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# Preventing and Mitigating Violent Conflicts:
## *A Guide for Practitioners*

**Prepared for:**

**The Greater Horn of Africa Initiative,**

**The United States Department of State**

**and**

**The United States Agency for International Development**

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# PREFACE

This Guide was requested by the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative to help support the Initiative's effort to promote peace and development in the Greater Horn of Africa. The purpose of the guide is threefold:

1. To summarize the literature and provide a common language in the area of conflict prevention and mitigation.
2. To discuss some of the most important tools used in conflict prevention and mitigation efforts and show how they have been applied in the Greater Horn and elsewhere.
3. To outline the present and potential conflicts in the Greater Horn and examine their sources.

This document is not meant to be definitive. We hope it will be a catalyst for opening discussions among conflict prevention and mitigation practitioners. Since the Guide is a "living" document which will evolve with this rapidly changing field, we have chosen to publish it in loose leaf format in order to easily accommodate changes, updates, and new material.

Many individuals and organizations supported the Creative Associates International, Inc. project team. Among those who were particularly helpful were: Ambassador David Shinn, Jennifer Douglas, Shirley Hoffman, Heather McHugh, Jonathan Olsson, Patricia Rader, and Lynn Sheldon. We would also like to acknowledge helpful comments from USAID's Center for Democracy and Governance, and the U.S. Embassies and USAID Missions throughout the Greater Horn of Africa. We would also like to express special thanks to our project supervisor, Rosemary O'Neill. Finally, we owe a debt to many private individuals and organizations who supplied us with information and ideas.

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Guide was commissioned by the United States Department of State and the Agency for International Development as part of the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative. Creative Associates International, Inc., was asked to develop a reference manual for practitioners to prevent and mitigate conflict in the Greater Horn of Africa.

The end of the Cold War offers a new opportunity to address conflicts cooperatively. Yet major powers and international organizations are finding unacceptable the mounting human, material, and political costs in alleviating the effects of these conflicts. Commitment is growing to finding ways to stop violence before it erupts and to keeping recent conflicts from reigniting. The Guide first outlines why and how the design and implementation of established programs in development and other longstanding fields must be more finely calibrated to address the different sources and levels of incipient conflicts more directly. Newer approaches to conflict resolution and prevention must be linked with established programs in more coherent, context-specific conflict prevention and mitigation strategies.

Conflict prevention is not a discrete technique or method in itself. It is an orientation that can be applied to a variety of techniques, programs and projects in many fields — to the self-defined field of "conflict resolution" as well as to the fields of development, humanitarian affairs, democracy-building, military affairs, and diplomacy. These activities prevent or mitigate conflict when they are consciously designed and operated with attention to conflicts' sources and manifestations.

Conflict prevention can be carried out by:

- Applying stand-alone initiatives to particular disputes or potential conflicts, in which particular methods such as negotiations or dialogues are aimed deliberately at keeping these disputes from escalating — for example, an NGO project that engages influential people from two ethnic communities with tense relations in a training program in conflict resolution.

- Adding explicit objectives in conflict prevention or mitigation to existing development, relief and other programs that have other primary objectives. These programs can become conflict prevention or resolution when they take special pains to:

    - Do no harm — avoid contributing to the sources of conflict, for instance, by changing an electoral system from a "winner-take-all" formula to reduce ethnic competition.

    - Do better — increase positive impacts in ameliorating conflicts, for example, deliberately hiring laborers from two ethnic groups with tense relations to build a road, or designing social safety nets for a minority-populated region into a structural adjustment program.

- Strengthen and transform indigenous social and political mechanisms to support conflict prevention —for example, supporting elders' councils in addressing simmering local issues.

This Guide then strives to provide concrete tools for conflict prevention and mitigation in the field. The subsequent sections of this Guide:

- Review the key features of several current and potential conflicts in the Greater Horn region;
- Discuss the causes of violent conflict, distinguishing between systemic or background preconditions, enabling or proximate factors, and immediate triggering events.
- Examine the nature and ingredients of violent conflict compared to peace, in order to suggests leverage points for action and to look at gradations between these differing states within societies or in the relations between nations and dividing a typical conflict's life cycle into initial, middle and end phases.
- Describe the escalatory processes and stages through which violent conflicts arise out of peaceful conditions.
- Compile a list of policy tools that have been used by both outside third parties and national actors in conflict prevention and mitigation in differing functional areas — official diplomacy, non-official facilitation, military measures, economic and social development, judicial or legal processes, human rights, communications, education, humanitarian assistance, and political development.
- Profile sixteen of these policy tools, discussing their applicability to conflict, organizers, implementors and resources required for implementation, with in-depth illustrations of past experience within and outside the Greater Horn region.
- Extrapolate lessons learned from recent experiences applying these tools in conflict situations worldwide.
- Discuss strategies for selecting and applying policy tools in overall strategies toward conflict.

More than one tool can be applied to a conflict. To provide a basis for making decisions in applying various tools, this Guide offers a set of lessons learned derived from case studies of prior conflict interventions. Experience suggests that pre-crisis preventive involvements will be initiated and will be successful to the extent that:

- A potential conflict is perceived to have wider symbolic significance or to threaten the regional or global interests of one or more major third party actors.
- Multiple third party actors with moral standing and effective power act in a relatively concerted fashion.
- Significant inducements to conduct disputes peacefully are brought to bear early.

- A combination of positive, negative, and facilitative tools is employed.
- Major powers and regional neighbors share an interest in resolving the conflict.
- The United States gives at least indirect support to the preventive effort.

The policy-maker or practitioner's choice of tools depends on a number of factors, ranging from the reason for the conflict, the stage of conflict at which intervention is anticipated , and the timetable expected for results.

We supplement this empirical analysis with an analysis of issues to be thought through in developing strategies to prevent or mitigate conflict. These issues converge on:

- Goal trade-offs — what conflict prevention or mitigation is trying to achieve in the context of democratization and other policies which the U.S. believes are important to developing nations' growth and well-being.
- The status of national transition — including an area's capacity to absorb disruptions and foster peaceful transitions to desired goals.
- Early warning — specific signs of brewing violent conflicts to watch for.
- Conflict needs and responses — pinpointing the aspects of potentially violent situations that need the most attention.
- Tool implementers — who should do what in light of various actors' strengths and limitations.
- Entry and disengagement — timing third party involvement in light of optimal sequencing of conflict intervention tools.
- Mid-conflict prevention — ways to administer humanitarian aid to avoid worsening the conflict.
- Institutionalizing conflict prevention — how to structure a regular multi-lateral process linking US and international actors for preventive interventions.

An annotated list of organizational resources and a selected bibliography complete this Guide.

# HOW THIS GUIDE IS ORGANIZED: A ROAD MAP

For ease of readership, this Guide is structured into ten sections.

*I.* ***Rationale*** presents what this Guide offers in terms of the challenges in new and existing paradigms, strategies and programs in conflict prevention.

*II.* ***Conflict in the Greater Horn*** discusses the manifestations and underlying and proximate sources of conflicts in the ten countries in the Greater Horn region.

*III.* ***Conceptual Building Blocks*** defines the types, stages and levels of conflict and considers ways to prevent incipient conflicts from escalating into unmanageable conflicts and past conflicts from re-igniting.

*IV.* ***Toolbox*** reviews the array of tools of existing and new policy tools that are and might be used to prevent further conflicts and how they may be applicable to particular conditions.

*V.* ***Applying the Tools*** suggests entry points for preventive action with lessons derived from past experiences.

*VI.* ***Intervention Strategies*** discusses guidelines about the goals, tasks and issues in planning and implementing conflict prevention strategies.

*VII.* ***Organizational Resources*** offers a preliminary annotated list of organizations within and outside the Greater Horn of Africa that are involved in various aspects of conflict prevention.

*VIII.* ***Bibliography*** supplies complete references to all publications cited in this Guide.

*IX.* ***Acronyms*** defines all acronyms used in this Guide.

*X.* ***Supplemental Information*** provides a place for users of this Guide to organize additional information on conflict prevention.

# PROJECT TEAM

Creative Associates deployed an eight-person team to develop this guide. The team was comprised as follows.

- ***Team Leader***

***Charito Kruvant.*** As President and CEO of Creative Associates International, Inc., Ms. Kruvant is responsible for the leadership and management of a professional and technical services organization that specializes in human resources development, information management, and private enterprise development. In addition, she has extensive skills and experience in the areas of human and civil rights, change management and conflict negotiation and mediation.

- ***Principal Authors***

***Dr. Michael Lund.*** Dr. Lund is Senior Associate at Creative Associates International, Inc. His prior accomplishments include work at the United States Institute of Peace, where he was a Senior Scholar in charge of the Preventive Diplomacy Initiative (1994 to 1995), and established and directed the Jennings Randolph Fellows Program (1987 to 1993). His interests at the Peace Institute focused primarily on conflict resolution and multilateral organizations in sub-Saharan Africa and Europe. Dr. Lund is author of *Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy* (United States Institute of Peace, forthcoming, 1996).

In the mid-1980s, Dr. Lund researched domestic programs for social welfare, housing, community development and the US policy-making process at the Urban Institute in Washington, DC. He co-edited and contributed to *The Reagan Administration and the Governing of America* (1984) and *Beyond Privatization: The Tools of Government Action* (1988). He convened a conference on the Horn of Africa and edited a Research Report *Dilemmas of the Horn: Famine, Development and Politics in Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia* (1991).

Dr. Lund has taught comparative politics, public policy and public administration at Cornell, UCLA and the University of Maryland, and has consulted for the US Department of Health and Human Services. His interest in the Horn of Africa began with his service as Peace Corps volunteer in Ethiopia in the 1960s. His subsequent Masters degree thesis was on the role of patrimonialism in the formation of the Ethiopian state.

Dr. Lund earned his Ph.D. at the University of Chicago in political science, where he studied comparative political development, African politics, comparative social policy and American public policy making.

His dissertation examined the politics of the British welfare state. He has a B.D. from Yale University Divinity School and a B.A. from Augustana College.

***John Prendergast.*** Consultant at Creative Associates International, Inc. since October 1995, Mr. Prendergast is a specialist on issues related to the Greater Horn of Africa. He brings particular expertise in humanitarian aid, human rights and conflict management. He is currently the Director of the Horn of Africa Project at the Center of Concern. He has worked with a variety of relief and development NGOs, UN and government agencies as well as human rights organizations in Africa, Europe and the United States.

Mr. Prendergast has authored numerous articles in magazines, newspapers and journals. He authored or co-authored the following books:

- *Without Troops and Tanks: Humanitarian Intervention in Ethiopia and Eritrea*, Trenton: Red Sea Press, 1994 (with Mark Duffield);
- *Civilian Devastation: Human Rights Abuses by all Parties in Sudan*, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994 (with Jemera Rone);
- *Situation Analysis of Women and Children in Sudan*, Khartoum: UNICEF, 1995;
- *Humanitarian Aid and Conflict Prevention in the Greater Horn of Africa*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishing (tentative);
- *Humanitarian Band-Aids for Human Rights Crises: Somalia and Sudan Case Studies*, London: Pluto Press, forthcoming, 1996;
- *Crisis and Hope in Africa*, Belgium: CIDSE Consortium, forthcoming, 1996.

### ♦ Other Team Members

***Susan Votaw.*** Senior Associate at Creative Associates International, Inc., Ms. Votaw brings 17 years of diverse experiences in designing, managing and evaluating leadership training programs, and designing strategies for human resource and strategies for meeting development goals in communities in transition. She has worked in Burundi, Rwanda and Kenya, and has designed and evaluated projects to reintegrate demobilized soldiers in Mozambique and El Salvador. Ms. Votaw is a skilled facilitator and communicator with a reputation for timely completion of multiple tasks to USAID's satisfaction.

***Raiza Kolia.*** Consultant at Creative Associates International, Inc. since September 1995, Dr. Kolia is a South African citizen with extensive training and experience with issues related to international development policy analysis, gender inequality, impact evaluations and project designs and conflict management. She worked for the Center for Inter-Group studies in Cape Town during the apartheid years. Most of her work involved conflict resolution and management, negotiation and mediation between government forces and the community, student bodies and trade unions.

***Suzanne Heigh.*** Ms. Heigh has served as Senior Associate in the Communities in Transition Division at Creative Associates International, Inc. since April 1994. Her specialties are post-conflict transitions and reconciliation, ex-combatant demobilization and reintegration programs, research and analysis and project evaluation. Her 10-plus years as a military officer (over 7 on active duty) contribute greatly to her understanding of conflict and peace issues and to her experience working in an inter-agency environment.

Ms. Heigh is the Principal Investigator and co-author of a series of Demobilization and Reintegration Project Studies produced for USAID. She supported the United Nations in planning and designing demobilization and reintegration programs in Angola under sponsorship by USAID/OTI. She was in Somalia in April 1995 to conduct an assessment and propose a strategy for demobilization and reintegration programs for USAID/Somalia. Her other experience includes consulting for the World Bank and the Overseas Development Council as a co-author and researcher.

***Stephen Horblitt.*** As Senior Associate at Creative Associates International, Inc., Mr. Horblitt brings extensive experience in strategic planning and external relations management in the US and Haiti. He has been engaged in reinforcing constructive dialogue among Haiti's political actors. He served as Legislative Director for Representative Walter E. Fauntroy.

***Kiyoshi Harada.*** Program Associate at Creative Associates International, Inc., Mr. Harada has experience in management and leadership evaluation, organizational development, human resources training and political economies. He has also worked in democratization.

### ◆ *More about Creative Associates International, Inc.*

Creative Associates International, Inc. incorporated in 1979, is a private minority and women-owned and operated professional and technical services firm. Creative is headquartered in Washington, DC, with branch offices and project staff in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East.

Creative Associates offers key capacities to implement this project.

- Creative brings sixteen years of experience designing and managing projects for government, non-governmental and private clients that are makers and managers of change and transition;
- Creative is a leader among US firms in working with communities in transition and with emerging democracies, with an entire full-time division devoted to designing and implementing projects in democratic development, post-crisis transition and community action;
- Creative is thoroughly familiar with USAID contracting and requirements and has earned an outstanding reputation for effectively managing research and field operations worldwide.

Creative Associates offers the Division for Communities in Transition (CIT) to assist in implementing this contract.

- CIT supports change towards peace, self-sufficiency and stability, building on civic initiative and popular participation and working with local resources and institutions to forge renewed communities following social unrest, political upheaval, natural disasters and civil war;

- CIT designs and implements training, technical assistance, and research;
- CIT interventions build individual, organizational and institutional capacity to reach populations in greatest need; CIT supports these institutions and organizations to continue to use and develop newly acquired skills and knowledge beyond the life of the project;
- CIT establishes effective mechanisms with donors, host-country institutions and community-based groups to expand and improve resources and services to communities of greatest need and to highest-risk populations;
- CIT conducts programs that are sensitive to and adept at working in difficult settings, under tight timeframes, and in countries facing social and political change.

Creative Associates has provided technical assistance to a range of institutions from grassroots organizations to policy-makers, from nascent to experienced institutions. Creative has designed, managed, and evaluated a wide range of projects and research activities, from leadership development to community development. Creative staff have procured commodities to support other development initiatives. Creative's philosophy is always to provide the regional perspective and breadth of background necessary while attending to cost efficiency to achieve consultancy and project results.

Creative has a longstanding history of collaborative and sensitive work with Africa. Creative has conducted various projects for Africa Bureau of USAID (Women in Development in Africa). Examples of Creative work in the Greater Horn region include the Somalia Management Training and Development Project, a strategy for training and the Education Reform Project in Rwanda, and national-level interventions for primary education in Uganda.

# RATIONALE: WHY RE-TOOL FOR POST-COLD WAR CONFLICTS?

## I. Context: Conflict Amid Cooperation

### A. The New Climate

With the end of the Cold War in 1989-90, many leaders and other observers saw an historic opportunity for international collaboration to resolve ongoing violent conflicts and prevent new ones. Some looked forward to a "New World Order." Six years later, while cooler US-Russian relations have dampened that initial euphoria, the end of the Cold War has dramatically increased international cooperation. Global nuclear war no longer looms so ominously, and other signs are evident:

- More than at any time this century, none of the major centers of power — the United States, Russia, Western Europe, China, Japan — perceives other major powers as currently posing a serious military threat or as fundamentally antagonistic to its interests.

- A number of long-standing conflicts have diminished, such as those in the Middle East and South Africa, even though they are not settled.

- Governments are more willing to work together through the United Nations (UN) and other multilateral channels to resolve international conflicts.

- Only three vetoes have been cast in the Security Council since 1991, a dramatic reduction since Cold War years.

- The number of cases brought to the International Court of Justice has shot up in the past five years.

- Notwithstanding their many frustrations, the growing number of peacekeeping missions — Cambodia, Namibia, Iraq and Somalia — reflects international willingness to cooperate in mitigating conflicts and alleviating human distress.

- War as an instrument of national policy is losing favor. The hostility to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, for example, signalled that many nations are less willing to tolerate the unilateral use of force as a foreign policy tool.

- The bitter global contest between governing ideologies has been replaced by general acceptance of market-oriented economics, freer trade, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. In Latin America, for example, every country except Cuba now has a democratically elected government in

place. In Africa, the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe stimulated a wave of popular pressures on one-party and autocratic regimes that led in places such as the Congo and Zambia to broader participation in politics, if not necessarily full democracy.

There is continued insistence on the sanctity of sovereignty and often rancorous debate about how these principles should be fulfilled and on whose timetable. Yet governments increasingly implicitly act as if international standards for human rights and democracy are acceptable criteria for judging their performance, even though these principles are often honored in the breach.

## B. Persisting Violent Conflicts

Violent conflict around the world has not declined, despite the end of the Cold War. From 1989 through 1993, a total of 90 large and small armed conflicts occurred. At any given time, the number of violent conflicts fluctuates around 50 each year.[1]

- Long-standing civil wars and government/minority conflicts continue in Afghanistan, Angola, Sudan, and eastern Turkey.
- New conflicts erupted — Nagorno-Karabkh, Tajikistan, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Algeria, Chechnya, Chiapas, and Rwanda.

Other nations are perilously close to serious conflict. No single set of clearly teetering situations can be precisely identified, but various knowledgeable observers worry about Egypt, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Zaire, South Asia, the Korean peninsula, and the Persian Gulf.

In sum, though not all the developing world is in or on the verge of chaos,[2] destructive violent conflicts have been and will continue to be serious problems in many of them.

## C. The Nature of Post-Cold War Conflicts and Complex Emergencies

Few post-Cold War conflicts have occurred between states. However, all regions have numerous unsettled border and natural resource disputes; inter-state wars and related phenomenon such as nuclear arms proliferation and state-sponsored terrorism could increasingly destabilize international relations in the years ahead. These types of threats must be vigilantly monitored because of the scale of their potential destruction.

However, inter-state conflict has not been the dominant form of violent conflict around the world for many years, even during the Cold War. The vast majority arose *within* nations over ethnic, governance, ideological or other national issues. In 1993, for example, all 47 active conflicts were internal, without a single active inter-state conflict. Consequently, many analysts expect that most post-Cold War conflicts will arise from pressures within and across states, especially in the developing world (in which analysts now include most of the new states of the former Soviet empire).

Both authoritarian regimes and broader-based governments in the developing world are having difficulty maintaining their political legitimacy and governing effectively. Many face economic decline and

competition, demands for increased participation in government, fragmenting political parties, ethno-nationalism or fundamentalist political movements, and security threats fueled by proliferating conventional arms. The result has often been self-determination and secessionist struggles, civil wars, collapsing states, local warlordism, organized international criminal activity, ethnic cleansing, state repression, gross human rights violations, and genocide.[3]

Violent national conflicts have frequently caused major humanitarian crises for innocent bystanders — witness the massive flows of internally displaced persons and refugees in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda. Since only the international community's resources can come close to adequately alleviating these crises, international attention, aid resources, and peacekeeping forces have become increasingly involved in a growing number of "complex emergencies." These are defined as combinations of internal conflicts, fragile or failing economic, social and political institutions, large-scale population displacements, and widespread famine, malnutrition or other human deprivations, sometimes exacerbated by natural causes such as drought.[4]

## D. Regional Differences

The number and nature of violent conflicts and complex emergencies varies by region. Violent conflicts and tensions have generally eased more in Latin America and Southeast Asia, for example, than in Africa, Central Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and South Asia. Indeed, regions such as Western and Northeastern Europe, North America, and in certain respects, Latin America, have been called *de facto* "zones of peace," because it is difficult to imagine that certain types of conflicts, especially inter-state wars, will occur in them in the near future.[5]

Particular regions tend to be prone to certain types of conflicts. For example, some analysts expect that communal conflicts are likely to increase in South Asia. Conflicts between governments and indigenous minorities, as in Chiapas, could worsen in Latin America, though they are not conspicuous so far.[6]

Africa's combination of advances and setbacks mirrors is also a mixed picture. Yet Africa has experienced an especially large number of recent conflicts and complex emergencies.

- Liberation wars have been replaced by struggles for material survival and competing groups' control of the state and a country's resources — seen in warlordism, ethnically-based factional struggles, fundamentalist movements, resource wars, and failed states.[7]

- Overall, from 1989 through 1993, Africa was second only to Asia in the average number of small and large armed conflicts active in each year (15). This figure does not include instances of repression or massacres of civilians, as in Burundi in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994.

- Twelve of the 18 "great domestic slaughters" occurring in the world from 1955 through 1994 were in sub-Saharan Africa.[8]

- In 1995, 26 countries in the world were affected by complex emergencies; twelve were in Africa.[9]

## E. Conflict in the Greater Horn of Africa

> The Greater Horn of Africa is made up of ten countries: Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.

Pessimism regarding the Greater Horn of Africa is more understandable, maybe even justified, than for Africa as a whole. Conflicts and repression within the past decade in this region caused some of the most massive human crises in world history.[10] Eight of the twelve "great domestic slaughters" in sub-Saharan Africa between 1955 and 1994 occurred in the Greater Horn: in Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi.[11] Other illustrations:

***Ethiopia, 1984-85.*** Possibly a million people perished in a famine caused by years of military campaigns by the Addis Ababa regime against areas of northern Ethiopia and Eritrea harboring liberation movements. Drought exacerbated the crisis.

***Sudan, 1987-88.*** Over a quarter of a million people died in a famine caused by Sudanese governments' campaigns to wipe out the southern rebel movement's support base. Again, drought was a contributing factor.

***Somalia, 1991-92.*** The Somali famine developed out of a vicious conflict between factions contending for power after Siad Barre was overthrown in 1991. Estimates of how many Somalis died in this two-year period range from a quarter to a half million people.

***Rwanda, 1994.*** Perhaps a million people were slaughtered as a result of a power play by a group of senior government officials who envisioned a "final solution" in which all Tutsis and moderate Hutus would be exterminated, leaving only government supporters of Hutu origin.

Today, actual and potential conflicts are rife in the Greater Horn.

- The longstanding war in the Sudan shows no signs of ending, much less of its issues being resolved.
- While international intervention in Somalia saved many people from starvation, opposing factions still fight for control of the country.
- In Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda, years of civil war or internal turmoil ended. But because peace came essentially through military victory, resentments fester and the task of national reconciliation to avoid future conflicts is problematic. Economic reconstruction is particularly difficult in environmentally-devastated Eritrea.
- In Rwanda, ethnic distrust still weighs heavily on its weak institutions as they struggle to maintain basic order.
- Knowledgeable observers see Burundi moving into crisis despite recent efforts to avoid the horrors experienced by its neighbor.

- Kenya and Tanzania face serious turmoil and tensions over unresolved political and ethnic issues, though both have avoided major civil conflicts in recent decades.

Despite important differences in scale and intensity of the various conflicts in the Greater Horn, in many peoples' eyes the region epitomizes war, famine and ethnic bloodshed.

## F. Impacts and Costs of Conflicts

The many recent violent conflicts and accompanying humanitarian crises have mostly been relatively small-scale and "low-intensity" in nature, yet these "nasty little conflicts" have imposed significant costs individually and cumulatively.

The international community usually takes some action to alleviate these conflicts. Assuming responsibility for such crises through diplomacy, humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, and reconstruction aid is necessary, moral and laudable. But prolonged conflict could lead to the attitude that conflict is endemic in the Greater Horn, and that sending peacekeepers and doctors is simply one of the international community's permanent functions.

Such an reaction may not be sustainable, however. Humanitarian crisis-remedying is full of political pitfalls and moral ambiguities.[12] Furthermore, economic problems and domestic political concerns in developed countries have given rise to a backlash against the risks and costs of international humanitarian interventions.

Even without this backlash, the developing world's conflicts could become just part of the world's scenery, dulling the sense of outrage at their tragic and destructive cost. We may lose sight of how many lives, resources and intangible assets could be saved if fewer of them occurred. Conflicts rage on in the Greater Horn, and their impacts and costs are multiple, staggering and far-reaching.

### 1. *Impacts on Countries in Conflict*

***The Human Toll for Individuals and Families.*** In the 1990s, while exact numbers are still open to question, there is a clear upward trend in the numbers of people directly affected by wars.[13]

- 11.7 million people alone were killed in the 18 "great slaughters" that occurred from 1955 to 1994, including Sudan, 1955-72; Uganda, 1981-85; Nigeria/Biafra, 1967-70; and Bosnia/Yugoslavia, 1992-1995.[14]

- Between 7.8 and 19.6 million people are estimated to have lost their lives as a result of genocides and politicides since 1945.[15] These figures do not count the numbers killed in major international wars such as Vietnam and the Persian Gulf war.

- The wars in Angola and Mozambique alone are estimated to have caused one million deaths each.[16]

- The number of battle-related deaths from active conflicts in 1993 alone is estimated at over 68 thousand.[17]

- Wars make millions homeless by displacing whole populations. The number of refugees increased seven-fold from 2.5 million in 1970 to 17.5 million in 1992, with an additional 24 million displaced persons, due in large part to wars and accompanying distress. The total number of refugees and internally displaced persons in 1994 was 42 million.

- War prevents people from providing for their own basic needs, especially food, by destroying crops, land and the environment. Modern war destroys subsistence mechanisms and undermines daily coping strategies, particularly in developing countries.

- War blocks access to emergency aid. For refugees, displaced persons and generations caught up in war, conflict makes daily life a constant process of adapting to basic insecurity and permanent crisis.[18]

- Wars affect their victims differentially. The differing capacities and vulnerabilities of men and women, for example, affect their comparative ability to cope and survive.

    - Over 80 percent of the victims of war are women and children.[19] For one thing, conflicts contribute to the "feminization of poverty": women are not as mobile as men, do not have the same access to credit and resources as men, and must take on mens' responsibilities as well as their own.[20]

    - War and militarization impose special burdens on children:

        - Many children are drafted into armies;
        - The number of orphans and homeless children grows;
        - War destroys schools;
        - War impairs physical and mental development;
        - War robs children of hope for gainful civilian employment;
        - War fuels the desperation which forces children to pick up a gun before they reach adulthood, so they grow up immersed in a culture of war.

    - Teenagers feel the lure of an increasingly militaristic way of life. "If you're an unemployed youth and can get an AK-47 for anywhere between nothing and $100," asks David Lambo of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), "why not do it? Initially, you take up arms for survival, for basic needs. Then you get a taste for money and it becomes an end in itself."[21]

These human impacts are not merely conflict by-products. They are often combatants' intended strategies. Internal war strategies often target household coping strategies as a primary means of destroying an opponent's support base. These deliberate tactics of war include:[22]

- Planting land mines in farmland.
- Heavy taxing and tribute-taking, eroding subsistence cushions for lean years.
- Destroying crops and livestock and poisoning wells.

- Stripping households of their basic assets.
- Forcing civilians to join militias or work on combatant-owned land during peak agricultural seasons, thus inhibiting local production.
- Bombing farmland to restrict production.
- Bombing markets to disrupt commerce, especially grain trade.
- Disrupting, blocking or diverting humanitarian aid.
- Using denial of food aid as a weapon to displace and starve populations.
- Using provision of food aid as a magnet to draw civilians away from enemy territory.
- Terrorizing civilian populations through executions, torture, rape, forced conscription and resettlement, and restricted mobility.
- Undertaking offensives aimed at displacing civilians, often to draw them into territory controlled by those conducting the offensive, and thus more easily monitor and control these populations while depriving opponents of their civilian support base.

Indeed, complex emergencies differ from natural emergencies in that they thrive on war economics.[23] For many movements and factions, for example, controlling and manipulating relief assistance has become important in the political economy of conflict.

***Effects on Communities and Social Structures.*** War destroys a society's social fabric and coping mechanisms when civilians are the direct targets as well as affected bystanders of violence.[24] For all the cited heroics of individuals who overcome immense obstacles caused by war, the fact is that a return to normal community life may take years following the deliberate and traumatic destruction of social institutions and ways of life.[25]

For example:

- War disrupts the support provided by wider family and kinship systems.

- War exacerbates divisions between groups, increases intra-group insecurity and hostility, and disrupts inter-group economic relations. Manipulation and mobilization of ethnicity hardens group differences and destroys reciprocal relations.

- War worsens public sanitation and promotes disease. HIV spreads. For instance, after the killing subsided in Rwanda in mid-1994, a slower death watch commenced in which refugees and the internally displaced fell victim to disease from lack of food and potable water.

***Effects on National Economies.*** Violent conflicts and resulting complex emergencies have profound short-term and long-term consequences on economic resources and institutions. They destroy local and national economies — capital and investment — and they skew productive economic activity. Again, this destruction is often deliberate.

- Wars remove the resource base on which populations depend. Asset depletion and transfer is especially debilitating to pastoral and farming communities. In Somalia, for example, combatants often stripped villages of all of their assets. Minority agriculturalists with no military capacity or protection were the majority of those who died.

- War destroys other capital — physical and social infrastructure, human capital, and local economic institutions. Forced conscription or killings can mean insufficient labor for productive work.

- War disrupts trade and economic activity. Armies often target merchants and trading systems collapse.

- War reduces investment by the government, aid agencies and domestic and foreign entrepreneurs.[26] War reduces recovery possibilities by frightening away foreign investment.[27]

- War re-orients resources from socio-economic development to the military. War indirectly creates social costs as military expenditures detract from development. A strong correlation has been found between infant mortality rates and military expenditure.

- Rather than legitimate economic enterprise, war promotes the drug trade and increased arms sales as the means to support armies.

***Effects on Political Institutions.*** War destroys national political systems, killing off current and future leaders, sowing seeds of bitterness and division between communities, destroying or altering traditional political institutions, and changing power relations and national political institutions.[28]

Planned genocide is not the only way that populations are targeted for political reasons. In civil wars, the distribution of power or assets depends on who is harmed or spared; this distribution is usually along ethnic or regional lines. Parties attempt to gain legitimacy and resources while undermining their opponents.[29]

- Wars worsen political inequalities, for example, when the powerful are enriched by selling assets. The state of one's economic livelihood affects one's ability to exercise human rights.[30]

- Even in the most developed democracies, democratic institutions are compromised by war when war suppresses press freedoms and civil rights.[31] Where democracies are just coming into being, prospects for fledgling democratic institutions may be dashed.

In few regions around the world have conflicts had greater impact along these lines than in the Greater Horn of Africa. For those who have been personally involved in or observed the conflicts of the region, the litanies of these impacts are increasingly familiar.

## 2. *Impacts Outside the Countries in Conflict*

Understandably, many in the US and other well-off nations far away from the fields of battle share a view that remote national conflicts pose little harm to their own country's interests and goals. But the continued violence in the Greater Horn and imposes significant consequences on them. Even though recent wars have been relatively small-scale, they inflict real costs on third party governments, donor institutions, and other outsiders. Some of these costs are direct and conspicuous, such as the risks run by foreign relief workers in war-torn societies. Others are more indirect and less visible, but still real.

Local conflicts block the US and other donor nations' ability to pursue foreign policy goals such as regional security, development, democracy-building, free trade, environmental protection, human rights, and multilateral cooperation. Instead, they divert scarce international resources into relief, peacekeeping, and reconstruction.

***Regional Stability and Security.*** National political disputes frequently spill over into neighboring countries, or threaten to do so, endangering or destabilizing particular regions. Such is the case in the Balkans, central Europe, the Sudan, and Central Africa.

***Humanitarian and Reconstruction Aid Costs.*** The US and other countries supply increasing humanitarian and refugee aid and eventually funds for rebuilding war-torn societies through bilateral aid, the UN, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and international financial institutions. For example:

- In 1993, the latest total figures, international emergency humanitarian assistance amounted to $6.2 billion. The US share was about $1.5 billion, a quarter of this amount.[32]
    - Total costs in Mozambique after 1992 for reconstruction, refugee repatriation, military demobilization, infrastructure repair, government budget support, and new elections amounted to somewhere between $1 and 2 billion. This figure excludes the United Nations/Mozambique (UNOMOZ) peacekeeping effort itself.[33]
    - Rebuilding Rwanda is costing hundreds of millions of dollars. The US government committed $500 million to help refugees there, more than double the entire amount of development aid the US has given Rwanda in the three decades since its independence.[34]

***Pricetag for Peacekeeping.*** In 1993, nearly 80,000 troops were deployed in 18 UN peacekeeping missions. These numbers are higher than ever before, and so were the costs-- an unprecedented $3.6 billion that year.[35] This was, incidentally, over three times the regular UN budget. Eventual peacekeeping costs for Bosnia alone are estimated at $8 billion; the US's share has been about 30 percent.

The defense ministries of countries that supply peacekeeping troops have noted that these activities sometimes displace part of their own defense budget and may compromise their national defense effort.

***Opportunity Costs in Development, Commerce and Investment.*** These conflicts also cost the US money in foregone trade and business opportunities.

- Conflicts destroy existing development projects and prevent new projects in the conflict areas.[36]
- Development aid professionals note that scarce funding for long-term economic, agricultural and other development is siphoned off into emergency humanitarian relief and reconstruction.
- Highly visible conflicts in the developing world may damage the image of development aid. When conflicts tear apart countries that previously received substantial aid, legislators and the public may feel that development expenditures are ultimately wasted in the developing countries' unstable environments.[37]

- Lost trade and private investment has been high for both Greater Horn countries and potential partners outside the region. For example, between 1982 — when the civil war in Sudan began to escalate — and 1992, US exports to the Sudan slumped from $192 million to $51.5 million. Kenya and Uganda, with no major wars during this period, doubled imports from the US.[38]

***Conduct of US Foreign Policy and Domestic Political Fall-Out.*** These "nasty little wars" have palpably affected the ability of the US and other third party nations to achieve global and regional goals and even to carry out US foreign policy.

- Conflicts thwart the achievement of US regional goals such as opening and increasing trade and investment and fostering stable democracies.

- Conflicts siphon off partner governments' scarce resources into wars, funds that otherwise could have gone into development and economic reform, for which stretched donor assistance dollars already have been expended.

- Conflicts like that in Yugoslavia have put political pressures on important regional alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and on regional organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

- These conflicts reduce donor country leaders' political capital and efficacy when leaders strain to justify risky and costly peacekeeping, continued close relations with often-offensive regimes, and further foreign assistance.

- Frustrations over these conflicts have increased rancor in the US domestic foreign policy debate and fueled efforts to reduce appropriations for the US presence abroad. The bi-partisan consensus that traditionally supported US foreign policy has been reduced.

***Impact on International Order and Cooperation.*** Violent national conflicts erode the international order, the tenor of international relations, and the viability of multilateral institutions by:

- Weakening the sense that violent national conflicts are preventable and manageable. Such apathy invites ambitious regional leaders and local factions to take advantage of international indifference by deliberately perpetrating conflicts, thus further reducing the prospects for international order, and eventually threatening international security.

- Discrediting the general idea that international cooperation can help solve common problems.

- Damaging the stature and legitimacy of the United Nations and other international bodies.

- Offending and inhibiting our moral sensibilities as global citizens and human beings as we witness horrible slaughters and heinous crimes against humanity.

# II. New and Old Responses

Outsiders respond to local conflicts in two ways.

- Developed countries may be tempted to ignore local conflicts and to resist any efforts to address their costs. The common reaction is to deride local conflicts' importance for one's own national interests and to push to disengage from all but the most strategic countries and regions.

- The mounting human toll and other costs of persisting national conflicts prompt a different viewpoint: developed nations cannot disengage from these conflicts because of their huge impacts and costs.

Clearly, many countries are at risk for violent conflict in the coming years. These states usually have of poor resources, lack international economic competitiveness, are often undergoing the strains of economic and political liberalization, have weak political and state institutions, are prone to ethnic and religious nationalisms, and have ready access to arms. Recent crises were not aberrations; these countries cannot be ignored.

## A. New Resolution Behind "Conflict Resolution"

The appeal of "conflict resolution" or conflict management gains strength with the combination of the new world climate, persisting violent conflicts, and the prospect that future conflicts will incur high human and material costs. International agencies, governments, NGOs and independent professionals are increasingly committed to addressing post-Cold War conflicts in a ways that can avoid at least some of these costs. Most familiar are the large number of diplomatic initiatives the UN, European Economic Community (EEC), OAU, the US, other governments and third parties have launched to mediate recent conflicts in Angola, Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, and El Salvador, and the often accompanying peacekeeping and humanitarian missions that try to restore order and to provide medical and other aid.

The new thrust toward international conflict resolution was expressed most prominently in UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's widely circulated 1992 report *Agenda for Peace*, requested by the first summit of the Security Council members' Heads of State. Boutros-Ghali urged a renewed international effort to address violent conflicts and humanitarian crises in Africa and other conflict-prone regions through preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and post-conflict peace-building.

Governments and NGOs have taken advantage of the new climate of cooperation by taking actions to address particular conflicts. While peace has not always been achieved, the efforts to mitigate and alleviate conflicts can claim real results, even in the most troubled places, albeit at high financial and political cost.

- UN and other organizations' efforts kept many Somalis from starving in 1992-94 even though civil war continues.[39]

- For all the continued uncertainties in Haiti and Bosnia, US perseverance has led to meaningful progress in ending these conflicts and addressing their humanitarian crises.

Conflict resolution as a discipline began some twenty years ago.[40] It has gained more attention recently with the end of the Cold War era of hostile confrontation, providing a favorable environment for these techniques.

Interest in conflict resolution is high. Training courses and curricula in conflict resolution have spread through Eastern Europe, Africa, and delegations from developing countries have visited the US for training in the ideas and methods of this craft.

## B. From Conflict Intervention to Conflict Prevention

The term "conflict resolution" implies ending already active conflicts. This reflects the traditional focus of conflict resolution: containing, mitigating and ideally terminating active conflicts. The first efforts in the post-Cold War period concentrated on ending ongoing wars and alleviating their attendant human suffering — Angola and Cambodia — rather than on the more fundamental effort of avoiding conflict in the first place. Within the last three years, international interest in conflict prevention has grown, looking beyond the largely reactive approaches of conflict resolution or management.

Both humanitarian concerns and a pragmatic interest in cost-effectiveness have prompted this development. Preventing political and military quagmires might be largely avoided by addressing conflicts before they start, and this is what is meant by terms such as "preventive diplomacy," "crisis prevention" and "preventive deployment." These activities comprise deliberate steps to deter conflicts and crises before they escalate. Such actions come into play early in a conflict and address some of the conditions that give rise to violent conflicts. They also entail building early warning and other institutional capacities to anticipate and cope with conflicts at an early stage.

### *1. Key Notions*

The new methods of anticipating and keeping incipient conflicts from erupting has joined the historical techniques of managing and resolving existing conflicts. Three notions guide crisis prevention.

***National-Level Conflict Antecedents.*** The notion is spreading that, despite sovereign nations' prerogatives, internal sources of potential conflicts warrant monitoring and early response. More policy-makers and citizens accept that the international community is burdened and its security possibly threatened when national troubles erupt into violence and cause massive refugee flows and large-scale loss of life.

Preventive action no longer means watching for cross-border aggression. It means looking for signs of possible national crises such as gross violations of human rights, massacres, ethnic cleansing, collapsing states, and military or executive usurpation of established democratic institutions. Communications technologies are opening up more nations' affairs to general view, and databases and information-sharing networks are proliferating, (e.g., "Reliefweb," the project of the UN's Department of Humanitarian Affairs which puts conflict information on-line worldwide).

***Early Warning Systems.*** Technology now permits reliable early warning systems to be devised, including processes for regularly scanning given regions for signs of trouble. University researchers are studying past conflicts to determine reliable indicators of civil wars, genocide and failing states. Efforts are being made to link these indicators to decision processes.

***Multi-Pronged, Multi-Organizational Means.*** Early warning systems and preventive diplomacy are beginning to use a wide array of tools and more global and regional actors, rather than leaving the task solely to individual states or the UN. These entities range from third-party official international entities to NGOs, individual governments, and military and civilian agencies, inside and outside the affected countries and regions. "Preventive diplomacy needs a multi-track approach where national, regional, and international actors complement one another."[41]

> The Cold War philosophy held that certain policies and programs — diplomacy and development — were inherently peaceful, while others — military assistance and military intervention — were inherently bellicose.
>
> Current conflict prevention theory states that the whole array of policy tools must be evaluated to see whether they cause or prevent conflicts.

## 2. Manifestations

While skeptics may dismiss conflict prevention as idealistic, a review of specific ways the new focus on pre-violent conflict interventions has been used provides a evidence that this approach to conflict works.

***High-level Interest.*** High-level interest in conflict prevention was stimulated by UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali's call for "preventive diplomacy" in Chapter One of *Agenda for Peace*. He defines preventive diplomacy expansively as "action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur."

According to Boutros-Ghali, "preventive diplomacy" uses a wide range of methods going beyond those used by traditional diplomacy. He cites early warning, fact-finding, confidence-building between parties, preventive deployment of peacekeeping forces, and demilitarized zones. For this reason, terms like "preventive action" or "conflict prevention" could serve equally well, since "diplomacy" is too restrictive a term in this case. The essence of the new thrust does not lie with a particular technique of conflict intervention or particular entity using it. Rather, conflict prevention is associated with the point of entry into emerging conflicts: acting deliberately at an early, preferably pre-violent or pre-crisis stage.

World leaders and organizations have subsequently echoed Boutros-Ghali's call, urging earlier attention to avoid the suffering and frustrations of the recent wars and humanitarian crises.

- The most vocal and consistent national spokesmen for conflict prevention have been high-level US officials, including Presidents Bush and Clinton.
  - Addressing the General Assembly in September 1992, Bush stated that "monitoring and preventive peacekeeping, putting people on the ground before the fighting starts, may become especially critical in volatile regions."[42]
  - In their respective National Security Strategy reports for 1992 and 1993, these two US administrations declared a variety of possible national conflicts to be threats to US security that require preventive responses. Former Bush Administration Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger has supported preventive diplomacy.
- Since early 1993, the Clinton Administration has been explicit about the need to head off potential crises before they erupt. Virtually the entire top echelon of foreign policy officials have spoken out in the last two years urging this basic strategy, using such terms such as "preventive diplomacy," "crisis prevention," "preventive engagement," and "defense by other means."
  - In his 1993 confirmation hearings, Secretary of State-designate Warren Christopher said, "We cannot careen from crisis to crisis. We must have a new diplomacy that can anticipate and prevent crises... rather than simply manage them."
  - National Security Advisor Anthony Lake subsequently affirmed that "in addition to helping solve disputes, we must also help prevent disputes... [and] place greater emphasis on such tools as mediation and preventive diplomacy."[43]
  - USAID Administrator Brian Atwood has been the most consistent US spokesman for conflict prevention.[44]
  - In mid-1993, following the Rwanda massacres and the White House Conference on Africa, the administration adopted "crisis prevention" as a major foreign policy theme,[45] including a Presidential request to the USAID Director to create a US early warning capacity.
  - At Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) leaders' summit in December 1994, President Clinton again urged, "We must work to prevent future Bosnias."
- Top officials of US allies and partner nations have endorsed conflict prevention. Observing the continuing bloodshed in Bosnia and Rwanda, world leaders including British Foreign Minister Hurd, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel and Russian President Boris Yeltsin have joined the Secretary General's call for ways to prevent such conflicts from occurring in the first place.

***International Discussion.*** International discussion around conflict prevention has increased in recent years, under various names and definitions.

- The UN General Assembly has discussed preventive diplomacy at least twice.
- International conferences of professionals and academics in the Greater Horn region and elsewhere have taken up the subject.[46]

- Officials of NGOs engaged in refugee work and other humanitarian or development projects have issued increasing calls to prevent conflicts as a way to avoid costly relief and reconstruction efforts.

***Beyond Rhetoric to One-Time Initiatives into Particular Disputes.*** The interest in conflict prevention has spread beyond rhetoric, discussion and op-ed articles. More significantly, there have been concrete actions to head off possible brewing conflicts in specific countries or regions.

- Britain, France, Canada and other governments have launched conflict prevention initiatives, including the Balladur Plan for central Europe, a British-French Initiative in Africa, and a Canadian initiative in the Greater Horn of Africa.

- Individual states have intervened in potentially troublesome disputes, as illustrated by Indonesia's and Canada's sponsorship of informal multinational talks on control of the South China Seas islands.

- Middle Eastern countries are conducting multilateral talks over water disputes and arms control.

- Well-reported US initiatives have focussed on averting regional nuclear crises — North Korea — and inter-state wars — the Persian Gulf. The negotiation of nuclear arms dismantlement with Ukraine and Russia in 1993 represents a less heralded achievement.

- US action and preparedness have also advanced, although opportunities were missed in Somalia, Rwanda and Chechnya. While the US deferred to the European Union's ultimately failed effort to avoid the violent break-up of Yugoslavia, a succession of US diplomats has headed the OSCE observer mission since 1992, and 550 US troops in Macedonia participate in the UN's only preventive peacekeeping mission in a place where no war has occurred in recent decades.

- Special US emissaries have been dispatched to try to head off incipient conflicts or crises. Envoys have gone to Zaire and Nigeria to try to coax African leaders who have resisted pressures for democratization to turn over the reins of power. Whether greater sensitivity to incipient crises has increased the tendency to dispatch such envoys is not clear.

- Though less visible, NGOs are increasingly carrying out national and grassroots non-official dialogues, democracy-building, and rule of law projects in potentially explosive areas such as central Europe, Macedonia and Burundi. These projects are being implemented in countries like Bosnia where recent wars require continued vigilance and peace-building efforts to avoid re-igniting the violence.

- NGOs, think tanks, and foundations have begun research, action, coordination and lobbying projects in conflict prevention, and are developing networks for early warning and information exchange.[47]

***Institutionalizing Prevention Capacities.*** Organizational and procedural changes are supporting conflict prevention. These changes improve the capacity to anticipate and respond to the first signs of conflicts by ministries, international and regional organizations.

- Regional multilateral organizations (RMOs) have set up mechanisms that perform conflict prevention and management in various ways.

  - The leader in this field by far is the CSCE (renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE, in 1995), whose members committed in the *Charter of Paris for a New Europe* (1990) to seek "new forms of cooperation... [for] ways of preventing, through political means, conflicts which may emerge." Since then, the OSCE has deployed long and short-duration observer missions and special envoys to at least nine areas in Central Europe and states of the former Soviet Union threatened by incipient or escalating crises, including Estonia, Kosovo, Moldova, Hungary, Macedonia, and Kazakhstan.

  - The OAU and the Organization of American States (OAS) have implemented new procedures for conflict avoidance and management. In 1993, the OAU established a new mechanism which has "as a primary objective the anticipation and prevention of conflicts."

  - In Asia, the Regional Forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is exploring inter-state confidence-building to ease tensions regarding several countries' current military modernization plans.

RMO mechanisms have been applied with some success in places like Estonia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Congo and Guatemala. The US has supported this UN and regional organizations' capacity-building, in some instances by providing financial support such as aid provided to the OAU under the African Conflict Resolution Act of 1995.

- Secretary General Perez de Cuellar created a UN unit in the late 1980s to collect information on incipient conflicts in reaction to the unexpected onset of the Falklands war. Boutros-Ghali subsequently reorganized the UN Secretariat to create a political affairs branch that was expected to respond to incipient humanitarian crises by linking up with the Secretariat's relief and peacekeeping branches for early warning and crisis pre-emption actions; this was disbanded for lack of wide member support. Plans have been sketched to institutionalize a UN-centered international conflict prevention regime which might work through regional organizations.

- For six successive months in 1994-95, the US State Department and USAID conducted a pilot exercise in pre-conflict responses. Each month, a potential trouble spot which could become a problem 18 months in the future was identified. Consultations were held among State, USAID and the US UN delegation to suggest what might be done in the present to head off that crisis. As a follow-up to the experiment, in early 1996, the Secretary of State asked the Policy Planning Staff to make this procedure permanent.

- The Greater Horn of Africa Initiative between the US and regional governments is an effort to establish a better conflict prevention capability. This inter-agency effort seeks to address regional vulnerability to "agents of disruption" by upgrading resources and capabilities for conflict prevention and food security.[48]

> Explicit international interest and action to develop and use various methods to head off future conflicts — not just to stop already raging wars — is at its highest since the founding of the United Nations in 1945 and the efforts to prevent nuclear war of the 1970s and 1980s.
>
> This new interest in conflict resolution and conflict prevention is encouraging and shows an unusual recognition that peace is not simply something that prevails automatically once wars end. Peace needs deliberate efforts to be preserved and consolidated.

As the historian Donald Kagan concludes in a recent study of five historic wars and crises:

> A persistent and repeated error through the ages has been the failure to understand that the preservation of peace requires active effort, planning, the expenditure of resources, and sacrifice, just as war does. In the modern world especially the sense that peace is natural and war an aberration has led to a failure in peacetime to consider the possibility of another war, which, in turn, has prevented the efforts needed to preserve the peace.[49]

## C. Is Conflict Prevention New?

Seasoned diplomats and other long-time development or other professionals sometimes react skeptically to the idea of conflict prevention. They feel that diplomacy, development and other policies already in operation prevent conflicts, implying that the new interest and methods are a fad.

In one sense, this reaction is correct. Conflict prevention is not entirely new. Like the Molière's character who discovered he had been speaking in "prose" all his life without knowing it, practitioners have always pursued conflict prevention in a general sense even though their work does not bear that label.

### ♦ *Prevention Goals in Development and Other Established Programs and Institutions*

Programs and professions have contributed to preventing future conflicts through various functional fields — international diplomacy, economic development, economic reform, education, health, agriculture, population, democracy-building, human rights, humanitarian affairs, defense and military affairs, and international law. A range of governmental and non-governmental agencies carry out these programs within particular governments and through international organizations though they may not be labelled "conflict prevention," "preventive diplomacy" or "crisis prevention."

### *Conflict Prevention and the "Six Ds."*

Conflict prevention is an implicit if not always explicit rationale in the US and other nations' functional programs in all of the following "Six D" fields.

***Diplomacy.*** Governments and multilateral organizations conduct official bilateral and multilateral diplomacy and negotiations that frequently ease tensions between and even within states that otherwise might lead to conflicts.

***Development, Trade and Environment Programs.*** Economic development activities aimed at alleviating poverty address basic resource deficiencies that can breed violent conflicts. Health and social service programs address disease, sanitation, famine and other community problems which are possible causes of desperation that can produce conflicts. Education programs to increase literacy and spread knowledge address ignorance and prejudice, both classic sources of violent conflicts. Programs to halt environmental degradation seek to preserve and expand existing physical resource bases, reduce scarcity, and avoid possible conflict.

Economic reform is intended to stimulate nations to adopt more efficient market-oriented ways to produce and distribute goods and services to more effectively meet human needs. Opening state-dominated markets unleashes entrepreneurial initiative, increasing economic innovation, efficiency and growth and generating wider prosperity. Higher living standards for more people provide a solvent for social strife by removing organized groups' incentive to resort to arms to satisfy their needs.

Efforts to promote freer trade can be justified in terms of conflict prevention: historically, protectionism and scarcity of vital resources have been causes of war.

***Defense and Arms Control.*** Military assistance programs aim to strengthen national defense against potential aggressors or seek to create a balance of power between nations that can deter war. The US Defense Department's military-to-military International Education and Training (IMET) programs strive to develop appropriate professional roles for foreign military establishments and encourage their subordination to civilian authorities. Other infrastructure and "Operations Other Than War" (OOTW) have peacemaking as an objective. Programs such as arms control, weapons dismantlement and counter-proliferation clearly relate to conflict prevention.

***Democratization and Human Rights*** and related programs to build civil society work to give unrepresented citizens a voice, strengthen governments' ability to fulfill citizen needs, and promote the rights of minorities. All these redress or pre-empt demands and grievances that could otherwise provoke conflicts. Opening up authoritarian and autocratic governments to wider participation both makes government structures more legitimate and fragments political power. In this way the incentive and the capability are removed to seek better political outcomes through revolution or other destabilizing actions.

***Demography*** or population control programs aim to reduce rapid population growth, especially in societies whose resource base cannot adequately provide for the large numbers of people their high birth rates are generating. Population control helps prevent conflicts because competition over scarce resources can cause political instability and violent conflicts.

***Disaster Relief.*** Aid workers meet basic needs when they provide food, medical supplies, temporary housing, and other humanitarian relief for refugees and others affected by war. This reduces frustrations that can lead to conflicts. At the same time, aid workers may become involved in resolving disputes that could easily escalate into larger conflicts.

***Conflict Prevention in Indigenous Institutions.*** All developing societies have indigenous dispute resolution and social control mechanisms. These range from councils of elders and other traditional dispute settlement mechanisms to national institutions such as modern parliamentary government legislatures. These institutions operate through local and national governments, culturally-specific customs and procedures, and even the family to keep many disputes from becoming unmanageable and violent.

> Long-standing international programs and indigenous institutions serve as conflict prevention "safety nets," contributing to dispute management and conflict prevention in a variety of ways.
>
> With all these programs and institutions in place, we might feel confident the existing preparations are sufficient, except perhaps that more money should be provided them.
>
> But accepting such an assumption uncritically could be extremely risky.

## D. Why the Need to Re-Tool?

Despite all the efforts of international and indigenous programs and mechanisms, horrible conflicts have recently erupted or been deliberately launched in Africa and elsewhere. These conflicts were not adequately addressed by existing programs. Why have these events occurred?

One possible explanation is that violent conflicts in developing countries stem from historical forces so powerful that efforts to prevent them will be fruitless. Yet this deterministic and defeatist ignores those instances when efforts to prevent conflicts have headed off possible crises, or have stopped already-active conflicts before they played themselves out. In Kagan's words,

> "It would... be wrong to despair of reducing the danger and frequency of wars. If war in general cannot be avoided, we may still hope to be able to reduce the danger of war for long stretches of time, to avoid particular wars, to pursue policies that make a satisfactory peace more likely and more lasting."[50]

***Dollars or Design?*** If human effort can make a difference, keeping conflicts from occurring lies in improving the state-of-the-art. But "improving" in what sense? Should we conclude that conflict prevention is underfunded and understaffed and simply add resources? That would argue for increasing

expenditures for established programs while maintaining the current ways that these programs operate. Alternatively, are there deficiencies in these programs' design that inhibits their ability to prevent or manage conflicts?

A strong argument can be made that present approaches to conflict prevention are not adequate. The problem may be that existing programs are rarely designed explicitly for dealing with conflicts at various stages in their emergence. Additionally, there may not be sufficient budgetary, staff and other resources.

## 1. *Conflict Prevention Gaps in Established Programs*

There are many gaps in design and operation of existing approaches to preventing conflicts.

***The Dominant Crisis Orientation.*** Despite the new mechanisms which look to deal with future conflicts, existing government agencies and international institutions whose mandates concern war and conflict, are still oriented primarily to the Cold War function of managing full-blown violent crises once they occur and providing relief, rather than averting them. For example, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees can only try to alleviate refugees' plight, not address the forces that caused it. The Cold War bequeathed a number of crisis management procedures such as hot lines, but these deal with crisis situations, not pre-crisis action.

Responses to looming political crises and possible violent conflicts are thus left to the vast majority of officials and field professionals who are primarily doing other tasks. To act preventively, they must step outside their established bureaucratic routines and job descriptions.

***Crisis Overload.*** A handful of agencies or programs have added explicit conflict prevention to their mandate, including the UN Secretariat. This means there are built-in institutional commitments to preempting national and international crises. Unfortunately, most of these units are also expected to deal with existing and incipient conflicts.

These units are often overburdened with current crises and are often understaffed. They do not have time to look ahead systematically and prepare for future crises. As a result, current crises typically absorb their time and preventive tasks get short shrift.

Few officials in governments and multilateral organizations are assigned to regular monitoring and response before the fact to social, political and international changes that may generate violent national conflicts. Perhaps the single example of an official and staff whose mandate is solely conflict prevention — so he cannot be diverted by current crises — is the OSCE's High Commissioner on National Minorities. His marching orders allow him to act only in perceived pre-crisis situations; if they heat up, he must go elsewhere.

Active, ongoing, conflict prevention efforts are still the rare exception, rather than the rule, in major governments and international bodies. The timeframe for addressing conflicts is still mostly short-term, and thus suited largely to crisis situations.

The international community has had long experience with problems and policies — development, state-to-state diplomacy, and other established fields — that affect certain kinds of conflicts directly or

indirectly. However, the international community is much less experienced in dealing specifically with preventing relatively low-level conflicts within countries, with little experience in galvanizing different functional programs in development, human rights, education, and so forth into coherent, effective anti-conflict strategies.

***State-to-State Focus.*** Most conventional methods of international diplomacy, bilateral or multilateral — negotiations, shuttle diplomacy, sanctions, arms control, and so on — were designed to respond to the behavior of states and the corresponding types of conflicts they usually perpetrate, inter-state border wars or nuclear crises. This assumes that states are the only organized, cohesive actors affecting international problems and solutions.

Technically speaking, the language of the UN Charter does not specifically foreclose the possibility that threats to international peace and security may originate in forces within member countries, rather than only from the member states themselves. Nevertheless, the prohibition against infringing on domestic affairs of sovereign governments and the inertial tendencies in international politics means that the Security Council has mainly addressed inter-state conflicts involving cross-border incursions of national armies, such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, or domestic conflicts only after they have become major civil wars and humanitarian crises, as in the Congo in 1960 or Somalia in 1992.

Yet the vast majority of post-Cold War conflicts originated within states and involve disputing parties other than states or concern the make-up of the states themselves. Eastern Europe is the sole significant example where existing institutionalized international preventive procedures and mechanisms have focussed on states' domestic behavior towards their own populations and on groups within states.

***Focus on Armed Force as Conflict Cause.*** In recent years, the international community has become more deeply involved in the domestic affairs of nations to try to regulate the level of armed conflict and alleviate its effects. Existing international tools such as mediation and peacekeeping now penetrate more frequently behind sovereign countries' boundaries to seek to mitigate conflicts. In that sense, they have sometimes come into closer contact with domestic forces such as rebel political movements that may perpetrate typical post-Cold War types of conflicts.

This increased involvement in national affairs often comes too late in the development of violent national crises. Furthermore, it generally focusses on the symptoms of those national conflicts — such as the organized armed forces of rebels or standing governments — but not their sources. Thus, even when an international peacekeeping force is in place, peacekeepers cannot easily transform the political, cultural and other conditions within the respective antagonistic communities that have caused the conflict.

Extensive nation-rebuilding is often necessary after conflicts have ravaged economies and riven societies. Yet nation-building is costly and it is difficult to obtain the consensus and resources to do an adequate job. Even international programs directly concerned with conflict generally focus on the behavioral manifestations of conflicts, or at best, on their most immediate antecedents, such as ceasefire violations and troop movements. These programs typically do not address deeper sources of conflict. Intervenors on the scene are not usually prepared to systematically survey evolving conditions for their potential for violence and rarely have a mandate to address those conditions before they worsen.

***The Importance of a "Medium Term" Focus.*** Programs require different timetables to have an impact on violent conflicts. It is important to distinguish between and prioritize long, medium, and short-term

sources of conflicts, and to adopt the corresponding approaches required to deal with the particular situation. Otherwise, the potential mismatch between programming and the conflict's particular circumstances might lead to ineffectiveness.

> Defining poverty or underdevelopment as "root" or "underlying" causes of violent conflicts misleadingly suggests that these are somehow more significant than more evident causes of conflict.
>
> This can obscure the multi-levelled causes of conflicts and complex dynamics behind their emergence.

Development programs may be effective in achieving objectives in the long run. However, they generally do not address the short and medium term causes of violent conflict. Implementers may not necessarily see the early signs of violent conflicts, and may have few effective means to deal with them. Moreover, the good that development assistance does is often destroyed in violent conflict.

***Development Assistance and Conflict Prevention: An Unproven Link.*** Programs for economic assistance, economic reform, democratization, and education can help prevent conflict, but causal links are often diffuse and unclear. The ways in which preventive effects arise may be unexplained, indirect, and difficult to discern.[51] As presently carried out, these efforts are not necessarily conflict-preventive, though they can support the conflict prevention objective. Development programs primarily pursue their own particular functional mandates and perspectives. They regard the new agenda of conflict or crisis prevention through the prism of established program mandates, not from the standpoint of the nature of the problem itself. Only secondarily, if at all, are they oriented to preventing conflicts.

In fact, development assistance often inadvertently contributes to conflict. A particular project's content in relation to its national or local context — distribution among beneficiaries, usages, timing, controls over them — determines whether it contributes to preventing conflicts, or instead, becomes part of the problem.

- In fragile societies and brittle political systems, rapid socio-economic development or democratization, can, in the short run, weaken the ways societies use to manage disputes and thereby be destabilizing. This can increase, not reduce, the chances of violence or repression in the short run.

- The way humanitarian assistance is distributed among different regions can buttress the political and military power of one side of a conflict which may have the effect of worsening rather than alleviating it.

- It may make good development sense to build a road or bridge or stimulate intra-regional trade. Yet these can enhance a regional warlord's position and make aggression more viable.

Certain constituencies justify a range of US foreign assistance and multilateral programs — from supporting UN peacekeeping in Bosnia to economic reform in Russia to training judges in Latin America — on the grounds that they protect US national security by avoiding future conflicts. Recent analyses have sought to make the benefit in protecting US national security a prime criterion for budget decisions concerning programs as varied as democracy-building, arms control, peacekeeping, family planning, child and maternal health, education, agriculture and grassroots development.

Yet the specific ways in which programs may help, or hurt, the cause of conflict prevention has not been spelled out and documented. Efforts aiming at promoting social and political change must be tailored to the capacity of societies to absorb those changes. The relationships of these programs to the sources and dynamics of violent conflicts must be further developed; the design and implementation of such programs must be modified accordingly. In Deputy Director, United Nations Development Programme Humanitarian Program Deputy Director Peter Witham's words:

> "...We must give greater thought to prevention before we reach for the 'cure' — for humanitarian, political, and financial reasons... This means, for example, that we will have to begin examining whether the economic policy 'medicine' often prescribed will reduce conflict or enhance it."[52]

***Detection Without Enforcement.*** Some organizations monitor nations' domestic behavior to alert the world community to possible violent conflicts or repression in the short and medium term. Examples would be international or domestic NGOs monitoring human rights. Yet the organizations who sponsor these efforts do not have the capacity for taking action in response to such early warning signs of possible violent conflicts. An international publicity campaign and/or an effort within the UN Security Council or other bodies would be required to gain support for imposing sanctions to compel nations to pursue peaceful resolutions to conflicts.

***Lack of Coordination and Coherent Strategy.*** International agencies pursuing separate functional mandates in a given locale rarely coordinated with each other in a conflict prevention strategy that addresses potential conflicts' long, medium, and short term sources. This lack of coordination can lead to missed opportunities for conflict prevention or might contribute to a conflict's emergence.

The international and national agencies now addressing violent conflict were largely created during the Cold War and organized around distinct "specific and defined sets of problems,"[53] such as arms control, development, security assistance, health, or agriculture.

- These separate functional mandates mean that the entities often operate in isolation from each other, and even departments and sub-units within the same international entities, such as third party donor governments, often work at cross-purposes.

- Decision-making and action are often governed by bureaucratic politics and organizational routines; policies that are ostensibly those of a government pursuing its interests are actually the particular priorities, agendas, and modus operandi of departments within that government. While some parts of a government may be trying to prevent violent conflicts, another part of the same government may be doing things that worsen them.[54]

For example, the French Government's military training in Rwanda in 1993-94 probably aided some Hutu militia members responsible for the subsequent massacres. This was not a deliberate government-wide foreign policy decision that supported genocide. Rather, the Ministry of Defense was conducting business as usual to help out President Habyarimana.

***Stove-Pipe Organization.*** Existing international bureaucracies and programs are generally organized according to a "stove-pipe" or top-down, compartmentalized structure. This causes some of the functional fragmentation in many international relief and other programs and makes difficult lateral coordination behind a new problem such as conflict prevention.

***Weaknesses of Indigenous Institutions.*** National-level state institutions and local-level traditional institutions have several shortcomings.

- Many indigenous ways of resolving conflicts do not operate effectively any more, largely because they have been destroyed by socio-economic change, wars, or deliberate subversion. In some cases, indigenous institutions are not useful because these structures have been part of the coercion and repression, rather than part of its solution.

- Traditional rural institutions often are not effectively linked to modern state institutions[55] and in fact have been eroded or displaced by "modernizing" trends such as wider communications, modern schools and local government officials, and so on. At this point, many may be largely incapable of mediating conflicts effectively.

- Many indigenous institutions are themselves sources of violent conflict, coercion, or repression. One illustration is traditional rural community authority structures, such as councils of elders, who discriminate against outsiders or minorities in their midst, including women or ethnic groups.

## 2. Gaps in the New Approaches

The new impetus is beginning to generate early warning indicators for conflicts. Yet there are gaps in the newer approaches as well.

***Inadequate Response Structure.*** The lack of institutionalized procedures to respond to early signs of conflict means that special efforts, largely *de novo*, must be worked out to mobilize resources and political will for action.

***Patchy, Fragmented Coverage.*** Post-Cold War early warning and preventive action lacks institutionalized focal points where information and responses can be pulled together and coherent policy responses launched on a regular basis.

The Clinton administration has been vocal about the need for conflict prevention, yet individual initiatives and pockets of institutional experimentation are all that has been achieved so far. Other governments may be even less prepared.

The US government has implemented a number of initiatives with regard to critical threats such as nuclear proliferation and terrorism associated with certain strands of political Islamism. Systematic early warning and preventive responses have been developed mainly in countries seen as geopolitically critical

— Russia, Ukraine, Japan, China, North Korea, Iraq and Iran. US support for watching and engaging medium-term factors that might provoke violence has been less, even for these countries, and much less for US partner countries and in smaller, less strategically important countries.

More general systematic early warning activities occur within some regional bureaus and functional units of different departments across the government. These include certain geographic areas (Russia, Latin America) for different types of crises (terrorism, drugs, nuclear dissemination) using different policy tools (peacekeeping, diplomacy). Possible conflicts and responses are viewed through each unit's conceptual lens instead of in terms of the wider range of policy options that might be brought to bear at various stages of conflict emergence.

> The US government lacks an overall conflict prevention strategy and capability. US preparedness is patchy and disjointed. Absent are government-wide procedures that regularly monitor and systematically assess a wide range of incipient national and sub-regional political disputes, explicitly using known indicators and linking these to decision-making that assesses the stakes, poses feasible objectives, and considers intervention alternatives based on lessons from past experience.
>
> Except with the most compelling global or regional threats, to be crisis preventers, most US officials and policy-makers must work outside established job descriptions, functional program mandates, and bureaucratic routines. US preventive policy has not achieved the status of foreign policy doctrine or standard operating procedure.

***Inadequate Knowledge and Feedback.*** Recent country-level initiatives have had successes and failures. However, the lessons from these experiences need to be examined more systematically and disseminated more widely. In addition, existing and new programs typically contain no provisions for evaluating their efforts. Relatively little has been done to garner lessons from these cases, identify useful differing circumstances in achieving various results, and then disseminate these results to policy-makers.

***Existing Prevention Mechanisms Neglected.*** The existing international network of programs, initiatives, and tools for early warning and conflict prevention comprises the established approaches to conflict prevention. As noted, there are also newer prevention procedures, mechanisms, and field projects and various stages of development and implementation. However, even where early warning and preventive mechanisms are relatively institutionalized and available, they are not always used. Present-day Burundi is an example: a peacekeeping force might cool the situation, but nations are not willing to deploy that tool. In Chechnya the US and other CSCE member nations failed to pressure Russia to comply with already agreed-on CSCE transparency requirements regarding troop movements and CSCE human rights standards. Neglecting these existing international agreements sent a message that Chechnya was an internal matter and that Russia did not have to be concerned about their agreements.

# III. The Challenge

## A. New Wine into Old [and New] Bottles

We do not need to scrap existing programs and replace them with new programs to avoid the further violent conflict in the Greater Horn of Africa. Yet, existing international programs and indigenous dispute resolution and governance are not completely adequate. Existing donor and indigenous programs need to be crafted to successfully deal with national political disputes and low-level violence. Policies of food security, development, diplomacy and relief are all relevant ingredients, but these programs will not necessarily be successful without focussing them explicitly on preventing conflicts.

On the other hand, the new approaches to conflict prevention must be linked to sources of effective power, at least by following more systematic strategies of conflict intervention with appropriate divisions of labor between NGOs and governments. Old and new programs must be coordinated into focussed, effective strategies that methodically address the short, medium and long terms sources of conflicts.

## B. Changing the Cold War Paradigm

New thinking — not just new programs — is needed on how to meld traditional and non-traditional programs into effective strategies for the Greater Horn. A new policy is needed to link development, diplomacy, and other tools to provide a new "operational code" for preventing conflicts.

> "We haven't the money, so we've got to think." — Attributed to Ernest Rutherford, British physicist, 1876-1933.

The Cold War paradigm provided the overall rationale that shaped development, military assistance, and other policies that determined our approach to the developing world. Some of that paradigm's assumptions and elements were:

- World ideologies competed for and within the developing world, so development assistance served foreign policy objectives, such as containing communism.
- Bilateral economic development aided friends or client states as a bulwark against subversion.
- Conflict was supported when it served Cold War goals.
- Aid was largely government-centered and program decision-making and administration were highly centralized.

In the different global political climate, new capabilities and new threats require a new approach.

## C. Four Imperatives

Retooling policy to be more focussed on trying to break the pattern of recurrent conflicts in the Horn involves four components.

*1. "Do no harm."* Evaluate programs that have other primary goals — humanitarian aid, economic development, economic reform, military assistance, and democratization — to ensure they do not contribute to causing violent conflict. Adjust their operations accordingly. An appropriate mechanism might be a "conflict impact statement" for proposed projects.

*2. **Adjust the operations of established programs*** so that they contribute positively to conflict prevention goals explicitly and directly, rather than nominally and generally.

*3. **Strengthen as well as transform indigenous social and political mechanisms*** so they can be useful in preventing conflict, including traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, standing governments (where they are not part of the problem), and regional mechanisms.

*4. **Add appropriate new initiatives***, linking them with the existing efforts to complement, supplement, and energize these programs to make them more explicitly conflict preventive.

## D. The Greater Horn of Africa Initiative: Themes In Search of Strategy

Aware of the need to achieve more with less in post-Cold War conflict prevention, the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) and other recent efforts have articulated new themes on how conflict prevention and resolution and food security efforts are to be handled. These include:

***African Self-Help***: reduced external aid and skepticism about externally-imposed development models means increased emphasis on African-led needs, African responsibility and African-generated approaches, coupled with external support for African capacity-building.

***Localism***: decentralized economic and social activity and decision-making by encouraging bottom-up and small-scale initiatives such as grassroots development projects and local market creation.

***Common responsibility and accountability*** of all Horn region actors, including not only governments, but indigenous civil society and political oppositions, to their peoples' needs and involvement.

***Regionalism***: regionally linking governmental action — in relief, development, and conflict management through regional organizations like the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought (IGADD) — and non-governmental transactions such as liberalizing trade.

***Pragmatism***: non-ideological, flexible, tailored applications of general goals like economic reform in light of individual country variation in economic circumstances and institutional capacities.

***Functional interdependency and lateral coordination*** at all levels of operating programs and agencies. Relief, economics, political development and conflict prevention are interactive and interdependent. Coordination should incorporate external governments with due attention to appropriate divisions of labor.

***Multilateral pooling of effort*** through cooperation among outside governments and NGOs operating in the Horn region.

***Pro-active orientation*** to prevent possible famines, conflicts, and other crises.

## E. Unanswered Questions

The GHAI's timely and innovative principles provide a useful start, yet effective strategies require more details. A number of issues surrounding conflict prevention and resolution efforts must be addressed.

- How can we know when violent conflicts are imminent and countries or sub-regions may erupt into conflict?
- Are there particular strategic entry points into emerging conflicts?
- What approaches can be taken to intervening into conflicts before they become major crises?
- Which of the various interventions are most effective at different stages of conflicts?
- What is the relationship of long-term, medium-term, and short-term approaches to conflict resolution and prevention?
- How can indigenous capacities to manage conflict be preserved while promoting often-disruptive social and political change?
- How can established international programs pursuing other primary goals be attuned to averting conflicts?
- How can third parties avoid harming, and help to empower, indigenous institutions?
- Who should take responsibility for various tasks in early warning and conflict prevention?
- How could an ongoing prevention capability be structured?

# IV. What this Guide Provides

This Guide explores questions and offers preliminary answers that can provide some overall direction to thinking and action. The Guide aims to provide a framework for how to think about and do conflict prevention in the Greater Horn of Africa. To do this, the Guide seeks to:

- Sensitize practitioners to the various conflicts in the Greater Horn and their main sources.
- Examine the ways conflicts emerge.
- Clarify the spectrum of interventions at various stages of conflict.
- Familiarize professionals with a broad range of policy instruments and tools that might be used in conflict intervention, by describing those at work not only in the Greater Horn itself, but elsewhere in Africa and around the world.

- Present insights into the comparative strengths and weaknesses of these tools, and useful policy lessons from recent applications that have been successful and unsuccessful.

- Suggest the main issues and tasks to be faced in launching coherent strategies of conflict prevention.

- Describe available organizations and resource persons who might be drawn upon to address aspects of conflict prevention and resolution.

Above all, this Guide aims to stimulate more focussed discussion, engaged dialogue, and bridge-building across professional specialties, and among those actively engaged in the movement to prevent future conflicts and achieve sustained development in the Greater Horn.

## A. What This Guide Is Not

This Guide is not intended to be:

- ***A negotiations manual.*** Many handbooks are available that outline techniques of face-to-face conflict management. This Guide deals with the whole array of policy instruments that are useful in conflict prevention and is not limited to negotiations.

- ***A "cookbook"*** that prescribes specific remedies for individual conflicts or on advises on the nuts and bolts of particular programs. Rather, it seeks to offer suggestions, ideas and guidelines that are useful. Once these are examined and discussed, the next step is for the agencies themselves to consider the specific relevance to their operations.

- ***A finished definitive statement*** on how to conduct conflict prevention. This report is an evolving document which will be modified as further experience with conflict prevention in the Greater Horn is gained.

- ***A substitute for the judgment and wisdom*** of individual policy-makers and practitioners, Africans and others, who must meet the challenges of each unique situation facing them either "on the ground" or at "headquarters."

Conflict prevention strategies may become more developed, but they should never be applied mechanistically. Effective conflict prevention will always ultimately rely on the experience, talents and leadership of Greater Horn government officials, diplomats, development aid officials, relief administrators, and local leaders and citizens. The Guide is intended simply to aid in planning and carrying out local, national and regional conflict prevention efforts.

# V. Notes

1. Peter Wallensteen and Karin Axell, "Conflict Resolution and the End of the Cold War." *Journal of Peace Research,* Vol. 31, No. 3, 1994, pp. 333-334. The data count all armed conflicts over territory or government control that involved at least one government and resulted in more than 25 battle-related deaths.

2. Robert Kaplan' influential article *The Coming Anarchy* sees Sierra Leone and West Africa as reflecting "the withering away of central government, the rise of tribal and regional domains, the unchecked spread of disease, and the growing pervasiveness of war" that is occurring more and more in much of the developing world. *The Atlantic Monthly,* February 1994, pp. 46, 48, 54.

3. See, for example, Max G. Manwaring, "The Threat in the Contemporary Peace Environment" in Edwin G. Corr and Stephen Sloan (eds.), *Low-Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World,* Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992, pp. 46-59; Max. G. Manwaring and Edwin G. Corr, "Confronting the New World Disorder: A Legitimate Government Theory of Engagement," Chapter 3 in Max G. Manwaring and William J. Olson, *Managing Contemporary Conflict: Pillars of Success,* Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996, pp. 31-47; Kurt C. Campbell and Thomas G. Weiss, "The Third Wave in the Wake of Eastern Europe," *The Washington Quarterly,* Spring 1991, pp. 95-98; Mohammed Ayoob, "The New-Old Disorder in the Third World," *Global Governance,* Vol. 1, No. 1, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995, pp. 59-77; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Conflict After the Cold War," *The Washington Quarterly,* Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 5-24.

4. *Global Humanitarian Emergencies 1995,* Paper released by the United States Mission to the United Nations, January 1995.

5. See Arie Kacowicz, "Explaining Zones of Peace: Democracies as Satisfied Powers? *Journal of Peace Research,* Vol. 32, No. 3, 1995, pp. 265-276 and Ted Gurr, *Minorities at Risk,* Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1993, pp. 314-324 for some of the factors that keep regions such as Western Europe and Latin America relatively free from certain kinds of conflicts.

6. Gurr, *Op. Cit,.* pp. 332-33.

7. Mark Duffield, *Protracted Political Crisis and the Demise of Developmentalism: From Convergence to Coexistence.* Discussion paper prepared for Aid Under Fire: Redefining Relief and Development Assistance in Unstable Situations. London, UK, April 27, 1995.

8. Milton Leitenberg, CISSM, 1995.

9. Bread for the World Institute, *Countries in Crisis,* Sixth Annual Report on the State of World Hunger, Silver Spring, MD, 1995, pp. 9-10.

10. From John Prendergast, *Crisis and Hope in Africa.* Brussels, Belgium: CIDSE-Europe, forthcoming 1996.

11. Milton Leitenberg, CISSM, 1995.

12. See David Rieff, "The Humanitarian Trap," *World Policy Journal,* Vol. 12, No. 4, Winter 1995/6, pp. 1-11.

13. Mark Adams and Mark Bradbury, *Conflict and Development: Background Paper for UNICEF/NGO Workshop.* New York, NY: United Nations. April 27, 1995, p. 7.

14. Leitenberg, *Op. Cit.*

15. Genocide/politicide is the promotion, carrying out or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites and their agents or either contending party in a civil war that cause the deaths of a substantial number of the members of a communal — ethnic or linguistic — group. See Barbara Harff, "Victims of the State: Genocides, Politicides and Group Repression from 1945 to 1995," Chapter prepared for a volume on genocides in the 20th century to be published by the PIOOM Foundation, University of Leiden, September 1995.

16. Heather S. McHugh, "USAID and Ethnic Conflict: An Epiphany?" Paper presented at a conference on Development and Ethnic Conflict, Cornell University, Ethnicity and International Conflict Program, October 5-7, 1995; citing Mario Dujisin, "Africa: Portugal's Ex-Colonies Complete Cycle of Formal Democracy," *Inter Press Service,* November 4, 1994.

17. International Negotiation Network, *State of World Conflict Report,* Atlanta, GA: The Carter Center, 1995, p. 60.

18. Adams and Bradbury, p. 8.

19. *Ibid.* p. 7.

20. *Ibid.* p. 10.

21. Ron Redmond, "Demilitarization Crucial for Return of Refugees," *Refugees,* No. 96, 1994, p. 13.

22. Mark Duffield and John Prendergast, *Without Troops and Tanks: Humanitarian Intervention in Ethiopia and Eritrea.* Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1994.

23. Adams and Bradbury, p. 9.

24. *Ibid.* p. 9.

25. *Ibid.* p. 49.

26. D. Keen, *The Benefits of Famine.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 12.

27. Adams and Bradbury, p. 10.

28. Mark Duffield, "Complex Emergencies and the Crisis of Developmentalism." *IDS Bulletin: Linking Relief and Development*, Vol. 25, No. 3, October 1994.

29. Keen, pp. 16-17.

30. Adams and Bradbury, pp. 9-10.

31. Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen. *Hunger and Public Action.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, p. 275

32. *Global Humanitarian Emergencies, Op. Cit.* This figure includes aid for natural disasters.

33. Estimate inferred from Cranna, p. 149.

34. McHugh, *Op. Cit.*, citing Atlas, 1995, p. 3.

35. Trevor Findlay, "Multilateral Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution," *SIPRI Yearbook*, 1994, p. 26.

36. McHugh, *Op. Cit.*, p. 9, citing interviews with USAID officials.

37. See Marc J. Cohen, "But the Cupboard is Bare: The Crisis of Aid," Bread for the World Institute, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 62-65.

38. Figures from *UN Commodity Trade Statistics* cited in Cranna, p. 152.

39. Robert Oakley and Robert Hirsch. *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping.* Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1994.

40. See John Burton, *The History of Conflict Resolution.* 1986.

41. *The Challenge for Peacemaking in Africa: Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution,* p. 4.

42. "Remarks of President Bush to the United Nations General Assembly," New York, NY, September 21, 1992. Transcript provided by United Nations Publications Office, Washington, DC, p. 2.

43. See, for example, Joseph F. Brinley, Jr., "National Security Advisor Anthony Lake Launches Defense of US Foreign Aid," *The Woodrow Wilson Center Report,* Vol. 7, No. 1, June 1995, pp. 1-2.

44. Among many of his speeches on the theme of crisis prevention is "Emerging Markets," speech at Wharton Business School, University of Pennsylvania, March 5, 1996.

45. Thomas Lippman, Finding Theme in Foreign Policy," *Washington Post,* June 30, 1994, p. A10.

46. See, for example, *The Challenge for Peacemaking in Africa: Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution, Op. Cit.*, Report of a Conference held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, September 12-15, 1994.

47. Gareth Evans, *Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond.* St. Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 1993.

48. *The Horn of Africa Initiative: A Strategic Approach,* Summer 1994, p. 7f.

49. Donald Kagan, *On the Origins of War,* New York, NY: Doubleday, 1995, p. 367.

50. *Ibid.* p. 566.

51. An effort to suggest these links is *Enhancing US Security Through Foreign Aid,* Congressional Budget Office, April 1994, pp. xi-xxii and pp. 9-12. This report itself notes that aid can create dependency, prop up corrupt regimes, allow postponement of economic reforms, go to ill-chosen projects, possibly exacerbating regional, class or ethnic jealousies or strengthening authoritarian regimes, engender resentment and radicalism, flow to countries with little ability to absorb outside money or to undertake projects efficiently, be siphoned off by corruption, be wasted on poor development schemes, and be poorly targeted and ill-timed.

52. In "Crisis Prevention: Can Better Development Planning Lessen the Toll of Civil Emergencies and Natural Disasters?" *Choices: The Human Development Magazine,* March 1994, p. 15.

53. Daniel D. Bradlow and Claudio Grossman. "Limited Mandates and Intertwined Problems: A New Challenge for the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund." *Human Rights Quarterly.* Vol. 17, 1995, pp. 411-442.

54. See the study of the Cuban Missile Crisis by Graham Allison, *The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis.* Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1971.

55. *The Challenge for Peacemaking in Africa: Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution, Op. Cit.*, p. 10.

# UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM: CONFLICT IN THE GREATER HORN

Understanding today's conflicts in the Greater Horn of Africa is an obvious prerequisite for considering actions and policies aimed at preventing further violent conflict. However, a simple country-by-country description of actual and potential conflict in the ten countries of the Greater Horn does not provide a full understanding. Therefore, this chapter examines conflict through two lenses: the first section contains short summaries of current and potential regional, national, and local conflicts in the Greater Horn; the second, more thematic section distinguishes between intra-regional and extra-regional factors, as well as between systemic and conflict-enabling conditions.

## I. Current and Potential Conflict in the Greater Horn

### A. Regional-Level Conflicts in the Greater Horn

There is a long history of regional-level conflict in the Greater Horn.

- The Mengistu regime in Ethiopia aided the SPLA and the SNM.
- Successive Sudanese governments supported the EPLF and TPLF.
- The Somali government assisted liberation movements in Ethiopia's Ogaden.
- For decades, refugees have poured in and out of Rwanda, Uganda, Zaire, Burundi and Tanzania to escape conflict.
- Historical claims by Somalis on territory in Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti have kept that sub-region unstable since Somali independence.

There are three major conflict clusters in the Greater Horn which in recent years have crossed national boundaries, threatened regional security, and may chronically re-explode in spasms of violence: Sudan's regional destabilization agenda; the Great Lakes conflagration; and the conflicts involving Somalis in the region.

#### *1. Sudan's Regional Destabilization*

The civil war in Sudan evolved from an internal conflict to a regional security crisis in 1994-95.

- The government of Sudan, controlled by the National Islamic Front or NIF, is engaged in low-intensity conflicts with the governments of Uganda, Eritrea, and Ethiopia -- with larger war clouds ominously on the horizon.

- The government of Sudan is supporting the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF), Ugandan rebel groups based in southern Sudan; the Ugandan government in turn has assisted the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), which has battled often with the LRA and WNBF.

- In addition to the military activity between Sudan and Uganda, Eritrea, and Ethiopia, cross-border conflict of one kind or another is also occurring between Sudan and Zaire, Central African Republic, and Egypt.

There is a danger of escalation to a major regional war over ideology and resources, especially the use of the Nile waters.

## 2. *The Great Lakes Conflagration*

The nearly 2 million Rwandan refugees in Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi, is a fertile source of potential conflict in the region as the leaders of the refugee population prepare for war. Many of these leaders are the same extremists who organized and executed the 1994 genocide.

There is a long history of refugees organizing revolutions in the region; this is but the latest installment. For example, the Rwandan Patriotic Front/Army (RPF/A) was born in southern Uganda, a generation after colonial and post-colonial communal violence forced out thousands of Tutsis from Rwanda. Prominent future members of what became the RPF were instrumental in assisting Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA) in toppling Uganda's President Milton Obote in 1985. General Paul Kagame, now Vice President of Rwanda was once head of NRA intelligence. Museveni's support was instrumental in preparing the RPF for its 1990 invasion and its eventual victory four years later, although many observers and Museveni himself claim that he did not instigate the invasion.

