


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**EL SALVADOR
ELECTION OBSERVATION
REPORT**

March 20, 1994 Convergence Elections

April 24, 1994 Presidential Runoff Election

Issue Date: July 25, 1994

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Executive Summary

The International Republican Institute (IRI) conducted an extensive observation project of the Salvadoran elections of March 20, 1994 and April 24, 1994. Under the auspices of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), IRI sponsored four pre-electoral assessment missions to El Salvador during the months of January, February, and March in order to meet with all contending political groups and examine the pre-election environment. The project culminated in the fielding of a 20-member international observation delegation to the March 20 elections and a five-member team to observe the April 24 runoff election.

IRI delegations met with a wide range of people, political parties, and organizations involved in the electoral process of El Salvador, including the Human Rights and Electoral Divisions of the United Nations Mission to El Salvador (ONUSAL), the Centro de Asesoría y Promoción Electoral (CAPEL), the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), the Archbishop of San Salvador, the National Government Prosecutor for Human Rights, the American Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM), the Asociación Nacional de Empresa Privada (ANEP), Southwest Voter Research Institute (SVRI), the Centro de Estudios Democráticos (CEDEM), the National Union of Peasants and Workers (UNOC), the National Federation of Unions of Salvadoran Workers (FENASTRAS), the National Confederation of Agricultural Cooperatives (COFENACOA), the Center for Broadcast Training for Salvadoran Women (CORAMS), the Foreign Ministry of the Government of El Salvador (GOES), and officials of the U.S. Embassy and USAID. Members of T.V., radio, and print media in El Salvador were also interviewed during the assessments.

Meetings also were held with party leaders and presidential candidates from Alianza Republicana Nacional (ARENA), the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC), the Partido de Conciliación Nacional (PCN), the Movimiento Auténtico Cristiano (MAC), the National Unity Movement (MUN), the Movimiento Solidaridad Nacional (MSN), the Convergencia Democrática (CD), the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN), and the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR).¹

Following the assessment missions, a larger monitoring team was assembled to observe election day activities. The IRI delegation to the March 20 elections was comprised of a number of election and political experts from throughout the American continent. They included Congressmen from Argentina, Bolivia, and Haiti, and state legislators from the United States; executive directors of public policy institutions from Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru; and professional staff members from the House Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. Congress. The IRI delegation for the second round of voting in the presidential election on April 24 was composed of national deputies from Mexico and Guatemala and IRI staff. All delegates were drawn from IRI's extensive network in the hemisphere.

¹ For a complete list of meetings, see Appendices 1-4.

This report provides a general background of Salvadoran history and politics, ending with the signing of the Chapultepec Accords in 1992. It includes an overall assessment of the pre-electoral climate and discusses key players and issues involved in the 1994 electoral process. Final results are provided and a series of recommendations also are offered.

Preface

Viewed by many observers as the culmination of the 1992 Peace Accords, the Salvadoran elections of 1994 also held the distinction of being "convergence" elections. Occurring only every 15 years, the electorate cast ballots for the presidency (five-year term), all 84 legislative assembly seats (three-year terms), all 262 mayors and municipal councils (three-year terms), and all 20 Central American Parliament seats (five-year terms).

Throughout the electoral process, observers voiced concerns that such a massive electoral contest held so close to the official signing of the Accords could destabilize the delicate peace recently achieved. However, throughout the entire electoral process, IRI delegations found most sectors genuinely working toward building an inclusive political process. Despite several events that could have derailed the process, including the discovery of FMLN arms caches, a wave of assassinations during the last part of 1993, and a number of disagreements over electoral procedures, Salvadorans asserted themselves in a strident manner in order to defend the peace achieved. Indeed, they consistently sent a strong message to Salvadoran political leaders that the time for peace and national reconciliation had come.

The Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) was the most heavily criticized organization and seemed to be the biggest loser in the 1994 elections. Although many suggestions concerning electoral administration were made in previous years, the TSE found itself consistently facing one delay or crisis after another. However, many observers noted that the TSE also became a scapegoat for various groups seeking to gain political capital without criticizing specific individuals or political parties. In addition, the magistrates of the TSE were appointed by several political parties, and the capacity to separate technical and political issues was difficult, which slowed progress. As problems arose and deadlines passed, the tasks of the TSE multiplied, and although TSE staff worked at a frenzied pace, the organization constantly played a game of "catch-up" in all aspects of electoral administration.

Most of the technical problems of the March 20 elections were related to the issuance of voting cards, the national registry, the opening and closing of voting sites, the cumbersome voting process, and the training of poll workers. However, it is a true testament to the peace process that the main problems encountered during both the election and the runoff were related to technical and logistical issues. The violent confrontations that characterized Salvadoran elections of the past were absent from the 1994 elections. All political parties should be commended for conducting modern campaigns, free from much of the polarization of the past. In addition, this electoral cycle strengthened a number of civic associations that became constructive factors in the voter registration process. The continuing efforts of these organizations are crucial to the development of a civic culture in the country.

Throughout the process, the efforts of the United Nations, the Centro de Asesoría y Promoción Electoral, the United States Agency for International Development, and Salvadoran political parties were integral, and all worked together admirably to solve difficult issues as they arose. IRI delegates also were heartened to observe poll workers and party watchers working together amicably at the municipal level to ensure the proper administration of electoral issues.

All participants should be commended for the reform efforts instituted during the month between the first and second round of voting. During the second round of voting, poll workers were better organized, the number of voting sites was increased, some voting sites had TSE orientation centers, and most voters who experienced problems were able to give their information to the TSE to facilitate a future restructuring of the electoral process.

Although many of the technical and logistical problems encountered in March and April were related to their sheer mass (four concurrent elections) and special post-war nature, within the context of Salvadoran history and compared to previous elections, a record number of citizens were able to exercise their right to vote.

El Salvador has achieved much in strengthening its governing institutions, but all sectors must continue to work together to define the crucial issues that face the nation as a new century approaches. Full implementation of the 1992 Peace Accords, reform of the judiciary, full deployment of the national civilian police, and completing the land transfer program are but a few of the next challenges on the horizon.

Endemic problems such as reconciling sharp ideological differences, poverty, illiteracy, and crime still remain as large obstacles to the nation's development and will require bold policies to address the challenges presented by them. As several Salvadorans told IRI delegations, "Elections are but a note in the symphony called democracy," and the future challenges of democracy will require Salvadoran society to finish composing its own melody, as it strives to expand economic and social opportunities for its people.

Historical Background

Located on the Central American isthmus, the Republic of El Salvador is approximately the size of the state of Massachusetts, occupying 8,260 square miles (21,476 sq. km.). The population is estimated at five million, with an annual growth rate of 3 percent. The nation is divided administratively into 14 Departments, and the largest cities are the capital, San Salvador, Santa Ana, and San Miguel. The country is divided into several distinct regions by mountains: the southern coast, the central valleys and plateaus, and the northern mountainous region. Per capita income in El Salvador is \$1,160 (1993), and literacy rates are estimated at between 50 and 65 percent. While 58 percent of El Salvador's population lives in rural areas, most of the work force is divided mainly between the agricultural, services, and industrial sectors.²

Although the nation's main language is Spanish, a majority of El Salvador's population is of Spanish and Indian extraction, with indigenous groups representing approximately 10 percent of the population. Before the Spanish conquest, modern-day El Salvador was made up of two large Indian states and several principalities, populated by the Pipils, a tribe of nomadic Nahua people long-established in Mexico. In 1525, the area was brought under the control of the Captaincy General of Guatemala, who exercised Spanish authority until 1821.

In 1821, El Salvador and the other Central American provinces declared their independence from Spain. Although the provinces initially were joined with Mexico in early 1822, following the Mexican revolution of 1823, the provinces were allowed to decide their own fate. That same year, the ill-fated United Provinces of Central America was formed under former independence general Manuel José Arce. The federation dissolved by 1838, and El Salvador became an independent state.

Frequent revolutions marked El Salvador's early history as a state; however, relative stability was achieved in the 1900-1930 period. With the economy primarily based on coffee cultivation, a small economic elite developed and effectively administered the nation's affairs in conjunction with the military. However, the country's stability was highly dependent on the world price of coffee.

From Gen. Maximiliano Hernandez's coup in 1932, and the brutal repression of rural resistance that followed (known as "La Matanza"), until 1980, most presidents were army officers. During the period from 1960 to 1972, the alliance forged between the military and elites ruled the nation's affairs through the National Reconciliation Party (PCN), instituting some limited reforms under the concept of "controlled revolution" and allowing some peaceful opposition groups to develop, primarily the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). Indeed, the PDC would make impressive gains in the legislative and municipal elections of 1964 and 1966, with Jose Napoleon Duarte becoming mayor of San Salvador.

² United States Department of State, Background Notes, February 1993

In the 1970s, the political, social, and economic situation in El Salvador worsened. Although the brief war against neighboring Honduras in 1969 temporarily strengthened the PCN, declining coffee prices, the failure of the Central American Common Market, and growing political polarization all contributed to destabilizing the status quo. The presidential elections of 1972 marked a turning point as several democratic opposition parties united behind the candidacy of José Napoleon Duarte of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). The military nominated Colonel Arturo Molina from its own electoral organization, the Party of National Reconciliation (PCN). Amidst claims of widespread fraud, the military-backed candidacy of Molina defeated Duarte, touching off mass protests, an abortive coup, and Duarte's arrest and eventual exile. This event served to move a significant number of those opposed to military rule toward armed insurrection as the only method for change.

Until 1970, the Communist Party of El Salvador was the main channel for radical leftist opposition. However, the debate that raged throughout most of Latin America, between the old Moscow-oriented communist guard and young university-educated radicals, would soon reach Salvadoran shores. Older radicals generally advocated working within the political order until the conditions for socialism could be built. They followed Moscow's line, which sought to avoid direct confrontation with the United States in its own sphere of influence. However, younger radicals demonstrated little patience for this approach, instead finding encouragement in the victory of the Cuban Revolution, which advocated armed struggle.

In El Salvador, the first confrontation within the left ironically arose in 1970 with the defection of the Communist Party's 50 year-old Secretary General, Salvador Cayetano Carpio, who advocated armed struggle. He was replaced by 39 year-old Jorge Shafik Handal, who would remain as the party's Secretary General. Cayetano would go on to form the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL). A year later, another guerrilla group, known as the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) was formed by young university activists and others from the communist party. By 1975, an internal dispute within the group ended with the assassination of the Salvadoran poet, Roque Dalton, and the rise of Joaquín Villalobos. The controversial affair resulted in a split within the ERP, with defectors forming the Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN). Ernesto Jovel, who later became leader of the FARN, accused Villalobos of personally killing Dalton. Jovel died in 1980 when his plane crashed on route to Panama, seeking to secure arms for the FARN.

Violent leftist groups capitalized upon the instability of the 1970s, mainly financing their activities through a series of kidnappings for ransom. Working through popular organizations, the groups also specialized in occupying churches, factories, and government buildings. Military regimes during this era responded to the unrest by expanding repressive tactics. By 1979, guerrilla warfare and paramilitary violence had enveloped both urban and rural areas. In April 1979, the Salvadoran Communist Party decided to join the armed struggle, reportedly with the approval of the Soviet Union.

On October 15, 1979, reform-minded military officers joined with moderate civilian leaders in a peaceful coup, ousting the regime of General Carlos Humberto Romero, with the

goal of establishing a centrist government. By March 1980, Christian Democratic Party leader José Napoleon Duarte joined the junta and led the government until the elections of 1982. The junta initiated a controversial reform package that included agrarian reform and nationalization of both the banking system and the marketing of coffee and sugar.

The four guerrilla factions fighting in El Salvador were united under the Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation (FMLN) at a 1980 meeting in Havana, under the auspices of Fidel Castro. By the end of 1980, a fifth group joined the FMLN, the Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (PRTC). After the triumph of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the FMLN began to count on large amounts of arms and munitions. In January 1981, the FMLN was able to execute a nationwide offensive. Although the offensive managed to control much of the countryside, it did not set off the expected popular uprising and the army regained control of most of the country. Nonetheless, large areas in the countryside remained under the control of the FMLN and by the early 1980s, Joaquín Villalobos was recognized internationally as the FMLN's top military strategist.

Political Overview

On March 28, 1982, Salvadorans elected 60 deputies to a constituent assembly. Following that election, deputies elected Alvaro Magaña as provisional president. The 1983 constituent assembly's constitution enacted a number of reforms including the strengthening of the legislature, the judiciary, and an expansion of individual rights. Guerrilla groups, however, now united under the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) with Joaquin Villalobos as their leader, did not recognize the junta's reforms as anything beyond superficial concessions.

The constituent assembly scheduled presidential elections for March 1984, and legislative and municipal elections for March 1985. In the presidential elections of 1984, José Napoleon Duarte from the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) defeated Major Roberto D'Aubuisson of the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), capturing more than 54 percent of the vote. In doing so, he became the first democratically-elected president in the past 50 years of the nation's history.

Legislative and municipal elections followed in 1985 and 1988, with Duarte's PDC continuing as the country's ruling party and the ARENA party developing into a well-organized opposition party. Although human rights abuses were reduced, and Duarte entered into negotiations with the FMLN in October 1984, his administration was affected adversely by its economic mismanagement and charges of corruption. Peace talks were later suspended with the FMLN, and urban terrorism increased.

In March 1989, the ARENA party captured the presidency with the candidacy of Alfredo Cristiani, winning with 54 percent of the vote. At his inauguration in June 1989, President Cristiani called for a revival of the beleaguered economy using market mechanisms. He also called for direct dialogue between the government and the guerrillas. An unmediated dialogue

between the two groups began in September, but was broken with the November 1989 national offensive by the FMLN.

