



International Foundation for Electoral Systems

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IFES REPORT:

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN GUINEA

DECEMBER 1993

Prepared by Thomas C. Bayer

IFES Senior Program Officer for Africa and the Near East

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This report was prepared by Thomas C. Bayer, IFES Senior Program Officer for Africa and the Near East. The report represents the views and opinions of IFES, and reflects the observations and recommendations of the IFES Guinea election team.

The **International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)** is a private, nonprofit foundation established in September 1987 with a mandate to analyze, support, and strengthen the mechanics of the election process in emerging democracies and to undertake appropriate education activities which contribute toward free and fair elections.

The Foundation fulfills its objectives through programs in technical election assessment; on-site technical assistance; poll worker training; citizen education in democracy; and election day activities. IFES also serves as a clearinghouse for election-related information and experts.

IFES' program activities have expanded dramatically since the worldwide shift toward democratic pluralism and the ever-increasing demand for technical support services in the area of election administration. In the past five years, IFES has sent more than 35 pre-election survey teams to five continents and provided on-site technical assistance to the election councils of Albania, Angola, Bulgaria, the Comoro Islands, Congo, Haiti, Guinea, Guyana, Madagascar, Mali, Mongolia, Romania, Venezuela, and many other countries. Election related material and equipment have been shipped to countries in Africa, East-Central Europe, and Latin America.

Among IFES' significant contributions have been the undertaking of training for voter registration workers, poll workers, and other election officials in Bulgaria, Guinea, Haiti, Mali, Madagascar, Malawi, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Romania, the former Soviet Union, and Yemen. IFES has also used its resources to link election administrators on a regional basis through conferences and symposia on selected topics in election administration in Latin America and East-Central Europe.

IFES election observers have produced comprehensive reports on more than 20 elections on five continents, and post-election analysis reports have been completed for 11 countries in Latin America, Asia, Central Europe, and North Africa.

IFES is a vital resource center for any nation seeking expert assistance in developing a sound election process, an essential step in establishing and maintaining a democratic form of government. IFES also serves as a clearinghouse for sharing information about any technical aspect of electoral systems, including names of those expert in these systems and the materials essential to administering democratic elections.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Republic of Guinea held its first multiparty presidential elections on December 19, 1993. Eight political parties presented candidates for the contest. The elections were a culmination of more than one year of discussions and planning by the government and the opposition parties. On January 4, 1994, Guinea's Supreme Court upheld the victory of President Lansana Conté, giving him 51.7 percent of the vote. In his announcement of the results, the president of the Supreme Court, Laminé Sidimé, admitted that the December 19 elections were not without their technical problems. According to the Supreme Court, these problems resulted in the nullification of the election results in the opposition strongholds of Siguiri and Kankan. However, these difficulties, in the view of the Court, did not reflect widespread and generalized fraud. Nor were these problems sufficient cause to require that by-elections be called in any of Guinea's 33 departments (préfectures) or Conakry's five boroughs (communes).

The opposition did not accept the election as open and transparent -- nor did it acknowledge that the incumbent captured more than 50 percent of the first-round votes cast. Provisional election results were transmitted via radio, telephone, telefax, and courier to the National Counting Commission (*Commission Nationale de Recensement des Votes*) seated at the People's Palace in the Hall of the Second of October. Provisional standings at 19h00 on December 22, 1993 revealed that President Conté had garnered 44.92 percent (939,814 votes). Running in second place was Alpha Condé, with 26.43 percent (552,983 votes). Third place was claimed by Mamadou Ba with 12.84 percent (268,599 votes), who was closely followed by Siradou Diallo with 11.88 percent (248,522 votes). By that time, 37 of 38 domestic electoral constituencies had reported.

Mathematically, the odds were very good that there would be a runoff between President Conté and Alpha Condé. The last unreported constituency, the borough of Ratoma, was home to 111,911 registered voters. While observing the local vote tabulation procedure in Ratoma, IFES was told by the mayor's assistant that approximately 50 percent of Ratoma's polling stations were not functional on election day. In other words, roughly half of the eligible voters were able to participate in the election, 56,000 voters (assuming 100 percent participation by those who were able to vote). Internationally, some of the Guinean embassies had yet to report their totals. However, this total

number of unreported votes was not significant enough to influence the standing of the top two vote getters.

The National Counting Commission (NCC) took a short break until 22h00 at which time it was anticipated that Ratoma's results would be reported. But at 22h00, Ministry of the Interior and Security Secretary General Fofana, the NCC president, declared the NCC adjourned until 09h00 the next day, December 23. Political-party representatives and all individuals who were not official members of the National Counting Commission (NCC) were told to vacate the Hall of the Second of October. As they left, they were told that no final announcement of provisional results would be made until 09h00 on December 23, after the results of the remaining constituencies were reported and all calculations were checked for errors. The previous evening, it had been broadcast that the provincial results available as of 22h30 on December 22 would be publicly announced by the Minister of the Interior and Security, Alseny Rene Gomez, at 23h00 on December 22.

The appointed hour for the announcement came and went. Following broadcasting of three hours of aimless local travelogue and traditional dance ensembles, Minister Gomez appeared on the television, surrounded by members of the national and international press corps and military and ministry officials. It was 01h00 on December 23, 1993. A listless Minister Gomez read from a paper the "final" provisional election results for each candidate: 50.93 percent for Lansana Conté (1,085,976 votes); 20.5 percent for Alpha Condé (444,695 votes); 13.11 percent for Mamadou Ba (279,603 votes); 11.64 percent for Siradou Diallo (248,379 votes); Faciné Touré 1.37 percent (29,297 votes); Jean Marie Doré 0.91 percent (19,560 votes); Mohamed Mansour Kaba 0.60 percent (12,956 votes); and Elhadj Ismaila Mohamed Ghassim Ghussein 0.54 percent (11,701 votes). The Minister informed those assembled that the results of the department of Siguiiri had been annulled due to irregularities as reported by "authorities of the Governor's offices of Upper Guinea." As soon as this was announced, the national anthem was played and the television and the radio stations went off the air.

The International Foundation for Electoral Systems is confident that its activities in pre-election Guinea positively impacted Guinea's electoral process. What occurred between 19h00 on December 22 and 01h00 on December 23 was beyond the scope of influence of any poll-worker training or technical elections assistance program. The government's secretive handling of the election results indicates a lack of will on its part to conduct open and transparent elections. There was no attempt made on the part of the government to clarify the annulments of the results of Kankan and Siguiri, nor to investigate the tabulation anomalies in Dubréka, Boké, Kindia, Forécariah, N'Zérékoré, or Guékédou. Based on the information available to IFES staff and consultants and to other international election technicians present in Guinea during the elections, one may conclude that the results of the 1993 presidential elections, as verified by the Supreme Court, were fraudulent and do not reflect the actual election results, nor the will of the Guinean people.

Lansana Conté was inaugurated as president of Guinea's Third Republic on January 29, 1994. Guinea's legislative elections are unofficially scheduled for the first half of 1994. There has been no announcement of an election date. The opportunity still remains for the Conté government to prove that it is capable of holding open and transparent elections.

Presently, the international community is discussing what follow-up assistance, if any, is to be offered to Guinea for the legislative elections. It is critical that this follow-up assistance be tied to procedural changes in the administration of elections in Guinea. Initiatives and programs that would illustrate the administration's willingness to lead Guinea and Guineans into a system of participatory multiparty democracy include the granting of decision-making authority to the national electoral commission; the correction, by this commission, of the procedural anomalies of Guinea's electoral law; the revision of the electoral list and the respect of the legal deadlines for the distribution of voters lists and cards; the development of a domestic election monitoring capacity through the involvement of local civic groups; and the timely implementation of a voters information-civic education program targeted at literate and illiterate populations.

II. SLOUCHING TOWARD DECEMBER

Through careful crafting of the electoral law and the constitution, the government of Guinea established itself as the sole entity responsible for the organization, implementation, and control of all phases of the electoral process. Elections were to be prepared and managed through the Ministry of the Interior and Security (MIS), headed by Minister Alseny Rene Gomez. The participation of Guinea's 43 recognized political parties in the electoral process is delimited by the electoral law and the constitution.

A. The Election Order is Changed

Legislative elections were initially scheduled for December 27, 1992. These were postponed by Guinea's leader, General Lansana Conté, who claimed that there were insufficient finances for the support of a national election. Guinea's electoral law stipulates that the legislative elections are to be held before the presidential elections. However, President Conté reversed the order of the elections, announcing his decision during a speech to the Guinean people on April 3, 1993, the anniversary of the 1984 military coup that brought Conté into power. The reversal of the election order was seen to benefit the president, as his popularity was higher than that of the leading pro-government party, the Party for Progress and Unity (*Partie pour unité et progrès*). During the speech, the President promised Guineans that both the presidential and the legislative contests would take place before the end of 1993.

There was no coordinated, immediate reaction to the decision to switch the order of the elections among the political parties nor the citizens. Some of the local newspapers discussed the unilateral decision to reverse the contests. A leader of one party maintained that the President hoped that the opposition would invest time and effort in protesting this decision as that was the reaction desired by the President. Other party representatives explained that the last-minute postponement of the

December 1992 elections allowed President Conté and the political organizations supporting the current government to gauge the support of the other political parties and adjust their campaign strategies accordingly. The reversal of the order of elections added to the climate of suspicion that the Conté government was incapable of organizing free-and-fair elections. Some Guineans began to speculate whether elections would take place at all.

The reversal of the elections did not violate any specific law. Some accepted the change, maintaining that the facilitation of the presidential election, with less than 10 candidates, would be far easier than the management of the proportional and majoritarian legislative elections with more than 25 parties presenting candidates and lists. Therefore, the presidential election would prepare the administration and the population for the more complicated legislative process. Those opposed to the switch called attention to Article 34 of the Constitution, which states that in the absence of the president, the president of the National Assembly takes charge of the government. They believed that a popularly elected national assembly would be better placed to organize a non-partisan presidential election than the president himself. Guinean and international experts also pointed to the fact that in other countries where the legislative elections have followed the presidential elections, citizens who might have been inclined to split their vote will no longer do so, voting overwhelmingly for the party of the newly elected president.

Rumors of ethnic violence and organized opposition to the political process being facilitated by the Conté government increased following the President's April speech. An estimated 100,000 opposition supporters belonging to the 31 parties making up the *Etats Généraux* participated in a peaceful march and rally on May 25, 1993. The leaders of the participating political parties were subsequently convoked to meet with government officials at the national police headquarters. They refused to report, maintaining that their march had been peaceful and had not violated Guinean law. Two more convocations were issued and the parties refused each time to respond. Tensions mounted. On June 18, 1993, the Minister of the Interior and Security agreed to meet directly with the leadership of three of the larger opposition parties: the PRP, the RPG, and the UPG. During

this meeting, the opposition representatives presented Minister Gomez with the 11-point platform of the *Etats Généraux*. All local and international actors in the electoral process were encouraged by this exchange, hoping that it signified the opening of a positive dialogue between the political parties and the government.

B. Communications Between Groups

The opening of the "dialogue" proved to be more cosmetic than substantive. There were no movements made by the MIS or the government to include the opposition parties in the pre-electoral processes. In August, there was tentative discussion of an October 17 election date. This date met the resistance of the opposition and the international electoral consultants on technical and social grounds. In fact, the electoral technicians at the MIS confided off the record that it would be impossible and potentially disastrous to attempt the elections in October. October is harvest time in rural Guinea. More importantly, it did not appear possible that the electoral list and the voting cards could be prepared in time. The date came and went.

Minister Gomez met with the parties on August 4 to announce the results of the census following the second phase of the CYK's electoral census (*Société CYK Informatique*). He announced that administrative commissions would be formed to facilitate the revision of the electoral list between August 20 and September 18. Finally, he informed the parties of the government's intent to establish an elections steering committee (*Commission de Pilotage des Élections*). The parties enumerated their three main issues for the Minister:

1. The necessity for the establishment of a government of national unity. This body would be responsible for the appointment of the electoral commission.
2. The parties' general dissatisfaction with the reversal of the order of elections.
3. The President's refusal to meet with the political parties and the lack of effort to include the parties in all aspects of the election process. Efforts by the international community and domestic leaders of opinion to encourage the administration to decree the creation of a functioning independent electoral commission continued to fall on

deaf ears. Guinea's situation resembled that of other nations where the government in power is responsible for the organization as well as the implementation of a nation's first multiparty elections -- the "transparency" of the process receives only lip service while the government strives to control all aspects of the election process.

On August 14, Ibrahim Taleb, the son of a successful businessmen, was found dead in the borough of Matoto. In the search for Mr. Taleb's murderers, the authorities detained the son of another well-known merchant, Almamy Kourouma. Within 48 hours, Mr. Kourouma was dead of heart failure. However, photos of the corpse and the results of an autopsy performed on August 19 revealed broken bones, electrical burns on the genitalia, and other injuries indicating that Mr. Kourouma had been tortured to death. Guineans were outraged by these atrocities, unknown since the time of the overthrow of the former regime. The administration's capacity to control its own members was questioned. General citizen frustration with the government increased.

III. A DECISION IS MADE

In a speech presented on September 3, 1993, President Conté appealed to all Guineans to respect the law and to "strive to preserve national unity and peace." The President stated,

I urgently call on all authorities at all levels to adopt an impartial attitude toward the political parties which, equal in their rights and respects, are entitled to the same treatment. Comply strictly and ensure strict compliance with the laws in force so as to enhance the free exercise of freedoms granted the citizen and guaranteed under the constitution.

President Conté concluded his speech by announcing that the elections would take place on Sunday, December 5.

Minister Gomez convened a meeting of the representatives of the political parties on September 15. Thirteen of the 43 parties accepted his invitation to attend. During the meeting he announced that the administrative commissions would work beyond their mandated deadline until September 30. Also, he stated that the cost of the consular card required by all Guineans residing abroad would be reduced from 2,000CFA to 500CFA (the pre-devaluation equivalent of two U.S. dollars). The consular card was required to be presented as identification by Guineans abroad to allow them to register to vote at their embassies. Opposition party representatives claimed that their supporters were not being provided the consular cards upon request, that the cards were being distributed solely to PUP supporters. The consular card issue was especially problematic in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire, two nations with large populations of expatriate Guineans.

On September 26, 1994, approximately 30,000 Guineans representing approximately 30 political parties and affiliations held a rally to demand the establishment of a transitional government. The opposition was not confident that the Conté administration could remain neutral while organizing the elections. The rally participants also demanded "the creation of an independent and sovereign national electoral commission." Security for the rally was tight. At the end of the meeting, it was announced that there would be a march through Conakry in support of the creation of an interim

government on September 28, the 35th anniversary of Guinea's independence.

Marching into the center of Conakry on September 28, the masses were turned back by a concentrated presence of Guinean military and police. The demonstration dissolved into tribal clashes, primarily between the Peulh and the Soso. The opposition claimed that the riots had been touched off by the anti-riot police who had fired on the unarmed marchers. President Conté placed the blame at the feet of the opposition, charging them with instigating violence because they knew that they would not win the elections. The President announced that 18 Guineans had died and 198 were injured over the 72-hour period. Opposition members and human rights organizations set the total dead at 63 and the injured at 405, based on surveys of the local hospitals.

A. Decree 93/196/PRG/SGG

On October 6, 1993, President Conté signed the official decree 93/196/PRG/SGG establishing the groundwork for the creation of an election commission. However, the language of the decree did not afford the group any authority. The commission outlined by the decree would be little more than a figurehead -- window dressing designed by Conté and the administration to create the external appearance of a participatory, non-partisan process.

The 60-strong members of the National Electoral Commission (*Commission Nationale Electoral, CEN*) were to be named by presidential decree based on a nomination submitted by the MIS. The commission's role and mandate, operational or consultative, was not clear. The voting procedures outlined in the decree would allow motions to pass with a limited number of the commission members present. In the case of a tie, the president of the CNE was to cast the tie-breaking vote after consulting with the Minister of Interior. The CNE was to meet two times per month (Article 22). Special sessions could be called by the CNE president, by Minister Gomez, or by two-thirds of the CNE membership. There was no indication if this was two-thirds of the total commission or two-thirds of the members present at the time of the request for an extraordinary session. The

language of decree D/93/196 did not meet with the approval of the political parties.

I was informed that the CNE would form its own technical subcommissions. It was not clear if the CNE would incorporate the five technical subcommissions already active at the MIS. The CNE executive was to be composed of four members. Minister Gomez's counsellor and the National Director of Elections, Mr. Ahmadou Dieng, was to occupy one of these positions. He was assigned to assist the CNE president in "coordinating" the commission's work. Mr. Dieng's mandated presence on the CNE executive was an indication that the work to date of the MIS would receive no more than cosmetic scrutiny by a CNE formed in accordance with DE/93/196.

B. The Candidates

The official list of the candidates for the presidential election was published by the Supreme Court on October 25, 1993. The court document (Arrete 93/003/C.C.A) included the deliberations on each of the candidatures submitted before the court, the final decisions of the court, and the names, party affiliations, and ballot designs of each of the candidates.

The candidatures of Souleymane Kaba and Elhadj Bouna Keita were rejected by the court because they were not presented by a political party. Guinean law requires that all candidates must have a political affiliation; independent candidates are not permitted.

The accredited candidates, their professions, and their presenting political parties were:

Lansana Conté, President of the Republic of Guinea, *Parti de l'Unité et du Progrès* (PUP)
Alpha Condé, Professor, *Rassemblement du Peuple de Guinée* (RPG)
Mamadou Bhoie Ba, International Consultant, *l'Union pour la Nouvelle République* (UNR)
Siradiou Diallo, Journalist, *le Parti du Renouveau et du Progrès* (PRP)
Faciné Touré, Retired Civil Servant, *Union National pour la Prospérité de Guinée* (UNPG)
Mohamed Mansour Kaba, Engineer, *le Parti Djama*
Elhadj Ismaila Mohamed Ghassim Ghussein, Financial Auditor, *le Parti Démocratique de Guinée -
Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (PDG-RDA)
Jean Marie Doré, Retired Labor Inspector, *Union pour le Progrès de la Guinée* (UPG)

C. General, President, and/or Candidate?

Once presented as a candidate by the PUP, Lansana Conté did not retire from the military. His candidacy was challenged by the opposition. On October 26, the PRP political-party and the UNR presidential candidate Mamadou Bhoie Ba officially contested General Lansana Conté's candidacy before the Supreme Court. Mr. Ba's complaint was disallowed by the Court as having been filed by an individual speaking for an entire party. Per Guinean law, the party can speak for the individual, but the individual may not assume to speak for the party.

The PRP charged that the candidacy could be contested for four reasons:

1. Violation of Article 5 of L91/014/CTRN.
2. Violation of Article 130 of L91/012/CTRN.
3. Violation of Article 3 of Decree 91/263/PRG/SGG.
4. Reversal of repeated declarations by President Conté recorded by print and electronic media stating that a members of the military interested in becoming involved in politics must "hang up their tunic" before doing so.

As further proof of the incumbent's relationship with the armed forces, it was noted by the PRP that the official designation of his home of record was the Army's base, Camp Almamy Samory, in Conakry.

In a decision dated November 3, 1993, the court determined that the articles enumerated from laws L91/012 and L91/014 concerned only the elections for the national assembly. Article 3 of decree 91/263 has not pertained to the incumbent since October 11, 1993. On October 11, 1993, a special disposition, Decree 197/PRG/SGG/93, based on Ordinance 042/PRG/SGG of May 28, 1987 was passed. The disposition granted General Conté, as of October 11, 1993, a leave of absence from his post as General of the National Army.

Concerning the PRP's fourth point, the Court noted that it was impossible to judge if these repeated comments were made by General Lansana Conté or President Lansana Conté. Furthermore, the Court established that verbal declarations have no legal standing. As for the incumbent's home of

record, the President of the Republic is also the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. In this role, his recording of the military base as his residence was seen as justifiable. The Court also pointed out that there is no official presidential residence. The Supreme Court ruled that President Conté's candidacy was legitimate and valid and charged Mr. Ba and the PRP for court costs.

D. The Government Tightens Control

Moving into the final quarter of 1993, administrators entertained fewer suggestions for improving the management of the coming elections. Casual visits from "opposition" elements of the political and civil societies diminished. IFES continued to be optimistic that diplomatic maneuvering room remained for the political parties to be incorporated into the process. This positive outlook was fueled by private admissions by well-positioned officials that nothing had "really" been done in the area of civic and voter education, and that the earliest that an election acceptable to the Guinean people could be held would be late December. However, in public it was next to impossible to find an MIS bureaucrat willing to make management decisions regarding anything from ballot design to the positioning of the state seal on the election documents. Chains of command within the MIS, and between the MIS and the Ministries of External Affairs and Justice, were confused or non-existent. There was growing internal frustration that regardless of their hard work, the decisions of the MIS technicians would be disregarded by officials at a higher level with no explanation nor justification.

In a more fundamental way, it was increasingly apparent to those working at all levels of the system that the outcome of a free and fair election stood to jeopardize their positions in the government. Therefore, suggestions and plans offered by IFES for initiatives such as voters education programs were categorized as non-important. Administration officials lacked the will to make a special effort to inform the rural population, especially the illiterate population, of the meaning of the vote, of voting procedures, or of the rights and the responsibilities of the voter, the political parties, and the administrators in the electoral process. IFES' ability to launch a nationwide poll-worker training program was a hopeful sign. The program's positive impact was primarily due to the attitudes and

the beliefs of the 10 trainers. Although they were all employees of the current administration, they were excited about the training and for the most part believed in the importance of well-informed poll workers. The core trainers realized that their training sessions served as de facto voter information sessions, and each took pride in his role as a primary resource person for the general population.

