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**Breaking the Cycle of Despair:
President Clinton's Initiative on the Horn of Africa**

**Building a Foundation
for Food Security and Crisis Prevention
in the Greater Horn of Africa**

A Concept Paper for Discussion

November 1994

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Executive Summary

"Tribute is due to the great thinkers of our continent who have been, and are, trying to move all of us to understand the intimate inter-connection between the great issues of our day of peace, stability, democracy, human rights, cooperation and development. Even as we speak, Rwanda stands out as a stern and severe rebuke to all of us for having failed to address these interrelated matters."

**Nelson Mandela
at the Organization for African Unity meeting in Tunis
June 1994**

The Greater Horn of Africa -- a region comprising Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania -- remains a region in the throes of crisis. Famine, conflict and poverty have become all too common elements in these countries' differing levels of development.

In response to the existing and impending crises in the Greater Horn of Africa, President Clinton has called for a renewed commitment to these countries. It is in the interest of the international community to prevent further human suffering and political deterioration, and to work together to create an environment where future investments will result in sustainable development. This initiative represents a collaborative effort among African states, non-governmental organizations, concerned citizens, Inter-governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) and the international donor community to address the root causes of food insecurity in the Horn. This paper is forwarded not as a final product, but as a spark for a much needed dialogue among the mutual "owners" of this initiative. Only with the collective insight, creativity, and vision of these concerned parties can we respond effectively to these grave challenges.

To achieve the goal of food security requires changes in thought and action both in Africa and beyond. The way in which countries in the region relate to each other must change. The way donors approach country programs and assistance must be improved. The abilities of Africans to guide sustainable development efforts must be strengthened. Voices of peace and moderation, which all too often in the past have been cruelly ignored, must be heard. We must begin to look at the problem as a whole and not just the sum of its parts.

The Magnitude and Underlying Causes of Food Insecurity

A portrait of food insecurity in the region reveals acute and chronic food security concerns more severe than those of any other region in sub-Saharan Africa. Food insecurity

in the region is growing because of a complex and interrelated set of political, social and economic factors.

In 1989, an estimated 46 percent of the region's population, some 71 million people, were chronically food insecure. This percentage is greater than that of the overall figure for sub-Saharan Africa. This year an estimated 22 million people in the region required external food aid assistance. Nearly 11 million of these were refugees and internally displaced people, with another 11 million in danger of being severely drought-affected. Per capita food production declined in the region by more than 16 percent during 1980 to 1993 period. As a result, domestic food production per capita has declined and food import bills have placed increasing strains on trade balances. Donor food aid assistance has also increased. Regional per capita calorie availability (1,950 Kcal per capita per day) is less than the international minimum standard for survival of 2,100 calories, and much less than the standard for an adequate diet of 2,400 calories a day.

Solutions to these daunting problems must be grounded in an understanding of their root causes. It can be argued that the unstable social and political environments that have stunted economic growth in the region lie at the heart of inadequate food production and the low capacity to import foodstuffs. A number of factors have converged to create this instability: Poor economic policies have limited possibilities for intensification of agriculture and economic growth; growing population pressures and a lack of development of human resources have further stressed the natural resource base; civil strife and the absence of good governance structures have hindered equitable economic and social development; and the natural resource base of the region, although highly uneven, is limited in high production potential endowments. While these are some of the most immediately apparent factors that have eroded food security in the region, we hope that subsequent discussions will further our understanding of the region's problems.

An initial analysis of food insecurity in the region suggests the following framework as one way to address this humanitarian crisis. Again, this framework is a work in progress, one that will ultimately be strengthened by the critiques and insights of all those who help shape and implement it.

A Proposed Framework

In Preliminary discussions, members of the international community have voiced a recommitment to this region. For reasons of stable development, political interests and budgets, this renewed effort is needed. There is agreement that we need to collectively stimulate consensus on the goals and approaches to this task and institutionalize a new partnership in the region. This framework, when complete, will be entirely a product of the capabilities and input of national and regional African leaders and organizations, donors and all in the development community. Hope for the future lies in its creation and implementation.

The central goal of this framework is for the people of the Greater Horn region to achieve lasting food security. To achieve this goal there needs to be an institutionalized process of joint problem-solving to attack root causes of food insecurity.

The following suggested objectives outline a program of action for where this effort might begin:

- strengthen support for effective regional and national food security strategies;
- increase the capacity in the region for crisis prevention, response and conflict resolution;
- improve regional collaboration in promoting sustainable economic growth and reducing population growth rates; and,
- implement regional and national strategies to ensure the transition from crises to broad-based sustainable growth.

The Next Steps

The process suggested in this paper can be implemented if donors, country leaders, and non-governmental organizations approach the problems in a more integrated fashion. From mid-November to mid-December, we suggest that bilateral discussions for re-commitment to the Greater Horn of Africa take place in donor headquarters and African field offices. Simultaneous with donor discussions, joint donor meetings with African governments will be conducted.

We propose six steps to initiate a discussion on a recommitment to the Greater Horn region: First, regional institutions could be strengthened to perform stronger coordination roles for regional food security. We propose IGADD as an important regional institution. Second, options for a donors forum could be explored. Third, regional and national early warning systems could be expanded to cover the region, and to include political, security and social factors. Fourth, an international team might be asked to detail the principles that could guide the "relief-to-development continuum" approach. Fifth, joint analysis by donors and Africans could be undertaken to analyze strategies and priorities for agricultural and economic growth. And, sixth, joint donor/recipient portfolio reviews could be conducted to ensure that efforts contribute to a food security objective and that gaps in assistance are identified.

Open discussion, comments and alternatives, and ultimately decisions on the proposed concepts and framework are seriously solicited. The magnitude of human suffering and the hope for a better future demand urgent attention by the international community.

I. Introduction

International donor responses to the Greater Horn of Africa region, in many respects, reflect the region's turmoil. Throughout the world, as in the Greater Horn, the donor community is spending more on emergency relief and peacekeeping operations than on conflict prevention. The international community is spending more each year to dress the wounds of disaster and civil conflict while spending less on the development programs that might prevent them. This fact is nowhere more evident than in Somalia, where the U.S. contribution to the relief effort from the onset of Operation Restore Hope forward cost five times more than did its total development expenditures in Somalia for the 30 previous years.

