as ensuring that programmatic objectives are achieved, which leaves NGO capacity building as a lower order priority. NGOs are viewed in this situation as mere implementing agents rather than partners. It is thus recommended that the principal role for NGO capacity building be conferred upon an intermediary implementing mechanism engaged by the D/G team, whose primary role is NGO capacity building.

Recommendation: Because of the significant role that other international NGOs are playing at the community level throughout Mali, the D/G team should, at the very least, consider holding a meeting with them to explain the D/G strategy and solicit their input as to how USAID can work more closely with them at the local level to build sustainable community development. Consideration could as well be given to involving them in training and sensibilization activities organized under the D/G SO, concerning D/G approaches to building CO capacity for democratic self-governance and civic action.

3. Malian NGOs

Conclusion: While the Appraisal Teams were pleasantly surprised to find a significant number of Malian NGOs implementing effective community level programs, it is doubtful that many of them could actually meet USAID registration criteria conferring upon them the right to receive direct funding from USAID. One can also question whether putting them through the the onerous and time-consuming process is necessary to ensure their participation in the D/G SO program. There are probably only a handful of Malian NGOs which might qualify for USAID registration. The vast majority NGOs, many of whom are providing important services to COs, would require significant capacity building to achieve such a status, thus delaying their direct participation in the D/G program. The issue, then, is how to fully integrate Malian NGOs without USAID registration into the D/G program.

Conclusion: Secondly, as discussed under the Findings section, the principal constraint facing the great majority of Malian NGOs is the lack of financial resources to implement their programs. Where funding is available from donors, it is usually provided on a project-by-project basis with little or no funding for capacity building and overall institutional development. This pattern is replicated by international NGOs including US PVOs which fund Malian NGOs, who impose, in many cases, the same requirements on their NGO "partners" that are imposed on them by donors. NGOs require funding to cover the costs of permanent staff, transportation, and other normal operating expenses. It is interesting to note that many of the community organizations interviewed during the appraisal exercise referred to the NGOs working with them as "projects." This rather insightful view, reflects the fact that NGOs undertake a well-defined activity, with a specific budget and time-frame, rather than implementing a more comprehensive program looking at the longer-term needs of their clients and communities.

Recommendation: In order to avoid having to gain USAID registration status, and thus be able to receive USAID funding for their on-going programs while simultaneously improving their institutional capacity, NGOs should be permitted to receive funding from a US PVO intermediary. While this can undertaken by US PVOs with on-going operational programs in Mali, it is preferable that they receive grants from an umbrella PVO intermediary engaged under the D/G SO whose primary purpose is NGO capacity building; and the provision of financial grant (as well as technical assistance and training) to Malian NGOs. It should be noted that the other principal reason for working through an umbrella intermediary is decrease the management burden on USAID staff that many small individual grants would entail.

Recommendation: Secondly, USAID needs to make the same commitment to the long-term funding of Malian NGOs as it is with US PVOs in its newly defined policy. This is the only way to ensure that

NGOs receive the kind of capacity building assistance, including institutional infrastructure (e.g., transport, staff, operating costs) required to build sustainable organizations. With a stable source of funding, NGOs can focus on developing staff capacity and implementing their own programs rather than continually searching for donor funding and implementing their own well-defined programs. This approach will necessitate the careful selection of a relatively modest number of Malian NGOs (20-25) that will be strengthened over the long-term. One eventual outcome might be their future registration with USAID.

4. Malian Federations

Conclusion: Malian federations play two important roles in the D/G strategy. Along with US PVOs and Malian NGOs, they are expected to work with and strengthen COs -- in this case their members -- in democratic self-governance and civic action, as well as delivering concrete development services. And secondly, they are expected to represent and defend member interests vis-a-vis those of the state and market. The teams, in fact, found examples of federations undertaking both functions as well as those undertaking one or the other functions. One of the most disquieting findings that the Teams found was the use of federations by donors to implement the donor program rather than to strengthen member capacity or defend their interests. This has had the impact of strengthening the federation at the expense of its building blocks, and more importantly, divorcing it from the reality and needs of its members. It is, therefore, extremely important that federations are not used -- or created -- to implement D/G interventions before they are ready to do so, and/or before the base units or their members find that there is a true need for a supra CO body to undertake activities on their behalf.

Recommendation: Strict selection criteria need to be established for the financing of Malian federations, particularly where they are expected to undertake CO capacity building and/or deliver development services to them. Assessments of federations should be conducted to determine whether member COs really view them as representative and delivering services which they have identified. Secondly, the closer the federation is to its members (e.g., supra-village, communal or Arrondissement), the more likely it will be representative of member needs and interests. Thus, where interventions are designed to strengthen federations, they should start at the bottom and work up rather than the top and work down.

5. Consortiums and Networks

Conclusion: While not a direct focus of the validation exercise, the Teams did encounter a number of sectoral and regional networks of PVOs and NGOs. In addition, prior to the field exercise, D/G officers visited both CCA-ONG and SECO-ONG, the two principal consortia representing international and Malian NGOs. We found that these organizations not only provided valuable services to their constituent members (e.g., coordination, information and dissemination, training) but often engaged in civic action -- on both macro-political issues and sectoral concerns -- representing member interests vis-a-vis either central or sub-national governments. It was our conclusion that both types of organizations have a potentially important role to play in the implementation of the D/G strategy. They can serve as a means for disseminating information to their members about the D/G program; provide a locus for the training and sensibilization of PVOs and NGOs in democratic governance and civic action; and strengthened through training to better undertake direct civic action vis-a-vis government agencies.

Recommendation: Particular consideration should be given to targeting regional and sectoral networks of PVOs and NGOs, as they are likely to have the greatest immediate impact on the capacity of COs and federations to increase their participation in governance matters and political life. At the same time, both Bamako-based consortia have good knowledge of the NGO community and in the case of CCA-ONG, have regional branches as well. They may also be important to press for the interests of non-state actors over issues which have a country-wide impact on their members and

the larger sector of civil society. They should be invited to any meeting of partners to explain the D/G strategy and solicit input and possible participation in it.

6. The Enabling Environment including Decentralization

Conclusion: While the enabling environment that conditions the ability of COs, federations and NGOs to participate in governance matters and political life has generally been deemed as favorable, there are important areas where it is either constraining or where laws and policies have as yet to be passed. We have already discussed, the case of the legal status of village associations and federations, the most glaring areas where the enabling environment has yet to be clearly defined. There are also a number of important laws and policies which are still in the process of being formulated by the GRM which will have a specific impact on the ability of COs and federations, in particular, to participate in Malian sustainable development. From recent interviews with the agencies responsible for formulating these policies and laws, it is evident that they may not be favorable to our partners and customers. This includes both the body of decentralization laws and the law on associations, cooperatives and mutuelles. Finally, it was extremely evident from our interviews that neither COs, federations or NGOs were knowledgeable about the laws that governed their rights and obligations, including and specifically those related to decentralization. It was also clear, that government officials at all levels were equally ignorant of these laws and/or used the ignorance of COs and federations to deny them of their rights.

Recommendation: The previously designed, illustrative D/G results packages and activities did not reflect -- in terms of resources devoted to it -- the importance of the intermediate results of the enabling environment and decentralization. The validation exercise has shown that this was a mistake. As a result, two actions must be immediately taken. The first is to increase the resources devoted to civic education, including a focus on decentralization. And secondly, that the Mission in general and the D/G SOT in particular, needs to become more involved with concerned GRM agencies in policy dialogue over enabling environment including decentralization laws. Given the fact that the success of the D/G SO is dependent on a favorable Malian enabling environment, this recommendation cannot be emphasized enough. This is likely to require additional analysis and assessment -- a solid base already exists -- of certain areas of law and policy by the team. While no resources were devoted to decentralization activities -- its progress is only to be monitored by the team -- this can be remedied through an expanded civic education program.

B. Validating D/G Indicators

The validation exercise showed that the great majority of indicators developed by the team were relevant to the situation and capabilities of NGOs, federations and COs. The single indicators that requires modification is that of the **audit** requirements of community organizations. This was found to be unrealistic both in the immediate context of rural and urban Mali, and will be an unrealistic expectation over the life the SO plan. What is more realistic is to set an indicator which requires COs and federations to maintain appropriate accounting procedures and documents. This will thus become the new indicator replacing that of audits. While we found only a few Malian NGOs that had actually been audited, this is an objective that we want them to achieve. Thus, the indicator will remain as stated, while realizing that most NGOs do not have the funds to have a complete audit undertaken. For those NGOs which USAID chooses to work with, sufficient funding should be built into their grants to cover the costs of audits.

The second set of indicators that need to be reviewed, while not requiring immediate revision, include those related to *voluntary association, associational autonomy, and consensus versus elections* as a means of leadership selection and decision making among COs and federations. The specific concerns have been detailed in the preceding chapter on findings. The conclusion and corresponding recommendation is that these issues represent very real potential constraints to the achievement of the D/G objective and thus merit further study and analysis.

C. Validating Potential Activities

In general, the initial set of activities elaborated with our results framework was well received. This specifically included capacity building interventions in the areas of management, democratic self-governance and civic action which were seen as a major key to improving the overall capacity of COs and federations as sustainable community development agents. On the other hand, the teams found that some activities given only marginal importance were described by our potential partners and customers as being critical to their increased participation in democratic governance at the local level and beyond. Others which the Teams did not adequately foresee in the initial planning exercise were also pointed out as being important to the future success of our strategy. The following discussion notes the lacunae which were discovered as a result of the validation exercise.

1. Literacy and Numeric

Conclusion: By far, the number one need expressed by those interviewed was the lack of a literate and numeric membership and leadership. Literacy/numeric was viewed as pre-condition to participating in any type of public activity, whether in the provision of services or in the representation of member interests. What was particularly interesting was the way in which respondents viewed literacy as part and parcel of a much larger process of sensibilization, animation and civic action; it subsumed all of these aspects of social mobilization under one rubric. While the initial set of activities briefly discussed the need for literacy, it was mentioned only in passing and no resources were actually devoted to it. Our conclusion is that literacy and numeric must be up-graded as an activity to be undertaken through this SO and integrated into a coherent results package together with civic education and action activities. It is also extremely important to note that the success of other SOs is also critically tied to the need for a literate and numeric population. This includes family planning and AIDS activities as well as all forms of productive economic growth interventions from credit programs to crop and livestock programs which involve community organizations.

Recommendation: The D/G SOT needs to begin developing an integrated results package based on literacy and civic education and action. It must begin discussions with other SOs to solicit their interest in participating in this activity as well as allocating funds from their own budgets to cover the associated costs that will be necessary to operationalize it. It will also need to reach out to other potential partners and implementing agents, including concerned government agencies and NGOs, to determine the *state-of-the art in functional literacy* in Mali. There is no sense in reinventing the wheel when considerable experience has already be gained in this area.

2. Conflict Management and Resolution

Conclusion: It was evident from our interviews that conflicts and tensions between social groups and among resources users has been escalating significantly over the past several years. Tensions between age, gender, geographical units, and ethnic groups among others, and between herders and farmers and various forest resource users all were reported during our interviews. Conflict resolution and management has thus become a significant function of many community organizations. In fact, conflict resolution has always been a function of traditional village authorities, but much of their power in this area was taken over first by colonial administrators and later by administrative agencies of the First and Second Republics. With the advent of the Third Republic and increased political space accorded to local communities and their organizations, this function is again being exercised. The difference today is that not only traditional authorities are undertaking it, but also the more modern self-governing associations that have formed voluntarily to meet the specific needs of members. In some cases, conflicts are beginning to emerge between traditional authorities and community organizations over who has the right to resolve local conflicts and make public decisions. Many of the respondents interviewed specifically noted the need to improve their skills in conflict resolution and even felt that managing tensions before they turned into conflicts was more important.

Recommendation: Conflict resolution was identified as one of several skills areas that would be included in democratic self-governance capacity building. Our interviews simply point to the importance of this issue and the need to ensure that it is adequately highlighted in the development of training programs.

3. Civic Education and Action

Conclusion: The need for civic education on a wide range of issues was clearly identified by respondents as a major need if they were to participate as true partners in democratic governance at the local level and beyond. While the team included this activity in the initial strategic planning exercise, it was clearly seen as of secondary importance and allocated resources accordingly under the **enabling environment** intermediate result. Civic education was identified closely with the larger process of sensibilization which was itself tied closely to the need for literacy and numeric, all of which are linked to the eventual undertaking of civic action in defense of individual and associational rights. Thus a major conclusion arrived at as a result of the validation exercise was to recognize that the link between civic education and civic action are far more interdependent than was previously thought, that is, education leads to awareness which in turn forms the basis for action. It should also be noted that respondents repeatedly stated the importance of meeting with both government administrative leaders and their political representatives to exchange views and promote their interests. While there was a generally held view of the divisive nature of political parties in terms of their attempts to use community organizations for their own partisan purposes, it was also recognized that politics and political parties were a necessary "evil" of a democratic Mali. The issue was how to maintain their autonomy from political parties while using them to advance CO interests.

Recommendation: Consideration should be given to creating an integrated results package which combines functional literacy and numeric, sensibilization and animation, civic education campaigns and training in and financial support of civic action. In addition to the literacy and numeric activities

discussed above, other interventions to be financed under this results package should include funding for:

- **Dialogue Fora:** that bring government and political leaders together with community organizations and federations at different levels of democratic governance, around a range of issues and on a periodic basis as a means for the former to explain their policies and programs and for the latter to assert their interests and to hold their public servants accountable for their actions.
- **Centers for Civic Education and Action:** that serve as centers of information and animation where literacy training takes place, where relevant laws translated into the local language are kept, and serves as a locus for community mobilization and civic action. It is proposed that concerned communities would engage animators and functional literacy teachers that would work out of these centers.
- **Micro-Grant Civic Action Fund:** which finances the costs of COs and federations to engage in civic action at the local level and beyond. The Micro-Grant fund would fund such activities as: transportation and lodging costs of CO and federation representatives to participate in meetings, to lobby government leaders, etc.; for COs, federations, networks and consortia to organize and hold fora bringing together other civil society actors, government and political leaders around specific topics and issues; or to pay for air time on rural radios to disseminate messages to their members and the general public on issues of common concern.

ANNEX 1: INTERVIEW GUIDELINES

**USAID/MALI D/G STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE
VALIDATING THE RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND INDICATORS
SYNTHESIS REPORT**

April 16, 1996

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**USAID/MALI D/G STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE TEAM:
VALIDATING THE RESULTS FRAMEWORK & INDICATORS/TARGETS
Rapid Appraisal Exercise**

Purpose and Methodology:

This validation exercise has two principle objectives and a secondary one as well. The initial impetus for undertaking this exercise was to “ground truth” the indicators, their corresponding targets, and the assumptions which underlie them that were finalized with the MER team in early March. By “testing” them out with potential partners and customers, we will either feel more comfortable with the performance targets that were designed to measure our attainment of results; or take steps to bring them more in line with the “reality” that the field perspective brings us.

Since we will have the opportunity to spend significant time in the field, it also makes sense for the D/G SOT to validate the “logic” of its results framework with those actors who will be most affected by it. We have laid out a framework of cause and effect based on a number of assumptions, some of which may or may not reflect the views of ordinary Malians and the organizations which they create to address their common problems and advance shared interests. Thus, the second purpose of this exercise will be to validate the logic upon which rests our strategic objective, and which the D/G SOT has committed itself to achieve.

Finally, while we have begun the initial process of identifying results packages and the specific activities which will be carried out to achieve intermediate results, we have not yet discussed them with our implementing partners nor our ultimate customers. This field exercise gives us the opportunity to do just that. This is, however, considered a secondary activity to the previous two noted above.

To accomplish this exercise we shall utilize a **rapid appraisal** methodology targeting potential customers, that is, community organizations and the citizen-members which compose them; and to some extent, the implementing partners, i.e., intermediary NGOs and federations, that will work with and represent them. While the attached handouts describe rapid appraisal methods in more detail, suffice it to note here that it is “a form of qualitative – not quantitative – research used for preliminary design and implementation of applied activities.” The ultimate goal of rapid appraisal methodology is to **grasp an INSIDER’s perspective** on a particular system -- in this case the Malian political system; rather than to **analyze** at the system from an **OUTSIDER’s** viewpoint. Thus our intention in the upcoming validation exercise is to discover from our potential customers: (i) whether USAID’s intended D/G initiative is important to them; (ii) whether they have ideas about its practicality or feasibility; and (iii) if they have any suggestions as to how each of the intermediate results might be operationalized and implemented.

The attached questionnaire is divided into three parts reflecting the three objectives that we have set for this exercise. Part 1, focusses on the logic of our D/G SO results framework. Part 2, tries to get at the appropriateness of our indicators and the feasibility of the targets that will measure intermediate results’ achievement. Part 3, looks briefly at customer views on the initial set of activities that we have set forth in our planning documents.

This questionnaire is directed solely to the our customers, community organizations. It is intended that we will interview leaders and/or members of community organizations in a (focus) group setting, preferably with not more than 8-10 individuals. In each of the three (and perhaps four) regions selected for this exercise -- Mopti/Douentza (Team 3); Segou/Sikasso (Team 2); Bamako/Koulikouro (Team 1); and perhaps Timboctou (Team 4) – one team will attempt to interview at least four community organizations in at least two different arrondissements. Arrondissements, and to some extent community organizations -- will be chosen based on a combination of discussions with U.S. PVOs, and Regional and/or Cercle officials knowledgeable about a

given area. Community organizations will be chosen based on discussions with Cercle officials, Malian NGOs and Chefs d'Arrondissements.

Finally, we will also attempt to gain information about Malian NGOs and federations present and working in the regions. This information will be gathered through interviews with: CCA-ONG and concerned U.S. PVO; Regional and Cercle officials; community organizations; and with NGOs that we come across working in targeted arrondissements. A separate set of questions and guidelines is attached.

Interview Guidelines:

First explain the purpose of your visit. You can say that you are from USAID, the development cooperation arm of the United States Government. Within USAID/Mali you work in the Office responsible for Democracy and Governance programs. That USAID is proposing to assist the people and government of Mali to improve the functioning of democracy (and governance) in the country. That we have two principal objectives for our visit to their community organization. The first is to share our strategy of assistance with the members of the CO and to gain their feedback on whether they believe the strategy is practical and can have a real impact. And secondly, that we are seeking to better understand the nature and operations of their CO as well as the problems that it faces in trying to achieve its objectives. That we have two other teams administering this survey and asking similar questions of community organizations in other parts of the country. That from all these responses we will be better able to ensure that the program we implement will have a significant impact on the political, economic and social welfare of all Malians. Assure them that their responses will be confidential. We are not asking for the names of individual CO members; just the CO itself, therefore they can be completely frank with you. You should finish the introduction by telling them you appreciate the trouble or time they are giving you.

Suggested Interview Opening

"Good day. My name is (interviewer say your name) and this is my colleagues (name of other team member). We come from USAID (provide a brief explanation of USAID). USAID is in the process of talking with many people in community organizations all over the country about what they think about democracy and what they think should be improved so that life can become better for them. We are in the process of refining our program strategy and would like to share it with you in order to get your feedback on its usefulness and whether it makes good sense or not. We would also like to ask you a number of questions about your community organization so that we can better understand how it functions and the problems it faces in trying to achieve its objectives."

**USAID/MALI D/G STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE TEAM:
VALIDATING THE RESULTS FRAMEWORK & INDICATORS/TARGETS
Rapid Appraisal Questionnaire**

Part I: Validating the D/G SO Results Framework

First the interview team makes a brief presentation of the D/G Results Framework:

Suggested Presentation Format

The Democracy and Governance Problem Addressed:

After many decades of authoritarian rule (e.g., an absence of basic freedoms of speech, association and rule by men, not by law) in Mali, democratic values (e.g., tolerance, participation, trust) and good governance practice (e.g., accountability, transparency, responsiveness) -- at the national level among state institutions, and even at the primary level of society among local associations -- had almost disappeared. There was no role for individual Malian citizens in the construction and development of their country; in truth, it was hard even to consider most Malians as citizens as they had no political rights. The **problem** that USAID has identified, and wants to support the government and citizens of Mali to address, is how to increase the **voice and choice** of ordinary Malians in the process of sustainable development, including decision-making around issues that affect them and the selection of leaders who are politically accountable to them. In short, USAID wants to help empower Malians as citizens by building democracy from the bottom-up.

S.O. Overall Program Purpose/Goal (Strategic Objective):

The overall purpose of our assistance program is to increase the capacity of community organizations like yours to become equal and effective partners along-side government in: 1) making (public) decisions on issues that are of great importance to CO members, their families, their communities, and even the country itself; and 2) in carrying out public decisions and policies, including the delivery of social services; the management of local natural resources; the management and resolution of local disputes and conflicts; and the promotion of economic welfare. USAID believes that citizenship, democratic values and good governance practices are best learned in the organizations that people create themselves to address common problems and advance shared interests. Community organizations and the federations which they sometimes create, we feel, offer the best means for achieving these objectives while holding governments accountable to citizens at the local level and beyond.

Principal Objectives (Intermediate Results) to Achieve this Purpose (SO):

In order to achieve this purpose/goal we have identified two principal objectives which we will directly support; and one which we shall monitor closely over the six year life of our program. Permit me to explain:

IR 1. Community Organizations Manage Their Affairs Effectively and Democratically, and Engage Government at the Local and National Levels over Important Public Issues:

In order to be effective partners we believe that community organizations must be able to govern their affairs democratically, manage their organizations effectively, and be capable of participating directly with traditional authorities and local governments in decision-making, including formulating their own development priorities and needs; analyzing programs and policies formulated by local governments; and actively lobbying traditional authorities, government, party members, NA deputies etc., to achieve their objectives. We also believe it is the right of community organizations, acting on behalf of their members to ensure that government does not abuse its powers or violate the rights of citizens; and to monitor the use of public resources (e.g., funds, materials, natural resources) in order to ensure that they are allocated for the purposes intended and managed

properly. (Optional) We call the effective and democratic management of a COs affairs: **democratic self-governance**; and engaging government (traditional, local or national) over public issues: **civic action**.)

1.1 NGOs/Federations Support COs to Become Effective, Democratic and Capable of Engaging Traditional and Communal Governments as Equal Partners:

To assist community organizations to achieve this capacity vis-a-vis traditional authorities and local governments, we have proposed that Malian NGOs or Federations (of community organizations) that are present in a particular (Cercle, Arrondissement) commune work with a number of COs in the same area to improve their skills in management and civic action as well as to promote their practice of internal democratic (self)governance. In this regard, we also intend to provide a certain degree of support to improve the capacity of these NGOs/federations to effectively work with community organizations.

1.2 NGOs and Federations Effectively Extend the Voice and Interests of Community Organizations to Higher Levels of State Governance:

Because USAID believes that democracies function best when community organizations and their citizen-members are involved in national matters and participate in public decision-making beyond the local and communal levels, we have proposed that Malian NGOs and particularly federations of community organizations (e.g., APEs, AVs, primary cooperatives, CSCOMs) be strengthened to aggregate and/or represent the interest and concerns of COs to higher levels of state governance (e.g., Cercle, Regional and National levels).

IR 3 The Laws, Policies and Regulations of Mali Empower Community Organizations, Intermediary NGOs and Federations:

The ability of community organizations to fully participate in political, social and economic life, including public decision-making as well as implementing public decisions, depends on a favorable legal, regulatory and fiscal environment. While the Malian constitution lays out the fundamental rights and obligations of both citizens and governments, the laws passed by the national assembly, the decrees enacted by the executive, the policies formulated by government ministries and the decisions rendered by the courts are also important in providing this enabling environment. Thus, USAID will work with community organizations and their partner NGOs and federations to: 1) identify constraints in the enabling environment which inhibit the ability of community organizations to participate in public decision-making and the implementation of public decisions; and 2) to support civic education campaigns which explain the rights and obligations of citizens in political, social and economic life.

IR 2 Effective Decentralization will Occur in Mali by the End of 1999:

In order for the strategy and assistance program discussed above to work, USAID is assuming that the Government of Mali will implement its decentralization program by the end of 1999. This includes the holding of local elections and the installation of freely elected local governments at the communal level (and Cercle and Regional levels). To be truly effective, decentralization must be accompanied by the devolution of decision-making authority as well as public resources to the communal level of government. In USAID's conception of decentralization, not only will communal governments be empowered to undertake a range of governance functions previously undertaken by central government, but that communal government will as well define certain areas of **self-governance** which will be devolved to community organizations to undertake. It is this sense of **shared governance** (between central and local governments; and local governments and community organizations) undertaken democratically, that we believe will lead to community organizations becoming effective partners in democratic governance at the local level and beyond.

Questionnaire Number _____

Survey Team Number _____

**USAID/MALI D/G STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE TEAM:
VALIDATING THE RESULTS FRAMEWORK & INDICATORS/TARGETS
Rapid Appraisal Questionnaire: Community Organization/Federation**

Date _____	Name of Team Member 1 Interviewer) _____	Name of Team Member 2 _____
Arrondissement _____	Cercle _____	Regions _____
Name of Village/Quarter _____	Name of Community Organization/Federation _____	
Number of Members Present at Interview _____	Males _____	Females _____

Part I: Validation of SO Results Framework

1. In general, what do you think of our program strategy? Is it a good idea? Why or why not?

2. Do you think it is possible or not possible to achieve the objectives describe above?
Yes _____ No _____ Please explain.

3. Do you think COs are capable of playing the role we portrayed above, i.e., undertaking civic action, practicing democratic self-governance? Yes _____ No _____ Please explain.

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4. Do you believe that NGOs (and federations, if they exist) are or could become good providers of technical assistance and training to build the capacity of (your) community organizations? Yes _____ No _____ Please explain.

5. Do you believe that NGOs and federations (at the commune level and beyond) can adequately represent the interests of your community organization? Yes _____ No _____ Please explain. Are there perhaps other actors (e.g., politicians/political parties) that could do it better?

6. Do you believe that there are laws, regulations or policies that constrain the ability of COs like yours to function well and achieve their objectives? Yes _____ No _____ Please explain.

7. What are the major problems facing your CO that prevent it from achieving the purpose & objectives that it set for itself? Facing your community?

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Questionnaire Number _____

Survey Team Number _____

**USAID/MALI D/G STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE TEAM:
VALIDATING THE RESULTS FRAMEWORK & INDICATORS/TARGETS
Rapid Appraisal Questionnaire: Community Organization/Federation**

Part II: Validating D/G Indicators, Targets and Underlying Assumptions

We now want to ask you a few questions about your community organization and those specific organizations with whom it interacts.

1. What is the nature/type of your CO (e.g., APE, AV, CSCOM, cooperative, other)? Are there other COs of your type in the Arrondissement or neighboring arrondissements? How many community organizations do you estimate altogether in your Arrondissement? Please explain.

2. Is membership in your CO voluntary, obligatory or other? Explain, if necessary.

3. What is the size of membership? _____ Men _____ Women _____

4. Are members of your CO required to pay a membership fee? Yes _____ No _____ If yes, how much? _____ Does this follow your constitution/by-laws? Yes _____ No _____

5. Are you officially registered with the GRM? Yes _____ No _____ If yes, with which GRM agency? Do you see any advantage(s)/disadvantages to be registered or not? Please explain.

6. Does your CO have a constitution/by-laws? Yes _____ No _____ If yes, do you follow them?

7. How was your leadership chosen (elections, appointed by consensus, other)? Please explain?

8. Does your CO practice alternance in the selection of your leadership? Yes _____ No _____
If yes, how often? Is it provided for in your constitution/by-laws? Please explain.

9. How many or what percentage of your board of directors (leadership) is/are women?

10. How often does your CO meet: Board of directors? General Membership? Other meetings? Does this conform to your constitution/by-laws? Yes _____ No _____ What percentage of the membership participates in Board meetings? General meetings?

11. How are decisions made in your CO (e.g., by board, at AGM, consensus)? To what extent to women participate in decision-making? Please explain?

12. Has your CO undergone an external audit within the past 12 months? Yes _____ No _____
Does your CO maintain accounts books or records? Yes _____ No _____ Comments?

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13. Does your CO do strategic planning (results frameworks/packages)? Yes _____ No _____
Does your CO do any type of planning (e.g., setting objectives, time frames, implementation or action plans) Yes _____ No _____ Further comments?

14. What percentage of your board members are literate and numeric? General membership?

15. Has your CO participated in any of the following (civic action) in the past year: (I) making any decisions affecting member welfare; (ii) undertaking advocacy on behalf of member interests; (iii) intervened to protect member rights: in your village/neighborhood vis-a-vis the local traditional authority? Yes _____ No _____ If yes, were these actions effective in your opinion?

16. Has your CO participated in any of the following (civic action) in the past year: (I) making any decisions affecting member welfare; (ii) undertaking advocacy on behalf of member interests; (iii) intervened to protect member rights: at the Arrondissement (commune) level vis-a-vis the local government (e.g., line ministries, administration)? Yes _____ No _____ If yes, in your opinion were these actions effective? Please explain.

17. Has your CO participated in any of the following (civic action) in the past year: (I) making any decisions affecting member welfare; (ii) undertaking advocacy on behalf of member interests; (iii) intervened to protect member rights: beyond the Arrondissement (commune) level vis-a-vis the local government (e.g., ministries, administration)? Yes _____ No _____ If yes, in your opinion were these actions effective? Please explain.

18. Has your CO been a partner in the delivery of any public service (e.g., health, education, other) with the support (e.g., financial, material, technical) of local traditional authorities? Yes _____ No _____ With Arrondissement (commune) government? Yes _____ No _____

19. What percent of your CO's overall resources (e.g., financial, material, human) come from: Members? _____ %; NGOs _____ %; GRM _____ %; Foreign Donors _____ % Other _____ %

20. Are you a member of any formal (legally registered) federation (of similar COs) at the commune (Arrondissement) level? Yes _____ No _____ Beyond? Yes _____ No _____ explain.

21. Do you know of any type of federations operating in this Arrondissement? Yes _____ No _____

22. Do you see any value in belonging to a federation of like-type COs? Yes ___ No ___ Please explain.

23. Have you joined COs with the same purpose on an informal basis (alliances) to advocate for or protect the interests of your members? Yes ___ No ___ With any type of CO? Yes ___ No ___ Please explain

24. Do you know of any Malian NGOs working in this Arrondissement? Yes ___ No ___ Any international NGOs? Yes ___ No ___ Comments?

25. Has your CO received any assistance from either a Malian or international NGO? Yes ___ No ___ If yes, did you find the assistance useful? Please explain.

