

# THUNDER

---

USAID Global Bureau  
Center for Democracy

Civil Society Literature Review:  
Democratic Governance and Civil Society's  
Theoretical Development,  
Contemporary Conceptualization, and  
Institutional, Economic, and Political Implications

by

Jennifer M. Coston

Prepared for G/DG  
Contract AEP 5451-I-2050-00  
Delivery Order 11

March, 1995

---



GLOBAL BUREAU  
CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY

**CIVIL SOCIETY LITERATURE REVIEW:**

**DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY'S**

**THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT,**

**CONTEMPORARY CONCEPTUALIZATION, AND**

**INSTITUTIONAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS**

by

**Jennifer M. Coston**

**March 1995**

**Prepared by Thunder & Associates, Inc.**  
Contract AEP 5451-I-00-2050-00  
Delivery Order 11

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This literature review originated in response to the scope of work for the civil society design team for the Global Bureau Center for Democracy. Although tasked with the primary responsibility for its research and write-up, I would be remiss if I didn't acknowledge the contributions of others in this endeavor. First among those in need of mentioning are the other members of the design team, specifically Leslie Fox, the team leader, who provided guidance and review of the final product. I also appreciate the insightful meetings with and generous provision of relevant materials from many individuals within USAID, particularly in G/DG, CDIE, and the WID Office. Finally, I would like to thank Thunder & Associates, Inc. and the University of Washington for providing reference resources, additional materials, and general support.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</b> .....	i
<b>ABBREVIATIONS</b> .....	iv
<b>PART I: INTRODUCTION</b> .....	1
<b>Methodology</b> .....	1
<b>Civil Society and Democratic Governance</b> .....	2
<b>Interrelationship</b> .....	3
<b>PART II: THE HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL ROOTS, AND NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY</b> .....	5
<b>Civil Society in Historical Perspective</b> .....	5
<b>THE RESURGENCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY</b> .....	6
<b>CONTEMPORARY CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY</b> .....	7
<b>The Theoretical Origins of Contemporary Civil Society</b> .....	8
<b>THE STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONSHIP</b> .....	8
<b>THE <i>QUALITY</i> OF CIVIL SOCIETY</b> .....	9
<b>STATE, SOCIETY, AND THE ECONOMY</b> .....	10
<b>THE ELEMENTS AND FUNCTIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY</b> .....	10
<b>The Normative Implications of Civil Society</b> .....	13
<b>PART III: CONTEMPORARY CONCEPTUALIZATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY</b> .....	17
<b>Democratic Governance</b> .....	17
<b>Civil Society Defined</b> .....	19
<b>DEFINITIONAL ELEMENTS AND FUNCTIONAL CRITERIA</b> .....	20
<b>STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS</b> .....	21
<b>AN EMERGING DEFINITION</b> .....	22
<b>The Elements of Civil Society</b> .....	23
<b>The Functions of Civil Society</b> .....	28
<b>SOCIAL INTEGRATION</b> .....	29
<b>THE PROMOTION AND PRACTICE OF DEMOCRATIC VALUES</b> .....	29
<b>SELF-GOVERNANCE</b> .....	31

SOCIETAL PARTICIPATION IN STATE GOVERNANCE .....	32
<i>Representation</i> .....	33
<i>Information Dissemination</i> .....	34
LIMITING THE STATE'S AUTHORITY .....	34
GENERATING CONSENT .....	36
THE OUTCOMES OF CIVIL SOCIETY FUNCTIONS .....	36
<b>PART IV: THE INSTITUTIONAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY</b> .....	<b>37</b>
<b>The Institutional Strength of Civil Society</b> .....	<b>37</b>
ORGANIZATIONAL INDICATORS .....	37
SECTORAL INDICATORS .....	38
<b>Civil Society and Economic and Political Reform</b> .....	<b>41</b>
SEQUENCING .....	41
RESPECTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS .....	44
THE IMPORTANCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY .....	46
<b>Civil Society and Political Development</b> .....	<b>47</b>
POLITICAL STAGING MODELS .....	47
<i>Pre-transition</i> .....	48
<i>Transition</i> .....	49
<i>Consolidation</i> .....	50
CIVIL SOCIETY STAGING .....	50
STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONSHIP TYPES .....	52
STATE PENETRATION .....	54
CIVIL SOCIETY AT THE LOCAL LEVEL .....	55
THE EVOLUTION OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE .....	56
<b>CONCLUSION</b> .....	<b>56</b>
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b> .....	<b>60</b>

## ABBREVIATIONS

<b>ARD:</b>	Associates in Rural Development
<b>CSOs:</b>	Civil Society Organizations
<b>DAC:</b>	Development Assistance Committee
<b>MSI:</b>	Management Systems International
<b>NGOs:</b>	Non-governmental Organizations
<b>PACT:</b>	Private Agencies Collaborating Together
<b>UNECA:</b>	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
<b>USAID:</b>	United States Agency for International Development
<b>USAID/BA:</b>	USAID Bureau for Africa

## **PART I: INTRODUCTION**

According to USAID's strategy for sustainable development, the global threats to "peace, stability, and the well-being of Americans and people throughout the world" are rooted in the absence of democracy (USAID 1994, 1-2). While many debate the source of primary responsibility for the future, it is clear that governments *and* their societies have important roles to play. Many are optimistic, arguing that as civil societies are gaining in strength, governments are responding by seeking ways to be more responsible and receptive to popular expressions of political will (Schearer 1992, 4). However, the rapid global changes and the corresponding instability and transitions in much of the world illustrate the need to proactively support such efforts. Democracy is seen not only as an end in and of itself, but as a means to sustainable development (Charlick et al. 1994a, 1, 4), and "a more peaceful, more prosperous world" (USAID 1994, 3).

While there are many possible approaches to these efforts, the Global Bureau, specifically the Center for Democracy and Governance, has identified four target areas of support: governance, rule of law, electoral processes, and civil society. The following review is in partial fulfillment of the scope of work to conceptualize and design a global civil society field support program to be housed in the Global Bureau.

The review is designed to identify the best current thinking or state-of-the-art on civil society. In doing so, it provides a theoretical basis for the support of civil society in promoting democracy, outlining the current assumptions and practice of civil society. The remainder of Part I presents an initial discussion of civil society vis-à-vis democratic governance, and includes a brief discussion of the interrelationship among the four target areas. The historical and theoretical roots of civil society are then examined, followed by the normative implications of promoting civil society (Part II). Part III more explicitly (albeit briefly) introduces the notion of governance, and focuses on contemporary conceptualizations of civil society, outlining its inherent controversies concerning both its generally accepted definition, and its operationalization. This discussion emphasizes the elements and the broadly diversified functions attributed to civil society. Part IV examines the institutional, economic, and political implications of civil society in greater detail, focusing on the indicators of a strong and sustainable civil society, its relationship to economic and political reform, and its functions and characteristics at various stages of political development.

### **Methodology**

This review investigates several different bodies of literature related to civil society. These include both the historical and theoretical roots of civil society, and civil society as it is currently conceptualized and practiced -- within particular nation states and regions, and as advocated by scholars, promoted by practitioners, and sponsored by donors. The treatise on the theoretical history of civil society relies heavily on Cohen and Arato's seminal work, Civil Society and Political Theory (1992) -- the most comprehensive and widely recognized treatment to date. The review includes an examination of the political rationale for supporting

civil society, as well as the practical rationale as expressed in the participatory development literature of the seventies and its extension to the notion of structural transformation and the emphasis on NGOs in the nineties. It is important to note that some of the conceptual and practical work on civil society referenced, developed, and expanded herein originated under USAID funding.

### **Civil Society and Democratic Governance**

The current emphasis on civil society derives from a growing interest and effort to promote democracy worldwide. Specifically, these efforts, at least instrumentally, focus on the notion of democratic *governance*, as opposed to democracy per se, acknowledging that democratic practice extends beyond the form of particular political systems, and that processes of governance have the potential for the greatest impact on development, sustainability, and ultimately political and economic stability.

The delineation of **democratic governance**, "involves subjecting the exercise of political power by both state and civil society actors to a number of institutional disciplines" [emphasis added] (Charlick et al. 1994a, 2). Corresponding measurements include limiting the abuse of central state authority, broadening opportunities for participation, assuring the rule of law, developing democratic values, and expanding opportunities for self-governance (Ibid. 5-7).

An enhanced civil society addresses each of these criteria. In fact, Gellner (1991) argues that supporting civil society provides a much more useful model than a more broadly defined attempt to promote democracy as "participatory and accountable government" (495). It is here that representative democracy can be introduced "in the relevant polyarchic centers of society" (Bobbio 1984, 56; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 171). Cohen and Arato (1992) explicitly argue that the institutionalization of civil society is necessary to avoid "destructive cycles between authoritarianism and populism" (489).

Literature from donors, practitioners, and scholars echoes this role of civil society in promoting democratic governance. For example, Dr. Carol Lancaster, deputy administrator for USAID, recently confirmed: "a vibrant civil society is key to the success of democratic governance" (From Conference entitled, "Civil Society, Democracy and Development in Africa"; qtd. in USAID/BA 1994, 1). Similarly, the DAC believes that a broadly based society which civil society affords provides the basis for a successful democracy (DAC 1993; qtd. in McHugh 1994). That civil society may be a significant requisite to democracy is an idea widely expressed among prominent scholars of the subject (see Diamond 1994; Vilas 1993). More specifically civil society is viewed as an essential component of the reform process (Barkan & Ottaway 1994, 1), and a guarantor of effective social policy (Reilly 1993, 6). Civil society actors "enhance popular participation, that deepens the benefits to society, and whose very existence can promote peaceful change" (USAID 1994, 6).

## **Interrelationship**

However, civil society does not exist in a vacuum; nor is it the only means by which to promote democracy. Each of the target areas identified by USAID -- governance, electoral processes, rule of law, and civil society -- play an important part in promoting and sustaining democracy.

These should be considered interdependent; that is, support for one area lends support to the others, just as weaknesses are potentially shared. In general, the rule of law (Fox et al. 1994, 10; Bell 1989; qtd. in McHugh 1994; see also O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986 ) and good governance provide an enabling environment to civil society (Charlick et al. 1994a, 102), and electoral processes are an expression of a strong civil society and an enforced rule of law (Ibid., 102). However, this is an oversimplification of a complex interrelationship. Each target area can act as both a mediator among and a contributor to the other areas.

Through the intermediaries of rule of law and electoral processes, civil society can promote good, democratic governance. Both Hegel and Parsons discuss the role of the legislature as a mediating organ between the state and society. That is, in Hegel's model, the rule of law (and its definition, expression, and protection through the efforts of the legislature) prevents the state from becoming tyrannical and civil society from becoming a mere aggregate or mass of dangerous opinion (1967, par. 302; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 110). Parsons describes in greater detail how the pressure of civil society can lead to the institutionalization of a rule of law which enforces "certain legally embodied restrictions" on the legislature's own powers (1971, 62-64; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 127). This theme is echoed in more recent theoretical treatises and extended to include societal pressure for a rule of law which imposes limits on society as well (see Ekeh 1994, 4). Through this means, civil society can prevent the "repenetration" of the state into the economy or society following transitions (Cohen & Arato 1992, 62), and can safeguard the pluralism on which civil society is presumably grounded (Ekeh 1994, 4; Kiss 1992).

The pressure of civil society and the rule of law also enable the implementation and follow-through of reforms for good governance; these pressures -- both coercive and consensual -- can counteract conservative-bureaucratic resistance (see Cohen & Arato 1992, 61). Civil society can also assure that the reform process does not fall back on "elite democratic transitions from above" (Ibid. 488). Finally, it is pressure from civil society (whether or not it is conceived to include social movements) which can lead to democratic elections -- a defining factor of democratic transition.

On their part, electoral processes safeguard the continuing role of civil society in promoting democratic governance. Electoral processes provide an essential feedback mechanism to prevent the role of civil society from being relegated to merely providing a suitable environment for market economic self-regulation (see Cohen & Arato 1992, 489), or political parties from being manipulated to reflect elitist interests (see Cardoso 1989, 319-320; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 53-54). More specifically, electoral processes offer the opportunity for

the "remobilization" of civil society where demobilization occurs after failures (or even successes) of early challenges to authoritarian rule (Cohen & Arato 1992, 53). In fact, member associations of civil society -- even multipurpose NGOs -- are beginning to realize that the greatest opportunity for influencing good governance may be through the electoral process (Serrano 1993, 32).

According to some formalistic definitions, civil society would not exist without the rule of law. That is, a basic premise of civil society is the right of free association which is secured through the rule of law. Basic rights guaranteeing the existence of civil society include freedom of public communication (see Hegel 1967; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 111; see also Weiner 1991); and, more specifically, the "negative liberties" of rights involving property, speech, religion, association, assembly and individual security (Parsons 1971, 21; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 128). Nowhere in the literature is the importance of civil liberties minimized (see, for example, Arendt 1977, 147; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 194). In fact, Cohen and Arato (1992) posit that the internal relationships of rights of cultural reproduction, social integration, and socialization determine the type of civil society that is institutionalized (441, 442). Importantly, Parsons points out that these rights often embody universal norms of a higher order than the traditions of particular societies (1971, 18-19; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 127).

Civil society also provides support for the rule of law. This support is derived primarily through civil society's fostering of consent. This is particularly important in transitioning economies where political transition can lead to economic frustration resulting in instability and unrest (see Dahrendorf 1990). Here, civil society can nurture the necessary consent for reform and its ramifications, and also fill resultant gaps in public support services. Also, as noted above, civil society can provide the necessary pressure for the implementation of reforms and the security of the rule of law, counteracting bureaucratic power centers (see Cohen & Arato 1992, 62).

Finally, civil society plays a crucial role not only in supporting good governance generally, but in promoting democratic governance in particular. Notions of democracy and citizenship require much more than legal mandate. Civil society functions to promote accountability and transparency of governance, *and* to provide experiential learning for democratic processes (see, for example, Charlick et al. 1994b, 102). These functions will be discussed in greater detail below.

Despite the prevalence of civil society models which would pit the society *against* the state, it is essential to recognize that both the state and civil society are indispensable to democratic governance. Democratization must entail both the expansion of social equality and liberty through civil society, *and* the restructuring and democratizing of state institutions (see Keane 1988a, 14). The state can provide an important integrative function which is balanced by the redistributive, decentralized emphasis of civil society (Serrano 1993, 30). Furthermore, Anderson (1977) emphasizes the state's role in wielding cultural legitimacy through its educational and legal institutions; he argues that civil society produces cultural hegemony and

consent, while government promotes consent and coercion (31-34; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 161, 162). While the state is needed to counteract forms of cultural hegemony present in civil society, civil society is needed to counteract cultural hegemony as institutionalized in educational and legal institutions. Also, both consent and coercion are essential to good, and hence democratic, governance.

The role of civil society in promoting democratic governance is implicit in the latter's definition. Civil society provides the checks and balances to ensure government transparency and accountability (see Hirschmann 1993, 29), and is an essential vehicle to participation which is intrinsic to good governance (see World Bank 1994, 42). Civil society also acts to inform the state of its demands and expectations, promoting responsiveness and efficiency (see Rothchild 1994, 1). Before these functions can be properly understood, and the means for promoting them identified, an understanding of the historical and theoretical roots of civil society is necessary.

## **PART II: THE HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL ROOTS, AND NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY**

### **Civil Society in Historical Perspective**

Although the concept of civil society is definitely not new -- having roots in the classical and medieval philosophical traditions -- it has recently returned to public and, specifically political consciousness, after a notable hiatus. Even its dramatic return is not entirely new. In fact, the historical development of "civil society" follows a recurrent pattern which registers popular gains "in periods of revolutionary change and transition from totalitarian political circumstances to ones that promote the freedom of the individual" (Ekeh, 1994, 31). This "anti-statist" perspective runs consistently throughout the historical development of the concept of civil society, despite the fact that "civil" society has been applied in opposition to "savagery" and anarchy, and the Church as well (Gellner 1991, 495).

The utopia of civil and political society has incorporated "the ideal of voluntary association, democratically structured and communicatively coordinated" from Aristotle to Marx in 1843 (Cohen & Arato 1992, 451). According to Poulantzas (1973) the concept of a civil society explicitly separated from the state is an invention of eighteenth-century political theory (124-5; qtd. in Keane 1988b, 31). More specifically, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries witnessed the development of the concept to describe the "historically established domination of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat" (Keane 1988b, 32). This socialist tradition and its conventional Marxist understanding of the separation of society from the state does not account for the existence of civil society prior to the emergence of the bourgeoisie (Ibid. 32-3).

Parsons emphasizes its historical, rather than its early theoretical development, when he argues that the differentiation of the societal community from the cultural, economic, and political subsystems was the result of three modern revolutions: the industrial, the democratic, and the

educational (1971, 99; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 120). There is no doubt that each of these has informed our contemporary understanding of civil society. However, the most widely referenced is the influence of the "democratic" revolution as initially embodied in the Enlightenment and the subsequent French Revolution (see, for example, Ekeh 1994, 3). According to Parsons this revolution (of political thought and historical action) witnessed the creation of a new type of solidary, national collectivity which entailed equally recognized political and civil rights, with the ultimate differentiation of a societal community "superior [and] legitimately entitled to control" government (1971, 84; Cohen & Arato 1992, 122).

Parallel to these political developments, Polanyi (1944) asserts that a program of societal self-defense emerged in the nineteenth century in response to the "economization" of society resulting from the self-regulating market (qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 122). Thus the elements of civil society up to the late nineteenth century (in Western Europe and the United States) entailed associations which addressed both economic and political concerns; these included the growth of new professional guilds, trade unions, political parties, and additional voluntary associations (Ekeh 1994, 4). The nineteenth century also witnessed the broad acceptance of civil society in the context of a dichotomous model of state and society still in use today, specifically by Marxists, neo-liberals, neo-conservatives, and utopian socialists (Cohen & Arato 1992, 423). In fact, this dichotomous model continues to be a theme in West European discussion of *practical* socialist policies (Keane 1988a, 15).

Consistent with his thesis that civil society is a reactive construct, Ekeh (1994) notes that the concept was absent from the active discipline of comparative politics in the 1950s through the 1970s (2), and even as late as 1979 prominent scholars applied it in its neo-Marxian sense of bourgeois society (O'Donnell 1979; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 76). However, in the next decade these same scholars adopted a new, modern usage of the term to connote the sphere between the economy and the state, characterized by associations and publics -- not exclusively bourgeois (O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 76). In its recent resurgence it is this latter interpretation that it is more commonly understood.

### **The Resurgence of Civil Society**

The recent resurgence or revival of interest in civil society is most often accredited to the turbulence in Communist Eastern Europe and its dramatic outcomes in 1989 (see Gellner 1991, 495; see also Ekeh 1994; Kumar 1993; Cohen & Arato 1992). Dissidents in Central and Eastern Europe resurrected it from nineteenth century Western social thought and adopted it to help explain the changes following *glasnost* and *perestroika*, and particularly to use it as a weapon against the totalitarian state (Kumar 1993, 76; qtd. in Ekeh 1994, 31). This was particularly notable in the ideology of the Polish opposition from 1976 to the advent of Solidarity (Cohen & Arato 1992, 31), which derived from lessons in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 (Ibid. 58).

Though this is the most popularly recognized source of resurgence, Cohen and Arato (1992) also note its reappearance in the ideology of the "Second Left" in France, which was rooted in a sympathetic understanding of the developments in the East (36); and in the transition from

Latin American Dictatorships. In the latter case, civil society emerged both as a key term of self-understanding of democratic actors, and as an important variable of analysis for transition (48).

These recent applications -- both in theory and in practice -- offer important lessons which build on the essentially Western origins and historical development of civil society. First, is the conception of self-limitation which embraces social movements as an essential component of civil society; second, the explicit application of civil society development and action and democratization; third, the recognized potential influence of civil society on political and economic society; and fourth the acknowledgement that civil society is not exclusively bourgeois (see Cohen & Arato 1992, 15-16). Civil society is now identified as a target for democratization and transition rather than the state, as was demonstrated in Poland (see Cohen & Arato 1992, 58).

### **Contemporary Conceptualizations of Civil Society**

These historical developments have yielded modern concepts of civil society which differ in their interpretations and applications. Cohen and Arato (1992) contrast three such conceptualizations before developing their own: a neo-liberal model that identifies civil society with the bourgeois (or middle class); the antipolitical model that rigidly juxtaposes society to the state; and an antimodern interpretation that seeks to absorb the modern economy in a less differentiated society (464).

Neo-conservative perspectives seek to capitalize on the failing of welfare state governments to promote libertarian values, such as freedom of choice, mutual aid, and self-reliance (Keane 1988a, 7-8). However, Cohen & Arato (1992) warn that such returns to tradition, family, religion, or community can foster fundamentalism (24). They further point out that the neo-conservative stance of "society against the state" often translates to a model of civil society equivalent to the market or bourgeois society (23), which becomes a depoliticized society equating the freedom of civil society with that of the market (Ibid. 43). This bourgeois interpretation of civil society is also neo-Marxist, although civil society in post-Marxism is not altogether discarded. Some post-marxists maintain a normative desire to preserve civil society (see Cohen & Arato 1992, 71), albeit in some cases a "liberated" one.

Keane (1988b) remarks that to equate the state-society distinction with capitalism, or civil society with the bourgeoisie, is "to do violence to whole traditions of rich and suggestive political discourse" (33). In fact, Keane (1988a) holds that neo-conservatism is incapable of realizing libertarian values; what is needed is a pluralist conception of equality in the democratic tradition (10, 12). This leads to an alternative contemporary conceptualization of civil society -- rooted in its theoretical evolution -- which entails democratization through "reforming and restricting state power and expanding and radically transforming civil society" (Keane 1988a, 13-14).

This conceptualization takes as its central concern individual liberty, which in Western political history is secured through freedom of association (Ekeh 1994, 4). In fact, its

emphasis on associations has been interpreted as a more politically subtle "demand for a return to a manageable scale of social life," which maintains its distinction from the state and its pressure for local and popular decision making (see Seligman 1992, 2; qtd. in Batista 1994, 12). The consequent pluralism is seen to be the basis for a stable democratic polity (Cohen & Arato 1992, 18). Also required for democracy is the separation of this civil society from the state and the mutually reinforcing democratization of each (Keane 1988a, 14-15). In Cohen & Arato's (1992) contemporary theory, civil society is contrasted not only with the state but also with the economy.

