



**Mozambique's Transition from War to Peace:
USAID's Lessons Learned**

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Executive Summary

In October 1994, Mozambique held its first ever multiparty elections, which formally ended a two-year transition that had begun with the signing of the peace accord in October 1992. USAID was active in the transition, implementing activities to support the peace and working with other donors to make sure that the process stayed on track. This paper documents the lessons learned in the war-to-peace transition, a huge success from USAID's perspective, but one that was not without its share of obstacles.

USAID's transition program encompassed three related strategic objectives: avoid war- and drought-related famine and death, contribute to the implementation of the peace accord, and contribute to the reintegration of populations into stable and productive social and economic activities. The Mission modified existing projects and developed new ones to meet changing needs, relying on task forces to design, implement, and monitor aspects of the transition program. USAID also developed an innovative approach to monitoring its people-level impact, relying on a combination of statistical data from secondary sources and information gleaned from site visits and other reports.

Four projects formed the core of the transition strategy. The PVO Support Project, operational since 1990, used Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) to implement activities to enable the reintegration of rural populations. The Democratic Initiatives Project (DIP), initiated in 1991, provided funds to the United Nations for election logistics, training, and civic education materials, and grants to U.S. organizations to develop a civic education campaign and conduct poll monitor training. The Demobilization/Reintegration Support Project (DRSP) assisted with the demobilization and reintegration of combatants and funded mine clearance activities. The Rural Access Activity (RAA) rehabilitated select roads and bridges to facilitate repatriation, reintegration, and economic rejuvenation. In addition to these projects, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) continued to provide emergency food and non-food distribution, much of it through airlifts, to mitigate the lingering effects of the 1991-92 drought and help to get the rural populations through to the first post-war harvest.

The challenges in the transition were enormous. The Mission was understaffed, depended heavily on regional contract support, and was able to draw on limited technical support in the Regional Economic Development Support Office (REDSO). Preparing for elections in a country with very low literacy levels, minimal government capacity, and almost non-existent infrastructure meant that everything was being done for the first time. Collaborating with the United Nations involved several layers of authority, since new units were established to address specific aspects of the peace accord.

USAID's successes were tremendous, as documented in its fiscal year (FY) 1993-1994 Assessment of Program Impact (API). In particular, the Agency was able to

undertake activities that no other donor could. These included the training of political party monitors for the elections, funds for election logistics, and supplying key services in and around the assembly areas for the demobilizing soldiers.

USAID learned several lessons within its own transition program, and articulated others that pertain to the international community:

- USAID's presence in Mozambique before the peace accord was signed facilitated the transition program because it already had operational projects, though limited, and staff on the ground who were familiar with the country.
- The onset of peace, however, meant that staff levels were suddenly inadequate—a situation that USAID is likely to face in other war-torn countries. USAID found creative solutions to compensate, by establishing task forces, relying on Personal Service Contractors (PSCs) and Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs), and adapting the Mission's organizational structure to meet new needs.
- Interagency task forces greatly facilitated cooperation and communication among staff in USAID, the Embassy, and the U.S. Information Service (USIS), yielding tangible results in each entity's activities. Leadership at the top encouraged staff to work together, and emphasized information-sharing.
- Having a range of flexible funding sources to draw upon is necessary, as is adequate funding. If one funding source cannot be used for various reasons, others can fill critical gaps.
- War-to-peace transitions require taking risks. Donors may find that they must proceed with an activity before they have complete confidence in its technical feasibility, a situation that would be unlikely in a more traditional development program.
- Transitions take time, despite the pressure to move as quickly as possible from signing a peace agreement to holding elections. A more realistic timetable in Mozambique would have made for better planning, and consequently enhanced the use of resources, both human and financial.
- Given the fast-paced nature of transitions and the need to implement activities quickly, the limited capacity for executing grants and contracts slowed program implementation in Mozambique, despite the good cooperation that USAID/Maputo received from the Regional Contracts Office (RCO) in USAID/Swaziland.

- With respect to elections, USAID encountered difficulties in depending on unsolicited proposals. A greater reliance on competitive bidding procedures would have ultimately saved time and reduced tangled negotiations.
- Relations between institutions can be highly complicated. Roles and relationships need to be clearly articulated and understood between organizations working in the same programs or areas.
- Evenhanded treatment of the opposing parties during the transition is essential. One implication is that implementation of many activities will need to be through both non-governmental and host government institutions.
- The UN bureaucracy is not well suited to fast-paced transition programs. Therefore, UN involvement should be based on an unambiguous command structure and tailored to the situation on the ground, and make maximum use of agencies and organizations already active in the country.

List of Acronyms

AA	Assembly Area
ADA	African Disaster Assistance
AFR	Agriculture and Food Resources Office, USAID/Maputo
API	Assessment of Program Impact
ARC	American Refugee Committee
AREAF	Africa Regional Electoral Assistance Fund
CCF	Cease-Fire Commission
CCFADM	Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Forces
CNE	National Elections Commission
CORE	Reintegration Commission (for the demobilized)
CSC	Commission for Supervision and Control
DCM	Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy
DFA	Development Fund for Africa
DIP	Democratic Initiatives Project
DNEP	National Directorate of Roads and Bridges
DRSP	Demobilization/Reintegration Support Project
ESF	Economic Support Fund
FAM	Mozambican Armed Forces
FFP	Food for Peace
FHI	Food for the Hungry International
FRELIMO	Frente da Libertação Moçambicana
FSN	Foreign Service National
FY	Fiscal Year
GPA	General Peace Agreement
GRM	Government of the Republic of Mozambique
GTZ	German Society for Technical Cooperation
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRI	International Republican Institute
MDD	Mine Detecting Dog
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
PACD	Project Assistance Completion Date
PAO	Public Affairs Officer
PDO	Project Development Officer
PIO/T	Project Implementation Order for Technical Assistance
PF	Provincial Fund

PSC	Personal Services Contractor
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
RAA	Rural Access Activity
RCO	Regional Contracts Office
REDSO	Regional Economic Development Support Office
RENAMO	Resistencia Nacional Moçambicana
RFA	Request for Applications
RLA	Regional Legal Advisor
RSS	Reintegration Support Scheme
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
STAE	Technical Secretariat for Elections Administration
TDY	Temporary Duty
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNOHAC	United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination
UNOMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAID/W	United States Agency for International Development/Washington
USG	U.S. Government
USIS	United States Information Service
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organization

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1. Introduction and Overview

1.1. Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to examine the lessons learned in the transition from war to peace in Mozambique, a country that held its first ever multiparty elections October 26-28, 1994. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) worked with other U.S. government (USG) agencies, other donors, the United Nations, and the parties to the peace accord to respond to the changing needs of the country. The effort was a huge success, as recorded in the Mission's fiscal year (FY) 1993-1994 Assessment of Program Impact (API), but not without its share of obstacles. Staff in USAID/Maputo decided it would be beneficial to document the lessons learned to share with others in USAID, particularly those involved in countries emerging from civil war. Since the projects that composed the transition strategy have been or are being evaluated individually, this paper tackles the interrelationships between the projects and the processes adopted by the Mission in dealing with the overwhelming challenges presented them.¹

Mozambique: Facts in Brief

Population: 16.5 million

People and languages: The majority of the population is African. Minority groups include Asians and Europeans.

Language: Portuguese is the official language, but more than 13 different African languages are spoken in the countryside.

Land area: 304,000 square miles, about twice the size of California.

Capital: Maputo.

1.2. Political Background: Civil War, Drought, and Peace

The origins of the civil war are too complicated to fully address here, but the salient factors are worth noting. The Frente da Libertação Moçambicana (FRELIMO) came to power in 1975, when Mozambique was granted independence following the overthrow of the Caetano government in Portugal, Mozambique's colonial ruler for 500 years. FRELIMO's strength was primarily in the south (the origin of its leadership), and the north (where it had operated from Tanzania). Marxist in orientation, it sought to establish a society and an economy heavily controlled by the government, ignoring the role of traditional authorities and the church, and collectivizing agriculture. The Rhodesian government trained and supplied the Resistencia Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) to counter the threat from the Zimbabwean independence movement operating out of Mozambique. After Zimbabwean independence in 1980, South Africa took over

¹ The methodology involved interviews with USAID staff and others in Mozambique, reviewing USAID reports, cables, and evaluations, and drawing on outside sources such as news articles, books, and UN reports.

sponsorship of RENAMO, which found fertile recruiting ground in central Mozambique, where people resented FRELIMO policies and the domination of the government by southerners.


The civil war lasted 16 years, resulting in more than a million deaths, 1.6 million refugees in neighboring countries, and as many as 4 million internally displaced persons. Landmines, strategically placed by both sides on roads, footpaths, and fields, restricted access and prevented people from planting and harvesting crops (Human Rights Watch 1994). RENAMO also set out to destroy schools and health clinics, thereby sabotaging the government's ability to serve its citizens. In the summer of 1992, it was estimated that the Mozambican Armed Forces (FAM) and RENAMO each controlled a third of the country, with neither in firm control of the remaining third.

The destruction in Mozambique during the mid- and late 1980s was tremendous, but changes were also occurring in Mozambique and in the region that laid the groundwork for an eventual peace. In 1987 the Mozambican government (GRM) undertook a macroeconomic stabilization program supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In 1989, the FRELIMO party congress formally rejected Marxism, opening the door for deeper political and economic reforms. Direct negotiations between the GRM and RENAMO commenced for the first time in late 1990, under the auspices of the Sant'Egidio lay community in Rome, Italy. In the shadow of events in Angola and South Africa, and given the inability of either side to gain the upper hand, the GRM and RENAMO slowly overcame deep mistrust through a series of protracted discussions (Hume 1994).