The question is whether or not the aid dollars provided by the international community are being well-invested. Food aid alone cost donors more than \$4 billion between 1985 and 1992. Many believe that too much foreign assistance is being provided to address the symptoms of crisis in the region, while too little is being allocated to address the problems that cause them. The time has come for the international donor community to address the broader causes of disaster by placing a strategic focus on sustainable development while responding to the existing and impending crises in the region.


The rationale behind this recommitment is clear: The international community -- of which the governments and people of the Greater Horn are members -- can no longer afford to commit massive resources to the region that have little development payoff.

The proposed goal of this renewed effort is to achieve food security in the Horn. Food insecurity is both a cause and effect of crisis in the region and is, therefore, inextricably bound to crisis prevention. Drought and civil strife, two important sources of food insecurity, appear to be increasing in this region (Figure 1 (p.2)). Crisis prevention -- averting the horrors of another Somalia or Rwanda -- is an important objective. Collaboration on achieving food security is the wedge that breaks the "cycle of despair." Everyone living in the Greater Horn of Africa region, and everyone who is committed to its development, has a stake in achieving sustainable food security in the region. New ways of thinking, new ways of acting and new institutions should be adopted and supported by all partners in the region.

Humanitarian, political and development interests converge on this problem. Food insecurity reduces peoples' quality of life and fosters the social, political, environmental and economic instability associated with recurring crises.

Figure 1

Drought and Civil Strife in the Greater Horn



Source: U.S. State Department, 1994; World Bank, 1994.

II. Donors in the Greater Horn: The Historical Context and New Realities

During the Cold War period, outside powers were extensively involved in the internal affairs of African states. Both the United States and the USSR commonly exercised disproportionate influence over African domestic political and economic policy as well as foreign relations. One of the many negative consequences of this external involvement was that it fostered the notion among African leaders that solutions to political and economic problems were to be found externally and not locally. By and large, national governments followed either socialist or capitalist models of development, thus reinforcing the belief that there existed a development model or formula that could be imported from outside.

One of the most influential trends of the Cold War was the superpower support for centralized and authoritarian regimes that were highly militarized and whose activities fueled the burgeoning arms trade on the continent. Military expenditures outpaced social spending in many of the countries of the Greater Horn. Production was not geared to meet basic needs, but to sustain governments and to pursue wars. Inevitably, as conflict escalated in much of the region, food security decreased.

Another consequence of this period of misplaced priorities was a relentless economic decline. The confluence of armed conflict, failed policies, poor leadership and the increasing disenfranchisement of the citizenry undermined economic and social conditions in most of the region. This led to the collapse of market systems; the deterioration of tax and other revenue-collection systems; corruption and patronage; substantial military and other debt; increased food aid and Official Development Assistance (ODA) dependency; population growth in excess of economic growth; massive population displacement and, thus, shifting trade and labor patterns; an increase in black market trade both internally and across borders; a severe reduction in the village-level and household asset base; an increase in the number of female-headed households; a decline in the delivery of social services; growing risk-aversion on the part of subsistence producers; the continuation of inequitable land tenure systems; and, significantly, a sharp rise in the percentage of national populations considered vulnerable to external shocks.

As strategic interests in the Greater Horn region have declined, donor resolve to assist countries of the Greater Horn is being tested by the immense costs of recurrent crises, especially complex ones of a man made nature (Figures 2 and 3, p.5). U.S. expenditures in Somalia alone from the start of Operation Restore Hope in December 1992 to the present have been about \$1.6 billion. This is equivalent to two years of U.S. development assistance to all of sub-Saharan Africa. The European Union increased by five times its external humanitarian expenditure between 1990 and 1993, and many other foreign assistance agencies are experiencing similar trends.

The post-Cold War period has seen a shift in the basis of relationships between donors and recipient countries and a leveling-off of development assistance flows. Official Development Assistance to the Greater Horn in current dollars net of food aid and

emergency assistance rose from \$25 per capita in 1985 to \$36 per capita in 1990 and then dropped to \$27 per capita in 1992. While donors remain committed to provide relief for major humanitarian and development needs, demonstrable progress toward sustainable development should be paramount in consideration of future flows.

For many of the reasons described above, government development policies have not been implemented, and investments have not resulted in significantly increased capacity of national governments in the region to address the social and economic needs of their populations. Similarly, relief assistance, while undoubtedly saving lives, has fostered a dependency mentality among many recipients and has not contributed to addressing causes of recurring crises. In contrast to the Cold War era, donors increasingly recognize the limits on their ability to effect change without constructive leadership in recipient countries. Experience in Somalia over the last two years has further driven home lessons about the limits of successful donor intervention.


Though in its early stages, both donors and leaders in the region have embarked on a new and different approach, marked by greater power and authority being vested in Africans. Donors and regional leaders are structuring better partnerships. Development is characterized by efforts to ensure popular participation and the involvement of indigenous organizations. Host governments are expected to take the lead in development and economic reform programs in a new effort to achieve sustainability.

In recent years, the emphasis has begun to shift to the identification and implementation of local solutions and to more practical mechanisms for regional cooperation. In 1992, the leaders of five states in the region met in Addis Ababa to draft a regional framework on humanitarian principles. The Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) in 1993 became the umbrella for a regionally supported peace process in Sudan.

While constructive leadership in the region is necessary for improving returns on development investments, donors also must meet the challenge of applying foreign assistance resources differently. Political and social factors need to be better incorporated in planning. The "relief-to-development continuum" concept is a good example of this new approach to assistance. Relief should address a wider set of issues to prevent humanitarian crises and reinforce investments aimed at sustainable development. Similarly, development aid should facilitate emergency prevention and response but focus on ameliorating the root causes of food insecurity and instability. All resources should be integrated to achieve the greatest impact with the least duplication.

A recommitment is needed to address the combined problems of the region and the international community. At the regional level, this means tackling the challenge of achieving food security with the ultimate objective of reducing economic and political vulnerability; at the international level, it means developing integrated approaches that are driven from the ground up.


