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**NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

THE 1993 ELECTIONS IN PAKISTAN

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This report on the October 1993 elections in Pakistan was prepared by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI). It focuses on the period from November 1990, when the last elections were completed, through the October 1993 elections and summarizes work NDI has conducted in Pakistan since 1987. NDI reports completed for the 1988 and 1990 elections in Pakistan describe those past activities in more detail.

The 1993 report was prepared under the Institute's auspices after consultations with the 35 members of the international delegation NDI organized to observe the elections. Although information from the delegation's post-election debriefing and from subsequent communications with delegation members are incorporated in the body of the report, the Institute assumes full responsibility for the accuracy of this account.

NDI staff members Salman Ahmed and Derek Mitchell were the primary writers of the report. Sections were also contributed by Patrick Merloe, NDI senior associate for electoral processes, and Karen Clark, NDI senior program officer and manager of the Pakistan program; NDI Regional Assistant Marjorie Collins prepared the appendices, and the report was edited by NDI Editor Douglas Stevenson and myself.

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Kenneth D. Wollack
President, National Democratic Institute
June 27, 1994

PROLOGUE

The 1993 elections were Pakistan's third in five years. The 1988 elections, scheduled following President Zia ul-Haq's death in August 1988, brought to power Pakistan People's Party (PPP) leader Benazir Bhutto as prime minister. On August 2, 1990, charging official corruption, nepotism and malfeasance and citing authority under the Pakistan Constitution, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed the Bhutto government, dissolved the national and provincial assemblies and scheduled new elections for October 1990.

The Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI), a coalition of nine conservative and Islamic political parties led by former Punjab chief minister Mian Mohammed Nawaz Sharif, emerged victorious in 1990 with 105 seats. The People's Democratic Alliance (PDA), a four-member coalition dominated by Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP), won 45 seats. Sharif was elected prime minister.

The Sharif government assumed power on schedule in November 1990, and the PDA took up the opposition in the national and provincial assemblies. However, the PDA never accepted fully the results of the 1990 elections, presaging the political turmoil that racked the Sharif government throughout its short tenure. The PDA charged that the elections were rigged and filed a series of petitions with the Central Election Commission. In October 1991 the PDA released a "White Paper" on the elections, in which the coalition officially stated its allegations and sought to document them. For her part, Benazir Bhutto continued to challenge the constitutionality of her ouster.

Over the next three years Bhutto consistently pressed for new elections, even as she and her husband faced criminal charges of official corruption. Bhutto's persistence led to repeated clashes with government forces amid charges of intimidation and partisan violence. In November 1991, government forces arrested hundreds of PPP activists and supporters in Sind province, claiming those detained were members of the Al-Zulfikar group, an alleged terrorist wing of the PPP said to be headed by Benazir Bhutto's brother, Murtaza Bhutto. The PPP claimed partisan violence. When the PDA threatened to conduct a "Long March" from Rawalpindi to Islamabad to demand President Ishaq Khan dissolve the Sharif government in late 1992, skirmishes between police and PDA supporters again erupted, leading to hundreds of arrests and injuries.

Lingering partisan and ethnic tensions exploded in Sind again in mid-1992. Increased dacoity [banditry], kidnapping, and the proliferation of unauthorized weaponry (in large part a legacy of the Afghan War) led the Islamabad government to call in the army to restore order in what became known as "Operation Clean Up." Violence soon also broke out between two factions of the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM), a Karachi-based political party of post-partition *muhajirs* (immigrants) from India. Government forces, contending that the MQM was involved in a range of crimes, stepped in. Hundreds of people were arrested. The majority Altaf faction of the MQM accused the government of using Operation Clean Up to crush the party. MQM representatives in the National Assembly and the Sind Provincial Assembly resigned in protest. Meanwhile, MQM leader Altaf Hussain decided to remain in London, where he had gone before the crackdown. Hussain remained in exile through the 1993 elections.

The Sharif government nonetheless initiated an aggressive agenda to promote economic modernization and privatization. Proposals to denationalize the banking system, liberalize foreign exchange and import restrictions, and open government-run industries to private investors were well received by the business community and helped to expand Pakistan's tiny middle class. Eventually, however, such policies drew the ire of allies within the IJI coalition, particularly the religious parties. These groups were dissatisfied with what they perceived as the government's inadequate commitment to further Islamization of Pakistan society and its insufficient support for allies in neighboring Afghanistan and Kashmir. Additionally, these groups were unhappy with allegations of corruption among Sharif's advisors and relatives. Rivals within Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League (PML) also created problems with their challenges to his leadership and, eventually, by defections. By the summer of 1992, the IJI coalition was substantially weaker than it had been a year earlier and was confronting ongoing internal divisions.

Ultimately, however, it was friction between the prime minister and the president that precipitated the premature elections of 1993. The rift developed in the wake of presidential appointments of the office of the Chief of Army Staff in late 1992 and early 1993 and the president's growing discontent over Sharif's desire to have a say in military matters. In March 1993 the Sharif government initiated discussions in the National Assembly to modify the controversial Eighth Amendment to the constitution. The amendment, a legacy of Zia's regime, gives the president broad power to dissolve the parliament and to appoint military chiefs and judges. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan resisted what he saw as a challenge to his authority and, for the third time in five years, a constitutional power struggle between the president and prime minister ensued.

Bhutto, despite having fought since 1990 her removal under the same provision, sided with the president. The decision cost her the support of some traditional allies who had been part of the PDA coalition that had formed the government in 1988.

On April 18, President Ishaq Khan invoked the Eighth Amendment, dissolved the National Assembly and, citing "maladministration, nepotism and corruption," dismissed the prime minister and his cabinet. The four provincial assemblies, however, remained intact. An interim cabinet including opposition representatives was appointed. Balakh Sher Mazari, a member of the dissolved National Assembly, was sworn in as acting prime minister. National Assembly elections were scheduled for July 14.

On May 26, however, the Pakistan Supreme Court unexpectedly ruled the dismissals unconstitutional and ordered the National Assembly, the cabinet and the prime minister restored to power. Sharif declared victory and returned to his post seemingly stronger than ever -- particularly in light of the popular support for the Supreme Court's decision.

Deadlock soon returned, however, as each of the four provincial chief ministers -- allies of the president -- dissolved their respective assemblies and called for new elections. Bhutto staged a PPP walkout of the National Assembly and threatened to organize street demonstrations to force new polls.

On July 18, after a series of discussions brokered by Army Chief of Staff Abdul Waheed failed to lead to a resolution of their differences, the prime minister and the president each resigned and agreed to the appointment of a neutral caretaker government to administer new elections and oversee Pakistan's affairs in the interim. With the assent of Sharif and of Benazir Bhutto, former World Bank official Moeen Qureshi was appointed interim prime minister. In accordance with the constitution, Chairman of the Senate Wasim Sajjad assumed the role of interim president. The National Assembly and all provincial assemblies were dissolved, and new national elections were scheduled for October 6. Provincial elections were set for October 9.

(For a more complete overview of Pakistan politics since 1947, please refer to NDI's report on the 1990 elections.)

I. NDI HISTORY IN PAKISTAN

Since 1987, NDI has sent to Pakistan 11 missions, seven of which have dealt directly with the election process. NDI sent a two-member team to Pakistan for the 1987 Local Bodies elections and scheduled its first seminar for 1988. The seminar was canceled however when President Zia ul-Haq dissolved the national and provincial assemblies in May 1988.

In November 1988, the Institute organized an 18-member international delegation to observe national and provincial elections scheduled following Zia's death in August. In NDI's final report on the elections, the delegation cautioned that Pakistan's political leaders must work to consolidate democratic government and that institutions such as an accountable government, vibrant political parties, an independent judiciary, democratic trade unions and a nonpartisan military must be nurtured and supported as crucial to the maintenance of a free society.

NDI returned to Pakistan in 1990 following the dismissal of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's government in August. NDI organized a 40-member international delegation to observe elections held in October. In its final report on these elections, NDI concluded that there was no evidence of a "systematic effort to commit fraud on a national scale" but that first-hand observations as well as a statistical analysis suggested serious electoral inconsistencies in 15 percent of the constituencies. The report strongly recommended the adoption of comprehensive electoral reforms in Pakistan, including greater financial and administrative support to the Central Election Commission (CEC) in non-election years; review of procedures used at women's polling stations; an improved complaint adjudication procedure; and increased voter education and training programs for the general public. The report also noted the need for political parties to educate and train their workers about electoral law, election monitoring and the complaint process.

To follow up on NDI's 1990 recommendations, the Institute returned to Pakistan in February 1992 with a program dedicated to electoral processes and political party building. NDI conducted separate consultations with representatives from the Pakistan Democratic Alliance (PDA) and with civic leaders. The Institute also discussed electoral and political issues with members of the Central Election Commission and with leaders of the Senate and the National Assembly, who represented the governing Islamic Democratic Alliance.

A. 1993 Pre-Election Survey Mission

Upon the scheduling of the October 1993 elections, the Pakistan Embassy in Washington informed NDI that the CEC and the interim government would welcome an NDI observation mission. On September 11, NDI dispatched a 10-member, pre-election survey mission to Pakistan to obtain information regarding the political situation, the pre-election environment, and the electoral laws and procedures in order to determine what type of assistance NDI could provide to strengthen the electoral process. (See Appendix 1.)

In a statement released September 17, the survey team said it was "favorably impressed" overall by the election preparations and the general campaign environment. The team lauded

the transparency of the process as devised by the CEC. The army's acceptance of a nonpartisan role was also singled out as an encouraging development.

However, NDI also noted some serious concerns as the elections drew near. These concerns included: seriously deficient voter rolls; widespread voter apathy and fears of election-related violence; allegations of vote buying and other campaign finance violations; and unfinished procedures for ensuring security at women's polling stations on election day. (See Appendix 2.)

B. Field Presence

After the survey mission, a six-member NDI field team remained in Pakistan to continue to gather information about the electoral environment and administrative preparations leading up to the election and to lay the groundwork for the October arrival of the international observer delegation. The team also initiated a media monitoring program, retaining the services of three politically independent Pakistani nationals to monitor radio, television and newspaper coverage through the elections. The team also repeatedly offered training assistance to the major parties and to other domestic organizations interested in election monitoring.

NDI worked with the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) as the commission trained domestic monitors for election day. The NDI field team contributed training and monitoring material and offered advice on how to design objective monitoring forms. The HRCP in return offered crucial assistance, providing the NDI field team with contact names and telephone numbers and advice on which constituencies should be observed. The HRCP also provided basic demographic information and other essential, election-related constituency materials such as maps, lists of polling stations and candidate names, and candidate profiles.

Members of the field team were deployed to each of Pakistan's four provinces, where they held meetings with government and election officials at both the national and provincial levels. Team members also met with candidates and their representatives, members of civic organizations, journalists, academics and other citizens. In an effort to assess the level of public confidence in the unfolding electoral process, members of the field team sought information regarding anticipated problems or problems encountered during the campaign and election preparations. They also targeted their interviews in areas that, based on previous experience in Pakistan, were potentially problematic. But the team's movements were not restricted, and team members reported being received cordially at all points.

As election day approached, an NDI coordinator served as liaison with other international observation teams in an effort to share information and to avoid duplication of polling site coverage on election day. NDI coordinated with international delegations from the European Community, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Commonwealth States, as well as with the HRCP.

Despite the relatively short time that NDI had to establish its in-country presence, the field team's travels were extensive and its contacts were comprehensive. Key political actors and observers -- particularly those who had expressed a lack of confidence in the previous

elections and the role they perceived was played by international observers -- were aware and appreciative of the sustained NDI presence throughout the pre-election period.

C. 1993 International Observer Mission

NDI's Pakistan program culminated in the organization of a 35-member international election observer delegation. The group included parliamentarians, political party leaders, regional specialists and election experts from 17 countries. Canadian Member of Parliament Maurice Foster and NDI President Kenneth D. Wollack led the delegation. (See Appendix 3.)

The delegation arrived in Islamabad on October 2. Two days of meetings with representatives from the political parties, government and election officials, representatives of civic organizations, journalists and members of the military followed on October 3 and 4. On the afternoon of October 4, NDI held a news conference during which Wollack and Foster introduced the delegation and clarified the parameters of its mission. (See Appendix 4.)

By October 5, delegates were deployed to 23 targeted constituencies in preparation for election day. Two representatives were assigned to constituencies in and surrounding the major deployment sites. (See Appendix 5.) Delegates surveyed their constituencies and met with contending candidates, party representatives, local election officials, journalists and members of local civic organizations.

NDI's election-day observation on October 6 extended from the early-morning arrival of official personnel, ballot boxes and election materials at polling stations to the final count and announcement of results, often early the next morning, by the central election commissioner. (See Appendix 6.)

NDI also stationed representatives at the Central Election Commission headquarters in Islamabad on election night. The NDI representatives observed CEC activities and fed election results via telephone to a computer systems specialist in Canada whom NDI hired to conduct a statistical analysis. The specialist, who had conducted similar analyses of election results in 1988 and 1990, measured 1993 constituency results against the totals in the previous elections.

Delegates reassembled in Islamabad the next day for a comprehensive debriefing. The debriefing reports provided the basis for a preliminary statement on the National Assembly elections released at a news conference the next day, October 8. (See Appendix 7.)

Twenty members of the delegation remained in Pakistan to observe the October 9 Provincial Assembly elections. Most returned to Islamabad on October 10 for debriefing and departed Pakistan that evening or the next day. Two NDI representatives remained in Pakistan for two weeks following the departure of the observer delegation to follow up on outstanding questions about the election as well as to monitor the transition to a new government.

II. THE LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK OF THE 1993 ELECTIONS

A. The Electoral System

The electoral system for 1993, except for a few significant modifications, was essentially the same as the system employed in Pakistan's 1988 and 1990 elections. The system is based on the British model of one-person/one-vote, single-member districts (called "constituencies") and "first past the post" contests. Candidates contested 217 seats in the October 6 National Assembly elections. All but 10 of those contests were for seats representing single-member, Muslim districts; 10 seats reserved for non-Muslim minorities were contested in at-large elections. The October 9 elections determined the allocation of seats in Pakistan's four provincial assemblies.

B. Central Election Commission

The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Chapter VIII, provides for an independent Central Election Commission (CEC). Under the constitution, the president of Pakistan appoints the three-member election commission, which is charged with the responsibility to "organize and conduct elections and to make such arrangements as are necessary to ensure that the elections are conducted honestly, justly, fairly and in accordance with the law and that corrupt practices are guarded against."

Specifically, the constitution also authorizes the commission: 1) to prepare and annually revise the electoral rolls; 2) to organize and conduct elections to the Senate and to fill vacancies in the National Assembly or provincial assemblies; and 3) to appoint election tribunals. Election tribunals comprised members of the judiciary and received petitions for and heard challenges to candidacies.

The chief election commissioner for the 1993 elections, as in 1990, was retired Justice Naimuddin Ahmed. The two other commissioners were Justices Sheikh Riaz Ahmed and Mohammad Bashir Jehangiri.

C. Overview of Election Laws

The primary law governing elections for the National Assembly and provincial assemblies is the Representation of the People's Act of 1976, as amended. The Electoral Rolls Act of 1974 describes the rules for determining eligible voters; under this law, all individuals who appear on the electoral rolls are eligible to vote and are deemed "registered." The Delimitation of Constituencies Act of 1974 sets forth the manner in which the election commission should draw constituency boundaries. The Political Parties Act of 1962, the starting point of modern political law in Pakistan, governs the formation and activities of political parties.

The CEC instituted a number of measures designed to prevent competition from escalating into violent acts. After consultations with the various political parties, the CEC promulgated the 1993 Code of Conduct For The Political Parties. The code established

common, voluntary guidelines under which the parties were to abstain from negative, inflammatory or aggressive rhetoric and activities. (See Appendix 8.)

New CEC regulations also banned the display of cloth banners; limited the size of political posters; and restricted the hoisting of party flags on public buildings, public places and utility and telephone poles. The CEC placed limits on campaign spending: 1 million rupees (US\$33,333) for National Assembly seats and 600,000 rupees (US\$20,000) for provincial assembly seats. Under this new rule, each candidate was required by law to document election expenses and to report them to the CEC within 30 days after the contested election. The expense reports were to be open for public inspection. Procedures also were established to ensure the security of printing, distributing, storing, counting and transporting ballots; of numbering and securing ballot boxes; and of certifying and consolidating tally sheets. (For a detailed description of voting procedures, see section IV.)