In the midst of these negotiations, drought struck southern Africa. The rainy season of 1991-92 was woefully inadequate throughout southern Africa. The drought was devastating for Mozambique, which was already highly dependent on food aid due to the large internally displaced population. An ironic result of the drought was that, instead of leading to widespread famine, it gave greater impetus to the negotiations, which culminated with the signing of the General Peace Agreement (GPA) on October 4, 1992.

1.3. USAID Activities Prior to the Peace Agreement

At the time of independence in 1975, Mozambique found strong allies in the Soviet bloc and the Nordic countries, where there was sympathy for its socialist agenda. With a beleaguered economy, Mozambique joined the IMF and the World Bank in 1984.



Beginning in 1984, USAID significantly increased its humanitarian and development assistance, as demonstrated in the graph on the previous page, and initiated an agenda to promote economic policy reform. As the GRM began to adopt major political and economic reforms, USAID/Maputo expanded its efforts in assuring food security, increasing the role of the private sector in the economy, and facilitating improved governance.

2. The Transition Strategy

2.1. The General Peace Agreement and the United Nations

The GPA's seven protocols and four annexes laid the framework for peace in Mozambique by addressing the concerns of both parties and establishing the mechanisms to create an open and democratic society. Issues addressed by the GPA included the demobilization of combatants, assistance to help them reintegrate, the formation of the new armed forces, the development of the electoral law, formation of political parties, and the conduct of multi-party elections. It called for the creation of an independent Mozambican entity, the National Elections Commission (CNE), to implement the presidential and legislative elections.

The GPA also called for the creation of several commissions to monitor the peace process. The Commission for Supervision and Control (CSC) consisted of the United Nations, the United States, Italy, France, the United Kingdom, and Portugal. The CSC had the general mandate of supervising and controlling the implementation of the peace agreement, and also supervised the other three commissions. The Cease-Fire Commission (CCF) was composed of the United Nations, the United States, Portugal, Italy, the United Kingdom, France, Egypt, Nigeria, and Botswana, and was responsible for demobilization. The Reintegration Commission (CORE) was responsible for the soldiers' economic and social reintegration into civilian life. The only commission on which the United States did not sit was the Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Forces (CCFADM). The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) chaired the Aid-For-Democracy Group, a fifth donor group that pre-dated the GPA but was critical to the transition's success. The UNDP also managed the Elections Trust Fund, the primary mechanism for coordinating donor contributions for the elections. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was also a member of the CSC.

In his report to the Security Council, the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali recommended establishing the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ), and named Aldo Ajello as his special representative (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). UNOMOZ's mandate was to monitor the implementation of the GPA, which went beyond traditional peacekeeping to include demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, monitoring of elections, and formation of the unified armed forces. Within UNOMOZ, the Demobilization Technical Unit coordinated the demobilization of combatants, while the Elections Technical Unit was responsible for monitoring the election process. The United Nations also created the Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (UNOHAC), which coordinated donor assistance for demining, reintegration of ex-combatants, and more than \$600 million in funding for relief and recovery. UNOHAC also chaired CORE. Specialized UN agencies already operating in Mozambique also played important roles in the peace process. These included the UNDP, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Program (WFP), and the World Health Organization (WHO).

2.2. USAID Response

On November 2, 1992, USAID/Maputo submitted to USAID/Washington (USAID/W) an 18-month interim program to support ongoing efforts to relieve the emergency and support the peace process (92 Maputo 5037). USAID/Maputo prioritized its activities by emphasizing a fourfold approach:

- continue to provide *drought-related emergency assistance* through the first post-drought harvest of 1993, with the expectation that peace and good rains would then reduce the need;

- *implement the peace process* by planning new activities to support elections, demobilize and reintegrate the combatants, resettle and rehabilitate war-displaced populations, and undertake reconstruction activities;
- *modify the existing development program*, which was centered on improved food security through economic policy and regulatory reform, by adjusting ongoing activities and putting others on the back burner until after the transition; and
- engage in post-transition *strategy development*, as time permits.

To implement these activities, USAID/Maputo requested an additional \$124 million in FY 1993 funds, to complement already approved funds of \$114 million. The request included an additional \$99 million in food resources² (\$45 million from PL 480 Title III and \$54 million from PL 480 Title II) to meet the food aid requirements, and \$25 million in new dollar resources. The Mission immediately reprogrammed \$15 million of already-approved funds to address transition priorities, and USAID/W's initial response came in the final days of the outgoing administration, when \$15 million from the African Disaster Assistance (ADA) was allocated to Mozambique. This was enough to enable the Mission to redesign existing projects and make commitments to contractors and grantees for urgent tasks. When the new administration came into office, dialogue continued between the Mission and USAID/W on the legal and policy interpretations on the use of the Development Fund for Africa (DFA) and the ADA account.

The Mission elaborated on its early thinking, as articulated in the November 1992 cable to USAID/W, to focus on three strategic objectives that would contribute to the overarching goal of achieving a successful war-to-peace transition:

- *avoid drought- and war-related famine and death* by expanding health and water activities under the PVO Support Project, continuing emergency food distributions, and expanding supplies of essential drugs;
- *contribute to the successful implementation of the peace process* through support for demobilization and national elections, and through participation in UN-led commissions; and
- *contribute to the reintegration of populations into stable and productive social and economic activities* by launching new activities in landmine clearance, road and bridge rehabilitation, and reintegration of ex-combatants, by expanding existing activities under the PVO Support Project to distribute seeds and tools and make

²PL 480 Title III resources in Mozambique are based on policy reforms. Mozambique's poverty and food insecurity make it the number one Title III country candidate. PL 480 Title II consists of grant food aid, of which Mozambique is also a major recipient.

grants for rural infrastructure and services and agricultural recovery, and by developing election-related civic education activities under the Democratic Initiatives Project (DIP).

In June 1994, USAID/Maputo requested additional resources from USAID/W to fill final gaps in the months before the election (94 Maputo 3190). Additional efforts were required to support the election, plug holes in demobilization, and accelerate mine clearance and road upgrading activities. The Mission requested an additional \$18.5 million from the DFA and Defense Department, as well as \$2.1 million from Economic Support Funds (ESF).³

3. Constraints to Implementation

Implementing the strategy was a challenging task in light of several constraints, primarily staff shortages and a rapidly increasing burden on the Regional Contracts Office (RCO) in Mbabane, Swaziland. USAID/Maputo felt the lack of staff acutely, with only 11 of 17 direct hire slots filled in November 1992. Recruiting staff to a war-torn country was not easy, but improved through the transition. USAID compensated by relying on Personal Service Contractors (PSCs), and Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs), many of whom played critical roles. Technical staff were also in short supply, particularly in the first year of the transition when the projects had to be designed or modified. Technical support from the Regional Economic Development Support Office (REDSO) in Nairobi was limited because it was absorbed by other priorities in Ethiopia and Eritrea.

During the Mozambique transition, USAID commitments to other countries in the region were increasing. This placed a heavy load on the RCO, which needed to review and approve grant and contract actions. The RCO recognized that USAID/Maputo's contract actions were a priority because a successful war-to-peace transition would positively affect the rest of southern Africa. USAID/W attempted to address the need for speedy review and approval of USAID/Maputo contracts and grants by providing short-term support. Nonetheless, the demand for quick contract actions still outpaced the supply of contract officers, particularly as the end of FY 1993 approached.

4. Task Forces

USAID/Maputo established four inter-Agency task forces to develop, implement, and monitor the transition program: Drought Emergency (which already existed), Elections, Demobilization (later Demobilization and Demining), and Rehabilitation and Reintegration.

³ Annex B contains a detailed description of U.S. assistance in Mozambique.

The Elections and Demobilization and Reintegration task forces contributed to the Mission's second objective, implementing the peace accord. The Drought Emergency Task Force contributed to the first objective, avoiding war- and drought-related famine and death. The Rehabilitation and Reintegration Task Force developed activities to implement the third objective, reintegration of populations into stable and productive social and economic activities.

The task forces played a significant role in USAID's ability to implement the transition program. First, the personnel shortage meant that, in order to meet the demands of the transition program, staff had to take on additional responsibilities. The Mission used the task forces as a technique for coherently managing the increased workload, using them to develop and monitor activities to achieve the respective strategic objectives. Second, the components of USAID's transition program were interrelated, with success in one project contributing to success in another project.

The structure of the task forces was an important factor in their success. First, they cut across offices within USAID. Involving the controller's office, for example, meant that as funding documents and other paperwork crossed their desks, staff already expected them and knew their purpose, enabling faster processing. Second, the task forces cut across projects that themselves cut across strategic objectives. The PVO Support Project, for example, had a management staff of four, and each person sat on a different task force. Because the PVOs were present in many parts of the country, they were a source of information on what was happening in the countryside. Involving the management staff in each task force brought that information to the other members. Third, the task forces involved all types of staff—direct hires, PSCs, and FSNs—which enabled a broad spectrum of knowledge and opinion to be shared. Finally, the task forces involved personnel from the Embassy and the U.S. Information Service (USIS), which improved information-sharing, cooperation, and coordination, thereby strengthening the U.S. effort.

In monitoring the implementation of activities, the task forces kept senior management informed of problems that needed resolution. The information shared and discussed in the task force sessions was consolidated into briefing points for the ambassador, who attended the CSC meetings, and the mission director, who attended the Aid-for-Democracy and CORE meetings. As a result, the task forces enabled the United States to work with other donors to keep the peace process on track.