Another powerful example of cross-border connections was the October 1993 assassination of Melchior Ndadaye, the first Hutu president in Burundi's history. Those responsible for the assassination graphically demonstrated to Hutus in Rwanda the perils of relying on democratization and the Arusha peace process. The 200,000 Burundian Hutu refugees who sought refuge in Rwanda from the post-assassination violence added fuel to the anti-Tutsi fire in Rwanda. Many of these refugees were incorporated into the former Rwandan regime's political mobilization strategies in south-central Rwanda, where resistance to extremism had been the highest and whose political leaders were the first targets of genocide.[1] Some of these refugees actively participated in the genocide, sometimes acting as the "shock troops for local militias during the genocide."[2]

A third example comes from the 1993 Rwandan peace agreement. The Arusha Accords provided for the right of return for refugees, a key plank in the RPF's political platform. But the Accords did not make provision to accommodate the refugees back into one of the most densely populated countries in the world. Major fears and tensions resulted, and added fuel to the extremists' propaganda campaigns and destabilization plans leading up to the genocide.[3]

A year after being pushed out of Rwanda, the former government has rebuilt its military capacity and rearmed in preparation for an assault on Rwanda. Fresh supplies of arms have come from a number of suppliers, and the former Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and the militias have recruited new fighters. The former militias have been increasingly incorporated into the ex-FAR structure, and Human Rights Watch estimates the ex-FAR's troop strength at 50,000 men. Ex-FAR and militia leaders have allied themselves with Hutu militias from Burundi, further regionalizing the conflict.[4] After a November 1995 field visit, one observer notes that "platoon-sized" operations are being run by *Interahamwe* in western Rwandan border areas.[5]

Zaire's *refoulement* of Rwandese refugees in August 1995 and its announcement of camp closures in February 1996 graphically illustrates the potential for regional destabilization inherent in the huge camps in Zaire and Tanzania. The refugee populations in Zaire wreak tremendous damage on Zairian daily life through increased crime, violence, environmental degradation, and racketeering. The refugees contribute to broader political instability in Zaire, especially in the context of a possible census and upcoming elections in Zaire. Increasingly, militant refugee leaders produce further instability and threaten to plunge the entire region into conflict.

### 3. *The Somali Conflicts*

Long before Siad Barre's militaristic pursuit of Somali irredentist claims, regions bordering Somalia have been unstable. Boundary divisions left Somali populations on both sides of the borders of four countries — Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia — as well as one unrecognized one, the Republic of Somaliland. The Somali remain the most isolated minority in Ethiopia and Kenya because they retain strong ties to the Somali Republic.

Major wars and minor skirmishes have been fought to expand or maintain the Somali state, including the Ogaden War in 1977-78, the bombing of Hargeisa in 1990, the Shifta War on the Kenya-Somali border, and, following the 1988 peace agreement signed between Siad Barre and Mengistu, a surprise attack by the Somali National Movement on northern Somalia, setting into motion a chain reaction which culminated in the 1991 overthrow of Barre.

Competition over lucrative trade routes constitutes an additional point of contention in the region. Trade syndicates that operate in the region aggressively compete to route trade through the most profitable avenues available. One of the principal economic issues in Region Five in Ethiopia, for example, is control over trade routes for goods from the region exported through Berbera. Conflict in Mogadishu and Lower Juba is driven by similar issues. In all of the countries with ports (Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and unrecognized Somaliland), a port is the primary revenue-generating asset.

Ogadeni populations in what is now called the Somali Region of Ethiopia (formerly Region Five, and before that the Ogaden) historically fought to return their territory to Somalia's control. But the current ethnic federalist system in Ethiopia has added a new political variable, and the currently dominant regional faction (the Ethiopian Somali Democratic League) is consolidating political control of the region while expanding its leaders' and supporters' trade ties with Djibouti and Somaliland. The previous governing group (the Ogadeni National Liberation Front) is fragmenting along both sides of the debate about whether to join the political process in Ethiopia or fight for independence and eventual merging with Somalia.

In 1995, numerous clashes occurred along the Djibouti-Somaliland border between the Somaliland government army and the United Somali Front militia, an Issa organization. The Issa control the government in Djibouti, but Issa sub-clans represent the primary armed opposition in Somaliland. When tensions escalated in early August 1995, fighting focused on control of a nine-square-kilometer area claimed by Issa pastoralists in western Somaliland who demand regional autonomy based on the peace agreement signed by all sub-clans in Boraama in 1993. They are accusing the government of violating the peace charter by attempting to set up a regional administration controlled by the central government which would marginalize the Issa in that area in favor of the Isaaq and Gadaboursy.

The Somaliland government's span of control is firm only in Issaq/Habr Awol areas, principally Hargeisa, Boraama and Berbera. The Issa/Garhajis opposition responded violently to the government's expulsions of an Idigalle militia from the Hargeisa airport in October 1994, sparking a new phase of the civil war. Broader grievances have sustained the rebellion, including the opposition's contention that Egal's government violated the Boraama peace agreement by shelving regional autonomy, appointing regional governors, and re-centralizing authority.

## B. National-Level Conflict in the Greater Horn

### *1. Sudan*

Civil war has plagued Sudan for three of its four decades of independence. Control of valuable natural resources is a critical element in Sudan's conflicts: water from the never-completed Jonglei Canal, vast deposits of oil, and rich farmland. But war in Sudan goes beyond the struggle for control of potential wealth-producing resources. It has become a primary means of expressing and suppressing economic and political discontent. War in Sudan has also served to weaken particular ethnic groups, while enriching those in power.

An unparalleled period of fratricidal civil conflict has unfolded in the southern Sudan. During the 1990s, hundreds of thousands of people have been killed and large segments of the population of the region are being indiscriminately stripped of their assets, at times rendering whole communities dependent on international aid.[6]

Food becomes a powerful instrument of warfare in this and other ongoing civil conflicts. Access and distribution for relief can be denied or disrupted; warring factions routinely divert food aid for their own sustenance; civilians are used as bait for internationally donated food supplies; warring factions gain legitimacy by providing food aid; warring factions or their sympathizers can monetize, barter or otherwise manipulate food aid to obtain arms or fuel; and food aid can be differentially provided to supporters at the expense of others in need who may not be sympathetic or of the correct ethnic, racial, or religious group. When these egregious violations of international humanitarian intentions are combined with military strategies of asset-stripping and destruction of communities, it is easy to see why the emergency is chronic, flaring up in various locations throughout the south on a continuous basis in response to the application of these counter-insurgency tactics.

Strong currents of Islamic fundamentalism and pan-Arab cultural nationalism in the north have further inflamed the conflicts, especially in recent years. At independence, Sudan was at least constitutionally a secular state. As military ruler from 1969 to 1985, President Numeiry gradually Islamicized the legal

system. Islamic laws were introduced in 1983 but not fully implemented. The democratically elected government of Sadiq el Mahdi was reluctant to repeal Islamic law despite its unpopularity with many northern and virtually all southern Sudanese.

General Omar el-Bashir -- who ousted Sadiq al Mahdi in June 1989 -- has pushed forward with an Islamization campaign, deepening the south's alienation. The legal code effectively makes non-Muslims second-class citizens and curtails the rights of non-fundamentalist Muslims. They severely limit the status of women. Islamic courts now can punish by crucifixion, amputation, stoning, and flogging. They codify the principle of retaliation, "an eye for an eye."[7]

But Sudan's divisions are not simply north versus south, Muslim versus Christian, or African versus Arab. Many northerners are non-Muslims; many Muslim Sudanese are African; and many Sudanese Muslims oppose fundamentalism and Islamic law as national law. It is mostly because differences in ethnicity and religion coincide with gaps in economic, political, and social status that these cleavages lead to violence.[8]

## 2. *Somalia*

Somalia is chaotic, but not chaos. It is a society without a state, but not, as is so often reported, an "anarchy." Somalia today is a mosaic of fluid, highly localized polities, some based on traditional authority, others reflecting hybrid arrangements. These are stepping in to fill the vacuum created by the collapse of the state and perform many essential day-to-day governance functions.[9]

The ascendence of these local polities in villages, urban neighborhoods, and the pastoral range may only be a transient feature of the Somali landscape until a central state authority is revived. Yet it is much more likely that they are a glimpse of the future of governance in Somalia. With all indicators suggesting that efforts to re-establish a central Somali state will continue to meet with frustration, what we call "Somalia" will remain for the foreseeable future this collection of diverse and overlapping localized polities that collectively add up to something less than a conventional state.

Somalia's vicious civil war is thought to have caused the deaths of a quarter to a half million people. The primary legacy of this war is the geographical realignment of many Somali population groups with forced displacement, extrajudicial execution, gang rape, and asset transfer of land, livestock, and grain reserves based primarily on sub-clan affiliation.

The main potential locus of military activity centers on Mogadishu, in a Hawiye turf war that sporadically pits a loose alliance of Abgal and Hawaadle against the Habr Gedir and some Murosade militias coordinating military campaigns.[10] There are significant fissures within each of these four Hawiye groups. There are also additional potential flashpoints: in Galgaduud in central Somalia, between the Habr Gedir and the Marehan in that area; in Hiran Region between the Habr Gedir and the Hawaadle; in Bay, between the Habr Gedir and Rahanweyne; and in Lower Juba between a number of different sub-clans.

In September 1995, General Aidid and 600 militia captured the town of Baidoa in what was the General's biggest offensive in two years. The Leyson is the Rahanweyne sub-clan that emerged as the dominant Rahanweyne faction during and after the civil war. The Leyson formed the Rahanweyne Resistance

Army in response to Aidid's takeover of Baidoa, and in October 1995 launched a counter-attack on Baidoa which Aidid's militia repulsed. Sporadic fighting continues.

The unrecognized Republic of Somaliland has entered a new cycle of conflict since October 1994, when government forces — primarily Habr Awol (Isaaq clan) — expelled Garhajis (Issa clan) militias from the Hargeisa airport. This is the latest chapter in a contest for control of the state — unrecognized as it is — which goes back to the overthrow of Siad Barre. Numerous attempts at mediation have completely failed to reconcile the two factions.

### 3. *Rwanda*

The defining act of Rwandan political history for decades to come will be the 1994 genocide. Most of the moderate political establishment was wiped out along with over half a million civilians, the vast majority of whom were Tutsi. But the extremists did not achieve the overwhelming victory they envisioned: they now find themselves international pariahs, dislodged from power and simmering in refugee camps which double as rear bases for cross-border guerrilla incursions.

Besides the political sources of conflict marked by a struggle for power between the former government and the RPF, resource issues fueled the conflict in Rwanda. Large tracts of pastoral land in eastern Rwanda opened up when over half of the country's Tutsi population was killed or fled during conflict in the late 1950s and early 1970s. Thousands of Hutu families moved into the area. When the RPF invaded in 1990, fears were ignited over the possibility that advancing Tutsi soldiers would recapture this land. Extremist Hutu politicians fed these fears.

Economic stresses heightened insecurities during the five years leading up to the genocide. In 1989, the price of coffee dove fifty percent, with debilitating ramifications for rural producers, causing the first famine since 1943 in the south and southwest. Perhaps 300,000 coffee trees were uprooted and replaced with food crops because of factors relating to terms of trade. A year later the Rwandan regime devalued its currency in line with IMF requirements for its stabilization program, increasing prices across the board for food, fuel and other commodities.[11] Falling food production — down by a quarter during the last decade — and declining coffee prices meant escalating economic hardships, especially among the younger generation who faced bleak economic futures with few options.[12] Military spending actually increased as social spending (Rwanda has the lowest number of secondary schools in the world per capita) and investment shrank, further militarizing a volatile situation. The massacres in Rwanda result in part from failed development strategies and an unjust macroeconomic trade system.

Rwanda points up some of the structural vulnerabilities in socio-economic systems throughout Africa. Rwanda is the most densely populated country in Africa. In some regions there are over 1000 people per square mile; in many of these same areas, households average little more than half a hectare. Wealthier farmers were expanding their land holdings, increasing land pressure for smallholders as well as class polarization.

In the post-genocide uncertainty, it is quite probable that revenge will be taken frequently in the coming years, land disputes in many areas may be extremely violent, and reconciliation will be unlikely, especially in the context of numerous massacres during the past three decades.

Rwanda's current situation includes: a rapidly growing population largely dependent on traditional agriculture; an environmental crisis; ethnic, social and cultural diversity demanding political attention; a destroyed and inadequate infrastructure; a history of natural and man-made disasters; a lack of widespread democratic choice; a century of colonialism and the long-lasting effects of a long civil war; and a time of new claims on relief and development assistance and donor fatigue.

The obstacles to political accommodation are daunting. For example, in Cyangugu prefecture, former government leaders have targeted moderate Hutu leaders supportive of reconciliation and repatriation. Killing particular individuals is part of a campaign of intimidation against Hutu supportive of the current government. The strategy will likely spread to other regions.[13]

## 4. Burundi

The eighth poorest country in the world, Burundi is at a critical juncture. Tutsi control of the military and economy is threatened; the way the Tutsi-dominated army responds to change will be the key to preventing or exacerbating violence. Violence in Burundi is episodic but sustained. Civil violence and political instability have crippled the economy. An oligarchy controls the export sector and the patronage system. These exclusionary mechanisms generate extreme tensions and are a primary cause of conflict.

The northwestern provinces of Bubanza, Cibitoke and suburbs of Bujumbura have seen major clashes between the army and guerrilla forces infiltrating from eastern Zaire into bases in the Kibira forest. In response, Tutsi militias increasingly collaborate with the military and are targeting their activities in Bujumbura. They have increased their training and recruiting to counter the Hutu propaganda spread primarily by Leonard Nyangoma's *Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie* (FDD) militia, which runs a short-wave radio station (*Radio Rutamarangingo*) broadcasting militant messages throughout Burundi and into the refugee camps in Zaire and Tanzania.[14] The other major Hutu militia, *Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu* (*Palipehutu*), maintains a much lower profile,[15] but has operated out of Rwanda and Tanzania for years.

On a local level, militias have undertaken what Amnesty International calls ethnic cleansing operations, especially against Hutu in Bujumbura and elsewhere. Amnesty suggests that the army uses attacks against soldiers as the pretext for killing civilians. Frequently, Tutsi militia and the military "act in concert."[16]

The UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights, Paulo Pinheiro, estimates that Hutu rebels killed up to four soldiers daily in mid-1995, and that roughly 200 civilians per week are murdered in political violence. Mostly Hutu peasants were killed by the army or Tutsi militia (*Sans Echec* and *Sans Défaite*) in "reprisal" attacks.[17]

Criminality and violence have rapidly increased Burundi and, as in other conflicts in the Greater Horn, have become inextricably linked to the political conflict. Quite often, militias which attack on the basis of politics also loot. Many have become involved in networks of banditry. Extremists on both sides use the media to broadcast their message, especially through "hate radio" or the proliferation of private newspapers, of which at least two dozen of the latter have started since 1992.[18]

## 5. *Ethiopia*

Ethiopia emerged in mid-1991 from a bloody, decades-long war which overthrew the authoritarian Derg regime, saw the independence of Eritrea, and brought the Ethiopian People's Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPRDF) to power. Although the EPRDF is largely dominated by the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF), the former has accommodated allies from outside the TPLF, and key positions in the justice and economic ministries are held by non-TPLF members.

A four-year transition ensued before national elections were held in mid-1995. During and following the transition, there has been sporadic localized conflict in some regions, but Ethiopia has largely been relatively peaceful overall. The absence of war has been marked by a flowering of private commercial enterprise; markets are better supplied than at any time during the Derg rule. Some analysts make the compelling case that this increase in private sector development is a key to preventing further conflict.

On the other hand, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and local human rights groups have documented numerous detentions, extrajudicial executions, secret detention centers, and impunity for soldiers.

Structural obstacles to reconciliation efforts between the government and opposition groups during the transition included: EPRDF domination of the army, police and electronic media; the EPRDF's replacement of numerous civil servants (a normal event when government changes but presented as "proof" of autocracy by some opposition parties); and the perception of many opposition parties that the EPRDF was attempting to divide and control major social organizations, such as the unions, peace groups, political parties and religious bodies, a claim for which there is very uneven evidence. For their part, most opposition groups were not prepared or willing to engage in a substantive debate with the government on basic questions of governance, perhaps the largest stumbling block to major progress on breaking the logjam between political parties. Now that the transition is over, with the EPRDF entrenched in the center and its satellite parties paramount in key regions, it is possible that the system will slowly reopen. The end of the transition process found the EPRDF's primary goal accomplished: the consolidation of its power in the system it envisioned creating.

The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) left the political process for a complex set of reasons, including harassment and intimidation throughout Region Four, favoritism shown to the Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO) by the EPRDF, a long history of disagreement and rivalry with the TPLF, a perception by the OLF that the odds were not in their favor in the electoral process and that agreements that had been negotiated in 1991 quickly gave the EPRDF the upper hand politically. This has resulted in a low-intensity conflict in many Oromo areas. The Southern Coalition was removed from the government after it signed a resolution calling for the formation of a new government. The All Amhara People's Organization (AAPO) is the youngest of these major groups, and its leader, Professor Asrat Woldeyes, has been in prison since July 1994 due to his inflammatory writings and speeches which the government felt incited ethnic hatred.

There is mixed reaction to the regionalization policy which devolved administrative responsibilities to regions based on nationalities. This "ethnic federalism" created regional administrations which are formed largely on the basis of ethnic affiliation. Supporters are encouraged by the recognition of local languages and cultures, welcome the breathing room from a history of Amhara domination, and believe overcentralization to be impractical in such a huge, populous country. The EPRDF views "ethnic

federalism" as a means, not an end; it represents their attempt to prevent a single economic class from dominating the poor majority. The hope is that if the economy is decentralized, the political arena will change to reflect that new reality. On the other hand, detractors say this brand of ethnic politics threatens peace, fails to protect minority rights, and has increasingly divided groups living in the same region. While ethnic tensions have been exacerbated in some places, but they are declining in others. The situation is fluid; it is much too early to see Ethiopia's ultimate course.

The experiment in ethnic federalism may contain ethnicity as a long-term producer of conflict at the national level (perhaps entrenching it at the local level), or it may spark it. It is too early to judge. Nevertheless, it is important to note that ethnic conflict did not commence at the outset of the transition. There is a long history of intercommunal competition and/or violence in many areas of Ethiopia, so it is not surprising that a reform process as significant as the regionalization policy would exacerbate existing tensions.

The attempt to redraw boundaries according to ethnicity has caused problems. People have been forced from lands their families have owned for generations. Ethnic claims to minerals, lands, and water will continue to be explosive issues. In some cases, ethnic segregation imposed from the top is difficult for peoples of different ethnicities who have coexisted peacefully for many generations. In other cases, longstanding ethnic tensions have been exacerbated. In yet other areas, tensions have been reduced because of increased commerce and access to decision-making structures.

Rapid urbanization is a potential destabilizing force. The urban influx results partly from the years of limited mobility during the Derg, a policy which changed under this government. It is also caused by the perception of violence targeting minorities in various regions.

Conflict is perhaps most endemic in Region 5, where the Ogadeni National Liberation Front (ONLF), other political parties, and Islamic organizations are all vying for power. Human Rights Watch says this conflict "threatens future peace and stability in the country."[19] In mid-1994 there was major conflict in the Region when the Western Somali Liberation Front and the ONLF were soundly defeated by the EPRDF military, reducing the two groups to occasional guerilla activity. There is sporadic conflict in many other areas, including Harar, Bale, Wollega, northern Shoa, and Gondar.

### 6. *Kenya*

Kenya has a history of ethnic cleavages which have changed over time and which have had politically determined effects. Pre-colonial Kenya was largely composed of ethnically homogenous areas with occasional intercommunal conflict. During the colonial period, divide-and-rule policies established ethnically distinct regions and ethnic favoritism in land holdings. The anti-colonial Mau Mau insurgency in the 1950s was largely Kikuyu, and caused an intensification of the British authority's divisive policies. Independent Kenya's first president, Jomo Kenyatta, continued the policy of legitimizing ethnic-based political organization, favoring the Kikuyu.

The current government has promoted the interests of the Kalenjin population and other allied groups at the expense of the Kikuyu, despite the latter's predominance in land ownership, civil service, trade, and industry. Many leaders of the opposition parties are Kikuyu and at times appeal openly to ethnic

sentiments. The opposition represents a broad array of ethnic and other groups, supported by a growing middle class.[20] But the opposition has fragmented along numerous lines, some ethnic and regional.

There are three main opposition parties: FORD-Kenya, FORD-Asili, and the Democratic Party. FORD stands for the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy, and was the coalition which campaigned for an end to one-party rule, but which splintered after its original objective was met mostly along ethnic lines. All of the opposition parties have experienced further internal splits. *Safina* is the most recent group to form, but has been prevented from registering as a political party. Within the governing party KANU, numerous power struggles are ongoing to determine the future of the party's leadership.

In 1995, international and local human rights organizations reported a serious deterioration of civil and human rights in Kenya.

## 7. Uganda

Uganda was ripped apart by conflict and massive human rights violations under both Milton Obote and Idi Amin. Since the ascension of Yoweri Museveni's government — what Gilbert Khadiagala calls a "soft authoritarian alliance" — Uganda has progressed rapidly from the Obote/Amin era of protracted civil conflict.[21]

The ongoing debate over multipartyism has opened up the larger issue of political freedoms and basic rights of speech and assembly, which threatens to turn violent. In July 1995, for example, opponents of multipartyism physically disrupted a meeting organized by multiparty supporters.[22]

Conflict has been escalating between Uganda and Sudan since 1994. Partially in response to the Ugandan government's support of the SPLA, the NIF regime in Khartoum has increased its support for two rebel groups in northern Uganda: the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), headed by Joseph Kony, and primarily Acholi; and the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF), led by Juma Oris, mostly Kakwa and Aringa. Both attack targets in their own areas, and both launch attacks from Sudanese territory and retreat there afterward.

The LRA's ideology is, ironically, one of Christian fundamentalism, holding that Uganda should be ruled by a strict interpretation of the Ten Commandments. An upsurge in LRA activities in early 1995 led Museveni to cut diplomatic relations with Sudan in March of that year.

Joseph Kony surfaced in the late 1980s as head of the Uganda Christian Democratic Army, an Acholi group which operated in Gulu and Kitgum districts, wreaking havoc on civilian populations and picking up the mantle of Acholi leadership from the defeated Alice Lackwana and her Holy Spirit Movement. Ugandan government forces unleashed a search-and-destroy military campaign in 1991[23] to eradicate this and other remnants of resistance. This came in the context of a history in which the government forces succeeded in containing rebel activity in the east and north of the country during the first five years of his rule. The methods employed left lingering resentment and the specter of conflict in the north has arisen again.

Some analysts express fear that northern Uganda features the elements of structural violence. Economic inequalities worsen: ongoing insecurity in the north coincides with continuing development in the

south.[24] The government has been unable to redress the economic imbalance between north and south. With the pressure to increase foreign exchange, Uganda has focused on further developing exports. This has meant intensifying agriculture in the south, leaving little investment for northern initiatives.[25] Pro-NRM candidates fared poorly in the 1994 Constituent Assembly elections in the northern and eastern constituencies. This implies that these small anti-government militias may be only one segment of opposition the government will have to overcome to maintain stability and peace in Uganda, despite the extent of these groups' foreign backing.

## 8. *Tanzania*

There are over 120 ethnic groups in Tanzania, yet larger groups live far enough apart that they do not compete constantly for resources, and no single group is sufficiently large to dominate the others. Former President Julius Nyerere, who hails from one of the smallest ethnic groups in Tanzania, was key in establishing a national framework which favored national identity over ethnicity, and actively sought to prevent marginalization of smaller groups. Nyerere made Swahili the national language, with no tribal languages taught in schools; local chiefs were disempowered; and civil servants were not allowed to work in their home areas, promoting integration and obviating opportunities for the establishment of parochial fiefdoms by government officials.[26]

The commercial sector has long been dominated by the Asian (Indian) community. A long recessionary period has increased African populations' resentment of Asians in Tanzania. The potential for violence exists, and references are occasionally made about the Ugandan purge of its Asian community during Idi Amin's reign. Extremists call for the deportation of Asian businessmen. Fearing that Asians businessmen would corner the market, the Tanzanian government has delayed a privatization plan which would sell off many publicly owned companies. It is important to note that most politicians -- especially from opposition parties -- who played this anti-Asian card did not win their seats in the election.

On the mainland, increasingly nasty rhetoric is directed at Islam. Rev. Christopher Mtikila, the popular leader of the unregistered Democratic Party, is a "fundamentalist" Christian and a leading proponent of anti-Asian sentiment.

Elections were held in November and, despite charges of fraud and an unsuccessful lawsuit by opposition figures to have the results thrown out, the ruling party won over 60% of the vote, and Benjamin Mkapa assumed the presidency. Some opposition members have taken their seats in Parliament.

A potential area of conflict is the governing arrangement for Zanzibar, the Indian Ocean island united with Tanganyika in 1964 to create modern-day Tanzania. Zanzibar has its own president and parliament in an autonomous relationship with the mainland. Voices for separatism have always been heard on the island and rose a decibel in the run up to the elections. Over 50 members of Parliament from the mainland openly advocate separation between Zanzibar and the mainland.[27]

Envoys reported "serious irregularities" in the regional elections on Zanzibar; opposition party members claimed the process was fraudulent.[28] After the poll, the Electoral Commission pronounced the ruling party a narrow winner in Zanzibar. The relationship between Zanzibar and the mainland has been damaged by the election process. CCM credibility has been eroded by charges of election fraud in Zanzibar.[29] The final tally is considered improper by most donor governments, thus affecting aid. The

ruling party CCM (*Chama Cha Mapinduzi*) candidate President Salmin Amour was announced to have won by 1500 votes. The Zanzibari opposition has refused to take their seats, despite having won almost half of them. President Amour has made no effort to bring the opposition into government.

Growing nationalism in Zanzibar coincides with the CCM's deterioration. Some analysts predict serious conflict if more autonomy is not conferred on Zanzibar. Ten years ago, the islands comprising Zanzibar produced the spices that made up the bulk of Tanzania's foreign exchange. As the islands' economic fortunes have declined, mobilization has increased based on religion and nationalism.[30] There is also growing tension between those living on the main island, Zanzibar, where the CCM drew much of its support, and the smaller island of Pemba, where the opposition received the bulk of its votes. The latter perceives discrimination from the former, and is another factor contributing to potential conflict in Zanzibar.

Another potential source of destabilization and conflict on the Tanzanian mainland is the presence of hundreds of thousands of Burundian and Rwandan refugees in Tanzania. Besides creating a strain on resources, concentrations of refugees provide haven for extremists plotting cross-border incursions and other activities which are destabilizing to the region.

## 9. *Eritrea*

Unlike its neighbor to the south in Addis, the victorious movement which swept the Derg out of Eritrea decided not to institute a multiparty framework during its transition period. The Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) has since changed its name to the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), but it has not been swayed on the issue of multipartyism.

Eritrea's religious and ethnic heterogeneity mean that the government will have to tread delicately around many social fault lines in order to avoid conflict. The PFDJ firmly controls the reins of government at all levels, and is also the country's main economic player, as it directly invests in private businesses with a price tag of 51 percent ownership. Land is government-owned, accompanied by the usual charges of favoritism in distribution for pro-government people. This is especially true in the west, where 2000 ex-fighters who received land were met with violent protests that resulted in some deaths.[31]

Two groups are active in the west, providing an additional source of potential conflict. These are the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), run by Abdullah Idriss, and the Eritrean Islamic Jihad. Both groups receive unknown levels of support from the Sudanese government and from Eritrean refugee camps in Sudan. Analysts are concerned that this support could lead to short-term conflict, possibly aggravated by the potentially destabilizing long-term issue of the role of Islam in the state. As the honeymoon of independence wears off and the economy does not improve fast enough to meet unrealistic expectations, these groups could gain internal support regardless of what support the Sudanese regime is able to offer.

The Eritrean independence movement has always seen significant fissures along ethnic, religious, and regional lines. While factionalism increases over time in southern Sudan, Eritrean nationalists were able to utilize solidarity created by years of war to produce a national consciousness. Initially, the Eritrean Liberation Front of the early 1960s was solely Muslim. A decade later, the founding of the EPLF gave voice to Christian dissent against Ethiopia, although the EPLF was and is not an exclusively Christian movement.

The destruction of an already narrow resource base adds an ingredient to potential economically-driven instability in Eritrea. War tactics which have wrought extensive environmental damage above and beyond Eritrea's natural disasters include: bombing civilian targets; using napalm and chemical defoliants; scorched-earth bush clearance to remove ground cover for the Fronts; increased demand for fuelwood around army garrison towns; use of depth charges by Soviet trawlers to harvest fish in the Red Sea; and concentrating civilians around security hamlets. Continuing soil erosion, locust infestation, deforestation and overgrazing add to these factors to devastate the ecological and subsistence base of Eritrea.

Another potentially exacerbating factor is the extent and rate of increase of unemployment. A third of all civil servants have been laid off during the transition; roughly 3000 of these were ex-EPLF fighters demobilized into the civil service. Further demobilization will throw more Eritreans into the ranks of the unemployed.[32]

## *10. Djibouti*

After a protracted armed struggle, the rebel Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) signed a peace agreement with the government in late 1994. FRUD has abandoned organized armed resistance for the past two years. Djibouti's constitution allows it and others to reform itself as a political party, a process which FRUD has not yet undertaken.

FRUD is primarily an Afar movement, while the government is dominated by Somali Issas. In late June 1995, assassins killed a key FRUD supporter of the peace process, Ali Houmed Soule. Anti-peace elements of the army were suspected, as they have been in other acts of terrorism, such as the bombing of a restaurant in early August. Despite this provocation, FRUD members who are part of the coalition government remained committed to the peace agreement.[33]

Northern Djibouti remains unstable in the vacuum of authority left by a government which has not asserted its authority in that area due to financial constraints. Violence is not a common element of the instability.

The peace accord in December 1994 allowed for the entry of FRUD members into the government, but a year later was only partially fulfilled. Two FRUD members had been brought into the governing structure. Opposition members in Djibouti dismiss the moves as cosmetic, and reject the label of multiparty for this government.[34]

The major conflict brewing is that over succession of the presidency, occupied by the aging Hassan Gouled Aptidon. Key Issa politicians are positioning themselves for a post-Aptidon takeover. The front runner is the hardliner *chef de cabinet* Ismael Omar Guelleh.[35]

France has a force of 3,250 troops based in Djibouti, including armored, artillery and infantry battalions. The French air force is significant, anchored by Puma helicopters and Mirage fighter jets.[36] Djibouti remains strategic because of its location at the mouth of the Red Sea, through which transits a significant amount of Gulf oil exports.

## C. Sub-National-Level Conflict in the Greater Horn

Local dynamics of violence must not be forgotten, even in the context of serious regional- and national-level conflicts. In the Horn, for elders and chiefs, for local commanders of government and rebel armies, for militia mercenaries, local conflict often takes precedence over national conflict. Opportunities for asset-stripping and revenge often dictate relations, and warlordism in some places.

Local conflicts are often more destructive and deadly for civilian populations than national-level ones. While sub-national conflicts usually have some kind of tie to the higher order national wars, they often have lives and logical frameworks of their own for which national level peace efforts are irrelevant.

Four illustrative cases will be briefly discussed: the Jonglei region of southern Sudan, Region Four (Oromia) in Ethiopia, prefecture-level resettlement problems in Rwanda, and the Juba Valley in Somalia.

### *1. Jonglei Province (Southern Sudan)*[37]

The Nuer incursions into Dinka territory in the Jonglei region in late 1991 laid the most recent roots for the current fierce fighting in southern Sudan. Soon after a split within the SPLA in August 1991, Nuer militia and troops from the splinter rebel faction attacked Dinka areas in two waves. One in September 1991 went only as far as Kongor; the second, in November 1991, advanced deep into Dinka territory south of Bor. Their primary objectives were looting and revenge for earlier SPLA atrocities. The results were catastrophic, as the US Committee for Refugees summarizes:

> An estimated 30,000 Nuer rampaged through the area, burning and killing, leveling hospitals and clinics, destroying crops and stores, killing cattle, and creating chaos throughout the district. In December, the UN reported that 'more than 200,000 residents of the Bor and Kongor districts, in an exodus unlike anything seen before in Sudan, fled south in search of food, shelter, and security.'[38]

The destruction or large-scale raiding of cattle devastated the subsistence base and livelihoods of thousands of families in Bor and Kongor districts. The attacks greatly weakened the SPLA as a cohesive military force. The ground was softened for the government's successful dry season offensive in 1992.

The assault on Bor and Kongor unleashed a series of attacks and counter-attacks by both SPLA factions, especially in the area dubbed the "starvation triangle" between Ayod, Waat, and Kongor in Jonglei region. The two factions encouraged civilian militias to enter the fray.

Civilians have been the primary victims of the persistent, ferocious and indiscriminate attacks by both factions in the inter-SPLA conflict. Ethnic tensions have been heightened between the Dinka and the Nuer because of the actions by both factions' leadership.

An uneasy truce emerged in 1994-95 between the two factions, punctuated by occasional skirmishes. A local peace process on multiple levels was initiated, but was eventually undercut by the factions' leaders.

Warlordism continues. Strong commanders in the Jonglei area and other areas of southern Sudan have developed local fiefdoms, and are subject to little direct control over day-to-day actions by SPLA or the

splinter SSIA leadership. Major abuses by armed factions continue at the intercommunal level, in addition to abuses as components of larger civil war strategies by warring parties.

## 2. *Region Four (Oromia), Ethiopia*

The Oromo consist of one of the largest, wide-ranging, and religiously, politically, and economically differentiated groups in the Greater Horn. In Ethiopia, the Oromo form the largest population group, and the Region Four which they inhabit is the largest administrative unit in present-day Ethiopia.

When the OLF was formed in 1975, it sought to mobilize the marginalization felt by Oromo populations who during the previous century had seen northern highlanders expropriate large areas of Oromo land and turn Oromo peasants into tenant farmers. But the same year, the Derg passed a land reform which returned the use of the land to the peasants, thus undercutting OLF's agenda. The appeal of OLF's call for the creation of a separate state has further been weakened by the level of Oromo assimilation in urban areas.

In 1989 the TPLF founded the Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO) as a rival to the OLF.[39] By the time of the transition and especially before the first round of elections in 1992, there was a steady incidence of armed skirmishes between OLF and TPLF/EPRDF forces. These incidents added fuel to tensions surrounding the post-Derg political liberalization process.

Currently, Region Four is a classic candidate for conflict prevention. The region experienced major conflict in 1992 and low-intensity conflict since then, and there are numerous fault lines which threaten stability in the region. Violence in Region 4 includes: occasional military confrontation between the OLF and EPRDF; OLF acts of violence; government reprisals against the communities in which the violence has occurred or from which it has emanated; intercommunal battles between the Oromo and Somali and Oromo and Amhara — historical tensions between Oromo and Amhara populations originated with a steady migration of Amhara southward from arid regions in the north);[40] occasional actions by the IFLO; and small-scale resistance against the misuse of power by local OPDO officials, who themselves are guilty of violence in some locales.

The future of the region is clouded by the uncertainty over the extent to which the NIF regime in Sudan will use IFLO or OLF to carry out a destabilization agenda.

Many private newspapers published in Addis and Amnesty International's *Action Alerts* are full of reports of major human rights abuses by OLF, OPDO and government soldiers. These reports are strongly disputed by other observers. The extent of abuses in Region 4 is largely unknown, as no comprehensive, truly independent assessment has taken place in the Region.

OLF activists still create small-scale disruptions. The threat of escalation remains, especially given the low status the OPDO is accorded by many communities due to its appearance of subservience to the EPRDF. *Africa Confidential* reports that the OLF continues to be a long-term threat to Region 4's stability, because "some community leaders have apparently been ill-treated over taxation and security [issues]."[41]

### 3. Refugee Resettlement in Prefectures in Rwanda

Major flashpoints exist throughout Rwanda in areas which expect major repatriation from refugee camps in Zaire and Tanzania. In some *préfectures*, the population is roughly half pre-genocide levels, while others are nearly 100 percent. UNHCR estimates that half of all Rwandan refugees come from Kibungo, Byumba, and Gisenyi prefectures. For example, in Ruhengeri prefecture, population estimates are currently almost 100 percent of pre-genocide levels. Yet some 165,000 refugees originally from Ruhengeri have not returned. Their homesteads have largely been taken over by "old caseload" Tutsi returnees who repatriated in the year after the RPA's military victory. Kibungo prefecture provides a similar dilemma. The Rwandan government has designated Kibungo as a permanent resettlement area for "old caseload" Tutsi returnees. Tutsis are settling there despite the presence of over 340,000 Hutus in refugee camps awaiting repatriation back to Kibungo. Major confrontations are inevitable.[42]

Overall, there are 750,000 "old caseload" Tutsi returnees, split evenly between rural and urban destinations. Only 20 percent of this population has resettled on their own land. The rest, perhaps a half million, remain internally displaced. Designated resettlement priority areas are Kibungo in the southeast, the extreme northeast including parts of Akagera Park, and northwest areas between Gisenyi and Ruhengeri. Major disagreements between UNHCR and the Rwandan government continue to plague the operation.[43]

Resettling the internally displaced has already proved fatal in some cases. The worst case scenario is the massacre at Kibeho in April 1995, in which 4,000 to 8,000 people were killed. There is high potential for future confrontation when a displaced (internally or refugee) community's wishes — or more importantly its leadership structure — are at variance with the government's. There must be sufficient investment in comprehensive repatriation or resettlement programs: inaction or under-resourcing can have deadly consequences, as it did in Kibeho when *Opération Retour* was not fully supported.

### 4. Juba Valley in Somalia[44]

Some of the central conflicts fueling Somalia's continuing war are rooted in the Juba Valley.[45] Seven major sub-clan groupings are active in the ongoing Juba Valley conflict, and this regional war is rooted in four overlapping struggles: political power, resources, cities, and clan competition.

Traditionally, Marehan camel herders migrated from Gedo down to Lower Juba for water and grazing during the very arid dry seasons. They came with the consent of the clan leaders along the river, sedentary agriculturalists who negotiated grazing rights and water sharing agreements. By the mid-1980s, some of these nomads began to come with arms rather than consent and negotiated access. The regional government ignored the farmers' pleas. The Marehan manipulated the land tenure laws (which abrogated group and individual ownership and expropriated all land to the state) to control some of the best land. Small-scale battles checkered the Valley landscape by 1987.

The defeat of Siad Barre's forces at the end of 1990 and their abandonment of Mogadishu triggered a series of major population movements. When the USC swept into Mogadishu, Darods began fleeing south by the thousands to Kismayu. With the Darods (Marehan and Majerteen) occupying Kismayu, Jess retreated to Afmadow in the Lower Juba. In the first five months of 1991 the Juba Valley changed hands three times between the USC and the SPM/Somali National Front (the largely Marehan SNF). After

General Morgan re-captured the town on February 22, 1993, a Green Line was established to demarcate zones of control. Continuous skirmishes mark the Juba Valley to the present.

Further west on the Juba River, the Marehan have assumed control of Bardera, the most important city in Gedo Region, despite its largely Rahanweyne and Ogadeni population. Various Hawiye militias and Ogadeni groups control the central part of the Juba Valley. No group's control is uncontested, and the potential wealth of the region makes it an ongoing flashpoint.

## II. Sources of Conflict in the Greater Horn

It is nearly impossible to isolate individual causes of conflict and specific causality chains for each conflict when analyzing the Greater Horn of Africa. This is true both at the analytical stage or when determining appropriate policy responses.[46]

- The causes of armed conflict are numerous and interconnected, ranging from individual or group volition to structural inequality and injustice.
- Causes are both local and the result of transformations of the international structure since the end of the Cold War.

Although the quality of governance in a few states in the Greater Horn has improved in the last decade, state structures are steadily eroding. Continuing economic decline and material insecurity are accompanied in many countries in the region by increasing political instability and conflict.

- The geopolitical map is being rearranged in the Horn as new states are formed — Eritrea has won independence, Somaliland has declared it, and southern Sudanese rebels seek it.
- Power is being redistributed — group power relationships are far from stable in most states in the Greater Horn.

This process may be required to overcome the legacy of imperialism. Other African regions may follow the Horn's lead.[47]

Groups involved in conflict in the Horn often perceive their struggle as one of survival. This principle holds no matter what the organizing rationale for group identity -- religion, ethnicity, political affiliation, economic interest, etc. The result is a long and bloody process with little hope of compromise and little attention to human rights. Only from this perspective do the terrible events occurring make any sense.[48]

This section will examine a number of causes of conflict in the Greater Horn, all of which contribute to the kaleidoscope of instability in the region. They will reflect a division between:

- Systemic conditions, which would involve basic factors that are relatively less changeable, except in the long run, and would include:
    - Extra-regional factors such as the legacies of colonial and Cold War policies and the breakdown of values and traditions.

- Intra-regional factors such as geophysical conditions, resource scarcity, poverty, socio-economic inequalities, and ethnic divisions.

- Conflict-enabling conditions, which involve proximate factors relatively more changeable in the short run, including:

  - Extra-regional factors such as economic reform dislocations, arms flows and military aid.

  - Intra-regional factors such as the components of classic weak states, including militarization, competition for state power, and war-making for economic gain, as well as the strains of political liberalization and ideological differences.

## A. Systemic Conditions

### 1. *Extra-Regional Conditions*

#### ♦ *The Colonial and Cold War Legacies*

Colonialism in the Greater Horn has tremendous cultural ramifications. Kenya's Wangari Maathai summarizes the interrelated impacts of the colonial period:

> Culture is Africans' antennae into the unknown future and their reference point into the past... People who are robbed of their heritage during occupation, enslavement and political and religious colonization, become disoriented and disempowered.
>
> The world cannot ignore centuries of cultural adulteration of the African people through religious and mental indoctrination against their heritage.
>
> Colonization has left Africans weakened culturally, economically and politically..., [and in] a crisis of leadership.[49]

These cultural effects cannot be overemphasized. Adigun Agbaje of Nigeria contends that colonialism's attempt to replace indigenous values with Western ones produced a cultural dualism, leading to a "moral disorientation among the African people between the old and the new, a dualism neither well-aligned nor properly digested." Communalism and traditional religious leadership were discouraged, and replaced with "the gospel of individualism and a monastic and abstract view of a universal, remote God, not directly concerned with issues of governance, who could be approached only through practices and observances infused with Western cultural precepts."[50]

One of the most important legacies of the colonial era was the formalization of expansionism. The British pushed their boundaries in southern Sudan and Kenya until they met with resistance from Ethiopia, France and Italy, all of whom were widening their rule concurrently. The trend continued after independence with Somali irredentism, Ethiopia's annexation of Eritrea, claims on French-protected Djibouti, and various border skirmishes. Internal expansion — within state boundaries — of state power often met with violence, such as in the Ogaden, Bale, and Sidamo provinces of Ethiopia during Emperor Selassie's reign.[51]

Expansionism incorporated resistant groups who discovered that mobilizing around ethnic or religious solidarity was often the most effective way to fight for political change. These fault lines of identity corresponded predictably to cleavages of economic and political opportunity, creating a tremendous potential for conflict that has subsequently grown. Centralizing power in the post-colonial state was often a response to or excuse for ethnic strife and political competition, and served to exacerbate underlying problems even while temporarily overwhelming symptoms. The main investment in governance in the Greater Horn was the multi-faceted instrument of internal security,[52] subverting broader development of governance and civil society.

North-south dichotomies were cemented during colonial rule. Separate administration of northern and southern Sudan, British Somalia and Italian Somaliland, and Eritrea (Italian) and Ethiopia (not colonized), as well as regional or ethnic favoritism in Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi helped lead to political disputes directly after the departure of the colonial administrations.

Some analysts argue that the current conflicts result from colonialism and "incomplete nation-building." During colonization, heterogeneous populations were united into single parties and movements against the common enemy. Some states still experience conflict between those who won and those who lost out at independence.

Colonial borders are also a source of conflict. Due to the Cold War these conflicts were not easily distinguishable as internal or inter-state wars. The end of the Cold War has weakened ideological models and internal security mechanisms, resulting in new demands for self-determination.[53]

In a balanced system of reciprocity, traditional warfare had a political function: to establish ascendancy to ensure control of resources and a symbolic means of delineating the political and cultural boundaries of ethnic identity. The collapse of that balanced system of reciprocity began with colonial penetration and is linked to the introduction of new forms of exchange relations, a shrinking resource base, decay of governance, and the spread of automatic weapons.[54] Localized battles for resource control have in effect been replaced by state-sponsored asset transfer which benefits narrow bands of elite whose interests do not coincide with historical notions of balance and reciprocity.

As states formed throughout the post-colonial Greater Horn, Cold War imperatives influenced the policies of external actors toward the region. Although states and their associated social welfare systems received plentiful resources, the aid arrived along with hundreds of millions of dollars of military assistance which reinforced repressive security apparati and legitimized divide-and-rule governing policies.

The northeast corner of the Greater Horn was particularly targeted, being close to the Persian Gulf and bordering the Red Sea with its oil traffic and its strategic importance for introducing or countering naval blockades. The Soviet Union poured hundreds of millions of dollars into Somalia before -- and billions into Ethiopia after -- 1977. The United States did the reverse, although on a lesser scale. It also supported a wider collection of governments beyond Ethiopia and Somalia, including Sudan under Numeiry and Kenya.

As Cold War priorities subsided and military aid ceased, authoritarian states either met violent ends or mutated to attempt to address the post-colonial interests of donor states, especially democratization. Nevertheless, the legacy of overdeveloped internal security systems and bloated military budgets remain fixtures in most Greater Horn states, even in countries where governments are attempting to make clean

breaks with the past. As is seen in Russia and some of the former Soviet Republics, rapid change is not easy.

### ♦ *The Breakdown of Values and Traditions*

The rate of rural-urban migration continues to escalate throughout Africa. One African government minister described the effects of urbanization:

> In the villages of Africa it is perfectly natural to feed at any table and lodge in any hut. But in the cities this communal existence no longer holds. You must pay for lodging and be invited for food. When young men find out that their relations cannot put them up, they become lost. They join other migrants and slip gradually into the criminal process.[55]

The cultural crisis which results from urbanization is further explored by Zaire's Zeke Gbotokuma:

> Among the most painful consequences of this exodus are depersonalization and deculturalization. Despite their limited attractions, the way of living in the villages still procured a certain reassurance and a feeling of solidarity. There were laws, order, mutual community help and, in the family, along with a sense of responsibility for the needs of the others, was the feeling that 'someone cares about me, takes care of me.' This sense of responsibility is lost in the big cities. In the traditional milieu, the individual has a clearly defined status and a corresponding role to play; in the urban slums, he is isolated; nobody cares about him and he does not feel responsible for anybody. It is every man for himself; families must face competition from other families, a task for which they are ill-prepared. In the city, the immigrant must abandon his system of values, his traditional behavior; from then on, unemployment, crime, alcoholism, debauchery, divorce, etc., become commonplace. Respect for one's elders and parental authority diminish or disappear.[56]

On the other hand, the influx of women into urban areas often signals a desire to avoid degrading traditional practices and few opportunities in traditional settings. Nevertheless, what is gained in freedom from traditional boundaries is eroded by increased physical danger in the context of a lack of protection from kinship networks.

Participants in a workshop for local Sudanese NGOs were asked to consider which traditional values were no longer respected and why. The major responses for the reasons why traditional values have changed include:

- Modern weaponry, allowing for random killing.
- Traditional values not being passed along as a result of community breakdown due to displacement.
- The absence of a legal system outside the military system in which crimes can be tried.
- The replacement of traditional authority with military authority, thereby reducing the prospects of local approaches to peace.
- Economic stresses, including the rise of female-headed households and military lifestyles.
- The sheer brutalization of society in times of prolonged war.[57]

Problems in promoting peace, protecting human rights and delivering humanitarian assistance are related to the weakening of traditional authority structures, occurring for a variety of reasons. These reasons include:

- Marginalization by political movements and relief agencies.
- Disrupted transmission of traditional values due to displacement.
- The brutalization of society, a result of prolonged war which created a thirst for revenge and a generation who knows only violence.
- The growth of an "entrepreneurial class" who recognize the economic benefits of war and who do not hesitate to incite violence.
- Growing impoverishment and the decline in resources which has in turn led to a decline in the means to manifest the traditional value of caring for the most vulnerable.[58]

Constitutional law has replaced customary law in many places. However, national governments have often been unable to manage local disputes without using repressive measures. Some customary laws were abolished while others were absorbed into the state bureaucracy. In the colonial and immediate post-colonial period, the customary role of elders as peacemakers in many places became subject to party ideology and political manipulation.

In the absence of traditional means for resolving disputes, the transfer of assets from the politically weak to the politically strong was accelerated by the use of modern weaponry. In some cases, the use of these modern weapons helped destroy the remnants of balanced reciprocity. Local conflicts consequently escalated into state conflicts over the semi-subsistence economy, which sometimes resulted in famine and in many places the increased vulnerability of the weak.[59]

## 2. *Intra-Regional Conditions*

### ♦ *Resource Scarcity and Competition*

The primary cause for conflict in the Greater Horn is competition over declining resources. The central role of the state in determining resource distribution makes it a major target and, when power is over-centralized, reason for conflict.[60]

The natural resource base, topography, and climate of the Greater Horn are contributing factors to conflict, especially in the Northern Tier countries (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan). The history of the region includes massive population movements pushed by other groups and pulled by the search for better pasture and water sources.

- Pastoral migrations are legendary: Arab populations in the Sudan migrated from Egypt; Ethiopian Oromo originated in the tip of the Horn; the Somali came from the Gulf of Aden.

- The Horn contains the largest grouping of pastoralists in the world: Sudan has the highest percentage globally; Somalia is third; Ethiopia is fifth; in Djibouti, one third of the population is pastoralist.[61]

Drought is cyclical and omnipresent, increasingly in combination with over-cultivation. Desertification of large areas of once fertile soil, reduction of available land, and intensification of competition over remaining land results.

The Greater Horn of Africa suffers from extreme population pressures, calculated both in terms of population density and growth rates.

- Some of the highest population densities in the world are found in the Southern Tier of the Horn, especially Rwanda and Burundi.

- The Northern Tier also has some of the highest population growth rates globally:

  - Djibouti, 3.5 percent
  - Ethiopia, 3.1 percent
  - Kenya, at least 3 percent per annum
  - Somalia, 3 percent
  - Sudan, 2.8 percent.

Cultivable land is limited; in Ethiopia, for example, only a quarter of the total land mass is planted.[62]

Land tenure in the region remains a critical issue, a "ticking time bomb," in one Somali aid official's words.

- Land tenure is among the issues that led to Siad Barre's overthrow and remains at the root of much of the fighting in Lower Shabelle and the Juba Valley, as Omaar and de Waal confirm: "Clan-based militias have ravaged the country, but the commonest reason for their wars is land."[63]

- In Rwanda, disputes over land tenure and property ownership are one of the most explosive issues in the country. The Arusha Accords of 1993 clearly call for refugees who return to their land within ten years to have the rights to reoccupy their homes and land. "Old caseload" Tutsi refugees — originally displaced in 1959 — therefore do not have rights to their own homesteads, although often they are occupying the property and land of the 1994 refugees. The Habyarimana government used population density and land shortages as a pretext for keeping the largely Tutsi refugee population from returning to Rwanda. In exile, the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front was born in Uganda.[64] No clear legal process and policy has yet emerged to address this issue.

- In Kenya, Burundi, and Ethiopia, land tenure is a critical component of conflict as well.

Natural erosion and improper agricultural practices have greatly damaged the land's productive capacity. Food production rates have fallen behind population growth rates. This population growth combined with commercially-driven increases in the animal population has led to denudation, intensified erosion, falling yields, and possibly climatic change: precipitation has declined since the 1950s, drought is now common and famine inevitably follows.[65]

In Somalia, conflicts over pasture and water have been further exacerbated by intensifying environmental degradation. Traditional forms of mediation were overwhelmed in some places (and consciously undermined by the Siad Barre regime in others) by resource conflicts which became intertwined with larger civil conflict.

Land degradation is caused by climatic change and human activities such as farming and cutting trees. Resource competition, intensified by drought, heightens social inequalities. Often, the first to feel the effects of droughts are small farmers and poor pastoralists.[66]

Economic deprivation and environmental degradation escalate as poor inhabitants of degraded ecosystems are forced to compete for diminishing resources. Often conflict is the result, as, for example, in the conflict between pastoralist tribes over *haffirs* — water points — in Sudan.[67]

The balance between people and nature is threatened as drought reduces the available resources needed by livestock. Pastoralists are forced to roam in smaller areas and overgraze vegetation, overexploit water sources and prevent regeneration.[68]

Government action has often exacerbated conflict rather than provided relief. Destructive processes are often supported by legislation. In Sudan, traditional grazing lands were taken away from pastoralists and distributed to wealthy farmers for tractor cultivation on the assumption that unregistered land was empty.[69]

Instability caused by environmental pressures almost always causes further insecurity as people arm themselves for protection against theft of their resources and violence. The availability of weapons moves war-producing environmental causes (the Greenwar cycle) to higher levels of intensity. The Greenwar cycle develops new tensions and exacerbates political and racial antagonisms. Though not limited to poor sections of society, prejudice and xenophobia often stem from poverty and powerlessness. Whole communities have become refugees in order to avoid direct combat.[70]

Environmental degradation causes conflict which causes environmental degradation, creating a vicious cycle of environmental decline, tense competition for diminishing resources, increased hostility, intercommunal fighting, and social and political breakdown. In a semi-subsistence economy the easiest form of attack is to destroy an opponent's natural resources needed for survival.[71]

### ◆ *Poverty*

Endemic poverty and wide inequalities of income are reliable predictors of conflict, although not universal (e.g. Tanzania). Countries torn apart by violent conflict average a GNP roughly one-third of that of non-warring nations. "Poverty of this magnitude," notes Copson, "contributed to the emergence of war by exacerbating underlying social tensions and depriving governments of the means of ending war."[72] Combined with a legacy of state-controlled economies, poverty severely limits opportunities in education, employment, and economic advancement. Copson notes:

> This lack of opportunity can intensify the sense of grievance among social groups suffering discrimination. When opportunities generally are scarce, discrimination can take away any hope of finding employment. In tearing the last shreds of hope, it causes deep resentment

> and destroys any sense among its victims that they have a stake in society. In Sudan, Liberia, Uganda, and Rwanda, the denial of opportunity and impoverishment of people linked by primordial ties undoubtedly contributed to the strength of societal resistance to the state.[73]

### ◆ *The Marginalization of Pastoralists*

Most borders in the Northern Tier of the Greater Horn were drawn through areas inhabited by lowland pastoralists, dividing ethnic groups and pasture lands. The Somali were carved up into five states, the Afar three, the Beja and Boran two. Markakis notes:

> The economic viability, social integrity and political efficacy of pastoral society were gravely impaired as a result, and pastoralist groups were gradually relegated to a marginal position, alien and alienated in a changing world. The decline of pastoralism and endemic conflict in the lowlands of the Horn are closely related phenomena.[74]

Constraints placed on the mobility and migratory patterns of pastoral communities over the last century have severely limited the land available for grazing. National and provincial borders, designated grazing zones, wildlife sanctuaries, and the rapid proliferation of land under cultivation have combined to reduce the room to roam, igniting conflicts over increasingly valuable land and water. These conflicts are fed by generations of rivalries between major pastoral groups.

Sometimes these intercommunal disputes feed into larger contexts of national war, such as the Baggara Arab and Dinka in Sudan, as well as the Isaaq and Ogadeni in Eastern Ethiopia, Somaliland and, during Siad Barre's reign, Somalia. Agriculturalists also battle pastoral groups, such as southward-moving Ethiopian cultivators and pastoralists from the lowlands, the Afar Liberation Front and its historical disputes with highlanders, and the Baggara Arab pastoralists and the settled Fur communities in western Sudan.[75]

Conflict has been most prevalent in areas lacking in natural resources and neglected by the state, whose inhabitants are not part of the ruling group. These pastoralist regions are usually so deprived that the inhabitants' very existence is threatened.

### ◆ *Ethnicity*

Exacerbating ethnic cleavages is a tool leaders use to gain or consolidate power. Colonial rulers (similarly, successive monarchs in Ethiopia) and their successors have fueled ethnic tension by deliberately favoring some ethnic or religious groups at the expense of others. This approach to governance was directly supported by Cold War aid suppliers, despite contradictory rhetoric.

These divide-and-rule strategies created enduring ethnically-linked economic and political inequalities which help fuel continuing cycles of rebellion and repression. Superpower military and economic aid during the post-colonial era underwrote the strategies and reinforced the divisions, in countries as diverse as Djibouti, Kenya, and Burundi. The Isaaq in Somalia, the Tigrayans in Ethiopia, and the Dinka in

Sudan are examples of ethnic groups which suffered explicit discrimination from national governments and eventually erupted into violent rebellion.

In most cases of conflict in the Greater Horn, conflicting parties belong to different ethnic or clan groups. Whether the conflicts are caused by differences ascribed to ethnicity is hotly debated; that they are a contributing cause and routinely exploited is undeniable.

Leaders have emphasized differences among ethnic communities rather than similarities. The demand for liberation and ethnic self-determination is not necessarily popular or democratic (although it could be), but often it is rather a form of "elite advocacy" representing particular organized movements on behalf of entire "nations" and "peoples". The problem of nationalities was created within a particular tradition of political thought, discourse and struggle, not the spontaneous reality of ethnicity that became the basis of "national self-determination" struggles in Africa.[76]

Why is ethnicity often the most effective form of political mobilization? Markakis explains:

> Ethnicity is an imperative embedded in the foundations of the political order and functions as a controlling factor in the political process, long before an ethnic movement appears to challenge that order. It is precisely because ethnicity is intrinsically political in that setting that ruling groups go to great lengths to exorcise its spirit with invocations of 'nation-building' and 'national unity.' In the 'ethnocentric state', as one would expect, ethnicity is also the ruling principle of economic and social differentiation. This means that this principle divides, along ethnic lines, groups that confront each other in the process of competition for material and social resources...
>
> The ethnic group as a political actor is a product of the situation, not of history, and what mobilizes its members to take collective action is concern for future prospects, not an atavistic attachment to the past.[77]

Forced African unity or integration has been at the expense of distinctive identities, interests and aspirations of various nationalities and peoples, and based on the domination of small ruling classes belonging largely to one ethnic group.[78]

Another characteristic of conflict-prone areas that is related to ethnicity is cultural repression. Ruling groups discriminate against groups whose language and culture are different in the name of "national integration."[79]

A misunderstanding often occurs when conflicts in Africa are attributed strictly to "tribal warfare" and Western analysts attempt to place the burden of violence on sociological factors inherent to Africa. This view ignores the fact that asymmetrical modernization in Africa actually gave ethnic groups an incentive to organize and increased the level of competition that already existed in most countries.[80]

In theory, modernization should cause ethnic competition to disintegrate through a new social organization that centers around the capitalist means of production. Horizontal ties should form whereby class cleavages are more defining in real social terms than tribal or ethnic bonds. Yet in reality, rapid modernization often creates a competition for limited resources that mobilizes ethnic competition rather than causing its deterioration.

Robert Bates argues that there is a "rational basis for ethnic competition" since each ethnic group actually represents politically mobilized coalitions used to attain limited income and capital.[81] The most fundamental resources that groups desire are land, markets, power and jobs. Competition for these resources can be fierce.

With modernization it was clear that some groups would benefit disproportionately because of the "factor of space" — modernization begins in a few central areas and then diffuses outward to other regions. This inevitably causes ethnic groups to mobilize.

From colonial times, a primary agent of modernization was local administration. Groups tended to be organized along ethnic or tribal lines. This meant that groups that were better "spatially located" received a greater share of the benefits of modernization and had an incentive to mobilize support and gain political power to ensure that they retained these advantages. Political power, with authority over the distribution of many of the benefits of modernity, became tied to ethnic mobilization. The distribution of limited resources became a primary focus for both politicians and their supporters.

The competition for political power can exacerbate ethnic tensions. In many African countries, political leaders have attempted to mobilize supporters through appeals to ethnic identity, which can worsen underlying ethnic resentments, and may even lead to outbreaks of ethnic conflict. In particular, poorly designed and implemented elections which are perceived to be "fixed" or not otherwise seen as accurate reflections of voter preferences have aggravated ethnic tensions within the region. The mobilization that began with resources desired from modernization continues.

## B. Conflict-Enabling Conditions

### 1. *Extra-Regional Conditions*

#### ♦ *Economic Reform Programs*

The austerity measures introduced in the context of economic stabilization and Structural Adjustment Programs often intensify poverty and income inequality, at least in the short run, and therefore can exacerbate insecurity. Introducing user fees for previously free services in some countries also has heightened social tensions, as has the removal of certain producer and consumer subsidies. [See the section on national-level conflict in Rwanda.] Austerity measures have caused food riots and other forms of instability in some countries. This in turn has led to the expansion of security systems designed to repress such public expression,[82] undermining what are often parallel processes of democratization.

#### ♦ *Ideology*

Deeply held ideologies drove many of the liberation movements which have now ascended to power throughout the region. The leadership of the current governments in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Rwanda all spent years in the bush after significant university experience, as have some of the leaders of the southern Sudanese rebel movements. These governments all have firm ideas about governance, human rights, justice and other central issues, often at variance with Western donor concepts. The NIF-controlled government in Sudan is also driven by a particular ideology, that of political Islam.

Ideology was more overt before socialism's demise. Socialism still drives some leaders in the Greater Horn of Africa, as does religious fundamentalism. The more salient disagreements now are over models of governance: multi-partyism vs. single-partyism, alternative forms of engendering participation and sharing power, federalism, proportional vs. representational elections, strong vs. weak presidency, and so on.

### ♦ *External Military Aid*

Good governance is a Northern condition for aid, but the North continues to export materials/technology that support bad governments. The greatest transfer of technology North-to-South is in armaments.[83] Strategically driven foreign aid and trade have valued stability over inclusion.

Conflict in the Greater Horn has been fueled by external military aid to governments and rebel groups:

- France in Rwanda, Burundi, and Djibouti.
- The United States in Sudan, Ethiopia and then Somalia after 1977.
- The Soviet Union in Somalia and then Ethiopia in the same year.
- The British in Kenya.

At the apex of arms transfers during the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union was providing Ethiopia $1 billion per year in arms, while the United States underwrote a significant portion of the defense budgets of Sudan, Somalia, and Kenya. Among others, France, East Germany, Cuba, Israel, Iran, and Libya have all been significant arms providers to combatants in the Horn at various points during the past decade. Private arms dealers have also been extremely active in the region.

This military aid underwrote local and national military responses to fundamental economic and political problems, delaying their resolution and intensifying their importance. Prolonged military rule was the logical result.

## 2. *Intra-Regional Conditions*

### ♦ *The Dysfunctional State*

An important cause of Africa's deepening crisis has been political exclusion through single-party, state-dominated authoritarian rule. Basil Davidson referred to this hijacking by the state as "top-down commandism" which repudiated "Africa's democratic tradition" and produced "a concerted aggression against the common people."[84]

- There are various gradations of exclusionary rule extant in the Greater Horn, from fascist fundamentalism to narrowly based authority.

- Election processes are tightly controlled, manipulated or flawed.

- Coalition governments are often powerless, window-dressing or tenuously balanced.

- Political movements throughout the region which are opposed to governments are often no more inclusive.

Even when there is a will to share power, there is great difficulty in developing coalitions across ethnic, religious, or regional blocs. Intense pressure exists within groups to consolidate power in case there is a serious challenge. Fear of eventually losing power often leads to a rapid effort to expand resources, often illicitly and extra-judiciously, under the control of the group(s) in authority.

In the Horn, the state developed a repressive apparatus which the excluded groups opposed violently. Other state functions not related to internal security degenerated. Military aid from the East and the West ended with the Cold War, and was replaced with concern in the West over human rights and democracy. The authoritarian state was now deemed dysfunctional and a political system conducive for "free market" operations was recommended.[85]

States in the Horn are, or until recently have been, examples of what Ali Mazrui called "ethnocracy" — monopolistic control of a state by one or more ethnic group, a basic cause of conflict within the region. Examples include Arab control of Sudan, Issa Somali control of Djibouti, and former Amhara control of Ethiopia.[86]

Copson contends that wars in Africa have resulted from "grave errors of policy and conduct" by regimes in power. Decision-making processes offered no room for participation or expressions of dissent by affected communities. Examples include President Numeiry's imposition of Shari'a and redivision of the south in Sudan, Emperor Haile Selassie's annexation of Eritrea, President Obote's stealing of the 1980 elections in Uganda, and Siad Barre's increasingly exclusionary reign in Somalia. These errors of policy, connected with a perception of exploitation by a certain region or ethnic group, combined to produce conflict, as in Tigray, southern Sudan, Eritrea, and the Buganda in Uganda.[87]

In a recent public forum, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi stated that "All African countries are potentially failed states." He opined that the two most important reasons for violence in Africa are perceptions of mistreatment by a population, and no legal channel for that population to address that perceived injustice.[88]

In some Horn countries — Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda and Rwanda — visionary leadership from a younger generation of ex-freedom fighters has glossed over deepening structural problems. One of the deepest problems is a proliferation of fissures within national opposition groups in the region, both armed and unarmed. The lack of open, democratic structures gives a convenient excuse for opposition leaders to go underground and into the bush. As opposition groups split internally, violence and volatility usually increase. In response, state repression also increases, reinforcing the cycle and delaying the opportunity to address fundamental issues.

The disconnect in the Greater Horn between social organization and the state is a major cause of conflict. Originally expected to mobilize populations and economies and to modernize societies, the state at the end of the colonial period quickly became consumed with corruption and the consolidation of power. Possibilities for participation gradually eroded. New terms were developed to describe the deterioration of governing structures: "soft state," "lame Leviathans," and "pathological patrimonialism."[89]

There is an extraordinary divide between the concerns of ordinary people in the Greater Horn and the machinations of the political-military elite. Peter Vale of South Africa's University of the Western Cape speaks to the gulf between rulers and ruled:

> In post-colonial Africa, people have become totally alienated from the state. States are seen as partnerships of predatory elites. Part of that alienation is to withdraw.[90]

A further element of dysfunctional leadership is the phenomenon of elite insecurity. Brian Job describes this critical issue as:

> ... an internal predicament in which individuals and groups acting against perceived threats to assure their own security or securities consequently create an environment of increased threat or reduced security for most, if not all, others within the borders of the state.[91]

### ♦ *Competition for State Power*

Profound demographic shifts are underway in the post-Cold War era in the Greater Horn, stemming from contests over state power and from the transfer of assets and resources that results from changes in government. There are numerous current examples.

- Fundamentalists backed by the Sudanese government have gained control of much of the productive infrastructure and marketing channels in northern Sudan, and are penetrating into central and southern parts of the country, pursuing policies of ethnic cleansing in some areas with great economic potential, such as the Nuba Mountains and Northern Bahr al-Ghazal.

- Rwandans who were "old-case" refugees in Burundi and Uganda began reasserting themselves in Rwanda and consolidating assets and political power within a year after returning in the wake of the genocide.

- Habr Gedir pastoralist militias originally from Central Somalia have forcibly occupied key productive zones in Lower Shabelle and Bay Regions, as well as commercial channels in the capital of Mogadishu.

- Historic jockeying for ascendancy in Ethiopia continues as politically paramount groups move south and experiment with ethnic federalism, creating regional power struggles which presently take precedence over national ones.

- Leaders of various communities position themselves for the spoils of Kenya's eventual transition, displacing and stripping the assets of certain Rift Valley communities.

- The Issa/Habr Awol are consolidating their commercial axis from the Ogaden through Somaliland, displacing formerly paramount Darod/Ogadenis and Issaq/Garhajis.

These historical realignments of populations and political power are fueled by a hyper-exploitative quest for the consolidation of resources and access to the machinery of the state — taxation, trade, patronage, and aid.

Competition for the benefits of modernity has changed slightly in current Africa. Political power is no longer strictly a question of land or jobs. The purse strings of a nation now reside in the hands of ruling elites. This makes political power more desirable than ever, especially when drought and famine create scarcity that intensifies competition and can be manipulated by politicians to mobilize support.

In post-colonial Africa, and especially in the Greater Horn, the state is often the locus of conflict because it controls "the production and distribution of material and social resources."[92] Unequal access to state power inevitably creates conflict, as those in power attempt to consolidate it and those outside the circle often fight to get in.

- Groups fight for state power.
- State power is used to combat or repress those seeking to displace the entrenched.
- Opposition groups attempt to reform state structures to allow wider access to decision-making, or advocate for autonomy or independence, ultimately to capture as great a share of the state's resources as possible.

As Markakis concludes, "[State power] is the real bone of contention and the root cause of the conflict in the Horn, whether it is fought in the name of the nation, region, religion, ethnicity, or clanship."[93]

The socialization of the means of production means that the state provides the main channel for the accumulation of personal wealth and the securing of privileged positions.[94] The state's role as a primary vehicle to accumulate personal wealth causes a brutal competition for power and position where groups and individuals feel that they must win at any cost to society or individual life.[95]

Development has contributed to conflict primarily in response to state decisions about investment in export sectors, especially agriculture and livestock. The state steered investments towards areas controlled by ruling elites. Resulting investment patterns led to extraordinary disparities in economic opportunity from region to region. These disparities have been intensified as the state provided social services primarily to the same areas. This post-colonial continuation of a colonial trend intensified inequalities between various social groups and regions; resulting tensions fed larger civil conflicts. The most conflictual areas in the Greater Horn are nearly all areas which have been excluded from the fruits of state investment.[96]

Governments in the Greater Horn have exacerbated differences through cultural imperialism, imposing their language, religion, and particular versions of history on all groups. Markakis demonstrates the folly of such policies:

> Forced assimilation not only was rejected by subordinate groups, but also encouraged them to invoke their own cultural symbols, most often religion and language, in the propagation of what may be called 'dissident nationalism'... As a result, the conflict often appears to be a sectarian or communal struggle lacking objective causes.
>
> However, appearances can be misleading. On the one hand, cultural elements are often used as rallying symbols to mobilize groups in conflict that have an objective material

basis... On the other hand, cultural elements themselves can have a material dimension in a given situation.[97]

### ♦ *War for Economic Gain (Crass Profiteering)*

To understand the causes and consequences of war, one must examine its relationship with political and economic processes. War would not occur or persist if it did not have significant functions/benefits — such as manipulating the war economy — for political power groups.[98]

When analyzing the economics of warfare, it is useful to distinguish between groups who actively manipulate violence (greed) and those who are ready to be manipulated into violent activities (need).[99]

The absence of ideology is striking in many of the complex emergencies to which the UN and NGOs respond. "The combatants are often crass profiteers," motivated by "pure self-interest," says one observer. Asset-stripping is a primary feature of this crass profiteerism. Participants are motivated by the sharing of profits and plunder. They use ethnicity and fear to mobilize and terrorize. Asset-stripping has become easier with the advent of modern weaponry.

When one or both sides is unable to control or pay its own fighters, civilians are usually raided. As economic rationales for war change, warfare may "mutate" like a virus. Outside assistance becomes difficult when this shift is not understood.[100]

Since they can profit, authorities often calculate they have much more to gain from continued war than from peace. As formal economies contract or collapse, asset-stripping, authoritarianism and controlling aid inputs become attractive options when placed against alternative (and more risky) options of engaging in slow, painstaking democracy-building with no survival guarantees. In extreme cases, famine or scarcity can be profitable: in times of stress assets are transferred from poor to rich more rapidly and at panic prices.

Insecurity and conflict are manipulated for economic gain in the following ways:

- Raiding
- Protection rackets
- Diversion of relief
- Charging people to move from one area to another
- Official corruption and the use of public funds for private purposes
- The use of force to skew markets in particular ways
- Ejecting people from productive or mineral-rich land.[101]

The benefits of war can exceed its costs especially when a country, group or individual is relatively immune to these costs.

Benefits may be intended or unintended; benefits may accrue to a narrow or to a large section of the population.

- Keen hypothesizes that unintended benefits that accrue to a broad section of the population may perpetuate the conflict, but probably do not cause it.

- Intended benefits that accrue to a narrow section of the population are likely to be a cause of war. These intended benefits can be described as part of the function of war and must be taken into account in any attempt to prevent, reduce or stop a war.[102]

Those who benefit from violence may find it relatively easy to avoid the costs of fighting and trading. This may help to explain patterns and persistence of conflict.[103] Large sections of the population may benefit in the form of security in geographical areas controlled by warlords or "mafia-type" bosses.[104]

Other economic benefits can accrue from war, including:

- Protection rackets
- Monopolizing trade and profits through violence and smuggling
- Exploiting labor through low wages or in extreme cases slavery
- Taking valuable land
- Controlling and manipulating emergency aid
- Gaining or retaining state power and the corollary benefits of aid and taxation.[105]

Some wartime economic strategies are clearly exploitative, such as raiding and protection rackets. Other strategies are not directly exploitative but are damaging to long-term production. These include:

- Stripping the environment
- Selling off assets
- Consuming seed
- Leaving productive land
- Investing in activities of limited usefulness rather than putting money into production, "legitimate" trade or savings
- Directing public policy to attract external aid rather than develop the domestic economy.

These economic strategies may be legal or illegal.[106]

Often upward mobility and opportunity are best accessed through participation in militia forces, whether as foot soldiers or revolution leaders. Alternative, peacetime livelihoods rarely offer the same benefits and security as membership in an armed force, be it government, rebel, or criminal.

There is often a fine line between politically motivated violence and criminality. Asset-stripping and attacks on those in power in many Greater Horn countries are often linked. Politically motivated opportunism with economic rewards is a driving force behind violence in many places.[107]

The possibilities that conflict or violence are responses to economic and political pressures deserves analysis. In wartime, violence may serve an important economic function for particular groups by providing resources. However, it may be difficult to differentiate between actions aimed to attain economic benefits and actions aimed for the execution of war. The interaction between violence and deprivation is important to understand, because violence results in the transfer of resources and victims may become perpetrators.[108]

The parallel economy — the transfer of assets that can fuel war — can represent an essential source of income and is not necessarily violent. However, attempts at regulation usually generate violence. The parallel economy is very destructive of the subsistence economy and in some places has resulted in the virtual annihilation of certain ethnic groups, as occurred with the Nuba, Mundari and Uduk in southern Sudan.[109]

An analysis of the political economy of war in Africa explains that war is not chaotic but is usually organized to benefit the few. It also identifies how international aid can be used to sustain violent conflict.[110]

Sometimes violent and politically destabilizing alternative or parallel economies have emerged in reaction to marginalization within the global economy. These adaptations have created new forms of political economy beyond conventional socio-political relations.[111]

The functions of a civil war may be economic and political for international actors as well. Governments and groups outside the country at civil war may be directly or indirectly involved in trying to secure, or maintain, a distribution of political and economic power to fit their own interests.[112]

### ◆ *The Problems of Political Liberalization*

In the Greater Horn, attempts to liberalize political processes--specifically when introducing multi-party elections--have been incomplete and fraught with difficulty. Undertaking a liberalization process is risky. Change of any sort is likely to cause conflict, at least in the short-term. Understandably, then, certain approaches to political liberalization in formerly authoritarian states can increase instability. One study found that globally, states transforming from autocracy to multi-party democracy are twice as likely to fight wars in the following decade than states that remain autocratic.[113] Conversely, other studies have demonstrated that mildly multi-party systems are actually better at containing conflict by providing more channels for expression.[114] Typically, voters are averse to the high costs of war, but multi-party democratization can lead to war when domestic pressure produces incentives for elites to elevate nationalist sentiment.[115] "Democracy challenges entrenched autocratic elites," notes one analyst for USAID, "and thus can engender a violent period."[116]

The introduction of a multiparty electoral process can exacerbate instability and heighten tensions in the following way, according to Hizkias Assefa:

> As can be seen in many Western countries (and already in Africa), having access and selling one's ideas in a competitive multiparty situation requires a complex organizational capability and abundant material and human resources. Ordinary citizens are usually restricted in their ability to sell their ideas due to a lack of access to these means. Therefore, it is usually those individuals with wealth, connections, and strong organizations who can put forward their views and exercise their influence...
>
> The most serious problem with the multiparty system has to do with its high degree of win/lose orientation in election contests; one party wins and the other loses. The winner gloats in triumph while the vanquished licks its wounds. The loser must accept its loss and wait for its turn in the next round of elections to hopefully defeat the opponent. This

> approach works in societies characterized by a strong measure of social consensus and where the issues of contention are relatively marginal... Multiparty competition tends to exacerbate rifts rather than provide resolution to outstanding social and political issues... Especially when ethnicity is an important factor in party affiliation, losing an election might mean exclusion from power for an entire ethnic group, followed by discrimination and even repression.[117]

During processes of political liberalization, both new elites and old ruling groups, fighting over public support, often resort to nationalist appeals. It is difficult for an already weakened state not to further fragment when the strain of liberalization processes is placed on it, especially winner-take-all approaches to democracy. Severe pressures are compounded by powerful remnants of the old order, such as the military and internal security systems, often responsible for keeping weak states together by force. Increased conflict between different interest groups (political, economic, identity) can result.[118]

The initiation of multiparty liberalization processes has in many cases intensified conflict in the Greater Horn:

- In the Rift Valley in Kenya, ethnic tensions were deliberately stoked to achieve particular political objectives, including the appearance of anarchy and ethnic strife.
- In Rwanda, the fear of losing power fueled the extremists' plans for a "final solution."
- In Sudan, the democratic period accelerated the plans of a clique of fascist fundamentalists to grab power.
- In Ethiopia, the governing coalition narrowed rapidly once movement towards elections went too rapidly before genuine reconciliation had taken place after the fall of the Derg.

Political liberalization often corresponds with economic reform processes, which can decrease the rewards available to authorities doe to the opening up of formerly closed economies and diminishing the state's ability to collect rents. Leaders understandably feel besieged be these new pressures, and become more desperate to hold on to the advantages which they have. Many tools are employed to maintain control, including fomenting violent conflict.

Winner-take-all elections can marginalize minorities and provide an opportunity for disaffected losing parties to organize their opposition along military lines. There is increasing recognition of the importance of minimizing the win-lose orientation of electoral politics.

In analyzing the effects of introducing electoral processes, numerous issues must be differentiated, including electoral laws, state institutions, types of electoral systems, etc. The question for many is not the number of political parties in the system, but whether the system is polarized. The structure of electoral laws and rules in which political competition occurs is critical. There is a rich debate about how institutions and electoral laws can be structured so as to not inflame ethnic cleavages and tensions.

But election laws are only part of the democratization equation. Basic laws related to freedom of expression and association are critical as well. Illustratively, if groups are prevented from forming political parties under existing law and from participating lawfully in the political system, then there are

incentives to organize violently to disrupt the system, whether it involves boycotting or revolting militarily. More broadly, when there are widespread perceptions that the state is infringing on basic human rights or property rights, and there are no legal procedures for redress, violent responses often occur.

The depth of the liberalization process is also key in averting violence. When non-executive components of government--parliaments, local governments, etc.--are perceived to be relatively powerless, there are less opportunities for the formal democratic institutions to channel broad societal currents and to bring extremists into compromise positions. It may not be necessary for one ethnically-based party to win the presidency, but if that party's members feel they can have some degree of local autonomy and control over their own lives through empowered local government structures, then they may not resort to violence. The solution is not authoritarianism, but rather deeper political liberalization.

Formal democratic institutions are extremely weak in their current form, particularly nascent political parties. They often lack the legitimacy necessary to satisfy those who want their views expressed. In most instances there has been little organizing of a grassroots base. These institutions are having little impact on national level decisions in most countries of the Greater Horn.

Consequently, when individuals want to express themselves, they often turn to civil society organizations (representing an increasing trend) or they turn to violence. The development of civil society organizations will be a key in avoiding future conflict if they are able to act in a way to aggregate interests rather than aggravating societal cleavages.

- ***Militarization***

Organized primitive weaponry can be devastating, as seen in Rwanda. However, civilian casualties have increased with the proliferation of small arms, land mines, modern counter-insurgency operations and low-intensity warfare tactics. It is estimated that 90 percent of deaths in such situations are civilian.[119]

Access to arms is becoming easier and cheaper in most of the Greater Horn. The availability of weaponry has led even traditional conflicts to become much bloodier. High-technology weaponry, new modalities of war, and intensified cycles of revenge have overwhelmed traditions that formerly attempted to ensure that elders agreed on what wars were to be fought and that maintained a code of chivalry in battle.[120]

Militarization consumes enormous resources. Mengistu Haile Mariam spent over $700 million per year for military purposes, and Sudan continues to spend over $1 million per day to finance its war in the south.[121]

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# CONCEPTUAL BUILDING BLOCKS

The prior section *Conflict in the Greater Horn* outlined the history and sources of recent violent conflicts in the Greater Horn of Africa. This section sets out conceptual building blocks for addressing these conflicts.

## I. Preventing Conflict and Building Peace

The Greater Horn suffers from ongoing conflicts and tensions. However, some Greater Horn countries and areas within them are more or less at peace. There is less conflict in Kenya's Rift Valley than in the southern Sudan today; Ethiopia is a lot less tense and susceptible to violence now than Burundi.

Consequently, dealing with conflict in the Greater Horn means different things depending on the specific country or area of concern.

- In areas currently in the throes of conflict, the main challenge is to contain the conflict, to alleviate suffering, and if possible, to reduce the violence.
- Where conflicts have abated but tensions remain high — Rwanda and Burundi — principal tasks are reconstruction, social reconciliation and healing so that social and economic progress can be made and future conflicts avoided.
- Where conflicts have recently ended and basic political order has been restored — Ethiopia — and in areas that have been at peace for some years — Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania —the main tasks are protecting and advancing the social and economic progress that has been made or is beginning to be made. This means ensuring that tensions over ethnic relations, human rights, and political representation do not lead to further violence, thereby destroying or thwarting the larger achievements.

> Dealing with conflict in the Greater Horn in some places means stopping bloodshed, while in others, it means protecting and strengthening peace so that these nations do not deteriorate into violent conflicts.

Usually, we think of dealing with conflict in terms of a negative, but important, goal: ending violence. Where bad things are happening, we want to stop them or keep them from worsening; where bad things are not occurring but pose immediate threats, we want to prevent them from occurring. Dealing with conflict may also means pursuing positive goals: preserving, strengthening and building on good things where they exist or are coming into being. In this way reducing or preventing violent conflict and building peace are parts of a single whole.

Preventing or mitigating conflict may require different policies or techniques depending on the type and stage of conflict in particular places. No policy or program is equally useful in all settings.

Conflict and peace are not random events. Conflict and peace are both created. All countries in The Greater Horn have systemic features which are sources of conflict — poverty, competition for scarce resources, the colonial heritage, and ethnic-oriented politics. Yet some areas are relatively peaceful.

Identifying the main factors associated with conflict and those that characterize places of peace help us to isolate some ingredients that create the difference. These ingredients give us clues about the factors to try to suppress and those to try to bolster to make us better equipped to reduce conflict and preserve peace.

> To prevent violent conflicts, we need to understand what brings about conflicts and we need to know the ingredients of peace.

At the same time, conflict and peace are not static. They transform into each other, and so are dynamic processes that occur over time.[1] By understanding how peace changes to war, and vice versa, we can develop knowledge about the best leverage points to "interdict" the worrisome trends and arrest deterioration while boosting encouraging movement and helping positive forces move in the right direction.

Our policies and programs need to take these varying conditions, critical moments and points of leverage into account. To find out how to identify what specific actions are appropriate and when and how to apply them, this section will:

- Examine the nature and ingredients of violent conflict compared to peace, and look at the gradations between these differing states within societies and in the relations between nations.
- Describe the processes through which violent conflicts arise out of peaceful conditions, and vice versa.
- Clarify the confused vocabulary used for various kinds of interventions to ameliorate conflicts.

Subsequent sections in this Guide will profile policy tools used in conflict intervention, with illustrations from around the world; offer preliminary conclusions about how and why various tools have successfully kept incipient conflicts from escalating; and examine the main policy and implementation tasks that policy-makers and field personnel should do to be more effective in preventing and mitigating violent conflicts.

# II. Conceptual Building Blocks for Conflict Intervention

To develop practical and effective strategies, we must first define and discuss the following key terms and concepts:

- Conflict
- Violent conflict
- Levels of conflict and peace
- How conflicts escalate
- The stages and life history of conflicts
- The emergence of violent conflicts
- Phases of intervention
- Tools of intervention
- Tool implementers.

## A. What is Conflict?[2]

***Conflict*** is present when two or more parties perceive that their interests are incompatible, express hostile attitudes, or take action which damages the other parties to pursue those interests. These parties may be individuals, small or large groups, and countries.

***Latent conflict.*** Sometimes an observer may believe that parties' interests are incompatible but the respective parties are not aware of these incompatibilities. This may be caused by self-delusion, rationalization, lack of knowledge, or suppressed information. We call such unacknowledged conflicts of interests latent.

***Manifest conditions*** exist when these unacknowledged contrary interests become conscious and voiced.

Interests may diverge in many ways; for example:

- Over ***resources*** — territory, money, energy sources, food —and how they should be distributed.

- Over ***power***, how control and participation in political decision-making are allocated.

- Over ***identity***, whether people believe they are treated with respect and dignity and whether their traditions and social position are respected.

- Over ***values***, particularly those embodied in systems of government, religion, or ideology.

Incompatibilities can arise from ***objective*** changes in circumstances — for example, a lowered standard of living of certain social classes or regions within a country, or industrial changes that alter technologies and relative power. ***Subjective*** changes can also generate conflict through, for instance, newly felt social resentments or a rising new nationalist ideology.

The parties' emotional states and mental outlooks influence conflict. And observers note that the longer a conflict goes on, its subjective content gains importance and its objective basis is obscured.

> A group's or nation's objective circumstances themselves do not cause violent conflicts.
>
> Conflicts only arise out of these conditions — or changes in them — when it is perceived that interests are threatened by some other party.

## B. Peaceful and Violent Conflicts

Not all conflicts are violent; conflicting interests are not always pursued through violence or coercion. Conflicts handled peacefully and non-coercively can be positive events. Societies can progress when parties' changing needs are recognized and accommodated, as in the case when minorities are recognized and better served.

***Peaceful conflicts*** are handled according to regulated mechanisms to pursue competing interests. Various factors regulate conflict: national constitutions and laws, the Law of the Sea, court systems, Robert's Rules of Order, religious codes, or habits of debate and discourse. These can be informal and tacit — social mores and customs. They can also be highly formal and institutionalized, as in a nation's written statutes. Elections are a classic way that conflicts can be addressed peacefully. These peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms can be traditional or modern, local, national, or international.[3] Such mechanisms operate effectively in the regions and communities around the world called "zones of peace," generally keeping these areas' social and international conflicts from becoming destructive and violent.[4]

***Violent conflict.*** Conflicts can become violent when parties go beyond seeking to attain their goals peacefully, and try to dominate or destroy the opposing parties' ability to pursue their own interests.

With so much violence around the world, we might assume that violent conflict and coercion are the natural order of things: human beings are inherently aggressive, and wars and violent conflicts are inevitable. Yet violence does not always occur, even when interests differ: violence is *not* inevitable.

> Conflict is common, perhaps inevitable, in human relations. But conflicts can be resolved peacefully. Therefore, coercive or violent conflicts are not inevitable.
>
> Violence is contingent on the presence or absence of certain conditions.