Still, the PPP was most interested in pressing for electoral reforms, particularly on the following issues: whether to replace or abolish the national identification card as a prerequisite for voting; whether to hold national and provincial elections on the same day or, as called for in the electoral law, on separate days; and whether to establish joint electorates rather than separate electorates for the Muslim and non-Muslim communities. The CEC met with the political parties at the beginning of August 1993 to discuss these issues and ultimately decided to retain the status quo when a consensus could not be reached.

D. Election Administration at the Provincial and Local Levels

The CEC was authorized to appoint judges to a separate elections commission for each province. The four provinces are divided for the purposes of election administration into districts that were in turn divided into a number of constituencies. The Representation of the People's Act stipulated that all national and provincial executive authorities render any assistance requested of them by the CEC.

The CEC appointed district returning officers, returning officers and assistant returning officers to help administer elections at the local levels. These elections officers were drawn from the ranks of officials of the federal government, provincial governments, corporations controlled by any such government and local governments.

There were approximately 34,000 polling stations throughout the country for the 1993 elections -- roughly 165 polling stations per constituency, a slight increase over the number in 1990. Separate polling stations were established for men and women, although the stations were often located in the same building. Not more than 1,200 voters were assigned to a polling station.

Each polling station included no more than four polling booths, which were administered by one assistant presiding officer and two polling officers. Up to 350 voters were assigned to a booth. An agent for each candidate (sometimes called a "party agent" or "polling agent") was also permitted to be present at each voting booth to observe the voting procedure.

On election day, the CEC employed more than 350,000 people, from headquarters staff to polling officers. Before the elections, the CEC distributed electoral administration instruction manuals to each employee below the level of the provincial election commissions.

E. Delimitation

Under the Delimitation of Constituencies Act, the CEC constructs constituencies for Muslim seats according to the "distribution of population, including non-Muslims, in geographically compact areas" and taking into account "existing boundaries of administrative units, facilities of communication, . . . public convenience and other cognate factors to ensure homogeneity in the creation of constituencies." In 1993, there was no new delimitation conducted before the elections, even though more than 10 years had passed since the last census was completed and most of the current district boundaries were drawn. Neither the interim government nor the parties advocated delaying the elections for new delimitation.

F. Voter Registration

Everyone listed on Pakistan's electoral rolls were automatically registered to vote. The constitution provided that a person was eligible to be enrolled in an electoral area if he or she: 1) was a citizen of Pakistan; 2) was at least 21 years of age on January 1 of the year of enrollment; 3) had not been declared of unsound mind by a competent court; and 4) was deemed to be resident in the electoral area. Under the Electoral Rolls Act, the rolls were closed on the date, August 22, that the 1993 elections were officially announced. The CEC had partially updated the rolls by that date.

The number of voters included on the rolls for the 1993 elections was 52,326,021, an increase of 3,677,061 from the number of voters eligible for the 1990 elections. At the same time, some progress was made in purging bogus names and names of the deceased from the rolls. In Punjab, for example, the provincial election commission reported having taken 43,347 names off the lists from 1990 based on its staff's ability to process evidence presented by political parties and local officials. National and provincial authorities conceded, however, that the time was too short and resources were insufficient to fully update the electoral rolls.

G. Allocation of Party Symbols

Because of widespread illiteracy in Pakistan, symbols as well as names were used on ballots. The CEC allocated symbols to the political parties for use during the campaign. (See Appendix 9.) The symbols were depicted on campaign signs, posters and banners and often were displayed more prominently than party and candidate names.

The dissolution of the 1990 party coalitions led to questions about which group would succeed to each coalition's symbol. As it turned out, the PPP succeeded to the PDA's symbol, the arrow, while the PML(J) acquired the IJI's bicycle symbol. The PML(N) chose the symbol of a tiger (manifested as a lion, in some instances). NDI noted no complaints among 1993 candidates about party symbols.

H. The Complaints and Petitions Process

Parties or candidates were able to seek redress for alleged electoral improprieties in the following manner: 1) pre-election complaints were filed with the CEC; 2) election-day challenges were presented to the presiding and returning officers; 3) post-election complaints were also filed with the CEC; and 4) formal election petitions were filed with the CEC and then referred to an election tribunal.

The law did not require pre-election complaints to be recorded on a specific form or to follow a specific format. The election commission was not empowered to investigate complaints independently; it relied on information provided by other government departments, returning officers, provincial election commissioners and civil servants of the CEC.

Presiding officers of each polling station were empowered to settle complaints relating to conduct of voting. A placard captioned "Please Register Complaints Here" was required to be displayed prominently at or near the presiding officer's table at each polling station. Polling officials also were allowed to challenge a voter's identity.

The CEC, under new provisions of the election laws, also authorized all presiding officers and representatives of the armed forces stationed at the polling stations to exercise the power of magistrate and to try summarily offenses that included: falsely impersonating someone listed on the electoral rolls; illegal election-day campaigning; disorderly conduct in or near a polling station; and tampering with ballot boxes, ballot papers or ballot counts. According to Section 82 of the Representation of the People's Act, punishment for such polling place offenses included up to 5,000 rupees in fines or three years imprisonment or both.

After the publication of the official results and for 45 days thereafter, parties or individuals were allowed to file petitions with the CEC. These petitions were formal pleadings, similar in form to a pleading in a civil lawsuit. The petitions were required to state allegations, list witnesses and supply documents of proof. If the evidence provided in any given petition was deemed sufficient for review, the electoral commission referred the petition to an election tribunal. The tribunal ruled on the petition with only a hearing; or it invalidated the results in a given constituency, declared a new winner or ordered repolling or recounting. According to a new amendment to the Electoral Law, the CEC was required to dispose of all election petitions within six months of the election.

III. THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN ENVIRONMENT

A. The Candidates and Political Parties

With the dissolution of the PDA and the IJI alliances, the 1993 elections became a two-party contest between the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz group PML(N), which fielded candidates in 172 of 207 National Assembly constituencies, and the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), which nominated candidates in 166 National Assembly constituencies. Nawaz Sharif led the PML(N) bid for another term and, as in 1988 and 1990, Benazir Bhutto led the PPP's effort

to regain the office of prime minister. (For a more detailed political history of these parties, see NDI's 1990 election report.)

Former IJI Partners

Pakistan Muslim League (Junejo group)

The departure from the Pakistan Muslim League of Hamid Nasir Chattha's faction, thereafter known as the Pakistan Muslim League-Junejo group PML(J), weakened Nawaz Sharif's position, particularly in southern Punjab. A former minister for planning, Chattha cited personality disputes as the cause for splitting from the PML in April of 1993 following the death of former prime minister and PML leader Mohammed Khan Junejo in March. The PML(J) worked to undermine Sharif's rule, allying itself with President Ishaq Khan and the PPP against the prime minister. During the campaign, the PML(J) and the PPP formed stronger links and agreed not to contest the same seats. The PML(J) fielded 19 National Assembly candidates.

Religious Parties

The so-called "religious" parties had been an integral component of the IJI. Religious parties differed over the pace and scope of Prime Minister Sharif's Islamization program. Religious parties also clashed with IJI leaders over other issues. The issues included: the extent of Pakistan's assistance to Kashmiri separatists, the nation's nuclear weapons policy and the nature of support for the Afghan *mujahideen*. These differences led the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), the leading party, to abandon the IJI in May 1992. In 1993, the JI formed the Pakistan Islamic Front (PIF) and fielded 103 candidates in the National Assembly elections. Though non-members of the JI were invited to compete under the PIF banner, the party, led by Senator Qazi Hussein Ahmed, chose not to ally itself with other religious parties.

The remaining religious parties formed alliances to strengthen their chances in the 1993 elections. The Jamiat-i-Ulema Pakistan [JUP(N)], led by Maulana Shah Noorani, and the Jamiat-i-Ulema-Islam [JUI(F)], headed by Maulana Fazlur Rehman, formed a supposed long-term alliance under the name of the Islami Jamhoori Mahaz (IJM). The IJM fielded 49 candidates for the National Assembly elections, with their strongest support coming from Fazlur Rehman's strongholds in the North West Frontier Province and in Baluchistan.

Another religious-party alliance, the Muttahida Deeni Mahaz (MDM), which comprised the Samiul Haq group (JUI) and Sipah-e-Sahba Pakistan, contested 36 National Assembly constituencies.

Regionally Based Parties

Some political parties catered to regional or ethnic interests. During the 1988 and 1990 elections, such parties included the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) in urban Sind and the Awami National Party (ANP) of the North West Frontier Province. Along with the Baluchistan parties -- the Baluchistan National Movement [BNM(N)], the Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP) and the Pakhtoonkhwa Mili Awami Party (PKMAP) -- these regional parties have enjoyed electoral

success in their respective limited spheres. Although none of these regional parties command enough support to form provincial governments on their own, the PML-N and PPP would likely require their support to form a coalition government.

The Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) has dominated elections in Karachi, winning 13 National Assembly seats in urban Sind in 1988 and 15 seats in 1990. The MQM split in 1992, however, in the wake of Operation Clean Up and subsequent leadership disputes. The splinter faction, known as the Haqiqi group [MQM(H)], fielded 14 candidates in urban Sind. The remaining faction, the MQM-Altaf group [MQM(A)], led by exiled leader Altaf Hussein, ran 33 candidates.

In 1993, many expected the MQM(A) to carry the MQM banner and contend as successfully as in past elections. However, citing a number of factors, the MQM(A) announced shortly before the National Assembly elections that it would boycott the polls. (The boycott is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.)

Other Parties

Small political parties led by influential politicians rounded out the field in 1993. Like the regionally based parties, these smaller parties were in a position to command a high political price if their support was required by one of the major political parties to form a coalition government.

The most well-known small parties included: the Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP), led by senior Sindi politician Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan; the National People's Party (NPP) of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, 1990's caretaker prime minister; and former PDA coalition member Tehrik-e-Istiqlal (TI), led by retired Air Marshal Asghar Khan. The TI supported the PML(N) during the 1993 elections, despite having been once allied with the PPP as part of the PDA coalition.

The creation of the Shahid Bhutto Committee (SBC), led by Murtaza Bhutto, added controversy in Sind. Exiled for more than 15 years after his conviction on terrorism charges under the Zia regime, the brother of Benazir Bhutto faced possible imprisonment if he had returned to Pakistan to contest the elections. Instead, he chose to contest in absentia and received an endorsement from his mother and PPP co-chairperson, Nusrat Bhutto. Initially, prospects of the SBC competition against the PPP in several national and provincial assembly constituencies spawned fears of tension and possible violence. Murtaza Bhutto later withdrew from the contest in the majority of those constituencies upon his mother's request, but the SBC's existence fueled speculation over a familial division within the PPP.

B. Campaign Issues

Although the major political parties unanimously pledged to uphold the 1993 Code of Conduct for Political Parties (See Appendix 8), their pledges were not fully realized. Negative campaigning, for instance, continued in 1993, though not nearly at the level of 1990. The PPP ran advertisements portraying the PML(N) as a party catering to wealthy industrialist interests.

The PML(N) depicted the PPP as a dynastic order rather than a political party. The PIF accused both parties of "selling out" Pakistan's national interests in response to demands made by the West.

Against this background, the incumbent PML(N) chose to run on its record and the message that "Nawaz Sharif delivers." Sharif vowed to continue the economic reforms he instituted during his 30 months in office, stressed commitment to women's employment and support services and pledged the continuation of Pakistan's nuclear program "for peaceful purposes."

The PPP ran against Sharif's record and promoted its manifesto, "An Agenda for Change," as the alternative. The PPP agenda focused on building infrastructure such as hospitals and schools, encouraging decentralization and other political reforms, and attending to a variety of foreign policy issues. Both parties supported the repeal or modification of constitutional provisions that weakened parliamentary authority to the benefit of the presidency. The PIF, other third party contenders and independents attempted to capitalize on charges of misconduct launched against previous PPP and PML governments.

However, candidates rarely debated or discussed substantive public policy issues in much detail during the 1993 campaign. The campaign was essentially a head-to-head race between Sharif and Bhutto who travelled the country exhaustively in an effort to engage a fairly apathetic electorate. Their public appearances and televised coverage of their rallies (of which there were as many as four or five daily) constituted the bulk of campaign activity.

The race was considered by many as too close to call, with Bhutto perhaps enjoying a slight edge during the campaign. PPP supporters were confident of a large plurality, arguing that a truly neutral caretaker would enable their claims of massive support to be borne out at the polls. PML(N) workers were equally confident but perhaps more cautious in their predictions. They implicitly acknowledged that then-recent political stalemates might have undermined the party's record of accomplishment.

C. Role of Caretaker Government

Despite the circumstances that precipitated it, the appointment of interim Prime Minister Moeen Qureshi met with little controversy. Observing the constitutional mandate to oversee the neutral administration of new elections in October and to govern Pakistan in the interim, Qureshi appointed virtually unknown officials to high-ranking posts throughout the country.

The major political parties and independent media generally applauded the interim government for its neutrality and nonpartisanship. The caretakers appeared to cooperate with the political parties, the CEC and the army when preparing for the elections. Election officials said they received no political pressure from senior interim officials, although election officials admitted the existence of such problems in previous elections.

Several initiatives by Qureshi's caretaker government set strong precedents for future elections. These included: debarring loan defaulters and drug traffickers from contesting the

elections; exposing politically suspect methods of awarding government contracts; dissolving the local bodies; and transferring thousands of administrators to areas outside of their home districts where they would be less susceptible to political pressure. With these measures the interim government inadvertently deflected attention from the candidates during the election period. The integrity, and even the popularity, of the caretaker government became more frequently discussed than other substantive issues such as health care, education or the economy. Although some critics of Qureshi asserted that the interim government went beyond its mandate to organize new elections, the interim prime minister enjoyed widespread support for his anti-corruption campaign.

D. Role of the Armed Forces

Upon the official request of the CEC and at the further suggestion of several political parties, the armed forces agreed to play an oversight role in the 1993 elections. Some of the parties had requested that the army conduct the elections, though the request was denied on constitutional grounds.

The military articulated its goals as follows: a) to secure law and order; b) to secure transportation of material and personnel; c) to reassure staff in resisting intimidation; and d) to deter irregularities. Members of the political parties [the MQM(A) and MQM(H) notwithstanding], the media, the CEC, the caretaker government and the public expressed confidence in the integrity of the military in performing its electoral tasks.

The military designated about 150,000 personnel to participate directly in the electoral process. The military deployed at least two soldiers or officers in each of approximately 34,000 polling stations throughout the country on election day. It established an administrative structure that mirrored the administrative structure of the electoral commission. The army formed "election cells" at the general headquarters, corps command and district command levels and established "vigilance teams" to assist the returning officers and presiding officers. Noncommissioned military officers, like presiding elections officers, were given magisterial powers to conduct summary trials of possible violators of the electoral law.

The armed forces employed state-of-the-art telecommunications equipment to tabulate results and transmit information. The military's computerized system was clearly capable of outperforming the mechanical methods employed by the CEC. The magnitude of the armed forces' involvement prompted questions about its position relative to the CEC. In each instance, senior military personnel reiterated that the military was to perform its duties only to assist the CEC. The military pledged to use only its own resources to conduct electoral functions.

The military appeared to have a calming influence during the electoral campaign. Except in urban Sind, involvement of the military also seemed to encourage voter confidence in the integrity of the process.

E. Pre-Election Violence and Intimidation

The CEC characterized the pre-election period as relatively calm and peaceful compared to previous elections. The CEC indicated that most of the 84 incidents of violence that appeared in the press during the campaign were not of a serious nature. Much of the violence erupted when followers of rival parties crossed one another's paths during political rallies and processions. The NDI pre-election delegation cautioned the political parties against desensitization to politically motivated violence, which still occurred frequently even if less often than in previous years.