26. Do you know of any Malian NGO or federations that have represented or protected the interests of a CO(s) vis-a-vis government at the: Arrondissement? Yes ___ No ___; Cercle? Yes ___ No ___; Regional? Yes ___ No ___; Central? Yes ___ No ___

27. Do you believe NGOs and Federations (of COs) offer community organizations an effective means to extend their voice, advocate for or defend their interests? Yes _____ No _____

Additional Space for Notes: Part II

Questionnaire Number _____

Survey Team Number _____

**USAID/MALI D/G STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE TEAM:
VALIDATING THE RESULTS FRAMEWORK & INDICATORS/TARGETS
Rapid Appraisal Questionnaire: Community Organization/Federation**

Part III: Validating D/G Proposed Results Packages and Activities

1. What are the principle constraints inhibiting your CO from operating more effectively?

2. Do you believe that your CO is run effectively? Yes ___ No ___ If no, what specific types of training and technical assistance could increase management effectiveness?

3. Do you believe your CO is run democratically? If not, how could it be improved in this regard?

4. Is a lack of literacy and numeracy a problem for CO leadership? Yes ___ NO ___ For the membership in general? Yes ___ No ___

5. Do you believe that your CO has a right to participate in village/quarter decisions-making? Yes _____ No _____ In Communal decision-making? Yes _____ No _____? If yes, are there any particular skills or understandings that your CO needs to become better able to participate?

6. Do you feel as if you understand the nature and operations of Malian democracy? Yes _____ No _____ If no, what are there specific areas where you would like to see your knowledge improved?

7. Do you feel as if there are certain rights (economic, social and human) protected by law of which you are unaware and would improve your quality of life? Yes _____ No _____ If yes, what are there specific areas where you would like to see your knowledge improved?

8. Do you believe literacy/numeracy is a priority for your community? Yes _____ No _____ Would you be willing to support some of the costs of such a program? Yes _____ No _____ What costs would you be willing to support (e.g., contributions to a building, teachers, other)?

9. Do you believe civic education is a priority for your community? Yes _____ No _____ Would you be willing to support some of the costs of such a program? Yes _____ No _____ What costs would you be willing to support?

10. Do you find that there are disputes or conflicts within your village/quarter that could be managed/resolved locally if there were either greater conflict resolution skills or mechanisms among community members? Yes _____ No _____ Between villages/quarters? Yes _____ No _____ Between different social groups (e.g., men/women, youth/elders) Yes _____ No _____ Between resource users (e.g., farmers, herders, forest and water users)? Yes _____ No _____

11. Do you believe its important to be in contact with your National Assembly Deputy? Yes _____ No _____ Arrondissement Officials? Yes _____ No _____ Cercle/Regional Officials? Yes _____ No _____

12. Do you believe that more contact between community organizations of the same type would be useful to press for the interests of their members? Yes _____ No _____ Between different types of community organizations? Yes _____ No _____

13. Do you believe that federations of COs should be supported? Yes _____ No _____ If yes, what type of assistance would be useful?

ANNEX 2: INDIVIDUAL TEAM REPORTS

**USAID/MALI D/G STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE
VALIDATING THE RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND INDICATORS
A SYNTHESIS REPORT**

April 16, 1996

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Date: March 28, 1996

From: Teams 3 and 4: Sekou Sidibe, David Atteberry, Leslie Fox

To: Distribution: D/G SO Team

Subject: Trip Report: Timboctou and Mopti Regions

I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

This synthesis report covers the field trips of Teams 3 and 4 to the Mopti and Timboctou Regions (5th & 6th Regions). The visits took place between March 14-16 and March 17-23, 1996 respectively. As with the other two teams, the purpose of Team 3 and 4's visit was to validate both the D/G Results Framework and corresponding indicators developed during the visits of the Thunder D/G Support (November 1995 and January 1996) and the MSI MER (February/March 1996) team's earlier in the year. In addition, the field trips were also designed to provide information relative to the illustrative results package activities tentatively proposed by Thunder in its final report to the Mission in January 1996.

A total of 12 interviews were conducted in Timboctou and 11 in Mopti. In Timboctou the Team interviewed: 2 international NGO (CARE and Norwegian Church Aid); 4 Malian NGOs (Voldet, Espace Verte, GAFACO, Mouvement des Femmes pour le Sauvegarde de l'Unite et de la Paix); 1 APE Central Federation (Timboctou Cercle) and 1 APE primary federation (Bourem Arrondissement); 7 women's associations (1 interview with one CO and 1 interview with 6 COs); and one farmers cooperative. In addition, the Team met with members of the "Equip Mobile" (Commissariat du Nord) and the coordinatrice of "Promotion des Femmes" (Prime Ministers Office).

In Mopti, the Team met with 2 international NGOs (CARE and NEF); 2 Malian NGOs (OGES and GAE/Walia); 1 APE central Federation (Djenne Cercle); 1 women's association (Demenso); 2 village associations (Ogokana, Kamaka); 2 associations of AVs (essentially federations) Molibemu and Walde Kalka); and 1 cercle level cooperative (Pêcheurs de Mopti). In addition, the Team paid a courtesy call on the Mayor of Mopti (who was helpful in providing us with contacts) and met with the Director of the Mopti Cercle Centre d'Action Cooperative (CAC Ministry of Rural Development and the Environment).

The following report provides principal findings, conclusions and lessons learned, and recommendations related to each of these survey purposes.

II. SURVEY FINDINGS

While there are certainly significant differences (e.g., cultural, social, economic) between Timboctou and Mopti Regions, the following provides a consolidated synthesis of survey findings. Where it is felt that distinctions between responses made from respondents in the two regions are necessary, they will be noted specifically in the following narrative.

A. Validating the Results Framework

In this section we discuss the logic of the results framework including each of the intermediate objectives from tertiary to primary levels, and ultimately the strategic objective (SO) itself. This will include discussions of the capacity of community organizations (COs) and Malian and international NGOs to undertake the tasks foreseen in the results framework.

1. International NGOs

- * In addition to CARE and NEF, the Team either met with or heard of other international NGOs with programs assisting community organizations in these two regions, including the following: AFVP (French volunteers), CECI (Canadian volunteers), Oxfam UK, International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), ACCORD, SOS Sahel and SOS Netherlands, SNV (Dutch Volunteers), DED (German NGO) etc.
- * A number of these NGOs act purely in a donor capacity (e.g., SOS, ACCORD, Oxfam) while others have their own operational programs (e.g., CARE, DED, CECI, NEF). Among the "operational" NGOs, some work with and through Malian NGOs (e.g., NEF, CECI), while others directly implement their community-based programs with no Malian NGO partnership (e.g., CARE, DED). Donor NGOs primarily fund Malian NGOs as a means of reaching the community level.
- In a number of areas (e.g., Timboctou, Koro Cercles) international NGOs (e.g., CARE, AFVP) were the only non-state development actor working at the grassroots level. In these cases, and in a number of international NGOs working elsewhere, their staffs were entirely Malian.
- It was not actually possible to determine the degree to which those international operational NGOs working with Malian NGOs actually contributed to their strengthening. It can be said, however, that many of these operational NGOs were heavily involved in either building capacity for effective CO running or internal democratic self-governance. NEF was particularly spectacular in this regard.
- A number of these international NGOs were instrumental in supporting their Malian counterparts to become registered and, in several cases, undertook what can be considered true civic action on behalf of COs they were working with (e.g., CARE, NEF); again NEF deserves special mention.
- Each of these NGOs had a specific area of programmatic intervention which served as the entry point for their capacity building activities vis-a-vis COs, (e.g., natural resources management, credit and micro-entreprise, primary health care).
- Each of the international NGOs that we had the opportunity to talk with in detail (e.g., NEF and CARE) felt that our strategy was both appropriate and achievable. In fact, it can be said

that NEF is probably the closest to implementing a program which is consistent with our own and, in a number of areas, has probably surpassed our own in terms of both conception and concrete activities. Principal conditions that would be required for successful achievement included significant capacity building interventions for both NGOs and COs..

- Concerning the specific role of international NGOs in our strategy, i.e., as being a primary means for strengthening Malian NGOs, it is one they were either carrying out already (NEF), or one they could consider (CARE).
- Concerning decentralization, these NGOs felt that decentralization was likely to take place by 1999, and that in the case of NEF, its program had been geared towards increasing CO capacity to meet the new opportunities that would come about with the implementation of the decentralization program.

2. Malian NGOs

- The Teams were pleasantly surprised to find, in each region, a number of Malian NGOs which were actually implementing effective development programs in conjunction with COs (e.g, Voldet in Timboctou, and OGES and Walia in Mopti). In fact, they were instrumental in arranging meeting for us with COs in both regions.
- As with their international counterparts, Malian NGOs point of entry into communities and their work in strengthening CO capacity was based on addressing specific development needs of their CO clients (e.g., increasing incomes, irrigated and portable water, improved health care). Sensibilization and training were thus built around their specific development interventions.
- In terms of representing the interests of COs, in most areas Malian NGOs were the only true organizations (along with their international counterparts) which attempted to extend the voice and protect the interests of their CO clients vis-a-vis government agencies and commercial or business interests.
- Likewise, Malian NGOs saw their primary responsibility as the strengthening the capacity of their CO clients. As will be discussed in the following section on validating indicators, they were far more limited in accomplishing this task than their international counterparts due to a lack of training and the institutional infrastructure (e.g., transportation, equipment, etc.) needed to complement their "bon volonté." Yet, their efforts were impressive, nonetheless given what limited resources were available. There are sure to be a significant number of other Malian NGOs that we did not meet with similar capacities given the relatively short duration of our visits.
- Malian NGOs were virtually universal in their agreement with our approach and strategy and its likelihood for success. They believe that they are capable of improving their capacity to undertake the strengthening of COs in both democratic self-governance and civic action. They

also felt that they had an important role to play, have, in fact, been playing such a role in defending the rights of the COs with whom they work. This includes advocacy and promoting and protecting CO interests at the local level (at the supra-village to arrondissement levels) and beyond. An interesting example was given by one NGO in which a local chief tried to claim all the best land on an irrigated rice perimeter, but where other AV members, with the NGOs assistance denied this claim and land was allocated equally to all members.

The key to their being able to undertake the role foreseen for them in the strategy was in the capacity building interventions noted and explained in our strategy. They also noted that the greatest problem facing community organizations and their capacity to participate was illiteracy. One of the biggest problems seen by both international and Malian NGOs was the growing number of conflicts both within and between COs, primarily over resource use.

- In general the NGOs felt that effective decentralization was possible by 1999 and that it would greatly improve CO participation in local planning and decision-making. One NGO, however, felt that there was a real danger in local communes being captured by political parties and other local elites with no interest in the problems of community organizations. At the same time, they did not think that decentralization had been adequately explained to COs and their members (women particularly ignorant of the new laws) and that the decoupage was still incomplete and a cause for future problems.
- Concerning laws that inhibit the ability of COs and federations to participate as partners in democratic governance, NGOs noted that there was no law that covered village associations, thus requiring them to either assist them in registering under ordinance 59 which requires a difficult set of conditions to be met; also, there does not exist a specific law for registering federations.

3. Federations

- Surprisingly or not, the Teams discovered and interviewed, or heard about, a range of federations operating in both regions. These included APEs at the arrondissement, cercle and regional levels; a federation of women's associations (Mopti); farmers cooperatives at the supra-village, arrondissement, and cercle levels (Timboctou and Mopti) and the Cooperatif de Pecheurs (Mopti Cercle); and natural resource management associations at the supra-village and arrondissement levels (Mopti).
- As many of these federations were registered as non-registered; and except for a few (Timboctou farmers cooperative and Mopti Fisherman's Cooperative), none were actually registered as federations, but rather as associations of groupements (Molibemu) or AVs (Welde Kelka). This issue is discussed in more detail in section B, indicators, below.
- While not all were effectively undertaking civic action on behalf of their member associations, several of them (Welde Kelka and Molibemu) had been extremely successful in advancing their interests vis-a-vis the administration (cercle and arrondissement) and a number of

government services (e.g., Eaux et Forêt). As discussed in greater detail below, however, there are some potentially serious problems with a number of these federations which the D/G SO Team (and other Mission SO Teams) will be well advised to review and incorporate into the various results packages and activities yet to be designed.

- In general, the federations interviewed felt that our strategy and approach were quite appropriate and that the role defined for them in both building member capacity and representing their interests was well taken. One federation (Molibemu) felt, however, that it was only federations which should undertake the civic action-cum-advocacy and representation role, and not NGOs. All federations, as did all NGOs, felt that for the strategy to succeed, they must receive the training discussed in our strategy documents.
- The federations interviewed believed that effective decentralization would be implemented by 1999 and would increase their ability to engage local government about issues which concerned them and their members. There is concern by one federation that the decoupage into communes is going to perhaps transfer some their member AVs from the same arrondissement or cercle in to a new commune or cercle, with uncertain results. One of the federations (Molibemu) has been intimately involved in sensibilizing communities about the decentralization laws, and has run into problems with both the administration and political parties over this role.
- Some federations found existing laws to be constraining. While cooperatives are able to federate under Ordinance 88/62, it is much more difficult for AVs and groupements to do the same as there are no corresponding laws providing for their right to federate. The biggest problem, however, lies with the APEs, in that their legal status including the structure from the lowest unit to the national level organization was mandated by law passed under the Second Republic. Thus, individual APEs, whether at the individual school level (comite de gestion), arrondissement (primary federations) and Cercle (centrale federation), etc., do not have their own individual registration certificates. APEs also no longer have their own source of revenue, as the previous "Taxe Scholaire" which directly funded individual school running was replaced by the Taxe de Developpement Rurale and Locale (TDRL) which is now managed by the Comite Locale de Developpement (CLD) which is headed by the Commandante de Cercle.

Also, for most rural organizations there is the additional problem of their relationship to and membership in the Chambre d'Agriculture, a federated structure created and governed by a law mandated under the Second Republic. Any rural organization -- from farmers and artisanal cooperatives to AVs and groupements -- are automatically a member of the Chambre, whose role and capacity as a representative body is unsure and less than legitimate.

4. Community Organizations

- If there was any doubt concerning the explosion of associational life at the community level, these two trips ably dispelled it. Both the density (numbers) and diversity of COs at the

grassroots level has increased significantly since the events of March 1991 in Timboctou as well as Mopti; the biggest surprise in terms of CO growth was in Timboctou where it was anticipated that the rebellion would have severely disrupted community life, including the growth and functioning of COs.

CARE/Djenne, for instance, recently conducted an inventory of COs in the Djenne Cercle which showed 104 COs, not counting traditional associations. In the arrondissement of Bourem (Timboctou) there was one cooperative of some 300 members, numerous AVs working on rice perimeters, associations of fisherman, livestock herders, and commercants, numerous women's associations, and even a charcoal making associations, among others. According to CAC Cercle figures, there were a total of 62 village associations, 64 cooperatives, 9 village Tons and 1 coordination des cooperatives (Road Transport) registered with this government agency. Finally, Promotion des Femmes (attached to the Primature) in Timboctou Cercle noted 63 womens associations registered with perhaps double or triple that number which were as yet registered.

- COs are engaged in a wide range of public governance activities in both regions including: natural resource management (e.g., Welde Kelka, Molibemu, Ogokana); provision of social services (e.g., APEs in education, women's associations in literacy training); promoting economic growth in Mopti and Timboctou (e.g., AVs, women's associations, cooperations); and in conflict resolution (particularly the Ogokana).
- COs were virtually unanimous in their praise for our strategy and felt that with sufficient time it could be achieved. A common response was that development takes place at the grassroots level and COs are at the principal actors at this level; therefore they should be supported. In order for them to become partners with local governments however, they would require training and local governments would need to be open to their participation, especially if they were to undertake civic action.
- Specifically, COs felt they were capable of undertaking their activities in a democratic manner with additional training, and many of them felt they were already doing so. Concerning civic action, COs were virtually unanimous in their belief that NGOs, both international and Malian, and federations were best placed to represent their views vis-a-vis government agencies. A number of them (e.g., the Ogokana) stated that they were already able to deal with government agencies (Eaux et Foret) and have their concerns dealt with seriously.

Two COs specifically noted that while NGOs were best placed to strengthen them and represent their interests, not all NGOs should automatically be thought of as capable or willing to undertake these functions. They also need to be held accountable by donors for their use of funding destined for COs; and that in the statutes of NGOs it should be specifically stated that they would be run in a democratic manner with transparency in decision making and use of funding. In short, our strategy depended on choosing the right NGOs.

There was, however, no question that NGOs, whether local or international, were the best means of strengthening COs and thus achieving our strategy. Both government agencies and political parties were seen as either illegitimate or incapable of representing CO interests. Government agencies at the local level, in particular, were seen to suffer from a "crisis" in their credibility vis-a-vis local communities. All COs praised the NGOs which worked with them. A common refrain was "grace a notre NGO ..." In several cases, COs said that their NGO was responsible for giving them hope again and bringing back their youth that had left on the "exodus."

- While many COs were initially unable to identify any laws which constrained their ability to participate as partners at the local level, upon further probing a number of legal constraints were identified. One women's association for instance noted that they were unable to secure loans because they had no legal standing and thus could not provide a guarantee for their loans; only their husbands or mens associations could. Most of the COs interviewed stated that registration was worthwhile as it provided them with an ability to officially deal with government agencies; to be able to negotiate binding agreements; and, to be invited to seminars, conferences or workshops hosted by government or donors. In short, to be taken seriously.

While the Welde Kelka is officially registered, and has signed a convention with the Eaux et Foret, the latter does not believe it has the right to sanction member associations or individuals for infringements in forest use. This decreases its legitimacy and hence effectiveness. As discussed in more detail below, only the Molibemu was having difficulties in gaining official registration status. This could be because it was requesting registration as a federation of AVs, rather than as an association of AVs. The delay they have experienced in gaining recognition could be due to the fact that there is as yet no law covering the registration of federations of AVs; or equally likely, the administration was delaying its registration because of the power it saw in this organization.

- The issue of whether decentralization would be implemented by 1999, elicited mixed responses from our respondent COs. A number of COs commented on the problems associated with the decoupage which has not yet been fully completed in most Cercles. And one CO noted that local elections were slated for 1995 and have been delayed time and again, so one can question whether effective decentralization will actually take place by 1999. And to one degree or another, most COs were worried about the impact that political party campaigning would have on the harmony in their villages given previous experience, and the preparations which are now being taken in preparation for local elections, whenever they may take place.

In general, however, all COs saw decentralization as a means for increasing their participation in local government matters, although it can also be said that most COs felt there had not been enough sensibilization about how decentralization will work, and whether funds will actually be devolved to the local level.

B. Validating Indicators

In this section, only those findings which call into question or raise additional issues related to a given indicator will be discussed.

1. Voluntary Association

Fundamental to any conception of civil society is that people come together voluntarily to address a common problem or advance a collective interest. The issue of whether individual citizens voluntarily join associations has been one which has been raised in previous documents (see Fox, "A Conceptual Framework for Assessing Local Civil Society" and ARD, "Economic Policy Making in the Sahel: The Case of Mali,") which have been used by the D/G SOT in the formulation of its results framework. The principal concern in this regard, revolves around the case of village associations (AVs) and whether they are actually voluntarily formed and, if so, the nature and structure of their internal self-governance. Because AVs are formed around a "residential" unit, i.e., the village, where everyone is expected to belong by virtue of their living in this unit (obligation morale), it can in principal as well as fact be questioned whether they are voluntarily formed. The following are findings in this regard.

- It appears that, except in the case of village associations, individuals had the right to join or not join newly created community organizations (e.g., CSCOM, APE, women's associations, savings and credit associations); or at the very least not to participate in them without fear of sanction. The problem with village associations, it appears, is that their function and responsibilities overlap with that of the traditional village authority, i.e., the chief and his counsel, in terms of acting as an overall multi-purpose development body improving village economic and social welfare. At the same time, membership in AVs are either a morale obligation -- village solidarity -- a response made by AVs in virtually all regions visited; and/or an economic necessity as credit, farm inputs and produce marketing were only provided through AVs; this was particularly true in the CMDT zone and to a lesser extent in OHVN.
- The case of the Ogokana is particularly illuminating in terms of how an AV blurs the lines between voluntary association and obligatory participation at the village level. The Ogokana is a traditional form of self-governance employed among the Dogon people dating from pre-colonial times. All members of the community are subject to the laws established by it. This is because the Ogokana is more than a voluntary association. Although resurrected to manage local natural resources, it has taken on its traditional role of "local government" governing all aspects of local community life.

Because the members of village community view the Ogokana as a legitimate governing body, based on what could be considered a social contract among community members, and because it undertakes decision making in a manner agreed to by the citizens, it can be considered as a democratic self-governing association, the overall objective of the D/G SO. In short, there is no difference between the Ogokana as a traditional form of "local government" and the Ogokana as a self-governing association. This contrasts significantly with AVs in other parts of the country where the two are nominally separated, but where the traditional authority significantly influences the governance of the AV.

Both the Ogokana and Welde Kelka have developed rule systems which govern the conduct of members and even non-members as relates to natural resource management. The issue is the degree to which non-members are subject to these rules and whether they can be enforced and sanctions levied on those who do not comply with the stated rules. In the case of the Welde Kelka, although it has a signed convention with the administration (both cercle and eaux et foret), the administration questions whether the Welde Kelka has a legal right to levy sanctions on non-members and even members themselves. Although the Ogokana is officially recognized, it does not depend on external recognition, or the lack thereof, to enforce its rules. If members are not willing to abide by the sanctions levied, they are simply excommunicated from the village; a fairly effective way to enforce its rules.

Finally, as discussed in more detail below, both APEs and cooperatives, and to a lesser extent, other rural-based federations, are constrained by a combination of law and practice. Because the APE and the Chambre d'Agriculture were created by legislative mandate, in principle, all parents of school children and all rural people were automatically considered members of these two organizations. While it appears that both organizations have begun to reconstitute their governing boards at the subnational national levels through elections, they are still governed by legislation which structures their internal governance and over which members have no say in how to amend or change them. In the case of the Chambre d'Agriculture, it is largely staffed by government fonctionnaires, while the APE national federation is staffed by unelected personnel.

It is difficult to determine the degree to which cooperatives are still dominated by such government agencies as the CAC, but many of the older ones as well as those which are massed based such as the Fishermen's Cooperative, appear to be operated by leadership which is largely viewed as illegitimate. On the other hand, there are such cooperative organizations as the "Kafojigine" in the Segou and Sikasso regions which appear to have a great deal of credibility vis-a-vis their members and exercise significant autonomy from the concerned state agencies.

2. Associational Autonomy

A second and related issue concerns the associational autonomy of COs and federations from the state, whether administrative units such as the arrondissement and cercle governments, or implementing agencies such as the Eaux et Foret and Centre Action de la Cooperatif, or such parastatal bodies as CMDT and OHVN. Furthermore, there are at least two organizations, i.e., Chambre d'Agriculture and the APE structure whose legal status is unclear as they are both organizations which were created by law or decree prior to the establishment of the Third Republic thus confusing their identity as members of civil society. The following are the findings in this regard.

- In general, there is no problem among COs concerning their autonomy from state agencies. The problem with autonomy comes primarily among COs that regroup themselves into higher levels of self-governance, i.e., federations. It does appear that at the lower levels of

governance (e.g., arrondissement and cercle) that APEs are beginning to regain their autonomy; the situation is less clear at the regional level; and there is still no democratically elected body representing APEs at the national level. In general, our interviews with APEs at both the arrondissement and cercle levels, indicated autonomy existed in a formal sense, i.e., there was no direct state interference in their affairs. However, because the APEs no longer have a direct source of revenue, they are extremely dependent on the CLD for allocations from the TDRL to run their individual schools or school systems. Thus, the question can be asked as to how autonomous they are without financial independence. This same question can be asked about all civil society organizations.

- The only instance where the teams saw any indication that the Chambre d'Agriculture may have had any influence in the internal affairs of COs or federations was with the Cooperative des Pecheurs, which stated that the Chambre was its "tutelle." In various documents which the Team has had access to, however, it appeared that SYCOV, the syndicate representing farmers associations in the CMDT and OHVN zones, had extremely close ties to the Chambre d'Agriculture, as well as CMDT administration, including intimate involvement in SYCOV's internal decision-making process. Because, the Chambre was viewed by the vast majority of our respondents as a state, or at least, semi-state organization, this decreased the credibility of SYCOV vis-a-vis its members. In general, however, because of the lack of financial resources, the Chambre has apparently had limited capability to intervene in the affairs of most rural community organizations.

3. Issues of Internal Democratic Self-Governance

This issue covers a number of indicators which measure ability of COs and federations to undertake their governance activities in a democratic manner. Perhaps the most important issue concerns the way in which the leadership of COs and federations is chosen as well as the way in which decisions are reached. Related issues concern whether COs/federations have statutes and, if so, whether they are followed; and the degree to which the leadership is representative of membership (e.g., gender, age, ethnicity, wealth). The following are relevant findings related to these issues.

- In the great majority of the cases, respondents stated that the leadership of their CO or federation was chosen through consensus and to a far lesser extent by election. However, whatever the method of selection, it normally took place at the COs' annual general assembly meeting. This same pattern held true with the way in which they made decisions on organizational matters, i.e., in which consensus was the principal form of decision making mechanism. Whether by vote or by consensus, it is difficult to assess the impact this issue has had on the internal democratic self-governing practices of our respondents. As discussed below, given the traditional relationships among village people, patterns of power, including their asymmetries, that exist in villages are likely to be reproduced within the associations themselves.

Certainly, it was clear that the governing boards of the vast majority of COs/Federations were dominated by men, in many cases exclusively, providing little or no direct representation of women. Likewise, leadership was drawn, in many cases, from amongst the village elders, and in a significant number of cases (particularly among AVs) from among the village chief's council, whether as honorary members with only symbolic power, or as a full member with corresponding rights. We did not receive the impression that representation was problematic as concerned ethnic composition.

While many villages were relatively homogenous in terms of ethnicity and thus did not pose a problem for individual COs, even among federations of AVs, there appeared to be a conscious attempt to gain leadership representation by different ethnic groups on the board of directors. Thus, while individual villages were often homogenous in ethnic terms, where villages differed by ethnic group, it was likely that the governing boards of federations would achieve ethnic representation by ensuring that each village was allotted a seat on the board.

- Even where COs and federations were not officially registered, they all had statutes stipulating, at least in general terms, the rule structure and procedures that governed their internal functioning. There were mixed responses concerning the degree to which these statutes were actually followed however. Alternation of leadership through periodic elections was not universally applied, although in many cases the organizations were too new to actually have required a second round of elections.
- Board meetings and meeting of the general assembly generally took place as scheduled, in many cases more frequently than stipulated. On the other, hand there were a significant number of cases where meetings were not held as scheduled and it was evident that these organizations were suffering from internal dissension and ineffectiveness (see the case of Bankoumana AV in Team 1 report).
- Good governance practices such as transparency in decision making and the management of resources, responsiveness of leadership to members, and the accountability of leadership for their actions seemed to be generally acceptable with some notable exceptions. Given the fact that many COs and federations had little direct access to financial resources, there were few examples of the misuse of funds, although there were a number of cases reported.

Where funds were made available to COs or federations directly, it was normally by NGOs who also took responsibility for monitoring their use. Most of the problems that did arise in terms of poor governance practices could be attributed to a lack of true participation of members in the overall functioning of their organizations. In most cases, this was a result of boards which were dominated by a few strong individuals who made most of the decisions, and/or who were the only members literate within the organization. This happened in women-owned organizations as well as in those which were of mixed gender.

- No COs or Federations that were interviewed had audits undertaken of their use of funds. As noted above, it was primarily NGOs which ensured the proper use of funding coming from external sources, e.g., donors or government. It should be noted, however, that many COs

and federations did in fact keep their accounts with accounting ledgers and various back-up documentation.

- Only a small number of COs and federations were found to be undertaking what could be considered strategic planning, i.e., the setting of long-term objectives, determining associated resource requirements and their source, establishing indicators to measure achievement, etc. Those which were undertaking strategic planning had received significant assistance from international NGOs.

4. The Right and Capacity to Undertake Civic Action

Here the indicators were designed to measure the degree to which COs and federations actually undertook some form of civic action, i.e., delivering public services with government support, undertaking advocacy on behalf of member interests, protecting members civil and human rights, vis-a-vis traditional authorities at the local level (below the commune) or at higher levels of governance beyond the commune. In addition, responses indicated the effectiveness of COs/federations in undertaking civic action, as well as the factors which constrained their capacity to do so. The following were the Teams' findings.

- While virtually all COs believed they had the right to undertake civic action, a slight majority stated that they did not. Where civic action was undertaken, it was primarily at the local level vis-a-vis traditional authorities or at the arrondissement level vis-a-vis the administration (Chef d'Arrondissement) or line ministries (e.g., Eaux et Foret). Many civic action activities were undertaken with other COs in the same arrondissement and on an informal basis around specific problems.
- Roughly one-third of the COs interviewed indicated that they were members of some type of federation at the Arrondissement level or beyond. Those that were members were primarily affiliated with APEs, the national federation of community health centers, cooperative or savings and credit unions (e.g., SYCOV, UCOVEC), or the chamber of Agriculture.
- Virtually all COs, however, saw great value in belonging to a federation of COs with similar objectives. Federations provided a means to express their solidarity and to advance shared interests; to network and share knowledge and experiences about technical issues as well their interactions with state and market agencies; and to solve collective problems.
- Most COs believed that their capacity for civic action was dependent on: better organization, communication and coordination among them; decreasing conflicts both within and between COs; improving their understanding of their rights and obligations under the law; lack of civic action skills (e.g., advocacy and policy analysis); and local governments which were open to their participation in local affairs.
- Slightly more than a third of COs were aware of NGOs or federations undertaking civic action on their behalf at the arrondissement level or beyond. As noted above, all COs believed that

NGOs and federations were the best means for extending their voice and protecting their interests beyond the local level.

- Federations of COs existed in all four regions and a number of them have been particularly effective in representing member interests and defending their rights. Not surprisingly, the prevalence of federations were to some extent a function of environmental and geographic features of the regions. Thus, in the Mopti and Timboctou regions, for instance, a number of the stronger federations were concerned with natural resource management (e.g., Welda Kelka, Molibemu) given the harshness of climate and the degradation of the resource base or with occupations that centered on livestock raising or fishing.

On the other hand, in Segou, Sekasso and Koulikoro, where climatic conditions were more favorable and farming was more productive, farmers associations and cooperatives (e.g., SYCOV) were more in evidence as was the only example of federation of savings and credit associations (e.g, UCOVEC).. Federations involved in social service delivery (e.g. APEs, CSCOMs) were found to equally represented throughout the country.

- Individual Team reports indicate that federations were involved in a range of civic actions from lobbying local governments for public funds to provide services (e.g., Timboctou Central APE Federation vis-a-vis Cercle government), to decreasing taxes levied on members by the Arrondissement (e.g., COTAPE in Sikasso), to limiting government interference over the management of natural resources (e.g., Welda Kelka in Mopti).
- It should be noted again, that the great majority of federations and well over half of the COs were not officially registered with government; or in the case of federations of COs they were not technically registered as federations, but rather as associations or groupements of COs. All respondents believed that official recognition was extremely important to their effectiveness as it increased their legitimacy vis-a-vis government and market agencies and credibility among their members.