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## C. Pitfalls in Labelling Violent Conflicts

Violent conflicts are distinguished by different dimensions:

- The main ***substantive issues*** in contention or interests at stake — natural resource competition, government control, territorial control, governing ideologies.
- The ***parties involved*** — ethnic, religious or regional communities, states, political factions.
- The types of ***force or coercion*** used — nuclear war, conventional war, terrorism, coups, repression, genocide, gross human rights violations, ethnic cleansing.
- The geographic ***scope*** of killing and destruction — international conflicts, inter-communal conflicts, state-sponsored terrorism.

These dimensions are essential to understanding and comparing particular conflicts. But conflicts have many dimensions, exhibit several variations simultaneously, and features may fluctuate in importance over the course of a conflict. For these reasons, policy-makers and practitioners should exercise caution in using these dimensions to label a conflict: a single label can obscure a particular conflict's many facets and result in policy errors.

## D. From Harmony to All-Out War: Degrees of Peace and Conflict

Whatever the issues, weapons, parties and geographic scale, the intensity of hostility between the parties — how much they are in conflict or at peace with one another — is a useful way to assess a conflict and compare it with other conflicts. This level of hostility can be measured through the attitudes and behaviors the parties exhibit towards each other.

Some conflicts are barely recognized or acknowledged. Once recognized, different levels of conflict may exhibit differing degrees of cooperation or hostility. Some conflicts may be handled amicably without coercion or violence. Others rise to high levels of confrontation. Still others involve repression and sustained physical violence.

> Interactions do not fall into the simple categories of war and peace, where peace is the opposite of war. Instead, there are *degrees* of conflict: conflicts vary in the level of hostility between the parties.

The different levels of interaction in conflicts can be arranged along a continuum from highly cooperative to highly conflicted relations — from total harmony of interests to sustained all-out war. This continuum shows that there is overlap between peace and war. The overlap is reflected in terms such as "hot war," "cold war," "co-existence," "rivalry," "detente," "alliance," "special relationship," "confederation," and so on.

The gradations from harmony to all-out war are indicated in Figure 3-1, a kind of barometer of peace and conflict. The figure shows terms for important turning points such as the shift from latent to manifest conflict and from non-violent conflict to violence. Discussion follows below the figure.

**FIGURE 3-1: THE CONTINUUM FROM HARMONY TO WAR — A BAROMETER OF PEACE AND CONFLICT**




***Harmony.*** Some analysts posit harmony as a relationship between communities and nations in which there are virtually no conflicts of interests or values.[5] An example might be the feeling of bonding and unity that members of groups, and sometimes, citizens of a nation may feel when they share a common purpose.

***Durable Peace.*** "Lasting," "positive" or "just peace" involves a high level of cooperation even with awareness and pursuit of conflicting interests. In this case, the parties value their relationship more than achieving specific self-interests. Pursuing separate interests takes place within agreements about how they can be legitimately pursued. Peaceful, institutionalized dispute settlement prevails, so there is no felt need to safeguard one's security against the other party by maintaining military forces to defend against it. The possibility of conflict or repression is virtually nil. Examples are US/Canada relations or the European Union's Maastricht Treaty goal of common economic institutions and foreign policies.

Cooperative, regulated conflict requires a number of conditions to exist and endure. These conditions include shared values and goals, accommodating political institutions such as those of a democracy, and outlets for political expression and access to decision-making. Economic interdependence, common culture, and common values may also come into play. Domestic forms of durable peace range from processes of national reconciliation to a legitimate constitutional democracy such as reunified Germany.

***Stable Peace*** or "cold peace" is a relationship of wary communication and limited cooperation within a context of basic order, mutual respect and absence of violence. Value or goal differences remain, and nations may compete in various ways such as economically ("trade wars"), but competition follows accepted rules and disputes are generally worked out in non-violent, more or less predictable ways. Violent conflicts are possible but unlikely. Examples are US/Soviet détente in the late 1960s, the Israel/PLO accommodation, US/Russia and US/China in 1995. Domestic illustrations include national political compacts among competing, sometimes hostile political factions as in South Africa (1994-95) or Nicaragua (1991-94).

***Unstable Peace*** or "cold war" involves palpable tension and suspicion among parties, possibly with sporadic overt violence — for instance, US/Iran. A "negative peace" prevails: there is little physical violence but no friendship. The parties do not value their relationship enough to guarantee not to use coercion or violence to gain particular objectives. Peace is tenuous; parties maintain armed forces as a deterrent. There are few or no explicit mutual agreements.

When one party is much weaker than the other, order and absence of violence derive largely from the powerful party's suppression of the weaker party's efforts to assert or achieve its interests. There is some probability of crisis or war. Government repression of groups is a domestic variety of this type of conflict — as in Burma. Some analysts refer to states of peace with political and economic injustice but no physical violence as "structural violence."

***Crisis*** is a level of conflict with tense confrontation between mobilized armed forces. These forces may engage in threats and occasional skirmishes but have not exerted significant amounts of force — the US/Soviet relationship in the late 1950s. The probability of war is high — as in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. In national contexts, this condition might involve imminent civil war or a general breakdown of law and order — Peru, Colombia.

***War*** is all-out, sustained fighting between organized armed forces. It may include low-intensity local conflict such as gang wars, national anarchy — Somalia, Algeria — or "hot" civil and inter-state wars — World War II, Vietnam, Sudan.

In actual situations, these different conditions are not sharply demarcated but are matters of degree. Situations may exhibit several levels of conflict which gradually shade from one to another. Yet distinguishing these gradations has several practical implications for policy-makers and practitioners concerned with conflict. The gradations suggest that conflicts rarely, if ever, arise suddenly, shift quickly from one status to another, or end suddenly. Relations do not move from total peace to total war without going through intermediate states — even the "Cold War" evolved through periods of direct confrontation, détente, and renewed hostility.

## E. Factors Underlying the Gradations Between Peace and War

There are numerous factors underlying each gradation.

- The intensity of grievances.
- The parties' awareness of their differences and separate identity.
- The parties' perceptions and attitudes towards each other.
- The level of political mobilization and organization behind the parties' positions.
- The extent of polarization.
- The amount of hostile behavior.
- The extent that parties use or threaten to use arms.
- The number of issues that are in dispute.
- The number of parties supportive of each side.
- The intensity of emotion and level of psychological investment in the parties' positions and views of the world.
- The amount of direct interaction and communication the parties have with one another.
- The cohesion between the leaders of the respective parties and their constituencies.

Analysis of these factors in a particular conflict situation may suggest what can be done to stop a situation from worsening or possibly to improve it.

> To move from one stage of conflict to another involves changes in several conditions. Analysis of the conflict's features may provide clues to the tasks that conflict intervention must address.

## F. Conflict Stages and Life Histories

Conflicts change over time; conflicts usually have a beginning, a middle and an end corresponding to the emergence, growth and abatement of hostility.

Figure 3-2 depicts the stages and levels of a dispute that becomes violent.

- The horizontal axis represents the stages of the conflict over time, distinguishing between early, middle and late phases.
- The vertical axis measures the levels of the conflict, meaning the degrees of cooperation or hostility between the parties in conflict.
- The arcing line across the diagram portrays the "biography" of the conflict as hostility rises and falls in intensity.

**FIGURE 3-2:**
**THE LIFE HISTORY OF A CONFLICT**



The smoothly curving bell shape of the line representing the course of the conflict is simplified to characterize an "ideal type." As suggested by the several arrows that deviate from the line, particular conflicts may exhibit different trajectories, thresholds, jumps and discontinuities. Note that the rising arrow in the lower right-hand corner suggests that even conflicts that have ceased can re-escalate. Nonetheless, although individual conflicts make take different trajectories and vary greatly in shape and length, most violent conflicts have periods of initial growth, full-blown antagonism, and abatement from their high points. Figure 3-2's parabolic curve has heuristic value, allowing us to make certain distinctions about phases of conflicts.[6]

Figure 3-2 also suggests where one might place current conflicts, both within the Horn and outside it, in terms of their stages. Observers may disagree about the exact level and stage of particular conflicts. Yet differentiating conflicts according to their level and stage is useful because it encourages the search for the associated characteristics of conflicts. These characteristics greatly affect the kinds of interventions that are timely and appropriate.

## G. The Emergence of Violent Conflicts: How Peace Becomes War

How do situations of harmony and lesser forms of peace become all-out wars? We tackle this problem in two steps. The first examines how violent conflicts emerge out of basically stable conditions in which conflict is latent. The second traces how conflicts that have become manifest escalate from low levels to high levels of violence.

### *1. Modelling the Sources of Conflicts*

Various sources and causes of conflict were derived in the prior section, *Conflict in the Greater Horn.* Figure 3-3 depicts the systemic or background, enabling or proximate, and triggering or immediate factors.

# FIGURE 3-3
# SOURCES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT



Figure 3-3 identifies possible factors and causal linkages occurring between them. An all-out war usually requires a number of these causes.

***Systemic*** sources like environmental deterioration, population growth, and resource scarcity can cause objective changes in parties' material circumstances. Because systemic sources of conflict are pervasive and affect large numbers of people, they are less easy to alter through deliberate action such as international programs or government policies. Their impact on overt violent conflicts is less direct; their influence in increasing the probabilities of conflict operates slowly. This means that systemic factors do affect the chances of violent conflict but are not very helpful in pinning down where or when it will occur.

Yet systemic factors are important in explaining violent conflict. In a comprehensive study of 113 instances of failed states, civil wars, and related national crises from 1955 to 1994, for example, Gurr and associates found that three factors — a nation's infant mortality rate, the extent of a nation's trade, and the extent of democracy — were the most closely associated with the crisis, out of 75 political, leadership, demographic, social, economic, and environmental factors tested. The first two are systemic. The authors point out that these variables are most strongly associated with states' crises and are linked with other factors that affect the risks of crisis, though they are not directly cause the crisis themselves.[7]

This means that measures that seek to prevent or reduce conflicts by treating their systemic sources will have more diffuse and uncertain effects in achieving that result.

***Proximate*** sources are social, political, and communications processes and institutions--such as a society's government--that mediate between systemic factors and peoples' lives. These are crucial influences on whether systemic conditions give rise to violent reactions or to more peaceful ways of dealing with conflicting interests. The linkage between these factors and manifestations of violent conflict are easier to discern and their effect is more direct. Thus, looking at these factors is somewhat more likely to help in identifying when and where violent conflicts will occur.

The most ***immediate*** and direct causes of violent conflict are found in the actions and events that trigger violent expression, for instance, when a government crackdown on an oppressed group prompts a rebellion. Because they are more visible, these factors may be relatively easier to influence.

While the model depicts conflict as resulting from a linear process in which causes impact on one another in a certain sequence, this model also incorporates "feedback," represented by the backward pointing arrows. For example, environmental degradation over many years might increase a population's desperation to the point of revolt, and once war breaks out, the destruction from the conflict further damages the environment.

The fact that violent conflicts have several kinds of causes helps to explain why different observers and analysts of the same conflict often come up with completely different explanations for why it is happening. Some interpreters point to basic sources while others look at more immediate factors. Both may be correct. For example, current debates over whether the Greater Horn's conflicts are caused by factors outside or inside the region, by economic factors such as resource scarcity, or by the political behavior of leaders and other key actors, point to different sources contributing to these conflicts. Only rigorous and detailed examination of particular conflicts is likely to help sort out the relative importance of each factor in the complex mix of factors that lead to conflicts.

The model itself does not explain why violent conflicts happen. It is instead a simple way of classifying the various links in the causal chain leading from peaceful conditions to violent conflicts that may be present in some degree in particular conflict situations. Particular conflicts may not have all the factors; the weight various factors have will vary. Nevertheless, the model is useful in distinguishing the sources and evolution of conflict. In analyzing a particular situation, the model can be used to examine the relative importance of the factors and how they interact with each other. This understanding provides a better basis for considering what interventions are most appropriate, and on what sources of conflicts one might concentrate one's efforts.

## 2. *Dynamics of Escalation*

Conflicts can express violence without becoming a full-blown war. There are dynamic and interactive processes in individual and collective behavior that explain whether hostile attitudes and behavior escalate or not.[8]

Escalation may be ***vertical*** — hostile behavior becomes more intense — or it may be ***horizontal*** — hostile behavior of the same intensity spreads over a larger area. Escalation can take both forms. Escalation can be caused by the parties themselves or by actions that third parties take.

A set of social-psychological phenomena within each party's collective mind and behavior have been identified as the fuel that feeds spiralling conflicts. People get more committed to a struggle as they become more involved. The sense of urgency takes over, through which the pressure of having little time to make decisions narrows options to little more than the existing courses of action. Each side's perceptions of the other are shaped by the psychological investment a conflict requires: one's own cause is seen as just, the other side's cause is evil. Stereotyping and dehumanizing the opposition also helps to steel parties, often leading to acts of brutality that are seen as completely justified.

Leaders may become more committed to their positions once they are announced publicly: it becomes harder to back down, and if there is competition for leadership positions, rivals can appeal to the broader constituency by questioning the leadership's determination and ability to conduct the struggle. Moderates may be driven out or quit; leadership is left to militants. Another factor that increases commitment to fight is that once conflict is being waged, those who are specialists in using force gain influence over the leadership and the policies of the government or organization involved. Fighting brings out the grievances that may lie behind it. A process of wider discussion may raise additional issues and grievances, adding more reasons for pursuing the struggle.

Escalation proceeds: once harm is inflicted on a party, that party feels more justified in hitting back, and vice versa. Use of coercion and violence also discourages communication between the parties which limits the opportunities for addressing the issues through compromise. Even lack of retaliation may lead the other party to perceive weakness and persevere in the conflict.

Finally, a conflict makes for wider awareness of the grievances involved. This may affect third parties who perceive their own interests are helped by intervening on behalf of one party or another. The entry of others into the conflict may then prompt additional parties to aid the other side.

***"Ethnic" Conflict.*** The question of how violent conflicts emerge out of systemic factors and escalate has come to the fore in a particular form recently--the distressing rise of ethnic conflict. Ethnicity, the identity felt by people as a language group, tribe/clan, religion, or region is seen as a factor that drive many current conflicts. There are two general positions taken in the literature about the influence of ethnic identity on causing conflicts. The "primordial" explanation sees the main source of conflict in a deep sense of identity. This view corresponds to the conventional notion that ethnic conflicts in Africa and elsewhere come from "ancient hatreds" which the removal of certain authoritarian controls have "unleashed." The theory thus tends to attribute conflicts to systemic causes outside the control of the leaders of the groups, and thus of third parties as well.

The other view, "instrumentalism," sees such conflicts arising from policies pursued by groups who use group identity as a tool to mobilize people in pursuit of specific gains. Thus, conflict may be fomented by elites who manipulate the symbols dear to their group and can stir resentment against other groups. They invoke hatred through propaganda, or they take covert actions to provoke violent reactions from their followers. The notion here is that group emotion needs to be whipped up, it does not usually combust spontaneously. From this perspective, ethnic conflicts are less subject to unalterable forces and more contingent on the action of elites and individual leaders.

A reasonable position to take in this debate is not to accept either extreme. We can acknowledge that some societies' history and physical circumstances may have fostered a much stronger sense of identity in some groups than in others. If ethnic identities are deeper in some people and societies and shallower in others, the amount of "pull" a particular identity has on behavior can be affected by economic interest, history, political persuasion, and other factors. Thus, many analysts prefer to call conflicts with ethnic overtones "ethno-political," suggesting that willful activity may cause feelings of identity to become linked to political causes.

## H. The Continuum of Conflict Interventions: A Working Vocabulary

Conflicts may have multiple causes. They may be at various stages of escalation or de-escalation. Interventions can be undertaken at any point in the conflict-peace continuum and can be performed by third parties as well as by parties to the dispute themselves. We are most familiar with interventions taken at the height of violent conflicts, such as shuttle diplomacy, peacekeeping, or with regard to full-blown wars, direct military intervention. Yet efforts to intervene in conflicts can be and are taken at all their pre-violent, violent, or post-violent stages. And successful intervention will depend critically on the sources of the conflict and the stage the conflict is in.

Policy-makers and practitioners must be able to communicate effectively with each other to effectively plan and carry out conflict prevention and mitigation. To do so requires some consistent, unambiguous terms.

A host of phrases are now being bandied about to describe various conflict interventions — "conflict management," "conflict resolution," "peacemaking," "peacekeeping," "peace operations," "peace enforcement," "preventive diplomacy," "conflict prevention," preventive engagement," to name a few. These terms are used loosely, even interchangeably. People often use the same term for different things and different terms for the same thing. Few consistent definitions have been offered, and consequently, there is confusion about what is meant by each term and how they differ from each other.[9]

One problem is the failure to distinguish between the ***stage*** of conflict at which intervention occurs and the particular ***means*** or tool used to intervene. "Peacekeeping," for example, is commonly used to describe inserting an armed force into a conflict, but it can also imply an action taken once a conflict has abated. The confusion arises because, historically, most actual peacekeeping missions products of UN actions with mandates given under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Chapter VI authorization is considered when combatants have laid down their arms and agreed to a ceasefire enforced by a neutral peacekeepers. However, from an analytical point of view, the means used — insertion of third party armed forces — can also be used to defuse tensions in pre-violent situations, such as is being done in Macedonia now.

We would like to propose the following working definitions that incorporate both the phases of conflict and interventions. The following section also describes the range of tools that may be used for these interventions.

| | |
|---|---|
| **Conflict prevention** (preventive diplomacy, preventive action, crisis prevention, preventive deployment) | Actions, policies, procedures or institutions undertaken in particularly vulnerable places and times in order to avoid the threat or use of armed force and related forms of coercion by states or groups as the way to settle the political disputes that can arise from the destabilizing effects of economic, social, political and international change.<br><br>Conflict prevention may also include action taken after a violent conflict to avoid its recurrence. |
| **Crisis management** | Efforts to keep situations of high tension and confrontation between conflicting parties, usually associated with threats of force and its deployment, from breaking into armed violence. |
| **Conflict management** (conflict mitigation; peacemaking) | Efforts to contain and if possible, reduce the amount of violence used by parties engaged in violent conflict and to engage them in communication looking toward settling the dispute and terminating the violence. |
| **Peace enforcement** (sometimes called peacemaking) | The use of armed force by a third party designed to deter, suppress or terminate hostile action by a party or a violent conflict between parties, such as under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. |
| **Conflict termination** | The cessation of armed hostilities between the parties. |
| **Peacekeeping** | Efforts to maintain a cessation of armed hostilities or ceasefire reached by the parties to a violent conflict by separating their armed forces, such as under Chapter IV of the UN Charter. |

| | |
|---|---|
| **Conflict resolution** (post-conflict peace-building) | Efforts to increase cooperation among the parties to a conflict and deepen their relationship by addressing the conditions that led to the dispute, fostering positive attitudes and allaying distrust through reconciliation initiatives, and building or strengthening the institutions and processes through which the parties interact.<br><br>Conflict resolution can be used to reduce the chances of violence or to consolidate the cessation of a violent conflict in order to prevent re-escalation. |

## I. Conflict Prevention and Mitigation within the Continuum of Interventions

The term "conflict prevention" captures new emphases within recent discussions of international involvement in conflicts.

- Conflict prevention specifically refers to actions that take place before political disputes between parties become either a crisis or an active violent conflict.
- Conflict prevention strives to intervene before threats to use force or coercion are made or before resort to significant exercise of armed force or coercion.

This means that conflict prevention can occur at two points in the life history of a typical conflict.

- When there has not been a violent conflict in recent years, and before any significant violence signals the possible escalation to sustained violent conflict.
- When there has been a violent conflict in recent years, but peace is being restored, so as to avoid a relapse or re-igniting of violence.

"Conflict mitigation," on the other hand, refers to actions taken to contain and reduce violence in conflicts that have already exploded. Conflict mitigation interventions thus occur at other points during the typical conflict life cycle, after violence has erupted.

We highlight these definitions and intervention points because current discussions use "conflict prevention," "preventative diplomacy," "preventive action" and "conflict mitigation" for interventions at any stage of conflict. This tendency to interchange terms obfuscates the important descriptive and operational differences between interventions taken at the different levels of conflict.

> Different interventions are appropriate for differing stages of conflict. Blurring this distinction limits reasonable consideration of policy and programming options.

## J. Phases of Conflict Intervention and the Relief to Development Spectrum

The phases of conflict intervention resemble the "relief-development spectrum." These two frameworks from different professions and disciplines — conflict resolution, diplomacy and security vs. relief and development — relate to various actions taken at different stages of a conflict.

The links between the status of a conflict, the spectrum of conflict interventions and the development-to relief spectrum are shown in Table 3-1 below.

**TABLE 3-1: THE PHASES OF CONFLICT INTERVENTION AND THE DEVELOPMENT – RELIEF SPECTRUM**

| STATE OF CONFLICT AND PEACE | PHASE OF CONFLICT INTERVENTION | DEVELOPMENT-RELIEF SPECTRUM |
|---|---|---|
| WAR | Conflict management/ Peace enforcement | Relief |
| CRISIS | Crisis management/ Conflict termination | Reconstruction |
| UNSTABLE PEACE | Conflict prevention/ Peacekeeping | Preventive development |
| STABLE PEACE | Peacetime relations/ Normal politics<br><br>Conflict resolution/ Post-conflict peacebuilding | General development |
| DURABLE PEACE | Not applicable | |
| HARMONY | | |

## K. Intervention and the Life History of Conflicts

Conflict interventions can usefully be differentiated according to the stages of the typical conflict's life cycle. Different interventions might come into play at different stages in the conflict. Figure 3-4 depicts the links between the various phases of conflict intervention and the gradations and stages of conflict described earlier.

## FIGURE 3-4: THE LIFE CYCLE OF A CONFLICT WITH PHASES OF CONFLICT INTERVENTION




The figure shows a typical conflict rising along the intensity curve. The stages of peace and conflict are specified alongside typical interventions as defined above. Types of interventions are spelled out as the conflict progresses along the continuum from peace to war and then back to reconciliation and peace.

- Peacetime diplomacy or politics are suitable interventions for parties in a state of durable peace.
- Conflict prevention or preventive diplomacy are appropriate tools if tensions rise to a point of confrontation.
- Crisis management becomes necessary when the dispute reaches the crisis point, with outbreaks of violence.
- Conflict management or peacemaking are required in times of war.

- As the conflict subsides to a ceasefire, peace enforcement becomes appropriate.
- Interventions in conflict termination are required until settlement of the dispute.
- As conflicting parties begin rapprochement, peacekeeping interventions are helpful.
- Conflict resolution or post-conflict peacebuilding are interventions to apply in the final stages of a conflict, as the parties move towards reconciliation.

Note that conflict prevention comes into play during the level of conflict we called "unstable peace." As such, conflict prevention occupies the position in between regular peacetime diplomacy (or national and sub-national politics) that operates during stable peace and durable peace, on the one hand, and those interventions calculated to minimize or manage crisis and war, on the other. Interventions in conflict management or mitigation, on the other hand, are required in the high-violence period of war.

## L. Intervention Actors

A host of specific techniques or approaches can be applied to support conflict prevention or mitigation. These techniques or tools operate in numerous functional areas — diplomatic, political, military, legal, and economic. The choice of tools should be dictated by the likelihood of achieving the desired results.

The phases of conflict intervention do not connote any particular kind of governmental or non-governmental implementing organization. A variety of organizations may carry out functions that prevent or mitigate conflicts. Intervention might involve the efforts of:

- Individual third-party governments.
- Global and regional multilateral organizations.
- Non-governmental organizations, both international and indigenous.
- Particular individuals.
- The groups or states that are themselves parties in disputes.
- Local authorities in areas not controlled by central governments and undergoing severe social and political stress.
- Traditional authorities.

The terms for conflict interventions are rooted in the timing or phase of intervention, rather than in any particular means or technique used to intervene.

Successful interventions might involve a variety of appropriate means, which we call policy instruments or tools.

Similarly, interventions might require different actors or agents to implement the chosen tools.

The following section, *Toolbox*, categories and profiles a range of policy tools that have been used successfully in conflict prevention and mitigation.

## III. Notes

1. For example, it is almost inconceivable that historic enemies France and Germany or early 19th century antagonists Britain and the US would go to war against each other. These conflicts are not impossible, but for them to happen would take drastic changes in these countries' multiple relationships which would probably require many years to occur.

2. This section draws on Connie Peck, "An Integrative Model for Understanding and Managing Conflict," *Interdisciplinary Peace Research*, Vol. 1, No. 1, May, 1989, pp. 7-36; Louis Kreisberg, *Social Conflict* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1982) Chapters 1-5; Ronald J. Fisher, *The Social Psychology of Intergroup and International Conflict Resolution* (New York, NY: Springer-Verlag, 1990), Chapters 1 and 4; Dean G. Pruitt and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement* (New York, NY: Random House, 1986), Chapters 1, 2, 5 and 6.

3. An interesting historical example of an effective system of international conflict-regulation is the Concert of Europe, formed at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The Concert was the first major multilateral agreement to avoid future wars among the type of modern states that emerged from the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648.

   On the eve of their ending Napoleon's campaign to liberate all Europe from absolutism, his allied opponents — England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia — met to set down rules and procedures to govern their own post-war relationships and that with defeated France. The resulting Concert allocated territories, fixed boundaries, reduced militaries, guaranteed security for small states, arranged international tribunals, and held periodic consultations among its foreign ministers.

   The goal was not simply to avoid direct attacks on each other, but also to remove temptations to seek unilateral aggrandizement from Europe's growing popular unrest. For example, the members agreed to restraining their competition in peripheral regions such as the Americas. The great powers of that day saw their balance of power as necessary but not sufficient to ensure peace; explicit agreements and active management of emerging conflicts were also required.

   Being an arrangement among powerful states to maintain peace among themselves, the Concert was hardly perfect. It did not preserve peace everywhere, and it prevailed often at the expense of weaker peoples. These were among the same powers that agreed to divide up Africa into colonies. Nevertheless, the Concert and the less secure 1871 Berlin Pact are regarded as key to maintaining overall peace among the major European powers of that day until August 1914.

4. Arie Kacowicz, "Explaining Zones of Peace: Democracies as Satisfied Powers? *Journal of Peace Research,* Vol. 32, No. 3, 1995, pp. 265-276.

5. Hizkias Assefa. *Peace and Reconciliation as a Paradigm.* Nairobi: Nairobi Peace Initiative Monograph Series, No. 1, 1993.

6. Some analysts would reject the notion of an arcing line or bell-curve diagram because they tend to see conflicts as having no particular beginning points or end points, only highs and lows in a recurring cycle of violence. In this view, conflicts would be diagrammed as a circle, rather than a parabola.

   Such an approach is perhaps derived from the study of what have been called "intractable" conflicts, because they are prolonged and seem to be unresolvable. This perspective rightly stresses that some conflicts continue at levels of tension or violence for many years are not definitively settled for years,

because even when ceasefires are reached, they only then enter new rounds or re-escalated violence. This may capture the general experience in some regions that are subject to recurring conflicts.

Nevertheless, the cyclical imaging of conflict is too limiting. A circular portrayal of conflict is too pessimistic for it suggests that conflicts never end. But while some last decades, all violent conflicts do eventually come to a close. But a circle suggests the cycle of violence cannot ever be broken out of. It allows no way analytically to represent the possibility that particular conflicts might transcend recurring violence and achieve degrees of peace, including forms of "durable peace" that go beyond the transient cessation of violence.

The other limitation of the circular imagery is its ahistorical character. A circle does not allow one to measure a conflict over a period of time. But it is important to represent the course of a conflict over time because research shows that the duration of a conflict affects its tractability, in part because the memory of the past influences the parties' behavior. The longer a conflict wages on, and the more times parties have engaged violence conflicts in the past, the more bitter and intense is likely to be their war.

7. Daniel C. Esty, et. al., *State Failure Task Force, Final Report*, Vol. 1, Science Applications International Corporation, Inc., November 30, 1995. p. 6-1.

8. Discussion drawn from Kriesberg and Peck.

9. Stephen Stedman, "Alchemy for a New World Order: Overselling 'Preventive Diplomacy.'" In *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 3, May-June 1995, pp.14-20.

# A TOOLBOX FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION AND MITIGATION

A wide array of techniques, methods and programs can be used to prevent and mitigate conflicts in the Greater Horn or other regions. This section profiles a set of tools in different functional categories. Subsequent sections offer ways to apply these tools most effectively to conflict prevention and mitigation and suggest strategies for policy-makers and practitioners.

## I. Policy Tools and their Features

Policy tools are generic modes or strategies to address a conflict's overall effects. Policy tools may comprise several projects, procedures, programs, policies, or mechanisms and may require more than one organization.

Each tool operates on conflicts by manipulating different kinds of influence — "carrots" or "sticks" — and is carried out through different organizational channels. Some are sponsored by actors outside a region in conflict, some by national governments, and some locally. Tools vary in the aspects of conflicts they address and in their effectiveness and efficiency in achieving results.

> Effective conflict intervention requires choosing tools with care. This in turn rests on a thorough understanding of how each tool operates.

### A. Tools for Conflict Intervention and Principal Sources of Conflict Addressed

Policy tools can be classified according to the main sources of conflict they address. Some tools aim directly at triggering sources of conflicts, such as an ethnic group leader's hostile rhetoric. Others target potential sources of conflict, for instance, anti-poverty programs intending to rectify disparities in resource distribution and living standards.

Table 4-1 below classifies 89 policy tools for conflict intervention in terms of whether they address:

- ***Systemic*** conditions such as material resource deficiencies and conditions.
- ***Enabling*** factors such as institutions and processes, perceptions and attitudes, the means of coercion and force, substantive issues in dispute.
- ***Triggering*** factors such as conflict actions or behavior.

**TABLE 4-1: TOOLS FOR CONFLICT INTERVENTION BY PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF CONFLICT ADDRESSED**

♦ **Systemic (Background) Level Tools**

***Main Aim and Target:*** *To increase the aggregate and/or redistribute natural, economic, and human resources — land, water, food, infrastructure, technical skills — in order to improve material conditions.*

- Targeted development assistance such as road-building
- Economic reforms, including possible social safety nets
- Economic integration/cooperation
- Inter-communal trade
- Private economic investment in conflict-prone areas
- Human resource development programs such as job training
- Public/private health assistance such as sanitation facilities
- Agricultural productivity promotion programs
- Humanitarian aid

## ♦ Enabling (Proximate) Level Tools

***Main Aims and Targets:*** *To create or strengthen general political, social and economic institutions, rules, procedures, and other decision processes through which societies define their public problem agenda, set goals, form policies, allocate authority, implement public decisions, and settle grievances.*

- Constitutional commissions/reforms
- Judicial/legal reforms
- Support to local indigenous dispute resolution and legal institutions
- Human rights education/training/institution-building
- Promotion/advocacy of human rights standards
- Election monitoring
- National conferences
- Political institution-building/capacity-building of civil society
- Training political leaders
- Capacity-building of authorities/training public servants
- Conditionality (political and economic)
- Conflict prevention centers
- Power-sharing arrangements (such as consociation)
- Sub-national devolution and autonomy (e.g. federalism)
- Federation
- Confederation
- Partitioning
- Secession



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***Main Aim and Target:*** *To reduce and put prior restraints on specific means of coercion that could be used to carry out violent conflicts.*

- Coercive diplomacy (economic sanctions, diplomatic sanctions)
- Human rights monitoring
- Human rights suits
- Police reform
- Professionalization/restructuring of military forces
- Demobilization/reintegration/reduction
- Military-to-military programs to help professionalize militaries
- Military confidence-building and security measures
- Non-aggression agreements
- Security agreements
- Demilitarized zones, peace zones (e.g. nuclear-free zones)
- Trusteeships, protectorates
- Arms embargoes
- Surgical power projection/threat of force
- Disarmament
- Arms control agreements
- Arms proliferation controls
- Military aid
- Alternative defense strategies
- Preemptive peacekeeping forces
- Targeted deterrence policies
- Permanent war crimes tribunals

***Main Aim and Target:*** *To shape and change the attitudes, perceptions and skills of masses and elites that affect their grievances and actions.*

- Commissions of inquiry/war crimes tribunals
- Peace Radio/TV
- Media Professionalization
- International public diplomacy (international broadcasts to other publics)
- Journalist training
- Civic education
- Formal education programs
- Peace education
- Exchange visits
- Conflict resolution/prevention training

### ♦ Triggering (Immediate) Factors

***Main Aim and Target:*** *To regulate parties' conflict behavior — actions, speech and interactions.*

- Special envoys
- Mediation
- Negotiations
- Arbitration
- Conciliation
- Good offices
- Adjudication
- Civilian fact-finding missions/observers/monitoring/verification teams
- Conditionality
- Humanitarian diplomacy
- Sanctions
- Arms blockades
- International moral appeals/condemnation
- Informal consultations
- Support local (indigenous) conflict management/resolution mechanisms
- Crisis management procedures
- Peacekeeping forces
- Conflict management and resolution training
- Peace commissions/committees
- Peace conferences
- Reciprocated good will gestures
- Non-official facilitation (e.g., problem-solving workshops)
- Peace monitors
- Internationally sponsored peace consultations
- Conflict resolution/prevention centers
- Visits by eminent organizations/individuals ("embarrassing witnesses")
- "Friends" groups
- Non-violent campaigns
- Threat or use of force
- Surgical military intervention

## B. Policy Tools and Functional Areas: A Matrix of Conflict Intervention Tools

Tools directed at the same causes of conflict may be operated through different functional areas. For example, the threat of economic sanctions, diplomatic sanctions and targeted military deterrence measures might all be used to try to block anticipated possible hostile acts, such as invasions, by governments or groups engaged in particular conflicts. Table 4-2 shows the 89 tools arranged by functional category.

## TABLE 4-2: A MATRIX OF CONFLICT PREVENTION TOOLS [TOOLS MARKED WITH * ARE PROFILED IN DEPTH]

| Official Diplomacy | Non-Official Conflict Mgmt. Methods | Military Measures | Economic and Social Development | Judicial/Legal Processes and Arrangements | Human Rights | Communications and Education | Humanitarian Assistance | Political Dev./ Governance Structures |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| • Mediation<br>• Negotiations<br>• Conciliation<br>• Good offices/ informal consultations<br>• Peace conferences<br>• Unilateral good will gestures<br>• Civilian fact-finding missions/ observers/ monitoring/ verification teams<br>• Conditionality<br>• Special envoys*<br>• Conflict prevention/ management centers<br>• Humanitarian diplomacy<br>• Diplomatic and economic sanctions<br>• International appeal/ condemnation<br>• Partitioning<br>• Secession | • Mediation<br>• Support local conflict mgmt./ resolution mechanisms*<br>• Conflict mgmt./ resol. training<br>• Peace commissions*<br>• Non-official facilitation/ problem-solving workshops*<br>• Civilian peace monitors<br>• Internationally sponsored peace consultations<br>• Exchange visits<br>• Conflict resol./ prevention centers<br>• Peace education<br>• Visits by eminent organizations/ individuals ("embarrassing witnesses")<br>• "Friends" groups<br>• Non-violent campaigns | • Preemptive peacekeeping forces<br>• Professionalize/ restructure military forces*<br>• Demobil./reint./ reduction<br>• Mil.-to-mil. programs<br>• Mil. confidence-building and security measures*<br>• Non-aggression agreements<br>• Security guarantees<br>• Targeted deterrence<br>• Demil. zones<br>• Arms embarg./ blockades<br>• Threat/project. of force<br>• Disarmament<br>• Arms control agreements<br>• Military aid<br>• Crisis mgmt. procedures<br>• Arms prolif. control<br>• Alternative defense | • Targeted development assistance*<br>• Economic reforms<br>• Economic integration/ cooperation<br>• Inter-communal trade<br>• Private economic investment<br>• Health assistance<br>• Agricultural programs<br>• Conditionality for conflict prevention<br>• Environment/ natural resource management | • Commissions of inquiry/war crimes tribunals<br>• Constitutional commissions<br>• Judicial/legal reforms<br>• Police reform<br>• Support local indigenous legal institutions<br>• Arbitration<br>• Adjudication | • Human rights monitoring<br>• Human rights education/ training/ institution-building<br>• Promotion/ advocacy of human rights standards | • Peace Radio/ TV*<br>• Joint investigative reporting projects<br>• Media professionali-zation*<br>• International public diplomacy<br>• Journalist training<br>• Civic education<br>• Formal education projects<br>• Peace education<br>• Exchange visits<br>• Conflict resolution prevention training | • Humanitarian aid<br>• Repatriation/ resettlement of refugees<br>• Capacity-building for public welfare | • Political institution-building<br>• Election monitoring<br>• National conferences*<br>• Capacity-building of civil society<br>• Training of political leaders<br>• Power-sharing arrangements*<br>• Sub-national devolution and autonomy<br>• Capacity-building of authorities/ training public servants*<br>• Civic education<br>• Federation<br>• Confederation<br>• Partition<br>• Secession<br>• Trusteeship/ protectorates |

## II. Tool Profiles

Each conflict intervention tool has strengths and weaknesses and may require different pre-conditions for successful application. To select tools appropriately, we need to know what is entailed in each tool and how well it performs various functions relative to preventing and mitigating conflicts. This section presents profiles of 16 policy tools or instruments that have been used in conflict prevention in the Greater Horn of Africa and elsewhere. These profiles are intended to assist practitioners in considering a tool's applicability to the particular situations they encounter and in implementing chosen tools.

### Format

For ease of readership, the tool profiles are organized according to a consistent set of elements. In each tool profile below, we provide:

**TABLE 4-3: FORMAT FOR THE TOOL PROFILES**

- A ***description*** of the tool — objectives, expected outcome or impact, and relationship to conflict prevention.
- A discussion of the ***applicability*** of the tool — strengths, weaknesses, lessons learned and recommendations.
- A summary of the ***conflict situation*** in which the tool should be applied — stage and type of conflict and cause of conflict the tool addresses.
- A discussion of the tool's ***implementation*** — organizers, participants, implementors, activities, equipment, budget, set-up time, timeframe to see results, other resource considerations, and pre-conditions that must be in place in order for the tool to have its intended effect.
- Brief ***examples*** of how and where the tool has been applied in the past.
- A list of ***sources and references***.
- In-depth ***illustrations*** of the tool used within and outside the Greater Horn of Africa.

# A. Official Diplomacy

## Tool:

- Special Envoys

# 1. Special Envoys
## (Special Representatives, High Commissioners)

## Description

Special envoys (hereafter, envoys) are widely respected, experienced diplomats who travel to areas in conflict to help reduce tensions and resolve disputes.

***Objectives***

Envoys contribute to conflict prevention or mitigation by assessing circumstances, offering conciliation efforts, providing early warning for the outside community, and other such responsibilities.

***Expected Outcome or Impact***

Special envoys are rarely able to keep a volatile situation from worsening for very long solely through their own efforts. Rather, they act as facilitators or catalysts for additional interventions such as observer missions, economic assistance and democracy-building. Indeed, envoy visits to possible conflict arenas are generally short. They therefore must set in motion further indigenous or international efforts to keep tensions under continuing control. For example, the OSCE often follows up visits by the HCNM (further described below) with one of its short-term or long-term observer missions. These missions are in turn consulted by the HCNM for their intimate knowledge of the local situation if and when the HCNM pays a return visit.

## Applicability

***Strengths and Weaknesses***

Envoys are individuals who represent no particular country, do not command armies, bureaucracies, or resources, and bring with them little or no staff. Their strength lies in their stature and experience and in their considerable degree of independence from particular countries and sponsoring organizations. This stature and flexible authority mean they sometimes can achieve significant breakthroughs and break diplomatic logjams at relatively low expense, as well as spare the cumbersome political processes and time required by other tools or procedures that involve multiple actors.

However, the role's effectiveness is heavily dependent on the individual incumbent's stature, personality, and skills. Some observers feel, for example, that the OSCE HCNM has been successful largely because of the competencies of Ambassador van der Stoel, rather than other features of the position.

- Special envoys have no powerful carrots or sticks to enforce peaceful agreements. Their ability to prevent or mitigate a conflict is thus constrained by factors beyond their control. Envoys' achievements are limited unless the parties themselves are to some

degree willing to consider peaceful settlements and to refrain from provocative actions that inflame the situation.

- To be effective, envoys must also enjoy the continued backing for their work from the top political authorities of their sponsoring organization, support from other third parties, and so on.

- Envoys must typically struggle to reconcile the pressures and preferences they receive from their appointing organizations with their own independence and judgments about the leeway and tolerance that can be granted to particular parties with often delicate considerations that must be taken into account. The OSCE HCNM has expressed concern over the possibility that governments and groups with whom he has worked out agreements may subsequently be held publicly accountable to a formal review at the international level for meeting specific goals and timetables. This approach would discourage future parties from working with the HCNM.

- Despite their discretion, envoys are still part of international officialdom and thus are bounded by the formality and visibility of high-level officials dealing with intra-national parties and issues. Accordingly, the HCNM has undertaken discussions with NGOs to explore the aspects of its mandate that they can address in a more informal way.

- Envoys may be able to smooth relations between disputing parties, but be unable by themselves to obtain commitments from their organizations to the follow-up programs and resources that are essential to make these agreements stick and to keep tensions from re-igniting conflict. For example, the HCNM has been frustrated that funding for minority language training in the Baltics and for economic aid for the Ukraine has been difficult to obtain.

***Lessons Learned/ Recommendations***

*The importance of indigenous political support.* Envoys are heavily dependent for effectiveness on a general willingness among the parties to show restraint as well as cooperation in addressing their mutual grievances. For example, although the OAU special envoy to the Congo was successful in negotiating an agreement between the government and the opposition, his work took place after the Congo Army itself had restored general order in the country and foresworn any direct role in politics. Similarly, when guerrilla attacks against the Army and wider ethnic killings between Hutus and Tutsi re-emerged in Burundi in 1994, there was little the UN representative could do to stop the fighting.

*The "honest broker."* Successful envoys must be seen as impartial and competent by the parties in a conflict. One method used to improve the chances an envoy will be favorably received is to appoint someone from the

region where the governments and other parties who may be involved in disputes are members. This may depend, however, on the region's particular sensitivities and perceptions of who is acceptable and desirable. Regional roots are no guarantee of acceptability, for ultimately, what may count is the personality of the individual and the image of the organization from which they come. Thus, the UN envoy to Somalia and the OAU envoy to Congo were Algerian and the UN envoy to Burundi was the former Foreign Minister of Mauritania, whereas the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities active in Central Europe and the former Soviet Union is from Western Europe.

## Conflict Situation

***Stage of Conflict***

Special envoys may be more effective during the early stages of conflicts rather than at later stages. This means the envoys must be in place before disputes have escalated into full-scale wars and major armed force has been committed. Because envoys *per se* have limited "clout" to move states to comply, their leverage may be more useful before the stakes of conflicts have risen. Furthermore, maintaining the implicit or explicit permission from sponsoring organizations' member states to make contact with all relevant parties in a conflict may depend on the fact that at early stages the actions of the special envoy are relatively conciliatory and inoffensive.

***Cause of Conflict Addressed***

Being short-lived in duration, envoys focus mainly on particular disputants and immediate tensions between them. Realistically, although they may be able to single-handedly avoid the eruption of a conflict, they cannot ensure that the underlying problems or policies that cause tensions are redressed. The latter may require continuing attention. Envoys must therefore be supplemented by other tools that operate over a longer term, such as democracy-building efforts aimed at creating more representative institutions and correcting discriminatory policies. In this respect, envoys can act as catalysts for initiating such institution-building or other means of addressing more fundamental sources of conflicts.

## Implementation

***Organizers***

Envoys are deployed by international organizations. They have been used primarily by UN Secretaries-General and executives of regional organizations. They also act by invitation of regional governments who are involved in conflicts.

***Participants***

Envoys must be independent and unbiased individuals who have effective working relationships with key officials in the government and with other members of the diplomatic community.

***Implementors***

During visits, envoys meet with the highest-ranking officials such as the President, Prime Minister, other ministers, parliament members, other

government officials who are responsible for policy-making, opposition party leaders, various representatives regarding issues, and sometimes with religious leaders or heads of non-governmental organizations.

***Activities***

Envoys generally perform the following activities:

- Collect information on areas and conflicts;
- Promote dialogue over situations which have the potential to develop into a new or further conflict;
- Make reports of suggestions for preventive activities and recommendations on various aspects of issues.

Envoys have tackled a great variety of issues both between states and within states, including boundary issues, minority discrimination and rights, group representation and composition in governments, and secession claims. Envoy roles vary in terms of whether they are primarily fact-finders and observers or take a more active role in engaging parties to disputes in communications and negotiations. Envoy roles vary in terms of the breadth of the functional scope of their activities: some focus on issues such as human rights, refugees or national minorities, while others encompass all international activities in that area.

***Budget***

Special envoys are a relatively inexpensive method of conflict prevention, requiring only their maintenance and small staffs. To this must of course be added the costs of any commitments they may make on behalf of their sponsor in areas such as economic aid.

***Set-Up Time***

In order to make envoys fully effective, they must gain a certain degree of trust from every side of participants of conflicts. Therefore, the process to actually send an envoy to a troubled area by request of international mediators might take a long time after mediators plan to dispatch an envoy.

***Other Resource Considerations***

Most special envoys are appointed to deal with a specific locale, and thus work for limited terms, as determined by the needs of each conflict situation. Envoys who are high commissioners occupy permanent positions which different people fill over time.

Special envoys may vary in the degree to which they have authority or *de facto* influence to coordinate the activities of other third parties in a conflict area. Acceptance of an intermediary may entail trade-offs by the third party. Therefore, disputants are likely to be concerned about such trade-offs before they accept the intervention.

All UN Secretary-Generals have used special envoys as a diplomatic tool. Since humanitarian organizations and peacekeepers have political drawbacks, Secretary-Generals use special representatives as their political actors during international crises. However, the nature of international

crisis has changed, and intrastate conflicts are more prevalent than interstate conflicts. Boutros-Ghali has made it a normal practice to send special representatives to reside in crisis areas.

***Preconditions***

Once approved, envoys are especially empowered by governments, organizations, and parties who are involved in issues. Thus, the expectation in using envoys is twofold. First, because of their considerable visibility, they can bring to bear on particular disputing parties the influence of the multilateral organizations they represent and their own personal stature so the parties will settle a dispute or eschew forceful means of pursuing it. At the same time, however, they present the prospects of an impartial peace broker who understands the grievances of the parties and may be able to represent their interests where appropriate before the international community. Thus, part and parcel of their role is the degree of flexibility and discretion they can use to explore and offer possible settlements to the disputants in low-key, discreet settings.

## Examples

***The OSCE's Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM)***, created in 1992, is perhaps the only example worldwide of an official whose portfolio is specifically and exclusively dedicated to preventing violent conflicts from erupting. Since January 1993, the office's first incumbent, Ambassador Max van der Stoel of the Netherlands, has undertaken missions of various kinds and lengths to potential ethnic trouble spots throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, including Hungary, Romania, the Baltic states, Nagorno-Karabakh, Macedonia, and Kazakhstan. The HCNM has also examined the problem of the Roma (formerly called gypsies) in several CSCE states.

***UN Special Representative to Burundi, 1993-1995.*** In an effort to prevent rising ethnic tensions in Burundi following the October 1993 assassination of the country's first Hutu president, Ahmedou Ould Abdullah served as mediator and focal point for UN and other third party efforts in Burundi from 1993 to 1995.

***OAU Envoy to Congo, 1993.*** Soon after the OAU adopted a new procedure for preventing and managing conflicts in mid-1993, Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun was appointed by OAU Secretary-General Salim-Salim to mediate a dispute and prevent further escalation of tensions. The dispute arose over the results of a new presidential election in Congo and widespread riots in the capital city, Brazzaville.

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## Illustration

- ***Outside the Greater Horn***

***The OSCE's Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM): The Roving Preventive Diplomat.*** The HCNM is a permanent official position in a government or international organization whose mandate is explicitly and exclusively preventing violent conflicts. In fact, if conflicts do erupt in an area, the HCNM is precluded from involvement.

The CSCE established this position at its 1992 summit meeting in Helsinki, reflecting its conclusion that intra-national ethnic tensions both between different groups and involving their governments should be a top priority in the region because of their potentially serious international repercussions. HCNM efforts since then have addressed tensions between the Russian-speaking minority and ethnic Estonians and Latvians in those Baltic states; ethnic Russians and other groups in Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, and Ukraine; Albanians and other groups in Macedonia; Greeks and Albanians in Albania; and Hungary and the neighboring states of Slovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia and Ukraine, where Hungarians are minorities.

The HCNM is expected to look into situations that may become ethnic conflicts, provide impartial evaluations and recommendations, and engage relevant parties in dialogue. Typically, after a visit or two of extensive consultations with the governments and groups affected, he will submit his recommendations to the government concerned and maintain contact concerning their implementation. As in Ukraine, the HCNM's recommendations sometimes call for creating specific dialogues on pertinent issues and more long-term observer missions. He has opened up communications between different groups that were not in contact, defused tensions and reduced confrontations that were rising between governments and minority organizations, facilitated dialogues and helped encourage local roundtables, and made specific recommendations on national legislation affecting minorities, such as language and citizenship laws, the establishment of special governmental bodies, or an ombudsman dealing with minority issues. The HCNM is assisted by a small staff headquartered in The Hague.

The HCNM was originally to provide "early warning" as well as early action in the form of consultations that might generate ways to ameliorate worsening situations. Interestingly, however, the HCNM has not found it especially useful to sound the alarm bell to alert the wider international community. In fact, a public statement of this kind could lead to a dispute's further escalation. Disputants may be tempted to take advantage of a wider political arena to publicize and advocate their cause before other outside parties and to seek allies, thus complicating the High Commissioner's job. Furthermore, the idea of early action is in some ways contradictory with early warning, since the purpose of addressing tensions at early stages is to facilitate local solutions that avoid the need for wider involvement at all. For these reasons, the HCNM has often preferred simply offering his good offices in a low-key, unpublicized way.

The HCNM uses various sources of information to monitor the 53 member states for areas and issues that might lead to worsening ethnic conflicts. These include ongoing data collection and informal communications with diplomats and specialists. The HCNM decides at his own discretion where and when to get involved and does not require the direct approval of member states or of the OSCE's executive body, the Committee of Senior Officials (CSOs). Because the purview of his office was authorized in general terms through *a priori* unanimous consent by its member states, technically, he can enter an OSCE participating state even without this state's formal consent. In effect, the OSCE handed the HCNM a portfolio that allows him to make inquiries into emerging ethnic disputes anywhere within its member states and to talk to any of the parties involved, including representatives of minority groups and government officials.

Obviously, however, the HCNM will choose to go places not only where he is needed, but also where he is welcome and can make some headway. He must maintain member states' overall confidence and political support in order to implement recommendations. In this way, the HCNM is held accountable to the overall body, and in fact, consultations have increased between the HCNM and the CSO, as well as the CSO's subsidiary body, the Permanent Committee.

It is critical that the HCNM be seen as impartial and even-handed because member governments are often among the very parties to the disputes he examines. The HCNM is not an outside ombudsman *for* minorities but a roving emissary *on* minority problems. This does not mean he will not or cannot call a government to account for human rights violations publicly or privately. He can also tel a minority group that it has national responsibilities as well as rights. The HCNM has urged minorities to make a serious effort to learn a dominant language, participate in free and fair national elections, rather than boycott them, and take every opportunity that is opened up to participate in legitimate governmental institutions.

In sum, the genius behind the concept of the HCNM derives from two factors that increase the member governments' incentive to cooperate with him. His discreet and even-handed style of operation engenders trust. Because he does not come from outside this circle, but belongs to the member governments of the organization with whom he deals, he is not threatening because the member governments feel they have some ultimate control over his work.

One drawback of the HCNM's low-key approach is that although it appears to have been effective in stemming certain disputes that could have gotten out of hand, it also means the accomplishments of the office are not widely publicized and thus may be generally underrated. This may make it difficult for the HCNM to get the financial support he needs to carry out his work.

The HCNM collaborates with the various OSCE in-country missions that are active in the field, and he consults regularly with the OSCE's Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). His bailiwick has numerous other regional organizations beyond the OSCE, including the UN, Council of Europe, the European Union, and NATO. These organizations' activities overlap in certain respects. The HCNM tries to avoid competing with these other organizations, or to cooperate with them where they are also involved. This has applied especially with the Council of Europe, which deals more with legal rather than political issues, for often these separate organizations can reinforce each others' approaches to governments and minority groups.

- ***Inside the Greater Horn***

***UN Special Representative to Burundi: Barely Keeping the Lid On.*** The UN Secretary General appointed this official in November 1993 following the October assassination of the country's first Hutu president. Ahmedou Ould Abdullah's original appointment was for three months, but he stayed for almost two years, leaving his position in November 1995. His staff numbered five, along with a small UN team dispatched to determine the facts and facilitate government and OAU efforts to restore democratic processes and stability. Two further fact-finding teams visited from March to April 1994 and in August 1994.

Abdullah brokered acceptance by Hutu and Tutsi politicians of a Hutu president, Cyprien Ntarymira, and pressured them and Burundi's mainly Tutsi military leaders to issue calls for calm immediately after Ntarymira was killed in the April 1994 plane crash that set off the ethnic genocide in Rwanda. Subsequently, he facilitated power-sharing arrangements for Burundi's interim government through which the Parliament appointed another Hutu president but guaranteed the Tutsi 45 percent of key government posts. To keep the situation calm, he reportedly restrained his criticism of the primarily Tutsi army and postponed an investigation of the assassination.

While Burundi's relative calm in 1994 may be attributed in some measure to Abdullah's efforts, Hutus soon felt deprived of their overwhelming 1993 election victory and began guerrilla attacks against the Tutsi dominated army, provoking countermeasures aimed at driving Hutus out of their government positions. Ethnic killings erupted in spring 1995 and have continued at an increasingly dangerous level ever since.

## B. Non-Official Conflict Management Methods

### Tools:

- Non-Official Facilitation
- Peace Commissions
- Indigenous Dispute Resolution Mechanisms

# 2. Non-Official Facilitation
## (Analytical Problem Solving Approach; Problem-Solving Workshops (PSW); Facilitated Problem-Solving Conflict Resolution; Third-Party Consultation; Controlled Communication; Pre-Negotiation Workshops; Dialogue Facilitation)

## Description

Non-Official Facilitation (NOF) is a term used to describe a method of informal, non-directive workshops that bring members of conflicting parties together in small-group problem-solving discussions. These face-to-face meetings involve representatives for the two or more parties in a dispute, and an informal panel of consultants (facilitators) who apply a problem solving approach to help the participants understand and resolve their conflicts.

Non-Official Facilitation includes:

- Controlled communication
- Problem-solving workshops (PSW)
- Conflict analysis
- Dialogue facilitation
- Third-party consultation
- Pre-negotiation workshops
- Other types of unofficial or "Track-Two" diplomacy.

### *Objectives*

The objectives of NOF include:

- Producing change in the participants' attitudes, perceptions, images, and ideas about the conflict.
- New realizations about the sources and nature of the conflict.
- Generating creative solutions to the problem.
- Generating ways by which whatever change occurs in the participants will be transferred in some way to the larger political/decision-making process.

NOF methods are designed to supplement and encourage official diplomatic negotiations with a new emphasis on the human, social, and cultural dimensions of the conflict. They are undertaken in hopes that insights generated from the workshops, and new means for creatively resolving them, will be communicated by participants to policy-making elites and negotiators as they set agendas, determine priorities, and build confidence that negotiation is desirable and successful outcomes are probable.

### *Expected Outcome or Impact*

NOF techniques assume productive dialogue and problem solving can be encouraged through the assistance of a trusted, skilled intermediary, who facilitates communication and analysis using human relations skills and social-science concepts relevant to conflict processes.

As a minimum almost all interventions reports increased understanding or improved attitudes on the part of participants, which indicates success of the third party in creating conditions which allow participants from conflicting groups to learn about each other in a positive manner. Forty-three percent have been interpreted as having a positive influence on the peace process, and nineteen percent as producing specific contributions that were fed into the peace process in the form of principles for a settlement, plans for peace-building activities, and initiatives. In most workshops, participants emerge with new insights and options, ideas about alternative means, procedures for moving toward a solution, and some principles on which a solution might be based.

***Relationship to Conflict Prevention***

NOF methods assume that skilled intermediaries can facilitate representatives of conflicting parties to understand and resolve conflicts, and that the insights and proposals generated by the workshop can later be conveyed to officials and applied to the formal negotiation process to bring about an end to the conflict.

## Applicability

***Strengths and Weaknesses***

NOF exercises generally occur in an academic context, which provides a relatively non-committal atmosphere in which parties can explore options not possible in an official setting.

A workshop creates an environment for adversaries to interact in ways their home settings, and especially public events, would not permit. The setting releases participants from many normal restraints by isolating them from their customary environment and encouraging them to express themselves. The workshop provides a politically safe place for testing ideas. The environment enables direct interaction and encourages the development of relationships, and flexibility in looking at the parties' shared problems and possible solutions.

Through NOF workshops, participants frequently gain greater understanding of and appreciation for the political and psychological complexity of a conflict and the way they perceive the conflict, and the opposing party is often transformed.

Scholars have noted an increased level of contact and communication between participants after workshops and the birth of new networks across lines of conflict.

Applications of NOF to date indicate that NOF has significant potential for the study and resolution of protracted social conflict.

Organizers face the dilemma of how to expand the consensus reached in a workshop beyond the workshop group and how participants can build a

social movement around the workshop, or mobilize the political power necessary to expand that consensus. The closed structure of a workshop does not directly mobilize more than a handful of people. The individual participants must become change agents among their constituents. Non-official participants may be more willing to enter into dialogue, but have no power to negotiate a solution. Participants must gain the attention of outside supporters and mobilize political pressure on government officials to negotiate.

NOF events cannot be expected to directly deliver formal agreements.

The number of knowledgeable, skilled, ethical professionals equipped to carry out NOF applications is extremely small.

It is difficult to obtain funding, even when such interventions are requested by the parties themselves.

Conflict prevention and resolution using NOF approaches is non-dramatic, incremental, slow and modest.

Most diplomats and international organizations are not informed about this approach and how it differs from traditional methods, and have questions of its practicality and applicability, or whether it can be effective in international conflict resolution.

Given the demanding objectives of many NOF methods, some observers question how applications of short duration could hope to have a significant impact, and favor having a series of workshops over time instead of just one.

Most applications of NOF thus far have had a "Western European/North American base," which raises the question of the cultural appropriateness of the method to conflicts in less developed countries.

***Lessons Learned/ Recommendations***

*Participants.* There are trade-offs to be considered when selecting participants. To increase direct transfer of the workshop experience to the policy process, the most desirable representatives would be as close to the official decision-making process as possible; however, the closer participants are to the policy-making process and the center of power, the more constrained the workshop becomes because the participants, by virtue of their positions, are less able to engage productively in this type of interaction. On the other hand, the participation of intellectuals and other lower-level figures in workshops could increase the degree of learning and influence on public opinion, but limit the impact on policy decisions. To resolve this dilemma in choosing appropriate participants, it is important to define the objectives of the workshop, and especially to allow them to do things which they would normally not be able to do in a politically-charged

arena. A PSW practitioner (Kelman) recommends using participants who are *politically active and influential*, but *are not directly involved in the policy-making process*. Officials and leaders can be incorporated later in the process.

There has been value gained from including both participants as close to the political mainstream of their communities as possible, as well as hardline extremists. Participants should be knowledgeable of the underlying interests and values of their parties, the likely reactions to alternative solutions, and any obstacles in their parties to resolution.

*Re-entry.* Participants can face problems upon returning to their communities after participating in a NOF process. People who did not participate in the process may feel alienated from and suspicious of those who have. Participants with new insights and more cooperative orientations are subjected to social pressure and sometimes physical danger, potentially hostile press and public opinion, and difficulties in implementing the proposals reached. If participants develop too much empathy for one another it can negatively affect the quality of the proposals, and participants may become disqualified as representative of their communities. Participants must take care to avoid forming a special "in-group" separate and apart from their communities.

*Impact.* It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which individual workshops have been influential in the peace-building process, because it is unclear as to how much credit can be given to a workshop for a successful outcome to a conflict. Also, many other variables are involved and because of the "uncontrolled" nature of the exercise. More detailed, systematic and rigorous use of research methods are required to evaluate this. Most evaluations to date are based on consultant impressions with little use of pre- and post-assessments or quantitative analyses of processes or outcomes and almost no consideration of possible transfer effects.

## Conflict Situation

### *Stage of Conflict*

NOF exercises have mostly been used as part of an unofficial, pre-negotiation process to resolving an existing, protracted conflict. Little work has been done yet on examining where exercises fit into the dynamics of a conflict. Potential third parties and the adversaries themselves have to make informed judgments about whether the time is ripe for an NOF initiative. Problem-solving exercises have been usefully employed at the height of violent interactions and confrontation, in periods of impasse, and in the period immediately following a short, violent conflict. Certain types of problem-solving activities may be more appropriate than others, depending on the stage reached. However, insufficient work has been done to identify which stages, the conflict characteristics and circumstances for

which NOF exercises are likely to be effective, and the most appropriate form of NOF initiatives for particular circumstances.

Some practitioners insist that, to be most effective, NOF initiatives need to take place early in the development of a conflict, and not to be delayed until the hostile parties have soured their relationship by acts of violence, to aim at avoiding violence, not at its mitigation.

***Conflict Type***

Most NOF applications have dealt with protracted, complex social conflicts with international involvement. Some have been in the early stage of escalation where large-scale hostilities could be prevented, for example, in conflicts between Russia and the Baltic Republics. It is possible that NOF methods could be effectively used for all levels of conflict, from grassroots to international conflicts, and for conflicts due to various causes, since one of their primary purposes is to uncover and suggest ways of addressing the conflicts' root causes.

***Cause of Conflict Addressed***

NOF methods aim to identify root causes of conflicts and propose solutions to directly address the root causes. Therefore, they address structural prevention or resolution of conflicts more than operational prevention.

## Implementation

***Organizers***

Organizers are normally academics/practitioners, primarily political scientists and social psychologists, skilled in group process and conflict resolution, and with regional expertise. Their national/ethnic identities are either seen as impartial or at least balanced within the team. Most have been American, British, Canadian, or Australian. Funding may come from various sources, usually external, including bilateral and multilateral organizations and NGOs. Many recommend against government funds, to reduce actual or perceived bias. The source of funds should be transparent.

***Participants***

The participant representatives should be politically active. They are typically invited because of their knowledge of the conflict and proximity to key decision-makers-top-level actors are typically not invited. The main emphasis is on involving individuals who have some influence in their nations/communities and who can effectively work for political change at home. Over half of the past participants have been informal advisors with direct access to leadership, but not through official policy roles. Participants often have the tacit approval of their leadership.

***Implementors***

The third party facilitators should be fully competent and properly qualified in relevant disciplines and practical experience.

***Activities***

A typical NOF workshop includes four representatives each from the adversarial sides, and four to eight third-party members. The workshops occur in an informal, often academic environment. The workshop is

conducted full-time over a period ranging from 1-14 days, including meals and breaks together; the majority have been three to four days. Most have been "one-shot affairs," although a recent innovation is to conduct a series of workshops, which requires a longer-term commitment by the same participants, trainers and organizers.

A typical NOF workshop sequence is: analysis, access, preparation, workshop, re-entry, and effects. Representatives of the disputing parties meet in the presence of a panel of consultants who facilitate the exercise. The facilitators do not provide traditional mediation or offer solutions, but strive to put the adversaries in a situation where they explore the possibilities for new options leading to a "win-win" solution to what can be recognized as a mutual problem. The facilitators seek to provide participants an opportunity for and example of a more effective mode of interaction, and to look at the conflict with a more analytical than coercive viewpoint.

Some NOF exercises involve a highly structured sequence of planned activities, designed to minimize antagonisms between adversaries, break down barriers, and create a minimal sense of trust between participants before moving on to further exercises directly related to the conflict. Others use a highly unstructured format.

There is generally no discussion of potential solutions until each party talks of their own perspectives, concerns, fears and needs, and appears to understand those of the other party. The dialogue then turns to discussing potential solutions, and each party is responsible for coming up with a solution that is satisfactory from both their own point of view and that of the other side as well.

In cases where the parties in conflict are deadlocked, the workshop organizers and facilitators are responsible for preparing conciliatory gestures to break the deadlock, reestablish the fact that there is potential for negotiation, and explore the conditions necessary to restart stalled talks.

In one form of NOF, Problem-Solving Workshops (PSWs), the objective is a specific political purpose, closely linked to the phase of actual ongoing negotiations, as follows:

- In the pre-negotiation phase the purpose is to identify conditions required for negotiations, and to help create a political environment conducive to encouraging the parties to move toward the negotiation table.

- During actual negotiations, the PSW process can help break stalemates or work out specific solutions to technical, political, or

emotional blocks. The solutions identified in PSWs can then be incorporated into the official process.

- In the post-negotiation phase, the participants in a PSW can help identify ways to implement the agreement which has been reached, and explore ways to co-exist, cooperate, and develop a long-term relationship.

Objectives of another NOF method, Pre-negotiation Workshops, include:

- Altering participants' perceptions and helping them develop a will to negotiate during the early stage of a crisis.
- Identifying methods for getting to the table for negotiations, and the structure of the negotiations.
- Identifying relationships between non-reducible needs and negotiable interests that must be addressed in negotiations.
- Trying to create integrative solutions and a framework for substantive negotiations.

A Pre-Negotiation Workshop has three stages: framing, inventing, and structuring, as follows:

- Framing is the process by which parties in conflict derive shared definitions about conflict parameters and build a will to negotiate. The objectives of this stage are: to change the parties' negative views of the conflict; for participants to publicly acknowledge their own needs and values; and to teach the participants how to distinguish between the positions, interests, and needs that each party brings to the conflict. The third party lectures on communication and empathy, followed by directed group discussions.

- During the Inventing Stage, integrative approaches are used to design possible solutions to the conflict, to promote confidence that negotiations are worth undertaking, and to foster agreements that endure. This stage begins with instruction on integrative solutions, then moves to group participation in a brainstorming session, with guidance from the third party instructing on tactics for constructive creative, integrated solutions. The objective is to develop solutions which fulfill both parties' needs without undermining the needs of either party.

  To facilitate integrative problem solving, three categories of solutions are used: resource expansion, exchange techniques, and functional techniques. In *resource expansion*, parties can assume

that the amount or types of resources needed to resolve the conflict can be expanded. In *exchange techniques*, parties first determine the extent to which they prioritize their interests differently, then attempt to make exchanges and/or offer compensation for differently valued issues and interests. The parties may try to build integrative solutions through three types of *functional techniques:* sharing, division, and delegation.

The participants then evaluate the options in light of the underlying needs listed during the framing stage, and consider their likely acceptance by each party's constituency. The most promising possibilities are elaborated to provide concrete ideas for future negotiations.

- During the Structuring Stage, preparations are made for negotiations on the joint solutions developed during the inventing stage. The agenda and order of the agenda are established, and procedural issues decided upon, i.e., time and venue for negotiations, selection of participants, and the need for and role a third party could play.

***Budget*** Costs for NOF would include transportation and site expenses for the actual workshops and research and preparation on the part of the organizers and related costs to their organizations.

***Set-Up Time*** The workshops are difficult to organize, requiring substantial time for organization and advance preparation, including gathering funds.

***Other Resource Considerations*** Most of the high-level workshops have been held in neutral sites, often a third country, away from the given conflict situation addressed. A campus is a good neutral setting. Some institutions now offer facilitation and problem solving services.

***Timeframe*** NOF exercises can contribute to positive, long-term peace building. However, because setup and implementation is time consuming, and their direct impact on official policy may be small and take a long time to be felt, NOF initiatives are a more likely option in situations where time is less urgent.

***Preconditions*** The organizers must carry out a thorough preliminary analysis of the conflict and its key aspects, and decide whether they are to hold a single workshop or a series of workshops, and whether there will be any follow-up activities. Some decisions, such as time, duration, location, composition of participants and staff, must be made well in advance. Before the workshop is underway, organizers must decide the initial groupings of participants and have a plan for the nature and sequence of activities; select and articulate the operational goals to be pursued; and decide whether the workshop is to

be seen as a singular event or is conceived as an element of a larger continuing project.

To initiate an NOF workshop, generally a third party chooses to be involved in a particular conflict situation, and sets about organizing a workshop. The organizers identify the participants and invite them. Prior to inviting representatives, organizers generally first approach formal leaders of the parties in dispute to describe the planned exercise and its basic aims. Organizers try to reassure the leaders of the academic nature of the exercise, that its purpose is to analyze the conflict in the presence and with the assistance of party representatives, and that participation concedes nothing in terms of the issues at stake in the conflict. Organizers inform the leaders the other party is also being approached, trying to synchronize the introductions as much as possible, and try to obtain a written commitment from the top leaders indicating their support for the NOF process. The arrangements for the meeting take considerable time and effort.

## Examples

This approach has been mainly applied to the Israeli-Palestinian, Egypt-Israel, and the Cyprus conflict. Notable examples also occurred in Sri Lanka, Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and in the Falklands/Malvinas conflict.

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## Illustration

♦ *Inside the Greater Horn*

***Border Disputes.*** In August 1969, organizers invited six representatives from each of three African countries, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya, for two weeks to discuss resolution of two border disputes, one between Ethiopia and Somalia, another between Kenya and Somalia.

The objectives of the project were:

- To ascertain whether in the detached and permissive atmosphere of a workshop the participants might express and then modify some of their attitudes and values, improve their communication skills, reveal the deeper psychological or emotional issues in the disputes, and thereby move close to an innovative resolution.
- Give participants new insights into the attitudes and values behind the disputes.
- To see whether the influential elites participating in the workshop would or could transmit their new knowledge and insight to the leaders in authority.

The planning process took over three years, and encountered many complications and cancellations. To raise money, the organizers approached major foundations and private individuals in the US, most of which refused to support the initiative, considering the project too politically sensitive and impracticable. They also applied to the US government for financial support, but were rejected. In an attempt to demonstrate the plan's feasibility, the organizers then used funds from Yale to visit the three countries, to gain tacit approval from government leaders and locate six highly qualified and willing participants. The workshop cost $40,000, not including hidden expenses, for example, salaries and overhead absorbed by Yale over an extended period. Eventually, the exercise was sponsored by the Academy for Educational Development, James Marshall Fund, Yale University, plus institutional support from the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), and funds from a British trust.

Organizers encountered numerous administrative and other difficulties scheduling the workshop, especially finding people of the required caliber who could give up two weeks and working around the availability at the same time of participants and the four trainers plus the organizers. They used a neutral, isolated location to promote critical reflection and intensive encounters, which was insulated from family, work, and professional distractions.

The participants were mostly academics. Since Somalia had no university, four of the Somali participants were government employees (with no connection to foreign policy) and two were private lawyers; one was exceptionally well-versed in Somali traditional proverbs, poems, and stories, which he frequently recited during the workshop. Since none of the participants officially represented their governments, they were less constrained to uphold a position previously established by the leaders of their countries. All were members of their countries' elite and had informal influence and access to decision-making channels to communicate. However, this did not guarantee they would be willing and able to transmit the information when they returned home, or would be listened to. All were fluent in a common language (English).

The third party consisted of four professional trainer/practitioners, all American. The workshop was conducted in a neutral site, a hotel in a ski resort in Italy. The organizers were three American academics.

The participants were divided into two groups of nine participants each, called T-groups (training groups) for more intensive interaction. The trainers used sensitivity training, whereby participants learn through analysis of and generalizations from their own experience and that of others with whom they interact. The workshop involved a prolonged series of small-group sessions with unstructured procedure, encouraging relatively free expression of feelings and interaction, through which participants were to learn to communicate their views. The trainers used this technique to try to create an atmosphere in which international discord might be better understood and eventually diminished, and that participants and organizers might gain new insights into the attitudes and values behind the disputes. The T-groups began with minimal structure, without specified agenda or conventional leadership. In the process of finding its way, of building structure and constructing an agenda, a T-group is supposed to develop a shared experience of creating something together.

The trainers or facilitators were trained in the laboratory method, and sat in on the T-group to help the participants understand what was happening, and at times present more structured exercises to help the participants conceptualize and understand, e.g. role playing, lectures, and audiovisual aids.

The organizers were bystanders, not participants, and took notes.

The first phase, which lasted about a week, was designed to give the African participants an opportunity to learn to communicate more effectively with one another in a general way before turning to the border disputes. Each side was requested to compose documents in which they listed their grievances and anticipated the grievances of their opponents. At the end of the week, organizers distributed material on the problem. Participants identified the fundamental triggering substantive issues and discussed them in great detail, generating solutions to the border problems. In the first week the groups were urged to focus on the purported aims of the technique by avoiding the purpose of the meeting. The second week was devoted to the border dispute. The organizers became more involved, especially in the discussion of substantive issues. Toward the end of the second phase, participants were given some instruction on the difficulties of re-entry to their own countries.

The outcome was considered by most to be at least partially successful. Most participants admitted having gained some insights into the difficulties of their neighbors. Participants probed controversial issues. The trainers and some of the organizers believe the technique revealed attitudes not obtainable otherwise, and free and frank discussions in the T-groups raised information "of a nature that rarely comes to the surface, if ever, at regular negotiations..."[1] However, some contend the common professional background of most participants could have produced the same result in the total absence of the training.

The main operational objective, of producing a general consensus among participants for a proposal to solve the border dispute, was not achieved -- no solution to the disputes evolved that won the instant acclaim of all the participants. Each of the two T-groups argued through and eventually arrived at a detailed solution to the disputes. A joint Planning Group amalgamated the two proposals into one for presentation on the last day to the General Assembly, which was a major mistake -- the resulting proposal satisfied no one and the whole group reached a stalemate. The workshop did not end with a final

communique proposing a single peace formula, signed by all, but did produce general agreement on a two-stage approach involving neutralization of disputed areas during the initial period.

Participants hardened their positions near the end of the workshop. Toward the end, nationality became more salient than at the beginning, and a majority of the participants were intent on promoting the national interests of their governments. The organizers described what occurred the last two days as a type of "reentry problem", when several individuals retreated from previously established conciliatory positions "in a manner to suggest...they were preparing a safe record of suitably nationalistic statements... or realized they were about to resume their normal lives..."[2]

There is no way of knowing definitely whether the successes and failures of the workshop can be attributed to the use of sensitivity training and the various techniques used by the trainers. The trainers believed they succeeded in producing positive relationships within each of the groups to promote sufficient collaboration and commitment to yield agreement on the border problems, but failed when they tried to put the two groups together to get one common solution. The organizers and observers generally believed the training did contribute appreciably to the breaking down of reserve and to enhancing communication between participants. The organizers concluded no fundamental changes were wrought directly by the workshop, although participants' attitudes were changed.

Subsequent events complicate whatever repercussions might have resulted from the workshop, as there was a coup d'etat in Somalia in October 1969 which included assassination of the president and jailing of the prime minister, who had supported the workshop. Two of the participants, however, became very important ministers in the new government and two others became members of a committee involved in revising the constitution. Given these events, it is even more difficult to isolate the workshop's contribution.

One or more of the African participants from each country were debriefed by their foreign offices and other government agencies, which organizers hoped helped to diffuse the ideas from the workshop farther. One of the trainers and an observer recommended for future exercises that organizers select participants closer to the centers of power in their countries.

## Notes

1. Leonard Doob (ed.). *Resolving Conflict in Africa: the Fermeda Workshop*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970, p. 111.

2. Doob, p. 107.

# 3. Peace Commissions
## (Peace Committees, Dispute Resolution Committees, Peace Structures)

## Description

Peace Commissions or Committees are structures set up at the national, regional and/or local levels to involve community members at each level in resolving issues through joint action to reduce, counter or prevent conflict.

***Objectives***

To reduce, counter, or prevent conflict by involving local private citizens in resolving issues through joint action with other community representatives.

***Expected Outcome or Impact***

The greatest anticipated impact of peace commissions is in the establishment of mechanisms to reduce political violence at the grassroots level.

In South Africa and Nicaragua, where they have been used extensively, Peace Commissions have had a mixed success. Although political violence has continued in areas where Peace Commissions were active, many sources report the violence would have been much worse without their presence. In both cases, many residents claimed the local peace commissions had successfully prevented emerging conflicts from escalating into armed, violent conflict.

The South Africa peace structures are still relatively young, and many observers focus on possibilities rather than failures or limitations. While major incidents of political violence gain media attention, the commissions' successes are not usually highly visible news events, especially overseas. The peace structures have at times contained political violence. One of the ways peace committees have proven effective is identifying when political violence is likely to flare, and working to preempt or contain it. This was the case following the assassination of Chris Hani in April 1993. Peace commission personnel, working closely with international observers, were effective in preventing many clashes. Although nearly 200 died in the ensuing nationwide unrest, without active intervention casualties would likely have been much higher. The committees have also built regular lines of communication and confidence across South Africa's racial divides. The committees have the potential, beyond their original intent, of giving participants lessons in multiparty cooperation and tolerance.

In Nicaragua, the Nueva Guinea region experienced less violence than other parts of the country despite the fact it suffered from many of the same problems. This suggests Peace Commissions can have some positive effect on preventing the escalation of violence. Both community members and outside observers report the Nueva Guinea Zonal Peace Commission has made significant steps toward rebuilding communities deeply affected by years of war and to prevent the re-emergence of violent conflict.

## Applicability

***Strengths and Weaknesses***

Peace Commissions provide a forum to bring stakeholders together, giving them a role within and ownership of the peace process to help move it forward. In both Nicaragua and South Africa, Peace Commissions have facilitated consultation between rival political groups and between them and the authorities.

Experiences in South Africa demonstrate the active involvement of a Peace Commission combined with international observers can contribute to peaceful political activity and spread the concepts of political pluralism and tolerance, which can help prevent violent conflict.

A disadvantage of the decentralized, bottom-up structure as in Nueva Guinea is the loose organization of the local commissions, resulting in poor coordination between them and limiting their ability to learn from one another and to work in other parts of the country where the services are also needed. Local Peace Commissions may require a national or regional entity to coordinate actions and facilitate communication among the individual commissions.

An evaluation of the South Africa peace structures noted the existence of a widespread public perception that they are elitist.

Some constraints limit what Peace Commissions alone can achieve. They can address symptoms of political conflict (violence) but cannot alone overcome structural causes of political conflict, such as a crisis of governance or a need for political and constitutional reform. Thus, Peace Commissions can mitigate disputes from escalating into major confrontations and violence but are not substitutes for viable institutions such as the police, judicial system, and governing structures. They, however serve as a temporary framework on which more enduring initiatives can be built.

Some analysts allege the party-based structures tend to politicize conflict that may be apolitical; i.e., a local dispute channeled through a peace commission composed of political leaders may turn a conflict that has little to do with politics into a divisive political issue.

There is danger of such peace structures deteriorating into just another state bureaucracy with little responsiveness to community needs and desires. To avoid this, some recommend forming stronger linkages between the peace structures, especially the LPCs, and indigenous, grassroots community conflict resolution practices and homegrown organizations.

Although they cannot stop antagonisms, Peace Commissions try to set rules and codes of conduct for venting them.

***Lessons Learned/ Recommendations***

The UN's decision to coordinate with and bolster indigenous conflict resolution structures in South Africa (see illustration below) is a potential precedent for others undergoing political transitions. It is one means to cost-effective "preventive diplomacy" aimed at keeping conflicts from escalating and requiring a more intrusive action, such as a peacekeeping mission.

In many situations, participation should include those on the extremes, although the decision must be made on a case-by-case basis.

Participation should include local community leaders, including traditional leaders, women, and youths. Structures should be flexible enough to foster community and indigenous initiatives.

The level and quality of participation by community leaders must improve through enhanced training programs on negotiation.

## Conflict Situation

***Stage of Conflict***

Peace Commissions can be useful at all stages of conflict. For example, they have been effective during a post-conflict period of transition as in South Africa or Nicaragua, or during a period of rising conflict to prevent or slow its escalation.

***Conflict Type***

Peace commission structures are especially useful for conflicts in which institutions of government, justice and police are considered inadequate to redress grievances.

## Implementation

Peace Commissions can be created spontaneously by community members, created through a top-down method, set up formally and internally through an accord, as in South Africa; or prompted and supported by outsiders in coordination with internal actors, i.e., the Ethnic Conciliation Commissions.

Peace Commissions, especially at the local level, take responsibility for implementing the peace process in their areas. The roles peace commissions take on vary by country and locality, including the following:

- Become an *advocate* for community members — denounce human rights violations, speak out on behalf of victims, investigate cases and channel information to the proper authorities, document abuses, and make nonpartisan public statements.
- Help counter exaggeration and rumors.
- When there is a strike or demonstration, provide pressure for groups to use non-violent means.

- Act as mediators, for example between armed groups and the government, or in land disputes. They may formally preside as moderator, facilitate discussions, write down subjects of mutual interest for future discussions, and make recommendations.
- Offer pastoral support, listening and grieving with sufferers of violence, and provide a moral force, demanding people be treated with respect and referring to faith and values, especially those Peace Commission members who are also religious leaders.
- Provide a forum for dialogue and problem-solving, such as holding assemblies attended by representatives of the government, opposition groups, military and police as well as general community members, where they can address each other and discuss issues and resolve problems face-to-face.
- Help facilitate reconciliation meetings between factions. They can coordinate the place and timing of meetings between conflicting parties, and facilitate communications between the two sides. They can act to maintain the integrity of talks, plan and schedule sessions, carry messages between participants, prepare records and written documents. Members meet before major events to discuss potential problems.
- Assist with elections.

***Organizers***

Committees can be created informally and independently by community members, using a bottom-up approach; set up formally from the national level using a top-down approach, or both approaches simultaneously, as occurred in South Africa; or prompted and supported externally, in coordination with local actors.

***Participants***

Peace Commission members may include both paid and volunteer members and outside supporters. They are members of the communities in which they serve, not outsiders, and in most cases have a long history of being an active part of their communities. Because Commission members are members of these communities, they can be aware of conflicts as they emerge and respond to them quickly. Generally, members live in the same conditions as the people they serve and therefore also experience the consequences of their decisions.

The members are not neutral, and include representatives from opposing sides, even ex-combatants. Their value lies in not being neutral outsiders but partial insiders. Peace Commission members are not distanced from the conflict but are connected to and trusted by the conflict parties. Although members may be partisan toward the cause of the group they represent, they may also be respected by other community members. By virtue of their local roots, and for some the positions they otherwise hold in the community, they may already have credibility with the various sides and have longstanding relationships of trust that cross political boundaries. Commission members often include lay church leaders or clergy. Through

their ongoing presence in a conflict situation, commission members can help sustain progress over time.

Not all members must be professional mediators or formally trained in conflict resolution skills, although experience has shown it is helpful to have at least one professional mediator present to serve as a technical assistant. Members who are religious leaders may help create an environment of trust and community through their standing as local spiritual leaders.

***Budget***

Comparatively low-cost, and extremely cost-effective.

***Set-Up Time***

Experience has shown that several local commissions can be set up in a few months. Adequate time should be taken to carefully compose the members of a Peace Commission to ensure balance and effectiveness.

***Other Resource Considerations***

The resources needed to set up a Peace Commission include training for members in conciliating disputes, running meetings, negotiating skills, mediation, facilitation, and the content of any existing peace accords. Evaluation reports on the South Africa commissions stress the importance of all Commission members being together for training. In Nicaragua, while commission members have little formal education or specific training in conflict resolution and mediation, many were very effective due to skills acquired through their religious background.

Also needed are appropriate meeting venues, and the ability to take minutes and organize meetings, produce reports, and coordinate with the Secretariat. Access to political, economic (money), technical resources, such as communications equipment, is also beneficial, as is means of transportation where necessary.

Funds can come from the government, from bilateral government organizations, multilateral agencies, or NGOs. In Nueva Guinea, Nicaragua, access for Peace Commissions to vital resources was limited by their bottom-up approach and lack of ties with the government. However, the South African case suggests that Commission funding should ideally come from an independent, neutral entity, not from the government or other institution involved in the conflicts. In South Africa, although the Peace Commissions received adequate funding from the government, their dependence on the government partly compromised their effectiveness because of widespread perceptions of partiality. Members with church denominational ties can help arrange for funding through church bodies in and outside the country.

External organizations such as the UN, EU, and OAU have contributed to strengthening peace structures, such as in South Africa, by contributing observers, training, and funding. The presence of international observers

with members of peace commissions at public events can help reduce the threat of violence by political rivals. In South Africa, for example, the international observers coordinate with the Peace Commissions, attend meetings, and communicate regularly with political groups across the spectrum, keeping informed of planned events and potential conflicts.

*Timeframe*

Many of these local commissions have rapidly made an impact on the conflict situation in their communities. While Peace Commissions can quickly act to assist in limiting political violence, they cannot alone overcome structural causes of political conflict.

## Examples

National, regional, and local peace commissions in Nicaragua, including the Nueva Guinea Zonal Peace Commissions. Local and regional peace commissions in South Africa. Ethnic Conciliation Commissions in Eastern Europe.

After the 1994 Akobo Peace Conference (an initiative of community elders in southern Sudan to address intercommunal conflict between two sections of the Nuer), mobile peace commissions were formed which included community and church leaders. They were tasked with traveling to fishing holes and cattle camps to explain, monitor and promote the peace agreement.

## References

For information on the *Ethnic Conciliation Commissions*, see the Partners for Democratic Change, in affiliation with the Centers on Conflict Resolution in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, and The Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University.

For the South Africa Peace Commissions, see Peter Gastrow (in bibliography); Timothy Sisk, "South Africa's National Peace Accord," *Peace and Change*, Vol. 19, No. 1, January 1994, pp. 50-70.

On the Nicaraguan case, see Craig Kaufmann (in bibliography) and John Paul Lederach (in bibliography).

## Illustration

- ***Outside the Greater Horn***

**Ethnic Conciliation Commissions**

Responding to concerns that ethnic tensions throughout Central and Eastern Europe and the Russian Federation could threaten European regional security, Partners for Democratic Change launched an initiative in 1992 to develop local ***Ethnic Conciliation Commissions*** in areas experiencing significant ethnic tensions. By 1995, six commissions were operating in Bulgaria (in Plovidiv and Sliven), the Czech Republic (in Prague District 5), Hungary (in Ozd and Salgotarjan), and Poland (Sejny). The effect

the Commissions have had on ethnic relations within each area and the role the Commissions have played in wider regional efforts to prevent the escalation of ethnic tensions into armed, violent conflict still needs to be evaluated.

