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CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE

"...promoting the transition to and consolidation of democratic regimes throughout the world."

DEMOCRACY OFFICERS' CONFERENCE

Conference Materials

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U.S. AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT

CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE

"promoting the transition to and consolidation of democratic regimes throughout the world"

Dear Conference Participant:

Welcome to our second annual Democracy Officers' Conference. The Center's staff and I are delighted that you will be part of what promises to be a most productive conference. We look forward to working with you over the next few days and to learning more about how your program has evolved.

This year, the bulk of the conference will focus on DG assessments, civil society, governance, and political party support. In addition, time has been set aside to discuss the future of democracy programming, democracy-related policy guidance, and DG personnel issues. Finally, we will have an opportunity to discuss the services the Center can provide to help you meet your objectives.

I am confident that all of us will benefit from and enjoy meeting friends and colleagues from inside and outside the Agency.

Sincerely yours,

Charles E. Costello, Director
Center for Democracy and Governance

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Annual Report to the Administrator on Program Performance

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I. INTRODUCTION

This guidance is designed to assist USAID personnel in identifying democracy-sector strategic objectives and in formulating action plans that incorporate democracy sector projects in sustainable development countries. In addition, the guidance should assist in the development and implementation of democracy sector activities in nonpresence countries, notwithstanding the lack of formal assessments undertaken and the different standards for measuring results in such situations.¹

Use of the term "democracy promotion" in this guidance covers a broad range of activities, but establishes as priorities those aimed at initiating or enhancing:

- unrestricted political competition at the national and local levels;
- respect for the rule of law and fundamental human rights;
- effective, transparent and accountable governance structures; and
- popular participation in decision making by all sectors of civil society.

In this context, the macro-institutional and the micro-grassroots aspects of democracy promotion are two sides of the same coin and must be addressed in tandem.

Programs in other sectors where USAID provides assistance also should be evaluated for their potential impact on democracy and governance concerns. Specifically, every USAID program should:

- expand the participation, initiative and empowerment of the population, particularly women and minorities;
- improve access to and information about policy and regulatory decisions among all sectors of the population;
- enhance reliability and responsiveness of governance institutions; and
- help open policy dialogues.

¹ This guidance elaborates on the USAID strategy "Building Democracy," issued in January 1994, and the earlier 1991 Democracy and Governance Paper. The earlier documents provide the broad philosophical framework for agency efforts to promote the strengthening of democratic institutions worldwide. This guidance is designed to help USAID personnel choose from among programmatic alternatives.

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USAID appreciates the special political sensitivities involved in democracy promotion work, the wide variation of potential project designs, the time pressures that often dictate the nature of specific programs and the difficulties in measuring results in a meaningful manner. Consequently, the guidance does not prescribe the type or sequence of democracy promoting activities for every country. **On the contrary, experimentation in this sector is encouraged.**

At the same time, USAID experiences in democracy promotion activities, while less extensive than in other fields, are not inconsequential. Prior USAID activities provide the foundation for an understanding of what constitute best practices in democracy and governance. This experience underscores the need for the following:

- integrating democratic approaches in other sectors, and other sectoral concerns in democracy, to address jointly the principal constraints to sustainable development;
- enhancing partnerships with NGOs, host country institutions, other USG agencies, and other donors;
- anchoring these relationships in coherent programs, rather than limited projects;
- tailoring programs to the local context;
- responding to and building upon local commitment;
- securing the support of local leadership and ensuring that groups within the host country initiate political developments; and
- improving systems for measuring results and impact through democracy programs, rather than merely monitoring inputs and outputs.

Notwithstanding the increased agency involvement in this sector since 1990, review of USAID experience highlights several shortcomings in the delivery of democracy programs. Political and bureaucratic constraints have deterred the agency from working directly with local NGOs, although this has been less true in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Protracted implementation delays, often due to contracting backlogs and clearance requirements, have reduced the impact of the assistance provided, particularly in transition situations. Also, US domestic considerations have driven programs that overestimate the potential impact of the US government contribution and ignore the local dynamics of political change. Lastly, the difficulty with measuring success occasionally has resulted in the premature abandonment of democracy programs or sustaining them in circumstances where they have not proven effective.

II. DEVELOPING A COUNTRY'S DEMOCRACY PROGRAM

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Democracy programs should be integrated with and contribute to USAID's general development goals. This will require overcoming long-standing political constraints to sustainable development. Identifying these constraints orients the Agency toward a more clear set of democracy objectives. Specifically, USAID will work to achieve the following:

Liberating individual and community initiative. The expansion of vibrant self-governing associations in civil society is both desirable as an end and critical as a means for achieving broader development objectives. Moreover, local action is most effective when demands are aggregated vertically and horizontally so that local interests and communities can influence national policy.

Increasing political participation. In many countries, large segments of the population are politically and economically excluded. These individuals or groups are easily exploited by officials and elites who control them by patronage and coercion. Democratization must be defined as creating the means through which the political mobilization and empowerment of such individuals and groups is possible.

Enhancing government legitimacy. A narrow political base often combines with poor economic conditions and social divisiveness to limit the legitimacy of governments. Authoritarian traditions and the experience of nationalist movements has provided little understanding of or sympathy for the concept of political checks and balances. Opposition and treason are easily confused, especially by politically weak governments. A constitutional order must emerge that allows for dissent, but also for effective government action. Indeed, particularly in transition situations, a government must produce effective, broad-based growth to retain legitimacy.

Ensuring greater accountability among government officials. Corruption and abuse of human rights, and the constraints alluded to above, destroy the potential for sustainable development by violating the freedom and undermining the initiative of those outside government. To avoid the inevitability of such abuses, mechanisms must be in place to ensure that powerful government actors serve the broad public interest rather than their own concerns. Honest, fair and efficient implementation of laws, regulations, and public investments is possible, however, only where civil servants, police, and the military are held accountable by independent judiciaries, elected representatives and informed, educated constituents.

Creating the means for public deliberation of issues. In nearly all societies, distinct consensus building models form an important part of traditional political processes. However, authoritarian regimes and economic decline seriously undermine these mechanisms. When solutions are imposed from above, opposition forces are not consulted and the sustainability of development progress often proves elusive because citizens have failed to forge a durable agreement on difficult problems. Increasing the capacity and representativeness of democratic forums facilitates agreement on important policy and implementation issues.

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Promoting peaceful resolution of conflicts. Intra-societal conflict -- political, economic, cultural, or religious -- destroys the stability on which sustainable development depends. Repression has proven an ineffective means for containing conflict, since when the repression is reduced, highly destabilizing, often violent confrontations result. To the extent feasible, mechanisms for managing and resolving conflicts must be sought through improved mediation and arbitration mechanisms, as well as by creating and maintaining formal rule structures that are broadly accepted in society.

The listing of these objectives highlights the multitude of existing constraints in the political arena, and suggests that no single need may be paramount. Rather the list provides a starting point for building democracy programs at the country and regional level. **Focusing on a manageable number of objectives, however, is critical, and limiting assistance to those activities that are most likely to accomplish the broad development objectives is fundamental.**

Decisions on priorities for democracy and governance programs will be specific to each country; however, some common themes and considerations are suggested by USAID's overall level of involvement in a country. Specifically, USAID will conduct democracy programs in the following three settings:

- *sustainable development countries*, where USAID will provide an integrated package of assistance - these countries will be designated by USAID/W based, in part, on democracy and human rights performance considerations;
- *countries emerging from dire humanitarian crisis or protracted conflict*, where the short-term emphasis will be on developing or safeguarding the basic elements of a democratic political culture, including respect for human rights, the existence of independent groups, and setting the stage for political institution building; and
- *other countries*, where US foreign policy interests or other global concerns -- such as refugee flows, gross human rights abuses and the demonstration effect of democratic progress -- warrant small scale programs, notwithstanding the lack of USAID field presence.

Considerations for developing programs in each of these settings are detailed in the following three sections.

A. Sustainable Development Countries

The sustainable development category includes countries at very different levels of political development. Some are ruled by autocratic regimes, but will permit the occurrence of some independent political activity. Other countries have begun a transition process, with the pace varying from countries on the verge of multi-party elections to countries where a phased transition will take several years. A third category includes countries that have completed the

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initial transition phase, usually with a fairly conducted election, and are beginning the phase of institutional consolidation. Finally, a few countries may have established democratic institutions, but these institutions are threatened by other constraints on sustainable development.

Once a country is designated for sustainable development support, the mission should **review or develop** the country strategy. In circumstances where only review of an existing strategy is required, action plans for democracy programs should be formulated, to the extent feasible, in accordance with this guidance.

Traditionally, mission strategies have relied on field assessments performed on a sectoral basis. In the democracy sector, assessments have ranged from lengthy, multi-person field assessments analyzing all aspects of political development in a country to simpler assessments conducted by mission staff or a contractor in response to a discrete political development. In any event, the imperative of conducting an assessment should not preclude missions from responding to immediate democracy needs once initial approval has been received from USAID/W.

As part of or as a follow-up to the initial assessment process, missions may consider establishing ad hoc, local consultative groups, comprising individuals with diverse backgrounds and relevant expertise, to help formulate the strategy for democracy promotion and to identify priority areas for USAID support. Where appropriate, the group's status can be formalized and expanded to include reviewing proposals and evaluating programs.

In identifying strategic objectives in the democracy sector, the following elements should be considered:

First, define the political context of the country in question and identify the type and impact of previous democracy sector programs (if any) initiated by USAID or other donors.² Relevant information can be derived from interviews with government and NGO representatives, diplomats, scholars and journalists, including those outside the capital area and those not normally recipients of USAID assistance. Since successful democracy programs build upon local commitment, particular attention should be paid to evaluating nascent local institutions and indigenous demand for USAID support.

Second, review the activities of other organizations involved in democracy programming. Potential actors may include international organizations (*e.g.*, the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the World Bank, and the CSCE), bilateral donors, other U.S. Government agencies (*e.g.*, the U.S. Information Agency, the Department of Defense, and the

² Variables to consider might include: the stage of democratic evolution; the basis of government; economic conditions; the security situation; the role of the military in the government; the level of engagement of civil society; the country human rights performance; the role of women; the government's attitude towards political reform; government transparency, accountability, and effectiveness; and other cultural and social factors determined to be relevant.

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Department of Justice), international NGOs (particularly US-based), and local NGOs. The objective is to avoid duplication of efforts and to present consistent and mutually reinforcing messages within the host country. In this context, USAID personnel should actively participate in the USG Country Team responsible for democracy and human rights.

Third, generate a list of potential opportunities in democracy programming and assess the probable impact of each in promoting democratic change and achieving sustainable development goals. This should influence types of activities selected and the amounts budgeted for them. Table 1 lists a series of questions to consider in evaluating specific program activities.

In establishing priorities and determining the sequencing of USAID support, the following analytic framework should be utilized:

- Are the basic elements of a democratic political culture -- including respect for fundamental human rights, political space for independent groups, freedom of the press and the emergence of broad comprehension regarding the rules of political competition - established? If not, support might appropriately be directed toward human rights groups and other NGO organizations promoting democratic change, including labor unions and the independent media;
- Are the basic institutions necessary for democratic governance in place? If not, support might be targetted at developing a constitutional framework, a competitive and meaningful electoral process, and legislative and judicial institutions necessary for the adoption and enforcement of laws and policies;
- Is there a system of effective and transparent public institutions and are public officials accountable to the citizenry? If not, assistance might be provided to help reform the governance infrastructure in accordance with democratic norms; and
- Does the nongovernmental sector have the capacity to engage in meaningful public policy review and to monitor effectively the activities of government institutions? If not, support might be provided to the independent media and civic action groups, and to promote the establishment of cross-border and cross-sectoral networks of NGOs.

The framework suggests, but does not prescribe, the appropriate mix and succession of potential program interventions. For example, a determination that the major obstacle to democratization is the absence of a viable democratic political culture does not preclude program interventions in the other areas. **However, deviations from the presumptions established by the framework should be explained.**

Once the overall strategy or action plan is approved by AID/W and budget allocations set, program activities should begin as soon as possible. Because democracy promotion

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activities are particularly time sensitive, USAID/W will be favorably disposed to requests for expedited treatment of new democracy programs.

B. Specially Designated Transition Countries

As suggested above, many democratic transitions occur in countries where USAID missions already exist. In addition, a select number of countries will be designated for handling by USAID's newly-formed Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), which is sited alongside the Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance in the Bureau of Humanitarian Response.

Given the foreign policy implications involved, designation of focus countries for OTI will follow inter-agency discussions. Situations entailing negotiated settlements of protracted conflicts and where political transformation ranks particularly high among US foreign policy goals are prime candidates for OTI involvement. Frequently, such transitions share common elements, including:

- humanitarian concerns;
- disrupted economies and damaged infrastructures;
- heavily militarized societies;
- an imperative to return home dislocated populations, including demobilized soldiers;
- ambitious plans for swiftly erecting democratic institutions; and
- urgent appeals for international support.

OTI's principal efforts will include: rapid assessments of a transition situation; implementation of programs in response to urgent short term needs; and facilitation of a coordinated US government and international donor response. Initial OTI services will be concentrated in the following areas:

- reestablishment of the rule of law, including local security and mechanisms for resolving disputes peacefully;
- restoration of political and social infrastructure, including local government bodies responsible for providing social services; and
- demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, including employment, housing and retraining programs.

OTI involvement in a country will generally be short-term. In some instances, specific political developments -- such as constitution drafting, a national referendum or an election--

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may signal the end of OTI's role. In instances where the political institution building that OTI initiates carries forward into the future, OTI will strive to transfer full responsibility for programs to a mission or regional bureau within a fixed time period.

C. Non-Presence Countries

In recognition of moral and political imperatives associated with expanding and consolidating democratic governments, USAID will continue to offer limited support for modest democracy programs in countries where no USAID mission is present. The U.S. country team may request such assistance or a request may be made directly by a local NGO to USAID/W or to an international NGO operating with USAID support.

Programs in nonpresence countries will include support for transition elections and for local organizations promoting or monitoring respect for human rights, conducting civic education programs and encouraging broader participation in political affairs. Generally, these programs will be implemented by NGO partners through core grants or through Global Bureau projects to support small scale democracy activities in non-presence countries.

Planned democracy activities in a non-presence country must meet general requirements for all democracy programs (*e.g.*, high impacts, high benefit/cost ratio, USAID technical capabilities, etc.). Those proposing the program must demonstrate that other donors, including the National Endowment for Democracy and private foundations, are unable to provide necessary funds. Additional criteria that might justify such activity include: unique opportunity; substantial multiplier or demonstration effect (including in other sectors and other countries); broad-based interest in addressing issue of particular importance to the US (*e.g.*, narcotics or immigration); and USAID comparative advantage in the particular program area. Finally, implementation of the program must be possible in a manner that guarantees financial accountability and provides mechanisms for measuring results.

III. PROGRAM PRIORITIES

USAID democracy promotion activities are not limited to a narrowly prescribed activity list. Democracy promotion is too context specific for such an approach to work. Moreover, circumstances may require that a mission take advantage of emerging opportunities or respond to specific exigencies (including extreme poverty and other unmet human needs). Table 2 identifies the different types of potential USAID program interventions.

With the above caveats in mind, USAID democracy programs will focus on the following four areas:

- promoting meaningful political competition through free and fair electoral processes;
- enhancing respect for the rule of law and human rights;

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- encouraging the development of a politically active civil society; and
- fostering transparent and accountable governance.³

These focal areas represent strategic sub-objectives in the democracy sector. Project interventions should be designed to meet a particular sub-strategic objective in a reasonable timeframe. Focus on a specific sub-strategic objective, however, does not imply that the four areas are not inter-related and that projects will have impact in only one area. Indeed, in many cases, properly designed projects will contribute to progress in all four areas and should be measured accordingly.

Moreover, countries plans should consider programs that simultaneously bolster more than one core element of sustainable development. Some of the more obvious opportunities for synergies include:

- working on specific local concerns (*e.g.*, land and water distribution, pest control, forestry) in an integrated manner that assures participation by all affected sectors and that creates a sustainable institutional framework;
- supporting legal reform in the regulatory, financial and economic fields;
- developing mechanisms for informed political debate on economic, environmental, education and health issues;
- pursuing curriculum and pedagogic reforms that instill democratic values and improve the quality of education;
- assisting new advocacy NGOs working in environment, education, and health policy; and
- empowering local organizations to participate in local politics and to enter the national policy dialogue.

In many instances, these projects should **not** be attributed to the democracy sector for budgetary allocation purposes, but their impact on democracy performance should be measured throughout the life of the project.

³ In program areas where USAID has considerable experience, a growing body of knowledge exists regarding how best to support democratic political development. For example, USAID efforts in the areas of rule of law and election support have been evaluated, lessons have been learned, and guidance has emerged that can assist in implementing these types of programs. *See, e.g.*, H. Blair and G. Hansen, *Weighing In On The Scales of Justice: Strategic Approaches for Donor Supported Rule of Law Programs*, USAID Center for Development Information and Evaluation, USAID 1994; D. Hirschmann and J. Mendelson, *Managing Democratic Electoral Assistance: A Practical Guide For USAID*, USAID 1993.

A. Electoral Processes

The initiation or conduct of an electoral process provides an opportunity for democratic forces to organize and compete for political power. Thus, requests for assistance in support of an electoral process deserve special consideration. Moreover, the critical role that elections play in the democratization process justify USAID support even when fraud or administratively improprieties are deemed possible. In such circumstances, an *a priori* determination must be made, in consultation with the democratic forces within a country, whether the assistance in question will benefit the democratic cause or will merely legitimize a corrupt process. These issues should be the subject of constant review with the country team and USAID/W in the period preceding the election.

Given USAID's emphasis on sustainability, electoral support should be directed at enhancing local capacity. **With this in mind, training and technical assistance is preferred over commodity transfers, and development of domestic monitoring capabilities should take precedence over support for international observer efforts.** Also, establishment of a respected, permanent national electoral commission and encouraging meaningful participation among all sectors of the population merits particular USAID backing.

In designing electoral assistance programs, the following points should be kept in mind:

- USAID should not provide *unconditional* assistance where electoral processes appear flawed or where segments of the population are denied participation;
- electoral assistance should be provided at an early stage in the process to ensure effective usage;
- requests for high priced, state of the art electoral commodities are often unsustainable and technologically inappropriate, and raise the specter of large scale corruption;
- effective participation by political parties are critical to the success of an electoral process, although USAID must be particularly scrupulous in avoiding even the perception that it is favoring a particular candidate or party through the provision of financial or technical assistance;
- campaign periods provide an excellent opportunity for developing nongovernmental organizational capacity through civic education and election monitoring programs; and
- a programming commitment to a successful election should not skew resource allocations to the extent that funds are unavailable for post-election activities.

B. Rule of Law⁴

A democratic society requires a legal framework that guarantees respect for citizen rights and ensures a degree of regularity in public and private affairs. Corruption and abuse of authority have an obvious impact both on economic development and democratic institutions. Finally, effective public administration is essential to enhancing popular support for democracy.

Rule of law programs form an integral part of a democracy strengthening strategy. USAID experience with rule of law programs suggests the importance of promoting *demand* for effective administration of justice (*i.e.*, coalition building to support legal reform, guaranteeing access to the legal system, assisting human rights groups that monitor government performance and represent victims of abuse, and encouraging development of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms), as well as the more conventional *supply* side activities, (*i.e.*, legal reform and institution building). Supply side programs are however much more dependant on a government demonstrating the requisite political will, which must be monitored throughout the life of project.

While the breakdown of law and order is a real threat to democracy, USAID must exercise considerable care in developing programs that support police forces. Specifically, the government must demonstrate a commitment to discipline those responsible for human rights abuses and to take other appropriate steps to ensure that the police forces are accountable to the democratic government. At the same time, a holistic rule of law program may, and often should, include a police assistance component, in addition to the more traditional support for judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, human rights groups and an independent media.

C. Civil Society

A vibrant civil society is an essential component of a democratic polity and contributes to the overall agency goal of promoting sustainable development. The concept of civil society, however, covers a broad swath. Thus, USAID democracy programs designed to strengthen civil society generally should focus on support for organizations (established or in formation) that:

- engage in civic action to promote, protect and refine participatory democracy;
- encourage deliberation of public policy issues;

⁴ In addition to the guidance contained in this document, those developing rule of law programs should refer to the USAID Rule of Law Policy Guidance Paper issued in November 1994 and to H. Blair and G. Hansen, *Weighing In On The Scales of Justice: Strategic Approaches for Donor Supported Rule of Law Programs*, USAID Center for Development Information and Evaluation, USAID 1994.

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- monitor government activities; and
- educate citizens about their rights and responsibilities.

This formulation includes public advocacy groups, labor unions, independent media institutions, politically active professional associations, human rights and good governance organizations, and local level associations and institutions that tend to aggregate and articulate their constituents needs. At the same time, the formulation discourages democracy sector attribution of USAID assistance for service organizations and local associations -- including health care providers, producer cooperatives, water-user and community based forest management associations, and similarly oriented groups -- unless the support is designed to accomplish one of the specific goals listed above. Instead, USAID assistance to these organizations should be justified as contributing to the achievement of other agency strategic objectives, while recognizing the important spill-over consequences for the democracy sector.

USAID civil society programs incorporate training components, other forms of technical assistance and, in appropriate circumstances, financial support to the types of organizations listed above. **Because the concern is the development of a democratic polity, USAID assistance should also be directed towards reform of laws that prevent or deter the formation of independent groups.**

The potential long-term viability of local organizations is an important criteria for USAID assistance. However, given the dynamics of a transition situation, this emphasis should not preclude support for organizations that emerge in response to particular political development needs and that may disappear after the principal political goals of the organization have been achieved.

D. Governance

The promotion of good governance has become a major theme among all donors. In large measure, this reflects recognition of the fact that corruption, mismanagement and government inefficiency are inextricably linked with poor development performance. The challenge for USAID is to design good governance programs that are consistent with the broader goal of promoting true political liberalization.

For USAID, the emphasis in good governance is on promoting transparency and accountability of governments in policy making and resource use. Projects and nonproject assistance may involve:

- support for executive branch ministries to plan, execute and monitor budgets in a more transparent manner;
- strengthening legislative policy making, budget and oversight capabilities;

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- decentralizing policy making by working directly with accountable local government units; and
- supporting independent media and nongovernmental organizations.

Because of the programming emphasis of other donors, most notably the multilateral development banks, USAID will give less emphasis to public sector management and civil service reform.

IV. IMPLEMENTING PROGRAMS

Successful programs in the democracy sector require not only a clear understanding of the political, social and economic circumstances in the host country, but also an implementation plan that utilizes the following principles:

- ensuring participation of local groups in strategic planning and program development, design, implementation and evaluation;
- incorporating the concerns of women and other minorities from the strategic planning through the evaluation phases;
- pursuing program implementation in a consciously nonpartisan manner;
- relying on trainers and resource persons from different countries, representing varying democratic practices, rather than relying exclusively on U.S. nationals and models of U.S. government structures and practices; and
- utilizing approaches that emphasize sustainability and local empowerment over attainment of short-term performance targets.

USAID recognizes adherence to these principles is labor intensive and that adequate and appropriate personnel must be assigned by both USAID and the missions to ensure they are carried through.

A. Timeframes

Most democracy programs require patient, long-term commitment. In some instances, however, democracy activities need not have a long life span. Some programs will be completed in less than a year, either because objectives have been achieved (*e.g.*, registering voters, conducting an election, developing a civic education program), another donor has assumed responsibility for the activity, or the supported organization has used the assistance to develop a sustainable capacity (*e.g.*, labor unions, political parties and NGOs). In other instances, multi-year programs are required to ensure an initiative continues through a turbulent period (*e.g.*

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promoting legal reform) or because an objective can not be accomplished quickly (e.g., institutional strengthening of a new legislature, a new court system or local governments).

Because the political situation in a country may shift suddenly, democracy programs should be monitored and evaluated throughout their duration. The PRISM framework and country team reviews provide a basis for conducting such on-going evaluations. Where necessary, missions should consider reorienting or closing down a program. Eliminating specific projects should not be avoided simply because of sunk investments, as maintaining a project may legitimize a corrupt or human rights abusing regime or may involve wasting scarce resources.

B. Partners

Democracy programs may be implemented through contracts, cooperative agreements or grants with host governments, intergovernmental organizations, other U.S. government agencies, U.S. based and local NGOs, and private sector organizations. USAID policy encourages partnerships with the full range of nongovernmental entities, both U.S. based and local. **This is particularly important in the democracy area, where strengthening nongovernmental entities directly serves the goal of democratization.**

Development success will not be possible without the active participation of local individuals and communities. To achieve this objective, missions should maintain open and constructive dialogues with local groups (USAID grantees and others). Formal mechanisms for joint analysis of development problems with the local NGO community should be established.

USAID's relationship with US and local **NGO partners** reflects a dynamic, complex collaboration. To ensure implementation of integrated country strategies, USAID often requires the services of NGOs with technical expertise and periodic consultations once program activities are underway. At the same time, USAID should not micro-manage or exert excessive control over program implementation, as this may compromise the independence of the NGO and might identify US government policy too closely with the viewpoint of the NGO.

Special attention should be paid to creating cross-border and cross-sectoral networks of NGOs as a means to strengthen civil society. Contacts will allow indigenous NGOs to transcend local arenas and avoid "reinventions of the wheel." One way to encourage contacts is to promote electronic networking via telephones, electronic mail and conferencing. Such networking is well advanced within the U.S. NGO community and is growing rapidly in Latin America.

Where appropriate, USAID should implement democracy programs through direct partnerships with **local NGOs**. In selecting partners, USAID should seek to identify those groups whose programs will contribute toward long-term sustainable democracy and whose internal makeup reflect basic equity criteria. In working with partners, USAID should recognize

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their institutional limitations and develop mechanisms for enhancing their capacity, including the ability to meet accountability requirements imposed by USAID. In some cases, USAID's partner may be a consortium of NGOs, allowing groups to build on economies of scale. USAID should avoid exclusive reliance on NGOs that have become the focus of all donor activities, unless circumstances dictate otherwise.

Several U.S. based NGOs have developed particular expertise in democracy promotion activities and thus should be considered as potential partners for specific interventions. In selecting U.S. based NGO partners, bureaus and missions should consider the following factors:

- prior experience with similar programs, including past successes in leaving behind a sustainable component;
- ties to local counterparts and potential impact upon strengthening local civil society;
- knowledge of the country - people, history, groups in civil society and public institutions;
- dedication to local capacity building;
- in-house expertise in specific subject areas;
- willingness to place field representatives on the ground for extended period and past experience supervising work of field representatives;
- previous record in implementing USAID programs, including achievement of objectives and meeting reporting requirements; and
- projected cost involved in implementing a specific project.

Host governments are normally the direct beneficiaries of democracy funding where the objective is to strengthen government institutions. In providing direct assistance to governments, the mission must ascertain that the requisite political will exists to ensure project objectives can be achieved. Local NGOs may prove useful partners in monitoring such programs and in explaining programs to the public.

USAID will provide funds to **international organizations** directly involved in democracy promotion activities, where their objectives coincide with those of USAID and proposed activities cannot be easily replicated by NGOs. This includes efforts to coordinate donor or nongovernmental activities, for example, during election periods. International organizations receiving USAID funds must be held to reasonable accountability and performance standards.

Subject to existing law establishing a preference for the private sector and NGOs in implementing programs utilizing development assistance, USAID will transfer funds to **other U.S. government agencies** for democracy initiatives. Their proposed work must be consistent with

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USAID's approved strategy and welcomed by the host country partner. The agency also must be uniquely qualified to achieve the identified objectives and must have the capability to manage the program and exercise appropriate financial oversight.

C. USAID Capacity

The establishment of a Democracy Center in the Global Bureau will allow USAID to better service field missions in implementing democracy programs. In particular, Global Bureau personnel with relevant expertise will conduct assessments, help with project design, provide technical backstopping and assist with evaluations. The Democracy Center also will manage a limited number of programs in "nonpresence" countries.

To facilitate program implementation and the development of partnerships, the Center will enter formal relationships with several NGOs and/or contractors. These relationships will allow missions to solicit involvement of one or more groups in response to a request for specific services. Once an agreement is reached between the mission and the group regarding the nature of the services required -- which might include the development of a democracy strategy, implementation of a particular project or evaluation of a project in progress -- program activities can begin immediately.

The Democracy Center will be responsible for disseminating information on democracy programs across the agency. A newsletter will highlight effective program activities, evaluation reports and lessons learned. The Center also will arrange training programs on specific subjects relevant to the development of agency technical capability in the democracy sector.

D. Donor Coordination

In December 1993, the Development Assistance Committee adopted an orientations paper on Popular Participation and Good Governance, which reflects a consensus among donors on specific principles relating to democracy, human rights, good governance, participation and excess military expenditures. The paper provides a basis for bureaus and missions to seek broad donor agreement on democratization principles, priorities and programs. The objective is to maintain consistent pressure for reform, to assure adequate levels of donor support and to encourage complementarity and economies of scale among programs. Where significant policy differences among donors constrain cooperation at the country level, missions should inform USAID/W so that these matters can be addressed in headquarter-level discussions.

During a pre-transition phase, USAID missions should strive for consensus among donors on the levels and types of economic assistance, through bilateral discussions or the convening of existing or ad hoc groups. As a political transition gets underway, donor coordination becomes increasingly more important, both in ensuring consistent signals are sent and in guaranteeing the provision of appropriate assistance to support the transition. Regular consultations are invaluable for agreeing upon a division of labor and avoiding duplication. Ad

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hoc working groups that meet regularly and are chaired by a lead bilateral donor or by UNDP provide useful fora for discussion of critical issues pertaining to the transition.

Successful transitions often depend on donor agreement on the level, character, and timing of economic assistance triggered by the political reform. As the transition evolves, USAID should work with other donors, including multilateral institutions, to develop an appropriate package for the immediate post-transition period and to set the conditions that permit grants and loans to begin. Where bilateral donors are in agreement on democracy and governance goals, the World Bank can act as an effective agent of the Consultative Group process in urging policy reforms.

During the post-transition or consolidation phase, donor coordination remains critical. Inevitably, USAID assessments will identify many more needs than USAID resources can meet. The guidance that missions focus their activities on a small number of projects in the democracy sector also highlights the critical importance of donor coordination. Given these constraints, missions should share information and analysis with other donors as a matter of course.

V. MEASURING RESULTS

Lessons of the past clearly point to the importance of developing strategically focused democracy programs to avoid spending scarce resources on ad hoc activities that fail to achieve discernable impacts. Though measuring the results of assistance is a widely accepted principle, concrete guidance on how to carry this out in the democracy area is both scarce and complex. This is an important priority for the Agency's research agenda.

Development analysts and practitioners highlight the conceptual and methodological difficulties in measuring democracy promotion and good governance programs. There is no generally-accepted, comprehensive theory of democratic development that is helpful for building tightly-constructed strategies and successfully predicting results. Furthermore, existing tools of measurement are imperfect, particularly for evaluating such a country-specific, multifaceted and complex process. It is impossible to capture change by simply examining one or two variables. Moreover, political change is a long term proposition and setbacks in the short-run are inevitable, creating potential problems for demonstrating success in five-eight year strategies.

At present, limited data have been collected in the democracy and governance area, even for programs that have been in place for a few years. This is because strategies and indicators have been continually refined as USAID has become more specific about identifying objectives. Despite difficulties in measuring results, a compelling need now exists to ensure that data are collected for performance indicators. This information is crucial to improving the performance of USAID's programs, permitting informed decision making by USAID, refining strategies, testing assumptions, learning from experience and building confidence among USAID constituencies.

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This guidance recognizes problems and important gaps in our knowledge; however, our efforts to learn more will be greatly enhanced through examining cumulative experience. Measuring results can be greatly simplified if managers aim for a hierarchy of objectives, make explicit a strategy that links lower- and higher-level objectives, distinguish short-, medium-, and long-term indicators of progress, and disaggregate indicators by region, gender, ethnicity and other measurable groupings. The logic underpinning this approach is outlined in the following three sections through the example of electoral assistance.

A. Short-Term Impact

In the short-term (one to five years), indicators are needed to measure performance in attaining program outcomes. To use the example of elections, if the objective of the program is "impartial and effective electoral administration," some illustrative indicators of program outcomes could include:

- percentage of errors corrected in voter registration lists;
- increased percentage of the population with reasonable access to polling places; and/or
- decrease in the time needed to tally results and publish them simultaneously.

This information then would be used to monitor and evaluate the use of resources.

B. Medium-term Impact

In the medium-term (five to eight years), indicators are needed to measure achievement of anticipated strategic objectives. To continue using the example of elections described above, the objective statement in the medium term might be "free, fair, and routinely held elections at the national and local levels." Some illustrative indicators of performance for this strategic objective might include:

- increase in the percent of registered voters voting or the percent of eligible population registered (disaggregated by sex, ethnic group, etc.) if USAID supported a voter registration effort;
- reduction in the number of parties protesting or denying the election results if USAID sponsored a parallel vote tabulation or a verification mission; and
- decrease in the number of incidents of violence following the elections if USAID supported programs to discourage violence.

Information at this level enables managers to refine strategies and reallocate resources into the most effective programs. Often, the data on strategic objectives can be built into the program strategy itself, for example, through the establishment or strengthening of an election

commission, a human rights monitoring organization, a court-watch campaign, or a citizens advocacy group.

C. Long-term Impact

In the long-term (more than eight years), managers aim for achieving yet a higher objective. At the goal level, indicators are needed to determine whether the strategy had an impact on the country's democracy performance. Indicators of whether a country is performing democratically would include whether political power has been transferred through free and fair elections, whether the country has achieved freedom from foreign or military control, and whether citizens have greater freedoms to peacefully organize, express themselves, and produce or use alternative sources of information.

For goals, managers (usually based in Washington) can now rely upon composite indicators developed by groups such as Freedom House, Charles Humana in the Humana Index, the UNDP, or bring together qualitative materials from a variety of sources (State Department, human rights organizations, opinion polls and election observation team reports). Indicators of impact are used to measure progress toward democracy, and assess changes in democratic conditions. Therefore, the information that they provide enables managers to make decisions about the commitment of host country leadership to democracy, and the types of programs, strategies, and interventions that might make the most meaningful contributions.

To complete the election example used above, the objective statement at the goal level might be "free and fair elections serve as the forum for mediating major political disputes." Some illustrative indicators of performance for this goal might include:

- the transfer of power via elections; and
- the percentage of the population confident that elections are free and fair.

At all levels of assessment and strategy development, it is essential that Missions consider the participation of women and marginalized groups. Performance measurement plans should capture the benefits that accrue to these groups through carefully-thought out strategies.

Finally, it is essential to strive for sustainability in democracy programming. Democracies are sustainable when indigenous forces within society can maintain and strengthen the democratic foundations without external support, and government institutions and officials remain firmly committed to democratic practices and the rule of law. When monitoring and evaluating progress, therefore, USAID must assess the likelihood democracy activities will continue absent international funds.

Table 1

Considerations in evaluating specific program activities

- the potential impact of a specific intervention
 - are there immediate short-term benefits (or costs) likely to flow from the intervention?
 - does the intervention have a sustainable component?
 - who will the intervention most directly affect - elite or non-elite sectors of society?
 - what is the impact upon women and minorities?
 - what effect will the intervention have on specific USG interests?
 - is there a multiplier effect or synergy in terms of linkages with other aspects of USAID programming or, conversely, are there trade-offs and conflicts with other USAID programming?

- the existence of the requisite political will in the host country to ensure that the intervention will contribute to the designated objective - this consideration is particularly important where a program is directed at a government entity
 - what financial, personnel or organizational resources is the recipient contributing to the process?
 - what specific legal or institutional changes (including, in the case of governments, accession to international human rights instruments) is the recipient willing to undertake in furthering the goals of the project?
 - how open is the government to allowing and promoting participation by the nongovernmental sectors?

- the amount of resources required for a particular intervention
 - how much will the intervention cost in dollars, including local currency costs?
 - what are the personnel requirements for the intervention and are they available without causing dislocations in other critical areas?
 - how does a particular intervention compare with alternative interventions in terms of cost and potential impact?
 - how much will a particular intervention leverage other contributions?

- USAID technical capabilities available to assist with a particular intervention
 - does USAID have the requisite skills to manage and evaluate project in efficient and timely manner?
 - does USAID have pre-existing arrangements with reliable NGOs which could implement the project?

- collateral effects of intervention
 - will the project promote political interests and involvement of women and minorities? and has project been designed in manner to ensure that women and minorities suffer no untoward consequences as a result of project implementation?

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- can the project be designed to ensure that different groups, even those not directly involved with the project implementation, have a role in project review and evaluation?
- will the project affect activities in other sectors by ensuring broader participation in policy debate, by providing legitimacy for policy or by increasing accountability?

Table 2

Democracy Program Options

A. Electoral processes

- election law reform
- independent and credible election administration
- election commodities
- voter education
- training of local pollwatchers
- international election observing

B. Rule of law

- legal reform
- judicial infrastructure (e.g., courts, libraries, etc.)
- training of judges
- criminal investigation techniques
- training of lawyers
- alternative dispute resolution
- citizen awareness of legal rights

C. Education for democracy

- school age programs
- adult education
- teacher training
- assistance in developing education materials
- support for organizations implementing programs

D. Good governance

- promotion of government accountability to the public
- improvement of government budget processes and policy development procedures
- techniques for monitoring corruption
- support for good governance groups
- promotion of decentralization efforts
- technical assistance on decentralization plans
- training local leaders in management and outreach techniques
- developing local government capabilities
- public administration

E. Labor unions

- support for democratic labor unions
- training programs for workers

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F. Civil society organizations, including human rights monitoring groups, professional associations engaging in political activities, local NGOs engaging in political activities, women's organizations

- support organizational development
- training in management and technical issues
- develop and promote cross-border and cross-sectoral networking

G. Legislative assistance

- technical assistance
- infrastructural support

H. Political parties

- organizational training
- election preparation training
- role of political parties in government and opposition
- training local leaders for competitive electoral politics

I. Reducing ethnic and religious conflicts through democratic processes

J. Civil-military relations

K. Free flow of information

- independent media
- investigative journalism
- alternative information sources

L. Diplomatic efforts in establishing political order

**Note From the Administrator --
Policy Working Papers**

From time to time, I will be sharing with you some of the thinking of senior Agency leadership on key policy issues and major USAID program areas. These periodic policy working papers will outline the way we are approaching USAID activities. They will include some of the questions we will be asking about planning country and global programs, and issues that we expect you will address as you develop USAID strategic plans and specific programs.

This is the first in this series of working papers. The subject is USAID efforts to promote respect for the rule of law. This is a key element in our overall approach to sustainable development and is critical to our democratization strategy. As a result of experience gained during the past decade, USAID is the leading donor in the design and implementation of rule of law programs that stress democratic values and respect for fundamental human rights. This is a standard that I intend to maintain.

The attached memorandum summarizes our current thinking about USAID efforts in the rule of law area.

Attachment: a/s

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM FOR THE USAID SENIOR STAFF

FROM: Rule of Law Working Group

SUBJECT: Policy and Implementation Options for Rule of Law Programs in USAID

OVERVIEW

In October 1993, a five-person Rule of Law Working Group (ROLWG) initiated a policy review of USAID activities in the rule of law sector.¹ Responding to concerns raised during a congressional hearing the previous month, the ROLWG considered issues relating to host government commitment, human rights and inter-agency coordination. The group also conducted an inventory of programs, examined recent program evaluations, considered program design and implementation criteria, and identified interagency and donor coordination issues.

This memorandum presents the ROLWG's conclusions regarding USAID programming in this sector. The memorandum also identifies a number of issues requiring further discussion and policy decisions by USAID senior staff and, in some instances, by an inter-agency process.

BACKGROUND

Since the mid-1980s, USAID has committed more than \$220 million in resources to rule of law programming. While many of these programs have been quite successful, some aspects of the programs have been criticized by congressional oversight committees and human rights organizations, among others.

The General Accounting Office (GAO) in a September 1993 report identified several specific criticisms. Regarding the Latin American program, the GAO offered the following comments: 1) implementing programs without a host country political commitment narrows the sustainability of the work; 2) taking a narrow technical and institutional approach has limited impact; 3) obtaining total US Embassy support is essential for effective program management; 4) program management is hampered by the lack of experienced staff; and 5)

¹ The working group included: Larry Garber, PPC/OSA; Gary Hansen, PPC/CDIE; Keith Henderson, ENI/Rule of Law Adviser; Debra McFarland, LAC/DI; and Johanna Mendelson, LAC/DI.

impact evaluations are important for sound management decisions. In Eastern Europe, the same GAO report concluded that USAID had not learned from its experience in Latin America, that the agency focussed on short-term technical requirements without fully assessing needs or formulating long-term goals and objectives, and that programming was initiated without identifying clearly defined lines of authority and responsibility among the participating agencies and embassies.

In September 1993, the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) held hearings on US government rule of law/administration of justice programs. Many members, including Chairman Hamilton, expressed concern about the lack of effective coordination among the participating US Government agencies: USAID, Departments of State and Justice and United States Information Agency. The agencies responded that a new Interagency Working Group on Democracy and Human Rights would soon be established and would provide the necessary policy coordination. At that time, Chairman Hamilton indicated that he would convene a follow-up hearing to review progress on the coordination issues. We have subsequently heard that HFAC has prepared draft legislation on Rule of Law programs for inclusion in new foreign assistance legislation and is planning follow-on hearings in the fall of 1994.

FINDINGS/CONCLUSIONS

The following summarizes the findings and conclusions of the Rule of Law Working Group (ROLWG).

1. Inventory

The inventory verified that Latin America is in the forefront with diverse and active programs in virtually all countries, followed by Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and the Near East. Program funding in the NIS region, however, will quickly eclipse that in most other regions given the level of effort of recently let contracts. Most regions designate their programs as supportive of democracy building goals, but economic development goals are also identified as the objective of some rule of law programs; this is most clearly the case in the NIS region.

Latin American programs tend to focus on promoting judicial independence, with secondary objectives of efficiency and effectiveness; newer programs add elements of increased access and accountability. Eastern European programs support the objectives of fairness and equality through the development of new laws, constitutions and procedures. In Africa, efficiency and effectiveness, followed by increased access, equality and fairness, are generally identified as program objectives. The NIS concentrates on two objectives: judicial independence and equality/fairness.

2. Program Impact

USAID can attribute impact in a number of areas directly to agency funded interventions.

- Strengthened *judicial independence* with the introduction of judicial career mechanisms.
- Improved *efficiency and effectiveness* of justice sector institutions through case tracking, professional training and modern management practices.
- Increased *access to justice* through the expansion of public defender programs, legal aid and introduction of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.
- Enhanced *equality and fairness* through law reform and drafting of new constitutions with greater guarantees for due process and protection of rights;
- Greater *accountability and transparency* resulting from court watch programs, media assistance and other NGO efforts; and
- Better *police and investigative services* as a result of the activities of the Department of Justice's ICITAP program, which operates with USAID funding in Latin America.

In addition, USAID rule of law programs have had collateral benefits for other USG objectives. For instance, improving prosecutorial systems through the introduction of oral, adversarial criminal procedures has positive spin off effects for USG counter-narcotics program objectives. In some circumstances however, attributing improvements to specific USAID interventions is quite difficult (*e.g.*, improving court efficiency as a consequence of providing computers and other equipment).

3. Criteria for Assessing Country and Program Priorities

Determining whether a host government possesses the requisite political will to justify USAID programs in the justice sector remains the most significant issue in rule of law programs. Without host government support, long term sustainability of USAID funded programs are jeopardized. Thus, the ROLWG sought to identify specific criteria to assist USAID in making these determinations and considered various sources of information upon which to base these decisions. It also reviewed the circumstances under which active rule of law programs should be suspended.

The working group determined that the issue of program sustainability and its relation to other development objectives was critically important. In this respect, an objective analysis of the level of political/legal development in the country and the constraints to justice sector reform should be carried out before program implementation. Based on this analysis, a decision should be reached as to the perceived commitment to reform. This

analysis, along with a technical assessment of the justice sector, should be used to determine the appropriate mix of program interventions.

The following criteria should be used to assess political commitment, the current state of political/legal development and constraints to reform:

- the degree of support (or lack thereof) for reform among elite groups such as the supreme court magistrates, legislators, and other executive branch officials;
- the existence of (or lack thereof) a reformist constituency among professional associations and interested NGOs;
- the level of judicial independence (or lack thereof) from other branches of government, political parties, and/or military and police;
- the level of perceived honesty (or lack thereof) of judicial personnel and accountability within the system; and
- the level of resources (or lack thereof) provided overall to the justice system as compared to other budgetary requirements such as military spending.

Other essential elements to consider in assessing host country commitment to reform are: the human rights environment; the ratification of international human rights covenants; and the willingness of a government to permit on-site investigation by intergovernmental organizations and human rights NGOs.

