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**Development before Disaster:
USAID in Somalia
1978-1990**

**A Retrospective of Lessons Learned
in Pre-Civil War Somalia**

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Executive Summary

This report is an overview of USAID's development activity and experience in pre-civil war Somalia. Recurring issues and lessons learned are highlighted to provide a starting point for anyone interested in learning about USAID's pre-civil war program. The report is also written with an eye towards future activity should the transition to rehabilitation evolve into one of development.

The first part of the paper is a brief overview of USAID's involvement in Somalia. The time period covered is from 1978, when USAID initiated broad-scale involvement in Somalia, through the evacuation of USAID staff in late 1990. A summary of feedback gathered through documents and interviews on lessons learned is provided. Also included are suggested considerations before proceeding with development in Somalia again. U.S. involvement in Somalia during the 1960s and early 1970s is described briefly, but not detailed in this report.

The second part of the paper provides information on projects and experience by sector as well as individual project profiles. Resource information for each project is referenced to support further research. Lessons learned from individual project experience are drawn primarily from USAID documents, but again, supplemented by interviews with individuals who were involved with the projects.

The major findings of this report are that from the outset, the size, complexity and diversity of the Somalia portfolio challenged the management and monitoring capacity of the USAID Mission and that many of the portfolio's problems stemmed from a social and political environment not conducive to development work. A number of recurring problems evolved in the implementation of most projects. Detailed in various project evaluations and documents, the problems fall into four interrelated categories:

- **USAID Administrative and Organizational Issues** - Many of USAID's initial projects in Somalia were designed based upon other donors' information; pre-project research and analysis was limited and project papers did not specify implementation strategies. Consequent delays and management confusion required reducing the scope of most projects by mid-project in order to make any aspect of planned outcomes feasible in an environment both highly political and lacking sufficient supporting infrastructure.
- **Donor Coordination** - The multi-donor development approach used in the early 1980s resulted in complicated implementation schemes; project success depended upon numerous donors' inputs. Despite early efforts to devise coordination schemes, project management was cumbersome and implementation hampered by overly complex and confusing sets of responsibilities.
- **Insufficient GSDR Commitment to Donor Agenda** - From the early 1980s on, despite specific agreements on projects and reform agendas, the GSDR continually failed to meet

its commitments in providing local currency or following concessional pacts providing critical inputs. Inconsistencies and shortfalls in GSDR contributions on a number of levels led to many projects' limited success.

- **Exogenous Constraints** - In addition to problems inherent in working within an unstable socio-political context and with a drought-vulnerable country lacking natural resources, the influx of a large refugee population, fluctuations in the price of oil and the 1983 Saudi ban on Somali livestock imports further complicated development efforts. The structure of Somali society is also extremely complex and few individuals implementing projects had sufficient knowledge of Somali culture and language.

In many cases, projects were redesigned mid-implementation in attempt to correct shortcomings or better accommodate constraints. In other cases, projects ended as scheduled or were reincarnated under a different title and revised strategy. USAID also shifted its development approach in the mid-1980s, from providing technical assistance on multi-donor projects to focusing more closely on policy reform with stringent conditions and benchmarks explicitly specified.

Many aspects of the problems outlined above, however, continued to frustrate activity in Somalia up until the collapse of the Barre government. The redundancy of such problems is somewhat confounding, but clearly, various sets of interests at work in Somalia did not allow room for USAID and other donors to require binding adherence to agreements. International organizations continued to work in Somalia in spite of rampant corruption, violations of agreements and little evidence of development progress. Also, at several critical junctures, the GSDR complied with donor demands or demonstrated new commitment to reform and development agendas which then led to renewed hope for success. Continued strategic interests and desire to maintain the stability of the region provided impetus enough for donors to continue with their efforts.

Several lessons can be drawn from the USAID experience in pre-civil war Somalia. The most explicit is that development cannot proceed in the midst of a civil war or be channeled through a government with little or no legitimacy supporting its tenure. Most of the modest successes of the Somalia program occurred in spite of the Barre administration, not as a result of GSDR cooperation. Somalia under Barre was not a good development partner.

Many of the other lessons learned are somewhat obvious in retrospect, but due to their future relevance, worth iterating below. Again, these were gathered primarily from USAID project documents, but supported through interviews with former project personnel. Individuals were asked what USAID should consider if development were again attempted in Somalia.

- **Start small and build instead of downsizing mid-project.** All of the projects in the early Somalia program were overly broad in scope. Commitments quickly develop constituencies and are difficult to scale back after initiation. Do not initiate projects without identifying assured means for covering recurring costs.

- **Be clear and explicit about U.S. interests and objectives.** The GSDR recognized the scope and extent of U.S. interests in pre-civil war Somalia and was able to play interests against one another. Limit involvement to areas where interests are mutual; abandon any program of grandiose objectives and goals.
- **Center-based strategies may never work in Somalia, but support collaboration.** Development efforts in Somalia should be designed appropriate to a dynamic social environment where conflict happens, alliances shift and time horizons may not match those of donors. Incorporate balance in sponsoring settled and non-settled activities. Do not assume that resources targeted to any one sector or geographical area will benefit the whole nation. Do not get involved with clan politics. At the same time, recognize that alliances and collaboration are a part of Somali traditions and can be encouraged and nurtured.
- **Think and re-think through all assumptions.** Assumptions can be and were translated into policy and project design without sufficient scrutiny. This resulted in poorly devised project strategies, implementation delays and limited project success.
- **Education may be the most useful input donors can provide.** Somalis are capable problem-solvers and can do a lot with very little. At the same time, they are fiercely independent and often do not trust outsiders. Relationships will require time and change will only occur in the long-run. Education can create demand for services and may affect values, but the process is likely to be slow. Education is the best vehicle for opening Somalis to the rest of the world.
- **Development should be community-based, but realistic.** Sustainable development requires community commitment which may in turn require adjusting donor time-horizons and assumptions. Past projects were most successful when initiatives were local or grounded in Somali realities.

This report was researched and written by Melissa Pailthorp as set out in P.O.623-0510-0-00-4048-00. Any inaccuracies or omissions are the responsibility of the author. The attached bibliography and list of contacts detail potential sources of further information.

I. Overview of USAID Involvement in Pre-Civil War Somalia

With the considerable advantage of hindsight, USAID/Somalia's program in the 1980s could be written off as a categorical failure and one of the great tragedies in development history. Prospects for successful development in Somalia were never all that good. Hundreds of millions of dollars of donor funds were funneled into a country whose leadership had tenuous hold and little political reach over the nation. Between 1979 and 1989, the U.S. alone spent over \$620 million dollars on various types of development assistance,¹ yet USAID projects accomplished close to nothing if measured against their original design. Despite blatant corruption, human rights abuses and inconsistent cooperation in policy reform, donors continued to support a government financed almost exclusively by external sources in order to uphold foreign policy agendas. When Siad Barre finally lost control and civil war overwhelmed what many already thought a destitute country, the meager progress that had been made was soon destroyed.

Much of the cynicism about donors' involvement in Somalia is difficult to refute. USAID project documents confirm that the program continued in spite of recurring problems and explicit failures. Nevertheless, an important step in mitigating the tragedy is extracting any lessons that might inform future pursuits so that the same mistakes are not repeated. Although many of the lessons are not unique to Somalia and some of what took place was directed by an international and domestic political context specific to the 1980s, the relevance of much of what was learned will persist. At some point, order will be restored and Somalia will need to rebuild. This document is one step in preparation for that time.

USAID's Involvement before 1978

USAID was first involved in Somalia in the early 1960s, shortly after the country had won its independence.² At that time, Somalia was considered a model of democratic government and economic liberalism. Between 1962 and 1970, USAID sponsored the Agricultural Services Project, consisting of extension and research activities taking place primarily in the Bay Region and at Afgoi. The University of Wyoming provided technical assistance to the project.

1. This figure is compiled from USAID/Bureau for Africa, Program and Budget Information: A retrospective Through FY 1993 and USAID Congressional Presentations for 1988 and 1989.

2. The U.S., Britain and Italy apparently financed agricultural extension work in Somalia in the 1950s. Between 1953 and 1971, U.S. assistance amounted to \$90 million. Of these funds, \$70 million was used to finance development projects (detailed information on this funding is not available, but included at least \$2.2 million for the port at Kismayo, \$8.1 million to improve Mogadishu's water supply, and \$500,000 for the National Teacher's Education Center at Afgoi); \$14.5 million financed food purchases; and \$5.4 million financed Peace Corps programs [Source: "Somalia: Towards a Revised Rural Development Strategy," (1985), p. 176.]

USAID also financed the construction of Kismayo Port between 1963 and 1965, carried out by the Army Corps of Engineers. Due to later washouts and deterioration from waves and tidal surges, USAID financed repairs to the port's breakwater in 1967.³

U.S.-Somali relations deteriorated, however, in the early 1970s. In 1969, President Ali Shermake's administration was overthrown by military coup. Siad Barre came into power and launched his agenda of scientific socialism. Soviet influence in Somalia escalated. Following modest success in research, but less in completing construction of planned facilities, training farmers or securing Somali government commitment and follow through, USAID's Agricultural Services Project closed mid-1970.⁴ By 1974, U.S. ties with the Somali Democratic Republic were broken.

Post-Ogaden War

USAID was not active in Somalia again until 1978, after Siad Barre's falling out with the Soviet Union and defeat in the Ogaden War.⁵ Barre, confronted with a food crisis brought on by the 1975-76 drought and an influx of refugees displaced by the war, sought aid from Western donors. The United States gave Somalia high strategic priority due to the need to safeguard oil routes in the Straits of Bab al Mandab and maintain U.S. port access in the region. Soviet ties with Ethiopia and relations with the Yemen Democratic Republic also increased Somalia's strategic importance to the U.S.

As one of the poorest countries in the world lacking natural resources, Somalia quickly become a major recipient of project and non-project aid on both developmental and political grounds.⁶ Together with other donors' contributions, Somalia received over \$100 per capita in overseas development assistance throughout most of the 1980s.⁷

3. This was the first of two efforts to rebuild the port. USAID again financed rehabilitation of Kismayo in the early 1980s.

4. CDIE document PD-AAA-565-A1 is the most recent and comprehensive evaluation of this project.

5. During the prior period of U.S. involvement in Somalia, however, foreign aid had also financed most of Somalia's government expenditures. Through 1969, approximately 85% of total development expenditures were externally financed. Foreign resources provided more typical developing countries at that time only about 10% of total investment expenditures. [Source: Mehmet, "Effectiveness of Foreign Aid - The Case of Somalia," (1971) p. 31.]

6. David Rawson has written extensively about this history in both his book [Rawson (1993)] and his article in Samatar (1994).

7. Specific annual figures are not available, but based upon D.A.C. bi-lateral contributions of over \$729 million from 1978 and 1983 and a population of 6.5 million, assistance per capita amounted to \$112 [Source: Source: USAID, 1987 Congressional Presentation, p. 403]. The World Bank also estimated that in 1987, Somalia received \$102 per capita in overseas development assistance [Source: East Africa Department/World Bank, Somalia: Crisis in Public Expenditure Management, Vol. I, Summary of Findings and Conclusions, (March, 1991), p. 1].

Initially, USAID followed the IMF and World Bank's lead in providing development assistance to the GSDR. Both the IMF and the World Bank had been involved in Somalia since the 1960s and continued work through the Soviet presence in Somalia during the 1970s.

While changing international partners from the Soviets to the U.S., Barre also proclaimed an end to scientific socialism in Somalia. The IMF then determined that Somalia needed policy reform to restore short-term financial equilibrium, to stimulate economic growth through free market mechanisms and to improve institutional tools and capacity for economic management. In 1981, the GSDR signed a standby agreement with the IMF establishing a program for more realistic exchange rates, reduced deficits and inflation and a greater role for market forces.

Apparently consistent with GSDR's basic development plans and in concert with the IMF, the World Bank targeted improvement of Somalia's agricultural and livestock sectors through broad-based development projects in the Bay Region, the Central Rangelands, and the Northwest. Exploration of fisheries development and later, an energy and power project, were also funded by various donors. As its contribution to multi-donor development efforts, USAID agreed in the early 1980s to provide technical assistance primarily to the Bay Region and Central Rangelands projects, while other donors were to provide support for infrastructure in these areas.⁹

USAID Approach

Initial USAID strategy statements stressed the need for both short-and long-term thinking in assisting Somalia's development. USAID targeted sectoral growth and stabilizing the economy in the short run, while intending to address larger macroeconomic problems later in the program.

Project assistance was initially directed at agriculture and health care. PL 480 food support was provided to alleviate the crisis brought on by the 1975-76 drought and economic distress of the Ogaden War. ESF grants were to correct short-run balance of payment problems while assuring access to essential inputs through a series of commodity import programs. Local currency generated through CIP and food sales was supposed to provide GSDR contributions to development projects and instigate private sector economic activity.

The need to improve indigenous skills at all levels of society and among refugees was also soon identified as a priority. Training was directed at government administrators to bolster institutional development and create a pyramid structure whereby those trained could train others.

9. USAID/Somalia, Country Development Strategy Statement, FY 82, p. 50.

USAID approved six large development projects in the eighteen months between January, 1979 and August, 1980. Each of these was originally designed as a five-year project and as a component of the larger multi-donor regional strategy.

Within a few years of initiation, a number of recurring problems evolved in the implementation of USAID's initial projects and others later added to the portfolio. The size, complexity and diversity of the Somalia portfolio challenged the management and monitoring capacity of the Mission. Several projects were considered for deobligation.¹⁰ Detailed in various project evaluations and documents, the problems fall into four interrelated categories:


- **USAID Administrative and Organizational Issues** - Many of USAID's initial projects in Somalia were designed based upon other donors' information; pre-project research and analysis was limited and project papers did not specify implementation strategies. Pre-project assumptions were often incorrect. This led to significant confusion in the first few years of most projects followed by delays or poor timing of technical assistance. Projects depended heavily on imported supplies and lengthy procurement processes slowed implementation. The scope of most projects, particularly in the early 1980s, had to be reduced significantly by mid-project in order to make any aspect of planned outcomes feasible in an environment both highly political and lacking sufficient supporting infrastructure.
- **Donor Coordination** - Most of the projects USAID initiated between 1978 and the early 1980s were structured so that implementation depended upon other donors' inputs. Despite early efforts to devise coordination schemes, project management was cumbersome and implementation hampered by overly complex and confusing sets of responsibilities. Later efforts were revised so that projects complemented one another rather than requiring implementation across organizations.
- **Insufficient GSDR Commitment to Donor Agenda** - From the early 1980s on, despite specific agreements on projects and reform agendas, the GSDR continually failed to meet its commitments in providing local currency or following concessional pacts accepting responsibility for provision of critical local inputs and staff support. Inconsistencies and shortfalls in GSDR contributions led to the projects' limited success. Civil service reform of employment policies and salary schedules was acknowledged as necessary, but ultimately, to little effect. Some policies were altered, but overemployment persisted and salaries for most public employees remained too low to assure consistency and commitment to projects. Lines of accountability and job responsibilities were never clarified. The GSDR was often unwilling to yield authority over implementation and management of projects. Critical supplies were regularly diverted to particular individuals' benefit. Similarly, selection of training participants and managers of projects was politicized to the detriment of project success.

¹⁰ Project Implementation Report, December 16, 1984.

