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Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: Lessons Learned



Rapporteurs' report of presentations at the May 4-6, 1995 conference, *"Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: Lessons Learned,"* sponsored by The Democracy Projects at The American University's School of International Service, Washington, D.C.

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Report Summary

Since 1986, The Democracy Projects of The School of International Service at The American University has engaged a wide variety of actors—scholars, civilian policymakers, and military officers—in a dialogue on civil-military relations and national security. Civil-military relations remains the subject of considerable public discussion as the global trend from authoritarian regimes to more open societies continues to characterize the post-Cold War political environment.

This conference, held in Washington, D.C. from May 4-6, 1995, accumulated thinking about civil-military relations based on lessons learned from transitions to civilian democratic rule in Latin America. Similarly, the meeting laid a foundation for applying knowledge on national security and civil-military relations in the Western hemisphere to relevant cases in Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe.

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Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: Lessons Learned

Executive Summary of the Rapporteurs' Report

From May 4-6, 1995, the Democracy Projects of The American University's School of International Service convened a meeting of the hemisphere's leading civil-military researchers, policymakers, and senior military officers in Washington, D.C. The purpose of the meeting was to distill lessons from the scholarship and practice of civil-military relations in Latin America which could be instructive in other regions of world currently experimenting with democracy.

The conference opened with a welcoming address by Ambassador Sally Shelton, USAID's Assistant Administrator for Global Programs, who reinforced the global applicability of civil-military issues. The first working day was organized into three sessions to determine the way that civil-military relations interact with the political system, civil society, and the economy.

Session I revealed the variety and the subtlety of civil-military configurations in Latin America. In contrast with the rest of the hemisphere, for example, the Mexican armed forces are taking an increasingly active role in politics because of the difficulties of transition from the civilian-led form of inclusionary authoritarian rule. The speaker from Costa Rica asserted the historic specificity of his country's army-less democracy and spoke to the way drug trafficking and violent crime have prompted a redefinition of the legitimate use of force by the state's security corps. Similarly, key to defense policy formulation in Argentina has been the idea that post-Cold War security threats are regional and global in nature, and cannot be met on the basis of a single national army.

Session II explored the relationship of civil-military relations to civil society. The speaker from Peru emphasized the need for democratic education to provide substance behind procedure. A second panelist shared the findings of an Andean survey which demonstrated broad popular confidence in the competence of the military. The final speaker addressed the pivotal and neglected role of NGOs as honest brokers in post-transition societies where polarization lingers after the inauguration of civilian governments.

The luncheon address by the Ambassador of Argentina to the OAS emphasized the need to differentiate between military and non-military threats in an era where security also means prosperity. Such a premise requires the formulation of national defense policy in a larger regional or global context.

Session III focused on civil-military relations and the economy. All the panelists noted the increased vulnerability of military budgets to shrinking public resources; the need to make the allocation process transparent and consensual; and the dearth of civilian expertise in military matters. The project directors closed the first day with a summary of lessons from the Latin American experience.

In the second part of the conference, experts from Asia, Europe, and Africa identified the variables of their regions' experience. This was followed by five simultaneous small group sessions where participants met to identify specific lessons relating to aspects to civil-military relations and democracy. A plenary was then convened at which representatives from each group reported their findings. The project directors then closed the conference with a summary of the proceedings, and announced plans to intensify cross-regional dialogue and research.

Welcoming Dinner
May 4, 1995

Opening Remarks: Johanna Mendelson Forman[1]

Since the start of the Democracy Project's civil-military relations program in 1986 many individuals have worked together to forge a network of scholars and practitioners who share a common interest in the subject. Johanna Mendelson Forman opened the conference with special thanks to her colleagues and co-directors, Louis W. Goodman, Juan Rial, and Carina Perelli about their continued efforts to better understand civil-military relations and to apply the lessons of the project's work to other regions of the globe.[2] This notion was underscored by Charles Costello, the director of USAID's Global Democracy Center, and Ambassador Sally Shelton, who delivered the keynote address at the dinner.

Welcoming Address:
Ambassador Sally Shelton, *Assistant Administrator, Global Bureau, USAID*[3]

Ambassador Shelton sketched the evolution of USAID in promoting projects on civil-military relations within the wider context of democratization efforts in the hemisphere. When The Democracy Projects were first launched in the mid-1980s, civil-military relations was an extremely controversial theme. A decade ago, the US government was not convinced that it made sense to promote programs in democracy and governance. The right was skeptical because such an agenda might destabilize friendly authoritarian governments around the world (such as that led by General Augusto Pinochet in Chile). The left was also skeptical because it might be a cover for other, more "nefarious schemes." Ambassador Shelton expressed her pleasure at

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[1] Dr. Mendelson is Research Assistant Professor and Director of Democracy Projects at the School of International Service, The American University, Washington, D.C. She is currently on leave at the Office of Transition Initiatives, USAID.

[2] The project directors extend special thanks to Roma Knee (USAID, LAC-retired) and Debra McFarland (USAID, Global Bureau).

[3] Following a distinguished career in the public and private spheres of the Americas, Ambassador Shelton was sworn in as the Assistant Administrator of Global Programs for USAID in June of 1994. In that capacity, she manages the agency's technical activities with the objective of fulfilling US bilateral aid programs in the areas of population, health, nutrition, environment, economic growth, human resources development, and democracy and governance.

having witnessed the evolution of her government's position on civil-military programs, and named Brian Atwood as "the most important advocate" of democracy programs in the broader context of sustainable development.[4] The funding of programs like The Democracy Projects is part of a wider effort to create a political environment that sustains and nourishes democratization. She stated that:

> Democracy is more than the military returning to their barracks. It means civilians taking responsibility for governing through the formal institutions which make up the political system and through social institutions which allow individuals to express their concerns. In Latin America, the waning of the dictator has not always meant the dawning of democracy. Throughout the world, some countries have achieved more enduring progress than others. Examining the successes provides us with some lessons: the stronger the civilian control of government and the more deeply rooted the democratic consensus, the less likely it is that authoritarian challenges to governance will ensue.

Ambassador Shelton then said that the Global Bureau is part of the reorganization of USAID that began last year. It is the center of the agency's technical expertise, and home to a broad range of specialists divided among five centers: the center for democracy and governance—perhaps the "*primus enter pares*"—and the centers for population, health and nutrition; economic growth; environment; and, an office of women in development.[5]

The promotion of civil-military relations in the Western Hemisphere consists of increased competition, the rule of law, and the strengthening of civil society. All of these translate into greater efficiency, efficacy, and accountability on the part of national governments.[6] These themes have worldwide resonance: the breadth and depth of Latin America's experience have overwhelmed those observers once skeptical of the region's relevance to other polities. Ambassador Shelton pointed out to the audience of the "intellectual synergies" that came from a meeting between Poland's Lech Walesa with Chilean NGO leader Mónica Jiménez. The richness of comparing regional experiences is not in finding 100 percent replicability, but in drawing on a past to inform the future. Lessons must, to some extent, respect the peculiarities

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[4] Brian Atwood is Administrator of USAID.

[5] The establishment of the women and development office will be announced at the much-anticipated September 1995 Beijing conference, as the Bureau's number one program priority.

[6] It is worth noting that the correct Spanish translation for "accountability" in this context was the subject of some discussion throughout the meeting. It was generally agreed that "*contabilidad*" refers to bookkeeping, and not the political meaning of the word "accountability."

of national histories. Nevertheless, the current decade—unlike the last one—is full of reasons to be optimistic, even given the year's events in Mexico.[7] Civil society is more complex, and civil associations are more sophisticated than in the past; and they have established linkages with powerful international allies. The new movements toward regional integration renew momentum toward sustained economic development and democratic stability. Finally, there is the explicit understanding that harmonious civil-military relations are key to sustainable development. She stated:

> As democracy expands, the distinction between internal and external security calls into question the long history of dual roles which of the region's militaries played in the name of anti-communism. Cops don't fight subversives, they fight crime. Militaries fight wars, not their own citizens.

Ambassador Shelton cited the following lessons regarding civil-military relations and democracy:

1. Accountability. She said that the construction of democratic civil-military relations requires arduous labor from both civil society and the government. Without it, sustainable development and democracy are virtually doomed to fail. Legislatures must be both free and responsible. The executive branch must be held accountable for its actions. Military roles must be appropriately and explicitly defined, particularly in regard to internal security matters. Freely elected governments that fail to support civilian institutions come to rely instead on repressive bodies to implement policy. At the same time, civil society must take and sustain initiatives to build autonomous institutions and to enforce accountability from the public sector.

2. The Changing Missions of the Military. Ambassador Shelton said that in an era of global transition, the decisive definition of appropriate roles for the armed forces is the *sine qua non* of working civil-military relations. In the wake of the bi-polar world, free trade and economic integration have flourished unburdened by communism, but they have also accompanied a host of new threats: drug trafficking, migration, and international organized crime, for example. Measures to counter these new threats have raised questions about the nuances of public security versus national defense, the changing definition of national security, as well as the military versus non-military aspects of national defense. The delicacy and the urgency of these questions require continued and sophisticated dialogue among civilian and military specialists in these areas. Appropriate roles for armies, law enforcement, intelligence,

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[7] The first five months of 1995 saw a clumsy devaluation of the Mexican peso which led to the near-collapse of the Mexican stock market, the flight of billions of dollars in capital investment, and persistent allegations that the brother of former President Carlos Salinas was involved in the murder of Francisco Ruiz Massieu, the Secretary General of Mexico's ruling political party.

and other state apparatae continue to be the subject of debate in the policy arena, although Ambassador Shelton was unambiguous on the point that "cops fight crime, not subversives; and the military fight wars, not citizens."

3. Civil-Military Relations and Regimes in Transition. Ambassador Shelton stated that USAID's programs must sustain a commitment to democratic transitions around the world. An important part of this mission is to create new knowledge of civil-military relations. We know that in Latin America good civil-military relations girded democratic openings, but in other parts of the world, the challenges are manifold: How to proceed in the republics of the former Soviet Union? How to restore post-transition societies in Africa and Asia? How to restore Rwanda and manage the armed forces in anarchic societies?

Further complicating the recipe is the necessity to connect and construct several tasks concurrently: demilitarized police forces must be supported by efficient judicial systems which, in turn, require a vibrant civil society. Many of this region's militaries continue to be isolated from the societies they are sworn to protect. This is reflected in the persistent opacity of military judicial procedures and the paucity of civilian expertise in military matters. Normalized mechanisms of civil-military dialogue will be critical to creating citizen-soldiers rather than praetorian guards.

The speaker closed on a note of guarded optimism: parts of the Latin American experience will help international expertise in civil-military relations, and knowledge on the subject has progressed enormously in ten years. Still, noting the fragility of nascent democratic regimes which must face cantankerous armies, shrinking public resources, and an increasingly competitive economy, she stated, "the battle is not over and the hardest parts are before us. Elections do not a democracy make."

