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## **Making Food Aid Work For Long-Term Food Security\***

***Future Directions and Strategies in the Greater Horn of Africa***

**Draft Proceedings of a USAID/IFPRI Workshop**

**Addis Ababa, Ethiopia**

**March 27-30, 1995**

**International Food Policy Research Institute**

**1200 Seventeenth Street, N.W.**

**Washington, D.C. 20036**

- \* This work was carried out under USAID Contract BOA DAN-4111-B-00-0112-00, Delivery Order No. 07, with the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). The views expressed in this document are personal and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organizations represented by the participants.

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## Foreword

### Introduction

From March 27-30, 1995, the USAID Bureau for Humanitarian Response and the Bureau for Africa co-sponsored a regional workshop in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on "Making Food Aid Work for Long-Term Food Security" to discuss future directions and strategies for U.S. food aid in the Greater Horn of Africa. The workshop was facilitated by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) of Washington D.C.

The workshop was motivated by USAID's long-term objectives to

- review food aid strategies and operations in order to increasingly use food aid for improved long-term food security;
- better define strategic objectives for food assistance, and to improve program performance and impact measurement; and
- explore and identify innovative uses of food aid to move beneficiaries away from relief dependency towards sustainable development.

Workshop participants discussed food aid programs and their integration with financial resources in the region in view of (i) the new USAID food aid strategy to emphasize improved agricultural productivity and household level nutrition programs, (ii) President Clinton's Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, which views food security and crisis resolution and prevention as two sides of the same coin to increase stability in the region, and (iii) USAID's strong commitment to improve strategic planning and manage for results.

The workshop also offered an opportunity for regional USAID Mission directors to discuss the progress of the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAi) and to determine its next steps. The deliberations of this group went partly parallel to the main workshop, and are not all reported here in

detail. But the basic principles and goals of the Initiative served as an important framework for the workshop, and were thoroughly woven into its main discussions and recommendations.

Participants at the workshop included USAID policy makers and technical experts from regional Missions, REDSO, and Washington D.C.; representatives of U.S. Private Voluntary Organizations that handle U.S. food aid, the World Food Programme (WFP) and FAO; several other major food aid donors (European Union, CIDA, Australia); and colleagues from the research community. A detailed list of participants can be found in the Annex of this volume.

### Organization of the proceedings volume

This report is a first draft of the workshop proceedings volume. It includes records of the major speeches, discussions, and recommendations of the workshop. **At this stage, the editors would wish to kindly ask all readers of this volume to refrain from quotations or wider distribution of the draft beyond the circle of workshop participants. Not all speakers have yet had the opportunity to thoroughly review their contributions.** The proceedings volume will be finalized and more widely distributed before the end of June 1995. The editors would be thankful for any comments on the current draft.

The proceedings volume is organized as follows: Workshop recommendations on specific follow-up activities are summarized up-front. They may serve as a checklist, in line with Margaret Bonner's challenge in her closing remarks that the real test of the seriousness of this workshop and the GHAi is a comparison of plans and achievements of follow-up activities in the next 6 months.

The main parts of the proceedings volume reflect the three specific goals of the workshop, (i) to effectively redesign food aid programs in line with new USAID policy and regional priorities, (ii) to record achievements and constraints in moving forward on the relief-to-development continuum, and (iii) to define specific follow-up activities to the workshop.

**Part 1** of the proceedings volume assesses future design and role of food aid in the Greater Horn of Africa against the background of emerging regional food security issues; the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative; changing ways of 'doing business' at USAID; and the new food aid/food security policy. Welcome addresses and keynote speeches deal with urgent food security issues and information needs in the region. Central features of the new USAID food aid/food security policy and its practical implications for the region are presented and discussed. Contributions in this part refer to deliberations on day 1 of the workshop.

**Part 2** follows with a review of accomplishments, practical implications, and constraints in moving faster from relief to development and in preventing emergencies in the first place. Possible solutions to implement food aid programs more effectively and to better integrate assistance resources are discussed. This part of the proceedings volume contains speeches, discussions, and working group presentations of day 2 and the morning session of day 3.

**Part 3** Detailed recommendations by the workshop on follow-up activities are presented in part 3 of the volume. Three working groups identified ways towards possible improvements in (i) country food security assessments, (ii) impact assessments and performance indicators, and (iii) integration of food aid and financial resources within USAID. Part 3 ends with workshop closing remarks by Bob Kramer, Carol Peasley, and Margaret Bonner.

Workshop agenda, list of participants, acronyms, and a reading list of literature displayed at the workshop can be found in the Annex.

### **The next steps**

Hopefully, the wealth of individual and collective thoughts streaming from the many pages of this proceedings volume may be helpful in formulating the next steps of donor and PVO assistance to the region. In line with the basic principles of the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, these steps will have to include a very active involvement of national Governments, local NGOs, and other development and research institutions. These groups must work to define, fine tune, and test priorities, policies and strategies in order to amalgamate food aid into long-term food security programs in the region. Secondly, much more work needs to be done to identify and propagate Africa's success stories, to exchange ideas on creative and innovative approaches, and to come up with specific programs and guidelines to achieve the ultimate objective of national and household level food security.

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## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITIES

### COUNTRY FOOD SECURITY ASSESSMENTS

#### (Working Group #1)

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#### A. Country Food Security Profiles

FAOWFP [no date yet]

##### 1. Coordination mechanisms

- a. Establish a **Coordinating Committee** (or 'Technical Secretariat') with representatives from different organizations, possibly in Nairobi; Lead responsibility: possibly REDSO; at a later stage such a Coordinating Committee could be based at IGADD

Functions: (i) serve as a planning group; (ii) develop TOR for country food security profiles

- b. Establish a small **inter-bureau working group in Washington** (possibly DRCO responsibility)
2. Get a **basic commitment from IGADD summit** in May for carrying out joint country food security assessments; present the idea of profiles in a very general format
3. Establish **Key national working groups and task forces**
4. Develop **common TOR as a framework for individual country food security profiles**; build consensus on common TOR among participating governments, donors, PVOs etc.
5. Determine **division of labor and costs across donors**; who will take the lead in a specific country?
3. Ensure **representation of local NGO expertise** in technical working groups

#### B. Emergency assessment methodologies

Organize a workshop on emergency assessments for Governments, PVOs and donors; Lead role:

Workshop goals:

- increase accuracy of assessments;
- improve the quality of methodologies;
- ensure that assessments are more widely accepted;
- improve coordination between FAO, USAID, and regional views on early warning systems

#### C. Household level food security assessments, methodologies, and processes

Organize a **workshop on household and community survey methodologies and coordination** [no date yet]

Workshop goals:

- improved decision making on location and household specific food security interventions;
- improved coordination and information exchange on household survey methodologies and processes;
- developing a menu of survey options for different purposes

#### D. Miscellaneous activities

1. Identify the **best way to include national, and possibly regional (sub-national) governments** at an early stage;
2. Mobilize about **\$500,000** for 10 country food security profiles;
3. Have **bilateral discussions with national governments** at an early stage; reconcile different interests;
4. Determine **specific responsibilities** to get things going (REDSO, FFP, HACC);

5. Determine how IGADD should get involved and who should liaise with them?
6. Determine **technical assistance** needs and available expertise;
7. Coordinate country food security assessments

with ongoing activities on inventory of regional food security projects and relevant documents; (*Brian D'Silva*)

8. Country food security assessments should have a **timeframe of about 6 months**.

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## **Suggestions for basic outline and objectives of country food security assessments**

### **1 Issues**

For each type/level of food security assessments we would look at:

1. What are the purposes? Why do we want to do that type of food security assessment?
2. What should be key elements of the assessment?
3. What is currently being done by the PVOs and governments?
4. What are the commonalities of approach?
5. What are some of the constraints and issues that we have to face if we want to move towards having some good food security assessments which we can all use?
6. Who should do what as we move forward?

### **2 Purposes of country assessments**

As we look at country profiles of food assessments, what is it that we want them to do for us?

1. Identifying the vulnerable groups and areas;
2. Helping us to collaborate better and to reduce duplication of efforts;
3. Assisting us with our strategic planning;
4. Understanding the position of the government and how government policies relate to food security problems in the country in order to design prevention properly;
5. **Establishing a baseline that we can use for measuring progress in achieving food security;**
6. Giving us an idea of how the food security situation in the country relates to the international system. How does the international system impact on the country

situation? How do changes in the international system affect changes in the national level?

7. Identifying needs for capacity building;
8. Facilitating cross-country comparisons and resource allocations;
9. Optimizing management resources.

### **3 Key elements**

What should the key elements of a country food security assessment be? Essentially, we need a description and a better understanding of:

1. agro-ecological zones in a country and other natural characteristics;
2. cropping systems;
3. location of food surplus and food deficit areas;
4. countries' socio-economic systems;
5. key reasons of food insecurity in the country and a clear description of the vulnerable groups;
6. prevalence and distribution of vulnerable groups in the country;
7. countries' market systems: food and other goods/resources
8. trade, which includes domestic trade, regional trade, and international trade;
9. consumption and cooking habits of vulnerable groups; patterns of food shortage;
10. a briefing on different government and donor sponsored aid agencies and their different programs: a program inventory could provide a clearer idea of where they are working in relation to the vulnerable groups; where resources may be over-committed, or which areas or groups may be insufficiently covered;
11. the contribution of conflict as a major risk factor for food security; this includes political dynamics and their effect on food security;
12. migration patterns.

#### 4 Trends

In addition to an assessment of the current situation there was a feeling that the profiles should also include longer-term trends. They should provide an idea of what trends have occurred in the last five to ten years in relation to food security. This would include information on

1. prevalence and likelihood of conflicts;
2. interrelations with surrounding countries;
3. patterns in malnutrition;
4. government policies, programs, and interventions;
5. population growth and its impact on food security, health, income, consumption patterns, and food preferences;

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**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITIES**  
**IMPACT ASSESSMENTS AND PERFORMANCE INDICATORS**

**(Working Group #2)**

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**A. Start a PVO/NGO/WFP dialogue on common M&E systems and performance indicators**

1. Establish a PVO working group on common M&E systems under the Food Aid Management Group (FAM) in Washington D.C.

*Rudy von Bernuth, by 6/30/95*

2. Link up with EURONAIID, a consortium of NGOs in Europe

*Rudy von Bernuth, by 6/30/95*

3. Establish an information network on M&E systems/performance indicators for PVOs currently negotiating Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with WFP (e.g., SCF/CARE/WFP/WVRD)

*David Morton, David Fletcher, Tim Lavelle, by 6/30/95*

**B. Review and discuss PVOs' M&E/performance indicator systems and resource requirements for currently negotiated food aid implementation plans**

1. Explore to what extent PVO's could better coordinate their impact assessment systems for this year's implementation plans

*Tim Lavelle, Ina Schonberg, by 7/30/95*

2. Ensure that Institutional Support Grants (ISG) for PVOs are sufficient to address M&E needs for improved performance/impact assessment

*Tim Lavelle, Ina Schonberg, by 7/30/95*

**C. Create awareness for improved impact assessment in the international food security/nutrition community**

1. Get 'Food aid-food/security linkages' and 'M&E' on the agenda of the

a. UN Sub-Committee Meeting on Nutrition in June 1995

b. FAO World Food Summit (sometime this year)

*Lawrence Haddad, Barbara Huddleston*

2. Put 'Common Approaches to M&E' on the agenda of the forthcoming meeting of USAID - EU - CIDA

*Bob Kramer*

3. Put M&E on the agenda of the WFP/CFA meeting in May '95

*USAID; Invitations should go out in April*

**D. IFPRI will set up an e-mail system to facilitate an interactive dialogue on M&E/performance indicators on food security impact in the workshop's follow-up process**

*Detlev Puetz, April*

**E. Solicit USAID/AFR Bureau and Global Bureau participation in development of common impact/M&E indicators and methodologies**

*Cindy Clapp-Wincek, Jerry Wolgin, Tracy Atwood*

**F. Get WFP evaluation unit and UNHCR into the loop**

1. The WFP evaluation service should be brought into the loop on issues regarding impact monitoring and evaluation with regard

to development, emergency, and refugee situations.

2. This would include bringing in UNHCR on the refugee side

*Michael Sackett*

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**Some suggestions for impact and process indicators for food security impact assessment**

*(Presentation of Day 3 Working Group)*

**A. Food Security**

The key question is: What is the impact of food aid program interventions on individual people, families, communities—in terms of availability, access, utilization, and risk?

**1. Availability**

Assess changes in:

- a. Agricultural production (e.g., crop assessment, yield)
- b. Food availability on local markets
- c. Food availability at household level (e.g., inventory)
- d. Quantity and quality of diet (consumption share of cereals, livestock products)

**2. Access**

Assess changes in:

- a. Household income
- b. Agricultural production
- c. Employment
- d. Price of food on local markets

**3. Utilization**

Assess changes in:

- a. Nutritional status of children and adults
- b. Diet diversity and appropriateness
- c. Usage of improved water sources
- d. Immunizations
- e. Nutritional practices and knowledge (e.g., infant feeding, sanitation)

**4. Risk**

Assess changes in:

- a. Environmental risks
- b. Security risks
- c. Community perceptions

**5. Process Indicators**

1. Does food get there?
2. Agricultural practices (e.g., irrigation, use of marginal land)
3. Nutritional practices (e.g., feeding, hygiene)
4. Capacity building of counterparts
5. Infrastructure (e.g., roads)
6. Education (level and facilities)
7. No. of small traders (local market)
8. Government financial commitment to food security
9. Extent of community participation

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## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITIES

### INTEGRATION OF FOOD AID AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES

#### (Working Group #3)

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1. Explore extended use of "Not-Withstanding Authority" (*HACC*)
2. Examine the redelegation of some authorities for Title II program management to the field (*BHR*); This includes the necessity for AFR to determine how it will participate in Title II regular program reviews, i.e., DP or Desks?
3. Earmarks - Examine the possibility of eliminating them for the GHAI or of using food aid to meet them (*HACC/GC*)
4. Coordination and responsibilities during emergencies: (i) determine responsibilities and interface right at the start of emergencies; (ii) perform semi-annual reviews in emergency situations (*BHR/AFR*)
5. Eliminate annual Title III reviews (*AFR/BHR*)
6. Solicit field inputs into farm bill rewrite, particularly from Missions; keep field personnel informed, lobby for specific concerns, such as increased use of triangular monetization, or other constraints to monetization. (*BHR, Bob Kramer, HACC*)
7. Increasingly include PVOs in Mission strategy development (*BHR/AFR/DP*)
8. Develop coordinated strategies for refugees and transition situations from a regional perspective (*PRM/AFR/FFP/OFDA*)
9. Clarify roles of Regional Bureaus and BHR in review of non-emergency food aid (*FFP/Regional Bureaus*)
10. Improve coordination within BHR (*BHR*)
11. Make FFP/OFDA assignments more attractive to USDH/FS (*M/BHR/GEO.BUR.*)
12. Personnel: Improve incentives for assignments to FFP and OFDA (*M/PM; BHR*); what can be done to attract DH into OFDA?; set up a process to rotate staff between AFR, OFDA, FFP; BHR and AFR will devise orientation of BHR staff in regional bureau programs, policies, and vice-versa
13. Use re-engineering principles to ensure a better integration of food aid and other food security related objectives into overall Mission objectives and management (*Missions*)
14. Reporting: Integrate food aid into agency reporting systems (*PPC/LEG*)
15. Ensure appropriate representation in Brussels and Geneva
16. Review and possibly extend the role of the Disaster Relief Coordination Office (DRCO) within the Africa Bureau

**PART I**

**EMERGING FOOD SECURITY ISSUES AND THE ROLE OF FOOD AID**

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## OPENING ADDRESS

### H. Robert Kramer

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*Mr. H. Robert Kramer is from the United States Agency for International Development, Bureau for Humanitarian Response, and Office of Food for Peace*

I am delighted to welcome you all to this workshop on "Making Food Aid Work For Long Term Food Security: Future Directions and Strategies in the Greater Horn of Africa." But then, I must confess that I am delighted to be anywhere outside of Washington these days where the political rites of spring are being played out, rites that completely ignore the absolutely critical, difficult, and selfless business that we perform in the field. In the past several weeks Doug Stafford, my extraordinary boss, and I have ushered by AID. We blitzed Congress, offering the course of Food Aid 101 to Members and their staff. We have emphasized the importance of the food aid resource in addressing both the US Government's humanitarian and development objectives. To our surprise, these meetings have gone well and have struck a responsive chord on the Hill. But they are no substitute for being educated by the talented and experienced people who are gathered here today.

#### Food aid - a quality resource

Food aid, finally, has "come of age." There has long prevailed, in AID and among our PVO partners, a mind set that considered food aid as a cheap, abundant, and therefore a marginal second-class resource. Many still believe that the standards used to identify, design and manage food aid programs should be less rigorous than those used for dollar funded activities. For far too long, the thoroughly committed and dedicated individuals who manage food aid have been considered the "Rodney Dangerfields" of development. This mind set still prevails in some quarters. But I believe we are winning the war to enhance the credibility of food aid as a critical humanitarian and developmental tool.

The situation has indeed changed. Food aid is now a "premium" resource that is expensive and increasingly scarce. We--the participants here that include the academic researchers, practitioners, managers, generalists, and even a smattering of us bureaucrats--are witnessing the fundamental transformation of an institutional culture. I can only speculate and hope that PL 480 may not suffer the

disproportionately large cuts we may face with our dollar budget.

#### U.S. cuts food aid by half

At an urgent inter-Agency meeting convened by the National Security Council last week, we had to clearly convey a sobering fact. If a significant new emergency requiring food aid arises, such as Burundi or Southern Africa, we simply may not have the resources to respond. With a Title II budget of \$850 million this year, we are left, six months into the fiscal year, with only \$50 million. We are also witnessing a chess game on the Hill with Title III. I am only cautiously optimistic. At the Food Aid Convention in London last month, the US Government was forced to reduce its annual pledge of grain by almost 50 percent, from 4.7 to 2.5 million tons, sending shock waves through Europe and the developing world.

#### Addressing the root causes of food insecurity with food aid

I mention this funding situation, not to unduly depress you, but rather to place what we do here in perspective. The problem of food insecurity in the Greater Horn is staggering. Brian Atwood, the Administrator of AID, as the President's Special Coordinator for Disaster Assistance, has made a public commitment to the White House, the Congress, and to the American people, that all of us--AID, PVOs, host governments, international organizations and other donors--will use our resources to address the root causes of food insecurity in the region.

In the past few years we have provided over \$4 billion in food aid to the region--a staggering amount that simply cannot be sustained in the future. But this massive aid flow has mostly addressed the symptoms of crises, and not the underlying problems that caused them. I quote from the paper which lays out the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative ("Breaking the Cycle of Despair"): "The time has come ... to address the broader causes of disaster by placing a strategic

focus on sustainable development while responding to the existing and impending crises in the region."

That is our formidable challenge that we will be discussing during the next few days. USAID provided three times more food than dollar assistance to the Greater Horn last year, a trend that is likely to be continued. Food aid then, even if by circumstance and not by choice, is the major resource we must use to address the challenge. We must promote the creative and strategic use of this resource, and we must demonstrate how food aid is, and can be used, creatively and strategically, efficiently and effectively. We must demonstrate, empirically and conclusively, that food aid can elicit the kinds of results required to mitigate hunger and the structural causes of hunger.

### **A better focus for food aid**

Food security, as universally defined, is access by all people at all times to the food needed for a healthy life. That is the common goal we all embrace. Moreover, over the past year we developed the Agency's first food aid/food security policy paper. The new policy recognizes that, in order to demonstrate the impact of a resource that is all too finite, we have to accord greater priority in allocating food aid to those countries most in need of food, primarily countries in Africa. We also have to focus on improving household nutrition, especially in children and mothers, and on alleviating the root causes of hunger, especially by increasing agricultural productivity.

### **New Ideas for effective food aid management**

This workshop offers the first opportunity to apply this new policy and introduce new programs to reduce hunger and support sustained development in the Greater Horn of Africa. I hope that, during the next few days, we can break away from the ossified ways of managing food aid. Let's engage in some "brainstorming" where we can exchange ideas in open, candid, and frank discussions. The markers we lay this week may have implications that have the potential to far transcend the Greater Horn of Africa. By understanding the unique characteristics of food as a humanitarian and development resource, let's challenge those who still make the distinction between "food aid" and "development aid." Let's establish a clear set of objectives and standards to help us measure how food aid can address the food security needs of vulnerable populations. By the end of this workshop, let us identify areas of consensus and

develop guiding principles for the food aid strategies in the Greater Horn of Africa.

### **Planning food aid more strategically**

Food security is not synonymous with food aid. We must realize that sustained food security will not be achieved by simply supplying food aid. Food aid must be programmed creatively to address the objective of food security. Achieving food security requires a deliberate choice of objectives and the subsequent formulation of strategies within which food aid can be properly supplied.

Above all we must understand that food aid cannot be programmed in a resource and institutional vacuum. It must be integrated with other resources to have any sustained impact. And any strategy must be coordinated and implemented with the full participation of all actors—USAID Missions, PVOs, the WFP, other donors, and especially the host governments.

### **Bridging relief and development**

We must break down the dichotomies of relief and development that have only served to perpetuate and exacerbate the institutional barriers and to inhibit us from thinking creatively about the real challenge of planning the transition from relief to development. The distinctions that we have artificially and institutionally created between relief and development often dictate that we operate at cross-purposes with different objectives, cultures, and modes of operation. We must seek mutual enforcement rather than dichotomies. To do this requires a commitment to change the way we do business.

### **Concluding remarks**

Again, this workshop provides us all with a unique opportunity. It is intended to be but a first step to prepare USAID and our Cooperating Sponsors for an intensified dialogue with national host governments and other donors in the region on the future role of food aid in national food security policies in the context of the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative. We have a challenging and thought-provoking agenda ahead of us. Marge Bonner and her Mission, have conspired to ensure magnificent weather and congenial company. Let's take advantage of both to let the creative juices flow. Again, welcome.

---

## WELCOME ADDRESS

### Ambassador Irvin Hicks

---

*His Excellency Mr. Irvin Hicks is the United States Ambassador to Ethiopia*

Ladies and Gentlemen, Vice Minister Brooke, and all the other distinguished guests from near and far. Welcome to Addis Ababa, The New Flower.

I am pleased to be here this morning to give some opening remarks on this very important occasion--the start of a four day workshop on the role of food aid in addressing food security in the Greater Horn of Africa. I can think of no other issue that will affect the future of Ethiopia and the Greater Horn more deeply than the subject that you will be addressing during the coming days. I believe that none of the other foreign policy objectives can be met unless the people of the Greater Horn have access to the food needed for a sustained healthy life. I realize that attaining this goal is easier said than done. However, I firmly believe that economic, social, and political developments in the region will be stymied along with democratization until people are free from hunger and the threat of hunger. Historically, the Horn has been a region of great promise, both in natural resources and energetic and hard-working people.

However, that has mainly been a promise unfulfilled, as the previous regimes consumed resources in wars that could have been better devoted to national development. Those wasted years have seen chronic food deficits and a lack of attention to increased agricultural production. I applaud the objectives of your workshop, especially exploring and identifying innovative uses of food aid to move beneficiaries away from relief dependency towards sustainable development.

Looking at the list of participants of this workshop, people from USAID Washington, regional Missions, PVOs and NGOs, and representatives from the World Food Program, they seem to me to be just the right mix of experts and experience to tackle this all important issue. I won't take any more of your precious time and let you get down to the reason you came here. I wish you the best of luck and look forward to reading the results of your work. Thank you very much.

---

## WELCOME ADDRESS

### Vice-Minister Brooke Debebe

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*Ato Brooke Debebe is Vice-Minister for External Economic Cooperation, Government of Ethiopia.*

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen. We are gathered here during the month when Ethiopia commemorates the 1984/85 famine disaster. Even if droughts are bound to recur, famine disasters should and need not be repeated. You are also gathered here shortly after the March 1995 UN Social Summit in Copenhagen passed resolutions on the economic empowerment of the poor. These events make your seminar very timely and appropriate.

Food security is a critical issue to the people and the Government of Ethiopia. We know what famine is. We know what it means not to be able to produce one's own food and the accompanying erosion of national pride. We are also grateful to the people in the world who still respond to our continued structural food shortages.

#### Causes of food shortages

The causes of food shortages in Ethiopia are not new, but have been getting worse over the last thirty years. They can be summarized as economic backwardness. The Government is very committed to get out of this 'poverty trap'. It put in place an "Agricultural Development led Industrialization Strategy" and various multisectoral and sectoral strategies. The strategy is centered at promoting peasant agriculture which employs 85 percent of the population. Peasants produce much of the food required by the nation and much of the country's exports. The policy's emphasis on basic education, health, and physical infrastructure is intended to address the problems of the rural poor.

The Government is determined to address the issue of poverty in particular and economic development in general. Therefore, Government programs call for a massive investments both in human and physical infrastructure. Rehabilitating the physical infrastructure by itself requires resources beyond the means of the nation. Again concerned donor countries have come to our help.

#### Food aid objectives

Even though multi- and bilateral donors intervene in many fields, their ultimate objective is the economic empowerment of the poor. Their priority is to make more food available, among others through food aid. A famished person is too weak to work and susceptible to diseases. During famines, the fabrics of family and community bondage may easily break up.

Food aid is not new in Ethiopia but has a history of more than a decade. What is new, is the emphasis being given to (i) food aid for development purposes, (ii) who should be the beneficiary of food aid, or the issue of targeting, and (iii) the impact of food aid on domestic production.

During Emperor Haile Selassie's period food aid was totally in the form of relief. During the Dergue's period, food aid was mainly for relief save some food-for-work programs carried out by some NGO's. As you are well aware, the current Government position is to use food aid primarily for development, and only for relief when it is absolutely necessary.

#### Food for development

Food aid for development should lead to economic betterment. And, indeed, in Ethiopia food is being used as a direct and indirect payment to build rural roads, schools, clinics, micro-dams, river diversions. It is also used to plant trees, to prepare farm lands, etc. These activities are expected, and will lead to economic development through the provision of social infrastructure that enhances productivity, through the provision of physical infrastructure that increases productivity and access to market. Hence food aid can be used effectively for development.

#### Food for relief

Food aid for relief will still remain essential as some of those who need it are not fit to work. The elderly, the orphans and the handicapped will still

need it. The Ethiopian society used to have a built-in mechanism to handle these vulnerable groups. However, the onslaught of recurrent drought and war destroyed the fabrics of society. Hence, food aid for relief will be unavoidable.

The other reason for food aid for relief is the response of donors during crisis. When international news agencies report on the number of deaths due to famine and the number of people in shelters, food aid for development is rarely an issue, it is rather targeted to save lives in the short run.

### *Strategic food reserves*

This brings up the issue of food reserves. A country such as Ethiopia which is prone to drought may have no alternative but to build a food reserve—a biblical strategy employed by the pharaoh of Egypt on Moses' advice and a lesson on how some societies have degenerated from Moses' time. Unfortunately, Ethiopia cannot build food reserves at the current level of production. Thus using food aid for food reserves should be an issue that this workshop needs to address.

### *Lower food prices*

The workshop also may examine the role of food aid for food prices in countries undertaking structural adjustment programs in the presence of structural food deficits. In such countries structural adjustment programs by nature tend to be inflationary. One way to cope with inflation may be to use food aid for price dampening. However, this raises the issue of the effect of food aid as a deterrent for domestic food production, a formidable trade-off.

Economists agree that price is the best signal for production. Some argue that irrespective of the level of economic development, interferences with market mechanisms which distort prices are wrong. Others argue, however, that proper government intervention in the economy is essential. I think, the current world economy has proven them right. In developed countries, any Government, take the US, EU, or the Japanese, for example, interferes in agricultural sectors rather than taking world prices as their best signals.

In developing countries like Ethiopia, where structural food deficits exist and a structural adjustment program is underway, prices of food

without government intervention are bound to be high. High food prices may rather lead to hyper-inflation and even force the Government to abort the structural adjustment program. And for farmers prices alone rarely lead to production increases.

Thus a general subsidy approach is essential, a universalistic approach, that is an across-the-board subsidy, to dampen inflation and to facilitate targeting. Yet, using food aid as a means of price support has to carefully balance the period of boosting inflation on one side, and depressing agricultural production on the other.

### **Targeting**

This brings us to the difficult issue of targeting. Targeting calls for a thorough statistical base and a set of well developed criteria. In Ethiopia the primary food aid beneficiaries should be the rural and the urban poor. But given the overall level of poverty, which will be more clear after the forthcoming welfare survey, and limited program resources further targeting is essential. Food aid beneficiaries should be particularly drought affected farmers, internally displaced people (IDPs), the aged who lack family support, the orphans, and the unemployed.

### *Self-targeting through wage rates*

Government should make more use of, so called, self-targeting approaches. Those who need food aid most and are unable to get alternative employment would be welcome to participate in the program. To make the program effective, the volume of grain or its equivalent cash payment should be less than the daily wage rate in the locality or the surrounding areas.

### **Decentralized food aid management**

The management of food aid is not only the role of the central Government, or that of the NGO's. With the advent of democratization in Ethiopia participation in political decision making has broadened. In theory, regional governments are very best located to know the level of poverty and the people most affected by it. They may be best placed to know and prioritize development projects. Thus they can and should assist in targeting.

### **Government/NGO partnership**

Non-governmental-organizations are also important in the management of food aid and regional governments are in fact developing programs to be undertaken by NGO's. At the same time, the central government is working out a comprehensive guideline which enables the smooth functioning of NGO's. Government, and NGO's should be partners for development. In 1994, the coordinated effort of Government and NGO's in averting a disaster was exemplary. Partnership, rather than conflict, should be the principle approach.

### **Assistance to self-reliance**

The people and the Government of Ethiopia are committed to work for food self-sufficiency in the long run. We hope, pray and most of all work hard for food self-sufficiency in less than a decade. And we are aware of the budget constraints of developed countries and of aid fatigue, etc. However, in the mean time the country needs food aid. Food aid for development, food aid for relief, food aid for food reserves, food aid to mitigate inflation, the management of which should be carried out in partnership.

I wish you a fruitful seminar. Thank you.

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# THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA INITIATIVE - AN OVERVIEW

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## Ted Morse

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*Mr. Ted Morse is Head of the USAID/GHAI Task Force*

On behalf of Carol Peasley and John Hicks of the Africa Bureau, let me start by reinforcing the point that this is very much a co-sponsored workshop by the Africa Bureau and the Bureau of Humanitarian Response. As resources are scarce, there is every reason to come up with new ways to integrate the dollar funds, mainly of the Development Fund for Africa (DFA), along with the food aid funds. From the beginning, it has been the hopes of Carol and John that these would be seen as equal resources that need to be brought to bear in the Horn of Africa at this time. But, even without the resource constraints, it just makes sense to focus on this interrelationship, the interface, or so called "continuum". All the Bureaus, but specially Africa and the Bureau of Humanitarian Response, are working hand and glove to do things differently in this particular region.

It also was very much the intent of the Administration and the Administrator of AID, but especially the Africa Bureau, that USAID Mission directors in this area should come together at this particular point in time to understand where we are in the process of the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI). This Initiative sets the framework for the deliberations of this workshop. It is another sign of great support and strength, that almost all the regional directors have come to this workshop. There is an overwhelming commitment in Washington and the Missions to involve policy leaders and managers, and not to solely leave the integration of resources with the food aid people, the PVOs, agriculture, and the planners.

I am delighted to see the strength, the depth and the continuity of people that are assembled here. People who went through the droughts of '73 to '75 are still working in this area; those who went through the droughts of '84 to '86 are here; those who now are working in insecure areas in Sudan and Somalia are here. You bring continuity and you bring urgency to doing some things differently. We need the frank discussion of your experience and the insights of your leadership. We need to bring forward the positive lessons learnt from mitigating the South African drought a few years ago, but we also should highlight the differences of the situation.

The Greater Horn of Africa Initiative was born almost 13 months ago when we realized that this region was being threatened by another drought. A group of people, under the leadership of Nan Borton, BHR/OFDA, and Fred Fischer, REDSO/EA, came together to see how we could keep this drought from turning into another famine. At that time, the donors cooperated to accelerate some deliveries and the good Lord was helpful in eventually bringing the rains. 1994 did not turn into another killer famine. There are some lessons to be learned from that.

One of the lessons for the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative is: what can we do to prevent more of this rather than just responding? Let me start by going through six key tenets of the GHAI with you: (i) crisis response and prevention, (ii) dealing with man-made crises, (iii) dealing with relief and complex emergencies, (iv) dealing with the chronically food insecure, (v) improved donor coordination, and (vi) putting the Initiative into a regional perspective. Afterwards, I am going to offer some challenges to the workshop as we go into deliberations.

### 1. Preventing crises

Just responding to crises when it is too late has proven to be costly, not only in human and monetary terms, but also in terms of political embarrassment. For the President of the United States, his representative Brian Atwood, the USAID administrator, and down to the rest of us, there is an enormous challenge to not just keep responding to these emergencies but to find ways how to prevent them. To have to call in the U.S. military into Somalia, after it hit so low, or to have to call the military into Rwanda is embarrassing. One of the things that we would like to see changed under the Greater Horn of African Initiative is to prevent these chaoses, not just to respond to them.

There is questionable staying power. There is despair, discouragement, and fear that donors are going to walk away because it may just be seen as a region that is in constant chaos. If we don't do something different in this region, donor discouragement could leave it in a much weaker state

than it is right now. Burundi, which is again on the international news this weekend, could be another lesson of where we are failing. Burundi now, Rwanda last year, Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia the years before. I doubt that there is anyone amongst us with experience in this region who would say it is going to stop here. We must assume chaos. We must assume that we have to come up with new ways to act differently to prevent this chaos, not just to respond to it.