The annual human rights report prepared by the Department of State provides an overall assessment of human rights conditions worldwide. The State Department report, as supplemented by reports of NGOs, provides the foundation for assessing the specific human rights performance of any given government. The report also includes an evaluation of judicial independence, access to legal assistance, status of due process rights and constitutional norms in each country considered. In relying on this report as a basis of determining political commitment, USAID should explore with the State Department, or develop on its own as is done in the Africa Bureau, the use of more quantitative reporting indicators so that changes can be tracked over time. Research on appropriate quantitative and qualitative indicators will be carried out by the Agency's Democracy and Governance Center.

The proposed list of criteria tracks with the approach outlined in a recent CDIE assessment on ROL programs (see below). The CDIE assessment identifies the potential for support and/or opposition from political elites and organized constituencies -- such as bar associations, law faculties, and NGOs -- as the most important factors to consider in making investment decisions. Other critical factors include judicial independence, levels of corruption, media freedom, and donor leverage.

In the same vein, although more difficult, criteria also are required for determining when and how to close down a rule of law program. Usually, some political event (e.g., the overthrow of a democratically elected government) serves as the basis for such actions. USAID should also reconsider expending scarce resources for approved programs where host country support is not forthcoming.

In summary, where there is no willingness to support judicial reform, or where the non-governmental community is denied access to government institutions, government-to-government assistance simply should not be provided without a change in conditions. Assistance to and through NGOs, however, may still be provided. On an exceptional basis, and, if appropriate to facilitate dialogue with the government and to foster greater awareness for reform, highly specific, short term pilot projects with the government may be undertaken.

4. Strategic Framework

In 1992-93, CDIE conducted an assessment of recent rule of law programs, reviewing activities in six Latin American and Asian countries. The report was the focus of a discussion with interested US government agencies, NGOs and academics in February 1994, and with field personnel during the first USAID Global Rule of Law Conference held in July 1994.

In the view of the ROLWG, the most practical aspect of the report is the development of a strategic framework for setting ROL priorities and designing country programs. The strategic framework identifies the most essential need as host country political leadership support. If this support is lacking or weak and fragmented, a program focussing on "*coalition and/or constituency building strategies*" is called for to build political will and public pressure for reform. Program elements would include support for the media in investigative journalism, anti-corruption campaigns, and/or other mechanisms to elicit public support and dialogue on the issues of judicial reform. Various education and training programs, along with observational visits, also are helpful in this context.

Where political support exists, program designers should analyze whether the legal system structures are adequate. If not, ROL programs may emphasize "*structural reform strategies*", which include budgetary autonomy, restructured processes and procedures such as judicial review, adversarial procedures, alternative dispute resolution and judicial career services. This is similar to the approach in several Latin American programs.

The next level of program review, given adequate political commitment and equitable legal structures, is to examine the performance of the legal system. In many circumstances, the appropriate focus for donors is on "*access creation strategies*" such as legal aid, court watch programs and alternative dispute resolution. Programs would be designed to empower those groups and individuals that are disadvantaged and do not have guarantees of due process. While not specifically covered in the assessment, gender issues such as women's

access to justice and the role of women in the legal system should be strongly considered in this approach.

The final level of assessment focusses on "*state building strategies*", which involves the institutional capacity of existing legal structures to perform their intended functions. Many traditional USAID program elements such as improved court administration and human resource development through training for judicial sector personnel are included in this approach. Other possible approaches to address this strategy include programs to enhance the functioning of law schools and bar associations.

While generally praised, the report generated some controversy among field practitioners during the July 1994 conference. Field officers questioned the selection of countries and projects and the evaluators' criteria for determining a successful effort. Mostly, field officers were leery of the report being used improperly as a prescriptive tool for determining project components, hampering creativity and country specific solutions and being used inappropriately by the IG and/or GAO as the basis for evaluating projects and programs.

In reviewing the comments prepared by the field officers, the ROLWG concur that the strategic framework should not be applied in a prescriptive manner. Rather, it should be used by the field to fully consider various options and approaches to building sustainable reform programs. In order to do this, field personnel require on-the-job training, easy access to expert advice to conduct the required analyses, information on successful approaches and a compendium of program indicators to track overtime. It is anticipated that these tools will be provided by the Democracy and Governance Center and by PPC/CDIE.

The ROLWG concurs that the strategic framework developed by CDIE provides useful guideposts for USAID and US Embassy personnel in developing rule of law program components. While USAID/W will review future rule of law programs with reference to the framework, deviations from the framework are anticipated in accordance with the specific country situation. These deviations should be articulated and justified in the mission strategy or the program design document. Further, USAID/W will review the framework to incorporate lessons from on-going programs.

5. Performance Measurement

USAID's mandate of sustainable development can best be achieved by selecting a long-term approach. However, recognizing that the impetus for sustaining the reform effort must come directly from the host country and that there are pressures within the US to demonstrate results, USAID must set realistic short, medium and long-term goals to measure success based on a continuum of reform.

In the short term, USAID should consider forward movement in the reform process as an indicator of success. Similarly, the strengthening of the judicial system is only one factor

in the broader goal of creating strong institutions of governance that can provide a base for democratic growth. A coherent set of performance standards related to specific objectives and accomplishments can and should be developed.

Within rule of law programs, performance measures can be developed and applied to the accepted principles of judicial independence, access to justice, equality and fairness, expedition and timeliness, accountability, public trust and confidence. Justice sector institutions must be encouraged to develop their own performance standards and, given the tools, held responsible for data collection. On the other hand, work with local NGOs will have to be assessed by broader measures of public opinion polling and political behavior indices.

6. Inter Agency Issues

The ROLWG identified several issues relating to how USAID interacts with other US Government agencies. The ROLWG strongly supports enhanced interagency coordination. Each agency involved in this sector has useful skills that can be brought to bear on the common agenda of strengthening democracies through ROL programming. USAID programming should generally utilize the sustainable development paradigm rather than focus on short term political and/or law enforcement interests (although there will be times when USAID can and should support these types of programs).

A major concern with USAID ROL programs is the convergence of interests with law enforcement programs. In transition countries, there is often a breakdown of public security and increase in common crime leading to a crisis of public confidence in a fragile government. Police and other law enforcement agencies in host countries are often ill-equipped to deal with these issues, given the low level of police prestige, lack of resources and other institutional constraints. At the same time, these institutions are often corrupt and abusive, and US government support to these institutions may be wasted or misused.

The ROLWG favors direct US government involvement in police assistance issues as it relates to improving the overall justice system and assuming human rights and accountability safeguards are in place. While State/INM and the Department of Justice clearly have the lead on law enforcement programs that relate to the US domestic agenda, they do not necessarily support sustainable development objectives. Thus, under appropriate circumstances, USAID should be willing to provide appropriate assistance to police and other law enforcement organizations. The ROLWG, together with others agency personnel, is preparing an options paper for senior staff review on the future role of USAID in police assistance programs. A follow-up memorandum will provide details on USAID policy in this area.

7. Donor Coordination

To date, USAID has been the lead donor in most ROL programs. The depth of the problems countries face in providing an equitable and fair system of justice, however, far outstrips USAID's resources and capacity to respond. The Agency must now share its experiences with the donor community and fashion effective donor coordination by identifying priority countries and developing mechanisms for co-financing of programs and projects. The May 1994 meeting of the DAC working group on Popular Participation and Good Governance, for example, provided an opportunity for USAID to share the CDIE rule of law assessment and to describe the strategic framework contained therein with interested donors.

USAID's strength lies in its in-country presence, which should be used to establish and build coalitions and constituencies for reform, to identify key policy issues and to initiate demonstration and pilot programs. Some of the follow-on activities can be undertaken by donors with the resources to sponsor large scale efforts. Latin America, where the IDB and the World Bank have expressed an interest in funding judicial reform, is an ideal laboratory for enhanced donor coordination.

CONCLUSION

ROL should be a priority program within USAID's strengthening democracy strategic objectives. However, to achieve greater coherence within the program, the Agency will need to operationalize the strategic framework outlined above and continue to provide USAID personnel with the opportunities for training in the substantive areas of rule of law and more specifically on the application of the strategic framework. The First Global Rule of Law Conference held this past July provided a critical opportunity for developing a more coherent approach to Rule of Law programming.

TO USAID DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE OFFICERS

FROM: Larry Garber, PPC/SA
Chuck Costello, G/DG

DATE: July 18, 1995

RE: Clarification of Recent Communication Regarding USAID
Rule of Law Programs

This memorandum seeks to clarify information recently distributed to all USAID Democracy and Governance Officers by the above, regarding policy guidance on USAID Rule of Law (ROL) programs.

In a cover memorandum dated February 15, 1995, we stated that one of the attachments reflected USAID's position that ROL programs should be developed in a holistic manner, and, where appropriate, may include a police assistance component. We would like to take this opportunity to clarify that current law restricting USAID's activities with regard to police assistance has NOT changed. Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, (FAA) prohibits USAID from providing "training or advice, or ... any financial support, for police, prisons, or other law enforcement forces for any foreign government" Section 534 of the FAA and Section 549 of the FY 1995 foreign operations appropriations act provide limited exceptions to this rule, but only in the LAC region. Other exceptions to the prohibitions contained in Section 660 have been made when funds have been appropriated "notwithstanding any other law", such as the FY 1995 appropriation of up to \$30 million for police training and exchanges in the NIS and Eastern Europe.

The purpose of distributing the ROL and police assistance policy information at this time was to inform the field that USAID is now prepared, as a policy matter, to integrate police assistance into ROL programs, subject to existing legal prohibitions. If an exception to the statutory prohibition is available, the Administrator has agreed with the recommendation of the USAID ROL Working Group that USAID should now be prepared to oversee the police assistance component of a program directly, as opposed to requesting the Department of State to oversee the program (as is generally the case now). It is still expected that other agencies, e.g., Department of Justice, including ICITAP and OPDAT, will implement such programs. Similarly, if a mission is developing a ROL program that would benefit from the inclusion of a police assistance component, we urge that mission to consult with USAID/W to determine whether any waiver or proposal to change applicable law might be warranted.

Please contact the above for any further clarification of this issue.

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With continued social and political instability in the developing world, pressures for the USG to support the development of professional police forces will increase. We also anticipate a strong interest in using at least some USAID funds for these purposes. At the same time, because of past USAID experiences with the Public Safety Program, many USAID personnel, congressional staffers and human rights PVOs and NGOs react negatively to any intimation of additional USAID involvement with police training and support activities. The question, therefore, is whether changed world circumstances (i.e., end of the cold war, a more human rights sensitive development assistance bureaucracy and a more proactive US involvement in assisting with failed states), coupled with inter-agency pressures and USAID's own sustainable development agenda, warrant a more engaged role for the agency with police assistance programs.

Assuming USAID becomes more directly involved in police assistance programs, clear policy guidance is necessary. At a minimum this should probably address the following: criteria for USAID involvement; specific activities that USAID might support; and specific activities that USAID would not support. In addition, USAID should consider whether different ground rules should be adopted for sustainable development countries; failed states where restoration of public order and security are predominant concerns (e.g., Somalia, Haiti and West Bank/Gaza); and countries where law enforcement concerns are closely linked to US foreign policy objectives (e.g., Colombia, Peru and Russia).

Options: Based on the review and other information included in the background paper, the working group proposes the following options for consideration:

1. *USAID Out of Police Assistance* - USAID cedes all authority for police assistance, even as a funding vehicle, because police assistance is not considered part of USAID's sustainable development mandate. Other USG agencies assume responsibility for providing all necessary services, including financial management and oversight.
2. *Maintenance of the Status Quo* - This option posits that USAID is not interested in nor has the staff capability for direct involvement with police assistance programs. Police assistance programs supported by the USG will remain distinct from USAID democracy building programs. Still, USAID may be required to fund police assistance programs, such as those currently operational.
3. *Defer Decision* - While several specific issues require decisions at the present time, USAID could defer an overall policy determination on the issue until certain inter-agency issues are resolved and until the hill perspective on this issue is clarified. This reactive strategy has the virtue of avoiding direct USAID involvement in a

polemical and bureaucratic debate, regarding which use of USAID political capital would be unwise.

4. *Increased USAID Policy Involvement* - This option, again, recognizes that USAID does not have the staff capability to assume full management responsibility for police assistance programs. Nonetheless, USAID has an interest in actively reviewing proposed programs and offering an institutional (*i.e.* developmental) perspective concerning program design, direction and approach. This option provides USAID a seat at the policy table and a stronger voice in the types of police assistance programs being planned, while developing a capability that may permit a more direct management role in the future. The Africa Bureau recommends this option because it enables USAID to leverage the resources of other USG agencies and donors through our seat at the policy table and does not preclude USAID funding/engaging in direct interventions where appropriate.

5. *Integration of Police Assistance into USAID Rule of Law Programs* - This option proposes that USAID consciously integrate support for the police into the agency's overall rule of law and democracy strategy, consequently assuming greater control of the design and management of police assistance programs in sustainable development countries. Under this option, police assistance programs also would be integrated into USG efforts to improve the justice systems in the failed state context, with USAID playing either a direct or indirect role, as appropriate. By adopting this option, USAID explicitly recognizes the role that a properly trained and law abiding police force plays in the development of a justice system. This option may require a modest set of resources, especially staffing increases to manage the program (some bureaus have questioned the assumption regarding the resources necessary to implement this option). As this option marks a significant break from the past, a set of principles for implementing police assistance programs, which build on the criteria established for rule of law programs, must be developed and agreed upon (see annex).

Recommendation: Approve Option 5 as official USAID policy (Integration of Police Assistance into USAID Rule of Law Programs). Authorize PPC to develop agency guidance that builds upon the criteria for USAID involvement in police assistance programs set forth in the annex, that recognizes development assistance resources for police assistance programs are limited, and that seeks to utilize effectively the expertise offered by other USG agencies in this area.

 Agree

_____ Disagree

11-23 DATE

Considerations for USAID involvement in police assistance programs

- Demonstrated host country commitment to justice reform;
- Climate of respect for human rights;
- Adequate resource base for the justice sector as a whole;
- Judicial independence recognized *de jure* by the constitution and *de facto* by the other branches of government;
- Government commitment to address problems related to corruption;
- *De facto* and *de jure* civilian control and separation of the police from the military and special investigative forces.

Specific police assistance activities that USAID *might* support:

- Development of Police Academy Training Programs
- Personnel Management including internal discipline
- Police Organizational and Management Reform
- Investigative Training
- Forensics
- Legislative Reform
- Improved Coordination with other entities

Specific police assistance activities that USAID will *not* directly support:

- Programs directed toward resolving specific crimes
- Case Building Activities
- Training in Specific Police Operations
- Major commodity support, including provision of lethal weapons



U.S. AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT

November 14, 1994

ACTION MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM: The Rule of Law Working Group (ROLWG)

SUBJECT: USAID Involvement in Police Assistance

Issue: How should USAID respond to increasing requests for US government technical and other support for police forces in developing countries?

Background: This memorandum requests your guidance on USAID's role and involvement in police training and other police support activities. While this matter has been the subject of discussion by the ROLWG for the past year, several recent developments highlight the need for an expeditious review and determination of USAID policy:

- As part of the FY 96 budget process, the Office of International Criminal Justice of the State Department has sought policy control over all rule of law programs, including but not limited to police training;
- The various versions of the PPDA (administration, Senate, House staff) authorize police training programs, but contain conflicting provisions regarding responsibility within the USG for policy coordination and program implementation;
- Activities in West Bank/Gaza (payment of salaries to police), Haiti (establishment of an entire new police structure) and ENI (soft earmark for funds to law enforcement agencies on a country-by-country basis) suggest that support for police and law enforcement activities is a growing target for US foreign assistance.

In response to these developments, PPC formed a police assistance sub-group of the ROLWG. The sub-group includes representatives of G/DG, LPA, GC, OTI, LAC, ENI, CD1E, State/ARA, and State/DRL. Most of the individuals involved with the sub-group have considerable experience working on rule of law and supervising law enforcement programs. In addition, we solicited comments and assistance from USAID missions with police training programs.

A draft action memorandum and background paper were circulated to all bureaus for comment in early October. The October 25 senior staff meeting was dedicated to a discussion of the issues raised by the paper. Following the meeting, the draft action memorandum was again circulated to all bureaus; comments received from several bureaus have been incorporated into this memorandum.

As detailed in the background paper, the sub-group considered several different aspects of the police assistance issue from a USAID perspective. These included: USG police assistance experience starting with the lessons learned from the public safety program; legal and legislative issues surrounding the provision of police assistance; the mandate of other USG agencies involved in police assistance, including State and Justice; and the activities of other donors. Admittedly, most of recent USAID experience is drawn from LAC; specific circumstances relating to ENI and other regions may require a somewhat different approach.

Discussion: USAID is already involved in police assistance in one form or another in several countries. This involvement is accelerating, with little overall policy guidance. Moreover, the review by the working group revealed several problems with current programs.

- In LAC programs, where USAID funds are utilized, USAID has only an indirect management relationship with other USG agencies responsible for implementing police assistance programs.
- Other USG agencies concerned with police training generally have specific operational objectives and often do not share USAID's sustainable development perspective.
- There is no clear institutional incentive that encourages USAID staff to become directly engaged in police training programs.
- As a result, integration of the police assistance programs with on-going USAID democracy building efforts has been haphazard, incomplete or nonexistent.

PROPOSED CONCEPT FOR USAID'S STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

What is it?

USAID's strategic framework is the hierarchy of the Agency's mission, goals, objectives, and program strategies taken from the Agency's strategic plan (currently the Strategies for Sustainable Development and the Implementation Guidelines). The framework is one of the tools we use to manage for results. Its strength comes from its simplicity, but it has its limitations. Additional tools are needed to analyze cross-cutting concerns, such as integration, sustainability, and participation. The framework summarizes Agency policy and reflects the results being sought by Missions and offices (operating units). It is a conceptual diagram which illustrates the causal links between:

1. the Agency's mission and the national interests which USAID serves by fostering sustainable development,
2. the Agency goals and objectives and the Agency mission and,
3. the objectives which the operating units pursue to contribute to the achievement of the Agency objectives, goals and mission.

How can it be used?

It is a tool which can be used;

1. To **communicate** the essence of the Agency's strategic plan,
2. To **focus operating unit strategy plans**,
3. To **contribute to management decisions**,
4. To **analyze and report results** of Agency programs for internal and OMB reviews, Congress, and the annual report required by the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA).

The components of the framework -- see attached figures

- * *U.S. national interests* considered in identifying recipients of foreign assistance
- The *Agency mission* -- USAID's unique contribution to those national interests
- The *Agency goals* -- the long-term sector goals which support the mission
- The *Agency objectives* -- significant development objectives that contribute to Agency goals.
- The *Agency program approaches* -- the program strategies that operating units use to achieve results which contribute to the Agency objectives.

Performance Indicators

Performance indicators are dimensions of goals or objectives which are measured to assess progress being made towards the goal or objective. Baselines and targets are the values of performance indicators at the beginning and end of the planning period.

Agency mission. There are no distinct performance indicators at this level. Success in reaching the Agency's mission is determined by examining performance for each of the Agency goals.

Agency goal indicators. Indicators of goal achievement are changes in country characteristics. Goals are long-term (10+ years) objectives. Changes in their indicators may be slow and only partially caused by USAID programs. The targets established for the goal indicators are the "threshold" values which show that USAID assistance may no longer be needed in a sector.

Agency objective indicators. Agency objectives are medium term (5-8 years) and their indicators are also country characteristics. Measurable change in their indicators may take several years. Changes in these indicators are more directly related to USAID programs than changes in goal indicators.

Agency program approaches. The Agency's program approaches do not have their own indicators. Their indicators are derived from the indicators being used by operating units for their strategic objectives. Within each approach we will assess the effectiveness of the strategies by analyzing the performance indicators for the strategic objectives and intermediate results of the operating units.

Analysis and Reporting

Agency mission and goals. At this level we will examine and report on global, regional, and national trends in key indicators taken, primarily, from existing international databases of development indicators.

Agency objectives. Here we ask: What progress are the countries where we are working making towards achieving key objectives in each sector? How does their progress compare with similar countries not receiving our assistance? How do trends at this level compare with trends at the goal level? Are there management or technical issues that require further analysis. Data will be drawn from international databases.

Agency program approaches. Here we can examine the approaches and expected and actual results from operating units using the same strategy. Within each group we can examine performance by analyzing the changes in the indicators of the strategic

objectives and intermediate results and reviewing the narrative explanations in annual performance reports. Performance data on strategic objectives and intermediate results for all USAID assisted countries will soon be available on the automated, agency-wide, performance tracking system.

Results can be "rolled up" in various ways to provide a more complete picture of our results and their significance. For example, we can aggregate results across countries and look at regional trends when operating units have the same objectives and indicators. We can report and compare progress being made within a group of units pursuing the same strategy. We can compare the progress of units using different strategies to reach the same objective -- interpreting the results with caution. We can assess Agency contributions to changes in country conditions by comparing trends in country level indicators with trends in strategic objective and result indicators. We can identify successes and failures to provide a basis for further investigation. We can provide information for management decisions.

Performance Measurement and Evaluation

Both performance measurement and evaluation are required to ensure that Agency resources are deployed most effectively towards Agency goals and mission. They are distinct, but complementary, ways of obtaining information for decisions.

Managers use **performance measurement** to track their results. The core of the system is a clearly defined hierarchy of objectives, which is derived from development theory and practical experience. A limited set of performance indicators for each objective is measured to assess progress towards that objective. Performance measurement answers questions about "**whether and if**" results are being achieved on schedule.

Evaluation can answer managers' questions about "**how and why**" results are, or are not, being achieved. They can examine both intended and unintended results and more complex issues such as sustainability. They enable us to go far beyond performance measurement to examine and describe the fuller impacts of our activities. Performance measures are useful in evaluation but they provide only a small portion of the information required for impact assessment and management decisions..

To analyze and report our results we need both systems. Shortly USAID will have a broad base of performance data regarding all its programs. We can use this information to plan our evaluations more strategically -- which in turn will improve our performance measures. Both systems are essential for managing for results.

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Draft for discussion only: July 1995

**Figure 1: Agency Strategic Framework:
Proposed Objective Levels and Terms**






Figure 3: Agency Strategic Framework: The LINK between the Agency Strategic Framework and Operating Unit Results Framework



*Indicators with standard, cross-country comparable definitions; data primarily from international sources


**Indicators with similar definitions, commonly shared by Missions; data primarily from Mission sources

Figure 2: Proposed Strategic Framework



11

**Figure 4: Elements of Performance Measurement System:
Comparison of GPRA and USAID**



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Developing Strategies **3**

A Summary of Democracy Strategies & Assessments

Indonesia Assessment

A Summary of Democracy Strategies & Assessments
Jerry Hyman
Center for Democracy and Governance
7/15/95

During the past several years, various USAID bureaus and missions have conducted "democracy assessments" or sought to develop approaches to such assessments. These assessments were designed to serve as the basis for democracy strategies. The assessments have ranged from short documents drafted by USAID personnel to long papers based on several months of work by consultants. Some bureaus have required assessments before programs could be initiated; other bureaus have insisted that, to avoid delays, assistance begin before any formal assessments are undertaken.

At present, there are several theoretical approaches to assessing democracy and devising a democracy strategy. The Agency has as yet reached no consensus on either the need for or the content of general democracy assessments. Nor has it reached any consensus on approaches for sub-sector assessments: rule of law, civil society, elections and political process, or governance. Indeed, some of the approaches to macro-assessments suggest that a division of democracy programming into such sub-sectors is counter-productive.

Summarized very briefly below are four approaches to assessments, including their respective strengths and weaknesses.

1. USAID Guidelines

In February 1995, the Agency released the "Guidelines for Strategic Plans" together with five technical annexes. The primary document discusses the Agency's goal of sustainable development and key factors in the Agency's four areas of concentration, including democracy, and for each area it includes "key factors" the presence of which requires "serious consideration" to the formation of strategic objectives in the area. (Incidents of torture and disappearance, flawed elections, prohibition of political parties or independent media, and controlled judiciaries are among the key factors in democracy.) Taken together, these documents describe USAID policy particularly for sustainable development. All strategies must fit within Agency policy.

Strategic objectives are defined in reengineering terms: "the most significant development result which can be achieved within the time period of the strategic plan and for which the operational unit will be held accountable." The Guidelines also contain some general criteria for assessing---but not formulating---strategic plans. Attached to the general Guidelines are five technical annexes, one for each of the Agency's four areas of concentration under sustainable

development and one for humanitarian assistance.

The Democracy Annex describes some general democracy objectives: liberating individual and community initiatives, increasing political participation, enhancing government legitimacy, etc. For each category of countries -- sustainable development countries, transition countries and non-presence, -- the Annex describes a general approach to formulating a strategy. For sustainable development countries, the Annex suggests "but does not prescribe" a general sequence: first, begin with democratic political culture (basic human rights, political space for NGOs, parties and the press, etc.); second, look to the existence of basic institutions for democratic governance (constitutional frameworks, free, fair and competitive elections, legislative and judicial bodies necessary for enforcement of laws and policies, etc.); third, strengthen government institutions (executive branch ministries, local governments, etc.); and fourth, return to strengthen civil society as a check on government abuses (media, watchdog NGOs, etc.).

The Annex also highlights the four areas in which USAID has a comparative advantage in democracy programming: rule of law, meaningful political competition, civil society, and transparent and accountable governance. It includes "programming points" to keep in mind when programming in each of these four areas.

Strengths and Weaknesses: The Democracy Annex does not contain a theoretical approach to the development of strategies. It presents the Agency's bottom line. It provides a general guide but, except for the presumptive sequence, not a technique or approach for missions to develop democracy strategies. Missions seeking to develop a democracy strategy will want to begin with the Guidelines but will often need more.

2. Institutional Approach

Some years ago, LAC developed an Assessments Handbook which applies what has, for want of a better term, been called the "institutional" approach. The institutional approach begins with a kind of inventory of the institutions and processes that characterize democracies as we know them: freedom of speech and association, free and fair elections contested by political parties, independent media and judiciary, and so forth. At least implicitly, it posits these institutions and processes as the ultimate goals of a democracy program. The strategy for achieving the goals depends on an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of these institutions and processes in the host country, the areas we believe are most critical politically, the mission's other goals, the areas with the greatest promise for impact (e.g. resources vs. obstacles), U.S. comparative advantage (e.g. availability of excellent partners), efforts of other donors, etc.

The LAC handbook is a collection of questions, sector by

sector, and its purpose is to assist missions in their consideration of sectoral programs in democracy: administration of justice; free and fair elections; local and municipal governments; civilian control of the military; etc. It is a very useful guide, almost a checklist of questions, for DG officers implementing sectoral programs.

Strengths and Weaknesses: The institutional approach is probably the one most commonly used by USAIDs...even if they don't realize they are doing so. It appeals to our sense of what constitutes a democracy. However, it does not flow from any processual theory of democracy nor is it very dynamic. By itself, it does not suggest a timing sequence or a set of programmatic priorities. Moreover, some argue that it is too grounded in the experience of European or European-derived democracies and that it does not (sufficiently) consider the experience of Asia (eg. Japan or Korea) or Latin America and that it is inappropriate in, say, North Africa. (The LAC Handbook is not, and does not purport to be, a comprehensive approach to strategy. It is a handbook, a series of questions, useful at the implementing level to work through the analysis of a grant proposal or the steps to achieving concrete, sector-level results. Except as a checklist, it will not help to define priorities between sectors, develop programming sequences, etc.)

3. Macro-institutional framework analysis (sometimes called the "Indiana Framework").

Developed primarily by the Bureau for Africa, the macro-institutional (or Indiana) framework begins precisely where the institutional approach leaves off...with the questions of priority. It starts with a question relating to incentives: what makes people behave the way they do? The answer: rules, both formal and informal, explicit and internal. Consequently, if we want to change political behavior, we need to change the rules and incentives to which institutions and individuals respond.

This assessment approach looks at the way people are "governed," although in this framework "'governance' refers to a process that is at once broader and narrower than the total set of governmental activities. It is broader because it embraces many activities that fall outside the scope of government per se." It is narrower because it includes only part of what government may do. It refers to the prescription, invocation, application and enforcement of rules.

Good governance depends on subjecting the use of political power to multiple sources of discipline, each one operating through a different set of constraints. Each discipline is exerted through a distinct set of institutional arrangements. The basic democratic disciplines are (1) constitutional discipline, (2) electoral discipline, (3) deliberative discipline, (4) judicial discipline or a rule of law, (5) the discipline of an open public realm, and (6) the

concurrent practice of democratic governance at multiple levels. ("Assessing and Assisting Democratic Governance Reform: A Framework" Prepared by Ronald J. Oakerson for AFR/SD/HRD, February 1995)

A democracy program results from an in-depth assessment of the country's institutions and its rules or "disciplines." Where are the deficiencies of governance? What are the sources of those deficiencies? How would a change in the rules and incentives produce a better "disciplined" governance?

Strengths and weaknesses: The institutional approach provides a good handle on many of the sub-areas for programming. It fits well within Unsaïd four areas of democracy programming. However, many past assessments have taken a long time to complete, so the time between assessment and program delivery has been quite long. That is not inherent in the approach, however, and AFR is working to reduce the time between the decision to begin a democracy assessment and the resulting program.

More critically, like the institutional approach, the Indiana framework reflects a static approach, not a dynamic one. How and why do rules change? Why would those who benefit from the present set of rules agree to change them? Or is change forced by the rule-disadvantaged?

The framework also does not provide guidance on how a mission chooses between the various disciplines? Is there a temporal order or sequence? Is there a preference list between the "disciplines"? The constitutional discipline is first but what happens after that?

Finally, the framework does not suggest whether attitudes and values have any role in defining---or changing---the rules or are whether they are merely the result of institutional arrangements? This again may affect project development.

4. Political Economy

The political economy approach begins with the assumption that the "political behavior" of various groups a country's political process is driven primarily by the pursuit of concrete interests, rather than by a set of abstract ideals or political values. For a variety of reasons (previous political rule structures, differential wealth, ability and willingness to use force), some interest groups have substantial "leverage" over others. Particularly in developing in flux, that leverage is used by existing elites and their allies to shape emerging institutions, policies, regulations, and sometimes even value systems to enhance their dominance. Donor efforts will often be wasted or even counterproductive unless they take into account the ability of dominant groups to derail or coop the political and legal reform process. Donor assistance will have the greatest impact where it strengthens the ability of pro-reform

constituencies to organize, access information, build coalitions, and enter decision making processes through parties and parliaments in ways that pressure leadership in the direction of reform.

Programmatically, two principles can help to increase the impact of DG assistance: First, is there sufficient political will in support of proposed activity to make successful implementation likely? Second, if the activity is successful will it enhance or undermine the ability of pro-reform coalitions to shape emerging institutions, policies, and political processes? DG assessments conducted under a political economy framework can help a mission answer those two questions to design high impact and cost effective DG programs fully tailored to the host country's situation.

Strengths and weaknesses: This approach is more dynamic than the institutional approach. It asks why and how political reform take place and, therefore, how it can best be supported in a specific country. Moreover, because it links political and legal reform to other dimensions of the development process, it is likely to produce greater synergy among the economic, social, and political components of the mission's portfolio.

On the negative side, the political economy approach may be viewed by some as overly interventionist in its explicit targeting of pro-reform constituencies, and in its concern with "outcomes" in addition to pure "process". At the same time, this approach tends toward "risk aversion", often resulting in a conclusion that certain aspects of political and legal reform are simply unlikely to yield results in a given country at a given time. This may discourage investment in pilot or demonstration efforts that "test the waters" in what may in fact be situations more fertile for DG programming than the political economy assessment might suggest. Finally, the political economy approach often results in a conclusion that political change is secondary to economic change. When our interests in democratic change conflict with our interests in economic change, the economic ones will win out, if only because they are seen as the basis for future democratic victories. Is that consistent with Agency policy and US interests? And what about values and attitudes, are they simply products of interests? Can a political economy emphasize on conflict over concrete interests adequately address programming requirements in the context of popular democratic revolutions presumably driven by democratic ideals as occurred in Asia and Europe in the 1980's?

A Nation in Waiting

Indonesia in the 1990s

ADAM SCHWARZ

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Contents

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10

A democratic future?

The problem of finding a collection of 'wise men' and leaving the government to them is thus an insoluble one. That is the ultimate reason for democracy.

Bertrand Russell¹

Contrary to what American political commentators say, I do not believe that democracy necessarily leads to development. I believe that what a country needs to develop is discipline more than democracy.

Lee Kuan Yew²

The essence of democracy is that people freely participate in the political process. I don't know what Pancasila Democracy is, but it isn't that.

Sri Bintang Pamungkas³

Modern history is full of examples of autocrats, who not only alienated their peoples, but also did everything they could to make a peaceful change of rulers and policies impossible.

Ben Anderson⁴

On 5 March 1993, Indonesian Democratic Party member Sabam Sirait felt his patience snap. With the fifth day of the People's Consultative Assembly drawing to a close, Sirait could no longer deny what he already knew to be true: his party's efforts to reform Indonesia's tightly controlled political system were going to be stymied. As he rose from his chair to make a rare interruption in the carefully managed assembly, a year's worth of frustration welled up.

Only ten months earlier the future had begun to look brighter for the

Democratic Party, the smallest of Indonesia's three political parties. Fashioning itself as the defender of the poor, the party ran an innovative and popular campaign ahead of the parliamentary elections held in June 1992. Attracting hordes of younger Indonesians, its star performers were the party's leader Suryadi, businessman and economist Kwik Kian Gie and, especially, Guruh Sukarnoputra, the youngest son of Indonesia's founding father. In their campaign speeches, the party's politicians broached several of the New Order's political taboos by calling for a limit on presidential terms, insisting on a thorough overhaul of the electoral process, demanding the government respect the spirit of democracy as laid out in the 1945 Constitution, and implying it was prepared to nominate someone other than Soeharto for president in the 1993 People's Assembly session. Suryadi said that having more than one candidate for president 'is simply a matter of democracy. You can't force people to all choose the same candidate.'⁵ Brave words, although they would soon prove to be untrue.

In the elections, the Democratic Party obtained fifteen per cent of the votes, an improvement over its 1987 performance but much less than party leaders had expected. As in 1987, allegations of vote rigging surfaced but these were denied by the government and then set aside. Despite its worse than expected results, however, the party emerged from the elections in reasonably good shape. Its promises of political change had proved to be enormously popular, especially among the young. Several million Indonesians attended its final rally in Jakarta, a turn-out well above any that the ruling party Golkar was able to attract. But with the ending of the 'festival of democracy'—as the government likes to call the five-yearly parliamentary elections—the Democratic Party was faced with the daunting task of translating its campaign message into government policy.

When the three political parties began meeting in October 1992 to prepare the agenda for the People's Assembly the following March, the Democratic Party resurrected its campaign demands for comprehensive changes to the electoral system, and an end to the abuse of power, corruption and injustice. The most radical of its nine demands was for the People's Assembly to vote on a presidential ticket, a sharp departure from the usual practice of having a single presidential candidate 'chosen' by consensus. To prove its seriousness, the party decided not to nominate a presidential candidate until its national congress convened in January 1993, even though all the other factions in the Assembly—the two other political parties, the armed forces (Abri) and regional representatives—had already nominated Soeharto. The Democratic Party's proposals ran into heavy resistance from Golkar and Abri representatives who waged a strong defence of the status quo.

In the lead-up to its congress, the Democratic Party's president Suryadi came under extreme pressure from reformers who wanted the party to

nominate someone other than Soeharto for president and thereby force the People's Assembly into a vote, as well as from the government which was equally insistent that the nation's time-honoured political approach based on consensus not be disrupted. The risks for Suryadi were high. Caving in to government pressure would damage not only his credibility but also the legitimacy of the party. But crossing the government would surely invite retribution and harassment from the authorities. The stakes were raised in early January when Guruh Sukarnoputra, the party's most popular campaigner, offered himself as a presidential candidate.

As the Democratic Party's congress opened on 12 January 1993, supporters demonstrated outside calling on Suryadi to respect the party's campaign pledges. But inside the meeting hall, the government brought its full influence to bear on Suryadi. In a blunt and unambiguous speech to delegates, Lieutenant General Harsudiono Hartas, who headed the social and political affairs department at Abri headquarters, warned his audience that 'Abri will not take the risk of closing its eyes to anything that could endanger the development of the nation . . . Abri is watchful of any issues that could shake the national stability through intellectual manipulation.'⁶

According to several delegates, military officials met privately with Suryadi on several occasions to drive the point home. The officials argued that the party's refusal to nominate Soeharto was pointless since he was going to be elected president anyway, and that to break with the consensus tradition would be bad for Indonesia and bad for Suryadi. The meetings served to remind Suryadi that, at least with regard to the issue of presidential succession, the desire for consensus means in practice an insistence on unanimity.

When the congress closed on 14 January, Suryadi announced the party's unanimous support for another Soeharto presidential term. While the decision was not unexpected, it left many delegates and supporters—including Sirait—deeply disappointed and feeling betrayed by the party's leadership. The party had also decided to drop all its demands for political change except for one measure calling for electoral reform. Objecting to Golkar's monopoly on organising parliamentary elections, the Democratic Party insisted that all three political parties be allowed representatives on the commission which sets the rules for campaigning. It also urged the government to make election day a national holiday so that civil servants would not feel pressured to vote for Golkar. Although these two demands fell a long way short of the radical reforms the party had campaigned for eight months earlier, the Democratic Party at least had the distinction of being the only parliamentary faction to enter the People's Assembly with anything resembling an agenda for change, no matter how modest.

But as Sirait and his fellow reformers would learn as soon as the People's Assembly opened on 1 March 1993, the government had no

intention of accommodating any of the party's demands. Attempts to place the electoral reform issue on the Assembly's agenda were brusquely swept aside by the Golkar and Abri officials chairing the working sessions. So, as Golkar chairman Wahono banged his gavel on 5 March to close the general session, Sirait marched to the podium followed by two other delegates from his party. While other delegates shouted, whistled and called for security guards to physically remove them, the three Democratic Party representatives insisted that their electoral reform proposal at least be submitted for discussion. As a tongue-in-cheek *Jakarta Post* editorial put it: 'That dreaded incident—the interruption of procedures in the nation's highest legislative body—has happened at last.'⁷

Little would become of the dreaded interruption. Sirait and the other two renegades were subjected to intense pressure from Golkar and Abri leaders to back down—advice which was also offered by Democratic Party chief Suryadi—and back down they did. On 7 March, the party withdrew its demand for electoral reform, allowing the People's Assembly to return to its prepared script. As a weary spokesman explained: 'PDI [Indonesian Democratic Party] had no choice but to submit to the will of the majority.'⁸

Suryadi's acquiescence to military wishes in January 1993 was not enough to mollify Soeharto, however. In July 1993, the Democratic Party held a national congress to elect a new chairman, a post for which Suryadi was the leading candidate. The military leaned on Democratic Party delegates from the provinces to rebuff Suryadi and choose a chairman more to its liking. Suryadi was able to resist this challenge and secured enough votes to be re-elected, but his success was to be short-lived. Citing procedural irregularities at the Democratic Party's congress, the military pressured Suryadi's rivals in the party's leadership to set up a caretaker administration in August 1993, which then proceeded to call for new elections. It was understood in Democratic Party circles and elsewhere that the pressure to unseat Suryadi came from Soeharto, who was said to be unhappy with Suryadi for his frank criticisms of government policies and officially sanctioned corruption in the campaign for parliamentary elections in 1992.⁹ 'No one can afford to be independent around here for too long,' said Democratic Party delegate Laksamana Sukardi. 'If this is a trial run for the presidential succession,' he added, 'then we're in for a real mess. Intervention like this is not just bad for the Democratic Party, it's bad for democracy in Indonesia.'¹⁰

As it turned out, Soeharto would have been better off sticking with Suryadi. Having forced the Democratic Party to hold new internal elections, the army assumed that chastened party delegates would choose a new chairman more sympathetic to the government. But in a sign of the times—a worrying sign from Soeharto's perspective—the Democratic Party simply refused to play along. Megawati Sukarnoputri, Guruh's elder

sister, allowed herself to be drafted as a candidate for chairman and reformers in the party rallied around her.

The prospect of a Sukarno scion heading one of Indonesia's three permitted political parties was greeted with dismay inside the presidential palace. Acutely sensitive to his historical legacy, Soeharto has spared little effort in distancing himself from his flamboyant predecessor. But although New Order doctrine paints Sukarno's legacy as an unvarnished failure, Indonesia's first president remains a widely popular figure, especially among the young. The Democratic Party had used the banner of 'Sukarnoism'—which was understood to be a code word for more democracy and greater government accountability—to great effect in the 1987 parliamentary elections. The party's followers festooned rallies with banners and posters carrying Sukarno's likeness and favourite phrases. Sukarno's resurgent popularity became such a visible rebuke to Soeharto that the government prohibited Democratic Party enthusiasts from wearing their Sukarno t-shirts in the 1992 parliamentary election campaign. And now, a year and a half later, Sukarno's daughter was quickly becoming the frontrunner to succeed Suryadi as Democratic Party chairman.

The military went back to work, pressuring the party's delegates in the provinces not to support Megawati's bid for chairman. But when the party's second congress got underway in December 1993, the delegates complained instead of military harassment and reiterated their support for Megawati. Army officers and government officials tried desperately to force the party to choose its new chairman by committee—which they could control—rather than by floor vote. When that effort failed as well, the military simply ensured that the party's caretaker administration did not attend the closing session of the congress, thereby making it impossible for the party to ratify Megawati's election.¹¹ Much to the government's surprise, its ham-handed attempts to intervene again in the Democratic Party's internal affairs elicited howls of outrage from other politicians, the press and many influential retired officers. It soon became clear that the government's already battered credibility would come under renewed attack if it didn't relent in its opposition to Megawati's candidacy. Finally, in the last week of the year, the government agreed to endorse Megawati as Democratic Party chairman, although it fought to the end to see that the party's most vocal critics and Megawati's closest supporters were kept off the party's new executive board.¹²

All in all, 1993 was a rough year for both the Democratic Party and the government officials charged with keeping it in line. Government interference did succeed in exacerbating the party's own internal disunities and forced the party to pass through one wrenching gathering after another. But, by the end of the year, the government came off looking the worst of the two. Its futile attempts at weakening the party and diluting

its reforming instincts only succeeded in highlighting the government's own weaknesses while at the same time transforming Megawati's into a credible opposition figure and establishing the Democratic Party as a legitimate rival to Golkar in the 1997 parliamentary elections. More broadly, the government's troubles with the Democratic Party illustrate one of the most serious problems facing Indonesia: as much as the government would like to pretend otherwise, pressures for political change are rising and the existing political structure is poorly equipped to accommodate them.

As earlier chapters have discussed, Soeharto came to power in a specific historical context in which a reassertion of authority and control was of paramount importance. He succeeded beyond all expectations. His achievement in imposing order on Indonesia and building up the power of the state paved the way for other accomplishments, notably in economic development and in strengthening the bonds of national unity. But almost three decades later, the challenges of the day are different. The concerns of state authority and national unity have been joined, if not superseded, by new concerns of economic competitiveness, wealth inequalities, human rights and political pluralism. The overriding political question facing Indonesia in the 1990s, then, is whether and how to adjust its political system to deal with these new concerns. Will Indonesia be well served by maintaining a dominant chief executive and keeping civil society—represented by, among others, parliament, the press and the legal system—weak and ineffectual? Should the reins of power remain in the hands of the very few? Is it reasonable to expect that Soeharto, in power for more than half of Indonesia's existence as a nation, will be able to adapt to the new realities? Does the People's Assembly really represent the 'will of the majority', as the government maintains?

Many in the Indonesian elite would answer 'no' to all these questions. And if the response to the Democratic Party's campaign platform of 1992 is any guide, these feelings extend considerably beyond the elite. A great deal of uncertainty and disagreement exists about where Indonesia's political future lies, or should lie. But there would appear to be widespread agreement within the elite and the middle class that certain aspects of the political status quo are in dire need of change. Many Indonesians in these categories accept the need for a strong executive branch, but feel that the balance has been tipped much too far in its favour. A strictly controlled political system is no longer seen as the best approach for dealing with a variety of social tensions, from Muslims agitating for Islamic values and traditions to be reflected more overtly in government policies, to the resentment of the wealth and standing of ethnic-Chinese businessmen, to the debilitating effect of pervasive corruption, to the widespread view in the Outer Islands that Java is the first island among equals. The common thread linking all these concerns is a sense of frustration that changes in the economic and social spheres have not been accompanied by any real change in the political arena.