The offensive in the capital city brought the war home to many who had previously stalled negotiations hoping to eliminate the guerrillas in the countryside. Moreover, once the United States and the Soviet Union voiced interest in a negotiated settlement, the peace talks resumed. By January 1990, President Cristiani announced his intent to continue negotiations with the FMLN. In April 1990, the United Nations joined the process in an official capacity. Talks progressed rapidly, with agreements on a timetable signed in Caracas, Venezuela in June, and a human rights accord signed in San José, Costa Rica in July. However, talks stalled once again over key issues relating to disarmament and the status of the FMLN. In addition, the upcoming legislative and municipal elections of March 1991 also served to divert attention from the negotiations.

In 1990, the electoral system was reformed, expanding the National Assembly from 60 to 84 deputies with the goal of expanding representation for smaller parties. In the legislative and municipal elections of 1991, six parties including the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), the National Reconciliation Party (PCN), the Democratic Convergence (CD), the Authentic Christian Movement (MAC), and the Nationalist Democratic Union (UDN), ran candidates for the 84 legislative seats and 262 mayoralties. ARENA was just short of a majority in the legislature with 39 deputies, and won 177 municipalities. The PDC received 26 deputies and 69 municipalities. The PCN received nine deputies, and the CD took eight deputies. MAC and the UDN both received one deputy in the legislature.

In September 1991, representatives of the government of El Salvador and the FMLN accepted an invitation by the U.N. Secretary General to meet in New York and discuss negotiations over the end of the civil war. On September 25, both sides signed the New York Accord, which created the Committee for the Consolidation of the Peace (COPAZ). Made up of representatives from the government, the FMLN, political parties, the Catholic Church, and observers from the United Nations, the committee sought the necessary conditions and guarantees for the reintegration of FMLN members into national life, before a cease fire could be declared.

With the direct participation of President Cristiani and U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, the government and the FMLN reached an agreement on December 31, 1991. The final agreement, termed the Accords of Chapultepec, was signed in Mexico City on January 16, 1992. The cease-fire took effect on February 1, and was to last nine months without a single violation before the war would be declared officially over.

Concurrent with the dismantling of its military structure, the FMLN was legalized as a political party. The Accords of Chapultepec also included a two-year timetable for implementing various aspects of the troop reduction accords. Demobilization of government military forces have generally proceeded on schedule throughout the entire process.

All of the immediate reaction battalions were scheduled to demobilize by February 1993. The Treasury Police and National Guard were abolished, and the intelligence services were transferred to civilian control. The military lowered force levels from a wartime high of 63,000 to 32,000, as required by the Peace Accords, nine months ahead of schedule in February 1993.

Although President Cristiani moved in January 1993 to initiate the purge of military officers accused of human rights abuses, the completion of the process has been delayed. Training of the new civilian police force began several months late, but the establishment of the force has continued otherwise on schedule despite funding problems. Land transfers to excombatants have proven the most contentious issue between the FMLN and the government. A U.N.-brokered agreement established a three-phase program to transfer land, and despite some delays, the program is into its second phase.

The signing of the Accords of Chapultepec moved U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar to declare that "the long night of El Salvador is drawing to an end." However, most observers added that the convergence elections of 1994 would truly represent the last chapter in the Salvadoran civil war, while also representing the first test on the road toward national reconciliation.

The Pre-election Environment

The electoral environment in El Salvador remained surprisingly tranquil during the months preceding the March 20 elections, with little campaign propaganda seen in the streets of the capital until late February. Although there were incidences of alleged politically motivated assassinations in October 1993, the electoral campaign remained relatively peaceful compared to past campaigns that featured terrorist assaults and bloody insurgent and counterinsurgency operations. Most agreed that the campaign had evolved rather uneventfully, due to the recent peace negotiation. Few parties were able to define concrete issues to galvanize the public, and most people interviewed commented that the main topics currently governing public discussion were related to issues of common crime, rising prices, and jobs.

Irregularities in the voter registration process were often criticized, with several groups indicating they suspected government manipulation of the process. However, the bulk of the criticism came from partisan sectors, and although they criticized the handling of specific issues, most seemed to agree that the electoral process was moving forward, and that all sides seemed to be genuinely working to ensure that the elections were not only free and fair, but also as inclusive as possible.

Roberto Villanova, president of the Asociacion Nacional de Empresa Privada (ANEP), commenting on the tranquility of the electoral environment, offered the IRI delegation an interesting insight, noting "We're somewhat concerned about the possible polarization of the election because all power is up for grabs; however, a new consensus exists about the path that the country needs to take, including the FMLN. Whoever wins, they cannot change the path of the country much." Villanova noted that ANEP had adjusted to the new climate in the

country by changing its mission statement in 1989 from "defending" the free market to "promoting" it.³

Although issues in the Salvadoran electoral process have involved a number of sectors of society, several key players influenced the process substantially. Since the electoral cycle began to gain momentum in July 1993, most issues have centered around the actions of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the United Nations, the U.S. Embassy and AID, the Centro de Asesoría y Promoción Electoral, a number of political parties, non-governmental organizations working with Southwest Voter Research Institute, the Catholic Church, national universities, and the media. Moreover, although this electoral cycle experienced some problems, it produced the most inclusive process in Salvadoran history and reinvigorated a number of social organizations. This could prove vital for the continuation of a culture of democratic civic values, not only among political elites, but throughout society as a whole.

KEY PLAYERS IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

The Supreme Electoral Tribunal

The 1992 Peace Accords replaced the existing Central Elections Council (CCE) with the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, known by its Spanish acronym as the TSE. During the 1994 elections, the TSE was administered by five Magistrates named from the four political parties with the most representation in the Legislative Assembly. The TSE was presided over by a President named by the Supreme Court, which was dominated by ARENA-appointed justices. The Magistrates during the 1994 elections were: Luis Arturo Zaldivar, President; Jaime Francisco Romero Ventura, ARENA; Jose Rutilio Aguilera, PCN; Eduardo Colindres, PDC; and Pedro Solarzano, CD. All 1,253 staff positions of the TSE were also filled by party quotas based on election votes.

The new electoral code also established a permanent Oversight Committee (Junta de Vigilancia) composed of representatives from all the political parties. This was the only representation available to new or smaller parties involved in the process, which were not represented at the Magistrate level. Committee members were sworn in on May 26, 1993. However, since the Junta de Vigilancia began its work, the committee was seriously affected by funding problems, and relations with the TSE deteriorated throughout the electoral period due to questions concerning funding and jurisdiction over the electoral process.

The TSE was affected adversely since its creation because of its partisan composition. Many people commented to the delegation that the partisanship of the TSE unnecessarily

³ Based on interview with Roberto Villanova, president of the National Association of Private Enterprise, Jan. 21, 1994.

politicized a process that depended primarily on resolution of logistical and technical issues. However, others noted that, due to the special post-war nature of these elections, it was necessary to ensure full partisan participation in the administration of the voting process. Moreover, some observers note that the party system would be adversely affected by constantly depending on non-partisan personnel for sensitive areas, such as electoral administration.

Nonetheless, the partisan nature of the TSE slowed progress in critical areas that required extreme competency in electoral issues and substantial speed in action. In many instances, the capacity to separate technical problems from political issues was lacking. According to Dr. Luis Arturo Zaldivar, president of the TSE, various decisions were slowed due to the positioning of political parties on the TSE. Zaldivar noted that ". . . it is a difficult challenge to be both a magistrate of the TSE and a representative of a political party."⁴ Although he pointed out that the Tribunal functioned adequately during this electoral cycle and that the need for partisan representation stemmed from the post-war nature of the election, Zaldivar added that the future composition of the TSE should not be based on partisan quotas, but instead should be elected by the National Assembly.

The TSE also was affected adversely by the partisan quotas utilized for filling staff positions. Most TSE workers were often at odds with their superiors at the TSE and the political parties. In addition, the staff of the TSE had no institutional memory. Although El Salvador has conducted elections since 1982, and had built on that progress in numerous ways, the evolving electoral system has not generated a stable staff for its institutions.

Various observers pointed out that the most serious factor contributing to the problems in the TSE's administration of the voter registration process was the delay in implementation, which was compounded throughout the months preceding the election. In essence, the TSE experienced delays in registering voters and distributing voting cards, then reacted by extending deadlines, attempting to fill serious gaps. When the TSE should have been concentrating on election day organizational issues, it was still caught in the mire generated by delays in voter registration. Thus, when election day approached, the TSE was ill prepared for administrating the myriad of challenges presented by an electoral process with four separate elections being held simultaneously.

Nonetheless, the TSE was able to improve considerably its administration of the second round of voting on April 24. The Tribunal established orientation centers at many voting sites to assist voters, and increased the number of voting centers, especially in the capital, where the most congestion occurred on March 20. It also placed ads in the major daily newspapers indicating the location of voting sites and tables by surnames. In addition, the National Assembly passed last-minute legislation allowing the TSE to issue voting cards that had not been issued in the first round of voting. Approximately 30,000 voting carnets were issued during the

⁴ Based on interview with Dr. Luis Arturo Zaldivar Romero, president of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, February 18, 1994.

interim. However, some groups of observers noted on election day, April 24, that a number of those who could not vote possessed voting carnets that had been issued in this process. Thus, it is possible that those carnets were not included in the national registry in time for the election. All of these factors, plus the fact that the second round of elections featured only one race, made the administration of that election day much more effective. Although the turnout of voters was higher than expected (approximately 1.2 million), the reforms enacted and the experience gained by poll workers in the first round of voting contributed to a less congested and confused process. Although it took the TSE more than a week to issue final results for the first round of voting, initial results for the second round were available on election night.

The United Nations

The role of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador, also known by its Spanish acronym as ONUSAL, began in July 1991, when it began to monitor human rights as outlined in the San Jose Accords. When the Peace Accords were finalized in January 1992, ONUSAL's role was expanded to verify their implementation. In July 1993, the Electoral Division was established.

The efforts of ONUSAL in the registration and verification process have been exemplary, and all political sectors applauded the division's efforts. The division had 36 experts in the field and borrowed 150 personnel from the military and national police to assist in verification and logistics. ONUSAL met once a week with different groups (which included USAID, all political parties, Supreme Electoral Tribunal, CAPEL, and International Observers) to coordinate efforts and identify trouble spots in an effective manner.

An ONUSAL survey in July 1993 identified 786,000 citizens who were without voting cards (both the FMLN and ARENA agreed on this figure). This figure represented approximately 29 percent of the 2.7 million eligible voters in El Salvador. The survey also pointed out that a majority of non-registered citizens resided in San Salvador and the most populated departments, instead of in the countryside or the former conflictive zones, as had been believed previously.

Initially, the option of allowing people to vote with a receipt of registration, known as a Solicitud de Inscripcion al Registro Electoral (SIRE) was discussed (an approach implemented in the 1991 legislative and municipal elections). However, various groups argued that if this option was made available, a large percentage of voters would not bother to pick up voting carnets. Thus, ONUSAL took the position that it was necessary to register and deliver carnets to all those identified in the July survey in order to bolster the electoral system's legitimacy. ONUSAL decided in July 1993 to launch a massive program issuing voting cards to all registered voters. Throughout this process, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) collected 780,000 applications, of which, 469,098 were new, 229,800 were replacements, and 85,560

were modified.⁵ By late January, the number of those not registered due to missing birth certificates had been reduced to 130,000, and ONUSAL predicted that another 65,000 would be processed shortly. In addition, ONUSAL doubted that there were 130,000 people to match the missing birth certificates. Although official sources claimed the number of those requests without voting cards could be reduced to 30,000 by election day, as of early March there were still more than 70,000 voters without their carnets. This number was a marked improvement over the more than 700,000 identified in July, but some problems remained with these voters outside the process. Although 70,000 was not large enough to impact on national races, it could have had serious consequences for local races. Particularly throughout the former conflictive zones, neither the Salvadoran government nor the FMLN leadership wanted to see a scenario where large numbers of voters were turned away from the polls. Nonetheless, Francesco Manca, chief of logistics and planning for ONUSAL's electoral division, commented that according to the division's own polls, only 25,000 people were not able to vote due to problems with voting cards or the national registry.⁶ Although the irregularities did not affect the outcome of the presidential and legislative elections, several observers noted that the irregularities may have affected the outcome in a handful of municipalities.

The Supreme Electoral Tribunal closed registration on Friday, January 21, 1994. Processing applications was expected to last only a few days, then a massive media campaign was launched to encourage the citizenry to pick up carnets. A large part of the outreach effort involved "Mega Jornadas" (large public registration days), during which voting cards were issued in large numbers on the weekends throughout the departments. During several visits by IRI delegations, some local TSE sites were full of voters waiting to receive carnets, while others were relatively empty, (For an indication of voting cards issued, see chart on page 16).

Although most sectors applauded the efforts of ONUSAL, some did voice concerns that the organization had given up its role as a neutral point of verification once it became engaged in implementation. Once involved in the process, some observers argued that ONUSAL had a stake in the successful outcome of the election and would thus protect the process, no matter what violations occurred. However, due to the post-war nature of the election, ONUSAL found it necessary to become involved throughout the process in order to keep it moving forward. Some observers comment that although ONUSAL was able to salvage the process in some difficult moments, they fear that once ONUSAL's presence is no longer in the country, the consensus found among parties throughout the electoral campaign could disappear. ONUSAL's presence therefore has been extended to December 30, 1994.



⁵ Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador, October 20, 1993, p. 5

⁶ Based on interview with Francesco Manca, Chief of Logistics and Planning, ONUSAL Electoral Division, during a discussion of the administration in the first round of voting, April, 23, 1994.