- **Exogenous Constraints** - In addition to problems inherent in working within an unstable socio-political context, other issues complicated development efforts. Somalia is vulnerable to droughts and has few natural resources, making any development work extremely difficult. The large refugee population added another layer of complexity to the situation. The 1983 Saudi ban on Somali livestock imports severely impacted foreign exchange reserves and the profitability of livestock. Increases in cereal prices increased incentives for farming which together with population growth created competition for grazing lands. Fluctuations in the price of oil also affected development efforts. Working with a largely nomadic population complicated any efforts to collect data on social welfare and population or evidence of project impacts. The structure of Somali society is extremely complex and few individuals implementing projects had sufficient knowledge (or desire for knowledge) of Somali culture and language.

Most of these problems were recognized and acknowledged in documents tracking projects' implementation. In response, many projects were redesigned mid-implementation in attempt to correct shortcomings or better accommodate constraints. In other cases, projects ended as scheduled or were reincarnated under a different title and revised strategy more appropriate to Somalia. Donor coordination issues were resolved somewhat through increasingly regular discussion and changes in approach so that activities were complementary rather than interdependent across various organizations. USAID also revised its development approach in the mid-1980s, shifting from providing technical assistance to focusing more closely on policy reform with stringent conditions on progress meticulously specified.

Many aspects of the problems outlined above, however, continued to frustrate activity in Somalia up until the collapse of the Barre government. The redundancy of such problems is somewhat confounding, but clearly, various sets of interests at work in Somalia did not allow room for USAID and other donors to require binding adherence to agreements. International organizations continued to work in Somalia in spite of rampant corruption, violations of agreements and little evidence of development progress. At several critical junctures, the GSDR complied with donor demands or demonstrated new commitment to reform and development agendas. Continued strategic interests and desire to maintain the stability of the region provided impetus enough for donors to continue with their efforts. The Barre government was able to manipulate the situation with sufficient compliance to keep contributions coming. During the ten years leading up to the civil war, USAID provided approximately \$165 million in development assistance to Somalia. Somalia also received about \$298 million in PL 480 funds and another \$150 million in ESF grants over this period. The attached chart illustrates the annual amounts of US aid to Somalia by type for years 1978 through 1993.



	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93
Development Assistance	3.3	10.1	12.3	12.1	14.4	26.9	14.9	20.7	22.2	18.3	5.9	4.3	0.7	0.0	0.0	8.0
Economic Support Funds	0.0	0.0	5.0	0.0	20.0	21.0	35.0	30.0	22.0	17.1	4.0	8.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
PL 480 Funds	15.8	18.0	45.6	44.9	21.4	21.8	31.1	31.7	24.4	17.8	13.1	7.2	4.7	3.1	38.6	48.7

Sources: USAID/Bureau for Africa, Program and Budget Information: A retrospective Through FY 1993 and USAID Congressional Presentations for 1988 and

Lessons Learned

The most explicit lesson learned through USAID's experience in pre-civil war Somalia is that development cannot proceed in the midst of a civil war or be channeled through a government with little or no legitimacy supporting its tenure. Most of the modest successes of the Somalia program occurred in spite of the Barre administration, not as a result of GSDR cooperation. Somalia under Barre was not a good development partner.

The USAID Somalia pre-civil war program also demonstrates all of the major trends and lessons learned in development over the past 15 years. Development work in Somalia began when providing infrastructure and financing conceptually broad project schemes were thought the key to generating industrialization and modernity. Priority was later given to getting economic policy right above all other considerations. Although seemingly absurd in the wake of the civil war, early in the development program, societal cohesiveness was assumed Somalia's greatest asset: Somalis were a linguistically, religiously and ethnically homogeneous people.¹¹

Obviously, many of these assumptions proved faulty. The lessons learned in Somalia throughout the 1980s are also now part of standard development litany. Assumptions about the potential to transform societies through elaborate and externally provided assistance and economic reform agendas are widely recognized as erroneous. Projects were most successful when communities identified their needs and participation was incorporated into the design and implementation of programs. The shift from grandiose schemes to more localized and basic strategies is seen in the Somalia program's Comprehensive Groundwater (649-0104), Family Health Services (649-0131) and PVO Development Partners (649-0138) projects, among others.

Many of the other lessons are also somewhat obvious in retrospect, but due to their future relevance, worth iterating below. Again, these were gathered primarily from USAID project documents and supported through interviews with former project personnel. Individuals were asked what USAID should consider if development activities were again initiated in Somalia.

- **Start small and build instead of downsizing mid-project.**

All of the projects in the early Somalia program were overly broad in scope. Commitments quickly develop constituencies and are difficult to scale back after initiation. Incorporate feedback loops into tightly designed pilot projects and build on successes rather than attempting to fix mistakes built into overambitious and complex designs. Minimize involvement to facilitating self-directed development or providing limited inputs such as veterinary supplies or improved seed stocks which inspire growth. Do not initiate projects without identifying assured means for covering recurring costs.

11. USAID, Congressional Presentation for FY 80, p. 388.

- **Be clear and explicit about U.S. interests and objectives.**

The GSDR recognized the scope and extent of U.S. interests in pre-civil war Somalia and was able to play interests against one another. Donors were as addicted to giving aid as Somalis were to receiving it. Be clear and wary of competing self-interests; such complexity impedes flexibility. Limit involvement to areas where interests are mutual; abandon any program of grandiose objectives and goals.

- **Center-based strategies may never work in Somalia, but support collaboration.**

Somalia is a nomadic society where clan politics determine resource allocation. Risks are minimized through extensive and complex networking that most outsiders do not understand. Strategies need to be designed appropriate to a dynamic social environment where conflict happens, alliances shift and time horizons may not match those of donors. Incorporate balance in sponsoring settled and non-settled activities. Do not assume that resources targeted to any one sector or geographical area will benefit the whole nation. Do not get involved with clan politics. At the same time, recognize that alliances and collaboration are a part of Somali traditions and can be encouraged and nurtured.

- **Think and re-think through all assumptions.**

Assumptions are frequently translated into policy without sufficient scrutiny. Many incorrect assumptions about environmental degradation caused by traditional grazing practices were incorporated into project designs. Similarly, vacant land was wrongly assumed unclaimed.

- **Education may be the most useful input donors can provide.**

Somalis are capable problem-solvers and can do a lot with very little. At the same time, they are fiercely independent and often don't trust outsiders. Particularly when the state has little or no leadership clout, unless people can clearly see that their lives will improve with settlement or alternative types of livelihood, they are not going to respond to project initiatives. Relationships will require time and change will only occur in the long-run. Education can create demand for services and may affect values as evidenced by the Family Health Services project, but the process is likely to be slow. Education is the best vehicle for opening Somalis to the rest of the world.

- **Development should be community-based, but realistic.**

Sustainable development requires community commitment. Past projects were most successful when initiatives were local or grounded in Somali realities. Many hard-working and committed Somalis put good work into projects when actually used not as tools or equipment, but as colleagues. At the same time, recognize when form differs from substance and strategize accordingly. Supporting Range Land Associations under the Livestock Marketing project (649-0109) might have appropriately built upon indigenous governance structures, but

extending responsibilities to conservation without seeing that this entails accepting time-horizons and management roles which are not part of traditions can lead to failure.

II. USAID Activity by Sector

The second part of this report is a breakdown of USAID projects by sector with general descriptions of strategy used and project experience. Detailed project profiles listing project-specific lessons learned are attached following the overview of each sector. The project profiles also include documents reviewed and CDIE reference codes to support further research. Contacts listed include where available current positions of individuals who were involved with the projects.

1. Agriculture

Background: Developing Somalia's agriculture sector was always a major thrust of donor activity in Somalia. With agreement from various donors for assistance with the food crisis that followed the events of the 1970s, the Barre administration identified food self-sufficiency as one of its development priorities. Commercial and irrigated agriculture was limited to bananas and sugar with large and inefficient parastatals monopolizing production. With GSDR pledges for privatization and changes in land registration policies, donors accordingly focused on diversifying crops and improving productivity through education of both government technicians and small farmers, dryland crop research and water development activities. As part of larger IMF/World Bank strategies, USAID targeted agricultural development assistance primarily at the Bay region.

USAID/Somalia's first post-1978 project was the **Agricultural Extension and Training project (649-0101)**, similar to a project the Agency had sponsored in the early 1960s. The Agriculture Extension and Training project was one piece of the larger, multi-donor Agricultural Extension and Farm Management Training (AFMET) project taking place in both the Bay region and Shebelli River Valley.

The extension strategy was continued and expanded with the **Agricultural Delivery Systems project (649-0112)**. This project was to build upon its precursor and support development of a self-sustaining National Extension Service in the Bay Region.

A third project was added in 1980. The **Bay Region Agricultural Development project (649-0113)** similarly supported research, extension and training activities as well as veterinary services and water development efforts.

Later, in 1983, as part of a separate multi-donor effort to develop the Juba Valley and plans for the Bardera Dam, USAID financed the **Juba Development Analytical Studies project (649-0134)**. This project was limited to a series of contracted studies and some training to support planning efforts.

Experience: A large body of research on dryland crops and cultivation in Somalia was collected through these projects. A research station at Bonka was again established under the Bay

Region project. Wide-ranging research and baseline data was collected through the Juba project. A number of extension agents were trained and participated in training small farmers. The extension problem-solving approach was well-received, particularly when farmers could see somewhat immediate improvements.

At the same time, each of these projects proved over-ambitious in scope and required some revision mid-implementation. Pre-project assumptions about available technology and research proved faulty; consequently, basic research had to be conducted and materials developed before planned extension activities could take place.

Measuring success of the extension projects was not possible due to insufficient collection of baseline data and little distinction between projects' parameters and goals. Some improvement in agricultural production occurred in the early 1980s, but whether this was due to improved inputs, better weather or education through extension programs is unclear.

Training programs were successful in providing knowledge, but insufficient civil service salaries and failure of long-term participants to return to Somalia affected turnover in staffing and sustainability of the extension service.

Lessons Learned: In addition to the general lessons learned about multi-donor coordination, the importance of host government commitment and pre-project information, these projects demonstrated the necessity of local impact to project success. Evaluations suggest that these projects had greatest impact where technology shared was basic, but easily communicated and immediately useful. Background papers and elaborate studies might someday provide information of some consequence, but given the political climate and lack of connection between much of society and the state, localized small-scale service delivery was likely more effective in improving both the quality of life of small farmers and agricultural productivity. A pilot-project approach carefully structured to build upon successes may have achieved as much as the broad-based schemes used.

Project Title:	Agricultural Extension, Training and Research
Project Number:	649-0101
LOP Funding:	USAID - \$5.1 million GSDR - \$6.7 million
Date of Initial Obligation:	8/31/78
PACD:	7/31/82

Other donors: IBRD and others (not specified in documents).

Implementing Agency/Primary Contract: National Extension Service; USDA (PASA).

Project Purpose: To assist GSDR in reaching its goal of self-sufficiency in food production by establishing a viable, integrated, self-sustaining National Extension Service in the Bay Region.

Components/Expected Outcomes: The project had a number of objectives:

- Establish an Extension and applied research program.
- Assist in training GSDR Extension staff and farmers.
- Provide long-term training for GSDR technicians.
- Provide short-term training for technicians.
- Conduct baseline surveys to measure project impact.

Specific quantitative targets were established for number of participants and number and size of demonstration plots where activities were to take place.

Project Results/Experience:

Accomplishments: The project provided a sound base for future work in training and demonstration exercises to build upon. Technologies were apparently well-received once farmers saw benefits and began to trust project goals. Although increases in grain production of over 100% were reported by some farmers, the evaluation documentation available states that no firm quantitative data recording levels of production over time was maintained and so progress is difficult to substantiate. Product demonstration activity, however, was well documented and exceeded original goals. A number of extension agents were trained and apparently practicing in the Bay Region at the PACD.

Constraints: No baseline data or crop observation data was maintained and so impact of technologies could not be evaluated. The results of this project were fused with projects 649-0112 (Agriculture Delivery Systems) and 649-0113 (Bay Region Agricultural Development). GSDR contributions fell short of original commitments by approximately \$2.9 million. The

National Plan for agriculture and existing minimum technology packages discussed in the project paper were never located. Physical training materials for extension agents apparently were not produced and could have been more appropriately designed by and for Somalis. Late arrival of TA, slow procurement of essential inputs and shortages of fuel also impeded project implementation.

Lessons Learned:

- Baseline data is essential to measuring a project's impact.
- Careful research should go into project design to establish accurately what does and does not exist to support the project.
- Extension programs should foster technology transfer between farmers and research, not conduct fundamental research.

Documents Reviewed:

Regional Inspector General/Audit (Nairobi), Audit of Somalia Food and Nutrition Projects (No. 3-649-85-14), March, 1985.

USAID/Somalia, Project Evaluation: Agricultural Extension, Training and Research (PD-AAL-690), August, 1982.

Seastrunk, Dempsey/Texas A&M, An Evaluation Report of Project 649-101: Agricultural Extension, Training and Research in the Bay Region of Somalia (PD-AAP-501), March, 1980.

USAID/Somalia, Project Paper: Agricultural Extension, Training and Research, August, 1978.

Contacts: Gary Nelson, USAID (retired).

Project Title:	Agricultural Delivery Systems
Project Number:	649-0112
LOP Funding:	USAID - \$8.6 million (original) \$8.4 million (revised)
	GSDR - \$3.8 million (l/c)
Date of Initial Obligation:	7/27/79
PACD:	9/30/88

Other Donors: IDA, EEC, ADF.

Implementing Agency/Primary Contractor: Ministry of Agriculture and Agricultural Extension and Farm Management Training (AFMET) Project Management Unit; Utah State University.

Project Purpose: To increase indigenous food crop production through enhanced management of extension services and training activities involving the National Extension Service (NES), the Agricultural Research Institute (ARI), the Faculty of Agriculture (FOA) and the farmers who were intended beneficiaries. As part of a larger AFMET effort co-financed by IDA, EEC and ADF, USAID project activities were directed at Afgoi, Janale and Jowar in the Shebelli River Valley and Bonka in the Bay region.

Components/Expected Outcomes: Major activities financed by USAID included:

- Technical assistance in developing a national research strategy.
- Training, commodities, machinery, equipment and technical assistance to strengthen the NES and Farm Management Extension Training Center (FMETC).

The GSDR provided project management and technical assistance funding of \$3.8 million through CIP and PL 480 generated currency. ADF financed \$8.0 million in vehicles, machinery and consultancy services. The EEC (\$1.7 million) and IDA (\$11.7 million) provided consultancy and contract services, technical assistance and supplies.

Project Results/Experience:

Accomplishments: The 1986 evaluation concluded that project was extremely successful in upgrading NES research and extension staffs; post-project, NES staff were capable of facilitating transfer of applied research to farmers. The problem-solving approach of extension agents was well-received by Somali farmers.

Constraints: The causal connection between project activities and the successes highlighted in the project evaluation is not entirely clear. Both a 1984 project audit and a 1985 audit of agriculture projects in Somalia find that little progress had been made toward reaching project goals. The audits question the viability of an extension strategy due to Somalia's large size,

poor roads and limited access to vehicles and fuel. Only half of the long-term participants trained overseas returned to Somalia.

Lessons Learned:

- Multi-donor coordination on project implementation is difficult and can impair project success if not carefully structured.
- Low-technology improvements can be as productive as complex, high-tech strategies for increasing yields if easier to communicate.

Documents Reviewed:

USAID/Somalia, Project Assistance Completion Report: Agricultural Delivery Services Project (PD-AAZ-722), July, 1989 .

Regional Inspector General/Audit (Nairobi), Audit of Somalia Food and Nutrition Projects (No. 3-649-85-14), March, 1985.

Regional Inspector General/Audit (Nairobi), Agricultural Delivery Systems Project in Somalia Has Made Little Progress Towards Its Original Objectives. Report 3-649-84-15 (PD-AAP-700), August, 1984.