5. CO and Federation Knowledge of Rights and Obligations

Indicators were developed to evaluate the knowledge of COs and federations concerning their legal rights and obligations. Such knowledge is obviously a requirement if they are to be able to defend their interests and rights vis-a-vis government agencies and market firms, in short, to undertake civic action. While decentralization laws were not intended to be covered in any depth in the validation exercise, as this intermediate result was not one that the D/G team was to take direct responsibility for, it was evident from our interviews that the ensemble of laws that make up this important area the enabling environment were an area of potentially great importance to the successful achievement of the SO.

- While roughly half the COs and federations interviewed felt that decentralization would be implemented by 1999, it was equally clear that the great majority respondents did not fully

understand decentralization objectives, its process, and the impact of specific laws on their ability to participate more fully in local governance matters.

- While the decentralization mission had been to all regions in which interviews were conducted, it was primarily involved in redistricting (decoupage) activities, and not in disseminating information about the decentralization laws and the rights of citizens and their organizations under them. While a number of respondents indicated that they had heard that GREMs and GLEMs had been formed they were unsure of their role in terms of decentralization. For those that understood that these bodies were responsible for disseminating information on decentralization, they felt that GREMs and GLEMs had not fulfilled this function, nor were particularly interested in doing so. A number of respondents believed that the inclusion of political parties in these bodies was a mistake as they were only concerned with using them for their own partisan purposes.
- In general, the great majority of COs, and to a lesser extent, Federations, had only a basic understanding of Mali's democratic system, institutions and processes. Those areas where they felt additional understanding was required included: (i) decentralization laws including the electoral code as it would relate to local election; (ii) the Constitution of the Third Republic; (iii) taxation policies and laws related to associations and federations, and the overall rules governing the allocation and use of public funds; (iv) the degree to which government agencies demonstrated transparency and accountability in the use of public funds for social service delivery; (v) civic rights including women's rights; and (vi) citizen rights and participation in public decision-making.
- In relation to laws, policies and regulations governing the types of public governance functions which most affected them (e.g., natural resource management, social service delivery, and promoting economic growth and welfare), COs and federations were either unaware of them or only marginally informed. The most frequently mentioned were: (i) land tenure laws; (ii) laws governing conflict resolution between resource users (e.g., between herders and farmers); (iii) laws on natural resource management; (iv) customary rights versus codified modern law; and (v) policies by commercial banks on requirements for taking and making loans.
- Except for APEs and some of the larger federations, roughly 50% of respondents felt that the lack of literacy and numeracy skills were a principal constraint to the functioning of their governing bodies and by extension to the running of the CO/federation itself. Close to 80% felt that lack of literacy and numeracy were a major constraint to the ability of their communities to participate fully in economic, social and political life at the local level and beyond.
- Perhaps the most misunderstood laws related to the registration and official recognition of COs and federations. This includes which government agencies are responsible for administering these laws. As discussed above, both COs and federations view the receipt of official recognition as extremely important to their ability to serve member needs and represent their interests. Specifically, they clearly saw the importance of legal registration as providing them

with the right to enter into legally binding contracts with both government agencies and market firms (banks). It should also be noted that even where COs and federations were registered, it was unclear to them and to the interview teams as well under which laws and by which agencies they were registered.

6. Validating NGO and Federation Indicators

Malian NGOs and Federations have been highlighted as playing a major role in the implementation of the D/G SO. Their role is dual one in this regard: building capacity of COs and federations in democratic self-governance and civic action on the one hand; and representing and defending, along with federations, the interests of COs vis-a-vis government and market on the other. As discussed in section A above, the teams were pleasantly surprised and impressed with the number and quality of Malian NGOs involved in undertaking both these functions. There are a number of specific findings, however, which will be important in operationalizing the D/G strategy:

- The majority of Malian NGOs interviewed received their funding from international NGOs; a number received direct financing from international bilateral or multilateral donors (e.g., FED, CIDA); and several received subventions directly from various government agencies (e.g., promotion des femme, Commissariat du Nord).
- In a number of cases, NGOs are simply used as "pass-through" mechanisms by donors and government to channel grants to community organizations, including helping them to prepare proposals and follow-up or monitor the use of these funds. Where this is the case, the NGO takes a percentage of the donor or government grant (normally 10%) as an "administrative" expense to cover their own costs in undertaking these functions.
- Very few NGOs actually receive funding to implement their own programs with COs. Where this does take place it is through the funding of international NGOs. In general, NGOs complain that donors are not very flexible in the way they make funding available to them. Little donor funding is provided to improve the institutional capacity of NGOs, including funds to cover salaries, transportation, training, etc.
- Two-thirds of the NGOs interviewed had their main offices in Bamako, however, it is still worth noting that a number of regionally-based NGOs exist and appeared to be functioning fairly well.
- A number of the strongest of the Malian NGOs interviewed had their origins in international NGOs that "gave birth" to them (e.g., Walia/IUCN, CANEF/Freedom from Hunger) or have been close partners with international operational NGOs (e.g., OGES, Voldet) such as World Education and NEF. In one case (Voldet), the NGO was formed by a number of former technical agents laid off by government agencies.

- The actual membership of Malian NGOs is relatively small, i.e., 10 - 30, with little or no representation of community organizations on their governing boards. These NGOs are normally formed by a small number of founder members. Of particular note, board members normally take salaried positions once funding is secured from a donor for a project activity without relinquishing their positions on the governing boards.
- While there appeared to be a significant degree of internal self-governance practiced by most NGOs, including participation of women on their boards and overall participation of members in decision making, the interview teams were unable to definitively verify this.
- While only two NGOs were actually audited, most of those interviewed followed normally accepted accounting practices with the maintenance of books and records. Donors also expected full reporting on the use of their funds, thus providing an additional degree of accountability. There was, however, little "down-stream" accountability of NGOs to client COs, a concern noted by several COs themselves.
- Members of one regionally based network (e.g., GDRN 5) representing international and Malian NGOs in the fifth region involved in natural resources management was interviewed. Although an informal grouping of NGOs, it was apparently playing an important role for its members in sharing information and knowledge and coordinating regional activities. A number of NGOs stated they were either full members of CCA-ONG or observers, while one stated it was a member of a Groupe PIVOT.
- Three federations (Molibemu in Mopti, UCOVEC in Koulikoro, and SYCOV in Segou) stated that they were providing capacity building assistance to their members as well as representing their interests to higher levels of administration or vis-a-vis parastatal agencies (e.g., CMDT and OHVN). One federation (Welda Kelka) believed that the civic action function was only appropriately undertaken by federations and not NGOs.
- The executive unit of one federation (Molibemu) actually appeared to be operating as an NGO implementing the programs of the federations two donors rather than those of the federation. Thus, there was great attention paid to building up the capacity of the federation versus the member COs as a means to ensure effective implementation of these programs.

C. Validating of Proposed D/G Results Packages and Activities

In the process of developing the D/G SO results framework, the Team also identified a number of potential interventions, either in the form of results packages or as stand-alone activities which it was hoped would lead to the attainment of related intermediate objectives. In this section we briefly review the findings to the set of questions devoted to this issue.

1. Community Organizations

- The principal constraints identified by community organizations in terms of their ability to carry out democratic self-governance and civic action functions included:
 - The lack of resources (e.g., financial, material and human) to be able to meet the social and economic welfare needs of their members.
 - A lack of understanding or awareness (sensibilization) concerning the larger concept of Malian democracy and more specifically related to the laws, policies and regulations which specify their rights and obligation as citizens.
 - A lack of management skills from accounting and financial management to strategic planning and proposal development.
 - A lack of literacy and numeracy skills both among board members and the general population; viewed as pre-condition for sensibilization, training and animation to take place.
 - A lack of capacity to undertake civic action, including how to analyze government policies, how to formulate their own priorities and development plans and how to effectively lobby government agencies. This also includes how to form alliances, whether formal or informal with like-minded organizations to advance common interests.
 - How to overcome internal conflicts within their organizations and between them and other COs, i.e., conflict resolution and management skills.
- Whether explicitly stated or not, all COs made it clear that they were formed for a specific purpose (e.g., to improve the economic welfare of their members, to manage natural resources in their locales, to deliver important social services to their members) and if unable to carry out the objectives for which they were formed would not have any reason for existence.
- Literacy and numeracy were seen as perhaps the most important initiatives required for their COs in particular and communities in general. But this was tied closely to any training they would receive to improve their capacity in either the programmatic areas or in democratic self-governance and civic action.
- Most COs indicated the need to be better informed about the laws, policies and regulations which determined their rights and obligations vis-a-vis government. This specifically included decentralization. This could be achieved through civic education.
- The great majority of COs also felt it important to initiate and maintain contacts with their deputies in the National Assembly and with government officials at the arrondissement, Cercle and regional levels. Concerning political parties, COs were virtually unanimous in wanting to keep them out of their internal affairs.

- All the COs indicated that they would be willing to contribute whatever resources they had available, i.e., unskilled labor, land, in-kind materials, to support, literacy, civic education and animation in their communities.
- In general, COs felt they were capable of acting as partners in democratic governance provided they received the above type of assistance, but that ultimately it would also depend on governments at the local level and beyond to open to their participation, which meant a significant change in their behavior if not attitudes (mentality).

2. Federations

- One of the biggest problems facing the formation of federations is the lack of an enabling legal environment which easily permits the official registration of federations. This is particularly true for APEs and farmers federations which find existing legislation to inhibit their effective operations.
- Additional constraints to federations undertaking both CO capacity building and civic action were a lack of all types of institutional resources including finances, training, equipment and transportation, and permanent staff.
- In the majority of cases, federations were formed to represent the interests of their members vis-a-vis government and market agencies. While there was an equal emphasis on providing them with additional services (e.g., training, credit provision, networking and information sharing), most federations lacked the insitutional infrastructure to adequately perform such functions.
- The biggest need for federations in addition to sensibilization and capacity building to improve management capacity, was adequate funding to permit them to deliver capacity building for their members and provide them with concrete services.

3. Malian NGOs

- While NGOs did not generally see the legal environment as constraining their ability to work with COs, several of them did note that laws were not clear on tax exemptions related to the importation of project commodities and the requirements related to employees payment of INPS contributions. The single biggest legal constraint to their work with COs related to their inability to qualify for bank loans because COs did not possess a legal personality.
- The biggest constraint to NGOs undertaking their role in building CO capacity was the lack of a stable source of finances to operate their programs. This was seen as primarily a result of donors who were not willing to provide medium to long-term assistance to NGOs to implement their own programs as opposed to being used by donors to implement their programs. As such, little funding went to building an NGOs long-term capacity to plan and implement development programs.

PART 2
USAID/MALI D/G STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE
PERFORMANCE MONITORING PLAN
1996 - 2002

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ANNEX 1: Thunder & Associates Monitoring and Evaluation Plan: Final Report

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

This performance monitoring and evaluation plan represents a synthesis of work undertaken over the past six months by several consultant teams in collaboration with USAID/Mali's Democracy and Governance (D/G) Strategic Objective (SO) Team. Specifically it combines a monitoring and evaluations (M&E) plan¹ prepared by Thunder and Associates in January 1996 and a monitoring, evaluation and reporting (MER) plan prepared by a USAID/Washington MER team in March 1996. Finally, in the most recent consultancy undertaken by Thunder and Associates in March and April 1996, a *Rapid Appraisal* was undertaken to *ground-truth or validate* the results framework and indicators developed under these prior consultancies.² This synthesis M&E performance plan also prepared under the most recent Thunder and Associates contract, thus, provides what is intended to be the final draft performance monitoring plan to be used by the D/G SOT in its recently designed D/G program. It should be noted that there are still a number of issues which must be resolved and decided upon by the D/G SOT before this plan becomes operational. As such, the consultant has provided one or more options for each issue from which the Team will be able to choose.

While this synthesis report takes the MER Team's report as the basic document to which revisions and modifications have been made, Thunder's January 1996 M&E Report provides significant and extremely useful guidance in the development and implementation of performance monitoring under the Agency's re-engineering efforts. Particular note is given to the various methodologies proposed in the implementation of a *comprehensive* M&E plan, and specifically the use of case studies, commissioned studies, rapid rural appraisals, etc., as a means to complement the specific data and analysis obtained through the measurement of stipulated indicators and targets (found in Annex 1, the Performance Monitoring Plan). Annex 2, the Thunder January 1996 Proposed M&E Plan, is thus considered an integral component of the overall performance monitoring plan presented herein.

A. Strategy and Rationale

The finalized D/G SO reads as follow:

Community Organizations in Targeted Communes are Effective Partners in Democratic Governance, including Development Decision-Making and Planning

The Mission's governance strategy has undergone considerable refinement since the CSP was presented in Washington early last autumn. Joint planning exercises, with technical assistance from Thunder and Associates and the Global Bureau's Democracy Center, took place in November and January 1996. The Results Framework was revised during that time, the strategy more clearly articulated, and a preliminary list of indicators developed. The purpose of the MER consultancy was to vet the preliminary indicators developed by the Thunder/G/DG Team, define and operationalize them, and begin to determine how the data collection and analysis would be done. In this regard, the results framework underwent some additional refinement (a key partners' result was added and some of the wording of existing results were altered).

One of the most important changes was in the wording of the strategic objective from "Target Community Organizations are Effective Partners in Democratic Governance, Including Development Decision-Making and Planning" to the version given above. This change in wording more adequately reflects the strategy's

¹ See , Fox, Leslie, J. Coston and P. Isman, Final Report of the D/G SO Support Team, January 26, 1996, Thunder and Associates; and Carter, Lynn et. al., Final Report, March, 1996, USAID/Mali's Strategy Performance Monitoring Plan, Management Systems International.

² See, Fox, Leslie, Synthesis Report: Validating The D/G Results Framework and Indicators, April 1996, Thunder and Associates.

emphasis and expected impact on the 150 target communes that will be the focus of the Mission's overall country program strategy, rather than the more limited group of target community organizations (COs) that are the direct beneficiaries/customers of SO interventions. Within target communes, the Mission expects to see and will measure for a spread effect from target community organizations to non-target community organizations within the targeted communes; and, possibly in neighboring ones as well.

There were some changes in indicators as a result of both the MER Teams visit and the "ground-truthing" exercise undertaken during Thunder's March/April visit. Some indicators were reformulated to allow more practical data collection; some were dropped and substitutes added to better reflect anticipated results, permit data collection or to enable targets to be set; and a small number because they were found to be unrealistic given the conditions *sur terrain*. Most of the finalized indicators attached to this Plan are those developed by the MER Team. They were precisely defined and targets were set for almost all of them. In addition, the MER Team and the D/G SOT did preliminary thinking for an annual survey, including estimated level of effort.

While few potential "partners" were not brought directly into either the strategic planning or MER processes, the recently conducted ground-truthing exercise provided the opportunity for significant input from US, other international and Malian NGOs as well as community organizations and federations. Thus, the D/G SOT can be sure that not only is its strategy appropriate, but it can be fairly certain that the finalized indicators and targets are as close to representing "reality" as can reasonably be expected at this time. The performance monitoring plan presented below allows for, and, in fact, demands that refinements be made as the strategy is operationalized and executed.

The most current and comprehensive description of the strategy can be found in the January 1996 Thunder and Associates final report. The results framework was slightly revised by the D/G SOT from the version included in the Thunder report to reflect some changes in wording decided upon during the MER visit. While the ground-truthing exercise did not lead to any substantive changes in the logic of the results framework, it did highlight certain aspects which were only marginally touched upon in the earlier documents (e.g., the importance of literacy as a key factor in civic education and action). The underlying logic of the D/G strategy identifies a group of implementing partners, including an "umbrella intermediary" program manager and US PVOs with on-going programs in Mali who will strengthen approximately 30 - 40 Malian intermediary NGOs and federations, who in turn will work with approximately 750 community organizations in an estimated 150 communes. It is estimated that these 150 communes represent 25% of all communes to be formed under the soon-to-be implemented decentralizations program, but probably a larger share of Mali's population, given that targeting will be carefully done.

The emphasis is on enabling community groups of different kinds to aggregate and represent their interests and to affect government decision-making at different levels. The Mission has a particular interest in women's groups and will ensure that such groups are well represented. All relevant indicators are disaggregated to allow gender-differential impacts and benefits to be known. The D/G strategic objective will support improvements in democratic governance (operating democratically and improving management and accountability) and civic action skills for intermediary NGOs and federations and for community organizations. Benefits are expected to spread from targeted community organizations to non-target COs in the targeted communes.

This strategy takes advantage of the flowering of NGOs and local associational life Mali in recent years as well as the government's commitment to decentralization. Decisions about the actual shape of the GRM's decentralization program are pending and the outcome is not yet known. The Mission is well aware that these decisions may have an effect on its strategy. Consequently, an intermediate result concerning decentralization

has been added to the framework, and progress will be closely monitored. The Mission is concerned with both the degree of decentralization as well as the pace of decentralization and local elections for promised councils.

B. Performance Monitoring Plan

The Mission will report in its R4 on the SO, intermediate results 1, 2 and 3; and intermediate result 1.2. Indicators were developed for the other intermediate results on the framework, but there will not be formal reporting to Washington on these. They are intended for Mission management use only. There are some additional indicators that the Mission will track to assess impact but these lay outside the framework either because they concern impacts that are not planned but might well occur or because there were already enough indicators to demonstrate progress. One example concerns the spread of civic action from target communes to neighboring communes, as neighbors learn both the utility and the skills. These indicators are included in a special section of this report. The performance monitoring plan and the baseline data and targets table are attached in Annex A.

1. Performance Indicators

The basis for the indicators used in this plan are those developed during the January G/DG - Thunder TA visit. They tried to capture qualitative as well as quantitative change but there was not time during the January visit to develop operational definitions for these indicators. In trying to specify definitions for these indicators during the MER visit so that data could be collected the same way each time, the SOT found it necessary to re-configure some of the indicators. Some indicators were also revised to permit more cost-effective data collection or to permit targets to be set with greater accuracy. All indicators can be found in the monitoring plan and the baseline and targets table in this report. Only the indicators for those results upon which the Mission intends to report to Washington are reviewed in this section of the narrative (more detail can be found in the monitoring plan itself).

It is important to note that very few of the indicators selected are straightforward measures of quantitative change. The vast majority are qualitative indicators that have been formulated in a quantitative fashion to permit easier reporting. As such, they are "soft" or somewhat subjective indicators. While parameters or criteria have been determined to permit a standard approach to judging qualitative change for all target groups, it is almost impossible, and indeed would be counter-productive, to set criteria in such a manner as to remove all subjective judgement. Indeed, it can be argued that the resulting information will be richer and more useful if some room is left for subjective judgement. This may reduce precision, but the Mission does not require 100% precision.

Core indicators should be included in any procurement documentation that the Mission develops to secure M&E implementation support. The Mission could request future proposers to offer additional or replacement indicators that they think would be useful. It would probably not be helpful to leave the complete identification of performance indicators up to the proposers, given the technical skill required to identify such measures and the investment the Mission has already made in developing the current set of indicators. Proposers could also be asked to identify data collection approaches, although the MER consultant felt fairly strongly that the proposed surveys will yield the most cost-effective information. Proposers should identify what information they would expect to provide at semi-annual or quarterly intervals.

Intermediate Result 1.2 reads as follows:

Target Malian Intermediary NGOs and Federations Effectively Aggregate and Represent Community Organization Interests at the Local Level and Beyond

The expectation with this result is that target federations and NGOs can become more effective vehicles for representing CO and therefore citizen interests. Establishing vertical linkages between COs and larger representative bodies (such as federations) and/or establishing horizontal linkages between COs should to the increase of influence by citizens in these groups by bringing them together in pursuit of common agendas. The indicators rely partly on CO satisfaction with federation/NGO representation as a proxy for the quality of their representation. They assume that NGOs and federations communicate fully with their COs, in terms of the latter's interests and concerns, but also in terms of federation or intermediary NGO civic action capacity and effectiveness. The "local level and beyond" includes the new Communes on up to national level (e.g., Cercle, Regional and central governments). It should be noted that the D/G SO will promote and strengthen federations as a priority, because they are member based, i.e., federations of COs, whereas NGOs represent clients who have no direct say in the decisions of the NGO.

The following are the indicators associated with IR 1.2

Ind. 1: Number of target federations and intermediary NGOs for which 2 or more CO partners report that they are effectively represented

The assumption here is that if two community organizations agree that the intermediary NGO or federation which represents them is effective in its representation of their interests that this is a reasonable sign of adequate representation. While we could have asked for a higher degree of CO consensus, this would have an effect on the size of the CO sample for the annual survey. Whether 2 is an adequate number of not depends on how many members these target federations or clients intermediary NGOs have.

Ind. 2: Number of federations of at least 5 C.O.s formed to address specific concerns related to government decisions

Once community organizations recognize that horizontal affiliation can bring success, the SO team would expect to see new federations formed to pursue common concerns.

Ind. 3. Number of target federations whose membership is stable or increasing

The assumption here is that if COs find their federations useful vehicles, they will remain members and more COs will join over time. There is evidence that when COs are dissatisfied with federation performance, they drop out.

Ind. 4: Number of target federations and intermediary NGOs engaged in sustained, joint collaboration in civic action on issues of mutual concern

This indicator shows an added aggregation of interests, perhaps permitting more effective advocacy.

Intermediate Result 1 reads as follows:

Target COs are Engaged in Democratic Self-Governance and Civic Action at the Local Level and Beyond

The indicators that demonstrate CO engagement in democratic self-governance beyond the local level are found in IR 1.2, because intermediary NGOs and federations are the vehicles for representation beyond the

commune level. It would be rare to see a community organization engaged with local governments beyond the commune level except through the intermediation of a group like a federation.

The expected results here are that community organizations operate democratically and are soundly managed -- the combination of these characteristics are what we term effective democratic self-governance -- and undertake direct civic action at the community and commune levels in pursuit of their interests.

The following are the indicators associated with this IR:

Ind. 1: Percent of target C.O.s that govern themselves democratically

This indicator is an index. There are four criteria (all weighted equally) for democratic operation. They are laid out in the attached monitoring plan. All four must be met for a CO to be counted as qualifying. The index may not do an adequate job of capturing member participation in either leadership selection or decision-making; this will depend to some extent on whether or not major decisions are made at the Board of Directors level or in general meetings. As discussed in greater detail in the Studies and Research section below, further work must be carried out on the use of consensus as an approach to both leadership selection and decision-making in COs. Previous analysis undertaken by the SOT and collaborating consultants, including during the ground-truthing exercise, has indicated that true participation may be problematic in groups where consensus is used and power symmetries exist. This will be further validated during baseline data collection, the actual use of the indicator, and from further research.

Ind. 2: Percent of target COs that have sound management practices

This is also an index. There are six criteria laid out in the monitoring plan. If any four out of the six are met, the CO will be counted as having sound management practices. What the SO team needs to look at over time is whether this formulation of the indicator adequately reflects progress. For example, a CO could meet two criteria one year and three the next but still would not be included in the count. In another example, the quality of planning could be just good enough to qualify in one year and could improve substantially the next, but the count will not reflect this qualitative change. This could also be an issue for the management practices index for intermediary NGOs and federations, found "lower" in the results framework.

Another issue with this indicator is that other SO teams are interested in the institutional capability of their community organization customers. Since there is overlap in interest, joint explorations are needed. It may be possible to develop common criteria and to share implementation or data collection. It should be noted that at the time of this writing the Mission is in the process of discussing how it will integrate work across all SOs, in which common customers or COs, are essential to the achievement of SO results. The issue of how to determine achievement of common results will be one of the issues to be dealt with in this Mission-wide discussion.

Ind. 3: Percent of mixed gender COs with at least one woman in a leadership position

Although the MER Team did not feel that women do not have to be office-holders to qualify the CO for inclusion, i.e., any demonstrated, visible position of leadership will count, this final performance monitoring and evaluation plan believes that it is the only true indicator of women's participation in CO governance. **Recommend that SOT review this further!**

Ind. 4: Percent of COs pursuing civic action, as gauged by any kind of public advocacy on even one issue

This will be disaggregated by percentage of total COs and the percentage of women's COs. This is a mild standard to see if any civic action (meetings with officials, trying to rally public interest and support) follows training and TA in civic action techniques.

Ind. 5: Percent of target COs pursuing effective civic action

This indicator tries to get at the quality of civic action and should be interpreted jointly with indicator 4 above. There are six criteria laid out for effective civic action in the monitoring plan. To be included in the count, a CO must meet four of the five criteria. Again, this is an index. It must also be checked after a period of time to determine whether it is adequately reflecting progress. The criteria should also be checked with other SO teams which are working with community organizations.

Ind. 6: Percent of target C.O.s mobilize non-USAID, non-member resources

This indicator captures CO sustainability, growing resourcefulness and public support. It counts COs which a) secure credit; b) raise funds from larger community; or c) obtain grants (not from USAID or USAID-funded PVOs) from either other donors or government; and d) from earned income (e.g., user fees, business activities, etc.)

Intermediate Result 2 reads as follows:

Effective Decentralization Occurs by 1999 (Other donors, GRM)

This is not a USAID-produced result. The Mission intends to monitor progress only. Both the timetable and the actual content of decentralization are important. Monitoring will be informal, and reporting will be by narrative. Several of the more important dimensions of the GRM's decentralization program are listed in the monitoring plan. The SO team will be investing time in the next couple of months in developing benchmark; these may change as the decentralization process takes further shape as concerned GRM institutions (e.g., National Assembly, Decentralization Mission) take required steps and make decisions. If this result begins to go awry and the SO team believes that it will adversely affect its SO accomplishments, the team has two choices: adjust the SO or address the problem with its own resources (in other words, make the solution part of the strategy).

Intermediate Result 3 reads as follows:

The Enabling Environment Empowers Target COs, Intermediary NGOs and Federations

Other donors as well as USAID and international and local NGOs are working with or lobbying the Malian government to develop a new set of laws and regulations governing a range of civil society actors, including many types of COs. USAID hopes that its efforts will lead to COs, federations and intermediary NGOs identifying those legal, regulatory and fiscal constraints that most impede them and then working together to address those constraints. While the initially developed results framework did not give much emphasis to this intermediate result, the recent ground-truthing exercise made it clear that most COs and federations knew very little about the enabling environment that governed their organizations and that there were significant legal constraints preventing them from carrying out their responsibilities as they had defined them.

Of particular importance, the ground-truthing exercise showed a far greater relationship between sensibilization, literacy, civic education and civic action than had previously been understood. While the following indicators are deemed adequate for the moment to measure this IR, it is strongly suggested that the D/G SOT give these newly discovered relationships more thought -- one implication is that a cross-cutting results package addressing sensibilization, literacy and civic education and action may be most appropriate in the achievement of IRs 1 and 3 -- and whether one or more new indicators may be necessary.

Also, while the original intention was to leave much of the responsibility for the creation/maintenance of a favorable enabling environment to other donors (e.g., UNDP/ILO), the recent ground-truthing exercise plus several meetings with concerned GRM agencies (e.g., MDRE, Mission Decentralization) makes it entirely clear that USAID will need to take a more direct role in, including taking responsibility for, ensuring a favorable enabling environment for civil society. This will require the expenditure of program resources including funds and the use of staff time. It is also likely that the same problem will be found, to some extent, with the decentralization laws.

The following are the indicators associated with IR 3:

Ind. 1: Concerned laws, regulations and policies are passed or put into effect granting full legal recognition to community organizations, federations, NGOs and other concerned civil society actors

A number of community organization types, as well as cooperatives and some federations are either operating under laws which do not currently provide them with full legal recognition; or operate with no legal recognition because there are no current laws governing their operations. This hampers their operation, particularly in terms of entering into legally binding contracts and access to and the lending of credit. The response for this indicator will be formulated as full legal recognition, some improvement in legal recognition and no change. It should be realized that legal recognition in and of itself does not ensure that civil society actors will improve their capacity to participate in economic, social or political life. The enabling environment also includes the extent to which such laws, regulations, and policies are enforced by concerned government agencies, if not the attitude of public servants towards civil society organizations. While we are not recommending at this point the addition of a new indicator to measure this factor, the D/G SOT needs to monitor the situation carefully, particularly at the subnational level where functionaries often are ignorant of laws or choose to ignore them altogether.

Ind. 2: Number of federations and intermediary NGOs working together in a systematic manner to address significant environmental constraints

To meet the terms of this indicator, two or more partners must be addressing an environmental constraint jointly. Other groups can be involved and should be counted. In addition, the constraint must be one that would have significant impact on the environment for many COs or that threatens the fundamental rights (e.g., freedom of association, speech) of civil society; and the quality of civic action must be good. What this indicator is measuring is the ability of civil society actors to form alliances or coalitions around issues of common concern or to advance shared interests. In this regard, it might be more interesting to count the number of issues around which such alliances form, but it is almost impossible to set meaningful targets for such an indicator. Nonetheless, the SO team will consider this change.

Ind. 3: Percent of community organizations which are knowledgeable about their rights and obligations vis-a-vis local governments

Part of the Mission strategy is to provide civic education as a means to inform COs and communities in general about their rights and obligations as citizens. Community organizations cannot pursue their interests and their rights if they do not understand their rights and obligations. The measurement of this indicator will carefully follow the actual content of the civic action. One key leader in each sampled CO will be interviewed in terms of his/her knowledge of four or five of the key rights taught in the civic education program. Knowledge of those few key rights will serve as a proxy for learning from the entire program. There are other SO teams that are also likely to be involved in educating COs with whom they work about their rights (i.e., cooperatives, APEs). This issue will or should be taken up by the Mission as a whole in its discussions concerning the cross-cutting nature of the D/G SO.

The D/G Strategic Objective reads as follows:

Community organizations in Target Communes are Effective Partners in Democratic Governance, including Development Decision-Making and Planning

While COs are the principal focal point of the D/G SO, the larger objective is to empower individual citizens in their ability to participate in the social, economic and political affairs of their country. To achieve this we build the capacity of COs as well as the communities and the communes within which COs will operate. Being effective partners means that COs are viewed as legitimate actors in local governance matters, and that they have the capacity to participate efficiently and knowledgeably. The SO is as concerned with COs being able to participate in decision-making and problem solving at the level of their communities as it is with influencing decision-making at the communal level and beyond.

The following are the indicators associated with the strategic objective:

Ind. 1: Percent of total target community organizations which have affected 2 or more development decisions (total COs/women's COs)

The idea behind this indicator is that civic action needs to result in some evidence of change. Community organizations cannot be "effective partners" unless they are able to affect actual decisions whether vis-a-vis traditional authorities or decentralized local government. This is an annual and not a cumulative measure.

Ind. 2: Number of regional/national government decisions target intermediary NGOs and Federations affected (total issues/women's issues)

The SO team believes that affecting government decisions that have impact on large populations is a good sign of effective partnership and growing government openness to citizen input. This is an annual and not a cumulative measure.