The most widely publicized incident occurred September 29, 1993, when Ghulam Haider Wyne, former chief minister of Punjab and PML(N) candidate in National Assembly constituency 123, was assassinated. Wyne's murder highlighted the difficulties of distinguishing politically related violence from violence motivated by other factors, such as clan rivalries, under cover of political conflict. The Wyne killing fortunately did not precipitate an escalation of violence in Punjab, leading many to conclude that his death resulted from a personal dispute and not from his candidacy.

MQM(A) Boycott

On October 1, 1993, Senator Ishtiaq Azhar of the MQM(A) announced that his party would boycott the national and provincial elections. Azhar explained that the interim prime minister, the chief election commissioner and the chief of army staff had failed to respond to the MQM(A) ultimatum of August 30, 1993, which called for, *inter alia*: equal freedom for MQM(A) candidates and party workers to conduct their campaign; cessation of what the party said were unwarranted acts of aggression by the army against MQM(A) stalwarts; and reversal of what the MQM(A) said was an army policy to turn a blind eye to alleged terrorist acts perpetrated by the Haqiqi splinter group, the MQM(H), against MQM(A) party workers and supporters.

The MQM(A) had lodged complaints throughout the campaign period that were consistent with the grounds given for the announced boycott, so the announcement was not altogether unanticipated. The MQM(A) called off its boycott after the National Assembly elections and participated in the provincial elections. According to MQM(A) officials, the decision to end the boycott was motivated by verbal assurances from the army and the interim government that MQM(A) grievances, when justified, would be heard and redressed. The army also vowed to provide MQM(A) workers with the requisite security on election day. Members of the NDI field team and observer delegation met frequently with representatives of the MQM(A) to attempt to understand the party's reluctance to participate in the elections.

~~In its October 8 statement on the national elections, the observer mission noted the seriousness of the MQM(A)'s allegations of interference with the party's ability to contest the elections. The delegation said it was not in a position to judge the validity of the charges, but it expressed hope that the MQM(A)'s allegations and similar allegations by other parties would be investigated by the proper authorities. The delegation said the boycott regrettably appeared to deprive voters of the full range of political choices.~~

MQM(H) Boycott

Citing reasons similar to the MQM(A)'s grounds for boycotting the National Assembly elections, the MQM(H) boycotted the provincial assembly elections. However, because the MQM(H) had participated in the National Assembly elections and acquired few seats, the MQM(H) provincial boycott received considerably less attention.

F. CEC Disposal of Pre-Election Complaints

The CEC stated that it received relatively few serious or substantiated complaints during the campaign period. Likewise, the political parties did not bring any substantiated complaints to the attention of election observers, which suggests the parties' general satisfaction with the process. During the pre-election campaign the CEC received 2,173 complaints, of which 1,550 were determined to have been of a general nature or without substance.

The CEC recorded 355 complaints regarding, *inter alia*, the preparation of bogus registration cards; problems with the Registration Office; the setting-up of polling stations; and minor cases of violence, disputes and use of threats. According to the secretary of the CEC, these matters were addressed before election day.

PPP and PML(N) candidates accused each other of violating campaign spending limits. Accusations of "vote-buying" circulated in news media rumors, but no formal complaints were registered with election officials.

The CEC classified as most serious complaints about allegedly inappropriate conduct by election officials, about alleged misappropriation of government resources by members of parliament for campaign purposes and about violence directed at candidates. Of 268 such complaints in the pre-election period, the CEC reported settling 118 satisfactorily and finding 112 baseless. Since the election, NDI has sought further information regarding the status of the remaining 38 pre-election complaints still pending as of October 19 and has received no indication that their ultimate disposal was controversial.

Concurrent with entertaining complaints from the political parties, the CEC and the provincial commissions scrutinized nomination papers for candidates to the national and provincial assemblies. The CEC rejected 67 of 2,351 nomination papers filed to qualify for participation in the National Assembly elections. Seventeen of 39 candidates won their appeals against the rejection of their nomination papers. Although disqualification of loan defaulters received prominent attention during the 1993 campaign, only 19 candidates who filed nomination papers for the national and provincial assemblies were disqualified for this reason.

G. Domestic Monitoring Efforts and the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP)

The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, led by Chairperson Asma Jehangir and Director I.A. Rehman, is a human rights organization that has dedicated itself to, among other issues, upholding minority and women's rights in Pakistan. The HRCP characterized its 1993

election-related activities as an effort to build public pressure for responsible governance and for serious discussion of substantive electoral reform. In July 1993, the HRCP released 50 electoral reform proposals that were published in the *Frontier Post*. The HRCP strongly advocated the institution of adult franchise in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the restoration of joint electorates for the non-Muslim community, among other proposals. The commission also attempted to draw conclusions about the relationship between voter behavior and perceptions of Pakistan's democratization process.

The HRCP hoped to gain national prominence in 1993 through the implementation of an election monitoring effort that targeted 50 constituencies and drew upon the observations of 1,500 monitors (30 volunteers per constituency). On September 23 and 24, NDI's field team attended an HRCP workshop and training session for the commission's 50 constituency team leaders. The team leaders were mainly advocates, journalists and HRCP council members. The HRCP's monitoring operation included preparing constituency profiles, monitoring and analyzing the media, surveying voters and poll watching. (See Appendix 10 for sample form.)

H. The Media

During the 1993 pre-election period, all forms of media enjoyed greater freedoms than in previous elections. The state-owned electronic media operated under strict guidelines for nonpartisan political coverage, and the interim government supported enforcement of these guidelines. Print media, the majority of which is privately owned, also provided extensive campaign coverage, albeit with varying degrees of balance. Because less than 25 percent of eligible voters are literate and because public access to television is limited, radio is Pakistan's principal mass medium. Yet, the use of communal television sets and the practice of reading newspapers aloud gave these two media greater significance in the 1993 campaign than a purely numerical analysis might suggest.

NDI monitored the electronic and print media to identify prominent trends and outstanding features of political coverage during the crucial weeks before the elections. Three independent Pakistani nationals assisted in the media monitoring effort, which took place from September 26 to October 10, 1993. NDI's field staff prepared media monitoring forms, which the monitors completed on a daily basis. (See Appendix 11.)

Electronic Media

Pakistan's Ministry of Information and Broadcasting supervises the operation of television and radio stations. The Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation (PBC) is government-owned and is the only organization authorized to operate radio stations in Pakistan. Pakistan Television (PTV) is also government-owned and, as of 1990, shares the television airwaves with Shalimar Television Network (STN). The Pakistani government is a majority shareholder in Shalimar Recording Company (SRC) of which STN is a subsidiary.

During the 1993 campaign, the state-owned electronic media introduced an "Election Hour" with the candidates every evening at 9:35 p.m.; each of the parties was allotted one evening, on a free and equal basis, to convey its message to the public. After delivering a short

speech during such broadcasts, a party leader responded to questions posed by three panelists selected by the same party leader from a larger pool of journalists.

Another program, "Election Magazine," aired three times a week at 7:35 p.m. "Election Magazine" presented a collage of popular opinion as well as campaign analysis from journalists, intellectuals and academics. Both of these innovative programs proved to be popular supplements to political coverage provided on PTV's regular 9 p.m. newscast, "Khabarnama" (national news). The amount of coverage in 1993 markedly contrasted the coverage in 1990 when PTV avoided election-related programming.

Radio provided its primary political coverage during 8 a.m., 8 p.m. and 9 p.m. newscasts. PTV and PBC executives said that the networks had established guidelines that required equal and fair coverage for the two major parties and comparable coverage for the remaining parties.

In monitoring news broadcasts, NDI found very little quantitative evidence of deviation from the PTV and PBC guidelines. Coverage of the PPP and the PML(N) averaged 1.45 minutes for each party per 30-minute television news show. On radio, the PPP (32.95 seconds per 10-minute broadcast) slightly edged PML(N) coverage (28.3 seconds per 10-minute broadcast). The PIF received an average of 5.60 seconds per broadcast. The average coverage of all other parties was 24.76 seconds per broadcast. In the post-election period, radio news favored the PPP, which garnered an average of 3 minutes of coverage per 10-minute broadcast. Television news registered a similar jump in PPP coverage.

Radio and television coverage was straightforward and professional and contained virtually no editorial content. The majority of political parties acknowledged the nonpartisan nature of the electronic media's coverage. The PIF complained, however, that PTV neglected to cover a number of its well-attended rallies. The PML(N) lodged a similar complaint in reference to at least one of its rallies in Sind.

Print Media

The Pakistani government lists 33 regularly published daily newspapers on the press register, of which 17 are in Urdu, 13 in English and three in Sindi. The majority of these newspapers are privately owned and have operated relatively free from legal restrictions since 1988.

NDI monitored five Urdu dailies and five English-language dailies, which were chosen either for their large circulations or regional influence. The English-language newspapers included: *The News*, *The Muslim*, *The Nation*, *Dawn* and *The Pakistan Times*. The Urdu newspapers monitored were: *Jang*, *Nawa-i-Waqt*, *Markaz*, *Mashriq* and *Khabrain*.

During the election campaign, English and Urdu newspapers demonstrated a preference for the lengthy reprinting of politician's statements as opposed to analytical and investigative reporting. However, many of the papers did offer analysis of the 1993 campaign by profiling

the prominent candidates and the issues in key constituencies. Dailies in both languages emphasized coverage of political rallies.

The News and *The Muslim* ran more substantive articles in favor of the PPP, while *The Nation*, *Nawa-i-Waqt* and *Markaz* printed more positive articles for the PML(N). *The Pakistan Times*, *Dawn*, *Jang*, *Khabrain* and *Mashriq* each printed an almost equal number of positive and negative articles on the two major parties. The Urdu newspapers, *Jang* in particular, gave far more coverage to the PIF than did the English-language newspapers. (See Appendix 12 for a full quantitative analysis.)

IV. ELECTION-DAY OBSERVATIONS

Election day in Pakistan is a national holiday. Because two sets of elections were held three days apart, the Pakistani government declared the intervening days to be national holidays as well. According to Pakistan's election law, political parties must cease campaigning 48 hours before an election [Election Law: VIII.84.(1)]. On election day, however, parties may dispatch workers to conduct a variety of functions.

Polls were open from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. -- one hour more than in 1990. Election officials were to arrive at the polling stations by 5:30 a.m.

A. Party Tents and Transportation

Outside many polling stations the political parties set up "locator" tents under which party representatives helped voters find their assigned booths. A party worker would write a voter's identification and booth numbers on a slip of paper (*parchi*) that invariably contained the party's symbol -- a not-so-subtle but legal encouragement for the voter to return the favor. While this procedure publicly identified a prospective voter with one political party, it was voluntary and did not compromise ballot secrecy. Pakistan election law stipulates that party tents must be located at least 100 yards from the polling site entrance. NDI observers noted no significant violations of the distance requirement.

Party workers often provided voters with transportation to and from the polls on election day and thus had another opportunity to distribute *parchis*. Cars or small wagons decorated with candidate or party memorabilia, and often with horns or campaign songs blaring, would pull up to a polling site and dispatch voters. Many voters then were led to party tents or directed to the polling site entrance. Members of the delegation observed no evidence of coercion.

B. Balloting Procedures

Before the voting began, the presiding officer showed the sealed bags of blank ballots and the empty ballot boxes to the party agents. The presiding officer and party agents then signed a form verifying this fact, and the form was placed in plain view during polling hours. The presiding officer secured the ballot boxes with a wax seal, and the boxes were numbered.

Party agents were provided a table and chairs from which they could view the ballot box and voting procedures. Most agents brought copies of the voter registration roll to keep a parallel record of who was eligible to vote and who voted. NDI observers noted extraordinary cooperation among agents, even in highly competitive constituencies. Another table was set up for election officials.

To enter a polling station, a voter had to display her or his identification card, which contained a serial number. Men's identification cards contained their photographs; women's did not, though most women's cards contained a thumbprint. After checking the card, a polling officer placed a mark on the electoral roll next to the voter's name and number, punched a hole in the card and placed an indelible ink mark on the voter's thumb to safeguard against multiple voting. The assistant presiding officer then recorded the voter's identification number, electoral-roll serial number and electoral area on the ballot's counterfoil. The voter's thumbprint was also applied to the counterfoil, which the election official then signed and stamped. No ballot was valid without the stamp and signature. An election official's failure to follow these procedures was a violation of Pakistan's election law.

The voter then took the ballot and an inked rubber stamp behind a screened booth, oftentimes located in the corner of the room. The voter stamped the space on the ballot containing the name and symbol of the candidate that he or she supported, folded the ballot and placed the ballot in the ballot box. (See Appendix 13.)

Party agents could challenge the eligibility of individual voters. If the presiding officer accepted the challenge, the official required the voter to cast a "challenged" ballot. Challenged ballots were stored separately for special treatment during the count. There was also a procedure whereby a voter who claimed that someone had voted in her or his stead could cast a "tendered" ballot, which was also counted separately from the regular ballots. Absentee ballots were also used.

Election-day violence has posed a problem in previous elections. Thus, at the CEC's request, executive authorities deployed the police and the armed forces on election day to deter and control activity that might lead to election-related violence. No substantial election-related violations of law and order on election day were reported.

C. The Counting Process

Immediately upon the closing of the polls, presiding officers counted the ballots in front of party agents and army representatives. After completing the count, the presiding officer prepared tally forms containing the signatures of the election officials and the party agents. The presiding officer was under legal obligation to provide party agents with a written statement of the ballot count and an account of all ballot papers originally delivered to the polling station. The presiding officer was also obliged to sign and affix his or her thumbprint to the tally sheets. A copy of the tally sheet then was displayed in a conspicuous place at the polling station. The original form was placed in a sealed bag that contained the ballots.

The presiding officer then transported the ballot bags and the unused election materials to the returning officer, who consolidated the results from all of the polling stations in the constituency and from the postal ballots received before election day.

Returning officers presented the results to the district returning officer only after all polling stations in a constituency had reported. District returning officers relayed the results to the provincial election commissioner who, in turn, communicated the results to the CEC in Islamabad. Returning officers and district returning officers were permitted to release preliminary results to the media. The CEC did not announce most results until early on the morning of October 7.

D. Delegation Observations

The balloting process took place in an efficient and generally orderly fashion. Delegation members observed throughout the country that voter lists were acknowledged by election officials and party agents to be flawed, but observers received no complaints that these flawed lists had the effect of disenfranchising voters or affecting disproportionately one party. In some places in Baluchistan, several individuals said that they were unable to obtain identification cards even though they had applied for them in accordance with the law. In other instances, observers were told of attempts to use bogus identification cards to vote. Such alleged irregularities did not appear, however, to be systematic or widespread.

The elections proceeded smoothly and were virtually free from serious incidents of violence. The vast majority of elections officials observed by the delegation acted impartially and approached their responsibilities diligently. In most cases, polling officials appeared to perform their tasks with pride. The delegation received credible reports of threats and intimidation in a number of places visited. But observers concluded from follow-up interviews with party agents and election officials that the reports concerned isolated cases that usually were resolved easily.

Unlike 1990, polling agents from a number of parties were present for the voting, counting and tabulation stages of the electoral process. In most places, election officials and party polling agents acted cooperatively. Independent Pakistani election monitors were accredited by the CEC and observed the elections in a number of constituencies; the independent monitors, party polling agents and election officials cooperated in most places. The delegation's observer teams moved freely and, with few exceptions, were warmly received in polling places and tabulation centers throughout the country.

A number of observer team members expressed concern about the performances of party agents. Many agents were 30 to 45 minutes late and seemed passive about assuming the monitoring responsibilities required of them. In a number of polling stations throughout the country, political party agents appeared to have been poorly trained or were not vigilant in their duties. These agents appeared insufficiently prepared to verify voter identities, to check voters on the list, to observe the voting process to ensure that procedures were followed, and to identify and document problems properly.

Observers noted that few party agents monitored the polling process once a voter proceeded to the polling booth. Many party agents posted themselves far away from the polling booth, making it difficult for them to observe the voting satisfactorily and as required by the electoral law. Some minor violations of procedure noted by NDI observers went unnoticed or unreported by agents; the violations included improper displays of party symbols and posters at the polling site.

Furthermore, those agents who may have observed instances of alleged irregularity at the polling site often were not prepared to record or document adequately their charges. These agents often lacked proper report forms, lacked basic supplies or misunderstood the proper complaint procedure. Absent such documentation, candidates and parties were ill-equipped to substantiate claims of electoral abuse.

