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DECENTRALIZATION AND THE POTENTIAL FOR EFFECTIVE MUNICIPAL GOVERNANCE IN SENEGAL

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Decentralization and the Potential for
Effective Municipal Governance in Senegal

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AGETIP	Agence pour l'Execution de Travaux d'Intérêt Public
APE	Association Parents Elèves
AMS	Association des Maires du Sénégal
ASC	Association Sportive et Culturelle
CAC	Code de l'Administration Communale
DCL	Direction des Collectivités Locales
DFCL	Direction Financière des Collectivités Locales
FECL	Fonds d'Equipement des Collectivités Locales
GIE	Groupement d'Intérêt Economique
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PDS	Parti Démocratique Sénégalais
PS	Parti Socialiste

Field research for this study was performed in Senegal from April 1993 to May 1994. Based at the Ecole Nationale d'Economie Appliquée in Dakar, I completed three case studies in Thies, Tambacounda, and Bignona. Except where otherwise indicated, all data for *Section 3 - The Senegal Case* were collected through archival research and interviews with government functionaries in Dakar and regional capitals, municipal officials, and local politicians.

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Research Summary

Across Africa, and indeed throughout the developing world, the devolution of authority to local government has failed to achieve the efficiency, and democracy-enhancing goals championed by international agencies in their support of decentralization. This research finds that Senegal's ongoing experience in intergovernmental decentralization has not yielded superior results. Despite an historical tradition of decentralized urban administration, and a comparatively strong contemporary institutional setting for self-governance-- in functional as well as fiscal terms-- municipalities in Senegal are exemplars of ineffectual, unrepresentative local government.

This research has analyzed the prospects for effective urban governance in Senegal in the context of an ongoing program devolving administrative and fiscal authority to municipalities. Senegal's communal government system-- *communes* are francophone municipal jurisdictions, equivalent to the American borough or township-- presents an important case study. Roughly half of Senegal's population lives in the country's forty-eight officially recognized cities and towns (and the quasi-urban agglomeration of Touba), an urbanization rate among the highest on the continent. The country's municipalities operate within a relatively progressive legislative framework defining an autonomous communal domain: representation by directly-elected officials, broadly-defined public service responsibilities (conditioned by central oversight), and an independent tax base. Moreover, Senegalese communes enjoy an historical tradition of limited self-government and urban political activity unique among francophone African countries.

In spite of these institutional advantages, urban government in Senegal is unaccountable and ineffectual. Financially dependent on the state, unable or unwilling to fulfill the service provision responsibilities it bears, and operating in disdainful isolation from the great mass of its constituents, Senegalese municipalities manifestly fail to accomplish their mission of "ensuring the best standard of living for the entirety of the population" (Article 44, *Code de l'Administration Communale*).

This research finds that in Senegal administrative decentralization *per se* has neither improved municipal management dramatically nor facilitated the democratization of local political life. Unlike most studies of decentralization in the developing world, I have concentrated on the decisive role played by political institutions in shaping patterns of urban governance. Political and economic benefits presumed to derive from intergovernmental decentralization are predicated on the assumption that local officials are accountable to a representative proportion of the locality's constituents. In Senegal, on the other hand, uninterrupted political incumbency by the hegemonic *Parti Socialiste* has homogenized national and local political objectives. This political reality undermines a nominally differentiated urban government system-- conditioning internal municipal operations, relations between city government and community associations, and interactions between municipal officials and central bureaucrats with oversight authority. Political affinities have withered the potential for disinterested oversight by central ministries, and compromised any incentives for fiscally-sound local management. City administration remains captive to national regime maintenance objectives unrelated to local needs and aspirations, decoupling political rewards from municipal performance.

Accountability failure must be addressed directly if municipal management programs supported by development agencies are to have long term efficacy. Drawing on the lessons of this research, I suggest strategies to progressively develop an environment of public scrutiny-- increasing the availability and relevance of information regarding municipal performance, and enhancing the effectiveness of institutions which have incentives to exploit it. Even in the absence of electoral reforms, broadening the potential for public monitoring and demand making will increase the implicit political prices of choices made by municipal politicians.

1 - Introduction

From Ecuador to Poland to South Korea, intergovernmental decentralization is *de jour* in developing regions of the world. Sixty-three of the seventy-three developing and transitional countries with populations greater than 5 million have undertaken to devolve authority to subnational units of government (Dillinger, 1994:1). The application of decentralization by Africa's historically centralized governments structures in the past ten to fifteen years has been an exemplar of this movement. Across the continent the resuscitating of subnational government has emerged as a catholic response to the failure of the unitary state to incorporate dispersed political authority and fulfill its presumed role as developmental catalyst.

This is a study of municipal decentralization in Senegal.¹ That country's long experience with semi-autonomous urban government provides an exceptional case study of intergovernmental decentralization in the African context. Senegal's communes (francophone municipal jurisdictions equivalent to the American borough or township) enjoy an historical tradition of self-government and urban political activity unique in sub-Saharan Africa.

In the developing world, the transfer of legal and administrative authority to subnational bodies has generally failed to deliver anticipated participation and efficiency-enhancing effects (Randinelli and Cheema, 1983; Mahwood, 1983; Olowu, 1990). Why, given the battery of arguments in favor of decentralization, have these programs yielded persistently unsuccessful results?

The position elaborated in this research is that political institutional variables deform the application of decentralization-- and constitute the elemental cause of persistent local misgovernance. That decentralization takes place in a political setting is

¹ Decentralization is defined as the transfer of administrative, fiscal, and political authority to subnational authorities. This may involve the deconcentration of tasks within the government hierarchy, the delegation of responsibilities to semi-autonomous bodies or voluntary organizations, or the devolution of governance authority to lower levels of government. The study focuses exclusively on the transfer of governing powers to urban government. Unless otherwise indicated, I use the terms decentralization, devolution, and intergovernmental decentralization interchangeably.

an unremarkable assertion. Intergovernmental decentralization can profoundly redefine the territorial distribution of power in national governance systems-- the political stakes surrounding decentralization are necessarily high. In the context of Africa's oligarchic political systems, decentralization has little to do with enhancing development capacity at the local level, or broadening the scope of national political participation. State bankruptcy and contraction of public spending as a result of structural adjustment has threatened the clientelist bases on which regime longevity had depended. Intergovernmental decentralization, in this taut political environment, plays a powerful role in reapportioning symbolic and patronage authority within single-party systems. Decentralization represents an instrument of regime maintenance.

To explain the inability of decentralized government to fulfill its governance role, most analyses of decentralization have focused on shortcomings in the legal and organizational profile of local government systems. It is the contention of this study that legislative and administrative deficiencies are symptoms but not the fundamental causes of malperformance in African local government.

In Senegal the Parti Socialiste's unitary political hierarchy has trivialized the formal municipal governance system defined by the country's Communal Code, trapping urban government in a downward spiral of insolvency and delegitimization. Because rules structuring the municipal political arena have limited the constituency to which local officials remain accountable, commune officials have had little or no incentive to improve the performance or representation of their administrations. Indeed, intra-party affinities between central bureaucrats and municipal politicians have eased the burden of fiscal self-reliance and stripped the budgeting process of its disciplining logic, encouraging profligate management patterns at the local level.² In sum, political rewards for municipal politicians are in no way linked to governance results.

² A similar analysis could be made of every public institution in the country (the development banks, public utilities, state lottery agency, social security trust, Red Cross...), each overwhelmed with patronage demands, weakened by factional in-fighting and eventually plundered for available regime-sustaining resources.

2 - Decentralization at the Intersection of Politics and Administration

Decentralization's great appeal can be likened to the real distinction attributed to changes in legal dispositions relating to property rights regimes. On one hand, public ownership of economic assets has given rise to an insitutional culture of profligate management, inefficiencies, and weak performance (Waterbury, 1993:262). By contrast, the incentives which inhere in the privatization process are expected to generate gains in technical and allocative efficiency (Aharoni, 1991:74). However, as Shapiro and Willig (1990:58) caution: "If market failure-- externalities, monopoly power, and the like-- are severe, then privatization without regulation may well be inferior to public enterprise." The point is that organizational performance is determined by institutional characteristics proper to the entity as well as the structure of market competition. Similarly, local government systems defined by formal administrative codes operate within environments shaped by political rules and structures. Policy outcomes associated with decentralized governance units will depend on ways in which political variables condition the system's administrative attributes.

2.1 - Understanding the Application of Decentralization

In apparent deference to the battery of theoretical arguments in favor of decentralizing reforms, many studies of decentralization in the developing world are surprisingly formulaic. Much of this abundant literature is "prescriptive or didactic in style, with relatively little critical analysis" (Conyers, 1984:191); without systematic examination of whether promised benefits are realized in practice (Wolman and McCormick, 1990:37), these analyses "posit a likelihood that positive results will occur from structural or procedural reforms" (Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986:19).

There are two disciplinary approaches to the analysis of decentralization: a public policy approach and an institutional approach. The public policy perspective identifies the administrative system as the unit of analysis; government malperformance derives from lacunae in the components which make up the system. To understand local government

systems' often disappointing governance outcomes, policy studies have invariably focused on discrete legislative deficiencies and capacity constraints which handicap the functioning of national decentralization programs: the scope and significance of powers and functions devolved to local government systems; the degree of fiscal and administrative autonomy accorded subnational bodies; the nature of linkages between central and local authorities; the physical, human, and organizational resources available to decentralized bodies; bottlenecks in the system of revenue generation; and differential economic endowments across regions. A few studies also cite a lack of constituent participation in decision-making as a shortcoming, but without explanation of how such interaction comes about. (Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983; Cochrane, 1983; Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986; UNCHS, 1989; Olowu, 1990; Olowu and Smoke, 1992).

The institutional approach builds on rational choice approaches developed by the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University (Ostrom and Ostrom, 1977; Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, et. al., 1993). Institutional approaches to decentralization (Campbell, 1991; Wunsch, 1991; Rondinelli, McCullough and Johnson, 1989) focus on incentives which derive from the attributes of different public goods and services: excludibility of use; jointness of consumption, and willingness to pay. Different collective goods generate different information and governance problems which can only be resolved by a variety of institutional arrangements. These include central and local government, intermediate non-governmental organizations, and user groups. A network of multi-tiered or "polycentric" governance arrangements encourages beneficiary participation, and reduces monitoring costs.

From this perspective, the objective of decentralizing reforms is "not 'strong local government' but an efficient and responsive system of ... [local] service delivery" (Dillinger, 1994:12). Offering citizens "the opportunity to organize not one but many governing authorities" (Ostrom, et. al., 1993:178), decentralization can be thought of as a "competition surrogate" (Israel, 1992:76; 1987:ch.7), which exposes public administration to performance-enhancing pressures.³ The inclusion of private and community-based

³ New models of public management (e.g. Esman, 1991; Hage and Finsterbush, 1987) also embrace decentralization although for somewhat different reasons. These approaches emphasize the importance of developing patterns through which "to discover and articulate goals, select among means, cope with

arrangements in local service production not only limits the role of subnational government to that of organizing and overseeing the provision of services-- "substantially resolv[ing] many of the issues related to inadequate capacity at subnational government levels" (Silverman, 1992:14)-- but also holds the promise of better incorporating disenfranchised segments of the population into the public realm.⁴

Both institutional and public policy approaches to decentralization acknowledge the political underpinnings of the decision to shift the balance of central-local power. However, non-administrative concerns enter these analyses less as explanatory variables than as a source of drag: a "lack of political commitment" (Rondinelli, Cheema and Nellis, 1986:39) or "resistance to change" (Silverman, 1992:13) manifested in cautious or incomplete implementation of institutional changes.

An implicit proposition is that there exists a neat differentiation between political variables and more tractable legal and managerial concerns. Writing on governance issues more broadly, for example, Landell-Mills and Serageldin (1990:8) distinguish between "political" and "technical" aspects of governance reforms. The former relates to the "degree of commitment to the achievement of good governance" and the latter to "issues of efficiency and public management." Addressing political governance, the authors note an apparently universal inclination towards disengagement of the state from national economies, and a trend towards the devolution of public service responsibility to local communities. Such political processes have opened up new opportunities, but "empowerment and greater accountability will not ensure better governance unless public agencies are made more compliant. This brings to the fore issues of technical management and related to that, skill acquisition."

uncertainty and controversy generated both within and without the organization, and foster legitimacy and commitment inside and outside the organization" (Hult and Wolcott, 1990:37).

⁴ For this reason analysts interested in participatory approaches to development also find decentralization *qua* pluralization of the local public sphere to be an appropriate component of governance reforms (e.g. Leonard and Marshall, 1982; Paul, 1986:20). Participation by private and community groups in governance activities provides a "real check on government excesses" (Chazan and Rothchild, 1989:34) and over time will result in the building of a more responsible political culture (Bratton, 1990:104). Hyden (1983:131) summarizes: "With more and more people having a chance to experience the implications of 'institutionalized suspicion', their civic consciousness will increase and the ability of society holding its public officials accountable for their actions will be enhanced."

In a similar fashion, the literature on decentralization commonly assumes political conditions and associates support of technical capacity within government bodies with good analysis, sound decision-making, and eventually good policy-making (Gordon, 1992). Some analysts propose that there exists a relationship of sorts between tangible elements of organizational capacity such as "skill acquisition" and the quality of local political exchange. A recent assessment (Kumado, 1994:200) of Ghana's decentralization program argues that "only the skilled and trained officials can be relied upon to keep continuity, system [sic], impartial interpretation, and disinterested impetus." Vengroff and Ben Saleh (1991:490) seem equally comfortable with this presumed correlation: their study of decentralization in Tunisia finds that elected municipal officials are "poorly trained and not well prepared to address urban functions. They appear to serve the representational function to the extent of seeking patronage."

In a typical study, Nigerian public administration specialists Laleye and Olowu (World Bank, 1989:117-20) classify problems confronting local governments in Africa as either "environmental" or "managerial." They characterize environmental constraints as historical (notably a powerful tradition of centralization), institutional and programmatic (including the center's monopoly on political, financial, informational and human resources), and attitudinal (particularly the low regard with which local institutions are held by elites within and outside of government). Managerial problems include "structural" concerns such as the legal status of local government; inappropriately large local government staffs; personnel management problems; unequal repartition of fiscal resources available to local government; poorly-defined support linkages to central institutions; and a host of "operational" issues comprising excessive control by the center, weak information management systems, and inadequate training of local officials. The authors conclude,

"[while] contextual factors are quite weighty, the more serious problems are the managerial ones. Research into local organizations has proven quite conclusively that problems within the environment are not so determinative of the performance of local organizations. What is critical are the structure of local organizations, the operational procedures within such organizations, and the type of interventions made by external agencies (Laleye and Olowu, 1989:118).

Institutional analyses of decentralization are similarly incomplete. Deterministic portrayals of induced political change oversimplify what are highly uncertain relationships between legislative reform and the evolution of local political exchange. Reprobation of centralized government translates into unconditional faith in the appropriateness of local contracting. Arguing in favor of decentralized arrangements to improve renewable natural resource management (RNRM) in the Sahel, Thompson and his collaborators (1989:114) assert,

[local governance] regimes must enjoy authoritative powers to create the framework of authorized and authoritative relationships necessary to facilitate both individual and collective action concerning resources under management. If local regimes enjoy authority to make, modify, and enforce RNRM rule, probabilities are good that local officials and others acting as "public entrepreneurs" will gradually develop efficient RNRM concerns that are supported by resource users.

In the same vein, Olowu (1990:92) writes,

Local government is thus fundamentally a constitutional issue. It is one to approach as an issue of organizing and enhancing popular collective choice and collective action.

I would argue that these prescriptive analyses are very much off target. It is by no means self-evident that local leaders will make choices consistent with the collective welfare, or that arrangements will emerge which promote allocative efficiency. Indeed, as Bates (1988:395-6) has pointed out, the emergence of efficient organizational forms is itself a public good subject to collective dilemmas; there are few incentives for political entrepreneurs to act as disinterested third parties even in a universe of secure contracting.⁵ As Ribot (1995:2) rightly observes,

The single user group commons that the common property literature has so carefully searched out may be a delightful and easily studied find, but it is rare (see Wade, Ostrom, Bromley). The most common form of collective action governing the commons is the collusion of layered and inter-linked oligopsonies, as they are shaped by the monopoly of selectively implemented state policy.

⁵ On the contrary, the high levels of individual uncertainty which local political figures face in the context of Africa's personalized and centralized governance regimes inevitably encourage an "après moi le déluge" attitude.

Thus 'getting the property rights right' represents an overly narrow conception of what drives organizational and individual behavior (Williamson, 1995:173). Political as well as administrative rules matter. Politics not only determines how constituent and resource-user demands are articulated and responded to, but establishes the sanctions which (may or may not) oblige public officials to take into account the social and economic costs of their private actions. As Douglass North (1994:360) states in his 1993 Nobel address:

Politics significantly shape economic performance because they define and enforce the economic rules. Therefore an essential part of development policy is the creation of politics that will create and enforce efficient property rights.

2.2 - How do Politics Affect the Performance of Decentralized Government?

Political arrangements establish patterns of access to government institutions. Electoral systems, political parties, and legislation governing civil activism condition the inclusiveness of governance systems, defining the degree to which particularistic interests will subsume broader community concerns. In Senegal, for example, it is clear that complete dominance of the political system by the hegemonic and hierarchical *Parti Socialiste* has introverted the local governance regime: for municipal officials political success may have absolutely nothing to do with conventional indicators of effective city management or good representation. In the context of government systems in which appointment or election to local political bodies is largely controlled by single-party regimes, "the distinction between deconcentration and devolution becomes meaningless" (Werlin, 192:224). Decentralization is about power. Writing on the contemporary Mexican experience, Rodriguez (1993:142) asserts succinctly:

As long as political power is not actually redistributed, decentralization cannot succeed.

The crux of the issue is accountability. The entire rationale for decentralized government, efficiency and political arguments, rests on the assumption that local authorities are answerable to a representative proportion of the locality's constituents. How are local authorities held accountable?

Public accountability is a complex process requiring often overlapping sets of controls (Hood,1985). Making public administrations more accountable has often been taken to be synonymous with the putting in place of transparent administrative procedures and structures. The objective has been to establish accountable units within governments where output can be measured against input and individuals can be measured against performance. This is what Paul (1991) refers to as the classic view of public accountability through "hierarchical control," central oversight of subordinate administrative strata; a corollary approach has been to ameliorate accountability by improving the design of services and providing appropriate incentives to managers and service providers.

Focusing on subnational government, an effective framework for local accountability can be conceptualized as composed of two dimensions: vertical controls and horizontal controls. In practice, the potential effectiveness of both sets of controls is conditioned by environmental constraints, in particular political rules and practices. Let us begin by addressing the issue of establishing adequate vertical controls (government and legislative oversight).

Even in highly federalized systems localities operate within the bounds of a jurisdictional hierarchy with more or less, but never absolute, independence from superior levels of government.⁶ Thus, insofar as separation and distance obfuscate performance, the devolution of decision-making to local government necessarily poses a principal agent problem. Even application of guidelines defined by higher authorities represents a constant challenge. Even in administratively well-developed polities such as the United States, for example, municipal breaches of state environmental laws are common. In the developing world structural barriers (weak communications networks, insufficient personnel, geographic obstacles) aggravate agency and make effective central monitoring of local government particularly problematic.

⁶ Militant states' rights advocates in this country challenge this assertion, contending that the central government was created by the states and therefore inferior to them (Nice, 1987:82-6).

Even more damaging, political maneuvering by ministerial officials undermines any presumption of impartial application of tutelary authority; in countries (with parliamentary systems) where the party in power dominates the national assembly, and thus the government, inconsistent application of regulatory rules will be particularly acute (*cf.* Williamson 1995:191). In many African countries, central oversight organizations such as the French regional accounting courts (*Chambres regionales des comptes*, presided over by a magistrate from the national *Cour des Comptes*) either do not exist or have been emasculated by political affinities. Where senior bureaucrats belong to the same national party as local politicians, these officials face competing priorities which clearly weaken incentives to sanction mismanagement. Alternatively, in countries such as Kenya (Stren, et. al.,1994:185) where politicians from an opposition party have taken control of important municipalities, the government has arbitrarily applied legislation to constrain the maneuvering room of local elected officials. Either way, central oversight is uneven.