This conceptualization forms the theoretical basis for promoting democracy through support to civil society. However, it cannot be fully appreciated without an understanding of its theoretical origins.

## **The Theoretical Origins of Contemporary Civil Society**

### **The State-Society Relationship**

The theoretical development of civil society can be traced through its conceptualizations in relation to the state. Early liberal political philosophy saw the state as a product of reason, controlling the passions and private interests of individuals (Keane 1988b, 34). Hegel saw the state as an embodiment of the universal whose task it was to conserve and transcend civil society (Keane 1988a, 15; Keane 1988b, 35-6). Similarly, Hobbes believed that the state's sovereign power supplied the only "social" bond among individuals; the social contract, then, creates the state (Cohen & Arato 1992, 87).

This transcendence of the state over society is implicit in the notion of the separation of the state and civil society invented in eighteenth-century political theory (Poulantzas 1973; qtd. in Keane 1988b, 31-2), which is embodied in the work of Paine, Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill and others (see Keane 1988a, 14-15). This separation is similarly traced in the German traditions of Kant and Fichte (Cohen & Arato 1992, 90), and further justified in Durkheim's (1925) thesis on professional ethics and the role of unattached intellectuals in Mannheim's (1956) theory of culture (qtd. in Ekeh 1994, 4). Cohen and Arato (1992) note the particular contributions of Locke (1690) and Montesquieu (1748) in terms of establishing this separation.

The distinction between state and society can imply an adversarial relationship. According to Keane (1988b) this stance is first noted in Tom Paine's reply to Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France; here, the state is deemed a necessary evil and natural society an unqualified good (34, 35). Less dramatic is the fear that civil society is suffocated by state intervention; this concern is evident in the writings of John Stuart Mill and Tocqueville (Ibid. 36). Cohen and Arato (1992) posit that the conception of civil society against the state was also developed in the salons and coffee houses of the time; and it unites the rhetoric of antiabsolutism of Montesquieu and the opposition to privilege of Voltaire (89). The most extremist opposition to the state is found in Gramsci's promotion of a self-governing civil society which would eventually replace the state (1971, 268; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 156).

In fact, the importance of civil society relative to the state is a theme throughout much of the supporting literature. Civil society is considered to be part and parcel of the social contract (see Norton 1993). More specifically, Hegel stresses that civil society is the "locus and carrier of material civilization" (qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 92). The Enlightenment produced perspectives on civil society that were more explicitly superior to the state; society is the sole source of legitimate authority according to Thomas Paine's Common Sense, the American Bill of Rights, and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 89). More recently, Parsons' confirmed this notion of civil society as superior to the state: "The societal community was to be differentiated from government as its superior, legitimately entitled to control it" (1971, 84; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 122).

Cohen & Arato (1992) build their contemporary theory of civil society substantially on the works of Hegel (1967) and Parsons (1971). In terms of the relationship between the state and society, they rely heavily on the latter's notions of mediation and interpenetration (see 92, 128-9). In fact, the contemporary concept of civil society does not seek to eliminate either the state or society; as noted above, there is a crucial role to be played by both in promoting democratic governance. Cohen and Arato (1992) provide a theoretical basis for emphasizing a separation *and* interpenetration between the state and society. In fact, Parsons argues that it is the mediating structures between the state and society that will establish the primacy of the societal community, beyond the constitutional state (1971; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 128-129).

### The Quality of Civil Society

The theoretical development underlying the contemporary concept of civil society rightly emphasizes the importance of the *quality* of civil society. What is at stake here is primarily the question of whether or not civil society exclusively represents the bourgeoisie. As noted above, there is both a socialist tradition and a neo-conservatist tradition which emphasize civil society as representing the bourgeoisie and capitalist/free market interests respectively. There are also those who would support civil society in terms of traditional societal power structures (see Montesquieu 1748; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 88).

In the socialist, neo-Marxist tradition, Gramsci (1971) holds that the particular content and form of civil society will reflect a class struggle; where the bourgeoisie is hegemonic, civil society will be bourgeois (qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 146). Hence, this version of civil society must be destroyed and replaced with other forms of association which would create a "proletarian counterhegemony" (Ibid. 151). From a more explicitly democratic perspective, Bobbio (1984) promotes the democratization of such "spaces of society," and argues that pluralism itself opens the door to democratization (qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 172).

The tradition derived from the Enlightenment, which emphasizes universal or natural rights, promotes a concept of civil society which is egalitarian in structure and practice; this is evident, for example, in Tocqueville, Voltaire, Locke, Paine, Kant, and Fichte. As expected, Hegel and Parsons -- specifically in the latter's emphasis on equal rights -- build on this

particular tradition, which also forms the basis of the contemporary theory of civil society promoted by Cohen and Arato (1992).

### **State, Society, and the Economy**

The quality or nature of society is often determined by its relationship to the economy. It is for this reason that some scholars argue a contemporary theory of civil society must include a tripartite relationship between the state, society, *and* the economy.<sup>1</sup> In fact, some contemporary models of civil society specifically pursue the penetration or economization of society; these models arise in opposition to state socialism in the East and the welfare state in the West and are embraced by the antiliberals, antipoliticians, and antimoderns referenced above (see Cohen & Arato 1992, 464).

The distinction of civil society from both the state and the economy represents a theoretical corrective of Hegel on the part of Parsons and Gramsci (Cohen & Arato 1992, 118). In his distinction, Gramsci promoted the liberation of civil society from the economy as well as from the state (Cohen & Arato 1992, 145). On his part, Parsons (1969c) noted civil society's penetration of the economy through professional associations and fiduciary boards (340; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 133).

Cohen and Arato (1992) build on this tripartite distinction in their modern theory of civil society. They argue that the need for economic rationality and societal solidarity are conceptually two different issues, representing competing claims (476) which cannot be addressed in a solely dichotomous model. In fact, they develop three distinctive sets of rights to correspond with civil society; these include rights for: 1) cultural reproduction, social integration, and socialization; 2) the market economy, including rights of property, contract, and labor; and 3) the modern bureaucratic state, emphasizing the political rights of citizens and the welfare rights of clients (441). Thus, in terms of democratization, the "colonizing tendencies" of both the administrative state *and* the market economy must be limited through civil society (489).

### **The Elements and Functions of Civil Society**

Even if contrasted from both the state and the economy, civil society's inherent nature must still be defined. The currently prescribed elements and functions of civil society (to be elaborated below) can be derived from its theoretical roots. It is important to note that these can be viewed as definitional, normative, and/or structural. The following discussion emphasizes the identification of particular elements and functions for definitional purposes.

Determining which **elements** to include and exclude from modern civil society entails controversies with deep theoretical traditions. For example, Hegel excluded the family, while emphasizing the role of corporations -- including corporations from the economic sphere, in addition to learned bodies, churches, and local councils (1967, 360). Gramsci, on the other

---

<sup>1</sup>Though gaining in popularity, this view is not universally accepted. Some scholars continue to believe that the market is coterminous with society.

hand, includes family, political culture, and social movements, while excluding the capitalist economy (Cohen & Arato 1992, 143, 147). He further enumerates modern churches, unions, cultural institutions, clubs, neighborhood associations, and political parties (Ibid. 143). The controversial inclusion (or exclusion) of the family, economy, (some) churches, and political parties continues today.

These controversies are partially resolved through qualitative and structural critiques, as exemplified by Parsons' framework. For him, an association "represents a corporate body whose members are solidary with one another, in the sense of having a consensual relation to a common normative structure" (1971, 24-26; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 130). Structurally, the modern principle of associations is characterized by voluntariness, equality of members, and proceduralism which entails formal rules for regulating discussion, and voting (Ibid. 131).

The **functions** attributed to civil society represent an evolution in its theoretical and practical application. The basic underlying functions of civil society -- as with society in general -- are *socialization and education*. These are the primary functions espoused in Hegel's theory, where civil society is intended to "educate individuals to internalize the common good and develop civic virtue" (1967, 360; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 106-7). Parsons claims that the societal community is the normative center of society (Cohen & Arato 1992, 425); he echoes this function in his dimensions of normativity and collectivity. Here, civil society represents the institutionalization of cultural values (1971, 24; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 126). Parsons is also more explicit than Hegel in terms of civil society's function of *social integration*, as represented in his dimension of collectivity. That is, civil society's function is "to integrate a differentiated social system by institutionalizing cultural values as norms that are socially accepted and applied" (Cohen & Arato 1992, 120). The multiplicity of associations, according to Parsons, partially counteracts the "traditionalist implications" of all associations (1969c, 220; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 131).

These functions of social integration and socialization imply the potential for *instilling democratic values*. This is implicit in Parsons' reference to cultural values and norms that are "socially accepted" (1971, 99; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 120), and is made more explicit in his citizenship complex (1971; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 127). This function is most obvious in the writings of Bobbio (1984) who argues for the introduction of representative democracy in the "relevant polyarchic centers of society" (qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 171). In fact, he argues that the index of democratization in the future will be the number of contexts outside of politics where the right to vote is exercised (Ibid.).

The potential for democratization is also seen in civil society's purported function to broaden *societal participation in state governance*. This function can be traced to Hegel who made a strong case for the transparency of state governance which would allow for the participation and influence of public opinion (1967, para. 319; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 111). Parsons (1971) builds on this notion through his promotion of rights to influence policy (qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 128). Arendt is even more adamant in her promotion of the right "to be a participator in government" which is grounded in the right of assembly (1977, 218; qtd. in

Cohen & Arato 1992, 197). Finally, in their modern interpretation, Cohen and Arato (1992) assert that the "plurality of alternative publics... time and again revives the processes and quality of political communication" (460).

Implicit in these efforts to broaden society's political participation is the essential function -- grounded in the *historical* development of civil society -- of *limiting the state's authority and potential abuse of power*. Because of its obvious roots and recent resurgence, this function is taken as a given and extended, by some, to specifically democratic functions. Parsons, for example, describes the mediation between civil society and the state in terms of society influencing the development and implementation of state policies which legally restrict the powers of the state (1971, 62-4; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 127).

A seemingly less politicized function of civil society is the embodiment of *self-governance*. Closely related to the functions of socialization and integration, and in some cases democratization (see Bobbio 1984), self-governance represents the action of associations and communities to meet their own needs through potentially democratic processes. Parsons refers to this function in his discussion of community, and particularly in his promotion of rights which involve "indirect participation in representative government through the franchise" (1971, 21; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 123).

In fact, Parsons' framework of the citizenship complex includes -- whether implicitly or explicitly -- each of these aforementioned functions: socialization and integration, the promotion and embodiment of democratic values, self-governance, societal participation in state governance, and the limiting of state authority and potential abuse of power. His citizen complex is as follows:

- (1) Embodying universal norms, modern rights anchor constitutions in principles higher than the traditions of particular societies.
- (2) Representing a move from objective law to subjective right, modern citizenship makes constitutional claims actionable on the part of individuals and groups. As a result,
- (3) the citizenship complex not only further differentiates societal community and state but establishes the priority of the former over the latter in the sense of both normative principles and political action (1971; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 127).

This framework is a mainstay of contemporary notions of civil society, especially those which would view civil society as a means to democratization.

However, the subtle superiority of society to the state inherent in this definition could minimize the important role of the state elaborated above. In fact, Parsons' framework ignores an additional, fundamental function of civil society, particularly in the context of promoting democratic governance. Ironically, it is Gramsci (1971) who explicitly discusses the important role of civil society in *garnering consent*: "the demand of the state for consent,

and its tendency to organize and educate such consent, is the major reason for the emergence and stabilization of new types of associations" (qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 146). Of course, Gramsci's emphasis on the manufacturing of consent holds negative connotations, especially in light of his assertion that civil society needs to be liberated from both the state and the capitalist economy. However, given the importance of the state in sustaining democratic governance, this role of producing consent, when originating in a proactive, somewhat politicized civil society, plays an essential role -- especially when the threat of continuous civil unrest can undermine democratization and stabilization.

### **The Normative Implications of Civil Society**

The potential emphasis on democratization within the conceptualization of civil society, coupled with the neo-marxist perspective which equates civil society to the market economy emphasize that civil society is a value-laden concept with normative consequences. This is evidenced more objectively, by Parsons' dimension of normativity (1971; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 126), and his assertion that the normative structures of society are never free of a dimension of particularism (1969a, 418; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 127). Gramsci (1971), on his part, argues that not only does civil society represent the bourgeoisie, but even in its structural sense, "the associational forms..., cultural institutions, and values of civil society are precisely those most adequate to reproducing bourgeois hegemony" (qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 151).

One must ask then, what are the normative implications of promoting civil society? Some recent scholars vehemently criticize efforts to promote civil society globally as being equivalent to promoting democratic capitalism and mass conservatism at a world level, and particularly as an important component of the "new institutional order" which is, in essence, a US renewal of Manifest Destiny (Batista 1994, 13). This movement has even been referred to as a new "international civil religion" (De Santa Ana 1994).

Inherent in this controversy is the continual "dialectic" between liberalism and communitarianism -- liberalism with its rigid promotion of individual rights above all else, and communitarianism which claims to represent essential aggregates of individual rights (see Cohen & Arato 1992, 8-9). Cohen and Arato (1992) claim that these two perspectives are mutually reinforcing and partly overlapping sets of principles (20). Keane (1988a) further claims that, in fact, neo-conservatism is incapable of realizing the libertarian values it affirms, suggesting that only the democratic tradition can "genuinely defend the libertarian ideals of mutual aid, democratic accountability and the taming and restriction of state power" (10). In this sense, the promotion of democracy globally is somewhat justified from the libertarian/neo-conservative point of view, and civil society is seen as an essential vehicle to this end.

This is not to say that the promotion of democracy globally is solely intended to further neo-conservative agendas. In fact, the US example of civil society in the 1960s demonstrates its role and acceptability in terms of resistance and demands for justice (Batista 1994, 13). Regardless of its ultimate intentions, democracy is being promoted "as a political and socio-

cultural system which combines freedom of expression, association, worship, the rule of law and an open society" (Mirsky 1994). And civil society is an important facet of this democratic system (see Lewis 1992), clearly linked with the quest for human rights and moral values, and which may be seen "as an ethical banner, a call to resistance, hope and life" (Batista 1994, 16).

But what *type* of democracy is to be promoted? In their discussion, Cohen and Arato (1992, 4-7) differentiate elite and participatory democracy. Elite democracy is premised solely on the principle of competition and periodic elections. The supposition is that individuals will be elected to represent the masses and hence will create their own elite social strata which is equivalent to the bureaucratic and political state. The participatory model, on the other hand, contends that what is good for the leaders is good for its citizens; hence, all citizens should have access to a democratic political culture. This access will afford the experience necessary to the development of a conception of civic virtue, tolerance for diversity, the tempering of fundamentalism and egotism, and of processes of negotiation and compromise.

Given its theoretically-based functions, the use of civil society as a vehicle for democratization corresponds more fully to participatory democracy. Indeed, it is this interpretation of democracy which is avidly promoted by Bobbio (1984). He argues that "the promise of democracy can be redeemed only through the extension of processes of democratization through the whole fabric of human association" (qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 171). He measures the strength and endurance of democracy accordingly (Ibid.). He even implies that civil society affords a variable of analysis to determine why liberal democracies have failed to keep their promises, and to articulate a movement for their increasing democratization (Ibid. 165).

In a similar vein, Cohen and Arato (1992) contend that the organizing principle of civil society must be fundamental rights, and Arendt (1977) holds that the corresponding right of assembly by definition must translate as a right to be a participator in government (218; Cohen & Arato 1992, 197). In fact, Cohen and Arato (1992) argue that without the reliance or at least inclusion of civil society in the democratization process, this process must necessarily fall back on elite democratic transitions from above (488). Hence it would seem that a policy to promote democratization which includes a role for civil society is essentially a *participatory* democratic program and should be recognized as such.

But how does this argument differ from the normative implications of the promotion of democracy mentioned above? Does the promotion of democracy, particularly through civil society, necessarily result in the furtherance of neo-conservative objectives? explicit objectives of resistance? Regardless of its particular relation to the state, it is argued that civil society itself is an important terrain of democratization (see especially Tocqueville; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 16-17). In fact, there is some justification for supporting civil society precisely to obtain consent for the activities of the state (Ibid.), *not* solely to promote a particular resistant stance vis-à-vis the state, nor for the primary purpose of promoting particular economic behavior. The ultimate impact of civil society is thus dependent on many factors. What is of

interest here is: In what way can civil society promote the *potential* for democratization and stabilization, not necessarily of a particular form or ultimate objective?

First, it is clear from the above, the mere existence of civil society can offer opportunities to exercise rights in the form of participatory democracy (see Cohen & Arato 1992, 19). Hence civil society itself, in its aggregation of competing and/or coexistent particularist associations and communities is seen as a characteristic of democracy (see Cohen & Arato 1992, 57). In fact, Bobbio (1984) argues that even if it is not democratic in origin, the mere existence of pluralism, as manifest in a dynamic civil society, provides an opportunity for democratization (qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 171). Indeed, civil society's functioning is believed to help open up the framework of political parties and representative institutions (Cohen & Arato 1992, 19).

As a potential embodiment of normative procedural principles of representative democracy (see Bobbio 1984), the promotion and activities of civil society represent a *means* by which democracy may potentially be promoted without explicit attention to particular normative *ends*. This leads to a dynamic conception of civil society (see Cohen & Arato 1992, 19) which entails *communicative interaction* among members of associations, between associations, and mediating between civil society and the state. This communicative process -- whether explicitly democratic or not, and particularly as institutionalized through the socialization function of civil society -- can involve the development not only of the internalization of particular norms or traditions, but also of "reflective and critical capacities vis-à-vis norms, principles, and traditions" (Cohen & Arato 1992, 21), as well as state policies and actions.

Due to its relatively longer theoretical development, it is the distinction and communicative interaction between the state and society -- without consideration of the role of the economy -- whose procedural outcomes are most often mentioned. For example, Hegel argued that without autonomous cultural processes that create them, rights cannot acquire validity or recognition (qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 101), even when mandated by the state. Similarly, Anderson (1976) discusses the mutually reinforcing and accountability functions of society's cultural hegemony and consent, and the state's consent and coercion (qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 162).

In its interaction among individual members of associations and between various associations, this process has the potential to combat fundamentalist tendencies (see Hegel; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 110; Cohen & Arato 1992, 24-5) which is further reinforced through civil society's relation to the state. This latter process entails the pressure for rights and laws which will embody universal principles and self-limiting mechanisms for both the state itself and society. The outcome is a "reflexive law" which focuses on these procedures of communication and interpenetration of state and society, not on the specific results (see Cohen & Arato 1992, 26).

As a process, then, the promotion of civil society need not espouse a particular political or moral rhetoric, although some scholars add their own prescriptive outcomes. (For example,

Cohen and Arato (1992) believe this interactive process should result in a synthesis of Habermas' "reflexive continuation of the welfare state," *and* the complementary idea of the "reflexive continuation of the democratic revolution" (26)). The processual goals, rather, are to produce "spheres of *positive freedom* within which agents can collectively debate issues of common concern, act in concert, assert new rights, and exercise influence on political (and potentially economic) society" (Ibid. 23). Thus the mere existence of autonomous associations constitutes the condition which "makes possible the self-organization, influence, and voice of all groups, including the working class" (Ibid. 125).

Aside from promoting the *potential* development and fundamental characteristics of democracy, regardless of the ultimate ends of this process, there is also a practical justification for supporting civil society, particularly in countries which are transitioning politically and economically. The existence of an active civil society can provide a buffer to the unfavorable short-term impacts of reform policies through its self-governance, political participation, and generation of consent functions (see Cohen & Arato 1992, 489). That is, civil society can provide support services and resources to those communities hardest hit by short term negative impacts, while at the same time educating its members as to the ultimate purpose and logic of reform policies and socializing them with particular values which may generate consent. Such efforts will enable the follow-through of immediately unfavorable policies while securing the political future of visionary leaders. *Finally, working through civil society is the least disruptive method of promoting democracy or structural reform without resulting in social revolution* (Ibid. 32).

Because in practice civil society and its promotion can be quite value-laden, there is a crucial caveat to the promotion of democracy and democratic governance through civil society. Rather than adopting a Western view of democracy, scholars and practitioners alike concur that the notion of democracy must be operationalized such that "individuals influence or participate in the governmental decisions that most affect them" (Golub 1993, 62). The structure and location (see Golub 1993, 62) of such influence and participation is determined by contextual traditions. In short, though there are certain universal standards, as a value democracy is somewhat open to interpretation (Slabbert 1993, 10; see also OECD 1993, 3). This concern is partially addressed by focusing on democratic and communicative *processes*. However, the crucial consideration of contextualism needs particular mentioning.<sup>2</sup>

First, civil society -- and, for that matter the resulting *form* of democracy -- must be *relevant* to and compatible with modern society (see Cohen & Arato 1992, xii). Second, and perhaps most importantly, the promotion of civil society, and consequently democracy, must not be restricted to Western models. In fact, Cohen and Arato (1992) point out that even in Western societies, the norms of civil society were institutionalized heterogeneously (xiii). Indeed, civil

---

<sup>2</sup>As with any normative issue, the particularism/contextualism vs. universalism argument remains unresolved. However, in a climate where political and cultural sovereignty are at issue, i.e., foreign aid, I believe the contextual argument is a crucial consideration. In general, scholars tend to espouse universal *principles* of democracy, but contextual *practices*.

society and democracy must take an evolutionary form consistent with its contextual structure and history. This thesis is borne out by the recent experience of emerging civil societies and their variations (see Cohen & Arato 1992, 69), both in the East and the West, which include civil societies which are more or less institutionalized, democratic, and active (Ibid. 17). A final important distinction is necessary: many advocates of civil society view the Western manifestation as an operationally desirable goal; however, identifying any existing form as a target negates the importance of critical examination which is central to a functioning civil society in processual terms (see Cohen & Arato 1992, vii). Therefore, Cohen and Arato (1992) assert that though there may be many important lessons to be derived from the West, it is to the potential *future* of these Western models which civil society and democracy advocates must look for future relevance, productivity, and theoretical discourse (491).