Contacts: Gary Nelson, USAID (retired); Michael Fuchs-Carsch, USAID (retired).

Project Title:	Bay Region Agricultural Development
Project Number:	649-0113
LOP Funding:	USAID - \$11.2 million (original) \$10.7 million (amended)
Date of Initial Obligation:	8/31/80
PACD:	9/30/85 (Original) 9/30/88 (Revised)

Other Donors: World Bank, ADF, IDA, IFAD, IDRC.

Implementing Agencies/Primary Contractor: Ministries of Agriculture and Livestock; University of Wyoming.

Project Purpose: To assist the Somali Government in achieving self-sufficiency in food production through development of institutions, personnel and infrastructure to support integrated rural development activities and increase production on cultivated lands.

Components/Expected Outcomes: As part of this five-year, \$50.3 million multi-donor project, USAID's primary emphasis was agricultural research, funding:

- Technical assistance through the University of Wyoming in applied research extension and seed production, participant and in-country training, and baseline data collection and analysis.
- Provision of equipment and supplies for research.
- Support to veterinary services
- Rural water development through well-drilling.

The GSDR was to establish a Project Management Unit (PMU) funded from CIP and PL 480 currency proceeds to increase development planning and implementation responsibilities at the regional level. IDA and IFAD co-funded \$12 million in technical assistance, consulting agreements, contract services, equipment and water supply development activities. IFAD provided \$8.0 million for veterinary services and related construction. ADF financed road construction (\$8.9 million).

Project Results/Experience:

Accomplishments: Research on soil composition and on a number of species of beans and oilseeds was conducted with some success in establishing the viability of mung beans and safflower. Although not completed until 1986, the project established a functioning crop research station at Bonka deemed in the final evaluation "a major step" toward attaining food self-sufficiency. The World Bank was to fund the station for two years beyond USAID

involvement in order to assure that newly-trained Somalis acquired skills to maintain and continue research via technical assistance. Abundant sociological data was collected by the technical assistance team.

Constraints: Significant delays in commodity procurement and construction affected the project's success. A 1984 mid-project evaluation conducted by the World Bank concluded that the project's scope of activities was too broad and required that the range management component be dropped. All components of the project were two to three years behind schedule, requiring a three-year extension of the PACD if any of the project targets were to be met.

Facilities necessary for project administration, maintenance and research activities were not completed until 1986 which delayed initiation of planned agricultural research for 6 years. Research pertaining to improving sorghum cultivation should have received more emphasis. Failure to establish pre-project baseline data limited the analytical scope of the evaluation considerably.

Only 25% of the project's overseas trainees returned to Somalia thus jeopardizing the contribution of this component of the project.

Lessons Learned:

- Multi-donor projects are inherently complex and require a great deal of coordination and monitoring in order to avoid delays and ensure compliance with agreements.
- Baseline data must be collected at the beginning of the project if progress and achievements are to be documented.
- Training is only beneficial to development if incentives capable of maintaining participants' commitment are in place.
- An agricultural research program requires a full complement of researchers if improved technology is to be forthcoming in a reasonable amount of time.

Documents Reviewed:

University of Wyoming Team (at Bonka Research Station), Somalia: Bay Region Dryland Agricultural Research, Final Report, 1983-88. University of Wyoming, 1990.

This document provides an extensive summary and bibliography of research accomplished under the Bay project.

USAID/Somalia, Final Evaluation: Bay Region Agricultural Development Project (XD-AAY-860A), October, 1988.

Regional Inspector General/Audit (Nairobi), Audit of Somalia Food and Nutrition Projects (No. 3-649-85-14), March, 1985.

USAID/Somalia, Project Paper: Bay Regional Agricultural Development Project (PD-AGG-112-A1), August, 1980.

Contacts: Ralph Conley, USAID (Nicaragua); Gary Nelson, USAID (retired); Hariadene Johnson, USAID (AA/ENT); Rodger Garner, USAID (Philippines); Michael Fuchs-Carsch, USAID (retired).

Project Title:	Juba Development Analytical Studies
Project Number:	649-0134
LOP Funding:	USAID - \$5.3 million (original) \$8.6 million (revised)
Date of Initial Obligation:	9/25/83
PACD:	12/31/86 (original) 9/30/92 (revised) 9/30/91 (revised; 1990 Phase-Down)

Other Donors: IBRD.

Implementing Agency/Primary Contractor: Ministry of Juba Valley Development (MJVD); U.S. Bureau of Land Reclamation, Associates in Rural Development.

Project Purpose: To provide background analysis for a multi-donor effort to develop a master plan for the Juba river valley including the proposed Bardheere Dam.

Components/Expected Outcomes: USAID financed:

- Environmental and socioeconomic studies to inventory resources and provide information for planning and monitoring future development of the Juba Valley.
- Institutional development through on-the-job training and long-term training of MJVD staff.

The PACD was extended in 1989 after completion of the studies and again in 1991 to allow individuals to complete long-term training.

Project Results/Experience:

Accomplishments: Most of the project's planned outputs were achieved. A series of soil and land use classifications, maps and computerized data bases were completed. Analyses included work on rivers, forests, vegetation, water quality, fisheries, limnology, ornithology and long-term environmental monitoring. A number of individuals completed short-term and long-term training programs in a variety of disciplines.

Constraints: Although soil studies began two years before the project's official starting date, initiation of the social and environmental studies did not begin until two years after. The delays were due to USAID's contracting procedure requirements and difficulty with identifying a qualified agent. Delayed procurement of supplies, fuel and local currency also impeded the project's progress at various points.

Brooke sanctions resulted in cancellation of long-term training for two individuals and an earlier PACD than originally planned.

Lessons Learned:

- Adequately qualified and interested counterparts must be made available to a given project and committed to its institutional concerns.
- Donor coordination and cooperation is essential to efficient and effective use of multi-donor project resources.
- Use of PASAs should be carefully designed and monitored so that outcomes meet all parties' expectations.
- Research programs need to be clearly identified and articulated in order to meet a project's timetable and use resources well.
- NAS volunteer personnel probably did not provide as useful critiques as would paid peer reviewers.

Documents Reviewed:

USAID/Somalia, Mogadishu Phase Down Plan, August, 1990.

USAID/Somalia, Project Implementation Report, April 1 - September 30, 1989.

USAID/Somalia, Project Evaluation: Juba Development Analytical Studies, 649-134 (PD-ABA-262), November, 1989.

Ministry of Jubba Valley Development and USAID/Somalia, Juba Development Analytical Studies: Final Evaluation Report, August, 1989.

USAID/Somalia, Project Evaluation Summary: Juba Development Analytical Studies, 649-134 (PD-AAY-884), December, 1987.

USAID/AFR/PD/EAP, Somalia Portfolio Review (PD-AAU-564), January, 1985.

USAID/Somalia, Project Paper: Juba Development Analytical Studies, 649-134 (PD-BBH-183), September, 1983.

Contacts: Michael Fuchs-Carsch, USAID (retired); Robert Ondrusek, UNDP/Somalia.

2. Livestock

Background: Livestock has always been vital to the Somali economy, supporting 60-80% of employment and generating 75-90% of total export earnings. Improving the health and marketing of livestock was a critical element of USAID's and other donors' pre-civil war development strategy. Because rangelands were apparently at capacity, donors sought to improve animal health and range management in order to improve offtake.

USAID's contribution to improving the productivity of livestock originated with the **Central Rangelands project (649-0108)**. As part of a multi-donor effort to improve management of grazing lands through education, conservation and water development activities, USAID used this project to provide technical assistance.

A second USAID project supporting livestock improvements was first conceived when in May of 1983, Saudi Arabia banned all imports of East African cattle, ostensibly due to a rinderpest outbreak in some African countries. Since sale of live animals generated approximately 75% of Somalia's hard currency and over 90% of all cattle exported were sold to Saudi Arabia, the ban drastically cut Somalia's foreign exchange earnings. At the request of the GSDR, the **Livestock Marketing and Health project (649-0109)** was to set up a vaccination and quarantine system to improve the quality of Somali cattle and other livestock exports.


Experience: Both of these projects contributed to donors' growing base of knowledge about the structure and intricacies of Somalia's pastoral society. The conditions and limits of rangelands were established. Maps, surveys and rangeland sustainability standards were also created. GSDR staff were trained in data collection, analysis and management. Although not completed until shortly before the USAID mission was evacuated, the quarantine station at Warmahan was supposed to be self-sustaining through fees for services by 1992.

Both projects also achieved much less than what was originally planned. Delays in construction and procurement of supplies impeded progress and effectiveness of technical assistance. Security problems also required scaling back the number of quarantine stations planned from four to one and areas targeted for water development. Low civil service salaries and other difficulties with the National Range Agency jeopardized the sustainability of the project.

Lessons Learned: The lessons learned through these projects were similar to those of most all of the USAID Somalia projects: host government commitment, careful project design and critical assessment of pre-project assumptions and flexibility in timing inputs are essential to successful implementation.

Efforts to improve health of livestock, however, was one of the few instances in the USAID Somalia portfolio where the interests of many Somalis converged with project goals.

USAID/Somalia: Livestock Development Projects



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Improvements to land were less favorably received due to fear that the Barre administration would confiscate any readily viable land.

Project Title:	Central Rangelands Development
Project Number:	649-0108
LOP Funding:	USAID - \$14.9 million GSDR - \$ 5.0 million
Date of Initial Obligation:	8/18/79
PACD:	9/30/86 (original) 9/30/88 (amended 9/21/83) 6/30/89 (amended 7/22/86)

Other Donors: World Bank, IFAD, GTZ, WFP.

Implementing Agencies/Primary Contractor: Ministry of Livestock, Forestry and Range (MLFR) and Faculty of Agriculture, Somali National University; Louis Berger International

Project Purpose: To assist the GSDR in improving rangeland management and livestock productivity in the central region through a ten year, \$45 million multi-donor project led by the World Bank.

Components/Expected Outcomes: USAID financed the following project components:

- Technical assistance to the GSDR to improve range resources including development of water, soil and water conservation activities, survey and monitor vegetation and livestock and establish a Department of Botany and Range Science at Somali National University.
- Commodities including teaching supplies, textbooks, survey and laboratory equipment, trucks, heavy equipment, pumps and four-wheel drive vehicles.
- Participant Training including long-term training in the U.S. and in Kenya and short-term training in-country.

IDA (World Bank)/International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) provided logistical support, project equipment and some technical assistance to project staff. The German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) financed animal health/veterinary services and forestry activities. The World Food Programme (WFP) provided food rations for project staff and laborers.

All local currency to support the project was to be generated through USAID CIP and PL 480 programs. For the first five years of the project, Somali personnel and trainees were provided and selected by the National Range Agency (NRA). After 1984, an independent project management unit made these decisions.

Project Results/Experience:

Accomplishments: Much of the research to establish baseline conditions was completed and professionals were trained. A resources survey was conducted by air. Ground surveys of most of the area were completed by the end of the project. Range condition guides, maps and minimum standards for sustainability were developed. The project range ecology staff conducted some surveys and were trained in plant identification and forage analysis using key and indicator species. Range and Livestock Associations (RLAs) were established in 16 of 18 *degaans* (traditional land unit) for which management plans were developed. The RLAs were comprised of elders and pastoralists, local government and party authorities and religious leaders elected by pastoralists of the *degaans*.

The project assistance completion report concludes that although original targets were not met, a sound base of technical and sociological knowledge relevant to future efforts was established by the project.

Constraints: All of the projects' targets had to be revised or were not achieved due to an overambitious project design. Only about half of the planned water development activities were accomplished due partly to inadequate hydrological knowledge at the project's outset. In 1984, the project target area was reduced to three priority districts (Bulo Burti, Ceel Dhere and Hobbio) or by 75% due to overextension and security problems. In 1987, however, project activities were expanded to three additional priority districts (Jalalaqsi, Ceel Bur and Haradheere).

Problems with donor coordination and between field and project headquarter staff also interfered with implementation. Following difficulties with the National Range Agency (NRA), a semi-autonomous project management unit was established in 1984 and selection of training participants moved to the Faculty of Agriculture. In 1988, the project was made completely independent of the NRA.

Although several staff were trained in various aspects of range management, it was clear throughout the project that low pay and per diem compensation by the NRA jeopardized the sustainability of the project.

The RLAs as organizations formed for rangeland management were promising due to their traditional role in mediating use-right claims, but assumptions about consistency between their function and interest in or capacity for conservation were likely overly optimistic.

Lessons Learned:

- Project design should involve critical assessment of pre-project assumptions.
- Management of multi-donor projects is inherently complex; such projects are likely to accomplish more if structured as sub-projects with interdependence minimized.

- Training programs will not assure sustainability if incentives to support desired outcomes are lacking.

Documents Reviewed:

USAID/Somalia, Project Assistance Completion Report: Central Rangelands Development Project, 649-108 (PD-AAZ-721), August, 1989.

This document provides a list of studies completed and project documentation.

USAID/Somalia, Project Evaluation Summary(PES)/Eval Summary, Central Rangelands Development Project (PD-AAX-955), June, 1988.

Regional Inspector General/Audit (Nairobi), Audit of Somalia Food and Nutrition Projects (No. 3-649-85-14), March, 1985.

Memo from Michael Brown to Kay Wilkes re. Range and Livestock Associations, January 24, 1984 (in AFR/EA project files).

USAID/Somalia, Project Paper: Central Rangelands Development Project (PD-AAG-414-A1), August, 1979.

Contacts: Michael Brown (anthropologist), World Wildlife Fund (Director of PVO/NRMS Project); Michael Fuchs-Carsch, USAID (retired); Dennis Herlocker, GTZ/Nairobi; Emily McPhie, USAID (Dhaka); Phil Warren, USAID (G/R&D/AGR/AP).

Project Title:	Livestock Marketing and Health
Project Number:	649-0109
LOP Funding:	USAID - \$19.4 million GSDR - \$16.0 million
Date of Initial Obligation:	7/30/84
PACD:	6/30/88 (original) 12/31/89 (amendment 1) 12/31/91 (amendment 2) 9/30/92 (amendment 3)

Note: This project ended with the evacuation of the USAID Mission.

Implementing Agencies/Primary Contractor: Ministry of Livestock, Forestry and Range (MLFR); Ronco Consulting Corporation.

Project Purpose: To restore the contribution of cattle exports to the Somali balance of payments through improvements in animal health and veterinary care, establishment of a quarantine system, support of private sector growth in livestock and fodder and infrastructure improvements. The project was also supposed to lay a conceptual basis for a broader approach to strengthening the Somali livestock industry through a series of marketing studies for long-range planning.

Components/Expected Outcomes: The project was originally designed to:

- Establish a quarantine system for cattle with stations at three ports (Mogadishu, Berbera, Kismayo).
- Establish a Livestock Investment Fund (LIF) to support development of private sector fodder production.
- Provide transportation equipment to support the quarantine system.
- Conduct a series of marketing studies for long-range planning.

Project Results/Experience:

Accomplishments:

No final evaluation of the project is available; the project was still in operation when the USAID Mission was evacuated in 1990. The most recent PIR available (covering April 1 - September 30, 1989) indicates that construction of the Warmahan facility was progressing well and roads and other concrete works were about 90% finished. According to documentation provided in the August, 1990 Phase-Down Plan, the Warmahan quarantine station was expected to be complete in September 1990. Approximately 3600 cattle had been processed at Warmahan for export to North Yemen. In full operation, this facility would process 30,000

cattle for export and generate fees sufficient to cover operating expenses by the proposed 1992 PACD.