Review of Lessons Learned from Latin America
May 5, 1995

Session I. Civil-Military Relations and the Political System
Chair: **Louis W. Goodman**, The American University, School of International Service

Speaker: **Raúl Benítez Manaut**, *Universidad Autónoma de México*

Civil-military trends are different in Mexico. In contrast to the rest of Latin America, and in a departure from its own history, the Mexican military is increasing its political presence, owing mostly to the prolonged stalemate over the 1994 Chiapas rebellion.[8] Chiapas became a catalyst for re-examining civil-military relations: it was unprecedented in Latin America that a guerrilla group and government negotiate without resorting to extended violence. One

[8] Benítez Manaut noted a 15-30% increase in drug enforcement officers in rural areas.

consequence of this policy decision was the political establishment's re-evaluation of the role of the armed forces in politics. For the first time, opposition parties also wish to be heard—albeit quietly—by the armed forces, and the desire for communication is apparently reciprocal: the armed forces too, wish to hear the political parties.

The Mexican military was once marginal to politics, but a growing crisis of confidence in the political leadership of the country—centered around the numerous transition issues, not just Chiapas—spurred the High Command to a more proactive stance. For the first time, the military is publicly expressing its political opinions that include doubts over the integrity of the ruling party's[9] leadership and the inexperience of the opposition parties.[10] In so doing, senior officers have revealed the existence of at least two wings. "Hawks" believe the Chiapas situation has been unnecessarily prolonged and poorly managed while the "*demócratas*" insist that civilian management of the military institution and the ongoing political crisis is the only way to avoid further political polarization.

Chiapas was also precedent-setting in the way it brought to light the Mexican army's conduct in human rights matters. For twenty years, no one questioned its tactics. Suddenly, the High Command found itself facing international criticism for its handling of the *chiapanecos*. The question became an ethical one for senior officers: they had condoned the same treatment for the insurgents as for drug traffickers—to their mind the only way of doing business in the countryside—but external actors were vocal in their disapproval of treating Indian rebels in the same manner as drug traffickers. The army's role in politics is further complicated by the PRI's long domination of the state apparatus, and the normative idea that the army should be a state apparatus, not an arm of a political party. The PRI itself was born of the Mexican revolution, a popular peasant revolt of the 1920s. Separating the army from it is in some ways asking it to break with itself. It is not surprising, then, that the army prefers to deal with the PRI, although it is opposed to the PRI maintaining power through extra-legal means. The ascension to power of the opposition parties would be acceptable to the military if it were accompanied by "*entendimientos*" (deals or understandings) with local governments and the army. All branches of the High Command maintain some links with the PRI leadership and are disposed to accept the plurality and democratic legality of the political party system, although not at the cost of political stability.

Mexico is perhaps the slowest and longest ongoing transition in the hemisphere, having begun in the early 1970s. It has been managed by a fluid pact between the PRI leadership and the military: the shared objective has been to maintain a thread of governability and stability throughout a difficult and unpredictable transition. In summary, the Mexican armed forces have

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[9] *Partido Revolucionario Institucional*, PRI.

[10] *Partido de Acción Nacional* (PAN) is the conservative opposition party; the *Partido de la Revolución Democrática* (PRD) is the liberal opposition party.

become more professional, more politicized, and less committed to the PRI. They have evinced a growing, but not complete commitment to democracy and human rights: proven and sustained competence in governing continues to be the implicit condition for the armed forces' subordination to the civilian elite.

Speaker: **Constantino Urcuyo,** *Legislative Assembly of Costa Rica*

Costa Rican democracy is often held up as a model to its neighbors, but the speaker did not believe that his country's experience was replicable or transferable. He qualified it as the product of a peculiar convergence of historical forces. Most importantly, Urcuyo reminded the audience that the dissolution of the Costa Rican army was the result of a domestic political process, and not an externally-imposed process (as in Panama and Haiti). Moreover, the experience of being a demilitarized democracy long surrounded by military governments has obliged Costa Rica to learn to "navigate the precarious waters" of civil-military relations on an international level.

It has become possible to note some trends in the direction of the region's civil-military relations. The military is certainly withdrawing from direct political power, but it will continue being very important in the political process. In fact, it is still "impossible to think about politics without them." Therefore it is important to think of the demilitarization of the state and the depoliticization of the armed forces as being both *relative* and *long term.*

The speaker identified a number of important forces that are influential in shaping the future of civil-military relations in the region.

1. More bang for fewer bucks. The challenge for civil-military relations in the next few years will be how to confront the new challenges given the reduced role of both the military and the civilian state. At the heart of this matter is who should confront military participation in politics? For example, in Central America, the role of the military in politics was a direct cause of national civil wars. In the future, the military will likely continue to express political opinions in Central America. How oversight will be exercised will be a key issue. Proposals for a collective regional (Latin American) approach to security (which, by definition, will diminish the relative influence of national armies) are unlikely to succeed right now since the concept of the nation-state retains much of its weight in the region.

2. Back to Basics. Much of the debate revolves around the style and substance of civilian control mechanisms, particularly over determining missions. In Central America, the armed forces can revert to their "traditional roles," which in many cases have been to maintain internal security and not national defense. In cases where weak civil societies struggle to organize over traditionally dominant armies, civil action programs—often called "nation-building"—are extremely risky because such programs "give the military a taste for politics."

3. External actors. During the 1980s, elections were a very important way for national governments engaged in guerrilla wars to maintain political legitimacy abroad and within the US foreign assistance community. Nevertheless, external pressures to democratize were very

important, and shall continue since it is clear that the consolidation of fragile democracies remains a long-term goal for nations throughout the hemisphere. Aiding this momentum is the end of the Cold War, which should impede a return to guerrilla warfare and limit the ability of armies to return to traditional modes of praetorian behavior. The "Great Democratic Revolution" makes military intervention in politics a "qualified" or "conditional subordination." Other important forces that encourage military extrication from politics are the international media, whose relentless and instantaneous coverage have helped create military sensitivity to the "CNN Syndrome;" and the United States, whose impact can be extremely positive.

4. The Political Role of the State. Future civil-military programs must focus on the political role of the civil state as well as civil society and the military. The ultimate check against military domination is the development of strong legislative, executive, and ultimate judiciary branches of government. The military then does not need to be discarded, but appropriately structured as an organic part of the state.

The leadership capacity of civil societies evokes the concept of military autonomy in both economic and institutional terms. Normatively, armies might be limited to national defense missions, but the growing economic autonomy of Central American militaries is not conducive to extrication from politics. Urcuyo specifically referred to the proliferation and strengthening of the "*instituciones de previsión militar*," (military pension funds) which in some cases are the largest official supply of capital in the country. The success of such enterprises have granted economic autonomy to the armed forces and, in some cases, to even the extent that they are no longer beholden to civilian banks for loans. The economic power of the military pension, and its financial autonomy undermine civilian authority, particularly in Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala.

Institutional development is not a sufficient condition for change. Substantive changes in civil-military culture will require re-educating and re-training on the level of the individual. Civilians must master military matters, and the military must master the political process. Educational programs along these lines will enhance efficiency and legitimacy which, in turn, enhance governability and security.

Speaker: **Andrés Fontana,** *Institute of Foreign Service, Buenos Aires*

Fontana identified five lessons to be drawn from the Latin American experience.

1. Redefining the role of the armed forces. Redefining the role of the military cannot be left to one group or another, but must be the product of dialogue. Such conversations must take place within a well-defined, working concept of regional and global security. Part of the challenge here is to evolve beyond narrow definitions of security that refer only to combat capabilities. Traditional military thought continues to be corporatist in nature, perhaps not with negative intentions, but possibly with negative consequences. Therefore, while combat readiness

is certainly key to security, it is important to incorporate preventive and cooperative security mechanisms, especially on the regional and subregional level, into new role definitions.

Redefining the role of the armed forces is basic to defining perceptions of threat, many of which are outdated. Old threat perceptions are based in a combination of Latin American nationalism and the perception of the United States as the "Imperial Yankee." This is the kind of thinking that allows Chileans and Argentines to continue to view each other as potential threats. Fontana emphasized that important and influential people continue to cling to such notions makes transparency in the policy process all the more important because such privately held ideas are publicly indefensible since contemporary threats are global in nature can only be confronted globally.

2. Civilian empowerment. By definition, civilian authorities in new democracies must have de facto command over the armed institutions of the state. However, in societies with long traditions of military domination, the simple fact is that the human resources necessary to fulfill this goal are yet to be created. The procedural norm, for example, of having a civilian minister of defense is often problematic because few civilians have the technical expertise to ask and answer serious questions about material and equipment acquisition, force size and structure, promotion and seniority systems, and military education and doctrine. Control over the budget is an important procedural instrument for asserting civilian authority, but the deficit in civilian expertise is mostly and pointedly manifested when military budgets are presented to civilian legislative bodies that, with few exceptions, have not been able to provide serious debate over the soundness and rationale behind public allocations. Control and authority over military budget allocations must be an interactive process of engagement, dialogue, and discussion. Oversight must rest, not merely with an appointed civilian, but with one whose competence over military matters command the respect of the military leadership.

If civilian authorities who lack military expertise are imposed upon armed institutions, the resulting relationship will almost certainly confirm what praetorian armies have long suspected: i.e., they are turning the future of their institution—and by extension, their nation-state—over to individuals who are less than fully competent to defend them. The result it that the cycle of military distrust of civilian authority begins anew.

Thus, the matter of military subordination to civilian authority goes beyond providing for a civilian minister of defense or granting the president the authority of commander-in-chief, although these are also critical. Civilian empowerment in this matter requires earning the confidence of the armed forces. To do this, civilian authority must consistently demonstrate competence in governance, respect for the integrity of the armed forces as an institution, as well as the willingness to assert executive leadership at critical moments.

One method of working toward these results is to initiate an integrated program of civil-military confidence-building measures. The ultimate goal of such a program would be to make civil-military decision-making a routine, normal, and regular part of the legislative process. The process should involve participation of a wide variety of services, both outside the country as

well from within. Technical assistance and learning from NGOs and civil-military experts from other countries have been extremely enriching in the Argentine case, particularly in matter of the military budget. On the domestic level, participation from high-level civilian politicians should encompass the scope of the political parties without becoming partisan. For the purposes of transparency, the media should also have a systematic and participatory role in the process. The process should be inter-institutional, involving not only ministries of defense, but also other agencies involved in security issues. Finally, the process requires practice, i.e., time and iterations to make it routine and normal. Only in this fashion do perceptions, mentalities, and values change.

3. Military reform. In the changing global context, military reform is extremely complex but imperative to safeguard the integrity of the institution. It must address the new role of the military in democracy within the constraints of shrinking public resources and the uncertain shape of contemporary security threats. Instructive in this measure would be to study the post-Cold War doctrines, strategies, and structures of the world's major military organizations like NATO.

4. Avoiding the isolation of the military from society at large. Many Latin American armies are organizing from a defensive posture, in the sense that they face shrinking public resource, diminished social esteem, or military defeat. In this context, it would be expected for any institution to withdraw, regroup, and find ways to build walls between itself and the outside world. It is precisely at these moments that civil society must remain open to civil-military rapprochement, and make explicit overtures to this effect. The uncomfortable legacies of military domination may make continued segregation between civilians and soldiers seem the path of least resistance, but it is precisely at this juncture that civilian leaders need to take the initiative to assure the continued vitality and need for senior officers to be part of the state's future. Measures to prevent backsliding into segregated societies include public education efforts to raise mass public opinion (and social esteem) for the military's role in society; the negotiation of military privileges and prerogatives (particularly compensation) appropriate to a new national context; and the normalization of interaction between military and civilian professionals.