Judicial systems and specially devised laws in some countries have augmented the individual accountability of local officials (Paul,1991:8). But where judiciaries are part of the bureaucracy or under the Ministry of Justice, as is the case in most African countries (Dia,1993:15), these potential benefits will be lost. Further, the absence of institutions which buttress the rule of law in the industrialized world (a vigilant press, diversified civil associations) further lowers the cost of conspiratorial behavior between politically-allied elites. As Gray Cowan (1962:208) observes, describing interaction between different levels of government in Sékou Touré's Guinea:

[when] the source of power is expressly kept outside of the constitution, the subordination of all government to the party organization render meaningless the constitutional relationships of these organs to another.

In Africa, deepening resource constraints at the central level have further withered the effectiveness of vertical controls, and this at a time when local government systems have expanded and their responsibilities multiplied. Already, regionally-based agents of the Senegalese Treasury and the Ministry of Urbanism must borrow working vehicles and diesel fuel from other agencies to complete their municipal oversight obligations; and the number of local collectivities in that country is expected to increase in the next year or

two. In this context, horizontal controls must shoulder much of the burden of improving local accountability.

Horizontal controls mean, in essence, community control. Community oversight takes place periodically through the vehicle of local elections, and through day-to-day interaction with local authorities. Consensual social controls, for many analysts, hold great policing potential: "In a face-to-face community, officers can be held accountable as much by social processes of pair-wise reciprocity as by formal procedures of election" (Oakerson, 1988:149). Constituent oversight is, nonetheless, problematic in practice. The rhetorical advantages of 'shrinking the distance between governor and governed' notwithstanding, community scrutiny of local government demands a highly mobilized public and the overcoming of considerable information barriers. As evidenced by voter ignorance and apathy concerning local issues and elections in the United States, the challenges of establishing community control are universally daunting.

In the developing world high information costs constitute a first and fundamental obstacle. Public administration analyses have tended to categorize this problem as a matter of making transparent opaque bookkeeping practices and behind-closed-doors decision-making. This is only a first step. Low levels of education, the absence of locally-oriented-local language mass media, and low levels of local government-community interaction present formidable barriers to the development of an informed electorate. Moreover, after decades of non-performing local government in Africa, and aggressive superintendence of the urban associational sector, intra-community mobilization is low and most city neighborhoods have grown unaccustomed to looking to the municipality for public service solutions (*cf.* Grindle, 1980). The potential for third-party oversight (e.g. whistle-blowing) is further diminished because errant local officials are rarely punished by national authorities for deviance from the rules (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, 1990:434). User-driven accountability does not ineluctably emerge.⁷

⁷ On the other hand, conscientious constituents can apparently be formed. Analyzing the success of an urban health project in Northeast Brazil, Tandler and Feedheim (1994:1784) found a key component of the program to be aggressive use of advertising to stimulate public awareness of the program and public recognition of the workers. In this way regional state authorities "raised the community's hopes about what to expect from its government, and then educated them precisely about what workers, supervisors, and mayors should be doing."

The quality of local electoral accountability varies considerably in the developing world. In Africa, democratic transitions and incremental political liberalization notwithstanding, oligarchic rule continues. Multiparty elections held amid much enthusiasm in a number of countries in the early 1990's-- for example, in Kenya, Gabon, and Côte d'Ivoire-- were marred by procedural irregularities. And Bratton and Van de Walle (1992:51) conclude, at the end of a review of democratic reforms across the continent: "By the criteria of free and fair elections, we cannot say that any of the African regimes studied is indisputably embarked on a democratic route."

Electoral rules and polling procedures continue to set careful bounds to political competition. Election by party-based list, for example, remains a prominent feature of political-electoral arrangements in Africa, offering a considerable advantage to dominant national parties. Once in power, it is hard to shake these regimes loose, even by electoral means. In Senegal, fifteen years of multiparty democracy notwithstanding, the political machine established by Senghor in the 1950's remains solidly in power. Through cooptation, electoral manipulation, and expeditious legislative reforms (partial political liberalization, decentralization, the creation of new ministerial portfolios), the *Parti Socialiste* has managed to more or less satisfy democratic aspirations of the political elite without giving up control of the national governance apparatus. And, even without resorting to procedural irregularities, judicious use of national resources at election time have given the incumbents an unbeatable advantage; elections in Senegal, as an observer remarked to me, 'are the times of red bills' (the red 10,000 franc note is the cfa's zone's largest denomination).

Formal studies of the political business cycle have shown (Rogoff, 1990; Rogoff and Sibert, 1988) that as information asymmetries between voters and politicians increase, incumbent politicians will have greater opportunities to 'signal' how their administrations are doing through transfers and or lowering taxes prior to elections. Such information asymmetries are naturally prevalent in the developing world. In addition, low-income, low-education voters will also tend to have high discount rates (shorter time

horizons) making them even more susceptible to pre-election economic enticements offered by incumbent regimes.

The influence of entrenched national political regimes often translates into considerable distortion of electoral processes at the local level for several reasons. First, the same advantages which accrue to incumbent parties nationally tend to be multiplied by the parochial (less media coverage, fewer independent observers) nature of local elections, and because party resources can be concentrated in a powerful discrete way.⁸

Second, national issues (employment in particular) tend to dominate local elections in all parts of the world. By the same token, local politicians can be swept out of office because of national political dynamics (such as party affiliation) which may have nothing to do with the performance of local politicians.⁹ And local elections may be highly personalized affairs, with individuals voting on the basis of who they know or have an affinity for. In sum, the local electoral mandate is not necessarily congruent with the quality of local governance.

Third, the ability of local elites to dominate subnational politics often translates, through common economic interests and political alliances, into further homogenization of national and local politics; collusion between intra-national elites substitutes for genuine principal-agent relations (Paul, 1991:91). Generally, elite bias nationally combined with unequal relations of power at the local level tends to nullify the participatory benefits which are presumed to accrue to decentralized government. Griffen (1981:225) writes:

it is conceivable, even likely in many countries, that power at the local level is more concentrated, more elitist and applied more ruthlessly against the poor than at the center.

In terms of community accountability, that local elites hold disproportional amounts of power or economic interests makes it easier for them to overcome the costs of collective action (Olson, 1965) and thereby crowd out weaker interests in the local

⁸ As evidenced by the PRI's astounding electoral expenses (\$ 70 million) during the Tabasco gubernatorial elections in November 1994, it is possible to concentrate resources and still spend a lot.

⁹ This 'national party effect' is as strong in Senegal (where Dakar's largely successful mayor Mamadou Diouf was ousted in a protest vote against the ruling *Parti Socialiste* in 1993) as it is in Texas (witness Ann Richards' ejection from the governorship in 1994).

governance arena. In a review of the Onitsha local government in Nigeria, Olowu describes dominance of the town council by local merchants (which he cheers as "a good working relationship between the council and the local citizens"):

Through these various professional associations, the most powerful of which is the Onitsha Market Amalgamated Association (OMATA), traders have been influential, for instance, in deciding major issues relating to market projects and market administration... Currently, most of the local government council members are members of OMATA. Indeed, Mr. Ben Ohanugbo,... chairman of the local government until August 1989, was a past chairman of OMATA (Olowu, 1992:42).

In the face of increasing exclusivity of access to local government decision-making and provision of goods, a broader public accountability necessarily wanes. In addition, careful oversight of civil associations by government ministries has helped to preserve the prerogatives of (regime-affiliated) elites. In Senegal, through legislation regimenting the activities of civil associations, direct suppression and cooptation of threatening groups or individuals, the state has severely limited the scope of independent community mobilization. Officially-sanctioned or politically-affiliated civil organizations proliferate but, naturally, do not serve an oversight role. Relating a dearth of civic activism to misgovernance in southern regions of Italy, Putnam (1992) makes a similar point, although he emphasizes the absence of social cohesion rather than monitoring problems. As Oakerson (1988:149) summarizes:

Primary local units can be regulated or preempted by overriding political (or, in the case of the church, ecclesiastical) authority to such an extent that the costs of productive local action become prohibitive.

Where community 'voice' is constrained, weaker elements in the community can in principle apply 'exit' strategies to signal discontent and assert accountability over local authorities. However, because many local public services are monopolies, exit options are limited. In European countries, instruments such as housing vouchers may allow disfavored residents to exit substandard public housing (Paul, 1991:37). But these opportunities are not necessarily available in much of the developing world (Chile is an exception). On the other hand, across Africa the urban poor have indeed exited unresponsive municipal governance arenas to squatter neighborhoods, 'informal' housing

constructions, and ambulant or unstructured marketplaces. However, as evidence by the willingness of municipal authorities across the continent to clean out (*déguerpir*) informal market areas, evict squatters or even destroy whole low-income settlements on the urban periphery, these weapons of the weak do not immediately threaten oligarchic local politics.

2.3 - Bringing Political Institutions into the Analysis

A number of monographs of national decentralization programs have probed the motivations behind the move to decentralize, and the timing and scope of reforms. Political-economic studies of Senegal (Gellar, 1990), Mexico (Rodriguez, 1993), Peru (Kim, 1992), Nepal (Bienen et. al., 1990), Sri Lanka (Craig, 1981) and Papua New Guinea (Tordoff, 1981) provide rich descriptions of the political significance and uses of decentralization, local distributional impacts of devolution, and ways in which national political competition has conditioned decentralization policy. A comparative study by the University of Manchester summarizes:

those in authority will always seek to manipulate decentralization institutions to their own advantage. Decentralization can, perhaps, be viewed as a neutral administrative instrument which may be turned to subjective, and diametrically opposed political purposes... (Tordoff, et. al., 1981:vii.).

These works employ politics as an macro-variable to understand how public agencies and interest groups behave in the wider political system (*cf.* Moe, 1991:108-9).¹⁰ An explicit challenge of this study, not always taken up by the aforementioned works, is to understand how political institutions structure the implementation of decentralization at the local level.

As detailed in later sections, incentives which derive from representative institutions (nationally and locally), formal and informal rules governing party primaries,

¹⁰ A parallel can be made between these analyses and studies of political liberalization and economic adjustment in the developing world (Nelson, 1989; Nelson, 1990; Haggard and Kaufman, 1992; Bates and Krueger, 1993; Haggard and Webb, 1994). Authors in these edited volumes have similarly incorporated electoral-governmental arrangements and policy-making structures into their analyses to explain the timing, content, and eventual sustainability of selected reforms.

rules defining municipal elections, and the hierarchical characteristics of the dominant national party have warped all aspects of a formally-defined urban government system: the internal functioning of communes, their relationship with the community, and municipal interaction with central government. The structure of political competition in Senegal has constrained the polity to which elected officials remain accountable, encouraged virulent factionalism within municipalities, provided central authorities with considerable leverage over local decision-makers, and generated few incentives for responsible, responsive local management. These politically-induced disfunctions represent the elemental cause of the failure of urban government to provide sound governance in Senegal.

3 - The Senegal Case

The Senegalese municipal tradition pre-dates the French Revolution (Johnson, 1971:39-40), formalized in the granting of full municipal status to the Four Communes beginning in 1872. Contemporary communes in Senegal operate within a progressive legislative framework defining an independent communal domain. Every five years voters elect councilors in municipal elections; the newly-elected council then elects a mayor from within their ranks. The mayor assumes full executive authority over municipal affairs (subject to the Ministry of the Interior's oversight authority). Communes have broad responsibility over the provision and maintenance of most urban infrastructure and services. And the national Communal Code provides municipalities with an independent tax base made up of direct and indirect local taxes, taxes from use of the public domain, and revenues shared with the central government. The institutional setting for autonomous municipal government in Senegal is practically unmatched in sub-Saharan Africa.¹¹

¹¹ Differing institutional features make comparisons across local government systems problematic. Local government systems are generally compared along two dimensions: administrative autonomy and fiscal self-reliance. Information for a detailed comparison is not available, but a few indicators are illustrative. For example, in terms of legislated administrative independence, Senegal and the Côte d'Ivoire are exceptional. In other francophone countries— including Benin, Guinea, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Togo, Central African Republic, Cameroun, and Congo— appointed municipal administrators replace elected mayors in national and/or regional capital cities. Similar arrangements have obtained in Ghana (Crook, 1994), Kenya (until 1993) (Stren, et. al., 1994), and Zambia (at least through 1991) (Mukwena, 1992). In terms of fiscal independence, Senegalese communes receive no more than 10 percent of their annual total revenues from government grants, a proportion considerably smaller than that of municipalities in other francophone African countries; even in the Côte d'Ivoire's aggressively decentralized system, the government allocates transfers to

Administrative and political legislation has placed Senegal's municipal government program at the forefront of decentralization efforts in the Sahel (Gellar, et al., 1992), and the country continues to serve as something of a model for West African decentralizers. Public administration specialists have given the government generally good marks for the progressive legal structure in which local authorities operate (Rondinelli and Minis, 1990:448; RTI, 1989). The country's apparent "commitment to the values of liberal democracy" (Fatton, 1987:158) has also helped sustain a favorable impression of municipal institutions. In terms of political process, Senegal has scored seven on the Carter Center's eight point scale measuring phases of transition to democracy, the highest rating received by an African government (*Africa Demos*, 1992). Moreover, a recent evaluation of the country's local government system (Vengroff, 1993:27) suggests that,

"democracy in Senegal has been strengthened by the development of locally oriented representative institutions".

I find, on the contrary, that decentralization *per se* has not improved the quality of municipal governance in Senegal. Public infrastructure is not maintained, taxes are not collected, and communication between the municipality and its constituents remains extremely limited. Political rules and practices have fundamentally warped the commune's representational and service-providing role. And uninterrupted political incumbency has homogenized national and local political objectives, undermining a nominally differentiated urban government system.

The following sections will explain the apparent failure of Senegal's urban administrations to provide effective governance. I focus on formal and informal rules

communes for recurrent expenses (Sinet,1995; CFD,1994). Fiscal comparisons across anglophone and francophone urban government systems are somewhat more difficult. On one hand, municipal councils in a number of anglophone countries have greater service responsibilities than, say, communes in Senegal or the Côte d'Ivoire. City governments in Kenya and Zimbabwe, for example, have the provision of housing and potable water systems as part of their portfolio (Smoke,1992; Wekwete,1992). On the other hand, local governments in these countries do not have important fiscal roles, and are reliant on central government transfers and off-budget credits for all capital and some recurrent expenditures; Zimbabwean municipalities, for example, only raise approximately one half of their total revenues (UNDP,1993). Extreme fiscal dependence is also a feature of Nigeria's municipal government system which depends on the central government for as much as 80 percent of its resources (O'Donovan,1992:358).

structuring political competition in municipalities: electoral laws defined in the *Code de l'Administration Communale* (CAC) and the *Code Electoral*; legislation regimenting the activities of civil associations; and the centralized codes and conventions which regulate alignments and conflicts within the *Parti Socialiste* (PS).

I argue that these political arrangements have subsumed the formal municipal governance system defined in the CAC, and constitutes the elemental cause of commune misgovernance. Indeed, contraction and/or restitution of the scope of municipal prerogatives, including the imposition and eventual withdrawal of centrally-appointed managers, has not fundamentally changed the quality of commune management since independence. Nor has the return of full executive authority to elected mayors in 1990 (1983 in Dakar) prompted an improvement in municipal performance.

Relying on evidence from recent field research, the discussion begins with a description of contemporary urban management patterns. Subsequent sections document ways in which political rules warp communes' representational and service providing role. First, I detail the immediate and divisive effects of partisan politics on internal commune operations. Second, I analyze the inability of municipal officials to develop collaborative relations with civil associations which proliferate in urban Senegal. Lastly, I describe ways in which latent political relationships deform the supervisory role played by government ministries which intervene in municipal affairs.

3.1 - Municipal Misgovernance

The Senegalese *Code de l'Administration Communale*, passed into law in 1966, defines the role and mandate of the country's municipal administrations. There are currently 48 communes¹² in the municipal system, spanning a demographic range from the 800,000 inhabitant agglomeration of Dakar (2 million people live in the five communes of Greater Dakar) to the micro-municipality of N'dioum with a population of 3,000. Communal councils, composed of between 23 and 110 councilors depending on the jurisdiction's size, represent the population. Councilors are elected by universal suffrage in

¹² Commune is a francophone jurisdiction corresponding to the American borough or township.

quinquennial multiparty elections. Mayors, designated by their peers from within the ranks of elected councilors, are invested with broad authority over municipal affairs including preparation and execution of the municipal budget, which is deliberated and voted on by the council. At the same time, the *Code* invests the Ministry of the Interior's *Direction of Local Collectivities* (DCL) with broad oversight authority over commune decision-making. Practically all important actions taken by the council, including approval of the annual budget, require the DCL's *a priori* approval. (Application of the DCL's authority is discussed in greater detail later in the chapter.)

The CAC details communal responsibilities in broad terms which translates, in practice, into responsibility for the provision for a great number of urban services including: garbage collection; sanitation (in the few cities where sewers exist); roadway maintenance; street lighting; maintenance of parks and public spaces; land surveys for residential zones; expansion of the potable water system; expansion of the electricity network; nursery and primary school maintenance; primary health center maintenance; and the issuing of administrative acts.

Principal Municipal Investments: 1989-1992 (Excluding Dakar)

Land Management	7%
Markets, Stalls and Souks	10%
Road Maintenance	8%
Sanitation	8%
Extension: Electricity Network	4%
Education Infrastructure	5%
Socio-Cultural Infrastructure	5%
Health Infrastructure	3%
Sports Infrastructure	9%
Purchase of Vehicles	12%

Source: MEFP:Projet d'Appui aux Collectivités Locales

The *Code* also provides municipalities with an independent tax base composed of: revenues shared with the government (motor vehicle tax and real estate capital gains tax); indirect municipal taxes (fees for administrative acts, garbage collection, advertising); taxes of the public domain (market, kiosk and taxi fees); and direct local taxes (business and property taxes).

3.1.1 Governance Failure

Throughout the country's cities garbage piles up in vacant lots, peripheral quarters are unlit and dangerous, and during the short wet season rainwater creates muddy rivers which flood houses and create mosquito breeding pools. Beyond generally well-maintained city centers, streets are often so deteriorated that only horses and motorcycles can pass. Families must walk many kilometers to reach primary health facilities. Shallow wells and un-sealed septic pits lie dangerously juxtaposed in neighborhoods not served by the city's water network.

Urban Service Provision: Communes Excluding Region of Dakar¹³

	Water Network Access (%)	Public Standpipe (1k hab)	Electricity Network Access (%)	Classroom Primary (1k hab)	Classrooms Secondary (1k hab)	Health Centers (beds/1k hab)	Health Posts (1k hab)
Regional Capitals Pop: 50k-200k	31	1	49	2.2	0.98	0.25	0.06
Secondary Towns Pop: 15k-50k	22	1.2	41	2.33	1.07	0.24	0.05
Small Towns Pop: 5k-15k	20.5	2.2	33.2	4.4	1.8	0.3	0.2

Source: République du Sénégal/MUH/DUA (1991) Annexe B

National averages obscure often desperate living conditions. In the regional capital of Tambacounda (1993 pop: 53,000), the public water network serves a scant 6 percent of the population; twenty-four public standpipes, roughly equivalent to one per four hundred households, serve the rest of the commune's population (République du Sénégal/MUH-MDC:1993). Several of the municipality's peripheral neighborhoods-- home to a slaughterhouse, a cotton ginning factory, and the municipal garbage dump-- are completely reliant on shallow wells for their drinking water.¹⁴ Two primary health posts, staffed by 3 nurses, serve the heart of the city, home to more than 20,000 people. Two maternities serve the commune (an area of almost 8 square kilometers) and the

¹³ In cases where alternative data sources exist, these figures appear greatly exaggerated-- in particular relative to access to the water and electricity networks.

¹⁴ A survey completed in 1974 found only 12% of households in Tambacounda to have some form of WC on their property, compounding the risk of a public health disaster (République du Sénégal/MTPUT: (1974)).

surrounding countryside. The commune's primary schools are similarly saturated-- averaging between sixty and one hundred children per class.¹⁵


In the country's densely-populated principal cities, public service failure has resulted in extremely degraded and dangerous environmental conditions. Only 65% of Dakar's solid waste makes it to the capital's overwhelmed dump and waste processing center in Mbeubeuss. The garbage collection service with whom the Urban Community of Dakar¹⁶ contracts finds "improvised ways" to dispose of the remainder. In Tambacounda, the commune itself contributes to the anarchy, turning a blind eye-- as do agents of the Ministry of Public Health's *Service d'Hygiène*-- to the clandestine dumps preferred by its garbage trucks to the inconvenient authorized site at the edge of town. In the country's six older municipalities equipped with a formal sanitation system only 27 percent of households in centrally-located neighborhoods are covered by the sewer network, fewer than 10 percent in peripheral neighborhoods. In Dakar, the only commune with a waste water treatment plant, only 3 to 5 percent of waste water is treated; the rest (1200 m3 per day) pours into the ocean or seeps into the water table (*Wal Fadjiri*, 27 février 1995).