Because the LIF component of the project was canceled but demand for fodder in the South had increased, the GSDR and other donors initiated fodder production activities. These included joint ventures between Somali and foreign companies. The GSDR also revised some regulations, eliminated some taxes on exports and privatized veterinary services.

Four studies on livestock marketing were completed in 1987; LMPH staff were beginning to collect and analyze data on livestock prices using a database created for the project.

Some training of Somalis was taking place in country. Two of four participants sent abroad for training returned to Somalia, but only one returned to the project.

Constraints: Lengthy delays in construction of quarantine facilities plagued the LMHP for most of the first three years of the project. Delays were caused by redesign needs, difficulty in finding an appropriate bidder for facilities construction and projected budget overruns. A Somali firm won the construction contract in December 1988 and the first quarantine station near Mogadishu at Warmahan was started. The other two stations were dropped from the project due to security concerns. The Livestock and Investment Fund (LIF) and technical assistance for fodder production were canceled so that funds could be used to cover the higher than expected construction costs. In 1989, the Mission proposed extending the PACD from June of 1991 to September, 1992, in order to provide needed technical assistance.

Lessons Learned: (these are taken primarily from the mid-term report; no final evaluation of the project is available.)

- Full design specifications and careful cost estimates should be done during the design phase of a project with a construction component.
- If construction is delayed, TA related to the construction should be rescheduled.
- An evaluation should be done as soon as it seems a project is behind schedule to determine the cause and necessary remedial actions.
- USAID's response to an emergency situation should be simple enough so actions can be accomplished quickly and should not involve high capital investment or institution-building programs.

Documents Reviewed:

USAID/Somalia, Mogadishu Phase Down Plan, August, 1990.

USAID/Somalia, Project Implementation Report, April 1 - September 30, 1989.

Consortium for International Development, Mid-term Evaluation of Somalia Livestock Marketing and Health Project (XD-AA-Y-859-A), February, 1988.

Ronco Consulting Corp., International Market for Livestock in Somalia, November, 1987.

USAID/Somalia, Project Paper Supplement, Livestock Marketing and Health (649-109), August 20, 1986.

USAID/Somalia, Project Paper: Livestock Marketing and Health (649-109), July 12, 1984.

Holzman, John. The Market for Livestock and Meat in Saudi Arabia: Implications for Somalia (AID sponsored study), June, 1982.

Contacts: Michael Fuchs-Carsch, USAID (retired); Emily McPhie, USAID (Dhaka); Phil Warren, USAID (G/R&D/AGR/AP); Dan Vincent, USAID (Egypt).

3. Water

Background: Another important facet of the pre-civil war development program was exploration of potential groundwater resources. Before land tenure issues proved problematic, donors considered water the limiting factor to land exploitation where cultivation was possible. USAID pursued well-development and improvements to catchment and irrigation systems to better support both agriculture and livestock.

USAID financed two projects in the 1980s targeting water resource development. The **Comprehensive Groundwater Development project (649-0104)**, first approved in 1979, consisted of extensive exploratory drilling to test the viability of any existing aquifers in both the Bay Region and Central Rangelands. The project also involved data collection and training of GSDR staff in well-drilling and data analysis.

In 1987 USAID began the **Shebelle Water Management I project (649-0129)**. This project was a piece of another multi-donor effort to support the development of the Shebelle River basin. After determining that an additional 150,000 hectares of land could be cultivated in the Shebelle and Juba valleys with improved water storage and management, the World Bank took on leadership of the project.¹² USAID limited its involvement to reconstruction of the irrigation systems on the Shebelle river in two phases. The first phase consisted of research and technical assistance to support later rehabilitation of the Shlamabood irrigation system. Specific progress toward reform of the GSDR's land registration system was a condition for further assistance.

Experience: A range of geological, economic and sociological information was collected through both of these projects. Although implementation delays put the Comprehensive Groundwater project significantly behind schedule in its early years, extensive drilling later in the project did establish some wells and revealed that the few aquifers that exist in Somalia are not viable. One of the unexpected successes of this project was use of community participation to facilitate well-development and maintenance programs. This was not part of the original project design.

This project was also one of the first to reveal the significance of rift between traditional land tenure laws and policies and practices of the Barre administration. Implementation was regularly hampered by security incidents following from misunderstandings and locals' mistrust of the Barre government and project motives.

Socioeconomic studies financed by the Shebelle project were completed, but shortly before technical assistance was to begin, the project was canceled due to security problems.


12. USAID, Country Development Strategy Statement, FY '87.

Lessons Learned: Some of the most important lessons learned by donors about Somali society were learned through the Comprehensive Groundwater Development project. The importance and potential of local participation and the necessity of staff with language skills and cultural familiarity was highlighted through this project. The large gap between the Somali state and its citizens was also made obvious.


The project underscored the necessity to incorporate sustainability criteria into project design as well. One of the unresolved problems with the Groundwater project was confusion over ownership and maintenance of wells. Although community participation and buy-in ensured a certain level of sustainability for some wells developed, ownership issues and responsibility for long-term maintenance was never sorted out and much of what was developed quickly fell into disrepair. These issues are particularly critical when projects require sophisticated technology and skills.

Some of these lessons seem to have been acknowledged in the Shebelli project's design. Socioeconomic and land tenure issues were given priority as the planned outcome of the first phase. Aid was conditioned upon implementation of land registration procedures and required approval of an action plan. One of the compelling reasons to go forward with the project was existence of local irrigation user organizations which could likely contribute to rehabilitation and maintenance of canals. Sustainability was foreseen through imposition of user fees, although the project was canceled before this could be tested.


USAID/Somalia: Water Development Projects



Comprehensive Water Development (649-0104)



Shebelle Water Management I (649-0129)



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Project Title:	Comprehensive Groundwater Development
Project Number:	649-0104
LOP Funding:	USAID - \$13 million (original) \$18.8 million (amended 8/84) GSDR - \$6.3 million (l/c)
Date of Initial Obligation:	9/30/79
PACD:	9/30/84 (original) 9/30/88 (amended)

Implementing Agencies/Primary Contractor: Ministry of Minerals and Water Resources (MMWR), Water Development Agency (WDA); Louis Berger International/Roscoe Moss.

Project Purpose: To strengthen the management capability of the GSDR's Water Development Agency (WDA) and assist in the establishment of an on-going water development program which provides potable and livestock water in rural areas.

Components/Expected Outcomes: The project had four components:

- Technical assistance and staff training for the WDA in data collection and analysis, logistical supply and equipment analysis systems and policy liberalization where affecting private drilling operations.
- Data Collection and Utilization through establishing a WDA planning unit and Ministry of Mineral and Water Resources (MMWR) National Water Center.
- Well-drilling to establish 92-100 rural borehole water wells in the Bay Region and Central Rangelands over the life-of-project.
- Studies to support water resource development.

The number of wells was amended to 60-65 in a revised project paper (August, 1984).

Project Results/Experience:

Accomplishments: A number of producing wells were completed to the benefit of surrounding communities. Technically speaking, the project met its stated goals in terms of wells drilled and private sector participation, but did not meet institutionalization objectives. A water quality lab and an electronics/geophysics lab were established. Seven studies and a number of reports were also completed under personal services contracts.

Although not part of the original project design, community participation (using the Tuulo Village Assessment and Participation Process) worked well when developed prior to well construction and when provided adequate and timely support by the WDA. On-the-job

training of drilling crews and some WDA personnel was one of the most significant benefits of the project.

Constraints: According to the project director, one of the biggest problems with this project was that Somalia has no viable aquifers. The exploratory drilling called for and conducted early in the project revealed that groundwater under large areas of the Bay Region is too saline for human or animal consumption. This required a shift in emphasis from drilling wells to water catchments and hand dug wells. Delayed commodity procurement, WDA staff displeasure with compensation and low morale, exhausted fuel supplies and security problems (one Roscoe Moss staff driller was killed potentially due to a land tenure dispute) also affected project success.

The final project evaluation also details several problems with the project's design and implementation. Lack of qualified personnel and financial incentives to staff to maintain wells, conduct water quality tests and maintain equipment affected the project's overall success. The WDA was apparently incapable of or not interested in supporting the project or the infrastructure developed beyond the primary contractor's departure. Project staff had no control over who received training; WDA selected all personnel, many of whom were competent, but others who were not qualified and uninterested in fieldwork training. Construction of the National Water Center did not begin until April, 1987 and thus its activities could not be integrated with the WDA planning unit nor its impact realistically assessed in the final project evaluation. The MMWR Water Data Unit was never established because the required Presidential decree was never published. The project assistance completion report (June, 1988) recommends deobligating any remaining project funds.

Lessons Learned:

- Project design should involve long-term staff who are familiar with the local conditions and language, particularly if training is a project component.
- Standardization of equipment and vehicles among donors and with what is available locally is important to minimizing interruptions in implementation of multi-donor projects.
- Providing appropriate technology is as important as meeting quantitative needs. Alternative approaches to project design should be considered in developing project objectives and thinking about project impact on settlement patterns, future maintenance needs and organizational structure.
- The impact of developing large water resources on urbanization should be thought through; well failure can result in dislocation.
- Local participation should be incorporated into all groundwater projects.

- Those responsible for implementing a project must have authority necessary to exercise control over all aspects of the project; fragmented authority reduces the likelihood of success.

Documents Reviewed:

USAID/Somalia, Comprehensive Groundwater Development Project (649-104): Project Assistance Completion Report, June, 1988.

Regional Inspector General/Audit (Nairobi), Audit of Somalia Food and Nutrition Projects (No. 3-649-85-14), March, 1985.

Louis Berger International, Inc; Roscoe Moss, Comprehensive Groundwater Development: Final Report, Vol. I, March, 1985.

USAID/Somalia, Project Paper: Comprehensive Groundwater Project, September, 1979.

Contacts: Ed Birgells, USAID (Khazakistan); Bill Darkins, USAID (AFR/SWA/MBF); Thomas Lofgren, USAID (Malawi); Winston McPhie, USAID (Dhaka); Phil Roark (Project Director for Louis Berger), Chemonics, Inc; Andrew Sisson, USAID (AFR/DP/PSE).

Project Title:	Shebelli Water Management I
Project Number:	649-0129
LOP Funding:	USAID - \$22.6 million
Date of Initial Obligation:	8/30/87
PACD:	9/30/92 (original)
	5/31/94 (revised)
	8/30/89 (security reasons)

Implementing Agency/Primary Contractor: Ministry of Agriculture; University of Wisconsin Land Tenure Center.

Project Purpose: To assist Somalia in laying the foundation for continued development of the Shebelli River Basin. As part of a multi-donor effort, USAID targeted irrigation rehabilitation work in the Shalambod district. The two-part project was to be the Agency's major initiative in the agricultural sector over the next decade at a total cost of \$50 million.

Components/Expected Outcomes: The project had three components to be implemented through a two-stage authorization process:

- Development of private/public capacity to manage Shebelli basin irrigation incorporating user fees and user associations.
- Support of adaptive irrigated agricultural research to support improvement of on-farm water management and crop technologies.
- Rehabilitation of the Shalambod irrigation system through gate repair and improved cleaning and maintenance of canals.

The first phase of the project would focus on research and technical assistance and training in water management which would then support rehabilitation work in the project's second phase. IBRD and the GTZ also financed projects as part of the development effort.

Project Results/Experience:

Accomplishments: A series of reports with recommendations detailing land tenure and socioeconomic issues pertaining to the region's irrigation system were prepared by the University of Wisconsin's Land Tenure Center and others. Colorado State University was selected to provide technical assistance, but the contract was canceled before the start date due to security problems in the region. A proposed Land Administration project (649-155; detailed in FY 92 ABS) was to provide support for revised, equitable land administration policy and programs.

Constraints: The project was terminated in August, 1989 due to heightened security problems and concerns about the size of the U.S. presence in Somalia. When terminated, the project was about one and a half years behind schedule in TA contracting because of late issuance of the

RFP and contracting procedures. The PACD had been extended to 1994 to accommodate the delay.

Lessons Learned: The project was terminated shortly before technical assistance was to begin; no evaluation other than a 1989 project implementation report is available.

Documents Reviewed:

USAID/Somalia, Project Implementation Report, April 1 - September 30, 1989.

Roth, Michael. Somalia Land Policies and Tenure Impacts: The Case of the Lower Shebelle (PN-ABB-822), September, 1988.

Delancey, Virginia; et al. Somalia: An Assessment of SWDO and the Social and Economic Status of Women in the Lower Shebelle (PN-ABB-483), June, 1987.

Roth, Michael; et al. Analysis of Land Tenure and Water Allocation Issues in the Shalambood Irrigation Zone, Somalia (PN-ABG-331), March, 1987.

USAID/Somalia, Project Paper: Shebelli Water Management I (PD-BBH-180), May, 1987.

ECPR Issues Paper on PID, Shebelli Water Management (649-123) (in AFR/EA files) May, 1986.

USAID/Somalia, Design Guidance for Shebelli Water Management Project, WMS Report 49 (PD-ABC-860; no date).

Contacts: Deborah Mendelson, USAID (AFR/SA/MBZ); Jim Merryman, Wilkes University; Nancy Merryman, Wilkes University; Deborah Prindle, USAID (ENI/EUR/PDP/PA); Dennis Sharma, USAID (LAC/II).

4. Health

Background: Like other social services, health care was never a priority of the Somali state. In response, the early USAID program identified primary health care as a priority in improving lives of the rural poor.¹³ The **Rural Health Care Delivery project (649-0102)** was intended to be USAID's first major contribution to enhancing health care delivery in Somalia.

As part of efforts to narrow the scope of the USAID program in the 1984 CDSS, health care was de-emphasized while recognizing that other donors' contribution should be encouraged and GSDR commitments were insufficient. While the Rural Health Care Delivery Project closed on its original completion date, the **Family Health Services project (649-0131)** was initiated. The FHS project was less ambitious than its predecessor and focused on providing education about family health care issues and localized MCH services.

Experience: Of all the projects in the USAID/Somalia portfolio, these two arguably illustrate the worst and the best extreme in terms of accomplishing planned outcomes. Poor pre-project analysis and design impeded every aspect of Rural Health Care Delivery project's implementation. Since various components of the project were meant to build upon one another, insufficient needs assessment and incorrect assumptions affected the viability of the entire project. The project also required the GSDR to maintain facilities beyond its capacity or commitment.


The Family Health Services project, however, seems to have been one of the best performers in the USAID/Somalia program, even when plagued by corruption as Somalia fell apart. Education was provided at both formal institutions and local levels through an outreach program which used village leaders to disseminate information. Significant work was accomplished in educating and soliciting agreement from religious leaders and politicians about the dangers of female circumcision. The project survived the 1990 USAID phase-down and managed to function reasonably well even as the government fell apart and other donors' assistance had to be enlisted.

Lessons Learned: The most obvious lessons learned from these projects are again typical of the Somalia experience: pre-project design and host government commitment are essential to project success. Commitments are also difficult to rescind; the Rural Health Care Delivery project might have ended earlier if it were not politically important to the GSDR.

Clearly, the more basic and localized design of the later project was better suited to Somalia. Providing education about family health helped to create a demand for services. Despite its successes, however, the sustainability of the project was questionable as there was no mechanism to provide critical inputs. Data collection in some instances also became politicized as survival in Somalia required accumulating and subverting as many resources as possible.

13. Improvements to health care are identified as a priority in both the 1983 and 1984 CDSSs.

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Project Title:	Rural Health Care Delivery
Project Number:	649-0102
LOP Funding:	USAID - \$15.2 million GSDR - \$5.2 million
Date of Initial Obligation:	6/11/79
PACD:	9/30/85

Implementing Agencies/Primary Contractor: Ministry of Health (MOH); University of North Carolina.