Ind. 3: Percent of target COs which have formed good partnerships with local governments in delivering services (total c.o.s/women's COs)

Target COs which have formed close working relationships with local governments in the provision of social services, the management of local public natural resources and in resolving conflicts will be counted here. The collaboration can be at a high level or evidence can be presented that it is at a reasonable level and is increasing. This is a qualitative indicator at heart and while some criteria or standards can be developed for making judgments, it is likely to remain somewhat subjective. Some criteria have been suggested in the

monitoring plan, but this will need to be further fleshed out by the D/G SOT, and with implementing partners, including intermediary project manager and PVOs.

Ind. 4: Percent of target communes in which new community organizations (and/or communal level federations) have formed during the year

This indicator is defined as those target communes in which one or more new community organizations (non-target) – and it is suggested, new communal level federations – have formed and become operational during the year. It is possible that this is too low a standard, and that the minimum requirement should be set at two new COs (and one federation) during the year. This indicator tries to gauge the spread effect of citizens becoming aware that they can jointly address their problems and work with government to advance their interests. While it would be more interesting to capture the total number of new COs (and federations) in target communes on a per annum basis, the sample survey would not permit this kind of information to be generated. Alternately, NGO (and PVO implementing) partners could be asked to track the formation of new COs in target communes. This would in all probability involve an inventory, which it might be more realistic to do every other year, due to the work involved. Another option would be to specify the number of new communes formed in any given year in the sample communes.

Ind. 5: Percent target communes in which non-target community organizations adopt civic action practices

This indicator measures the spread from target COs to non-target COs in the same commune in undertaking civic action. One or more non-target community associations must have demonstrated some civic action or advocacy during the year. The standard can be set higher than this if that is useful. Again, this indicator is formulated with target communes as the base because of the limitations of a sample survey. It would be possible to add non-target COs to the sample survey on a random basis but this will 1) add to sample size; 2) cause some difficulties in calculating the sample frame; and 3) add to costs and labor. The information that would be gained is probably not worth the investment. Data about non-target COs can be collected first by asking target COs to identify relevant non-target COs and then doing limited interviewing with those non-target COs.

Ind. 6: Percentage of target COs that expand their development services and activities (total COs/women's COs)

This indicator will count the percentage of total target COs which 1) deliver new services; 2) try to solve a new problem unrelated to original mandate; and/or 3) expand the provision of original services (either a new service or more clients). The notion here is that once COs reach a certain level of competence, they will become more proficient in self-governance and will work on other problems they see in their communities. The exact parallel here are USAID-supported water users' associations in Tunisia that over time began to take on a range of development functions in their communities. There are an increasing number of examples emerging in Mali.

2. Estimated Number of Target Partner/Beneficiary Groups

At this point it should be noted that there were some differences in the assumptions or estimates used by the MER Advisor and the Thunder Advisor used as the basis in determining indicators and targets. Both sets of assumptions are provided for the D/G SOT which will have to be the final arbiter of which set to use in finalizing the plan. Section 2a, provides the Thunder assumptions, section 2b, that of the MER Team and

section 2c a comparison of the two. It should be noted that no changes to the indicators and targets developed by the MER Team have been changed. This will be the responsibility of the D/G Team.

a) Thunder Assumptions

Table 1 below presents the set of assumptions that Thunder believes should be used in determining D/G indicators and targets. The primary issue underlying Thunder's assumptions relates to the overall anticipated D/G SO results and impacts. In order to demonstrate impact beyond the 750 community organizations which are the primary target beneficiary group of the D/G SO it is proposed that a **critical mass** of results the combination of which would ensure that not only COs, but the **communes** in which they reside would be strengthened and capable of engaging local governments as effective partners in democratic governance at the local level. Thus, in addition to **5 COs** strengthened per commune, the overall goal would be to strengthen **one communal level federation**, as well as the establishment and strengthening of **one Center for Information and Animation** (Center for Civic Education and Action). It is the combination of these three target groups that constitute the critical mass required to initiate a **spread effect** of strengthened civil society at the commune level and an equally desirable result of a **spill-over** effect into neighboring communes.

As such, a new category of *effective communes* is provided as a possible indicator category and could be considered a result at the strategic objective level, that is, 80 % of all 150 communes worked in will have attained a critical mass of COs, communal level federations and Centers that indicate a level of result beyond the achievement of individual community organizations. This has not been included in the attached performance monitoring plan; rather it is put forward for the D/G SOTs consideration.

TABLE 1: ASSUMPTIONS USED TO ESTIMATE NUMBER &/OR PERCENT OF PARTNERS & BENEFICIARIES

CATEGORY OF ASSOCIATION	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	COMMENTS
Total Community Organizations	100 % women	200 % women	350 % women	550 % women	700 % women	750 % women	Total COs assisted; % women TBD
Target COs practice democratic self-govern	50 % 50 COs	60 % 120 COs	70 % 245 COs	75 % 410 COs	80 % 560 COs	85 % 640 COs	% of total COs Actual #
Target COs have sound management practices	30 % 30 COs	40 % 80 COs	50 % 175 COs	60 % 420 COs	70 % 565 COs	80 % 600 COs	% of total COs Actual #
Target COs pursuing any civic action/advocacy % women-run	50 % 50 COs TBD	60 % 120 COs TBD	70 % 245 COs TBD	75 % 410 COs TBD	85 % 595 COs TBD	90 % 630 COs TBD	% of total COs Actual # % Women
Target COs pursuing effective civic action Mixed & Women-run	25 % 25 COs TBD	35 % 70 COs TBD	45 % 160 COs TBD	55 % 300 COs TBD	65 % 455 COs TBD	75 % 565 COs TBD	% of total COs Actual # % Women
Total NGOs/federations	15	20	25	30	35	40	SO Supported
Federations/NGOs: provide capacity building	10 NGOs/feds	15 NGOs/feds	20 NGOs/feds	25 NGOs/feds	30 NGOs/feds	30 NGOs/feds	1 NGO/fed per 25 COs
Total NGOs/federations undertake civic action # of Women-run	5 NGOs/feds 2	10 NGOs/feds 3	15 NGOs/feds 4	20 NGOs/feds 5	25 NGOs/feds 5	25 NGOs/feds 5	Represent CO interests at commune/beyond
Total federations/NGOs provide capacity building & undertake civic action	5 NGOs/feds	10 NGOs/feds	15 NGOs/feds	20 NGOs/feds	25 NGOs/feds	25 NGOs/feds	Of total NGOs/ federations 25 do both CB & CA
Communal Level Federations	10 Federations	30 Federations	60 Federations	90 Federations	120 Federations	150 Federations	Total federations formed /supported
Communal Federations undertake D/S-G	15 Federations	27 Federations	55 Federations	80 Federations	110 Federations	135 Federations	90% of federations do D/S-G
Communal Federations undertake D/S-G & have effective management	13 Federations	25 Federations	50 Federations	75 Federations	100 Federations	125 Federations	85% of federations do D/S-G & have effective mangment
Communal federations do D/S-G, CA and have effective management	12 Federations	24 Federations	48 Federations	72 Federations	95 Federations	120 Federations	80% of federations do D/S-G, CA, & have effective mgt.
Civic action & education centers/volunteer animators in place	15 Centers	30 Centers	60 Centers	90 Centers	120 Centers	150 Centers	Centers form & are supported in every commune
Centers/volunteers effectively provide communal services	12 Centers	24 Centers	48 Centers	72 Centers	96 Centers	120 Centers	80 % of all centers /volunteers are effective
Total effective communes	0 communes	10 communes	25 communes	50 communes	80 communes	120 communes	Critical mass of COs, fed, center
Intermediary partners do NGO/federation capacity building	3 Partners	4 Partners	5 Partners	6 Partners	7 Partners	8 Partners	PVOs/public & private actors do capacity building

It was precisely this reason of wanting to gain a higher level of impact than the number of COs supported, that the SO statement itself was changed during the MER exercise to read: **COs in target communes ...** This leaves the issue of how many intermediary NGOs/federations will extend CO (and communal) voice beyond the local level. As Table 1 points out, 25 intermediary NGOs/federations beyond the communal level will be supported over the strategy period in this regard, while 150 communal federations and Centers each would be supported. Obviously, this is a significant increase in the number of federations targeted, and adds a whole new category of commune level Centers (although they were discussed in Thunder's January 1996 final report. It should be noted that the recent "ground-truthing" exercise indicated that local federations existed in many places and that this trend was likely to continue. Also, many respondents interviewed were positive in their view of the need of such Centers, which could serve other SO Team communications and information objectives as well. Is this proposition ambitious? Yes, but it lends greater credence to the overall results and impact of the SO, i.e., in terms of 150 communes or one-quarter of the total number being targeted are strengthened and engaging local government, particularly given the amount of funds being expended over the strategy period.

b) MER Estimates

Performance targets and data collection estimates are based on the estimates of numbers of partner groups shown below. Targets for some indicators may change if estimates about the number of groups in any given year turn out to be overly ambitious or overly cautious.

Table 2: Estimated Number of Target Partner/Beneficiary Groups

Type of Group	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Community Organizations	100	200	350	550	700	750
Intermediary NGOs and Federations	15	25	35	40	40	40
Civic Action groups - total	10	15	20	25	25	25
Civic Action groups - women's	2	3	4	5	5	5
Democratic governance groups - total	10	20	27	30	30	30
Groups which do both democratic governance TA/training & civic action	5	10	12	15	15	15

Targets are also based on selecting the strongest intermediary NGOs and federations first. It would also make sense to give priority in the selection process to those groups which are targeted by other SO teams for technical assistance. In fact, this issue is currently under Mission-wide discussion. In fact, the D/G SOT has decided that it will only work with those COs that are the target of other SO teams. While it may

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be that the D/G SOT can only deal with 750 community organizations itself, there will presumably be other community organizations with which Mission staff are working. For example, CLUSA works with 300 village associations (AVs). The D/G SOT will have to determine whether all of them will become targets for assistance, given the intention to work with only 5 COs per commune. There may be D/G-type impacts with these non-target cooperatives whether they are worked with and supported by the D/G SO or not. Do they get counted in the D/G indicators? How do the data relative to these non-DG target groups get collected?

These are extremely important issues, and ones only touched upon during the most recent Thunder visit. Ultimately, its resolution will be tied to the current Mission-wide discussions concerning the cross-cutting nature of the D/G SO, and increasing synergy and integration of other SOs also targeting community organizations. One point to keep in mind is that with a common Mission strategy towards working with COs, the possibility of supporting and increasing the number of COs actually strengthened increases significantly. This would lead to a significant increase in the overall targets found in the attached performance monitoring plan. The implementation issues at this point concern which team is doing what kinds of training and is interested in what kinds of institutional capability results. If different groups are doing training of different kinds at different points, how does it get coordinated? The Mission is very aware that M&E requirements need to be consolidated for whatever partners will be involved in the implementation of the monitoring and evaluation plan, and is looking at ways to address this.

c) Conclusion: Comparison of Estimates and Assumptions

The principal difference between the two sets of assumptions or estimates portrayed above is the addition of communal level federations, Centers for Civic Education and Action, and the overall category of effective communes found in the Thunder option, Table 1. The overall purpose in presenting these new categories is to improve the perception of partners, including USAID/W, concerning the overall result and impact that the Mali D/G program will have over the strategy period. In reviewing the final set of indicators developed during the MER exercise, and which are also reflected in the MER assumptions and estimates, there is not only no mention of the larger communal result/impact, but in fact, by the end of the strategy period there are far fewer than 750 COs assisted and that are actually achieving results in terms of practicing effective democratic self-governance (75 % or 550 COs) and effective civic action (60 % or 450 COs). One could argue that for the investment being made through the D/G SO, the benefits do not justify the costs. It is for this reason that the Thunder proposal to add an "effective commune" category where there is a critical mass of CO, federation and Center results was developed. As Table 1 notes, 120 communes (80 % of 150) or roughly 20 percent of the 600 total to be created under decentralization, would have achieved total effectiveness in terms of having a critical mass of desired results. This is not only a more defensible position in terms of benefits to costs, but it is also attainable. This, however, is left to the D/G Team to decide.

The other differences between the two estimates are related to the targets or numbers established for COs that: undertake democratic self-governance, have effective management practices and pursue effective civic action. The Thunder targets, especially for effective civic action, are significantly higher than those of the MER Team (e.g., 75% versus 60%). During the MER exercise, democratic self-governance was further defined by separating out sound management practices and democratic practices as discrete indicators, while civic action was divided into any civic action and effective civic action. This now leads to four separate categories on which to evaluate or measure what we could call effective COs. With targets of 85% for democratic practices; 75% for sound management practices, 100% pursuing any civic action and 60% pursuing effective civic action, the question needs to be asked how many of the 750 COs have achieved all four measures of effectiveness. The other problem with the MER assumptions and estimates is that by subdividing democratic self-governance and civic action, it appears the link between the two has been broken, i.e., that COs must

achieve democratic self-governance before receiving civic action training, thus becoming effective civic action actors.

While the indicators and targets developed by the D/G SOT during the MER exercise have not been changed in this document, it strongly recommended that the D/G SOT take the above issues into consideration when finalizing the performance monitoring plan, including indicators and targets.

C. Institutional Responsibilities in Performance Monitoring

Who will be responsible for undertaking the range of functions associated with the implementation of the performance monitoring plan? That is the question which this section attempts to answer. While it is clearly understood that USAID through the D/G SOT is the overall party responsible for performance monitoring, the principal issue is which implementation functions it should retain and which functions should be devolved to other actors involved in program implementation activities. As discussed in greater detail below, the alternatives include: (i) that the Mission engage through contract an outside organization with no other program implementation responsibilities, the implementation of the performance monitoring plan; (ii) that the proposed intermediary program manager which will be engaged to provide technical assistance, training and financial grant assistance to implementing PVO and NGO partners add performance monitoring to these other tasks; and (iii) that the Mission retain certain implementation functions which it would contract out to either local or US firms with recognized expertise and turn over others to the intermediary program manager. In each of these scenarios, implementing PVOs and NGOs would have certain responsibilities that would be built into and funded through their grants or Cooperative Agreements.

An externally engaged US contractor – perhaps obtained through an IQC under one of the Democracy Centers new facilities – is the recommended option in this regard. In this way the Mission is ensured of getting an organization with the required expertise and avoids the possibility of conflicts of interest which may obtain with the use of either an intermediary program manager or implementing PVO and NGO partners whose own performance may be the object of monitoring and evaluation requirements. If the US contractor were required to partner with a local Malian organization(s) then it could take advantage of this local expertise while transferring performance monitoring skills and expertise. While the costs associated with this option may be greater than either of the other two options, it could be easily justified by the importance of the task and the fact that it would not be required to have permanent long-term staff assigned to Mali. The following implementation tasks are reviewed in terms of this option.

1. Baseline and Performance Data Collection

The indicators have been set up in such a way that the great majority of them rely on two annual back-to-back surveys for the collection of data: (i) an annual stratified random sample survey of target community organizations; and (ii) a census or full survey of target intermediary NGOs and federations as well as those US PVOs working with COs and supported under the D/G SO. Baseline data cannot be determined at this time. None of the information required for performance indicators had been collected as of the MER exercise, although records showing some of the needed data do exist at the community organization or intermediary NGO and PVO levels (to differing degrees and quality). However, the recently conducted ground-truthing exercise did provide a good sense of the appropriateness of the standard of accomplishment set in each indicator (i.e., what kind of strategic planning do we expect COs or intermediary NGOs to undertake) and of the preliminary performance targets previously established.

In fact, the only indicator changed as a result of this exercise was the standard of audits, one of the criteria used for determining whether COs should be counted as having achieved effective management. This was

changed to **acceptable accounting practices and documents in place**. In addition, more detailed conversations will take place with World Education which is now expected to undertake a number of important D/G with corresponding and anticipated D/G results.. The Mission's recent funding of World Education's integrated development program, including those which have D/G results, is being taken as a **pilot activity** by the D/G SOT, which will, in addition to testing out result framework assumptions, provide further evidence of the appropriateness, or lack thereof, of the D/G indicators and targets. Some revision in indicator definitions and targets may be needed after this effort.

Baseline data will then be collected by developing a sample frame from the Malian universe of community organizations and federations/intermediary NGOs. **The sample frame will need to be stratified in the same way that the annual sample drawn from target groups will be stratified.** While the D/G SO team initially agreed to have an intermediary program manager -- which may or may not be a US PVO -- involved in the collection of baseline data in autumn 1996, the recommendation is that a contractor take overall responsibility for these performance monitoring requirements, including questionnaire design, pilot testing of the survey instrument, and the sample framework related to these two principal surveys. As the D/G team believes that some degree of technical assistance can be obtained locally (e.g., the statistics institute), the contractor could work with the best identified partners to undertake related tasks. The importance of the baseline survey being implemented competently cannot be stressed enough as it provides the benchmark against which all indicators will be measured.

By working with and through an external contractor, the D/G SOT would probably not be required to conduct some sort of post-test itself, i.e., visiting a small number of the sample COs and intermediary NGOs/federations to check the survey results of an intermediary program manager or implementing partners. However, and as discussed in both the Thunder November 1995 and January 1996 final reports, maintaining a long-term relationship between D/G SOT members and a cross-section of target communes makes not only good sense in terms of an on-going learning experience (learning laboratories) but as a way to directly monitor progress and performance of D/G interventions without having to depend totally on any type of intermediaries. The recently conducted ground-truthing exercise, provides a sound basis for continuing this direct contact with partners and customers.

Baseline data will be very important for (i) revising the standards inherent in performance indicators; (ii) revising targets in line with current status; and (iii) determining priorities for action planning. Therefore, the baseline survey data should be analyzed jointly by the D/G SO team, the intermediary program manager and its PVO/NGO implementing partner.

2. The Annual Surveys

The two annual surveys will require some level of PVO and NGO implementing partner participation. This would be primarily an investment in record keeping matters. The kinds of records that community organizations and implementing partners must maintain are laid out in the description of the two surveys below. One idea is to develop simple organization **logbooks** which would be set up at the start of a program supported relationship, and in which target groups would record information needed for performance indicators. The maintenance of these logbooks and other key records would need to be supervised by the intermediary program manager (vis-a-vis PVOs, intermediary NGOs and federations) and implementing partners (vis-a-vis COs and communal federations) providing TA and training.

a) Community Organization Survey

- For performance reporting purposes, this survey needs to be conducted annually, in October/November/December, by the contractor supervising intermediary PVO, NGO/federation data collection.
- Sample size must be worked out and will vary from year to year as number of intermediary groups and COs grows but *could* include stratification as follows:
 - o at least 2 COs supported by each intermediary NGO or federation;
 - o adequate number of communes represented;
 - o adequate mix of intermediary PVOs, NGOs and federations doing CO institution building only, civic action only, and both;
 - o geographic mix;
 - o by PVO partner providing capacity building experience only in order to gauge PVO performance;
 - o different types of COs (school groups, health committees, cooperatives, etc.); and
 - o new COs versus better established ones.

In general, the more varieties of segmentation desired, the larger the sample size will need to be. In the event that PVO and NGO implementing partners participate in these survey tasks, the sample would need to vary given their possible role in administering the survey(s); the groups in the sample must be changed from year to year so that special efforts are not devoted to those groups known to be in the sample to ensure the success of those groups. In this regard, USAID through the Contractor should be responsible for selecting the sample each year and should give the sample COs to participating partners perhaps a month prior to the start of the survey to permit adequate planning for administering the survey.

- The survey will be conducted according to a questionnaire which the Contractor will work on with USAID and will be a mix of interviews and document reviews. The documents and records which the COs will need to keep will be laid out at the start of an intermediary PVO, NGO/federation - CO relationship. Training will be offered to the CO to allow it to keep records, and the PVO and NGO partner will check the records periodically and ensure that they are up-to-date and maintained with reasonable accuracy.
- Documents required: accounting documents (a change from audits), by-laws of the CO, most recent election records, legal recognition, strategic plan, list of leaders and members, income statement to gauge source of resources (budgets may serve this purpose), and service delivery records.
- Logbooks should be kept to track the following:
 - o CO meetings (internal and board) - date, attendance;
 - o Issues addressed through civic action (commune or community level) and actual steps taken with dates; and
 - o Government decisions affected (commune or community level) through civic action.

- Interviews would be conducted with the following individuals:
 - o one or more leaders about literacy rate among leadership and how many women are among the leadership of the CO;
 - o one or more leaders/members on whether the training offered by their intermediary PVO or NGO/federation partner led them to make any organizational changes or to apply new skills (those interviewed must be able to name specific instances and not just answer yes/no);
 - o the quality of their civic action (there are six criteria included in the indicator - there may or may not be documents attached to any of these - oral evidence, if adequate, is acceptable);
 - o leaders' knowledge of 4-5 key rights on which civic education provided;
 - o government support for their activities (financial, material or technical); those interviewed must be able to name specific instances (financial support should be confirmed by review of audits or income statements);
 - o new COs formed in the last year that they can think of;
 - o whether they know of any non-target COs undertaking civic action during the year; and,
 - o new or expanded development services developed (should be confirmed by review of records).
- In addition, if target COs identify new COs formed or non-target COs using civic action, then leaders from those identified groups will need to be interviewed to (i) verify whether they are truly functioning; and (ii) make some sort of assessment of whether they did in fact undertake some sort of civic action. It must be recognized that target COs may not be the best source for identifying these non-target COs. Some thought should be given to other ways of identifying these groups.
- The implementing partners and/or intermediary program manager should give detailed survey results to the USAID M&E Contractor (e.g., raw data, semi-processed, including scores for each sub-indicator in an index, fully processed and analyzed). Data should be reviewed for its strategic and implementation implications jointly, perhaps in the context of an annual performance workshop which brings together key partners.
- Based on survey data, USAID could ask for case studies of extraordinary successes and/or failures. Provision for such studies should be included in cooperative agreements with implementing partners. These case studies could be structured as rapid appraisals, such as the January 1996 SO support team report suggests, or they could be somewhat more rigorously structured studies. This issue is discussed in more detail below.
- The survey can also be used to elicit qualitative information about the nature and utility of the relationship between the target implementing PVO, intermediary NGO and federation partners and their CO partners. This information can be used to improve the TA, training and representation conducted by these intermediary groups. These kinds of data, along with the information derived from performance measures, essentially constitute the SO team's *customer service plan* for the DG SO.

b) Implementing Partner Survey

There are actually two levels to this survey. The first will measure the performance of implementing partners, i.e., intermediary NGOs, federations and a small number of PVOs, all of whom provide capacity building assistance to COs. And the second survey will measure the performance of the intermediary program manager and those PVOs that partner with NGOs, both of whom provide capacity building assistance to intermediary NGOs and federations. The following discusses the requirements for these surveys.

- For performance measurement purposes, this survey needs to be conducted annually, in October (probably directly prior to the CO survey) by the Contractor.
- This is not a sample survey. All implementing partners should be reviewed annually. There will not be a large number of them. The D/G team anticipates that there will be 30 intermediary NGOs/federations providing capacity building to COs and 25 undertaking civic action on behalf of COs. At the same time, there will be a comparatively small number of US PVOs (three to five) providing capacity building support directly to COs.
- The intermediary program manager and a small number of PVOs that partner with NGOs and federations for the purposes of strengthening their capacity will also be surveyed. This is one of the principal reasons for not turning over greater performance monitoring functions to either one of these partner organizations.
- USAID staff should consider accompanying the Contractor on its assessments of both groups i.e., perhaps to 5 of the implementing PVO, NGO and federation partners and to a number of the PVO capacity builders.
- The surveys will be a mix of interviews and document reviews. The documents and records which the intermediary partners will need to keep will be laid out at the start of relationships between the providers of TA and training, i.e., the intermediary program manager and some PVOs and the recipients of this training, i.e., intermediary NGOs and federations on the one hand; and the PVO, intermediary NGO, and federation providers and the CO recipients on the other. Training will be offered by the USAID Contractor to all implementing partners to allow them to keep proper records and the Contractor will check the records periodically and ensure that they are up-to-date and maintained with reasonable accuracy.
- Documents required: audits, accounting records, by-laws of the intermediary NGO or federation, most recent election records, strategic plans, gender analysis if this exists, training records (number of NGOs, federations, or COs trained, number days training per CO, number of staff trained per CO), training curricula, civic action plans, days of TA per CO, staffing pattern and organizational chart, job descriptions for core staff, code of ethics, etc.
- Logbook should be kept to track the following:
 - o Intermediary NGO/federation meetings (general and board); date and attendance;
 - o Issues addressed through civic action (including environmental constraints), actual steps taken with dates, and whether cooperated with any other groups; and
 - o Government decisions affected at local, regional and national levels through civic action. Decision and date recorded.
- Interviews should take place with:

- o trainer(s) on the staff of intermediary program manager or hired consultants/firms; PVO, NGO, and federation personnel responsible for capacity building;
- o PVO, NGO and federation staff person(s) with conflict resolution skills;
- o Intermediary program manager, PVO, NGO and federation staff with strategic planning responsibilities;
- o staff responsible for monitoring civic action quality;
- o staff responsible for audits and audit recommendations; and
- o staff responsible for gathering evidence of new federations of five or more COs forming to pursue common interests.

Backup documentation should be presented whenever possible to confirm statements of those being interviewed.

3. Calculations of Estimated Level of Effort Required for the Survey in Year 3

The calculations are based on the following assumptions:

- o intermediary program manager
- o 3-5 PVOs providing capacity building to NGO/federation partners
- o 3-5 PVOs working directly with COs and federations;
- o 20 - 25 Intermediary NGOs and federations providing technical assistance to COs and communal level federations
- o 25 Intermediary NGOs and federations undertaking civic action
- o 350 COs
- o 60 communal level federations (depending on whether this becomes an indicator)
- o Sample size of 50 COs (at least 2 per NGO & federation); all Intermediary NGOs/Fed.

a) CO Survey

Overall responsibility for this survey rests with the Contractor who organizes the overall survey effort, designs questionnaire, trains and monitor implementing partners' data collection, and analyzes data and prepares final report.

<u>Tasks</u>	<u>No of Days</u>	<u>Responsibility</u>
Survey planning:	4 days	Contractor
Questionnaire design:	4 days	Contractor
Pre-Test of Questionnaire:	5 days	Contractor
Training for surveyors:	5 days	Contractor
Survey Implementation:	115 days ³	Implementing Partners
Contractor accompanying initial CO surveys:	15 days	Contractor
Survey processing, analysis & reporting:	40	Contractor
<i>Total CO survey:</i>	<i>198 days</i>	

³ Each Implementing Partner, i.e., PVO, NGO and Federation surveys 3 COs. Calculation based on 5 days to survey 3 COs.

b) Implementing Survey

Overall responsibility of this survey will be with the Contractor, including survey implementation. Implementing partners surveyed will include: (i) the intermediary program manager and a small number of PVOs involved in NGO/federation capacity building; and (ii) intermediary NGOs, PVOs and federations building CO capacity.

<u>Tasks</u>	<u>No of Days</u>	<u>Responsibility</u>
Questionnaire design:	2 days	Contractor
Training for surveyors:	2 days	Contractor
Survey Implementation:	30 days	Contractor
Survey processing, analysis and reporting:	11 days	Contractor
<i>Total Implementing Partner Survey:</i>	<i>45 days</i>	

The level of effort required for the annual survey and the costs entailed in mounting the survey would be more modest in the first two years, given the smaller number of target groups, and somewhat greater the last three years, due to the larger number of target groups. Costs will depend in the end on the sample size, which will, as noted previously, depend on the degree of stratification desired. The year three sample size was based on a desire to survey at least two CO partners attached to *each* target intermediary NGO and federation.

4. Implementing the Survey

As noted above, USAID will require a Contractor that has a high degree of sophistication in the area of monitoring and evaluation, who will in turn need to provide TA/training and careful supervision to those partners participating in the implementation of the annual surveys. The Contractor will be responsible for analyzing the results, preparing final reports, and providing an in-dept debriefing for . USAID and its partners. USAID may want to be involved in the development and pre-testing of the survey questionnaire, because this instrument should remain similar each year. The higher the quality of the survey instrument, the more useful the results. Additional questions could of course be added to the survey each year, but a core of questions must stay the same in order to elicit information concerning the indicators. A survey statistician with a lot of experience in questionnaire design for illiterates/semi-literates could help with this.

USAID (through whatever mechanism it decides to pursue) also probably needs to assume responsibility for determining the sample size and selection of groups in the sample each year. A math statistician can help with this. It may be possible to procure this help locally.

In the event that the Mission decides to use the intermediary program manager to implement the monitoring and evaluation plan, another approach would be to use a buy-in to a DG Center IQC for sustained support to the prime PVO over the life of the strategy. If this is done, an effort should be made to secure the same individuals, to allow for continuity. This is not always easy to arrange with intermittent support, particularly if the time periods for assignments shift.

It would be useful over time to transfer as many of these skills as possible to Malian staff of the various partners and perhaps particularly to local partner(s) of the Contractor and to intermediary NGOs and federations.

5. Semi-Annual Information on Progress

The Mission will need some information from the Contractor and its implementing partners at the six month point. Mostly, this information should be confined to outputs, with some evidence that training and TA are resulting in some changes in what and how INGOs and federations, as well as COs, go about their work. Information reported at six month intervals could include:

- o numbers trained, by subject
- o person days of training, by subject
- o number of workshops held, by subject;
- o curricula and training materials developed;
- o TA provided, by subject; and
- o immediate outcomes of training and TA (i.e., numbers of COs or INGOs/federations with new strategic plans, using one or more civic action techniques, developing a code of ethics; developing job descriptions, hiring women, etc.)

Qualitative reporting on progress would also be extremely useful.

The Mission could think through very carefully what information it might want at six month intervals or could specify in its scope of work for the IQC that proposals lay out what prospective partners would expect to provide.

D. Additional Indicators for Gauging Impact Outside of the Performance Monitoring Plan

The following indicators are outside the performance monitoring plan because they exceed manageable interest or were useful for management but not essential for illustrating impact:

Strategic Objective:

1. Number of communes bordering target communes that show some evidence of a spill-over; community organizations undertaking civic action and either trying to influence government decisions or actually doing so. It is not practical to structure a representative sample for this indicator, since it is outside the performance monitoring plan. It makes most sense to take a small sample of those target communes where COs have been most effective in working with local governments, and then looking at neighboring communes for a spread affect. If such impact is found and it seems reasonable to conclude that at least part of the reason for CO vibrancy is learning from neighbors, then the information could be used to supplement or illustrate regular SO indicator reporting.
2. Percent of COs whose members believe that local governments (community and commune) are receptive to citizens' input. Questions to elicit this can easily be added to the annual questionnaire. It is not,

however, proposed to add such an indicator to the performance monitoring plan due to the unpredictability of opinion. This indicator might have some value-added but it is not critical to demonstrating impact.