### **PART III: CONTEMPORARY CONCEPTUALIZATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY**

The contemporary conceptualization of civil society represents an evolution of theoretical development whose fundamental origins are Hegel's synthesis of late-eighteenth century thought; the French, English, and German writers of the Enlightenment; and, more recently, the writings of Parsons (who builds extensively on Hegel), Gramsci (who promotes a post-Marxist interpretation), and Bobbio (who emphasizes the role of civil society in democratization). Though it is a value-laden concept and practice, the promotion of civil society can best be viewed as the promotion of particular communicative *processes* whose outcomes are not predetermined and, therefore, theoretically represent the dialectically determined objectives of competing associations within civil society and their interaction with the state and the economy. With these theoretical, historical, and normative characteristics in mind, it is now possible to more accurately delineate the contemporary conceptualization of civil society which is the current focus of democratizing efforts. First, however, a better understanding of these efforts -- that is, their emphasis on promoting democratic *governance* -- is in order.

#### **Democratic Governance**

"Governance" is often misinterpreted to refer solely to the role of a formalized state government structure. While few will dispute the importance of a central authority in implementing governance (see Fox et al. 1994, 10; see also Axelrod 1984, 4; Clark 1991, 65; Walzer 1991, 302), governance is increasingly viewed as a broader concept which includes the participation of societal forces (ARD 1992, i; Charlick et al. 1994a, 6-7, 72, 101). More specifically, governance has been defined as

**the effective management of public affairs through the generation of a regime (set of rules) accepted as legitimate, for the purpose of promoting and enhancing societal values sought by individuals and groups [emphasis in the original] (ARD 1992, i).**

Good governance within formal government structures entails everything from financial management to the creation of an enabling environment for civil society (ARD 1992, 8; Crook 1993 qtd. in Charlick et al. 1994a, 1; Esquel 1993, 13-14; USAID 1991 qtd. in Hirschmann 1993, ii). At a minimum this requires transparency, accountability, and responsiveness (USAID 1991 qtd. in Hirschmann 1993, ii; see also World Bank 1992, 1994), as state institutions act as protectors, coordinators, and regulators of citizens' lives (Keane 1988a, 14).

The result is a mutually reinforcing dialectical relationship between government and society. Specifically, society acts to assure government accountability, and as an informant to further enhance governance's responsiveness (Rothchild 1994, 1; Tocqueville 1945 (1840) qtd. in Diamond 1994, 11; World Bank 1994). This accountability and responsiveness, in turn, establishes the requisite legitimacy to sustain the governance system (Fox et al. 1994, 13; Handy 1992, 69; Harbeson 1993, 1; OECD 1993, 3). The strength of the civil society-government relationship is contingent on the strength of the state (Barkan & Ottaway 1994, 3). Through this relationship, governance is seen as a process (ARD 1992, i; USAID/ENI 1994, 7).

It is precisely as a process that good governance relates to democracy (see Charlick et al. 1994a, 1). The characteristics of democracy as a process are articulated in the philosophies of Hegel, Parsons, and Bobbio, among others. For example, Hegel emphasizes transparency and the influence of public opinion (1967, par. 319; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 111); he stresses that truth emerges through a *process* of debate both within the state apparatus and between the state and public opinion (Ibid.). This is similar to Parsons' notion of "consensus building through persuasion" (1969c, 220; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 131). More recently, Bobbio defined democracy as a procedural minimum of 1) participation of the largest possible number of those concerned, 2) majority rule in decision making, 3) the existence of real alternatives, and 4) the existence of free choice through the assurance of basic rights (1984, 24-25; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 166-7).

Democracy is thus seen, in addition to a desirable end in itself, as "**a particular set of governance relationships or ways of achieving governance objectives,**" which "emphasizes **accountability through open competition for authority..., responsiveness and policy pluralism through participation..., and respect for human rights**" [emphasis in the original] (ARD 1992, ii).<sup>3</sup> Also emphasized is the notion of **inclusiveness**, where "those affected by public policy have a right to express their views and exert their interests with regard to that policy" (Fowler 1993, 3). In fact, democracy is explicitly linked to improvements in governance (Hirschmann 1993, 29; World Bank 1994).

As noted above, the delineation of **democratic governance**, "involves subjecting the exercise of political power by **both state and civil society actors** to a number of institutional disciplines" [emphasis added] (Charlick et al. 1994a, 2). Corresponding measurements include

---

<sup>3</sup>This perspective draws upon the work of Ronald Oakerson.

limiting the abuse of central state authority, broadening opportunities for participation, assuring the rule of law, developing democratic values, and expanding opportunities for self-governance (Ibid. 6-7). Theoretically, these are all functions embodied by civil society. In fact, the contemporary conceptualization of civil society further emphasizes these, especially in its *instrumental* focus on representing and promoting democratic governance. However, the current conceptualization of civil society is not as clearcut as this might suggest.

## Civil Society Defined

Gallie (1955-56) rightly identifies civil society as an "essentially contested concept" which "inevitably involve[s] endless disputes about [its] proper uses" (qtd. in Ekeh 1994, 9). In terms of the general definition of civil society, controversy surrounds the inclusion or exclusion of particular elements and functions, yielding definitions of civil society which range from the relatively narrow to the more broad.

General definitions usually identify a realm between the state and particular elements of society; the latter are sometimes defined as the **individual** (Blair et al. 1994; Charlick 1994), the **family** (see Charlick et al. 1994a; Reilly 1993; West et al. 1994), the **household** (see Fox et al. 1994; Barkan & Ottaway 1994; Charlick et al. 1994b; USAID/BA 1994), or, most recently, the **economy** (see Blair et al. 1994; Cohen & Arato 1992; O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986; Schearer 1992).

There is a reasonable rationale for focusing on the household as the societal limit of the realm of civil society. First, in focusing on the individual, one loses the sense of communicative interaction promoted by Cohen and Arato (1992): individuals must have other individuals with whom to interact in order to qualify as "social" or engage in communication. Second, the family is a subset of society which can be quite patriarchal and autocratic; membership is not voluntary. These are important criteria and relate to the structural characteristics of civil society actors discussed below. Third, the notion of the household embraces various forms of groupings including individuals, aggregates of individuals, and families. Fourth, civil society incorporates associations of economic, albeit non-profit, interests which can blur the delineation of civil society and the economy, from the tripartite model's perspective. Finally, the household is the societal limit of civil society most widely accepted within USAID (see Fox et al. 1994; Barkan & Ottaway 1994; Charlick et al. 1994b; USAID/BA 1994).

Once the limits of this "realm" are defined, its components are still contested: does this realm consist of economic, profit-making actors and associations? would this exclude the independent media? what about exclusively political bodies, such as political parties? In its widest sense, civil society would include political parties on the public side, and business corporations on the private side (Blair et al. 1994, 5).<sup>4</sup> Civil society's most narrow definition, excludes individuals, families, profit-making enterprises, and political parties (Diamond 1994,

---

<sup>4</sup> It is not contested that these are elements of society in general, though specifically they can be referred to as political society and the market respectively.

4). Again, the range of the definition is determined by its definitional elements, prescribed functions, and structural characteristics.

### **Definitional Elements and Functional Criteria**

The most general, broad interpretation defines civil society as a "public space," or the "space of uncoerced human association," (Walzer 1991, 293) consisting of "all manner of independent groups..." (O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986; see also Blair et al. 1994). That is, "civil society refers to those areas in the overall society in which there are institutions and associations that exist and function in the public arena independent of control by the state" (Ekeh 1994, 10). In the broad *processual* sense, civil society refers to an arena of "public discourse about how citizens can best govern themselves and how they should relate to the state" (Fox et al. 1994, 7); it is in this arena that *civic* institutions develop. Harbeson (1993) defines civil society as processes which are also distinct from society, referring to "the processes by which any society asserts and defends its core political values and not the adoption of a particular society's value structure" (3).

We have already discussed Cohen and Arato's (1992) interpretation of civil society as a sphere of social interaction. Similarly, Azarya (1994) views the essence of civil society as reciprocal obligations and expectations which link groups in society, developing into patterns of regularized interaction (267; qtd. in Rothchild 1994, 1). Despite his normative implications, Gramsci defines civil society as an area of expression, interest articulation, and associational activity (qtd. in Weigle & Butterfield 1992, 4).

Even those who begin with such broad definitions later refine them to very narrow interpretations. This is most notable in the CDIE study (Blair et al. 1994, 4-5) where civil society is confined to one specific type of association (NGOs) and one function (influencing the state) (see Charlick 1994, 2). This interpretation grows out of the literature which bases any understanding of civil society on the relationship between the state and society in general. Hence, *civil* society would be that aspect of society which interacts directly with the state (see Bayart 1986, 111; qtd. in Ekeh 1994, 12; Bratton 1992; Fowler 1993, 5; Chazan 1992, 281; Rothchild 1994, 1; Tripp 1994, 2). More specifically, Harbeson (1993) refers exclusively to NGOs that "make it their business to articulate and defend society's shared principles concerning how it should be governed against governmental violation" (1). One rationale for these limitations concerns democracy: some practitioners have argued that civil society does not become relevant to democracy unless it is directly engaging the state (USAID/BA 1994, 4). This narrowly defines civil society in terms of those associations which engage in civic action.

Even if this were true (at least in part), from an operational perspective this reasoning is insufficient to justify its detour from civil society's historical and theoretical roots discussed above. Civil society in the generic sense is comprised of a *process* which is not relegated to one organizational form or function. In fact, Charlick (1994) argues that limiting the definition of civil society to its relation to the state, "contributes very little to understanding how specific civic functions actually get performed" (12). And a broader perspective

coincides much better with the many forms of civil society which exist in Southern, Eastern, and Western nations (see Schearer 1992, 4). In fact, some of these forms and functions differ to such an extent, even within nation-states, that at least one scholar advocates referring to civil society as a plural -- "civil societies" (Onwudiwe 1994, 2).

It is precisely because these broad and narrow viewpoints co-exist (see Ekeh 1994, 10) that it is important to clearly define what is meant by civil society with each usage. Alternatively, one can redefine these two interpretations, clarifying that the narrower interpretation is separate from, or at least a specialized sub-set of the broader sense of civil society (see for example Barkan & Ottaway 1994, 2). Cohen and Arato (1992), for example, redefine this narrow interpretation and distinguish it from civil society, entitling it "political society" (38).

This perspective is closely related to the most common method of clarification: many scholars and especially practitioners define this more proactively politicized segment of civil society as their *operational* definition. However, the same weaknesses of the narrow general definition apply here. In this scope of work, we prefer to remain consistent with civil society's theoretical development and historical application and, therefore, maintain a broader definition of civil society. This discussion still needs to be informed by the *structural* characteristics of civil society.

### Structural Characteristics

The *associations* which comprise civil society are defined according to several structural characteristics. Though some variation exists, the literature generally concurs on the following characteristics: civil society associations are

- **private or autonomous from the state** (Fox et al. 1994; Charlick et al. 1994a; Diamond 1994; Tripp 1994; USAID/BA 1994; Weigle & Butterfield 1992),
- **voluntary** (Fox et al. 1994; Charlick et al. 1994b; Cohen & Arato 1992; Diamond 1994; Paz 1994; Weigle & Butterfield 1992), and
- **self-organizing** (Diamond 1994; Keane 1988a; Weigle & Butterfield 1992) or
- **non-coercive** (Arendt 1977, qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 179; Fox et al. 1994).

Additional criteria on which there is relatively less consensus, include

- **non-profit status** (Fox et al. 1994),
- **legal definition or recognition** (Fox et al. 1994; Diamond 1994; Keane 1988a; Weigle & Butterfield 1992), and
- **the practice and promotion of particular community values or democratic norms** (Fox et al. 1994; Charlick et al. 1994b; Cohen & Arato 1992; Seligman 1992; USAID/BA 1994; Weigle & Butterfield 1992).

These latter characteristics generate controversy, especially when applied to distinguish among civil society and non-civil-society actors who by function appear to be quite conducive to the

general definition and purposes of civil society. For example, the non-profit status might automatically exclude organizations representing the independent media. However, these organizations perform a fundamental role in linking society and the state. On its part, legal definition or recognition would exclude the many less formal associations that perform crucial self-governing and participatory functions, as well as virtually all private organization under repressive, and pre- and early-transitioning countries (see Reilly 1993, 2).

The final controversial characteristic, the practice and promotion of particular norms or values, is even more difficult to reconcile with the various perceptions of civil society. From a structural sense, Parsons argues that these associations should entail a consensual relation and a common normative structure among members (qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 130). This would seem to coincide with the other structural characteristics of non-coercion and self-organization. However, some scholars enumerate specific community values and democratic norms; these include: cooperation, trust, inclusiveness, and reciprocity (USAID/BA 1994, 1, 4; Charlick et al. 1994a, 80); equality of members and proceduralism which includes voting (Parsons 1971; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 131); and norms which promote "participatory, non-violent, negotiated solutions to problems of collective co-existence" (Fox et al. 1994, 7). These latter include political tolerance and community activism (Ibid.; see also Weigle & Butterfield 1992, 5).

Clearly these normative characteristics are difficult to measure and can only be evaluated on relative scales. Hence, any effort to distinguish civil society associations according to these criteria would be subjective at best. Furthermore, these characteristics might exclude organizations which, although particularist and possibly even elitist, perform essential civil society functions in relating to the state and representing their members' interests. Finally, Walzer (1991) points out that individuals are likely to be members of multiple associations, "some of which [they] will want to manage directly in [their] interests, others [they] will want managed in [their] absence" (302-3). It is for these reasons that, once again, it makes sense to rely on a theory of civil society which focuses on processes of communicative interaction. In this sense, the roles of many of the otherwise excluded groupings can be recognized as providing essential input into dialectic and aggregated processes of interaction and decision-making, representing the broadest aggregate of interests possible. This is not to say that support for a particular association should not be determined according to this normative variable.

### **An Emerging Definition**

This reliance on civil society as communicative interaction is prevalent throughout the most modern definition. Consistent with the above, the preferred definition is not limited to those associations which relate directly to the state; this would ignore several of the fundamental functions of civil society as theoretically defined (see also Charlick 1994, 12). Similarly, it would not exclusively limit civil society to include only legally defined and non-profit associations. *Operationally*, it may only be possible to support legally unrecognized associations indirectly, through intermediary organizations; but as a *definition* civil society

must be viewed as inclusive of these associations. Indeed, they are often the most politicized especially under repressive regimes.

As for the non-profit characteristic, the ideal approach would be to look critically at the intended purpose or outcome of a particular association's efforts, and specifically to the *functions* of civil society it is designed (consciously or not) to support. In this sense, there may be some organizations, particularly within the independent media, which must be considered components of a particular civil society. Finally, although NGOs are the most prevalent civil society actors receiving donor support (see Rudi Frantz 1987), they are not the sole components of civil society; as with the non-profit criterion, other forms of organization should not be universally excluded.

With these considerations in mind, an operational definition will encompass the pluralism and diversity which is essential to a healthy, active civil society (see Diamond 1994, 6). As communicative interaction, civil society is seen to consist of norms and networks which "comprise a stock of 'social capital' which social actors can draw upon when they undertake collective action" (Putnam 1993; qtd. in Fox et al. 1994; see also Bates 1992; Coleman 1988; Hirschmann 1978; Ostrom 1990; and Uphoff 1993). The corresponding networks and associations provide opportunities for citizens to "express their interests, passions, and ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on the state, and hold state officials accountable" (Diamond 1994, 4). Of primary focus, then, will be associations which entail and/or promote participation in either self-governance *or* national governance (see Fox et al. 1994, 11).

This is not to say that the distinctions revealed by narrower definitions are not important. In fact, special attention may be warranted for those organizations comprising the sub-set of civil society which "demand[s] good governance from the state sector [and] support[s] particular norms and values among ordinary people which will foster popular involvement and active citizenship from local to national levels" (Fox et al. 1994, iv, v). More specifically, special attention *may* be warranted for specialized civic associations which perform the following functions: defending legal and constitutional rights; defending individuals against human rights violations; signaling poor governance practices such as corruption; defending, promoting, and educating on political rights; and monitoring the fairness of electoral processes (Charlick 1994, 7-8).

### **The Elements of Civil Society**

This leads to the need for a more specific discussion of the elements which comprise the contemporary understanding of civil society. Civil society consists of a number of institutions, including norms, networks, and organizational structures (see Fox et al. 1994, 11). In its broad sense, operationalized here, it includes groups that are economic, cultural, informational and educational, interest-based, developmental, issue-oriented, and civic (see Diamond 1994, 6; see also Hirschmann 1993, 16). Indeed, some scholars refer to civil society as a "web" of associations, implying linkages and strength in aggregation (see Luche 1994, 12).

Perhaps the easiest, least controversial, element to include is specialized civic organizations. Indeed, many practitioners have operationalized civil society to target solely specialized organizations which promote civic action. Civic organizations have as their aim the promotion of "any organized activity which fosters goals and norms of civic community, and which enhances the participation of a country's citizens in either self-governance or national governance" (Fox et al. 1994, iv). The activities of *specialized* civic organizations include, but are not necessarily limited to, public policy advocacy, election monitoring, civic education, human rights monitoring and advocacy, defending legal and constitutional rights, and signaling poor governance practices (see Fox et al. 1994; Blair et al. 1994; Charlick 1994b; Luche 1994; USAID 1994).

However, if one adopts a broader perception of civil society, consistent with its theoretical roots and historical development (as we have done here), civil society (and civic organization) is seen to be comprised of much more than these specialized civic organizations. Fundamental here is the focus on the crucial functions (to be discussed in greater detail below) set-out by the theory of civil society. These functions include self-governance, the experiential learning of democratic values and practices, societal participation in governance, and limiting the state's authority, all of which would call attention to a greater variety of associations and organizations. In the latter cases, it is important to recognize not just the current activities of particular associations, but also their *latent* capacity to perform these functions. This dormant capacity is predicated on the mere existence of a *variety* of associations. The corresponding interpretation calls attention to less formal organizations, associations which focus on economic interests, and development NGOs.

Cohen and Arato (1992) present an important reminder: the agents of modern civil society are ordinary people ( ix, 17-18), acting through their voluntary associations. Furthermore, ordinary people associate in a variety of forms which are more or less formal and recognized; these include self-help groups, neighborhoods, communities, and grass roots movements (see Cohen & Arato 1992, 74; Esquel 1993, iii, 1; USAID 1994, 18), in addition to more formal NGOs. Unfortunately, it is often these less formal associations which are perforce the most politicized and, hence, feared, repressed or at least suspect under various regimes (see Walzer 1991, 2).

These informal organizations clearly perform essential functions of civil society, even though they may be restricted from interacting directly with the state as more formal organizations are able to do (Ibid. 1). For example, De Soto's (1989) informal society operates parallel to the state apparatus, but its developmental impact is not unrecognized and it will continue to have increasing impact on public policies. An additional example of less formalized associations or civil society actors, is social movements. Several scholars argue that these should be considered an element of civil society (Cohen & Arato 1992, 74; Gramsci 1971, qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 147; Paz 1994, 4); indeed they often consist of an aggregation of these less formal associations.

Although informal associations must be recognized as an essential component of civil society, in operational terms they present quite a challenge to potential donors. Without formal structures and legal recognition, bi-lateral donors are restricted from providing them with direct aid. However, their recognition is essential to supporting civil society; indirect support can be provided through intermediary organizations (Carroll 1992), and/or donors can assist them in gaining the legal status required to expand their civic activities. It is also important to note that these organizations often do not have the requisite institutional or absorptive capacity to receive and effectively utilize donor assistance.

Less controversial are those associations which focus primarily on economic interests. Though most scholars and practitioners tend to exclude the market economy and for-profit private associations from their schemas of civil society -- and recent theoretical development supports this differentiation between the civil and economic, they do recognize particular associations that promote economic interests but maintain the structural characteristics of civil society organizations (CSOs) (i.e., private, voluntary, non-profit, non-coercive, autonomous from the state), and that represent the interests of their members to the state. These organizations include chambers of commerce and industry, trade and labor unions, professional associations, associations of manufacturers, and consumer groups (Fox et al. 1994, 9; Blair et al. 1994, 6; USAID 1991, qtd. in Hirschmann 1993, 16; Serrano 1993, 43; USAID 1994, 18; USAID/ENI 1994, 13).

Such organizations are not precluded from performing the functions of civil society and, in fact, quite frequently do so. These economic actors serve as a countervailing force against bureaucratic/military alliances (Hansen & Calavan 1994, 15), and have "the potential to articulate and amplify a pluralistic array of interests... and to secure policies that can win support from a broad domestic constituency" (Bratton 1990, 89). They further demonstrate the pluralism which exists not only in society, but in the private sector as well -- pluralism which provides the communicative interaction that is civil society, and is particularly crucial for democratization (see Sullivan 1994, 147).

This is similarly true of development, or multipurpose NGOs, which provide opportunities for societal participation, self-governance, and the learning and practice of democratic values. It is here where, most often, donors focus for partnerships and the enhancement of development effectiveness in general. In fact, these organizations maximize responsiveness by organizing around the demands and needs for services for particular groups and communities, yielding a diversity of services which a state governance structure alone could never provide (see Douglas 1987, 47). In fact, in some circumstances these NGOs represent the only available public services and, hence, the only public governance or responsiveness presence (see Ekeh 1994, 22; see also Tripp 1994, 3, 7; Thompson 1992, 396).

In subtle ways, these organizations contribute to the politicization of their membership, whether intended or not. At a minimum, by acknowledging the needs of otherwise unrecognized constituencies and giving voice to these needs, development NGOs "give constituents a sense of their own power" (Fisher & Kling 1993, 323), reinforcing individuals'

belief in their own development choices (Fowler 1993, 16). This type of empowerment, whether or not it is formally organized, can become a strong political force as indicated by governments' resistance to such efforts (see Hodgkinson & Sumariwalla 1992, 487). In fact, their mere existence represents "a kind of nonpartisan political alternative or challenge to prevailing power monopolies" (Fisher 1992; qtd. in McHugh 1994; see also Interaction n.d., 2), which "constitute[s] a ready-made means of popular mobilization against tyrannical or inept governance" (Charlick et al. 1994a, 9). Development NGOs develop skills in networking, coalition-building, and public relations -- skills which are highly valued in political efforts (see Hansen & Calavan 1994, i). For these reasons, in his definition of civil society Ekeh (1994) stresses the importance of including organizations which demonstrate not only *manifest* but also *latent* capacity to confront the state (12).

Furthermore, even in their exclusive attention to particular development objectives, NGOs can quickly become political in relation to the state. For example, if a government attempts to disrupt or eliminate services or structures on which an NGO's objectives rely, an organization may be forced to respond with political pressure in order to survive (see Peil 1981, 217-240; qtd. in Woods 1994, 12; see also Serrano 1993, 31). Even in implementing their missions under the best of circumstances, development NGOs may confront implications of state actions or policies which encourage them to relate to governments (see Tripp 1994, 15; for examples from Latin America, see Carroll 1992, 114). Blair and associates (1994) recognize these implications in their acknowledgement of development NGOs' *potential* to influence the state (5).