The transformation of Indonesia's economy is probably the most important factor behind the growing pressures for change. The robust economic growth of the past half-decade has enlarged and strengthened the business community and helped reduce Indonesians' isolation from the outside world. The move from a state-directed economic policy to a greater emphasis on private sector-led growth has given the emerging middle class more self-confidence, more leverage and a desire, says Ben Anderson, 'to have a political role commensurate with its economic stake'. The middle class, Anderson continues:

does not have any substantial interest in Suharto's pre-1975 'security state', and does not have much sympathy with the repressions that as much as anything have spawned the recent violence in Aceh, as well as the longstanding resistances in West New Guinea [Irian Jaya] and East Timor. Many of its younger members are uncomfortable with Indonesia's international image. Businessmen dislike, or are envious of, the Suharto family's greedy monopolism; lawyers dislike the government's profound contempt for law. Students and intellectuals dislike the boring nature of the press and the dreariness of university life. More important, there is less and less feeling that all this is *necessary*.¹³

The government seems incapable of effectively responding to this deepening disenchantment. It pays lip service to the concept of 'openness'—which is, among its several meanings, also a code word for democratisation—but its actions belie its words. Within the government there remains an as yet unresolved tug-of-war between those who believe that the existing political system needs reconditioning and those who think that only tinkering is required.

Which view is likely to prevail? It is a question, unfortunately, which can be answered only with hypotheses, alternative scenarios and still other questions. Given the constraints on public expression, it is difficult to gauge how strong pressures for change are, or to predict how these pressures may be reflected in policy or political changes. Much will depend on the extent to which Soeharto is able to continue setting an agenda of limited change only. But for all the uncertainty, the debate on Indonesia's political future is real, and its broad outlines are reasonably clear.

This debate is more properly thought of as two debates. One concerns what is known as the 'succession issue', which focuses on the tricky task of removing a president who is firmly ensconced in office and who shows few signs of being willing to step down. It asks whether a coalition of forces can be assembled to force Soeharto to leave power and what are the factors that work for and against such a coalition being formed. The second debate revolves around the broader issue of political change; it focuses on what changes should or should not be made to the political system created by Soeharto. The two debates are often confused and

treated as one. There is a good deal of overlap between them, for the simple reason that it may not be possible to change the political system while Soeharto is in power. But they are, in essence, two separate issues and this chapter tries to treat them separately. But before turning to these debates, it is worthwhile taking a brief look at the existing political institutions and the ways in which they serve to prop up the status quo.

The political machinery

Indonesia's two main political institutions are the parliament and the People's Consultative Assembly, the 1000-member body which meets once every five years to pick a president and vice-president and to draw up the 'guidelines for state policy'. (The 500 members of the parliament form half of the People's Assembly, with Soeharto, the military, regional bodies and the political parties choosing the other half.) The constitution charges these two institutions with translating public aspirations into government policy.

The two main political players are Abri and Golkar. They are closely related to each other, although they are not identical. Abri is the most powerful component of the 'Golkar family' but government bureaucrats and civilian politicians also hold powerful positions in the party. Soeharto provides the most important link between the two, as he is both the Abri commander in chief and the paramount leader of Golkar. As described earlier, Golkar came into its own in the early 1970s when the government forced the existing nine political parties to merge into two new ones. The idea behind Golkar was that it would represent everybody. Its name, an abbreviation for *golongon karya*, or functional groups, explains its identity. It is the intended political vehicle for all societal groups, from women's clubs to farmers to labour unions to industry associations. As well as representing the entire spectrum of society, Golkar acts as the legislative representative of the army and the bureaucracy.

In practice, Golkar has done more to serve the interests of its creators than act as a tribune of its member groups. It would appear to have two central purposes as far as the government is concerned: to dispel the notion that Soeharto is an authoritarian ruler; and to absorb societal grievances in a way that does not impinge on the executive's freedom to act. Golkar is not the only parliamentary actor—the two small opposition parties and Abri are represented as well—but it can be described fairly as a proxy for the parliament as a whole. It embodies what Soeharto believes a parliament should do—implement the government's policies, not participate in the formation of those policies.

Golkar draws support from many Indonesians because it represents a government which has an enviable record of poverty alleviation and economic development. But Golkar's dominance at the polls owes at least

as much to an electoral system which is overwhelmingly tilted in its favour. The party's presence extends down to the smallest village, while its two smaller rivals are prevented from operating in rural areas. The government's resources and authority are pledged to Golkar, and areas that vote against Golkar risk seeing development funding dry up. While none of the parties is allowed to campaign except for a brief period before the five-yearly elections, the restriction is less onerous for Golkar since it is synonymous with the government which, of course, is in action all the time.

The Golkar-dominated parliament—the party collected 68 per cent of the votes cast in June 1992, about the same percentage it has held since the early 1970s—has never drafted its own legislation and has never rejected a bill submitted by the executive branch. It has no say in cabinet appointments, little influence over economic policy and virtually no role at all in the making of foreign policy. It is, in short, as effective as the government wants it to be. Like a child, the parliament is displayed for visitors (and foreign legislators and donors) but otherwise is expected to be seen rather than heard. The running joke about the parliament is that its activities can be summarised by the five Ds: *datang, duduk, dengar, diam, duit*, which, roughly translated, means 'show up, sit down, listen, shut up and collect your paycheck'.

Not surprisingly, many Indonesians view the parliament as a body more concerned with appearances than content, Golkar as an ineffectual government creation and parliamentary elections as an event rather unrelated to democracy. In most cases, parliamentary legislators have little connection with the people or area they nominally represent, and the carefully controlled electoral process largely severs the link between a legislator's performance and his or her electability. In fact, elections in Indonesia, far from empowering the people, would seem to have the opposite effect: 'Legitimate' politics is confined to an arena which is unable to make much of a difference and all other political activity is deemed 'illegitimate'. This carefully controlled electoral process 'serves to distance people from politics', says Anderson. 'It is designed to make sure people do not do all the things they might otherwise do in a participatory democracy . . . The real function of elections' political mechanism . . . is actually to pacify, to mediate and to punctuate political participation.'¹⁴

Attempts have been made to fashion a more independent stance for Golkar, and by extension the parliament. So far, however, these attempts have floundered against Soeharto's reluctance to reinvigorate a political system he has spent so much effort to neutralise. As the government critic Marsillam Simanjuntak tartly put it, explanations for the parliament's 'systemic paralysis' need go no further than to recognise that a 'premed-

itated political lobotomy [was] performed on the institution [by the executive branch]'.¹⁵

Golkar's experience in the mid and late 1980s highlighted the political system's resistance to change. From 1983 to 1988, the civilian wing of the party grew in stature under the tutelage and support of its chairman Sudharmono, a retired military general.¹⁶ Together with Sarwono Kusumaatmadja and former student activists Rachmat Witoelar and Akbar Tandjung, Sudharmono believed that Golkar as a reasonably independent political party would be an ideal machine for producing a new generation of Indonesian leaders. Their hope was to lessen Golkar's dependence on the executive branch and the military and to turn the party into a proper political party.

By the end of the decade, however, these plans ran into determined opposition from Soeharto and parts of the army. The army's reaction seems to have been motivated mostly by a dislike of Sudharmono. Although he came from a military background, Sudharmono was deeply distrusted by influential figures at Abri headquarters, notably Benny Murdani, who commanded the armed forces until February 1988. As a military lawyer, Sudharmono lacked combat credentials and was considered an unreliable leader. Apart from serving as Golkar chairman since 1983, Sudharmono had held the powerful state secretary role since 1973 through which he exerted considerable influence over the disbursement of government funds.

Through mechanisms like Team 10, discussed in Chapter 5, Sudharmono cultivated a handful of indigenous businessmen by widening their access to government projects and state bank funding. The army, to put it mildly, felt Sudharmono was not looking after its interests with equal vigour and tried, without success, to persuade Soeharto not to pick him as his vice-president in 1988.

Between the People's Assembly session of March 1988 and Golkar's national congress seven months later, the military took matters in its own hands. It placed military representatives in some two-thirds of Golkar's provincial chairmanships and spread rumours that Sudharmono had links with the banned Communist Party. 'We knew Sudharmono had built up contacts in Golkar,' said General (ret.) Soemitro. 'That's why we had to put military people in the Golkar provincial slots so he wouldn't be re-elected Golkar chairman.'¹⁷ The military got what it wanted. In the Golkar congress, Sudharmono was shunted aside and replaced with another Soeharto loyalist, Wahono, also a retired general but one with no obvious political ambitions. In hindsight, it is hard to tell whether this was a victory for Abri or for Soeharto, but it was clearly a loss for Sudharmono and his civilian supporters.

Abri opposition to Sudharmono, however, did not mean it was opposed to a relatively more independent parliament. The dominant Benny

Murdani-wing of the army, resentful at its dwindling influence with Soeharto, saw a more active and critical parliament as serving its own interests. The army's attitude was welcomed by Golkar reformers, the two smaller parties and promoted by the Speaker of the Parliament Kharis Suhud. And on a series of issues between 1989-91, the parliament parted company with the executive branch and adopted an increasingly critical stance. It objected to higher utility prices, jumped on the 'openness' bandwagon, supported criticisms of press censorship laws, opened a dialogue with the political dissidents known as the 'Group of Fifty', championed the cause of striking labourers and offered encouragement to new labour unions, sided with farmers in several high-profile land compensation cases and even made the occasional disparaging remark about the business empires of Soeharto's children. On many of these issues, military representatives took leading roles, a fact which did not go unnoticed in the presidential palace.

By the middle of 1991, Soeharto's patience with the invigorated parliament was exhausted. In August 1991, the leaders of Golkar's three factions—the army, bureaucracy and civilian politicians—finished assembling a tentative list of party candidates for the general elections ten months away and made plans to seek Soeharto's approval of the list. The so-called master list contained almost eight hundred names. Only those at the top of the list for each province would be elected, with a few more serving only in the People's Assembly.

The party leaders were not expecting any opposition. But when Soeharto saw the list he made some immediate changes. Several of the most outspoken members of the existing parliament were scratched or moved so far down the ranks as to have no chance of re-election. Altogether, about fifteen names were dropped. While the number was small, the message was loud. University of Indonesia political scientist Yuwono Sudarsono called Soeharto's move a 'retrenchment of *keterbukaan* (openness). The president felt things were getting out of hand.'¹⁸ Marzuki Darusman, one of the legislators denied re-election, put the case more bluntly: 'After five years of heightened parliamentary profile, [Soeharto] has completely overturned the norms [of debate] which have developed in recent years. The message is that Soeharto doesn't want the parliament to be a participant in the national debate. The whole episode makes a sham of openness.'¹⁹

Golkar, as would be expected of a party in power, ran a conservative campaign ahead of the elections in June 1992. Stressing the government's record of economic achievement, the party said with some justification that it alone had any hope of influencing the government to address social grievances. 'With Golkar there will be continuity,' said the party's secretary-general Rachmat Witoelar, 'and continuity leads to more productivity.' But Witoelar was also quick to concede that in practice Golkar's

leverage is slight. 'Golkar doesn't consider itself to be in a position to bargain with the president. You can't bargain within the same family.'²⁰ Prudently, the party avoided comment on some of the more important societal grievances. 'We will not infringe on sensitive issues,' Witoelar said. 'Talking about these things will not solve the problems but only aggravate the situation.'²¹

The hopes of Golkar reformers and their Abri sympathisers would be dashed again in October 1993 when the party met to choose a new chairman. Although the military had again built up its representation in Golkar's provincial chapters, its input into selecting the party's chairman was practically nil. And the same could be said of the civilian politicians who run the party on a day-to-day basis. Instead, Soeharto, as head of the party's all-powerful board of patrons, entrusted the management of the Golkar congress to Minister of Research and Technology B. J. Habibie, blithely ignored all dissenting views from party delegates and installed his long-serving information minister, Harmoko, as party chairman. Harmoko, a politician whose principal qualification is an unshakeable loyalty to Soeharto, was the first civilian to ascend to Golkar's top job.

But nobody confused the much-touted 'civilianisation' of Golkar with democratisation.²² Just the opposite, in fact. The day after Harmoko's election, Golkar announced a new 45-member executive board crammed with Soeharto loyalists. The president's daughter Siti Hardijanti Rukmana was named one of the party's vice-chairmen and his son Bambang Trihatmodjo became party treasurer. In addition, sons and daughters of some of Soeharto's most trusted peers were well represented on the board. 'It's nepotism on a grand scale,' said a disgusted Marzuki Darusman, the former Golkar parliamentarian who currently sits on the national Human Rights Commission. 'The executive board was chosen for the sole purpose of re-electing Soeharto again in 1998. It's simply no longer realistic to expect Golkar to ever be independent of Soeharto.'²³

Whatever its shortcomings, Golkar is looked on by many as a crucial player in Indonesia's political future. Its ability to absorb and respond to public pressures will determine the extent to which the parliament plays an active role in making Indonesia more democratic. Equally important, because Golkar can command a majority of votes in the 1000-member People's Assembly, the party will play a crucial role in finding and electing a successor to Soeharto. 'I think all areas of government are already aware that if we are going to build a democracy, we have to work through, and build up, Golkar and the parliament,' acknowledged Golkar member Theo Sambuaga.²⁴ Whether Golkar is able to make itself more relevant to a changing, increasingly complex and demanding society remains to be seen, however. Its performance in the People's Assembly sessions of March 1993 provided little encouragement for its reformist

elements. Although apparently divided on who it favoured for vice-president, it staunchly resisted the attempt to make the People's Assembly vote on the presidential ticket. And even though a poll of Assembly members showed that more than one third of Golkar representatives favoured introducing presidential term limits,²⁵ Golkar leaders would not permit this issue to be discussed in the Assembly's sessions.

As might be expected, the People's Assembly of 1993 was largely bereft of suspense or surprise. The re-election of Soeharto for a sixth five-year term was never in doubt, least of all by the delegates themselves. The People's Assembly, explained the body's Deputy Speaker Ismail Hasan Metareum, is 'like a wedding ceremony. Although everyone knows who the bride and bridegroom are, the ritual is necessary to formalise the union.'²⁶ Perhaps, though, the most revealing comment of all about the Assembly was made by the former police chief of Jakarta, General Kunarto. Appointed as a delegate, Kunarto told journalists after the Assembly closed that he had gained nothing by attending its deliberations except that his lips had swollen from having to repeatedly shout 'Setuju!' (I agree!) to decisions made beforehand.²⁷

The succession dilemma

Perhaps only two things can be said with certainty about Soeharto's eventual replacement as Indonesia's president. The first is that it will happen; mortality, if nothing else, will take care of that. The second is that, when it does happen, it will create a good deal of uncertainty.

Developing a workable mechanism for the presidential succession is the most pressing political issue facing the Indonesian leadership. Nothing less than the nation's political future is at stake. Political stability has been one of the hallmarks of Soeharto's rule but that is not the same thing as saying that Indonesia is politically stable. Before that claim can be made, it must be tested by a transition of power.²⁸ Only then can it be said that the political system itself is stable, and not merely that one ruler, albeit a strong one, was able to keep destabilising forces at bay while he was in power.

Many Indonesians would argue that continued political stability will depend to a great extent on *how* Soeharto leaves office.²⁹ Indonesia has had only one presidential succession, and it happened amidst the traumatic conditions created by the coup attempt in September 1965 and the messy confrontation between Sukarno and Soeharto which followed. It was an experience that no one in Indonesia would like to repeat, including Soeharto. But can a repetition be avoided? Will Soeharto's departure from power be any smoother than his entrance?

Soeharto could die before his current mandate expires, of course. He turned 72 in June 1993, compared with an average life expectancy in

Indonesia of about 62. But he appears reasonably healthy, if mildly overweight, and barring unforeseen consequences it seems unlikely that health reasons will prevent him from serving at least until 1998. But should Soeharto die in office before 1998, the most likely result would be for the military to reassert control over the political process. Such an event, while succeeding in changing the personality at the top, would leave unanswered the important question of Indonesia's political maturity. What the nation needs, most Indonesians would agree, is to experience a peaceful, reasonably transparent succession of power in the manner prescribed by the constitution. There is a lot of work that needs to be done before that can happen.

Perhaps the most urgent requirement for a 'successful' presidential succession is planning. Without it, said the late Lieutenant General T. B. Simatupang, the situation in Indonesia could degenerate into 'a kind of anarchy with everyone manoeuvring for position'.³⁰ Unfortunately, there has been little planning for the succession so far, at least in public, a fact which is making the succession process much more complicated than it needs to be. Indeed, the riskiest aspect of Soeharto's eventual departure from office is its sheer unpredictability.

One reason for this unpredictability is that presidential succession is not considered a topic fit for public discussion. Most mainstream politicians and the press are fearful that any comments on this subject will be construed by Soeharto as criticism of his leadership. When, in late 1993, several academics and Islamic leaders stated publicly that it was high time for Indonesia to discuss the presidential succession process, the newly-installed Golkar chairman Harmoko cut them off at the pass, describing their opinions as 'unethical'.³¹

Soeharto is no more willing to countenance discussion of topics that serve as proxies for the succession issue, one example of which is term limits. On many occasions the president has bluntly and often angrily rejected calls for a limit on the number of terms a president can serve. In 1992, he again dismissed the idea when it was raised in the parliamentary election campaign, calling it a form of 'political castration'.³² Soeharto appears to be equally reluctant to discuss the succession issue in private. When the topic of his replacement arises, he invariably replies that it is a matter for the People's Assembly to deal with.

This answer, of course, sheds little light on the issue because Soeharto controls the mechanism for presidential elections. He determines who occupies the top Golkar slots and, by keeping a tight leash on the electoral process, he can ensure that the party's legislative dominance remains intact. Moreover, by having veto power over the selection of Golkar and Abri delegates to the People's Assembly, he has been able to ensure that a comfortable majority remains loyal to him. Thus, by saying that the presidential succession issue is a matter for the People's Assembly,

Soeharto is in effect saying that it is really up to himself. The problem is that nobody knows what Soeharto plans to do. He said in his autobiography published in the late 1980s that he would probably step down in 1993, but then he didn't. Is he thinking of stepping down in the middle of his current term? In 1998? In 2003? Does he want to stay in office until he dies? Is he worried about what will happen to his children and their business interests once he is out of power? What will it take to convince him to step aside? The answer to all these questions is that nobody—and this possibly includes Soeharto as well—seems to know. And because they don't know, the parts of the Indonesian elite who would like to see Soeharto out of the way are being forced to consider how they can counteract Soeharto's manipulation of the People's Assembly by manipulating it themselves. From their point of view, this is the only way forward since Soeharto has made it all but impossible to reform the political system from within.

Another factor contributing to 'succession unpredictability' is the lack of credible alternatives to Soeharto. The generally accepted profile of Soeharto's successor is that he will be Javanese, Muslim and a military officer. Identifying realistic candidates is no easy task, however. Indonesia's current president is a strong believer in absolute power and he has little room in his domain for strong, independent-minded figures whose loyalty to himself is in question. And he has proven to be adept at undercutting any potential rivals. In this respect, Soeharto's style of rule bears more than a little resemblance to that of ancient Javanese monarchs. And true to Javanese court traditions, Soeharto has shown no interest in openly grooming a successor. None of the vice-presidents chosen by Soeharto has been considered presidential material. (The current vice-president, Try Sutrisno, may be an exception to this rule but this is more by default than by design.) Restrictions on the press and on political campaigning have helped ensure that political aspirants find it hard to build any mass-based support. The resulting picture is a towering president surrounded by a host of political dwarves. It is a picture, moreover, which Soeharto uses to great effect in thwarting challenges to his rule. If there is no one who can fill my shoes, he says in effect, why should I go?

Yet another factor is that whoever replaces Soeharto will by definition be a different kind of president. Indonesia's third president, regardless of political philosophy, will have nowhere near the personal influence that Soeharto enjoys, influence that extends well beyond the powers accorded him by office.³³ Soeharto came to power in the mid-1960s when political and social institutions were in disarray. His efforts to restore order, which required strengthening the presidency, were welcomed or at least accepted by a broad cross-section of society. Building on that base, Soeharto over the years has constructed an intricate network of alliances with important

sections of the military and business elite, he has gained control over Golkar and by extension the parliament and the People's Assembly, and he has learned how to silence his critics, sometimes by repression, sometimes by co-optation. Soeharto's successor, necessarily a much less experienced politician, will inherit only a fraction of his impressive array of powers. That points inevitably to a power vacuum when Soeharto finally leaves office, whenever that might be. Someone or some entity will have to fill that vacuum. It might be Abri, it might be Golkar, or it might be some other group or coalition of groups. The point is that no matter how well managed the succession process is, it will be disruptive as traditional institutional relationships will be upset. This process would be less worrisome for those groups interested in filling this vacuum if they could discuss the problem among themselves prior to the succession itself. Unfortunately, there is little reason to believe that Soeharto is prepared to allow such a dialogue to develop.

The combination of these three obstacles and uncertainties serves only to illustrate how difficult it will be to arrange a 'smooth' succession process. But for the reasons listed above, the political status quo in Indonesia is unsustainable; something has to give. Soeharto could announce at any time that he plans to step down in 1998. That would make the situation considerably less unpredictable, though not completely so. Or he could announce that he is *not* planning to step down in 1998. Or he could initiate a public debate on how the succession process will work, a debate that would go far beyond the simplistic view that it is simply 'a matter for the People's Assembly to decide'. But none of these options is terribly likely.

Much more likely is that Soeharto does nothing to reduce the uncertainty of his succession and that everyone is left guessing until the last moment. In recent years especially, Soeharto has behaved as if he is very much aware that once loyalty to him begins to slip, it could evaporate quickly. He seems keenly conscious of the need to retain the means by which he can both reward his allies and punish his enemies. And by diligently placing trusted aides in Golkar and in the top ranks of the military, he has made it more likely that the People's Consultative Assembly meeting in 1998 will be beholden to his wishes. The question, then, is can Soeharto get away with it? Could he manage to get himself re-elected again in 1998 if he chooses to stand again? If he decides to step down, will he be able to hand-pick his successor? Can he, more generally, control his own destiny? It is hard to answer 'no' to any of these questions precisely because Soeharto has been in power so long and has proven himself time and time again to be a masterful political operator. Consequently, the most plausible succession scenario is the one which has Soeharto in control of the process.

But there is another scenario worth considering. This scenario has

Soeharto gradually losing control over his own succession as 1998 draws nearer. It has a coalition of elite groups dissatisfied with all or parts of Soeharto's leadership banding together for the purpose of obliging Soeharto to step down in 1998. The key is whether the anti-Soeharto groups can find common ground. Individually, they do not pose much of a threat to Soeharto, but united they would constitute a formidable pressure group for change. What might an anti-Soeharto coalition look like, and what would hold such a coalition together?

One thread binding these forces together is the belief that Soeharto is an obstacle to Indonesia's political development and that this development, therefore, can begin only when Soeharto is out of office. By and large they are not animated by hatred or even dislike of Soeharto. They give him credit for stabilising Indonesia's political life and for overseeing an extended period of economic development. They simply feel that his paternalistic style of authoritarian rule is no longer appropriate. They think there is something seriously wrong with a political system that permits one man to stay in power for 30 years. They argue that a younger, more dynamic leader is needed to cope with the nation-building challenges of the 1990s.

They disagree among themselves on what *sorts* of political changes Indonesia needs—a topic returned to below—but they agree that some change is necessary. They want a government, generally speaking, that is less arbitrary in nature and one which depends less on personal ties between the rulers and the ruled; a government which has more respect for the law and for the political process; and a government which provides for more and better communication between itself and the people it is meant to serve.

Possible members of an anti-Soeharto coalition include many parts of the Indonesian elite which once supported the president but have become disillusioned with his leadership. They include university professors and students who abhor the intellectual rigidity of campus life; artists, journalists and intellectuals who want more freedom to express their views; activists in non-governmental organisations chafing at restrictions on their activities; Muslim leaders unhappy with the New Order's deep-seated suspicion of Islamic aspirations; economists and business leaders who believe that rampant corruption is retarding the nation's development; prominent community leaders off Java irritated by the centripetal urges of Soeharto's administration;³⁴ and civilian politicians or would-be politicians who want to participate more fully in government decision-making, and who want, in other words, Soeharto to give someone else a chance. Finally, and most importantly, such a coalition would contain disaffected elements of the military who for their own reasons—personal, institutional and political—believe that Soeharto has been in power long enough. The military is not likely to lead an anti-Soeharto coalition much less con-

template a military coup. Either of these actions would make a mockery of the constitution and the military's beloved dual function doctrine. But it is quite possible that efforts to ensure Soeharto steps down in 1998 will receive the sympathy and tacit support of at least parts of the military establishment. Without this support, moreover, any anti-Soeharto initiative is unlikely to be successful.

Will it be possible for the constituent members of an anti-Soeharto coalition to form an open, public pressure group with clearly stated objectives? Given that the parameters of acceptable political activity in Indonesia are narrowly drawn, it will not be easy. One of the secrets of Soeharto's longevity is that he has kept his opponents divided and therefore weak, and he is not likely to change his approach this late in the day. Direct pressure, in any case, is not likely to be the most effective way to persuade Soeharto to step down. In an open confrontation, Soeharto will prevail.

Instead, he needs to be convinced that it is best for him, his legacy and the country that he leave office in a planned, smooth and reasonably predictable fashion. It would help if Soeharto could be made to feel it is his own decision. He is, after all, not a man who likes to be told what to do. But skilled diplomacy, while necessary, will not be enough. Somehow, Soeharto has to be made to understand the consequences of a refusal to relinquish power. Coordinated political action will be difficult to arrange and carry out but there may be some scope for individual groups to bring the message of change to Soeharto's notice. Bolder voices in the parliament could step up their criticism of government policies and of the government's cosy relationship with big business; students could become more politically active; non-governmental organisations could hold demonstrations on a variety of pretexts, such as the environment, labour rights and land compensation; and the press could gird itself to highlight in even more clearer terms social, religious, economic and political grievances. Indeed, by 1993 many of these groups were already beginning to take a more confrontational approach to criticising government policies. But again, the crucial piece of the puzzle is whether Abri will continue to allow these voices to be heard. If it did, it might be in a position to persuade Soeharto to step aside in exchange for restoring order. There is an obvious parallel here, of course, with Soeharto's campaign to unseat Sukarno in 1966. But the scenario listed above is not merely a historical fantasy. It is a topic of regular, if private, debate within Indonesia's elite.

The military

What can be said of Abri's attitude to Soeharto? The first thing is that it has many attitudes. It is tempting to treat the Indonesian military as a monolithic force, given the difficulties in ascertaining what its leading

officers really think and who among them has the most influence. But like any large organisation, Abri contains a spectrum of differing perspectives as well as being bound by several core principles. One of these principles is that political stability is a necessary precondition for economic development. A second is that extreme vigilance is needed to counteract forces which might fray the bonds of national unity. But it would be wrong to conclude from Abri's commitment to these principles that its support for Soeharto is unwavering. A body of opinion within the Abri family believes that Soeharto's domination of the political process is not serving the causes of political stability, economic development and national unity. These officers worry that issues such as wealth inequality, the repoliticisation of Islam, anti-Chinese sentiment and corruption could become serious political problems, and that not only is Soeharto not doing enough to address them but that he may well be contributing to them. These concerns are expressed most openly by retired generals but they appear to be shared by many active duty officers as well. 'The feeling in Abri that Soeharto has to go is widespread,' said Lieutenant General (ret.) Hasnan Habib, a former ambassador to the US. 'Even younger officers like colonels and lieutenant colonels share this view.'³⁵

Another way to view Abri's relationship with Soeharto is to look at how well the military as an institution has fared under Soeharto. Taking a broad look at the entire New Order period, Abri has every reason to be pleased with Soeharto. He is a military man himself, and he has done a more than credible job in rescuing Indonesia from the political and economic morass of the mid-1960s. Relative to what came before, the New Order has dealt deftly with ethnic and religious tensions, imposed at least a modicum of discipline on the bureaucracy, and fostered a sense of national unity and purpose. And last but not least, Abri has done well by Soeharto. In pre-Soeharto Indonesia, the army was factionalised and constantly in competition for power with other groups. Under Soeharto, Abri has been relatively unified as well as the most powerful political institution in the land. The doctrine of *dwifungsi*, or dual function, has grown by leaps and bounds in the New Order, allowing the military's influence to percolate into virtually every nook and cranny of society. Military officers hold key positions all through the government, from city mayors, ambassadors and provincial governors, to senior positions in central government ministries, regional bureaucracies, state-owned enterprises, the judiciary, the umbrella labour union, Golkar and in the cabinet itself.

But as the focus narrows to the recent past, Abri has less reason to be content and more reason to support an attempt to force Soeharto to step aside. If in the first fifteen years of the New Order, Abri and Soeharto were practically synonymous, their relationship has grown more distant since the early 1980s (although it was only much later that this change

came to be widely appreciated). A number of explanations for Abri's declining influence with Soeharto can be put forward. One is that the military's sources of revenue were threatened by new rivals in the 1980s. Then State Secretary and Golkar chairman Sudharmono played a role in that process, as did the emergence of Soeharto's children as serious business players. The First Family supplanted the military in a handful of areas from oil trading to airlines to timber which previously had been important contributors to Abri's budget as well as to the banking accounts of privileged generals. More generally, the collapse of oil prices in the mid-1980s and the subsequent need for significant economic reform raised the stature of civilian economic 'technocrats' and closed off some avenues of off-budget financing.³⁶

A second reason is that the military's partnership with Soeharto weakened as his need for political backing from the army declined. By the early 1980s, the political landscape had been all but wiped clean of credible opponents, allowing Soeharto the luxury of disregarding the military's political opinions. The military, in effect, had fallen victim to its own handiwork. This lesson was brought rudely home to Abri in 1988 when Soeharto ignored the military's strongly worded advice and picked Sudharmono to be his vice-president. If Abri needed any further reminding of its current place in the political hierarchy, Soeharto's complete dismissal of its views during the October 1993 Golkar congress provided it.³⁷

A third reason, or at least a possible reason, is that Soeharto deliberately distanced himself from Abri to enhance his own legitimacy as president and to dispel the notion that he was beholden to the military for his continued hold on power.³⁸ (Possibly this was why he disparaged the contributions of his closest military advisers in his 1988 autobiography.) A related dynamic was that Soeharto appeared increasingly doubtful of Abri's loyalty to him. This may have been behind his (only partly successful) attempts to cultivate a new base of support within the Islamic community in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It may also be the reason why Soeharto has endeavoured in recent years to place confirmed loyalists at or near the top of all the military services. The powerful army chief of staff billet is currently held by his brother-in-law, General Wismoyo Arismunandar.³⁹

Soeharto's success in sidelining critical officers, notably former armed forces commander General Benny Murdani, also succeeded in weakening the political half of the military's dual-function role. While military personnel still occupy many important positions in the political hierarchy, the military as an institution clearly has lost some of its political leverage. The reason is that influence in Soeharto's Indonesia is personality-driven; even in the early days of the New Order the military's political leverage was secured through influential figures like Ali Murtopo and Sudjono

Humardhani. But as the military has learned to its dismay, Soeharto's tolerance of influential personalities has decreased with age. He has been able to reduce Abri's political influence simply by removing or weakening its leading political thinkers. Without any effective political 'think-tank' of its own, the military has found it hard to supply new, politically savvy thinkers to establish themes and objectives for a constructive political strategy.

What remains is a military considerably more powerful in appearance than in reality. On paper Abri's position has slid somewhat, but not markedly so. It held thirteen of the 32 cabinet positions in 1983, eleven of the 38 positions in 1988 and ten of the 41 positions in 1993. But the ten military personnel in the current cabinet have considerably less clout than their cabinet-level counterparts in 1982 simply because Abri by the 1990s had become less able to formulate and disseminate its own political opinions. 'Only Soeharto has the power to get anything done in Indonesia,' lamented Habib. 'Abri is very weak, and subservient to Soeharto. We just implement what he wants us to do.' Added another retired general, Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo: 'Soeharto no longer listens to anyone, not Abri nor anyone else. This is the danger we are facing.'⁴⁰

Abri's dilemma is that it remains closely associated in the public mind with the New Order government even though its influence has declined. The shortcomings of Soeharto's government—corruption, disrespect for the law, favouritism to ethnic-Chinese cronies, etc.—are also held to be shortcomings of the military. If Abri is to make a convincing case for a continued political role after Soeharto goes, it will need to distance itself from the more unappealing aspects of Soeharto's rule. One way to do that is to provide tacit support to the groups manoeuvring to unseat Soeharto. Gadjah Mada University sociologist Lukman Soetrisno described Abri's predicament this way: 'Abri is going to have to choose. Is it for corruption or is it for the people?'⁴¹

The changing relationship between Soeharto and Abri is nicely represented by the rise and fall of Benny Murdani. After joining Indonesia's war of independence at the age of sixteen, Murdani rose quickly through the ranks and by the early 1970s had become one of Soeharto's most trusted and powerful aides. A protege of General Ali Murtopo, Murdani's strong suit was intelligence operations and, like his mentor, he was, and is, a shrewd political strategist. As a Catholic, Murdani was never a likely political rival of Soeharto. But he was—and maybe still is—enormously influential within the armed forces and as a political actor in his own right. Throughout his career as an active duty officer, up to and including his stint as armed forces commander from 1983 to 1988, Murdani remained fiercely loyal to Soeharto and was openly dismissive of retired generals who criticised the president from the sidelines, notably the generals who joined the dissident Group of Fifty. Shortly before and

after his own fall from grace in 1988, however, Murdani gained a new appreciation of his retired colleagues.

Murdani lost Soeharto's trust by broaching with the president the subject of his family's business activities and objecting to Sudharmono's vice-presidency. But Murdani had also begun to sympathise with the view that *dwifungsi* had gone too far and that it was time to tone down the 'security approach' to governance. In March 1988, Murdani was named defence minister, a less powerful position than Abri commander, and five years later he was dropped from the cabinet altogether. It was a classic case of Soeharto trying to weaken Abri politically by removing one of its main political thinkers. It was also a particularly visible—though not unusual—example of Soeharto being prepared to lose the services of one of his most experienced operatives in a probably futile attempt to ensure that the military's political activities remain firmly under his control.

It is far from clear whether the treatment of Murdani will quell military unease at Soeharto's domineering leadership. After he was 'kicked upstairs' in 1988, Murdani remained an influential figure through the force of his own personality and because he could count on the loyalty of many active duty officers who owed their positions to him. The push for 'openness' and the invigoration of the parliament in 1989–91 were widely attributed to Murdani's influence, as was the decision of some 40 retired military officers to throw their weight behind the Indonesian Democratic Party in 1991. In apparent recognition of Murdani's continuing sway within active duty ranks, in early 1994 Soeharto ordered the dismantling of the powerful intelligence agency known as BAIS. The agency, once Murdani's principal power base, was considered his strongest remaining link to active-duty officers.⁴² Nevertheless, Murdani is likely to remain an important behind-the-scenes operator even though his links to the current military leadership are dwindling.

How might Murdani's influence be felt in the coming years? He apparently has little ambition to become a public opponent of Soeharto; in the past he has been clearly uncomfortable at being perceived as one. But although he has strived to be a loyal team player in public, he has become increasingly critical and even contemptuous of Soeharto in private. He feels, it seems, that Soeharto has turned his back on the institution which put him in power. Moreover, he has taken some steps to strengthen Abri's hand in the coming succession battle and at the same time he has begun cultivating ties with civilian politicians and intellectuals who might also be counted on to raise the pressure on Soeharto.

His most meaningful step so far has been to corner Soeharto into accepting Try Sutrisno as vice-president for the 1993–98 term. This, at least, is how Murdani's supporters describe it. Others believe that Sutrisno, a former aide to Soeharto, would have been the president's

choice anyway. Which of these scenarios is closer to the mark may never be known. More to the point, perhaps, was that many in Indonesia *believed* Abri forced its wishes on Soeharto, a rare enough occurrence in any case. Many military leaders were undoubtedly worried about the prospect of Soeharto choosing Minister of Research and Technology B. J. Habibie as vice-president, or opting to retain Sudharmono for another term. Whether Soeharto was considering either option is impossible to say. He clearly had his doubts about Sutrisno, both because of the officer's political inexperience and because he is close to Murdani, whom he succeeded as Abri commander.

A few weeks before the People's Assembly of March 1993 got under way, Abri took the unusual step of nominating Sutrisno for vice-president even though Soeharto had yet to make his wishes known. The other Assembly factions quickly followed suit. Soeharto was left with the choice of either accepting the vice-presidential nominations of all five Assembly factions or publicly rejecting the stated views of the body which is constitutionally responsible for selecting the nation's top leaders. Although he opted for the former, he later made it clear to several government officials that he was unhappy with Abri.⁴³

One interesting aspect of Abri's vigorous campaign in support of Sutrisno is that the new vice-president is not especially well-regarded by his peers. An amiable man with good Islamic credentials, he is seemingly bereft of a political vision and his public utterances are often cliché-filled and at times downright silly. In his favour, however, is that he is not Habibie, he is not Sudharmono, he *is* a military man, and he provides Abri with some insurance should Soeharto die or become incapacitated before 1998. As vice-president, he also has to be considered the front-runner to succeed Soeharto should the president step down in 1998. These considerations overrode concerns about Sutrisno's (so far undisputed) political skills. Abri's 'victory' did not come cost-free, however. Two leading Abri 'politicians'—Murdani and former Home Affairs Minister Rudini—were dropped from the cabinet, while several officers close to Murdani—like Harsudiono Hartas, who headed Abri's social-political department, and Teddy Rusdy, a top aide to Sutrisno—were unexpectedly overlooked for cabinet jobs. This was, apparently, Soeharto's payback to the Abri officers presumptuous enough to restrict his latitude in choosing a vice-president.

Faced with a still strong and wary Soeharto, the Abri leaders who are anxious to see Soeharto's tenure come to an end no doubt understand that Soeharto will not be easily pushed from power. To notch up the pressure on Soeharto they will have to reach outside their small circle and enlist the support of civilian sympathisers. It will be a delicate game for all concerned.

The civilian elite

It is not hard to fathom why many members of the civilian elite are uncomfortable with the idea of Soeharto staying in power indefinitely: they have had little political influence almost since Soeharto's ascension. They may not have much more under Indonesia's next president but they would like to find out sooner rather than later. Getting there, as always, is the problem. The following list highlights some of the roadblocks that lie ahead.

The Faustian bargain

Civilian critics of Soeharto have a tricky choice. They must have some support from Abri if they are to mount an effective challenge to Soeharto but they worry they will end up with a raw deal. 'We know we have to work with Abri if we are to achieve a transition of power but we are worried that the army will take over again once Soeharto is gone,' said Arief Budiman, a sociologist at the Satya Wacana Christian University. 'Right now we have a common cause with Abri, just like we did in 1965-66. But can we carve out enough space for ourselves so that Abri won't take it all away once their objective has been reached? This is what they did in the late 1960s and I'm afraid they could do it again. If that is going to happen, what's the point of trying to push out Soeharto?' United Development Party legislator Sri Bintang Pamungkas arrived at the same conclusion: 'We will have to cooperate with Abri. The question is will we do the using or will we get used?'⁴⁴

Another way to describe the dilemma facing civilian reformers is that they need to chip away at Soeharto's aura of invincibility until the idea of a new president taking office in 1998 seems like a feasible alternative to the broad political elite. But they can't risk overdoing it. A full scale campaign to weaken Soeharto's authority could backfire in one of two ways. It could provide an excuse for Soeharto to strike back forcefully at his critics. And, if it succeeded too well, Abri hardliners would themselves have an excuse to step in and reassert control. In either of these scenarios, democracy advocates would come out on the losing end.

Developing the Abri-civilian dialogue

Getting military officers to communicate more with their civilian counterparts is arguably the most important prerequisite for developing an effective common front on the succession issue. 'It is imperative for Abri and enlightened civilians to work together to reduce the unpredictability of Soeharto's succession,' said former legislator Marzuki Darusman.⁴⁵ But it will not be easy. Memories die hard in Abri and one of its most enduring

memories is of strife, political ineffectiveness and economic stagnation in the 1950s. Abri blames this turmoil on parliamentary democracy and the civilian politicians who led it. Many contemporary military figures doubt whether civilian politicians today are any more reliable than their precursors. 'They still regard politics,' says academic Michael Leifer, 'as too important a matter to be left exclusively to civilians.'⁴⁶ As one retired four-star general put it in an interview in early 1994, 'civilians are not yet ready to do what Abri has been doing for them'.⁴⁷

For all its talk of being 'one with the people', Abri remains socially isolated. Mixing with the civilian elite has never been high on its priority list. When Benny Murdani was Abri commander, for example, he discouraged contacts between junior officers and civilian intellectuals because the latter were 'too Westernised and a destabilising influence'.⁴⁸ His successor Try Sutrisno followed a similar line, possibly because he believes there is no such thing as a civilian-military distinction in Indonesia. 'The dichotomy [between civilians and soldiers] only exists in a liberal democracy,' he asserted in February 1993.⁴⁹

But it does exist in Indonesia, even if Sutrisno is not prepared to admit it. Soldiers and civilians rarely mingle in Indonesia and distrust is mutual. 'The problem with Abri is that it lacks finesse, it lacks exposure to society, it lacks political skills, and it is convinced it is its right to rule Indonesia,' said one non-military cabinet minister with close ties to Golkar. 'The military has contempt for civilians and for politics in general but they relish power,' he continued. 'Murdani is a good example. He only understands force. He can't cope with complexities.'⁵⁰

The rapid growth of the private business sector in recent years has added a new complicating factor in the civilian-military relationship. Top students increasingly are opting for high-paying jobs in business rather than seeking careers in government service or the military. This is more than a recruitment problem for the military. With underpaid officers increasingly resentful of their higher-paid peers in the business world, developing a dialogue between civilian and military leaders becomes that much harder.

For the civilian elite, there is an additional problem: how to identify which segment of Abri might be open to a dialogue. Some argue that the so-called 1945 Generation of Abri officers offers the best hope since these officers experienced the political give-and-take of the 1950s—even if they didn't like it much—and therefore are more comfortable dealing with civilians. 'The older officers have a better feel for politics, they can handle disagreement,' said newspaper editor and Democracy Forum member Aristides Katoppo. 'The younger officers all seem to feel they have to think the same way. They are afraid to debate.'⁵¹

Others hope for better things from the younger officers. Jusuf Wanandi, a political analyst at the Centre for Strategic and International

Studies, points out that younger officers 'are better educated and they should better understand the problems and the needs of a more open society [and] the wishes of a larger middle class . . . But at the same time they seem also to be overly worried about the unity of the nation, the continuity of development and the continued stability of political life . . . In fact, we just don't know what they will do or think once they have the opportunity to act politically.'⁵² Many prominent Muslim figures blame the older military generation for denying them the political stature they feel they deserve. 'The younger officers are much more liberal and open than the older generation,' contended Nasir Tamara, a leading member of the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals. 'At least when you talk to them you are not scared.'⁵³

Overcoming Abri-Muslim suspicions

As Tamara's comment indicates, the relationship between Abri and politically active Muslims is a difficult one. Modernist Muslim leaders advocate political change in Indonesia and are interested in playing a part in a 'succession coalition'. They share with some parts of Abri a desire to see Soeharto leave office, but there the commonality ends. Abri is unhappy with what it sees as Soeharto's attempts to 'repoliticise' Islam and it knows that some Muslim activists would like to see Islam 'repoliticised' to a much greater extent. Its suspicions of Islamic political aspirations is a serious obstacle to attempts to assemble a broad-based coalition to plan the succession process. The role of the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) is particularly troublesome. 'Before ICMI was set up, civilians and parts of the military were already working on forming some kind of coalition,' said Arief Budiman. 'But these efforts were set back when ICMI was announced. The army got scared.'⁵⁴

Soeharto

An important obstacle to any civilian-military coalition is of course Soeharto himself. The tools of government are at his disposal and he knows how to use them. If he senses that elite groups are aligning against him, he can be expected to take steps to weaken them. He can crack down at any time on the media by revoking a few publishing licences. And it would be difficult for Abri officers to refuse a direct order to break up public protests by, say, students or workers. Should such a situation arise, the senior active duty officers—including Abri commander Feisal Tanjung and Army Chief of Staff Wismoyo Arismunandar—and Defence Minister Edi Sudrajat will have to decide whether loyalty to Soeharto and loyalty to Abri is still the same thing and, if not, which way to turn. It

is hard to predict what they would do, of course, but it would be wrong to assume they would automatically support Soeharto. Not even the views of Wismoyo, married to a sister of Soeharto's wife, can be predicted with any certainty. According to several military sources, he too shares the view that Soeharto has been in power too long.

