AGRICULTURAL POLICY ANALYSIS PROJECT, PHASE II

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IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY REFORM IN AFRICA: TRAINING MANUAL FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PRACTITIONERS

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PREFACE

During the past decade policy reform has become a valuable tool in efforts by the U.S. Agency for International Development (A.I.D.) to improve the contribution of agriculture to the physical and economic well-being of developing nations. The success of reforms requires not only rigorous economic analysis and extensive host country collaboration, but also strategic implementation. To perform effectively in the design and implementation of policy dialogue and adjustment-related programs, A.I.D. field officers as well as their host-country counterparts must be familiar with the repertoire of strategic and political issues that affect the reform process.

The Bureau for Research and Development's Agricultural Policy Analysis Project, Phase II (APAP II) has been a key vehicle through which A.I.D. has developed practical insights for the initiation, implementation and sustainability of agricultural policy reform. In addition to highlighting issues like these, APAP II has developed practical tools and methods for agricultural policy analysis and implementation in developing countries.

The "Improving the Effectiveness of Agricultural Sector Policy Reform in Africa" research project was funded by the Africa Bureau of A.I.D. (AFR/ARTS/FARA) under a buy-in to APAP II, in an effort to improve the quality of policy reform efforts. The specific objectives of this activity have been (1) to gain better understanding of the political and socio-cultural factors that explain the success and failure of agricultural policy reform programs and projects in Africa; and (2) to develop a set of guidelines and training materials that will enhance the ability of A.I.D. staff and host country officials to effectively incorporate political and socio-cultural analysis into the design and implementation of agricultural policy and institutional reform programs and projects.

The role of policy leadership, the political impact of key technical assistance staff, and strategies for institutional change were examined in a range of countries and contexts using a common analytical framework. Field studies were conducted in Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, and Zambia, and desk studies examined Cameroon, Ghana, Madagascar, and Malawi.

This document is but one component of the research reports produced under the "Improving the Effectiveness of Agricultural Sector Policy Reform in Africa" task.
The complete corpus of documents include:

Improving the Effectiveness of Policy Reform in Africa: A Synthesis of Lessons Learned, by Nicolas Kulibaba and Catherine Rielly;

Improving the Effectiveness of Policy Reform in Africa: Manual for Agricultural Development Practitioners, by Catherine Rielly and John Tilney;

Improving the Effectiveness of Policy Reform in Africa: Training Module by Catherine Rielly and John Tilney;

Improving the Effectiveness of Policy Reform in Africa: Cocoa Marketing Reform in Ghana by Nicolas Kulibaba;

Improving the Effectiveness of Policy Reform in Africa: Marketing Reforms in Malawi by Nicolas Kulibaba;

Improving the Effectiveness of Policy Reform in Africa: Maize Marketing Reform in Zambia by William Levine and Charles Stathacos;

Improving the Effectiveness of Policy Reform in Africa: Cereals Market Policy Reform in Mali by Ismael S. Ouedraogo and Carol M. Adoum;

Improving the Effectiveness of Policy Reform in Africa: Rice Market Liberalization in Madagascar by Catherine Rielly;

Improving the Effectiveness of Policy Reform in Africa: Fertilizer Reforms in Cameroon by Catherine Rielly;

Improving the Effectiveness of Policy Reform in Africa: The Politics of Agricultural Policy Reform in Côte d'Ivoire by Jennifer A. Widner with Atta Brou Noel.

1. INTRODUCTION

Over the past ten years, A.I.D., the World Bank, and other donors have sponsored extensive research into the questions of how to promote and assist policy reform efforts to correct economic distortions in the markets of developing countries.[1] A.I.D. and other donors have focused particular attention on countries in Africa where the distortions have been most severe and where the economic reforms efforts have been most difficult to implement. The work has examined both macroeconomic issues as well as market dysfunctions in the all-important agricultural sector, which is often the greatest component of economic activity in African nations.

One of the shortcomings of the prior research is that it focused heavily on economic problems and strategies to address them without examining in sufficient detail the political and social factors which can impede or promote reform. Prior research was also not grounded sufficiently in field studies of successful reform efforts, due in large part to the scarcity of successful reform programs in Africa.

The research upon which this manual is based has sought to overcome these shortcomings. In an effort to learn what donors and host country policymakers can do to *positively* affect reform, this research sought to focus on *successful* cases of agricultural policy reform in Africa, given the emphasis of much of the existing literature on the reasons for policy failure.

The aim of this applied research effort is to use empirical data from the case studies to identify the factors explaining policy choices and outcomes throughout the process of reform initiation, implementation, and sustainability. Most importantly, the research sought to identify how host country policy-makers and donors can effectively collaborate to promote agricultural policy reforms that favor economic growth in Africa. Each of the seven country case studies brought empirical evidence to bear on the central question of whether policymakers play an instrumental role in shaping policy change.

The research upon which this manual is based examined successful agricultural policy reform efforts in Cameroon, Madagascar, Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Zambia, and Malawi and obtained detailed information from the field about what factors allowed these reforms to occur and be sustained. In particular, the research examined the political and social determinants of agricultural policy reform outcomes. The domain of agricultural policy reform is centered around issues of agricultural pricing and marketing reform (which were examined in all cases), but also includes a range of other issues depending upon particular country circumstances.

This manual is designed to be an adjunct to previously completed manual issued by A.I.D. entitled "Agricultural Policy Analysis: A Manual for A.I.D. Agricultural and Rural Development Officers" (A.I.D. Evaluation Special Study No. 61, February 1989) and the

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[1] See Tilney and Block, 1991; Lele, 1990; Sahn, 1992; Vondal, 1989.

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Guidelines for Agricultural and Natural Resource Policy Analysis (APAP II Guidelines and Methods No. 407, March 1993). The manual provides directions for designers and implementors of agricultural reform programs to allow them to analyze critical political, institutional and social issues that must be addressed before a reform program can be designed or negotiated with governments in developing countries. The manual can be used by agricultural and rural development officers at A.I.D., loan officers at development banks, and technical assistance teams involved in the design of reform programs.

The recommended strategies in this manual are based upon the findings of a detailed review of agricultural reform programs throughout Africa entitled "Improving the Effectiveness of Policy Reform in Africa: A synthesis of Lessons Learned." The manual has also been designed to be used in conjunction with a training program designed for the same audience entitled "Training Module: The Politics of Agricultural Policy Reform." The structure of the manual is straightforward. Section 2 presents the analytical methodology used in conducting the case studies. Section 3 presents the findings from the above mentioned research study, and Section 4 provides strategic recommendations for the design/initiation phase of reform, the implementation phase and, finally, efforts to promote long-term sustainability of reforms.

This manual is intended to allow professionals involved in donor-sponsored agricultural reforms to design and implement more successful agricultural reform programs, particularly in the African context. While the findings presented in this manual have emerged from agricultural sector reforms, many of the lessons can be applied to the management of other sectoral or macroeconomic reforms, and to other geographic regions.

The overarching conclusion that can be drawn from this research is that political dynamics play a determining role in the ultimate success or failure of agricultural policy reform efforts and, therefore, must be considered as a key element of planning for change. The lessons and recommendations presented below suggest the kinds of analysis that are necessary for successful reform and provide a resumé of guidelines derived from successful reform efforts in which A.I.D. has often played a significant role.

2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Although techniques of analyzing economic policy reform, especially structural adjustment, are farily well understood, analytical techniques for understanding the political process by which policy changes are initiated, implemented and sustained are much less well developed. The insufficiency of analytical tools for political analysis of reform reflects the lack of attention most development theory pays to the process of policy change. Most current research in political science and political economy address the questions of why policies take on a particular form, which social or political constituencies they favor, or why seemingly irrational policies are perpetuated over time, rather than why policies change.

Recent academic studies that seek to explain policy and institutional change offer little insight regarding how foreign and host-country decision-makers initiate reform.[2] The two stages of activity that follow initiation—policy implementation and efforts to sustain it-are often considered to be mechanical, not interactive. As a result, the existing literature tends to neglect the interplay of political actors and their influence on how policies will be pursued, altered, reversed and sustained after they have been decided upon.