IV. THEOPHANE NOEL AND THE TRAINING OF TRAINERS

IFES consultant Théophile Noël arrived in Guinea on September 8, 1993. During his stay in Conakry, he designed training programs for the trainers of poll workers and for the poll workers. Mr. Noël developed the format and the content of the manuals for the poll workers, the political-party delegates, and the vote counters. Working with MIS counterparts, Mr. Noël identified and trained the 11 members of the core training team. The final preparations for the cascade training of the trainers of election workers were not complete until late October. All five regional training programs were scheduled to commence on October 29.

During his time in country, Mr. Noël offered a series of technical election process recommendations to the MIS. He emphasized the importance of distributing the honorarium as promised by the government to the poll workers on election day. Mr. Noël also recommended that the distribution of this money be handled by an independent body and not by the MIS to ensure that it reaches the poll workers.

The Guinean government planned to require each locality to draw on their own resources to furnish the polling stations with tables, chairs, and a voting booth as outlined in the electoral law. The potential for politically-related disturbances was the highest in Conakry, with the capital's vast population of eligible voters representing all of the major ethnic groups. Mr. Noël recommended that a sufficient number of voting screens be procured internationally for Conakry's polling places. He felt that the standardization of polling station furnishings in Conakry would make for a smoother process. He listed additional procurement needs that had yet to be handled by either the Guineans or the donors: various forms for use in the polling stations and the department counting centers on election day; ballot box ID stickers; identification stickers or badges for the party poll watchers; and plastic tamper-proof sacks for the delivery of the pollbooks, null ballots, and documents from the polling stations to the provincial and national levels.

A. Eighty Jurists

The International Commission of Jurists sent representatives to Guinea on two occasions. The first trip was an assessment mission in country April 24 through May 31, 1993. The ICJ General Secretary, Adama Dieng, was in Guinea on a follow-up mission from August 15 to August 18, 1993. In their report, the ICJ highlighted eight recommendations. Based on its assessment missions and supported by its recommendation calling for the presence of international election observers for the elections, the ICJ announced its intent to send an advance observation team. The eight team members were to be well versed in: constitutional law, electoral legislation, mass-media, accounting, and logistics. This team was scheduled to arrive in Guinea during the month of October, planning to begin by surveying the legal preparations for the elections and to investigate the roles of the National Communication Council (*Conseil National de la Communication -- CNC*) and the CNE. In addition, the team was to lay the ground work for an 80-member delegation of technical ICJ observers for Guinea's December 5 elections. Two observers would be deployed to each of the 38 departments, and eight would be stationed at the national level. IFES wanted to be available as a resource for both teams to make sure that there would be no duplication of effort or suggestions for alterations in the electoral procedures without the input of the IFES/MIS core-trainers in the field.

B. Debriefing

The responsibilities of the finalization of the training-of-trainers program, the potential coordination with the ICJ team, and the number of unresolved technical issues facing the MIS and the still non-existent CNE, combined to provide justification for a continual IFES presence in Guinea through the December 5 elections. Mr. Noël's contract was extended an additional two weeks to minimize the time lag between his departure and my arrival in Guinea.

Mr. Noël stopped over in Washington, D.C. on his way home. He met with IFES staff and conducted a joint briefing for representatives from AID and the Department of State. Mr. Noël

speculated that the December 5 election date would be moved back. However, he warned that such a decision would not be made by the Guinean government until immediately before December 5, requiring that all election organizations continue their programs until immediately before election day.

Mr. Noël reported that the members of the district-level commissions for the distribution of the voting cards and the electoral lists (*Commission(s) Distribution des Cartes des Électeurs*) had been appointed during the second week of October, 45 days before the election. According to articles L37 and L38, these commissions must commence their work 30 days before the election, continuing through the day before election day. The commissions could not begin their work without the voting lists and the voting cards. The CYK faced two problems in assuring that the commissions would be in possession of the necessary information to begin their work on time: 1) data was not coming in at the same rate from all of the departments; 2) it was apparent that CYK's equipment was insufficient for proper data manipulation within the condensed time frame.

Mr. Noël felt that 75 percent of IFES' work was complete, leaving only the follow up of the training. (This proved to be an underestimation of the amount of oversight that would be required for the printing of the election documents and training materials.) He recommended:

1. Assisting in the creation and empowerment of an independent electoral commission to provide the civil society and the political parties with decision-making roles in the electoral process.
2. Follow-up and management of the regional training of poll-worker trainers and the subsequent follow-up down through the polling station level.
3. Continued provision of suggestions for the improvement of the system for the verification of the electoral list and the distribution of the voting cards.
4. Establishment of a positive working relationship with the UNDP electoral assistance program (the IFES and the UNDP programs possessed similar mandates).

V. COUNTDOWN TO ELECTION DAY

A. November 1 - 6, 1993

I departed for Conakry on November 2, 1993. After meeting with USAID and U.S. Embassy officials, I conducted a series of information-gathering meetings with donor representatives, local printers, MIS officials, and members of various political parties and civic organizations. Despite the efforts of USAID, the U.S. Embassy, and a few representatives of other diplomatic missions and international NGOs, there was no movement toward establishing a coordination mechanism among the donors. Group coordination would have resulted in better organized international electoral assistance and encouraged the Guineans to develop and follow a work plan and calendar for the pre-electoral period.

Due to a complex series of events, IFES was no longer responsible for the provision of voting screens as was stipulated by the original agreement between the United States and Guinean governments. Minister Gomez and Ambassador Saloom signed a revised agreement between the two governments on October 6, allowing that the voting screen funds be retargeted for training support and the printing of election documents and training manuals.

Immediately following my arrival, a planning session was held for a two-day training for political-party representatives at a downtown technical training facility (CEDUST). It was agreed that IFES and the UNDP election assistance project would share the costs. The final phase of the 1993 UNDP program was directed by a Malian bureaucrat formerly with the Malian Ministry of Territorial Administration, Abderhamane Niang. UNDP consultant Françoise Legault worked with Mr. Niang during this period in early December.

1. MIS Meetings

My first meetings at the MIS were with Mr. Dieng and each of the five subcommission heads. Due to its involvement in the printing of election documents and training materials, and its lead role in the organization of the poll-worker training program, IFES' primary MIS liaison was the head of the subcommission for rules and regulations, Amadou Baïlo Diallo, a career bureaucrat and member of the Guinean bar. Mr. Diallo had been appointed by the MIS as the director of the poll-worker training program.

Mr. Diallo explained that the training teams departed from Conakry on October 28, approximately one week behind schedule. To the best of his knowledge, all five teams were active and making progress at the regional level. He thought that the regional TOTs would soon be completed. Mr. Diallo shared his understanding of the logistical arrangements made by Théo Noël for vehicles and drivers for each of the training teams. I reviewed the contracts for Mr. Diallo, the 10 trainers, and the vehicles. The logistical and financial support of the training teams required considerable attention during the first three weeks of my stay. According to Mr. Diallo, additional groups were asking to be trained in election procedures:

1. the members of the national electoral commission (once they were appointed);
2. the personnel of the Ministry of the Interior;
3. key personnel of the largest Guinean embassies: Guinea-Bissau, Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal, Paris, and Mali.

2. Printing and Training

My primary activity, outside of the oversight of the training program, was to finalize the versions of the guides for poll workers, party poll watchers, and vote counters. There was confusion as to the numbers, designs, and applications of documents required by the electoral law for the polling stations and the provincial and national levels. Faced with the need to begin the training no later than the end of October, Mr. Noël and Mr. Diallo had rushed to produce interim training manuals

for the training participants at the national and regional level. I set about following up on the work initiated by Mr. Noël. Once the forms were designed and approved, they had to be printed and distributed. While waiting for the MIS to complete and approve the text of the forms and the manuals, I continued to collect printing bids, building on the information that I had collected during an earlier trip to Guinea.

Members of the various groups to be represented on the CNE assembled informally on November 3. This first meeting was a "meet your co-workers" session. I was not granted access to the meeting hall. According to Mr. Dieng, the other three members of the commission's executive committee were to be elected on the following Monday: the vice-president, treasurer, and the president. The next evening, the national television and radio carried the official presentation of the eight presidential candidates. The official campaign period had begun.

On November 6, the MIS verified that the training was complete on the regional level. The training teams had completed the training of the individuals who would train the department and sub-department level trainers. High-frequency radio contact had been made with each of the training teams, except for N'Zérékoré, from the CYK's offices. One of CYK's data collectors had just returned from N'Zérékoré, where he said that he had encountered the IFES training team as they began their final training session in town. The next initiative for each of the teams was to survey as many training sessions as possible in Guinea's 38 constituencies.

I was informed that not only had the government decided not to directly oversee the construction of the voting screens, but that the MIS was dropping the plan to finance the construction of two large tables for each polling station. This was the initial indication of the government's grudging acknowledgment of the limits to its financial resources. Each polling station president was to receive 30.000FG to build, rent, or borrow, tables, seating, and a voting booth or screen to correctly furnish their polling stations. This money was to be distributed by the local authorities.

I obtained a hand-written draft of the text proposed to replace D93/196. The proposition favors language designed to provide the CNE with considerably more autonomy from the administration. The composition of the body was expanded to include representatives of additional professional organizations. The draft outlined an expanded commission directorate and broadened the powers of the commission's president. Conversely, it substantially reduced the power of the MIS representative (Mr. Dieng) to the commission. It also called for the commission to meet on a weekly basis. The language of the draft stipulated that the CNE will consider all issues brought to the commission's attention by not only the MIS, as in D93/196, but by all citizens.

B. November 7 - 13, 1993

I began the week with meetings at the offices of donor organizations and diplomatic missions to discuss the status of the election preparations and to inform them of IFES' plans through December 5. Most of the individuals with whom I spoke were doubtful about the December election date. As for the opposition's dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court's ruling on President Conté's military status, the donors did not think that it was prudent to question the ruling. Regardless, it was certain that this would remain a contentious campaign issue.

Together with Mr. Diallo and the president of the subcommission for logistics, Kader Sangaré, I worked to establish a system for calculating the numbers of documents and the amount of indelible ink necessary for the presidential election. It was agreed that only the ink needed for the December 5 election would be removed from the USAID warehouse. The remaining supply would be removed at the time of the legislative election.

1. Political-Party Training

The November 10-11 political-party training at CEDUST was a surprising success. The two-day program followed the same format as the field training of the poll workers and local administrators.

Representatives of 40 political parties participated in the seminar. 30 parties were represented over both days. On the first day, several key organizational and technical points were raised:

1. The facilitators clarified the importance of the *procès-verbal*. The party representatives were pleased to learn that their poll watchers would be allowed to sign these documents, certifying the validity of the results of the voting and counting process.
2. There was interest expressed in extending the official voting hours beyond the mandated 07h00-18h00 period.
3. There was confusion (that was not clarified by the MIS representatives in attendance) as to the definition of "competent authority," indicated in the electoral law as qualified to sign the proxy voting form (*fiche de procuration*).
4. Participants were confused as to how the different ballots could be distinguished by illiterate voters. The election-day role-play conducted during the second day of training showed how the ballots were to be handled.

The closing of the training was attended by representatives of the government and of the diplomatic community. The political parties reacted positively to the training and requested that it be replicated at the regional level. It was evident from their response to this activity that neither the government nor the political parties achieved adequate progress in the areas of voters information and civic education.

2. Printing Bid Collection

Following the training, I concentrated on collecting printing bids and visiting printing facilities. Establishment of a contract with the local printer offering the best bid package was made more complex by the intrusive actions of the MIS. I was required to justify the logic of my selection at several levels within the Ministry and to respond to charges of conflict of interest leveled by MIS officials. Certain individuals were disgruntled at being cut out of the loop in awarding the printing contract. As a result, they were unable to arrange inflated unit prices and obtain kickbacks from the vendors.

C. November 14 - 20, 1993

Difficulties continued with MIS officials as I worked to engage the printer for the election documents. Several political-party representatives stopped in the IFES/UNDP office at the MIS to comment on the previous week's seminar and to share their doubts of the government's will to provide adequate voters information and civic education. I reminded the visitors that the political parties share with the state the responsibility for the education of the voting public. One group of party representatives pointed out that if the government would include the parties and civic groups in the organization of the election, the groups might be motivated to assume more of these responsibilities.

Voter information articles that did not accurately reflect the electoral law appeared in some of the local newspapers. I initiated discussions with the UNDP election specialists regarding the value of a one-day seminar for journalists. Three weeks from the December 5 elections, neither the government nor the political parties could afford to confuse the electorate. It was decided to hold a practical "working seminar," featuring discussions on the electoral law, the roles of the political parties and the administration in the process, and an election day voting simulation. IFES and the UNDP agreed to share the training costs. The seminar was scheduled for November 24.

By week's end, I had completed the assembly of bids and costs for the printing of those election documents that were already designed. Document samples and bids were sent to IFES/Washington for approval. I was concerned about having adequate money to advance the printer. The local bank's procedures for depositing money in the IFES project account were time consuming. Two cashier's checks for \$50,000 required over 30 days to clear. Wire transfers took less time and, as I learned, even with the service charge were a better value than the cashier's checks from IFES' Washington bank. In either case, the bank benefited on the exchange rate that it applied to the deposit. The bank's directors allowed IFES to draw against the as-of-yet uncleared funds in order to initiate the printing activity.

Rumors that the President had finally signed off on a new decree forming the CNE were partially true. Signed by President Conté on November 19, 1993, Decree 95/225/PRG/SGC was nothing more than the names of all 66 of the CNE members. There was no news of a revised decree.

Based on the change in the terms of the protocol between the governments of the United States and Guinea, and the printing bids, I revised the project budget to reflect expanded printing and training components.

D. November 21 - 27, 1993

1. Additional Staff

Daily technical support, printing oversight, and reporting responsibilities associated with the project each demanded more time as the election date approached. I decided that day-to-day project activities would be better divided between two people. On the recommendations of AID staff and representatives of other development organizations, I interviewed and hired Marguerite Roy, a former Peace Corps/Guinea volunteer. Her knowledge of Guinea, proficiency in local languages, and interest in the IFES program contributed positively to the project. Ms. Roy assumed the day-to-day oversight of the printing of the documents and manuals, allowing me to spend more time at the MIS.

At the request of USAID/Conakry, I presented an overview of the elections preparations and IFES' work for the mission's Guinean staff. The staff asked questions regarding the status of MIS preparations for the December 5 elections and shared their impressions of the process to date.

2. Journalists' Seminar

The IFES/UNDP press seminar took place at the Hotel Camayanne on November 24. In attendance were members of the local press and Guinean representatives of the international press. Presentations focused on the electoral law, election procedures, and a discussion of the MIS' level of preparation. Leading the seminar were representatives from MIS, IFES, UNDP, CEC, and the ICJ. In his introduction of his discussion of the electoral law, Ahamadou Diallo established the central theme of the one-day meeting by stating, "Nothing is served through the conduct of elections if the results can be contested." The journalists seemed to have difficulty differentiating between a press conference and a seminar. Most of the panel's time was devoted to fielding participants' questions.

Most of the journalists' questions covered several issues:

1. Procedures for handling voters without voting cards.
2. The subjects of the guides currently under production, and their release date.
3. The number and origin of the anticipated international observers. This was not possible to clarify at the time.
4. Provisions for accreditation of domestic observers. According to Mr. Dieng, the government had not decided that domestic observers would not be permitted. He questioned if it would even be possible to find "neutral" local observers.
5. The status of the rumored revision of decree 93/196/PRG/SGG outlining the organizational and legal parameters of the CNE. Mr. Dieng explained that the initial text was indeed under revision in response to the demands of the opposition parties and other involved groups.
6. The reasons for the seeming inability of the MIS and the CYK to conclude the electoral census. Mr. Dieng allowed that delays in the payment of some of the field staff had played a role in the problems with data compilation. Some data collectors held their collected information hostage in exchange for their salaries. There were reports of the destruction of collected data by field agents in protest of the lack of remuneration. He added that frequently citizens assumed that the census was for the purposes of taxation and did not participate.

A census revision had been undertaken to attempt to correct for these problems. The political parties were allowed to appoint representatives to work with the local-level administrative commissions responsible for approving the compiled list. Mr. Dieng shared the list correction date with the assembled journalists.

	1992	1993	Corrections
Total Population	4,833,804	5,232,335	Additions 351,722 Removals 39,900
Eligible Voters	2,662,470	2,858,318	Corrections 37,654

Through conversations with representatives of the political parties, it was apparent that there had been considerable confusion surrounding the establishment and the make up of the administrative commissions. Minister Gomez announced the creation of the commissions on August 4. The government decree (*Arrête 6615/09 August '93/MIS/CAB*) announcing the initial dates of the list compilation (August 20 to September 18) and the composition of the commissions reportedly was gazetted until immediately before August 20. This late date of publication made it difficult for the political parties to organize nationwide participation.

7. Voting card distribution procedures. Participants questioned why the voting cards would not be distributed straight through election day.
8. Mr. Dieng reported to those assembled that 14,000 voting screens and 14,000 tables were under construction and would be delivered to the polling stations by election day.

At the end of the program, the journalists offered the following two comments:

1. There was the need for a press center at the MIS to operate through the electoral period. Journalists would be able to check in for the latest election news; space would be available for press conferences; and the center could be made responsible for the issuance of press credentials for the election.
2. There was some agreement that all of the administrative and training literature and forms would be easier to use, and more effective in both urban and rural Guinea, if they were available in both Arabic and French. This could also enlarge the pool of potential poll workers and political-party delegates.

3. Technical Modifications in Election Procedures

In late October, Mr. Diallo collaborated with IFES and UNDP consultants in preparing a technical memorandum proposing procedural changes to the electoral process. There was no language in the law allowing or disallowing these additions. Issues and procedures detailed in the memorandum included: the requirement that all poll workers sign -- and poll watchers be invited to sign -- the summary polling station election documents; the provision of signed provisional result forms to all poll watchers; the application of indelible ink on the voter's index finger after the deposit of the ballot versus before; the provision of a special form allowing registered voters lacking their voting cards to vote in their assigned voting station; and the utilization of plastic, numbered ballot box seals in addition to the padlocks required by the electoral law. MIS officials had signed-off on these measures when they approved the formats of the election forms and the training guides produced by IFES and the MIS. The memo was transmitted to Minister Gomez. The Minister passed copies of the memo to the Court and to the CTRN.

On November 24, Mr. Diallo received a message from the Supreme Court responding to the added and amended procedural steps outlined in the poll-worker training program. Both groups found fault with the proposed changes. In light of this negative reaction, Mr. Diallo insisted that IFES redraft the training manuals and change the formats of the election documents to reflect only the language and the actions of the existing electoral law. Several of the documents in question had received MIS approval and were under production. To edit the documents again and destroy the copies that had been printed and delivered would have amounted to a significant loss of time, printing resources, and project funds.

This seemingly arbitrary decision by the Court and the CTRN created a problem for the training-of-trainers program, the poll-worker training programs, as well as trainings being conducted by the political parties. I felt strongly that to return to the field to change some of the fundamental aspects of the training program would not only be expensive, but it would call into question the

administration's will to facilitate a free and fair process. The components of the training program not specified by the electoral law were added in the interest of increasing the transparency of the voting process. All printing was placed on hold as I appealed to Mr. Diallo and Mr. Dieng for a definitive explanation of, and reaction to, the decisions of the Committee and the Court.

I did not seek someone to "challenge" the decisions of these two important groups, but someone to resubmit the suggestions in a complete manner and request a new judgment from the Court. Mr. Diallo's memorandum had been passed to the Minister without any explanation or supporting information. Minister Gomez had handed the document over to the Court and to the CTRN, with no explanation. The logic behind these proposed operational changes was not readily apparent to those responsible for passing judgment. A similar problem occurred with the presentation of the voting screen models to the President. The models were placed before him by MIS officials, who offered no explanation of the technical and financial strengths and shortcomings of each model. When I expressed surprise at the selection of the voting screen model, Mr. Dieng responded, "We are not there to explain...he is the President of the Republic."

Obtaining a viable "second opinion" was difficult. Mr. Diallo acknowledged that the changes that had been incorporated in the training and the documents enhanced the transparency of the process and made sense procedurally. However, he did not feel that the decision of Guinea's highest court could be challenged. I presented my arguments to Mr. Dieng. He agreed that the additions were valuable to the integrity of the process. However, he did not see that changing aspects of the nationwide training program would be a problem.

I drafted a letter to Mr. Dieng supporting the procedural changes incorporated in the electoral forms and the training documents with the approval of the MIS. I insisted that someone from the MIS approach the Supreme Court and the CTRN, explain the logic behind the changes, and ask that they reevaluate Mr. Diallo's original document. In the absence of this action, no documents could be printed.

4. Facing the Fifth

I was concerned that the delay in the printing of election documents presented the MIS with a convenient excuse for postponing the elections. In private, most MIS technicians confided that elections could not be held on December 5. Publicly, no one was willing to explain this to the Minister nor to the President. For an international organization to initiate a public appeal for the postponement of the elections would have not been well received. There was a fine line between the provision of international assistance and an action that would be perceived as interference in Guinea's affairs. At the same time, laying the blame at the feet of one of the international organizations assisting with the election process for the postponement of would provide all of the political actors with a face-saving alternative to internal finger pointing. Neither IFES nor USAID were deserving of the blame, and we worked successfully to guard against that possibility.