3. Increased citizen participation in COs. One existing indicator (formation of COs) does give us some sense of increasing participation. It could be useful, but not critical to look at whether CO memberships grow or whether individuals are volunteering more in conjunction with the public services provided by COs.

E. Evaluations

"Performance monitoring and evaluation are different dimensions of the same management system in USAID. Evaluations are seen as a way of learning about experience: what is happening, what are the intended and unintended impacts of USAID's activities, why things happened the way they did. To effective learning tools, evaluations must involve managers, contractors, counterparts, beneficiaries. They must be participatory. This view of evaluation contrasts, however, with another view -- perhaps more prevalent in the Agency and the donor community generally -- that evaluations should be independent, objective, rigorous, and be instruments to hold managers and contractors accountable for the results for which they are responsible. The shift to a more participatory, learning role for evaluation will not occur overnight and is by no means assured. It will require a change in USAID's institutional culture and system of incentives. The pace and success of this change will depend in no small measure on the extent to which managers perceive a "safe" environment for learning from evaluations, rather than one which puts a premium on always giving the appearance of success."⁴

Evaluations should be problem-based during the first several years of this strategy. If, for example, performance indicator values do not move in the anticipated direction, and the reasons cannot be readily identified, then the Mission may want to set up an evaluation which tries to determine the reasons for the problem and recommend how to overcome them. Toward the middle of the third year of the strategy, there may be good reason to examine more carefully the "vertical logic" in the results framework or the development hypothesis put down by the Mission. A qualitative evaluation to assess the nature of the change in the relationships between citizens' groups and government, and between citizens and community organizations, particularly at the local level, could also bear fruit, as could a careful assessment of the relationship between c.o.s and intermediary federations and representative groups.

A principal component of the evaluation methodology used in this plan should be the incorporation of the several types of appraisal, study and research proposed in Thunder's January 1996 proposed M&E plan. Throughout the strategic planning process and culminating with the "ground-truthing" exercise of March/ April 1996, a number of major issues arose which could have a significant, and possibly negative impact on the outcome of the D/G program results. For instance, consensus is the recognized approach used by COs in both decision-making and leadership selection. However, it has been argued that in local settings where traditional values (e.g., male dominated, patrimonial rule) and existing power asymmetries resulting from these values (e.g., between age groups, gender) will lead to low participation by those with marginal power and, therefore to undemocratic outcomes. Since democratic self-governance obviously requires internal democratic practice among COs, if consensus is used in decision-making and leadership selection there could be serious problems in the logic of the D/G results framework. A second example, relates to the voluntary nature of *village associations (AVs)*. Voluntary association is a pre-requisite to the formation of civil society organizations. The D/G SOT has consistently heard that many types of AVs, particularly those in the CMDT and OHVN zones, were imposed by the parastatals that manage these zones to ensure input supply and marketing. Thus,

⁴ This quotation is taken from "Program Performance Monitoring and Evaluation at USAID," Scott E. Smith Director, January 1996, CDIE, USAID.

they serve the needs of the parastatals and not necessarily those of the AV. The question, then, is how cohesive, representative and democratic are these community organizations given the way in which they were formed.

In both the above examples, and several others mentioned in the Thunder report, further study will be required to ascertain the impact of these issues on the intended results anticipated in the D/G results framework. Case studies over time, commissioned studies, or rapid appraisals all offer ways in which to examine such critical issues in more detail.

II. SUMMARY OF NEXT STEPS

Next steps for the DG SOT are summarized below:

- o **Initiate a Mission-wide review of synergy and integration of all SOs. Specifically, what approaches and mechanisms will be employed by the Mission and/or concerned SO Teams in activities that intend to work with and through COs to achieve their individual results.**
- o **Meet with the other SO Teams to determine which COs will be the common focus of their programs and then explore overlapping implementation concerns, commonly desired results and indicators, and possibilities for joint data collection;**
- o **Explore with the Democracy Center buying into the Center's IQC mechanisms for long-term M&E support;**
- o **Determine local resources available for implementing surveys; and**
- o **In the event that the intermediary program manager is engaged to undertake M&E responsibilities, ensure that M&E requirements are adequately represented in relevant procurement documentation. Local TA from a Malian statistician could help the Mission to spell out the survey requirements for all years of the strategy.**

ANNEX 1:

**USAID/MALI D/G STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE
PERFORMANCE MONITORING PLAN**

ANNEX 1:

THUNDER & ASSOCIATES MONITORING AND EVALUATION PLAN: FINAL REPORT

April 16, 1996

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PROPOSED MONITORING & EVALUATION PLAN
FOR THE
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE

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Draft
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Preface

The following describes a proposed M&E plan for the D/G SO. While the team did not have sufficient time to finalize an M&E *system* (which was not a requirement of our Scope of Work), we believe that the plan proposed below is an appropriate and responsive outline for the D/G SO's M&E needs required by reengineering. Additional effort will be required to finalize the survey instruments, collection procedures, and reporting requirements. These must respond to refined indicators and targets. The scope of the M&E system will also be determined by USAID Mali's and the D/G Team's defined target geographic areas. While the whole team reviewed this report, it was drafted by Jennifer Coston with revision support from Leslie Fox.

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INTRODUCTION: THE CHALLENGE OF M&E FOR D/G PROGRAMS

In its re-engineering effort, USAID is placing a relatively greater emphasis on *measuring results*. That is, the most significant questions monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems seek to address under re-engineering is "Have the goals been reached?" "Have the problems been solved?" and "Do results justify expended resources?" A further analytical component of M&E systems would also seek to identify means of correcting for a negative response to the above.

The first challenge, then, for an M&E system with a re-engineering emphasis, is to ensure that the objectives and intended results are well-defined. Without a clear direction and specific measurable progress indicators, results cannot be adequately gauged. In the M&E field, there is a consensus that the more quantifiable the indicators and results, the more stable the operational environment, and the less variable the internal and external inputs – the more reliable, simple, and effective the M&E system. Unfortunately, given the nature of the D/G SO and democratic governance in general, the D/G SO is faced with the greatest possible challenge to designing an effective M&E system. In fact, it is argued that the less clear, appropriate, and available the generalized knowledge of causal relationships between intended actions and desired results, i.e., the less developed the state-of-the-art of the sectoral knowledge, the more difficult to design an appropriate M&E system. While *theorizing* on democracy and governance has been around for a long time, broadly accepted theories regarding causal relationships, especially those which are operationally useful, are still under development.


That said, how can we begin to address this challenge? First, as mentioned above, we need to be as specific and clear as possible about what we are trying to accomplish (objectives or intermediate results) and what we expect to see as outcomes (indicators). Second, especially given the D/G SO's emphasis on *democratic governance and practice*, we need to also include monitoring *process or behavior* in the implementation of the D/G SO activities. This will necessarily imply an inevitable and necessary emphasis on qualitative data, and, specifically, participant observation. The latter must be applied both to the target beneficiaries, i.e., community organizations and RPOs, as well as to implementing USAID agents and partners, i.e., the D/G Team, international or USPVOs, contractors, and Malian NGOs and federations. Of course, whenever process is a key evaluation target, it must be recognized (and safeguarded to the extent possible) that such evaluation is subject to subjective interpretation. For this reason, we must pursue a *multidimensional approach to M&E*. This would include a combination of both quantitative (where possible) and qualitative data, from multiple sources, in various locations, at several stages (time series).

Under the circumstances, in making evaluative conclusions, care must always be taken to re-examine whether poor results are attributable to program management or to unverified and potentially faulty assumptions about causal relationships. Finally, in any M&E system, and particularly under such challenging circumstances, the system must be flexible and open to adaptive changes on the basis of experienced failure, new developments in the sectoral state-of-the-art knowledge/theory of causal relationships, and interesting unintended results (positive or negative) from program implementation. In short, the developing nature of the democratic governance field necessitates a flexible M&E system with a strong feedback and learning component. The corresponding process and components are summarized in Figure 1.

Any M&E system will also face the inevitability of flaws and deficiencies. No one system can provide *all* the data for decision making which a manager thinks s/he will require. Care must be taken, then, to not expend an overabundance of resources to design a "perfect" system. Not all information can be obtained, not all indicators

Figure. 1

**MONITORING & EVALUATION:
PROCESS AND COMPONENTS**



are measurable, and 100% accuracy is unattainable.⁵ The M&E plan proposed below seeks to incorporate these considerations, and the recommended major functions of USAID M&E systems, namely:

- I. Regular analyses of administrative data on select indicators of project progress and performance
 - A. Planned or ad hoc studies on key management or impact questions
 - B. Procedures for timely feedback of both types of information to managers (Norton & Benoiel, 1987, 32).

The plan is designed to address the three purposes of judging results as outlined by reengineering:

1. To *assure accountability* by verifying that our resources are being well-spent and that our programs are achieving expected results in improving the lives of our customers;
2. To *improve management* by identifying progress in achieving expected results, problems (and successes) as a basis for strategic and tactical decision-making, and information gaps where additional knowledge and attention is needed; and
3. To *improve our understanding of development* by assessing impact, identifying lessons learned, and advancing broader development theory and practice (USAID, 1995, I.26).

It is important to note that the design of a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation system is a significant endeavor which needs to be closely integrated with program and activity design. As the precise activities and mechanisms of the D/G SO are still under development, and as the endeavor will require a greater amount of time and resources than is allocated under the current assignment, the Support Team has undertaken to propose the components and timeline of an exemplary M&E plan. The precise survey instruments and methodologies remain to be determined. However, we believe that the plan outlined below is an appropriate and responsive outline for the D/G SO's M&E needs required by re-engineering.

THE PROPOSED M&E PLAN FOR D/G SO According to a USAID Methodology report, "Experience shows that, in most cases, regular analysis of administrative data, small-scale surveys, case studies, and rapid, low-cost methods (rather than large-scale surveys or censuses) are the data gathering and analysis approaches that will be most useful and efficient for A.I.D. and counterpart managers..." (Ibid., 46). Consequently, these are the components incorporated and encouraged in the proposed M&E plan for the D/G SO. Before outlining the proposed plan, each of these methodologies will be briefly explained.

I. M&E METHODOLOGIES A. IMPLEMENTATION MONITORING

Implementation monitoring seeks to measure the program progress and implementation performance (i.e., efficiency and effectiveness) of individual implementers and their activities. Such monitoring must occur both within USAID, i.e., targeted to the performance of the team; and among its implementing partners, i.e.,

In fact, a World Bank study surveyed project managers and found that on the whole, they believed that an 80% accuracy rate was sufficient for management decision making (World Bank, 1980).

international or USPVOs, Malian NGOs and federations, contractors, etc. An important component of both targets of implementation monitoring (USAID and its partners) is how each relates to the other.

Administrative records are a relatively inexpensive means to regularly evaluate program progress and implementation performance. Typically, this will entail simple, one-page reports submitted periodically by local implementers/partners, and D/G Team members. The results of these reports are quickly tabulated and analyzed, and the results are shared with management on a regular basis. The D/G Team will need to determine the various reporting requirements (i.e., specific content, and whether they should be submitted quarterly or semiannually). Reporting requirements from partners will need to be tied to the reporting requirements of the D/G Team to the Mission, and from the Mission to USAID Washington. The precise parameters of the data to be collected will depend on the particular activity and target population.

The D/G SO Team should establish a reporting plan with each implementing partner. Additional performance data will be acquired through the Team's "Learning Lab" activities. That is, the D/G Team's periodic monitoring of targeted areas through participant observation.

Under the D/G SO, it is recommended that the data be analyzed and more broadly reported on a semiannual basis. The results should be shared both with the D/G Team, the Results Center, and the relevant implementing partners. Exemplary questions, as suggested by reengineering documentation, can be found in Annex 1.

B. Surveys: Baseline Data and Time Series Monitoring

Before considering the conduct of surveys, it is highly recommended that the D/G Team investigate the data collection efforts of other actors in Mali, i.e., other donors, government agencies, etc. (See "Secondary Data" below). If some of the data recommended below is available elsewhere, the D/G Team could save valuable time and resources by drawing upon this available information. The D/G Team would need to confirm that this information would be consistently available on an updated annual basis and/or be prepared to take over the collection efforts if necessary. Given the specific results for which the D/G Team is responsible according to the Results Framework, it is likely that the D/G Team will want to take responsibility for its own baseline data collection and monitoring. However, to the extent possible, the D/G Team should decentralize M&E activities to its implementing partners, including its baseline data collection and monitoring.

As large-scale surveys are costly and unnecessary for the monitoring of key indicators related to program activities and objectives, small-scale and informal surveys will be used. These surveys will initially gather baseline data which will be monitored annually through time-series analysis. The surveys will be closely tied to the indicators and targets outlined in the Results Framework. The D/G Team is identifying additional indicators which will assist them in delineating more broadly the impact of program activities, but for which the Team will not be held responsible as part of the Results Framework. These indicators will also be reflected in the survey instruments. The suggested surveys encompass two methodologies: public opinion measurement, and knowledge, attitude, and practice (KAP) measurement. The surveys will examine both democratic governance practice at the local level and beyond, and more *localized* development results (stemming from this practice). Two surveys are suggested:

1. Small Scale Sample Survey on Participation in Governance

The aim of this survey is to measure whether or not individuals' and community organizations' participation in governance has been enhanced by program activities. The questionnaire would be in two parts: Part 1 would

target individuals; Part 2 would be answered only by individuals who are participating in community organizations. Exemplary questions/information targets would include:

- I. As an individual (and as part of your participation in a community organization(s)), do you have contact with your elected representatives? Frequency & results.
- II. As an individual (and as part of your participation in a community organization(s)), do you have contact with government officials (administrative & executive)? Frequency & results.
- III. Perception that election results accurately represent the desires of the majority of constituents, if not, why?
- IV. Expectations/anticipated results of elected representatives? Of decentralization efforts?
- V. Participatory/democratic practices within community organization(s) to which respondent belongs
- VI. Relationship of community organization to Traditional Village Leadership
- VII. Linkages with RPOs, capacity building NGOs and federations, and Government (local and state)?

2. Informal Survey on Quality of Life and Progress of Development

The ultimate goal is to assess whether or not the efforts of individuals and community organizations (either directly or via RPOs) to participate in governance result in their development priorities being addressed. Exemplary questions/information targets would include:

- VIII. What are your development priorities and a) desired timeline to meet these needs, and b) perceived realistic timeline
- IX. Economic opportunities, literacy, average household income, access to primary and secondary education, sanitation, water supply, mill, Maternity, Primary Health Care Clinic, roads/transportation infrastructure, viable means to get goods to market, impediments to economic activities (e.g., regulation, getting goods to market, access to inputs at reasonable costs)
- Which of these priorities are being met and to what extent by:
 - COs directly
 - Communal governments in response to CO civic action
 - Other levels of government as a result of RPO civic action

C. Rapid, RURAL APPRAISAL

These appraisals or studies are designed to provide rapid feedback to managers at a relatively low cost. They are used to collect both regular information over time (for time series analysis), and ad hoc information on unanticipated implementation problems or impressive successes. Data can be both qualitative and quantitative; its collection can entail a number of different techniques and combinations thereof, including: record examination, group interviews, confidential interviews, key informants, participant-observation, informal surveys, and rapid, non-random sample surveys. A brief description of these techniques, from USAID's Program Design and Evaluation Methodology Report No. 10, can be found in Annex 2. This approach is guided by two principles: "1) 'optimal ignorance,' or the art of knowing what is not worth knowing, and 2) 'proportionate accuracy,' or the avoidance of unnecessary precision" (Chambers 1981, 99; qtd. in Norton & Benoliel, 1987, 13). With these principles in mind, the approach emphasizes low-cost, and timely and practical feedback. Finally, because sophisticated methods are not required, the studies can be easily replicated in multiple areas and can be conducted by local individuals and institutions.

D. Case Studies

Case studies are more in-depth investigations of certain aspects of relatively successful or unsuccessful projects. Case studies seek 1) to determine those factors which enhance or impede implementation, and 2) to examine unanticipated and secondary effects of the project. The case study seeks to put the project in its historical and

socio-economic context. Typically the data collection techniques will include an examination of secondary data (existing records), formal and informal interviews, small scale surveys, and direct observation. More than one case study should be conducted at any time to provide the basis for comparative evaluation and to facilitate the isolation of external factors beyond the control of project management. Case studies are particularly useful for documenting and explaining program successes for broad dissemination.

E. Commissioned Research

Assessing the validity of causal relationships is essential to the M&E of any SO pursued under reengineering. However, especially given the state-of-the-art of knowledge about democratic governance (as discussed above), investigating these relationships is even more salient under the D/G SO. The Mission's ground-breaking work in this area has the potential to make a significant contribution to the state-of-the-art theory and practice -- particularly as it is exercised in USAID's development work. On the other hand, without a strong commitment to learning and an appreciation of this challenge, the D/G Team risks continual investment in the pursuit of ineffective approaches based on unverified assumptions.

Commissioned research can seek 1) to verify important assumptions at critical points in the implementation process and the program's evolution; 2) to validate the attribution of outcomes to program efforts; 3) to investigate and begin to identify the causality of unanticipated results; and 4) to begin to draw important theoretical generalizations and practical implications of lessons learned. The results of the other M&E methodologies will likely identify important specific research questions. Indeed, because the research topics will be identified as the program and its implementation evolve, an appropriate research agenda cannot be specified in advance. Of particular interest will be periodic assessments of the enabling environment and key macro-political and economic developments (i.e., the progress of decentralization implementation), their effect on the development of democratic governance, and the specific implications for program activities.

It is recommended that the D/G Team appropriate a budget for research activities, especially for Year Two and beyond. It is anticipated that after Year Five of implementation, the D/G Team's experience would be adequately mature for significant conclusions -- based on research -- to be made. Therefore, we recommend that Years Three and Five be earmarked for significant evaluation and review, to specifically test causal relationships and assumptions underlying the D/G SO.

F. Evaluations

Evaluations are tied to individual Results Packages and overall program results and performance. They measure both the impact of the Results Framework, and the effectiveness of individual partners. Particularly if the D/G SO Team decides not to pursue the scope of research activities described above, the questions elaborated above will have to be addressed through comprehensive evaluations. The D/G Team will need to further elaborate an evaluation plan. In general, it is recommended that evaluations be scheduled for Years Three and Five, and as program results and M&E findings warrant.

G. Action Research

Another important learning and evaluation opportunity will be the conduct of action research by the Malian NGOs and federations providing technical assistance and training to community organizations. Conducting action research would enable these implementing actors to systematically record key lessons learned at the community/grassroots level which is relatively less accessible to USAID's other implementing partners. Of course, such research would necessitate training these organizations in action research skills, and limits would need to be set in terms of how much action research would be pursued. It is recommended that the D/G SO

pursue this opportunity as funding allows, and according to submitted research proposals, once these implementing partners have been trained in action research.

II. ADDITIONAL SOURCES & MANAGEMENT OF DATA. Secondary Data

While the above mentioned methodologies will generate their own data, it is also important to draw upon existing or secondary data sources. The availability, accuracy, and usefulness of secondary data will need to be determined. Potential sources for investigation include the State Statistical Office, the Decentralization Mission, and other donors; as well as data available and/or collected by USAID partners and Pivot Groups. In particular, the potential contribution of the Decentralization Mission should be carefully investigated. The World Bank's survey work on the quality of public service delivery should also be examined; it might provide useful baseline data, and/or provide interesting examples for the survey instruments. Relevant secondary data should be included in the analysis and reports of all surveys, case studies, and rapid, rural appraisals where appropriate.

B. USAID Information & Communication SO (INFOCOM) Information Center

It is strongly recommended that the D/G Team draw upon the important information resources and services proposed by INFOCOM, namely the development of a public information center incorporating appropriate information technology. First, it is recommended that the D/G Team consider coordinating with INFOCOM regarding the selection of information to be made available. This information should include a general library on democratic governance, in addition to periodicals relevant to the Malian socio-economic and political context and related data. The D/G Team should be prepared to allocate resources to the INFOCOM Center for this purpose.

Second, the D/G SO should take full advantage of the information technology to be made available through the INFOCOM Center. This includes identifying and accessing databases and information sources available through the INTERNET. Most importantly, it is strongly recommended that the D/G Team utilize the GIS system, already available at the Mission, to monitor the progress of key indicators on a comparative geographical basis. This would allow the D/G Team to identify the need to explore geographic discrepancies in results which might be tied, for example, to the effectiveness of particular partner organizations in the various locations. Cultural differences might also be reflected regionally, which would enable the D/G Team to identify needs for more specialized services under the D/G SO.

C. Reengineering Information Services

The D/G Team should also take full advantage of USAID's proposed new management system (NMS) supporting SOs and Results Packages. This will eventually include the Results Package Implementation System and the Results Tracking System. As this system is being specifically designed to support the tracking of results under reengineering, it should be used to its full advantage once it is in place.

III. IMPLEMENTING AGENTS/DIVISION OF LABOR*The proposed D/G SO M&E plan is designed to be multidimensional, which entails the collection of data from a variety of sources, conducted by a variety of implementers. The proposed division of labor will be subject to the capacity of the Results Center, and the M&E activities pursued under the other SOs. In all cases, the D/G Team should seek to coordinate and complement -- wherever feasible -- the activities and efforts of these other M&E systems.*

We believe that the division of labor should meet several key criteria:

- A. It should be multi-sourced: data would be collected in a variety of locations within the program areas, from a variety of target beneficiaries, and implementing partners.
- B. It should incorporate the spirit of participation in its collection and dissemination processes: information should be solicited from implementers and target beneficiaries, results should be shared with implementing partners, and representatives of both groups should be invited to attend dissemination workshops and conferences.
- C. It should encourage close collaboration and input from the D/G Team, the Results Center, and the other SO Teams, in the spirit of team management inspired by re-engineering.
- D. Most importantly, it should entail significant capacity building and technology transfer to Malian counterparts.

Activities required to operationalize an appropriate M&E system (based on the proposed system) include:

- A. Initial refinement of the proposed M&E system, including the design of survey instruments, and key administrative indicators
- B. The identification of key M&E implementers within the D/G Team, the Mission, and/or among implementing partners, and the provision of technical assistance to them
- C. The training of target Malian NGOs and federations in action research (as funding allows)
- D. The conduct, analysis, and reporting of surveys and rapid rural appraisals. It is recommended that the responsibility for these activities be gradually transferred from a technical expert (either from USAID, an international or USPVO, or contractor) to a Malian counterpart (gradual transfer of responsibilities described below)
- E. The conduct of research and evaluations as deemed appropriate, particularly following Years Three and Five.
- F. The design and delivery of dissemination workshops and conferences, including the commissioning of specialized analytical reports and research products for presentation.

Some of the above activities will require a technical expert. The technical expert may come from USAID, an international or USPVO, or a contractor. More generally, implementing actors should include member(s) of the D/G Team, representatives of the Results Center, and USAID partners. The precise partners might include the Malian NGOs and federations engaged in CO capacity building, international or USPVOs engaged in the capacity building of Malian NGOs and Federations, and possibly contractors. To the extent possible, the D/G Team should decentralized M&E activities (particularly data collection) to implementing partners. A proposed data collection and monitoring plan should be required for each negotiated contract. Subsequently, the D/G Team will need to coordinate the various M&E actors and their respective processes.

It is strongly recommended that the D/G Team determine its M&E implementing actors as early as possible. Accordingly, an element of trust, collaboration, and team spirit can be cultivated both among the implementing partners and the D/G Team, and between the technical expert and the Malian counterpart. Furthermore, experience shows that such early established relationships can lead to greater acceptance of findings and a greater likelihood that negative findings will be appropriately addressed (Norton & Benoliel, 1987, 30). Overall such early involvement and continuity of effort will result in a gradual refinement of the system and its contribution to program management, *building* on results for greater effectiveness.

While the technical expert would remain accessible as needed, assuming the expert is from outside of the USAID Mission, its presence over the life of the program should diminish and its relative attention to various tasks

should change. Initially, the technical expert would focus primarily on the design of the system; it's role in refining the system is anticipated to diminish after the first three years of program implementation. While the technical expert will initially participate in the collection of data for the surveys and rapid rural appraisals, this role is also anticipated to diminish as the responsibility is increasingly transferred to a Malian counterpart. In fact, the technical expert's role from the beginning in this regard will be participation only to the extent that the Malian counterpart needs technical assistance during the process of learning-by-doing. Similarly, the Malian counterpart will assume increasing responsibility for data analysis and reporting. However, it is anticipated that the D/G Team will want to maintain a longer-term relationship with the technical expert to oversee data analysis and undertake specialized studies of complex issues as the program evolves.

The details of the proposed system's data collection, analysis, dissemination, and initial division of labor (dependent on the identified implementing actors and implementing partners' proposals) are outlined below.

IV. DATA COLLECTION

A. Year One

1. Implementation Monitoring

This will depend on each activity and/or implementing partner. Appropriate information requirements should be determined accordingly.

2. Small Scale Sample Survey on Participation in Governance

Description.

In Year One, the survey would provide baseline data.

Location.

Will depend on defined project area but might entail something like:

- I. 2 villages in each of four districts targeted
- II. 2 villages in each of 2 districts outside of project area but proximate (to eventually measure spread effects)
- III. 2 villages in each of 2 districts outside of and remote from project area (baseline comparison and eventually potential spread effects)
- IV. Additional villages if and when the program area expands

3. Informal Survey on Quality of Life and Progress of Development

Description.

In Year One, the survey would provide baseline data.

Location.

Will depend on defined project area but might entail something like (as above):

- I. 2 villages in each of four districts targeted
- II. 2 villages in each of 2 districts outside of project area but proximate (to eventually measure spread effects)
- III. 2 villages in each of 2 districts outside of and remote from project area (baseline comparison and eventually potential spread effects)
- IV. Additional villages if and when the program area expands

B. Year Two

1. Implementation Monitoring

Continuation of Year One and to be on-going. At the end of Year One and each subsequent year (for the first three years) a technical expert would be commissioned to review the usefulness of the administrative data collection, analysis, reporting procedures, and management responsiveness to data analysis. The administrative system would be revised accordingly. After the first three years, the Results Center would continue this annual review.

2. Small Scale Sample Survey on Participation in Governance

Entails time series data to monitor progress on key indicators, using Year One results as baseline. The survey would be conducted in the same locations as the previous year, and additional ones if the program target area(s) expand.

3. Informal Survey on Quality of Life and Progress of Development

Entails time series data to monitor progress on key indicators, using Year One results as baseline. The survey would be conducted in the same locations as the previous year, and additional ones if the program target area(s) expand.

4. Rapid Rural Appraisal in Areas with Unexpected Results (Poor Performance)

Description.

To find out what didn't work and why.

Methodology.

Should entail one, more, or all of the following: participant observation, focus groups, targeted interviews, informal surveys as appropriate.

Location.

A minimum of two to three villages each that 1) reported no increase in citizen participation in governance, or 2) reported major discrepancies with anticipated development results.

5. Rapid Rural Appraisal in Areas with Significant Improvements

Description.

To find out what was different from other areas and why it worked.

Methodology.

Should entail one, more, or all of the following: participant observation, focus groups, targeted interviews, informal surveys as appropriate.

Location.

Two to three villages reporting significant improvements.

C. Year Three

1. Implementation Monitoring

Continuation of Years One and Two and to be on-going.

2. Small Scale Sample Survey on Participation in Governance

Entails time series data to monitor progress on key indicators, using Years One and Two results to monitor progress. The survey would be conducted in the same locations as the previous year, and additional ones if the program target area(s) expand.

3. Informal Survey on Quality of Life and Progress of Development

Entails time series data to monitor progress on key indicators, using Years One and Two results to monitor progress. The survey would be conducted in the same locations as the previous year, and additional ones if the program target area(s) expand.

4. Rapid Rural Appraisal in Areas with Unexpected Results from Year Two

Description.

To find out what changes were made based on Year Two's assessment, if they yielded good results, why or why not.

Location.

Same four to six villages examined in Year Two.

5. Case Studies of Villages Identified in Year Two as Yielding Significant Improvements

Description.

To further explore in greater detail what worked and why; how the successful villages differ from an average project village; if the results from Year Three were consistent with Year Two and if not why; how issues addressed in Year Two were successfully addressed; and to draw recommendations, where appropriate, for other village operations.

Methodology.

Should entail one, more, or all of the following: participant observation, focus groups, targeted interviews, informal surveys as appropriate; in addition to secondary sources.

Location.

The same two to three villages reporting significant improvements in Year Two, in addition to a village reporting moderate to average results.

6. Commissioned Research

A broader based research effort would be conducted to assess the enabling environment for democratic governance in Mali in light of the social, economic, and macro-political developments during the first three years of implementation. Of specific interest will be the development and interaction of decentralization with

D/G SO customers. A separate, or more comprehensive, piece will also assess the validity of the causal relationships inherent in the results package in light of program outcomes.

D. Future and On-Going

1. Emerging Issues

Additional activities, particularly rapid rural appraisals and commissioned research, should be implemented as needs are identified, e.g., to answer questions regarding project management adjustments, identified issues resulting from Monitoring and Evaluation activities, and new challenges in the enabling environment. For example, as different phases of the Decentralization Program are implemented, the effects of this effort on the project areas should be carefully examined.

2. Action Research

Additional findings can and should be obtained from the action research conducted by implementing Malian NGOs and federations, as the funding allows. Findings should be incorporated into the analyses of the other M&E activities.

3. Participant Observation

Through its "Learning Lab," the D/G Team should use participant observation to periodically (and regularly) monitor the democratic internal working of associations, and at meetings between associations and RPOs. This effort would target specifically assigned villages and be on-going.

4. Evaluation

Evaluations should be considered following years Three (smaller-scale), and Five (comprehensive), as needed (i.e., if associated research is not conducted).

5. Beyond Year Three

It is anticipated that similar activities, i.e., implementation monitoring, surveys, rapid rural appraisals, case studies, commissioned research, and action research (as above) will continue throughout the life of the program. The implementation monitoring and surveys should continue as outlined above. However, the D/G Team may decide to conduct the surveys in newly targeted areas. Rapid rural appraisals similar to the ones recommended in years two and three should also be repeated in subsequent years. It is anticipated that additional information requirements will be identified as the program evolves and it is recommended that supplemental rapid rural appraisals, case studies, commissioned research, and action research be conducted accordingly. Finally, it is recommended that the technical expert be engaged at the end of year three to design an extended M&E system, with as much specification as is appropriate for the coming years based on the results of Years One through Three.

V. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISSEMINATION (AND DIVISION OF LABOR) *These activities must be closely coordinated with the Results Center and the M&E implementers of the other SOs. Specific roles and responsibilities may vary accordingly. Discussion of the division of labor is intended to demonstrate how technical expertise and responsibility can be transferred to a Malian counterpart. The "technical expert" may be an individual or an institution, i.e., a member of the D/G Team, a representative from USAID Washington, the Results Center, an international or USPVO, or a contractor.*

A. Year One

1. Implementation Monitoring

One annual report will be compiled. The D/G Team will carefully monitor the results of the administrative data throughout the year and make adjustments to program operations as deemed necessary. The results of the administrative data collection and its analysis for the comprehensive year, including a report of responsive changes to management systems will be compiled by the D/G Team with support from the technical expert (particularly for the analysis). The report will be shared with implementing partners for their feedback and information. In cases of poor performance, the D/G Team may want to consider requesting action plans from implementing partners regarding how they plan to address shortcomings identified in the report.

At the end of Year One and each subsequent year (for the first three years) the technical expert would review the usefulness of the administrative data collection, analysis, reporting procedures, and management responsiveness to data analysis. The administrative system would be revised accordingly. After the first three years, the Results Center would continue this annual review.

2. Small Scale Sample Survey on Participation in Governance & Informal Survey on Quality of Life and Progress of Development

- I. Technical expert designs the surveys and works with a Malian counterpart to collect the data.
- II. Technical expert will review the results of the surveys, determine whether the desired information was captured by the instrument, and summarize the findings in a report.
- III. Technical expert will review D/G SO goals, objectives, and activities to ensure that they will address priority needs in target areas. Findings will be summarized in a report which would also make recommendations for adjustments as needs are identified.
- IV. All reports will be presented and discussed with the D/G Team and the Results Center, and be shared with implementing partners (as above).

B. Year Two

1. Implementation Monitoring

Semiannual analysis and reports will be conducted. The system will be reviewed and revised as in Year One. The reports will be compiled by the technical expert in close collaboration with the D/G Team (for Year Two only), and with input from the Results Center. The reports will be shared with implementing partners for their feedback and information. In cases of poor performance, the D/G Team may want to consider requesting action plans from implementing partners regarding how they plan to address shortcomings identified in the report.

2. Surveys

- I. Technical expert will revise the instruments for use in subsequent data collection according to the findings of Year One.
- II. Technical expert provides assistance to Malian counterpart to collect the data.
- III. Technical expert analyzes data and produces a report with participation of Malian counterpart.
- IV. All reports will be presented and discussed with the D/G Team and the Results Center, and be shared with implementing partners (as above).

3. Rapid Rural Appraisals

- I. Technical expert collaborates with Malian counterpart to conduct the studies, analyze the results, and write the respective reports.
- II. All reports will be presented and discussed with the D/G Team and the Results Center, and be shared with implementing partners (as above).

4. Dissemination Workshop

The results of Year Two's data collection and analysis will be presented and discussed at a one to two day workshop. Conclusions will be drawn regarding the successes, challenges, and progress; needed revisions in the M&E system will be identified. Initial discussions of project management implications may also be discussed. The audience would include the D/G Team, representatives of the Results Center, and Program Development Officers of USAID; USAID implementing partners; and representatives of selective Malian NGOs and federations, RPOs, and community organizations. Other relevant stakeholders and donors might also be included. The workshop will be organized and facilitated by the M&E technical expert in close collaboration with its Malian counterpart.

5. Monitoring Review Committee

Following the workshop, the monitoring review committee -- to include the D/G Team, the technical expert and Malian counterpart, and the Results Center -- will meet to review the feedback reports and draw implications for program management. Revisions will be planned and implemented accordingly. These meetings will focus on the management of the overall D/G SO and each results package individually as needed.

C. Year Three

1. Implementation Monitoring

Semiannual analysis and reports will be conducted. The system will be reviewed and revised as in Years One and Two (and each subsequent year as needed, though major revisions after Year Three are not anticipated). The reports will be compiled by the D/G Team (with optional assistance from the technical expert), with participation from the Results Center (as deemed appropriate). The reports will be shared with implementing partners for their feedback and information. In cases of poor performance, the D/G Team may want to consider requesting action plans from implementing partners regarding how they plan to address shortcomings identified in the report.

2. Surveys

- I. Technical expert will revise the instruments for use in subsequent data collection according to the findings of Years One and Two (substantial revision after year Three is not anticipated).
- II. Malian counterpart to collect the data (with optional assistance from the technical expert).
- III. Malian counterpart analyzes data and produces a report with assistance from the technical expert.
- IV. All reports will be presented and discussed with the D/G Team and the Results Center, and be shared with implementing partners (as above).

3. Rapid Rural Appraisals (To be Determined according to M&E results and management concerns)

- I. Technical expert collaborates with Malian counterpart to conduct the studies, analyze the results, and write the respective reports. Eventually the Malian counterpart should be qualified and experienced enough to conduct the studies independently or with minimal guidance from the technical expert.
- II. All reports will be presented and discussed with the D/G Team and the Results Center, and be shared with implementing partners (as above).

4. Case Studies

- I. Technical expert and Malian counterpart collaborate to conduct the case studies and produce an analytical report
- II. All reports will be presented and discussed with the D/G Team and the Results Center, and be shared with implementing partners (as above).

5. Dissemination Conference

- I. Technical expert and Malian counterpart (with input and assistance from the D/G Team) compile a comprehensive report of all of the M&E activities and reports from Year Three, including an analytical section on progress, prospects, and challenges based on the first three years of implementation of the D/G SO.
- II. The results of this report will be presented and discussed at a three to four day conference. The conference will include sessions on the prospects for the future of Mali's civil society and its contribution to democratic governance, including analyses of the evolving enabling environment. Conclusions will be drawn regarding the successes, challenges, and progress, and needed revisions in the D/G SO, its activities, and management.

The audience would include the D/G Team, representatives of the Results Center, and Program Development Officers of USAID; USAID implementing partners; representatives of selective Malian NGOs and federations, RPOs, and community organizations; GRM representatives from relevant Ministries, agencies, and elected bodies; and other donors working to support democratic governance in Mali. The conference will be organized and facilitated by the M&E technical expert in close collaboration with its Malian counterpart. Both these entities would be commissioned to write appropriate reports and analyses (e.g., on the enabling environment) and deliver sessions.

6. Monitoring Review Committee

Following the conference, the monitoring review committee -- to include the D/G Team, the technical expert and Malian counterpart, and the Results Center -- will meet to review the feedback reports and draw implications for project management. Revisions will be planned and implemented accordingly. These meetings will focus on the management of the overall D/G SO and each results package individually as needed. An M&E revision team will be assembled to include the technical expert and Malian counterpart, and members of the D/G Team and the Results Center to more fully review and revise the M&E system and design an extended system for the coming years.

CONCLUSION

The plan proposed above will address the various functions and requirements of M&E under reengineering. While it begins to outline important components and time lines, it requires substantial further work to refine these, and particularly to specify the data gathering instruments and roles and responsibilities. These activities may require the input of the Results Center and related USAID management decisions. Finally, these decisions, and most importantly the determined budget for implementing the D/G SO, will determine the number, scope, and relative emphasis of each of the proposed activities. While it is not possible to specify a budget and agenda at this time, the finalized system should follow the general rule that "the cost of an information system should be between 0.5 percent and 3 percent of the total project costs, depending on the significance of the project and the need for low- or high-cost options for data gathering, processing, and analysis" (World Bank, 1980; qtd. in Norton & Benoliel, 1987, 50). Due to the innovative nature of the D/G SO and its potential contribution to the state-of-the-art understanding of D/G promotion, it is recommended that the D/G Team invest adequate funds

in an M&E system which would appropriately incorporate a continual learning process, and assessment of presumed causal relationships.

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ANNEX 1: EXEMPLARY QUESTIONS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE DATA⁶

For SO/RP managers during the performance period:

- A. Was the team assembled, motivated and effective in doing its work?
- B. Was the type of partnership selected fully reflective of the core values and particular development situation?
- C. Was the partnership mobilized and engaged in support of achieving the development results?
- D. Were the available resources deployed in a timely and effective manner?
- E. Was needed feedback from customers, from monitoring and evaluation, as appropriate, obtained and used by the SO/RP team in implementing the SO/RP?
- F. Was any needed redirection of tactics and tools to enhance the prospects for achieving the significant development results accomplished by the RP team? Was this redirection effective?
- G. Was continuity of team effort maintained despite team member turnover?
- H. What development results were achieved (intermediate, etc.) during the performance period?
- I. Were appropriate problems raised and resolved in a timely manner with the SO team/manger as needed?
- J. Were lessons learned, if available, fully documented?
- K. Were evaluations of team members completed and accurate in documenting their performance and potential?
- L. Were evaluations of partners/contractors completed and accurate in documenting their performance?

For SO/RP team members during the performance period:

- A. What development results were achieved (intermediate, etc.) during the performance period by the team?
- B. Was the designated role of the team member fulfilled?
- C. Were the team tasks assigned to the team member completed and effective?
- D. What was the full contribution of the team member to the RP effort?
- E. Was the members' evaluation of team managers fully reflective of his/her performance during the period?

For USAID managers evaluating partners during the performance period:

- A. Did they deliver on their commitments agreed to in developing the SO/RP?
- B. Did they fully engage customers during the performance period?
- C. Did they make full contributions to team decision-making in needed changes in tactics/tools as the SO/RP effort evolved?
- D. Within the partnership, what contribution to achieving development results did they make?

⁶From USAID. Preliminary Report of the Business Area Analysis Team for Operations Reengineering: "Making a Difference for Development." Washington, DC: USAID, January 1995: II.3.14-15.

ANNEX 2. DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES⁷

The most common data gathering techniques used in conducting rapid, low-cost studies are discussions with key informants, group interviews, guided interviews, observation, informal surveys, and rapid, non-random sample surveys. These techniques are described in greater detail below.⁸

1. **Key informants.** In the key informant method, the researcher seeks the desired information from a few people in a community or organization who, by virtue of their position and role, are knowledgeable about the phenomenon under study. Key informants are usually those who are better off, better educated, and more powerful (e.g., the village headman, local school teachers, or the head of the local women's organization). Although there are dangers of bias (which can be offset by also talking to the disadvantaged and less powerful members of the community), these individuals can provide valuable insights. This technique can be very useful, for example, in obtaining information concerning the following:

- Anticipated and unanticipated project effects
- Village-level constraints to effective implementation

2. **Group interviews.** This social science technique brings together a small group of people for an extended discussion cued by a series of questions or discussion topics put forward by the investigator. This technique is also referred to as "focus group" interviews. The discussions usually last 30 minutes to 1 hour. A degree of rigor is imposed by conducting group interviews with both project participants and nonparticipants. One advantage of group interviews is that there is a tendency for mutual checking. That is, if one group member misrepresents certain topics, the rest of the group usually speaks up to correct any false impressions. A disadvantage is that sometimes a few individuals or special interests may dominate the discussion. The group interview technique can be useful in obtaining information concerning the following:

- Participants' perceptions of project benefits and equity
- The degree to which certain project components are working out as planned
- Village participation in and understanding of the project

3. **Guided interviews.** In conducting guided interviews, the interviewer uses a checklist of questions as a flexible guide rather than a formal questionnaire. Not all points are raised in all interviews, but a composite picture usually emerges after several interviews. The checklist has been found to be an effective tool for quickly diagnosing farming problems and opportunities. It is a valuable technique for investigators with professional training but without extensive field experience. A drawback of this technique is the difficulty in organizing the data generated from these discussions. The guided interview can be useful in obtaining information such as the following:

- Farmers' perceptions, problems, and use of new technological packages
- Families' use and acceptance of family planning methods

⁷This Annex is a recreation of: "Data Gathering Techniques for Conducting Rapid, Low-Cost Studies," Appendix B, B:1-4, Norton & Benoliel, 1987. It is included in order to further clarify the distinction between the various techniques mentioned and give a clearer picture of the low-cost options.

⁸This section draws, in part, on two sources: Robert Chambers, "Shortcut Methods for Information Gathering for Rural Development Projects," Paper for World Bank Agriculture Sector Symposium, January 1980; and Daniel Santo Pietro (ed.), Evaluation Sourcebook for Private and Voluntary Organizations, American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, Inc., 1983.

- Families' use of health services
- Village/household acceptance and use of potable water installations

4. **Observation.** Observation is fundamental to the investigation of almost any phenomenon. Observation techniques involve viewing project activities. Observations of project results or activities can be obtrusive (everyone knows why the evaluator is there) or unobtrusive (people are not told the real purpose of the visit). For evaluative purposes, observation must systematically try to answer specific questions. Evaluators need to agree on time (how much is adequate at each site?) And focus (what will be observed?).

Observation is useful for gaining insight into behavior. To obtain information on the sanitation practices of villagers, it may be more useful to observe (unobtrusively) whether soap is available in washing areas than to ask directly. A variation of this approach is called "participant observation." Observers participate in project activities and prepare regular reports on their perceptions. The advantages of observation are that it is easy to do, requires minimal preparation, and is useful in identifying unintended, as well as intended, project outcomes. A disadvantage is that the analysis depends heavily on the perceptiveness of observers and will be influenced by their biases. These deficiencies may be partly compensated for by carefully selecting a balanced team of observers.

Observation can be useful in obtaining information concerning the following:

- The nature and effectiveness of the implementation process
- Villager participation in project activities
- Farmer contributions to operation and maintenance.

5. **Informal Survey.**⁹ Both quantitative and qualitative data can be gathered through informal surveys incorporating innovative features. There are two principal types of informal surveys.

The first type is based on the use of proxy indicators. For example, to assess quality of life, a researcher may gather information on household roof and floor materials and quality rather than attempt to gather precise household income data. By using innovative indicators, the investigator tries to get a general idea of the situation without undertaking comprehensive surveys that directly measure standard indicators. This approach is quite new and its usefulness remains to be tested.

Another promising approach, which has already proven useful in framing systems research,¹⁰ can be termed "informal, multi-disciplinary surveys." In such surveys, a multidisciplinary team (e.g., agronomists, economists, anthropologists) spends 1-2 weeks in the project area interviewing farmers and community leaders. Team members compare notes, exchange ideas, and write up their report. This mutual checking by all disciplines encourages accuracy and contributes to a broad-based, yet integrated perspective. In farming systems projects, for example, this type of survey has been used to orient the research program, but it can also be used to identify on-farm changes that have taken place.

⁹The discussion of informal surveys and rapid, non-random sample surveys is taken from Krishna Kumar, "Rapid, Low-Cost Data Collection Methods for Project Design, Monitoring and Evaluation: Outline of Proposal," A.I.D., Center for Development Information and Evaluation, July 1985.

¹⁰Dr. Peter Hildebrand has developed and used this approach at the Institute de Ciencia Tecnologia Agricola (ICTA) Guatemala. (See "Summary of the Sondeo Methodology Used by ICTA," prepared for the Workshop on Rapid Rural Appraisal, 26-27 October, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, 1979.)

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6. Rapid, non-random sample surveys. Rapid, non-random sample surveys are distinguished from sample surveys in two ways. First, the number of variables is kept to a minimum. Only a few questions are asked, and an interview can usually be completed within 5-10 minutes. Second, the norm of random sampling is abandoned in favor of a purposive sample which is deliberately kept small. Because the number of variables is limited and the sample size is small, the data can be quickly tabulated manually, thus facilitating rapid analysis.

One distinctive advantage of these surveys is that they can generate quantitative data which can be statistically manipulated. Only sampling error cannot be estimated for them. Moreover, because of their smaller size, non-sampling errors remain low, which enhances the validity of findings. Non-random sample surveys are otherwise conducted like other surveys.

Rapid , non-random sample surveys can be useful in providing information concerning the following:

- Agricultural production levels and adoption of new technologies
- Use of and access to health services
- Irrigation systems operation and maintenance

PART 3
USAID/MALI D/G STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE
PROGRAM STRATEGY CONCEPT PAPER

April 16, 1996

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I. D/G STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE

A. Introduction and Purpose of This Concept Paper

After nearly 18 months in which USAID/Mali has been involved in an intensive exercise of strategic planning and re-engineering, it is now entering the final stage of operationalizing its **Country Program Strategy (CSP)**. The Democratic Governance (D/G) strategic objective (SO), one of four SOs contributing to the achievement of the overall Mission goal is itself ready to move from the planning stage to the implementation of strategy. This Concept Paper provides a first step in the *transition* from conceptualizing and planning to operationalizing and implementing the D/G SO. It forms the basis for the development of more detailed documentation which will be used in the authorization and obligation of the D/G program and the funding that will permit its execution. As such, it provides essential information that will permit the Mission Director to make this authorization and corresponding obligation of program funding.

The remainder of Chapter I, includes sections on **Background and Opportunity** which describes the set of circumstances to which the D/G SO addresses itself (Part B); the **Purpose of the SO and its Relationship to the Mission's Country Program Strategy** (Part C); and the **D/G Results Framework** which provides the causal relationship of results that, taken together, will lead to the achievement of the strategic objective (Part D). Chapter II, presents the **Plan of Action** which describes the way in which program will work, including Results Packages and Interventions; Implementation Arrangements and Mechanisms; and Illustrative Management Plan. Chapters III through V, discuss respectively, the indicators which will define the achievement of D/G program success; the key assumptions which must hold true for the D/G program to succeed; and further design and analytic work which must be completed prior to program authorization and obligation.

B. Background and Opportunity

It is felt that rather than frame the purpose of the D/G SO in terms of a problem to be addressed, the tremendous progress that the country has achieved over the past five years merits discussing the current situation as an opportunity to be seized and supported. The events of March 26, 1991 overturned nearly a century of Colonial rule followed by three decades of post-independence authoritarianism. It also started a process which has led to the holding of free and fair multi-party elections for the first time in the country's history and subsequent establishment of a democratic pluralist system. One of the distinguishing features of the democratic transition in Mali has been the significant role played by its citizens and the organizations they formed to represent their interests and demand an end to authoritarianism. From the creation of the Sovereign National Conference in 1991, to the drafting and passage of a new constitution and the installation of the government of the Third Republic, to the major political and economic reforms which are still being instituted today, Malian civil society has provided the principal means by which citizens in thousands of communities throughout the country have been able to participate in the consolidation of a democratic system of governance. It is this phenomenon of a proliferating number of civil society actors, particularly at the local grassroots level, contributing to the economic, social and political development of the country that presents the real opportunity to which USAID/Mali's country program strategy, and each of its strategic objectives, address themselves.

C. D/G SO Purpose and its Relationship to the Mission Country Program Strategy

Mali has long had a history of people coming together in voluntary association to address collective problems and to promote common interests. The impact of more than a century of colonialism and authoritarian rule, however, inhibited the growth of voluntary associations at all but the most local level and around issues which

presented no political threat to the country's non-democratic rulers. In fact, the defining features of both the First and Second Republics was the creation of wide range of *corporatist* bodies which served to channel and structure citizen participation in social, economic and political life in ways that ensured the continued dominance of the ruling elite. To talk about the existence of a Malian civil society when voluntary association and autonomy from the state were not permitted is a misconception of the situation which existed during this period. What did exist were either state-run institutions which claimed to represent the interest of people, or small, isolated and atomistic traditional associations geared to meeting the survival needs of their members. Participation either in the larger political system or even decision making at the local level was severely circumscribed.

With the events of March 1991, and the eventual transition to democratic rule, the possibility for the emergence of a true civil society representing and defending the interests Malian citizens in economic, social and political affairs was finally possible. Not only did the democratic revolution of 1991 change the context within which Malians were able to participate in the development of their country, it also provided the conditions for Mali's partners to support this new context and, more importantly, to look to the day when donor support would no longer be necessary. For USAID/Mali this led to the conception of a country program strategy which sought to promote the goal: *Mali achieves a level of sustainable social, economic and political development which eliminates the need for concessionary foreign assistance.* In this regard, each of the Mission's four SOs -- Sustainable Economic Growth (SEG), Youth, Democratic Governance, and Information and Communications (InfoCom) -- were designed to contribute to this larger goal.

What particularly distinguishes the Mission's newly conceived program goal from previous Mission efforts in Mali is the addition of a political dimension or objective to economic and social ones. USAID/Mali has a long history of working with and through non-state actors at the local level and beyond in the pursuit of its program goals and objectives. In the process of developing its new CSP, the Mission viewed this factor as an important comparative advantage and one it should build upon in each of its SOs. Looking at the community level as the building blocks of social, economic and political development -- or sustainable development -- the Mission felt that the most appropriate development strategy in the new democratic context would be to target an integrated program of support to the mushrooming number of community organizations (COs) that had emerged as a result of the withdrawal of the state from its previous and dominant role in managing all aspects of Malian life. Thus the promotion of a system of democratic governance in which community organizations -- representing and defending the interest of their members -- participate as equal partners in sustainable national development efforts at the local level and beyond is viewed as a means to achieving the Mission's program goal, as well as a desirable end in itself ... the overall purpose of the D/G SO. In this sense, i.e., as a means to achieving the larger country program goal, the D/G SO was also viewed by the Mission as the single element *cross-cutting* other SOs and thus forcing integration and synergy which were fundamental to the re-engineering effort.

Finally, in addition to its comparative advantage in working with non-state actors, the Mission chose strengthening local level civil society as the focus of its democracy and governance program -- as opposed to working on the supply-side with either institutions of the central state or local government -- based on the Government of the Republic of Mali's (GRM) commitment to the major political reform of **effective decentralization**. It is this reform which the Mission believes will permit its program to have the greatest impact in terms of the consolidation of democratic governance in Mali. As discussed in greater detail below, it will be the capacity of COs to participate as effective partners in democratic governance, including development decision-making, at the local level and beyond throughout the country that will both strengthen democratic institutions and processes while contributing to sustainable development.

C. The D/G Results Framework and its Underlying Logic

Community organizations are considered **effective partners in democratic governance** when they are perceived as legitimate and capable actors undertaking both *civic action*, i.e., promoting and defending member (public) interests, and *democratic self-governance*, i.e., solving collective (public) problems in a democratic manner. The D/G Strategic Objective Team (SOT) defines community organization as the smallest social or associational unit of civil society with **legal recognition** undertaking democratic self-governance functions. The D/G SO targets not only those COs that undertake democratic self-governance, but also those that undertake civic action at the local level and beyond, and particularly at the communal level of governance. It is precisely this aspect of COs representing, promoting and defending member interests, or civic action, that distinguishes the D/G SO from other Mission strategic objectives that also target COs in their results frameworks. It is also the pursuit of civic action that places this strategic objective firmly in the domain of democracy and governance programming, consistent with the Agency's larger goal of promoting sustainable development.

While the **purpose of and principal result** to which the D/G SO addresses itself is to promote COs to be **effective partners in democratic governance, including development decision-making and planning**, for this to take place a number of lower order intermediate results (IRs) must also be achieved. In this regard, the D/G SOT has identified three *first order* IRs whose combined attainment, it is posited, will lead to the achievement of the D/G SO. One of the three first order IRs are in turn composed of secondary and tertiary IRs which contribute to the achievement of these first order IRs. It is this hierarchy of results, or results framework, that define the underlying logic -- or cause and effect relationships between results -- of the D/G SO. The following discussion presents the several levels of intermediate results composing the overall D/G SO Results Framework as well as its underlying logic. It should be noted that in the development of the final document used to authorize and obligate the D/G SO -- and which will likely serve as the basis for preparing a scope of work for use in relevant bid documentation -- the following sections can be considerably expanded to provide necessary detail by referring to February 1996 Final Report prepared by Thunder and Associates.

IR 1 Community Organizations are Engaged in Democratic Governance and Civic Action at the Local Level and Beyond

To be effective partners in democratic governance, including development decision-making and planning, it is believed that COs must be able to effectively engage both government agencies and market interests over decisions which affect the interests of their members (civic action); and to undertake themselves a range of public governance functions in a democratic manner (democratic self-governance). The objective of IR 1, is thus to build the capacity of COs to undertake both civic action and democratic governance at the local level where they reside, and beyond the local level where many public decisions are made that ultimately condition their ability to undertake these functions. This poses two fundamental problems concerning how to achieve this result. First, who is to take responsibility for building CO capacity to become effective partners in these two areas? And secondly, how are COs to participate in democratic governance beyond the local level? The logic that was adopted by the Team was to conceive of two secondary IRs, respectively addressing each of the identified problems.

IR 1.1 Target Intermediary NGOs and Federations Support Community Organizations' Democratic Self-Governance and Civic Action

IR 1.2 Target Intermediary NGOs and Federations Effectively Aggregate and Represent Community Organizations at the Local Level and Beyond

In essence, the cause and effect relationship which these two secondary level IRs represent, is that of a set of intermediary organizations – NGOs and federations (of COs), and under certain circumstance US PVOs -- being best placed to strengthen the capacity of COs and/or to represent their interests at higher levels of democratic governance. Malian NGOs, US PVOs and, to a lesser extent, federations of COs were seen to have close relationships with community organizations and thus in a position to provide a range of interventions designed to build their capacity in the areas of civic action and democratic self-governance. At the same time, some of these NGOs and federations as well as others not directly involved in capacity building activities, would be prepared to represent and defend CO interests at the communal level and beyond.

These two secondary IRs are, however, built upon the assumption that NGOs, federations and PVOs have the skills and expertise themselves to strengthen CO capacity and/or undertake civic action on their behalf. Because of the weakness of most Malian NGOs and federations, as well as the relative newness of democratic development for all intermediary actors, a tertiary level of IRs were formulated to address these lacunae. They are:

IR 1.1.1 The Capacity of Target NGOs and Federations is Strengthened

IR 1.2.1 The Civic Action Skills of Target Intermediary NGOs and Federations Improved

To achieve these two tertiary IRs, it is foreseen that a range of partner organizations (e.g., PVOs, private sector consulting firms, concerned government agencies) will provide technical assistance and training to build NGO and federation capacity in democratic self-governance and civic action skills.

IR 2 Effective Decentralization Occurs by the End of 1999

As previously discussed, one of the principal factors that led USAID/Mali in general and the D/G SO in particular, to formulate the strategic plans that they did, was the GRM's explicit commitment to a program of effective decentralization. While the D/G SOT is not taking direct responsibility for achieving this intermediate result, it will closely monitor its progress in terms of: (i) relevant laws passed; (ii) local elections held; (iii) Communal, Cercle and Regional governments constituted; and (iv) the establishment of the Haut Conseil des Collectivités.

IR 3 The Enabling Environment Empowers Target Community Organizations, Intermediary NGOs and Federations

The enabling environment is defined as the body of laws, regulations and policies that delineates the legal, judicial and regulatory framework, that allocates powers among political actors and governs relations among and between both individuals and individuals. While the Team has determined that enabling environment, while generally favorable to the participation of civil society in democratic governance matters, is still in the process of being defined with notable exceptions. To ensure a more favorable enabling environment which is essential to the achievement of the D/G SO, an IR has been formulated which will include a defined set of interventions.

II. D/G SO PLAN OF ACTION

Chapter II presents the D/G SO Team's *Plan of Action* for operationalizing and implementing the D/G strategy. Part A provides a set of *lessons learned* resulting from the recently conducted **Results Framework Appraisal and Validation Exercise**. These lessons provide the underlying rationale for the choice of D/G SO Results

Packages and Interventions (Part B); and Implementation Arrangements and Mechanisms (Part C), which in turn serve as the basis for developing an Illustrative Management Plan (Part D).

A. Lessons Learned Underlying the Plan of Action

The D/G SO validation exercise elicited from respondent COs, federations and NGOs seven principal areas of need that, being addressed through a corresponding set of interventions, would lead to their becoming effective partners in democratic governance at the local level and beyond. These seven needs are: (i) improving the economic and social welfare of their members (COs and federations) or clients (NGOs); (ii) functional literacy and numeracy skills for members and leaders (COs and federations); (iii) strengthening the management capacity of their organizations (all respondents); (iv) ensuring that the manner in which they are governed promotes democratic participation, transparency, accountability and responsiveness (COs and federations); (v) increasing their awareness and understanding of the Malian political system, their rights and obligations under it, and how to mobilize themselves to protect these rights and advance collective interests (all respondents); (vi) promoting and maintaining contact between themselves and other organizations in civil society, government agencies and market interests (all respondents); and (vii) how to manage and resolve internal organizational conflicts as well as those that occur between themselves and other organizations in their locales (COs and federations).

All of these needs had been, to some extent, identified in earlier assessments and discussed by the Team in the various documents it produced during an extended strategic planning period which took place over the past eighteen months. The major importance of the recently conducted ground-truthing appraisal was the relative emphasis and importance which our partners and customers placed on these needs. Thus, while there were no major surprises in terms of new needs being identified, there was certainly a significant difference in the value that COs, federations and NGOs placed on these needs versus that of the D/G Team. The specific results packages and activities which are set forth in this concept paper, now reflect this newly gained knowledge and serve as the basis for the subsequent design of the D/G SO results packages and the obligation of funding that will permit its operationalization.

1. International PVOs

US PVOs with whom the Team interviewed are without exception doing an outstanding job in terms of improving the general welfare of Malian communities. This includes those PVOs which work through Malian counterparts, as well as those which work directly with COs and federations. While our strategy previewed a significant role for PVOs in terms of building the capacity of Malian counterparts, there was a far smaller role seen for them in the direct implementation of our strategy vis-a-vis COs and federations at the community level and beyond. What we found was that in a number of the more remote areas in the country, PVOs and other international NGOs were the only non-state development actor delivering services to Malian communities. At the same time, many of these programs were largely decentralized and autonomous operations managed, in many cases, entirely by Malian staff. It should also be acknowledged that not all PVOs have the capacity and/or mandate to strengthen Malian NGOs, particularly in the areas of democratic self-governance and civic action. While the D/G Team still feels strongly that building a cadre of strong Malian NGO intermediaries is a discrete objective of this SO, it is also necessary to acknowledge the direct role being played by *indigenizing* US PVOs in grassroots development. The obvious conclusion is now to find a way to maintain the D/G SO *principle* of strengthening and working through Malian NGOs while accepting operational realities.

While the focus of the D/G SO should still be in implementing its strategy through Malian NGOs and strengthening them where appropriate by US PVOs, it is also necessary to find a means for incorporating those US PVOs with a solid track-record in strengthening CO capacity. The first step should be to develop criteria

for the selection of those PVOs which will be funded to implement the D/G strategy. This would include a means to prioritize PVOs in terms of their role in the program. Certainly those PVOs which work with and through NGOs, including capacity building would be the first priority. Those which do not should be encouraged to do so, if they want to receive program funding. An interesting alternative and one which is consistent with D/G SO principle of sustainability, would be for US PVOs that want to participate in the D/G program to develop *an exit strategy* which includes spinning off those geographically defined project offices responsible for implementing their country program in a specific area. The spin-off would ultimately lead to the creation of a new Malian NGO. As many PVOs and other international NGOs have already indigenized and decentralized their programs at the regional level, this strategy just takes the phenomenon to its logical conclusion. It also recognizes the fact that many of the strongest Malian NGOs have their origins in and were created by international NGOs.