Soeharto, in addition, still enjoys plenty of support from the Indonesian elite. Grateful for the stability and economic development he has brought to Indonesia, many are prepared to overlook the less commendable aspects of his rule. Some groups, with the ethnic-Chinese business class being a good example, are nervous about their standing in a post-Soeharto Indonesia and are reasonably content to postpone the day of reckoning. And, obviously, those who have directly benefited from his patronage, such as the top crony businessmen and his family, are anxious to have Soeharto stay in power for as long as possible. 'Thank God, my father is still entrusted to be the head of state,' his son Tommy said just after the People's Assembly elected Soeharto for a sixth five-year term in March 1993.⁵⁵

More positively, Soeharto may decide to take the wind out of the sails of a succession coalition by loosening the political controls he has imposed. In his Independence Day speech in August 1993, for example, Soeharto promised that 'in the political field, we shall continue to develop openness and promote political norms, morals and ethics'.⁵⁶ How sincere he is in this regard is impossible to predict. At the time, some prominent Indonesians felt that Soeharto had no choice but to give way before a 'democratising tide', in the hopeful words of leading Indonesian Democratic Party member Kwik Kian Gie.⁵⁷ Many others took a more sceptical view, remembering that Soeharto has promised a measure of political openness before and not delivered. The sceptics viewed Soeharto's apparent change of heart as yet another ploy to undermine opposition to his rule without permitting anything remotely resembling a meaningful change to the political rules of the game. As usual, no one quite knew what Soeharto was up to.

The economy

One of the wild cards in the succession debate is the state of the economy; this is both Soeharto's strength and vulnerability. Economic development has been the centrepiece of his administration. As long as growth can be maintained, jobs created and incomes raised, Soeharto will be in a powerful position to undermine efforts to unseat him. But development is a two-edged sword. Some serious weaknesses remain in Indonesia's economy and some difficult measures will need to be taken if it is to become more internationally competitive. Yet it is not clear if the political will exists to take these steps. Soeharto's refusal to act resolutely to reduce

corruption is clearly a brake on growth as well as a drain on his own legitimacy as ruler. The apparent emergence of Minister of Research and Technology B. J. Habibie as an important political player in the early 1990s has further clouded the issue. Many feel that Habibie's plans to turn Indonesia into a technological powerhouse would derail economic growth instead. And finally, the unpredictability of Soeharto's succession is itself becoming an economic cost: foreign investors in particular say that the uncertainty surrounding Soeharto's succession is adding to the political risk of an investment in Indonesia.

Only time will tell how well the government will manage the economy in the years ahead, but the initial reactions to the cabinet appointed by Soeharto in March 1993, in which Habibie loyalists were well represented, were mixed at best. Many observers described the cabinet as weak and inexperienced; a number of first-time ministers were said to owe their appointment more to their personal loyalty to Soeharto than to any skills they could bring to their individual portfolios. United Development Party legislator and Muslim intellectual Sri Bintang Pamungkas expressed, in typically blunt terms, a not uncommon view: 'This is a lousy cabinet, an act of a tiring president. It seems like there is new blood there, but that's not really the case. They are all bureaucrats. It is not a cabinet designed to help development.' But, he added, 'this cabinet will probably provide a good opportunity for us in the parliament. A weakening economy will damage Soeharto and allow the parliament to become more critical.'⁵⁸

These sorts of views may be little more than wishful thinking, of course. While there is little doubt that a faltering economy would weaken Soeharto, there is no way of knowing whether the economy will falter. Soeharto has adjusted well to economic crises in the past. And even if economic growth did slow, it is still not clear whether a 'succession coalition' could capitalise on it to pressure Soeharto to move aside. Any such coalition would contain widely differing views on what economic policy should be. All would agree that some of the worst features of Soeharto's record—such as corruption—needed to be remedied, but after that opinions would begin to diverge. Economic 'technocrats' believe Indonesia's basic policies are on target and need only minor changes. 'Technologists' in the Habibie camp argue for a significant re-orienting of public expenditures toward capital-intensive industries. Some *pribumi*, or indigenous, business leaders want a government-sponsored affirmative action program to close the gap between *pribumis* and Indonesian-Chinese. Populist academics and politicians insist that more emphasis be placed on equity than growth. Abri doesn't appear to have an economic strategy of its own but is too conservative an institution to accept dramatic change. Whether all these groups would be able to overcome their political, social and economic differences to forge a common front on the succession issue is a question waiting for an answer.

The politics of change

As noted earlier in the chapter, the political debate in Indonesia has two basic components. One is the succession issue. The other is political change: should there be any, and what sorts of changes are needed? The debate is complicated because these two components are tightly interconnected: it may not be possible to arrange a smooth succession without first changing the prevailing political approach. And it also may not be possible to make any meaningful political changes while Soeharto remains in power. Before focusing on the question of political change, it is important to note that the many differing views of Indonesia's political future constitute still another obstacle to the formation of a 'succession coalition'.

Perhaps the most appropriate place to start a discussion of Indonesia's political future is the present. Soeharto describes the nature of his government as Pancasila democracy. He believes it to be 'democratic' but not in a Western liberal sense. Instead, Pancasila democracy is meant to be a communitarian form of government in which decisions are made by consensus in a nation conceived of as a family. Open confrontation is thought to be damaging to the welfare of the community, which is much more important than the interests of individual family members. Soeharto contends that Pancasila democracy, infused by the 'family spirit', is the form of government most closely congruent with Indonesia's cultural traditions.

In reality, Indonesia is far from the ideal of Pancasila democracy. Not only is it not democratic in the Western liberal sense, it is not democratic in the Pancasila democracy sense either. The imperative of 'consensus at all costs' leaves Indonesians with little scope to disagree with official policy. The dismantling of political parties, the manipulation of the People's Assembly, the controls placed on the press, and the enforced weakness of the legal system have done much more than empower the guardians of the community. They have created a government that is far more authoritarian—as that term is commonly understood—than democratic.

So what is to be done? Virtually the entire Indonesian elite, both in and outside the government, agrees that the political system can and should be improved. Consequently, there is a great deal of talk about democratisation, though it means different things to different people. When Soeharto speaks of 'democratisation', for example, he has in mind improvements to Pancasila democracy:

We have all testified that Pancasila as the sole basic principle continues to provide room to move in our political life and democracy, enriches our ideas, stimulates our religious life, guarantees the right to express opinions and evolves the execution of human rights . . . Obviously, we are not

going to look back in developing a political life. Our experience has shown the failure of liberal democracy and Guided Democracy. On the contrary, we have to look ahead to enhance the application of democracy based on Pancasila that is in line with the progress we achieve in development in general.⁵⁹

It is the rare Indonesian who would claim to know what Soeharto means exactly by 'enhanc[ing] the application of democracy based on Pancasila'. Although there has been some movement toward *keterbukaan* (openness) in recent years, with the press for example becoming more forthright than a decade ago, there has been little movement on the political front. The elections in 1992 and the People's Assembly of 1993 were no more indicative of a political renewal than were the same events in 1982 and 1983. Voting in Indonesia remains largely unrelated to the political process, and a significant part of the Indonesian elite believes Soeharto intends to keep it that way. This is why these same Indonesians believe that real political change is possible only after Soeharto is gone. The question, says Democracy Forum member Marsillam Simanjuntak, is 'whether the president is to be relied upon . . . to solve the problem of democratisation, or [is he] a problem, a complex one at that, to be solved first'?⁶⁰

But what, exactly, is the 'problem of democratisation' in Indonesia? Most agree that it means a process of opening up the political system and making 'society' a less subservient partner to the 'state'. But there is deep disagreement over what the stages of this process are and how quickly they should be reached. The enhancement of Pancasila democracy, as Soeharto puts it, is at the most conservative end of the spectrum of change. But what is at the other end, and what is in between?

Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter described two general categories of change in their studies of authoritarian states in Latin America. They called the first liberalisation and the second democratisation. To put these concepts in the Indonesian context, liberalisation is seen by advocates for political change as being somewhere in the middle of the spectrum; democratisation, on the other hand, is at the end opposite from Pancasila democracy. O'Donnell and Schmitter define liberalisation as

[t]he process of re-defining and extending rights . . . By liberalization we mean the process of making effective certain rights that protect both individuals and social groups from arbitrary or illegal acts committed by the state or third parties. On the level of individuals, these guarantees include the classical elements of the liberal tradition: habeas corpus; sanctity of private home and correspondence; the right to be defended in a fair trial according to pre-established laws; freedom of movement, speech, and petition; and so forth. On the level of groups, these rights cover such things as freedom from punishment for expressions of collective dissent

from government policy, freedom from censorship of the means of communication, and freedom to associate voluntarily with other citizens.⁶¹

A process of democratisation incorporates and expands upon these rights and freedoms. The guiding principle of democracy, they say,

is that of *citizenship*. This involves both the *right* to be treated by fellow human beings as equal with respect to the making of collective choices and the *obligation* of those implementing such choices to be equally accountable and accessible to all members of the polity . . . What specific form democracy will take in a given country is a contingent matter, although . . . there is likely to exist a sort of 'procedural minimum' which contemporary actors would agree upon as necessary elements of political democracy. Secret balloting, universal adult suffrage, regular elections, partisan competition, associational recognition and access, and executive accountability all seem to be elements of such a consensus in the modern world.⁶²

The interesting thing about Indonesia's Pancasila democracy is that it includes many of the features of democratisation—secret balloting, universal adult suffrage, regular elections—but relatively few of the individual and group freedoms on the liberalisation agenda. It has, in other words, the form of (Western) democracy but not the content. The result is a formalistic democracy that is not easy to distinguish from authoritarian rule.

It is a result, as well, which poses something of a dilemma for Indonesian advocates of political change. Within the elite there appears to be considerable agreement that Indonesia ought to provide more of the freedoms inherent in liberalisation. Recent moves toward 'openness' are one example. But 'openness' on the political front has sputtered precisely because of disagreement over where 'openness' is headed. At the risk of oversimplifying the issue, there are two broad views on this subject. One is in favour of adopting some features of 'liberalisation' but without altering the basic structures of Pancasila democracy. The group hewing to this view would like to see a freer, more dynamic society but is not necessarily in favour of making the executive more directly accountable to the people. This is the 'enhancing Pancasila democracy' group, for want of a better term. A second, more radical view is that liberalisation ought to be the first step to 'real' democratisation, to a form of democracy that 'doesn't need an adjective in front of it', in the words of the neo-modernist Islamic leader Abdurrahman Wahid.⁶³

The dilemma is that the former may not be possible and the latter probably will not be allowed. So what can we say about the prospects for political change in Indonesia? Perhaps only this: since the 'enhancing Pancasila democracy' group is by far the stronger of the two, the most likely scenario is that it will set the agenda at least for the immediate future. But it would be a mistake to suppose that political considerations

alone are responsible for the weak prospects for 'real' democratisation. Economic and social considerations play a role as well.

Society

A well functioning democracy requires a shared awareness of what democracy is about. It requires an ability to publicly debate—and disagree on—important matters of state without rendering the government of the day impotent; it presumes knowledge of what it means to win and lose on the political battlefield; and it assumes a common understanding of citizens' rights and responsibilities. These conditions do not apply in Indonesia. It is true that Indonesia has experienced 'Western-style' democracy, in which a free press and a free political system actively engaged in public debate. But the 1950s have faded from the collective memory. More than half the Indonesian population has experienced only the regulated public discourse of Pancasila democracy. Moreover, the enduring memory of the 1950s is of public divisiveness, a memory kept alive by tireless reminders by Soeharto's government. The philosophical underpinnings of the New Order are infused with fears of national disunity—fears which emanated from the 1950s and were further strengthened by the societal breakdown in 1965–66—and these fears have been bought by the public. The result is a society, and a relatively lowly educated one at that, which is ill-equipped for and deeply nervous about political change.

Economy

The structure of Indonesia's economy offers another clue into why democratisation remains an elusive goal. At first glance, it seems surprising that the steady growth of Indonesia's economy over the past two decades has not created more of a push for a political opening. But, in fact, economic success has tended to strengthen the authoritarianism of the New Order government.⁶⁴ Usually, when people reach a certain level of wealth, they generally desire a greater say in their political destiny. In Asia, a recent example of this phenomenon is the shift beginning in 1987 from authoritarianism to democracy in South Korea. Mass protests against military rule in Thailand in mid-1992 provide another example. This same dynamic in all likelihood will be at work in Indonesia, but probably not soon.

Demands for political pluralism, if propelled by economic factors, are related to the level of economic wealth, rather than the pace of economic growth.⁶⁵ Indonesia, despite its rapid growth in recent years, remains a poor country. It will take several decades for per capita income to rise to the level attained by South Koreans in 1987. But equally important, Indonesia's business community has decidedly mixed views on

democratisation. It desires a dose of economic liberalisation but it is less sure that political democratisation is in its best interests.

The economic reform program begun in the mid to late 1980s shifted Indonesia away from a government-directed, import-substituting focus to a private sector-led, export-oriented approach. In the new economy, cost competitiveness is critical. Greedy monopolies, bureaucratic corruption and nepotism, all prominent features of Soeharto's rule, push costs up and make Indonesian products more difficult to sell overseas. Secondly, the private business sector needs a reliable, predictable and effective legal system. Banks need legal protection against bad debtors, investors need legal protection against fraudulent business practices, and entrepreneurs need legal protection against unfair competition.

The business community is anxious for reforms in all these areas but its demands for more economic 'transparency' are tempered by political considerations. The most powerful segment of Indonesia's private sector is composed of ethnic-Chinese businessmen. While economically dominant, the Chinese are politically weak, or at least they would be in a more representative political system. Well aware of the streak of anti-Chinese sentiment which runs through society, ethnic-Chinese businessmen have a stake in maintaining the current political system in which they can 'buy' protection via personal alliances with government officials or through financial contributions to the institutions charged with maintaining the status quo. Liem Sioe Liong's close relationship with Soeharto and the financial support given by the Chinese business community to Golkar are two obvious examples. For the immediate future, these considerations are likely to carry more weight with the ethnic Chinese than a desire for a more rational business climate. To many of them, the risks of a political opening outweigh the benefits of having a government 'which is accountable to the requirements of the market'.⁶⁶

For the much more numerous *pribumi* businessmen, a different set of considerations apply but they too are nervous about weakening Indonesia's 'strong state'. They regard economic liberalism with trepidation and are not at all sure about political democratisation. For ease of argument, the *pribumi* business lobby can be broken down into two parts: small and big.

Small businessmen, merchants and petty traders feel themselves vulnerable in the face of an onslaught of big business—domestic and foreign—and see a big, powerful government as their only salvation. Their political views tend to populism, nationalism and often xenophobia.⁶⁷ Their political activities, as far as they go, have 'taken the form of a constant appeal for protection and favour from big government and criticism of the government for failing to deliver'.⁶⁸ They see their interests being best served by currying favour with Golkar and other government-controlled organisations. They suspect—and not without

some justification—that a more democratic polity would be prone to manipulation by big business.

Similar views are held by larger *pribumi* businessmen. They, too, feel that economic liberalism is a mixed blessing. Many believe that they can only catch up with the leading Chinese businessmen if they have government help. While they want Soeharto to stop helping the Chinese, they don't want him to stop helping businessmen such as themselves. It might be thought that these businessmen would favour democratisation as a way to secure their economic interests but that does not seem to be the case. Most seem to believe they can better secure the 'political favours' they feel they need through alliances with Golkar and the bureaucracy than through a competitive political system. 'Eighty per cent of my business is government-related,' explained one leading *pribumi* businessman, Fadel Muhammad. 'I can't join the PDI [Indonesian Democratic Party]. I have to be realistic. I have to be with Golkar.'⁶⁹

Naturally, within all these groups there are dissenting opinions. Many medium-sized *pribumi* businessmen, for example, who don't have strong enough contacts to benefit from political favouritism are more warmly disposed to economic liberalisation and democratisation. And some Chinese businessmen are so fed up with the corruption and bureaucratic politics of Soeharto's rule that they are ready to back any reform mandate, even democratisation. However, in general it remains true that the 'business lobby' tends to conservatism.

What about the middle class? Will it emerge as a powerful force for democratisation before the end of the century? Doubtful, is the short answer. The weight of evidence rests with the pessimists who believe the middle class by and large is still taking advantage of economic opportunities recently made available, and is not yet concerned with agitating for a relaxation of political controls. 'At this stage . . . they are thinking less about politics and more about making money,' says Jusuf Wanandi.⁷⁰ A healthy percentage of the middle class shares with the army a concern that national stability is not as secure as it seems, a view militating against political activism. Democratisation, for this group, could open the door to sectarian impulses which would threaten economic prosperity. As Robison puts it: 'The bulk of the middle class are prepared to acquiesce in New Order authoritarianism because they see little prospect for an orderly democratic state.'⁷¹ For the time being, it would seem that the broad political objective of the middle class is for a reformed authoritarianism—incorporating some of the liberalisation agenda listed above—rather than democratisation.

The battle within Abri

Just as it holds the key to the success of any 'succession coalition', so

too has Abri the power to set the agenda for political reform. Its power has been weakened by Soeharto but it remains the most powerful institution in Indonesia, a role it is almost certain to keep even after Soeharto has left the scene. Generalising about Abri's political views is a hazardous business, but a few clearly defined threads can be discerned.

Like other members of the inner power circle, top military officers are content to operate in a system in which their removal by political means is all but impossible. While parts of the military establishment want Soeharto to step down, Abri as an institution is not remotely interested in dismantling the strong state structure which he—with its help—has built up, nor with bringing the masses back into the political process. Abri remains acutely concerned with achieving the Holy Grail of national unity, political stability and economic development, and feels that all of these goals require the maintenance of a strong state. And finally, Abri believes that it must continue to play an integral role in the political process.

Within these broad outlines, however, there are many differences of opinion on what political development means—or ought to mean—in the Indonesian context. Some military leaders, while sympathetic to some items on the liberalisation agenda, are practically paralysed by the fear that any process leading to real democratisation could quickly unravel and spiral out of their control. Their major concern is that ethnic, racial and regional tensions could splinter Indonesia, just like similar tensions succeeded in breaking up Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. They are not yet convinced that adherence to the ideology of Pancasila is universal and they sense that the sectarian impulses which they see themselves keeping in check still lie uncomfortably close to the surface. For them, the secret of success lies in limiting control of the political process to as small a group as possible.

Defending the need for restrictions on political rallies prior to parliamentary elections, former Coordinating Minister for Political Affairs and Security Sudomo said 'the problem is that any assembled mass can turn into a mob'.⁷² General (ret.) Soemitro, in an interview in late 1991, expressed the same fear: 'It's very dangerous for us to allow public demonstrations. We could lose control.'⁷³ A related if usually unspoken concern for this group is the fear that in a more democratic Indonesia the military would have to answer for the many human rights abuses it has committed in the name of national unity, most especially in trouble spots like East Timor and Aceh.

Other influential military figures, however, are open to some movement on both the liberalisation and democratisation agendas, provided Abri's *dwifungsi*, or dual function, doctrine remains in force. One example is former Home Affairs Minister Major General (ret.) Rudini who, while he was still in office, publicly advocated a shift away from the military's

traditional 'security approach' and praised the virtues of democracy. 'We cannot talk about a developed and honourable Indonesia in the eyes of the world community,' he said, 'without promoting democracy and democratisation.'⁷⁴ Hasnan Habib, the former ambassador to Washington, offered the same view when considering the question of *dwifungsi*'s elimination in a 1992 speech:

The answer is a definite 'never'. *Dwifungsi* is here to stay. [But] what will definitely change is the implementation of *dwifungsi*. That is to say, in Indonesia's future political development, Abri will gradually shift its role from emphasising the 'security cum stability' approach to the 'prosperity cum stability' approach . . . Pancasila is not supposed to be 'from, by, and for' the Armed Forces; nor is it 'from and by Abri for' the nation. It must be 'from, by, and for' the people.⁷⁵

Habib argued that *dwifungsi* could only be considered successful if the political system became more meritocratic, a process which implies more political influence for civilians.⁷⁶ The flip side of this argument is that Abri must change its approach to wielding political power. General (ret.) Abdul Haris Nasution, the man who is credited with authoring the original dual-function doctrine in 1957—then called the 'Middle Way'—has been throughout the New Order one of the most strident critics of how *dwifungsi* has evolved. Nasution wanted the military to have political influence but not through intervention in day-to-day politics. He saw the military as a kind of political referee which could step in to settle disputes amongst political parties but one which would stay above the fray of party politics. The whole point, in his view, of giving Abri a reserved allocation of seats in the parliament was to obviate the need for Abri to engage in party politics. Needless to say, Abri's extensive involvement in, and overt support for, Golkar is a frequent target of criticism from Nasution and like-minded retired generals. 'Abri should become a watchdog only,' said Lieutenant General (ret.) Ali Sadikin, a leader of the dissident Group of Fifty. 'It should not play an active political role. The way it stands now, it would be better to change Abri's name to *Angkatan Bersenjata Golkar* (Armed Forces of Golkar).'⁷⁷

More generally, the starting point for Abri political 'softliners' is that some sort of political opening is inevitable and that it is better to be part of the process in order to retain some control over it. Moreover, they argue that it is better for the government to give ground during a period of relative economic success—such as the present—since this would make it easier for Abri to claim a meaningful political role even in a more open political system. (Partly, it must be added, the reformers' optimism on this point is grounded in their belief that Abri remains an extremely popular institution. Rudini, for example, argued that if Abri were allowed to run as an independent political party, it would win 90 per cent of the votes.⁷⁸) The reformers' fear is that if they fail to 'reform' Pancasila

democracy, outside pressures will continue to build up until more radical and uncertain change—such as real democratisation—could become unavoidable.⁷⁹

Whose views will prevail in the coming years is impossible to say. The views of Abri hardliners and softliners both appear to have substantial support. What can be identified with slightly more confidence are a number of obstacles that Abri reformers will have to overcome if their hope for a more 'dynamic' political process is to become a reality.

The viability of the halfway approach

The first obstacle, to repeat the point made above, is that what Abri reformers want to do may not be possible. Giving ground on the liberalisation agenda may only increase, not deflate, the pressures for democratisation. 'Once some individual and collective rights are granted,' O'Donnell and Schmitter acknowledge, 'it becomes increasingly difficult to justify withholding others . . . [A]s liberalisation advances so does the strength of demands for democratisation.'⁸⁰ Darusman makes the same point: 'Can you go halfway democratic?' he asks. 'That's the way authoritarian governments want to do it but it doesn't work.'⁸¹

The conservative opposition

At least for the immediate future, the most serious opposition facing Abri reformers is that coming from Abri hardliners, a group in which Soeharto should be included. For the reasons noted above, the conservative wing in Abri favours a very cautious approach to political change. Habib, for example, contended that the 'openness' campaign in Indonesia made such a fitful start in the early 1990s because Soeharto, uninterested in real change, ordered Abri to slow down the process. 'There are certainly some in Abri,' he said, referring to the softliners, 'who feel that if Abri was more independent from Soeharto then Indonesia would be more democratic.'⁸² The succession issue, of course, is itself a major obstacle to political change. If the succession process gets 'inessy', as one cabinet official put it, 'army hardliners will move in quickly and install themselves'.⁸³

One of the key battlegrounds will be Golkar. If power is to travel from the 'state' to 'society', its likely first stop is Golkar, the New Order's grand corporatist creation. At present, Indonesia has the characteristics of a one-party state, with Golkar acting—albeit inefficiently—the part of a Leninist-type party whose main purpose is to relate the policies of an all-powerful government to a mostly powerless civil society. The reformist vision is to turn Golkar into a different kind of political organisation, one which, while continuing to be an elite-centred party acting in a 'strong

state' system, will provide for a broader participatory role for the military-civilian elite in national policymaking. Abri and moderate civilian reformers argue that the transformation of Golkar along these lines offers the best hope for preserving Indonesia's 'strong state' in the post-Soeharto era.

Sarwono Kusumaatmadja, the environment minister and a former Golkar secretary-general, warns that Golkar is in danger of being left behind by emerging social forces. Business lobbies, urban professionals and middle-class organisations are all looking for a political vehicle to protect their interests, he says, and it is up to Golkar to make itself relevant to these constituencies. He argues that Golkar's mission is to make the 'gradual shift from the politics of ideology—which characterised our older political system—to the politics of interests'. He says the politics of ideology, which aimed at ensuring unanimous acceptance of Pancasila, has accomplished its purpose and must now make way for a more dynamic, if more rambunctious, political environment. Golkar's task, then, is to reshape its amorphous collection of 'functional groups' into a true political party.⁸⁴

While Abri reformers subscribe to the basic thrust of this argument, they recognise that any tinkering with Golkar could have unintended negative consequences for Abri as an institution. Herein lies one of the many dilemmas facing Abri in the mid-1990s, as well as a fine illustration of how difficult it is to disengage the succession issue from the question of political change. As mentioned earlier, Abri is determined to retain a significant political role in Indonesia for the indefinite future. To do that, it needs to continue justifying the need for its dual function doctrine, and that in turn can best be accomplished by ensuring that Golkar remains the pre-eminent political party and, secondly, that Abri remains very much within the 'big Golkar family'. But by lending its efforts to keep Golkar strong, Abri also contributes to keeping intact Soeharto's power base and to making it harder for a 'succession coalition' to nudge Soeharto from office.

The liberal opposition

Another obstacle facing Abri reformers are the critics outside the government who demand change at a faster rate than Abri as an institution is prepared to tolerate. The more radical of these critics tend to reinforce in Abri hardliners the belief that Indonesia is not yet ready for change. Generally speaking, the civilian critics reject the notion that authoritarianism is 'in keeping' with Indonesia's cultural traditions. They argue that Abri—including its reformist members—has considerably underestimated the pressures for change and favours therefore an overly tame reform agenda. 'The outburst of emotion in 1965 came about because pressures

had been bottled up for so long,' said Darusman, the former Golkar legislator ousted from the party by Soeharto in 1992. 'We're heading that same way now.' Darusman and other civilian reformers contend that Soeharto doesn't appreciate the strength of society's desire for change partly because he has surrounded himself with sycophants and yes-men and consequently has lost touch with the people, and partly because authoritarian rulers in general, say O'Donnell and Schmitter, 'tend to interpret . . . [a] lack of perceivable opposition as evidence of "social peace" among previously conflicting classes and of "tacit consensus" for their policies'.⁸⁵

Similar to their concerns about joining with Abri in a 'succession coalition', some civilian reformers are deeply sceptical of its stated commitment to gradual democratisation. Abri is seen by this group as being fundamentally anti-democratic and its sympathy for some political liberalisation a kind of trick intended both to put pressure on Soeharto and to let off the steam of elite dissatisfaction without altering the basic structures of power. 'This is our dilemma,' said legal activist Adnan Buyung Nasution. 'We need an army strong enough to get rid of Soeharto but an army that strong is incompatible with democracy.'⁸⁶ Arief Budiman, who shares this view, identifies two types of pseudo-democracies that are often mistakenly confused for real, or as he says structural, democracy:

The first is what I would call *loan democracy*. This democracy exists when the state is very strong so it can afford to be criticised. A sort of democratic space then emerges in which people can express their opinions freely. However, when the state thinks the criticism has gone too far, it will simply take back the democracy that it has only lent. The people have no power to resist. There is, second, *limited democracy*. This democracy exists only when there is a conflict among the state elites . . . People can criticise one faction of the 'powers that be' and be protected by the opposite faction . . . However, when the conflict within the elite is over, this democratic space will probably disappear also.⁸⁷

Budiman describes Pancasila democracy as a form of loan democracy and the brief campaign of *keterbukaan*, or openness, as a period of limited democracy. As for real democracy, that 'is still far away'.⁸⁸

Democracy Forum member Simanjuntak rejects the notion that gradual, controlled change is possible inside an authoritarian regime. To believe in it, he says, is 'to doggedly defy the logic of change, or to simply mistake an unending status quo [for a] slow journey through a long, winding road to democracy'. To believe that recent 'symptoms of openness' represent the beginnings of substantive change, he continues, the gradualists are making two basic assumptions.

First, that political powerholders have freed themselves from the ruling idea that the unity of the plural society is precarious and that the national

integrity is fragile and must be constantly protected by means of coercion. Secondly, we are accepting that there is a sort of altruism on the part of the power holder, i.e. the military, such that it is prepared to relinquish voluntarily its position through a sustained gradual release of its once strict control.

Simanjuntak adds, convincingly, that there is little evidence to suggest that either of these assumptions is correct. Openness, he concludes, such as it is, has not come about because of 'real democratisation, but more as a gradual process of [Abri] employing subtler . . . means of control and appeasement'.⁸⁹

Other civilian reformers zero in on Abri's *dwifungsi* doctrine and say this is where real change must begin. In mid-1992, a few politicians and political scientists reopened the old question of why the 500 000-strong military, 0.3 per cent of the population, should be handed twenty per cent of the parliamentary seats. Said United Development Party delegate Sri Bintang Pamungkas at the time: 'Abri is an obstacle to democracy and Abri's domination of the political system has to be stopped. Many countries in Latin America have already realised this.'⁹⁰ (Soeharto quickly put this argument to rest by warning that Abri 'may take up arms' if it is excluded from parliamentary representation.⁹¹) Pamungkas, undeterred, said in 1993: 'Look at what has happened or is happening in Russia, South Korea and Thailand. There is a message there for Abri and we have to deliver it. *Dwifungsi* has to be scaled down.'⁹² Lawyer Buyung Nasution saw the civilian reformers' task in essentially the same terms: 'We have to disabuse the military of the notion that they can follow the Singapore model and fend off democracy indefinitely.'⁹³

Abri hardliners, needless to say, react poorly to these kinds of comments. In early 1994, the new Coordinating Minister of Political Affairs and Security, Soesilo Soedarman, darkly warned that 'intellectuals penetrated by liberal democracy' posed a serious threat to national unity. At about the same time, Armed Forces Commander General Feisal Tanjung cautioned agents of the national security agency that pro-democracy advocates were trying to 'undermine and destroy the credibility and position of the government . . . [Their] acts are designed to change the system, mechanism and structures of Pancasila Democracy.'⁹⁴

The international arena

The final piece of the puzzle is the effect on Indonesia of events in the world outside its borders. The international arena impinges on Indonesia in two ways; by example and by direct pressure. It is possible to identify 'positive' and 'negative' aspects of each type as they relate to Indonesia's democratisation process; it is impossible to predict, however, which of these various aspects will dominate in the years ahead.

In terms of 'positive examples', the fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has given the democratic governments of the West an aura of success. While there are some important differences between the totalitarian regimes of the former communist bloc and authoritarian governments like Soeharto's, the 'triumph' of Western democracies in the Cold War struggle tends to chip away at claims that strong nations need non-democratic governance. Second, information about life in the world abroad is flooding into Indonesia faster and more thoroughly than ever before, thanks to advances in communications technology and Indonesia's ever-expanding interdependence with the global marketplace. This is not to suggest that Indonesia's dominant cultural traits—marked by a deference to authority, tolerance and a premium on harmony—are under siege. Rather, it is to make the point that Indonesians, especially those living in urban areas, are vastly more aware of the outside world than they were ten or even five years ago. To be sure, much of what they see taking place elsewhere they would just as soon do without. Nevertheless, a familiarity with other societies does give Indonesians the knowledge that there are alternatives, some successful, some less so, to their current form of government.

In the 'negative example' category, many in Abri share the view of Singapore's former prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, that Western-style democracy is 'inimical' to economic development. The 'Asian' view of liberal democracies, explained Tommy Koh, the respected former Singapore ambassador to the United Nations, is that they

often lead to contention and political instability. And it is very difficult in a democracy to persuade the electorate to accept wise policies that may be painful in the short-term. There is often no industrial peace because management and unions are locked in a class conflict.⁹⁵

State Secretary Murdiono, a retired major general, articulated Abri's deepest fears of liberal democracy in an interview in 1991. 'Shall we go the way of Pakistan, India and the Philippines, the so-called democracies in the region?' he asked. 'No, because multiparty democracy will not solve the real problems that we face like creating jobs or building schools. So, is it for the sake of democracy that we will ruin this country?'⁹⁶

International pressure also works two ways. One consequence of the ending of the Cold War is that it has raised the profile of democracy advocates in the West. The foreign policies of leading Western nations are becoming increasingly concerned with the promotion of democratisation and respect for human rights around the world. The prominence, if perhaps not yet the influence, of human rights monitoring organisations is rising. Certainly some in the Indonesian civilian elite believe pressures from abroad can help further the process of democratisation in Indonesia, although they rarely make this point in public.

The more common view is that any kind of foreign pressure constitutes interference in Indonesia's affairs. Ardently nationalist, Indonesian leaders are opposed adamantly to any attempts to link economic relations with human rights or political development. International pressure clearly has forced changes in some aspects of domestic policy—notably in the area of labour rights—but it is highly improbable that the army will be swayed by foreign pressure alone to relinquish its hold on the political process. Moreover, international pressure may actually inhibit moves toward a political opening by creating a siege mentality within Abri. Obsessed with its own uniqueness, Abri is convinced that its Western critics are biased, simplistic and either unable or unwilling to understand the challenges it faces in developing a young nation or the historical experiences which gave rise to the concept of *dwifungsi*. In a typically defensive remark, Benny Murdani complained to a gathering of Abri leaders in October 1992 that the 'West and its one-sided media keeps itself busy gossiping about Abri's social-political activities'.⁹⁷

Yuwono Sudarsono, the University of Indonesia political scientist, puts the case against, and implications of, foreign pressure in more general terms:

Today's more competitive and intense international political, economic and security system works to the distinct disadvantage of Asian nations. In this era of global production, global marketing and global sourcing, the nations of Asia not only have to compete for market access, trade expansion and foreign investment. They are at the same time under constant pressure from powerful unions and lobbies in the parliaments of the developed world [for] a wide range of sins ranging from undemocratic government, environmental degradation, human rights violations, unfair trade practices, dumping, market restrictions, non-adherence to intellectual property rights and assorted other issues . . . As with other nations of Asia, we do not have the luxury accorded to the nations of the North in forming the bed in which the seeds of democratic forms of government and political development could flourish. Indeed, precisely because the international environment is more intense there is sometimes more need to stress deliberate and slower development of forms of political modernisation.⁹⁸

An uncertain future

One final point needs to be made about the differences of opinion within the Indonesian elite regarding both the need for political change and the nature of that change: it is quite possible that the best case that can be made for democratisation in Indonesia is that it will happen in spite of, rather than because of, what the Indonesian elite wants.

The period leading up to Soeharto's eventual departure has the potential to be a profoundly uncertain time. A dizzying array of elite groups will be jockeying for influence and trying to reform and update existing

mechanisms for protecting their interests. The military will be positioning itself to regain the political high ground, manoeuvring to get Soeharto to step aside gracefully, and trying to keep the whole process as smooth as possible. Soeharto has his own set of needs. He wants to hand power to a successor willing and able to preserve his design for Pancasila democracy, his own personal image for posterity, and the more immediate interests of his children. Chinese and *pribumi* businessmen need to make accommodations with whoever the future national leaders will be. Islamic groups will be looking to support military officers sympathetic to their cause. Civilian politicians will attempt to secure in the uncertainty of the transition period a higher profile for the parliament, a more equitable sharing of power with the military, and some safeguards against the possibility of another 30-year president. And so on down the line.

Each of these groups will have to assess its own leverage and its ability to get what it wants. Alliances will be sought and may be formed. Inevitably, there will be some 'repoliticisation' of Indonesian society, no matter how hard the military tries to keep this to a minimum. And this melange of informal politicking will undoubtedly put the cohesion of the elite under strain. The various components of the elite have different interests and will have to compete to protect them. And it is these possible cracks in the elite which present, perhaps, the most optimistic case for real political change in Indonesia.⁹⁹

Already, in fact, elite divisions are making themselves felt. Abri's quiet support for the Indonesian Democratic Party in 1987 and 1992 and for 'openness' in the years in between, and Soeharto's wooing of support from Muslim groups are both examples of this trend. The possibility that this 'political broadening' will extend still further is certainly one plausible scenario. The fact that democratisation per se is not the objective of either Soeharto or Abri does not guarantee that democratisation will not occur. Events can have unintended consequences.

Indonesia is approaching a crucial moment in its history. There have been only a few such moments since independence was declared a half-century ago. The struggle to remove the Dutch was one such moment, of course, as was the shift from parliamentary democracy to Sukarno's Guided Democracy in 1959 and also the transition to Soeharto's New Order seven years later. In each of these last two shifts, Indonesia attempted in effect to reinvent itself. In each case, the future represented a sharp, discrete break from the past. Both were draining and even painful episodes for a young nation. Indonesians of all political ideologies would like the next transitional moment to be smoother.

Whether this will happen is largely up to Soeharto. Will he leave office before being pushed? Will he act to reduce the unpredictability of his own succession? There are few signs which would suggest a positive

answer to either of these questions, unfortunately, and that augurs poorly for a smooth transition.

Soeharto has undeniably achieved a great deal during his rule. And in assessing the present challenges for Indonesia, it makes little sense to downplay his achievements. The government he has headed has forged a stronger, more prosperous nation. It has fostered a sense of nationhood, raised living standards and improved the welfare of its subjects. There have been flaws and these too should not be overlooked. But the point is that Soeharto's record contains many important accomplishments, and Indonesians, by and large, are grateful for them.

But the history of Soeharto's rule cannot yet be written. He has at least one more major task to accomplish: to remove himself from power without making Indonesia reinvent itself yet again and without putting the nation through all the turmoil and dislocation this would involve. Realising this task begins with the recognition that different times require different rulers. It begins, also, with the understanding that the economic development and societal changes that he has overseen have themselves given rise to new demands, desires and needs: a demand for more political participation, a desire for a more accountable government and a need for a more rational, more transparent and less personal system of government decision-making. Herein lies the *perjuangan*, or struggle, of the 1990s.

If Soeharto fails the succession challenge, he fails also in the broader and more important challenge of political development; the latter, simply, has fallen hostage to the former. And while Soeharto ponders his succession options, the nation waits. Indonesia's problem, however, is that it cannot afford to wait much longer. A once-a-generation transition takes planning. And planning, for all the reasons outlined in this chapter, remains at a very early stage. Unless Soeharto begins to show some willingness to permit the planning process to proceed, history books may well write of him that the worst aspect of his rule was the way in which he left it.

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**U.S. Agency for International Development
Bureau for Global Programs, Field Support and Research**

CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE

" . . . promoting the transition to and consolidation of democratic regimes throughout the world."

The Center for Democracy and Governance (DG Center) is the newest of the Global Bureau's five centers. It was established in 1994 to serve as a focal point for the Agency's commitment to promote "the transition to and consolidation of democratic regimes throughout the world." Operationally, the DG Center's role is to "provide USAID with the technical and intellectual leadership needed to promote democracy within the context of sustainable development."

The Center maintains a professional staff of democratic development experts led by Charles E. Costello, Director, and Jennifer Windsor, Deputy Director. The Center's organizational structure reflects the Agency's four priority areas for democracy and governance: **Rule of Law, Governance, Electoral Processes, and Civil Society**. The Center's activities in each priority area are directed by an experience Senior Advisor and supported technical staff. Each Technical Team directs and manages assistance projects/mechanisms designed to meet the needs of field programs. Complementary Regional Teams have been formed to follow issues of geographic importance and to promote collaboration with the Regional Bureaus. In addition, the Center maintains Strategic Planning and the Program and Information Teams to reinforce the work of the Technical and Regional Teams. (See Center Staff and Staff Responsibilities.) All Technical Teams are responsible for monitoring program impact, compiling lessons learned, developing new approaches and methodologies, conducting assessments and evaluations, responding to technical queries, ensuring the training and career development of the Agency's Democracy Officers, and assisting with donor coordination and inter-agency issues.

At present, the Center manages thirteen pre-existing projects i.e., projects transferred to the Center from other offices/bureaus. (See DG Center Project Inventory.) By early FY 1996, the Center will have on stream a series of DG service delivery mechanisms designed to support democracy/governance activities worldwide. The Center's functions and priorities are:

- **Field Support** -- This encompasses the conceptualization, design and implementation of global technical assistance mechanisms to support the DG work of USAID field missions. All designs incorporate direct input from the field on anticipated needs, as well as examine proven approaches to situations which currently challenge democratic development such as ethnic and minority participation, conflict resolution, corruption, etc. This effort is built upon the democracy projects transferred from the Regional Bureaus. The new mechanisms provide technical support to all four of the Center's priority areas plus general assessment, design, evaluations and support. (see DG Center Action Plan - FY 1996 and FY 1997).
- **Information and Research Support** -- As part of the Center's responsibilities for ensuring that lessons learned and cutting-edge technical information are widely disseminated, the Center is building a technical information and research support capability. For this

effort the Center collaborates closely with PPC/CDIE to meet the information needs of both Washington and the field. In FY 1995, two electronic newsletters, Democracy Report and Democracy Exchange, were initiated to promote technical exchanges between and among practitioners in the field and policy makers in Washington. Additional newsletters and technical publications will further the Center's outreach capabilities. In the future, and as appropriate, the Center will sponsor research studies.

- *Global Democracy Database* -- In FY 1996, once the Agency's re-engineered information system is fully operational, the Center will effectively monitor and report on democracy and governance activities whether at the project, country or regional level. Drawing on this and other existing Agency information sources, the Center will make information accessible to USAID staff and interested parties within the U.S. government on a wide range of democracy and governance indicators, along with financial information and achievements toward strategic objectives.
- *Democracy Fellows Program* -- This innovative program provides participating NGOs, the international development community, and (for limited purposes) Missions, Regional Bureaus, and/or the Center access to a cadre of trained and experienced democracy/governance experts.

The Center is located at:

320 Twenty-First Street, N.W., Room 5258
Washington, D.C. 20523-0090
Telephone:202-736-7893. Fax: 202-736-7892

CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE

"...promoting the transition to and consolidation of democratic regimes throughout the world.

Staff Responsibilities

Chuck Costello, Director - Jennifer Windsor, Deputy Director

TECHNICAL TEAMS

Rule of Law

Debra McFarland
Laura Libanati, PMI

Electoral Processes

Amy Young
Nadereh Chahmirzadi

Civil Society

Gary Hansen
Eric Bolstad
Peter Accolla, RSSA

Governance

Patrick Fn' Piere
Jeanne North
Pat Isman, RSSA
Yolanda Comedy, AAAS

Program/Information

Joe Williams
Francis Luzzatto
Dora Jackson
Deborah Price
Kim Mahling Clark, CDIE
David Breg, CDIE

Strategies and Field Support

Jerry Hyman
Erin Soto
Roberto Figueredo
Melissa Brown, PMI
Yolanda Comedy, AAAS

Key:

Technical Team Leaders underlined
Regional and Specialized Team Coordinators underlined
CDIE - Center for Development Information and Evaluation
PMI - Presidential Management Intern
RSSA - Resources Support Services Agreement
AAAS - American Association for the Advancement of Science

REGIONAL TEAMS

Asia/Near East

Roberto Figueredo
Gary Hansen
Peter Accolla, RSSA
Patrick Fn'Piere

Africa

Melissa Brown, PMI
Eric Bolstad
Debra McFarland
Pat Isman, RSSA
Yolanda Comedy, AAAS
Nadereh Chahmirzadi

Latin America/Caribbean

Erin Soto
Eric Bolstad
Debra McFarland
Jeanne North

Europe/Independent States

Jerry Hyman
Francis Luzzatto
Amy Young
Laura Libanati, PMI

SPECIALIZED TEAMS

Information/Research

Francis Luzzatto
Kim Mahling Clark, CDIE
David Breg, CDIE

Women's Rights

Melissa Brown, PMI
Debra McFarland
Nadereh Chahmirzadi

As of: July 12, 1995

CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE

"...promoting the transition to and consolidation of democratic regimes throughout the world."