On a campaign swing through the Forest Region and the regions of Middle and Upper Guinea, the President began to comprehend that the pieces were not in place for the election. Minister Gomez was summoned to join the campaign entourage and to meet with the President. Returning to Conakry, the Minister called a general meeting of the presidents of the subcommissions, Mr. Dieng, and other MIS officials for 22h30 on November 24. The goal that evening was for each subcommission head, Mr. Dieng, and Mr. Kane to enumerate the activities remaining to be accomplished in their respective areas before the elections. From what I had been told, the minister would take that information into a special council of ministers meeting on November 25.

CYK -- Technical Needs

I paid Mr. Kane a visit late on November 25. His primary concern was that if the elections were to be postponed, that they be postponed for a period of time calculated in regard of the technical requirements of the subcommissions and the CYK. There was speculation that the elections would

be rescheduled for December 19.

Five weeks before the election date (three weeks before the original December 5 date), the CYK informed the government that in order to complete its tasks, it required additional equipment, high-speed line printers and 300+ megabyte hard drives. These items were unavailable in Guinea. Minister Gomez insisted that the equipment was available in Guinea and proceeded to demand equipment loans from a variety of development projects active in and around Conakry. However, none of the local projects possessed equipment that could handle even the data-processing needs generated by the election data of a single department. In the meantime, CYK arranged for the shipment of the necessary material from France. The Minister refused to approve the purchase and the shipment of this material, continuing to search for a "free" solution in Guinea. Timely delivery of this equipment could have accelerated the final production of the electoral lists and the voter cards by a minimum of five or six days.

Entering the final week of November, Mr. Kane estimated that a rapid delivery of additional equipment could still reduce the printing of the lists and the cards by three days. Planning for December 19, the equipment would have to be in place by November 29. To prepare the lists and cards in time for nationwide distribution, the deadline for the entry of all of the corrections to the electoral census would have to be December 1.

Mr. Kane felt that the government's organizational difficulties were due to a lack of training and information, not a generalized desire to rig the process. He maintained that better training of the individuals involved in the registration process and increased information dissemination to the population by the private and state-controlled media, the government, and the political parties would have increased participation in the census and encouraged citizen oversight of the process. He cited the example of the Conakry borough of Matam. The head of Matam's administrative commission had arrived at the CYK the previous week with an original registration list bearing the names and registration information for 2,800 eligible voters. According to the bearer of the list, a member of

his family had passed away upcountry and he had departed for the funeral locking the list in a cabinet in his home for safe keeping. Returning to Conakry one month later, he realized that the list had never been submitted to CYK. Matam's was not a unique case. Although the list revision deadline was September 30, omissions of this sort continued to be added to the list through early December.

My almost daily visits to the CYK had impressed me that in the face of the unworkable time constraints and shortages of equipment and personnel, the organization set up by Mr. Kane and his collaborators was commendable. Mr. Kane hired a large group of young Guineans and rapidly trained and organized them to carry out all stages of the process. The group developed as team. This drive and spirit played a large role in the fact that CYK's technical tasks were essentially 95 percent to 100 percent complete by noon on the day before the election.

During the afternoon of November 26, Minister Gomez invited members of the national press to the Palais du Peuple to hear him elaborate on the reasons for the postponement of the elections. The Minister used the time to refute rumors of his being asked to step down due to the delay. "I do not have to quit because I am at peace with my conscience," he stated. His presentation focused on several topics:

1. *The locations of the voting stations.* The Minister was aware that there were voting stations located in individuals' homes or within their compounds. He knew that the initial assignment of voting stations had created voting stations with as few as 80 and as many as 1,000 voters in the same neighborhood. The electoral law indicated that no polling stations should serve over 1,000 registered voters. The MIS was planning for an average of 500 voters per station.
2. *Registration of voters abroad.* Minister Gomez stated that out of 27 diplomatic missions, 10 had provided all of the necessary information and completed their respective censuses. The remaining 17 missions had yet to submit their registration data.
3. *Reopening of the voting rolls.* The Minister acknowledged that it was possible that some Guineans were overlooked in the census. For this, he did not fault the system but the political parties that initially encouraged their supporters to boycott the

census. Therefore, he saw no reason to reopen the list.

4. *Training and civic information.* The Minister held up the draft copies of the IFES guides (in limbo due to the decisions of the CTRN and the Supreme Court) and asked those assembled, "What country would produce these things that are not even required by law if they were determined to fix the elections?"
5. *The potential for ethnic conflict.* The possibility of electoral violence in general and violence along ethnic lines was downplayed by Minister Gomez. The fact that so many families and individuals were fleeing Conakry before the elections was perceived by the Minister as unfortunate, especially since they would be unable to vote upcountry if they had registered in Conakry.
6. *The establishment of polling stations on military bases.* The Minister observed that, "Those who registered in a neighborhood will vote in that neighborhood. Those who registered on the bases will vote in the barracks. There is no law prohibiting the establishment of voting stations on a military base."

Decrees

At the top of the 20h00 evening news broadcast November 26 there was an official announcement of the two decrees regarding the election date and the campaign period drafted on November 25.

1. **Decree 93/226/PRG/SGC** stated that the scheduled December 5, 1993 presidential election was postponed until December 19, 1993. All eligible voters were invited to participate in the election on this new date.
2. **Decree 93/227/PRG/SGC** stated that the electoral campaign would be suspended from midnight November 26 through midnight December 11. The new campaign period would run from December 12 through December 18 at midnight. Administrators at the national, regional, departmental, and district levels were asked to monitor the observance of this decree.

A televised statement by President Conté followed the announcement. The President said that during his campaign voyage he realized that the technical preparations were not in place for free and fair elections. Therefore, he had decided to postpone the elections until December 19. He called on the

MIS to prepare and implement a program to allow the elections to be held on the new date, pledging the administration's total support. "All means" would be placed at the disposition of Minister Gomez to insure that the December 19 election date was respected.

Strategic planning for the rescheduled election began early on November 27. Among the domestic and international technicians, there was general agreement that the postponement was of insufficient length. The MIS technicians felt that the earliest that the elections could be held was during the first week of January. An additional month would allow enough time for the election materials and the electoral documents to arrive in their respective destinations and provide the voters with the legally mandated length of time to collect their voting cards. The new election date allowed only 13 additional days to prepare.

It was disappointing but not surprising that the suggestions offered by MIS technicians did not receive consideration in the selection of a new election date. There was speculation that the President was receiving incomplete information due to the lack of direct communications link between Minister Gomez and President Conté. Privately, MIS officials felt that the fixing of the new date remained open for discussion.

E. November 28 to December 4

Election administrators faced a variety of problems to overcome before the election. One was the preparation of the electoral lists and the voting cards by the CYK. CYK technicians estimated that the printing would be complete by December 15. Another problem was the distribution of the lists and the cards to the distribution commissions around the country. These commissions were in charge of the actual distribution of the cards to individual voters. Delivering the lists and the cards to the villages as far distant as the Liberian, Ivorian, and Malian borders and to those as close as Conakry's central neighborhoods was a formidable task requiring a well-thought out delivery mechanism.

A December election would not allow time for nationwide distribution of the electoral lists and voter cards. Mr. Kane explained that once the electoral cards and accompanying lists for a department were printed at the CYK computer center, they were delivered to the logistics subcommission at the Ministry of Interior and Security. Facilitation of the distribution from the MIS to the countryside posed a problem. The first cards and lists that were completed were for departments in the Lower Guinea region, the home region of several of the candidates, most importantly President Conté. MIS and CYK technicians realized that delivering the first shipment of cards and lists to Lower Guinea could be seen as favoritism toward the PUP and fuel the parties' suspicions that the MIS and the CYK were pro-administration and pro-PUP. Minister Gomez was approached on this issue and ordered that all materials and lists and cards be distributed as they became available, regardless of the reactions of the parties. The materials distribution sequence did not prove to be an important factor as the dispatching from the MIS often did not match the order in which the lists and cards were received from the CYK. The lack of an adequate national distribution plan became the more important problem facing the MIS. On December 18, boxes of cards and lists destined for departments around the country were seen in the MIS alcove. Several cartons of prepared electoral lists were never distributed from the MIS. It could not be verified if all of the cards actually left the Ministry premises by election day.

1. Indelible Ink

Most of the elections commodities were stored and distributed from the Palace of Nations. This facility is the location of the President's office. Access to the grounds and the main building was tightly controlled. I suggested to Mr. Dieng that representatives from the political parties be encouraged to observe the distribution of the election materials. He thought that this might be difficult to organize. However, realizing the non-neutral nature of the Palace, Mr. Dieng agreed not to transfer the elections documents and ballots from the storage facility at the Ministry to the Palace. The election forms and ballots were directly distributed from the MIS where political-party delegates could be present.

Ms. Roy worked with the logistics subcommission to arrange for the pick up of the indelible ink from the USAID warehouse. The ink was delivered to the Palace of Nations. USAID agreed to store the remaining ink until the legislative elections.

On several occasions, IFES representatives visited the palace grounds to observe distribution of the election materials. The ballot boxes, lamps, calculators, indelible ink, ledger books, stamp pads, and padlocks were counted and loaded onto trucks by the military. The vehicles moved to the MIS, where ballots, forms, plastic padlocks, and remaining materials were added. From the ministry, the vehicles departed for their respective destinations. Deliveries to distant cities not accessible by land were facilitated by airplane and helicopter. The MIS contracted local air carriers for this purpose.

2. The Training Teams Convene

All of the training teams reported to Conakry by November 30. We had planned for a pre-December 5 meeting to allow us to organize a "rapid-response" poll-worker training for areas identified as potential flash points. The new election date allowed for the organization of a better-prepared training follow up. In the midst of our debriefing, a memo was received from the Minister indicating that five of the trainers would be sent abroad for the training of the staff of the staffs Guinea's larger embassies. I was unhappy that the trainers were being sent away at this critical juncture; however, there was nothing that Mr. Diallo could (or was willing) to do to rectify the situation. Among the five were both of the members of the Conakry training team, placing the supplementary training program for the capital at a disadvantage.

During the meeting, I asked Mr. Diallo to inform the group of the ongoing process with the CTRN and the Supreme Court. Each team agreed that altering the election-day procedures at this time would be disastrous, especially when the procedures in question had increased the political parties' confidence in the administration commitment to an equitable process. I credit the trainers'

unanimous reaction against the potential changes as the additional pressure necessary to encourage the Minister to finally resolve these issues. Before the trainers were redeployed, we had received word that all but one of the elements in Mr. Diallo's original memo had been accepted. It was decided that voters without their voting cards would not be offered the option of voting upon presentation of a form signed by the president of their respective polling station and two voters registered in the same station. Domestic and international technicians agreed that given the fact of the last-minute distribution of the voting cards, the use of this form would create confusion on polling day, and draw the polling station president away from his primary job of surveying all activities in the polling station.

F. December 5 - 11, 1993

The acceptance of the procedural changes allowed the printing of the election documents recommenced at full speed. I continued grappling with financial issues while Ms. Roy facilitated the verification of the document and manual proofs by IFES, UNDP and the MIS. As each document received approval, it went to press. In view of the time limitations, we decided to first concentrate on the production of the polling station documentation necessary for the first round of presidential elections. Regrettably, the production of the training manuals became a secondary objective. USAID provided us each with hand-held radio units, allowing us to communicate without sacrificing time while trapped in Conakry's formidable traffic jams during our frequent trips between the MIS and the printing facility.

1. Shifting Gears

With the election postponement, there was a noticeable loss of momentum at the MIS. We realized that the technicians were hoping for a supplementary delay until early 1994. Much work remained to be completed and we spent considerable energy encouraging the MIS staff and the printers to

continue to focus on the scheduled election day. The work ethic at the Ministry improved near week's end as the population anticipated the reopening of the political campaign and the MIS staff accepted the low odds of a second postponement of the election.

Decree 93/277/PRG/SGC had officially suspended the political campaign. Regardless, the President enjoyed substantial coverage of two events, effectively sustaining his campaign through the suspension period. First was the response of the state media organs to Siradiou Diallo's allegations that the footage of the President's campaign visit to Labé was footage taken during his 1992 pre-referendum visit to the same town. Through the first week of the suspension the campaign, the RTG repeatedly showed films of both visits in an attempt to prove that this had not been the case, while Mr. Diallo's allegations were debated at length on the radio and in the print media.

The second event occurred in response to political violence that resulted in deaths and property losses in Siguiri and Kankan. The disputes were as much ethnic as they were political, between supporters of the RPG (primarily Malinké) and those of the PUP (primarily Sousou). In reaction to the violence, the President traveled to Kankan on December 6. His daily activities, footage of his entire visit, and complete coverage of his speech to assembled regional leaders was carried on radio, television, and in the newspapers. Throughout the event, it was impossible to make a distinction between Lansana Conté the President and President Conté the candidate. The aftermath of the day trip brought more violence with the beating of Kankan's elderly imam by a young RPG supporter(s) for allegedly accepting money from the President.

2. Cards and Lists

The voting cards for two department capitals and their corresponding electoral lists were delivered to the MIS by December 12. Faced with limited time and poor planning for the distribution of the cards, MIS officials instituted yet another last-minute procedural adaptation. Voters claiming their cards were not required to sign the card reclamation list nor the signature/fingerprint space on the

card itself. The "competent authority" (finally defined as a member of the local distribution commission) was required by law to initial the distribution list and to sign the card in the space provided. This requirement was waived. Questioned about the legality of this adaptation, Ministry officials explained that, "The electoral cards are produced by a machine -- a computer. A duplicate card cannot exist because the machine does not make mistakes." This was not the case; the production of double cards was indeed possible. However, no evidence was produced verifying widespread production of duplicate cards. The time restraints imposed by the December 19 deadline made it virtually impossible to print even a single set of all of the necessary lists and cards before election day.

Distribution List

Utilizing the census data gathered in the field and centralized in the 38 departmental computer centers, CYK produced the electoral cards and several accompanying lists. The first list was the distribution list (*liste de retrait des cartes électorales*), indicating from left to right: the number of the voter on the signature list (*liste d'émargement*) for his or her respective polling station; the voter's number on the electoral list for the urban or rural neighborhood; family name and first name of the voter with family affiliation; date and place of birth; profession; sector of electoral district; and a space for the voter's signature or digital imprint. Clearly indicated on each page of this list is the region, department, borough, subdepartment or CRD, and urban or rural neighborhood. Also noted on each page is the number and name of the voting station in question and the date of the edition of the copy of the list. Specified on the last page of the listing for a polling station is the total number of voters registered in that particular station and the totals by gender. This list was intended to be delivered, along with the lists for the other polling stations located in a particular urban or rural neighborhood, for the use of the administrative commissions for the distribution of voting cards. As it turned out, these lists were rarely available in time to be used for the distribution of the voter cards before the election. The information included on each individual's voting card corresponded with the information found on this and the following lists.

Electoral List

The second list was the actual electoral list (*liste électorale de l'année*). The information on this list was arranged into columns from left to right: the number of the voter on the electoral list; family name and first name of the voter; parents' names; date and place of birth; profession; rural or urban neighborhood and sector of electoral district; the identification number of the voting station and the number of the voter on the list for his or her voting station. On each page of this list is indicated on each page of this list is the region, department, borough, subdepartment or CRD, urban or rural neighborhood, and the polling station number. Once again, at the end of the listing for a polling station is the total number of voters registered in that particular station and the subtotals of eligible male and female voters. Copies of this list were intended to be delivered to the rural or urban headquarters, the subdepartment headquarters, the offices of the department head, and to the MIS.

The entire electoral list was not available for the scrutiny of the political parties, candidates, and the general population before the electoral cards were printed and the distribution and signature lists were created. During their meetings with each of the eight political parties contesting for the presidency, consultants from the International Republican Institute (IRI) were told by seven of the eight that they had not actually seen the completed electoral list. There was confusion surrounding the parties' discussions of a provisional list that was assembled by CYK earlier in the year and the central national list for the December 19 election. This provisional list had nothing to do with the final December edition.

Signature List

The final list produced was the signature list (*liste d'émargement*), indicating from left to right: the number of the voter on the signature list for his or her respective polling station; the number of the voter on the electoral list for the rural or urban neighborhood; family name and first name of the voter with family affiliation; date and place of birth; profession; sector of electoral district; and a

space for the voter's signature or digital imprint (two spaces are provided, allowing the same list to be used for two successive elections). On each page of this list is indicated the region, department, borough, sub department, and urban and rural neighborhood. Noted on each page is the number and name of the voting station in question and the date of the edition of the copy of the list. At the end of the listing for a polling station is the total number of voters registered in that station and the associated gender breakdown. This list was intended to be delivered along with the other polling station materials directly to each voting station for use on election day. This list was rarely found to be in use in the polling stations on election day.

G. December 12 - 18, 1993

Realizing that all of the election materials would not be in place before the December 19 election date, and that the electoral cards and voter lists were still being printed at the CYK one week before the elections, official instructions and a circular were issued by Minister Gomez. These last-minute measures were too little, too late to reduce the risk of pre-election and election-day violence. Regardless, the decrees did not prevent the destruction of voting materials in Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal, Guinea Bissau, and Sierra Leone; nor protests in Brussels and Paris. Domestically, polling station materials in four of Conakry's boroughs were destroyed. (IFES received no reports of problems in Kaloum.)

Dated December 10, the official instructions discussed the distribution of the electoral cards. Several approaches had been considered to facilitate the election-day participation of registered voters not yet in possession of their voting cards. Forty-five days before election day, the governor and the department heads were mandated to appoint distribution commissions responsible for the distribution of the voting cards at neighborhood (CRD and quartier) level (Article L37). Voting card distribution was to commence 30 days before the election and run through the day before polling day (Article L38). Article L38 states that the electoral cards that are not distributed by the end of the day before the elections are returned, that day, to the departmental headquarters (in Conakry, to the governor's

office). The majority of the voting cards arrived at the departmental level only four or five days before the election (in violation of Article L38). There was insufficient time for the distribution of the voting cards. The Minister decreed that the distribution commissions would remain in position through the election day. Voters would be able to report to the distribution center in their rural or urban neighborhood, pick up their electoral card, and continue to the polls. Following the closing of the polls, the distribution commissions were to prepare an official record of distribution and return that document with the non-distributed cards to the department administrator.

The circular that was also released concerned voting by Guineans abroad. It was necessary to present one of these cards in order to qualify for registration as a Guinean voter abroad. The limited supply of these cards was cited by the opposition as evidence that the administration was working to prevent the participation of Guineans abroad, who were thought to be primarily pro-opposition. The administration pointed out that they had already reduced the price of the cards to make them accessible to more people. In the first week of December, supplementary stocks of consular cards were delivered abroad. Unfortunately, the late arrival of the cards did not reduce tensions. In the circular issued on December 10, the Minister indicated that all Guineans possessing any form of identification listed in Article L21 could be registered to vote. Registration would remain open up to 24 hours before the election. The voting cards would be filled out and distributed as the individuals registered. Following the election, the voting lists compiled at each diplomatic mission would be delivered to Conakry for inclusion in the computerized electoral data base. Computerized cards and lists would be produced to replace the handwritten ones. Regardless, the circular did not prevent the destruction of voting materials and equipment in Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, and Sierra Leone, nor protests in Brussels and Paris.

VI. TRAINING OVERVIEW

All of the training teams were scheduled to return to Conakry by December 14 in order to assess the coverage of the poll-worker training and to report any problems that could impede the smooth administration of the December 19 elections. Each team was asked to prepare a written report to be submitted to IFES. These reports are summarized below and offer an overview of Guinea's pre-electoral environment.

A. Labé

Sixteen-hundred polling stations were planned for Middle Guinea. The trainers report that the majority of the polling stations were positioned and the poll workers were trained. The training was accessible through each of the departments. The per diem for the poll workers and for the training participants had been delivered to the department level.

The initial trainings at the departmental and local levels conducted between November 3 and November 28 were successful in two important ways. First, the information was disseminated to not only the administrators and the designated poll workers, but also to political-party representatives and community leaders. Second, the trainings defused inaccurate rumors. Misunderstandings of the electoral process had been fed by rumor to the point that these inaccuracies exacerbated political and ethnic tensions throughout the region. Technical modifications of the electoral law, such as the provision of numbered plastic seals in addition to padlocks for the sealing of the ballot boxes on election day, and the post-election distribution of a provisional result form signed by poll workers and party poll watchers, were welcomed by the trainees and the general population as tangible guarantors of the transparency of the electoral process.

The trainers noted that electoral cards and lists were lacking in Pita, Mamou, and Mali departments. The trainers felt that Guineans not in possession of their voting cards who presented themselves at a polling station on election day could create a problem for the polling station staffs. In some areas, the population was determined to "vote no matter what." The word on the street was that those prevented from voting would have no alternative than to prevent the voting from taking place. The trainers recommended to the National Training Coordinator that the elections not be held on December 19.

B. N'Zérékoré

The trainers departed Conakry for their pre-election follow-up mission on December 7, 1993. The ministry required the trainers to deliver residency certificates to the departments of Kissidougou (December 9), Guékédou (December 11), and N'Zérékoré (December 14). These certificates were to serve as individual identification on election day for rural Guineans lacking national identity cards as required by Article L21 of the electoral law.

Originally, 1,203 polling stations were planned for the Forest Region. During their first training trip, the trainers noted that in some cases, as many as 1,800 voters were registered in a single polling station. It was apparent that there was a need for a redivision of the number of voters between polling stations or for the creation of additional stations. Surprisingly, the number of stations was reduced to 909 (Table A). This last-minute reduction drew criticism from the political parties and the voting population. Some said that the distances to vote in several places were increased and that the corresponding number of voters per voting station was increased. The 1,470 appointed poll workers would not be needed. Many were unhappy -- not so much due to their loss of their role in the process, but to their loss of the opportunity to collect per diem.