These commissions did not develop spontaneously from the local populations, but were established through the coordinated efforts of local community members, local government and NGOs, and outside actors. These commissions can provide lessons on the viability of developing a coordinated mechanism that strengthens civil society's ability to constructively manage conflict and change. The purpose of the Conciliation Commissions are to provide leadership and advocacy to secure, protect and promote human rights, to promote ethnic, religious, and national harmony, and to encourage understanding through education of cultural differences. The Commissions seek to advance these goals by providing an impartial, non-partisan forum for the peaceful expression of majority-minority and minority-minority conflicts and by conducting educational outreach and training in cross-cultural communication and cooperative problem-solving skills and processes within the various communities. The Commissions consist of 11-15 members who represent the various ethnic, religious, and national groups in their communities. They are all respected people in their communities, capable of bringing together knowledge and resources complementary to the purpose of the Commissions. Commission members and a chair person are either appointed or elected as determined by the city creating the Commission for a three-year term.

The functions and duties of the Commissions are:

- To study, investigate, mediate, and hold public hearings on community-wide problems which may result in inter-group tensions or discrimination.
- To prepare and disseminate cross-cultural and human rights educational and informational material. To develop courses of instruction in human rights.
- To act cooperatively with other public agencies, especially schools, and private persons or organizations engaged in similar human rights activities and programs.
- To prepare, engage, and coordinate programs, research, and publications designed to promote good will and reduce or eliminate inequalities and disadvantages resulting from past discriminatory practices.
- To submit an annual report and make recommendations to the Mayor and City Council about legislation to aid in carrying the purpose of the Commissions.
- To investigate incidents, potential or actual, of ethnic, religious, or national minority conflicts and allegations of discrimination in employment, housing, education, or public facilities.

**South Africa, National, Regional and Local Peace Commissions**

In South Africa, guidelines were specified in the National Peace Accord for creating Dispute Resolution Commissions, later known as Peace Commissions, at the national, regional and local levels to assist in actively combating violence and intimidation at regional and local levels, with national coordination. The aim was to create a nationwide network of peace structures in a society that was deeply divided and experiencing widespread political violence. The September 1991 National Peace Accord set up a nationwide dispute resolution system which includes top-level mechanisms aimed at resolving disputes among political elites, and grassroots commissions to address conflict on the ground.

The National Peace Commission (NPC) was created by each of the signatories providing one or two members to serve on the Commission, resulting in approximately 60 in the NPC, most of whom were

senior and experienced politicians. Their task is to oversee implementation of the NPA and ensure compliance. Although the NPC meets 4-5 times a year and an executive commission about every 3 weeks, it has not been the high-level compliance/arbitration mechanism envisaged. Its powers to call a meeting of signatories and to refer violations and disputes to binding arbitration have not been exercised.

A National Peace Secretariat (NPS) is permanent and full-time, consisting of 7 persons nominated by the major political parties, one from the legal profession, and one representative of the Department of Justice. The NPS was to establish and administer Regional and Local Dispute Resolution Commissions (RDRCs and LDRCs), which later came to be known as Regional and Local Peace Commissions (RPCs and LPCs). A seven-member NPS was created in November 1991, including one representative each from the ANC alliance, the National Party, the IFP, the Democratic Party, the Labour Party, and the legal profession, and one member from the Department of Justice. Their immediate task was to establish RDRCs, with priority to the most violence-torn regions.
Regional leaders of various organizations (referred to in the NPA) were invited to attend exploratory meetings to discuss establishment of RDRCs. Each region required a different approach because of political, demographic, historical, and other differences. Since senior members of some political parties/alliances were on the NPS, in areas where those organizations were key players those members of the NPS could prepare the way by explaining to their respective regional leadership what the meetings were all about and attempting to secure their cooperation. The preparatory meetings organized and attended by the NPS in the different regions were often tense, crisis ridden, and confrontational. By the middle of December 1991, RDRCs were established in three regions, and by the end of September 1993 11 RPCs had been established. Once an RDRC was established, an office and staff had to be found and LDRCs had to be established. The national government, through the Department of Justice, provided financial and administrative resources to the NPS and the other structures it established. RPCs were to include representatives from "relevant" political organizations, churches, trade unions, industry and business in the region, local and tribal authorities, and from the police and defence force. Their stated duties in the NPA included advising on matters causing violence and intimidation in the region; settling disputes causing political violence or intimidation by negotiation with the parties concerned and recording the terms of such settlements; guiding LPCs; monitoring current applicable peace accords and future peace agreements in the relevant region and settling related disputes; informing the NPS of steps taken to prevent violence and intimidation in its region including breaches in agreements; and consulting with authorities in the region to combat or prevent violence and intimidation. RPCs also identify communities where LPCs should be established.

LPCs comprise "representatives reflecting the needs of the relevant community." Their stated duties include creating trust and reconciliation between grassroots community leadership of relevant organizations, including security forces; cooperating with the local Justice of the Peace in combating and preventing violence and intimidation; settling disputes causing public violence or intimidation by negotiating with the parties concerned; eliminating conditions which may harm peace accords or peaceful relations, and promote compliance with peace accords; to agree upon rules and conditions relating to marches, rallies and gatherings; and liaise with local police and magistrates on matters concerning the prevention of violence and political events. Representatives of relevant political organizations, churches, business, trade unions, the police, and security forces serve on the peace commissions to resolve disputes at the grassroots level. Each commission reports to the Secretariat.

The grassroots-based conflict resolution structures of the Accord are generally operating as envisaged. As of mid-1993, the full complement of 11 regional commissions had been established and were operative,

and by October 1993, approximately 180 LPCs were in operation, with more being established. Commission work was bolstered by hiring full-time staff in each of the regions, and establishment of regional offices. Numerous regional and local offices were operating, with 239 paid staff working in the peace structures throughout the country, and 8,500 volunteers, consisting of members of the various peace commissions, monitors, and other helpers. Therefore, in at least 180 local communities, residents were witnessing community leaders, police, political groups, tribal chiefs, and church representatives sitting around the same table and jointly addressing community issues, when in the past many rival groups would not have communicated. (For example, police and defense force members formerly had not been able to establish normal communication channels with many black political activists in townships.)

A police spokesman, speaking of a local peace commission related in an interview that "We cannot do without them...They are seen as neutral and can communicate with those groups who don't feel they can communicate with the police."

At first it was proposed that whites should be deployed in white areas and blacks in the townships, but that was rejected in favor of mixed-race teams.

Peace Committees have helped to create a measure of trust among themselves and show it is possible to work with "enemies" for the common good, introducing the notions of political tolerance and political pluralism among the communities where LPCs are established.

Extensive efforts were undertaken to provide training for the members and other volunteers, including skills in facilitation, mediation, and conflict management.

For the first 18 months after the signing of the accord, all funds required for the peace structures were paid directly from the government's Department of Justice or the Department of Finance. The government budgeted R41.175 million ($12.2 million) for FY 1993/94 for the activities of the NPS, the RPCs and LPCs (some funds were also provided by the Danish government for training and the British government for communication equipment). The overwhelming reliance on government funding led to the perception the peace structures were under the control of the government, with the implication that manipulation could take place or was taking place, and a risk that peace commissions would be hampered by red tape. To shorten cumbersome procedures required by government financial regulations for handling public funds and to become more visibly independent from the government, it was agreed the NPS would administer funds through its own account in accord with agreed procedures. In many areas of the country, facilitators had to be appointed on a paid basis to assist in establishing committees or to facilitate and mediate in disputes. The Peace Secretariat has gained more budget autonomy — still funded by the government but with independent accounts and fiduciary control — and has an annual operating budget of nearly $12 million.

The peace commissions have facilitated in hundreds of disputes throughout the country, arising from various sources, including the following: withholding of permission for political marches and rallies; police conduct during marches and rallies; attempts by one political group to prevent another from engaging in political activities; threatened or actual consumer boycotts or refusal to pay for municipal services; and threats to withdraw such services. The RPCs and LPCs have dealt with various issues; i.e., joint planning and monitoring of political rallies and marches in volatile areas, relations between worker hostel dwellers and township residents, violence in workplace settings, gang rivalry and localized conflict.

For example, in May 1993 during the funeral of ANC leader Oliver Tambo, LPC members were out in force. Trouble was always feared whenever large crowds of ANC supporters and police were around, and especially since the funeral two weeks earlier of leader Chris Hani had turned violent and the mood in the country was still tense. LPC members in teams of four per car, linked by two-way radio, deployed at strategic positions around the stadium where clashes might erupt. They traveled with the funeral procession to deter provocations by either side. When the procession was to go past an area controlled by the ANC rival Inkatha, which threatened to attack passing mourners, the LPC members intervened, asking the ANC to take a different route. The police agreed to redeploy their forces, and the LPC struck a deal with Inkatha to keep its supporters inside as long as the ANC remained out of sight. No incidents of trouble were reported during the event.

Getting a commission going is difficult. Parties often insist on several preconditions before a commission can meet. Once constituted, problems include participation and infrastructure. Finding representative, capable and willing participants at the local level has been difficult in some places. Community leaders are uncertain of the commissions' purposes, power, and prospects; they are wary of being drawn into cooperation with rival political forces, undercutting their own legitimacy. In some cases, participation puts members lives in jeopardy. For example, in Natal, several peace commission participants have been assassinated. The range of participation has also been limited, lacking women, youths, and church leaders willing or able to participate.

Some argue the structure and format of the commissions encourage an adversarial, not conciliatory, relationship among the participants. Limiting representation primarily to local political party leaders can reduce participants to squabbling over blame instead of serious dialogue to seek solutions and practical measures to prevent further violence. Commissions are also decried as imposed, top-down structures, out of touch with community sentiments and needs. Because the stimulus for formation of the PCs did not originate at or near the grassroots, communities have been slow to gain a sense of ownership over them. A common sentiment is that political elites at the top created the local-level structures, then thrust responsibility for them on organizationally weak political organizations and ill-prepared NGOs, without adequate attention, resources, or commitment.

The RPCs and LPCs faced a difficult adjustment period, and have had varying degrees of success, some making more progress than others. In especially tumultuous areas, some commissions found it difficult to isolate themselves from the tensions and hatreds present.

The establishment of several credible local peace structures and the effective joint planning and monitoring of political marches by monitors from peace structures have given some RPCs credibility and standing widely recognized in the community.

The UN Security Council authorized the deployment of the UN Observer Mission to South Africa (UNOMSA) and specifically mandated the observers to strengthen ties with the National Peace Accord structures. The international monitors have considerably bolstered the peace structures, and their presence has been effective in containing some political violence. UNOMSA officials regularly attend political rallies and demonstrations, RPC and LPC meetings, and NPC meetings and consult weekly with NPS staff.

## Nueva Guinea Zonal Peace Commission

In 1986 a group of concerned citizens in the rural Nueva Guinea region of Nicaragua began meeting to respond to violence, resulting in the formation of what are now known as local peace commissions. In some cases, the creation local peace commissions in the Nueva Guinea area and elsewhere was not centrally organized: they were generated somewhat "spontaneously" from the grassroots level up. Almost simultaneously, however, a top-down approach was also occurring. The Esquipulas II peace agreement, signed in early 1987, included a provision that all five of the Central American countries which were involved then in civil conflicts would form national reconciliation commissions. The National Commission in Nicaragua also moved to establish and support Peace Commissions at the zonal and local levels, although resources were very scarce. A zonal peace commission fills a coordinating role, overseeing the work of existing local peace commissions and the development of new peace commissions. As of early 1995, there were over 85 local peace commissions.

According to one account, local peace commissions have gained credibility and legitimacy in their communities such that community members often come to commission members rather than going to the police or acting on their own. These commissions have played a significant role in maintaining peace and lowering the levels of violence in the region. At their annual assembly, several local commissions presented cases in which they had intervened in communities to prevent the escalation of violence during incidents of kidnapping, robbing, land disputes, and clashes with the government.

# 4. Indigenous Conflict Management and Resolution Mechanisms (Community-Based/Traditional/Indigenous Mediation; Community-Based Conflict Mitigation; Grassroots Approaches to Peace)

## Description

The term "Indigenous Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms" describes mediation by local, indigenous parties to establish and maintain peace, using traditional mechanisms for managing and resolving conflicts within the community as well as with other communities.

Many communities perceive state-run legal and judicial institutions as intrusive and ill-suited for representing indigenous concepts of justice, and prefer to resolve conflicts within the community. Use of local mechanisms gives communities an ability to resolve some types of disputes more permanently, and without resort to the state-run judicial system, police, or other external structures. The use of both official and non-official initiatives provides a basis for communication and the development of a constituency for peace.

### *Objectives*

Indigenous Conflict Management/Resolution Mechanisms can help manage conflicts through their use of community-based judicial/legal decision-making. Use of such mechanisms by community members can precede or even replace use of external dispute resolution for certain types of conflicts, thereby reducing reliance on external structures. Potentially, use of such mechanisms can resolve conflicts with more appropriate, complete and locally-owned resolution. Use of local mechanisms has the potential to prevent some conflicts from elevating beyond the community or immediate inter-community levels. While local peace processes are not likely to stop a large conflict, they can help prevent the escalation or spread of disputes to even larger conflicts.

### *Expected Outcome or Impact*

Negotiations often result in agreements which keep broader inter-communal relations positive, creating environments where nomads can graze together, townspeople can live together, and merchants can trade together, even though military men remain unreconciled.

The mediation incorporates a consensus-building approach involving open discussions to provide information and clarify issues. Both parties are more likely to accept a decision from the mediators than from another source, since an elder's decision is not considered to entail a loss of face and is backed by social pressure. The end result is, ideally, a sense of unity, shared involvement and responsibility.

### *Relationship to Conflict Prevention*

Local mechanisms can be used to resolve some types of community disputes internally before they can escalate to the level of violent conflict. Use of such mechanisms can reduce reliance on external, state-run

judicial/legal structures for certain types of disputes. Depending on the origin of the dispute and the presence or absence of various complicating factors, local mechanisms can be used to prevent or reduce the level of violent conflict resulting from inter-community disputes, or to bring about local reconciliation of a more widespread violent conflict.

## Applicability

***Strengths and Weaknesses***

Conflict management mediators from the local community are generally more sensitive to local needs than outsiders. Traditional mediation helps the community keep control over the outcome of the dispute. This approach provides a low-cost, empowering means of resolving conflicts within a relatively short time frame. In the past, the resolutions were generally well accepted and respected by all parties concerned (although more recently there has been a loss of respect for this process, especially by armed youth in the community). The implementation of this approach does not require sophisticated party structures or expensive campaigns.

Even though the social influence of the elders is important, the verdict is only accepted because both parties agree to it. In some cases, the elders cannot compel either party to accept a decision nor exert coercive sanctions, while in others there is a political structure of chiefs and sub-chiefs with the authority to enforce the decisions (although, as previously mentioned, they more recently face difficulties in enforcement against armed elements of the community). The power of traditional structures to prevent the occurrence of crime and violence is increasingly limited.

Traditional mechanisms have been less effective in areas where foreign aid resources were heavily concentrated; such aid is believed by many to have a negative consequence of actually stimulating conflict as well as undermining local structures and mechanisms.

Age and gender biases do exist in some cases. For example, where there are no women elders, some women believe the male elders are biased against women, and therefore the decisions they will reflect this.

It is possible for one or both parties to feel that their concerns were not properly addressed, which could result in a recurrence of the conflict.

There is a lack of written documentation regarding past and present cases, resulting in inconsistency as similar cases are sometimes treated differently.

The erosion of traditional authority and an increase in the predominance of armed authority seriously diminishes the continuation and potential of local conflict management and reconciliation methods, which are based on traditional values.

***Lessons Learned/ Recommendations***

In the process of strengthening international and regional institutions, internal solutions have been neglected. As conflict is inherent in society, so are the mechanisms for dealing with it. Even though a society is in a state of conflict, local means of resolving disputes still exist and can be brought to bear.

External initiatives can renew "indigenous forms of peacemaking and conflict resolution to restore the balance in society," destroyed by modern internal war. Such work must rebuild indigenous peacemaking capacity from the bottom up, and from the periphery in. The attempt by external parties to recreate an overly centralized government in Somalia, for example, created conflict among political and military rivals positioning themselves for the spoils of state control, and exacerbated the civil war. High profile peace forums financed and organized by external parties may interfere more than assist in producing plausible settlements, especially if not conducted in coordination with local (non-military) leaders. At the national or international level, such efforts may require external support, such as logistical assistance, and probably should be accompanied by other actions to prevent the immediate outbreak of violence. The following are additional guidelines for such initiatives:

- Key authority structures of conflicting parties must be included in the process, including traditional, military, administrative, and religious leaders.
- Women's groups and leaders must be a part of the process from the beginning.
- Traditional conflict resolution mechanisms should be used.
- Those with moral authority in the community must be central to the process. Educated exiles have a role to play as well.
- External support should be minimal and fill gaps, taking care not to replace indigenous leadership.
- These indigenous processes represent long-term interactions between traditional and modern societies, and cannot act as quick fixes.

## Conflict Situation

***Stage of Conflict***

This approach for mediating disputes can be used at all stages of a conflict: from on-the-spot mediation to prevent the outbreak of violence to efforts toward reconciliation after the dispute has escalated to violent conflict. These processes can take place before formal peace structures have been established.

***Conflict Type***

Traditional Mediation is very effective in dealing with interpersonal or inter-community conflicts. This approach has been used at the grassroots level to settle disputes over border/land confrontations, watering rights, grazing-land rights, fishing rights, marital problems, inheritance/ownership rights, money cases dealing with the abduction of women, murder, brideprice, cattle raiding, theft, rape, banditry, and inter-ethnic and religious conflicts. By using existing accessible structures, this process has the potential to be used at the national and international level to create a more participatory and harmonious society.

***Cause of Conflict Addressed***

Traditional Mediation is an effective means of addressing structural root causes of conflict.

## Implementation

***Organizers***

In many cultures, one or both parties of a dispute will request the intervention of an elder, the elder council, or another appropriate community member. The mediator's open, consensus-building discussion provides the opportunity to find common ground where both disputing parties are able to meet in a win/win approach without the fear of losing face. Occasionally, the elders unite and take the initiative in forming a local council to represent the interests of the community. The elders function as a court with exceptionally broad and flexible powers to interpret evidence, impose judgements, and manage the process of reconciliation.

***Participants***

Community members involved in the conflict participate in the dispute resolution process.

***Implementors***

Generally, the mediators must understand the nature and history of the conflict and the relationships within the community. Traditional authorities, (elders, chiefs), women's organizations, local institutions and professional associations have critical roles to play in the development of grassroots peace building. In many societies, elders are recognized as having traditional power for facilitating and arbitrating the process and events, and monitoring the outcomes. Moral status and the customary skills of elders are important for their success. Generally, the local conflict mediators possess qualifications such as seniority, neutrality, acceptability to all parties, respect of the community, demonstrated leadership capacity, and status in the community.

***Activities***

In a typical scenario, one or both parties of a dispute will request the intervention of an elder, or other traditional leader or mediator. Discussion of the problem is led and channeled by the mediator. Parties typically do not address each other, therefore eliminating direct confrontation. Interruptions are not allowed while parties state their case. These statements are followed by an open deliberation which may consist of

listening to and cross-examining witnesses, the free expression of grievances, caucusing with both groups, reliance on circumstantial evidence, visiting dispute scenes, seeking opinions and views of neighbors, reviewing past cases, holding private consultations, and wide input to finding solutions.

The process may be time-consuming and encourage broad discussion of many aspects that may seem unrelated to the central problem, as the mediator tries to situate the conflict in the disputants' frame of reference and decide on an appropriate style and format of intervention.

The elders or other traditional mediators use their judgment and position of moral ascendancy to find an accepted solution. The decision -- in some societies based upon consensus of the elders' or chiefs' council -- may be rendered on the spot. Resolution may involve the arrangement of restitution if necessary, forgiveness and mutual formal release of the problem.

*Negative Impacts on Traditional Mechanisms.* In many cultures, traditional mechanisms for resolving conflicts have been overrun, usurped, or removed by "modern", external structures, some deliberately, some unintentionally. Significant portions of various societies no longer rely on traditional ways of social organization, including those of handling conflict. More "modern" or Western conflict resolution mechanisms may not fulfill community needs or function adequately in some types of disputes. The marginalization of traditional authority in some locations has had profound consequences, including the severing of channels for transmitting basic values and a consequent increase in the raping and killing of women and children. In the efforts of international agencies to build local capacity and enhance participation, they need to question whether traditional authority structures are being undermined, what their role is in keeping the society intact and managing conflict, and whether it is important to make efforts to retain such structures.

*Encouraging Indigenous Mechanisms.* International agencies could ensure the participation of local actors in conflict management is not marginalized as the new, "modern" institutions and infrastructure external actors are sponsoring develop. The dissemination of traditional values toward conflict management can be promoted by international agencies and others, in loose coordination with local communities. They can encourage conflict resolution structures grounded in local culture and norms, through partnering with existing local institutions.

Those concerned with resuscitating local conflict management mechanisms can help provide and support opportunities for grassroots-level leaders and others to work at the community or village level on issues of peace and conflict resolution. The establishment of conflict management mechanisms must take into account the moral authority of indigenous peacemakers such

as elders, and whatever steps they have already taken in establishing local level peace agreements. They can identify the strengths of previous mechanisms, re-establish them and adapt them to current demands. However, local peace-making initiatives should be encouraged and external assistance should be handled carefully to preserve the self-help effort of local initiatives. Monitoring arrangements and training are needed to build trust that the agreed-upon resolution will be carried out by all involved parties.

Steps external supporters can take include:

- Help to build and restore indigenous regional conflict resolution structures and capabilities.
- Build on traditional structures for peace and conflict resolution, make use of those structures in ongoing conflicts.
- Develop a strategy for identifying existing conflict resolvers and peacemakers within each cultural group in the operating area, validate and empower existing conflict resolvers, and create opportunities for their interaction with other communities.
- Help local partners to evaluate some of the traditions and approaches to peacemaking that worked for them in the past, and think how they can be helpful today.
- Learn what can be done by external actors to bolster such mechanisms and actors to increase their effectiveness, or as a minimum, to not harm them -- to avoid eroding or undermining them or their authority.
- Sponsor forums to develop comprehensive strategies for conflict mitigation activities in the region.
- Conduct workshops to focus on a process by which local groups can be empowered to help themselves in managing conflict.
- Provide an opportunity for NGO and government personnel to explore the application of community-based conflict mitigation by learning from the experience of practitioners in the field.
- Pay attention to traditional customs, cultures, and roles, and learn the community structure in areas where external actors are operating programs, including the role of the elders, women, and other leaders (especially non-military leaders).

- Support or develop local venues for mitigation and mediation rather than outside the country, and allow enough time for those processes to take place.

*The Role of Women.* In some societies, women have played a unique role in conflict management and resolution. External agencies can attempt to encourage the inclusion of women in negotiations, and recognize the roles of women in peacemaking and conflict, through measures such as:

- Hold workshops to promote dialogue among women at the regional level.
- Sponsor training to develop women's conflict resolution skills.
- Provide assistance to women's groups interested in developing peace education and civic education materials for use in schools and the media.
- Facilitate the evolution of regional umbrella women's organizations to serve as mechanisms for information sharing and coordination and to maximize lobbying power for greater participation of women in the reconciliation and development processes.

After marriage in Somalia, for example, a woman retains her kinship ties with her father's group. This dual kinship role through marriage often occurs across two neighboring but warring clans. Often they provide the only means of communication between rival clans, since their status allows them to cross clan boundaries. In Somalia and elsewhere, women have often undertaken the role of ambassadors between rival groups. There are examples in Somalia and other societies of delegations of women being sent to their clans of origin to persuade their maternal relatives to pass on communication and encourage the initiation of cross-clan dialogue.

*Influence of Poetry for Encouraging Peacemaking.* Poetry is the a celebrated and respected art form in Somalia and many other societies, and has been involved in peacemaking. In many such cultures, poetry is widely understood and enjoyed, and has the power to influence opinion. In inter-clan peace conferences, distinguished poets have recited poems advocating peace. Poetry in Somalia can help move people toward war or reconciliation. It can help identify grievances, argue for causes, rights and responsibilities, and justify the views and demands of different groups. The modern parallel of the traditional mechanism of poetry is mass media's effect on public opinion.

*Local Peace Conferences.* An open, multiple, and cross-clan peace conference is preceded by a combination of subclan deliberations about grievances, issues and representation, then a series of cross-subclan

deliberations and consultations. Through this consultative process, perspectives are gathered, procedural steps are negotiated, and the basic parameters are set for moving toward a more explicit forum, guided by the (called the *guurti* in Somalia). They set parameters, negotiate agenda, and establish the beginnings of a reconciliation process. the process builds from smaller collectives toward a larger forum, a bottom-up approach to peace building. The larger forum or peace conference can take the form of large, usually public meetings, which involve lengthy speeches and the extensive use of poetry. Preparing for and holding such a peace conference commonly lasts four to six months. Throughout the process, the elders help prepare, moderate, listen, and often arbitrate procedural problems, and help formulate an eventual consensus of the clans. Various inter and subclan deliberations also occur on the side simultaneously. Key authority structures of conflicting parties must be included in the process, including traditional, military, administrative, and religious leaders.

***Budget***

The activities of the local peace process are generally very economical. Some expenses may be incurred by agencies providing support and education to assist in promoting or re-establishing local mediation efforts.

***Set-Up Time***

It is critical to respect local time frames for planning and implementing local peace processes.

***Other Resource Considerations***

A setting which is non-threatening and familiar to the parties involved is needed. Local efforts may be financed solely through community sources, or may require external, including international, support (especially in the initial stage of rejuvenating such mechanisms). However, external assistance must take care to supplement rather than overwhelm existing local grassroots initiatives. In the view of some, high profile peace forums financed and organized by international organizations, may interfere more than assist in producing plausible settlements at times, especially if not conducted in coordination with local leaders.

***Timeframe***

Traditional Mediation at the grassroots level can be applied in some cases immediately on the spot, decreasing the potential for violence. Traditional peacemaking may also be slow and cumbersome: the mediation continues until a solution is found acceptable to all parties. However, it can help reach lasting reconciliation.

These indigenous processes represent long-term interactions between traditional and modern societies, and cannot act as quick fixes. The conflict must be placed firmly in historical context for the participants and outside observers. This may take more time than outside observers are accustomed, and the discussion of "important" issues will generally occur only after other obligatory topics have been handled. Some peace conferences can go on for months.

***Preconditions***

An existing (even if currently dormant) tradition of local conflict management mechanisms is necessary, and the presence of mediators willing and credible to play the role of traditional mediators is required.

## Examples

Locally initiated peace conferences and agreements in Sudan, including:

- Grassroots peace conferences in Eastern and Western Torit District which involved the Catholic church and community leaders.
- The Dinka-Misseriya peace agreements in the transitional zone between north and south which more or less have held for commercial and deterrence reasons for seven years, but more recently are under extreme threat.
- The Jikany-Lou Nuer Reconciliation Conference held in Akobo, South Sudan between July and October 1994.
- In the Upper Nile area of southern Sudan, World Vision helped provide relief supplies and food to support a peace conference among local leaders.

The role of elders and elders' councils are crucial in local peacemaking in the Ethiopian and Somali societies as well:

- The Qabri Dahar conference in Region Five (the Ogaden), which brought together a significant cross-section of the political and traditional leadership of the Ogaden, stopped the planting of landmines, reduced tensions between the army and local population, drew many of the Ogadeni National Liberation Front (ONLF) fighters out of the bush, increased commerce, and temporarily brought some consensus about the future of the region.
- In Somaliland, "By solving the disputes at the level of traditional social organization, the elders were able to deprive the politicians of the possibility of making war, and thus help to create the conditions of peace."
- In 1990 a group of Somali intellectuals in Canada and the US set up an organization "to empower local structures in peacemaking" in Somalia, known as the Somali Peace and Consultation Committee (ERGADA). This organization also received support from a Swedish NGO, the Life and Peace Institute (LPI).

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## Illustration

- ***Inside the Greater Horn***

***Somalia***

Traditional social organizations are often the means by which local communities resolve conflicts. The breakdown into "warlordism" resulted in turning back to clan and subclan structures to meet basic needs, including security, and the adaptation of traditional mechanisms to resolve interclan killings and scarce resource conflicts. While the reascendency of clan politics in Somalia encouraged certain patterns of conflict, it also favored the revival of traditional mechanisms for dealing with interclan disputes. Lineage elders, who led smaller units within the clan, returned to prominence. The mediating authority of Akils, the heads of lineage groups, was reestablished, and their functions expanded into the vacuum left by the collapse of the national government. The mechanisms for establishing peace depend on joint community committees formed at the local level, which are empowered to implement agreements reached by Councils of Elders. Another local authority is responsible for dealing with banditry and minor disturbances.

According to a survey of traditional local structures to establish and maintain peace in Somalia/Somaliland commissioned by the NGO ACTIONAID, such structures have enabled Somalis (in some areas) "...to break the momentum of war..."

*Peace Conferences.* In many areas residents have an approach of first achieving agreements to end the fighting through local peace conferences. These peace conferences brought together and were guided by the elders of contiguous and interdependent subclans. These conferences dealt with immediate issues of concern at local levels, made local leaders responsible for interclan fighting, and helped identify appropriate representatives of those clans' concerns. Once such local agreements were secured, it was possible to repeat a similar process at a higher level with a wider set of clans. These processes included the following characteristics: reliance on elders, lengthy oral deliberations, creation of a forum or

assembly of elders (known in some areas as the *guurti*), and careful negotiations over access to resources and payments for deaths between clans.

The authorization of agreements at peace conferences is given by clan elders, but other traditional leaders, such as politicians, military officers, religious figures and poets, have played crucial roles in the peace process. Religious figures, such as sheikhs and wadaads (Islamic scholars) have peacemaking duties, with an authority based on the esteem with which they are held as spiritual leaders. Spiritual leaders are seen as ideal, neutral arbiters, who have allegiance to universal Islamic values that transcend clan loyalties. They do not settle disputes themselves, or sit in judgment -- this is done by councils of elders. The responsibility of religious figures is to encourage rivals to make peace. Delegations of renowned holy men participated in all major peace initiatives between clans in 'Somaliland.'

In such a context, efforts to identify national leaders or convene peace conferences bringing together key militia leaders creates only a "superficial structure," instead of a process which would build on Somalia traditions and structures. The UN political affairs division belatedly shifted from an earlier concentration on top-level national peace process for Somalia through a series of conferences of political and militia leaders, to a more direct efforts to support a more bottom-up method and political structure, including efforts to establish local and regional councils in late 1993.

The peace and governance-building conference, held between February and June 1995 among the Rahanweyne in Bay and Bakool Regions, helped tamp down intra-Rahanweyne violence, but was not successful in its objective of deterring attacks by neighboring clan militias from Mogadishu, Gedo Region, or the central regions, as General Aidid was able to recapture Baidoa in September 1995 with superior firepower.

A series of peace conferences in Absame areas (in the Juba Valley) reduced intra-Absame conflict, and aimed to galvanize a momentum for peace with neighboring Majerteen in Kismayu and Marehan in Gedo Region.

In May 1993, elders from numerous sub-clans in the economically and strategically critical Mudug region of the central Somali rangelands linking the north and south of Somalia undertook a peace initiative in Galkaiyo. UNOSOM was not involved in its organization and chose not to recognize or support the conference, fearing that General Aidid had hijacked the process. At roughly the same time, UNOSOM was supporting a conference organized by Ali Mahdi and Abshir in the Karaan area of Mogadishu.

The Galkaiyo conference produced a largely successful ceasefire. The conference involved community and religious leaders, businessmen, students, and factional representatives. The agreement involved the return of property, the withdrawal of militias, and the opening of roads. The commercial imperative for peace is the most important factor in the continuing stability in the region. After over six months, a 'national' (Somaliland) peace charter was agreed upon, and basic provisions for law and order were formulated. This effort was successful in establishing a peace lasting for at least four years.

*Northwest.* Other examples of this process were implemented in the northwestern region, known as Somaliland, which declared secession from Somalia in 1991. All clans in Somaliland and some of the large sub-clans, as of late 1993, had their own Supreme Council of Elders, known as *guurti*. These act both as legislature and executive, and are responsible for responding both to questions within the clan and

for arbitrating with other clans. Peacemaking initiatives in this region have been relatively successful compared with the rest of Somalia.

A series of inter-clan reconciliation conferences began in 1991 and gradually advanced to district and regional levels. Two elders' conferences held in Boraama and Sanaag brought together communities and their leaders from northern Somalia in early 1993 to address conflicts in those areas. Both led to a significant reduction of tensions in Somaliland. The Boraama conference created a national security framework for Somaliland, developed an interim constitutional structure, and facilitated a peaceful change in government. The agreement held until October 1994, when fighting erupted between the government army and an opposition militia. The Sanaag conference managed to keep the peace in Erigavo at least two years despite major external pressures.

John Paul Lederach observes that two ingredients were critical for the success of the Boraama meetings: a series of local clan meetings which preceded the conference; and the fact that clan elders initiated and conducted the meetings. Having the process rooted in the place of conflict was another important factor. The conference in Boraama cost roughly $100,000 for five months, a minute fraction of the weekly cost of the UN's mediation efforts in Mogadishu, Nairobi and Addis. The key pieces, according to another observer, Rakiya Omaar, were in place: "community support, participation in and ownership of the process, common goals, legitimate representation and a long-term process." The Boroma conference received international support, as did the follow up conference in the Sanaag region. However, most other successful clan conferences in the north were financed through the community.

### *Sudan*

*Dinka-Nuer Conflict.* The fratricidal inter-communal conflict between Dinka and Nuer communities in southern Sudan caused more death and destruction in four years than the larger conflict between the Sudan government and the SPLA. Between September 1994 and June 1995, there were a number of significant moves made by traditional leaders, junior rebel officers, women's groups, exiled southern politicians, local church leaders, and merchants to bridge the divide between neighboring Dinka and Nuer communities in the Upper Nile region. The situation was "ripe" for support from the outside, and even the rival rebel commanders were feeling the heat to negotiate from their internal constituencies. But with little fertilization from the outside, both rebel leaders were able to undermine the initiatives sufficiently. Another cycle of cross-line raids began, and military responses recaptured the upper hand. In this case, direct support for inter-communal negotiations and for local groups favoring peaceful solutions might have made a huge difference to hundreds of thousands of residents of that region. Instead, they will be receiving emergency inputs of a much higher cost to donors as the conflict escalates again, which appears likely.

*Ikotos Conference.* The Eastern Equatoria province of southern Sudan is a melting pot of ethnicity, including the Lotuko, Didinga, Boya and Toposa. Historically, cattle rustling is endemic in the region, going even beyond Sudan's borders into Kenya and Ethiopia. Intercommunal conflict had increased in the Lotuko areas following the SPLA split in 1991 due to constant clashes for control of certain areas and the rise of banditry and large-scale cattle raiding.

In response, the two major Christian churches of the region, the Catholic and African Inland Church, joined together to write a Pastoral Letter which was read during Christmas ceremonies in 1994. The

Letter emphasized the local Lotuko concept of *emwara* (reconciliation). Leaders of the Catholic Diocese of Torit began visiting villages to discuss the *emwara* concept.

Consequently, in January 1995 the Diocese hosted a peace conference in Ikotos, involving roughly 7,000 participants, including chiefs, teachers, youths, and SPLA leaders and members. The conference resolved many of the conflict issues, i.e.: Given that the escalating price for the dowry was a reason for increased involvement of young men in cattle rustling, the conferees agreed to reduce the dowry from thirty to ten cows. Those caught raiding would be fined double their take. Compensation for wrongful death was set at 22 cows. Traveling outside one's own village with guns was disallowed, with confiscation of the weapon the penalty. Soldiers would not be allowed to visit villages without specific orders from their commander. As of mid-1995, the agreement was holding for the most part.

*Akobo Conference.* The Akobo Peace Conference was called to address the serious intra-tribal fighting between the Jikany and Lau sections of the Nuer in Eastern Upper Nile, southern Sudan. The Conference included eighteen delegations of mediators, 500 official delegates, and about 1500 observers from the Jikany and Lau, and lasted from mid-August until late September, 1994. The structure of the Conference included ad hoc committees, traditional courts, an open floor for input, a technical committee to recommend ways forward, and a secretariat. Malual Wun Kuoth, a chief for 44 years from Western Upper Nile, presided over the Conference.

The Conference sought agreement over the use of resources which had been at the heart of the preceding violence. Pasture land, water, and fishing areas all had been subjects of conflict because the larger civil war had cut off traditional grazing and fishing areas for many Nuer. Thus, squeezed onto shrinking lands, the division of access to resources had become an increasingly troublesome process as more communities fought over a steadily reduced pool of resources.

The agreement was signed by ten Lou and twelve Jikany chiefs. It set forth provisions regarding the sharing of water, grazing lands and fishing points and the maintenance of peace and security. Any violator of the agreement was to be apprehended. The covenant was sealed by the sacrifice of two bulls, the conducting of rituals to demonstrate divine support, and the cursing of violators.

Women played a particularly effective witnessing role at the Conference, acting as an informal 'truth commission.' As *maan naaths* (mothers of the nation) the Nuer women would shout down any man whose testimony contained falsehoods. The shame of the women's hoots drove many men to revise their testimony to avoid the embarrassment of being tainted as a cowardly liar.

Immediately after the Akobo Peace Conference, the South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A, the rebel authority in the area) held a Convention which endorsed the resolutions of the Conference.

The Akobo Conference follows a tradition of conferences which from the 1940s codified and subsequently modified Nuer traditional law. The conferences served to maintain Nuer culture and steer the community's response to new challenges. No conference had been held previously since 1973.

# C. Military Measures

## Tools:

- Confidence-Building Measures
- Professionalization of Militaries

# 5. Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBM)

## Description

Confidence and security-building measures are agreements between governments requiring exchanges of information, joint activities and achievement of mutual goals regarding the size, composition, movements and use of their respective military forces and armaments.

### *Objectives*

The purpose of CSBMs is to lessen tensions by allaying anxieties or suspicions and clarifying intentions about military force activities. By increasing the reliable knowledge countries have about each other, CSBMs seek to prevent conflict through gradually eroding barriers for closer or more stable political and diplomatic relations.

The use of CSBMs is aimed toward precluding misjudgments and avoiding misunderstandings about ambiguous events and policies or perceived hostilities and threats that otherwise might result in confrontations or war.

### *Expected Outcome or Impact*

By creating processes of contact and interaction between parties that require communication of credible information, CSBMs are intended to reduce tensions and allay anxieties and suspicions, remove uncertainties and unwarranted fears. Greater mutual transparency and thus predictability of the policies and actions of other governments will reduce fears and potential distrust, thereby lowering the risks of war from miscalculation, misunderstanding of intentions, and miscommunication.

### *Relationship to Conflict Prevention*

Mutual confidence is essential to reducing the likelihood of conflict between states. In the short run, CSBMs aim to alter distrustful perceptions of parties and their motives toward each other, and thus avoid misjudgments of possible military actions and policies that might otherwise provoke violent conflict.

While a single CSBM may not prevent a conflict, a cumulative series of such agreements can provide reassurance the parties involved. Over time, CSBMs can erode barriers standing in the way of closer, more stable, political and diplomatic relations, change a country's concept of its military security needs and interests, and even encourage moves to identify shared security or other interests.

## Applicability

### *Strengths and Weaknesses*

Although most regions have some CSBM initiatives, their respective politics and interests limit the scope of issues around which they address functional issues. For example, the Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) first

took up human rights and then expanded into security, while the OAS stated with security and only recently moved into human rights.

CSBMs can start small, but proceed gradually as the parties are willing to address certain issues. Even small gains and incremental changes can be useful and should be pursued.

CSBMs are less likely to be effective if some parties are militarily dominant and use this power to intimidate or coerce the others to its will.

Some parties could "take advantage of the other by exploiting unilaterally the information acquired."[1]

CSBMs are ill-advised if some of the parties flagrantly flout widely-accepted international or regional standards.

CSBMs depend on the voluntary compliance of signatories.

***Lessons Learned/ Recommendations***

Military CSBMs are most likely to succeed and be sustained when augmented with political and other CSBMs. CSBMs can be precursors to further cooperation in other spheres and indicate a commitment to future peaceful co-existence.

CSBMs are more difficult to achieve if major powers outside the region are in competition with each other for influence in the region and try to exert pressures on regional governments, thus increasing divisions among them.

In contrast, support from countries outside the region to set up CSBMs can help increase the political will of regional countries to attain a successful agreement.

CSBM agreements require careful selection of realistic areas of agreement and detailed specification of their enforcement to provide incentives for compliance.

CSBMs need to be even-handed so one side does not gain undue advantage over another.

The introduction of CSBMs can be linked with other conflict management processes such as negotiations and peacekeeping.

## Conflict Situation

***Stage of Conflict***

CSBMs are most effective at the early stage of a conflict, or in the aftermath of a conflict to prevent recurrence. CSBMs have been shown to be most effective between states with relations between close friendship and hostility. CSBMs are least likely between countries which are actively

antagonistic. CSBMs cannot be effective if severe hostilities and active wars prevail, because the objectives of the hostile parties are self-defense or national gain at others' expense.

***Conflict Type***

CSBMs may be especially useful in reducing or preventing conflicts affecting national cohesion, arising from refugee problems between states, border issues, and suspected or actual clandestine support of political oppositions.

***Cause of Conflict Addressed***

Operational prevention: CSBMs are not expected to alter the existing balance of power between countries or to resolve issues or conflicts between them, although they can help to enhance a cooperative atmosphere in which such disputes might be resolved. They can also confirm and thus undergird relations of basic mutual trust where they already exist, and can hasten and reinforce accommodations and rapprochements already in progress in other policy spheres.

## Implementation

***Organizers***

CSBMs can be initiated by individual governments or through third parties such as the UN, regional organizations, or other states.

***Participants***

Participants in the CSBM process are the governments of the two or more states involved in the particular agreement.

***Activities***

CSBM activities include:

- Systematic exchange of military missions.
- Formation of regional or sub-regional risk reduction centers.
- Arrangements for the free flow of information, including the monitoring of regional arms agreements.
- Information exchange, communications, and notification requirements, such as pre-notification of upcoming military activities like war games and training exercises or new troop movements carried out close to borders.
- Declarations and codes of conduct, such as common targets for the levels of armaments.
- Consultative mechanisms, security commissions, and other joint activities, such as
  - direct telephone lines between military commanders,
  - mutual privileges for joint observation of military maneuvers or inspection of military installations, and

- meetings to review the security situation and cross-border problems such as smuggling, poaching, customs, and cattle rustling.

***Budget***

CSBMs are not likely to be very expensive. Because they may lead to changed understandings of a country's security needs, CSBMs may permit a reduction in military expenditures.

***Set-Up Time***

The time taken in negotiations and signing of CSBMs can vary greatly. However, once CSBMs are signed, implementation often begins immediately and set-up of supporting technologies is achieved in very short time frames.

***Other Resource Considerations***

CSBMs require adequate technological means for maintaining direct, regular and quick communication and ongoing monitoring among governments and militaries, including provisions for instantaneous translation between languages.

***Time frame***

Once signed, CSBM agreements may be quickly implemented and the results are often long-lasting.

***Preconditions***

Some degree of political good will have to exist before cooperation can begin. The more areas of cooperation that are forged, the easier it is for states to resolve disputes without violence.

The parties involved have to accept the need for mutual security and for preserving the territorial status quo irrespective of any existing disputes between them. Each has to accept certain historical conditions as given and discern specific advantages of military cooperation to their own national interests.

While not necessary conditions, CSBMs have been shown to have greater chances of success if countries can readily identify common interests and have the following factors in common:

- Historical experience
- Cultural and religious heritage
- Similar form of social and political organization
- Strong states
- Stable governments
- Civil control of the military
- Effective multilateral institutions in other issue areas
- Approximately equal military forces.

Where conflicts have deep historical roots, military cooperation may not be feasible, but exploration of non-military areas of cooperation, such as joint economic development and environmental projects, could be more fruitful.

## Examples

***The Helsinki Final Act.*** Signed in 1975 by 33 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Warsaw Pact, and neutral and non-aligned countries (NNA) countries, the Final Act inaugurated a series of East-West confidence and security building measures established under the Conference for CSCE from 1975 to 1990. "First generation" measures involved notification and access agreements for reducing the risk of surprise attacks. The "second generation" increased the restraints on military postures and deployments and governed dangerous nuclear activities.

***Central American Security Treaty.*** The Central American Security Treaty involving Guatemala, Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador bans them from supporting insurrections against each other and arranges inspections for drugs and arms trafficking.

***Communications Hotlines.*** In 1991, India and Pakistan re-ratified an agreement signed after the 1972 war which involves a communications hotline between commanders governing troop maneuvers, joint patrols of common borders, and a pledge not to launch preemptive attacks. In 1991, South and North Korea adopted hotlines and prior notification of military maneuvers.

***Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Protocol.*** ECOWAS adopted a protocol in 1978 to allay fears of any aggression of one country against another. Its 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defense Matters created a joint defense council of the heads of state and a joint defense commission comprising defense ministers.

***Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).*** SADCC was formed in 1980 by nine countries. Although primarily to increase economic cooperation among the members to reduce dependence on South Africa, it also included a code of conduct in 1981 that urged members to refrain from expansion and occupation of each other's territory and from serving as a base of support for subversion.

***Mutual Security Measures.*** In late November 1995, the leaders of Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, and Uganda agreed to mutual security measures such as closing their borders to militias and ferreting out ethnic extremists. This action was part of a plan facilitated by former US President Jimmy Carter to alleviate the threat of increasing ethnic unrest posed by Rwandan refugees in Zaire.

## References

Cathleen S. Fisher, "The Pre-Conditions of Confidence Building: Lessons from the European Experience," Draft Paper, no date.

Augustine P. Mahiga, and Fidelia M. Nji, *Confidence-Building Measures in Africa United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research*, (New York: United Nations, 1987)

Alan Platt, ed., *Arms Control and Confidence Building in the Middle East* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1992).

## Illustration

♦ ***Outside the Greater Horn***

***CSBMs under the CSCE, 1975-90.*** The contemporary idea and practice of CSBMs emerged from the increasing East-West detente in the early 1970s, and thus are most extensive in Western and Eastern Europe. Initial confidence-building measures involving notification and access agreements for reducing the risk of surprise attacks appeared in the Helsinki Final Act, signed in 1975 by 33 countries that were members of NATO or the Warsaw Pact, and neutral and non-aligned countries. These included the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union and countries in Western and Eastern Europe. The Final Act also established the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which subsequently undertook a series of meetings that adopted further CSBMs. The agreements entailed provisions that increased the restraints exerted on military postures and deployments, as follows:

- Stockholm (1986) — involved notification, observation, and access
- Nuclear Risk Reduction Act (1987)
- 1987 — meetings on notification of military exercises
- 1989 — governing dangerous nuclear activities.

In the confidence-building area, the CSCE followed a method of self-imposed peer pressure. Having little in the way of a secretariat or bureaucracy until the 1990s, in the CSCE process its members would meet periodically to establish certain goals to aspire to in each issue area. These meetings typically lasted a month or longer. The resulting agreements were politically but not legally binding. Thus, there is no method of enforcement. However, each party made a commitment to comply. Review of members' accomplishments in meeting their commitments, accomplished in summit meetings every two years, provides a form of peer pressure for enforcement.

By its involvement in various functional issues, such as human rights, rule of law, security and economic cooperation, the CSCE demonstrates how cooperation in one sphere can bolster achievement in others.

♦ ***Inside the Greater Horn***

***Tanzania-Uganda Mogadishu Agreement of 1972.*** After tensions escalated between the two countries over the activities of Ugandan exiles in Tanzania and incursions into Tanzania by Idi Amin's forces in response, the Mogadishu Agreement of October, 1972 arranged a peace agreement between the two countries that included the following confidence-building provisions:

- Cessation of military operations against each other's territory and withdrawal of all military forces to ten miles behind their common border.
- Halt hostile propaganda.
- Refraining from allowing subversive activities to operate in one country against the other.

Although this agreement broke down completely with the onset of the 1978 war, it reduced tensions between the two countries for awhile.

## Notes

1. Augustine P. Mahiga and Fidelia M. Nji. *Confidence-Building Measures in Africa.* New York, NY: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1987, p. 3.

# 6. Professionalization and Restructuring of Military Forces (Reform, Reduction, Integration)

## Description

Restructuring refers to the absorption or integration of existing, former opposition forces and/or active recruiting of under-represented groups.

Restructuring may be accompanied by force reduction, especially of troops in the over-represented categories.

Professionalization of the military forces is a term used to describe somewhat different processes:

- A *modernization process*, which may include the acquisition of more modern technology and doctrine, and/or use of a more formal rank structure and command and control, and increasing the education, training, and other standards of force members.

- According to the western model, professionalization describes efforts to refocus and retrain armed forces in support of democracy and to reduce their role in internal repression, eliminating the policing role of the military and increasing their focus on defending against external threats. Under this model, the military is subordinated to domestic civilian rule.

### *Objectives*

One objective of restructuring is to make the military a more national institution, making both the officer corps and ranks more representative of the society. Another is to make the military a state structure, no longer subject to regional, ethnic, or personal interests. This may be the outcome of a government to share power, which may be motivated by a desire to increase and broaden support and legitimacy. This may occur after resolution of an internal conflict or as part of a transition from an authoritarian to a democratic government.

Civilian governments may initiate professionalization of the national armed forces to help consolidate their power and reduce the threat of being overthrown. Civilian governments may support force reduction to reduce military demands on the national budget.

### *Expected Outcome or Impact*

Restructuring the armed forces, over the long term, can increase military loyalty to the state. This can decrease the incidence of military coups and resources being misappropriated for use in internal disputes. A well-structured military can reduce the likelihood of soldiers from regional, political and ethnic groups causing or supporting conflict within a county.

Professionalization requires increased skills, which may be rewarded through increased salaries and benefits. The resulting increase in skill and pride in professionalism may allow for a reduction of the services, thereby increasing the quality while reducing the size of the force.

Courses aimed at teaching the military respect for human rights and democracy work only when targeted appropriately. Participant selection, military advancement, and rotational policies within the host countries sometimes result in the ineffective placement and use of trained individuals. There is some evidence that intensive training of junior officers, over time, may alter institutional attitudes.

***Relationship to Conflict Prevention***

Countries attempting to make a transition to democracy cannot be successful if force is not subjected to civil authority or is divided between warring factions.

A national military force in which a particular ethnic, regional or political group predominates in a multi-ethnic, multi-party society can be a major source of violent conflict within the state. Restructuring the ethnic/political/regional balance of national military forces through integration to be more representative of the state's citizens can be an important tool in preventing or mitigating internal state conflict.

Security forces influence reconciliation in all post-conflict states. A strong and loyal miliary can aid the reform process during the uncertainties and setbacks experienced in a major political transition by controlling violently unleashed popular demands or the old order's resistance. A recalcitrant miliary closely identified with the old order will often oppose reform. If the armed forces fear likely ideological, institutional, or personnel changes, they may try to enter domestic politics, and act as if the war and the enemy still exist.

## Applicability

***Strengths and Weaknesses***

The process of effective force restructuring is difficult to design and implement, lengthy, and very expensive, and external assistance is generally required.

The process of modernizing militaries may also increase their power and organization, to the detriment of civilian governments and institutions, and undermine civilian efforts to gain control of the military.

Evaluating the effects of training and professionalization efforts on military behavior and on civil-military relations is difficult. Critics of such training argue it makes officers more likely to oppose reforms and insert themselves into politics, especially if the military organizational capabilities are strengthened beyond the capability of civil institutions. Major institutional

changes are needed to complement training to actually professionalize an armed force.

Host government institutional problems can limit the effectiveness of military reform efforts. Some objectives of foreign-led military reform efforts may be at cross-purposes with other objectives of foreign policy, and implemented without full consideration of their possible consequences.

Such efforts may increase the dependency of regional militaries on foreign powers.

Reducing the size of the military can create a major unemployment problem, which can lead to further instability and violence.

***Lessons Learned/ Recommendations***

Restructuring is especially unlikely when the army, or a controlling segment of the army, functions as the agent of ethnic minority rule. An effort to restructure such a country's military is unlikely to be seriously undertaken and to be successful when the ruling power is highly dependent on military support to remain in power. It can occur, as did in Uganda, when the ruler has successfully consolidated power and acquired broader support. Such an effort can also gain support of leading segments of the military if combined with promises of better pay and training, more advanced weaponry, and other moves to modernize and professionalize the forces.

Some prerequisites seem to improve the prospects of success of integrating armed forces:

- An extended period of time over which to develop a sense of cohesion.
- A rigorous process of selection and promotion, taking into account aptitude and experience.
- Deployment assignments that are not more divisive than the force's level of cohesion can withstand.
- Mixed units, not ethnically (or regionally or politically) distinct units.
- New uniforms and symbols.
- Clear structures, systems, and operating procedures.
- Strict discipline, and a code of conduct banning such things as violence, insubordination, strikes, criminal acts, desertion, racism, partisanship, and mutiny.



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- A sustained effort to promote a sense of common purpose and achievement.

## Conflict Situation

***Stage of Conflict***

Restructuring and reduction of forces can occur at the early stages of a conflict to allay opposition group fears; or as part of the resolution or reconciliation of a conflict through an accord. Reduction may also be prompted primarily by internal and/or financial pressures, unrelated to the presence (or absence) of a conflict. Force reduction/restructuring is less likely to occur during a widespread internal or external conflict.

***Conflict Type***

Reduction and restructuring motivated by the an attempt to prevent or mitigate conflict is most appropriate for conflicts with political roots, especially related to ethnic, political, or regional representation and participation.

***Cause of Conflict Addressed***

Included in this professionalization process are efforts to subordinate the military to civilian control. This is generally accompanied by efforts to reduce troops' politicization and reduce the capacity of the military to seize power, encouraging forces to be loyal to the state and/or constitution instead of to particular individuals or parties, and may include increasing the military's respect for human and civil rights.

## Implementation

***Organizers***

Efforts at restructuring, reforming, retraining and professionalization of national armed forces occur at the national level. Programs for professionalization and reform must be approved at the national level by the civilian and/or military heads, although it can be assisted by external actors in planning and design, actual implementation, and funding.

***Participants***

National-level military forces; can also include absorption of irregular forces into the national military.

***Activities***

*Professionalization.* One aspect of professionalization is to increase civilian government control and oversight of the military, including its budget, thereby increasing the military's accountability to civilian society.

Four conditions are generally seen as necessary for effective civilian oversight of the military:

- Either the constitution and/or amendments establish a clearly-defined division of authority between the president or prime minister and the defense ministry. The law must be clear for peacetime authority (command and control of the military, promotions of senior military



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officers, and appointment of civilian defense officials) and for crisis (emergency powers), including transition to war.

- The legislature must exert oversight of the military by exercising effective control of the defense budget; its role in deploying armed forces in wartime and emergencies must be clear.

- Control of the military (General Staff and military commanders) must be exercised through the civilian defense ministry, including effective peacetime oversight of the defense budget, intelligence, strategic planning, force structure and deployments, arms acquisitions, and military promotions.

- Military training levels and equipment must be sufficient and appropriate to protect the state from external threats.

Part of the effort to increase civilian control is the education of civilians on defense issues and creating civilian experts on defense and strategic studies.

To agree to such changes, the military generally requires reassurance by the civil government to not intervene in the internal affairs of the armed forces; to guarantee the internal operation of the army will not be manipulated by civilians; assurance the military will retain power in areas of national security (although these may be redefined); and assurances there will be no reprisals against force members for past actions connected with "domestic security." Often, amnesty is decreed for offenses conducted by armed force members against citizens during a civil war.

External parties such as the US can encourage professionalization of a country's military through some of the following actions:

- Support military-to-military contacts to promote a better understanding of the role, rights and responsibilities of the military in a democratic society.

- Integrate the US military's support of democracy into ongoing contacts between US and foreign defense establishments.

- Continue and expand contacts between Department of Defense personnel and civilian and military leaders of transitioning or emerging democracies, through Military Liaison Teams, small unit exchanges and exercises.

- Create and support regional programs which promote democracy, respect for human rights, military justice administration, and civilian control of the military. Donor countries can include programs for

educating and professionalizing the military in their assistance strategies.

- Convene regional conferences on subjects such as the role of the military in a democratic society, civil-military relations, encouraging the participation of civilian and military leaders in the region.

- Encourage input, coordination and approval of such programs through civilian channels of authority in the host country. Include host country personnel (military and civilian) in the design of any such programs.

- Encourage reforms to increase accountability and transparency through development of ethical and apolitical standards, and enhance civilian expertise and oversight of defense policy and its execution.

- Develop an officer education program. Provide reading materials on democracy and democratic political systems and the inter-relationship of the military. Provide support to regional academic centers that can teach civilian defense establishments and militaries the concepts and practice of the role of the military.

- Strengthen civilian expertise in defense affairs, to improve responsible civilian control of the military.

- Initiate programs in other countries aimed at improving respect for human rights and military justice systems, and institutionalizing human rights training in foreign security forces.

- Send teams of military justice experts to improve host nation capabilities by reforming codes of conduct and strengthening expertise in internal investigations.

- Condition military aid to human rights performance of the military. Ensure the military is a key component both of democratic reform and of preventing and mitigating violent internal conflict. Ensure any foreign military assistance is balanced with programs to support civilian institutions and improve the management capabilities and skills of the civilian administration overseeing the military.

In 1991, the US Congress expanded the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program to include civilian leaders, and in 1993 authorized training to members of national legislatures responsible for oversight and management of the military. This training of civilians is expected to contribute to responsible defense resource management; foster greater respect for, and understanding of, the principle of civilian control of

the military; and improve military justice systems and procedures in accordance with internationally recognized human rights.

*Restructuring.* Reducing the potential for violence generally requires demilitarization of selected members of military forces and an influx of new troops to redress the imbalance. The troops to be separated could be selected on the basis of ethnic, regional or other criteria. Those troops "downsized" will require reintegration programs, such as counseling and retraining for the transition to civilian life and employment.

The reduction process requires legal mechanisms, including selection criteria which are transparent and consistent, and avoid the appearance a group is being singled out or victimized. Reduction in force should be on a voluntary basis, whenever possible. Some advocate confronting the military cautiously and gradually. Positive inducements are needed to encourage voluntary departure, to reduce the bitter reaction of a forced removal from service, and to ease the strain of the transition to civilian life.

The process begins by civilians defining precisely the functions of the country's security forces. Ways of determining the correct size of a country's military and how much it should be reduced will vary; a general guideline is that expenditures on the military sector should not exceed three percent of GNP during peacetime, depending on circumstances, including the internal and external security situation, the ability of an economy to sustain the military budget, in competition with the other sectors, and the political pressure from various interest groups for or against military expenditures.

Civil and military parties must have agreement and follow-through on decisions concerning the role, command and control structures, recruitment and training policies, deployment of forces, and force strength:

- Training time and facilities, finances, and accommodations available may be determining factors more than the objective security situation in establishing force strength.

- Whether recruitment should be restricted to members of established armed forces.

- Which forces to include in integration. For example whether to include armed formations not officially under the control of any recognized or identifiable political organization, for example, community self-defense units and paramilitary groups.

- The type of screening for applicants.

- Whether to assign quotas to the various force components.

- Forging a single, united, disciplined force out of disparate armed formations, with greatly differing traditions, training, and agendas is difficult, especially when they have recently been enemies.

***Budget*** Force restructuring, reform and professionalization efforts are very expensive and will likely involve generous external assistance, including finances, training, organization and equipment.

***Other Resource Considerations*** Among the additional resources to be considered are trainers and training materials and compensation and severance packages retired soldiers.

***Timeframe*** A properly designed and managed force reduction and restructuring program takes a long time. Individual reform/ professionalization programs may proceed more quickly, but their effects are limited; over time, several separate programs can produce a cumulative effect. To magnify their positive effects they must be accompanied or even preceded by several changes in political structures, including building up of civilian institutions. Some analysts report professionalization and reform efforts could strengthen or modify attitudes, but are not likely to produce sudden or radical alterations or behavior.

## Examples

In Uganda, the military has been both down-sizing and restructuring to be more ethnically representative and politically balanced. In Burundi, the mono-ethnic army continues to be a major source of violence.

In El Salvador in the mid-1980s and in Honduras in the late 1970s, some evidence suggests US training helped convince the officer corps to accept a broader range of political opinions and restrain its power in certain limited areas. However, there is no evidence it led them to transfer their loyalties from the military institution to the civilian government, to recognize the right of civilians to control the military, or to give up limiting and shaping the ways in which civilians are allowed to exercise power. During this time period, whenever the military perceived a threat to its institutional autonomy, it rejected US pressures and continued to dominate the political process.

## References

William Foltz.

## Illustration

♦ ***Inside the Greater Horn***

***Uganda: Force Reduction, Restructuring, and Reform.*** For 25 years predatory military rule and civil war destroyed lives, skills, and assets, undermined institutional competence and accountability, suppressed autonomous organizations in civil society, and intensified ethnic hostility and conflict. The National

Resistance Movement (NRM) came to power in 1986. The NRM and its military wing, the NRA, increasingly established national security and began moving the country toward a more peaceful path of social and economic reconstruction and development. Rebellion and banditry continued in various parts of the country until 1991. The NRA had greatly increased in size through assimilation of defeated rebel forces. Uganda undertook a program to professionalize the regular army, including establishing a command structure, personnel and logistics systems, training, and acquisition of equipment and supplies. As the Museveni regime consolidated power and political situation was stabilized, attempts were made to reduce the size of the army. The reduction was motivated by financial and political forces both inside and outside Uganda. Both the government and donors were concerned with the heavy burden of defense expenditures on scarce government resources.

Uganda suffered from regional, ethnic and sectarian conflicts in political and military organizations; poorly educated and corrupt miliary leaders; an army which made unsustainable demands on state and economic resources; political elites unwilling to accept electoral defeat; weak non-miliary components of the state apparatus; and weak organizational capacity of groups and associations in civil society. Political loyalties rather than military skills had been critical, which destroyed solidarity and technical competence, and the ability to enforce military discipline, turning the army into an oppressive social force and producing increasing levels of repression. Ethnicity became the key factor in recruitment and promotions, and many educated officers from the "wrong" ethnic groups were dismissed or otherwise punished. The officer corps was decimated and untrained soldiers were promoted, military expenditure escalated. Violent crime escalated, often perpetrated by military personnel. Regimes' political dependence on the military make it implausible to discipline them; soldiers were frequently drunk, unpaid, and out of control, and ethnic conflicts escalated.

The ethnic factor was eliminated from recruitment, and recruitment was broadened, to remove fears it would become an instrument of 'Bantu' domination. Of the 23,000 soldiers demobilized in 1993, 38% were from the Northwest, Northeast, and Karamoja; 31% from the Southwest and West; 19% from Buganda; and 12% from the East and Southeast. The army was removed as a direct player in setting the political agenda. All members of the various guerrilla groups were allowed to join the NRA, and others were recruited into Local Defence Units (LDUs), which were trained and controlled by the army, but responsible for protecting their own villages. Some abuses by NRA soldiers continued, but much fewer than in the past, and the government made serious attempts to improve discipline. A 'Code of Conduct for the National Army' was added in 1987. By 1994 the civil war was virtually over. The survival of the government and integrity of the state was related to the army's ability to restore order, enforce discipline, deal equitably with hostile populations, become recognized as a national rather than an ethnic force, and allow political authority to take precedence over military authority. The regime reduced its reliance on military power by widening its support base, incorporating more groups into the political process and strengthening the democratic mechanisms through which they are selected.

The demobilization program planned for the reduction of about 45,000 soldiers of the estimated 90,000 member National Resistance Army (NRA) between 1992 and 1995. Over 25% of the first 32,000 demobilized left voluntarily and just under a quarter were discharged on medical grounds. The discharges were not random, but were based on rational personnel management. After the first two phases of demobilization, the defense budget was reduced from a previous 39.3% of recurrent expenditures to 26.1%, although defense spending in real terms rose by nearly 12% due to wage increases for the remaining soldiers and limited hiring of local defense units (LDUs) in the northern region to

contain recurrent insurgency. The ratio of social to defense spending improved from 0.6 to 1.1 from before demobilization (1989/90) to after the first two phases (1992/93).

There is still no certainty the NRA would serve other leaders with the same loyalty as they currently serve Museveni. In 1993, the Constitutional Commission emphasized the need for a professional army which would serve national, not partisan interests; vested overall command in the President advised by an Armed Forces Council; and called for a National Security Council to coordinate all security organizations, and an Armed Forces Service Board to advise on conditions and terms of service and promotions. The creation of LDUs created a citizen force in some disturbed areas, and the state is attempting to give as many civilians as possible some military training.

- ***Outside the Greater Horn***

***South Africa.*** Before President de Klerk left office, he made significant moves to shrink the military. His overall policy of reconciliation over confrontation made the government less reliant on physical force, and therefore on deference to the security establishment. By mid-1992 the South African Defence Force's political influence and its conventional capability had been reduced. President de Klerk halved the size of the standing force by lowering the national service commitment to one year. He lowered the defense budget each year from 1989 to 1992, and eliminated at least 11 major weapons systems, but was reluctant to weaken the counterinsurgency and intelligence network. The military was divided between supporters of a professional ("constitutionalist") force and a smaller more interventionist force. Even within the army's top ranks, a technocratic outlook prevails over ideology. SADF officers had political, corporate, and personal agreements with de Klerk, complained that any "affirmative action" would lower the SADF's standards, and worried they may have fewer opportunities in a smaller, more "mixed" force. Simultaneously, South Africa enlarged the manpower and budget of the SAP, the primary force against internal unrest, which helped assuage the military's fear of reform-induced unrest. Through reforms and firings, de Klerk eliminated or effectively silenced many officers who otherwise might have opposed his actions.

***Central and Eastern Europe.*** The US Military-to-Military/Joint Contact Team Program operates in Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and the Baltic. The program provides military liaison teams of US personnel to assist in the transition to democracy, encouraging their armed forces to develop into "positive, constructive elements of democratic societies that are apolitical, respect human rights, and adhere to the rule of law."

Teams have been established in Hungary, Albania, the Baltic, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. Liaison teams work in the host country for a year, helping Ministry of Defense personnel to identify assistance needed. A sustainment liaison team then takes over, first providing information to Ministry of Defense personnel on democracy, civilian control of the military, and budget development, followed by an exchange between host-country and US personnel. In FY 93, the program was allocated $6 million, and FY 94 costs were estimated at over $24 million.

# D. Economic and Social Development

**Tools:**

- Conditionality
- Development Aid
- Environmental and Natural Resource Management
- Humanitarian Aid

# 7. Conditionality for Conflict Prevention

## Description

Conditionalities are positive or negative incentives imposed by external parties to encourage an authority (usually a government) to make specific changes in policies or actions. The desired changes are most commonly political — to urge governments to take steps toward "democratization" or improve their performance in adopting and respect for human rights standards — and economic reforms in monetary, fiscal, or trade policies, privatization or structural adjustment.

Incentives can also be tied to conditions with the goal of preventing or mitigating conflict, either directly — progress in preventing, containing or resolving conflicts or at least to cessation or mitigation of hostilities, progress in negotiations and making compromises — or conditions can be applied to other types of changes which are believed to prevent or mitigate conflict indirectly.

### *Objectives*

Governments or multilateral organizations place conditions on aid and other support to promote objectives, most commonly goals such as political liberalization, economic reform, and human rights improvements. This profile is concerned with the use of conditionality either to prevent or mitigate violent conflict directly or to encourage actions believed to indirectly prevent conflict or discourage actions believed to be contributing to conflict.

### *Expected Outcome or Impact*

In the case of humanitarian assistance, it is difficult to evaluate how effective threats and actions to withhold aid have been, since rarely, if ever have such efforts been unanimous. Some agencies continue their funding and support, defending their efforts on the basis of "humanitarian imperative," thereby undercutting the efforts of the agencies imposing the conditions.

### *Relationship to Conflict Prevention*

Any of the various conditionalities can be used to persuade an authority to curtail actions believed to be provoking or exacerbating conflict, or to take actions which they believe will directly or indirectly help prevent or manage a conflict.

## Applicability

### *Strengths and Weaknesses*

The inclusion of trenching as an element of the conditionality creates the potential for conflict between the political goals of US foreign assistance.

Compliance with the conditions can become a problem when disbursing funds. The dilemma often arises of what to do when the host country complies in part.

Conditionality can slow or kill projects that otherwise may be desirable.

In the case of conflict related to ethnicity, discontinuation or interruption of donor assistance can create potential for backlash against ethnically non-dominant groups, and possibly against donors themselves.

Aggressive conditionality runs the risk of driving the recipient government into the camp of alternative donors which either do not engage in conditionality or impose different political conditions.

Conditionality can lead to sovereignty issues, including debate over whether contributing assistance, especially assistance that comprises a large percentage of a government's budget, gives the right to help determine or dictate how the money is spent.

The decision to actually stop assistance, as threatened, is often difficult to follow through. Such a move may result in loss of access, information, and the ability to witness events.

There is an ongoing debate over whether humanitarian assistance should be cut off in a crisis situation, regardless of non-compliance with conditions.

Agencies rarely follow-through on threats, reducing credibility and effectiveness. Agents may concede or compromise on the previous conditions because they fear a loss of influence if the recipient cancels project arrangements. A development agency, for example, may be reluctant to stand firm against a particular infraction of conditions for fear of disrupting an entire program or major investment. Or, the agent may concede that the fear confrontation or withdrawal would create worse consequences or make future development efforts more risky or expensive.

Other political considerations, including competing objectives of a foreign government, may override the imposition and enforcement of strict conditionality by a particular donor agency, and may result in disbursements without compliance.

Some policy changes tied to conditions may aggravate conflict instead of preventing or mitigating it. Conditionality on economic reform has at times exacerbated social tensions and undermined efforts to improve human rights through political conditionality. For example, structural adjustment programs have often contributed to devaluation-driven inflation, unemployment, and deteriorating real incomes, which in turn have prompted major disturbances, widespread protests and strikes, prompting some governments to increase repression.

The recipient government or other entity may publicly accede to imposed conditions, but fail to fulfill the conditions. It can be difficult to determine whether the lag in implementation is due to inability or unwillingness.

***Lessons Learned/ Recommendations***

Governments with little access to alternative sources of revenues are more likely to concede to conditionalities, especially if failure to do so would result in damaging domestic, political or economic costs, and/or threaten adverse relations with other actual or potential sources of revenue.

Aid should be conditioned on actions within the government's control.

Conditionalities should be country specific, and should involve extensive negotiations and consultations with recipient governments and various segments of each country's civil society.

Decisions on withdrawing assistance should be coordinated among agencies, to avoid political problems and working at cross-purposes, actions should be as unified as possible among countries and agencies.

The consequences of conditionality should be incremental, instead of an all-or-nothing option, which is generally less credible and more difficult to implement.

*Conditioning Aid to Discourage its Contribution to Conflict.* In various places, humanitarian aid is siphoned off to underwrite a government's or faction's war efforts. Through humanitarian aid — even if carefully distributed only to civilians — the international community is assuming or subsidizing the government's public welfare responsibilities, thereby freeing resources for the war. Common abuses include aid flights being diverted to supplying combatants rather than civilians in need, funds for aid projects providing the government with a source of hard currency used to prosecute the war, and donated food stocks freeing grain production for export.

Many defend continuing aid even in situations of such abuses, insisting there is a role for aid in keeping the lid on an explosive situation — however, sometimes this becomes the objective, rather than addressing the roots of the conflict itself. Despite problems with the aid and its negative impact on the conflict situation, many agencies will continue to remain, viewing their assistance as a humanitarian imperative. It is rare that other principles besides the security of agency staff are invoked for a cessation of humanitarian assistance.

For example, in November 1994 when one donor decided to stop funding for NGOs serving the internally displaced camps within Rwanda, in hopes of providing incentive to return people to their home areas, agencies with other sources of funding remained in the camps.

Unified actions on conditionality have at times brought better results. In response to the looting of agency vehicles in Eastern Equatoria (southern Sudan), three NGOs and a UN operating agency teamed together to make safety on the roads and unfettered, secure access a condition of continuing to provide assistance. In this case, the responsible faction (SPLA) was concerned enough about the affected people (Bor Dinka) that they ensured raiding of agency vehicles stopped. A consortium of NGOs operating in southern Sudan is developing a unified response to particularly egregious abuses by all parties to the conflict.

Some familiar with such actions recommend any cut-off or suspension should be tied to previously stated conditions, and the same principles should be applied equally to aid to the various factions and regions involved in the conflict.[1] An aid official insists, "Aid should only be suspended within the framework of an agreement with authorities."[2] Decisions about withdrawal should be coordinated among agencies. To the maximum extent possible, before making a decision whether and how to invoke conditions, agencies should canvass the target population on whether the agencies should go public about certain abuses and withdraw or get kicked out, or continue with their limited inputs in silence.

*Conditioning Aid to Progress in Conflict Resolution.* Continuous cycles of conflict in some areas frustrate responding donors and agencies, who feel they are repeatedly placing band-aids over wounds constantly re-opened by violent conflict. Some question whether they ought to be more assertive in addressing the conflicts, and whether there may be situations when humanitarian assistance should be conditioned on progress toward peace, or at least cessation or mitigation of hostilities at the local or national level.

Noting that extended, expensive relief could prolong conflict by enabling warring parties to evade their responsibility to civilians, one humanitarian NGO involved in Sudan urged agencies to consider withholding aid if peace efforts failed. Its director has declared the time has come to "question the effectiveness of paying endless millions for humanitarian aid which may only be exacerbating and prolonging the conflict..."

Some believe that such conditionality might facilitate reconciliation between ethnic groups or warring factions: "Giving aid unconditionally emboldens the warmakers," says the Sudanese employee of one international NGO. But conditions, he warns, can have other side effects: "If we cut aid, we will weaken the people even more in their efforts to defend themselves against the government offensives."

One example of intercommunal conflict prevention is to condition assistance such as animal health services to curtailment of cattle raiding — an activity which often provokes wider conflict in some regions.

Once an acute emergency phase of a conflict or other crisis is over, the opportunities increase to tie conditions to improvement in a conflict situation. "The emergency mandate is to save the drowning person," says one donor official. "When the person is out of the water, we need to get tougher politically. We shouldn't go beyond the basics until there is peace."

Conditioning aid on progress in peace-building is a tricky process. One side in a conflict may be especially motivated to see humanitarian aid curtailed to both parties if they believe their opponent would be hurt by the cut more disproportionately.

An alternative is to use positive conditionality: "If you do X, we'll give you Y." For example, the Somalia Aid Coordination Body requires an area to be secure for aid providers as a condition for providing rehabilitation assistance. A possible problem in implementing positive conditionality is whether the pattern of incentives can be changed sufficiently to change the behavior of an authority — are the incentives great enough to increase their interest in and perception of benefits from peace.

## Conflict Situation

***Stage of Conflict***

Conditionalities can be used at all stages of conflict:

- Pre-conflict
- Ongoing conflict
- Post-conflict

***Conflict Type***

Imposing conditionalities to prevent or mitigate conflict may be relevant to various types of conflict. In a situation of ethnic conflict, assistance could be conditioned to rights and protection for non-dominant groups, or donors could make aid conditional on whether a recipient country addresses transborder ethnic issues.

***Cause of Conflict Addressed***

Conditions on assistance can address either structural or operational prevention, depending on the changes they are attempting to affect. The most easily enforced conditions address operational, short-term prevention.

## Implementation

***Organizers***

The organizers and sponsors of conditionalities vary, according to the type of incentives being offered and by the types of policies or actions the imposed conditions are trying to influence. At the national level, they generally include foreign governments, bilateral and multilateral donors and governmental organizations, and at the sub-national level the most frequent organizers are NGOs.

***Participants*** Conditionalities can be applied to national or local governments, or to factions or other local entities.

***Implementors*** The personnel and skills needed to invoke conditionalities vary too widely to generalize here.

***Activities*** A policy measure commonly used by donors is to condition economic, development or security assistance to institutional and policy reforms. Donors can condition such assistance to reforms designed to improve social services and strengthen efforts to create jobs and income — promotion of microenterprise development, efforts to redistribute land, provide credit, and extend technical assistance to small farmers, and reforms to promote investment — in the belief that such actions would encourage conflict prevention or mitigation. Conditions for economic stabilization and structural adjustment reforms have been imposed in the past not only for their economic merits, but also to achieve self-sustaining growth and development, and strengthen civilian, democratic governments — attributes believed to encourage political stability and prevent conflict. For example, in the early 1980s, USAID began conditioning its Economic Support Fund (ESF) balance-of-payment and budget support assistance on host governments' adoption and implementation of economic policy reforms.

While the use of aid conditionalities for development and security assistance are well established tools of foreign policy, humanitarian assistance has been largely exempt from such overt conditions. Given that humanitarian assistance is most frequently the largest input from external donors to a government or rebel group engaged in conflict, such aid can hold tremendous leverage on conflict management. Because it is less common, this profile will focus on conditionality tied to humanitarian assistance to directly or indirectly impact conflict prevention or mitigation.[3]

Humanitarian assistance could be conditioned to progress in areas such as human rights, sincerity at the negotiating table, security of aid personnel, curtailment of aid diversion, or other actions which both improve the environment for and effectiveness of humanitarian aid, as well as contribute to conflict prevention or mitigation. Conditionalities are most commonly imposed by a foreign donor or international agencies on a government however, they can also be used on a more local level, for example, on a warring faction. Many humanitarian assistance agencies have been experimenting with conditionalities on their assistance in the field.

The issue of whether humanitarian aid should be cut off in situations when key conditionalities are not respected is greatly debated — not only how and when, but whether it should be used as a policy tool at all. The decision to stop assistance is often traumatic for an agency. The loss of access to the affected area, of information on the humanitarian and conflict situations, and the witness provided by the presence of international aid workers

(believed by many to influence a reduction in atrocities) are usually judged to be so grave that most agencies will not completely withdraw from an area unless the emergency is completely over or the security situation is untenable. A cut-off of aid can also have unintended side effects, especially on those who are not responsible for the violations and are the most needy of assistance. However, agencies unwilling to withdraw aid face the dilemma of their assistance and its abuse contributing to, provoking, or sustaining a conflict.

***Budget*** Budgeting conditionalities would be closely linked, if not completely dependent upon, the budgets of the individual projects with conditions placed upon them. Since a conditionality program deals directly with requirements for outlay of funds, larger budget spending would be linked to compliance and non-compliance would result in budget savings. Budgets for projects must be formulated in anticipation of maximum compliance.

***Set-Up Time*** Some types of conditionality can be imposed rapidly.

***Timeframe*** The effects of placing conditionalities may be either immediate or take a great deal of time.

***Preconditions*** The government (or non-government entity) which is being conditioned to modify its behavior must have the ability and will to take such actions.

## Examples

Some examples of positive incentives include the promise of debt forgiveness, reduction in trade protectionism, diplomatic recognition, admission to a coveted international organization, or economic and/or security assistance, if certain changes are made. Some negative inducements include the threat of sanctions on trade, curtailment of assistance, expulsion from esteemed international organizations, or even an international boycott of sporting events in that country and barring athletes from participating in international events, if the regime fails to make progress in the direction of desired policy changes by a given timeframe.

Examples of the application of the conditionality tool include:

- Several international and local NGOs working in Sudan teamed up to require safety on the roads and unfettered, secure access for their mission as a condition for continuing aid. In response, the raids on mission vehicles stopped.

- The International Monetary Fund made Slovak leaders aware that democratic institutions and non-discrimination against their Hungarian minority were tacit conditions for continued financial support.

- Germany conditioned the provision of economic benefits in bilateral agreements to special rights for ethnic Germans in neighboring countries.

## References

Carol Graham, Safety Nets, Politics and the Poor, *The Brookings Institute, 1994.*

## Illustration

♦ ***Inside the Greater Horn***

***Rwanda.*** A handful of donors adopted human rights principles in their Rwanda policies as early as 1992, but no donor actually reduced aid because of human rights considerations. Belgium and Canada overtly incorporated human rights concerns in their policies, while Switzerland and the Vatican repeatedly raised the issue of human rights with the Rwandan government. Many donors used their leverage — mostly without resorting to overt conditionality — to push for political liberalization, in the belief that a democratic system would be the best antidote to human rights violations and continuing conflict. Actual aid conditionality was limited to the economic sphere, where a structural adjustment program was a precondition of most donors for aid disbursements. Constructive engagement on the peace and economic reform made human rights conditionalities largely unfeasible for most donors.

The policy of constructive engagement included positive conditionality (as the European Union called it), involving sectoral aid programs designed to encourage pluralism and respect for human rights. Programs were sponsored to strengthen the Ministry of Justice and a number of local human rights organizations, as well as a free press.

Major donors finally began suspending aid programs in early 1994 in response to a marked deterioration in the quality of governance. Ultimately, compliance with human rights conditions was shown to be nothing more than rhetoric. When aid was suspended, it was done largely on grounds of economic inefficiency and difficulty of project implementation. Failure to address even the most egregious, public manifestations of extremism and authoritarianism — such as Radio Mille Collines' venomous broadcasts — showed Rwandan authorities that most donors lacked the political will necessary to meaningfully confront human rights concerns.

In the few months before the genocide which began in April 1994, some donors began to condition their development assistance on the implementation of the Arusha Accords and more specifically on the composition of the transitional government called for in the agreement. Nevertheless, the response was 'too little and too late' and largely symbolic, in the absence of meaningful actions to deal with the extremists.

***Kenya.*** In 1991, donors suspended aid to Kenya (which had reached $1 billion per year) on economic reform and human rights grounds. In direct response to this overt pressure, the government legalized a multi-party system. A pattern has developed since then, in which government abuses subside in the period before each annual donor consultative meeting and accelerates after aid pledges are completed and disbursements begin. "In response to international and domestic criticism, the government periodically suspends its harassment of critics or adopts different methods," charges Human Rights Watch.[4] In 1994,

some donors changed tack and began publicly noting progress on the government's human rights record and its handling of ethnic tensions, despite significant contrary evidence. The government was clearly emboldened by this vote of confidence and rights abuses increased.

In response to the deterioration in the rights environment and the government's complicity in the Rift Valley clashes, the German government cut its aid package to Kenya by two-thirds in April 1995. The Nordic countries in particular have consistently used their economic assistance as a lever for political accountability.

In many states with uneven records in economic policy and human rights, donors often gradually restructure aid programs to circumvent governments and utilize NGOs and consulting firms to implement projects. In Kenya, the utilization of NGOs gradually increased over years. The result is that only a small portion of the overall aid package goes directly to the state, so aid suspensions impact the governing elite less than they did previously.

Nevertheless, there still are critical government projects reliant on donor aid, such as the power plant in Central Province and two major road projects worth at least $200 million, as well as the usual balance of payments transfers from the IMF. In the showdown with donors over the political parties bill, the registration of the newest aspiring party Safina and the need to pulverize the opposition in advance of the 1997 elections, the government may risk a reduction in aid in order to achieve its political objectives.

## Notes

1. John Prendergast, "Tie Humanitarian Assistance to Substantive Reform," *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, July/August 1995, p. 42.

2. Interview, Philip O'Brien, Coordinator, Operation Lifeline Sudan — Southern Sector, June 28, 1995.

3. Much of this information comes primarily from John Prendergast, Humanitarian Aid and Conflict Prevention in the Greater Horn of Africa, forthcoming, 1996.

4. Human Rights Watch/Africa, "Kenya: Old Habits Die Hard," July 1995, p. 2.

# 8. Targeted Development Assistance

## Description

Development Assistance (DA) is aid from bilateral or multilateral donors to another country, to carry out socio-economic and/or political development. Aid can be in the form of transfers of money or goods, or sponsorship of projects or programs. DA can be targeted or steered to specific geographic areas identified as being at-risk, in the early stages of experiencing violent conflict, or in the process of reconstruction to prevent the recurrence of violent conflict. Preventing or managing violent conflict can be either the direct primary aim or a secondary objective of such assistance. DA can take either a direct or indirect approach to influence the level of conflict in an area.

### *Objectives*

The use of DA is intended to promote conflict prevention in identified at-risk areas. The direct objectives of some DA programs is the design and implementation of conflict prevention and intervention targeted to affected areas. Another objective of DA is to reduce the negative impacts of DA programs/projects on conflict issues in at-risk areas.

### *Expected Outcome or Impact*

*Direct Aid.* In a direct DA approach, aid is used for projects specifically designed to address conflict issues in the affected areas, to prevent conflict, to affect ongoing conflict, or to focus on post-conflict reconstruction in an attempt to prevent the recurrence of conflict.

*Indirect Aid.* Supporters of DA argue that an indirect approach can involve providing various forms of aid to affected areas for wider objectives than specifically for conflict prevention or resolution, under the assumption that DA in general can reduce the potential for conflict through economic growth and reduced poverty, and thereby increased stability in the targeted areas.

Indirect methodologies can also involve strengthening the positive impacts and minimize the negative impacts ("do no harm") of DA on conflict issues in affected areas. This can include adding procedures to examine, monitor and evaluate each program/project in at-risk areas for the way it affects or could affect conflict in general and/or specific conflict issues.

### *Relationship to Conflict Prevention*

Economic deprivation and/or disparities can increase political instability and violence, or make it more difficult for governments to take politically responsible steps in pursuit of peace. If economic disparities, access to and control over resources, and constraints on economic participation and opportunity have lead to conflict, then appropriate DA would theoretically be helpful in preventing or reducing conflict. However, DA has not been shown to mitigate conflict a priori, at least not in the short term.

Changes in the distribution of and access to resources may be disruptive, even when they are made equitable, and can result in an increase in conflict. Rather than easing poverty and mitigating conflict, increased assistance may sometimes result in the perception of greater relative deprivation by some groups, resulting in intensified conflict. Some types of assistance may produce negative impacts in the short run, even though in the long run they may produce positive effects on conflict management.

Unconditional foreign aid can encourage a government's tendency to forcibly impose their will on society and repress their internal opponents. However, foreign aid can provide a political and economic boost to governments willing to try to resolve conflicts peacefully. DA can create an incentive to governments to be more responsive to the needs and demands of resistant elements within society, encouraging compromise thereby, mitigating or preventing conflict.

Conflict precludes or degrades development at micro and macro levels, including socio-cultural, leading to diminishment of values, political, disturbing power and decision-making structures, and economic/environmental, diminishing resources. Being aware of the potential of such side effects of DA on conflict can help to minimize or avoid the negative impacts of certain projects on conflict issues; motivate the cancellation or suspension of conflict-exacerbating assistance until a situation stabilizes; or give rise to attempts to offset the negative conflict impact of assistance through other projects or policies.

## Applicability

***Strengths and Weaknesses***

Some conflict experts say that there is no evidence to suggest that economic development can mitigate ethnic conflict and that it may perhaps even exacerbate it. When policies that seek to distribute resources change the ethnic balance of economic opportunities and rewards, especially through investment or preference schemes, their effect on conflict must be addressed.