## **2. Fighting man-made causes of food insecurity - developing a conflict early warning system**

Secondly, in the past we assumed that a lot of the food insecurity and chaos have been driven by natural causes, drought and desert locusts. In fact, food insecurity in this region is being driven by twice as many man-made as natural factors. We need to act differently to understand this phenomenon. We need to act differently to be prepared to prevent it. And we should discuss with all of you, with the governments of this region, and with other international organizations, some sort of a conflict early warning system, parallel to the existing drought and famine early warning systems. Those are working very well, as we saw in 1994 in this region, and as we saw down in Southern Africa in 1991/92. But these systems are totally inadequate to capture the conflicts and the root causes of conflicts that are continuously driving this region into chaos. We need to look at the inter-relationships between those man-made causes, the political instabilities and the bad governance and policies.

Part of the Greater Horn Initiative is trying to better integrate political and social issues with economic, food, and agricultural concerns in a very complex matrix. We are not there yet. We have a lot of work to do on creating some sort of conflict early warning system, and, most importantly, appropriate decision making and response mechanisms.

## **3. Replacing relief with development**

Third, USAID is now spending twice as much money on relief as on development in this region. In 1993 the expenditures were \$400 million for relief, most of it for food, and \$200 million for development. Last year we were spending even three times as much on food and relief than on development, and it may escalate, unless something is being done. We're mainly treating the symptoms by pouring so much relief. Nobody is saying to abandon relief or to let

people starve; but we have to administer relief differently and that is what this workshop is about. We have to go differently through these transitions, because, quite frankly, some of the emergency relief has become so prolonged that we are getting bogged down. At the USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance 80% of the budget is now going for prolonged emergencies.

And still, we are not getting at the root causes of the problems. We are constantly just responding to the last man-made as well as natural chaos. We have to act differently to move through the transitions: from relief, through recovery, rehabilitation, and eventually to sustainable development. When we were talking about participants' expectations for this workshop this morning, nobody mentioned that one of our basic principles should be to work ourselves out of a job. We should, indeed, work ourselves out of perpetual relief, and get back into sustainable development. Eventually, we should work ourselves out of a job even in sustainable development.

## **4. Addressing the root causes of chronic food insecurity**

Bob Kramer mentioned earlier that we have spent 4 billion dollars on relief and 2 billion dollars on development in the last decade. Six billion dollars in the ten countries that we have arbitrarily described as the Greater Horn of Africa, and still two million people died; and still 46-48% of the population as a whole is chronically food insecure by one definition or another. We have to do some things differently. With that kind of track record we don't have the credibility to say "if we only had another 6 billion dollars in another decade we can show that we're going to get out of this." We have got to get back to the root causes of poverty and under-development. We have to see them in the context of natural resources, population pressure, and economic policies.

## **5. Improving strategic coordination within and among donors**

We particularly have to improve the strategic coordination of all the efforts that are going on. First of all, we have to overcome the kind of stereotypical, vertical separateness that has characterized our operations within USAID for too long. We certainly are very conscious of the distinctions between OFDA, Food for Peace, the Africa Bureau, and the Refugee Program of the State Department. The same type of

stereotyping that all too often also exists within the UN system and the NGO/PVO community.

Many African leaders have asked us "Can't you donors do a better job of coordination?". Under the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative we want to discuss whether or not we can do a better job of strategic coordination at national and regional level. Improved coordination is the only way to get the kind of synergy to stop the duplication of work, to stop working at cross purposes, to identify and address the critical gaps, and to, ultimately, achieve food security in the Horn of Africa cheaper, faster, and more effectively.

This does not mean the type of coordination where you exchange information after the fact. It rather means that we sit down in a frank discussion and you all tell us "AID, you are constraining us from going through that transition because we have to deal with five different parts of AID, and you have five different rules and regulations, five different time zones, five different sets of paper work, and they don't fit together." You've got to tell us those things. And we have to be prepared to do something about it.

#### **6. Taking a regional perspective**

The sixth point under the Initiative is to look at the region as a whole. As the region is changing, there are some opportunities which have to do, partly, with some of the more enlightened leadership and good governments that are ready to take responsibility for the food security of their people. Nobody says that these changes in the region are perfect by any means, but we are hearing from these African leaders that they are ready to look at food insecurity and chaos in a broader, regional context. Every country in this region has refugees from one of their neighbors. Even that former island of stability, Tanzania, has had a new wave of refugees every year for 32 years.

Regional cooperation is not a panacea. It isn't going to solve all of the problems. But we need to honestly say where can we get a value added by emphasizing finding solutions in a regional context--not just the national, or the international context. We are not just trying to create another layer because we are frustrated that the national and international layers are not entirely responsive.

Many of us feel that there isn't a single answer, or, metaphorically speaking, a silver bullet, that's going to solve the many problems in the Horn of Africa. It may take 200 smaller solutions before we can get close to being more helpful. And one of those

may be trying to find the solutions in a regional context.

These are the main points. Gayle Smith later will highlight some other points that we regard as extremely critical for the Initiative to succeed, including consultation, listening, and participation. I held 27 meetings with 250 people throughout Europe and North America and the other donors. Gayle Smith has held over 68 meetings with 800 people here in the field.

#### **Agency support for the Initiative**

Within USAID, John Hicks, the Assistant Administrator for the Africa Bureau, chairs a weekly meeting of Assistant Administrators and Deputy Assistant Administrators from other Bureaus of USAID. This initiative is supported by BHR, the Office for Disaster Assistance, the Office for Transitional Initiatives, and the PVOs. It includes the Global Bureau that has the technical resources that can be brought to bear. The Policy and Program Coordination Bureau (PPC) has a lot to do with policy and budgets, but right now it is specifically responsible for donor coordination. The meeting also includes the Chief of Staff of the Agency.

The deliberations of this workshop will inform people who are receptive and ready to put the authority, the responsibility and the decision making power behind any proposals. You can be ensured that your suggestions will be getting a very serious hearing within AID. There is enough commitment to trying to do some things differently in the Greater Horn of Africa at the moment even if there is some truth in what Marge Bonner said that "you sure can't expect this GHAI tail to whack the whole agency elephant".

#### **State Department Involvement**

As we recognize that foreign aid, development and relief, cannot take place in a politically neutral environment, the State Department is very much part of the GHAI initiative. We currently have four preliminary working groups that are looking at the areas that I've just discussed with you here. The State Department is chairing the one on conflict early warning systems. It's being chaired by someone who has just come to Washington from Addis Ababa, out of the political section of the Ethiopian US Embassy. He is integrating information, political reporting, and what we can learn from those of you who are working

in international organizations and the NGOs, as well as what we can learn from our own AID Missions and Embassies.

### **Tribute to Gayle Smith**

Let me pay tribute to what Gayle has done. When many of our African colleagues in the region apparently have embraced this Initiative, a lot of the credit has to go to Gayle's consultations, the way that she has approached them, the way she has conducted them. And I think that we're further along on that process than we would have been without her highly professional contributions on this. I want to pay proper tribute to her work.

### **Challenges for this workshop**

I would like to conclude with a couple of challenges for this workshop.

First, at this point it would not be useful to engage in an academic debate over the definition of food security. Maxwell and Smith and others have identified over 200 separate definitions. It's time to get down to some very practical work in this region.

Second, it may not be useful to spend a lot of time debating analytical frameworks. There has been a lot of work on this. We have to try to integrate research that is very policy and practical oriented. Driven not by the supply side, but by what insight we can supply to influence policy for the better. Listen to policy

makers, find out where they are ready to come up with new policies, and then move. Supply them with the analytical framework to enlighten their decisions.

Third, as we are spending twice as much money on relief as we are on development, how do we get the most developmental impact out of it? What can you recommend to do differently? Procedurally, where could we free you up? Policy-wise, where could we free you up? Where could we do things together in a new partnership? Practical recommendations are needed for the Greater Horn of Africa. How can we move ourselves out of the job?

Fourth, we recognize the connectivity between politics and policy, between war and welfare, and the changing conditions and opportunities. Let us see where we can change the approach to food security in this region to get a much higher development impact through the integration and synergy of efforts.

We must take the work of people who are assembled here, who have been working in many emergencies, such as Allen Jones, David Morton, or Fred Fischer, to name just a few, very seriously. We need your counsel and advice. In this initiative, we do not have answers. In great humbleness, we are trying with this Initiative to be catalytic and to consult with people like you and with the Governments of the region. That is the essence of the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative.

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# LEVERAGING FOOD SECURITY WITH FOOD AID: THE ROLE OF RESEARCH

**Lawrence Haddad**

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*Dr. Lawrence Haddad is director of the Food Consumption and Nutrition Division in the International Food Policy Research Institute.*

On behalf of IFPRI I would like to welcome you all to this workshop on making food aid work for long term food security. The numbers on hunger and malnutrition are by now depressingly familiar: 800 million people do not have enough food to eat, one in three preschool children in sub-Saharan Africa is significantly underweight, and over 2 billion people world-wide are deficient in one or more micronutrients. To put it bluntly, for many children, being born is a shock from which they never recover.

Food aid is already an important resource in trying to turn back the tide of malnutrition. This workshop will be exploring ways in which that impact can be enhanced in the short run, and, in particular, the long run. Part of the story rests in better management. There is no doubt that food aid can have a bigger impact on food security through better organization at the implementing level, better coordination at the PVO and donor levels, and through more regional integration. Discussion on if and how that can be achieved will be an important part of the workshop. But another part of the story rests on better information and better analysis. This is one of the reasons USAID invited IFPRI to assist in facilitating and organizing this workshop, and I would like to thank my IFPRI colleagues, in particular Detlev Puetz and Ellen Payongayong for their tireless effort in organizing this workshop at short notice.

Why the urgent focus on food aid? As we have heard, food aid can no longer be considered a surplus resource. In a world of smaller government, food aid has become a scarce resource that has alternative uses. This continuum of uses is characterized at its extremes by relief and by development. More people must be made food secure with a dollar of food aid than ever before. Food aid must not only contribute directly to food security, it must, whenever possible, be used to leverage it.

Good information and good policy analysis are central to the success of this objective. Without good information few sound decisions can be taken about investment alternatives. The longer decisions are

made on an uninformed ad hoc basis the longer hunger and food insecurity will persist.

Timely information is only useful if the organizational mechanisms are in place to act upon that information. These mechanisms will be the subject of many of the sessions in this workshop, and I would be presumptuous to pretend IFPRI's comparative advantage lay here.

Therefore in my talk to you today, I would like to tell you what applied policy research--something we do have a comparative advantage in--has to contribute to improving the food security impact of the food aid dollar. I will point out some areas in which extant research and analysis has given us some ideas on how to do better in this area. I will highlight information and analysis bottlenecks that threaten to impede attempts to leverage food security with food aid. Finally I will make the case that the research community cannot conduct business as usual if it is to contribute significantly to relieving these bottlenecks.

## **A. First, what has research already told us about leveraging food security with food aid?**

The concept of food insecurity is centered on shortfalls of food today as well as the risk of shortfall tomorrow. If food aid policy is to be linked to food security, its main objective should be to minimize the occurrence, severity, and impact of several risks: crop production risks (such as crop susceptibility to disease and drought), food availability and price risks (such as rapidly rising prices), employment and income risks (such as losing a job), health risks (such as diseases like diarrhea), and security risks (such as civil unrest). Applied research helped us to realize this in a number of ways: by understanding how the poor cope with food insecurity, by suggesting ways of targeting and monitoring food aid impacts, by assessing cost effectiveness of various food aid interventions, and by suggesting ways of linking short term and long term food security strategies. These topics are described in greater detail in the 5 policy research briefs prepared by IFPRI for this workshop.

### *1. How do the poor cope with food insecurity?*

Research confirms that even in areas of desperate poverty some households are much better able to cope with food crises than others.

In fact households cope by linking long-run and short-run strategies in a household level analogy of the relief to development continuum. For example our research shows that lending small amounts of money to the poor to permit them to maintain consumption in the short run, allows them to preserve their assets for production when things get better. We call this managing consumption for production.

### *2. How to target food aid?*

The targeting of food aid can take place at the district level or the household level. At the district level IFPRI has used classification and regression tree analysis (CART) to identify indicators of food insecurity.

To conceptualize this approach, think of a medical model for a triage system that sets priorities for intervention. In fact, our model is adapted from a model developed in California by emergency room doctors. The California model assesses who is most at risk through a series of indicators such as age, weight, and blood pressure. These indicators determine the likelihood of survival and suggest a course of treatment.

In adapting the model for famine-prone areas, we identified indicators of famine vulnerability in Ethiopia. We found that an area that faces high prices of crops relative to livestock, that lacks roads, and has a high variation of the vegetation index is at risk of famine and is probably less well-equipped to take advantage of any systematic intervention that would prevent famine.

Are these areas of vulnerability being served by programs of action? Not necessarily. Our research indicates that many of the current food security programs in Ethiopia are not active in areas most vulnerable to famine. This is critical information. This suggests, that some of the food security programs in less vulnerable areas need to be reexamined.

### *3. How to monitor food aid impacts?*

In directing food aid programs to be more results-oriented, indicators of outputs need to be developed

as a complement to the more straightforward input indicators.

Our work with collaborators in India compared the performance of food insecurity indicators from conventional surveys, pared-down rapid surveys, and participatory appraisal methods.

In terms of their ability to track food insecurity, we found that the rapid survey and participatory indicators performed as well as the more conventional survey indicators but were easier to collect. In addition, the participatory methods proved more flexible than conventional survey methods, more respectful to local knowledge, better for establishing rapport between investigators and villagers, and more promising for nutrition education purposes.

### *4. Assessing the cost-effectiveness of food aid*

Because food aid is now a scarce resource that has alternative uses, food aid projects need to be subjected to more scrutiny in terms of cost effectiveness.

Research completed in Bangladesh in 1994 examined the performance of two systems of public works programs: one cash for work, and the other food for work. Under the cash for work program it cost 1.3 dollars to transfer 1 dollar to the household. The food for work program cost 2.5 dollars to transfer 1 dollar to the household, but dollar for dollar had a larger impact on food consumption. This result emphasizes that the choice of food aid delivery system will likely be driven by donor objectives.

### *5. How to link long term and short run strategies?*

A Greater Horn without famine depends crucially on good governance: governance that is accountable, nondiscriminatory, and participatory. In addition, the abolition of famine in the region rests on both long term strategies such as investing in research to raise the productivity of agriculture (crops and livestock) and short-term strategies such as designing safety nets for those who do not have access to resources or labor.

But how to link the long term with the short term? I have already mentioned innovative informal rural finance schemes which allow consumption to be smoothed today in order to preserve assets for productive use tomorrow.

Labor intensive public works also exhibit potential in this regard. Public works can act as a relief

program that develops the community by building schools, clinics, roads, and shelter; and as a development program that, by acting as collateral for informal credit, or by building environmentally friendly structures, is more sensitive to preventing the need for relief. To date, experience from sub-Saharan Africa is somewhat mixed. Some studies show that participation in public works is self targeting, and income-increasing. On the other hand, there is some unevenness in the participation and status of women as a result of the programs, and, in addition, the programs place heavy demands on institutional capacity, especially at the regional level.

## **B. Second, what are the information and analytical bottlenecks likely to be?**

So, applied policy research has already given us some ideas about how to leverage food security through food aid. But when we look more closely at the information and analytic requirements necessary to think differently and act differently in this regard, a number of gaps are apparent.

### *1. There is a need to locate and promulgate success stories from Africa*

In our attempts to find ways of leveraging food security with food aid we must make sure that we are not re-inventing the wheel. There are food security success stories coming out of Africa. They do not carry the journalistic impact of the failures, but they should, and, if documented in a systematic but accessible way, they could. What makes one project work well, while a seemingly similar project does not?

Similarly if a regional approach to food security is to be an important part of the success story in the Greater Horn, we need to learn from the experiences of SADC and the Club du Sahel.

### *2. We need to understand the inherent tradeoffs in asking food aid to work for long term food security.*

In some sense this workshop is asking food aid to have a relief and a development focus, but we must understand that there are tradeoffs involved.

The assumption is often that there are no tradeoffs to this approach either in theory or practice. Is linking food aid to food security a win-win situation? Not always. We have to ask two questions:

In attempting to make food aid have more of a development focus does it lose its ability to have a relief focus? and In attempting to make food aid have more of a relief focus does it lose its ability to have an development focus?

First, in attempting to make food aid have more of a development focus does it lose its ability to have a relief focus? Consider:

- the difficulties of implementing food for work schemes as opposed to basic feeding programs
- the need to monetize food aid despite the vulnerability of markets to production disincentives at certain times of the year
- the difficulties of measuring the short-term impact of using food aid to improve agricultural practices
- the potential quality risks of using labor intensive public works to construct a health center or school
- the dangers of reducing school performance through reduced teacher performance and increased class sizes through food for education programs
- delays in program implementation due to the less top-down nature of development programs
- the danger of pulling food aid feeding away from the more vulnerable under 5 group through school feeding programs

Similarly, in attempting to make food aid have more of a relief focus does it lose its ability to have an development focus? Consider:

- the tradeoffs of using food aid to promote food production in low potential areas instead of high potential areas
- the danger of making credit available to those who are especially vulnerable, but do not have enough time or opportunities to use it, and therefore end up in a worse position through failure to repay

In short, we need to know more about the economic and political economy tradeoffs inherent in the pursuit of the objectives of relief and development.

3. *Is leverage best achieved within a program or by a set of programs?*

We know food aid is most effective when used in conjunction with other resources, but can single projects achieve this linkage? Evidence, scarce as it is, is mixed. For example, qualitative evaluations done by IFPRI of the USAID-supported credit with nutrition education program in Mali say yes, linkage can be achieved within a single project, but quantitative evaluations of the same project are more circumspect.

On the other hand, when is it best to embody the leverage process in a portfolio of projects? Note that the design of a portfolio approach may have especially large information, analytic, and coordination requirements.

4. *The need for research to do more evaluations*

There is a need for research to focus more on the operational realities of development. This requires researchers to focus less on links between abstract variables and more on (1) working more closely on a day to day basis with project management and (2) collecting information on programmable variables. This is rarely done. A recent World Bank report found that only 10 percent of 93 nutrition programs in Latin America were evaluated, and only three of these evaluations were judged to be of reasonable quality. Some researchers consider such evaluations to be beneath them. In truth, such evaluations may simply be beyond them. It takes first rate research to unlock the impacts of project and program design on food security.

5. *The drive to more inclusive and participatory research*

Whatever researchers do to address these questions they will need to do it in a participatory way. They will need to listen to the visions of the national governments, NGOs, donors, and most importantly, of the hungry themselves: relevant research cannot be conducted without an appreciation of the everyday realities that the food insecure face.

The incentives to program designers and implementors may seem underdeveloped when it comes to listening to the people themselves. But the payoffs can be large. For example, a recent IFPRI study in Ethiopia shows that only 1 percent of all public works participants were consulted about the design of public works. While most public works projects in Ethiopia are based on soil conservation or

reforestation, most participants desire public works that construct health clinics and provide piped water.

6. *The need to strengthen capacity to undertake analysis*

Much of the applied research agenda described above can only be carried out if research and implementing institutions within the Greater Horn are strengthened. There have been repeated calls for the strengthening of IGADD (the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development). But national and district agencies need to be strengthened too. One important method of strengthening institutions is through conducting operational research side-by-side with researchers from the region. I have just come from Malawi and Ghana where IFPRI has long-term commitment to doing just this with policy analysts at Bunda College in Malawi and the National Development Planning Commission in Ghana. Similar commitments need to be shown to institutions such as IGADD. For institutions in Ethiopia, there remains a need to support regional bureaus in the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) and other decentralized agencies.

C. *Third, is research up to the challenge of meeting these bottlenecks?*

I suppose it is inevitable that I would argue that "yes" research is up to the challenge. But, in truth, many of these gaps are eminently researchable. If the applied research community is to meet the challenge, there are however, three important things that we have to do differently:

- we must make sure that research packs a punch outside the academic arena. This does not mean we back off on the rigor of the research, but that we realize that different problems call for different levels of sophistication.
- more attention needs to be paid to the research process in terms of capacity strengthening as well as the research outcome: both are indicators of research quality.
- we must make sure that applied research is undertaken in a manner that builds up institutional memory, this again, goes back to my concerns of us not learning from past work

In short, research results have to be accurate, have to be instrumental in building capacity, have to be user-driven, and have to be linked by some institutional arrangement.

In conclusion, so long as economic growth continues to be crippled by structural food deficits, weak market infrastructure, inappropriate economic policies and armed conflict there will continue to be a role for food aid.

But, as is clear from the previous addresses, the role of food aid will be fundamentally redefined in the next decade. Crucial to this redefinition will be new ways of thinking about the coordination, management and institutional aspects of food aid. But management and coordination feed on information. Better information and analysis—in terms of relevance, methods, and process—is a cornerstone for this redefinition.

New ways of doing applied research must be combined with new ways of acting upon the information generated if we are to make food aid work for lasting food security.

In his introductory comments at the World Bank's Hunger Conference in late 1993, Tony Hall told an allegorical story about how a fire only burns brightly if all its logs are placed together. If the logs are separated, most quickly burn out. Others continue to burn but they do not generate much warmth or comfort. For the leveraging of long term food security through food aid to occur, efforts on the managerial side and on the analytical side need to work hand in hand to ensure that the fire we are kindling this week continues to burn brightly.

Thank you.

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## KEYNOTE SPEECHES: DISCUSSION

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### **Responding to Crisis Early Warning Systems (CEWS)**

**Timothy Frankenberger:** What do we do if we get the information from a crisis early warning system? PVOs and others can normally tell where conflicts are likely to erupt. What to do about this information is something entirely different. It is critical to think in advance about the range of responses once your early warning system tips you off. You might, for instance, reposition things around the conflict area to anticipate the refugee flow, or send in negotiators, like Jimmy Carter, and try to fix things.

**Ted Morse:** In defining the response to crisis early warning systems it is useful to disaggregate the response into conflict resolution and conflict prevention. You have a whole series of different response options depending on whether you are trying to resolve something that is already in the making versus if you are trying to prevent something. In terms of conflict resolution, you have a wide range from the eminent personal negotiator, all kinds of influences and sanctions, to inducements and enticements that are not always successful, as Sarajevo or Rwanda have shown. Let me also emphasize that in my opinion the world does not have a very good decision making process to deal with long-range conflict questions. Even the UN system tends not to respond until it becomes the CNN moment and then they get forced to respond. We have to structure something different from that. For conflict prevention, it may be useful to disaggregate into short-, medium-, and long-term activities. There are a wide range of activities, but allow me just to list a few.

**Developing negotiation skills.** First, people in the region should know a little bit more about negotiations. They should know the principles of negotiation, and be better trained in the art of negotiation. Where you have time that may be one response.

**Training and exposure.** Second, there are many lessons for the Horn to be learned from recent experiences of community-based organizations in the Republic of South Africa that have been

preventing and resolving conflicts. These people from South Africa should be encouraged to come up to the Horn to share their experiences, and vice-versa people from the Horn should go down and see how South Africans did it.

**Long-term changes in the education system.** In the long-run you may want to look at basic education, beyond training and exposure. Education fundamentally determines the value systems of a culture or a society, and the likelihood for short-or medium term chaos is often embedded in an education system that may be perpetuating hate and animosities. You will have to change such education systems, even though long-time educational and attitudinal changes may pay off only in the long run, maybe only in 15 to 20 years.

**Gayle Smith:** In terms of conflict early warning systems we frequently do, quite frankly, have a real challenge in terms of the political will of the different parties involved. But to put a slightly different and possibly more developmental twist on it, part of it has to do with the timeframe we attach to early warning. How early are those warnings? Are they one year or are they ten to fifteen years? Let me give an example. The effects of changes in land tenure on pastoralists or of the creation of commercial farms, for instance, may not cause a problem over the next 6 months. Way down the line it might. Presence of Rwandan refugees in Tanzania who are not likely to go back to Rwanda may overtime hold the keys to conflict, depending on how you respond to it. If you elongate the time frame—to 10, 15, or 20 years—you can take a more developmental look at what early warning means.

### **Trade-offs of long-term development and short-term relief and regional leaders' understanding**

**Marty Hanratty:** This is a question for Lawrence Haddad and Gayle Smith. Based upon your field research and your discussions with African leaders in the region, do you get a sense that they have an understanding of the trade-offs between long-term development and short-term relief options, and the

intricacies and complexities of food systems as expressed by Lawrence Haddad?

**Lawrence Haddad:** I would have to say no. But then I would have to say that we, donors and other expatriates, don't understand the trade-offs very well either. The process that IFPRI has found successful in the past is one of working together with national policy-makers and managers, and discovering the tradeoffs together. Our work in Ethiopia, for instance, has drawn in people from the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Planning, RRC, Addis Ababa University, to name just a few, and together we discovered some of the major trade-offs.

**Gayle Smith:** I have to say that the awareness within the regional political leadership of the trade-offs between the present state of affairs and a stronger focus on food security is uneven. And among the leadership that thinks most developmentally, there may be a keen intellectual awareness of those tradeoffs, but at the same time there may be very little practical knowledge of what it means in terms of policies and specific programs. I don't know that there has been that much research done on what the tradeoffs are. Whether that research exists out here in the field, or back in Washington, New York, Michigan, so on and so forth. We need to do more practical research.

One of the impediments, I think, of grasping the tradeoffs is that in most of the governments in the region there is the same institutional split between development and relief/food aid that we have in donor institutions. That needs to be overcome.

**Barbara Huddleston:** I do appreciate the long list of trade-offs offered by Lawrence Haddad. But it appears that from the standpoint of programming resources, you don't need to know all the tradeoffs in detail as long as you acknowledge their existence. I don't think that multi-objective programming is going to work. Development agencies should rather program for one objective and, by default, you will get secondary benefits for the other objectives.

#### **Cost of public work programs versus straight food aid distribution**

**Margaret Bonner:** Lawrence Haddad talked about IFPRI studies on the cost-effectiveness of cash- and food-for-work programs. Has this included any research on supplementary requirements in terms of people, institutions etc. to actually organize and carry out the work? Have you or others looked at the cost

of setting up these schemes, whether it is food-for-work or cash-for-work, versus the actual costs of straight food distribution? As we try to move from relief to development, and we are trying to replace free food distribution by food/cash-for-work programs, it appears that we have to carefully assess the resources to carry out these programs.

**Lawrence Haddad:** The numbers I presented were based on variable costs. In the study area the delivery infrastructure was already in place. We tried to get some quantitative idea of the fixed costs of setting up administrative structures to effectively carry out some of those programs, but this turned out to be very difficult. As we all know, fixed costs are very difficult to assess and to allocate to specific activities.

#### **Taking a regional perspective**

**David Morton:** I'd like to comment on Ted Morse's suggestion to look at the problems in the Greater Horn of Africa from a regional perspective. But there is no regional political body in the Greater Horn that we or the governments can work with. IGADD, at best, is a technical agency. Secondly, to what extent is the basis for better coordination at all regional levels better donor coordination in general?

**Ted Morse:** David Morton is right on regional bodies. There is a vacuum in terms of regional organizations here in the Horn. I'm not sure we presently see the kind of vision and leadership in IGADD that guided SADCC over its 15 years of existence. In spite of many frustrations we have to give SADCC credit for a grand vision of development and political solidarity that eventually made a difference in Southern Africa.

But I think that the political leaders are seeing that the rest of the world is beginning to organize, not only for trade, but in terms of political identity and solidarity. We do not feel that IGADD is the only institution, by any means, that we would want to work with. But it probably at the moment is the one that the leaders of the region would like to see strengthened by the donors to work on some aspects of regional interest, not all of them. I think, they still have to educate us in terms of what they would like done, for instance, on conflict resolution prevention and mediation. It is very important for long-term regional development to strengthen all kinds of professional and technical institutions, public and private. These may range from the East Africa Agricultural Economists group that can help in capacity building

and local research to the Center for Population activities in Nairobi.

In terms of coordination amongst donors, that's exactly what we call and strive for in the Initiative, ideally under African leadership; the type of strategic coordination where we can sit down and share information, examine policies, and say "Where are we duplicating? Where are we hurting each other?"

### **American leadership in the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative**

**Joe Gettler:** In order to maintain the momentum of this Initiative, we should raise the question of continued American leadership over the next two, maybe even five years. Are Americans willing to provide the appropriate resources and personnel—with sufficient seniority, experience, talent, and vision—to maintain the focus of the GHAI?

**Ted Morse:** There are two answers to this. First of all, USAID has made a commitment to institutionalize the Initiative in the Agency so that it is not depending on any task force or any individual. But, in the end, the initiative has to be something that is far beyond USAID or the U.S. Government. It must be ultimately led by the continuity and the vision and the insights of the Africans themselves. If the leadership depends on USAID, we will have failed. Or, as Gayle put it at one point, "The United States is prepared to be the midwife for this Initiative but we're not prepared to raise it as a single parent." It won't work as a single parent.

### **The role of commercial food markets.**

**John Flynn:** I was expecting Lawrence Haddad to discuss a bit more the role of commercial food markets for food security, at local, regional, national and international levels. Some time ago in Nairobi, we talked about the impending crisis which Ted discussed in his keynote address. However, one of the main reasons why the crisis was averted was not mentioned: the very rapid commercialization of regional food markets. More than a million tons of cereals were imported into Kenya commercially which averted a major disaster in that region.

I can see, you're asking, what does this have to do with food aid? One of the major and more creative uses of food aid over the past several years has been to use it to encourage market reforms, particularly through title III resources. The impact may

not have been researched or documented very well, but has been significant. We need to think much more commercially about our food aid programs. For instance, we could be hedging in international commodity markets, that deliver food in predetermined time. There are all kinds of streamlining mechanisms that could make things cheaper than what we are doing them now. We need to open our eyes a bit more, and think about how to better tap into the power of the private sector.

**Lawrence Haddad:** I indeed overlooked commercial food markets. I think it is crucial that we carefully analyze the liberalization of food markets, as well as input and labor markets, and see how that dovetails with the way we use food aid. We are, for instance, very concerned about public works programs becoming such a major component in Ethiopia that they may disrupt the fledgling labor markets that currently exist. We have to be very cognizant of these tradeoffs between existing market activities and public interventions such as food aid. The critical question in each case is: How can food aid strengthen, and not undermine those markets?

### **Elongating the time frame of cost/benefit analyses**

**Blaine Pope:** Gayle Smith talked about elongating the time frame to use in crisis prevention, up to 15 to 20 years. Intellectually, I think, that makes very good sense. The problem is how many of us are in a position to program or budget along those lines?

**Gayle Smith:** I think, Blaine is right. There would have to be institutional changes to allow for a longer-term perspective. When you program assistance to refugees from southern Sudan, do you assume that they are going to go back in six months and therefore, program that as relief? Or do you assume that the war might go on for some time, that they might be displaced for quite a long time, and that, therefore, you need to take a development approach?

**Jim Phippard:** In the context of a longer time-frame I would like to go back to points raised by Lawrence Haddad. In doing research you also probably want to look at the long-term developmental impact of making people food secure and self-sustained over a longer term. Does that factor into your cost-benefit analysis?

**Lawrence Haddad:** We, indeed, need to pay more emphasis to factoring in long-term food security benefits into our cost/benefit exercises; the food security community is fairly poor at that. The education lobby has been dramatically successful at

doing this. In contrast, we have not trumpeted the fact that improved food security has a lifelong impact on labor productivity, cognitive development, and even in lowering fertility through a decrease in the desired family size. These are all long-term benefits, social as well as private benefits, and we haven't done a good job of explaining their magnitude to the public.

#### **Transitory versus chronic food insecurity and ultimate food aid priorities**

**Barbara Huddleston:** Lawrence Haddad spoke about food insecurity as primarily relating to riskiness. That sounded as if all the indicators of whether a person, or a family or a community were food insecure were related to the degree of their risks. This is, indeed, an appropriate definition for transitory food insecurity, for families who move in and out of a food insecure situations. These families would see relief as the response in times of need.

But by far the larger problem is that of chronic food insecurity. But in this case it is not really a question of risk. If a family is chronically food insecure, it does not have enough food for their nutritional adequacy all the time. Chronic food insecurity is more a problem of poverty. This, partly explains, why food aid and other resources should be used in developmental activities to address the poverty problem in order to overcome food insecurity. If we tackle the chronic problems, we might get at the root causes, and therefore we may also eliminate transitory food insecurity.

**Allen Jones:** I would like to ask a very fundamental question: is the ultimate priority for the use of food aid food relief or is the priority development? I perceive mixed signals so far. Is there really a choice for us, in a situation of diminishing resources, other than to concentrate on the relief? I was prompted to ask this question by the organizers' choice of the Ethiopian Government's welcome speaker this morning. Mr. Debebe is a representative of the Ministry of External Economic Cooperation which suggested that your answer is 'development' which his ministry is principally involved in. The Ministry of External Economic Cooperation probably spends maybe 2 to 3 percent of its time thinking about food aid. There is another organization in Addis Ababa, the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, that spends 95 percent of its time thinking or dealing with food aid. Have we just gotten a very strong message what USAID's priority is?

**Margaret Bonner:** By inviting a representative of the Ministry of External Economic Cooperation for the official Welcome Address there was, indeed, an intended, hidden message. All too often we automatically assume that food aid goes with relief. The invitation was a very overt attempt to say that's not the case. We have to look harder at where to invest our scarce food aid resources, and we have to emphasize the development side more. We have to start saying in some of the relief places "we're not going to do it because we have a better investment on the development side."

**Bob Kramer:** Whether USAID/FFP assigns priority to relief or to development is a very difficult question to answer. Because of the cost, size and complexity of emergency activities and a stagnating budget, we have been forced to provide more of our resources to relief activities in the last years. We have tried to protect the development budget. But we have been only partly successful, and success is not ensured in the future. It has been suggested that AID should just provide all of its food resources to relief activities. I think that would be a major mistake.