In addition, the delegation observed problems with the indelible ink, which on occasion washed off soon after application.

The role of the military was generally positive. Although the military was highly visible at all phases of the election processes, its presence did not appear to intimidate voters. Several delegation members commented that voters did not seem to notice the armed forces; others observed that voters attributed the calm of election day to the presence of military personnel.

Military personnel and election officials cooperated. For the most part, civilian election officials maintained control of the election processes; the delegation, however, did observe some instances where either military officers asserted control or election officials abdicated decision-making in deference to military personnel. The delegation observed a few, sporadic instances in which military personnel overstepped their bounds. For example, in one polling station a military officer ordered party polling agents to remain outside the polling station throughout the National Assembly election day, while voting proceeded inside. And in a small number of polling stations military officers seemed to be in charge of the voting and counting processes.

Although election processes were generally transparent and the overall atmosphere surrounding the elections was positive, there were nonetheless noteworthy problems. The October 6 National Assembly elections in Sind, Pakistan's most ethnically polarized and violent province, occurred in the shadow of the MQM(A)'s boycott, which created potential for violence and disruption at the polls. Unfortunately, the boycott deprived voters in Sind of the full range of political choices, and some individuals may not have voted due to fear. Observers in Karachi noted that, particularly in the morning hours, the streets were virtually empty. But the elections proceeded in Sind with few incidents, and the MQM(A) decided to participate in the October 9 provincial assemblies elections.

A problem area noted by the delegation concerned women's participation in the election processes. As noted in previous NDI election reports, Pakistan's cultural and social realities and the government's identification procedures sometimes make it difficult for women to vote. Because women's identification cards lack photographs and because many women wear veils, election officials had difficulty verifying women's identities. The problem raised the possibility of multiple voting. Because voter lists were not updated fully, many women were registered

under their maiden names although their identification cards bore their married names. In many instances this discrepancy resulted in election officials prohibiting women from voting.

In addition, a lack of women election officials sometimes created staffing problems for women's polling stations. The delegation also observed some women's polling stations that were not operating, apparently because women were not able to come to the polls. Other women's polling stations were chaotic. Many women were unfamiliar with the voting process and could not read or write. The necessity of instructing uninformed and illiterate women instruction, an often cumbersome task, resulted in queues of voters who waited to be told what to do. Some women's polling stations were quite crowded with women who, after voting, took advantage of such a rare outing to visit with each other.

E. Provincial Assemblies Election Observation

Twenty-two members of the delegation remained in Pakistan to observe the provincial assembly elections on October 9. Their observations resembled quite closely with those of observers of the National Assembly elections. Several delegates commented that there did not appear to be any indication that the October 6 experiences of party agents would be in any way instructive for agents performing the same tasks three days later. For example, party workers did not use the information gleaned about who voted on October 6 to mobilize more voters on October 9. Party agents did not record the names of challenged voters to help update the lists. And they remained extremely nonchalant in their approach to observing the voting process.

To be sure, the lack of vigilance was undoubtedly, and deservedly, attributable to a high degree of confidence in the electoral process. However, the opportunity the elections provided for party workers to develop further their organizational skills was missed somewhat.

V. POST ELECTION DEVELOPMENTS

A. National Assembly Results

About 41 percent of eligible Pakistani voters participated in the October 6, 1993 National Assembly elections, a decline from the 43.07 percent turnout of 1988 and the 45.76 percent turnout of 1990.

The Pakistan People's Party emerged with a narrow plurality. Benazir Bhutto's PPP won 86 seats, while the PML(N), led by Nawaz Sharif, secured 72 seats. Although neither party obtained enough seats to command a majority in the 217-seat assembly, the two parties won more than 70 percent of the contested seats. (See Appendix 14.)

The Pakistan Islamic Front managed victories in only three of the 103 National Assembly constituencies in which it fielded candidates. The other religious parties fared similarly: the Islami Jamhoori Mahaz contested 49 seats and won only four; the Muttaheda Deeni Maha contested 36 seats, winning two.

The Pakistan Muslim League (Junejo group) won six of the 14 seats it contested in Punjab, giving the PML(J) the third largest number of seats in the National Assembly.

Independent candidates and regionally based parties, such as the Awami National Party, the Pakhtoonkhwa Milli Awami Party and the Jamhoori Watan Party, accounted for the remaining seats in the National Assembly. In the North West Frontier Province, the PPP emerged with the largest number of seats, followed by the PML(N) and the ANP. In Baluchistan, no single party won more than three of the 10 seat allocated to the province.

As expected, results in Punjab and Sind, the two largest provinces, were crucial determinants of the overall victor. In Sind, the PPP captured 34 of 46 available seats, but the PML(N) made inroads beyond its Punjab base by winning 10 seats. The PML(N) was unable to make up the difference in Punjab, where its candidates secured only 52 of 112 seats contested. The PPP won 47 seats.

The MQM(A) boycott contributed to a significantly lower voter turnout in Sind, particularly in Karachi and other urban areas. A united MQM won 15 seats in 1990 and 13 seats in 1988, and the MQM(A) was expected to contend strongly in those same urban constituencies in 1993. The boycott created an opening for the PML(N), which won seven of the MQM seats in areas where the party had not performed well in the past.

B. Provincial Assemblies Results

Turnout for the provincial assemblies elections reached 43 percent of eligible voters, 2 percent higher than for the National Assembly races three days earlier.

In only one of the four provincial elections held on October 9 did a political party receive a clear majority: the PPP collected 56 of the 100 seats in Sind. Punjab's 240-seat provincial assembly elections mirrored the National Assembly election results: the PML(N) secured 106 seats; the PPP won 94 seats; the PML(J) garnered 18 seats; and independents won 17 seats. Independents won nine seats and led the field in the contest for Baluchistan's 40-seat assembly. In the North West Frontier Province, alliance partners PML(N) and ANP together registered 35 seats. (See Appendix 15.)

The MQM(A) returned to the electoral process for the provincial assemblies elections. The party reaffirmed its strong position in urban Sind, capturing 27 seats. Unlike 1990, however, the PPP's overall majority in the province in 1993 prevented the MQM(A) from joining the PML(N) to form a government.

In the Punjab Provincial Assembly, the alliance between the PPP and PML(J) led to the election of Manzur Ahmed Wattoo, a PML(J) member, as chief minister of Punjab. The PML(N), in alliance with the ANP, secured the North West Frontier Province. In Baluchistan, an independent candidate was elected chief minister.

C. The Formation of a New Government

Because neither political party emerged with a clear majority in 1993 -- unlike 1990 when the IJI secured an absolute majority of National Assembly seats -- the leading parties maneuvered to form a coalition government. The PPP had the advantage: combined with the PML(J)'s six seats, the PPP held a 20-seat edge over the PML(N). Nevertheless, the lack of a clear majority for either party sparked a number of rumors, including, briefly, a scenario in which Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif would agree to a power-sharing arrangement. Both the PPP and the PML(N) were actively courting the smaller parties, and there was much cynical speculation regarding the price of securing support among the independents.

Such conjecture ended when the PPP's made strong showings in elections for speaker and deputy speaker of the National Assembly. These elections established the momentum for a week of victories for the PPP.

On October 19, Benazir Bhutto received a majority of votes in the National Assembly and won the prime minister's post on a 121 to 72 vote. The PML(J) proved critical in helping Benazir Bhutto form national and provincial governments.

In contrast to 1990, which witnessed a controversial and bitter transfer of power, the new 1993 government assumed power amid a spirit of reconciliation. After some initial complaints by the PML(N), the defeated candidates publicly accepted the legitimacy of the results. Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif both paid tribute to the caretaker government, the CEC and the army for having contributed to Pakistan's democratization process in conducting these elections.

D. The Complaints Process

By the time Prime Minister Bhutto took the oath of office, all major political party leaders had acknowledged publicly the legitimacy of the election results. Nonetheless, leaders of several other political parties chose to air their election-related grievances in the press. As occurred during the campaign period, most could not substantiate or document adequately their complaints. Consequently, political parties formally lodged only five or six "serious" complaints with the CEC regarding the conduct of the polls during the National Assembly elections. Parties filed 21 serious complaints concerning alleged irregularities during the provincial assembly elections.

The majority of complaints raised by the political parties referred to acts of voter fraud, which involved attempts to use bogus identification cards or to impersonate voters. Military officers were forced to exercise their magisterial powers in only four voter fraud cases on election day. Presiding officers invoked their magisterial authority in 12 cases. Those found guilty of voter fraud in the summary trials were arrested, fined and released shortly thereafter.

As of October 19, 1993, the CEC had rejected 21 of 24 requests for recounts. None of the three recounts resulted in reversals of the previously determined outcomes. The CEC conducted one of the recounts in National Assembly Constituency 100 because the margin of victory was less than the number of votes rejected. In Baluchistan Constituency 24, a provincial

assembly candidate who had lost by 15 votes claimed that postal ballots had been counted improperly. After a recount, the candidate lost by 102 votes.

The complaint and recount process was considerably less controversial after the 1993 elections than after the 1990 general elections. During the 1993 elections, there were no serious reports of election-day violence. In 1990, 34 persons were killed and 100 others were injured in politically related violence on the day of provincial assembly elections.

Some points of concern are worth noting. The field team witnessed a measurable discrepancy, as in previous years, between the public's perception of the number of complaints lodged by the political parties and the actual number filed with the CEC. Political parties frequently did not file complaints with the CEC that they had aired in the press.

Another point of concern is that the number of "serious complaints" may be low because of the CEC's narrow definition of the term "serious." In addition, the likelihood of a quick dismissal by the CEC was and is high. As mentioned in NDI's 1990 report, the CEC's dismissal of most complaints reflects the high standard of evidence required by law, the inability of the allegedly aggrieved parties to collect such conclusive evidence or the parties' ignorance of evidentiary requirements. Indeed, by the October 19 election of the prime minister, few election petitions had been received.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

In its report on the October 1990 elections in Pakistan, NDI proposed a series of recommendations designed to strengthen Pakistan's democratization process. In the period leading up to the 1993 elections, a number of NDI's concerns were addressed, although others remain. Below are NDI recommendations based on observation of the 1993 election process.

NDI's international delegation noted many encouraging developments during the 1993 elections. The state-owned electronic media provided equal time and access for political parties to convey their messages to the electorate. Civic organizations increased their participation, particularly in the area of election monitoring. The CEC worked closely with the political parties to establish a code of conduct and to encourage respect for that code. Political parties and civic organizations initiated debate on electoral reform in concert with the CEC. The caretaker government and the armed forces strongly distanced themselves from activities that suggested partisanship.

In the months leading up to the elections, the CEC and interim government also promulgated a number of decrees and regulations that strengthened the confidence of political parties and of the electorate in the electoral system. The Election Commission disqualified candidates associated with drug trafficking and loan defaulting. The commission also required polling officials to count and publicly declare balloting results at the polling station, to provide polling agents with signed copies of the tally sheets at the polling station, to affix unique seals on the back of issued ballot papers and to label ballot boxes with code numbers. Additionally,

the new laws expedited the complaints process by requiring the adjudication of election petitions within six months of an election.

The cooperative manner in which the governing and opposition parties assumed their seats in the newly elected assemblies is a tribute both to the contestants and to those responsible for conducting the 1993 elections. The new government now has the opportunity to encourage and facilitate constructive dialogue on issues raised during the election campaign. Those issues include, *inter alia*: electoral reform; the respective roles of the military and the civilian government in conducting elections; effective methods of civic education; and the role of the media in publicizing political activity.

Recommendations

Pakistanis, through their elected leaders, can best determine the steps needed to ensure the prospects for consolidation of democracy in Pakistan. The following recommendations, therefore, are made in the hope of stimulating discussion in Pakistan regarding possible electoral reforms.

- 1) **Election Administration** -- Because of the exigencies of time during the campaign season and the lack of consensus among the political parties, the CEC maintained existing electoral arrangements on a number of controversial issues. Time now permits the parties to examine in more detail several of those issues, which include:
 - separate or joint electorates, or both, for Muslims and non-Muslims;
 - same-day polling for national and provincial assembly seats;
 - adult franchise in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas; and
 - use of national identification cards in future elections or implementation of mechanisms to issue cards more expeditiously and to detect fraudulent cards.

- 2) **Delimitation of Electoral Constituencies** -- During the campaign, a number of political parties expressed dissatisfaction with the delimitation of constituencies, the inaccuracies of the electoral rolls and the inconsistencies between national identification cards and voter lists.

Each constituency should have a roughly equal distribution of registered voters. However, wide discrepancies exist; for example, 419,717 voters were listed on the electoral rolls for National Assembly Constituency 18, but just 91,530 voters were listed on the rolls for National Assembly Constituency 16. Excluding the eight seats in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, approximately 256,000 voters per constituency would be an equal distribution of the Muslim electorate. Yet, only 44 of 199 National Assembly constituencies or 22 percent of the constituencies were within 10,000 voters of 256,000 voters.

Since the last national census was conducted in 1981, population shifts occurred that partly explain the discrepancies noted above. There appeared to be general agreement in Pakistan that a fresh census should be conducted as soon as possible. The completion of a new census would help the CEC delimit new constituency boundaries.

Currently, the delimitation of constituencies and the preparation of voter lists is the responsibility of the CEC. The Ministry of Interior conducts the census. The Registration Office issues national identification cards. These three agencies should consider establishing a coordinating body well before the next elections to supervise the completion of each agency's tasks and to ensure that resources are available to perform these functions adequately.

- 3) **Media** -- Independent and vigilant media are essential for constructing and maintaining a democratic society. In 1990, NDI's report noted that "the government monopoly on radio and television, the print media's reliance on government advertising, the government's monopoly on newsprint, and the intimidation of news organizations by political parties all impinged on the media's ability to serve as a watchdog and source of accurate information."

Marked improvements were made in 1993 to address some of the concerns noted in 1990. The electronic media provided generally balanced coverage to the major political parties. The print media enjoyed greater freedom in its reporting than it had ever had in the past.

However, the media still should improve its monitoring ability to better fulfill its responsibility as public watchdog. The print media should conduct more objective, analytical and investigative reporting. During the 1993 elections, the print media appeared to rely upon verbatim reprinting of lengthy news statements issued by political leaders and government officials as the primary source of information about political activities.

The state-owned electronic media also appeared to rely solely upon official sources for its information rather than draw from primary information obtained by its own correspondents. Pakistan Television (PTV) and the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation (PBC) should consider expanding their information-gathering and -processing capabilities. In so doing, PTV and the PBC would establish themselves as more credible, independent sources of information.

- 4) **Civic Education** -- In 1988, 1990 and 1993, less than 50 percent of eligible voters participated in the electoral process. This low turnout reinforces the need for political parties, civic organizations, the CEC and the media to design and implement more effective voter education and mobilization programs.

PTV and the PBC attempted to encourage a higher voter turnout by broadcasting positive messages such as: "It is your civic duty to vote." That type of message can help mobilize voter participation only if supplemented by messages that educate the public

about the electoral and political process as a whole. The PBC experimented with the use of Urdu poetry to explain some of the intricacies of the voting process. Both broadcasting concerns, working with political parties, the CEC and civic organizations, should develop further these and other creative methods of education.

Civic education must be perceived as a collective responsibility commanding a high priority. Furthermore, civic education should not cease once the elections are over. The public's interest in the political and electoral process usually increases during the political campaign. That interest can be sustained, nurtured and developed in the period between elections.

- 5) **The Monitoring and Complaints Process** -- As noted in this report and in the 1990 report, Pakistan's election laws carefully outline procedures for the prevention of fraud. The laws do not, however, provide a mechanism for recording problems if they occur. The CEC relies almost entirely on the political parties to document abuses of the electoral system. Unfortunately, in 1993 the political parties had not improved their ability to meet the responsibility. Parties that alleged pre-election or election-day fraud often were not properly prepared to document the complaints. NDI's 1990 recommendations to rectify these problems are still relevant:

- **CEC** -- To ensure that all irregularities are properly recorded the CEC should require presiding officers, immediately after the polls close, to record on a simple form any interruptions, disturbances and irregularities that have occurred. The party agents present would sign the form or, alternatively, polling place officials would note an agent's refusal to sign the form. These forms could be made available to the public immediately after the elections to provide a basis for verifying allegations subsequently presented by the parties.
- **Political Parties** -- Political parties should improve the training programs they use to prepare workers for election-related activities. Through the design and distribution of training materials and monitoring forms, the political parties can overcome some of the inconsistencies in training that emerge from decentralized party structure. Candidates should also avail themselves of training materials prepared by the CEC for election officials and adapt the materials accordingly. The parties must bear in mind that effective training is a time-consuming process that must be incorporated into election preparation.