Mirroring the low level of urban service provision, Senegalese municipalities are, by and large, somnolent, consumptive structures. With the notable exception of Dakar, commune administration is badly run-down, poorly organized, and lacks appropriate equipment to function properly. Elementary administrative techniques, such as functional organigrams and detailed job descriptions for staff, are practically unknown. Only 12 of 48 municipalities have detailed Communal Investment Plans and these are rarely consulted. In larger communes, frequent absences by the mayor and his principal lieutenants consign week-to-week planning and management to retired, resident assistant mayors. Municipal councils meet infrequently and, with the exception of a well-attended annual budgetary session in December, an average of 60 percent of council members regularly attend these meetings. Moreover, passivity characterizes council sessions in which the mayor and his deputies present municipal business with little dissent.

¹⁵ According to UNDP's 1994 Human Development Report, the average pupil-teacher ration in Low Human Development countries is 43.

¹⁶ Created in 1983, the Urban Community of Dakar (CUD) is a management committee composed of the 5 communes in the capital region; garbage collection is the CUD's principal service responsibility.

Fiscal Profile: All Communes (1986-1992)



Severe fiscal imbalances underlie the visible evidence of governance collapse. Tax collection has not kept pace with recent urban demographic growth-- 4 percent in the capital region, and higher in a number of secondary cities (Perrault et Fournier, 1994). Over the period 1986-1993 municipal own-revenues have grown at an average annual rate of 1.9 percent (secondary communes outside of the Dakar region have recorded slightly stronger annual revenue growth, 2.5 percent).

Fiscal potential is highly uneven across Senegal. In particular, Dakar's monopolization of taxable modern sector activities places all other municipalities at a disadvantage. Municipal business taxes (*patente*) collected by the commune of Dakar represent some 70 percent of revenues from the *patente* across the country; the five communes of the Dakar region together take in more than 80 percent of the *patente* collected nationally. Overall, average per capita tax revenues in Dakar (approx. 9,000 cfa) are four times that of the other 47 communes (approx. 1,900 cfa).

On the other hand, taxes are simply not collected. Evidence from Tambacounda suggests that the 80 million cfa collected by the commune in 1993 may represent as little as 20 percent of potential revenues.¹⁷ A survey conducted by the author in 1994 in the

¹⁷ Estimates of municipal tax collection across Senegal suggests a fiscal yield, relative to potential receipts, of 40 percent (*Caisse Française de Développement*, 1994).

commune's markets estimated that only 1 in 5 merchants and market women pays the daily municipal market fee. If those market vendors counted had paid the appropriate fee (ambulant sellers were not counted), the commune would have harvested 64,000 cfa, as compared to 17,000 cfa actually taken in that day. In 1993, Tambacounda collected some 4.5 million cfa in market fees. Estimating 300 collection days a year, results from the survey represent a potential annual intake of more than 19 million cfa from the *Grand Marché* alone. Assuming that the commune's three secondary markets yielded similar results, the municipality could be taking in close to 30 million cfa annually. Moreover, 72 of 249 merchants who rent enclosed market stalls on a monthly basis from the commune are delinquent in their payments; amounts past due in the first trimester of 1994 were greater than 3.5 million cfa. And rates charged for the rental of these *souks* are one third of the going rate for similar stalls rented by Lebanese property owners (creating an active secondary market in sub-leased market stalls).

Similarly, to avoid discomfiting the politically potent transporters union, a blind eye is turned to taxis and mini-buses which pick up and drop off passengers clandestinely thereby avoiding the municipal *gare routière* and its fees. For the same reason, fees charged trucks and tractor-trailers were reduced in a pre-election gesture several years ago, and never increased; an eighteen-wheeler with several million francs worth of cargo now pays a little more than twice the amount charged a *taxi brousse* transporting 20 passengers to the adjacent regional capital.

A similar nonchalance obtains in Tambacounda's collection of direct local taxes which contribute some 30 percent of municipal receipts. Of approximately 40 million cfa in local business, property and municipal service (*taxe sur l'ordure ménagère*) taxes assessed by agents of the *Direction des Impôts et Domaines* (federal tax assessment agency), the commune took in a little more than 26 million cfa in 1993.¹⁸ In addition, none

¹⁸Reliance on the Ministry of Finance's underequipped deconcentrated agencies for assessment and collection of direct local taxes constitutes an admittedly serious handicap. Tax rolls generated by computer in Dakar are several years out of date. And the willingness of Ministry functionaries to get tough on behalf of the commune is limited. When asked why the only industry in Tambacounda - a ginning factory belonging to the state cotton company SODEFITEX - was not paying the municipal business or property tax, the regional head of the *Direction des Impôts et Domaines* replied, "I am not here to force down the medicine!" In addition, the government's liberal granting of tax waivers to property owners has saped the revenue-raising potential of municipal property taxes.

of the town's hotels, bars and restaurants pay the municipal licensing fees (*license*), a loss of close to half a million cfa. Nor is a direct household tax (*minimum fiscal 4e catégorie*) collected at all. If all 11,732 residents subject to the 900 cfa tax (1988 estimate) paid their obligation, the commune would harvest some 10 million cfa annually, potential revenues currently thrown away.¹⁹

Annual increases in municipal expenditures, meanwhile, have outpaced growth in own revenues. In Tambacounda, while tax revenues have increased at a modest 1.3 percent per year (1986-92), recurrent expenditures have surged ahead by 4.9 percent annually (1986-93). Across Senegal, municipal operating expenses-- personnel, transportation for municipal officials, administrative equipment-- have grown at an annual rate of 3.6 percent. Patronage hiring has made personnel by far the single largest component of municipal expenditures, consuming almost a third of overall operating expenses. Outside of the region of Dakar practically one of every two francs collected by municipalities is applied to the wage bill.²⁰

Repatriation of Municipal Personnel According to Education Levels

	Communes in Region of Dakar	Secondary Communes	All Communes
University-level Education	3%	1%	2%
Lycée-level Education	7%	4%	7%
Primary and Middle School Education or Less	90%	95%	91%

Source: Caisse Française de Développement (1994)

Municipalities are both understaffed in professionally qualified personnel to manage communes' growing responsibilities, and overstaffed in unqualified, redundant employees. In the commune of Thiès (200,000 inhabitants), for example, only 3 out of 132 employees have obtained their baccalaureate; no member of the personnel, except the state-appointed municipal manager (*secrétaire général*), has completed the three-year

¹⁹ The *minimum fiscal* is an admittedly difficult tax to recover-- logistically because of the obligation of door-to-door collection, and politically because the flat tax is necessarily regressive.

²⁰ Similar personnel/recurrent expenditure ratios can be found elsewhere in francophone Africa (e.g., Stren, et al., 1993: Annex2; CFD/BREEF, 1994:II-21). In other parts of the world, personnel tends to take a considerably smaller bite out of local governments' budget. In Poland, for example, municipal payroll expenses, as a proportion of total recurrent expenditures, varied from 13.3 to 19.8 percent (Barbone and Hicks, 1995:270).

university *license*. 73 percent of the staff have no more than a primary school diploma. Municipal administration is run by a handful of competent individuals who head up the commune's finance, personnel and technical bureaus. The commune's archivist, for example, performs a dozen activities beyond his nominal responsibilities, including writing the mayor's correspondence, collecting fees for administrative acts and documents, and working on calculations for the commune's annual budget. On the other hand, the commune employs a *dactylographe* whose special dactylography machine has been broken for several years, leaving her with apparently nothing to do. Similarly, 72 employees are assigned to the municipal garage and the sanitation service, ostensibly to maintain a five vehicle fleet and accompany the commune's three tractors and a dump truck on their daily garbage collection rounds.

In effect, commune administrations collect revenues to sustain themselves. In recent years (1988-1992), operating expenses averaged some 87 percent of municipal tax receipts. And this figure hides chronic municipal debts to the public telephone, electricity and water companies, arrears the communes would never be able to pay with current revenue levels. Arrears to the electricity utility alone, accumulated in the course of one year (March 1992-June 1993), were equivalent to 10 percent of annual municipal tax receipts. The Government has in the past informally covered municipal debts with the utilities, clearing the reciprocal liabilities every year or two (the electricity and water companies collect a tax during customer billing which is due the municipality). Accounts payable to private contractors pile up similarly, often rolling over silently from one budgetary period to another.

Cloaking its arrears permits commune administration to shift scarce resources toward (politically remunerative) investment expenditures.²¹ Investment expenses have grown a remarkable 26 percent during the 1986-1992 period, relying on external financing sources. For many years allocations from the Government's grant facility, the *Fonds d'Equipe ment des Collectivités Locales* (FECL) provided municipalities with at least half of their total investment resources; case studies reveal that in a number of communes FECL

²¹ Other incentives exist for fudging the books in favor of investments. To encourage communal self-financing of investments, FECL block grants (*fonds ordinaires*) are allocated, in part, as a function of the percentage of total commune expenditures committed to investment expenditures!

monies have paid for up to 90 percent of municipal investments in certain years. Because of recent illiquidity the Government has had to sharply reduce its contributions to the grant facility. In the past four years a World Bank-financed project supporting labor-intensive public infrastructure activities, AGETIP, has taken an increasingly prominent role in providing resources for municipal investments. By 1993, AGETIP monies constituted 50% of total municipal investment financing.

Without access to external financing, municipal investment expenditures would be radically compressed, as was the case in 1990/91 when government illiquidity precluded any FECL allocations.

Communes Excluding the Region of Dakar

	1989/90	1990/91	1991/92	1993
Investment/Total Expenditures	35%	18%	43%	31%
Total FEC' Allocations (millions cfa)	1,157	0	3,567 (41% disbursed)	851

Source: Direction du Trésor/MEFP

Even with pliant accounting practices and external investment financing, a number of communes are unable to meet their nominal operating expenses, drawing on advances from the Government.²² Municipal deficits vis-à-vis the Treasury reflect short term illiquidity as well as chronic mismanagement. The generally well-run commune of Dakar ran a deficit with the Treasury for five of 1993's twelve months but was in the black by year end. The commune of Pikine, on the other hand, an agglomeration adjacent to Dakar whose population is approaching one million, posted a deficit of 129.4 million cfa at 1993 year-end, equivalent to 14 percent of taxes collected by the municipality that year (an

²² According to French fiscal tradition, communes maintain accounts with the Treasury. The national "caisse" is thus said to be unitary. The Treasury collects certain taxes for communes and credits their accounts. To resolve its own liquidity crises the Government abuses its fiduciary control of municipal accounts-- aggravating communes' already weak fiscal situation. Taxes collected in the second quarter of the year generally do not become available until the end of the fiscal year or are simply credited the following year. Similarly, taxes shared with the government (at least 10 percent of secondary cities' revenues) have become a highly unreliable source of funds because of significant lags-- several years-- in their transfer to municipal accounts.

amount which does not include accounts payable, unreimbursed credits from the government, or delinquent payments to the *Communauté Urbaine de Dakar*).

At the other end of the demographic scale, a number of the country's smallest communes, created as municipalities in 1990, have proven themselves to be fiscally unviable. In three years the Casamance communes of Goudomp, Thionck-Essyl and Marsassoum, all with populations under 10,000 inhabitants, have accumulated deficits many times their annual fiscal revenues. Marassoum's deficit of 13.58 million cfa is equivalent to 700 percent of the town's yearly tax income. The functioning of these communes depends wholly on transfers from the Treasury.

Public satisfaction with the quality of urban governance is, predictably, not very high. An opinion poll taken in the region of Dakar in June 1993 (*Sud*, septembre 10 1993) reported the following levels of respondent dissatisfaction with current levels of service provision:

Public Dissatisfaction with Municipal Services - Region of Dakar

	Waste Removal	Access to Electricity	Access to Health Services	Access to Water Services
Percentage of Respondents Expressing Strong Dissatisfaction	97	91	85	79

Source: *Sud*: 10 septembre 1993.

In terms of representation, a citizen in Dakar summed up, to the author, a widespread perception: "municipal councilors treat the population as a peasant treats a plow-- left dirty and unattended until the arrival of the campaign, when the instrument of his livelihood is cleaned and cared for, to be forgotten again seven days later.

The following sections explain how commune politicians have been able to mock the responsibilities they shoulder, and cast off the burden of electoral accountability. I describe how the fractured and hierarchical politics of PS hegemony have trivialized the formal municipal governance system defined by the *Code de l'Administration Communale*. The primacy of an extra-municipal agenda subordinates incentives for responsible representation and effective municipal management.

3.2 - The Reign of Single-Party Politics

As discussed in the previous chapter, the push-me-pull-you character of state-municipal relations has remained fundamentally unchanged for the past one hundred years, punctuated by the application of successive territorial reforms and constraints on commune prerogatives. The imposition of managerial rigor has served as a pretext for the bridling of municipal autonomy: from 1964 to 1968 when legislation derogated the autonomous status of Dakar and other regional capitals; and in 1972 with the dispatching of functionaries of the Ministry of the Interior as municipal administrators (Sall, 1969; Collin, 1975; Collin, 1977; Fall, 1978). Nonetheless, the essential nature of urban governance has not changed.

On the eve of the first round of centralizing reforms, year-end 1964, Senegal's thirty-three communes had effectively bankrupted themselves, accumulating some 3 billion cfa in debt, far in excess of annual municipal revenues. After five years of tutelary oversight by the regional governor, however, commune finances had not improved; and "the first generation of [functionaries delegated by the governors to oversee municipal affairs] had not proven satisfactory" (Sall, 1969:24).

A serious house-cleaning was in order, announced by the appointment of full-time municipal administrators. By 1973 the new managers had forced down the total number of communal employees by more than 30 percent, compared to the level of ten years earlier (Collin, 1975). This enthusiasm, however, only lasted until the next round of national and local elections (in 1978). By the mid-1980's, in a number of regional capitals managed by municipal administrators, personnel expenditures far surpassed 40 percent, the benchmark established by the Ministry of the Interior.

Communal Wage Bill Relative to Expenditures (%)

	1964	1976	1988
Dakar	67	28	n/a
Diourbel	59	56	36
Kaolack	65	42	40
Louga	63	58	65
Saint-Louis	115	40	70
Tambacounda	43	40	44
Thiès	44	55	40
Ziguinchor	67	54	67

Source: 1964: Collin (1977); 1976: Fall (1978); 1988: Direction du Trésor/MEFP

Lax management in the commune of Dakar, for example, allowed communal accounts receivable to soar to some 14.7 billion cfa in the years 1978-81, a period of profligate mismanagement presided over by mayor A.C. Sall, ex-Minister of the Interior (Diop et Diouf, 1993:113-7). Similarly, the commune of Thiès began a massive hiring campaign in 1978. And under the direction of its mayor, Minister of the Interior Jean Collin²³, the municipality took on a 300 million cfa interest-free loan from the government (a burden which Thiès is still liquidating) to initiate an extensive public works program. By 1985, the commune's wage bill was hitting record levels.

These examples are by no means exceptional. Unpaid commune debts to the state (*avances de trésorerie*) surpassed 4.3 billion cfa in 1982, and are estimated²⁴ to have exceeded 9 billion cfa when municipalities simply stopped reimbursing these credits in the mid-1980's. Added to these sums, of course, are aforementioned municipal arrears to the utilities: 6.8 billion owed to the water company SONEES in 1989, and 1.1 billion owed to the electricity company SENELEC in 1993. (By means of comparison, total commune revenues in the late 1980's averaged around 15 billion cfa.)

In terms of administrative rigor, the disciplining strictures built into the Communal Code, and reinforced by the presence of appointed functionaries in the country's principal communes during the 1970's and 1980's, have shattered against the

²³ Secretary General to President Senghor in the first years of independence, Jean Collin (a colonial administrator naturalized Senegalese) held the post of Minister of Finances from 1964 to 1971. Named Minister of the Interior the following year, he held this portfolio for ten years (Diop et Diouf, 1990:105-7).

²⁴ Interview: *Direction Financière des Collectivités Locales/Direction du Trésor*.

hard exigencies of political management. The examples of Thiès and Dakar are particularly revealing insofar as mayors A.C. Sall and Jean Collin were among Senegal's most highly trained bureaucrats-- and most severe critics of municipal clientelism before acceding to their respective mayoralties.

The patterns observed in Senegalese municipalities should be distinguished from classic machine politics. On one hand, communes remain the predatory instruments of local politicians. Every day dozens of citizens wait outside the doors of municipal officials to ask favors or financial support. And valuable clients benefit disproportionately from allocated municipal resources: water and electricity subsidies for mosques and churches, residential housing plots distributed informally, subsidies to football clubs, patronage hiring, preferential construction contracts. Borrowing Rakove's (1975) description of the old Democratic machine in Chicago, commune administration "is essentially non-ideological in its orientation... dedicated primarily to gaining and retaining office, and to reaping the rewards of office".

On the other hand, unlike Daley's Chicago, cities in Senegal do not work in spite of endemic clientelism. Complicitious relations between local elites notwithstanding, there is no integrated politico-administrative machine such as existed in Cook County, Illinois. At the end of the day commune leaders are not accountable to the formal communal system defined in the *Code de l'Administration Communale*. In effect, a differentiated municipal governance arena has not emerged. Instead, a unitary political regime, the product of almost forty years of political hegemony by the *Parti Socialiste*, subsumes all political and administrative interaction at subnational levels.

3.2.1 Political Rules as Bulwark Against Local Contestation

The party's challenge of maintaining national political dominance has grown more acute since the introduction of multipartyism in the late 1970's. And while deteriorating economic conditions have raised the level of socio-political contestation, the regime has posted national electoral victories in 1978, 1983, 1988, and 1993. The PS' principal political opponent, the *Parti Démocratique Sénégalais* (PDS) has taken advantage of a

democratized political arena to gain ground nationally. After the 1993 legislative contest, the PDS and a number of lesser parties now hold 31 out of 120 seats in the National Assembly and at least six ministerial portfolios in the current government.

At the commune level, on the other hand, the PS has enjoyed a practically uninterrupted political monopoly. Rules defining the nominally democratic municipal electoral process have effectively limited competition, and constitute the vehicle through which the PS has dominated commune administration, unifying centre and periphery politically.

As stipulated by article 18 of the CAC,²⁵ election of the municipal council proceeds by single list, representing a single political party, winner-take-all. Parties unable to mobilize a sufficient number of viable candidates to present complete electoral lists disqualify themselves from the election. Lists presented by party coalitions are illegal. This format clearly favors the incumbent PS which enjoys unique organizational, financial and human resources, derived from almost forty years of incumbency at all levels of administration. Indeed, since independence, only one municipality, the Casamance town of Oussouye in 1978, has been won by a political party other than the *Parti Socialiste*. Opposition politicians currently do not hold a single council seat, not to mention the mayoralty, in any of the country's forty-eight communes.

Secondary provisions of the electoral code further tip the electoral operation in favor of the PS. These provisions include a legal voting age of twenty-one (eliminating from eligibility sizable cohorts most likely to vote for the opposition²⁶) and payment of a deposit for ballot printing by political parties presenting a list, an amount reimbursed to the victorious party. In addition, the *Code* provides incumbent municipal executives with certain advantages. For example, electoral publicity may be legally posted exclusively in

²⁵ A number of provisions detailed in this sections have been modified by Law 92-16, a new electoral code passed in February 1992, which will affect municipal elections in November 1995.