Though born out of necessity, it was not necessity that made the task forces work. Rather, the task forces succeeded because of the people who led and participated in them, and because the leadership at the top emphasized cooperation and communication. Embassy staff felt that the ambassador and the USAID mission director established informal lines of communication, which set a tone for the rest of the staff. Information was shared between the different offices, and the attitude of the people who participated contributed substantially to the task forces' success. In addition, the task forces adjusted to the changing

circumstances in the country, increasing or decreasing the frequency with which they met. Membership also shifted as new personnel arrived, both in USAID and the Embassy.

4.1. Drought Emergency Task Force

The Mission established the Drought Emergency Task Force to deal with the tremendous humanitarian needs and logistical complications that the 1991-92 southern Africa drought presented for Mozambique. The task force had a lead role among the many donors involved in food relief, emergency medical and nutritional activities, water and sanitation efforts, and, as the drought ended, the distribution of seeds and tools to permit initial food production.

Chaired by the deputy director, the task force brought together staff from different offices with different expertise. Members included the PVO Support Project manager, the Food for Peace (FFP) officer, a short-term PSC FFP officer, the program office's FSN agricultural sector advisor, the engineer managing assistance to the road and transport activities, the project development officer (PDO) who managed the health/nutrition portfolio, and staff from the controller's office.

The task force filled many needs. First, it closely monitored the arrival and distribution of food from all sources, and brought this information to biweekly donor coordination meetings, chaired by the GRM. The World Food Program (WFP) later established a country-wide logistics operation to receive and distribute food from many donor countries, but USAID was able to fill an important gap during the time it took the WFP system to become operational. Second, USAID closely monitored the on-the-ground situation through contacts with PVOs and site visits. The team constantly fed information on the changing situation to USAID/W to ensure the appropriate timing of deliveries of needed commodities and other assistance.

Third, unlike the other task forces, the Drought Emergency Task Force was also a vehicle for coordination with the other USAID missions in the region, namely Swaziland, Zimbabwe, and Malawi. Working in land-locked nations, they relied on the transportation corridors through Mozambique to implement their drought response and recovery programs, thus the task force was in the best position to provide valuable information on the logistics of food aid delivery, the principal form of emergency assistance.

By late 1993, the chairmanship of the Drought Emergency Task Force had passed to the chief of the Agriculture and Food Resources (AFR) Office. By mid-1994, the country had experienced two relatively normal agricultural cycles. The task force had filled a gap by pooling information from different sources, and sharing it with USAID/W, other missions, the Embassy, donors, and the GRM. It ceased to exist once the emergency subsided, and the AFR office took over responsibility for monitoring the food situation and harvest outlook.

4.2. Elections Task Force

USAID established the Elections Task Force, known as the E-team, to monitor the process leading up to the country's first ever multi-party elections, and develop, implement, and coordinate USAID support to the elections. In the first year of the transition, the deputy program officer, who was also the project officer for the DIP, chaired the E-team. Other members included a representative from the controller's office, the program office's FSN senior policy advisor, the public affairs officer (PAO) from USIS, and the Embassy political officers. Other staff joined the task force as they arrived in Maputo, including the DIP project manager and assistant project manager, and the PVO Support Project manager. The Embassy's political officers changed in the summer of 1993, and the new arrivals immediately joined the E-team. The DIP project manager took over its chairmanship in late 1993. In January 1994, with the shift of the DIP from the program office to a newly created General Development Office, the new general development officer joined the E-team. The mission director and deputy director sat in on E-team meetings throughout the transition, and, as the elections approached, the Embassy's deputy chief of mission (DCM) began to do so as well.

By developing a plan for USAID's assistance, the E-team filled four crucial needs. First, the E-team put an enormous amount of time in the first year of the transition into planning for the election and USAID-funded activities. This included preparing resource requests, determining needs from potential grantees, and amending the DIP project paper.

Second, the E-team reviewed proposals that it received from potential grantees and contractors, asked for revisions where necessary, and monitored their activities in order to make sure that course changes were made when and where needed. The fast changing political environment in Maputo required that the United States constantly assess what it was doing and, in particular, what new activities it needed to undertake to ensure that the elections could take place.

Third, the E-team shared information on the bigger picture of what was happening in the country that could affect, positively or negatively, the elections. In this sense, the E-team monitored what was *not* happening that, in fact, needed to happen for the elections to proceed on schedule. This meant following activities within the United Nations, and negotiations between the GRM and RENAMO on the drafting of the electoral law and other matters.

Fourth, relying on information coming out of the E-team meetings, the mission director and the ambassador were able to raise critical issues in the Aid-for-Democracy Group and the CSC, and directly with the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Aldo Ajello. As a result, inter-agency collaboration enabled the United States to more effectively work with other donors to keep the peace process on track.

As a model for inter-agency collaboration, the E-team succeeded because a premium was placed on information sharing. This happened not only because of the personalities involved but also because USAID, the Embassy, and USIS all shared the goal of a successful war-to-peace transition. With its larger staff and budget, USAID played the central management role, but with key input from the Embassy and USIS. By pooling their efforts, all elements of the U.S. Mission were all able to accomplish a common objective.

4.3. Demobilization and Reintegration Task Force

This task force was created to monitor events related to the demobilization and reintegration of the combatants as called for in the GPA, develop USAID activities to support the process, and monitor their implementation. Its membership consisted of the Demobilization/ Reintegration Support Project (DRSP) coordinator and assistant coordinator, the defense attaché, the PAO from USIS, the senior program officer, the project officer for the PVO Support Project, and a representative of the controller's office. The task force designed the DRSP, a major undertaking because of issues surrounding the legalities of providing USAID assistance.

As the U.S. representative on the Cease-Fire Commission, the defense attaché's participation was particularly relevant because he needed to verify the encampment and demobilization of troops and the containment of weapons. He and the DRSP staff worked together closely, sharing information on their respective site visits and keeping each other informed of potential complications, problems, and progress.

As demobilization commenced and attention began to focus on reintegrating demobilized combatants, a staff person from the program office who also sat on the Rehabilitation and Reintegration Task Force joined the Demobilization and Reintegration Task Force, thereby sharing information between the two task forces.

4.4. Rehabilitation and Reintegration Task Force

The Mission engineer, who was also a member of the Drought Emergency Task Force, chaired the Rehabilitation and Reintegration Task Force, which examined needs in several areas, including transportation infrastructure, water access, and health facilities. Membership included both the direct hire and FSN agriculture officers, the program office impact monitoring advisor, the rural development specialist from the PVO Support Project, a financial analyst from the controller's office, and once the refugees began returning, the Embassy political officer who was also responsible for refugee affairs and a member of the E-team.

The busiest time for this task force was in early 1993, when it needed to prepare for the expected movements of refugees and internally displaced persons. The task force identified priority areas for transport and infrastructure rehabilitation, targeting areas where

the war-displaced were to return, and isolated areas that required expensive airlifts to reach. By September 1993, the Rural Access Activity (RAA) was designed and contractors were ready to implement specific road and bridge reconstruction activities, thus absorbing the rehabilitation aspect of the task force.

To monitor reintegration activities for rural populations, the task force worked closely with staff from the PVO Support Project, particularly in the water and health areas. Once a water resources specialist joined the staff, she specifically worked with UNICEF, other donors, and PVOs to improve water access to drought-vulnerable rural villages. Providing assistance through PVOs to rehabilitate key health facilities and services in targeted areas was another important objective. The task force also worked extremely closely with UNHCR, both in Maputo and in field locations, to monitor the situation on the ground and to coordinate Mission-funded activities with those funded by UNHCR and OFDA.

Finally, USAID was undertaking so many activities across the country that it became the center of USG information on reintegration needs for war-displaced populations, including refugees. Consequently, the refugee officer's participation in the task force was critical to her role in coordinating the State Department's refugee assistance. In addition, both USAID and the Embassy worked closely with the regional refugee coordinator posted at the U.S. Embassy in Malawi.

Between the departure of the engineer in mid-1994 and the arrival of his successor, the impact monitoring advisor from the program office became the task force's acting chair. While information continues to flow, the task force rarely meets because most of the critical needs have passed and nearly all rehabilitation and reintegration activities have become either project-specific or strictly monitoring tasks.

5. Projects

5.1. PVO Support Project

USAID/Maputo developed the PVO Support Project in 1990 in an attempt to shift away from delivering emergency humanitarian assistance to addressing the root causes of poverty.⁴ The project's purpose, as defined in the project paper, was "to improve the food security and well-being of those who have been displaced or otherwise seriously affected by the insurgency in Mozambique" (MSI 1994), thus contributing to the Mission's strategic objective of avoiding drought- and war-related famine and death, developed at a later stage. During the transition, 11 PVOs implemented 22 activities in six sectors: food logistics and

⁴ See Annex A for a detailed project description. For additional information, see the 1994 mid-term evaluation prepared by Management Systems International.

relief operations, health, water and sanitation, agricultural recovery, education and/or vocational skills training, and children and war.

The needs of the targeted population changed during the drought of 1991-92. Widespread crop failures meant that food assistance had to be increased over the short term, and more emphasis had to be placed on activities to facilitate drought recovery. USAID/Maputo amended the project paper in September 1992 to cope with the additional demands, and invited its partner PVOs to increase their activities.