Additionally, political parties should take heed of the corrosive effects on public opinion regarding elections (and the governments formed after those elections) that stem from airing grievances only in the media. Unsubstantiated or premature complaints erode public confidence in the process without enabling corrective measures to be employed.

- 6) **Women's Polling Stations** -- As in 1990, the delegation noted confusion and disorder at many women's polling stations. Despite the social and religious constraints placed on the participation of women in Pakistan's public life, women comprise about half the

national population and possess the right to vote. Therefore, the NDI delegation urges the CEC to review again the procedures used at women's polling stations with regard to the identification and treatment of voters and to make the administrative changes necessary to encourage participation.

Conclusions

Having observed Pakistan's last three elections, NDI was struck by the sense of "election exhaustion" that many observers believed had become entrenched within the society. The election results to some extent confirmed widespread ambivalence about the choices available and, perhaps, the frequency with which voters were being asked to choose. However, the conduct of the elections suggests several areas of potential promise for future elections and, more broadly, for the democratization process in Pakistan.

A fundamental and obvious point is that elections, however flawed in origin and controversial in execution, continue to be held in Pakistan at least partly to seek resolution to political stalemate. The cynicism and exhaustion with which Pakistan's elections are regarded, particularly by elites and even some in the international community, is tempered by recognition of the unpleasant alternatives to elections Pakistan has experienced historically.

After 1993, Pakistan's elected governments will be challenged to support the integrity of the electoral process with the same vigor demonstrated by the Qureshi government. The new, Bhutto-led government has an opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to electoral reforms and to prove that Pakistan does not need interim governments to conduct elections that enjoy popular legitimacy.

Although senior officials of the interim government took pride in their popular mandate, they and others expressed concern over future reliance on a caretaker system. "This system reflects the weaknesses of our political institutions," said one official. "Eventually an incumbent government will have to be relied upon to carry out credible elections."

As noted earlier, the military played an extraordinary and positive role in the elections. However, this role also reflected the weaknesses of traditional institutions, such as political parties. The NDI observer group expressed the hope that the maturation of these institutions would obviate the need for such large-scale military presence in future elections.

Voter turnout in Pakistan's elections remains highest among the segment of the population that has the most to demand of government -- the poor. This observation is often used to support the proposition that the people, but not the politicians, of Pakistan are ready for democracy.

In response to this charge, many politicians and political observers cite an un-elected civil and military bureaucracy, known popularly as "the establishment," as the primary obstacle to meaningful progress on democratization. Yet during the 1993 elections, the military's support of the process was nonpartisan and professional. Many civil servants expressed relief at the absence of political pressure and appeared to conduct themselves in accordance with the

expectations of impartiality set forth by the interim government. This promising precedent challenges future elected governments to lead and cooperate with the "establishment" in order to achieve their goals.

Notwithstanding the predominance of personality as the distinguishing feature of the 1993 campaign, the election to some extent augured the beginnings of consolidation among Pakistan's diffuse political forces. Some prominent political observers hailed the election results as indicative of an emerging two-party system that might gradually produce a measure of political stability. Citing the constraints of Pakistan's electoral system and constitutional arrangements, these observers noted that the 1993 elections underscored the need for the two major parties to build foundations for national majorities.

Building such foundations would require the parties to solidify their support and to continue expanding beyond traditional, regional strongholds. Examples of measured progress in this regard include the PML(N)'s success in winning seats in Sind and the North West Frontier Province as well as the PPP's ability to increase its victories in Punjab from 1988. Such developments, some observers argue, present opportunities for younger leaders such as Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif to build stronger, participatory political foundations for Pakistan's democratic future.

Other observers express skepticism. They believe that the legacy of bitterness between Bhutto and Sharif is too great to overcome and that the tactics either might employ to broaden her or his party's support would contravene the aim of democratic political party building. Better, the skeptics argue, that Bhutto and Sharif concentrate on initiating institutional reforms that promote stability rather than merely perpetuate their careers. Such measures would include addressing the Eighth Amendment to the constitution, which confers broad powers on the presidency; reexamining the balance of power between the federal and provincial governments; and introducing electoral reforms that enhance public confidence in the process.

The stated approaches are not, of course, mutually exclusive and are indeed inextricably linked. Pakistan has a host of serious problems: hostile and/or unstable neighbors in India and Afghanistan, widespread poverty and illiteracy, and potentially violent ethnic and regional rivalries. To attend to political reforms may seem a luxury in a society so needful. However, by demonstrating an ability to cooperate on political reforms, Pakistan's leaders -- in government and in opposition -- may begin to overcome their differences and build mutual trust and popular support for efforts to address the country's economic and social problems.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1

Terms of Reference

NDI Pre-Election Survey Mission September 11-17, 1993

Based on NDI's previous experience with observing elections in Pakistan, the Institute has developed a comprehensive election assistance program. The program includes a pre-election survey mission, a sustained field presence during the campaign period and an international observer delegation.

The survey mission is planned for September 11-17. Its purpose is to gather information on the electoral preparations and political environment, introduce members of the NDI field team, and develop a plan for monitoring and training activities to be undertaken by the field team. Based on the findings of the survey mission, NDI will produce a report for use by the field team, NDI's election observer delegation and other groups interested in Pakistan electoral developments.

NDI has worked in Pakistan since 1987. In November 1988, at the invitation of Acting President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, NDI organized a 25-member international delegation to observe national and provincial elections scheduled following the sudden death of President Zia ul-Haq. In its final report, the NDI delegation concluded that the elections were generally free and fair and that the electoral laws and procedures compared favorably with those used in other democratic countries.

NDI returned to Pakistan in 1990, dispatching a 40-member international observer delegation for the October 24, 1990 national elections. Ten members of the delegation remained through the October 27 provincial elections. One NDI representative remained in Pakistan until November 18 to review post-election developments.

In its final report on the 1990 elections, NDI concluded that despite evidence of serious irregularities in the electoral process in 15 percent of Pakistan's constituencies, the poll results reflected the general will of the Pakistan people. A statistical analysis conducted by NDI suggested some anomalies but offered no conclusive evidence of massive fraud.

The presence of irregularities, as well as violence, however, fueled Pakistanis' cynicism and undermined confidence in the viability of the fledgling electoral system. Such irregularities if uncorrected threaten the future of democratization in Pakistan and led the NDI delegation to issue a series of recommendations concerning the electoral process.

These recommendations included ensuring that Pakistan's Central Election Commission appoint impartial and independent election officials, follow up on election complaints and conduct the ballot count process in a more open and timely manner. The report also

recommended loosening the close partnership between the media and government, and challenged the political parties to meet their responsibilities to train and educate their workers to monitor elections adequately. Finally, the report suggested electoral authorities do more to improve their control over issuance of identification cards to prevent multiple issuance and other types of fraud, to ensure the ability of women to vote, and to encourage civic and voter education programs outside of the elections season to institutionalize a healthy democratic culture.

In 1992, NDI proposed to return to Pakistan with an "Elections and Parties" program as a follow-up to the 1990 election report and as an initial effort to support the evolution of modern political parties in Pakistan. The program was to emphasize enhancing political party and civic organization monitoring capabilities. Due to controversy and reluctance within the ruling IJI, however, the program was altered and ultimately included only members of the PDA and civic leaders. Election reform dominated PDA discussions and a range of options was discussed.

A subsequent meeting with civic leaders discussed NDI's election observer philosophy and pointed up the critical importance of effective domestic civic monitoring organizations in securing the institutionalization of Pakistan democracy. While no organization resulted or yet exists that is dedicated to supporting free and fair elections in Pakistan, several participants expressed interest in monitoring future elections in a more systematic manner. A major focus of the upcoming mission is to determine whether and to what extent this interest can produce an effective monitoring program.

NDI's intended electoral program should be stated clearly: NDI field representatives to be stationed throughout Pakistan in September will observe and gather data concerning the electoral process leading up to, during and immediately following the October elections. These NDI representatives will also work with all domestic elements, public and private, within Pakistan society interested in organizing an indigenous election monitoring system. NDI will not provide campaign-related advice beyond issues involving election monitoring.

NDI is disinterested in election results and will conduct its activities in a nonpartisan manner in accordance with Pakistani law as well as international standards for election monitoring. NDI will not assume responsibility for supervising the elections nor will NDI involve itself directly in electioneering activities.

Based on NDI's experience in Pakistan and lessons learned from its two election observer missions in 1988 and 1990, the following are among the issues NDI's September survey mission will explore in preparation for dispatch of its field representatives:

Election Administration

1. Are the Central Election Commission (CEC) and provincial election commissions conducting the elections in a politically neutral manner? Are election authorities perceived by the parties to be independent of political direction?

2. What is the status of the CEC's vast recruitment and training of election workers throughout the country? Are past election workers being recruited? What percentage have worked as pollworkers previously? Is new training being undertaken?
3. Are administrative provisions made for domestic civic organizations to monitor the elections and conduct a parallel vote count (PVT)?

The Army

4. What will be the role and scope of the army's involvement in the electoral process? Where will army representatives be stationed on election day? Will they be armed?
5. How will the army, CEC and political and civic organizations coordinate their respective roles and responsibilities?
6. How are complaints about army conduct to be handled?

Campaign Procedures

7. Are the caretaker national and provincial governments remaining neutral? Is there evidence that government funds and services are being used to advance the fortunes of a particular candidate or political party?
8. Has the new report form for registering the preliminary vote count at the polling site been released? Is the form adequate for its purposes and tamper-proof?
9. Have there been changes in constituency boundaries and polling sites since 1990? Have procedures been put in place to rectify irregularities of 1990 involving the announcement of last-minute changes in polling sites?
10. Is there a mechanism by which presiding officers may record polling-site activities on election day in a comprehensive manner, including incidents of violence, intimidation, etc.?
11. Are parties confident about the integrity of the voter lists? Have the lists been updated/modified satisfactorily? If so, what was the process for making these adjustments?
12. Are parties satisfied with the new procedures regulating the allocation of election symbols?
13. What safeguards have been promulgated to assure the integrity of a Pakistani woman's right to vote? Are women's polling stations accorded equal treatment and resources to men's polling stations?

14. Is the Ministry of the Interior doing a satisfactory job in ensuring that all voters on electoral rolls get an ID card? Are the parties satisfied with the ministry in this respect?
15. Is the Ministry of the Interior doing a satisfactory job in protecting against the use of fake and canceled ID cards? Are the parties satisfied with the ministry in this respect?
16. Do the parties generally view the Ministry of the Interior as acting impartially, effectively and professionally? What are their specific complaints about the ministry, if any?
17. Do there appear to be any particular restrictions or other barriers that hinder political parties or candidates from campaigning in any region or province?
18. Is there any evidence of violence or intimidation against political parties, candidates or others involved in the electoral process?

Campaign Law

19. What changes have been made in Pakistan's election law since 1990? Have these changes been communicated to and understood adequately by the parties concerned? Have the parties been complying? What are the penalties for failing to comply?
20. How are the new regulations concerning campaign spending limits being monitored? How will they be enforced?

Complaint Process

21. What procedures will authorities use to investigate alleged election-related improprieties? Will such procedures protect the identity of the "victim" from retaliation for filing the complaint?
22. How is the new code of conduct recently promulgated by the CEC affecting the electoral process? Does the code have the force of law or is it merely a set of guidelines? If so, how will it be implemented? Who will adjudicate? Who will enforce the code's strictures?
23. Upon what bases are prospective candidates for office being disqualified? How many have been disqualified?
24. Are accountability tribunals being established as in 1990? What is their mandate? Are they the primary forum for deciding disqualification? How are their members chosen?
25. Do the tribunals appear to be nonpartisan? Does any party or faction appear to be disproportionately or unfairly targeted for investigation?
26. Do the national party leaderships understand the procedure for filing complaints and the

burden of proof necessary for securing convictions before election day, election day and after election day? Have they communicated these procedures to their local members?

Media

27. Is the government-controlled broadcast and print media demonstrating bias in covering the campaign? Is news coverage giving any candidate a notable political advantage or disadvantage?
28. How are the independent print media covering the campaign? Is there any evidence of government attempts to influence such coverage?
29. Should NDI monitor media coverage? If so, how?
30. Are innovations of 1990 -- airing of public service announcements, panel interviews of leading national candidates -- to be repeated in current campaign?
31. Are parties provided direct-access time slots to air their messages? How are they allocated? When are they broadcast?
32. What languages are used in campaign broadcasting, especially on radio?
33. Have the media been covering campaign problems to date?

Election-Day Monitoring

34. How interested are the national party leaderships in monitoring the polling sites on election day? What kind of resources do they have? Are they willing to devote these resources as well as significant time to the effort?
35. How are local party agents chosen? According to what criteria are they assigned a polling place? Have they been selected already? Is there a list?
36. Do local party agents understand the electoral code? Have the national party leaderships adequately trained and educated their local representatives about their role and responsibilities on election day?
37. Is any political party, civic organization or coalition of civic organizations willing and able to conduct an effective PVT as part of their monitoring operation? Is the civic organization viewed as independent and impartial by the parties, press and public?
38. What type of PVT operation -- randomly selected, representative, or problem constituency-based -- should be conducted considering resources available? Are the differences among them and inherent limitations clearly understood by concerned Pakistani parties?

39. What is the structure and organization of the various political parties, election commissions and civic organizations? What are their various affiliations and factions? Who in the chain of command has real authority? Who makes decisions?
40. Do the Pakistanis understand clearly NDI's role and involvement in the upcoming electoral process? What do Pakistanis expect of NDI? Are Pakistanis receptive to NDI involvement?

Post-Election

41. How will election reports be communicated? What is the fastest and most reliable way to do this?

NDI Operations

42. Should NDI issue periodic pre-election statements? If so, how often? What should the statements include and not include? How should the content and timing of any statements be determined?
43. When should NDI's preliminary post-election statement be issued -- before the provincial assembly elections or afterward? What do the parties prefer? What will be the policies of other observer groups?
44. What other observer missions will be present on election day? Should NDI coordinate with these groups? How?
45. How do Pakistanis view the relationship between the National Assembly and provincial assembly elections? How are the parties allocating their resources? What is their campaign strategy?

Terms of Reference

International Election Observer Delegation Pakistan National Elections October 1993

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) is organizing a 35-member international observer delegation for the October elections in Pakistan. The delegation will be the third part of NDI's comprehensive program for the Pakistan elections, which has included a survey mission to Pakistan conducted from September 11 to 17 and the presence of a six-member field team on the ground through the elections.

Observers will include parliamentarians, political party leaders, journalists, academics, and election specialists from five continents. The entire delegation will be present to observe the October 6 National Assembly elections, while a smaller group will remain to observe the provincial assembly elections on October 9.

The mission has been welcomed by the Pakistan caretaker government, political parties, civic organizations and election officials. The delegation's purpose is to support the Pakistani people's desire for free and fair elections, and to demonstrate the international community's continued support for democratization in Pakistan. Many members of the delegation are from countries in political transitions that will soon be holding their own elections. Through observing of the Pakistan elections, these representatives will be able to learn from Pakistan's experience and relate their observations to political development in their own countries. In this way, democratic development around the world benefits from a variety of national models and experiences.

NDI has considerable experience in organizing international observer missions in more than 40 countries. The Institute organized international delegations to Pakistan for the 1988 and 1990 elections.

In observing the 1993 elections, NDI does not presume to supervise the elections nor to intervene in Pakistan's internal affairs. The observer mission will conduct its activities in a nonpartisan manner in accordance with international standards and the laws of Pakistan. NDI recognizes that it is the Pakistani people who will determine the significance of these elections and ultimately determine whether the will of the electorate is expressed in the results.

The delegation's observations and other credible sources of information will supply the basis for its conclusions about the elections. The delegation will seek to document all its observations and conclusions to the extent possible.