5. Political will of the civilian leadership. All across Latin America, the pivotal role of civilian leadership has been critical in assuaging military skittishness in transitions to democracy. Civilian "political will," however, must exist beyond the executive branch. The active leadership of legislative bodies is critical because it indicates to the public that a democratic system is in place and functioning. The understandable reluctance of civilian leaders to have confrontations or tensions with the military must translate into carefully structured engagements, rather than avoidance of critical issues that require dialogue.

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Discussion. Audience comments reflected the broad array of opinion on the appropriate relationship of the military to civil society.

Roderic Camp, *Tulane University.* We tend to forget that politicians and officers are products of society in general. We have to change basic social values—but how and where? Through the education system? How should these new values be socialized? They certainly don't start from the top down.

John Fishel, *US Army Command, Ft. Leavenworth.* Urcuyo's comments regarding nation-building do not take into account the structural variations in civil-military relations. What, precisely, is negative about the military role in politics? The military is a political institution in any society, but the nature of the role is critical. At the tactical level, those encounters can reinforce democracy or dictatorship. The relationship is contextual.

Alain Joxe, *Groupe de Sociologie de la Defense de l'EHESS.* This is an opportune moment to return to social science basics. What is the relationship of violence, politics, and the economy—which can also be an instrument of violence? When economic sovereignty is under attack is the military part of the national defense or not? What is the role of armed forces in global threats? What is the scale of the main threat: is it local, national, or international?

Enrique Obando, *CEPEI, Lima.* In many countries an arms race accounted for substantial increases in the military budget, which in some cases came to constitute 30-50 percent of the external debt. It became imperative to convince militaries to work on national development as well as national defense. This was a phenomenon we came to regret, but now are back where we started, with the military in the barracks. If armies begin to believe that national defense is the only role, then the institution will pursue the most narrow means to it.

John Cope, *National Defense University.* As a recently retired military officer, I have come to view civil-military relations in three ways: from the perspective of civilians, the military, and the interaction between the two. The last perspective receives the least attention and, in my view, is the most important in the long run. One of its key possibilities is the opportunity to craft a "contract" between the civilian and the military sides. If the military is to be a "good instrument" of civil society, civilians need to accept responsibility for the institution in the broadest sense. This includes providing an adequate standard of living—health care, retirement, housing, etc.—to ensure professional integrity and to discourage the armed forces from seeking financial resources from other sources. The idea that the military will be provided for is one of the successes of the civil-military contract in the United States. In return, the military institution focuses on internal professional development and maintaining the high standards of readiness necessary to perform assigned missions on short notice.

Gabriel Aguilera, *FLACSO, Guatemala.* Discussions of national defense should include provisions for collective security mechanisms—although armies do resist this notion—which include the possibility of interstate conflicts. This will help maintain missions within ever-narrowing parameters.

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Responses from the panelists:

Benítez Manaut responded to Cope by acknowledging the persistence of mutual distrust. In Mexico, the military is courting the civilian ear much more than the reverse, especially in the

area of civic action. The military has also invited civilians to participate in courses with the Navy and the High Command, acting on the idea that education is a contributing factor to political stability.

Urcuyo agreed with Fishel that the appropriateness of civic action is contextual: where civilian institutions are strong, the risk is reduced: this is not usually the case in the countries under discussion. Regarding Obando's remarks, the speaker noted that the transparency in the process of military allocations is now a possibility. Finally, in response to Cope, Urcuyo clarified the point that especially in Central America, military institutions are often in direct competition with civilian economic and political power, which deepens the militarization of society. What is critical here is to measure the depth of military economic autonomy.

Responding to Camp, Fontana emphasized that values do not appear in a vacuum. They can be changed through practices and routines. The internationalization of the mission of the armed forces is a critical means to changed values, particularly moving beyond the bilateral perspective of conflict and security. Fontana discouraged approaches that would strengthen the tradition of national approaches to security in favor of intermediary (subregional and regional) perspectives: he called for a new way to design armed forces that would lend themselves to some kind of collective approach to security issues which, in turn, would go beyond the concepts put forth in the UN charter or in traditional notions of static alliances.

Session II. Civil-Military Relations and Civil Society

Chair: Johanna Mendelson Forman, *The American University, School of International Service*

The term "civil society" refers to an arena where citizens participate in politics under the protection of the law. It includes the sector which includes non-governmental organizations and religious groups. Political participation by civil society is shaped by the legacies of the nexus between governments and civilians during the period of democratic opening.

Speaker: Enrique Obando, *CEPEI, Lima*

Obando identified seven lessons from the Peruvian experience that can inform other cases of civil-military relations in transition.

1. Civilian control over the military does not guarantee democratization. In Peru, the democratically elected president Alberto Fujimori used his executive powers and his relationship with key sectors of the armed forces to suspend the legislature and the courts, and to restrict media access. The *"Fujimorazo"* proved that elected civilian leaders could also be authoritarian. Because military institutions reflect the society at large, civilians can and do create opportunities to politicize the military. In Latin America, democracy has been a political "artifact," not an integral part of social values, as in the United States.

2. **Co-optation of the military by civilian elites** contributes to political instability as illustrated by contemporary developments in Peru and Venezuela. "Knocking on the barracks" undermines legitimate civilian authority over the military. One of the most basic means of co-optation is to concentrate power of promotion in the president, who advances officers based on loyalty rather than merit. This is frequently the situation that produces junior officer coups.

3. **Institutional integrity is eroded by politicization.** Eventually, the armed forces lose their identity in the state and are perceived as just another government agency.

4. **In South America, conventional wars have a domestic function.** During periods of budget cutbacks and diminished social esteem for the military, war justifies the existence of the military. When armies feel defensive about their value to society, a successful war can restore their confidence.

5. **The armed forces are large bureaucratic organizations** that have garnered considerable economic autonomy in some countries. They have reasons to oppose neoliberal economic reforms which would eliminate their control over certain revenue-generating operations, particularly in public utilities or strategic industries. In an era of reduced public resources, this will become a particularly important struggle.

6. **Militarizing the war on drugs** exposes the institution to corruption and jeopardizes the success of anti-war initiatives. The only branch of the military that should play a significant role on this front is the Air Force, because their actions are easier to monitor, thereby lending themselves to greater accountability and control. Secondly, their role in the drug war should not deviate much from their traditional mandate of providing surveillance, technical and logistic support, and engaging in search and destroy missions from the air.

7. **Education, e.g., the teaching of democratic values,** is the best way to diffuse three norms that could facilitate civilian oversight of the armed forces: to encourage members of the armed forces not to participate in any way or capacity in the political process; to depoliticize and thus, separate ideology from doctrine so as to ensure that the military as an institution is not affiliated with any political party; and to encourage respect and defense for democratic values.

Speaker: **Carina Perelli,** ***PEITHO, Montevideo***

Perelli shared the results of a public opinion survey her institute conducted in the Andean countries of Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Colombia. She designed the survey in response to the lack of empirical data regarding popular attitudes toward the military, after transitions to democracy. One reason for this neglect, Perelli noted, is that most transitions were negotiated among elites.

The survey was completed before the Peru-Ecuador confrontation and confirmed that the majority of respondents agreed to the need for an army and the continued existence of an armed institution. The survey revealed that the armed forces enjoy more citizen confidence than civilian political leaders, and ranked second only to the Church in that regard. Most people

agreed that the present size of the armed forces was adequate and were satisfied with the size of the military budget. When asked about the purpose and role of the military and the future of military service, most believed that the military should concentrate on traditional defense and development policies. National defense, defense of the Constitution, and socio-economic development ranked high. However, respondents had little regard for the military in politics, and in the fight against drugs. Regarding military service, the responses were almost equally divided between those who favored a volunteer army and those who did not. The overwhelming majority stated that military training should include courses that are applicable in civilian life.

A number of conclusions can be drawn from these findings. First, the armed forces are not viewed as a threat by the people of the region, although it is not known what impact this has on civilian political institutions. Second, current trends in public opinion may facilitate the involvement of ex-military officers in politics. Finally, regional military experts should reconsider their analytical approaches and incorporate more hard core data in their work.

Speaker: George Vickers, *Washington Office on Latin America*

The speaker focused on the role of NGOs in civil-military relations in Central America. He argued that two traditional patterns need to be overcome in the transition to democracy.

First is the tacit alliance between civilian economic and military elites that led to praetorianism in Central America and contributed to a weak civil society. The military viewed civil society as an arena where its enemies had an advantage. Thus, groups in civil society were perceived as adversaries to be repressed. Insurgencies also contributed to this weakening trend because insurgents used civil society as a weapon in their political campaign against the military: they diverted resources to penetrating and manipulating NGOs and other actors in civil society.

The end of the Cold War reduced the influence of the military and led to quantitative growth but qualitative weakness of NGOs: it did not reduce the tension or the polarization between the two. Consequently, one of the effects of the process of democratization should be to reconcile civilians with the military. International NGOs play a role as honest brokers in post-transition scenarios since both the civilian and the military need to take certain steps to improve civil-military relations in Central America.

Civilians need to create legitimate roles for both groups in defense and development policy. They also need to improve their capacity to monitor military affairs—which means acquiring the technical expertise and confidence to evaluate military needs and requests. Military officers must recognize the need to guarantee basic human rights. To this end, officer training should include human rights sensitivity courses; mechanisms to break the isolation of the armed forces from civil society at large; increased contact with civil associations; and civilian monitoring of military projects.

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Following a set of questions and comments from the floor, the panelists responded in the following manner: Obando clarified that neither armies nor civil society behave as homogeneous groups. In Peru, relations between the army and the popular sectors are considerably less tense than those between the army and the political elite. Intra-institutional divisions emerge frequently, particularly over the future of the institutions. Many fear regional integration because it threatens their traditional mission of national defense and implies rapprochement with former adversaries. Perelli added that insecurities brought on by the end of the Cold War affected civilians as well as officers. Many new actors have emerged on the political scene, complicating long-standing relations. Relations between multinational corporations and the military are taking on new significance; and former military officers are preparing to become civilian presidential candidates. George Vickers closed the session with a call for inclusive dialogue suggesting that all social groups must proceed from the understanding that military reform is a matter of public debate. Moreover, given the changing global environment, he argued that domestic actors in a post-conflict situation must not underestimate the significant role that can be played by international mediators since domestic actors in post-conflict situations sometimes cannot easily take the lead in starting a dialogue or a process of negotiations.

Remarks from the Keynote Address
Hernán Patiño-Mayer, *Ambassador of Argentina to the OAS*

Two questions lie at the heart of civil-military relations and security policy: (1) What is the nature of the relationship between the armed forces and power? and (2) What are we defending when we defend sovereignty?

The Ambassador began with a clear statement of his position regarding the future of the armed forces, which must be respected and preserved as part of the nation-state. In his view, civil-military relations was not a theme per se, but an instrument at the service of the much larger political objective: democratization. Finding the proper role for armies was essential to the consolidation of democracy since the real challenge is to find an appropriate role for the military in a democratic society. Argentine policy in national security matters is now being formulated in the context of a worldwide swing toward more open political and economic systems, as well as the recognition that the nature of threats have changed fundamentally from the Cold War era. In terms of the military's traditional role of defending national territory, the Ambassador called for a return to the traditional Anglo-Saxon model in use in the advanced western democracies.