No one wants to have to make a very difficult decision between providing a food supplement to a lactating mother in the highlands of Peru or providing food to a Rwandan refugee. Unfortunately, in my office, we have to make those decisions. We have to determine how to establish these priorities.

We will have to use food aid more effectively to address both short-term emergencies and to establish the framework for long-term development to avoid and mitigate emergencies. We have to start thinking more creatively about breaking down the dichotomy between emergency and development and how to use a very finite resource to address both relief and development. It's not easy, but therein lies our challenge.

**Gayle Smith:** I would be disinclined to make a choice between relief and development. Following up on Barbara Huddleston's important point, I would say that one of the characteristics of this region is that transitory food insecurity quickly turns into a chronic situation. For instance, mass migration all over the region goes unresolved. Just take the example of the Rwandan refugees in Tanzania. If they are going to be there for 20 years, you will have to look at them through both lenses at once. A lot of the structural food deficits in the region are born not only from the fact that population and economic growth have not moved in pace, but also from profound demographic changes.

**Timothy Frankenberger:**

**Choosing the right kind of relief-based development activities.** First, I think that you can always do development with relief activities. But the kind of development you chose do is critical. In an area where refugees are not planning on staying forever, there are certain kinds of development activities, for instance training, that can easily be done in camps. Things are different when you plan to settle refugees, allocate land resources, or improve agricultural productivity. There has to be a time threshold after which the intervention mix is allowed to change.

**High-potential versus low-potential areas.** Second, it is really critical to distinguish between high-potential and low-potential areas in terms of food aid supported development activities. In some places, agricultural infrastructure investments will be too expensive to bring a totally degraded area back to productive agriculture. This doesn't mean we shouldn't try to develop these areas, it means that the kind of development we should do may be different. It might be more focused on human capital rather than on agricultural infrastructure. You could still use food aid programming for it, but you need to bear in mind the local conditions.

**Geographic distribution of vulnerability and assessments.** Third, on chronic versus transitory insecurity, we really have to understand how vulnerability is geographically distributed. That doesn't mean that FAO should come in with one plan, and AID should come in with another plan, and that WFP should come in with a third plan. If we are going to do vulnerability mapping for a country we have to get everybody to buy into the same plan and we should talk about coordinated efforts. We then can strategically decide who is going to take on those areas that are totally degraded; who's going to take on those areas that have a little more potential but have transitory food insecurity, and who is going to work in areas that might be alright now but might be where negative trends may be going on such that the area may eventually become food insecure?

**John Grant:** We have complex regional problems that require long-term solutions. So the question of how to maintain the commitment over the long-term is absolutely critical and very challenging. I think, one possible approach is to try to develop a consensus among the people of the region, donors and others on some measurable objectives to strive for over the medium-term. Currently we may have 2000 goals. Let us try to generate some consensus over the most important ones, some commitments for measuring specific indicators. Hopefully that will have some chance of surviving the changes in individual country leadership and donor priorities.

#### **More emphasis on relief-to-development**

**Getachew Diriba:** Several speakers at this workshop have talked about doing things differently. How in practice are we going to do things differently? I'd like to comment particularly on the relief-to-development continuum. It might appear that the relief-to-development continuum is one of these new fashionable concepts. To me it's not. It has always been a necessity.

If we look at Ethiopia, the record shows that during the 1973-74 famine more than 200,000 people died, probably one million people suffered. Ten years later more than five million people suffered and an estimated one million people died. Since then every year a minimum of five million people suffer from some sort of food shortages, be it transitory or chronic. And the current estimate of food insecurity is in the order of 50-60% of the total Ethiopian population.

We have to look again at our activities in the past and make sure that every food assistance we provide today, while saving lives, at the same time, provides the necessary ground for those people to be able to rebuild their future and to make them resilient.

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# THE NEW FOOD AID AND FOOD SECURITY POLICY PAPER - AN OVERVIEW

**John Grant**

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*Mr. John Grant is from the United States Agency for International Development, Bureau for Humanitarian Response, and Office of Program Planning and Evaluation*

## **Introduction**

I have been asked to review the highlights of the new Food Aid and Food Security Policy Paper which was signed exactly a month ago today, and was formally issued just 10 days ago. This paper had a gestation period which stretches back almost a year. The PVOs and a number of actors in the Agency have been involved. Carol Lancaster gave the original push to develop the paper, and she and PPC have significantly contributed.

This document is designed to guide program development and resource allocation for all USAID administered food aid activities. It is an important document that Missions and PVOs alike should be utilizing—hopefully in conjunction with one another—as they develop CPSPs and MYOPs. It is also a document that we will be using in Washington for review of MYOPs and Mission CPSP's. The guidance is timely because it should serve as a key reference point and anchor for this workshop as we think about how best to program our food aid and couple it with DA resources to maximize the impact on Food Security. This is the first test of how these guidelines should be interpreted on the ground in a specific part of the world.

The paper lays out general guidelines and principles to guide the programming of food aid but it is not meant to dot every i and cross every t. It is not intended to be a straightjacket, but to establish useful guidelines of achieving our ultimate objective of improving the food security of poor and hungry people. Underlying the paper is an understanding that we are dealing with highly complex problems and some flexibility of approach is needed.

## **Background and context**

Some background and context may be helpful in understanding and interpreting the paper.

### *1. Developing strategic objectives for food aid*

This paper is part of an Agency wide process to better determine our objectives and strategies. A year ago we issued broad strategies for the five sectors USAID is working in to achieve Sustainable Development, that is (i) Economic Growth, (ii) Population Health and Nutrition, (iii) Environment, (iv) Democracy, and (v) Humanitarian Assistance. We have now taken it a step further with Implementation Guidelines for all these sectors which were finally issued just a couple of weeks ago. But none dealt adequately with food aid, and there was a desire for a special paper which focused specifically on how food aid would be used to achieve food security and accomplish our strategies for sustainable development.

### *2. Managing for results*

There is a strong emphasis in the Agency to "Manage for Results". The Government Performance and Results Act requires us to have clearly defined objectives and indicators for all aspects of our program. With the added budgetary pressures we need to document more effectively the results of our programs, and this need is acutely felt in the Food Aid area. There is a strong drive to shift our focus from food as an input to the results of these programs.

### *3. The changing global context of food aid*

There was felt need for a policy that reflected the changing Global context related to Food Aid—in terms of agriculture and the changing capability of different parts of the world to meet their food needs, complex emergencies and increased demands on food, and changing food aid availabilities.

In terms of agriculture, East Asia and Latin America have made significant progress in their ability to feed themselves. It is places like the Greater Horn of Africa where food deficits are skyrocketing. The food gap in Africa is expected to quadruple to 50

million tons in the 90s. In the last six years per capita food production has declined in 26 countries in Africa.

#### *4. Food aid as a scarce resource*

It is increasingly realized that food aid is now a scarce resource. The GATT and farm subsidy reductions are reducing agricultural surpluses in the US. In the future, Government budgets for food aid will be subject to the same budget constraints as other forms of assistance. Increasingly, a dollar of food aid is equivalent to a dollar of DA. At the same time there are exploding demands from complex emergencies around the world. Between 1989 and 1993 Emergency Food Aid needs have more than doubled, from \$1.1 billion in 1989 to 2.5 billion in 1993. USAID has to ensure that food aid is used as effectively and efficiently as possible.

#### *5. The special nature of food aid*

It has to be recognized that food aid is a specialized resource, that has both advantages and disadvantages as a tool to promote sustainable development. It has immediate value in addressing hunger, it is a valuable complement to other programs, and has been relatively abundant compared to other resources. But it can also disrupt local markets, distort local agricultural markets, and local consumption patterns.

#### *6. Learning the lessons of the past*

There was also a desire to capture some of our lessons learned from working with food aid over the years and to encapsulate them in policy. One of the most powerful ones was that food aid when used in isolation has limited impact—in order to be most effective it must be integrated with other resources.

#### *7. Linking relief and development*

Growing awareness of the "Relief to Development Continuum", and realization that relief and development are not at opposite poles, with relief over here and development over there. The two are linked and we have to integrate our humanitarian assistance and development resources more effectively. We have to use our DA resources and Food development programs more effectively to prevent crises and mitigate their effects, and we must use our emergency

resources more effectively to promote a return to development.

### **Policy guidance on emergency food and the relief-recovery-development continuum**

The policy paper highlights the fact that although we have traditionally thought of and managed "relief food aid" and "development food aid" separately, they are in fact part of a "continuum". On the one hand long-term food security efforts through our DA and food aid development programs constitute the best "preventive strategy" for dealing with acute food needs; on the other hand, emergency food aid, if properly programmed, can help to promote long-term food security.

The paper calls for a new approach to "emergency food aid" and other relief interventions. They should be designed and implemented on the same principles that guide sustainable development: (i) capacity building, (ii) participation and sustainability, and (iii) decentralization and human capacity development. We need to ensure that emergency programs look at long-term development needs while meeting short-term critical needs. At a minimum they should not undermine long-term development efforts.

The paper specifically calls for much greater attention to the relief-to-development continuum to reduce vulnerability and mitigate the impact of disasters. Food insecure countries must be prepared to cope with recurring drought and even with political conflict. Equally important, relief programs must ensure that families are able to return as quickly as possible to productive lives. The paper calls for a new framework to assess needs and program resources along the relief-to-development continuum. For example, how can we use relief and development activities together to maintain productive capacity or prevent migration? This is an area which is still to be developed and I hope we can make progress in outlining this framework at this workshop.

### **Key tenets of the policy paper**

#### *1. Definition of food security*

It is important to realize that the policy paper does not try to redefine food security. The broad definition of food security contained in the 1990 amendments to PL 480 will continue to govern food aid program

development. PD 19 will also remain in force. The legislation defines food security as

"Access by all people at all times to sufficient food and nutrition for a healthy and productive life."

AID's definition in PD 19, which draws on the legislation, is:

"When all people at all times have both physical and economic access to sufficient food to meet their dietary needs for a productive and healthy life."

This definition includes the three key variables which are central to the attainment of food security: availability, access and utilization. **Food availability** may be ensured by appropriate farm household production, other domestic food production, commercial imports or food assistance. **Food access** is linked to income available to the household, distribution of income within the household, and the price of food. **Food utilization** may be improved by better nutritional knowledge, or health, water and sanitation facilities.

## 2. Causes of food insecurity

The paper also recognizes that the causes of food insecurity are extremely broad and complex. They include chronic poverty, population growth, poor agricultural output, poor infrastructure, inappropriate policies, disease, poor water and sanitation, inadequate nutritional knowledge, inappropriate cultural practices, civil war and ethnic conflicts. In some way the causes of food insecurity cut across all the sectors that USAID works in, and in the broadest sense all our strategic priorities contribute to food security.

## 3. Geographic and program priorities for food aid

Within this broader context, the policy paper takes a careful look at food aid, its special qualities as a resource, and our lessons learned with food aid over the years and develops some key tenets about how we should manage food aid to maximize its impact on hunger and food insecurity. Two central tenets are that in order to maximize the impact of food aid we must allocate it to a smaller number of priority countries, and we must focus it better on a few priority program areas. In sum, we need better geographic and program focus.

In future, priority in allocating food aid will be given to the most food insecure countries, and within those countries to the most food insecure groups. The rationale is very clear: if you have a scarce resource which is expensive to manage it should go where it is most needed and can have the greatest impact. This means a shift to South Asia and particularly to Sub-Saharan Africa.

Secondly, USAID will give priority in allocating food aid resources to programs which improve agricultural productivity and household nutrition. The decision to focus our food aid programs on enhancing agricultural productivity and improving household nutrition is based on our experience and belief that it is these programs that have the greatest potential for sustained improvements in food security. This is particularly true in the food insecure countries of Africa and South Asia, where substantial numbers of the poor depend on agriculture for food or income.

## Implications for food aid programs

### 1. Title III Programs

First, greater priority in allocating food will be given to countries most in need of food. Under current world conditions these countries are primarily in Africa. Second, highest priority will be given to programs with direct linkages to increased agricultural production and household level food consumption.

### 2. Title II Programs

As for title III, priority will be given to programs in those countries that need food most and where food insecurity is greatest. Title II programs will focus on improving household nutrition, especially in children and mothers, and on alleviating the causes of hunger, especially by increasing agricultural productivity.

For Title II programs there will be somewhat greater flexibility in identifying countries and types of programs. Title II programs will be eligible for funding in countries which may have made progress on food production at the macro level, but where there are still large numbers of poor and hungry people. While priority will be placed on agricultural production and household level nutrition, other programs which may contribute to food security, such as programs that increase income through economic and community development and sound environmental practices, will also be supported.

### 3. *Range of programs*

Some may wonder if focusing on agricultural productivity and household nutrition may give undue attention to two legs of food security, that is availability and utilization, and ignore the third one, access. Three key points. First, in developing these policies we looked carefully at the comparative advantages of different types of resources, and we felt it was important and appropriate for our dollar funded Mission programs to tackle the income and access problem directly. Improving the agricultural productivity of poor farmers does contribute to improved access in important ways--both increased income for the household, and decreased prices.

Second, both Agricultural Productivity and Household Nutrition are broadly conceived. The illustrative list of agricultural productivity activities ranges from agricultural policy development and establishment of private credit institutions to the introduction of cash crops to improve incomes, or off-farm microenterprises to improve the marketing of food or agricultural inputs. The list of household nutrition activities ranges from health and nutrition education to water and sanitation, and it includes pilot programs to improve local storage and household food preparation.

Third, the bottom line is effective and efficient use of food aid resources to reduce hunger and achieve food security. We are very serious about applying these priorities but if a PVO has other interventions to propose based on a careful analysis of what it takes to achieve food security, we will consider them, but there is an added burden of proof on the side of the PVO.

### **Implications for all agency programs**

#### 1. *Integration of resources*

Food aid should be integrated to a greater extent with other assistance resources, particularly USAID Development Assistance. Greater priority on this integration must be the responsibility of both the Missions and the PVOs. Proceeds from the monetization of food should be used to complement direct feeding programs and to support development programs, particularly those which enhance agricultural productivity and/or improve household nutrition. This flows both from the finding that food aid is most effective when it is used in conjunction

with other resources and that food aid is a major resource that has to be programmed more effectively in conjunction with DA resources.

#### 2. *Managing for results*

There will be a much greater emphasis on "Managing for Results" with Title II. In order to accomplish this, greater attention and resources will be allocated to strengthening the program development and management capacity of USAID's food aid partners: PVOs, NGOs and the World Food Program. USAID field Missions will strengthen collaboration and dialogue with these partners in working to achieve mutually agreed upon objectives.

USAID is committed to bringing food aid programs into a managing for results framework with clearly articulated objectives and measurable indicators. In order to achieve this there needs to be:

- Much better communication and coordination between PVOs and field Missions in the development of strategic plans. USAID and PVOs need to have a "shared responsibility concept" in planning and managing food aid programs.
- USAID and PVOs should develop and implement a shared framework for measuring results in food aid programs. As part of this we need better indicators and systems to measure results.
- USAID and the PVOs need to develop better information systems and assessment tools to design food security programs.
- USAID must provide PVO capacity building to ensure that results are achieved.

#### 3. *Responding to emergencies*

We need to develop greater budgetary flexibility to respond to emergencies. Emergency food needs are growing and we want to meet recurrent emergency needs without draining food aid from development. This may need to come from measures such as expanding the types of commodities in existing reserve systems and improved multilateral coordination. USAID/W is also exploring the possibility of new legislation.

#### 4. *Agricultural research*

**Reshaping Agricultural Research:** USAID wants to develop a broader and more inclusive vision in applying agricultural research to food security. USAID is going to encourage the development of new "food security crops" that can be grown in chronic food insecure areas—crops such as "super cassava" and drought resistant maize. USAID intends to work with national systems, U.S. centers of excellence, and the International Agricultural Research Centers.

#### 5. *Donor coordination*

**Improved Donor Coordination.** The paper calls for USAID to play a much more active donor coordination role in order to develop an integrated food aid and development strategy to improve food security in the Greater Horn of Africa.

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# PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW FOOD AID POLICY IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA

**Gayle Smith**

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*Ms. Gayle Smith is Advisor to the USAID Chief of Staff*

I have been asked to address the 'practical implications' of the new USAID food aid policy. Having only learned two days ago that I was to make this presentation, I cannot say whether this means that the organizers think I know something about the subject or that they think I am quick enough on my feet to make something up. I will do my best, but would like to add that I think it would be useful if the workshop could also solicit from field staff their views on the practical implications of this policy, as they are well-placed to identify the nuts-and-bolts implications of new directions. For my part, I will try to focus on areas where new ways of thinking will be warranted and/or decisions will need to be made.

First, the global context in which the Greater Horn of Africa exists, and within which this new policy is to be implemented must be taken into account. As we are all aware, the world is seeing the formation of potent regional trading blocs—as evidenced by the EU, NAFTA, etc.—in much of the world but the absence of these in Africa. There are signs that the continent is moving toward forming its own blocs, whether this be through SADCC or COMESA or other mechanisms, but at present the fact remains that the North and the developed South are moving to consolidate their own regional markets, and that these are becoming increasingly closed to Africa, the South's most underdeveloped area. At the same time, while the GATT has been received with enthusiasm in many parts of the world, there are not many who would challenge the argument that it is likely to have less positive—and possibly more negative—impact in Africa than in other parts of the world. As a consequence of these two developments, the terms of trade continue to be generally unfavorable for the GHA region.

Second, there has been a dramatic shift in the allocation of development resources to the region. Over the last decade, there has been a marked increase in the percentage of assistance deployed towards macro-economic goals. Combined with a net decline in ODA resources and a skewed relief-to-development assistance ratio (2:1), this has meant that in many cases the amount of development assistance targeted to production, and particularly to small producers, is falling.

Third, as we have heard from another speaker, production in the region is decreasing. It is important to note, however, that this is not simply because of the absence of an "enabling environment" or because population growth is outstripping economic growth; there are multiple other reasons. Among them are the gradual erosion, over time, of the productive assets of small farmers forced to cope with war or drought, and the failure or inability of governments or donors to replace these. We must also take into account the decline of regional infrastructure, and the paucity, in many parts of the Greater Horn, of local infrastructure. The fact that international aid investments have favored relief over development assistance, and that the primary component of relief assistance is imported food, is also causal. Finally, we must take into account the significant impact of migration in the Greater Horn, which disrupts production, places enormous stress on the natural resource base, dramatically (although sometimes positively) affects labor and trade patterns and, most significantly, removes small producers from their land.

I am not attempting to paint a dismal picture of a region which, to my view, is at its most exciting and potentially robust point in history, but rather to make clear the importance of our acknowledging, from the outset, that the economic environment for Africa is not what it is for Latin America or for the former Soviet Union. I must also point to another reality which will have direct impact upon the new food aid policy, and that is the reality which dictates that this region will likely see an increase in localized—or in some cases regional—crises over the short-term. We are all watching Burundi closely, Somalia is far from over, and Sudan is quickly transforming from a national into a regional crisis. The 'southern tier' of the Greater Horn, meanwhile, is witnessing what may be a sharp decline in collective regional security.

Before proceeding, I hope you will allow me a brief editorial moment. Assessments of this region, including some of those provided here, employ the term "chaos" to describe the instability and turmoil that we have seen in Somalia, Rwanda and other parts of this region. Clearly, these crises are messy and complex; but while they may appear chaotic or senseless to an outsider, we must bear in mind that

what appears chaotic on the surface obscures an underlying political logic. In other words, these crises have political and economic roots, and are not merely the consequence(s) of madness, ignorance or cultural inclinations toward violence. When we acknowledge these political and economic dimensions, however foreign they may be, we stand a greater chance of fashioning political and economic responses that bear relevance.

### **The New Food Aid Policy**

The new food aid policy is divided into several components. I will attempt to look at the implications of those which will apply to all programs.

#### **1. Greater priority in allocating food aid will be given to countries most in need of food.**

That food aid will be provided to a smaller number of countries (as the policy later states) is not necessarily a bad thing. It may mean that USAID will have to apply some kind of triage to determine where food resources can most effectively be deployed. It will further require that the regional perspective which is now gaining currency be deepened; in other words, it will be necessary to determine which interventions represent an investment in economic and political stability, both within and across borders.

This policy shift—coupled with the anticipated overall decline in total food aid resources available to the Agency—may also provoke USAID to make some intelligent decisions regarding when and where food aid—as opposed to some other type of resource—is the most appropriate response to crisis. In consultations conducted in Rwanda and Somalia on the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHA) during the last several months, individuals, NGOs and some donor and government officials expressed the view(s) that there is too much food aid available in those countries, that it is “turning us lazy” and distorting market recovery. As the crisis in Burundi escalates, it is important to consider, well in advance, whether food is likely to be a useful resource, or whether other inputs might prove more valuable.

The example of Sudan poses the question most starkly. Currently, the USG provides a significant amount of food aid to Sudan, not because production is down—in fact, the Sudanese

Government is expected to export one million tons of sorghum this year—but because the Government itself refuses to allow food produced in Sudan to be distributed to Sudanese citizens. While one cannot in good conscience advocate that the people of Sudan be starved in order to punish a Government many of them themselves reject, the Sudanese situation does beg the question: is the continued use of food aid, either by itself or in the absence of an over-arching strategy, creating an enabling environment for war? More practically, this situation should force us to look at what other resources might be deployed in Sudan in order to, for example, increase the ability of food aid-dependent communities to produce for themselves.

#### **2. Food aid will be integrated to a greater extent with other assistance resources (particularly USAID resources).**

Everyone in the room would agree that there is good reason to integrate assistance resources and so maximize impact. However, I think everyone in the room would also likely agree that massive structural impediments stand in the way. Within USAID, as within many bilateral and multilateral agencies, within a number of NGOs, and within many African governments, relief and the provision of food aid are perceived and programmed in almost total isolation from development planning. These divisions are expressed in terms of the fact that there is little joint planning (of food and development programs), that relief and development staff commonly work in separate agencies, departments or ministries, and that there is often tension between the two. These structural impediments will have to be removed if resources are to be effectively integrated.

Similarly, analyses of food security or short-term food emergency needs are rarely, if ever, conducted in conjunction with analysis of macro-economic conditions. Structural adjustment program planning does not often take into account the impact of food aid upon national economic indicators; the relationship between the reforms generally included in SAPs and food aid, or food aid systems, is rarely scrutinized. Integrating assistance resources will therefore mean integrating analysis and considering how that integrated analysis should inform policy.

Ethiopia in 1984-85 and Rwanda today both provide practical examples of one of the problems to be overcome. Massive food aid programs, most of which are initiated during the initial stages of a disaster, necessitate the creation or expansion of infrastructural capacity, for example in the areas of communications, transport and port clearance. In these two countries, massive relief interventions triggered the creation of dedicated relief systems that emerged parallel to existing national systems. In other words, Ethiopia in 1992 had two transport sectors: a 'normal' system that was the primary focus for economy analysis and planning, and a ten-year-old 'temporary' system run primarily by NGOs and aid agencies which functioned largely outside of the 'normal' national economy. Integrating resources means ensuring that dual systems are not created, where possible, and that, where necessary, they are not unduly sustained.

One of the areas in which integration is likely to be most important in this region is that of infrastructure. Of critical importance in the GHA countries suffering from structural food deficits, such as Ethiopia, is the expansion (or creation, in many areas) of rural infrastructure, and particularly roads. Throughout the GHA regional consultations, participants pointed to the need for maintaining and strategically expanding regional infrastructure. While the needs are clear, at least two practical considerations remain. First, though the international community appears to recognize the need for infrastructural development, the trend in recent years has been against development investment in this sector. Second, food-for-work programs have gained new currency in the region, and are viewed in many circles as viable means of expanding rural infrastructure; however, it is important that these programs, while important, not be viewed through a formulaic lens, and that food-for-work, overall, not be seen as a panacea or as a substitute for additional investment in this sector.

Finally, integrating food aid resources with other assistance implies integrating food aid resources into an economic context. I am not, as yet, convinced that we know enough to do this effectively; while the information may be out there, the extent to which it informs our thinking remains to be seen. For example, how much do we know about how local household economies, as opposed to national economies, function? While we emphasize the importance of the private sector, how much do we know about the rural and

peri-urban private sectors, such as the "horse-cart private sector" that operate at the village level, and into which food aid is often inserted? How well do we understand -or to what extent do we take into account--the impact of food aid resources on pastoralists, as opposed to settled farmers?

Integration will require understanding these issues and more, and learning about them not only from studies but from consultation with local communities. At the same time, it will require taking a strategic look at how--and in some cases, if--food aid resources can support market formation or market integration. At the local level, this might mean careful or 'tactical' distribution of food aid resources, or the use of auctions or other market-stimulation practices; it may mean, however, avoiding the use of external food aid and instead deploying cash resources toward internal purchase. Similarly, at the regional level it will require both looking at the impact--both positive and negative--of food aid resources on local markets and upon regional trade.

***3. Greater attention and resources will be allocated to strengthening the program development and management capacity of USAID's food aid partners.***

Building local capacity is obviously important. However, there are a number of practical implications of this policy shift which bear consideration. First, it is important to take into account that the increased allocation of food aid to the Greater Horn region over the last ten years has, among other things, led to the creation of a cadre of food aid contractors, or NGOs whose primary institutional function has become the acquisition and delivery of U.S. or other donor food aid. Coupled with the dramatic expansion of the role of international NGOs in the region, this has had significant impact upon national economies and on local politics. As pointed out earlier, many of these agents are not integrated into national economic plans; many remain highly operational, and are themselves considered by some critics to be preventing the development of capacity at the local level.

Throughout this region, debate on the roles and responsibilities of African governments, as opposed to international (and in some cases local) NGOs is gaining ground. Governments are questioning the degree to which the NGO

community is encroaching upon national territory, and further questioning the sustainability of NGO involvement in the provision of welfare safety nets; many NGOs are themselves questioning in the appropriateness of their involvement in what some consider to be the intimate realm of governments, or local institutions.

It is important, therefore, to take a hard look at who these partners are, at the strengths and weaknesses of both the international and indigenous NGO sectors, and to take into account the need for an appropriate and mutually-acceptable division of labor between governmental and non-governmental actors.

It is further important to take into account the importance of consistency in approach, and to acknowledge the growing absence of this consistency. It has been my experience that in many countries of the GHA, there exist multiple approaches towards determining the need for, use of, and evaluation of food aid resources; governments may have one view, each donor another, and each NGO yet another. These differences can be as simple as NGOs using different-sized food rations, and as significant, in impact, as therefore causing tension between different beneficiary populations. Just as USAID's resources need to be integrated, so does the overall package of resources deployed to a country. Clearly, NGOs and other partners should and must play a role in this; in most cases, so should governments.

There exist at least two more practical implications of increasing our emphasis on "capacity building." First, donors need to decide how they see their NGO "partners." The term partner is commonly used, but so is "implementing agency." "Donors" are "donors" but NGOs are not. In fact, many NGOs are donors themselves, and many have functions that extend beyond serving as implementing agents for bilateral donors. If they are to be seen as implementing agents, or in a subsidiary role, then little needs to change. If, however, NGOs or local government agencies are to be viewed as "partners," then this means that they must be treated as such—this means consulting with them before policies are made, and moving beyond simple information-sharing and toward more strategic coordination.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we must determine what we mean by "capacity-building."

All too often it means helping local NGOs to look and act as we do, or empowering NGOs to meet our administrative and financial requirements. Capacity-building may necessarily entail enhancing an NGO's ability to engage with donors, but it should also imply increasing the ability of an NGO to meet *its* goals on the ground.

#### **4. USAID will seek to identify greater budgetary flexibility to respond to emergencies.**

I can say little on this point except to stress the importance of delivering commodities that are appropriate to local market conditions and cultural preferences. In other words, this new approach should allow USAID greater flexibility with regard to the provision of types of food aid that are likely to be well received. It would be simple enough to identify food resource preferences for chronic deficit countries, and to attempt to match available commodities with these preferences.

Second, greater budgetary flexibility will also need to reflect the current impediments to coordination at the field level. Each donor, UN operational agency, NGO and government operates on the basis of a different fiscal year, call-forward system, delivery system and reporting and evaluation methodology. At the very least, and if USAID truly wishes to maximize donor resources by streamlining coordination, these realities need to be taken into account.

#### **5. Greater priority will be given to the relief to development continuum.**

The "relief to development continuum" is fast becoming a mantra in this region. While it is, in principle, important, we must first ensure that we are all employing the same definition, and then shift our discussion from theory to practice. (We must also bear in mind that what we are talking about is not, actually, a continuum, but the simultaneity of approaches).

In my view, giving priority to the relief to development continuum means adopting a developmental mindset from the moment an emergency response is fashioned; in other words, evaluating, *before* 100,000 metric tons are rushed to the scene, what impact that food will have on markets and local production, the degree to which that food can be utilized for productive purposes, and the possibility that other resources (i.e.,

agricultural or other inputs) might also be required.

Prioritizing the continuum then also means shifting our timeframe from a six-month maximum to one of five or ten years. It means looking at Rwandan refugees in Tanzania not as an emergency caseload but, given political realities, potential long-term visitors in Tanzania. It means considering, before launching an operation into Somalia, what the anticipated one-, two-, five- and ten-year consequences will be, and therefore how the operation should be conducted.

#### **Some views from the region.**

Finally, I would like to point to several additional items which should be taken into account, many of which were raised during the regional consultations on the GHAI:

- Many suggest that USAID, and other donors, give insufficient attention to the issue of migration in this region, and add that we need to look more seriously at the effects and effectiveness of assistance to refugees and returnees;
- A large number of people consulted between December and February made a strong call for us to harmonize our policies and procedures. At the policy level, they pointed to real and potential contradictions between, for example, food aid and structural adjustment policies. At the procedural level, they pointed to the fact that every donor, and NGO, has a different system for reporting on the use of, for example, food aid resources, and the standardization of these would allow local governments and NGOs to deploy scarce human resources towards tasks other than "donor management";
- In both Ethiopia and Eritrea, governments are making a dramatic shift away from the distribution of free food aid and towards the utilization of food as a tool for development. People who are able to work are expected to work for their food, and only those who are truly dependent receive free food aid. Surely this attempt to move away from food aid dependency should inform our decisions;
- In many parts of the region, people have stressed the importance of evaluating the entire food aid system, and not simply monitoring the end-use of food aid resources. In other words, people are calling for an evaluation of food aid resources and programs from the point at which resources are shipped to the point at which they are finally utilized. This sort of evaluation, they point out, might help to reduce the number of gaps that often occur just prior to annual rainy seasons, prevent port congestion, allow for more qualitative, as opposed to simply quantitative, observations, and also allow donors and implementing agencies to consider their roles on a much more equal footing;
- Finally, I cannot overstate the importance of consultation to making the new food aid policy work effectively. Very often, we think we know what we are doing, and we assume—often with the best of intentions—how people think and how they will act. In almost 20 years in this region I have been constantly reminded of how little I know, and of how much the people of this region do know. Only when we recognize the depth of their knowledge and understand that though consultation "takes too much time" it is vital to success will this policy bear fruit.

Thank you.

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# SOME COMMENTS ON PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW FOOD AID POLICY

**Simon Maxwell**

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*Dr. Simon Maxwell is from the Institute for Development Studies*

There is a renewed interest in global food supplies, food security and the role of food aid. Of course, this interest is partly institutional, propelled by the upcoming World Food Summit next year. But the discussion is also driven by panics over emergencies that seem to be growing so fast, as John Grant pointed out. That's why linking relief to development is on top of the agenda. There is also a near-Malthusian fear, which is concerned with the world's declining per-capita food production and declining growth rates of cereal yields. There are increasing environmental and distributional questions regarding capital and input intensive agricultural growth. There are widespread misgivings and uncertainties about the impact of the GATT.

## **Agricultural growth strategies and food aid requirements in Ethiopia**

The international debate that is taking place is mirrored in Ethiopia and, you will forgive me, if I talk about Ethiopia in this presentation, but I've been eating, sleeping, and dreaming Ethiopia for the past five years. So, I would like to address some critical issues in the debate about future agricultural policy, food security and food aid choices, taking Ethiopia as a case in point.

### **1. Consensus on agricultural sector development in Ethiopia**

There is a broad consensus among agricultural policy analysts and policy makers on several points regarding future agricultural policies and strategies in Ethiopia:

- Agriculture must be the motor of the Ethiopian economy, to provide jobs, raw materials, foreign exchange, demand for industrial products and an investible surplus.
- Past performance has been poor, mainly because of policy failure, the costs of war and the effect of drought. Both the national food deficit and the number of people exposed to

food insecurity or famine seem to be increasing.

- Liberalization is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for agricultural growth. Public sector investment will be necessary for growth to be achieved. External support will be justified.
- Food aid is a necessary short-term measure, but should be reduced in the longer term.
- Informed policy choices depend on better information and analysis.

### **2. Disagreements on specific agricultural policy choices**

From here on, the arguments begin to diverge, mainly around the following issues:

- Food or cash crops?
- Investment in high or low potential areas?
- Faster growth of food production, or slower growth with more stability?
- Investment in physical infrastructure or in delivery of public services?

These alternatives are not always mutually exclusive. For example, food crops can be cash crops. Nevertheless, real choices in allocating resources will have to be made. Decisions on agricultural strategies have to be taken in the context of overall economic policy based on liberalization. They also need to take into account both the highly heterogeneous and location-specific characteristics of agriculture in Ethiopia, and the political context of regionalization.

### 3. *Linking relief and development.*

I think, in principle, linking relief and development is easy. It's, first, about development that makes shocks less likely; it is, second, about relief that makes development more sustainable, and it is, third, about effective rehabilitation.