Many development organizations are rightly referred to as "multipurpose" NGOs. Sometimes this refers to multiple development objectives, but increasingly development NGOs formally engage in political or advocacy objectives as well. This combination of services has been found to be quite useful in meeting needs in both the short- and long-term (see Luche 1994).

Other scholars and practitioners argue for an explicit, exclusively political role for development NGOs. For example, Serrano (1993) observes that NGOs are realizing they are limited to creating political pressure for policy reform unless they engage directly in election processes (32). Such attitudes are reflected in the structural transformation movement which focuses on NGOs as the vehicle to such transformation (see Korten 1991, 1990, 1987, 1984, 1981; Korten & Quizon 1991; Elliott 1987). Within this literature, scholars advocate the increasing politicization of development NGOs which will result in "third generation" NGOs who specialize in policy advocacy (see Korten 1987, 1992; see also Elliott 1987). Though narrow conceptions of civil society would focus solely on these types of NGOs, the "generation" metaphor confirms the latent or potential capacity of development NGOs to directly engage the state and, therefore, justifies their inclusion in any efforts to support civil society and democratization.

Despite their ultimate objectives, development NGOs do vary in the quality of their responsiveness to and participation of constituents. Aside from the normative variations discussed above, Charlick and associates (1994a) specifically mention intolerance of opposing

views, a penchant for patriarchal domination, autocratic governance procedures, and ethnic or racial exclusivity as characteristics not conducive to democratic rule (9). PACT (1989) also points out a crucial qualitative distinction among NGOs. With the increasing emphasis on NGOs as donor and government partners in the delivery of development services, a new breed of NGOs has emerged which is *not* necessarily consistent with the spirit of civil society: contractor NGOs (12, 26). These NGOs operate more as businesses than fora for the communicative interaction of citizens. Hence, although they are sometimes difficult to distinguish from other types of NGOs, when identified, their potential contribution to civil society support should be carefully scrutinized.

An additional caveat concerns political parties. Although some scholars include them in their conceptions of civil society (Charlick et al. 1994b, 88), more scholars and practitioners tend to distinguish them from civil society associations due to their aim not to merely *influence* the state and its policies, but rather to *control* them (Fox et al. 1994, 8; Charlick 1994, 9; Diamond 1994, 4, 7; Fowler 1993, 14; USAID/BA 1994, 4). This corresponds to the distinction between politicization of civil society (discussed above), and political society (which includes explicit partisanship). Hence, political parties might best be considered part and parcel of an elections and political processes target area. Despite their self-imposed limit to merely *influence* the state, many civil society actors find it difficult to remain non-partisan, or at least be *perceived* as non-partisan (Luche 1994, 13), while others are increasingly viewing partisan participation necessary for significant political impact (see Serrano 1993, 32). The focus of political activity raises another qualitative criterion for supporting particular NGOs or associations: at which point should NGOs not be considered for civil society support: election participation? endorsement of a candidate? partisan affiliation? (see Blair & Jutkowitz 1994, 54).

These caveats aside, the literature indicates that civil society is much more than informal groupings, independent associations, and voluntary efforts (Fox et al. 1994, 9); civil society also embraces linkage and "independent expression" mechanisms (see Charlick et al. 1994b, 1; see also Cohen & Arato 1992, ix, 17-18, 74; West et al. 1994, 17). These potentially include the media, educational institutions, and cultural organizations, including some churches. Despite the structural prohibition discussed above (non-profit status), the media plays an essential role in civil society (Blair et al. 1994, 7) which should not be excluded due to its potential profit generation (see Diamond 1992; qtd. in Blair et al. 1994, 4). In fact, it is argued that the greater the number and diversity of media outlets, the stronger a civil society (see Fox et al. 1994, 9-10).

In addition to the mass media, Diamond (1994) also includes institutions representing autonomous cultural and intellectual activity in his notion of the "ideological marketplace" (6). These institutions of independent public expression (see Cohen & Arato 1994, 74) include associations such as churches (see Fox et al. 1994, 9; see also Esquel 1993, 1), universities (Ibid.), think tanks, and theaters (Diamond 1994, 6; see also Hegel 1967; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 106). The inclusion of these types of associations in support programs must be qualitatively determined. Among them, universities are controversial because of their typically

public, state-funded nature (see Fox et al. 1994, 12), and churches are sometimes excluded due to their "inward-looking activity" (see Diamond 1994, 4) or hierarchical structure and autocratic management. (The threat of Islamic fundamentalism poses an additional consideration).

In sum, civil society includes associations which are both formal (legally recognized NGOs) and informal (community and neighborhood groups, and social movements), promote economic (trade and labor unions, chambers of commerce, and professional associations) as well as development interests, perform both multipurpose functions (development NGOs) and civic ones (specialized civic organizations), do not seek to control the state (as in the case of political parties), and perform linkage functions regardless of their structural characteristics (the media, selective educational institutions and cultural organizations, and some churches). Civil society is *operationalized* through the consideration of various structural (private, autonomous, voluntary, self-organizing, non-coercive, non-profit, legally recognized) and qualitative criteria (value orientation, internal organization, representativeness as opposed to contractor NGOs, and degree of partisan political engagement), with an emphasis on the functions or roles played by particular associations within civil society. It is to these more specifically defined functions that we turn next.

### **The Functions of Civil Society**

The functions derived from civil society's theoretical foundations are consistent with those conceived, practiced, and advocated under its contemporary interpretation. These include: socialization and integration, the promotion and embodiment of democratic values, self-governance, societal participation in state governance, the limiting of state authority and potential abuse of power, and the generation of consent (see Fox et al. 1994, 13; Blair et al 1994, 8; Charlick et al. 1994b, 72). A broader conceptualization of civil society -- specifically as contrasted with *civic* society -- also includes service delivery (see Blair et al. 1994, 8).

In its relation to good governance, Charlick and associates (1994b) distinguish among these functions those that *demand* good governance, and those that *supply* it (72). That is, limiting the state's exercise of authority and potential abuse of power, and broadening societal participation in state governance constitute the demand side; and the development and practice of democratic norms, and self-governance represent the supply side of good governance. The generation of consent, which is not explicitly discussed by Charlick and his associates, can facilitate the supply of good governance, prevent it, or be somewhat neutral.

Lipton (1991) defines a broader, ultimate function of civil society as being a channel for the distribution of resources and power (24). However, civil society is but one of four such channels which also include the market, the State, and "familial society," or "the networks of extended family, kin group, and ethnic group" (Ibid. 24). Not only does this model recognize the potential importance of civil society in the distribution of resources and potential exercise of power, it further situates civil society among other state and society actors, confirming its

inherent function as a counter-balancer among these competing power sources. This role is implicit in the pursuit of each of the other functions. In fact, each function contributes to the effectiveness of the others, as they are all interrelated. The contemporary practice of these functions will be briefly discussed in turn.

### **Social Integration**

Today's civil societies perform social integration through networks of communication, both among citizens, and between citizens and the state (Fox et al. 1994, 14). The integration which civil society can potentially provide through these networks is particularly important for educational purposes: both for *civic* education per se, and also for political education and consent generation. A recent study in Africa confirms that this function is particularly important under efforts of economic reform (Fox et al. 1994, 15). Another significant contemporary application of this integration occurs under political unrest. For example, Oliver (1992) notes the success of Ireland's nonprofit sector in "overarching local sectional interests" to neutrally provide important social services to both sides of the conflict (186). Such efforts can become the building blocks for enhanced mutual understanding and ultimate political rapprochement.

In addition to these particular applications, civil society's function of social integration serves several other purposes. These include the encouragement of marginalized groups to participate politically (Blair et al. 1994, 9); the minimization of the domination of special interests through the aggregation of diversified interests (Ibid. 9; Montville 1992, 8; Cohen & Arato 1992, 18); and the aggregation of society's demands for good governance, particularly for policy decisions, and service delivery (USAID Moscow n.d., 3; Mathews 1993, 5; Cohen & Arato 1992, 18). It is important to note that this "integration" or aggregation, even under reforming and modernizing regimes and societies, in no way is expected to denigrate or completely override local traditions of views and practice (Ekeh 1994, 25). In fact, these traditional perspectives can sometimes provide the most culturally relevant solutions to public policy matters, especially when modernizing governments have distanced themselves from such traditions (see Tripp 1994, 10).

### **The Promotion and Practice of Democratic Values**

The explicit promotion and practice of democratic values is the modern, normative application of the socialization function advocated by Hegel and Parsons. Although civic, and hence implicitly democratic, values were mentioned in their works, the precise articulation of democratic values and the promotion of a democratic system are contemporary goals prescribed to civil society. The normative implications of civil society as discussed above confirm its potential to promote values; however, defining these preferred value systems to represent a particular political system represents an instrumental view of civil society which is much more explicit in this contemporary conceptualization than in previous perspectives. In fact, scholars and practitioners now promote not only the democratization of the state via civil society, but also the democratization of civil society itself (see Charlick et al. 1994a, 9). According to Bobbio (1984) this will be the true measure of democratization in the future: the

number of opportunities to exercise the right to vote outside the explicit realm of politics (qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 171).

Tocqueville held that "modern civil society is based on egalitarian principles and universal inclusion" (Cohen & Arato 1992, 19). Though this is most likely far from universally true, proponents of civil society do tend to view civil society accordingly and advocate its function of promoting democratic values. In fact, some scholars go so far as to argue that the associational networks of civil society are the only realm in which to learn the "civility" on which democracy is predicated (see Walzer 1991, 302). Specifically, it is argued that in order for democracy to succeed it must be practiced at the most relevant level where the potential impact is the greatest (see Charlick et al. 1994b) -- this is often precisely in the workings of civil associations. Furthermore, the democratic value systems which these associations promote are seen as the means to *sustainable* democratic institutions (Hirschmann 1993, 23; see also USAID 1994).

But what is meant by the promotion of democratic values? Which values are advocated? These values are often referred to as the "norms of civic community" (see Fox et al. 1994, iv). They include trust, reciprocity, tolerance, and inclusion (Ibid., 9); moderation, a willingness to compromise, and a respect for opposing viewpoints (Diamond 1994, 8); loyalty and political competence (Walzer 1991, 301); and the adoption of broader interests which extend not only beyond self-interest, but potentially beyond particular community interests as well (Ibid., 303). In a contemporary context, Reilly (n.d.) also includes the "experience of 'secondary' citizenship," which teaches negotiation, competition, contained conflict, and the search for workable consensus (5). Specifically, citizens have the opportunity to learn important democratic skills, such as conducting elections, negotiating contracts, and building coalitions (Haines 1993, 5). These skills are particularly salient in contexts threatened by tribalism, regionalism, and religious intolerance (Ibid., 5).

This confirms the view of civil society as an "experimental lab" (Reilly n.d., 28) or "school for democratic learning" (Tocqueville; qtd. in Charlick et al. 1994b, 102; see also Harbeson 1993, 3). This viewpoint is widely advocated in the literature, from Pateman's (1970) argument for democracy in the workplace as a means to learn responsible citizenship, to Ritchey-Vance's (1991) appreciation of community-based organizations as an important realm of day-to-day practice in leadership and democratic decision-making (2), and West and Associates' (1994) recognition of civil society organizations as "valuable schools for the development of habits of participation and cooperation" (16). Through such practice, individuals will become more likely to trust each other, further reinforcing important civic values (see Putnam 1993, 171-2; qtd. in Woods 1994, 21).

But what purpose will such values serve? Mansbridge (1980) points out that many community organizations rely on a "unitary" conception of democracy which seeks only to promote democratic practice in the pursuit of community interests *within the community*. He contrasts this with "adversarial democracy" which would explicitly challenge national, state, and local politics (3; qtd. in Fisher 1993, 7). Hence, even if civil society fulfills these roles of

promoting democratic values and practice and providing opportunities to learn these, the ultimate result may not be the democratization of the state per se. If democracy is to be measured by its practice within society as Bobbio (1984) advocates, this is not problematic. However, if the democratization of civil society is seen only as a means to an end which is defined as the democratization of the state, civil society's capacity and intent are not guaranteed.

Even if these organizations do not ultimately engage the state in policy dialogue, it is argued that as a result of their participation, individuals are more likely to become informed citizens, active voters, and policy advocates in their own right (Fox et al. 1994, 11). In fact, such participation and particularly the experience with democratic values and practices which it offers, can promote "an appreciation of the obligations as well as the rights of democratic citizenship" (Diamond 1994, 7-8; see also Fowler 1993, 16). An additional result and function can be the recruitment and training of new political leaders (Diamond 1994, 9).

### **Self-Governance**

Self-governance is seen as a primary -- perhaps *the* primary -- purpose of civil society. It is defined as the management of "matters of common concern without resort to state intervention" (see Fox et al. 1994, 8; based on Tandon 1991, 10; Habermas 1978; and Chazan 1990). Put another way, civil society can "multiply the capacities of groups to improve their own welfare, independently of the state" (Diamond 1994, 11). Collective development action is increasingly pursued within civil society (see Bratton 1990, 92), confirming a rationale for the principle of subsidiarity: "A higher order body should not take unto itself responsibilities which properly belong to a lower body" (Handy 1992, 64; Schumacher 1973). Whether or not these self-governance functions "properly belong" to civil society, they do serve essential purposes under a variety of circumstances.

Civil society's self-governance function can provide services and meet needs when the state is for one reason or another -- will or capacity -- unable to do so (see Tripp 1994, 7); or when the state is simply ineffective (see Weigle & Butterfield 1992, 16). In some instances, *self-governance* may be the only option, or at least the only opportunity for participation in governance; this has been the case in both the Palestinian territories (prior to the granting of limited sovereignty) and in Egypt (Ibrahim 1992, 419-20). In contemporary settings, this self-governance enables the privatization of services, "supporting and encouraging private businesses and a new market economy, providing a structured vehicle for public participation and providing the civic fora essential for a democratic society" (USAID 1994, 1). Some even argue that civil society's self-governance ability provides the "possibility of productivity in the economy" (Montville 1992, 8). When it is not explicitly endorsed by government, especially under authoritarian regimes, civil society's self-governance can effectively undermine the legitimacy and authority of these regimes (see Weigle & Butterfield 1992, 15). In fact, through self-governance alone, civil society associations can provide alternative channels of expression and participation when other forms are prohibited; this is specifically documented in Latin America (Thompson 1992, 396).

This self-governance is particularly significant for the poor who are increasingly designing and implementing their own "survival strategies" (Esquel 1993, iii, 3), which when aggregated are proving quite influential (Ibid., 3). These efforts creatively approach seemingly intractable problems in the most culturally relevant ways (see Ritchey-Vance 1991, 42). In addressing the issues of greatest importance to citizens, self-governing civil society organizations enhance citizens' self-reliance and empowerment (Hirschmann 1993, 16), again serving as experiential learning for democratic governance. This continuum from self-governance to civic action is clearly delineated in Korten's (1987) generational model of NGOs. He argues that NGOs have the potential to develop from relief and welfare organizations (first generation), to organizations which represent local self-reliance (second generation), to those which promote sustainable systems development through political action (third generation) (187).

Specifically, the crucial outcomes of self-governance are community capacity building (See Fisher 1993, 12-13), enhanced confidence in collective processes (Eckstein 1990, 277) and self-worth and ability (Fowler 1993, 8) -- in short, empowerment which is both practical and psychological. This capacity-building and psychological empowerment is the basis for a successful democracy (DAC 1993); that is, it represents the foundation on which people can make their own choices which is a prerequisite to democratic processes (Fowler 1993, 17). This linkage is further enhanced when the self-governance embodied by civil society organizations is implemented through democratic means (OECD 1993, 5). Finally, some define such empowerment and its ensuing democratic practice as development itself (Elliott 1987, 57-8), and the essence of sustainability (see Korten 1990).

### **Societal Participation in State Governance**

As has been pointed out, governance does not take place exclusively within state government, nor exclusively in civil society. In fact, the two realms of governance are quite different, providing an important balance of power and governing tendencies. Serrano (1993) argues that state governance is integrative and concentrates power, while civil society diversifies and redistributes power (30). It can be argued that both approaches are essential to good governance, as together they can lead to greater state accountability, responsiveness, and effectiveness in the allocation and management of public resources (Charlick et al. 1994b, 101; see also Roth 1991; qtd. in Fisher 1993, 22; Fox et al. 1994, 62). Clearly, given its important self-governance function and the many obstacles to expanding its influence, civil society offers many more opportunities for participation in local governance as opposed to state governance (Charlick 1994, 10). Nevertheless, it is its potential to promote participation in state governance that is most often emphasized in strategies to promote democratic governance.

What does participation in state governance mean? In terms of the activities of civil society organizations, this participation is most often interpreted to refer to lobbying and advocacy activities. More specifically, "civil society organizations pursue from the state concessions, benefits, policy changes, relief, redress, or accountability" (Diamond 1994, 6-7). High capacity civil societies, typically in the context of democratic regimes, can also be directly enlisted by the state to participate in policy dialogues and, most often, service delivery. That

is, they may be enlisted "to help grapple with problems stemming from debt, economic adjustment, austerity measures, and poverty" (Reilly n.d., i).

But in what way is this participation made possible? The aforementioned functions -- social integration, the promotion and practice of democratic values, and self-governance -- all culminate to contribute to the potential for enhanced societal participation in state governance. This is particularly notable in the learning, experience, and relevance embodied in democratic practice and self-governance. These are prerequisites to societal participation on a wider scale, and eventually in state governance.

In addition to these precursors, scholars and practitioners enumerate other factors which support societal participation in state governance. For example, Blair and associates (1994) list: educating and mobilizing citizens, encouraging previously marginalized groups to participate, and building networks of citizens with overlapping multiple affiliations which moderate the destabilizing effects of exclusive groups (9). The importance of mobilizing previously marginalized groups should not be minimized, especially as these groups can represent the majority of societies under authoritarian regimes (see Fox et al. 1994, 13; see also Paz 1994, 4). Another recent study proposed that civil society promotes this participation by providing fora "to disseminate information on civil liberties, [and] to exchange independent political opinions" (Fox et al. 1994, iv-v).

In fact, the two most important mechanisms by which civil society organizations enable participation in state governance are representation and information dissemination. The expression of ideas within civil society promotes policy dialogue -- based on available information -- which lays the groundwork for the representation of constituency interests (see Charlick et al. 1994a, 7; see also Diamond 1994, 4).

### ***Representation***

In terms of representation, civic institutions "perform functions of communication, representation, and negotiation through which citizen preferences are heard and acted upon" (Fox et al. 1994, 13), and act as "channels... for the articulation, aggregation, and representation of interest" (Diamond 1994, 8). Through these functions and channels a broader based aggregation of interests is communicated to the state than mere political parties would provide (Ibid., 8; see also Blair & Jutkowitz 1994, 66-7). This broader base representation is an important foundation for democracy (see Dahl 1971; qtd. in Rauner 1993, 2).

Civil society's role in articulating the interests of its constituents and conveying their demands to government is widely noted (Barkan & Ottaway 1994, 1; Bratton 1990, 89; Holm et al. 1994, 1; Van Til 1987, 51). Some have even referred to civil society organizations as "interlocutors," which give voice to those segments of society which are traditionally discounted (Ritchey-Vance 1991, 42). This focus on the marginalized or poor, particularly beyond mere service delivery to assistance with articulating interests (see Drabek 1987, x), emphasizes this highly politicized function of civil society. As OECD (1988) has pointed out,

"giving poor people more of a say in their societies by definition means change" (28; see also Paz 1994, 4).

The extent and political sensitivity of such efforts vary. As intermediaries between the state and their members/constituents, civil society organizations most often interface at the local government level (Swilling 1992), but are increasingly looking to influence the national level as well (Charlick et al. 1994b, 86; see also Korten 1987). Furthermore, such activities can evolve from mere articulation and representation of interests to active advocacy for policy change (Tripp 1994, 15) and participation in defining policy options (Hirschmann 1993, 16).

### ***Information Dissemination***

The pursuit of these interests is predicated on access to relevant information which civil society provides to citizens (Diamond 1994, 10). Values, ideas, and information are derived and disseminated through the public discourse which civil society affords and promotes (Fox et al. 1994, 7-8; Diamond 1994, 4). Among the many elements of civil society, this function is most obvious in the networks of communication such as the media, educational and cultural organizations, and think-tanks (see Fox et al. 1994, 9-10; see also Blair et al. 1994, 7; World Bank 1994, 30).

The information dissemination function is increasingly viewed as instrumental to generating policy dialogue, and to informing and generating consent for policy reform -- political, economic, and social (see Hennin 1991; qtd. in Esquel 1993, 8). This instrumental view is recognized by both multi-laterals (*ibid.*, 8), and governments (Holm et al. 1994, 1). The free flow of information is particularly important in market economies (Sullivan 1994, 150; World Bank 1994, 29). In addition to its support to state governance, reform, and the market economy, civil society's information dissemination role is an important prerequisite to democracy. That is, democracy is predicated on inclusiveness which cannot exist without the broad sharing of relevant information (Fowler 1993, 3). Furthermore, this information enables people to gain the intelligence and relevance they need to effectively participate (Handy 1992, 65). Finally, it is this information exchange and dissemination, among other things, which keeps existing democracy healthy (Reilly 1993, 9).

### **Limiting the State's Authority**

This representation of citizen interests and information dissemination form the basis of societal participation in state governance which, in turn, has the potential to limit the state's authority and potential abuse of power. Through its many functions, civil society can create pressure for policy reform and improvement in governance (Serrano 1993, 32; see also Fox et al. 1994, iv, v; Hodgkinson & Sumariwalla 1992, 491; Lewis 1994, 3), as well as explicitly monitor the state's actions for corruption and abuse (Diamond 1994, 7; Barkan & Ottaway 1994, 1; Holm et al. 1994, 1). This highlights two of the four critical roles of voluntary action outlined by Korten (1990): catalyzing the transformation of institutions, policies, and values; and monitoring and protesting abuses of power (185).

Civil society actors perform these functions in a variety of ways. First, their mere interaction with government offers the potential for policy impact, particularly in the arenas in which specific civil society organizations operate (see Drabek 1987, xiv; see also Blair et al. 1994, 6). This policy impact is possible through either direct involvement in policy dialogue, the exercise of pressure to change policy, or public criticism of policy (Streeten 1988, 8).