The more complex of these threats are non-military in nature: economic crises, corruption, social disintegration, the use of political violence. The way in which we define sovereignty and security determines how we defend them. So what are we defending? Japan demonstrated that land is not the same as power, so the mere protection of physical territory is not enough to guarantee security. Other indicators regarding the physical quality of life, particularly health and education, have become more important.

The speaker ended with a reference to one of his country's military presidents: In 1953, General Perón said that the world functioned with a static concept of sovereignty because we imagined the nation-state system to be the highest form of social organization. Now we know that by the year 2000, we will be living in supranational regions and groups. The American continent has the choice of insertion or marginalization, and the correct choice is vital to protecting security and democracy in the hemisphere.

Session III. Civil-Military Relations and the Economy
Chair: **Juan Rial**, *PEITHO*

Speaker: **Alexandre Barros**, *Early Warning Risk Analysis, Brasilia*

Three developments today are likely to demand or stimulate a reduction in the size of the armed forces in Latin America. First, is the outcome of the Peru/Ecuador crisis, which proved once again the need for negotiation. Second, advances in transportation technology are changing the nature of the nation-state. Third, regional integration is gradually becoming a reality, fed by the rapid evolution of communications and other technological developments. This trend will also result in more cooperation among the regional armed forces and their eventual need to integrate.

Speaker: **Paul George**, *SIPRI, Stockholm*

Military expenditures are becoming a sensitive issue for the international community, in particular for major lending institutions like the World Bank and the IMF. However, there is much more bilateral donor activity than multinational initiative to reduce military expenditures.

In 1986, worldwide figures for military expenditures began to decline. The former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have had major cutbacks, but not in Asia or the Middle East. From this, one can draw at least two generalizations. First, the major force behind the size of the military budget was the Cold War. In Nicaragua, the military budget fluctuated with international political tensions. Second, there seems to be a relationship between economic growth and military expenditure.

Evidence suggests that economic growth is a factor contributing to heightened military spending, but not a decisive force. A primary driving force behind military spending is the power and leverage of the armed forces relative to other national actors. Countries with powerful armed forces tend to spend heavily on the military. A second important factor is the degree of transparency in military procurement, outlays, and other budgetary considerations. The more transparent this process becomes, the less likely the military budget will be inflated. Third, the size of the military budget is conditioned by geo-strategic concerns both at the regional and international levels. Finally, increases in military expenditures reduce the availability of funds for socio-economic development projects. In short, increased military spending seems to adversely affect efforts for economic development and thus should be contained.

Speaker: Francisco Rojas, *FLACSO, Santiago*

The speaker listed five lessons from the Latin American case regarding the relationship of the military to the economy. First, information regarding procurement and defense spending throughout the region needs to become more widely available and more transparent. Second, international and regional arms control regimes must be reinforced to slow the arms race. Third, empirical research on patterns of military spending must improve. Fourth, defense departments must be under civilian control. Fifth, the expansion of the armed forces into non-traditional roles must be avoided at all costs.

Rojas then identified the dynamics that actually shape the budget process. The most important consideration is the legacy of previous spending levels. In the military, like any organization, the previous spending level determines future budgetary considerations. This is particularly true in Latin America because reductions in the defense budget are very rare and mechanisms for controlling spending are limited. Another consideration is who gets involved in the process. In Latin America, the President usually plays the predominant role in setting economic considerations for the armed forces, but legislators should be more assertive in setting the national economic priorities for defense since they have a much broader mandate.

Contrary to what some may think, the post Cold War period had little or no effect on Latin American defense budgets. In fact, with the easing of East-West tensions, nations in the region lost a common enemy and with it an incentive to cooperate. In addition, the post Cold War period has produced no international regime with enough leverage to monitor military spending. The nature of international relations today is mostly economic-based. The end of the Cold War also marked an increase in interdependence and transnational relations. The challenge is two-fold: how to acquire more responsibility for global defense as part of increased participation in international economic relations; and how to manage national defense without reversing the movement towards regional integration. In sum, we need to build a cooperative hemispheric regime. This will be the basis for a new associative pattern of relations in the hemisphere.

Session IV: Lessons Learned

The project directors closed the day's proceedings with a summary of each panel.

Speaker: Johanna Mendelson Forman, *The American University*

Summarizing Session I, Mendelson noted the lack of consensus about the proper role of the military in Latin American and whether it must adopt new mandates as the century draws to a close. On the one hand, new security issues have replaced the traditional mandate of the armed forces. More than ever, contemporary threats involve using formal police functions, and the war against narcotrafficking. Yet, the extension of military involvement in these areas is not without risk. In countries with weak civil societies, military involvement in nation-building

projects may only strengthen the autonomy and prestige of the armed forces, thus increasing its appetite for politics. The Costa Rican option is not available to other nations in Latin America.

In formulating a proper role for the armed forces, Mendelson outlined the following considerations: the creation of civilian leadership capable of controlling military affairs; incorporation of military personnel into the mainstream of society; the role of civilian leadership in politicizing the military; and the normative supposition that the role of the military is to guarantee the security of citizens.

Speaker: **Juan Rial,** *PEITHO*

Juan Rial commented on the major conclusions of Session II. He saw the central dilemma as the increased differentiation of Latin American societies alongside the static organizational structure, capacity, and configuration of the military. Latin America today is more modern, cosmopolitan, and urban than ever before, but the organizational structure and rationale of the military in the region has not kept pace with the requirements of this new environment. For example, external linkages have created dual societies in almost all of the region, but a third or marginal sector based in ethnic differences demands new security schemes. Recent events in Chiapas are a case in point. Another point of contention is the relationship between the armed forces and national police in light of transnational criminal activities.

Speaker: **Louis W. Goodman,** *The American University*

Goodman was optimistic about the conclusions Session III. He noted a consensus regarding the legitimacy of military as an institution, which meant that the military should not feel threatened or defensive about the recent turn to democracy in the hemisphere. There was also considerable agreement on the fact that the contemporary political, economic, and social landscape in Latin America was very different than in the past, a situation calling for a new organizational structure and mandate for the regional armed forces to be able to meet the new kinds of threats emerging throughout the area.

The speaker highlighted the following recommendations from Session III: that the role and function of the military must consider sustainable development; that the military budget should come from public revenues, not from their own private economic activities; that the most appropriate role for the armed forces is to go back to their traditional role of defending the state, and that existing institutional arrangements, i.e., strong presidents with weak legislatures ought to be reexamined.

Global Implications: Applicability of Lessons Learned in Latin America to Other Regions
May 6, 1995

Opening plenary
Chair: Larry Garber, USAID

Speaker: Carolina Hernandez, *Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, Quezon City, Philippines*

Hernandez opened with a functional definition of civil-military relations, characterizing it as the balance of power between military and civilian branches of government. In democracies, military power is always subordinate relative to civilian power. The speaker went on to identify 10 critical lessons from the Asian experience, drawing mostly on the one she knew best, the Philippine transition.

1. A critical mass of the military must be willing to cooperate in a transition to civilian power. The presence of such a coalition was particularly key in Pakistan and the Philippines.

2. Reconstructing democracy is easier than constructing it. Before martial law was declared in the Philippines, nascent civilian political institutions had already been in place. Relative to Indonesia, where the military is by far the best organized institution, it was easier to restore democracy.

3. Economic factors lead to mixed outcomes, but the role of the middle class is determinant. Sometimes the failure of military regimes to prevent or reverse economic decline has expedited their withdrawal from politics. In Korea and Taiwan however, economic prosperity created a middle class which became a catalytic force for political opening. The creation of new wealth also made it possible to finance a substantial military budget and arms acquisition. Civilian governments had the resources to guarantee the continued prosperity of the military institution, thus diminishing the threat of reduced prerogatives. One important change in this process is that the military's access to economic resources becomes institutional rather than individual. An activist middle class led openings in Thailand and the Philippines; the Burmese opposition is also based in the middle class.

4. Political successors must have the confidence of the military. Post-authoritarian rulers must, in one way or another, earn and maintain the confidence of the armed forces, particularly during the early days of the transition. Aquino struggled with this; many members of the senior corps did not believe she could transcend her past, and on some occasions objected to her cabinet choices. Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan and San Suu Kyi in Burma were also in the same situation.

5. In the same vein, succession mechanisms must be obvious and workable. If they are fuzzy, trite, or unclear, they will never get off the ground. Of particular concern to Southeast Asians right now is the Indonesian case, where succession has been untried without Suharto.

6. Retribution must be balanced against reconciliation. The desire for justice after a period of arbitrary rule is understandable, but civilian authorities must exercise restraint in their prosecution of human rights violators. Post-authoritarian regimes must often choose between leading either a national reconciliation or retribution for what the armed forces will view as the normal discharge of their duties. In the Philippines, Argentina, and Thailand, aggressive campaigns to bring human rights violators to justice often have led to the military's closing ranks.

7. A review of military force structure is a good idea and civilians should be prepared to increase resource allocations. Major modifications in the ASEAN strategic environment came about requiring change in force structure. It was also found that arms and equipment were outmoded and required replacing. All of this major changes are being implemented amid an enhanced dialogue on defense issues. The Philippines, for example, hosted an informal summit of the region's Joint Chiefs of Staff, in which all nations but Burma participated. The meeting raised the level of military transparency as well as military cooperation. The group is currently attempting to expand such an initiative to include the other Asia-Pacific nations. The success of this initiative is not guaranteed, but it merits serious effort.

8. Distinctions between the military and the political sphere should be made clearly and adhered to. First, when mapping new civil-military relations, it is worth remembering that neither group is less prone to corruption than the other. The idea is to reduce the influence of the military in politics relative to civilian officials; not to destroy the institution. Second, law enforcement should be placed under civilian authority. Role expansion brought on by national development projects and weakening civilian institutions politicized the military faster than anything in the past. If it is determined through regular channels that such involvement in necessary, then the relationship should be narrowly circumscribed and brief—in and out. In the Asian case, the prevalence of drug trafficking and other international organized crime machines necessitated a broadened definition of security. Normally, the police cannot handle anti-terrorism programs because of the disparity in armaments, but it can collaborate in the investigation phase. Subtleties become important here: it is important to differentiate between military and non-military aspects of national security or the armed forces will become omnipresent.

9. Access and control over resources has been determinant in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Thailand, China, Korea, and Indonesia.

10. The values of the military institution can be re-oriented through constant regularized dialogue.

Speaker: **Eboe Hutchful,** *Wayne State University*

Hutchful began with an anecdote. That week in Washington, he had run into two visiting African parliamentarians. Both turned out to be members of the oversight defense committee; one was a former student. They had just approved their first defense budget, and the process was thus: the Minister of Defense came to Congress, told the Parliament they had to pass it, and they did. The Deputy Speaker said they did it that way because that was the way it had always been done. The Speaker was left over from the last regime; while the other parliamentarian was a former general. Another thing the Minister of Defense did to was to take members of the oversight committee on a tour of the barracks; the MPs were shocked at the decrepitude of the quarters.

The story effectively illustrated a number of points. First, despite the drama of political transition and transformation, the on-the-ground understanding of civil-military relations is shallow and superficial. In many cases, it is a variation on this theme: a former authoritarian regime transforms itself into a political party subject to competition. Thus, what was once the only party, becomes the dominant party in a multiparty system. Confrontations become rancorous and exacerbate polarization (which can be a product of an individual's choices or of the democratic movement per se). Even in new governments (e.g., Zambia), there is the lurking fear that civilians will break all relations with the military.