Secondly, it also needs to be admitted that **forced** partnerships between US PVOs (or international NGOs) and Malian NGOs have not worked well in the past, particularly in terms of the capacity building role that PVOs were supposed to provide to NGOs. Most PVOs with operational programs view their principal responsibility as ensuring that programmatic objectives are achieved, which leaves NGO capacity building as a lower order priority. NGOs are viewed in this situation as mere implementing agents rather than partners. It is thus recommended that the principal role for NGO capacity building be conferred upon an intermediary implementing mechanism engaged by the D/G team, whose primary role is NGO capacity building.

Because of the significant role that other international NGOs are playing at the community level throughout Mali, the D/G team should, at the very least, consider holding a meeting with them to explain the D/G strategy and solicit their input as to how USAID can work more closely with them at the local level to build sustainable community development. Consideration could as well be given to involving them in training and sensibilization activities organized under the D/G SO, concerning D/G approaches to building CO capacity for democratic self-governance and civic action.

Finally, in recent meetings between the Mission and US PVOs present in Mali, the latter have indicated their strong preference for maintaining a direct (funding) relationship with the Mission. While this may be a desired option for both parties, it will have serious implications in terms of the Mission's overall management burden, as well as for the implementation arrangements and funding relationships that will have to be developed by each of the SO teams. In a sense, by choosing this direct relationship, the Mission's country program goal and individual SOs will be dependent on and integrated around PVOs, rather than the PVOs fitting into an established and well-defined program and strategic objectives. As discussed in more detail under Part C, Implementation Arrangements and Mechanisms, there are more appropriate means for achieving synergy and integration among SOs, and a more effective way to decrease the number of management units and hence management burden than using PVOs.

2. Malian NGOs

While the Appraisal Teams were pleasantly surprised to find a significant number of Malian NGOs implementing effective community level programs, it is doubtful that many of them could actually meet USAID registration criteria conferring upon them the right to receive direct funding from USAID. One can also question whether putting them through the onerous and time-consuming process is necessary to ensure their participation in the D/G SO program. There are probably only a handful of Malian NGOs which might qualify for USAID registration. The vast majority NGOs, many of whom are providing important services to COs, would require significant capacity building to achieve such a status, thus delaying their direct participation in the D/G program. The issue, then, is how to fully integrate Malian NGOs without USAID registration into the D/G program.

Secondly, as discussed under the Findings section, the principal constraint facing the great majority of Malian NGOs is the lack of financial resources to implement their programs. Where funding is available from donors, it is usually provided on a project-by-project basis with little or no funding for capacity building and overall institutional development. This pattern is replicated by international NGOs including US PVOs which fund Malian NGOs, who impose, in many cases, the same requirements on their NGO "partners" that are imposed on them by donors. NGOs require funding to cover the costs of permanent staff, transportation, and other normal operating expenses. It is interesting to note that many of the community organizations interviewed during the appraisal exercise referred to the NGOs working with them as "projects." This rather insightful view, reflects the fact that NGOs undertake a well-defined activity, with a specific budget and time-frame, rather than implementing a more comprehensive program looking at the longer-term needs of their clients and communities.

In order to avoid having to gain USAID registration status, and thus be able to receive USAID funding for their on-going programs while simultaneously improving their institutional capacity, NGOs should be permitted to receive funding from a US PVO intermediary. While this can be undertaken by US PVOs with on-going operational programs in Mali, it is preferable that they receive grants from an umbrella PVO intermediary engaged under the D/G SO whose primary purpose is NGO capacity building; and the provision of financial grant (as well as technical assistance and training) to Malian NGOs. It should be noted that the other principal reason for working through an umbrella intermediary is decrease the management burden on USAID staff that many small individual grants would entail.

Secondly, USAID needs to make the same commitment to the long-term funding of Malian NGOs as it has with US PVOs in its newly defined policy. This is the only way to ensure that NGOs receive the kind of capacity building assistance, including institutional infrastructure (e.g., transport, staff, operating costs) required to build sustainable organizations. With a stable source of funding, NGOs can focus on developing staff capacity and implementing their own programs rather than continually searching for donor funding and implementing their own well-defined programs. This approach will necessitate the careful selection of a relatively modest number of Malian NGOs (20-25) that will be strengthened over the long-term. One eventual outcome might be their future registration with USAID. While this strategy certainly raises the issue of NGO sustainability over the long-term, it is felt that it makes more sense to deal with it than it is to discuss that of US PVO sustainability. It is also consistent with both the Mission vision statement: **More Mali, Less Aid** as well as the Country Program Goal, previously discussed.

3. Malian Federations

Malian federations play two important roles in the D/G strategy. Along with US PVOs and Malian NGOs, they are expected to work with and strengthen COs -- in this case their members -- in democratic self-governance and civic action, as well as delivering concrete development services. And secondly, they are expected to represent and defend member interests vis-a-vis those of the state and market. The teams, in fact, found examples of federations undertaking both functions as well as those undertaking one or the other functions. One of the most disquieting findings that the Teams found was the use of federations by donors to implement the donor program rather than to strengthen member capacity or defend their interests. This has had the impact of strengthening the federation at the expense of its building blocks, and more importantly, divorcing it from the reality and needs of its members. It is, therefore, extremely important that federations are not used -- or created -- to implement D/G interventions before they are ready to do so, and/or before the base units or their members find that there is a true need for a supra CO body to undertake activities on their behalf.

Strict selection criteria need to be established for the financing of Malian federations, particularly where they are expected to undertake CO capacity building and/or deliver development services to them. Assessments of federations should be conducted to determine whether member COs really view them as representative and delivering services which they have identified. Secondly, the closer the federation is to its members (e.g., supra-village, communal or Arrondissement), the more likely it will be representative of member needs and interests. Thus, where interventions are designed to strengthen federations, they should start at the bottom and work up rather than the top and work down.

4. Consortia and Networks

While not a direct focus of the validation exercise, the Teams did encounter a number of sectoral and regional networks of PVOs and NGOs. In addition, prior to the field exercise, D/G officers visited both CCA-ONG and SECO-ONG, the two principal consortia representing international and Malian NGOs. We found that these organizations not only provided valuable services to their constituent members (e.g., coordination, information and dissemination, training) but often engaged in civic action -- on both macro-political issues and sectoral concerns -- representing member interests vis-a-vis either central or sub-national governments. It was our conclusion that both types of organizations have a potentially important role to play in the implementation of the D/G strategy. They can serve as a means for disseminating information to their members about the D/G program; provide a locus for the training and sensibilization of PVOs and NGOs in democratic governance and civic action; and strengthened through training to better undertake direct civic action vis-a-vis government agencies.

Particular consideration should be given to targeting regional and sectoral networks of PVOs and NGOs, as they are more likely to have the greatest immediate impact on building the capacity of COs and federations to increase their participation in governance matters and political life. At the same time, both Bamako-based consortia have good knowledge and understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of NGO community and, in the case, of CCA-ONG, have regional branches through which member organizations can be reached with relevant information as well as to serve as focal points for a variety of training activities organized under the D/G SO. They may also provide important fora to press for the interests of non-state actors over issues which have a country-wide impact on their members and the larger sector of civil society. They should be invited to any meeting of partners to explain the D/G strategy and solicit input and possible participation in it.

5. The Enabling Environment including Decentralization

While the enabling environment that conditions the ability of COs, federations and NGOs to participate in governance matters and political life has generally been deemed as favorable, there are important areas where it is either constraining or where laws and policies have as yet to be passed. We have already discussed, the case of the legal status of village associations and federations, the most glaring areas where the enabling environment has yet to be clearly defined. There are also a number of important laws and policies which are still in the process of being formulated by the GRM which will have a specific impact on the ability of COs and federations, in particular, to participate in Malian sustainable development. From recent interviews with the agencies responsible for formulating these policies and laws, it is evident that they may not be favorable to our partners and customers. This includes both the body of decentralization laws and the law on associations, cooperatives and mutuelles. Finally, it was extremely evident from our interviews that neither COs, federations or NGOs were knowledgeable about the laws that governed their rights and obligations, including and specifically those related to decentralization. It was also clear, that government officials at all levels were equally ignorant of these laws and/or used the ignorance of COs and federations to deny them of their rights.

The previously designed, illustrative D/G results packages and activities did not reflect -- in terms of resources devoted to it -- the importance of the intermediate results of the enabling environment and decentralization. The validation exercise has shown that this was a mistake. As a result, two actions must be immediately taken. The first is to increase the resources devoted to civic education, including a focus on decentralization. And secondly, that the Mission in general and the D/G SOT in particular, needs to become more involved with concerned GRM agencies in policy dialogue over enabling environment including decentralization laws. Given the fact that the success of the D/G SO is dependent on a favorable Malian enabling environment, this recommendation cannot be emphasized enough. This is likely to require additional analysis and assessment -- a solid base already exists -- of certain areas of law and policy by the team. While no resources were devoted to decentralization activities -- its progress is only to be monitored by the team -- this can be remedied through an expanded civic education program.

6. Literacy and Numeracy

By far, the number one need expressed by those interviewed was the lack of a literate and numeric membership and leadership. Literacy/numeric was viewed as pre-condition to participating in any type of public activity, whether in the provision of services or in the representation of member interests. What was particularly interesting was the way in which respondents viewed literacy as part and parcel of a much larger process of sensibilization, animation and civic action; it subsumed all of these aspects of social mobilization under one rubric. While the initial set of activities briefly discussed the need for literacy, it was mentioned only in passing and no resources were actually devoted to it. Our conclusion is that literacy and numeric must be up-graded as an activity to be undertaken through this SO and integrated into a coherent results package together with civic education and action activities. It is also extremely important to note that the success of other SOs is also critically tied to the need for a literate and numeric population. This includes family planning and AIDS activities as well as all forms of productive economic growth interventions from credit programs to crop and livestock programs which involve community organizations.

The D/G SOT needs to begin developing an integrated results package based on literacy and civic education and action. It must begin discussions with other SOs to solicit their interest in participating in this activity as well as allocating funds from their own budgets to cover the associated costs that will be necessary to operationalize it. It will also need to reach out to other potential partners and implementing agents, including concerned government agencies and NGOs, to determine the *state-of-the art in functional literacy* in Mali. There is no sense in reinventing the wheel when considerable experience has already been gained in this area.

7. Conflict Management and Resolution

It was also evident from our interviews that conflicts and tensions between social groups and among resources users has been escalating significantly over the past several years. Tensions between age, gender, geographical units, and ethnic groups among others, and between herders and farmers and various forest resource users, were all reported by respondents during our interviews. Conflict resolution and management has thus become a significant function of many these community organizations and federations. In fact, conflict resolution has always been a function of traditional village authorities, but much of their power in this area was taken over, first by colonial administrators, and later by administrative agencies of the First and Second Republics. With the advent of the Third Republic, and the increased political space accorded to local communities and their organizations as a result, this function is once again being exercised. The difference today is that not only are traditional authorities undertaking conflict management functions but also, the more modern self-governing associations that have formed voluntarily to meet the specific needs of their members. In some cases, conflicts are beginning to emerge between traditional authorities and these new community organizations over who has

the right to resolve local conflicts and make public decisions. Many of the respondents interviewed specifically noted the need to improve their skills in conflict resolution and even felt that managing tensions before they turned into conflicts was extremely important.

8. Skills in Analyzing and Appraising Community Dynamics

One of the first steps to becoming aware of the causes of poverty, and even local conflicts -- and eventually finding ways to resolve them -- is the ability of local people and their organizations to analyze the conditions that give rise to them. While the Team initially identified the need for promoting *gender awareness* in the package of interventions which were to be targeted to COs and federations, our interviews indicated that in addition to the particular problems faced by women, there were also significant issues that faced Malian youth, ethnic minorities and the wide range occupational groups that depend on common resource use for their livelihood. Thus, rather than focussing solely on gender analysis and awareness training for COs and federations, the capacity building package designed for effective management and democratic self-governance, will also need to include a separate module on analytical and appraisal skills that promotes greater understanding of the power dynamics and relationships present in Malian communities and how they determine community and community organization decision making.

B. Defining D/G SO Results Packages and Interventions

Part B presents the specific results packages and interventions that the Team has fashioned to: (i) address the identified needs of our partners and customers; and, (ii) authorize and fully obligate D/G SO funding. The first two sections present the result packages that are designed to directly prepare our customers for their role as effective partners in democratic governance. They incorporate and address six of the seven needs identified in the ground-truthing exercise and discussed in Part A, above. The single need not included in these two results packages is that of *improving the economic and social welfare of CO and federations members*. It the importance of this need unanimously identified by our potential customers that has led to our proposal for integrating the concerned results packages in other Mission SOs with that of the D/G SO. This proposal is discussed in greater detail in Part C, below.

The latter two sections discuss results packages that are designed to: (i) prepare our implementing partners for their role in strengthening CO and federation capacity; and (ii) provide the D/G SOT with a number of services required to adequately manage the three results packages that directly target partners and customers while monitoring and evaluating overall SO progress.

1. Results Package 1: COs and Federations are in Effective Civic Action

The purpose of this first results package is to ensure that COs have the skills and expertise and, where appropriate, access to financial support, to undertake civic action. Therefore, all the interventions discussed below are designed to contribute to this result.

The need for civic education on a wide range of issues was clearly identified by respondents as a major need if they were to participate as true partners in democratic governance at the local level and beyond. While the team included this activity in the initial strategic planning exercise, it was clearly seen as of secondary importance and allocated resources accordingly under the *enabling environment* intermediate result. Civic education was identified closely with the larger process of sensibilization which was itself tied closely to the need for literacy and numeric, all of which are linked to the eventual undertaking of civic action in defense of individual and associational rights. Thus a major conclusion arrived at as a result of the validation exercise was

to recognize that the link between civic education and civic action are far more interdependent than was previously thought, that is, (civic) education leads to awareness (sensibilization) which in turn forms the basis for (civic) action.

It should also be noted that respondents repeatedly stated the importance of meeting with both government administrative leaders and their political representatives to exchange views and promote their interests. While there was a generally held view of the divisive nature of political parties in terms of their attempts to use community organizations for their own partisan purposes, it was also recognized that politics and political parties were a necessary "evil" of a democratic Mali. The issue was how to maintain their autonomy from political parties while using them to advance CO interests.

Given this new awareness and understanding of the dynamics and relationships between civic education and action, the Team has decided to create an integrated results package combining interventions which were initially divided between Intermediate Results One (IR 1) and Three (IR 3). This first Results Package (R 1), Civic Education and Action, thus combines interventions in functional literacy and numeracy, sensibilization and animation, civic education and financial support for civic action. The specific interventions to be financed under this results package include for:

- **Functional Literacy and Numeracy Training:** Funding will be provided for: (i) the training of (NGO) trainers on a country-wide basis who will in turn provide training for the selected CO members in targeted communes who will in turn teach other CO members and leadership; and (ii) the production and/or distribution of existing functional literacy materials for trainers and teachers. Individual COs and their members will be responsible for taking care of the payment of teachers and providing necessary learning supplies for trainees. Because this intervention is crucial to the achievement of both the SEG and Youth SOs, they will be asked to contribute to its costs.
- **Civic Education:** Based on the Team's validation exercise it is evident that there are a wide array of issues, both of a macro-political nature (e.g., structure and processes of Malian democracy, fundamental laws concerning basic rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution of the Third Republic) and of a sectoral or operational nature (e.g., laws, policies and regulations) that directly affects the ability of COs to undertake self-governance functions in the areas of social service delivery, management of natural resources and the promotion of economic growth. Funding will be provided for the: (i) development including translation of materials into the concerned local languages; (ii) the training of (NGO) trainers and CO teachers; and (iii) where appropriate the launching of media campaigns on specific topics of a national interest.
- **CO Civic Action Animator Training:** Funding will provided for the training of (NGO) trainers on a country-wide basis who will in turn train selected CO members in civic action and animation techniques and skills. COs will be responsible for supporting their animators in ways they determine to most appropriate for their CO. It is possible that civic education or literacy numeracy teachers could also serve as civic action animators.
- **Dialogue Fora:** Funding would be provided for bringing government and political leaders together with community organizations and federations at different levels of democratic governance, around a range of issues and on a periodic basis as a means for the former to explain their policies and programs and for the latter to assert their interests and to hold their public servants accountable for their actions.

- **Centers for Civic Education and Action:** Modest funding, matching that contributed by COs themselves, would be provided for the construction of centers of information and animation where literacy training takes place, where relevant laws translated into the local language are kept, and which serves as a locus for community mobilization and civic action. As proposed above, concerned communities would engage civic action animators, civic education and functional literacy teachers that would work out of these centers.
- **Micro-Grant Civic Action Fund:** This fund would primarily finance the costs of COs and federations to engage in civic action at the local level and beyond but could also be drawn upon by NGO consortia and networks that want to undertake similar activities that either directly benefit COs and federations, or indirectly benefiting them by improving the enabling environment. The Micro-Grant fund would thus fund such activities as: transportation and lodging costs of applicants to participate in relevant meetings, seminars and workshops; to lobby government leaders, etc.; for COs, federations, networks and consortia to organize and hold fora bringing together other civil society actors, government and political leaders around specific topics and issues; or to pay for air time on rural radios to disseminate messages to their members and the general public on issues of common concern.

2. Results Package 2: COs and Federations are Effective in Democratic Self-Governance

The second results package (R 2) is designed to ensure that CO and federation capacity is strengthened in the areas of *effective management and democratic self-governance*. The set of activities to be financed under this R were those previously identified under IR 1, democratic self-governance skills. As we have now split-off civic action from the IR 1, this results package now focusses solely on building capacity for effective democratic self-governance.

The validation exercise clearly indicated that fundamental management practices were, for the most part, lacking among all COs and federations interviewed. In addition, while many of the respondents indicated that they believed their organizations were governed in a democratic manner, they also expressed concerns that there were not adequate structures and processes in place that ensured and provided for: (i) member participation in leadership selection and decision-making; and (ii) the accountability, responsiveness and transparency in the way organizational resources were allocated and managed by leaders on behalf of members. Specific areas where respondents indicated additional training and technical assistance were required to their management and democratic self-governance practices included: (i) assistance in becoming officially recognized by government; (ii) improving structures and procedures promoting internal democratic and good governance practices, values, and professional ethics and standards; (iii) improving management of resources, i.e., financial and budget, human, material, information and technology; and, (v) capacity to undertake strategic planning and develop workplans.

In addition to the above noted areas of capacity building, this R will also focus on training and TA interventions which strengthen CO capacity in the areas of *conflict management and resolution* and *analytic and appraisal skills in community dynamics*, areas which the validation exercise specifically high-lighted as of importance and relevance to COs.

Of particular importance, the D/G Team must conceive of and ensure the development of a comprehensive and integrated package of training and technical assistance geared to improving the internal management and democratic self-governance capacity of targeted COs and federations. As there will be numerous **implementing partners** (some 25-30 PVOs and NGOs) that will be involved in the delivery of capacity building interventions, many of whom have little capacity in these areas themselves, the Team will need to engage one or more

technical assistance and training organizations to develop a standardized package of materials which will be used uniformly by the partners in their work with COs and federations.

Since the costs of PVO and NGO implementing partners -- the primary agents for CO and federation capacity building in effective democratic self-governance -- will be covered under results package three, the only funding to come from R 2 will be for the development of training materials to be used by PVOs and NGOs with targeted COs and federations.

3. Results Package: Implementing Partners are Effective in CO Capacity Building

The success of the above two results packages largely depends on the ability of the Mission's US and Malian implementing partners to deliver the packages of technical assistance and training necessary to improve the capacity of COs and federations to effectively undertake civic action and democratic self-governance. As previously discussed, while the primary role in this regard has been conferred to Malian NGOs and federations, there will also be a significant and direct role for selected US PVOs as well. At the same time, US PVOs will, in addition to working directly with COs and federations, also be one of several agents which will be used to strengthen Malian NGOs and federations in their work with COs. In either case, all implementing partners, whatever their actual relation to COs, will require significant strengthening and capacity building themselves to carry-out their work with COs and federations.

In addition, those implementing partners that are targeted for participation under the D/G SO will require tangible support -- in addition to training -- to carry-out their work with COs. This will include funding to cover such institutional infrastructure costs as additional staff, travel and transportation, some equipment, and related operating costs. A principal point needs to be kept in mind in this regard. It is clearly understood that selected implementing partners will already have on-going programs and thus some level of institutional capacity, including infrastructure. Thus, the funding provided under this results package will be used to cover the *marginal costs* of these organizations to undertake the specific tasks associated with strengthening COs and federations.

Finally, if, as is proposed below, implementing partners will be undertaking an integrated set of interventions vis-a-vis COs and federations -- those financed by other SOs as well as the D/G SO -- then the costs required to both build implementing partner capacity as well as support their institutional infrastructure, will require close coordination among all Mission SOs, with some type of *cost-sharing* arrangements to be agreed upon. Given these issues, the following interventions are those to be financed under this results package.

- All training and technical assistance interventions required to permit PVOs, NGOs and federations to provide capacity building assistance to COs and federations. This will include capacity building packages in: (i) democratic self-governance and civic action for those working directly with COs and federations; and (ii) civic action for those NGOs and federations which will directly engage in the representation and defense of their members interests. This will include costs required to develop appropriate training materials in each of these areas.
- All institutional or operational costs necessary for targeted implementing partners to deliver the set of capacity building interventions noted immediately above.

Again, it must be clearly stated that if the Mission decides to consolidate all activities, from whatever SO, targeted to work with and through COs, then a cost-sharing formula will need to be developed to cover both sets of results package interventions for implementing partners. The interventions discussed here and their associated

costs are, however, specific to the D/G SO, and will be able to be obligated independently from whatever cost-sharing and corresponding implementation arrangements are finally agreed upon.

4. Results Package: Strengthened SOT Capacity to Implement D/G Program

The principal problems addressed by this results package is: (i) How will the above three results packages be implemented and through what funding source? and, (ii) how will the D/G SO Team access required technical and management assistance to undertake collateral activities required to ensure the achievement of D/G SO results? In short, how will the D/G SOT itself, secure technical and management support, to ensure the successful implementation of the principal results packages and thus achievement of SO result. The following interventions will thus be supported with funding obligated under this results package:

- **Intermediary Project Manager:** Whatever implementation arrangement and mechanism are finally chosen by the Mission, funding must be set aside to cover the costs of an intermediary project manager who will be responsible for ensuring that RPs one through three are effectively implemented. Specific costs to be covered will include only those related to the functioning of **Project Management Unit**, e.g., staff salaries and benefits (expatriate and local), operating costs (office rent, utilities, etc), travel and transportation (international and local), etc. Those pertaining to programmatic costs, i.e., those covered under other RPs will be funded under the concerned R.
- **Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting:** While the intermediary project manager and implementing partners will likely play some role in the MER process, the overall responsibility will rest with the D/G Team. As a principal, results monitoring should remain the sole responsibility of the Team, as other partners may be unable to maintain the necessary objectivity required for proper MER tasks. The Team would likely contract this responsibility to an outside agency not affiliated with program implementation.
- **Analytic and Design Tasks:** There are likely to be a number of studies, assessments or appraisals required to explore issues or topics which are of interest to USAID/Mali, its partners or its customers. Funding would be provided under this results package for these interventions.
- **Conferences and Workshops:** Either to fund the costs of D/G SO Team members to attend regional or international workshops, conferences, etc., or for the Mission itself to sponsor the same on issues that it deems important to the success of the SO.
- **Training and Technical Assistance:** Either to fund the costs of D/G SO Team members to attend regional or international training events, or for the Mission itself to sponsor training events for its partners and customers on issues or topics it deems important; and to engage technical assistance for a variety of needs specific to the D/G SOT.

It should be noted that a number of these interventions could be conferred to the intermediary project manager, however, the purpose here is to ensure that adequate funding is set-aside and obligated through relevant documentation.

B. Implementation Arrangements and Mechanisms

There can be little doubt – particularly based on the responses of those interviewed during the "ground-truthing exercise recently undertaken by the D/G Team – that the D/G Results Framework and the logic which underlies it, is both appropriate to its setting and achievable over the longer-term of the strategic plan period. More

importantly, it is also *implementable* keeping in mind a few key principles which provide the larger context and framework within which the D/G SO will be executed. In section 1 of part B, the larger context that will condition the implementation of the D/G SO is first discussed. In section 2, three different options related to possible implementation arrangements and their corresponding mechanisms are presented.

1. Democratic Governance as an End and Means

Governance has always been the principal focus of this SO, albeit a particular form of governance, i.e., democratic governance. In its most basic conception, governance is viewed as the way in which any social unit -- from an entire society to the smallest local association -- organizes itself to solve collective problems or advance shared interests. Thus, while D/G SOT has always viewed democratic governance as a **desirable (political) end** in itself, for the majority of its potential partners and customers, democratic governance must also be seen as a **practical (development) means** to meet the social and economic problems that confront them, their families and communities in their daily lives. If there was one single finding that emerged from recent validation exercise that stands out among all others, it is the fact that the primary *raison d'être* of the NGOs, COs and federations that we interviewed was to address and resolve a well-defined collective problem or to advance a shared interest as identified by their members or clients. As a means to achieving sustainable development, democratic governance thus becomes a **cross-cutting** strategy contributing simultaneously to each of the Mission's other strategic objectives, while promoting the desirable political end of a democratic Mali.

The conclusion -- one that the D/G SOT has acknowledged from its very beginning -- is that for the D/G strategy to be successfully implemented, recognition must be given to the unalterable fact that community organizations, its primary customers, must be **directly** supported to address the social and economic needs of their members. As it is the Mission's other strategic objectives whose programs address these more material needs, it is clear that the D/G SO must work with and through them to attain its defined results. Conversely, it can also be stated that the likelihood of other Mission teams achieving their own results -- as well as the overall Mission goal of sustainable economic, social and political development -- will depend largely on the ability of the D/G Team to build the capacity of COs and federations to undertake democratic self-governance and civic action. This conclusion thus leads to the issue as to how to achieve integration and synergy of SOs and corresponding results packages and activities on a Mission-wide basis. There are a number of options in this regard which will likely lead to the achievement of this integration of and synergy among the Mission's four SOs. Before presenting them in full, it is important to view COs in the broader context in which they operate.

Community organizations, as previously noted, are voluntarily formed by their members to address a particular, shared governance problem, i.e., joblessness and low incomes; a lack of access to critical social services; and, the poor management of common non-renewable natural resources required to support basic family and community needs. It is precisely these types of community problems to which COs address themselves and to which other Mission SOs are gearing their programs of support. In short, Youth and SEG SOs are concerned with improving the economic and social welfare of Malian communities while InfoCom is concerned with disseminating improved knowledge and practices in these areas as well as that of political affairs. The D/G SO, on the other hand, believes that in order for COs to be able to effectively provide services to members that address these problems, they must be well managed and democratically governed; and, that when necessary, that they be capable of defending and advancing the interests of their members vis-a-vis government and market interests. Thus, the principal results to which the D/G SO addresses itself is the building of CO capacity in the areas of democratic self-governance and civic action.

2. Implementation Arrangements and Mechanisms

The net result of individual SOs pursuing their discrete results will be to target a common set of COs with different interventions, i.e., those aimed at strengthening CO capacity (e.g., technical, management, democratic self-governance) and those concerned with providing concrete programmatic assistance (e.g., micro-credit funding, community school construction, dissemination of improved knowledge and practices in family planning). While it may be convenient for each SO to develop interventions according to its own specific needs, the impact on a given CO is to view it "in parts" rather than as a "holistic" organism with multiple functions and needs. The question then becomes whether it is up to Malian COs to integrate these different messages and interventions which ultimately aim to achieve individual Mission objectives or, rather, for the different SOs to integrate their interventions to promote **sustainable community development**, the replication of the Mission's country program goal at the community level. The proposition put forth here is that it is not only appropriate that integration take place at the level of the Mission, it also makes good development management sense. The following discussion provides three options which, we believe, are most likely to lead to SO integration and the related objective of synergy. They are listed in order of priority.

a) Option 1: Decentralized Approach

This option -- and one that takes USAID/Mali's re-engineering efforts to its logical conclusion -- treats the D/G SO as one of four SOs contributing to the achievement of the Mission's goal of **Mali achieves a level of sustainable political, social and economic development that eliminates the need for concessionary foreign assistance**. Viewed in this light, the achievement of the D/G SO as well as the other three SOs, becomes a by-product in the process of achieving the larger Mission goal. How does this vision translate in practical operational terms? The proposal made here is to decentralize responsibility for achieving the Mission goal to *mini country program strategy teams* at the regional (or other geographic defined areas) level and composed of members from each of the four SOs. Within each of these regional teams -- estimated at three to five country-wide -- there would be one or more results packages that aim at achievement of, not individual SOs per se, but rather the larger country program goal. Each SO could thus be treated as something approaching an "intermediate result" with their corresponding set of indicators used to measure overall progress towards the achievement of the Mission goal of sustainable political, social and economic development. Such an approach not only ensures integration and synergy among SOs, but promotes two of the most essential principles of Agency re-engineering, that is, employee empowerment and accountability.

Within each regional program there would be one **cross-cutting** results package that has as its principal objective the promotion of **sustainable community (political, social and economic) development**, the replication of the overall Mission goal at the local level as it is being replicated at the regional level. This cross-cutting results package would include all interventions, from whatever SO, that are intended to work with and through community organizations to improve the capacity of Malian communities to achieve the Mission's sustainable development goal. While this would not be the only results package at the regional level, it is likely to be the only one which cuts across other SOs. Each SO would also likely have other results packages that aim to achieve discrete results specific to that SO (e.g., policy reform, private sector development, government capacity building). There would also likely be one or more **supra or Mission level results packages** that support country-wide objectives that no regional program team addresses itself. This might also include a responsibility for overall monitoring, evaluation and reporting on the individual progress of mini-country program strategy teams.

What are the implications of this decentralization option in terms of Mission structure and the mechanism(s) required to operationalize it? In an ideal world, where the process of re-engineering was just beginning, a

decentralization strategy including devolution of powers and finances, would translate into the actual physical relocation of Mission personnel to mini-country program strategy teams in the targeted regions. In the real world, however, with the costs of such a restructuring unknown, and taking personnel considerations into account, such an approach is probably not feasible. In fact, it is not necessary to achieve the desired result of synergy and integration. What is necessary is the constitution of the regional teams, perhaps through formal *charter* (similar to what was undertaken by USAID/Bangladesh and its D/G team) promulgated by the Direction Core, empowering them while also holding them accountable for the achievement of the Mission's country program goal at the regional level. It would then be the responsibility of each regional team to determine the implementation arrangements and mechanisms best suited to the particular characteristics of its geographic area. What would, however, be common to each regional team, is the **cross-cutting results package** designed to achieve **sustainable community development**.