Civil society's monitoring role is facilitated by existing constitutional norms, legitimate judicial systems, and opportunities for citizen participation and voter education (Charlick 1994, 10). Specifically, this monitoring is performed through defending legal and constitutional rights; defending individuals against human rights violations; signaling poor governance practices such as corruption; defending, promoting, and educating on political rights; and monitoring the fairness of electoral processes (Ibid. 7-8). A final approach to monitoring and limiting the state's activities is through the media: by exposing wrongdoing the media encourages accountable behavior (World Bank 1994, 30); and by disseminating information on policies and policy dialogue, the media facilitates the participation of other civil society actors in supporting, criticizing, and/or designing these policies.

Civil society organizations, even service delivery NGOs, are increasingly confronted with dysfunctional aspects of the institutional settings in which they work. Hence, they often evolve in their approaches and involvement with other public and private organizations at the local, regional, and national levels where they are affected (Korten 1987, 148-9). Through such evolution, NGOs -- even in very restricted environments -- "have successfully challenged socially or environmentally damaging programs pursued by their own governments" (Clark 1991, 3). Such experience lays the groundwork for further evolution into direct policy dialogue and advocacy on a broader scale (see Korten 1990).

Such activities are the mainstay of democratic governance which "posits a shared governance function between the state and civil society for the purposes of increasing state accountability, responsiveness, and increased effectiveness" (Charlick et al. 1994b, 101). In fact, as one of four channels for the distribution of power and resources, and as only one governance actor, civil society should be conceived more as a "counter-balancer" of the state and its governance, rather than exclusively a "limiter." On its part, state governance, through its integration and concentration of power, can serve to limit and monitor the influence of special interests within civil society as well.

Of course, civil society's counterbalancing activity is facilitated by the pre-existence of some democratic norms, for example, the right to lobby and the existence of legitimate recourse and accountability through the judicial system (Charlick et al. 1994a, 101). Through its application this activity enhances the meaning of democratic governance to the individual citizen as her/his rights to participate are extended beyond mere electoral participation (see Roth 1991; qtd. in Fisher 1993, 22).

### **Generating Consent**

A final, less broadly recognized function of civil society is its role in generating consent for government policies and reform. This confirms civil society's role as a counter-balancer as opposed to a strict limiter of government action. In fact, this particular function makes civil society essential to government in relatively open regimes: because it manufactures consent, civil society is an important source of state legitimacy (Fox et al. 1994, 12). This function, thus, recognizes that civil society holds significant inherent power -- it can either grant or withhold this legitimacy and influence the state and society's reaction to it accordingly (ibid., 15).

In fact, without this legitimacy, the state cannot govern (Barkan & Ottaway 1994, 1). At a minimum its effectiveness is enhanced by civil society's participation in state governance and granting of legitimacy (Tocqueville 1945 (1840), 126). Granting legitimacy is directly related to civil society's capacity and action in participating in state governance; that is, "the level of a regime's legitimacy is directly dependent on the degree of citizen engagement in political processes" (Fowler 1993, 3). This holds true even where civil society participants are negatively disposed to particular government policies and their implementation: these participants and the pressure which they exert will, in theory, result in the inclusion of specific constituent interests which will facilitate the implementation of these policies (see Haggard & Webb 1994, 31-2). Consequently, Reilly (1993) refers to civil society actors as "guarantors of effective social policy" (6). Hence, civil society's granting of legitimacy is also crucial to sustainability -- of both particular policies, and political systems (see Harbeson 1993, 1).

Alone, the state cannot expect to produce loyalty, civility, political competence, and trust in authority and thus needs to rely on civil society for this end (see Walzer 1991, 301). Not only does this confirm the role of both the state and civil society in democratic governance, it is also often the motivation for state governments to allow the participation of civil society in the governance process (see Gramsci 1971; qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 146). This instrumental view of civil society is increasingly embraced in terms of generating consent for major policy reforms, particularly in the context of marketization (see Fox et al. 1994, 15) and structural adjustment (see Hennin 1991; qtd. in Esquel 1993, 8). Civil society can play a crucial role in supporting such reforms by educating citizens, building support, and diverting opposition to constructive channels (Fox et al. 1994, 15).

### **The Outcomes of Civil Society Functions**

Hence, civil society not only represents and supports citizens, it also can generate consent and support for state governments, eventually improving the latter's effectiveness. These functions specifically support democracy by embodying pluralism and hence the distribution of power, aggregating and conveying diversified interests, and providing the prerequisites (information, confidence, civic values, learning, and experience) to societal participation in state -- and democratic -- governance. Finally, these functions contribute directly to the accountability of the state and the ensurance of the sustainability of democratic governance.

## **PART IV: THE INSTITUTIONAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY**

The institutional strength of civil society and its relationship to economic and political reform are the crux of any motivation to support civil society. That is, there is a significant potential relationship between a strong civil society, sustainable democratic systems, and sustainable development. An understanding of this relationship is enhanced by the identification and evaluation of specific criteria of institutional and sectoral strength of civil society; the potential ramifications of the sequencing between economic and political reform; the implications of various stages of political development; and the opportunities and constraints presented by various state-society relationship types.

### **The Institutional Strength of Civil Society**

The effectiveness of civil society in performing these functions will depend on the institutional strength of individual civil society organizations, and of the sector as a whole. At the organizational level, this will depend on the internal workings of particular organizations, specifically whether these are democratic in orientation, and on institutional capacity. At the sectoral level, indicators of institutional strength include the density, diversity, and autonomy of the sector as a whole; the degree of linkage among organizations; and its enabling environment. An additional potential indicator is the incidence of specialized civil society organizations.

### **Organizational Indicators**

The effectiveness of a particular civil society organization in contributing to democratic governance is appropriately considered a function of its capacity to "participate in and influence social, economic and political processes" (Interaction n.d., 2). On the supply side, this translates to democratic internal governance structures;<sup>5</sup> on the demand side, to institutional capacity to fulfill its objectives.

On the first note, Charlick and Associates (1994b) hold that **democratic governance within an organization** determines, at least in part, its ability to achieve its chosen mission (85). Certainly, whether an organization's mission is to influence the state or to supply democratic self-governance, its effectiveness will depend on its popular appeal, and relevance and persuasiveness of its arguments in the first case (see Clark 1991, 14); and on its commitment to participation, equality, and democratic procedures in the latter (see Charlick et al. 1994b, 9). These important factors are grounded in the fostering of and compliance with normative values (Ibid. 81), which contribute to a sense of community and responsiveness to local values and traditions (Ekeh 1994, 13, 25).

---

<sup>5</sup>Internal democratic governance is not a universally accepted criterion. However, given the presumably desirable functions of potentially demanding *and* supplying democratic governance, it becomes an important *operational* criterion for selecting organizations to support.

Hence, in order to assess a civil society organization's potential to contribute to democratic governance, one must consider both the supply and demand sides and the application of democratic and other relevant normative values in the pursuit of the organization's mission. For example, the "democratic quality" of the increasing numbers of contracting organizations - those which are created and/or develop in response to funding opportunities (see PACT 1989, 12, 26) -- is questionable at best, and their contribution to democratic governance is doubtful.

Even with internal democratic governance, an organization's mission is not assured unless it possesses the **institutional capacity** to design, finance, implement, and evaluate its objectives. In fact, such institutional capacity is a common barrier to CSOs' contribution to democratic governance; the most notable organization deficiencies include resources, management capacity, and technical skills (see Charlick et al. 1994b, 85-6). Capacity and sustainability concerns raise issue with various finance mechanisms; first, organizations must be gauged for their absorptive capacity of donor funding (see Barkan & Ottaway 1994, 5); second, they must assure at least a matching domestic base of financial support to assure policy voice (see Bratton 1990, 114) and local accountability (Ibid., 114); and third, they must avoid the temptation to accept financing through general taxation which generally serves to co-opt their efforts and support the agenda of the regime in power (Fowler 1993, 15).

In addition to the need for general managerial capacity building and strategic planning to carry out projects, deliver services, and raise funds, scholars and practitioners are increasingly identifying specific civic action skills which are necessary for CSOs to contribute to democratic governance. These include coalition building, negotiation, conflict management, policy analysis, and the drafting of alternative legislation (see Interaction n.d., 5).

It can be argued, then, that the greater the occurrence and quality of these internal values and skills, the greater the contribution of a particular organization to democratic governance. It follows that the greater the number of organizations demonstrating these characteristics, the stronger the civil society and its contribution to democratic governance as a whole. However, there are numerous other sectoral indicators as well.

### **Sectoral Indicators**

Larry Diamond (1989) summarizes many of the sectoral and organizational indicators of a strong civil society as follows:

The greater the number, size, autonomy, resourcefulness, variety and democratic orientation of popular organizations in civil society, the greater will be the prospects from some kind of movement from rigid authoritarianism, and for subsequent movement towards semi-democracy and democracy (qtd. in Fowler 1993, 5).

The importance of **density**, diversity, and autonomy of the sector as a whole is widely recognized. In fact, some argue that it is its mere strength in numbers which enables civil

society organizations to develop an influence on state governance (see Clark 1991, 14; see also Charlick et al. 1994b, 81). This "density" refers to the incidence of both formal, state-recognized, and informal associations, urban and rural (Ibid., 81, 83, 91). In this argument, the actual *quality* of particular CSOs matters less than their sheer numbers, as the latter is a precondition to the emergence of high quality and specialized CSOs (see Charlick et al. 1994b), and constitutes "a ready-made means of popular mobilization against tyrannical or inept governance" (Charlick et al. 1994a, 9). In fact, this "critical mass" is deemed important in order for other indicators to emerge (see Interaction n.d., 2). Regardless of their quality, a critical mass of CSOs is a de facto contribution to the "policy pluralism" and the creation of "multiple publics" which is necessary to democratic governance (ARD 1992, 16).

This latter point, underlines the importance of **diversity** within a civil society sector, especially as it relates to democratic governance. Holm and Associates (1994) contend that the broader the range of CSOs, the greater the percentage of the population which has influence on the government (1). The importance of this diversity is demonstrated in Poland where the overunification of civil society prevented the emergence of political pluralism (Cohen & Arato 1992, 67). Civil society can also contribute to multiple centers of polarization which is equally disconcerting, as in the case of ethnic or national movements such as those seen in the former Soviet Union (Ibid., 67). However, in its theoretical foundations, Parsons (1971) holds that civil society offers the opportunity for individual citizens to participate in a multiplicity of organizations simultaneously, which affords the opportunity to bridge seemingly polarized differences (qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 131; see also Walzer 1991, 302-3). Perhaps the least controversial segment of civil society for which to argue for diversity is in networks of public communication. Here, the multiplicity of channels affords the greatest reach to the most diverse populations for purposes of information dissemination (see Fox et al. 1994, 9-10).

Such density and diversity can also contribute to the relative **autonomy** of at least some civil society actors. Such autonomy is crucial to the accountability, transparency, and responsiveness characteristic of democratic governance. Here, autonomy refers to both the state and potential dominating forces within society; in some cases these may be the same. For example, many civil societies tend to be dominated by CSOs originating and operating from centers of urban elite control which can be heavily linked to the state government, whether benevolent or not. "Autonomy" then refers to the ability of an organization to effectively represent and act upon the objectives of its members; it is thus a relative concept. However, adequate density and diversity of organizations within the sector, as discussed above, can enhance the likelihood of relative autonomy and representativeness of society as a whole. An additional implication of autonomy refers to financing as above.

This autonomy, and especially the strength of the sector as a whole, is also supported through **linkage** among civil society actors. In fact, it is argued that linkage is the primary means by which these actors "articulate, aggregate, and advocate for their interests in the political arena" (Charlick et al. 1994b, 93). Linkages facilitate interaction with the state on behalf of the sector as a whole (Drabek 1987, xii); they can deter the dominance of large associations

(Woods 1994, 7); and they can help transcend local parochialism (Fisher & Kling 1993, 322) and a sense of isolation (Clark 1991, 86). However, an important caveat needs mention: It can be argued that the existence of umbrella organizations and other linkage structures may be an indication of the strength of civil society, particularly as it is indicative of a critical mass or density of civil society organizations. However, this is not universally true; the *quality*, especially the representativeness of these linkage organizations, is critical to a strong civil society. Here, the diversity argument holds equally well: the greater the number and diversity of linkage structures, the potentially more representative they are collectively.

Linkage targets include local and national governments, multilaterals and bilaterals, key individuals, the private business sector, and other national and international NGOs (Esquel 1993, 3). In terms of strengthening civil society in its promotion of democratic governance, what is most often referred to is horizontal and vertical linkages primarily among indigenous civil society actors. Additional advocated linkage structures -- particularly between citizens and the state -- include the independent media, political parties, human rights organizations, interest groups, and the judiciary (Charlick et al. 1994b, 9).

*Horizontal linkage* represents solidarity among interests and efforts to promote them (see Charlick et al. 1994b, 81). As with a federation, the individual civil society actors create alliances for mutual benefit (see Handy 1992, 65). That is, collectively they can enhance their ability to influence government policy and distributional issues (Harbeson 1993, 3; Woods 1994, 7, 9-10). The mere act of associating can become "the vehicle through which NGOs learn to formulate advocacy positions," whether on particular policy or to facilitate the operations of the NGO sector as a whole (Interaction n.d., 4). In fact, such linkage is beneficial even to those organizations who do not directly participate; smaller and weaker organizations can "free-ride" off the policy influence of such networks (Woods 1994, 9-10).

*Vertical linkage* enables civil society actors to construct alternative channels that bypass "unreliable state institutions" (Bratton 1990, 92) -- at the local, regional, and sometimes the national levels. In addition, vertical linkages cultivate both local roots and channels to articulate demands to the policy center (Ibid. 106), maximizing representativeness at the national level and relevance at the local level. Vertical linkage can imply internally federated organizations such as labor unions (Woods 1994, 4), or can refer to linkage among organizations. That is, smaller, local NGOs may form strategic alliances with intermediary organizations who can bridge the gap between these base organizations and the government (Lehmann 1990; qtd. in Carroll 1992, 22). In some cases, such linkage is wise not necessarily due to insufficient capacity, but rather because many organizations develop a comparative advantage in addressing policy issues (see Fowler 1993, 9-10).

This latter point highlights another indicator of sectoral strength, namely the incidence of specialized civil society organizations. Specialized civil society organizations include election monitoring groups, civic education groups, and human rights watchdog groups (see Fox et al. 1994, 12). Such advocacy groups can act on the local or national levels (see Fisher & Kling

1993, 323). Their existence can either imply minimal tolerance in the environment, capacity, and resources; or a reactive effort vis-à-vis an authoritarian state or a limited environment.

The issue of an **enabling environment** for civil society is quite complex. It can include the historical and regional context and the political and social culture (see Weigle & Butterfield 1992, 2); as well as the legal framework and government-society relationship (see Chazan 1992; see also Charlick et al. 1994b, 95-99; Coston 1994). Theoretical debate is on-going regarding the precise relationship between the strength of civil society and the degree of economic liberalization. Theories on each of these factors are still in development. For example, in terms of historical context, Bianchi (1986) argues that civil society, pluralism, and the prospects for democratic governance are much more pronounced where the "art of association" was proactively cultivated as opposed to being repressed and/or retarded. This hypothesis is yet to be substantiated. It is possible that repression may actually accelerate mobilization. In some cases, historical events may serve to cultivate association by necessity which can later become a resource for a more vigorous and potentially politicized civil society. This was arguably the case, for example, in Niger (see Charlick et al. 1994b, 81). A more detailed discussion of the implications of the economy and political development for the strength of civil society and its contribution to democratic governance follows.

### **Civil Society and Economic and Political Reform**

Much has been written about the relationship between democratic transition and economic growth, unfortunately, with little agreement. The debate primarily concerns the sequencing of reform, specifically whether political reform should precede economic reform or vice versa. Additional concerns revolve around the general compatibility of the two. These arguments focus on the respective contributions or hindrances of each type of reform to the other. The following discussion is in no way intended to be comprehensive. In fact, recent works demonstrate the increasing attention to this issue while remaining inconclusive as to the priorities and respective impacts of reform.<sup>6</sup>

#### **Sequencing**

Theory in this arena is in its nascent stages, coinciding with the increasing though relatively new historical experience with simultaneous political and economic reform in the form of democratization and market liberalization. To date, much of this "theory" mistakenly draws causal conclusions from historical fact. For example, broad generalizations regarding the sequencing of reform types -- specifically political reform first, economic reform later -- have been made based on the historical experience of Central and Eastern Europe (see Aslund 1994; Balcerowicz 1994). Similarly, generalizations purporting a causal relationship between

---

<sup>6</sup>See for example, "Economic Reform and Democracy." *Special Issue. Journal of Democracy* Vol. 5, No. 4 (October 1994). See also Nelson, Joan M., ed. *A Precarious Balance: An Overview of Democracy and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. A Copublication of the International Center for Economic Growth and the Overseas Development Council. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1994.

authoritarian regimes and successful economic reform have been made based on the Chilean case (see Geddes 1994; Armijo, Biersteker & Lowenthal 1994). In fact these hypotheses are contradictory.

More than providing general rules of thumb, together they emphasize the importance of the historical and perhaps cultural contexts of reform. This has led to an increasing call to focus on intervening variables which would determine when and how a particular sequencing of reform -- including the potential for simultaneous reforms -- should be pursued. As of yet, the findings are inconclusive but the path has been laid. While some authors attempt to delineate models which would identify the circumstances under which one type of reform would follow another, in reality each country and its experience are unique and provide little input for a comprehensive model. For a better appreciation of this development, the respective arguments will be briefly discussed in turn.

The argument for the political-economic reform sequence is based on the experience in Central and Eastern Europe (as above). Aside from this historical reference, the rationale for commencing with political reform centers around democratization's purported fostering of an enabling environment for economic reform (see ARD 1992, ii; Hirschmann 1993, 6). Democratic governance, it is argued, creates effective social management, and the ability for non-state actors to demand appropriate economic policies which would avoid excessive state intervention (ARD 1992, ii). In essence, citizens learn to participate in political processes which informs their potential to participate in the economy.

Certainly the success of this sequence will not hold true for all circumstances. This sequencing will be most effective where the democratic government has the requisite support and legitimacy to withstand the disruptive effects of economic reform (Linz 1990, 160), and where the democratic transitions marginalize former political elites and adequately prepare the public for the hardships of economic transition (Nelson 1994b, 53). Haggard and Webb (1994) add that under such circumstances, the move to economic reform should be swift and decisive to exploit any political advantages associated with the political reform (3).

It can also be argued that the political-economic sequence is more conducive to the sustainability of the comprehensive system. Both political and, especially, economic systems create poverty and income inequalities (for a discussion see Haggard & Kaufman 1994, 10-12). Political reform presents the potential to ensure that economic growth will be "just, sustainable, and inclusive" (Korten 1990, 34), thus thwarting potential civil unrest.

Of course, the arguments for this sequence are primarily based on *possibilities*, not probabilities, and certainly not proven theory. In fact, democratic regimes must be very stable if they are to successfully introduce market reforms and survive (Cavarozzi et al. 1994, 34). Furthermore, economic reforms will pose the challenge to democratic regimes of how to appropriately incorporate emerging interest groups into decision-making processes. Labor unions pose a particular challenge as they may resist reforms conducive to economic

liberalization (Kochanowicz et al. 1994, 30). Finally, it may be, as many scholars argue,<sup>7</sup> that democratization leads to unreasonable economic expectations which, when not met, lead to frustration and potential civil unrest.

The economic reform first approach is based on the Chilean experience (see Armijo, Biersteker & Lowenthal 1994, 165); and the "Asian model" (Sullivan 1994, 150). That is, before the political transition, countries such as Chile, Thailand, Turkey, Korea, and Taiwan, had already achieved strong positive results from their economic reform (see Haggard & Webb 1994, 6). This is related to the "Lipset hypothesis" which claims a strong correlation between the level of development and democracy (Lipset 1959; see also Haggard 1994, 1; Rauner 1993, 2). In fact, many scholars hold that economic growth is a favorable precondition for democracy.<sup>8</sup> Even USAID recognizes that the lack of economic development impedes democratic consolidation (1994, 21).

Haggard and Webb (1994) hold that successful reforms implemented prior to transition are not likely to be reversed by democratic transition (3). But how are such reforms implemented? In fact, advocacy for this reform sequence is closely related to arguments based on regime type. That is, many scholars argue that authoritarian regimes are more likely than democratic ones to effectively implement economic reform, hence the sequence. One rationale for this argument is that the high turnover of democratic governments is likely to foster a reversal of reforms due to their adverse affects on powerful constituencies (see Nelson 1994b, 55). Authoritarian regimes, it is argued, can more easily ignore the outcries of such constituencies (Geddes 1994, 105).

However, evidence shows that there is not as strong of a link between regime type and economic liberalization as is assumed (Ibid. 106). In fact, it may be risky to pursue the economic-political sequence under authoritarian regimes as these regimes often fail to liberalize their economies and those that do experience less short-term demand for democratization and therefore may not follow through with the sequence (Ibid., 108).

A third option, less often mentioned, is simultaneous political and economic reform. Evidence suggests that in many cases democracy has held with the introduction of market reforms (Kochanowicz et al. 1994, 10). But the fact of the matter is, this option -- and specifically the precise interaction of the two reform efforts -- has not been adequately analyzed (Ibid. 9).

There are several more certain conclusions. First, a strong state is essential for economic reform and development (see Lipton 1991). Basic state functions, particularly those which support the market, are essential to effective economic liberalization and development (Kochanowicz 1994, 30). Second, there are winners, losers, and great -- perhaps contradictory -- challenges to either reform. Democracy will not necessarily improve the

---

<sup>7</sup>See for example Healy & Robinson 1992, 157; Mkandawire 1992, 24; qtd. in Martin 1994, 10.

<sup>8</sup>See for example Onimode 1992, 7; Tetzlaff 1991; qtd. in Martin 1994, 10. See also Sullivan 1994, 151-2.

economy; in fact, short term sacrifices are required for a sustainable productive economy (see Linz 1990, 161). Some argue that the essential strengthening of the state and market may actually be incompatible, that the strengthening of the one can subvert the other (Lipton 1991, 21). Others argue that, once in place, democratic institutions and free markets are actually mutually supportive (see Nelson 1994a, 7-8).