#### **Agricultural policy options and related food aid needs**

What, then, are the agricultural policy options available? How far will they achieve the various objectives set out above? And what will be their effect on food aid requirements? I see three main options:

#### 1. *Maximize growth and pursue comparative advantages*

This will almost certainly mean concentration of investment in traditional high potential areas to the south and west of Addis Ababa. The output mix will include food and non-food crops, with a bias to crops with a high return to land as the scarce resource (*teff*, coffee, vegetables, cotton). The national food balance sheet will probably continue to show a deficit, though net foreign exchange earnings should increase sufficiently to allow commercial imports, especially in non-drought years. Growth in high potential areas will create new jobs and attract labor from low potential areas. However, migration will not be sufficient to eliminate vulnerability in low potential areas, given current population densities in high potential areas and socio-cultural barriers to inter-regional migration. Thus relief will still be needed, financed partly by food imports and partly by local purchase: the costs will have to be shared between the government and donors, with the balance depending partly on the effectiveness of taxation in surplus areas.

For those who are worried about Ethiopia's capacity to import food, it may be instructive to know that Ethiopia is presently suffering from a foreign exchange glut because of the coffee boom and the increase in foreign aid since 1991. The Ethiopian Central Bank is actually withholding money from foreign exchange auctions in order to keep the currency from appreciating. So when we look at food needs we should also look into the capacity to import food commercially.

### 2. *A strategy of national food self-sufficiency*

This will again mean a concentration of resources in high potential areas, with investment in irrigation to reduce variability. It is not quite clear what incentives could be introduced to bias the output mix to food in a free market economy, but research might be able to increase the relative profitability of food crops. Until full food self-sufficiency is achieved, efficiency prices will continue to be at import parity level. Foreign exchange earnings will be lower, not least because of the foreign exchange cost of fertilizer and other inputs needed to grow and transport food. At the same time, employment is likely to be lower because food crops (with the exception of *teff*) are generally less labor intensive than cash crops. Thus, poverty and vulnerability will be higher than in the growth-oriented strategy. Income transfers will be needed and are more likely to require food aid.

#### 3. *A direct attack on poverty and vulnerability ('food security first')*

This strategy will bias public investment to low potential areas, with, by definition, a lower rate of return than investment in high potential areas, though it is possible to find acceptable investments even in low potential areas. National economic growth, however, will most likely be slower and foreign exchange earnings lower than in either of the other models. There will be fewer employment opportunities outside low potential areas. On the other hand, relief needs, including food aid, should fall; and there should be substantial environmental benefits. Imports to supply market demand may continue to rise.

#### **Making choices on policy priorities**

#### 1. *The trade-offs*

The impact of the various strategies is summarized in the table below. The entries are all somewhat speculative and certainly require further discussion and analysis. However, the table shows that the choice of strategy depends on the combination of objectives chosen. If the main objectives are to achieve growth or to boost commercial import capacity, then a 'growth first' strategy is likely to be preferred. The impact on poverty reduction and on food aid needs depends very heavily on the government's capacity to transfer resources through taxation from rich areas to poor

areas, both in normal years and in years of harvest failure.

If, on the other hand, the main objective is primarily to reduce poverty or to reduce the need for food aid, then a strategy directed at food insecure areas is likely to have the greatest impact on poverty reduction and food aid needs, at least for emergency purposes. If enough good development ideas can be found in resource-poor areas, then the food insecurity first strategy may even deliver acceptable growth. This strategy would be less attractive if rapid growth in high potential areas could motivate enough genuine migration to reduce needs in low potential areas - but as argued above, this is unlikely.

Third, a 'food first' strategy for Ethiopia, even given the potential for migration from low-potential areas, may leave about as many people as there are now extremely vulnerable to famine.

## 2. Combining different strategies - a two-legged approach

In practice, it will probably not be possible, mainly for political reasons, to follow any one strategy exclusively. Thus, a strategy of 'walking on two legs' seems to be called for, with investment both in high potential and low potential areas. However, given the capacity of richer areas to raise private resources for investment, it is arguable that the priority should be to focus first on low potential areas. But this argument needs further elaboration. There are many unanswered questions of detail, for example of the 'roads or fertilizer' kind. These questions cannot be answered at macro level and require a better, local understanding of farming systems and rural economies. A literature search and consultation exercise would undoubtedly uncover hitherto untapped expertise.

## 3. Taking tough choices

We can easily collect samples of activities that governments and private development organizations have done and should do—employment creation, safety nets, micro-irrigation, soil conservation, reforestation and so on. That's the easy bit. The difficult bit is to say, "Well, what do we say about how effective the choices that we have to make are? What kind of decision-making processes should we follow?" As an economist I would first ask about the cost and benefits of different options. For instance, employment and safety nets are much more expensive than pure relief. Is that money well spent, or should we have spend it in some other way? Investing in low-potential areas has an opportunity cost, which is to invest in high-potential areas, so is it worth it? It is absolutely essential to sketch out what the costs and benefits of a strategy are.

The important thing in this discussion is to get away from listing good ideas, and to rather move toward looking at the analytical issues which underline some of these good ideas and to making the hard choices. Also, political scientists talk a lot about the institutional issues and about who's interests are followed. How do we structure public programs in order to deliver these kinds of activities? For instance, I am not sure about the appropriate relationship and distribution of responsibilities between the state and civil society, particularly the NGOs. Most of you who work in Ethiopia will know what a tense relationship there currently is.

It is a great mistake to think that nothing is known about these issues. There is already a tremendous amount of experimentation by governments and NGOs. So learning by doing, seems to me what we should be doing. We are doing quite a bit of doing, I am not sure we're doing quite enough learning

Strategy	Impact on				
	Growth	Poverty reduction	Food Import reduction	Commercial Import capacity	Reduction in food aid need
Growth first	High	Medium	Medium	High	Medium
Food first	Medium	Low	High	Medium	Low
Food Insecurity first	Low	High	Low	Low	High

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# PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW FOOD AID POLICY

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## DISCUSSION

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### Implications of the new policy for WFP

**Larry Meserve:** To what extent do the new criteria of the Food Aid/Food Security Policy Paper apply for allocating resources to regular WFP programs?

**Bob Kramer:** WFP is held to the same kind of standards and policies that the US Government is imposing on the other food aid programs. We also tried to enlist other donors to establish the new criteria for approval of WFP programs. For the first time, we rejected WFP project proposals.

**Michael Sackett:** The sentence which hit me between the eyes when I read the Food Aid/Food Security Policy Paper was on page 21: "Direct contributions to WFP for management have so far been minimal." There obviously is a message there and I wonder if Bob Kramer would like to expand on this?

**Bob Kramer:** The U.S. Government has always provided mainly commodities to WFP, and expected other donors to come up with the dollar resources to manage the commodities. In fact, for a long time, the WFP prided itself that its overhead was very small. We think that may have been penny wise and pound foolish. In our discussions and our negotiations on the farm bill of 1996 we tried to assign a fairly significant amount of money for the management of WFP. We are also trying to come up with ways of supporting country offices.

### Investments in low- or high-potential areas and the scope for agricultural growth

**Paul Webber:** Simon Maxwell promoted a two-legged policy, with one side longer than the other. He was saying that we should primarily invest in low-potential areas with a secondary leg in high-potential

areas. Has he any ideas for practical approaches and investments in those areas?

**Simon Maxwell:** The low-potential/high-potential area concept is really at the heart of many rural development debates in Ethiopia. The World Bank has always maintained to encourage people to move out of low-potential areas, but where should they go?

**Man-made low potentiality.** When we examine more specifically, what is "low-potential", it turns out that a lot of low-potentiality is related to neglected infrastructure, roads, institutions, or other investment gaps in the past. For some, although not all regions low-potentiality is man-made rather than natural.

**Slumbering potentials.** Secondly, there may be quite a lot of high-potential investments hidden in low-potential areas. Often the solution is about diversification into non-agricultural production. Sometimes it is about intensification of agriculture, in a smarter way than it has been done in the past. Look at the earth dams in Tigre that have been built with food-for-work in the last decade and a half. You almost never see any irrigation in the catchment area below the dams. What you see is a pond from which a few cattle are drinking, with a lot of water wasted through seepage and evaporation. They are just not being used for the kind of job-creating, livelihood-creating agricultural activities.

**Margaret Bonner:** Simon Maxwell may be surprised, but USAID Ethiopia in fact does have a long leg and a short leg in place, even though he may think we only have the short leg. A lot of our resources are presently going to Title II food aid programs in low potential areas, with a smaller portion going to increase agricultural productivity in high-potential areas.

**Marty Hanratty:** I just finished writing up a component of the Ethiopia USAID Mission's food security strategy which focuses on high-potential areas. We also have \$25 million of our annual

agricultural related budget of \$35 million committed to food insecure, low-potential areas. In focusing our strategy on high-potential areas, my basic contention was that Ethiopia has to follow "high growth strategies". Most importantly, we have to tie food security very carefully to economic growth. If we can't make that connection with national political leaders who are absolutely committed to economic growth, market liberalization, and food security, then we risk focusing only on a very small subset of a large and integrated problem.

**Timothy Frankenberg:** The highest levels of food insecurity often exist in low-potential areas. But in those areas increases in agricultural productivity are often extremely difficult to achieve, particularly where soils and other resources are significantly degraded. Yet, one of the major strategies for addressing food insecurity, advocated by the new Food Aid/Food Security Policy Paper, is to increase agricultural productivity of food insecure populations. Essentially, it may make more sense to invest in alternative income generating activities in those low-potential areas rather than to invest in agricultural productivity growth.

Where agricultural productivity increases are difficult to achieve, lots of vulnerable people may be falling through the cracks with regards to better food access since the focus of the new food aid policy is limited to one type of intervention, that is agriculture. We should rather make sure that we have good criteria for identifying the food insecure and their constraints, and then let problems drive solutions, rather than limiting the solutions to drive our activities.

**Bob Kramer: Agricultural and other investments.**

Those of us who have been involved in formulating the Policy Paper never intended Title II to be exclusively used for programs that promote agriculture. There's a lot of flexibility in the Food Aid/Food Security Policy Paper although priorities are finally well established. We are trying to see which kinds of program interventions can use food aid most efficiently and effectively. Income generating programs may be very critical for addressing food security objectives, but food aid may not be the most efficient resource for income generating programs. In some cases food aid in conjunction with other resources might be employed; we are not going to dismiss income generating activities at all.

**Country food security assessments.** We all agree that in order to most effectively program food

and non-food aid, you have to do a country assessment of food insecurity and its major sources, including regional and household level food security assessments. These food security assessments are critical to better identify the vulnerable population and to increase the efficiency of food aid interventions. Where are we with these assessments in the Greater Horn? Have we got the necessary food security profiles in terms of assessing both the macro level policy problems that are causing food insecurity and the vulnerable areas and populations? Right now we have the situation in many countries where NGOs make their own individual food security/insecurity assessments, each based on its own methodology, we have FAO and WFP doing certain kinds of assessment, we have Missions doing assessments. Should we not, as one of the recommendations of this workshop, try to come up with a more integrated approach for these food security assessments?

**John Grant:** Most importantly, food aid programs should be well integrated into overall Mission programs. This doesn't mean that Mission programs should quit working in high production areas; but they may decide to address food security specifically with food aid, by targeting vulnerable populations both in low- and high-potential areas.

#### **Emergency expertise in policy paper development**

**Joe Gettler:** To what extent did people who are knowledgeable about emergency assistance participate in developing the Food Aid/Food Security Policy Paper?

**Bob Kramer:** I think, the point is very well taken that there were few people involved in preparing this paper who were very familiar with emergencies; that was an oversight. I think, there is indeed a weakness in the food aid/food security policy, as it does not address how to make emergency programs far more efficient. On the other hand, the main reason for the new policy was to recognize the finite food aid resources, and to primarily focus on improving the qualities of those development programs as resources for development programs are being squeezed.

## Country priorities

**Joe Gettler:** I think the new policy should better improve the stack of decks in favor of countries where strategic national interests may, in the short-run, be small or non-existent. Ethiopia in the mid-eighties got a lot of food aid from non-US sources, and I think, a lot of Ethiopians around today are alive because of food aid. At the same time, USAID's marvelous priority countries were Zaire, Liberia, Somalia and Sudan.

**Bob Kramer:** I fully agree. There are voices in Congress who say that they are very happy with the idea of USAID being eliminated so that the countries receiving foreign aid will follow foreign policy dictates more preferably. I think the US did that in the 1970s and 1980s, precisely in Liberia, Somalia, Sudan and Zaire. That's where following foreign policy dictates led us.

## Tanzanian and Ugandan beans - the nitty-gritty, day-to-day problems

**Mark Wentling:** Tanzania is different from the countries you've been talking about so far. At the moment, Tanzania has a food surplus, and there is little food aid. But this year we asked for 15,000 tons of food aid for refugees from Rwanda and Burundi. The question I have is a very practical one. The major staple of refugees is beans, not the yellow maize that the US keeps sending them. The big job we are facing this week is that food aid beans have run out. Where do we get more beans? Well, the beans are right through the door step. Stimulated by good rains and local purchases by NGOs and other donors last year there are a lot of beans on Tanzanian markets. In fact, bean prices are at a historic low right now. But where do we get the money to buy the beans? What does the new policy say about that?

**Donald Clark:** Uganda has similar circumstances as Tanzania. Uganda is normally a food surplus producer, however, we do have some food aid programs and we are very disappointed to hear that there may be no more Title III programs. We have been particularly keen on monetized food aid programs, both from Title II and Title III, which brought us a number of benefits. As in Tanzania, it should be possible in Uganda to bring in food aid commodities,

sell them, and use the proceeds to buy beans. I don't think food aid managers at AID in the past have been particularly supportive of this kind of creative thinking.

**Bob Kramer:** Actually, the new policy doesn't talk very much about the different kind of relief that you mention, to give more flexibility for field managers. But its main intent is, indeed, to come up with new approaches for exactly those situations that you mentioned, turning maize into beans. Unfortunately we are not really used to this kind of thinking about how to respond best. This has to change. Let me assure you that we have made every effort in Washington to become far more receptive for well argued specific suggestions.

## Targeting the most needy

**Keith Crawford:** When we, in the Africa Bureau, first read the Food Aid/Food Security Policy Paper, we were really happy, because we felt that directing food aid to countries that are most in need will mean that the Africa region will get more food aid. But soon colleagues working in other regions, such as Asia, started pointing out that this kind of policy does not square with meeting overall food security objectives. There are hungry people in many countries where we're phasing out US support, and many of these people may be in fact the most food needy.

**Bob Kramer:** Obviously, priorities need to be established. But you are right. People are hungry in lots of countries. And it is very difficult to sustain very large AID programs in only a few key countries. We have to address the absorptive capacity of the PVOs.

## Emergency monetization

**Joe Gettler:** I just came back from a country where a very innovative NGO, Save the Children, wants to monetize 25,000 tons of wheat and take the hard currency to put it into resettling 60,000 people, by clearing mines, building health stations, and supporting other sustainable development activities. It is estimated that the \$5 million this will take would be what it costs to feed those 60,000 people for a year. So, you get them off the dole, you resettle them, and you enhance agricultural production and food security.

I hope that the new Food Aid/Food Security Policy does not propose to restrict monetization to such mundane approaches as complementary support of distribution or feeding programs, but that emergency monetization can indeed be used for sustainable solutions as the one proposed by SCF.

**Bob Kramer:** The Policy is not restrictive, but 100% monetized programs are not of high priority.

### **The new food aid/food security policy and Mission strategies**

**Lawrence Haddad:** How does the new food aid/food security policy fit into overall Mission strategies? What reactions have you, at Food for Peace, received from the Mission directors on the subject?

**Bob Kramer:** Let me just mention one example. India receives approximately \$100 million of Title II funds a year; DA programs account for about \$20 million. Recently, the USAID Mission submitted a 100-page document that mentioned Title II only by putting it under the broader strategic objective of fertility reduction. That created a tremendously negative precedent. If the India Mission, with the largest Title II program in the world, thoroughly marginalizes food aid, it does not bear well for the rest of the portfolio.

USAID has defined its core objectives or pillars as i) economic growth, ii) population, iii) democracy and iv) environment. It came out with a fifth pillar, that is humanitarian assistance, which has been thoroughly ignored by the agency. As a result, Mission directors may be getting a very strong sense from Washington, that despite the amount of food aid they get for food security purposes, they don't have to integrate it into their program or strategy priorities.

**Margaret Bonner:** Lawrence Haddad is right. As a Mission, you can't look at issues in isolation, but you have to look at how the new food aid policy matches with everything else, with all the other Agency policies and 'non-policies'. Part of the difficulty in pulling together a food security strategy is that you don't have many resources out there. You are kind of trying to nail holes in the resources that are there. One of the major difficulties is trying to put together programs where there are so many unknowns. Knowing we had very few DA resources that we could put toward food security and agriculture in low potential areas, we tried to use Title III in support of that whole process, but we are now in a situation where we don't know whether that resource will continue to exist or not in the future. It is extremely difficult to meld all those different resources and policies together to come up with a coherent long-term food security strategy unless there is some certainty about what resources will be available in the future.

**PART II**

**ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS IN MOVING  
FROM RELIEF TO DEVELOPMENT**

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# USAID FOOD AID POLICY: ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA

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## Michael Harvey

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Mr. Harvey is with the United States Agency for International Development, Ethiopia Mission

I was flattered to be asked to give this speech, but then that was matched by a flush of perhaps uncharacteristic modesty. So I called on old friends who presently work in southern Sudan and Somalia to help me prepare these remarks so that they don't simply reflect my own perspective. I appreciate the input I received from Larry Meserve, Joe Gettier, and Ron Ullrich, although Ron will quickly tell you that his contribution was actually prepared by Jan Coffy, one of the most committed and smartest colleagues in the business.

### Three success stories from Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia

I will draw on experiences we have had in working along the relief-to development continuum here in East Africa, in three very different case studies, each of which offers examples of where we, as an Agency, have done things right: Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia. I also want to point out, that in those three countries USAID has called on its three main resource spigots, PL480, DFA, and OFDA disaster assistance funds, in very different ways.

### Ethiopia: Walking on two legs

In Ethiopia, USAID already follows Simon Maxwell's advice from yesterday's session. We do have a two-legged approach, one focusing on high potential areas and increased agricultural supply, the other on low potential areas and food access issues. If I can stretch the analogy a little, however, I would like to point out that we don't have a man walking on two legs, as Simon pictures it, but rather two collegial amputees who are working very closely together. I say this because the DFA funded program, as designed, will be concentrating on the high potential areas, supported in an integral manner by Title III resources, but with little or no involvement of Title II resources or NGOs. Low potential areas, where issues of food access are a key concern, will be the focus of NGO efforts supported by Title II resources, again with little if any involvement on the part of the DFA or Title III resources.

Given the urgency of the situation in Ethiopia, and the scope of the problems we face, such a division of labor is entirely appropriate and necessary. Over the longer term, there will be more direct relationships between the two, particularly as the results of an interregional market study by Michigan State University (MSU) gradually come on line. We hope that NGOs and the government will better understand how markets function, how prices move, and what consumption patterns exist. Once we gain a better understanding in these areas, I expect NGOs will be able to better program and target food aid going into vulnerable areas.

### *Too much food?*

This new information resource will greatly help address an issue of personal concern, that we are sending too much food into this region. Often this is to compensate for a lack of political vision or strategy, as in Sudan, or for a lack of knowledge of alternatives, as in Somalia, at least in the initial phase of the conflict. At the same time targeting requires support from local governmental authorities, which I think we now have in Ethiopia.

We have been very fortunate in Ethiopia that the NGO programs have established a strong presence on the ground through their regular Title II activities. This has allowed them to move away from the relief end of the continuum and into development. This transition has been made possible in large part by significant monetization.

### *Pre-positioning food aid stocks*

On the relief side, I must add that we have learned to deal with the scale of the challenge in Ethiopia by working much smarter. A key example of this has been to pre-position food aid stocks when our early warning systems tell us we have a problem. This is made possible because our FFP colleagues listen to and trust the FEWS and Mission staff in the field when they say food is needed. This has enabled USAID to get its food in early, always the first to do

so, and the presence of those food stocks in-country has meant the difference between success and failure in the past years. We have appreciated this support.

#### **Sudan: *Portable development* in a long-term crisis**

Sudan has a very different situation which has remained almost unchanged within the last six years. When I was reading current materials on Sudan, this was *deja-vu* all over again; because the list of things that Larry Meserve is doing right now in southern Sudan is exactly the list that was put together six years ago. I would like to think that shows the wisdom of what we were doing six years ago.

When the U.S. first started working seriously in southern Sudan in 1988, we were all serving in an initial relief effort, trucking food into some of the areas of the SPLA (Southern Sudan People's Liberation Army). But we quickly tried to complement those food aid resources with development efforts aimed at strengthening local capacities for self-sustenance: things like training and provisioning health workers, some of whom were brought out of the relief camps in Ethiopia and re-established in their communities in southern Sudan; providing seeds and tools; inoculation of animals given to pastoral communities in partnership with ICRC; provision of fishing nets; upgrading roads to increase access for both trade and also for food relief. This package of interventions has been retained and expanded and the reasons for this approach have been reaffirmed in the recent strategy which Larry Meserve's office in Nairobi has put together for southern Sudan in the coming years.

As the war in southern Sudan has ebbed and flowed, much of what we have accomplished has been set back primarily by the fighting within the SPLA camps in the north. But part of our strategy was intended to provide portable development, by this we mean things which can move when war forces people to move, such as inoculated cattle, inoculated children, fishing nets. Obviously, seeds and tools are a little more stationary, and I think, it's interesting that most of the refugees that we now have from Sudan are not from local populations, but from the settled agriculturalist populations in Equatoria. We in Ethiopia are receiving almost no refugees anymore, when in the past our refugees were primarily from the pastoralist areas. It is possible, though it can't be proved, that this is due to our efforts to provide portable development. I think it's an interesting success and I would like to ask some of our research friends to see if they can document that.

#### **Somalia: A positive example for the Horn?**

Somalia is a fascinating case. I would like to think that it is probably the most instructive case for the purposes of this discussion, because it offers a model which follows exactly some of the basic rationales of the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative and the new Food Aid/Food Security Policy. The USAID Mission in Somalia articulated two major goals for the program: 1) to increase crop production in targeted areas, and 2) to stabilize the health status in targeted areas. These are not relief objectives, these are development objectives, and they have very clear performance indicators, such as the area of land under cultivation and the nutritional status of children under five. Again, those are development indicators, not relief indicators.

Current activities in the first category include clearance of irrigation canals, water system rehabilitation, seeds and tools, and extension services, and others such as market activities and market surveys. Activities in the second category include, rehabilitation of health facilities, training of health care workers, support of hospitals, provision of inputs and nutritional surveillance.

On the food side, which remains a significant part of the program, we have seen UN/NGO programs shifting from direct and general food distributions to targeted distributions and supplementary feeding programs, mostly involving food-for-work, complemented by some MCH. The NGO programs have shifted from provision of seeds and tools to agricultural extension, and increasingly to structural development.

Several large-scale emergency seeds and tools distribution projects funded by AID in the early years have evolved into agricultural rehabilitation programs, in extension projects which are now receiving DFA funds under a CARE umbrella grant which funds a whole slew of NGOs working in the country, including indigenous NGOs.

#### ***Graduating into development activities***

Since 1993 when DFA funds first became available in Somalia, it has been possible to reduce contributions of emergency projects quite dramatically. They've gone from \$49 million in 1993, to \$12 million in 1994, to \$6 million in 1995 and this has been matched by a corresponding increase of DFA funds. The PVO umbrella grant was signed originally for \$14 million for four years with CARE. Through the

umbrella mechanism, NGOs who had been receiving AID for emergency activities have graduated into development activities. Now, perhaps this co-financing of WFP's countrywide program using OFDA, DFA, PL480 resources provides another example of USAID's commitment to the continuum principle.

#### *Pulling together emergency and DFA funds*

In mid-'94, USAID-Somalia decided to put the continuum principle to the test by encouraging WFP to submit a single project proposal which clearly distinguishes between those activities which are considered to be relief in nature and those which focus on development. The proposal was ultimately approved in two separate grants, one for \$1.3 million of emergency funds, and one for \$2 million of DFA funds. The same approach was then applied when UNICEF, came forward with two elements, emergency intervention and a more traditional use for a development program. Recognizing the simultaneous need for both types of activities, USAID-Somalia worked closely with UNICEF to put the projects together. USAID ultimately was able to leverage \$1.3 million out of OFDA funds and another \$2 million in DFA funds.

#### *Integration through monetization*

A third example of integration of resources to move along the continuum was a monetization project, co-financed by CARE and WFP. Since the inception of the monetization project in 1982, CARE has received \$3 million for operational and administrative support, while Food for Peace committed 15,000 metric tons of food commodities which were ultimately used to generate \$4.9 million. These have been used for rehabilitation activities in the agricultural sector, involving canal rehabilitation, water resource development and other community infrastructure development.

#### **Conclusion**

Having been working in this business for a while, I think the Somalia case offers probably the most intriguing example of how we can do things differently if we set our minds to it, although my hunch is that Somalia will always be cited as the exception. I strongly doubt that we will ever accept the Somalia example as a model for how we do business, even though from my humble perspective it sounds like it ideally matches the vision that Ted Morse, Gayle Smith and others have set out for the Greater Horn.

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# PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE RELIEF-TO-DEVELOPMENT CONCEPT - CRS EXPERIENCE IN THE GREATER HORN

**Barbara Huddleston**

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*Ms. Huddleston is with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations*

The discussion of the practical implications of the Relief-to-Development Continuum can be broken down into three sub-topics, that is (i) defining the term, (ii) discussing ways of assessing needs, and (iii) discussing how to match interventions to needs and possibilities. (The following presentation is based on a recent CRS survey on food aid and food security in East Africa.)

## **A continuum of interventions**

In defining the Relief-to-Development Continuum, it is useful to see it as a continuum of interventions. The ultimate aim is to ensure long-term development with drought mitigation and emergency preparedness. This includes water management, soil conservation, participatory public works, extension, and early warning/relief networks. The interventions are classified below, going from the shortest to the longest-term interventions.

### *Emergency response*

First, there is the category of emergency response, which usually involves providing food, water, shelter and medicines. It is important to try to include development components in this phase, such as seeds.

### *Rehabilitation*

The next stage is rehabilitation with development and emergency preparedness components, where rehabilitation requires providing seeds, tools and other inputs, the provision of local storage facilities, training and so forth.

### *Reconstruction*

The next set of interventions can be classified under the general heading of reconstruction with development and emergency preparedness components. Reconstruction with development components includes in particular the provision of

basic services, political and social institutions and the creation of personal security.

### *Long-term relief*

The fourth intervention is that of long-term relief with development and emergency response components. This might include mobile development actions, mobile reserves of food to cope with fluctuating quantities of food aid, and the development of monitoring systems.

### *Long-term investments to combat malnutrition*

Next in line is the task of providing long-term services to combat malnutrition through preventative or curative services. The aim here is not to deal with an existing situation but to prevent a situation of malnutrition from developing.

### *Long-term investments in agriculture and nutrition*

Finally, a last set of interventions can be classified as long-term development. They involve building up infrastructure for agriculture and health, nutrition, water and sanitation services. In addition, agricultural services and inputs may need to be provided.

### *The dimensions of time and space*

The Relief-to-Development Continuum may be perceived through time in one location, where interventions may move back and forth along the continuum, according to the position of the location on the emergency-relief-rehabilitation-development cycle. It may also be perceived through space, according to the nature of each intervention and its place on the continuum. Unfortunately, in the Greater Horn of Africa, the continuum has been of a cyclical nature. To break this cycle a new approach to relief and rehabilitation strategies is needed. Instead of trying to return affected populations to previous status and traditional coping strategies as soon as possible after an emergency, innovations and new ways of doing things should be introduced as part of the

rehabilitation phase, such as improved seeds or other technologies.

### **Assessing needs by location and vulnerable groups**

The second topic is that of understanding and assessing needs. Needs may be assessed by location, that is, by country, by district, by agro-ecological or food-economy zone, or by type of vulnerable group, that is, groups with different socio-economic and/or ethnic characteristics, each affected by food insecurity in a particular way. Location-based assessment is useful for program management, but may produce a mixed bag of needs. Group-based assessment is useful for understanding nature and causes of food insecurity for each vulnerable group and for designing results-oriented interventions, but maybe harder to manage. CRS sees its own country programs in terms of three categories with respect to the continuum.

#### *CRS interventions by country*

In Sudan, Rwanda, and Burundi CRS operates relief programs. Sudan is in the long-term relief stage, which includes both development and emergency response components; Rwanda is in the rehabilitation stage, with some development components; Burundi is in the long-term relief stage, with emphasis on feeding. CRS programs in Ethiopia and Eritrea can be broadly categorized under the stage of reconstruction with cyclical emergency response. Kenya is in the development stage, emphasizing livelihood security programs.

#### *Vulnerable groups*

CRS has identified three vulnerable groups to address with its programs. These include (i) nomadic pastoralists (some displaced), (ii) small-holder farming households in arid and semi-arid lands (many female-headed), (iii) demobilized soldiers/war widows (mostly in urban centers).

#### **Matching interventions to needs**

The third topic is that of matching interventions to needs and possibilities. Taking the example of small-holder farming households, a category of vulnerability found particularly in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Kenya, important sources of risk are:

- **Natural disaster** (drought every 2 years, long-term land degradation, deforestation, increased grazing, decline in asset base);
- **Civil disaster** (ethnic conflict);
- **Market policy** (price instability); and
- **State policy** (land tenure regulations).

#### *A sample of possible interventions*

Several responses are possible. Among them are programs of bringing new lands under the plough while trying to preserve the existing resource base, or intensifying production - the use of fertilizers in African agriculture is very low by international standards - or diversifying livelihoods. Resettlement on new lands could be promoted by building infrastructure and other incentives, but it has to be recognized that resettlement may lead to conflict with pastoralists and/or adverse environmental impact. Soil and water conservation can be supported, but land tenure policies and regulations may constrain farmers from adopting new technologies. Also, incentives to cover farmers' risks when adopting new technologies have to be provided. Requirements for agricultural extension work are heavy, requiring a large cash input and representing comparative advantage for NGOs. Crop protection, especially through storage construction or well digging is feasible, although, again, cash for inputs and training is required.

#### *Improving the management of development resources*

In doing all of the above, there is a need to manage development resources more effectively. Specifically, it will be necessary to:

- Improve food aid and development aid partnership;
- Establish a common approach for participatory needs assessment and program design;
- Specialize among relief agencies by type of intervention or location;
- Invest in capacity-building of local counterparts;

- Link US/non-US and UN inputs through cooperative agreements at both local and headquarters levels.

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# CARE'S HORN OF AFRICA STRATEGY

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## Timothy Frankenberger

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*Dr. Frankenberger is with CARE*

### Household livelihood strategy: Defining the concept

The concept of household livelihood security is defined as adequate and sustainable access to income and resources to meet basic needs; including adequate access to food, potable water, health facilities, educational opportunities, housing, and community participation. Food and nutritional security are subsets of livelihood security: food needs are not necessarily more important than other basic needs or aspects of subsistence and survival within households. Food insecure households juggle among a range of requirements including immediate consumption and future capacity to produce and consume.

### Characteristics of food insecure populations

Food insecure populations in the Horn fall into five main groups, and the differences among the groups have important implications for interventions. These groups are:

- **The chronically food insecure**, whose livelihoods have failed, and for whom the productive assets needed for ensuring livelihood security are not available. These number about 24 million.
- **The transitory food insecure**, who are exposed periodically to drought or market failure. These number about 11 million.
- **Conflict affected populations:** These include international refugees as well as the internally displaced people. Those who have been uprooted need immediate relief. This group numbers about 7 to 8 million people.
- **Refugee catchment populations:** These are permanent residents of an area into which large numbers of refugees have moved. The size of this group is not known.

- **Post-conflict populations:** These are groups struggling to rebuild and develop livelihood systems damaged by war. This group numbers about 6 million.

### Types of interventions and the Continuum

What are the implications for the relief-to-development continuum? There are three interventions that are particularly important. These are:

- **Livelihood promotion** through sustainable development. This means that the resilience of households in meeting food and other basic needs must be improved, on a sustainable basis.
- **Livelihood protection**, which entails protecting livelihoods to prevent an erosion of productive assets or assisting them in their recovery. This must be tied to rehabilitation or mitigation programs.
- **Livelihood provisioning**, i.e., relief programs. This entails providing food and meeting other essential needs for households to maintain nutritional levels and save lives. Targeted food and health relief should be combined with livelihood promotion interventions wherever possible.

### Elements of CARE's strategy

The strategy that is proposed has three elements: improving targeting mechanisms, program elements and implementation mechanisms. Targeting mechanisms include developing country food security profiles and vulnerability maps or establishing improved safety nets and contingency plans, and creating decentralized food security monitoring systems. The vulnerability maps or food security country profiles will pinpoint the geographic locations of transitory and chronically food insecure groups; to link food surplus and food deficit areas and to allow

effective contingency plans to be made. These profiles must review macro policies that may affect food insecure groups.

### **Program elements of CARE's strategy**

Five program elements are implied by the CARE strategy for the Horn of Africa.

- The first is targeting high risk but low potential areas. This can be done by **developing human capital** - education, skills, training (especially for female headed households), rather than focusing upon physical capital. This is a better approach because human capital is more mobile and adaptable.
- The second program element is targeting low risk, high potential areas through **agricultural intensification**. This could be done by developing the research infrastructure, by making needed inputs available on a local basis, and by creating linkages with input and output markets.
- The third program element is **urban food security**. Since Africa's cities are growing faster than those of any other continent, this is very important. It is necessary to collect more information on food insecure groups in

urban areas and to develop appropriate interventions.

- The fourth program element is to focus on population movement and growth and **reproductive health**. This could take the form of family planning education coupled with girls's education and HIV/AIDS education.
- Finally, the fifth element is **conflict resolution**. This implies that field staff will have to be educated in the subtleties of conflict situations in the areas where they work and attempts will have to be made to achieve community participation in conflict resolution.