The international observer delegation will arrive in Islamabad, the federal capital, on October 2. On October 3 and 4, the delegation will receive introductory briefings by NDI staff members and meet with Pakistan political party leaders, government officials, election officials, and representatives from non-governmental organizations. On October 5 the group will split into teams and deploy to all four provinces of Pakistan, plus Islamabad. These teams will meet with local election officials and political leaders to gain insight into local conditions.

On October 6, the teams will visit polling places and counting centers to observe the general conduct of the National Assembly elections. Special attention will be placed upon highly contested "key" constituencies, as determined by data compiled by NDI during past elections as well as by recent discussions with party leaders. An additional representative will sit with the Central Election Commission to observe the workings of the commission on election day as well as to provide data for a statistical analysis following the election.

The delegation will reassemble in Islamabad on October 7 for debriefing, discussion, and drafting of a preliminary statement. A press conference on October 8 will publicize these findings and allow for questions concerning NDI's conclusions.

Many members of the delegation will depart Pakistan early on October 9. A smaller group will remain to deploy again to the provinces to observe the provincial assembly elections on October 9. This team will reassemble in Islamabad the next morning for debriefings, drafting of a preliminary statement and a press conference to announce its conclusions.

Drawing upon information gathered by NDI's presence prior to, during and after the elections, NDI intends to issue a comprehensive report on the elections by the end of the year. The report will discuss in detail the delegation's observations and provide an assessment of the election issues, including those in the following sections.

Because of the possibility that casual statements may be taken out of context, delegates should not make any comments to the media regarding their personal observations of the elections until after the delegation has reconvened in Islamabad, all the teams have provided their briefings, and the delegation has issued its formal statement. Only then will delegation members have a national perspective on the electoral process.

Based on NDI's work in Pakistan over the past seven years and, in particular, the report of a nine-member survey mission to Pakistan on September 11-17, 1993, the following are among the issues the delegation will explore.

MEDIA

Have the media revealed through their coverage a bias toward one party or candidate?
How have television, radio and newspapers differed in their coverage?

Did the broadcast media provide equal access to all political parties?

Were the government-controlled media biased in its coverage of the election? Was there evidence of government funds being used to support a partisan newspaper or electronic media outlet, through advertisement money, for instance?

Have the media generally been helpful in providing necessary details of the election, *i.e.*, polling place sites?

CAMPAIGN ENVIRONMENT

Were there instances of election-related violence and intimidation during the campaign season? Did one party or faction seem to benefit more than another? Did the army respond effectively to secure a free and fair electoral environment for all parties?

Were there any restrictions on candidates or their party representatives from campaigning in any region of the country?

What was the effect on the electoral process of the ordinance disqualifying prospective candidates who have defaulted on bank loans? Were there questions as to the integrity of the defaulter lists released by the Pakistan Banking Council? What were the procedures for adjudicating, and who made the final judgment? Was there an appeals process? Did any particular parties, factions or candidates seem to be unfairly singled out for sanction?

How many candidates were disqualified on other grounds? What were those grounds? Did such qualifications appear to affect any party disproportionately?

Did the caretaker government administer its electoral responsibilities in a fair, equitable and impartial manner?

Were government resources used to the advantage of any party or candidate? What effect did this have on the campaign?

Were the restrictions on campaign spending adhered to? How was spending monitored? Did the election commissions find evidence of violations? Did the Central Election Commission (CEC) respond promptly, and what penalties were imposed? Did a particular party seem singled out for scrutiny?

How many new ID cards were issued during the "crash program" of August and September? How many citizens were eligible? Was there evidence of partiality in the registration of new voters and the issuance of identification cards?

Were there violations of the new Code of Conduct For Political Parties? What were the penalties for violating the code, if any, and how were allegations adjudicated? Was the process fair and timely?

Are presiding officers and party polling agents planning to meet prior to election day to ensure that the responsibilities of each are understood?

ELECTION DAY

Did the Central Election Commission and the provincial election commissions perform their duties in a nonpartisan, impartial manner? Did the district returning officers, returning officers, presiding officers and other election officials do so? If not, please describe examples.

Did polls open and close on time?

Were there instances of election-related violence or intimidation at the polling site or elsewhere on election day? If so, by whom? Did authorities respond promptly and efficiently to protect voters' rights? Were the polls closed temporarily for any reason, and if so, for how long and for what reason?

Were any obstacles placed in the way of properly registered foreign or domestic observers in the conduct of their election-site responsibilities? Did the election authorities or the army respond promptly and efficiently to secure these rights?

Were any unauthorized personnel stationed at the polling site?

Did the identification card requirement disenfranchise a significant number of potential voters? Were there allegations of identification card fraud?

Were voter lists accurate, complete and up-to-date? Were challenges made? On what grounds? How were controversies resolved?

Where were the ballot boxes, ballots and ink being stored prior to election day? Who handled these components?

Were party agents stationed at each polling site? Were they adequately prepared for and educated in their election-day responsibilities? Were they sufficiently knowledgeable of the rules and regulations governing election-day activities at the polling site?

Were women's polling stations administered with equal care and efficiency as men's polling stations? Were any extraordinary obstacles placed in the way of a woman's legal right to vote? Were complaints aired? Did polling site officials and army representatives resolve the situation in a timely manner?

Was a preliminary vote count held at each polling site in front of the candidates (or their polling agents), army representative and presiding officer? Did the candidate/party agent and army representative sign the tabulation sheet, and the presiding officer affix his thumb print to the back, according to procedures in the new election code? Were the results posted at the polling site?

Did the returning officer compile the count for his constituency in the presence of the candidates or their agent as stipulated? If not, why not? Did the returning officer announce the result from his office and over the media? Were there any complaints about the process and were they credible?

Are there any conditions under which a candidate, party agent, army representative or presiding officer may legally refuse to sign or otherwise fail to countenance the preliminary tabulation? Are there sanctions for refusing to sign the tally sheet?

Did each candidate or representative receive a copy of the results?

How much time elapsed between preliminary tabulation at the polling site and announcement of official results by higher levels up to the CEC? Was there a significant,

unexplained time lag?

Did the ballot box remain sealed until the preliminary count was undertaken? Did the ballot boxes remain in view of party agents and independent monitors?

Were certain ballots disallowed? For what reason? Who made the judgment? Was the decision explained to the satisfaction of observers? Did party agents and independent monitors challenge a decision? Did they have credible grounds for challenging?

Was the army a help or hindrance to the electoral process? Was the army called on to mediate any dispute or attend to any challenge to law and order at any polling site, as outlined in the electoral code? Was there any evidence of bias in the discharge of its responsibilities?

PARALLEL VOTE TABULATION

Was a parallel vote tabulation (PVT) attempted? By whom? Was this entity credibly nonpartisan and disinterested in the eyes of the Pakistan general public?

Was the tabulation carried out in a competent, professional manner? What faults in the system could be noticed? Were monitors subject to allegations of partisanship and fraud? Were these charges credible and documented?

Did the conduct of a PVT seem to enhance public confidence in Pakistan's electoral system?

RESULTS AND POST-ELECTION EVALUATIONS

Were the official results reported in accordance with the election law?

Did the various Pakistani political parties recognize the results? If not, were challenges filed in accordance with the election laws? Did the CEC follow-up in a fair, efficient and timely manner?

Were any petitions referred to election tribunals? If so, what were the subjects of the complaints? Did the election tribunals act promptly in accordance with the law, and did they function impartially and independently? What standards of evidence were employed? Was there an appeal process? What were the final judgments?

Were new national and provincial governments formed in accordance with the prescribed procedures?

Appendix 2

Report of NDI Pre-Election Survey Mission September 11-17, 1993

This statement is offered by an international team of election experts and regional specialists organized by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI). The survey team held a series of meetings with government officials, political party representatives, nongovernmental organizations, journalists and other opinion leaders at the national and provincial levels to review administrative preparations and evaluate the political climate leading up to Pakistan's October 1993 elections. Several members of the NDI team will remain in Pakistan until the elections. As in 1988 and 1990, NDI also plans to organize an international observer delegation for the October polls.

From a democratization perspective, the team recognizes that complex factors have led to the holding of this third set of elections in five years. These factors include Pakistan's constitutional and electoral arrangements as well as the evolution of, and relationships among, key institutions such as the media, political parties and the military. By remaining in Pakistan over the course of the next several weeks, the Institute hopes to gain a better understanding of the confluence of these factors and their impact on the elections as well as on Pakistan's continued democratic development.

Over the past several days, elections officials and representatives of the political parties expressed the view that the present election environment is less controversial than previous pre-election periods. Persons with whom the team met also affirmed that election preparations being undertaken by the caretaker government and election officials are being accomplished in an impartial manner. The team's meetings and review of published reports in the media reinforce the impression that the caretaker government has created an environment conducive to meaningful political competition for the support of the electorate.

The team noted that the Central Election Commission has announced a number of steps to demonstrate and promote the transparency of the election process. These include explicit instructions to election officials regarding the distribution, safe storage and documenting the disposition of election paraphernalia (ballots, ballot boxes, tally sheets, etc.), providing party agents with signed copies of the official tally sheets, announcing the election results at the polling station level, and plans to accredit nonpartisan domestic election monitors. In addition, the army has responded affirmatively to the request of the Central Election Commission that it help ensure that the elections will take place in a peaceful and orderly manner and in accordance with the constitution and electoral laws.

The team noted that the preparations by these institutions do not obviate the need for other participants in the electoral process -- particularly the political parties and candidates -- to observe the new code of conduct and exercise vigilance in ensuring that the electoral laws are fully respected. The team was encouraged to learn that Pakistani nongovernmental organizations such as the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan are also preparing to observe the election process. It is the experience of NDI that observation of elections by nonpartisan domestic

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groups that do not have a direct stake in the outcome of the election contributes to citizen participation and public accountability of elected officials. Such activities strengthen democratic institutions and enhance the development of modern civic societies.

While in an overall sense the team was favorably impressed by the election preparations and the general campaign environment thus far, several observations cause concern. Virtually everyone with whom the team spoke expressed the view that voter turnout for the October elections is likely to be lower than in past elections. The team urges continuing efforts by the government and political parties to encourage voters to cast their ballots on both October 6 and 9 in order to ensure the credibility of the electoral process and public confidence in the future national and provincial governments.

A second concern expressed to the team by a large number of people was that election-related violence could result from a heated campaign. Such violence could reduce voter confidence in election results. At the same time, individuals could use the election campaign as a pretext for pursuing long-standing conflicts unrelated to politics. In some places, prejudice against certain groups or regional parties could also lead to violence that might negatively affect the campaign environment. The team was assured by provincial officials, the Central Election Commission and the army that steps are being taken in the pre-election period as well as on election day to maintain law and order and at the same time permit peaceful political expression.

The team also learned of concerns regarding problems in campaign finance. While limitations have been announced regarding campaign spending, it was almost universally stated that the present mechanisms to monitor expenditures and enforce spending limits are inadequate and unlikely to be followed. In addition, a number of people identified vote-buying by several parties as a persistent problem -- although one difficult to verify. These practices undermine the expression of political choice and create cynicism among the electorate.

The team noted that while efforts to update the electoral rolls were initiated by the caretaker authorities and election officials before the August 22 deadline, it was acknowledged that there was not sufficient time or resources to complete the task. The degree to which this deficiency is perceived to affect voter turnout should be considered by the future elected government to strengthen electoral law provisions regarding the review and updating of the voter rolls.

A matter still awaiting resolution by election officials is how women's polling places will be secured on election day. The team hopes that the procedures adopted will encourage and ensure that women exercise their right to vote.

In closing, as in 1988 and 1990, the team expresses its appreciation for the reception it has been accorded by party leaders and election officials throughout the country. We also recognize that the ultimate judge of these upcoming elections will be the people of Pakistan and offer our support to all of those who are working to ensure that the unfolding electoral process will ultimately contribute to Pakistan's long-term democratic development and prosperity.

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Appendix 3

Delegation Members

**International Election Observer Delegation
Pakistan National Elections
October 6, 1993**

MAURICE FOSTER
Delegation Co-Leader
Member of Parliament
Canada

KENNETH D. WOLLACK
Delegation Co-Leader
NDI President
United States

ALFRED ALOCI
Member, Executive Council
Society for Democratic Culture
Albania

ABDUL KADER EL-GUNEID
Physician Former Mayor of Taiz
Yemen

GEORGE BRUNO
Former Chair
New Hampshire Democratic Party
United States

FAITH GAZA
President, Women's Brigade
K-Inkatha Freedom Party
South Africa

RASHID CHAUDARY
Businessman
United States

GERALDINE JOSLYN FRASER
Nat'l. Elections Deputy Coordinator
African National Congress
South Africa

KAREN CLARK*
NDI Senior Program Officer
United States

MAHDI ABDUL HADI
President
Palestinian Academic Society for
the Study of Int'l. Affairs
Jerusalem

JOE COSTELLO
Member of Parliament
Labour Party
Ireland

MIRZA HAIDER ALI
Study & Research Group for Democracy &
Socio-Economic Development
Bangladesh

BARBARA DAVIS
Author and Literary Critic
United States

FEROZ HASSAN
Study & Research Group for Democracy &
Socio-Economic Development
Bangladesh

AMADOU MODY DIALL
Former Minister of Justice
Mali

HOUDA KANOUN
Member of Parliament
Tunisia

VIVYANE MPEH KIMA
Attorney
Cameroon

CARL LARKINS
NDI South Africa Field Representative
United States

OLEKSANDR LAVRYNOVYCH
Acting Chair
Central Election Commission
Ukraine

MARIA LEISSNER
Former Member of Parliament
Sweden

PATRICK MERLOE*
NDI Senior Associate for
Electoral Processes
United States

PAULA NEWBERG
Senior Associate
Carnegie Endowment for Int'l. Peace
United States

BHARAT PAUDYAL
Director
Center for Electoral Processes and
Democratic Governance
Nepal

IRMA ALASYA D. PUTRA
Member of Parliament
Indonesia

WILLIAM RICHTER*
Professor of Political Science
Kansas State University
United States

MPHO INNOCENT SCOTT
Deputy Regional Secretary (So. Natal)
African National Congress
South Africa

MOUSA SHTEIWI
Professor of Sociology
University of Jordan
Jordan

HOWARD SCHAFFER
Former Ambassador to Bangladesh
United States

DAVID VAN NOTE
Attorney
United States

JUAN VARGAS
System Analyst, Chase Manhattan Bank
National Commission of Election Observers
Panama

MICHAEL WEEDER
Executive Director
Project Vote
South Africa

ANITA WEISS
Associate Professor of International Studies
University of Oregon
United States

DEGEE WILHELM
Former Personal Assistant to
President-Elect Clinton
United States

SEAN WOO
Minority Counsel
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States

SUE WOOD
Former President
New Zealand National Party
New Zealand

NDI STAFF

Monte Achenbach
Program Intern

Derek Mitchell
Program Officer

Salman Ahmed*
Field Representative

Maryam Montague
Program Assistant

Ann Colville
Logistics Coordinator

Scott Morton
Logistics Coordinator

Kate Head*
Field Representative

Timmy Napolitano*
NDI Advisor

Mary Hill
Logistics Manager

Steve Siegler*
NDI Advisor

*** Indicates members of NDI Survey Mission, September 11-17, 1993. The team also included NDI advisor Glenn Cowan and Canadian Senator B.A. Graham**

Appendix 4

Arrival Statement

**NDI International Election Observer Delegation
Pakistan National Elections
October 4, 1993**

Ladies and Gentlemen, I am Maurice Foster, a member of parliament from Canada and vice chairman of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. I am pleased to introduce the international delegation that is in Pakistan to observe the October 6 and 9 national and provincial elections. This delegation is being organized by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), which has gained an international reputation for professionalism in organizing such efforts.

Before we explain the nature of our visit, allow me to introduce the co-leader of this delegation, Kenneth Wollack, president of NDI.

I would also like to note that this 35-member delegation includes parliamentarians, political party leaders, regional specialists and election experts from 17 countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East and the Western Hemisphere. Some of the delegation members have participated in NDI observer missions to previous elections in Pakistan.

Given the significance of these elections for the democratic future of Pakistan, it is not surprising that the elections have attracted international attention. This and other observer delegations have been welcomed by the Central Election Commission and the caretaker government, as well as major political parties and civic organizations.