Table A.

Department	Old	New	Change
Kissidougou	221	167	-54
Guékédou	211	167	-54
Macenta	167	144	-23
N'Zérékoré	268	167	-101
Beyla	150	126	-24
Yomou	77	60	-17
Lola	109	78	-31
Totals	1203	909	-294

It is interesting to note that the total number of polling stations reported by the trainers in the week proceeding the election did not correspond with the totals recorded at the Ministry of Interior and Security in Conakry. Two sets of figures existed -- the first was presented to the international observers immediately before the elections, the second set of figures provided the basis for the quantity calculations for election materials and documents to be shipped to each regional department (Table B).

Table B.

Department	Obs #	MIS #	Registered	Per Poll MIS#/Reg.
Kissidougou	168	163	94,386	579
Guékédou	176	173	110,739	640
Macenta	170	148	94,333	637
N'Zérékoré	199	167	126,499	758
Beyla	136	145	77,528	535
Yomou	64	65	38,985	600
Lola	86	77	56,373	732
Totals	999	938	598,853	638

The training was completed in all seven departments. The final training sessions were conducted in N'Zérékoré on December 9 and 10. The direct intervention of the trainers was required in order to encourage the governor to free up the participant and per-diem funding. At the time of the team's departure, the department administrators had received the funding for distribution to the subdepartment and the polling station levels.

The trainers noted that voting cards and voting lists were absent in Kissidougou and Biela. As of December 14, only Yomou had received the electoral lists and the voting cards for the department. Macenta was in need of 10 additional ballot boxes. All of the departments indicated the need for additional copies of the guidelines for polling-station operations. The trainers recommended to the National Training Coordinator that the elections not be held on December 19.

C. Kindia

Lower Guinea was the sight of 1,376 polling stations. According to the trainers, the polling station staff prepared and the training had been conducted throughout the region. The trainers felt that one of the major problems would be the timely and fair payment of per diem to the training participants and to the poll workers. Payment was already underway in Téliimélé. A last-minute increase in the number of polling stations in Boké created a shortage of per-diem funds and the need for some supplementary training.

Special notice was made of the large numbers of people leaving Conakry for the election and settling in with family and friends in Lower Guinea. Many of those leaving Conakry were stopping in Téliimélé. There was concern that those of voting age could create difficulties on election day as they reported to the polls only to be denied the opportunity to vote.

Many of the poll workers were demanding transport to their respective polling stations for election day. The majority of poll workers were selected from the urban populations and assigned to rural polling stations. The trainers acknowledged that it was inconvenient to select polling center presidents who resided far from their assigned posts. Given the distances and the lack of available transport, it was to be expected that it would be difficult for some of the polling stations presidents to verify the arrival of the voting materials and to undertake the preliminary preparation of the voting area the night before the election. It was noted that no plastic seals had arrived in Lower Guinea. The trainers made a recommendation to the National Training Coordinator to ask that the elections not be held on December 19.

D. Kankan

In Upper Guinea, 1,492 polling stations were to be established. During the initial series of regional and departmental-level trainings, the trainers were unable to access the departments of Siguiri and Mandiana. Political tensions had erupted in violence in both areas, and there was an inoperable ferry at a major river crossing. Time and logistical constraints prevented the team from traveling in the department of Kerouane. On the second trip, the trainers experienced no difficulties facilitating the poll-worker training and evaluating training in each of these areas. In order to insure that the training had indeed reached the countryside, the trainers conducted spot checks through the four outlying departments of Dinguiraye, Siguiri, Mandiana, and Kankan.

Throughout the region, the trainers noted difficulties in the distribution of election materials. Additional problems posed by the training participants and local administrators concerned the lack of respect the various operational deadlines stipulated by the electoral law and the timely provision

of the residency certificates to the rural populations. Three days before the election, the electoral cards and lists had yet to arrive in Kankan for distribution. Many of the individuals selected to run the polling stations were from administrative centers. As in Kindia, transportation of the poll workers to the polls posed a problem.

The participants in the Kindia trainings had yet to receive their per diem. There was concern that the failure to pay this per diem would negatively affect the participation of the poll workers on election day. The payment of poll workers was identified as a pivotal issue in areas where pre-election tensions between political parties and candidates were high.

The trainers recommended that in the future the electoral cards should contain the family name in Arabic as well as French. This would facilitate the distribution of cards to French-illiterate, Arabic-literate populations and allow the distribution of the electoral cards from the mosques.

The trainers suggested that the sub-department heads not be directly involved in the training of the poll workers. As the primary government representative in the sub-departments, many of these individuals allowed their support of the current administration and president to influence their training sessions. The trainers highlighted the unsolicited participation of community elders and political-party representatives who sat in on the training sessions as observers. Each of the regional training teams reported that there was a high rate of participation by members of these two groups. Finally, the trainers recommended to the National Training Coordinator to ask that the elections not be held on December 19.

E. Conakry

The Conakry training experienced a number of problems. It was unfortunate that due to the myriad of tasks leading up to the elections there were limited opportunities for training-session evaluation and follow up by the IFES staff. The Conakry trainers reported that a significant number of poll workers who were trained in the communes of Ratoma, Matoto, and Dixinn did not meet minimum literacy requirements. A lesser number of similar problems were noted in Matam and Kaloum. As a result, thousands of poll workers were reselected and retrained. Arranging for training venues proved to be a problem. After considerable discussion, I agreed to provide a token sum for the rental of theaters in each of the communes for the three to four hour training sessions. In the end, the training took place in administrative facilities. The financing vanished somewhere between the trainers and the mayors.

The Conakry training team members' performance and attitude were the least satisfactory of all of the national trainers. This was critical given the concentration of eligible voters in the Conakry area. It became obvious that the Conakry trainers were involved in a number of aspects of the electoral process and that their neutrality and integrity were questionable. It is not surprising that four of

Conakry's five communes experienced violence and logistical problems on election day.

On December 16, a delegation arrived at the MIS representing the Matoto poll workers. The delegates stated that even if the government paid each of the poll workers 10,000GF, that they would not work on election day. They felt that their request for more money was justified due to the political tension building in the commune and the potential for election-day violence. The trainers made a recommendation to the National Training Coordinator to ask that the elections not be held on December 19.

F. Synthesis

Each of the 10 members of the national training team favored a postponement of the December 19 elections. Justification for this postponement was technical and political. Technically, the polling materials, electoral lists, and voter cards could not be delivered and distributed on time. Areas remained where training could have been strengthened in response to the skill level of the individuals selected to serve as poll workers and to a lack of adequate exposure to civic education and voter information. The short delay, given the wide range of preparatory activities to be completed added to the electorate's general suspicion of the entire process. The collective suspicion fed numerous election-related rumors, accelerating the spiraling political and social tension. In addition, the administration's blatant disregard of a number of deadlines established by the electoral law made the process legally impossible to justify.

Politically, through postponing the elections, the administration created for itself the opportunity to show Guinea's neighbors in the sub-Saharan region, and the international community, its capacity to create the climate for an open and transparent electoral process. Among the presidents of the five subcommissions, the national coordinator of elections, and the members of the national training team, there existed the general desire to do a good job. President Conté's tenacious insistence on the conduct of the elections before the end of the calendar year was the primary contributor to the climate of pessimism within the Ministry. This attitude reduced the effectiveness of the Ministry work force and did nothing to bolster the electorate's confidence in the process.

VII. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ELECTION

A. International Republican Institute

The International Republican Institute (IRI) issued a press release on December 3 registering their doubts of the quality of the election preparations. "IRI thinks that it will be extremely difficult to organize technically sufficient presidential elections on December 19th as planned." The statement cited two key shortcomings, the uncertainty that the electoral cards and lists could be printed and distributed in time, and the lack of an operative CNE.

B. GERDDES-Guinea

A statement issued by one of the civic organizations monitoring the preparations of the electoral process, the *Groupe d'Études et de Recherches sur la Démocratie et le Développement Économique et Social (GERDDES-Guinea)* recommended the postponement of the December 5 elections. Distributed on November 15, the statement was the first to call attention to the inadequacies of the election preparations to date. GERDDES pointed to the lack of an independent electoral commission, the amount of material preparation that remained to be completed, and the lack of nationwide voters education targeted at all sectors of the society combined with the need for the development of a true "civil society." In the interest of national peace and unity, GERDDES recommended the postponement to allow sufficient time for election preparation.

C. États Généraux pour le Changement Démocratique

The organization representing 31 of the opposition parties and more than 50 democratic associations, *États Généraux pour le Changement Démocratique*, issued a statement on December 15. The statement observed that 72 hours from the election most of the pre-electoral conditions as outlined

by the electoral law had not been met or had not been met within the deadlines prescribed by the law. The document highlights violations of articles L18 (establishment of the electoral list), L38 (distribution of the voting cards), and L71 (organization of the voting bureaus). The statement observes that government's concerted control of all aspects of the election preparations offered no opportunities for the participation of the political parties. More importantly the organization observed, the electoral commission, the organization formed by government decree to guarantee the morality and the openness of the electoral process, was not in place until December 10. The authors of the statement saw no way that a commission installed one week before an election could possibly complete an assessment of the process to date and implement corrective measures. Based on this analysis, *États Généraux* recommended that the President postpone the elections, appealing to all Guineans to demand that General Lansana Conté and "his team of extremists" subscribe to reason and wisdom while there was still time.

The group served notice that in the event that there was no means to postpone the process, the association would not only not take part in the election, but they would impede the "fraudulent process organized and controlled by the President in order that he succeed himself at any cost."

D. Labor Unions

Eleven national labor unions issued a statement on December 16, 1993. In their statement the unions acknowledged their support of aspects of Guinea's political transition since April 3, 1984. However, recent events had pushed the unions to draw attention to developments on several levels. On the political front, the President's refusal to meet with the other candidates in the interest of the establishment of a dialogue left the candidates and their parties to work in a vacuum. All were prepared to pay any price for victory. To compound the difficulties, there was a segment of society actively encouraging ethnic strife in the interest of political gain. On the socio-economic front, the transition had paralyzed work in all sectors of the economy. Increasing unemployment and the inability of the state to provide adequate salaries or benefits led to dissatisfaction and an increase in

senseless violence. The severity of the current situation was illustrated by the mass exodus of Conakry's citizens to ancestral homes upcountry, or to other countries entirely, and a general "tearing of the social fabric." The unions appealed to the President to postpone the December 19 elections pending the restoration of a sense of social calm and the reestablishment of citizen confidence in the political and electoral systems.

E. CNE

In the days prior to the election, the members of the CNE traveled throughout Guinea assessing election preparations. Reconvening in Conakry, they issued a statement on December 16 declaring that the December 19 election "constituted a real danger for the peace, the harmony, and the security of Guinea's citizens and their possessions." The CNE recommended that Guinea's political actors establish a dialogue, without which the "socio-political environment" would continue to deteriorate. Guineans in general were asked to put aside partisanship in favor of unity. Each of the members of the CNE encountered by IFES in the two weeks prior to the election were adamant in their views that the elections should not be held on December 19th. This statement did everything short of recommending a postponement.

VIII. BRIEFING FOR INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS

International observers were neither accredited nor briefed until 11h00 on December 18, less than 24 hours before the election. Minister Gomez and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sylla co-chaired the meeting. Ahamadou Dieng made a general presentation to the assembled observers, the majority of who were members of the diplomatic community. Mr. Dieng discussed the steps of the election process before, during, and after the election. He did not discuss the roles and the responsibilities of poll workers nor of the international observers. There was no distinction made between categories of observers -- international and local diplomats versus representatives of international and national non-governmental organizations. According to Minister Gomez, the leader of the delegation from the Organization for African Unity was designated as the official head of all international observers. This action was effected without consultation with the other observers.

One question was asked by a member of the diplomatic community regarding that morning's AFP and BBC radio reports of violence at the Guinean embassies in Abidjan and Dakar. Minister Gomez responded saying that the Guinean electoral law contained provisions concerning election-related violence and illegalities. However, he had received no forewarning of building tensions at certain diplomatic missions that would have allowed him to inform the host-country governments in time for them to mobilize security for the locations in question. No questions were posed on the subjects of the printing and distribution of the electoral cards and voter lists, the distribution of the lists of polling stations in each urban or rural neighborhood, or the payment of poll workers for their efforts on election day.

The government's handling of the entire observation "effort" indicated that they had neither the interest in nor the understanding of international observation. IFES and other organizations and diplomatic missions had offered to assist the government in this regard. They refused all offers, insisting that they were a sovereign nation and would establish modalities for all forms of

observation, national and international. Ministry officials approached IFES on December 10, requesting assistance with the establishment of a "code of conduct" for international observers. IFES and IRI had provided the Ministry with this material months earlier.

IX. DECEMBER 18, 1993. AFTERNOON.

Following the observer briefing, IFES and IRI representatives met to discuss final arrangements for election day. Kevin Lineberger from IRI planned to circulate through Conakry's five boroughs. IFES Project Assistant Marguerite Roy, on loan to IRI for election day, departed for the town of Mamou, a department capital in Upper Guinea and Guinea's primary transportation "crossroads." I planned to circulate around Conakry with members of the MIS technical subcommissions and UN Project Director Abderhamane Niang. Late in the day, Mr. Niang and I were issued credentials by the MIS as "technical supervisors." We were not accredited as international observers due to our extensive technical interaction with the Guinean government prior to the elections.

Security at the MIS was high throughout the afternoon of December 18. Numerous ministry officials shared their fears of the potential for election-day violence. Most of the subcommission heads departed work early in order to arrive at their homes before dusk. In my final discussion that evening with MIS technicians and the Guinean press, there continued to be hope that the President would declare a postponement. We had seen several high-level dignitaries speed by the front of the MIS en route to the National Palace. According to my sources, a group of leaders-of-opinion representing religious, ethnic, and other sectors of Guinean society were meeting with the President in a last-ditch effort to convince him to call off the election.

At approximately 19h00 reports were received of a large UNR march in the Hamdallaye neighborhood. Blocked from returning to the downtown area because of the march, Mr. Lineberger radioed at 20h00 from Hamdallaye to report that he was in the middle of the commotion. The principle thoroughfare was blocked with burning tires and a dumpster of trash that had been hauled into the center of the road and set ablaze. Local residents had directed his driver to move some distance off the roadway until the marchers cleared the vicinity.

I returned to the Hotel Camayenne from the MIS. The central city was calm. There was evidence of heightened security, especially around the Gardens of the Second of October and the Castro Bridge. For the past four days, the gardens had assumed the appearance of an armed camp, with groups of military and armored vehicles positioned just inside of the main gates under the trees.

Due to the "no-vehicle" ordinance scheduled to go into effect at 00h00 on the 19th, Kindo Camara, the IFES driver, left our project car at the hotel parking lot and continued to his home located in the Belle-Vue quartier. Forty minutes later, Mr. Camara was telephoning me from the lobby requesting that I descend to the lobby with the car keys. He asked for permission to spend the night with the vehicle at the hotel, as the security forces were circulating and he was afraid that it would not be possible to arrive at the hotel in time for our scheduled 06h00 departure the next day. Almost as an afterthought, he added that he had arrived home to find an unidentified body lying in the dirt not far from his front door. He attributed the death to "bandits" who had been emboldened to commit crimes in the open, taking advantage of the politically-charged atmosphere and the population's fear of violence.

By 23h00, a stream of radio reports were coming in from the Dar es Salaam and Gbessia neighborhoods of the borough of Matam. In the course of the night, several polling station sites and material storage points around Conakry were broken into and the electoral materials and poll furnishings destroyed.

X. DECEMBER 19, 1993. MORNING.

Convening in the hotel parking lot at 06h30, the IFES, IRI, and UNDP representatives compared notes and plans for observation. Lists of all of the polling stations in the five boroughs were obtained from the MIS on the 18th. IFES and IRI decided to remain in radio contact throughout the day.

A. Camayenne

Mr. Niang and I commenced at a group of five polling stations located at the Lycée Donka in the Camayenne neighborhood of the borough of Dixinn. The polls were scheduled to open at 07h00. At 07h00, no poll workers were in evidence at any of the five sites. After 10 minutes, the polling center presidents appeared followed by a car. The vehicle's trunk was packed with boxes of ballots and forms packaged by polling station. Each president took the packets for their respective stations. In the meantime, the poll workers began to arrive. A custodian came with a ring of keys to open the four classrooms designated as polling stations. The process was moving at no great speed, but preparations were proceeding properly.

We decided to observe the opening of a poll at another location in order to save time. We travelled north toward the Amilcar Cabral school in the Miniere neighborhood. The school was the site of two polling stations for 549 and 912 voters each. The main road was empty of vehicles. Traffic barriers manned by a variety of municipal, regional, and national security forces were frequent. Our credentials allowed us to pass through these checkpoints unimpeded. Between checkpoints, we were flagged by the numerous pedestrians hopeful for a lift. Slowing to navigate around a pile of burning tires at the Belle-View round point, we were approached by some young men who requested rides. Two were travelling in our direction and were unarmed so we invited them along. They turned out to be poll workers for the Amilcar Cabral polling stations, an assessor and a station president.

There was no activity at the school. A few members of the community were standing before the school gates. They reported that the polling station materials were on their way. The materials for all of the polling stations in the neighborhood were stored in a central secure location. An elderly gentleman began to explain to us that a group of young men had attempted to burn down the storage facility the previous night, but departed upon the arrival of a truck of anti-gang forces. Some shots were fired "above their heads to make sure that they did not return."

As the man recounted the previous night's activities, a pair of all-terrain vehicles drove up to the school gate with armed members of the Republican Guard (*béret-rouge*) leaning out of the open windows. The vehicles stopped in a cloud of dust and the soldiers deployed rapidly into a defensive formation around the first truck. Inside, a woman clutched a voting card. "The President's wife," offered the man with whom we were speaking. Mr. Niang and I conferred and decided to continue toward the borough of Ratoma where we had heard that there had been trouble the night before. We left the group in front of the school, the President's wife with her voting card, and the growing crowd of voters and poll workers waiting on the voting materials and the opening of the polls.

B. Ratoma

The road from Dixinn into Ratoma was increasingly littered with the remains of burning refuse and piles of smoldering steel belts from the tire fires of the previous night. Approaching a security check-point we saw approximately 30 men milling about in front of a Ratoma municipal office. We stopped and asked where the nearest polling station was located. One of the group took us to a man standing in the middle of the road who he introduced as the neighborhood chief. We exchanged greetings and asked directions to the polls. He gestured toward a pile of smoking tires and at the military men at the checkpoint. "We are not sure if there will be any election at all," he said. Mr. Niang asked why. "Last night our warehouse was attacked and all of the materials for the polling stations in this area were destroyed. We are waiting for someone from the MIS to come tell us what to do." Another member of the group spoke up. "If you want to see some polling stations, go up

the hill," he said pointing down the road and to the right. "I hear they are voting there." As we returned to our vehicles, the group followed. A man came forward and stood in front of Mr. Niang and I. "We are scared that if we start to vote, that we will be attacked," he said. We asked who would attack them. No one was very specific. We thanked the men and drove away.

Members of the security forces were numerous around the Hamdallaye intersection where more smoldering debris and piles of charred steel belts indicated that the area had been the site of a great deal of activity the night before. Past the round point, we came upon the Ratoma Dispensaire and the day's first indications that there was an election under way. Two polling stations were set up, numbers 3 and 5. It was 07h40. Station 3 was opening as we walked in. Approximately 75 voters were in line, pressing forward to maintain their positions. The polling-station president was going through the opening procedures and attempting to maintain order. There was no kind of list present among the electoral documents. According to some of the voters in line, they had only received their voting cards the previous afternoon. We gathered that the lists had yet to be distributed by the department or by the neighborhood authorities. In the absence of the lists, the secretary was noting all of the proceedings in the ledger book that was provided among the electoral materials. He had prepared columns for voter's names, card numbers, and signatures. Three of the men in the station identified themselves as party poll watchers, representing the RPG, the UNR, and the PUP. We watched the first few voters enter the station and vote. An adjoining room served as the voting booth. The president was in such a position that he could watch the voter select their ballot and place it in the envelope. The president was taking advantage of this vantage point, watching each voter. Mr. Niang and I agreed that his behavior was in reaction to our presence and the president's desire to not have us see any mistakes in his polling station, not an attempt to influence the voters. The adjoining station, Number 5, was not yet operational. The poll workers for Station 5 informed us that the voting materials had yet to arrive. We made a note to stop by again on our trip back into town.

Continuing toward the Kaporo community, we stopped at Station 4 in Ratoma Centre. More than

100 voters waited patiently in line. We entered the station and found that things were moving smoothly in the presence of poll watchers from the UNR and the PUP. This was the first station where we discovered what was to prove to be standard procedure among other polling stations around the city. In the absence of the signature list for the polling stations, the neighborhood authorities decided to separate the electoral card distribution lists by polling station and deliver each section to the respective station. The voters, who did not sign the list when they received their voting cards, were signing the list as they cast their ballots.

We left the main road to visit three polling stations located in Ratoma's AGRICOF Primary School. Driving up the hill toward the school, we moved through groups of men and women running down the hill. A siren blared behind us and we pulled to the side of the narrow road, allowing just enough room for a blue jeep packed with helmeted members of the anti-gang force to speed by. We continued after the jeep, noting what resembled snowfall on the top of the hill in front of AGRICOF. Turning the corner beyond AGRICOFF, we came upon 30 to 50 heavily-armed troops who were taking up positions on both sides of the road. The anti-gang vehicle was stopped in the center of the road 50 meters in front of us. We turned our vehicles around and returned to the front gate of AGRICOFF.