²⁶ Opposition parties have had considerable success recruiting supporters from the great mass of disaffected urban youth. Faces with public sector retrenchment, few employment prospects in the private sector, and a reduced number of university scholarships, younger cohorts in Senegal's cities gain few immediate benefits from the state's resources and harbor considerable rancor towards national elites.

areas designated by the mayor (which in smaller towns may be limited to the door of city hall). Further, to be inscribed on voter registries individuals must present a national identification card and proof of residence, requiring a birth certificate and residence attestation issued by the municipality; the fee for these administrative acts is waived as a matter of course for Party rank-and-file.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the Ministry of the Interior, the minister himself a senior member of the PS hierarchy, administers the entire electoral process: providing materials required for the election; maintaining and updating voter registries; assigning polling locations; and designating commissions to distribute voting cards, administer polling, and finally count the votes. All stages of this process are vulnerable to partisan maneuvers by Ministry functionaries. A National Democratic Institute mission to Senegal in October 1990 (NDI, 1991) observed that the Ministry of the Interior's dominant role in the electoral process did little to reinforce public perception that the administration of elections was fair.²⁷ Indeed, manipulation of voter registries maintained by the Ministry and the exceptional inclusion of unregistered voters just prior to and on election day, a prerogative of the Ministry's governors and *prefets*, have been the source of bitter protests from opposition parties in past national and local elections; preparation for the 1995 municipals has initiated a new round of acrimony over this issue of *ordonnances* (*Wal Fadjiri*, 10 avril 1994).

The Minister of the Interior also wields the power to gerrymander. In anticipation of upcoming municipal elections, Dakar, Rufisque, and Pikine-- high stakes communes facing serious challenges from the opposition-- are to be subdivided into numerous *mairies d'arrondissement*. Not only will this move minimize political losses, but in those areas where opposition politicians do triumph, their fiefs will be limited and fiscally feeble.

The following sections document ways in which political incentives undermine administrative practices at the municipal level. First, we consider ways in which an overlay of party administration onto the municipal institution distorts management within

²⁷ In a sour reply to the mission's report, the Government reminded mission members that in the French tradition the Administration is considered NEUTRAL (*sic*).

communes. Second, I analyze the rules which regiment the formation and functioning of community associations, and which have discouraged the development of productive relations between the commune and a vibrant urban civil society. Third, I describe how homogenized national and local political objectives have undermined the supervisory role played by government ministries which intervene in municipal affairs.

3.3 - Politicized Management within Commune Administration

Uninterrupted electoral hegemony has produced a perfect intermingling of Party hierarchy and municipal government. And as is true at the highest levels of government in Senegal-- the President of the Republic holds the position of Secretary General of the Party-- PS administration mirrors and blankets municipal administration. With some exceptions, mayors of the principal cities in Senegal are simultaneously executive of the commune and secretary general of the Party's municipal cell, the *coordination*²⁸; his assistant mayors are invariably leaders of PS *sections*, cells hierarchically subordinate to the *coordination*; and ordinary councilors represent influential *sous-sections* and *comités*, the Party's neighborhood bodies.

Cannibalizing local administrative institutions has compensated for a poorly integrated Party bureaucracy (Schumacher, 1974:226) and provided an institutional structure through which PS leaders discipline their fractious, mercenary rank-and-file. And, of course, monopolizing local government prevents opposition parties from developing a secure local power base from which to assault the PS at the national level. The resulting confusion of Party and municipality has transposed the Party's structural features-- notably clan-struggles and vertical alliances in the context of a highly fragmented base (Zuccarelli, 1970; Adamolekun, 1971)-- onto the functioning of commune administration.

²⁸Other than the *coordinations* representing Dakar and the regional capitals, the *coordination* is contiguous with the administrative *Département* which encompasses both town and countryside. Thus the mayor of a departmental capital may only be a *section* boss, subordinate to a rurally-based secretary general of the *coordination*.

Because the *Parti Socialiste* has not lost a municipal election in fifteen years, Party primaries (*renouvellements de la coordination*) have effectively supplanted formal municipal elections in importance. Easing of the burden of electoral accountability has introverted municipalities. Indeed, the indicators of good representation-- interacting with constituents, expressing concern for and an understanding of local problems-- may be almost irrelevant to political survival.

Maintaining stature within the Party, by contrast, is of great importance. These realities are revealed by the dynamic young mayor of the Casamance town of Bignona who, by his own admission, owes his post to a deal cut in 1990 between his political patron and another contender for leadership of the regional *coordination*. Reflecting changing political alliances at the regional level and his prospects for the upcoming election, the mayor (by all evidence a highly committed and effective executive) ruefully observed: "Not only can I not count on any resources or support... but my [commune management] record counts for nothing."²⁹

3.3.1 Clans and Personalized Politics

Since the Party's emergence as a dominant political force, the *Parti Socialiste* has been characterized by extreme factionalism. Clan politics reflects, first, the mercenary alliances through which the PS maintains its rule. Under conditions of perpetually limited patronage resources, machine-based clientelism in Senegal has yielded a conflictual, unpredictable pattern of distributional politics. Local leaders jealously guard their prerogatives within pyramidal networks of influence and alliance. The result has been a highly atomized political base. The party's institutional history has reinforced the clan tradition. Through the 1950's and 1960's Leopold Senghor aggressively incorporated the country's divergent political currents into a unified structure. Senghor's success assured the party's political dominance but has left the PS chronically unstable and fractured.

Clan-based party politics has produced a highly personalized, fragmented form of municipal management. Attempts by the party's summit to assert control generates

²⁹ Source: Interview, Bignona, Easter Sunday, 1994.

further friction as local political figures assert their rivalries with politicians designated by the *Bureau Politique* in Dakar. These tensions poison the policy-making environment in communes and help to incapacitate municipal administration. For example, in many municipalities factions (*tendances*) within the communal PS structure circulate tracts in city hall to denounce the state of municipal management or to attack rivals. The following was used to refute accusations of mismanagement by a municipal politician whose *tendance* opposed that of the current mayor:

"We, Young Socialists of the Municipal Coordination of Thiès, conscious of our responsibilities, draw the attention of all citizens of Thiès to the calumny and intoxication orchestrated by a group of opportunists... whose dishonesty is only equaled by their unpopularity in the City of Rails. If it was not necessary to reassert the truth we would not waste our time in responding to this garbage. In fact, from among the good sons of Cayor this group could only find as its representative an habitual criminal, drunk, and thief... This neurotic individual and his HIV-positive, husband-cheating whore... have attempted to discredit our august Municipal Council."³⁰

Not unsurprisingly, given such vituperative 'debate', cohesion within municipal administrations remains extremely low. The mayor and his designated deputies form an often embattled clique. Authority over important commissions within the municipality is rarely delegated beyond the most loyal lieutenants in the municipal bureau. Internal centralization and compartmentalized organization define most commune administrations.

Municipal councils are at once a fraternal lodge whose members are wed to common fate, and a political *bourse* in which resources and information represent discretionary power. Either way, transparency is not at a premium, and councilors frequently complain in council meetings of being left in the dark on important issues. To prepare for deliberations on the commune's annual budget, the most important session of the year, councilors may not receive draft copies of budget documents from the Finance Commission until the day before or the day of the vote; councilors in rival factions have missed sessions because convocations sent by the commune somehow do not arrive in time at their homes. Challenges to obscurantism by the municipal bureau are

³⁰Excerpt from a tract circulated on Party letter-head by the *Mouvement National des Jeunesses Socialistes/Coodination Communale de Thiès* dated October 18, 1993 in the city hall of Thiès., a regional capital of 200,000 inhabitants eighty kilometers from Dakar.

met with defiance. In response to a councilor's request for additional data on the budget being debated, the President of the Finance Commission of the commune of Thiès responded:

"The budget of a legally constituted commune is a political instrument. There are certainly expenditures which can be made public, but others which can not because of their confidential character. The appropriateness of each case is left to the judgment of the mayor." (*Conseil municipal de Thiès: procès verbal du 02.05.91*)

Exchanges such as these generate considerable ill-will within the council, leading to further polarization-- councilors have even brandished guns in municipal sessions-- and hoarding of internal authority by the mayor's clique. As a result municipal government isolates itself even further from the jurisdiction it manages and represents. Indeed, allocation of services, as a study of the territorial distribution of water standpipes in Pikine concluded, may have nothing to do with municipal socio-economic structure but everything to do with the differential strength of Party factions (Salem, 1992).

Intra-party politics can also immobilize commune administration. The commune of Thiès, for example, is understaffed in municipal tax collectors, compromising a fiscal strengthening program undertaken by the municipal accountant. For two years the mayor has refused requests from the accountant to hire additional collectors, squandering the revenue growth this recruitment would presumably yield (and the political capital gained from new hiring). Similarly, the mayor has postponed filling in 5 vacancies among the city's 27 appointed neighborhood delegates, whose duties include collection of a direct household tax (*minimum fiscal*). Interviews in Thiès reveal that the mayor's stance derives not from managerial prudence but from his precarious political standing in the commune. "Parachuted" into the mayoralty by an influential political patron in the *Bureau Politique* in Dakar (who has since died) the mayor of Thiès governs from an extremely weak local base. Unwilling to confront factional interests which riddle the council, the mayor has clung to the status quo.

Examples of faction-oriented sabotage of municipal management also abound.³¹ In the commune of Sédhiou, a *tendance* led by the outgoing mayor has led eleven councilors in a boycott of the municipal council in an effort to destabilize the new executive. A similar situation exists in Linguère, whose council has had difficulty obtaining a quorum. Most recently infighting has delayed deliberation on the annual budget, compromising municipal activities in the upcoming year. In the regional capital of Tambacounda, a sister-city arrangement with a European city initiated by an influential councilor, representing a potential windfall for the commune, was sabotaged by his well-placed colleague whose mayoral aspirations would be challenged by the highly visible success of his rival.

3.3.2 Centralized Party Priorities

Providing cohesion in the face of clan-based factionalism, authority within the *Parti Socialiste* is highly centralized.³² At the party's summit, the *Bureau Politique*, a ten-person body presided over by the Secretary General, Abdou Diouf, "plays a role of coordination and synthesis," arbitrating and guiding subnational Party operations (*Parti Socialiste, 1983:23*). The *Bureau Politique* asserts its authority most visibly through selective support of individuals for leadership positions in regional, departmental and municipal cells. Rules governing PS primaries at different echelons within the *coordination* provide numerous opportunities for the *Bureau Politique* to influence the outcome.

At the base *comité* level, leadership positions are determined by the sale of party cards, which eventually serve as voting cards, during a fixed pre-electoral period. By convention few electors actually pay the nominal 200 cfa. Rather, the candidate purchases cards for his supporters who will, presumably, cast their vote accordingly. Successful candidates at the *comité* level may then contest positions at higher echelons within the *coordination*. At the *sous-section*, *section* and *coordination* level, the election of secretaries general takes place by a show of hands.

³¹ Cottingham's (1970:105-6) observations of some twenty-five years ago remain pertinent: "Rather than concentrate upon stabilizing support within its own majority clan, majority clans apparently prefer... to minimize rival clans."

³² On centralization of the party see: Zuccarelli, Francois (1970:190-212; 1979); Barker (1973).

A remarkable contrast to the consciously democratic procedures characterizing formal municipal elections, norms girding PS primaries make these political races vulnerable to central influence in the form of discretionary financial support.³³ Indeed, the party instituted the use of membership card sales to designate local cell leadership in 1963 (Barker, 1973:295) during a period of partisan conflict following Mamadou Dia's arrest, to ensure the placement of cadres who supported Senghor in the schism.

Commissaires politiques appointed by central party organs superintend the primary process. *Commissaires* distribute party cards to be sold by candidates within the *coordination* and are in privileged positions to influence the primary process at the outset. Their presence at successive intra-*coordination* elections also discourages dissent. Further suppressing discord, *controleurs* who report directly to the Secretary General of the Party oversee the primaries in important *coordinations*.³⁴

As subordinates in a hierarchical party system, municipal officials must remain sensitive to national party priorities.³⁵ Municipal council sessions are often punctuated with gratuitous references to the leadership and integrity of ministers and the President (public affirmations of party loyalty which will be relayed to the Ministry of the Interior in the form of council minutes). These declarations may also serve as a form of defense against local challenges. For example, a municipal councilor in Thiès, publicly accused of having passed confidential information on the upcoming construction of market stalls--valuable resources to individuals who rent them from the commune, and then (illegally) sublet them for considerable profit--defiantly offered this retort:

"I am the elder of the Party and of this municipal body, I can claim (*être nanti de*) a glorious past, and have been awarded a number of distinctions by the President for services rendered to the nation." (*Commune de Thiès, procès verbal du 07.02.92*)

³³ The primal role of financial resources in PS primaries can lead to considerable distortions of the notion of local electoral accountability. Underfunded relative to political rivals and without a powerful patron in Dakar, the mayor of Bignona has travelled to France to solicit campaign funds from expatriate Casamançais.

³⁴ Regional governors, the President's administrative representatives, also provide political reports on the unfolding of party primaries.

³⁵ Municipal officials are all the more wedded to the Party and its resources because they do not directly control allocation of land in the commune.

This defense was seconded by another councilor who exhorted his colleagues to be understanding and respectful "because of his age and his political engagements."³⁶

Municipal administrations must also cater to individuals with influence in exclusive circles in Dakar. For example, municipal officials in Thiès appropriated 300,000 cfa, budgeted for emergency aid to the indigent, to pay for a reception for the President's wife, Elizabeth Diouf, who was passing through the commune.³⁷ Similarly, it is important to maintain positive relations with the appointed governors, influential political figures in their own right and the President's direct representative in the region. Governors have considerable authority (e.g. over land allocation) with which to favor certain factional alliances within the council. And, in part to advance their own agendas, the governor often demands 'favors' of municipalities serving as regional capitals for the exceptional financing of regional orchestras, regional youth conferences, and repairs of non-municipal infrastructure-- requests which are not often refused.³⁸

Most importantly, carrying one's commune and the surrounding department during presidential and legislative elections is a priority. Loss of favor with Dakar may be costly in monetary or influence terms. The threat of sanction carries all the more weight because of the multiple "mandates" held by influential commune leaders.³⁹ In Senegal, the CAC allows municipal councilors and the mayor to simultaneously hold powerful and remunerative national offices: ministerial portfolios, deputorial seats, posts in the National Assembly's bureau, high positions in central ministries. The accumulation of mandates

³⁶ A pattern of quasi-traditional (geroncratic) governance persists in many municipalities. The norms of PS rule at the local level, notably the importance of resource transfers from elected leader to elector, recalls patrimonial leadership roles-- a professional profile which obviously does not favor young, managerially-inclined young men or women.

³⁷ The DCL-appointed municipal manager (an unusually combative functionary in his last years of service before retirement) discovered the accounting legerdemain and refused to sign off on the allocation. The DCL in Dakar eventually intervened, relieving the municipal manager of the burden of approving the transaction, but ignoring the bogus use of funds. (Interview, *Secrétaire Général de la Commune de Thiès*, December, 1993)

³⁸ In Tambacounda, the governor's cook-houseboy is on the municipal payroll.

³⁹ In 1993, the opposition *Parti Démocratique Sénégalais* beat the incumbent party in the commune of Thiès (but not at the departmental level) in presidential and legislative elections. The mayor of Thiès-- who had been a deputy as well as an officer in the bureau of the National Assembly, a post carrying ministerial rank-- was demoted to simple deputy a few months later.

not only deals a powerful blow to local representation-- in many larger communes across the country the mayor and the municipal council's most effective members reside in Dakar-- but provides central Party organs with a potent instrument of control over local officials.


High-level posts constitute the most important forms of compensation in the party's incentive program.⁴⁰ To develop a political presence in the commune, the ability to secure, or appear to secure, resources and influence for one's community or clan is vital. And because the centralized institutions of the public sector hoard most of the country's wealth and power, a privileged position in Dakar holds great appeal. A ministerial portfolio, or a post with ministerial rank in the Bureau of the National Assembly, represents the ultimate prize in terms of direct compensation and leverage over the placement of national investments. Allocation of high-ranking bureaucratic posts has in the past been "quasi-automatic, flowing from the exercise of certain Party responsibilities" (*Parti Socialiste*, 1993:4); the secretary general of a powerful *coordination*, for example, could expect to be appointed deputy. Alternatively, appointing individuals to senior office may be a means for Dakar to selectively promote certain men and women at the local level.

For officials who hold multiple posts, as is the case for all mayors of the country's large cities, the fire wall between local and national politics breaks down completely. These coincident priorities are suggested in the graph below, showing the chronological pattern of municipal staff hiring in Thiès. Peaks in the graph appear to correspond as much to national election years as to municipal elections.⁴¹

⁴⁰ The Party also multiplies the number of bonuses it can allocate. For example, in 1993 the President elevated an influential councillor-deputy from Tambacounda to the position of Minister of Decentralization (a newly created ministry). The vacant departmental seat in the Assembly could then be awarded to a popular member of the *Jeunesse Socialiste*, placating that organization's demands for greater representation in the department.

⁴¹ A bitter feud for control of the commune's *coordination*, following the death of the incumbent mayor, incapacitated the commune and precluded any hiring during the the 1988 electoral season.

Annual Personnel Hiring 1973-1994: Commune of Thiès



Source: Commune de Thiès/Etats de développement de personnel (This series was constructed from personnel records over a number of years. Information was not available to calculate annual hiring net of retirement, which would have been a more accurate measure of patronage hiring.)

Municipal treasuries are pillaged for the national Party cause in ways both small and large, as evidenced by extraordinary communal expenditures in the months leading up to 1993's presidential and legislative elections. Thiès' municipal stadium accommodated PS rallies almost continuously in the weeks prior to the presidential election, generating a dramatic surge in the municipality's electricity bill. In Bignona (a commune currently without a deputy on its council), the mayor purchased 900 kilograms of sugar the month before legislative elections to distribute to religious leaders. During the fiscal year preceding the election during which time voters register, the commune of Tambacounda processed some 14,000 birth certificates (needed to obtain identity cards for voter registration); despite having processed an administrative flow five times that of non-election periods, ledgers from the clerk's office (*état civil*) did not record above-average fee collection.

And again in Thiès, the commune spent more than 13 million francs-- a sum roughly equivalent to the commune's average annual expenditures on primary health center construction and maintenance-- for the "organization of elections" including 11,200

litres of diesel fuel (used according to sources to transport Party rank-and-file in rural areas to voting stations).

Lastly, there is circumstantial evidence that monies are directly siphoned off from municipal revenues, presumably for political purposes. For example, in a commune visited for this research the collection of fees for administrative acts had long been the responsibility of an associate of the mayor's clique. On average this man collected some 150,000 cfa every ten days. When the task was taken over by another employee with no alliance to the municipal bureau, an average of 450,000 cfa poured into the commune coffers every week. It seems unlikely that pilfering of this magnitude-- by means of comparison, the employee involved earned less than 75,000 cfa per month-- could occur without the involvement of higher authorities in the commune. But this is speculation. On the other hand, it is inarguable that expenditures made by mayors during electoral campaigns far surpass what even a draconian savings regimen might have accumulated. The mayor of the commune referred to above, according to a close political associate, received 8 million cfa from PS coffers in Dakar and spent an additional 7 million cfa of his own money during the 1993 presidential and legislative electoral period!

3.4 - Commune-Community Relations

Collaborative relations between municipalities and community associations are extremely limited. On one hand, there exists an abundance of associational life in Senegalese cities: professional groups, associations representing middle-class residential neighborhoods, sports clubs, women's solidarity groups, *tontines*, prayer groups, clubs formed around innumerable hobbies, groups formed around regional affiliation. Unquestionably, twenty years of economic crisis and shrinking patronage resources available to the state and the party has encouraged the emergence of this variegated phenomenon.⁴² But in contrast to Robert Putnam's (1993) descriptions of the web of civil associations from which dense networks of civic engagement have emerged in northern Italian cities, local non-governmental organizations in Senegal intervene infrequently in anything other than intra-

⁴²The associational phenomenon has proliferated throughout urban Senegal. For an analysis of the greater Dakar region: Sy, Issa (1991), *Phénomène associatif et gestion urbaine à Dakar*, Thèse de troisième cycle, Département de Géographie, Université de Paris VIII.

household or inter-household social support activities (e.g. savings societies). Except in greater Dakar where international and national NGO's have mobilized neighborhood groups to perform tasks such as garbage incineration, community engagement in the public realm is practically unknown in urban Senegal.⁴³

3.4.1 Politicization of the Civil Realm

The "primary (negative) function" of the single party in Africa, writes Bayart (1986:110), is "to prevent any form of autonomous organization within civil society." Both during and after the decade of *de facto* single-party rule (roughly 1966-1976), asserting control over "societal space" has been a constant challenge for the PS regime. In a previous chapter I have described the government's persistent efforts to bridle formal organizational opposition, including rival political parties and the activities of labor unions. An abundance of associational life in Senegalese cities has posed a corollary challenge to regime hegemony.