Y 9 DIAS DE FEBRERO DE 1994

DEPARTAMENTO	JULIO	AGOSTO	SEPT.	OCT.	NOV.	DIC.	ENERO	FEBRERO	TOTAL	x
SAN SALVADOR	5848	8171	14978	25687	24838	23381	45825	12657	168489	31.89x
SANTA ANA	771	2687	4315	6499	8673	8192	13844	5263	58244	9.73x
SAN NIGUEL	676	886	1673	3129	5878	5353	8268	3485	29167	5.65x
LA LIBERTAD	1334	3373	4474	6935	9877	9698	28872	4642	68397	11.78x
USulután	615	1173	2451	3538	7381	6854	9252	4219	34683	8.72x
SONSONATE	613	1784	2668	4597	6978	5951	9584	6489	38488	7.44x
LA UNIÓN	146	333	497	916	1765	2875	3979	2342	12853	2.33x
LA PAZ	529	1182	1878	4831	5868	4281	7931	4265	29884	5.63x
CHALATENANGO	346	639	954	2385	4546	2667	5688	1466	18582	3.58x
CUSCATLÁN	377	736	1224	2885	4788	2758	6352	1738	28834	3.88x
AHUACHAPÁN	333	884	1882	2368	3314	4219	4547	2647	19386	3.74x
MORAZÁN	172	349	925	1417	2747	2848	3738	1747	13942	2.78x
SAN VICENTE	183	392	775	1752	1955	2194	4357	3389	14997	2.91x
CABAÑAS	169	419	1226	1281	3279	2162	3342	3857	14935	2.89x

TOTAL	12811	22668	39184	66532	98268	81737	146691	57238	516241	188.88x
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The United States

The U.S. Embassy and Ambassador Alan Flanigan hosted several private luncheons with all presidential candidates during the final few months of the campaign and found great consensus between the candidates on electoral issues. The Ambassador continued to meet with all parties, sending the message that U.S. policy was not supporting any one candidate but instead steadfastly supporting the democratic electoral process as an integral part of the peace process.

In response to the recent U.S. State Department de-classification of documents related to El Salvador, there were various interpretations and reactions. As part of an overall effort to declassify U.S. State Department documents, many related to El Salvador from the State Department, Defense Department, and Central Intelligence Agency were made public during the latter part of 1993. Several documents purportedly linked current members of the Salvadoran government and members of the ARENA party to death squad activity during the 1980s.⁷ Throughout the pre-election period, most organizations believed that the de-classification indicated that the United States was firmly supporting the peace process. Although ARENA party members did not have a serious problem with the de-classification of documents, they did indicate that the timing of these efforts could derail the delicate balance of interests achieved in recent months, noting that they thought the issue was being used politically in Washington.

During February 1994, J. Brian Atwood, Director of USAID, visited El Salvador as a special envoy of the U.S. Secretary of State. In his remarks to the Legislative Assembly of El Salvador, Atwood voiced the position of the United States in relation to the upcoming elections, noting ". . . we look forward to working with whatever government you freely elect to complete the task of national reconstruction. Let me be absolutely clear, we are strictly neutral with respect to any particular party or candidate, but we are passionately committed to an electoral process that is free and fair to all participants."

Atwood proceeded to lead an official U.S. delegation of observers to the elections on March 20, concluding that although they had observed ". . . no visible signs of intimidation or fraud," the delegation was concerned that many of the administrative defects noted in previous elections continued to exist.⁸ Indeed, Atwood noted that the majority of problems encountered on election day stemmed from the complex registration and voting process.

USAID in El Salvador worked closely with ONUSAL and the TSE so that every effort was made to ensure that the elections were as inclusive as possible, mainly assisting with

⁷ Clifford Kraus, "A Salvadoran Denial on Death Squads," New York Times, Nov. 25, 1993.

⁸ Douglas Farah, "Salvadorans Await 2nd Voting Round," Washington Post, Mar. 22, 1994, P. A11

technical and logistical issues. The USAID Mission also has been supported activities to implement the 1992 Peace Accords including judicial reform, deployment of the National Civilian Police, and reintegrating former combatants into productive roles within society through a program of land grants.

The Centro de Asesoría y Promoción Electoral (CAPEL)

The Costa Rica-based Centro de Asesoría y Promoción Electoral (CAPEL) was created in 1983, as part of the Interamerican Institute for Human Rights (IIDH), sponsored by the Organization of American States (OAS). CAPEL is required by charter to play a purely technical role in elections assistance. Its main role is to work with governments on the legal and administrative aspects of elections. CAPEL's services are increasingly sought by governments entering elections in the region; its participants are legal and administrative experts from across Latin America.

CAPEL was contracted by the TSE in November 1993 to assist in several areas of electoral administration. Its general role was to assist with the assembly of the national registry, set-up of computers, training of electoral workers, and logistical support. During its work in El Salvador, CAPEL became a central component of the electoral process. CAPEL staff pointed out that the most difficult part of their project was the politization of technical issues. The delicate political repercussions of electoral issues caused the organization to often become involved in internal disputes between parties. However, the organization's recognized non-partisan nature assisted it in becoming an effective mediator of disputes, in addition to the mediation efforts of ONUSAL and USAID.

After the first round of elections, CAPEL's main task was assisting the TSE in establishing an agenda to address issues that were possible to address in several weeks. It identified that the largest problems in the March 20 elections were related to logistics. CAPEL sought mainly to relieve the congestion at the polling sites throughout the election, and to address problems related to the national registry. CAPEL advised the TSE to increase the number of voting centers, and asked the TSE to publish ads in national newspapers listing voting centers and voting table numbers by surnames. CAPEL is continuing to work with the TSE to implement further reforms of the electoral system.

Salvadoran Political Parties

All political parties interviewed during IRI's visits agreed that the electoral process was moving forward, and they did not think it would face any major difficulties. All parties also voiced general satisfaction with the role of ONUSAL and believed that the presence of international observers was a positive force. All political parties viewed the March 20 elections as a culmination of the peace process begun in 1992. However, some parties noted that it might actually be detrimental to the electoral process to enter elections before the peace accords were finalized. There was a definite mood among the parties interviewed that the electoral process must not become too politicized, and all showed restraint in criticizing the process. Some

groups even criticized leftist parties for leveling too many criticisms and were alarmed by the negative international press coverage that it generated. Nonetheless, the stances and claims of political parties vary widely and deserve to be addressed individually. Although not intended to be a comprehensive description of those parties, a brief synopsis of their origins and position within the 1994 elections is offered as follows:

Authentic Christian Movement (MAC)

The Authentic Christian Movement (MAC) was created as an offshoot of the Christian Democratic Party by Julio Rey Prendes after losing an internal struggle within the party for the presidential nomination in 1989 to Fidel Chavez Mena. Its 1994 presidential candidate was Rhina Victoria Escalante de Rey Prendes, the first female candidate for president in Salvadoran history. Due to the low percentage received by the party in the elections, it is doubtful that it will remain recognized as a political party.

Christian Democratic Party (PDC)

The Christian Democratic Party (PDC) was formed in 1960 as a moderate government opposition party. Under the dynamic leadership of José Napoleon Duarte, the PDC gained the most votes in the legislative and municipal elections of 1982 and 1985, and captured the presidency in 1984. However, after several corruption scandals, an inability to negotiate an end to the war, and inefficient administration, the party lost at the polls in the legislative and municipal elections of 1988, gaining only 36 percent of the vote.

Following the death of its founding leader, José Napoleon Duarte, the party's leadership has been a point of contention between would-be successors. As the party entered the 1989 elections, a schism developed within the party over the selection of the presidential candidate between Fidel Chavez Mena and Julio Rey Prendes, causing Prendes to defect, forming his own party and taking a significant number of elected legislative and municipal officials with him. During preparations for the 1994 elections, an internal dispute emerged between Abraham Rodriquez and Fidel Chavez Mena over the presidential nomination of the party, causing further party divisions within the PDC. After months of discussions within the party, Fidel Chavez Mena became the presidential candidate. Although the party dropped to third place, in terms of the number of deputies in the National Assembly, it still possesses a significant popular base.

Democratic Convergence (CD)

Formed in 1987, the Democratic Convergence party (CD) is essentially a coalition of leftist parties including Ruben Zamora's Popular Social Christian Movement (MPSC) and the Social Democratic Party (PSD). Although the late Guillermo Ungo's National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) was part of the coalition in the 1991 legislative and municipal elections, and he ran as its presidential candidate in 1989, it left the coalition for the 1994 elections. The presidential candidate of the coalition in the 1994 elections was Ruben Zamora. The CD ran in a coalition with the FMLN and the MNR at the presidential level, while running its own

candidates and coalition candidates in various legislative and municipal races. The future of the party is in doubt due to its poor performance at the polls, gaining only one deputy to the National Assembly.

Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN)

The Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) was formed in 1980, uniting several guerrilla groups that operated in El Salvador since the 1970s. Although the unified directorate known as the FMLN was formed from a May 1980 meeting in Havana, Cuba, the FMLN chose a different path to guerrilla warfare than previously advocated by Fidel Castro. Instead of operating solely in guerrilla focos (isolated encampments in the countryside), the FMLN chose to utilize popular organizations formed throughout the 1970s for both peaceful and violent actions, and also launched several nationwide offensives in 1981 and 1989. The five groups belonging to the FMLN are the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), founded in 1970; the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), founded in 1972; the Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN), founded in 1975; the Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (PRTC), founded in 1976; and the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES), founded in 1930.

During the electoral campaign of 1994, the FMLN ran with the leftist coalition of the Democratic Convergence (CD), and the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) in the race for the presidency, while running its own candidates for deputy and mayor. However, in several municipalities the FMLN joined the coalition to run candidates. Ruben Zamora, of the Democratic Convergence, was selected as the presidential candidate of the coalition.

FMLN leaders claim they had difficulties in the 13 months since establishing a political party because they essentially had to carry out simultaneously three roles: defend the peace accords, reconstruct the former conflictive zones, and manage the campaign. Most observers commented that the FMLN also suffered from the confusing coalitions it formed at the national and local level of voting, and were affected adversely by divisions within the party over differing electoral strategies. Although the FMLN essentially became the second force in national politics when 21 of its deputies were elected to the National Assembly, the divisions seen throughout the campaign have continued to aggravate party relations after the campaign. Some observers suggest that the FMLN may split into several parties as it adjusts to the new political landscape. Some observers note that the ERP, today known as Expresion Renovadora del Pueblo (Renovated Expression of the Population), led by Joaquin Villalobos, the main FMLN commandante (personally chosen by Fidel Castro), has decided to move the party toward the center, renouncing Marxist-Leninism, instead embracing social democracy.⁹ However, others within the FMLN coalition, continue to hold on to their age-old belief in socialism.

⁹ Universidad Centroamericana "José Simeón Cañas," Estudios Centroamericanos, "El ERP Se Convierte a la Social Democracia," Estudios Centroamericanos, Vol. 539, September 1993, p. 884

Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA)

The Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) was founded in 1981 by Major Roberto D'Aubuisson. Viewed by many observers as a hardline anti-communist party with links to death squad activity during the 1980s, the party developed as an alternative to the PDC in confronting the FMLN during the civil war. In the 1982 and 1985 legislative and municipal elections and the 1984 presidential elections, the party finished a solid second, becoming a formidable opposition force within the national legislature.

Through the 1980s, the party expanded beyond its traditional base, building a modern party structure. Arguably, one of the most effectively organized political parties in Latin America, ARENA was able to expand considerably its support in the 1994 elections by several hundred thousand votes. According to President Alfredo Cristiani, who will take over the presidency of the party, ARENA's new task is to develop further as a broad-based movement, going beyond its effectiveness as an electoral vehicle.¹⁰

During the electoral campaign of 1994, ARENA chose to nominate 45 year-old Dr. Armando Calderon Sol as its presidential candidate. Calderon Sol is one of the founding members of the ARENA party and was elected to the presidency of the party in 1988. He was elected to the National Assembly in 1985, and became mayor of San Salvador in 1988, winning reelection in 1991. President Calderon Sol sees the party as a continuing watchdog over the government's policies, noting that it has good experience in the legislature and is independent enough to offer solid criticism where necessary.¹¹

National Revolutionary Movement (MNR)

The National Revolutionary Movement was founded in 1964-65, replacing the banned liberal opposition Partido Accion Renovadora (PAR). It is the traditional social democratic party of El Salvador with ties to the Socialist International. Its traditional leader, Guillermo Ungo, died of cancer in 1991 and since that time, Victor Valle has led the party. The MNR chose to support the candidacy of Ruben Zamora for president, but also ran its own candidates for most legislative and municipal races, although joining the coalition in various regions. Since the party did not elect any deputies to the National Assembly, it is in danger of losing its official recognition as a legal political party.

National Solidarity Movement (MSN)

The National Solidarity Movement (MSN), founded in 1991, is considered by many observers to be one of the country's two evangelical parties. The party's presidential candidate

¹⁰ Based on interview with President Alfredo Cristiani, April 25, 1994.

¹¹ Based on interview with President-elect Armando Calderon Sol, April, 26, 1994.

campaign was titled, "Campaign for Your Vote in 94," and its main slogan became "Cabal, Tu Voto es Clave! (Your vote is essential)." The effort also included a calendar that featured a board game illustrating the registration and voting process. More than 110 radio commercials were aired daily that called on citizens to vote and announced the work of the NGOs. Local theater groups were utilized to present plays illustrating the registration and voting process in the central plazas of towns, and NGO volunteers went door to door registering voters.

The Salvadoran NGOs working with SVRI were selected by a process that required the organization have low administrative overhead, experience in civic education, members necessary to carry out the registration drive, and the ability to recruit volunteers. Through this selection process, 17 NGOs were chosen to work with SVRI. These NGOs were asked to appoint several individuals to receive training at SVRI's office in San Salvador. They in turn trained each NGO's volunteers in the principles of voter registration. Throughout the process, more than 41 supervisors, 402 promoters, and 5,900 volunteers were trained in voter registration. Once implemented at the grassroots level, the project was able to reach more than 149,000 Salvadoran homes. Although SVRI claims to have attempted to gain a balance of NGOs in terms of the ideological spectrum, it was able to attract only one NGO from the conservative spectrum. Thus, various groups subsequently called into question the non-partisan nature of the NGO voter registration effort.