I wish to emphasize that this delegation is here as observers. We do not come as supervisors or arbiters. We have taken no position on the outcome of these elections. Ultimately, it will be the Pakistani people who will judge the fairness of the electoral process.

The purpose of the delegation is to demonstrate the international community's continued support for the democratic process in Pakistan. We also are here to learn from the people of Pakistan about the nature of the electoral process and its implications for Pakistan's political future. Let me emphasize, however, that the members of the delegation are not serving as representatives of governments, and therefore, we will not make recommendations as to bilateral issues among our respective countries. Our role is strictly limited to providing the international community with an assessment of the elections.

This role is consistent with the practice of international election observer missions, a practice that is now widely accepted in the international community. The attitude of political party representatives, and members of the election commission and caretaker government toward the presence of this delegation reflects this trend.

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We have already met with a wide spectrum of Pakistanis to obtain their views on the electoral process. The delegation has divided into teams, most of which are soon departing Islamabad to visit all four provinces of the country. Delegation members will meet with Pakistanis involved in the electoral process in each of the provinces and, on Wednesday, will observe the balloting and counting processes at hundreds of polling sites around the country.

NDI has maintained a permanent presence in Pakistan since early September when a nine-member international team visited the country to assess the pre-election environment and preparations for the elections. A six-member group remained in Pakistan to continue pre-election monitoring throughout the country and to prepare for the visit of this delegation. The delegation has been briefed by these pre-election missions.

The NDI delegation is also maintaining close communication with other international observer delegations, as well as Pakistani civic groups monitoring the electoral process. This communication will enable us to share information and maximize the observation of polling sites. Throughout our stay, members of the delegation will be obtaining assessments of Pakistanis regarding three distinct elements of the electoral process -- the campaign period, election day procedures and the tabulation of results.

The delegation reassembles in Islamabad on Thursday, October 7, to share our experiences and plans to issue a preliminary statement on Friday. Our observations of this process will, we expect, reflect those of the Pakistani people.

In addition to the delegation's observation of the national elections, members of the delegation will remain in Pakistan for the provincial polling. NDI representatives will then remain in Pakistan to gather post-election data. A comprehensive report on the elections will be published next month.

We wish to reiterate our support for the people of Pakistan in their efforts to consolidate democratic government in which political pluralism flourishes, individual rights are protected and the rule of law is institutionalized.

Thank you.

Appendix 5

Deployment Teams

International Election Observer Delegation
Pakistan National Elections
October 1993

PUNJAB

Lahore -- Team #1

1. Salman Ahmed *
2. Michael Weeder
3. Azeem Ali (Interpreter)

Lahore -- Team #2

1. Karen Clark
2. Musa Shteivi
3. Faisal Rizwan (Interpreter)

Lahore -- Team #3

1. George Bruno
2. Vivyane Mpeh Kima
3. Omar Hassan (Interpreter)

Lahore -- Team #4

1. Barbara Davis
2. Mpho Innocent Scott
3. Hanif Tayyab (Interpreter)

Lahore -- Team #5

1. Carl Larkins
2. Houda Kanoun
3. Tariq Afzal (Interpreter)

Multan -- Team #1

1. Maryam Montague *
2. Amadou Mody Diall
3. Zia Rehman (Interpreter)

Faisalabad -- Team #1

1. Derek Mitchell *
2. Alfred Aloci
3. Quassim Darr (Interpreter)

Islamabad -- Leadership

1. Ken Wollack
2. Maurice Foster
3. Najam Saeed (Interpreter)

Islamabad -- Team #2

1. Ann Colville *
2. Mary Hill
3. Atif Saeed (Interpreter)

Rawalpindi -- Team 1

1. Faith Gaza
2. Sean Woo
3. Aseem Saeed (Interpreter)

Rawalpindi -- Team 2

1. Monte Achenbach *
2. Haider Mirza
3. Tariq Rana (Interpreter)

Rawalpindi -- Team 3

1. Pat Merloe
2. Alia Masood (Interpreter)

SIND

Karachi -- Team 1

1. Sue Wood *
2. Rashid Chaudary
3. Ali Wagar Husain
(Interpreter)

Karachi -- Team 2

1. Paula Newburg
2. Abdul Kader El Guneid
3. Shariq Ahmed (Interpreter)

Karachi -- Team 3

1. Maria Leissner
2. Oleksandr Lavnyynovych
3. Daniel Rizi (Interpreter)

Khairpur -- Team 1
1. Timmy Napolitano *
2. Howard Schaffer
3. Mohammad Rizwan
(Interpreter)

Hyderabad - Team 1
1. Bill Richter *
2. Geraldine Joslyn Fraser
3. Mohammad Mujeeb
(Interpreter)

BALUCHISTAN

Quetta -- Team 1
1. Steve Siegler *
2. Baharat Paudyal
3. John Rashid (Interpreter)

Quetta -- Team 2
1. Anita Weiss
2. Juan Vargas
3. (Interpreter)

NORTH WEST FRONTIER

Peshawar -- Team 1
1. Kate Head *
2. Mahdi Abdul Hadi
3. Rukshana Iqbol
(Interpreter)

Abbottabad
1. Feroz Hassan *
2. Degee Wilhelm
3. Faisal Jafree (Interpreter)

Mardan -- Team 1
1. Irma Alasya Putra
2. Dave Van Note
3. Sheraz Khan (Interpreter)

Mardan -- Team 2
1. Scott Morton *
2. Joe Costello
3. Mohammad Khurshid
(Interpreter)

(*) Coordinator

Appendix 6

**Election-Day Checklist
International Election Observation Delegation
October 1993**

Team _____	Time of Visit _____
Province _____	Constituency _____
Polling Site _____	PO Present? yes ___ no ___ APO? yes ___ no ___
Opening Time _____	Poll Closing Time _____
Number of Polling Compartments in a Booth _____	Number of Booths _____
Number of Meetings with Agents and Number of Agents _____	

Number of Meetings with Tents _____	

1) Total Ballots Delivered Before Voting	_____
Muslim Ballots	_____
Non-Muslim Ballots	_____
2) Number of Normal Ballots Cast	_____
3) Number of Spoiled Ballots	_____
4) Number of Challenged Ballots	_____
5) Number of Tendered Ballots	_____
6) Number of Unused Ballots	_____

BEFORE VOTING

	Yes	No
Polling Officials Arrive on Time	___	___
Expected Election Staff (No Last Minute Changes)	___	___
Party Agents Arrive on Time	___	___
All Party Agents Credentialed	___	___
Army Representative Present	___	___
Domestic Observer Present, Org. _____	___	___
Adequate Materials, Ballots, Ink, Boxes	___	___
Ballot Boxes Numbered with Code	___	___
Ballot Boxes Empty Before Voting	___	___
Ballot Boxes Sealed Before Voting	___	___
Preparations Completed Before Polls Opened	___	___

DURING VOTING

Yes

No

Polls Open on Time	—	—
Booths are Private for Secret Balloting	—	—
Men and Women's Voting Separate and Private	—	—
Free Access to the Polling Place	—	—
Visits by Army Mobile Teams	—	—
Visits by International Observers	—	—
Visits by Domestic Observers	—	—
Lines are Orderly	—	—
Voting is Orderly without Interruption	—	—
Voters Leave Polling Station After Voting	—	—
Lists are Accurate	—	—
Sufficient Ballots	—	—
Voters Sign and Thumb Print Voter List	—	—
Voter Name Crossed Off List	—	—
Voter Fingers are Inked	—	—
Voter ID Cards are Punched	—	—
Included on Each Ballot Counterfoil:		
Serial Number from Voter List	—	—
Voter ID Card Number	—	—
Voter Thumbprint	—	—
Voter Given One Ballot	—	—
Ballot Signed and Stamped by the APO	—	—
Ballot Boxes Remain in View of Agents and Monitors	—	—
Voters Cast Tendered Ballots (Name Recorded as Voted)	—	—
Voters Cast Challenge Ballots (Identity Questioned)	—	—
Election Workers Respond to Complaints Fairly	—	—
Election Workers Act Impartially	—	—
Army Representatives Act Impartially	—	—
Party Agents Act Impartially	—	—
Party Locator Tents at 400 Yards	—	—
Neutral Voting Place (No Campaigning)	—	—
Voting Calm (No Guns or Fights)	—	—

Did Presiding Officer/Military Office exercise authority for summary trial and/or punishment? Please explain

ER VOTING AT POLLING SITE

People in Line at 5:30 Allowed to Vote	_____	_____
Polls Close on Time	_____	_____
Seals Remained on Ballot Boxes Until Counting	_____	_____
Ballot Boxes Remain in View of Agents and Monitors	_____	_____
Only Authorized People Present During Counting	_____	_____
Unused Ballots Properly Secured Before Count	_____	_____
Stamps Properly Secured Before Count	_____	_____
Orderly Counting Process	_____	_____
Counting Done in Full View of Agents and Monitors	_____	_____
Ambiguous Ballots Judged in a Neutral Manner	_____	_____
Spoiled Ballots Properly Sealed	_____	_____
Unused Ballots Properly Sealed	_____	_____
Tendered Ballots Properly Sealed	_____	_____
Challenged Ballots Properly Sealed	_____	_____
All Party Agents Sign the Statement of the Count	_____	_____
All Party Agents Given the Statement of the Count	_____	_____
Presiding Officer Takes Results to Returning Officer	_____	_____
Results Announced by Returning Officer Same As Count	_____	_____

Recounts Ordered or Requested? _____

ER VOTING AT THE CONSTITUENCY/DISTRICT ELECTION OFFICE

Yes No

List of Requests for Postal Ballots	_____	_____
How Many Postal Ballots Sent	_____	
How Many Postal Ballots Received	_____	
Consolidation of Results of Muslim Ballots	_____	_____
Consolidation of Results of Non-Muslim Ballots	_____	_____
Results Released to the Media	_____	_____
Results Reported to District or Provincial Level	_____	_____
Ballot Bags & Tally Sheets Secured & Transported	_____	_____

Please Explain in Full Detail any NO Answers, Complaints or Challenges:



NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Fifth Floor, 1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 528-5156

■ FAX (202) 959-5166
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Appendix 7

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

NDI INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER DELEGATION TO THE PAKISTAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS

October 8, 1993

This is the preliminary statement of a 35-member international delegation that observed the October 6 National Assembly elections in Pakistan. The delegation, organized by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), includes parliamentarians, political party leaders, election experts and regional specialists from 17 countries in Europe, Africa, Asia, the Pacific, the Middle East, Latin America and North America.

Given the significance of these elections for the democratic future of Pakistan, it is not surprising that the elections have attracted international attention. This and other observer delegations have been welcomed by the Central Election Commission and the caretaker government, as well as by major political parties and civic organizations. Our delegation came as observers. We did not seek to supervise the elections or certify the integrity of the process. Ultimately, it is the Pakistani people who must judge the elections.

The purpose of the delegation is to demonstrate the international community's continued support for the democratic process in Pakistan. We also are here to learn from the people of Pakistan about the nature of the electoral process and its implications for the further development of Pakistan's democratic institutions.

This is NDI's third international observer delegation to Pakistan. NDI delegations also observed the 1988 and 1990 polling. Since early September, NDI has maintained a continuous presence in the country. A 10-member international team visited Pakistan September 11-17 to assess the pre-election environment and preparations for the elections. Six members of this team remained in Pakistan to continue pre-election monitoring throughout the country and prepare the visit of this delegation. The delegation was briefed extensively by these pre-election missions.

NDI carefully reviewed media coverage of the campaign leading up to the elections. It also maintained close communications with other international observer delegations as well as Pakistani nongovernmental organizations monitoring the electoral process. Members of the delegation will remain in Pakistan to observe the provincial elections and to monitor post-election developments.



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The delegation's mandate included the examination of three distinct aspects of the election process: the campaign; election-day proceedings; and the tabulation of results to date. This statement is a preliminary assessment of these issues. We note that the tabulation of results and the resolution of any electoral complaints have yet to be completed. NDI will continue to closely monitor developments and will issue a more detailed report at a later date.

The delegation arrived in Pakistan on Saturday, October 2. During our stay we met with government and election officials, leaders of the major political parties, nongovernmental organizations, journalists, and others involved in the electoral process in all four provinces and in the federal capital. On election day, members of the delegation visited polling stations in rural and urban areas throughout the nation.

The delegation noted significant improvement of the pre-election environment over that of the 1990 elections. The caretaker government sought to establish an environment in which the elections would be administered impartially. Opposing parties agreed that the government successfully promoted an open, competitive process.

The electronic media provided generally balanced coverage of the campaign and access for 22 parties to present their messages directly to the public. Contesting political parties were able to communicate with the electorate through the printed press, rallies and other avenues. The printed press also enjoyed freedom in political reporting. Additional steps taken to ensure impartial election administration included the policy of transferring government officials.

The Central Election Commission (CEC) adopted new procedures that promoted the transparency of the election. These actions included providing party polling agents with signed copies of the official tally sheets, announcing results at the polling stations, promoting greater awareness of the Code of Conduct for Political Parties and accrediting independent Pakistani election monitors. The CEC also considered carefully recommendations by political parties and nongovernmental organizations and sought consensus on a number of electoral reforms.

Notwithstanding these positive developments, a number of recurring features remained only partially addressed. These include the quality of the electoral rolls, which had not been fully updated since 1991. After the elections were called, there was not enough time to remove all of the names of those who were deceased, had relocated, or were deemed "bogus" upon investigation. Concern was also expressed that some prospective new voters could not be registered because of cumbersome procedures to acquire the

national identification cards. Also, the delegation noted reliable reports from numerous sources that parties and candidates often ignored legal requirements regarding campaign spending limitations as well as aspects of the Code of Conduct for Political Parties.

The delegation notes with deep regret serious incidents of violence that resulted in a number of deaths during the campaign.

The MQM(A)'s allegation of interference with its ability to contest the elections is a serious charge. However, the delegation is not in a position to judge how valid these charges were, or whether they justified the decision of the party to boycott the National Assembly elections. The delegation regrets that the party's withdrawal apparently deprived voters of the full range of political choices. We hope that the proper authorities will investigate and act upon these and similar allegations by other parties.

On election day, the balloting was generally open, orderly and well-administered. The atmosphere in and around the polling stations was peaceful. In the polling stations observed by delegation members, election officials generally carried out their tasks impartially and with diligence. Polling agents from major contesting parties were present at voting booths, appeared to work cooperatively, and expressed confidence in the election officials' resolution of disputes. The delegation was also encouraged by the presence of independent domestic monitors organized by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan in polling sites around the country. The counting was conducted in an expeditious and transparent manner, and the consolidation and announcement of results has generally proceeded in accordance with the law.

The delegation nonetheless noted some problems and irregularities. The most frequently observed problem was in identifying and verifying voters which, because of either inaccurate electoral rolls or possibly false ID cards, resulted in some persons not being able to vote. Other irregularities included delays in opening the polling stations and occasional ineffectiveness of the indelible ink. However, the delegation did not receive evidence that these problems were systematic or that they affected the outcome of the elections in the constituencies observed.

The delegation wishes to emphasize that we have maintained contact with the political parties throughout the pre-election and election day period. Although parties identified electoral issues that were cause for concern, at no point did they accuse the CEC, the military or the caretaker government of partisanship. Parties or candidates that alleged pre-election fraud often did not appear to be prepared to document their complaints. In addition, the delegation noted that on election day, party agents were in some instances not investigating or recording potential irregularities

or challenges. The absence of such documentation hinders the parties' ability to substantiate claims of electoral abuse.

The delegation expresses serious concerns regarding the participation of women in the electoral process. As NDI noted in its report on the 1990 elections, cultural and social realities, as well as identification procedures in the polling station, make it difficult for women to vote. For example, in certain areas designated to have a polling station for women, presiding officers did not even bother to set up the facilities because of expectations that women would not come to vote. The delegation also observed significantly more confusion and disorder in women's polling places.

The active involvement of the armed forces in these elections deserves special attention. It was generally viewed by party leaders and the electorate that beyond maintaining law and order, the military's role in support of the Central Election Commission was aimed at guaranteeing the integrity of the entire process. The large-scale military presence on election day provided a calming influence. Except for isolated instances, members of the armed forces did not interfere in the process or act in an intimidating manner.