The "snow" turned out to be thousands of discarded ballots. Several men approached our vehicle. I leaned out the window and asked where the polls were. One of the group pointed to the ballots at his feet. "There will be no election here today," he said. Mr. Niang drove up beside our vehicle and we questioned the group. Apparently, we had missed the attack on the polling stations by just a few minutes. A large group of young men appeared just after the polls opened brandishing sticks and throwing rocks. The voters panicked and ran and most of the poll workers followed. Two of the polling station presidents convinced some of their colleagues to grab as much of the polling materials as possible as they ran out of the door and down the hill. The attackers systematically smashed the ballot boxes, shredded the voting forms and the voting lists and scattered the ballots in the wind. The group disappeared in various directions as the forces of order arrived at the school.

Opinions among the group we were questioning differed. Some said that as soon as the security forces took up positions around the school, that new materials would be delivered and the voters would come back to vote. Most of those present disagreed, saying that people would not come back out of their homes until the next day. We thanked the group and the older of the men made a short speech thanking us for our presence and admonishing us to be careful, but to not turn and run as "someone has to see what is happening here."

Leaving the main road, we negotiated a rocky track up the hill into the neighborhood of Kaporo. Arriving at the primary school, we found voters in two lines segregated by gender. Inside the voting was proceeding in a slow but orderly fashion. There were two poll watchers, from the RPG and the PUP. We watched for a while. One of the voters waiting in line said that they had received their voting cards two days earlier. I asked if he had obtained his card from the distribution committee. He said that someone had come by his house with a big stack of cards and delivered the cards for the registered voters in his compound.

Two hundred meters from the school was another polling station located in the Franco-Arab School. The PUP and the RGP were again the only two party with representatives present. Voting was proceeding smoothly and at a quicker pace than at the previous station. Voters were completing the voting process in approximately 1.5 minutes. We remained seated for almost 10 minutes. Leaving the polling station, we noticed that the attention of the 75 to 100 voters waiting outside of the station was attracted to something up the hill above our position. Mr. Camara came up and reported, "I think that there are some people headed this way and we should leave before there is trouble." It was apparent that something was wrong as some of the waiting voters broke ranks, walking, and then running, away from the station. Several men outside of the station shouted to the voters to remain calm that there would be no trouble. I heard dull whizzing sounds overhead. Mr. Niang pointed to the rocks bouncing off of the school wall. I motioned to the Mr. Camara to take the car around the wall from the polling station and point it downhill. Mr. Niang and I stood with his truck

between us and the higher elevations. No one was paying any attention to us and we felt reasonably secure.

A cloud of dust was rising among the scrub trees up the slope. Out of the cloud flew chunks of red laterite. The rocks clattered off of the school's zinc roof. Through the school gate, we could see the poll workers continue to calmly verify the identity of the next voter. The voters remaining in line outside of the compound turned as one and started downhill as 20 to 30 men materialized out of the dust and the bushes. The men approached the school at a dead run, throwing rocks and wielding tree limbs, batons, and boards. We concentrated on the scene before us, watching to see what would become of the polling materials and the poll workers. A volley of gunfire brought Mr. Niang and I to our senses, propelling us to the ground behind the truck. Members of the security forces had approached from behind us and were firing steadily into the air, over the heads of the approaching men. The attackers neared the school gate. The next volley was joined by the chatter of several automatic weapons. The attacking group's forward progress faltered and some began to disperse in different directions. Mr. Niang and I took advantage of the lull in the action and bounced downhill in his truck. More soldiers were heading up toward us, firing over the vehicle in the direction of the fleeing men.

We passed two young men being hustled down the hill in the company of the military. Near the bottom of the hill, we came upon two other youths who we assumed had been in the vicinity of the attack. One was being alternately hit and kicked as he stumbled down the hill in front of a small group of citizens. The second was being dragged by two larger men. Those following the second youth were kicking him and striking him with sticks. We passed both groups and stopped the vehicle at the road so that I could rejoin Mr. Camara.

At the roadside were several members of the armed forces watching the two groups coming down the hill and laughing. The group dragging the one youth passed four feet in front of me. His face was a lumpy mess and his jaw jutted crazily at a right angle to his ear. The second man was still

vertical, but bloodied. Both men were hustled across the street and the crowds around them grew as younger children joined in the beating. By this time the security forces had reached the road with the other two suspects and were placing them into a vehicle. Gunfire continued on the hillside. Mr. Niang and I decided to work our way back into town realizing that the situation was out of our hands.

We passed Station 4 in Ratoma Center. Voting continued peacefully. Some of the voters waiting in line were staring toward Kaporu, in the direction of the chatter of automatic and small-arms gunfire. Stopping at the Ratoma Dispensaire, we found that Station 3 was still operating and that Station 5 had opened around 08h45. Both stations were set up on opposite sides of the same room, each accessible through a separate door. A armed member of the city police was stationed next to each door. Station 5 was operating without any kind of voting list. Like the poll workers of Station 3, the poll workers in Station 5 had set up the ledger book to serve as a voter list. The president of Station 3 was having problems controlling the operation of his station. He was not consistent about requiring identification from the voters and became frustrated as waiting voters began to shout out advice. Several of the voters' knowledge of the electoral law was more complete than the president's.

Outside of the dispensary, I spoke with some of the assembled voters. A man ran into the courtyard carrying a ballot box on his head. He entered a small building next to the dispensary. As it turned out, the man was the president of one of the two polling stations from the AGRICOF school that had succeeded in protecting most of their electoral documents and supplies. The neighborhood chief had decided to relocate the polling station next to the others at the dispensary. The voters originally assigned to the station seemed to have been informed of the change and were beginning to arrive in the courtyard and assemble in front of the relocated station. Speaking with the voters forming a line outside of the relocated polling place, they estimated that at least one-third of the voters registered for the AGRICOF station would not wait in line a second time in order to vote, preferring to remain in the relative safety of their homes.

We arrived at the Hamdallaye round point. Passing through the checkpoint, we saw a group of 30 to 50 people moving in our direction on foot, brandishing burning pieces of wood and tree limbs. Some in the group were throwing rocks toward the checkpoint. Bottles smashed on the ground 20 meters in front of our vehicles. Members of the security forces eyed the approaching crowd and began to move back from the checkpoint. Mr. Niang reversed his truck and we followed him back through the checkpoint searching for a suitable hiding place. We looked up one of the side streets, but it offered little protection. I noticed that a vehicle entry for the local police station and signaled to Mr. Niang. We drove our vehicles into the courtyard. We watched from the gate as the group surged past the checkpoint barrier. The police moved to the sides of the street and kept their weapons pointing in the air. From a gateway across from the police station, two members of the Republican Guard emerged. They strolled to the center of the road and stopped. Oblivious to the young men swarming around them, they smoothly attached ammunition clips and began to shoot skyward. At the sound of the gunfire, the crowd scattered. The police were commencing an angry house-to-house search for the protestors as we pulled out of the courtyard and continued toward town.

C. Belle-Vue and Beyond

At the Belle-Vue intersection, we stopped to discuss plans. Mr. Niang decided to continue to the MIS to see how ministry officials were reacting to the problems that we had seen. Mr. Camara and I decided to traverse the Belle-Vue neighborhood to his polling station. Moving through Belle-Vue market we passed four polling stations. Three of the four had been vandalized. Shredded election documents filled the road and littered the deserted market stalls. The police in front of the fourth station said that they arrived in time to chase away the attackers before that station's election materials were destroyed. The station would be reopened soon, but no one was certain if the voters would return.

By 10h00, what had started as random gunfire and attacks on the polling stations in the boroughs of

Ratoma, Dixinn, and Matoto had now spread through those areas. Mr. Camara's voting station remained in operation. The poll workers paid little attention to the sound of gunfire coming from nearby Hafia. The sole party representatives present at each of the three polling stations clustered in this area of the Kenien neighborhood were from the PUP. Voters in line waited silently and the poll workers conversed in hushed tones. Within the grassmat-delimited confines of each station sat a blue-uniformed armed policeman.

XI. DECEMBER 19, 1993. AFTERNOON.

Through the remainder of the regular voting hours we continued to visit polling stations. By midafternoon, the gunfire had ceased. In the outlying boroughs, where voting continued, it did so in an uneasy silence. Voting stations visited in the boroughs of Matam, Ratoma, Matoto, and Dixinn were showing between 45 percent and 55 percent participation by 16h00. Voting at many of the stations with 550 or fewer registered voters had tapered off to two or three voters every 30 minutes. The larger polling stations, such as a primary school in Matoto, continued processing voters as rapidly as possible.

A. Hermakono

The morning's confusion had resulted in the overcrowding of some stations as more voters reported to vote at midday. At Polling Station 5 installed at the Hermakono neighborhood administrative headquarters, approximately 300 voters crowded before the poll workers seated on the veranda. The polling station president had limited control of the situation and an incomplete understanding of the voting regulations. As a result, voters were not being properly processed. I was offered a seat next to the two party delegates present representing the RPG and the PUP. A station wagon squealed to a stop on the main road running in front of the polling area. A woman in an olive drab uniform emerged from the car and pushed her way to the front of the line trailed by two helmeted soldiers carrying their rifles at the ready. She demanded of the poll worker in French if the day was progressing smoothly. He responded that there were a lot of voters who were trying to vote at his polling station who were not registered at his polling station. The poll had not opened until 11h00 and had still not received the voting list and other materials promised by an MIS official who had been present at the time of opening. The female soldier began picking up one of each of the ballots and an envelope. The president asked her what she was doing. "Voting, can't you see?" she responded. He asked her to present the form allowing her to vote in his station. She said she did

not have a copy of her orders and refused to allow the president to inspect her hands for traces of indelible ink. At this point, the soldiers moved up behind her. The president motioned her toward the room that was designated as the voting booth. Emerging with her envelope, she deposited it in the ballot box and began to leave. The polling station president called after her in Malinké, "You have to put your name in the register, especially with this stranger sitting here." The woman showed no concern as she acknowledged my presence for the first time. "It doesn't matter," she responded unsteadily in Malinké, "he doesn't understand anything here." The party delegates said nothing, their vision focused on some distant point in space.

In an adjoining building I found Station 8, originally located at the Hermakono primary school. The poll had been attacked at 10h00, but the station president had kept the voting card distribution list from being destroyed. Following the attack, he had reestablished the poll next to Station 5. Only the PUP delegate was present. The president explained that following the attack, the RPG delegate fled. From stations 5 and 8, we travelled in search of Station 15 in Hermakono. This polling station was somehow overlooked in the redistribution of the voters. There were 2,130 voters registered to vote at Station 15. We asked local citizens for directions and were told that the station had been overrun that morning.

B. Kaloum

Following an afternoon meeting with Mr. Lineberger and AID and U.S. Embassy officials, I travelled into town to visit polling stations in the borough of Kaloum. I had avoided visiting these stations earlier, knowing that many of the other observers would visit this "safer" borough due to its convenient location. Driving through Kaloum's neighborhoods, I noted limited evidence of continued voting. Two stations, 4 and 5, were located in the courtyard of the National Museum. At Station 4, 324 of 415 voters had voted. The poll workers at Station 5 estimated that 366 of 496 voters had cast their ballots. Political-party delegates were not present at either station. Both presidents confirmed that they had received their polling station material two days before the

election. At that time they were issued the actual signature lists that I had not seen used in the other boroughs that I had visited. Checking the signature lists in both stations, I noted the lack of voters who had signed their names. Instead, most made a fingerprint in the space next to their name. Between stations 4 and 5, fewer than 20 voters had placed pen to paper. As I looked over the list, the president provided an explanation. He began by reminding me that I was in Africa and not in the United States. "People in Africa, and especially Guinea, are poor and can not write their names," he said, adding that most of the female voters marked the list with a fingerprint. "Hardly any of the women in this neighborhood can write." I noted that at each of the two stations, the fingerprints were aligned in the same direction and were of similar size. As I prepared to leave the polling station, a young man and a woman entered Station four. I stopped to watch the poll workers in action. Once each voter deposited their envelope in the ballot box, one of the poll workers handed them a pen and both signed their names on the list.

My final stop in Kaloum was Camp Samory. Three polling stations were within the confines of the camp. After answering a series of questions and showing my credentials to a number of soldiers, we were allowed to drive onto the base. Station 9 was mobbed with soldiers clamoring to vote before the 18h00 closing of the polls. The polling station was staffed with civilians who were successfully maintaining order within the tight confines of the polling room. Three young women sat along the wall opposite the polling station president. I asked the president what their role was. The poll worker controlling the flow of the voters into the room responded for the president, "They are the political-party representatives." He laughed. The president explained that as the soldiers came off duty they were being brought in to vote. Many of the soldiers voting at the camp had been transferred to Conakry for the elections. Therefore they were not on the voting list. They voted upon presenting a copy of their military orders and their voting card. The names of each of the soldiers voting away from their place of registration had to be recorded longhand in the poll's register book. This slowed the pace of the voting.

Walking from Station 9 to Station 10, I was approached by a young lieutenant who offered to guide

my visit. He first suggested that we pass by and greet the camp commander who was seated nearby. The commander and I exchanged greetings and he insisted on escorting me to Station 10. Entering Station 10, I found 25 to 40 soldiers in line waiting to be processed. The poll workers were civilians. To the side of the polling area, a soldier was seated at a table. On the table was a stack of blank order forms like those that I had observed the soldiers presenting to the president of the polling station. The soldier was filling in the forms, sliding them across to an officer, who signed and stamped the form. The completed form was handed to the soldier waiting in line. There was also a pile of 50 to 100 blank proxy voting forms. I recalled that I had noticed that several of the soldiers relaxing in front of Station 9 had traces of indelible ink on fingers on both hands. Those men could have arrived at the poll with the proxy of one of their colleagues, or perhaps the forms had originated on the base. While I was in Station 10, no proxy forms were filled out. A second soldier was seated at the far end of the table writing on some computer forms. Closer inspection revealed that this was not a printout of the electoral list, but several hundred unused voting cards. The soldier was filling in the cards by hand and handing them to the soldiers in line who were waiting to be presented with the completed certification of orders. Once their paperwork was complete, each soldier would enter the polling station and cast his or her vote.

I commented to the commandant that it was nice to be able to produce voting cards on the spot. He replied that many of the men voting were from other areas and that they had not received their voting cards before election day. Therefore, this system was in use. After making my rounds of the work station in the poll, I passed by the paperwork station. The one soldier was still working on filling in the order forms. The second soldier and the blank voters cards were no where in sight.

XII. DECEMBER 19, 1993. EVENING.

The polls were to close officially at 18h00. All voters waiting in the vicinity of the station at that hour would be allowed to vote. Stations that had opened late in the day, as had been the case in several areas around the city, were to remain open for an 11-hour period. Mr. Camara and I headed back to the Amilcar Cabral School in the Miniere neighborhood to see how their day had been. From there we planned to return to the Lycée Donka in the Camayenne quartier, where we had started the day, to observe the closing of the station and the vote count. Arriving at the school, I was surprised to find the gate closed and no sign of a crowd. Stepping out of the car, I glanced at the ground. In the dusk, I had not noticed that the gravel in front of the gate was covered with ballots. An elderly woman across the street greeted us and I asked where the voting was. A man came up and introduced himself as a member of the neighborhood council. He pointed to the ground behind the car where Mr. Camara was investigating the remains of a ballot box top. According to him, a large group arrived at 10h00 just after the station had been opened for one hour. All of the voters ran away as the attackers began destroying the polling station materials. The man was not sure but he thought that the voting list was not destroyed. Most of the other stations in the immediate area had been attacked. Another man came up to our car and pointed to the west. "(the MIS) sent materials and they have placed a polling station at the intersection near the water. Anyone who was registered in this area is supposed to be able to go there and vote," he said. I asked those in the group that formed around our car if anyone had voted. Two women said that they had voted at the school before the attack came. I asked if anyone was going to the polling station at the intersection. No one responded. Finally the man who had identified himself as a council member responded, "I...we are all scared. But you should go ahead, nothing will happen to you. Do you hear the shooting? Those are the police and the army keeping people in their houses. You should go to the voting place."

We searched the streets and asked the few people who we found for directions. Nearby gunfire was

increasing in frequency. At the intersection where we expected to find the "super" polling station we found several fully armed members of the anti-gang unit in their plexiglass helmets. They were not talkative and used their guns to wave us past. Gunfire erupted immediately to our left. Mr Camara used his trajectory around the roundpoint to gain momentum and we shot off on the street heading south, neither of us speaking until we crossed through the roadblocks and over the bridge into the next neighborhood.

Arriving at the Lycée Donka, all was quiet. In the school yard, two soldiers sat guarding the premises. There was no one present apart from the poll workers, vote counters, and party representatives from the RPG and the PUP. The count went smoothly in stations 8 and 9. At the end of the process, each of the poll workers and poll watchers signed the poll books and the copies of the results summaries. The poll watchers were given copies of the results. The presidents of the polling stations approached me and asked if I could transport the results to the central counting center (*Commission Centrale du Recensement des Votes*) at the Dixinn borough headquarters. I agreed to take as many people as possible and to have a word with the mayor. Hopefully he would dispatch a vehicle to pick up the remaining poll workers, the ballot boxes, materials, and the soldiers.

The borough headquarters was filled to capacity. The courtyard was crowded with soldiers and casual spectators. The ground-floor meeting hall was packed shoulder to shoulder with shouting people as polling station presidents brought in materials and their tabulated results. Some initial vote counting was taking place in the back of the room where there was limited floor space. Seated around some tables on the stage, officials were organizing the envelopes of incoming results. On my way to the mayor's second floor office, I discovered groups of six to ten people huddled around ballot boxes anywhere where there was space. By the light of their kerosene lanterns they were counting ballots and filling in forms. Only portions of these two floors had working electricity. Those fortunate enough to arrive early were seated around tables on which were spread their polling materials. The mayor was in and I arranged for a vehicle to return to the Lycée Donka. We talked for awhile about the day's events. I noted that there had been considerable disturbances in his

borough. He acknowledged that and explained "this is why the president was hesitant about this transition to multiparty democracy, because many Guineans do not understand this system." The mayor asked my opinion on his counting system, in light of the fact that it was technically illegal to move the ballot boxes before the ballots were counted and the results recorded. I agreed that with the events of the day, I could not blame the poll workers and the party delegates from wanting to come into a central area that was protected and well illuminated.

I spent the next two hours wandering the halls and responding to requests for help with the forms or with the calculations of the results. This was an excellent opportunity to see if the forms that IFES had provided were easily understood by those who had to use them. Apart from some confusion with one portion of the poll book (*procès-verbal*), the overall response to the forms was positive. Many of the poll workers recognized me from my election-day travels through their boroughs and were eager to update me on the events of the afternoon. Although the scene in the Dixinn borough headquarters was chaotic, it was open to the parties. I was impressed with the commitment of the poll workers and the poll watchers who, after a stressful day, were still going strong under less-than-optimal conditions.

Arriving at the MIS around midnight, I found only a very tired Mr. Sangaré, the president of the subcommission for logistics. He asked for my impressions on the day. We discussed the supply problems experienced by many stations that caused them to open late. He indicated that several areas in the interior had experienced supply problems as well, especially around Kankan.

From the MIS, I continued to the borough headquarters of Kaloum. Unlike Dixinn, the building was silent. The parking area was empty of cars. The entry alcove was stacked floor-to-ceiling with ballot boxes. I headed upstairs and wandered down a hallway until I came to a partially open office door. Entering, I found five people seated at desks arranged around the room. I addressed myself to the man seated in the center of the room, he said that he was the president of the counting commission of the borough and with him were most of the commission members. I asked where the

political-party poll watchers were. He responded that there were none, but that as results came in his committee was handling them.

Leaving the building, we came face-to-face with the Governor of Conakry accompanied by two civilians and several soldiers. They swept up the stairs, not even acknowledging my presence. I passed by the U.S. Embassy and arranged for a second vehicle to follow myself and Mr. Camara to Mr. Camara's home so that he would not be driving late at night during the no-vehicle curfew. The embassy driver dropped me at the Camayenne around 03h00.

XIII. DECEMBER 20, 1993.

My morning was spent comparing notes with the Canadian observers and checking in at the U.S. Embassy, the MIS, and the CYK. The downtown area was calm. After noon, I visited each of the borough headquarters to assess the progress of the local vote tabulation.

13h00. Matam:

The centralizing commission in Matam was verifying the calculations as they had been submitted by the polling stations. There was not a crowd present. The counting center was well organized, but the work was progressing very slowly. The president of the commission had set up a blackboard with a result grid that made it easy for everyone to follow the proceedings. Delegates representing the PUP, the RPG, the UNR, and the PRP worked together cross-checking the results. As of 13h20, two of 20 neighborhoods were complete. The president hoped to be able to deliver the borough's results to the People's Palace that evening.

14h10. Matoto:

The mayor's office in Matoto was surrounded by a large and boisterous crowd. I remarked to a man on the fringe of the crowd that the tabulation of the results was an exciting time. He looked at me and laughed. "The results are being counted down the road, we are here for the distribution of per diem for our work yesterday." At the counting center, all was quiet. The military guards escorted me inside where I discovered the centralizing commission busily rustling through piles of paper. The president of the commission indicated that due to the attacks on polling stations around the borough many of the voting stations counted their results at the borough headquarters. An estimated 174 of 258 polling stations were operational on election day. Delegates were supposedly present representing the PUP, the RPG, the UNR, Dyama, the PRP, and the PDG-RDA. Unlike Matam,

most of the delegates seemed to be doubling as commission members. The president estimated that the centralization would be complete by 16h00. The commissioners were counting on delivering the results for Matoto to the palace by 21h00.