The Catholic Church

The Salvadoran Catholic Church expanded its social role in the 1960s and 1970s as the new tenets of liberation theology produced a more politically active church, known as the "popular church." In the 1970s, with the rise of the Church's social and political advocacy, local priests began to train activists. The Salvadoran government reacted by classifying this activity as threatening, subversive, and clearly outside the role of the church. Nonetheless, then-Archbishop Luis Chavez y Gonzalez and his auxiliary Arturo Rivera y Damas both actively supported the activities of the local priests. However, following Chavez y Gonzalez's retirement in 1977, Rivera y Damas was passed over as a candidate for Archbishop because of his confrontational relationship with the government. Oscar Arnulfo Romero, perceived to be a conservative, was nominated the next Archbishop.

However, as the political violence of the 1970s escalated, Romero and Rivera y Damas continued to support the work of the "popular church," which by now was increasingly involved with the popular organizations. These popular organizations became increasingly allied with the guerrilla fronts operating in the country, further straining relations between the Salvadoran Church and government, and also creating divisions within the church itself.

Following the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero in March 1980, Arturo Rivera y Damas was appointed acting Archbishop. Since that time, he has continued the Catholic Church's political advocacy role within Salvadoran society, which has often placed it as an arbiter between warring factions. Rivera y Damas is considered a liberal within church circles and has often spoken out against the "neoliberal" policies of the ruling ARENA party. The

Church's role in Salvadoran politics was integral during peace negotiations, and during the campaign it issued several harsh statements criticizing the ruling ARENA party. During the campaign, he often spoke out against the possibilities of an ARENA government, and after the election, Rivera y Damas voiced serious concern over the polarizing effect that such a landslide victory for ARENA might create.

National Media

There is a relatively large media presence in El Salvador including 10 television channels, 150 radio stations, five newspapers, and three cable systems. Most news media in El Salvador is extremely politicized, and television news is the most centrist. Television news came into its own during the war, when it was able to offer much more vivid coverage of the conflict.

In the print media, the Diario de Hoy is often the most ideologically conservative in its reporting, while the Prensa Grafica has recently gravitated toward the center. El Mundo and Diario Latino are the publications of leftist orientation with the largest circulation.

Most news outlets interviewed by IRI delegates noted that the campaign period had been rather uneventful and that the rhetoric of most parties was less ideologically based than in previous campaigns. In addition, most noted that the lack of any charismatic leader from the parties made the electoral campaign less attractive to cover from a news perspective. Several television news stations hosted debates with the candidates; however Armando Calderon Sol of the ruling ARENA party was noticeably absent from all these. Media coverage of the campaign was furthered complicated by the fact that the public was tired of the coverage concerning the peace process, and instead was more concerned with domestic issues such as jobs and crime.

Although El Salvador has a free press in most regards, many media observers contend that restrictions still exist. Some commented that the local press has difficulty in obtaining interviews if sensitive issues are raised. Moreover, some added that reprisals are often taken by business groups in pulling advertising from media outlets that run controversial interviews.

One issue in particular that raised objections from the public and large business groups was an interview conducted with President Cristiani on Channel 12, also used for CNN. The interview centered on the U.S. State Department's declassification of documents and the implementation of the peace accords. However, the reporter's treatment of the president was considered rude, due to the manner in which he cut off answers by Cristiani. The interview caused a nationwide debate, and several business groups sent letters threatening to cut advertising to the station.

National Universities

The University of El Salvador and the Jesuit-run University of Central America (UCA) are two main campuses involved in political activism. According to the University of El Salvador, the elections of 1994 were tainted by fraud. In several publications, the university's

Rector, Fabio Castillo, noted that the majority of the fraud had occurred in the 18 to 24 months preceding the election. Castillo added that the high percentage of illiteracy and poverty found in El Salvador prevents a majority of the public from making informed choices. Moreover, he stated that rural peasants are still under the control of powerful landowners, who still utilize rural patrols to keep century-old power structures in the countryside stable. Castillo further alleged that one specific form of fraud utilized since 1967 is still in use, arguing that factory owners simply inform their workers that if the ruling party does not win the elections, the factory will be forced to implement massive layoffs. Although recognizing the good intentions of foreign observers to the elections, Castillo termed their task as "Mission Impossible."

During the electoral campaign, UCA published a series of controversial articles and polls examining voter attitudes about the elections. According to UCA publications, El Salvador had changed dramatically since the signing of the Peace Accords, but not to the extent voiced by the government or the United Nations. Although UCA asserted that the country had progressed much since the beginning of the peace process, it also affirmed that the road toward national reconciliation was still a long journey.

Although armed struggle has been discredited, UCA stated that the political aims that brought the war are still worthy, but that the struggle must now be waged within the political order. It essentially argued that the factors that brought the armed conflict are still present, namely the existence of a disproportionate imbalance in the distribution of the country's natural and human resources.¹²

UCA noted that the electoral code, although including some mild reforms, was insufficient to ensure free and competitive elections. It also claimed that more than a third of the population was not registered to vote and that the climate of the country was still governed by a fear of violence. The university further charged that ARENA sought to polarize the campaign, while assessing that the leftist coalition (CD/FMLN/MNR) was hurt by taking a very cautious approach in responding to the charges leveled by ARENA throughout the campaign.¹³

KEY ISSUES IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

Although the IRI delegations noticed considerable consensus concerning the elections, several groups pointed out a variety of issues that hampered participation.

¹² Universidad Centroamericana "José Simeón Cañas," *Estudios Centroamericanos*, "Mas Alla de las Elecciones," Vol. 543-544, January-February, 1994, p. 3

¹³ Universidad Centroamericana "José Simeón Cañas," *Estudios Centroamericanos*, "Son libres las elecciones de 1994?" Vol. 539, September 1993, p. 801

Voter Registration

In theory, the process for registering to vote with the TSE is fairly straightforward. In order to register, Salvadorans must present themselves at any of the local TSE offices throughout the 262 municipalities, with one form of identification, and fill out a one-page form (Solicitud de Inscripción al Registro Electoral-SIRE). This form is then sent to the central TSE office in San Salvador where staff attempt to match the request to a birth certificate on file. If the birth certificate is found, the name is added to the electoral roster, the application is approved and sent back to the TSE local office. The prospective voter must then return to the local TSE office, have a picture taken, and receive the voting card (carnet).

However, serious delays and technical problems in the registration, notification, and pick up of voting cards arose throughout the process. Although the new electoral code required the TSE to process all applications for voting cards within 30 days, it was not required to notify citizens when their application was approved. Many Salvadorans would thus take a costly day off from work to visit the TSE office and find that their application had not been processed, forcing them to return another day (costing them another lost day of work). Moreover, not every TSE field office had the sufficient materials (cameras, laminators, office furniture, transport, etc.) to effectively take applications or produce voting cards.

Salvadorans without valid identification also found it difficult to become enrolled on the electoral roster. Those without birth certificates had to request that the mayor of their municipality send these documents to the central TSE. Many local mayors thus slowed efforts to register voters and return voting cards. Although the TSE did run advertising in the major newspapers declaring that any mayor found guilty of purposely delaying the registration process would face stiff fines, none were ever issued. Some leftist parties charged that towns that registered a high level of support for leftist parties or those in former conflictive zones experienced extreme delays in registration and receiving voting cards.

Indeed, the FMLN alleged 37 cases of fraud in the March 20 elections, and argued that problems in the registration process should have merited new elections in the municipalities mentioned. However, the TSE reviewed and denied all 37 claims, stating that the electoral code only provided for specific violations related to election day events (fraud or violence, errors on ballots, or serious abnormalities in counting).

Party Registration of Candidates and Campaign Funding Advances

Several political parties also alleged that the process for registering candidates and receiving government advances for campaigning were extremely slow, with various groups claiming that rightist parties and candidates were receiving more effective treatment than those of the left.

Use of State Resources in Campaign

Many parties also charged that ARENA utilized government resources to run their campaign, pointing out several television and radio ads that were government sponsored carried partisan advertisements on behalf of ARENA. In addition, some parties made continuous claims that ARENA partisans utilized government equipment, vehicles, and hung party propaganda from municipal buildings. Delegates on IRI's pre-election assessment missions noted ARENA's use of such state resources to conduct its campaign.

National Registry

Ruben Zamora commented after the March 20 election that, "Conservatively, more than 10 percent of the voters couldn't vote simply because of errors [in the voter roll] by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal."¹⁴ Several non-governmental organizations working with voter registration efforts conducted exit polling at voting sites from 150 voting places in 120 municipalities. Citing those polls, the groups claimed that about 300,000 people were not able to vote because their names did not appear on the voting lists. However, Augusto Ramirez Ocampo, head of the U.N. monitoring mission, claimed that only 25,000 people had been unable to vote due to problems in the registry.¹⁵

Regardless of the numbers of people not allowed to vote due to problems related to the national registry, all parties agreed that the list needs to be cleaned, to include more accurate information regarding the number of eligible voters in the country.

Political Violence

Various parties claimed that political violence, although reduced since November and December 1993, and a large military presence in the countryside threatened to generate a climate of fear among voters. Since October 1993, 43 people associated with rightist and leftist political factions were the victims of "arbitrary executions," according to the United Nations.¹⁶ The United States and United Nations reacted to these events by establishing the "Joint Group" to investigate death squad activity in El Salvador after the signing of the Peace Accords. Several of the murders investigated have been attributed to common crime, which has risen significantly in the country since the end of the war. Most of the violence has also been attributed to

¹⁴ David Clark Scott, "Rightists Lead in Salvadoran Vote," *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 22, 1994, p. 4

¹⁵ Douglas Farah, "Salvadoran Rightist Expresses Confidence in Second-Round Election Victory," *Washington Post*, March 23, 1994, P. A25

¹⁶ Howard W. French, "As the Elections Near, Killings Shake El Salvador," *New York Times*, Dec. 15, 1993 p. A3

recalcitrant factions within the political parties and the culture of violence generated by so many years of civil war.

Although most organizations agreed on the need for elections free from violence, many commented that confrontations could arise in the weeks before the election in order to dissuade voters from going to the polls. Although there were some party rallies in the weeks preceding the March 20 election that were marred by violent confrontations, no acts of politically-motivated violence were reported on March 20 or April 24.

Pollworker Training

One of the most serious problems confronted on the March 20 election day, was the lack of training among the pollworkers. Pollworkers are distinguished from pollwatchers, who were appointed by the political parties as observers, and were termed "vigilantes." Pollworkers are responsible for actually conducting the election at a polling station and their training falls under the mandate of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), although they are also nominated by political parties. One instructor interviewed in Cojutepeque on March 19 commented that up until March 16, she only had the electoral code to use in her instruction courses. Other materials, such as charts on the voting process, and videotapes of the voting process, were delivered only a week before the election. Nonetheless, she was able to offer training to more than 200 pollworkers.

Although many groups criticized the TSE for failing to provide adequate training, Dr. Luis Arturo Zaldivar, president of the TSE, noted that the political parties were often the cause of many delays. He commented that many of the parties delayed excessively in naming workers to the polls, and in many cases nominated illiterates to work at the voting tables as members of the Juntas Receptoras de Votos (JRVs).¹⁷

Indeed, many pollworkers were found by observer groups to have been seriously lacking in proper training. In many instances, pollworkers were seen reading the electoral code in the early hours of March 20, attempting to solve questions and open the polls. At some voting sites, this delayed the opening of the voting tables and contributed to the delays and confusion found at many sites throughout the day. In addition, several voting tables with excessive delays were directly related to the illiteracy of one or more of the pollworkers. The improvement of the pollworker's performance in the April 24 runoff gave an indication of how even limited training could alleviate the confusion and congestion found on March 20.

¹⁷ Based on Interview with Dr. Luis Arturo Zaldivar Romero, president of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, April 23, 1994.

Transportation of Voters to Polls

This issue seemed of critical importance to rural voters who could not reach the voting centers that were mainly set up in the larger municipalities. It also became an issue for those in large urban centers, who often had to vote long distances from their homes because they were assigned polling places based on the alphabetical designation of their surnames.

Many of the non-governmental organizations working with SVRI claimed that they could provide transportation to rural voters in the first round of voting on March 20, because their registration effort had taken them to many of the rural districts and had provided transport to the Mega-Jornadas scheduled by the TSE and ONUSAL. Although the TSE initially accepted the SVRI transportation plan, the project was canceled some days before the election, fueling some protests that the TSE simply did not want to see a large turnout of voters in rural and urban municipalities. Others noted that the NGOs working with SVRI had become too politicized throughout the registration effort, and the TSE reacted by stating that the transportation of voters needed to stay as de-politicized as possible.

In the second round of voting in the presidential election, the TSE offered free transportation to voters through the political parties. However, the firm of Price Waterhouse was contracted to perform auditory services on the provision of transport to ensure the accountability concerning allocation of funds. The issue of transport was sensitive in the first round due to the perceived partisan nature of the non-governmental organizations. It was not known whether they would offer transport to all voters, or use selective criteria to move the voters of one particular party. By offering the funds directly to the parties through Price Waterhouse, the TSE was able to provide effective transport and avoid the partisan pitfalls found in the first round on the transportation issue.

Access to Media

Access to paid media in El Salvador is difficult because it is expensive. Although several political groups spoke to IRI delegations about seeking free air time for partisan ads or debates, most media outlets opposed such a plan.

Radio seemed to be more utilized, and campaign posters and painting were heavily utilized. However, some parties claimed that supporters of ARENA tore down their posters, which became a serious hindrance in getting the parties' messages out because of the high cost.

Election Final Results

The final results of the March 20 elections took some time before they were announced to the public. During the night of the 20th, many organizations of the left denounced the results as fraudulent due to the leftist coalition's poor showing and the technical irregularities. The only result communicated by Dr. Luis Arturo Zaldivar Romero, president of the TSE, on Monday morning of March 21 was that with 75 percent of returns in, the ARENA party candidate had only received slightly more than 49 percent of the vote and that a second round of elections would be scheduled within one month. Later that day, all returns were declared null and a full recount of returns was begun at the TSE counting center at the Presidente Hotel. By mid-week, results of the election were made public, indicating both a substantial showing by opposition forces in the legislature, and an impressive victory for the governing party both in the legislative and municipal races. The actual results are as follows¹⁸:

Presidential Elections:

Dr. Armando Calderon Sol	49.03 %
Ruben Zamora	24.90 %

Legislative Elections:

ARENA	39 seats
FMLN	21
PDC	18
PCN	4
CD	1
MU	1
Total	84

Municipal Elections:

ARENA	207 municipalities
PDC	29
FMLN	15
PCN	10
MAC	1
Total	262

¹⁸ For Official Results by Department and Municipalities, see Appendix # 11.