CENTER STAFF

As of: July 12, 1995

TEAM ASSIGNMENTS

Chuck Costello, Director - Jennifer Windsor, Deputy Director

		TECHNICAL	REGIONAL/SPECIALIZED
Peter Accolla	663-2594	Civil Society	Labor, ANE
Jane Anglin	736-7893	Administrative Support	
Eric Bolstad	663-2696	Civil Society	Labor, LAC, Africa
David Breg	663-2197	Program/Information	Research
Melissa Brown	736-7883	Strategies/Field Support	Africa, Women's Rights
Nadereh Chahmirzadi	736-7896	Electoral Processes	Africa
Kim Mahling Clark	663-2209	Program/Information	Research, Africa
Yolanda Comedy	736-7881	Governance/Strategy	Africa
Chuck Costello	736-7893	Director	
Roberto Figueredo	736-7891	Strategies/Field Support	ANE
Patrick Fn'Piere	736-7887	Governance	ANE
Pat Isman	663-2693	Governance	Africa
Gary Hansen	663-2694	Civil Society	ANE
Jerry Hyman	736-7885	Strategies/Field Support	ENI
Dora Jackson	663-2255	Program/Information	
Laura Libanati	736-7878	Rule of Law	ENI, LAC
Francis Luzzatto	663-2251	Program/Information	Research, ENI
Debra McFarland	736-7877	Rule of Law	LAC, Personnel, Women's Rights
Sheron Moore	663-2454	Administrative Support	
Jeanne North	663-2692	Governance	LAC, Africa
Deborah Price	663-2690	Program/Information	
Erin Soto	736-7875	Strategies/Field Support	LAC, Democracy Fellows
Joe Williams	663-2180	Program/Information	
Jennifer Windsor	736-6793	Deputy Director	
Amy Young	736-7886	Electoral Processes	ENI, Democracy Fellows

The Center is located at:

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USAID Democracy & Governance Field Officers (July 1995)*

AFRICA

Ruben Johnson Benin	Peter Olson Botswana (SA Reg.-9/1)	Julianne DiNenna Burundi	Antero Veiga Cape Verde
Les McBride Chad	Rene LeMarchand Cote d'Ivoire-REDSO/W	Micheline Symenouh Cote d'Ivoire-REDSO/W	Moussa Okanla Cote d'Ivoire-REDSO/W
Victor Barbiero Ethiopia	Walter North Ethiopia	Steve Tucker Ethiopia	Gary Cohen Gambia
Naucy McKay Gambia	Denise Rollins Ghana	Ruth Buckley Kenya-REDSO/E	Nancy Gitau Kenya
John Harbeson Kenya-REDSO/E	Steffi Meyer Kenya	Ronald Ullrich Kenya (Somalia)	Bill Hammink Madagascar
Karen Poe Madagascar	Stephanie Funk Malawi	Tom Lofgren Malawi	Andy Sisson Malawi
George Thompson Mali	Sergio Guzman Mozambique	Carol Martin Mozambique	Laura Slobey Mozambique
Edward Spriggs Namibia (Dir.)	Samir Zoghby Namibia	Souleymane Aboubacar Niger	Gary Merritt Niger
Keith Simmons Niger	Halima Souley Niger	Brian Williams Rwanda	Jan Vanderveen Senegal
Steve Brent South Africa	Louis Coronado South Africa	Ric Harber South Africa	Douglas Heisler South Africa
Farooq Mangera South Africa	Harold Motshwane South Africa	Dennis Wendel South Africa	Courtney Blair Tanzania
Diana Putman Tanzania	Norm Olsen Uganda	Jim Polhemus Zambia	Stephen Norton Zimbabwe

ASIA & NEAR EAST

Emily McPhie Bangladesh	Alexander Newton Bangladesh	Karl Schwartz Bangladesh	Ron Briggs Cambodia
Ned Greeley Cambodia	Jean DuRette Egypt	Ana Klenicki Egypt	Connie Paraskeva Egypt
Frank Pavich Egypt	Diane Ponasik Egypt	Jon O'Rourke India	Mark Johnson Indonesia

Maria Rendon Indonesia	Karen Turner Israel (Jerusalem)	Robert Hansen Jordan	Chuck Howell Mongolia
William Riley Morocco	Helen Soos Morocco	Neal Cohen Nepal	Harold Dickherber Philippines
John Grayzel Philippines	David Nelson Philippines	Luisa Panlilio Philippines	Fatima Verzosa Sri Lanka
Tupou Lindborg Sri Lanka	Stan Stalla Sri Lanka	Lawrence Dolan Thailand (RSM)	Mohammed Abassi Tunisia
Harry Birnholz West Bank/Gaza	Basharat Ali Yemen	Bill McKinney Yemen	

EUROPE & NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES

Cameron Pippitt Albania	Brad Fujimoto Bulgaria	Jim Bednar Czech Republic	Bob Posner Czech Republic
Adrian de Graffenreid Estonia	James Watson Hungary	Paula Feeney Kazakhstan	John Scales Kazakhstan
Tamara Arsenault Poland	William Carter Romania	Julie Allaire-MacDonald Russia	Jeanne Bourgault Russia
Anne Aarnes Ukraine	Patricia Liefert Ukraine	David Mandel Uzbekistan	

LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN

Robert Dakan Belize	Carl Cira Bolivia	Walter Guevara Bolivia	Robert Kahn Bolivia
Lewis Lucke Bolivia	Peter Natiello Bolivia	Omar Ojeda Bolivia	Joseph Spooner Bolivia
Ricardo Falcao Brazil	Ed Kadunc Brazil	Paul Bisek Caribbean (Bridgetown)	Rebecca Cohn Caribbean (Bridgetown)
Richard Macken Caribbean (Bridgetown)	Claudio Mundi Chile	Tom Nicastro Chile	John Jones Colombia
Lars Klassen Colombia	Robert Buergethal Costa Rica	Betsy Murray Costa Rica	Flora Ruiz Costa Rica
Manuel Ortega Dominican Republic	Christof Baer Ecuador	Michael Hacker Ecuador	Linn Hamnergren El Salvador

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Mauricio Herrera El Salvador	Kris Loken El Salvador	Beatriz Molina El Salvador	Salvador Novellino El Salvador
Michael Radmann El Salvador	Carrie Thompson El Salvador	Beth Hogan Guatemala	Debbie Kennedy-Irahita Guatemala-ROCAP
Margaret Kromhout Guatemala	Todd Sloan Guatemala	Brian Treacy Guatemala	Chris Brown Haiti
Catherine Hall Haiti	Carol Horning Haiti	Emily Leonard Haiti	Sue Nelson Haiti
Ron Glass Honduras	Carla Perez Honduras	Mario Pita Honduras	Sigifredo Ramirez Honduras
Kirk Dahlgren Jamaica	Rosalee Henry Jamaica	Arthur Danart Mexico	Sarah Donnelly Mexico
Todd Amani Nicaragua	Kevin Armstrong Nicaragua	Karen Hilliard Nicaragua	Susan Reichle Nicaragua
Gary Russell Nicaragua	Aura Feraud Panama	Robert Murphy Panama	Roger Yochelson Panama
Julio Basualdo Paraguay	Jeffrey Borns Peru	Grimaldo Guipttons Peru	Edith Houston Peru
Alfredo Larrabure Peru	Ana Sanchez Peru	Julianna Abella Uruguay	

* Note: There is no official list of DG officers. The above list attempts to cover Mission staff that deal with democracy-related activities. Any additions/deletions should be sent to David Breg G/DG.

ADDITIONAL USAID/W DEMOCRACY-RELATED PERSONNEL

Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination

Larry Garber
Jennifer Douglas
Norm Nicholson
Shelly Rojano

AA/Management

Bill Krause

General Counsel/Global

Nina Nathani

Bureau for Humanitarian Response

Rick Barton
Johanna Mendelson

Office of Women in Development

Jenna Luche

Office of Environment and Urban Programs

Steven Sharp

Center for Development Information and Evaluation

Boyd Kowal
Jan Emmert
Hal Lippman
Heather McHugh
Ryan McCannell

Africa Bureau Information Center

Patricia Mantey
Zoey Breslar
John Engels

Africa Bureau

Robert Shoemaker
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Asia/Near East Bureau

John Anderson
Richard Whitaker
David Yang

Latin America/Caribbean Bureau

Sharon Isralow
John Swallow

Europe/Newly Independent States

Geraldine Donnelly
Maryann Riegelman
Keith Henderson
William Cole
Kevin Kelly
Corbin Lyday
Susan Kosinski
Ilona Countryman
Kathryn Stratos
David Black
Kay Harris
Christine Sheckler
Steve Bouser
Eileen Wickstrom
Theodore Priftis
Mitchell Benedict
Aldrena Williams
Melissa Schwartz

CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE

"...promoting the transition to and consolidation of democratic regimes throughout the world"

1995 Project Inventory

July 17, 1995

U.S. Agency for International Development

CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE

"...promoting the transition to and consolidation of democratic regimes throughout the world."

1995 Project Inventory

USAID's Center for Democracy and Governance is one of five "centers of excellence" which constitute the Agency's commitment to provide leadership, guidance and technical assistance in four agency-wide program areas.

The following pages present an up-to-date inventory of current DG Center-managed projects which are directly supportive of the Agency's effort to promote Democracy and Governance. This Project Inventory was prepared specifically for the Democracy and Governance Field Officers Conference held July 24-26, 1995. Project profiles summarize each project's current status and present a number of programmatic indicators designed to describe the scope of the project.

Proj. No	Center-managed DG Projects	Geographic Scope	Priority Areas
936-5469	Global Elections	Global	Electoral Processes
936-5451	Implementing Policy Change I	Global	Governance
936-5466	Global Democracy Program Support Project	Global	Technical Support*
598-0669	Administration of Justice Technical Support	Latin America/Caribbean	Rule-of-Law
936-5471	LAC Regional Civil-Military Relations	Latin America/Caribbean	Rule-of-Law
598-0806	American Institute for Free Labor Development II	Latin America/Caribbean	Civil Society
698-0477	Strengthening African Trade Unions Project	Africa	Civil Society
698-0486	Africa Regional Electoral Assistance Fund (AREAF)	Africa	Electoral Processes
698-0497	African Lawyer DG and Private Sector Development Training	Africa	Rule-of Law
698-0542	Africa DG Program Development and Support Facility	Africa	Technical Support*
298-0377	Democratic Institutions Support	Near East	Technical Support*
398-0263	Asian-American Free Labor Institute	Asia/Near East	Civil Society
499-0002	Asia Democracy Project	Asia	Technical Support*

* general technical support across program emphases

Global Elections

Project Number: 936-5469

Date of Info: March 1995
Proj. Manager: Amy Young
Area Served: Global

Office: Democracy and Governance
Status: Active
Mechanism: Cooperative Agreement

LOP: \$7,200,000

Primary Organizations: **Component #1** International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)
Component #2: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI)

Other Implementing Orgs.: International Republican Institute (IRI)

<u>Component #1 Program Activities</u>		<u>%</u>
DIEA	Electoral Assistance	75
DICE	Civic Education	20
DIPP	Political Party Support	05

<u>Component #2 Program Activities</u>		<u>%</u>
DIEA	Electoral Assistance	100

<u>Component #1 Special Interests</u>		<u>%</u>
FBN	Female Share of Benefits	35
MBN	Male Share of Benefits	65
INS	Institution Building	75
PVX	PVO Institutional Dev.	20
PVU	USAID Registered PVO	100

<u>Component #2 Special Interests</u>		<u>%</u>
FBN	Female Share of Benefits	40
MBN	Male Share of Benefits	60
PVU	USAID Registered PVO	100

Purpose: To promote open and participatory political and electoral processes that reflect the will of the electorate.

Description: The Global Elections Project provides technical assistance, assessments, training, and commodities to democracy and governance initiatives in USAID assisted countries.

COMPONENT #1

Projected Results at Completion: Citizens have increased access to, and participate in, free and inclusive electoral processes in selected countries.

**Key Results:
(Prior 6 Months)**

Publication and dissemination of IFES International Calendar of Events.
Ballots procured and printed in a timely manner for the 1995 Haitian national and local elections.
Developed training for poll workers in Haiti.
Rapid deployment of commodities for the Benin elections (first and second rounds).
Helped launch the African Association of Electoral Administrators.
Resource Center in El Bireh (West Bank) was officially opened; technical assistance was provided to the Palestinian Commission on Elections and Local Government (CELG).
Developed effective civic education and NGO training program in Romania.
Assessed political and technical pre-election or electoral environment in Brazil, Colombia, and Jamaica.

**Anticipated Results:
(Thru Sept. 30, 1995)**

Pollworkers effectively trained to administer Haitian presidential elections.
Election administrators in Bangladesh trained to enhance their skills and competence.
Contribute to political and technical pre-election assessment in Sierra Leone.
Romanian project will evolve into a locally run NGO assistance center.
Continuation of NGO training and civic education in the West Bank through the Resource Center.
Technical assessment of electoral administration in the Philippines

COMPONENT #2

**Projected Results
at Completion:**

A more open and participatory political and electoral process that reflects the will of the populous.

**Anticipated Results:
(Thru Sept. 30, 1995)**

Increased number of citizens in Mexico will participate in state and local elections as observers to ensure a transparent and fair election.
Increased capacity of the Civic Alliance NGO to develop and implement programs that educate citizens about their rights and responsibilities in the democratic process.

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Implementing Policy Change I

Project Number: 936-5451

Date of Info: May 1995 **Office:** Democracy and Governance **LOP:** Note: IPC Phase 2 (936-5470), is currently being competed.

Proj. Manager: Jeanne North **Status:** Active
Area Served: Global **Mechanism:** Contract

Primary Organization: Component #1: Management Systems International (MSI)

Other Implementing Orgs: Abt Associates
Development Alternatives, Inc.

<u>Component #1 Program Activities</u>	<u>%</u>
DIFM: Accountability of the Executive	40
DIME Free Flow of Information	30
PSMG Public Sector Admin. and Management	30

Component #1 Special Interests

RDV Development
ROR Operational Research
RSS Social Science Research

Purpose: To assist host country organizations to design broad-based management strategies for policy change and effectively manage the process of implementation.

Description: Host country NGOs will receive training and guidance to develop effective management and implementation policies.

COMPONENT #1

Projected Results at Completion: The development and use of methods and models to promote participatory and democratic processes for policy implementation.

Clients in approximately 25 countries (8 long-term activities) will have been assisted to develop a shared understanding of implementation problems and opportunities and will have skills with tools and techniques to move their policy agenda forward in a participatory manner.

**Key Results:
(Prior 6 Months)**

Integrated infrastructure in Southern Africa: With IPC assistance in facilitating regional and private national-level workshops and conducting supporting research, the public and private stakeholders in 11 countries of Southern Africa have made a great deal of progress in reaching agreement across sectors and between countries on the major questions involved in regionally-integrated infrastructure (transportation -- roads, rail, air, trucking--; telecommunications; posts; and meteorology).
South Africa: The post-election IPC support provided to private sector groups working to improve the policy climate for business has been re-oriented.

**Anticipated Results:
(Thru Sept. 30, 1995)**

A synthesis of lessons from IPC 1 will be available to the practitioners with the completion of four books ("papers") which incorporate results of research and development based on technical support over five years to approximately 20 policy implementation situations. The subjects relating to policy implementation are: Strategic Management; Public-Private Interaction; Organizational Complexity; and Natural Resource Management Policy. Also, a paper on the role of "outsiders" in assisting policy implementation will be available.
IPC's lessons learned will be disseminated in a USAID/W summer workshop.
SATCC countries will have written agreements in respect to the integration of regional infrastructure resulting from a year of technical support.
A workshop on the role of the "President's Office" or "Cabinet Office" in policy implementation will take place in Mali with representatives of approximately 10 countries participating.
A workshop on the role of the private sector in policy implementation will take place in Harare with private (and some public) representatives of approximately 10 countries participating.
Strategic management workshops will strengthen the ability of provincial officials in the northwest of South Africa to manage the changes required of the new governmental structure.
Two studies will be completed on trade and investment in South Africa and NAFCOC will be strengthened as a leader for majority business interests.

Global Democracy Support Project

Project Number: 936-5466

Date of Info: May 1995

Proj. Manager: Patrick J. Fn'Piere

Area Served: Global

Office: Democracy and Governance

LOP: \$22,021,000

Status: Active

Mechanism: Grant, Cooperative Agreement, and Contract

Primary Organization: Chemonics International

Other Implementing Orgs.: Academy for Educational Development (Democracy Fellows Program)

Transparency International

Other organizations are authorized to implement activities under this project

Purpose: To provide on an interim basis a wide range of technical support services for designing, strategic planning, implementing and evaluating DG projects.

Description: The project will be accomplished through: 1) the development of global projects; 2) the provision of long and short-term technical specialists with expertise in the DG Center's functional areas; and 3) by conducting cross-sectoral initiatives, studies, seminars, conferences, and workshops.

The project will be implemented through various mechanisms that support: a) project and program development activities, feasibility studies, operational research and pilot testing; b) sector assessments or other special studies that will lead to better understanding of technical or institutional constraints to DG development; c) project design and evaluation; d) financial reviews and project-related technical support to field missions; e) publications and information systems development; and f) workshops, seminars and conferences and short-term training courses on DG priority issues.

Administration of Justice

Project Number: 598-0669

Date of Info:	May 1995	Office:	Democracy and Governance	LOP:	\$2,850,892
Proj. Manager:	Debra McFarland	Status:	Active		
Area Served:	Latin America/Caribbean	Mechanism:	Contract		

Primary Organization: **Component #1:** National Center for State Courts (NCSC)
 Component #2: National Center for State Courts (NCSC) -- Requirements Contract

<u>Component #1 Program Activity</u>		<u>%</u>	<u>Component #2 Activity Code</u>		<u>%</u>
DILJ	Legal/Judicial Development	100	DILJ	Legal and Judicial Development	100

Component #1 Special Interests

- TIC In-Country Training
- TPU Public Training
- TTH Third Country-Based Training

Purpose: To increase the independence and institutional capacity of judicial systems in Latin America and the Caribbean and to promote information sharing regarding the administration of justice in the region.

Description: This project will provide a series of regional seminars and conferences on major themes and trends in the rule of law in Latin America. Additionally, the project will maintain a clearinghouse of information related to judicial and legal reform. A companion requirements provision provides for technical support to Missions through a buy-in provision.

COMPONENT #1

Projected Results at Completion: Models that improve the administration of justice (AOJ) will be in place in 30% of the USAID countries that have AOJ activities.

Key Results: (Prior 6 months) Conference on ADR held in Bolivia (March 1995).
 Agenda, invitations, and logistics prepared for conferences in Chile and Costa Rica on oral process and pretrial detention.
 Meeting planned for Washington, D.C., for the Judicial Summit.

Completed automated links with USAID Missions in the LAC region.
Drafted the second newsletter with anticipated distribution set for mid-June, and developed the format for the third and fourth issues scheduled for distribution in mid-August and September, respectively.
Recruited new project director, project coordinator, and consultant to advise on USAID regulations.

Anticipated Results: NCSC will sponsor two regional conferences and one planning meeting
(Thru Sept, 30, 1995) The publication and distribution of three newsletters regarding the progress toward rule of law in the region will be completed.
Continue to function in a clearinghouse capacity by providing information and technical assistance to missions requesting it.
Draft reports on lessons learned.

COMPONENT #2

Key Results: Completed short-term judicial training program in Haiti.
(Prior 6 Months) Began preparation for legal services conference to be held in Chile (August 1995).

Anticipated Results: Deliver services to Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and Peru as requested in the various MOUs
(Thru Sept. 30, 1995) signed in FY 1995.

LAC Regional Civil - Military Relations

Project Number: 936-5471

Date of Info:	May 1995	Office:	Democracy and Governance	LOP:	\$1,690,545
Proj. Manager:	Debra McFarland	Status:	Active		
Area Served:	Latin America/Caribbean	Mechanism:	Contract		

Primary Organization: The American University

<u>Component #1 Program Activities</u>	<u>%</u>
DIHR Human Rights	60
DICE Civic Education	10
DICS Civil Society	20
DIFM Free Flow of Info	10

Component #1 Special Interest

RSS Social Science Research

Purpose: To strengthen democracy in Latin America by deepening knowledge, promoting new research and encouraging discussion of civil-military relations among military and civilian leaders in Latin America

Description: The project aims to define a dialogue with military and civilian leaders and create new knowledge about the subject of civil-military relations. This is carried out through seminars, conferences, workshops, and assessments of civil-military relations in specific countries.

Projected Results

at Completion: Improved relations among civilians, NGOs, and the military.
Improved and constant oversight of the military by civilian government.
Lessons learned in Latin American case disseminated to other regions.

Key Results: Technical assistance provided to USIS/El Salvador and USAID/ Guatemala.
(Prior 6 months) Attendance at WIIS seminar on Civil-Military Relations in Moscow.
Published Lessons Learned from the Venezuela Experience.
Sponsored the May 4-6 "Lessons Learned" conference.

Anticipated Results: Disseminate the proceedings from the May 4-6 "Lessons Learned" conference.
(Thru Sept. 30, 1995) Sponsor a round-table at the Latin American Studies Association meeting on Civil-Military Relations.
Provide technical assistance to Guatemala, Ecuador, and Paraguay according to MOUs.

American Institute for Free Labor Development II

Project Number: 598-0806

Date of Info: March 1995 **Office:** Democracy and Governance **LOP:** \$37,741,730
Proj. Manager: Eric R. Bolstad **Status:** Active
Area Served: Latin America/Caribbean **Mechanism:** Grant

Primary Organization: American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD)

<u>Component #1 Program Activity</u>	<u>%</u>
DILA Labor (Unions)	100

Component #1 Special Interests

FBN Female Share of Benefits	EVP Environmental Policy
MBN Male Share of Benefits	PVU USAID Registered PVO
INS Institution Building	PVL Local PVO
SPR Sectoral Policy Reform	TUS U.S. Based Training
EPR Macroeconomic Policy Reform TIC	In-Country Training
EDU Education	TTH Third Country-Based Training
IAS Integrated Agricultural Systems	ALT Land Tenure

Purpose: To strengthen free, democratic trade unions and promote internationally-recognized worker rights throughout the LAC region.

Description: AIFLD programs emphasize trade union development, improved labor-management relations and worker rights, an increased role of women within the union movement, the promotion of socio-econ. reforms, and the self-sustainability of worker organizations.

Projected Results at Completion: The grantee will have institutionalized a capacity within the trade union movement to defend the economic and social interest of its members through policy reform, participation in the political process (including elections, rule of law, and governance), the promotion of labor-management relations and internationally-recognized worker rights.

Key Results: There has been a marked increase in the growth of the creation and membership of free democratic unions, and enhanced socio-

(Prior 6 months) political role of worker organizations in key areas of policy related to trade and internationally-recognized worker rights, and an enhanced role in democratic elections. There has also been moderate success in bringing about labor-management cooperation, particularly in the export-led (maquila) sector/free zones.

Anticipated Results: The improved capability of unions to assure labor code enforcement.
(Thru Sept. 30, 1995) Increasing collective bargaining contracts
The formation of unions across economic sectors and assuring the self-sustainability of such unions.

Strengthening African Trade Unions

Project Number: 698-0477

Date of Info:	March 1995	Office:	Democracy and Governance	LOP: \$25,300,000
Proj. Manager:	Eric R. Bolstad	Status:	Active	
Area Served:	Africa	Mechanism:	Grant	

Primary Organization: African-American Labor Center

<u>Component #1 Program Activities</u>	<u>%</u>
DILA Labor (Unions)	100

Component #1 Special Interests

FBN Female Share of Benefits	ALT Land Tenure
MBN Male Share of Benefits	EVP Environmental Policy
INS Institution Building	PVU USAID Registered PVO
SPR Sectoral Policy Reform	PVL Local PVO
EPR Macroeconomic Policy Reform TUS	U.S. Based Training
EDU Education	TIC Third Country-Based Training
IAS Integrated Agricultural Systems	ALT Land Tenure

Purpose: To strengthen free, democratic trade unions and promote internationally-recognized worker rights throughout Africa.

Description: AALC programs emphasize trade union development, improved labor-management relations and worker rights, an increased role of women within the trade union movement, the promotion of socio-economic reforms, and the self-sustainability of worker organizations.

Projected Results at Completion: There will be greater cohesion among unions within federations and among federations on a regional basis. There will also be greater collaboration among labor, government, and business on socio-economic policy at the national and plant levels.

Key Results: (Prior 6 Months) An increase was achieved in trade union membership growth, organizing capacity, trade union education, and the improvement in the administrative and financial management in assisted trade union organizations.

Anticipated Results: Greater efficiency in trade union organization and operations and a corresponding increase in collective bargaining agreements (Thru Sept. 30, 1995) between unions and company management.

Africa Regional Electoral Assistance Fund (AREAF)

Project Number: 698-0486

Date of Info:	Dec. 15, 1994	Office:	Democracy and Governance	LOP:	\$13,500,000
Proj. Manager:	Nadereh Chahmirzadi	Status:	Active		
Area Served:	Africa	Mechanism:	Cooperative Agreement		

Primary Organization: African American Institute (AAI)

Other Implementing Orgs.: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI)
International Republican Institute (IRI)

Component #1 Program Activities

DIEA Electoral Assistance
DIPP Political Party Support

Component #1 Special Interests %

FBN	Female Share of Benefits	35
INS	Institution Building	20
MBN	Male Share of Benefits	65
PVU	USAID Registered PVO	100
PVX	PVO Institutional Dev.	20

Purpose: To support free and fair elections at the local and national levels and constitutional referenda and post-election consolidation activities throughout sub-Saharan Africa.

Description: The African-American Institute (AAI), in partnership with the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI), is undertaking activities to: 1) improve public understanding of, participation in, and acceptance of national electoral processes; 2) ensure fair and open elections; and 3) strengthen institutions key to democratic electoral processes. The project finances short-term TA, significant training activities, equipment and supplies, and local cost support for African organizations involved in the electoral process. The partners also undertake various cross-cutting activities, such as organizing regional conferences, workshops, and seminars to bring together democratic activists and political leaders from a number of countries, publishing and disseminating materials about election monitoring and democratic processes, and coordinating multinational financial support for election assistance.

Projected Results

at Completion:

A greater number of citizens in selected countries benefit from and participate in democratic processes through improved access to free and fair political processes, due in part to improved USAID Mission programs in the electoral sector.

Key Results:

(Prior 6 months)

Improved electoral systems and processes in Botswana, Zimbabwe, Niger, Kenya, Ghana, South Africa, Tanzania, and Senegal.
Wider national participation in the electoral process in Niger, Benin, Uganda, and Botswana.
Confidence-building in electoral democracy in the Congo, Benin, and Gabon.
Democratic institution building in Kenya, Zimbabwe, Benin, Senegal, and Ghana.

Anticipated Results:

(Thru Sept. 30, 1995)

Improved electoral systems and processes in Cote d'Ivoire and Uganda.
Wider national participation in electoral processes in Cote d'Ivoire, Madagascar, Tanzania, and Uganda.
Confidence-building in electoral democracy in Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Madagascar, and Tanzania.
Democratic institution building in Cote d'Ivoire and Kenya.

African Lawyer Democracy/Governance and Private Sector Development Training

Project Number: 698-0497

Date of Info: May 1995 **Office:** Democracy and Governance **LOP:** \$500,000
Proj. Manager: Debra McFarland **Status:** Active
Area Served: Africa **Mechanism:** Grant

Primary Organization: International Development Law Institute (IDLI)

Component #1 Program Activities %

DILJ Legal and Judicial Development 50
PEBD Business Development Promotion 50

Component #1 Special Interests

TTH Third Country-Based Training
FBN Female Share of Benefits

Purpose: To further the Institute's objective of helping African legal advisors and lawyers play a more constructive role in the development process, and to support the Africa Bureau's on-going democracy and governance and private sector initiatives.

Description: IDLI anticipates a 2-pronged approach: 1) provide funding for 24 participants to attend Rome-based training programs; and 2) provide a minimum of two in-country one-week training seminars pertaining to democracy/governance issues.

Projected Results at Completion: A cadre of well-trained African legal advisors and lawyers will be able to play a more constructive role in the development of their nations. Greater transparency will be achieved in public procurement, accountability and the procedures governing international transactions. Overall improved democracy and governance conditions in recipient countries will occur and a more favorable atmosphere for private sector entrepreneurship and trade will exist.

Key Results: 5 African lawyers trained (3 in International Business Transactions and 2 in the Development Lawyers Course).
(Prior 6 Months)

Anticipated Results: With the Mission in Uganda, IDLI will conduct a one-week in-country workshop on a topic consistent with the grant's focus on
(Thru Sept. 30) democracy.

Key Results: Provided Missions/Bureau with basic information and data that enabled them to carry-out a DG strategy or program.
(Prior 6 Months) Missions obtained project service.

Key Results: Responded to Missions that needed rule of law project design.

(Thru Sept. 30, 1995) Lessons learned and cumulative knowledge gained from assessments.

Lessons learned and cumulative knowledge from assessments.

USAID information increased regarding the participation of women in democracy and governance.

Lessons-learned in democracy transitions and consolidations.

Democratic Institutions Support

Project Number: 298-0377

Date of Info: May 1995 **Office:** Democracy and Governance **LOP:** \$17,500,000
Proj. Manager: Roberto Figueredo **Status:** Active
Area Served: Asia/ Near East **Mechanism:** Contract

Primary Organization: Chemonics International

Other Implementing Orgs.: Datex
Hudson Institute
Carter Center

<u>Component #1 Program Activities</u>		<u>%</u>
DICS	Civil Society	25
DIFM	Accountability of the Executive	25
DILJ	Legal and Judicial Development	25
DIME	Free Flow of Information	25

Purpose: To assist Near East Missions in designing and implementing programs aimed at developing democratic political institutions and organizations in the public and private sectors.

Description: The project 1) provides a broad range of technical support services, along with modest training and commodity support; 2) provides matching funds for Mission-generated institution-building activities; and 3) finances a limited number of institution strengthening activities by international organizations.

The technical support component involves: a) Conducting country-level political and economic reviews and institutional assessments aimed at identifying reforms critical to democratization and economic liberalization, along with studies and workshops on selected topics, e.g., the legal status of women; b) helping Missions to draft governance and democracy projects and strategies; c) helping design and monitor small-scale institutional strengthening activities, e.g., training parliamentary research staff to use on-line databases; d) developing a management information system, to include syntheses of evaluations and lessons learned; and e) promoting regional institutional linkages and sponsoring regional networking conferences.

**Projected Results
at Completion:**

Lessons learned and cumulative knowledge gained from political and economic reviews.
Provided USAID/W and MENA Missions with basic information and data for the design and implementation of DG strategies and

programs.

Missions obtained project services.

DG strategy for each MENA country completed.

**Key Results:
(Prior 6 Months)**

Completed an NGO assessment in Tunisia.

Completed field work on a DG assessment in Yemen.

Completed the DG strategy for Morocco.

Completed the design of the WID and DIS projects in Yemen, Lebanon, Egypt, the West Bank/Gaza, and Tunisia.

Completed the design of country-specific programs to strengthen women's NGOs in Yemen, the West Bank/Gaza, Tunisia, Lebanon, and Egypt.

**Anticipated Results:
(Thru Sept. 30, 1995)**

Lessons learned and accumulated knowledge from assessments.

USAID information increased regarding the participation of women in democracy and governance.

Lessons learned in democracy transition and consolidations.

Lessons learned in strengthening civil society organizations.

Asian-American Free Labor Institute

Project Number: 398-0263

Date of Info: March 1995 **Office:** Democracy and Governance **LOP:** \$22,333,431
Proj. Manager: Eric R. Bolstad **Status:** Active
Area Served: Asia/ Near East **Mechanism:** Grant

Primary Organization: Asian-American Free Labor Institute (AAFLI)

<u>Component #1 Program Activity</u>	<u>%</u>
DILA Labor (Unions)	100

Component #1 Special Interest

FBN	Female Share of Benefits	EVP	Environmental Policy
MBN	Male Share of Benefits	PVU	USAID Registered PVO
INS	Institution Building	PVL	Local PVO
SPR	Sectoral Policy Reform	TIC	In-Country Training
EPR	Macroeconomic Policy Reform TTH	Third	Country-Based Training
EDU	Education	ALT	Land Tenure
IAS	Integrated Agricultural Systems		

Purpose: To strengthen free, democratic trade unions and promote internationally-recognized worker rights throughout the ANE region.

Description: AAFLI programs emphasize trade union development, improved labor-management relations and worker rights, an increased role of women within the trade union movement, the promotion of socio-economic reforms, and the self-sustainability of worker organizations.

Projected Results at Completion: Trade union institutions will be responsive to changing political and economic environments. Partnerships will be promoted between AAFLI, local union groups and non-union organizations that share a commitment to democracy and broad-based economic growth.

2/1

Asia Democracy Project

Project Number: 499-0002

Date of Info: May 1995
Proj. Manager: Roberto Figueredo
Area Served: Asia

Office: Democracy and Governance
Status: Active
Mechanism: Grant and Cooperative Agreement

LOP: \$7,848,000

Primary Organization: Asia Foundation

<u>Component #1 Program Activities</u>		<u>%</u>
DICS	Civil Society	25
DIFM	Accountability of the Executive	25
DILJ	Legal and Judicial Development	25
DIME	Free Flow of Information	25

Purpose: To develop and strengthen sustainable democratic societies in Asia.

Description: The program supports a range of activities focusing on 1) U.S. and indigenous PVO efforts in civic participation, association, and advocacy; 2) dissemination of information and opinions; 3) free and fair elections; 4) effective and open administration by all branches of government; human rights and redress; and 6) financially responsible and accountable government.

Projected Results at Completion: Lessons learned and cumulative knowledge gained regarding the participation of women in democracy and governance in the Asia region.
Lessons learned in democracy transitions and consolidations.
Responded to the Missions' need for women in politics design and support.
Missions obtained project services.

Key Results: (Prior 6 Months) Missions provided with the resources to carry-out women in politics programs.
Missions obtained project services.
Lessons learned and cumulative knowledge gained from design and implementation activities.

Anticipated Results: (Thru Sept. 30, 1995) Lessons learned and cumulative knowledge gained from design and implementation programs.
USAID information increased regarding the participation of women in democracy and governance.
Lessons learned in democracy transitions and consolidations.

CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE

Bureau for Global Programs, Field Support and Research

Request for Proposals (OP/B/AEP 95-006)

This RFP solicits proposals for 16 separate awards:

- 2 awards for strategies and assessments
- 3 general awards for rule of law
- 1 specialized award under ROL for alternative dispute resolution
- 1 specialized award under ROL for access to justice
- 3 general awards for Governance
- 1 specialized award under Governance for decentralization and participatory government
- 1 specialized award under Governance for deliberative bodies
- 2 general awards for civil society
- 2 general awards for elections

Contractors will be expected to provide services on a global basis, wherever USAID has a program. Taken together, the awards are designed to encompass all of the substantive areas in the Democracy and Governance area. Although the Center is likely to make other awards at some later time, these 16 awards, together with 3 awards to be made under the RFA (see below), are expected to be the Center's primary tools.

In order to assure that the Center is responsive to field needs and that the anticipated volume of delivery orders can be handled expeditiously, the Center has limited to two the number of awards which any one offeror may receive under the RFP (see cover letter and L.3.(b)(1)). Moreover, one of the general awards in rule of law is set aside for a "Grey Amendment" firm and one of the general awards in governance is set aside for a small business firm (see M.5.). There is no limit on the number of proposals or areas for which a offeror can be proposed as a sub-contractor. So, an offeror may receive up to 2 awards and may be a sub-contractor or member of a consortium on any number of other awards.

The awards will take the form of indefinite quantity contracts (IQC's). Basically, IQC's are retainers. Contractors are guaranteed a minimum amount of \$25,000 (see B.5.a). More important, it is anticipated that the Center (or USAID missions) may issue several millions of dollars of delivery orders, which are really mini-contacts, over the three-year life of the IQC's (see B.5.c). However, that expectation is not a guarantee. The delivery orders will describe USAID's needs, expected results, the level of effort, etc.

Neither contracts, in general, nor IQC's in particular are the only instruments

available to the Center. However, the Center has been designed around several principles, two of which make IQCs the most appropriate instrument: the Center has relatively little of its own core funds and it is supposed to be responsive to field and regional bureau needs, so the money and the definition of need lie in the field while the expertise lies in the Center or with its partners. The IQC mechanism is, in general, the best way to deal with these purposes and constraints.

In order to increase competition, responsiveness and quality of performance, the delivery orders may be competed among the contractors in the respective areas of competence (e.g. election orders will be competed between the two election contractors, the civil society orders among the two civil society contractors, etc.) and those contractors will have exclusive rights to compete. However, USAID is not required to compete the delivery orders between the contractors; it can choose to assign the orders to one or another of the contractors without including the others. As to the specialized awards in the ROL and Governance areas, four contractors may be asked to bid: the three general contractors and the specialized contractor.

The delivery orders will range from short-term advisory assistance to long-term implementation. Consequently, the awards may vary widely with regard to the amount of the order and the period of performance.

Request for Applications
(OP/B/AEP-A-95-011)

Elections pose particular problems and opportunities for the Center. They arise at often unpredictable times, yet create a sense of urgency. Moreover, they often involve assistance whose nature is best suited to non-profit NGOs which operate more independently from the U.S. Government than do contractors. Finally, the Center hopes to engage the independent expertise and core staff of those NGOs to advance the state of the art in election-related assistance. Consequently, the Center has decided to use some of its core funds to fund three cooperative agreements. Two of those are in the area of elections. These three-year awards, \$500,000 per year for each of two awards, will take the form of cooperative agreements. Cooperative agreements are a form of grant in which both USAID and the grantee seek to put into place a general program whose specifics will be worked out over the course of the program through workplans. In a cooperative agreement, USAID has "substantial involvement" with the grantee in the formation of the workplan. Grants are available to non-profits and to those for-profit organizations which are willing to forego profit in order to undertake the program. The RFA is entirely independent of the RFP, and offerors may bid on both.

A third cooperative agreement, totalling \$1 million over three years, will be awarded for a program to encourage the participation---and to help assure their political equality---of women in the political process. Again, the Center has decided to use its core funds to achieve some expertise and excellence in this important area.

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Proposed DG Activity Codes

The following DG-related Activity Codes are the first comprehensive set of categories proposed since the Center was established. When approved, they will be used to classify DG programs in FY 1996 and beyond. While it may look like we have done little more than expand the number of categories (to be more in synch with what we do), there are several proposed changes which will make a big difference in how DG programs are classified worldwide.

1. We are attempting to convince the guardians of the AC/SI codes that we want a two-tiered system. Level-one consists of the four DG priority areas (*Rule of Law, Governance, Electoral Systems and Civil Society*) and of a fifth primary category called *Democracy/Governance-General*. In this manner we will be able to aggregate information by priority area as well as by type of activity.

2. Each of these five primary areas has a final "other" activity category which allows staff to classify any activity which does not easily fit into the prescribed level-two activity codes. (The use of such codes will be reviewed, periodically, to determine whether more categories should be added to account for a changing portfolio, and/or to determine whether we need to clarify our definitions/instructions.)

3. The fifth in level-one category, *Democracy/Governance-General*, has been added to account for several anomalies already in the system, to capture cross-DG activities and to provide even more flexibility for the future.

a. While the DG Center defines four priority areas, PPC (CDIE et al) tend to see DG as being subdivided into five categories, with *Free Flow of Information* being the fifth category. Separating *Free Flow of Information* from the other four categories will allow us to aggregate what we do more cleanly.

b. It is evident that *DG Leadership Training in Democratic Processes* (e.g., the Democracy Fellows Program et al) crosses the four priority areas.

c. We have introduced a category entitled *Development of DG Strategies/Methodologies* to account for those activities which, heretofore, may have been classified as research, but which do not meet the stringent PPC definition of research.

d. We have introduced *Democracy/Governance-Other* as a final catch-all category for whatever DG activities which are not picked up elsewhere. The use of this final "other" category will be reviewed periodically as well.

The final step will be to provide succinct definitions for each of these categories.

Proposed DG Activity Codes

Arranged by Priority Areas

Rule of Law

	Administration of Justice
	Access to Justice
DIHR	Human Rights
DILJ	Legal Reform/Legal Education
	Alternative Dispute/Conflict Resolution
	ROL-Other

Electoral Processes

	Voter Education
	Pre-election Assistance
	Post-election Assistance
	Elections-related Commodities
DIEA	Electoral Assistance-General
	Observer Delegations
DIPP	Political Party Support
	Electoral Processes-Other

Governance

	Constitutional/Legal Structures
DIFM	Accountable/Transparent Government Practices
DIPI	Deliberative Bodies
	Public Management/Administration
DIDE	Decentralization/Devolution
DELG	Local Governance
	Policy Development/Implementation
DICM	Civil Military Relations
	Governance-Other

Civil Society

	Civic Action/Advocacy Political Reform
	CSO Institutional Development
DICE	Civic Education
DILA	Labor
	Civil Society Structures
DICS	Civil Society-Other

Democracy/Governance-General

	Development of DG Strategies/Methodologies
DILT	DG Leadership Training in Democratic Processes
DIME	Free Flow of Information-General
	Democracy/Governance-Other

NOTES: The four-letter DI codes (listed above) reflect existing Activity Codes. Please address comments/suggestions to Francis Luzzatto, G/DG

CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE

"...promoting the transition to and consolidation of democratic regimes throughout the world."

Part III of the Strategic Plan

FY 1996 - 1997 ACTION PLAN

"Managing for Results: Toolmaking, Direct Action, and Mission Support"

July 17, 1995

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CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE

"...promoting the transition to and consolidation of democratic regimes throughout the world."

FY 1996 - 1997 ACTION PLAN

"Managing for Results: Toolmaking, Direct Action and Mission Support"

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Budget and resource pages have been deleted for public distribution

I. Introduction

A. Overview

This FY 1997 Action Plan represents the third chapter of the Center for Democracy and Governance's Strategic Plan submitted in May, 1995. The Action Plan builds on the strategy and provides further detail on the specific results the Center will focus on achieving in FY 1996 and FY 1997. The Action Plan (outlined below) represents the collective judgement of what the Center anticipates achieving over the next two critical years. Staffing and budget shortages, OE restrictions, and the seemingly ever-proliferating amount of paperwork, cumbersome procedures (despite two years of reform), and other factors are still of concern to the Center and may have an impact on the Center's ability to achieve these results as stated.

B. Background

The creation of the Center for Democracy and Governance is an essential element in the reform efforts undertaken by the Agency in the last two years. Those reforms introduced a fundamental change in both the internal structure and the manner in which the Agency conducts activities by creating a reorganized operational approach that better promotes internal efficiency and better supports sustainable, participatory development. The Bureau for Global Bureau, Field Support and Research (G) was created as the centerpiece of USAID's new operational approach to sustainable development. Within G, the Center for Democracy and Governance (DG) was created to serve as a focal point for the Agency's goal of promoting democracy and governance worldwide.

Unlike other parts of the G Bureau which had previously existed in altered forms, the DG Center had no true central bureau predecessor. The Center was designed in late 1993 by a working group comprised of existing democracy personnel within the Agency. A retreat was held in April, 1994 in which all democracy officers offered their "vision" of what an ideal democracy center should be.

This past year has been a challenging time for the Center -- we began to give form to how the Agency can strengthen democracy/governance programs worldwide and we positioned ourselves to deliver that assistance with a new "results package" which complies with the requirements of re-engineering. And while it has been a time of great creativity and great excitement, it was not without its frustrations -- the actual staffing level assigned to the Center were less than one-third of the suggested level, vacancies have been slow to fill given the dearth of qualified technical personnel within the Agency, new budgeting systems were introduced and the process of transferring projects and personnel to the new

Center impinged on the Center's relations with the Regional Bureaus.

The Center for Democracy and Governance became the first AID/W re-engineering laboratory to begin 1) working in teams 2) managing for results and 3) committing itself to quality customer service. A new "results package" which utilized the new performance-based contracting system was designed to offer (for the first time) a series of global, comprehensive services to the field in the key areas of democracy and governance.

In assessing its own achievements over the last year, the Center has concluded that it has had to spend a disproportionate amount of time on internal (to Washington) procedures/requirements and, lamentably, not enough time on direct support for the growing number of new, exciting and changing democracy programs in the field. This will not be the case in FY 1996. The Center believes that its investments in 1995 will pay off in effective programs and Regional/Mission support in FY 1996 and beyond.

II. The DG Center's Organization, Mandate, and Relationships

A. Organization

At present, the Center is comprised of 22 FTEs and is organized into six formal teams: two overarching teams -- Program/Information, and Strategies/Field Support; and four technical teams -- corresponding to the Center's four priority areas of Rule of Law, Governance, Electoral Processes and Civil Society. The Center has also established cross-cutting Regional Teams to more effectively backstop Regional Bureau and Mission activities.

B. Mandate

• To Provide Timely, Effective Technical Support to Field Missions

The Center's principle role is to work with and support DG-related activities, programs, and strategies at the region and mission levels. The majority of Center staff time has been and will continue to be devoted to providing support to the field. Comprehensive contractual and grant mechanisms to provide additional services to the field will be in place by the beginning of FY 1996.

• To Serve as a "Home" for all Agency Democracy Officers

Democracy officers are still relatively unique in Agency staffing history. The Center serves as a "home" for all DG officers in USAID, recruiting and selecting new officers, and providing training, career advice, and support in assignments and evaluations.

- **To Provide Technical Leadership**

As one of the Agency's Centers for Technical Excellence, the DG Center is responsible for the identification, enhancement and development of tools, methods, and methodologies that USAID and other organizations can use to support democratic development at the national, regional and local levels in countries around the world. This entails analyzing and applying "lessons learned" from current experience as well as supporting innovative approaches in this rapidly evolving technical area.

- **To Manage Global Activities**

The Center is charged with the responsibility of directing a limited number of activities best managed out of USAID/Washington, including activities in non-presence countries.