### **Implementation mechanisms**

The strategy necessarily also implies mechanisms for implementation. Capacity building, both for governments and NGOs will be necessary, as will the building up of linkages between countries. There is also a need for constant advocacy, to ensure that donor and government policies and actions best support the food security of people in the Greater Horn of Africa. Some issues that should be focused on are: training on food security issues; standards by which food security is measured; selecting interventions and areas for intervention strategically; developing information systems to track food security changes; and developing effective contingency plans.

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## DISCUSSION

**[Questions and Answers: 3/28/95, 10:15 - 10:45 am]**

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### **Successful programs: lessons and constraints**

**Willet Weeks:** Michael Harvey has cited several cases of successful interventions, but there have also been some big failures in the past ten years and many successes are precarious because they did not get institutionalized.

In every case where things have worked, it was because there was a coordinating process at the policy level that involved some smart decision making and flexible responses by individuals who managed to transcend their institutional constraints. Michael Harvey is one of these people who personally made a large difference in their institutions, in Washington and now out here in Ethiopia. But in many cases it has been an example of too little, too late. A critical characteristic of successful and sustainable interventions is that everyone in the institutions involved has placed a very high priority on immediately re-establishing local capacity. Capacity building will also form the kernel of whatever successes may ensue from the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative.

If you look at some of the failures in the region, I think, they highlight just how vulnerable this process is. It is my gut feeling and I'm sure many people would argue with it, that the situation in Somalia did not have to reach the point that it reached with the famine of early 1992 had these mechanisms been in place and had there been resources in support for them in 1991. That is just one example. Rwanda is another terrible example of how things go wrong, if institutional mechanisms are not in place.

Another problem is that while some of these successful interventions quickly re-established local capacity, they have also sometimes involved very decapitating and poorly thought through massive relief interventions in places where they were simply not needed. Furthermore, they did not formally involve local partners and in some cases had to go around local structures and local individuals. For all these reasons, it might be useful to look at some failures too.

I don't know if Mark Wentling who's very closely involved in all this agrees with me, but I think in '93 there was a real opportunity for developing meaningful coordinating mechanisms in some of the regions of Somalia that would have led to better thought out international interventions. But the institutional interests of a lot of the parties involved strangled that process and that shows how limited some of these rays of hope are. So one of the greatest challenges with the Greater Horn Initiative will be to take these examples where the coordinating mechanisms were smart and flexible and where the personal chemistry has clicked and see how we can build on them.

**Paul Webber:** Today's agenda states that we're talking about 'Achievements and Constraints'. Well, we heard a lot about achievements but not very much about constraints, particularly in terms of the range of instruments you have to address urgent questions. Yesterday Mark Wentling reported, for instance, that there were beans in Tanzania that could have been bought locally for Rwandan refugees, but you were having to import yellow maize from America to feed them. I wonder what other constraints you see in terms of your instruments? And I also wonder, with the new Congress you have, how much of a constraint the reduction of food aid will be with regard to making food aid work for long-term food security?

**Jeanne Downen:** Just a comment on Mike Harvey's presentation. I think that what is being done in Somalia in the post-conflict era is interesting and innovative. I was disturbed to hear Mike say that this might remain the exception rather than the rule with USAID. From a practical point of view, for PVOs there's often a huge pot of money available for emergency relief, but when we enter that critical rehabilitation phase, suddenly all the donors disappear, either because they have other emergencies to deal with, or because they don't have funds for long-term development, leaving very little for getting people back on their feet. I think the kind of flexibility USAID showed in Somalia should serve as a useful lesson on how to keep things from slipping back to where they were.

## **Moving along the continuum: opportunities and constraints**

**Jerome Wolgin:** I want to commend Tim Frankenberger on the outline of the strategy that he has laid out. But I would like to add that even after you develop a surveillance strategy, priority setting will still be crucial because the funding won't be there to deal with all the issues. I also want to point out two linkages between the two amputees that Mike was talking about. If development programs focus on agricultural productivity they can have two important impacts on food security. First, food prices should fall, increasing the real incomes of food buyers in both urban and rural areas. Secondly, income diversification in low potential areas is driven by, for example, labor demand in high potential areas. So growth in the high-potential areas can help diversify incomes in low-potential areas.

**Michael Harvey:** Jerry, on your comment on amputees: I thought it was very clear to say they were very collegial, very self-supporting. I think we all see quite clearly that policy reform definitely involves local people and most of what the NGOs have been doing in local areas is productivity enhancement in agriculture. My point was that there is a latex wall between those two users in terms of funding.

**Negusse Micael:** Talking about urban food security is fine, but isn't there a danger that promoting it might encourage rural to urban migration? I recently talked to a worker on a road construction crew who said, "What is happening is that many farmers who used to farm their land work on road construction projects instead, but after the roads are finished they don't go back to their farms".

**Kathrin Puffenberger:** I like Tim Frankenberger's focus on the appropriate interventions for high-risk, low-potential and low-risk, high-potential areas. But if you develop people's skills in a high-risk low-potential area where people are having a hard time living, I don't know who will employ them. What are they going to do? They can't all be plumbers or build houses. Who is going to do what and who employs whom? I'd like to hear more about that.

**Martin Hanratty:** I also liked Tim's presentation, because it begins with the question of vulnerable groups and ends with what concerns me, the development of efficiently functioning markets. Tim begins to lay out some very fertile ground for the discussion in terms of the seven interventions and talks about it from the relief side as well as the development side. My first point is that most

countries have solved the problems of regional poverty through people voting with their feet. In the United States, people in West Virginia and Tennessee, for example, simply moved to Washington, D.C. or Detroit. The other point is that even though people look at famines as natural events I would contend that they are not. They're failures of governments. A good example is Ethiopia where a progression of government failures through 1982, 1983, 1984 culminated in a massive famine in 1985. So if you don't have government sovereignty, or if the government abdicates responsibility for a section of its people, as the Sudanese government has done with the people of Southern Sudan, how does this constrain what an NGO does in a particular area? Because in the long term you need to find ways to bind individuals into the market economy and the market economy has a set of public goods associated with it such as the right of contract, transportation over long areas, things like arbitration with disagreements in the market, which can only be provided by a sovereign government. That whole structure sets up particular sets of constraints that affect each of the interventions and we need to keep an eye on the overall structure and what we are doing to facilitate a change from emergency relief to market participation.

**Timothy Frankenberger:** First I want to thank Jerry Wolgin for pointing out that jobs have to be demand driven and not supply driven. That's really an important point. And this does touch on the question about jobs in low-potential areas. If there is no other economic activity in the country, this kind of program will not go anywhere. You do have to take a macroeconomic perspective on this. I also think it's important not to forget how important governance is to the development process. With regard to Negusse's question about the role of urban food security in creating rural to urban migration, I have a paper on that and my analysis shows no such effect. I will be happy to share this paper with you. Finally, it's important to remember that if the number of beneficiaries we can service through relief is a lot larger than the number of beneficiaries being serviced through development, you need more human resources as well as more physical capital resources to do development activities. This is why it's so important to identify partners who can work with us and help us move towards more development oriented activities.

**Mark Wentling:** I just wonder if sometimes we get too ambitious and try to move prematurely beyond the relief phase before the right conditions exist. In Somalia, although it's unique, a lot of fruitful lessons were learned. I think before we move beyond the

relief stage we need a stable, peaceful, secure environment. We need counterparts which should be helping us, especially the local and not the national government and to make this sustainable, we need a local revenue generation system. We also have to realize that there are natural constraints on the donor side. My experience in Somalia and now in Tanzania shows that some organizations are very good at coming in and doing short-term relief but are incapable of doing anything beyond that. It's one thing to hire somebody on a six month, or a one year contract to try to do relief work. It is quite another to try to get somebody with agricultural expertise, for instance, to come in on a three-year contract. I think that's a very big constraint. You have also mentioned the funding constraint. Well, under the relief mode we have access to OFDA funds, Notwithstanding funds and so forth. But on the relief to development side, it's a different story. So I think we do need to keep the constraints in mind.

**David Piraino:** I would like to follow up on the idea of the continuum. The continuum has a kind of a nice smooth ring to it, but in fact, you can fall into a lot of holes. For relief agencies to work their way up the continuum is difficult, when an emergency lasts a long time because they get stuck in relief mode, and find it hard to move towards development. Not only can the beneficiaries become dependent on food assistance but also the counterpart agencies, your own organization, local governments, etc. The government here in Ethiopia is trying to do something about these problems and is now insisting that 80% of free distribution should be done as part of food-for-work. Well there are difficulties with that. Not only is it a sharp change, very quickly, but the expertise, the funding and the structures for running a food-for-work program are not there. So the continuum provides a nice framework, but the really important question is how do you move out of relief and keep going towards development.

**Ron Ullrich:** Just a comment. When we put together these development grants for WFP and UNICEF in Somalia, we knew this would press the AID bureaucracy hard, we knew they were going to have fund rehabilitation schemes. It really is going somewhat the other way, from development towards relief. It took a lot of debate but the bureaucracy did

respond. They did a lot of extra funding for rehabilitation and development.

**Bob Kramer:** I am reluctant to introduce more mundane constraints, but I have a very important question in mind. That is, what institutional constraints do we face? In my office we have two divisions, an emergency division and a development division. We also have different pots of money and different ways of using the money. CARE, for example, has got a food security unit that analyzes the constraints to food security, and then it has an emergency unit and I am not quite sure communication exists between those two units in that organization. I suspect the same is true in other PVOs and inside Missions, where you have a Title II person and also maybe a Title III person, and the two don't communicate. In that corner office dealing with strategic issues you've got the Title II officer and the FFP officer dealing with mundane distributional issues. You have different cultures associated with different kinds of resources and that's why I think the constraints will remain along the continuum.

**Soil and water conservation as a growth instrument?**

**Tracy Atwood:** Barbara Huddleston talked about soil and water conservation as one of the priority intervention activities and then went on to talk about how it was constrained by tenure issues, that there wasn't high level management and so on. I was just curious as to why soil and water conservation is now a growth panacea. Why are people using this as a major intervention?

**Barbara Huddleston:** Answering the question why people are treating soil and water conservation as a priority? It is a priority. Development institutions are using food aid resources to do reforestation and so forth, but there is a need for cash for extension work and to provide training for food management capacities and help them to avoid situations like the one Simon Maxwell described yesterday, where ponds were built but never used for irrigation. CRS was making the point that the food resource alone will not be of much help in achieving this objective. Therefore, you can't do the job unless you get the resources working together.

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## **Presentations of Day 2 Working Group Findings**

### **MOVING FORWARD ON THE "RELIEF-TO-DEVELOPMENT CONTINUUM"**

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#### **GROUP 1: Presented by Kristy Cook**

Our working group tried to focus first, on the necessary processes to achieve the right mix of interventions for relief, recovery, rehabilitation and development programs, and second, how food aid fits into all that. We basically identified the following procedural steps:

- 1) Setting agreed norms and standards for interventions;
- 2) Carrying out country and regional food security profiles as important information sources;
- 3) Improving the planning phase to determine the appropriate mix of interventions;
- 4) Determining roles and responsibilities of various agencies and organizations; and
- 5) Improving implementation.

#### **Agreed norms and standards**

There was a strong sense in a group that all agencies involved in food security and food aid programs in the area should agree on some common norms and standards for interventions, in particular on local capacity building, priority for vulnerable groups, equality of access, and food-for-work norms.

#### **Country and regional food security profiles**

Secondly, the need for more comprehensive country and regional food security profiles was a central part of the working group's discussion. For this reason, we first need to identify what relevant information currently exists and where the gaps are. We need to find out if local and regional institutions have the capacity to collect and disseminate this information? Can they respond to it? We need to identify who the food insecure groups are, where they are and why they are there. We also need an inventory of the various agencies involved in these regions, their expertise, their programs, and an inventory of their performance and experience. Food security profiles should also address the issue of high-potential/low-potential, high-risk/low-risk areas

and should draw conclusions on optimal investments and other interventions coming out of this sort of assessment. It might also be necessary to do a macro-policy review and then put these variables in specific contexts. Equally important, food security monitoring systems have to be put in place.

#### **Planning stage: setting objectives and indicators**

We need to clearly set objectives, which includes determining the indicators of success and indicators that show the transition to the next phase. This kind of process should be done in a multi-disciplinary, multi-actor group. The roles and responsibilities of different agencies and organizations need to be defined. We have to ensure continued inputs from all sides during this planning phase and be open for the discussion of alternative scenarios. In order to determine the appropriate mix of interventions the underlying causes of food insecurity need to be identified. A mix of interventions needs to be designed to optimally address the causes of food insecurity. During the planning phase, we also need to develop guidelines for appropriate implementation, based on previous lessons learned.

#### **Roles and responsibilities of various agencies**

The roles and responsibilities of various agencies and organizations on the development and emergency side need to be explicitly spelled out at the planning stage. We need an effective coordination mechanism early in an emergency. Who should be involved will usually be determined by the context, and the proposed food security profile could be very useful here. If we get involved in an area, what expertise etc. will be needed? The group also talked about early involvement of development personnel in emergencies. Ideally people with experience both on the emergency and the development side should be included. So we talked about bringing knowledgeable regional experts together who know both development and emergencies. There was some concern on

institutional and personnel constraints. People, for example in AID, who specialize in emergencies, might need more training in development or more cross-cutting experience. The same is true for the PVOs, where more internal coordination is needed among and within PVOs, as they have some of the same institutional constraints.

#### **Implementation issues: more beneficiary participation and program flexibility**

We discussed in detail the need for participatory development in the relief mode, so that any relief efforts would ultimately lead to self-reliance on the part of the people affected. The constraints that include planning cycles that may be out of synch or a lack of development expertise in emergencies. There are also constraints on how the communities involved can respond to emergencies. There was a lot of discussion in the group about the context of transitions: the context should determine the length of the transition period from relief to rehabilitation. Therefore, it is vital to build flexibility into the funding and programming side of interventions, and, in particular, to take account of the need for a smoother switch from the relief to the development mode of interventions. We may also need to prepare for the possibility of returning from development interventions to relief, as communities may fall back into some kind of crisis.

That might imply various kinds of programs. One possibility in this context is 100% monetization, but is that possible any more? Secondly, how can we develop more flexibility in development assistance resources? Third, we may need to consider the option of triangulation in this context. Monetization for internal market development was another option that was considered as an important flexible intervention.

We talked about the need for complementing food aid resources with development assistance resources, since food resources alone are sometimes inadequate for proper implementation. USAID has to address this issue internally, as have WFP with UNDP, and the PVOs.

#### **Four key principles**

Last but not least, we identified four key principles of successful interventions in emergencies:

- i) First, do no harm. Our fundamental principle should be, especially in an emergency: first of all don't make the trouble worse.
- ii) Do not refight the last battle.
- iii) Pay attention to the lessons learned.
- iv) Be committed to rebuilding at all levels.

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#### **GROUP 2: Presented by Blaine Pope**

Our working group began with two basic questions: What do we need and how do we get there?

#### **Clarity of vision, consensus, consistency and commitment**

First, what do we need? Looking within ourselves, what we need is clarity of vision. Looking amongst ourselves, what we need is consensus. That should be followed by consistency in approaches and strong commitments, in a flexible manner.

#### **Strategic planning, monitoring and evaluation, conditionality**

How do we get there? We all agreed that strategic planning is critically important at various levels, in terms of regional organizations, national organizations, global organizations, governments as well as NGOs, bilateral agencies, etc. Second, monitoring and evaluation are very important. What are we doing presently, how well is it working, what have we done in the past, how well did it work? Third, conditionalities may become occasionally necessary.

## **Obstacles to moving on the Continuum**

The group felt the biggest problem for moving faster towards development on the Continuum was the rigid division between relief and rehabilitation in development agencies at the bureaucratic level, although some agencies show more flexibility in implementing programs than others. Therefore USAID, WFP, and the NGOs need to think less compartmentally, and learn to respond more flexibly. For example, the REST strategy in Tigray of using 80% of relief food aid for developmental activities is seen as "innovative", but is certainly not yet common. By contrast, OFDA usually thinks in the short-term only. The main conclusion is that the nature of emergencies has changed in this region and therefore dramatic changes are needed in bureaucratic response.

The lack of implementation guidelines hampers food aid efforts, implying that strategic planning is badly needed: this includes rigorous thinking as opposed to "muddling through", as well as innovative approaches which go beyond food.

## **Population control conditionalities for food aid?**

Second, the working group intensively addressed the role of food aid for a long-term strategy to improve food security. The group started from the premise that food aid should be just one part of the overall set of strategies. That role has to be linked with other issues, not the least of which, particularly in this country, Ethiopia, is population. Elsewhere in the continent, people are familiar with the idea that even if we have consistently good production or delivery of food, population growth can sometimes outstrip the growth in food availability. Making food aid conditional on population policies may be necessary but the way in which conditionality is applied should depend on the context. Moreover, in order to ensure a successful long-term food security strategy, information exchange and distribution of responsibilities among NGOs, bilateral agencies, and host-country governments, are vitally important. Committed host governments are vital, as they have to provide the necessary enabling environment for food aid to work.

## **Improved planning**

Third, the working group discussed how we could improve our planning to get a better program mix for short and medium term interventions which would permit people to be brought back faster from emergencies. The critical factors here are timing, resource mix and the type of planning we do -- is it, for instance, coordinated among organizations? The example of South Sudan was brought up. In order to plan effectively, the question where we are on the Continuum must always be kept in mind. Are we in a strictly emergency relief mode? Are we moving more towards rehabilitation? Are we further out on the development side of the continuum? That will affect the type of planning that is done.

We definitely need more flexible programming. One example of this would be the prepositioning of food, e.g. someone suggested prepositioning several thousand metric tons of grain in the Republic of South Africa in anticipation of a potential crisis.

## **Overcoming food aid disincentives, food aid dependency, and misappropriation**

The Group also discussed the negative effects of food aid, such as disincentives, dependency, and misappropriation. It was felt that misappropriation was no longer a serious problem because of increased vigilance on the part of donor agencies. That left the issues of disincentives and dependency. Here it was felt that at the macro level, there was less of a problem of disincentives in the Greater Horn because food aid is just a drop in the ocean compared to the size of the population. However, there may be possible disincentive effects at the micro level and this depends on the level of market integration. If local markets are integrated with outside markets, surplus food can flow out and not affect local prices. As far as dependency goes, it is critical to distinguish between food aid dependency and program dependency, since recipients may become convinced that an NGO or program is here to stay and use this belief in their plans. However, there was a consensus that this is much less of a problem than before and aid agencies and NGOs are well aware of it.

## GROUP 3: Presented by Lawrence Haddad

Our group focused mainly on the question: What role can future food aid play in addressing the root causes of food deficits, insecurity, and vulnerability in the region? How can food aid resources be programmed in the long-run to prevent food insecurity and emergencies? Strategic questions loomed very large in our group, so we focused on two different types of scenarios, the Rwanda and the Ethiopia case.

### Common food security profiles and strategies

One thing that came up very strongly over and over again in our group, was the fact that there are no food security assessments or profiles that are comprehensive, reliable, credible, accessible and unifying. FAO/WFP food assessments are available, but the Group felt that even though they are very useful, they are not nearly useful enough. There was a lively discussion about why there weren't any more assessments and what factors might have to be put into place to make them accessible.

Another big theme both for the Rwanda and Ethiopia situations was that there is no national food security strategy into which all the different actors, AID, WFP, PVOs, EU etc. could fit even if they wanted to.

### Ethiopia: Elements of common food security goals and strategies

In Ethiopia there seems to be no one focal point within the government responsible for food policy and food security. The group felt that this made it difficult to formulate a strategy that all PVOs or donors could really buy into.

The challenge of developing a common strategy became evident when it proved difficult, even in our small group, to reach a consensus on the usefulness of food-for-work. Some felt it was a safety net mechanism, others that it was useful for income generation, but less useful for the production of productive assets. There was a lot of debate on that, with no real consensus. We also talked about the various high-potential, low-potential area strategies in Ethiopia, focusing on increased productivity using Title III food aid to understand better how markets work, and stimulating markets to leverage food aid into food security.

We talked also about a *quid-pro-quo* between donors and PVOs. There ought to be more long term agreements between them. If donors are going to ask PVOs to fit into some common strategy then they will have to make 5 to 7 year commitments to PVOs to allow them to defray some of the fixed costs of actually picking up from one area, and moving to another area, or changing from one food-for-work activity to another. Such agreements would also have to include a realistic assessment and agreement of complementary financial resources for food aid supported programs.

### Rwanda: Moving from the 'Continuum' to a 'Simultaneity of Approaches'

In Rwanda, where the main cause of food insecurity presently is conflict and displacement, rather than structural food availability and access problems, we identified three groups in need of relief. These groups are i) refugees, ii) internally displaced persons (IDPs), and iii) non-displaced persons (NDPs). We recognized the need to stabilize each of these three groups, and at the same time to repatriate the first group, reintegrate the second, and restart production for the third.

We have to get away from the idea that the only way to handle relief to development activities is by sequencing programs, so you start out with titled feeding programs or untitled feeding programs, and then you move on to something else. If you do this, you have already created inertia, dependency and expectations, and it will be very difficult to move away from that. So we thought it would be a good idea to do two things simultaneously. I don't think we have understood why this does not happen more often, or if it does happen, where is it happening?

### Actual and Ideal response

For the three target groups identified in Rwanda we tried to ask (i) what was the actual response in Rwanda, (ii) what potentially could have been done differently, and (iii) what constraints affecting the initial response weren't really that many disputes about what happened. We know there were disputes for refugees and IDPs but we didn't know what happened to the non-displaced persons. A simultaneous response to all three groups involved not only feeding

development of "portable skills", such as training or health education, the aim of which would have been to try to move refugees and IDPs back. And eventually, for non-displaced people, maybe some food-for-work programs could have been developed as part of the return package for refugees and IDPs, perhaps building infrastructure.

#### **Response constraints**

What are some of the constraints to this ideal response? Again, no food security assessments exist at the national, regional or household levels. There are variable strategies and variable consensus

among donors and PVOs; lack of political will at the national government level; lack of information on the various sizes of different groups; a lack of an arbitration system for settling disputes and conflicts; a lack of security on the part of displaced people; and a lack of programming of complementary resources.

The group also talked about conditionality of food aid and the political economy of aid, just as Group 2. We had a lot of discussions about pull and push factors with respect to refugees and IDPs. While there may be a need for food aid conditionality or triage, this would have to be politically tempered.

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### **GROUP 4: Presented by Francesca Bravo**

Working Group 4 focused on the general role of food aid under different circumstances as well as on food aid dependencies and disincentives.

#### **The role of food aid**

We discussed when to use food aid and how to use it by starting off with defining the basic three roles of food aid:

- 1) Providing food for consumption and improved nutrition.
- 2) Offering economic incentives and payments, for income generation and asset formation.
- 3) Monetizing food aid for fund raising purposes.

Besides these three roles there are several programming options: Programming options at the macro or market level include grain reserves, government budgetary support policy, or market stabilization; while those at the micro level include direct distribution of food, school feeding, nutrition enhancement, capacity building, training, extension, crisis interventions, and emergency prevention.

There was a lot of discussion on the question, under what conditions food is the right resource, and also when is food not the right resource? In searching for frameworks for the use of food aid, we concluded that the appropriate role and programming of food aid depends primarily on its context. This would include government institutional capacity, or

legitimacy, for example. It would depend on the presence of structural deficits and on the presence of integrated, functioning markets. It would also vary with the risk of emergencies, due to natural disasters or human made conflicts.

#### **Negative food aid effects?**

The second issue addressed by this working group was whether enough attention is paid to the possible negative effects of food aid. We assessed that food aid monitoring and control by both NGOs and donors have improved considerably over the past five years so that misappropriation is no longer a significant problem. Food aid is no longer a cheap resource, and tight monitoring rules are increasingly enforced. But the Group also felt, that the costs of monitoring must be seen in relation to the resources protected from misappropriation.

With regard to the problem of disincentives for local food production, both of Title II and Title III programs, the Group held the view that, by and large, disincentive effects of food aid on agricultural production are relatively small in the Greater Horn as structural food deficits in several Horn countries are large, and food aid often substitutes for commercial imports (particularly Title III aid) or satisfies otherwise ineffective demand. But the group also recognized that the situation may vary from country to country.

Also, the main disincentive effects are more likely to happen at local rather than national level, and they

may be season specific, because food aid is often allocated under specific project circumstances, in specific locations, and at specific times (particularly Title II, which constitutes the bulk of U.S. food aid in the Horn). A micro-analysis of food aid effects also has to consider possible labor market disincentives beyond mere commodity market price effects. In sum, it is very risky to draw general conclusions on disincentives.

The third disincentive point to look at is the **dependency** issue which is quite controversial. Research has come up with conflicting evidence on this issue. The discussion often focuses on whether people depend on food aid for 100% or 10% of their income. Our Group took the position that this percentage does not matter; what matters is if people depend on it, whether fully or partly. When dealing with refugees dependency on food aid can create serious problems with repatriation. Examples could be cited from Harerge, where Somali refugees receive assistance from NGOs and donors, probably

providing disincentives for returning home. Rural people may also abandon traditional coping mechanisms of voluntary resource accumulation and sharing under emergencies, because there is food assistance. At the same time it should be remembered that recurrent droughts and famines have led to the erosion of the asset base of the population so that traditional coping mechanisms have dwindled to the point where they may offer only limited assistance. Another aspect of dependency may be the loss of traditional skills and willingness to apply new techniques to improve production, not only in the camps but also in the resident population, because these populations know that they will survive on food aid. We also should look at dependency in terms of dietary changes, where a population begins to get a taste preference for certain kinds of foods that are not grown locally but are provided as food aid. And at the macro level, increasingly governments are becoming dependent on food aid as a budgetary support.

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# FOOD AID AS A RESOURCE - THE CRS EXPERIENCE

**David Piraino**

*Mr. Piraino is with Catholic Relief Services*

I would like to preface my remarks by saying that we have enjoyed very good relations with the USAID Ethiopia Mission and the Food for Peace Office. We have had very generous monetization, we have received food resources in significant amounts, and we have had a very good dialogue with the Mission, with both sides listening and providing input to each other.

## **The importance of food aid for CRS**

Food aid, Title II food aid in particular, has been very important for Catholic Relief Services (CRS) during the 52 years of our existence. It has allowed us to carry out our mission much more effectively than if we had just had cash resources. It has allowed us to respond flexibly to emergencies. But there have also been problems with food aid, particularly with logistics and disincentives.

However, on balance, food aid as a resource has two dimensions that are very valuable to us. First there is the qualitative dimension. It is a resource that helps us in improving the quality of life and even saving lives. The second dimension is scope. By scope I mean the number of people and program size. If real impact is to be achieved, programs often require a certain critical size, which food aid has helped us meet.

## **Innovative food aid programming**

Some of the confusion over food aid as a resource arises out of the different possible uses of food aid and the term "innovative uses" of food aid. There are basically three uses: nutritional, economic transfer, and monetization. I believe the search for innovative uses of food aid should not focus so much on the uses of the food (which I believe are limited), but on the programming that goes with the food resource. Maintaining this distinction is important. If this distinction is not maintained, then failures in programs that use food aid will be laid at the door of the resource (food) and not based on the

programming where the success or failure more rightly belongs.

Here are some examples where food aid carried out its role based on its intrinsic value as a resource. In emergency programs, food aid has a major impact on nutrition and in many cases literally keeps people alive. In MCH programs it has acted as an incentive for people to participate. Similarly, when food aid is monetized, it generates cash, thereby carrying out its role. However, what is accomplished through programming the cash from monetization is the real test of effective use of monetization funds. Therefore, while food aid frequently is successful in its role as a resource, we run into difficulties on the programmatic side. I think the distinction between food aid as a resource and programming issues is particularly useful in helping us focus on where we should put emphasis and work together in making food aid function as a more effective resource.

## *The new food aid policy paper: a basis for innovative programming*

The new USAID policy paper on Food Security can be a basis for innovative programming. The policy paper, coupled with the relief-to-development continuum principle, provides a new framework for the analysis and evaluation of food aid by serving a common goal. Now that we have that goal and a clear understanding of where we are going, it will help a lot in focusing our resources, in collaborating, and in integrating efforts by using a common denominator. The context within which we work can be defined through the Continuum. That part of the framework (i.e., the Continuum) will tell us where we are (relief, rehabilitation, development) and what kinds of activities are needed, while the Food Security goal provides a common link.

On the programming side, there are different kinds of suggested activities in the policy paper that lead to food security. In other words, the activities provide a starting point for the kinds of activities that are required to achieve food security. In the final version

of the policy paper, as it was presented by John Grant at this workshop, I heard a lot of discussion on how focused the policy is. At the same time, I was happy to learn that the paper is "not prescriptive". I hope that the paper does not attempt to list all the interventions that would lead to food security, but only serve as a starter list. This way the door will remain open for innovative programming based on local needs and circumstances.

### **Keep targeting the most vulnerable**

We do have one major concern with the Food Security paper and that is targeting to the poorest and most vulnerable. I think it is very important to keep in mind that the most vulnerable groups are a very critical and important target area where food aid can make a difference. The difference may not be so evident in the areas of developmental impact or cost-effectiveness, but more in humanitarian concern for the destitute, infirm, and elderly. As food aid becomes scarcer, the emphasis on using food aid more cost-effectively and demonstrating developmental impact may be harmful to the poorest and most vulnerable people. This target group seems to be falling out of favor despite their great needs and the American public's great concern for them. For example, suggestions to focus on high-potential areas and activities may imply that focusing on the poorest is not an effective use of resources.

The last couple of days in this workshop I was reminded of arguments used to justify the trickle-down theory back in the 60s and 70s. I am not saying that we are going back to that. The theory was not effective then and I question it would be now.

### **Innovative institutional approaches**

In an effort to improve CRS/Ethiopia's food aid programming, we recently established three task forces. The task forces address integration, sustainability, and capacity building. We are trying to make these three "buzz-words" operational and include these aspects in our programming of food-assisted projects. We anticipate having more impact on moving towards food security objectives by insuring our projects are integrated and sustainable and that our counterparts come out of a project stronger than when they began.

### *Collaboration between CRS and WFP*

The Food Security Paper and the GHAI call for innovative and closer collaboration between different players. A recently signed Memorandum of Understanding between CRS and WFP may help demonstrate new ways to collaborate. Both agencies agreed that their comparative advantages would be used as the basis for collaboration. Since WFP has a comparative advantage in obtaining and transporting food resources, and CRS in delivery and distribution systems, it makes sense for each organization to specialize according to their strengths. WFP would secure resources and provide them in-country, while CRS would have responsibility for implementation, once agreed objectives are established and roles clarified. A joint management structure would be set up for joint assessments and evaluations, as well as audits.

### *Funding*

Another area that calls for closer collaboration is funding. It is not always easy for organizations like CRS to obtain sufficient funding in reasonable time periods. Perhaps donors could concentrate on mobilizing funds and co-funding programs and projects as they work with NGOs and other organizations.

### *Research*

A third area where more collaboration would be beneficial is research. CRS, as well as most NGOs, don't have the capacity nor mandate to carry out fully acceptable scientific research. There are, however, many organizations, such as IFPRI, that do specialize in research and could collaborate more with NGOs in research projects. NGOs shouldn't be pushed to become research agencies when there are agencies that do have the capacity and mandate for research.

### **Conclusion**

I am in agreement with what Allen Jones of WFP Ethiopia was saying yesterday—that there is a lot of valuable information out there, which will allow us to better use our resources. We now have the Food Security Paper and Relief-to-Development Continuum as frameworks. We have resources, capacity, and support. Now we must put them all together and start moving ahead with urgency.

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# TARGETING

**David Morton**

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*Mr. Morton is with the World Food Program*

I have spent the last two and a half years in our program in Bosnia trying to target food to the vulnerable areas, and although I am not really an authority on targeting, I am aware of how important it is. The issue of how to target food aid more precisely is now pressing. First, unlike in the '70s, food aid is no longer abundant. Second, merely throwing food aid at problems creates disincentives and other market distortions. But most important, targeting is essential to our program because food programs are about getting food to vulnerable people. If you don't know who those people are or where they are, then the program fails at the first step.

## **The Targeting - Assessment - Distribution - Monitoring Continuum**

I would like to suggest that there is now a continuum of which targeting is a focal point and this may be called the targeting-assessment-distribution-monitoring continuum. First of all you have to define your target, i.e., define the criteria for your program. Then you assess the need based on that definition, which should be a common definition that all parties agree upon. Having agreed on that definition, you can assess the need for those groups of people. After the needs have been assessed you have to work out how to get the food to those people. Then you should monitor whether in fact the food reached those people. The targeting, I think, is central to the whole effort.

## **Targeting methodologies**

There are different kinds of targeting that can be done. Of these, geographic targeting is relatively easy, for instance, with the aid of Famine Early Warning Systems (FEWS). It is much harder to identify particular vulnerable groups within target areas. WFP is presently benefiting from the USAID grant on vulnerability mapping. Once we have the vulnerability maps, everyone should buy in on it.

## **Requirements and obstacles for successful targeting**

### *Common standards and discipline*

There really is a need for common definitions and common standards, not only for targeting within but also for targeting between countries. Another requirement for the successful application of targeting is discipline. It is critical to set and enforce targeting priorities and standards which are common to all agencies. I can think of several occasions where most of the agencies involved in a program had agreed on targeting criteria, and then in came a particular NGO with an agenda of its own and did something that cut across all their plans by using different targeting criteria. This kind of thing can really set back your programs.

### *Resource driven targeting*

It is also important to set the right parameters for your targeted interventions. For example, in Ethiopia in the mid-1980s we had about three droughts in five years. For every drought we would do a need assessment and come up with an estimate of, say, a million tons of food aid that year. We usually got about two-thirds of what we asked for. After the third time around, the donors responded that in the last drought we had asked for a million tons and were given 600,000 tons, so they argued that as deaths had been minimal, we had obviously overestimated the need.