Some generalities can be culled from the African continent. First, the less professional the military, the less likely they will want to or be able to negotiate for long term institutional interests. Because many problems are caused by dictators themselves, it is important to distinguish between institutions and regimes. Most damaging, democratic movements in Africa have no comprehension of the military in Africa, so both democratization and professionalization are under constant military threat. Institutions are highly factionalized and possess little loyalty in any direction. Incoming civilian governments are tempted to consolidate their power over other civilians by manipulating military cleavages, but they lack the knowledge and the resources to do it well.

Second, control over the armed forces and security agencies was not broadly raised or treated in Africa. It was a peripheral topic in the negotiated peace or brokered transitions of South Africa, Mozambique, Angola, and Namibia. The exception was Tanzania, where for historic reasons, control over the military became critical to the transition. Tanzania had adopted a Chinese-style of control over its army. The military has membership in parliament within a single party framework. The transition altered this arrangement radically: control of the army went from political party to the state, and the military could not hold office.

By contrast, the Ghanaian transition was private, secret, and closed, which accounts in part for the mutual isolation of the military from civil society. The lesson here was that self-

reform is not conducive to democratization. In the final outcome, civilians were not able to control the military.

Putting together feasible strategies for a successful transition has created huge cleavages within the armed forces over the direction of military institutions despite strong evidence that a military government is ruinous for professionalism. Successful civilian democratic movements have taken care to develop factions that can create a constructive civil-military relationship. Consensus is critical because the process must avoid both the impression that civilians are forcing reforms as well as military self-reform.

In conclusion, there has been little systematic attention to civil-military relations in Africa. Most transitions have not translated into democracies, and there has been a wide variety of experience with the role of civil-military relations in regime transition. In South Africa, for example, there was considerable transparency. Since the subject was put on the public agenda and discussed as part of the public domain. This was not the case in Lesotho, where military institutions are not controlled by civilians and are not democratic. In summary, there is little knowledge on how African countries are arranging their civil-military relations.

Speaker: Christopher Dandeker, *Kings College, London*

Since 1991, Dandeker has participated in a series of educational initiatives among civilian and military officers in Central and Eastern Europe. New democracies try to work out for themselves how to build civil-military relations in detail. A key innovation of this enterprise is that the participants talk about the details of civil-military relations, and not just institutional relations, with a number of external actors, including the EC, the EU, NATO, and other national governments, through the auspices of the Department of War Studies and Centre for Defence Studies at King's College London. The need for dialogue and exploration is acute and aggravated by the dismissal of the most senior officers whose expertise and resources are then no longer available to the governments in transitions. Many of the key posts contain officers far too inexperienced to handle the difficulties of transition.

Here the speaker outlined the four major "worries" raised in these conversations.

1. **The nature of civil-military relations in democracies.** It has been difficult to persuade the military that democratization involves more than subordination to civilian political authority. They find it hard to believe that the process of implementing defense policy is a collaborative process conducted by military and civilian officials who are subordinated to civilian political authority and connected to a wider strategic community in civil society. In this process, military officers alone should not have routine access to supreme political authority. The participants have found that it is in fact a joint operation which only works with strong civilian executive leadership, and that it needs to be trained.

2. **The armed forces and public security.** Among the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia, and Bulgaria, a "strategic community" forum was established to work out defense and security policy. This drew on members from the military, civilians, the academy, and independent think tanks, and then linked to similar forae around the world, producing a more integrated strategic community. *A priori* parliamentary monitoring over budget and policy implementation was key to confidence building and transparency. Finally, Parliament only worked when it focussed on a broader public sphere. This raised the need for an independent media and independent institutions to mediate civilian and political society. In this vein, it became important to encourage the establishment of journalism schools to train competent defense correspondents.

3. **Missions.** The honeymoon is over for international peacekeepers. Major new demands are being placed on second generation peacekeepers, whose mission deviates from traditional UN operations. Many second generation peacekeepers are in a position where "everyone is an enemy but there is no enemy." In operations midway between classic peacekeeping and peace enforcement it is difficult to apply General Colin Powell's ideas of clear objective, maximum force and clear exit point for the operation. And, although contributing to international peacekeeping forces appear to have a salutary effect on the sender country's own democracy, cultural interoperability has become a major issue in designing effective multinational peacekeeping forces.

4. **The force structure dilemma.** Assuming it is better to link to the EC, armies in Central and Eastern Europe must then shift force structure to an all-volunteer force. But there are major problems with this: first, governments do not have the resources to protect armies from shrinking public coffers. All-volunteer armies are simply too expensive for most developing countries. The dilemma is further compounded by the fact that the developed country model is a moving target: Western Europe's armies have changed fundamentally over the last five years, and they also have—being now much more "in the marketplace"—downsized considerably.

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Discussion

A number of audience comments revolved around questions of ethnicity. Noting that the question of ethnicity had not been raised in the earlier discussion of civil-military relations in Latin America, Harold Crouch (Australian National University) pointed out that ethnic considerations are very important in Asia and Africa. In some Southeast Asian countries the relations between indigenous military officers and businesspeople of Chinese descent are significant. In Indonesia and Burma, military officers are worried about possible dismemberment of the nation along Yugoslav lines. In many countries, armies do not reflect the ethnic composition of the population. He also suggested that commitment to democratic values sometimes was less important for democratization than factional struggles which led military

officers to seek civilian allies against each other. **Ivelaw Griffith** (Florida International University) wanted to know more about the role of subnational actors in post-transition societies. What is the role of the church, religion, social movements, and ethnicity in reconciliation? **Samuel Decalo** (University of Natal) pointed out that in Russia and Chechnya, ethnic nationalism is the key variable. The Soviet empire left multiple ethnic armies, each in isolation. Decalo was suspicious of the benefits of participating in international peacekeeping. He espoused the view that sending units abroad was a way of exiling undesirables, and would exacerbate institutional segmentation. **John Fishel** reminded the audience that the US army had only been an all-volunteer army since the mid-1970s, and suggested a review of Charles Moskos's work for its caution with respect to distancing a volunteer force from the effects of society at large. **Nicole Ball** (Overseas Development Council) pointed out that the African continent's experience may be instructive for AID's efforts bureau-wide because the donor community has had considerable influence over post-transition demobilization and reintegration efforts. For example, Mozambique's negotiated peace agreement called for the reduction of troops to 30,000 standing men. The government elected in October 1994 wanted to increase that to 45,000, although only 8-11,000 men have joined the new force. Donors have strongly encouraged a shift in the composition of government expenditure, and are in agreement on promoting reduced military expenditure. It is vitally important that this be done through consultation and dialogue, and accompanied by efforts to build civil society. Donors and the government of Mozambique established two working groups on governance and budgeting issues in November 1994 which deal with these issues, among others. **Alexandre Barros** (Early Warning Analysis, Brasilia) asked Hutchful to clarify whether African armies are privatized because they hire people or because the institution itself is co-opted.

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Each panelist was given a few minutes to respond to these inquiries.

Regarding ethnicity and civil-military relations, **Hernandez** thought there might be a small attempt in the Philippines to recruit more Muslim officers, but in general, she knew of no organized campaign to help the armed forces reflect the proportions of the population. She noted strong links between commerce and the military, as elsewhere, but not necessarily via Chinese businessmen. **Hutchful** identified ethnic warfare as the reason for the collapse of regimes in Burundi and Nigeria.

In response to **Griffith's** question, **Hernandez** described the role of the church in the Philippines as double-edged. The church was a powerful reminder to social leaders that reconciliation had to be accompanied by justice There had to be limits, for example, on the election of former state enemies. The Church also lent credibility to the elections and found a way to handle the attempts of the disloyal opposition to buy votes: by telling their parishes to

take the money but to vote as they wished. On the other hand, the Church, which is not a monolithic institution, can become obstructionist. It had launched a strong campaign against the Health Secretary for promoting population control.

Dandeker stood by his original arguments. He emphasized his view that participation in international peacekeeping was entirely salutary for home institutions because it increased transparency by demanding a constant, two-way flow of information and submitting to external scrutiny. He also took the opportunity to point to a possible source of conflict in the near future, i.e., the "commitments or contribution" dilemma: governments could develop tensions over the fact that the more affluent countries could make cash contributions while developing ones would make theirs in personnel.

Hutchful clarified privatization in Africa as the private appropriation of public resources. The financing of military expenditures is pivotal to resolving questions of civil-military tensions, and, as Hutchful's opening anecdote illustrated, it is often done pro forma, or worse, left to rhetoric.

Reports from the Break-out Groups and Closing Plenary. Chair: Louis W. Goodman

At this point, conference participants were divided into five pre-arranged groups. Each group was led by two co-chairs, one a new project participant, and another who had been with the project since its inception. Each group was then assigned to break-out rooms to discuss a question assigned to it. A group rapporteur, also previously assigned, would then have 5-10 minutes to report each group's findings in the closing plenary. Seated at the dais were the session chair and the rapporteurs for Groups 1-4.

Reports from:

Group 1. Topic: What is the relationship of the non-military components of the political system—state, economy, and civil society—to defense and military affairs? What is the impact of these relationships on civil society?

Reporting: David Pion-Berlin, *University of California at Riverside*

Pion-Berlin reported that the phrasing of the topic led his group to question traditional roles and relations among the state, civil society, and the military. How do these entities "plug into" each other? What are their changing functions? The state, for example, has economic functions and would certainly retain them. But what are the legitimate uses of violence? Democratization necessitates an explicit re-articulation of the role of "legitimate" violence and force. Are we now convinced that broad use of violence diminishes its operational utility? Moreover, what about the expanding economic power of armies in developing countries? If this

trend continues, would the repressive apparatus of the state be the only legitimate employer of force and have considerable influence over sources of economic wealth as well?

The group began with the traditional Weberian definition of a state, normatively civilian, elected, and a political representation of civil society. However, to maintain its authority over the armed forces, it had to evince leadership in governance, capability in defense issues, and credibility to maintain its performance and foundational legitimacy. Across the world, states, societies, and armies have arrived at different formulae for carrying out this relationship (Pion-Berlin highlighted the unusual case of India, where complex bureaucratic layers of civil servants buffer the military from civil society) with the exception of functioning democracies in which civilians are empowered to handle public institutions. Following an extended discussion of military roles, Pion-Berlin reported that the deterrent to military role expansion was competent civilian control and leadership.

Group 2. Topic: Will the armed forces be necessary in the 21st century? If so, what kind and for what kind of countries? What will be their missions?

Reporting: Gerardo Le Chevallier, *San Salvador, El Salvador*

This group decided not to have an ideological nor an idealistic approach, but rather a pragmatic one: countries and armed forces exist. They are concrete realities and as such, their mission has to be reviewed according to the needs of the country they are supposed to serve in a new world with new global trends.

The first conclusion is that the armed forces are designed to face the challenges of the past, not the ones of the future. They have not yet realized that it is not their role to fight current security threats. For example, illegal immigrants from Cuba and Haiti are a problem for a civilian Coast Guard; police fight drug traffickers, international criminals, terrorists and those who violate environmental laws; and finally, civilian authorities must also deal with public health threats like HIV.