Project Purpose: To assist the Somali Government in developing institutional capacity to provide basic health care services to 800,000 rural and nomadic peoples in four regions (Bay, Togdheer, Mudug, Lower Juba) using a model replicable for the entire country.

Components/Planned Outcomes: The project was to support development of the primary health care system through the following components:

- Establish 2 national training centers to provide enhanced training to MOH health care workers and train paramedical staff.
- Establish 4 district health centers and 64 preventative health care clinics
- Train 975 health care workers

Project Results/Experience:

Accomplishments:

The two national training centers were built, equipped and staffed while the project was in operation. Some health care workers were trained and the project did provide a primary health care delivery model which could be replicated. The project's "demonstration effect" served to raise awareness of the benefits and potential for improving health care conditions in rural areas.

Commitment of the Somalis implementing the project was exceptional. All individuals involved were eager to correct problems.

Constraints:

The scope of the project was overambitious necessitating reduction of activities mid-project. Assumptions made in project design about training capacity were faulty. A needs assessment to establish existing skills of health care workers was not conducted before implementation. As a result, the training offered required translators in-class and was far more basic than originally anticipated.

A detailed implementation plan was not established until at least 3 years into the project. Only 2 of the 4 planned clinics were opened; 82 of a projected 975 health care workers were trained. An extension of LOP was rejected and the project was closed on original PACD.

Assumptions about the Ministry of Health's institutional capacity were also faulty. Despite agreements about MOH responsibilities, vehicles were not maintained, MOH employees at project sites were unpaid or did not receive their entire salary. The MOH did not have a system for procuring, storing, distributing or maintaining an inventory of medical supplies or equipment. The two clinics opened under the project closed shortly after the PACD.

Lessons Learned:

- Even the least successful projects are difficult to terminate. When obvious that little was being accomplished, it was virtually impossible to close this project down. The request for an extension of the PACD was only to placate the GSDR; apparently the Mission was not interested in continuing the project.
- Careful research is essential to competent project design. The project probably would have been smaller and more localized if better research was done. UNICEF and WHO were both active in rural health care delivery; their "lessons learned" could have been explored and appropriated.
- Host country commitment and communication is essential. Identifying a process and program for reducing recurrent costs will not necessarily result in sustainability; the MOH apparently did not follow the recommendations of the outside evaluation team. The feasibility of these, however, was somewhat questionable.

Documents Reviewed: (no end of project evaluation is available).

USAID/Somalia, End of Project Report (PD-AAS-584), January, 1986.

John Snow Public Health Group, Somalia Rural Health Project Delivery (RHD) Project: Project Evaluation (PD-AAP-723), April, 1984.

USAID Inspector General, USAID/Somalia's Rural Health Delivery Project: Needed Management Attention (PD-AAN-532), Audit Report No. 3-649-84-02, October, 1983.

USAID/Somalia, Project Paper: Rural Health Delivery (PD-AGG-111-A1), January, 1979.

Contacts: Jim Merryman, Wilkes University; Nancy Merryman, Wilkes University; John Rose, USAID (G/R&D/POP/FPS); Marion Warren (wrote end of project report), USAID (AFR/ARTS/HHR).

Project Title:	Family Health Services
Project Number:	649-0131
LOP Funding:	USAID - \$10.1 million GSDR - \$10.3 million
Date of Initial Obligation:	8/26/84
PACD:	6/30/89 (original) 12/31/89 (revised) 9/30/92 (extended)

Implementing Agencies/Primary Contractor: Ministry of National Planning, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education (Women's Education Department and Curriculum Development Center), Somali Family Health Care Association, Somali Women's Democratic Organization; University Research Corporation.

Project Purpose: To strengthen Somali institutions' capacity to promote, support, coordinate and sustain family health programs.

Components/Expected Outcomes: Initially focusing on five regions (Banadir, Lower Shebelli, Middle Shebelli, Bay and Lower Juba), the project financed:

- Collection and analysis of demographic data and development of policy options.
- Information, Education and Communication (IEC) activities training community leaders and village women to disseminate information in communities and developing textbooks.
- Delivery of clinical services.
- Operations research to inform policy recommendations.

Project Results/Experience:

Accomplishments:

This project appears to be one of the most successful in the Somalia portfolio of the 1980s. The project raised public awareness of family health issues and managed to get religious and political leadership to agree on the need for improved health care for mothers and children and the dangers of female circumcision.

Institutional strengthening took place through personnel training at six institutions and upgrading of facilities at participating institutions. A mainframe computer facility was established at the Ministry of National Planning. The project evidenced some of the first cooperation between the Ministry of Health and other government and local organizations.

Community level IEC programs developed and distributed textbooks and information on breast-feeding, child-spacing and female circumcision. Roughly 2000 women in 20 villages in

five regions were trained. IEC campaign activities also took place in the Bondhere district of Mogadishu reaching an estimated 7500 households. A local private sector publisher under contract with the State Printing Agency printed health education textbooks for grades 1-6. Textbooks for grades 7-12 were also completed, but may not have been printed and distributed.

Demographic information was enhanced through project supported studies. Flexibility in techniques and implementation allowed surveys to continue even though inputs were unexpectedly unavailable.

Constraints:

Greater integration of service delivery and IEC activities was needed. More time was needed to improve institutional linkages, strengthen service delivery to keep pace with IEC and continue efforts to enhance family planning.

Activities were overly diverse to the detriment of strategic planning. The MOH was not using the demographic information collected systematically. Some of the clinical data was manipulated to affect distribution of supplies as conditions in Somalia worsened.

Implementation by six different Somali agencies complicated coordination and administration. Although cooperation was good, the final evaluation found that the administrative structure was fragile.

The project's activities had to be reduced as the country's political situation and security deteriorated.

Lessons Learned:

- Much can be accomplished even with minimal inputs; some of the survey techniques used to establish baseline data demonstrated the creative resourcefulness of those implementing the project.
- Family planning and family health objectives need to be wary of social mores and local priorities and set objectives accordingly.
- Including both political and religious leaders in discussions enhanced outcomes.
- Even the most committed staff will subvert project inputs when survival is threatened.

Documents Reviewed:

University Research Corporation, Somalia Family Health Services Project: Final Report, October 1987-December 1990 (PD-ABC-517), February, 1991.

Written by Mary Ann Abeyta-Behnke (Chief of Party), this document provides a concise and useful summary of project activities and suggestions for the future.

USAID/Somalia, Mogadishu Phase Down Plan, August, 1990.

USAID/Somalia, Project Implementation Report, April 1 - September 30, 1989.

USAID/Somalia, Project Evaluation: Family Health Services (PD-ABA-153), April, 1989.

Contacts: Mary Ann Abeyta-Benke (Chief of Party), University Research Corporation; Ed Birgells, USAID (Kazakhstan); Annie Cross, Macro International; Bob Morgan (Operations Research), University Research Corporation; Dr. Asha Muhamed (former Deputy Director, FP/FH, Ministry of Health), Advocates for Youth (Washington, D.C.).

5. Refugees

Background: A large refugee population has long been cited as reason for donor involvement in Somalia. Initially, Somalia asked the international community to contribute to supporting refugees displaced following the Ogaden War.

Donor strategy was to address the refugee problem by encouraging self-reliance. The first USAID project targeting refugees was the **Kurtunwaare Settlement Program (649-0103)**. Apparently this project was requested by the GSDR as one component of its plans for constructing a large housing development.

Later projects targeted more specifically developing displaced persons' skills and providing work opportunities to foster integration. In 1982, USAID approved two related projects, the **Refugee Areas/CDA Forestry project (649-0122)** and the **Refugee Self-Reliance project (649-0123)**, both of which were somewhat experimental efforts to explore potential models for further work. Following modest successes, these projects' work was continued through the **Somalia Refugee Settlement project (649-0140)**. Refugee assistance was also targeted through the **PVO Development Partners project (649-0138)**.

Experience

By most accounts, USAID's original settlement project at Kurtunwaare was a fiasco. The project was overly dependent upon imported supplies and no provision was made for recurring costs. Construction costs were higher than anticipated which limited prospects for replication. Settling nomadic herdsman also proved more challenging than perhaps anticipated.

Later projects were better structured and had some successes, but ultimately were limited by the same difficulties with the procurement and security problems of most projects in Somalia and ambiguities in Barre's refugee policy.

As long as territorial disputes with Ethiopia persisted, GSDR policy on whether to settle or repatriate displaced persons remained somewhat ambiguous. Several people have said that this ambiguity also served Barre's military pursuits well; as long as camps existed to support families, the GSDR could recruit men from the refugee camps. For years, the GSDR was suspected of inflating refugee numbers to marshal donors' aid. USAID's 1987 CDSS reports that the GSDR count of 700,000 was 30-50% higher than donors' estimates. These projects as a group again highlight the necessity of donor and host government clarity and commitment to mutually identified goals.

Project Title:	Kurtunwaare Settlement Program
Project Number:	649-0103
LOP Funding:	USAID - \$1.5 million
Date of Initial Obligation:	1/8/79
PACD:	11/1/82

Project Purpose: To develop a pilot program of environmentally suitable, low-cost minimum housing at Kurtunwaare for nomadic herdsman displaced by the 1973-75 drought.

Components/Expected Outcomes:

50 units comprising one part of the GSDR's Kurtunwaare housing project master plan. The initial living units were to be constructed while training 15 refugees in roofing, carpentry and masonry. During a second phase, 350 additional housing units, school, daycare and health care facilities and a mosque were to be built using trainees to complete construction.

Project Results/Experience:

Accomplishments:

310 of 400 houses, a school, 150 pit latrines and a garage/workshop were built. 11km of road were constructed, but by the 1983 evaluation, already badly rutted. A warehouse and several houses were partially built.

The 1983 evaluation indicates that strong GSDR support for an 80-bed hospital and completion of housing construction as well as pledges to privatize state farms bode well for the future of the project.

Constraints:

Lack of spare parts to keep vehicles, the generator and water pump operable and procurement delays affected the project's success. Training of settlers in building skills was overly theoretical. Lack of pay and other incentives also affected success.

Lessons Learned: None provided in evaluation, but construction cost overruns and dependency upon imported supplies indicated that the project was not likely replicable.

Documents Reviewed:

USAID/Somalia, Evaluation of Kurtunwaare Settlement Project, March 1979 - May 1983 (PD-AAP-204), June, 1983.

USAID, Regional Inspector General for Audit/Nairobi, Kurtunwaare Settlement Project, Audit Report 3-649-82-03 (PD-AAI-660), December, 1981.

USAID/Somalia, Kurtunwaare Settlement Project, Project Paper, January, 1979.

Contacts: Gary Nelson, USAID (retired).

Project Title:	Refugee Areas Project/ CDA Forestry
Project Number:	649-0122
LOP Funding:	USAID - \$6.0 million GSDR - \$5.2 million
Date of Initial Obligation:	11/23/82
PACD:	9/30/87

Implementing Agency/Primary Contractor: Overseas Education Foundation (now defunct; at Arabsiyo and Agabar; Save the Children/USA (at Qorioley); Africare (at Jalalaqsi); CARE (at Belet Wayne); National Range Agency (at Gedo).

Project Purpose: To support reforestation and fuelwood production in and near refugee camps as a means to provide income and employment to refugees and to minimize environmental impacts of population pressure in refugee areas.

Components/Expected Outcomes: Companion to the Refugee Self-Reliance project (649-123), the project originally consisted of six components:

- Institutional support to the National Range Agency (NRA) in developing and managing forestry programs through technical assistance and long-range advisors.
- Reforestation and Fuelwood Production Sub-Projects carried out by U.S. PVOs in close cooperation with the NRA. The projects were to establish or extend nurseries for seedling production; plant trees to provide fuelwood for refugee camps and nearby communities or for specialized tasks (sand dune, canal and river bank stabilization, shading camps, providing live fences and windbreaks in and around fields, amenities to camps and surrounding communities).
- Fuelwood Conservation through the introduction of improved woodburning stoves.
- Natural Resources/Land Use Survey of Southern Somalia to support a planned second phase of the project.
- Fuelwood Supply/Demand Marketing System to support planning interventions and conservation priorities.
- Project Monitoring and Management through personal services contractors.

The fuelwood supply/demand component was dropped after the project was initiated. The majority of financing was directed at the PVO component (\$4.4 million).

Project Results/Experience:

Accomplishments:

The project was apparently well-structured. Planning and management of nurseries was good; on-the-job training of staff at all levels was satisfactory. Amenity and shade tree planting was well-received; survival rates of the shade trees suggest project success. Agroforestry interventions with settled farmers were enthusiastically executed and welcomed.

Experimentation with sand dune stabilization was more successful than anticipated. Because sand dunes were assumed unproductive and hence unclaimed, land tenure was not an issue. Increased awareness of forestry issues among the GSDR, donors and recipients was a major success of the project.

The woodstove component developed and tested a range of wood and charcoal-burning stoves. The most successful stove was a soapstone, charcoal-burning model which a local cooperative (Dayax) mass-produced.

Constraints:

The primary weaknesses of the project were due to faulty assumptions and overestimation of the growth rate of trees, appropriate species and the availability of good quality land. Land tenure issues and lack of clear GSDR policy interfered with the project's success; refugees were not inclined to invest energies where benefits were uncertain. The project was too short (3 years) to allow initial findings to be translated into improved procedures. Block and strip plantings on public land failed due both to the harsh climate and land ownership issues. Evaluators concluded that fuelwood lots were not economical given existing technology and knowledge. Rapid turnover at the NRA defeated efforts to train staff in management.

The end of project evaluation indicates that the price of stoves may have affected their distribution, but project participants reported that the popularity of the stoves persisted beyond the project's close. A lack of infrastructure to support marketing was also identified as a constraint.

Data was collected through the land use survey, but was apparently not compiled or synthesized in a useful manner.

TA staff were called upon to carry out duties beyond their advisory role; rapid turnover among NRA staff defeated efforts to train staff in management. Ex-patriate staff were not always qualified nor did they have relevant background to manage a dryland/arid zone forestry project. OEF was isolated from other agencies in working in the North and lacked infrastructure to support its project.

After initiation of this project, the Mission dropped forestry from the CDSS due to pressure to reduce its program portfolio. Other donors, however, continued to fund forestry projects.

Lessons Learned:

- Plan around evidence, not assumption of, available land. Future projects should better research assumptions about soil, climate, appropriate plant species and land ownership. Block plantings for fuelwood on public land should not be continued in future projects.
- With appropriate attention to local conditions (land tenure, climate, etc.) successful forestry/fuelwood interventions can be made. The Gedo Community forestry sub-project agroforestry component is a positive example. More attention should be paid to management of existing bushlands for fuelwood production.
- Three years is an insufficient time period for implementation of a conservation project, particularly when the planting season occurs only once per year. Forestry projects in arid areas should have a duration of at least five years or more.
- A carefully designed feedback loop is essential to project success. Designs should include a clearly defined research component where results are fed back into the project for improved performance.
- Sustainability of project inputs is essential. An adequate supply of improved seeds was not identified for this project.
- Experimentation with technologies should be done on pilot-level initially, before diffusion or dissemination. The implications of the technology should be thought through completely to other kinds of damage to the environment and to incorporate other benefits into the project such as improving marketing and management skills.

Documents Reviewed:

USAID/Somalia, CDA Forestry Phase I/Refugee Areas Project, Final Evaluation Report (XD-AAZ-297A), April, 1988.

VITA/NRA/USAID, National Woodstove Program: Final Report, March, 1986.

OEF International, Somalia NW Community Forestry Project, Internal End of Project Evaluation, December, 1986.