The signing of the GPA in October 1992 further changed the needs of the project, though not immediately. Peace would change the nature of the services delivered, and require even greater emphasis on developmental projects. As RENAMO allowed outside organizations access to areas under its control, the scope for PVO activities further increased. The project paper was again amended in September 1993 to add significant resources. The amendment was consistent with the transition strategy of providing humanitarian assistance and reintegrating and rehabilitating an enlarged group of beneficiaries. PVOs expanded their activities to assist refugees and internally displaced persons to return to their homes, rebuild their houses and essential community services, and plant their fields. While still contributing to the Mission's first strategic objective of avoiding drought- and war-related famine and death, the PVO Support Project rapidly increased activities to support the third strategic objective, contributing to the reintegration of populations into stable and productive social and economic activities.

The tremendous needs of the population in the countryside and the lack of road and transportation infrastructure meant that the parts of the country most in need of assistance were the most inaccessible. USAID compensated for this by initially using OFDA-funded airlifts, but demining and road clearance facilitated the PVO activities tremendously and allowed donors to increase overland transport, thereby diminishing the need for airlifts and reducing transportation costs. In addition, PVOs used food-for-work and cash-for-work programs to clear trees and brush from secondary roads to link villages within a district.

Throughout its existence, the PVO Support Project, funded through the DFA, has proven to be a very flexible instrument, allowing the Mission to adapt to the country's changing needs. Many PVOs had been on the ground since 1990, and some for as long as 10 years. Without the PVO Support Project, it is highly unlikely that USAID would have been able to meet the challenges that peace presented. First, many PVOs were already moving away from food aid delivery and enabling people to grow their own food. They accelerated the developmental approach as the war-displaced populations began to return home, accomplishing this objective by distributing improved seeds and hand tools, digging wells and drilling bore holes for potable water, and re-establishing functional health clinics.

Second, PVOs often made strategic decisions about where to work. For example, the American Refugee Committee (ARC) had been working in a refugee camp in Malawi

and chose to establish itself in the area in Mozambique where those refugees would repatriate. ARC already had ties to the community, and it knew the skills that the people possessed, having, for example, already taught them how to bore wells with a hand auger, dig latrines, and plant vegetable gardens. Consequently, ARC could work in the resettled areas more efficiently than a PVO with no previous contact with the community.

Third, communication between USAID and the PVOs has been very good, further increasing the project's impact. For example, Food for the Hungry International (FHI) opened a 140 kilometer (km) road between Inhaminga and Marromeu, a town previously accessible only by airlift or uncertain river transport because the road went through RENAMO territory. FHI worked closely with USAID throughout the operation, and once the road was demined and overgrowth removed, USAID staff promptly shut down the airlift of food aid, thereby substantially reducing transportation costs.

PVOs have encountered numerous challenges in implementing their activities. First, their relationship with the GRM has not always been easy. Their main complaint relates to the high levies that the GRM imposes on the importation of capital goods such as vehicles and computers, which fall outside the government's definition of "emergency relief" items. Negotiating their reduction has been a long and complicated process, which frustrates PVOs and slows implementation. The relationship at the local level is much better, where PVOs have participated in meetings chaired by district and provincial officials. Staff report that provincial and district officials aren't always responsive to PVO concerns, but have been more cooperative in providing needed assistance and information than GRM officials in Maputo.

Second, not all PVOs are making the transition from relief to development at the same pace, and the tension between the short-term need for food aid and long-term developmental objectives has been evident. Recognizing the potential conflict between the two types of assistance, USAID sought to coordinate PVO activities in the same area to ensure that they worked toward the same objective. During the drought emergency, USAID did not want PVOs to become totally absorbed by emergency assistance at the expense of laying the foundation for rehabilitation and development activities. PVOs are definitely moving away from emergency assistance, and, working with local GRM officials, have developed mechanisms to ensure that food assistance is targeted to those who need it. Those organizations that were most successful combined techniques such as improved seed varieties with an integrated approach to relief and development.

USAID staff noted that the burdens of managing the PVO Support Project have been tremendous because the demands of routine paperwork were exacerbated by the changing needs of the beneficiaries. Once USAID reviewed and accepted a PVO's proposal, processing project implementation orders for technical assistance (PIO/Ts) and grant agreements in the RCO took on average two months, slowing implementation of PVO activities (MSI 1994). To complicate matters, a PVO might commence its activity, only to

find the circumstances either substantially different from its initial assessment or changing mid-course because of new refugee arrivals. Changes in activities meant that the grant agreement had to be amended, another step for staff and the RCO. To accelerate the grant authorization process, USAID/Maputo created quick implementing projects that could be approved within the Mission. Staying on top of all the activities with limited staff has been very time-consuming for USAID staff in Maputo.

Nonetheless, staff felt that USAID/Maputo's management of the project has been one of the keys to its success. Since the PVO Support Project is so large, there have been suggestions to contract out management of the project. In the war-to-peace transition, USAID staff felt very strongly that their own management of the project—as difficult as it has been with limited staff resources—has greatly contributed to the project's success. USAID staff and PVOs have been in constant communication, sharing information on developments in various parts of the country. Since so much of the country had been inaccessible during the war, PVOs became critical eyes and ears on the ground in the transition. Information gathered was passed to USAID senior management participating in the UN commissions, enabling them to keep the peace process on track. Had the project been managed outside of USAID, staff felt that they almost certainly would not have been as quickly or as well informed of changing circumstances.

5.2. Democratic Initiatives Project (DIP)

USAID designed the DIP in 1991, after a new Mozambican constitution came into effect. Authorized initially at \$4 million, the DIP was intended to finance studies and short-term advisory services related to elections, decentralization, and legal reform. USAID/Maputo substantially revised the project paper in September 1993 to handle the increased demands that elections would warrant, and increased total funding to \$17 million. The DIP contributed to the Mission's second strategic objective, implementing the peace process. Additional amendments in September 1994 and February 1995 added \$5.3 million. In addition, the African-American Institute received a grant for \$175,000 from the African Regional Electoral Assistance Fund (AREAF) to provide last-minute technical assistance to the CNE⁵ (MSI 1995).

The election process was complicated because of the sheer size of the operation, the logistical impediments, and the number of players involved. Established in March 1994 as an independent Mozambican entity to supervise the elections, the CNE had equal numbers of RENAMO and FRELIMO representatives and a smaller number of representatives from the unarmed parties. The Technical Secretariat (STAE) reported to the CNE and implemented the elections. The UNDP administered the Elections Trust Fund, provided

⁵ Accessing the ARAEF mechanism was not easy because ARAEF was not designed to work in countries where a democracy project already existed, as was the case in Mozambique. Staff made the argument that DIP funds were seriously depleted, and they ran the risk of having no funds available for post-election work.

technical assistance to the STAE, and chaired the multi-donor Aid-for-Democracy Group. The UNOMOZ electoral division monitored the overall process. In addition to the two Mozambican and two UN entities, a myriad of donors, including the United States, funded different activities.⁶ The potential for confusion and discord was there from the beginning because so many donors and so many different organizations were involved.

The country's poor infrastructure and weak institutional capacity made organizing and implementing national elections a major challenge. USAID/Maputo felt it was important to contribute early on to the Elections Trust Fund, to show confidence in the peace process and encourage other donors to come forward. In particular, USAID/Maputo wanted to pay for costs associated with leasing small fixed-wing aircraft to ensure that election workers and materials could reach all parts of the country. DFA funds could not be used for election logistics. It took time and effort to figure out the most appropriate and legally-acceptable method of funding election activities, which the Mission considered a critical component for ending the civil war.

In March 1993, USAID/W agreed to fund some election activities from the DFA. Arguing that small planes and fuel costs were a one-time expenditure, and therefore did not contribute to the sustainability of the elections, USAID/W instead agreed to make \$2 million available from ESF (93 State 52103). USAID thereby ensured that voting materials and registration teams could reach remote parts of the country, critical to the potential success of the elections. In September 1994, just one month before the election, USAID/W provided an additional \$2.1 million from the ESF to pay for logistics and per diem for the political party monitors.

USAID/Maputo had to overcome an additional hurdle related to restrictions on paying for overhead costs. While USAID/Maputo felt that a grant to UNDP was the most direct way to pay for UNDP-organized logistics, civic education materials, and training activities, USAID regulations prohibited paying overhead on grants to the United Nations unless the costs were clearly identifiable and directly related to the grant. USAID/Maputo found that the most expedient method was to issue a grant to the UNDP in Maputo that could account for the funds and bypass the UN office in New York that was responsible for the Trust Fund.

USAID funded the other activities through unsolicited proposals, primarily because, with a one-year timetable, there was too little time to issue a Request for Applications (RFA). Even once it was clear that the elections would have to be postponed, it wasn't clear when they would be held. Unsolicited proposals are submitted on an ad hoc basis by organizations with project ideas that have not been specifically requested by the Agency.

⁶ Through the DIP, USAID funded activities with seven different organizations. These activities are described in more detail in Annex A and in the mid-term evaluation submitted by Management Systems International in June 1995.

Problems arose when organizations submitted proposals that required extensive negotiations to properly meet election needs. With the benefit of hindsight, staff acknowledged that there had been time to issue an RFA, which would have been more explicit from the outset in defining the activities that the Mission wanted to fund, and would have encouraged additional organizations to submit more targeted proposals.

As with the PVO Support Project, the DIP suffered from the Mission-wide staff shortage and the added burdens placed on the RCO. Staff noted their own failure in quickly processing the National Democratic Institute's (NDI's) cooperative agreement, causing NDI to lose its chosen local consultant and slowing project implementation by several months.