Central American Parliament:

ARENA	9 seats
FMLN	5
PDC	4
PCN	1
CD	1

The second round of elections for the presidency of the republic took place on April 24, 1994. With many of the reforms to the electoral system in place, the election was administered much more efficiently. Final results were available on the night of April 24, and showed what for most groups was a foregone conclusion. Dr. Armando Calderon Sol of the ARENA party had won a substantial victory over his opponent, Ruben Zamora. Indeed, Zamora went on the air that night in a concessionary speech and also noted that the election was completely free and fair. Election results from the second round were as follows:

Dr. Armando Calderon Sol	67.9%
Ruben Zamora	32.1%

Recommendations

During the course of IRI's pre-election work in El Salvador, and both electoral observation missions, delegates noted several aspects of the electoral system that should improve the administration of future elections in El Salvador. They are as follows:

Simplify Registration and Issuance of Voting Cards

One of the most serious problems during the pre-election period was the process of registering voters and issuing voting cards. Although El Salvador's electoral system was designed to prevent traditional forms of fraud, it is also complicated in its structure. Although the TSE is required to process registered voters within one month of receiving an application, it was rarely able to meet this deadline. One method of ending the long process of registering to vote is to mandate one general identification card for all transactions of the citizenry. This was attempted previously, but was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. However, it appears that the next legislature may choose to act on this recommendation. One general identification card would eliminate the extra manpower necessary during the electoral season for registering voters.

Update National Registry

The national registry of El Salvador is in desperate need of review. Many voters who possess voting cards are not on the registry and were thus prevented from voting during these elections. In addition, many citizens who are dead or living outside the country are still included in the registry, which tends to inflate the number of potential voters.

Revise the TSE

During the pre-election period, many political groups and parties criticized the partisan composition of the TSE. Regardless of which way the Tribunal leaned, having four political parties represented on the TSE slowed the decision-making capacity of the organization. Moreover, the quota system used to staff the TSE was also a hindrance to effective administration, due to the conflicting loyalties of electoral workers.

Although the partisan composition of the TSE was understandable given the delicate balance of interests achieved since the signing of the Peace Accords, certain problems arose with this framework. Magistrates may act as political party representatives and members of the TSE, but the task is difficult. Some observers would add that the two tasks are vastly different.

In the future, members of the TSE should be elected by the legislature using a mix of professional and partisan criteria. Moreover, the staff of the TSE should not be based solely on party quotas and should be institutionalized in order to allow for expanded institutional memory in the organization. Some observers pointed out that although El Salvador has held elections since 1982, members of the Electoral Tribunal had been changed constantly over the

years, leaving little institutional memory. Thus, for the benefit of future elections, it would be highly advisable that staff who were electoral and pollworkers in this electoral cycle be kept on with the TSE.

Increase Training for Pollworkers

One of the most critical problems of these elections was the lack of training of pollworkers. Some observers commented that the TSE had not made teaching materials available in sufficient time to prepare pollworkers. Others noted that political parties hesitated in presenting their pollworkers for training from the TSE. In addition, it would have been advisable to conduct a "dry run" on the voting process with pollworkers before the election on March 20. The vastly improved administration of polling stations on April 24, proved what advance training could do for local pollworkers. Although the voting process was still the cumbersome system inherited from past elections, the poll workers were able to process voters in a much more rapid manner due to the experience gained in the first round.

Increase Number of Voting Sites

The number of voting sites throughout the country should be increased. During the March 20 election, many voting sites had hundreds of tables with only one access door, both for entrance and exit. At these sites, this added to the confusion of the process, and caused some voters to leave in frustration without voting. During the April 24 election, there was an attempt to vary and increase the number of voting sites. The greater number of voting sites served to alleviate greatly the congestion previously found at voting sites. In addition, with fewer voters at each site, the voting tables (JRVs) processed voters in a much more rapid and effective manner.

Establish TSE Orientation Centers at Voting Sites

Many of the pollworkers designated by political parties during this election were not well versed in the requirements of the electoral code. Many observers saw presidents of the JRVs who were not literate. Overall, many of the pollworkers lacked the proper training. Most of the issues that arose throughout both election days revolved around essentially simple matters (Are partisan t-shirts considered propaganda? Which finger is marked with indelible ink after voting? Which finger is used to stamp the electoral roster?) Having an orientation center at each voting site would be extremely useful not only in adjudicating local disputes but also in assisting members of the JRVs in fulfilling their function. In addition, those who are not able to vote due to problems with voting cards or the national registry can be directed to such an orientation center to have their claims attended to in a timely and effective manner. These centers can also be used to direct voters to voting tables, rather than having the party pollwatchers (vigilantes) direct them as was done during the 1994 elections, thus leaving the orientation process devoid of any partisan presence.

Simplify Voting Process to Speed Up Voting

It is evident that the electoral system in El Salvador is designed to prevent fraud. One observer noted that the system had been designed to keep the dead from voting, but now kept the living from exercising their constitutional rights. The number of steps required to vote are numerous and provide grounds for confusion and unnecessarily create congestion of citizens seeking to vote. Moreover, although the ballot is designed for illiterates at the (voters mark ballots for party flags, not candidates), the rest of the process requires substantial literacy and reasoning skills.

Presently, voters arrive at the voting center and are instructed to find their names on the national registry in order to locate their prospective voting tables. Once in line at the table, voters are asked for their voting cards, which are then matched to the registry at the table. Upon finding the voters' names on the registry, pollworkers give individuals their ballot, which requires a stamp from the president of the JRV and a signature from the secretary. After voters have entered the voting booth and voted, they then deposit their ballots and go back to the voting table. There, voters sign their name, have a fingerprint taken, have their finger marked with indelible ink, and then have their voting cards returned. No other voter can be processed until the last person to vote has completed all these steps. This type of administration caused long lines to develop and lessened the number of voters that voted during the day.

Proportional Representation at Municipal Level

One of the problems with the current manner of deciding local representation is the "winner take all" method. The system calls for a mayor who is elected to appoint his own cabinet and local officials. In a country with a history of concentration of power, it can be problematical to allow all local power to be vested in one person or party. Considering some of the technical difficulties experienced during the elections, where some local races could have been decided by only a few votes, it could be destabilizing to allow only one party to completely dominate local administration. Thus, ONUSAL and CAPEL have advised that in future elections, a proportional representation model should be applied that would allow for a multi-partisan administration of local government. IRI recommends this change be considered or that local officials be directly elected and not appointed by the mayor.

Residential Voting

Much of the confusion found during both rounds of voting had to do with the alphabetical manner in which voting lists were distributed. Many voters were listed to vote at long distances from their homes due to alphabetical order, forcing them to travel great distances on election day to cast ballots. In addition, voters had substantial difficulty in finding their respective voting sites due to problems related to illiteracy and locating surnames on alphabetical lists. In the future, ONUSAL and CAPEL have recommended that the TSE organize voting on a residential basis, facilitating voter access to voting sites. IRI also agrees this aspect of electoral administration should be considered.

Continue Efforts to Broaden Democratic Training Courses

Both the ARENA and FMLN parties commented to IRI delegations that one of the main difficulties during the election and the transition to peace were attempts to forge a democratic consciousness among the general population, hardened by many years of war. Both President Cristiani and ERP President Joaquín Villalobos commented that they would like to expand their parties' activities in public education on aspects of participatory democracy. These types of efforts are crucial for establishing a democratic culture, and IRI applauds the movement toward supporting democratic development within the nation's political parties.

Conclusions

Considering the decade-long civil war experienced in El Salvador, IRI chose to monitor the election process beginning some months before election day. When IRI began its assessment missions in January 1994, the electoral environment in El Salvador remained relatively tranquil. The economy has improved considerably since the end of the civil war, and most people interviewed seemed more concerned with issues such as crime and jobs, rather than ideological debates concerning democracy and Marxist-Leninism.

All IRI delegations were impressed by the ability of political parties to wage modern election campaigns throughout the entire process. Although many of the parties interviewed criticized the ruling party on a number of issues, they all agreed that the process was moving forward and concluded that the election would occur free from traditional forms of fraud. IRI also found that the number of civic organizations established in previous years were assisting greatly in the generation of a civil society. Most important, IRI applauds their efforts during the voter registration process and hopes their efforts continue in the years to come.

The spirit of national reconciliation and respect for democratic institutions was heartening to observe. Where technical and logistical problems threatened to derail the process, the Salvadoran people consistently voiced a desire to move forward toward a democratic and inclusive political order. Organizations as diverse as business groups, opposition parties, and rural and urban unions commented that the country had changed irreversibly in recent years. Many IRI delegates who had been involved in the decade-long debate over El Salvador also agreed that the country had progressed in a remarkable way. Throughout the months preceding the election, many situations occurred that could have destabilized the process. Some rallies were disrupted by minor outbreaks of violence, some candidates or party workers were harassed, and relations between the parties became strained. However, the Salvadoran public showed political maturity again and again throughout the process. Many times, difficult situations were dealt with in an effective manner, both by the authorities and the citizenry.

Despite problems in voter registration and election day organization on March 20, IRI observers were impressed with the local cooperation exhibited by pollworkers and party representatives. Indeed, the degree of cooperation found at local polling sites was a testament

to the recognition that these elections represented a final step in the peace process begun in 1992, and the first on the road toward national reconciliation.

Moreover, much of the congestion and confusion found on March 20 was alleviated in the interim before the April 24 runoff election. The organization of voting sites was improved markedly in the second round of elections. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the United Nations, the Centro de Asesoría y Promoción Electoral (CAPEL), and USAID should be commended for their efforts to improve the voting process in the second round. In addition, although there were a number of problems related to registration in this electoral cycle, it should be noted that most of those can be attributed the post-war nature of these elections. Nonetheless, within the context of recent Salvadoran history and compared with previous elections, a record turnout of voters was recorded in both rounds of voting.¹⁹ Both election days proceeded without any acts of violence, and members of opposition parties were present at every voting table throughout the country. Most important, losing opposition parties accepted the results of the election, thus further strengthening the governability of the nation.

IRI commends the people of El Salvador in bringing a long and hard civil war to a close, and applauds their efforts to work for a peaceful and inclusive political transition toward an increasingly democratic political culture. The delegation believes that El Salvador has made significant progress in reconciling sharp ideological differences and that the foundations of a strong civil society are taking root.

With this election, President Calderon Sol gained a significant mandate from the Salvadoran people to continue on the road of national reconciliation, democratization, and economic growth. IRI hopes that all parties will continue to work toward an effective reform of the electoral system, adhering to the agreements signed on April 25, 1994 by President Calderon Sol and opposition candidate, Ruben Zamora. In addition, IRI encourages all parties to continue to cooperate in the full implementation of the 1992 Peace Accords, including a full deployment of the National Civilian Police force, effective judicial reform, and reincorporation of excombatants into national life through the land transfer program.

¹⁹ According to estimates from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, out of 2.7 million registered voters, turnout was 1.3 million on March 20, and 1.2 million on April 24.

APPENDIX # 1



**EL SALVADOR
IRI Assessment Mission
January 17-22**

Volunteer consultants included:

K. Larry Storrs, The Congressional Research Service, United States.
Martin Krause, America Foundation for Political Training, Argentina.
Erick Bolaños, Pro-Democracy and Development Institute, Guatemala.
Staci Sticht, Project Coordinator, International Republican Institute.
Norberto Santana, Regional Analyst, International Republican Institute.
Kellyn Guevara, Program Assistant, International Republican Institute.

Meetings included:

- 1) U.S. AID - Salvador Novellino
- 2) U.S. Embassy Political Counselor - Jim Carragher
- 3) United Nations Observer Mission to El Salvador (ONUSAL) - Francesco Manca
- 4) CAPEL(Centro de Asesoría y Promoción Electoral), Ricardo Valverde
- 5) Salvadoran Foreign Ministry - Miguel A Salaverria
- 6) Supreme Electoral Tribunal, Dr. Luis Zaldivar
- 7) Party of National Conciliation (PCN), Dr. Hernan Contreras
- 8) National Solidarity Movement (MSN), Lic. Edgardo Rodriguez
- 9) Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), Armando Calderon Sol, Presidential Candidate.
- 10) Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), Marcos Jimenez
- 11) National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), Ricardo Cordova
- 12) National Association for Private Enterprise (ANEP), Roberto Villanova
- 13) Christian Democratic Party (PDC), Gerardo Le Chevallier
- 14) Center for Democratic Studies (CEDEM), Luis Cardenal

APPENDIX # 2



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**EL SALVADOR
IRI Assessment Mission
February 3-7, 1994**

Volunteer consultants included:

Guillermo Reyes, Fundación Simón Bolívar of Colombia.
Eduardo Mendoza, Instituto Superior de Cultura Democrática of Mexico.
Martin Barillas, IRI Program Officer.

Meetings included:

Thursday, February 3 - San Salvador

Archbishop Rivera y Damas

Friday, February 4 - San Salvador

Authentic Christian Movement (MAC)

National Unity Movement (MUN)

National Prosecutor for Human Rights - Dr. Carlos Molina Fonseca

National Conciliation Party (PCN)

Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front - FMLN

Saturday, February 5 Visit to Cuscatlán and San Miguel departments

National Solidarity Movement (MSN)

National Republican Alliance - ARENA

Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front - FMLN

Christian Democratic party (PDC)

ARENA Rally, San Miguel

Sunday, February 6 Visit to Ciudad Barrios, San Miguel Department

ARENA Rally

Monday, February 7 - San Salvador

Presidential Advisor Mauricio Vargas

Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front - FMLN

ONUSAL - Augusto Ramirez Ocampo

APPENDIX # 3



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**EL SALVADOR
IRI Assessment Mission
February 17-22, 1994**

Volunteer consultants included:

Daniel Fisk, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives.
David Hirschmann, Association of American Chambers of Commerce in Latin America.
Matthew Holder, Office of State Senator John Lewis, R-Calif.
Staci Sticht, Project Coordinator, International Republican Institute.
Kellyn Guevara, Program Assistant, International Republican Institute.
Norberto Santana, Regional Analyst, International Republican Institute.