USAID/Somalia, CDA Forestry Phase I/Refugee Areas Project, Project Paper, November, 1982.

Contacts:

Hank Cauley (Chief of Party, Woodstoves component), World Wildlife Fund; Kermit Saphron, Africare; Mohammed Hassan Nur (Woodstoves component), A.T. Kearney (Arlington, VA); Bill Haleen, US Forestry Service; Marion Warren, USAID (AFR/ARTS/HHR).

Project Title:	Refugee Self-Reliance
Project Number:	649-0123
LOP Funding:	USAID - \$6.0 million GSDR - \$2.4 million (1/c) PVOs - \$2.9 million
Date of Initial Obligation:	12/22/82
PACD:	9/15/86 (original) 3/31/88 (revised)

Implementing Agency/Primary Contractor: Save the Children Federation, Partners in Productivity, New Transcentury Foundation, the Experiment in International Living (EIL).

Project Purpose: To experiment with strategies to provide refugees with income opportunities and skills encouraging productivity and self-reliance.

Components/Expected Outcomes: Companion project to the CDA Forestry Project (649-122), this project consisted of four components:

- Institutional support to the National Refugee Commission (NRC) through skills upgrading and training.
- Socioeconomic Technical Studies (SETS); six studies were to provide objective, scientifically objective data for use in planning overall refugee activities.
- Self-Reliance Sub-Projects via US PVO activities in agriculture, skills training, infrastructure and regional development.
- Project Monitoring and Management through personal service contractors.

Eighty percent of the project's funding was directed at supporting PVO activities. Full self-reliance was not anticipated as an outcome of the project; non-refugees were also to benefit from project activities.

Project Results/Experience:

Accomplishments:

PVO activities demonstrated that refugees respond well and will help themselves when provided resources and opportunities to do so. Land development of rainfed cultivation exceeded targets. 240 km of road were constructed or repaired. Large numbers of refugees were trained in new job skills or employed. New Transcentury Foundation was apparently successful in locating water in the Northwest and establishing a metal fabrication operation.

Constraints:

The number and range of sub-projects anticipated in project planning never materialized and the results of sub-projects varied by sector and implementing PVO. According to the final

evaluation, the project was confronted with "problems common to all project activities in Somalia -- difficulty in communication, a cholera epidemic in the project area, fuel shortages, delays in local currency disbursement by the Ministry of Finance, and late arrival of commodities." The agricultural sub-project encountered problems with land tenure issues and uncertainty of GSDR refugee policy. The effect of EIL training on both refugee and non-refugees is unclear. Too few staff were available for monitoring and management. The research component only produced 3 studies of any value to long-term solutions to refugee problems; no reason for the insufficiency of remaining 3 reports is provided in the evaluation. Institutional support to the NRC was not of sufficient duration to make any significant changes to policy and planning.

Lessons Learned:

- Refugees respond well to opportunities to earn income. Apprenticeships with small businesses was an effective training strategy. Manual labor and piece-work, however, do little to prepare refugees for settlement.
- Monitoring and managing PVO projects is time-consuming, particularly due to paperwork involved.
- PVO sub-projects should rely on one donor only to prevent management confusion and procurement delay.

Documents Reviewed:

USAID/Somalia, Project Assistance Completion Report (PD-AAZ-720), 1989.

USAID/Somalia, The Refugee Self-Reliance Project: Final Evaluation Report (XD-BBP-367), April, 1988.

USAID/Somalia, Evaluation Report on the Refugee Self-Reliance Project (PD-AAY-140), December, 1985.

USAID/Somalia, Project Paper: Refugee Self-Reliance (PD-AAM-196), December, 1982.

Contacts: Rosemarie Depp, USAID, (The Gambia); Emily McPhie, USAID (Dhaka); Marion Warren, USAID (AFR/ARTS/HHR).

Project Title:	Somalia Refugee Settlement
Project Number:	649-0140
LOP Funding:	USAID - \$4.0 million GSDR - \$1.0 million PVOs - \$1.0 million (in kind)
Date of Initial Obligation:	7/16/86
PACD:	6/30/91 (original) 12/31/93 (revised)

Note: This project ended with evacuation of the USAID Mission.

Implementing Agency/Primary Contractor: Ministry of Agriculture (lead); World Concern (at Luuq), Save the Children/US (at Qorioley).

Project Purpose: To test alternatives to continued support for refugees in camps by establishing voluntary self-help agricultural settlements and non-agricultural income generating activities which enable refugees to become self-supporting.

Components/Expected Outcomes: Designed to build upon the lessons of the Refugee Self-Reliance Project (649-123; \$6.0 million) and its companion CDA Forestry Project (649-122; \$6.0 million), originally, the project was to fund small-scale grants to PVOs for 5 Rapid Impact Projects (RIPs; life of one year and value of less than \$200,000), two modest-sized settlement sub-projects and implementation and project monitoring and evaluation activities by the GSDR. The project was supposed to engage at least 1,600 refugee families in activities which demonstrably lead to self-sufficiency.

Following a mid-project evaluation, a project amendment (June, 1989) extended the PACD by two years and combined settlement sub-project and RIP components into one component called Settlement Activities, eligible for grants in excess of \$1 million. PVOs were also to receive technical assistance and guidance in designing grant proposals. Provision for technical studies grants of up to \$30,000 was established as part of a revised proposal review process.

Project Results/Experience:

Accomplishments:

Save the Children/US and World Concern International implemented rapid impact projects in first two and a half years of project. The 1989 Project Implementation Report indicates that 272 families were being served. The PVO sub-grant component and grant review process were improved in 1989.

According to information provided as part of the 1990 Phase Down, World Concern and Save the Children/US were preparing to submit proposals for the Settlement Activity component in September, 1990. Despite initial implementation problems, the Mission supported the project because it was the only project at that time devoted to supporting refugee integration. The UNHCR's 1988 decision to phase out food assistance to refugees in favor of more durable

solutions further elevated the project's importance. (Note: the project's funds were apparently transferred to the 495F account and hence not subject to Brooke sanctions).

Constraints:

The project fell far behind schedule within the first two years due to design problems with the RIP component and review process, uncertainties about land tenure and security problems. Approximately 40% of project funds were designated to support projects in the North, but civil conflict prevented PVOs there from initiating any new activities. Mid-way through the project, only two RIP grant proposals had been received; PVOs were reluctant to apply due to the small amount of funding available (\$200,000 grants) and because reviews of those submitted took over one year. World Concern's project in Luuq was also delayed due to procurement and security problems.

Land tenure issues and confusion about GSDR policy apparently also caused problems early in the project. The 1988 interim evaluation recommends that the Ministry of Agriculture should submit a formal statement specifying intent and financial commitment to registering land designated for refugee settlement and outlining procedures for land registration. None of the documentation reviewed for this summary indicates resolution of this issue.

The PVO Development Partners Project provided another outlet for PVO grants which may have deflected interest in this project. The UNHCR's 1988 decision to phase out food assistance to refugees by 1990 apparently did not affect the viability of the project, but required rethinking project indicators.

Lessons Learned:

No final evaluation of this project is available. The 1988 evaluation did not include a "lessons learned" component. From the paperwork available, however, the following is suggested:

- PVO Sub-grant criteria and processes need to be thought through carefully and incorporated into a realistic project design.
- Host government project commitment and related policy should be clearly and carefully articulated from the outset.

Documents Reviewed:

USAID/Somalia, Mogadishu Phase Down Plan, August, 1990.

USAID/Somalia, Project Implementation Report, April 1 - September 30, 1989.

USAID/Somalia, Somalia Refugee Settlement Project: Mid-Project Evaluation (XD-AAZ-562A), November, 1988.

Somali Refugee Settlement Project, Project Paper, July 16, 1986.

Contacts: Michael Fuchs-Carsch, (Field Backstop Officer) USAID, (retired); Thomas Lofgren (Project/Program Officer), USAID (Malawi); John Marks (CARE), Save the Children (Armenia); Lois Richards (Mission Director), USAID (AA/BHR).

Project Title:	PVO Development Partners
Project Number:	649-0138
LOP Funding:	USAID - \$18.2 million GSDR - \$6.8 million (1/c)
Date of Initial Obligation:	8/31/85
PACD:	7/30/92 (Original) 12/31/93 (Proposed in Phase Down)

Note: This project ended with the evacuation of the USAID Mission.

Implementing Agency/Primary Contractor: Ministry of Interior, Experiment in International Living.

PVO Partner Grants: AMREF (Gedo), Africare (Bari and Sanaag), CARE/Somalia (Hiran), Haqabtir (Los Anod), OEF International (Baidoa), Cooperative Housing Foundation (grant approved, but canceled due to security problems).

Project Purpose: To expand development activities in GSDR/USAID priority areas by establishing partnerships between international and Somali PVOs and by upgrading Somali PVO and local group capacities for development projects.

Components/Expected Outcomes: Two types of grants were to be used to support sub-projects:

- 1) Organizational Program Grants (OPGs) - 12-15 grants of up to \$1 million to USAID-registered PVOs for activities designed to develop managerial capacities of local groups;
- 2) Community Action Grants (CAGs) - Up to 40 grants of less than \$50,000 to support rapid, small-scale "immediate impact" activities through provision of TA, materials or equipment.

A Management Unit for Support and Training (MUST) was to be funded through a CAG. MUST was to be comprised of both ex-patriate and local staff and responsible for monitoring, management and training for other implementing agencies.

Project Results/Experience:

Accomplishments: The most recent documentation available (1990 Phase Down Plan) states that 5 OPGs had been awarded, four to US PVOs (all in \$2-\$4 million range) and one to a Somali PVO (\$116,000 to Haqabtir). Both the AMREF (primary health care project in Luug region of Gedo) and CARE/Somalia (environmental sub-projects in Hiran) projects were reportedly doing well. AMREF was able to marshal community support for the project and had developed a strategy to cover recurring costs. The CARE project incorporated maximum flexibility which allowed communities to define their needs and implement projects accordingly.

Constraints: All the projects suffered from the hardships of working under deteriorating security conditions and Somalia's increasingly troubled economy. By 1988, the Somali shilling had depreciated to less than 30% of its 1986 value and negotiations with the GSDR to adjust local currency funding levels were generally unsuccessful.

Three of the five OPG/PVO projects suffered from design problems. Africare's project (increasing agricultural production) had management problems and was overly dependent upon heavy equipment and technical know-how. OEF International's original project (involving women in irrigated agricultural project) was based on incorrect data and had to be redesigned (small enterprise development). According to a 1988 evaluation, Haqabtir had not begun basic planning or implementation (project developing water resources).

None of the anticipated CAGs were awarded due to a lack of expertise among Somali PVOs and local groups, although two Somali PVOs did begin the registration process (Al-Muntadhar and Horumarin) and one applied for a CAG. Little interest was expressed by US PVOs for cooperating on or a sponsoring CAG.

Direction and responsibilities of project management through MUST also proved problematic. GSDR/USAID disagreements over the scope of MUST activity contributed to reduced project performance and accomplishment. After some negotiation, USAID agreed to support the unit (through the Experiment in International Living) while remaining under MOI management.

Lessons Learned:

- GSDR staff salaries need to be high enough to prevent rapid turnover.
- USAID registration requirements are too cumbersome for newly established Somali PVOs.
- CAG grants were apparently too cumbersome or too small to attract interest.
- US PVOs were not as interested as assumed in partnering with Somali PVOs.
- Organizations already established in their project areas, addressing an immediate need and with community-driven plans were most successful.

Documents Reviewed:

Otto, Jonathan and Drabek, Anne (DATEX, Inc.). Designs for Collaboration: a Study of PVO/NGO Umbrella Projects in Africa (PN-ABL-955), September, 1992.

OEF International, Baidoa Women's Small Enterprise Development Project: Final Report, May, 1991.

USAID/Somalia, PVO Development Partners Project: Evaluation Report (PD-ABB-395),
March, 1989.

USAID/Somalia, Project Paper: PVO Development Partners Project, August, 1985.

Brown, Michael. PVO Development Partners Project: Social Analysis (P.O. 649-510.49-020),
March, 1985.

Contacts: Michael Brown, World Wildlife Fund (Director, PVO/NRMS Project); Andrew Sisson, USAID (AFR/DP/PSE); Mary Hope Schwoebel, Independent Contractor; Marge Tsitouris, CARE International (Atlanta Office); Kermit Saphron, Africare; Adolf Wilburn, USAID (CCWA/G).

6. Other Sectors

A. Human Resources/Institution Building

Early in the post-1978 assistance programs, donors identified Somalia's civil service as needing radical reform. During the 1970s, Barre had guaranteed public employment to all high school graduates. This policy created a bloated civil service with limited skills. Donors encouraged extensive policy reform and strengthening institutions through donor-assisted training. The GSDR responded by eliminating the employment guarantee in the early 1980s and freezing civil servants' wages to control government spending. These changes limited growth in public sector employment costs, but created problems with turnover among civil service employees as real wages dropped. Skills and organizational development also needed attention.

Most projects implemented in the 1980s included a component directed at developing human resources and institution building. Long-term and short-term training for Somalis was a regular feature of projects; through extension and other models, trainees were expected to return to institutions and provide training to others.¹⁴ This pyramid strategy was theoretically sound, however, due to an increasingly tenuous domestic situation and low civil service salaries, retention of trainees proved problematic.¹⁵

Training and donor advice seems to have been well-received, but donor efforts to secure GSDR commitment to wholesale civil service reform were apparently unsuccessful. A 1990 report commissioned by USAID indicates that little had changed since studies identified problems in the early 1980s. USAID attempted to correct what it could. Projects implemented in the later 1980s tried to resolve the returnee problem by devoting resources specifically to training and institution building in-country. Both the **Somalia Management Training and Development project (SOMTAD; 649-0119)** initiated in 1985 and the **PVO Development Partners project (649-0138)** were designed to address capacity development on a wider scale, but by providing skills development and assistance in-country.¹⁶ The impact of these projects is unclear as implementation was interrupted by the civil war.

¹⁴ See 1982 CDSS for discussion of this approach.

¹⁵ For an overview of this issue, see Jeffrey Franks, "Brain Drain or Brain Gain? A Review of USAID Participant Training in Somalia (for USAID/Somalia) September, 1986.

¹⁶ Apparently the PVO Development Partners project was originally intended to support organizational development in various sectors, but the GSDR would only allow sub-projects addressing refugee issues. This project's profile is included with other projects targeting refugee issues.

Project Title:	Somalia Management Training and Development Project (SOMTAD)
Project Number:	649-0119
LOP Funding:	USAID - \$18.5 million GSDR - \$6.9 million
Date of Initial Obligation:	6/30/85
PACD:	12/31/92 (original) 12/31/91 (revised - 1990 Phase Down)

Note: This project ended with the evacuation of the USAID Mission.

Implementing Agencies/Primary Contractor: Ministry of National Planning, followed by Ministry of Labor and Sport; Academy for Educational Development, SUNY Albany, USIS (PASA).

Project Purpose: To increase and institutionalize the ability of the GSDR and the private sector to plan and carry out development and economic activities efficiently and provide training to other public and private sector actors.

Components/Expected Outcomes: The project consisted of three components:

- Long-term advisors (Operational Experts or OPEX) placed in selected organizations and at Somali Institute of Development and Management (SIDAM)
- A Worksite Management Training Unit (WMTU) set up to provide short-term training to public and private sector organizations.
- An MPA/MBA program through SIDAM and recognized by Somalia National University including an English for Special Purposes (ESP) program coordinated by USIS.