Third, the on-going debates regarding sequencing do not necessarily negate the merits of each approach. Rather, they underline the importance of historical, social, and economic context (see Sullivan 1994). Intervening variables are crucial to determining the appropriate strategies. On the reform side, such considerations include the sequence, pace and design of political and economic reforms (Nelson 1994a, 2). Contextual considerations include state-society relations, class, political culture, civil society, and the degree of economic stability and development (Sullivan 1994, 151-2).

Perhaps the easiest area of agreement is that political and economic reform are sometimes inevitable and always risk instability. Democracy, it is pointed out, is a powerful force that once unleashed is difficult to contain. On the other hand, countries facing deep fiscal crisis don't always have the luxury to choose the timing and sequence of reform (see Armijo, Bierstecker & Lowenthal 1994, 173). USAID has explicitly recognized, "Slow or inequitable growth and widespread poverty feed political instability and civil strife" (1994, 29). Where possible, reform strategies should heed the potential not only for the "discontent of the masses" (see Linz 1990, 159), but should also give special consideration to important social cleavages such as class, caste, ethnicity, race, religion, language, location, and gender, which can and will affect the reform process (see Hirschmann 1993, 3).

### **Respective Contributions**

Regardless of the sequencing strategy, political and economic reform inevitably impact the effectiveness of each other -- for better or for worse. Once again, the precise direction of these impacts are inconclusive. Some scholars argue that political and economic reform efforts are simply incompatible,<sup>9</sup> as mentioned above. Others outline the potential contributions of one to the other.

Democratic governance can make significant contributions to economic reform and development. In fact, the World Bank (1989; 1992) posits a causal relationship between political liberalization and successful economic reform (see also Verba, Nie & Kim 1978; qtd. in Rauner 1993, 4). Political institutions create the context for the market economy (see Hirschmann 1993, 6). This include an appropriate policy environment, sound institutions, and good governance (USAID 1994, 29).

---

<sup>9</sup>See O'Donnell 1973; Dornbusch and Edwards 1991; qtd. in Haggard & Webb 1994, 2. The incompatibility argument has most often been made for poorer countries which underlines the potential importance of the level of development to reform efforts.

More specifically, the accountability and legitimacy indicative of true democratic governance foster the confidence needed to undertake the economic risk associated with capital investment (see ARD 1992, 14; see also Maravall 1994, 28-30). This confidence is reinforced by the opportunity for economic actors to participate in the political and, albeit less directly, policy making processes, presumably leading to informed, and thus relevant, economic policies (see Haggard 1994, 3). Finally, an open political system, and the transparency of democratic governance, facilitate the free flow of information crucial to economic decision making (World Bank 1994, 29; Sullivan 1994, 150; Maravall 1994, 19).

Democratic governance also holds the potential to sustain economic development and political systems. Through democratic processes, citizens can have an input into economic policies and decision making, attempt to buffer themselves from the consequences, and press for inclusive economic growth (see Clark 1991; Korten 1990). This input can divert civil conflict (see USAID 1991; Hirschmann 1993, i) by specifically addressing "debilitating distortions" in economic and social structures (Adedeji 1994, 130; UNECA 1989).

Nelson (1994b, 56) outlines the debate regarding economic contributions or detriments to democratic governance. On the one hand, economic reforms can establish the credibility of a new democratic government; and in the long run they can diffuse the control of economic resources and political power. On the other hand, the short-term consequences of economic reform can be painful, leading to instability for the new regime; and in the long run such reform can alienate the underclass and give undue representation to the elite beneficiaries of economic reform.

Despite these opposing possibilities, economic reform and a strong economy provide the *potential* for many important contributions to democratic governance. First, a strong economy provides citizens with the requisite resources to attempt to influence the state and its policies (Holm et al. 1994, 1; see also Weintraub 1991, 35). Typically these resources are most prominent among professional and urban income groups (Ibid., 11). When there is a critical mass of such resources, civil society is more likely to thrive through the sustenance of issue-oriented and charitable organizations (Ibid. 15).

Second, these resources are essential to support an independent media. The media is supported through advertisements which reflect the strength of the economy, which in turn determines citizens' ability to buy these newspapers (Johnson 1994, 24). The media must first exist, and then be affordable to the general citizenry. Only then, can citizens benefit from the information and commonalities fostered by the media (Ibid., 25). In turn, the media provides essential information flow which feeds not only the economy but civil society as well. In fact, Sullivan (1994) argues that once the market economy establishes the necessary free flow of economically-related information, it is very difficult to control the flow of information in other arenas (150).

Closely related to these specific benefits of economic growth is the development of a middle class. A middle class represents a critical mass of citizens able to take autonomous action

(Lewis 1992; Nyang'oro 1994; qtd. in Holm et al. 1994, 1). These citizens are able to collectively respond to economic and political issues without resorting to civil conflict which might threaten the regime (Salamon 1994, 118; Linz 1990, 159). The importance of the middle class is demonstrated in India where, with gains in efficiency and economic growth, the pro-democratic middle class came to support the Congress party and its reforms (Sullivan 1994, 153).

The market economy also provides an important learning opportunity for citizens. Specifically, it is argued that the market encourages cooperative behavior; participants in the market must learn to be responsive to the needs of consumers (Norton 1992, 60-1). In addition, the market creates common interests among diverse groups, encouraging tolerance (Ibid., 61).

In more general terms, it is argued that economic development facilitates the consolidation of democratic institutions (USAID 1994, 21). Conversely, slow and inequitable growth feed political instability (Ibid., 29). Again, this supports the notion that together economic and political reform lead to more sustainable comprehensive systems. This underlines the perspective that political and economic reform can be mutually supportive (see Lipton 1991, 26-7; Nelson 1994b, 61; Geddes 1994, 117-118). At a minimum, taken together the reforms create a dynamic process where each affects the other -- particularly their respective credibility (see Nelson 1994a, 4).

### **The Importance of Civil Society**

This said, what is the role of and impact of this dynamic process on civil society? According to Dahrendorf (1990), "If there is any project that links economic and political reform, it must concern civil society" (qtd. in McHugh 1994; see also Hyden 1992, 24-25). The role of civil society in promoting democratic reform is apparent (and will be discussed in greater detail below); less obvious, is the role of civil society vis-à-vis economic reform.

Civil society can play an essential role in diverting or minimizing the devastating impacts of the instability which often follows economic reform. At the outset, civil society organizations can be important vehicles for building constituencies for reform and promoting broad public support (Hennin 1991). Indeed, some governments are recognizing the need for consultative approaches to reform, approaches which would see the input, for example, of trade unions into the design and implementation of privatization (Nelson 1994a, 8). If instability does ensue, civil society organizations can play a crucial role in providing intermediate social services to ease the pains of transition for those who suffer (see USAID 1994, 1). Civil society organizations can also address the social cleavages which further aggravate this instability and can ultimately threaten the regime. In all, civil society is an important counterbalance to the

tension between politics and economics, particularly in the reform environment (see Wolfe 1991; qtd. in Esquel 1993, 3).<sup>10</sup>

Civil society is purported to be a key link to socio-economic processes (see Esquel 1993, 7). It contributes to these processes in several ways. At the most general level, civil society "provides new knowledge, freedom of choice, and the possibility of productivity in the economy" (Montville 1992, 8). More specifically, civil society organizations can promote income generation, employment, and production (Esquel 1993, i). Civil society also contributes essential information services to economic progress, including public statistics on output and impacts, and public debate and analyses through the media (see Lipton 1991, 29).

Specific economically-oriented civil society organizations can also significantly contribute to democratic governance. For example, through unions, workers (citizens) learn how to operate democratically (see Pateman 1970; see also Haines, 1993, 5). Economic interests can also serve to unify opposing groups within civil society organizations (see Haines 1993, 5). Finally, business associations can be an important countervailing force to bureaucratic/military alliances (see for example, Hansen & Calavan 1994, 15).

In short, the sequence and respective contributions of economic and political reforms will vary according to their contexts. The potential importance of civil society in linking these reform efforts and easing the transitions is universal. Civil society can lay the groundwork for reform, help to sustain it, and eventually become a beneficiary of and continuous contributor to the resulting economic and political systems.

### **Civil Society and Political Development**

In addition to political reform per se, civil society can also be examined with respect to political development in a broader sense. Political development can be gauged through a number of criteria and frameworks. While models of political stages have been widely criticized for their implied or assumed linearity and inflexible categorizations, they remain the most commonly debated heuristic for understanding political development. Within the context of such models, civil society -- its role, strengths, and weaknesses -- can be examined at each identified stage. Additional approaches to understanding civil society vis-à-vis political development include models of state-society relations, and the degree of state penetration. Each of these approaches underlines the ultimate importance of civil society at the local level.

### **Political Staging Models**

Political staging models find theoretical roots in the works of Gramsci and Habermas. Gramsci (1971) outlined five stages of state-society relations, while Habermas (1987)

---

<sup>10</sup>This further supports Cohen and Arato's (1992) tripartite model of the economy, the state, and civil society. In fact, civil society can also be seen as a result of effective political and economic reform. Evidence suggests, as one would expect, that civil society is stronger in stronger economies and more open political systems (see Bratton 1990, 92).

identified four stages in the relationships between the "lifeworld" and the bourgeois state (qtd. in Cohen & Arato 1992, 147, 442-3). More recent models focus specifically on the stages of democratic transition, typically referring to such stages as initiation, consolidation, and completion (Cohen & Arato 1992, 50), or more commonly, pre-transition, transition, and consolidation. Each of these three stages can also be subdivided, particularly the transition stage. For example, Healy and Robinson (1992, 151) distinguish three stages of democratization which can occur in the transition stage: political liberalization (guarantee of constitutional rights), political accountability (movement towards more inclusive politics), and democratization (the introduction of genuine political competition) (qtd. in Martin 1994, 8). It is this latter stage that is generally seen to constitute a completed transition. Each of these stages will be briefly discussed, followed by a more specific treatment of the role and staging of civil society.

### *Pre-transition*

In the pre-transition stage, there is on-going debate regarding the importance of specific pre-conditions to democracy.<sup>11</sup> Specifically, some argue that especially in poorer countries, the economic and institutional conditions for political change must first be nurtured (see Haggard 1994, 1). The instability of pre-transition, or authoritarian regimes, does not necessarily signal a *de jure* propitious environment for democratization. Linz (1990) points out that authoritarian regimes are frequently deposed by new authoritarian or military regimes (144). In fact, scholars now consider the possibility that no *universal* preconditions for democracy exist, and that some of what were previously considered preconditions may actually be outcomes of democracy (Karl 1991; qtd. in Rauner 1993, 7).

Rather than necessarily defining essential pre-conditions to successful transition, some scholars prefer outlining supportive conditions, focusing specifically on the role of civil society. For example, O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) argue that where popular mobilizations have occurred in the past, and where some linking among "subterranean" organizations has occurred, a strong upsurge or a transition in response to regime instability is more likely to occur (55). Charlick (1994) notes that self-governance tendencies typically pre-date political liberalization (2); and, even more optimistic, Ostrom and Associates (1989) purport that small-scale organization is likely to exist even under the most repressive regimes (qtd. in Silverman 1993, 10).

At this stage, Linz argues, a leaderless and disorganized civil society can be relegated to repression or may end in revolution (1990, 152). Implicit in such observations is that democratization requires a proactive yet organized civil society, else its demands will be repressed, ignored, and controlled, the perceived silence used to support the notion of "social peace" and "tacit consensus" for authoritarian policies (O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986, 48).

---

<sup>11</sup>This is particularly highlighted in terms of the introduction of political and economic reform as discussed above.

### *Transition*

Just as there is no universal definition of pre-transition, so too is the transition stage difficult to pinpoint. Here the debate encompasses questions such as what exactly constitutes a transition?, and to what is the state transitioning?

The literature is consistent on at least one essential point: there are many forms of democracy. Perhaps the lowest common denominator is Dahl's (1971) notion of polyarchy. However, O'Donnell (1994) points out that many such "democracies" are not necessarily *representative* democracies; rather, he argues, they resemble what he calls *delegative* democracies that, while enduring, are not necessarily consolidated (56). Implicit in such observations is the normative perspective that authoritarian states should be transitioning to some form of consolidated representative democracy.

Hence, O'Donnell distinguishes two transitions: the first consists of the democratic election of a government; the second, is to an institutionalized, consolidated democratic regime (Ibid. 56). Whereas formerly the most important indication of a completed transition was considered an election (see West et al. 1994, 20), increasingly scholars are considering the acceptance of particular normative rules (see Charlick et al. 1994a, 8). In fact, West and Associates (1994) distinguish the *opening* to transition as being marked by some change of rules (19).

It follows, then, that the transition stage consists of establishing the basic rules for a future democratic political process (Linz 1990, 150). The establishment of these rules and their eventual institutionalization will depend, to a large extent on civil society. First, civil society organizations may represent the most credible source of support for such rules (see Lemarchand 1992, 190-191). By exerting pressure for the establishment, enforcement, and eventual institutionalization of such rules, civil society can become the driving force for transition, at a minimum pushing it beyond where it might otherwise end (O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986, 56).

In fact, Harbeson (1993) points out that weak civil societies are a manifestation of fragile democratic transitions -- a strong civil society is essential to diverting any potential reversals (3). However, as Rothchild (1994) rightly notes, it takes an enlightened self-interest on the part of such transitioning regimes to see this potential and proactively encourage independent association (2).

Accordingly, West and Associates (1994) outline three significant development tasks during the transition stage: 1) the development and acceptance of democratic rules; 2) the development of a democratically operating civil society with the capacity to influence the determination and application of such rules; and 3) the development of institutions to continually link the state and society (13). These tasks are not necessarily sequential. Civil society's precise role will depend on the evolutionary stage of the transition. In early transition it will consist of testing the initial rules, such as the right to assemble and freedom of expression. At this stage, civil society itself may be nascent with limited self-consciousness and proaction. As the transition evolves, civil society is likely to become more developed and

structured -- not just within individual associations, but also as a whole, with increasing linkages among organizations. It is then that civil society is likely to have its greatest impact on the consistent application and eventual institutionalization of these rules.

### ***Consolidation***

The initiation of consolidation, as referenced above, is commonly perceived to be the holding of free and fair elections. However, actual consolidation is a lengthy and less quantifiable process. The establishment of rules in the transition stage does not necessarily indicate the practice and acceptance of particular norms which tend to be introduced incrementally (see Sklar 1987). Linz (1990) holds that elections are insufficient proof of consolidation and confirms that there is no scholarly consensus on how to define consolidation (158).

The most common view of consolidation is the institutionalization of particular norms and rules of democratic behavior (see Charlick et al. 1994a, 7); that is, consolidation occurs when "acceptance of a given set of constitutional rules becomes increasingly widespread, valued, and routinized" (Haggard & Kaufman 1994, 6). But how does one measure such institutionalization? Przeworski (1991) argues that the most important indication is that democracy becomes self-enforcing: all relevant political parties submit to the democratic institutions and comply with the results of their interplay (26; qtd. in Rothchild 1994, 3). Indeed, Hirschmann (1993) emphasizes the *implementation* and *enforcement* of the established democratic rules (53).

Consolidation is much more complicated than transition. In fact, many enduring democracies are arguably unconsolidated. Transitioned regimes face the challenges of conflicting demands which may threaten their own survival (see Reilly n.d., 25), the frequent enduring political autonomy of the armed forces (see Linz 1990, 160), and the linking of political actors to civil society (see Charlick 1994, 2).

While transitions can be initiated from a multitude of sources, including actors from within the regime itself, consolidation is not possible without a strong, proactive civil society. Civil society represents the potential for democratic institutionalization in even the most remote corners of society, and plays an essential role in both the demand- and the supply-side of democratic processes (see USAID 1994, 17). Its functions of social integration, the promotion and practice of democratic values, participation in governance, limiting the state's authority, and generating consent are essential to the institutionalization and sustainability of democratic norms and behavior which constitute consolidation.

### **Civil Society Staging**

Civil society plays an important role at each stage of political development. However, civil society itself must evolve to fulfill its roles at each stage. Accordingly, civil society has its own staging model with various indicators of evolution and influential variables.

Weigle and Butterfield (1992, 1) outline the most explicit staging model for civil society. Their four stages consist of:

1. Defensive, where private individual and independent groups actively or passively defend their autonomy against the party-state;
2. Emergent, in which independent social groups seek limited goals in a widened public sphere sanctioned by the reforming party-state;
3. Mobilizational, in which independent groups undermine the legitimacy of the party-state by offering alternative terms of governance to a politicized society; and
4. Institutional, in which publicly supported leaders enact laws guaranteeing autonomy of social action, leading to a contractual relationship between state and society regulated eventually by free elections.

The first three stages can be seen to occur primarily in the pre-transition and transition stages of political development; the institutional stage is likely to occur in the later stages of transition and consolidation. However, just as with the political staging model, this staging model is not necessarily linear: the stages are reversible and can occur simultaneously depending on the specific sector or civil society organization.

Cohen and Arato (1992) outline an evolutionary model of cycles for civil society. Civil society moves first from being de-mobilized to becoming mobilized; and later from being mobilized to relatively demobilized again. During the later stages of political development, what they call political society (consisting, for example, of political parties and other actors vying for state power) will "take over" the initial efforts of civil society, rendering it relatively demobilized. This demobilization of civil society, they believe, signals first the stabilization of democracy and only the eventual possibility of a return to dictatorship (77). This is not to say that the importance of civil society is diminished through the stages of political development. However, it is likely that the precise role of civil society will change through the political transition.

In the early stages of political development, civil society is likely to work to instill democratic political culture rather than wait for its emergence (Harbeson 1993, 3). This implies Weigle and Butterfield's first three stages of civil society development. Throughout the development process, civil society is likely to cultivate a "broad-based societal understanding of, and eventually commitment to, the value of democracy as a superior political system" (Hirschmann 1993, 23). Increasingly, as it develops, civil society will assume important negotiating and bargaining processes, and eventually will become involved in supporting and promoting electoral processes (Cohen & Arato 1992, 51). It is following this stage that Cohen and Arato argue political society will take on a more visible role. However, this model presumes a linearity to the development of civil society and the democratic transition. Harbeson (1993) points out that in some cases democratic constitutions may be established before civil society matures (3). Thus the sequencing and relative importance of civil society's roles may vary.


The emphasis on civil society's contribution to political development assumes that civil society itself is evolving. In fact, as it develops civil society's boundary with the state is somewhat amorphous (Weigle & Butterfield 1992, 17-18), and its own experience with democratic

governance and mobilized efforts may be limited. As it matures, civil society is likely to become more structured, with deep organizational roots which are difficult to suppress (Cohen & Arato 1992, 51). These roots are likely to entail linkage -- both horizontal and vertical -- with other associations and political actors. Thus, as democratic values and processes are institutionalized in the consolidation stage of political development, so too is civil society institutionalized, with its own internal democratic governance procedures, increasingly enhanced institutional capacity, and density, diversity, autonomy, and linkage within the sector as a whole.

The precise evolution and relative strength of civil society will, of course, depend on its context. Weigle and Butterfield (1992) hold that the character of civil society is unique to each country and will depend, to a large extent, on the historical precedent, political culture, particular forms of nationalism, and the social context of institutional development (2). Other moderating variables include the type of political system which precedes transition (see West et al. 1994, 18), and the pre-existence of independent social structures (Cohen & Arato 1992, 50). Specifically helpful to the successful evolution of civil society are existing independent values and social processes, and what Weigle and Butterfield call "political opportunity structures" (1992, 18, 19). These opportunity structures are crucial in the movement to the institutional stage of civil society development and entail state sanctioned opportunities to publicly voice demands.

### State-Society Relationship Types

Civil society's strength and role can be more specifically examined with respect to the precise nature of its relationship with the state. This examination is facilitated by a typology of government-NGO relationships, summarized in Figure 1 below.<sup>12</sup> The model identifies eight potential relationship types, indicates which types are associated with acceptance or resistance on the part of the state to institutional pluralism, reveals a continuum of relative power, and notes the interactive style, whether it is formal or informal.



**Figure 1. Typology of Government-NGO Relationships**

<sup>12</sup>The following typology model and associated discussion is based on Coston 1994, 1995.

The asymmetrical power continuum reflects the fact that government dominates the NGO sector much more than the reverse (Gronbjerg 1987, 78). Demonstrating this, the resistance or acceptance of institutional pluralism is reflected in government policy vis-à-vis NGOs: it is typically unfavorable where governments resist institutional pluralism, and neutral or supportive where it is accepted. It is this distinction which is most relevant to our discussion: whether the state resists or accepts the institutional pluralism endemic in transition and consolidation.

For the most part, the line of demarcation between resistance and acceptance of institutional pluralism implies some forward movement along the continuum of the political development staging model. In some cases, this may mean a country is at the beginning of transition; as the democratic regime is consolidated, the relationship will have greater *potential* to move along the relationship continuum towards cooperation (informal information sharing with possible coordination of effort), complementarity (reliance on respective comparative advantages, NGO autonomy, and a legitimate and recognized role of government), and collaboration (formalized joint action). However, relationship types are not standardized across states and their respective societies -- they may vary among particular sectors, NGOs, and government representatives.

Under repression and rivalry, the distinction between the sectors is clear and NGOs attempt to operate regardless of government policy, sometimes attaining the status of popular movements (see Di Palma 1991). With rivalry and competition, civil society begins to "compete" with the state for legitimacy and the right to organize and take action. Once the state has accepted the institutional pluralism of a de facto civil society a new range of relationships becomes possible. These are most common (as above) in the post-transition and consolidation stages. At this point, the state may move beyond recognition of civil society organizations and begin to illicit their support, and/or rely on and contract for their resources and services. It is here that the autonomy, and potentially the legitimacy, of civil society organizations may be compromised.

This infers that civil society, as Cohen and Arato (1992, 77) demonstrate, is not necessarily automatically safeguarded after transition and during consolidation. The securing of freedom to associate, legal recognition, and even institutionalization of civil society is insufficient to guarantee civil society's on-going important role in the political process as a watchdog and participant in the governance process. In fact, as the mobilization of political society can lead to the demobilization of civil society during the latter stages of transition and the democratic consolidation process, civil society can become refocused and compromised by the state in new yet powerfully subtle ways. As the state-society relationship moves along the continuum towards a symmetrical power relationship, collaboration between government and civil society organizations holds much promise, as collaboration entails mutual recognition of organizational integrity and autonomy and interrelationship by choice and mutual advantage. However, due to the inherent political, and hence power, advantage of government, examples of true collaboration are extremely rare.