The state has rightly interpreted community activism in political terms. In Senegal the frontier between political activism and civil engagement is ambiguous, a legacy of Senghor's early efforts to ally all political and civil groups under the leadership of a unified party. Moreover, the sclerotic nature of contemporary party politics in Senegal has again made civil society an appealing refuge for the political left-- student groups, labor unions, non-governmental organizations. Civil activism remains a threat. As revealed in a recent interview (*Cafard Libéré*, 13 janvier 1994), the current Minister of Youth and Sports, Ousmane Paye, remains remarkably vigilant for an official whose principal responsibilities include building relations between the Government and the country's young people:

"as concerns the associative movement, the smallest stretching of the rules opens dangerous breaches..."

At the municipal level, political insecurity also derives from personalized, clan-based infighting within the PS, translating into further wariness towards community

⁴³ These observations appear to hold across geographic and cultural regions, and in homogeneous urban neighborhoods inhabited by the same ensemble of extended families for several generations (such as the Mangouline quartier of Bignona inhabited by the same family clans since the 1880's).

engagement in public affairs. Dynamic groups headed by charismatic leaders, even those embarking on as unremarkable a task as establishing a neighborhood kitty to replace light bulbs and street signs (as was the case in Thiès) generate suspicion from city hall. In Rufisque, rather than sharing in the success of a community-based sanitation project coordinated by a Dakar-based NGO, the municipality views the activities as "practically a challenge to its power, an incursion onto its prerogatives."⁴⁴

Through constraining legislation, direct suppression and cooptation of threatening groups or individuals, the Government has severely limited the scope of independent associational activity.⁴⁵ These constraints have discouraged community participation in the provision of public services, an institutional option for service provision communes can no longer afford to disdain, and squandered legitimacy-enhancing benefits associated with community engagement in municipal activities.

3.4.2 Legislation Regulating Community Associations

Article 9 of the Senegalese Constitution protects the right to "freely form associations and organizations." Nonetheless, laws and decrees carefully prescribe the boundaries of what constitutes legal community activism,⁴⁶ and have raised the costs of legally engaging in civil activity.

Community associations must register with the Ministry of the Interior's *Direction des Affaires Générales et de l'Administration Territoriale*, submitting their request to the departmental *prefet*, along with two copies of standardized statutes, four copies of the minutes from the constitutive assembly, and four copies of the list of members complete

⁴⁴Review of ENDA project in quartier Diokoul taken from: République du Sénégal/Banque Mondiale/Coopération Française (1994), *Développement Local Urbain: Gestion Partagée des Services Urbains*, rapport provisoire, présenté par Fabrice Richy, Agence E4 International, 81 rue des archives, 75003 Paris.

⁴⁵ This description challenges optimistic assessments of the "environment of governance" Senegal, and assertions that there may exist any degree of "trust in state-civil society relationships" in that country (Young and Kanté, 1992:72-3). No one, particularly after the political assassinations, tortures, and arbitrary imprisonments of the past 36 months, trusts the state in Senegal.

⁴⁶This legislation relates to the policing of *sedition associations*. According to law 79-03, reinforcing law 65-40, groups exercising "certain activities which threaten public order" may be disbanded, subject to a fine of three million francs (\$1,000) and its officers imprisoned for up to two years.

with members' age, date of birth, address and profession (*Loi 68-08; Loi 79-02*). A 1976 decree (76-40) provides a similar cadre for the prominent youth groups, the *Associations Sportives et Culturelles* (ASC), carefully delimiting the range of their legal activities. The Government may even demand that these associations "insert specific clauses into their operating statutes" (*Loi 92-07*). Similarly, to operate within the bounds of the law, non-governmental organizations must receive the approbation of their tutelary ministry, and may be subject to an assessment of their *moralité* by the gendarmerie. Lastly, a 1984 law (84-37) formalizes the status of commercially-oriented groups or associations, *groupements d'intérêt économique* (GIE). To be identified officially as a GIE, and be eligible for public contracts and bank credit, these groups must be inscribed in the regional commercial register, submit a number of documents to the regional tribunal, and pay a considerable registration fee.

Once through this thicket of regulations, NGO's may obtain approved *conventions* with the Government in order to benefit from tax and customs waivers. But as with other legislation relating to the policing of civil society, uneven application of the law constitutes a powerful disciplining instrument for the state. For example, to penalize a prominent Dakar-based non-governmental organization (RADI/APEC) whose leadership is identified with opposition political parties, the Government has delayed approval of the organization's *convention* for several years.

Regimenting community affairs in this manner sends an unmistakable message that the public domain, in particular the provision of public goods, remains an exclusive preserve. Discretionary control over urban civil society not only closes down a potential breeding ground for contestation, but makes it easier for the Government, and commune officials, to provide preferential support to selective groups.⁴⁷ The body of rules governing civil associations offers an analog to the institutional arrangements which offer selective support and protection for favored public and private firms in the commercial and manufacturing sectors. Preferred community groups represent, in this way, the smallest

⁴⁷ Some African countries have been even more aggressive than Senegal in circumscribing the scope of legal activity by non-governmental organizations, cloaking civil repression behind a nominally liberal, rule-based approach to the oversight of community activism. In the early 1980's Kenya and Uganda simply declared moratoria on further registration of voluntary associations (Bratton, 1990:31).

vassals in the Sengalese clientocracy. Asked why local youth groups which participate in traditional labor-sharing activities in fields near town perform no community tasks in their neighborhood, a community leader in the Casamance town of Bignona replied, "that is the domain of politics."

3.4.3 Seduction, Suppression and Cooptation of Civil Associations

The regime has actively supported community groups in order to create an alternative, captive civil sector. Under the patronage of senior party officials and bureaucrats, voluntary associations have sprung up all over the country's cities. For example, under the guidance of the deputy governor of Thiès, an "apolitical and non-sectarian" association recently announced its creation, *La Convention des Thiessois*, a structure which "will wake up and bring together dormant and dispersed energies" (*Le Soleil*, 18 avril 1994). The formation of similar organizations has become commonplace, as evidenced by the multiplication of Saturday evening dances held to support the associations' kitties and to promote group recognition.

The proliferation of politician-supported non-governmental organizations has, naturally, led to a reproduction of political rivalries in the associational realm. In Richard Toll in early 1994, competition between three local civil groups, representing two factions within the local *coordination*, climaxed in a tense battle to obtain the right to sponsor a concert by a prominent Senegalese musician. After maneuvers by the mayor to favor one of the two groups, the departmental *prefet* finally authorized the gala at a stadium safely outside the city (*Sud*, 16 avril 1994). The infiltration of community associations by powerful political interests has not helped to legitimize the non-governmental organization movement.⁴⁸ As an editorial lamented (*Wal Fadjiri*, 13 avril 1994),

[NGO's] are becoming, with a few exceptions, instruments of PS power in its multiple campaigns of seduction, cooptation and mystification, in order to better regain its lost or oscillating bastions.

⁴⁸ Moreover, this process has been effected subtly enough that international donors searching for well-organized counterpart organizations may be unknowingly drawn into the game (*Wal Fadjiri*, 13 avril 1994).

Beyond such velvet-gloved measures, the Government has not hesitated to use force to moderate civil activism. Clashes between *gendarmes* and student associations or labor unions continue to punctuate life in Dakar, recalling the historical challenge to the government presented by such groups. To avoid a repeat of 1993's turbulent university year, the Government arrested student syndical leaders at the beginning of the 1994 school year, banned public protests, and ordered policemen to patrol the campus (*Wal Fadjiri* 12/13,15 novembre 1994). *Violent* confrontations in Dakar in the past year, including riots in February 1994 which left five policemen dead, have led to renewed suppression of civil organizations in the past 18 months.

The Government has pursued with particular intensity the Islamic movement *Moustarchidine al Moustarchidata*, whose militant leader has allied himself with opposition politicians. In the weeks following the February 1994 riots, police rounded up hundreds of *moustarchidine*, one of whom died in custody. Recently, the Government has embarked on a campaign to suppress the activities of other Muslim non-governmental organizations, pursuing nominally developmental and humanitarian work, many of whom receive support from other Islamic states. The Ministry of the Interior has justified these moves in the name of muting "fundamentalism" but observers interpret the new policy as a concession to the country's politically-powerful Islamic brotherhoods, and a reaction to the implicit political challenge posed by these grassroots groups. As one journalist noted, "certain of today's Islamic leaders are yesterday's leftists" (*Wal Fadjiri*, 26 décembre, 1994: 3).

Challenges to municipal authorities are also met with force. In a highly publicized case in 1994, a community association in the Casamance commune of Kolda, the *Comité pour la défense des intérêts de Kolda* (CIDIK), confronted municipal authorities over a "lack of transparency" and unexplained delays which have characterized rehabilitation of a municipal sports stadium. Following a number of rebuffs, CIDIK organized a sit-in at city hall to gain publicity for their cause, threatening to continue their acts of civil disobedience. Two days later CIDIK held a protest march which degenerated into a day long riot as police and *gendarmes* moved in to disperse the marchers, eventually firing tear gas canisters into the crowd. A number of CIDIK members were arrested and many injured.

In Thiès, the leader of a new association, *La Jeunesse pour l'alternance* (Youth for Change), was temporarily put in jail without explicit charges being brought against him. Latent political motivations help to explain the actions of the *Sûreté de Thiès*: JF-A's leader had been active in the mobilization of Thiès youth to register for the November 1995 municipal elections, presumably to the benefit of opposition political parties (*Wal Fadjiri*, 27 décembre, 1994).

More generally, the Government has been very effective at muffling civil protest through cooptation. With practically all of the country's institutional resources at its disposition, the buying off of influential civil leaders has not been difficult. Even vocal and nationally visible opponents of the regime have forgone their militancy for lucrative ministerial portfolios.⁴⁹ At the local level, the task has not been any harder. For example, with municipal elections on the horizon, the government stifled the prominent *Convention Saint Louisienne*-- a social movement drawing attention to numerous problems affecting the regional capital (*Sud Hebdo*, 15 octobre 1992)-- by naming the *Convention's* leader, Almany Fall, as director of the Dakar-based public housing corporation SICAP in 1993. Similarly, following the violent suppression of marches led by a youth association in Tambacounda in February 1992, the association's leader was incarcerated for three days then given a permanent position in the regional bureau of the national electricity company SENELEC.

Parodying the distrust and wariness which characterize interactions between communes and civil groups, the Government has created a Potemkin façade of formal community representation on the municipal council. In 1972, modifications to the Communal Code reserved a small but not insignificant number of seats on the municipal council for delegates of "the most representative" community-based associations (*groupements à caractère économique et social*). Upon proposition by the mayor, the Ministry of the Interior designates which organizations will be represented. In the

⁴⁹The most recent examples of this established tradition include principal political opponent Abdoulaye Wade's entry into the government in 1991 and again in 1995. Even opposition politicians more politically militant than Wade, such as Marxist PIT leader Amath Dansokho and LDM-PT leader Abdoulaye Bathily, have put aside their protest banners (in 1993) in exchange for the influence and income of national ministerial portfolios.

commune of Thiès, for example, these groups include the Senegalese Red Cross, FARPAS (an association representing retired salaried employees), the official labor union CNTS, the *Chambre des Métiers*, and the *Conseil Régional de la Jeunesse*-- all of which are informally or officially associated with the party and the state.

3.4.4 The Costs of Non-Collaboration

Politically-motivated contraction of the community sector has sapped the civil character of social and political life in urban Senegal of any vitality. Cooptation and suppression of the community realm by the state have precluded development of the "horizontal bonds of collective reciprocity" which, Putnam (1993:112) suggests, facilitate the emergence of effective subnational government. Not unlike the hierarchical societies of southern Italy, the municipal arena in Senegal is marked by vertical relations of authority, particularistic contacting between the community and the commune, and rigid partisanship-- broad-based interaction between municipality and community is essentially unknown. Decoupled from the communities they govern, communes have squandered the opportunity to harness (for consultation, deliberation and ultimately contracting for service delivery) the social and institutional resources which abound in contemporary urban areas.

Communes in Senegal ask little of neighborhood associations, and get little in return (such as respect, cooperation or taxes). A few progressive mayors have entered into contractual agreements with civil groups. For example, the Urban Community of Dakar collaborates with ASC and GIE of an umbrella organization composed of youth associations (CAMCUD) to provide a number of small-scale urban services. And through its urban environmental project (PEUL) the commune of Louga has contracted with a local GIE to collect garbage by horse cart.

More commonly, however, communes content themselves with the sponsorship of certain ASC, largely to cover football expenses. (ASC also participate in sporadic community clean-up efforts in the summer when students swell associations' ranks.) Since neighborhood clean-up groups first burst onto the national consciousness in 1989 (the *Set Setal* movement) the national government has done its best, through youth

outreach agencies, to institutionalize and officer the ASC movement. Similarly, municipal subsidies for ASC represents more of a political offering to mercurial urban youth than initiation of a process of productive collaboration with representative civil groups.

In Tambacounda, for example, sustained collaboration between the commune and local associations for the delivery of community services really occurs only once a year. During the two-week Celebration of Woman (*Quinzaine de la Femme*), a fête organized by the Ministry of Women, Children and Maternal Health and subsidized by the *French Coopération*, women's groups undertake a flurry of neighborhood beautification activities. This spasm of public-private cooperation, overseen by municipal politicians, is accompanied by dances, fashion shows, topical discussions and community dinners.

Focused on building politically profitable relations, commune officials have disdained community groups with genuine developmental potential. For example, visible and successful community health committees (*comité de santé*) which manage neighborhood health posts and pharmacies in numerous towns, under the aegis of a UNICEF-sponsored program, operate with practically no interaction with the municipality. In Tambacounda, an enterprising health committee put together a sound proposal for the construction of a maternity ward, eventually accepted for financing by the American Embassy, without city officials having shown the least interest in the project.

Lack of commune support has also limited the effectiveness of parent-student associations (*associations parents-élèves: APE*). These voluntary associations have been active in a number of communes, making physical and monetary contributions to the construction and maintenance of primary and secondary schools. Often constructed out of unreinforced mud bricks, sometimes with tin roofs and sometimes not, APE classrooms generally require additional funding to make them last more than a season or two. In municipalities visited for this study, however, commune politicians have shown a remarkable disinterest in collaborating with these dedicated self-helpers.

Construction of Public School Classrooms - Commune of Bignona

	Ministry of Education (pre -1966)	Municipality of Bignona	International Donors	Non-governmental organizations	Parent-Student Associations
Nursery	0	5	0	0	1
Elementary	35	0	14	10	26
Secondary	0	0	0	11	0

Source: Inspection Départementale de l'Education National/Bignona

Nonetheless, the contribution of parent-teacher associations has been considerable. As shown in the table above, self-financed APE's have constructed almost a third of elementary schools in the commune of Bignona. Non-governmental organizations subsidized by French development organizations have complemented these efforts. APE's have made similarly heroic efforts in Tambacounda, constructing 31 of the 116 elementary school classrooms in the municipality. Without matching contributions from the commune, however, these community initiatives are rapidly falling into disrepair-- and discouraging APE leaders.⁵⁰ In effect, the potential social capital which inheres in these community groups is being squandered and, as the number of students per classroom in the commune climbs to an average of 70+ in 1993, frustration replaces proactive good will.

3.5 - Relations with Government Ministries

Existing legislation limits commune autonomy, conferring considerable authority over important aspects of municipal management on government ministries. These bounds, however, are frequently broached. A common political affiliation allying senior government administrators and municipal officials overwhelms adherence to formal rules. Ministers and their cabinets have little interest in seriously compromising the livelihood of their fellow cadres at the local level.⁵¹ Moreover, through the simultaneous holding of local and

⁵⁰ The inability of the Ministry of Education to pay for primary and secondary school instructors constitutes another brake on the expansion of educational infrastructure in cities. Interviewees at regional offices of the Ministry of Education implied that APE's are constructing more classrooms than the Ministry can supply teachers.

⁵¹ On the other hand, intra-party factions, splitting vertically, have in the past created dramatic rifts between central ministries and certain municipal administrations. Following Mamadou Dia's arrest in December 1962, municipal councils controlled by supporters of the deposed prime minister were dissolved and executive powers assumed by appointed *délégation spéciales*.

national posts, municipal official may leverage influence within the PS hierarchy, exercising even more power over formal bureaucratic channels. The sections below detail the subversion of formal interaction between municipalities and representatives of central ministries.

3.5.1 Management of Municipal Land

Communes have a marginal role in urban land use planning. In 1964 all land in Senegal was nationalized, those few properties legally registered before passage of the law being exempted, creating a common preserve called the National Domain to be managed by the state. The commune, it follows, asserts no direct control over any of the land within its jurisdiction, except those plots upon which municipal buildings sit. To be developed for residential or other use, urban land must first be identified and surveyed by regional bureaus of the Ministry of Urbanism and Habitat, and then titled in the name of the state (as distinct from the National Domain). This laborious process, involving several agencies of two ministries, eventually requires the signature of the President of the Republic and may take several years to complete.

Once residential zones are titled in the name of the state, a commission composed of representatives of concerned technical ministries and presided over by the Governor or *prefet* allocates individual indefinite-term leases within the master title. Residents submit requests for land to the commission which, in principle, distributes plots according to applicants' need (e.g. they do not currently hold a legal plot of land). A representative of the mayor sits on the commission but has no formal discretionary role in the proceedings.

Demand is acute among urban populations for legal plots of land proximate to existing services. Land security represents another concern, although forced eviction of squatters is uncommon outside of the exceptionally crowded Dakar region. The cumbersome process of titling land out of the National Domain compounds the problem of urban land scarcity. As a result, residents build upon informal property holdings which may represent more than 50% of municipal surface area in most communes outside of the Region of Dakar.

That informal land holding benefits politically influential local elites may also help to explain the persistence of *zones irrégulières* in municipalities. For example, in Tambacounda town notables including the mayor-deputy operate lucrative gardens along the banks of the Mamacounda River which traverses the commune. These activities, however, slow the circulation of water, creating stagnant pools and aggravating seasonal flooding in adjacent residential quarters. To address these problems Government technicians drew up a proposal several years ago to formally survey land along the stream, broaden the Mamacounda, and title the plots. Enactment of the plan would have compromised all gardening activities along the Mamacounda. However, according to current bureau chiefs of the Land Registry Office (*Direction du Cadastre*) and the Water Management Office (*Direction de l'Hydraulique*), initial survey work for the project was inexplicably "misplaced". As a result, the technicians' plan was stillborn, a victim of politically-driven collaboration between powerful municipal officials and deconcentrated Government bureaucracies.

Informal control of municipal property by local elites provides a similar, perhaps more common motivation for delaying application of the official land allocation process. In certain neighborhoods of Dakar, for example, the Government has gingerly respected traditional land holding rights of the politically potent Lébou minority. In the commune of Tambacounda, local elites assert similar prerogatives. The last formal allocation of land in that commune took place four years ago. In the meantime a new residential zone has been surveyed and titled; and 1374 residents have submitted requests for land in the next allocation. These law-abiding citizens, however, have missed the boat. Hundreds of families have already occupied this newest residential zone, most of whom "bought" their plots from municipal politicians and other notables who claim "traditional" land-holding rights. After a long delay, the land allocation committee is expected to meet at the end of this year. However, by reason of the *fait accompli* it faces (and has implicitly sanctioned by inaction), the *prefet* will probably move to "regularize" the squatters rather than proceed with a reallocation.

In Bignona, a politically-sanctioned market for residential land has emerged in Tengono, an adjacent rural community only separated from the commune by the Trans-Gambian highway. Land across the asphalt remains theoretically part of the national domain, but now serves as a tenorial pressure valve for the crowded commune (whose requests for extension of its 1957 borders have languished in Dakar for more than fifteen years). Tengono has become densely populated, effectively urbanized, with a market beginning to rival the one in Bignona-proper, but which remains beyond the reach of municipal tax collectors. A windfall for those residents of Tengono who have "sold" the land of the national domain, this informal property market also benefits certain municipal politicians who have gained political (and financial) capital by serving as intermediaries for clients-- who can afford the \$1,000 per plot price tag -- seeking a place across the highway. With the eventual integration of Tengono *compliqué* (as it is known) into the commune, these wealthy squatters will become the happy holders of municipal property.⁵²

Even in situations where residential plots are in fact to be allocated, political interests invariably dominate the proceedings of land allocation committees chaired by the *prefet* or governor. Indeed, formal requests may only be summarily reviewed.⁵³ Access to those on the committee, or to local politicians, becomes of primary importance. According to several sources, communes present a list of favored individuals to the

⁵² The political configuration of the region helps to explain the existence of Tengono *compliqué*. The PS *coordination* of Bignona is contiguous with the department and not the commune, whose mayor is but a secretary general of one of the *coordination's sections*. The coordination's political heavy-weights, on the other hand, reign in the countryside. As a result, rural community interests-- e.g. the ability to sell what is, in effect, municipal land fill-- dominate those of the commune. It is ironic that the commune's requests for incorporation of Tengono have gathered dust in Dakar because Minister of Urbanism Landling Sané sits on Bignona's municipal council (but does his politicking in the surrounding countryside).