Civic education was an area in which USAID wanted to contribute significantly. USAID was very concerned about possible duplication of effort among donors, and therefore recognized the necessity of working through the UNDP. In addition, USAID added a small bilateral program, in order to demonstrate USG commitment to the elections and to influence how the civic education campaign was developed and conducted. USAID recognized that UNDP focused on a government-implemented campaign, while USAID placed its priority on a more balanced approach, with extensive use of NGOs. The NDI proposal emphasized participation and working through NGOs.

USAID ultimately funded different components of a civic education program through separate grants to NDI and the UNDP, both of which worked with STAE to develop and implement the program. The grant to the UNDP covered the cost of civic education materials, while the STAE was the executing agency responsible for production. The UNDP provided technical advisors to the STAE throughout. NDI was responsible for designing civic education materials, obtaining STAE approval for the design, and ensuring a timely production schedule.

Relations between the UNDP, NDI, and STAE were complex, and the three entities did not always work well together. Part of the problem was ownership. UNDP technical advisors, for example, were on the ground well before NDI, giving them greater influence in the design of a civic education campaign. The UNDP advisor for civic education, working for the STAE, saw designing civic education materials as part of her job, not NDI's. In addition, disagreement surfaced between NDI and STAE as to who was to pay the production costs for materials that NDI used in its own programs. The STAE was not aware that the funds they received from UNDP also covered costs for kits that NDI would use exclusively in their own programs, as USAID had stipulated in the grant agreement with UNDP. When STAE refused to cover these costs, USAID agreed to add \$60,000 to the cooperative agreement with NDI to ensure to that they could implement the civic education programs as expected. In retrospect, USAID recognized that written agreements on implementation details should have been a requirement for receiving assistance, not just a recommendation. This was only one example of the challenges that occur when different

organizations are implementing aspects of the same program and must collaborate to succeed.

As the elections approached, the pace of decision-making required within USAID increased substantially. For example, the electoral law stipulated that only Mozambican election monitors could verify the conduct of the elections, but it was only in July 1994—three months before the election—that USAID's close reading of the law, confirmed by the CNE, clarified that the monitors had to be affiliated with a political party. This requirement added a new challenge because the political party monitors needed to be identified and trained, and a further determination was made that they should be compensated, otherwise, few would be in a position to participate. With too few monitors, the elections could not reasonably be declared free and fair as required in the constitution. Despite USAID's efforts to focus attention on this need, neither the CNE nor any other donor would take initiative to meet the crucial requirement for effective poll monitors. USAID undertook this responsibility.

In a matter of weeks, three groups came together to train the political party monitors, transport them to and from both the training and the polls, and pay them per diem. In contrast to the experience with civic education materials, the clear definition of roles made the training exercise a success. CARE-International designed the training program. The International Republican Institute (IRI) conducted training at the national level for the political party monitors, after which CARE-International conducted provincial and district training, using its extensive network of provincial and district staff.⁷ USAID brought in the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to arrange for the monitors' transportation to and from the training and the polls, and to administer payment of the monitors' per diem during the elections.

Even during the actual polling days, on-the-spot decisions had to be made. For example, when the CNE decided to extend elections for a third day, a large number of monitors demonstrated in front of IOM's Maputo office demanding an additional day of per diem. USAID agreed to their request, and, within 24 hours, prepared, cleared, and signed a PIO/T for an additional \$400,000, and obtained permission from USAID/W to use DFA resources for this purpose. This incident demonstrates that elections in a transition environment are intricate endeavors that require as much advance planning as possible to handle the unexpected, last-minute challenges that will surely arise.

Many people from different organizations noted the success of this effort, and that it never could have happened if USAID hadn't pulled it together. The political party monitor training was also one of the few examples where organizations with different missions

⁷ Logistical support from UNOMOZ (not directly funded by USAID) helped trainers reach all areas of the country within a short period of time.

worked together to handle different aspects of an activity. It succeeded because IRI, IOM, and CARE recognized the need to collaborate and were willing to adapt to a rapidly changing environment.

The 30,000 poll monitors were key to declaring Mozambique's elections free and fair. The monitors, three to four at every polling station, had to countersign each polling station's vote count. The elections could have been challenged or discredited without their contribution. The GRM had made no provisions for their training and deployment because it was the responsibility of the political parties, not the government. This program was therefore one of the most important electoral inputs financed by USAID.

5.3. Demobilization/Reintegration Support Project (DRSP)

After much consultation with USAID/W, staff in USAID/Maputo designed the DRSP at a funding level of \$15 million to respond to several needs: transportation of demobilized soldiers from the Assembly Areas (AAs) to destinations of their choice, essential non-food supplies for the AAs, health clinics in RENAMO areas, food supplies for the soldiers while in encampment, land mine clearance, assistance to vulnerable soldiers and their families, and reintegration of the demobilized into civilian society.⁸ Support for demobilization contributed to the second strategic objective of implementing the peace process, whereas the reintegration and demining activities advanced the third strategic objective of contributing to the reintegration of populations into stable and productive social and economic activities.

5.3.1. Demobilization

USAID had to overcome several hurdles to provide support to demobilization. First, in order to provide any assistance in the AAs, it had to demonstrate that the parties to the conflict did in fact intend to demobilize, since U.S. law prohibits USAID assistance to foreign militaries. Because a plan for demobilization existed—agreed to by both parties to the GPA—and a mechanism existed to ensure compliance, assistance to demobilization was deemed acceptable. In addition, the USAID regional legal advisor (RLA) wrote a legal opinion that put a percentage ceiling on USAID-funded supplies for the encampment areas. After much debate, it was agreed that, since no more than 30 percent of the soldiers entering the AAs were expected to join the new army and at least 70 percent were to be demobilized, USAID could provide no more than 70 percent of the costs of the camps' provisions.

Second, USAID/W originally offered funds only from the DFA. The Mission argued that demobilization was a precondition for development and that many of the direct

⁸ See Annex A for a detailed project description.

beneficiaries of such support would be the lower-ranking demobilized troops and their dependents, who would subsequently rejoin rural and urban civilian society. Time was needed to determine the most appropriate use of funds. A solution was found when \$15 million from the ADA account⁹—an anomaly of FY 1993—was made available for the DRSP. These discussions spanned several months, and the DRSP was not formally authorized until April 8, 1993. In the end, the delays did not seriously jeopardize demobilization programs because demobilization itself was temporarily derailed by political squabbles between RENAMO and FRELIMO, with RENAMO withdrawing its representatives from the UN commissions between March and June 1993.

Legal restrictions made other components more difficult to implement. USAID was never able to address the needs of the disabled soldiers because legal prohibitions on support to foreign militaries prevented implementation of a plan to send out teams of WHO and GRM doctors to examine the disabled, do the paperwork to get disability benefits, and formally discharge them (Maputo 5206).

5.3.2. Reintegration

Reintegration programs in Mozambique were contentious because of the opposing views of the donors and UNOHAC, the chair of CORE. At the December 1993 donors' conference in Rome, UNOHAC presented a long-term plan for reintegration activities, which would not begin for a couple of years and would be managed within the GRM. USAID/Maputo Mission Director Roger Carlson noted in a speech on March 27, 1995:

Most of the bilateral donors, and many multilateral as well, believed that UNOHAC should concentrate on the short to medium term because it was so vital to preservation of the fragile peace process and to ensuring the timely implementation of its various phases. In my view, UNOHAC lost much valuable time during its first year of existence in developing ... proposals that depended on strengthening Mozambican institutions which were not ready for them (Carlson 1995).

Donors ultimately refused to fund UNOHAC reintegration programs, but lost nearly a year arguing the point.

With demobilization about to begin, donors realized that there would be no program in place for the soldiers when they returned to their communities. Having witnessed the long-assembled soldiers' mini-riots in some AAs, donors realized the potential for a serious disruption to the peace process. Consequently, donors developed three principal

⁹ Congress created the Africa Disaster Assistance (ADA) account and appropriated \$100 million on a one-time basis in order to respond to the 1991-1992 drought in Southern Africa and the humanitarian crisis in Somalia.

alternatives: the Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS), the Information and Referral Service (IRS), and the Provincial Fund (PF). USAID did not participate in the smaller fourth component, the Occupational Skills Development (OSD) program, which provides funding for training at institutions deemed capable of providing instructions in areas likely to lead to employment. The programs, discussed in greater detail below, are inter-related, providing different opportunities for the demobilized and relying on each other for implementation.

Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS). Initially proposed by the Netherlands, the RSS extends for an additional 18 months the monthly readjustment allowances that the GRM agreed to pay the demobilized soldiers from both sides for the first six months. The payments vary according to rank; for enlisted men they are slightly less than the minimum wage, but significantly higher than the monthly payment the men received on active duty. In addition to buying time to get other programs in place, the RSS had the unintended consequence of encouraging soldiers to demobilize rather than join the new army. As a result, the army's size is less than one-third of what was called for in the GPA. The estimated funding required for the RSS also increased from \$22 million to \$30 million, because an additional 20,000 soldiers unexpectedly opted to demobilize.

Despite some early skepticism, USAID staff feel that the RSS has successfully served as an interim measure for the ex-soldiers, providing them with immediate benefits and giving them time to adjust to civilian life. Moreover, the soldiers feel that they deserve the payments because of their years of sacrifice. Anecdotal evidence of impact is mixed, with hopeful indications that some are readjusting their expectations and beginning to think about ways to earn a living once their payments stop.

Information and Referral Service (IRS). Proposed and funded largely by USAID, the IOM received a grant to establish and maintain IRS centers in every province to handle the day-to-day problems encountered by the demobilized soldiers. The four main functions are to solve paperwork problems, map out employment and training opportunities, administer the PF, and implement the OSD.