While the armed forces played a positive role in this election, it is essential that other institutions be strengthened. This would obviate the need for the military to assume extraordinary roles in the election process. These institutions include democratic political parties, active civic organizations, vigilant and independent media, a strong independent electoral commission, and a government and parliament responsive and accountable to the citizenry.

Democracy in Pakistan will only advance through tolerance, dialogue and cooperation among ruling and opposition parties alike. In this immediate post-election period and beyond, Pakistan's political leaders must reach out not only to their own supporters, but to the millions of Pakistanis who did not vote. This election provides an important opportunity to broaden popular support for and confidence in democratic governance.

Appendix 8

Code of Conduct for Political Parties



**CODE OF CONDUCT
FOR
THE POLITICAL PARTIES**

GENERAL ELECTIONS

1993

ELECTION COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN

ISLAMABAD

CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE POLITICAL PARTIES GENERAL ELECTIONS 1993

- (1) The political parties shall not propagate any opinion, or act in any manner prejudicial to the ideology of Pakistan, or the sovereignty, integrity or security of Pakistan, or morality, or the maintenance of public order, or the integrity or independence of the judiciary of Pakistan, or which defames or brings into ridicule the judiciary or the armed forces of Pakistan, as provided under Article 63 of the Constitution.
- (2) The political parties, their candidates, agents or workers shall not obstruct or break up meetings organized by the rival parties and candidates, nor interrupt speeches or prevent distribution of handbills, leaflets and pasting of posters of other parties and candidates.
- (3) The political parties shall avoid criticism of other political parties, their leaders and candidates having no bearing on their public activities. Criticism and comments shall be confined to policies and programmes of other parties. Speeches and slogans shall be dignified and based on principle of morality, decorum and decency.
- (3A) The political parties, their candidates and workers shall refrain from deliberate dissemination of false and malicious information and their workers shall not indulge in forgeries and disinformation to defame other political parties and their leaders, and use of abusive language against the leaders and candidates of their political parties.
- (3B) No leader or candidate of a political party shall call the leader or candidate of another party kafir or traitor.
- (4) The political parties shall refrain from speeches calculated to arouse parochial and sectarian feelings and controversy or conflicts between sexes, sects, communities and linguistic groups.
- (4A) The political parties, their candidates and their workers shall not propagate against the participation of any person in the elections on the basis of sex.
- (5) Public leaders and all other participants in political activity shall act with a sense of responsibility and dignity befitting their status. While propagating their own views and programmes, they shall not interfere with the freedom of others to do the same as that would be the negation of democracy.

- (6) Appeals to violence or resort to violence during meetings, processions, or during polling hours shall be strictly avoided.
 - (6A) No person shall in any manner cause injury to any person or damage to any property.
 - (7) Carriage of lethal weapons and fire arms shall not be allowed in public meetings and processions and official regulations in this regard shall be strictly observed. Use of crackers and other explosives at public meetings shall not be allowed.
 - (8) The political parties and their candidates shall extend cooperation to the officers on election duty in order to ensure peaceful and orderly polling and complete freedom for the voters to exercise their franchise without being subjected to any annoyance or obstructions.
 - (9) The political parties and their candidates shall scrupulously avoid all activities which are "corrupt practices" and offences under the election law, such as the bribing of voters, intimidation of voters, impersonation of voters, canvassing within 400 yards of a polling station, holding public meetings during the period of 48 hours ending with the hour fixed for the close of the poll.
 - (10) The political parties, their candidates, agents or workers shall not indulge in offering gifts or gratifications or inducing another to stand or not to stand as a candidate, or to withdraw or not to withdraw his candidature.
 - (11) The political parties and their candidates should not procure the support or assistance of any civil servant to promote or hinder the election of a candidate.
 - (12) The political parties and their candidates shall dissuade their workers or sympathisers from destroying any ballot paper or any official mark on the ballot paper.
 - (13) The political parties and their candidates shall not hold public meetings or rallies on main streets, roads and chowks to avoid traffic jams and public inconvenience.
-

Appendix 9

Political Party Symbol Allocation

CHART OF APPROVED SYMBOLS

 1. ARROW	 6. BROOM	 17. CANDLE	 25. COMB	 33. CUP	 21. HELICOPTER	 28. TROWEL OR BRUSH	 57. PERSIAN WHEEL	 65. BORER OF WORM	 73. SPINNING WHEEL	 81. TEAPOT	 89. TRUCK	
 2. AXE	 10. BOOK	 18. CAR	 26. COW	 34. EGG	 22. HORSE	 68. LADDER	 74. MORTAR AND PESTLE	 66. ROPE	 78. SACK	 82. TELEPHONE	 90. TIE	
 4. BAT	 11. BRUSH	 19. CAP	 27. CUP AND SAUCER	 36. CIGARETTE	 23. HAKUI	 83. LANTERN	 69. PITCHER	 87. SCISSORS	 79. SEAL	 85. TELEVISION	 91. UMBRELLA	
 4. BELL	 12. BUCKET	 20. CIRCUIT AMP	 28. DOVE	 36. GARLAND	 44. INK POT WITH PEN	 82. LETTER BOX	 60. PLANER	 68. SAW	 64. SLEDGE	 76. TIDE	 84. TIGER	 92. WIFE
 4. BICYCLE	 14. BULB	 21. CHAIR	 29. ELEPHANT	 37. LATHI	 45. IRON	 61. LOCKET	 63. MALLET	 66. SEWING MACHINE	 77. TABLE	 86. TONGS	 93. WHISTLE	
 6. BULL	 16. BUNCH OF GRAPES	 22. TABLE	 30. SWORD	 38. GUN	 46. MUG	 54. LION	 62. TRACTOR	 70. SPOON	 78. TABLE LAMP	 86. TONGS	 94. WHISTLE	
 7. BOTTLE	 10. BUS	 23. CLOCK	 31. EGG	 39. HAND PUMP	 47. BELL	 64. LOUDSPEAKER	 65. RHINOCEROS	 71. SAW	 79. TABLET	 87. TRACTOR	 95. WRIST WATCH	
 8. BOWL	 10. BUTTERFLY	 24. COAT	 32. FISH	 40. HAMMER	 48. KNIFE	 56. MOUNTAIN	 64. RING	 72. SPECTACLES	 80. TAP	 88. TREE	 96. WAIST COAT	

38.	Pakistan Islamic Front	Car
39.	Mutahidda Deeni Mahaz	Ladder
40.	Pakistan Ittehad Tehreek	Butterfly
41.	Balochistan National Front (Dr. Abdul Hayee Group)	Saw
42.	Balochistan National Movement (Mengal Group)	Horse for Balochistan
43.	Gujrati Qaumi Movement	Flower Vase for Sindh
44.	Haqiqi Group	Candle
45.	Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz Sharif Group)	Tiger
46.	Gharib Awam Party	Chiragh (Lamp)
47.	Pakistan Muslim League (Junejo Group)	Bicycle
48.	National Peoples Party (Workers Group)	Rose
49.	National Peoples Party	Tractor
50.	Tehreek Inqilab Islami	Helicopter
51.	Jamiat-e-Mashaikh Pakistan	Turban
52.	All Pakistan Muslim League (Zehri Group)	Railway Engine

POLITICAL PARTIES OF MINORITIES COMMUNITIES

1.	Progressive Christian League	Tonga
2.	Pakistan Aqiliati Rabita Party	Table Lamp
3.	Pakistan Minority Inqilabi Tehreek (Yousuf Inayat Group)	Spade
4.	All Pakistan Masihi Party	Tractor
5.	Masihi Awami Party	Well
6.	Pakistan United Christian Front	Umbrella
7.	Pakistan Minority Inqilabi Group	Axe
8.	Pakistan Masihi Party	Car
9.	Pakistan Minority Front	Clock
10.	Minority Inqilabi Tehreek (Yousuf Khairat Group)	Hammer
11.	Pakistan Masihi Ittehad	Ladder
12.	Pakistan Hindu and Scheduled Castes Party	Spinning Wheel

Appendix 10

Poll Day Checklist
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan

Basic details

Observer's name _____	Constituency No. _____
Polling station No. _____	Polling booth No. _____
Observer's arrival time _____	Observer's departure time _____

Polling officer's name _____	Military officer's name _____
Polling agents' name and party _____	
Time the polling started _____	Time the polling ended _____
No. of ballot boxes used _____	

	<u>Muslim</u>	<u>Non-Muslim</u>
- No. of ballot books	_____	_____
Their serial Nos.	_____	_____
- No. of ballots cast	_____	_____
- No. of ballots destroyed	_____	_____
- No. of challenge votes	_____	_____
- No. of tender votes	_____	_____
- No. of unused ballots	_____	_____

Check list

1. Before polling	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
- Does the presiding officer have all the material?	_____	_____
- Is the polling staff exactly the same as previously notified?	_____	_____
- Is the polling station within 3 km of all voters of the station?	_____	_____
- Are polling agents of all the candidates present?	_____	_____
- Was the ballot box shown to be empty before start of polling?	_____	_____
- Was the ballot box sealed after it was shown to be empty?	_____	_____

2. During polling	Yes	No
- Did the polling start at appointed time?	<hr/> <hr/>	<hr/> <hr/>
- Does the place for ballot marking fulfil secrecy requirement?	<hr/> <hr/>	<hr/> <hr/>
- Is the voters' list exactly the same as earlier notified?	<hr/> <hr/>	<hr/> <hr/>
- Is the voters' queue orderly?	<hr/> <hr/>	<hr/> <hr/>
- Are the voters' identity cards being appropriately checked?	<hr/> <hr/>	<hr/> <hr/>
- Is every identity card being punched?	<hr/> <hr/>	<hr/> <hr/>
- Is the voter's name scored off after his identity has been checked?	<hr/> <hr/>	<hr/> <hr/>
- Is every voter's thumb marked with indelible ink?	<hr/> <hr/>	<hr/> <hr/>
- Is the ink indelible enough?	<hr/> <hr/>	<hr/> <hr/>
- Does the presiding officer stamp and sign the back of the ballot paper before giving it to the voter?	<hr/> <hr/>	<hr/> <hr/>
- Does he make the necessary entry on the counterfoil of the ballot paper?	<hr/> <hr/>	<hr/> <hr/>
- Does every voter put the ballot paper in the ballot box after marking?	<hr/> <hr/>	<hr/> <hr/>
- Is the presiding officer's stamp and initials on the back of the ballot paper visible as it is dropped in the box?	<hr/> <hr/>	<hr/> <hr/>
- Is the ballot box within everyone's sight all the time?	<hr/> <hr/>	<hr/> <hr/>
- Is the voter allowed to cast tender or challenge vote when necessary?	<hr/> <hr/>	<hr/> <hr/>
- Is the polling staff fair in responding to complaints?	<hr/> <hr/>	<hr/> <hr/>
- Is the polling staff impartial?	<hr/> <hr/>	<hr/> <hr/>
- Is the military official on duty impartial?	<hr/> <hr/>	<hr/> <hr/>
- Are the party camps at proper distance from the station?	<hr/> <hr/>	<hr/> <hr/>
- Is the prohibition on campaigning within polling premises being observed?	<hr/> <hr/>	<hr/> <hr/>
- Is the whole process being carried out in an orderly and peaceful atmosphere?	<hr/> <hr/>	<hr/> <hr/>

3. After the polling

Yes

No

- Did the polling end at appointed time?
- Is the seal on the ballot boxes intact?
- Is the ballot box within everyone's sight?
- Are only the authorised people present at the counting?
- Is the counting of both Muslim and non-Muslim votes being done in the prescribed way?
- Is the counting being done in the presence of the polling agents and poll-watchers?
- Is the decision on doubtful ballots fair in all cases?
- Are the destroyed, tender and challenge ballots sealed separately?
- Do all polling agents attest the statement of the count?
- Does the presiding officer publicly paste up the statement of the count?
- Does the presiding officer take the result directly to the returning officer?
- Is the returning officer's announcement in conformity with presiding officer's count?

Explanation

- If your answers to any of the questions above is 'no' please give details here.

Appendix 12

NDI Media Analysis

The following quantitative analysis shows how each of the five English daily newspapers projected the two major parties from the 26th of September to the 11th of October.

The News*

Of the 36 articles mentioning the PML(N),

20 were positive
8 were negative
8 were neutral

Of the 45 articles mentioning the PPP,

37 were positive
6 were negative
2 were neutral

Of the 9 articles mentioning the PIF,

1 was positive
7 were negative
1 was neutral

Other parties comprised 18 articles of which,

8 were positive
4 were negative
6 were neutral

The Muslim*

Of the 32 articles mentioning the PML(N),

9 were positive
12 were negative
11 were neutral

Of the 36 articles mentioning the PPP,

26 were positive
4 were negative
6 were neutral

Of the 6 articles mentioning the PIF,

2 were positive
4 were neutral

The Nation *

Of the 53 articles mentioning the PML(N),

31 were positive
12 were negative
10 were neutral

Of the 49 articles mentioning the PPP,

21 were positive
17 were negative
11 were neutral

Of the 9 articles mentioning the PIF,

4 were positive
1 was negative

4 were neutral

Other parties comprised 21 articles

Dawn

Of the 53 articles mentioning the PML (N)

27 were positive

26 were negative

Of the 52 articles mentioning the PPP

32 were positive

20 were negative

Of the 9 articles mentioning the PIF

7 were positive

2 were negative

Other parties comprised 10 articles

The Pakistan Times

This newspaper was only monitored in terms of the number of news items per party.

The PML (N) were mentioned in 22 articles

The PPP were mentioned in 18 articles

The PIF were mentioned in 5 articles

* These newspapers were monitored by Aliya Masood

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

Number of news items for PPP, PML (N) and PIF in various newspapers.

JANG

PPP	50
PML (N)	50
PIF	33

NAWA-E-WAQT

PPP	34
PML (N)	49
PIF	19

MARKAZ

PPP	20
PML (N)	41
PIF	15

KHABRAIN

PPP	17
PML (N)	17
PIF	5

MASHRIQ

PPP	14
PML (N)	10
PIF	9

Appendix 14

**Results of 1993 National Assembly Elections
By Party and Region**

PARTY	PUNJAB	SIND	NWFP	FATA	ISLAMABAD	BALUCH.	TOTAL
Pakistan People's Party	47	33	5			1	86
Pakistan Muslin League (Nawaz Group)	52	10	9		1		72
Independent	5	1	1	7		1	15
HAQ Parast Group							
Awami National Party			3				3
Pakistan Muslim League (Junejo Group)	6						6
Pakistan Islamic Front		1	2				3
Jamhoori Watan Party						2	2
Baluchistan National Movement (Hayee Group)						1	1
Islami Jamhoori Mahaz			2			2	4
PKMAP						3	3
Mutahidda Deeni Mahaz	1		1				2
Baluchistan National Movement (Mengal Group)						1	1
Nat'l Democratic Alliance	1						1
Nat'l People's Party		1					1
PKQP		1					1
TOTAL	112	46	24	7	1	11	201*

* Total pending results of by-elections

Results obtained from Embassy of Pakistan

Appendix 15

**Results of 1993 Provincial Assemblies Elections
By Party and Region**

PARTY	PUNJAB	SIND	NWFP	BALUCH.	TOTAL
Pakistan People's Party	94	56	22	3	175
Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz Group)	106	8	15	6	135
Independent	17	5	11	9	42
HAQ Parast Group		27			27
Awami National Party			21	1	22
Pakistan Muslim League (Junejo Group)	18		4		22
Pakistan Islamic Front	2		4		6
Jamhoori Watan Party				5	5
Baluchistan National Movement (Hayee Group)				4	4
Islami Jamhoori Mahaz			1	3	4
Pakhton Knwa Qaumi Milli Awami Party				4	4
Mutahidda Deeni Mahaz	1		1	1	3
Baluchistan National Movement (Mengal Group)				2	2
Nat'l Democratic Alliance	2				2
Nat'l People's Party		2			2
Dehaat Ittehad Party				1	1
Jamiat-E-Mashaikh Pakistan			1		1
Pakistan National Party				1	1
Shaheed Bhutto Committee		1			
TOTAL	240	99	80	40	459