The acceptance of institutional pluralism works both ways. By definition, under complementarity and collaboration NGOs maintain a significant degree of autonomy from the state *and* a legitimate role of government is recognized. Hence, for these relationships to be possible, a legitimate transition must have occurred and civil society organizations must not continue competing with or attempting to de-legitimize the state. Charlick (1994) underlines the importance of linkage mechanisms between the state and society to avoid the tendency of civil society organizations, particularly in Africa, to destabilize the state (3). This is a serious challenge in contexts where civil society's only experience in dealing with the state is opposition and repression as on the left end of the continuum (see Esquel 1993, 8; see also Fisher 1993, 3-4; Reilly 1993, 9). Yet increasingly, both the state and civil society organizations are finding mutual advantages in cooperating and collaborating.<sup>13</sup>

### **State Penetration**

Of course, the potential for these more positive, mutually beneficial relationships will depend not only on the strength and independence of civil society, but also on the legitimacy and power of the state. Barkan and Ottaway (1994) confirm that the prospects for accommodation between the state and civil society are greatest where the state has the capacity to respond to the demands emanating from society (3). The most comprehensive treatment of state strength, particularly in developing countries, is Migdal's (1988) analysis of state penetration in the face of strong societies (see also Bratton 1991).

Migdal analyzes authority structures and determines that in many developing countries, the primary source of authority is not the state, but that in fact, authority is fragmented -- particularly among what he calls local strongmen [sic] with state institutions playing minor roles if any. He thus illustrates a picture of disjointed societies comparable to a series of fiefdoms where the state's unifying role is limited.

This is not to imply that the state has no presence in decentralized society. In fact, the regional and local state bureaucracies continue to play an important role in the allocation of resources. However, these representative become subjects to the powerplays of the local societies in which they reside. In fact, they may actually be in service to the local strongmen, being linked through kinship, class, or mere self-interest. The question, then arises: where is the presence of the *central* state, and do its edicts hold any power or even influence? In such cases the "penetration" of the state into society is said to be quite limited.

One crucial factor in the state's failure at the local level is its inability to respond to the "survival strategies" of the local constituents. Typically the state competes with traditional leaders or strongmen who are more familiar with, and hence able to be more responsive to the

---

<sup>13</sup>Evidence that governments and NGOs can effectively cooperate and work together is documented in Africa (Adam & Brown 1987, 252; OECD 1988, 109); Asia (Bowden 1990, 148; Fernandez 1987, 45; Boyer 1990, 37; Kamaluddin 1989, 122); Latin America (Boyer 1990, 37; Carroll 1992, 114; Frantz 1987, 126; Bebbington 1991, 26); Western Europe (Hodgkinson & McCarthy 1992, 9; Van der Ploeg 1992, 192); Australia (Hodgkinson & McCarthy 1992, 9); the United States (Kramer 1981, 144-5; Salamon 1987, 116); and Israel (Kramer 1981, 144-5).

needs of local citizens. This situation is further complicated by the ethnic and linguistic fractionalization so typical of developing countries.

### **Civil Society at the Local Level**

This underlines the importance of civil society at the local level. In fact, Migdal marks as a grave mistake the tendency to "dismiss with a wave of the hand the importance of the local small organizations with rules different from those of the state" (36). These organizations represent both the strongmen and local efforts to resist this elite control. They are another important player vying for social power and legitimacy which, together with the local elites and the state, can provide some semblance of balance in the plurality of demands.

It is important to note that local civil society organizations do not necessarily significantly enhance the influence of their members/clients on the state and local elites. However, they can equip them with the voice and capacity they need to make their demands known (Esman & Uphoff 1984, 27). This is particularly true when one takes into account the subtle empowerment which these organizations nurture, "where the self-image of the poor and marginalized people changes in ways which enhance their sense of self-worth and trust in their own ability to address imposed constraints that maintain the status quo" (Fowler 1993, 8). Such attitudinal changes and empowerment can lead to demands for institutional reforms for good governance (Ibid. 11), especially at the local level where they are most heard.

The local level also offers citizens the opportunity to make demands in areas which most affect them. That is, democratic governance has the greatest potential to be *relevant* to citizens needs at the local level. Golub (1993) even points out that the political, economic, and legal concerns of the local level are a much higher priority to many local citizens than who is elected to parliament or how parliament functions (64). USAID itself has recognized that without this relevance at the local level, at least in Africa, many citizens would not be interested in investing in the formation of higher level democratic norms (USAID/BA 1994, 4). It is also here that local organizations have the opportunity for the greatest impact, winning tangible improvements in people's lives even if their reach doesn't extend beyond their particular communities (Fisher & Kling 1993, 323; see also Sanyal 1991; qtd. in Carroll 1992, 129; Reilly n.d., 16). This impact can then form the experiential basis for moving beyond the local level to influence regional and central government (Reilly n.d. 16).

Because the local level is better equipped to address the specialized interests of particular communities and constituents, that is to be *responsive*, it is also here that women's and other minorities' needs are likely to be addressed (see Akatsa-Bukachi 1994, 1). Luche (1994) found that civil society organizations at the local level in Nepal, Bangladesh, and Thailand were "more socially progressive and issues-activated than the national governments" (12). Furthermore, particularly for women, it is easier for them to participate in local politics because of time, travel, and home-duty constraints (Hirschmann 1993, 25).

The results of the interaction between local civil society organizations and local government are also quite significant. First, local CSOs have important experience in local issues from

which local governments can benefit in making their policies more relevant and responsive (see ARD 1992 17). Fisher (1992) also points out that such interaction allows local governments to assume new roles not specifically performed or suggested by national authorities. These roles and the benefits of interaction with civil society are particularly important to local governments in an environment of resource constraints and the addition of new responsibilities from strapped central governments (see Reilly 1993, 10).

In its specific contribution to democratic governance, local civil society can counteract intensive state penetration, ensuring that political power does not become concentrated or limit the opportunities for self-governance (Charlick et al. 1994a, 5). And local government is more permeable and vulnerable to the lobbying efforts of these organizations (Alvarez 1993, 213). Finally, civil society organizations can assist local governments -- through their mere presence -- by counterbalancing any efforts on the part of national authorities to centralize and consolidate their power (Kante et al. 1994, 3).

The local level is the most immediate interface between the state and society (Swilling 1992; Reilly 1993). Here, civil society can have an impact which is relevant and tangible, gaining the capacity in the process to move to higher levels of influence on government. On the other hand, local government can also benefit from the efforts, experience, and assistance of local civil society, as further suggested by the typology of government-NGO relationships above.

### **The Evolution of Civil Society and the State**

Regardless of the stage of political development or the maturity of civil society, civil society consistently maintains the potential for significant impact on the process of democratization and its consolidation, particularly at the local level. State-society responsiveness is a function of the state's own capacity, including its penetration, and its acceptance of institutional pluralism. On its part, at a certain point in the democratization process civil society must recognize the legitimate transition and begin to work for the consolidation of a democratic state which is sustainable -- *not* contribute to its instability. As with the more advanced relationship types on the model's continuum, this implies a "bargain" between state and society (see Rothchild 1994, 3) to recognize each other as legitimate actors, and significant contributors to governance. A final caveat is necessary: state-society relations will vary not only according to the stage of political development, the maturity of civil society, and the definitional type of relationship, but also according to the particular context in which the state and society are interacting -- whether as entire institutions or individual organizational representatives.

## **CONCLUSION**

Civil society's current resurgence in popularity is grounded in both its theoretical roots and its recent historical importance. Especially given the latter, civil society has become key to any discussion of democratic governance and the promotion thereof. Furthermore, even in relatively democratic regimes, civil society has become a popular topic -- especially in reference to NGOs -- in an almost universal environment of government downsizing and

shrinking public resources. Civil society, then, is seen as central to both *practical* efforts to promote economic development, and *political* efforts to promote democracy.

On the practical side, civil society functions to meet the needs of its own constituents either through individual associations or demands on the state. In the first case, civil society's efforts supplement the resources and activities of government service provision, relieving some of this burden on the state; or, in some instances, civil society fills gaps in inefficient, ineffective, or specialized areas of public service. In its demands on the state, civil society can contribute to state-provided public services and processes through information provision and tactical support, making services and policies more relevant, responsive, and hence effective. Finally, through its functions of social integration, the promotion and practice of democratic values, governance participation, and generating consent, civil society can potentially provide an environment conducive and proactively supportive of economic growth. These functions are key to stability in times of economic as well as political transition.

On the political side, *working through civil society is the least disruptive method of promoting democracy or structural reform without resulting in social revolution.* Compared to its alternatives, it is less obtrusive and thus less likely to be perceived as an impingement on state sovereignty. Democratization is a long term endeavor which demands extensive social roots. Civil society provides those roots as well as a sustained indigenous effort to promote greater accountability, transparency, and responsiveness in governance structures. Furthermore, civil society is a central element of a more comprehensive approach comprised of four mutually supportive target areas. That is, civil society promotes democratic governance directly, *and* through the intermediaries of *rule of law* and *electoral processes*. Civil society also functions to enable the implementation and follow-through of reforms for good *governance*. On their part, the rule of law, electoral processes, and good governance safeguard the role and activities of civil society.

Viewing civil society as a process of communicative interaction, enables promoters of democratic governance to avoid the controversial implications of promoting a particular *form* of state governance or democracy. The emphasis, then, is on how civil society can promote the *potential* for democratization and stabilization not of a particular form, but rather in accordance with the context of *indigenous* efforts and goals. Thus as a process, civil society's outcomes theoretically represent the dialectically determined objectives of competing associations within civil society and their interaction with the state and the economy.

This perspective is supported by the theoretical roots and historical experience of civil society reviewed above, and manifested in the contemporary conceptualization of civil society. This contemporary view holds that civil society is comprised of associations conforming to particular structural and functional criteria, occupying the realm between the household and the state. That is, **civil society includes associations which are both formal** (legally recognized NGOs) **and informal** (community and neighborhood groups, and social movements), **promote economic** (trade and labor unions, chambers of commerce, and professional associations) **as well as political and development interests, perform both multipurpose functions**

(development NGOs) and civic ones (specialized civic organizations), **do not seek to control the state** (as in the case of political parties), **and perform linkage functions regardless of their structural characteristics** (the media, selective educational institutions and cultural organizations, and some churches). **Civil society is operationalized through the consideration of various structural** (private, autonomous, voluntary, self-organizing, non-coercive, non-profit, legally recognized) **and qualitative criteria** (value orientation, internal organization, representativeness as opposed to contractor NGOs, and degree of partisan political engagement), **with an emphasis on the functions or roles played by particular associations within civil society.**

These functions include social integration, the promotion and practice of democratic values, self-governance, societal participation in state governance (through representation and information dissemination), limiting the state's authority, and generating consent. They specifically support democracy by embodying pluralism and hence the distribution of power, aggregating and conveying diversified interests, and providing the prerequisites (information, confidence, civic values, learning, and experience) to social participation in the state -- and democratic -- governance. Finally, these functions contribute directly to the accountability of the state and the ensurance of the sustainability of democratic governance.

The effectiveness of civil society in performing these functions will depend on the institutional strength of individual civil society organizations, and of the sector as a whole. At the organizational level, this will depend on the internal workings of particular organizations, specifically whether these are democratic in orientation, and on institutional capacity. At the sectoral level, indicators of institutional strength include the density, diversity, and autonomy of the sector as a whole; the degree of linkage among organizations; and its enabling environment. An additional potential indicator is the incidence of specialized civil society organizations. All of these factors, then, become targets for support in a civil society promotion strategy.

The enabling environment will also determine and be determined by the political and economic climate of a particular country -- specifically, whether the country is pursuing political and/or economic reform and its degree of success in this endeavor, and the level of political development. This latter point entails the particular stage of a political regime in the democratic transition process, the relationship of the state to non-state actors, and the degree of state penetration. These factors, in turn, will impact the development stage and functional proficiency of civil society, and determine its degree of strength and importance at the local and national levels.

What is the role of civil society under these various circumstances? Civil society can play an essential role in diverting or minimizing the devastating impacts of the instability which often follows economic reform, and can be an important vehicle for building constituencies for both political and economic reform. Civil society can lay the groundwork for reform, help to sustain it, and eventually become a beneficiary of and continuous contributor to the resulting economic and political systems.

It is crucial to note that both the state and society are essential to democratic governance. Both play key roles, and their respective democratization can be mutually reinforcing. With respect and recognition of their respective legitimacy, the state and society can engage in mutually beneficial relationships. Such relationships depend on the strength and independence of civil society, *as well as* the power of the state. In the long run, in well developed democracies, these factors can become targets of broader strategies to improve the effectiveness of the governance process.

Any strategy which aims to promote democratic governance via civil society must start with a clear understanding of what exactly is being targeted: what is meant by the use of the term civil society, and what the specific delineation of elements and functions will entail. Only then can one begin to *operationalize* the concept in terms of the specific targets for support. Such a process often will include the application of particular structural, functional, and qualitative criteria, depending on the particular objectives of the strategy and the context of its application. An examination of the economic and political context for such strategies can identify additional support targets, including indicators of organizational and sectoral strength, and particular civil society functions, linkage mechanisms, and governance levels (local or national). An understanding of civil society's theoretical roots including its normative implications, historical experience, contemporary conceptualization, and institutional implications is essential to this process.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adam, Hussein, and L. David Brown. "Appendix II: Forum of African Voluntary Development Organizations: Observations of the Dakar Conference, May/June 1987." World Development. Ed. Anne Gordon Drabek. 15 Suppl. (1987): 251-253.
- Adedeji, Adebayo. "An Alternative for Africa." *Special Issue: Economic Reform and Democracy*. Journal of Democracy Vol. 5, No. 4 (October 1994): 119-132.
- Akatsa-Bukachi, Marren. "Civil Society, Democracy and Development in Africa." USAID, Workshop of Civil Society, Democracy and Development in Africa. Washington, DC, June 9-10, 1994.
- Alvarez, Sonia E. "Deepening Democracy: Popular Movement Networks, Constitutional Reform, and Radical Urban Regimes in Contemporary Brazil." Chapter 9. In Robert Fisher and Joseph Kling, eds. Mobilizing the Community: Local Politics in the Era of the Global City. Urban Affairs Annual Review Series 41. Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1993: 191-219.
- Anderson, Perry. "The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci." New Left Review No. 100 (November 1976-January 1977): 5-78.
- Armijo, Leslie, Thomas Biersteker, and Abraham Lowenthal. "The Problems of Simultaneous Transitions." *Special Issue: Economic Reform and Democracy*. Journal of Democracy Vol. 5, No. 4 (October 1994): 161-175.
- Aslund, Anders. "The Case for Radical Reform." *Special Issue: Economic Reform and Democracy*. Journal of Democracy Vol. 5, No. 4 (October 1994): 63-74.
- Associates in Rural Development, Inc. (ARD). "The Concept of Governance and its Implications for AID's Development Assistance Program in Africa." Prepared for the AID Africa Bureau under the Africa Bureau Democracy and Governance Program. June 1992.
- Fox, Leslie M., Michael Bratton, Peter Kirithi, and Marie Ali Tripp. "An Assessment of USAID's Capacity for Rapid Response in Support of African Civil Society." Washington, DC: Associates in Rural Development, Inc. (ARD) and Management Systems International (MSI), for USAID/Africa Bureau/Office of New Initiatives/Democracy and Governance Program. January 7, 1994.
- Arendt, Hannah. On Revolution. [1963] New York: Penguin Books, 1977.
- Axelrod, Robert. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1984.
- Azarya, Victor. "Civil Society and Disengagement in Africa." In John W. Harbeson, Donald Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan, eds. Civil Society and the State in Africa. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994.
- Balcerowicz, Leszek. "Understanding Postcommunist Transitions." *Special Issue: Economic Reform and Democracy*. Journal of Democracy Vol. 5, No. 4 (October 1994): 75-89.
- Barkan, Joel D. and Marina Ottaway. "Democratization and Civil Society." Prepared for the Democracy Roundtable Series. Overseas Development Council, May 24, 1994.
- Bates, Robert. "Social Dilemmas and Rational Individuals: An Essay on the New Institutionalism." Duke University Program in Political Economy, Working Paper, No. 164, April 1992.

- Batista, Israel. "Civil Society: A Paradigm or a New Slogan?" *Ecumenical Review* Vol. 46, No. 1 (January 1994): 12-20.
- Bayart, Jean-Francois. "Civil Society in Africa." In Patrick Chabal, ed. Political Domination in Africa. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- Bebbington, Anthony. "Sharecropping Agricultural Development: The Potential for GSO-Government Cooperation." Grassroots Development: Journal of the Inter-American Foundation 15.2 (1991): 21-30.
- Bell, Daniel. "American Exceptionalism Revisited: The Role of Civil Society." The Public Interest. No. 95 (Spring 1989).
- Bianchi, Robert. "Interest Group Politics in the Third World." Third World Quarterly. Vol. 8, No. 2 (April 1986).
- Blair, Harry and Joel Jutkowitz. "Civil Society and Democratic Development in Bangladesh: A CDIE Assessment." Washington DC: USAID, CDIE, July 5, 1994.
- Blair, Harry et al. "Civil Society and Democratic Development: A CDIE Evaluation Design Paper." Washington, DC: USAID, CDIE, February 24, 1994.
- Bobbio, Norberto. The Future of Democracy. Oxford: Polity Press, 1984.
- Bowden, Peter. "NGOs in Asia: Issues in Development." Public Administration and Development 10.2 (1990): 141-152.
- Boyer, David. "The Role of Northern NGOs in the Promotion of Sustainable Development in Africa." Occasional Paper No. 28. Edinburgh, Scotland, U.K.: Centre of African Studies, Edinburgh University, 1990.
- Bratton, Michael. "Civil Society and Political Transitions in Africa." In N. Chazan, J. Harbeson, and D. Rothchild, eds. Civil Society and the State in Africa. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992.
- Bratton, Michael. "Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa." International Transnational Associations. No. 3 (1991).
- Bratton, Michael. "Non-governmental Organizations in Africa: Can They Influence Public Policy?" Development and Change (SAGE, London, Newbury Park and New Delhi), Vol. 21 (1990): 87-118.
- Cardoso, Fernando H. "Associated-Dependent Development and Democratic Theory." In Alfred Stepan, ed. Democratizing Brazil. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.
- Carroll, Thomas F. Intermediary NGOs: The Supporting Link in Grassroots Development. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1992.
- Cavarozzi, Marcelo with Joan M. Nelson and Miguel Urrutia. "Economic and Political Transitions in Latin America; The Interplay between Democratization and Market Reforms." In Joan M. Nelson, ed. A Precarious Balance: An Overview of Democracy and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. A Copublication of the International center for Economic Growth and the Overseas Development Council. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1994: 33-51.
- Charlick, Robert B. "Presentation to Joint AID/HFAC Africa Sub Committee: The Role of the US in Promoting Democracy in Africa." Washington, DC: draft, June 20, 1994.
- Charlick, Robert et al. "The Consolidation of Democratic Governance in Ghana: How Can USAID Respond?" For ARD, Inc. March 1994a.

- Charlick, Robert, et al. "Improving Democratic Governance for Sustainable Development: An Assessment of Change and Continuity in Niger, Final Report, 26 Sept 1994b.
- Chazan, Naomi. "Africa's Democratic Challenge." World Policy Journal 8 (Spring 1992).
- Chazan, Naomi. "Engaging the State: Associational Life in Sub-Saharan Africa." Paper presented at a symposium on State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World, University of Texas, Austin, February 1990.
- Clark, John. Democratizing Development: The Role of Voluntary Organizations. West Hartford: Kumarian Press, 1991.
- Cohen, Jean L. and Andrew Arato. Civil Society and Political Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992.
- Coleman, James. "Social Capital and the Creation of Human Capital." American Journal of Sociology, 94 (Suppl.) (1988): 95-120.
- Coston, Jennifer M. "Model and Typology of Government-NGO Relations." For presentation at the American Society of Public Administration Conference, San Antonio, Texas. July 22-26, 1995.
- Coston, Jennifer M. Exploring the Complementarity Between Government and Non-Governmental Organizations in Promoting People-Centered Development. Doctoral Dissertation. University of Southern California, School of Public Administration, June 1994.
- Crook, Richard C. "Four Years of the Ghana District Assemblies in Operation: Decentralization, Democratization and Administrative Performance." 1993.
- Dahl, Robert. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.
- Dahrendorf, Ralf. "Transitions: Politics, Economics, and Liberty." Washington Quarterly. Vol. 13, No.3 (Summer 1990).
- De Santa Ana, Julio. "The Concept of Civil Society." Ecumenical Review Vol. 46, No. 1 (January 1994): 3-11.
- De Soto, Hernando. The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World. New York: Harper & Row, 1989.
- Development Assistance Committee (DAC), Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). DAC Orientation Paper on Participatory Development and Good Governance (Draft). Paris: DAC, OECD, March 1993.
- Diamond, Larry. "Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation." Journal of Democracy. Vol. 5, No. 3 (July 1994): 1-17.
- Diamond, Larry. "Introduction: Civil Society and the Struggle for Democracy." In Larry Diamond, ed. The Democratic Revolution: Struggles for Freedom and Democracy in the Developing World. New York: Freedom House, 1992: 1-27.
- Diamond, Larry. "Beyond Autocracy: Prospects for Democracy in Africa." Working Paper for the Inaugural Seminar of the Governance Program. In Beyond Democracy in Africa. Atlanta: The Carter Center, Emory University, 1989.
- DiPalma, Giuseppe. "Legitimation from the Top to Civil Society: Politico-Cultural Change in Eastern Europe." World Politics. Vol. 44, No. 1 (October 1991).
- Dornbusch, Rudiger and Sebastian Edwards, eds. The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.