If not provided with care, DA can be useless or even harmful to conflict prevention. It can undermine indigenous development and create dependency, prop up corrupt regimes, favor certain classes or groups at the expense of others, allow leaders to postpone economic reforms that might result in actual development or conflict prevention, and free up a country's own resources for wasteful or negative purposes such as excessive military spending (including engaging in war against internal enemies, forgoing compromise). Aid could go to ill-chosen projects, possibly exacerbating regional, class, or ethnic resentment, or strengthening authoritarian regimes. By giving only a glimpse of a better life without providing full access, aid can create resentment and exacerbate radicalism.

Recipient countries may have only a limited ability to absorb outside money and to undertake technical projects efficiently. DA can be siphoned off by corruption or wasted on poorly conceived development schemes, military hardware, capital-intensive projects, or salaries to professionals hired by donors.

Foreign assistance can help contain or "keep the lid on" an explosive situation. This can become a problem when containing the situation becomes more the objective than addressing the causes of the conflict.

Offering preferential treatment in business opportunities or employment programs to any group may result in backlash from the groups left out if they resent the special treatment that group is getting, and can also result in less economically sound decisions and outcomes. Economic incentives have a slightly higher likelihood of getting private and public sector organizations to improve access of non-dominant groups into the job market with less conflict.

Land reform programs to secure access to land by particular groups may result in increasing ethnic conflict.

Development progress, even with foreign assistance, is often hampered by slow economic growth, armed conflicts, weak host government capabilities, and failure to implement needed policy and institutional reforms, natural disasters, a poor investment climate, and administrative requirements of foreign donor aid programs.

There needs to be an economic base to employ those who are trained through development programs.

***Lessons Learned/ Recommendations***

Transactions should be transparent.

DA should not be given to corrupt governments that have shown little desire or ability to use such resources for the public good.

Ethnic communities should be allowed to select conflict resolution trainees. Training should be implemented through native speakers of the language. Qualified, local staff should be employed as much as possible in projects.

Attention to ethnic conflict issues must be incorporated into programming long after a dispute is resolved.

Resource extraction investment projects may generate little employment, or result in unevenly distributed benefits across ethnic groups or regions which could exacerbate tensions.

*Addressing Economic Roots of Conflict.*[1] Donors can move beyond treating the symptoms of crises and use DA to address the economic disruptions at the root of many complex emergencies. Localized conflicts with roots predominantly in competition over resources are obvious candidates for interventions which seek to resolve the underlying resource-driven tensions. In many places, conflicts are frequently more resource-based at the local level than ethnicity-based. Water, grass, and land use are key issues. Understanding traditional uses of natural resources, and how communities apply their own laws and mechanisms to resolving conflicts, should be important components of planning development interventions.

If assistance is utilized strategically, it might be able to significantly contribute to longer-term indigenous and external processes of building peace from the bottom up. At the sub-national level, where local resources fuel tensions, aid has great potential in addressing some of the igniting factors. Given the increasing ferocity of sub-national conflict, the comparative advantage which aid agencies have in their proximity to these conflicts on a day-to-day basis makes their engagement in laying the groundwork for their eventual resolution a logical endeavor.

In conflicts with a strong ethnic component, assistance to affected areas can attempt to address causes through a focus on transforming relationships between ethnic groups through preventive actions (education, legal systems reform, civil society, employment, etc.) and post-conflict projects/programs aimed at reconstruction/peace-building efforts.

DA programs should proactively seek to reduce regional and ethnic tensions, and care should be taken to ensure that aid projects do nothing to widen those divisions. It is especially helpful if the aid can be perceived in target areas as something that benefits all groups, not just a particular group or region.

*Land Settlement Programs.* In cases where the lack of access to or legal title to land by an ethnically non-dominant group is a major source of conflict, programs to increase that group's access and title to land may help reduce or prevent conflict. Such projects include resettlement programs, legal title reforms, migration programs, and land reform programs. In some cases, community or government institutions that can resolve competing claims should be supported before distributing inputs. For example, aid to farmers in areas experiencing disputed occupancy can increase tensions if the land issues are not resolved first.

*Investment Promotion.* Economically weak and dependent regions are often prone to violent ethnic conflicts. Therefore, directing investment and capital improvements (infrastructure improvements, health clinics, improvements to transportation networks to link non-dominant group areas, job training and education programs) to regions and communities populated

by ethnically/regionally/politically non-dominant groups can help alleviate tensions. Commercial interests can benefit from stable investment climates, adding a pressure group for conflict prevention.

*Business/Employment/Education Opportunities.* Programs to prevent or reduce conflict include training programs and preferential treatment to discriminated or under-represented groups in such areas as business incentives such as investment, business licenses, contracts, loans, and employment and education incentives. Affirmative action programs (quotas for hiring and giving preference in government jobs) can benefit a weak, non-dominant group or an under-resourced region. However, as mentioned above, this can also have an effect of increasing conflict, especially in the short run, as dominant groups or other non-recipients feel threatened or left out.

*Reducing Incentives for Military Recruitment.* The supply side of recruitment for armies and militia is often driven by socio-economic need. This is evidenced by the recruitment by General Aidid in Somalia of disenfranchised youth from Somalia's under developed central regions, *Interahamwe's* recruitment base of young Hutu men from Rwandan farm areas with declining returns, and the *Murahaliin* militia in Sudan's southern Kordofan region who were displaced by ill-devised agricultural development in the 1970s and early 1980s. Investment in those regions might draw back some of these militia back to their home areas. "When people are satisfied, doing business, growing crops, they will not take up arms," claims Abdi Aden Ali of Oxfam UK. "People take up arms when they see negative trends in development."[2] Low-level economic activity provides some measure of economic independence, which lessens dependence on military authorities. This can reduce the rationale for joining militia.

Appropriate DA can enable democratic, peaceful elements in society to compete for the loyalty of young men at risk of being lured into engaging in violence.

In Sudan and Somalia, for example, addressing the economic interests of pastoralists in their home areas might contribute to reducing the ease with which militia leaders recruit young men. The processes of under-development in Southern Kordofan, Sudan, and the central regions of Somalia which impoverished huge numbers of families throughout the 1980s provided a breeding ground for resentment and were easily harnessed by manipulative politicians. The vast majority of externally provided resources do not go to their areas of origin, but to the areas which these militia attack or where they reside now as militia (such as Mogadishu). The development of sustainable alternative livelihoods for young men in their home areas may help reduce their incentive for travelling to other areas to exploit assistance and increase their potential to lead productive, less violent lives in their home areas.

Aid that is focused on creating opportunities for productive livelihoods could help to reduce incentives for the creation of armed resistance forces. Efforts to ease rural poverty, reduce the isolation of rural areas, and integrate rural people into national life would make it more difficult for grievances to fester in remote areas, and give residents less reason to become soldiers in resistance armies.

*Increased Commerce.* Increasing the potential for commerce between communities and promoting export opportunities may increase the vested interest in defusing conflict-producing instability. For example, improving the operation of ports in Somalia can increase the potential for profits and therefore provide more incentive for stability. Economic exchange between communities keeps lines of communication open. This in turn is critical for addressing misperceptions about the intentions of neighboring communities. Encouraging, supporting, and protecting these indigenous intercommunal points of contact should be a major priority of intervening agencies.

*Incorporating Conflict Prevention/Resolution into Assistance.* Most agencies operating in conflict areas lack clear, systematic principles of relationship to conflict and its resolution, partly due to their need to maintain an image and ideology of neutrality. Agencies sometimes lack thorough knowledge of conflict issues in their operating areas and of potential conflict resolution initiatives. Most aid organizations involved in internal conflicts and conflict emergencies generally respond to the casualties and manifestations of war, such as refugee flows, with little investment in peacemaking and preventing the expansion of wars. The few who have a long history of peace work, such as the Mennonite Central Committee, American Friends Service Committee, and other church-related agencies, are an exception. Increasingly aware of the costs of this neglect, many agencies are exploring or beginning to include issues of peace-building and reconciliation in their programming. For example, CARE held a workshop on this topic for its country and regional managers in the Greater Horn in January 1996, and World Vision has employed a specialist for advice on reconciliation.

Various agency personnel working in the field have expressed interest in bringing conflict resolution experts (local and international) in at the planning or evaluation stage of projects/ programs to advise agencies on how to better contribute to peace-building. Some agencies have introduced conflict mitigation or prevention as specific objectives in their planning processes. This requires checking the location, staffing, and project content for their peace-building potential. Development and conflict resolution or prevention objectives are not necessarily mutually exclusive; operational agencies are not required to be mediators, but their programming should at least not contribute to exacerbating tensions, and at best can astutely address some of the causes of conflict.

*Monitoring for Conflict Impact.* Using a process approach of continual monitoring and evaluation of whether activities raise or lower the risk of conflict can help ensure that development aid reduces rather than intensifies conflicts. Agencies could integrate analyses of conflict, political impact, and human rights effects throughout planning, design, and implementation. Being aware of an area's conflict history, and the people's needs and relations can promote awareness of the latent tensions a project might activate.

In the efforts of international agencies to build local capacity and enhance participation, they need to be aware of the impact of their projects on undermining traditional authority structures (and whether such structures are repressive and counter-productive in that area, or are valuable in preserving the social fabric and therefore important to retain to, control conflict).

Agencies cannot simply ignore such issues out of a quest for neutrality, because most interventions have the potential to empower or disempower certain segments of the community based on the composition and structure of planning and delivery mechanisms.

Structural adjustment policies often meet limited very success, partly because many countries cannot effectively institute the adjustment programs. They can also aggravate political and economic instability, partly through their impact on exacerbating inequalities. International financial institutions can first take into account possible effects of economic reform/structural adjustment programs on increasing political and economic instability. Then it becomes possible to incorporate a monitoring responsibility and a temporary safety net program with the adjustment policy and proactively seek to design adjustment interventions to address some of the economic disputes which fuel elite competition.

## Conflict Situation

***Stage of Conflict*** In the pre-conflict stage, DA projects/programs can be aimed at potential socio-economic causes of conflict. Post-conflict programs might be aimed at reconstruction/peace-building.

***Conflict Type*** Localized conflicts with roots predominantly in competition over resources are obvious candidates for DA interventions which seek to resolve the underlying resource-driven tensions.

***Cause of Conflict Addressed*** Depending on the type of intervention undertaken and the approach used toward conflict prevention (direct or indirect), assistance could address either operational or structural prevention.

## Implementation

***Organizers***

Foreign aid providers include official multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and its affiliated International Development Association, the Asian, African, and Inter-American Development Banks, and the International Monetary Fund. Multilateral groups involved more at the project level include such entities as UNDP and UNICEF. Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOS) involved in development include CARE, Catholic Relief Services and Save the Children. Donor government agencies include the US Agency for International Development. Donors can choose to channel funding through bilateral organizations, PVOs, or multilateral organizations. There are also regional and national organizations in recipient regions and countries: IGADD, ECOWAS and SADCC are three prominent African regional organizations. Local NGOs in Africa are proliferating and are attracting increasing amounts of bi- and multi-lateral aid.

DA activities can be initiated by any of the above parties. They can be funded bi-laterally or multi-laterally, with joint support from the beneficiary, or without any matching funds. Projects can be controlled by the donor or implementor, either totally or in partnership with a national government or private entity, or in some cases be controlled partially or totally locally.

***Participants***

Participants include both government and NGOs. Many disagree on whether donors should channel more aid to nongovernmental organizations rather than governments. Critics charge the external resources provided to NGOs weaken state structures, making the latter highly dependent and less able to relate to other indigenous groups, and that promoting NGOs can lead to greater fragmentation.

***Implementors***

For DA interventions to incorporate either a direct or indirect approach to conflict prevention in planning, design, and implementation, conflict resolution specialists, especially those with local knowledge, should be consulted.

***Activities***

A process of development does not necessarily lead to political stability, and can exacerbate disruption and suffering. Donors, planners and implementors need to:

- Carefully examine DA programs.
- Reformulate them to maximize their contribution to conflict prevention, if that is one of the primary objectives.

- Take steps to reduce their negative impacts or avoid certain projects during times of heightened tensions until the area is better able to withstand the negative effects.

In some situations, using aid to specifically reduce local violence can produce greater gains than simply distributing commodities.

Some assistance strategies to reduce or prevent conflict in targeted areas include support for conflict resolution and conflict management programs or initiatives; the construction of social safety nets to offset the negative impacts of structural adjustment policies; investment promotion; alternative employment and livelihood development; land settlement programs; programs aimed at increasing access to opportunities for non-dominant parties (women, indigenous populations or other minority ethnic groups); assistance for work and training programs; or appropriate sustainable development programs, (health, education, family planning, water and sanitation, roads, ports, agriculture, livestock, or environmental preservation).

***Equipment*** The type of equipment needed for DA either directly related to conflict prevention or for an indirect approach is too diverse to be able to describe here. Equipment needs are tailored to each project and range from little or no equipment to extensive equipment requirements.

***Budget*** Budget requirements vary enormously with the scope and objectives of each project.

***Timeframe*** The time required to prepare and implement assistance projects and to see the results on a conflict situation vary greatly. Those which attempt to address the economic roots of a conflict, if successful, can have long-lasting results, but can require long investment time-frames before benefits are realized.

***Preconditions*** The necessary preconditions to successfully introduce an economic assistance intervention vary greatly. Generally, for aid to maximize its effectiveness, recipient countries need to have sound economic policies and inclusive political processes.

## Examples

***Cross-Line Communication.*** Strengthening cross-line communication may have no impact on the warleaders, but perhaps will lead the peace-seeking elements of neighboring communities to see mutual interests in cooperation. With communication and cooperation partially restored, neighbors can continue to trade, graze animals, and maintain other ties even while warleaders continue to fight. Providing political space and lines of communication is critical for buttressing conflict prevention processes. This is perhaps the most important contribution outsiders can make. Community

attention is focused on the visible benefits of cooperation and avoidance of conflict, rather than on some abstract concept of peace. These cross-line mechanisms can have extremely important preventive ramifications, providing fora to discuss rather than fight over misunderstandings and resource questions.

Border areas throughout the Great Lakes Region are logical focal points for this kind of initiative, where communication between those "outside" and those "inside" is critical for balancing perceptions. A few agencies began a series of cross-border meetings between towns inside Rwanda facing the Zairian camps. This was interrupted for a time by the Kibeho massacre, but resumed in mid-1995. Other candidates for this kind of mechanism are border areas of intercommunal conflict in southern Sudan (Duk Fadiet and Duk Faiwil between the Dinka and Nuer), Ethiopia, Somalia and Somaliland.

In the greater Somali and Afar communities inhabiting Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somaliland and Somalia, the UN is examining cross-border strategies regarding resource use, trade, grazing routes, communication and transport. Since the UNDP established guidelines regarding its response to complex emergencies, and conflict avoidance is a key element, these kinds of non-traditional cross-border planning and programming have greater latitude when being explored by UN agencies. Since these countries are all continuous recipients of relief and development assistance, this regional framework should be utilized and intercommunal planning should be a part of all emergency responses. "Going across borders to solve problems is critical," says Walid Musa of UNDP.[3] Similar thinking is taking place in the Great Lakes Region, where cross-border links are strong between the movement of people, the concentration of populations, and the movement of military forces.

***Addressing the Economic Causes of Conflict.*** Low-level economic activity provides some measure of economic independence, which lessens dependence on military authorities. This can reduce rationales for joining militia and reduce a community's dependence on aid which often cements local populations to military leaders.

For example, on the road from Boraama to Hargeisa in Somaliland, the number of checkpoints increased because people all along the road needed money to buy water from the limited number of usable water points. UNDP dug two more water holes and the checkpoints disappeared.[4] The fighting over water points in Bakool Region in the spring and summer of 1995 between the Jiron and Hadame sub-clans was also amenable to resolution through elder negotiation backed up by limited agency resources in digging additional water points per the eventual agreement.

## Illustration

♦ ***Inside the Greater Horn***

***Functional Cooperation.*** Animal health is one sectoral area which has experimented with cross-line programming. Vaccination programs across the lines of battle are feasible with something as critical to local communities as the health of their animals, which often comprise their entire asset base. For example, animal herders of the Misseriya from Southern Kordofan were not receiving veterinary services from northern Sudan and therefore wanted to be served from Akon, an area held by the SPLA. An already brisk trade between Southern Kordofan and Northern Bahr al-Ghazal might be further assisted by aid planners who could provide certain inputs to the Misseriya and other inputs to the Dinka, to encourage further cooperation and perhaps help forestall an escalation of hostilities which threatens the fragile situation in that transition zone.

Animal health programming when pursued intercommunally provides an opportunity to operationalize things like codes of conduct, ground rules, or the Geneva Conventions themselves. 'If raiding continues, aid will not,' could be a standardized condition.

Some agencies use the opportunity of animals coming together to treat people as well. Mobile health clinics and veterinarians can travel together and create further incentives for temporary intercommunal cooperation.

Education is another potential vehicle for cross-line contact. Bishop Paride Taban's Diocese of Torit has a boarding school which brings together the children of many neighboring tribes in Eastern Equatoria. Although it is hoped that this programming will lead to increased cooperation in the present, this strategy is more geared toward creating a future atmosphere where tomorrow's adults will have had more experience peacefully interrelating with their neighbors. Training programs, although shorter-term, can also be a vehicle for bringing different perspectives and representatives of conflicting communities together on technical, joint problem-solving grounds.

A third sectoral area for intercommunal planning is water. Bringing community water committees together to jointly plan regional drilling, maintenance, and use is a logical extension of participatory strategies. For example, if appropriately engaged, the Regional Water Authorities in Somalia might act as mechanisms for cross-line discussions.

Fourthly, human health holds great potential for inter-community cooperation. UNICEF has brokered 'days of peace' and corridors of tranquility' in order to carry out immunization programs for children. The Carter Center has used guinea worm eradication as the logic for temporary cessation of hostilities. The mobile clinic of Catholic Relieve Services and the Diocese of Torit funded by ECHO goes across boundaries of conflicting parties in southern Sudan, and can be a vehicle for dialogue through intercommunal planning.

Housing is yet another sector holding some promise for conscious cross-ethnic programming. In Gitarama, Rwanda, a housing reconstruction program assisted by CRS provides Hutu locals with raw materials for building or repairing housing for returning Tutsis.

***Encouraging Intercommunal Trade.*** Commercial activity is often a leading rationale for stability. Mudug Region in central Somalia is a continuing potential flashpoint because of its multi-clan composition, but relative peace held since a 1993 peace agreement due to the commercial imperative. "Mudug is the Dubai of Somalia," claims Osman Ato. "The businessmen are keeping the peace."[5]

Agencies interested in supporting reconciliation can seek creatively to foster interdependence rather than competition. Exchange mechanisms are often cut off by front lines, or communities are so impoverished by chronic conflict that transporting goods back and forth becomes problematic. Supplying means of transport for locally produced and traded commodities should be explored by intervening agencies. Backhauling goods by air, allowing trucks bringing inputs also to be used for transporting local goods, and providing bicycles or canoes (depending on the topography) to facilitate the movement of small amounts of produce are all critical in keeping lines of cooperation open between neighboring communities whose relations are perhaps strained by the actions of warleaders.

Cooperatives and other methods of community cooperation are in some places key actors in sustaining intercommunal exchange. Utilizing these kinds of indigenous mechanisms supports local adaptation to conflict as well as keeps lines of communication open. For example, CRS is giving money to a community cooperative in Chukudum (southern Sudan) in order to increase their purchasing power, the cooperative in turn is buying goods from neighboring communities, stimulating exchange between the Boya, Didinga, and Toposa, who have historically raided each other for cattle or grain. Simply knowing these cooperative mechanisms exist is important in agency planning. For example, Rahanweyne sub-clans in the Bay Region are increasingly pooling their money into small, cooperative, profit-sharing businesses called iskashis. The profitability of these ventures and their ability to penetrate markets in Mogadishu and Bardera will greatly influence the Rahanweyne's ability to one day defend themselves from military and commercial incursions from militarily stronger and wealthier Habr Gedir and Marehan neighbors. Supporting non-indigenous forms of social organization like local NGOs will do nothing to reduce conflict and little to reduce vulnerability in Bay Region, but perhaps supporting iskashis will. The conquest of Baidoa by General Aidid in September 1995 reinforces the analysis of interdependence between Bay Region's food production and Mogadishu's markets and port. Gradually equalizing the power balance between the two neighbors is a prerequisite for non-predatory relations.

In Western Equatoria, cooperatives and other local producers are again selling surpluses with the help of some agencies and donors. The surplus production opens up old trade routes, some of which go across borders, which can't be completely controlled by the warleaders.

On the Ugandan side of the border, Equatorian refugees produce vegetables, seeds, and root crops for sale to other Sudanese refugees and to the Ugandan host population. There are historical links of reciprocity and ethnicity across the border which have been called upon repeatedly during the last three decades of violent conflict in both countries. Much more could be done to support the refugee populations in their production and commercial networks.

Trade can be the great equalizer. Some of the conflicts in the Horn have partial roots in exclusion from trade routes. In Somaliland, perceptions of unequal access to Berbera-Jijiga trade routes fuels the Garhajis' militia in its war with the Somaliland government and its Habr Awol supporters. Agencies should at least factor this in to their humanitarian response to the displacement caused by the war and to ensure the assistance that's going into government-held areas doesn't reinforce patterns of domination and

exclusion. Aid into the Lower Juba Region in Somalia also requires political savvy, as the exclusion of Ogadenis from Kismayu's political and commercial benefits enhances the likelihood of future conflict.

# Notes

1. Adapted from material in John Prendergast, *Peace-Building in the Greater Horn of Africa*, forthcoming, and his work for the US Institute of Peace.

2. Interview, Nairobi, August 18, 1995.

3. Interview, Walid Musa, July 10, 1995.

4. Interview with UNDP staff, July 7, 1995.

5. Interview, July 5, 1995.

# 9. Environmental/Resource Management (Natural Resource Conservation/Management)

## Description

Conservation of resources involves efforts to slow the degradation of both renewable and non-renewable natural resources, and also to reverse the decline of and regenerate renewable resources. Environmental or resource management includes efforts to form regimes to oversee and administer resource use, and agreements to standardize or reallocate existing resources.

An indirect approach of resource conservation and management can also be encouraged by foreign donors international development and humanitarian agencies. They could conduct preliminary assessments and subsequently monitor the impact of sponsored programs and projects. "The property rights that govern resource distribution often change as a result of large-scale development projects or new technologies that alter the relative values of resources."[1]

### *Objectives*

The primary objective of resource conservation and management efforts is to slow or reverse the use and degradation of natural resources and to use existing resources more fairly. However, such efforts can also contribute to preventing violent conflicts over resources or to mitigate existing conflicts in which resource scarcity or misallocation is a primary or contributing factor.

### *Relationship to Conflict Prevention*

Violent civil or international conflict can be precipitated or aggravated by resource scarcity, which is often caused by a man-made disturbance of its regeneration, e.g., overuse of a renewable resource. Many conflicts in the Greater Horn of Africa, for example, stem from or are exacerbated by issues of resource shortage or unequal distribution of resources, such as water, forest or fertile land. The renewable resource most likely to cause resource conflicts is rivers, partly because water itself is an important resource, and because rivers often form political boundaries and frequently cross national borders, provoking problems of resource usage between upstream and downstream neighbors.[2] Overfarming and overgrazing leads to further declines in already low standards of living, increased vulnerability to natural disasters, and a greater likelihood of conflict over scarce resources.

Environmental degradation can lead to a decrease in agricultural production; general economic decline; displacement of population; and disruption of institutions and social relations — any of which may result in conflict.[3] Environmental scarcity can also prompt more powerful actors — both

national and sub-national — to take steps to increase in their own favor already inequitably distributed resources.

Resource scarcity and related violence can both result from and cause further population displacement, including migration to urban areas and ethnic clashes. Resource scarcities can sharply increase demands on key institutions such as the state, while simultaneously reducing their capacity to meet those demands, further increasing the risk of the state fragmenting or becoming more authoritarian. The multiple effects of environmental scarcity, including large population movements and economic decline in the face of increased financial and political demands on the government can weaken the capacity and legitimacy of the state and increase potential for urban unrest and/or peasant receptivity to rural insurgency.[4] Severe environmental scarcity can increase economic deprivation and disrupt key social institutions, which in turn can cause so-called deprivation conflicts such as civil strife and insurgency.[5] While a resource shortage alone may not be enough to precipitate violence, it can interact with other resource, demographic, and economic pressures.

For the reasons stated above, actions to slow down or even stop the degradation of resources, to reallocate or better manage existing resources and even to restore renewable resources can help to prevent or mitigate violent conflict.

## Applicability

***Strengths and Weaknesses***

During problems of power asymmetry between two or more parties involved in a resource dispute, the dominant party is likely not easily refrain from dictating the conditions of cooperation.

Resolving resource scarcity can also result in aggravating conflict. For example, the huge dams that are often built to resolve water scarcity can be disruptive, because the consequent relocation of large numbers of people generates turmoil among those displaced and causes clashes with local groups in areas where they are resettled. Those affected are often members of ethnic minority other non-dominant groups, rebellion by these groups and subsequent repression by the state may result. Steps to increase water resources upstream can induce conflict among downstream users.

***Lessons Learned/ Recommendations***

Solutions to resource conflicts can cut across the lines of battle and encourage joint participation. The formation of such linkages can help to further mitigate and avoid violent conflict.

Resource conflicts can occur between and among ethnically non-dominant groups, developers, governments, etc., therefore, in order to be effective, it is important that natural resource decision-making include all such groups.

Foreign aid or specific programs to protect the environment have been shown to be less important than the basic regulatory and economic frameworks of individual countries.

Some lessons have been learned from environmental and resource management initiatives:

- Encourage local cooperation, informal integration, and action on environmental issues by NGOs, special interests, and citizens' groups, without the intervention or overt cooperation of public authorities.

- In issues where government already is or becomes involved, form groups to study and advise on resource degradation issues and support programs to increase the knowledge and skills of government officials on environmental problems and their solutions.

- Support the formation of supranational organizations, commissions, and joint advisory boards and committees, with oversight and enforcement authority to cope with resource problems.

- Solutions to resource conflicts can cut across the lines of battle and encourage joint participation. The formation of such linkages can help to further mitigate and avoid violent conflict.

- Support strategies for adapting to environmental scarcities, for example:
    - Using indigenous resources more sensibly.
    - Providing alternative employment to people with limited resource access.
    - Utilizing economic incentives such as increases in resource prices and taxes, which can reduce resource degradation and depletion by encouraging conservation, technological innovation, resource substitution, and turning to production of goods and services which do not rely as heavily on the scarce resource.
    - Undertaking land redistribution and labor-intensive rural industries which can relieve the effects of unequal access to good cropland.[6]
    - Providing and helping develop technologies which compensate for resource losses.

International actors can encourage host country governments to join international resource management regimes. While international environmental organizations generally do little themselves to enforce rules, they do help increase member governments' ability to make and keep



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agreements, promote concern among governments, and to build national political and administrative capacity to regulate resources.[7]

Because resource conflicts can occur between and among ethnically non-dominant groups, developers, governments, etc., natural resource decision-making should include all such groups to be effective in reducing conflict. "The participation of citizens in community-based organizations involved in natural resource management can contribute to alleviation of environmental problems, while at the same time enabling people to become involved in the national decision-making process."[8]

Because both subsistence farmers and governments respond more to short-term political and economic pressures than to the dictates of sound planning, they need prodding and financial inducement to lessen and repair environmental damage. Foreign aid or specific programs to protect the environment have been shown to be less important than the basic regulatory and economic frameworks of individual countries.

It is useful to hold training seminars for regional representatives to concentrate on issues such as capacity-building in environment management skills, and/or present techniques used in western industrial countries for prevention and resolution of environment-related conflicts. Such a seminar could also present case studies of potential and actual conflicts related to resource issues, and their solutions. Seminar participants could include professional local managers, representatives of environmental agencies, members of NGOs, business, and academia who have a stake in conflict prevention/resolution and environmental management.

International agencies and foreign donors can also indirectly contribute to resource conservation and management by instituting policies to, include in the planning phase of projects an assessment of environmental impact, as well as introducing periodic monitoring, especially of the impact on potentially contentious resources.

## Conflict Situation

***Stage of Conflict***

Although little has been written on this topic and the scope of this project did not allow extensive analysis, it appears that efforts to conserve or manage resources would be easiest to implement prior to a conflict reaching a violent stage, or in a post-conflict environment as part of reconstruction. However, such steps would likely also contribute to, mitigate, and/or limit the spread of an ongoing conflict.

***Conflict Type***

Environmental management and conservation efforts most obviously are appropriate for conflicts stemming from resource disputes. However, as environmental scarcities are often less obvious contributing causes to other types of conflicts, efforts to slow the degradation of, reallocate or renew

resources can help prevent or reduce the level of violence of conflicts with multiple causes.

***Cause of Conflict Addressed***

Efforts at environmental restoration and resource management can address the economic roots of a conflict thereby, contributing to structural conflict prevention or mitigation.

## Implementation

***Organizers***

Resource conservation and management efforts can be initiated by national actors, either governmental or non-governmental, or by foreign actors. Although prompted from the outside, related institutions are most effective and more likely to be sustained if run by host country organizations, either governmental or civil. Resource conservation and management endeavors in developing countries are most likely funded at least in part by foreign sources.

***Participants***

Participants in resource conservation and management efforts vary, depending on various factors such as the endeavor, the source of support, and the level at which it is implemented.

***Implementors***

The personnel and skills required to design and implement resource conservation and management efforts again depend on the type of project, regime, or other endeavor undertaken.

***Activities***

Direct efforts to help conserve and better manage resources which can also help prevent or mitigate conflict include programs to accomplish the following:

- Participatory rural appraisals of resources.
- Community-based forestry programs and other efforts to reduce the rate of deforestation.
- Protection and respect of traditional resource practices and knowledge.
- Strengthening protection of the environment, including the design and passage of legislation and its enforcement.
- Efforts to encourage the capacity of civil society to engage in collective decision-making and create national and local institutions and organizations which formulate and implement environmental regulations.
- Creation of institutions to mediate and adjudicate resource disputes.
- Support the development of local institutions to build their own capacity for resolution of resource disputes.
- Negotiate agreements which initiate actions such as clean-up projects, waste reduction measures, and other cooperative efforts.
- Provide the assistance of technical experts.

- Develop the capacity of regional countries to design and institutionalize mechanisms for resolving resource disputes and preventing them from escalating to violence.
- Support locally-based expertise and indigenous knowledge regarding land use issues and resource management.

***Timeframe***

The various types of resource conservation and management efforts vary greatly in the time they take to plan, to implement, and to have an impact on the resource situation and in turn on the conflict situation. The results can often be long-lasting.

## Examples

$15 million of the annual US foreign military financing funds for Africa for FY 1991-93 were allocated to the Africa Biodiversity Program, which provides funds to protect African natural resources.

The African Coastal Security component assists African navies to patrol their economic zones more effectively and enforce environmental protection regulations.

The IDP camps in Rwanda — and other large scale concentrations of people throughout the Greater Horn — have left the surrounding area stripped of its vegetative cover, accelerating erosion. Only a few agencies are addressing the nexus of environmental problems which will inevitably spawn another generation of intercommunal conflict driven by scarce resources. Unfortunately, agroforestry falls outside of the funding parameters of some agencies, especially those with emergency mandates such as OFDA.

Search for Common Ground/Macedonia is developing a project with a local environmental NGO in the Lake Prespa region to bring together Macedonians and Albanians in mixed villages to clean up polluted waterways.

## References

Search for Common Ground/Macedonia, Director, Dr. Eran Fraenkel.

# Notes

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2. Thomas Homer-Dixon, p. 19.

   Katrina Rogers, "Rivers of Discontent — Rivers of Peace: Environmental Cooperation and Integration Theory." *International Studies Notes*, Vol. 20, No. 2, Spring 1995, p. 13.

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4. Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict...," pp. 25, 32.

5. Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict...," p. 7.

6. Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict..." p. 16.

7. Marc Levy, et al., "Improving the Effectiveness of International Environmental Institutions," in Peter Haas, et al. (eds.), *Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993, p. 397.

8. Green Guidance 1993.

# 10. Humanitarian Assistance

## Description

Humanitarian assistance refers to emergency aid which targets affected populations with inputs that address immediate, basic needs such as food, water, shelter, health care and sanitation.

***Objectives***

To provide humanitarian assistance in such a way as to prevent or mitigate conflict, to prevent the escalation and spread of conflict, and to contribute to conflict resolution efforts.

***Expected Outcome or Impact***

Humanitarian aid primarily intends to sustain life and relieve suffering. Such aid should not exacerbate tensions which lead to conflict.

***Relationship to Conflict Prevention***

In most complex political emergencies, humanitarian aid is by far the most important avenue of contact between the international community and conflicting parties. Emergency assistance can fuel conflict and dramatically influence the dynamics of conflict. Humanitarian aid has potential to be as an important policy instrument for preventing the escalation of conflict and promoting long-term peace-building.

Humanitarian assistance programs can be specifically designed to include concern for preventing conflict; to mitigate existing, ongoing conflict; or to focus on post-conflict reconstruction, in an attempt to prevent the recurrence of conflict. In this way, humanitarian assistance programs can be planned and implemented in ways that attempt to strengthen the positive impacts and reduce the negative impacts ("do no harm") of such programs on conflict issues in affected areas. Increasingly, the case is being made to incorporate developmental principles into the emergency response, which involves capacity and institution-building objectives. This allows greater flexibility in addressing the institutional crises which accompany most complex emergencies, which are usually a primary cause of conflict.

Humanitarian aid is key to minimizing the potential instability posed by displaced populations. Without appropriate assistance, refugees and internally displaced populations may provoke greater instability, become unmanageable burdens on countries or communities accepting them, and could cause disruption as they seek safety elsewhere. In extreme cases, refugee problems can lead to war between states if countries, unwilling to provide temporary haven to displaced persons undertook military operations to eliminate the cause of the exodus, or if refugee populations harbor armed elements which undertake cross-border incursions into their country of origin.

## Applicability

***Strengths and Weaknesses***

Measures taken with humanitarian assistance to reduce the negative impacts of conflict or help to mitigate conflict may encounter resistance from governments that perceive agencies' efforts as interference in their countries' sovereignty.

An effective early warning system could identify potential situations of large-scale emergencies and prompt the necessary political and humanitarian actions to prevent or limit violent conflict and population displacement. Early warning is more than just collecting information about possible emergencies. The problem lies with linking an early warning system to mechanisms and organizations with the mandate, willingness, and ability to take action quickly and appropriately. In the area of monitoring food supply conditions worldwide, early warning systems have proven effective in mobilizing an international response to prevent famine and promote longer-term development; however, such a response has generally not occurred in developing strategies to avert disasters from internal conflicts and gross violations of human rights.

***Lessons Learned/ Recommendations***

Humanitarian assistance programming should at least not contribute to the exacerbation of tensions, and at best should astutely address some of the causes of conflict, thereby contributing to peace-building. Humanitarian assistance can help contain or "keep the lid on" an explosive situation. In most internal conflicts and complex emergencies, humanitarian agencies have until recently responded to the casualties and manifestations of war, such as refugee flows, with very little investment in peacemaking and preventing wars' expansion. More and more agencies are becoming interested in widening their mandate to incorporate conflict prevention and mitigation objectives in their programming.

This section on lessons learned and recommendations will be divided into three components: minimizing aid's contribution to conflict; utilizing codes of conduct and humanitarian principles; and maximizing aid's contribution to conflict mitigation.[1]

### Minimizing Aid's Contribution to Conflict

During the emergency response it is necessary to pay strict attention to the causes of conflict, so as not to create or exacerbate conflict and to promote reconciliation. Attempting to minimize the negative aspects of programs in affected areas — must be a primary objective.

This could include adding procedures to examine, monitor and evaluate each program on how it affects or could affect conflict in general and/or specific conflict issues; considering the impact on conflict issues of any

sponsored projects; and even conditioning assistance to progress on conflict issues. Responding to only one aspect of a conflict without considering its complex, complementary, inseparable aspects may actually exacerbate it; using a more integrated approach may help reduce the negative aspects of programs in affected areas.

The mere presence of relief and development agencies can at times deter or mitigate some violent conflict. Beyond presence and involvement in negotiating access and safe passage, humanitarian agencies may be in a position to raise concerns about affected peoples' physical security, particularly when they have gained confidence within the framework of providing assistance.

An effective early warning system which utilizes information collected by aid agencies could help identify potential situations of large-scale emergencies and prompt the necessary political and humanitarian actions to prevent or limit violent conflict and population displacement. Effective early warning requires more than just collecting information about possible emergencies, but also needs definitive links between early warning systems and mechanisms and organizations with the mandate, willingness, and ability to take action quickly and appropriately. Early warning systems should more explicitly address who should act on generated information and how.

Beyond early warning, what follows are a number of aspects of agency operations which can contribute to the minimization of aid's contribution to conflict.

*Planning/Procedures*

Advance planning by humanitarian agencies, with at least minimal contingency plans in place, can contribute significantly to preventing or mitigating conflict. Advance simulations addressing diversion and violence could be helpful, especially if undertaken regularly. For example, both Burundi and the Great Lakes Region have been the subject of advanced planning exercises by various donor and operational agencies. The earlier and better prepared the response, the sooner staff can act to add rehabilitative principles to the assistance and address issues minimizing aid's sustenance of conflict.

Donor countries need to have updated plans of action for areas identified through early warning mechanisms as imminently experiencing crises. "Both the State [Department] and USAID Inspector Generals consistently remark on the lack of mission preparation with specific reference to Mission Disaster Relief Plans and Emergency Action Plans," claims a cable addressing US disaster assistance.[2] To complement improved contingency

plans, having a 'first team' of agency operators on call for major emergencies would greatly improve response time and effectiveness.

Another consideration for emergency aid planners is how the their aid might impact the economic and military strategies and balance involved in the conflict, and how unequal supplies might affect tensions. The timing of aid interventions is also key in their impact on a conflict — for example, providing aid during harvests generally makes diversion of the aid to non-intended recipients easier.

Planning for relevant community participation is important for building the internal accountability necessary to minimize aid's contribution to conflict. Poor planning lowers the effectiveness of accountability, with the effect of reinforcing the war economy. Planning assistance so it helps to minimize dislocations of population can both mitigate conflict and be more cost effective: people in their home areas can usually continue to maintain productive livelihoods, while assistance to displaced populations is often easily diverted.

Through including certain guidelines and requirements in RFPs (Requests for Proposals), donors could motivate agencies to improve their planning processes vis-a-vis how their aid will influence the course of the conflict. Donor requirements for operating agencies to make such considerations mandatory to receive agency funding would help make procedures across agencies (i.e., NGOs) more standardized and provide them a mandate to pursue such considerations as those summarized below. These considerations could also be included in humanitarian agency field operations guides, as follows:

- Prior to starting any operations, make concerted efforts to understand the nature of the conflict, and take into consideration what happened and why people are in a state of conflict.
- When the "first team" goes out to make an initial assessment, the team could include someone with knowledge of what the conflict is about, where it is going, and what questions need to be raised in that particular context. Humanitarian organizations tend to operate in a similar manner from one place to another, concentrating on getting inputs from point A to point B. However, it does matter who and what are involved and how the situation has arisen and progressed. Ideally, the team would include someone with conflict assessment skills.
- Obtain appropriate personnel and literature to educate staff on the local context. This can help reduce mistakes which fuel conflict.
- Pay attention to the location of projects. Food distributions will create movements of needy people; however, they will also attract people who want to use food diversions to perpetuate their interest

or power. How food deliveries fit with the structure of that society can exacerbate an ongoing conflict.

*Needs Assessment*

Improper assessments leading to inflated population figures or a misunderstanding of the local food economy can result in making diversion easier. Necessary steps for more accurate assessments include the following:

- Staff must be appropriately trained in assessment techniques.
- Assessments must answer the question of why people are vulnerable. The food economy approach being developed by Save the Children-UK, for example, provides an objective rationale for when and how to assist a population under stress.
- Diversify when and to whom agencies communicate with during assessments: strive to meet minority groups, women, and demand independence to the maximum extent possible, perhaps to the point of conditioning a response on the degree of independence of assessment.
- Ask not just what a community needs, but what it is already doing and build on that.
- Try to do construction/reconstruction work and assistance equally in various ethnic communities, for returnees as well as others, including the main ethnic group, to not exacerbate conflict. Look for common opportunities, common needs, and balance.

*Independent Monitoring and Evaluation*

Humanitarian assistance practitioners should evaluate and monitor their programs for their impact on conflict. Evaluation and monitoring would help them know what effect on conflict they have in the community they are working in, and result in better self-awareness of the effects of their interventions. Warring parties often manipulate aid for their own ends. Agencies monitoring the actual distribution processes can help to reduce diversion and increase accountability. A commitment to adequate, independent monitoring and a willingness to continuously evaluate programming are key elements in reducing aid's contribution to conflict.

Adequate monitoring, to be truly effective in reducing diversion and other negative impacts on conflict, requires local staff to be highly experienced and well-trained in monitoring techniques. Adequate evaluation includes the following steps:

- Thorough evaluation of aid requirements.
- Identification of the most vulnerable people within the community.

- Identification of problems such as diversions, forceful confiscation of supplies and misappropriation, and development of a system of accountability.

The next step is using the information gained from monitoring and evaluation to try to mitigate the negative effects of the intervention and agencies' presence while enhancing those that are positive. Operating agencies must be flexible enough to change their policies and practices when the information available indicates a negative impact on the conflict situation.

*Access Options*

The various methods of negotiating and ensuring access to needy areas and populations by humanitarian agencies — such as negotiated access, cross-border operations, military protection, or commercial channels — can play a role in minimizing aid's contribution to conflict.

Critical tasks to permit and sustain effective humanitarian action include: negotiating with governments and opposing factions for humanitarian access; raising concerns with the authorities about the safety and security of displaced populations; securing safe zones; agreeing on corridors of tranquility; and ensuring respect for human rights.

Often, once humanitarian access is secured, pressure from aid agencies, donors, and foreign governments diminishes on other issues, often to the detriment of the rights and welfare of affected populations. To discourage abuses, which could further fuel the conflict and expand the scope of the emergency, access agreements should not take precedence over human rights and justice issues.

Diversification of entry points for emergency supplies can reduce unintended empowering of a particular authority; utilizing various channels can lessen the dependence agencies have on particular large-scale extortion networks.

*Targeting and Distribution Methods*

Flawed distribution systems facilitate diversion; getting aid directly into the hands of families (especially female heads-of-households) denies military authorities an opportunity for easy diversion. At the local level, women should be involved in the planning process and identification of beneficiaries to the maximum extent possible. The framework for emergency response should be to protect livelihoods and prevent further degeneration of a community's capacity to adapt to chronic crisis and manage its own response to these crisis cycles. In this regard, aid to women's groups and female heads-of-household is critical.

It is important to identify the differentiation in suffering along class and identity lines in the affected area to avoid strengthening warring parties. The internal social relations within a community often pre-determine who will receive how much in any given distribution of aid. By comprehending the likelihood of who receives what, humanitarian agencies can be better prepared to create targeting and distribution approaches which reduce these internal transfers from weak to strong, poor to rich, and unarmed to armed.

Where the opportunity exists, alternative structures to armed factions should be cultivated and supported through distribution mechanisms which prioritize women's groups, technical committees (e.g., for water, health, food), and traditional leaders where appropriate.

*Types of Aid Provided*

Certain kinds of inputs are more lootable than others. A food's market value, for example, can play a major role in whether it draws the interest of military forces and looters. To reduce the potential of diversion, consider distributing less lootable inputs such as blended foods, easily stored foods like cassava, easily stored and fast-yielding seeds, vaccinations for children, etc.

Better assessment and analysis can lead to a more appropriate mix of inputs and policy responses. An important rationale for increasing the ratio of non-food to food inputs is the lower military benefit of most non-food rehabilitative aid.

*Coordination*

Increased emphasis on unity of effort between NGOs, the UN and bilateral agencies, and coordination between political, humanitarian, and military objectives can help mitigate the negative impacts of the humanitarian aid response. These efforts should correspond and be related to ongoing indigenous efforts. The aid community, acting collectively, should choose whether to continue their operations or not in difficult situations, and to scale their operations according to the affected community.

At the outset of major emergencies (preferably before, if early warning systems are utilized and heeded), which draw dozens of agencies to the scene, coordination over a rational division of responsibilities is critical in avoiding manipulation by warring factions over the placement of agency resources and other unintended consequences of large-scale humanitarian responses. Coordinating on a regional level is key as well, i.e., exchanging information among agencies between countries and between refugee camps and countries of origin.

To more fully address aid's role in sustaining conflict, agencies and donors must enhance coordination, communication, and decision-making chains of command, both within a country and regionally; the role of the UN's Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) could be revamped and its coordination role in the field clarified. Individual donors could also improve their inter-agency coordination within their governments. Agencies should cooperate in jointly reviewing proposals and evaluating projects.

*Cost Standardization*

Controlling the costs of agency operations, which can be used to reinforce military authorities or war economies, is critical in reducing aid's contribution to conflict. Establish consultation and coordination processes for cost containment and standardization at the outset of an emergency response. Unity among agencies and donors (where appropriate) should be sought in negotiating large-scale contracts involving housing, labor, transport, and currency exchange.

Outrageous overheads and poor accountability by agencies in emergency situations can feed conflict. In most emergencies, agencies independently establish their own standards of operation, such as pay scales and contracts. To reduce inflationary pressures, early coordination among agencies in the field and at the headquarters level on nuts-and-bolts issues can help agency negotiators on the ground to withstand extortionary pressures. By being conscious of their contribution to warring parties through diversion and extortion, agencies can help minimize this contribution, taking steps in a coordinated fashion to do so.

*Human Rights*

Human rights abuses are at the core of what drives conflict in much of the Greater Horn, and they produce much of the human suffering which necessitates humanitarian responses. It is necessary to address the human rights violations directly while in the process of responding to humanitarian needs.

Humanitarian focus on individuals' rights can ignore and undermine survival strategies based on commitment to group survival and preservation of a way of life; agencies should consider focusing on community rights where individual vulnerability stems from communal dissolution.

Including surveillance of human rights (i.e., monitoring of forcible resettlements, attacks on markets, and resource thefts), in early warning monitoring of famines could help identify imminent violent conflict.

The mandates of most operational agencies prevent them from speaking out aggressively and publicly on human rights issues. However, many of these

agencies provide key information to human rights monitoring groups. Strengthening coordination between humanitarian and human rights agencies could encourage more action on their information.

**Utilizing Codes of Conduct and Humanitarian Principles**

Codes of conduct are important international legal instruments to which most governments have agreed that these can provide guidance to warring parties with respect to their treatment of civilian populations in war situations; i.e., the Geneva Conventions and the Convention of the Rights of the Child. These initiatives are critical for exposing warring parties in the field to basic humanitarian principles, and their dissemination should be fully supported as a basic humanitarian activity. Codes of conduct are important as professional guidelines.

According to the Geneva Conventions, the primary responsibility for the welfare of a civilian population is with the authority of their area; agencies and donors can be a positive influence in encouraging fulfillment of this responsibility.

Specific agreements regarding internationally accepted principles should be signed onto by military and civil authorities. The situation in some local operating areas may require a unique local code. In many places where observance of codes do not yet exist, advance efforts to build knowledge and respect for these principles before a crisis erupts would be more effective than trying to introduce such codes, ground rules, or conventions during an ongoing crisis.

There is often a lack of respect for existing international legal principles. Enforcement mechanisms, such as the use of conditionality with aid, are needed which are acted upon impartially and in a coordinated manner among the various donors and agencies involved. (See separate Tool Profile on "Conditionality", which includes discussion on the use of conditionality with humanitarian aid for conflict prevention.)

There are specific humanitarian principles which are particularly germane to the reduction of aid's exacerbation of conflict: neutrality and accountability.

*Impartiality*

Independence and impartiality are critical in an emergency context. Transparency and openness of operations are critical in avoiding charges and perceptions of partiality to any of the warring parties — which can aggravate conflict and interfere in reconciliation attempts. Objective assessments and transparent responses are needed to ensure this. It is



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crucial to avoid politically expedient formulas which balance aid equally to the territories controlled by warring parties. Key steps are to respond proportionately to need to the greatest degree possible and understand local economics to avoid unintentional partiality.

*Accountability*

Transparency of operations is also critical: announcing publicly people's entitlement can help restrain diversion of aid resources. Operationally, transparency in humanitarian aid supplies is critical for building internal accountability. Announcing to people what their ration is both publicly at the time of distribution and in advance through community structures provides a check on unimpeded diversions by rapacious authorities — whether military, commercial or civil. Even where civilian voices are subordinate to the military, this can provide support for communal demands for their "fair share." Such social pressure is helpful for improving the behavior of responsible authorities, and is likely much more important than outsiders' demands. Helping to promote such a lobby for humanitarian programs within the society receiving aid can help to strengthen internal mechanisms of accountability and internal demands for improved behavior by all parties in the aid relationship. Working through and promoting community structures can create an atmosphere in which the community itself demands a high degree of responsibility from those managing the program on their behalf, whether they are locals or internationals.

In the Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire, some aid agencies recognized intimidation of refugees by camp leaders based on misinformation. The agencies responded with a mass information campaign which empowered refugees. UNHCR also initiated radio broadcasts to highlight secure returnee communities. These efforts undercut the camp leaders' rule by terror based on misinformation.

In the Ngara refugee camp in Tanzania, ICRC personnel gathered the masses before distributions and used megaphones to explain the process and exactly what people were entitled to. An observer of the process described it this way: "First they made people understand what they deserved. Then they went to the those who are responsible and told them what they should do. That way the people couldn't come back and say that they were cheated."

In Southern Sudan, the rationale for the establishment of relief committees by local churches, and later by WFP, was that ultimately local communities play the most important role in making the rebel SPLA accountable for aid distributions. Individual NGOs have concluded this as well. One NGO, for example, distributes its aid based on the decisions made at a public meeting between the chiefs, sub-chiefs, and community leaders. "The SPLA will

inevitably get fed. They are part of the community. Accountability must be demanded by the people," says the NGO's country director.

External conditions requiring accountability can reinforce internal demands for it as well. Timing of aid deliveries and distributions is also important to minimize diversion. For example, when food is delivered during harvest time, communities often have less interest in protecting their rights to the assistance, as they are preoccupied with their own production and exchange.

Ensuring broad local participation in rehabilitation planning, increases the stake communities have in the planning of a response to emergencies that impact them. Having a larger stake will make community members more likely to hold their authorities accountable in the distribution of aid commodities. When planning is deemphasized and local communities are not fully consulted, diversion of aid is much easier, and warring parties are, thus, more easily resupplied, further fueling the conflict.

**Maximizing Aid's Contribution to Conflict Mitigation**

Beyond programming initiatives which minimize aid's exacerbation of conflict, there are specific conflict mitigation and prevention elements which can be incorporated into the humanitarian aid package.

*Incorporating Peace-Building into Humanitarian Assistance*

Conflict prevention and peace-building elements can be developed and incorporated into humanitarian aid strategies and methods. Training staff in conflict management can help develop a capacity for peace-building in emergency operations. Conflict prevention and mitigation programs could be introduced at the community level within the humanitarian assistance process. Program content could include dispute resolution addressing local issues that promote reconciliation, tension de-escalation and establishment of rapport among community members, training in conflict management such as problem-solving, negotiation, conflict aversion, democratic decision-making, and the role of community leaders in conflict management. Many NGOs are realizing they need to enhance their proficiency and familiarity with other skills such as international humanitarian law, conflict mitigation and management, which are necessary to work more closely with local NGOs and other local people.

Such a program could address the emergency aid process, including evaluation of aid requirements; identification of the most vulnerable people within the community; pinpointing existing problems such as diversions, forceful confiscation of supplies and misappropriation; and development of

a system of accountability. If appropriate, the program may also assist in establishing a community-wide dispute resolution system.

An important aspect is remaining flexible to respond to situations which might allow for positive interventions in support of local level reconciliation. Such flexible interventions can include small, in-kind support for local level conflict resolution conferences or other conflict mitigation initiatives. Agencies could systematically apply lessons from the field which can reduce the contribution of humanitarian aid to the exacerbation of conflict.

*Encouraging Indigenous Peace-Building Capacity*

One of the most important elements of sustainable reconciliation is to support the building of a peace constituency, i.e., among local organizations and community leaders which are directly involved in peace-making. Emergency interventions can support local peace-makers and constituencies by virtue of who the agencies utilize as local partners. More attention should focus on supporting indigenous capacity to deal with conflict in a society. External responses should be guided by what already works at the local level, what structures are in place and supported by the community, and what the indigenous social welfare mechanisms and kinship exchange dynamics are. The steps of this process can be summarized as follows:

- Consider what is in place, and how it can be encouraged and supported.
- Identify what natural processes already exist and partner with them.
- Enhance the people's ability to respond to their own emergency.

It is important to be aware that sometimes those people relief agencies partner with are the same who helped create and manipulate the conflict to begin with, and it may be to their advantage to keep the conflict going until they accomplish their objectives. It is often easiest in the short term to work through established leadership. However, they may have a stake in continuing conflict. It is important to understand whether the government is contributing to peace or the conflict, and consider how external agencies can promote their commitment to peace.

In the efforts of international agencies to support local capacity and enhance participation, practitioners need to continually evaluate whether traditional authority structures are being undermined, or conversely whether they should be supported at all. In hiring local staff for aid projects during the relief process, humanitarian agencies should consider hiring people from all sides of the conflict.

*Creating Intercommunal or Cross-Line Aid Committees*

In areas where communities or contesting militia groups have frequently clashed and created emergency needs, creating or supporting intercommunal mechanisms to discuss their emergency needs should be a priority; these mechanisms often already exist, but are under extreme pressure.

Strengthening cross-line communication and sectoral-level cooperation may encourage the peace-seeking elements of neighboring communities to see mutual interests in cooperation; with communication and cooperation partially restored, neighbors can continue to trade, graze animals, and maintain other ties even while warleaders continue to fight.

When seeking cross-line dialogue, cross-line sectoral level cooperation with functional objectives is a promising approach. For example in the area of animal health, vaccination programs across the lines of battle are feasible as the health of their animals, which often represent their entire asset base, is a critical priority of affected populations on both sides of the conflict. For example, animal herders of the Misseriya from Southern Kordofan were not receiving veterinary services from northern Sudan and therefore, wanted to be served from Akon, an area held by the SPLA. An already brisk trade between Southern Kordofan and Northern Bahr al-Ghazal might be further assisted by aid planners who could provide certain inputs to the Misseriya and certain inputs to the Dinka, to encourage further cooperation and perhaps help forestall an escalation of hostilities which threatens the fragile situation in that transition zone.

## Conflict Situation

There are two broad categories of humanitarian emergencies:

- Relatively "simple" situations resulting from a single cause and not involving extensive protection issues, such as displacement due to a natural disaster; and
- "Complex" situations, such as civil conflict which, have multiple causes and which require several institutions to cover protection (defending both physical safety and fundamental human rights) as well as other assistance.

***Stage of Conflict***

Attempting to link humanitarian aid with conflict prevention is an appropriate objective for all conflict stages.

***Conflict Type***

The kinds of interventions suggested above might be employed whether a conflict is violent or pre-violent, regardless of the cause.

***Cause of Conflict Addressed***

Tying conflict prevention to humanitarian aid is partly an effort to begin addressing structural aspects of conflict prevention and mitigation, the root causes. Nevertheless, most of the above interventions, especially those

aimed at minimizing the exacerbation of conflict, are aimed at immediate causes.

## Implementation

***Organizers*** Initiated by various agencies, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNICEF, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), World Food Program (WFP), International Organization for Migration (IOM), and NGOs, often coordinated by the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA). Funding generally comes from international donors. Local bodies initiate humanitarian action as well, including government relief agencies, local NGOs, and traditional kinship networks and community welfare mechanisms.

***Participants*** Impacted communities include those with large populations of displaced persons and refugees returning to adverse conditions and an antagonistic public; mixed populations containing multiple sides of the conflict; those near the edge of a conflict zone; and homogeneous populations suffering from extreme violence.

***Implementors*** Besides aid agency personnel, those responding locally could include civic, community, and women's groups, religious leaders, community elders, business owners, teachers, local government officials, heads of organizations, local faction commanders, local authority figures, and peacekeepers.

***Activities*** All actions designed to sustain life and reduce suffering.

***Budget*** Conflict prevention and mitigation components of existing humanitarian aid programs only add to the overall costs in small increments, and would vary widely depending on the intervention chosen. Nevertheless, global expenditures for emergency aid are increasing dramatically in absolute terms, and as a percentage of overall foreign aid.

***Set-Up Time*** The time required to implement a major emergency response is decreasing. The learning curve is high, and agencies are applying lessons learned in improving their response time.

***Other Resource Considerations*** The nature of international involvement depends on the causes and circumstances of the humanitarian emergency. Those affected require emergency aid in the form of food, water, shelter, health care, and sanitation, depending on the situation.

Post-conflict situations may require programs with more long-term development assistance to promote self-sufficiency and sustainability, integrating uprooted populations into development plans.

*Timeframe* Humanitarian assistance can have an immediate impact on the conflict situation, although its effect will not necessarily be long-lasting.

## Examples

InterAction, with the support of OFDA, is working to develop some standardized curricula to help prepare relief and development workers for these new challenges. They are also trying to develop some basic standards of proficiency for NGO staff in these new areas, i.e., conflict mitigation.

## References

The US Institute of Peace supported a study by John Prendergast of the Center of Concern which examined the role of humanitarian aid in conflict prevention and mitigation. Mary Anderson of the Collaborative for Development Action in Cambridge, MA, is currently developing training materials for NGOs in conflict situations, and is addressing many of these issues.

## Illustration

- ***Inside the Greater Horn***

Both Somalia and Sudan are the subjects of experiments in applied codes of conduct. The Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) — the donor coordination group — introduced a Code of Conduct, and the Operation Lifeline Sudan's Humanitarian Principles section has negotiated an agreement on ground rules recently signed by the two larger rebel factions. As resources become tighter, donors will inevitably express increasing interest in creative approaches to the abuse of humanitarian principles.

### *a) Somalia Code of Conduct*

The Somalia Aid Coordination Body's Code of Conduct which was established in early 1995 prioritizes the establishment of secure and less intrusive (freedom of program implementation, hiring and discharging personnel, etc.) conditions for aid agencies as prerequisites for their provision of non-emergency aid.

When aid worker Rudy Marq from Agence Internationale Contre la Faim was kidnapped in January 1995, the SACB scaled down quickly to emergency-only operations, suspending all rehabilitative or developmental activities. Community pressure on the kidnappers helped lead to Marq's eventual release. Later, when the Supreme Governing Council in Baidoa wanted to dictate which agencies would hire and fire, the Code was invoked to protect agencies from undue interference.

Questions have arisen as to what approach the Code takes. Somali critics say that the process was unilateral and heavy-handed, not consultative. The Code is open to wide interpretation by various donors.

Certain phrases — such as "secure regions" — are not clearly defined. No mechanism of enforcement exists and also no common formula for responses to violations exist.

This leads to the Code being arbitrarily applied. For example, a series of mistakes made by World Food Program staff compounded a difficult situation involving a WFP warehouse, security guards, and General Morgan in Kismayu. Operations were scaled back to emergency-only, despite the shared culpability for the dispute and the need to expand information-gathering on deteriorating nutritional conditions in the Juba Valley and Kismayu itself.

Another critique revolves around the issue of representativeness of local authorities. The SACB went on a field mission to Gedo Region, and found that the authorities had met their conditions for assistance, which are heavily weighted to stability and security of international agencies. When the "authorities" of the community accepted the Code, the mission recommended the commencement of rehabilitation and reconstruction activities in the Region. But the authorities in the region are almost exclusively from one sub-clan (Marehan), while Ogadeni and Rahanweyne peoples, who make up a substantial percentage of the Region's population, are almost completely unrepresented. "Justice has been sacrificed at the mantle of stability," decries one Somali official.

Yet another issue with the Code is the individualized nature of justice in which it demands that perpetrators are punished for crimes against agencies, problematic in the current context of no justice system and the historical context in which groups negotiate compensation in lieu of individual punishment.

One debate to which the Somali experience will contribute is the prerequisite of security for undertaking rehabilitative initiatives. Is it possible for "authorities" to guarantee security? Which authorities should be recognized? Does providing aid to secure areas and ignoring insecure ones draw predators to the secure areas? Did this last factor contribute to General Aidid's invasion of Baidoa?

### *b) Sudan Ground Rules*

In Sudan, the Operation Lifeline Sudan-brokered ground rules include the following central points:

a) the protection of civilians is fundamental to aid delivery;

b) civilians have a right to live in safety and dignity;

c) aid cannot be denied even if it crosses lines of battle;

d) responding proportionately to need does not represent an abandonment of neutrality; and

e) transparency of operations will be followed at all times.

The southern Sudan ground rules have been signed by OLS and the two major rebel factions in the south. It is the first time anywhere in the world that rebel organizations have recognized and signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Others (PLO, Tamil Tigers) have signed the Geneva Conventions. The OLS ground rules also stress protection of civilians as an integral part of assistance.

The Geneva Conventions and the Conventions of the Rights of the Child undergird the ground rules. Urging greater respect for human rights is palpably encouraging greater democratization and better governance.

After the signing of the ground rules by the rebel factions, the first major violation involved a revenge attack by an Akot-based group of civilians and SPLA soldiers on villages held by an opposing faction in the Ganliel area of Western Upper Nile, in which 210 civilians were allegedly killed, including 127 children. OLS officials immediately met with the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA) leadership, using the ground rules as the basis for discussion. OLS and the SRRA agreed upon the following measures:

a) an inquiry and disciplinary actions against SPLA or SRRA officials;

b) the necessity of locating and returning missing children;

c) the holding of the first ground rules dissemination exercise in the Akot area, especially for commanders; and

d) the need for grassroots peace and reconciliation activities by the chiefs of both areas.

A major shortcoming of the southern Sudan ground \rules is that they have only been taken to and signed by the rebel factions. A corresponding interest on the part of the leadership of OLS in Khartoum is not there. This leaves agencies open to charges of double standards, placing higher demands and expectations on rebels than on the government. The most important drawback to the ground rules is the lack of any enforcement mechanism for major violations by any party, including the donors. Processes are spelled out, but in the end no real sanctions are available.

# Notes

1. The following material comes from John Prendergast, *Humanitarian Aid and Conflict Prevention in the Greater Horn*, forthcoming, 1996.

2. AID/BHR/OFDA, *Guidelines for Foreign Disaster Assistance*, September 1, 1994.



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# E. Political Development and Governance Structures

## Tools:

- National Conferences
- Power-Sharing Arrangements
- Capacity-Building of Government Officials

# 11. National Conferences (National Debates)

## Description

The idea of national conferences is based on "limited democracy." With this type of democracy, people have an elected government, opposition parties, free elections, and are also afforded at least the minimum extent of political freedom.

A national conference can be a key initiative for the populace in conflicted areas to establish political rights through debates and to lay the groundwork for removing dictators and establishing transitional governments leading to relatively open elections.

### *Objectives*

The goal of organizing national conferences is to re-establish state institutions and functions democratically and create a political climate where armed conflicts within the state will cease.

### *Expected Outcome or Impact*

A national conference can gain consensus for the state's legitimate actions from society as well as instill confidence in the government from civilians. For the state authority that traditionally provides strong leadership, the national conference can facilitate the extension of authority and legitimacy by bolstering institutions while directing them to share greater political freedom with citizens. By decentralizing heavily centralized government, a country can develop a civil society with a foundation of strong democratic consolidation.

### *Relationship to Conflict Prevention*

A national conference is an opportunity for various political groups to change patterns of political behavior and develop more people-oriented political systems. A national conference not only re-establishes governance of stable civilian control but helps to rid the fear of military intervention. The state can gain legitimacy through discussions on economic development and other important policies, as well as evaluate the effectiveness of international financial contributions.

## Applicability

### *Strengths and Weaknesses*

National conferences can provide a stage for initiating discussions to establish a base for the effective use of other conflict prevention and resolution tools.

National conferences provide opportunities for politicians, businessmen, journalists, and leaders of nongovernmental organizations to discuss the quality of national and local governance as well as the application of economic and social policies.

A National Conference is a good method for extending dialogue between the corridors of power and grassroots level. It is therefore one of the best tools to form a national consensus for specific national policies.

In addition to having an impact on the governance and the political system of a nation, national conferences also have a significant impact on political culture. National Conferences also have a profoundly therapeutic effect on civil society.

Immediate impact of the national conference on conflict is considered to be modest since conferences can only set up the chance for political participation of various political parties and groups. At the same time, it is difficult to define how participants will manage a conference. For example, a national conference could begin with a chaotic argument over the membership and participation, as government and the opposition struggle for control.

In the long run, the impact of national conferences could be enormous and could promote further democracy. However, in many countries, political corruption is still a serious problem and political elites have a stake in trying to revert back to the previous non-democratic situation. In order to make the results of national conferences valid, these political elites must remain focused on democratic development and stay away from the temptation of power.

***Lessons Learned/ Recommendations***

Political openness, stemming from an explicit need to attract external assistance needed to manage a worsening economic crisis, permits at least the voicing of discontent. An announcement of steps taken to organize a national conference can therefore have a short-term effect on preventing conflict by groups who previously resorted to violence. These groups may adopt a wait-and-see attitude, and direct their efforts toward preparation for the conference.

However, if no actual, substantive political changes result, such groups may return to violence with even greater zeal and additional disillusioned groups may choose to join them. Before and after the conference, several steps must be taken to increase the political representation and participation of under-represented groups through constitutional and institutional changes.

For national conferences in Africa so far, the most important principle is the principle of inclusion — especially as observed in South Africa. However, this principle has not been institutionalized, and its implementation relies on the attitudes of leaders.

## Conflict Situation

***Stage of Conflict***

National Conferences are likely to take place following an outbreak of violence - such as oppression, massacres, and genocide - in an effort to prevent future occurrences, partly through restructuring the government.

***Conflict Type***

A government facing internal opposition may resort to using a national conference to resolve political conflicts in a democratic manner rather than employing military means.

***Cause of Conflict Addressed***

National conferences address conflicts where one or more groups of people are alienated from the current political process.

## Implementation

***Organizers***

National conferences can be organized by a number of parties, generally executives from government or the opposition.

***Participants***

The possible participants invited to a conference can vary greatly. Fundamentally, the current government and the opposition must have representatives participate and discuss political, economic, and social issues. Academics, national and local government personnel, representatives from nongovernmental organizations, human rights organizations, and aid donors could also be included according to the purposes of the debates.

***Activities***

Prior to a national conference, government's plans for defense, agriculture, justice, education, etc. should be publicized by radio or other communication means to create public confidence. Meanwhile, international organizations and/or universities invited by the government can organize the conference, working with other NGOs, the UN, and international donor governments. International organizations and governments can consolidate the follow-up group after the conference.

***Equipment***

Technical assistance may be required to implement the conference.

***Budget***

Financial assistance is often necessary to organize national conferences and support their functions.

***Other Resource Considerations***

Several conditions should be taken into consideration for maximum impact of the conference on preventing conflict. Participants must include representatives of all social, religious, professional, and political interest groups whose aim is to introduce a constitutional liberal democracy. The effective presence of international observers are also necessary to assure the process and results of the conference.

***Timeframe*** National conferences can be held for a long-term period (from several months to over a year) and/or a short-term duration (from several days to a few weeks).

***Preconditions*** Seemingly, successful transitions to democracy depend on the existence of a mature civil society. A favorable movement towards democracy can support national conferences followed by elections, after a period of transition.

## Examples

*Benin, 1990.* Benin was the first country in Francophone Africa to adopt multi-party democracy through national debate. President Kérékou had made the first concession to his opposition by accepting an opposition group spokesman into his cabinet. The National Conference lasted only nine days. Despite President Kérékou's initial reluctance to accept reduced and divided presidential prerogatives, his political isolation left him no option but to respect the acts and declarations of the Beninois National Conference as sovereign. Robert Dossou, the opposition leader, helped negotiate the membership of the conference, which included representatives of numerous civil associations and nascent political parties, as well as representatives of the former ruling party and the army. The interim period was scheduled to last for one year, during which time elections and a referendum to approve a new constitution would be held. Kérékou was eventually removed from office.

*Congo, 1991.* The national conference took place between February 25 and June 10. Following the Benin conference, the Congo's Marxist President, Denis Sassou-Nguesso, came under increasing pressure from opposition groups, leading him to renounce Marxism-Leninism and promise political reform. In the midst of strikes that began in September 1990, Sassou agreed to opposition demands to hold a national conference the following year. Some 1200 delegates representing 67 different political parties and associations, including the ruling Parti Congolais du Travail, participated in the conference.

## References

John F. Clark, *"The National Conference as an Instrument of Democratization in Francophone Africa," Journal of Third World Studies*, Vol. XI, No. 1, 1994, pp. 304-335.

## Illustration

- ***Outside the Greater Horn***

***Mali, 1991-92.*** After three days of bloody street riots, the 22-year dictatorship of Moussa Traoré was overthrown in a military coup led by Col. Amadou Touré on 25 March, 1991.

After the coup, the umbrella organization for the opposition, fearing a new dictatorship, switched its pressure for democratization to the new military rulers. The coup-planners then established a transitional

government with the joint participation of the opposition coalition and the military, under the popular Soumana Sacko. Three months later, a national conference was convened. For a brief two weeks, the different factions met to adopt a new constitution, electoral code and charter for political parties.

Finally, in elections held on April 12 and 26, 1992, Alpha Oumar Konaré was elected the new President of the country. He took office on June 8. This transition was an altogether successful process, with Konaré and Touré each expressing gratitude for the statesmanship of the other. Meanwhile, the loser of the election, Tieoulé Konaté, while complaining of voting irregularities, did agree to become part of the "democratic opposition." Another wind-fall of the elections has been an accord, albeit a tenuous one, with the troublesome Tuareg rebels, whose opposition activities have recently plagued Malian unity.

# 12. Power-Sharing Arrangements

## Description

Power-sharing describes arrangements where all significant groups in society are represented proportionally in a post-election coalition government. Power-sharing arrangements can result from negotiated settlements, providing reassurance that all parties will have positions in a coalition government commensurate with their vote share in an election.[1]

Power-sharing arrangements establish a setting of fair political competition by recognizing various political freedoms. The results are not merely constitutional reforms toward democracy, but also toward institution building and eventual economic reform and development.

### *Objectives*

The objectives of power-sharing arrangements include the transition of political regimes, liberation for political groups (including freedom from punishment for expressing collective dissent from government policy, freedom from censorship of the means of communication and freedom to associate voluntarily with other citizens), and democratization — guaranteeing citizens secret balloting, universal adult suffrage, regular elections, competition among parties, recognition of and access to political and economic associations, and executive reliability.

### *Expected Outcome or Impact*

The most difficult part of the use of power-sharing is unpredictability of its impact. Political leaders could achieve the goal of encouraging political participation of formerly excluded groups and stabilize a society simultaneously. But, the size of impact of new political freedom — how fast political change will progress, how efficiently the government will function vis-à-vis other political groups and the populace, how politically responsive to the political change the populace will be — will vary greatly depending on the society and the conditions to be affected. For example, state-society relations affect how political groups generate popular political participation, and civil-military relations affect the chance of military coups in the process of power-sharing. A society must have sufficient political institutions to absorb the high level of political participation. Therefore, dramatic power-sharing arrangements are less suitable for a society without strong political guidance by legitimate leaders, political parties and a political institutional framework.

### *Relationship to Conflict Prevention*

The concentration of power in the hands of a single tribe, clan, racial group, religious group, or a party has been one of the major causes of conflict in Africa. Power-sharing arrangements aim at allowing political opponents to a government to conduct legal political activities; lack of political power often means these groups will fight the government through violence. These arrangements also help promote legitimacy of the government and a sense of political fairness and confidence in political systems among the populace. Power-sharing can be effective in stopping

conflicts when there is a strong commitment among political leaders to democracy-building, and a consensus on respecting impartial power-sharing processes and upcoming election results.

## Applicability

***Strengths and Weaknesses***

Power-sharing arrangements are the most effective method for the expansion of political participation, which can promote peaceful resolution on various issues before they develop into violent conflicts. Power-sharing arrangements generate a culture of negotiation and compromise, and a positive sum system.

Power-sharing arrangements can even tackle fundamental causes of conflict that are mainly based on unfair distribution of material resources and information.

Power-sharing arrangements are very cost-effective since the only cost is in institutional building. To remain cost effective, the process must be well and consistently managed.

Interruptions to power-sharing arrangements can nullify progress achieved thus far, and re-implementing changes can increase cost significantly.

Potential problems include the difficulty of 'cohabitation' with former enemies, and continued unwillingness of parties to accept losing an election.

At the initial stage of power-sharing, the role of political leaders is more significant than that of groups and individuals of civil society. Therefore, civil society might not gain sufficient autonomy in determining arrangements. Although the role of political leaders is important, there is always a risk of their lack of commitment to fair arrangements.

It is difficult to make arrangements satisfactory to all sides and political groups in a limited time.

Power-sharing arrangements for democracy building often supersede ideological or religious aspects of issues. Thus, political leaders may risk their lives from uncooperative terrorist groups.

***Lessons Learned/ Recommendations***

*Models of Democracy.* There are two fairly useful models of democracy. Arend Lijphart describes one that is based on the consociational power-sharing process; it consists of four different elements: sharing of executive power by all significant groups; such groups' retention of a high degree of cultural or regional autonomy; proportionality in the distribution of civil service positions, public funds, and legislative seats; and a minority veto on most vital issues. The other model is a group building-block approach accommodated by group leaders with a high degree of group autonomy.

This model indicates that power-sharing process is conducted according to the political will and consensus of leaders of different political factions.

*Power-Sharing and Other Tools.* Various tools such as restructuring of the military, human rights enhancement, confidence and security building measures, and economic sanctions may help facilitate or expedite the process of power-sharing. For example, redrafting constitutions and laws, lowering the degree of military penetration by the government to the polity and society, redefining the institutional role of the military, civic education, and conflict prevention skills workshops should be used simultaneously with power-sharing arrangements to promote effective political participation. Also, monitoring assistance to the changing process and other training programs could be provided by third parties to give legitimacy and stabilize the process. However, tools that put pressure on the incumbent to initiate power-sharing must be used with a specific timing and a goal to avoid worsening conditions for power-sharing.

## Conflict Situation

***Stage of Conflict***

Power-sharing takes place in two different ways. Before the stage of power-sharing, there is always a potential danger of violence in a society because a large portion of populace is excluded from political and economic arenas. These people are likely to have a high degree of frustration toward the incumbent regime, and seek methods to change the system — even if just to express their opinions. Unless the dominant class changes (or at least tries to change) political and economic conditions through legal procedures, power-sharing is likely to occur only after a riot or a violent revolution by marginalized groups of a society. Civil war may seem probable or may break out before political leaders are willing to agree to act for power-sharing.

Alternatively, power-sharing arrangements can occur nonviolently through tenacious negotiations, compromises, pacts, and agreements by political leaders. Mostly, an occupation force or soft-liners of an authoritarian regime conduct this measure with internal pressure within the polity or pressure from civil society.

If a violent conflict is already taking place, power-sharing arrangements might be effective at the initial stage or when all sides suffer from severe damages. Power-sharing arrangements are especially attractive during a political transition stage.

***Conflict Type***

Power-sharing arrangements are especially effective where an authoritarian regime exists, and latent causes of conflicts are related to its policies or its political and economic institutional framework.

## Implementation

***Organizers*** While the US and other external powers can encourage constitutional arrangements that allow for a proliferation of power, indigenous leaders must organize efforts for power-sharing arrangements.

***Participants*** The participants in power-sharing arrangements are the political groups, their representatives, and the voting population.

***Implementors*** Implementation of power-sharing arrangements is done by the representatives of indigenous groups and through the state political infrastructure. Additionally, this tool requires a domestic or international monitoring of the process.

***Activities*** Political violence caused or exacerbated by the disenfranchisement of certain populations may be reduced by a combination of activities, including:

- Promotion and expansion of citizen participation in the political process.
- Strengthening of voter confidence in the effectiveness of open, pluralistic methods of choosing government.
- Encouragement of a competitive political environment.
- Institutionalization of the electoral process, brought about through civic education of the citizens and inclusion in the constitution of a rational electoral process.

Power-sharing arrangements can be implemented through the following specific measures:

- Constitutional changes.
- Agreements among political leaders in conflict.
- Electoral reforms.
- Political party training.
- Legislative training.
- Empowerment of local governments.
- Changes in civil-military relations.

- Civic education.

Civic education is the introduction to citizens of their constitutional rights and opportunities under existing state laws. Formerly marginalized people gain knowledge of how to participate in the decision-making process, empowering them to be involved in influencing the government. Civic education can include explaining to citizens:

- The state's political process.
- Their constitutional rights and the legal means for influencing governance.
- The boundaries for political participation under the constitution.
- Procedures for participating in and influencing the system.

***Budget***

Power-sharing arrangements are generally cost effective. Almost all associated costs go into institution building or rebuilding.

***Other Resource Considerations***

Power-sharing arrangements fundamentally require some institutions where political leaders start negotiations. Power-sharing arrangements also require:

- Sustainable legitimate political leadership.
- Consensus building skills of leaders to include as many parties (or groups) as possible.
- Political institutions capable of absorbing proliferated political participation (legalized political parties, labor unions, and religious groups, for example).
- Citizen enthusiasm that discourages activities for cancellation, postponement, or abstention of election by any groups or parties.

***Timeframe***

The period of time needed for power-sharing arrangements differs from case to case. Political leaders could make arrangements in a short time, but the process of power-sharing usually takes one year or even a few years for arrangements to take effect. Therefore, maintaining leadership that can lead the process over a long period of time becomes crucial.

***Preconditions***

Since power-sharing arrangements require negotiations among political leaders, various kinds of incentives are necessary for the leaders to come to a negotiation table and discuss decentralization of their power framework.

A government's leader might be willing to begin making power-sharing arrangements when:

- The government faces political inefficiency due to a lack of legitimacy.
- There are conflicts regarding institutional roles within a ruling group, especially within the military.
- Because of the incumbent leadership's suppression of opposition groups — especially in cases with human rights violations — foreign countries apply pressure through economic or military measures.

Another necessary condition is the maturity of political institutions. If a country has a democratic tradition or pluralistic political institutions, the power-sharing arrangements proceeds relatively smoothly. Since effective systems of governance seem necessary for the implementation of power-sharing arrangements, the challenge in African countries is to create new models of governance in a climate of decline and economic stagnation. Donors need to address the linkages between the economic and political reforms they suggest to African countries, particularly in relation to their compatibility with each other and the development process.

## Examples

*Spain, 1975.* During the 1960s, Spain experienced a relatively fast economic growth. This rapid economic growth enlarged socio-economic cleavages within the society, and increased the social frustration and political discontent. In this political turmoil, the death of General Franco raised fundamental questions about the regime's legitimacy to rule from both the government and the democratic opposition. The opposition agreed to the electoral system which could provide some chance of winning to even authoritarian leaders. This cooperation between the government and the opposition also contributed to decrease chances of a military reaction.

*Brazil, 1974.* The power-sharing process was triggered by the regime's difficulties in solving problems of managing economic policies and allocating financial rewards to the government's supporters. President Ernesto Geisel and General Golbery initiated a controlled series of liberalizing policies such as a less constricted right to contest elections, fewer arbitrary arrests and tortures, less censorship, and free access to radio and television. This liberalization was sustained by governmental concessions. It took more time to achieve a true sense of power sharing. The liberation moved forward to democratization after the military government perceived strong social demands developed by the opposition.

*Peru, 1977.* After the general strike, a revolt spread quickly to various regions of the country. Following these incidents, the military leaders announced a withdrawal from politics, and the election of a constituent

assembly took place in 1978. This case shows the role of civil society to create social pressure on the government to start power-sharing arrangements.

*Columbia, 1958.* The opposition political parties organized a pact to defeat the authoritarian regime and lay the foundation for a democratically elected government in which power is open to opposition groups and parties.

## References

Arend Lijphart.
Smock and Crocker.

## Illustration

♦ ***Outside the Greater Horn***

***Mexico, the 1977 Political Reform Law.*** Mexican regimes have often used repression effectively against opposition political groups and individuals. Thus, a combination of particular events and the broad consequences of socio-political change stimulated the government to initiate political restructuring. The government had three major incentives for the 1977 Political Reform Law:

- During the early 1970s, the government suffered from a substantial erosion of its political legitimacy.
- Second, several new opposition political parties emerged outside the officially recognized party system. The Díaz Ordaz administration suppressed many political groups with violence, but violent attacks by paramilitary groups eventually fueled guerilla movements.
- The governing political elites were concerned about the institutional health of Mexican politics. During the 1970s, more people were disappointed with the established regime, due to severe suppression by the government, traditional opposition parties decreased political viability, and the major opposition political party's mobilization capacity seriously eroded.

All these factors resulted in a steady decline in voter participation in the electoral process. Considering this situation, López Portillo began the reform during his presidential campaign, and continued after the 1976 general election by conducting high-level, confidential consultations with diverse groups regarding the content of the reform initiative.

The 1977 Political Reform Law in Mexico:

- Gave official recognition to political parties receiving at least 1.5 percent of the total national vote in the election or officially enrolling the minimum required party membership.
- Increased the size of the Chamber of Deputies to four hundred members and created a two-tier electoral structure.

- Extended representation on the Federal Electoral Commission and state and district electoral committees to conditionally registered parties.

- Permanently permitted political parties access to television and radio.

♦ ***Inside the Greater Horn***

***Burundi, 1992 and 1994.*** In Burundi's transition period from 1989-1993, stability was contingent upon President Buyoya's control of the Tutsi-controlled army and ruling party. After the victory of the Hutu-led Frodebu party, the new coalition government set aside one-third of the portfolios for Tutsis. But Tutsi insecurity was not sufficiently addressed, and in October 1993 a coup was attempted by Tutsi military officers and President Ndadaye was assassinated, sparking a surge of ethnic killings which left 50,000 dead and nearly one million internally displaced or refugees.

In September 1994, a power-sharing agreement was signed in Burundi which gave the powerless presidency (presently Sylvestre Ntibantunganya) and 55 percent of the ministerial jobs to the Hutu. In October 1995, after weeks of paralysis of the coalition government, a reshuffle removed hardliners from both the Hutu *Mouvance Présidentielle* (presidential movement) and the Tutsi opposition. International pressure is received unevenly: the Hutu urge intervention to rectify injustices, and the Tutsi fear pressure to undermine their control of the army and economy.

In the September 1994 agreement, the Tutsi received 45 percent of all government ministries, the post of the newly empowered Prime Minister, and a number of provincial and local government posts. In December 1995, the national debate will examine inequality related to ethnicity, and will devise protections for minority Tutsi under a new constitution scheduled for completion in 1998, when the current power-sharing deal expires.

# Notes

1. Smock and Crocker, p. 112-114.

# 13. Capacity-Building of Government Officials (Professionalization/Reform of Civil Service)

## Description

Official capacity building refers to measures designed to enhance public officials' skills and ability to administer and govern. Such programs can be directed at the national level, including authorities in the executive and legislature as well as mid- and low-level appointed officials in the civil service, as well as at officials serving at local and provincial or state levels.

Training of officials can include leadership skills, administrative and technical skills, such as accounting, finance and budgeting, and assistance with developing and managing a more effective taxation system, organizational skills, as well as democracy, human rights, and/or conflict resolution training.

### *Objectives*

Programs geared toward increasing the capacity of public officials are generally intended to improve a regime's governance and administrative abilities. However, the resulting increased effectiveness in governance can reduce domestic opposition and increase legitimacy, which can help prevent or mitigate violent internal conflict. One objective of capacity building in divided societies is the support of grassroots governance, which can be viewed as a tool of preventive diplomacy. Governance is often a source of conflict at the national level and the local level. Providing training and other support can enhance the professionalism of authorities, which in turn can help increase the stake of local populations in their local representation and affect local stability.

### *Expected Outcome or Impact*

Capable, responsive governance and administration is a critical element in developing capacity to prevent conflict. Through reducing the inefficiency that undermines public confidence in civilian institutions, capacity building helps increase officials' capability to manage conflicts at an earlier stage.[1]

### *Relationship to Conflict Prevention*

Implementation of national policy is carried out by civil servants, who are usually controlled by the executive branch. According to the present laws of many African states, administration is wholly in the hands of the executive. Employment or promotion may depend more on loyalty to the state or the executive than to merit. A civil service not integrated politically, regionally, or ethnically can be a source of conflict by carrying out more biased and inefficient policies. "An independent civil service...can be a major resource for economic and social development and for conflict prevention."[2]

## Applicability

***Strengths and Weaknesses***

Strengthening civilian government institutions through capacity building can also help reduce their susceptibility to domestic military domination.

A phenomenon that can counter official capacity building efforts is the typical policy of international agencies to hire the best and brightest away from government service, thereby reducing the quality and skills of personnel available to serve in the government.

***Lessons Learned/ Recommendations***

Meaningful capacity building requires long time horizons and liberal allowance for mistakes and problems.

At the national level, independent monitoring bodies could be set up which are answerable to a democratically elected legislature to regulate the civil service.

To help prevent or mitigate conflict at the local level, local leaders could be trained in community building skills and conflict resolution skills, and taught how to identify and deal with the root causes of conflict in their areas.

For some international agencies and organizations operating in a host country, capacitation of officials is made a high priority early on, while others prefer to maintain total control of projects and circumvent use of authorities wherever possible. Circumvention of authorities by NGOs has become a major issue in the Greater Horn, especially in areas where governments or authorities believe NGOs should not be replacing authorities in their capacities as planners, assessors, implementors and evaluators.

However, donors and agencies need to consider whether the government institutions they help to build up will be sustainable without continued major financing by outsiders. To have a tax base which can finance government services requires the generation of wealth in the society. One method of generating wealth is through supporting community development initiatives in the private sector, which can then be taxed by authorities — although the government must be providing legitimate and effective services to justify tax and reduce opposition to it. The various levels of government may require outside assistance in developing and sustaining a viable taxation system in tandem with capacity building of government officials.

Capacity building of officials, such as training and other steps to increase their capability to respond to emergency and development priorities, can be integrated into the planning process of each sector, such as food, water, sanitation, health, veterinary, etc. Steps to increase the capacity of local sectoral officials can increase the ability of communities to manage their response to chronic crises. For example, in anticipation of re-developing a

collapsed health service, capacity building can take the form of training medical personnel, standardizing health guidelines, and consideration of how to restructure health provision in a manner relevant to limited-resource, highly unstable environments.

Training by experienced professionals from the country, region or local area may be more effective and better received by trainees. Outsiders training of host country officials to be trainers themselves is a cost-effective approach.

## Conflict Situation

***Stage of Conflict***

Generally, such programs are most well-received and effective prior to a conflict escalating to violence, and during the post-conflict reconstruction stage of an internal conflict. However, it is not unheard of for capacity-building programs to be introduced during a conflict in an attempt to make government more effective and reduce domestic opposition.