Meetings included:

1. United Nations Observer Mission to El Salvador (ONUSAL), Francesco Manca.
2. Executive Committee of American Chamber of Commerce.
3. U.S. Embassy Political Counselor, John Anderson.
4. U.S. Information Service, Michael Hahn.
5. Southwest Voter Registration Institute & NGOs working with voter registration.
6. Democratic Convergence (CD), Hector Silva, Campaign Manager.
7. Supreme Electoral Tribunal, Dr. Luis Arturo Zaldivar Romero, president.
8. Party of National Conciliation (PCN), Ciro Cruz Cepeda, president of National Assembly.
9. National Solidarity Movement (MSN), Manuel Edgardo Rodriguez Engelhard, presidential candidate.
10. Examined Mega Jornadas, party rallies of ARENA/FMLN in San Salvador and Chalatenango.
11. Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), Enrique Borgo Bustamante, vice-presidential candidate.
12. Teleprensa, Moises Urbina

13. Diario de Hoy, Rolando Monterosa

14. Prensa Grafica, Eduardo Torres

15. TCS, Samuel Arias

APPENDIX # 4



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**EL SALVADOR
IRI Assessment Mission
March 3-7, 1994**

Volunteer consultants included:

Michael Wilson, Heritage Foundation of United States.
Miguel Angel Afanador, Simón Bolívar Foundation of Colombia.
J. Nabor Centeno, State Legislator from Guanajuato, Mexico.
Martin Barillas, IRI Program Officer.

Meetings included:

March 3

Ricardo Cordoba - National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) mayoral candidate

March 4

José María Argueta - Centro DEMOS

Carlos Hurtado - National Union of Workers and Peasants (UNOC)

Juan José Huevo - National Federation of Unions of Salvadoran Workers (FENASTRAS)

Ofilio Cuchilla - National Confederation of Agricultural Cooperatives (COFENACOA)

March 5

Silvia de Aguillón - Center for Broadcast Training for Salvadoran Women (CORAMS)

Gloria Salguero Gross - National Deputy, ARENA - Santa Ana

Genaro Guevara Delgado - FMLN Committee Secretary - Santa Ana

Edwin Veliz - Democratic Convergence - Santa Ana

March 6

Roberto Guzman - Supreme Electoral Tribunal - Santa Ana

Supreme Electoral Tribunal - Sonsonate

ARENA leadership - Sonsonate

APPENDIX # 5



**INTERNATIONAL
REPUBLICAN
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ELECTION OBSERVATION DELEGATES

EL SALVADOR

MARCH 20, 1994

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U.S. CO-LEADER

Hon. Lela Steffey, State Representative, Arizona, USA

LATIN CO-LEADER

Dr. Antonio Erman Gonzalez, National Congressman, ARGENTINA

DELEGATES

Evans Beaubrun, National Congressman, HAITI

Erick A. Bolanos, President, Instituto Pro-Democracia y Desarrollo, GUATEMALA

Guillermo Leon Escobar Herran, Director, Fundacion Simon Bolivar, COLOMBIA

**Daniel Fisk, Minority Professional Staff Member, House Foreign Affairs Committee, U.S. Congress, .
USA**

Kellyn Guevara, Program Assistant, International Republican Institute, USA

Martin Krause, President, Fundacion America para la Capacitacion Politica, ARGENTINA

R. Bruce McColm, President, International Republican Institute, USA

Eduardo Mendoza Ayala, Executive Director, Instituto Superior de Cultura Democratica, MEXICO

**Janine T. Perfit, Regional Program Director for Latin America and the Caribbean, International
Republican Institute, USA**

Martin Poblete, Permanent Advisor, Northeast Hispanic Catholic Center, USA

Guillermo Reyes, Auxiliary Judge to the Constitutional Court, COLOMBIA

Cesar Rodriguez Rabanal, President, Foro Democratico, PERU

Norberto Santana, Regional Analyst, International Republican Institute, USA

Enrique Toro Tejada, National Congressman; Executive Director, FUNDEMOS, BOLIVIA

Staci L. Sticht, Lead Consultant, International Republican Institute, USA

Hon. Carole Wells, State Representative, South Carolina, USA

Neil C. Whiteley-Ross, Vice President, San Diego Economic Development Corporation, USA

APPENDIX # 6



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AGENDA

ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION TO EL SALVADOR

MARCH 16-22, 1994

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 16

Delegates Arrive

7:30 pm:

**Welcome Reception
IRI/IFES
Hotel Camino Real, Salon Arcos**

THURSDAY, MARCH 17

**DELEGATE BRIEFINGS
SALON ARCOS**

7:30 - 8:30 am:

Dr. Jorge Martinez, Presidential Candidate, Movimiento Unidad (MUN)

8:30 - 9:30 am:

Dr. Armando Calderon Sol, Presidential Candidate, ARENA

9:30 - 10:30 am:

Coffee Break

10:30 - 11:30 am:

Spanish Ambassador to El Salvador (pending)

11:30 - 12:30 pm:

**Dr. Fidel Chavez Mena, Presidential Candidate, Partido Democra-
ta Cristiano (PDC)**

12:30 - 2:30 pm:

Lunch

2:30 - 4:00 pm:

Business/Labor Panel

**Jose Luis Grande Presa, Secretary General,
Confederation of Workers (CGT)**

Hugo Barrera, General Manager, Productos DIANA

**Juan Hector Vidal, Executive Director,
National Association of Private Enterprise (ANEP)**

**Fredy Vasquez, Executive Committee
National Union of Workers and Peasants (UNOC) and
Secretary General of the Construction Workers Union (SUTC)**

4:00 - 4:30 pm:

Coffee Break

4:30 - 6:00 pm: Voter Registration Panel
Armando Villareal, Southwest Voters Research Institute (USA)
Buen Ciudadano (Salvadoran get out the vote organization)

6:00 - 7:00 pm: IRI Delegate Briefing

8:30 pm: Dinner, Pueblo Viejo (optional)

FRIDAY, MARCH 18

**DELEGATE BRIEFINGS
SALON ARCOS**

8:30 - 10:00 am: Campaign Strategists
Gerardo Le Chevallier, Partido Democrata Cristiano (PDC)
Hector Silva, Convergencia Democratica (CD)
Gerson Martinez, FMLN
ARENA (confirmation pending)

10:00 - 10:30 am: Coffee Break

10:30 - 11:30 am: Dr. Ruben Zamora, Presidential Candidate, CD/FMLN/MNR

11:30 - 12:30 pm: Francesco Manca, United Nations (ONUSAL), Electoral Division

12:30 - 2:00 pm: LUNCH

2:00 - 3:00 pm: Dr. Luis Arturo Zaldivar, President, Supreme Electoral Tribunal

3:00 - 4:00 pm: Roberto Rodriguez, United Nations (ONUSAL), Human Rights Division

4:00 - 4:30 pm: Coffee Break

4:30 - 6:00 pm: Media Panel
Amalia Alejandro, Radio Venceremos
Jorge Barahona, Telemundo
Flavio Villacorta, Prensa Grafica

6:30 pm - 7:00 pm: IRI Delegate Briefing

7:30 pm:

Reception at the Salvadoran Foreign Ministry
Hosted by Salvadoran Ambassador to the United States,
Ana Cristina Sol

SATURDAY, MARCH 19

DELEGATE TEAMS DEPLOYED

Local Briefings

SUNDAY, MARCH 20

ELECTION DAY

pm

Debriefing of observations following vote count

MONDAY, MARCH 21

8:00 - 10:00 am:

Deployed teams return to San Salvador
Debriefing of observations

Monsenor Rivera y Damas Archbishop of San Salvador
(confirmation pending)

11:00 am:

IRI/IFES/Freedom House Press Conference
Hotel Presidente

2:00 pm:

U.S. Ambassador Thomas Flannagan
U.S. Embassy

3:30 pm:

Dr. Alfredo Cristiani
President of the Republic of El Salvador


8:00 pm:

Farewell Dinner, IRI/IFES

TUESDAY, MARCH 22

Departure of Delegates

APPENDIX # 7



INTERNATIONAL
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INSTITUTE

For Immediate Release
March 21, 1994

Contact: Shirley Green
(202) 408-9450

**PRELIMINARY FINDINGS
OF THE INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE
MARCH 20, 1994 PRESIDENTIAL, LEGISLATIVE, AND MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS
IN EL SALVADOR**

San Salvador -- The International Republican Institute (IRI) released today the preliminary findings of its international observer mission.

The IRI delegation was comprised of a number of professionals and elected officials from throughout the American continent, well versed in the democratic and electoral process. They included: Congressmen from Argentina, Bolivia and Haiti; state legislators from across the United States, executive directors of public polling institutions from Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru; and professional staff members from the House Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. Congress.

The IRI delegation of twenty observers deployed on Election Day in ten teams to the 14 departments of El Salvador. They visited over 70 municipalities and interviewed officials of the Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE), political party representatives working at the polls, and voters. Reports from the fourteen provinces have been instrumental in the development of the IRI statement of preliminary findings.

The findings are only preliminary because the counting process is still being undertaken and while there have been announcements, there are no final results of the voting. IRI will issue a final report after the conclusion of the process.

IRI's delegation offers the people of El Salvador its sincere congratulations and admiration for the genuine spirit of national reconciliation and tranquility, which has been manifested throughout this electoral process, at all levels. All IRI teams deployed throughout the

countryside were especially impressed by the amount of cooperation found at the local level, without which this process could not have moved in the positive direction that it has taken.

This process also has reinvigorated civil society, actively seeking to shape and define its own future as a nation. IRI takes special note of the role of citizen's groups in the voter education and registration process, which is instrumental in disseminating democratic values. It is IRI's sincere hope that the efforts of those involved in this process continue to gain momentum in the years ahead.

Political parties should be especially applauded for their peaceful and modern campaigns, which offered Salvadoran voters clear choices and brought a new array of actors into the political sphere, both on the parliamentary and local level. These parties also played an especially constructive role in contributing to the positive atmosphere displayed throughout the voting process. All sectors agreed on the fact that the process needed to be not only free and fair, but as inclusive as possible.

IRI delegates found local party workers able and willing to work together to find solutions to the problems that arose during the day in an extremely effective manner. This was especially impressive considering that some of the parties involved have only recently ceased armed actions. The national reconciliation and democratic process practiced at the "mesa" level showed a remarkable amount of progress since the elections of 1982. Indeed, the lack of violence and orderly conduct of all involved was a testament that these elections were truly the culmination of the peace process begun in 1992.

IRI delegates were constantly impressed by the diligent and dedicated work performed by the electoral workers of El Salvador and the observers and officials representing the United Nations or ONUSAL.

Although the delegates found some controversy over several specific technical issues, these should not overshadow the overwhelming and energetic participation that the citizens of El Salvador demonstrated throughout the process. IRI delegations stationed throughout the countryside noted several aspects of the elections that should be examined in order to improve the process.

-- The process of "carnetizacion," which refers to the issuance of voting cards, should be reexamined in order to simplify their requirements and issuance.

-- Although delegates did not witness large numbers of Salvadorans being turned away from polling stations, they saw a percentage of voters disenfranchised due to problems related to the national registry. It is IRI's recommendation to examine and update this list to include all those eligible to vote as well as clear the list of non-eligible voters.

-- In some polling sites, there was some confusion concerning the preparation and procedures for opening and closing voting tables to the public.

— Concerning the actual process of voting, a more simplified method could be instrumental in increasing the number of voters processed at voting tables. In many instances, IRI delegations found that table workers might have been better trained in the procedures for processing requirements. Moreover, the number of technical requirements should be streamlined in order to allow voters to move through the voting table with more ease, allowing for greater speed in voting.

Although many of the technical problems in this election can be attributed to its special post-war nature, it should also be noted that within the context of Salvadoran history and compared to previous elections, a record number of citizens were able to vote this past Sunday. The registration process enabled a large number of new voters to exercise their civic duties.

All political parties deserve special mention today and should be applauded for their ability to wage a peaceful campaign and build modern party structures. This evolution in party politics will stabilize El Salvador's nascent democratic institutions and provide peaceful outlets for political expression for a younger generation. It is essential to move toward a more democratic social order, which respects dissent and seeks to build consensus instead of confrontation.

The delegation believes that El Salvador has made significant progress in reconciling sharp ideological differences and that the foundations of a strong civil society are quickly taking root. These elections give hope to future generations living in a democratic El Salvador and throughout Central America. In conclusion, IRI commends the people of El Salvador in bringing a long and difficult civil war to a close, and applauds their efforts in working towards a peaceful and inclusive political transitions.

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APPENDIX # 8



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ELECTION OBSERVATION DELEGATES

EL SALVADOR

APRIL 24, 1994

DELEGATES

Sr. Carlos Arce Macias
National Deputy - Mexico (Partido Accion Nacional - PAN)

Sr. Rafael Rottman
National Deputy - Guatemala (Movimiento Accion Solidaridad - MAS)

Norberto Santana
Regional Analyst - International Republican Institute

Staci Sticht
Project Coordinator - International Republican Institute

Michael Zarin
Program Officer - International Republican Institute

APPENDIX # 9



**INTERNATIONAL
REPUBLICAN
INSTITUTE**

1212 New York Avenue, N.W.
Suite 900
Washington, D.C. 20005
Telephone: (202) 408-9450
Telex: 5106000161 (IRI)
FAX: (202) 408-9462

SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS FOR IFES AND IRI DELEGATION

APRIL 21-26

THURSDAY 21 :

- 8:00 Breakfast - Jack Spence Hemispheric Initiatives
- 10:00-1:00 Joaquín Villalobos, Gen. Mauricio Vargas (RET) - Centro Demos
- IFES and IRI join delegation**
- 6:00 Ricardo Valverde, CAPEL.