C. Key Relationships Within/Outside USAID

The Center collaborates and works closely with other parts of the Agency in order to carry out its work effectively. In this regard, the Center is in close collaboration with the Regional Bureaus, PPC, and OTI.

The importance of the Center's relationship with the Regional Bureaus and Missions cannot be overstated. Indeed, these relationships are recognized by the how the Center has chosen to "package" much of its activities under one broad Strategic Support Objective, an objective which cannot be achieved without coordination between the Center and the Regional Bureaus and without close collaboration with participating Missions.

Collaboration with PPC is too diverse to describe here. It should be noted, however, that the Center is directly involved with, and responsive to, PPC's policy-making mandate, and that it expects to continue preparing and disseminating Democracy Report worldwide to USAID staff involved in democracy/governance programs. In addition, the Center utilizes a number of information services offered by CDIE.

The DG Center has begun to integrate its activities across sectors and plans to build on existing collaboration with other G Centers/Offices including Economic Growth, Environment and WID. Specifically, the Center and the WID Office have undertaken a joint initiative on the role of Women-in-politics. (The Center's part of this joint effort is presented under Strategic Objective 2, Program Outcome 3.)

In regards to collaboration with the Center for Economic Growth, the DG Center proposes to explore the degree to which its three regional grants with the AFL-CIO international labor institutes contribute to tangible results that can be

properly attributed to the Agency's goal for sustainable economic growth. In FY 1996, the Center proposes to establish a joint Democracy/Governance-Economic Growth Team to better coordinate Agency-supported labor activities and to develop joint reporting requirements for the Labor grants. In addition, in FY 1996, the DG Center proposes to explore possible connections between the Center for Economic growth and increased financial and in-kind support of Civil Society Organizations.

Specific modes of collaboration with the Center for the Environment and Natural Resources Centers have yet to be defined but it is anticipated that they will be in the area of Civil Society.

Externally, the Center coordinates and shares information with other USG agencies, non-governmental and international organizations, and other donors. Inherent in all three Program Outcomes listed under Strategic Objective 1 is the commitment to collaborate with, and provide technical leadership to, that part of the international development community which devotes all of, or part of, its efforts to the promotion of democracy and good governance.

III. Relationship to Agency Strategies and Administration's Priorities:

U.S. Foreign Policy: The Center for Democracy and Governance's work directly supports an important U.S. foreign policy goal -- the promotion of democracy around the world.

USAID Strategies: Strengthening democracy is also an integral part of USAID's work in sustainable development. As described in the Strategies for Sustainable Development, one of USAID's main strategic goals is to "support the transition to and consolidation of democratic societies throughout the world." As stated in current Agency policy guidance, to achieve its democracy goals, the Agency will focus on increasing competition and participation in decision-making, fostering respect and adherence to the rule of law, and supporting the development of civil societies and a more efficient, accountable and transparent governance.

As the technical leader of the Agency's democracy program, the Center for Democracy and Governance plays an integral role in achieving the Agency's strategic objective in democracy and governance.

Crisis Prevention: One of the most effective ways to prevent man-made crises from erupting is to establish accountable, transparent, representative, and participatory political systems which have institutions to channel conflicts peacefully. In collaboration with other parts of the Agency, the work of the Center directly contributes to that process through its efforts to build strong and

effective democratic institutions and processes throughout the world.

New Partnership Initiative: Through its work in all four priority areas of democracy and governance, the Center will continue to support democratic local governance and the development and strengthening of NGOs and PVOs.

IV. Managing for Results: DG Program Outcomes and Anticipated Results

The Strategic Plan the Center submitted to the Global Bureau in May 1995, enumerates two Strategic Objectives and one Strategic Support Objective.

Strategic Objective 1: More effective use of information and methodologies by USAID and other international organizations and partners better promotes democracy worldwide.

Strategic Objective 2: Greater number of citizens in selected countries directly benefit from and participate in democratic practices.

Strategic Support Obj: Greater number of citizens benefit from and participate in democratic processes through improved USAID Mission programs which result in:

Rule of Law	<i>a greater number of citizens living under legal systems which promote democratic principles and protect human rights;</i>
Governance	<i>a greater number of citizens living in countries served by transparent and accountable governmental systems;</i>
Electoral Processes.	<i>a greater number of citizens with access to open and participatory political and electoral processes which reflect the will of the electorate; and</i>
Civil Society	<i>Increased effectiveness of citizen interest groups which promote pluralism and contribute to responsive government.</i>

These strategic objectives translate into three separate but related tasks: 1) providing technical leadership through "toolmaking," 2) managing selected democracy programs directly, and 3) assisting Regional Bureaus and Missions to achieve results in the field. By necessity, and in the spirit of re-engineering, the

Center works together with other parts of the Agency to accomplish these goals. While the Center accepts responsibility for the accomplishment of its objectives, it fully recognizes that these objectives can be accomplished only by the coordinated action of many different operating units within the Agency including (but not limited to) procurement, the Regional Bureaus and participating Missions..

The attached matrix further delineates the SOs, program outcomes and results the Center expects to achieve in FY 1996 and FY 1997.

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TOOLMAKING

DIRECT ACTION

MISSION SUPPORT

<p>Strategic Objective 1</p> <p>More effective use of information and methodologies by USAID and other international organizations and partners better promotes democracy worldwide.</p>	<p>Strategic Objective 2</p> <p>Greater numbers of citizens in selected countries directly benefit from and participate in democratic practices.</p>	<p>Strategic Support Objective: Greater number of citizens benefit from and participate in democratic processes through improved USAID mission programs which result in:</p> <p>A. Rule of Law - a greater number of citizens living under legal systems which promote democratic principles and protect human rights;</p> <p>B. Governance - a greater number of citizens living in countries served by transparent and accountable governmental systems;</p> <p>C. Electoral Processes - a greater number of citizens with access to open and participatory political and electoral processes which reflect the will of the electorate; and</p> <p>D. Civil Society - increased effectiveness of citizen interest groups which promote pluralism and contribute to responsive government.</p>			
<p><i>Technical Leadership</i></p> <p>PO 1: Development and application of appropriate strategies, models, methodologies and indicators in the DG program as a whole, and in all four priority areas.</p>	<p><i>Labor</i></p> <p>PO 1: Increased direct and indirect involvement in democratic processes by a free and independent labor sector in USAID countries.</p>	<p><i>Rule of Law</i></p> <p>PO 1: Structural reform methodologies and skills transfer which improve legal system adopted for use in 25% of USAID countries with ROL program.</p>	<p><i>Governance</i></p> <p>PO 4: Public institutions are administered in a more open and democratic manner in 20% of USAID countries with a governance program.</p>	<p><i>Electoral Processes</i></p> <p>PO 7: Improved electoral administration in 50% of USAID countries with electoral activities.</p>	<p><i>Civil Society</i></p> <p>PO 10: Strategies for analyzing and increasing NGO capacity and sustainability adopted in 50% of USAID countries with a civil society program.</p>
<p><i>Innovations</i></p> <p>PO 2: Selected innovative approaches and lessons thus learned built into strategic support of Mission programs.</p>	<p><i>Elections</i></p> <p>PO 2: Citizens in selected countries have increased access to and participate in free and fair electoral processes.</p>	<p>PO 2: Methodologies and skills transfer which improve administration of justice in place in 30% of USAID countries with AOJ activities.</p>	<p>PO 5: Methodologies which increase the effectiveness and accountability of deliberative bodies in place in 25% of USAID countries with a governance program.</p>	<p>PO 8: Voter/citizen education programs which increase citizen knowledge and awareness in 50% of USAID countries with electoral activities.</p>	<p>PO 11: Strategies which increase citizen access to information about and influence on governmental decision-making adopted in 50% of USAID countries with a civil society program.</p>
<p><i>DG Professionals</i></p> <p>PO 3: USAID and its partners have access to a cadre of democracy professionals.</p>	<p><i>Women in Politics</i></p> <p>PO 3: The active participation of women in political and electoral processes has been both strengthened and increased in selected countries.</p>	<p>PO 3: Methods and practices which result in greater access to legal systems in place in 10% of USAID countries with a ROL program.</p>	<p>PO 6: Procedures which ensure public access to information and promote public participation in government decision-making in use in 50% of USAID countries with a governance program.</p>	<p>PO 9: Political party representation is more inclusive, democratic and effective in 10% of USAID countries with electoral activities.</p>	

Strategic Objective 1. More effective use of information and methodologies by USAID and other international organizations and partners better promotes democracy worldwide.

PO1 - The development and application of appropriate strategies, models, methodologies and indicators in all four of the Center's priority areas.

Indicators:

- The Center has the institutional capacity to develop and analyze democracy data. (1.5 yrs)
- The Center develops program models/methodologies in DG program as a whole and in its four priority areas for use by missions and the international development community. (On-going)
- Models which identify and reduce government corruption and abuse are adopted in 20% of the countries with a governance program. (2-5 yrs)
- Increased partnership between USAID, NGOs and international organizations based on adopting of USAID democracy policies. (4 yrs)

Anticipated Results:

Technical Leadership

General Results

- By the end of FY 1996, the Center will have established, tested and/or begun to utilize mechanisms to analyze Agency-level democracy data for DG programs as a whole, and for each of its four priority areas. - By mid FY 1997, these mechanisms will be fully operational
- By the end of FY 1996, the Center will have designed and initiated at least one assessment within each of the Center's priority areas (e.g., legislative strengthening, alternative dispute resolution). - By the end of FY 1997, the four assessments will have been completed; appropriate strategies, models, methodologies, and indicators will have been developed and disseminated to USAID Missions; and four additional assessments will have been designed and initiated. Such assessments and models will take gender-related considerations into account.

Results for Rule of Law

- By the end of FY 1996, the Center will have developed a country-level legal systems assessment methodology and checklist which identifies problems and issues in need of reform - By the end of FY 1997, the Center will have identified successful methodologies for promoting legal reform, and will have participated in a joint study of international standards, legislation, policies and implementation methodologies which are designed to provide increase protection under the law to women and other disadvantaged groups.
- By the end of FY 1996, the Center will have reviewed countries with alternative dispute resolution (ADR) programs and will have identified models for court-annexed and community-based ADR systems.
- By the end of FY 1996, the Center will have conducted an analysis of on-going case tracking and case management systems and made recommendations on standard approaches and methodologies. These methodologies will include gender-related considerations.

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- By the end of FY 1996, the Center will have obtained statistics on pre-trial detention in all countries with a significant rule of law program. Where available, statistics will be broken down by gender.

Results for Governance

- By the end of FY 1996, the Center will have developed models for the devolution/decentralization of government resources/authority, and will have developed a series of prototypes which illustrate how incentives can be used to encourage the devolution of central authority to local/regional government. - By the end of 1997, the Center will have reviewed the worldwide use of these models/ incentives, will have revised their design in accordance with it's findings and will have disseminated the results to the missions.
- By the end of FY 1996, the Center will have completed a review of effective legislative reform models consistent with stages of political transition and will have identified methodologies for promoting legislative reform.
- By the end of FY 1996, the Center and its partners will have begun to identify a series of models for strengthening the effectiveness and accountability of legislative bodies. Accountability to the needs/rights of women, as well as men, will be stressed.
- By the end of FY 1996, an analysis of government practices in 12 countries will provide a basis for public debate and the development of reform strategies. These analyses will review constraints, opportunities, experiences and possible approaches for: increasing the scope and frequency of public hearings; establishing procedures for the recall of elected officials; repealing legislation; and holding mandatory reviews of government actions. - By mid 1997 this will have resulted in the development of a practical methodology for increasing public participation, including the participation of women..

Results for Electoral Processes

- By the end of FY 1996, the Center will have developed more effective tools for pre-election assessments and other assessments concerning the electoral process.
- By the end of FY 1996, the Center will have assessed the efficacy and methodologies of USAID-supported voter education programs and will have developed appropriate models. Such programs and models will place special emphasis on the participation of women.
- By the end of FY 1996, the Center will have developed more effective tools for selecting which U.S. and in-country NGOs to support. Support for women will be taken into account.
- By the end of FY 1996, the Center will have reviewed the efficacy and methodologies used by USAID-supported international observer delegations and will have developed model(s) for future delegations.
- By the end of FY 1996, the Center will have developed more effective tools/models for providing assistance to political parties.
- By the end of FY 1996, the Center will have performed a technical review of the use of Agency-supported elections-related commodities and will have developed criteria for their use

in 1997 and beyond.

Results for Civil Society

- By the end of FY 1996, the Center will have begun to share the interim results of the Center's assessments and other information with major international organizations and NGOs.
 - By the end of FY 1997, the Center will have initiated a process for sharing effective models, methodologies and indicators with international organizations and NGOs, and will have developed additional forms of collaboration and information-sharing.
- By the end of FY 1996, the Center will have compiled a comprehensive inventory of institutional resources capable of offering assistance/support to host country NGOs, and will have established a network of the most effective among these institutions. In all cases, gender considerations will be taken into account.

Comments: Results presented under PO1 which directly lead to a result under one of the 11 POs in the Strategic Support Objective are repeated (and italicized) under that PO. - Where appropriate, gender considerations are to be taken into account in the implementation of the Center's programs.

Strategic Objective 1. More effective use of information and methodologies by USAID and other international organizations and partners better promotes democracy worldwide.

PO2 - Selected innovative approaches piloted, and lessons thus learned built into strategic support of Mission programs.

Indicators:

- Innovative approaches funded. (1-3 yrs)
- Lessons learned utilized by USAID and the international development community, including NGOs. (3-5 yrs)

Anticipated Results:

Innovations

- By the end of FY 1996, the Center will have selected and provided support for (1-4) innovative programs which strengthen it's ability to contribute to Mission programs in the four priority areas; each program will be designed to further develop and/or adapt an innovative methodology. The results will then be made available to USAID Missions and other international development organizations and partners. - By the end of 1997, (1-4) additional innovative programs will have been selected and their initial results will have begun to be applied by 15 missions.
- By the end of FY 1997, the Center will have designed a mechanism for disseminating lessons learned (i.e., how results can be achieved) to USAID Missions, to NGOs and to the international development community. - By the end of 1997, the Center will have further developed this mechanism and will have developed a mechanism to ascertain whether, and to what degree, such lessons are being used and are having a positive impact.

Strategic Objective 1. More effective use of information and methodologies by USAID and other international organizations and partners better promotes democracy worldwide.

PO3 - USAID and its partners have access to a cadre of democracy professionals.

Indicators:

- International Development Interns are requested by USAID Missions (On-going)
- DG Center and DG Officers trained in democracy/governance issues. (2-5 yrs)
- Democracy Fellows Program results in effective mid-level and entry-level democracy promotion professionals. (1-2 yrs)

Anticipated Results:

DG Professionals

- By the end of FY 1996, (3-6) technically qualified International Development Interns will have been selected by DG Center staff, will have developed skills in democracy-related issues/programming, and will have been placed in other parts of the Agency. - By the end of FY 1997 an additional (3-6) IDIs will have been selected, will have served with the Center and will be utilizing their expertise in democracy-related programming in other parts of the Agency
- By the end of FY 1996, the Center will have established a democracy/governance state of-the-art training program for Mission, Regional and Center DG personnel. - By the end of FY 1997, all Mission, Regional and Center DG personnel will have been trained and will be managing democracy-related programs and activities.
- By the end of FY 1996, Democracy Fellows will have been selected and will have begun to work on democracy-related programs with USAID, PVOs/NGOs, or other international development organizations. - By the end of FY 1997, additional Democracy Fellows will have begun to work with democracy-related programs/organization.

(2)

Strategic Objective 2. Greater number of citizens in selected countries directly benefit from and participate in democratic practices.

PO1 - Increased direct and indirect involvement in democratic processes by a free and independent labor sector in USAID countries.

Indicators:

- Unions demonstrate the capacity to be free, viable and self-sustaining. (On-going)
- Union-led coalitions are advocates for institutional and policy reform at the national, regional and local levels. (3 yrs)
- Unions actively participate in electoral processes which result in greater voter registration and participation (On-going)
- Unions monitor the extent to which internationally-recognized worker rights are adhered to. (On-going)

Anticipated Results:

Labor

- By the end of FY 1996, free and independent labor unions in 20 countries will have developed/increased their institutional capacity to carry out their stated missions. - By the end of 1997, labor unions in 5 additional countries will have developed this capacity.
- By the end of FY 1996, union-led coalitions in 15 countries will have become participants in public sector institutional reform and policy formulation. - By the end of FY 1997, an additional 5-10 union-led coalitions are active participants in such processes.
- By the end of FY 1996, independent labor unions in 20 countries will have increased voter registration and participation by an average of 5% and 10%, respectively. - By the end of 1997, an additional 10 countries will have evidenced similar results. Special emphasis will have been placed on the registration and participation of women.
- During FY 1996 and FY 1997, independent labor unions will assist in the monitoring of national, regional and local elections in 20% of countries which support independent unions that hold elections during those years.
- By the end of FY 1996, independent labor unions in 25 or more countries will have developed the institutional capacity to monitor the application of labor laws and labor rights/standards. - By the end of FY 1997, labor unions in 10 additional countries will have developed this capacity. Special emphasis will have been placed on monitoring the equitable application of laws, rights and standards to women and children.
- By the end of FY 1997, labor unions will have increased the membership of women by 10% and will have achieved a 15% level in the number of women in leadership positions.

Comments: USAID-funded labor programs directly or indirectly support all five of the Agency' strategic objectives.

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Strategic Objective 2. Greater number of citizens in selected countries directly benefit from and participate in democratic practices.

PO2 - Citizens in selected countries have increased access to and participate in free and fair electoral processes.

Indicators:

- At least two independent political parties participate in any election.
- Public opinion believes that pre-election processes (including registration, media access, and campaign practices) are fair to all major parties.
- Public opinion believes that elections are free, fair, and open. (disaggregated by gender, ethnicity, etc.)
- Elections are rated by (local and international) monitors as free and fair.
- No major opposition party boycotts the elections.
- A significant percentage of eligible voters cast their ballots.
- A peaceful transition of the civilian authorities takes place.
- All major parties accept the results of the elections.

Anticipated Results:

Elections

- By the end of FY 1996, the Center and its partners will have assisted three countries prepare for and administer three national elections and two local elections in which at least two independent parties participated. - By the end of FY 1997, the Center and its partners will have assisted four countries prepare for and administer four national elections and three local elections in which at least two independent parties participated.*
- By the end of FY 1996, the Center and its partners will have assisted elections in three countries in which over half of the citizens (by public opinion poll) rate their respective elections as free and fair. - By the end of FY 1997, the Center and its partners will have assisted elections in four countries in which an increased number of citizens rate their respective elections as free and fair.
- By the end of FY 1996, the Center and its partners will have assisted two elections in three countries in which the percentage of eligible voters voting (including women) exceeds 50%. - By the end of FY 1997, the Center and its partners will have assisted two additional elections where the percentage exceeds 50%.
- By the end of FY 1996, the Center and its partners will have assisted two national and one local election(s) in which the participating parties accept the results and a peaceful transition of power takes place. - By the end of FY 1997, the Center and its partners will have assisted three national and two local elections where the participating parties accept the results and a peaceful transition takes place.

Comments: The above indicators were developed at the DG Indicators Workshop. They measure whether or not an election was "free and fair", and should not be seen as measuring the Center and/or the Agency's interventions. Given the "single event" nature of elections, the Center sees this as an appropriate use of indicators. The "anticipated results", are thus written to parallel these indicators. - All elections assistance will take gender into consideration. - * These levels assume that the Center's core funding would be supplemented by other source

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Strategic Objective 2. Greater number of citizens in selected countries directly benefit from and participate in democratic practices.

P03 - The active participation of women in political and electoral processes has been both strengthened and increased in selected countries.

Indicators:

- % of women knowledgeable of election issues.
- % of women that understand the advantages of participatory democratic systems.
- % of women knowledgeable of constitutional rights and responsibilities.
- % of women knowledgeable of voting procedures.
- An increase in the number of women voting.
- An increase in the number of women who are members of a political party.
- An increase in the number of women who are elected/hold political office.

Anticipated Results:

Women in Politics

- By the end of FY 1996, the numbers of women who join political parties, run for political office, or assume leadership positions in the legislature or executive branches of government will have increased in countries receiving USAID elections assistance focused on women's political participation. - By the end of 1997, additional women will have moved into leadership positions.
- By the end of FY 1996, USAID countries with electoral programs focused on women's political participation will have established women's political organizations which are capable of preparing, training and supporting women candidates for public office. - By the end of 1997, that number will have risen.
- By the end of FY 1996, the number of women aware of registration and voting procedures, and of the roles played by political parties, election commissions, and monitors will have increased in countries with USAID electoral programs focused on women's political participation. - By the end of 1997, that number will have risen by 5%.
- By the end of FY 1996, voter participation among women in countries with an electoral program focused on women's political participation will have risen by 5%. - By the end of 1997, that number will have risen an additional 5%.

Strategic Support Objective: Greater number of citizens benefit from and participate in democratic processes through improved USAID mission programs:

A. Rule of Law - a greater number of citizens living under legal systems which promote democratic principles and protect human rights.

PO1 - Structural reform methodologies and skills transfer which improve legal systems adopted for use in 25% of USAID countries with a ROL program.

Indicators:

- Improved understanding of legal systems and structural impediments to legal reform necessary for the rule of law. (2-3 yrs)
- Methods for innovative legal reform are tested, adapted and utilized. (2-3 yrs)
- Laws enacted and/or enforced which eliminates/corrects discrimination of women and disadvantaged groups. (3-5 yrs)

Anticipated results to be achieved in collaboration with Regional Bureaus/Missions:

- *By the end of FY 1996, the Center will have developed a country-level legal systems assessment methodology and checklist which clearly identifies remedies to reform, will have participated in a joint study of international standards, legislation, policies and implementation methodologies which are designed to provide increased protection under the law to women, a other disadvantaged groups.* - By the end of FY 1997, the methodology will have been field tested, approved, and actively utilized by USAID countries with ROL programs, and training programs for Mission staff and counterparts will be conducted on legal reform issues, method and models.
- *By the end of FY 1996, the Center will have completed a review of legal reforms conducted under on-going rule of law programs and will have identified successful methodologies for promoting legal reform.* - By the end of 1997, the Center will have presented model legislation as a useful tool for legal reform and will have advised on a policy for use of model legislation in various areas.
- By the end of FY 1996, specific proposals for how existing civil and criminal codes can be reformed so as to increase timeliness, access and/or equality before the law will have been developed in five countries. - By the end of 1997, legislation based on these proposals will have been drafted and will have been presented to parliament for their action.

Comments: Where appropriate, gender considerations will have been taken into account. - Italicized results are to be achieved under SO1.

Strategic Support Objective: Greater number of citizens benefit from and participate in democratic processes through improved USAID mission programs:

A. Rule of Law - a greater number of citizens living under legal systems which promote democratic principles and protect human rights.

PO2 - Methodologies and skills transfer which improve administration of justice in place in 30% of USAID countries with a AOJ activities.

Indicators:

- Administration of justice programs reviewed and pilots initiated which test innovative practices and procedures for judicial systems reform. (2-3 yrs)
- Methods identified and tested for delay reduction in court procedures and for reduction in numbers of people in pretrial and pre-sentencing detention. (3-5 yrs)

Anticipated results to be achieved in collaboration with Regional Bureaus/Missions:

- By the end of 1996, as a result of USAID training, five countries will have developed judicial reform action plans to be carried out with minimal USAID resources.
- By the end of FY 1996, the Center will have reviewed countries with alternative dispute resolution (ADR) programs and will have identified models for court-annexed and community-based ADR systems. - By the end of 1997, a comprehensive guide to ADR program methodologies will have been prepared and will distributed the guide to USAID missions, and 10 countries will have taken steps to initiate/restructure/strengthen their ADR programs.
- By the end of FY 1996, the Center will have conducted an analysis of on-going case tracking and case management systems and made recommendations on standard approaches and methodologies. - By the end of 1997, the Center will have applied two innovative case tracking and case management systems in field missions which have a rule of law program.
- By the end of FY 1996, the Center will have obtained statistics on pre-trial detention in all countries with a significant rule of law program. - By the end of FY 1997, the Center will have developed and discussed in public fora with counterparts methodologies for reduction in pre-trial detention.
- By the end of FY 1996, two countries will have applied tested case tracking and AOJ management procedures which result in increased efficiency and timeliness of judicial or prosecutorial proceedings. - By the end of FY 1997, five countries with rule of law programs will have reduced numbers of people in pre-trial detention by 10%.

Comments: While the use of ADR is rising rapidly, it not a panacea. The Center will assist missions determine when ADR should be applied. The Center will continue to be an advocate for judicial reform. In addition, the Center will focus on the human rights implications of large numbers of untried and unsentenced, usually indigent people, locked in jails and prisons. - Where appropriate, gender considerations will have been taken into account.

Strategic Support Objective: Greater number of citizens benefit from and participate in democratic processes through improved USAID mission programs:

A. **Rule of Law** - a greater number of citizens living under legal systems which promote democratic principles and protect human rights.

PO3 - Methods which result in greater access to the legal system in place in 10% of USAID countries with a ROL program.

Indicators:

- Public defender programs reviewed, tested and evaluated which result in greater numbers of clients accessing the services of a public defender. (2-4 yrs)
- Information regarding sustainable approaches to legal service programs developed and disseminated to the field. (1-3 yrs)

Anticipated results to be achieved in collaboration with Regional Bureaus/Missions:

- By the end of FY 1996, the Center will have conducted a comparative review of public defender programs and identified the key elements for program success. Access to women will have been taken into account.
- By the end of FY 1996, the Center will have compiled data on on-going legal services programs and begun to develop a network among providers. - By the end of FY 1997 the Center will have assessed the sustainability factors for legal services program
- By the end of FY 1996, the Center will have compared "successful" legal education campaign approaches. - By the end of FY 1997, the Center will have tested legal education programs and campaigns in three field missions.
- By the end of FY 1997, three counties with public defender programs will have increased the number of clients served by 20%.
- By the end of FY 1997, the number of people who are knowledgeable about how legal/judicial systems operate will increase by 25% in three countries which have a legal education program.
- By the end of FY 1997, four community-based legal services programs expand client services and client outreach.

Comments: Where appropriate, gender considerations will have been taken into account.

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Strategic Support Objective: Greater number of citizens benefit from and participate in democratic processes through improved USAID mission programs:

B. Governance - a greater number of citizens living in countries served by governmental systems which are transparent and accountable to the people.

PO4 - Public institutions are administered in a more effective and democratic manner in 20% of USAID countries with a governance program.

Indicators:

- Host country public and private organizations manage policy implementation in a democratic and strategic manner in 20% of countries with a governance program. (1-3 yrs)
- Civilian control and oversight of military resources (1-4 yrs)
- Models of codes of ethics and incentives for responsible government behavior are used by host countries as they develop anti-corruption policies and systems. (2-4 yrs)
- Public review and debate of government use of resources results in improved use of government resources (or result in their improved use). (3-5 yrs)

Anticipated results to be achieved in collaboration with Regional Bureaus/Missions:

- By the end of FY 1996, public institutions are implementing policy more effectively and more openly, including the interaction between responsible public and private organizations -- in three countries, and for other sustainable development policies in two countries. - By the end of FY 1997, this will be true for DG policies in three additional countries and for sustainable development policies in two additional countries.
- By the end of FY 1996, two host country governments will have begun to integrate systems to increase civilian control and oversight of their military establishments. - By the end of FY 1997, three additional countries will have increased civilian control of their military establishments.
- By the end of FY 1996, three countries will have begun to apply Center-provided, anti-corruption models which are designed to promote responsible government behavior. - By the end of FY 1997, these models (together with assessments of how they were applied) will have further decreased public corruption in the three countries and will have been introduced to four additional countries.
- By the end of 1996, two host country governments will have begun to integrate a transparent policy and performance-oriented budgeting process and will have strengthened the systems for control, audit and public reporting (including publishing in the press). - By the end of FY 1997, these countries will have continued to strengthen these processes and three additional countries have taken comparable steps towards transparent government practices and performance-oriented budgeting

Strategic Support Objective: Greater number of citizens benefit from and participate in democratic processes through improved USAID mission programs:

B. Governance - a greater number of citizens living in countries served by governmental systems which are transparent and accountable to the people.

P05 - Methodologies are applied to increase the effectiveness of deliberative bodies (i.e., legislatures, local councils) in 25% of USAID countries with a governance program.

Indicators:

- Analyses of legislative effectiveness are developed and used to influence operational procedures (2-3 yrs)
- Transparent and participatory deliberative processes are standard to legislative operations. (3 yrs)
- Systems of checks and balances which provide legislative oversight are instituted among various branches of government. (4-6 yrs)

Anticipated results to be achieved in collaboration with Regional Bureaus/Missions:

- *By the end of FY 1996, the Center and its partners will have begun to identify a series of models for strengthening the effectiveness and accountability of legislative bodies and will have provided these models to legislatures and their stakeholders in 20% of USAID countries with a governance program.**

These models will include: a) methods for increasing (post election) interaction between constituents and their representatives; b) ways of increasing public debate of issues that face the legislature; c) structures for achieving a better balance in the separation of powers; and d) procedures for professionalizing the management of legislatures.

- *By the end of FY 1996, the Center will have completed a review of effective legislative reform models consistent with stages of political transition will have identified methodologies for promoting legislative reform.* - By the end of 1997, the Center will have disseminated the model to USAID Missions and will have assisted selected Missions in the adaptation/application of these models to their requirements.

Comments: Tangible "results" will be reported in FY 1998 and beyond. - Italicized are to be achieved under SO1.

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Strategic Support Objective: Greater number of citizens benefit from and participate in democratic processes through improved USAID mission programs:

B. Governance - a greater number of citizens living in countries served by governmental systems which are transparent and accountable to the people.

PO6 - Procedures which ensure public access to information and promote public participation in government decision-making in use in 50% of USAID countries with a governance program.

Indicators:

- Methodology for determining effective country-specific interventions that result in stronger demand/response relationship between civil society and government in place. (2 yrs)
- Effectiveness of civic education strategies and their relevance to different stages of economic/political transition tested. (2-3 yrs)
- Increased number, scope and access to government proceedings which assure NGO and direct citizen participation in public hearings, recall petitions, repeal actions, and mandatory reviews of administrative and bureaucratic decisions. (3-4 yrs)

Anticipated results to be achieved in collaboration with Regional Bureaus/Missions:

- *By the end of FY 1996, an analysis of government practices in 12 countries will provide a basis for public debate and the development of reform strategies. These analyses will review constraints, opportunities, experiences and possible approaches for: increasing the scope and frequency of public hearings; establishing procedures for the recall of elected officials; repealing legislation; and holding mandatory reviews of government actions. By mid 1997, this analysis will have resulted in the development of a practical methodology for increasing public participation.* - By the end of 1997, these reform strategies will have been integrated into a multi-country (three target countries per region) NGO-based south-to-south assistance program

Comments: Italicized results are to be achieved under SO1.

Strategic Support Objective: Greater number of citizens benefit from and participate in democratic processes through improved USAID mission programs:

C. Electoral Processes - a greater number of citizens with access to open and participatory political and electoral processes which reflect the will of the electorate.

PO7 - Improved electoral administration in by 50% of USAID countries with electoral activities.

Indicators:

- Equitable laws and regulations regarding the establishment of voter registration, voting procedures, and political competition are adopted.
- Electoral systems deemed fair by political parties, interest groups, and citizens.
- Election commissions that function independently and autonomously.
- Electoral laws promulgated and accessible to the public.
- Electoral laws in each country are applied equally to all political parties.
- Elections results are accepted by all major political parties.
- Local election monitors verify validity of elections.
- No valid election protests filed by candidates.
- Electoral results published within agreed upon timetable.
- A significant percentage of eligible voters registered to vote (disaggregated by age (18-21), gender, ethnicity, and region).
- Public expresses confidence in the impartiality of electoral tribunal.

Anticipated results to be achieved in collaboration with Regional Bureaus/Missions:

- By the end of FY 1996, three USAID countries receiving electoral assistance focused on electoral laws and law reform will have electoral laws which establish reasonable regulations regarding voter registration, voting and political campaigning/candidacy, and will have made these laws accessible to the public. - By the end of FY 1997, four USAID countries participating in such programs will have adopted and promulgated comparable laws.
- By the end of FY 1996, three USAID countries receiving electoral assistance focused on electoral laws, law reform and election administration will have election commissions which function independently and autonomously. - By the end of FY 1997, four USAID countries participating in such programs will have independent functioning election commissions.
- By the end of FY 1996, local, independent monitors in three countries receiving USAID electoral assistance focused on training/strengthening of indigenous monitoring groups will be able to assess independently their respective election processes. - By FY 1997, local monitors in four countries receiving such assistance will have the capacity to make independent assessments.
- By the end of FY 1996, the percentage of eligible voters registered to vote in three countries receiving USAID electoral assistance focused on election administration will reach 50% (per country). - By the end of FY 1997, the percentage of eligible voters registered to vote in each of four countries receiving such assistance will reach 65%.
- By the end of FY 1996, public confidence in electoral tribunals in three countries receiving USAID electoral assistance focused on election administration will reach 50% in public opinion polls. - By FY 1997, the percentage in each of four countries receiving such

assistance will have reached 65%.

- By the end of FY 1996, election administrators in three countries receiving USAID electoral assistance focused on election law reform and election administration will have applied electoral laws equally to all political parties. - By FY 1997, that number will reach 65% in each of four countries receiving such assistance.

Comments: Gender is to be an important element factor in judging the overall effectiveness of the activities designed to achieve these results..

Strategic Support Objective: Greater number of citizens benefit from and participate in democratic processes through improved USAID mission programs:

C. **Electoral Processes** - a greater number of citizens with access to open and participatory political and electoral processes which reflect the will of the electorate.

PO8 - Voter/citizen education programs which increase citizen knowledge and awareness in 50% of USAID countries with electoral activities.

Indicators:

- % of voters knowledgeable of election issues.
- % of voters that understand the advantages of participatory democratic systems.
- % of voters knowledgeable of constitutional rights and responsibilities.
- % of voters knowledgeable of voting procedures.
- % of spoiled votes.

Anticipated results to be achieved in collaboration with Regional Bureaus/Missions:

- By the end of FY 1996, the percentage of voters knowledgeable about voting procedure will increase to 50% in each of three countries receiving USAID electoral assistance focused on voter education. By the end of FY 1997, that percentage will have increased to 65% in each of four countries receiving such assistance..
- By the end of FY 1996, the percentage of voters knowledgeable about election issues will increase to 50% in each of three countries receiving USAID electoral assistance focused on voter education. By FY 1997, that percentage will have increased to 65% in each of four countries receiving such assistance.
- By the end of FY 1996, the percentage of voters knowledgeable about their constitution rights and responsibilities will increase to 50% in each of three countries receiving USAID electoral assistance focused on voter/civic education. By the end of 1997, that percentage will have increased to 65% in each of four countries receiving such assistance.

Comments: Gender is to be an important element factor in judging the overall effectiveness of the activities designed to achieve these results..

Strategic Support Objective: Greater number of citizens benefit from and participate in democratic processes through improved USAID mission programs:

C. Electoral Processes - a greater number of citizens with access to open and participatory political and electoral processes which reflect the will of the electorate.

PO9 - Political party representation is more inclusive, democratic and effective in 10% of USAID countries with electoral activities.

Indicators:

- Parties have platforms which address the needs of their constituencies.
- Parties have effective local structures which reach and educate voters.
- Parties are policy-oriented rather than personality-oriented.
- Internal political party rules have been adopted and decisions are made democratically.
- Parties demonstrate the capacity to govern if elected.
- Parties represent the demographics of their constituents.
- Parties demonstrate the ability to build coalitions.

Anticipated results to be achieved in collaboration with Regional Bureaus/Missions:

- By the end of FY 1996, three countries receiving USAID electoral assistance focused on strengthening/developing political parties will have independent parties which put forward platforms representative of the needs of their constituencies. - By the end of FY 1997, four countries receiving such assistance will have achieved these results.
- By the end of Fy 1996, three countries receiving USAID electoral assistance focused on strengthening/developing political parties will have independent parties with effective local structures which reach and educate voters. - By the end of FY 1997, four countries receiving such assistance will have achieved these results.
- By the end of FY 1996, three countries receiving USAID electoral assistance focused on strengthening/developing political parties will have independent parties with internal rules and democratic decision making procedures. - By the end of FY 1997, four countries receiving such assistance will have achieved these results.

Comments: Gender will be an important element factor in judging the overall effectiveness of the activities designed to achieve these results..

Strategic Support Objective: Strategies for analyzing and increasing NGO capacity and sustainability adopted in 50% of USAID countries with a civil society program:

D. Civil Society - increased effectiveness of citizen interest groups which promote pluralism and contribute to responsive government.

PO10 - Strategies for analyzing and increasing NGO capacity and sustainability adopted in 50% of USAID countries with a civil society program.

Indicators:

- Assessments of USAID Mission needs and priorities for technical assistance in developing and implementing civil society programs performed. (1-2 yrs)
- Institutional resources capable of supplying technical assistance to USAID Missions in the design and implementation of civil society programs identified. ((1-2 yrs)
- Learning network of technical assistance institutions capable of disseminating information and/or of providing strategic guidance to USAID Missions developed. (1-2 yrs)

Anticipated results to be achieved in collaboration with Regional Bureaus/Missions:

- By the end of FY 1996, the Center will have applied the new Civil Society framework in four USAID Missions. - By the end of FY 1997, the Center will have applied the Civil Society framework in four additional countries.
- *By the end of FY 1996, the Center will have compiled a comprehensive inventory of institutional resources capable of offering assistance/support to host country NGOs, and will have established a network of the most effective among these institutions.* - By the end of F 97, that network will be operational and will provide substantive assistance to host country NGOs.

Comments: The Center will assist missions to engage in field-level application, design and implementation of civil society programs. The approach will focus on mobilizing a network of experienced resource institutions who are to provide expertise in strategy development and state-of-the art methodologies for field-level applications. More generalized strategic guidance and methods will be developed from this field experience for wider distribution to USAID missions. - Gender will be an important element factor in judging the overall effectiveness of the activities designed to achieve these results. - *Italicized* are to be achieved under SO1.

Strategic Support Objective: Strategies for analyzing and increasing NGO capacity and sustainability adopted in 50% of USAID countries with a civil society program:

D. Civil Society - increased effectiveness of citizen interest groups which promote pluralism and contribute to responsive government.

PO11 - Strategies which increase citizen access to information about and influence on government decision-making adopted in 50% of USAID countries with a civil society program .

Indicators:

- More effective advocacy and monitoring strategies are employed by NGOs to influence government policy formulation and implementation. (1-4 yrs)
- More effective mechanisms and strategies are employed by NGOs to inform and mobilize public pressure for government reform. (1-4 yrs)

Anticipated results to be achieved in collaboration with Regional Bureaus/Missions:

- By the end of FY 1996, major NGOs in two countries will have adopted more effective advocacy/monitoring and/or public education strategies. - By the end of 1997, major NGOs in six additional countries will have adopted similar advocacy/monitoring and/or public education strategies.

July 12, 1995 [action4]

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An Overview of Governance

BY

Patrick Fn'Piere

I wish to gratefully acknowledge the assistance of USAID staff and outside experts who contributed to the preparation of this document. In particular James Wunsch, Robert LaPorte and Leslie Fox.

An Overview of Governance

Samuel P. Huntington has referred to the events of the 1980s and 1990s as the "third" and potentially most inclusive "wave" of democratic reform experienced in world history. Throughout what has been traditionally called the "second" and "third" worlds, many authoritarian regimes have collapsed, or surrendered in the face of public demands for greater accountability and participation. Indeed, elections have been held, jurists have begun reasserting their independence, and top-heavy bureaucracies have been thinned and, at times, decentralized and reformed.

And yet, the experience of the past five years has also indicated that those concerned with supporting these newly emerging democracies must remain realistic about the very real obstacles which impede the democratization process. The pressures on these young regimes to revert to more familiar patterns of authoritarianism and abuse have been equally as strong as the initial impulse that led to political reform in the first place.

Whether democratic transitions (over the past five years) have been the result of enlightened authoritarian leadership or the impulse of ordinary people for democratic freedoms, what has been recently witnessed in each major region of the world indicates that a key determinate for successful consolidation has been the ability of democratically-elected governments to provide good or effective governance. While people place great value in the requisites of democracy (e.g., elections, human rights, representation), on a day-to-day basis they are equally interested in having a form of governance which is able to: maintain social peace, guarantee law and order, promote directly, or create the conditions necessary for economic growth, and ensure a minimum safety-net. In this light, the "wave" of democratization that has swept the world can be interpreted as a popular expression in the belief that the political system that we know as democracy offers the best means to bring about good governance.

USAID has a long history of supporting improved governance in its programs around the world. Whether viewed as increasing public sector administrative efficiency, supporting decentralization and local government reform, or enhancing public policy making and implementation, such programs have been designed and executed for the past 30 years. What distinguishes the present from previous efforts is the political context in which governance is occurring. Democracy has enlarged the realm of governance decision making and action to include far greater societal participation in addition to that of formal government. In fact, the notion of "democratic governance" implies that society i.e. its citizens, for/non-profits, and NGO's have organized itself in such a way as to cede to the state certain

governance functions while retaining certain domains for itself ... including the right to redefine the relationship on a periodic basis. It is this phenomenon of society's participation in constructing a governance system of its choice which has generated the political legitimacy needed by governments to initiate and sustain political, economic and social reforms.

In reviewing USAID experience in the governance area one notices a gradual change from an almost exclusive concern with building the institutional capacity of state institutions throughout much of the 1960s and 1970s to increasingly targeting non-state actors in civil society with direct assistance as a means of achieving many of its country program objectives. Now with an ability to support macro-political reforms as it had traditionally done in other sectoral programs, USAID missions have become involved in supporting a range of democratic reforms aimed at improving governance capacity and effectiveness.

This growing body of experience in the area of democracy and governance, and particularly in the promotion of a system of shared "state - society" governance, or democratic governance, has led the Agency to focus its support of democratic reform on both sets of institutional actors. Thus, achieving reform objectives in such areas as the rule of law or elections has meant developing strategies and targeting assistance to institutions and organizations in both the state (e.g., electoral commissions, the judiciary) and civil society (e.g., human rights and election monitoring groups). In this paradigm, state and civil society constitute "arenas" where reforms take place and good governance is rendered. The governance activities which will be discussed are concerned with how to promote democratic governance through support to formal state institutions and processes. This discussion is therefore, just one of several components which comprise the Agency's larger D/G program.

At a conceptual level governance is understood to be the management of public affairs, that is, how society organizes itself to allocate authority, responsibility, initiative, etc., to affect issues of public concern. As previously noted, democratic governance is a particular form of governance. It combines a set of norms (e.g., respect for human rights, broad-based political participation) and institutional arrangements (e.g., constitutionalism, pluralism) together to provide a set of incentives (and disincentives) that produce organizational and individual behavior that we associate with good governance: **public accountability, responsiveness, transparency, and efficiency**. The purpose, therefore, of supporting governance activities is to promote good governance behaviors in the formal institutions of the state through adoption and practice of democratic reforms and thereby further greater democratic political liberalization..

Supporting state governance will require interventions that will lead to good governance behavior. This will include assistance designed to (i) create rules and incentives that induce institutions and individuals to choose the broader public interest over narrower private or parochial concerns; and (ii) increase the capacity of state institutions including public administrative structures to formulate, coordinate and implement public policy in a more transparent participatory manner. In practical terms, the governance activity targets the following institutions, policies and processes to achieve good state governance: legal structures, representative bodies, public administration/management, and local government.

Constitutionalism and Fundamental Law

The agreements or "social contract" that societies arrive at in defining the nature of their political systems and governance relationships are codified in fundamental law, most frequently embodied in national constitutions. Constitutions set out the broad understanding of the fundamental rights and obligations of citizens and the authorities and responsibilities accorded to the state by society which ultimately limits the former's exercise and potential abuse of power. It is at the constitutional level that the fundamental rules and institutional arrangements of a polity are designed and which, in turn, define the incentive structure to which organizational and individual behavior responds. Getting the rules right at this level is a prerequisite for the adoption of other democratic reforms (e.g., rule of law, the open public realm). In short, the fundamental principles laid out in the constitution serve as the broad framework for ensuring accountability, transparency and effective performance in public affairs. While constitution building is essentially a transition or early consolidation stage undertaking, if it is to be a relevant and living expression of social and political life there will certainly be modifications as citizens gain experience with its usefulness and effectiveness and times/conditions change.

