

RESEARCH REPORT

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Benchmarks in Democracy Building:
Public Opinion and
Global Democratization

A Case Study of Four Countries:
Ukraine, Romania, Panama and El Salvador

A Special Report prepared for USAID
by the Office of Research and Media Reaction, USIA
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Executive Summary

Background

This paper presents the results of the first phase of a joint USAID and USIA project designed to measure public attitudes toward democratization worldwide. In September/October 1994, USIA conducted nationwide, representative, face-to-face surveys among mass publics in four countries – Panama, El Salvador, Ukraine and Romania. These surveys tapped the following five broad areas designated by USAID:

- adherence to due process;
- freely elected national leaders;
- government accountability and transparency;
- respect for civil liberties; and
- government control over security forces.

Our goal with this project is to measure public attitudes in roughly 30 additional countries over the next two years. These data will provide a baseline of country-level democratization indicators. While public opinion is only one factor in the democratization equation, the very process of global democratization has empowered the public in new ways. Better-educated and armed with more information about the world around them, publics in the countries under study are better able to actively engage the political class and frame the parameters within which these elites maneuver. We seek to address this change in the importance of public opinion by systematically reporting attitudes toward democratic institutions and processes.

Key findings:

- The characteristics deemed central to good governance in liberal western democracies are also important to publics in Latin America, eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. These data suggest that the political ideals of the West are not uniquely suited to a particular culture but are in evidence across a diverse range of countries and cultures. This finding bodes well for the development of programs designed to further these political ideals.
- Broadly speaking, public support of democratic ideals is greater in those countries where the democratic process and USG programming are better established (Panama and El Salvador) than in those countries where democracy and USG programming have a shorter history (Ukraine and Romania).

Turning to each of the five areas specifically, these surveys show:

Adherence to Due Process -- Equal justice (a judicial system that punishes the guilty no matter who they are) is the one characteristic virtually all in each of the four countries believe is important in a society. Yet, relatively few think this ideal actually describes the situation in their country.

Freely Elected Leaders -- Related to the rule of law are the fundamental democratic principles of free and fair elections and the right to choose among several parties and candidates in elections. All four of these publics agree that a multiparty system of government is important. But half of those in Ukraine, four in ten in Romania and a quarter in El Salvador do not believe honest elections are regularly held in their country.

Government Accountability and Transparency -- Regardless of whether elections are free and fair, publics tend to view their government and politicians negatively. Just a quarter to four in ten say the government is run for the benefit of the people. Even smaller percentages feel politically efficacious.

Moreover, fewer than half in El Salvador, Ukraine and Romania express confidence in the government, parliament and civil service. Majorities in Panama voice confidence in these institutions.

Maintaining order and stability is important to most people in these countries. But relatively few in Romania and Ukraine feel their society is orderly or stable. By contrast, solid majorities in Panama and El Salvador believe their country maintains stability and order.

Civil liberties -- Freedom from government censorship of the media is of particular concern to publics in Ukraine and Romania, and to a lesser degree in El Salvador. Whereas most believe they can openly criticize the government, sizable minorities in Ukraine (45%), Romania (35%) and El Salvador (24%) feel the government censors the news. Majorities believe that another civil liberty, freedom to practice one's religion, exists in these countries.

Political freedoms are more important than economic security for between 40 and 60 percent of these publics. Still, a sizable minority in each of these countries (30 to 40%) say they would trade many of their political freedoms for economic security.

Government control of security forces -- The importance placed on government control of the security forces differs between Latin America (El Salvador) and the former Soviet bloc. In El Salvador three in four say it is important for the military to be under the control of civilian leaders while in Ukraine and Romania half or fewer share this opinion. Clearly the history of these two regions contributes to different perceptions of civil-military relations.

Likewise, confidence levels in the military are lowest where concern is highest over civilian control. Half in El Salvador lack confidence in the armed forces, while eight in ten in Romania and six in ten in Ukraine voice confidence.

UKRAINE

BACKGROUND: Public Pessimism Receding

Ukraine's emergence in 1991 as an independent state – the August 24 resolution of the parliament and the December 1 national referendum – altered the political map of the region. Entering the world arena required not only internal restructuring and the creation of direct external ties, but also a fundamental reorientation of society to transform from a totalitarian, centrally controlled system into one driven by market forces and based on principles of democracy. This transitional period, requiring extensive changes of the socio-economic structure at the individual and societal level, has been fraught with economic problems and political uncertainties.

This report examines public opinion on these democratic principles:

- ▶ freely elected national leaders
- ▶ adherence to due process
- ▶ civilian control over the military
- ▶ government accountability and transparency
- ▶ respect for civil liberties


Additionally, it analyses attitudes towards

- ▶ foreign aid and foreign investment
- ▶ the United States


The initial months of independence in Ukraine were marked by widespread public participation in political activities. Public activism began to recede at the end of 1992 as the economic crisis deepened – inflation spiralling, productivity in severe decline, and reform measures laid aside. By the end of 1993, economic deprivations and political uncertainties created a mood of doom and gloom, but without outbreaks of violence, massive socio-economic dislocations, or restraints on the newly won political freedoms. The spring and summer 1994 Parliamentary and Presidential elections diminished the sense of foreboding, creating an air of expectancy that the newly elected government would lead the country out of its economic quagmire and political gridlock.

Today, the public in Ukraine is less pessimistic than a year ago, though quite unsettled about the country's overall direction. A large majority say the country is

going in the "wrong direction," a view shared across all demographic and socio-economic groups. This negative view has persisted over the last two years and is in sharp contrast with the initial period of independence when, albeit by a slim margin, opinion prevailed that the country was going in the "right direction."



Notwithstanding this pervasive negative assessment, the current mood is one of "wait and see." Many withhold judgment on the performance of the newly elected government. According to a September poll, around half refuse to assess the President's or Parliament's first few months in office (45% and 46%, respectively); among the rest, by a two-to-one margin the President's performance is rated positively (28% positive to 13% negative), while Parliament (the Rada) is given a negative rating (25% negative to 13% positive).¹ The persistent economic problems have not eradicated hope for improvement, with pessimism about the economy diminishing. Compared with a year ago, far fewer predict further economic deterioration in the next 12 months, and one-fifth foresee improvements.



¹SOCIS-Gallup nationwide omnibus survey, fielded September 16-29, 1994.

FREELY ELECTED LEADERS

There is broad consensus about elections and a multiparty system. Large majorities believe it is important for society to guarantee that "honest elections are held regularly" and that "one can choose from several parties and candidates when voting." There is also broad agreement that Ukraine currently has a multiparty system, while opinion about Ukraine's electoral process is largely negative -- half reject the proposition that elections in Ukraine are honest and regular. Moreover, around half (46%) do not believe that the last Parliamentary elections were "free and fair" (28% say they were; 26% give no response).

ISSUE	<i>Important for Society</i>		<i>Describes Ukraine</i>	
	Important	Not important	Yes	No
Honest, regular elections	77%	16%	35%	49%
Multiparty system; many candidates in an election	62%	29%	81%	10%

Support for a democratic electoral process does not differ along demographic lines, nor does assessment about conditions in Ukraine, except for a slightly higher nonresponse rate among those with primary or less education and those over 50 years of age (for educational breaks on the importance of democratic values and conditions in Ukraine, see Table 1, page 19).

Public endorsement of a fair electoral process and a multiparty system is in sharp contrast to the very limited appeal of political parties. None of the parties attracts a broad following among the public. The party ranking first in terms of public support is the Communist Party (with 12% nationwide), followed at some distance by the Democratic Party (5%), Rukh (5%), the Republican Party (2%), and the Green Party (2%); other parties attract fewer than one percent of the public nationwide.² This rank ordering underscores the decline of the fortunes of the centrist parties and a gravitation to the left.³ The low incidence of public identification with a party may

²Question used to measure party appeal: *Of the various political movements, parties, or groups about which you have heard, which one do you feel is closest to your current political views?*

³In the first year of independence, centrist parties had much broader appeal than those on the left of the political spectrum. An October 1992 nationwide survey provided this rank order of political parties: Rukh (10%), the Democratic Party (7%), the Green Party (5%), the Republican Party (2%), the Communist Party (2%, then illegal), and the Socialist Party (2%).

be due to poor communication (specifically, the failure of leaders to articulate the objectives and principles of their party) or may reflect a largely negative, if not hostile, public attitude toward politicians and government (see discussion on pages 10-12).⁴ This sense of alienation from political parties is not only characteristic of the general public, but also endemic to elected officials.⁵ A July 1994 directory of deputies in the Rada had 215 of the 387 elected deputies – 56 percent – listed as being "nonparty," that is, not affiliated with any political party (see Table 2, page 20).

DUE PROCESS

Of various government institutions, the judicial system is probably the most highly cherished. Nearly all agree it is important for society that "the judicial system punishes the guilty no matter who they are" (81% say this is "very" important). However, only one-in-ten says this statement describes the system of justice in Ukraine.

ISSUE	<i>Important for Society</i>		<i>Describes Ukraine</i>	
	Important	Not important	Yes	No
Equitable judicial system	92%	3%	12%	76%

The public has scant trust in the country's legal system -- two-thirds express little or no confidence (see figure on page 11). As many reject the proposition that the judicial system would help the innocent "if wrongly accused of a crime" (70%) or that "the judges are fair and honest and do not abuse their powers" (70%). These views are shared across all demographic groups.

GOVERNMENT CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY

Opinion is inchoate on the relationship between the military and civilian leaders, both in assessing the issue's importance to society and in evaluating conditions in Ukraine.

⁴According to a January 1994 nationwide survey, one-third of the electorate said they would not vote for a party, but would vote for individuals who are not affiliated with a political party.

⁵Ukraine's political parties represent a full spectrum of political and economic orientations. However, many elected officials do not identify with a party. For example, of the 5,830 candidates who registered with the Central Electoral Commission for the March 27, 1994, Parliamentary election, only a small proportion were candidates from a political party.

By a 2-to-1 margin, half agree that it is important for society that "the military is under the control of civilian leaders," but a high proportion (24%) express no opinion.⁶ Nor is opinion more defined about the situation in Ukraine -- a plurality do not give a response (39%); among the rest, opinion is almost evenly divided.

ISSUE	<i>Important for Society</i>		<i>Describes Ukraine</i>	
	Important	Not important	Yes	No
Civilian control of military	52%	24%	32%	29%

Notwithstanding the lack of consensus about military-civilian relations, the armed forces are the only national institution with a clearly positive level of confidence (63%, see figure, page 11).

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY

There is near unanimity that it is important for society that "stability and order are maintained" (88% say it is "very" important). Most agree Ukraine sorely lacks stability and order.


ISSUE	<i>Important for Society</i>		<i>Describes Ukraine</i>	
	Important	Not important	Yes	No
Stability and order	96%	2%	15%	80%

This negative view of Ukraine reflects the pervasive lack of confidence in the nation's leaders, perceptions which may be undergoing a change. President Kuchma is the only national leader eliciting the confidence of a majority, albeit among a very narrow majority.⁷ Confidence in Kuchma is widespread in the eastern and southern oblasts, including Crimea (confidence levels range from 54% to 64%), and is divided

⁶On questions measuring the importance of democratic values, the typical rate of nonresponse and "don't know" is between 3 and 9 percent.


⁷According to a September nationwide survey, most hope that Kuchma will deliver on his campaign promises to solve social and economic problems -- 32 percent expect him to deliver on most and 37 percent on a few of his promises; 14% say campaign promises are tactical maneuvers, repudiated the "very moment a President comes to power." Findings are from a SOCIS-Gallup survey, fielded September 16-29, 1994.

in Kiev and the northern area, while in the western oblasts, lack of confidence prevails. Other national leaders lack public confidence by varying margins.



Politicians and government officials generally are regarded with disdain. A vast majority (82%) agree that "the country is run by a few big business interests looking out for themselves," rejecting the proposition that the country "is run for the benefit of all people" (only 5% subscribe to this view). Moreover, three-fourths agree that public officials do not care what ordinary people think (51% "strongly agree" and an additional 26% "somewhat agree" with the statement "I don't think that our public officials care much about what people like me think").

Nor does the public hold national institutions in esteem. Most "only occasionally trust the national government "to do what is right" (50% say "only some of the time" and an additional 29% "almost never"). Only a few express trust in the national government (3% "almost always" and an additional 13% "most of the time"). These perceptions are shared across all demographic groups. With the exception of the armed forces, not one national institution elicits an overall positive level of confidence – majorities lack confidence in Parliament, the judicial system, trade unions, and the civil service.



The public does not have a sense of empowerment. A large majority say that people like themselves almost never influence decisions on the national level, and a slightly smaller majority believe the public has no influence on decisions at the local level. These opinions do not vary along demographic lines, except that perceived influence on local decisions increases with education. Opinion on the extent of public influence on decision-making is roughly comparable to perceptions in the United States -- two-thirds of the American public believe they have "not much" say in what the government does (6% say "a good deal" and an additional 25% "some").⁸

"Do you believe that people like yourself can have some effect on the decisions made by the national government, the local government--almost always, most of the time, only some of the time, or almost never?"

	Total	Among Educational Groups		
		Primary	Secondary	University
National Level				
always/mostly	9%	8%	10%	9%
some of the time	15%	13%	17%	19%
almost never	70%	73%	69%	70%
Local Level				
always/mostly	12%	10%	12%	20%
some of the time	21%	15%	24%	26%
almost never	62%	69%	59%	51%

CIVIL LIBERTIES

There is broad consensus that the four civil liberties measured in this survey -- religious freedom, protection of minority rights, uncensored media, and the right to criticize the government -- are important attributes of a society. Strongest support is given the right for everyone to "freely practice their religion" (69% "very important") and the protection of "the rights of ethnic groups" (65% "very important"). Opinion about media "free to report the news without government censorship" is slightly less intensely felt (52% "very important"), as is perception about the importance of the freedom "to openly criticize the government" (40% "very important"). There is also

⁸Findings from a New York Times/CBS nationwide telephone poll; fieldwork was conducted just before the 1994 elections; fieldwork dates -- October 29 to November 2, 1994.

consensus that currently in Ukraine there is religious freedom and the right to freely criticize the government. Opinion is less clear on the other two attributes: by a small margin, the public does not see current domestic media as uncensored and opinion divides on the protection of ethnic rights in Ukraine today.