- Douglas, James. "Political Theories of Nonprofit Organization." In Walter W. Powell (ed.). The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook, 43-54. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987.
- Drabek, Anne Gordon. "Development Alternatives: The Challenge for NGOs -- An Overview of the Issues." World Development. Vol. 15, Supplement (1987).
- Durkheim, Emile. Professional Ethics and Civic Morals. Cornelia Brookfield, trans. London: Routledge & Paul, 1925 [1957].
- Eckstein, Susan. "Poor people versus the State and Capital: Anatomy of a Successful Community Mobilization for Housing in Mexico City." International Journal of Urban and Regional Research Vol. 14, No. 2 (1990): 274-296.
- Ekeh, Peter P. "Historical and Cross-Cultural Context of Civil Society in Africa." USAID, Workshop on Civil Society Democracy and Development in Africa: The Implications of Organization," Washington, DC December 9-10, 1994.
- Elliott, Charles. "Some Aspects of Relations Between the North and South in the NGO Sector." World Development Vol. 15 (Suppl.), Edited by Anne Gordon Drabek, 1987: 57-68.
- Esman, Milton J., and Norman T. Uphoff. Local Organizations: Intermediaries in Rural Development. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984.
- Esquel Group Foundation. "Civil Society, State and Market: An Emerging Partnership for Equitable Development." Presented to the Social Forum Convened by the Inter American Development Bank and the UNDP. Washington, DC. February 10-13, 1993. January 1993.
- Fisher, Julie. "Local Governments and the Independent Sector in the Third World." In The Nonprofit Sector in the Global Community: Voices from Many Nations. Ed. by Kathleen D. McCarthy and Virginia A. Hodgkinson. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1992.
- Fisher, Robert. "Grass-Roots Organizing Worldwide: Common Ground, Historical Roots, and the Tension Between Democracy and the State." Chapter 1. In Robert Fisher and Joseph Kling, eds. "Mobilizing the Community: Local Politics in the Era of the Global City." Urban Affairs Annual Review Series 41. New York: Sage Publications, 1993: 3-27.
- Fisher, Robert and Joseph Kling, eds. Mobilizing the Community: Local Politics in the Era of the Global City. Urban Affairs Annual Review Series 41. New York: Sage Publications, 1993.
- Fowler, Alan. "Democracy, Development and NGOs in Sub-Saharan Africa: Where Are We?" To appear in Development and Democracy. South Africa: Urban Foundation, March 1993.
- Fox, Leslie et al. "An Assessment of Politics and Governance in Madagascar." Washington, DC: ARD, Inc., with support of MSI for USAID. Draft report of April 24, 1994.
- Frantz, Telmo Rudi. "The Role of NGOs in the Strengthening of Civil Society." Suppl. Ed. Anne Gordon Drabek. World Development 15 (1987): 121-127.
- Gallie, W. B. "Essentially Contested Concepts." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 56. London: Harrison & Sons, Ltd., 1955-56: 167-98.

- Geddes, Barbara. "Challenging the Conventional Wisdom." *Special Issue: Economic Reform and Democracy*. Journal of Democracy Vol. 5, No. 4 (October 1994): 104-118.
- Gellner, Ernest. "Civil Society in Historical Context." International Social Science Journal. Vol. 43, No. 3 (August 1991): 495-510.
- Golub, Stephen. "Assessing and Enhancing the Impact of Democratic Development Projects: A Practitioner's Perspective." Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Spring 1993): 54-70.
- Gramsci, Antonio. Prison Notebooks. New York: International Publishers, 1971.
- Gronbjerg, Kirsten A. "Patterns of Institutional Relations in the Welfare State: Public Mandates and the Nonprofit Sector." Shifting the Debate: Public/Private Sector Relations in the Modern Welfare State. Ed. Susan A. Ostrander. New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1987. 64-80.
- Habermas, Jurgen. The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 2. Boston: Beacon Press, 1987.
- Habermas, Jurgen. "Legitimation Problems in the Modern State." In Communication and the Evolution of Society (Trans. Thomas McCarthy). Boston: Beacon Press, 1978: 18-205
- Haggard, Stephan. "Democracy, Economic Policy, and Performance." Paper presented at the conference: Economic and Political Institutions for Sustainable Development: Implications for Assistance. Washington, DC: October 24-25, 1994.
- Haggard, Stephan and Robert R. Kaufman. "The Challenges of Consolidation." *Special Issue: Economic Reform and Democracy*. Journal of Democracy Vol. 5, No. 4 (October 1994): 5-16.
- Haggard, Stephan and Steven B. Webb. "Introduction." In Stephan Haggard and Steven B. Webb (eds.). Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalization, and Economic Adjustment. New York: Oxford University Press, published for the World Bank, 1994.
- Haines, Corrie. "Trade Unions and Democracy in Africa: The African-American Labor Center." USAID Bureau for Africa. African Voices: A Newsletter on Democracy and Governance in Africa. Vol. 2, No. 3 (Fall/Winter 1993): 4-5.
- Handy, Charles. "Balancing Corporate Power: A New Federalist Paper." Harvard Business Review (Nov-Dec 1992): 59-72.
- Hansen, Gary and Michael Calavan. "The Development of Civil Society in Thailand: Donor Approaches and Issues." Washington DC: USAID, CDIE, June 16, 1994.
- Harbeson, John W. "Civil Society and Democratization in Africa: Some Preliminary Notes from the Field." USAID Bureau for Africa. African Voices: A Newsletter on Democracy and Governance in Africa. Vol. 2, No. 3 (Fall/Winter 1993): 1, 3.
- Healy, J., and M. Robinson. Democracy, Governance and Economic Policy: Sub-Saharan Africa in Comparative Perspective. London: Overseas Development Institute, 1992.
- Hegel, G.W.F. Philosophy of Right. T. M. Knox, trans. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967.
- Hennin, Christopher J. "NGOs Inter-Institutional Strategic Planning." For presentation to the practical modes of non-governmental/NGO cooperation organized by the Institute for Cultural Affairs International, Mauloff, Germany, 1991.

- Hirschmann, Albert O. "Exit, Voice and the State." World Politics, Vol. 29, No. 1 (1978): 90-107.
- Hirschmann, David. "Democracy and Gender: A Practical Guide to USAID Programs." Genesys Special Study #9. Washington, DC: USAID, Office of Women in Development, February 1993.
- Hodgkinson, Virginia A., and Kathleen D. McCarthy. "The Voluntary Sector in International Perspective." The Nonprofit Sector in the Global Community. Ed. McCarthy, Hodgkinson, and Russy D. Sumariwalla, et. al. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1992. 1-23.
- Hodgkinson, Virginia A. and Russy D. Sumariwalla. "The Nonprofit Sector and the New Global Community: Issues and Challenges." In Kathleen D. McCarthy, Virginia A. Hodgkinson, Russy D. Sumariwalla, et. al. (eds.). The Nonprofit Sector in the Global Community. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1992, pp. 485-508.
- Holm, John D., Patrick Molutsi, and Gloria Somolekae. "Civil Society in Botswana: A Developmental View." Gaborone, Botswana: Democracy Research Project, University of Botswana, September 20, 1994.
- Hyden, Goran and Michael Bratton, eds. Governance and Politics in Africa. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992.
- Ibrahim, Barbara Lethem. "Indigenous Philanthropy in the Arab World: Contrasting Cases from Egypt and Palestine." The Nonprofit Sector in the Global Community. Ed. Kathleen D. McCarthy, Virginia A. Hodgkinson, Russy D. Sumariwalla, et. al. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1992. 406-421.
- Interaction. "Worldwide Fund for the Promotion of Civil Society." Washington, DC: Author, n.d.
- Johnson, Eric. "Can Private Media Save the Day in Central Asia?" Surviving Together. Vol. 12, No. 3 (Autumn 1994): 23-25.
- Kante, Mamadou et al. "Governance in Democratic Mali: An Assessment of Transition and Consolidation and Guidelines for Near-Term Action." Draft Final Report. Washington, DC: Associates in Rural Development, Inc., in Association with: Management Systems International, May 1994.
- Karl, Terry Lynn. "Getting to Democracy: A Research Perspective." In The Transition to Democracy: Proceedings of a Workshop. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1991: 29-40.
- Keane, John. "The Limits of State Action." Democracy and Civil Society. 1988a: 1-30.
- Keane, John. "Remembering the Dead." Democracy and Civil Society. 1988b: 31-68.
- Kiss, Elizabeth. "Democracy without Parties: 'Civil Society' in East-Central Europe." Dissent Vol. 39, No. 2 (Spring 1992): 226-231.
- Kochanowicz, Jacek, Kalman Mizsei, and Joan Nelson. "The Transition in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland: An Overview." In Joan M. Nelson, ed. A Precarious Balance: An Overview of Democracy and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. A Copublication of the International center for Economic Growth and the Overseas Development Council. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1994: 9-31.
- Korten, David C. "Sustainable Development." World Policy Journal 9.1 (Winter 1991): 157-190.

- . Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda. West Hartford: Kumarian Press, 1990.
- "Third Generation NGO Strategies: A Key to People-Centered Development." World Development Vol. 15 (Suppl.), Edited by Anne Gordon Drabek, 1987: 145-159.
- . "Strategic Organizations for People-Centered Development." Public Administration Review 44 (July/August 1984): 341-352.
- . "The Management of Social Transformation." Public Administration Review 41.6 (Nov/Dec 1981): 609-18.
- Korten, David C., and Antonio B. Quizon. "Government, NGO and International Agency Cooperation: Whose Agenda?" Discussion paper, AP/90.09 DOC 4. For presentation at the Regional Dialogue on GO-NGO Relations in Asia: Prospects and Challenges for Improving the Policy Environment for People-Centered Development. Chiangmai, Thailand, 11-15 March 1991. Manila: The People-Centered Development Forum and the Asian NGO Coalition, 29 June 1991.
- Kramer, Ralph M. Voluntary Agencies in the Welfare State. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981.
- Kumar, Krishan. "Civil Society." In William Outhwaite and Tom Bottomore, eds. The Blackwell Dictionary of Twentieth-Century Social Thought. Oxford: Blackwell Publications, 1993: 75-77).
- Lehmann, David. Democracy and Development in Latin America: Economics, Politics and Religion in the Post-War Period. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990.
- Lemarchand, Rene. "Uncivil States and Civil Societies: How Illusion Became Reality." The Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 30, No. 2 (1992): 177-191.
- Lewis, Barbara. "The Role of Urban Civil Society in the Malian Democratic Transition." Annex V in Mamadou Kante et al. "Governance in Democratic Mali: An Assessment of Transition and Consolidation and Guidelines for Near-Term Action." Draft Final Report. Washington, DC: Associates in Rural Development, Inc., in Association with: Management Systems International, May 1994. Not for Citation.
- Lewis, Peter M. "Political Transition and the Dilemma of Civil Society in Africa." Journal of International Affairs Vol. 46, No. 1 (Summer 1992): 31-54.
- Linz, Juan J. "Transitions to Democracy." The Washington Quarterly Vol. 13, No. 3 (Summer 1990): 143-164.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." American Political Science Review Vol. 53 (1959): 69-105.
- Lipton, Michael. "The State-Market Dilemma, Civil Society, and Structural Adjustment: Any Cross-Commonwealth Lessons?" The Round Table Vol. 317 (1991): 21-31.
- Locke, John. The Second Treatise on Government [1690]. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980.
- Luche, Jenna. The Gender and Political Participation (GAPP) Study. Washington, D.C.: USAID, Asia Democracy Program, June 1994.
- Mansbridge, J. Beyond Adversary Democracy. New York: Basic Books, 1980.
- Maravall, Jose Maria. "The Myth of the Authoritarian Advantage." *Special Issue: Economic Reform and Democracy*. Journal of Democracy Vol. 5, No. 4 (October 1994): 17-31.

- Martin, Guy. "Democratization and Governance in Africa: General Trends and Typology." USAID, Workshop on Civil society, Democracy and Development in Africa. Washington, DC. June 9-10, 1994.
- Mathews, David. "Reconnecting the Public and the Government." Adapted from Politics for People by David Mathews. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1993.
- McHugh, Heather S. "Civil Society Bibliography with Annotations." Washington, DC: USAID, CDIE, January 1994.
- Migdal, Joel S. Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.
- Mirsky, Yehudah. "Democratic Politics, Democratic Culture: Democratization and Civil Society." Current No. 359 (January 1994): 29-35.
- Mkandawire, Thandika. In Giovanni A. Cornia and Rolph Van der Hoeven, eds. Africa's Recovery in the 1990s: From Stagnation and Adjustment to Human Development. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992.
- Montesquieu. The Spirit of the Laws [1748]. New York: Harpers, 1949.
- Montville, Joseph V. "Civil Society in the New Russia: The Neo-Bolshevist Threat." The Esalen Exchange Program Goes to Moscow. May 26, 1992.
- Nelson, Joan M., ed. A Precarious Balance: An Overview of Democracy and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. A Copublication of the International center for Economic Growth and the Overseas Development Council. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1994.
- Nelson, Joan M. "Introduction." A Precarious Balance: An Overview of Democracy and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. A Copublication of the International center for Economic Growth and the Overseas Development Council. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1994a: 1-8.
- Nelson, Joan M. "Linkages Between Politics and Economics." *Special Issue: Economic Reform and Democracy*. Journal of Democracy Vol. 5, No. 4 (October 1994b): 49-62.
- Norton, Augustus Richard. "The Future of Civil Society in the Middle East." Middle East Journal Vol. 4, No. 2 (Spring 1993): 205-216.
- Norton, Andrew. "Markets and Civil Society." Review of Michael Pusey. Economic Rationalism in Canberra. Cambridge University Press, 1991. IPA Review Vol. 45, No. 2 (1992):60-62.
- Nyang'oro, J. "Reform Politics and the Democratization Process in Africa." African Studies Review Vol. 37, No.1 (April 1994): 133-149.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo. "Delegative Democracy." Journal of Democracy Vol. 5, No. 1 (January 1994): 55-69.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo. "Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State and the Problem of Democracy." In D. Collier, ed. The New Authoritarianism in Latin America. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo. Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics. Politics of Modernization Series 9. Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies. 1973.

- O'Donnell, Guillermo and Philippe Schmitter. "Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies." In Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, eds. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. 4 Volumes. Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1986.
- OECD. "Draft DAC Orientations Paper on Participatory Development, Good Governance, Human Rights and Democratization." Paris: OECD, Development Co-Operation Directorate, DAC, October, 1993.
- OECD. Voluntary Aid for Development: The Role of Non-Governmental Organisations. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1988.
- Oliver, Quintin. "The Role of Nonprofit Organizations in a Divided Society: The Case of Northern Ireland." The Nonprofit Sector in the Global Community: Voices from Many Nations. Ed. Kathleen D. McCarthy, Virginia A. Hodgkinson, Russy D. Sumariwalla, et. al. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1992. 176-189.
- Onimode, Bade. "The Bretton Woods Institutions and Africa's Development." Development No. 1 (1992).
- Onwudiwe, Ebere. "Civil Society in Africa -- A Comment." USAID, Workshop on Civil Society, Democracy and Development in Africa, Washington DC June 9-10, 1994.
- Ostrom, Elinor. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Ostrom, Elinor, Larry Schroeder, and Susan Wynne. "Institutional Incentives and Rural Infrastructures." Draft state-of-the-art paper prepared for USAID "Decentralization: Financial and Management Project." Mimeo (April 1989).
- Parsons, Talcott. The System of Modern Societies. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1971.
- Parsons, Talcott. "On the Concept of Influence." In Politics and Social Structure. New York: Free Press, 1969a.
- Parsons, Talcott. "The Political Aspect of Social Structure and Process." In Politics and Social Structure. New York: Free Press, 1969b.
- Parsons, Talcott. "'Voting' and the Equilibrium of the American Political System." In Politics and Social Structure. New York: Free Press, 1969c.
- Pateman, Carole. Participation and Democratic Theory. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970.
- Paz, Yehudah. "Identity and Empowerment." Excerpts from a Presentation. Surviving Together: A Quarterly on Grassroots Cooperation in Eurasia Vol. 12, No. 3 (Autumn 1994): 3-5.
- Peil, Margaret. Cities and Suburbs: Urban Life in West Africa. New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1981.
- Polanyi, Karl. The Great Transformation. New York: Rinehart and Co., 1944.
- Poulantzas, Nicos. Political Power and Social Classes, London 1973.
- Private Agencies Collaborating Together (PACT). Asian Linkages: NGO Collaboration in the 1990s. A Five Country Study. New York: PACT, 1989.
- Przeworski, Adam. Democracy and the Market. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- Putnam, Robert D. Making Democracy: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993.

- Rauner, Mary. "Education and Democracy: A Review of the Literature." Social Sector Policy Analysis Project. Washington, DC: Academy for Educational Development, in collaboration with Harvard Institute for International Development for USAID/Bureau for Research and Development/Office of Education, October 1993.
- Reilly, Charles A. "Notes of the Forum on Social Reform and Poverty." Sponsored by the IDB and UNDP, February 10-13, 1993.
- Reilly, Charles A. (ed.). "Joint Ventures in Urban Policy: NGO-Municipal Collaboration in Democratizing Latin America." n.d.
- Ritchey-Vance, Marion. The Art of Association: NGOs and Civil Society in Colombia. Country Focus Series: 2. Rosslyn, VA: Inter-American Foundation, 1991.
- Roth, R. "Local Green Politics in West German Cities." International Journal of Urban and Regional Research. Vol. 15 (1991): 75-89.
- Rothchild, Donald. "Activating Civil Society in Africa." USAID, Workshop of Civil Society, Democracy and Development in Africa. Washington, DC, June 9-10, 1994.
- Rudi Frantz, Telmo. "the Role of NGOs in the Strengthening of Civil Society." World Development. Vol. 15, Supplement (1987): 121-7.
- Salamon, Lester M. "The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector." Foreign Affairs Vol. 73, No. 4 (July/August 1994): 110-122.
- Salamon, Lester M. "Partners in public Service: The Scope and Theory of Government-Nonprofit Relations." The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook. Ed. Walter W. Powell. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987. 99-117.
- Sanyal, Bishwapriya. "Antagonistic Cooperation: A Case Study of Nongovernmental Organizations, Government and Donor Relationships in Income-Generating Projects in Bangladesh." World Development 19 (10) 1991: 1367-79.
- Schearer, S. Bruce. "The Emerging Role of Civil Society in National Development Efforts." Impact (Spring 1992): 4, 17.
- Schumacher, E. F. Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1973.
- Seligman, Adam. The Idea of Civil Society. New York: Free Press, 1992.
- Serrano, Isagani R. On Civil Society. Monograph Series. Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement. Quezon City, Philippines, 1993.
- Silverman, Jerry M. "Bottom-Up Principal Agency: Meeting Client Needs." Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences (IIAS), Toluca, Mexico, 27-30 July 1993.
- Sklar, Richard L. "Developmental Democracy." Comparative Studies in Society and History. No. 29 (1987).
- Slabbert, Frederik van Zyl. "What Price Mass Action?" Towards Democracy: Journal of the Institute for Multi-Party Democracy. First Quarter (1993): 10-18.
- Streeten, Paul. "The Contributions of Non-governmental Organizations to Development." Asian Journal of Economics and Social Studies 7.1 (1988): 1-9.
- Sullivan, John D. "Democratization and Business Interests." Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5, No. 4 (October 1994): 146-160.
- Swilling, Mark. "Socialism, Democracy and Civil Society: The Case for Associational Socialism." Theoria. No. 79 (May 1992).

- Tandon, Rajesh. "The State, Civil Society, and the Role of NGOs." Draft Paper. Boston and New Delhi: Institute for Development Research/Society for Participatory Research in Asia, August 1991.
- Tetzlaff, David. "Divide and Conquer: Popular Culture and Social Control in Late Capitalism." Media, Culture and Society Vol. 13, No. 1 (Jan 1991): 9-34.
- Thompson, Andres A. "Democracy and Development: The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay." In Kathleen D. McCarthy, Virginia A. Hodgkinson, Russy D. Sumariwalla, et. al. (eds.). The Nonprofit Sector in the Global Community. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1992, pp. 389-405.
- Tocqueville, Alexis. Democracy in America. (1840). Bradley Phillips, ed. Knopf, 1945.
- Tripp, Aili Mari. "The Universe of Civil Society: The Heterogeneity of Associations in Africa." USAID, Workshop on Civil Society, Democracy and Development in Africa, Washington DC, June 9-10, 1994.
- United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAD-SAP). E/ECA/CM.15/6/Rev.3, 1989.
- Uphoff, Norman. Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993.
- USAID. Strategies for Sustainable Development. Washington, DC: Author, March 1994.
- USAID. Democracy and Governance. November, 1991.
- USAID, Bureau for Africa. "Strengthening Civil Society in Africa: Workshop Generates Dialogue on Helping Africans Promote Democracy." African Voices Vol. 3, No.2 (Summer 1994).
- USAID, ENI. "Request for Applications: Democracy Network Program Central and Eastern Europe." Washington, DC: Author, June 16, 1994.
- USAID Moscow. "Russia NGO Sector Support Activity." Activity Memorandum. n.d.
- Van der Ploeg, Tymen J. "Changing Relationships Between Private Organizations and Government in the Netherlands." The Nonprofit Sector in the Global Community: Voices from Many Nations. Ed. Kathleen D. McCarthy, Virginia A. Hodgkinson, Russy D. Sumariwalla, et. al. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1992. 190-204.
- Van Til, Jon. "The Three Sectors: Voluntarism in a Changing Political Economy." Shifting the Debate: Public/Private Sector Relations in the Modern Welfare State. Ed. Susan A. Ostrander. New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1987. 50-63.
- Verba, Sidney, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-on Kim. Participation and Political Equality: A Seven Nation Comparison. London: Cambridge University Press, 1978.
- Vilas, Carlos M. "The Hour of Civil Society." NACLA -Report on the Americas Vol. 27, No. 2 (Sept-Oct 1993): 42.
- Walzer, Michael. "The Idea of Civil Society." Dissent (Spring 1991): 293-304.
- Weigle, Marcia A. and Jim Butterfield. "Civil Society in Reforming Communist Regions: The Logic of Emergence." Comparative Politics. Vol. 25, No. 1 (October 1992).
- Weiner, Richard R. "Retrieving Civil Society in Postmodern Epoch." The Social Science Journal. Vol. 28, No. 3 (1991).
- Weintraub, Sidney. "Should US Foreign Policy Promote Democracy or Market Economics First?" Foreign Service Journal (March 1991): 32-41.

- West, Tina et al. "The Transition to Democratic Governance in Tanzania: An Assessment and Guidelines for Near-Term Action." Washington, DC: USAID Bureau for Africa, March 15, 1994.
- Wolfe, Alan. "Three Paths to Development: Market, State, and Civil Society." Presented at the first International Meeting of NGOs and Systems Agencies, "Development, International Cooperation and the NGOs." March 6-9, 1991. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
- World Bank. Government: The World Bank's Experience. Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1994.
- World Bank. Managing Development: The Governance Dimension. Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1992.
- World Bank. Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth. Washington, DC: World Bank, 1989.
- Woods, Dwayne. "The Vertical and Horizontal Dimensions to Associational Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa." USAID, Workshop of Civil Society, Democracy and Development in Africa. Washington, DC, June 9-10, 1994.