The research methodology created for this applied research effort attempts to address these shortfalls. In our analytical framework, the reform process is conceptualized as transpiring in three phases named: initiation/adoption, implementation, and sustainability. This phasing allowed researchers to assess policy change at each stage in the reform process, not merely to the earlier stages of policy design and "marketing."

Our analytical framework provides a means for examining how interactions between the key players including social and institutional actors, as well as policymakers, influence policy change at each stage of reform. The critical political interactions are grouped into four broad categories or themes:

- Coalitions and mass political pressure;
- Donor-government relations;
- Political elite/factional; and
- Bureaucratic interactions.

Each category of political interactions deals with the political behavior of relevant actors as they conceive, design, react to and implement reforms. Using empirical data from the case studies, this applied research endeavor tests whether or not these four themes are important independent variables explaining policy outcomes. The relative importance of these different themes and the interactions between them varies, according to the stage of reform.

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[2]Notable exceptions are Grindle and Thomas, 1989, 1992.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

An analytical matrix designed for this study elucidates the role that key political, social, and institutional actors play in influencing each stage of reform (Table 2.1). The matrix boxes contain issues regarding each political theme for practitioners to consider at the various stages of the reform process.

Table 2.1: Analytical Matrix

Improving the Effectiveness of Policy Reform in Africa

POLITICAL THEMES: LEVELS				
PHASES OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY REFORM	Coalitions & Mass Political Pressure	Donor-Government Relations	Political Elite, Factional	Bureaucratic Interaction
Initiation/Adoption	• Consensus Building • Public Perception of Crisis • Previous Style of Adjustment Discredited	• Perception of Need for Consensus • Donor Resources • Sense of Urgency to Act • Sequencing of Reforms • Conditionality	• Selling Reform to Politicians • Autonomy from Elites • Support of Elites • Clientelism • Political Management Skills	• Policy Champions • Critical Mass of Technocrats • Tactical Thinking • Autonomy • Parallel Markets
Implementation	• Protests • Winners/Losers: • Urban/Rural, Farmers, Military, Other Interest Groups • Compensatory Measures	• Pace • Conditionality • Institutional Reform Strategies • Timing of Financing • Level of Financing • Tactical Thinking	• Motivation: Ideas, Party, Donor Resources, Constituency, Ethnic Group, Diffuse Opposition • Duration of Regime, Legitimacy	• Capacity of Technocrats • Incentives • Effective Institutions • Technocrat Autonomy/Influence on Bureaucracy • Role of TA
Sustainability	• Compensatory Measures • Concentrated Benefits • Dispersed Costs • New Coalition	• Supply of Public Goods • Conditionality • Relations with Bank, Fund, USAID, Other External Relations • Resources	• Institutionalized Autonomy • Role of Ideas • New Consensus	• Rules/Norms Reducing Discretionary Power of Bureaucracy • Reform Pace • Successful Institutional Change

3. KEY FINDINGS

This section distills the key findings which emerged from the seven country case studies on the politics of agricultural policy reform in Africa. Generalizations are developed on the basis of the case study material about the political factors which either help or hinder the long process of reform. While the countries studied shared a few common characteristics of reform, they also displayed pronounced differences, suggesting that the politics of reform vary greatly depending on the context. Nevertheless, A.I.D. officers working on policy reform can benefit from common lessons learned and questions raised by these studies.

The experience with agricultural policy change in the seven country case studies illustrates that politics creates opportunities for reform. This section examines examples from the country case studies of how reformers, both African policymakers and donors, strategically managed reform. Sixteen major lessons are suggested by the experience with agricultural reform in the seven case studies.

3.1 Analysis, Strategy and Tactics

RPL1 While economic analysis is the basis for the design of agricultural marketing reforms, political analysis is crucial to assessing the prospects of reform success and developing appropriate implementation strategies.

As part of their policy dialogue with host-country governments, donors have increasingly relied upon policy inventory and diagnosis as a means of identifying the need and prospects for agricultural policy reform. Policy diagnosis typically employs quantitative and qualitative analysis in order to identify the macroeconomic impacts of policy and the impacts of policy on the agriculture sector and relevant subsectors. A second aspect of problem identification and diagnosis also often involves "political mapping," which identifies the array of institutions and actors whose interests or activities play a role in policy implementation and its outcomes.[3]

The case studies upon which this document are compelling in their demonstration of the need for detailed stakeholder analysis in the design, implementation and monitoring of agricultural policy reforms.

The purpose of stakeholder analysis is to identify (a) whose interests must be taken into account when political or policy decisions are made; (b) the character and saliency of their interests; (c) the probable response of those actors to prospective policy actions.

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[3] For a more detailed discussion of this topic, see Abt Associates Inc. *et al*, "Agricultural Policy Analysis: A Manual for A.I.D. Agricultural and Rural Development Officers," 1989.

This information is vital to policymakers and their technical advisors for numerous reasons: identifying who might benefit or be threatened by reform, and what the magnitude of their interests would be; identifying whether stakeholders are in a position to challenge or strengthen the authority of political leaders; identifying pockets of prospective institutional support or resistance to reform; predicting how the interests of stakeholders might be utilized as a constructive force for positive change; and, developing effective strategies and tactics for creating predictable political and economic outcomes. If carried out with appropriate rigor and objectivity, stakeholder analysis can be a powerful tool for effective political, social, or economic marketing.

RPL2 Seizing political opportunity can be crucial to the successful initiation of reforms.

The cases illustrate the importance of political timing to politicians trying to initiate reform efforts. Policymakers took advantage of political moments that were ripe for reform, such as periods of economic crisis and the "honeymoon period" immediately following a regime change. In Cameroon, Mali, Ghana and Madagascar, the economic crisis of the 1980s fostered a political environment that was conducive to reform initiation. The crisis atmosphere empowered President Ratsiraka to end government control of rice; President Traore to abolish the state monopoly on coarse grains; Flight Lieutenant Rawlings to completely overhaul the national cocoa marketing system; and, President Biya to close the National Export Crop Marketing Board. In these four cases, the fact that the previous regime had been discredited put pressure on leaders to take bold action immediately, in order to ensure their political legitimacy—and in some cases, survival. The political interest of the regime and the economic interests of the entire nation coalesced behind the reform.

In Mali, the fact that the public perception of crisis was much stronger for coarse grains than for rice enabled coarse grain reforms to proceed, while rice reforms were delayed. The case of rice provides a useful counter example suggesting that it is difficult to initiate reform in the absence of a public perception of crisis.

While crisis can be a catalyst for reform initiation, there is no guarantee that any remedial actions taken in response to crisis will be institutionalized or sustained. With the alleviation of the crisis and the weakening of the reform motive, political forces resistant to reform may easily revive, producing cycles of policy deterioration.

Timing within the political cycles was also a crucial factor in the ability of Zambia's newly-elected President Chiluba to launch broad economic reform initiatives in 1991. Kaunda's economic and policy legacy provided greater political leeway for Chiluba to formulate policy. Chiluba took advantage of the political honeymoon offered by his victory, which he won on a platform promising change from the policy failures of the previous regime.

The Ghana case suggests that the agricultural marketing reforms benefitted from a more radical and systemic transformation of governing institutions, in which prospective opponents of reform were intimidated by a climate of suspicion and, at times, violence. However, the authors hesitate to generalize this observation given that reforms undertaken during a period of radical change are likely to be as vulnerable as the unstable political environment itself.

RPL3 Risks of failure are heightened when policy reform will result in the displacement of entrenched political patronage systems and the suppression of politically-derived rents.

This observation is drawn from several of the case studies—Cameroon, Madagascar and Ghana—where agricultural policy reform was, in effect, an antidote to systemic rent-seeking that shifted the benefits of agriculture from producers to protected elites. Reform only became possible when strategies for compensating, coopting or eliminating rent-seekers were devised.

Political patronage and croneyism exist, in large measure, because of their sheer utility. A regime that enjoys considerable autonomy and little public accountability is, through patronage, able to forge a strong constituency united by the fact of its control on segments of the economy. However, when that control becomes predatory, economic crisis is often the result. This was, indeed, the case of the Cameroonian and Ghanaian marketing boards, which over the course of several decades, extracted such progressively greater rents that they triggered an exodus away from cocoa and coffee production.

To some extent nearly every agricultural reform examined in the case studies had a redistributional impact, e.g. reducing official or quasi-official rents extracted from agricultural marketing, lowering barriers to widespread participation in agricultural production and marketing, or increasing returns to individual producers. However, in those nations where political patronage and croneyism were deeply entrenched political leaders had the least room to maneuver for change. Only prolonged economic crisis and regime transition enabled political leaders to acquire the political freedom necessary to reverse corrupt institutional culture.

RPL4 "Sweeteners"—Strategies designed to defuse opposition by compensating—raise the cost but lower the political risk of reform failure.

In several cases, donors offered compensatory programs to reforming governments or to groups of potential losers from reform to "sweeten" bitter reform programs and minimize political risk. From the time reforms were initiated, donors recognized the importance of devising tactics to minimize political obstacles to reform. In the case of Madagascar, donors were aware that liberalization of the rice market could destabilize consumer prices of the nation's staple commodity, and, consequently, threaten the stability of the government. To minimize this political risk to the regime, a consortium of donors proposed a buffer stock strategy as a mechanism for minimizing the political risk of liberalization.

It is especially important to try to defuse the opposition of political elites benefitting from the previous regime who stand to lose their power through privatization. The cases revealed that those elites who were not brought in to the reform coalition in the initiation phase used their political clout to derail reform in the implementation phase.

For instance, agricultural reforms in Cameroon and Madagascar met with institutional resistance from parastatals, ministries, and businesses whose employees had received privileged access to markets, jobs, credit, foreign exchange, and other resources under the old regime. In Cote d'Ivoire as well, powerful vested interests opposed to suspending quotas on cocoa and coffee impeded reform implementation in these two markets. In all three cases, failure to compensate losers blocked implementation efforts. In cases such as these, reform would have been more effective if policymakers had anticipated opposition and modified the reform program to accommodate losers.

3.2 Initiation

INI1 Political leaders' control over bureaucratic appointments and government structures gives them enormous power to mobilize elite support behind reform and distance reform opponents.

Political leaders can use their power as presidents and prime ministers to build elite coalitions behind reform, even in highly divided, conflictive political environments. Heads of state can use their executive power to restructure government institutions, shuffle bureaucratic appointments, and protect pro-reform technocrats from economic interest groups. For example, they can create special technical advisory units or agricultural policy units in the presidency to serve as institutional champions of reform. Leaders in non-coalition governments usually have a free hand to bring in technocrats of their choosing to lead these new reform centers.

In the case of Mali, President Traore used the forum of a national seminar to mobilize elite support behind the grain marketing reforms. The consensus-building framework of a public forum shielded the President from confrontation with anti-reform politicians. The President's strong leadership and political management skills enabled him to reach consensus by arbitrating effectively between reformers and ministers opposing reform.

In Ghana, Flight Lieutenant Rawlings hand-picked a core group of economic policymakers, provided them with institutional insularity and support over time to forge a workable set of policy alternatives to reverse the downward cycle of cocoa production. His choice of competent advisers, his insistence on their integrity, and his willingness to take personal responsibility for their decisions sent a powerful message to opponents: any attack on presidential advisers would be equivalent to an attack on the head of state himself.

Rawlings' continued support for this team over time also enhanced Ghana's position *vis-a-vis* donors, by providing for continuity and familiarity between negotiators during periods of policy crisis.

However, other cases revealed that African leaders' concerns about reelection, legitimacy, or survival often prevented them from taking advantage of these opportunities to champion reforms. Many African regimes are too fragile and their span of control too limited to effectively lead reform programs that would hurt their supporters. For example, after the Cameroonian elections in 1992 when President Biya's legitimacy was threatened, he failed to honor his promise to donors to liberalize cocoa prices, because he was afraid to jeopardize his strategic political constituency in the cocoa zone.

In Madagascar as well, President Ratsiraka eschewed liberalization policies that would alienate his supporters. During his election campaign, he used low rice prices to "buy" votes. The mechanism he used to keep prices down was to designate that foreign rice donated to his political party should be considered *political imports* that were exempt from restrictions on official imports. This policy violated the spirit of liberalization and sent signals that the President was not serious about reform.

INI2 "Policy champions" are instrumental in selling the reforms to the President, organizing reform constituencies, and brokering compromise.

In all of the African cases studies, politically influential technocrats facilitated initiation of reform and successful implementation. "Policy champions" —technocrats who can organize constituencies for their ideas both in government and among interest groups in the society at large—were instrumental in convincing top policymakers to back reform. These are people who are not only themselves attuned to the need for economic reform and the options available to them but also have political skills. They consult with those who may be opposed to reform measures and seek to broker compromises with them. In so doing, they may seek to limit both bureaucratic barriers to implementation and outcry from parts of the citizenry negatively affected. In some instances, they may perform an educational function by ensuring that natural clienteles—people whose interests are favorably affected by reform—are aware of the initiatives and galvanizing them as public spokespersons for proposed measures. The combination of political management skills, bureaucratic access, and technical training enabled these leaders to stem opposition among the political elite and influence policy change at the level of the Presidency.

The case studies suggest that policy champions acted autonomously, as a result of prior experience in the policy area, personal values, ideology, or study, debate and discussion among a group of individuals concerned with similar issues. In other words, policy champions are not always motivated by their own vested interests or rent-seeking. Rather, their decisions can be understood independently of the social class background or economic interest of the societal

groups from which they come. In the case of Madagascar, the Special Economic Adviser to the President used his access and technical skills to convince President Ratsiraka to take the tough decisions necessary to turn the rice sector around, even though reform meant the end of a system of privileges benefitting the political elite of the country, of which he was a member.

The cases indicate that to be effective, policy champions must have broad jurisdiction. They lacked this scope in Cote d'Ivoire, where the responsibility for agricultural policy was divided among four different agencies. As a result, the Minister of Agriculture had little influence over cocoa and coffee policies, even though he behaved like a policy champion, bringing bureaucrats, farmers, and private business interest together to identify common ground. In this case, the Minister's narrow scope of authority undermined his ability to broker compromise and "reform deals."

INI3 Build consensus among donors before negotiating with the government.

Agricultural sector reforms were accomplished more swiftly when donors reached consensus among themselves before dealing directly with the government. Cereals marketing reform in Mali represents a rare case of donor success in accommodating different donor-specific approaches to policy change and establishing a coalition. The confluence of unusual circumstances (the crisis of food aid), personalities (of policy champions) and strategies (donor flexibility, consensus building, and World Bank pressure to liberalize) shaped the donors' perception of the need for coordination of the Cereal Market Reform Program (PRMC). Consensus eventually reached by donors provided them with a powerful bargaining chip in negotiating the reorganization of the grain marketing board (OPAM) with the government.

Conversely, when donor consensus was *not* achieved, as in the case of *Office du Niger* reforms in Mali or ONCPB (National Marketing Board) reforms in Cameroon, liberalization was much less successful. Export crop marketing in Cameroon represents an example where the Government was able to play donors'—and in this case, a foreign government's—interests off each other, because they had not reached consensus before dealing with the Government. The divergent interests of the French Government, the French bilateral aid agency, and the World Bank provided maneuvering room for the Government to postpone reform.

INI4 Foreign technical advisers play an important role in supporting policy champions.

The cases suggest that foreign advisers resident in Africa who have good access to host country technical staff can play an important role in cultivating policy champions. In the case of Madagascar, foreign experts used technical reports diagnosing the state of the rice sector and presentations of policy options to convince host-country technocrats of the necessity of reform.

Malagasy policymakers who had not been liberals in the past altered their ideas about appropriate solutions to particular problems in the agricultural sector and thus enlarged the range of policy options they would consider.

Essentially, technocrats who had devoted their careers to state management of the economy were transformed into progressive advocates of reform. The cases considered in this study attest to the potential for learning and reflection among African policymakers. Countries where host-country policymakers were genuinely convinced of the importance of reforms—and "owned" the reforms themselves— exhibited more successful policy outcomes than cases where the liberalization program was externally driven.

INI5 Close donor contact with host country technocrats leads to more successful implementation.

For reforms to succeed, donors need good access to technical staffs in ministries. Donor access is vital for building dialogue and tailoring conditionality to local conditions, as well as for providing assistance in the implementation stage.

Comparison of cocoa/coffee reforms with banana/pineapple reforms in Cote d'Ivoire indicates that the rate of implementation of agricultural sector reforms was highest where the policy process was most open and where donors had contact with technical personnel. In the case of pineapple and banana reforms, the World Bank had started to work hand-in-hand with growers to analyze costs and competitiveness, prior to suspension of lending to the country. The ties developed were strong enough that even after lending was formally stopped, the contacts continued. In contrast, in coffee and cocoa where the marketing board (CAISTAB) regulated contacts between donors and personnel tightly, there were comparatively few advances on key aspects of reform proposals. Technocrats could not act as interpreters, explaining the reforms to their directors, nor could they seek help in overcoming problems they encountered in implementation. Implementation of some of the reforms was stalled in consequence.

3.3 Implementation

IMP1 Policymakers' lack of understanding of market reform and weak intellectual commitment to liberalization inhibit implementation.

Lack of understanding of market reform by political elites erodes local tolerance for the costs and risks of liberalization. In Zambia, only a relative handful of political actors understood what is meant by market reform. The concept was murky to many Zambians, largely because it was imposed from without, at the instigation of the World Bank, IMF, and, in the agricultural sector, USAID. In Zambia and Cameroon, as well, domestic "ownership" was missing. In cases such as these where commitment to reform did not extend beyond the donors and a small circle of technocrats with temporary backing from political leaders, the

reform process dragged out at a slow pace. Donor support proved not to be a strong enough base upon which to build reform efforts.

In all the case studies, reformers met with resistance from officials who did not believe in the ideology of market reform. African policymakers in Francophone countries who inherited the *dirigiste* development strategy and the statist ideology out of which it emerged often lacked an intellectual commitment to reform. The French suspicion of private traders reinforced local skepticism about the free market. The statist development policy pursued by the leaders of non-Francophone African countries, as well, such as Zambia and Ghana, has supported a more active role for the state than reform proposals allow. It was difficult for policymakers who had devoted their careers to state control to be converted to believers in the "miracle of the market" overnight.

IMP2 Reform is most likely to succeed when implemented by a strong and committed central authority.

To what extent are political liberalization and economic reform compatible? The case studies suggest, at the very least, that in those nations where representational governance functioned best, agricultural reform was most difficult.

Committed political leadership is an essential ingredient of the reform process. There are often limits to the extent to which that leadership can exercise its authority to implement reform, however. In the case of Ghana, a coup d'etat, political violence and intimidation against the opponents of the Rawlings' regime, and public support for radical change of any kind created conditions in which the chief of state was able to unilaterally dictate the timing and goals of the national Economic Reform Programme, which included a systematic overhaul of the cocoa marketing system. The success of the ERP provides some comfort to Ghanaians and foreign observers alike. The inescapable conclusion, however, is that nothing short of a dictatorship could have accomplished what several decades of uncommitted leadership could not.

The presence of strong central leadership does not alone guarantee success for reformers: the Malawi, Mali and Côte d'Ivoire studies portray regimes which enjoy a highly-concentrated authority, yet which were so internally fractious as to unnecessarily prolong the initiation of reforms which were widely-acknowledged as being necessary.

The true test of reform effectiveness, of course, comes not with implementation per se, but rather with the degree to which institutional and political culture are sufficiently altered over time as to make reform both effective and sustainable.

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IMP3 Donor conditionality is an imperfect strategic tool in reform implementation.

While donor conditionality can be used to induce governments to initiate policy change, it is not an effective tool for either enforcing compliance with reforms or for sustaining reform. Development practitioners should understand what donor conditionality and other forms of leverage can and cannot accomplish.

Conditionality in policy-based grants or lending is a simple *quid pro quo* disbursement of funds based upon the recipient's implementation of an agreed upon reform or reform-related action. Characteristically, conditions attached to policy-based financial transfers are seen as a way to lower resistance to change by allowing the recipient greater financial maneuverability during the period of policy transition.

Conditionality is often the subject of heated debate during pre-reform negotiations. Political opposition, and a government's willingness or unwillingness to override it, are more likely to emerge at the implementation stage. However, the failure of a recipient to live up to its commitments is possible because political leaders are well aware of donors' reticence toward any action which might place on-going reform effort in total jeopardy. A lender's dilemma is further aggragated when the possibility arises that invoking conditionality sanctions will endanger the prospects of recovering its loan.

The means by which governments seek to delay adherence to conditionality are many, they include: politically-based delays, such as election calendars, democratization timetables, and concerns about public security; weather conditions or natural disasters that impact on agricultural productivity during a given year or cycle of growing seasons; exogenous market conditions for agricultural exports; exaggerating the difficulties of enacting a particular reform; prolonging or delaying the implementation process; and, arguing that financing is inadequate given the emerging complexities of enacting a particular reform.

The case studies undertaken for this study reinforce a variety of other analyses which emphasize the limited capacity of donor conditionality.[4] Conditionality was successfully invoked when market problems reached crisis proportions in virtually all of the case studies, but was almost never a sufficient condition for producing successful policy reform. In the case of fertilizer in Cameroon, conditionality, and the staged release of funds in particular, provided an institutional means for the Government to make a commitment to liberalization. USAID used the mechanism of a phased program agreement to enhance the political chances of the reform's success by convincing members of the public and private sectors that the Government was serious about reform.

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[4]See Center for Strategic International Studies, *The Politics of Economic Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa-Final Report*, March 1992.

In the case of Cote d'Ivoire, the World Bank failed to use conditionality as an effective instrument for enforcing reforms. The Bank lost credibility with Ivorian policymakers when it did not always conduct appropriate reviews of compliance before releasing tranches. In other African nations as well, donors have not exercised the leverage that conditionality theoretically provides, and thus the overall credibility of conditionality has suffered.[5]

Finally, in the case of Malawi conditionality conflict emerged when the team negotiating the country's third Structural Adjustment Loan sought to remove a fertilizer subsidy for small farmers that was fundamental to the success of the National Rural Development Programme, which was being financed by the Bank's own project division.

Donors rarely have the resources to monitor a government's compliance with conditionalities, particularly in environments characterized by poor or unreliable government statistics or large and dispersed agricultural communities. As noted in Table 2.0 ("Financial Transfers: Four Types of Conditionality"), in such settings it can often require several years to obtain adequate policy compliance data.

IMP4 Complementary policies that strengthen the environments in which the private sector and rural markets operate enhance the likelihood of implementation success.

The replacement of state-managed agricultural systems with new, viable institutional regimes enhances potential for reform success. For example, USAID program and project assistance helped the Cameroonian government to design a new institutional mechanism for fertilizer provision and fostered private sector participation in the fertilizer reform program.

On the other hand, several of the case studies undertaken for this research effort revealed that when policies were *not* pursued to complement marketing and pricing reforms, implementation was problematic and slow. In Cameroon, for example, where the state had been responsible for the provision of inputs, credit, and technical assistance before the reform, farmers were left in an institutional vacuum after liberalization of cocoa and coffee marketing. In Madagascar and Cameroon, the absence of public policies strengthening rural markets frustrated the marketing and pricing policy mechanisms for improving market incentives and signals at the farm level. Malagasy rice farmers and Cameroonian cocoa producers lack rural infrastructure, including transportation, credit and savings opportunities and market information on prices.

[5]See *Ibid*, 1992.

Financial Transfers: Four Types of Conditionality

Type of Transfer	Instrument (condition)	Target (purpose of condition)	Link between Instrument and Target	Monitoring of Compliance	Legal Enforceability
Collateralized Loan by bank to individual	Repayment	Maximize probability of repayment	Very tight	Instantaneous	Yes
Loan by IMF to sovereign country	Various, usually including ceilings on central bank credit and public spending	Maximize probability of repayment; reduce aggregate demand	Fairly tight	After delays (usually 1-3 months involved in publication of statistics)	No
Loan by World Bank or bilateral donor to sovereign country	Various, usually including increases in agriculture and energy prices, reductions in rate of protection, etc.	Increase aggregate supply by improvements in economic efficiency	Rather loose	Often not for several years	No
Grant by bilateral donor to sovereign country	Various, usually including market liberalization, cost recovery for government services, deregulation, etc.	Increase aggregate supply by improvements in economic efficiency	Rather loose	Often not for several years	No

This table is adapted from Paul Mosley, "On Persuading a Leopard to Change His Spots: Optimal Strategies for Donors and Recipients of Conditional Development Aid," in Bates, 1988. Mosley did not examine grants by bilateral donors to a sovereign country. However his approach to assessing the effectiveness of conditionality applies well to this instrument, used so often in the support of economic policy reform efforts.

IMP5 Contingency planning should be a key element of implementation strategy

By its very nature, agriculture is a risky pursuit, subject to the vagaries of annual variations in weather, natural and man-made disaster, and exogenous market and currency forces. When these are combined with risks engendered by social and political action (e.g. regime changes, democratization, and civil conflict) the complex challenges facing agricultural policy reform can be better appreciated.

While each of the reforms analyzed in the case studies may be considered to have been successful, in whole or in part, no single case took place as originally planned. Opposition to the reform process in key institutions (marketing boards in Ghana and Cameroon), politically important geographic zones (Madagascar and Mali), and among senior government cadres (Zambia, Malawi and Côte d'Ivoire) manifested itself in a prolonging of the reform process. In Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, and Cameroon, sluggish world markets for agricultural exports limited the freedom of reformers to act and prolonged the period during which the benefits of reform were to be realized by agricultural producers and the state alike, while simultaneously allowing the opponents of reform to consolidate their resistance.

The lesson to be derived from all of the case studies is that planning for reform requires the development of strategies that lay out alternative courses of action. Contingency planning allows policy-makers to anticipate events and avoid the appearance of indecisiveness when setbacks occur.

3.4 Sustaining Reform

SUS1 It is not sufficient to assume that political support will coalesce among the beneficiaries of reform. Policymakers and political leaders must work to mobilize stakeholders to defend the reform process.

Policymakers often failed to build support for reform among actors who stood to gain the most from reform, especially small farmers and members of the private sector. Smallholders tended to be dispersed and disorganized, and did not have a strong voice in the political debate over reform.

Small farmers in Mali, Cameroon, Malawi and Madagascar lacked bargaining power at the national and local levels and thus did not act as a united, countervailing force against institutions opposing reform. Furthermore, after reforms had been formally adopted in Madagascar and Cameroon, farmers were unable to challenge the traditional patterns of control over marketing networks. Consequently, reforms were only partially implemented.

Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire represent counter examples, where the political actions of potential winners from reform—cocoa and coffee farmers—facilitated reform. In Côte d'Ivoire

in 1992, new national farmers' unions lobbied for trade liberalization and political reform of the agricultural sector. Specifically, farmers' unions championed efforts to rid internal marketing of opportunities for rent-seeking and emphasized the need for transparency in government operations. In Ghana, small farmers who most benefitted from cocoa marketing reforms turned out at the polls in support of Rawlings' presidential bid, effectively neutralizing centers of opposition based in the country's largest cities.

Failure to bring private sector actors into the policy dialogue inhibited them from participating in the new policy regime and hindered implementation. Furthermore, inconsistent policies provoked private sector uncertainty about the government's commitment to the new policy regime. Consequently, private traders viewed participation in the new policy regime as a risky endeavor. In the case of Madagascar, the Government changed its rice pricing and import policies in mid-season, heightening the risk to private traders of entering the market. The exaggeration of risks stemming from erratic government policies impeded implementation of marketing reforms.

The case studies identified another constraint on private sector participation in privatization efforts: hostility against foreign traders and ethnic groups likely to benefit from reforms. Governments have resisted reforms where the ethnic groups likely to benefit from reforms are potentially powerful politically or economically. Ethnic constraints on reform have been particularly important in West and Southern Africa where fear of the economic power of residents of Asian and Levantine extraction has contributed to a reluctance on the part of governments to implement reforms likely to benefit them.

For instance, privatization was a politically sensitive issue to the Malagasy who feared it would benefit exclusively "foreign" business people, specifically Indians and Chinese. Public discontent with liberalization was often targeted at Asian traders who were accused of gouging consumers and were blamed for high rice prices. Economically powerful groups such as the Bamileke in Cameroon and the Lebanese in West Africa have provoked similar fears that economic reform will disproportionately benefit more powerful groups.

SUS2 Donor commitment to supporting reform should extend to the medium-term.

Donors played a critical role in the initiation and implementation phases of agricultural policy reform in each of the cases studied. In some instances (e.g., Cameroon, Madagascar, Mali and Malawi), they also provided financial and technical support for extended periods of time. In the case of Ghana, however, donors came belatedly to the process, only when they became convinced of the Rawlings regime's commitment to a sustained reform effort.

Just as timing can be crucial to the initiation and implementation of reform, commitments to support reform efforts until they become safely embedded are essential to success. Technical assistance in monitoring policy performance, helping to demonstrate the sustainable benefits of

reform, and supporting efforts to transform institutional and political cultures are of the greatest possible utility to policy champions in Africa.

At the same time, the tendency for opponents of reform to resist implementation through recidivism, counter-reform measures, and "rent-shifting"; the building of opposition over time; and the impulse to attribute a wide variety of ills to the effect of reform are all dangers to the sustainability of reform efforts. Sluggish economic performance resulting from exogenous variables opens the way for opportunistic attacks on policymakers, even after the initial benefits of reform have registered.

All of these factors suggest that the best assurance of sustainability is a commitment by donors, as well as policymakers themselves, to a course of action extending over a period of as many as five to ten years. However, the internal budgeting and planning cycles of donor agencies such as A.I.D. make this an extremely difficult proposition.

4. STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS

This section examines the implications for ADOs and other A.I.D. policy reform practitioners of the findings of the seven case studies. It is important to stress that the case material presented in this study does not reveal an easy political formula for successfully undertaking and sustaining policy reforms. Nevertheless, political analysis can be a useful tool for policy reform practitioners. The political economic analyses conducted in these case studies do contain important insights, findings, and questions that, if kept in mind and applied thoughtfully, will enable officers involved in policy reform to do a better job at the difficult tasks they face.

The case study experiences indicate that tactics and strategy can make the difference between effective and failed reform efforts. The lessons presented above revealed instances where reformers acted strategically to foster conditions facilitating policy change and better manage reform constraints. The discussion also demonstrated how the absence of strategic management damaged reform outcomes in several cases. This last section suggests strategic recommendations for improving reform outcomes in the design/initiation phase, the implementation phase, and finally the long-term "sustainable" phase.

4.1 Design/Initiation Stage

In the design of A.I.D. policy reform programs, there has been a tendency to focus on economic analysis and to concentrate less attention on political, social, and institutional analysis. The central message of this manual is that policy reform in Africa is an intensely political process that deserves careful attention from policy reform practitioners. A.I.D. officers need to think much more directly about how political factors influence policy outcomes and encourage African policymakers to include political issues in analyzing policy options, before reforms are adopted.

The following discussion suggests how donors can incorporate political factors into the policy initiation process through conducting political analyses themselves, financing training of African policymakers in political management, mobilizing reform supporters, cultivating policy champions, acknowledging and defusing opposition, and taking advantage of politically opportune moments.

- Both prior to and during implementation, missions should **conduct political economic analyses** of reform and sponsor training programs for host policymakers to learn tools of political and policy analysis. Useful analytical techniques for political analysis include stakeholder analysis (Box 4.1) and

dynamic political mapping (Box 4.3).[6] These analytical tools aim to develop management skills in designing improved strategies for achieving reform goals. These tools can be used most effectively when reformers view strategic management of reform as an iterative process. For instance, reform practitioners should not draw just one political map before reform is initiated, but donor and host country managers should continually update their analysis as new players enter the policy picture throughout the entire reform process.

While these tools are useful for clarifying the political environment for reform and its potential effects, they do not prescribe a generic solution to political dilemmas surrounding policy change in Africa. After the analysis is done, the challenge is for reformers to craft the best strategy to fit the particular reform context. After these analyses have been conducted, the next step is to consider prospects for sustaining reform through the implementation stage. The premise behind this type of analysis is that all policy reforms will encounter antagonistic reaction that can be overcome more easily if policy elites develop a specific strategy for managing the reform process. Implementation can be organized in such a way as to reduce the negative impact of policies on certain groups.

- At the reform initiation stage, mission technical staffs should **present a variety of scenarios** to host governments as part of the analytical work conducted in

[6]For a useful discussion of these and other techniques of political analysis aimed at developing management skills, see Crosby, Benjamin, "Management and the Environment for Implementation of Policy Change: Parts 1 and 2," in "Technical Notes," Implementing Policy Change Project, April, 1992 and "Strategic Analysis: A Vital Tool for Strategic Managers," in "Technical Notes," Implementing Policy Change Project, March, 1992, by the same author.

Box 4.1 Stakeholder Analysis

Stakeholder analysis is a tool for identifying the constellation of political, social and economic interests that may come into play in the policy reform process. It provides insight as to whose interests must be taken into account, the positions that they are likely to take on reform, and their probable response to reform and its effects.

Stakeholder analysis is most relevant (a) during the early phases of the reform process, when policy decisions are being evaluated, deliberated and assessed for their probable effectiveness, and (b) periodically during implementation, when the effects of reform are being most closely monitored. Stakeholder analysis is also a useful tool for donors and host-country policy analysts during their preparations for negotiation of the timing, pace and financial support for the reform process.

A simple matrix for stakeholder analysis is found below, in which the analyst is asked to provide certain information:

Political Actor: Any social, political or economic constituency, party, institution or actor who may be seen to have an interest in the outcome of the policy or issue being analyzed.

Position: Tendency to support or oppose the policy or issue being analyzed. (+, Neutral, or -)

Saliency: An assessment of the relevance or importance of the policy or issue to the actor's interests. (High, Neutral, Low)

Power/ Capacity: An assessment of the political actor's ability to influence the outcome by economic, political, violent or other effective means.

Appropriate responses to the information required should be derived from a variety of sources, screened for their bias or authoritative integrity: interviews with the actors themselves, interviews with local and foreign political observers, media and secondary sources, public position statements of the actors themselves.

support of reforms. The state of the agricultural sector should be forecast under conditions where no reforms are undertaken and where alternative reform packages are implemented. Missions should keep in mind that forecasting alternative scenarios requires substantially more analytical work than presenting one policy solution. Nonetheless, if carried out and presented well, it can provide the basis of a learning process for both host governments and A.I.D. Comparison of an array of policy options also yields stronger arguments for technocrats to present to politicians.

The case study experience suggests that the timing of the presentation of analytical findings and presentation style are important considerations when using analysis to effect policy change. For example, foreign advisers to the Ministry of Agriculture in Madagascar made a very influential analytical presentation of three different policy scenarios just before leaders met with the Paris Club, a politically opportune moment for reformers. Using visually powerful charts, the advisers demonstrated vividly that the current policy regime was unsustainable and persuaded political leaders to undertake dramatic reform of the rice sector.[7]

- Donors should encourage governments to build consensus behind reform and broaden support for reforms among decision makers early on. Donors can sponsor public forums for consensus-building among public officials at the beginning of the reform initiation process. President Traore of Mali effectively used the forum of a national seminar to build elite consensus behind the grain marketing reforms. Other Malian politicians, as well, minimized the personal risk of spearheading reforms by negotiating for consensus in high-level government forums, such as the *Bureau Executive Central* and the *Conseil des Ministres*. Individual ministers were not held responsible for unpopular decisions taken under the cloak of these executive institutions.

- Donors should encourage policymakers to stem political opposition to reform by integrating "sweeteners" to compensate losers into program design. Crafting reforms in such a way that defuses opposition reduces the political risks of reform. In Mali, compensatory measures (*mesures d'accompagnement*) promising government access to funds originally used in paying for subsidies to increase civil servant salaries were used to inspire politicians' support of parastatal reforms. While measures such as these may conflict with the reform objective of reducing government spending, they may be essential for capturing the support of the most politically potent losers.

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[7]One such chart prepared by the technical team was an especially powerful tool for converting policymakers to support the reform effort. Entitled, *L'Hemorraghie de Devises* (The Foreign Exchange Hemorrhage), it depicted in red the amount of foreign exchange necessary to finance Madagascar's rice import bill. Such an image conveyed the extent to which subsidized consumer rice prices had truly "bled" the Malagasy economy.

Box 4.2: Example of a Stakeholder Analysis Matrix:

Liberalization of maize marketing in Country X

Political Actor	Position	Saliency	Power/ Capacity
Government-licensed buyers	Oppose (-)	High (Protected economic activity)	Moderate (Rely on personal influence with political elites)
Maize producer cooperatives	Support (+)	High (Principal source of income)	High (Actively petitioning regime for this reform)

In the case of fertilizer reform in Cameroon, USAID devised a "sweetener" to bring political elites who were benefitting from the previous regime's policies into the reform process. USAID/ Yaounde sent entrepreneurs who had participated in the previous fertilizer distribution regime to a seminar on marketing in Jamaica, ostensibly to facilitate their participation in the new regime. Anticipating that these businesspeople had enough political clout to endanger the implementation process, USAID technical staff created a strategy to coopt them. While small-scale workshops can be funded from project funds, other sweeteners such as the buffer stock strategy in Madagascar discussed above are often expensive and require program funds.

- The last decade's record of both limited external influence on reform and often disappointing results counsels more open minds about the best solution to policy problems among donors. Policy dialogue must become more genuinely two-way, in order to better serve the goal of increasing government commitment and ownership of adjustment programs. In African countries where the state has historically controlled the economy, there is great potential for ideological resistance to liberalization: market-oriented policies are *not* the "natural" first choice of policymakers seeking solutions to their economic problems. Therefore, donors should recognize that the rationale for privatization is not always obvious,

Box 4.3: Interactive Political Mapping

Political mapping is one analytical technique that can be used to develop management skills for designing improved reform strategies. Host-country policy makers and donors alike may find it useful to construct "policy maps" to guide them through the often treacherous and confusing political terrain upon which they travel. While the work that has been done on political mapping is useful in laying out the actors and institutions involved in reform, it has one major flaw: it fails to consider the interactions between the players.

A new type of "interactive policy map" that was designed for use in several of the case studies is presented in Figure 2. What is original about this schematic is that it shows the dynamic relationship between different organizations and actors. One way for practitioners to clarify their understanding of the dynamic political forces influencing reform is to draw a policy map in three steps: Figure 2 maps the dynamic forces influencing initiation of rice policy reform in Madagascar.

Step 1- Identify the Key Actors

The first step is for the analyst to decide who are the most important political actors on the path leading to reform. The boxes in Figure 4.1 represent the most important actors at the initiation stage of rice reform in Madagascar.

Step 2- Determine How the Key Actors Interact

The second step is to determine the pattern of interaction among policy actors. This can be done through careful field research, including interviews with the key political actors, and study of the country's political history and policy background. It is clear from the map that in Madagascar, the Presidency is the hub of the policy making process (as illustrated by its position in the center of the map). Therefore, the most important interactions take place between political actors and the Presidency, where policy reform is generated. This map is useful in clarifying potential points of access to the Presidency which were necessary to have leverage over reform initiation.

Step 3- Weight the Influence of Actors on Reform Process

Third, the analyst must weight each actor's influence on the reform process. The relative strength of the incluence is indicated in this diagram by the weight of the arrows.

It is more complicated to draw a map of implementation than initiation (See Figure 3, compared to Figure 2). Interest groups who did not play a role in initiation, but stood to lose from the policy changes, react to the reform in the implementation phase. Several new political actors appear on the policy map, including traders, local government officials, the ruling party, and parastatals, who try to subvert the reform process (as symbolized by arrows 10, 14, and 15 breaking the implementation arrow). Several other cases, including Cameroon, displayed a similar pattern.

Figure 1: Politics of Agricultural Policy Reform: Initiation Stage



and work with host-country policymakers to develop a consensual view of the most appropriate solution to the policy problem.

Policy dialogue should be more a mutual effort to define key problems and devise alternative solutions than an attempt to persuade governments of the merits of specific external recommendations. This shift is particularly needed with respect to the design of politically unpalatable reforms when host-country knowledge and judgment is essential to the design of feasible strategies.

In Mali, for example, in 1984, the diagnosis of problems that eventually formed the basis of its economic policy reform program was done in a shared, collegial manner among professionals from the Mission, host government, and the private sector. The Mission provided the working groups with economic data previously collected for its own country assessments and gave the Malians time to reflect on the implications of the data for the economy before a jointly developed program was designed. Reform is more likely to be accepted politically when host government technocrats have conducted analyses of their economic situation, set their priorities, and selected problems to be tackled under the reform program.

- Donors should reach consensus among themselves on reform and coordinate their reform programs. Contrasting ideologies, development theories, policies, and styles of individual donors make collaboration especially challenging. Nevertheless, varying policy positions that result in different spheres of investment and project activity need not hinder reform efforts. Conversely, donors can use differences to their advantage, as the Mali case illustrated. The presence of many players with their own bilateral projects (USAID, FAO, EEC, French, and Dutch) supporting Malian grain marketing provided technical background and knowledge of on-the-ground activities that is often limited when policy reform is undertaken by a single donor. Therefore, donor collaboration strengthened the position of donors in their policy dialogue over cereals marketing reform.

- Donors should identify potential policy champions who are well positioned in key institutions leading the reform effort. Once reform leaders are identified, donors can cultivate their development by sponsoring training in policy and political analysis at the earliest stages of reform, funding reform groups early on in the process, and offering incentives to bureaucrats, such as workshops abroad. Training courses could include analytical methods for defining different policy options as well as techniques of political analysis such as stakeholder analysis and dynamic political mapping. Donors can strengthen the effectiveness of policy champions by providing them with resources to bring to the bargaining table.

STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS

- Foreign technical advisers can encourage policy champions by building the capacity of local technocrats to diagnose technical problems in the agricultural sub-sectors that need reform and provide well-defined policy options. USAID should focus on providing support for foreign advisers to build local analytic capacity and provide opportunities to gain experience that they can apply to future policy analysis and management, rather than on conducting the technical analysis themselves. In the case of Cote d'Ivoire, local consultants were better equipped to undertake the technical analysis than foreign consultants.

- A.I.D. Missions should insist upon private sector participation in the policy dialogue. In the case of fertilizer reforms in Cameroon, it was necessary for Mission staff to go over the heads of technocrats responsible for supervising the reform program and advocate at the level of the Presidency for the private sector to be included in the policy dialogue. Their participation boosted private sector confidence in reform and facilitated implementation.

4.2 Strategic Recommendations: Implementation Phase

Throughout Africa the frequent disparity between policy goals and outcomes has called attention to the problem of implementation. Political analysts acknowledge that implementation involves far more than a mechanical translation of goals into routine procedures and raises fundamental political questions about the division of resources and power in a society (Grindle 1980). Implementation requires highly developed political skills needed to devise the most effective implementation strategies. Yet design and analysis often focus only on getting the policy regime approved. The case studies addressed this problem by examining the political factors affecting the implementation process. The following recommendations emerging out of the case studies suggest how A.I.D. can enhance the capacity of African policymakers to strategically manage the implementation process.

- Donors should continue to support high-level workshops in political, institutional, and policy analysis for policymakers participating in reform projects and programs. Policy champions and African academics should be trained to conduct the training themselves for other policymakers new to the reform process. Programs to "train trainers" will foster greater host country ownership of—and commitment to—reform programs. After political and institutional analyses have been done, the policymakers should use the findings to carefully devise an implementation strategy. At this point, A.I.D. should support workshops and seminars for dissemination of the findings and the implementation strategy.

- Donors should strengthen those sectors of society that are "winners" from economic reform, but have thus far been politically weak in most African countries, such as farmers. A.I.D. can undertake activities that promote the organizational strength and

capacity of farmers through supporting non-state organizations, such as producer associations. Political liberalization is creating a context in which these types of organizations are likely to become more viable than they have been in many countries in the past. A.I.D. could follow the example of the German bilateral aid agency (GTZ), which recently financed a project supporting mobilization of Cameroonian cocoa farmers in *groupements producteurs* (producer associations) to sell their crops collectively. This project, which resulted in lower marketing margins and, consequently, higher producer prices, improved the environment for implementing export crop reforms.

USAID could also support farmers unions, like those in Cote d'Ivoire, which gained a voice in the agricultural policy debate in the early 1990s. Through collective action, cocoa and coffee growers won greater opportunity to market their own production to exporters and suppressed many of the practices that enabled local authorities or traders to extract extra taxes or offer farmers very low prices. Farmers unions and cooperatives used two effective mechanisms to put their issues on the agricultural policy agenda. First, they threatened a farmers' general strike that would block movement of export crops and/or food to port facilities and urban areas to convince the Government to heed their demands. Second, they called press conferences and public meetings to highlight the abandonment of farmers by the Government whose leader, President Houphouet Boigny, cultivated a reputation as the country's "*premier paysan.*"

A.I.D. can support activities such as these either through projects that facilitate specific policy reforms or in project activities that are not "policy-based." It may be easier politically for donors to fund these organizations through intermediaries, such as indigenous and foreign NGOs.

- Donors should provide a forum for listening to the perspective of farmers, who often lack a political voice at the national or local levels. For instance, in Mali, a rice farmer representing producer groups eloquently presented his views to donors in an effort to put pressure on them to revise their requirements for rice pricing.

- Donors should assist in the creation of viable institutions after the state-run system has been dissolved. One successful example from Mali was the creation of a market information system, *Systeme d'Information sur le Marche Cerealier* (SIM) originally proposed by a research team from Michigan State University funded by USAID and USAID staff at a National Seminar on Food Policy. The SIM provided a new sphere of activity that replaced the dismantled Grain Marketing Board, and consequently made institutional change more politically palatable to staff and management alike.

- Donors should assist governments in conducting publicity campaigns clarifying the content of reforms and the new "rules of the game." It is important that governments make effective efforts to publicly defend their reform agendas, especially in controversial

areas such as privatization. Enhancing public understanding of economic issues can help sustain the economic reform process. In the new political environment of Africa in the 1990s, public opinion will play a more important role in determining the viability of reform efforts. A.I.D. Missions should explore activities that enhance public understanding of economic issues in general, and the specific reform program, in particular.

One possibility would be for missions to hold open, high-profile meetings to defend their proposed policies. In the case of Cote d'Ivoire, the World Bank Resident Representative met regularly with journalists and business associations to build the case for reform. In so doing, he advanced public knowledge of the proposals and of the reasons for them, contributing considerably to the level of economic literacy of the community.

- Recent experience indicates that donors often underestimate the complexity of reform implementation and fail to realize that assistance with implementation is often necessary. At a time when foreign technical assistance in Africa is under intense (and often justified) attack, A.I.D. officers should avoid the temptation of leaving the implementation of policy reform out of their agendas. The fact that some technical assistance has been wasted does not take away from the key role that appropriate technical assistance can play in implementation.

USAID field staff can be most effective by working hand in hand with their African counterparts and engaging in direct and open dialogue over problems with reform implementation. Close donor contact with technical personnel enhances the success of policy implementation. Therefore, missions should be actively involved in program implementation and not allow consultants or Washington support staff to dominate the activity. Donors must also realize that implementation will be heavily staff-intensive, if it is to be effective.

In the case of pricing and marketing reforms in Cameroon, representatives of the World Bank who remained distant from reform technocrats were less successful than the French donors who benefitted from 30 years of intimate institutional involvement in Cameroon. Strong resident missions in Africa will facilitate fuller policy dialogue than that currently allowed by organizations such as the Bank that rely on inevitably hurried visiting teams. In the case of Mali, arms-length interactions with Malian policymakers meant that donors were not aware of the political pressures and risks facing their Malian counterparts.

4.3 Strategic Recommendations: Sustainability

Once reforms are initiated and even after implementation has begun, there is no guarantee that they will be sustained in the future. The real challenge of the reform process is how to sustain the gains realized by policy changes. Even in the case of reforms that are "self-implementing"—such as a price increase, which can be accomplished in a single

action—sustainability will be determined by public reaction. Therefore, consolidating and institutionalizing reform requires building a new base of political support among emergent winners. The case study experiences suggest the following recommendations for how USAID can promote the long-term sustainability of policy reform.

- The case studies show that policy reform efforts, by themselves, have not been sufficient to address the agricultural development problems that necessitated structural change. A.I.D.'s efforts in agricultural reform should be less narrowly focused on the particulars of policy change and more on fostering the broad societal environment for sustainable efforts. This involves working on activities to promote economic literacy and shape the overall intellectual environment. These efforts should be directed not only at government officials, but also the media, unions, the military, consumers, farmers, and other groups likely to have an impact on the adoption and implementation of reform.

- Sustaining economic reform means affecting a transition to a market-based, private sector-led economy. Donors should provide assistance for strengthening the environment in which rural markets operate. This transition depends upon the generation of a wide range of public goods, many of which are in short supply in Africa. Some of these goods are traditional, while others are related in particular to the needs of the transition period. Especially important are investments in infrastructure and research, and the key institutional underpinnings for a market economy, such as capital markets, privatization capacity, market information systems, and economic monitoring. A.I.D. missions should work with governments, the private sector, and NGOs on developing financially sustainable programs for the provision of public goods.

- The sustainable provision of the public goods needed for the transition to a market-based economy in Africa depends upon fundamentally changing the role of government in Africa. One appropriate entry point for A.I.D. into this process is to focus on building capacity for effective implementation of reform programs. Another potential entry point is for A.I.D. to support efforts to shift to more rule-ordered policies that reduce the autonomy of politicians.

- Another potential entry point for A.I.D. is to promote better governance in Africa by supporting measures that enhance civil society. By holding governments more accountable to their citizens, good governance encourages transparency in reform implementation and sustainability. A.I.D. can foster civil society by supporting legal, institutional, and regulatory reform, as well as promoting non-state institutions, such as civic organizations and farmer associations.

- A.I.D. must take steps to foster the political sustainability of reform, which requires a change from the "top-down" pattern of policy reform that dominated donor efforts in the 1980s. New regimes coming to power in Africa are likely to base their legitimacy on

a more participatory policy process. Consequently, A.I.D. should try to broaden and indigenize the policy dialogue process by permitting a wider range of social actors, such as members of the private sector and farmers, to put their issues on the policy agenda. The political sustainability of policy reform in the new political environments of the 1990s will demand far greater attention to coalition-building than had been the case in the 1980s.

- In order to sustain reform, host-country technocrats should be responsible for training other African policymakers in political, institutional, and policy analysis. Donors should continue to finance training policy champions to become trainers and take over the leadership of workshops and courses previously conducted by foreign experts.

- Certain key policy changes, such as exchange rate policy reform at the early stage of the reform process, are prerequisites for the success of subsequent reform actions. Sustaining reform is not possible in nations where reform of an inappropriate exchange rate regime is precluded. Overvaluation of the CFA franc counteracted policy efforts to create price incentives for export crop production. Thus, there was limited scope to deepen and sustain economic reform efforts in CFA countries. In such situations, donor reform efforts should attempt to focus on "exchange rate-neutral" reforms that facilitate economic activity.

- Sustaining reform is not possible where governance is not rule-ordered or where political leaders are excessively devoted to self-enrichment. For example, under the Biya regime in Cameroon, where patronage politics still dominate, attempts by elites to subvert the reform program for their advantage jeopardized the sustainability of export crop marketing reforms. A.I.D. efforts should focus on countries that have moved the furthest towards political liberalization. While it is appropriate to give additional financing to support reform in newly democratic regimes, such support should be strictly time-bound. A.I.D. should avoid the temptation of trying to create "African winners" through a large and long-term commitment of donor resources.

- Accurate information is a crucial element in making markets operational and in promoting improved governance. A.I.D. activities should focus on improving the flow and lowering the cost of information. These efforts will be much more politically viable given the more open political environment in Africa today.

5. SUMMARY MATRIX OF ISSUES AND RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

In order to assist the Agricultural Development Office prepare scopes of work for consultants, think strategically, and sequence work tasks, the following table is provided as a quick reference. It summarizes the main points of this report.

Table 1.3: Summary of Issues, Tasks, and Scopes of Actions for ADOs

PHASES	ISSUE(S)	TASK(S)	ADO ACTIONS
I. Planning (Analysis, Strategy, & Tactics)	Convincing elite host nationals of the necessity for economic reform	Win support of elite	Design and fund economic analysis
	Building a broad coalition for change	Mobilize potential beneficiaries (may included formerly disenfranchised groups)	Design and fund political stakeholder analysis
		Neutralize opponents (likely to be factions within the elite class and the civil service bureaucracy)	Assist in the dissemination of economic findings
			Use findings of political analysis to help pro reform host country parties develop a "Political Marketing Plan." The plan should be sensitive to the reigning **political mood in the country** and exploit any auspicious periods in the **cycle of political timing** for starting reforms. It should explicitly address how to abolish **rents** and the possible use of **sweeteners** to compensate potential losers and thereby increase the chances for successful reform
II. Initiation	Obtaining commitment of central government officials	Identify and empower policy reform champions	Maintain close contact with "policy champions." Encourage other donors to do likewise
		Achieve donor consensus	Assist "policy champions" however possible, including brokering compromises, funding expatriate technical assistance, drafting conditionalities
			Attempting to prevent donor community from working at cross purposes

Table 1.3: Summary of Issues, Tasks, and Scopes of Actions for ADOs			
PHASES	**ISSUE(S)**	**TASK(S)**	**ADO ACTIONS**
III. Implementation	Ensuring compliance with pricing and marketing reform accord.	Monitor reform compliance.	Investing in data building and maintenance capacity. Frequent field visits with lower level bureaucrats and ordinary citizens needed to check compliance.
	Educating and motivating lower level bureaucratic and political actors about the need to reform, how to implement, and the validity of the approach chosen.	Agitate for implementation of complementary regulatory and institutional reforms that can enhance scope for private sector investment and activity.	Judicious application of donor conditionality clauses. Promote donor interest in supporting complementary regulatory and institutional reforms also needed.
	Educating journalists and other broad social sectors in the country about the need for reform.	Prepare for adverse weather and trade developments that can delay implementation.	Assist and encourage host government to engage in contingency planning for implementation strategy. Policymakers should have alternative courses of action to avoid appearance of indecisiveness that permits opposition to coalesce.
IV. Sustaining Reform	Maintaining coalition of reform supporters.	Better organize and empower beneficiaries of reform (small farmers).	Assist NGOs in organizing beneficiary classes who are dispersed and diffused and lack a voice in political and media fora.
	Maintaining donor interest and support in the medium term.		Promote continued donor support for reform program.

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