USAID Development Aid vs Emergency Expenditures Greater Horn of Africa



Source: USAID, 19944

Figure 3

Total Donor Food Aid to the Greater Horn (1966 to 1993)



Source: FAO/USDA 1994

III. The Magnitude and Causes of Food Insecurity and Prospects for Change

This section describes the food insecurity problem in the Greater Horn of Africa, examines the most important causes of food insecurity and lays the foundation for developing a framework for action. This preliminary problem identification section will need to be jointly refined by those who commit to this effort.

A. The Magnitude of Food Insecurity

Although there is considerable variation across countries in this region, the regional statistics and trends presented below paint a stark portrait of food insecurity.

- In the late 1980s, an estimated 71 million people, or 46 percent of the region's population, were chronically food insecure. This percentage is higher than that for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole and has continued to increase in the past five years (Figure 4, p.13).
- In August 1994, approximately 22 million people in the region were in need of external food aid assistance. Nearly 11 million of these were refugees and internally displaced people, most of whom fled their homes as a consequence of civil strife. Another 11 million are severely drought-affected. Most refugees and internally displaced people do not have the resources for sustained access to food supplies. The 7.3 million internally displaced were concentrated in five countries: Sudan, Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and Somalia. Every country in the region except Eritrea hosts some of the 3.8 million refugees.
- Per capita food production declined in the region by more than 16 percent over the 1980 to 1993 period (Figure 5, p.13).
- As domestic food production per capita has declined, food import bills have placed increasing strains on trade balances and donor food aid assistance has increased substantially. The value of food imports as a percentage of export earnings has risen from a low of about 27 percent in 1980 to more than 35 percent in the early 1990s. The capacity of most countries in the region to significantly increase commercial imports is limited by low export earnings.
- Regional per capita calorie availability (1,950 Kcal per capita per day) is less than the international minimum standard for survival of 2,100 calories and much less than the standard for an adequate diet of 2,400 calories (Figure 6, p.13). These current levels, stagnant for the last 10 years, are even below those attained in the region in the 1960s.

- The Greater Horn region is one of the poorest in the world. Gross National Product per capita is US\$167, and growth rates, which were negative throughout most of the 1980s, averaged -2 percent in the early 1990s. Poverty analyses done by the World Bank suggest that skewed income distribution in some countries (Kenya, Tanzania) makes food access a struggle for many even when food is nationally available.
- Poor nutritional and health status indicators are another dimension of high food insecurity. The regional infant mortality rate is 107 deaths per 1,000 with malnutrition underlying more than one-third of infant and child deaths. The prevalence of wasting (low weight to height measurement) of children under 2 years was between 30 percent and 45 percent in 1990 for the six countries for which data were available. Malnutrition also may be implicated in up to 80 percent of maternal deaths. Country-specific data are shown in Table 1 (p.14).

The magnitude of food insecurity in the Greater Horn of Africa remains a compelling human crisis.

B. The Root Causes of Food Insecurity

At the root of this alarming description of food insecurity is an unstable social and political environment that has precluded sustainable economic growth. A number of factors have converged to create this instability: Poor economic policies have inhibited the development of agriculture based on comparative advantage and intensification of agriculture, retarding economic growth; growing population pressures have combined with a lack of investment in human resource development, further stressing the natural resource base; civil strife and a scarcity of democratic institutions have undermined sustainable growth strategies; and the natural resource base of the region is highly uneven, and several countries have limited areas of high agricultural production potentials. Linked to weak national institutions are weak regional institutions precluding effective action on these underlying causes. These causes and their relative importance should be jointly analyzed with African organizations to help guide integrated efforts to overcome food insecurity.

1. Natural Resource Constraints

The limitations of the natural environment in the Greater Horn place certain constraints on improving food security. The chances of drought occurring in parts of the Greater Horn have increased from a probability of one in every six years to one in three years for those areas affected. Over the last decade there are two apparent changes in long-term weather patterns. First, there is a mean decrease in annual rainfall in the Sahelian Zone of Sudan; and second, interannual variability of rainfall has been increasing in the crescent from Kenya to Sudan, including parts of Ethiopia and Tanzania.

Repeated occurrences of drought and high variability in precipitation have reduced the ability of many smallholders to maintain their assets or to respond when conditions are good. Other natural disasters such as pest infestations and periodic flooding destroy area-specific production levels. Analysis of these factors argues for an more effective weather and pest early warning system in the region.

Increases in agricultural production in the past in many of the Greater Horn countries resulted from expansion onto new lands; notable exceptions include parts of Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda, where land scarcity has led to intensified use of existing land. The movement onto new lands, without improvement of management techniques, has caused environmental deterioration. In several countries, there is little additional land to be brought into production -- but there exists potential for agricultural intensification. However, in many areas few incentives exist to intensify. Roads are inadequate, and market distortions are common due to poor policies, including pricing, land rights, and, in some areas, poorly targeted food aid programs. Arable land in Ethiopia exists, but required investments in infrastructure and malaria eradication would be costly. Unexploited water resources exist, but the potential has not been fully explored and can be costly. The current accounting shows that our knowledge of the region's natural resource endowment is less than adequate.

Lack of agricultural intensification and low agricultural productivity mean that many of those in rural areas remain subsistence producers, and, therefore, the large quantity of food at low prices which is essential for economic growth in urban areas is not available. Productivity increases and growth linkages both in rural areas and between urban and rural areas are a prerequisite to increased incomes and sustained access to basic foodstuffs. Other food sources that have been neglected and could provide these linkages include livestock and aquatic resources. Aquaculture could be enhanced, and the rational use of marine resources could be promoted (six of the 10 countries have access to marine resources). Livestock are also extremely important throughout the region, but continued difficulties in policies such as disease control, grazing rights and supply of important inputs inhibit production increases. A component of a successful regional food security strategy needs to focus on regional research and diversification in resource management, and growth linkages throughout these economies.

2. Poor Economic Policy Environment

Agricultural intensification and the development of product markets and processing industries have not occurred partly because of a poor policy framework that has led to inadequate research, a lack of appropriate technologies and weak dissemination of existing technologies. Many policies persist that neglect the critical role of women in agriculture and restrict their full involvement in that and other sectors.