Project Results/Experience:

Accomplishments: Although reduced by half in the 1989 decision to drawdown U.S. presence in Somalia, long-term advisors were well-placed and well-received. In 1989, the WMTU offered 14 workshops. Two classes of MPA/MBA students were about half-way through their program in May 1990. A third class was supposed to receive training, but was instead dropped from the project due to lack of funds for training. The project's PACD was moved up to 12/31/91.

Constraints: Coordination between USAID, AED and SUNY/Albany, procurement delays and supply problems stemming largely from difficulties securing GSDR currency contributions put the project two years behind schedule by 1988. Many of the difficulties followed from Somalia's increasingly troubled economic and political climate and drawdown of the U.S. presence mid-project. Political changes and changes in Somali counterparts and trained

personnel interrupted project continuity. The AED final report details several areas where contracts' structure impeded project implementation.

The USIS English language component was apparently poorly managed and not well integrated into the program. USIS withdrew from the project in early 1988.

Lessons Learned: No final evaluation is available for the project. However, it is clear that an administratively complex program in an unstable environment will always have difficulty succeeding.

Documents Reviewed:

Academy for Educational Development, Inc. Somalia Management Training and Development: Final Report, November 21, 1986-July 31, 1991, (no publication date).

USAID/Somalia, Mogadishu Phase Down Plan, August, 1990.

USAID/Somalia, Project Implementation Report, April 1 - September 30, 1989.

Research Management Corporation, Somalia Management Training and Development: First Interim Evaluation Report (XD-AAY-555-A), July, 1988.

USAID/Somalia, Project Paper: Somalia Management Training and Development, June, 1985.

Contacts: Adolf Wilburn, USAID (CCW/G); Marion Warren, USAID (AFR/ARTS/HHR).

B. Privatization/policy support

Privatization and policy reform was another early priority of the multi-donor development agenda. Employment guarantees, price controls and large parastatals in industry and agriculture created under Somalia's "scientific socialism" were each addressed. Initially, the IMF led most efforts at policy reform as part of the structural adjustment program. USAID had limited involvement through one early project, the **Privatization and Policy Initiatives project (649-0132)** and also through CIPs directed at imports to support private sector development (**CIP I, 649-0118; CIP II, 649-0120; CIP III, 649-0125**).

In 1985, however, USAID shifted its development strategy to focus more exclusively on policy reform and developed several projects designed to further reform. Some success was achieved: in 1986, the GSDR agreed to a cash auction supported by ESF funds which was apparently well-run and sold foreign exchange at close to the free market rate.¹⁷ GSDR cooperation remained uneven, however, and adherence to IMF and USAID agendas inconsistent. Most of the projects specifically targeting policy reform were approved but never implemented due to Congressional holds on assistance and the deteriorating domestic situation.¹⁸

C. Transportation

Transportation infrastructure was never an emphasis of the USAID agenda, with the exception of the **Kismayo Port Rehabilitation project (649-0114)** and some financing for roads supporting other projects' implementation.

¹⁷ Minimal information is available about this program. The auction was funded by the IMF, Italy and USAID (apparently \$11 million of FY 86 ESF funds were used for the auction [PAAD for Foreign Exchange Market Support II, 649-0139]).

¹⁸ These include the following projects: Foreign Exchange Market Support II (649-0139; FY 87); Foreign Exchange Support (649-0144; FY 88) and an Economic Rehabilitation Sector Grant (649-0143; FY 88).

Project Title:	CIP I
Project Number:	649-0118
Authorization:	\$15.0 million (original) \$18.5 million (amended)
Date of Initial Obligation:	8/28/82 9/08/82 (amended)

Project Purpose: To assist the GSDR to overcome serious balance of payments problems and to rejuvenate the private sector.

Components/Expected Outcomes: USAID limited import support to agricultural, agro-industrial and private manufacturing sectors including inputs such as fertilizer, trucks, cement and machinery. 34% of foreign currency was to be directed to the private sector, 66% to the public. Local currency generated was to be used for mutually agreed upon development projects. The grant agreement also stipulated a number of policy reforms directed at deregulating and stabilizing the economy as program conditions. Additional funds were to be added when available.

Project Results/Experience:

Accomplishments: Available evaluation finds the program an "extreme success." The program helped several industrialists maintain economic activity in making a variety of inputs available to both the agricultural and industrial sectors. 69% of proceeds were allocated to the private sector versus 16% required by grant.

Constraints: Rigorous macroeconomic analysis of CIP impact on the balance of payments was not possible due to insufficient data trade and production data. Similarly, the evaluation points out that there was nothing to measure policy progress against. The CIP seems to have maintained rather than stimulated private sector activity. Lots of capital intensive equipment was provided to large producers (\$2.5 million to inefficient sugar enterprise) instead of assisting targeted small farmers.

Lessons Learned: None provided in the evaluation cited (the evaluation was conducted before any local currency generated had been dispersed). A 1987 audit of local currency generated from both CIP and PL 480 programs does not provide numbers for CIP I, but finds that oversight control of all CIP and PL 480 funds was negligible.

Documents Reviewed:

Regional Inspector General/Audit (Nairobi), Audit of Local Currency Generated From Somalia's Commodity Import and PL 480 Programs (No. 3-649-87-7), January, 1987.

Ricardo, Jose. Overview of the Evaluation of the Somalia CIP I (PD-AAP-838). August, 1984.

Ricardo, Jose; et al. An Evaluation of the Somalia Commodity Import Program, 649-K-602 (PD-AAP-373). April, 1984.

Contacts: Meredith Scovill, USAID (AFR/SA).

Project Title:	CIP II
Project Number:	649-0120
Authorization:	\$18.5 million
Date of Initial Obligation:	7/23/83

Project Title:	CIP III
Project Number:	649-0125
Authorization:	\$27.0 million
Date of Initial Obligation:	7/23/85

Project Purpose: To continue to assist the GSDR with balance of payments problems and to secure commodities to promote development with emphasis on the agricultural sector.

Components/Expected Outcomes: For CIPs II and III, 85% of foreign currency provided was to be directed to the private sector, 15% to the public. Local currency generated was to be used for mutually agreed upon development projects. The grant agreement also stipulated as conditions a number of policy reforms directed at de-regulating and stabilizing the economy.

Project Results/Experience:

Accomplishments: Evaluated together, these CIPs were found to have had a positive impact on Somali economy helping to ease severe balance of payments problems, to finance growth-enhancing productive capital and intermediate goods inputs, and to strengthen the Somali private sector. The CIPs promoted policy reform in Somalia in reducing government employment, introducing efficient import procedures and supporting establishment of private trade organizations.

Constraints: Allocation of foreign exchange fell short of targets by about half (amounting to 48% to private sector); public sector petroleum imports accounted for about 40% of CIP II and III funds available even though grant agreements stipulated against this use in favor of private participation in the petroleum market.

Local currency generated went primarily to non-agricultural activities and was not applied directly to policy reform activities, despite stated goals of implementing reforms and supporting priority development projects. The policy reform agenda was over-ambitious; while some progress was made in reducing civil service employment through policy changes, planned salary enhancements were not provided.

The evaluation of both programs finds that local currency generations were properly documented, tracking and documentation of transfers among GSDR accounts and allocations was not adequate. A 1987 audit of CIP and PL 480 programs also found oversight extremely weak and funds diverted from development projects to other illegitimate uses.

Lessons Learned:

- Programs would have fared better if more emphasis was given to the private sector instead of policy-reform.
- Given the Somali context and administrative difficulties, CIPs are not a fast-disbursing mechanism as intended.
- Participation of U.S. suppliers providing commodities was limited by price factors.

Documents Reviewed:

USAID/Somalia, Final Evaluation: CIP II (649-120) and CIP III (649-125) (PD-AAY-861).
December, 1987.

Regional Inspector General/Audit (Nairobi), Audit of Local Currency Generated From Somalia's Commodity Import and PL 480 Programs (No. 3-649-87-7), January, 1987.

Contacts: Meredith Scovill, USAID (AFR/SA).

Project Title:	Policy Initiatives and Privatization
Project Number:	649-0132
LOP Funding:	USAID - \$2.5 million (original) \$7.0 million (amended)
Date of Initial Obligation:	9/29/83
PACD:	3/31/87 (Original) 9/30/90 (Revised) 12/31/92 (Revised)

Note: This project ended with the evacuation of the USAID/Somalia Mission.

Implementing Agencies/Primary Contracts: Ministry of National Planning (MONP), Ministry of Finance and Treasury (MOFT), Ministry of Industry (MOI); TIPCO, Inc., ISTI.

Project Purpose: To improve the Somali economic climate by supporting the development and implementation of improved economic policies, identifying and testing means of promoting private sector participation, and by improving the GSDR's budgeting and revenue collection system.

Components/Expected Outcomes: The project's design was not very specific, but supported three types of activities:

- Technical assistance through long-term advisors to the public and private sector.
- Policy-related studies focusing on privatization processes in various sectors and tax, civil service and budget reform.
- Training through seminars, workshops, conferences and study tours for Somali private and public sector participants.

Project Results/Experience:

Accomplishments: Long-term advisors to Ministries of Commerce, Finance and Industry contributed to institution building and management improvement. Assistance to private sector entrepreneurs enabled increased effectiveness. Over 16 studies and reports were completed.

The flexibility of the project design allowed room to reorient the project as needed. This was particularly appropriate and useful following the GSDR's 1987 falling out with the IMF and consequent revised structural reform program. When a new IMF agreement was reached in July, 1988, the Mission reworked the PIP to complement the IMF program and provide more specific policy and implementation assistance. The Mission also adjusted the project to accommodate funding reductions.

Long-awaited legislation and agreement on private banking and trade liberalization was reached mid-1989 and the project's PACD was extended to December, 1992. One state

enterprise had been privatized and negotiations on three others were in progress when the Barre government collapsed.

Constraints: The first years of the project had little impact on policy reform or private sector development. Studies had no unifying theme or strategy behind them; lack of a clear agenda in the project's design resulted in few accomplishments. The GSDR's continued ambivalence about privatization, private sector development, fiscal restraint and meaningful policy reform meant the project had little impact. USAID also did not have the personnel capacity for direct management and monitoring. Follow-up on contracted studies and study-tours was minimal. Flexibility in project design was at times an advantage, but also challenged project management. Mid-implementation, funding constraints required reorientation of the project.

Lessons Learned:

- Meaningful dialogue and extensive changes in the economic environment cannot occur without sufficient commitment from the host government and intensive mission management.
- Flexibility in project design can facilitate implementation, but requires careful management.

Documents Reviewed:

USAID/Somalia, Mogadishu Phase Down Plan, August, 1990.

USAID/Somalia, Project Implementation Report, April 1 - September 30, 1989.

USAID/Somalia, Project Evaluation: Policy Initiatives and Privatization Project Evaluation (PD-AAZ-539), June, 1989.

USAID/Somalia, Policy Initiatives and Privatization Project Evaluation (PD-AAT-332), March, 1986.

USAID/AFR/PD/EAP, Somalia Portfolio Review (PD-AAU-564), January, 1985.

USAID/Somalia, Project Paper: Policy Initiatives and Privatization (PD-AAN-534), September, 1983.

Contacts: Lois Richards (Mission Director), USAID (AA/BHR); Meredith Scovill, USAID (AFR/SA).

Completed Studies (from FY 1985 4th Quarter PIR; at REDSO library):

Trade Policy and Tariffs Study	Coastal Development Agency Fishing Assessment
Edible Oil Marketing Study	Edible Oil Industry Development Project, Phase I
Metal Working and Foundry Assessment	Kismayo Meat Factory Assessment

Project Title:	Kismayo Port Rehabilitation
Project Number:	649-0114
LOP Funding:	USAID - \$42.0 million
Date of Initial Obligation:	9/23/82
PACD:	3/14/84 (Original)
	3/31/85 (Amendment 1)
	9/30/87 (Amendment 2)
	9/30/88 (Amendment 3)
	3/31/92 (Amendment 4)

Implementing Agencies/Primary Contractors: Ministry of Public Works.

Project Purpose: To rehabilitate the deepwater port at Kismayo which had deteriorated due to faulty engineering.

Components/Expected Outcomes: To demolish the entire pier, rebuild the four berths, extend the pier and ancillary facilities and provide training to maintenance personnel. USAID agreed to provide engineering studies, rehabilitation supervision, and foreign exchange for materials, equipment and supplies through a Participating Agency Services Agreement (PASA) with the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC).

A 1988 project amendment authorized use of uncommitted project funds for rehabilitation of the Kismayo Water Supply System (KWSS) to provide potable water to ships using the new facilities.

Project Results/Experience:

Accomplishments:

No final evaluation of this project is available. The April- September, 1989 Project Implementation Report indicates that rehabilitation of all berths was complete and port operation and maintenance were turned over to the GSDR in October, 1988. Training of port staff was also complete.

Constraints:

A mid-project evaluation by REDSO/ENG details the construction history of the project and problems encountered. It also indicates that the construction firm had difficulty clearing goods through the port and that the Port Authority's incapability or unwillingness to make repairs did not bode well for the long-run maintenance of the facility.

Progress on the KWSS component of the project was put on hold in August, 1989 in due to security concerns and the reduction in U.S. presence in Somalia. The Mission terminated all activities for the KWSS, but the project's PACD was extended to March 31, 1992 to allow rehabilitation at a later date. Remaining funds were deobligated as part of the 1990 Phase Down following from Brooke Amendment sanctions.

Lessons Learned:

No final evaluation of the project is available.

Documents Reviewed:

USAID/Somalia, Mogadishu Phase Down Plan, August, 1990.

USAID/Somalia, Project Implementation Report, April 1 - September 30, 1989.

Dan Vincent, Memorandum re. "Kismayo Port Project (649-114) Project Evaluation," August 7, 1988 (PD-AA4967).

USAID, Office of the Inspector General, Audit of the Kismayo Port Rehabilitation Project (Somalia), Audit Report 3-649-88-14, June, 1988.

USAID/Somalia, Kismayo Port Rehabilitation, Project Paper, July, 1983.

Contacts: Ed Birgells, USAID (Khazakistan), Thomas Lofgren (Project Development Support) USAID (Malawi); Emily McPhie, USAID (Dhaka); Dan Vincent (Chief Engineer) USAID (Egypt).

7. Excluded Sectors

USAID was only minimally involved with development efforts in the areas discussed below.

A. Oil & Energy

Somalia's dependency on oil imports has always complicated development efforts, although rumors of oil in the north persist. Various donors have explored solutions to Somalia's need for inexpensive and viable energy source, the most extensive being the World Bank's work on the Bardeere Dam. USAID's involvement was limited to sponsoring a sectoral study in the mid 1980s and, at the request of the GSDR, placing a long-term energy advisor at the Ministry of Planning with support from a regional project.

B. Fisheries

Fisheries has long been identified as one of Somalia's underexploited sectors. Its potential, however, remains controversial for a number of reasons. Traditionally, fish are not a regular part of the Somali diet and fishing has been limited to artisanal activity in isolated pockets along the coast. The World Bank did some exploratory work in fisheries development in the mid 1980s, but did not find readily viable prospects for development.¹⁹ Apparently other donors provided significant assistance as well. USAID's participation was limited to an assessing the viability of privatizing a fish processing parastatal, Somali Marine Products (see CDIE document PN-AAV-907), which USAID found a weak candidate for privatization.

Recent reports attest to rampant pirating of fish resources in Somali waters in the absence of an authority capable of enforcing territorial rights.²⁰

C. Education

Beyond sponsoring an overall survey of Somalia's education system in the early 1980s, USAID's involvement with education was primarily limited to higher education and specialized training programs while other donors addressed basic education. USAID proposed one additional project in the FY 88 ABS, but it was not approved (Improving the Efficiency in Primary Education, 649-0142).