Then in 1991, I came here for an assessment and we travelled around Wollo, Tigre, Gondar and other areas with checklists of questions to ask farmers on the way. And what these questions really demonstrated was that over the years, these farmers had run down their stocks. We would ask them how many livestock they had fifteen years ago, in 1976. And the answer would be, "Well, I had 10 cattle, 25 goats, and 2 chickens." And then gradually over the years, they sold them off, so that they were down to perhaps one ox and a goat. It was also clear that different agencies operating in those areas had

different cutoff-points for including those people in relief programs. For most agencies the cutoff-point for receiving food aid was two large animals. But there were one or two that cut you off if you had any live animal at all. If a farmer was down to one male goat, he was in a difficult position to recover his herd. I tried to find out from these agencies why they had set these levels and the answer was resource constraints. The agency which set the level with no animals had to do it because it didn't have enough resources to cover all the people in this area who needed food, so they tightened the targeting criteria, and the answer to the donors was that people had survived previous droughts, which were under resourced, by destocking. This made them more vulnerable to future droughts and made recovery more difficult.

There can be other problems in targeting. For example, how do you target for a situation, perhaps in Rwanda, where you have refugees, internally displaced people and non-displaced people. What does one do in that kind of situation? Zimbabwe provides another kind of lesson, of a failure of targeting. During the drought of 1992, the government found it politically impossible to target. They preferred to identify an area and then give everyone in that area a small amount of food.

#### *Successful self-targeting*

It is one thing to establish targeting criteria, but it is quite another to actually get food to the target beneficiaries. Botswana is an example of a success

story. They have had a unique program involving cash for food, i.e., monetized food aid with the wage rate set below the minimum wage, self-targeting in other words. Self-targeting was also used in Zambia where they used "unpopular" grains like sorghum or low quality yellow maize.

#### *The importance of household and market surveys*

In Bosnia, we have benefited greatly from regular household and market surveys that were undertaken with some difficulty. These gave us a lot of information about alternative means of support. How did these people survive? Were they getting money from their relatives? Were they selling off their possessions? It's really important to understand the coping mechanisms, as they impinge on targeting.

#### **Conclusion**

Thus the key points are: first, the targeting continuum as an organizing principle, including assessment, distribution, monitoring, and, second, a need for all to agree and to adopt uniform standards. Also, as mentioned earlier by David Piraino, we now have developed with CRS a new understanding for what we see as a commonly agreed upon methods for improved food distribution and distribution of responsibilities. And we are going to extend this now in our discussions with Save the Children, World Vision, CARE and other agencies.

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# HOPE FOR AFRICA - PROMOTING FOOD SECURITY THROUGH ASSETS AND SAVINGS

**Negusse Micael**

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*Mr. Micael is with World Vision*

## **Attitudinal Change Towards Africa**

My training, background, professional experience in agricultural and rural development for 17 years, and the experience of living in a country torn by war for 30 years led me to believe that Africa will not develop in the foreseeable future. But today the end of the cold war, the emergence of democracy, reconciliation among former enemies, and political stability in many African countries have all led me to reconsider my position. Now I am more convinced than ever that there is hope for Africa, and that Africa shall be the continent of the 21st century. If the South East Asian countries have made it in 25 years, why not Africa, given its enormous potential resources?

It is only when we have a positive attitude and believe that Africa shall be the continent of 21st century, that food aid can be creatively used for long-term food security.

## **The importance of building up assets and savings**

Till now we have focused on the heavy use of relief food aid during emergencies, followed by activities to promote rehabilitation through Food for Work programs, such as reforestation and soil conservation activities. The challenge for us has been, how to enable households to withstand shocks at times of drought. We looked into the definition of food security and struggled for a long time to operationalize it.

We learned that the achievement of food security requires going beyond having sufficient food or income to purchase food today. In other words, households require assets to withstand a major food crisis. Assets provide a household with a buffer to withstand damage to its food safety net. Assets can create savings and provide a household with resources to generate more income through increased investment. Furthermore, the ability to invest provides the opportunity to diversify food security options and avoid dependence on a single season's harvest.

*Including assets and savings in the definition of food-security*

A household's capacity to save and invest over and above its consumption needs is therefore a more reliable measure of the extent to which a household can be considered food secure.

Building on the standard definition of food security, World Vision therefore come up with the following definition:

$$D = C + S + I$$

where:

- D = Demand
- C = Availability, access, use (minimum calorie requirement)
- S = Saving (cash, seed, food reserves ... etc.)
- I = Investment (productive + durable assets)

## **Implications for operational strategy and monitoring**

The above model was then followed by a shift in the approach to operational strategy and monitoring in food aid. First of all, *free handouts of food aid were stopped* and all able bodied people were required to work. Need Assessment surveys were reinforced by a *potential resource based planning approach* in each project area. Instead of only responding to needs, the tapping of potential resources in each project was recognized. This process avoids a "cookie cutter" approach to development and embraces alternative activities that are most appropriate to a given area in achieving food security. This in turn helps households to use food aid for *economic diversification* (e.g., sheep and wool production, promotion of underground and surface water, lake-side farming, small scale irrigation schemes, agro-forestry, fattening programs etc.) rather than only limiting themselves to environmental rehabilitation.

### *Monetizing food aid for savings purposes*

Food aid was also integrated with other resources in the program that were supposed to assist households to undertake long term development efforts. Households have also begun to think of reducing their food aid consumption as a preparatory more towards saving for future investment. They have been setting aside 40% of their food-for work payment through *local monetization* for saving and investment purposes. They have agreed to reduce present consumption and invest the savings in productive assets, thus providing for long-term food security and sustainable development. These households often cite the 1984-85 and 1987 relief handouts as an example of what not to do, noting that they only provided a short-term solution to their problems, because these handouts did not address the root causes of food insecurity.

### **A 'SMART' selection of Impact Indicators**

Impact indicators must be established during the design and planning stage of a program. Establishing impact indicators from the outset helps to focus programs on stated objectives since activities can be aligned to the same objectives. However, indicators should be limited in number since too many indicators create conflicting aims and priorities. A good set of indicators should not exceed 3 to 5. Indicators should concentrate on measuring impact rather than input

delivery; should be meaningful and easily understood by stakeholders particularly staff and community members; and above all should be simple. Time and resources can be wasted on collecting too much information, which may not necessarily be helpful for practitioners. Moreover it may be too late to take corrective action by the time the information is compiled and analyzed.

The following set of critical indicators, with the acronym SMART (Specific, Measurable, Area specific, Realistic and Time bound), was developed in preparing the multi-year operational plan (MYOP - 1995-97), submitted to USAID. These indicators are logically interrelated in achieving their aim of food security and long-term sustainable development and are as follows.

- **Availability:** Increase in agricultural productivity (by X% in a given time);
- **Access:** Increase household income (by X% in a given time)
- **Use:** Improved nutritional status (by X% in a given time)
- **Asset creation:** Increase investment (number of loans made and repaid; increase in investment by X% in a given time).

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# USAID ETHIOPIA: EXPERIENCE ON INTEGRATED COUNTRY STRATEGIES

**Walter North**

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*Mr. North is with the United States Agency for International Development, Ethiopia Mission*

It is rather stimulating to follow this string of distinguished speakers. I will just say that anyone who is engaged in development in Ethiopia shares Micael Negusse's perception that there is indeed hope for Africa. Ethiopia is a beacon for a better future not only for Ethiopia itself but also for the Horn of Africa.

The comments that follow are my own. I was asked to talk about how USAID/Ethiopia successfully integrated food aid into its development program. To suggest that we have successfully integrated food aid resources presumes that somehow we have done so. In Ethiopia we have tried to do so but I am not sure we have succeeded. The basic point of this presentation is that unless the cash, food, and intellectual resources are all there, and we ask and answer the right questions, some of which are very difficult, this kind of integration will not happen.

## **The developmental challenges of food aid**

Real integration of our developmental assets in a cost-effective manner to promote food production and improve household nutrition in Ethiopia has not been easy. Food aid is really not the preferred option for development. Food is a tangible good, is hard and expensive to move around, requires protection, is highly vulnerable to fraud, waste and abuse and can have unintended, deleterious development impacts. Equally frustrating, the way in which we in the U.S. government administer it is marked by some of its least attractive aspects. The approval process is cumbersome, authorities for it are diffuse, we don't treat or look at it as an economic good, we lack field flexibility, and we tend to ghettoize it organizationally. Moreover, we are required to program most of it through expensive quasi-independent intermediaries—the NGOs—in ways which can decapacitate host country institutions, and be at cross-purposes with country strategies, both ours and those of host country governments, and sound development principles. Finally, we aren't really required to look rigorously into what is being done with food aid and what it has accomplished. Many of these constraints play themselves out in spades in the Ethiopian context. Despite them, we are making progress in integrating development and food. Let me quickly

recapitulate how we got to where we are and where that is.

## **U.S. humanitarian assistance in Ethiopia before 1991**

USAID only got reengaged in development in Ethiopia in 1991, after the *Dergue*, the previous Marxist Government, fell. There was already a small office here, but it had been working exclusively on emergency humanitarian assistance since 1984. From 1984 - 91, we provided about 1.2 billion dollars worth of humanitarian assistance to Ethiopia. Almost all of that assistance was programmed through NGO partners, most of whom only became active in Ethiopia during and after the 1984 famine. After the worst of the '84-'85 famine period, there was a recognition that Ethiopia's food vulnerability was immense and likely to get much worse—bad economic policies, bad weather, more mouths to feed and war. The extent of this looming calamity was crystallized in a report commissioned by the then AID Representative in Addis, Fred Fischer, in 1985. That report estimated that within about five years Ethiopia would have a structural food deficit of a million tons. Unfortunately, that report was correct.

In light of the adverse relations between the U.S. and the *Dergue*, it wasn't possible for the U.S. government to do development here. Indeed, it was often nearly impossible to even get the *Dergue* to let the donors feed Ethiopia's people. Given that reality and the likelihood of the recurrence, on a large scale, of a food emergency, the U.S. enabled a group of NGOs to establish regular Title II programs in vulnerable areas of Ethiopia. This kept a network of sentinels in place to sound the alarm if famine loomed again since we didn't trust the government to do so. Very quickly those regular programs grew and over time they took on a more developmental character. Intermittently, and in 1988-1991 in particular, there was a surge of emergency requirements. This network of NGOs proved itself to be efficient, creative and timely in beating a very challenging humanitarian crisis. At the same time, there was a parallel shadow exercise which was ongoing with the relief wings of the insurgent movements. In any case, by the end of

the *Dergue*, the USAID office was managing this humanitarian program in a close, and I think, collegial partnership with the NGOs—partly emergency assistance, and partly regular food aid assistance. Average annual expenditures under this approach were about 100 to 150 million dollars a year.

### **"Back to the Future" - a new USAID development strategy for Ethiopia**

In May of 1991, the *Dergue* was replaced by a Transitional Government, and in September a high-level U.S. team recommended getting back into development in Ethiopia. By 1992, the Mission was starting to get in place here, with several bridging activities in AIDS prevention and control, democracy and governance and economic growth. These activities were put in place to buy time for the iteration of the new strategy. That strategy, "Back to the Future," premiered in Washington in the spring of 1993. It called for a program with four strategic objectives, with a focus on the target of opportunity. The objectives were to increase food production, improve health and population activities, provide better and more basic education and promote democracy and governance. What was called a target of opportunity was a timely response to humanitarian crisis. We recognized that Ethiopia, even with the best of policies and the best of intentions, is still tremendously vulnerable and will be for some time to come.

#### *Food security emphasis*

Given where we are coming from and where Ethiopia is, it is natural and imperative that the heart of our program is food security. It was also natural that we draw heavily on NGOs for the development of the new strategy. At the same time we challenged the NGOs to rethink how the regular and emergency food components of their programs could make a difference in a new Ethiopia. Rightly, they reminded us that they had been doing development in Ethiopia for almost a decade with our food, but the shift gave all of us a chance to rethink what we have been doing and could do. We tried to send similar messages to Washington. For example, making it easier to use emergency food for development-like uses; get emergency and other food aid approval processes more concurrent with each other rather than going through separate channels. At the same time, we were getting help from the new government itself which expressed concern about what they saw as a dependency created by food aid, and they wanted to

end free food distribution in emergency programs. In the wake of economic reform programs, and Ethiopia's agrarian background, they were also committed to putting in place safety nets in rural and urban areas.

#### *Integrating food aid into the new development strategy*

In the process of preparing the new strategy, we recognized that we needed to take a closer look at the food component of the portfolio. In the Fall of 1993 we asked a team, led by John Flynn of REDSO, to look at these issues. They came up with a number of good recommendations about how we could fine tune our regular emergency programs. They set some aspirational targets for decreasing the share of overall resources which went to emergency efforts and free distributions and partly as a result of this, we increased the size of the regular programs and began to look at them more developmentally, but probably not as much in economic terms as we should have. This whole process got plugged back into the development of the "Back to the Future" strategy and we had vigorous discussions about how we would actualize all this intellectual discussion. The articulation of this effort is found in our new food security action plan, which was presented in Washington in December of 1994.

#### *The role of DFA, Title II, and Title III resources*

Essentially, the strategy calls for using DFA assets to make investments in crop systems with a high potential for increased production so that you get more food into markets, more money into farmers' pockets and create more jobs. At the same time, we recognize that massive food shortages are going to recur and there were and are many areas of Ethiopia which are acutely vulnerable and the people who live there need to survive. To buy time for a growth strategy to work, the needs of those groups could not be ignored, a familiar case of making tradeoffs between equity and efficiency.

Title II and III food aid programs would therefore be integral parts of the new country strategy. Regular Title II programs would be used for asset and capacity building in selected vulnerable areas. Emergency programs would be used for the same purposes, if possible. We recommended using a new Title III program for two purposes. At the policy level, to look at ways to better understand grain markets and perhaps help government find ways to buffer price shocks and secondly, to accelerate progress on more

cost effective targeted safety net programs. We contemplated using the actual commodities under the new program to support those safety nets, to alleviate emergency requirements in some years and to create emergency and possibly market buffer stocks.

### Open questions

In developing this approach, some serious questions emerged, most of which we are still working on:

- **Food aid composition.** Is the commodity composition of our food aid, primarily wheat, still appropriate, or would a commodity like Sorghum be better? Is it a disincentive in concert with the wheat that other donors import? Is it really helping or reaching poor people? (Indeed, we have already adjusted our commodity mix because of these kinds of considerations and started to use more sorghum and maize.)
- **Cost-effectiveness of safety-nets.** How effective are the currently planned safety nets and at what cost? We've looked a lot at where they are targeted. We haven't looked at whether this is the most cost-effective way to put safety nets in place. We need to do more analysis.
- **Targeting.** Are our emergency programs well targeted? As David Morton pointed out, while we are good at geographical targeting, we are not as good at targeting the households that should get food aid within those areas.
- **Cost-effectiveness of food-for-work.** Is the attempt to end dependency by emergency food-for-work approaches really cost-effective? Since human and financial capital in Ethiopia is limited would money spent creating good food-for-work projects in poor areas be better spent in high potential areas, this is a crucial question.
- **Title II program performance.** How effective are our Title II programs technically and economically? For example, we have done some analysis of the natural resources components of our Title II programs and come up with mixed results. But we cannot always only look at the cost-effectiveness of those approaches. We have to look at other critical

questions. For example, are the programs de-capacitating the needs of the Government of Ethiopia's ability by poaching staff? NGOs in Ethiopia are the largest source of non-governmental employment. It is an issue that we have, in fairness to our Ethiopian colleagues, started to wrestle with. Are these programs, e.g., the NGO programs, in sync with our strategy? We recently found that several NGOs are doing micro-credit schemes. But several of those schemes, while well intentioned, were not in concert with AID policy or the best practices in successful credit programs.

- **Nutrition's capacity at regional and national level.** In Ethiopia today, for example, we found the nutritional levels of children declining even in the highest surplus areas. Why is that happening? What, if anything, should we be doing to increase the government's capacity in food programming and management, especially for emergencies. And if we do something with the government, how can it take account of the needs of the different regions. Regionalization is a pervasive theme in Ethiopian political life.

### Conclusion

When we went to Washington in December of 1994 to present our new food security action plan and to request Washington support for this plan, we discovered we were a bit naive. The plan outlined a melded use of DFA, Title II and Title III resources. But people didn't really want to talk about the substance of the proposed program. Mostly they wanted to talk about money and the lack thereof, and food and the lack thereof. When we got to Washington we were told, basically, that Title III was history, and that side of our planned intervention would have to be taken care of by unidentified donors. Likewise, we were told, that there really was not going to be much money for agriculture. Nonetheless, Marty Hanratty and others in the Mission are working with our NGO colleagues and people in the government to come up with a more modest approach. We went in with a package worth more than \$250 million and left with a package worth about \$50 million. We have had some inquiries from the European Union about collaboration on food security but they think we still have assets. It remains true though, that we still probably get treated better than most Missions: at least we still do have a Title III program. Internally, food aid has not been reengineered enough to be truly

called user friendly and I hope that this workshop will come up with some ways to overcome these problems.

Despite its awkward qualities, there is potential to integrate food and financial resources, especially in a situation like Ethiopia. We finally have peace in

Ethiopia, after more than a generation of lost opportunities, we have a committed and honest government, and we have the chance to start the long process of turning things around. But it can't be done with virtual resources. In short, with real food and dollar resources, it should be done, it could be done, it could be done. There is still hope.

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## DISCUSSION

*[Questions and Answers: 3/29/95, 10:15 - 10:45 am]*

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### Food aid monetization

**Jim Phippard:** I would just like to add a comment on monetization as an innovative use of food to David Piraino's presentation, because in addition to generating cash, monetization can have an intrinsic worth that goes beyond the cash generated. For example, in Uganda, ACDI and USAID asked the government to privatize the importing of vegetable oil and this was done. The other element of that program was breaking the monopoly of the three or four large traders by setting lots small enough so that the small traders could get in on it, by having regular sales, by publicizing events and by providing training to the small traders. But there could be a dark side to monetization too. When you look at monetization you have to ask are we improving markets or are we doing something counterproductive? I think the worst thing is not to ask the question, but to look at the cash generated and not at the process.

**Getachew Diriba:** I think monetization could also be used as a famine response. Most often we only provide food when there is drought or famine. But that, can create dependency and disincentives. So monetization at the local level could also be used as a famine response or to mitigate the effects of food shortages if we intervene well before the types of grains and the exchange rates of those markets go beyond the capacity of those people to participate in the market. In certain circumstances there may not be any food but there may be cash within the society.

**Martin Hanratty:** I would like to address Walter North's comments. When you attempt to deliver Title III commodities to a country for monetization—you're not sending wheat, you end up with commodities that are hard to monetize. There are a couple of reasons for that. Sorghum and maize are used for animal feed in the U.S. but are used for human consumption here. So what we get is animal feed which is not marketable locally. Then there are constraints on the transportation of Title III commodities which may damage them further and you end up with, for example, sorghum that cannot even be given away without protest. On the NGO side, as you get more and more into monetization, I don't see the capacity in

the NGO community for commodity analysis and understanding of the markets into which they are selling the commodities. A case in point: I have not seen a very good analysis of the operations of Ethiopia's vegetable oil market, price fluctuations, who the major traders are, and what impact the sale of vegetable oil would have on market structure, etc.

**Jerome Wolgin:** I would just like to underline something David said earlier. You may want to deal with the comparative advantage that institutions have in terms of analysis. It may not be the role of NGOs to do the analysis but that we could work together some way to make sure the analysis is done.

**Allen Jones:** David Piraino mentioned that the NGOs were very generous on monetization. True, but the government, which is primarily responsible for response and coordination of activities is disabled by the fact that it doesn't have resources. Title II should also consider monetization to support government initiatives. We know that implementation of Title II food aid programs is expensive in terms of technical assistance and cash resources. One way of overcoming that is to generate funds within Title II.

We tend to talk about monetization of Title II and Title III at the same time. But, in fact, they are extremely different instruments. Title III was very effective and crucial last year in averting the problems of the emerging crisis in Ethiopia. It generated cash to support government operations. But it did not go into relief or social welfare. It's only monetization within Title II that could actually be directly targeted to support consumption and relief for the most vulnerable groups.

**Timothy Frankenger:** I don't disagree with the notion that some NGOs may not have the technical capacity to handle market analysis and monetization. I think that there is a need for strengthening NGO capacity to recognize when such an analysis is needed. There also has to be a source to turn to for collecting this information, a source with the technical knowledge of the systems.

## Investing in high or low potential areas?

**Jerome Wolgin:** When you talk about food aid for development, there are certain tradeoffs between doing development in areas where the returns to development activities are low, i.e., in asset poor, low potential areas, as opposed to areas where returns are higher. This basically gets back to the issue of whether there is indeed something that trickles down. Our experience in Asia shows that where the economy grows quickly poverty gets eradicated quickly. Almost all economic experience in different countries shows that if you look at the number of poor people and the depth of poverty, it gets reduced very quickly with labor intensive growth strategies. You cannot do human resources development and expect people to find jobs if the economy isn't growing to provide the jobs. Secondly, a big and important part of dealing with the welfare issues of the poor is to reduce the price of the food that they purchase. If you can reduce that price by 10% or 20%, you are raising their real income and increasing their capacity to buy food and therefore to improve their nutrition. So there is a real synergism between these things, but at the margin there are tradeoffs in the use of resources.

**Barbara Huddleston:** I would like to make two comments on this point. I'm glad that you've raised it. First, we've heard a lot about the tradeoffs between high-potential low-risk and low-potential high-risk areas. FAO is very engaged in identifying these tradeoffs because FAO too is trying to focus more of its efforts on high-potential areas. Now FAO's own programming efforts often defines high-potential or low-potential purely in terms of the existing physical agricultural potential of the area, i.e., the current agro-ecological conditions. If the soil is of such and such quality, the climate has such and such characteristics, water availability is such and such, the area is either high- or low-potential. Now, of course, anybody who has been working in agriculture knows that the potential of the area is not determined solely by the physical qualities; the ability to produce depends on the investments that you make. So an area which currently does not have access to water can obtain access through irrigation. We have to bring in the question of technology levels and technological options to change the production characteristics of a region. Then we have to bring in the best economic opportunities available for each of these areas. So, an area that is labeled low-potential because of its natural conditions, may be high-potential when we look at technological options, and access to one or another kind of markets. There needs to be a geographically based analysis of potentials; so that we see what possibilities exist for development in one of

these zones, whether it be staple foods, crop production, high value crops, some kind of industrial development or if migration has to be a part the package for the zone. We need to get away from this labeling of zones as having high or low potential.

**Michael Harvey:** Jerry, I think your comments were right on the mark and you should give that speech before the House Agriculture Committee because what you are giving is the argument for Title III. I think those of us who are here in Ethiopia panicked over the thought of losing Title III because somehow an equivalent amount of food will need to come into Ethiopia. Personally speaking, most of my NGO colleagues will agree in private that there is no way that three hundred thousand tons can be moved through NGOs effectively, efficiently, and appropriately. If you take out the emergency component of our programs here, the regular Title II program is only 20% of all food aid commodities coming into Ethiopia. The rest of it is Title III. Title III programs are primarily used to get the whole kind of growth promoting activities in high-potential areas going that you were talking about. We think we presently have the right mix and that message needs to go back to Congress loud and clear.

**Willot Weeks:** I would also like go back to the points made by Jerry, because I think, they were very important. What we saw this past year argues for a very strong emphasis on a more strategic use of the Title II resources we are receiving here in Ethiopia. These 20% of total food aid resources can be absolutely vital. While we did manage to avert a famine in Ethiopia last year, there were huge opportunity costs. The efforts required to reorient resources did, I think, disrupt efforts to make profitable investments and strengthen the economy. There is a real impo.ative to be very strategic in identifying options for those easily identifiable but not yet identified low-productivity, high-risk areas that constantly fall into famine. And I think unless significant, intelligent, and coordinated investments are made in getting together the donors, the NGO's, and the regional (local) governments that under the present structure are primarily responsible for these investments, you will never get anywhere with the broader creation of wealth in this country.

**Timothy Frankenberg:** I would like to make two points. One is that I agree totally with the economists about how investment in high-potential area could generate income. But I think we need to be more strategic about identifying surplus producing areas next to deficit areas and then building linkages between those two areas. I don't think we have done

that well. Some areas within a country might increase their productivity but these may be thousands of miles away from the deficit areas. The second point echoes what Barbara said. Risk and low potential are relative to the context and the countries we work in. We should not use a straitjacket in terms of criteria that we use across all countries, but in fact, we need to be careful about understanding risks and potentials for each of these countries. We need to be thinking about where our best payoffs are in terms of improving food security for these populations.

**Lawrence Haddad:** This is just to follow up on what seems to be a building consensus. We have got to consider where the poor and vulnerable live. For example, do they live in the high potential areas, or do they live mostly in low potential areas? Are high-potential areas really low risk? Another consideration should be the linkages that Tim introduced. The linkages are going to be strongly dependent on food market integration—whether farmers can respond to market prices, and to demand generated elsewhere. Then there are various constraints. For example, seasonal labor constraints and credit constraints. If these constraints bite, the end result might just be rising prices. The linkages are very important and in fact, I think that many of the low-potential activities in the neighboring areas, such as public works activities could be used to generate safety nets that strengthen the linkages. Finally, how high-potential are high-potential and how low-potential are low-potential areas? Potential may be in the eye of the beholder. As Barbara was saying, it's not only the physical and natural resource endowment, but the endowment of a number of other factors, that determines the potential of an area. The release of just one constraint could turn a seemingly low-potential area into a high-potential area.

#### **Refugees - a forgotten group?**

**Sharon Carper:** I'm going to use the *R-word*, because very few people have used it for the last three days. I appreciate the fact that David Piraino talked about vulnerable groups, and that David Morton talked about refugees. But I repeat, may we say the *R-word*, that is refugees, more outspokenly in our working groups today? Because I would like to contribute a new category to high-potential, low-risk and low-potential, high-risk areas and that is by talking about the refugees in those areas. Mostly they are

high-risk and low-potential anywhere. But as Ted Morse pointed out this morning, in Tanzania they've had refugees now for 35 years. As far as Ethiopia goes, we have to look at refugees in terms of the high-risk potential that they give to our food security situation. I am very upset with the fact that I'm the only person here who works primarily with refugees; that we do not have any representatives from UNHCR or the Refugee and Relief Commission of the Ethiopian government. We cannot ignore the fact that refugees could seriously and continually disrupt the food security situation not only in this country but in the whole of the Horn of Africa.

#### **Population, development, and conditionality**

**Joe Gettler:** As Jerry Wolgin has pointed out, where the economy grows poverty is eliminated. He used Asia as an example. If you look at several countries in Asia, you will also notice that there is in particular a close correlation between effective population programs and relative economic affluence—with Singapore on top. In Ethiopia we've seen three or four consecutive good harvests but these have not reduced the structural food deficit, mainly because of fast population growth. I was wondering if Walter would care to comment on the possibility of using conditionality with regard to food aid in return for a good population program here in Ethiopia.

**Walter North:** The short answer to that is, it isn't necessary because the government here promulgated a progressive, activist population program. This has started to make a difference, and we're helping them to do that. When we sign our first major new health program in Ethiopia, a population program is going to be a significant part of it. One thing to keep in mind is that you don't get overnight returns on investments in population programs. In Ethiopia where the contraceptive prevalence rate is about 4% nationally, of which about half is so called traditional methods, and the population growth rate is 3%, it's just going to be a long term prospect. I don't believe in conditioning aid in the sense of "you do this or else...". In Ethiopia, fortunately, I think we have an effective partnership with the government, so if we do have conditionality, it's something we sort of mutually agree on. If it changes and we'd have to force them to do things that they don't want to do, I don't think we should be here.

**PART III**

**WORKSHOP FOLLOW-UP**

## **Presentation of Day 3 Working Group Findings, Working Group # 1:**

### **COUNTRY FOOD SECURITY ASSESSMENTS: PURPOSE AND ISSUES**

**John Grant**

Food security assessments are one of the things that we need to focus on here, because if you are talking seriously about an Initiative that has food security as its main objective, you need to understand the nature of the problem, if you are going to design effective programs.

In the past, the PVOs have all been working in different ways, shapes and forms in this area, on different kinds of food security assessments at the national and local level. They may have a real interest in meeting and talking about how to synchronize their approaches. The basic idea was to bring AID, PVOs, and some of the other donors together, so that we can have one overall approach to food security assessments. Our objective was to talk generally about food security assessments, their objectives, and assess the current situation.

How can we best move towards some type of synchronization? There was a desire from the group for some fairly specific recommendations, action recommendations. We had a fairly vocal and congenial group. We soon realized in the group that there are different types of food security assessments at different levels. You can talk about food security assessments at the regional level. You can talk about food security assessment at the national level and you can talk about food security assessment at the local level. There are similarities and differences. To avoid getting totally confused, we decided that we would separate them out.

#### **1. Issues for Country Food Security Assessments**

For each type/level of food security assessments we would look at:

- a. What are the purposes? Why do we want to do that type of food security assessment?
- b. What should be key elements of the assessment?

- c. What is currently being done by the PVOs and governments?
- d. What are the commonalities of approach?
- e. What are some of the constraints and issues that we have to face if we want to move towards having some good food security assessments which we can all use?
- f. Who should do what as we move forward?

Primarily, we wanted to come up with an action plan. This is a very ambitious thing to try to do in an afternoon. I think, we did a very successful job on one level, the national level, country assessment or the country profile. We had some ideas for the next lower level, the local assessments. But if country assessments get rolling in the right kind of way, that sets the stage for the local level assessments.

#### **2. Purposes of country assessments**

As we look at country profiles of food assessments, what is it that we want them to do for us?

- a. Identifying the vulnerable groups and areas;
- b. Helping us to collaborate better and to reduce duplication of efforts;
- c. Assisting us with our strategic planning;
- d. Understanding the position of the government and how government policies relate to food security problems in the country in order to design prevention properly;
- e. Establishing a baseline that we can use for measuring progress in achieving food security;
- f. Giving us an idea of how the food security situation in the country relates to the international system. How does the international system impact on the country situation? How do changes in the international system affect changes in the national level?
- g. Identifying needs for capacity building;

- h. Facilitating cross-country comparisons and resource allocations;
- i. Optimizing management resources.

- e. population growth and its impact on food security, health, income, consumption patterns, and food preferences.

### 3. Key elements

What should the key elements of a country food security assessment be? Essentially, we need a description and a better understanding of:

- a. agro-ecological zones in a country and other natural characteristics;
- b. cropping systems;
- c. location of food surplus and food deficit areas;
- d. countries' socio-economic systems;
- e. key reasons of food insecurity in the country and a clear description of the vulnerable groups;
- f. prevalence and distribution of vulnerable groups in the country;
- g. countries' market systems: food and other goods/resources
- h. trade, which includes domestic trade, regional trade, and international trade;
- i. consumption and cooking habits of vulnerable groups; patterns of food shortage;
- j. a briefing on different government and donor sponsored aid agencies and their different programs: a program inventory could provide a clearer idea of where they are working in relation to the vulnerable groups; where resources may be over-committed, or which areas or groups may be insufficiently covered;
- k. the contribution of conflict as a major risk factor for food security; this includes political dynamics and their effect on food security;
- l. migration patterns.

### 4. Trends

In addition to an assessment of the current situation there was a feeling that the profiles should also include longer-term trends. They should provide an idea of what trends have occurred in the last five to ten years in relation to food security. This would include information on

- a. prevalence and likelihood of conflicts;
- b. interactions with surrounding countries;
- c. patterns in malnutrition;
- d. government policies, programs, and interventions;

This is a fairly comprehensive list of information and data needs. There was general agreement that we cannot assemble this type of comprehensive country profile everywhere in the region. Secondly, in some countries much of the relevant information is already available, but has not been systematically pulled together. Brian D'Silva took us through a review of each country in the region, what kind of data were collected, and how these were used in food security assessments. What we found was a very mixed situation of the information base, a lot of variation from country to country.

### 5. Data quality and discrepancies

We already have FAO and WFP doing their annual assessments every year on things like production, yields, rainfall, or food demands. But the quality of this data from different regions varies and there is a lot of variability. For instance, there appears to be a discrepancy of a million tons in food production estimates for Ethiopia. For instance, just in Ethiopia, you have a multitude of agencies collecting food security data such as CARE, Save the Children UK, RRC, FEWS, WFP, CRS, UNHCR, and national agencies. There is a wide variety of agencies collecting different types of data, and there is little consistency across these different types of data collection systems. There is little standardization which makes it difficult to get any kind of comparability. There are lots of problems with data quality, transparency, and a lot of variation of ways of collecting methodologies.

### 6. The politics of information

One of the big problems that we need to deal with, as we move forward to put together good country profiles, was seen as the politics of information. For instance, in Sudan and other places, will the authorities permit development organizations to collect and objectively utilize the necessary information? There are issues about ownership of the country profile that need to be addressed: Who owns it? Who controls access to it? Who is the editor in charge? Who decides what goes in what goes out? Who pays? How to deal with politically sensitive problems, such as refugees?

## **7. Timeframe for country studies**

For most of the things in our overall profile some kind of data exist for most countries. Somebody has to pull it all together. So we talked a little bit about where do we go from here? What should we do, to try to put profiles together? We decided as a group, that it would be a good idea to try to push, as good as we can get, country profiles together over a timeframe of about six months. In order to do these, we thought what we need to do is put together some kind of a working group at the national level, including interested PVOs and NGOs and donors. And there should be representation from the relevant government agencies.

## **8. Government representation**

This is an issue that we spent a lot of time talking about: how actively should the Governments get involved at the initial stages of food security assessments? How active an ownership role should they play? There were many different schools of thoughts. Some said we should work immediately through the government systems and strengthen them, and others said let's get going quickly, let's get something together, and then talk about how to institutionalize the process over time.