⁵³ Material constraints make observation of legislated rules problematic, further informalizing the process. It would be extremely difficult for the Land Registration Office to accurately assess the "objective" qualifications of most individuals requesting a residential lot. Respecting the most elementary of distribution criteria, that the individual requesting the plot does not hold property elsewhere in the region, would require a substantial effort. And even if a functionary of the Land Registration Office in Tambacounda undertook to collaborate with a functionary of the Cadastral Office to manually cross-check the 1400 new requests with the more than 7500 attributed plots, the great dusty registers containing the names of individuals having benefitted from past allocations are not kept up to date. Individuals have died, "sold" their lease, and so on.

commission. It goes without saying that the best way to get a plot of residential land is to have one's name on that list.

Ample *ex post facto* evidence of favoritism in land allocation exists. In neighborhoods which have been surveyed and parcels of land distributed, local notables may hold second and third plots on which rental properties sit. In Bignona, Ibrahima Diallo and Mamadou Oulé Diallo, cousins and the commune's most powerful merchants, together hold 14 plots of land in the municipality (not including properties registered under the names of wives and other family members). In Thiès, land brokers representing political elites circulate with titles for "sale". And in all the cities studied for this research, dozens of vacant lots lie undeveloped but untouchable, allocated to departed functionaries who have no immediate use for them (but who, according to the law, should have initiated construction on the land within two years of receiving the plots).

3.5.2 Fiscal and Operational Oversight of Communes

Articles 46, 47 and 48 of the CAC invest the *Direction des Collectivités Locales* with tutelary authority over municipal decision-making, concerning both the legality and the appropriateness (*opportunité*) of council deliberations. Prior approval by the DCL applies to budgetary and fiscal issues (which also require the Treasury's consent), matters relating to personnel, and all of the twenty-six major responsibilities the CAC devolves to commune government.

The Treasury plays a secondary role in fiscal oversight of communes, participating (indirectly) in the budget review process and in the allocation of investment grants from the *Fonds d'Équipement des Collectivités Locales*. More importantly, the Treasury serves as the bank of last resort for municipalities. Profligate management has made communes highly reliant on overdrafts-- a facility reserved for exceptional use according to article 157 of the CAC. Evidence suggests that rather than aggressively discourage abuse of this facility, the Treasury has been more than pliant.⁵⁴

⁵⁴ Actions by the highly politicized DCL often leave the Treasury holding the fiscal bag. On the eve of presidential elections in 1993, the DCL sent a radio message (2/12/93), urging all communes to make known any liquidity problems to be resolved by overdraft: "all communes facing possible

Commune Deficits as of January 1994

	Commune Population (1993)	Fiscal Deficit (cfa) @ 28.01.94	Tax Receipts 1993 (cfa)	Deficit/ 1993 Tax Receipts	Wage Bill 1993 (cfa)	Wage Bill/ Tax Receipts
Pikine	395,787	382,432,043	945,099,180	40%	660,000,000	70%
Rufisque	135,617	182,193,257	368,036,501	50%	343,894,020	93%
Sédhiou	15,776	33,530,608	16,055,683	209%	17,580,000	109%
Thionck-Essyl	6,467	5,745,787	1,925,483	298%	4,852,392	252%
Goudomp	6,408	8,812,130	2,093,498	421%	6,000,000	287%
Marsassoum	5,941	14,141,532	1,722,583	821%	7,080,000	411%
Dioffior	5,448	1,532,805	15,762,153	10%	6,160,000	39%

Source: République du Sénégal/Direction du Trésor/MEFP. Pikine and Rufisque's deficits include delinquent contributions to the Urban Community of Dakar, equivalent to 279 million cfa and 180 million cfa respectively (as of year-end 1993).

In the course of 1993 at least eleven of the country's forty-eight municipalities requested and were authorized overdrafts (*paiements à découvert*) from the Treasury. Seven communes were unable to close their shortfall and began 1994 with substantial deficits. Indeed, in a September 26, 1993 correspondence the Director of the Treasury agreed to cover, by overdraft, the commune of Louga's counterpart contribution to the World Bank's AGETIP project. Treasury officials then instructed the municipal administrator (and the mayor) to "make sure that the council eventually votes a transfer of funds to this account." These conspiratorial dealings between the commune executive and Treasury bureaucrats represent a remarkable circumvention of accounting rules and of municipal councilors' deliberatory role; clearly the annual budget approved by the council had not made allowances for the AGETIP project. Moreover, these actions mock the World Bank's efforts to encourage prudent management by insisting on a local counterpart contribution for AGETIP activities.

Tutulary oversight by the DCL resembles a block of Swiss cheese, firm and heavy while riddled through with holes. Staffing constraints and politicization of the DCL's supervisory role have made application of the *tutelle* uneven and inefficient.⁵⁵ Central

delays in the payment of personnel salaries must transmit details including the number of months owed, the amount, and the urgency of the situation."

⁵⁵ A consultant's report finds that even those municipal deliberations which, according to the CAC, can be legally executed 40 days after their submission to the *prefet* ascend systematically to the DCL in Dakar. The report attributes this contravention of the Communal Code to a "culture hypercentralisée" (PAFL, 1994:III), and the fact that municipal managers appointed by the Ministry

approval of a contractor's bid, already accepted by the municipality, may take up to six months; approbation of municipal personnel decisions requires a three to four month wait (Banque Mondiale/République du Sénégal, 1994). Important year-end accounting documents are not transmitted to Dakar: the most recent approved *comptes de gestion* available at the DCL or the Treasury date back to 1982! Nor are procedural guidelines observed. Many municipal councils, for example, do not hold the requisite four sessions annually. Most revealing of all, performance benchmarks established by the DCL are not respected: personnel expenses should not surpass 40% of recurrent expenditures, and investments should represent at least a quarter of the total budget, 20% of which should be self-financed. Recent results from communes studied in the course of this research, for example, reveal that none of the municipalities completely satisfies the tutelary authority's standards.

Municipal Performance Ratios: 1993 Results in Three Communes

	Personnel/Recurrent Expenditures	Investment/Total Expenditures	Self-financed Investment
Thiès	36%	19%	14%
Bignona	59%	53%	0%
Tambacounda	60%	1%	0%

Source: Direction du Trésor/MEFP; Perception Municipale Thiès; Perception de Bignona; Trésorie Régionale Tambacounda

Because rules are not regularly respected, the DCL holds discretionary power to sanction municipalities at any time. Municipal councils in communes running chronic fiscal deficits, for example, could by law be disbanded. This potent weapon serves to temper the autonomy of wayward communes. According to a senior official in the DCL, "life was made very difficult" for the commune of Oussouye during the opposition *Parti Démocratique Socialiste's* brief control of the municipality beginning in 1978.

In the context of the PS's current, exclusive franchise over the municipal institution, application of central oversight can be made more or less slack depending on intra-party relationships and local political conditions. The process through which the DCL reviews and approves municipal budgets provides a good example.

feel more comfortable receiving approbation directly from their superiors. Needless to say, this supplementary work flow aggravates administrative shortcomings in the DCL.

In late December and early January of each year, the DCL receives provisional annual budgets voted on by municipal councils. According to article 150 of the Communal Code, the DCL has 15 days to reject budgets which are judged to be "unbalanced" or based on "insincere" income estimations. In turn the mayor must resubmit a rectified version to the municipal council within 10 days, and send it back to Dakar. This sequence is, in fact, no longer respected. By mid-March of 1994, for example, the DCL had not completed its review and approval process.⁵⁶ In effect, because of resource constraints and tactical bloating of the budget by commune officials (ask for a lot and bargain hard), the budget approval process proceeds with little respect for the law. Regulatory rigor having been abandoned, political interests easily enter this porous process.

For example, in 1993 the DCL judged 47 of 48 communal budgets to be unbalanced. Administratively ill-equipped to process this work flow in the prescribed manner, the Direction has developed an alternative procedure: prepare a cursory analysis, provisionally reject the budgets, and call the mayors to the DCL in Dakar. Then, over the course of an afternoon DCL functionaries hammer out the new budget with the municipal executive and his secretary general (an employee of the DCL). Not only is this process laborious, but it becomes highly personalized, transforming a straightforward budgetary approval procedure into a face-to-face bargaining session. These conditions weaken considerably the ability of DCL functionaries to hold their ground against the extra-administrative influence of certain mayors. Moreover, budgets from certain politically important communes-- important because of the mayor's weight in the Party or because of political considerations particular to the municipality-- never even make it to these haggling sessions. DCL functionaries receive instructions from their superiors to approve these budgets as voted by the municipal council or modify them only superficially, with no regard for the commune's fiscal performance.

Kedougou, for example, is a small isolated town in eastern Senegal which has posted unremarkable fiscal results for many years. The recently-deceased mayor of the

⁵⁶ This means that for those communes awaiting their budgets, municipal management has been on hold for the entire trimester-- no expenditures, other than personnel salaries and bare-minimum maintenance expenses, can be made until the DCL approves the budget.

town, however, was one of the barons of PS hierarchy, having held a number of important administrative posts in his lifetime, including president of the *Conseil Economique et Social*. Over the past six years (1988/89-1994) budgetary amounts approved by the DCL averaged 91% of the amounts proposed by Kedougou's council, including two years during which the budget was approved without modification. Annual fiscal receipts actually collected by the commune during that same period (1988/89-1993), on the other hand, averaged only 59% of amounts approved by the DCL.

Extra-bureaucratic interests also play a role in the allocation of project-specific grants for investment financing, the *Fonds Spéciaux* facility of the *Fonds d'Equipement des Collectivités Locales*. The FECL management committee, composed of senior bureaucrats from the DCL and the Ministry of Finance, responds to annual grant requests submitted by communes. Distribution criteria are vague, opening the door to political influence. According to anecdotal evidence, *Fonds Spéciaux* grants perennially favor politically powerful mayors and supply spot financing for politically urgent projects (such as funding, with AGETIP assistance, the construction of a sports stadium in Tambacounda following violent protests by the city's youth in 1992).

Using OLS regression techniques, and a constructed index measuring the relative intra-party influence of municipal executive bureaus,⁵⁷ I tested for a systematic relationship between intra-party political power and the allocation of categorical FECL grants (*fonds spéciaux*) over three years (1988/9, 1991/2, 1993). In addition to the political influence index, independent regressors included demographic and urban development indicators (such as were available) relevant to the FECL committee's decision to allocate investment grants to specific municipalities. Primary school enrollment and the number of medical practitioners, for example, serve as rough proxies for urban income and municipal infrastructure development. An expectation is that in the interests of income redistribution, FECL allocations would tend to favor less well-endowed

⁵⁷ The Political Influence Index was constructed from coding completed by six Senegalese contemporaries associated with the *Ecole Nationale d'Economie Appliquée de Dakar*, the *Direction Financière des Collectivités Locales* in the Treasury, the Ministry of the Interior's DCL, the *Comité Central* of the *Parti Socialiste*, a Ministry of Finance urban development project, and the World Bank Mission in Dakar. The coders rated each commune on a 1 (essentially no influence) to 5 (maximum influence) scale.

municipalities. On the other hand, I would anticipate that FECL awards would target towns in regions undergoing rapid urbanization. Not only are these municipalities growing relatively quickly, and face rapidly expanding demands for social services and infrastructure, but the economic well-being of these regions will depend increasingly on the ability of urban areas to support growth and provide employment.

OLS Regression: FECL Awards to Urban Communes 1988-1993

FECL (cfa)	coefficient	standard error
Political Influence Index (squared)	1424.277 *	701.4926
Urban Population (1988)	0.2295521 *	0.0877202
Regional Primary School Enrollment Rate	638.4328	610.7503
Medical Personnel per 1000 inhabitants	-0.000113	0.000301
Regional Urbanization Rate	-3735.732	14320.47
constant	7027.858	45453.69

N = 76; R-squared = 0.2936; * significant at 0.05 level.

Source: *Recensement général de la population et de l'habitat de 1988*, Rapport National, Dakar: Ministère de l'Economie, des Finances et du Plan/Direction de la Prévision et de la Statistique (juin 1993); République du Sénégal (1991).

The regression results above find political influence and city size to be positively related to increasing FECL allocations and statistically significant. The squared political influence indicator suggests that the positive relationship between that variable and FECL allocations, holding other factors constant, is a curved rather than linear one. (Using the non-squared term in the regression yielded a coefficient which was just under the 95 percent confidence threshold: $t = 1.987$.) In spite of the small sample size, a noisy political measure, and insufficient data to run a more complete model,⁵⁸ the regression presents strong evidence that the annual process of FECL grant distribution is sensitive to the differential political strength of certain municipal politicians.

Given the unitary political objectives present in a national governance regime dominated by a single-party, it is unsurprising that extra-administrative concerns intervene in the distribution of investment monies with considerable political consequences at the

⁵⁸ A study of grant allocation to municipalities in France (Nevers, 1991) found a negative correlation between fiscal wealth and the distribution of central government grants. In the Senegalese case, using tax information to test for a similar redistributive effect appears problematic because, as I argue in this chapter, fiscal results may have nothing to do with the underlying wealth of the municipality. Indeed, there may be a (negative) correlation between tax collection and political influence, introducing problems of multicollinearity.

local level. Politics in Senegal has long been characterized by clan-based personalized relationships. Moreover, senior bureaucrats unavoidably wear two hats, one administrative and one political. In addition, the institutional resource of the *cummul des mandats* provides certain mayors with exceptional access to, and influence with, high-ranking decision-makers in the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Finance. Indeed, the Minister of Decentralization, who oversees the operation of the DCL, also sits on the municipal council of one of the country's regional capitals (and will probably be its next mayor). So DCL functionaries must, in effect, make allocation decisions on their boss' requests for financing! An analysis of the role of political processes in investment grant allocations to municipalities in France similarly revealed a statistically significant relationship between increasing levels of national political responsibility (e.g. mayors being or having been members of the national assembly or senate) and the allocation of conditional investment grants to municipalities from the central government (Nevers, 1991). The study found a correlation between the holding of increasingly powerful national posts and the mayors' rate of success in obtaining investment subsidies, as well as the size of the grant allocated to their municipality (regardless of political affiliation).

3.5.3 Effects of Complicitous Central-Municipal Relations

Politically-determined channels of influence running from commune to Government and vice-versa exacerbate communal mismanagement described earlier, and further buffer commune officials from the burdens of municipal superintendence. Indeed, in a recent inter-ministerial meeting (*République du Sénégal*, 1994) held to discuss a deteriorating municipal fiscal situation, the Director of the DCL voiced his concern not with commune mismanagement *per se*, but with (politically sensitive) delays in the payment of municipal staff salaries-- and admonished his colleagues in the Treasury for having tightened their overdraft policy!⁵⁹

The cumulative effects of overdraft access, Treasury resolution of communal accounts payable, and subjective allocation of FECL grants does not create incentives for

⁵⁹ A deepening fiscal crisis at the national level, related in part to diminished donor support, and aggravated recently by devaluation of the CFA franc, has made it difficult for the State to continue subsidizing its many institutional satellites, municipalities included.

mayors to commit to the fiscal rehabilitation of their institutions. Who needs to collect taxes? Or who needs to plan in a responsive or responsible way? The decoupling of prospective budgeting from the satisfaction of objectives strips the planning process of its disciplining logic and makes insignificant the accounting procedures which structure annual operations. Contravening francophone budgetary convention and the Fiscal Code, the commune of Pikine has even been allowed on one occasion to use FECL investment financing to cover operating expenses. Such legerdemain renders commune operations opaque to the majority of elected officials (whose understanding may be weak to begin with) and citizens alike. Most councilors can cite the size of the commune's annual budget with pride, but few can recall the amount of revenues actually collected the previous year, or what percentage of the budget was actually spent.

Complicitous relations between commune officials and senior bureaucrats further diminishes the importance of the formal municipal governance system defined by national legislation. The ability of the mayor to provide benefits for selective constituents (land, special projects) may have little to do with how he actually manages the commune-- just as political participation in commune affairs may depend more on massaging one's affiliation with the Party than on neighborhood representation. And once in the realm of these extra-bureaucratic circuits, informal relations play a large role. Even the powerful mayor of Dakar has observed that a well-placed member of his staff is more effective than he at moving the commune's business through the DCL.

Lastly, through the multiplier effect of "accumulated mandates" political strength may be leveraged into considerable resources for municipal activities and in turn reinforcement of one's political base. For example, one of the PS' young rising stars was named Minister of Decentralization in 1993; he also sits on Tambacounda's municipal council. In the course of negotiating a public works and employment project with the French Cooperation Agency earlier this year, he was able to earmark 200 million cfa for Tambacounda. For a commune whose annual tax revenues do not exceed 90 million, this represents a windfall for the city and considerable political capital for the minister. Able to announce the arrival of a project which will provide employment for several hundred youths, the minister has almost certainly guaranteed himself leadership of the municipal

coordination in primaries to be decided this year, and by extension the mayoralty in 1995. Managing the commune, it would appear, is a snap.

4 - Politics and the Urban Management Approach

These results pose a challenge to international development agencies which actively support municipal decentralization programs through technical assistance, training, and the supply of investment credits to city government. Urban development objectives for institutions such as the World Bank have evolved in the past two decades as continuing demographic pressure has drawn attention to urban centers' importance in macro-economic growth (cf. World Bank, 1991; World Bank 1994). A broad view of urban management issues, highlighting the vital role of subnational government in fostering a socio-economically productive municipal environment, has superseded an earlier emphasis on physical infrastructure and shelter related activities. A loosely defined "urban management approach" has attempted to coalesce these new institutional and administrative concerns-- urban management and planning; local government revenue generation and budgeting; decentralization of national government authority over cities-- into a unified framework (Stren, 1993:131).

Operationally, the urban management approach boils down to a combination of conventional financial and technical capacity issues with a new accent on the urban regulatory environment, to facilitate private sector involvement in city governance: alternative arrangements for service delivery; user-oriented revenue sources; policy reform of property rights, regulations, and subsidies. In effect, this is a municipal version of structural adjustment. Indeed, Annick Osmont's assessment (cited by Stren (1993:135)) of the "urban management approach" echoes critiques of national adjustment programs: "the idea of urban management assumes that policies have been already determined; the question then becomes how to secure a proper level of technical implementation. This involves 'technocratizing' the city to the maximum, treating social problems as natural consequences of growth, 'and avoiding any questions on the causes of problems, on the impact and on the implications of technical choices.'"

Implicitly addressing Osmont's critique, this research finds any distinction between political-institutional concerns and "practical, technical and decentralized organizational elements of the urban management approach" (Stren, 1993:137) to be empirically unfounded. Reforms which bolster institutional capacity-- internal management structures, personnel management and performance incentives, strengthening of municipal fiscal instruments, alleviating burdensome regulatory controls, making precise the functional boundaries between public bodies, etc.-- are inarguably important in the building of a viable subnational government system.⁶⁰ But better cars do not make better drivers. Political as well as administrative institutions shape the alternatives and payoffs facing subnational authorities. Focusing on legislative and private contractual arrangements ignores the decisive role played by the political regulatory regime in establishing organizational accountability and, by extension, corporate performance.