Deliberative Bodies and Representative Democracy

Democratic governance is predicated on the capacity of representative institutions to deliberate on issues of public concern and pass legislation that embodies the national (or local) interest. Deliberative bodies such as national assemblies and parliaments provide a forum in which elected representatives debate the merits of specific laws and have the opportunity to widen this debate by calling on members of the executive branch to defend their policies, or special constituencies in society (e.g., business associations, environmental groups) to comment on the impact that proposed legislation will have on their members. In addition to its law making and representative functions, the legislative branch undertakes important oversight functions vis-a-vis the executive branch including the civil service. From the formulation of public policy to its implementation, the legislative branch provides an institutional check (within the state) on the executive branches' exercise of

authority and hence, governance performance. Increasing the effectiveness of the deliberative process and the capacity of deliberative bodies to better represent the interests of their constituents, pass legislation that advances the public interest and monitor governmental performance is a principal objective of governance activities.

Public Administration: Executing Public Policy

Within a democratic polity, the formulation of public policy takes place in the public realm through the interaction of both state and non-state actors. While the ultimate decision making responsibility resides with the state, one of the principal impacts of democratization has been to broaden the policy making process to include civil society participation. The execution of large areas of public policy, particularly those related to management of public goods and services, public safety, national defense, economic, social and environmental reform, are the responsibility of a country's public administration service, whether at the national or local levels. Given the institutional weakness of most newly democratizing countries, increasing the capacity of public servants and agencies to undertake these governance functions in a transparent, accountable and effective manner is a critical element in democratization. It should be noted that this focus on increasing the governance performance of the public service does not preclude the very real role that civil society and the private sector play in the management of public resources and the delivery of goods and services.

Decentralization and Local Government

Governance takes place at many levels within the formal institutions of the state as well as in civil society itself. Decentralization is both a policy and strategy designed to increase participation in policy making and improve the effectiveness of those responsible for its implementation. As a strategy related to improving state governance, decentralization can simply mean relocating public servants from the center to the periphery (deconcentration), or involve a true "devolution" of authority for decision making as well as the resources to carry it out at subnational (local) units of government. Developing policies and strategies for "effective" decentralization and equipping those local government units with the skills to carry it out are important governance interventions and have been, under the right conditions, instrumental in increasing public sector accountability, and effectiveness. Moreover, increasing power and decision making at the local government level can (again under the right circumstances) also serve as an internal check on the power of the central state and thus complement that of civil society.

Two other areas of special note relating to Governance activities which had not been originally envisioned but have emerged as critical components for USAID's overall DG programming;

Civil Military Affairs

As Johanna Mendelson from the Office of Transition Initiatives noted in a response to the question, "Why is Civil-Military relations an issue for the democracy area?", she said, "This question might appear at first glance to be a non-sequitur, but indeed, the democratization process relies on the military relinquishing control and power to civilian elected leaders. This is a process. It does not happen overnight. What is important is that the ability to develop other democratic institutions is very much a function of the ability of civilians to participate in these institutions without interference from any outside force. Frequently, the Military remains a state within a state, even after the transition to democratic government begins. Unless civilians are prepared to take control of the security apparatus of the state-- both the military and the police, the success of democratic reform will be ephemeral.

Thus, civil -military relations is a threshold question, a condition precedent to other democratic reforms.

The Second New Area is the New Partnership Initiative (NPI)

Announced last spring by Vice-President Al Gore at the Social Summit in Sweden, this new initiative represents a major thrust in USAID programming. On one hand, NPI seeks to increase "People to People" assistance and unleash human capital in its most basic institutional setting i.e. in their very community. Overall, NPI focuses on small business enhancement, NGO empowerment, and democratic local governance.

The democratic local governance part of NPI begins with the premise that "all things being equal, empowering the local community to take initiative should provide for more effective and efficient responses in dealing with local problems." NPI will build on the Agency's longterm experience with promoting decentralization and the local delivery of services to the increased attention to the development of local level democratic institutions or quite simply to move toward a more inclusive approach to community decision making.


Determining when, who, how and even whether USAID should provide support to state institutions in a given country depends on a combination of factors, some of which the Agency has influence on and others which it does not. Both the

Agency's "Sustainable Development Strategy" and "Guidelines for Strategic Plans" provide the policy parameters and criteria through which such decisions would be made. However, there are a set of issues related to governance support, particularly in terms of establishing priorities at the Macro-political level that should be noted. And at least one fundamental question posed and answered i.e. What role can/will formal "State Actors" play in furthering or consolidating democratic gains? The answer is not always -- positive.

In addition to partner countries classified as "sustainable development," USAID works in a far larger number of "transition" countries that are at various points along the "transition - consolidation" continuum. More important than where "transition" countries are actually located is their demonstrated commitment or "political will" to the principles and practices of democracy and good governance. Making such determinations entails a significant degree of qualitative judgements, but is a necessary action for field missions which must make critical choices about where limited resources are to be invested; and what will yield the desired measurable results. As a matter of general principle, however, such determinations can be enhanced by looking at power relationships in an historical context. For example:

- (a) *Between State and Society:* Prior to the commencement of democracy's third wave in the mid to late 1980s, political power was concentrated in authoritarian state institutions. To the extent that civil society existed under such regimes, it was largely structured through bodies which served to restrict rather than promote societal participation in political life. Therefore, providing support to civil society over state institutions particularly, during the transition stage and in the early stages of consolidation recognizes an historical imbalance in power relations between these two sets of actors.
- (b) *Within Central State Institutions:* Among the three branches of the central state, the executive has traditionally dominated both the judiciary and legislature. Regardless of the nature of the authoritarian regime (e.g., one party states, military rule), legislative bodies often served as rubber stamps of the executive while judicial independence was subverted either structurally through attachment to the executive (e.g., under the Ministry of Justice) or indirectly through control of the budget process and thus the allocation of resources to judicial personnel. Given this imbalance, supporting the creation of independent legislative and judicial branches should be given considerable weight prior to further strengthening of the executive. Recent experience has shown this to be true even where constitutional provisions have deliberately weakened the power of the executive in general and the presidency in particular.

- (c) *Between the Central State and Local Government:* In many developing countries, there are few examples of countries where local governments have been directly elected by the citizens they are representing or governing. In many cases, local government officials are appointed by the executive branch and directly subordinate to a designated Ministry (e.g., Ministry of Interior or Territorial Administration). In the cases where elected officials or local assemblies do exist, they are often affiliated to one-party regimes effectively denying any independence from the central state. Therefore, supporting local government autonomy and the policies (e.g., decentralization or federalism) could be key to balancing central state authority and furthering democratization at its most basic level.



Technical Notes

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Management and the Environment for Implementation of Policy Change: Part One

Political Mapping

By Benjamin L. Crosby

INTRODUCTION

Over the past ten years, with the continuing and apparently insoluble economic crisis afflicting most parts of the developing world, the competition for ever-diminishing resources has increased notably. The effect of the crisis on the public sector, and especially the functional areas of the public sector, has been singular and dramatic. Even countries that once had prospering and relatively efficient public sectors are now confronted with the deterioration of priority programs, a general slashing in the level of services offered, an inability to maintain a technological presence, and rampant desertion of professional staff—all of which are products of decreasing budgetary allocations and diminishing resources. At the same time this deterioration has occurred, the public sector has been asked to take on the challenge of implementing significant policy changes, including decentralization, privatization of state activities, macro-economic adjustment and liberalization, as well as a general shrinking of the role of the state—actions that frequently threaten powerful actors and vested interests both within and outside the public sector.

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With the combination of deteriorating resources and major shifts in policy orientation, even the funding of budgets for supposedly vital services such as health and education cannot be considered a given; rather, each ministry or agency must compete on ever more difficult terms with other actors. Ministries must lobby, politic, and form coalitions simply to maintain their levels of resource allocation, let alone think about increasing their shares. In short, agencies must pay more attention to how they can obtain resources. This increasingly involves the development of **political** strategies designed to improve a ministry or agency's clout in determining who gets what. When faced with the need to obtain additional resources for new projects or refocus the objectives or policies of the agency in ways that will threaten resource levels of already-established projects of other agencies, the need for political analysis and strategy development is all the more vital.

Generally, managers and professionals in the public sector are poorly equipped to deal with either political analysis or the formulation of political strategies. When injected into the budget process for the first time, many discover that their sector's needs are not automatically met. To the contrary, rapidly declining levels of budget authority for the more vulnerable sectors such as education and health, attest to their inability to defend themselves against more able, though perhaps less needy, competitors for budget resources. When faced with the need to increase or shift resources to implement changing policies or objectives, the task becomes doubly difficult.

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This and the following Technical Note of this series review political and environmental mapping and analytical techniques aimed at developing management skills in designing improved strategies for achieving goals and objectives. Part One covers macro-political mapping and political resource analysis while Part Two micro-political mapping, policy network analysis and force-field analysis. Together, these techniques help in assessing the level of competition faced by the public manager, the channels of access to critical decisions, and the possibilities for coalitional arrangements to help achieve objectives.

Politics: An Informal Definition

It has been said that politics is the art of determining who gets what, where, and when. It has also been said that there is no such thing as a free lunch. These two ideas are critical to understanding political analysis and how to use it effectively. Politics is based on the notion that resources are scarce and that decisions must be made regarding how such resources are allocated. The function of politics is deciding who gets what resources and when those resources should be delivered. **Who** decides is usually what is taken to be "the government" or some other equivalent ruling body. On a more micro level, the decision maker may be the CEO of a firm, or perhaps the Minister of a cabinet department. That person is generally accorded such power through a process of legitimation that permits her or him to make decisions regarding who gets what in the allocation of resources. But how are such decisions made? What are the criteria that indicate that one actor will prevail over another in the allocation of scarce resources? Such decisions are made based on what the petitioner can bring to the deal and what the decision maker can and is willing to offer in return.

Some Premises About Politics and Politicians:

Having said that politics is essentially a transaction, it is important to note that the techniques of analysis presented here are based on a series of elementary, but fundamental, premises.

No government can stand entirely on its own. While this perhaps seems overly elementary, it is interesting to note that many governments think otherwise.

To remain in office a government must have the support of key actors. A government must have support in order to remain in office. However, not just any kind of support will do; the government must enjoy the support of key and powerful actors. In many countries, if the military decides to withdraw support from the chief executive, the government's chance of remaining in office will diminish dramatically. Likewise, support from a major political party in a democratic environment will generally be vital to remaining in office. A vote of "no confidence" by the prime minister's party in a parliamentary democracy signals the end of that government.

Without support, governments do not have authority. The greater the support for a government, the more it can do, and the greater its authority to make decisions. Support represents permission to make decisions. Conversely, when support is withdrawn, the government's options narrow dramatically and it can do less. Without support, any decision is likely to meet with criticism and resistance.

Without authority, governments cannot implement decisions. Perhaps more important than the ability to make decisions is the ability to implement decisions. Here, it is vital that decision makers have authority; that not only are they permitted to make decisions, but they are capable of enforcing the implementation of those decisions. With authority, those who would resist decisions can be made to comply, but without authority, governments are unable to extract obedience. Key actors in positions to sabotage or otherwise modify either the content or outcomes of decisions can be neutralized by a government that possesses proper authority.

Support cannot be obtained without cost. Support is given with the expectation of receiving something in return. Support can only be obtained by offering benefits to those capable of giving support. The quality and quantity of benefits offered are instrumental in determining the quality and quantity of support given. Key actor support will be more costly than the support of actors who aren't very important. To induce support, the government

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may offer different kinds of benefits—material, positions of influence, or the chance to hear one's views defended—but benefits must be offered.

The offer of support may be used to obtain benefits or increase influence in the government. Since the government, or those who aspire to governmental positions, need support, the offer of support can be negotiated and/or “sold to the highest bidder.” Just as companies compete for clients or markets for their products, politicians must also compete for support. This gives clients (or supporters) the opportunity to use their support to obtain more benefits through negotiation. Those who can offer more valuable support to the government will be accorded a more important role or voice.

In effect, politics may be viewed as a transaction in which support is traded for benefits or influence. But the important message here is that support is vital (decisions cannot be implemented without it), there is always a cost to obtain it, and there is generally competition for that support. Looking at politics in this way helps us understand which actors are important and provides insight into the factors that affect the capacity of a government to implement decisions.

POLITICAL MAPPING

Two elements that complicate political analysis are the large number of actors present in any given political system and the vast quantity of information about politics available. In virtually any political system there are, quite literally, hundreds of different political actor groups. To analyze the influence and/or capacity to influence of each group would require much more time and interest than a manager in the public sector has available. At the same time, the quantity of information available about politics is overwhelming. Much of what we see, hear and talk about concerns politics. Tune the radio to the morning news and chances are that most of what is discussed concerns politics. Likewise, in the first section of the newspaper political themes predominate. Even at the office and at lunch, much of the conversation revolves around politics or politicians. With the quantity of information available, analysis of politics, and determining what is important for the official, is an extremely difficult task. But this difficulty stems largely from problems of processing the information; how to organize the information and make it useful.

In much the same vein, there is also a tremendous amount of information available regarding the physical

attributes of the environment in which we live. However, when we want to quickly and accurately describe that environment we can refer to a map. Depending on the scale, we can show the most important and even lesser details; hills, valleys, rivers, highways, villages, towns and cities. We can also see how far it is from one place to another, or even get an idea of how big a town is depending on the size of the letters.

We can use the same technique to describe the political terrain in which a politician or public official operates. The purpose of the political map is to organize and reduce the amount of information available regarding politics to a manageable quantity in order to focus on those aspects of the terrain most important to the decisions managers must make. The map organizes and identifies the most important political actors and spatially illustrates their relationships to one another.

Organization of the Political Map

The political map, (Figure 1) like the geographical map, has two dimensions: a horizontal (latitudinal) dimension and a vertical (longitudinal) dimension. At the center of the map is the government. The primary reason for locating the government at the center is simply because the government is the primary focus of decision making regarding how the benefits of society will be distributed. Political activity is centered on and directed toward influencing the government and its policy decisions.

Along the vertical axis, the different types of political actors are organized into four sectors: external actors, social groups, political parties, and pressure groups. The purpose of the horizontal axis is to assess the degree to which each group supports the government. Support for the government varies from core or central support to ideological or mild support while opposition is differentiated as either legal or anti-system opposition.

A criticism sometimes made regarding political mapping is its lack of dynamism. Unlike the geographical map, changes in the political terrain occur often and sometimes rapidly. Thus, a single political map may be likened to a snapshot—it is a loyal interpretation of the political system at a particular point in time, but not at another. While it is certainly true that a particular map represents a particular point in time, by combining a series of maps over time, we can begin to appreciate the dynamics of politics—just

as time-lapse photography (through a series of individual photos) can reveal the opening of a flower.

Actors begin to take on movement; we can see how support for the government waxes and wanes; and we can see coalitions take shape and later fall apart.

Figure 1
Political Map

Political Actors

The Government: The government, or more precisely the head of government, is the single most important political actor. It is the actor ultimately responsible for deciding between different and/or conflicting alternatives and demands, and the source to which other actors turn when they cannot resolve disputes among themselves. As a consequence, the government is always at the center of the map. A government need not be elected, nor need it be "legitimate" in the legalistic sense; rather, it is the actor that has the role of final arbiter. It should also be noted that the head of government here may be the president, a general, a dictator, a junta, a "national directorate," or whoever is designated the role of final decision maker.

Political mapping is not restricted to the national level. Mapping is also useful at the provincial or municipal level, and can be applied even to single organizations such as enterprises or Ministries. In such cases, the "government" is, again, the individual who has the role of final decision maker. If mapping were to be applied to the health sector, such a position might well be occupied by the Minister of Health; in a private company, such positions are occupied by the chief executive officer of the organization. Again, even at the micro-level, the "government" occupies the center.

Other Political Actors

Besides "The Government," there are four other sets of political actors: social sectors, political parties,

	OPPOSITION SECTORS		SUPPORT SECTORS			OPPOSITION SECTORS	
EXTERNAL SECTORS							
Sector Position	Anti-System	Legal Opposition	Ideological Support	Core Support	Ideological Support	Legal Opposition	Anti-System
	THE GOVERNMENT						
SOCIAL SECTORS							
POLITICAL PARTIES							
PRESSURE GROUPS							

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pressure groups, and external actors. Each of these groups has particular relevance in the political scenario, but the relevance and degree to which each type of actor is mobilized varies. Each plays rather different roles and employs different types of strategies and objectives despite the fact that in one way or another, each wants to influence political outcomes.

Social Sectors: These consist of large, social groups of individuals that share some general, but loose, characteristic or affinity. Such groups are amorphous and unorganized, with very poor mobilization capacity. Nevertheless, their commonality of interest can be manifested through certain mechanisms, i.e., in the way they vote in an election. Among such groups are typically found urban workers, the urban middle class, small farmers, large landholders, industrialists, agro-export farmers, urban professionals, or minority groups. Such groups are most highly mobilized during electoral periods, but primarily because candidates make special appeals to such groups. For instance, most electoral campaign messages and rhetoric are directed at these groups. Indeed, political parties and candidates will often single out certain groups for special attention. Once the electoral period is over, however, such groups lose relevance because of their lack of organization and inability to mobilize.

Political Parties: These are groups often composed of several social sectors, whose main objective is to influence public policy through the direct exercise of the instruments of power. While political parties are generally associated with electoral politics, parties can take on rather unorthodox forms. For instance, in many parts of the world the military often acts as if it were a political party not content simply to influence indirectly public policy but frequently desiring to assume direct exercise of the instruments of power. Guerilla groups, even though they employ violence rather than electoral methods, still have as their main objective the direct exercise of power—they are therefore, political parties. The principal defining characteristic of a political party is whether or not it wishes to exercise power.

Pressure Groups: Pressure groups are groups of individuals that share a relatively narrow set of interests and that seek to defend or promote such interests by influencing the direction of public policy. But unlike political parties, pressure groups do not seek the direct exercise of the instruments of power and authority. It is important to note that virtually any group, as long as it simply seeks to influence policy and not exercise power, can be considered a pressure group. Under

these criteria, groups as diverse as labor confederations, business groups, the Catholic church, or organizations, agencies and ministries within the public sector (which try to influence the budget allocation process among other things) can all be considered pressure groups. While public sector actors are part of the government, they also try to influence the direction of public policy—for instance, the education ministry will try to expand its share of the budget even when austerity measures are being introduced. Since pressure groups are virtually the only actors that can articulate and channel demands during non-electoral periods, pressure groups serve a vital role in designing and determining public policy.

External Actors: In many regards, these groups are similar to and frequently play a role nearly identical to pressure groups. The primary difference is that such actors are not “natives,” their origins are from outside the country. Nevertheless, they seek to influence the direction of public policy in defense or promotion of their own particular interests. Included among such groups might be transnational corporations, governments of other countries (working through their embassies or assistance agencies), missionary groups, private volunteer organizations, international political party organizations, banks, bilateral and multilateral assistance agencies, and so on. In open economies and polities, such groups can play an extremely powerful role.

Opposition and Support: Locating the Actors

Once actors have been categorized, attention may then be turned to analyzing their support or opposition to the government. Support for the government is broken into two categories: central or core support and moderate or “ideological support.” Opposition is also divided into two types: legal or “loyal” opposition and anti-system opposition.

Core Support: Core support is the type most vital to the maintenance in power of the government and the most important to the assurance of power and decisional authority. Groups in this sector are unequivocal in their support for the regime and their interests are the most closely identified with the government’s objectives and policies. They tend to be powerful actors such as the major political parties, the military, or major pressure groups. Because such groups invest heavily in the government (in terms of support), they also receive the most important positions

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in the government, the most substantial material benefits, and are the most influential in the decisional process. Loss of support from any of these groups can be very damaging to a government with respect both to its survival as well as to its capacity to implement decisions. For example, in most LDCs, withdrawal of support by the military would likely result in the downfall of the government. While core support groups provide political solvency to the government through their support, it is not without a price ... they **demand** benefits and influence. When there are several such competing groups, and the government has relatively few resources to hand out, difficult decisions will have to be made that might cause the exit of one or more of these actors. Ironically then, it can be just as dangerous to have too much core support as to have too little. Core support groups will likely include the ruling political party, key elements of the bureaucracy, the military (especially in developing countries), and certain key constituency groups.

Moderate or Ideological Support: Groups located in this sector agree with the government on most issues, but their support is much weaker and less committed than core support, and is often characterized as "silent support." For these groups, support for the government entails little investment of time, money or commitment—and therefore little risk. But at the same time, since the groups are not particularly committed, or have little to offer, they receive relatively few benefits from the government in return; they are generally at the margin of the decisional process and unable to exert much influence in the determination of important policy. While such groups play only a minor role in policy making they do benefit from the policies.

The government must also take care not to alienate or ignore these moderate support groups. Their demands must be taken into account with some regularity, and must be satisfied or the groups will withdraw support from the government and begin to look elsewhere for satisfaction of their demands. Ideological support groups are important in that they are candidates to become core support should others decide to withdraw. Since satisfaction of such groups does not require expenditure of large sums of resources, the government can comfortably afford to maintain several groups in the ideological support sectors. Ideological support groups could include minor coalition partners, large constituency groups such as farmers or workers, and pressure groups of minor consequence to the vitality of the government.

Legal Opposition: Because they do not share common goals and objectives, groups in the legal opposition sectors generally disagree with policy decisions of the government and have no vested interest in the government; nevertheless, they are strongly in agreement with the fundamental rules of the political system. They oppose the government but not the system, and in systems with alternability, the legal opposition will become the next government. In a democracy, the legal opposition presents an alternative to the government and at the same time acts as a watchdog. The legal opposition will make deals with the government in pursuit of its own interests. It is important for the government to be attentive, if not necessarily compliant, to the demands of the legal opposition so as to avoid the risk of such groups turning anti-system. Without periodic satisfaction of demands, the legal opposition can radicalize. Among such groups might be found the primary opposition political parties, business groups, or opposition labor groups.

Anti-system Opposition: As implied in the name, these groups not only do not share the same values and objectives as the government, they are opposed to the system as a whole. In order to be satisfied, they require that the fundamental rules of the political game be drastically changed. They are opposed not only to who makes the decisions but also to how the decisions are made. Since their ideas and values are so conflictive with the norm, such groups tend to be repressed and are often obliged to act clandestinely. And because their ideas do not find easy acceptance, they frequently resort to violent means. Among such groups one might find guerrillas on one side of the political spectrum and death squads on the other. What they have in common is that the system cannot satisfy their demands.

Location of Actors on the Map:

The location of a group or actor on the map depends on a number of variables, and not simply the degree to which the group supports the government. In locating a group on the map there are two dimensions to be considered: first, the location of the group in terms of its support or opposition to the government and second, the position of the group to the left or the right of the regime on the map. With respect to the first factor, a group will be located toward the core support area to the degree that it conforms to the following indicators:

the group is in basic agreement with the fundamental rules of the political game

the group agrees with the objectives, goals, and policies of the regime

the group is important or critical to the government's permanence in power

the group is influential in the determination of important policies

the group receives important benefits

Those groups that fulfill all of these characteristics will most certainly be located in the very center, and be the major actors within the political system. It must be noted, again, that simple agreement with the government on major issues is necessary but not sufficient to place a group in the center.

The placement of a group to the left or the right of the regime is often a subjective decision. The reason for dichotomizing the map is to distance those that have little in common or who differ substantially on general policy orientation, ideology, or values. Such actors will rarely form coalitions or otherwise politically participate together. When there are two powerful, but opposite, actors in opposition, they tend to cancel each other out and only present a very diminished threat to the government.

The placement of a group to the left or the right of the government will depend on whether the analyst believes that the group is "more progressive" or more "conservative" than the government ... whether the group is more "interventionist" or less "interventionist" than the state ... whether the group is more "leftist" or more "rightist" than the regime. As can be seen, such judgements will be situational, and will depend on the context in which one is making the judgement. Regardless of which criteria are chosen for making such decisions, the criteria ought to be clear and consistent. It might also be noted that in certain cases, the distribution of right and left can change overnight, as is the case when a socialist government is defeated by a party with neo-liberal leanings.

Reading the Map

Reading the political map is really answering a series of questions about the map. Beginning with the center and moving out toward the extreme, the first set of questions looks at the degree of support for the regime. How much support is there, and how intense or committed is that support? What is the actual number of groups in support? Are critical actors in the center

or are several off to one side or another, indicating only lukewarm support? Is the support balanced, or is it over-reliant on one particular type of group, such as labor unions or the military?

Looking at Figure 2, the Government has fairly substantial support in the core sector. However, that support is concentrated mostly in and among big business or powerful economic interests (typical in countries undergoing economic shock therapy). This support is backed by the international donors, whose economic resources make them powerful interests. While the government is not overreliant on a particular group, the number of "winners" in this scenario are few, while those in opposition are many.

The next set of questions deals with cohesiveness of support. Are there signs of fragmentation? Occasionally, one might have support from the official leadership of an organization but the rank and file may be opposed. Under these circumstances, can the leadership exercise sufficient control over the rank and file to assure continued and reliable support?

Figure 2 shows a serious problem with cohesion within the Government's coalition National Alliance. There are two major factions. The Progressive Democrats sit on the border between opposition and support, while the Authentic Liberal Party is split from the Liberal Party. With such polarized partners, coalition management for the Government will be difficult. Failure could result in an opposition Congress and loss of key cabinet ministers.

Finally, one should examine where support for the government is concentrated. If it is heavily concentrated in the core support area, it will prove very costly to maintain over the long haul. Are there groups located in the ideological support area? How important are these groups and how expensive to the government would it be to mobilize them? It should be remembered that it is important for the government to maintain an adequate reserve of such support precisely so that it can be mobilized for support. In Figure 2, the government may find that maintaining such powerful support is rather costly.

In reading the opposition sectors, several elements should be kept in mind: first, how many groups are there in the opposition? It should not be surprising to find many more actors in opposition than in active support. In LDCs, resources to satisfy demands are in scarce supply, so that only a relative few can be

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satisfied, leaving many others discontent ... and in opposition. Nevertheless, if there is a significant difference in quantity between opposition and support, there may be cause for worry. One normally expects groups from the social sectors to be predominantly in the opposition because they are the largest, most amorphous, least identifiable, and least committed and hence, the most difficult and costly to satisfy.

However, if an election is approaching, some of those groups ought to be returning to the support sectors. If not, the governing party will certainly suffer on election day.

Second, how intense and committed is the opposition? If it is relatively uncommitted, then the prospects of mobilization against the government will diminish — a committed opposition will be much more difficult.

In Figure 2, there is a good deal of opposition, but it does not appear to be particularly intense, as can be noted by those groups straddling the line between opposition and support. The lack of clear link between groups or concentration also signifies relative weakness of the opposition.

Third, how much of the opposition is concentrated in the anti-system? Large quantities of opposition of this type is costly and will have a wasting effect on the government, as in the cases of El Salvador and Nicaragua during the 1980s.

Fourth, are there important alliances in the process of formation? Is there evidence of recent collaboration among important sectors, such as the labor movement, the private sector, or among political parties on one side of the spectrum or the other? Are large labor confederations forming or umbrella business

Figure 2
An Illustrative Political Map

	OPPOSITION SECTORS		SUPPORT SECTORS			OPPOSITION SECTORS	
EXTERNAL SECTORS				World Bank IMF USAID		Private Banks International Investors	
Sector Position	Anti-System	Legal Opposition	Ideological Support	Core Support	Ideological Support	Legal Opposition	Anti-System
	GOVERNMENT						
SOCIAL SECTORS		Urban Workers Small Farmers Peasants Urban Middle Class		Large Farmers Exporters		Urban Middle Class Industrialists Commerce	
POLITICAL PARTIES		MPD		National Alliance Progressive Democrats		Authentic Liberal Party National Republicans Liberal Party	
PRESSURE GROUPS	Fed. of Socialist Labor	Confed. of Workers Farmworkers Federation	CONGRESS Government Employees Union	Economic Council Armed Forces Farmers Assoc. Bankers Assoc.		Chamber of Commerce Chamber of Industry	

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associations being put together? Finally, is the opposition balanced? When there are roughly the same number of opposition actors on one side as the other, there will be a neutralizing effect — divide and conquer, playing one group off another, both are viable strategies when the opposition is conveniently divided.

In Figure 2, there are no apparent alliances or coalitions in formation. The lack of ties between either business or labor groups allows the Government the possibility of playing one group against another. In the present case, the lack of ties between opposition on the left means the Government can concentrate on keeping the business community happy, and not worry too much about labor, at least until the next election.

In sum, Figure 2's Government faces two challenges: first, it must maintain the support of the business community. To do so, it must maintain an adequate flow of resources and benefits to them. Second, the Government needs to shore up its coalition. The repercussions of shifts into the opposition of key players would be quite serious in terms of capacity to make and implement policy.

In general, a political map should be read with an eye to seeing the whole picture rather than concentrating on particular details. It should be remembered that the map is an imperfect instrument, and close detailed analysis may magnify distortions.

Resources and the Determination of Influence:

If politics is essentially a transaction, i.e., the exchange of benefits for support, then the medium of that exchange is resources. Resources have been defined elsewhere as "articles of worth that individuals or organizations may be able to expend, save, or invest to help accomplish desired goals." More specifically, in politics, resources are used by the government to obtain support from the various political sectors, and by the sectors to obtain benefits or influence in the policy process. For instance, the government can offer the possibility of tax exemptions or import privileges to exporters in order to gain their support in economic reform policy. Likewise, powerful labor unions can use the threat of general strikes to preserve public transport subsidies, even though such subsidies contribute to the public deficit. Possession of resources is vital to both the government and the sectors: without resources to dispense, the government will be unable to attract the support vitally needed to make and

implement decisions. Without resources, the sector group will not attract the attention of the government, and thus will be unable to influence the direction of policy. Although the range of potentially useful resources is wide, resources can be divided into five major types: information, economic or material, status, legitimacy/authority, and violence.

Information: The adage that knowledge or information is power is only partially correct. Were it entirely true, one can imagine that heads of large data-processing services or librarians would be much more powerful than they actually are. Information is certainly a necessary component to power, but it is not sufficient. It is the ability to process opportunistically and to use valuable information that counts—not simply the mere possession of that information. Information as a resource might consist of new ideas regarding solutions to problems, data regarding the behavior of the economy, the build-up of military forces that might threaten a country, trade secrets regarding new technological advances—in short, it is knowledge about some particular phenomenon. To the extent that information is held exclusively, the more valuable it is; widely known information has relatively little value as a resource.

Information is only valuable if it can be used, and used opportunistically. The person with the "idea ahead of its time" will have less impact than one with the right idea at the right time. For instance, to know that a country will devalue its currency is certainly an important piece of information but it is information that will likely be shared by many; however, the more important and valuable information about exactly when that devaluation will occur will be shared by very few. The capacity to disseminate information is also important; in a repressive society, dissemination may be restricted, thereby undermining the value of information and causing expenditure of other resources developing alternative channels. Finally, if information is to be valuable, it must be credible and persuasive. Part of the reason for the ascendancy of economists in policy circles is that they present plans that have the appearance of being at once credible and persuasive—even though they may not necessarily be correct.

Economic: Economic resources are material goods and services that can be bartered for other goods and services or exchanged for money. Examples might include an organization's assets, control of public utilities, control over means of production, and access to or control of credit. For the government, economic

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resources are vital to provide material benefits to constituents, to construct roads, maintain subsidies, build bridges, and thus gain or maintain support. For the different sector groups, economic resources can finance a candidate's electoral campaign, purchase vital information, or even obtain prestige. The mere possession of large stocks of goods and services does not imply vast stocks of political resources. Can the goods and services be expeditiously and effectively mobilized to some political end? If not, their value as potential political resources is diminished. Were mere possession of economic resources sufficient, then the thesis of economic power being equivalent to political power would certainly be correct. By that argument, private sector associations or business groups should be the most powerful political groups. However, that is not always true. The directors and leaders of these groups frequently find it extraordinarily difficult to mobilize their potential resources. As a consequence, such associations are generally ill-equipped to pay for publicity campaigns or to commission studies in defense of the interests of the private sector. Thus, the important measure of the worth of such resources is the quantity that can be mobilized when most needed.

Status: Status can be viewed as the deference or prestige awarded to individuals or groups because of their position in the social structure. The position accorded a group or individual in society can be used to obtain other benefits. Individuals with high perceived status are almost always accorded a high level of credibility and may be regarded as opinion leaders. Political candidates will generally seek out groups they consider to be of high status such as medical doctors or business associations to support them on the assumption that others will be impressed by the endorsement of distinguished groups. Likewise, candidates will scrupulously avoid association with nefarious groups. A druglord may be able to easily finance the campaign of a candidate to high office, but such an association would have a disastrous impact on the candidate's chances. The concept of status also applies to the government. At the outset of a government, it is relatively easy to attract highly qualified talent for ministerial or other important posts, but as the government wears on, and as its credibility and status begin to decline, it will become increasingly difficult to attract qualified talent. Governments or ministers with high status will also find it easier to get compliance with their wishes than those without.

Legitimacy/Authority: A government does not automatically have the "right" to rule. An election

simply concedes "permission" to rule until the next election. By the same token, the government does not automatically have authority; again, it is conceded or "legitimized" by the government's constituents. Without that legitimacy, the government will have no authority—it will be unable to govern. Legitimacy is not simply established by a law or the constitution, it is accorded by the sector groups—sector groups give permission to the government to make decisions. If that permission is withdrawn (constitutionally or not) the government will be unable to implement decisions, and indeed may be at risk of a coup d'etat. Legitimacy and authority are counterparts; the more legitimacy a government is accorded, the more authority it will have.

Some groups are more capable of lending legitimacy than others. The military in many LDCs, though relatively small, numerically speaking, carries a considerable legitimizing capacity. When the military decides to withdraw its support from a government, the speculation is when, not whether, the government will fall. Likewise, a vote of no-confidence for the prime minister by the majority in a parliament will be fatal to the government. One measure of a group's "legitimacy" resources is the importance of that group to the government's permanence in power.

Coercion: The use of force or coercion to obtain certain goals or objectives can be an important resource for both the government and other political actors. Coercion, when used by the government, includes repression, torture, or economic persecution; for political actors it can include guerrilla actions, strikes, boycotts, demonstrations, or violent actions. Groups such as landless peasants who have little else in the way of resources at their command will resort to land invasions. Right-wing extremist groups, dissatisfied with the government's treatment of alleged subversives will form death squads. Likewise, when labor unions fail to respond to the government's demands to halt a general strike, water cannons and tear gas will be used to forcibly disperse them. Businessmen irritated over the imposition of a new tax might resort to a boycott or "business strike."

To be effective as a resource, however, violence or coercion must be controlled. A strike that turns into looting will undermine the usefulness of the strike and turn sympathy away from the union. Likewise, police repression that turns brutal, will provoke harsh and negative reactions, thus reducing the effectiveness of the repression and the status of the government as well.

Resources and Strategy:

For political groups and actors, resources are the means for obtaining benefits and influence. For the government, they are the means for attracting and maintaining support. The level of resources possessed by the group or actor are determinant in the type of strategy that may be chosen in order to obtain those benefits and influence. A political actor, be it an interest group or other type, must choose a strategy appropriate to the type and level of resources it possesses. Nevertheless, there are only a limited number of types of strategies available to a political actor: these are confrontation, collaboration, and abstention.

Confrontation: The actor may choose to confront the government, demanding that it receive satisfaction for its demands. Confrontation can range from mild to belligerent (such as that practiced by guerrilla groups), but the uniting principle is that the group thinks that the object of the demand is appropriately theirs and **must** be delivered; if not, the group is prepared to take it, by force if necessary. Should a group wish to confront the government and **demand** that a certain policy be implemented or that they receive "x" amount of influence via cabinet posts or other significant positions, the group's level of resources should be quite high. This strategy is sometimes characterized as "negotiating from strength," wherein the actor is unwilling to concede much.

A strike by a public sector labor union is a typical confrontational strategy. In this instance, the union must have accurate information that the government will be damaged by a strike and that it does in fact have the capacity to meet the union's demands; it must have the economic resources to see a strike through and to help mitigate the hardships that its members will suffer; it must have status so that management will take it seriously; it must have legitimacy in the sense that the government needs the union's members, that it cannot easily hire replacements; and finally, the union must have the ability to back up its threats of violence to repel strikebreakers or sanctioning those who would cross picket lines.

Collaboration: A collaborative strategy requires substantially less in the way of resource endowment. Rather than a confrontational posture, the group agrees to collaborate or cooperate with the government on some issue or agenda. Nevertheless, in order to be listened to, the group must have something interesting

or attractive to offer the government. It must have information or perhaps a unique idea regarding something about which the government has a keen interest. It might have particular economic resources that can help make an investment project work. Perhaps the status of the group might provide some additional legitimacy to the government. The point is that the group, in order to collaborate with the government, need not have a high level of resources across the board, as is the case with the confrontational strategy—sometimes a little bit of pertinent information or status will suffice. Under this strategy, positions are negotiable.

Abstention: Withdrawing from active pursuit of group demands can be a useful strategy, especially when the group finds its stock of resources nearly depleted. Abstention will allow the organization to halt the pursuit of demands with the government in order to attend to replenishment of resources that will enable the group to participate or negotiate once again. Since it is generally not the case that all the group's resources will be completely exhausted, the most abundant remaining resource should be wisely invested in activities that will produce more or other resources. For example, a small, non-traditional exporters association with little influence might adopt a low profile strategy to build that activity into such a potent foreign exchange earner that it will have to be taken into account by the government in setting the direction of export policy. It should be noted that abstention does require possession of at least a residual amount of resources; a complete absence would likely signify elimination of the group.

Put into matrix form, the amount of resources required for the different types of strategies can be found in Figure 3. It should be noted that each of the strategies is an analytical type, but in practice one will likely find a mixture of strategies being used.

Nevertheless, it is highly probable that one type of strategy will be stressed over another. It should also be mentioned that there are different degrees of each type of strategy: a mildly confrontative strategy requires much less in the way of resources than a strident confrontation. What is important to remember is that the resource level must be adequate to the type of strategy to be undertaken.

Resource Maintenance and Replenishment

For effective political participation, the maintenance of an adequate stock of political resources is vital

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—without resources the actor will be unable to influence the policy decision process; and without resources the government will find it difficult to make decisions, much less assure their implementation. Possession and maintenance of adequate resources is not automatic. If resources are simply consumed with little or no attention to their replenishment, they will soon be exhausted. Once exhausted, actors will find their influence substantially diminished. To retain influence then, consideration must be given both to the maintenance and production of resources. This requires that the politician or official pay attention to how resources are used—what benefits will the expenditure of a resource produce, both for the agency as well as for the recipient? To the extent that resources are in scarce supply, even more attention must be paid to the utilization of the **productive** capacity of those resources.

Summary: The Utility of Mapping

Mapping can serve several purposes. First, it can provide a graphic representation of the health of a regime or government. By indicating the level of support for the regime, the political map can tell us the condition or state of health of the government with respect to the making and implementation of important decisions. Second, it can tell us something about the vulnerabilities of the regime. The map should clearly indicate which key elements of support are missing or are merely lukewarm in their support; it can also show which important actors are in opposition, and the degree of their opposition.

Third, the map can detect the existence of opposing alliances and potential support coalitions. This will permit the government to concentrate on critical actors rather than wasting time on those that have little possibility of producing much in the way of support or benefits for the regime. Fourth, the political map can give a rather clear indication of the level of authority possessed by the regime, which is important for staking out the parameters of policy making. Depending on its level of support, the regime will have the authority to carry out certain types of policy but not others. Fifth, the map can also help to indicate implementation capacity by noting the position of instrumental actors such as the bureaucracy. While there may be permission to enact certain policies, the lack of a cooperative bureaucracy can easily sabotage the implementation of those policies. Finally, the map can detect new directions in policy. If the map indicates a gathering of support or actors in one area of the map, it may not indicate the formation of a coalition but a concentration of interest in opposition to current policy, which might ultimately cause the government to re-think its position.

Although a political map can be an extremely useful instrument for clarification, it is neither a crystal ball nor a substitute for good analysis or judgment. The map is merely a tool, and like other tools, its usefulness will depend on who wields it. The effectiveness of the map will depend both on the quality of data that goes into the construction of the map and the seriousness and quality of interpretation given the data on the map. If either are poor, the map loses utility and the decisions based on that map will suffer.


Figure 3

RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS FOR POLITICAL STRATEGIES					
Strategy	Information	Economics	Status	Authority/ Legitimacy	Violence
Confrontation	high	high	high	high	high
Collaboration	medium	medium	medium	medium	medium
Abstention	low	low	low	low	low

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(See IPC Technical Note #5 for further discussion of environmental mapping techniques.)

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MANAGEMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY CHANGE: PART TWO

Policy Environment Mapping Techniques

By Benjamin L. Crosby

One of the first tasks required of strategic managers is to fully understand the terrain upon which they will have to play. The variety and complexity of political and decisional processes found in the making and implementation of policy change calls for a wide variety of tools for mapping, diagnosis, and analysis. The purpose of this note is to introduce and describe a variety of mapping and analytical tools useful for increasing managers' comprehension of the decision and implementation context in which they must work. Three policy mapping techniques will be discussed in this technical note: micro-political mapping, policy network mapping, and force-field analysis.

Political mapping need not be confined solely to the macro or national level as discussed in Part One of this series. Two other useful techniques are micro-mapping and policy network mapping. Micro-mapping diagrams the relationships between actors at a micro-political level, and is especially useful to illustrate relationships among actors in a

particular sector (e.g., health, education, agriculture). For instance, should the Minister of Agriculture of Boligway wish to evaluate intra-sectoral support for new policies or ideas, then a micro-political map denoting the components and constituencies of the agricultural sector would be useful. If, on the other hand, the Health Minister wanted to focus specifically on a particular policy and gauge the potential efficacy of her strategy for getting through the approval process, she might wish to develop a policy network map in order to zero in on the key pressure points in the policy process.

Micro-Political Mapping:

Although a macro-political map shows overall support for the government, it does not necessarily reveal support on specific issues. It is possible that though a government has solid overall support, on specific issues there may be massive or particularly intense opposition. A micro-political map can clarify the distribution of support for specific issues, indicate how certain sectors will react to particular policies and clarify the positions of different organizations within the same sector. If, for instance, a Minister would like to promote a policy altering the nature of relationships within the sector, a map can reveal the extent of support for the policy,


Benjamin L. Crosby is a Director of MSI; he holds a Ph.D. from Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri and manages the Implementing Policy Change project.

where support is located, where opposition lies, and possibilities for alliances or coalitions — should they be necessary. A serious lack of support, would certainly be an indication to either drop or substantially modify the idea, rather than wasting precious resources. Suppose, for instance, that the Minister of Agriculture of Boliguay wished to examine support for a reduction of price controls on grains in order to stimulate production, the forces around the issue might be arrayed as illustrated in Figure 1.

The micro-map indicates less support than one might assume from simply looking at the macro-map. The reason is that the particular issue of price controls on grains only interest a relatively limited number of actors and in this instance most actors are opposed to the issue. Judging from the array of actors present and the controversy that socially charged issues like price controls provoke, if the Minister of Agriculture wants to pursue the issue, he will have to think about how he can widen his support. The combination of

ambiguity of support from powerful actors such as the Congress, the military, and a significant part of the President's political party pose a very uncertain environment for pursuing the elimination of price controls. However, if at least two of these powerful actors could be brought on board, their support would probably be enough to cancel the strong, but amorphous and difficult-to-mobilize opposition of the middle class, urban workers, unions, and small farmers. The combination of forces arrayed both for and against price control on the micro-map suggest that if the Minister were to go ahead he might have to alter the structure of the policy or otherwise modify it so as to decrease opposition. Tactics and strategy apart, it is quite clear that although there is a good general level of support for the government, the micro-map indicates that this particular policy is not likely to do well.

Should the Minister give up? Not necessarily. The micro-map can help indicate who needs to be satisfied in order for the policy to progress. Can a



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coalition be put together that will be strong enough to prevail over the opposition? Is the opposition coalesced around a single point or is it dispersed and fragmented? How entrenched and distanced is the opposition or potential coalition partners? What would the Minister have to concede those potential coalition partners? If a coalition does not seem to either be feasible or desirable, is there a way to neutralize key opposition actors—what changes would have to be made in the policy and what kinds of concessions would have to be made to those key actors? All of these questions can be answered by determining the level of resources and mobilization capacity possessed by each of the key actors (both opposition and support) identified on the map.


Policy Network Maps:

There are instances when officials would like to concentrate on a particular policy idea and would like to remove from consideration unimportant or irrelevant actors. The construction of a policy network map can be extremely helpful in such circumstances. There are several steps to develop a

policy network map: first, what are the different points through which a project or policy passes to become approved and implemented? Second, who are the actor(s) in charge of each step? Third, how can officials gain access to these actors? Are there other actors, though not officially part of the process, that have substantial influence over those who decide? Finally, in which ways can officials exercise influence over this process? Do they have any particular skills or contacts that might help in this process? An illustration of how this process works can be seen in Figure 2.