A proposed mechanism designed to operationalize this results package has already been briefly discussed with the Regional Contracts Officer/West Africa. It is the engagement, through *assistance instrument*, of multi-disciplinary implementation teams that would execute, in partnership with the mini-country team, the cross-cutting sustainable community development results package. It is anticipated that a consolidated Request for Applications (RFA) for a Cooperative Agreement (CA) would be issued to solicit proposals from interested parties to implement the cross-cutting results package by targeted region. From this single RFA multiple awards would be made by region or geographic zone targeted by USAID/Mali. Because of the broad range of technical and management skills and expertise required to implement this results package, it anticipated that either a consortium or prime - sub-contractor arrangement would be necessary, although this would ultimately be up to the applicants to decide the most compelling arrangement.

What would be necessary is that the several implementing partners have the capacity to provide training and technical assistance in: (i) a range of technical sectoral or programmatic areas; (ii) a range of generic development management skills; and (iii) in democratic self-governance. The purpose of such training and TA would be to prepare other PVO and NGO partners to build the overall capacity of COs, and the federations they form, to become sustainable community development agents. Technical programmatic or sectoral training would include civic education and action (the technical areas of the D/G SO) and such social and economic sectoral skills and expertise as credit administration, school, health center and rural radio station management, and information and communication approaches to knowledge and practice dissemination. In addition to the provision of training and technical assistance to PVOs and NGOs, the implementing partners would also be capable of providing grants to them to implement programs in collaboration with COs to undertake such activities as: construction of schools, health centers and rural radio stations; initiate micro-enterprise and AIDS education activities; and to establish Community Information and Animation Centers. Whether or not or, to what degree, the implementing partner would undertake MER functions would need to be determined between the mini-country program strategy teams and the Direction Core. *The principle being proposed here is that capacity building interventions for COs should not be separated from the actual execution of concrete sectoral programs that improve the economic and social welfare of CO members and the larger community itself.*

The advantages of this option are several. First and foremost, it ensures integration and synergy among Mission SOs by forcing individual SO teams to focus on achievement of the Mission goal rather than their individual results. Secondly, it increases the likelihood that the interventions developed by individual mini-country program teams are more relevant to the specific needs and conditions of the given region. Thirdly, it would reduce the number of overall management units by consolidating results packages and corresponding mechanisms, particularly those related to improving the social and economic welfare and political participation of Malian communities, i.e., promoting sustainable community development. Fourthly, as a result of decreased management units, results packages and mechanisms, it would likely decrease overall programmatic and

management costs. And finally, by decentralizing and devolving authority and finances to the mini-country program strategy teams, it would empower mission staff and their partners, while holding them accountable for results. In this regard, it is hoped that innovation and risk-taking would be increased.

b) Option 2: Centralized Approach

An alternative approach to that of decentralization, focusses solely on the way in which synergy and integration would be achieved in relation to any intervention which targets working with and through community organizations to achieve individual SO results at the community level. This is essentially taking each of the regional cross-cutting sustainable community development results packages and consolidating them at the **centralized** Mission level. Thus, this **supra or cross-cutting results package** operates on a country-wide basis rather than at the level of targeted regions or geographic areas. In the same vein, rather than mini-country program strategy teams taking responsibility for individual regional results packages, it is proposed that a supra or cross-cutting sustainable community development results package team be formed with membership from each SO. Rather than one RFA with multiple awards by region (the decentralized option), the centralized option would call for an RFA with a single award covering all regions. The functions of the single awardee (CA recipient) would be the same as those discussed above for the multiple awardees responsible for implementing the sustainable results packages at a regional level.

There are advantages and disadvantages to this option in relation to the previous option discussed above. In terms of the number of management units and corresponding results packages and mechanisms related to promoting sustainable community development, it decreases them from three or five, to one, albeit a very large results package and mechanism. This is likely to lead to significant cost savings vis-a-vis the multiple results packages and mechanisms of the decentralized option. It is also anticipated that this option will be less disruptive and threatening to the Mission as a whole as it does not entail the significant physical restructuring and mental reordering of staff members associated with the first option.

On the other hand, what is gained in economies of scale through this option is lost in terms of the development of regional specific programs designed to respond to the unique conditions and needs of the region concerned. It will also decrease the ability of the single mechanism to devote the time necessary to identify, select, train and monitor the activities of partner NGOs and PVOs in each of the regions upon which the success of the results package implementation rests. This option is also likely to decrease overall Mission synergy and integration as the focus will remain on achieving individual SO results rather than the country program goal. At the same time, there is likely to be less empowerment and accountability associated with this option as the same degree of authority and finances devolved under the first option are not likely to be devolved under the second. This, however, depends on how the Direction Core constitutes the supra results package team and the way in which individual SOs contribute to it.

c) Option 3: A Lead Strategic Objective

Assuming that neither of the two options previously discussed are workable alternatives for the Mission, it is proposed that the D/G SO become the *lead SO* coordinating those interventions, from whatever SO, that aim at improving community welfare through COs. In this regard, the D/G SO would take the lead in designing an overall approach to working with the Mission's PVO and NGO partners to implement a an integrated program vis-a-vis COs at the community level. It is suggested that other SOs that depended on achieving their results through COs would *buy-in* to the services provided by the mechanism(s) engaged by the D/G SO to implement its program. This would first require the D/G SO Team being empowered by the Direction Core as the principal agent responsible for achieving results that depend on COs. It would then likely involve other SOs negotiating with the D/G SO Team over the results to be achieved, the interventions to be implemented and the funding that would be provided to achieve the stipulated results.

To operationalize this option an umbrella-like mechanism, managed by an intermediary cooperative agreement (CA) recipient and responsible to the D/G Team is recommended. In addition to purely D/G activities such as civic education, the holding of dialogue fora, and the establishment of information and animation centers, the umbrella intermediary would be responsible for all capacity building interventions, including training in technical or sectoral programmatic areas related to the needs of other SOs. An issue to be resolved would be whether the umbrella intermediary would also manage the programmatic activities of other SOs (e.g., school and health center construction, micro-enterprise funding) or simply handle related training activities. The D/G SOT and corresponding mechanism would operate on a country-wide basis. Funding, including the costs of the intermediary umbrella manager, would come from each of the concerned SOs based upon an agreed upon formula. Monitoring, evaluation and reporting (MER) tasks could also be assigned to the umbrella intermediary or retained by the lead (D/G) SO team.

While this option is the least desirable of the three it still provides a number of advantages. First, it continues to treat our partners (NGOs) and customers (COs and federations) in a holistic manner acknowledging that they are concerned both with addressing the practical economic and social problems of their members and representing and protecting their interests vis-a-vis government and market interests at the local level and beyond; and doing so effectively and in a democratic manner. Secondly, it should still have the effect of decreasing the number of individual management units, results packages and implementation mechanisms involved in delivering services to the same target groups. This should ultimately decrease the management burden on Mission staff, lower costs through economies of scale, and lessen confusion among customers who might otherwise be confronted by several partners attached to or funded by different SOs. Finally, it offers one way to ensure a minimum degree of synergy among SOs and the integration of SO Team members.

C. Management Plan

In Part C, an illustrative management plan is provided to establish the way in which the D/G SOT will structure itself both internally and in its relations with other Mission SO teams, its implementing partners and the final customers. The principal problem in developing this plan is that neither the implementation arrangement nor mechanism that will operationalize the D/G strategy has yet been decided upon. As this issue is one that has Mission-wide ramifications, the decision will ultimately be made by the Direction Core, and may take some time. Thus, it is difficult at this point to state with any precision what relationships will be developed between the D/G SOT and other Mission SOs on the one hand, and with implementing partners and customers on the other. At the same time, it is also difficult to determine the staffing pattern of the SOT because the choice of one option over another (as discussed above) will necessarily drive the internal allocation of responsibilities among Team members. For instance, if the Mission were to choose the regional option, then D/G staff may be divided up among one or more mini-country program strategy teams; and funding would be allocated by region based on some percentage of each D/G results package going to a given regional team. On the other hand, if option three were chosen, then the Team would be structured along the current results packages discussed in Part B, above, while actual funding would depend on whether other SO teams decided to buy-in to the services provided by the D/G SOT.

The principal decision that the Team will need to decide is whether it will align itself according to the four results packages proposed in this Concept Paper. It is thus proposed that the Team review its current staffing pattern – developed prior to the intensive period of strategic planning that has taken place since November 1995 – to see if it still holds true under the new conditions and understandings that currently define its program and the larger Mission setting. In this regard, the following staffing pattern is recommended.

As noted above, there are a total of four results packages composing the D/G SO. One alternative to the existing staffing pattern, would be to assign one person to each results package. The first three results packages contribute directly to the achievement of one or more intermediate results. The fourth RP is the means by which the other three will be implemented, that is, it provides the SOT itself with access to technical assistance and management support through the funding obligated under it. Since the first two RPs focus on building the capacity of COs and federations in the areas of civic action (RP 1) and effective democratic self-governance (RP 2), it is conceivable that one RP manager could handle both of these RPs. RP 3 is geared to strengthening the capacity of implementing partners (PVOs and NGOs) to strengthen the capacity of COs and federations. This could thus stand-alone as a separate RP with RP manager. Because RP 4 will be handling the actual contractual arrangements with an intermediary program manager and/or several implementing partners for the implementation of the other three results packages, plus handling MER responsibilities, arranging training, workshops, studies, etc., it may require two different D/G SOT members assigned to handle this single result.

III. EXPECTED SO RESULTS/DEFINITION OF SUCCESS

The D/G SOT has gone through an extensive exercise in first formulating its results framework (previously called logical framework) including D/G strategic objective and corresponding intermediate results; and then developing indicators and targets to be used in measuring achievement of these results. It is the results framework and corresponding indicators and targets which will be used by the Team and its implementing partners. It should be noted that both the results framework and indicators and targets were recently validated in a D/G SOT ground-truthing exercise. The finalized D/G SO results framework and indicators and targets are attached as Annexes 1 and 2 respectively. Annex 3 contains the Validation Synthesis Report.

IV. KEY ASSUMPTIONS

The D/G SO Results Framework reflects the use of a number of fundamental underlying assumptions. The principal assumption that the Team has made is that it can only work with those COs and federations that are already the target of other Mission SOs. This issue has been discussed in detail above, but suffice it to note here, that COs and federations were initially formed around a common interest or problem by their members. Thus their first priority is to ensure that this interest or problem is resolved. The achievement of D/G SO results have taken this unalterable fact into consideration in the formulation of its strategy and is the principal reason why the Team has decided it must work with and through other SOs. The second assumption concerns the number of communes that will be targeted for SO activities. It is assumed that if COs become effective partners in democratic governance with decentralized local governments in 25 percent of the country's newly formed communes then it will have contributed to the Mission's overall goal of sustainable political, economic and social development. As it is expected that there will be approximately 600 new communes formed with corresponding local government bodies, activities will take place in some 150 communes over the strategic plan period. The choice of communes to be targeted will likely be based on: (i) high population densities; (ii) level of economic activity; and (iii) those communes where there is already *a critical mass* of other activities being supported by other SOs. As the Mission is in the process of undertaking a GIS exercise which is, among other functions, inventorying these three criteria.

In each targeted commune, a total of five COs and at least one federation will be targeted for assistance. It is assumed that with at least five COs and one federation (of COs) effectively performing civic action functions in addition to those of democratic self-governance, that a *critical mass* of local civil society participation in communal governance will be achieved. And that this level of participation will ensure that local governments render governance that is transparent, responsive, accountable and effective; and in which the development priorities of COs and their members are effectively represented and acted upon. Under the D/G SO, then, a total

of 750 COs and some 120 commune level federations will be strengthened to engage in civic action by the end of the SO period.

In order to strengthen both COs and federations, it is assumed that one NGO/federations will be responsible for working with 25 COs and one (communal-level) federation, with a total of some 30 NGOs/federations supported over strategic plan period.

Finally, as concerns the D/G SO specifically, including its ability to achieve stated results, the assumption is made that the GRM's decentralization program will be fully implemented by 1999. As shown in the revised D/G results framework, **effective decentralization** has now been incorporated as a first level intermediate result, but one over which the Team takes no responsibility in achieving; rather it will monitor its progress towards the expected result.

V. FURTHER DESIGN ISSUES AND ANALYTIC WORK

With the completion of the ground-truthing or validation exercise undertaken by the Team in March 1996, no further analytic work is required to complete documentation permitting the authorization and obligation of the D/G SO and its funding. Those issues which remain outstanding concern operationalizing the D/G SO and should not hinder further work related to the development of final design documentation necessary for this authorization and obligation. However, there are a number of critical decisions which must be made by Direction Core which will ultimately determine the way in which the D/G SO will be executed including implementation arrangements and mechanisms. The following issues are those which must be decided upon before operationalization of D/G SO takes place.

- Which implementation arrangements and mechanism(s) option will the Mission decide upon to ensure synergy and integration of all strategic objectives? The D/G SO cannot be implemented in isolation from other SOs that are also targeting community organizations. Once the arrangement and mechanism are chosen then the D/G SOT can begin operationalizing the strategy.
- Preparation of procurement documentation for the engagement of a contractor to undertake implementation of the *Performance Monitoring Plan*. This should first be discussed with the Democracy and Governance Center to see whether one of their newly developed IQCs might provide the needed services.
- Hold a Partners' workshop or series of workshops to bring, other donors, US PVOs, Malian NGOs, relevant GRM agencies and local consulting firms up to date with the progress of the D/G SOT. Sharing various documents that the SOT has developed over the previous six months would be advisable prior to such meetings. This is a most urgent and critical step to take as soon as possible.
- Restructuring the D/G SOT and reallocating responsibilities as a function of the to be decided Mission-wide implementation arrangements and mechanism, revised Results Framework and proposed Results Packages. This includes developing new scopes of work for each of the SOT members.
- Work can commence on the development of both civic education materials and a training course materials for implementing partners, i.e., intermediary NGOs, federations, and PVOs. The Mission should be able to obtain technical assistance for this activity through the Democracy Center's new Civil Society Support Facility. The SOT should investigate what local technical assistance and training resources are available which could work with a US contractor.

- Immediate discussions with World Education should take place to ensure that its recently funded grant activity is consistent with the objectives, indicators and activities of the new D/G strategy. Specifically, the World Ed grant needs to be viewed as a pilot activity in which a number of proposed D/G activities (e.g., Centers for Civic Education and Action, federation training) are implemented.
- Follow-up discussions should be held with both the Ministry of Rural Development and Environment (CAC) and Decentralization Mission on the status of Associational Laws and the status of decentralization, respectively. The D/G SOT will need to become much more involved in the development and implementation of these laws than was initially thought.
- Consideration could be given to undertaking or commissioning studies on two major issues which again emerged during the "ground-truthing" exercise: (i) the degree to which Village Associations are actually voluntarily formed; and (ii) the appropriateness of consensus as a mechanism for choosing CO leadership and making CO decisions. At this stage developing a scope of work for local consultants would be appropriate.

ANNEX SCOPE OF WORK

AMENDMENT OF SOLICITATION/MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT

2. AMENDMENT/MODIFICATION NO. One (1)		3. EFFECTIVE DATE 04/01/96	4. REQUISITION/PURCHASE REQ. NO. HNE-0000-I-00-2098-00	5. PROJECT NO. (if applicable) 688-0510
6. ISSUED BY Contracting Office USAID/Mali Dept. of State Washington, D.C. 20521-2050		7. ADMINISTERED BY (If other than Item 6) N/A		

8. NAME AND ADDRESS OF CONTRACTOR (No., street, county, State and ZIP Code) Thunder & Associates 719 Prince St. Alexandria, VA 22314 USA		9A. AMENDMENT OF SOLICITATION NO. One (1)
		9B. DATED (SEE ITEM 11) 04/01/96
		10A. MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT/ORDER NO. HNE-0000-I-00-2098-00 Delivery Order No.: 07
		10B. DATED (SEE ITEM 13) 2/24/96

11. THIS ITEM ONLY APPLIES TO AMENDMENTS OF SOLICITATIONS

The above numbered solicitation is amended as set forth in item 14. The hour and date specified for receipt of Offers is extended, is not extended.

Offers must acknowledge receipt of this amendment prior to the hour and date specified in the solicitation or as amended, by one of the following methods:
 (a) By completing items 8 and 15, and returning _____ copies of the amendment; (b) By acknowledging receipt of this amendment on each copy of the offer submitted; or (c) By separate letter or telegram which includes a reference to the solicitation and amendment numbers. FAILURE OF YOUR ACKNOWLEDGMENT TO BE RECEIVED AT THE PLACE DESIGNATED FOR THE RECEIPT OF OFFERS PRIOR TO THE HOUR AND DATE SPECIFIED MAY RESULT IN REJECTION OF YOUR OFFER. If by virtue of this amendment you desire to change an offer already submitted, such change may be made by telegram or letter, provided each telegram or letter makes reference to the solicitation and this amendment, and is received prior to the opening hour and date specified.

12. ACCOUNTING AND APPROPRIATION DATA (if required)

725/61014 GSS5-95-21688-KG63 increase \$2,502

13. THIS ITEM APPLIES ONLY TO MODIFICATIONS OF CONTRACTS/ORDERS, IT MODIFIES THE CONTRACT/ORDER NO. AS DESCRIBED IN ITEM 14.

A. THIS CHANGE ORDER IS ISSUED PURSUANT TO: (Specify authority) THE CHANGES SET FORTH IN ITEM 14 ARE MADE IN THE CONTRACT ORDER NO. IN ITEM 10A.

B. THE ABOVE NUMBERED CONTRACT/ORDER IS MODIFIED TO REFLECT THE ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES (such as changes in paying office, appropriation date, etc.) SET FORTH IN ITEM 14, PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF FAR 43.103(b).

C. THIS SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT IS ENTERED INTO PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF:
 X The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and Executive Order 11223.

D. OTHER (Specify type of modification and authority)

E. IMPORTANT: Contractor is not, is required to sign this document and return 3 copies to the issuing office.

14. DESCRIPTION OF AMENDMENT/MODIFICATION (Organized by UCP section headings, including solicitation/contract subject matter where feasible.)
 The purpose of this amendment is (1) to revise the Statment of Work; (2) extend the period of performance from March 3, 1996 to April 10, 1996; (3) increase funding from \$33,598 to \$36,061. Attached are the revised SOW and revised budget.

Except as provided herein, all terms and conditions of the document referenced in item 9A or 10A, as heretofore changed, remains unchanged and in full force and effect.

15A. NAME AND TITLE OF SIGNER (Type or print) Nancy A. McClintock Project Mgr	16A. NAME AND TITLE OF CONTRACTING OFFICER (Type or print) John R. Taber, Regional Contracting Officer
15B. CONTRACTOR/OFFEROR Nancy A. McClintock (Signature of person authorized to sign)	16B. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY John R. Taber (Signature of Contracting Officer)
15C. DATE SIGNED 17 April 96	16C. DATE SIGNED 4/5/96

INSTRUCTIONS

Instructions for items other than those that are self-explanatory, are as follows:

(a) Item 1 (Contract ID Code). Insert the contract type identification code that appears in the title block of the contract being modified.

(b) Item 3 (Effective date).

(1) For a solicitation amendment, change order, or administrative change, the effective date shall be the issue date of the amendment, change order, or administrative change.

(2) For a supplemental agreement, the effective date shall be the date agreed to by the contracting parties.

(3) For a modification issued as an initial or confirming notice of termination for the convenience of the Government, the effective date and the modification number of the confirming notice shall be the same as the effective date and modification number of the initial notice.

(4) For a modification converting a termination for default to a termination for the convenience of the Government, the effective date shall be the same as the effective date of the termination for default.

(5) For a modification confirming the contracting officer's determination of the amount due in settlement of a contract termination, the effective date shall be the same as the effective date of the initial decision.

(c) Item 6 (Issued By). Insert the name and address of the issuing office. If applicable, insert the appropriate issuing office code in the code block.

(d) Item 8 (Name and Address of Contractor). For modifications to a contract or order, enter the contractor's name, address, and code as shown in the original contract or order, unless changed by this or a previous modification.

(e) Items 9, (Amendment of Solicitation No.—Dated), and 10, (Modification of Contract/Order No.—Dated). Check the appropriate box and in the corresponding blanks insert the number and date of the original solicitation, contract, or order.

(f) Item 12 (Accounting and Appropriation Data). When appropriate, indicate the impact of the modification on each affected accounting classification by inserting one of the following entries:

(1) Accounting classification
Net increase \$

(2) Accounting classification
Net decrease \$

NOTE: If there are changes to multiple accounting classifications that cannot be placed in block 12, insert an asterisk and the words "See continuation sheet".

(g) Item 13. Check the appropriate box to indicate the type of modification. Insert in the corresponding blank the authority under which the modification is issued. Check whether or not contractor must sign this document. (See FAR 43.103.)

(h) Item 14 (Description of Amendment/Modification).

(1) Organize amendments or modifications under the appropriate Uniform Contract Format (UCF) section headings from the applicable solicitation or contract. The UCF table of contents, however, shall not be set forth in this document.

(2) Indicate the impact of the modification on the overall total contract price by inserting one of the following entries:

(i) Total contract price increased by \$

(ii) Total contract price decreased by \$

(iii) Total contract price unchanged.

(3) State reason for modification.

(4) When removing, reinstating, or adding funds, identify the contract items and accounting classifications.

(5) When the SF 30 is used to reflect a determination by the contracting officer of the amount due in settlement of a contract terminated for the convenience of the Government, the entry in Item 14 of the modification may be limited to —

(i) A reference to the letter determination; and

(ii) A statement of the net amount determined to be due in settlement of the contract.

(6) Include subject matter or short title of solicitation/contract where feasible.

(i) Item 16B. The contracting officer's signature is not required on solicitation amendments. The contracting officer's signature is normally affixed last on supplemental agreements.

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Revised Budget

SALARIES	DAYS	BASE		TOTAL
SrDG C.Soc. Spec. L. FOX	39	\$343	\$581.16	\$22,666
Personnel	Subtotal			\$22,666

TRAVEL & PER DIEM	Unit	Cost/U		
RT Airfares Mali	1	\$3,524		\$3,524
Per Diem Bamako 84/45	39	\$129		\$5,031
Airport Transfers	2	\$60		\$120
Local Transport	1	\$550		\$550
Transportation & Per Diem Subtotal				\$9,225

OTHER DIRECT COSTS

Communications/courier	1	\$1,000		\$1,000
Computer Notebook Rental	1	\$1,000		\$1,000
Printer Rental	1	\$200		\$200
Visa, Vacc, Mat, Comp Sup.	1	\$300		\$300
Excess Bag for Publications	1	\$500		\$500
DBA Insurance Gross \$22,666x\$4.72/100				\$1,070
Medex Evacuation Insurance				\$100

Other Direct Cost Subtotal \$4,170

GRAND TOTAL \$36,061

III. Purpose and Activities

The purpose of this buy-in is to assist the USAID Mali DG/SOT in a series of activities aimed towards significantly furthering the implementation of the FY 1996 Action Plan as previously developed. Specifically the consultant will:

1) Operationalize a monitoring and evaluation plan. Previous work on a M&E Plan has been done by Thunder Associates, the recent AID/W MER Team, and the DG/SOT itself. The contractor will take this information and prepare a concise conceptual framework for an M&E plan.

2) Develop a methodology and carry-out an inventory/survey of those communities and community organizations in Mali which would likely comprise the target group, geographic areas, and some of the specific partners with which the DG/SOT will likely be working throughout the life of the S.O. The survey will also be utilized to verify the indicators, targets and assumptions currently under development for the S.O. logical framework.

3) Develop a concept paper (5-10 pages) for the DG SO. This document will include the following information:

a) Statement of the problem/opportunity and program purpose. Relationship to Mission Strategic Plan

b) Plan of action - how the program will work

- 1) types of intervention expected
- 2) implementation mechanisms
- 3) illustrative financial plan
- 4) management plan

c) Definition of success

d) Key assumptions

e) Design and analytical work to be completed before authorization and obligation

IV. Deliverables

1. A M&E conceptual framework which is consistent with the requirements in III. (1) above.

2. A report which summarizes the conclusions and findings from inventory/survey outlined in III (2) above. The implications and findings will be incorporated and used to produce a final logical framework, indicators, and targets.

3. A concept paper as described in III (3) above.

The deliverables are due in draft prior to departure, and in final two weeks following performance of work.

V. Work Week

Six day work week is authorized.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Advisory or Assistance Services:
Yes X No

- 1. Country of Performance: U.S., Mali
- 2. Indefinite Quantity Contract: HNE-0000-I-00-2098-00
Delivery Order No: 07

NEGOTIATED PURSUANT TO THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT
OF 1961, AS AMENDED, AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11223

- | | |
|---|--|
| 3. CONTRACTOR: (Name and Address):

THUNDER & ASSOCIATES, INC.
719 PRINCE STREET
ALEXANDRIA, VA 22314 | 4a. ISSUING OFFICE:

CONTRACTING OFFICE USAID BAMAKO
DEPT. OF STATE WASHINGTON D.C. 20521-2050



4b. ADMINISTRATION OFFICE:
Contracts Office, USAID/Mali
Dept. of State
Washington, D.C. 20521-2050 |
| 5. PROJECT OFFICE:
Anna DIALLO D/GOV
Usaid Bamako | 6. SUBMIT INVOICES TO:
Office of Finance & Management
USAID/Bamako |
| 7. EFFECTIVE DATE:
March 4, 1996 | 8. ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE:
April 19, 1996 |

- | | |
|--|--|
| 9. ACCOUNTING AND APPROPRIATION DATA:
PIC/T No.: 688-0510-3-50066
Budget Plan Code: GSSS-95-21688-KG63
Appropriation No.: 72S/61014 | Total Estimated Cost: \$33,598
Amount Obligated : \$33,598
Unobligated Amount : \$ |
|--|--|

10. The United States of America, represented by the Contracting Officer signing this Order, and the Contractor agree that: (a) this Order is issued pursuant to the Contract specified in Block 2 above and (b) the entire Contract between the parties hereto consists of this Delivery Order and the Contract specified in Block 2 above.

- | | |
|--|--|
| 11a. NAME OF CONTRACTOR:

THUNDER & ASSOCIATES, INC. | 11b. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT |
|--|--|

BY: (Signature of Authorized Individual) 	BY: (Contracting Officer) 
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME: NANCY A. McCLINTOCK	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME: Dennis DCRSEY

TITLE: Project Manager	TITLE: Contracting Officer
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DATE: 29 February 1996	DATE: 2/29/96
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DELIVER ORDER STATEMENT OF WORK

IQC No: HNE-000-I-00-2098-00

Page 1 of 3

I. Objective

To support the USAID Mali Democracy & Governance Strategic Objective Team (DG/SOT) in the development of start-up activities, surveys, and studies required for the implementation of the strategic objective.

II. Background

USAID Mali has been undergoing a process of reengineering since December 1994. As part of this process, the mission has also undertook a profound analysis and re-orientation of its strategy.

The final 1996 - 2002 strategic plan focusses on four highly interrelated strategic objectives within the social, economic, and political realms. The Democratic Governance strategic objective is one of these four strategic objectives contributing to USAID Mali's Program Goal: **Mali achieves a level of sustainable economic, social, and political development that eliminates the need for concessional foreign assistance.** What distinguishes this program goal from previous mission efforts is the addition of a political dimension or objective to economic and social ones. As a result of Mali's transition to a multi-party democracy in 1991, the possibility of achieving **sustainable (social, economic, and environmental)** development became a reality for the first time in Mali's history. Thus the promotion of democratic governance in which community organizations (CO's) - as the base unit of civil society - participate as equal partners in sustainable national development efforts is viewed as a means to achieving the mission program goal, as well as a desirable end in itself.

FY 1996 represents the first year of the formation and establishment of the USAID Mali DG/SOT as well as development and implementation of activities and programs designed to implement the S.O. Step one was the formation of the S.C. Team itself which was accomplished in November 1995. Step two involved the initial training of the DG/SOT, finalization of the results framework of the S.O., development of a detailed first year action plan, outlining a seven-year life-of-S.O. plan and budget, and the development of a monitoring and evaluation plan. These were fully accomplished by the Team with the assistance and guidance of Thunder Associates in January 1996. This scope-of-work now outlines the next stage of assistance required for the third step in year one of the DG/SOT.

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III. Purpose & Activities

The purpose of this buy-in is to assist the USAID Mali DG/SOT in a series of activities aimed towards significantly furthering the implementation of the FY 1996 Action Plan as previously developed. Specifically the consultant will:

- 1) Finalize or further develop the monitoring & evaluation plan which was developed by Thunder Associates making it "operational" and ready to implement (specifically its relation to indicator/target measurements).
- 2) Develop a methodology and carry out an inventory and survey of those communities and community organizations in Mali which would likely comprise the target group, geographic areas, and (to the extent possible) the specific PVO's/NGO's and CO's with which the DG/SOT would work with throughout the life of the S.O.
- 3) Develop a survey methodology to collect and establish baseline target information for the indicators previously developed. Review and revise where necessary.
- 4) Develop scope-of-work for contracting with a local firm to conduct the actual baseline indicator survey described above. Provide technical advise and training where necessary (if possible) to the DG/SOT and contractor

IV. Deliverables

1. A finalized monitoring and evaluation plan which is consistent with the requirements in III.(1) above.
 2. A report which provides the methodology, assumptions, and recommendations for the target partners, stakeholders, and customers described in III.(2) above.
 3. A report which further refines and develops the targets and indicators (where necessary) of the DG/SO logical framework with special emphasis on the detailed, operational methodology and guidelines for conducting such a survey as required in III.(3) above.
- The deliverables are due in draft prior to departure, and in final two weeks following performance of work.

V. Level of Effort

It is estimated that this scope-of-work will be accomplished by one senior D&G specialist utilizing 36 person-days of in-country technical assistance. Six day work week are to be authorized.

Delivery Order #
Page 3 of 3

MALI DEMO/GOV STRATEGY & IMPLEMENTATION
IOC No HNE 0000-I-00-2098-00

ESTIMATED BUDGET

SALARIES	DAYS	BASE	TOTAL
SrDG C.Soc. Spec. L. FCX	36	\$348	\$581.16
Personnel Subtotal			\$20,922
TRAVEL & PER DIEM	Unit	Cost/U	
RT Airfares Mali	1	\$3,524	\$3,524
Per Diem Bamako 84/45	35	\$129	\$4,644
Airport Transfers	2	\$60	\$120
Local Transport	1	\$300	\$300
Transportation & Per Diem Subtotal			\$8,588
OTHER DIRECT COSTS			
Communications/courier	1	\$1000	\$1000
Computer Notebook Rental	1	\$1000	\$1000
Printer Rental	1	\$200	\$200
Visa, Vacc, Mat, Comp Sup.	1	\$300	\$300
Excess Bag for Publications	1	\$500	\$500
DBA Insurance Gross \$20,922x\$4.72/100			\$988
Medex Evacuation Insurance			\$100
Other Direct Cost Subtotal			\$4,088
 GRAND TOTAL			 \$33,598

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