15h00. Ratoma:

The scene around the Ratoma borough headquarters resembled that of an armed camp. Several Republican Guards were stationed at the turn off from the main road onto the street leading to the borough offices. More than 50 soldiers, followed by jeeps and a troop carrier, were running in the street in front of the mayor's offices. The first floor balcony was crowded with poll workers and political-party delegates waiting to hand their polling materials over to the commission. Conversation was hushed and the people on the balcony were showing the effects of 48 continuous hours of work.

The Centralizing Commission was hard at work. I was impressed that the undertaking was well organized. The commissioners were tired and welcomed a chance to blow off some steam and indulge in casual conversation. They asked of news from the other boroughs. I told them how I had started election day under a truck in Kaporo. Delegates present represented the UNR and the PUP. The RPG delegate had stepped out. The commission had verified the results of 100 polling stations. They were not certain of how many more were left to process. The president estimated that they would at least know which stations were operative and which ones were not by 18h00. Many of the polling stations in the borough had opened late -- and some were opened past midnight in order to allow the voters to pass through.

Descending to the ground floor, I struck up a conversation with some young men who were interested in what I was doing. One of the two was familiar with organizations such as IFES, specifically noting NDI and their work in Cameroon. He was disappointed to learn that I was not a member of a larger observation team. Soon I was surrounded by 30 men. Each had an anecdote on the happenings of the previous day. There was some disagreement between those on the porch

as to who was the primary instigator of the attacks on the polling stations. Everyone agreed on three points: 1) the elections should not have been held on the 19; 2) the gunfire on the night before the elections (blamed on the police and the soldiers "encouraging" citizens to remain in their homes) and the day of the elections radically reduced voter participation throughout Ratoma, Matoto, and Dixinn; and 3) the majority of Guineans wanted to participate in the election. I asked if some polling stations had remained open into the morning December 20. The group indicated that some stations in "safe" areas did remain open. One of the men who claimed to have voted around 23h00 maintained that neither he nor anyone near him in line, had been asked to show identification or a voting card. He felt that this oversight was not an indication of a will to commit fraud, but of the will to let people vote and of the poll workers' desire to process the voters as rapidly as possible given the potential for more violence.

Visiting the borough headquarters on December 21, I was told that 50 percent of Ratoma's 246 polling stations were unable to function on election day.

16h30. Dixinn:

I decided on a quick visit to Kaporo to assess the post-election mood. On the way, we saw a large group of people moving along the road north toward the Kaporo area. Mr. Camara offered his unsolicited view that we had been extremely lucky to date in driving through problem areas. Rather than pushing our luck, we turned south and headed for CYK. I was interested in sitting with Yaya Kane for a while and discussing some of my thoughts on the problems with the lists and the cards. I arrived at CYK to find Mr. Kane and his staff preparing to visit the morgue and the cemetery. One of CYK's top young workers had been killed in front of his Kaporo home on election day. According to Mr. Kane, the victim had decided not to vote due to the attacks on the polling stations and the gunfire. Most of the gunfire heard on election day was shots being fired over the heads of attackers or rounds being discharged straight into the sky. These bullets do, however, come down as "lost bullets." Near midday, the victim emerged from his home to stand outside for some air and

became the unwitting target of a lost bullet. Mr. Kane declared CYK closed for the afternoon to permit himself and his staff to offer their support to the man's family and friends as they struggled with this needless loss of life.

From CYK, I went to meet Marguerite Roy who had just returned to Conakry from Mamou. On our way to Dixinn, she told me about Mamou. The election there went smoothly and there were no problems between the Peuhl supporters of Mamadou Ba and of Siradou Diallo as had been anticipated. Most of the election day complaints were attributed to the last-minute distribution of the voting cards and the voting lists. The counting process was slow but accurate. Ms. Roy was confident that the final result of the count would be correctly reported.

The grounds around the Dixinn borough offices were crowded with citizens anticipating the borough-wide result. Inside the ground floor meeting hall, the commission continued working. The PUP, the UNR, and the RPG were each represented by party delegates. The verification of calculations was time consuming and difficult, as the commissioners were exhausted. The president told us that 109 of the 165 polling stations in the borough had been operational on election day. We were unable to copy down the exact number of votes for each candidate, but the incumbent was well in the lead. Voter participation here was at less than 50 percent. The president planned to have the borough's results to the Palace by 22h00.

18h50. Kaloum:

The scene at the borough offices was somewhat more animated than it had been in the early morning hours. We went straight to the first floor room where the commission was working. Representing the PUP, the RPG, the UNR, and the PDG-RDA, party delegates surveyed the scene. Unlike what I had observed in the other boroughs, Kaloum's polling-stations presidents had followed a different procedure for vote tabulation. At the commission level, votes were being totalled on scraps of paper rather than on the official centralizing forms provided for results centralization at the department or

borough level. According to the commission president, results for each neighborhood had been tabulated at the neighborhood level. That would have explained the lack of activity at the mayor's offices immediately following the election. However, there was no legal provision in the electoral law, nor any administrative support offered by the MIS for the neighborhood-level results tabulation. This structure was not a part of the process both for economic reasons, and in an attempt to reduce the number of times that official election documents were handled.

It was not apparent that the political parties had played a role at the neighborhood-level centralization. The political-party delegates present in the room at the time of our visit offered no information. Regardless of the level of accountability at the neighborhood level, the tabulation of the figures at the borough level was an disorganized mess.

XIV. NATIONAL COUNTING COMMISSION (NCC)

Ms. Roy and I paid a visit to the National Counting Commission (NCC) located at the People's Palace in the Hall of the Second of October. Many of the NCC members sat talking around the table positioned for their use. A television had been wheeled in for the commissioners. To a man, the commissioners were exhausted. We were able to speak with Mr. Dieng and the subcommission heads as well as to Mr. Fofana, the MIS Secretary General and the president of the NCC. There was a sense of relief that the process was over. Mr. Diallo asked if we could design a tabulation form for the national level. Some weeks before the election, I had raised the issue of the national form with Mr. Diallo. At the time he felt that such a form, although it would be nice, was not necessary. The proceedings of the national commission would simply be dutifully recorded and then typed. Now, at the last minute, it was decided that the form was necessary. We worked out how the departmental form would have to be edited for use at the national level. Mr. Dieng told us that few, if any, results would be received before morning. We decided to return early the next day.

Our results tabulation vigil began on the morning of December 21. Initially, Mr. Fofana asked that we leave the meeting room, because the tabulation of the election results was work for the commission alone. Outside, I was fortunate to run into Mr. Dieng. I explained that it was in the interest of the NCC to allow international observers, technical consultants, and political-party delegates to observe the commission's work. He agreed to raise the issue with Mr. Fofana. When we returned to the Palace later in the morning, we were allowed to enter the meeting room. The Secretary General asked that we refrain from coming up to the commissioners seated at the table. After noon, members of the press corps were kept from entering the conference room.

Results were communicated to the NCC by radio, telephone and courier. Radio communications were sometimes transmitted via CYK's base station in Conakry. A CYK employee would read the results as they had been reported to him, or would place Mr. Dieng in direct contact with the

department officials. The president of the department's centralization committee or another official would read the provisional results to Mr. Dieng. On occasion, the individual announcing the results identified himself as the head administrator of the department. Administration officials were not supposed to be involved in the tabulation of the results. The conversation was transmitted through the conference room sound system allowing all present to note the totals as they were read on the air. Technical difficulties made this transmission difficult to understand and at times Mr. Dieng stopped the transmission and asked the commission president to try again in the hope of having a better connection. Unfortunately, a standard format was not followed in the transmission of the results. Some departments reported numbers of null votes and percentages per candidate. Others provided only the vote totals for the candidates. I was interested to note that there was no central tally board for the recording of the provisional figures and associated calculations. Instead, each member of the NCC recorded the data in his individual manner.

This system did not offer a means to clarify the inconsistencies between figures as they were transmitted. Sometimes, the total of the votes obtained by each candidate did not equal the number of counted votes cast, as was the case in Forécariah, Pita, Kissidougou, Boké, Coyah, Tougué, and Dabola. In other cases, the number of voided ballots was not equal to the number of votes cast minus the total of votes counted. In most cases, the number of voided ballots was not transmitted. Still other departments reported a total of votes cast in excess of the total number of registered voters, such as Kissidougou and Dubréka. These anomalies were explained away by MIS officials with no attempt to verify the figures.

Minister Gomez announced provisional election results at 22h00 on December 21 in the presence of members of the national and international press and the diplomatic corps. Some breakdown of the figures was provided by the Minister and the figures were recorded on a large blackboard for the benefit of the press. The incumbent was leading with approximately 45 percent of the reported vote. Alpha Condé trailed with approximately 31 percent. The figures announced by the Minister corresponded with the information gathered by IFES.

Throughout the afternoon of December 22, the NCC members and political party observers seated around the vast conference table were unable to agree on vote totals as the district results continued to flow in. Fatigue made the calculations twice as difficult. I brought a portable computer into the meeting hall and set up a spreadsheet for the national and international results. An NCC member came over to see what I was doing. I explained that I thought that I could help with the cross checking of the NCC's figures. He returned to his seat only to return a short time later with his result tabulation chart that he said he had cross checked with colleagues to insure that the vote totals by candidate for the districts were the same. Ms. Roy and I entered all of the numbers and calculated the votes and percentages for each candidate as well as the participation rate. In the interest of time, I used the gross totals for the diplomatic missions versus the embassy-by-embassy breakdown. The only domestic district not reporting was Ratoma. The calculations yielded the following: participation rate, 68.84 percent; Lansana Conté, 44.92 percent of the valid votes cast; and Alpha Conde, 26.43 percent of the valid votes cast.

It is instructive to note the effect of giving President Conté all 111,911 eligible votes for the borough of Ratoma. Assume that 100 percent of these are valid votes, bringing the total of valid votes cast to 2,204,038, and the total for the PUP candidate to 1,051,725. This scenario (a 72.44 percent participation rate) gives Lansana Conté 47.72 percent of the popular vote to Alpha Condé's 25.1 percent. A second round of voting would have to take place between these two candidates.

Several NCC members and MIS staff watched as the totals appeared on the spreadsheet. It was 19h00. One of the commissioners exhaled loudly and stated to no one in particular, "Now I am morally exhausted as well." This curious declaration proved to be prophetic.

By waiting to verify and announce the results at the end of the day, Minister Gomez gave the population the impression that he and his colleagues were cooking the books. As described in the first pages of this report, the sequence of events after 22h00 on December 22 only increased suspicion. The late-night arrival of the leaders of the PUP, the Governor of Conakry, and several

ministers at the Peoples' Palace did not go unnoticed. Neither did the increase of the number of members of the Republican Guard around the building.

The surprise announcement of the provisional final results by the Minister early in the morning of December 23 was handled differently than that of two days before. No break down by préfecture was offered. The domestic and the international vote totals for each candidate were announced as well as the annulment of the Siguiri results. No further explanations or clarifications were offered by the authorities. The mathematical anomalies noted above remained. This announcement was not based on the information from each polling station included in the departmental results, but on the partial results as verbally transmitted to the NCC.

Minister Gomez stated that the Siguiri results were disallowed based on complaints filed by the regional authorities of Upper Guinea. These complaints were said to be based on the refusal of a nameless group to "install the voting screens" and on reports of the intimidation of voters during the election. No additional specifics were offered by the Minister. He stated that, "Conforming with Article L151 of the electoral law, the MIS invalidates the results of this department."

Article L151 states:

Upon viewing all of the pollbooks of the departmental commissions, the Minister of the Interior begins the general tabulation of the votes.

If in the process of the tabulation, it becomes apparent that there is an inconsistency in the results recorded in the pollbook that renders the results unusable or if the pollbook is marked in such a way to call into question the validity of the document, the Minister of the Interior, **after verifying the pollbooks of the individual voting bureaus within the department**, may pronounce the nullification of the results contained in the fraudulent pollbooks.

In this case, the votes represented by the fraudulent pollbooks are not accounted for in the general tabulation of the results.

Upon the completion of the general vote tabulation, the Minister of the Interior prepares a set of special minutes on the incident to be transmitted immediately to the Supreme Court.

There was no evidence that the Minister's decision to nullify the results of Siguiri was based on his viewing of all of the pollbooks from the department. Given the difficulty in accessing some of the most distant areas in the department, it is unlikely that the Minister was in possession of the actual pollbooks.

XV. VERIFICATION OF THE ELECTION RESULTS, JANUARY 4, 1994.

The Supreme Court presented the official election results on January 4. In its deliberations and consideration of the complaints filed by the political parties, the court determined that the results from Siguiri and of Kankan were not valid. The invalidations were based on complaints of irregularities filed by the incumbent and the UNPG candidate, Mohammed Mansour Kaba. Both areas are interesting in that these were major opposition strongholds and the annulment of these results was a major contributor to the incumbent's acquisition of over 50 percent of the vote on the first round of balloting.

The invalidation of the results of Siguiri due to a lack of voting screens that resulted in the undue influencing of voters was interesting in light of the violence and disorder that I had witnessed in Conakry. The mayor of Siguiri, accompanied by the head administrator of the department and a MIS representative, had visited more than 30 voting stations in Siguiri as well as in surrounding rural areas. They did not register any complaints from their tour. No indication was provided to the NCC that there was a problem with the Siguiri results.

Article L176 requires that in the event that the Supreme Court annuls the results of an election, that new elections be called in 60 days. At this writing, there has been no indication that a new election will be called in those areas.

XVI. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Voting by the military, police and security force members.

No polling stations should be established on military bases or in the facilities that are the property of the national police or security forces. Members of the military and their dependents should be assigned to vote in the neighborhoods surrounding the bases. All members of the security forces reporting to the polls as electors should do so unarmed.

2. Verification of the voting list.

Until Guinea has an accurate list the revision period in the electoral law cannot be observed. Copies of the voting list should be posted at the district level for review by the general population and the political parties. An extraordinary revision period should be organized. The revision must be preceded by a thorough multi-media voters information campaign targeted at rural and urban Guinea.

3. Voting cards.

Voting cards should be produced based on the revised list. The cards must be made available for distribution 30 days before the election, and remain available up to election day. At the time of distribution, the cards are required to be signed by the distributing authority and the bearer of the card. The distribution list should also be initialed by the distributor and the recipient.

4. Poll book preparation.

The filling in of the *procès-verbale* cannot be postponed until the close of the polls. The text of the form is presented in chronological order. The completed pollbook provides a minute-by-minute account of the election day. Therefore, the polling station secretary should begin to fill out the form

before the opening of the poll. This will reduce the amount of work necessary at the end of the day when the poll workers are tired, and it will encourage a more accurate recording of the day's events.

5. Vote tabulation.

Polling station level. Vote tabulation at the polling station level should be conducted by vote counters selected by the polling-station president from among the voters registered at the poll. These individuals report to the poll at closing time and work with the poll workers to count the votes and fill in the various forms. Their activities are verified by the political party representatives present in the voting station. The results of the poll must be posted outside the voting station. All party representatives must be provided with a copy of the results signed by the pollworkers, vote counters, and party delegates. The pollbook must have spaces for the signatures of the pollworkers, vote counters, and delegates.

Departmental level. Tabulation at the departmental level requires proper organization to avoid mistakes. Proper utilization and submission of the vote tabulation tables developed by the MIS and IFES will aid in improving the accuracy of the process. The administration should open this process to public scrutiny through the posting of provisional results by district or neighborhood as they are completed. Members of the centralizing commissions should be required to follow set procedural guidelines. These guidelines should be made available to the political parties and to the public. The departmental results must be reported to the NCC by the president of the tabulation committee, **not by a local administration official.**

National level. The workings of the NCC should be shared with the public. The result reporting and tabulating procedure was poorly planned and rife with errors. The handling of the election results by the administration was neither open nor transparent. All of the decision-makers on the NCC were MIS or administration employees. Other than a token group comprised of the representatives of three political parties, there was no oversight of the count. The manner in which

the provisional results of the presidential elections were handled by the NCC and the MIS only strengthened the perception of the administration's total control of the election process.

As results are reported to the commission, they should be posted in a central location within view of all of the commission members and the political party representatives. Once the results of a department or borough have been provisionally verified by the NCC, they should be posted for the public. If the Minister of Interior must place his seal of approval on the results, he can do it as they are verified by the NCC. The distinction between provisional and final results must be respected at all times.

6. Poll Workers and Other Election Officials.

The poll workers who I encountered on election day were reasonably familiar with their assigned tasks. I was disappointed to note the absence of female participation at all levels of the process. This was a major oversight on the part of the Guineans, especially in areas where the population of literate males who could serve as poll workers was limited.

7. Independent Election Commission

The legislation creating the CNE is vastly insufficient. The commission as it exists is merely window dressing. Without the creation of an independent body mandated to assume a proactive role in the electoral process, Guinea has no hope of conducting open and transparent elections. The participation of one or two MIS technical personnel at a high level in the commission is reasonable, if not necessary. There is no role, however, for the Minister of Interior on the commission. The opposition parties and civic organizations need to come together to agree on more general representation on the commission. One member per organization results in a commission unable to undertake the difficult and complex task of administering an election.

8. Domestic Election Observation

A plan needs to be established to create a capacity for domestic monitoring. Domestic organizations must be allowed to participate as observers/monitors of the electoral process--not only on election day, but from the moment of the announcement of the election date and the registration of the parties. Working with existing organizations to establish a plan for domestic monitoring can have short- and long-term benefits as the involved organizations become active in long-term civic education and voters education. A domestic monitoring capacity is also useful in the event that international observers are scheduled to observe elections in Guinea. Pairing domestic and international observers can increase the efficiency of the overall observation and monitoring effort.

9. International Observation

If the Government of Guinea (or the CNE) desires to involve international groups in the oversight of Guinea's electoral process, they must take measures to provide groups with the necessary support and information to allow them to undertake a serious observation effort. Implicit in this is the ability to accredit groups far in advance of the actual election date so that the political campaign and the pre-electoral situation may be monitored. A distinction could be made through the accreditation process between international governmental groups, international NGOs, members of the local diplomatic corps, and international technical observers.

XVII. CONCLUSION

The flawed outcome of Guinea's presidential election calls into question the Guinea government's ability to organize and manage open and transparent elections. There is a real need for an independent electoral commission through which all segments of Guinean society may not only be represented, but also play an active role in the organization and management of the elections. Without such a structure, domestic and international expectations for an acceptable set of legislative elections should not be set too high.

Guinea's legislative elections will be complicated due to the intricacies of the combination of a proportional and a first-past-the-post systems. The likelihood for the process to "fall together at the last minute" in a fashion similar to the presidential election is not great. These elections require the development of a realistic workplan and operations timeline; the revision of the voters list and distribution of voters cards; thorough technical and legal preparations; expansive civic and voters information campaigns, supplementary training of pollworkers and polling administrators; establishment of an infrastructure for domestic monitoring and observation; and additional information dissemination and training sessions for civic organizations, political parties, and journalists.

Successful elections require more than hard currency; they require commitment. I feel that the general population was as committed to the process as possible in the light of the limited dissemination of elections information by the government. Conversely, the Guinean administration was not committed to an open and transparent process.

The government's performance during and after the presidential elections does not warrant continued external assistance in preparation for the legislative elections. Only if the government, and General Conté, provide tangible proof of their commitment to an improved process should the international community become involved again.

Guinea possesses tremendous human and natural resources. With a real commitment to open and transparent participatory multiparty elections, this potential can be realized.

APPENDICES

Brief Guide to the Presentation of Results

The columns on each of the spreadsheets that follow are the same. The column headings from left to right are: Borough or District; Registered Voters; Voters (Reporting to the Polls); Participation Rate (Voters/Registered Voters); Spoiled Ballots; Valid Votes Cast (Voters minus Spoiled Ballots); Totals by Party; Votes Obtained (the total of all the votes obtained by the eight parties). This last total should equal the Valid Votes Cast (SVE). Valid Votes Cast minus Votes Obtained indicates the difference between the total SVE reported and the total actually obtained by the eight parties (candidates).

It should also be noted that in the case of the nullification of the results of a Borough or District, not only are the totals obtained by each candidate or party set at zero, but the number of voters reporting to the polls is brought back to zero as well. The impact of the nullification of a result should not be limited to the various candidate or party totals, but the overall participation rate as well. The decision to ignore the votes cast in an area essentially denies that the voters even reported to the polls in the first place.

APPENDIX A

Voting Results Spreadsheet #1: Results Compiled by IFES as of 19h00 on December 22, 1993

These are the figures gathered by Tom Bayer and Marguerite Roy at the NCC. The footnotes on the spreadsheet point out where figures are soft or incomplete. Please note that at this time Siguiiri results were still part of the equation. The total votes cast by Guineans abroad was complete save for three or four diplomatic missions.