Let us assume that the Health Minister wishes to increase budget allocations in order to establish better service in rural areas. The key actors in the policy decision process are the Health Minister, the Minister of Finance, the President and the Congress. But within that process there are several others who can and do influence decisions. The Minister of Finance's budget staff is charged with preparation of the budget and shapes most of the process and inter alia, many decisions about which projects will be

Figure 2
Policy Network Map:
Health Sector of Boliguay



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maintained and which will be curtailed. Who, then, are the members of this staff and might there be some way to gain access to and to influence them?

Among the more important constituents of the President's political party are the health workers union and the medical association. Each of these might be brought into alliance with the Minister, and then bring pressure to bear on the President. Within the Congress, it is actually the committees on budget and finance that are in charge of approving the budget submitted by the President. Might there be some mechanism to influence directly the committee or the committee staff charged with the actual preparation of legislative authorization bills for the budget? Does a certain member of the committee have a keen interest in the problems of rural health? Perhaps the Minister could bolster the member's interest with pertinent and timely information that could be used to defend the policy in committee debates or hearings.


Finally, the pressure of rather diverse groups such as the Mayors' Association, the National Cooperative Association, and the Agricultural Workers Union, might also be brought to bear. While these groups are not direct players in the policy process, in contrast to the member of Congress or the Minister, they are the eventual recipients of the policy and can be important sources of influence on elected officials such as the President or the members of the Congress.

It should be pointed out that while all these points of access are possible, to be useful they must be mobilized. This will require initiative, time, and energy on the part of the Minister or some credible representative or delegate. If the Minister does not make the effort, it is likely that no one else will. But mere effort won't be enough. Each point of access will have to be examined for its potential for collaboration and for how much it can add to the objective of improving budget allocations for rural health.

Force-Field Analysis:

Force-field analysis is another, rather convenient method to illustrate support and opposition to a particular policy. The technique for applying the analysis is simple and straight-forward: groups are placed on a continuum of "strongly in favor," or supportive, to "strongly opposed" to "x" issue or policy. The middle of the continuum is a neutral position. The product is a "map" of who supports and who opposes a particular policy. It is particularly useful as a "first-cut" mechanism for sorting out positions of different stakeholders, and for giving the manager a quick impression of where major opposition and support lie. An example of force-field analysis application to Boligway can be found in Figure 3.

Clearly, the analysis shows a great deal of opposition to the proposed reduction of price controls simply in terms of the number of groups opposed or



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supportive. But it does not indicate why such groups are opposed, if they might go along with the idea simply because they are part of the government's coalition, whether such groups are opposed for the same reason, nor much about the quality or resources of the opposition or support. In this particular situation, the oppositional configuration of the force-field analysis ought to signal the manager to more closely analyze these questions before making any strategy choices.

Force-field analysis has certain limitations. Unlike the techniques for political mapping described

earlier, force-field analysis does not examine questions of political support for the government on the policy or the value of a group's support on the issue, the degree to which the group supports a particular policy, or how much influence the group might have in determining the configuration or final outcome of the policy. Force-field analysis merely states whether the group is for or against the policy. Since the design of strategies for policy implementation generally requires more information, the manager will find the tool most useful for initial reconnaissance analysis.

**PATHWAY OR NO-WAY TO REFORM
CDIE ASSESSMENT OF LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS**

Gary Hansen
Center for Democracy and Governance
07/14/95

Over the past decade USAID has provided assistance to legislatures as part of the Agency's democracy program. In general, these programs have been designed to enhance the stature and role of legislatures in a context of democratic transition where their functions were seriously circumscribed by previous authoritarian regimes. Given the importance of the legislative function, either as a reformist or anti-reformist force in transition countries, it is imperative that USAID assess its efforts and other donor experience in support of legislative development in order to enlighten future investment strategies in this sector. Over the next six months CDIE will undertake a multi-country assessment of legislative projects with the intent of producing a summary report by the end of this calendar year. The report will provide a strategic framework, based on the assessment, which can be used in deciding when and how to invest in legislative programs.

BACKGROUND

USAID investments in legislative development congregate in the following geographical areas: Latin America, Central Europe, Southern Africa and Asia. Some legislative development activities are underway in the former USSR countries, but they are relatively new. In Asia, the Asia Foundation has also funded legislative development efforts. NED, IRI and NDI have also been active in legislative development efforts. At the moment it is not clear what, if anything, other bilateral or non-governmental donors (e.g. the German Stiftungs, Soros Foundation) have been doing in this area.

Much of the USAID assistance has financed the development of basic infrastructure. This has included, for example in East Europe, the provision of automation equipment (copiers, fax machines, office equipment), books, newspapers, CD-ROM subscriptions, and improvements in legislative staff research and analysis capabilities. Assistance has also included the training of legislative representatives and staff in the organization of committees, and in the general procedures required in organizing and conducting legislative business.

Variations on this assistance strategy, particularly by the Asia Foundation, (which has frequently served as the implementing agent for USAID legislative projects) have included the strengthening of policy analysis institutes outside the legislature who then provide their services to the legislature. In other cases, the Foundation has targeted

its support to particular issues (e.g. environmental policy reform) and sought to build support among particular reformist legislators and constituent lobby groups.

In the Philippines, the Foundation has supported Congress Watch, an NGO which observes and reports on the behavior of individual congress members in order to publicly highlight their performance and assure greater accountability. The Foundation has also supported in Manila the Legislative Development and Training Service, an independent organization to train NGOs on how to lobby congress. In Sri Lanka, the Foundation has funded the establishment of an independent policy institute at the University of Colombo to provide policy analysis to the parliament, as opposed to investing in an analytical unit within the parliament.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The opportunities for greater legislative roles has emerged with the demise of authoritarian regimes worldwide over the last decade. The question thus arises as to whether legislatures can respond to these opportunities and if they can become a reformist force in championing policies which address the larger national or collective interest.

What are the critical variables which need to be examined in understanding whether legislative can assume a constructive role in democratic transitions? Table 1 outlines a conceptual framework which identifies some of these variables. It should be stressed that the framework is an initial effort in identifying determinants and issues involving legislative roles, and that it will need to be expanded and revised as the study proceeds.

TABLE 1
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Legislative Development Assessment

Political Economy of Reform	Macro Structures for Interest Aggregation	Legislative Reform Objectives	Reform Impacts and Indicators
<p>Dominate interests, coalitions, advocacy groups</p> <p>Marginal interests, coalitions and advocacy groups</p>	<p>Electoral System</p> <p>Parliamentary vs President System</p> <p>Corporatist Systems</p> <p>Political Parties</p>	<p>Efficiency (CRS)</p> <p>Effectiveness</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Discipline - Incentives <p>Issue Focus</p>	<p>Expressing public opinion</p> <p>Oversight</p> <p>Representation</p> <p>Public Policy</p>

Reading from left to right the first column in Table 1 refers to the need for assessing the political economy of the ruling coalition in a particular country. Analyzing the dominate interests of the coalitions, their degree of cohesiveness, their inclusiveness or representativeness of the society at large, and their bases of power, will provide some indication of the prospects for the legislature emerging as a reformist force. Thus, the existence of the large coffee oligarchy in alliance with the military in El Salvador, prior to the more recent Peace Accords, did not provide an environment conducive for the legislature assuming a reformist role. Similarly, in Kenya, the power of the ruling coalition rests on a narrow identification with a minority tribal group, which inclines the regime to be unreceptive towards a more reformist legislature.

Ruling coalitions can change and become more inclusive of reformist interests, which can open the way to defining a more activist legislative role. Thus, since late 1980s, reformist groups who were at the margins of the political arena, have been riding the wave of democratic openings underway in many countries, and the reconstitution of ruling coalitions is providing more receptivity to enhancing the role of legislatures.

The second column refers to the macro structures through which group interests are aggregated. The nature of these structures are usually designed to serve the interests of the ruling coalition. Thus, an incumbent political party may design a electoral system which works to the disadvantage of opposition parties. In a recent election in an African country, the opposition parties secured 20 percent of the vote, but the

disproportionality inherent in the electoral system served to reduce their representation in parliament to 2 seats. A more proportional electoral system would have brought them 23 seats.

The choice of a parliamentary or a presidential system of government has obvious implications concerning the role of a legislature, with the later choice usually accommodating a more activist and robust role.

While, the current discourse in applied political science, as represented, for example in the Journal of Democracy, is quite divided over what kinds of electoral systems and parliamentary vs presidential structures are appropriate for particular country situations, there is unanimity on the profound importance these choices have in contributing to good or bad governance, and the positive or negative role of the legislature therein.

Another avenue through which interests are expressed, and one which has important implications for legislative roles, concerns the corporatist mode of interest aggregation and representation prevalent in many European countries and in Latin America. In these systems the legislature may be a marginal player, with peak associations from labor and business along with the executive branch negotiating major policies outside of the legislative process. This can evolve into a relatively tight and exclusive oligarchy of interests, as has been the case in Austria. New parties, which represent a more urban-middle class constituency, have sought to elevate the role of the Austrian legislature as a means of challenging the dominate peak associations.

The final item in the second column concerns the role of political parties. Where political parties are weak and fragmented, the role of the legislature can be diminished as an arena for constructive debate and policy deliberation. Indeed, in most developing countries political parties are weak, opening the way for the executive branch to overshadow the legislative function.

In summary, the variables contained in the first two columns have a strong impact in determining the role and political inclinations of the legislative function. In fact, some of the political economy literature considers these variables as having such a determinative impact that they focus little if any attention on the formal institutions of government as independent variables in their own right (see for example writings of Robert Wade and Michael Shafer cited in the bibliography). Know the interests of the ruling coalition, the types of macro structures they have designed to further those interests, and the formal institutions of government become the instrument which serves those interests. For this reason legislative dynamics frequently are not a paramount concern.

The third column assumes that, inspite of the leanings of some political economy writings, the legislature can at times be an important institution, in one or more areas,

(conflict resolution, oversight, etc.) particularly, where the processes of fundamental political change are underway, where new forces are emerging to challenge old coalitions, and where the legislature becomes an arena for reformers and the guardians of the status quo to contest future government roles and policies. The legislature might also assume a role (through its oversight function) in pressing a resistant bureaucracy to be more compliant and accountable in the implementation of reformist policies emanating from newly installed, more progressive ruling coalitions.

Putting aside for the moment the external variables (as indicated in the first two columns) which can constrain or enhance the reformist role of the legislature, the third column assumes that the external variables are favorable, and therefore the problem is how to organize the internal dynamics of the legislature in making it a more effective tool of governance.

Column three indicates the different kinds of objectives for reforming the internal dynamics of a legislature. First is the efficiency objective, an objective associated with the approach of the U.S. Congressional Research Service in the Post World War II era. Schooled in the principles of scientific management, the touchstone of this approach features an emphasis on achieving a more "rational and modern" legislative operation, a view which is well represented, for example, in the recommendations of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (Table 2).

TABLE 2
Recommendations of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946

- streamlined duties
- professional staff
- expanded research services
- symmetrical and streamlined committee structure
- increased information flow with the executive
- specialization and division of labor in oversight
- registration of lobbyists
- higher salaries and staff budgets

The efficiency paradigm to reform is the core strategy of the CRS in the provision of assistance to the East European legislatures (Table 3), and has been a major element of the approach taken by the Asia Foundation in its long history of assistance to legislatures in Asia.

TABLE 3
CSR ASSISTANCE TO CENTRAL EUROPE

- computer equipment
- books, library materials, data bases and CD-ROM
- staff training
- research and informational capability
- technical assistance on election laws, lobbying laws, etc.

While it is important that legislatures organize and conduct their business in an efficient and orderly fashion, a critique of the efficiency approach has been that more rational legislative procedures do not necessarily lead to more rational policy outcomes. The following statement sums up how a number of scholars have viewed legislative performance.

In other nations and at the municipal level in America, legislatures have withered because they have concentrated on particularistic representation at the expense of the more general responsibility for programmatic performance (Roos, p. 334).

The author of this statement goes on to drive home the point that without "party or institutional discipline, they (legislators) will tend toward delay, symbolism, servicing of the organized and particularism. There will be a systematic tendency to undertax and overspend (Roos, P. 334)."

The above quotations touch upon the central issue of whether the legislature has the capacity in act in the collective interest of a country, that is, can it engage in reformist actions, or is the **incentive system** such that legislators act in a manner which leads to "collective disaster or the tragedy of the commons."

While democratic theory provides a potent and in the view of many a sufficient justification for legislative autonomy, the recent history of the legislature's policy-making role suggests that its prerogatives need to be justified in practical as well as philosophical terms (Mezey and Olson, p. 214).

The above discussion leads one to the **fourth column** of Table 1 which indicates four normative criteria in judging legislative performance. The first item concerns public policy and the ability of the legislature to approve legislation consistent with the larger collective interest. In brief, does the legislature support reform. The second item focuses on the oversight function in holding the executive branch accountable. The third item refers to the deliberative capacity of the legislature and its ability to vent a

wide range of representative public opinions and interests. Finally, the fourth category concerns the ability of the legislature to serve constituent requests, such as working on behalf of a constituent in processing a claim against an unresponsive executive agency.

One or more of these functions would serve as the criteria for assessing the impact of direct or indirect donor investments in legislative activities. Direct investments refer to donor strategies designed to make the legislature a more effective and efficient institution; as such it could be considered an institution-building strategy. Indirect strategies refer to the wide array of donor activities involving donor support of reformist coalitions within a legislature or NGOs who are pressing legislative representatives to support major political or economic reforms. The example cited earlier where the Asia Foundation is working with the Thai legislative committee on environmental reform issues falls into this latter category.

EVALUATION ISSUES

USAID evaluation experience with legislative assistance is limited. An evaluation has been conducted of the regional Central American project, and ENI is planning to conduct an evaluation of its East European legislative assistance efforts this summer.

At this point an initial range of issues can be highlighted which can begin to focus on some of the strategic questions for this evaluation.

An effective Legislature. What does it mean? Most USAID projects are designed to create more "effective" legislatures. This obviously implies enhancing the power and independence of the legislative function, particularly with regard to more effective representation of constituents, stronger oversight of the executive branch, and more involvement in bill drafting. This looks good on the surface, but what if it turns out that the legislature is antithetical or indifferent to the political, social and economic reforms which USAID and other donors are advocating?

A general review of legislative performance in the developing world indicates that these institutions frequently harbor strong anti-reform propensities. In such a context, how then does one define "effectiveness:" by the fact that the legislature has more power vis-a-vis the executive branch and/or the fact that the legislature is using its power to favor or oppose reform?

What factors determine whether a legislature is effective? Assuming that one has been able to answer the first question addressed above, what are the variables which would need to be addressed to improve effectiveness? In many projects the presumption is that constraints to performance are internal to the legislature itself; i.e. the lack of adequate staff and equipment, or the lack of role definitions in the allocation of legislative work and bill drafting. However, there is plenty of evidence

to suggest that underperforming, weak or unreformist legislatures are reflective of conditions which lie outside of these legislatures. These conditions include:

(1) Ruling oligarchies which inhibit the growth of reformist voices and their expression within the legislative branch or other fora. Party elites are frequently able to control candidate selection in such a way that elected candidates are more dependent upon these elites than they are on constituency support. Thus, in some cases, legislative members lose their seat if they cast a vote which opposes their party position (Sri Lanka) or if they are "outspoken" in their criticism of government policy (Indonesia and Malaysia).

(2) Electoral systems which are rigged to favor a dominant party and to fragment or ban opposition parties, thereby weakening the capacity of the legislature to engage in constructive deliberation. This recently has been the case in most of the Central Asian states of the former Soviet Union, where opposition parties have either been banned or seriously constrained from having significant legislative representation.

(3) Corporatist political systems where major state policies are made in arenas outside of the legislative branch. In many Latin American and in some European states (Austria, for example,) major policies are negotiated (frequently in less than transparent ways) between the executive branch and peak associations representing business, (and sometimes labor), etc., which serves to bypass the legislature and exclude other major interest groups from the process. The neoliberal reforms negotiated in Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador excluded organized labor and lower-class groups (Conaghan and Malloy, p.17).

Added together the above factors can either marginalize the legislature or conversely make it an important political player, but primarily as a force in opposition to reform. **In brief, the locus or path to reform in a particular country may or may not be through the legislature.** Reforms in the electoral system and the governance rules within the political parties may be essential prerequisites for the emergence of a viable legislative function.

Based on the above discussion some of the basic questions which the CDIE assessment will seek to address are as follows:

What are the various strategic logics for determining whether to invest in legislatures?

By what standards does one judge the effectiveness of donor investments in legislatures?

Are there sequences and tradeoffs in the process of political reform which would give less or more priority to legislative investments?

Should investments in building constituencies and coalitions for reform, (i.e. demand generation around basic structural reforms or particular issues) in and outside of the legislature assume primacy as opposed to changing the internal organization and procedures of the legislature as an institution?

Can investments in legislatures be seen as discrete activities or must they be tied to a larger concept and strategy of political reform which requires investments in the other actors and areas of the political system? What would be the nature of the linkages between these elements.

If the legislature is to be an agent of reform, what kinds of strategies have donors employed in supporting this role? What have been the impact of these efforts?

EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The evaluation will be undertaken by CDIE teams visiting 6 to 8 countries where USAID/other donors have accumulated the most experience in legislative development. An initial candidate list includes the following countries: Philippines, Nepal, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Bolivia and El Salvador.

Each CDIE team will spend approximately two weeks in each country. They will then prepare a country report, which together with the other country reports would constitute the basis for writing the final synthesis.

WORKPLAN

TASKS	COMPLETION DATE
Issues Paper An issues paper will be prepared identifying major themes with respect to legislative development which will serve as as the briefing paper for each team prior to their departure. The issue paper will synthesize insights and issues from project documentation and literature surveys.	July 15
Phase I Field Visit The first phase of the evaluation will focus on the Philippines.	August 1-15
Phase II Field Visits The second phase will involve sending teams to the remaining 6 or 7 countries.	Sept-Oct.
Drafting of Synthesis Paper A synthesis of	

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the three field visits will be drafted as the final product of the study.

December 15

USAID LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

REGION	YEARS	CONTRACTOR
Latin America		
Regional	1985-1994	Center for Democracy Florida Intern. Un. SUNY/Albany
Honduras	1987-1995	Georgetown Un.
Guatemala	1987-1991 1990-1997	
Nicaragua	1991-1998	Center for Democracy
El Salvador	1989-1993	Research Triangle Inst.
Panama		Center for Democracy
Costa Rica	1991-	Center for Democracy
Bolivia	1989-1995	SUNY
Ecuador	1993-1995	
Chile		
Asia/Near East		
Nepal	1992-1995	Asia Foundation
Bangladesh	1989-1994	Asia Foundation
Cambodia	1992-1994	Asia Foundation
Thailand	1985-1992	Asia Foundation
Pakistan		Asia Foundation
Egypt	1993-1998	
Africa		
Zambia	1992-1997	
Nambia	1995-	NDI
SADC Regional		
Central Europe		
Poland		Congressional Research
Hungary		Service served in all Czech Republic of the Central European Slovakia Countries
starting in Albania	1991	
Bulgaria		
Latvia		

Lithuania
Estonia

Former USSR

Ukraine

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CONTENTS

Political Party Assistance **6**

Key Points Guiding USAID Political Party Assistance Policy

Additional Material Available at Conference:

Managing Democratic Electoral Assistance-A Practical Guide for USAID

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Key Points Guiding USAID Political Party Assistance Doug Patton

There has been discussion as to what possible framework should be implemented in the field of political party assistance to give guidance to mission offices. Historically there has been a slow evolution from completely dismissing the importance of political party assistance to the realization that political party assistance is vitally important towards building and sustaining democracies. Inquiries from both outside and inside USAID as to the policy towards assistance have prompted discussion within the Center as to which action if any to take. Thus this forum is the proper a meeting to begin that dialogue and achieve a policy.

Present policy concerning party assistance has basically been formulated from the USAID's Democracy and Governance policy paper issued in 1991 which stated that improving the "professionalism of political parties" was an aspect of the Agency's democracy initiative. The paper cautioned that assistance should only be done in exceptional circumstances.

The paper was basically a reflection of legislative guidance provided by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended in section 116e. In the past four years other papers have been issued reflecting some of that policy and even setting forth some newer approaches. Also some Bureaus within USAID have had a more restrictive policy and criteria for determination of assistance than others.

Essentially, a coherent policy towards political party assistance has been lacking in sufficient detail to be effective. A policy with established parameters could be a valuable tool to the field in making objective judgements and decisions about specific party assistance issues. For example, what determines whether a party is relevant or is it only a movement with no logical chance of success or longevity?

What should be the types of criteria and whom should establish these criteria to be meaningful ? Also what types of assistance should be given and what should be the vehicles for extending that assistance ? Or should any type of assistance be discouraged?

And what should be the goals, objectives, and anticipated results of political party assistance? It would be useful to understand the individual experiences each country has encountered or observed on political party activity to help formulate a consistent policy. Part of the process is to determine reasonable indicators about political parties to make objective judgements in the assistance field.

A series of questions are attached which hopefully will stimulate thought and discussion at the DG officers conference. The conference provides an opportunity

to exchange ideas and experiences about the subject of political party assistance. The conference can be an effective mechanism for reaching a sharper policy consensus.

Questions to pose on political party assistance:

- 1) How many clearly identifiable political parties are there in your country?
- 2) Can you make distinctions between actual political parties and so-called movements in your country?
- 3) Are most, if not all, parties in your country led or directed by a single strong personality type?
- 4) How are the parties funded----- private, public, foreign?
- 5) What is the state of the legal system in the country which can give stability and also create a climate for emerging parties?
- 6) Are the parties local, national in scope in terms of support?
- 7) In what condition is the communications network?
- 8) Is there any history or knowledge of past party assistance and in what form did the assistance take----- training for example?
- 9) Do you believe material assistance should be given or should assistance be limited to training?
- 10) Are there existing political coalitions and how successful have they been?
- 11) In your opinion would most of the parties be willing to attend a training seminar or would there be tendency for boycotting by one of the groups?
- 12) Are there any prohibitions by the existing governmental authorities against new developing parties or groups? Have they been effective or have they recently been modified?
- 13) How active have NGOs been in the country or is their influence not a major factor?
- 14) Is there an independent media? How do the constituents receive their information?
- 15) Are the parties, that you are familiar with, democratic internally? Are there

internal mechanisms for new leaders to emerge?

16) Is there an existing legislature and how many parties have representation? In what percentages?

17) Whom do believe should provide the assistance to political parties? What should be the vehicles for accomplishing this?

18) Are there stable voting systems in place and are they perceived by the constituents to be fair and honest?

19) Is the country currently in transition from a different form of government and has it stabilized?

20) What should be the goals of assistance to political parties?

21) Should the assistance be non-partisan or multi-partisan in nature?

22) If you could think of one main obstacle to party assistance in your country, what would be that obstacle?

23) Can there be effective party assistance given without compromising the mission of USAID?

24) When should assistance be given---- pre-election, post-election or only at specified periods?

25) Are there currently associations in place which could assume the role of political parties?

CONTENTS

Civil Society

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Constituencies for Reform: Strategic Approaches for Donor-Supported Civic
Advocacy Programs (Summary)

Civil Society-Overhead Transparencies

Additional Materials Available at Conference:

Constituencies for Reform: Strategic Approaches for Donor-Supported Civic
Advocacy Programs

**CONSTITUENCIES FOR REFORM
STRATEGIC APPROACHES FOR DONOR-SUPPORTED
CIVIC ADVOCACY PROGRAMS**

This report contains the findings and analysis of field studies conducted in 1994 of five countries, the purpose of which was to assess issues involving donor investments in civil society. The assessment was undertaken by the Agency's Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE) and is the second in a series of inquiries in the democracy sector. As in the first assessment — which examined donor support for rule of law programs the objectives of CDIE's civil society inquiry are to examine and analyze the experience of USAID and other donors over the past decade with a view to guiding and informing future donor efforts in promoting democracy and good governance.

One of the core components of the USAID democracy and governance agenda is support for the strengthening of civil society. The interest in civil society, within USAID and among other donors, reflects the growing realization that sustaining newly emerging democracies will be dependent upon building autonomous centers of social and economic power which promote accountable and participatory governance.

CDIE recently undertook a five country assessment of past and current USAID and other donor investments in civil society, with the intent of providing a more strategic perspective for future programming in this important sector. The five countries include Bangladesh, Kenya, El Salvador, Thailand and Chile. All have been recipients of significant donor funding for activities related to civil society, and four of the countries are in the process of undergoing recent democratic transitions. The following highlights the findings and conclusions of the study.

What is Civil Society?

Civil society consists of those non-state organizations which are engaged in or have the potential for championing the adoption and consolidation of democratic governance reforms. The study found that these organizations can generate the public push for political reform, as well as work to consolidate reform by helping to hold the state accountable for what it does. Such organizations include labor federations, business and professional associations, human rights and prodemocracy groups, environmental activist organizations, policy think tanks, and the like.

These organizations perform a range of diverse and vitally important roles, such as

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- engaging in public advocacy;
- analyzing policy issues;
- mobilizing constituencies in support of policy dialogue;
- serving as watchdogs in assuring accountability in the performance of government functions; and
- most importantly, acting as agents of reform in strengthening and broadening democratic governance.

The Role of Civil Society in Democratic Transitions

While in principle, civil advocacy organizations can contribute to the strengthening of democratic governance, in practice their actual contributions varied considerably in each of the five countries, with some assuming a high degree of prominence, whereas in other cases, they had little involvement in the transition.

What accounts for these differences? It would appear that earlier experience with democracy is a critical variable. Chile's long experience with a relatively advanced democratic political system provided the experience that civil society could draw on in mobilizing people for a No vote against continuation of the Pinochet regime in the 1988 plebiscite. While Thailand's adventures with democracy were more fleeting in the 1970s and the beginning of the 1990s, they did provide enough practice that participants from those earlier experiences could combine in 1992 to spearhead a pro-democracy coalition.

In contrast, for Bangladesh, Kenya and El Salvador, experiences derived from the very limited democratic openings of earlier periods did not provide favorable conditions for civil society roles in the democratic transition of the early 1990s. In Bangladesh, popular organizations were very much involved in the anti-Ershad movement of 1990, but these groups were largely student, professional and labor organizations closely connected to opposition political parties. They do not conform with the commonplace definition of civil society as operating independently of political parties.

In El Salvador, much of the civil society mobilization effort of the 1970s was largely autonomous of both parties and government, especially the advocacy groups mobilized by the Roman Catholic church in the late 1970s, and the Christian based communities which promoted grass-roots mobilization for social justice and political change. In the 1980s, these and other groups representing non-elites became the targets of death squads and direct government repression, and so were not in a position to influence the peace accords of 1992.

Finally, in Kenya, there was some political freedom after independence in 1963, but it was gradually swallowed up by the increasing movement toward one-party rule that has lasted down to the present time, and which left little room for civil society to organize on

behalf of reform. Donor-initiated pressure to democratize the system did lead to a significant opening in 1991, but dissension among the opposition parties and government manipulation in the 1992 parliamentary elections has served to inhibit progress in the democratic transition.

A Strategic Perspective on Civil Society

What insights can be gained from the five country study with respect to donor strategies in support of civil society. First, an assessment of civil society and its facilitating role in democratic transitions should be integrated into a larger country assessment of the political economy and the major problems which need to be addressed as part of a political reform agenda. Such an agenda might include for example, an emphasis on constitutional or electoral reforms to make the state more accountable and political parties more representative of society, or it could include a focus on judicial reform in an effort to strengthen the protection of human rights. It might involve as well an emphasis on decentralization in order to revitalize the role of local governments.

In brief, at a strategic level the major thrust of the analysis is on identifying how to move forward host-country dialog on a reform agenda and on changing the fundamental rules of the political game in moving towards greater democratic governance. However, at a more tactical level it is important to identify those issues currently animating public concern which can serve as a source of energy in driving the reform process. Frequently these issues emanate from particular sectors, such as citizen activism around environmental issues, labor or women's rights. Such issues can generate spill-over effects in the support of major political reforms as has been the case with the environmental movement in Thailand which assumed prominence in aligning itself with the prodemocratic campaign against military rule in the early 1990s.

The process of identifying issues also includes analyzing those constituencies that have interests in supporting public dialog and advocacy, particularly those that might share common interests and thus provide a basis for coalition-building. For instance, in both Bangladesh and Thailand labor unions and women's organizations may in time find much in common with respect to the growth of industry, which employs primarily women labors, in advancing the cause of both labor union and women's rights.

Some constituencies are easier to organize than others. Thus, labor and business probably may be able to overcome obstacles to collective action and organization, whereas other sectors, such as is the case with small farmers, because of their large number and lack of proximity to each other, may be less able to engage in collective action on behalf of a reform agenda. Likewise, some constituencies will be more inclined to reach beyond their narrow

interests and press for more fundamental pro-democracy reforms.

In any particular context, elements of civil society will exhibit differential proclivities in the support of democratic reforms. Some may stand in opposition to or remain relatively neutral to democratic reform efforts. For example, in resisting military rule, the business sector, religious institutions, or labor unions in some instances may move to the front lines in a pro-democratic movement, whereas in other cases they may remain relatively neutral.

The art and craft of the democracy strategist, then, lies in building and supporting those coalitions of associations which are pro-democratic at a particular historical moment in the democratic path. For donors, such support will focus on enhancing a wide range of organizational capacities which are frequently lacking in many civil society associations. In particular, skill improvements are usually needed in strategic planning, resource mobilization, policy analysis, advocacy, networking, media relations, coalition building, and policy dialog.

Strategic Sequencing: Initiating and Consolidating Reform

The five case studies indicate that the opportunity for civil society to organize and press for reform is conditioned by where a country is positioned in the transition to democracy. Thus, it is important to understand the dynamics of the transition process in order to determine how donors might appropriately tailor their support for civil society. The study findings suggest that democratic transitions can be divided into four phases: pretransition, early transition, late transition and consolidation.

Pretransition: In this period, civil society generally operates in an environment of government repression and hostility toward calls for political reform. The rights of association and assembly are severely constrained and civil advocacy organizations may be subject to government harassment or worse. There may be important enclaves — e.g., religious institutions, the NGO community, or universities — which provide a limited space within which civil advocacy organizations and their leaders can take refuge and build a larger network of reform constituencies.

Donor strategies under these constraining circumstances should address a number of tasks. First, a major task concerns the preservation of existing civil society resources. Donors may need to provide support to safehavens where reformist groups take refuge and where internally exiled reformers can find employment, protection and legal aid in the face of government harassment and persecution. In Chile, the Ford and Inter-American Foundations, Canada's International Development Research Centre, and a number of European donors were active in providing financial support to civil advocacy organizations who sheltered and employed social scientists

and political activists who were under censure by the Pinochet regime.

The second task is defending the autonomy of civil society in general. Authoritarian governments generally are aware, for instance, that non-governmental organizations frequently shelter reformist elements, and there may be efforts to weaken and control these organizations. In this context, it is vitally important that donors support the NGO community in resisting excessive government intrusion and support them in negotiating a governance regime which empowers the NGO community to regulate itself rather than submit to extensive government supervision.

A third order of business is to begin cultivating a dialogue within the reformist community in developing coalitions and consensus on reform agendas and strategies for political reform. The Chile case illustrates how civil advocacy organizations created fora and study circles where leaders from opposing factions were able to work together to dispel distrust and find common ground for collaborative action in preparing for the early transition phase.

Early transition: This phase begins with a political opening where an authoritarian regime concedes in some demonstrable way that legitimate rule depends on popular consent and where rival political elites seek a new consensus for a more open political system. Free elections are held and constitutional reforms adopted which provide the legal basis for a new democratic order. Most of the countries where USAID has programs are in the early transition phase, a phase which is critical in laying foundations for a new democratic order.

Regime acceptance of some political liberalization can open windows of opportunity for civil advocacy organizations to educate and mobilize public support for fundamental political reforms. However, these organizations must be prepared act with vigor and speed, as events may move very rapidly in the early transition phase. This is most evident with respect to elections, where civil advocacy organizations will need to engage in a wide range of labor intensive voter education and registration programs, and perhaps monitoring and even participating in election administration.

In Chile seven elections took place over a five year period — all of them crucial in laying the foundations for the restoration of democratic governance. A number of civil advocacy organizations, including the Crusade for Citizen Participation and Participa, both of which received support from USAID, organized massive voter registration and education campaigns. They also trained more than 5,000 electoral officials and political party representatives working in voting centers. All of these activities contributed in a significant manner to Chile's peaceful democratic transition.

Aside from the labor-intensive activities associated with

elections, another task in the early transition phase is to begin building a network of support for fundamental political reform beyond the small cadre of activist organizations which survived state repression in the pretransition era. Sources of support and alliances may exist in labor or women's organizations, student unions, professional associations, etc., and may be found at local as well as at national levels.

Mobilizing such groups behind a common reform agenda can provide the kind of public visibility and weight needed in negotiations with government that might otherwise be diluted when leaders and constituencies outside the government are divided. As an example, in Thailand the People's Constitutional Assembly, organized by a group of reformist organizations in 1992, was able to hammer together a unified platform, some elements of which were later reflected in the government's proposed constitutional amendments.

A third task in the early transition phase is creating a more favorable enabling environment to enhance the growth, autonomy and contributions of the civil society sector. It is frequently the case that a legacy of authoritarian controls has undermined the institutional mechanisms and arenas which serve as an avenue for civil society to engage the public and the state. Thus, in the early transition phase attention should be given to enhancing the autonomy of the media and universities, revitalizing the judicial system and municipal councils, and introducing mechanisms (e.g. right to petition, referenda, recall and the use of public hearings) wherein civil advocacy organizations can seek representation in advancing the cause of reform.

The above tasks are quite distinct from those of the pretransition phase, tasks for which many civil advocacy organizations are frequently unprepared and hardpressed to undertake. The role of the donor can be quite critical in this early transition phase, which may extend for a brief interlude, but can be more protracted in duration as major elite factions negotiate a more gradual process of political liberalization.

In this phase donors can be very helpful in providing technical and financial assistance to civil advocacy organizations who are involved in voter education, registration and election monitoring/administration efforts. Donors can also facilitate the process of dialog by funding those more non-partisan civil advocacy organizations who are seeking to provide a neutral ground where opposing elites come together in dialog on issues of political reform. Likewise, donors can also facilitate this debate by enhancing the technical capacities of think tanks, the media, and other activist organizations in analyzing and proposing alternative reform agendas.

Late Transition

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At this stage a fundamental redirection of a more open political system is underway. New rules for democratic governance have been agreed upon in the early transition period, and now the major task is assuring that political actors and governance institutions begin conforming to them.

Civil advocacy organizations play an important role in the late transition process. One of their major tasks is in civic education. This involves educating the general public on the rules and institutional features of the new political order, the means by which citizens can influence government, how they can seek redress in the face of arbitrary government actions, and in general how to take advantage of new opportunities in advancing community empowerment and governance. Civic education should create and strengthen public expectations which hold government and political actors accountable to higher standards of behavior.

A second task is to monitor compliance with the new set of rules for democratic governance, assuring that where there is non-compliance, the rules are enforced. Lack of enforcement is all too common a phenomenon in developing countries, but civil advocacy organizations can help by assuming a watchdog role in discovering and publicizing infractions by government and non-government actors.

A third task involves building government and civil society partnerships. For example, in Thailand and Chile, business associations have been actively supporting governance reforms by financing improvements and streamlining procedures in a number of public agencies which service the business sector.

The strategies of donors in this late transition phase includes provision of technical assistance to those civil advocacy organizations engaged in civic education and monitoring roles, and facilitating more partnership roles with government agencies. In addition, donors can be helpful in targeting assistance to those civil advocacy organizations which are championing the cause of trailing sectors, such as labor and women, who may still remain on the margins of the political arena.

Consolidation: In the consolidation phase, both basic and operational rules have been essentially agreed upon, and the mechanisms to ensure political participation and government accountability are in place. This last phase features a deepening of democratic governance within the culture and institutions of society and a growing capacity of society and government to adapt to change and effectively deal with major problems of reform.

An underlying issue concerns the sustainability of civil advocacy organizations, and in particular public interest organizations, as actors in conducting the ongoing functions of monitoring rule enforcement and mobilizing citizens and communities in support of

reform agendas.

Public interest organizations which advocate reform agendas and address issues of the larger public good are needed for society to engage in effective problem-solving. These organizations take up issues that may not be addressed if left to individual initiatives, largely because the costs for the individual to engage in activist initiatives frequently outweigh the individual benefits to be accrued. In this regard, unless society establishes incentives to support these organizations, it is unlikely that this sector will be able to make an effective contribution in activating and sustaining societal problem-solving.

Ideally, the issue of sustainability should be addressed in the late transition stage, after there has been some sorting out and resolution of more basic political issues. However, many donors, including USAID are frequently terminating their assistance in the early transition period, such as in Thailand and El Salvador, without having devoted sufficient attention to creating a favorable enabling environment for the growth of civil society.

In most of the five case countries there are few if any government incentives or tax write-offs for corporate or individual contributions to public interest associations. Likewise, many public interest associations have not been in the habit of seeking funding from the corporate world or from the public in general. Donors will need to devote more attention to creating a supportive policy environment and building bridges between public interest associations and in-country funding sources.

Recommendations

The four phase transition scheme may seem to imply a linear progression to a democratic nirvana, but in fact the process is uneven, messy, and subject to setbacks. Indeed, many transitions may lead to some new hybrid form of authoritarian governance, and what initially appeared to have been a democratic transition turns out to be a false start. Given the non-linear nature of change, the sequencing of individual donor tasks as envisaged for each of the phases may need to be changed in coping with unanticipated obstacles or the seizing of new opportunities.

Viewed as a heuristic device, the four-phase transition scheme provides a basis for advancing the following recommendations on priorities and the sequencing of donor investments.

1. Donors need to follow a rigorous strategic regimen in assuring that investments in civil society do not lose their focus and relevance to the reform process.

There is a risk that investments in civil society can easily be dissipated over a wide range of activities which may yield minimal

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results. The study findings suggest support for civil society should be viewed less as an end itself and more as a means for advancing a reform agenda toward greater democratic governance. In this regard, a strategy for investments in civil society should be focused on the attainment of structural reforms within the polity, and then sequenced in accordance with the transition process underway within a particular country.

2. Donors need to be prepared to exercise considerable leverage when supporting civil advocacy organizations engaged in fostering democratic transitions in the pre- and early transition phases.

Many of the political reforms undertaken in the country case studies likely would not have made as much headway without outside donor pressure and support. This was the case in Kenya, when bilateral and multilateral donors strongly pressured the government to undertake the political reforms of 1992. In Chile and El Salvador, without diplomatic pressure on the host country government, there would have been little progress in advancing the protection of human rights.

During the pre- and early transition phases, civil advocacy organizations are frequently not strong enough alone to move forward the reform process. In such situations, the added weight of donor collaboration in the use of conditionality to pressure for political liberalization may well be critical to advancing the reform effort. It also may be critical to the survival of activist organizations, which in the pre- and early transition phases can be operating in a high-risk environment where they are vulnerable to government attack.

3. Donors need to exercise caution when investing in institution-building efforts in the civil society sector during the early phases of democratic transitions.

Many civil advocacy organizations are quite small, perhaps only having a few staff members, who are led by a charismatic leader. There may be little internal democracy or leadership turnover, and linkages with potential coalition partners or constituencies might be quite tenuous. Most also are not membership organizations. Because of their fragile base, in the course of democratic transitions, particularly in the early transition phases many of these organizations will either cease to exist as their leaders move into government positions or they will affiliate and be submerged within resurgent political parties.

Given the precarious nature of many civil advocacy organizations in the pre and early transition period, donors will need to exercise considerable caution before investing major resources in these organizations as part of a larger and longer term institution-building effort. There will be exceptions to this rule, but major institution-building efforts, which seek to significantly enhance

organization capacities, introduce greater internal democracy, and reach out to broader coalitions and constituencies, may need to await some passage of time to determine which of these organizations are prepared to seriously engage in such changes.

4. Donors need to devote more attention to building a favorable policy environment for the growth of civil society, particularly with respect expanding in-country funding sources for this sector.

Most civil society organizations are dependent in great part, if not entirely, upon outside donor financing. Thus, there is a need for strategies to promote financial independence and sustainability. Creating an in-country enabling environment for individual and corporate contributions to public interest organizations, for instance by changing tax laws, is one such strategy. Another, in which USAID has been one of the pioneers, is providing funds to establish host-country endowments and foundations.

Considerable imagination can be applied in designing creative financing mechanisms for public interest organizations. For example, in Thailand the Asia Foundation is helping to establish a "green" mutual fund which will invest only in those Thai companies who have a record of observing environmental standards. Part of the earnings of the fund will be earmarked for distribution to environmental causes, including civil advocacy organizations who are part of Thailand's environmental movement. In effect, the mutual fund joins an incentive for private profit with that of supporting public interest organizations.

5. Donors should develop policy guidance which establish criteria for when a country graduates from receiving aid in support of democracy in order to defend these programs from premature termination.



Some countries are moving rapidly towards self-sustaining economic growth, which in contemporary donor thinking frequently justifies the diminution and even termination of development assistance, even though many of these countries still may be in the early phases of a democratic transition. The potential for political regression and instability will persist in the early transition phase, and could undermine investor confidence and hardwon economic gains. In brief, it may make sense to continue some support for democracy efforts even though economic development programs are terminated.

Given that the costs of democracy programs are generally quite small, the gains from such investments may yield sizeable benefits both from both a political and economic perspective. The justification of democracy programs in the later stages of transition and consolidation can be strengthened if donors clearly outline the rationale and criteria for continuation and eventual graduation.

6. Donors need to be cognizant of potential trade-offs in countries undergoing political transitions while also engaging in fundamental economic reforms in the move from statist to free-market economies.

Many countries are undergoing processes of economic and political reform simultaneously, although at different speeds with respect to each of these areas. In these situations donors need to calculate whether vigorously pressing for reforms in one of these sectors could destabilize and undermine the commitment to making progress in the other sector. This is particularly the case with investments in civil society which for the most part are designed to mobilize public pressure for political reform.

Under conditions where a ruling coalition is demonstrating genuine commitment to painful economic reforms, it may be more appropriate to emphasize complementing this effort by supporting civil society organizations who can help champion and consolidate these reforms. While such an approach may delay addressing more systemic political reforms, as this report suggests, sectoral reforms in the economic arena can contribute to the development of an autonomous commercial sector, which (if organized collectively) can advocate and advance the cause of good governance.



Regime Types


***Patrimonial
Totalitarian***

Regime Types

***Democratic
Governance***

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Table 1. CSO Strategic Logic



DEFINITION

Civil Society is defined as those non-state organizations which are engaged in or have the potential for championing the adoption and consolidation or democratic/governance reforms.


TYPES OF CSOs

- LABOR FEDERATIONS
- BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
- THINK TANKS
- PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS
- RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS
- ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
- WOMEN'S GROUPS
- HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS

CSO FUNCTIONS

- PUBLIC ADVOCACY
- ANALYZE POLICY ISSUES
- MOBILIZE CONSTITUENCIES
- SERVE AS WATCHDOGS

Democractic Transitions



2003

Pretransition

- Pseudo Democracy
 - One party regime
 - Political opposition repressed
 - Centralized political power

- Threats
 - Elite disaffection
 - Mass protests
 - External pressure

CSO Strategies

Pretransition

- Support safehavens
- Strengthen non-partisan CSOs
- Enhance NGO/CSO enabling environment
- Facilitate elite dialogue on reform agenda
- Support sectoral reform
- Foster inter- and intra-national communication linkages
- Increase donor coordination

Early Transition

- Limited Democracy
 - Elite dialogue on more open political system
 - Constitutional reform
 - political rights
 - parliamentary vs. presidential
 - Institutional roles redefined
 - judiciary
 - legislative

- Threats
 - Centralized political power
 - Lack of elite trust
 - Disaffection from left or right

CSO Strategies

Early Transition

- Launch voter education campaign
- Undertake election administration and monitoring
- Facilitate elite consensus on systemic reforms
- Support creation of NGO/CSO sector self-governance
- Protect non-partisan CSO base
- Create incentives for CSO financial sustainability

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Late Transition

- Inclusive Democracy
 - Peaceful regime turnover
 - Greater institutional autonomy
 - Broader political participation
 - labor
 - minorities

- Threats
 - Decline in governance capacities

CSO Strategies

Late Transition

- Institute civic education
- Build CSO-government partnerships
- Enhance CSO-watchdog roles
- Expand CSO nonpartisan base
- Strengthen CSO organizational capacities
- Support reforms in trailing sectors

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Consolidation

- Consolidated Democracy
 - Institutional checks on political power
 - Democratic political culture

- Threats
 - Fragmented political parties

CSO Strategies

Consolidation

- Strengthen linkages to international community