The IRS offices have served the ex-soldiers' needs by offering them a place to turn to with their problems, and indications are that the ex-soldiers deluged the offices "virtually from the time they opened their doors for business" (Carlson 1995). IRS staff helped ex-soldiers correct mistakes in their payment books, replaced lost books, and dealt effectively with other paperwork problems, when other government or UN institutions were unable to do so. IRS staff could not always provide assistance in as a timely a fashion as one might hope, particularly when 20,000 additional soldiers unexpectedly opted for demobilization, but without the IRS it likely would have been far more chaotic.

In funding the IOM to establish the IRS, USAID stipulated that they sub-contract to a U.S. company, Creative Associates International, Inc., for technical expertise. The ensuing relationship was initially problematic and required USAID intervention during early

project implementation. Though the rift healed, the problems point to the complications of "forcing" two organizations to work with each other.

Provincial Fund (PF). The PF makes available quick-disbursing funds for small projects to enable the social and economic reintegration of demobilized soldiers. With USAID and other funding, the IOM is implementing the PF in the northern and southern regions, while the German Society for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) is implementing it in the four central provinces. A recent initiative, it is too early to discuss successes because implementation began in earnest only in 1995. The PF is a complex effort because different organizations are involved at different levels. Differences emerged in the strategies employed by the two implementing organizations, IOM and GTZ, which initially hindered implementation of programs at the local level. The IRS, also run by the IOM in all provinces, was temporarily caught in the middle because the IRS offices are responsible for managing both the IOM and GTZ provincial fund efforts.

The RSS, the IRS, and the PF are multi-faceted, complementary in nature, and dynamic in the way they seek to meet the changing needs of the demobilized soldiers. Nonetheless, the disagreement with UNOHAC forced donors to develop alternatives. The result has been a myriad of mechanisms being implemented by organizations that have not always worked well together. As a cable notes, "had the donors been left to their own devices and spared UNOHAC coordination, a more effective program would probably have been in place earlier" (94 Maputo 5206). The programs that are operational, a success by itself, could have been better designed and more efficiently implemented if less donor attention had been required to surmount UNOHAC's objective of developing long-term GRM programs for reintegration.

5.3.3. Demining

In the transition period, mined roads and fields were identified as a major obstacle to reintegration because they prevented access to large parts of the country. The central provinces, including primarily the Zambezi River Valley, were the worst affected by the mines and the damaged decay of infrastructure during the war, and in general were the origin of the largest numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons. Since many of the war-displaced would likely be returning to these areas, and since these are among the country's most productive agricultural lands, USAID made demining in these areas a priority. Clearing landmines, or declaring a road to be free of mines, enabled road reconstruction and reintegration of war-displaced populations to begin, thereby facilitating the delivery of relief to isolated areas and opening the door to commercial activity, contributing to the Mission's first and third strategic objectives, avoiding famine and contributing to reintegration.

Program implementation has been complicated. At the national level, UNOHAC was supposed to prioritize, coordinate, and contract for clearance of routes and areas,

develop a Mozambican capacity for mine clearance, and implement a mine awareness program. USAID staff in Maputo felt that UNOHAC failed in all three areas. A September 1994 cable notes that only donors who proceeded independently of UNOHAC had operational demining activities. The UN-trained deminers have been restricted to two areas within 30 km of Maputo since becoming operational in October 1994, two years after the beginning of the UN mandate. Sweden and the Netherlands have frozen use of their contributions to the Demining Trust Fund, run by UNOHAC, while the Dutch are suing to get their money back. In addition, the GRM has not provided data, maps, or intelligence on the location of mines, which it is thought to possess since it laid the vast majority of mines during the war. Providing better intelligence and setting national priorities are two areas in which the GRM needs to take a leading role.

In addition to the constraints mentioned above, the USAID demining contractor, Ronco, had difficulty assessing the problems that it would encounter reaching and clearing sites. Some roads were abandoned as far back as 1982, so they first needed to be cleared of vegetation and underbrush. In other cases, bridges were down or roads were washed out, all of which slowed the demining teams. Another aspect is that, deminers have, from time to time, been slowed by poor health (primarily malaria) and rainy weather. Program performance has consequently been less than expected, and USAID has revised expectations downward during the contract. USAID's initial contract authorized \$4 million to clear 2,000 km of priority roads in one year. Instead, Ronco cleared 2,100 kms of roads at a cost of \$7.5 million over two years. The initial cost per km of road was \$2,000, but increased to \$3,500.

In addition, community volunteers have helped to make some roads minimally passable, but better equipment has often been needed. A road cleared of mines that is still not passable by car or truck is not going to have the kind of impact that USAID is seeking. Making tow- graders or bulldozers available to do an initial low-grade reconstruction would increase the quality of the road by smoothing and leveling it. In a few cases, mines have later been found on routes already demined. Doing low grade reconstruction would increase the chance of finding mines undetected by dogs or metal detectors (McCarthy 1995).

Therefore, conditions for demining were difficult, and initial cost estimates were too low. The activity was less timely and more expensive than originally expected. However, staff indicate that the activity's impact was quite positive and made an important contribution to the transition. Some of the approaches taken merit elaboration. First, Ronco trained 110 Mozambican deminers, and gradually decreased the number of expatriate supervisors, reducing long-term costs and leaving behind a capacity to continue demining. Second, the project utilized demobilized soldiers as deminers, with the benefit that they know the local territory, the language, the communities, and quite often, the location of the mines. Third, the project relied on a mixture of metal detectors and mine detecting dogs (MDDs). Using the dogs compensated for the fact that the metal detectors could not always

detect mines in soils with a high metal content, those that were buried deeply, or those with a low metal content. Fourth, Ronco made a deliberate effort to initiate contact with the community before beginning work and keep in contact while the work progressed. Members of the community told the demining teams where they thought the mines were, assisted road rehabilitation, and, in general, seemed to appreciate the deminers' efforts.

5.4. Rural Access Activity (RAA)

During the war, RENAMO targeted Mozambique's network of roads, rails, and bridges, as vastly underdeveloped as it was. Of the two paved highways that run from north to south, one of which is an offshoot of the other, large sections were impassable because they ran through war zones and had been cut by deep, hand-dug trenches. Further, sections of regions and districts were not connected by roads, and the pattern of warfare left many areas accessible only by airlift. One of the most important objectives after the end of the civil war was to reconnect the country in order to enable the return of refugees and internally displaced, speed the flow of emergency assistance, and facilitate the establishment of markets, thereby contributing to the reintegration of populations into stable and productive social and economic activities, the Mission's third strategic objective.

USAID developed the RAA because roads were critical to so many of its other activities. Consequently, it committed itself to rehabilitating a series of gravel roads in the Zambezi River Valley, a paved road between Vanduzi and Changara on the Beira-Tete-Malawi corridor, and the 4.2 km rail bridge over the Zambezi River at Sena.¹⁰

The process for identifying areas in which to work was relatively straightforward. With Swedish technical assistance, the Mozambican National Directorate of Roads and Bridges (DNEP) developed a list of priority roads that it asked donors to help reconstruct. USAID agreed to resurface one of these, the Vanduzi-Changara road. USAID also chose to rebuild select gravel roads in the Zambezi River Valley, even though they were not on DNEP's priority list, because they were important to assist refugees returning from Malawi.

UNHCR staff in Mozambique indicate that USAID's road work in Zambezia Province greatly facilitated the return of refugees from Malawi. Populations began moving spontaneously by foot once roads were cleared of mines, and organized repatriation began when roads were reconstructed. The bridge and roads provided an important gateway to the northern districts of Sofala and Manica provinces, the origin of thousands of refugees in Malawi. All USAID-funded road work was completed before the election.

Another USAID activity was to rehabilitate the rail bridge to facilitate the flow of refugees back into Mozambique, particularly into Sofala Province. Rehabilitation of the bridge was extremely difficult. RENAMO had placed explosives in the bridge's framework

¹⁰ See Annex A for a detailed project description.

in 1986, causing two of the 40 spans to fall into the river. Built during the colonial era, the bridge handled rail traffic for a line between the port at Beira and coal mines in Tete as well as the Shire Highlands rail in Malawi. Since the rail line was no longer in use, USAID proposed converting it to vehicular and pedestrian traffic, and conducted an aerial survey to determine feasibility. USAID let two contracts, one to a U.S. engineering firm to consult on all aspects of the project, and the other to an Italian company to repair and lift the spans into place. After initiating repairs, the contractor discovered that a third span was also damaged and in need of substantial repair, delaying project completion. Staff in USAID indicated that there was a sense of urgency to rehabilitating the bridge; thus there had been insufficient time to wait for the security situation to improve sufficiently to conduct a complete ground survey. The decision to proceed based on information from an aerial survey suggests that war-to-peace transitions require taking risks that would not be the case in traditional development efforts. The bridge rehabilitation has now been completed, and it was formally inaugurated in December 1995.

Unlike some of the other projects, working with other donors and the GRM on the RAA was relatively easy. The technical assistance from Sweden made a big difference in the quality of the coordination that DNEP was able to provide, but it still did not have the capacity to play an oversight role, much in the way a state highway department in the United States would. DNEP played a very positive role in collecting and disseminating information on donors' individual projects, thereby reducing duplication and facilitating efficiency.

6. Impact Monitoring

As the Mission developed a transition strategy, it also had to come up with a way to measure the impact of USAID efforts to ensure effective use of resources and determine progress. Having few reliable sources of secondary data, the Mission developed an approach that relied on statistical data available from secondary sources, information from existing news sources and reports from meetings, and the collection of primary data through site visits and interviews with local populations.