***Conflict Type***

Efforts to professionalize the civil service and other government institutions, which include making them more balanced and representative of ethnic and regional groups, can be useful for ethnic conflicts. They are especially suitable for crises of governance.

***Cause of Conflict Addressed***

By trying to improve the quality and effectiveness of government, capacity-building programs attempt to remove some of the structural causes of conflict.

## Implementation

***Organizers***

May be initiated by the domestic government or by international organizations, including NGOs, professional associations, universities, and bilateral and multilateral organizations. Foreign-supported programs are often run in partnership with various government levels or host-country universities. Funding can come from both foreign government and private sources.

***Participants***

Participants are government officials at whatever level(s) the program is targeting; i.e., senior to low-level officials at the national level and/or local and state or provincial officials.

***Implementors***

Program designers and trainers are often experienced, former public officials, as well as academics and professional trainers with skills and knowledge in public administration and leadership. Foreign trainers often use the training of trainers approach, to train some host country officials to train others.

***Activities*** Programs to build the capacity and increase the professionalization of officials include the following:

- Efforts to strengthen executives' financial and managerial accountability, i.e., improving and integrating financial management systems.
- Leadership training to officials, i.e., teaching them democratic values and leadership skills.
- Enhancing the professionalism of legislators.
- Strengthening legislative research, analysis, and drafting capabilities.
- Strengthening the accountability of municipal and local governments.

***Budget*** Costs will depend on the capacity-building selected.

***Other Resource Considerations*** Capacity-building may require trainers. Officials may have to devote time away from professional responsibilities to undergo capacity-building.

***Timeframe*** Efforts to professionalize government officials may slowly impact a conflict situation. If the various levels of civil service actually become more representative and trained officials continue their service for a long time, the effects of capacity-building efforts can be long lasting.

***Preconditions*** Some existing government structure, and the means to support and sustain government institutions.

## Examples

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and Search for Common Ground have sent political leaders to South Africa for training.

In various countries, USAID has funded leadership training and legislative assistance; efforts to strengthen executives' financial and managerial accountability, i.e., improving and integrating financial management systems; leadership training to officials, i.e., teaching them democratic values and leadership skills; enhancing the professionalism of legislators; strengthening legislative research, analysis, and drafting capabilities; and strengthening the accountability of municipal and local governments.

NDI has provided professional skills training to parliamentarians and staff in Burundi such as constituency relations and parliamentary oversight of government. Search for Common Ground has been involved in giving high-level parliamentarians from both ethnic groups in Burundi (Hutus and Tutsis) training in negotiation skills. The Africa Leadership Forum is engaged in discussions in Burundi at all levels from head of state to local organizations. Parliamentarians for Global Action sent a delegation of African parliamentary members who had gone through transitions in their

own countries to Burundi after the president was killed in April 1994, to work with their counterparts, discuss what they had gone through and share ideas on how to get through the crisis. This group helped broker several accords, including one over the Speaker in January 1995. The Congressional Human Rights Foundation planned to mobilize its International Parliamentary Network to also work with political leaders in Burundi.

The National Endowment for Democracy provides training, infrastructure, and operational resources for political parties, legislatures, election monitoring and administration, and local governments.

USAID supported an agenda in Rwanda which aimed to build up the government as quickly as possible after the Rwandan Patriotic Front's (RPF) assumption to power. AID provided vehicles, computers and other inputs to key ministries.

In Ethiopia, UNDP is supporting the capacity building of woreda (district) councils to undertake food security, human resources, natural resources and disaster prevention. These councils can also play other roles, i.e., conflict resolution.[3]

Also in Ethiopia, the government has developed a "National Program for Disaster Prevention, Preparedness and Mitigation." The objective of this program is to increase the ability of communities to withstand emergencies through information management, improved preparedness and a stress on household food security. To support this, development-oriented employment safety nets are being constructed to replace food hand-outs. Community adaptation to chronic emergencies is critical in creating the will and capacity for reconciliation.

## References

Burundi Policy Forum newsletters; Search for Common Ground newsletter

### Illustration: Inside the Horn of Africa

***Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) in Sudan*** [4]

OLS began its most concerted capacity building program with the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), and later the RASS, in 1993. The initial objective was to build the capacity of these organizations in delivering humanitarian aid. The results so far are widely debated. "This is the first time that values, principles and structures which undergird the movements were discussed," points out a former donor official. A contrary view is expressed by another donor official: "The capacity building program has only succeeded in bolstering the mafiosos. RASS and SRRA were made the official counterparts of OLS. They were grossly empowered."

The deep-seated problems in southern Sudan require more than material aid, including follow-up and encouragement of a 1994 SPLM announcement of a "New Sudan" structure to empower and separate civil authorities from the military and increase democratic space for civil society.[5] Based on the Eritrea and Ethiopian models, the National Liberation Council (NLC) of the SPLM has recognized the importance of building structures which give authority to the people in Southern Sudan. Thus, the NLC is drafting legislation to define the function, composition and basis of representation for the liberation councils which now exist from the village level up to the regional level.[6]

Building on this vision, agencies and donors might better serve long-term capacity-building objectives by focusing on and engaging the nascent village liberation councils and SPLM structures where it is possible, as well as the chiefs, churches, local community groups and other elements of non-military society. The SRRA and RASS by contrast have some paper authority over line departments, but they are usually not plugged into the system at the local level. In southern Sudan, civil society is healthiest at the grassroots level. Any efforts expended building externally-driven systems above this level is a diversion from real grassroots participation in rehabilitation and reconstruction. Much of the donors' engagement with the SPLM/SSIM should be directed at the local level for strengthening the capacity of local civilian officials.[7]

### *Somalia* [8]

An attempt to recreate civil administrative authorities in a situation of state collapse took place in Somalia when an international NGO, the Life and Peace Institute, and UNOSOM attempted to implement the results of an agreement among the factions to allow the creation of District Councils. The Addis Ababa peace agreement staked out a "two-track" approach to peace in Somalia which was supposed to address grassroots peace-making with warlord accommodation on parallel tracks. The District Councils were envisioned as the lowest level of local administration in the reconstitution of the Somali state.

The Life and Peace Institute has District Council training centers in Garowe, Jowhar and Baidoa, with international trainers paired with Somali counterparts. District Councilors undergo roughly a week of training in administration and management. Training sessions usually include Council members from a number of different locations, stimulating cross-communal interchange and communication. According to a requirement agreed to by the factions at the Addis conference, at leased one woman must be on the District Council in every location.

The District Councils are a new development in Somali political structure building and arguably allow a new approach to participation. They are nevertheless a foreign entity, whose structure was determined externally. In some places, the new form of participation may work, and communities may come to own their Councils. In others, parallel structures have already formed, and the District Council has been marginalized and rejected as an external imposition, the Councils threatened existing interests and have for that reason been sidelined.[9]

UNOSOM's hasty implementation of the District Councils has also undermined their validity. At the time of elections in many places, displacement was too great to allow truly representative institutions. "We are disenfranchising people," observes a Somali activist. One observer attributes what he sees as the District Council's failure to UNOSOM's bureaucratic centralism:

> Constituted by governments, its mandate is to establish centralized governmental structures, albeit with some emphasis on decentralized regional structures. Centralized government is the very thing that many Somalis have been fighting against. As implemented by the UN, approaches to peace-making in Somalia reveal the dangers of trying to impose an outside solution to the Somali conflict.[10]

Other concerns include:

- The legitimacy of the districts.
- The fairness and extent of external manipulation of the council elections, including by UNOSOM Political Affairs Director Leonard Kapungo.
- The current councils' questionable representativeness, given mass displacement.
- The replacement of existing local governmental structures.
- The tokenism of the one-woman requirement.
- The uncertainty over council jurisdiction and authority.
- The lack of resources.
- The inadequate time both for UNOSOM to form the Councils and for training Councilors (less than a week).
- The uncertainty of the role of elders in forming the Councils.

In some locations, such as Bardera, District Councils grossly overrepresent the dominant sub-clan of that locale, and training sessions for those Councils arguably buttress the legitimacy of those imbalances.

Even more fundamental are questions about the sense of ownership which communities have of these District Councils. In Bay and Bakool (before Aidid's September 1995 invasion of Baidoa), the creation of a clan-based Supreme Council had rendered the local District Councils largely irrelevant, as has the resumption of elder authority in Absame areas of the Juba Valley. "The Digil-Mirifle have developed a protective structure based on human affinities," says one observer. "The sense of communal responsibility is toward the clan. That's what needs to be mobilized."

"Clan-based institutions offer more credible partners than the District Councils," asserts one diplomat. "Some clan-based systems and some District Councils will likely emerge as credible authorities. In reality, the District Councils that work are essentially clan-based and not trying to reconcile hostile communities." Where District Councils do remain, they are being reoriented and reconstituted by the true authority structure of the area.

For example, in Kismayu the District Council is largely a formality, a functionary for the military and elder authority structure. There is no organization of public services like health or sanitation. The education system is completely privatized, and has no involvement of the Council.

The Supreme Council in the Digil-Mirifle areas was envisioned as the civil administration in Bay and Bakool (at least until Aidid's invasion). A compelling argument existed before Aidid's invention to work through the Council, building its capacity and constantly challenging it on good governance issues.

In another miscalculated move in Somalia, UNOSOM put money into local administration without considering the transition beyond UNOSOM. More recently, the European Union (EU) proposed food for work for District Councils and other local authority functionaries — police, medical staff, prison workers

— but other donors have hesitated, realizing that before taking such steps to build local structures, the sustainability of government resources to support them without outsider assistance must be considered. Local government institutions which are highly dependent on outside resources have less legitimacy and therefore less effectiveness.

## Notes

1. John Prendergast, *Humanitarian Aid and Conflict Prevention in the Greater Horn*, forthcoming, 1996.

2. Smock and Crocker (eds.), *Making War and Waging Peace: Foreign Intervention in Africa.* Washington, DC: USIP Press, 1993, p. 33.

3. Interview with Constantinos Berhe, July 28, 1995.

4. For more, see John Prendergast, *Sudanese Rebels at a Crossroads,* Center of Concern, 1994.

5. Catholic Relief Services, *Briefing Notes: Institutional Support for the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA) — The Third Wave,* 1995.

6. Gordon Wagner, *Project Proposal: Humanitarian Institutional Exchanges in the Horn of Africa between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Southern Sudan,* p. 7.

7. John Prendergast, *Diplomacy, Aid and Governance in Sudan,* Center of Concern, 1995.

8. For more, see John Prendergast, *The Gun Talks Louder than the Voice: Somalia's Continuing Cycles of Violence,* Center of Concern, 1994.

9. Ken Menkhaus and John Prendergast, "The Political Economy of Post-Intervention Somalia," *CSIS Africa Notes*, May 1995.

10. Mark Bradbury, *The Somali Conflict: Prospects for Peace,* Oxfam Research Paper No. 9, 1994, p. 4.

# F. Judicial/Legal Processes and Arrangements

## Tool:

- Judicial and Legal Reforms



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# 14. Judicial/Legal Reform

## Description

Judicial/legal reform is the strengthening of a country's justice system. Assisting judicial/legal Reform in areas without sufficient judicial/legal institutions generally includes:

- Making available human and financial resources needed by the judicial system.
- Establishing a sustainable system of justice and law-enforcement in which people have confidence.
- Providing the populace with judicial/legal support to protect their human rights.
- Providing an impartial political climate for opposition parties, political criminals, and the masses.
- Assisting in improving distribution of information about the legal system and the rights of people to bring legal complaints.
- Providing the means for equal treatment under the law regardless of social status, ethnic or regional group, and wealth.
- Assisting in increasing the accountability of civilian governments to their constituents, and the accountability of military members to civilian government law.

### *Objectives*

The objective of judicial/legal reform is to promote long-term, sustainable improvements in the delivery of law enforcement services to the public and judicial system. Judicial/legal reform, with assistance of the international community, contributes to strengthen weak civilian institutions and promote such values as human rights. In more a technical sense, goals of judicial/legal reform are to enhance professional capabilities of the judicial/legal system to investigate and handle criminal or other legal issues more speedily and fairly, to facilitate and strengthen the civilian rule of governance, and to develop training programs and administrative and management capabilities for law enforcement agencies.

### *Expected Outcome or Impact*

Judicial/legal reform has a significant impact to reduce tension or prevent conflict, but it should be supplemented by other activities according to given conditions. Once a reform is done, its influence lasts as long as a society is stable.

***Relationship to Conflict Prevention***

A properly authorized judicial/legal system is rudimentary both for the sustainable civilian rule of democracy and the prevention and management of potential conflicts. In the past, one of consequences of poorly functioning judicial/legal systems has been cruel assaults on the physical security of groups and individuals including genocide, torture, expulsion, persecution, and other political violence. Incidents of political violence occur due to insufficient legal protection, failure of judicial/legal procedure, and non-professionalism of judicial/legal system and authorities. Without a judicial/legal system in effect, violence escalates as a method for a settlement of issues and for authoritarian regimes to control civil society. Judicial/legal reform can be effective to areas from inter-relationship of social injustice and human rights abuses to armed conflicts.

## Applicability

***Strengths and Weaknesses***

The military may continue to shield its personnel from the civilian judicial system, even when they commit crimes against civilians.

The political appointment and frequent turnover of judges may negate the effectiveness of training, working against the goal of developing a professional judiciary.

Activities to carry out judicial/legal reform may be very politically sensitive. Since program implementers usually come from the international community, a national government may claim the program as intervention if there are not clear and specific agreements or there are disagreements over contents of the program. Governments may also lack the political will to improve their systems, or even resist against such efforts.

***Lessons Learned/ Recommendations***

The primary lesson learned is judicial/legal reform should be supplemented by other activities.

Efforts to create and strengthen indigenous and regional institutions charged with judicial/legal reform and training can increase the sustainability of initiatives to continue reform progress as foreign aid for such efforts declines. Funneling assistance through such regional institutions can also reduce the direct profile of the supporting country in sensitive areas of judicial/legal reform in host countries.

## Conflict Situation

***Stage of Conflict***

Judicial/legal reform can be used at any stage of conflict, but it is likely to be used at the beginning of conflicts or after violent conflicts. Judicial/legal reform could be a direct intervention into domestic institutions by the international community, and there needs to be a committed political will from political leaders to implement this reform. This type of political will of leaders is unlikely to be found during a violent conflict.

***Conflict Type*** Judicial/legal reform can be used for reducing tension among any kind of conflicting groups by regulating their activities and equalizing political, economic, and social opportunities. Ethnicity, political and economic bias, and rules of governance are usually causes of the types of conflict addressed by judicial/legal reform.

***Cause of Conflict Addressed*** Usually, major conflicts do not occur only due to an unfair judicial/legal system, but because the system is used as a tool for those who have power. For example, major conflict can occur when the system is used to control the society by containing political prisoners. Deficiencies in judicial/legal system are likely to exacerbate the intensity of inequitable political or economic situations.

## Implementation

***Organizers*** Many judicial/legal reform efforts are initiated or encouraged by foreign government agencies as well as by international NGOs because they are the foundation of the technical and financial assistance for programs. Sometimes a democratically oriented government organizes and conducts the reform by its own political development efforts.

***Participants*** Participants are selected at both the national and local level and include national and local government officials, law enforcement agencies, academics, legal interns, and other public and private legal agents.

***Implementors*** Most implementers participating in the reform project are from international agencies of justice or are academic specialists. In addition to information and knowledge from human resources, they can provide training facilities, crime laboratories and laboratory equipments, as well as financial donations.

***Activities*** Judicial/legal reform can encompass many of the following activities:

- International community assesses a regional judicial/legal systems to analyze in what aspects reform must be conducted.
- International community assists a society to establish a judicial/legal commission to monitor and advise for development of judicial/legal system.
- International community supports a society for institutional building of the courts through judicial training, technical assistance, and facility-building.
- International community supports legal procedure by establishing investigations and forensic unit.

- International community assists a society on capacity-building for crime prevention and criminal correction.
- International delegations for judicial reform conduct legal training workshops and legal advisory committees.
- US Department of Justice and State Department provide police training. One of their primary goals is often to devolve police functions from the military into a separate entity.
- USAID administers initiatives in judicial reform and training, and has supported the administration of justice in several countries.

In Central America, USAID financed assessments of the judicial systems in countries in the region, then formulated bilateral assistance programs to address identified needs. It also encouraged regional governments to establish national commissions to stimulate needed reforms and sought to improve the institutional capacities of the courts through judicial training, technical assistance, equipment, and facilities. Other efforts have included providing funding, training, and equipment for a special investigations unit and a forensic unit in host countries to improve the host government's capacity to investigate sensitive crimes.

The US State Department has supported rule-of-law programs in Eastern Europe (through its use of FREEDOM Support Act funds and Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act funds). Under the US Information Agency's (USIA) "Professionals in Residence" program, US judges and legal experts have spent up to 6 months with the Ministries of Justice in Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia providing advice on constitutional and legal procedures.

Another initiative in the area of judicial/legal reform is to create or strengthen the capacity of regional institutions charged with conducting judicial training in the region.

***Budget***

The costs associated with judicial/legal reform are dependent on the type and extent of reform and assistance needed.

***Other Resource Considerations***

Executive power-sharing is necessary to implement the reform; government leadership must approve the expected political changes. Conditionality also works to encourage a government to conduct judicial/legal reform by political and/or economic pressure.

***Timeframe***

Overcoming the deficiencies in judicial systems is a long-term process (five years or longer), and substantial improvement may not be seen in the short-term. Establishing institutions might not take a long time, but reform

normally requires a significant amount of time for education and training of people working with the judicial/legal system. However, its effects, when successful, are long-lasting, since it produces institutional overhaul which addresses some of the root causes of conflict and insecurity.

***Preconditions***

Since the judicial/legal system should function outside the influence of the government or other comparable institutions, the legislative and judicial branches of power need to become independent from the executive, and their powers strengthened. This condition building could be done by constitutional arrangements.

## Examples

In Latin America, the US Department of Justice has provided training and technical assistance for local law enforcement agencies through the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), by congressional mandate since 1986. The American Bar Association provides *pro bono* legal assistance to emerging democracies throughout the world. Its Central and East European Law Initiative linked each law school in the region with at least three American schools, conducted numerous legal assistance workshops, assessed more than 172 draft laws, and provided over $20 million worth of legal expertise by volunteer lawyers, judges, academicians, and interns.

In Russia, an NGO, the Free Trade Union Institute's (FTUI) rule-of-law project, is helping to build labor legislation and assisting unions with registration, local disputes, and illegal dismissals or privatization schemes. In Poland, FTUI has given technical and financial support for the Solidarity to safeguard worker rights during the economic reform process by exposing corruption, assisting management in enterprise restructuring, and assisting local unions in negotiating equitable contracts. In Colombia, USAID appropriated $6.5 million in FY 1992 to help redefine judicial organization roles, modify legal codes and other legislation, establish a judicial information system in the Judicial School, finance studies for the Ministry of Justice, and expand the training of judges and other court personnel.

USAID has supported several African countries in establishing a fund for small judicial training programs.

Belgium, in cooperation with the European Union, has provided assistance to Burundi's judicial administration. The UN Commission on Human Rights received funding to send 15 monitors to Burundi to be involved in judicial activities. The Burundian government has expressed interest in having the United Nations send a series of judges to assist in legal matters and concerns over the role of the military in a democracy. In Burundi, local authorities do not have the capacity to deal with assassination and terror through law enforcement, thus contributing to vengeance and vigilantism.

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## Illustration

♦ ***Outside the Greater Horn***

***South Africa - Police Reform.*** A record of suspicion and distrust, primarily from black South Africans, had built up and severely damaged relations between black communities and the police. The bias of the police and citizens' distrust undermined the ability of the police to maintain law and order and to deal effectively with political violence. However, the signatories to the National Peace Accord (NPA) envisaged a key role for the police in peacekeeping efforts and in maintaining law and order. The NPA (chapters 3 and 4) included a code of conduct for the police which was aimed at promoting sound policing practices and establishing a cooperative relationship between the police and communities. It established guidelines and procedures for the minimum use of force and the equal treatment for all citizens. It stressed police neutrality and guidelines for police involvement in the structures to be set up under the accord.

The main objective of the Police Boards, established by the NPA, is to promote more effective policing and better relations between the police and communities. It is composed of members of the public and police officers in equal numbers. It has no executive powers and makes recommendations to the minister of law and order on policy issues. The members of the public are nominated by the National Peace Committee (NPC) to ensure broad political representation.

# G. Communications and Education

## Tools:

- Peace Radio/TV
- Media Professionalization

# 15. Peace Radio/Television (Countering Hate Radio)

## Description

The use of radio and television to promote peace, to disseminate information that could turn public sentiment toward peaceful resolution of conflict, or to counter "hate radio." Hate radio promotes and incites violent ethnic and political conflict by broadcasting information biased against ethnic groups or other segments of the population. Peace radio disseminates the truth or presents alternative viewpoints, to help prevent or mitigate violent conflict. Countering hate radio can include jamming or otherwise interfering with hate broadcasts.

### *Objectives*

Media has a significant impact and reaches a broad public audience. Radio and television programs can support efforts at conflict prevention and reconciliation, and counter the use of the media to incite violence. They can present issues fairly and make alternative sources of information available. Media attention on prevention efforts in a pre-crisis situation can help build support for crisis prevention efforts. During or following a conflict, media can aid in reconciliation efforts.

### *Expected Outcome or Impact*

In countries where most of the population is illiterate and television is rare, radio is the key means of reaching the public with news and information and influencing people both positively and negatively. Media such as radio can reach the most vulnerable groups and can encourage their participation in change.

Peace radio and efforts to counter hate radio have not been formally evaluated to a great enough extent to make general assumptions about their impact. As discussed later in this section, the NYU Center for War, Peace and the News Media has made a proposal to do this.

### *Relationship to Conflict Prevention*

The media can be an agent for or against conflict and its resolution. "The media mediates conflict, whether it intends to or not."[1] It defines, shapes, and often exacerbates conflict by the stories covered, by those omitted, and by the sources used. The conflict resolution potential of the media is almost universally unacknowledged and under-utilized. The skills of exploring options and adding positive viewpoints to the agenda are new tools for the media as mediator.[2] One of the major problems in ethnically divided states, for example, is government control (or in some cases partisan ownership) of the communication of news, commentary, documentary, and entertainment, which can aggravate ethnic conflict.

## Applicability

***Strengths and Weaknesses***

Radio broadcasting is relatively inexpensive and, when necessary, can be beamed from hundreds of miles away.

The risks of supporting peace radio (and countering or preventing hate radio) are lower than the human and economic costs of inaction in cases of imminent genocide and gross violations of human rights.

There is considerable debate on whether jamming or taking out hate radio broadcasts is desirable. Some believe it is more important to hear and refute what perpetrators say. Taking action against hate radio may require high-level political decisions and involves concerns about the national sovereignty of states involved in domestic conflicts, and the perpetrator's right to freedom of speech. In response, others say these arguments fail when radio broadcasts directly violate Article III (c) of the UN Genocide Convention, "direct and public incitement to commit genocide."

Use of media runs a risk of co-option of information sources by elite ethnic or other partisan groups.

***Lessons Learned/ Recommendations***

While many believe "...the media have an obligation to enhance preventive diplomacy efforts through reporting and analysis that is consistent with the canons and practices of journalism," very little has been evaluated or written regarding the role the media could play in preventive diplomacy. One project proposed by the NYU Center intends to survey the role the media can play in shaping the dynamics of international, national, and intra-state conflict. The study would analyze the role of the media in recent preventive diplomacy efforts and survey and evaluate previous efforts to work with media to prevent or resolve conflicts. The goals are to draw the following lessons learned:

- How those involved in preventive diplomacy can make better use of national and international media resources potentially at their disposal.
- The activities available through peach media in support of preventive diplomacy
- Practical and procedural information and resources necessary to implement those activities.
- The role of non-news-related media (for example, "entertainment programming") in avoiding or moderating conflict.



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## Conflict Situation

***Stage of Conflict***

Ideally, actions in support of peace media or counter to hate media would be taken at the early stages, before widespread violent conflict. However, they can be helpful even in the more advanced stages and in the aftermath of a conflict.

***Conflict Type***

Peace Radio is an especially valuable tool when the media is being used by perpetrators to incite racial, regional, or other violent political conflict within a country.

***Cause of Conflict Addressed***

Peace radio initiatives affect public opinion within a country, which in turn can have impact on all levels of conflict.

## Implementation

***Organizers***

Peace Radio efforts can be set up and supported by independent indigenous organizations or by foreign governments, NGOs, or multilateral or regional organizations. Efforts to jam hate radio or assault hate radio transmitters can be undertaken by the UN or foreign government military forces.

***Participants***

Participants may include current and prospective journalists, editors, and media owners.

***Implementors***

Implementation staff have included members of foreign media, representatives of international media associations, and foreign educational institution media departments.

***Activities***

Control of the radio can be used as an instrument of peace or war. Open communications are important in maintaining or reestablishing stability and orderly change. Peace radio initiatives should encourage the range of responsible local, national, regional and international communications media.

To help prevent or reduce conflict, those promoting peace media can:

- Discourage and avoid the use of radio and other media to promote ethnic and political conflict.
- Counter its use for such purposes. Support efforts by radio stations to deliver accurate, timely news and information in a non-polemical manner that can counter the distortions broadcast by others, and provide broadcast time to opposing views.

- Exert pressure that the state not have a monopoly on the use of radio or control of the media.

- Provide training in political reporting and investigative journalism.

- Promote laws that could be enacted to monitor and ensure the radio is not used to undermine democracy and individual freedom, violate human rights, and incite violent conflict.

- An independent organization could actively keep track of rumors circulating in the country that might incite conflict, then use the media to refute them and disseminate the truth as widely as possible.

- Distribute radios and batteries, or windup generator radios, nationwide, especially in rural areas, to enable recipients to acquire accurate news and more balanced reporting. This can also include distribution of cassette recorders and tapes, so peace radio programming can be played at public meetings and in markets.

- Provide primary and relay transmitters, so the signal can be heard throughout the country.

- Encourage international sanctions against hate media.

- Provide a forum for voices of moderation to ensure they are heard over the media.

- Enhance the capabilities of professionals involved in the media, possibly including peace training.

- The United Nations (or other multilateral or regional organization) could install and operate a radio station prior to a crisis or transition period, particularly in situations where genocide or other atrocities are imminent or underway. Broadcasts by Voice of America or other foreign radio stations could do the same. Broadcasts should be in indigenous languages, so they can be received and understood by a broad segment of the population.

- Such programming could counter the incitement of violence, help disseminate the truth or present conflicting accounts of events when the truth is unclear:

  - Peace Radio broadcasts could warn perpetrators of hate radio they will be stigmatized by the world and prosecuted and brought to justice if they follow through on or continue violent acts, such as genocide.

- Programming could make leaders more accountable to their followings by broadcasting what they say and do.

- Broadcasts could even inform people when peace agreements have been signed.
- Broadcasts could urge citizens to defend their friends and neighbors of the beleaguered groups, and to offer them refuge, mobilize support for the victims among other citizens, and warn the intended victims.

- Encourage, protect, and offer other support to local groups involved in "Peace Radio" broadcasting. Some NGOs (such as Search for Common Ground) could be encouraged or supported in their "Peace Radio" efforts.

- Expand the mandate of national government broadcasters such as Voice of America, BBC, and Radio Deutsche Welle to intervene with bulletins and programs when genocides or other gross violations were imminent or underway.

- Provide funds to facilitate the broadcast of such programs in local languages when crises are anticipated.

A controversial method of countering hate radio is to jam its signals or even take steps to knock out the perpetrator's radio transmitters, especially when a genocide or other violent atrocity is indicated to be imminent or underway.

The UN could develop a mobile radio broadcasting unit and acquire suitable portable transmitters. Fully-equipped teams could be ready to deploy with equipment when such violent episodes as genocides were indicated to be imminent or underway. They could also be accompanied by a UN radio jamming unit, with a mandate to interfere with the signals of radio stations inciting listeners to commit genocide or other violent atrocities.

Journalists can also take steps to penalize others in their profession who contribute to disseminating hate propaganda. For example, at its annual world congress in 1995, the International Federation of Journalists (IJF) condemned the misuse of the media in the countries of former Yugoslavia to spread national and religious hatred and to spread a war atmosphere against other peoples and national communities. The IJF is establishing an international commission to investigate war propaganda and hate media. The commission will investigate journalists, media organizations and media authorities who have published or broadcast war propaganda or promoted ethnic hatred. The IJF is also organizing an international seminar on "journalism ethics in an age of racism and xenophobia."

***Equipment*** Creation of a new radio station or support of an existing radio station to disseminate peace messages could require primary and relay transmitters. To more widely disseminate the messages, radios and batteries can be distributed and additional relay transmitters set up.

***Budget*** Peace radio initiatives are relatively inexpensive.

***Set-Up Time*** This tool can be set up relatively quickly and its impact on conflict can be rapid.

***Timeframe*** With access to the right equipment, peace radio broadcasting can be set up and operational rapidly (either inside the country or from outside), and hate radio can be jammed (or transmitters destroyed) quickly. This can have an almost immediate impact on the conflict situation, with long-lasting effects.

## Examples

From Ethiopia, InterAfrica Group — on behalf of UNICEF — broadcasts a peace program into Somalia on a daily basis. Radio is by far the most influential means of communication in Somalia, a highly oral society. Links on the peace radio programs are made specifically between peace, protection of women and children, and religious traditions. A UNESCO Symposium on Somali Peace and Reconciliation urged more media programs presenting positive images of such components of peace-building as traditional conciliation mechanisms and human rights. Somali participants in the UNESCO symposium in Sana'a also urged an increase in dissemination of traditional values which promote a more peaceful environment.[3]

UNHCR is doing radio broadcasts in Rwanda and the refugee camps in neighboring Zaire and Tanzania which show that people can return to Rwanda. Burundi national radio broadcasts programs twice a week to refugees. UNICEF is collaborating with the Rwandan Ministry of Higher Education to produce a series of radio messages on cultural differences. In Burundi, an interview was broadcast with a returnee sitting next to people rumored to have been killed to illustrate that rumors are often wrong. The Walt Disney Corporation is taping a video for distribution in Burundi of UNICEF-sponsored puppet shows for children that teach reconciliation and peaceful resolution of conflicts. Search for Common Ground, in cooperation with the National Democratic Institute, the United Nations, and the World Bank, is setting up a studio in Bujumbura for broadcasting peace and reconciliation programming (Radio Nyogmoma). To counter hate programming in Rwanda, Search for Common Ground and Refugees International are working on a program known as Radio Reconciliation to counter such programming. *Reporters sans frontières* operated *Radio Muraho* in Rwanda in June 1994. UNTAC set up a radio station in Cambodia for three months in 1993 to counter Khmer Rouge propaganda prior to the election.

In Somalia, in the past, radio communication has been monopolized by the government. However, more recently, the elders of several bitterly embattled clans in 'Somaliland' have remained in radio contact during periods of tension, and radio links have provided vital channels for negotiation.

In South Africa, Radio Xhosa is cooperating with a Peace Committee in producing a bi-weekly phone-in education program to discuss its work. Radio Metro also transmits information about the various Peace Committees.

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Peter Gastrow, Search for Common Ground.

Robert Karl Manoff, Center for War, Peace, and the News Media, New York University.

Frank Chalk, Concordia University, Montreal, Quebec.

Frank Chalk, *Hate Radio vs. Democracy: Lessons from United Nations and United States Experience in Cambodia, Mozambique, Rwanda and Somalia.*

## Illustration

- ***Inside the Greater Horn***

***Hate Propaganda in Rwanda.*** Instead of illustrating the use of Peace Radio, this illustrates the effects of hate radio on violent conflict, and suggests what peace radio (and other efforts to counter or curtail radio-borne hate propaganda) might have done to mitigate the violence. In Rwanda in 1994, the Hutu government used the radio to help unleash the massacre of its opponents, mainly Tutsi. The dissemination of hate propaganda, including spreading ethnic hatred and inciting ethnocide and genocide, spread to radio in 1993 with the start of radio transmissions by the privately-owned Radio-Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), aided by the staff and facilities of Radio Rwanda, the official government-owned station. RTLM was created, some believe, to avoid key clauses of the Arusha Peace Accords of 1993 which barred the Government of Rwanda, as well as the RPF, from incitements to violence, promoting discrimination based on ethnicity, and issuing propaganda inciting the people to hate. Mille Collines called on the Hutu majority to destroy the Tutsi minority, and many have cited it as an important factor in the spread of genocide following the President's death. The programs were relayed to all parts of the country via a network of transmitters owned and operated by the government's Radio Rwanda. Even after RPF troops drove the Provisional Government and allied forces out of Kigali in July 1994, they used mobile FM transmitters to broadcast disinformation from inside the French-occupied zone on the border between Rwanda and Zaire, causing millions of Hutu to flee toward refugee camps, where they could be regrouped and recruited as future fighters.

No Western country took action in response to proposals from human rights and humanitarian groups to shut down or jam the broadcasts of RTLM and Radio Rwanda. There was also no UN (or other) radio station to counter the incitement of violence (including violence against UN personnel) or to set the

record straight. The UNAMIR commander in Kigali, Major-General Dallaire, has declared "if he had been equipped with proper jamming devices, many lives might have been spared (in Rwanda)."

***Peace Programming in Burundi.*** Search for Common Ground began an effort in Burundi in August 1995 operating a radio studio in Bujumbura which produces three to four hours of programming per week for broadcast on Burundi state radio and Radio Agatashya, a station in Eastern Zaire. The studio's mission is to counter the inflammatory rhetoric of hate radio by airing programs that promote peace and reconciliation. The studio has a mixed Hutu and Tutsi staff of five experienced journalists, plus production and administrative staff. The Search for Common Ground project director in Burundi serves as the program editor.

♦ ***Outside the Greater Horn***

***Video Dialogues in South Africa.*** *Video Dialogues* is a series of profiles of South African rural communities in transition, each focused around a particular conflict issue (for example, land rights, local government, or educational reform) that is critical to the community, but has ramifications for many other communities across the country. The purpose is to create forums (with Local Peace Committees) to further public debate, dialogue, and the management, if not resolution, of conflict within the communities. Community profiles around specific, contentious issues are screened within the communities themselves, as well as in the public broadcast.

In documenting the debate/conflict in each community, two videos are produced, using much of the same footage:

- A community video for use as a tool to mediate or open up debate, as well as educate and inform more broadly about an issue within the community at a "town meeting." This can be used within the original community and other, similar communities.

- A public broadcast video to be shown on the South African Broadcasting Corporation which profiles the community-in-conflict, but also includes footage from the "town meeting."

Some corporations have offered to help fund the project. Each region, in coordination with the Regional Peace Committee (RPC) of the region, suggests critical towns to be profiled. It is too soon to evaluate the impact and outcome of this effort.

## Notes

1. Baumann/Sievert 1993, p. 28.
2. CRNN 1991, p. 22.
3. Sana'a (Yemen) Symposium on the Culture of Peace in Somalia (1995) *Draft Report*, paras. 14, 16.

# 16. Media Professionalization
## (Journalist Training, Joint Journalist Projects)

## Description

Professionalization of the media centers on efforts to make the media more independent, free it from control by the state (or a dominant private entity), improve the standards by which media agents collect, edit, report, and disseminate information, and to make this information objective and balanced. Included are initiatives such as journalist training, editorial training, sponsoring joint journalist teams, promoting diversification of media sources, and expansion of media distribution.

***Objectives***

Measures to professionalize the media generally aim to reduce government control over the media and encourage alternative viewpoints. Further objectives in professionalization of the media include stimulating the consolidation of democracy, reducing partisan and bias reporting, and improving representation in reporting to present a more balanced depiction of events.

***Expected Outcome or Impact***

In countries where most of the population is illiterate and television-viewing is almost non-existent, radio is the key means of reaching the public with news and information and influencing people both positively and negatively. Mass media such as radio, when broadcast with professionalism and attention to conflict resolution, can reach the most vulnerable groups and can encourage their participation in change.

***Relationship to Conflict Prevention***

Focus on only one viewpoint on a conflict issue, or misrepresentation of other views, can exacerbate conflict. The media can be deliberately used by those who want to incite civil unrest. When unrest breaks out, some group leaders may restrict freedom of the media to prevent communications between certain groups, and limit information sources to that group's perspective.

## Applicability

***Strengths and Weaknesses***

Because of its crucial role, many governments rigorously control access to news through government ownership of media stations or regulations barring the broadcast of uncensored news by non-government media stations. This is the case in Burundi, Ethiopia, and other Horn of Africa countries. In many countries, the state has a monopoly on use of radio to propagate its ideas and ideology, and build support for its leadership, including support for conflict.

Even after restrictions and censorship have been dropped or decreased, the media may, out of fear, still retain a high degree of self-censorship, as, for example, what occurred with the press in South Africa.

Supporting privatization of the media may lead to concentration of ownership of the media in the hands of the wealthy few, leading to another bias.

***Lessons Learned/ Recommendations***

While many believe "...the media have an obligation to enhance preventive diplomacy efforts through reporting and analysis that is consistent with the canons and practices of journalism," very little has been evaluated or written regarding the role the media could play in preventive diplomacy. One project proposed by the NYU Center intends to survey the role the media can play in shaping the dynamics of international, national, and intra-state conflict. The study would analyze the role of the media in recent preventive diplomacy efforts as well as survey and evaluate previous efforts of the media to prevent or resolve conflicts. The goals are to draw the following lessons learned:

- How those involved in preventive diplomacy can make better use of national and international media resources potentially at their disposal:
- The activities available through peace media in support of preventive diplomacy.
- Practical and procedural information and resources necessary to implement those activities.
- The role of non-news-related media (for example, "entertainment programming") in avoiding or moderating conflict.

## Conflict Situation

***Stage of Conflict***

Professionalization of the media can be effective at all stages of conflict, including the early stages, during the peak of a conflict, and during the reconciliation stage.

***Conflict Type***

This tool is especially useful for ethnic and regional internal conflicts.

***Cause of Conflict Addressed***

Media professionalization topics generally address the operational prevention of a conflict.

## Implementation

***Organizers***

Efforts to professionalize the media can be initiated both within the country or by outside groups. External funding and support is often needed. External supporters have included foreign NGOs, foreign media, international professional media associations, and educational institutions. Sponsors have included foreign governments, including US agencies. For

example, USAID has sponsored projects in support of professionalizing journalism, and activities in several countries to strengthen the free flow of information on public issues. The US State Department has supported an independent media in East European countries through media training and development.

***Participants*** Participants may include current and prospective journalists, editors, and media owners.

***Implementors*** Implementation staff have included members of foreign media, representatives of international media associations, and foreign educational institution media departments.

***Activities*** Various measures aimed at professionalizing some aspect of the media include the following:

- Sponsor cross-ethnic teams of journalists and train them to conduct interviews in cross-ethnic teams to present a more balanced view of issues and reduce partisan reporting.
- Sponsor conferences on the issues of media professionalization and training.
- Sponsor training of journalists and editors, to enhance the capabilities of professionals involved in the media. Training could include reporting standards, rumor control, fact-checking and validation of sources, reducing bias, the need for objectivity and for presenting more than one side. Some also recommend providing peace training to media professionals.
- Support increasing diversification of media, including local press, and expanded distribution.
- Support and encourage growth of private media, especially where governments control all or most of the distribution of information to the public. Encourage reduction of government control and restrictions of the media. Reduce media dependence on the government and on government sources of information.
- Encourage equal opportunity in the media for ethnic, religious and regional groups.
- Encourage reform of media laws, including a code of ethics.
- Sponsor establishment and support of indigenous institutions for monitoring the media.

- Provide alternative information and communication sources to help mitigate conflict. Expanded media information sources include public libraries, NGO information centers, academic libraries, and international networks of computer bulletin boards.

***Equipment*** The necessary equipment varies by project, depending on how extensively one wants to develop and support the independent media in a country or area.

***Budget*** This is a very cost-effective tool. Measures having great impact can be taken at low cost.

***Set-Up Time*** This tool can be set up relatively quickly and its impact on conflict can be rapid.

***Timeframe*** Many media professionalization measures can be quickly implemented and have a significant, long-lasting effect on conflict prevention and mitigation.

## Examples

Search for Common Ground is working with NDI to schedule conferences and workshops for members of the press to improve their professionalism. The International Peace Academy is proposing to train journalists in objective reporting. In South Africa, a national magazine, in collaboration with an NGO involved with mediation and mediation training, has initiated a Mediation and Conflict Training for Journalists Project, which intends to make journalists more sensitive to conflict dynamics, the impact of reporting, and the potential for promoting conflict resolution. USAID created a fund in Nicaragua for making matching grants of up to $50,000 to media enterprises to improve their journalistic performance. The US Information Agency, through its US Information Service posts in 160 countries, provides print and electronic media, reference services, training workshops, computer data bank links, and satellite systems, and provides information on developing a free and independent media. Under USIA's "Professionals in Residence" program, experts on media and information issues have advised public and private sectors on media and information issues in several countries.

## References

Peter Gastrow, Search for Common Ground.

Robert Karl Manoff, Center for War, Peace, and the News Media, New York University.

Frank Chalk, Concordia University, Montreal, Quebec.

## Illustration

♦ ***Outside the Greater Horn***

***Media and Conflict Education, Macedonia.*** In 1994, the Center for War, Peace, and the News Media, a unit of New York University's Department of Journalism and Mass Communication, and Search for Common Ground/Macedonia launched a media and conflict education program in Macedonia to explore the role of the media in inter-ethnic relations and to develop practical journalism projects demonstrating innovative approaches to coverage of ethnic tensions and inter-ethnic relations. They designed and organized a cross-ethnic feature reporting project in July 1995. The four goals of the project were as follows:

- Give a small team of Macedonian reporters a hands-on experience with in-depth, American-style feature reporting.
- Bring together a multi-ethnic group of Macedonian reporters in a cooperative team reporting project.
- Demonstrate to participants, their professional colleagues, and the Macedonian public what a multi-ethnic approach to reporting can produce.
- Lay the groundwork for longer term, ongoing programs of multi-ethnic reporting as a mechanism for improved coverage of all communities in Macedonia and greater cross-ethnic understanding among journalists and the public.

This type of collaborative reporting across ethnic lines was (according to the project organizers) previously unheard of in Macedonia, in contrast to the ethnically partisan reporting predominant in the Macedonian media.

The four participating journalists were on leave from their normal media organizations and received a stipend from Search for Common Ground, who negotiated the arrangements for participants' leave and for the series to be published simultaneously in the four publications for which the participants worked. Funding for the project was provided by the National Endowment for Democracy, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Winston Foundation for World Peace, and the Soros Foundations.

Groundwork began with a field assessment in July 1994 by the Associate Director of the NYU Center and a Managing Editor of a US newspaper. Subsequently, the NYU Center, working with Search for Common Ground, organized two workshops for journalists in Macedonia: one on "Journalism and Social Responsibility — the Role of the Media in Inter-Ethnic Relations", which brought together print and broadcast journalists from ethnic Macedonian, Albanian, Turkish and Roma media outlets; and one on the role of editors, again including members of the different ethnic groups. The latter covered issues such as how to put out a newspaper that is inclusive, how to keep editorials separate from reporting, and the difference between reactive and pro-active (investigative) journalism. Following this workshop, Search for Common Ground and the NYU Center began to develop a hands-on reporting project involving journalists from different ethnic groups.

A veteran reporter from a major US paper, who had previously spent 4 months as a Fulbright Scholar teaching journalism, led and edited the project. The participating journalists and editor worked out of Search for Common Ground/Macedonia (SCG/M) offices in Skopje. The first few days they set project goals, defined the topic and suggested story ideas, deciding to set aside politics and focus on economic survival, "a shared problem regardless of religion or ethnicity." They agreed each reporter would write one story, with feeds from the others. They conducted numerous interviews throughout Macedonia, often splitting into multi-ethnic teams of two to conduct interviews.

Interviewing ordinary people rather than officials and "experts" was a new style of reporting for the participants; such interaction made the reporters more aware of stereotyping, and each experienced personal revelations. Minor ethnic tensions sometimes surfaced — on word choices and on the ethnic mix of interview subjects. The editor constantly recommended steering clear of political arguments. She was cautious not to lecture them on "how to do 'proper journalism.'" As a hands-on exercise, working side-by-side with participants, she was able instead to illustrate teaching points: pressing sources for more details, restructuring stories based on information they collected together, and encouraging reporters to re-examine their notes for key points left out.

The participants reacted very positively. The team of four participating journalists produced a series they titled "How We Survive," that examined how ordinary citizens of all classes, ethnicities and religions fare under difficult economic conditions in Macedonia. The series consisted of four main stories under shared bylines, plus five smaller sidebar stories. "In their articles as well as their day-to-day work, the four journalist participants confronted sensitive inter-ethnic issues such as relative status and stereotypes of their ethnic groups" and learned the value of cross-ethnic cooperation.

The articles were published simultaneously in the three newspapers represented by the print reporters of the team (the leading Macedonian-, Albanian-, and Turkish-language papers in Macedonia) and adapted for radio broadcast. The products were well-received by the public and the four editors. A press conference in the project's last week resulted in additional stories in the main newspapers, and radio and TV interviews. The organizers consider the project to have been "successful on every level." The project's direct or indirect contribution to conflict prevention or mitigation has not been evaluated, and would be difficult to determine. No independent evaluation has examined the project and its impact.

The two organizers partnered again to organize a similar project working with a new team of reporters, again from four different media organizations in Macedonia, this time on health care issues. As with the previous project, the reporters are conducting interviews in cross-ethnic teams to gain access to individuals from a range of ethnic groups and social classes and to present a balanced view of the issues.

# APPLYING THE TOOLS: LESSONS FROM PAST EXPERIENCE

The prior section, *Toolbox*, profiled policy tools that might be used in conflict prevention and mitigation, describing how they work and analyzing their particulars. This section examines how these tools can be applied most effectively to conflicts.

Conflict is complex; dealing with conflict is a multi-faceted process. Many different tools and actors may be necessary to achieve results. There are guidelines that can sensitize practitioners about some of the major forces at work and how to cope with them. These guidelines do not and cannot prescribe precise, infallible courses of action.

The guidelines come in two forms:

- Advice concerning how conflict intervention practitioners can best conduct themselves in terms of their own attitudes, communication and behavior.
- Preliminary findings drawn from the study of past conflicts about the elements in policy and implementation that have been present in apparently successful interventions.

This section will discuss these two kinds of lessons in turn.

## I. Beneficial Attitudes and Behavior: Tips from Professionals

There are helpful, practical lessons that speak to matters in a conflict situation that practitioners can control. In interviewing experienced practitioners who have done conflict intervention work of various kinds, the team researching this Guide uncovered the following ten suggestions to practitioners.[1]

*1. **Be clear about goals.*** Those wishing to prevent and resolve conflict should make explicit to themselves and to others what they seek to accomplish.

*2. **Be clear about the role one is playing.*** Practitioners in conflict intervention should avoid confusing roles. Attempting to play multiple roles — advocate, negotiator, mediator, facilitator, provider of humanitarian relief, compliance enforcer — impedes effectiveness.

*3. **Maintain frequent active communication, dialogue, and information-sharing between all parties.*** Particpants must seek to identify areas of mutual interest. Interveners must be skilled listeners.

*4. The spiritual dimension of human nature is central to conflict resolution and prevention.* Religious themes and values such as serenity, non-violence, openness, transparency, fairness, reconciliation, redemption, healing, mutual respect, and honesty are the basis for conflict prevention and resolution. Attitudes of hatred, bitterness, desire for revenge and retaliation are unproductive. Not surprisingly, religious leaders and organizations are often key players in conflict amelioration.

*5. Know the historical, social, cultural and psychological context of the conflict.* Interveners must be fully apprised of people, issues, emotions, mores, and political relationships. Generic methods or principles do not succeed. Instead, what can and cannot be done must be tailored to the realities, constraints and opportunities presented by each particular milieu.

*6. Encourage initiative from the parties who are in or closest to conflicts themselves.* Practitioners should empower these parties to undertake responsibility for limiting violent pursuit, to be accountable for results, and to strengthen indigenous, national, and regional institutions. Effective outcomes ultimately require conflicting parties' willingness to work toward solutions; solutions cannot be imposed.

*7. Use informal, non-public activities and interactions with with non-official representatives.* Public leaders often find it difficult to free themselves from polarizing issues.

*8. Principles — human rights, social and economic justice, free economic enterprise, democratic representation and rule of law — are the ultimate guiding light for conflict prevention and resolution.* Practitioners must aim to create a dynamic, ongoing, peaceful process of change that pursues these goals by transforming existing relationships into ones of reciprocity and joint pursuit of mutually acceptable solutions.

*9. Successful efforts require several forms of intervention.* These may include tools implemented by governments, NGOs, donor organizations and others in development, humanitarianism, diplomacy, and other functional areas. These actors should coordinate their interventions.

*10. Interventions and practices must be modified as the situation on the ground evolves.* Practitioners and policy-makers must be flexible.

# II. Strategies

## A. The Advantages of Early Intervention

Considerable theory and a few empirical studies show that it is easier to reduce conflicts if one acts early in their emergence, rather than later. Behavioral conflict theory suggests that phenomena like group-think and victimization help to explain why it is difficult to halt conflicts once they have escalated. A limited number of empirical studies have examined cases of past conflicts to identify correlations between characteristics such as the level of fatalities or duration of conflicts and whether they were settled peacefully or became violent. Although the large samples in these quantitative studies incorporate few post-1989 conflicts, the results provide empirical evidence that factors such as past antagonisms, the timing of third party efforts at settlement, and the types of issues at stake have significant effects on whether conflicts are amenable to peaceful resolution.

This theory and empirical evidence about the advantages of early intervention is summarized in Table 5-1. The table contrasts the conditions affecting parties to conflicts and third parties both before significant violence has occurred and after violence has escalated.

## TABLE 5-1: CHARACTERISTICS AFFECTING GROUPS IN CONFLICT AND THIRD PARTY INTERVENERS BY LEVEL OF VIOLENCE

| Factors Affecting the Parties to a Dispute | Pre- or Low Violence Stage | Violent Stage |
|---|---|---|
| Positions on issues | Malleable, less formed | Crystallized, rigid, zero-sum thinking |
| Nature of issues | Objective, discrete number of specific issues | Subjective, proliferation of issues, generalized and diffuse |
| Goals | To better own situation, do well for self | To hurt other regardless of effect on self |
| Extent mobilized, unified | Low "groupness," complexity and ambiguity tolerated, cross-cutting relationships | Sides taken, polarization, "enemies" defined, shrinking middle ground |
| Number of parties | Limited | Expanded, allies recruited, outside commitments made |
| Sense of hurt, injustice | Moderate, incipient | Feel victimized, legacy of bitterness, reciprocal violence |
| Degree of trust | Potential to be high, easier to build | Low, difficult to re-build |
| Communication between sides, chances for mutual empathy | Open or potentially open | Non-communication except through violence, "group-think," distorted information |
| Perception of other | Complex, individuation, moderation, relatively objective perception of information | Simplistic, dehumanization, stereotyping, extremism, distortion of information, "mirror-image" phenomenon: each party sees own motivation and behavior as rational and "right" while seeing other's as inexplicable and "wrong" |

| Factors Affecting the Parties to a Dispute | Pre- or Low Violence Stage | Violent Stage |
|---|---|---|
| Extent of institutional, social ties between sides | May still exist | Destroyed networks, political institutions |
| Extent of leaders' flexibility vis-à-vis constituents | Some maneuverability | Under pressure to win on battlefield, entrapment, "out-macho" alternate leaders |
| Conflict behaviors | Primarily forms of negotiation | Reciprocal violence |
| What is required to get parties to come to negotiating table | Chance of having some demands met | "Mutual hurting stalemate" |

| Factors Affecting Third Parties | Pre- or Low Violence Stage | Violent Stage |
|---|---|---|
| Leverage over, access to disputants | They may seek or accept help | Each side convinced it will win |
| Physical risks of involvement | Low | High |
| Costs of carrots, sticks required to stop the fighting | Low: parties less committed to positions | High: parties more committed to positions |
| Need to impose force, coercion to stop the fighting | Low: less desire for revenge and punishment | High: more desire for revenge and punishment |
| Difficulty getting third party domestic support for involvement | Low | High |
| Risks, stakes in multilateral involvements | Relatively low | High (command and control issues) |
| Likelihood and extent conflict affects own interests | Low | Moderate to high. |

Table 5-1 suggests that less intense and long-lasting disputes offer third parties a greater likelihood to gain access and achieve peaceful management. Issues tend to be simple and singular rather than complex and multiple. Fatalities and passions are low, disputants are less rigidly polarized and politically mobilized behind opposed causes, communication may still flow between them, and outside parties are less likely to have taken sides.

> Conflicts entering levels involving significant, sustained violence and armed force reach a threshold from which it is difficult to retreat.
>
> Conflict intervention gets the best results when implemented before significant violence or repression starts destructive spirals of mutual victimization and self-righteous revenge.

## B. Findings from Process Case-Studies

Grounded, specific guidance for policy and implementation can be derived from past experience, analyzing preventive interventions taken toward actual conflicts and identifying consistent ingredients associated with success. The post-Cold War period offers a rich field of study: Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Haiti, Estonia, the Congo, Rwanda, and others. Some of these initiatives headed off violence, tension and crisis; others failed.

The decline of state socialist ideology, increased political pluralism, the transfer of authority over economic policy decisions and state enterprises to market processes such as private ownership, and the spread of information technology: these trends have produced dramatic changes in the economies, societies, polities, and international relations in all countries and regions of the world. By changing the rules of the economic and political game and redistributing resources and power, these forces have created uncertainty and insecurity in these societies and have led to clashes among competing interests. But the nature of these political clashes has varied across regions and countries because of differing historical, sociological, political, cultural and institutional legacies and status of political development and state-building.

To make policy conclusions more meaningful, we grouped the conflict cases we examined into three categories of characteristic post-Cold War political disputes. All arose within or across states and involved opposed interests of ethnic or other political groups; conflicts strictly between states and on a larger scale, such as nuclear crises, are not included here.

Conflicts we analyzed tended towards the following groupings:

- *Ethno-political "kin-group" conflicts in Central Europe and the former Soviet Union* — Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia; Moldova and the "Dniestr Republic;" Estonia and Russia; Macedonia/Albania/Serbia; and Hungary and Slovakia. Occasional reference will be made to the dispute between Russia and Chechnya, and between the Czech and Slovakia Republics.

- *Democratizing "transition" conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa* — Zaire, Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, and Zambia. Occasional reference will be made to South Africa.

- *"New democracy" conflicts in Latin America* — Haiti, Guatemala, and Peru.

- ***Finding #1: Preventive diplomacy is multilateral.***

No single country, international organization, or individual has monopolized practice. Particular conflict arenas typically see more than one global, regional, or local third party involved in preventive efforts. These include major powers such as the United States, other middle-rank powers, neighboring states, regional organizations, NGOs, and prominent individuals. The disputants themselves initiated efforts, as did local third parties. In every conflict arena, multiple actors provided a range of services and resources — mediation and negotiations; threat or application of economic sanctions and arms embargoes; diplomatic leverage; financial and logistical support; preventive peacekeeping deployments; fact-finding or monitoring; and so forth. Often one actor played the leadership role.

Regional organizations such as the CSCE, EC, OAU and OAS were clearly the most frequently represented type of actor and were involved in all the cases mentioned. The US took a prominent role in about three-quarters of the cases and was active in more disputes than any other state, and in all three regions. The US generally led or participated in regional organization and UN initiatives. Other Security Council members or middle powers such as France, Britain, Germany and Italy also played important roles in the European and African cases, directly or indirectly through the UN and regional organizations.

The United Nations Security Council was involved in less than half the disputes, often playing a peacekeeping role, and sometimes, a mediating role through special envoys. Heavy reliance on the UN for peacekeeping to monitor ceasefires once conflicts have been waging accounts for the fact that the UN was active in almost all the cases that reached the crisis or violent stage (thus those we considered failures of preventive intervention) and in only two of the successes.

NGOs do not show up as salient actors in many of these disputes. This is probably because it is difficult to obtain information on their activities which are often extensive in these conflict areas but not widely documented. The only apparent third party involvement in the Russian/Chechnyan dispute prior to the outbreak of war in December 1994, for example, was a 1992 fact-finding mission sponsored by International Alert.

- ***Finding #2: A variety of preventive instruments with rewards, penalties, and services are used.***

Third parties used a range of intervention tools; no single tool stands out. A variety of positive and negative inducements and services were embodied in these instruments. This range included actual or contingent "carrots" explicit or implicit offers of membership in regional economic organizations and trade agreements, economic assistance, and diplomatic recognition of new states; as well as "sticks" such as moral condemnations of human rights or other violations of international norms, the threat or use of economic sanctions and withdrawal of aid or diplomatic recognition, warnings of military actions, and deterrence through preventive peacekeeping.

Another type of instrument was the offer of services or "tables," meaning opportunities to facilitate bargaining and negotiations between disputants and others, such as bilateral negotiations, fact-finding or monitoring missions, peace conferences, "track-two" informal dialogues and other joint projects, good offices, joint commissions, and binding arbitration.

- ***Finding #3: Third party actors tend to act to avert potential conflicts not with every warning or outbreak of violence, but rather when national or international leaders judge a dispute holds wider regional significance or a broader symbolic threat.***

These cases show that third parties on occasion seek to preempt crises, rather than wait and manage them. Responses follow warning signs, general apprehension that major violence or other destabilizing events might occur if action was not taken, or initial violent or coercive actions.

Preventive action has not required palpable and imminent threats posed directly to what are described as "vital" national or organizational interests of the third parties. Specific decisions to act may have required some triggering event or episode on the ground in the emerging conflict, such as the violence in Brazzaville, the army riots in Zaire, and the independence declarations of the Yugoslav republics. But in themselves, these were relatively minor occurrences. Even if they erupted, none of these anticipated conflicts would devastate a third party: no third party faced, for example, an attack on its national territory, interruption of essential oil supplies, or the complete destruction of an organization or regime. It was the local and regional or secondary effects themselves that were deemed worth avoiding.

Decisions to act preventively were taken by third party leaders without apparent pressure from domestic constituents or media. Indeed, Western publics and the citizenry within EC, UN, OAU or OAS member countries are unlikely to have even known of these disputes' existence. Instead, leaders acted in response to what they believed to be long-term considerations of national interests. Public opinion or press coverage were not factors.

Responses were not automatic to every episode of turmoil or sign of impending conflict. Early warnings in several instances — Somalia, Rwanda, Hungary and Slovakia — did not precipitate major, concerted actions. Strong expectations of potential or even actual erupting conflict and destruction was not in itself sufficient to generate preventive diplomacy. The fighting and grievous human rights violations in northern Somalia, widely reported by human rights organizations as early as 1988, for example, generated no response for some time. A 1992 International Alert fact-finding report and recommendations about the Russian/Chechnyan dispute were disseminated to the UN and other bodies with no apparent reaction. Another example is the CSCE mission's relatively late entry into the Moldovan-"Dniestr republic" dispute, after local skirmishing had already occurred. In the Danube River dispute between Hungary and Slovakia, disputants issued several requests for assistance with mediation long before any third party stepped forward.

What messages or meanings from disputes prompt new active involvement? Often, it is not specific events themselves that move third parties to act. Instead, action is spurred when events are deemed to hold the potential for wider damaging geo-political or symbolic impact if the conflict were to continue or grow. The tension between Estonia and Russia over Russian speakers' rights was judged of potential geo-political significance because Russia was using the issue as a bargaining chip to delay troop withdrawal from the Baltics. Ethnic turmoil within the Baltic states might also interfere with other matters between the US and Russia. EC and UN action toward Yugoslavia was prompted by the spreading perception that Yugoslavia was vulnerable to violent break-up if republics continued to show signs of seceding unilaterally. In Macedonia, the UN and Western governments feared a wider Balkans conflict that might draw in neighboring countries and, because Greece and Turkey were among these neighbors, weaken NATO cohesion. The West was also moved to action by the symbolic importance of ensuring the survival of a newly independent state struggling to make multi-ethnic democracy work.

The OAU Secretariat saw the 1993 Congo dispute as an opportunity to activate its newly established conflict prevention mechanism, created in part to improve that organization's declining reputation in conflict management. OAS members responded to attacks on democracy because of concern that events in Haiti, Peru, and Guatemala might invite similar moves elsewhere in Latin America.

Chances of third party involvement might increase if requests for action come from the disputants themselves, such as when Macedonian President Gligorov asked for a peacekeeping force in late 1992. But not all such requests are honored. Alija Izetbegovic had made a similar request for protective peacekeeping for Bosnia in the spring of 1992, but was turned down.

***Five Ingredients For Success.*** Policy-makers and practitioners must know what makes for effective interventions. Do preventive intervention efforts actually make a difference, or does the non-escalation of disputes have little to do with deliberate prevention? If preventive diplomacy has an impact, what explains that, so that policy-makers know where to devote resources to promising strategies?

Preliminary examination of the cases suggests that five more or less manipulable, proximate factors stand out as often characteristic of situations when emerging political disputes are handled through peaceful means, and as relatively absent in disputes that eventuated into the use of armed force. These factors appear to have differed fairly consistently between the violent and peaceful cases, and thus may be among the most important determinants of violent or non-violent resolutions of emerging post-Cold War political disputes.

- Three factors operate outside the immediate arena of the dispute and pertain to third parties:
  - ***Third party timing*** — the extent to which third parties are unified in supporting firm, unequivocal pressures behind a process of peaceful settlement before a disputant uses armed force or coercion to attempt to resolve it.
  - ***Breadth of engagement*** — multi-pronged engagement through several policy tools that address the several dimensions of conflicts.
  - ***Support from major powers*** — the extent to which major global and regional powers support or tolerate active preventive efforts and refrain from subverting a peaceful process by backing one disputant or another. This ingredient was often reinforced by the degree to which the US took an active interest in resolving the dispute.
- The other two factors are indigenous characteristics arising from the conflict arena itself. These are important because they alert third parties to leverage points conflict prevention strategies.
  - ***Accommodating leadership*** — the extent that disputing groups' leaders displayed moderation in their actions and policies as the issue emerges.
  - ***Strength of state institutions*** — the extent disputants could pursue their differences through common governing procedures and institutions rather than controlling them, including whether security and armed forces remained detached from the partisan aims of particular parties in conflict.

- ***Finding #4: Peaceful outcomes are more likely to the extent that third parties apply strong pressures on disputing parties to engage in processes and institutions aimed at peaceful settlement of differences before one or other party mobilizes a political following or succeeds in deploying armed force or coercion to make concrete gains.***

The cases reviewed suggest that in addition to early involvement, third parties must put political, economic and potential military pressures on disputing parties to work toward a mutual solution before either party has actually begun to garner mass political support or worse, to use coercive measures or force to make substantial gains.

In these cases, third parties had to be willing to convene conferences to bring disputants to the negotiating table. Third parties also had to offer sufficient rewards to gain parties' compliance or penalties adequate to deter non-compliance with these processes of peaceful negotiation — what has been called "muscular mediation." Merely offering a peaceful process has not stemmed violence; equivocal support for a single party's position or interests against the others may exacerbate it. These inducements must have sufficient influence over the parties to outweigh the partisan gains they might obtain through force or other unilateral coercion. Consequently, their impact is likely to be considerably dulled if they come onto the scene after one or other party has already made gains "on the ground" or politically, however powerful the third parties may ultimately be.

***Successful Cases.*** In the Hungarian-Slovakian dispute, third party involvement did not come especially early. The parties themselves had requested outside assistance several times and been turned down. Even when the EC did offer mediation, it initially failed to get an agreement. Nevertheless, a settlement was achieved once it was clear to Hungary and Slovakia that their EC membership would be hindered if they continued to balk at settling the issue. Similar monetary rewards were held out to Estonia as an inducement to modify its minority legislation; the threat that US and other Western economic aid would be withdrawn provided an incentive to Russia to remain on schedule with its troop withdrawals.

Several preventive measures in Macedonia were taken early to ensure against Serbian clandestine efforts to destabilize Macedonia — by Serbia directly or through intensifying suppression of Kosovar Albanians — and to monitor and signal international support for maintaining political cooperation among Macedonia's ethnic groups and their parties. Deterrents against Serbian activity included periodic warnings from Presidents Bush and Clinton to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to refrain from Serbian armed movement in Kosovo or against Macedonia under penalty of firm US retaliatory measures, understood to mean military intervention. The other action was the UN peacekeeping force set up in 1993 to patrol the Serbian-Macedonian border, after the Yugoslav Army had withdrawn from the area, as a tripwire to deter their return. The fact that Macedonia is recognized in international law as a state by 110 other countries and is a member of the UN may also be a significant normative deterrent; combined with the other measures, this "draws a line in the sand" *before* any encroachment.

These measures may have been effective because they involved symbolically powerful deterrents, put in place largely *before* any potential external or internal sources of instability had a chance to impose their will in Macedonia through force or agitation. These actions were probably more effective than the decision to recognize Croatia because Macedonia was endowed with the status of a sovereign state prior to any takeover by hostile elements and because military protection was provided to enforce it. Although the 1000-man force would in fact be no match for an actual Serbian Army invasion, incursions across the border now would be aimed directly at Western forces and violate firmly accepted norms against

international aggression, triggering a much more vigorous countermeasures such as US and perhaps other military intervention.

Prompt international involvement also characterized the relatively successful cases of international involvement in Latin American and sub-Saharan democratization disputes, although in these instances, the material inducements varied and their impact relative to other factors is less clear. Most OAS members preferred to rely on a Latin American style of consensus-building and facilitation rather than intrusive mediation or intervention to resolve domestic problems. The OAS has been wary of sanctioning the use of military force as a tool of enforcement and has been unwilling to make economic sanctions mandatory; the OAS Resolution 1080 warrant for early involvement against threats to new democracies relies primarily on moral condemnation, diplomatic persuasion, and the glare of publicity, not the presence or threat of military force or economic sanctions.

Nevertheless, 1080's requirement of prompt investigation of apparent irregular threats to legitimately established democratic institutions and its unambiguous prohibition of coercive actions may be effective because it creates a collective region-wide expectation from which it may be hard for offending governments to deviate and member governments to decline to support. It sets out a clear standard for judging governments' actions and requires OAS inquiry upon apparent violations of the standard. The resolution may have a multiplier effect, mobilizing economic and diplomatic pressure from other states while acting as a catalyst for domestic forces opposed to an action.

This was sufficient in the Guatemala case: as an executive, not military coup, it helped stimulate an international and domestic reaction before the Army acted, and their reading the response decided them against support for President Serrano. OAS's prompt response might have been quite effective in reversing this initial assault on democratic institutions.

With regard to the OAU and other international involvement to settle the election dispute in the Congo in mid-1993, it is less easily demonstrated how critical were the timing of the involvement and the inducements it offered in averting further violence and determining the dispute's peaceful outcome relative to factors such as the mediator's own efforts and skills, leverage from other countries, and the disputants' prior disposition to reach an agreement. The OAU emissary arrived in Brazzaville after extensive rioting and violence from street demonstrations left over 1000 dead. Although sporadic skirmishes were occurring and the atmosphere was tense, fighting had declined with the army's imposition of order.

Nevertheless, the government had requested a mediator, and this was agreed to by all the parties, so it could be argued that the OAU's relatively quick response to the situation and the mediator's success over the next ten days in obtaining an agreement may have been essential in avoiding further deterioration in the relationship of the parties and possibly more instability and violence. In that sense, its timing was crucial.

It is unclear how much concrete international inducements made a difference. Although the mediator offered no explicit rewards and made no threats, the president and opposition realized that outside powers were watching and supporting the talks. The electoral agreement agreed to was to be monitored and implemented under joint OAU-EC supervision, and the mediator had solicited support for his negotiations from the US ambassador, so eventual sanctions by the EC and/or the US may have been understood as a possibility if the talks produced no results. In the package, the mediator also had resolved a financial

dispute between the government and a French multinational oil company which had been suspected of supporting opposition parties.

***"Failed" Cases.*** The "failed" cases further support that early forceful international support for peaceful politics may be a requisite for effective preventive diplomacy. No disputes that eventuated into violence or deadlock show evidence that muscular third party efforts were made before significant inter-communal violence or the pre-emptive use of armed force occurred.

In Moldova, for example, no international body took an interest in the growing contention between the Moldovan government and the Dniestr separatist movement on the left bank until the CSCE mediated a ceasefire in 1994 and placed an observer mission in the Dniestr region to monitor it. But by that time, the local forces had captured all the territory they wanted.

There is a similar pattern in the events preceding the war in Chechnya in December 1994. Although the authorities in Moscow and Chechen political leadership carried out several bilateral negotiations in the preceding years and requests were made for international mediation, no such missions were sent. The only third party effort apparently was a fact-finding mission sent by the non-governmental International Alert in 1992.

In the growing conflict between the Yugoslav federal republics after the breakdown of the communist party, several outside efforts were made as of early 1991 to pressure the republics to stay together or negotiate their differences. In this case, the problem was not that no mediation efforts were made or that they did not incorporate the notion of peaceful resolution. In fact, the EC and the US government were quite clear, initially at least, that the issue was not whether Yugoslavia stayed together or divided; at stake instead was the need to arrive at mutual agreement on a governing structure without using force.

The defect in the effort may have been that the EC and US were acting at a time when the political division between the republics had already gone very far and when militia preparations and actions on the ground were already underway. To dissuade nationalist leaders in the republics from pursuing independence unilaterally, the EC had admonitions, the power to withhold recognition, threats of economic sanctions, and could proffer a negotiations table. But in comparison to the gain in popular support and territory through a unilateral *fait accompli*, the possible rewards for cooperating in a peaceful solution and the penalties for pursuing independence by fiat may have been insufficient to deter unilateral secessionist moves.

Vis-à-vis the issue of Croatian independence, initial EC support for all parties to meet certain general standards was soon followed by a split in the ranks that caused a policy shift. This occurred when Germany prevailed on the EC to recognize Croatia as a sovereign state — as if mere conferral of the status would itself stop the increasing local skirmishing. In fact, the decision backfired: instead of deterring further hostilities between Serbia and Croatia, it hastened their break-up, since no effort was made to insist on or enforce protection of minority Serbs in Croatia, or to back up recognition by protecting of Croatians, should local skirmishes continue to escalate.

Even after the short war between the federal authorities and Slovenia had been resolved by Slovenian victory in July 1991, and the longer conflict between Croatia and Serbia had been waging for some months, the international community had time and opportunity to prevent a similar outbreak in Bosnia before its future might be largely defined as a military question. But the shift in EC policy made it clear

that Bosnia was now less protected from domination than it would have been under the tri-partite proposal its leader Izetbegovic had earlier advanced. He felt his only recourse was to announce independence as well, despite the tensions this would unleash in Bosnia between Muslims, Serbs and Croats. Here again, the international community was not willing to provide the republic any protection in its vulnerable state. A request from Izetbegovic in early 1992 for the kind of UN preventive peacekeeping force that would be put later that year into Macedonia was denied.

Haiti shows the same lag in timing between forceful international efforts at peaceful resolution of a dispute and the use of force by a disputant. When the Haitian military authorities abrogated the democratic presidential election of Jean Bertrand Aristide in September 1991, OAS Resolution 1080 procedures were in place and used. But General Cedras's action revealed a shortcoming of the mechanism when it comes to military, as against executive, coups. There was not sufficient advance notice of the Cedras action for the mechanism to come into play before he completed his take-over, since that involved swift use of military force.

The OAS did react promptly, condemned the action, and asked the UN to impose a trade embargo. These pressures produced negotiations between the military and Aristide within a year, resulting in the Governors' Island agreement of 1992 by which Aristide was to assume his elected office. Subsequently, sanctions were suspended and the agreed UN training force on board the *Harlan County* was turned back, leading Haiti's military rulers to back down from that commitment in October 1993. This suggests again the amount of political, economic and/or military power it takes to keep mobilized political groups with access to military power from taking unilateral actions. Although the military pressure required would not have been substantial in view of the relative weakness of Cedras's 7,000 man force, the UN was unwilling to consider such an invasion force.

Nor did reimposed sanctions have any effect for some time. Although enforced by a naval blockade, in part because they were porous, the economic sanctions imposed by the UN on oil and other trade with Haiti did not bring the military authorities to the negotiating table and reverse their coup, though they did inflict hardships on the majority of the Haitian people. Even later efforts to target the sanctions more effectively on wealthy Haitians did not turn the situation around, although the authorities were undoubtedly weakened. It seems that even sanctions, when applied late after the opposed forces are entrenched, must be extremely powerful in their effects and thus costly for all involved.

Even though the Cedras regime was virtually isolated from the rest of the world in diplomatic terms, it was not until the threat of a full-fledged invasion, in combination with a high-visibility, face-saving mediation effort on the part of the mission headed by Jimmy Carter, that the regime actually gave up power peacefully and Aristide was returned. By then, the country was in even worse straits economically as a result of sanctions than it otherwise would have been, and it had generated thousands of refugees.

Rwanda presents another instance of failed international preventive action because resources were insufficient for the task. The deficiency appears not to be the lack of action, but the relative weakness of the particular carrots or sticks in proportion to the forces that were growing on the ground behind the use of armed force.

A civil war had waged between the predominantly Hutu government and the predominantly Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front since 1992. The OAU and UN were finally able to arrange a ceasefire and inaugurate a plan for achieving power-sharing through the August 1994 Arusha Accords. To monitor

observance of the Accords and watch for signs of instability, the OAU and subsequently the UN dispatched a small military observation force in fall 1993. This force was composed of only 500 troops, however, and was insufficient to be able to detect what we now know in hindsight subsequently developed: a deliberate effort on the part of the Hutu authorities to postpone and avoid implementing the Accords and to recruit and arm militias who could be ready to retake the country at the first opportunity.

That opportunity came when the plane carrying the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi was approaching Kigali airport on April 6, 1994. The most common criticism one hears of the Rwandan intervention is that the UN and the US were too slow in supplying more troops and equipment once genocide was being carried out throughout the countryside. But the defect in the mission emerged even earlier: the resources applied during the post-Accords implementation process were insufficient to discern the full implications of the facts that the political agreement was not being fulfilled and that the whole plan was being actively undermined by pre-emptive strengthening of partisan military forces.

In other words, the same imbalance was arising between the amount of pressure the international community was applying to the situation at a particular time, and the potential for violence that was developing at that same time.

In sum, these successful and failed cases suggest that the level of inducement that third parties must bring to bear — carrots and/or sticks — is relative to the strength of disputing parties and scale of the conflict being addressed. Measures applied early in a conflict require less pressure and thus costs than do measures applied later. To the degree that the use of coercion or force to gain territory or control over a government is imminent or deployed, preventive action must wield a greater counterforce to deter or reverse it, whether in the form of material rewards or military deterrence. Diplomacy and good offices may require behind them very attractive rewards or the contingent threat of force or other forms of coercion such as effective sanctions, before the parties to a mature dispute or an engaged violent conflict will contemplate a peaceful settlement.

- ***Finding #5: Preventive interventions were successful to the extent that a multi-pronged approach was taken, in which several policy tools were used to attend to the diverse political, military, psychological and other dimensions of the conflict.***

***Comprehensiveness and Coordination.*** The effectiveness of preventive interventions depends on the range of services required to address various needs in the conflict. This dimension differs from the gradation between force and conciliation and the notion of stimulus and response.

Parties to a conflict have other needs besides rewards for good behavior and penalties for bad conduct. In addition to deterring the use of force and assuring basic order and security, these needs include building institutions, alleviating distrust, promoting reconciliation, establishing channels through which to pursue negotiations, and formulating settlements. The means to fulfill these needs may come from the disputants' own resources and institutions.

As an example, the effective Macedonian preventive activities combined the firm warnings by US Presidents Bush and Clinton to Serbian President Milosevic that armed moves in Kosovo or Macedonia would be met with a strong response, the UN peacekeeping force, the CSCE observation mission, NGO projects, and diplomatic recognition of the new Macedonian government. In combination, these official

and nonofficial actions put the international spotlight on Macedonia and signaled externally and internally a significant international presence and interest in Macedonia.

Thus, in multi-faceted conflict situations with a variety of needs like Macedonia, Rwanda and Burundi, a premium is placed on cooperation and coordination among third party actors, for this will affect the success of preventive efforts. Whether they acted officially jointly or separately in a conflict arena, the multiple actors in the cases were not always unified in purpose. The EC decision to recognize Croatia, for example, was done against UN negotiator Cyrus Vance's wishes and added further strains to the relationship between the republican leaders, increasing difficulties in reaching a political settlement. The mutual wariness and different attitudes among the US, France, and Belgium toward Zaire has probably contributed to the lack of a sufficiently assertive effort to resolve that ongoing crisis. By contrast, the unified approach displayed in the Congo dispute, OAS coherence and the degree of collaboration achieved in Macedonia may help to explain the effectiveness of these efforts.

Concerted action can be greatly facilitated by an individual diplomat or other single player who, backed by a major power or organization, takes charge and orchestrates a unified preventive strategy. A source of synergy was the ingenuity of individual diplomatic entrepreneurs from the US and elsewhere acting as special envoys; these include US diplomat Robert Frowick, the first CSCE Head of Mission in Macedonia; the OAU's special envoy to the Congo, Mohamed Sahnoun; the UN Special Representative to Burundi, Ould Abdullah; and the CSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities, Max van der Stoel. By using their personal stature, diplomatic skills, and authority as *de jure* representatives of multilateral organizations and some, *de facto* representatives of various powers, such people established local contacts, found the best political leverage points, handled the media adroitly, and employed other tactics to help create a package of inducements, penalties and services tailored to a given situation.

- ***Finding #6: Preventive interventions are effective to the extent that major powers, regional powers and "neighbors" agree to support or tolerate them and do not undermine them by overt or covert support for one party or the other.***

The extent to which third parties outside a conflict's region gained effective access to the states or groups in a dispute, and the progress or obstacles they experienced in averting conflict, depended greatly in the cases on the attitude and actions of other states in the region — whether they perceived it to be within their sphere of interest or saw a partisan stake in the dispute. A major example is Russia's proprietary interest in the treatment of Russian minorities in the so-called "near-abroad" — the Baltic states, Ukraine, Crimea, and Kazakhstan.

Major powers or regional countries can constrain or weaken preventive actions toward local disputes in a number of ways. One is by vetoing UN or a regional organization's work. Serbian objections are why the CSCE became less effective than the UN and EC in the Yugoslavian negotiations after early 1991. Serbian President Milosevic expelled the CSCE observer missions in Kosovo, Sandjak, and Vojvodina.

Major powers and other countries can hamper preventive diplomacy by supporting one of the disputants or being a direct party itself to the conflict. In the Balkans, neighbors Bulgaria and Albania have recognized the new state and forsworn seeking to change existing borders by force. This has been crucial in avoiding the spread of war into Macedonia.

Powerful states also exert economic or diplomatic influence, requiring other states in the area and outside powers to depend on it or to come to terms with its point of view. In the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union such as Estonia, Moldova, and Ukraine, Russia is dominant economically, politically, and militarily, and plays active roles in these conflicts by using its energy supply as leverage over smaller states and the military forces it has stationed in Georgia, Tajikistan, and elsewhere. Even in the former Yugoslavia, an area that is not clearly within Russia's sphere of interest, the West has had to be mindful of Russian sensibilities because of Russia's links to the Serbs. The US was initially hesitant to criticize Russia when it went to war in Chechnya in December 1994 because of the way such pressures might complicate the US-Russian relationship and compete with other policy goals. The international community has had to be careful in addressing political transition issues in Zaire since Zaire has been essential in managing the refugee exodus from Rwanda and Burundi.

In the Western hemisphere, the US has resisted extra-hemispheric military forces, permitting their introduction only recently in Haiti, and then only under the aegis of the United Nations. Significant diplomatic initiatives by outside actors to contain or resolve hemispheric conflicts would almost certainly require US approval. Conversely, US political support of OAS responses to the executive usurpation of democratic authority in Guatemala and Peru was clearly important to their effectiveness. The threat of economic sanctions from the US added to the pressure the OAS exerted and was critical to persuading Guatemala's business community to support the coup's reversal.

As an example of a major power lying outside a conflict's region but with substantive interests shaping the outcome of prevention efforts, in the Middle East, the US has long been the main peacemaker and a prime actor, though it is not always the only one — witness the Norwegian-brokered Israeli-Palestinian talks.

In some regions, several outside powers may have interests. Although none of these powers will necessarily dominate the handling of a dispute, their interactions and cumulative effect will have profound impact on whether preventive action is taken. As examples, Sub-Saharan Africa lies outside the sphere of interest of any single major power, but European powers such as France, Britain, Italy, and Belgium have maintained close ties with their former colonies and been active in numerous military interventions, mediations, and peacekeeping. The US has considerable interest and influence in the region as well. The Baltic states, though formerly part of the Soviet Union, have historically enjoyed close relations with the West and the Nordic countries, a fact that has increased third party prevention activity and leverage there as a counterbalance to Russia.

The interest of several major powers in a particular region can enhance the prospects for effective preventive action, but it can also complicate, delay, or even undermine such activity. The crisis in Zaire has persisted in part because of differences among the US, Belgium, and France over how to deal with President Mobutu. More dramatically, France's wariness of Tutsi forces and apparent supply of arms to Hutu groups in Rwanda and Burundi are certainly not helping reduce the potential for further violence in those countries.

Finally, the impact of major powers on preventive initiatives also suggests that disputes are neglected where such powers have low interests. This may explain to some extent the slow response to developments in Moldova and Somalia, for example, neither of which has high economic or strategic significance for the West.

***The Unique Position of the United States.*** Notwithstanding regional variations in US prestige and influence, the US's global purview, moral standing and effective influence as a third party appears to have made it often the "first among equals" in supporting particular preventive diplomacy efforts, when it chose to be active. The US was widely welcomed as a participant in local and regional preventive efforts, and its role as "prime mover" was often crucial in securing cooperation and resolving conflicts. This reflects the US's special assets. The reception US actors received as leading energizers, mobilizers, mediators, guarantors, and/or financiers of many efforts arose from a perception that the United States was likely to be more balanced than other states or organizations and/or that it possessed the political and military power and economic influence to deliver on incentives or threats that might be part of a settlement package.
The US has been critical to several dispute settlements in Latin America — privately, Latin leaders often indicate as much, despite uncomfortable memories of past US military interventions. The prospect of US sanctions or assistance in the Haitian, Peruvian, and Guatemalan cases figured prominently in the calculations of the parties involved. Earlier, US support was crucial for hemispheric democratization. In Macedonia, the US government and US NGOs are often regarded as the most important third parties involved. The fact that the three heads of the CSCE mission have been American diplomats reflects the desire local actors have for US involvement and has undoubtedly gained local attention and respect. Few European nations are entirely free from historical baggage that discredits them in the eyes of some local groups. In Croatia and Macedonia, US NGO initiatives often seem to fare better than those conducted by European NGOs.

Major and direct US involvement is not always necessary, though, and US involvement has often been indirect. US actors have proved effective under the mantle of international organizations. In the Congo, for example, the US government was in the background as civil war was averted largely because of the efforts of an OAU mediator.

***Regional Organizations as Middle Ground.*** Regional organizations were active in the foreground in many of these cases. This suggests that they often provide a legitimate vehicle or buffer, allowing major powers to participate in a preventive strategy without creating suspicions of other major powers or other countries in a region. The CSCE, for example, has acted as a useful meeting ground for both Western and Russian involvement in the Estonian, Moldovan, and other cases in the former Soviet Union. The OAS has acted as a legitimating presence through which the US could put its powers behind Western hemispheric initiatives.

One factor motivating the OAS to adopt and apply the Resolution 1080 mechanism was Latin American members' desire to overcome a pattern whereby their inability to agree to address common threats and conflicts increased the rationale for unilateral US intervention. From this perspective, some Latin American leaders saw the US invasion of Panama to remove President Manuel Noriega from power as a failure in Latin American political self-reliance. The OAS's aversion to using force stems in part from Latin American resentment of past US military interventionism and a desire to substitute other methods. As the US representative to the OAS noted, the adoption of Resolution 1080 was in part a preemptive effort "by the Lilliputians to tie down the American giant."

- ***Finding #7: Peaceful outcomes of disputes were enhanced to the extent that leaders of the disputing parties were moderate in their words, actions and policies, made conciliatory gestures and sought bilateral or multi-lateral negotiations and bargaining to resolve conflicts — rather than engaging in provocative rhetoric, unilateral acts, uncompromising policies and coercion or force to pursue their objectives.***

The level of tension and disposition to use violence when political and policy disputes can be played out in public through the media and election campaigns can be greatly increased if controversies are intensified by a "war of words" involving ultimatums, threats or divisive rhetoric such as ethnic nationalist overtones. The potential for divisive rhetoric and ethnic scapegoating may be especially great now in the countries of central Europe and the newly independent countries of the former Soviet Union because the breakdown of the communist system's norms created a political vacuum and there are no new norms for popular politics that militate against blatant ethnic appeals, anti-Semitism and the like.[2]

Hostility is more likely when peremptory governmental or public actions are taken or legislation and policies enacted that achieve one party's partisan cause, without some sign of consideration to opposed minorities or other interests. The talking up of arms is even more probable when one side uses police or military action to pre-empt the issue.

In those disputes that led to peaceful outcomes, there seem to have been comparatively more signs that leaders were willing to accommodate the interests of parties other than simply their own constituencies through negotiating and consulting before or while taking public actions. In the failed cases, however, hostility appears to have bred hostility and no outlets for negotiations were sought.

In the Gabcikov-Nagymaros hydroelectric project dispute and other controversies between Hungary and Slovakia, for example, harsh words and unilateral actions were nevertheless mixed with efforts to initiate bilateral negotiations and to involve third parties, efforts that eventually resulted in mediated agreements. Moderate leaders from both Slovakia and Hungary have made a number of bilateral efforts over the last two years to maintain open dialogue on minority issues and to keep major crises from developing.

Other leaders managed potentially explosive crises over minority populations within their borders whose kin are majorities in neighboring states by referring issues to negotiations and international bodies. As Estonia moved to independence in August 1991, for example, nationalist feelings sought to reassert Estonian prerogatives to reverse the Russification experienced since World War II. Laws and referenda passed from 1989 through 1993 on language, local elections, citizenship and the constitution restricted the professional, educational, and cultural opportunities of many of its 30 percent non-Estonian population and removed the right to parliamentary vote from most of them. Russia retaliated in 1992 by slowing down the agreed schedule for withdrawing troops, and at one point Estonia seized a naval base. Tensions reached a high point when the Russian-speaking community demonstrated against a June 1993 law on aliens and Moscow reacted with bitter criticism from Russia's highest leaders, a gas cutoff, and calls for sanctions, including threatening statements from rising Russian nationalist Zhironovsky.