Attention to accountability as a means of controlling the performance of public officials is a relatively recent trend (Paul, 1991:9). Moreover, institutions such as the World Bank have tended to equate the strengthening of public agencies with increased professionalization of these institutions. In their much-cited paper on governance, senior Bank officials Pierre Landell-Mills and Ismael Serageldin (1991:8) argue that, "empowerment and greater accountability will not assure better governance unless public agencies are made more competent." Perhaps, but it is not inherently less correct to say, 'organizational competence will not assure better governance unless public agencies are held to account for their actions'. Indeed, as concerns urban management in Senegal I would argue that even if the state greatly relaxed its formal municipal oversight responsibilities, boosted the fiscal potential of urban government by, say, 50 percent (by transferring taxes or eliminating abatements), equipped every city hall with a computer,

⁶⁰ A vicious circle afflicts weakly-funded and weakly-empowered local administration. Lack of resources make it difficult for administrations to cover overhead costs, purchase equipment, train personnel, and maintain acceptable levels of service provision. Under these conditions fostering legitimacy with local constituents remains unlikely, impacting the ability of local entities to levy taxes and mobilize community participation (for consultation and co-production of services). Moreover, weak administrative capacity discourages the devolution of responsibility to these decentralized bodies. Local administration thus remains under-financed and under-bureaucratized.

and arranged for municipal officials to benefit from a comprehensive program of training, the overall quality of urban governance would not improve dramatically.⁶¹

Ultimately, profoundly modifying established patterns of commune management will require reform of the political rules of the game which define the universe of payoffs and sanctions at the local level. Measures to improve direct electoral accountability would include: institution of the direct primary or abolition of a designated intra-party order on the electoral slate; proportional representation and at-large general elections; direct election of the mayor rather than his selection from among the elected body of councilors; outright elimination of party designations from all or select electoral contests; and liberation of the timing of municipal elections from that of higher-order jurisdictions. While even reformed democratic machinery may remain largely at the mercy of hegemonic parties' money and influence, features of the electoral system can indeed introduce individualism among politicians and make it possible for new coalitions to unseat entrenched machine interests.⁶²

The ossified state of national politics in contemporary Senegal has made the advent of such potent political reforms unlikely. Thus the threat of democratic sanction (outside of the commune of Dakar) remains weak. And an enduring reality of non-contestable political markets has compromised the disinterested exercise of administrative and fiscal oversight. Public regulatory agencies in all polities are of course susceptible to extra-bureaucratic influence, but in Senegal (and other African states where incumbent regimes continue to monopolize political arenas) coincident political interests at the local and central level have made chronic subversion of regulatory guidelines the rule rather than the exception. Furthermore, aggressive superintendence of

⁶¹ Ribot's (1995:14) study of the devolution of natural resource management resource responsibility in Senegal has come to similar conclusions: "Even if benefits and decision making powers are devolved to local communities, participation without locally accountable representation is... not empowerment nor will it necessarily achieve the internalization of social and ecological costs into decision making... an accomplishment on which local control and participatory benefits are predicated."

⁶² State assemblies mandated many of these governmental-electoral reforms during the 30-year process of taking on the political machines and rehabilitating American municipalities in the Progressive Era. In conjunction with other structural reforms (some of which I advocate below) these measures yielded considerable improvements in municipal governance over what had been the norm at the turn of the century (Sundquist, 1983:173; Griffith, 1974:128,143).

civil groups by public authorities has raised the costs of community monitoring. The exigencies of regime survival tend to dominate, severely compromising the quality of local public accountability.

4.1 - A Challenge for Development Agencies: Raising the Costs of Municipal Non-Performance

If municipal development programs are to have any effectiveness, the absence of sanctions for profligate and unrepresentative behavior must be addressed head on. But how? The role of external agencies in directly promoting political reform is ambiguous in this regard. External support of democratic governance in Africa is expensive and operationally problematic.⁶³ Evaluating the quality of political practice is particularly difficult in a country such as Senegal where democratic infrastructure is nominally well established. In any case, international support for democratic governance in Africa tends to eschew direct reworking of local electoral systems in favor of institution building activities: subsidizing electoral commissions; promoting civic education through non-profit organizations; and providing training and operational support for legislatures, ministries of the interior, and the judiciary.⁶⁴

The importance of these activities for the long-term establishment of democratically responsible urban government is inarguable. But more immediately, how can the costs of exclusionary, partisan behavior be raised? I suggest that new pressures can indeed be brought to bear on municipal management. The challenge is to slowly develop an environment of public scrutiny-- to increase the availability and relevance of

⁶³ Moreover, even for bilateral agencies such as USAID which have made democracy promotion an explicit policy objective, commitment to political reform has been uneven (Jost, 1995). Jump-starting the democratic process through funding of a transition election-- e.g. Namibia, Benin, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa-- has proven relatively successful, but the Americans as well as the French have backed off public pressure on recalcitrant non-democrats in Kenya, Cameroun, and Nigeria (Diamond, 1994). As with any capital investment project, initial financing is easy but sustainable maintenance programs tend to fall down. (Personal communications from Nick Van de Walle, MSU/ODC; Don Muncie, USAID/Africa Bureau/Democracy & Governance Programs.)

⁶⁴ USAID is currently funding electoral assistance, civic institutional development, and legislative strengthening projects in Malawi, Kenya, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Zambia, South Africa, Rwanda, Guinea-Bissau, and Côte d'Ivoire. Regional Electoral Assistance and Democracy and Human Rights funds complement these country-level activities (Project document abstracts, USAID Africa Bureau/Information Service).

information regarding municipalities' performance, and to enhance the effectiveness of institutions which have incentives to exploit it. Even in the absence of electoral reform, broadening the potential for public monitoring and demand making will increase the implicit political prices of choices made by commune politicians.

The following three sections articulate methods (by no means an exhaustive inventory) through which to bolster public scrutiny of urban government and create the potential for greater public accountability. As a complement to the capacity-building focus of conventional municipal management projects, the strategies I describe below represent a first cut at building an operational approach to address accountability failure directly.

First, I discuss ways to increase the effectiveness of central oversight, limiting avenues for political bargaining and applying administrative techniques to overcome the obscurity which characterizes local government performance. Information must be highly leveraged-- sharply focused such that a few indicators yield a relatively well-defined profile of what local government has done in a given time period.

Second, I suggest measures to pry open the environment of exclusivity which has insulated the municipal institution from closer appreciation by its constituents: institutional reforms to bring into relief municipal performance in specific domains, and proactive support for local private and community actors who have a self-interest in engaging in public oversight.

Lastly, I address the issue of fiscal responsibility. Partisan politics have made the intergovernmental fiscal system a readily accessible safety valve for municipal politicians. In the process, incentives for resource mobilization, rational administration, and increased interaction with a range of municipal constituents (an inevitable consequence of self-reliant fiscal management) have evaporated. Localizing the municipal fiscal system to the greatest extent possible will begin to internalize the full economic and political costs of municipal decision making.

4.1.1 Focusing Administrative and Fiscal Oversight: Accountability to the Center

In Senegal, responsibility for administrative and fiscal oversight of municipalities is shared by the Direction of Local Collectivities (DCL), a division of the Ministry of the Interior, and the Treasury's Financial Direction of Local Collectivities (DFCL), part of the Ministry of Finance. A suffocating welter of responsibilities, murkily repartitioned between the two units, have aggravated the agencies' administrative shortcomings. This regulatory slack has broadened opportunities for municipal politicians to exercise their extra-bureaucratic leverage.

At present, oversight agencies (primarily a handful of functionaries in the DCL) perform exhaustive, minutiae reviews of local activities: prospective budgeting, personnel hiring, law making, rate setting, contracting, tax yields, overdraft requests, requests for grants-in-aid, monitoring of grant use, mid-term budgetary modification, agreements made with international funding sources, etc. As I have described, intimate interaction over dozens of administrative inputs, notably budgeting, transforms what should be mechanical procedures into bargaining sessions in which political pressures are unavoidably brought to bear. To limit the range of exchanges between Dakar and localities, the role of the DCL should be pared down to focus on a set of core activities, the analysis of which can be readily processed by resource-scarce central agencies: review of consolidated budget categories (rather than looking over the relative allocation of gasoline and office supplies); monitoring of gross personnel expenditures (does Dakar really need to approve every laborer hired?); supervision of large-scale contracting; juridical oversight of a few important classes of municipal legislation; and so on.⁶⁵

At the same time, the oversight responsibilities of the DCL and the DFCL should be more carefully delineated. Interaction between the two ministries on sensitive issues (municipal overdraft requests, extra-budgetary payments of municipal salaries, the allocation of grants-in-aid) is frequently tense, occasions which mayors exploit to play one bureaucracy off the other. An important change of practice would be to invest the

⁶⁵ For similar reasons, existing formulae for the allocation of intergovernmental transfers should be reformed (a subject discussed later in the chapter).

Treasury with responsibility over all intergovernmental financial transfers. Such a reform would simplify lines of responsibility-- municipalities would no longer have to send information up to two different bureaus-- and entrust decision-making to functionaries who face more strenuous incentives for responsible fiscal management.⁶⁶

More generally, a broader shift in the logic of central oversight is necessary. The concern of oversight agencies should evolve from a preoccupation with 'what subnational government say it is going to do' to 'what subnational government has done'. A change from *a priori* to *a posteriori* budget control by the DCL is already being considered, and such reforms should be expanded upon. A greater focus on what the public management literature calls 'performance management', for example, would direct oversight attention away from the present, stultifying accent on numbers which have little relation to reality (such as the budget) or which mean nothing to the municipal consumer (such as gross operating expenditures or the size of the city's equipment park). Performance indicators would include: data on taxes collected per class of instrument (some of which is already done but mostly analyzed by donor agencies) or tax collected per capita; expenditures per capita per sector; students per primary school class; health centers or maternity wards per thousand inhabitants; households per public standpipe in each neighborhood; percentage of households attached to the municipal water system in each neighborhood; frequency and coverage of garbage collection; percentage of streetlights burned out in each neighborhood; and so on.⁶⁷

Local governments in the United States, two-thirds of jurisdictions surveyed in 1988, have used outcome-oriented performance monitoring systems for several years in police, fire, solid waste, public transport, health, and social services (Poister and Streib, 1989; Cook, et al., 1995). Osborne and Gaebler (1993:145) report that in localities such as Sunnyvale, California use of performance indicators had important productivity gains:

⁶⁶ Unlike their colleagues in the Ministry of the Interior, Treasury officials are under intense pressure to make ends meet, make hard intra-government allocative choices every day, and face IMF review teams at the end of each month.

⁶⁷ The collection of accurate performance indicators, and *a posteriori* oversight generally, is a capacity-exigent switch with great potential for abuse. Delegating some of the information-collection and auditing functions to a private accounting firm would ease resource pressure on central institutions as well as constrain political manipulation of the measurement process.

the municipality found that over a five year period the city's average cost per unit of service went down 20 percent, and that it used 35 to 45 percent fewer staff to deliver most services compared to cities of comparable size.

In the absence of powerful electoral pressure it is clear that application of these performance monitoring techniques will yield less dramatic results in Africa than it has in the United States. Nonetheless, this information could serve as an important tool for relevant comparisons of municipal performance across the country, and could be integrated into grants-in-aid allocation formulas. Indeed, I would argue that the adoption of output-oriented indicators may find particular applicability in the African public management environment. A focus on government outcomes will illuminate latent effects of machine rule-- for example, patronage-driven hiring of unqualified staff-- which conventional budgetary controls do not address. Most importantly, communication of performance measures at the local level would be a powerful, accountability-strengthening complement to efforts to enhance community voice. It is obvious that for the public to make the most of disseminated indicators concerning public institutions, that information must be in as relevant and readily interpretable a form as possible. The disclosure of currently-collected information concerning the municipal institution presumably means little to most consumers of urban services: that a municipality carries a budget deficit of x percent; has annual tax revenue growth of y percent, or is staffed by personnel of which z percent has less than a high school education. On the other hand, community interest will be readily stimulated by a basket of indicators which reveal the frequency and coverage of garbage collection, or the state (infrastructure quality, student-teacher ratio) of municipal schools-- accompanied by potent comparisons across neighborhoods or across cities of similar size.

4.1.2 Strengthening Voice and Opening the Ear: Accountability to the Community

Complementary initiatives at the subnational level will reinforce the long-term effectiveness of central oversight.⁶⁸ In Western polities, for example, the costs of self-

⁶⁸ . Strategies to engage urban constituencies will have to overcome considerable inertial resignation. Urban communities have grown unaccustomed to looking to municipal government for problem-solving (even as aggressive superintendence of associational life has constrained

interested behavior by local politicians are considerably higher because of the press' vigilance, and the mobilization of large and small interest groups to denounce abuses of the public trust. Strengthening the potential for local government oversight by private and community groups has been an underexploited element of donors' institution building programs in the developing world (Paul, 1991). The objective is to leverage relevant information to the greatest extent possible, shortening the distance between municipal output and constituent sanction.

The better directed community voice becomes the more effective it will be, all the more so if service performance can be identified with a particular official or bureau. Compressing the range of municipal service responsibilities would help to focus urban constituents' voice, limited though it may be. In Senegal the Communal Code presently attributes an essentially boundless scope to work to urban government. Moreover, sectoral spending responsibilities are ill-specified; it is not clear, for example, whether municipalities' responsibility for primary education implies responsibility for capital spending, maintenance of infrastructure, or just recurrent expenditures (cf. Bird, Ebel, Wallich, 1995:35). Short of constraining the existing scope of municipal prerogatives, responsibilities may be classified to reflect their social or developmental importance: For example, health, education, waste removal, and sanitation could be designated Class I responsibilities; market facilities, and taxi parks Class II responsibilities; and socio-cultural, or athletic facilities Class III responsibilities. Performance indicators (as discussed earlier) for each class of investment would then reinforce the public's understanding of what the municipality was really up to. If the ball is well defined, constituents can more readily keep their eye on it.

In addition, functional responsibilities within municipal government can be highlighted to reinforce direct accountability. At present, the structure of representative institutions obfuscates lines of direct responsibility. Members of the *bureau municipal* hold delegated responsibilities, but they "oversee" spheres of action which correspond to

neighborhoods' ability to pursue self-help solutions). And in more affluent residential quarters, the emergence of private alternatives to public services— schools, clinics, solid waste removal (septic tank emptying)— has compensated for ineffectual government provision, and muted these most articulate and influential voices for municipal reform.

administrative duties (e.g. finance, contract bidding) not functional realms. The same organizing principle structures municipal operations: there is a *bureau de personnel*, and a *bureau de finances*, but all of the commune's public goods output is lumped under *services municipaux*. In any case, the mayor holds *de facto* monopoly authority within the municipality. As such he is master of everything but held to account for nothing in particular. Moreover, recall that the mayor is not directly elected by the population but chosen from among the elected slate of councilors.

In small and medium size American cities, Progressive Era reforms addressed similar accountability failures, replacing swollen councils of aldermen with commission-style government: directly-elected boards of commissioners, generally no larger than seven members each, which hold responsibility over a specific domain-- police, water, public works. Another Progressive Era legacy, the council-manager plan, vests all administrative power in a relatively small elected council which appoints a city manager to assume general direction of municipal affairs. The city executive in turn names subordinate officers with responsibility over specific administrative domains. Analogous executive arrangements, designed to balance the utility of strong internal leadership with the need for accountability, have been built into local government systems in Italy (Norton, 1995:269). Alternatively, Swedish and Norwegian municipalities have established auxiliary decision-making structures, which incorporate community representatives, covering politically sensitive functional domains such as health and education (Kjellberg, 1979:96-9).⁶⁹

Institutional reforms should be complemented by aggressive strategies to directly enhance the potential for community voice. Development assistance can play a constructive role in lowering the cost of voice to community members by supporting external actors which work with local associations, namely non-governmental organizations. In Senegal, international and domestic NGO's are practically absent from urban areas outside of the capital region (as is the United States Peace Corps). Urban community development activities should be aggressively targeted at the municipal

⁶⁹ While these models constitute a considerable departure from the Franco-Senegalese unitary consultative structure, institutional experimentation is always possible, as evidenced by the European hybrid forms.

sector. Further, urban development programs should encourage municipal governments to contract out labor-intensive service delivery functions to the informal sector, such as neighborhood garbage removal in coordination with city-wide collection services. Such arrangements yield improved service coverage as well as strengthened institutional links between the municipality and its less-influential constituents.⁷⁰

While international agencies have indeed made the support of NGO's and neighborhood associations a component of local development activities, the focus has invariably been on mobilization of communal labor or cost recovery (e.g. Nagle and Ghose, 1990:4). Accountability-strengthening strategies, on the other hand, make the dissemination of information about municipal activities an explicit objective. Increasing constituent knowledge will lower the costs of proactive community mobilization and assertiveness (*vis-à-vis* city government as well as other neighborhoods/groups with an interest in the status quo).⁷¹ Over time, the coalescence of public demands around the municipality will begin to break down the exclusivity of access which has made it possible for municipal officials to deal selectively with vocal clients.

Passive mechanisms, such as the reform of budgetary, accounting, and contracting procedures, are not enough. By themselves, top down instruments such as surveys initiated by local authorities to elicit public opinion are similarly insufficient. There are no substitutes for the incremental process of building up the public's capacity to understand what the municipality does, what its responsibilities are, how it does it, and how to pry open the process by which resources are distributed. For example, municipal information bulletins in local as well as official languages-- including advance details of

⁷⁰ Donor project documents reveal surprisingly mechanical prescriptions for the engagement of constituents in municipal development activities. Among its components, USAID's Guinea Decentralization and Participation project included a program of matching grants to finance neighborhood development activities. The project summary reads: "The key criterion for project selection will be evidence that the citizenry have been involved in a substantial way in the development and selection of projects. Possible means of carrying this out could be town-meeting-style deliberations" (USAID Project 6750226 Guinea, FY 92-94, Source: USAID Africa Bureau Information Center).

⁷¹ In taking on public management, African civil society tends to express its voice-- outside of activities where commercial or syndical interests are at stake-- through 'negative acts': opposing eviction, challenging the destruction of local environment preserves or, conversely, *ex post facto* protests over the localization of garbage dumps (NIMBY African-style).

budgeting sessions, annual expenditures, the contract bidding process-- could be easily posted throughout the city's neighborhoods on the columnar information kiosks found in French cities (*colonnes Morris*). Municipal information bulletins could also become a regular feature of regional radio broadcasts. Over time, information exchange can be institutionalized through public hearings, expert committees, and public-private development boards.⁷² The introduction of obligatory public referenda for certain classes of investment, or for municipal projects whose value surpasses a defined threshold, is another option.

Donor supported activities which strengthen commercial interests in municipal areas also contribute to the potential for community assertiveness. In the United States and Europe 'urban growth coalitions' have emerged as advocates for municipal reform, "local elites with property interests [which have] coalesce[d] into coalitions in order to persuade local government to provide better physical and social infrastructure" (Barlow, 1995:4). In Africa, privatization initiatives and programs which support small and medium enterprises help to deepen the base of economic actors with an interest in sound public management. The extent to which economic development potential is spatially decentralized will naturally determine the effectiveness of such a strategy. At the same time, larger cities and urban regions can be encouraged to embrace an economic development role, going beyond the function of simple caretaker to proactively encourage the localization of national and direct foreign investment through public-private partnerships, economic development councils, and so on.⁷³

Community voice can be further amplified through legislative reforms. For example, the recall provision, a feature of many American city charters, allows the electorate to call for a vote on whether a particular official accused of malfeasance should

⁷² Formalizing interaction early in the 'community voice development process' increases the risk that these bodies will be dominated by the usual, officially-sanctioned groups and the forum delegitimized in the eyes of the broader constituency.

⁷³ In African countries with relatively well-developed middle classes, the mobilization of urban elites to challenge the decay in urban life is by no means unheard of. In Nairobi in 1993, key members of the business and professional communities organized a conference entitled "The Nairobi We Want." Supported by a German-based foundation and the World Bank, whose resident representative gave the keynote address, the conference provided an occasion to review public management practices in a range of sectors; similar conferences were held in Kenya major secondary cities (Stren et al., 1994:187).

step down. And while it is unlikely that recall petitions could be applied successfully with any frequency, invocation of the measure would serve as a powerful expression of discontent.⁷⁴ Making municipal officials more accessible to their constituents may also have the effect of making municipal 'ear' more sensitive to community voice. As I have described, the mayor and most of the municipalities' most qualified councilors reside in Dakar; depending on the importance of their duties in the capital, councilors' visits to their jurisdictions may be highly infrequent. Limiting the ability of municipal officials to simultaneously hold offices at the national and local levels would subject city officials to the vulnerability of proximity, as would the imposition of strict residency requirements.⁷⁵

4.1.3 Localizing Municipal Management: Accountability to the Bottom Line

Accountability is about the attribution of responsibility within discreet jurisdictions. Indeed, the effectiveness of strategies enumerated above-- improving information relative to organizational performance, enabling a range of institutional actors to exploit this information and pressure the municipality-- depends on the relative integrity and 'localness' of the municipal administrative system. As described in this research, political variables tend to 'nationalize' municipal politics in Senegal: the party system, electoral rules, and the ability of politicians to simultaneously hold municipal and national posts. In the face of national political objectives, local hard budget constraints are regularly breached: municipal deficits are monetized; Treasury advances are accorded in violation of the Communal Code; conditional grants are subject to politicized bargaining; chronic arrears to public utilities are covered by the government; and the institution of the "unitary *caisse*" creates an infinitely supple fiscal safety valve for administrations under pressure. Moreover, the fact that certain, important sources of municipal revenue are collected, and held by the Treasury before being returned on an irregular basis to municipal administration, creates abundant alibis for profligate city managers.