To narrow the data-collection burden and increase statistical reliability, the Mission opted to focus on six districts. Three of the districts were located on the Zambezi River and were the sites for USAID-funded activities in the PVO Support Project, RAA, and demining. These areas suffered tremendously from both the drought and the war, and during the transition, experienced large influxes of war-displaced populations returning to their communities of origin. To contrast these areas with the rest of the country, USAID chose sites in three different provinces. USAID activities were concentrated there to a lesser extent, and consequently provided an interesting comparison to the Zambezi River Valley. The table on the next page summarizes the objectives, indicators, and information sources.

The monitoring plan is not perfect from a statistical perspective, but represents the best option in light of inadequate secondary sources, financial resources to conduct national surveys, and time to develop and implement full-scale national monitoring. USAID began implementing the monitoring plan systematically in October 1993, but did not finalize it until June 1994. From a statistical perspective, this delay means that some of the data, particularly information gathered from site visits, is not uniform from the first year of the transition to the second.

USAID effectively relied on secondary data gathered by Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) from PVOs around the country to assess food security and the nutritional health of the population at the district level. In the early stages, PVOs were so busy implementing their grant activities that they didn't have time to collect data on the populations and the areas they were serving, but this constraint diminished over time and the scope and depth of the information that MSF gathered improved enormously, making it a reliable secondary source of data.

Objective	Indicator	Information Source
Avoid drought- and war-related famine and deaths	Acute young child malnutrition rate	Secondary data from MSF-CIS monthly bulletins
Contribute to successful implementation of the peace process	Stated perceptions of personal safety and security of property	UNHCR & IOM statistics on population movements; observations and interviews during site visits
	Perception of electoral process, including voter registration, campaigning, and elections	Data on voter registration and turnout; information from UNOMOZ, CSC meetings, and NDI focus group reports; and interviews during site visits
Contribute to reintegration of populations into stable and productive social and economic activities	Supply of staple food (maize) available in local retail markets	Year-round availability of domestic production and/or food aid in monitored areas
Source: Monitoring Plan: USAID Transition Program, FY 1993-95, June 7, 1994		

Reliance on site visits to generate data was a particularly innovative approach because staff sought to obtain information directly from Mozambicans and judge how their lives were being affected by USAID-funded activities. It was cost-effective because it

expanded an effort that the Mission was already undertaking. It is also likely that the impact monitoring plan reinforced the notion that periodic internal evaluations were both necessary and valuable in monitoring the progress of different projects and activities. The information gathered resulted in a significant amount of anecdotal data on which USAID could judge its efforts. For example, staff asked Mozambicans if they were going to vote. Initially, people responded by indicating for whom they intended to vote. As the elections approached, staff heard a more sophisticated response, e.g., "I know who I'm voting for, but my vote is a secret." This type of response demonstrates the positive impact of the civic education program.

The monitoring effort was not intended to be very statistical, but even the non-statistical indicators were not always addressed systematically by all site visit teams, since members of the teams naturally focused more on their own responsibilities and areas of expertise. However, efforts to balance the teams helped ensure that the trip reports provided enough information to permit Mission staff already familiar with the country to synthesize and report of the changes in the countryside. This approach made the most of available resources—data, staff, and logistical—and enabled the Mission to both assess and report progress dynamically. The Mission was congratulated by USAID/W on the high caliber of the FY 1993-94 API and the innovative monitoring effort which made it possible.

7. Lessons Learned

Early USAID presence facilitated the development of the transition program. Well before the peace accord was signed, USAID already had operational projects and staff on the ground who were familiar with the country. In particular, having the PVO Support Project operational was crucial to USAID's ability to facilitate reintegration of war-displaced populations and reactivation of rural agricultural activities. This early presence meant that USAID could expand existing efforts, rather than build everything from scratch.

Recruiting and mobilizing staff creatively makes a difference. Despite USAID's presence on the ground, the onset of peace meant that staff levels were suddenly inadequate, a situation that USAID is likely to face in other war-torn countries. USAID found creative solutions to compensate: by using task forces to help staff share information and pool ideas across traditional office structures; by relying on PSCs and FSNs to complement the limited direct hire staff; and by adapting the Mission's organizational structure to meet new needs.

Interagency coordination produces real benefits. USAID, USIS, and the State Department benefited greatly from collaborating in USAID-established interagency task forces. There were several examples of this. First, the public affairs officer (PAO), through participation on the Elections and the Demobilization Task Forces, learned about projects as they were evolving and incorporated relevant aspects into his own programs,

thereby improving the effectiveness of U.S. public relations in Mozambique. Second, the defense attaché and the Demobilization/Reintegration Support Project (DRSP) staff collaborated very closely, routinely sharing information on progress and pitfalls in the demobilization process. Third, the Democratic Initiatives Project (DIP) staff and the Embassy political officers also benefitted from close collaboration and fed information to superiors who sat on UN commissions. Fourth, the Embassy's refugee officer relied heavily on information from USAID on repatriation-related efforts, and consequently was able to mobilize significant State Department resources for UNHCR's reintegration program for returning refugees. The task forces succeeded because leadership at the top encouraged staff to collaborate, share information, and work together, and because the personalities of the team leaders further encouraged openness and collaboration.

Adequate and flexible funding is critical. Transitions are both expensive and risky endeavors. USAID had to come up with significant resources in an era of dwindling funds. In particular, staff felt that having enough money available to deal with last minute contingencies was critical to USAID's success. Circumstances changed very quickly and frequently required quick decision-making, as the funding for the political party monitors demonstrated. Flexible sources of funds also proved to be critical, as the support for elections and demobilization readily demonstrated. USAID spent a great deal of time determining what it could and could not do, consistent with the legal requirements of the DFA. USAID missions working in transition situations in Africa should benefit from those negotiations by not having to repeat them. Given the legal requirements of the DFA, USAID should be prepared to make available significant resources from other accounts, such as ESF or disaster assistance, to the maximum extent feasible.

War-to-peace transitions require taking risks. As mentioned, transitions are risky endeavors because donors may find that they must proceed with an activity before they have complete confidence in its technical feasibility, a situation that would be unlikely in a more traditional development program. Such was the case in USAID's efforts to rehabilitate the Dona Ana bridge in central Mozambique, where the contractor and USAID opted to proceed before a complete ground survey could be done. Security constraints are likely to arise in other transitions, and USAID will have to weigh the costs and benefits of waiting for better information.

Transitions take time, despite the pressure to move quickly. Donors were initially dealing with a one-year time frame for demobilization of combatants, formation of a new army, and national presidential and legislative elections. The timetable stipulated in the GPA slipped almost from the first day because donors could not mobilize quickly enough, and because the GRM and RENAMO continued to negotiate several items. In both elections and demobilization, USAID was among the fastest of the donors, yet it took almost a year or more to initiate new activities and amend existing ones. This suggests that the one-year time frame was unrealistic in the first place. USAID and other donors need to keep this in mind in future transitions because a more realistic timetable will lead to fewer

hurried efforts, as USAID efforts in elections and road reconstruction readily demonstrated.

Expect and prepare for heavy demands on the contracts office, as well as support services in general. Transitions take place in a fast-paced and constantly changing environment. The need to respond immediately requires a priority commitment from the contracts office. USAID/Maputo now has its own contracts officer, but competing needs in the region meant added pressures on the Regional Contracts Office (RCO) based in an adjacent country. USAID should be prepared in future transition programs to provide maximum contract support when there is not enough support in the regional office.

For election-related activities, competitive bidding procedures may be more advantageous than unsolicited proposals. With the benefit of hindsight, staff felt that using Requests for Applications (RFAs) for election-related activities would have been less cumbersome and more cost-effective than relying on unsolicited proposals because the Mission would have been able to stipulate exactly what it wanted. The unsolicited proposal process did not encourage US-based organizations to consider investing in a longer-term commitment to Mozambique. USAID/Maputo staff also expressed the belief that expanding the base of organizations that carry out democracy-related activities is worthwhile for the long-term. Changing circumstances make the RFA process difficult to manage, but a cooperative agreement for election-related activities in a war-to-peace transition may be a better instrument than a grant precisely because of changing circumstances. The competitive process gives USAID more leverage because implementing organizations must submit good proposals that respond to USAID's stated needs in order to win a bid. Even if the same organizations had successfully competed an RFA, USAID would have been better off than they were in relying on unsolicited proposals.

Relations between institutions working on the same activity can be complicated. Multiple organizations working on components of the same activity can be problematic. USAID needs to ensure that implementing partners prepare written agreements that clarify roles and responsibilities. In instances when USAID relied on an organization to provide technical expertise, tensions developed with their partner organizations and USAID intervention was required to smooth out the differences between the parties. On the other hand, the collaboration between IRI, CARE, and IOM was a success, but it still required extensive USAID involvement to keep the activity on track. USAID should view these "forced marriages" with caution and carefully work out the details of their respective responsibilities.

Evenhanded treatment of the opposing parties is essential. USAID should expect the parties to the conflict to try to manipulate the process to their advantage, as occurred throughout the first year of the transition. A significant obstacle during the transition was UNOHAC's desire to have the Mozambican government run large programs

at a time when RENAMO, one of the parties to the previous conflict, did not fully trust the government. During a war-to-peace transition, it is important to treat all sides equally; one implication is that many activities will need to be undertaken through both non-governmental and host government institutions.

The UN bureaucracy is not well-suited to fast-paced transition programs.