Despite restrictive legislation and unilateral action against the naval base, Estonia's actions were increasingly tempered by willingness to accept monitoring and policy suggestions by international bodies such as the Council of Europe, the CSCE, and a UN Human Rights delegation. The aliens law and a measure to remove Russian from Estonian schools by the year 2000 were submitted to the Council of Europe and the CSCE for comment; Estonian President Meri sent back their drafts back to Parliament for

modification before final enactment. Other measures that helped reduce rancor included easing up on local election requirements, allowing a referendum on autonomy for the Russian-speaking areas, and registering a Russian-speaking party. At the same time, Russia used energy supplies and the presence of troops as bargaining chips while imposing pressure by appealing to European bodies and seeking to enlist world elite opinion.

Leadership moderation in actions and policies characterized other cases of relative "success" dealing with ethnic nationalist movements and may therefore have been a contributing factor. Czechoslovakia's peaceful break-up on January 1, 1993 into two new independent states, for example, was managed without violence in part because of the clear desire by the two parts' leadership to keep their negotiations from inflaming ethnic passions in the two communities. With the example of Yugoslavia already before them, both Havel and Meciar made special pleas to their respective constituencies during 1992 to avoid raising tensions. Contrary to the Yugoslav pattern of deliberately whipping up one's following with nationalistic rhetoric to get support for policies, the Czech and Slovak elites took pains to keep popular sentiments out of the debate.[3]

The peacefully resolved dispute between Russia and Ukraine over Crimea has ingredients similar to both the Estonian case of relative "success" and the Moldovan case of relative "failure:" a Russian-speaking majority in the area and other eastern parts of Ukraine attracted to retaining links with Russia, Crimean leaders risen in part from local aspirations for independence or autonomy, and a major military presence left over from the Soviet period in the form of the Black Sea Fleet.

Tensions over possible Crimean separatism caused considerable international concern but have since abated. This can be explained mainly in terms of the larger stakes involved in the overall Ukrainian-Russian relationship, especially the negotiations over dismantling Ukraine's nuclear weapons and Ukraine's considerable economic dependency on Russia.

But it is important also to note that Ukraine's policies toward minority rights and interests has been among the most liberal in the area. Although serious issues remain to be resolved over Crimea, moderate policies have undoubtedly kept discrimination charges from inflaming this issue. Unlike many other former Soviet Republics, Ukraine defines itself as a territorial and legal entity, not a nation of a certain people; its people are defined in terms of their place of residency, not ethnic or linguistic terms; and legislation on employment, education, and culture protects every citizen regardless of ethnic origin, language, religion, and so on. At the same time, Ukraine has turned to the OECD and the UN to help it with dealing with its local minority problems.[4]

In contrast, the Yugoslavian and Moldovan cases reveal multiple instances of provocative and divisive nationalistic rhetoric through the media, political action taken unilaterally such as *ad hoc* referendums and declarations of independence, covert build-ups of military power, immediate resort to force or coercion, and resistance to international influence and assistance except when it appears to consolidate a particular contending faction's own gains.

- ***Finding #8: Preventive intervention was more effective where the parties sought to resolve their dispute through procedures and norms embodied in common, governing domestic institutions that operated on the basis of agreed-on, enforceable rules, such as those of their legislatures, regularized election systems, judicial systems and bureaucracies.***

These "strong states" ensured that military and security forces served the interests of a constitutional order independent of partisan aims among political factions vying for control of the state. Preventive diplomacy was less effective when the parties themselves had the power to set those rules and control their own armies or militias.

Conflict preventive actions, conducted either by the disputants themselves or third parties, achieved peaceful resolutions of conflict more often when disputing parties dealt with one another within some previously established framework of rules and procedures. Rather than having the course of disputes subject to uncertain vicissitudes of personalities, publicly aired disputes between political factions and ethnic groups, or the dictates of a single ethnic group that represses others, conflicts were peacefully managed through governmental institutions. In these cases, no single party captured state organs and functions — lawmaking, administration, judicial decision-making, international relations — and security and military forces "stayed out of politics." These disputes were about state policies rather than the basic character and control of states.

Successful cases of preventive action occurring within states benefitted by working with effective governing institutions with control of their security and armed forces — Macedonia, Guatemala, Congo, Czech and Slovak republics. For example, even though Guatemala and Peru, like many other Latin American countries, had been ruled for years by military or military-dominated regimes, they had a legacy of strong state institutions which more recently had come under democratic control. The military and police forces had been more constrained from a political role in recent years, and did not automatically support the executive coups before considering the effects these would have on the country's economic position and standing in the international community. The Congo had also developed a strong civil service and its military in recent years had become committed to playing a neutral role in politics. When the OAU mediator arrived, although the army was not ethnically diverse, it had restored order in the center of Brazzaville and was remaining neutral in the dispute for fear of splitting apart.

In successful dispute outcomes between states, governments were constrained in their actions by other states and international norms. In Estonia, Russia, Hungary and Slovakia, preventive diplomacy was easier because the disputants, as leaders of established and internationally recognized states, stood to lose more in aid, multilateral memberships and other inducements the international community could bestow or withhold than they would gain politically from promoting ethnic nationalist causes.

Preventive initiatives were less effective, however, where only weak independent governmental institutions had existed in these areas in the past — Moldova, Yugoslavia — where what central state institutions existed were in the process of being torn down — the Belgrade federal government in Yugoslavia from 1990 to 1992 — and where state institutions were run like the leaders' private patrimonies — Somalia, Zaire. In these settings, the disputants themselves largely organized or ran what politico-administrative entities existed and set and manipulated rules and procedures for political ends. They stood at the head of politically mobilized and armed social groups, factions, or political parties who were competing for political power; they governed separate political and administrative entities over given territories — "ethnic states" — and they controlled distinct armies and militias that served their aims alone — "warlordism."

A major difficulty for mediators to keep the dissolution of Yugoslavia from erupting into violence, for example, was the disintegration already occurring since the late 1980s in collective organs of the state such as the system of economic self-management, the collective presidency and the Yugoslav army.

Indeed, this process had started as early as Tito's 1974 devolution reforms. Before and during the debate between republics over Yugoslavia's constitution, the republics' presidents held a high degree of control over republican political, administrative, economic, and, increasingly, military resources. As early as 1990, republics were creating their own armed republican units within the police instead of sending conscripts to the Yugoslav army. A common tactic among aspiring nationalists was to capture control of their parties, exclude moderates, and then unilaterally pass referendums at propitious moments to validate their parties' control of the republic.

Similarly, the leaders of Moldova and the Dniestr republic shared no common political institutions. As violence erupted on the left bank, interior ministry forces lined up against a local militia increasingly supported by the 14th Army. In Rwanda and Burundi, civilian government institutions such as the civil service and legislature are weak; ethnic group leaders were dividing up portions of the state under their respective influences and have had relatively free rein to arm their followers.

***The Impact of Civil Societies.*** An autonomous state does not necessarily require a fully developed popular democracy; rather, it means that a set of rules effectively govern state institutions. These rules may be enforced as much through compacts, coalitions, and other agreements by competing political elites who effectively control their own constituencies, as they could be through a process of immediate accountability to broad-based electorates.

Does peaceful dispute resolution require that social and economic groups in civil society and the institutions they dominate, such as trade unions and businesses, be organized separately from government, and thus have interests at stake other than those at risk in political disputes? In broad terms, that may be the case. But the range of the successful cases reviewed here revealed only two instances in which the strong pressure exerted by civil societies independent of separate political parties were a major factor in keeping the political dispute from becoming violent. In Guatemala, a wide network of business, labor and other groups mounted a great deal of pressure on President Serrano to back down. In Zambia, trade unions and other social and economic institutions were critical forces in helping to manage a peaceful transition from autocracy to pluralist politics.

## ◆ *Conclusion*

Experience suggests that preventive involvements will be initiated and will be successful to the extent that:

- A potential conflict is perceived to have wider symbolic significance or to threaten the regional or global interests of one or more major third party actors.
- Multiple third party actors with moral standing and effective power act in a relatively concerted fashion.
- Significant inducements to conduct disputes peacefully are brought to bear early.
- A combination of positive, negative, and facilitative tools is employed.
- Major powers share an interest in resolving the conflict.

- The United States gives at least indirect support to the preventive effort.

The following section suggests ways to create or restructure policies, procedures, and institutions to take full advantage of the opportunities presented by preventive diplomacy.

## III. Notes

1. The list is also drawn from Executive Summary, "Practicing Community-Based Conflict Mitigation," A Workshop Co-Sponsored by USAID/BHR/OFDA, USAID/AFR and DOS/AF, March 29 and 30, 1995.

2. Szayna, p. 18.

3. Goldie Shabad, Sharon A. Shible and John F. Zurovchak. *When Push Comes to Shove: Simultaneous Transformations and the Breakup of the Czechoslovak State.* Paper presented at the 1993 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington, DC, 1993, p. 45f.

4. Maria Drohobycky (ed.). *Managing Ethnic Tension in the Post-Soviet Space: The Examples of Kazakhstan and Ukraine.* Washington, DC: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1995, pp. 15-24.

# INTERVENTION STRATEGIES

The prior section examined how preventive interventions can be made effectively. This section addresses how policy-makers and practitioners can incorporate such lessons into their work so they are better prepared to respond appropriately to incipient conflicts.

Actors in conflict prevention — international organizations, local institutions, NGOs — can react "from scratch" to incipient conflicts, or can have policies and procedures in place to be activated in order to prevent a broad range of conflicts. Governments, inter-governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations and individuals are already on the scene in many conflict areas and are doing parts of the job. But to get the maximum benefit from thinly spread resources, the various actors have to be better focussed, enhanced and galvanized to achieve conflict prevention effectively.

Planning and implementing a preventive intervention strategy entails addressing certain basic issues, whatever unique circumstances affect particular emerging conflicts. Most preventive action is multilateral, so these matters face the participants collectively as well as individually. There are eight such issues:

*1. **Goal Trade-Offs*** — what will interventions aim to achieve? This deals with reconciling violent conflict prevention with the promotion of social and political change and related goals.

*2. **Tracking National Transitions*** — what is the current situation in a given nation or locality and where might it be heading? This means ascertaining an area's capacity to absorb the disruptions of social change.

*3. **Early Warning*** — where and when are tensions and disputes likely to escalate into violent conflicts? This concerns the signs of brewing violent conflicts that analysts should look for.

*4. **Conflict Needs and Responses*** — what should be done? This means pinpointing key aspects of potentially violent situations and choosing prevention responses to address those needs.

*5. **Tool Implementers*** — who should do what? This looks at strengths and limitations of various tool implementers who might be chosen to address the problem.

*6. **Entry and Disengagement*** — when should interventions start and when should they end? This addresses the timing of third party involvement in the emerging conflict, and planning for eventual disengagement.

7. ***Mid-Conflict Activity*** — when conflicts are underway, how can aid be given in ways that avoid worsening the conflict? This addresses the impact of aid, and strategies for providing aid appropriate to conflict situations.

8. ***Institutionalizing Conflict Prevention*** — how can a regular multilateral process for preventive interventions be structured? This considers how US and other actors might be linked in organized arrangements for conflict prevention.

In actual decision-making, these issues are inter-connected, but it is useful to look at them separately in planning strategies. The following discussion does not settle the issues, but aims to pose the right questions and provide some guidance to policy-makers and field personnel for working out appropriate answers.

## Issue #1: Goal Tradeoffs — What does the would-be conflict preventer wish to prevent or achieve?

***The Problem.*** This document is about preventing and mitigating violent conflicts, but governments and other organizations active in the Greater Horn pursue other policy goals such as protecting the environment, promoting democratization and human rights, setting up economic development projects, and providing refugee aid.

Prior sections developed a theme that preventing violent conflicts or coercion in the Greater Horn of Africa entails work to anticipate and head off obvious detriments like mass violence or the suppression of minorities. Yet it also involves preserving and building benefits such as bolstering peace through promoting and defending respect for human rights, democratic processes, economic growth, and protecting the environment.

"Preventing violent conflict" and "building peace" are both desirable goals. We might conclude they are fully compatible, even identical — after all, it is hard to promote democracy during a war, and democracies do not easily go to war, especially against their own people. But this assumption is too simple. While efforts to promote development may incorporate one or more such policy goals, pursuing these goals simultaneously is not always possible or advisable. In fact, there are times when they may work against each other. For example, one tension between desirable goals is between "peace" and "justice" — between preserving order, stability, and physical security against violence, and advancing human rights and greater political representation through social and political change. Such tensions frequently arise at the nexus between stable peace (preserving basic security and stability) and durable peace (advancing democracy, human rights, and economic growth) as defined in Section Three, *Conceptual Building Blocks.*

The sudden opening of some nations' political system to broader participation and human rights might destabilize established patterns of authority, encouraging newly mobilized groups to seek political power through violence or state coercion. In the newly independent states of the former Soviet empire, for example, rapid achievement of a populist democracy by dominant ethnic groups can produce a tyranny of the majority which neglects minority rights and causes oppression or strife.

The principles of territorial integrity of states and the self-determination aspirations of peoples within them may also cause friction. The international community is ambivalent about what trade-offs can be justified here. Why, for instance, accept self-determination for Eritrea and Macedonia but not for Southern Sudan, the Kurdistan, or Kosovo? The point is that no single principle can dominate. Both have contributed to both peace and war. Confusion over these competing goals made for an unsuccessful attempt at preventive intervention in the breakup of Yugoslavia. The issue for the EC, the US, and others trying to help manage this transition and avoid violence was whether to back Yugoslavia's territorial integrity or self-determination for Slovenia and Croatia. The eventual decision was to recognize Croatian independence, believing this ensured Croatia the international protection accorded to a sovereign state. Unfortunately, Croatia was not first required to establish safeguards for its Serbian minority, provoking a violent Serbian reaction. Conflict might have come anyway, but Western actions may have accelerated a war that might have been avoided or at least postponed.

The contrast with policy concerning Kosovo is instructive. In this case the international community compromised the achievement of full political justice for the sake of avoiding violence or repression. Since Serbia undeniably has effective control in Kosovo, and the international community is not willing to challenge that control, the international community has influenced the Kosovar alternative government to follow a policy of non-violence while warning Serbia against further oppression. So far, this has helped to avoid worse repression and possible civil war.

A second example of the tradeoff between restraining violence and achieving just governing principles was seen in the Vance-Owen peace plan for partitioning Bosnia along ethnic lines. The plan's proponents saw it as the way to end the war, yet the plan was rejected at the time because it appeared to give international approval to Bosnian Serb territorial gains and to legalize the cantonization of ethnically-based political communities.

These comments about tensions between peace and justice apply to other goals now prominent on the US policy agenda such as population control, the "enlargement" of democracy, controlling arms proliferation, protecting the environment, economic reform, and free trade. Virtually all these policies have been described as aimed at conflict or crisis prevention, thus obscuring tensions between them.

***Guidelines.*** While there is no simple formula for reconciling goal trade-offs, certain points can be offered.

- First, policy-makers need to be aware of the ways that violence prevention may compromise other worthy goals such as progressive political change. Policy-makers must face these trade-offs forthrightly when formulating country- and locale-specific strategies and adopt appropriate balancing and modulating tactics.

- Second, it is good practice to adopt the medical profession's principle of "do no harm." Whatever goals we seek, the first obligation is to avoid exacerbating tensions or conflict. The international community needs to be aware that militant promotion or enforcement of democracy and human rights against nondemocratic regimes or in fragile liberalizing societies can become a cause of increasing violence and destruction which then requires costly international remedial efforts.

In short, conflict prevention is not a moral campaign but a pragmatic exercise.

This is not a rationale for the entrenched to hold onto power without the legitimacy and accountability that must come with it. Oppressive policies and gross economic and political inequalities should not be infinitely tolerated for the sake of preserving order at the expense of the rights of, say, deprived minorities. Deciding on grounds of prudence and feasibility not to invariably act vigorously on behalf of cherished principles does not deny their validity. But an appropriate definition of democratization and other ultimate goals may need to include the notion of orderly transition and sustainability.

Peaceful settlement of disputes is an overarching norm that helps reconcile peace, justice and dilemmas. This principle could be revitalized through more deliberate application to intra-national disputes and to the inter-state disputes covered under Chapter VI of the UN Charter.

In sum, no one goal can be universally applied as an end in itself, whether it is the territorial integrity of states or the full self-determination peoples. Conflict prevention requires locale-specific balancing the prevention of violence with the promotion of peaceful socio-economic and political transformation.

## Issue #2: Tracking National Transitions — What is the current situation in a society and where is it heading?

***The Problem.*** To find the right approach for a given nation, conflict prevention strategies must be informed by an assessment of national and local conditions to assess where the society stands with respect to desired goals and the capacity for further peaceful change. A conflict prevention strategy is not just a matter of anticipating and responding to incipient violent disruptions. It requires understanding the evolving process of each nation's development. Abundant research on the dynamics of political change during transitions from authoritarian to freer political systems can be applied to analyzing the present power and other relationships in each society and informing judgments about the likelihood of developing conflicts.

***Guidelines.*** A society's carrying capacity is a useful concept, referring to the amount of change that can be accepted in an orderly way.[1] This capacity may be exceeded, for example, when weak states cannot withstand the pressure exerted by widened political participation. In this case the state is threatened by dissolution, rather than a peaceful transformation to a fully functioning democracy.

Determining carry capacity and societal breaking points is not an exact science, and requiring judgment to supplement analysis of objective trends. Nations proceed down several tracks toward different simultaneous desirable goals. Each track strives to fulfill a fundamental goal of national development — material prosperity through economic growth, a plural and participatory political system, an active and responsible civil society,[2] human rights, greater social equality, a sustainable natural environment, and effective, legitimate government institutions.

These goals gain compatibility as they are achieved. But none can be achieved swiftly without strain. Violent conflicts can arise when gross disparities appear in the progress made toward different goals, overtaxing the nation's capacity to adjust. For example, rapid economic growth may strain the ability of institutions such as family and local community to provide social support, leading to rapid urbanization and social dislocations. Opening politics to popular participation may outpace the economy's ability to meet new electorates' expectations for standard of living, causing rapid inflation, crime, and further economic deterioration.

The analyst's job is to track where societies stand on these various tracks. This can help refine realistic assessments of what can be achieved within given time periods so that a nation can be supported in ways that keep it proceeding toward its goals through an orderly process of change.

## Issue #3: Early Warning — When and where is violence or coercion likely to occur?

***The Problem.*** What are the specific signs of impending conflicts and crises to look for so that preventive responses and resources might be committed to heading them off?

Monitoring and information gathering must reach deeply into a country's social fabric and grassroots politics to identify possible sources of conflict. Lacking this, outside observers are taken by surprise when conflicts erupt. But as B.A. Kiplagat observes, "... those who look for telling signs and signals know that these crises could have been anticipated and predicted."[3]

Anticipating possible conflicts is not a matter of precisely predicting specific events and when they will happen — what the intelligence community calls "single-point" prediction. Claims of such precision are more suited to fortune-tellers; such exactitude is neither possible nor necessary. Rather, "early warning" is more a matter of determining the probability that certain events will lead to significant violence or other crises.

This requires obtaining reliable information about a range of possible common crises — border crises, disintegrating regimes, civil wars, human rights abuses, massive refugee flows — and where they are most likely to emerge. Relevant data has proliferated — in print and electronic media coverage, books and articles, government statistics, aggregate data-sets, socioeconomic and security research, and now through computer networks. But data are not enough: reliable assessments are required of their meaning concerning the likelihood of violent conflict.

A problem is that threats to security and national order emerge subtlely out of wide ranges of social, political, economic, and cultural international and national conditions and events, as diverse as price fluctuations, demonstrations, governments' policies, social movements, political infighting, leaders' attitudes, and arms flows. The job of anticipating future developments based on this inevitably equivocal information — "estimative intelligence" — is inherently difficult given the "messy" character of emerging post–Cold War conflicts. There may be ominous signs, but it is hard to estimate what levels of violence, crises, wars, or other problems may erupt, or when eruptions may occur. Available analyses often provide contradictory or at least inconsistent predictions, suggesting widely varying degrees of concern and types of response. Compared to the Cold War, this era, in Joseph Nye's words, holds fewer "secrets" but more "mysteries."[4]

In a world of transitions between economic and political systems, change, tension and political turmoil can be positive as well as negative. What factors explain the differences are only beginning to be grasped.

***Guidelines.*** Signs of instability and discontent are hard to decipher, especially in their early, diffuse stages. But this uncertainty makes it even more essential to develop objective, professional analysis.

Decisions will be sounder if based on informed and cogent analysis rather than public sentiment, the media, bureaucratic politics or international politics.

Having reliable early warnings by no means turns policy-making into an automatized, technocratic process that disregards judgment and political considerations. Signs of impending crises should be sought from news reports and expert observers as well as from social scientific analyses and other analytical tools. Systematic early warning is only a supplement to human judgment.

Attempts to develop reliable early warning systems have increased in the last few years. Universities and policy research organizations are developing and computerizing a growing number of systematic data-sets with quantitative and qualitative indicators of international events, socio economic and political phenomena, the sources of wars and the dynamics of conflict scenarios. Efforts are being made to install these data-sets on computer networks so they can be linked and blended. Modelling past instances of conflicts and crises is generating useful indicators that policy-makers and political officers in governments and multilateral organizations can use to check for possible trouble in their geographic and functional areas.

To illustrate the type of indicators that may be useful, below we list some of the warning signs analysts have posited as the antecedents of likely genocide.[5]

**TABLE 6-1: INDICATORS OF POSSIBLE GENOCIDE**

- **Proximate Factors**
  - Governing elites express exclusionary ideologies (beliefs that elevate some ethnic group or class to a position of superiority over other such groups).
  - Competition occurs among governing elites in a context in which the state security apparatus has few constraints.
  - A charismatic leadership emerges that attracts a mass following through abstract appeals to a group's destiny.
  - Severe economic hardship or differential treatment occurs for certain ethnic or other groups, so "scapegoats" are sought.
- **Triggering Factors**
  - A regime enacts new discriminatory or restrictive policies such as abuses of human rights.
  - Clashes occur between regime supporters and targeted groups.
  - External material or rhetorical support is provided for politically active groups.

## Issue #4: Conflict Needs and Responses — What should be done?

***The Problem of What is Needed.*** Once early warning signals problematic situations, how should the incipient crisis be handled? This decision must consider the situation's threats, constraints and opportunities as well as possible remedies.

***Guidelines.*** Conflict prevention may require efforts to reduce negative factors in the situation as well as to enhance positive conditions such as promoting human rights and social justice. Pre-violent situations usually have multiple dimensions to address.

The essence and purpose of preventive intervention is to keep political disputes from becoming violent or to manage incipient conflicts peacefully. Conflict prevention comes into play when major social or international change causes dispute that cannot be handled through the usual conflict regulation processes and institutions within national politics or international relations.

Each potential violent conflict has its own set of diplomatic, strategic, security, political, economic, and cultural-psychological elements which move it in toward or away from violence. The central question is: "What factors threaten to bring this unstable situation to crisis or violence?" Posing this question focuses the conflict preventer on the needs and tasks of the situation, and from there on to the functions or services that be needed.[6]

This question prompts examination of what local, national, or regional capacities, resources, and political will may be helping to keep the dispute from intensifying: indigenous institutions, political organizations, cultural practices, moderate leaders, and so on. One cannot presume that third parties should or can do everything that needs to be done. This needs assessment alerts preventive diplomacy to the leverage points and indigenous resources that might be used, and thus what third parties do *not* need to supply.

There are limits to what causes violence. Disputes become violent if on one or more of the following six deficiencies is present:

| TABLE 6-2: CHECKLIST OF CONFLICT NEEDS |
|---|
| **1. Lack of restraints on violence**<br>There are few limitations on parties' ability to resort to armed force to achieve their demands. |
| **2. Lack of a process**<br>There are no procedures or institutions exist through which the dispute can be discussed and solutions sought. |
| **3. Lack of resources**<br>The parties may have no immediate desire or means to use violence, but they simply don't have the material wherewithal to get engaged in any effort to keep the dispute from worsening. |
| **4. Lack of solutions**<br>The parties are at the table and seem willing, but lack proposals for settling the issue. |
| **5. Lack of incentives**<br>Solutions abound, but the parties lack sufficient motivation to accept any of them. |
| **6. Lack of trust**<br>The perceptions and attitudes of the parties toward each other are so negative that they can't get beyond their feelings to consider particular solutions or comply with them. |

This checklist generates corresponding tasks such as:

- Suppressing/containing imminent violence and protecting the physical security of parties in conflict.
- Establishing/strengthening regular processes and institutions of dispute resolution (politics and governance).
- Alleviating immediate, egregious human needs that tempt violence.
- Addressing the issues in dispute. This entails in turn:
    - "Getting to the table" — engaging disputants in a political process or communication for resolving the issues in dispute.

- "Getting to yes" — achieving agreements through negotiations and incentives.
- Implementing, guaranteeing, and enforcing agreements, monitoring compliance.
- Addressing the more fundamental sources of disputes.

- Gaining the support of, or at least neutralizing, nearby or powerful third parties, on whose support or tolerance of a peaceful process of dispute management successful prevention will depend.
- Gathering and disseminating accurate information on the situation — tracking the status of disputes, from early warning through monitoring of agreement implementation.
- Providing mutual assurance, dispelling distrust and suspicion, building relationships and trust among the disputants and their constituencies, and reconciliation.

Specific disputes will vary in how many of these different needs are evident and thereby in what needs to be done to meet them. Comparing the case-studies, for instance, it seems clear that the Hungary/Slovakia dispute was typified mainly by factors 4, 5, and 6, but not 1, 2, or 3. In Macedonia, 2, 3, 5, and 6 were evident. In Rwanda in 1993-94 and in Burundi in 1994-95, all six needs have been present.

This needs assessment procedure is useful to alert potential interveners to the full range of needs to be addressed so that important factors are not overlooked and mismatches of solutions with conflict problems are avoided. For example, Yugoslavia in 1991 saw verbal debates among the republics' leaders over the federation's future. Less obviously, militias were arming within the republics, and state institutions were being actively sabotaged. At this point, the international community attempted to intervene by calling the Conference on the Future of Yugoslavia (CFY) in which various specific constitutional *outcomes* were presented as options. While the CFY thus offered a forum and some ideas for solutions, it did not provide sufficient incentives through persuasive punishments or rewards to the parties to pursue peaceful resolution of their differences.

Policy-makers and practitioners must proceed inductively, working "from the ground up" to develop tailored intervention strategies rather than invoking familiar remedies simply because they are convenient or available. Only after diagnosing the needs of the local situation, identifying corresponding tasks, and assessing indigenous capabilities, can tools be chosen which best fit the tasks.

***The Problem of Devising Responses.*** This section examines the central question of which means, or tools of intervention, are likely to be most appropriate for addressing a conflict situation.

Surprisingly, this question is not often addressed explicitly. A good deal of conflict-related governmental decision-making and policy analysis is done reflexively rather than reflectively. It occurs within bureau-level agencies or non-governmental organizations whose jurisdiction and job is to implement one or two particular intervention tools — arms control, peacekeeping, diplomacy, track-two problem-solving, economic assistance, election monitoring, and so on — governed by the institution's experience with that tool. Under pressure to do something, the question of whether their particular intervention is appropriate to a specific context may never get raised, and little careful assessment is given to other possible responses.

This can cause policy errors. Policies that have been successful in one locale or conflict are by no means guaranteed to work in another. From late 1993 to early 1994, for example, the UN/OAU observation force in Rwanda was touted as a success of preventive diplomacy, perhaps because a similar force put in Macedonia a year earlier appeared to be effective. But in April, one of Africa's most savage inter-ethnic massacres was perpetrated which the small observation force could not control. A question worth further inquiry is whether the mere fact that someone was doing something in that locale displaced other international efforts that might have been more effective.

Locating intervention decisions in particular functional bureaus can lead to short-sighted decisions not to act in a prudently preventive way. Posing the question in the context of a particular intervention subjects the answer to the outlook and bureaucratic culture of the organization that deploys that method. For example, the possibility of intervening in Somalia was raised in 1991, after the civil war had started but before the massive famine. Because the issue was brought up within the Defense Department, the assumption was that "intervention" meant US peacekeeping troops. Because peacekeeping at the time was seen as particularly dangerous, something done more by the UN and warranted only in strategically vital areas, the idea was rejected. Limiting the debate in this way precluded consideration of many other alternatives.

***Guidelines.*** An approach is required which generates a broad range of preventive intervention options. Responses should not be deduced automatically from past experience or preferences; what has worked in one place may not work in another, and a third party's preference for one or another policy instrument should not itself dictate the type of preventive action undertaken.

Having first pinpointed what the most important tasks of preventive actions, the next step is to identify which tools best match a given conflict's condition.[7] How tools might be matched to tasks is illustrated below.

## TABLE 6-3: TASKS AND TOOLS TO FULFILL CONFLICT NEEDS

### 1. Lack of restraints on violence

*Task:* Suppress or contain violence or threats of violence. Deprive parties of arms. Provide protection against their use.

*Tools:* Preventive peacekeeping force, targeted deterrence, enforceable demilitarized zones, safe havens, emergency measures, protectorates, war crimes tribunals, military assistance, etc.

### 2. Lack of a process

*Tasks:* Engage the parties in communication and dialogue. Create channels and processes for discussion or negotiation. Set up or strengthen permanent political institutions through which such negotiations can be regularized such as legislatures and executive bodies,

*Tools:* Good offices, mediation, peace conferences, arbitration, adjudication, institution-building, problem-solving workshops, democracy-building, trusteeship.

### 3. Lack of resources

*Task:* Provide elemental needs, alleviate extreme social and economic conditions that provide the occasion for incitements to armed force

*Tools:* Humanitarian relief, technical assistance, economic assistance.

### 4. Lack of solutions

*Task:* Address particular disputes. Generate a range of possible settlements

*Tools:* Brainstorming, menus of alternative options for governance from other similar places.

### 5. Lack of incentives

*Task:* Induce parties to adopt solutions.

*Tools:* Positive inducements such as security guarantees, and aid.

Negative inducements such as coercive diplomacy (sanctions, threats of force), exclusions from international organizations, deprivation of aid, etc.

### 6. Lack of trust

*Task:* Provide mutual assurance. Change attitudes and perceptions. Reduce tensions when they arise.

*Tools:* Non-official dialogues, educational and informational efforts, media programs.



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The needs assessment helps to pin down the types and magnitude of preventive actions required. Managing or preventing a conflict is likely to take a variety of tools, contributed by a range of actors and using positive and negative pressures. Effectiveness lies in finding the right mix of tools to discourage parties from resorting to armed force or coercion. Needs assessment helps to set priorities among different tasks and corresponding methods of intervention.

***Calibrating Inducements.*** Preventive intervention must modulate the amounts and types of instruments deployed to the scale of the conflict and the incentives and capacities of the conflicting parties. What are the rules of thumb for matching tools to circumstances?

One rule of preventive engagement arises from the extent to which violence or coercion threatens a particular situation immediately or more remotely. The greater the use of, or inclination to use, armed force by the parties to the dispute, the more force needs to be brought into play by those who would steer it toward peaceful resolution.

In some situations, violence may be imminent. In these circumstances, preventive diplomacy has no choice but to urgently do whatever is necessary to deter the threatened hostility — through specific deterrence provided by a powerful state, economic sanctions against a state, or preventive peacekeeping. These forms of deterrence may be what is most important at the present moment in Burundi, for example.

In other places and moments, an outbreak of violence may be possible but not imminent. In this case, preventive strategists have time to look after other needs of the situation. For example, they can reduce, restrain or regulate the weapons that might be used in the future through disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation enforced by international agreements. In an inter-state context, this may mean security guarantees provided by a defense alliance. Sufficient breathing space may also permit preventive diplomacy to set about strengthening local, national or international political institutions and procedures such as power-sharing arrangements, special commissions, legislatures, and multilateral forums, where they exist in some form.

Where existing institutions normally used for resolving political disputes exist but are weak, preventive interventions should concentrate on strengthening these institutions and should avoid policies that may destroy them.

In view of the damaging side-effects that blunt coercive tools such as sanctions can have, prevention strategies must take care to target penalties and benefits as closely as possible on particular parties within societies rather than apply blanket measures which fail to discriminate between primary and peripheral actors in a conflict. Where they do not exist, preventive interventions should concentrate on creating these institutions, so future disputes might be channeled into these peaceful mechanisms of resolution.

Where such institutions exist but are not functioning well, preventive diplomacy might concentrate on addressing misunderstandings and distrust among disputing parties through non-official dialogues conducted outside the limelight by non-governmental organizations doing what is called "track-two" diplomacy. To resolve specific grievances at issue among established and politically secure governments, appropriate resorts might include formal arbitration and other judicial or quasi-judicial procedures of multilateral commissions or the International Court of Justice, or the less formal good offices, mediation, and negotiations offered by a third party government, the UN, regional organizations, or a prominent individual. Where egregious inequities and resource shortages tempt violence, preventive diplomacy

should urgently act to provide economic assistance targeted to especially vulnerable countries or regions within them.

## Issue #5: Tool Implementers — Which actors are most appropriate for which roles?

***The Problem.*** Conflict prevention is ordinarily a multilateral, governmental and non-governmental enterprise. A single party rarely can meet all of the disparate needs that caused the conflict. Furthermore, a third party that meets some needs — such as providing skills to one side to participate in negotiations — may disqualify itself from playing other roles, such as convening the negotiations. NGOs who seek to provide relief to conflict-affected areas and thus need access may not easily act at the same time as conflict "early warners" to the outside world.

All actors bring strengths as well as weaknesses. These assets and liabilities must be considered in assessing tools and their utility to the problems at hand. Some actors simply do not have the resources to perform certain tasks, such as providing guarantees in support of a negotiated agreement. Others differ in their perceived legitimacy in the eyes of the parties to the conflict. Some inevitably carry with them political or historical "baggage" that may discredit them.

***Guidelines.*** Rather than assuming that one organization or type of organization should undertake all preventive or conflict management activities within nations or a region, the international community needs to look more explicitly at appropriate divisions of labor and complementarities. It is useful in analyzing a country or region to inventory active organizations and assess what they can and cannot bring to conflict prevention. African analysts have suggested the usefulness of compiling such inventories of African and other organizations that might be able to assist in conflict prevention and resolution.[8]

To illustrate such an inventory on a more general plane, below we review major advantages and disadvantages of the following actors in conflict prevention:

- The UN
- Regional organizations
- Non-governmental organizations
- Individual third party states

***The United Nations.*** The UN is the single organized body that includes virtually all the countries of the world and already carries out a variety of functions in conflict management and peacekeeping, chiefly through the activities of the Security Council and Secretary-General. The UN has a number of other assets to build on for conflict prevention. The UN can:

- Use the resources of its worldwide organizational network, and thus call upon the services of a wide variety of ancillary UN programs (humanitarian, human rights, arms control, development, and so forth) and specialists.

- Use the option of bringing an issue or conflict to the world stage if necessary, through the Security Council or Secretary-General (Articles 35 and 39 of the UN Charter), and can focus the moral pressure of the international community on the parties in dispute.

- Bring parties together through the good offices of the Secretary-General.

- Draw on many years of diplomatic experience gained by a wide variety of professional diplomats from member countries and its staff.

- Gain the attention and rally the political power and resources of major powers behind formidable preventive measures, if necessary, such as economic sanctions or aggregations of national military forces for preventive peacekeeping.

Early warnings and preventive actions coming through the United Nations have some drawbacks:

- Both the Secretary-General (and his staff) and the Security Council are already under serious strain because of their overloaded agenda and limited resources.

- With many issues and actors competing for the organization's attention, they tend to focus chiefly on major world problems that have already reached a crisis.

- Earlier, Secretary-Generals used good offices to mediate disputes and assigned UN special envoys and regional monitors to these tasks. But the great demands placed on the Secretariat have generally overtaxed the abilities of these envoys to mediate effectively in all the regions where they could be used, much less be deployed to a large number of pre-violent, potential trouble spots.

- Because major security measures require the approval of the Security Council, the United Nations' ability to act is constrained by the ever-present possibility of a veto from one or more of the permanent members.

- Actions such as sending in an observer mission that would involve the approval of the General Assembly are similarly constrained by the need to obtain support from a large number of countries.

- Although the Charter permits the UN to act in regard to any potential threat or breach of the peace, whether intrastate or interstate, the United Nations deals mainly with disputes among states and governments and has difficulty addressing claims and conflicts involving nonofficial groups, such as grass-roots political movements and opposition parties.

- By raising a conflict to world visibility, the United Nations might raise the stakes of a dispute by internationalizing it. This can create incentives for the parties to become more combative, not less, and encourage other parties to take sides. Thus, the UN may inadvertently widen a conflict.

- States may also be reluctant to bring their disputes to the Security Council or the Secretary-General because of the visibility and exposure this brings. In addition, the policy tools with which

the United Nations is likely to respond, such as sanctions, are highly coercive and inflexible by nature, thus handing over to many other nations a great deal of control over the parties.

- It often may be politically unpalatable for the UN Secretariat to be in a position of looking as if it was poking directly into national and regional affairs.

- Although in the process of trying to achieve managerial reform, the United Nations still suffers from major organizational inefficiencies and a poor image, rightly or wrongly, in the eyes of many politicians and observers in various countries whose support is essential. Asking for even more resources at this time seems politically infeasible.

***Regional Organizations.*** Some would like to transform existing regional organizations such as the OAU and OAS into major centers of early detection and preventive response within their respective regions. Mechanisms for conflict prevention and management have already been created in the OSCE, OAS, and OAU, and are being developed by subregional organizations such as ECCAS and IGADD. Ad hoc initiatives focussing on particular disputes have been undertaken by ASEAN and other regional organizations.

Regional organizations do have advantages:

- Their geographical proximity to developing conflicts may make them more likely to learn of disputes before they have reached crisis levels and more likely to respond before they adversely affect the interests of the organizations' member states.

- With fewer actors needing to form a consensus in favor of action, and fewer items competing for attention on their agendas, regional organizations may be able to respond more quickly to a problem situation than, for example, the United Nations.

- Regional organizations might bring to bear on the parties to a conflict the "peer pressure" of their fellow regional states. They can evoke the region's pride in handling its own affairs, rather than having to turn to other bodies.

- The preventive methods they use and norms they espouse may be based on regional cultures, customs and practices and be more acceptable to the parties than methods and norms imposed by outside forces.

- Regional organizations can provide a legitimizing vehicle through which major outside powers can become effectively supportive of settling a dispute, either individually or jointly.

But regional organizations have significant shortcomings:

- In regions such as the Middle East, they have historically been weak and ineffective, and thus ill-placed to assume major conflict prevention responsibilities.

- Even where regional organizations are relatively strong, they rarely possess the financial, logistical, and manpower resources necessary for continuous preventive action.

- Regional organizations have comparatively little professional experience in conflict prevention and resolution.

- Because of rules often requiring unanimous consent and the lack of bodies similar to the UN Security Council, regional organizations cannot easily mobilize joint military forces for peace enforcement, sanctions, or other coercive actions.

- The frequent requirement to cater to the preferences of major regional powers makes it difficult for regional organizations to mobilize political support for joint action.

- Regional organizations often find themselves constrained by their member states' fierce determination to maintain their individual sovereign national prerogatives.

- Regional organizations may not be impartial in a given conflict, because they often reflect in their own politics the very disputes and clashes of interests that the organizations are supposed to settle.

***NGOs.*** The distinct advantages in conflict management that NGOs enjoy over both multilateral and single-state governmental entities are increasingly being recognized. Here, we refer primarily to NGOs active in humanitarian affairs, conflict resolution and democracy-building projects.

NGO advantages include:

- Extensive grass-roots contacts and intimate knowledge of a country or area, which fosters a keen awareness of the trajectories of local disputes and the chances of violence erupting.

- The ability to at least engage parties to a conflict, including opposition or "rebel" groups, in informal, low-key, non-threatening dialogue, where they can discuss their disputes free from pressure to commit themselves to binding agreements or to play to their respective constituencies.

- The ability to forge a variety of links directly between professional and commercial bodies and other NGOs that bypass governments and cut across national boundaries.

- A wealth of professional, specialized, often highly-motivated personnel, not very costly and sometimes in volunteer capacities, who are able to tackle labor-intensive tasks.

At the same time, however, NGOs:

- Are usually short of resources, financially dependent on their donors, and may not have the staying power in a conflict area that official entities would.

- Cannot build up the high-cost communications and logistical capabilities that states and large multilateral organizations can provide.

- Do not carry the financial and military "clout" of either the United Nations or individual powerful states. Thus, they cannot provide guarantees or inducements that will prompt the parties of a dispute to come to an agreement, or ensure local and regional security by means of strong economic or military instruments.

***Individual States.*** The limitations of both the United Nations and regional organizations have led some observers to point out certain advantages that individual states, especially major or medium-sized powers, have over multilateral organizations in conflict management and thus in preventive diplomacy. For example, a state:

- May have a more or less direct interest in the stability of another state, and thus be strongly motivated to prevent disputes there from escalating beyond control.
- Can respond more quickly than a multilateral organization to an international problem because the state does not have to go through the cumbersome process of gaining an international consensus for action.
- Especially if powerful, is likely to have formidable diplomatic resources, military forces, and technical resources already in place and at its command.

But states too have their shortcomings. A single government:

- Is unlikely to act to prevent a particular dispute from worsening, unless it has a special strategic, economic, or other interest in the dispute or situation.
- May be unable to act until it has secured public and/or political support, especially in cases where a nation's military forces will be involved.
- Will often approach a conflict in a way that favors its particular national interests, which is not necessarily in the broader interests of the international community.
- May be unwelcome in a particular region, for various historical reasons, and thus may lack the moral legitimacy necessary to gain the respect and cooperation of the parties to a conflict or other third parties.

## Issue #6: Entry and Disengagement — When should preventive measures occur and when should they end?

Three key questions arise about the timing of prevention interventions:

- When should third party preventive diplomats arrive on the scene? Are there moments "ripe for prevention"?
- What sequence of intervention measures is advisable?
- How can preventive interventions disengage?

***The Problem of Third Party Entry.*** The widely-cited idea that conflicts must be "ripe for resolution" deals with mediations into advanced armed struggles,[9] but some suggest it might also apply to preventing conflicts. And interventions that must wait for a war to wage are not conflict prevention as this document defines it.[10]

But those who would head off potential violent conflicts may still need to choose their moment as carefully as those who seek to end and resolve actual violent conflicts. An analogous notion of "ripeness" may apply to early stages of conflicts before they become violent. This "ripeness for prevention" would not mean waiting out prolonged bloodletting, however, but instead, action that is neither "too little, too late," nor "too much, too soon."

The cases of failed prevention in Croatia, Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti suggests that prevention that is "too little, too late" brings insufficient incentives and/or disincentives to bear before the point in a conflict when either party has mobilized a significant political constituency behind a position, or has achieved initial gains by force or coercion. Preventive intervention must bring to bear on the parties whatever is sufficient to outweigh the gains they might make by taking up coercion or arms instead.

How could preventers act "too much, too soon"? Can prevention be *too* early? As we saw earlier, latent conflicts need certain ingredients before violence between parties can occur:

- Discrete parties conscious of their interests.
- The perception that these interests are incompatible with those of other parties.
- Disputes over the clash of interests involving assertive or hostile statements and activity.

Intercession before these conditions exist may fail because no audience is found that feels a grievance enough to do anything to address it. Preventive intervention too early could create awareness of an interest conflict before parties affected by it see it themselves. This adds more disputes to the agenda that may not be genuine grievances.

Where disputes have already surfaced, there is a danger the third party can contribute to its escalation by prematurely "stirring up the pot." The parties might use the heightened attention to the dispute as a platform for rabble-rousing and provoking counter efforts, thus intensifying the conflict. Media attention to the dispute can create incentives for the disputing parties to "grandstand" before a wider audience in hopes of securing greater attention and support. Internationalizing a conflict, for example, might lead other nations and groups to join the cause. The preventer might also provoke swift pre-emptive countermeasures by more powerful parties who have become the objects of the controversy.

***Guidelines.*** Preventive diplomacy needs to be sensitive to the status of a conflict and to the effect of its own intervention on possible escalation. Precisely how to do that is a key challenge.

- Early warning systems need to follow emerging developments in specific locales with a great deal of sensitivity to the most opportune moments for preventive action. A highly nuanced picture of the situation can be gained by supplementing quantitative and qualitative data with news reports and detailed consultations with knowledgeable observers closer to, or at the site of, a dispute.

  Before undertaking a local mission, for example, the OSCE High Commissioner of National Minorities takes pains to read all the reports on the area his office receives as well as the local press, talks personally with known experts, and consults with local diplomats.

- Preventive action is best launched at points early enough that there is sufficient interest and motivation on the part of the disputants to seek a peaceful resolution, yet not so early that the disputants are incited to become even more confrontational than they otherwise would be, thus complicating the task. Acting on merely hypothetical presumptions or speculative fears of a future conflict might stimulate a party to promote its cause more forcefully and prompt a corresponding reaction.[11]

  This sort of timing was suggested to the CSCE HCNM when he sought advice in October, 1992 regarding how to help resolve the dispute in Estonia between Russian speakers and the Estonian government over proposed language laws. The HCNM was advised to pick only disputes that were "real," in the sense that more than mere fears of possible discrimination were evident.[12] He was also advised to intervene when the Parliament was debating the draft language laws, but before a law had been passed and any policies of perceived discrimination were implemented.

- This dilemma can also be alleviated by early action in a low-key and quiet mode, thus avoiding the attention of the media or some large audience and precluding the opportunity to take advantage of it.

Thus, priority might be given to disputes at their incipience and action should be taken at moments when third parties can pre-empt specific moves before one or other party can establish a decisive gain that might be hard to reverse.

***The Problem of Sequencing Interventions.*** Conflict preventers need to select appropriate intervention tools based on needs present in a particular conflict situation, depending on which of these needs are most pressing. Methods used in the conflict might have to be modified over time, depending on how the conflict situation itself changes. Some tools might remain operating throughout the stages of a conflict, but their mode of operation has to be altered to adapt to changing circumstances.

Peacekeeping missions are a tool, for example, that has typically been used at post-violence stages of conflict (under Chapter VI of the UN Charter), and also can be used during violent conflict (such as under Chapter VII). In addition, peacekeepers can be used preventively at pre-violent stages of conflict, such is the case now of the UN in Macedonia. Under each of these circumstances, the tool can to be refitted to be appropriate to the situation. In the peace-keeping example, the presence of certain types of weapons is simply more appropriate in an armed combat situation.

However, other tools being applied may need to be completely discarded and replaced because they are no longer relevant to the evolving conflict conditions. For example, problem-solving workshops may be more useful either at pre-violent stages of disputes, or after the parties to a conflict have fought without success and may be searching for alternatives. Problem-solving workshops may be much less effective during the heyday of the fighting.

The profiles in the "toolbox" of this document show that many tools work better at some stages of conflict than at others.

***Guidelines.***

- The application of tools in particular countries and regions should stay flexible and responsive to changing tactical, political, military and other developments. Effective preventive strategies should build in contingent options by which intervention tools will be modified relative to changes in the status of a dispute. Among other things, this means early warning systems directed at troubled areas must continue to operate beyond the initial alarm to help set and modify short, medium, and long-term goals.

- Although there are many dimensions of conflict that can define its current needs, the dimension that seems especially useful for deciding appropriate intervention is the intensity of the violence or coercion on the ground. Much else of what happens, and what one does about it, stems from this variable.

  In short, which tools are most appropriate depends heavily, though not entirely, on the changing relationship of the parties in the conflict — the quality of their peace or the level of their hostility.

  ***A Sequence of Graduated Contingent Responses.*** Overall, the most effective preventive strategies might involve a sequence of preventive responses and tools — ready at hand and in place, but introduced contingent on the level of intensity of a conflict. Such strategies would first use non-coercive and conciliatory policies, and move to more coercive approaches only if necessary.

  To illustrate such a contingent strategy, Table 6-4 shows the various states of peace or conflict linked to different types of intervention. The table indicates the corresponding time-frames of the actors involved, their objectives, and examples of appropriate policy tools.

**TABLE 6-4: TYPES OF CONFLICT INTERVENTION, CORRESPONDING LEVELS OF CONFLICT, TIME FRAMES, OBJECTIVES AND ILLUSTRATIVE POLICY TOOLS**

| Type of Intervention | State of Peace or Conflict | Action Time Frame | Primary Objective of Action | Illustrative Instruments and Agents |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crisis and War Diplomacy | ***Crisis to War:***<br>Intensity of conflict high.<br>Violence actual or imminent.<br>(Cuban Missile Crisis; Bosnia War) | Short-term to immediate | ■ Contain crises<br>■ Stop violent or coercive behavior<br>■ End wars<br>■ Enforce ceasefires | ■ "Hot lines," mediation, peace negotiations (UN role in Iran/Iraq war).<br>■ Title VII peace operations, military actions, economic sanctions, relief assistance (UNPROFOR).<br>■ Security Council resolutions of condemnation. |
| Preventive Diplomacy | ***Unstable Peace:***<br>Intensity of conflict moderate.<br>Violence possible to probable.<br>(Macedonia; US-Iran relations) | Short-term to medium-term | Carry out policies and create processes to:<br>■ Reduce tensions<br>■ Resolve disputes<br>■ Defuse conflicts<br>■ Head off crises | ■ OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities.<br>■ "Track Two" problem-solving dialogues.<br>■ Arms control agreements; confidence-building measures.<br>■ Military-to-military programs.<br>■ Middle East multilateral peace process; non-violent campaigns.<br>■ Arbitration by International Court of Justice; election monitoring.<br>■ Human rights standards-setting; political conditionality in aid. |
| Regular Diplomacy | ***Stable Peace to Durable Peace:***<br>Intensity of conflict low.<br>Chances of violence low to remote.<br>(US-China relations) | Long-term | ■ Conduct normal negotiations and ongoing affairs of state.<br>■ Maintain and strengthen stable relations and institutions.<br>■ Improve national and global welfare. | ■ G-7 summits.<br>■ NATO Partnership for Peace; EU stability pact.<br>■ Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.<br>■ Development assistance; NAFTA; economic reforms; 1992 Rio agreements.<br>■ Rule of law programs; Quadripartite (Berlin) Agreement.<br>■ International Court of Justice establishment.<br>■ UN charter principles. |

The distinction between conflict prevention and other phases of conflict intervention also allow a closer look at conflict prevention itself. Conflict prevention embraces a range of concrete activities and thus has several subtypes. Thus, Table 6-5 identifies three subtypes of conflict prevention:

- Crisis prevention
- Preemptive initiatives.
- Pre-conflict (or post-conflict) peace-building.

These variants depend principally on the particular needs of a pre-conflict situation, and especially, on the extent to which violence is imminent. In other words, these variants depend on whether the situation is in a state of near-crisis, low-level conflict, or significant political instability.

**TABLE 6-5: SUB-TYPES OF CONFLICT PREVENTION**

| Characteristic | Crisis Prevention | Pre-Emptive Initiatives | Pre-Conflict Peacebuilding |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Primary Objectives** | ■ Block violent acts.<br>■ Reduce tensions. | ■ Address specific disputes.<br>■ Channel grievances into negotiations.<br>■ Engage parties. | ■ Create channels for dispute resolution.<br>■ Build political institutions.<br>■ Define norms.<br>■ Change attitudes.<br>■ Reduce sources of conflict. |
| **Techniques** | ■ Economic sanctions.<br>■ Coercive diplomacy.<br>■ Deterrence. | ■ Special envoys.<br>■ Mediation.<br>■ Arbitration. | ■ Problem-solving workshops.<br>■ Arms control regimes.<br>■ Confidence-building measures/conflict resolution training.<br>■ Human rights standards.<br>■ Collective security. |
| **Examples** | ■ North Korea negotiations.<br>■ Macedonia peacekeeping. | ■ OSCE HCNM.<br>■ Observers. | ■ NGO Balkans Peace project.<br>■ Democracy-building Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.<br>■ OSCE standards. |
| **Intensity of Conflict and Time Frame** | ■ *Near crisis.*<br>■ Low-level violent acts.<br>■ Taking up of arms.<br>■ Threats.<br>■ Violence probable. | ■ *Low-level conflict* over particular issues.<br>■ Tensions.<br>■ Polarization.<br>■ Violence possible. | ■ *Unstable peace.*<br>■ Diffuse political instability.<br>■ Uncertainty.<br>■ Distrust.<br>■ Anomie.<br>■ Violence possible. |

- Because of the need to modulate the application of various preventive methods and modify their relative importance over time, preventive efforts may generally benefit from having a "prime mover" that orchestrates the design and implementation of a multi-faceted preventive strategy. The prime mover can be a single individual — such as an enterprising diplomat; a particular government, or a multicountry group, team, or task force.

  When several multilateral organizations operate simultaneously in one area, their separate functional tasks will not necessarily work easily in tandem. The challenge is to cut across the boundaries that divide governments, agencies, and other organizations with different functional mandates and loyalties, in order to focus on common goals so that coherent, effective, and coordinated responses are carried out.

- The need to combine and modulate various methods of intervention for specific local preventive strategies obviously has major implications for how and where policy-making and program planning is done in the bureaucratic hierarchies of the US government, the UN and other international bodies. The need to match particular preventive tools to particular levels of conflict suggests that third parties adept at using one or other tool should play greater or lesser roles according to the level that a given conflict has reached.

  The whole range of policy tools — economic, diplomatic, military, and so on — have to be viewed as the parts of a unified apparatus by which potential conflicts are anticipated and addressed. Thus, programs in the US government, for example, that are mandated to serve various discrete established purposes such as foreign economic aid, democracy-building, or national defense, have to be evaluated in terms of their effect on reducing or exacerbating the chances of violent conflict where they operate.

  Efforts to assess programs in the US government devoted to such interrelated but potentially conflicting goals have barely begun; initial steps have been taken to count the programs and budget allocations[13]. But much more thorough cross-budget analysis and evaluation of the impact of programs on the avoidance or intensification of conflict is needed to develop an effective, coherent preventive diplomacy strategy within the context of US planning and budgeting for national security.

  The alternative will be the wide dispersal and consumption of program resources driven by agency budgetary ambitions, particular preferences of Congress, the tendency of particular functional perspectives to become ends in themselves, sudden crises, and left-over assumptions from the Cold War about the nature of the post-Cold War era.

- More in-depth and rigorous empirical research using policy-relevant variables is needed to assess the advantages and disadvantages of policies and instruments that might be applied to different types and stages of conflict and different forms of political repression or instability. The "toolbox" is a useful start in this direction, but it faced the limitations of the existing literature.

  The effectiveness of interventions such as sanctions, war crimes tribunals, preventive peacekeeping, or the use of force varies considerably from case to case.

Thus, such research could examine cases of comparative success and failure in the use of alternative strategies in different contexts, identifying those factors and conditions that are conducive to avoidance of escalation. This evaluation of different preventive responses should then be fed back into early warning models.

***The Problem of Disengagement.*** Once a third party has chosen to involve itself in a potential diplomacy effort, the following questions are sure to arise:

- How can the party limit its commitment so as to ensure that it can withdraw?
- Should the effort be terminated? How? When?

In Zaire, for example, if a major US diplomatic effort were effective in facilitating democratic transition, where and how would this effort come to an end? Even if Mobutu were removed, there would remain the problems of setting up a new government, monitoring elections, providing economic aid, and so on. The successful negotiations to dismantle Ukraine's nuclear weapons, to provide another example, involved US and British security guarantees for Ukraine's present borders. But it is unclear how these guarantees would be redeemed in the event that pro-Russian secessionist sentiment and ethnic strife rise in the Crimea and eastern Ukraine, precipitating a backlash in the rest of the country and increasing Russian-Ukrainian tensions. Ensuring progress toward dismantling Ukraine's nuclear weapons requires further US attention to problems that go to the heart of Ukraine's continued viability as a stable state.

Understandably, the experience of past and recent US quagmires from Vietnam to Somalia has engendered a strong aversion to future military involvements. The results of the eventual intervention in Somalia stimulated the creation of Presidential Decision Directive-25 (PDD-25), which spells out the criteria that have to be met before the United States will commit resources to UN peacekeeping forces. US reluctance to become entangled in further operations is also accentuated by the fact that the United States has funded around 30 percent of the bill for the current 17 UN peacekeeping missions worldwide.

***Guidelines.***

- Preventive diplomacy has as its goal the avoidance of extreme intervention through selective and modest early engagement. In anticipation of future crises in especially vulnerable areas, preventive diplomacy seeks to shore up the local, national, and regional mechanisms able to handle dispute resolution on their own, not to replace them. Where indigenous institutions and processes are in danger of breaking down but still exist, such as in Estonia and Hungary, the risks of becoming inextricably involved are relatively small.

  Those risks increase significantly, however, where third parties are required to restore law and order, create political institutions, foster social reconciliation, and assist in economic reconstruction. The difficulties of disengaging become particularly great in instances when third parties have intervened through military force. But preventive diplomacy, of course, looks to intervene before violence has destroyed the institutional fabric of a country.

- To avoid encouraging even higher levels of conflict as a result of the third party's preventive effort itself, thought needs to be given to which levels of government and what kinds of governmental or nongovernmental actors are most appropriate to the scale and nature of the

conflict. Involvement by high-level officials (such as the US Secretary of State) and bodies (such as the UN Security Council) may be counterproductive in suppressing low-level conflicts because of its effect in raising the stakes and increasing incentives to "grandstand."

- Limits in the form of "sunset" provisions should be put on the potential responsibility and financial costs that a third party (whether the United States, the United Nations, or some other entity) could incur in a preventive effort. In implementing a specific prevention effort, its sponsors should specify in as much detail as possible the mutual obligations of local, regional, and other parties and arrange strict, quid-pro-quo contractual agreements with the parties in a dispute. Awareness of what preventive diplomacy does and does not seek to accomplish might also be enhanced by developing a set of criteria for direct US involvement in preventive diplomacy initiatives — as a counterpart of the criteria laid out in PDD-25 for peacekeeping, but with quite different criteria than found in that document.

- Further analysis of those cases where third parties have intervened and successfully disengaged without conflict recurring would be extremely instructive both for those people wary of taking preventive actions and for those responsible for its planning and conduct.

## Issue #7: Mid-Conflict Activity — How to avoid worsening the situation?

Where conflicts have not been prevented, how can humanitarian aid be administered so as to avoid worsening the conflict?

***Conflict Prevention Checklist.***[14] All of the tools in the conflict prevention toolbox hold the potential to fuel and dramatically influence the dynamics of conflict. It is possible to construct a conceptual framework or checklist for preventing conflict's escalation in the context of carrying out any particular tool.

**TABLE 6-6: CONFLICT PREVENTION CHECKLIST**

- **Deepen analysis in planning and diversity information sources**:
  - Ask questions about how the intervention impacts economic and military strategies and balance.
  - Take account of the risk that unequal interventions will intensify tensions.
  - Properly plan of timing of interventions.
  - Build extensive guidelines and requirements for planning into RFPs (Requests for Proposals), thus motivating agencies to develop better planning processes, especially in their interpretation of how their programs might influence the course of the conflict.
  - Have at least minimal contingency plans in place; advanced planning plays a central role in crisis prevention.
  - Plan for relevant community participation as a major determinant in building internal accountability; the chain of inconsistent accountability begins with poor planning, and war economies are reinforced as a result.
  - Provide appropriate personnel and educate them on local context; this helps reduce mistakes which fuel conflict.

- **Do proper and independent assessments of needs**:
  - Assess humanitarian needs; improper assessments leading to inflated population figures or a misunderstanding of the local food economy.
  - Diversify when and to whom agencies talk during assessments: strive to meet minority groups, women, and demand independence to the maximum extent possible, perhaps to the point of conditioning a response on the degree of independence of assessment.
  - Do adequate training for participants in assessment techniques.
  - Ask not just what a community needs, but what it is already doing and build on that.

- **Be astute and flexible in the types of aid provided:**
  - Create a framework for a response to a local community's emergency of protecting livelihoods and preventing further degeneration of a community's capacity to adapt to chronic crisis and manage its own response to these crisis cycles.
  - Correct inputs and policy responses in response to assessment and analysis performed.
  - Remain flexible in responding to fast-changing conflict contexts; functional divisions between relief and development aid are senseless and should be tossed out, as they hinder local and international actors from responding appropriately.
  - Guide external responses by what already works at the local level, what structures are already in place and supported and by the indigenous social welfare mechanisms and kinship exchange dynamics.

- **Study impacts of targeting and distribution methods**:
  - Attempt to understand patterns of political and social marginalization in order to develop appropriate targeting and distribution methods; there is usually great differentiation in suffering along class and identity lines, navigating along these fault lines is critical in minimizing the strengthening of warring parties.
  - Involve women in the program planning process at the local level to the maximum extent possible.
  - When appropriate, cultivate and support alternative structures to armed factions through distribution mechanisms and implementing partnerships, including women's groups, professional associations, technical committees (water, health, food), and traditional leaders.

- **Standardize costs and minimize hyper-inflation and extortion**:
  - Control the costs of program operations which might reinforce military authorities or war economies; this is critical in reducing aid's contribution to conflict.
  - Establish consultation and coordination processes for cost containment and standardization; this can be important for limiting manipulation by warring parties.
  - Seek unity among agencies and donors (where appropriate) in negotiating large-scale contracts involving housing, labor, transport and, most importantly, currency exchange.
  - Address internal agency problems such as high overheads and poor accountability; more credibility for reducing local extortion-based costs exist when internal houses are put in order.

- **Commit to independent monitoring and evaluation**:
  - Be willing to have independent monitoring and continuously evaluate programming.
  - Commit to quality monitoring. In the case of emergency assistance, more highly experienced and better-trained monitors is a key to reducing diversion.
  - Properly train local staff in monitoring techniques.
  - Frequently evaluate the effect of interventions. The more sophisticated warring parties become in manipulating aid for their ends, the more critical it is that agencies evaluate.

- **Prioritize engagement and capacity-building:**
  - According to the Geneva Conventions, the primary responsibility for the welfare of a civilian population is with the authority of their area. Encourage fulfillment of this responsibility.
  - Make external engagement and solidarity (tough-minded, demanding accountability and reciprocity) a priority. Day-to-day engagement of authorities must strive to contribute to the moving of these authorities from predatory relations with vulnerable populations to relationships built on reciprocity.
  - Diplomatically engage authorities at the political level not only on the need for freedom and space locally, but also on the development of reciprocal relationships with their own people.
  - Create the capacity internal to your agency or consortium to carry out or support any agreed-upon capacity building agendas responsibly. A principal failure of many agencies is that they do not build up their own capacity to in turn build the capacity of authorities in their locale.
  - Support capacity building through providing training and other support to enhance the professionalism of local authority.
  - Support indigenous non-governmental forms of social organization. In every society, there are traditional mechanisms of kinship and self-help which are often the primary contributors to a community's survival in the context of a complex emergency.
  - Allow for long time horizons and the likelihood of mistakes and problems; in many places, traditions of social organization have been bludgeoned by divide-and-rule authoritarian governmental structures, creating a legacy of mistrust, lethargy and corruption.
  - Build and alternative voice to military authority by encouraging women's organizations at the local level.

- **Integrate human rights monitoring, advocacy and capacity-building objectives:**
  - Address human rights violations directly. Human rights abuses are at the core of what drives conflict in much of the Greater Horn, and human rights abuses produce much of the suffering which necessitates humanitarian responses, therefore simply to respond to humanitarian need is not adequate.
  - Focus attention on building indigenous capacity to deal with rights abuses in a society.
  - Consider focussing on community rights where individual vulnerability stems from communal dissolution; humanitarian focus on individuals' rights can ignore and undermine survival strategies based on commitment to group survival and preservation of a way of life.
  - Systematically incorporate the human rights surveillance into famine early warning, incorporating the forcible resettlements, attacks on markets, and resource thefts that are as crucial as weather monitoring; this requires trained local participants, who may be the only logistically feasible data sources in volatile, insecure low-intensity conflicts.
  - The mandates of most operational agencies prevent them from speaking out aggressively and publicly on human rights issues, but many of these agencies provide key information to human rights monitoring groups. Make efforts for greater coordination between those that can respond publicly and those that can't.

- **Coordinate at all levels**:
  - Enhance coordination, communication, and decision-making chains of command among agencies, both within a country and regionally in order to minimize the role of external intervenors in sustaining conflict.
  - Improve inter-agency coordination within one's own organization or government. For example, UN agencies responding to emergencies — UNICEF, UNHCR, UNDP and WFP — must eventually be reined in by the Secretariat and better coordinated, most logically by DHA.
  - Cooperate in jointly reviewing proposals and jointly evaluating projects.
  - Coordinate a rational division of responsibilities *among agencies* to avoiding manipulation by warring factions over the placement of agency resources and other unintended consequences of large-scale responses.
  - Coordinate on a regional level as well; exchanging information among agencies between countries and between refugee camps and countries of origin must be more consciously undertaken.
  - Coordinate information; the framework provided by the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative could be useful in improving the communication lines throughout the region, in turn assisting in the coordination of regional planning.

## Issue #8: Institutionalizing Conflict Prevention — How can ongoing procedures for early warning and preventive response be structured?

The previous issues all arise when an individual initiative is launched toward a particular emerging conflict. A final issue that needs to be addressed is how a more regularized set of procedures and organizational arrangements might be established to incorporate the lessons learned from each initiative and make efficient use of the assets of their many participants.

As ad hoc endeavors grow in number, their sponsors will search out new ways to make their limited resources go further by adopting more coherent, coordinated strategies. As we saw in Part One, that kind of motivation in effect is one of the driving impetuses behind the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative. The only question is how soon such a systematic approach will be perceived as advantageous and steps taken toward it.

To hasten this process, this section describes some key elements that might go into a more institutionalized structure and the advantages they might yield.

***The Problem: Shortcomings in the Existing "System."*** There are two underlying problems a more organized approach to conflict prevention arises out of and to which it must respond.

***Fragmentation of Discrete Functional Mandates.*** Local preventive efforts usually involve several international actors, including individual states, groups of states, the UN, regional organizations, NGOs, and individuals. However, these participants each have different jurisdictions, mandates, funders and constituencies, so each proceeds largely independently, often without explicit reference to what the others are doing.

Each of the principal players — the United Nations, regional organizations, the United States, other major powers, and NGOs — has its strengths and weaknesses, and no one can perform all the tasks of prevention by itself or some tasks as well as another player.

Having a many possible channels, venues and actors at a variety of levels can be useful in giving a variety of choices to the disputants for addressing different facets of the dispute (mutual reassurance, technical assistance, political negotiations). However, having no set procedures in place and an understood order in which they might be tried, also invites the disputants (including potential "agents of disruption") to delay and maneuver incessantly without committing to any process of engagement whatever, to "deal shop" for the most favorable arrangements, and to play different parts of the international community off against one another. This also gives outsiders no clear mandate to try to pre-empt potential international crises before they erupt and no measures by which to assess their progress, if they do decide to do so.

When it comes to conflict prevention, this fragmentation of effort denies to third parties opportunities to keep local disputes from becoming wider problems that require their involvement at higher levels of expense. More damagingly, it may exacerbate local problems (by the pursuit of discordant or even conflicting strategies), raising the level of conflict and the level of resources needed to prevent its escalation. The result is particular efforts may fail for lack of appropriate joining of forces, many disputes may become violent with little effort being made by anyone to stop them, and other disputes may have more attention given to them than may actually be necessary.

Because an adequate and politically feasible global system of prevention cannot rely exclusively on one single actor, responsibility and resources for the tasks of early warning and preventive diplomacy must pool all relevant available resources for particular conflicts and assign tasks in a more deliberate fashion. Such a regime would make more conscious and coordinated use of the respective political, moral, and material advantages of the several types of third parties already involved in conflict regions around the world.

***Overload at the Top.*** The UN, the US, NGOs and most other bureaucratic governmental or nongovernmental entities have multiple competing demands on their time, staff, and resources, so they cannot devote unlimited energies to every problem within their domain.

But because large, complex bureaucracies such as the US government and the United Nations have largely centralized their decision making, in part because of Cold War imperatives, they have overloaded the capacity of their top decision-makers to deal with the vast number of different issues brought to their attention. When it comes to deciding priorities among early warnings, for example, middle-level and high-level decision-makers are severely strained in trying to make informed policy choices from among a range of "real" warnings — all potentially serious but none absolutely imperative — as to which warrant attention and which should be ignored or minimized.

In the absence of explicit procedures and criteria in place for sorting out issues at each of the levels of their hierarchies, these organizations take on too much and overload themselves or spread their resources too thinly across problems both large and small, thus squandering them. Or, they will respond chiefly to highly visible problems and leave potential problems to ferment and grow.

The most common way bureaucracies try to ration their energies is by concentrating on problems that have already reached the stage of crisis, that have attracted significant public attention, or that are advanced by the most persuasive policy entrepreneurs and most forceful domestic interest groups, such as immigrant and expatriate communities.[15] This tendency to focus only on immediate crises is particularly problematic for conflict prevention because its long-term and medium-term concerns tend to be pushed off the agenda by short-term pursuits. Even policy planning units that were specifically set up in governments to take the longer view, seem inevitably to get swallowed up in current operations.[16]

***Guidelines: A Layered, Multilateral Structure for Conflict Prevention.*** What would such a system of burden-sharing and lower-level initiative look like? An informal prevention regime could be worked toward whose parts are linked loosely a single system, but function in a highly autonomous way. The basic structure would be organized through dividing up the labor *both vertically and horizontally.*

Vertical differentiation of activity is necessary because responsibility for conflict prevention needs first to be located as close to an impending conflict as possible, and only the resources and actors sufficient to deal with its severity and scale need to be brought into play. As the first line of prevention, then, responsibility for conflict avoidance should be pushed downward as much as possible to local, national and subregional actors. At the same time, extra-local and extra-regional states and the United Nations would provide appropriate facilitative, material, and (when necessary) military support.

Accordingly, within the United Nations and other global organizations such as the US government, current operations should be more decentralized to country-level and field offices to fix responsibility and accountability by and large in relation to the seriousness and scale of given conflicts.

In addition, at each level within this stratified or layered hierarchy, collaboration and coordination by the pertinent and capable international or national entities that operate within a given geographic area should be encouraged. This horizontal division of labor is necessary because all the resources that are needed to fulfill the tasks of preventive diplomacy will not be obtainable within the lower-levels of individual states, the UN, regional organizations, and so on.

In most cases, the most capable actors might take the lead, acting as "prime movers" to create and energize international lateral teams of third parties to work together.

***The Vertical Hierarchy.*** To reduce overload at the top, early warning assessment and possible preventive responses do not need to continue to be so centralized. Indeed, even before foreign policy priorities are clearer and lateral program synergy improved, more routine implementation of threat management and crisis prevention can be decentralized in order to reduce the number of issues that have to be considered at headquarters. This more decentralized as well as multilateral system for conflict prevention thus would push down to lower levels and local and regional actors responsibility for issue processing, prioritizing, and responding to potential areas of difficulty, within appropriate parameters and international rules.

Over time, a clearer vertical division of labor could be established in which smaller-scale problems such as national ethnic conflicts and human rights disputes are engaged both earlier and more routinely by lower levels of foreign affairs bureaucracies and multilateral organizations, in conjunction with their counterparts among other local and regional actors. This allows the larger-scale issues, such as possible major interstate wars or potential nuclear crises, to be reserved for the attention of ministerial and chief

executive levels. The eventual effect of such a system might be to reduce the number of such major crises that even have to rise to the central levels.

Another reason to consider a decentralized approach is that several tools and thus implementers are usually necessary to address the several needs of a pre-violent situation, and because the mix of objectives and tools must change over time in view of changes in the relation of the parties on the ground. A great deal of latitude and flexibility is needed for those who devise such strategies and implement them.

Ideally, this calls for an individual or a small group to act as a coordinator, or at minimum, that frequent communication go on between the various governmental and non-governmental actors.

This vertically stratified system follows a principle similar to that applied in the American federal system for allocating responsibilities between the federal government and the states, and by the European Union in defining the respective responsibilities of the union and its member states: subsidiarity. Problems that can be handled by a lower level of government or organization should be handled by that level, and only those problems that cannot should be brought up to the next level.

***The Local Arena: The First Line of Preventive Defense.*** Preventive diplomacy is not needed when the parties to a conflict themselves choose to settle their disputes without violence, as the leaders of the Czech and Slovak peoples did when they peacefully divided their nation. Indeed, the ideal system of third-party prevention would be one left unemployed because disputes are resolved locally and at low levels of escalation. Preventive diplomacy only becomes an issue when the parties are unable or unwilling to negotiate successfully.

Accordingly, one premise of a global preventive system should be that the first step toward conflict avoidance is local self-help by conflicting parties. This is, in fact, already laid down in Chapter VI, Article 33 of the UN Charter: "The parties to a dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlements, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."

Thus, when early warning signals are given of a deepening dispute, even within countries, the international and/or regional community should explicitly and vocally reiterate through well-publicized statements and appeals the expectation that the parties to the dispute must seek their own solutions by engaging each other peacefully as early as possible. They should be discouraged from waiting for others to provide assistance in problem-solving and dispute and conflict resolution, although local requests for such services should be honored.

With intercommunal and intergroup disputes within existing states now widely regarded as posing the most common type of threat to international security, the political institutions of existing states should be expected to serve as the first venue for negotiation and mediation. Where these institutions and similar local channels exist but are weak, third-party action should seek to buttress, extend, or otherwise strengthen them; they should not be displaced by preventive efforts unless absolutely necessary. Direct third-party involvement in mediating a dispute should thus be avoided, and the focus placed instead on indirect support for pre-conflict peace building.

Of course, in many recent civil conflicts national institutions have failed or have them themselves been part of the problem, with regimes suppressing oppositions or minorities, parties vying for exclusive control of the state or seeking to escape from its control entirely. In such situations, responsibility for preventive diplomacy must shift from the disputants themselves to subregional or regional organizations.

***The Regional Arena: The Second Level of Prevention.*** Subregional and regional multilateral organizations (RMOs) can and should play a more active role both in strengthening regional interstate security and in the peaceful resolution of ethnic and other internal political conflicts within member states.

The international community should seek to capitalize on their assets by giving RMOs progressively greater authority to engage in local conflict prevention activities, developing commonly accepted rules for RMO initiatives, and providing more financial and logistical support to equip RMOs to perform their new responsibilities. Material and political support from individual states both inside and outside a given region will be necessary, but it should only be provided under the auspices of RMOs and within the parameters of the United Nations Charter.

Where mature subregional and regional organizations have some capacity to function cooperatively and effectively, the wider international community should seek to strengthen them as conflict-preventing agents. At present, however, many subregional and regional actors and institutions are incapable of handling localized disputes, thereby obliging higher-level actors to become involved. Certainly, obstacles must be overcome if RMOs are to carry out preventive diplomacy effectively. Thus, a dual strategy is called for that accepts the short-term need for international support of ad hoc regional preventive efforts while working over the long term to empower RMOs to assume greater preventive responsibilities. But over time, RMOs might develop the will and the capacity to oversee — whether by themselves or in partnership with the United Nations or a regional military alliance such as NATO — compliance with agreements negotiated by the parties.

Despite the present shortcomings of RMOs, the only alternatives to empowering such organizations are reacting with indifference to emerging local conflicts or looking to the United Nations or a major power to play a role in re-establishing peace amid chaos.

***The Global Arena: The Third Level of Prevention.*** As conflict prevention responsibilities are progressively pushed downward, global-level actors such as the UN Security Council and Secretary-General can concentrate their attention and resources on three types of problems: large-scale crises that local and regional efforts are unlikely to be able to handle, such as major wars and nuclear threats; lower-level regional conflicts that third parties have tried but failed to prevent; and the creation of back-up peace enforcement forces for deployment into new local and regional conflicts where regional military resources are inadequate to the demands of those conflicts.

***Decentralizing US Foreign Policy.*** To play the role that is needed to energize the local and regional levels, however, current tendencies in US foreign policy decision-making have to changed: highly centralized bureaucracies in which regional security policy and other decisions are made and priorities established mainly at the top.

Many of the challenges confronting preventive diplomacy—linking early warnings to levels of response, reducing bureaucratic overload, prioritizing values, and generating political will—could be diminished or

circumvented if the US government were to reorient its thinking and operations and fully accept that high-level decision makers do not need to be directly involved in many preventive initiatives. Although top-level personnel would need to encourage such initiatives, the responsibility for their conduct can be decentralized, with lower bureaucratic levels overseeing preventive efforts in local and regional arenas and enlisting the cooperation of NGOs to do so.

Within its own hierarchy, the US State Department could move to new type of diplomacy that would empower local and middle-level officials (such as ambassadors, country directors, desk officers and deputy and assistant secretaries). The role of ambassadors should be redefined so that ambassadors are seen as serving on the front lines of US foreign policy, tackling problems as they emerge rather than waiting for them to escalate and having to ask for direction from Washington as to how respond.

American emissaries have already used the latitude currently allowed them to engage incipient problems with considerable success. This latitude could be further widened by changing bureaucratic procedures, offering merit awards, and altering the existing high-level crisis orientation, allowing the most creative and enterprising ambassadors country directors and staff to pursue preventive solutions to local problems.

The difficulty of providing incentives for bureaucrats to undertake preventive efforts may be overestimated. Conventional wisdom holds that because "the dog doesn't bark" there's no way of telling if preventive diplomacy was responsible for the avoidance of a conflict, and thus to reward those involved. On close examination, while most incipient violent conflicts are not directly visible, they still have antecedents. Where evident trends toward increasing escalation — as measured by increasing violence, demonstrations, and so forth — are halted or reversed after significant prevention efforts have been made, the case is strong that the preventive efforts were at least in part responsible.

Accordingly, appropriate credit and rewards can be conferred on those third parties involved in cooling off rising tensions. Indeed, career promotions might be based on whether growing incipient threats are defused, rather than allowed to become crises. The fact that particular individuals who have been active in preventing conflicts in recent years, such as the OSCE HCNM, Max van der Stoel, and the US negotiator of the Ukraine nuclear dismantlement agreement, Ambassador James Goodby, have received considerable recognition for their work seem to belie the notion that such rewards are infeasible.

But reorienting foreign policy bureaucracies to undertake early preventive actions at the lower levels depends largely on high-level attention to creating career incentives toward that end. Indeed, a step in this direction has been taken in President Clinton's letter of instructions in 1993 to newly assigned chiefs of mission, in which he urges them "to practice preventive diplomacy, to anticipate threats to our interests before they become crises and drain our human and material resources in wasteful ways." To go further, conflict prevention requirements could be written into the routine guidance and instructions (post reporting requirements, mission priorities planning, and country director evaluations, for example) given to officials in the US State Department and the other agencies.

In addition, at each country level, strategic planning exercises need to go on periodically across the several US agencies represented in each mission. These could include the assessment of potential upcoming conflicts, the tracking of national transitions in relation to basic ultimate goals referred to earlier, the inventorying of available tools and the state of present local and regional capabilities for dealing with conflicts, and advisable current steps to be taken in support of initiatives to address them.

Some staff member or members would need to be assigned virtually exclusively the role of looking into the near future and representing it at the table with these concerns in mind.

At specified middle levels as well, procedures also have to be put in place that link the gathering of early warning information to specific decision-makers in bureaucracies whose explicit responsibility it is to consider whether the warnings indicate emerging situations that would significantly impact national interest, and who then have the authority to trigger additional preventive responses.

The areas for top-level concern would be direct attacks on the United States, interstate aggression, regional nuclear threats and arms build-ups, and other dangers to the credibility of US alliances and international arms control and security regimes.

Finally, training and orientation programs for new ambassadors, deputy chiefs of missions, and junior officers could include sensitization to the early stages of conflicts and the range of low-level tools that might be employed.

***The Horizontal Axis.*** The division of labor necessary to institute a multilateral system of conflict prevention must operate through a more explicit horizontal division of tasks, as well as vertically. This means that at each of the vertical levels must engage in much greater lateral cooperation, coordinating their actions, pooling their resources, and assigning responsibilities as required by the circumstances of a given conflict. Thus, each level would see a number of actors playing roles focussed on keeping the dispute within the bounds of that level. Accordingly, local field offices of US aid, information, diplomacy and defense agencies could be encouraged to work with one another more closely and with NGOs and other states, as well as regional organizations, pooling their resources and coordinating programs as they engage host governments and indigenous civic organizations in the prevention of local conflicts.

Third-parties must be as unified behind the idea of fostering a peaceful process of engagement as possible, rather than work at cross-purposes. Although divergent agendas are obviously unavoidable, the growing interest in conflict avoidance among large numbers of like-minded powers and multilateral organizations at the top leadership and global levels suggests the mutual benefits of much greater coordination of activities and policies at regional and country levels.

A more economical approach would have them look for opportunities to pool resources and pursue joint local strategies directed toward the realization of common goals. When faced with a potential conflict at, say, the local level, the relevant local-level personnel and agencies of the United Nations, United States, other major states, RMOs, and NGOs should create an informal multilateral task force or contact group. This body should:

- Inventory available local resources.
- Determine how best to fashion a comprehensive, coherent local prevention strategy.
- Allocate tasks and responsibilities according to the strengths of the participants.

The task force should design a"preventive package" of negative, positive, and facilitative techniques tailored to the various facets and peculiar conditions of the conflict situation. Proceeding "from the ground up," the designers of a preventive strategy should begin by assessing the requirements of a local arena, and then, on the basis of that assessment, determine the role of each third party.

Of course, not all states and organizations represented in the vicinity will be willing to participate; indeed, the participation of some may not be desirable. But the opportunities for attracting seemingly indifferent entities or even coopting seemingly hostile ones should not be dismissed out of hand. Because much less military and political clout is needed for low-level than for interventions at higher levels for more escalated conflicts, conflict prevention offers one of the easiest ways to initiate multilateral burden-sharing in pursuing mutual goals which are more widely shared.

A corollary to the idea of collaboration is the principle of third-party nonintervention, in this sense meaning that third parties refrain from political, diplomatic, or military actions that encourage one or both combatants to intensify their hostilities or that support one side militarily against the other. The aim of third-party intervention (save for collective peace enforcement actions) should be benign, nonviolent engagement to isolate and de-escalate the conflict. As the example of Macedonia suggests, agreement among third parties to refrain from partisan intervention may not end a conflict but it can help to localize and delegitimize outside partisan involvement.

***Public-Private Partnership.*** Among the participants within each level of preventive response should be NGOs active in the fields of "track-two" diplomacy, conflict resolution training, democracy building, and refugee and other humanitarian work.

Despite their resource and "power" limitations, the NGOs' private auspices, non-threatening presence, transnational contacts, and humanitarian goals endow them with special legitimacy and give them a degree of access to the disputants in a low-level conflict that is often not enjoyed by powerful states with coercive military power and security agendas. NGOs often have direct access to their indigenous professional counterparts (trade unions, professional groups, business people, universities, and so forth) in an area where conflict is brewing. They also are often able to provide an informal, unofficial forum for negotiations (at any stage in a conflict) that may yield greater results than government-sponsored, official talks.

The non-threatening and positive roles that such NGOs can play in alleviating low-level tensions and pre-violent conflict and the advantages they have over direct and official government involvement need much fuller exploration and experimentation.

NGOs can be used more extensively for pre-conflict peace-building, such as assisting in the writing of constitutions and the development of civil institutions. Further roles some NGOs can assume in the design and implementation of more deliberate preventive policies include providing information (including early warning), and serving as an implementer of government programs, for example, in election monitoring.

Building in NGOs explicitly as one expected participant in the overall system requires therefore greater lateral coordination and closer ties at each level between governments and multilateral organizations, on the one hand, and NGOs, on the other.

A more explicit public-private partnership between US NGOs and the State and Defense Departments in the field of preventive diplomacy is needed, one that might allow US-based NGOs to draw on the stature of the United States while also maintaining their independence. The extensive experience in the United States with public-private partnerships in economic development and the provision of social services suggest that issues of control of funds, recipient autonomy, and avoidance of undue governmental or

political influence are not insurmountable. If the government-run US Peace Corps was widely seen as maintaining this independence at the height of the Cold War, it certainly seems possible for NGOs to do so after the Cold War.

***US Leadership.*** If a stratified, multilateral regime for conflict prevention diplomacy is to become a reality, it must be championed by an actor of global stature, in terms of both active support at the local, regional, and global levels, and in terms of urging the adoption of an approach of this nature. For several reasons, the United States seems alone able to undertake such a role:

The United States has the world's most extensive foreign policy bureaucracy and information-gathering apparatus, thus affording it unparalleled opportunities to become involved in preventive diplomacy at each of the vertical levels described above.

The United States is the only country that is effectively a "member" of all regions — some by virtue of formal membership (in NATO, CSCE, OAS, APEC, NAFTA), others by dint of joint interests (OAU, ASEAN, the Middle East multilateral peace process).

While it is true that many international issues cannot be resolved by the United States alone, it also is true that many international issues cannot be resolved without US leadership. Thus, while the United States should welcome, encourage, and seek to enhance the international roles of other states and entities, both bilaterally and through the United Nations and other multilateral bodies, it remains the one actor on the world stage that can and must do more than that by helping to marshal the political will to provide leadership and resources on the widest range of issues.

US leadership in preventive diplomacy can be exercised by:

- Legitimizing and spreading the concept of early intervention as making strategic sense.
- Furnishing resources to multilateral organizations and NGOs in the front lines of prevention.
- Supplying diplomatic muscle, sponsorship, and energy behind particular preventive diplomacy efforts
- Providing experienced individual diplomats to mediate incipient disputes.

The attention and resources of the United States are not unlimited, of course, but rather than dampening enthusiasm for a broad multilateral regime, that fact should serve only to underscore the need to "download" current and future US responsibilities onto other capable actors. In advancing this process of downloading, as in so many other areas, US initiative and leadership is critical.

***Summary.*** The elements sketched here for more consistent and methodical multilateral preventive arrangements do not provide a detailed blueprint, but they do highlight the main features of an operating strategy that both takes fuller advantage of the multiple resources that US agencies and many other organizations already have deployed in the field and that circumvents the problems of getting attention and will at the "top" of these organizations to respond to the early signs of low-level, but potentially problematic local conflicts and humanitarian crises:

- Proactive interest in and early response to low levels of conflict.
- Resources and attention focused on especially troubled areas.
- Political disputes to be settled without the use of force.
- Assertion of the normative primacy of peaceful change.
- Local and subregional actors authorized and enabled to act as the first line of prevention.
- Coherent local conflict strategies.
- A graduated sequence of contingent responses based on the intensity level of conflicts and the power of the antagonists.
- When necessary, higher-level, more coercive responses by major powers and other global actors.
- Multilateral cooperation and coordination at all levels led by prime movers such as major powers.
- Public/private partnership between official bodies and NGOs.
- US leadership.