ISSUE	<i>Important for Society</i>		<i>Describes Ukraine</i>	
	Important	Not important	Yes	No
Religious freedom	87%	11%	86%	7%
Protect ethnic rights	83%	9%	39%	35%
Uncensored media	75%	14%	28%	45%
Freedom to criticize the government	67%	27%	66%	24%

Opinion on the importance of these civil rights is comparable across age groups; nor are there differences based on national origin. Education increases the perceived importance of these rights, with university-educated adults the most committed to them (in terms of extent and intensity). Opinions on conditions in Ukraine, however, do not differ along any of these demographic lines, except that persons over 60 and those with no more than primary education generally have a higher non-response rate (see Table 1, page 19).

RELIGION. In Ukraine, a majority (56%) describe themselves as believers (37% do not). This self-identification generally is more widespread among rural than urban residents (72% to 49%), among women than men (68% to 42%), and among those of Ukrainian rather than Russian national origin (61% to 44%). Such differences, however, do not exist in the western areas, where almost all (91%) say they are believers (in the eastern oblasts and the southern oblasts between 45% and 48% say they are believers). These regional differences reflect the history of the area, specifically, the time of annexation into the Soviet Union – the western regions were annexed after World War II and the southern and eastern areas have been part of the Soviet Union since the 1920's.

Since independence, one of the most visible forms of religious freedom has been the opening of churches as places of worship. Attendance at religious services is sporadic at best, with most attending occasionally (19% attend "a few times a year" and an additional 24% once a year); only a fifth attend services once a month or more often.

Significant proportions identify with Orthodoxy and far fewer with Eastern Catholicism; a few profess Roman Catholicism, Judaism, Islam, or Protestantism. Profession of a particular faith is roughly comparable among age and educational groups. With a few exceptions, those of Ukrainian national origin identify with "Ukrainian" churches, whereas those of Russian national origin are as likely to identify with one of the two Ukrainian as with the Russian Orthodox Church. Regional differences, however, as in the case of believers, demarcate church affiliation: residents in the west identify with the Ukrainian Catholic (Uniate) Church, whereas those in the east and south identify with the Orthodox churches.

"Which faith do you profess?"

	Total	By National Origin	
		Ukrainian	Russian
Ukrainian Orthodox, Kiev Patriarch	35%	43%	16%
Ukrainian Orthodox, Moscow Patriarch	6%	6%	5%
Russian Orthodox	9%	3%	23%
Ukrainian Catholic (Uniate)	6%	8%	1%
Other	9%	6%	14%
None/Don't know	35%	33%	42%

ETHNIC RIGHTS. As previously noted, the protection of ethnic rights is highly valued, but opinion is indefinite about the situation in Ukraine, a state of affairs that accurately reflects conditions. The "ethnic" issue periodically surfaces, mainly as a source of tension in the relations between Ukraine and Russia.⁹ The population of Ukraine is largely of Ukrainian national origin (estimates range from 75% to 80%); those of Russian national origin constitute about a fifth of the population. Less than 1 percent identify with any of the other national groups -- Jewish, Polish, Tartar, or Moldovan.¹⁰

⁹ Survey data collected since independence do not record feelings of national animosity or reservations toward national groups. Moreover, survey data consistently illustrate public commitment to allow national minorities full and free linguistic and cultural development.

¹⁰ Self-identification of "nationality" has fluctuated sharply since 1991, partly reflecting the various rules and regulations concerning movement of peoples and goods between Ukraine and Russia, particularly as these affect Russians living in the "near abroad." There is also a methodological issue -- the data collection process allows naming only one ethnic ("nationality") group. Due to intermarriage, many individuals see themselves as both Ukrainian and Russian in national origin.

MEDIA. Uncensored media are viewed as important to society, and close to half do not believe they exist in Ukraine (see table, page 13). In terms of providing information, television dominates as the uncontested "most reliable" source for domestic and international news. Not only is television the preferred source, but, on balance, it elicits a higher level of confidence than radio; the press is a close second in terms of confidence.

"Which do you consider to be the most reliable source on domestic/international developments?"

	Radio	Television	Newspaper
Domestic news	18%	69%	10%
International news	17%	71%	9%

"How much confidence do you have in domestic radio, domestic television, domestic newspapers -- a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or no confidence at all?"

	Radio	Television	Newspaper
Great deal, fair amount	27%	55%	50%
Not very much, none at all	58%	38%	41%

Public opinion about media probably accurately reflects the very fluid media environment. The transformation process, to date, has not fundamentally altered the media structure, nor is there extensive commercial activity in developing private media. At this time newspapers continue to be held hostage by the government, since the government controls paper distribution (via its ownership of the pulp and paper industry), and economic conditions preclude exploring alternative supply sources. Radio appears to be slightly better situated: a number of private stations have opened, but none is national in coverage and they remain mostly local resources. Television is much more problematic than the press or radio. It is the most controlled of the media, not only due to licensing, but, even more importantly, because of the large capital investment required to set up and maintain a private, commercial channel.

FREEDOM TO CRITICIZE THE GOVERNMENT. As already noted, two-thirds find the right to criticize the government important and as many say that it exists in Ukraine (see table, page 13). A majority say that few people are afraid to freely express opinions (70%).

"What is your opinion about people's willingness to publicly express their political opinions in Ukraine? Would you say that: nobody is afraid to express his/her political opinions, only a few people, many people, or everyone is afraid to express his/her opinion?"

Nobody	A few	Many	Everyone
37%	33%	20%	5%

The dire economic conditions present daily challenges and may have diminished some of the enthusiasm expressed initially for reform measures and for transforming from a centrally planned society into one based on free market and democratic principles. A hypothetical question was posed measuring receptivity to a trade-off between economic improvement and loss of political freedoms: as many agree with such a scenario as reject it, a divided opinion roughly comparable across all demographic groups.


"If a nondemocratic leader took power who could solve the country's economic problems, I wouldn't care if that leader took away many of the political freedoms we now have."

Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Disagree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly
22%	19%	21%	19%

FOREIGN AID AND INVESTMENT: Receptivity Increases

Two-thirds (65%) are aware that foreign countries and international organizations give aid to Ukraine. The most frequently named donor countries are the U.S. (volunteered by 38%) and Germany (36%), followed by Canada (24%). Most valued is assistance in the medical area (84% say it is beneficial), closely followed by exchanges of scholars and bank loans (both 78%). Smaller majorities view aid in developing energy resources (67%) and expert advice and training for regional and

local governments (64%) as beneficial. There is also broad consensus that foreign investment is essential to Ukraine's economic recovery (64%). Moreover, the climate of opinion has become more favorable towards foreign investment, with half agreeing that foreign businesses should open in Ukraine.



However, concern prevails, albeit by a narrow margin, that "foreign investment can lead to the loss of the economic sovereignty of Ukraine" (45% agree, 35% disagree). While opinion on democratic values is shared along age and educational lines, views on foreign investment differ. Welcoming foreign investors to Ukraine are mainly adults under 50 years of age and those with at least secondary education. The most enthusiastic are the university-educated, although a large number among them are concerned about a possible loss of economic sovereignty.

		Total	Among Educational Groups		
			Primary	Secondary	University
<i>Foreign investment is essential to recovery:</i>	Agree	62%	45%	68%	83%
	Disagree	22%	55%	23%	15%
	DK	16%	30%	9%	2%
<i>Foreign companies should open businesses in Ukraine:</i>	Agree	51%	32%	60%	79%
	Disagree	34%	39%	32%	19%
	DK	15%	28%	8%	2%
<i>Foreign investments could lead to loss of sovereignty:</i>	Agree	42%	43%	42%	41%
	Disagree	35%	21%	42%	51%
	DK	22%	36%	17%	7%

UNITED STATES, ADMIRER AND RESPECTED

The United States enjoys a positive image (81% have a favorable opinion) and is admired for its socially responsible policies and protection of personal liberties. Specifically, the U.S. is praised for providing an adequate standard of living (80%), protecting religious freedoms (78%), taking care of the sick and the elderly (71%), guaranteeing individual political rights (68%), ensuring employment for its citizens (67%), and encouraging artistic diversity and freedom (66%). The public also praises the U.S. for protecting the environment (68% say it is doing well), an issue of high sensitivity since Ukrainians live in the shadow of Chernobyl (90% say Chernobyl poses "a serious threat to Ukraine"). In addition, a small majority see the U.S. as protecting the rights of ethnic and racial minorities (57%).

U.S. foreign policies are also viewed favorably; majorities have confidence in President Clinton (54%) and in the U.S. ability to handle world problems (56%). However, in its dealings with Ukraine, the U.S. image is mixed: a majority believe that the U.S. treats Ukraine with dignity and respect (57%), but as many agree that the U.S. "expects Ukraine to give in to its wishes in matters that concern both countries" (54%). Also, as many believe the U.S. is even-handed in its dealing with Russia and Ukraine as say the U.S. favors Russia (40% and 38%, respectively). However, public sentiments are definitely oriented toward the U.S. and the West -- a vast majority (86%) agree that it is in Ukraine's interest to work closely with the U.S. and other Western powers.

CONCLUSIONS

These data show that the public shares a core of beliefs which underlie a democratic society, their commitment to values generally intensely felt. There is broad consensus (across all demographic groups and unaffected by national origin) that it is important for society to protect political and civil liberties. The public also agrees that Ukraine currently has a multiparty system, religious freedom, and the freedom to criticize the government, but sorely lacks an equitable judiciary, stability and order. At the same time, half doubt that media are uncensored and that elections are honest; opinion divides on whether Ukraine protects ethnic rights. Some of the acknowledged shortcomings stem from the lack of an infrastructure that could support democratic principles, a condition endemic to societies in transition.

Overall, the data also suggest a public receptive to institutional reforms and foreign assistance (in the form of aid or investment), seeing these as contributing to stabilization and supporting the democratization process. The public also welcomes interactions with the U.S., which is esteemed for its social, political and economic successes.

Table #1. Opinion By Educational Level

	Important for Society			Attribute of Ukraine		
	Primary	Secondary	University	Primary	Secondary	University
Honest elections	69%	81%	86%	37%	33%	37%
Multiparty system	54%	66%	73%	78%	83%	86%
Equitable judiciary	87%	94%	97%	14%	10%	13%
Civilian control of military	43%	56%	66%	30%	33%	32%
Stability and order	92%	97%	99%	14%	15%	20%
Religious freedom	85%	88%	80%	83%	89%	84%
Ethnic rights	77%	86%	92%	42%	37%	42%
Uncensored media	64%	81%	84%	27%	28%	25%
Criticize government	58%	71%	75%	67%	66%	64%

Table #2. Party Identification: Deputies & General Public

Political Parties	Deputies in Rada ¹		% of National Adult Population ²
	No.	%	
Communist Party of Ukraine	88	23%	12%
Rukh	20	5%	5%
Democratic Party of Ukraine	2	*%	5%
Ukrainian Republican Party	8	2%	2%
Green Party	0	0	2%
Socialist Party of Ukraine	14	4%	1%
Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists	5	1%	1%
Labor Party	5	1%	1%
Social Democratic Party	2	*%	1%
Party of Economic Rebirth of Crimea	1	*%	1%
Christian-Democratic Party of Ukraine	1	*%	1%
Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party	1	*%	*%
Civil Congress of Ukraine	2	*%	*%
Party of Democratic Rebirth of Ukraine	4	1%	*%
Peasant Party of Ukraine	19	5%	*%
No Party Affiliation	215	56%	63%
Total	387	100%	100%

1. According to the "Guidebook for Repeat Elections of Peoples' Deputies of Ukraine," International Foundation for Electoral Systems, Kiev 1994.

2. October 1994 USIA-commissioned nationwide survey

* Less than .5%

ROMANIA

BACKGROUND: Swimming Up-Stream

After the 1989 "December Revolution," Romania faced the same formidable challenges as its former Warsaw pact allies – the historically unprecedented transition from a command to a market economy and from single-party to multiparty democratic rule. Yet the transition to a market democracy has proven especially challenging for Romanians given their particular experiences under communist rule. Ceausescu's oppressive domestic rule took a heavy toll on the functioning of civil society. The communist regime penetrated every level of Romanian society (to a larger degree than other central and east European regimes except Albania), and effectively ensured that ordinary Romanians had little opportunity to think of how they might – some day – construct a new noncommunist society. Having never experimented with elements of market reform, Romania has a wider gap to bridge than many other countries in the region. Ceausescu's draconian economic policies left the country impoverished, adding to the already difficult transition to a market economy. Further, Romania's geopolitical position in the Balkans contributes to perceptions of the country's instability and potentially makes Romania less attractive for foreign investors. With this background in mind, in the following pages we examine Romanian attitudes on five issues central to democratization:

- adherence to due process;
- freely elected national leaders;
- government transparency and accountability;
- respect for civil liberties; and,
- government control over security forces.

DUE PROCESS

Rule of law is key to the consolidation of democracy in central and east Europe. Yet, the democratic opposition in Romania has questioned whether a truly independent judiciary exists. In 1993, the judiciary was reorganized into a four-tiered legal system but the lack of personnel to fill the new positions (private practice is much more lucrative) has slowed the implementation of these changes. The data presented below suggest that the public also questions whether Romania has a truly independent judiciary.

Equal Justice Very Important to Eight in Ten Romanians

Like other central and east Europeans, virtually all Romanians (98%) deem a "judicial system that punishes the guilty no matter who they are" to be important. In fact, most Romanians (80%) say it is very important. A comparison of similar questions asked in 1991 and 1993 shows an increase in those who believe equal justice is important (from two in three in 1991 to 96 percent in 1993). In 1993 the importance of a fair judicial system equaled the importance of "economic prosperity," their primary concern in the 1991 survey.


But Relative Few Believe Equal Justice Prevails

Despite the value placed on due process, relatively few (21%) say this ideal prevails in Romania today. Instead, a solid majority (67%) believe laws are differentially enforced. Romanians are not alone in their negative assessment of the legal system – two in three or more of the Estonians (81%), Czechs (68%), Slovaks (63%) and Hungarians (63%) do not think their judicial system "punishes the guilty no matter who they are."

The public finds fault with both the judges charged to administer the legal system and with the process itself.