War-to-peace transitions require speed in implementing activities, flexibility in dealing with changing circumstances, and local decision-making authority. Instead of creating new bureaucracies, USAID staff argued that the United Nations should expand the activities of UN agencies already on the ground, such as UNDP, UNHCR, and WFP, and give them operational responsibility. Further, all UN agencies should be put under the unambiguous command of the SRSG to streamline the chain of command and prevent extensive and conflicting involvement of head offices in New York.

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Cheryl Simmons, IOM
Jay Smith, Deputy Director, USAID
Michael Turner, USAID and Hunter College
Susie Pratt, U.S. Embassy
Sven von Burgsdorff, European Union

Annex A: Project Descriptions

PVO Support Project (656-0217)¹¹

<i>Authorization date:</i>	June 6, 1990
<i>Project Assistance Completion Date:</i>	September 30, 1997
<i>Current Life of Project Funding:</i>	\$90 million
<i>Funding Source:</i>	DFA

Amendments:

- The first amendment, signed in July 1991, changed the method of obligating project funding from direct grants to PVOs to the signing of a Project Grant Agreement with the GRM.
- The second amendment, signed in September 1992, added \$30 million to the original \$20 million, extended the PACD from March 31, 1994, to September 30, 1996, and added additional output objectives by expanding the potential beneficiary groups and eligible grant activities.
- The third amendment, signed in September 1993, added \$40 million to the project, and added target groups to enable project funding to reach returning refugees, dislocated families, and demobilized soldiers and their dependents.

Project purpose:

To reduce vulnerability to absolute poverty induced by rural insurgency, within targeted population groups.

Grantees:

CARE International
Save the Children Federation
World Vision Relief and Development
Africare
Adventists Development and Relief Agency
Action Internationale Contre la Faim
Salesian Missions
Medical Care Development International

¹¹ Annex B of the PVO Support Project June 1994 mid-term evaluation contains detailed descriptions of the each organization's activities

World Relief Corporation
Mozambique Health Committee
Food for the Hungry International

Democratic Initiatives Project (656-0227)¹²

Authorization date: September 1991
Project Assistance Completion Date: December 31, 1996
Current Life of Project Funding: \$23.3 million
Funding Source: \$19.2 million DFA, \$4.1 million ESF

Amendments:

- The first amendment, in September 1993, modified the project purpose, added \$13 million (\$2 million from the ESF) in funds to the original \$4 million, and extended the PACD from December 31, 1993, to December 31, 1996.
- The second amendment, in September 1994, added \$2.1 million from the ESF and permitted USAID to issue direct contracts and assistance instruments without first obtaining GRM concurrence.
- The third amendment, in February 1995, added \$3.2 million to permit completion and consolidation of ongoing activities and add additional funding for two new activities. Additional funds for ongoing election activities ensured that critical documentation were safely returned and stored in the capital and helped to create computerized database, thus starting the institutionalization of key electoral processes.

Project purpose:

To support Mozambican initiatives to establish the foundation for a stable democratic society.

Activities/Contractors:

- Through a \$105,000 cooperative agreement, IFES conducted in July 1992 an in-country assessment of electoral needs in Mozambique. The purpose of the

¹²The DIP has not been limited to elections, having funded studies related to decentralization and rule of law. For a fuller description on non-election related activities, see the original and amended project paper.

assessment was to recommend specific components necessary to hold national elections and determine the cost for these components.

- Through a \$8.55 million grant agreement to the UNDP Elections Trust Fund, USAID financed the production and distribution of civic education materials, leasing of small fixed-wing aircraft, and the training of 60,000 national election monitors. USAID provided an additional \$607,000 to support aircraft fuel and operations costs, and to provide additional support to the training of electoral officials.
- USAID signed a cooperative agreement with IRI for \$480,000 to: (a) support a program to institutionally strengthen Mozambican political parties through consultations with foreign politicians and policy experts, and (b) through means of a national seminar to promote public awareness and education, and help ensure ballot security during Mozambique's first democratic elections. In conjunction with CARE and IOM, IRI developed a training program for political party election monitors. Over 80 trainers attended IRI's national seminar. In addition, IRI developed and produced 35,000 training manuals for the national pollwatchers.
- Through a grant to CARE for \$117,000, CARE and IRI developed a joint program of political party monitor training, focusing on the rights and responsibilities of national observers. This program included a national seminar for the core trainers selected by the political parties, and included 13 national core trainers provided by CARE who were fielded into the provinces to conduct district-level workshops, with monitoring and facilitation of local seminars.
- A \$1.79 million grant to the IOM provided funds in support of logistical assistance to the political party monitors. The objective was to facilitate the transportation, deployment, and payment of a subsistence allowance for up to 35,000 political party monitors for training in ballot security, and to ensure their intra-provincial transportation to serve as pollwatchers at the voting tables during the elections.
- Through a cooperative agreement with NDI for \$1.9 million, USAID supported a national voter education campaign including: (a) training of voter education training agents; (b) production of election kits and other voting materials for the CNE and national and international non-governmental organizations; (c) development and production of voter education radio programs; (d) a survey of the national broadcast capacity of Radio Mozambique; and (e) two training seminars on methodology of elections reporting for Maputo-based and provincial radio journalists.
- Through a grant of \$175,000 from AREAF, AAI provided STAE with: (a) technical assistance in the form of three telecommunications and computer software specialists; (b) two administrative aides to work as rapporteurs and recording secretaries for STAE meetings; and (c) two interpreters to work in the STAE's

international press center during the electoral period, translating for CNE members and assisting the foreign press.

Demobilization/Reintegration Support Project (656-0235)

Authorization date: April 8, 1993
Project Assistance Completion Date: September 30, 1996
Current Life of Project Funding: \$29.6 million
Funding Source: \$8.6 million DFA, \$6 million DOD
\$15 million ADA

Amendments:

The September 1994 amendment added \$5 million in funds from the Defense Department's Office of Humanitarian Affairs for the continued support of mine clearance activities and \$5.1 million from the DFA to assist with the social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants.

Project purpose:

To support those immediate relief and rehabilitation needs necessary for the implementation of the Mozambican Peace Accord.

Activities/Contractors:

- A \$7 million grant agreement with the IOM funded approximately half of the costs associated with transporting demobilized soldiers home from the AAs.
- At a cost of \$1 million, USAID provided non-food supplies, such as tarps, blankets, and cooking pots for the AAs.
- USAID established health clinics in RENAMO zones through a \$1 million grant to WHO, which made sub-grants to PVOs for each of the AAs.
- A \$1.75 million grant agreement to IOM funded approximately half of the costs associated with establishing IRS centers in every province to deal with the ex-soldiers on a day-to-day basis. Its four functions are to: (a) help ex-soldiers solve problems related to their demobilization (e.g. lost demobilization cards and changes of payment address); (b) map employment and training opportunities in each province and the referral of ex-soldiers to these opportunities; (c) administer a provincial fund; and (d) implement the Occupational Skills Development (OSD) program, which is funded by other donors.
- USAID will contribute an undetermined amount to the Provincial Fund, which makes available quick-dispersing funds to the IRS for small projects aimed at the social and economic reintegration of ex-soldiers. These include support to

apprenticeships with local businesses, rehabilitation of local infrastructure, assistance in obtaining a drivers' or other licenses, and on-the-job training opportunities. While the IRS offices oversee and make the grants, they are implemented by businesses, community groups, and NGOs already working in the areas.

- In July 1995, Ronco completed the demining of 2,200 km of priority roads with DRSP funding. It is now providing technical assistance to the National Demining Commission to develop a program to allow future USAID resources to be provided to demining NGOs already present and active in Mozambique.

D. Rural Access Activity (656-0237 and 690-0270.56)

<i>Authorization date:</i>	September 24, 1993
<i>Project Assistance Completion Date:</i>	June 30, 1995 for 656-0237 December 31, 1994 for 690-0270.56
<i>Life of Project Funding:</i>	\$8.2 million for 656-0237 \$10.8 million for 690-0270.56
<i>Funding Source:</i>	all DFA

Amendments:

None.

Project purpose:

To increase transportation efficiency and capacity related to a) post-drought recovery in the Zambezi River Valley, and b) movement of drought relief assistance to Tete.

Activities/Contractors:

- USAID contracted with Basil Read, Murray & Roberts, and OPCA to rehabilitate approximately 710 km of gravel roads in Sofala, Tete, and Zambezia provinces.
- USAID contracted with CMC to rehabilitate and convert the existing war-damaged rail bridge over the Zambezi River between Sena and Mutarara to accommodate vehicular and pedestrian traffic.
- USAID contracted with Murray & Roberts to temporarily rehabilitate and reseal approximately 270 km of paved road in Manica Province on the Beira-Tete-Malawi corridor between Vanduzi and Changara, and 15 km of other paved road.

- USAID contracted with Louis Berger International to serve as a consultant on all aspects of the project.

**Annex B: Summary of U.S. Government Assistance to Mozambique,
1993-1994**

U.S. Government Assistance to Mozambique FY 1993-94 (expressed in USD thousands)		
	1993	1994
Development		
DFA	33,000	33,300
Food*	16,400	15,000
ESF	2,000	3,100
<i>Sub-total</i>	51,400	51,400
Humanitarian		
Disaster	9,114	961
Food**	50,700	20,000
ADA	17,000	5,000
<i>Sub-total</i>	76,814	25,961
TOTAL	128,214	77,361
Source: AFR/DRCO, March 27, 1995 *Includes USDA Title I, Title II Regular, and Title III **Includes Title II Emergency and USDA Section 416(b)		