The second conclusion is that the traditional geographical and economic notions of nation-state have to be redefined. In the past, armed forces not only protected their motherland, but also navigation routes and colonial empires. Recently they defeated Saddam Hussein to protect the oil supply. Will their next operation be to intervene in Brazil to protect the Amazonian oxygen supply? The notion of the nation-state must also be adapted to the effects of economic integration on national defense. Free trade agreements already establish the need for maintaining civilian democratic regimes because they are considered as part of the cost of production and thus a requisite for loyal competition. These agreements will soon include issues like cooperative defense in order to reduce military spending and collective production costs. Academia is already talking of regional treaties to limit the budget (3 percent of GNP) and size (1percent of the population) of the armed forces. Therefore, we will soon witness not only cooperative security, but also collective insurance against coup d'états and military regimes.

In the interim, armed forces will continue to be critical to politics. Since they are strong enough to impose their presence on their fellow citizens, they must be put to work usefully. They can be a unifying force in some multi-ethnic nation-states such as Spain, as they did in the former Yugoslavia, or be part of multinational peace operations, and help in natural or human-provoked disasters. In some cases, recruitment into the military may reduce mounting social pressures caused by the growing number of unemployed or underemployed as more open economies face international competition.

Our third and final conclusion is that each country, according to its specificities and the characteristics of its armed forces and civilian leadership, negotiations have to be started if they want national peaceful transformation. If not, the new security threats and international trends defined above will impose themselves and instead of positive reforms, there will be political instability and economic crisis.

Group 3. Topic: How will functions like the following be carried out inside the military organization: recruitment, career development, retirement, budgeting, force deployment, equipment acquisition, setting rules of combat, consensus on humanitarian laws and human rights concerns, professional training?

Reporting: Ivelaw Griffith, *Florida International University*

The issues identified under this topic are interrelated: how nations proceed on all of them will depend on defense policies and the defense needs identified in the larger security context. The responsibility for setting those policies lies with the civilian political elites. However, elites need to include the professional military in the articulation and design of policies and needs. This is because (a) the civilian elites are generally uneducated about military matters, and (b) the politics of inclusion are important to prevent the military from feeling threatened.

Recruitment has some socio-economic dynamics in that armies become a means of coping with high unemployment. Economic limitations and practical needs make both voluntary and conscriptive recruitment necessary. There are positive and negative aspects to both approaches, the securing of education by soldiers being a positive feature of both. Yet there are issues of class, gender, and ethnicity that need attention in many places. Such issues can have an impact on the capacity for professionalization by the army, stability within the military, and on matters such as career development and force deployment. Although armies are hierarchical in nature, they can serve harmonizing functions because they are also in some ways meritocratic and egalitarian.

Issues such as force strength, equipment acquisition, and budgeting are related to the nature and definition of threats. The circumstances of many countries make matters such as drug trafficking and terrorism eligible for inclusion in the broader security framework. These can serve as the basis for regional security collaboration. Not to be overlooked, though, is the continued salience of traditional bilateral security threats and concerns most of which are not amenable to such action.

It is recognized that economic pressures are forcing the downsizing of armies, but there should be rational and planned restructuring and not merely contraction because of the consequences for professionalization, equipment acquisition, and retirement, among other things. A call was made for ways to stem the flow of skilled military personnel to the commercial sector; e.g., pilots being one area of concern. One suggestion was to offer medical insurance arrangements that allow the military to benefit from the service of pilots after they leave the army.

The issue of human rights is important, but there will be a lag, and often palpable resistance, between the time when human rights education and sensitivity are introduced and when tangible results are measurable. Moreover, the approach to human rights training is important. The subject could be built into the code of military honor. Efforts should be made to ensure the credibility of people who offer human rights training. Former or current leftists or guerrillas would clearly present problems, no matter how well-intentioned. Perhaps more importantly, human rights training should be handled without conveying the impression of being a directive coming from some foreign power.

Group 4. Topic: How will the armed forces relate to the international community? What will relations be like with multilateral agencies; how will peace-keeping operations be organized; what will be the nature of military diplomacy; how will regional security matters be handled?

Reporting: Phyllis Greene Walker, *North-South Center*

Three themes emerged from this group: the importance of international peacekeeping (IP), the input of various publics into the decision-making process, and the importance of confidence building measures.

1. International peacekeeping. Now into its second generation, Argentina, a prominent IP participant, is experiencing some fatigue, but it is predicted that Latin American participation in IP will continue to rise. IP is after all a revenue-generator and may well contribute to demilitarization. However, it may also contribute to some degree of international security: for example, while Argentina is in Croatia, Chile continues to buy arms. It is critical then, to maintain international discussion on these issues. Also, opportunities for developing countries to have a role in IP will likely grow, given the current trend of "delayering" (condensing of forces hierarchy) in developed country armies to meet budget constraints. The operational implications of this are not yet clear, although specialists are already concerned about risks to combat flexibility. IP has also given rise to its own hierarchic international order of patrons and clients. How nations marry the constraints of resources versus forces will require negotiation. Finally, it is becoming more and more important to distinguish between peacemaking, which is a diplomatic effort, and peace-building, which is supportive of diplomatic efforts. The latter may be perceived as a challenge to national sovereignty.

2. **The public and decision-making.** The media and telecommunications are the ways that the public participate in the decision-making process. It is important to educate the media on how to report on civil-military issues, and to create opportunities for dialogue between the military and the public, especially as the military's role becomes blurry. Operational effectiveness can be challenged by public demands, such as the issue of gay participation in the military.

3. **Confidence-building measures.** These are methods for increasing civil-military integration and high-level state participation in military matters. Armies distinguish between loyalty to the state and the Constitution as opposed to that owed the government and the regime. Does this contribute to coups and military intervention in politics? Civilians must take the initiative and engage the armed forces in dialogue.

In conclusion, the group's discussions began at the international level and then finally came to focus on the domestic bureaucratic sphere. This suggests that the question of the armed forces' relations with the international community may be better understood by considering it using various levels of analysis.

Group 5. Topic: How will the armed forces relate to national politics in the 21st century? How will the military relate to the media, to NGOs, to environmental movements, and to other new actors?

Reporting: Juan Rial, *PEITHO*

Rial called for a more global approach to civil-military relations in the 21st century. Quoting General Mauricio Vargas,[11] Rial reminded the audience that the "problem isn't the military; the problem is the nexus of all the actors."[12] A new agenda that confronts the new economic rules and the transformation of democracy around the world is a prerequisite to future conversations on civil-military relations.

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The continuing challenge that faces all nations on the eve of the twenty-first century is providing the security forces of each state with resources to perform their jobs professionally, but not politically. Only by strenthening public participation—through legislative processes, through non-governmental organizations, through creating the environment for dialogue—will civil-military relations be supportive of the democratic processes needed to ensure individual rights, to protect minorities, and to guarantee economic development.

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[11] General Vargas was the Armed Forces representative to the El Salvadoran peace negotiations and a participant of this conference.

[12] "*El problema no son los militares; sino el conjunto de todo.*"

Appendices

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Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: Lessons Learned

The Democracy Projects
School of International Service • American University
Radisson Barceló Hotel—2121 P Street, NW, Washington, D.C.
May 4-6, 1995

AGENDA

MAY 4
WELCOMING DINNER

6:00 pm	Reception
7:00 pm	Dinner Introduction: **Charles Costello**, *Global Democracy Center, USAID* Keynote Address: **Ambassador Sally Shelton**, *Assistant Administrator, Global Bureau, USAID*

MAY 5
REVIEW OF LESSONS LEARNED FROM LATIN AMERICA

8:30 am	Breakfast
9:00 - 10:30 am	Session I: Civil-Military Relations and the Political System Chair: **Louis W. Goodman**, *American University/School of International Service* Panelists: **Raúl Benítez Manaut**, *Universidad Autónomo de Mexico, Mexico City* **Ricardo Córdova M.**, *FUNDAUNGO, San Salvador* **Andrés Fontana**, *Institute of Foreign Service, Buenos Aires*
10:30 - 11:00 am	Coffee Break
11:00 - 12:30 pm	Session II: Civil-Military Relations and Civil Society Chair: **Johanna Mendelson Forman**, *American University/School of International Service* Panelists: **Enrique Obando**, *CEPEI, Lima* **Carina Perelli**, *PEITHO, Montevideo* **George Vickers**, *Washington Office on Latin America*
12:30 - 2:15 pm	Luncheon Keynote Address: **Ambassador Hernan Patiño Mayer**, *Ambassador of Argentina to the OAS*
2:30 - 4:00 pm	Session III: Civil-Military Relations and the Economy Chair: **Juan Rial**, *PEITHO* Panelists: **Alexandre Barros**, *Early Warning Risk Analysis, Brasilia* **Paul George**, *SIPRI, Stockholm* **Francisco Rojas**, *FLACSO, Santiago*
4:00 - 5:30 pm	Session IV: Lessons Learned

MAY 6
GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS: APPLICABILITY OF LESSONS LEARNED IN LATIN AMERICA TO OTHER REGIONS

9:30 - 11:00 am	Morning Session: Opening plenary
11:30 - 3:00 pm	Working luncheon: Small group sessions
3:00 - 5:00 pm	Afternoon Session: Closing plenary

"Lessons Learned, Civil-Military Relations in Latin America"
The Democracy Projects, School of International Service, American University
Radisson Barceló Hotel—2121 P Street, NW, Washington, D.C.

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PROJECT HISTORY
THE DEMOCRACY PROJECTS AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
1986-1995

INTRODUCTION:

During the 1980s in country after country Latin American armed forces relinquished government control to democratically elected civilian leaders.* This democratic opening in the twilight of the cold war was initially viewed with skepticism by some who thought the moment would be short-lived. Fortunately, the endurance of democratic values coupled with the continued strengthening of democratic institutions and a changed international environment have resulted in a regional situation in which democracies appear to be gaining strength, albeit haltingly. Despite substantial uncertainty, constructive civil-military relations have been central to this process. Improving these relations and clarifying the role of the armed forces in democratic political systems is a key challenge today for leaders in Latin America and elsewhere.+

The last fifteen years have demonstrated that the path toward democracy in Latin America has not been easy. No simple formulae can heal the wounds of military repression—as, for example, is shown by revelations about the"dirty war" in Argentina. Nor are there simple solutions to cases such as those in Colombia and Peru where new problems—internal terrorists and narcotics trafficking—complicate civil-military relationship. In many cases, the presence of a freely elected civilian government may not necessarily indicate complete subordination of the armed forces to civilian rule. Even in the region's most stable democracy, Venezuela, the pressure of military leaders to correct the perceived inadequacy of civilian rule have shaken the roots of political culture.- And yet one of the critical underpinnings of a democratic government is subordination of the armed forces to the will of elected officials. The tradition of a powerful armed forces, an independent military institution with a legal and historical legacy of self-sufficiency and self-rule, still remains in the shadows of many of the achievements that democratic reforms and economic liberalization have bestowed upon the region. Certainly, this is the current situation in El Salvador,

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* In 1979, nineteen governments in Latin America were headed by military officers, in 1995 only Cuba has a head of state who appears publically in a military uniform and who has active ties to his nation's armed forces.

+ Discussed in The Military and Democracy. (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1990).

- Discussed in Lessons from the Venezuelan Experience. (Washington D.C. & Baltimore: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press & John Hopkins University Press, 1995).