Economic and agricultural policies that distort prices of agricultural inputs and outputs adversely affect investment in agricultural production, marketing and storage, and incomes earned from these activities. While structural adjustment programs have improved

some critical pricing and other administrative control issues, difficult policy problems remain, especially privatization, land tenure, access to critical inputs, and international and domestic trade. Policy reform is a high priority because it is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for growth.

Weak market integration due to both poor infrastructure and domestic and international trade restrictions affect the ability of food surplus countries and regions to export to food deficit countries and regions. Public infrastructure, an important condition for both food availability and access, remains limited in all countries. For example, road systems do not reach the majority of the population in Ethiopia and are a woefully inadequate support to an active and extensive agricultural trade in Tanzania. The eight major railroad systems in the region are in various stages of disrepair. Cross-border trade restrictions as well as restrictions on internal movement of foodstuffs has prohibited the private sector from responding to shortages when and where they exist. Some progress has been made in lifting these restrictions, but additional policy analysis and reforms are needed.

Liberalization of marketing systems has encouraged the growth of small trading firms and entrepreneurs in several countries, but viable commercial enterprises throughout the food system (storage, assembly, processing and marketing) are lacking. The lack of development of efficient services is to some extent linked to the inadequacy of roads and the availability and cost of trucking. In many areas private traders are not able to respond to the liberalized markets because of lack of access to working capital. In addition to policy constraints, firms in this area need technology, financing and management support to increase food availability at low cost.

3. Rapid Population Growth and a Poor Human Resource Base

Population growth rates in the region were very low before 1950. In the four decades from 1954 to 1994, population tripled, growing from about 61 million to approximately 186 million. The current regional population growth rate is 2.9 percent. A partial explanation for food insecurity is that the greatly increased population of the Greater Horn may have approached or exceeded the carrying capacity of the fragile environment in some areas. With reduced fallow, barely arable land being cultivated and increased grazing pressures to feed livestock, increasing soil erosion and deforestation are reducing productivity. High population growth must be dealt with immediately, even though the impact of policies implemented now will only occur over the long-term.

Population growth rates remain high because of poverty and accompanying problems of poor child survival rates. Limited access to or the absence of basic services such as health facilities and education has meant low contraceptive prevalence rates, poor bodily absorption of available food nutrients because of disease and high infant mortality. Illiteracy rates in the region, especially high for women, exceed the average for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole and correlate closely with fertility and high infant mortality rates. Another urgent problem that transcends borders is the spread of HIV/AIDS throughout these countries.

These poor levels of health undermine increases in labor productivity and represent a considerable barrier to increases in growth. Improvements in health services and education, especially those targeted to women, will contribute to reducing population growth rates and average family size over time. A healthy and educated population will, in turn, contribute to productivity increases and economic growth.

4. Civil Strife and Absence of Good Governance

For the last 25 years, armed conflict has been endemic to the region; since 1980, the number of Greater Horn countries suffering the consequences of civil strife at any one time has increased from three to five or six per year. Both military confrontation and attendant political instability have undermined food security in the region in direct and indirect ways. Agricultural production has been disrupted by actual conflict, by war-induced mass migrations and by an emphasis on defense over and above agricultural and social sector spending. Each of the greatest food crises of recent years -- Ethiopia in 1984-85, Somalia in 1992, Sudan since 1987 and Rwanda in 1994 -- has been generated by conflict.

Insecurity in the Greater Horn region ranges from full-scale warfare to cross-border clashes. In all cases, the militarization of the region during the Cold War era has contributed to the scale of conflict as well as to the tendency to resolve disputes by force. Governance in the Greater Horn region has for decades been characterized by autocratic rule and by extensive centralization required to maintain state power. This has, in turn, resulted in the growing political and economic disenfranchisement of the majority and in the retardation of the growth of democratic institutions in government or civil society. Armed conflict has evolved as the most readily available course of political interaction.

The structures of governance in the region have not only arrested popular participation in political decision-making and spawned armed conflict; they also have directly affected development. Weak, unstable or highly centralized governance structures have proven inadequate to the task of responding to food crises, even in cases where early warning indicators might have allowed for famine mitigation or prevention. The militarization and centralization of governance also has meant that the social sectors, including, for example, education, have received low priority. Illiteracy rates for the region are among the highest in Africa. Total illiteracy is above 50 percent for all countries but two, and in three countries, illiteracy rates for women exceed 85 percent. A healthy, well-trained labor force is a prerequisite for increased economic production; and at the same time, education is both a means and an end to a responsible citizenry.

There are cases for both optimism and pessimism in the potential for resolution of these crises in the region. In some parts of the Greater Horn the tide has turned. The 30-year war between Ethiopia and Eritrea has been resolved. Uganda has emerged from a past of terror and armed conflict. However, the Greater Horn region has seen -- in Somalia and Rwanda -- the emergence of "failed states".

5. Weak Regional Institutions and Donor Coordination

The absence of stable and legitimate national governance structures and the continuation of cross-border conflict have precluded strong regional organizations to deal with complex regional problems such as refugees, trade, arms flows, natural disasters, etc. Regional analysis and action are needed in these areas, and forums could be supported in which comparative experiences can be shared to increase options. One regional institution, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development, exists but is relatively weak. However, African leaders have indicated their support to strengthen IGADD, and other donors have initiated actions in this direction.

Donor involvement in the region has often been duplicative, conflicting or conducted without local participation. No mechanism comparable to the Club du Sahel exists that could improve collaboration among donors, and integrate actions of donors and African organizations. In-country donor coordination is often limited to the exchange of information after implementation. Not only is a regional coordination forum lacking, but no national structure exists for joint problem identification and joint resolution with donors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Societies of the region lack recognition of the benefits that accrue to nations from regional coordination. National organizations need to move beyond their preoccupation with national-level solutions where efficient and effective regional approaches can be formed.

C. Prospects for Growth in Food Production

The Greater Horn region is beset by some of the most intractable problems on the African continent. The difficulty of quickly turning around this bleak picture of food security for the region as a whole can be seen in projections of growth rates of critical parameters (food production and population) over the next 15 years. The World Bank and other research bodies have portrayed the necessary and sufficient conditions for progress toward attaining food security as increases of 4 percent GDP and 4 percent agricultural production growth or more, along with a reduction in population growth rates. Applying these conditions in the Greater Horn, projections from 1995 to 2010 range from a small, but significant increase in the food deficit to a doubling of the current deficit. Using the most optimistic assumptions about food and population growth rates, while keeping consumption constant (1,950 calories per capita), a small surplus in the regional food balance sheet results. Assuming no change in the current population growth rate of 2.9 percent, or the current food production growth rate of 2.1 percent, the regional food deficit will double in 15 years.

This analysis is only illustrative, and the focus on growth in food production does not imply that countries in the Greater Horn region should be food self-sufficient. Economic growth options in other areas that would provide capacity for countries to import also need to be analyzed. Annual food production growth rates of 4 percent in the next decade are, however, difficult to conceive, given past performance. Yet, there is cause for optimism as

such rates are, in fact, possible, according to recent analyses. Until 1990, the region experienced increases in food production of over 4 percent every third or fourth year. Precipitous declines in Somalia because of conflict have contributed to the negative trends; similarly, production levels have dropped in Rwanda and Burundi, but both countries experienced consistently positive national food balances until the late 1980s.

There are two important issues that a regional analysis masks. First, even in countries with national surpluses such as Tanzania and Uganda, nutritional indicators reveal considerable food insecurity for a large proportion of the population. Country-level statistics in Table 1 show unacceptably high infant mortality rates in these countries. Issues of access to food and other important basic needs within countries also must be addressed.

Second, dividing the region into a Northern and Southern tier reveals the production diversity of the region, which also indicates that there may be a partial solution to food problems through an expansion of regional food and livestock trade. Whereas countries in the Northern tier (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia) tend to have structural food deficits, the Southern tier countries (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) were as a group experiencing food surpluses until the end of the 1980s (either through domestic production or through the capacity to import). Although without concessional food neither Eritrea nor Ethiopia would make it through a "normal" year without a food crisis (Ethiopia has an annual structural food deficit usually in excess of 1 million metric tons), Sudan experiences considerable surpluses of sorghum every three years. These surpluses are frequently difficult to export. Absent political conflict, this production potential could be increased to three out of every five years. Several Southern tier countries experienced food surpluses until the end of the 1980s. Kenya was a food surplus country until 1988 but may be facing a continuing structural food deficit requiring significant commercial imports. In fact, Kenya is currently importing cereals from Uganda, as well as from outside the region.

Although the pressure on food availability for the region as a whole is growing, the individual country analyses indicate that there is still considerable scope within the region for increases in productivity and that regional trade can be a contributing factor in stimulating this production. In the short term, the Greater Horn region will require considerable assistance to raise consumption levels, but policies that promote sustained growth in agriculture through intensification and which emphasize comparative advantages can contribute to increasing regional and national food security.

The preliminary description of the food security problems and the analysis of the magnitude and root causes of this insecurity suggest the following as a possible framework for addressing this humanitarian crisis. It is a broad framework that starts with food security as the opening wedge to international and regional cooperation to break the cycle of despair in the Greater Horn of Africa region.

Figure 4

Food Insecure Population
Percent by Region




Figure 5

Food Production Index
Greater Horn




Figure 6

Food Security Gap
Horn of




Table 1: Basic Indicators for Countries in the Greater Horn

Country	GNP Per Capita (US \$)	Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) (1992)	Prevalence of Wasting Children Under 2 (1990s)	Fertility Rate (1992)	Adult Illiteracy
Burundi	210	106	43.5	6.8	50
Djibouti	--	115	--	--	--
Ethiopia	110	122	45	7.5	75
Eritrea	--	--	--	--	--
Kenya	310	66	31.6	5.4	31
Rwanda	250	117	38.4	6.2	50
Somalia	--	132	--	6.8	76
Sudan	--	99	--	6.1	73
Tanzania	110	92	36.7	6.3	35
Uganda	170	122	31.8	7.1	52
Greater Horn	167	107	--	--	57
Sub-Saharan Africa	530	99	--	6.1	50

IV. A Proposed Framework

This proposed approach will be discussed and modified with other organizations of the U.S. Government, other donors, national and regional African leaders, and private and other non-governmental organizations before adoption.

In essence, what is proposed is that the international community recommit to (1) provide long-term help to the Greater Horn region and (2) operate in a more effective, integrated way. Institutionalizing integrated operations will reveal gaps in solutions to food security and crisis prevention and provide a credible base to mobilize the resources needed to address the root causes of these problems.

A. The Goal and Purpose

The goal of the initiative is for the people of the Greater Horn region to achieve lasting food security. Ensuring food security is seen as the most important way to reduce the economic and political vulnerability of the people of the Greater Horn. Food security is meant in the broadest sense of the concept:

- adequate food availability at the regional, national and sub-national levels with sufficient quantities of necessary types of food consistently available to individuals and households;
- sustained access (entitlements) to food by those currently vulnerable to food deficiencies, particularly because of conflict, displacement and other crises; and,
- proper utilization including sufficient micro-nutrient intake, adequate health services and clean water to ensure proper absorption, and appropriate knowledge and inputs for good storage, preparation, and use.

The purpose of this framework is an institutionalized process of joint problem-solving to address root causes of food insecurity.

B. New Institutions, New Ways of Thinking and New Ways of Acting

Three new institution-building initiatives could be undertaken to ensure that the purpose will be achieved, and that the framework is further developed with regional and international participation.

- 1) International donors could support the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Disaster (IGADD) enabling it to become a viable regional coordinator for food security strategies, an objective currently within its mandate. There is an organizational vacuum in the region for policy analysis, coordination and monitoring,

and African leaders have indicated that IGADD is an appropriate sub-regional institution to assume this role. Regional technical and private associations also could be strengthened to supplement government analysis and planning.

- 2) A new donor forum could be formed. Lessons from CILSS (Intergovernmental Committee Against Drought in the Sahel) and SADC (Southern Africa Development Community) in the 1980s and 1990s show that a donor forum is important in a process for achieving regional food security and crisis prevention. True donor coordination and integration in the region would add value to all national and international activities.
- 3) National Action Committees at the governmental level could be established or adapted to undertake joint donor/recipient problem-solving. This mechanism also could draw in representation from other organizations such as international and local non-governmental organizations and the private sector.

New ways of thinking about food insecurity in the region are required by the magnitude of the problem described above. All organizations involved in the development process in the region need to be part of this new approach. The following principles are a starting point for discussions:

- Think crisis prevention/early warning. The root causes of food security problems, including political and social factors, need to be addressed. Political and social indicators could be brought into early warning systems, and better methods for linking warning to response in these areas could be developed.
- Assume prolonged or recurring instability. Development practitioners usually assume stability in planning. A high occurrence of shocks and the continuing presence of instability are, however, the norm in this region.
- Adopt common objectives and complementary approaches. If all donors and national governments commit to the objective of regional food security and develop complementary programs, a higher return on investments will be achieved. This process requires a review of current programs to identify overlaps and gaps.
- Plan jointly with a transparent approach. Both donors and national governments would agree to programs of action which provides guarantees of support on both sides in return for a joint commitment to tackle difficult and sometimes risky development problems.
- Integrate political-security factors with relief-development assistance. The proposed institutions can serve as fora for exploring new approaches as and vehicles for facilitating new and creative actions in crisis prevention and conflict resolution. Awareness of the linkages between instability and conflict, and relief and development, should lead to the promotion and elevation of sound humanitarian principles (e.g., the 1992 Regional Summit

on Humanitarian Issues) and acknowledgment of the fundamental civil, human and political rights of people. Deliberate efforts to ensure that development activities foster equitable access to both resources and opportunities and support for the basic principles of democratization at the national and grassroots levels also are suggested. These actions also might include establishing and developing government and civil democratic institutions and supporting efforts to decentralize power and authority.

- **Integrate all resources.** Internal and external resources for the region need to be better integrated toward the common objective of food security. In addition, stronger coordination within donor country agencies that provide resources to the region, e.g. ministries of development, agriculture, foreign affairs, etc., will bring the highest return on those investments.

New ways of acting also are essential to ensure a successful initiative. We offer the following as a start:

- **Consider a wider set of contributing causes.** Participants engaged in building a new foundation should be prepared to act on a wider set of contributing causes to the cycle of despair in the Greater Horn. The causes of food insecurity are multiple, complex and often regional in nature. Participants in joint problem identification may not agree on the priority of problems. Central to the achievement of food security, however, is the willingness of all to consider failures and successes of past efforts and to identify and act simultaneously on a wider set of contributing causes. It is increasingly necessary to address political instability. This framework calls for action to address political instability where it significantly increases the vulnerability of people to food insecurity.

- **Adopt the "relief-to-development continuum" approach.** The framework adopted should consider this approach in which short-term emergency responses and long-term development assistance would be integrated and undertaken simultaneously. Strategies would be developed to ensure the transition from crisis to broad-based sustainable development. Three concepts characterize this continuum:

Integration. These new ways of acting could be characterized by the integration of emergency relief and development programs. Relief resources can be used to address both immediate needs and longer-term objectives. Food aid distribution programs could support market development and agricultural productivity increases. Linking relief aid to longer-term objectives is illustrated through some programs in southern Sudan, which have aimed not just at meeting food needs but, importantly, have supported the rehabilitation of local productive capacity, particularly in agriculture and livestock, and have developed local capacity in health and sanitation. On the development side, programs would be based on sound risk assessments that identify vulnerabilities in social, political and physical infrastructure and provide means for preventing and mitigating disasters. Studies need to be undertaken to determine where investment in low-productivity areas, perhaps at the cost of growth dividends, may have high payoffs in social and economic stability, i.e., crisis prevention.

Methods to incorporate the probability of disasters into development strategies have begun to be developed and applied by major donors and some national governments, which urgently require policy implications from these exercises.

Simultaneous Action. An effective strategy also will require simultaneity in implementation. Practitioners need to deliver immediate life-saving food along with inputs allowing people to meet their own food needs, but, simultaneously, they need to use the good will and leverage of relief and recovery actions to move on short-, medium-, and long-term agendas (such as market reform, land reforms and stabilizing population growth) to solve the root causes of food insecurity.

Transitions and Gaps. While countries receive relief, rehabilitation and recovery activities necessary to fill gaps between crisis and sustainable development are often neglected. Examples of post-crisis transitions indicate that there is often under-investment in activities such as the demobilization of ex-combatants, demining, rehabilitation and reconstruction of critical infrastructure, and resettlement of refugees.

Operating principles on how to apply these new ways of thinking and new ways of acting would need to be jointly developed, and relief and development practitioners would need to be trained to think and act differently. Each donor would need to examine these principles within the constraints and mandates of their institutions. It is increasingly clear, however, that a new approach with real change is needed to address the magnitude of the problem in this region.

The inter-relationships of the major components of the proposed framework are summarized and illustrated in Figure 7 (p.22). Food security is the common goal on which all parties would focus complementary efforts organized through new regional coordination and national decision-making institutions. Although donors may play a large role in the beginning, their role should diminish over time with the impact of effective regional and national strategies. New thinking would be developed on how to integrate political and social factors with development efforts across a continuum from early warning-relief-recovery to development. Simultaneous implementation of interventions is needed to address the root causes of food insecurity. Some programs may not have a measurable impact for 15 years, but these should be implemented at the same time as interventions that have an immediate and short-term impact.

Sustained change in the Greater Horn of Africa will take at least a generation and probably more. All too often, international aid and financial institutions, as well as local government officials, fall into the "quick-fix" trap, advocating and designing programs aimed at resolving a crisis in one or two years.

C. Proposed Objectives for a Program of Action

Achieving food security in the Greater Horn region requires a program of action that addresses the root causes of food insecurity. The preliminary analysis of these root causes revealed critical obstacles to achieving food security in the region. Four objectives are proposed below as a framework in which we can together address these root causes. Projects appropriate for regional and national solutions would be formulated during regional consultations and by National Action Committees.

Objective 1: Strengthened support for effective regional and national food security strategies

Food security has been defined to include three aspects: availability, access and utilization at regional, national and household levels. Some countries experience serious problems of national food availability. Where countries have the potential to increase production, as well as the comparative advantage to do so, they will need to concentrate attention on improvement in policies and availability of technologies. This would imply a major research effort. However, some countries will not have a comparative advantage in food production, and economic growth in other sectors might be the best means to address food access problems. In these countries, and in sub-national regions where food insecurity cannot be alleviated through production, food access must be addressed through economic growth strategies and through systems for the effective identification and targeting of public works programs or other food safety nets. Much more would need to be done to encourage trade in the region between food surplus and food deficit countries.

Significant work has already been done on national and regional food security strategies for several of the countries of the region. For example, in 1990, with European Union funding, and with assistance from several British universities, IGADD prepared a regional food security strategy for six of the 10 countries in the Greater Horn. A ministerial-level conference in Kampala unanimously endorsed the resolution to implement "The Food Security Strategy for the IGADD Region." This analysis and similar work could be considered as a basis for the further development of this framework.

Objective 2: Increased capacity within the region for crisis prevention, response, mitigation and resolution

Crisis prevention involves the ability to foresee, and the means to prevent, prepare for, and mitigate or resolve crisis and conflict. Crises in the Greater Horn region have been and continue to be of a complex nature, in which there are political and economic dimensions that are often exacerbated by natural or external events. Effective prevention requires monitoring and analytical capacity at the regional, national and local levels, as well as the ability and will to respond to warning signs of all kinds (weather, economic, social and political) in a timely and appropriate manner. While there is a growing consensus that

interventions must be made in the region proactively, rather than reactively, the ability to do so will depend upon institutional capacity, good governance and effective coordination at the regional and international levels.

Effective capacity for crisis prevention depends on a balance between the complementary roles of the African state and civil society. There are many advocates of democracy and good governance. Multiple views exist, however, about the timing, sequencing and ownership of the processes through which these are achieved. Solutions to the larger issues of democracy and good governance can often be discovered in the process of working toward more limited objectives. Dimensions of democracy across a wide range of groups in the state and civil society should therefore be encouraged in such vital areas as agriculture and natural resources, education and family planning. In the state sector, local government and judicial bodies might receive special attention. Women's groups and indigenous NGOs are particularly important civil institutions.

Objective 3: Greater regional collaboration in promoting sustainable economic growth and reducing population growth rates

Measures described in the first objective that increase the productivity of food crop farming and which improve the access to and distribution of food supplies will be essential to achieving food security in the Greater Horn. Long-term food security also depends, however, on the sustained, broad-based growth of economies, which results in rising incomes on an equitable basis. Broad-based economic growth will require an appropriate policy environment, as well as support for sectors in addition to the food sector, such as export products, microenterprises and processing industries.

Population growth rates currently outstrip gains in economic growth. Investment in human resources through expanded programs in family planning, health and nutrition services, and education have the benefits of both improving the human resource base, thereby increasing productivity, and lowering population growth rates. A stronger human resource base is a precondition for sustained economic growth. Women deserve particular attention in this regard given the evidence that their educational status, income-earning capacity and nutritional condition are among the most important determinants of child survival rates and reduced demand for more children.

In determining growth strategies, it will be important to link the technical analyses proposed (particularly on agricultural production, natural resource development and social sector reform) with the broader macroeconomic and structural adjustment reform agenda and policy dialogue. This could be accomplished through technical symposia of research networks involving a broad array of public and private sector entities and institutions, or through more formal negotiating sessions under the aegis of IGADD or international donor institutions. Building the capacity of Africans to undertake technical and applied sectoral analysis to support effective policy dialogue would contribute significantly to this process.


Objective 4: Support of strategies to ensure the transition from crisis to broad-based sustainable growth

Nearly all of the countries of the Greater Horn region are in various stages of transition in and out of crisis, and none has escaped the fallout of crisis in neighboring countries. Emergency relief is being delivered to almost all of these countries. The transition from emergency relief to development programs, however, is made difficult by the lingering effects of these crises: large numbers of refugees and displaced persons, high military presence and crumbling infrastructures, among others. Given the great spillover of the effects of crisis on neighboring countries, the difficulties of transition in one country impede transition in the region as a whole.

The management of emergency interventions has generally been successful in saving lives. The means of achieving sustained development is well understood. But strategies for the successful transition from emergencies to development are not widely known, or if known, not often followed. Filling the transition "gap" in assistance strategies will be critical to achieving food security in the Greater Horn. Developing programs to ensure successful transitions may require changes in donor assistance mechanisms, and at the least, will entail considerable cooperation among donor agencies, international governmental organizations, the NGO community and a wide range of African organizations.

Figure 7

The Food Security Wedge



V. The Next Steps

The process outlined in this paper can be implemented if donors, African leaders and private and non-governmental organizations approach food security problems in a more integrated fashion, using new thinking and new actions.

The facilitative actions that follow are suggested as first steps in the implementation of an international recommitment. A tentative timeline follows in Table 2 (p.26). All such actions should be undertaken in a way that builds local capacities and institutionalizes the processes for sustainability.

1. IGADD and professional and private regional associations could be strengthened to perform stronger coordination roles for regional food security. IGADD also could support and facilitate improved policy analysis. IGADD could assist the coordination and monitoring of food insecurity across the region by providing a clearinghouse for information and comparative experiences, developing methods for regional solutions and providing training in these methods. The current United Nations Development Program institutional assessment of IGADD will help donors assess what assistance is required to strengthen the institution.
2. The options for a donors forum could be explored. Integrated approaches through a donors forum would promote complementary work plans, support cross-border solutions and promote transparency as a *modus operandi* for all efforts. A forum could serve to mobilize long-term commitments to address root causes of food insecurity in the Greater Horn of Africa. Options include a new forum, a sub-group under the Club du Sahel or a donors counterpart to IGADD, etc.
3. Regional and national early warning systems could be expanded to cover the region with access to findings by all parties. The system could include political, security and social factors and be connected to national, regional and international decision-making and response mechanisms.
4. An international, interdisciplinary team composed of African and donor members (including crisis prevention, relief, recovery, food security and economic development practitioners) might be asked to detail the principles that could guide the "continuum" approach for integrating prevention and relief-recovery-development. If this research and analysis phase is successful, the donors could support training for African and donor practitioners in regional and national food security organizations so that these principles will guide their operations.

5. Joint analysis by donors and Africans could be undertaken to: (a) analyze strategies for agriculture and economic growth; (b) collect knowledge on and model the necessary conditions to achieve food security; and (c) determine the relative importance of causes and optional interventions to achieve food security.
6. Joint donor/recipient portfolio reviews, based on the above analysis, could be conducted to determine how the present efforts serve to reduce national and regional food insecurity. The reviews also would show the degree to which current operations accord with continuum principles and contribute to a food security objective.

If Africans expand their efforts to address root causes of food insecurity, donors could recommit to not only help meet immediate and short-term food needs (two to four years), but to address medium (five to 10 years) and long-term (10-20 years) root causes as well. Clear specification of mutual commitment would be required. Under the concept of "variable geometry" (where each country moves as fast as it can in the agreed direction), this commitment will vary by country. All donors and host countries could work together to identify gaps in assistance, which would be filled on the basis of comparative advantage.

To facilitate these "process" actions, flexible donor support will be needed to fund research, assessments, analysis, conferences and contract staff. Appropriate "Horn of Africa Support Projects" could be established by donor and recipient programs to facilitate the initial activities.

The six suggested actions described above could be jointly accomplished with modest funding at a Facilitative Level, (\$7 million-\$10 million each). If donors and recipients went no further than these actions, the resulting changes in integrated processes should produce important efficiencies. If all parties decided to move forward, a start-up level of funding (\$25 million -\$75 million each) would be needed to begin priority programming. As soon as new processes have been institutionalized and action integrated, the credibility will exist to allow the international community to seek additional resources necessary (\$100 million per donor per year) to cut in half food insecurity in the region within 15 years.

From mid-November to mid-December, we suggest that bilateral discussions for re-commitment to the Greater Horn of Africa take place in donor headquarters and African field offices. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development is considering a meeting on the Horn of Africa in mid-December. This will be the first opportunity for donors to discuss together these concepts and possible next steps. It is anticipated that the DAC Informal Meeting will result in the scheduling of a Roundtable on the Greater Horn of Africa in late 1995.

Simultaneously with donor discussions, joint donor meetings with African governments and IGADD's secretariat will be conducted. African leaders could be asked to work with each other and donors in a new, integrated relationship and be willing to commit the staff, time and resources necessary for implementation. IGADD is proposing a first multidonor, multirecipient meeting to coincide with the ministerial meeting in Nairobi to be held January 10-15, 1995. This joint meeting would focus on reaching agreement on the regional and bilateral objectives of an international recommitment to the Greater Horn, with discussion of potential sectoral and geographic participation. Although all participants will have considered the framework, this opportunity to discuss details will be important.

If agreement is reached on sectoral and geographic coverage, joint donor-recipient working groups could be formed around the proposed objectives, or other objectives which are suggested during consultations. These working groups would focus on the analytical work needed to conduct joint portfolio reviews using an integrated regional framework. Working groups would submit Plans of Action to National Action Committees and to plenary sessions of IGADD members. We suggest that donors provide the necessary financial support for these analyses to be undertaken by recipients.

A Greater Horn of Africa recommitment should be given a high-profile official launching. The exact venue should emerge from joint consultations. The launching could be built around IGADD's annual Ministerial Meeting in January. Alternatively, the launching could occur in late January to coincide with the 10th anniversary activities commemorating work on the 1984-86 drought. Or a separate meeting could be organized in February-April 1995. We anticipate that the launching would be led by the African heads of government and donor ministers of development.

Open discussion, comments and alternatives, and ultimately decisions on the proposed concepts and framework are seriously solicited. The magnitude of human suffering and the hope for a better future demand urgent attention by the international community.

Table 2: Next Step Actions

Activity/ actions	October 94	November 94	December 94	January - March 95	April - June 95	July - September 95	October-Dec. 95
African Leaders Consider Recommitment Concepts	Read Concept Paper and see visual presentation Hold bilateral discussions	Further bilateral discussions Discussion among African leaders. Learn outcome of donors 12/16 discussions	Discuss concepts for IGADD ministerial mtg. 1/10 - 1/15 Appoint joint recipient - donor Working Groups	5/95 - High level LAUNCH			
Conduct Donor Discussions	Draft Concept Paper	Read Concept Paper Bilateral discussions	12/16 - DAC Informal Meeting on Greater Horn	Joint Donor - Recipient Working Groups	5/95 - LAUNCH event		
Establish Donor's Forum		Discuss bilaterally	12/16 - DAC Informal discussion	1/95 - Donor W/G Study CILSS, SADC, CARICOM, ASEAN, etc.	4/95 - Technical decision on Forum 5/95 - Forum LAUNCH		
Expand Early Warning (E/W) Systems		Form Interagency USG Working Group on E/W • EXTEND FEWS • Include potential social factors	Gather data on E/W systems in Horn, all donors	Appoint Working Group on Expanding E/W	4/95 - LINK Host Country E/W Systems 6/95 - Install regional E/W Systems	7/95 - Integrated system in place	
Strengthen IGADD and Regional Technical and Private Associations	Review UNDP instt. assessment of IGADD	Identify technical and private regional associations	Scope of Work (SOW) for multi-national regional organizations Institutional building analysis	Multi-national analysis of regional association needs	Draft report reviewed	Institutional strengthening assignments decided	10/95 - Action Plans agreed
Prepare Continuum Principles	Draft multi-national contract Scope of Work		Contract award	2-3/95 - Meeting with implementors Draft Principles	4/95 - Review Portfolios Review draft of principles	9/95 - Training of trainers Negotiate immediate needs/root cause program integration	10/95 - Practitioner training
Conduct Joint Analysis and Portfolio Reviews		Analysis SOWs drafted • 4% growth strategies • food security actions • relative value of root causes	Multi-national review scope of works	Contracts Awarded (3)	Analysis conducted	Analysis conducted 3/95 - Donors/Host country Portfolio Reviews	10/95 - Negotiate regional root cause program integration