## **9. Technical backup for national working groups**

The proposed national level working groups need to put the country food security assessment outlines together, and pull the existing information together. We felt it was very, very important that whatever kind of national level working groups will be established, they would most likely need some kind of technical backup. Whether such technical assistance should be contracted from outside, or whether competent food security experts can be found locally, needs to be investigated.

## **10. Coordination with GHAI portfolio review**

After deciding on where we are going, what is in process to fit into this? Apparently there is already an effort underway in the Greater Horn of African Initiative to do an inventory of who is doing what in different areas. We understand from Brian D'Silva that this should be ready by April. So this is something that should be fed into this process.

## **11. Timeframe for assessments and future data collection efforts**

Our idea was to put these assessments together within the next six months. Part of the exercise ought to be to identify the issues and problems, and to make recommendation about the kinds of information systems that need to be put in place to collect this information on a more regular basis. In the end, this may lead to annual data collection and reporting systems that need to be coordinated with current FAO and WFP reporting.

## **12. Initial requirements**

But the initial push will identify the current problems, what needs to be done in terms of information systems, what kinds of resources are required? The initial group could be tasked with making recommendations about where the long-term capacity should be housed and how to integrate the individual private voluntary organization, NGOs and other groups that are collecting information at the local level.

## **13. Leadership on country profiles**

There is a tricky issue of how best to present country food security profiles. Who introduces them? How much ownership should the governments take from the beginning? There was some discussion that the country food security assessment itself should include a series of specific recommendations about where we go from here? The group was of the opinion that the coordinating committee for the country food security assessment should rather be followed by some form of national action committee. The assessment then could be presented to them as one of the tools to use in formulating their action plans.

## **14. IGADD meeting**

We had a fair amount of discussion about this meeting that may take place next month with the heads of state from the region, perhaps something like this can be presented to them as a possibility, something that they might want to buy into and get behind. Another dimension is, to what extent should individual country assessments be coordinated regionally? It is clearly important to do each assessments at the country level, but where do we want to have some regional coordination? We want to have a group of two or three people or an institution

that is coordinating the overall effort to get good consistency between the different countries. We leaned towards having a coordinated regional effort,

but did not come to any specific recommendations in that regard.

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## Presentation of Day 3 Working Group Findings, Working Group # 3:

### BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN FOOD AND FINANCIAL AID AT USAID

**Joe Gettier and Michael Harvey**

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**Joe Gettier:**

This group focused on how to better integrate food and financial resources and some other internal USAID matters. Since the topic is rather broad and different perspectives were applied, we divided the presentation. I will discuss the strategy and coordination aspects and emphasize them from an emergency perspective. Mike Harvey will then discuss them from a broader Mission perspective.

**Better integration of NGO and Mission programs**

Should non-governmental organizations be more closely involved in strategic planning by AID Missions? Even though NGOs are not within the AID lines of authority the overwhelming opinion was that not only can NGOs be melded effectively and early on into Mission strategy development. In fact, they are already integrated in some countries. Also, whereas mission strategies and programs often take a long time to be put together, NGO programs can be effected in three to six months, as far as proposals, considerations, and final approval are concerned.

**Coordination of resources**

Integration of inputs and assets within AID begins at the strategy planning stage. Where we have a variety of resources, primarily those of DFA, OFDA and Food for Peace, all of these should be coordinated at the country level. For countries where we do not have a very large or permanent AID presence the development of strategies using a variety of resources is a difficult nut to crack. For instance, over the years we have had difficulties to utilize all available AID resources in countries such as Somalia. We think that a good place to start would be the Office and Bureau level in Washington to discuss jointly where we want to be in a country that does not have an AID presence five years from now.

**Support for WFP**

Support for the World Food Program was another strategic issue that was discussed. The good news is that the new farm bill is expected to have an allocation of \$10 million for strengthening administrative and assessment capabilities of WFP, Rome. There is also hope that the new farm bill will include a liberalized interpretation of ITSH whereby WFP country programs could benefit from ITSH for administrative expenses. This is not being done now, and there is a paucity of those resources for large WFP programs, specially here in the region.

**Institutional transition between relief and development - the CIDA model**

The issue was raised, where in a post-emergency situation does OFDA or FFP emergency responsibility stop, and where does Africa Bureau responsibility begin. In other words, where does DFA come in and where is OFDA/FFP emergency money, more or less, petered out? In this context, the model of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) was discussed. As a general policy CIDA sets a fairly firm one-year restriction on inputs for emergency money and after that the development programs are supposed to pick it up. We know that there are exceptions to that rule, but as a general policy, one year emergency input is something that could possibly be replicated by our own system. An important feature of that model is that the relevant regional bureau knows it is going to have to go into a particular country one year and one day after the initiation of the intervention. This encourages or even forces the regional bureau to have somebody on the design team from the very start where there is an emergency intervention.

**Bridging the continuum with emergency monetization**

We discussed Somalia as an example of where DFA money did not reach down far enough into the

rehabilitation and reconstruction phase. There were some legal constraints quoted; there was some possible bureaucratic reluctance to actually commit DFA funds under very uncertain circumstances. In this situation the USAID Mission creatively used emergency monetization to bridge the relief-to-development continuum. About \$3.6 million were monetized and worked rather well for development purposes. The group gave some thought to whether or not liberal emergency monetization, which is notwithstanding authority, could be applied more strategically in other programs where we have to bridge the continuum from relief to development.

### **Annual reviews of Title III**

Although Title III programs are approved for three years, there are yearly reviews. The group could not identify the origin of this rule whereby these consultations had to take place yearly. It was more or less decided that this annual review process should be stopped or, at least, be substantially modified.

### **Title II responsibility**

In future, the Africa Bureau should take a more active role in Title II program reviews. As part of a strengthened team effort, an officer at the desk level should more regularly and thoroughly review proposals to determine whether or not they should be approved and how they fit into the broader framework of the Africa strategy.

### **Review of DRCO responsibilities**

The Africa Bureau will review the role of the Disaster Relief Coordination Office (DRCO). DRCO is an Africa Bureau organization which primarily calls meetings on FEWS contracts, but it does not necessarily participate in emergencies. Extending the role of DRCO to address the continuum issues might be a good idea. They have some very good people in that office now. This might be the appropriate time to reinforce DRCO and possibly extend its role.

### **Bridging the cultural gap**

To some extent, the cultural gap between OFDA and the bureaus in AID should be bridged. For instance, where OFDA gives orientation classes to new entrants, or has meetings or retreats of a very general nature, Africa Bureau personnel, or other BHR

personnel might be able to attend and participate rather than only OFDA people. The same should apply to incorporating OFDA personnel into Africa Bureau forums of a similar nature. This way we hope to expand cooperation and understanding on the issues.

### **Personnel issues**

The role of Direct Hire, AID Direct Hire, and AID officers in OFDA was discussed. In the past there has been an overwhelming desire on the part of most development officers not to serve within OFDA, but that is beginning to change. It certainly is beginning to change in Food for Peace. Thanks to Bob Kramer's and his staff's interventions many more applicants from within AID now vie for positions at FFP, and I think that this is an occurrence that will probably affect OFDA as well. People who serve in OFDA tend to stay for quite a long time, but, at last, new slots have been opened up. Hopefully more line AID officer will apply to OFDA position, which could improve agency-wide understanding and coordination.

### **Resource competition within USAID**

One of our very articulate members of the discussion yesterday said that "the competition for resources is Washington's bloodiest sport, and OFDA and Africa Bureau are often its primary predators." OFDA has a borrowing authority that allows it, under specific circumstances, to take money from the regional bureaus. The regional bureaus naturally resent this and would like to protect what they consider their own. This often brings OFDA and the regional bureaus into some very strong contentions. This resource competition between the emergency side of the house and the development side of the house should be reviewed.

### **USAID Representation in Brussels and Geneva**

Finally, we talked about improved USAID representation in Brussels and Geneva replicating the very prompt and efficient manner of our office in Rome, which mainly coordinates with WFP. In various developing countries coordination of resources between the European Community and AID would combine up to 70% of total foreign aid resources. If we could have a more efficient coordination and work jointly with the European Community on issues of mutual interest, or, at least, learn more about each other's programs in any given developing country, we

could reduce duplication and possibly apply financial and political resources much more efficiently. The

**Michael Harvey:**

### **Making food aid more visible in reporting**

Almost none of the formal AID reporting requirements demands to pull in reporting on food aid resources. And it is not simply reporting, for the whole range of documentation that is prepared by AID the food aid side is missing, from the strategic documents to the Congressional representation over annual program impact assessments to our reporting against earmarks. None of that reflects or captures what is being done under the PL480. It is quite interesting that despite the fact that we don't report on it, USAID still has much less trouble getting PL480 resources than DFA resources. We do think that in order to integrate better in the actual implementation food aid needs to be more prominently reflected in reporting.

### **Flexibility of food aid**

Under current administrative regulations, food aid has an excellent flexibility in terms of programming and timing to really bridge the gap between emergency and development through monetization or food-for-work programs. However, I caution the workshop against saying "okay, rehab is the responsibility of food." I think we still need to push OFDA to reach out and push DFA to reach down into the rehab arena, but, realistically, we must realize there's going to be resource constraints on both of those two pieces. Probably food is the one resource which can reliably be called upon to fill any shortfall and compensate for failing to mobilize the other resources. We are not saying "exclusively give it to food" but recognize that it is presently the most flexible resource.

OFDA's mandate explicitly and very clearly allows it to do rehabilitation, but its first responsibility is relief. And given the Bosnias and Angolas and other emergency areas in the world, the pressure on OFDA's resources is such that they are saying, "look guys, until the world calms down, we can't do rehabilitation, somebody else do it." And DFA says, "look Africa is falling apart, we've got to focus on the development; we can't always have enough left over to clean up messes." Those are both very legitimate and responsible positions to take, but that leaves a gap.

same applies to AID's interaction with several large international organizations in Geneva.

### **Monetization**

Increased use of monetization has already been mentioned. There was some discussion about the problems we had in this country three years ago when both the new Ethiopian and Eritrian governments came into power. AID rushed in with huge high-level teams to recreate these countries. And then nothing happened. I think, the Africa Bureau and AHM were very aware of the fact that it was our own self-imposed constraints that resulted in that and that we are moving away from those self-imposed constraints.

### **'Not withstanding authorities'**

A "not-withstanding authorities" can be delegated to the regional bureaus by the Administrator of the Agency when they are needed. Not-withstanding is basically: "If you want to do it, do it" and "If it is legal and ethical, just do it", to quote Vice-President Gore. The problem is mostly procurement and contracts. You want to go and do something and it takes forever to do it. If you want to do something, if it's necessary, and the system doesn't support you, you can tell the Administrator and he can give you the authority to do it, not-withstanding any other elements of legislation. It's never, ever used.

### **Earmarks**

USAID works in an environment with earmarks. For those of you who don't live within the AID bureaucracy, you have to do x% for bugs and bunnies, x% for babies, x% for whatever else, and by the time you get to the end of the day, there's nothing left. That means that you don't have any money left for agriculture or for rehabilitation or whatever. We have got to talk to Congress to give the bill a little bit more flexibility how we are funded.

### **New Farm Bill**

We have got the rewrite of the farm bill underway. We have asked Bob Kramer for the administration's position on the farm bill. We encouraged Bob Kramer to share more widely outside BHR whatever is available in terms of suggested policy changes, and we were encouraging him to get some input from those of us who have to live with the bill out here.

**Increased delegation of Title II and Title III resource management to the field**

Finally, although there is no consensus on this point, in trying to better integrate food aid into the mission programming process, we ask for more delegation of authority for the day to day management of Title II and Title III programs to the field. Now, Bob Kramer raises, quite rightly, the point that few Missions in Africa, or few Missions with food aid programs have as strong a food aid staff, as perhaps we do in Ethiopia. We concede that. So, selectively delegate. Delegate more authority at least to those who have the capacity.

Secondly, in order to properly integrate Title III into Mission programming we think it should be programmed rather like DFA resources. Right now, the Mission director, Marge Bonner, gets a delegation authority from Carol Peasley on DFA resources for three years. She doesn't have to go back. She does have to go back in three years and say what she did with it. But this doesn't happen for Title III resources. The delegation maybe: have some money for the next 12 months and maybe in 12 months after that, and this doesn't work for proper integration of Title III resources. What we are asking for is: clear delegation, as with DFA resources, and then trust us.

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## Presentation of Day 3 Working Group Findings, Working Group # 3:

### DISCUSSION

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#### Intra-Agency Coordination

**Wendy Fenton, CIDA:** How much more of a bureaucratic delay may be added as more coordination and interchange between the Bureaus and OFDA needs to be done? Coordination requires extra time; you have to involve more players; and it may be much harder to reach consensus.

**Michael Harvey:** You are right, and we did not explicitly consider the element of time. What we did talk about was that if people from the relevant offices, who have been delegated the authority from their supervisors, are involved from the beginning that really does bridge a lot of that gap. Secondly, coordination typically works in crisis situations where you have clear lead roles by one Bureau or Office. Where it doesn't work is in long-term, complex emergencies, where you don't have a constant involvement from the people at OTI, the Desk, or whatever.

**Jerome Wolgin:** Coordination is incredibly critical. We are moving into a phase where AID is going to ask for a lot more coordination and a lot less clear responsibilities. In the working group we were particularly trying to improve coordination on developing a strategic framework for looking at key problems, for instance, of integrating food aid programs better into Mission strategies, or of integrating OFDA and the Regional Bureaus better into thinking about how to deal with long-term emergencies. First, we have to be clear on how to approach something, then we have to figure out what kind of coordination is needed.

**Margaret Bonner:** One of the problems in the past has been that things just don't happen when there is no coordination. Period. With coordination it may take a little bit longer, but, at least, hopefully, things might happen.

**Timothy Frankenberg:** Improved coordination may require deep re-configurations with regards to staff, particularly in terms of professional incentives. Staff have to derive individual benefits from the collaborating process.

**Joe Gettler:** A lot of resentment in the past has been caused by the fact that people may not have been asked to participate; or when asked to participate they may not have showed up, or may have showed up only for the initial meeting. We have to develop a different attitude towards coordination. Coordination is fine, but who is going to take the decisions, who will be responsible in the end? Who takes the lead role should be clear from the beginning.

Where the participants from different Bureaus may have difficulties in coming up with jointly supported decisions, there should be, perhaps, another entity to take that decision. The chief-of-staff might be involved in these forums and even though he might not take the final cut, his presence might facilitate a decision at the end of deliberations.

**Marty Hanratty:** What really happens in Washington is that OFDA, in an emergency, may come in and take \$15 million out of the Africa Bureau budget. It then may invite the Bureau to consider coordinated activities. You're starting off with a very, very difficult situation. Unless the issue of borrowing, which is not borrowing but taking, is recognized, you are not likely to make progress. This has to be dealt with straight on, because it is a major impediment to cooperation down the road, specially at the management levels of the bureau.

#### The role of the Office of Transitional Initiatives (OTI)

**Rudy von Bernuth:** There is some uncertainty concern on the part of the NGO community in the U.S.

about the role of the Office of Transitional Initiatives (OTI). Has the creation of OTI allowed both Africa Bureau and OFDA to wash their hands off rehabilitation? May OTI, an institution without any resources, be a barrier to coordination on the continuum.

**Kristy Cook:** OTI was set up two years ago within the Bureau of Humanitarian Response, with the mandate of addressing transitional situations. The office is very small, with a \$20 million budget which comes out of OFDA's budget. The management of OTI has, pretty much, focused on peaceful transition situations with a high priority for re-establishing civil and governmental structures. OTI has chosen countries such as Haiti and Angola. They have defined very clear priorities within their broad mandate. But there are people in the Agency who are pretty upset, because in their view, OTI is not taking on all the things they would like to see them take on.

**Carol Peasley:** It's fair to say that OTI hasn't worked the way we all expected which was that in transitional situations OTI might take lead responsibility in the same way that OFDA takes in emergency and relief situations. Instead, it appears that OTI has taken more of a piece-meal approach to action in some key countries. It certainly has not caused the rest of us to wash our hands of the transitional problems.

In Rwanda, for instance, the Africa Bureau is scrambling hard to reprogram available resources to meet short-term rehabilitation needs, particularly in the judiciary area. We have had discussions with OTI. They are interested in looking at longer-term decentralization issues. It turns out that we are doing what OTI, I thought, was supposed to be doing, and they are doing what we felt we were supposed to be doing.

**John Grant:** We are currently in the process at BHR of defining the best role of OTI. OTI's role is evolving; we are looking at it as part of our strategic planning process to deal with the continuum. It is recognized that there are some gaps. So far, with its small staff and budget, OTI has picked only a few specific situations to intervene in rather than try to play a policy coordination role in many of these transition situations.

**Gayle Smith:** One of the points people in the field repeatedly make is that they do not see the utility in the different "aid windows"--the relief window, rehab window, development window. There should be a long-term understanding between the different players within the Agency. On top of that it might be useful to have a mechanism, such as a swat team when there are delicate matters of transition. A steady transition, not chopped up into bumps, is much what is needed.

#### **The role of the State Department**

**Wendy Fenton:** We have heard that the State Department has become involved in collecting and synthesizing conflict early warning indicators under the Greater Horn Initiative. How does the State Department Refugee Program interface with the USAID programs and their coordination? Are food, rehabilitation, or resources for refugees considered peripheral or integral part of the whole State Department program?

**Jerome Wolgin:** Right now they are peripheral in terms of the basic structure of the GHAI. The State Department is, obviously in an evolving role and we have made some very good strides, perhaps, the past year. We would like to get them more deeply involved and that's one of the agenda items for the GHAI meeting.

**Carol Peasley:** We want and need to be more flexible in programming resources. I am more familiar with Southern Africa than Horn programs. I do know that in Southern Africa, in '91-'92, missions demonstrated a great deal of flexibility across the board in making adjustments to meet some emergency needs from DFA funds. So, I think it's conceptually possible to do that; at the same time, we all want to make the best use of scarce development resources we have. We don't want to jump too quickly into substituting development dollars for disaster assistance dollars.

**Jerome Wolgin:** In southern Africa, one of the reasons to continue the use of DFA during an emergency was because the southern African drought was seen as a short-term thing. We were already investing in those countries because we thought they had potential. It is more difficult to commit DFA resources in countries that AID may not want to be involved to start with. The Africa Bureau has just gone through a process of eliminating a lot of

countries from assistance where it was felt that there was no potential to move ahead. Are such countries, if they get into emergencies and if the emergency situation were to stop, are those countries places where you would want to invest your DFA money?

#### **Using scarce resources in unstable countries**

**Marty Hanratty:** Most of the emergencies that we deal with are man-made because governments neglected their responsibilities for a variety of reasons. After an emergency calms down, the underlying political conditions that generated the emergency in the first place may still be existing. They may make positive returns on investments in rehabilitation very problematic. You will be forced to decide if you take that high risk, or if you may use your funds in some other country where you can expect a higher return on your investment as government may be more cooperative and stable. Those are the types of problematic decisions to make.

**Jerome Wolgin:** In countries which have made transitions and where the political structure has changed we have been able to deal with rehabilitation issues well. A good example is Uganda. After the fighting stopped and the new government built roads, we were able to move in our resources on the country level and enable the whole government apparatus and economy to get a jump start. The key issue is the question "where is the best way of using scarce resources?"

#### **More emphasis on rehabilitation**

**Willet Weeks:** If we look back at the specific experiences in the countries of the Greater Horn of Africa over the last ten or twenty years, we see how difficult it is to visualize the actions in terms of the continuum that in retrospect have been appropriate. It's particularly distressing to see how poorly questions of rehabilitation have been addressed. The central lesson of countries in the Greater Horn tells us that if we don't make the restoration and the quick return to self-reliance our first priority, all those resources that are going into "pure relief" may be lost. They may even be doing a great deal of harm for restoring self-reliance.

How can we place rehabilitation at the top of the list, rather than thinking of it as some later phase of the continuum? How can we make it a the first concern of everybody involved? And in particular,

how can we find a better mechanism to make it easier for NGOs to approach AID to solicit the combined food and financial resources for rehabilitation, rather than pure relief?

**Barbara Huddleston:** In doing the rehabilitation work we have to do some creative thinking about moving into new modes. If we rehabilitate the way we were doing previously, we may just be putting the groundwork for another disaster. From my side, I don't think we know enough yet about what those alternatives actually are in specific situations. I think that this is an area where a lot of thinking and research need to be done. Rehabilitation right now is seen very much as a relief-related activity--somehow after the emergency, we just have to get people back to the way things were so that they are alright again. But if the emergency occurred because there was a developmental problem to begin with, we should be rather going into a developmental mode right at the stage of rehabilitation.

**Gayle Smith:** Ten years ago I lived in the North of Ethiopia which was a war zone. Many people back then said "it's a war zone, you can't do development, you can't do rehabilitation, it's not worth the investment." We did make investments, and I am sure that the region is better off today because we made those investments. One of the questions is, what is the timeframe for a cost-benefit analysis? Do we have to show results in one, two, or three years? Or you are we thinking in the long-term?

**Bob Kramer:** For instance, in states like Rwanda, after tremendous investments in emergency relief, there has been no attempt at the national and institutional level in the international donor community to support the government. It seems that Rwanda is not given the resources for development programs.

**Carol Peasley:** I don't think it is fair to say that in Rwanda nothing is being done on the national level. A lot of people are working very hard right now on rehabilitation, including USAID officers, and I think, they are using development resources very creatively. You may be right in saying that not enough resources are going into rehabilitation. But there are also some very fundamental political issues that need to be resolved. There have been human rights concerns; the Government must create the possibility for refugees to return and build a workable justice system which can deal with refugee property issues.

Above all, we have to recognize that we are dealing with infinite sets of problems in this continent with extremely finite resources. So, while there are thousands and thousands of important and useful things to do, we have got to choose what is the best thing to do.

**Jerome Wolgin:** We appear to have many situations in Africa, where we kind of slide along, and we don't come to decisions. When emergencies hit, people may come together for a while. But I think we do need a better process and a clear timeframe of bringing things and people together, to determine our policy options and to make conscious decisions on where we should go and who does what. Better coordination not only within USAID, but among donors, to make more conscious choices.

**Allen Jones:** I think it's interesting to note that after three decades of studying food distribution policies, the Government of Ethiopia has come to the conclusion that the food supported employment generation schemes are a simultaneous response to relief, rehabilitation and development.

**Lawrence Haddad:** These are real constraints that Jerry and others are highlighting--yes, we have to make choices. But I would like to underline what Barbara was saying about the need to get development in faster, and what Gayle was saying about the long-term cost-effectiveness of assistance. As a matter of fact, the domestic food programs in the United States have used these long-term, cost-effective, return type arguments very effectively to say that "a dollar spent today saves more than a dollar in five to ten years time." I think one has to realize that a dollar spent on livelihood protection today may save five dollars spent on livelihood advancement later on down the line.

**Berhane Woldetensale:** I have field experiences in emergencies dating back to 1986 when 300,000 refugees staying in Sudan came back to Ethiopia. We were doing relief, rehabilitation and development programs simultaneously at that time. But the resources that were provided for rehabilitation were much less than the community needed to seriously rehabilitate the displaced people. Taking these returnees back from Sudan went beyond nine months of food ration; the counseling, taking care of the communities, etc. We have to think about the continuum, but, primarily, we have to look at the available funding.

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## Presentation of Follow-up Activities

### COUNTRY FOOD SECURITY ASSESSMENTS

**Timothy Frankenberger**

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The following is an attempt to outline the necessary steps to get country food security assessments/profiles completed for each country in the Horn.

#### Country food security assessments

1. First, a **coordinating committee** needs to be established which would include different organizations. Such a committee should act very much as a planning group that could help draft common sets of terms of references so that we have consistency across the profiles, across the countries.
2. Secondly, it is important to put forward the notion of **country profiles on the agenda for IGADD** at the meeting that's coming up next month. That means that we would like to see if the Heads of States and the observing countries that are coming to this IGADD meeting will buy into the notion of country food security profiles that are going to be used for better targeting and coordination. If they do, we also want them to buy into the notion that key national working groups need to be formed to make this happen so that the Governments own this process. Currently, Ethiopia has already started to formulate such working groups.
3. Third, we need to make sure that these **common terms of reference** for country programs are accepted by the national working groups and that there is a division of labor across the donors for putting these profiles together. For instance, it may make sense to have FAO through their technical expertise pull the profiles together in some countries; the Food for Peace Office or Africa Bureau could pull them together in some; or the EC in others. But we should all have the same terms of reference, the same kinds of things going into these profiles. Then we can share in the costs of putting them together.
4. In terms of the **technical review teams** that will actually do the work for pulling these together, the notion is that we want to make sure that there are NGO representatives on those technical review teams. There is a real concern in the group that there needs to be a local NGO representation that is key to making this work. This might be done through combining or having a coalition group of NGOs working in a country come together and nominating a couple of representatives that can be part of the technical review team.
5. Our first objective is to try to get people (i.e., Governments) buy into the profiles. That is of immediate importance. In terms of timing a key date is the upcoming IGADD meeting. The idea is that there will not be a lot of detail presented in terms of the profiles, but the idea should be presented in a very general format to get the Governments to buy into it. At the same time there would be movement towards operationalizing this in much more detail. The coordinating committee would have to start working as soon as possible to start filling in the details.
6. We also thought it would be helpful to have a **central place in the region** where the planning committee could get organized and meet. Certain members of the group suggested Nairobi as the logical place. There was a suggestion that we utilize REDSO to help us in establishing a little secretariat there. We also talked about the **need for money**—putting money on the table for this right away—and we talked about a figure of \$500,000 dollars, or about \$50,000 per country. We talked about the need for good technical assistance, possibly on a couple of consultants on a full time basis.
7. One of the things I personally would suggest, and I stand to be corrected, is that it is also important to have **bilateral discussions at an early stage**. There are bound to be different interests in this profile exercise from country to country. If there is some bilateral dialogue early in the game—we

will have a greater chance of being able to reflect the variations in the region and also having serious regional interest in it rather than, sort of, opportunistic regional interest.

8. A major question is **who is going to be responsible for doing what?** Who is talking to IGADD, for instance? We thought that the Food for Peace Office (FFP) should be working in conjunction with the Horn of Africa Coordinating Committee (HACC) in taking responsibility for forming the initial components to present to representatives of IGADD.

#### **Emergency assessments**

9. Another notion that was talked about was trying to improve upon the emergency assessment methodology that FAO and WFP are doing globally. By bringing into play those institutions that have most to gain from accurate assessments, in particular PVOs and country governments, they could substantially improve the quality of the methodologies and ensure that they are more widely accepted. We did not set a date for this, but we thought that this should be an important future activity.

#### **Household level food security assessments**

10. Related to country profiles of food security are improvements on household level food security assessments, their methodologies and processes. We need to be aware that we have different data needs that may be context specific for particular vulnerable areas or groups. Detailed household data should inform us, for instance, about the best selection of interventions to deal with food security problems. We all have different household survey methodologies that we are using. We need to think about what is the best way to create a menu of options and then have criteria for when certain options make sense. Sometimes rapid assessments are going to be appropriate, at other times much more detailed base-line surveys or questionnaires that have representative samples may be appropriate. We want to have a range of options depending on the resource mix that's available to different groups. Workshops sometime in the future probably could help fine-tune or work towards these processes. We haven't set a date on this.

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## Presentation of Follow-up Activities

### IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

Rudy von Bernuth

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#### Introduction

What was our group about? First, we looked at current practices by the NGO representatives and our groups in terms of evaluating impact and monitoring, and we came up with a great big list of all the different kinds of things. We tried to sort that list out a little bit and organize it; and you can see the results there on the wall. We organized the different things that people looked at in terms of risk, utilization, access and availability--these were essentially indicators. We also separated out, as an area, what we were not going to deal with at the impact level.

We basically set all our process indicators aside as something that was not relevant to the final definition of impact. We then went on to see how we can capture a whole lot of those different things in one conceptual basket. We basically came up with two baskets to look at in the future as possible ways to conceptualize the impact of food security in a way that could be better marketed, emulating a way that has successfully been done by the Bureau of Population.

So we came up with two notions. One was the famous formula of  $D = C + S + I$ . The second thing we came up with was the Food Security Years of Protection, which is a bit of a rip off from the Population Bureau, but why not. That's food for thought.

#### Specific Follow-up Activities

1. It was agreed that we would use the existing structure of Food Aid Management (FAM). We will try to get FAM to establish a PVO working group on common evaluation and monitoring systems. I will take responsibility for that and will get the group organized by 6/30/95.

At the same time our colleagues from the World Food Program will inform people working on this

process at their organization. They will establish an information exchange on M&E related issues for NGOs that are negotiating MOUs with the World Food Program. David Morton and David Fletcher will be responsible for making sure that these issues gets onto that ongoing dialogue.

Tim Lavelle will take responsibility for making clear to all parties that this initiative does something highly endorsable.

2. On resource needs the bottom line is that currently existing resources of the institutional support grants (ISGs), which all the food utilizing PVOs in the U.S. already have, are probably sufficient for future M&E activities as many of the agencies have already been dealing with impact evaluations. In fact by pulling our records we might be able to move forward in this area at low costs.

Tim Lavelle and Ina Schonberg would be the ones to take the lead on this. Perhaps they could call a meeting of the ISG recipients to talk about this process and clarify PVO willingness to include new M&E concepts in the program implementation plans which are presently being developed for negotiation in June/July.

3. Lawrence Haddad (IFPRI) has agreed to get the topic of impact assessment on the agenda of the UN Subcommittee on Nutrition for June '95. In addition he will consult with Barbara Huddleston of FAO on getting the same subject matter on the FAO World Food Summit Agenda which is taking place sometime this year. This is part of our effort again to get this whole issues and dialogue extended throughout the system.

AID is going to invite CIDA and the European Union to a meeting. Bob Kramer is responsible for the invitation and to put on the agenda to that meeting common approaches to monitoring and

evaluation. The invitation will go out in April. We're not sure exactly when the meeting will take place. The World Food Program CFA meeting will be taking place in May '95. AID will initiate a dialogue with the World Food Program. All these are efforts to percolate the whole system so that nobody is left out.

4. IFPRI will set up an e-mail node following the progress of this whole dialogue and that will take place by April.
5. Regarding internal AID coordination on this issue we will request Cindy Clapp-Wincek to talk to Jerry Wolgin and to Tracy Atwood to get their ideas into this process.
6. Lastly, the WFP evaluation service should be brought into the loop of dealing with monitoring issues on their use of food in development, emergencies, and refugees. By its nature, this will bring in UNHCR on the refugee side. Michael Sackett is taking responsibility for that issue.
7. EuronAid. As a way of bringing the European NGOs into this process we will invite EuronAid to participate in the working group on these matters.
8. We have a contract with MSI to help us work on strategic planning including indicators and information systems on the food security side. They can be valuable resource people hooked

into this process. Cindy could be a coordination element.

## Conclusion

The only concern I have is that we have been pushing our NGOs out here to be coming up with their own indicators. I think it's the same problems we are all struggling with, to get those in their action plans in as part of our reporting system back in the U.S.A.. There should be some more discussion on how you get the field involved in what USAID is trying to do in terms of indicator development. I assume, much of this will be taking place at headquarters back in Washington. But how do you get the field input into what is going on? I think there has been a lot of thought going on within the NGOs that we deal with here on the ground.

The U.S. PVOs would be part of the earlier mentioned FAM group. In our regular ongoing dialogue with our field offices we see that each one of them will get input into the development of a system, in terms of what kind of indicators and what kind of systems are appropriate. This has to start with an assessment of what is currently used in the field and what is recommended for future use.

What we thought was important to do is to come up with a few common informal indicators and mutually acceptable methodologies that PVOs and BHR can then use in yearly report and congressional planning. We don't want to stifle the creativity of field missions and NGOs.

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# PRESENTATION OF USAID WORKING GROUP ON THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA INITIATIVE

**Jerome Wolgin and Ted Morse**

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***Jerome Wolgin:***

First, I would like to thank Bob Kramer and the organizers of this workshop for enabling us to meet here in Addis Ababa, because this was a sorely needed meeting between people working on the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative in Washington and those working on it in the field. In many ways it has been very much like working an elephant. There are lots of reasons for that. The most important one has to do with one of the basic principles behind the Initiative, which is African leadership. The United States do not want to lead this Initiative, but rather be led. But it is pretty hard to more clearly define it and move forward without heaping on ourselves the leadership which we don't want to take on. Over time we got a clear view of what we hope will happen, and what our particular role should be.

Basically, I am sure most of you know that the long-term vision of the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative is to eliminate food insecurity. And the goal of food security in the region is not only related to droughts but also to conflict. But the basic focus of the Initiative in these early days is really on process. It is on strategic coordination to achieve an African led development and food security strategy with participation of all stake holders. This includes particularly African governments, the donors and the NGOs. We don't expect that this Initiative is going to mobilize greater donor resources. But we can all see ways in which resources can be programmed more effectively in order to multiply the effect and impact of the resources we already have.

I think no one is operating under the illusion that will be easy or quick. There are differences among the governments and their ability to manage this kind of process. There are certainly differences among donors in terms of their willingness to accept African leadership. So, in many ways, implementation of the Initiative should be expected to be somewhat slow in the beginning. But we hope that as its benefits become clearer and clearer it will gain a momentum.

Among the basic parameters of the Initiative is the regional perspective of thinking of the Greater Horn as one area. Secondly, AID needs to expand its food security strategy to include conflict resolution and

prevention and to put greater emphasis on the issue of transition. We need a real understanding of how food aid and dollar resources can be better combined.