FRIDAY 22:

- 8:00
- 9:00 Dr. Jorge Martínez, Movimiento de Unidad and Gerardo LeChevallier,
PDC.
- 10:00 Coffee Break
- 10:30 Policía Nacional Civil and Armed Forces Panel.
Sub-Director Ing. Rodrigo Avila (PNC)
- 11:30 COMURES - Carlos Pinto, Ex.Dir.
Don Bryan Consultant
- 12:30 Lunch
- 2:00 Ken Ellis USAID/D.C., Charles Costello US/AID El Salvador.

- 3:00 Panel of ex-guerrilla comandantes:
Ana Guadalupe Martínez (ERP), Legislator elect
María Marta Valladares (AKA Nidia Díaz PRTC), Legislator elect
Mauricio Chávez (FPL).
- 4:00 Coffee Break
- 4:30 Press Panel:
Flavio Villacorta, La Prensa Gráfica
Mauricio Funes, Canal 12
Oscar Antonio Pérez, Radio Doble "F"
Moderator Lic. Any Cabrera, AP

SATURDAY 23:

- 8:00 Dr. Rubén Zamora, Coalition.
- 9:00 Panel Discussion The View from Below: Status of Salvadoran Women
Daisy Cheyne, Women's Institute (IMU)
Isabel Ramírez, National Coalition of Salvadoran Women
Sonya Cancinos, Mujer Ciudadana
- 10:00 Coffee Break
- 10:30 Francesco Manca, ONUSAL - Election Division

- 11:30 Women's Panel The View from Above: Status of Salvadoran Women
 Prominent Feminist Leaders
 Lic. Elizabeth de Calderón wife of Presidential Candidate (pending)
 Lic. María Ester de Zamora wife of Presidential Candidate
 Lic. Beatrice de Carrillo, Law Professor
 Sandra de Barraza, President of The Women's Foundation (FUDEM)
- 1:00 Lunch
- 2:00
- 3:00 Dr. Luis Arturo Zaldívar President Supreme Electoral Tribunal
- 6:00 Cocktail Reception US Embassy.
 Hosts - Ambassador Alan Flanigan and wife Beverly.

SUNDAY 24:

- 7:00 p.m. US Embassy - Buffet supper and meeting with Official US Delegation
 and Ambassador Alan Flanigan.

MONDAY 25:

- 9:00 Archbishop Arturo Rivera y Damas or Bishop Rosa Chávez (pending)
- 10:30 President Cristiani (pending)
- 4:00 Armando Calderón Sol, ARENA (pending)

APPENDIX # 10



**INTERNATIONAL
REPUBLICAN
INSTITUTE**

N E W S R E L E A S E

For Immediate Release
April 26, 1994

Contact: Shirley Green
Matt DeCamara
(202)408-9450

**PRELIMINARY FINDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE
APRIL 24, 1994 PRESIDENTIAL RUNOFF ELECTION**

The International Republican Institute (IRI) released today the preliminary findings of its international observer mission to El Salvador's second round of voting in the presidential election.

IRI's mission to the April 24 presidential runoff election was coordinated with other international delegations in order to cover all 14 departments of the country. The IRI delegation included National Congressmen from Mexico and Guatemala and IRI Washington, D.C.-based staff.

IRI's delegation offers the people of El Salvador its sincere congratulations and admiration for the genuine spirit of national reconciliation and tranquility, which was manifested once again throughout Sunday's election. Seen as an important step in consolidating the peace gained with the signing of the 1992 Peace Accords, local cooperation exhibited throughout these elections has shown that Salvadorans have made significant progress in reconciling their sharp ideological differences.

IRI notes that positive steps were taken in a relatively short period to resolve some of the technical deficiencies observed in the first round of elections on March 20. IRI observers noted that both voters and poll workers interviewed on April 24 expressed the sentiment that these elections had proceeded with more speed and efficiency.

Indeed, observers cited an improvement in the organizational ability of poll workers and a more rapid processing of voters. The opening and closing of polling stations also was

-more-

conducted in a much more efficient manner. Moreover, the number of voting sites was increased, which resulted in lessening of the congestion found on March 20. In addition, during this election all voters who did not find their names on the national registry were able to give their names and voting card numbers to poll workers, who noted them on a special list to be sent to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. This was helpful in gaining an indication of the number of voters prevented from voting and reconciling their information for future electoral lists.

Although significant progress was achieved in a short time in the administration of the April 24 election, IRI believes the newly-elected government and political parties should continue to work together on key issues of electoral reform. While many of the technical problems associated with this electoral cycle can be attributed to its special post-war nature, the experience gained from this election will provide the basis for ensuring that future elections are administered with more efficiency and are as inclusive as possible. With this election, President-elect Calderon Sol has received a clear mandate from the people of El Salvador to continue the nation's democratic consolidation and broaden its economic growth.

IRI has maintained a presence in El Salvador since January 1994 conducting four assessment missions, which included meetings with all contending political parties and social sector representatives. IRI also sent a 20-member international team to observe the March 20 presidential, legislative, municipal, and Central American parliament elections in El Salvador. The observers visited more than 70 municipalities throughout the 14 departments on election day.

#

APPENDIX # 11

SUPREME ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL FINAL RESULTS
PRES/VPRES ELECTION (RUNOFF)
24 APRIL 1994

DEPT	ARENA	COALIC	TOTVALI	REFUTED	NULL	ABSTENC	TOTVOT	REC	UNUSED	FAULTY	MISSING	TOTAL
SANSALV	238865	145301	384166	572	7199	742	392679	392679	430152	512	2257	825600
SANTAAN	78395	38451	116846	267	4427	667	122207	122211	146798	173	19	269201
SANMIGU	56772	18783	75555	255	2815	316	78941	78944	127709	129	18	206800
LALIBERT	91747	41076	132823	365	4807	636	138631	138631	157473	468	28	296600
USULUTA	44193	17743	61936	237	2720	350	65243	65244	103460	86	9	168799
SONSON	61343	28216	89559	251	4122	511	94443	94443	117869	78	12	212402
LAUNION	32234	7830	40064	283	1736	259	42342	42342	77618	31	9	120000
LAPAZ	43539	16468	60007	312	2099	289	62707	62707	79795	0	0	142502
CHALATE	31479	13418	44897	130	1771	263	47061	47061	61592	140	11	108804
CUSCATL	32891	12540	45431	208	1802	273	47714	47714	51426	61	5	99206
AHUACH	39911	14871	54782	210	2670	550	58212	58212	78262	18	8	136500
MORAZA	21743	7143	28886	135	1399	222	30642	30643	57680	51	14	88388
SANVICE	21963	11136	33099	100	1209	190	34598	34598	40120	79	3	74800
CABANA	23189	6004	29193	142	1272	193	30800	30800	41141	51	8	72000
TOTAL	818264	378980	1197244	3467	40048	5461	1246220	1246229	1571095	1877	2401	2821602

VOTE2.WQ1

SUPREME ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS
20 MARCH 1994

DEPT	ARENA	FMLN	CONV.	MNR	MAC	MU	MSN	PCN	PDC	VALVOTE	REFUT	NULL	ABST.	TOTVOT
SANSALV	188,690	124,196	23,711	2,571	2,317	12,005	3,352	16,468	47,896	421,206	903	15,956	3,477	441,542
SANTAA	58,702	28,685	5,933	816	989	2,266	1,255	6,978	28,043	133,667	239	7,645	2,607	144,158
SANMIG	37,317	12,575	3,210	952	943	2,467	1,388	5,045	19,708	83,605	280	5,446	1,411	90,742
LALIBER	72,673	33,288	7,273	1,327	1,745	4,198	968	6,644	23,700	151,816	617	8,737	3,230	164,400
USULUT	31,651	11,440	4,007	549	987	1,843	1,897	4,242	15,171	71,787	336	6,088	1,891	80,102
SONSON	45,700	17,715	5,079	664	1,136	1,825	941	8,112	24,871	106,043	242	6,977	2,552	115,814
LAUNION	20,946	3,141	1,705	235	786	1,491	473	3,359	13,833	45,969	243	4,098	1,569	51,879
LAPAZ	31,836	10,906	1,552	269	439	1,622	476	7,333	13,896	68,329	201	4,466	1,844	74,840
CHALAT	22,640	9,492	1,225	171	297	1,281	225	3,751	11,170	50,252	159	3,189	1,330	54,930
CUSCATL	25,449	8,899	2,402	167	681	694	244	4,020	6,046	48,602	153	3,257	1,259	53,271
AHUACH	24,794	9,633	1,218	394	555	573	856	7,866	14,499	60,388	317	4,038	1,983	66,726
MORAZA	14,143	5,670	714	135	159	2,339	203	4,038	8,411	35,812	327	2,645	1,325	40,109
SANVICE	16,180	8,491	1,236	575	140	542	243	1,589	8,430	37,426	232	2,201	1,016	40,875
CABANA	15,054	3,680	578	606	935	364	306	4,075	4,777	30,375	79	2,319	1,138	33,911
TOTAL	605,775	287,811	59,843	9,431	12,109	33,510	12,827	83,520	240,451	1,345,277	4,328	77,062	26,632	1,453,299
PERCENT	45.03	21.39	4.45	0.70	0.90	2.49	0.95	6.21	17.07					

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LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY¹
Elected On March 20, 1994

AHUACHAPAN

Carlos Magaña Durán (ARENA)
Alejandro Rivera (FMLN)
Gustavo Rogelio Salinas Olmedo (PDC)

SANTA ANA

Carmen Calderón de Escalon (ARENA)
Juan Duch Martinez (ARENA)
Vladimir Orellana Guerra (ARENA)
Jose Dagoberto Gutiérrez (FMLN)
Jose Gabriel Garcia (PDC)
Juan Antonio Ascencio Oliva (PCN)

SONSONATE

Rodolfo Varela Méndez (ARENA)
Renato Antonio Pérez (ARENA)
David Pereira Rivera (FMLN)
Alfredo Arbizú Zelaya (PDC)

LA LIBERTAD

Selia Alabi Mendoza (ARENA)
Osmin López Escalante (ARENA)
Ovidio Palomo Cristales (ARENA)
Oscar Samuel Ortiz Ascencio (FMLN)
Julio César Regalado Cuéllar (PDC)

SAN SALVADOR

Julio Antonio Gamero Quintanilla (ARENA)
Rene Mario Figueroa Figueroa (ARENA)
Gerardo Suvillaga (ARENA)
Edgardo Humberto Zelaya Dávila (ARENA)
Norman Noel Quijano González (ARENA)
Mauricio Enrique Retana Escalante (ARENA)
José Armando Cienfuegos Mendoza (ARENA)
José Eduardo Sancho Castañeda (FMLN)
Manuel Orlando Quinteros Aguilar (FMLN)
Miguel Angel Sáenz Varela (FMLN)

¹ Source: El Mundo, El Salvador, April 7, 1994

Norma Fidelia Guevara (FMLN)
Sonia del Carmen Aguiñada Carranza (FMLN)

Felix Blanco (PDC)
Alejandro Dagoberto Marroquin (PCN)
Jorge Villacorta (CD)

CHALATENANGO

Heber Mauricio Aguilar Zepeda (ARENA)
Eduardo Alfonso Linares (FMLN)
Roberto Serrano Alfaro (PDC)

CUSCATLAN

Salvador Horacio Orellana Alvarez (ARENA)
Maria Marta Gómez de Meléndez (ARENA)
Fidel Dolores Recinos Alas (FMLN)

LA PAZ

Reynaldo Quintanilla Prado (ARENA)
Jose Gilberto Alegría González (FMLN)
Jorge Augusto Diaz rivas (PDC)

SAN VICENTE

Luis Roberto Angulo Samayoa (ARENA)
Maria Marta Valladares (FMLN)
José Orlando Arévalo (PDC)

CABAÑAS

René Oswaldo Rodriguez Velasco (ARENA)
José Victor Garcia (ARENA)
José Daniel Vega (PDC)

USULUTAN

Ernesto Antonio Velásquez Pineda (ARENA)
José Dolores Zelaya Mendoza (ARENA)
Francisco Emilio Mena Sandoval (FMLN)
Nelson Edwin Ramirez (PDC)

SAN MIGUEL

Ricardo Adolfo León Mejía (ARENA)
Joaquin Edilberto Iraheta (ARENA)
Juan Ramón Medrano (FMLN)
Jose Alejandro Herrera (PDC)
Alex René Aguirre (PCN)

LA UNION

Luis Alberto Cruz (ARENA)
José Ramón Benitez (ARENA)
Miguel Antonio Espinal Lazo (PDC)

MORAZAN

Hermes Alcides Flores (ARENA)
Eli Avileo Diaz (FMLN)
Rosa Mérida Villatoro Benitez (PDC)

NATIONAL CIRCUMSCRIPTION**ARENA**

Mercedes Gloria Salguero Gross
Walter René Araujo Morales
Mario Ernesto Acosta Oertel
Francisco Guillermo Flores Pérez
Jorge Alberto Carranza Alvarez
José Vicente Machado Salgado
Alfredo Angulo Delgado
Salvador Antonio Rosales Aguilar
Carlos Valentin Zelaya Seeligman

FMLN

Francisco Alberto Jovel Uquilla
Ana Guadalupe Martínez Menendez
Lorena Guadalupe Peña Mendoza
Eugenio Chicas Martinez
Francisco Roberto Lorenzana Durán

PDC

José Roberto Lanes Rodriguez
Vicente Arturo Argumeda
Alfonso Aristides Alvarenga
Roberto Edmundo Viera