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in spite of the implementation of the peace accords and the presence of an apparently successful United Nations peacekeeping operation.

But there has been progress in civil-military relations during this transition period. Civilians have, through dialogue and discussion, gained a clearer understanding of the role of the military in democratic political systems. Nowhere is this more apparent than in Argentina, where a collaboration between the armed forces and civilian experts has yielded a new approach to creating a much-needed cadre of civilian expertise. Many Argentines have gained more education about national security matters and have entered the heretofore closed domain of military planning through employment in defense ministries. The economic shift to privatization and the regional integration movements (Mercosur and the Central American Common Market) have also made an impact on the armed forces of the region, challenging the armed institutions to reexamine their own resource needs in the context of national development agendas. Similarly, militaries, which were once completely segregated from civilian judicial systems, have come under greater scrutiny because of the increased vigilance by non-governmental human rights organizations who have not accepted impunity as acceptable in the context of democracy building. In many countries progress in this area will depend on how well judicial reform and citizen education in the law move forward.[4]

THE DEMOCRACY PROJECTS AT THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY:

The Democracy Projects at The American University's School of International Service began work on civil-military relations in 1986, a time when power had just been relinquished by the armed forces in many Latin American countries and hope for military subordination to civilian authority was just beginning to be seen as central to the goal of a more democratic hemisphere. The project entered its ninth year at a time when all countries of the region except Cuba had democratically-elected civilian presidents. Since its start the Democracy Projects has produced new research—both country specific and thematic studies—that has contributed to the establishment of Latin American civil-military relations as a strengthened field of study. Moreover, the project's staff and participants have developed substantial expertise in the area of civil-military relations and serve as advisors to programs throughout the world.

One of the oldest and most comprehensive efforts to gain a broader understanding of the theory and practice of civil-military relations, the project has collaborated with scholars and practitioners from throughout the hemisphere to achieve two interrelated goals: **1) the expansion of publicly available knowledge about the region's military through research, dialogue and networking, and 2) the dissemination of lessons learned from the Latin American experience**

[4]Problems and Progress are discussed in Civil-Military Relations: Toward the Year 2000 (forthcoming).

which might be applied to countries in other world areas experiencing transitions from military rule.

Through conferences, publications, networking and education the Democracy Projects have expanded the knowledge base on civil-military relations, and have created a growing base of individuals, organizations, and institutions. These seek to incorporate the work of the project participants into the practical world of democratic governance as it evolves throughout the hemisphere.

Although the armed forces in Latin America have generally supported democratically elected governments, the institution's future is uncertain. The end of the Cold War signals a diminishing need for large armed institutions. If civilians do not demonstrate creative leadership and if the armed forces react negatively to this uncertainty, the democratic gains of the last fifteen years could be threatened. More than any other time in history, the post-cold war period will underscore the challenge to civilians that democracy is more than holding free elections. Democratic endurance will be tested by the staying power of civilian governments to remain effective, credible and legitimate forces of order. Thus, a heavy burden rests with the civilian authorities as they define new institutional relationships with the military.

At a time of great opportunity shadowed by great danger, the Democracy Projects are a forum for efforts to strengthen democracy in Latin America and for providing insights for others striving to match democratic interest with changing institutional needs.

PROJECT HISTORY:

First conceived in 1986 as a way for scholars to contribute their expertise to the efforts of democratization in Latin America, the Democracy Projects on civil-military relations today has greatly expanded in terms of participants and subject matter. The project began when Dr. Louis W. Goodman, then director of the Latin America Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, collaborated with Uruguayan political scientist Juan Rial in a conference on civil-military relations. Dr. Johanna Mendelson Forman, a Latin Americanist, historian and attorney, joined the project in 1987, and has since served as director.

CONFERENCES:

In November 1986 the project received a grant from the United States Agency for International Development's Office of Democratic Initiatives to initiate work in this field. The site of the project would be The American University, School of International Service, where Goodman had been named Dean. A partnership was established with PEITHO, the Uruguayan research institute headed by Rial, based in Montevideo.

WASHINGTON/PANAMA CITY/WASHINGTON:

Work on the civil-military relations project began immediately. The first of what would be series of brainstorming meetings took place in Washington, D.C. in January 1987. Its purpose was to identify scholars and practitioners in the field who could become part of the Latin America network. **The meeting yielded important results: the creation of an initial roster of scholars and practitioners who could contribute to the dialogue. It also revealed the paucity of Latin American specialists, since study of the military had been taboo during the darkest years of military rule. The conclusion of this meeting was that the lack of serious civilian study of the military in Latin America and the spurning of the subject matter by serious scholars meant that much work would have to be done to create new knowledge about civil-military relations.** Indeed, the project would have to become a pioneering effort to establish a cadre of experts who could both understand the issues in the region and serve as practitioners in the freely elected governments which now comprised the political landscape of Latin America.

Four priority areas of inquiry were identified in this first session:

1. Legacies of the Transition Process.
2. The Perception of Threats by the Armed Forces.
3. New Missions and the New Professionalism of the Armed Forces.
4. Civil-Military Relations and Political Regimes in Latin America.

Out of the Washington meeting a plan developed to commission papers for a writer's conference on civil-military relations. Paper writers gathered, in December 1987, in Panama City at the invitation of the US Southern Command's Commander in Chief, General Fred Woerner. The Democracy Projects brought the nine paper-writers from Latin America and six from the United States to visit the headquarters of the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). The meeting provided participants with a close-up view of relations between civilians and military leaders at the center of US military strategy for the region. The Panama venue also afforded a rare window into the regime of military leader General Manuel Antonio Noriega at a time when the United States was spearheading an intense confrontation with Panama over military rule. It also brought into focus the ascendancy of the counter-narcotic mission that was now part of the threat assessment for the region. For many at this meeting, the drug war became the focus of debate as to its appropriateness as a military mission. It marked the beginning of a long series of dialogues on roles and missions of the armed forces, a theme that still pervades the subject of civil-military relations in a democratic government. The Panama meeting was an encounter to promote dialogue, discuss research, and to prepare for the project's first publication, The Military and Democracy: Civil-Military Relations in Latin America. It pointed out the challenges that the project faced in getting Latin Americans to learn about the military institution and its relationship to the success of the emerging democracies of the region.

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To meet the challenge of bringing civilians and military officials together from the region, the Democracy Projects convened a conference in Washington, D.C., in May 1988 which brought together defense ministers, officers, civilian political leaders and scholars from Latin America, Europe and the United States. Support provided by the McArthur Foundation and the Department of the Army allowed the project to support active duty officers in their travel and lodging to Washington. What many have called the largest privately sponsored meeting of national security experts from Latin America, the meeting was also attended by civilian and military practitioners in the United States.

Besides the exchange of views which took place during the Washington conference, the following observations provided guidance for ongoing discussion:

* Civilians and military did not share the same concept of democracy. For the military democracy was equated with economic and social reforms which would ultimately yield political stability. For civilians, democracy was a process which would only arise from the citizens, through popular demand for change.

* The legacy of authoritarianism was an issue which surfaced during the discussions. Some military officers expressed their belief that coup d'etat's were justified based on the absence of effective civilian power.

* Drug trafficking was an issue on which the U.S. military participants insisted was a necessary military mission. This view was not shared by their Latin American counterparts. Latin officers argued that involving them in the drug war would open up the military institution to corruption. Furthermore, combatting narcotics was viewed as a police action, not a military one.

* Except for the experts who had studied the military, few civilian leaders who attended the conference had much expertise on military policy, threat assessment, resource management or planning. This only underscores that in 1988 few civilians were able to handle military issues in their respective countries, thus allowing military matters remain predominantly in the hands of the armed forces rather than under civilian control.

* Finally, those in the military who spoke up expressed their support for democratic government. Nevertheless, there were still some expressions of distrust of civilian politicians due the perception that they were responsible for ongoing political and economic instability.

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GUATEMALA CITY:

Face to face contacts between civilian and military officials remain essential to the trust and confidence which will be needed to sustain the democratic transitions and consolidate them in the years to come. To further this notion in 1989 the Democracy Projects followed up a proposal by then Guatemalan Defense Minister, Hector Alejandro Gramajo, to hold a regional dialogue on civil-military relations in Guatemala City. (This invitation followed the Washington conference in 1988.) In June 1989 one hundred and eleven persons met at the Centro de Estudios Militares to discuss the regional need for improving the civil-military dialogue. For the first time many human rights non-governmental organizations joined with political and military leaders to discuss democratic transitions. Described by Guatemala's leading news weekly, Cronica, as creating "sparks of understanding" between civilians and military leaders, the three-day program marked a new opening for discussion between these two groups. The presence of political leaders and military officers from Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica transformed this conference to a regional dialogue on the way democratic transitions have affected the political climate. This very complex conference allowed the project to develop a methodology for creating dialogue among diverse social sectors on the subject of civil-military relations.

PANAMA:

The success of Guatemala took the project in a new direction, that of technical assistance to USAID Missions. The December 1989 invasion of Panama, which restored an elected government to power, also resulted in the abolition of the Panamanian armed forces. The former Panamanian military were converted to a police force, the Fuerza Publica, which in six months emerged as the only security force in the country. The Democracy Project was asked to explore the possibility of establishing a national dialogue on what Panama without a military would mean to the consolidation of democracy. Project staff and research teams visited Panama in 1990 with the hope of creating such a program, but political conditions did not allow the program to move forward.

SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA:

The relationship between internal and external security needs became a focus of the Democracy Project based on the experiences in Panama and El Salvador. Both nations had set up new police forces whose missions were purely internal. Yet it was also clear that the armed forces of the region had also performed policing functions under the guise of their respective strategic doctrines and their constitutional mandates. In San Jose, Costa Rica, in August 1991, in collaboration with the *Centro de Investigacion y Adiestramiento Politico-Adminstrativo* (CIAPA), the project convened a group of Central American leaders to discuss the subject, "The Military, the Police and the Courts." The two day session called for the need to clarify police power functions

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as part of the democratic state, and integrated the role of civilian justice systems in the furtherance of public safety and security. A volume of Pensamiento Centroamericano devoted an entire issue to the papers presented at the meeting.

Workshop participants analyzed ways the region's militaries could be reorganized, both to operate collectively and to function more efficiently on a national level. Underlying this discussion was the concept that military forces should perform appropriate roles within democratic political systems, such as providing external defense and national disaster assistance.

There was also substantial discussion on the need to strengthen the judicial systems in the region as a way to strengthen civilian state authority. In particular, participants were unanimous supporting efforts to return civilian judicial matters then under military courts to civilian authority as part of the consolidation of democratic rule in the region. This was especially important because during the period of military rule or military dominance, civilian judicial authority had been eclipsed by the military justice system.

Key to this program were the attendees, who included practitioners such as now-Honduran President Carlos Roberto Reina, the current Honduran Foreign Minister Ernesto Paz Aguilar, Constantino Urcuyo, now a Deputy in the Costa Rican National Assembly, and police experts, Ibrahim Azvat of Panama, who headed the newly created civilian police, and Luis Salas of Florida International University, and Martha Huggins of Union College, a specialist on Brazilian police issues. Also in attendance were then Guatemalan Assembly President Edmond Mulet, Hector Rosada Granados (currently Head of the Guatemalan Peace Commission and his country's key negotiator), and former Salvadoran Deputy, Gerardo LeChevallier. This small and productive working meeting contributed another dimension to the study of civil-military relations: the interrelationship between the rule of law and the democratic state.