⁷⁴ It is interesting to note that Poland included a recall provision in its recent decentralization reforms (Barbone and Hicks, 1995:153).

⁷⁵ On the effects of France's 1985 law limiting the *cumul des mandats* in France, see Schmidt (1990:144-9).

'Localizing' urban government implies limiting the number of arenas for politically vulnerable central-local interaction, and imposing a real bottom fiscal line on municipal leaders.⁷⁶ A first step would be to move towards greater fiscal separation of central and local government.⁷⁷

The objective should be to establish, to the greatest extent possible, a differentiated, integral municipal tax system. For example, taxes currently shared with the government could be transferred in their entirety to local administration. Or current tax sharing arrangements could be abolished in favor of a system whereby municipalities apply a locally-determined surcharge, perhaps within a band defined by the government, to a broad range of national taxes. Tax collection responsibilities could also be devolved entirely to agents directly answerable to municipal authorities. A less radical change would be to hold municipal taxes collected by the Treasury in regional branches of commercial banks, to limit the intermingling of central and local funds; the Côte d'Ivoire has initiated a pilot version of such a program.

Perhaps most importantly, current patterns of external funding of municipal investment expenditures must be modified. Even in northern European countries informal or arbitrary grant allocation processes are not only common (Nevers, 1991:366), but may encourage distortion of the local budgetary mix and the conduct of an expansive (and ultimately deficitary) local fiscal policy. For example, Carlsen's (1995:44) Norwegian case study describes a game of soft-budget chicken in which a county government persistently challenged the central government to respect the limitations of a new block-grant system: "As new projects exhausted the county's financial capacity and threatened existing

⁷⁶ It goes without saying that to impose financial responsibility on local government, financial responsibility must first be imposed on the central governments which ease municipal budgetary constraints. Falling foreign assistance levels in Africa have already begun this process in a broad sense. In addition, a result of their own budgetary realities, external donors have taken a harder line on discrete evidence of financial mismanagement by recipient governments. In Tanzania, USAID recently held up disbursement of \$40 million pending a government crackdown on tax evasion (*New York Times*, October 29, 1995:1:22). Of course, for the hard line to be effectively applied, considerable donor coordination is necessary.

⁷⁷ This idea parallels what Nellis (1994) argues is the ultimate justification for privatization of public enterprises: the long-term inevitability of political pressures which will force non-commercial aims to take precedence over commercial ones in public corporations (notwithstanding initial commitments to profitability and productivity objectives).

activities, the county targeted cutbacks at politically sensitive tasks in order to elicit additional grants."

In Senegal, as I have detailed, allocation of the great majority of centrally-funded investment financing proceeds by the submission of a wish-list by municipalities-- an opaque process which invites the intervention of extra-bureaucratic concerns. Moreover, the current system offers municipalities no incentives to request less capital-intensive, developmentally beneficial investments.⁷⁸ A simple allocation formula, exclusively targeting the financing of medium-scale, non-income generating activities such as primary schools, health centers, road maintenance, or natural resource management activities would reduce the political stakes surrounding these grants and enhance public welfare.⁷⁹ Use of sliding counterpart requirements based on the type of investment and/or infrastructure needs relative to population growth and the municipal tax base-- conditioned by fiscal effort-- would introduce a straightforward redistributive component and encourage use of own funds. Further, the Communal Code could be amended to mandate that certain classes of investment with a high potential for cost-recovery, such as market stalls or taxi and bus stations, be funded through municipal credit programs which are presently underexploited.⁸⁰

Donor funding of municipal sector activities should complement these efforts to establish a hard-budget environment. It is inarguable that in Senegal abundant concessional financing of public works activities has eased pressure on municipalities to search for low-cost, locally-financed and -organized service solutions. The World Bank's AGETIP project, for example, has been a principal funding source for municipal public works activities in Senegal and other countries in West Africa. While the project is rightly proud of the careful bidding, selection and monitoring procedures which structure the funding of activities, AGETIP has created relatively effortless political capital for mayors

⁷⁸ With the help of central grants (and donor financing through AGETIP), municipalities currently invest more in sports facilities than in health or education infrastructure combined.

⁷⁹ Carlsen's (1995) results from Norway, challenging the expectations of fiscal federalists, strongly suggest that use of specific grants linked to strict output measures may be necessary to prevent socially detrimental spending by local government.

⁸⁰ In countries where capital markets have developed, municipal bond issues will eventually be an option as well.

and dependency on easy money. Focusing on the internal viability of selected activities-- and project objectives of moving investment monies rapidly while creating as much short-term employment as possible-- AGETIP has readily financed massive, politically-potent projects such as sports stadiums as well as public works whose high income-generating potential (e.g. market stalls) would make them an excellent candidate for credit financing.⁸¹

Other international donors have aggravated these soft money conditions. For example, the Canadian Development Agency has paid for municipal counterpart contributions to AGETIP (to facilitate the completion of local projects), confounding the World Bank's attempt to introduce some fiscal ownership. Moreover, the abundance of AGETIP financing in Senegal has effectively undercut the efficacy of two "rival" urban development projects, also financed by the World Bank. One project has capitalized a municipal credit facility which, not surprisingly, has not attracted much municipal interest; and the other (still in the pipeline) will offer select investment financing in return for municipal commitment to a rigorous reform program. Clearly, harmonizing donor-funded municipal management activities, and other sources of municipal financing such as government investment grants, is an essential step in the development of self-reliant municipal financial management.

Limiting avenues for soft money will push municipal administrators, more or less quickly, to an unavoidable decision-point: cut benefits to the municipality's politically-select constituency, or develop less capital-intensive solutions to service-provision problems and raise revenue from within the collectivity (taxes or user fees to cover loan reimbursements). Choices which had been opportunity costless in the past-- e.g. hiring essentially redundant employees-- will now face a stiffened bottom line. I suggest that even if the absence of prior political liberalization, localizing the burden of financial

⁸¹ Mirroring my suggestions for the government's grant facility, AGETIP could modify its allocative procedures to favor certain activities, or certain impoverished neighborhoods (while not offering a cheap-money alternative for credit-eligible activities). For example, AGETIP could offer a menu of investments, with different scale options to match demographic needs-- e.g. health center: small, medium, large, or extra-large.

management will generate incipient incentives for less profligate management of the municipal institution and its resources.⁸²

Studies of local government management in a number of countries point to the catalytic, disciplining effects of fiscal stringency. Schmidt (1990:372-7), for example, has described the advent of a new managerial climate in subnational government following the passage of decentralization reforms in France. She observes that the challenges of managing localities within a tight budgetary frame-- including reliance on performance-exigent credit and bond markets for investment financing-- have induced a surge of managerialism by local politicians. This has manifested itself in the introduction of new financing arrangements and administrative techniques, as well as in a new, politically salient "rhetoric of good management".

Similarly, cross-country studies from OECD member states document that city administrations have responded to fiscal austerity not only with parsimony-- wage freezes and reductions, employee cutbacks, postponing of capital projects-- but revenue enhancement: use of user fees, charges for services, and searches for new sources of income (Walzer 1985:85-9; Walzer, Jones, Magnussen, 1992:136). Policy responses to revenue constraints also included the adoption of labor-saving, productivity-improving management strategies: delegating, contracting-out, purchase agreements, co-production (Walzer, Jones, Bokenstrand, Magnussen, 1992:152-4). Moreover, there is good reason to anticipate that as austerity sets in the municipality will be forced into more variegated interaction with constituents. Evidence from European and American municipalities (Mouritzen, 1985:27-9; Baldersheim, 1992:84-5), for example, finds that the advent of fiscal stress has been accompanied by the emergence of new political patterns and, in particular, heightened interaction between city administration and pressure groups.

⁸² Critics of strict fiscal separation argue that the application of true of fiscal federalism will create an undesirable "tax jungle" and aggressive fiscal competition between jurisdictions. In a comparative study Bird (1986:224-5) concludes that a stronger case can nonetheless be made in favor of greater fiscal independence. That is, the benefits associated with more efficient spending derived from greater fiscal independence tend to outweigh the administrative costs of compliance and achieving redistributive objectives through inter-jurisdictional transfers.

The ongoing reorientation of managerial priorities in the District of Columbia offers yet another example of fiscally-driven policy reform. Sheltered from real political competition and pampered in the past by "access to the millions that Democrats once unquestioningly funneled to the city," (*New Republic*, October 23, 1995: 46), the D.C. government functioned not unlike urban patronage machines in Senegal. Now facing an unsympathetic Republican majority in Congress, and unyielding commercial lenders in New York, the District Council and School Board have recently embraced managerial initiatives which, a few years ago, would have been unthinkable: a "family cap" measure that makes mothers on welfare ineligible for additional benefits if they have more children while on public assistance; a privatization plan for some of the district's schools; and the possible introduction of school vouchers and tax-free enterprise zones (*New York Times*, October 29, 1995: 6:41).

Even in a highly exclusionary governance environment such as exists in Senegal, political machines must provide some goods to select beneficiaries to survive. Over time, 'delivering the goods' will require some adaptation to new fiscal constraints. Under these conditions, local resourcefulness or managerialism may well emerge as politically-desirable traits within an oligarchic political realm. At the very least, incumbent, geroncratic local political elites (whose 'skills' are based on a resource allocation system which is falling into desuetude) may no longer have unquestioned advantages for constituents over younger, more managerially-inclined opponents.⁸³

⁸³ The danger of further deterioration of inter-municipal and intra-municipal inequities is very real. Central redistributive facilities have been essentially inoperative in Senegal. Moreover, there may be trade-off between some measures advocated above, such as shrinking the size of councils, and representation of weakly-empowered groups. In addition, the adoption of certain revenue-raising strategies, such as increased use of user fees and charges for municipal services, may have regressive effects. To partially mitigate these effects, development agencies can actively target the disfavored in particular activities, neighborhoods, and even regions. Even if vouchers are not going to be reality in Senegal in the foreseeable future, judiciously placed and managed micro-enterprise development projects and select, strictly-monitored support of NGO activities will make it possible for external assistance to reach politically-disenfranchised beneficiaries (while not deflating fiscal pressure on the municipality directly).

5 - The Political Economy of Improved Municipal Governance

Prospects for long-term improvements in urban management patterns in Senegal depend on the emergence of a municipal arena whose policy priorities and political dynamics can be differentiated from those of the center. As I have described, ongoing political hegemony by the *Parti Socialiste* has largely compromised the advent of a discreet urban governance realm.

It remains to be seen how effectively decentralization will serve as a means of political decompression in Senegal (and elsewhere in Africa) over time. Nonetheless, decentralization has played an undeniably important role in the Diouf administration's strategy of weakening incipient threats to regime hegemony. Various forms of administrative decentralization-- the devolution of low-grade responsibilities to newly-created ministries, reinforcement and expansion of the subnational government system-- have created new institutional space for the political integration of PS refuseniks and opposition figures nationally and (if the PDS wins a few municipalities in November 1995) locally. Through this process the *Parti Socialiste* has reaffirmed its paternalistic role and its claim to be the party of national reconciliation. In addition to providing the PS with the symbolic benefit of being seen as the promoter of local democracy and autonomy, decentralization has helped to delegitimize the opposition's claim of representing an independent and politically-consistent national alternative. Having displayed a remarkable willingness to compromise principled stands for shelter under the PS' big tent, Aboulaye Wade and his PDS have confirmed themselves to be associate players in the national political drama.

In sum, despite having traversed an economically bleak and politically treacherous period, the government has managed to strengthen its hand. Municipalities remain, inevitably, the captives of national political priorities. As evidenced by the creation of fiscally non-viable dwarf communes in 1990 and subdivision of the capital's existing municipalities in 1995, the state has a boundless capacity to manipulate territorial structures for tactical ends. Establishment of a new municipal police force in 1994, composed of officers laid off from the *police nationale*, whose recurrent expenses will be

shouldered by commune revenues, represents another, even more bald exploitation of the municipal institution.⁸⁴

Most damaging for the (potential) reinforcement of local public accountability, neutralization of the administration's principal political opponents has further homogenized the national political arena. Now a full associate of the Diouf government, Abdoulaye Wade's PDS has done an about-face and has supported the government's decision to postpone municipal elections scheduled for November 1995; like the PS they could use the time to regroup and pad their war chest before the contest. Further, the PDS has come out against universal election for councilors to the new regional assemblies, in favor of centrally-appointed representatives. Just as Senghor argued in the early 1960's, a PDS spokesman recently declared,

regionalization is dangerous: election of the regional assembly by universal suffrage will have centrifugal effects which will in turn encourage secessionist interests... such an assembly could claim popular legitimacy and presume to interpret (*prétendre être les interprètes*) the people's aspirations (*Wal Fadjiiri*, 1995).

At the same time, a deepening fiscal crisis has put pressure on the heretofore complacent confluence of politics and administration. Under extreme pressure from international donors in the post-devaluation environment, the Treasury has been taking a harder line on municipal overdraft privileges, and has indicated that it can no longer act as an intermediary *vis-à-vis* the public utilities.⁸⁵ Similarly, falling foreign assistance and stagnant national growth have obliged the government to drastically cutback allocations for municipal investment funding. In 1993, communes submitted approximately 2.5 billion cfa in project-specific requests to the government's categorical grant facility (*FECL/fonds spéciaux*) which was only able to dispense 514 million cfa among twenty-four communes.

⁸⁴ Fearing the fiscal burden, a number of prominent mayors protested establishment of the municipal force. But the project was forced down their throats. The government maintains that the police will play a valuable role in the collection of local taxes by backing up the agents who currently perform this task. The reality, however, is that municipal budgets will be decimated. In the regional capital of Tambacounda, for example, the municipal wage bill will double (!) in 1996.

⁸⁵ Public utilities, which now operate under a semi-autonomous status as the result of contract-plans and conventions with the state, face tighter cash-flow conditions themselves and have been less forgiving of municipalities. The phone company SONATEL, for example, has begun cutting off secondary lines in a number of communes.

Adding to fiscal pressure on municipalities, in 1995 the World Bank's AGETIP project raised counterpart requirements for larger communes to 50 percent.

For municipal administrations, patronage-based management will be increasingly difficult in these conditions of central, and thus local, austerity. The government can now be only so responsive to local needs, spreading existing funds as thinly as possible. But this may not placate subnational political operatives over time. For example, in the capital region's crowded municipalities the PS has encouraged the formation of urban associations, under its aegis, representing younger militants' concerns.⁸⁶ Having arrived at the public trough a decade too late, many of these groups feel marginalized rather than comfortably integrated (*Wal Fadjiri*, July 26, 1993). Thus generational tensions have aggravated an already taut environment within the party's municipal cells. As described in an earlier chapter, PS *coordinations politiques* have been the scenes of violent confrontations in the last two years.

Pressure on municipal leaders has also translated into tensions between commune politicians and government officials as soft budget constraints of the past tighten up. The Minister of the Interior, casting a watchful eye on pre-electoral dissatisfaction, has recently been critical of excessive hiring by the mayor of the commune of Rufisque, whose personnel has not been paid in two months (*Wal Fadjiri*, 30 October 1994). In response, the mayor has been critical of the minister's decision to award jurisdiction over a highly profitable toll station (*guérite*) to the neighboring commune of Bargny.

A similar conflict recently erupted between the Government and the commune of Richard Toll. To compensate the Richard-Toll based *Compagnie Sucrière Sénégalaise* for an increase in fees for water drawn off the Senegal River (over which the inter-state *Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Sénégal* has jurisdiction) the Government waived the company's business tax obligations to the commune of Richard Toll. These contributions have in past years constituted close to 50 percent of the commune's total tax revenues. Following the CSS's exemption in 1993, municipal revenues from local

⁸⁶ In the commune of Rufisque, for example, these associations include the *Association pour le développement de Rufisque*, *Recours*, *Carrefour*, *20 Mille Femmes*, *Le Mouvement Ouverture-Rénovation* (*Wal Fadjiri*, July 26, 1993).

business taxes fell to roughly 11.5 million cfa from some 130 million cfa collected during the previous 12-month period, crushing the commune's finances.⁸⁷

In the commune of Dakar, where some municipal politicians will be unavoidably sacrificed in the next municipal elections for the cause of national regime survival,⁸⁸ tensions between the communal council and government ministries have been acute (cf. *Sud*, 12 août 1993). The arm wrestling has been particularly intense between the municipality and the Ministry of Finance's *Services des domaines* over land use planning within the council's jurisdiction. The municipal council, in principle, must give its approval of the *Service's* recommendation. But often the council finds itself consulted after building authorization has been accorded and construction begun. The government tends to serve its own interests, either directly undertaking building projects or offering substantial plots of land to professional groups (university professors, port and airport employees) who have formed housing cooperatives. Faced with a *fait accompli*, municipal officials must shoulder the installation costs of electricity and water systems, in addition to recurrent sanitation and solid waste removal expenses.

Barely able to service existing residential developments the municipality is thus made to look bad by underproviding essential services or taking unpopular measures such as opposing new housing projects. Moreover, the refurbishing of old neighborhoods unavoidably involves the displacement of current residents and expropriation of their land. With fewer and fewer instruments through which to minister to their clients, city officials have been more cautious about alienating current constituents and aggressive in their demands to be included in land use planning and development decisions. For example, municipal councilors have recently taken on the *préfét* of Dakar to block advancement of a vast new housing project in the Dakar suburb of Hann proposed by a quasi-public land development agency (SCAT-URBAM); the project will house some 4000 families. The

⁸⁷ Information provided by interviews with officials in the DCL/MINT, and the *Direction des Impôts et Domaines/MEFP*; fiscal data from DFCL/DT/MEFP.

⁸⁸ As evidenced by high rates of mayoral turn-over at each municipal elections (30 percent in 1990), fractious PS politics repeatedly lead to the sacrifice of locals politicians. However, whenever the November 1995 municipal elections are held the bloodletting will be unusually severe. It is likely that entire communal councils will be turned out on their ear when the opposition PDS wins one or more of the new micro-municipalities created in the capital region.

council insisted that before the land was surveyed and cleared a tripartite commission had to be established, composed of representative of the government, the commune, and the land development agency (Sud. 13 août 1993).

These examples suggest the emergence of a subtle trend. The basic political logic of Senegal's decentralized polity has certainly not changed but fiscal stringency at the center has ratcheted up pressure on local politicians to find ways to build and service their constituencies. State financial support has in the past been able to conciliate the incongruous coexistence of a liberal municipal regime and a hegemonic political structure. But with the national party-state in less of a position to help out, satisfying political demands within the jurisdiction may force a gradual decoupling of local and central politics. Resource scarcity may thus be yielding the beginnings of a *de facto* municipal realm characterized by greater local responsiveness-- in the context of a highly exclusionary political regime, of course.

These assessments of the prospects for effective municipal governance are admittedly a far cry from the participatory, accountability-enhancing outcomes promised by decentralization theory. Complex interactions between formal institutional arrangements, political rules, and the national economic environment have driven evolving patterns of municipal governance in Senegal. A fundamental conclusion of this research is that the quality of institutional arrangements cannot be inferred from constitutional or legislative regimes alone. Indeed, the course of administrative reform and the relative importance of environmental variables are particularly difficult to discern at the local level because broad economic and political shocks filter down through national institutions. Most policy studies of decentralization in developing countries have downplayed the significance of extra-administrative variables and ignored the root causes of governmental malperformance. The reality of politically-manipulated patterns of access and allocation endure, however. As I have tried to show in sections of this conclusion, administrative and fiscal analyses can readily integrate political concerns to yield a more inclusive and empirically-relevant approach to local government reform. The goal of fostering improved municipal governance in Africa remains to be achieved.

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