Palais de Peuple, Commission Nationale de Recensement des Votes

Communes et Préfectures	Electeurs Inscrits	Votants	Taux	Nulls (1)	SVE	PUP	RPG	UNR	PRP	UNPG	Dyama	PDG-RDA	UPG	Votes Obtenus	(SVE) - Votes Obtenus
<i>Kaloum</i>	49,999	40,419	80.8396%	136	40,283	35,735	1,995	1,193	415	372	62	126	385	40,283	0
<i>Dixinn</i>	54,491	30,074	55.1908%	204	29,870	20,495	3,313	3,630	1,411	312	103	260	346	29,870	0
<i>Matam</i>	76,078	47,489	62.4215%	815	46,674	34,852	6,523	2,486	1,481	500	125	220	427	46,614	60
<i>Ratoma</i>	(2) 111,911	0	0.0000%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<i>Matoto</i>	96,594	51,594	53.4133%	602	50,992	35,308	8,155	3,771	1,402	660	201	179	1,296	50,972	20
<i>Fria</i>	37,284	27,288	73.1896%	404	26,884	14,969	1,153	6,634	3,239	350	150	106	283	26,884	0
<i>Boffa</i>	61,702	58,741	95.2011%	362	58,379	55,960	372	1,227	476	186	61	40	57	58,379	0
<i>Boké</i>	105,171	80,028	76.0932%	1,689	78,339	56,591	3,429	9,047	7,448	1,154	348	318	335	78,670	(331)
<i>Coyah</i>	33,651	27,511	81.7539%	522	26,989	22,673	1,688	1,876	797	233	52	43	245	27,607	(618)
<i>Dubreka</i>	50,511	50,894	100.7583%	0	50,894	50,813	17	32	15	10	1	1	5	50,894	0
<i>Forécariah</i>	72,528	70,658	97.4217%	492	70,166	62,502	587	1,474	566	767	42	49	179	66,166	4,000
<i>Kindia</i>	128,014	101,401	79.2109%	0	99,737	74,389	4,655	13,884	3,813	1,379	617	332	661	99,730	7
<i>Télimélé</i>	89,850	70,699	78.6856%	1,629	69,070	13,121	2,010	44,797	6,448	1,168	705	530	292	69,071	(1)
<i>Dalaba</i>	57,159	46,070	80.5997%	1,643	44,427	6,778	3,290	20,923	9,325	2,007	926	758	420	44,427	0
<i>Gaoual</i>	57,347	36,455	63.5691%	395	36,060	18,124	1,689	2,091	12,502	767	323	398	166	36,060	0
<i>Koubia</i>	40,480	32,381	79.9926%	1,465	30,916	7,103	1,196	916	20,424	491	268	403	115	30,916	0
<i>Koundara</i>	39,883	25,238	63.2801%	1,292	23,946	13,499	1,728	1,603	6,273	436	145	190	72	23,946	0
<i>Labé</i>	112,647	90,310	80.1708%	2,021	88,289	11,536	2,579	2,693	68,454	1,087	574	961	386	88,270	19
<i>Lélouma</i>	55,379	44,372	80.1242%	1,641	42,731	8,256	1,199	1,656	28,758	1,656	418	724	205	42,872	(141)
<i>Mali</i>	86,543	64,498	74.5271%	2,314	62,184	23,484	2,182	2,535	31,215	1,125	541	725	241	62,048	136
<i>Mamou</i>	92,931	64,824	69.7550%	2,397	62,427	18,162	6,982	27,949	4,487	2,374	1,130	857	486	62,427	0
<i>Pita</i>	93,673	86,821	92.6852%	427	86,394	5,023	1,987	73,570	2,522	1,106	614	414	244	85,480	914
<i>Tougué</i>	49,546	37,737	76.1656%	858	36,879	12,449	1,275	4,203	17,659	748	371	464	210	37,379	(500)
<i>Dabola</i>	41,981	33,724	80.3316%	1,051	32,673	15,329	12,739	2,475	559	974	332	259	286	32,953	(280)
<i>Farannah</i>	75,284	58,162	77.2568%	1,824	56,338	18,791	30,068	2,845	1,976	1,140	292	945	281	56,338	0
<i>Kankan</i>	124,439	115,144	92.5305%	1,412	113,732	4,628	101,024	3,387	1,831	576	1,513	212	563	113,734	(2)
<i>Kérouané</i>	71,440	56,435	78.9964%	794	55,641	6,217	43,551	3,259	1,543	510	285	154	142	55,661	(20)
<i>Dinguiraye</i>	51,168	38,378	75.0039%	1,387	36,991	14,112	6,448	14,190	562	823	352	301	203	36,991	0
<i>Kouroussa</i>	65,331	59,745	91.4497%	388	59,357	1,776	56,645	202	257	244	57	78	98	59,357	0
<i>Mandiana</i>	67,915	57,862	85.1977%	974	56,888	2,776	52,163	364	242	674	398	78	173	56,868	20
<i>Siguiri</i>	(3) 112,885	108,546	96.1563%	1,869	106,677	1,160	99,958	2,537	1,679	262	371	567	143	106,677	0
<i>N'Zérékoré</i>	126,499	84,938	67.1452%	2,156	82,782	61,613	14,194	1,659	967	626	213	195	3,315	82,782	0
<i>Youmou</i>	39,023	29,986	76.8419%	1,096	28,890	23,711	2,172	313	223	249	80	70	2,031	28,849	41

Palais de Peuple, Commission Nationale de Recensement des Votes

Communes et Préfectures	Electeurs Inscrits	Votants	Taux	Nulls (1)	SVE	PUP	RPG	UNR	PRP	UNPG	Dyama	PDG-RDA	UPG	Votes Obtenus	(SVE)-Votes Obtenus
<i>Lola</i>	56,371	40,751	72.2907%	247	40,504	29,642	5,587	527	315	300	305	156	3,672	40,504	0
<i>Macenta</i>	94,333	65,677	69.6225%	1,447	64,230	49,930	10,195	1,529	1,054	699	227	211	385	64,230	0
<i>Guéckédou</i>	110,739	64,915	58.6198%	0	64,915	57,122	5,328	723	939	367	102	134	200	64,915	0
<i>Kissidougou</i>	74,396	94,493	127.0135%	0	76,646	29,705	32,646	2,694	4,138	1,359	347	301	456	71,646	5,000
<i>Beyla</i>	77,528	41,221	53.1692%	0	41,221	16,627	20,252	1,133	857	1,310	454	294	294	41,221	0
<i>Exterieur</i>	(4) 276,544	12,112	4.3798%	0	12,112	4,853	2,009	2,572	2,250	136	71	95	126	12,112	0
TOTAUX	3,119,248	2,147,591	68.8496%	35,953	2,092,127	939,814	552,983	268,599	248,522	29,137	13,176	12,148	19,424	2,083,803	8,324
Pourcentage			68.8496%	1.6741%		44.9215%	26.4316%	12.8386%	11.8789%	1.3927%	0.6298%	0.5807%	0.9284%	99.6021%	0.3979%

NOTES

- (1) Soft numbers. These numbers were not announced in all cases. Some of these totals are extrapolations.
(2) No results reported as of 19h00' on the 22nd of December.
(3) On December 23 at 01h04', these results were provisionally annulled by Minister Gomez (Refer to Article L151 in the Electoral Law).
(4) These figures are partial totals as of 19h00'. The figure quoted by the Minister on 12/23 was 22,478, a surprising increase.

APPENDIX B

Voting Results Spreadsheet #2: Results Reflecting Announcement by Minister Gomez at 01h04 on December 23, 1993

The Minister's announcement was made before the results of Ratoma were known. Later in the morning of December 23, I learned that 26,000 valid votes had been cast in Ratoma, and that 12,000 of those went to Lansana Conté. For the sake of the calculations, I split the remainder between the other seven candidates. On this sheet, the results of Siguri are set at zero due to the annulation of their results as announced by the Minister.

Later results obtained indicated the following for Ratoma:

Valid Votes:	26,795
PUP:	12,138
RPG:	2,759
UNR:	9,870
PRP:	1,038
UNPG:	154
Dyama:	92
PDG-RDA:	138
UPG:	606

The total number of votes counted at Guinean missions abroad almost doubled. This total was announced by Minister Sylla on December 23.

Results reflecting announcement by Minister Gomez at 01h04' on December 23, 1993

Spreadsheet Edition: 12/24/93

Palais de Peuple, Commission Nationale de Recensement des Votes

Communes et Préfectures	Electeurs Inscrits	Voteurs	Taux	Nulls (1)	SVE	PUP	RPG	UNR	PRP	UNPG	Dyama	PDG-RDA	UPG	Votes Obtenus	(SVE) - Votes Obtenus
<i>Kaloum</i>	49,999	40,419	80.8396%	136	40,283	35,735	1,995	1,193	415	372	62	126	385	40,283	0
<i>Dixinn</i>	54,491	30,074	55.1908%	204	29,870	20,495	3,313	3,630	1,411	312	103	260	346	29,870	0
<i>Matam</i>	76,078	47,489	62.4215%	815	46,674	34,852	6,523	2,486	1,481	500	125	220	427	46,614	60
<i>Ratoma</i>	(2) 111,911	26,000	23.2327%	0	26,000	12,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	26,000	0
<i>Matoto</i>	96,594	51,594	53.4133%	602	50,992	35,308	8,155	3,771	1,402	660	201	179	1,296	50,972	20
<i>Fria</i>	37,284	27,288	73.1896%	404	26,884	14,969	1,153	6,634	3,239	350	150	106	283	26,884	0
<i>Boffa</i>	61,702	58,741	95.2011%	362	58,379	55,960	372	1,227	476	186	61	40	57	58,379	0
<i>Boké</i>	105,171	80,028	76.0932%	1,689	78,339	56,591	3,429	9,047	7,448	1,154	348	318	335	78,670	(331)
<i>Coyah</i>	33,651	27,511	81.7539%	522	26,989	22,673	1,688	1,876	797	233	52	43	245	27,607	(618)
<i>Dubrêka</i>	50,511	50,894	100.7583%	0	50,894	50,813	17	32	15	10	1	1	5	50,894	0
<i>Forécariah</i>	72,528	70,658	97.4217%	492	70,166	62,502	587	1,474	566	767	42	49	179	66,166	4,000
<i>Kindia</i>	128,014	101,401	79.2109%	0	99,737	74,389	4,655	13,884	3,813	1,379	617	332	661	99,730	7
<i>Télimélé</i>	89,850	70,699	78.6856%	1,629	69,070	13,121	2,010	44,797	6,448	1,168	705	530	292	69,071	(1)
<i>Dalaba</i>	57,159	46,070	80.5997%	1,643	44,427	6,778	3,290	20,923	9,325	2,007	926	758	420	44,427	0
<i>Gaoual</i>	57,347	36,455	63.5691%	395	36,060	18,124	1,689	2,091	12,502	767	323	398	166	36,060	0
<i>Koubia</i>	40,480	32,381	79.9926%	1,465	30,916	7,103	1,196	916	20,424	491	268	403	115	30,916	0
<i>Koundara</i>	39,883	25,238	63.2801%	1,292	23,946	13,499	1,728	1,603	6,273	436	145	190	72	23,946	0
<i>Labé</i>	112,647	90,310	80.1708%	2,021	88,289	11,536	2,579	2,693	68,454	1,087	574	961	386	88,270	19
<i>Lélouma</i>	55,379	44,372	80.1242%	1,641	42,731	8,256	1,199	1,656	28,758	1,656	418	724	205	42,872	(141)
<i>Mali</i>	86,543	64,498	74.5271%	2,314	62,184	23,484	2,182	2,535	31,215	1,125	541	725	241	62,048	136
<i>Mamou</i>	92,931	64,824	69.7550%	2,397	62,427	18,162	6,982	27,949	4,487	2,374	1,130	857	486	62,427	0
<i>Pita</i>	93,673	86,821	92.6852%	427	86,394	5,023	1,987	73,570	2,522	1,106	614	414	244	85,480	914
<i>Tougué</i>	49,546	37,737	76.1656%	858	36,879	12,449	1,275	4,203	17,659	748	371	464	210	37,379	(500)
<i>Dabola</i>	41,981	33,724	80.3316%	1,051	32,673	15,329	12,739	2,475	559	974	332	259	286	32,953	(280)
<i>Faranah</i>	75,284	58,162	77.2568%	1,824	56,338	18,791	30,068	2,845	1,976	1,140	292	945	281	56,338	0
<i>Kankan</i>	124,439	115,144	92.5305%	1,412	113,732	4,628	101,024	3,387	1,831	576	1,513	212	563	113,734	(2)
<i>Kérouané</i>	71,440	56,435	78.9964%	794	55,641	6,217	43,551	3,259	1,543	510	285	154	142	55,661	(20)
<i>Dinguiraye</i>	51,168	38,378	75.0039%	1,387	36,991	14,112	6,448	14,190	562	823	352	301	203	36,991	0
<i>Kouroussa</i>	65,331	59,745	91.4497%	388	59,357	1,776	56,645	202	257	244	57	78	98	59,357	0
<i>Mandiana</i>	67,915	57,862	85.1977%	974	56,888	2,776	52,163	364	242	674	398	78	173	56,868	20
<i>Siguiri</i>	(3) 112,885	0	0.0000%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<i>N'Zérékoré</i>	126,499	84,938	67.1452%	2,156	82,782	61,613	14,194	1,659	967	626	213	195	3,315	82,782	0
<i>Youmou</i>	39,023	29,986	76.8419%	1,096	28,890	23,711	2,172	313	223	249	80	70	2,031	28,849	41

Palais de Peuple, Commission Nationale de Recensement des Votes

Communes et Préfectures	Electeurs Inscrits	Votants	Taux	Nulls (1)	SVE	PUP	RPG	UNR	PRP	UNPG	Dyama	PDG-RDA	UPG	Votes Obtenus	(SVE) - Votes Obtenus
<i>Lola</i>	56,371	40,751	72.2907%	247	40,504	29,642	5,587	527	315	300	305	156	3,672	40,504	0
<i>Macenta</i>	94,333	65,677	69.6225%	1,447	64,230	49,930	10,195	1,529	1,054	699	227	211	385	64,230	0
<i>Guéckédou</i>	110,739	64,915	58.6198%	0	64,915	57,122	5,328	723	939	367	102	134	200	64,915	0
<i>Kissidougou</i>	74,396	94,493	127.0135%	0	76,646	29,705	32,646	2,694	4,138	1,359	347	301	456	71,646	5,000
<i>Beyla</i>	77,528	41,221	53.1692%	0	41,221	16,627	20,252	1,133	857	1,310	454	294	294	41,221	0
<i>Exterieur</i>	(4) 276,544	22,478	8.1282%	0	22,478	9,040	3,670	6,243	2,748	405	133	97	142	22,478	0
TOTAUX	3,119,248	2,075,411	66.5356%	34,084	2,021,816	954,841	456,686	271,733	249,341	31,144	14,867	13,583	21,297	2,013,492	8,324
Pourcentage			66.5356%	1.6423%		47.2269%	22.5879%	13.4400%	12.3325%	1.5404%	0.7353%	0.6718%	1.0534%	99.5883%	0.4117%

NOTES

- (1) Soft numbers. These numbers were not announced in all cases. Some of these totals are extrapolations.
(2) Only candidate total obtained was for Lassane Conté. Other totals assumed for purpose of calculation.
(3) On December 23 at 01h04', these results were provisionally annulled by Minister Gomez (Refer to Article L151 in the Electoral Law).
(4) These figures are partial totals as of 19h00'. The figure quoted by the Minister on 12/23 was 22,478, a surprising increase.

APPENDIX C

Voting Results Spreadsheet #3: Results by Region Showing the Nullification of Both Siguiri and Kankan

The totals for Ratoma in this sheet have yet to be adjusted for the candidates other than President Conté. The results for the entire prefecture of Kankan are set at zero due to a lack of complete information as to what was nullified and what was not. However, given the total votes obtained by Lansana Conté in Kankan (4,628), this approach has limited direct impact on his final statistics regarding the percentage of votes obtained overall. By setting all totals at zero, the incumbent enjoys the greatest indirect impact on his total percentage via the reduction of the total votes accorded to all opposing parties by a total of 109,106 votes.

Results compiled by IFES as of 19h00' on December 22, 1993

Spreadsheet Edition: 01/05/94

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Palais de Peuple, Commission Nationale de Recensement des Votes **TABLEAU REGIONAL** Supreme Court Special

Communes et Préfectures	Electeurs Inscrits	Votants	Taux	Nulls (1)	SVE	PUP	RPG	UNR	PRP	UNPG	Dyama	PDG-RDA	UPG	Votes Obtenus	(SVE) - Votes Obtenus
VILLE DE CONAKRY															
<i>Kaloum</i>	49,999	40,419	80.8396%	136	40,283	35,735	1,995	1,193	415	372	62	126	385	40,283	0
<i>Dixinn</i>	54,491	30,074	55.1908%	204	29,870	20,495	3,313	3,630	1,411	312	103	260	346	29,870	0
<i>Matam</i>	76,078	47,489	62.4215%	815	46,674	34,852	6,523	2,486	1,481	500	125	220	427	46,614	60
<i>Ratoma</i>	(2) 111,911	26,000	23.2327%	0	26,000	12,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	26,000	0
<i>Matoto</i>	96,594	51,594	53.4133%	602	50,992	35,308	8,155	3,771	1,402	660	201	179	1,296	50,972	20
<i>Sous-total</i>	389,073	195,576	50.2672%	1,757	193,819	138,390	21,986	13,080	6,709	3,844	2,491	2,785	4,454	193,739	80
<i>Pourcentage</i>			50.2672%	0.8984%		71.4017%	11.3436%	6.7486%	3.4615%	1.9833%	1.2852%	1.4369%	2.2980%	99.9587%	0.0413%
GUINEE MARITIME															
<i>Fria</i>	37,284	27,288	73.1896%	404	26,884	14,969	1,153	6,634	3,239	350	150	106	283	26,884	0
<i>Boffa</i>	61,702	58,741	95.2011%	362	58,379	55,960	372	1,227	476	186	61	40	57	58,379	0
<i>Boké</i>	105,171	80,028	76.0932%	1,689	78,339	56,591	3,429	9,047	7,448	1,154	348	318	335	78,670	(331)
<i>Coyah</i>	33,651	27,511	81.7539%	522	26,989	22,673	1,688	1,876	797	233	52	43	245	27,607	(618)
<i>Dubrêka</i>	50,511	50,894	100.7583%	0	50,894	50,813	17	32	15	10	1	1	5	50,894	0
<i>Forécariah</i>	72,528	70,658	97.4217%	492	70,166	62,502	587	1,474	566	767	42	49	179	66,166	4,000
<i>Kindia</i>	128,014	101,401	79.2109%	0	99,737	74,389	4,655	13,884	3,813	1,379	617	332	661	99,730	7
<i>Télimélé</i>	89,850	70,699	78.6856%	1,629	69,070	13,121	2,010	44,797	6,448	1,168	705	530	292	69,071	(1)
<i>Sous-total</i>	578,711	487,220	84.1906%	5,098	480,458	351,018	13,911	78,971	22,802	5,247	1,976	1,419	2,057	477,401	3,057
<i>Pourcentage</i>			84.1906%	1.0463%		73.0590%	2.8954%	16.4366%	4.7459%	1.0921%	0.4113%	0.2953%	0.4281%	99.3637%	0.6363%

Palais de Peuple, Commission Nationale de Recensement des Votes **TABLEAU REGIONAL** Supreme Court Special

Communes et Préfectures	Electeurs Inscrits	Votants	Taux	Nulls (1)	SVE	PUP	RPG	UNR	PRP	UNPG	Dyama	PDG-RDA	UPG	Votes Obtenus	(SVE) - Votes Obtenus
MOYENNE GUINEE															
<i>Dalaba</i>	57,159	46,070	80.5997%	1,643	44,427	6,778	3,290	20,923	9,325	2,007	926	758	420	44,427	0
<i>Gaoual</i>	57,347	36,455	63.5691%	395	36,060	18,124	1,689	2,091	12,502	767	323	398	166	36,060	0
<i>Koubia</i>	40,480	32,381	79.9926%	1,465	30,916	7,103	1,196	916	20,424	491	268	403	115	30,916	0
<i>Koundara</i>	39,883	25,238	63.2801%	1,292	23,946	13,499	1,728	1,603	6,273	436	145	190	72	23,946	0
<i>Labé</i>	112,647	90,310	80.1708%	2,021	88,289	11,536	2,579	2,693	68,454	1,087	574	961	386	88,270	19
<i>Lélouma</i>	55,379	44,372	80.1242%	1,641	42,731	8,256	1,199	1,656	28,758	1,656	418	724	205	42,872	(141)
<i>Mali</i>	86,543	64,498	74.5271%	2,314	62,184	23,484	2,182	2,535	31,215	1,125	541	725	241	62,048	136
<i>Mamou</i>	92,931	64,824	69.7550%	2,397	62,427	18,162	6,982	27,949	4,487	2,374	1,130	857	486	62,427	0
<i>Pita</i>	93,673	86,821	92.6852%	427	86,394	5,023	1,987	73,570	2,522	1,106	614	414	244	85,480	914
<i>Tougué</i>	49,546	37,737	76.1656%	858	36,879	12,449	1,275	4,203	17,659	748	371	464	210	37,379	(500)
<i>Sous-total</i>	685,588	528,706	77.1172%	14,453	514,253	124,414	24,107	138,139	201,619	11,797	5,310	5,894	2,545	513,825	428
<i>Pourcentage</i>			77.1172%	2.7337%		24.1932%	4.6878%	28.8621%	39.2062%	2.2940%	1.0326%	1.1461%	0.4949%	99.9168%	0.0832%
HAUTE GUINEE															
<i>Dabola</i>	41,981	33,724	80.3316%	1,051	32,673	15,329	12,739	2,475	559	974	332	259	286	32,953	(280)
<i>Farannah</i>	75,284	58,162	77.2568%	1,824	56,338	18,791	30,068	2,845	1,976	1,140	292	945	281	56,338	0
<i>Kankan</i> (3)	124,439	0	0.0000%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<i>Kérouané</i>	71,440	56,435	78.9964%	794	55,641	6,217	43,551	3,259	1,543	510	285	154	142	55,661	(20)
<i>Dinguiraye</i>	51,168	38,378	75.0039%	1,387	36,991	14,112	6,448	14,190	562	823	352	301	203	36,991	0
<i>Kouroussa</i>	65,331	59,745	91.4497%	388	59,357	1,776	56,645	202	257	244	57	78	98	59,357	0
<i>Mandiana</i>	67,915	57,862	85.1977%	974	56,888	2,776	52,163	364	242	674	398	78	173	56,868	20
<i>Siguiriri</i> (4)	112,885	0	0.0000%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<i>Sous-total</i>	610,443	304,306	49.8500%	6,418	297,888	59,001	201,614	23,335	5,139	4,365	1,716	1,815	1,183	298,168	(280)
<i>Pourcentage</i>			49.8500%	2.1091%		19.8064%	67.6811%	7.8335%	1.7251%	1.4653%	0.5761%	0.6093%	0.3971%	100.0940%	-0.0940%