MONTEVIDEO, URUGUAY:

In collaboration with PEITHO, the Democracy Projects co-hosted a meeting in Montevideo in March 1991. This program brought together the heads of the region's legislatures' defense committees with military officers, business leaders, scholars, practitioners and journalists. The conference, following an invitation issued in Washington by then-Defense Minister General Hugo Medina (Ret.), the focus was to discuss civil-military relations, the impact of civilian legislatures in military decision making and the consolidation of democractic political systems then taking root in South America.

At the conference, experts discussed key issues such as: the definition of the military profession; the effects of economic policies on the armed forces in the context of fiscal and

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economic adjustments such as privatization; the international context and its impact on the notion of defense and security; and the effect of the accelerated pace of regional economic and political integration on the efforts to improve communication networks between the civilian and military sectors. What became apparent at that conference was how ill-informed many legislators were concerning civil-military relations, and their responsibility to lead rather than follow the signals of the armed forces in their respective nations.

Participants at the Montevideo meeting included a wide range of military leaders, representatives of the Inter-American Defense Board, and Senator Eduardo Frei, the cousin of current Chilean president Arturo Frei, who in 1991, served as chair of the defense committee in the Chilean Senate.

PARAGUAY:

The democratic opening in Paraguay in 1991 led the way for intense interest in the future of the military in the changing political environment. The Democracy Projects, in collaboration with PEITHO and two Paraguayan non-governmental organizations, the *Centro de Estudios Democraticos* and the *Grupo de Estudios Sociales*, launched a program in Paraguay that culminated in a meeting between civilian and military experts from other nations and Paraguayan military officers and civilian leaders. Because of the fragile nature of the Paraguayan transition the directors of the program devoted much time and resources to laying an appropriate foundation for such a gathering. Working together with the few Paraguayan social scientists and political leaders who understood the Paraguayan military, several pre-conference encounters framed an agenda which included four topics:

1. the role of the armed forces at the end of the cold war.
2. constitutional development and the armed forces (Paraguay was about to draft an new charter).
3. professionalization, mission and future roles of the armed forces in Latin America.
4. integration and security in the Southern Cone.

Among the more salient discussion themes that emerged during the conference was the impact of regional economic and political integration on the armed forces.[5] Understanding what such economic changes mean within the context of traditional military roles is a key to determining the future structure and character of the region's armies. It also became clear to civilian leaders that they would have to collaborate closely with the armed forces to define appropriate missions that

[5] Mercosur, the regional trading arrangement among Paraguay, Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay, had just been created in 1991 by the Treaty of Asuncion.

support economic and democratic development. Finally, for Paraguay, ending the isolation of both the civilian and military sectors of that nation's society would require that all parties use the institutions of democratic government to facilitate changes that would reinforce mutual respect and support for each other's roles.

VENEZUELA:

The possibility of a reversal of democracy in Venezuela in February 1992 led the Democracy Projects to focus on the roots of the military uprising that nearly overthrew the government of Carlos Andres Perez. In collaboration with the Latin America Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., and the North-South Center of the University of Miami, we organized a meeting in the autumn of 1992 to explore the lessons learned from the situation in Venezuela. Drawing a high-level audience and expert speakers the conference explored the impact of the Venezuela experience on civil-military relations, and the implications that events in Venezuela had on other consolidated democracies. The two-day conference resulted in a major new volume on the Venezuela which was published by Johns Hopkins University Press in 1995, Lessons of the Venezuelan Experience.

EL SALVADOR:

The Democracy Projects continued to work in Central America in cooperation with the United States Information Agency on the subject of civil-military relations. In late summer 1994 the Democracy Projects sent a team of experts to San Salvador to participate in a national forum on civil-military relations in the context of the peace accords. Working together with *Centro de Estudios Democraticos*, CEDEM, a non-governmental organization directed by Luis Cardenal, the Democracy Projects provided the technical expertise, and the specialists who could illustrate the subject through comparative experiences for the case of El Salvador.

Preparations for this visit began in early 1994 when Drs. Goodman and Mendelson assisted the US Embassy in a technical mission to assess the state of civil-military relations in El Salvador. These encounters with business, military, professional leaders, and political parties was especially helpful in measuring the progress in civil-military relations that had taken place in El Salvador since the peace accords were completed in early 1992. This visit also provided us with an useful comparison to the conditions in El Salvador in 1992, when a project visit, sponsored by the multi-partisan think-tank, IDELA, revealed many obstacles to free dialogue about military roles.

Another effort to establish a clearer understanding about the unique case of El Salvador took place in partnership with the US Army War College in September 1994. A roundtable which included former FMLN leader Joaquin Villalobos, former presidential candidate Rubén Zamora,

and former Salvadoran army peace negotiator, General (ret.) Mauricio Vargas, led to an important dialogue on the war in El Salvador, and the democratic transition now occurring in that nation.

WASHINGTON, D.C.

From May 4-6, 1995, the Democracy Projects convened a meeting of the hemisphere's civil-military reseachers, policymakers, and senior military officers in Washington D.C. Experts from Asia, Africa and Europe also were invited to participate in the meeting. The purpose of the meeting was to distill lessons from the scholarship and practice of civil-military relations in Latin America which could be instructive in other regions of the world currently experimenting with democracy. The meeting reinforced the impostance of civil-military relations as a precondition to democratic development. Security concerns must be part of any transition dialogue.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

As the Democracy Projects look forward and examines the work that has been accomplished, the expertise developed by the staff, scholars and practitioners has led to continued requests for technical assistance in the field of civil-military relations to USAID missions and US Embassies. During the 1994 and 1995 the project has provided assistance to the Escuela de Defensa Nacional in Buenos Aires, and the USAID Missions in San Salvador, Quito, Ecuador and Guatemala City. It has also received additional follow-up requests from the USAID Representative in Paraguay and the US Mission in Ecuador.

Project participants, which include a wide variety of experts and practitioners from throughout the hemisphere, continue to play a major role as advisors to governments, legislatures and military organizations about the best ways to engage civilians to develop an understanding about security matters. Participation in hundreds of regional meetings has been a key to expanding the network of participation and information to all parts of the hemisphere and to other regions as well. Most recently, Democracy Projects participants have attended forums which approach the theme of civil-military relations cross-culturally in Asia, Africa and the former Soviet Union.

Expanding the network of specialists in civil-military relations has also evolved as a network which the Democracy Projects inaugurated in 1994 at the annual meeting of the Latin American Studies Association. The first network meeting exceeded our expectations, with over 70 persons joining the project directors to begin this new phase of communication and collaboration with others. A follow-up event is being planned for September 1995.

Since its inception, the Democracy Projects has sought diverse partners in the region to help foster greater understanding among civilians and military organizations about the importance of good civil-military relations as the key to deepening democracy. Among the partnerships are those with: PEITHO (Uruguay); CIAPA (Costa Rica); CEDEM (El Salvador); *Grupo de Estudios Sociales* and *Centro de Estudios Democraticos* (Paraguay); ASIES and the *Centro de Estudios Militares* (Guatemala); US Southern Command (Panama); US Army War College (Carlisle); the National Defense University (Washington, D.C.); the North-South Center, University of Miami (Florida).

The Democracy Projects also serves as a center for foreign experts who visit Washington, D.C. and whose interests focus on civil-military relations. The Democracy Projects has hosted numerous seminars, roundtables and luncheon discussions over the past nine years for civilian and military leaders from Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, El Salvador, Panama, Poland, Russia. Working with the USIA's international visitor's programming, the project is an important contact point for the US government for civilians and military desiring to learn more about promoting democracy and improving the civil-military balance.

BOOK PUBLICATIONS:

The project's first book, The Military and Democracy: Civil-Military Relations in Latin America, published by Lexington Books in 1990, remains a seminal work in the study of this subject. It was translated into Spanish and published in Montevideo, Uruguay, gaining wide circulation in Latin America. A work on Political Parties and Democracy in Central America, published by Westview Press in 1992, has also added to the literature. The book contained several chapters on the relationship between political parties and the region's militaries. A third book, Lessons from the Venezuelan Experience, published by Johns Hopkins Press and the Woodrow Wilson Center in 1995, has also reflected the ongoing interest among project directors in the relationship between democracy and civil-military relations. Civil-Military Relations: Towards the Year 2000, awaits final publication this year. It reflects new experience and expertise that project members gained in the context of the consolidation of the region's democracies.

The Democracy Project has also published occasional reports on its field missions and related subject-matter. Most recently, reports on our Ecuador, Guatemala and El Salvador missions were distributed widely. Project directors, Goodman, Mendelson and Rial and Perelli have also continued to publish policy-related and theoretical articles in numerous publications. Other project members have also contributed over 100 articles on the subject since 1986 the start of this project.

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CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND THE FUTURE OF THE DEMOCRACY PROJECTS:

After nine years of supporting dialogue among political leaders of all political persuasions and military officers whose careers have spanned the transition from authoritarian rule to an age of more open and democratic government, this Project seeks to extend the lessons learned to a global framework. By breaking down stereotypes and by looking for common ground, the Project participants and its directors have attempted to assist with building the foundation for peace and political stability in the region. These experiences can also offer hope to other parts of the world undergoing similar political changes.

There are still so many challenges that lie ahead. Many civilians still enter politics ill-prepared to govern, let alone manage the armed forces, an institution which still remain substantially isolated from the rest of political life. Additional training in the management of institutions of governance—including the executive branch, the legislature, and the judiciary—have made it more important to integrate programs on civil-military relations into the mainstream of other types of support for democracy. One piece of evidence that this is needed comes from growing number of requests for assistance by democracy officers in USAID programs and from other organizations involved in support for democratic reforms.

There is also the challenge of civil-military relationships and the notion of sustainable development. Without managing the security apparatus of a state moving through a democratic transition, other types of democracy building activities will only be marginal in their impact. While Latin America states have not experienced the massive demobilizations which have characterized the end of fighting in many African nations, or the downsizing now taking place among the armies of Russia and other former Warsaw Pact states, the future role of the military will still be dependent on a much reduced force performing changed missions. How these armed forces accept their new role, as institutions subordinate to civilian rule and as institutions in transition, will ultimately affect the quality of democratic government that develops.

Finally, in 1995, as the world faces greater numbers of complex crises—failed states, internal wars, displaced populations—an understanding of civil-military relations should be viewed as an essential tool for policy makers interested in preventive diplomacy. The greater communication between military forces and civilian populations, the better prepared new democracies will be to prevent a reliance on military force or military government as a way to combat crime, reduce violence, or prevent corruption. The new threats that challenge the state at the end of the 20th century require solutions that no military alone can counter. To combat narco-trafficking, to prevent illegal flows of populations, to reduce contraband shipments of arms, to counter large transfers of resources to illegal banks, and to ensure that public safety is not compromised through para-military operations or guerilla forces, more than a military response will be necessary. Finding

ways to respond to ever-more complex global issues will require dialogue, communication, and the ability to utilize force in a way which represents a democratic consensus rather than a minority reaction to events. Working with civilian and military leaders on these issues will help establish the basis for a maturing democratic relationship—a relationship that recognizes the dynamic in civil-military relations which can move nations toward stability, political legitimacy and economic development.

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