PCN

José Rafael Machaca

MU

David Castro Acuña

CENTRAL AMERICAN PARLIAMENT

ARENA

Raúl Manuel Somoza Alfaro
Mauricio Zablah
Mario Enrique Amaya Rosa
José Francisco Guerrero Munguia
José Mauricio Flores Urrutia
José Rodrigo Macelo Samayoa
Carlos Miranda
José Sergio Mena Méndez
Sidney Mazzini Villacorta

FMLN

Alfredo Salvador Pineda Saca
Marco Tulio Lima
Jorge Antonio Meléndez López
Othon Sigfredo Reyes
José Luis Quan Pineda

PDC

José Antonio Morales Ehrich
Carlos Alfonso Arevalo Cisneros
Ricardo de Jesús Acevecio
José Ovidio Hernández

PCN

Ciro Cruz Zepeda Peña

CD

Carlos Diaz Barrera

SUPREME ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS
20 MARCH 1994

DEPT	ARENA	FMLN	CD	MNR	MAC	MU	MSN	PCN	PDC	VALVOT	REFUTE	NULL	ABST	TOTVO
SANSAL	183,217	115,740	17,338	2,126	1,758	9,607	3,107	29,771	54,740	417,404	973	15,275	3,417	437,069
SANTAA	58,963	27,808	5,224	654	829	1,942	1,269	7,497	29,524	133,710	214	7,635	2,627	144,186
SANMIG	36,994	12,327	2,661	689	1,028	2,314	1,360	5,937	21,490	84,800	261	5,093	1,457	91,611
LALIBER	73,194	31,464	6,677	1,047	1,849	3,875	611	7,234	26,507	152,458	474	8,517	3,430	164,879
USULUT	31,402	10,958	4,040	418	732	1,826	1,886	4,354	16,650	72,256	250	5,684	1,906	80,106
SONSON	45,396	16,616	4,632	430	1,203	1,689	789	10,633	24,719	106,107	242	6,587	2,679	115,615
LAUNIO	20,775	2,744	1,552	48	629	1,430	467	3,449	15,021	48,115	244	4,028	1,563	51,950
LAPAZ	30,560	10,315	1,070	6	303	1,295	280	9,994	14,812	66,635	142	4,230	1,896	74,903
CHALAT	22,647	10,121	296	0	203	922	40	4,190	12,194	50,613	152	2,896	1,323	54,984
CUSCAT	26,286	8,215	2,626	626	41	3	168	4,621	7,109	48,695	243	3,023	1,288	53,249
AHUACH	24,729	9,530	835	208	490	14	1,006	8,525	15,160	60,497	172	3,956	2,179	66,804
MORAZA	14,133	5,929	393	0	40	2,309	39	4,735	8,548	36,126	386	2,461	1,294	40,267
SANVICE	15,878	7,907	1,050	311	32	440	172	2,056	9,699	37,545	185	2,061	1,083	40,874
CABANA	15,217	3,824	369	568	875	310	249	4,114	4,957	30,483	65	2,306	1,083	33,937
TOTAL	599,391	273,498	48,763	7,131	10,012	27,976	11,443	107,110	261,130	1,345,444	4,003	73,752	27,225	1,450,434
PERCEN	44.48	20.33	3.62	0.53	0.74	2.08	0.85	7.96	19.41	100				

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FINAL RESULTS FOR MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS ¹
MARCH 20, 1994

Department: San Salvador

Municipality	Party /Winning Percentage	
San Salvador	ARENA	48%
Ciudad Delgado	ARENA	41%
Mejicanos	ARENA	40%
Soyapango	ARENA	41%
Cusatancingo	ARENA	42%
San Marcos	ARENA	40%
Ilopango	ARENA	46%
Nejapa	FMLN	39%
Apopa	ARENA	42%
San Martin	ARENA	40%
Panchimalco	(FMLN/CD/MNR)	28%
Aguilares	PCN	38%
Tonacatepeque	ARENA	51%
Santo Tomas	ARENA	38%
Santiago Texacuangos	ARENA	63%
El Paisnal	FMLN	40%
Guazapa	ARENA	47%
Ayutuxtepeque	ARENA	42%
Rosario de Mora	PCN	42%

Department: Santa Ana

Municipality

Santa Ana	ARENA	45%
Chalchuapa	ARENA	40%
Metapan	PDC	43%

¹ Source: Hemisphere Initiatives
130 Prospect St.
Cambridge, MA 02139

Coatepeque	ARENA	42%
El Congo	ARENA	50%
Texistepeque	PDC	51%
Candelaria de la Frontera	ARENA	44%
San Sebastian Salitrillo	ARENA	39%
Santa Rosa Guachipilin	ARENA	66%
Santiago de la Frontera	ARENA	55%
El Porvenir	ARENA	44%
Masahuat	PDC	46%
San Antonio Pajonal	ARENA	49%

Department: San Miguel

Municipality

San Miguel	ARENA	44%
Chinameca	ARENA	56%
El Transito	ARENA	41%
Ciudad Barrios	ARENA	46%
Chirilagua	ARENA	53%
Sesori	PDC	56%
San Rafael Oriente	ARENA	36%
Moncagua	ARENA	40%
Lolotique	ARENA	48%
San Jorge	ARENA	44%
Chapeltique	ARENA	40%
San Gerardo	PDC	40%
Carolina	ARENA	45%
Quelepa	MAC	27%
San Luis de la Reina	ARENA	49%
Nuevo Eden de San Juan	ARENA	56%
Nueva Guadalupe	ARENA	44%
Uluazapa	ARENA	52%
Comacaran	PDC	62%
San Antonio del Mosco	ARENA	54%

Department: La Libertad

Municipality

Nueva San Salvador	ARENA	50%
Quezaltepeque	ARENA	34%

Ciudad Arce	ARENA	51%
San Juan Opico	ARENA	41%
Colon	PDC	16%
La Libertad	ARENA	38%
Antiguo Cuscatlan	ARENA	60%
Comasagua	ARENA	48%
San Pablo Tacachico	ARENA	45%
Jayaque	ARENA	55%
Huizucar	ARENA	51%
Tepecoyo	ARENA	62%
Teotepeque	ARENA	61%
Chiltiupan	PDC	44%
Nuevo Cuscatlan	ARENA	56%
Tamanique	ARENA	51%
Sacacoyo	ARENA	55%
San Jose Villanueva	ARENA	60%
Zaragoza	ARENA	51%
Talnique	ARENA	52%
San Matias	ARENA	42%
Jicalapa	ARENA	54%

Department: Usulután

Municipality

Usulután	ARENA	48%
Jiquilisco	PDC	37%
Berlin	ARENA	44%
Santiago de Maria	ARENA	46%
Jucuapa	ARENA	42%
Santa Elena	ARENA	55%
Jucuaran	PDC	42%
San Agustin	ARENA	33%
Ozatlan	PDC	43%
Estanzuelas	ARENA	42%
Mercedes Umana	ARENA	49%
Alegria	ARENA	39%
Concepcion Batres	ARENA	54%
San Francisco Javier	PDC	38%
Puerto el Triunfo	ARENA	41%
Tecapan	ARENA	37%
San Dionisio	PCN	44%
Ereguayquin	ARENA	51%

Santa Maria	ARENA	39%
Nueva Granada	ARENA	60%
El Triunfo	ARENA	44%
San Buenaventura	ARENA	50%
California	ARENA	49%

Department: Sonsonate

Municipality

Sonsonate	ARENA	41%
Izalco	ARENA	53%
Acajutla	PDC	31%
Armenia	ARENA	48%
Nahuizalco	ARENA	38%
Juayua	ARENA	51%
San Julian	PDC	47%
Sonzacate	ARENA	41%
San Antonio del Monte	ARENA	39%
Nahuilingo	PDC	41%
Cuisnahuat	ARENA	45%
Santa Catarina Masahuat	ARENA	49%
Caluco	ARENA	54%
Santa Isabel Ishuatan	ARENA	47%
Salcoatitan	ARENA	50%
Santo Domingo de Guzman	ARENA	42%

Department: La Union

Municipality

La Union	PDC	44%
Santa Rosa de Lima	ARENA	48%
Pasaquina	ARENA	45%
San Alejo	ARENA	46%
Anamoros	ARENA	54%
El Carmen	ARENA	43%
Conchagua	ARENA	42%
El Sauce	PCN	40%
Lislique	ARENA	64%
Yucaiquin	ARENA	48%
Nueva Esparta	ARENA	52%

Poloros	ARENA	58%
Bolivar	ARENA	48%
Concepcion de Oriente	ARENA	59%
Intipuca	ARENA	28%
San Jose las Fuentes	ARENA	63%
Yayantique	ARENA	55%
Meanguera del Golfo	ARENA	82%

Department: La Paz

Municipality

Zacatecoluca	ARENA	37%
Santiago Nonualco	ARENA	49%
San Juan Nonualco	ARENA	42%
San Pedro Masahuat	ARENA	54%
Olocuilta	PCN	39%
San Pedro Nonualco	ARENA	55%
San Francisco Chinameca	ARENA	79%
San Juan Talpa	ARENA	48%
El Rosario	ARENA	49%
San Rafael Obrajuelo	ARENA	51%
Santa Maria Ostuma	ARENA	44%
San Luis Talpa	ARENA	44%
San Antonio Masahuat	ARENA	49%
San Miguel Tepezontes	ARENA	64%
San Juan Tepezontes	PCN	43%
Tapalhuaca	ARENA	50%
Cuyultitan	ARENA	69%
Paraiso de Osorio	ARENA	67%
San Emigdio	ARENA	51%
Jerusalen	ARENA	52%
Mercedes la Ceiba	PDC	44%
San Luis La Herradura	PDC	39%

Department: Chalatenango

Municipality

Chalatenango	ARENA	45%
Nueva Concepcion	ARENA	38%
La Palma	ARENA	52%
Tejutla	ARENA	46%
La Reina	ARENA	63%
Arcatao	FMLN	55%
San Ignacio	ARENA	44%
Dulce Nombre de Maria	PDC	36%
Citala	ARENA	49%
Agua Caliente	ARENA	49%
Concepcion Quezaltepeque	ARENA	57%
Nueva Trinidad	ARENA	39%
Las Vueltas	FMLN	87%
Comalapa	PDC	45%
San Rafael	PCN	29%
Las Flores o San Jose	FMLN	56%
Ojos de Agua	ARENA	65%
Nombre de Jesus	ARENA	37%
Potonico	PDC	49%
San Francisco Morazan	ARENA	33%
Santa Rita	ARENA	54%
La Laguna	ARENA	40%
San Isidro Labrador	ARENA	42%
San Antonio de la Cruz	ARENA	70%
El Paraiso	ARENA	57%
San Miguel de Mercedes	ARENA	51%
San Luis del Carmen	ARENA	76%
Cancasque	ARENA	63%
San Antonio los Ranchos	FMLN	86%
El Carrizal	ARENA	47%
San Fernando	ARENA	62%
Azacualpa	ARENA	44%
San Francisco Lempa	ARENA	48%

Department: Cuscatlan

Municipality

Cojutepeque	ARENA	51%
Suchitoto	(FMLN/CD/MNR)	63%

Osicala	ARENA	58%
Chilanga	ARENA	44%
Meanguera	FMLN	62%
Torola	ARENA	44%
San Simon	ARENA	40%
Delicias de Concepcion	ARENA	59%
Joateca	ARENA	62%
Arambala	FMLN	39%
Lolotiquillo	ARENA	41%
Yamabal	ARENA	53%
Yoloaiquin	ARENA	36%
San Carlos	ARENA	38%
El Rosario	FMLN	34%
Perquin	FMLN	39%
Sensembra	PDC	31%
Gualococti	PDC	34%
San Fernando	PCN	39%
San Isidro	ARENA	39%

Department: San Vicente

Municipality

San Vicente	ARENA	46%
Tecoluca	FMLN	47%
San Sebastian	ARENA	43%
Apastepeque	PDC	50%
San Esteban Catarina	(FMLN/CD/MNR)	45%
San Ildefonso	PDC	48%
Santa Clara	ARENA	42%
San Lorenzo	PDC	52%
Verapaz	ARENA	54%
Guadalupe	ARENA	66%
Santo Domingo	ARENA	50%
San Cayetano	ARENA	47%
Tepetitan	ARENA	38%

Department: Cabañas

Municipality

Sensuntepeque	ARENA	54%
Ilobasco	ARENA	49%
Victoria	ARENA	49%

San Pedro Perulapan	ARENA	61%
San Jose Guayabal	ARENA	57%
Tenancingo	ARENA	47%
San Rafael Cedros	ARENA	52%
Candelaria	ARENA	74%
El Carmen	ARENA	69%
Monte San Juan	ARENA	58%
San Cristobal	ARENA	63%
Santa Cruz Michapa	ARENA	59%
San Bartolome Perulapia	ARENA	43%
San Ramon	ARENA	59%
El Rosario	PCN	57%
Oratorio de Concepcion	ARENA	57%
Santa Cruz Analquito	ARENA	39%

Department: Auachapan

Municipality

Ahuachapan	ARENA	39%
Atiquizaya	ARENA	48%
San Francisco Mendez	ARENA	42%
Tacuba	ARENA	38%
Concepcion de Ataco	ARENA	40%
Jujutla	PDC	40%
Guaymango	PDC	47%
Apaneca	ARENA	48%
San Pedro Puxtla	ARENA	37%
San Lorenzo	ARENA	41%
Turin	ARENA	46%
El Refugio	ARENA	52%

Department: Morazan

Municipality

San Francisco Gotera	ARENA	38%
Jocoro	ARENA	40%
Corinto	ARENA	44%
Sociedad	PDC	34%
Cacaopera	ARENA	28%
Guatajiagua	ARENA	51%
El Divisadero	ARENA	37%
Jocoaitique	FMLN	44%

San Isidro	ARENA	49%
Jutiapa	PCN	34%
Tejutepeque	ARENA	42%
Dolores	ARENA	56%
Cinquera	FMLN	56%
Guacotecti	ARENA	65%