- Two in three think judges are dishonest and unfair, up from one in two in 1993. Accusations that some judges were part of the Ceausescu regime and are obstructing the democratization process likely contribute to this high level of distrust.
- Half (50%) do not believe they would be acquitted if they were wrongly accused of a crime, while four in ten (42%) think they would. This evaluation is slightly more favorable than in 1993 when 47 percent believed they would not be acquitted if wrongly accused of a crime and 37 percent thought they would be found innocent.
- Overall, a majority (55%) lack confidence in the legal system while a third (37%) voice confidence in it. Romanians resemble other central and east Europeans, except Hungarians, in this regard (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Confidence in the Legal System



"Loyal Opposition" Least Convinced Rule of Law Prevails

Who evaluates the judicial system favorably? The following groups are more likely than others to see the judiciary in a positive light:

- the less well-educated;
- rural dwellers;
- those who have a favorable opinion of President Ilescu and support the ruling Social Democracy Party of Romania (SDPR); and,
- those who hold views more consistent with the tenets of social than liberal democracy (e.g., strong state control, economic equality, moderate government regulation of the market).

By contrast, negative evaluations are more likely found among:

- the well-educated;
- urban dwellers;
- supporters of the democratic opposition; and,
- those who hold views more consistent with the tenets of liberal than social democracy (e.g., holding the individual rather than the state primarily responsible for citizens' well-being, valuing political liberties over economic equality).

FREELY ELECTED LEADERS

Related to the rule of law is the fundamental democratic principle of free and fair elections and the right to choose between several parties and candidates in elections. Since 1989 Romania has had a mixed electoral record. In the run-up to the May 1990 parliamentary elections the ruling National Salvation Front effectively controlled access to the mass media, engaged in harassment of opposition leaders, raided the opposition headquarters and intimidated its workers, making it difficult to reach to electorate in rural areas.¹¹ By contrast, and despite some allegations to the contrary, international observers deemed the second parliamentary and presidential elections in September 1992 to have been generally free and fair.

¹¹Michael Shafir, "Promises and Reality," RFE/RL Research Report, January 4, 1991.

Multiparty System: Too Much of a Good Thing

Central and east Europeans agree that a multiparty system of government is important. In Romania, eight in ten (78%) say it is important to live in a society where "one can choose from several parties and candidates when voting." Yet, when it comes to choice of party, Romanians, like others in the region, may believe they have too much of a good thing (Table 2). A larger percentage say a multiparty system describes (88%) than is important (78%) for their society. This is also the case in Estonia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. Given the large number of parties participating in the post-communist elections in all these countries (79 parties competed for 341 seats in the Romanian Chamber of Deputies in 1992), it is no wonder that publics might feel overwhelmed by all the options.

Table 2. Percent Saying It is Important to have a Multiparty System of Government and Percent Saying this Describes their Country

	Important	Describes
Romania	78%	88%
Estonia	74%	81%
Czech Republic	86%	91%
Slovakia	86%	92%
Hungary	77%	96%

Support for a multiparty system of government is higher among those who are:

- younger
- better educated;
- higher income; and,
- less religious.

Many of these characteristics tend to be associated with more politically involved members of society, which bodes well for the continued development of a multiparty system of government in Romania.

Sizable Minority Questions Integrity of Electoral Process in Romania

As in other countries in central and eastern Europe, Romanians place a high level of importance on honest, regular elections. Nearly everyone (95%) thinks free and fair elections are important, with 66 percent saying they are very important. Yet a sizable minority question whether this democratic principle is practiced in Romania.

- Nearly half (46%) believe honest elections are held regularly in Romania. But almost as many (38%) do not. This stands in sharp contrast to the Czech Republic (91%), Slovakia (75%) and Hungary (86%) where solid majorities say their countries hold regular, honest elections. It is only in Estonia, where recent national elections excluded a large percentage of the noncitizen ethnic Russian inhabitants, that we see similar concerns about the integrity of the electoral process (62% dishonest).
- More specifically, a slim majority of Romanians (53%) say September 1992 parliamentary and presidential elections were free and fair, while 31 percent think they were not.
- A majority (60%) of the current supporters of the democratic opposition in Romania (the Democratic Convention, an umbrella coalition of half a dozen parties) do not believe honest elections are held regularly, while four in ten do. At the same time, three in four supporters of the ruling Social Democracy Party of Romania think honest elections do occur regularly.

These differing perceptions clearly point to one area of potential conflict. Central to a functioning democracy is the loser's knowledge that he/she can compete in the next election and potentially win. This fundamental principle is jeopardized if the political opposition questions the integrity of the entire electoral process. If these doubts become widespread, the legitimacy of the government may be threatened and lead some to conclude that power can be won only through extra-parliamentary means.

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY

Romanians Question Motives of Public Officials and Government

How much trust do people have in the government and politicians once they win office? It would appear very little:

- Seven in ten "seldom or almost never" trust the government to do what is right while only a quarter "mostly or always" trust the government to do the right thing.
- Likewise, 60 percent think the government is run for the benefit of a few big interests, while a quarter (26%) think it is run for the benefit of all the people.
- Three in four agree with the statement "Public officials don't care much about what people like me think," while one in five disagrees.

Demographically these sentiments span all ages, education levels, ethnic groups and gender. Romanians are not alone in these views. Estonians and Slovaks also share similar perceptions of their government, while Czechs are somewhat more positive.

These negative evaluations also extend to key government institutions. Roughly seven in ten say they have "not very much or no confidence" in the parliament (70%), national government (70%) and civil service (67%). The well educated and the young voice lower levels of confidence in these institutions than less well educated and older Romanians.

As Table 3 on the next page shows, confidence in the national government and parliament has been steadily declining since 1990 in Romania. In other countries in the region, except the Czech Republic and Hungary, confidence levels in these two key institutions are also moderately low (and declining for the parliament). In part low confidence may be attributed to a general lack of confidence in almost all key institutions (the church and army are exceptions). Although a number of positive structural reforms have been made, major institutions have not been able to deliver the services many expected from their new democratic governments. Until publics directly benefits from these reforms, they are likely to remain largely dissatisfied with these new institutions.

It is well-documented that key institutions in western Europe (and the U.S.) are also suffering from relatively low levels of public confidence. While modest levels of confidence in societal institutions are potentially troublesome to the democracies in the West, these stable democracies have weathered crises by relying on the public's underlying confidence in and commitment to well-established democratic principles

and institutions. People might lose faith in particular leaders or oppose particular policies but remain committed to the democratic tenets and institutions that undergird the system and reinforce its stability. The picture is different in central and eastern Europe. Given the infancy of their democratic institutions, this reservoir of support is shallow. Thus, although levels of confidence in political institutions may be low throughout all of Europe, commitment to democratic political institutions is probably less firmly grounded in the East than in the West.

Table 3. Percent Confident in National Government and Parliament ¹²: 1990-1994

	Fall 89/ Summer 1990	Fall 91	Spring 92	Fall 92	Spring 93	Fall 93	Fall 94
Confidence in National Government							
Romania	67%	49%	42%	33%	32%	-	26%
Estonia	81	-	55	-	54	-	33
Czech Republic	74	59	70	70	-	75	70
Slovakia	79	34	43	67	-	55	48
Hungary	46	34	40	-	24	-	58
Confidence in Parliament							
Romania	63%	47%	28%	20%	24%	-	19%
Estonia	-	-	-	-	42	-	29
Czech Republic	71	51	52	56	-	33	36
Slovakia	73	29	32	56	-	33	28
Hungary	42	30	29	-	25	-	51

¹²Civil service was asked for the first time in 1994.

Sense of Political Efficacy on the Decline

Many have argued that in a well-functioning participatory democracy people must feel they can play a part in the political process and have an impact on policy. If people do not feel they can influence government decisions, or think that government is not responsive to their demands, public support for the government is likely to wane – a phenomenon we see emerging in Romania.

In addition to the low level of confidence in the national government and parliament, a sizable minority believe they cannot affect government decisions on either the local or national level.

- Four in ten (38%) say that people "like themselves" never have an influence on local government decisions. Even more (45%) conclude the same about the national government.¹³
- Romanians express a lower level of political efficacy than they did earlier in the transition when they likely still felt empowered by the events of late 1989. More currently say they never have an influence at the national level (45%) than did in 1990 (38%). We see a similar trend at the local level (38% in 1994 vs. 25% in 1992).
- Those who feel least efficacious are more likely than others to be less well educated, older and have low incomes.

Few Dispute Importance of Maintaining Stability and Order

The maintenance of stability and order is a primary role of government, and throughout central and eastern Europe nearly everyone agrees on the importance of this function. In Romania, 98 percent say it is important for a society to be stable and orderly – 74 percent say it is very important. But relatively few (26%) believe stability and order prevail in Romania, a perspective shared by other central and east Europeans about their own countries (Slovaks 37%, Czechs 23%, Estonians 11%).

One interpretation of this finding might be that Romanians (and other central and east European) are nostalgic for the order and certainty of the past. Closer analysis, however, suggests this is not the case. While a sizable group (roughly a third) of Romanians long for the stability and order of the past, those most likely to place ~~importance on stability and order~~ are solidly supportive of political and economic

¹³The response categories for this question differ somewhat from those used in Ukraine, El Salvador and Panama. In these three countries the response categories were: almost always, most of the time, only some of the time and almost never. In the Romanian survey the categories were: most of the time, sometimes, rarely and never. Comparisons among these countries should be made with caution.

reforms. These individuals are more likely than others to be better educated, have higher incomes and live in urban areas. Thus, order and stability are important both to those who long for the past, as well as those who support the development of a market democracy in Romania. These data suggest that greater stability and order would find favor among all segments of Romanian society. But consensus might be more difficult to reach on the means to achieve this goal.

CIVIL LIBERTIES

In this section we focus on freedom of religion, freedom of speech, protection of ethnic rights and views of two institutions central to civil society -- the media and labor unions. Generally speaking these liberties are currently afforded Romanian citizens, although some concerns remain about the independence of state-owned TV and indirect government censorship of opposition viewpoints. Likewise, the issue of minority rights protection remains ongoing (especially for the Roma). Since the election of the new Hungarian government, however, some progress has been made toward resolving the question of minority rights for ethnic Hungarians living in Romania.

Most Say Freedom of Religion and Speech Prevails

Freedom of religion and speech are two civil liberties most Romanians deem important and believe their country guarantees.

- Nearly everyone (95%) says it is important to live in a society where people can freely practice their religion, and an equal percentage believe this is the case in Romania.
- Likewise, three in four think it is important for a society to permit open criticism of the government, and most (80%) say this freedom prevails.

Yet in comparison to other values -- equal justice, honest elections and the maintenance of stability and order -- substantially fewer say these civil liberties are highly important. Freedom of religion and speech are apparently somewhat less important to the public than these other values.

Those who place a high degree of importance on freedom of religion are more likely than others to be:

- older;
- less well-educated;
- women;
- rural dwellers;
- lower income; and,
- less interested in politics.

In contrast, freedom to criticize the government is most highly valued by:

- those with higher incomes;
- the better educated;
- the less religious; and,
- urban dwellers.

Those who value freedom to criticize the government are also more likely to look to the individual rather than the state to provide for the needs of the citizens, to believe the new political system is better than the former communist one and to want to continue with political and economic reforms rather than return to the security of the old system.

Ethnic Romanians and Hungarians Differ on Importance of Protecting Ethnic Rights

The history of ethnic relations in Romania has often been acrimonious. Thus, it is not surprising that ethnic Romanians and Hungarians have different opinions both about the importance of protecting ethnic rights and about the current status of this civil liberty. As Table 4 on the next page shows:

- Eight in ten (79%) ethnic Hungarians, but only four in ten (38%) ethnic Romanians, think it is very important to protect these rights. Yet majorities of both groups overall think it is at least somewhat important to protect minority rights.
- Further, seven in ten ethnic Romanians believe ethnic rights are protected while only two in ten ethnic Hungarians say this is true.

Table 4. Importance of Protecting Minority Rights and Whether Romania Protects these Rights

Importance of Protecting Minority Rights			
	Ethnic Romanians	Ethnic Hungarians	Total
Very Important	38%	79%	41%
Somewhat Important	48	16	45
(Subtotal)	(86)	(95)	(86)
Not Very Important	7	-	6
Not Important at All	2	-	2
(Subtotal)	(9)	(-)	(8)
Don't Know	5	6	5
Perception of whether Romania Protects Minority Rights			
Describe	73%	23%	69%
Does Not Describe	13	59	17
Don't Know	13	18	14

Other data shed more light on ethnic relations:

- A sizable minority (between a fifth and a third) of ethnic Romanians espouse "majority exclusive" views. For example, a third agree that "Romania is only for the Romanians." A fifth say life would be improved if "all foreigners were expelled from the country" and a third think there are "too many non-Romanians living in Romania."
- Asked their opinion of each other: ethnic Romanians divide in their view of ethnic Hungarians (43% favorable, 46% unfavorable), while most ethnic Hungarians (94%) express a favorable opinion of ethnic Romanians (5% unfavorable).
- Both ethnic Romanians (89%) and Hungarians (78%) voice negative opinions of the Roma.

Ethnic Tolerance of Minority Rights on the Rise

Since fall 1991 USIA has been asking ethnic Romanians about three specific minority rights that ethnic groups have been actively seeking: the right to establish organizations and associations for the preservation and development of their traditions and culture; to have their own representatives in parliament; and to have classroom instruction in their mother tongue (Table 5).

Table 5. Percent Ethnic Romanians Who Support Specific Minority Rights

	Fall 1991	Spring 1992	Spring 1993	Fall 1994
Cultural Organizations	83%	80%	89%	88%
Representative Parliament	75	72	78	80
Schooling Own Language	56	58	69	67

These data show that contrary to conventional wisdom, intolerant attitudes toward minority rights are not on the rise in Romania (or elsewhere in central and east Europe). Instead, over the last three years ethnic Romanians have become more tolerant of the rights ethnic Hungarians seek. Those who support the democratic opposition and the better educated are more likely than others to voice tolerance of extending rights. Somewhat surprisingly, those who are pessimistic about their economic prospects are no more likely than optimists to express intolerance attitudes.

One in Three Would Trade Political Freedoms For Economic Security

The uncertainty and economic hardship of the transition has led some to ask whether central and east Europeans might be willing to trade their newly won political freedoms for greater economic security. Asked if they would trade "many of the political freedoms we now have" if a "non-democratic leader would solve the economic problems of our country," a majority (56%) would not be willing to do so, but a third (31%) would. Romanians are not alone in this view. Three in ten Slovaks (31%), four in ten Estonians (37%) and Hungarians (44%), and a quarter of the Czechs (23%) would be willing to trade their political freedoms for greater economic security. This sentiment is greater among ethnic Romanians (33%) than ethnic Hungarians (11%). It also predominates among those least able to cope with the effects of the reforms – the less well educated, the old and those with lower incomes.

Rebuilding Civil Society: Labor Unions and the Mass Media

Many scholars have argued that the consolidation of democracy in central and eastern Europe will partly depend on the success of rebuilding civil society – the multitude of institutions and organizations that mediate between the individual and the state. Labor unions and the media are two such institutions focused on in this survey.

Historically, labor unions have served to articulate the public's demand for both a greater voice in the decision making process and greater government accountability and transparency. Yet in Romania, as in other countries in central and eastern Europe, labor unions command little confidence (24% confident, 56% lack confidence). As a political tool of the former system, unions apparently still suffer from the legacy of the past.

In a democracy, the mass media ensures the open flow of information uncensored by the government. Mass/elite discourse largely depends on the public's having access to diverse information to form opinions about policy issues. Lacking this information, the public is unlikely to be able to fully participate in the decision-making process. As a consequence the political elite may make decisions which the public does not feel represent its interests.

Romania enacted a media law in May 1992 that ended the state monopoly on broadcasting, guaranteed freedom of expression and forbade censorship. Yet with the exception of domestic radio, the following data suggest that the public still lacks confidence in the domestic media.

- A majority of Romanians (57%) voice confidence in domestic radio. Yet when compared to other countries in central and eastern Europe (75% Czech Republic, 68% Estonia, 67% Slovakia), this figure appears somewhat low.
- Domestic television does not fare as well. As many lack (47%) as express confidence (45%) in Romanian television. Again, this finding differs from the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovakia where majorities voice confidence in domestic television.
- The Romanian press elicits even lower levels of confidence (61% lack confidence). As found with radio and TV, this contrasts with the Czech Republic (72%), Estonia (65%) and Slovakia (61%), where majorities voice confidence in their domestic press.

One reason for these low levels of confidence might be that while most (84%) believe it is important for a society to have uncensored news coverage, only four in ten (37%) think this describes the Romanian situation. An equal percentage of Romanians (35%) say it does not and another quarter (28%) "don't know" if the government censors news reports. The concept of uncensored news reports appears to be new to a sizable minority of Romanians.

Uncensored news is deemed most important by the:

- better educated;
- higher income;
- young;
- urban; and,
- ethnic Hungarians.

These same characteristics describe those who do not think news reporting is free of censorship in Romania.

CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY

Finally, we look at the "dog that didn't bark" in the transition process in central and eastern Europe – the military. In Romania, the military turned against the Ceausescu regime and sided with the people in the "December Revolution." Since 1990, most Romanians (consistently between 80 and 90%) have voiced confidence in the army (79% in 1994). Unlike in Latin America, where the military has threatened the consolidation of democracy in some countries, the military in central and eastern Europe has not directly challenged the functioning of democracy. This likely explains why only one in four (23%) in Romania thinks it is important for the military to be under civilian control. Half (48%) say this describes Romanian society. The high "don't know" rates (21% and 34% respectively) may indicate the need for greater public education about the importance of civilian control of the military in a democratic form of government.

A NOTE FOR POLICYMAKERS AND PROGRAM DIRECTORS: IMAGE OF THE U.S.

Policymakers and program directors might find it useful to know what Romanians think about the U.S., since their policies and programs are likely to have the "made in the U.S." label attached to them, either directly or indirectly.

- Romanian opinion of the United States has been quite positive since USIA began polling in the early 1990's. Currently, eight in ten voice favorable views of the U.S. The university educated, younger Romanians and supporters of

the democratic opposition are more likely than others to express *very favorable* views. Romanians also voice positive views of other western countries, including France (79%) and Germany (76%).

- Romanians are less certain about their views toward other central and east European countries. While a majority view Poland (65%), the Czech Republic (64%), Bulgaria (60%), and Slovakia (61%) favorably, about a quarter of the public decline to respond. And despite the new Hungarian government's wishes for reconciliation with Romania, Hungary (41%) is also viewed less favorably than in 1993 (50%).
- While overall opinion of the United States remains positive among the Romanian public, more currently think the United States has too much influence over Romanian affairs and culture than have in past surveys. One in three, compared to two in ten in 1992, thinks the U.S. has too much influence over their country's affairs. Similarly the percentage who think the influence of American culture is a threat to their own culture has increased from 9 percent in 1992 to 21 percent in 1994.

CONCLUSION

We conclude by looking at whether these five central areas of democratization are interrelated. If there is a liberal democratic mindset in Romania we would expect those who support one of these aspects to support the others. For example, if an individual places a high degree of importance on civil liberties we would also expect the individual to value due process, free and fair elections, government transparency and accountability, and civilian control of the military. If this democratic mindset has not developed, these aspects are not likely be interrelated.

Statistical analysis shows that four out of five of these aspects are interrelated and form a single underlying dimension.¹⁴ This liberal democratic mindset includes all of these aspects except civilian control of the military. Those who place importance on the other four do not necessary believe in the importance of civilian control of the military. As noted earlier, this is not an unexpected finding given the recent history of Romania, but it does suggest that the public might profit from more information about how other democratic systems structure civil-military relations.

¹⁴Both correlational and factor analysis show these four aspects of democratization to be interrelated.

Those who espouse the liberal democratic mindset we have defined with these polling data are more likely than others to:

- lack confidence in labor unions, the civil service and the legal system (and think there isn't equal justice), but to express confidence in domestic radio;
- feel politically efficacious and think the current political system is better than the old one under communist rule. Yet these Romanians believe some key aspects of a functioning democracy are not fully ensured: honest and fair elections, uncensored media and a legal system punishes the guilty "no matter who they are."
- favor the development of a free market economy and to believe the free market will be good for both the country and themselves. These individuals tend to believe they will be "winners" in the new economic system.
- be better educated, interested in politics, urban, less religious and have a higher income. No ethnic, gender or age differences were observed. They also tend to be more favorable toward the U.S. than the less democratically minded.

These findings suggest that the democratically minded will be most receptive to programs that concentrate on rule of law, media censorship and electoral system reform (which is closely tied to media censorship in the Romanian case). Democratically-minded Romanians have strong reasons to personally want the transition to succeed since many feel they will profit both politically and economically. Their higher level of education and interest in politics bodes well for their having a loud political voice. But as in all of central and east Europe, the trick will be to ensure that the gap between the winners and losers does not become too large. This will be a particularly difficult balancing act, but one that has been more successful than unsuccessful over the last five years in Romania.

PANAMA

BACKGROUND: A Surge of Optimism

The May elections for president appear to have given most Panamanians a new lease on their government following Guillermo Endara's disappointing term. Endara, restored to the head of government by the highly popular 1989 operation "Just Cause," steadily lost favor with the public. By November 1993, his approval rating approached single digits and 85 percent of Panamanians thought the country was on the wrong course. Half had little or no sense that they lived in a democracy. However, the Spring 1994 election campaign evidently presaged the possibility for change; by April, just half thought the country was on the wrong track. Most observers judged the vote open and honest -- a first for Panama. The winner, Ernesto Perez Balladardes, candidate of the Torrijos/Noriega party, took office September 1. Although only a plurality voted for Perez in a multi-candidate field, public optimism is the highest it has been since the U.S. intervention. Half believe the country has turned the corner and is now on the right track and two-thirds expect Perez to do a better job than Endara at running the country.

The successful election experience has apparently enabled many in Panama to reevaluate basic components of their democracy. In fact, the findings from the September poll¹⁵ indicate that Panamanians are indeed quite positive about their level of democratization in four key areas: free elections, civil liberties, due process, and government accountability and transparency.¹⁶

FREELY ELECTED LEADERS

Holding elections to determine who leads a country is perhaps the quickest and easiest reform to implement when transitioning from authoritarian rule to a democratic government. In fact, elections are widely used as the defining characteristic of a democracy. But the institution of truly open and honest elections is often another matter entirely. Most Panamanians believe they have crossed that bridge. (Table 1)


Importance versus Reality Indicators: Panamanians at all educational levels and in all regions of the country believe that honest elections are important and, more significantly, that they exist in Panama. Two related indicators are highly positive:

¹⁵ This poll was initiated just a week after Perez' inauguration, on September 8, 1994.

¹⁶ The fifth area of interest, "government control of security forces," is not applicable to Panama given the disbanding of the Panama Defense Forces after Operation "Just Cause."

- Nearly all Panamanians (96%) consider regular, honest elections to be important in the society in which they live; most say they are "very" important. Somewhat fewer (88%; 73% "very") also believe that a choice of parties and candidates is important. The widespread embrace of both elements is no doubt a reflection on the recent presidential contest, which nine in ten judge to have been honest.
- There is relatively little difference between the proportion of the public that believes these elements are important and the proportion that thinks they are present in Panama and therefore "describe" the country. Better than eight in ten say Panama holds regular, honest elections, a dramatic turn-around from opinions in November a year ago, when a slight majority thought Panamanian elections were dishonest. Even more believe Panama provides a good choice of parties and candidates (seven candidates contested the May election). The gap between how many consider one or the other important to their society and how many believe they actually describe the country is small, the "dissonance" indicator non-existent in the case of candidates (+3) and -13 regarding honest elections. Still, the -13 index suggests that some Panamanians clearly believe electoral fraud remains a problem.

FIGURE 1: IMPORTANCE AND REALITY OF ELECTED LEADERS
("dissonance" indicators above bars)




CIVIL LIBERTIES

If holding elections is the easiest reform to implement in a new democracy, the promotion of respect for the civil rights of all citizens may be, in most countries, the longest to implement and one of the most difficult. Still, many Panamanians appear to believe selected civil rights and freedoms are respected. (Table 2)

Importance versus Reality Indicators: Panamanians consider the guarantee of freedom of speech and action for individuals, religious and ethnic groups, and the media both important and, with one exception, real:

- Virtually all Panamanians believe it is highly important that the society in which they live guarantees both the freedom to practice one's chosen religion¹⁷ and the protection of the rights of ethnic groups. Just about as many believe that the right to openly criticize the government and to report the news without censorship are "very" important societal characteristics. Again, neither regional nor educational characteristics make a discernable difference in attitudes.
- Almost everyone also believes that Panama provides three of these four civil rights; freedom of religion, freedom to openly criticize the government, and freedom to report the news objectively. The "dissonance" indicators are once again fairly low, ranging from -2 to -10. The exception is the fact that significantly fewer Panamanians (76%) believe the rights of ethnic groups are well protected in their country. The difference between those who think this right is important and those who say it describes Panamanian society jumps to 20 percent (25% among the university-educated¹⁸), giving a dissonance indicator of -20. Evidently, some believe that the Indian populations of Panama are discriminated against.

FIGURE 2: IMPORTANCE AND REALITY OF CIVIL LIBERTIES
("dissonance" indicators above bars)



Some still afraid to speak?: Despite the fact that close to nine in ten Panamanians (87%) say the freedom to publicly criticize the government exists in Panama, there is some skepticism that people take advantage of the right: Considerably fewer (64%) believe people are not afraid to express their political opinions in public. A third of the public (34%) believe "many" or "everyone" is still afraid to speak out.

¹⁷ In this poll, 13 percent practice a religion other than Catholicism.

¹⁸ The survey sample included 385 respondents (32%) with either no schooling or some or completed grade school, 610 (51%) with some or completed secondary schooling, and 205 (17%) with some or a completed university or technical education.

Willingness to sacrifice for rights: Panamanians evidence some willingness to sacrifice material benefits for their civil rights. Although economic problems (and drugs) are currently considered the most serious facing the nation, half the public (53%) indicate they would not be willing to give up their political freedoms for a "non-democratic leader [who] could solve our economic problems." Most of these (45%) are strongly opposed to the notion, perhaps due in part to a rejection of the dictatorships of the past and in part because a large majority expect their own economic situation to improve over the coming year. Still, a significant minority (42%) indicate they would not mind giving up these freedoms if economic problems could be resolved by a non-democratic leader.

Confidence in media and labor unions: Everyone considers freedom of the press to report the news unfettered by censorship an important element in the society in which they live, and large majorities express confidence in the domestic media: two-thirds (66%) have either a great deal or some confidence in the press, seven in ten (70%) in radio, and three-fourths (74%) in television. The university-educated are much more likely than the general public to express "some" rather than "a great deal" of confidence, but otherwise demographic factors appear to play little role. Moreover, half say their confidence in the media has increased in the last five years, while just one in five says it has decreased. Nevertheless, sizable minorities do not have confidence in the domestic media: From a fourth to a third of the population express little or no confidence in Panama's press (31%), radio (26%), or television (23%). Panama's labor unions receive mixed reviews: Half (51%) express confidence in them, but almost as many (41%) have little or no confidence.

DUE PROCESS


It can be argued that two elements essential to the success of a democratizing process, particularly in a less-educated society such as Panama's, are the rule of law and an effective, functioning police force. Unfortunately, when militaries and, by extension, the police forces are reorganized – or done away with entirely as in Panama – common crime and street violence are likely to expand unchecked until newly trained police can reestablish order. If criminals are captured, corruption and anachronistic laws and judicial procedures often combine to set them free. The poll findings indicate that, although there have been important improvements, Panama has yet to resolve most of these problems. (Table 3)

Importance versus Reality Indicators: Some Panamanians express doubts on the effectiveness and impartiality of their system of justice:

- Virtually all Panamanians (95%) believe that a system of justice that punishes the guilty no matter who they are is important to the society in which they live.

- Considerably fewer (70%; 57% of the university-educated) believe the Panamanian justice system always punishes the guilty; about three in ten say it does not. In this case, the difference in percentages between those who think a fair system of justice is important to society and those who believe Panamanian society actually provides it reaches a high of -25 points – and -39 points among those with university schooling.


FIGURE 3: IMPORTANCE AND REALITY OF IMPARTIAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM
("dissonance" indicators above bars)



Confidence in the System. Although a majority (70%) say the judicial system always punishes the guilty, as many Panamanians express "not very much" or "no confidence" (47%) in their judicial system as have "some" or "a great deal" of confidence in it (46%). Asked how their attitudes have changed over the past five years, responses are fairly mixed: close to four in ten (38%) say their confidence increased, while a fourth (27%) say it remained about the same, and an equal number (27%) report a decrease.

Fairness of the Courts: Panamanians voice mixed perceptions on the functioning of their judicial courts. About half agree with the statement that "if I were wrongly accused of a crime, ... the justice system would find me innocent." But almost as many (43%; 50% of the university-educated) are not sure the system would function fairly and a third of these are highly doubtful. Still, this is a marked improvement from March 1993, when just one in ten said the courts functioned well and half thought they functioned badly. On a related question, four in ten agree that Panamanian judges are "fair and honest and do not abuse their powers," but close to half disagree (60% among the college-educated) and a third express strong disagreement. (Figure 4, next page)

FIGURE 4: OPINIONS ON JUDICIAL SYSTEM



The Public (Police) Force: One of the unexpected findings in this poll is the continued rise in confidence in the post-Noriega national police "Public Force." A majority (59%) now express confidence in the Public Force, compared to half (53%) who were confident that it functioned efficiently, and 40 percent who felt secure in asking it for help, in March 1993. Nearly half (46%) say their confidence in the new police force has increased since its inception, while one in five (22%) has less confidence than earlier.


GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY

Accountability and transparency in government are characteristics of a democracy which, like the guarantee of civil liberties, often take some time to develop. Still, Panamanians are somewhat positive about the motives and openness of their government – again perhaps a reflection to some extent on the successful election and a new president in office – although few feel they have much influence on government decision-making. (Table 4)

For the people or for themselves? About half (48%) agree with the statement that "I don't think public officials care much what people like me think." But almost as many (45%) disagree, including a third "strongly," revealing a broad perception that government does care about common Panamanians. Demographics are a factor in this case: The university-educated and those living in Panama City and Colon are much more likely to believe the government does not care than are those with only primary schooling or those who live in other parts of the country. (Figure 5, next page)

Similarly, close to half (47%) believe the country is run by a few big interests looking out for themselves, but almost as many (41%) say it is run for the benefit of all the people. Again, the highly-educated and residents of Panama City and Colon are more likely than others to be cynical. In March 1993, on a similar question, eight in ten then believed political parties were dominated by "a few who have no interest in the people's problems."

FIGURE 5: OPINIONS ON GOVERNMENT



Little sense of government by the people: Panamanians have little sense that they personally can have impact on decisions at any level of government. Fully half believe they influence the national government (51%) or the local government (47%) "almost never" or "never," with most – especially those living outside Panama City and Colon – saying "never." Just one fifth feel they influence either government "always" or "most of the time" (19/20%) and about three in ten believe they have input at each level "some of the time" (27/29%). Interestingly, the university-educated have no more sense of political efficacy than those with little or no education.

Slim majorities confident in institutions: However, confidence in the key institutions of government may have increased in recent years: Small majorities of Panamanians express at least some confidence in the national government (62%), the national assembly (54%), and the civil service (56%), with the university-educated more likely to express confidence, particularly in the national government, than those with less education. Half (52%) say their confidence in the national government rose over the past five years; indeed in March 1993 two-thirds of the public were disillusioned with the government of then-President Endara. Pluralities also report an increase in confidence in the legislative assembly (41%) and the civil service (38%). Just a fifth

say their confidence in any of the three institutions diminished over the period.

Nevertheless, there is only luke-warm trust in the national government "to do what is right." Four in ten (42%) expect it to do so most of the time or almost always, while over half say it will act correctly only some of the time (43%) or almost never (12%). Neither educational nor regional factors make much difference on these views.

Stability and order: The maintenance of stability and order in the country – clearly a more difficult task in democratic societies than in authoritarian ones¹⁹ – is considered important by virtually all Panamanians (98%). However, eight in ten (80%) believe there is stability and order in Panama (72% among the university-educated), leaving a difference between what the public considers important in their country and what they believe exists in Panama of -18 (-27 among the university-educated).

CONCLUSION:

A successful electoral process has quite clearly given Panamanians a heretofore unknown level of optimism about democratic rights and institutions. As Table 5 presents, the "dissonance" indicators measuring importance versus reality are relatively small (in comparison to those found in El Salvador). It should be noted that the university-educated Panamanians are somewhat more likely than the general public to say key elements are important to their society, but less likely to believe their society provides those elements. Consequently, the dissonance indicators for the university-educated are consistently higher than they are for the public as a whole – which may paradoxically reflect a lack of knowledge about democracy among the less-educated more than anything else.

Of the four areas examined by the survey, two are of most concern – the impartiality of the judicial system and the accountability of government. In the first place, as many lack confidence in the judicial system as have confidence in it, and about as many do not think they would be fairly prosecuted by an impartial, uncorrupted judge as think they would be. (A positive note in this area, however, is the increased confidence in the new police force.) Secondly, the extent to which the government is perceived as neither "for" nor "by" the people, but as operating independently from them, is also a concern. There is only a limited sense of "empowerment" on the part of the Panamanian public, little apparent awareness that with their vote they can obligate government leaders to pay attention to their needs and interests. Instead, about as many feel little connection between government and themselves as feel that government cares, is run for their (the public's) benefit, and will do what is right. These two areas of democratization may warrant the greatest attention on the part of the USG agencies and NGOs involved.

¹⁹ USIA polls over the past year indicate that majorities or pluralities in a number of countries (Guatemala, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela) in fact think a military rather than democratic government handles this task best.

TABLE 1: FREELY ELECTED LEADERS
Panama

**Rights Considered Important in a Society and
Public Perception of Whether it Describes Country**

	Important Society	Describes Country	Difference/ Dissonance
Honest elections are held regularly	98%	85%	-13%
One can choose from several parties and candidates when voting	88	91	3

*Average % difference between what is important
in a society and what describes it*

-5%

LAST ELECTIONS FREE AND FAIR: 91% YES; 6% NO

COUNTRY RIGHT OR WRONG DIRECTION: RIGHT 56%; WRONG 17%

TABLE 2: CIVIL LIBERTIES
Panama

**Rights Considered Important in a Society and
Public Perception of Whether it Describes Country**

	Important Society	Describes Country	Difference/ Dissonance
Everyone can freely practice their religion	98%	96%	-2%
Freedom to openly criticize the government	93	87	-6
The media are free to report the news without government censorship	96	86	-10
The rights of ethnic groups are protected	96	76	-20

Average % difference between what is important in a society and what describes it

-10%

Confidence in Trade Unions, Domestic Radio, Press and Television

Institution	Great deal/fair amount confidence	Not very much/ no confidence
Trade Unions	51%	41%
Domestic Television	74	23
Domestic Radio	70	26
Domestic Press	66	31

TRADE POLITICAL FREEDOMS FOR ECONOMIC SECURITY: 42% YES; 53% NO

WILLINGNESS TO SPEAK POLITICAL VIEWS: 64% UNAFRAID; 34% AFRAID

TABLE 3: DUE PROCESS
Panama

**Rights Considered Important in a Society and
Public Perception of Whether it Describes Country**

	Important Society	Describes Country	Difference/ Dissonance
The judicial system punishes the guilty no matter who they are	95%	70%	-25%

Confidence in Legal System

Institution	Great deal/fair amount confidence	Not very much/ no confidence
Police Force	59%	38%
Legal System	46	47

Impartiality of the Courts

	Strongly/somewhat agree	Somewhat/strongly disagree
Judges fair and honest	43%	47%
Wrongly accused of crime, judicial system would find me innocent	48	43

**TABLE 4: GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY AND
TRANSPARENCY:**

Panama

**Rights Considered Important in a Society and
Public Perception of Whether Describes Country**

	Important Society	Describes Country	Difference/ in Dissonance
Stability and order are maintained	98%	80%	-18%

Public's Sense of Political Efficacy

	Almost always/most time	Sometimes/never
Influence decisions local government level	20%	76%
Influence decisions national government level	19	78

Confidence in Parliament, National Government and Civil Service

Institution	Great deal/fair amount confidence	Not very much/ no confidence
Parliament	54%	40%
National government	62	32
Civil Service/government workers	56	38

Government for the People or for Themselves?

PUBLIC OFFICIALS CARE ABOUT ME: 48% AGREE; 45% DISAGREE

COUNTRY RUN FOR BENEFIT OF WHOM?: 41% PEOPLE; 47% FEW BIG INTERESTS

TRUST NATIONAL GOVERNMENT DO WHAT IS RIGHT: 42% MOSTLY; 55% SELDOM

TABLE 5: RIGHTS, DESCRIPTIONS, DISSONANCE - COMPILED
Panama

Civil Liberties	Important Society	Describes Country	Difference/Dissonance
Everyone can freely practice their religion	98%	96%	-2%
Freedom to openly criticize the government	93	87	-6
The media are free to report the news without government censorship	96	86	-10
The rights of ethnic groups are protected	96	76	-20

Average % difference between what is important in a society and what describes it

-10%

Freely Elected Leaders

Honest elections are held regularly	98%	86%	-12%
One can choose from several parties and candidates when voting	88	91	3

Average % difference between what is important in a society and what describes it

-5%

Due Process

The judicial system punishes the guilty no matter who they are	95%	70%	-25%
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Government accountability

Stability and order are maintained	98%	80%	-18%
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Government Control of Security Forces

The military is under the control of civilian leaders	NA	NA	NA
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EL SALVADOR

BACKGROUND: Falling Expectations

The decade-long civil war in El Salvador ended in 1992 when peace agreements were reached between the government and the FMLN revolutionary groups. The third presidential election without a military candidate was held in March, 1994. For the first time a leftist coalition which included the FMLN participated. On these important bases, most agree that El Salvador has made significant strides along the path to a functioning, inclusive democratic system.

Still, a number of issues remain unresolved. In the first place, during the March elections many observers noted instances of administrative mixups at voting sites which reportedly left thousands of would-be voters excluded from the process. Secondly, a plurality of Salvadorans expected the new president, Armando Calderon Sol, to do about as well as his predecessor, Alfredo Cristiani – and a few expected him to do better. But stories of alleged administrative mismanagement and corruption have been reported in the local press and Calderon's commitment to carrying out the remaining peace agreements may be in some doubt. Finally, and perhaps most importantly for the public as a whole, crime and violence have increased dramatically over recent years, to the point where more Salvadorans say it is the country's most serious problem (40%) as name unemployment (16%) and the cost of living (11%) together.

The September survey²⁰ found Salvadorans less optimistic and more concerned about their future than at any point since October-November, 1992, when a final agreement on the peace process was still up in the air and hope was at a particularly low ebb. More thought the country was on the wrong track (43%) than on the right one (34%), figures almost identical to the fall 1992 findings and significantly less than the 56 percent who saw things in the country going well just after the critical agreements were reached. Half (51%) also had little confidence they would see any economic improvement in the coming year. In short, Salvadorans at all levels²¹ seem to be facing a new, more problematic reality.

The concerns of the Salvadoran public are clearly reflected in this assessment of selected key elements of their society: free elections, civil liberties, due process, government accountability and transparency, and civilian control of the military.

²⁰ This face-to-face interview survey was conducted in all regions of El Salvador on September 6-16, 1994, three months into Calderon's term, by CID-Gallup of Costa Rica.

²¹ The survey sample of 1202, which approximates the educational profile of the population as a whole, included 668 respondents (56%) with either no schooling or some or completed grade school, 394 (33%) with some or completed secondary schooling, and 140 (12%) with some or a completed university or technical education.


FREELY ELECTED LEADERS

Conducting elections to determine who leads a country is perhaps the quickest and easiest reform to implement when democratizing a society. But the institution of truly open and honest elections often proves a more lengthy and difficult matter. El Salvador is a case in point: Although the March election was the third regularly-held presidential election and the first in which the FMLN participated, observers reported that administrative and procedural irregularities kept many Salvadorans from voting. As a result, half the public voice little or no confidence in the Electoral Tribunal which organizes and oversees the election process and many appear to have lost faith in the system.

Importance versus Reality Indicators: Although almost everyone believes that regular and honest elections with a variety of candidates are important for their society, many doubt El Salvador provides either. Two related indices are revealing (Appendix, Table 1; Figure 1):

- Nine in ten judge both honest and regular elections (93%) and a choice of parties and candidates (89%) to be important elements in the society in which they live. Still, some 17 percent fewer Salvadorans (76% and 72%) hold either of these characteristics to be "very" important (considerably more of the university-educated accord them high importance).
- Just two-thirds (65%) believe that honest elections are held regularly in El Salvador, in part because only half (50%) believe the March elections were free and fair. Those residing in San Salvador and the highly-educated are especially likely to say those elections were dishonest. Although more Salvadorans believe there is a good choice of parties and candidates (81%), about two in ten feel otherwise or give no opinion, even with the FMLN's participation in the election. The difference – or "dissonance" indicator – between the percentage who consider either of these elements important in their society and those who think Salvador provides that element is relatively small in the case of the selection of candidates (-8). But the difference is large (-28) regarding the openness of elections. The possibility of fraudulent elections clearly remains a problem for some.

FIGURE 1: IMPORTANCE AND REALITY OF ELECTED LEADERS
("dissonance" indicators above bars)



CIVIL LIBERTIES

If holding elections is one of the easiest reforms to implement in a new democracy, the promotion of respect for the civil rights of all citizens may be one of the most difficult. Judging from public opinion, El Salvador's process has been slow. (Table 2)


Importance versus Reality Indicators: Most Salvadorans say the guarantee of selected civil liberties is important for the society in which they live. However, except among the university-educated, significantly fewer consider any of these to be "very" important. And fewer still believe El Salvador provides them to its citizens:

- Approximately nine in ten Salvadorans believe the freedom to openly criticize the government (85%) and to practice their own religion (91%), the protection of the rights of minority groups (89%), and the media's ability to report news without censorship (91%) are important liberties in their society. Virtually all of the university-educated consider them desirable. Still, between 15 and 20 percent fewer of the general public say these key democratic freedoms are "very" important to the society in which they live (67, 71, 74, and 71%, respectively). (Figure 2, next page)
- A still smaller proportion of Salvadorans think that three of these four civil liberties describe their country: About two-thirds believe they are free to criticize the government (63%), that minority rights are protected (63%), and that the media is free from government harassment (66%). As a result, the "dissonance" indicators are high, ranging from -22 (free speech) to -26 (protection of minority groups). The one exception is religious freedom: better than eight in ten (84%) say this civil liberty exists in Salvador.²² (Figure 2)

As Figure 2 indicates, education plays a significant role in attitudes: In all cases, those with no or primary-level schooling only are somewhat less likely to say a freedom is important to their society and more likely to say it describes Salvadoran society; as a result, dissonance indicators are lower than they are for the public as a whole. The opposite holds true for Salvadorans with university educations. As a rule, this group is much more critical of current society and, with the exception of religious freedom (-6), dissonance indicators range from -33 (freedom to criticize) to a very high -40 (protected rights for minority groups).

²² Indeed protestant and evangelical sects have been growing steadily – 22% of respondents in this poll practice a religion other than Catholicism.

FIGURE 2: IMPORTANCE AND REALITY OF CIVIL LIBERTIES
 ("dissonance" indicators above bars)



Fear expressing political beliefs: Although two-thirds believe there is freedom to openly criticize the government, there is some skepticism that people take advantage of this right. Only about half the public (48%) believe people are unafraid to voice their political views openly. A similar proportion say, to the contrary, that "everyone" (17%) or "many" (30%) remain reluctant to publicly air their beliefs. Education levels apparently make little difference on this issue.

Willingness to sacrifice to maintain rights: As we have seen, many Salvadorans believe that civil liberties are problematic in El Salvador and that the economy is unlikely to improve. Nevertheless, a plurality of Salvadorans (45%) would not be willing to give up their political freedoms for a "non-democratic leader [who] could solve our economic problems." A third are "strongly" opposed to the idea. Still, about four in ten (39%) would give up their civil freedoms for economic solutions. The university-educated are much more likely to reject the forfeiture of their civil rights to a non-democratic leader (49% disagree "strongly"), while a fourth of the grade school-educated give no response to this question.

Confidence in media and labor unions: As discussed above, about two-thirds of the public believe that the media are free to report the news uncensored by government. However, confidence in selected media is lower. About half have a great deal or some confidence in the local press (52%). Domestic radio and television earn only slightly broader votes of confidence (55% and 58%). Somewhat unexpectedly given their critical views on most issues, the university-educated are more likely to voice confidence in all three media outlets.

The public cited little overall change in their attitudes toward the media during the Cristiani term: Four in ten (39%) say their confidence remained about the same over the past five years. Three in ten (29%) say it increased, while somewhat fewer (22%) report less confidence.

El Salvador's labor unions still earn only limited respect. One-third (35%) express confidence in the *sindicatos* now, the same as in the October-November, 1992 poll. About half the public say they have "not very much" confidence (28%) or "none at all" (23%), a high proportion but down from the 65 percent who expressed little confidence in unions in the earlier poll (more responded with "don't know" in the September poll).


DUE PROCESS

Two essential elements for a successful democratization process, particularly in a less educated society, are the rule of law and an effective, functioning police force. When militaries are reorganized and downsized and existing enforcement agencies disbanded – as occurred in El Salvador in 1992 – common crime and violence on the streets is likely to increase unchecked until newly hired and trained police can reestablish order. Moreover, if criminals are captured, corruption plus an unreformed, antiquated judicial system often combine to set them free. Many in El Salvador believe the country is confronting just these sorts of problems (Table 3):

Importance versus Reality Indicators: For a number of Salvadorans, the country's system of justice is neither a functioning nor an impartial institution:

- Nine in ten (93%) of the public believe that a system of justice which punishes the guilty no matter who they are is important to the society in which they live; eight in ten (78%) say it is a "very" important element. Not surprisingly, even more of the university-educated considered it critical. (Figure 3, next page)
- Considerably fewer Salvadorans (62%) – and barely half (52%) of the university educated – believe El Salvador in fact has an impartial and competent system of justice. As a result, the "dissonance" indicators measuring the difference between what is important and what society provides are -31 for the public as a whole, and - 45 for the highly-educated, among the highest encountered in this review.


FIGURE 3: IMPORTANCE AND REALITY OF IMPARTIAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM
("dissonance" indicators above bars)



Confidence in the Legal System: El Salvador's system of justice earns only scattered expressions of trust. Thirty-eight percent say they have some or a great deal of confidence in the system, compared to half (49%) who have little or none. Nor has time brought any improvement – these perceptions are virtually unchanged from those expressed in late 1992. Just one in five (21%) report increased confidence in the judicial system over the five years of Cristiani's term. Nearly four in ten (37%) say their level of trust remained about the same and three in ten (30%) feel it diminished.

Fairness of the Courts: Salvadorans have fairly low expectations concerning the fairness of their judicial courts. About as many (43%) do not believe they would be found innocent if wrongly accused of a crime as believe justice would prevail (40%). Moreover, half disagree (33% "strongly") that "judges are fair and honest and do not abuse their powers." On both issues, the university-educated are much more negative.

FIGURE 4: OPINIONS ON JUDICIAL SYSTEM




The National Police: A major component of the rule of law is the enforcement authority charged with maintaining domestic law and order – particularly critical in a period of high crime and violence. El Salvador's newly instituted, largely ex-military national police force has yet to convince a majority of the public that it can handle the task. Less than half (42%) have some or a great deal of confidence in the national police, while more (49%) express little or no confidence. Those with primary school education are less likely to lack confidence (and more likely to give no opinion). In contrast, the university-educated are much more likely to voice doubts; two-thirds (67%) express little or no confidence in Salvador's new police force. Few Salvadorans report any increase in confidence in the new police over time. Just one-fifth (19%) say their confidence has risen in the past five years. Most are either less confident (34%) or report no change (37%).

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY

Competitive elections do not necessarily make a functioning democracy, which ideally requires both accountability and transparency in government. The situation in El Salvador appears typical of many Latin American countries: public cynicism on the motives and openness of government is fairly widespread. (Table 4)

For the people or for themselves? Opinions are divided on whether government officials care about the wants and needs of common people. Four in ten agree with the statement that "I don't think public officials care much what people like me think," but the same proportion disagree, including 26 percent who "strongly" believe officials do care to some extent. More striking is the fact that a solid majority of Salvadorans (64%) think the country is run by "a few big interests looking out for themselves;" just one-fifth (21%) believe it is run "for the benefit of all the people." Among the university-educated, eight in ten (79%) believe that government officials look out for themselves.

FIGURE 5: OPINIONS ON GOVERNMENT



Little sense of government by the people: Very few Salvadorans feel they have any influence on government decision-making. Just over one in ten believe they can affect decisions "almost always" or "much of the time" at the level of the national (13%) or local (15%) governments. In contrast, four in ten or more say they "almost never" or "never" influence decisions at either level (39% and 46%, respectively). The highly-educated have only a slightly greater sense of efficacy than those with little education.

Confidence in institutions: Salvadoran opinion splits on whether key governmental institutions inspire confidence. Four in ten report some or a great deal of trust in the national government (43%), the national assembly (40%), and the civil service (43%). But about as many express little or no confidence in any of these institutions (49%, 47%, and 47%, respectively), with the university-educated even more likely to give a no-confidence vote. Apparently, little has occurred in the past five years to modify these opinions. Pluralities of approximately four in ten say there has been no change in their confidence in any of the three institutions. Increased trust is reported only by minorities (22%, 21%, and 17%, respectively).

The lack of confidence in the national government is partially explained by the fact that just a fourth of the public (25%) say they trust it to "do what is right" almost always or most of the time. Close to half (45%) trust the government to do so only "some of the time" and nearly two in ten (17%) expect it will "almost never" do what is right.

Stability and order: The maintenance of stability and order in the country -- a more difficult task in democratic societies than in authoritarian ones²³ -- is considered important by almost all Salvadorans (94%), particularly in the context of the current wave of violence, crime, and kidnapping. Among the highly-educated, everyone (99%) believes it important and nine in ten consider it "very" important. But a considerably smaller majority of Salvadorans (64%; 54% of the university-educated) believe it exists in El Salvador. The difference between what is important and what society provides results in a "dissonance" indicator of -30 (-45 among the college-educated), one of the largest found in this analysis.²⁴

CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY

A key to the future of any democracy, but especially a Latin American democracy transitioning out of military rule, is control of the armed forces by the civilian leadership. A critical agreement of the 1992 peace accords in El Salvador was the functional, as well as constitutional, control of the military by the civilian government. However, change within the military has taken time; an active military officer is still Minister of Defense, for example. (Table 5)


²³ USIA polls over the past year have found that majorities or pluralities in a number of countries (Guatemala, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela) think a military rather than democratic government handles this task best

²⁴ The importance of law and order in newly democratic countries (in Latin America, at least) was graphically demonstrated in recent focus group discussions in Guatemala. Many less-educated participants directly blamed "democracy" and "human rights" for the so-called *libertinaje* -- an excess or abuse of freedoms, exemplified by street crime and criminals being released from jail -- in the country.

Importance versus Reality Indicators: Of all the components of democratic society examined in this survey, civilian control of the military is considered least important by the public. But it is also the element which fewest believe exists in El Salvador.

- Unlike the other elements of a democratic society discussed earlier, which approximately nine in ten of the public considered important, barely three-fourths of the public think it is important to their society that the army operates under civilian control. About six in ten (57%) consider it "very" important. The university-educated are no more likely than the general public to judge civilian control of the military important.
- Just half the public believes the military is in fact controlled by the civilian government in El Salvador. As a result, the "dissonance" indicator is -26. The less-educated are again less likely to believe civilian control is important and more likely to say it describes society ("dissonance" indicator -18), while the opposite is true of the highly-educated (indicator -33).

FIGURE 6: IMPORTANCE AND REALITY OF CIVILIAN CONTROL OF ARMY
("dissonance" indicators above bars)



Confidence in the armed forces: The Salvadoran military seems to be losing its "cachet." For the first time in USIA polling in the country, more Salvadorans have little or no confidence in the institution (50%), than express a great deal or some confidence in it (40%). This compares to two-thirds who expressed at least some confidence in the military in the fall of 1992. Although a plurality report their level of confidence unchanged (40%) over the past five years, three in ten say it declined (30%). Few (18%) feel their confidence in the institution increased over that period.

CONCLUSION:

The democratization of small, less developed and less educated countries such as El Salvador is bound to be a slow, incremental process. But past USIA research in Central America suggests it is also burdened by a specific problem: Publics are unable to divorce the system from the administration. They evaluate their "democracy" by how well or badly the current administration is doing. If expectations are falling and conditions difficult, as in El Salvador, governments – and democracy – are blamed. If optimism is high, as in Panama, government and democracy both reap benefits. Publics as yet have little sense of "empowerment;" they fail to comprehend their ability as voters to change what is going on in the country by replacing the current administration for a new one more responsive to public interests. Instead, they believe government, led by the same "few big interests," goes on irrespective of their wants, needs, or votes. Likewise, elected officials – particularly congressmen – are much more likely to owe their positions to the party apparatus and their relationship with its leadership than to satisfying "constituent" needs. This may be one of the greatest challenges to foreign governments and agencies attempting to promote democracy in such countries – educating both the public and elected officials on democracy in general and the power of the vote specifically.

El Salvador exemplifies the difficulties of this and other tasks. Despite the efforts made over the past decade, public perceptions point to limited signs of progress towards a truly democratic society and civic culture. (Table 6) Many core components of a democratic society are considered only "somewhat" – rather than "very" – important to less-educated Salvadorans; many do not exist in the country in the view of significant minorities. Of all the issues covered in the survey, the continued lack of a functioning, fair, and impartial system of justice is arguably the greatest problem. Without honest judges, a capable police force, and the public rule of law, corruption and crime cannot be controlled nor civil liberties guaranteed. But other issues also require attention, including the continued strengthening of government institutions and the electoral process. El Salvador is on the road to a democratic society, but apparently it is to be an even longer and more difficult passage than many had anticipated.

TABLE 1: FREELY ELECTED LEADERS
El Salvador

**Rights Considered Important in a Society and
Public Perception of Whether It Describes Country**

	Important Society	Describes Country	Difference/ Dissonance
Honest elections are held regularly	93%	65%	-28%
One can choose from several parties and candidates when voting	89	81	-8

*Average % difference between what is important
in a society and what describes it*

-18%

LAST ELECTIONS FREE AND FAIR: 50% YES; 30% NO

COUNTRY RIGHT OR WRONG DIRECTION: RIGHT 34%; WRONG 43%

TABLE 2: CIVIL LIBERTIES
El Salvador

**Rights Considered Important in a Society and
Public Perception of Whether it Describes Country**

	Important Society	Describes Country	Difference/ Dissonance
Everyone can freely practice their religion	91%	84%	-8%
Freedom to openly criticize the government	85	63	-22
The media are free to report the news without government censorship	91	66	-25
The rights of minority groups are protected	89	63	-26

*Average % difference between what is important
in a society and what describes it*

-21%

Confidence in Trade Unions, Domestic Radio, Press and Television

Institution	Great deal/fair amount confidence	Not very much/ no confidence
Trade Unions	35%	51%
Domestic T.V.	58%	33%
Domestic Radio	55%	37%
Domestic Press	52%	39%

TRADE POLITICAL FREEDOMS FOR ECONOMIC SECURITY: 39% YES; 45% NO

WILLINGNESS TO SPEAK POLITICAL VIEWS: 48% UNAFRAID; 47% AFRAID

TABLE 3: DUE PROCESS
El Salvador

**Rights Considered Important in a Society and
Public Perception of Whether it Describes Country**

	Important Society	Describes Country	Difference/ Dissonance
The judicial system punishes the guilty no matter who they are	93%	62%	-31%

Confidence in Legal System

Institution	Great deal/fair amount confidence	Not very much/ no confidence
Legal System	38%	49%
National Police	42	49

Perception of Legal System

	Strongly/somewhat agree	Somewhat/strongly disagree
Judges fair and honest	43%	47%
Wrongly accused of crime, judicial system would find me innocent	40	43

TABLE 4: GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY*El Salvador***Rights Considered Important in a Society and
Public Perception of Whether Describes Country**

	Important Society	Describes Country	Difference/ Dissonance
Stability and order are maintained	94%	64%	-30%

Public's Sense of Political Efficacy

	Almost always/most time	Sometimes/never
Influence decisions local government level	15%	71%
Influence decisions national government level	13	65

Confidence in Parliament, National Government and Civil Service

Institution	Great deal/fair amount confidence	Not very much/ no confidence
Parliament	40%	47%
National government	43	49
Civil Service/government workers	43	47

Government for the People or for Themselves?

PUBLIC OFFICIALS CARE ABOUT ME: 39% AGREE; 42% DISAGREE

COUNTRY RUN BENEFIT OF WHOM?: 21% PEOPLE; 64% FEW BIG INTERESTS

TRUST NATIONAL GOVERNMENT DO WHAT IS RIGHT: 25% MOSTLY; 62% SELDOM

TABLE 5: GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF SECURITY FORCES
El Salvador

**Rights Considered Important in a Society and
 Public Perception of Whether it Describes Country**

	Important Society	Describes Country	Difference/ Dissonance
The military is under the control of civilian leaders	77%	51%	-26%

Confidence in Army

Institution	Great deal/fair amount confidence	Not very much/ no confidence
Army	40%	50%

TABLE 6: RIGHTS, DESCRIPTIONS, DISSONANCE - COMPILED
El Salvador

Civil Liberties	Important Society	Describes Country	Difference/ Dissonance
Everyone can freely practice their religion	92%	84%	-8%
Freedom to openly criticize the government	85	63	-22
The media are free to report the news without government censorship	91	66	-25
The rights of ethnic groups are protected	89	63	-26

Average % difference between what is important in a society and what describes it

-21%

Freely Elected Leaders

Honest elections are held regularly	93%	65%	-28%
One can choose from several parties and candidates when voting	89	81	-8

Average % difference between what is important in a society and what describes it

-18%

Due Process

The judicial system punishes the guilty no matter who they are	93%	62%	-31%
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Government accountability

Stability and order are maintained	94%	64%	-30%
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Government Control of Security Forces

The military is under the control of civilian leaders	77%	51%	-26%
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APPENDIX

How These Polls Were Taken

These polls were commissioned by USIA. The questions were written by USIA and USAID and translated by the contractor, with final review by USIA. Ninety-five times out of one hundred, results from samples of this size will yield results which differ by no more than about 3 percentage points in either direction from what would have been obtained were it possible to interview everyone in the population. The comparison of smaller subgroups increases the margin of error. In addition, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey of public opinion may introduce other sources of error. Specific information about each study is given below.

Ukraine. Between October 10 and 23, 1994, SOCIS-Gallup, a Kiev-based survey research firm, conducted personal interviews with a sample of 1190 adults (18 years and older) representative of the national adult population.

Romania. USIA-commissioned Sociobit in Bucharest to conduct the survey. This survey is based on face-to-face interviews with a representative nationwide probability sample of 1011 adults, aged 18 and older, in Romania. Interviewing was conducted between September 12 and 30, 1994.

Panama. This USIA commissioned survey was conducted by CID-Gallup of Costa Rica. It is based on face-to-face interviews with 1200 adults aged 18 and over in all regions of Panama. Fieldwork took place September 8-18, 1994. The survey sample was selected by a modified probability method, and covered both urban and rural populations. When necessary, respondent selection was adjusted for age, sex, and education to more closely match estimated population profiles.

El Salvador. This public opinion survey was commissioned by USIA and conducted by CID-Gallup of Costa Rica. It is based on face-to-face interviews with 1202 adults aged 18 and over in all regions of El Salvador. Fieldwork took place September 6 - 16, 1994. The survey sample was selected by a modified probability method, and covered both urban and rural populations. When necessary, respondent selection was adjusted for age, sex, and education to more closely match the estimated profile of the population.

AID Questionnaire for Global Democratization Project

1. Do you think the country is going in the right or wrong direction?

2.-4. How important is it to you that the following rights be guaranteed in the country where you live? Is it very important, somewhat important, not very important or not important at all that:

One can choose from several parties and candidates when voting

There is freedom to openly criticize the government

Stability and order are maintained

Honest elections are held regularly

The judicial system punishes the guilty no matter who they are

The military is under the control of civilian leaders

The media are free to report the news without government censorship

Everyone can freely practice their religion

The rights of ethnic groups are protected

5.-7. Now I'm going to read these statements again. Please tell me if you think the statement describes our country or not. Do you believe that in our country...

One can choose from several parties and candidates when voting

There is freedom to openly criticize the government

Stability and order are maintained

Honest elections are held regularly

The judicial system punishes the guilty no matter who they are

The military is under the control of civilian leaders

The media are free to report the news without government censorship

Everyone can freely practice their religion

The rights of ethnic groups are protected

8.-10. Now I would like to ask you about some institutions and organizations. Please tell me how much confidence you have in the following domestic institutions and organizations. Do you have a great deal, a fair amount, not very much or no confidence in our...

National government

Parliament/Legislative Assembly

Armed forces

Legal/judicial system (courts)

Trade/labor Unions

Civil service/government workers

Domestic press

Domestic radio

Domestic television

11. Do you think that the last elections (date) were free and fair or not?

12. Do you believe that people like yourself can have some effect on the decisions made by the national government -- almost always, most of the time, only some of the time, or almost never?

13. And what about the local level -- do you believe that people like yourself can have some effect on the decisions made by local government -- almost always, most of the time, only some of the time, or almost never?

14. Generally speaking, would you say that this country is run by a few big interests looking out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?

15. How much do you trust the national government to do what is right? Do you trust it almost always, most of the time, only some of the time, or almost never?

16.-17. Now I'm going to read you some statements that describe how some people feel. Others disagree. Please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with each of these statements.

I don't think our public officials care much about what people like me think.

If a non-democratic leader took power who could solve our country's economic problems, I wouldn't care if that leader took away many of the political freedoms we now have.

If I were wrongly accused of a crime, I'm sure our judicial system would find me innocent.

Our judges are fair and honest and do not abuse their powers.

18. What is your opinion about people's willingness to publicly express their political opinions in (Survey Country)? Would you say that: nobody is afraid to express his/her political opinions, only a few people; many people, or everyone is afraid to express his/her opinion?

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DEMOGRAPHICS

1 How would you rate your income situation – very bad, bad, neither good nor bad, good, or very good?

2 What is your main occupation?

- 1 Intellectual (teacher, journalist, writer etc)
- 2 White collar, higher management (public and private)
- 3 White collar, lower management (public and private)
- 4 Skilled worker (including nurses)
- 5 Unskilled worker
- 6 Military/Police
- 7 Farmer (including fishermen)
- 8 Pensioner
- 9 Housewife not otherwise employed
- 10 Student
- 11 Temporarily not working, unemployed

3 How would you classify yourself - as the working class, the middle class or the upper class?

4 Do you attend religious services once a week, once a month or so, a few times a year, once a year or less, or never?

- 1 Once a week
- 2 A few times a year
- 3 Once a year or less
- 4 Never
- 5 Don't know/no answer

5 How old are you? Record exact age.

6 Education-- WE NEED TO AGREE UPON A SCALE THAT WILL WORK EVERYWHERE – how about

no formal schooling
primary
unfinished secondary
finished secondary
unfinished university
finished university

7 Nationality/ethnicity

8 Religion

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Interviewer please record:

Sex

- 1 Male
- 2 Female

Size of town:

- 1 Up to 999 inhabitants
- 2 1000-4,999 inhabitants
- 3 5000-19,000 inhabitants
- 4 20,000-99,999 inhabitants
- 5 100,000-499,999 inhabitants
- 6 500,000 - 999,999 inhabitants
- 7 Over 1,000,000

Urban/Rural:

- 1 Urban
- 2 Rural

Region of country (indicate one of the counties)

Date of interview

Table 1.

Q. Do you think the country is going in the right or wrong direction?

	<u>COUNTRIES</u>			
	El Salvador (1102)	Panama (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1190)
Right direction	34%	56%	38%	12%
Wrong direction	43	17	53	72
Don't know	23	27	9	16
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 2.

Q. How important is it to you that the following rights be guaranteed in the country where you live? Is it very important, somewhat important, not very important or not important at all that:

COUNTRIES			
El Salvador (1102)	Panama (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1190)

■ One can choose from several parties and candidates when voting.

Very important	72%	73%	36%	35%
Somewhat important	17	15	42	27
(Subtotal)	(89%)	(88%)	(78%)	(62%)
Not very important	3	7	12	14
Not important at all	3	3	5	15
(Subtotal)	(6%)	(10%)	(17%)	(29%)
Don't know	6	2	6	9
Total	101%	100%	101%	100%

Table 3.

Q. How important is it to you that the following rights be guaranteed in the country where you live? Is it very important, somewhat important, not very important or not important at all that:

COUNTRIES			
El Salvador (1102)	Panama (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1190)

■ **There is freedom to openly criticize the government.**

Very important	67%	83%	35%	40%
Somewhat important	18	10	41	27
(Subtotal)	(85%)	(93%)	(76%)	(67%)
Not very important	4	4	16	16
Not important at all	3	1	3	11
(Subtotal)	(7%)	(5%)	(19%)	(27%)
Don't know	8	2	5	6
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 4.

Q. How important is it to you that the following rights be guaranteed in the country where you live? Is it very important, somewhat important, not very important or not important at all that:

COUNTRIES			
El Salvador (1102)	Panama (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1190)

■ Stability and order are maintained.

Very important	78%	92%	74%	88%
Somewhat important	16	6	24	8
(Subtotal)	(94%)	(98%)	(98%)	(96%)
Not very important	1	1	0	1
Not important at all	0	0	0	1
(Subtotal)	(1%)	(1%)	(0%)	(2%)
Don't know	5	1	2	3
Total	100%	100%	100%	101%

Table 5.

Q. *How important is it to you that the following rights be guaranteed in the country where you live? Is it very important, somewhat important, not very important or not important at all that:*

COUNTRIES			
El Salvador (1102)	Panama (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1000)

■ **Honest elections are held regularly.**

Very important	76%	93%	66%	58%
Somewhat important	17	5	29	19
(Subtotal)	(93%)	(98%)	(95%)	(77%)
Not very important	2	2	2	10
Not important at all	1	0	0	6
(Subtotal)	(3%)	(2%)	(2%)	(16%)
Don't know	5	1	2	6
Total	101%	101%	99%	99%

Table 6.

Q. *How important is it to you that the following rights be guaranteed in the country where you live? Is it very important, somewhat important, not very important or not important at all that:*

COUNTRIES			
El Salvador (1102)	Panama (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1190)

■ **The judicial system punishes the guilty no matter who they are.**

Very important	78%	89%	79%	81%
Somewhat important	15	6	19	11
(Subtotal)	(93%)	(95%)	(98%)	(92%)
Not very important	2	2	0	2
Not important at all	1	1	0	1
(Subtotal)	(3%)	(3%)	(0%)	(3%)
Don't know	5	2	2	5
Total	101%	100%	100%	100%

Table 7.

Q. How important is it to you that the following rights be guaranteed in the country where you live? Is it very important, somewhat important, not very important or not important at all that:

COUNTRIES			
El Salvador (1102)	Panama (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1190)

■ The military is under the control of civilian leaders.

Very important	57%	*	8%	34%
Somewhat important	20	*	15	18
(Subtotal)	(77%)	*	(23%)	(52%)
Not very important	9	*	21	11
Not important at all	4	*	35	13
(Subtotal)	(13%)	*	(56%)	(24%)
Don't know	10	*	21	23
Total	100%	*	100%	99%

Table 8.

Q. How important is it to you that the following rights be guaranteed in the country where you live? Is it very important, somewhat important, not very important or not important at all that:

COUNTRIES			
El Salvador (1102)	Panama (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1190)

■ The media are free to report the news without government censorship.

Very important	71%	88%	48%	52%
Somewhat important	20	8	36	23
(Subtotal)	(91%)	(96%)	(84%)	(75%)
Not very important	2	2	6	8
Not important at all	1	0	4	6
(Subtotal)	(3%)	(2%)	(10%)	(14%)
Don't know	7	2	10	11
Total	101%	100%	104%	100%

Table 9.

Q. How important is it to you that the following rights be guaranteed in the country where you live? Is it very important, somewhat important, not very important or not important at all that:

COUNTRIES			
El Salvador (1102)	Panama (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1190)

■ **Everyone can freely practice their religion.**

Very important	77%	93%	58%	69%
Somewhat important	16	5	37	18
(Subtotal)	(93%)	(98%)	(95%)	(87%)
Not very important	2	1	4	7
Not important at all	1	0	1	4
(Subtotal)	(3%)	(1%)	(5%)	(11%)
Don't know	5	1	1	3
Total	101%	100%	101%	101%

Table 10.

Q. *How important is it to you that the following rights be guaranteed in the country where you live? Is it very important, somewhat important, not very important or not important at all that:*

COUNTRIES			
El Salvador (1102)	Panama (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1190)

■ **The rights of ethnic groups are protected.**

Very important	74%	91%	41%	65%
Somewhat important	15	5	45	18
(Subtotal)	(89%)	(96%)	(86%)	(83%)
Not very important	3	2	6	6
Not important at all	1	1	2	3
(Subtotal)	(4%)	(3%)	(8%)	(9%)
Don't know	6	2	5	8
Total	99%	101%	99%	100%

Table 11.

Q. Now I'm going to read these statements again. Please tell me if you think the statement describes our country or not. Do you believe that in our country:

COUNTRIES			
El Salvador (1102)	Panama (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1190)

■ **One can choose from several parties and candidates when voting.**

Describe	81%	91%	88%	81%
Does not describe	13	7	6	10
Don't know	6	2	6	9
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 12.

Q. Now I'm going to read these statements again. Please tell me if you think the statement describes our country or not. Do you believe that in our country:

<i>COUNTRIES</i>			
El Salvador <i>(1102)</i>	Panama <i>(1118)</i>	Romania <i>(1011)</i>	Ukraine <i>(1190)</i>

■ **There is freedom to openly criticize the government.**

Describe	63%	87%	80%	66%
Does not describe	29	10	12	24
Don't know	9	3	8	10
Total	101%	100%	100%	100%

Table 13.

Q. Now I'm going to read these statements again. Please tell me if you think the statement describe our country or not. Do you believe that in our country:

<i>COUNTRIES</i>			
El Salvador (1102)	Panama (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1190)

■ **Stability and order are maintained.**

Describe	64%	80%	26%	15%
Does not describe	30	18	68	80
Don't know	6	3	7	4
Total	100%	101%	101%	99%

Table 14.

Q. Now I'm going to read these statements again. Please tell me if you think the statement describes our country or not. Do you believe that in our country:

COUNTRIES			
El Salvador (1102)	Panama (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1190)

■ **Honest elections are held regularly.**

Describe	65%	85%	46%	35%
Does not describe	27	12	38	49
Don't know	8	2	16	16
Total	100%	99%	100%	100%

Table 15.

Q. Now I'm going to read these statements again. Please tell me if you think the statement describes our country or not. Do you believe that in our country:

COUNTRIES			
El Salvador (1102)	Panama (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1190)

■ **The judicial system punishes the guilty no matter who they are.**

Describe	62%	70%	21%	12%
Does not describe	31	27	67	76
Don't know	7	3	12	12
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 16.

Q. Now I'm going to read these statements again. Please tell me if you think the statement describes our country or not. Do you believe that in our country:

COUNTRIES			
El Salvador (1102)	Panama (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1190)

■ The military is under the control of civilian leaders.

Describe	51%	*	48%	32%
Does not describe	34	*	18	29
Don't know	15	*	34	39
Total	100%	*	100%	100%

Table 17.

Q. Now I'm going to read these statements again. Please tell me if you think the statement describes our country or not. Do you believe that in our country:

COUNTRIES			
El Salvador (1102)	Panama (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1190)

■ **The media are free to report the news without government censorship.**

Describe	66%	86%	37%	28%
Does not describe	24	11	35	45
Don't know	10	3	28	28
Total	100%	100%	100%	101%

Table 18.

Q. Now I'm going to read these statements again. Please tell me if you think the statement describes our country or not. Do you believe that in our country:

COUNTRIES			
El Salvador (1102)	Panama (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1190)

■ **Everyone can freely practice their religion.**

Describe	84%	96%	95%	86%
Does not describe	9	3	2	7
Don't know	7	1	3	7
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 19.

Q. *Now I'm going to read these statements again. Please tell me if you think the statement describes our country or not. Do you believe that in our country:*

COUNTRIES			
El Salvador (1102)	Panama (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1190)

■ **The rights of ethnic groups are protected.**

Describe	63%	76%	69%	39%
Does not describe	28	19	17	35
Don't know	8	5	14	26
Total	99%	100%	100%	100%

Table 20.

Q. Now I would like to ask you about some institutions and organizations. Please tell me how much confidence you have in the following domestic institutions and organizations. Do you have a great deal, a fair amount, not very much or no confidence in our:

	COUNTRIES			
	El Salvador (1102)	Panama (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1190)
■ National government.				
A great deal	20%	33%	8%	10%
A fair amount	23	29	18	33
(Subtotal)	(43%)	(62%)	(26%)	(43%)
Not very much	31	22	45	26
No confidence	17	10	25	19
(Subtotal)	(48%)	(32%)	(70%)	(45%)
Don't know	10	6	5	13
Total	101%	100%	101%	101%

Table 21.

Q. Now I would like to ask you about some institutions and organizations. Please tell me how much confidence you have in the following domestic institutions and organizations. Do you have a great deal, a fair amount, not very much or no confidence in our:

	COUNTRIES			
	El Salvador (1102)	Panama (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1190)
■ Parliament/Legislative Assembly				
A great deal	17%	26%	4%	9%
A fair amount	23	28	15	29
(Subtotal)	(40%)	(54%)	(19%)	(38%)
Not very much	30	25	42	29
No confidence	17	15	31	24
(Subtotal)	(47%)	(40%)	(75%)	(53%)
Don't know	13	6	8	9
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 22.

Q. Now I would like to ask you about some institutions and organizations. Please tell me how much confidence you have in the following domestic institutions and organizations. Do you have a great deal, a fair amount, not very much or no confidence in our:

	COUNTRIES			
	El Salvador (1102)	Panama (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1190)
■ Armed forces.				
A great deal	20%	*	38%	25%
A fair amount	20	*	41	38
(Subtotal)	(40%)	*	(79%)	(63%)
Not very much	28	*	11	15
No confidence	22	*	2	10
(Subtotal)	(50%)	*	(13%)	(25%)
Don't know				
	11	*	8	12
Total	101%	*	100%	100%

Table 23.

Q. Now I would like to ask you about some institutions and organizations. Please tell me how much confidence you have in the following domestic institutions and organizations. Do you have a great deal, a fair amount, not very much or no confidence in our:

	COUNTRIES			
	El Salvador (1102)	Panama (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1190)
■ Legal/judicial system (courts)				
A great deal	17%	22%	10%	6%
A fair amount	21	24	27	19
(Subtotal)	(38%)	(46%)	(37%)	(25%)
Not very much	31	28	36	31
No confidence	18	19	19	35
(Subtotal)	(49%)	(47%)	(55%)	(66%)
Don't know	13	7	8	10
Total	100%	100%	100%	101%

Table 24.

Q. Now I would like to ask you about some institutions and organizations. Please tell me how much confidence you have in the following domestic institutions and organizations. Do you have a great deal, a fair amount, not very much or no confidence in our:

	COUNTRIES			
	El Salvador (1102)	Panama (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1190)
■ Trade/labor Unions				
A great deal	14%	26%	6%	5%
A fair amount	21	25	18	21
(Subtotal)	(35%)	(51%)	(24%)	(26%)
Not very much	28	23	27	25
No confidence	23	18	29	33
(Subtotal)	(51%)	(41%)	(56%)	(58%)
Don't know	14	8	20	16
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

90

Table 25.

Q. Now I would like to ask you about some institutions and organizations. Please tell me how much confidence you have in the following domestic institutions and organizations. Do you have a great deal, a fair amount, not very much or no confidence in our:

COUNTRIES			
El Salvador (1102)	Panama (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1190)

■ **Civil service/government workers.**

A great deal	17%	25%	3%	5%
A fair amount	26	31	19	23
(Subtotal)	(43%)	(56%)	(22%)	(28%)
Not very much	31	26	39	27
No confidence	16	12	28	32
(Subtotal)	(47%)	(38%)	(67%)	(59%)
Don't know	10	6	10	13
Total	100%	100%	99%	100%

Table 26.

Q. Now I would like to ask you about some institutions and organizations. Please tell me how much confidence you have in the following domestic institutions and organizations. Do you have a great deal, a fair amount, not very much or no confidence in our:

	COUNTRIES			
	El Salvador (1102)	Panama (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1190)
■ Domestic press.				
A great deal	21%	35%	4%	9%
A fair amount	31	31	24	42
(Subtotal)	(52%)	(66%)	(28%)	(51%)
Not very much	28	21	42	27
No confidence	11	10	19	14
(Subtotal)	(39%)	(31%)	(61%)	(41%)
Don't know	9	5	11	9
Total	100%	102%	100%	101%

Table 27.

Q. Now I would like to ask you about some institutions and organizations. Please tell me how much confidence you have in the following domestic institutions and organizations. Do you have a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or no confidence in our:

	COUNTRIES			
	El Salvador (1102)	Panama (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1190)
■ Domestic radio.				
A great deal	29%	45%	11%	10%
A fair amount	29	29	46	44
(Subtotal)	(58%)	(74%)	(57%)	(54%)
Not very much	24	16	30	26
No confidence	9	7	6	13
(Subtotal)	(33%)	(23%)	(36%)	(39%)
Don't know	9	3	7	7
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 28.

Q. Now I would like to ask you about some institutions and organizations. Please tell me how much confidence you have in the following domestic institutions and organizations. Do you have a great deal, a fair amount, not very much or no confidence in our:

	COUNTRIES			
	El Salvador (1102)	Panama (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1190)
■ Domestic television.				
A great deal	*	*	8%	11%
A fair amount	*	*	37	45
(Subtotal)	*	*	(45%)	(56%)
Not very much	*	*	37	25
No confidence	*	*	10	13
(Subtotal)	*	*	(47%)	(38%)
Don't know	*	*	8	7
Total	*	*	100%	101%

Table 29.

Q. Do you think that the last elections (date) were free and fair or not?

	<u>COUNTRIES</u>			
	El Salvador (1102)	Panama (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1190)
Free and fair	50%	91%	53%	28%
Not free and Fair	30	6	31	46
Don't know	20	3	16	26
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 30.

Q. *Do you believe that people like yourself can have some effect on the decisions made by the national government – almost always, most of the time, only some of the time, or almost never?*

	COUNTRIES			
	El Salvador (1102)	Panama (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1190)
Almost always	3%	10%	7%	1%
Most of the time	10	9	20	8
(Subtotal)	(13%)	(19%)	(27%)	(9%)
Only some of the time	25	27	22	15
Almost never	39	51	45	70
(Subtotal)	(65%)	(78%)	(67%)	(85%)
Don't know	23	2	6	6
TOTAL	100%	99%	100%	100%

100

Table 31.

Q. *And what about the local level – do you believe that people like yourself can have some effect on the decisions made by local government – almost always, most of the time, only some of the time, or almost never?*

	<u>COUNTRIES</u>			
	El Salvador (1102)	Panama (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1190)
Almost always	5%	9%	12%	1%
Most of the time	10	11	22	11
(Subtotal)	(15%)	(20%)	(34%)	(12%)
Only some of the time	25	29	23	21
Almost never	46	48	38	62
(Subtotal)	(71%)	(77%)	(61%)	(83%)
Don't know	15	3	5	5
TOTAL	101%	100%	100%	100%

Table 32.

Q. Generally speaking, would you say that this country is run by a few big interests looking out for themselves, or that is run for the benefit of all the people?

	<u>COUNTRIES</u>			
	El Salvador <i>(1102)</i>	Panama <i>(1118)</i>	Romania <i>(1011)</i>	Ukraine <i>(1190)</i>
Few Big Interests	64%	47%	60%	82%
Benefit of all the people	21	41	26	5
Don't Know	15	12	13	13
TOTAL	100%	100%	99%	100%

Table 33.

Q. *How much do you trust the national government to do what is right? Do you trust it almost always, most of the time, only some of the time, or almost never?*

	<u>COUNTRIES</u>			
	El Salvador (1102)	Panama (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1190)
Almost always	9%	19%	7%	3%
Most of the time	16	23	18	13
(Subtotal)	(25%)	(42%)	(25%)	(16%)
Only some of the time	45	43	47	50
Almost never	17	12	23	29
(Subtotal)	(62%)	(55%)	(70%)	(79%)
Don't know	13	4	5	6
TOTAL	100%	101%	100%	101%

Table 34.

Q. Now I'm going to read you some statements that describe how some people feel. Others disagree. Please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with each of these statements.

COUNTRIES			
El Salvador (1102)	Panama (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1190)

■ I don't think our public officials care much about what people like me think.

Strongly agree	17%	26%	37%	51%
Somewhat agree	25	22	38	25
(Subtotal)	(42%)	(48%)	(75%)	(76%)
Somewhat disagree	13	12	14	12
Strongly disagree	26	33	7	7
(Subtotal)	(39%)	(45%)	(21%)	(19%)
Don't know	19	8	5	6
Total	100%	101%	101%	101%

Table 35.

Q. Now I'm going to read you some statements that describe how some people feel. Others disagree. Please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with each of these statements.

COUNTRIES			
El Salvador (1102)	Panama (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1190)

■ If a non-democratic leader took power who could solve our country's economic problems, I wouldn't care if that leader took away many of the political freedoms we now have.

Strongly agree	14%	21%	13%	22%
Somewhat agree	25	21	18	19
(Subtotal)	(39%)	(42%)	(31%)	(41%)
Somewhat disagree	12	8	18	21
Strongly disagree	33	45	38	19
(Subtotal)	(45%)	(53%)	(56%)	(40%)
Don't know	16	6	13	18
Total	100%	101%	100%	99%

Table 36.

Q. Now I'm going to read you some statements that describe how some people feel. Others disagree. Please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with each of these statements.

COUNTRIES			
El Salvador (1102)	Panama (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1190)

■ If I were wrongly accused of a crime, I'm sure our judicial system would find me innocent.

Strongly agree	0%	4%	13%	4%
Somewhat agree	4	25	29	12
(Subtotal)	(4%)	(29%)	(42%)	(16%)
Somewhat disagree	48	42	24	32
Strongly disagree	26	24	26	39
(Subtotal)	(74%)	(66%)	(50%)	(71%)
Don't know	23	5	8	14
Total	101%	100%	100%	101%

106

Table 37.

Q. Now I'm going to read you some statements that describe how some people feel. Others disagree. Please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with each of these statements.

	COUNTRIES			
	El Salvador (1102)	Panama (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1190)
■ Our judges are fair and honest and do not abuse their powers.				
Strongly agree	1%	7%	4%	2%
Somewhat agree	4	8	16	9
(Subtotal)	(5%)	(15%)	(20%)	(11%)
Somewhat disagree	1	4	30	30
Strongly disagree	4	3	33	46
(Subtotal)	(5%)	(7%)	(63%)	(76%)
Don't know	16	4	18	13
No Response				
	75	74	*	*
Total	101%	100%	101%	100%

107

Table 38.

Q. *What is your opinion about people's willingness to publicly express their political opinions in (Survey Country)? Would you say that: nobody is afraid to express his/her political opinions, only a few people, many people, or everyone is afraid to express his/her opinion?*

	COUNTRIES			
	El Salvador (1102)	Parana (1118)	Romania (1011)	Ukraine (1190)
Nobody is afraid	17%	31%	40%	37%
A few people	31	33	25	33
(Subtotal)	(48%)	(64%)	(65%)	(70%)
Many people	30	28	27	20
Everyone	17	6	5	5
(Subtotal)	(47%)	(34%)	(32%)	(25%)
Don't know	6	3	2	6
TOTAL	101%	101%	99%	101%