¹⁹ The World Bank sponsored exploratory/pilot project in the early 1980s which studied the viability of both onshore and offshore activities. Neither onshore nor offshore prospects were found viable due to transport and processing costs and small schools of fish scattered offshore, among various other complications. See World Bank report P-3769-SO (April, 1984) and IBRD's Project Completion Report, Sec M92-1191 (September, 1992) for further information.

²⁰ Several individuals mentioned that this is occurring in interviews conducted for this report. Also see Ben Wisner, *Jilaal, Gu, Haggaa, and Der: Living with the Somali Land, and Living Well*, (in Samatar, 1994), p. 52.

**Appendix A
USAID/Somalia
Summary of Projects
1978-1990**

Number	Project Title & Brief Description	SAID Funds (in \$millions)	Initial Obligation	Date Closed	Most Recent Eval. (CDIE Ref.)	Outcomes
649-0101	Agriculture Extension, Training and Research Training and research program to support establishment of a National Extension Service.	5.1	8/78	7/82	8/82 (PD-AAL-690)	Some farmers trained and useful research completed. Better data collection and project design could have improved project performance.
649-0102	Rural Health Delivery Project Basic health care services program to improve and build service delivery capacity.	15.2	6/79	9/85	6/86 (PD-AAS-584)	Two national health care centers were completed and staff trained. Complete pre-project assessment and narrower scope could have improved project performance.
649-0103	Kurtunwaare Settlement Program Housing construction and training program to support settlement of refugees.	1.5	1/79	11/82	6/83 (PD-AAP-204)	Most of the project's construction targets were met. Long-run success impaired due to dependence upon imported inputs.
649-0104	Comprehensive Groundwater Development Support program to strengthen Water Development Authority and create ongoing water development program.	18.3	9/79	9/88	6/88 (ref. n.a.)	A number of producing wells were completed and technical support services provided. Complete pre-project assessment and narrower scope could have improved project performance.
649-0108	Central Rangelands Development Rangeland management improvement project providing technical assistance and training.	14.9	8/79	6/89	8/89 (PD-AAZ-721)	Substantial technical and sociological research was collected. Better donor coordination and narrower scope could have improved project performance.
649-0109	Livestock Marketing and Health Veterinary services and quarantine program to improve Somali livestock industry.	19.4	6/88	9/92	2/88 (XD-AA Y-859-A); Mid term; No final eval. completed.	1 of 4 planned quarantine stations near completion when mission was evacuated. Full design specifications and facility cost estimates during project planning could have improved project performance.
649-0112	Agricultural Delivery Systems Skills enhancement program to improve extension program's research and service delivery.	8.4	7/79	9/88	7/89	Skills of National Extension Service agents were significantly improved. Retention of project trainees, however, threatened project's long-run success.
649-0113	Bay Region Agricultural Development Research support project to increase agricultural production and integrated rural development.	10.7	8/80	9/88	10/88 (XD-AA Y-860A)	A research station was established at Bonka and information on dryland crops collected. Procurement delays and poor donor-coordination impeded project's success.
649-0114	Kismayo Port Rehabilitation Project Reconstruction of deepwater port at Kismayo.	42.0	9/82	3/92	8/88 (PD-AA4967)); Memo; No final eval. completed.	Deepwater port at Kismayo which had deteriorated due to faulty engineering rehabilitated. Security concerns and difficulties with GSDR commitment impeded project's success.
649-0118	Commodity Import Program I (CIP I) Import support program designed to alleviate balance of payment pressures and assist agriculture and private manufacturing sectors.	18.5	9/82	N.a.	8/84 (PD-AAP-838)	Program supported supply of critical inputs to agricultural and industrial sectors. Insufficient data prevented rigorous macro-economic analysis of program impact.
649-0119	Somalia Management Training & Development (SOMTAD) Training program intended to strengthen public and private sector institutional capacity in support of development activities.	18.5	6/85	12/91	7/88 (XD-AA Y-555-A); Mid term; No final eval. completed.	Drawdown of US presence required reduction in project scope, but long-term advisors and training activities were apparently well-received.

Appendix A
USAID/Somalia
Summary of Projects
1978-1990

Number	Project Title & Brief Description	SAID Funds (in \$millions)	Initial Obligation	Date Closed	Most Recent Eval. (CDIE Ref.)	Outcomes
649-0120	Commodity Import Program II (CIP II) Import support program designed to alleviate balance of payment pressures and secure policy reform.	18.5	7/83	N.a.	12/87 (PD-AYY-861)	Helped to ease balance of payment pressures and support private-sector. Policy reform goals were over-ambitious and US supplier participation goals unrealistic due to price factors. (Evaluated with CIP III/649-0125)
649-0122	CDA Forestry Phase I - Refugee Areas Reforestation and fuelwood production support program targeting refugees as trainees to foster self-reliance. Companion to 649-0123.	6.0	11/82	9/87	4/88 (XD-AAZ-297-A)	Sponsored variety of experimental sub-projects, all with some individual successes. Improved pre-project assessment, timeline and narrower scope could have improved project performance.
649-0123	Refugee Self Reliance Skills development program designed to fund PVO sub-projects targeting refugees. Companion to 649-0122.	6.0	12/82	3/88	7/89	PVO activities demonstrated that refugees respond well to income-generating opportunities. Project over-estimated USAID and PVO capacity to manage projects in precarious environment.
649-0125	Commodity Import Program III (CIP III) Import support program designed to alleviate balance of payment pressures and secure policy reform.	27.0	7/85	N.a.	12/87 (PD-AYY-861)	Helped to ease balance of payment pressures and support private-sector. Policy reform goals were over-ambitious and US supplier participation goals unrealistic due to price factors. (Evaluated with CIP II/649-0120)
649-0129	Shebelle Water Management I Research piece of two-part project assisting with irrigation rehabilitation in the Shebelle River Basin.	22.6	8/87	8/89	N.a.	Project was terminated early in implementation due to security problems. A series of reports analyzing land tenure issues was completed and intended to complement the planned Land Administration Project (649-0155; FY 92 ABS).
649-0131	Family Health Services Health services project targeting population control through education.	10.7	8/84	9/92	2/91 (PD-ABC-517)	Appears to be one of most successful projects in pre-war portfolio despite security problems and difficulties with the GSDR; notable success was achieved through community involvement in service delivery and education.
649-0132	Policy Initiatives and Privatization Technical support program intended to provide training and policy assistance to further private sector activity.	10.1	9/83	12/92	6/89 (PD-AAT-332)	Advisors were well-placed; design provided project necessary flexibility. Management of this project was lacking until late in implementation.
649-0134	Juba Development Analytical Studies Research and training project intended to support development of the Juba Valley.	8.6	9/83	9/91	11/89 (PD-ABA-262)	Most of the project's research agenda was achieved. Procurement delays and coordination problems impeded implementation.
649-0138	PVO Development Partners An umbrella project awarding sub-grants to international and Somali organizations to encourage partnerships and institutional development.	18.2	8/85	12/93	3/89 (PD-ABB-395); Mid term; No final eval.	Some success was achieved by most of the projects attempted. Each sub-project suffered, however, under deteriorating security conditions and an increasingly troubled economy.
649-0140	Somalia Refugee Settlement Skills development program designed to fund PVO sub-projects targeting refugees while building upon the lessons of 649-0122 and 649-0123.	4.0	7/86	12/93	11/88 (XD-AAZ-562-A); Mid term; No final eval. completed.	Some success was achieved by the projects attempted. The deteriorating security situation impeded implementation; the project ended with evacuation of the USAID mission.

Appendix B: Persons Interviewed

Bonnie Bergey	Mennonite Central Committee
Michael Brown	World Wildlife Fund
Lee Cassanelli	University of Pennsylvania
Claudia Cantel	USAID
Hank Cauley	World Wildlife Fund
Glen Cauvin	USAID
Filsan Darman	Aademiga
Fred Fischer	USAID
John Gaudet	USAID
Fawzi Guleid	Somali Community Services
Steve Hansch	Independent Contractor
Paul Henze	Rand Corporation
Dennis Herlocker	GTZ, Nairobi
Thad Kaminsky	African Development Foundation
Helen Kitchen	CSIS
Lauren Landes	InterAction
Peter Lifert	Labat-Anderson
Terrence Lyons	Brookings Institute
Michael Madeny	Society of International Ministeries
Deborah Mendleson	USAID
Ken Menkhaus	Institute for Peace
Jim Merryman	Wilkes University
Nancy Merryman	Wilkes University
Paul Miller	Catholic Relief Services
Harold Miller	All Africa Council of Churches
Bob Morgan	University Research Corporation
Dr. Asha Muhamed	Advocates for Youth
Gary Nelson	USAID (retired)

Margaret Neuse	USAID
Mohammed Hassan Nur	A.T. Kearney
Sharon Pauling	Bread for the World
John Prendergast	Center for Concern
Lois Richards	USAID
Philip Roark	Chemonics
John Rose	USAID
Lisa Freund Rosenblat	InterAction
Kermit Saphron	Africare
Mary Hope Schwoebel	Independent Contractor
Meredith Scovill	USAID
Andy Sisson	USAID
Stephen Solat	Africare
Wayne Stenson	University Research Corporation
Marge Tsitouris	CARE
Mark Wentling	USAID
Warren Whitlock	Land Commissioner, New York City

Appendix C: Bibliography of Selected Studies and Reports

In addition to the project-specific documents listed in the individual profiles, the following documents may be useful in further research of development in Somalia and the USAID program. Most of these documents are available through USAID's Center for Development Information and Evaluation in Rosslyn, VA.

Besteman, Catherine. Land Tenure in the Middle Jubba: Customary Tenure and the Effect of Land Registration. Land Tenure Center, Research Paper 104 University of Wisconsin at Madison, 1990. This paper provides a concise analysis of consistencies, contradictions and implications of customary land tenure and statutory law.

Claxton, Ann E. An Institutional Analysis of Local Government in the Somali Democratic Republic. (USAID sponsored study) December, 1983.

Development Alternatives Inc. Donor Influence and Rural Prosperity: The Impact of Policy Reform on Economic Growth and Equity in the Agricultural Sector in Somalia, March, 1987. This document summarizes the status of policy reform in Somalia in the mid to late 1980s and provides information about agriculture at that time. Contacts and a bibliography are included.

Franks, Jeffrey. Brain Drain or Brain Gain? A Review of USAID Participant Training in Somalia, (for USAID/Somalia), September, 1986.

Gregory, Peter. Somalia Civil Service Reform. (USAID Contract under P.O. 649-051-0-00-0014-00), March, 1990.

Gunn, Susan Elizabeth. Development in a Nomadic Society: A Study of Indigenous and Exogenous Change in Northern Somalia. Dissertation (Univ. of Colorado at Boulder, 1990) UMI #9032837, 1990.

Harvard Institute for International Development, Quantitative Analysis of Incentives and Disincentives for Expansion of Industrial Output and Employment in Somalia (AID Contract DAN-5426-C-00-4098-0), July, 1985.

Hoben, Allen. Resource Tenure Issues in Somalia, Boston University: African Studies Center, 1985. (USAID Contract PDC-1096-I-01-4160-00). This document discusses refugees and land tenure issues at length.

International Science and Technology Institute, Inc. Report on Tax Reform in Somalia: Evaluation of the Recommendations and Suggestions for Implementation. (USAID Contract AFR-0348-C-5037), January, 1989.

Mehmet, Ozay. "Effectiveness of Foreign Aid - the Case of Somalia," The Journal of Modern African Studies, 9, 1 (1971), pp. 31-47.

World Bank/ East Africa Department, Somalia: Crisis in Public Expenditure Management, Vol. I,
Summary of Findings and Conclusions, March, 1991.

The parallels between this article describing the programs of the 1960s and USAID's experience in the 1980s are interesting.

ODC Conference Report, "Conflict Resolution, Humanitarian Assistance, and Development in Somalia: Lessons Learned," Dec 3, 1993, Washington, D.C. (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).

Poulin, Roger/Development Alternatives, Inc. A Study of Recurrent Costs of Development Projects in Somalia. March, 1987.

Putman, Diana Brion. A Cultural Interpretation of Development: Developers, Values, and Agricultural Change in the Somali Context (Isku Kalsoonaan Baa Horumar). Dissertation (Bryn Mawr, 1984) University Microfilms International, # 8505770, 1985.

This is an ethnography which targets the developers as well as the individuals living in the Bay Region and includes extensive and detailed anthropological information.

Rawson, David. The Somali State and Foreign Aid, Washington, D.C.: Foreign Service Institute, Department of State, 1993.

This short book is a comprehensive overview of USAID's involvement in Somalia. Some project-specific information is provided.

Rawson, David. "Dealing With Disintegration: U.S. Assistance and the Somali State," in Samatar, ed. The Somali Challenge, Boulder: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 1994, pp. 147-187.

This article is a brief version of Rawson's earlier book.

Roth, Michael; Lawrance, Jeremy; Mohamood, Ahmed Sheikh and Bruce, John. Land Tenure Policy and Registration in Somalia: An Action Plan for Legislative and Administrative Reforms. Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin at Madison, 1989.

In addition to providing a specific action plan for reform, this document summarizes the issues around the land tenure problems of pre-civil war Somalia.

Roth, Michael. Somalia Land Policies and Tenure Impacts: The Case of the Lower Shebelle. Land Tenure Center, Univ of Wisconsin at Madison, 1988.

Roth, Michael; Lemel, Harold; Bruce, John and Unruh, Jon. An Analysis of Land Tenure and Registration and Water Allocation Issues in the Shalamabood Irrigation Zone, Somalia. Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin at Madison, 1987.

Samatar, Ahmed I., ed. The Somali Challenge: From Catastrophe to Renewal?, Boulder: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 1994.

Semida, John. A Study of Fifty Small Scale Industries Which Can Utilize Local Raw Materials in Somalia. November, 1984.

Although this study is not all that quantitative, it does provide a survey of locally available materials and industry with suggestions for further work.

SRI International, The Policy/Regulatory Environment for Private Investment in Somalia (AID Contract 649-132-C-6009), February, 1986.

UNDP/IBRD, Somalia: Report of a Joint Technical Cooperation Assessment Mission, October, 1985.

USAID/Somalia, Congressional Presentation, FY 80.

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USAID/Somalia, Country Development Strategy Statement, FY 1982.

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USAID/Somalia, Country Development Strategy Statement, FY 1987.

USAID/Somalia, Country Development Strategy Statement, FY 1990.

Wisner, Ben. "*Jilaal, Gu, Haggaa, and Der: Living with the Somali Land and Living Well,*" in Samatar, ed. The Somali Challenge, Boulder: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 1994, pp.27-63.

Acronyms

ABS	Annual Budget Summary
ADF	African Development Foundation
AFMET	Agricultural Extension and Farm Management Training
CDSS	Country Development Strategy Statement
CIP	Commodity Import Program
EEC	European Economic Community
ESF	Economic Support Funds
GSDR	Government of Somali Democratic Republic
GTZ	Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Technical Cooperation)
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDA	International Development Administration
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JUDAS	Juba Development Analytical Studies
LOP	Length of Project
MCH	Maternal and Child Health
MLFR	Ministry of Livestock, Forestry and Range
MMWR	Ministry of Water and Mineral Resources
MOH	Ministry of Health
NES	National Extension Service
NRA	National Range Agency
NRC	National Refugee Commission
PAAD	Project Assistance Approval Document
PACD	Project Assessment Completion Date
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
SWMP	Shebelli Water Management Project
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission on Refugees
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
WDA	Water Development Authority
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization