

**Other Country Experiences in
Demobilization and Reintegration
of Ex-Combatants**

**Workshop Proceedings and
Case Study Findings
(revised version)**

Prepared by:

Creative Associates International, Inc.
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I. INTRODUCTION

This document reports the proceedings of a workshop held under the auspices of USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives with experts and the coordinator of the Demobilization and Reintegration Office (within the United Nation's Humanitarian Coordination Unit for Angola -UCAH) on the application of other country experiences to UCAH's reintegration strategy for ex-combatants in the program categories of: activities in assembly areas; kits and departure packages; cash disbursements; credit programs; and, institutions created for the reintegration of demobilized soldiers.

Following the workshop agenda, this report responds to questions posed by UCAH in its discussion guide for the workshop (see appendix A for a complete list of questions):

- ◆ What content and implementation strategies were used in social promotions programs developed for assembly areas? Who was responsible for their design? What materials were developed and who were the target groups?
- ◆ What kinds of immediate assistance packages (kits and departure packages) have been distributed in previous demobilizations, to whom were they given and what distributions points work best (at final destination or in assembly areas)?
- ◆ What has been the experience of other countries in providing cash disbursements as a program benefit to soldiers? What payment strategies work best? What strategies for implementation were developed and what effect did the disbursements have on the surrounding population?
- ◆ What community credit programs have been developed for demobilized soldiers? Who were the beneficiaries and how did the programs operate? What effect did the programs have on the surrounding population?
- ◆ How should the Institute for Reintegration in Angola be organized? What should its functions be and who should staff it? What has been the experience in other countries?

Prior to the workshop, UCAH requested that Creative Associates International, Inc. (CAII) review the experiences of other countries and relate them to UCAH's planned interventions for demobilized soldiers. The workshop drew on CAII's review of project experiences in

Mozambique, Ethiopia, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Namibia, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Angola (during the Bicesse period). A summary of the initial set of findings is contained in appendix B. A more complete report of other country experiences will be prepared in early 1995.

The information from other countries' experiences in demobilization and reintegration programs is drawn from documents and interviews with individuals primarily involved in implementation. Since there have been few rigorous impact evaluations performed on demobilization and reintegration programs or even specific interventions, actual outcome or success of any given intervention or scheme has been obtained through impressionistic data given by those interviewed, from culled documents and limited descriptive data and analysis where documents have been available. In cases where interventions were implemented several years ago, analysis or experience has been constrained by the limited availability of resources and project documents.

II. ACTIVITIES IN ASSEMBLY AREAS

Assembly area activities generally include information and communication programs, civic education, conflict resolution, vocational training, and education programs prior to demobilization. UCAH has included these activities under its social promotion program (SPP).

A. Program content

Experiences relevant to UCAH's proposed social promotion program are found in the demobilization activities conducted for demobilizing soldiers in Mozambique, El Salvador, Uganda and Honduras. The most comprehensive set of activities similar to those proposed under the social promotion program in quartering areas undertaken so far has been in Mozambique and in the bases of the Nicaraguan Resistance in Honduras over a 19-month cease-fire period prior to their demobilization and return to Nicaragua. While encamped in Honduras prior to their demobilization, members of the Nicaraguan Resistance were given short courses in civic education, vocational skills (ranging from butchering and barbering to computer software manipulation), primary health care and literacy.

In El Salvador, vocational orientation was provided to troops in the government forces. This orientation was geared toward the demobilized soldier and proposed vocational "tracks" (agriculture, microenterprise, education, employment) offered by the national reconstruction plan. In Uganda, the "Information for Veterans" booklet developed for demobilizing soldiers contained information on many of the themes included in UCAH's proposed social promotion

program, such as information on benefit schemes and other support services for veterans, civic duties and community participation. In Zimbabwe, activities resembling a social promotion program in the assembly points included an information booklet on the demobilization program and benefits, a counselor to inform the demobilized soldiers of opportunities and discuss future plans, a basic education and literacy course, and agricultural projects set up at four assembly points.

In Mozambique, El Salvador, and Ethiopia there were not enough activities to fill the prolonged cantonment period, resulting in escalating outbreaks of unrest (El Salvador and Mozambique), and donor pressure to demobilize on humanitarian grounds (Ethiopia). What is noteworthy from other experiences is that the cantonment period in all countries has been considerably longer than projected. This has budgetary ramifications as well as implications on the content of UCAH's design of a social promotion program.

B. Target groups

Assembly area programs in other countries generally have not targeted quartering areas' population according to rank. In El Salvador, there was a special scholarship program set up for officers of the insurgency, with an estimated six hundred individuals targeted, but this was in the post-demobilization phase. The information and social reintegration program, the broadest social promotion program implemented thus far, was designed for all the demobilized soldiers in assembly areas in Mozambique regardless of rank. Some soldiers to be demobilized in the non-assembly areas received booklets on reintegration but did not benefit from the rest of the information and assembly area program. In other countries where components of a social promotion related program were implemented (Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Uganda), they were geared to all ranks of soldiers.

C. Program Design

In Mozambique, the assembly areas' activities program was designed by the ONUMOZ Technical Unit (TU) for demobilization. Since the main thrust of the TU was registration, logistics and the actual demobilization process (including procurement of clothes, transportation of UN personnel, infrastructure of the assembly areas, disarmament), the information and social reintegration program was a lesser priority and therefore became somewhat neglected. Mozambique's information and referral service, a support service post-assembly areas (AAs), was designed by a private contractor and implemented by a multi-lateral organization with technical support from the design contractor. In El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua (for the disabled) private contractors designed and implemented

portions of the support services provided to demobilized soldiers.

D. Use of military counterparts

Military counterparts can be used effectively to help carry out programs in collaboration with implementors prior to and during demobilization in the assembly areas. To make this relationship "official" would bolster the troops' esteem and sense of involvement with the program, as well as contribute to the appropriateness (culturally) of any interventions. In Mozambique, no members of either force (government or RENAMO) were formally employed in the program as counterparts, although many ad hoc activities took place because of their initiative. Soldiers in several assembly areas (AAs) gave courses on skills, ranging from making bread to basket weaving, and prepared radio broadcasts for their colleagues.

Experiences in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras were positive when members of the forces were included in any stage of design and/or implementation of demobilized soldiers' activities, whether a social promotion program or distribution of goods (see also below, immediate assistance packages). In Uganda, prior to their demobilization soldiers in the barracks underwent counseling and orientation designed and delivered by soldiers. In El Salvador, members of the FMLN in some AAs started academies for the training of candidates to the new police force. This met with great success, as did other initiatives such as the building of small classrooms for carpentry, sewing, machine work, and welding. These initiatives sprung up from the individual AA's commanders and were financed through funding drives led by the political cadres of the factions.

In Honduras, Nicaraguan Resistance commanders became actively involved in requesting courses for their troops, and their support for all activities increased once they felt the contractor was responsive to their needs. Also, the training centers' maintenance and liaison personnel were staffed and housed in the training centers. This was conducive to building solid relationships where problems in implementation and design could be addressed. In Nicaragua, CIAV - OAS used the command structure to help register soldiers and distribute food and materials.

E. Specific country experiences

1. Mozambique

The information and social reintegration program delivered in Mozambique most closely resembles the social promotion program proposed by UCAH. The objectives of the program

were geared toward social readaptation. Other than a few agricultural/animal husbandry seminars delivered by the Ministry of Agriculture and some ad hoc activities transferring vocational skills, little was done to assess vocational skills or capacity to help prepare for return to civilian life. The questions asked on the demobilization registration form about vocational skills necessary for civilian life were the only other reference made to vocational skills development during the demobilization phase.

Activities designed for each assembly area in Mozambique included radio programs, a library, posters and booklets, music and dance, sports and recreation, and other local cultural activities. Radio programs broadcast information and entertainment programs (prepared in Maputo as a package prior to assembly) daily. Later monitors gathered, programmed and transmitted programs created by the soldiers themselves as a way to further occupy the soldier's time as the quartering period dragged on for longer than expected. The library contained information on career skills, health, and industries. Color posters were made to illustrate the demobilized soldiers' changing role in civilian society. Booklets were prepared on sanitation, health prevention topics, the rights and duties of the demobilized soldier, the reintegration support scheme, how to start a new life, basic concepts on agriculture and rural industry, and basic information (geography, population, environment) on Mozambique. The education program included preliteracy and prenumeracy courses. The Red Cross also presented a program in some assembly areas which included topics on health, ethics, and respect for citizen rights.

Monitors were selected in Maputo and trained for two weeks by the National Institute for Development of Education in adult teaching methodologies, literacy didactic and pedagogy. Selection criteria included a background in education. One monitor per assembly area was fielded, working with a UN Technical Unit person and a UN Volunteer who were also posted at the site.

2. El Salvador

In El Salvador vocational orientation and some short courses were offered to government troops in barracks. For political reasons (i.e., the insurgent forces were already receiving benefits), the timing of benefits was well ahead of the army's "demobilization" schedule. Since the army viewed its demobilization as a reduction in force, many troops were selected for counseling and training without knowing if they were going to be demobilized. This was not cost efficient, and was remedied when the National Police (PN) initiated demobilization. Since it was known in advance when they would be demobilized, vocational guidance and counseling began prior to demobilization. PN members would not be demobilized until a

series of activities, including aptitude tests, informational sessions on opportunities and their pros and cons, and counseling took place. Once demobilized, the beneficiary opted for a reintegration "track", and the program provided educational or training courses, a living allowance, and monitored the delivery of services and the individual's progress.

3. Uganda

Results of the Phase I demobilization showed the need for predischarge counseling on social stress and civic responsibilities and an orientation for soldiers demobilized in later phases. A planned vocational and training fund will provide funding for some training and apprenticeships on agricultural and vocational skills as well as grants for basic tools and loans for income-generating projects after soldiers are demobilized, but no vocational training or education prior to their discharge.

4. Honduras

Short courses were an excellent way to occupy soldiers throughout their period of waiting during a cease-fire. Courses were hands on and did much to rehabilitate the cantonment region. The contractor and NR counterparts built training centers, rehabilitated or cut roads, constructed and staffed health clinics, initiated environmental sanitation activities, and widely distributed literacy materials. A training of trainers approach was utilized to great effect for literacy and health prevention programs. Trainers were selected from beneficiary ranks and trained as "promoters", equipped with materials, and freed from military duties to pursue their work.

The courses' impact on soldiers' future vocational activities after demobilization is undetermined. The training program was expensive (approximately eight million US dollars), and did not cover the entire target population. Due to the selection process adopted by the NR, participants tended to be those with connections to the higher ranks; courses were seen as a reward, and many took three, four or even more courses in different skill areas. In short, trainee selection criteria was not based on need or ability but rather influence.

F. Lessons learned

The lessons learned from various country experiences in assembly area programs are:

1. Take into account the characteristics of the target group when designing materials for the program. This pertains to content as well as methodology in delivery of

information. Many of the Mozambican and Ugandan demobilized soldiers were totally alienated from civil society and had little understanding of how it functioned

- a. Use oral methods instead of or to supplement written text when disseminating information if the literacy rate is low (as it is among Mozambican soldiers) and where there is a strong oral tradition. Effective communication to demobilized soldiers in assembly areas is extremely difficult. Be sure communication materials are prepared in other languages in a case such as Mozambique where many do not speak Portuguese, the national language. Monitors should also be skilled in one or more of the local languages. Because of language and literacy problems, many demobilized soldiers left the assembly areas in Mozambique not understanding even the basic procedures of their transport home, benefits they were to receive, and how to access information and referral (IRS) offices.
 - b. Deliver information that pertains to soldiers' immediate interests and keeps abreast of changes, in addition to cultural and educational materials. There was a critical lack of timely, accurate information on demobilized soldiers' immediate needs and concerns (such as how long they would be in camps, demobilization procedures, eligibility requirements for benefits, and how, when and where they would receive them).
 - c. Involvement of counterparts from the military forces is essential in making programs relevant and assisting implementors in building confidence and trust. Counterparts' participation at the design phase helps achieve early buy-in into the program.
2. Program implementation should be well planned out, with curricula, methodology and appropriate materials available and well understood by the monitors. The assembly area's activities success (or failure) in Mozambique was highly dependent on the individual abilities and initiative of the monitors. Monitors received little or no supervision or prior training. Monitors should be present in AAs at the start of encampment; for example, in Mozambique some did not arrive until two months after the soldiers arrived.
 3. Design program budgets, activities and materials to cover a much longer cantonment period than projected because long, unanticipated delays in demobilization are the norm, extending the encampment period.

4. Care needs to be taken that all information presented is politically impartial and programs and materials are identical for both forces. There were complaints by RENAMO that some of the information was pro-government. Also, RENAMO refused to allow Radio Mozambique to broadcast its daily programs on the grounds that political propagandizing would take place.
5. The procurement process for assembly area activities should be decentralized, and procedures quick, efficient and flexible. The slow pace of the UN procurement system in Mozambique had a deleterious effect on timely delivery of SPP materials and planned activities.
6. Planners were overly ambitious in the music, dance and theater components of assembly area activities in Mozambique. Many activities they had planned were not implemented due to budgetary constraints or lack of interest by local performers.

III. KITS AND DEPARTURE PACKAGES

Immediate assistance packages (IAPs) as defined by UCAH's strategy paper (reconstruction/reintegration kits, agriculture starter kits, clothing sets) are to be distributed in the QAs just prior to the demobilized soldier's departure. Kits that have been offered to the demobilized in other countries, although not always in the QAs, fall into three broad categories: "household effects" kits, or those that contain items for reintegration vis a vis contributing towards a household or immediate nutritional requirements (cutlery, pots and pans, seeds); vocational kits (agricultural or vocational tools); and building materials/tool kits.

In Africa, household effects kits have not been offered to demobilized soldiers, although "vegpaks" containing seeds and tools were distributed in Mozambique with the goal of contributing to the short-term nutritional needs of the demobilized and others. In Namibia, as refugees, demobilized soldiers received seeds and agricultural tool kits and household items. In Uganda a cash allowance toward the purchase of clothing, food, medical care, agriculture and housing construction was provided in lieu of in-kind assistance. In Zimbabwe, the demobilized were apportioned cash to purchase some items that might be considered household effects (termed a "settling in allowance").

Immediate assistance packages have varied according to ex-combatants' final destinations (rural/urban) in El Salvador, Mozambique, Nicaragua and Ethiopia. In El Salvador, the household effects kits were initially different and contained several items more for rural,

rather than urban, dwellers. In Mozambique, the initial plan was to distribute vegpaks only to ex-combatants settling in rural areas. In Nicaragua, a rice seed and productivity project specifically targeted a population sector in a specific geographical region. Although not exactly a kit, demobilized soldiers settling in rural areas in Ethiopia were entitled to a three-month extension of food rations as an incentive to rural settlement.

A. Specific country experience

1. El Salvador

a. Household effects kits

Household effects kits were delivered only to demobilizing members of the FMLN insurgency, on the premise that the guerrilla fighters were in need of basic household goods, whereas government troops had been recruited out of homes and had them to return to. The exact composition of the kits was proposed by the FMLN leadership, and after strained negotiations agreed to by the government as a way to guarantee demobilization on schedule. In short, these kits became a means to further pacification. Kits, whether household effects or vocational, had not been contemplated in the peace accords. The politically-driven arrangement came at a high cost that had not been anticipated by the government or donors. The UNDP agreed to finance the packages at the beginning, but the appeal process was too lengthy to accommodate the tight time frame and be of benefit to the demobilization scheme. The distribution of the packages (both household effects and agricultural tools) was to take place at the final destinations immediately after demobilization, so timing was essential. The US government ended up financing both the household effects and agricultural starter kits because there was not time to coordinate multiple contributions. Also, one contractor as procurer and distributor was preferable for logistical and financial reasons (this was also a recommendation from UNOHAC in Mozambique).

Initially, the rural household effects package consisted of several more items than the urban kit, but beneficiary demands made the government accede to upgrading the urban kit. Beneficiary reactions to the household effects kits were mixed. Many thought the kits inadequate compensation for so many years of fighting, this being their first in-kind demobilization benefit (other than clothing). There were many criticisms about the appropriateness and quality of the items in the kits, despite the fact that the items and brands were selected by their own command structure.

b. Agricultural starter tool kits

These kits were distributed to all ex-combatants opting for rural destinations, including the disabled on the premise that their families would benefit from the tools. The composition of the kits was negotiated and agreed to in response to the FMLN initiative prior to their demobilization; the army demanded the same items for GOES troops. The number of soldiers who would opt for the rural packages was given by the FMLN high command, who estimated that 80 per cent of their troops would resettle in rural areas. All beneficiaries choosing the agricultural tool kits were automatically excluded from the urban/vocational reintegration tracks. Troops had to decide which reintegration track they wanted. However, since the agricultural tool kits were immediately available while other urban/vocational options were not yet online, many soldiers chose to receive agricultural starter kits to guarantee they got something out of demobilization, having little confidence in the government's political will or operational capability to offer the other promised options in the future. When the other vocational training programs were in place, many soldiers who had previously accepted the agriculture reintegration track wanted to switch, claiming they were not aware of the mutual program exclusivity or that their needs had changed since demobilization.

2. Mozambique

The stated objectives for vegpak distribution included promoting demobilized soldiers to return to family sector agricultural production areas, providing them with self-employment through vegetable production for their family and the market, providing them with an incentive for microenterprise based on vegetable production, and contributing to the short-term needs of demobilized soldiers' families. In retrospect, these objectives appear to be overly ambitious. World Vision considered the vegpaks to be sufficient to supplement the food of a family of five, not necessarily enough to create microenterprises or to act as an effective incentive to convince soldiers to remain in the agricultural sector (there being probably better reasons for a soldier to do so or not other than the vegpak).

The vegpak consisted of eight packages of different seed, a manual, bucket, hoe, machete and capulana (a cloth wrap worn by Mozambican women). The cost per beneficiary was just under US \$13.00. Vegetable seeds were chosen because they offer more flexibility to ex-soldiers than cereals, as the seeds will keep indefinitely.

The total beneficiary target was estimated at a maximum of 60,000; in fact the actual number ended up over 90,000 due to a change in eligibility requirements (vegpaks were originally

intended for rural settlers only) as well as a politically-driven extension of the number of ex-soldiers eligible for demobilization and reintegration. This increase in numbers delayed operations and depleted stocks, requiring workers to resort to a voucher system for later distribution outside the quartering areas. The failure to deliver promised benefits upon demobilization contributed to encamped soldiers' frustrations, resulting in riots, looting, blocked roads and hostage taking.

3. Nicaragua

In Nicaragua, a rice seed and packing sack distribution was implemented on the Atlantic coast. Demobilized soldiers of Mosquito ethnic extraction, their families and communities into which the demobilizing soldiers were returning were targeted. By taking advantage of traditional production schemes and soil characteristics, the implementing agency (CIAV-OAS) was able to distribute rice seed to 14,000 families in very remote locations. Eighty percent of the seed was planted, with a good harvest yield. The success of the project has been attributed to the project's use of the commitment and effort of the beneficiaries locally available resources, well-understood technologies, and their perception of the project as a self-generated response to their problems (the project team went to much effort to utilize a participatory design for project conception).

Other keys to success of the 6-month long project were its effective logistics and direct beneficiary participation. Eighty pounds of rice seed, an appropriate number of storage sacks and a machete were distributed to each eligible family. Families were responsible for land preparation (a minimum of one hectare), while implementors researched the most appropriate seed type, conducted a farming families census, logistical surveys and overall project design.

4. Ethiopia

Subsistence ration cards were distributed to demobilizing soldiers in the QAs. Ex-soldiers choosing an urban destination received seven months of food, while those settling in rural areas received ten months' rations. Soldiers with less than 18 months service were demobilized more rapidly and received different benefits than those with more than 18 months service based on the assumptions that they were less inclined toward military service and thus required less compensation to leave and that their reintegration needs were less since their civilian experience was more recent.

Reintegration assistance also differed for ex-soldiers returning to urban vs. rural areas, although these interventions were administered in the returning areas, not the QAs. Those

returning to rural areas (approximately 40 percent) were given one hectare of land through the Ministry of Agriculture, with a heifer or plough ox, seeds, coffee seedlings and tools distributed over a two-year period in relevant areas. A revolving fund was established to provide easy credit for the urban demobilized.

B. Disabled soldiers

The problems of disabled soldiers are complicated by the lack of sufficient resources in countries to meet the medical and long-term rehabilitative needs of disabled populations. Due to the extreme sacrifices made by soldiers wounded in war, the expectations for benefits and assistance are high. Many soldiers need repeated surgeries and long-term care to survive the physical damage they have incurred, as well as counselling. Community-based rehabilitative programs and services for prosthetics are essential and are often the focus of programming.

Funding from donors, however, falls short of requested levels leaving many programs woefully short of needed commitments. This section of the report does not attempt to analyze programs for disabled, focusing only on the provision of kits in other countries; however, the broader context of difficulties encountered in programming for disabled should be understood (see chart on programs for disabled in the appendices).

Accommodations for disabled soldiers in the composition and distribution of kits were only made in El Salvador and Nicaragua. In El Salvador, household kits for disabled included a bed, sheets, and pillow. Vocational tools were distributed to disabled Nicaraguan Resistance members prior to their demobilization and repatriation. As part of their rehabilitative program in Nicaragua, equipment to support five cooperatives started by CIAV-OAS for disabled soldiers also was provided. In Mozambique, the occupational skills development program, which includes kits and training, specifies that at least 10% of its beneficiaries will be disabled soldiers. In Zimbabwe, equipment was provided to cooperatives formed by disabled demobilized soldiers. In Uganda, no special provision was made for disabled veterans.

C. Clothing sets

Civilian clothing was distributed to demobilizing soldiers in Nicaragua, Mozambique, El Salvador and in Uganda a portion of the cash payment was allotted for clothing. In all but one of the demobilization programs, the clothes were provided at the end of the encampment period just before their departure, a symbolic transition to civilian life. However, in

Mozambique, RENAMO demanded its soldiers receive civilian clothes upon arrival at assembly areas (because many soldiers' clothing and uniforms were in such poor condition that they needed something to clothe them). Providing civilian clothes at the beginning of encampment can be an advantage if the goal is to "civilianize" the camp and can help begin the reintegration to civilian life sooner. A drawback found in Mozambique was that when it came time to demobilize after over nine months of encampment, instead of the anticipated eight weeks, the civilian clothes were again much in tatters. If an additional set of clothing is provided, then it should be a universal benefit and not offered selectively to some soldiers, especially since the resources to spend on new clothing are so scarce and the clothes are viewed as a symbol of changed status.

D. Vocational tool kits

Vocational kits are attractive to donors because in theory they offer a relatively fast response to unemployment and address the perceived needs of the demobilized early in the reintegration process. Kits have been offered in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Mozambique with mixed results. While Uganda has a vocational training fund (which covers only a percentage of veterans according to certain selection criteria), kits are not a standard component of the training package. In Zimbabwe, equipment was provided to cooperatives formed by demobilized soldiers, and as such cannot be considered kits per se. Also in Zimbabwe a vocational school for the disabled was formed, although the numbers it could accommodate were low in relation to the numbers of disabled in need of training.

While vocational tool kits have not been distributed in quartering areas (except for the agricultural starter packages in El Salvador and vocational tools for the disabled in Nicaragua prior to repatriation) it is salient in the case of Angola to discuss not only the procurement and distribution of vocational kits, but the conceptual framework behind them. Stated objectives for vocational kits are that they are distributed as support for job creation, employment or microenterprise creation. They have been tied to training programs and, in El Salvador and Mozambique, carry a credit component and/or a subsidized cost to the beneficiary.

1. Beneficiary expectations

An issue with vocational kits, and training, is the beneficiaries' perception of the nature of the donation. Experiences in Nicaragua and El Salvador have been that demobilized soldiers perceive training and vocational kit distribution as a form of entitlement, due them upon discharge as compensation for their years of service. Kits and training are not valued as an

opportunity in the longer term sense, but as pay offs. In both countries, and with vegetable packs in Mozambique, tools and materials were often quickly sold rather than utilized for resettlement, nullifying donors' intentions of facilitating economic reintegration (at least in the manner designed). In Mozambique, where vocational kits will be issued to ex-soldiers for a subsidized price after participating in training programs or otherwise verifying relevant skills, it is too early to tell whether requiring the demobilized soldier to pay for the kit, even at a subsidized price, will have an impact on it being used for the intended purpose.

2. Programming issues

(a) In Nicaragua, El Salvador, Mozambique and Angola during 1991-1992, there was a tremendous rush by some demobilization and reintegration coordinating agencies to get training programs online as quickly as possible under the assumption that if channeled into productive training activities, beneficiary (and national) stability would be enhanced. Surveys of beneficiary interest usually reflected a wish list of vocational interests. In many countries, this information was collected through questions on the demobilization registration form. Such information is needed to begin designing proposals to arrange for funding. However, a drawback is such surveys and questionnaires may feed unrealistically high expectations among the demobilized soldiers that their vocational aspirations would be automatically served by training programs. The types and number of recipients for training and vocational kits are very difficult to ascertain accurately at this stage, since while encamped the soldiers' expectations are inflated and their projections for the future unrealistic. Thus, surveys and registration questionnaires must be carefully designed in such a way as to not fuel false expectations.

(b) Start-up of training courses requires considerable investments of time and money. If offered, training courses are often chosen by the beneficiaries either because of the monetary value of accompanying vocational training kits or the status the occupation carries, regardless of the skills needed or the time required for effective training. When vocational kits were offered to the Nicaraguan Resistance disabled before their repatriation, for example, beneficiaries selected the type of kit based on the cash value of the kits' contents, not on the kits' relevance to the demobilized soldier's chosen occupation. This was openly admitted by the beneficiaries who participated in the selection of the contents of the kits, who also said they had no idea what civilian life would be like on their return, whether their families were still at home or even alive, and what vocational opportunities would be available to them back home.

In Ethiopia, demobilization was delayed by the government's proposal of massive training

programs for its soldiers, which donors would not fund. In Zimbabwe, vocational training was provided to demobilizing soldiers in agriculture, but the project failed due to (among other things) lack of beneficiary interest (reportedly less than 4 percent) in the agricultural sector. In Mozambique, the training program took months to plan and has been unable to meet the large demand due to a shortage of qualified institutions and funding.

In El Salvador, Mozambique and Nicaragua, the type and numbers of training courses (and accompanying kits) have been largely unrelated to labor market demand and actual (self) employment and business opportunities. In El Salvador and Nicaragua, this has led to beneficiary frustration when job opportunities fail to materialize or success of microenterprises fails to meet expectations. Even when training schemes can be designed with opportunities and job availability in mind, the fast-changing economic conditions in a post-war scenario make it extremely difficult to project how the formal sector will evolve. One recommendation is that training, at least at the beginning of resettlement after QAs, be focused on the informal sector and providing kits as working capital for self-employment. In the case of microenterprise development, practitioners have made the point that entrepreneurs are born, not made, and programs targeting microenterprise development for a broad population, some without the aptitude and skills to become entrepreneurs, do a disservice to many they are trying to help.

Based on experiences in Uganda and Ethiopia, GTZ has devised an approach of "wait and see" regarding the design of vocational reintegration programs. The articulation of this new approach is the GTZ Provincial Fund project in Mozambique. Experience in these countries has led GTZ to distrust surveys. They have decided to be reactive with their funds, financing initiatives as needs and interests evolve post-demobilization rather than designing interventions prior to demobilization or at the initial stage of reintegration. This approach, however, would require that other benefits be available for soldiers upon demobilization as a more immediate safety net.

(c) In countries where benefits to the demobilized are to be equivalent, some courses/kits cost considerably more than others; the duration and characteristics of training required in different occupations also vary, so parity is difficult to achieve (training a mechanic, and the tools required are much greater in time and cost, for example, than those of a cobbler). Because curricula and quality of teaching vary across training providers, an evaluation and monitoring component needs to be developed and be in place prior to any training implementation, to ensure consistent quality based on the evaluation indicators.

In both El Salvador and Mozambique, when it was known that training for demobilized was

to be funded, educational organizations and training institutes marketed their programs successfully, despite often questionable capability or capacity to effectively deliver training in the numbers required. In El Salvador, particularly during the early stages of demobilization and reintegration, training courses given to government troops were often of extremely poor quality, the system was abused, and beneficiary frustration was widespread.

(d) While these issues can be addressed in the design phase, they are usually not, due to the heavy political pressure to have kits, or at least the promise of kits, available as a means of pacification. Job market surveys are lengthy processes, and generally a sufficient number of formal employment opportunities simply does not exist in post-conflictive countries. In El Salvador, counseling has helped, to some extent, address these problems. In Mozambique, counseling is a component of the reintegration process and ideally will address the appropriateness of beneficiary selection of a vocation, training and therefore kits, but the training programs have been slow to start up and the procurement and composition of kits have been mired in procedural questions and delayed donor funding. However, counselors have not been sufficiently skilled and trained to assess beneficiary aptitudes nor have they had time to do so because of demobilization trouble-shooting responsibilities. Subsidized on-the-job training has been somewhat successful in El Salvador and Nicaragua and is being attempted in some pilot projects in Mozambique (although it is too early to judge their success).

E. Lessons learned

In most countries studied, ex-soldiers exhibit a high level of mobility post-demobilization. Despite having transportation home, many traveled about, visiting relatives or friends, or sought opportunities elsewhere. This mobility has meant that one of the intentions for kits often is not fulfilled; they are often either sold on the journey back, or given to family members. Kit distribution at the destination point, instead of upon departure from AAs, might encourage use of materials, particularly of building materials and vocational tools, for their intended purpose. For example, in Uganda roofing and housing materials were distributed by veterans' program offices upon veterans arrival in their communities. These materials were

used by veterans to construct homes or make additions to existing homes (such as those of relatives).

The following lessons learned come from implementors of kit procurement and distribution. They are country-specific, and should be weighed against the Angolan context.

1. The decision of what kits should contain is best left to beneficiaries' representatives, or, at the very least, these representatives should approve of the kits' contents. In Mozambique, the UNOHAC representative chose to distribute vegpaks and selected the contents, a decision he has been criticized for both within UNOHAC and by the beneficiaries themselves, since several other programs in Mozambique provide vegpaks for which demobilized soldiers were eligible as community members. Also, the vegpaks were made less effective by failure to combine their distribution with the training which normally accompanies them. Many thought a more appropriate package, tailor-made to ex-combatants' immediate needs, would have contained household effects items that were not offered through other standardized programs of assistance. Alternately, suggestions were made that for future demobilization programs it might be more effective to include items that are given to returning refugees of the area, with perhaps some additional articles to acknowledge the soldiers' special status as an ex-combatant. This also shows the need to coordinate the contents of kits with other assistance providers to reduce duplication in assistance for which demobilized soldiers might be eligible as community members. In El Salvador, even with the composition and specifications of the kits having been proposed and authorized prior to procurement by the FMLN, there were widespread complaints by the beneficiaries about the quantity, quality and selection of the items.
2. If kits are to be distributed at the QAs, experiences in El Salvador and Mozambique suggest that the contents should be standardized (the same number and types of items) for all beneficiaries. Failure to have standardized kits resulted in unrest in El Salvador (over the household effects package differences for urban vs. rural dwellers) and in Mozambique (regarding the initial exclusion of urban ex-combatants for vegpaks). In both cases, the ex-combatants' demands were acceded to resulting in higher beneficiary numbers and therefore greater cost than originally projected (and shortages). In Mozambique, the issue was also raised of varying the contents of the vegpaks to suit regional differences but again, for simplicity, the decision was made to include seed types which could be cultivated in most areas.
3. The timing of kit distribution is key to smooth execution; issues such as allowing sufficient time for negotiation of benefits between the parties, donor buy-ins and/or available funding, and setting a realistic implementation timeframe for procurement are interdependent and must be included in plans. In El Salvador, the first scheduled demobilization was delayed because a household effects package was negotiated late in the process and there was not time to procure the items. In Mozambique, the delays in demobilization (due to logistical and political factors) made the seeds

distributed useless for that time of the year, thereby eliminating the goal of providing immediate assistance for the initial transition period.

4. Policies and procedures for kit composition and distribution, including inventory control and tracking systems, should be thoroughly designed and in place prior to any distribution. These policies and procedures need to be clearly communicated to and understood by implementing agencies and adhered to consistently. These include beneficiary numbers and eligibility criteria, documentation required for kit retrieval, and the quantity and quality of items in each kit (with no substitutions). These problems have been underscored by the experiences of implementors in Mozambique, El Salvador and Nicaragua. For example, in Mozambique, other items (such as blankets) were substituted by implementors when stocks of the original vegpak ran out. This caused problems for the implementors as soldiers in other areas demanded equal treatment (i.e., the same items given elsewhere), and fueled the beneficiaries' frustrations and suspicions that their welfare was being disregarded. If a certain item runs out or is not delivered on time, a preferable alternative to offering a substitute would be to provide a voucher for the item for its receipt later.
5. In El Salvador, utilizing the political-military structure as counterparts in the selection of items and the distribution system helped the contractors both in logistics and in times of heightened tension due to dissatisfaction with the kits or exclusion of beneficiaries when documentation was insufficient. In short, the command structure accepted the responsibility of partnering with the implementing NGO, and was helpful in times of crisis. In Nicaragua, OAS officials utilized the command structure of the Nicaraguan Resistance for distribution of food and building materials, and claimed this strategy was a major factor in its ability to reach the target population.

IV. CASH DISBURSEMENTS

Cash disbursements are an attractive benefit for donors to accept and fund because they are largely viewed as an administrative exercise, logistically simpler and more rapidly implemented, requiring little programming and logistical preparation. The intention is for the cash to provide a safety net supporting demobilized soldiers during the social adjustment phase until they can find adequate means to support themselves. For this reason, in some cases cash benefits are provided in installments over an extended period of time. Donors often assume that cash will be used to support investments toward self-sufficiency by the demobilized soldiers such as education, training or purchase of materials for trade or capital investments.

The evidence shows that demobilized soldiers in many instances are not used to dealing with large amounts of cash and are unfamiliar with a cash economy, and concepts such as saving, investment, the value of money, and banking systems. Soldiers in the disbanded forces, such as RENAMO and UNITA, often have not been financially compensated during their military service. In many post-conflict situations the banking infrastructure is too undeveloped--bank branches are too dispersed to provide payments to soldiers in remote locations or encourage savings through easy access to savings accounts. Providing cash to demobilized soldiers can give them a sense of special status at a time when they should be reintegrating into the mainstream at the social and economic standard of their family and community. With income assured, ex-soldiers may be less motivated to seek new employment and training opportunities thus delaying their eventual reintegration as a civilian and self-sufficiency. With extended payment periods, ex-soldiers may try to prolong their special status through agitating for even further benefits, again delaying their reintegration as regular citizens.

A number of payment schemes have been tried and the evidence should be weighed against the eventual pressure to provide soldiers with cash compensation over an extended period. Consideration should be given to providing soldiers a one-time severance payment, versus a protracted series of payments over a specified period of time. Factors such as banking infrastructure, ties to investments such as purchase of tools and training programs, provision of financial counseling, as well as the appropriateness of cash disbursements in the Angolan context should be considered.

A. Specific country experiences

Experience in Zimbabwe suggests that a large lump sum payment is not effective: implementors initially tried this approach, offering each soldier approximately \$550 (over two-thirds of the GDP per capita and nearly a half of a year's minimum wage) upon demobilization. However, within a month many demobilized soldiers had returned to the camps, demanding more assistance. A new cash scheme was implemented of paying approximately \$260 a month for two years (a payment scheme made possible by the prevalence and efficiency of the post office system), but offering the option of receiving payment of the entire \$6216 in a lump sum if used as a business investment or combined with others to develop cooperatives.

The experience in Uganda is quite different, however, where cash allowances instead of in-kind assistance were the dominant component of demobilization benefits. An initial \$130 (75 percent of the GNP per capita) was distributed upon discharge, intended to cover the purchase of clothing, food rations, and other immediate needs, followed by a subsequent

payment of \$360. During the initial round of demobilization (Phase I), this latter sum was distributed in two installments. However, since reports reflected that veterans were generally using the money wisely, in subsequent demobilization phases the latter payment would be made in one installment 2-1/2 months following demobilization.

The difference between these two experiences with large cash payments may well be attributed to the fact that in Uganda, soldiers received financial counseling and information booklets on saving money and using it wisely prior to their demobilization (while such counseling was non-existent in Zimbabwe). Also likely contributing to the comparative success is that in Uganda demobilized soldiers were required to open savings accounts at bank branches near their settlement destinations in order to receive their second cash payments, which were deposited directly to their accounts. Although other factors may have influenced the different results in the two countries, the experience in Uganda suggests that adequate counseling combined with mechanisms such as opening bank accounts (provided a viable banking system exists) improves the chances of a large sum of cash being used for necessary transition expenditures by demobilized soldiers.

B. Banking infrastructure

In order for a scheme of payments over time to be effective, a functional, dispersed banking system or an alternative logistical structure is needed to disburse payments over a wide geographic area (as many demobilized settle in remote, rural areas). In Mozambique, the paucity of bank branches at the district level has forced many demobilized soldiers to travel great distances to pick up their subsidies -- for many demobilized (as much as 15 percent at one branch) the payment amount is not worth the effort and expense of the journey (according to one study an average of one-third of the cost of the benefit) to collect it.

C. Donor interest

The main advantage of cash programs, which makes them attractive to donors, is that they can be quickly prepared and ready by the time soldiers demobilize. They are also less difficult logistically and easier to administer than in-kind assistance. In support of cash subsidies for a short time, almost 70 percent of the demobilized soldiers interviewed in Mozambique three to six months after most were demobilized had no income other than farming and the subsidy. Cash subsidy programs should be seen as an entitlement (severance pay) and as a temporary safety net, not as a reintegration program (for this reason, calling Mozambique's cash payment program for demobilized soldiers a "Reintegration Support Scheme" is a misnomer). A cash benefit, if not linked to other opportunities, such as

education, training, tool kits, or business investments (including use of future payments as collateral for credit, and the opportunity to pool advance payments with other ex-soldiers to start businesses), will likely not contribute to reintegration and development.

D. Perceptions of beneficiaries

A possible drawback to such schemes of attaching cash payments to receipt of other opportunities is that many demobilized soldiers see cash payments as an entitlement which they may be reluctant to use to access other benefits. Demobilized soldiers may feel entitled to cash payments and may not believe they should use their own resources (i.e., cash payments) to access other benefits, especially if they can receive similar benefits or resources of much lower quality for free. Cash gives immediate, tangible results, while the potential opportunities of alternative benefits such as training or business investments represent risk and delayed rewards. It is too soon to tell whether in Mozambique demobilized soldiers will want to use part of their monthly reintegration support scheme (RSS) payment toward purchasing a more valuable tool kit appropriate for their skills and training.

E. Other issues

Another issue of cash programs is how high to set the payment and whether the programs will discourage ex-combatants from seeking employment during the time they are offered. Anecdotal evidence from Zimbabwe suggests that if payments are at or above the minimum wage, it removes incentive to enroll in other programs encouraging a productive future (thereby actually postponing their reintegration into the general civilian community). Recent accounts from Mozambique also reflect this -- 95% of those interviewed in several communities believe demobilized soldiers are not helping in the community, and 91% believe they are not doing any work.

Other issues with cash schemes include whether to offer the same amount to all or to vary the amount by rank (dividing beneficiaries into three categories, either officer, NCO, or soldier) and/or time in service. In Ethiopia, those serving 18 months in the military received a lesser payment under the assumptions they would be more eager to leave the military and that with less time away from the civilian community their transition needs were lower.

Another consideration is whether payments should be curtailed when ex-soldiers become employed as was attempted in Namibia and Zimbabwe. However, experience has shown such a policy to be too difficult administratively to verify and counterproductive (discouraging employment).

V. CREDIT PROGRAMS

Community credit programs (the main credit issue which UCAH expressed interest in during the workshop), such as village banks, have been successful in Latin America. The objectives are to grant seed money for productivity to individuals grouped together in a community who otherwise would not be eligible for formal credit. However, these banks have targeted women, and not demobilized soldiers. The goal of community or village banks is to make the beneficiaries better credit risks for the formal credit system. Village banks have a small membership (usually under 20 participants), structure and monitor paybacks, and utilize community pressure to make members pay back on time. Ex-combatants would be a high risk because of their fragile link to the community and volatile levels of stability making them less likely to respond to community pressure.

Provincial funds have been established in Ethiopia and Mozambique to respond to community initiatives for reconstruction, training or other community-based services. Unless expressly designed as a credit program, credit does not form a part of the Provincial Fund.

A. Payback rates

Credit schemes with demobilized soldiers in Latin America, however, have met with a very low success rate. Land credit schemes and microenterprise loans have, in Nicaragua, less than a 7 percent payback rate and in El Salvador less than 30 percent. Again, this appears to be because the beneficiaries see land and loans as an entitlement, not an opportunity that carries with it responsibility. In both countries, the schemes have had the unfortunate result of blacklisting many beneficiaries from any formal credit programs, excluding them from a potentially valuable resource in the future.

Other credit programs have attempted to design community credit funds, using community peer pressure as an incentive for repayment. In Uganda, a plan for Uganda Veterans Assistance Board (UVAB) to create a revolving loan fund to assist veterans' income generating projects could not be implemented because of a lack of funds (no support by donors) and for structural reasons -- that UVAB was not "a perennial institution." As an alternative, UVAB trains its field personnel to assist veterans in signing viable project proposals to present to loan or grant-giving agencies. UVAB reviews the proposals and helps channel them to appropriate organizations.

B. Microenterprise credit

The reintegration strategy for ex-combatants in Ethiopia and Eritrea emphasizes helping them set up businesses. In both countries, funds have been made available through the formal banking sector (using both government and donor funding) to provide credit for ex-soldiers' business initiatives. In Ethiopia, the revolving fund credit scheme is administered by the Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank to finance micro-projects. A technical committee assists ex-soldiers in project development and administrative matters, such as issue of permits, legal matters, micro-project sites.

In the first five months of Ethiopia's credit program (July to December 1994), Ethiopian Birr (EB) 11,188,970 (US\$ 4.9 million) was distributed to 5,620 organized in 230 projects. Of the EB 23 million (US\$ 10 million) available, \$1.3 million came from the government and \$8.7 million from the World Bank Emergency Recovery and Rehabilitation Program (ERRP - a fund for overall postwar reconstruction). Ex-soldiers are not expected to produce collateral and are charged the deposit rate of interest on the principal of their loan.

While some critics say with this design the revolving fund will decapitalize over time and it would be cheaper to actually provide grants than to administer a credit scheme, the Demobilization Commission defends the program's social benefit of fostering ex-combatants' self-reliance by making them responsible for repaying loans and encouraging them to take initiative. Economists in donor institutions are not convinced -- but it is too soon to judge the results of this program. NGOs have also implemented credit schemes in Ethiopia, mostly under the GTZ fund, which have assisted 2,947 ex-combatants. It should be noted that after an in-depth assessment of the "Revolving Loan Fund Scheme", USAID decided it could not support it as it was not a viable loan scheme.

C. Training component

If selected as a reintegration option, credit schemes must be accompanied by training in how to manage finances and organization. Ex-fighters' unfamiliarity with money constrains their capacity to develop realistic project proposals for credit financing and limits their chances of success. Unless credit as a concept is well formed in Angola, credit schemes should be discouraged. They require financial and administrative infrastructure that is nationwide, fully operational, with a long life and the capacity to monitor loans and give technical advice.

VI. GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS FOR REINTEGRATION

Many of the questions asked on the structure of the Institute for Reintegration in the discussion guide will need to be addressed by an in-depth feasibility study, as is being planned by the UN. However, it is instructive to present the experiences of institutional structures formed in other countries to accommodate the needs of demobilized soldiers.

In El Salvador, the *Secretaria de Reconstruccion Nacional* (SRN) was a secretariat appointed by the president to coordinate all reconstruction projects throughout the country. The SRN managed the demobilized soldier program funding and overall design, contracting NGOs and private companies to implement projects specifically targeting demobilized soldiers. In its coordinating role, the SRN met with donors, disbursed funds, and negotiated with army and insurgency commands. In Uganda and Ethiopia, separate structures specifically dealing with benefits for demobilized soldiers were created which might serve as more useful examples for the planned institute in Angola.

A. Uganda experience

An institutional model relevant in many respects to the Institute for Reintegration is the UVAB. Since the UVAB's structure responded to a reduction-in-force program of one army, it did not need to be concerned with incorporating personnel from an insurgent force or responding to the interests of two political powers as would be the case in Angola.

UVAB was created by parliament in October 1992, as an autonomous parastatal -- a deliberate decision was made to not have the army itself execute the reduction-in-force program. The UVAB reports directly to the prime minister's office and is governed by a seven-member board of directors appointed by the prime minister's office. UVAB has a three-tier administrative structure, consisting of (1) the national-level UVAB to set policy, 2) an executive secretariat as the responsible central implementing body, and 3) implementing bodies in all 38 districts, known as district veterans program offices (DVPO).

Another layer of administration and empowerment at the district level is provided by the district veterans advisory committees (DVAC), which actually supervise the DVPOs, counsel veterans, and report to the UVAB on local implementation. DVAC members are veterans, elected by their fellow veterans. DVAC members tour the districts, during which they meet with other veterans, hold rallies, discuss important issues and provide counselling.

At the central level UVAB is divided into four departments (financial control, administration,

inspectorate of operations, and reintegration) and three units (monitoring and evaluation, public relations, and internal auditor). The monitoring and evaluation section provides feedback to management for program improvement, analyzes the program's impact on veterans and their families and communities, and provides information for the design of the later demobilization phases and longer-term reintegration programs.

UVAB developed the demobilization procedures and decided on the contents of demobilization packages and made arrangements for the delivery of benefits. UVAB made arrangements with the Uganda Commercial Bank for payment of allowances, and prepared and presented the orientation and information materials for demobilizing soldiers. UVAB also arranged for the World Bank to take the lead role in donor coordination. Technical assistance to UVAB for project management and project management and evaluation has been provided by two advisors from Germany (GTZ) and one from Denmark (DANIDA). The monitoring and evaluation unit has a database with the ability to track veterans' progress, using information provided by the DVPOs, including monthly reports and special surveys of their districts.

The DVPOs distribute some of the benefits to veterans after they resettle (cash payments, iron roofing sheets, making tuition payments for two children per veteran), provide career guidance to veterans and arrange regular meetings with veterans to again explain possible areas of confusion such as payment procedures. The DVPOs provide a valuable function in the communities, including arranging for bolstering local social services (including testing, counseling, and treatment) both for veterans and for others in the communities. District veterans officers meet with community leaders before veterans arrive in a community to explain the demobilization program, hear their concerns, seek their assistance, and sensitize community members to the special needs of veterans and their families, to facilitate veterans' reintegration to civilian life. DVPOs also arrange tours of the districts for returning veterans.

Both a health care fund (for disabled or chronically ill veterans) and a vocational training fund (including skills training and formal education) are administered by the DVPOs. For both the health care fund and the vocational training fund, the final decisions on funding applications and requests are made by the DVACs. UVAB performed a survey of existing vocational training institutions throughout Uganda, giving it the ability to choose the most appropriate institution for veterans. UVAB encourages income-generating projects by veterans (which include other community members as well), assisting veterans in preparing proposals for viable projects and helping to direct proposals to Ugandan loan and grant-making agencies.

The UVAB will not transform itself into a development organization, but is designed as only a temporary institution with a life-span of five or six years. UVAB is due to close down operations in late 1997, or at the very latest by the end of 1998, two and a half years after the completion of the final round of demobilization, Phase III.

The Ugandan experience with the UVAB suggests that district offices such as the DVPOs play a role in disseminating information to ex-soldiers after they demobilize (to clarify and update predemobilization information); provide vocational counseling; make referrals to and play a role in bolstering local social services (for use by the community at large including veterans); try to help obtain land for veterans in their communities; and, promote veteran projects (which can include and benefit other community members). District staff need to have the skills and training necessary to perform these functions. Toward this end, GTZ conducted a project to support institutional strengthening of the UVAB (sponsored by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development at a cost of 4.8 million DM for technical cooperation and 5 million DM for financial cooperation).

Within the UVAB, national staff played the dominant role in planning and implementation, while a small number of international staff (mentioned above) have provided technical assistance (other than the donor coordination role, which the World Bank took on). However, in the context of a country recently emerging from a conflict, a more extensive international role may be needed to play the role of mediator and provide more unbiased support.

The role of the UVAB and of DVPOs with NGOs is unclear, and still under development. UVAB's success in implementing the demobilization program is unquestioned. More time and information is needed to gauge its performance in reintegration, although reportedly many veterans have invested their benefits in economic activities, have brought new land into production, and produce foodstuffs for local markets.

B. Ethiopia experience

In Ethiopia, the commission for members of the ex-armed forces and disabled war veterans was established on June 14, 1991 by a directive of the Transitional Government (TGE), only two weeks after the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) took power. The directive specified the objectives, powers and duties of the commission. The commission was chaired by a Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) member formerly in charge of all Ethiopian prisoners of war. Additional commission staff were assembled from

other ministries and commissions. An advisory council was also formed to assist the commission, chaired by the demobilization commissioner, and members included the head of the relief and rehabilitation commission (RRC), vice-ministers of nine relevant ministries, and representatives of appropriate agencies designated by the government as necessary.

The commission's first challenge was to round up, disarm and register as many ex-soldiers as possible (of the over 400,000 soldiers in the defeated army, an estimated 250,000 were in transit centers throughout the country, 50,000 had fled to Sudan where they were held in refugee camps, and another 100,000-150,000 had simply "melted into the countryside"). Via radio, television and newspapers, ex-soldiers were ordered to report to camps, many located at former military training centers.

Having done extensive planning prior to the takeover, the commission had ready a demobilization and reintegration strategy. In mid-July, the demobilization commission chairman presented a \$47.8 million appeal to donors for repatriation, reintegration, and rehabilitation, including a six-month in-camp training and re-education program. Donors were distrustful of the TGE's mandate or attitude toward demobilized soldiers, and were skeptical of the commission's capability to manage the large amounts of financial and other resources required. A joint technical committee of donors, international organizations, and the government (represented by the commission) was established to evaluate the commission's plans and develop an alternative. A steering committee including the commission and members of the international community was also created to mobilize resources for the demobilization and reintegration program. Donors refused to support the TGE's proposal, and various international organizations also undertook designing their own proposals (i.e., UNDP, ILO).

Meanwhile, the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) and their Ethiopian counterparts had undertaken preparations for demobilization on their own: mobilizing transport, preparing schedules, printing food ration cards, prepositioning food near distribution points and supplying food at camps for the journey home. Funds for transport and food rations came from an appeal launched independently by ICRC in June 1991.

By mid-September 1991, general agreement was reached on Phase I of the program by donors and the TGE. Phase I included "repatriation" -- release and transportation of ex-soldiers to their place of origin -- and emergency assistance consisting of food and a cash grant as a safety net for ex-soldiers and their dependents. By late January 1992 the majority of ex-soldiers had been returned to their areas of origin and were receiving monthly food rations distributed by the government's relief and rehabilitation commission, working through

the demobilization commission's regional centers.

Immediately after demobilization of those in the first round, other ex-soldiers who had failed to report during the first call for fear of reprisal by the EPRDF appealed to the TGE to be included in the reintegration program. In December 1991 the demobilization commission set up 36 regional coordination offices to continue registering "self-demobilized" soldiers who had not reported to the camps resulting in registration of an additional 90,000. These regional offices were also used to organize and coordinate field implementation of the demobilization and reintegration program (the number of branch offices was determined on basis of population density).

In yet another effort to develop a reintegration strategy or "Phase II", UNDP sponsored a one-month consultancy which produced a new proposal by late January 1992. The transitional government decided to adopt this as its own revised proposal, and it was finally accepted by donors in late March.

The commission implemented the rehabilitation/reintegration program in both rural and urban areas. The commission set up layers of committees down to the grassroots level. At the local level, these committees represented both ex-soldiers and other community members. These committees acted as facilitators in persuading former employers to take back veterans they had formerly employed.

The World Bank's ERRP became the main conduit for funds to ex-soldiers. GTZ established its own project, in close collaboration with the commission. Other donors channeled their resources through NGOs. Some NGOs coordinated their reintegration support with the commission's program, while several others followed an individual approach. This latter approach caused problems in some areas among beneficiaries because of unequal distribution of support and others (i.e., church-affiliated organizations) were accused of using discriminatory practices.

Ethiopia's demobilization effort is generally considered to be successful, despite donor delays. The victorious government, through the demobilization commission, was committed to addressing the needs of the defeated army quickly and effectively. The commission demonstrated a commitment and skill beyond donor expectations and increasingly gained the trust of donors (who had initially been skeptical). One author credits this commitment and the rapid establishment of the commission for helping to offset the overall lack of institutional capacity. The advisory council formed to assist the demobilization commission in Ethiopia played an important role in seeking coordination and cooperation from other

ministries.

The TGE will conduct a later demobilization of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), which has the advantage of more time and occurring in a more stable political climate. Prior to demobilization members of the TPLF held discussions with communities where TPLF fighters would return after demobilizing, to ensure community members' concerns would be incorporated into program planning.

A. Discussion Guide for Workshop

**Discussion Guide for Workshop on Other Country Experiences in Demobilization and
Reintegration of Ex-Combatants
Submitted by UCAH
16-20 January 1995**

1. Have Social Promotion Programs ever been designed targeting different ranks (officers/non-officers)?
2. Has there ever been a "massive" Social Promotion Program targeting all soldiers to be demobilized?
 - (a) Have civic values, duties or education ever been offered to demobilized soldiers?
 - (b) Have vocational aptitudes ever been identified or promoted?
 - (c) Has vocational counseling or vocational training ever taken place in QAs?
 - (d) How were monitors selected and trained for Social Promotion Programs?
 - (e) Were videos used? Postures or pamphlets? Radio programs?
 - (f) How were SPPs implemented?
4. Who has been responsible for designing Social Promotion Programs, who implemented them, and has there been a role for members of the demobilizing military (counterparts) in the implementation?
5. Have immediate assistance packages been distributed according to the final destination of the beneficiary (i.e., a rural/urban differentiation)?
 - (a) What were the contents of kits distributed to demobilized soldiers (agricultural, reintegration, reconstruction)?
 - (b) Were special kits distributed to disabled veterans?
6. What has been the viability of cash disbursements to demobilized soldiers?
7. UCAH is proposing a single payment of four months' pay that can be converted into other benefits such as training, tools, and building materials.
 - (a) What has been the experience in other countries?
 - (b) What implementation criteria have been designed?

- (c) What has the impact of cash disbursement schemes had on the surrounding population ?
- (8) What have been the objectives of community "credit" programs (social stability, minimizing donor investment, social investment)?
- (a) What have been the modalities for these programs (provincial fund, community credit schemes, credit + training + kits)?
 - (b) What has been the impact on the surrounding population?
- (9) What should be the profile of the Institute for Reintegration offices?
- (a) Should activities include information and referral, vocational counseling, promotion of community projects, a coordinating agency, an implementing agency (for social infrastructure, community social development, productive projects)?
 - (b) What would be the role of the institute in relation to NGOs?
 - (c) What would be staffing pattern and functions of the staff?
 - (d) Define the relationship between international and national staff.

B. Charts Comparing Other Country Experiences

Assembly Area Activities

b5

	El Salvador	Ethiopia	Mozambique	Nicaragua	Uganda	Zimbabwe
Information/Civic Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •ESAF: Pre-demob. informal seminars by ONUSAL to disseminate information, incl. covering some civic ed. topics¹ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Held Group discussions on causes of war, help to part with 'undesirable habits'² •Held voluntary public confessions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Monitors/animations in each AA •Booklets on: "What demobilized need to know"³; sanitation, prevention of diseases; "how to start a new life"; Geography, Population, Environment in Mozambique •Information on peace process, electoral process, rights/responsibilities as citizens. •Posters (on changing role in society of DS). •Radio Programs (information, entertainment, news) •Red Cross/Mozam. prgm on health, ethics, respect for human rights, counseling on AIDS, family planning. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Civic ed.⁴ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Counseling and info. on saving money, spending it wisely •Booklet on "Information for Veterans"⁵ •3-day pre-demob. orientation/counseling⁶ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Pamphlet distributed on the demobilization program and benefits⁷
Occupational Skills/Education (in Assembly Areas)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •ESAF: 7,400 received counseling while on military bases⁸ •FMLN: some received vocational counseling⁹ •FMLN: some mid-rank officers organized vocational workshops in tailoring, carpentry and political indoctrination in some QAs¹⁰ 	n/a	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Booklet on basic concepts of agriculture and small rural industries. •Ministry of Agric. rural extension instruction on agriculture, cattle-farming techniques, support for small projects started by soldiers in AAs. •Ad hoc classes taught by soldiers with skills, i.e., basket-making, baking, carpentry, making musical instruments, agriculture, English classes, etc. •Pre-literacy prgm •Pre-numeracy prgm 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Vocational ed.¹¹ •Literacy courses¹² 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Post-demob. district veterans' offices provide counseling, career guidance, explain payment procedures, conduct community sensitization prgms 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Counselor at Assembly Points to inform of employment opportunities, discuss plans •Operation SEED: set up agricultural projects at 4 camps (lacked infra-structure, instructors, other resources, never actually formally got off ground) •Basic education and literacy courses

Other	•FMLN: CARITAS (NGO) distributed beds, mattresses, blankets, dishes to improve living conditions at QAs	n/a	•Cultural activities (theater, music, dance) •Sports (volleyball, soccer) •Recreation (checkers, cards) •Library (books on career skills, health, industries, etc.) •Subscribed to newspapers, journals.	•Rural skills ¹³ •Health promotion ¹⁴ •Maternal/child health	•AIDS testing and education	n/a
Encampment Period	ESAF: 3 mos.-1 yr. FMLN: 5-11 mos. ¹⁵	aprx. 9 mos.	9 mos.(8 wks planned)	17 mos. ¹⁶	n/a	aprx. 9 mos.
Comments	•Need for conflict resolution/consensus-building projects/counseling to promote reconciliation ¹⁷ •The ESAF High Command largely controlled which ex-ESAF received what benefits ¹⁸	n/a	•Booklets insufficient means of presenting info. (direct contact and radio more effective) •theater, music, dance not implemented •radio popular, considered effective (locally and regionally produced considered more useful).	•Civic ed. courses contributed to successful election through heightened civic awareness of participants •Soldiers "downtime" used to transfer skills with future application to rural civilian lives	•Recommend pre-discharge counseling on social stress and civic responsibilities •Recommend training/apprenticeships on agricultural/vocational skills •Recommend basic tools grants and loans for income-generating activities	n/a
Total Cost	n/a	n/a	\$439,203	\$7.8 million	n/a ¹⁹	n/a ²⁰
Per Beneficiary Cost	n/a	n/a	\$7.50 per assembled soldier ²¹	\$110 per direct beneficiary ²²	n/a	n/a

1. A regional effort only, promoted informally by some UN observers, not a documented program.

2. EPRDF argued 'group discussions' were form of civic education; international donor community considered it political screening and re-education, and discouraged it.

3. Included sections on: 1) General Peace Accord and what it says on demobilization; 2) the organizations supporting demobilization; 3) provisions for demobilized; 4) Rights of Demobilized; 5) Responsibilities of Demobilized; 6) Beneficiary Eligibility Requirements; 7) Demobilization Procedures; 8) Benefits; 9) Transportation Program; 10) Demobilization Subsidy; and 11) District Support after Demobilization.

4. offered in camps in Managua to Nicaraguan Resistance soldiers during a ceasefire. Mid-level officers were trained in content and teaching methodology in democratic values and process, public communication, human relations, forms of govt., etc. These new trainers then taught every available NR soldier two-day basic course in civic education (including role of individual and of in society, municipal government, right to vote, free elections, structure and functions of national government, and Nicaraguan constitution.

5. Included sections on: 1) Benefits; 2) "what banks are and how to do your banking"; 3) role of District Veterans Program Office (DVPO) and District Veterans Committees; 4) Civic Duties and the Community; 5) Environment/Conservation; 6) Starting Income Generating Ventures; 7) Family Planning and Childrens' Immunizations; 8) AIDS; and 9) Basic Laws in Respect of Human Rights, Marriage and Inheritance.

6. Included guidance on initiating micro-enterprises, environmental awareness, and human rights.

2/10

7. contained many inaccuracies and false promises,

8. # of beneficiaries far below the 38,500 projected due to lack of support from ESAF high command and short-notice of large wave of ESAF demobilization left insufficient time for counseling prior to their departure.

9. FMLN polit. suspicions delayed counseling, prevented many from accessing counseling.

10. Received some support from Scandinavian NGOs. Ad hoc, not a formal program.

11. to Nicaraguan Resistance members in camps in Honduras during ceasefire, courses were provided (combining on-the-job practical experience with classroom activities) including computer, clerical, secretarial, mechanical, warehousing, transportation, health/sanitation skills, carpentry, road maintenance and repair, automobile mechanics/repair, radio maintenance/repair, drivers' education, warehouse management, shoemaking and leatherwork.

12. Offered to Nicaraguan Resistance members and dependents in camps in Honduras and Costa Rica during ceasefire. 190 trainers were trained, who in turn taught over 7,000 to read and write. Post-literacy courses offered in numeracy, geography, natural sciences, reading/writing comprehension, history.

13. Vegetable gardening, food preservation, butchering, improved cookstove production, animal husbandry. Many graduates became rural skills promoters, spreading their skills throughout area.

14. For Nicaraguan Resistance in camps in Honduras and Costa Rica during ceasefire. 3-week health promotion course, including content and extension methodology in basic first aid, environmental sanitation, infectious disease control and prevention, family planning, home improvements and personal hygiene. These promoters were responsible for environmental sanitation interventions in their units and for surrounding civilian population.

15. There were five waves of demobilization for each side, 20% of those to be demob. from each side, as stipulated by the peace accords.

16. length of time programs were offered. Beneficiaries were not continuously encamped during this period.

17. emphasis on strengthening participatory civil society.

18. As DS became civilians, the Ministry of Defense no longer represented their needs. DS were not permitted to choose their preference of training or benefits, but were forced to attend or accept whatever they were ordered to by ESAF.

19. costs for these activities not broken out from other demobilization costs.

20. costs not broken out from other demobilization costs.

21. several thousand non-assembled soldiers also benefitted from some aspects of the program, i.e., received information booklets, which reduces somewhat the actual per beneficiary cost.

22. Not including the countless indirect beneficiaries, i.e., those affected by projects such as sanitation and health.

Demobilization Benefits

	Chad	El Salvador	Ethiopia	Mozambique	Namibia	Nicaragua	Uganda	Zimbabwe
Cash Payments	Officers: \$1212 NCOs: \$1024 Soldiers: \$758	•Salvadoran Armed Forces (ESAF), National Police (PN), and Security Forces: up to a maximum of 12 months of previous salary, depending on # years of active service ¹	•\$60 for < 18 mos. service ² •\$175 for > 18 mos. service ³	\$336-\$5520, depending on rank	\$476	\$50	\$490 ⁴	\$6,766.
Resettlement/Departure Packages	•Transportation allowance ⁵	•Transportation •Household Starter Packages ⁶ (FMLN only) •Agricultural Tool Starter Kits ⁷ •Temporary Shelter Materials ⁸ •Civilian clothing	•Transportation home and travel allowance •Food for journey home ⁹ •Food ration cards ¹⁰	•Transportation ¹¹ •Food for journey home •Food ration (WFP) for 3 mos. •Seeds and agr. tools ¹² •Civilian clothes ¹³	•Transportation (by UNHCR, as refugees) Returnees received ¹⁴ : •6 mo. rations (WFP) •Seed and agr. toolkits (FAO) •Household items	•Transportation •Food rations •Civilian clothing ¹⁵ •Housing materials •Tools ¹⁶ •Cooking implements ¹⁷ •Personal items ¹⁸ •Pre-departure health exams	•Transportation •Iron roofing sheets for homes ¹⁹ •Health care ²⁰ •School tuition (PTA) for 2 children for 1 yr. ²¹	No transportation
Total Cost	\$18.9 mil.	info. pending	\$34.1 mill. (incomplete costs) ²²	aprx. ²³ (incomplete costs)	n/a ²⁴	n/a ²⁵	\$36 million	
Cost per Beneficiary	\$836	pending	\$100 (based on incomplete costs)	aprx. \$560 (based on incomplete cost info.)	n/a		\$900	pending

1. Demobilized FMLN and ESAF received \$100/mo. while enrolled in training or academic scholarship programs (generally 4-6 months long). Inability of FMLN to receive severance pay motivated them to abuse training program, enrolling as many as possible in whatever training programs were offered just to receive the associated subsidy.

2. 71,000

3. Total of US\$23 mill. for subsistence allowance.

4. cash payment intended for clothing, food, medical allowances, per diem, agricultural and building allowances.

5. Transportation home provided in Protocol II demobilization program, in 1992; the lack of transportation for ex-soldiers has been documented as a major short-coming of Chad's previous demobilization efforts.

6. Also known as basic items package; contents included propane gas cooking stove; food mill; 3 pots; frying pan; pitcher; 4 glasses; cooking spoon; eating utensils; knife; bed linens; towel; pillow; table and chairs; provided to 10,747 FMLN. Many ex-comb. had to store their household packages with relatives because had no homes; however very few reports of re-selling items.

7. Consists of 3 hoes, a pike, shovel, pick, axe, 6 machetes, hammer, drying cloth and an agricultural sprayer, provided to approx. 8,800 FMLN and 6,800 ESAF ex-combatants

8. For land transfer recipients. Two separate projects: 1) total cost of \$491,000 for 720 ex-FMLN and 624 ex-ESAF, for per beneficiary cost of \$365; 2) \$1.1 mill. for 588 FMLN and 681 ESAF, for per beneficiary cost of \$900

9. Transportation and food: \$11.1 mill.

10. 6 mos. for those with less than 18 mos. service. If have over 18 mos.: 7 mos. of food rations if settling in urban areas, 10 mos. of rations for ex-soldiers settling in rural areas.

11. \$9.6 million

12. Consist of a plastic bucket, a machete, a hoe head, 7 types of vegetable seeds, an instruction manual, and a capulana (2 meters of wrap-around cloth used as women's garment), for total cost of \$1.2 million.

13. Consisting of 2 pairs pants, 2 shirts, 2 pairs socks, 2 sets underwear, 1 pair shoes, at cost of \$20-25 per beneficiary, for total cost of \$1.2 mill.

14. PLAN fighters were not formally demobilized, but were repatriated from Angola as refugees and thus became "returnees"

15. For ex-soldiers and dependents

16. Machete, files, hammers, handsaws, hoes. Offered to some ex-Nicaraguan Resistance members

17. knives, plates, glasses, pots, buckets, ladles

18. Soap, toothbrushes, toothpaste

19. Distributed upon arrival in settlement areas by DVOs (value equal to Ushs. 300,000 (\$260) per veteran).

20. For Phase II veterans only, due to lack of funds. Treatment for 6 months only following date of demobilization. Fees for treatment paid by DVPO directly to person/institution. Intended for disabled and chronically ill to continue treatment in respective districts and occasionally to reach hospitals in Uganda. Those who have been getting treatment through NRA medical services, and who become critically ill after demobilization are eligible, must be examined and recommended by a Medical Doctor of NRA before demobilization and be issued medical certificates, or report to DVPO after reaching home district, to be examined by District Medical Officer to verify illness and determine treatment and costs.

21. For veterans released in Phase II, possibly also for Phase I veterans also depending on the amount of donor funds available. Administered by DVPOs directly to schools where children are registered, for total cost of Ushs. 107.2 million (\$112,842).

22. Does not include cost of food for journey home and food rations. More complete cost estimate pending receipt of further information.

23. incl. 6 mos. subsistence allowance, excluding costs of food rations and food for journey home (more complete cost estimate pending receipt of further info.)

24. Difficult to compute because there was no actual demobilization program; it is difficult to disaggregate the costs for disarming and repatriating soldiers from expenditures by UNHCR/RRR and UNTAG.

25. costs for demobilization benefits not disaggregated from total expenditures of \$43.3 million for demobilization, repatriation, and resettlement of Nicaraguan Resistance.

Cost of Demobilization and Reintegration Programs

13

	Chad	El Salvador	Ethiopia	Mozambique	Namibia	Nicaragua	Uganda
Demobilization Prgm	\$18.9 mill. ¹	info. pending	\$59 mill. ²	\$23.4 mill. ³	n/a ⁴	n/a	Aprx. \$35 million
Reintegration Prgms	n/a	info. pending	\$80 mill. ⁵	\$47 mill. ⁶	\$11.4 mill.	n/a	Pending ⁷
# Demobilized	22,594	24,400	340,000	90,000	60,000-65,000 ⁸	22,000 ⁹	32,000 ¹⁰
Encampment Period	n/a	ESAF: 3 mos.-1 yr. FMLN: 5-11 mos.	apr.: 9 mos.	9 mos.	n/a	3-9 mos.	n/a
Total Cost	\$18.9 mill.	\$94 mill.	US\$133 mill. ¹¹	\$70.4 mill. ¹²	n/a	\$43.3 mill.	\$35 mill. ¹³
Cost Per Beneficiary	\$840	\$3,850	\$390 ¹⁴	\$780 ¹⁵	n/a	\$1,900	\$1,000 ¹⁶

1. For those demobilized under 1992 Protocol only.

2. A rough estimate. Costs are difficult to extrapolate, partly because government's terms of "Emergency Program" and "Mid-term Program" do not mesh with our definitions of "demobilization" and "reintegration" programs. Figure includes: UNHCR repatriation operation: \$15.2 mill.; ICRC operation: \$30 mill.; food: \$2.48 mill. and \$24.8 million; unclear whether these programs also benefitted non-ex-combatants as well. Figure excludes Demobilization Commission's administrative expenses during "emergency program".

3. Based on incomplete cost information. Does not include the following: costs of setting up, maintaining and supplying assembly areas and non-assembled areas (CTNAs); ONUMOZ staff and other ONUMOZ expenditures; food for transport and 3 mo. post-demobilization food rations for demobilized soldiers and dependents. Includes the following costs: Information and Social Reintegration Program (activities in assembly areas): \$439,203; civilian clothes: \$1.2 mill.; vegpacks: \$1.2 mill.; transportation: \$9.6 mil.; 6 mos. demobilization severance pay (estimate) \$11 mil.

4. PLAN was not formally demobilized, but was disarmed across the border and repatriated into Namibia by UNHCR as refugees, receiving the same benefits as refugees.

5. Rough estimate, based on incomplete costs and conflicting information. Includes the following: Rural areas "rehabilitation" packages: \$44 mill. (169,628 beneficiaries); Packages for urban and disabled: \$18 mill. (158,710 beneficiaries); Credit program: \$10 mill.; GTZ: \$5.3 mill.; and NGOs: \$1.6 million (NGO total does not include all NGO programs).

6. Includes the following: IRS: \$3.85 mil.; RSS: \$33.6 mil.; Provincial Fund: \$9.1 mil.; Occupational Skills Development/Management Framework: \$4 mil.; and "Support to the Reintegration Program for Demobilized Soldiers" (which includes Consultants' Study of officer class, Consultancy for project development of VegPacks; Pre-project assessment for IRS; Project development for OSD; support to provincial CORE officers; employment of assistant CORE coordinator; and conflict resolution team): \$488,850.

7. incl. Scholarship Fund: \$3 million; further info. pending.

8. 30,000-35,000 in People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) and 30,000 in SAF (refers to Namibians who were members of the South African Defense Force (SADF), South West African Territory Force (SWATF), South West African Police (SWAPOL) and the Counter-Insurgency Unit of SWAPOL, *Koevoet*).

9. From *Desmovilizacion, desarme e integracion de los demobilizados a la vida civil: experiencia nicaraguense*, Asociacion para la Democracia y el Desarrollo en Centroamerica, November 1991; including dependents, aprx. 100,000 beneficiaries.

10. for Phases I and II, plus aprx. 47,400 dependents; additional 17,000 scheduled to be demobilized in Phase III in mid-1995.

11. Very rough estimate, based on incomplete and conflicting cost information. The government cites total expenditures of \$153.6 million, but it is unclear whether this included the "emergency program" for civilians as well as demobilized soldiers.

12. Incomplete cost total, pending additional information (see notes above). Also does not include most ONUMOZ expenditures (especially staff) due to difficulty of extrapolating costs specifically expended on demobilization/reintegration from ONUMOZ budget.

13. not including cost of reintegration programs.

14. Rough estimate, based on incomplete cost information (see notes above).

15. Rough estimate, based on incomplete cost information.

16. including transport and administrative costs, from *UVAB Information Digest* for participants of OAU Demobilization Workshop in Kampala, November 7-9, 1994.

Cash Payments

3

	Chad	El Salvador	Ethiopia	Mozambique	Namibia	Nicaragua	Uganda	Zimbabwe
Severance/ Departure Pay	Officers: 130,000F (\$492) NCOs: 100,000F (\$379) Soldiers: 60,000F (\$227)	FMLN: 0 ¹ ESAF: 0	EB 137 (US\$60) if < 18 mo. service	6 mos. salary ² Total: aprx. \$84-1380	SAF received pension or payment equal to 2 mos. salary ³	\$50 (for RN only)	Ushs. 150,000 (\$130) upon discharge ⁴	Z400 (aprx. \$560 each ⁵)
Subsidy/ Indemnity Pay	Officers: 190,000F (\$719) NCOs: 170,000F (\$644) Soldiers: 140,000F (\$530)	*Salvadoran Armed Forces (ESAF), National Police (PN), and Security Forces: up to a maximum of 12 months of previous salary, depending on # years of active service ⁶	EB 350 (\$153) if > 18 mos. service	18 mos. salary (above min. amt.); MT 75,000-1,270,080 Total aprx. \$252-4140	*R1400 ⁷ (US\$476) *Allowance to Development ⁸ Brigade members of R50 (\$17)/mo. for 2 yrs. (4,000)	n/a	Ushs. 408,935 (\$360)	Z4440 (US\$6216) ⁹
# of Periods/ Phases	6 tri-monthly payments	One lump-sum payment ⁹	Monthly stipend of EB 50 (US\$25) for 7 months	9 bi-monthly payments, begin 4 mos. after demob.	One payment	One payment	One payment aprx. 2 1/2 mos. after demob.) ¹⁰	24 payments: Z185/mo. (US\$259) for 2 years ¹¹
Basis of Payment Amount	According to rank (divided into 3 categories, officer, NCO, and rank soldier)	According to rank/active duty salary	Equal amt. for all ranks	Amt. according to salary at army rank, above a minimum amt. ¹²	Equal amt., determined by dividing \$24 mill. from S. Africa by # eligible.	Equal amt.	Equal amt. for all	Equal amt. for all; amt. equal to monthly salary of a private
Tied to other programs?	No	No	No	Ex-soldiers can opt to purchase kit through debt to RSS payment over time	No	No	No	Ex-soldiers could draw advance, combine payments, to develop cooperatives, other businesses
Payment Institution	n/a	Ministry of Finance	(Info. pending)	Bank (Banco Popular Desenvolvimento) ¹³	Payment at designated banks	n/a	Local branches of Uganda Commercial Bank ¹⁴	Post Offices ¹⁵
Other Institutions Involved	n/a	Defense Ministry	(info. pending)	UNDP (Impl.); ONUMAZ Technical Unit, CORE, donors (Coord.).	I.D. cards issued by Ministry of Home Affairs and Defence, needed to verify eligibility	n/a	Uganda Veterans Assistance Board (UVAB)	Demobilization Directorate

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Donors	Govt of France	ESAF Govt of El Salvador Training/ed subsidies: USAID	Govts of Ethiopia, Italy, USA, Japan, EC	Govt of Mozam: Severance Pay, RSS Denmark, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland	South Africa	US	World Bank, KFW, USAID, UNDP, UNICEF, DANIDA, GTZ, Sweden, Netherlands ¹⁸	Govt of Zimbabwe
Total Cost	\$18.9 mill. ¹⁷	Official data not available ¹⁸ . Best guess: \$90 mill. ¹⁹	\$23 million	US \$43 million ²⁰	R24 million (\$8.2 million)	(info. pending)	\$15.7 mill. ²¹	Allowance: Z155 mill. (\$217 mill.) ²²
Problems/Comments	n/a	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Lack of donor support for ESAF subsidies resulted in diversion of govt resources •Ex-ESAF subsidies approved through virtual extortion (riots, demonstrations, violence by DS, forced approval by legislature) •Est. only 20% of potential beneficiaries have accessed thus far. 	n/a	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Incr in # beneficiaries due to broadening rules of eligibility, causing funding problems •Distance and cost of travel to BPD branches, possibly motivating migration to urban areas •Disincentive to join new army •Lack of financial counseling 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •At least half of ex-PLAN potentially eligible were unable to register or misinformed of procedures •Reports of employed receiving payment 	(info. pending)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Soldiers receive financial counseling before demobilizing •Info. booklet for veterans includes section on banking 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Lack of experience with money, need for financial counseling •Because payments could be picked up at any post office, did not encourage settlement in rural areas •Disincentive to find employment •No audit of program; alleged abuse.
GNP per capita	\$210		(info. pending)	\$80	\$1,080 (1990)	\$420 (1990)	\$170 (1991)	\$710 (1980)
Minimum Wage	n/a	\$120 (1994)	(info. pending)	MT 70,000 (US\$12) ²³	n/a	\$396	n/a	Aprx. \$1200

The FMLN wanted to be able to provide "mustering-out pay", but was not permitted under the terms of the USAID Project Agreement. Demobilized FMLN and ESAF received a \$100/mo subsidy while enrolled in training or academic scholarship programs (generally 4-6 months long). Because FMLN not provided severance pay or subsidies, insisted all participate in training programs, because guaranteed participants income (living expenses) while in program. Resulted in waste, and reduced effectiveness of training programs.

3 mos. paid upon demobilization, additional 3 mos. paid 90 days after demobilization.

SWAPO guerrillas (PLAN) did not receive any financial compensation at the time of demobilization. South African-sponsored forces received a pension from Govt. of South Africa, if eligible (minimum of 15 yrs., at the highest grade served for 3 yrs.); those ineligible for pension received a "mustering out" pay equivalent to 2 mos. salary.

Broken down as follows: Clothing Allowance: 36,000; Settling-in/per diem/Ration Allowance: 100,000; Medical Care: 4,000.

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This was not a well publicized program, and not all soldiers received it. Acceptance was contingent upon no further claim to demobilization benefits (although this dictum was not necessarily accepted). Those who accepted this offer had spent their money, regrouped and demanded more benefits.

Defined as a "demobilization compensation" or "severance payment" in Peace Accords. Ratified by National Assembly after DS noted at their building and held half the representatives hostage for two days.

Single payment to ex-fighters (both ex-PLAN and Namibians who had fought for South African forces) who were in active service at the time of implementation of UN Resolution 435 and remained unemployed in March 1991 (16 months after they were demobilized). 17,000 ex-PLAN fighters registered at police stations (Aug-Sept 1990) to be considered for selection to NDF or receive demobilization payments and/or training. There was no formal registration of former SAF members since good records were available.

High estimate, based on all demobilized continuing to receive payment over entire 2-year period (although publicized policy was to curtail payment when demobilized became employed).

There were some split payments in special cases and when the government had cash-flow problems.

9. Broken down as follows: Settling in/per diem: 100,000; Building material: 154,500; Ration Allowance:

26,000; Agricultural tools and seeds: 25,000; Medical Care: 3,435. Soldiers demobilized during Phase I received their Ushs: 408,935 in two installments; however, during the next round of demobilization, Phase II, the decision was made to make payments instead in one lump sum.

1. Only if unemployed, although this provision was nearly impossible to enforce.

2. This caused some problems with the insurgent group, RENAMO, as their rank structure was difficult to compare with the government army and they had no pay records.

3. On demobilization day before departing the Assembly Areas, demobilizing soldiers are issued official identification cards and a payment book (known as a "checkbook") containing nine vouchers to collect payments bimonthly over an 18-month period. They present voucher to nearest BPD branch to their settlement location.

4. Money transferred to the Uganda Commercial Bank branch nearest to their ex-soldiers' homes, to the savings account veterans are required to open upon their arrival.

5. Received photo ID cards and Post Office Bank Savings Book in Assembly Points, used to collect payments at any Post Office.

6. Funds were controlled by the UVAB with external auditors reports going to World Bank, which managed the consortium of donors.

7. Includes other costs of demobilization, i.e., transportation and administrative expenses.

8. sum too high and controversial to make public knowledge.

9. Based on estimate of 25,000 DS X 12 months X avg. \$300 mo. salary

10. Estimate of cost of government-sponsored severance payments of 6 mos. salary (\$11 million) plus estimated total cost of RSS (18 mo. salary) of \$33 million.

11. not including administrative and program management costs.

12. Based on government's claimed total cost of cash program. Some sources claim there were approximately 37,000 recipients; however, dividing the claimed total program cost of \$217 million by the cost of two years' payment for one beneficiary suggests over 49,000 beneficiaries (not taking into account program administrative costs, which are not available). It is unclear whether the government's claimed total cost includes payments to beneficiaries who opted for the initial Z400 (\$560).

13. Estimated by a Mozambican trade union to cover less than 30% of the basic needs of a family of 5.

Programs/Benefits for Disabled

PH

	El Salvador	Ethiopia	Mozambique	Namibia	Nicaragua	Uganda	Zimbabwe
Programs/ Benefits	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Medical-surgical attention •Physical therapy •Rehabilitation assistance¹ •Vocational training •Prostheses •FMLN war-wounded also helped by USAID funding of Ministry of Health surgical procedures and a large NGO that assists all disabled (including civilian) •ESAF: raw materials provided to ESAF facility for prosthetic and orthotic devices 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Survey² •3 categories according to type/severity of injury and services needed³ •Transportation home (when able) •Medical and prosthetic assistance •Some admitted to hospitals or disabled war veterans centers •Strategy to reintegrate into productive work directly whenever possible or through specialized training •Pension •Vocational training (for severely disabled) •Support for micro-projects 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Received same benefits as other soldiers⁴ •Eligible for additional benefits, incl. special transport to home districts,⁵ medical care, prostheses, and disability pensions from Govt.⁶ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Vocational training in traditional skills⁷ •National Association for the Disabled⁸ •Good quality and capacity of health services to assist physically disabled⁹ •Services for mental war-related disabilities poor •Community-based rehabilitation recently begun (small-scale, disabled-led schemes) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Program to reintegrate disabled Nicaraguan Resistance (NR), emphasis on training •Medical, surgical, rehabilitation care 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •District Veterans Program Office provides special social service assistance in communities where large #s of disabled or sick veterans will settle¹⁰ •Health care¹¹ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Received same demob. benefits, plus pension for some •War Victims Compensation Act¹² set up Department of Rehabilitation, 1980 •2-3 rehabilitation centers set up for disabled ex-combatants by army and govt •Vocational school for disabled •Cooperative farm set up for disabled (privately donated)
# Beneficiaries	FMLN: 4,558 (medical attention) ESAF: 144 (vocational training); 112 (prostheses); others.	15,208 ¹³	5,000	n/a	293	Reportedly half of 23,000 soldiers demob. in 1993 were socially maladjusted, medically ill (including AIDS) or disabled	aprx. 6,000 ¹⁴
Total Cost	\$5 million from USAID ¹⁵ ; data from other donors unavailable	\$4 mill. ¹⁶	(info. pending)	n/a	\$2.5 million	n/a	no payments annual cost
Cost per Beneficiary	n/a	n/a ¹⁷	(info. pending)	n/a	\$8,532	n/a	n/a
Donors	USAID, others	Govt. and multilateral sources	ONUMOZ; Govt. of Mozambique	n/a	USAID	n/a	Combination of local organizations who raised money (locally and overseas), foreign funding, govt. grants to NGOs

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Impact/ Problems	•Some difficulty persuading institutions to deal with ex-combatants	An ILO project planned for reintegration of disabled ex-combatants feel through. ¹⁸	•Govt. approved pensions late (June '94) after many had demobilized, leaving problem of arranging medical exams, contacting disabled, and transportation to transit centers for exams, often with a long wait. ¹⁹	•Ex-comb. from each side assisted by separate organizations	Upon program completion, 15% were enrolled in govt. programs, 41% in process of reintegrating but needed additional assistance, and nearly 1/2 had reintegrated on their own.	Lack of rehabilitation programs for disabled veterans caused great resentment.	•Fraud by ex-combatants •Party politicking over issue of disabled stymied programs •Shortage of trained physiotherapists, counselors, etc •Conflict at rehab. ctrs over housing issue ²⁰
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1. 150 ESAP receiving training, professional rehabilitation, and micro-enterprise credit

2. Because of the large number of disabled ex-combatants interned in various temporary shelters and camps, it was only possible to gather comprehensive data on the most severely disabled, and a limited sample of the less severely disabled

3. Category 1: less severely disabled who did not require further medical care; are helped to join mainstream of urban and rural reintegration programs. Category 2: moderately impaired, needing medical and paramedical service and/or prosthetic and orthotic devices before being integrated into vocational training or provided with specialized vocational rehabilitation services. Category 3: more severely impaired who require ongoing care periodical medical or attendant care in specialized medical facilities, which preclude any training and job placement. Receive medical and home care services in two centers for disabled veterans for long-term care

4. Disabled soldiers received same benefits as other soldiers (6 mos. demobilization subsidies, 18 mos. cash subsidy from RSS, civilian clothing, and food rations)

5. IOM transported disabled soldiers to rehabilitation centers in home districts, run by Handicapped International (HI) or ICRC. At centers, received another medical check-up to determine need for physiotherapy, wheelchairs, crutches, prostheses, etc.

6. Upon medical exam (by Department of Military Health) to determine degree of disability and letter prepared by ONUMOZ Technical Unit requesting disability pension.

7. Training in traditional areas of employment for disabled such as basketry, knitting and sewing, brickmaking, etc. has mostly been a failure, not leading to income-generating or employment.

8. created in 1993

9. Over-centralization of services, and lack of transportation prevents many disabled from using health services available (recommend greater outreach)

10. Benefits available to entire community. NGOs and private sector agencies contracted to provide additional testing, counseling, and treatment during first 6-mo. settling-in period. Services to be extended beyond 6 mos. subsequently if proven necessary and effective. Existing testing, counselling, and treatment capacities are strengthened rather than supplemented by parallel services. NGOs enhance local capacities to deliver social services by training staff.

11. For Phase II veterans only, due to lack of funds. Treatment for 6 months only following date of demobilization. Fees for treatment paid by DVPO directly to person/institution. Intended for disabled and chronically ill to continue treatment in respective districts and occasionally to reach hospitals in Uganda. Those who have been getting treatment through NRA medical services, and who become critically ill after demobilization are eligible; must be examined and recommended by a Medical Doctor of NRA before demobilization and be issued medical certificates, or report to DVPO after reaching home district, to be examined by District Medical Officer to verify illness and determine treatment and costs.

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12 legislated pension, vocational assistance, training, and rehabilitation for war-disabled ex-fighters and civilians

13 Number of pension recipients. Of these, the following received additional benefits:

Prostheses: 3,257, Long-term institutional care in Disabled War Veterans Centers: 2,328, of whom 640 receive vocational training (only for those with severe disability); micro-projects for vocational rehabilitation and socio-economic reintegration of disabled ex-combatants (\$4 million fund)

14 rough estimate, based on pensions rolls excluding civilians

15 incomplete cost estimate, does not include much of ESAF costs because the activities were managed by the Armed Forces Professional Rehabilitation Center (CERPROFA), a Defense Ministry institution, which received multi-donor support and various unknown support

16 Incomplete costs, this figure includes only the cost of vocational rehabilitation of disabled (640 beneficiaries); other reintegration costs for disabled are included in general medium-term program for reintegration; figure does not include cost of pensions to disabled and of health care

17 Dividing the quoted cost of \$4 million for developing micro-projects for vocational rehabilitation and socioeconomic reintegration of disabled ex-combatants by the number quoted as receiving vocational training (640) yields \$6,250 for vocational training, however, this is highly unlikely and probably a misprint. Data is from the *Commission for the Rehabilitation of Members of the Former Army and Disabled War Veterans*, from a paper "Demobilization and Socio-economic Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: Ethiopian Experience", prepared for conference in Kampala, Uganda, November 9-11, 1994.

18 The estimated cost was \$1.5 million, to be sponsored by the Netherlands govt., USAID, and other multilateral sources. The Demobilization Commission claims it fell through because ILO responded to Ethiopian government's requests (to reduce work of CTA and to replace some ILO expatriate staff with Ethiopians) by withdrawing from the program and persuading other donors to withdraw as well.

19. Recommend having qualified medical personnel in Assembly Areas verify level of disability and services needed.

20 Many disabled ex-combatants participating at rehabilitation centers wanted to continue housing at centers even after they became employed, while centers required them to move out and provide their own accommodations after finding employment; this issue became a source of grievances and conflict.