These were the broad kinds of things that we have been discussing during this workshop in our working group on the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative. We have also spent a lot of time in trying to clarify the management roles. The Initiative has so far been managed in Washington by a Task Force. Our intention now is to institutionalize it within the existing bureaucracy as much as possible while maintaining a coordination role for the task force and trying to make sure that we are working in harmony. We also expect to shift a lot of responsibility to the bilateral Missions and to REDSO so that Washington's role would be a point of advocacy and facilitation.

The critical next steps which will help define how the Initiative is to move ahead is the expectation that the IGADD members will call a donors meeting, most likely sometime in May. That meeting is expected to help set the framework for how we move forward. Again, we expect, want, and intend to have the Africans in the lead here; how we are going to respond and proceed with the Initiative will depend a lot on how they organize themselves and what they ask from us.

***Ted Morse:***

The Greater Horn of Africa Initiative has been taken on by Brian Atwood on behalf of the President of the United States, and the U.S. Government as a whole. He is absolutely adamant that the Initiative gets continued high level attention and operational attention. For that reason there is a Steering Committee, that John Hicks chairs on a weekly basis with the deputy assistant administrators. Quite frankly, the day to day work is being done by Carol Peasley. And I would like to say in this public forum that since she took over that portfolio it's been energized in a way that had not happened in the first six months. The last three months have been phenomenal, including the establishment of an interbureau group of office directors, the Horn of Africa Coordinating Committee (HACC), chaired by

Jerry Wolgin. It includes Bob Kramer from BHR, people from the global bureau, Tracy Atwood, when John Lewis is not there, people from program coordination. And then under the HACC there are four interbureau working groups.

Regarding the organization of the Initiative, one of the things that was very useful for me at this workshop was to get a better clarification of what is expected of Missions, REDSO, and Washington. REDSO staff have just gone for a retreat to look at their own strategic objectives, one of which is how to handle the Greater Horn Initiative. So they are already starting to incorporate that into their present policies.

Let me add that the "Greater Horn of African Initiative" is not separate from what we have been doing in the plenary sessions and other working groups of this workshop. It is very much integral. We have been sitting here and carefully listening to the reports that you have been giving. For instance, the concept that there should be country food security profiles and that these country profiles should be the

focal point for bringing together all of the actors that are involved in a country on food security, looking at food security in its broadest context of everything from big governments, political and military aspects, as well as the availability, access and utilization of food, what you are talking about here is in a sense the Initiative.

What we have been trying to do in the Initiative is exactly what you have been doing here for the last 3 1/2 days. The next phase of this is to take and fit the recommendations of this workshop together with what has already been articulated by the 800 people that Gayle Smith has consulted and the 250 that I have consulted. We should also be looking now for African leadership to tell us "Okay, you the outsiders, this is how we want to approach this. We agree with the final objective and we like the ideas that you all have been perking up, but here is what we don't like, and this is how we the Africans would like to put it together." I couldn't be more pleased with what has been going on at this workshop from my point of view as the Director of the Greater Horn of Africa Task Force for the last nine months.

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## Closing Remarks

# TURNING FOOD AID INTO A HIGH QUALITY RESOURCE: A TRANSFORMATION PROGRAM FOR FOOD FOR PEACE

H. Robert Kramer

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### Introduction

#### *Food aid - a developmentally challenged resource?*

Walter North made a very important statement the other day, when he said that "food aid is a developmentally challenged resource." Most importantly, he pointed out that "Food aid has not yet been re-engineered and made user friendly." Over the past 11 months, my office, the Office of Food for Peace, has been engaged exactly in this effort, a fundamental transformation of how food aid as a resource is perceived and used.

#### *The GAO challenge to USAID food aid management*

The challenge was and is real. In 1984 the GAO issued a very stern warning to the Agency. In essence, two of its blue-covered auditing reports stated that PL 480 resources were being mismanaged by AID. One report criticized AID, I think quite appropriately, for the very ineffective management of PL 480. Another report condemned AID and the World Food Program for poor accountability for the use of food aid resources. USAID appeared very vulnerable as an Agency. Unfortunately, there has long prevailed in this Agency a mind set that considered PL 480 as a marginal resource, poorly managed, and with little impact. Basically, food aid was seen as an entitlement rather than a challenging quality resource.

#### *Goals of the transformation program*

The fundamental goals of the transformation program we embarked on were to enhance the credibility of food aid and the capabilities of the people who manage it. Some of the detailed objectives were to:

- Increase the awareness of the use of food aid as a quality resource;

- Establish a more efficient and effective management system for the Agency's food aid program; and
- Redefine and focus on strategic food security objectives.

### The early situation

#### *A policy vacuum*

In April 1994, when I took over the responsibility for the Food for Peace Office, the relationship between PVOs and USAID was very tense. The PVOs had met with the Administrator of AID several months before. They had made clear that they wanted to be considered as equal partners. But there was a thorough policy vacuum. There was no food aid/food security policy. So food aid could, in fact, be used quite indiscriminately for a variety of purposes, and AID was unable to demonstrate any kind of impact on food security. This was pointed out by the GAO reports and others.

#### *Poor management*

On the management of food aid we were very vulnerable. In fact, we had very few people managing a very large resource. There are only 30 people in this agency, direct hires, who manage food aid. Yet, the office manages \$1.2 billion of mostly projectized resource. I think this puts things in perspective. I am very fortunate to have definitely the most committed and dedicated staff I've had the privilege to work with in my two decades with the agency. Their commitment and dedication are obvious, and the abundant talent of the very few people who manage one third of the Agency's resources is widely recognized. We realize that we're not going to get a large infusion of new staff in Food for Peace, although we have been very fortunate to create in fact some new positions.

On the other hand, professional training of FFP staff had been neglected for decades. Moreover, there had been no recruitment of food aid managers for many years. And of course, we had some intractable problems with WFP's financial and program management.

### **The transformation program**

#### *A plethora of challenges*

We knew that we had to create a much greater awareness within USAID, the PVOs, international organizations, and Congress, of food aid as a quality resource. The second class nature of food aid in USAID was paralleled by the same perception within PVOs. Even though food aid often constitutes a majority of resources for American PVOs, they were having problems to demonstrate that they saw food aid as anything more than an entitlement.

So, we had to put food aid into a strategic planning framework. We had to be able to demonstrate to ourselves and to Congress that a finite resource could have the greatest possible impact. And we had to come up with a new way of dealing with PVOs as partners. We had to develop a form of professional development program for USAID staff, and, very importantly, we had to establish a career path for food aid managers, including incentives to attract and retain the best people in the business.

We realized that to improve the food aid program, we had to redefine and focus our strategic objectives. We had to commit the Agency to a new food aid/food security policy paper. We had to come up with a new project design and review process, and we needed a coherent food aid evaluation plan. We had to develop a core of common, generic Title II performance indicators. We had to improve the quality of WFP's development programs. We had to formulate a new monetization policy. And we had to come up with areas to permit the PVOs to enhance their institutional capability to do this.

#### *Retreating and brainstorming*

We started with our office in a strategic planning retreat. More than 20 Food for Peace people attended this brainstorming. Many Agency staff tend to consider Food for Peace "types" as purely operational and not capable of thinking creatively. In fact, we are to some extent condemned to perpetuate that perception because we have little time to put our

feet up on a table, and extensively think about why we are doing what we are doing. One may better understand, if one had the opportunity to see the kinds of administrative detail that FFP is responsible for.

We also realized that as we tried to establish more specific strategic objectives, we couldn't do it in a vacuum. We had to engage other food aid related managers in U.S. government agencies--USDA, OMB, State Department--and, of course, our partners the PVOs. We got together for another retreat on a mountain in Virginia and we brainstormed again.

When we started to develop a food aid/food security policy paper it became quite obvious that food aid was being used for a large number of purposes. It also turned out to be very difficult to think about how to conceive of food aid strategically, and how to come up with a consensus. The Agency's PD 19 had a very broad definition of food aid. That was okay when you used to have \$2 billion in Title II alone. At that time we were basically encouraging Missions and PVOs to absorb food aid for whatever development activities out there. For a long time, program proposals had been endorsed according to the prevailing mind set of "who cares?" But now we have gone down to about \$800 million, and you got complex emergencies eating up most of these resources. So you have to use the remaining resources very wisely and effectively.

#### *Applying tougher standards for food aid programs*

The situation has long changed. Last June when we began to review the annually submitted Multi-Year Operational Programs (MYOPs), we decided to engage in comprehensive program reviews using the same standards that we would use for dollar funded programs to review PVO proposals. Not to do that would perpetuate the "second class mentality" of food aid. These reviews by FFP, other Bureaus in AID, other Government agencies, and PVO headquarters took two months. Many programs simply could not be approved, because they could not demonstrate that they were having a food security impact or that food was, in fact, the most efficient resource to use. Some of them simply didn't have the capability to manage the resource. You can imagine the consternation that caused.

#### *Developing policy priorities*

But we still did not have a policy. We did not have, what I like to call, "a program compass" to

permit us to make the decisions on what's in and what's out. At that time we began drafting the food aid/food security policy paper and we decided to narrow the definition of how to use food aid to address food security to the strategic objectives, or "priorities", as we call them, of increasing agricultural productivity and increasing household level nutrition.

We had to make some difficult decisions. As Jerry Wolgin said earlier, there's a universe of wonderful programs and activities but with the limited funding, we've got to make some tough choices. We used to be presented with some wonderful activities--for AIDS prevention or population control, as an example, a lot of micro-enterprise development activities or vocational training. But PVOs usually couldn't demonstrate how Title II was the best, most effective and most efficient resource to use for these kinds of activities.

We engaged PVO and USAID field people on helping us formulate our strategic objectives and the new food aid/food security strategy. Throughout the year we engaged our partners in discussions on how we can simplify the program design, and we gave feedback on the program review process.

#### **Strengthening WFP programs**

We also had to establish a model for WFP. We believe that WFP should play to its comparative strengths and mainly concentrate on emergency programming. WFP began as a development agency but most of its resources now are being devoted to emergencies. We believe that WFP should cooperate in most of its development programs with NGOs that have a far greater capability to manage development activities in the field. That's why we see a lot of Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) now being signed between WFP and PVOs--recognizing and playing to each other's comparative strengths.

The US also, for the first time, turned down WFP projects. This was a revolution in the World Food Program which as a UN agency usually works on consensus. We basically applied the same standards to review WFP projects that we would use for our own dollar funded and food aid projects. We turned down the first project in May of '94 and the second project a few months later. I suspect there will be a lot more projects turned down.

We are particularly working with WFP to strengthen their "country outline" approach. This is

basically a country assessment to better define the areas of vulnerability and to target resources.

#### **Management training at FFP**

As food aid is a very specialized and complex business we had to do much of the management training ourselves, and could not rely on the Human Resource Development Office in the Agency. So, we put together our own training modules. Several months ago we brought together 20 people from around the world, direct hires and FSNs. This was a highly successful exercise which will be repeated again this fall.

#### **40th Food for Peace Anniversary Conference**

We also took the opportunity to enhance the credibility of food aid by organizing a 40th Anniversary Food for Peace Conference where we tried to create an awareness of food aid and talk about the new food aid/food security policy.

#### **Emergency requests**

As important as the program reviews were on the development side, we had to do the same kind of work on the emergency side. We were being inundated with appeals and had to respond quickly. But we were not responding strategically. We were mostly responding to emergency requests without putting them into any context of what we our Bureau was doing versus what other Bureaus were doing, versus what other agencies of the U.S. government were doing. We started to have a series of emergency program reviews.

#### **Introducing a new procedure for project proposals**

The Multi-Year Operational Programs (MYOPs) that PVOs used to design each year made little sense. Why should food aid be treated differently from dollar resources? We came up with a new concept of "Development Project Proposals" (DPP) where Missions and PVOs are expected to put in much more analytical rigor than before. Development project proposals have to be consistent with the new food aid/food security policy. They can and should reflect all the resources required to meet the objectives of a project or a program, that is, Title II, commodity monetization, dollar resources, ISG resources, OFDA resources etc. This acknowledges that Title II

resources alone may not be enough to achieve complex food security objectives.

PVOs have received the new guidelines on the DPPs and have been working over the past few months using this new project design schedule. DPPs will be coming in for review in May and June, which promises to be an interesting, and probably exhausting, process. At this workshop we agreed that the President of the Africa Bureau will co-chair these meetings.

#### **Taking a long-term perspective**

In the end, we would like to be able to approve food aid using programs for a four to five-year time frame, just as we do for dollar-funded activities. Besides, we don't have the time and the staff to review each year 50 to 60 individual proposals in depth. Once approved, PVOs would have to submit annual reporting documents, very similar to those provided by Missions for dollar-funded projects.

#### **Computerizing PL 480 procedures**

The procedures that govern PL 480 applications and reporting are Byzantine. They haven't changed in 40 years, and people are still using their sharpened pencils which become blunt when filling out these colored coded forms. The number of forms involved in PL 480, just on the logistic side, is absolutely staggering. We came up with a thoroughly

streamlined computerized form that is now being field tested.

#### **Food aid as a reengineering lab**

When we suggested to the reengineering folks of the Agency, that we should be a reengineering lab, they considered us so marginal that it would be of little importance to reengineer food aid. But when we came up with our new Development Project Proposals, we demonstrated that we were far ahead of the curve in using the 'Strategic Planning' and 'Managing for Results' framework.

#### **Concluding remarks**

The work continues. This workshop was, for me, one of the most important parts of our agenda. It was an opportunity for us to break out—to see if we can use the food aid resource more effectively and efficiently in the Greater Horn of Africa, in an area where there is a public commitment by the Administration to do something important, and to do it in a different way than usual.

I remember several months ago at a workshop in Nairobi on the GHAI I was struck by the fact that many people did not like the idea of using PL 480 to address the objectives of food security in the Greater Horn of Africa. So I thought that this workshop was important for us to communicate with you and to come up with some new ideas. To me it has been so successful that we will take it on the road, and we will do it in Latin America and in Asia.

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## Closing Remarks

### OPTIMISM IN THE FACE OF DIFFICULT CHOICES

**Carol Peasley**

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*Ms. Carol Peasley is from the United States Agency for International Development, Africa Bureau*

First, on behalf of the Africa Bureau, I would very much like to thank BHR, IFPRI and MSI for a really productive workshop. I certainly have learned a great deal and I think we have accomplished much more than I had expected. We've got a number of very actionable recommendations. You've helped us a great deal in moving forward with the GHAI. Again, it's been a very productive session.

#### **The USAID Ethiopia Mission program -- an example for the Greater Horn**

I would like to give special thanks to USAID Ethiopia for their gracious hosting, but even more importantly for their leadership in crafting a country program which, I think, perfectly represents the objectives of this workshop: a program which deals so well with food security issues, with the integration of food and dollar resources, and with partnerships between NGOs and donors and across different countries. It represents the kind of thing that we are looking for through the GHAI. I think this country program and the fact that we are here in Addis Ababa have given much reality to much of our discussions.

#### **An optimistic view of Africa's future**

From the Africa Bureau's perspective, I would also like to go back to the earlier statement by Negusse Micael, our colleague from World Vision, that Africa is the continent of the 21st century, and that one must be optimistic about the future to creatively program resources. We, in the Africa Bureau and AID really share in that optimism, and it is a message that we are trying to get out across the United States, in the testimony before Congress, and in public forums throughout the United States. We believe that Africa is a far different place than it was ten years ago. Most countries are engaged in serious economic restructuring, and nearly two-thirds are in the process of democratic transition. This gives us great hope in our development programs--that broad-based, sustainable economic development is achievable in

many countries. We believe we are beginning to see that happen.

#### **Linking resources to promote food security**

While the focus of our development resources, by definition, will always be on long-term sustainable development, we realize that food security is the important measure of whether or not our development programs have been successful, or if they have failed. We also realize that we must make better use of non-DFA resources to achieve our objectives. This particularly means food aid, but it also means more creative linkages of development with relief and emergency resources. It means that we must work more closely with other partners, including all elements of BHR, to help countries move along the relief-to-development continuum.

#### **Difficult choices for allocating resources**

It is also important for everyone to recognize that we have limited development resources and we must make tough decisions. In the same way that Tim Frankenberger spoke of CARE's choices between high-risk and low-risk, and high-potential and low-potential areas, we must assess whether our scarce development resources are best directed toward those countries which are committed to broad-based economic growth, that is, to those countries that are good performers, where results could be achieved, or to poor performers or even to failed states, where results at the very best are questionable? Given the current needs, almost infinite needs throughout the continent, that decision would be difficult under any circumstance. It is particularly so given our very firm belief, really the premise by which our programs are operating in Africa, that economic growth is essential for poverty alleviation and poverty reduction. I might add, for Africa to become the continent of the 21st century we have to have economic growth. We thus have to honestly ask ourselves, in the Africa Bureau, whether the marginal development dollar is better

used in a Uganda or a Ghana or for a long-term emergency in a Somalia or a Sudan? Which option would really have the greatest impact on poverty alleviation or on moving Africa to become the continent of the 21st century? These are the tough questions that we have to deal with every day. The answers are never clear cut. It is obvious that in the Africa Bureau we are prepared to move along the continuum toward the relief-rehabilitation side, hence our programs in Somalia and Mozambique and more importantly our commitment to the GHAI. I would at the same time also ask all of you, particularly those of you who are focusing on the relief side, to please understand and accept the difficult resource allocation decisions which we have to make each day.

#### **A tribute to Fred Fischer and Ted Morse**

Finally, and the real reason why I wanted to say a few things this afternoon, I would like to take this public opportunity to acknowledge two people who have shared this week with us. Their careers really have personified much of what we have talked about—relief, development, integrated and creative use of food resources, early warning crisis prevention. Both of these individuals are planning to retire this summer. Fred Fischer is, obviously, the first of the people I am talking about. The second one is, everyone knows, Ted Morse. These are two people that AID is losing and they are two real professionals. Two people who have personally made major development contributions throughout the world and have managed major relief efforts and saved countless lives in Africa. On behalf of the African Bureau and AID, I would like to salute both of them.

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## Closing Remarks

### A CHALLENGE TO FOLLOW-UP

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#### Margaret Bonner

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*Dr. Margaret Bonner is from the United States Agency for International Development/Ethiopia*

When Bob approached me by e-mail about seven months ago and asked "Would you mind hosting a Food for Peace conference in Ethiopia?" I thought, Food for Peace Conference, what could that be—five people or so, "sure, we can do that."

#### Getting Ethiopia "out of the closet"

Maybe it was time for Ethiopia to come out of the closet. We have been developing a program here now for about 18 to 24 months, changing from a humanitarian to a development program; building up staff, trying to get internal order. At the same time Ethiopia itself has been coming out of the closet and I thought, well, it might be time to show Ethiopia off, as well as the Mission staff which you met a few of in the last couple of days, Mike, Marty, and Walter. Let me tell you the three of them are no different from the rest of my staff. They are all as feisty, and all as energetic, and all as witty as these three—they keep me on my toes.

It was also time to show the program off. I think one of the things I am very proud of is that we have been trying to really integrate food aid and development, looking at both sides of the relief-to-development continuum. We haven't been caught in the middle so far.

#### Saving Title III resources

I have taken the potential demise of Title III upon myself as a major effort. When the U.S. National Security Advisor Tony Lake was out here, I lined up the Economic Advisor to the President of Ethiopia, the Minister of Planning, to talk with Tony Lake about why we should keep Title III going. When we had some Congressional staffers out here, again, it was the top of my agenda. We didn't talk so much about the program we had but what we were likely to lose if Title III went away. I am glad to see that fight is still continuing, it's not one I'd want to give up.

I also wanted to show the relationships that we have out here. We've worked very closely for a very long time with World Food Program. We've got a good group of NGOs here.

Thus, wanting to show some of those relationships off was also in my mind when I went back to Bob and said, "Yes." Now, knowing what this grew into, I'm not so sure whether I'd have been quite so open in terms of saying, "sure, bring your five people over here." The only concern I did have was that I really didn't feel I could be a hostess, that we were still growing, we still had a program we had to pay attention to, we still had an executive office that was growing. But Bob promised me IFPRI was going to take care of that and I had to be a hostess, and frankly IFPRI has done most of that. We've been able to step back and just smile.

#### From vision to action

My personal focus tends to be very practical and operational. When we would do strategic planning exercises, I always had trouble getting my hands around what vision meant, and it was only when we would get down to the more operational side that I was able to understand those things. I think, during the past four days I started to get a feeling for what the GHAI is all about, and what 're-invention' is all about. Really working together, putting problems out on the table, moving down from up there, asking ourselves: what do we do next and how do we put it together. I think we have done the easy part now, we have come up with a lot of plans as to where we should go. I think the tough part is going to be how well we deliver on the lists of actions that were laid out.

#### A challenge to follow-up on planned actions

So, I'd like to put a challenge forth, and I don't know if this is to BHR or to IFPRI, in terms of following up. I would find it extremely useful if the

actions that were promised in today's session were clearly laid out, in terms of "these are the kinds of things we will try to achieve." They should not just be laid out in the final IFPRI compendium of the workshop, but there should also be follow up. Maybe six months from now something could be sent out that says, "this is what we've done about those things; this is what we have achieved; this is where we've tried and not been able to do what we hoped; and these are those things that, sort of, slipped off the list". To me that would be the real test of whether the ideas behind the Greater Horn Initiative and behind re-invention are really going to be able to work.

I had no idea what this conference was going to delve into, nor the numbers of people that were going to end up here. I kept seeing the list, by e-mail grow

and falter, and grow and falter. Then I got a note from Carol Peasley saying, "what if we add a Mission directors group on the Greater Horn Initiative onto this food aid conference?". By that time I was so involved in trying to figure out what was happening with the Greater Horn Initiative and I didn't know how many people were coming anyway. So I said what's the difference if we have five or six more.

But I think, it has surprisingly, to me anyway, turned out to be a fruitful conference. I don't go to many conferences, let alone sit still through them for four days; but what I have seen come out of this one has been very operational and moving us forward. Thank you.

**ANNEX**

# AGENDA

## MAKING FOOD AID WORK FOR LONG-TERM FOOD SECURITY *Future Directions and Strategies in the Greater Horn of Africa*

	MONDAY, MARCH 27, 1995		TUESDAY, MARCH 28, 1995
	<b>Emerging Food Security Issues in the Greater Horn of Africa: A Framework for Food Aid</b>		<b>Moving Forward on the Relief-to-Development Continuum</b>
8:30am	<i>Coffee and Registration</i>	8:30am	<i>Coffee</i>
9:00am	<b>Welcome and Workshop Overview</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◆ H. Robert Kramer, USAID/BHR/FFP, <i>Opening Address</i></li> <li>◆ His Excellency Ambassador Irvin Hicks <i>Welcome Address</i></li> <li>◆ Brooke Debebe, Vice-Minister for External Economic Cooperation, Government of Ethiopia, <i>Welcome Address</i></li> <li>◆ Detlev Puetz, IFPRI, <i>Workshop Overview</i></li> </ul>	9:00am	<b>Session 2: Achievements and Constraints In Moving Forward on the Continuum</b> <i>Introduction of the Theme for the Working Groups (Plenary)</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◆ Michael Harvey, USAID/Ethiopia, <i>Accomplishments in the Greater Horn of Africa</i></li> <li>◆ Barbara Huddleston, FAO, <i>Practical Implications of the Relief-to-Development Concept</i></li> <li>◆ Tim Frankenberger, CARE, <i>Developing Relief-to-Development Program Strategies</i></li> </ul>
10:00am	Workshop Expectations		Questions and Answers
10:15am	<i>Coffee Break</i>		
10:45am	<b>Keynote Addresses:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◆ Ted Morse, USAID/GHAI Task Force, <i>The Greater Horn of Africa Initiative - An Overview</i></li> <li>◆ Gayle Smith, USAID/Ethiopia <i>Future Food Security Strategies in the Greater Horn of Africa</i></li> <li>◆ Lawrence Haddad, IFPRI, <i>Leveraging Food Security with Food Aid: The Role of Research</i></li> </ul>	10:30am	<i>Coffee Break</i>
	Questions and Answers	11:00am	<b>Working Group Session</b>
12:45pm	<i>Lunch Buffet</i>	12:45pm	<i>Lunch Break (on your own)</i>
2:00pm	<b>Session 1 : Background Information for Designing Future USAID Food Aid Strategies in the Greater Horn of Africa</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◆ John Grant, USAID/BHR/PPE, <i>The New USAID Food Aid/Food Security Policy Paper: Central Features</i></li> <li>◆ Gayle Smith, USAID, <i>Practical Implications of the New Food Aid Policy in the Greater Horn of Africa</i></li> <li>◆ Simon Maxwell, IDS, <i>Comments</i></li> </ul>	2:00pm	<b>Working Group Session cont'd.</b>
	Questions and Answers	3:30pm	<i>Coffee Break</i>
3:30pm	<i>Coffee Break</i>	4:00pm	<b>Session 3: Presentation of Working Group Findings to the Plenary</b>
4:00pm	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◆ Cynthia Clapp-Wincek, MSI, <i>Strategic Planning and Managing for Results: Current Efforts at USAID in Reinventing Government</i></li> </ul>	5:30pm	Questions and Answers
		6:30pm - 8:30pm	End of Session, Day 2
			Reception hosted by USAID/Ethiopia

AGENDA continued

Making Food Aid Work for Long-Term Food Security:  
Future Directions and Strategies in the Greater Horn of Africa

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 29, 1995		THURSDAY, MARCH 30, 1995	
	<b>Planning and Implementing Food Aid More Effectively</b>		<b>Workshop Findings and Future Action</b>
8:30am	Coffee	8:30am	Coffee
9:00am	<b>Session 4: Introduction of the Themes for the Working Groups</b> ♦ David Piraino, CRS, <i>Food Aid as a Resource</i> ♦ David Mcrton, WFP, <i>Targeting</i> ♦ Negusse Mikael, WVRD, <i>Case Study on Monitoring Efforts</i> ♦ Walter North, USAID/Ethiopia, <i>The Ethiopia Mission's Experience on Integrated Country Strategies</i>  Questions and Answers	9:00am	<b>Session 5 Continued: Working Group 3</b>  Questions and Answers
10:30am	Coffee Break	10:30am	Coffee Break
11:00am	<b>Working Group Session:</b>  1- Country Food Security Assessments  2- Impact Assessment and Performance Indicators  3- Integration of Food Aid and Financial Resources within USAID	11:00am	<b>What next? Specific Workshop Follow-up Activities</b>  --Working Groups --Report back --GHAJ report back --Discussion
12:45pm	Lunch Break (on your own)	12:45pm	Lunch Break (on your own)
2:00pm	Working Group Session cont'd.	2:00pm	Feedback: Workshop Expectations and Achievements
4:15pm	Coffee Break	2:45pm	Closing Remarks  ♦ H. Robert Kramer, USAID/BHR/FFP ♦ Carol Peasley, USAID/AFR ♦ Margaret Bonner, USAID/Ethiopia
4:30pm	<b>Session 5: Presentation of Working Group Findings To Plenary:- Working Group 1 &amp; 2</b>  Questions and Answers	3:45pm	Adjcum
5:30pm	End of Session, Day 3		

Making Food Aid Work for Long-Term Food Security, a workshop organized by USAID/BHR/FFP, USAID/AFR and the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), March 27-30, 1995, Hilton Hotel, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

AFR Bureau for Africa  
 BHR Bureau for Humanitarian Response  
 CARE Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere  
 CRS Catholic Relief Services  
 FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations  
 FFP Office of Food for Peace  
 GHAJ Greater Horn of Africa Initiative

IDS Institute for Development Studies  
 IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute  
 MSI Management Systems International  
 PPE Program Planning and Evaluation  
 USAID United States Agency for International Development  
 WFP World Food Programme  
 WVRD World Vision Relief and Development

## LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

<u>NAME</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>POST</u>
Tracy Atwood	USAID/G	Washington, D.C., U.S.A.
Margaret P. Bonner	USAID/Ethiopia	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
James Borton	U.N. Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Francesca Bravo	World Food Programme	Rome, Italy
Sumiter Broca	International Food Policy Research Institute	Washington, D.C., U.S.A.
Sharon Carper	State Department Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration	Addis, Ababa, Ethiopia
Cynthia Clapp-Wincek	Management Systems International (MSI)	Washington, D.C., U.S.A.
Donald Clark	USAID/Kampala	Kampala, Uganda
Elizabeth Cole	Food for the Hungry, Int'l/Ethiopia	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Kristy Cook	USAID/OFDA	Washington, D.C., U.S.A.
Keith Crawford	USAID/AFR/DP	Washington, D.C., U.S.A.
Brian D'Silva	USAID/AFR/SD/PSGE	Arlington, VA, U.S.A.
Getachew Diriba	CARE/Ethiopia	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Patrick Diskin	Michigan State University	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Jeanne Downen	CARE	Atlanta, GA, U.S.A.
Pat Duggan	Australian High Commission	Nairobi, Kenya
Jurg Eglin	International Committee of the Red Cross	Nairobi, Kenya
Paul Erickson	Food for the Hungry, Int'l/Ethiopia	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Wendy Fenton	Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Fred Fischer	USAID/REDSO/ESA	Nairobi, Kenya
John Flynn	USAID/REDSO/ESA	Nairobi, Kenya
Timothy Frankenberg	CARE	Atlanta, GA, U.S.A.
Flynn Fuller	USAID/BHR/FFP	Rosslyn, VA, U.S.A.
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## LIST OF PARTICIPANTS (continued)

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Wondimagegnehu Gizaw	Feed the Children	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Lalit Godamunne	WFP/Eritrea	Asmara, Eritrea
Peter Goossens	USAID/Sudan	Khartoum, Sudan
John Grant	USAID/BHR/PPE	Rosslyn, VA, U.S.A.
Lawrence Haddad	IFPRI	Washington, D.C., U.S.A.
Susan Hahn	Catholic Relief Services	Nairobi, Kenya
Martin Hanratty	USAID/Ethiopia	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Michael Harvey	USAID/Ethiopia	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
William Holbrook	Adventist Development and Relief Agency/Sudan	Khartoum, Sudan
Barbara Huddleston	FAO	Rome, Italy
Thom Jayne	Michigan State University	East Lansing, MI, U.S.A.
Allen Jones	WFP/Ethiopia	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
George Jones	USAID/Kenya	Nairobi, Kenya
H. Robert Kramer	USAID/BHR/FFP	Rosslyn, VA, U.S.A.
Timothy Lavelle	USAID/BHR/FFP	Rosslyn, VA, U.S.A.
Shewangezaw Lulie	USAID/Ethiopia	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Paolo Mattei	European Union	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Larry Meserve	USAID/REDSO/ESA	Nairobi, Kenya
Negusse Micael	World Vision	Harare, Zimbabwe
Ted D. Morse	USAID/GHAI	Washington, D.C., U.S.A.
David Morton	World Food Programme	Rome, Italy
Mamo Mulugeta	USAID/Ethiopia	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Chris Pearson	Commission of the European Communities Delegation Sudan CEC	Brussels, Belgium
Carol Peasley	USAID/AA/AFR	Washington, D.C., U.S.A.
Jim Phippard	Agricultural Cooperative Development International	Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

## LIST OF PARTICIPANTS (continued)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>POST</u>
David Piraino	Catholic Relief Services	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Blaine Pope	Africare	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Detlev Puetz	IFPRI	Washington, D.C., U.S.A.
Kathrin Puffenberger	USAID/Eritrea	Washington, D.C., U.S.A.
Colin Richardson	Adventist Development and Relief Agency Int'l(ADRA)	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Catherine Robins	World Vision	Washington, D.C., U.S.A.
Michael Sackett	WFP/Kenya	Nairobi, Kenya
Ina Schonberg	USAID/FFP/Mendez England	Washington, D.C., U.S.A.
Solomon Shiferaw	USAID/Ethiopia	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Gayle Smith	USAID/Ethiopia	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Mary Symmonds	U.N.D.P.	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Thomas Tauras	Project Concern International (PCI)	Bucharest, Romania
Tesfaye Teklu	IFPRI	Washington, D.C., U.S.A.
Ron Ullrich	USAID/Somalia	Nairobi, Kenya
Rudy von Bernuth	Save the Children	Westport, CT, U.S.A.
Paul Webber	Commission of the European Communities	Brussels, Belgium
Willet Weeks	Save the Children	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Mark Wentling	USAID/Tanzania	Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania
Berhane Woldetensaie	Relief Society of Tigray (REST)	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Jerome Wolgin	USAID/AFR/SD	Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

### Guest Speakers

His Excellency Irvin Hicks, U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia  
 Mr. Brooke Debebe, Vice-Minister for External Economic Cooperation, Government of Ethiopia  
 Dr. Simon Maxwell, Institute for Development Studies  
 Mr. Walter North, Deputy Director, USAID/Ethiopia

## LIST OF ACRONYMS

AA	Office of the Assistant Administrator
AFR	Bureau for Africa (USAID)
BHR	Bureau of Humanitarian Response (USAID)
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPSP	?
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DA	Development Assistance
DFA	Direct Foreign Assistance
DP	Development Planning
DRCO	Disaster Relief Coordination Office
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FEWS	Famine Early Warning System
FFP	Office of Food for Peace (USAID)
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
G	Global Bureau
GC	?
GHAI	Greater Horn of Africa Initiative
HACC	Horn of Africa Coordination Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
IGADD	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
LEG	?
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MCH	Maternal and Child Health
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MYOP	Multi-Year Operational Program
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID)
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
PPC	Policy and Program Coordination Bureau
PPE	Program Planning and Evaluation
PRM	?
PSGE	Productive Sector Growth and Environment Division
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
REDSO/ESA	Regional Economic Development Services Office/East and Southern Africa
RRC	Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
SADCC	Southern Africa Development Community (formerly SADCC)
SAP	Structural Action Program

LIST OF ACRONYMS (continued)

SD	Office of Sustainable Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Program
WVRD	World Vision Relief and Development

## READING LIST

- Aid to Agriculture: Reversing the Decline.** Joachim von Braun, Detlev Puetz, Rajul Pandya-Lorch. Washington D.C. IFPRI. 1993.
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