Woven together, these features would form the fabric of a regime able to respond proactively to post–Cold War threats and to make the most cost-effective use of the limited resources available to governments, multilateral organizations, and NGOs.

To suggest that conflict prevention might need more "system" is by no means to say, however, that a single, highly integrated, and formalized government-wide or world-wide machinery is either possible or desirable, nor would it ever be imposed. To a great extent, preventive intervention will always require and rely on the spontaneous energy and unique ingenuity of many kinds of actors in the different regions who assume responsibility and decide how to take action in their own ways.

Nevertheless, if preventive efforts are going to achieve better results than the occasional success story, some sort of more regularized, understood arrangements may be needed through which responsibilities would be assigned and certain procedures would be agreed to, in line with the known attributes of the various actors. In view of the post–Cold War era's multiple interrelated problems, constrained resources, and overloaded bureaucratic agendas, it seems useful if not imperative to at least explore further the possible ways in which the activities in preventive diplomacy can be better blended, resources pooled, tasks divided up, comparative advantages exploited, and economies of scale realized, so that the benefits of more collaborative action might be maximized.

The next step in that direction might be for practitioners themselves to consider in more depth whether and how the information and frameworks laid out in this document may apply to current operations in the Greater Horn of Africa.

# I. Notes

1. The idea of societies having a breaking point and using this as a criterion for balancing violence prevention with promotion of societal change is based in part on Janie Leatherman.

2. The difference between non-governmental institutions and a responsible civil society is pointed out by Naomi Chazan.

3. B.A. Kiplagat, "The African Role in Conflict Management and Resolution," in David Smock and Chester Crocker, *African Conflict Resolution: The US Role in Peacemaking*. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1995, p 27.

4. *Op.Cit.*, p. 88.

5. Barbara Harff, "A Theoretical Model of Genocides and Politicides," in "Early Warnings of Communal Conflicts and Humanitarian Crises", *A Special Issue of the Journal of Ethno-Political Development*, Vol. 4, No. 1, July, 1994, pages 25-30.

6. The notion that third parties should think of functions and services they provide is drawn from C.R. Mitchell, *The Structure of International Conflict* (London: Macmillan Press, 1981), pp. 299-313. Mitchell applies it only to the roles that mediators should play, however, whereas here the idea is applied to any parties seeking to prevent conflicts through whatever means.

7. Note, incidentally, that only some of these tools are easily characterized in terms of whether they are coercive or non-coercive inducements. While some could thus be called "carrots" (e.g. economic aid) or "sticks" (e.g. sanctions), other possible options are better described as "facilitators" or "enablements" (e.g., track-two diplomacy, policy ideas, technical assistance).

8. Kiplagat, p. 36.

9. In conflict management literature, conflicts cannot be resolved at just any point, but must be "ripe for resolution." A condition making for ripeness is a "mutual hurting stalemate" when the parties have achieved the ability to keep the other from prevailing and realize they cannot achieve their objectives by continuing the armed struggle. Rather than continue to try to defeat the other side militarily, they become more willing to enter into negotiations. The most explicit statement of the ideas of ripeness for resolution and mutual hurting stalemate is by William Zartman and revised in Stephen Stedman.

10. Stephen Ryan.

11. Conflict Management Group, *Early Warning and Preventive Action in the CSCE* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1993), pp.4f.

12. *Op. Cit.*, p. 5f.

13. GAO, 1993, CBO, 1993.

14. Adapted from John Prendergast, *Humanitarian Aid and Conflict Prevention in the Greater Horn of Africa*, forthcoming; and a strategy paper by the same author for the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.

15. Robert D. Blackwill, *A Taxonomy for Defining US National Security Interests in the 1990's and Beyond,* pp. 402-403. Source unknown.

16. Lincoln Bloomfield, "Anticipating the Future: Foreign Policy Planning," Chapter Nine, pp. 167-92, in *The Foreign Policy Process: A Modern Primer* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1987).

# ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCES

These pages describe a range of resources and organizations that intervene in preventing conflict worldwide. This list is not exhaustive; rather, we aim to provide a sampling of organizations involved in various aspects of conflict prevention, from advocacy, conflict resolution and facilitation to training, humanitarian assistance, democratization, and research.

These resources are provided first for organizations housed outside the Greater Horn of Africa, followed by those within the Horn. The organizations are presented alphabetically, with contact information and comments whenever available.

## ♦ *Organizations Housed Outside the Horn*

■ ***The African-American Institute***

1625 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20036
Telephone: 202-667-5636
Fax: 202-265-6332
Contact: Stoney Cooks

Focus: Democracy-building and governance.
Types of activities: Public education, research and policy analysis, skills training, advocacy.

The African-American Institute (AAI) offers a range of programs that contribute to conflict prevention. These include direct programs in democracy-building, a 40-year record of providing education and training to Africans in the US and in Africa as well as major programs of public education on Africa for members and staff of the US Congress. AAI played a major role in support of the US Congress' 1991 initiatives in conflict resolution and Africa, bringing African leadership to the US to speak to the issue.

AAI's democracy and governance programs work with electoral commissions, NGOs and political parties throughout Africa. AAI's multi-level approach stresses the use of the policy tools of negotiation and reconciliation processes, often within the context of its educational development programs.

AAI recently provided aid to Rwanda in the administration of justice, specifically helping Rwanda by providing contact with people in the United States to support the transfer of expertise in the administration of justice.

AAI believes that support to regional organizations is critical in conflict prevention and seeks to implement programs that build the capacity of regional organizations to prevent and resolve conflict. There are multiple examples that show the benefits of building indigenous capacity to prevent and resolve violent conflict.

- ***African Development Foundation***
  1400 Eye Street NW, 10th floor
  Washington, DC 20005
  Telephone: 202-673-3916
  Fax: 202-673-3810
  Contact: William Ford, President

Focus: Economic development and democracy-building.
Types of activities: Skills training, public education, direct services and technical assistance.

The African Development Foundation (ADF) takes each of the groups it works with and carries out a dialogue to help participants identify the challenges facing their communities. ADF works with grassroots groups to build capacity to work with each other and to develop democracy at the community and group level. This process of functional reconciliation helps to build tolerance and a base for pluralism and democratic behavior. ADF emphasizes job creation and income generation through participatory development methods. Participation in planning, designing, carrying out, and evaluating a project increases success and reinforces democracy building. Participatory development helps participants learn negotiation skills, imparting non-violent conflict prevention tools and building capacity in communication, negotiation, and reconciliation.

ADF tests and rates its programs using a participatory evaluation system. At a project's design stage, participants set benchmarks for evaluation and agree with ADF on an evaluation plan. ADF uses an outside evaluation network to rate its programs. Skilled African evaluators participate in these networks. These evaluators work with the participants throughout the life of the project. This process provides continual quality control and adjustment.

ADF has worked in 32 countries in Africa. It is currently active in 22 African countries, with country liaison offices in 18 countries throughout Africa.

- ***Africa Leadership Forum***
  821 UN Plaza, 7th floor
  New York, NY 10017
  Telephone: 212-534-2355
  Fax: 212-867-4810

See also Africa Leadership Forum below in *Organizations Housed Inside the Horn.*

- ***Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution***
  A-7461 Stadtschlaining/Burg, Austria
  Telephone: 43-33-55-24-98
  Fax: 43-33-55-26-62
  Contact: Gerald Mader

Focus: Peacekeeping and building.
Types of activities: Research, education.

The Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR) works with the European University Center for Peace Studies (EPU). Both institutions cooperate closely in staff, financial and organizational matters, so that they can be seen as one project, called the Schlaining Peace Project. Both institutions are organized as charitable, non-partisan, and independent associations and work on a non-profit basis. Both institutions are headed by Dr. Gerald Mader. The ASPR was founded in 1982. One of its goals was to establish a European Peace University at Schlaining. This goal was achieved with the support of European Commissions for UNESCO. Since 1990, a spring and fall semester has been conducted each year at the purpose-built Haus International.

The Schlaining Peace institutions have at their disposal a unique infrastructure for conference and seminars, comprising the conference center, Burg Schlaining, the student house, Haus International, the Peace Library, and seminar rooms.

Both institutions focus on peace research and peace education and based on two programs, EPU and IPT. The EPU program is made up of individual self-contained semesters which can be combined into a four-semester Master's degree program. The International Peace-Keeping and Peace Building Program (IPT) is a training program for participants of civilian UN and OSCE missions. It is composed of a three-week foundation course and a one-week specialization course. These courses are held three times each year. Teachers and students come from all over the world, and some with the Austrian government scholarships for participants from developing countries.

- ***The Brookings Institution***
  1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
  Washington, DC 20036
  Telephone: 202-797-6000
  Fax: 202-797-6004
  Contact: Terrence P. Lyons, Research Associate

Focus: Governance, democracy-building.
Types of activities: Research, policy analysis, public education.

The Brookings Institution's Foreign Policy Studies Program studies conflict resolution, examining national, regional and international issues. Research has focused on governance issues, the rule of law, and democracy-building in relation to conflict resolution. Brookings Institution publications include a book on the effectiveness of Operation Lifeline in the Sudan, studies on humanitarian relief, national issues in Sudan, and the international implications of the Somalia situation, including steps the international community can take to rehabilitate collapsed political institutions. Brookings is currently preparing a book on internally displaced persons and the problem of internal refugees.

Brookings' research and analysis examine the effectiveness of the tools used in conflict prevention and resolution. The Brookings Institution believes there is a strong linkage between conflict

management and resolution and issues of governance. A key challenge is to find ways to institutionalize the inevitable competition for power and resources. The goal is to channel this competition and conflict into non-violent paths through institution-building. This can and will often be slow: better governance cannot be created or democracy built in a linear leap. The development of improved governance and democracy will involve steps forward and steps backward. The Brookings Institution cautions against a mechanistic approach to conflict prevention and resolution, a hard and complex process with no magic formula of tools to fit every situation.

Brookings calls for members of the international community to recognize that indigenous leadership is the most likely to be knowledgeable about conflict in their country and region. If they are not speaking to the issue or acting on it, they may have functional political reasons for not doing so. Getting to this will require that members of the international community engage in dialogue and build relationships: Brookings stresses the cultural and historical context in predicting, preventing or resolving violent conflict.

- ***The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict***
  2400 N Street NW, 6th floor
  Washington, DC 20037
  Telephone: 202-429-7979
  Fax: 202-429-9291
  Contact: Jane Holl, Executive Director

Focus: Conflict prevention and resolution.
Types of activities: Research, policy analysis.

The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict was founded in 1994 to address intergroup violence's looming threats to world peace and to advance new ideas toward preventing and resolving deadly conflict. It has a membership of sixteen eminent international leaders and scholars with long experience in conflict prevention and resolution. They meet as a group four times a year.

The Commission intends to build on the work of many organizations and individuals to stimulate and sustain public interest in the prevention and resolution of violent conflicts. The Commission examines the principal causes of violent ethnic, nationalist, and religious conflicts within and between states and the circumstances that foster or deter their outbreak. It takes long-term, worldwide view of violent conflicts likely to emerge. It seeks to determine the functional requirements of an effective system for preventing conflict and the ways in which such a system could be implemented. The Commission looks at the strengths and weaknesses of various international entities in conflict prevention and considers ways that international organizations might usefully contribute toward developing an effective international system of nonviolent problem solving.

The Commission produces a series of reports, background papers, and other materials, culminating in a final report to be disseminated widely as a guide to preventive policies and actions at the national and international levels.

- ***The Carter Center***

  Emory University
  One Copenhill
  Atlanta, GA 30307
  Telephone: 404-420-5174
  Fax: 404-420-3862
  Contact: Joyce Neu, Associate Director, Conflict Resolution Program

Focus: Human rights, democracy building, promotion of public health.
Types of activities: Advocacy, mediation.

The Carter Center works globally with major activities in Africa, the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia, and Haiti. The Carter Center administers fourteen programs on issues such as health, agriculture, global development, human rights, and African governance. In the development programs such as the health program the Carter Center works at the grassroots level. In the area of conflict prevention and resolution the Center works nationally and internationally. The Carter Center's main resource in conflict situations is the leadership of an eminent person, using the eminent person's prestige and leverage to open doors that might otherwise remain closed.

The Carter Center uses a wide spectrum of tools including health promotion and agricultural support to prevent conflict. In conflict resolution situations the Carter Center does not carry out negotiations and is not a party to the conflict. Instead, the Center provides mediations at several levels. One level of intervention is the head of state. In such cases the mediation is carried out by President Carter, a member of the Center's International Negotiation Network (INN) or a member of the Freely Elected Heads of Government, another Carter Center network. Examples of such leaders include former President of Costa Rica Oscar Arias and Archbishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa.

A second focus of activity is conflict prevention, emphasizing relationship building as a way to prevent conflict. This long-term activity involves two INN members, one a former diplomat and the other an academic specializing in the psychological dimensions of conflict. This activity uses problem-solving workshops to examine the psychological and political reasons for conflict. These workshops bring together high-level representatives of the conflicting factions. In the Baltic States the Center is bringing together members of Parliament with the former President of Estonia, the Lithuanian and Russian Ambassadors and members of the Russian Dumas. The goal is to promote dialogue to prevent tensions from escalating. This dialogue stems from the formal workshop activities as well as informal networks which the Carter Center believes are important in conflict prevention.

A cautionary note drawn from the Center's experience in conflict prevention involves the issue of perceived coercion. In the Center's experience, if people attend a workshop or mediation because they fear they will face marginalization, there might be a problem with the sustainability of agreements they reach. A second issue surrounds the choice of participants in conflict resolution events: it happens that those most willing to participate are marginal in their societies. The Center has learned to take the time to identify and bring in the key people while guarding against a self-selection process that can limit participation to people who endorse what the Center is doing.

- ***The Center for Democracy***
  1101 15th Street NW, Suite 505
  Washington, DC 20005
  Telephone: 202-429-9141
  Fax: 202-293-1768
  Contact: Caleb McCarry, Vice-President, Americas Program

  Focus: Democracy-building.
  Types of activities: Providing technical assistance in conflict prevention and resolution.

  The Center for Democracy focuses on identifying and fostering dialogue between leadership of conflicting parties with the potential to prevent violent conflict. The Center emphasizes communication and negotiation among conflicting parties. It has often supported diplomatic initiatives of the US government. It is a bi-partisan organization and seeks to model the pluralism and tolerance that undergird democratic development. The Center makes strategic interventions. It exercises leverage with groups and individuals that can provide critical leadership in preventing violent conflict and supports the building of democratic institutions and processes. The Center has helped conflicting political forces to dialogue and resolve conflict where violence is already taking place or about to start. In El Salvador in 1984, the Center arranged a post-conflict negotiation. In 1986, it provided logistical support to examine the electoral process in the Philippines. In 1987, the Center, working with Zambian President, Kenneth Kaunda, promoted dialogue in South Africa. This dialogue helped lead to the release of Nelson Mandela from prison. In 1994, the Center provided logistical and technical assistance, in support of an official Department of State initiative, to foster dialogue among a diverse group of Haitian Parliamentarians.

- ***Centre for Intergroup Studies***
  37 Grotto Road
  Rondebosch, South Africa 7700
  Telephone: 021-650-2503/4
  Fax: 021-685-2142

- ***Center for Preventive Action***
  Council on Foreign Relations
  58 East 68th Street
  New York, NY 10021
  Telephone: 212-734-0400
  Fax: 212-517-4967
  Contact: Barnett R. Rubin

  Focus: Negotiation assistance, peace initiatives.
  Types of activities: Research, analysis, advocacy, skills training, consulting.

  The Center for Preventive Action (CPA) is a Council on Foreign Relations initiative to study and test conflict prevention — to learn whether and how preventive action can work by doing it. The CPA uses the unique resources of the Council on Foreign Relations' membership to fill these voids of action and understanding.

The CPA's primary function is to learn about conflict prevention by engaging Council members in such efforts. The CPA sends teams to pre-explosion crisis areas. These teams map out strategies to settle or manage conflicts and then advocate action by appropriate governments and organizations, national and international, private and public.

An Advisory Group of Council members, including diverse and experienced practitioners and experts, works in consultation with the CPA's professional staff to choose such pre-explosion areas of conflict for CPA action. The Advisory Group also assists in assembling the teams.

The teams visit the area for approximately two weeks. There they meet with politicians, business leaders, religious leaders, journalists, non-governmental organizations, and anyone else who can contribute to their understanding of the conflict. The group investigates both possible terms of a settlement and methods of bringing about a settlement by combining incentives, sanctions, and mediation.

Upon its return, the team presents a report or map of how to resolve or manage the conflict for review by the Advisory Group. The map is prepared in terms accessible to a wide policy audience. The CPA then publishes a report, briefs political and other leaders, writes articles and opinion pieces, instigates Congressional hearings and other actions. The Center seeks to deploy all the means at the command of the Council on Foreign Relations to mobilize the American and international communities to organize action to prevent conflict from escalating, or better, to resolve it.

A CPA working group visited the South Balkans in December 1995 to study potential conflicts in Macedonia and Kosovo. The Center is also forming a working group on Nigeria. The group will study ways out of the current transition impasse and address the broader political and economic structural decay in Nigeria.

The Center collaborates with other organizations engaged in preventive action. In cooperation with the African-American Institute, Refugees International, and Search for Common Ground, the Center has helped to organize the Burundi Policy Forum since January 1995. The Forum has become the focal point for discussion of Burundi in the United States, advocating a number of comprehensive policies on the part of the US and other governments and supporting the peace efforts of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General in Burundi.

The Center convenes an annual conference to assess the state of the art. The conference brings together practitioners from governments, international organizations and NGOs with scholars, representatives of foundations and Congress. To circulate information on preventive activities, the Center serves as a repository of relevant books, articles, and documents.

- ***Center for Strategic and International Studies***
  1800 K Street NW, Suite 400
  Washington, DC 20006
  Telephone: 202-775-3277
  Fax: 202-775-3199
  Contact: Joseph V. Montville, Preventive Diplomacy Program

Focus: Democracy-building.
Types of activities: Historical research, problem-solving.

CSIS's Preventive Diplomacy Program focuses on multi-level efforts (grassroots, regional-level, national-level, international-level) to help prevent conflict. It seeks to foster problem solving and community building. The program also pays great attention to religious leadership, both clergy and lay to prevent violent conflict. It designs its activities to promote tolerance and democratic pluralism. Much of the work of the program has taken place in areas experiencing ethnic and/or religious conflict.

The program uses problem-solving workshops that bring conflicting parties together. The workshops help participants to recognize the humanity of opposing parties to a conflict. Using scholarly research, the program brings to the surface the historical traumas and hurts that underlie violent conflict. There is a strong focus on identifying and acknowledging the psychological and historical dimensions of conflict. The program employs "Councils of Historians" to research and document the historical basis of the conflict. The program has found that the acknowledgement of hurt and trauma is crucial to making progress in preventing violence. A finding of the program is the importance of non-formal activities. The program has found that the opportunity to communicate with opponents in informal social settings is productive. These occasions are effective in building trust among participants from opposing sides of a conflict. The program has carried out activities in the Balkans, the Baltic, the Middle East and Northern Ireland.

- ***Committee on International Conflict and Cooperation***
  National Academy of Sciences,
  National Research Council,
  Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education
  2101 Constitution Avenue
  Washington, DC 20418
  Telephone: 202-334-3005
  Fax: 202-334-3768
  Contact: Paul C. Stern

Focus: Research development, policy-making.
Types of activities: Research.

The Committee on International Conflict and Cooperation of the National Academy of Sciences/National Research Council carried out research on international conflict, resolution, and prevention. The Committee synthesized knowledge that others developed on the causes of conflict. Some articles examined conflict resolution. There was a review on mediation and the role of third parties. Another review focused on negotiations. Its research activities covered the full range of interventions to resolve conflict. It geared its activities to researchers in the field of conflict resolution. The Committee's research included all regions of the world and was multi-level. It included the study of conflict at the grassroots level, the regional, national, and international levels. The Committee is now the Committee on the Study of Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution in International Relations. The Committee will assess the state of knowledge and the effectiveness of key techniques in conflict management, resolution, and

prevention. The Committee will design its research to benefit researchers, policy makers and practitioners, including a comprehensive study of tools for conflict prevention and resolution.

- ***Conflict Analysis and Transformation Programs***
  c/o Eastern Mennonite University
  1200 Park Road
  Harrisonburg, VA 22801
  Telephone: 540-432-4490
  Fax: 540-432-4449
  Contact: John Paul Lederach, Director, Conflict Analysis and Transformation Programs and International Conciliation Service (ICS), care of Mennonite Central Committee

Focus: Humanitarian relief, economic development, religion.
Types of activities: Skills training, higher education.

Primary activities focus on delivering education and training in several regions and countries. EMU offers a master's level degree program in peace-building. EMU carries out this program in cooperation with two strategic international partners. One partnership is with the Nairobi Peace Initiative in Nairobi, Kenya. The other partnership is BUSTAPAZ in Bogota, Columbia. These partnerships are creating a network of students, professors and activities in peace-building. EMU has established faculty exchange programs with these two international partner organizations.

EMU faculty also perform extensive consulting with other organizations providing training to support peace-building projects. EMU faculty have worked in the Horn of Africa, throughout Latin America, the Basque country of Spain, Northern Ireland and the Philippines. EMU's approach is multi-level, with 70 percent of activities to date occurring at the grassroots level. Faculty use negotiation, mediation, and reconciliation processes, working to integrate peace-building activities with economic development projects in keeping with the religious base of Mennonite activities which places reconciliation processes at the core of their work.

EMU and ICS faculty are currently writing a book based on case studies of Mennonite experiences in international conciliation. This book will document eight different case studies. Four outside non-Mennonite readers representing several disciplines will then read and study this case history of Mennonite work in conciliation.

EMU and its strategic partners in the Nairobi Peace Initiative and BUSTAPAZ have analyzed their approach to training and concluded that too often training programs are short-term and sporadic. Training programs most often bring people together, for the short-term, to learn techniques. They do not create a broader base for sustainable action over a longer period. EMU and its partner organizations have therefore worked to establish a more strategic approach, reformulating their training programs into a permanent course taking eighteen months to two years of long-term training, supplemented by a series of short-term training sessions. This longer training cycle should enable participants to link their training to the context in which they will apply their training.

- ***The Conflict Management Group***
  20 University Road, Suite 560
  Cambridge, MA 02138
  Telephone: 617-354-5444
  Fax: 617-354-8467
  Contact: Diana Chigas, Program Manager

  Focus: Negotiation assistance.
  Types of activities: Skills training.

  Conflict Management Group (CMG), founded in 1984, is an international non-profit organization. It is engaged in training negotiators, consulting, diagnostic research, process design, conflict analysis, facilitation, consensus-building, and mediation. CMG also facilitates institution-building for the prevention and ongoing management of conflicts.

  CMG offers expertise and experience in developing effective processes for negotiation and conflict management. CMG's services include diagnostic analysis, training, consulting, and third party assistance. CMG assists organizations in dealing with difficult, ongoing, and complex negotiation problems by studying and evaluating the organization's structures, resources, and strategies for dealing with such problems. Through diagnostic interviews, CMG analyzes the key challenges, evaluates the organization's ability to respond to those challenges, and produces recommendations as to how the organization might strengthen its capacity to achieve successful negotiated outcomes on an ongoing basis. CMG's consulting capability includes strategic advice and process design for negotiation teams, research and conflict analysis to improve the negotiation process, and institutional development for conflict management.

  CMG also helps third parties that try to establish a reasoned and productive dialogue, extending its role as facilitator to manage the development of consensus among multiple parties with divergent interests. CMG provides experienced mediators to help parties settle bitter or complicated disputes without the need for costly legal proceedings or coercive action. CMG designs training programs to develop negotiation skills for diplomats, economic officials, political leaders, development experts, business executives, and others, helps participants develop a common approach to negotiation and build working relationships that can help overcome deadlocks or make upcoming negotiations more efficient.

- ***Department of the Treasury***
  Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary
  Room 3222
  Department of the Treasury
  Washington, DC 20220
  Telephone: 202-622-0153
  Fax: 202-622-2536
  Contact: Willya Martin

  Focus: Sustainable economic development, humanitarian relief.
  Types of activities: Research, policy analysis, technical assistance, skills training, public education.

The US Department of the Treasury's Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Development has responsibility for US participation in the multilateral and regional development banks. These include the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the other regional banks. The portfolio of the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury is a focal point for US policy on global and regional development. The Office is concerned with development on a multi-level basis, is interested in institution-building and attaches great importance to participation issues. The Deputy Assistant Secretary is attentive to issues of project design and its relation to conflict prevention. The Deputy Assistant Secretary cited concessionary lending through the International Development Association (IDA). He said that participation issues tied to conflict prevention were a key element of country strategy assessments. Country strategy assessments now are part of the IDA lending process.

Key to avoiding violent conflict is the consultation process. It must take place on the ground with potential participants, beneficiaries, and grassroots organizations. The Office is acutely aware of the need to bring potential stakeholders into the discussion of any project early on in the project design process. Inclusion of stakeholders is central to preventing conflict. Development impact and evaluation is becoming much more of a concern in multi-lateral lending and development. The reality of tighter budgets for international development makes policy makers more attentive to evaluation and accountability. The incumbent Deputy Assistant Secretary, Lionel Johnson, has served with the Department of State and the National Democratic Institute. He has had extensive experience in societies experiencing conflict and change. Mr. Johnson has worked in Haiti, Kenya, the Philippines. He believes that we must develop programs to soften the dislocations that countries experience as they go through periods of economic and political reform. He feels that we must pay particular attention to the social sectors. Mr. Johnson also believes preventive dialogue is very important in countries moving towards democracy and free markets.

- ***The Dialogue Project***

  1225 15th Street NW
  Washington, DC 20005
  Telephone: 202-797-8961
  Fax: 202-462-3892
  Contact: Reena Bernards, Co-Coordinator

Focus: Conflict resolution.
Types of activities: Skill training, public education, advocacy.

The Dialogue Project is an activity of American Jewish and Palestinian women leaders. It has carried out training in the Middle East itself with Israelis and Palestinians. The Dialogue Project has worked in the Trans-Caucuses on a project with women from Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia. Ms. Bernards participated as a facilitator in a USAID-sponsored conference on conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa.

The Dialogue Project works on the international and national levels with women who are leaders in their countries. In Israel the Dialogue Project has worked with women Members of Parliament. It has provided training for Israeli and Palestinian women who are leaders of organizations. In Azerbaijan, the Project has worked with women leadership in political parties. The Dialogue Project emphasizes Track II problem-solving as a technique for conflict resolution and prevention.

It uses reconciliation processes featuring the communication and negotiation as the path to reconciliation.

The Dialogue Project emphasizes the need for symmetry in conflict prevention efforts. All the parties to a conflict need to feel empowered by the conflict prevention and resolution process, with a sense of shared ownership of the process. The perception that any one party controls a process will reduce trust and effectiveness. Choices of sponsors, facilitators, and venue are sensitive matters. It is also helpful to structure a facilitation team that includes people from groups that are parties to the conflict. Facilitators must understand the situation affecting the parties to the conflict. Ownership and trust are key. A focus on follow-up action steps should be on the agenda of the problem solving workshop or training activity.

- ***Forum of African Voluntary Development Organizations***
  1405 15th Street NW
  Washington, DC 20005
  Telephone: 202-387-7275
  Fax: 202-279-6261
  Contact: Gabriel Negani, Executive Director

- ***Foundation for a Civil Society***
  1270 Avenue of the Americas Suite 609
  New York, NY 10020
  Telephone: 212-332-2890
  Fax: 212-332-2898
  Contact: Sonia Valtasaari

Focus: Democratic transition, human rights, justice and the rule of law.
Types of activities: Skill training, sharing of experiences among leadership in transitioning societies.

The Foundation for a Civil Society fosters the development of democracy, civil society, and the rule of law, working in the Czech and Slovak Republics.

Also under the Foundation umbrella is the Project on Justice in Times of Transition. This project operates globally since 1991. It helps countries making the change from repression or conflict to democracy or peace. Initially emphasizing countries emerging from communism, the project brought leaders from other regions with leadership from post-Communist societies to discuss difficult issues of change and justice. The project seeks to promote creative dialogue among leaders in transitioning societies and leaders from other societies.

The project has expanded its work to include countries coming out of conflict with work to date with El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Northern Ireland.

Leadership working with the project in a given country defines the issues focus for project activities. The project brings to the process outside leadership whose own experience in change and justice issues can be of benefit to priorities expressed by indigenous leadership. The project offers a neutral place and sponsorship for people to meet, learn, and dialogue.

Usually, the project structures four or five expert panels on several topics at issue. These panels are for helping communication, problem solving, negotiation, and reconciliation. The project uses high level large conferences, smaller, problem solving workshops,. and consultations depending on the country. The project is now branching into Track II activities.

- ***The Fund for Peace***
  823 United Nations Plaza
  New York, NY 10017
  Telephone: 212-661-5900
  Contact: Nina K. Solarz, Executive Director

Focus: Democracy-building, human rights.
Types of activities: Research, advocacy.

The Fund for Peace advocates peace and security through respect for the principles of constitutional democracy that define the American political system. The Fund consists of several institutes: ACCESS, a security information system; the Center for National Security Studies; a Human Rights Program in the Horn of Africa; the Institute for the Study of World Politics; the Media and Security Project; the National Security Archive; and the Women's Program of the Fund for Peace.

The Fund creates new projects through its network of experienced people. This network positions the Fund to become a base of operation for several organizations whose work was jeopardized by financial problems. The Fund stepped in with governance and managerial assistance and bridge financing, enabling the projects to continue their missions. The Fund also helps establish ongoing projects as independent organizations. The project's Advisory Board becomes the new organization's Board of Directors. Funding relationships are transferred to a fully developed management system with long-term stability and the capacity to set priorities and build a strong advocacy network of people who care about a particular issue.

The Institute for the Study of World Politics supports research into issues of arms control, regional conflict, human rights, population and environmental pressures, and political and economic development.

The Center for National Security Studies has worked for the past twenty years to protect against violations of constitutional decision-making and civil liberties in the name of national security. The Center also assists reformers in emerging democracies to develop legal mechanisms of control and accountability for their intelligence agencies, combat excessive government secrecy and secure human rights.

The National Security Archive collects and publishes document sets of primary materials on such topics as US policy on Central America, Southern Africa, southeast Asia and nuclear strategy and proliferation.

The Fund for Peace Human Rights program in the Horn of Africa provides technical and financial assistance to groups working to protect and promote human rights in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia,

Somaliland, and the Sudan. The program organizes skill-building workshops, focusing on human rights education and advocacy and the elements of human rights institution-building.

The Women's Program focuses on women attaining equal rights as a central feature of a democratic and participatory society by providing workshops, internship, and technical assistance.

- ***IDR Associates***
  1901 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 500
  Washington, DC 20006
  Telephone: 202-466-5120
  Fax: 202-466-5669
  Contact: Hrach Gregorian, Director

Focus: Democracy-building, human rights, religion, economic development, humanitarian relief.
Types of activities: Skills training, public education, research, technical assistance.

IDR Associates carries out dispute resolution activities in divided societies. IDR works on issues of community participation, environmental dispute resolution, and on justice systems. IDR has carried out activities in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Cyprus, the former Soviet Union, Indonesia, Cambodia, Thailand and, in the US, with VOA, USIA, and several private companies.

IDR works mostly at the grassroots level. It emphasizes functional contact. IDR tries to organize projects and anchor skills training within the projects. This method of functional contact gives the participants a concrete reason to work together. Participants get real world, real time experience that shows them how the skills they learn work. IDR uses processes of functional reconciliation. Most IDR projects are small-scale environmental and community service projects.

IDR believes that it is more effective for IDR to get engaged in the earliest stages of a conflict. IDR feels that at the later stages of conflict the methods are less effective. At later stages of a conflict, IDR believes that a more formal diplomatic approach is more promising.

IDR places emphasis on working with youth leaders. Youth leadership is often less entrenched and more receptive to new approaches to resolve and prevent conflict. Youth leadership also often has a greater followership than others. Impact of training is therefore often more powerful with youth leadership. They are also "proximate policy players" that will determine future direction in conflicted societies.

- ***Institute for Central American Studies***
  1101 17th Street NW
  Washington, DC 20036
  Telephone: 202-833-6399
  Fax: 202-833-6228
  Contact: George Biddle, President

Focus: Democracy building, conflict negotiation.
Types of activities: Skills training, research, policy analysis, organizational capacity and institutional building.

Institute for Central American Studies (ICAS) uses face-to-face communication between different and competing sectors of society to promote dialogue, negotiation, and reconciliation. ICAS serves as the central point of contact for these competing societal sectors. ICAS seeks to promote tolerance and pluralism in polarized societies in Central America, working in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Mexico. ICAS does not seek to force consensus. Rather it helps participants of diverse backgrounds and views to negotiate and resolve disputes non-violently and cooperate. ICAS provides skills training improving the ability of participants to listen to one another. It also teaches skills in the evaluation of facts and reports.

ICAS began its operation in 1992-1993 following El Salvador peace accords. ICAS set up a neutral center where competing sectors could meet, communicate, negotiate, and reconcile. These different sectors include business, labor, government, political parties, religious groups and NGOs. ICAS concentrates its activities with emerging leadership at the national level. ICAS hold its sessions three times during the week. Sessions usually last for seven months.

Dialogue takes place around a U-shaped table. Seating is by alphabetical order. Sessions have a curriculum focussing on key issues of importance to participants. The group examines the selected issue from a regional and international perspective. It also discusses general concepts related to the chosen topic. Regional and international issues have included a country's role in the world. Free trade, modernization of the state, the rule of law, and sustainable development represent the regional and international issues. The second stage of the dialogue is country-centered. It features discussion of political, economic, social, military and environmental issues in the specific country. A third stage of discussion focuses on specific country centered themes such a civil society or civil-military relations. There are presenters for these topics. ICAS places emphasis on the presentation of diverse views and open discussion among participants in plenary and smaller study groups.

Participants take their learning and skills training experiences back to the institutions they represent. They then replicate the dialogue and horizontal communication experience with colleagues in their home institutions. Graduates of the skills training sessions have set up a formal network for follow-up. They continue communication and dialogue among themselves and within their institutions.

ICAS programs have also led to the setting up of NGOs that engage in functional reconciliation. These NGOs bring diverse people and groups together to work on specific social and economic challenges that participants have had under discussion.

- ***Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution***

  George Mason University
  4103 Chain Bridge Road
  Fairfax, VA 22030-4444
  Telephone: 703-993-1300
  Fax: 703-993-1302
  Contact: Wallace P. Warfield, Clinical Faculty

Focus: Democracy building, human rights.
Types of activities: Research and policy analysis, skills training, advocacy.

The Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution offers advanced degrees in conflict analysis and resolution. The master's degree program integrates the theory and processes of negotiation, mediation, and third-party facilitation, and analytical problem-solving. The doctoral program provides advanced study for students in the theory of conflict and conflict resolution to prepare students to become researchers, theoreticians, and teachers in higher education as well as policy administrators, analysts and consultants for both the public and private sector. The Institute's activities are multi-level, working with community leadership, public policy elites, and the private sector. The Institute has extensive international experience. The Institute uses negotiation, mediation, and reconciliation processes, giving considerable attention to problem-solving techniques. It does not offer training in arbitration and adjudication.

These graduate programs emphasize advocacy for the process of conflict resolution and a non-violent social world. The Institute's skills training activities place heavy emphasis on closing the theory and practice loop. The Insatiate offers three laboratory simulation courses to give students the opportunity to test theory and practice. One laboratory simulation course focuses on interpersonal relationships. A second focuses on community dynamics and the aggregation of conflict. The third laboratory simulation course focuses on the conflict at the international level.

The Institute also provides students with a practicum; the Institute currently has teams of students and faculty working in different areas of emphasis in three Washington area sites. One team is working with community leadership in the Mount Pleasant area in Washington, DC to understand how diverse elements of this community, riven by a 1992 conflict, can find common ground. A second team is focusing on conflict, governance and democracy-building at the community and neighborhood level, working with the Department of Parks and Recreation in Arlington, Virginia to examine the range of conflict that takes place around recreational sites. A third team is working with the public schools and surrounding community in Fairfax, Virginia with a special focus on gang activity and conflict resolution.

- ***Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy***
  1819 H Street NW, Suite 1200
  Washington, DC 20006
  Telephone: 202-466-4605
  Fax: 202-466-4607
  Contact: Amb. John McDonald, Chairman

Focus: Democracy and social peace-building.
Type of activities: Conflict prevention skills training, research.

The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy is an organization which carries out conflict resolution. It provides training in management skills grassroots leadership in areas of the world suffering from violent conflict. The Institute attempts to foster conflict resolution by identifying root causes of conflicts. The Institute conducts three stages of peace-making process: 1) political peace-building; 2) economic peace-building; 3) social peace-building. The approach is based on nine different tracks: government, professional conflict resolution, business, private citizen, research and training, activism, religious, funding, communication. The Institute's activities are currently in Cyprus, the Middle East, Liberia, Greater Horn of Africa, Cuba, Nicaragua, Tibet, Taiwan. The Institute identifies risk-takers to provide leadership in resolving violent conflict. It has trained 450 Greek

and Turkish people in Cyprus. It has also identified 9 core leaders in Liberia. and it also led leaders of conflicting areas to initiate dialogues. The Institute recognizes the importance of local political will in preventing and resolving conflicts.

- ***The Institute for Resource and Security Studies***

  The Winston Foundation for World Peace
  27 Ellsworth Avenue
  Cambridge, MA 02139
  Telephone: 617-491-5177
  Fax: 617-491-6904
  Contact: Paula Gutlove

  Focus: Democracy-building, human rights, sustainable development.
  Types of activities: Research, policy analysis, program evaluation, skills training, public education, direct assistance to promote dialogue between parties to a conflict.

  The Institute for Resource and Security Studies is working closely with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to introduce NGO involvement in conflict prevention. The Institute works in the Balkans, Central and Eastern Europe and in the US. It has worked with Members of Congress and others associated with the legislative branch of government. Its US activities focus on conflict management and security planning.

  The Institute's activities are multi-level. It places emphasis on Track II problem-solving, making extensive use of problem-solving workshops. The Institute carries out skills training and public education and implements joint action projects, a form of functional reconciliation that brings conflicting parties together to work on a project of mutual interest. This could involve a public health issue or rebuilding schools. In the Balkans the Institute brought people together around the impact of the refugee problem. In the process of the joint action project the Institute carries out reconciliation.

  The Institute believes that a progressive approach now taking place promotes collaborative, team efforts among practitioners from different occupations and disciplines. Such collaborative efforts are taking place in Burundi and Macedonia and represent a multi-faceted way of preventing conflict.

- ***Institute of World Affairs***

  1321 Pennsylvania Ave. SE
  Washington, DC 20003
  Telephone: 202-544-4141
  Fax: 202-544-5115
  Contact: Bradford P. Johnson, Executive Director

  Focus: Democracy building, human rights, religion, economic development, and humanitarian relief.
  Types of activities: Skill training.

  The Institute of World Affairs works extensively with diplomats. The Institute takes an integrated approach to the conflict resolution training activities it carries out with the diplomatic community.

It considers the issues of democracy-building, human right economic development, religion, and humanitarian needs as they affect conflict prevention and resolution.

The Institute provides professional development and training for international civil servants. It works extensively with the UN diplomatic community in New York and increasingly with the diplomatic community in Washington. The Institute does some work with the OAS and the OAU. Its skills training programs emphasize negotiation and reconciliation processes. Participants in training programs gain exposure to Track II problem methods and case studies.

- ***International Alert***

  1 Glyn Street
  London SE11 5HT, UK
  Telephone: 44-0-71-793-8383
  Fax: 44-0-71-793-7975
  Contact: Kumar Rupesinghe, Secretary General

Focus: Democracy-building, human rights.
Types of activities: Skills training, technical assistance, advocacy.

International Alert (IA) is an independent, international non-governmental organization, established in 1985. It seeks to contribute to resolving internal conflict by promoting peace and conciliation through dialogue, and furthering the observance and enhancement of international humanitarian and human rights standards.

IA represents an innovative initiative in international relations aimed at defining and implementing a role for non-governmental organizations in conflict resolution and conflict avoidance. The organization works on conflict and human rights issues that involve groups rather than individuals. It tries to establish workable dialogues between conflicting parties when there are violent conflicts within states. It also seeks to prevent such conflicts before they emerge, through international initiatives and support for bridge-building efforts.

The current program includes work in East and Southern Africa, Central America, South and East Asia, and Europe. Specific projects are on racism in Europe and on the themes of early warnings of conflict and codes of conduct for combatants.

In fulfilling its role, IA maintains a position of committed neutrality, commitment to international standards of human rights and humanitarian law and impartiality with regard to the parties in any conflict.

Fundamentally, IA does not intervene except by invitation and whenever possible it works in cooperation with local partners. Then, in the search for a peaceful resolution, it has several functions. IA alerts the international community to potential conflict and presses for preventive diplomacy. It identifies the causes of conflict through research and fact-finding field missions. It also encourages person-to-person dialogue, mediation and conciliation through roundtable conferences, seminars and workshops. Through them, IA trains local partners in ways of resolving conflicts.

IA promotes codes of conduct and respect for human rights and humanitarian laws according to accepted international standards. It also evaluates progress continuously, adjusting its approach to meet the needs of the moment. IA works with the network of international organizations and individuals engaged in conflict resolution, as well as with all sides involved in the conflict, whether government, opposition or other group.

- ***International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis***
  A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria
  Telephone: 43-2236-807-259
  Fax: 43-2236-73-149
  Contact: Bertram I. Spector

Focus: Environmental, economic, and social development.
Types of activities: Research.

International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), founded in 1972, is a non-governmental, non-profit international research institute. IIASA investigates issues of sustainability and the human dimensions of global change. Its researchers generate methods and tools useful to both decision makers and the scientific community. IIASA maintains neutrality and impartiality and provides non-political and objective perspectives.

The research is international and inter-disciplinary. Flexibility, integration, and advantages of multi-culturalism of IIASA replace traditionally rigid boundaries of scientific study. It has 17 national member organizations in Asia, Europe, and North America. IIASA's major topics are modeling uncertainty and dynamic process; decision support methods; and new ideas in risk management and fairness. An IIASA focus is the driving forces of development. It studies population, technologies, economics, and policies such as the economic transition of countries in Eastern Europe and their subsequent integration in the world economy.

- ***International Republican Institute***
  1212 New York Avenue NW, Suite 900
  Washington, DC 20005
  Telephone: 202-408-9450
  Fax: 202-408-9462
  Contact: Ed Stewart, Director of African Affairs

Focus: Democracy-building.
Types of activities: Skills training, direct services for institution building.

The International Republican Institute (IRI) carries out activities that prevent conflict within its democracy-building portfolio. IRI activities have included what IRI calls conflict avoidance activities in Mozambique. IRI is preparing to carry out comparable efforts in Angola. IRI staff are concerned that elections and democratic change in Africa require a framework that offers positive-sum results since democratic change and elections that produce zero-sum, winner-takes-all results often lead to violence.

IRI began work in Mozambique in 1994 to bolster the actual and perceived legitimacy of democratic change. On the grounds that it was crucial for political elites to buy into the process of democratic change, IRI initially worked to address the political hostility and fears of the opposing elites in Frelimo and Renamo. IRI directed its first phase of activities at building trust with both political parties, using separate teams to work with each party so as to safeguard confidentiality and build trust to encourage these political parties to stay in the political process. IRI teams approached Renamo and Frelimo concerning their respective plans of action within the Parliament after the election. They worked through scenarios that assumed electoral victory as well as the more difficult context of electoral defeat. International observers were especially concerned that Renamo would leave the process in the case of electoral defeat, and that this might lead to a resumption of violent conflict. Now, while in opposition, Renamo forms a strong minority caucus within the Parliament, with over 100 members of the Parliament. IRI's role was to help the political parties understand a framework and carry out a plan of action as a loyal, constructive, effective, and honorable opposition.

IRI helped to introduce subjects such as standing rules of debate and procedure. They exposed the political parties to parliamentary procedures. IRI focused on procedures Westminster parliamentary systems provide to a framework that gives an opposition party a voice and a vote. The training IRI provided played a role in keeping Renamo within a process that most observers expected it to leave.

The second phase of IRI's program focused on helping to ensure the legitimacy of the electoral process since IRI felt there was a danger of resentment and rejection of the electoral presence. The challenge was for the losing party to believe and accept that it had lost the election. IRI trained 31,000 poll watchers from both political parties to meet both parties' need for independent proof, outside the international community, of the integrity of the electoral results.

The third phase of IRI's program was parliamentary training. IRI helped the political parties to carry out the plans of action they developed in the first phase. Reports are currently coming in describing the important role played by the Renamo opposition in the Parliament. IRI also has provided training on oversight and investigative roles of a legislature reinforcing a system of checks and balances. IRI has trained most of the Mozambican Parliamentarians in these matters.

IRI works globally and carries out its programs on a multi-level basis. Its priority is on building the capacities of political parties. IRI has recently reduced the number of its programs, focusing on the quality of its product, not the quantity. IRI is making a major effort to develop mechanisms for examining the impact of their programs. It feels that in an environment of diminished resources and a skeptical US Congress evaluation and impact are key issues.

- ***Kettering Foundation***
  444 North Capitol Street NW
  Washington, DC 20001
  Telephone: 202-393-4478
  Fax: 202-393-7644
  Contact: Harold H. Saunders, Director of International Affairs

Focus: Conflict prevention and resolution, ethnic relations, religion, building civil society.
Types of activities: Dispute management, sustained dialogue, institution building.

The Kettering Foundation has identified two complementary programmatic focal points. One is a process that the Foundation calls sustained dialogue to change conflictual relationships. The other involves work that the Foundation has carried out to strengthen civil society. The Foundation has found that people have difficulty at the end of efforts to change relationships in conflict. The difficulty persists until they talk about what kind of post-conflict country or community they want to have. The challenge is how to build the structures that make up civil society.

The process of sustained dialogue treats deep-rooted human conflict. The Kettering Foundation uses this process when the parties to the conflict are not ready for mediation, negotiation, or referenda. These deeply rooted conflicts often center on ethnic, religious, and racial divisions. People don't negotiate easily about their identities, fears or historic grievances. The Foundation uses a methodology to begin to change the conflictual relationships so that mediation and negotiation can take place.

An example of this methodology is a Kettering Foundation program with people involved in the civil war in Tadzhikistan. The Foundation began this work in Tadzhikistan in March 1993, thirteen months before the UN succeeded in beginning formal mediation between government and opposition forces. The process involved six meetings of sustained dialogue every ten weeks. Each meeting lasted for three days. Through the sustained dialogue the opposition forces changed positions. Right after that the government of Tadzhikistan decided to join the negotiations. Credible sources believe this dialogue and the change in opposition position strengthened those within the government advocating negotiation. The Foundation is also applying this process in a dialogue involving racial conflict in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

The Foundation's sustained dialogue process comprises five stages:

- Recruitment: to identify people in communities or countries willing to talk with the other side;
- Mapping: participants identify the causes and grievances underlying the conflict;
- Generating Change: participants identify and examine deeply the specific, paramount problem they will work on to prevent or resolve conflict;
- Building Scenarios: participants are sitting side by side, not across from each other, and thinking together about ways to generate changes they agree on;
- Acting Together: participants agree on and carry out specific action steps to generate change that can prevent or resolve conflict.

■ ***The Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies***
University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, IN 46556
Telephone: 219-631-6970
Fax: 219-631-6973
Contact: Raimo Vayrinen

- ***Life and Peace Institute***
  S-75170
  Uppsala, Sweden
  Telephone: 46-18-169500
  Fax: 46-18-693059
  Contact: Sture Normark

Focus: Religion, justice, reconciliation.
Types of activities: Research.

The Life and Peace Institute initiated research on the relationship between theology, church activities and peace work both historically and in current conflicts with the hope that this would contribute to the work of the churches on justice, peace and reconciliation. The Institute developed a program in the Horn of Africa with a focus on action-research. Action-research, developed collaboratively with their global partners, intends to increase theoretical understanding in order to contribute to decision-making, advocacy, and policy-making. Action-research, built upon a solid knowledge and conceptual base, is concerned with furthering peace with justice, developing peaceful communities, safe environments, and just political, social, and economic relationships.

The Institute gives priority to four program areas: the role of religion in conflict and peace; human rights and economic justice; nonviolent conflict resolution; and the Horn of Africa.

The Institute developed the research examining the local-level political process in Southern Somalia with particular attention to the newly formed District Councils and their ability to initiate and contribute to a process of national or regional reconciliation. The Institute has received requests to engage in peace-building work in Sudan and Rwanda, and analyzes the complicated ethnic situation in Ethiopia. In Sudan and Eritrea, the Institute focuses on the refugee issue, investigating the implementation of repatriation, the cooperation of international NGOs with the Eritrean government, and the actual experiences of different groups of returnees.

- ***Médecins sans Frontières***
  11 East 26th Street, Suite 1904
  New York, NY 10010
  Telephone: 212-679-6800
  Fax: 212-679-7016
  Contact: Joelle Tanguy, Executive Director

Focus: Humanitarian relief.
Types of activities: Technical assistance, direct service.

Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) is an independent international voluntary emergency relief organization. Its mission is to provide assistance to victims of hardship, catastrophic natural disasters and acts of war throughout the world. More than 5,000 doctors and nurses and other medical professionals have worked as volunteers in over 80 countries. Each year, approximately 2,000 volunteers serve in some 65 countries. MSF's goal is to intervene with speed and efficiency

in critical emergency situations. Quite often it is the first relief organization at the scene of a violent conflict or natural disaster.

MSF helps to administer refugee camps in close cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. It estimates that there are over 20 million refugees in the world and the number continues to grow. MSF is the recognized leader in cholera epidemic management and is at the forefront of immunization programs. MSF often trains local people in public health skills.

MSF funds Epicentre, the only center for scientific study and training in the epidemiology of disaster. Epicentre's findings are published in journals such as the *Journal of the American Medical Association.* Most of the World Health Organization's disaster training is done at Epicentre.

- ***National Coalition Building Institute***
  1835 K Street NW, Suite 201
  Washington, DC 20006
  Telephone: 202-296-3610
  Fax: 202-296-3726
  Contact: Unyong Kim, National Associate

Focus: Community-building as a form of democracy building, human rights, interreligious relations.
Types of activities: Skills training, technical assistance, public education, advocacy of diversity and prejudice reduction.

The National Coalition Building Institute (NCBI) focuses on community building. Among its major activities are prejudice reduction and coalition building. NCBI works primarily in North America (Canada and the United States), with additional experience in Northern Ireland, South Africa, the Middle East, England and the German-speaking section of Switzerland.

NCBI's multi-level work includes leadership skills training development. NCBI has developed tools to treat difficult issues that polarize people along group identity lines. In the United States, NCBI works with issues such as the recent Million Man March, prayer in schools, trans-racial adoption and immigration issues like California's Proposition 187. NCBI held a workshop at the UN's Women's' Conference in Beijing. The topic was the differing perceptions of feminism of women from the industrialized West and women from Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean.

NCBI usually receives an invitation to provide its services. The organization's expertise lies in taking a polarizing issue and exploring it with a group. NCBI selects two people who have strong views on an issue. It works with these two persons who provide instructive examples of the importance of "deep listening skills." The exercise requires coaching the participants to help them develop good listening skills so that participants can move beyond positions to the interests that make people feel so strongly about a matter. The group then works to chart the underlying interests on both sides of the issue. The next step is to focus on identifying those interests that are common to both sides. This effectively reformats the issue so as to reduce the issue's polarizing

quality and build a basis for cooperation. The group then brainstorms on ways it can resolve the reformatted issue. This process involves the identification of winnable goals through cooperation.

NCBI also makes use of prejudice reduction workshops. These workshops provide people with a greater understanding of their intra-group and inter-group prejudices. This process involves awareness and skill-building. The goal is to help people to become effective leaders of change in prejudice reduction and community building.

NCBI believes there are pressing needs for pro-active intervention to prevent violent conflict and for grassroots empowerment. This empowerment means building the capacity of anyone to take leadership to build an organization or community. NCBI seeks to unleash initiative within communities. NCBI's findings point to the importance of team building as a requirement of community leadership. The goals are to heal powerlessness and break down a sense of isolation.

NCBI believes there is a market for help on inter-group conflict within the ranks diverse groups of leaders. The issues that lead to polarization are often the issues leaders find themselves attacked for not handling effectively. Leaders want help on tough and polarizing issues. NCBI has developed processes for helping leaders with what NCBI calls "leadership oppression." Leadership oppression is a form of mistreatment of human beings who take leadership roles. NCBI has used its skill building and healing methodologies with elected officials, managers, police chiefs, professors, and administrators in the US and abroad.

- ***National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI)***
  1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 5th Floor
  Washington, DC 20036
  Telephone: 202-328-3136
  Fax: 202-939-3166
  Contact: Ned McMahon, Senior Program Officer

Focus: Democracy-building.
Types of activities: Technical assistance, skills training, advocacy.

NDI carries out numerous activities with civil society and political parties, operating globally at the grassroots and national levels to strengthen electoral administration and build democratic political cultures. NDI administers programs in the Greater Horn region in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Burundi.

NDI focusses on building the capacity of legitimate, democratic political institutions. NDI's goal is to enhance the ability of societies to channel conflict through peaceful and democratic political processes. NDI focusses on institution-building and democracy-building, facing the challenge of helping societies to set up institutions in some cases, and in others, assisting in improving capacity.

NDI rates programs in the field but faces difficulties in quantifying results. NDI looks at indicators such as the increased ability of political actors to compromise and negotiate with each other or the ability of opposition parties and personalities to play a role in the political process in

addition to objectively quantifiable measurements such as the number of civic groups or political parties created or aided or the numbers of women it has helped bring into democratic processes.

NDI has devoted significant attention to indicators of success or failure of democratic change. Mr. McMahon cited Burundi as an instructive example. A finding was that Burundi had set up a zero-sum democratic political system. He believes that this zero-sum system, though democratic, was not functional in light of Burundi's socio-economic structure. Other countries have worked to set up a more positive-sum institutional framework in which the country's politics are not solely focused on the Presidential chair. A poorly managed democratic transition can increase polarization and conflict. A major challenge comes from weak national institutional settings with divisions based on ethnicity and regionalism. A zero-sum, Darwinian democracy with definite winners and losers is polarizing and can lead to violent conflict and the destruction whatever thin ties there are in a nation-building exercise. The challenge is to work with African countries to find ways to build institutions that offer positive-sum political contexts. NDI is helping countries to build institutions and frameworks that promote political pluralism, decentralization, and participation in political processes.

- ***National Peace Corps Association***
  1900 L Street NW, Suite 205
  Washington, DC 20036
  Telephone: 202-293-7728
  Fax: 202-293-7554
  Contact: Charles Dambach, President

Focus: Peace building, conflict prevention and resolution.
Types of activities: Advocacy, technical service. advocacy.

The National Peace Corps Association identifies former Peace Corps Volunteers with expertise in peace building, conflict prevention and resolution. It offers a human resource bank to supply persons with experience in conflict prevention to help reduce violent conflict in specific regions, nations, and locales. Former Peace Corps Volunteers have extensive knowledge of the cultural and historical context of the countries in which they served. The National Peace Corps Association functions as a referral service to help in discrete situations involving conflict prevention.

The National Peace Corps Association has recently taken an active role in conflict prevention and resolution issues. The Association has identified several leaders in conflict prevention and resolution. The Association has among its membership persons with experience in all the regions of the globe. It played an active role in Somalia, providing former Volunteers who had retained contact and were current on Somali affairs. The Association feels that knowledge and understanding of the social and historical context is crucial to effective conflict prevention and resolution.

- ***Organization of American States, Unit for the Promotion of Democracy***
  1889 F Street NW
  Washington, DC 20006
  Telephone: 202-458-3879
  Fax: 202-458-6250
  Contact: Ms. Ann-Marie Blackman, Senior Specialist

- ***Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) High Commission of National Minorities***
  P.O. Box 20062
  2500EB
  The Hague, Netherlands
  Telephone: 31-70-3622-588
  Fax: 31-70-3635-910
  Contact: Elizabeth Teague

- ***Parliamentarians for Global Action***
  211 E. 43rd Street, Suite 1604
  New York, NY 10017
  Telephone: 212-687-7755
  Fax: 212-687-8409
  Contact: Aaron Tovish, Program Director for Peace and Security

Focus: Democracy-building.
Types of activities: Research, policy analysis, advocacy, skills training, direct services.

Parliamentarians for Global Action provides direct services, carrying out conflict resolution in several regions and countries. It makes use of political psychology in conflict prevention and resolution. The organization has worked in Suriname and Haiti in the Western Hemisphere, throughout Southeast Asia (except Burma) and has a program on Africa and Democracy. Parliamentarians for Global Action works with parliamentarians, carrying out its efforts nationally and internationally to assist parliamentarians in developing skills that apply at the sub-national level.

Parliamentarians for Global Action employs communication, mediation, negotiation, and reconciliation processes. The members of Parliamentarians for Global Action are politicians from government and opposition parties. Membership is voluntary. Members use communications tools among legislative peers to dialogue on issues surrounding conflict. Off-shoots of the organization's activities include the establishment of affiliates and indigenous organizations of parliamentarians carrying out self-generated dialogue. In many instances the process of dialogue between conflicting parties is a sign of impact and progress. This is especially true of parliamentarians who continue to pursue dialogue on their own initiative.

- ***Partners for Democratic Change***
  823 Ulloa Street,
  San Francisco, CA 94127
  Telephone: 415-665-9171
  Fax: 415-665-2732
  Contact: Raymond Schonholtz

Focus: Democracy-building.
Types of activities: Skills training, technical assistance.

Partners for Democratic Change (PDC), established in 1989, is a non-profit organization committed to advancing the democratic management of conflict and civil society building in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. A regional organization of National Centers in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, and Slovakia, PDC provides conflict resolution training and services for government, business and non-government sectors. PDC's work is based on the concept that conflict need not be divisive, but can be utilized for positive change and the peaceful expression of diverse ideas leading to the development of civil society.

PDC is built upon the understanding that the most effective, responsive, long-standing, and culturally appropriate means for managing conflict is achieved by developing an indigenous capacity to address in-country conflicts and challenges. Through combining US resources and expertise with indigenous talent and knowledge of the social, economic, and political climate of the region, PDC's Centers design and implement conflict resolution programs and projects relevant to the specific needs of each country.

PDC provides training services to national government ministries, local government officials, environmental groups, elementary and secondary schools, ethnic minority groups, NGO activists, and private enterprise. PDC programs include conflict management skills training for representatives from the government, non-government, and private sectors; neutral, third-party facilitation for meetings, disputes, and strategic planning sessions in such areas as labor management problems, political party consensus building; ethnic conciliation commissions to discuss ethnic/minority based conflicts through a neutral participatory mechanism; university and academic programs in conflict management; and an East-to-East Training-for-Trainers Program to develop a cadre of highly-qualified indigenous trainers capable of providing relevant conflict resolution skills and programs throughout the new democracies.

- ***Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution Program***
  School of International Service
  The American University
  4400 Massachusetts Avenue NW
  Washington, DC 20016
  Telephone: 202-885-1632
  Fax: 202-885-1632
  Contact: Professor Abdul Said

Focus: Democracy, human rights, economic development, religion.
Types of activities: Skills training, public education, advocacy.

American University's Peace and Conflict Resolution Program trains teachers in conflict resolution for participants from the US and abroad. The program emphasizes cross-cultural negotiations and reconciliation processes using a multi-level global approach. The program is spearheaded by Dr. Abdul Said, a long-time intergovernmental interlocutor and prolific writer on conflict resolution who has conducted policy analyses for the US State Department and US Information Agency and who serves on the boards of several conflict resolution and peace organizations.

- ***Peacekeeping Institute***
  US Army War College
  Carlisle Barracks
  Carlisle, PA 17013-5050
  Telephone: 717-245-3740
  Fax: 717-245-3279
  Contact: Col. Karl Farris, Director

Focus: Democracy-building.
Types of activities: Research and study of peacekeeping operations as a method of non-violent conflict resolution.

The United States Army Peacekeeping Institute researches and analyzes peacekeeping operations, applying its findings to the instructional programs at the Army War College and to its training programs in peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement for US military units in the field.

The Peacekeeping Institute provides seminars and colloquia globally, working with all of the unified commands in education and training for peacekeeping and peacekeeping enforcement. The Peacekeeping Institute works at the strategic and working levels. The Peacekeeping Institute helps joint task force commands translate broad political mandates and statements into operations. It also helps members of the US military work as participants in multi-national peacekeeping efforts, orienting US military personnel to work with multinational staffs, international organizations and NGOs.

The Institute provides extensive training in negotiation skills down to the level of non-commissioned officers. This teaching focuses on principles of negotiation. The Peacekeeping Institute receives informal feedback on its training programs from personnel involved in peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

The Institute is currently helping the 1st Armored Division and the Allied Reaction Corps in preparation for service in Bosnia, in particular in their assignments to chair joint military commissions. These duties will require negotiation with military from other countries and the several factions in Bosnia.

- ***Program on the Analysis and Resolution of Conflicts***
  Syracuse University
  410 Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs
  Syracuse, NY 13244
  Telephone: 315-443-2367
  Fax: 315-443-3818
  Contact: Robert A. Rubinstein, Director

- ***The Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School***
  Harvard Law School
  513 Pound Hall
  Cambridge, MA 02138
  Telephone: 617-495-1684
  Fax: 617-495-7818
  Contact: Lawrence Susskind

Focus: Negotiation.
Types of activities: Research, skills training.

The Program on Negotiation is an applied research center committed to improving the theory and practice of negotiation and dispute resolution. The Program works to change the way people, organizations, and nations resolve their disputes, shifting the process from "win-lose" outcomes to "all-gain" solutions.

The Program aims to design, implement, and evaluate better dispute resolution practices; promote collaboration and communication among practitioners and scholars; develop educational programs and materials for instruction in negotiation and dispute resolution; and increase public awareness and understanding of successful conflict resolution efforts.

- ***Refugee Policy Group***
  1424 16th Street NW, Suite 401
  Washington, DC 20036
  Telephone: 202-387-3015
  Fax: 202-667-5034
  Contact: Steven Hansch, Senior Program Officer

Focus: Humanitarian relief, law, human rights.
Types of activities: Research, policy analysis.

The Refugee Policy Group (RPG) identifies gaps in meeting the humanitarian needs of populations in crisis, working with human problems that the system of humanitarian relief organizations is not meeting. RPG operates globally, bringing people and organizations together to find effective ways to meet the needs of vulnerable populations. It does not carry out programs of relief. RPG works with several international organizations to improve coordination. Its multi-level research and policy analysis activities examine all the tools used to prevent and resolve conflict. RPG also performs extensive evaluations of projects carried out by other organizations. The RPG published two studies in 1994 in which it examined the impact of humanitarian aid in Somalia.

- ***Refugees International***
  21 Dupont Circle NW
  Washington, DC 20036
  Telephone: 202-828-0110
  Fax: 202-828-0819
  Contact: Lionel Rosenblatt, President

  Focus: Humanitarian relief, prevention of emergencies, humanitarian support in times of emergency.
  Types of activities: Advocacy.

  Refugees International acts as an on-site organization in emergency situations. Refugees International identifies emergency situations, provides early warning and advocacy for timely action by governments and the international community, and works in disaster sites to identify the most urgent life-saving actions. The organization carries out advocacy in Africa, Europe, and Asia, and has worked on a sustained basis with Indochinese refugees, in Cambodia, and especially in the Rwanda and Burundi crises.

  Refugees International examines disaster situations at the grassroots, then brings advocacy to bear at the national and international levels. It works to influence policy responses to translate its assessment into actions by policy makers. It focuses on methods to deliver humanitarian aid and to prevent the outbreak of violence.

  Refugees International was one of the four the founding agencies of the Burundi Forum, a collection of NGOs and governmental representatives that examines ways to improve the situation in Burundi. Refugees International publishes findings and recommendations on many emergency situations across the globe. Recent examples are findings and recommendations on Cambodia and the Rwanda repatriation, with special attention paid to analyzing the availability of food.

- ***School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)***
  Johns Hopkins University
  1740 Massachusetts Avenue NW
  Washington, DC 20036
  Telephone: 202-663-5600
  Fax: 202-663-5683
  Contact: I. William Zartman, Director of African Studies

- ***School of Foreign Service***
  571028 Georgetown University
  Washington, DC 20057-1028
  Telephone: 202-687-5074
  Fax: 202-687-2315
  Contact: Chester Crocker, Distinguished Landegger Professor of Diplomacy

- ***Search for Common Ground***

  1601 Connecticut Avenue NW, Suite 200
  Washington, DC 20009
  Telephone: 202-265-4300
  Fax: 202-232-6718
  Contact: John Marks, Executive Director

Focus: Societal process of conflict resolution, conflict resolution as a key goal in democracy building, human rights, economic development.
Types of activities: Technical assistance, skills training, dispute management, organizational capacity and institution building, economic development, and public education.

Search for Common Ground is a leader in conflict prevention and efforts to turn conflict into preventive action. It is a pioneer in developing a "toolbox" to prevent conflict. Its "toolbox" contains eighteen tools for conflict prevention. Search for Common Ground views conflict prevention and resolution as a societal process. It sees its role as helping a society to shift from the use of violence to resolve problems. The goal of the organization is to aid in creating a culture that is less adversarial and prone to violence. It uses a comprehensive, societal approach to conflict resolution.

The organization uses these tools to resolve conflict on a global scale. It works in many regions including the Middle East, Africa, the Balkans, Sri Lanka, the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union and the United States.

Search for Common Ground's toolbox includes problem-solving forums, roundtables, training in journalism and hands-on skills and television and radio programming. The organization is active in community organizing and uses joint action projects to foster cooperation among conflicting parties. In Macedonia it is promoting cooperation between ethnic Slavs and Albanians in cleaning up religious sites. In the United States, its Life and Choice Network builds bridges between conflicting sides of the abortion issue based on a collaborative approach. Programs include conflict resolution training for youth in school settings.

Search for Common Ground produces several publications including *Bulletin for Regional Cooperation in the Middle East* as well as a book on arms control and security in the Middle East. Search for Common Ground makes extensive use of computer networks and multiple media to promote conflict prevention and resolution. In Burundi, it is working to set up a computer network for local NGOs and community organizations. Addition work in Burundi is in community organizing, where the organization collaborated with the UN and USAID to bring together seventy-six Hutu and Tutsi women for a conference on peace and non-violence.

Search for Common Ground has also set up policy coordination forums to improve coordination between NGOs, governments, and international organizations. These forums now operate for Burundi and Macedonia. Search for Common Ground's partners in the Burundi Policy Forum are the African-American Institute, the Council on Foreign Relations, and Refugees International.

Search for Common Ground has found that comprehensive, multi-tool efforts to prevent conflict improve the chances for conflict prevention. It believes that the simultaneous application of

several tools enhances the chance that a win-win, common ground result can take hold. It also believes there is significant potential for cross-adaptation. Lessons it learns in one geographical area often apply elsewhere. Search for Common Ground calls its approach "simultaneity."

Search for Common Ground has found that tools for conflict prevention and resolution are most effective when outsiders do not "parachute" into a foreign nation to carry out a project. Its staff live in the countries they seek to help. They manage multi-tool, long-term efforts.

- ***Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation***
  Stanford University, Cronin Quadrangle
  Stanford, CA 94305-8610
  Telephone: 415-723-2574
  Fax: 415-725-0253
  Contact: Andrew Ward, Director

Focus: Negotiation.
Types of activities: Research.

The Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation (SCCN) is an interdisciplinary research center dedicated to building theory in the areas of conflict and conflict resolution. A primary focus of SCCN is identifying the strategic, psychological, and institutional barriers to conflict resolution.

SCCN research examines conflict between individuals, interest groups, corporations and nations as well as intrapersonal or cognitive conflict. Interests include alternative dispute resolution, collective bargaining, decision making under uncertainty, the role of information in bargaining, and international negotiation.

SCCN has conducted various studies such as game theoretic modeling of civil litigation, psycho-linguistic research into the language of conflict resolution, a study of the dispute resolution system in San Francisco homeless shelters, and an analysis of peacemaking in post-war Nicaragua.

- ***TransAfrica Forum***
  1744 R Street NW
  Washington, DC 20009
  Telephone: 202-797-2301
  Fax: 202-797-2382
  Contact: Cherry Waters, Director, TransAfrica Forum

Focus: Democracy-building, human rights, sustainable economic development.
Types of activities: research, policy analysis, program evaluation, public education.

TransAfrica Forum's work focuses on Africa, the Caribbean, and Latin America. The Forum is planning to set up formal relationships with partner organizations in all three regions in order to carry out collaborative efforts with indigenous institutions. In the Caribbean, the Forum is now setting up a partnership with the University of the West Indies. In Latin America, the Forum is seeking a partner organization in Brazil. It is working to set up cooperative relationships with three organizations in Africa.

The Forum focuses its activities at the national and international levels. The policy tools it uses are communication, development, and peacekeeping. The Forum will produce several bibliographic resources in 1996 that can be useful in conflict prevention and resolution.

The Forum believes that it is especially important for practitioners in conflict resolution to pay attention to the cultural context. The Forum works to ensure that indigenous peoples and organizations participate and play central roles in Forum activities so that Forum efforts fit into the local context.

- ***United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD)***
  Place des Nations 1211
  Geneva 10, Switzerland
  Telephone: 41-22-798-8400
  Fax: 41-22-704-0791

- ***The United Nations Secretariat***
  European Division, DPA
  United Nations Plaza
  New York, NY 10017
  Contact: David Biggs

- ***United States Mission to the United Nations***
  Military Staff Committee
  799 United Nations Plaza
  New York, NY 10017
  Telephone: 212-415-4150
  Fax: 212-415-4154
  Contact: Colonel Bill Klontz

Focus: Peacekeeping, preventive diplomacy and deployment, humanitarian assistance.
Types of activities: Direct services, technical assistance.

The Military Staff Committee carries out peacekeeping, preventive diplomacy and deployment to prevent violent conflict. The Committee engages in humanitarian aid, providing direct services, communication equipment and technical support to humanitarian efforts and human rights activities. For example, the Committee provides transportation support, organizing transportation for relief workers and human rights monitors. The Military Staff Committee carries out advocacy to support the United States government's position within the UN. It operates globally, with recent work in Africa, Haiti, Central Europe and Bosnia.

The Committee's approach is multi-level. About half of its effort centers on working within the US and the US government's inter-agency process. The Committee's international work features activities within the UN system, regional/sub-regional and bi-lateral activities. Peacekeeping is a primary task. The Committee devotes considerable time to mediation and negotiation.

- ***The Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO)***
  444 North Capitol Street NW, Suite 846
  Washington, DC 20001-1570
  Telephone: 202-637-0475
  Fax: 202-637-0585
  Contact: Julie Berriault, Executive Director

Focus: Democracy-building, human rights.
Types of activities: Education, training.

The Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), founded in 1991, provides a voice for peoples not represented in established international forums. UNPO aids its members in pursuing social change through non-violent channels. UNPO is a democratically organized institution founded by the nations and peoples it serves. Participation in UNPO is open to occupied nations, indigenous peoples, minorities, and oppressed majorities who have no official representation in the international community.

UNPO supports standards such as principles of non-violence, respect for human rights, the right to self-determination and democracy for all, protection of the environment, and the rejection of intolerance.

UNPO's service includes education and training in the fields of diplomacy, democratic processes and institution-building, non-violent conflict resolution and management, international and human rights law, environmental protection, and women's leadership. UNPO works with the Urgent Action Council which takes initiatives to investigate, monitor or act as a mediation team to help implement non-violent resolutions to conflicts. UNPO's members consist of indigenous groups such as Abkhzia of Australia, Kurdistan, Sanjak, and East Timor, and newly independent states such as Armenia, Estonia, and other former Soviet Union.

- ***US Institute of Peace***
  1550 M Street NW, Suite 700
  Washington, DC 20005
  Telephone: 202-457-1700
  Fax: 202-429-6063
  Contact: Richard Solomon, President

Focus: Democracy-building, development.
Types of activities: Research, training.

The US Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan federal institution. The Institute mobilizes the best national and international talent from research organizations, academia, and government to support policy-makers by providing independent and creative assessments of how to deal with international conflict situations by political means. It facilitates resolution of international disputes through "Track II" encounters among parties to conflicts and by preparing US negotiators for mediation work. The Institute offers training for international affairs professionals in conflict management and resolution techniques, mediation and negotiating skills.

The Institute strengthens curricula and instruction from high school through graduate education, concentrating on the changing character of international conflict and non-violent approaches to managing international disputes. It raises the level of student and public awareness about international conflicts and peacemaking efforts through grants, scholarships, publications, electronic outreach, and conferences.

The Institute focuses on issues affecting international peace. For example, the Institute works with prospects for conflict and negotiation in the Korean peninsula, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the right to secession, and Bosnia.

The Institute is also developing conflict resolution training programs for civic leaders and diplomats, and has supported such training through its grant program. Examples include an international conflict resolution skills training seminar for foreign government and international organization officials, coordinated by the Institute; training in multi-party mediation skills for local and regional civic leaders in South Africa; and seminars to train the trainers of military officers and diplomats serving as United Nations peacekeepers.

- ***The Winston Foundation for World Peace***
  2040 S Street NW, Suite 201
  Washington, DC 20009
  Telephone: 202-483-4215
  Fax: 202-483-4219
  Contact: John Tirman, Executive Director

Focus: Human rights, refugees, religion, economic development, humanitarian relief.
Types of activities: Skills training, policy analysis, program evaluation, advocacy, direct services.

The Winston Foundation for World Peace supports efforts to promote and protect human rights and with refugees. Human rights violations are often an indicator of a deeper set of problems in a society. Refugees are an early indicator of deep-seated conflict in a society.

Most typically the Winston Foundation supports efforts to build the capacity of NGOs to prevent and resolve incipient conflict because NGOs have more freedom of action than government or multi-lateral organizations. In recent years, NGOs have expanded their roles and capacities in areas such as environmental protection, women's reproductive rights, human rights, and humanitarian aid. The Winston Foundation wants to capture increasing NGO energy for conflict prevention. Every NGO regardless of its central mission has an interest in conflict prevention. In addition to capacity building the Winston Foundation supports networking activities. The Winston Foundation also has an interest in experimentation in the ways NGOs can help with incipient conflicts, exploring how NGOs can work with governments and multi-lateral organizations.

The Winston Foundation has carried out activities globally in high-risk countries and regions. Most of the Foundation's work is in the former Soviet Union, Africa, especially Central Africa, and Central America. Its work is multi-level. It supports efforts with the grassroots but also with leaders in public policy. For example, the Winston Foundation funds the Burundi and Macedonia Policy Forums.

Track II problem solving is the main focus for the Winston Foundation. The Foundation has also funded Oxfam with a focus on how development can promote conflict prevention. It has also worked on issues of the media and conflict prevention. The Foundation is also very interested in reconciliation processes. The Foundation funds the Project on Justice in Times of Transition carried out by EGI under the Foundation for a Civil Society.

- ***World Vision***

  220 Eye Street NE, Suite 270
  Washington, DC 20002
  Telephone: 202-547-3743
  Fax: 202-547-4834
  Contact: Dayton L. Maxwell, Senior Advisor, Complex Emergencies, Conflict Management and Reconciliation

Focus: Humanitarian relief.
Types of activities: International development advocacy, policy assessment.

World Vision is an international nongovernmental organization. It identifies the needs of people in violence racked regions, and builds capacities to manage and resolve conflicts. World Vision carries out grassroots development and humanitarian relief in the Greater Horn of Africa. Its impact often extends to the national and regional level. World Vision has three-point approach to conflict prevention. First, it carries out its development activities understanding that it is important to have knowledge of the historical and cultural context. As a religiously based NGO, it assigns great weight to spirituality. Second, World Vision applies a multi-disciplinary approach. Third, it pays great attention to sorting out differing roles and the contradiction and disfunction that can result from a failure to do so. It believes that organizations will have great difficulty unless they carefully define and choose between the roles of advocacy, conflict prevention, humanitarian relief, and development.

World Vision will be focusing on activities in conflict prevention and resolution. It is very concerned with promoting participatory processes to foster sustainable reconciliation. World Vision plans to develop a methodology for assessing conflict resolution and reconciliation, exploring participatory methods for conducting such assessments on the grounds that systematic, participatory assessment is the first step to get people to communicate with one another to prevent conflict. World Vision will examine the more public successful cases of conflict prevention as well as the often less visible cases where success was elusive. It will seek to learn from these case studies and apply lessons learned to its future work.

## ♦ ***Organizations Located Within the Horn***

- ***Africa Leadership Forum***

  Ota-Ogun State, Nigeria
  Telephone: 234-90-406-887
  Contact: Ayodele Aderinwale

Africa Leadership Forum encourages diagnosis, understanding, and an informed search for solutions to local, regional, and global problems, taking full account of their interrelationships and mutual consequences.

The Forum develops, organizes, and supports programs for training of young and promising Africans with leadership potential so as to expose them to the demands, duties, and obligations of leadership positions and to prepare them systematically for assuming higher responsibilities and meeting the challenges of the world. The Forum involves young potential leaders from all sectors of society, cutting across national, regional, continental, professional, and institutional borders.

The Forum also researches appropriate and effective solutions to local and regional African problems and global problems from an African perspective. It works within the framework of global interdependence, including consideration of phased action programs that can be initiated by various countries, sub-regions and institutions.

- ***African Humanitarian Action***
  37, rue Deputé Kayuku
  Kigali, Rwanda
  Telephone: 250-72231
  Fax: 250-72811
  Contact: Ambassador Teffera Shiawl and Dr. Yoans Tegegn

- ***Ministry of State of North Uganda***
  Office of the Prime Minister
  P.O. Box 341
  Kampala, Uganda
  Telephone: 259-819-258-694

- ***Nairobi Peace Initiative***
  P.O. Box 14894
  Nairobi, Kenya
  Telephone: 254-2-441444
  Fax: 254-2-445177
  Contact: Hizkias Assefa

Focus: Conflict prevention and resolution.
Types of activities: Technical assistance, skills training, advocacy, research.

The Nairobi Peace Initiative (NPI) is an international, non-governmental organization. Founded in 1984, NPI promotes peaceful resolution of large-scale social conflicts in Africa. NPI provides mediation and conciliation assistance to organizations and groups engaged in violent conflicts. It undertakes peacebuilding activities at the grass-root level by promoting reconciliation between conflicting ethnic, religious or cultural groups by facilitating conflict resolution activities as well as by training actors in peacemaking and reconciliation processes. NPI organizes symposia, conferences, and workshops to develop new understandings of conflict and conflict transformation processes.

NPI approaches peacemaking as an instrument for profound social transformation aimed at creating a just and humane social order. It involves issues of governance, economic development, and all aspects of organizing society. It has conducted various mediation, training, symposia in countries such as the Greater Horn region, Liberia, Togo, Nigeria, Angola, and South Africa.

- ***Peace and Development Committee***
  P.O. Box 41879
  Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
  Telephone: 251-1-511966
  Fax: 251-1-515714
  Contact: Yusuf Hassen

Focus: Conflict prevention and resolution.
Types of activities: Education. technical assistance.

The Peace and Development Committee is a non-governmental, non-political, non-partisan, non-profit organization established in 1992. Its main objectives are to promote peace and stability and resolve conflicts. It provides civic education on issues related to peace, democracy, human rights, environmental protection, women's rights, and development. It monitors elections and submits independent reports to government and to other concerned organizations.

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# ACRONYMS

| | |
|---|---|
| **AAPO** | All Amhara People's Organization (Ethiopia) |
| **AF/E** | US Department of State, East African Affairs |
| **ANC** | African National Congress (South Africa) |
| **ARF** | ASEAN Regional Forum |
| **ASEAN** | Association of South East Asian Nations |
| **BPF** | Burundi Policy Forum |
| **CBM** | Confidence-Building Measures |
| **CBSM** | Confidence-Building and Security Measures |
| **CCM** | Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Tanzania) |
| **CDR** | Coalition pour la Défense de la République (Rwanda) |
| **CIDSE** | Coopération Internationale pour le Développement et la Solidarité |
| **CNN** | Cable News Network |
| **CR** | Conflict Resolution |
| **CSCE** | Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe |
| **CSIS** | Center for Strategic and International Studies |
| **CSO** | Committee of Senior Officials |
| **CSSDCA** | Conference on Security, Development and Cooperation |
| **CZSC** | Zairian Contingent for Security in the Camps (Zaire) |
| **DEU** | Donor Election Unit (Ethiopia) |
| **EC** | European Community |
| **ECOWAS** | Economic Community of West African States |
| **EDAG** | Ethiopian Democratic Action Group |
| **ELF** | Eritrean Liberation Front |
| **EPDM** | Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement |
| **EPLF** | Eritrean People's Liberation Front |

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|---|---|
| **EPRDF** | Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front |
| **ERD** | Emergency Relief Desk (Sudan) |
| **ERGADA** | Somali Peace and Consultation Committee |
| **ESDL** | Ethiopian Somali Democratic League |
| **ESF** | Economic Support Fund (USAID) |
| **EU** | European Union |
| **FAR** | Forces Armées du Rwanda |
| **FDD** | Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (Burundi) |
| **FORD/K** | Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (Kenya) |
| **FRELIMO** | Frente de Liberação de Moçambique |
| **FRODEBU** | Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi |
| **FRUD** | Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (Djibouti) |
| **FY** | Fiscal Year |
| **FYROM** | Former Yugloslav Republic of Macedonia |
| **GHAI** | Greater Horn of Africa Initiative |
| **GOS** | Government of Sudan |
| **GPDO** | Gideo People's Democratic Organization (Ethiopia) |
| **FTUI** | Free Trade Union Institute (Russia) |
| **HCNM** | High Commission on National Minorities |
| **HIV** | Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus |
| **ICR** | Interactive Conflict Resolution |
| **ICS** | International Conciliation Services |
| **ICVA** | International Council of Voluntary Agencies |
| **IDA** | International Development Association |
| **IDS** | Institute for Development Studies |
| **IFLO** | Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia (Ethiopia) |
| **IFP** | Inkatha Freedom Party (South Africa) |
| **IGADD** | Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development |
| **IFJ** | International Federation of Journalists |
| **IMF** | International Monetary Fund |
| **INTERAHAMWE** | "We fight together" — Rwandan militia |

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|---|---|
| **IPK** | Islamic Party of Kenya |
| **IRI** | International Republican Institute |
| **KANU** | Kenya African National Union |
| **LDRC** | Local Dispute Resolution Committee (South Africa) |
| **LDU** | Local Defence Unit |
| **LPC** | Local Peace Committee (South Africa) |
| **LPI** | Life and Peace Institute |
| **LRA** | Lord's Resistance Army (Sudan) |
| **MAD** | Mutually Assured Destruction |
| **MLLT** | Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray (Ethiopia) |
| **MNRD** | Mouvement National pour la Révolution et le Développement (Rwanda) |
| **MSF** | Médecins Sans Frontières |
| **NAFTA** | North American Free Trade Association |
| **NATO** | North American Treaty Organization |
| **NCBI** | National Coalition Building Institute |
| **NDA** | National Democratic Alliance (Sudan) |
| **NDA** | National Democratic Army (Uganda) |
| **NDI** | National Democratic Institute |
| **NGO** | Non-Governmental Organization |
| **NIF** | National Islamic Front (Sudan) |
| **NIS** | Newly Independent States |
| **NLC** | National Liberation Council (Sudan) |
| **NNA** | Neutral and Non-Aligned Country |
| **NPA** | National Peace Accord (South Africa) |
| **NPC** | National Peace Committee (South Africa) |
| **NPS** | National Peace Secretariat (South Africa) |
| **NPT** | Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty |
| **NRA** | National Resistance Army (Uganda) |
| **NRM** | National Resistance Movement (Uganda) |
| **NYU** | New York University |

| | |
|---|---|
| **OAS** | Organization of American States |
| **OAU** | Organization of African Unity |
| **ODIHR** | Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights |
| **OFDA** | Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, US Agency for International Development |
| **OLF** | Oromo Liberation Front (Ethiopia) |
| **OLS** | Operation Lifeline Sudan |
| **ONLF** | Ogadeni National Liberation Front |
| **OOTW** | Operations Other Than War |
| **OPDO** | Oromo People's Democratic Organization (Ethiopia) |
| **OSCE** | Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe |
| **PALIPEHUTU** | Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu (Burundi) |
| **PARC** | Palo Alto Research Center |
| **PDF** | Popular Defense Forces |
| **PFDJ** | People's Front for Democracy and Justice (Eritrea) |
| **PSW** | Problem-Solving Workshop |
| **RDRC** | Regional Dispute Resolution Committee (South Africa) |
| **RENAMO** | Resistencia Nacional de Moçambique |
| **RMO** | Regional Multilateral Organization |
| **RPA** | Rwandan Patriotic Army |
| **RPC** | Regional Peace Committee (South Africa) |
| **RPF** | Rwandan Patriotic Front |
| **RPG** | Refugee Policy Group |
| **RTLM** | Radio/Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (Rwanda) |
| **SADCC** | South African Development Coordination Conference |
| **SADF** | South African Defense Forces |
| **SAF** | Sudan Allied Forces |
| **SAIS** | School of Advanced International Studies, Georgetown University |
| **SCG/M** | Search for Common Ground/Macedonia |
| **SEOC** | Sudan Emergency Operations Consortium |
| **SNA** | Somali National Alliance |

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| **SNF** | Somali National Front |
| **SNM** | Somali National Movement |
| **SPLA** | Sudan People's Liberation Army |
| **SPM** | Somali Patriotic Movement |
| **SRRA** | Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association |
| **SRSG** | Special Representative of the Secretary General (Burundi) |
| **SSIA** | South Sudan Independence Army |
| **SSNM** | Southern Somali National Movement |
| **TPLF** | Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (Ethiopia) |
| **UNAMIR** | United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda |
| **UNDP** | United Nations Development Programme |
| **UNESCO** | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization |
| **UNHCR** | United Nations High Commission for Refugees |
| **UNITAF** | United Nations International Task Force |
| **UNITAR** | United Nations Institute for Training and Research |
| **UNOMOZ** | United Nations Operations, Mozambique |
| **UNOMSA** | United Nations Observer Mission to South Africa |
| **UNOSOM** | United Nations Operations in Somalia |
| **UNPO** | Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization |
| **UNPROFOR** | United Nations Protection Force |
| **UNRISD** | United Nations Research Institute for Social Democracy |
| **UNSG** | United Nations Secretary General |
| **UPRONA** | Union pour le Progrès National (Burundi) |
| **USAID** | United States Agency for International Development |
| **USC** | United Somali Conference |
| **USCR** | United States Committee for Refugees |
| **USIP** | United States Institute of Peace |
| **WFP** | World Food Programme |
| **WNBF** | West Nile Bank Front (Sudan) |