Palais de Peuple, Commission Nationale de Recensement des Votes **TABLEAU REGIONAL** Supreme Court Special

Communes et Préfectures	Electeurs Inscrits	Votants	Taux	Nulls (1)	SVE	PUP	RPG	UNR	PRP	UNPG	Dyama	PDG-RDA	UPG	Votes Obtenus	(SVE) - Votes Obtenus
GUINEE FORESTIERE															
<i>N'Zérékoré</i>	126,499	84,938	67.1452%	2,156	82,782	81,813	14,194	1,659	967	626	213	195	3,315	82,782	0
<i>Youmou</i>	39,023	29,986	76.8419%	1,096	28,890	23,711	2,172	313	223	249	80	70	2,031	28,849	41
<i>Lola</i>	56,371	40,751	72.2907%	247	40,504	29,642	5,587	527	315	300	305	156	3,672	40,504	0
<i>Macenta</i>	94,333	65,677	69.6225%	1,447	64,230	49,930	10,195	1,529	1,054	699	227	211	385	64,230	0
<i>Guéckédou</i>	110,739	64,915	58.6198%	0	64,915	57,122	5,328	723	939	367	102	134	200	64,915	0
<i>Kissidougou</i>	74,396	94,493	127.0135%	0	76,646	29,705	32,646	2,694	4,138	1,359	347	301	456	71,646	5,000
<i>Beyla</i>	77,528	41,221	53.1692%	0	41,221	16,627	20,252	1,133	857	1,310	454	294	294	41,221	0
<i>Sous-total</i>	578,889	421,981	72.8950%	4,946	399,188	268,350	90,374	8,578	8,493	4,910	1,728	1,361	10,353	394,147	5,041
<i>Pourcentage</i>			72.8950%	1.1721%		67.2240%	22.6395%	2.1489%	2.1276%	1.2300%	0.4329%	0.3409%	2.5935%	98.7372%	1.2628%
<i>EXTERIEUR</i> (5)	276,544	22,478	8.1282%	0	22,478	9,040	3,670	6,243	2,748	405	133	97	142	22,478	0
<i>Sous-total</i>	276,544	22,478	8.1282%	0	22,478	9,040	3,670	6,243	2,748	405	133	97	142	22,478	0
<i>Pourcentage</i>			8.1282%	0.0000%		40.2171%	16.3271%	27.7738%	12.2253%	1.8018%	0.5917%	0.4315%	0.6317%	100.0000%	0.0000%
Récapitulatif:															
<i>Ville de Conakry</i>	389,073	195,576	50.2672%	1,757	193,819	138,390	21,986	13,080	6,709	3,844	2,491	2,785	4,454	193,739	80
<i>Guinée Maritime</i>	578,711	487,220	84.1906%	5,098	480,458	351,018	13,911	78,971	22,802	5,247	1,976	1,419	2,057	477,401	3,057
<i>Moyenne Guinée</i>	685,588	528,706	77.1172%	14,453	514,253	124,414	24,107	138,139	201,619	11,797	5,310	5,894	2,545	513,825	428
<i>Haute Guinée</i>	610,443	304,306	49.8500%	6,418	297,888	59,001	201,614	23,335	5,139	4,365	1,716	1,815	1,183	298,168	(280)
<i>Guinée Forestiere</i>	578,889	421,981	72.8950%	4,946	399,188	268,350	90,374	8,578	8,493	4,910	1,728	1,361	10,353	394,147	5,041
<i>Exterieur</i>	276,544	22,478	8.1282%	0	22,478	9,040	3,670	6,243	2,748	405	133	97	142	22,478	0
TOTAUX	3,119,248	1,960,267	62.8442%	32,672	1,908,084	950,213	355,662	268,346	247,510	30,568	13,354	13,371	20,734	1,899,758	8,326
Pourcentage			62.8442%	1.6667%		49.7993%	18.6397%	14.0636%	12.9717%	1.6020%	0.6999%	0.7008%	1.0866%	99.5636%	100.0000%

NOTES

- (1) Soft numbers. Many of these totals were extrapolated -- few were actually reported at the national level.
- (2) No results as of 19h00' on the 22nd of December. (Results updated as a result of telephone conv. w/DOS on 3 Jan).
- (3) Results in Kankan were annulled by the Supreme Court on 4 January 1994. Entire préfecture set at zero for accounting purposes.
- (4) These results were provisionally annulled by Minister Gomez (Refer to Article L151 in the Electoral Law). Annulment upheld by Supreme Court on 4 January 1994.
- (5) These figures are partial totals. However, the figures quoted by the Minister on the morning of December 23 showed a remarkable increase. Final figures based on Gomez announcement on

APPENDIX D

Voting Results Spreadsheet #4: Results by Region Showing the Nullification of Both Siguiiri and Kankan Plus Adjustments Noted by the Opposition Parties

This table incorporates the most important of several anomalies raised by the RPG and echoed by other opposition parties. The anomalies are indicated on the spreadsheet by the ** next to the specific figures.

Although it is true that these figures are reported by a partisan source, it is interesting to note that by taking the third spreadsheet and making the changes noted in the RPG document, the vote totals approach those that were officially approved and transmitted by the Supreme Court. Without these alterations, it is impossible to accord President Conté the 50% plus one of the popular vote required to give him the majority in the first round of voting.

It is interesting to consider the participation rate as well in light of the 78.4% rate of participation claimed by the Government.

Boké:

The number of valid votes for Boké was recorded as 78,339 (56,591 for the PUP), with an unexplained 331 additional votes as indicated in the Votes Obtained column. However, the final total of valid votes reportedly released for Boké was 100,838 (78,590 for PUP). There remain 331 unexplained votes.

Forécariah:

The counting commission reported 62,502 votes for the PUP. The Ministry reportedly announced a total for the PUP of 65,502. Apart from increasing the PUP's share of the vote, the additional 3,000 votes put the participation rate in Forécariah over 100%.

Kindia:

The total votes for the PUP recorded by IFES was 74,389. The total reportedly posted by the MIS was 99,339, a significant gain by the PUP and a significant increase in the participation rate.

Siguiiri:

Regardless of the invalidation of the votes cast in the district of Siguiiri, the PUP retained all of the 1,160 votes that had been cast in favor of their candidate.

N'Zérékoré:

The district reported 61,613 votes for the PUP candidate. The MIS reportedly accorded the incumbent 71,613 votes.

Guéckédou:

The district reported a total of 57,122 votes for the PUP. The Ministry reportedly established the PUP candidate's total at 67,122.

Results compiled by IFES as of 19h00' on December 22, 1993

Spreadsheet Edition: 01/05/94

Palais de Peuple, Commission Nationale de Recensement des Votes **TABLEAU REGIONAL** *Supreme Court Special with Changes Indicated by the Opposition Parties*

PLUS: ADJUSTMENTS FOR OPPOSITION FIGURES TO TOTAL VOTES CAST

Communes et Préfectures	Electeurs Inscrits	Votants	Taux	Nuls (1)	SVE	PUP	RPG	UNR	PRP	UNPG	Dyama	PDG-RDA	UPG	Votes Obtenus	(SVE) - Votes Obtenus
VILLE DE CONAKRY															
<i>Kaloum</i>	49,999	40,419	80.8396%	136	40,283	35,735	1,995	1,193	415	372	62	126	385	40,283	0
<i>Dixinn</i>	54,491	30,074	55.1908%	204	29,870	20,495	3,313	3,630	1,411	312	103	260	346	29,870	0
<i>Matam</i>	76,078	47,489	62.4215%	815	46,674	34,852	6,523	2,486	1,481	500	125	220	427	46,614	60
<i>Ratoma</i>	(2) 111,911	26,000	23.2327%	0	26,000	12,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	26,000	0
<i>Matoto</i>	96,594	51,594	53.4133%	602	50,992	35,308	8,155	3,771	1,402	660	201	179	1,296	50,972	20
<i>Sous-total</i>	389,073	195,576	50.2672%	1,757	193,819	138,390	21,986	13,080	6,709	3,844	2,491	2,785	4,454	193,739	80
<i>Pourcentage</i>			50.2672%	0.8984%		71.4017%	11.3436%	6.7486%	3.4615%	1.9833%	1.2852%	1.4369%	2.2980%	99.9587%	0.0413%
GUINEE MARITIME															
<i>Fria</i>	37,284	27,288	73.1896%	404	26,884	14,969	1,153	6,634	3,239	350	150	106	283	26,884	0
<i>Boffa</i>	61,702	58,741	95.2011%	362	58,379	55,960	372	1,227	476	186	61	40	57	58,379	0
<i>Boké</i>	105,171	102,027	97.0106%	1,689	100,338 **	78,590	3,429	9,047	7,448	1,154	348	318	335	100,669	(331)
<i>Coyah</i>	33,651	27,511	81.7539%	522	26,989	22,673	1,688	1,876	797	233	52	43	245	27,607	(618)
<i>Dubrêka</i>	50,511	50,894	100.7583%	0	50,894	50,813	17	32	15	10	1	1	5	50,894	0
<i>Forécariah</i>	72,528	73,658	101.5580%	492	73,166 **	65,502	587	1,474	566	767	42	49	179	69,166	4,000
<i>Kindia</i>	128,014	126,351	98.7009%	0	126,351 **	99,339	4,655	13,884	3,813	1,379	617	332	661	124,680	1,671
<i>Télimélé</i>	89,850	70,699	78.6856%	1,629	69,070	13,121	2,010	44,797	6,448	1,168	705	530	292	69,071	(1)
<i>Sous-total</i>	578,711	537,169	92.8216%	5,098	532,071	400,967	13,911	78,971	22,802	5,247	1,976	1,419	2,057	527,350	4,721
<i>Pourcentage</i>			92.8216%	0.9490%		75.3597%	2.6145%	14.8422%	4.2855%	0.9861%	0.3714%	0.2667%	0.3866%	99.1127%	0.8873%

Palais de Peuple, Commission Nationale de Recensement des Votes **TABLEAU REGIONAL** *Supreme Court Special with Changes Indicated by the Opposition Parties*

PLUS: ADJUSTMENTS FOR OPPOSITION FIGURES TO TOTAL VOTES CAST

Communes et Préfectures	Electeurs Inscrits	Votants	Taux	Nulls (1)	SVE	PUP	RPG	UNR	PRP	UNPG	Dyama	PDG-RDA	UPG	Votes Obtenus	(SVE) - Votes Obtenus
MOYENNE GUINEE															
<i>Dalaba</i>	57,159	46,070	80.5997%	1,643	44,427	6,778	3,290	20,923	9,325	2,007	926	758	420	44,427	0
<i>Gaoual</i>	57,347	36,455	63.5691%	395	36,060	18,124	1,689	2,091	12,502	767	323	398	166	36,060	0
<i>Koubia</i>	40,480	32,381	79.9926%	1,465	30,916	7,103	1,196	916	20,424	491	268	403	115	30,916	0
<i>Koundara</i>	39,883	25,238	63.2801%	1,292	23,946	13,499	1,728	1,603	6,273	436	145	190	72	23,946	0
<i>Labé</i>	112,647	90,310	80.1708%	2,021	88,289	11,536	2,579	2,693	68,454	1,087	574	961	386	88,270	19
<i>Léouma</i>	55,379	44,372	80.1242%	1,641	42,731	8,256	1,199	1,656	28,758	1,656	418	724	205	42,872	(141)
<i>Mali</i>	86,543	64,498	74.5271%	2,314	62,184	23,484	2,182	2,535	31,215	1,125	541	725	241	62,048	136
<i>Mamou</i>	92,931	64,824	69.7550%	2,397	62,427	18,162	6,982	27,949	4,487	2,374	1,130	857	486	62,427	0
<i>Pita</i>	93,673	86,821	92.6852%	427	86,394	5,023	1,987	73,570	2,522	1,106	614	414	244	85,480	914
<i>Tougué</i>	49,546	37,737	76.1656%	858	36,879	12,449	1,275	4,203	17,659	748	371	464	210	37,379	(500)
<i>Sous-total</i>	685,588	528,706	77.1172%	14,453	514,253	124,414	24,107	138,139	201,619	11,797	5,310	5,894	2,545	513,825	428
<i>Pourcentage</i>			77.1172%	2.7337%		24.1932%	4.6878%	26.8621%	39.2062%	2.2940%	1.0326%	1.1461%	0.4949%	99.9168%	0.0832%
HAUTE GUINEE															
<i>Dabola</i>	41,981	33,724	80.3316%	1,051	32,673	15,329	12,739	2,475	559	974	332	259	286	32,953	(280)
<i>Faranah</i>	75,284	58,162	77.2568%	1,824	56,338	18,791	30,068	2,845	1,976	1,140	292	945	281	56,338	0
<i>Kankan</i>	(3) 124,439	0	0.0000%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<i>Kérouané</i>	71,440	56,435	78.9964%	794	55,641	6,217	43,551	3,259	1,543	510	285	154	142	55,661	(20)
<i>Dinguiraye</i>	51,168	38,378	75.0039%	1,387	36,991	14,112	6,448	14,190	562	823	352	301	203	36,991	0
<i>Kouroussa</i>	65,331	59,745	91.4497%	388	59,357	1,776	56,645	202	257	244	57	78	98	59,357	0
<i>Mandiana</i>	67,915	57,862	85.1977%	974	56,888	2,776	52,163	364	242	674	398	78	173	56,868	20
<i>Siguiri</i>	(4) 112,885	1,160	1.0276%	0	1,160 **	1,160	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,160	0
<i>Sous-total</i>	610,443	305,466	50.0401%	6,418	299,048	60,161	201,614	23,335	5,139	4,365	1,716	1,815	1,183	299,328	(280)
<i>Pourcentage</i>			50.0401%	2.1011%		20.1175%	67.4186%	7.8031%	1.7185%	1.4590%	0.5738%	0.6069%	0.3958%	100.0938%	-0.0938%

Palais de Peuple, Commission Nationale de Recensement des Votes **TABLEAU REGIONAL** *Supreme Court Special with Changes Indicated by the Opposition Parties*

PLUS: ADJUSTMENTS FOR OPPOSITION FIGURES TO TOTAL VOTES CAST

Communes et Préfectures	Electeurs Inscrits	Volants	Taux	Nulls (1)	SVE	PUP	RPG	UNR	PRP	UNPG	Dyama	PDG-RDA	UPG	Votes Obtenus	(SVE) - Votes Obtenus	
GUINEE FORESTIERE																
<i>N'Zérékoré</i>	126,499	94,938	75.0504%	2,156	92,782 **	71,613	14,194	1,659	967	626	213	195	3,315	92,782	0	
<i>Youmou</i>	39,023	29,986	76.8419%	1,096	28,890	23,711	2,172	313	223	249	80	70	2,031	28,849	41	
<i>Lola</i>	56,371	40,751	72.2907%	247	40,504	29,642	5,587	527	315	300	305	156	3,672	40,504	0	
<i>Macenta</i>	94,333	65,677	69.6225%	1,447	64,230	49,930	10,195	1,529	1,054	699	227	211	385	64,230	0	
<i>Guéckédou</i>	110,739	74,915	67.6501%	0	74,915 **	67,122	5,328	723	939	367	102	134	200	74,915	0	
<i>Kissidougou</i>	74,396	94,493	127.0135%	0	76,646	29,705	32,646	2,694	4,138	1,359	347	301	456	71,646	5,000	
<i>Beyla</i>	77,528	41,221	53.1692%	0	41,221	16,627	20,252	1,133	857	1,310	454	294	294	41,221	0	
<i>Sous-total</i>	578,889	441,981	76.3499%	4,946	419,188	288,350	90,374	8,578	8,493	4,910	1,728	1,361	10,353	414,147	5,041	
<i>Pourcentage</i>			76.3499%	1.1191%		68.7878%	21.5593%	2.0463%	2.0261%	1.1713%	0.4122%	0.3247%	2.4698%	98.7974%	1.2026%	
EXTERIEUR	(5)	276,544	22,478	8.1282%	0	22,478	9,040	3,670	6,243	2,748	405	133	97	142	22,478	0
<i>Sous-total</i>		276,544	22,478	8.1282%	0	22,478	9,040	3,670	6,243	2,748	405	133	97	142	22,478	0
<i>Pourcentage</i>			8.1282%	0.0000%		40.2171%	16.3271%	27.7738%	12.2253%	1.8018%	0.5917%	0.4315%	0.6317%	100.0000%	0.0000%	
Récapitulatif:																
<i>Ville de Conakry</i>	389,073	195,576	50.2672%	1,757	193,819	138,390	21,986	13,080	6,709	3,844	2,491	2,785	4,454	193,739	80	
<i>Guinée Maritime</i>	578,711	537,169	92.8216%	5,098	532,071	400,967	13,911	78,971	22,802	5,247	1,976	1,419	2,057	527,350	4,721	
<i>Moyenne Guinée</i>	685,588	528,706	77.1172%	14,453	514,253	124,414	24,107	138,139	201,619	11,797	5,310	5,894	2,545	513,825	428	
<i>Haute Guinée</i>	610,443	305,466	50.0401%	6,418	299,048	60,161	201,614	23,335	5,139	4,365	1,716	1,815	1,183	299,328	(280)	
<i>Guinée Forestiere</i>	578,889	441,981	76.3499%	4,946	419,188	288,350	90,374	8,578	8,493	4,910	1,728	1,361	10,353	414,147	5,041	
<i>Exterieur</i>	276,544	22,478	8.1282%	0	22,478	9,040	3,670	6,243	2,748	405	133	97	142	22,478	0	
TOTAUX	3,119,248	2,031,376	65.1239%	32,672	1,980,857	1,021,322	355,662	268,346	247,510	30,568	13,354	13,371	20,734	1,970,867	9,990	
Pourcentage			65.1239%	1.6084%		51.5596%	17.9550%	13.5470%	12.4951%	1.5432%	0.6742%	0.6750%	1.0467%	99.4957%	100.0000%	

NOTES

- (1) Soft numbers. Many of these totals were extrapolated -- few were actually reported at the national level.
- (2) No results as of 19h00' on the 22nd of December. (Results updated as a result of telephone conv. w/DOS on 3 Jan).
- (3) Results in Kankan were annulled by the Supreme Court on 4 January 1994. Entire préfecture set at zero for accounting purposes.
- (4) These results were provisionally annulled by Minister Gomez (Refer to Article L151 in the Electoral Law). Annulment upheld by Supreme Court on 4 January 1994.
- (5) These figures are partial totals. However, the figures quoted by the Minister on the morning of December 23 showed a remarkable increase. Final figures based on Gomez announcement on 23 December 1993 and Minister of External Affairs Sylla's post-election interview with foreign press.

APPENDIX E

Final Election Results as Reported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Referring to either spreadsheet number three or four, note the total registered voters by district or borough. These numbers correspond with the totals on spreadsheets numbers one and two, plus they are grouped by region. The figures were taken from the MIS documentation indicating the number of registered voters and the number of polling stations planned for each district or borough. These were the figures on which the distribution of polling station materials and election documents were based.

It is interesting to note the difference between the calculated total of registered voters (3,119,248) and the total from the diplomatic note (2,850,394). Also of note is the comparison for the Conakry Region: 480,597 in the diplomatic note versus 389,073 registered voters in the information from the MIS logistics sub-committee. The total number of registered voters abroad was never completely clear. The pre-election total of registered voters reported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 276,544. The diplomatic note reports a laughable 57,490 Guineans registered to vote abroad. Approximately 160 polling stations were planned for Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire alone--to serve over 150,000 voters between those two countries.

The participation rate calculated from the figures provided is 73.07%, several percentage points off of the proclaimed participation rate of 78.46%.

Final Election Results as Reported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs via Diplomatic Note

	Conakry	Districts	Abroad	TOTAL	
Registered	480,597	2,312,307	57,490	2,850,394	
Voted	196,626	2,019,686	20,114	2,236,426	
Null	2,052	151,450	84	153,586	
Valid	194,574	1,868,236	20,030	2,082,840	
Participation Rate	40.49%	80.80%	34.84%	73.07%	
<i>Rate as Reported by MFA</i>	40.91%	87.34%	34.97%	78.46%	
Breakdown by Candidate					% Rate
PUP	138,528	929,505	8,984	1,077,017	51.71%
RPG	22,745	381,643	2,833	407,221	19.55%
UNR	20,950	252,018	5,670	278,638	13.38%
PRP	5,747	238,574	1,779	247,100	11.86%
UNPG	1,998	26,867	401	29,266	1.41%
Dyama	647	12,117	126	12,890	0.62%
PDG-RDA	903	10,697	96	11,696	0.56%
UPG	3,060	15,808	141	19,007	0.91%
TOTAL	194,578	1,868,227	20,030	2,082,835	100.00%