


USAID REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SERVICES
OFFICE FOR EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA (REDSO/ESA)



April 21, 1995

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April 21, 1995

This Strategic Plan for the Nairobi-based Regional Economic Development Services Office for East and Southern Africa (REDSO/ESA) was prepared in accordance with the Directive entitled "Setting and Monitoring Program Strategies," issued by the Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination on May 27, 1994, the draft PPC document entitled BAA Strategic Planning, dated October 3, 1994, and subsequent guidance documents issued to the Field in recent months.

We have tried to adhere to this evolving Agency guidance. But it has not been easy to do so, because each new guidance document used somewhat different language to describe the same steps in the strategic planning process.

What we have done, I hope successfully, is follow the spirit of the PPC Directive, which states that "Strategic Plans for regional programs shall be tailored to the nature of the programs managed by the unit and clearly distinguish between the development objectives for which the unit is accountable, and the management and technical services to be provided in support of Mission objectives."

Thus, we have developed one Strategic Support Objective, to cover our primary function: program and technical support to bilateral Missions and Offices in the design and implementation of their strategies and programs, and three Strategic Objectives to cover REDSO's own portfolio, i.e., those programs and other activities that we design and manage ourselves, and for which we are primarily accountable and/or responsible.

Much of what is contained in this Strategic Plan is not new. We have mainly presented our ongoing functions in the Plan framework (although it wasn't always an easy fit), and identified the resources which we require in order to continue to carry out those functions.

In Section III we provide the rationale for a number of relatively new, REDSO-managed regional value-added initiatives. Some of these were launched with USAID/W approval over the past two years; others are being described here for the first time. We have grouped them all together as one of our Strategic Objectives.

We have also developed a Strategic Objective built around the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI). This is in response to Washington's clear directive that REDSO play a major analytical and facilitative role in the GHAI.

Taken together, the new regional initiatives, and the priority being assigned to the GHAI represent a significant expansion of REDSO's mandate. An important issue that Washington must address in its review of this Plan is whether USAID/W is willing to endorse this new mandate, and to provide REDSO with the resources that will be required to carry it out.

In the final weeks of our strategic planning exercise we began to receive the just-approved Strategic Plans of many USAID/W offices, e.g., the Global Bureaus' Centers. In our quick reading of these plans we were very gratified to find clear linkages between our Strategic Objectives and those being developed by our partners in Washington. Once our respective Plans are in place, we need to consult more fully with our partners on respective roles, allocations of resources, etc., in those areas in which our Strategic Objectives are complimentary and mutually enforcing.

Finally, the REDSO staff devoted a great deal of time -- I estimate at least 600 work-days -- to this strategic planning exercise. The lengthy process and the methodology we used are described in Annex A. I hope our end-product will be perceived as justifying this large expenditure of REDSO's human resources.

Fred C. Fischer
Director
REDSO/ESA

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I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF REDSO/ESA

A. Functions and Responsibilities

This document is not a regional strategy for the economic and social development of east and southern Africa. It is a Strategic Plan for the operations of USAID's Regional Economic Development Services Office for East and Southern Africa (REDSO/ESA) over the next five fiscal years (FY 1996-2000). Thus it is important, at the outset, that the office's current functions and responsibilities are clearly understood.

As its name implies, REDSO/ESA (hereafter, simply "REDSO") is primarily a service organization. REDSO was established in Nairobi in 1972, at a time when U.S. assistance programs were being expanded throughout east and southern Africa and it was recognized that USAID would not have the resources to fully staff every bilateral Mission in the region. Thus, REDSO's *raison d'être* was to provide a central pool of experienced officers and technical experts who would be available to respond to requests for support services from the other USAID Missions and Offices in east and southern Africa (and the Indian Ocean states).

Twenty-three years later, REDSO's most important and staff-intensive function is still to advise and assist in the design and implementation of USAID programs and projects in some 21 countries of the ESA region, including:

- Fourteen Schedule "A" posts, which have substantial delegated authorities to authorize and implement their own bilateral programs: Botswana, Burundi/Rwanda (which recently became a dual Mission), Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe;
- Three Schedule "B" posts -- Namibia, Eritrea, and Somalia -- which have very small staffs, and are thus required to obtain REDSO's concurrence to approve projects, negotiate and execute grant agreements, grant waivers, and take various other implementation actions;
- Two "rapid response" countries -- southern Sudan and Angola -- where there are currently no U.S. direct-hire personnel; and
- One Schedule "C" Post -- Djibouti -- for which REDSO itself serves as the USAID Mission.

As of mid-March, REDSO had received requests totalling 7451 TDY days of support services in FY 1995; and it expected to be able to provide approximately 4325 days. REDSO's inability to fully meet the demand for its services is due to two factors: (1) staff shortages and long vacancies in several key technical areas; and (2) other demands on the REDSO staff, as a result of a steady accretion in REDSO's own program and management responsibilities.

It should be noted, however, that while the number of TDY travel days is a fair indicator of REDSO's demand/supply situation, it does not tell the whole story. With modern

communications -- and a solid background in country programs developed over time -- it is not always necessary for a REDSO staffer to travel in order to respond to client Missions' needs. Indeed, an increasing amount of REDSO's support services are being provided from Nairobi by phone, fax and E-mail.

Furthermore, when REDSO is unable to respond to a particular request for its TDY services, it often assists the bilateral Mission in obtaining the required assistance from some other source, e.g., another USAID office or a private contractor or consultant. Thus, much of the gap between the demand and supply of REDSO's support services is handled by alternative means.

Over the past two decades, REDSO's role has considerably expanded (and only rarely contracted) in response to the ever-changing political and economic situation in the ESA region, and corresponding changes in USAID's policies and priorities. Mainly because REDSO is there -- because it constitutes a readily available and flexible resource -- REDSO has been directed by USAID/W to take on a substantial number of additional functions and responsibilities; these include:

- Managing the U.S. emergency relief operation in southern Sudan; in FY 1994 this included \$37 million in food aid (68,200 MT) and \$20 million in OFDA grants; the estimated levels for FY 1995 are \$24 million in food aid (38,500 MT) and \$18 million in non-food aid grants;
- Managing other emergency relief operations, e.g., the 1992 airlift from Kenya into Somalia, and providing technical and logistic support to OFDA Disaster Assistance Support Teams (e.g., the Rwanda DART in 1994);
- Managing the ESF-funded bilateral program in Djibouti, with annual funding in the \$1-3 million range; (the former REDSO-managed bilateral programs in the Indian Ocean States of Comoros, Mauritius, and Seychelles were terminated over the past two years);
- Monitoring the development of four regional agricultural research networks, supported by centrally-funded grants: the Africa Agro-Forestry Research Network, funded through ICRAF; the east Africa Rootcrops Network, funded through IITA; the east Africa Bean Network, funded through CIAT; and the east Africa Potato Network, funded through CIP.
- Managing an Africa-wide Center for African Family Planning Studies (CAFS) grant, with a current LOP of \$9.6 million; the purpose of the project is "to develop a stable, self-reliant, market-oriented institution that can effectively transfer modern family planning/reproductive health technologies (training, research, and technical assistance) to family planning and reproductive health programs in both the public and private sectors;"
- Playing an increasingly active analytical and facilitative role in the implementation of the Greater Horn of Africa initiative (GHA); REDSO is currently designing a \$12 million

Horn of Africa Support Project (HASP), which will operationalize many of the initial GHAI activities;

- Overseeing the work of the institutional contractor managing the Agency's Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) for Kenya, Somalia, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and southern Sudan;
- Monitoring the agriculture, health, and family planning activities of about 20 centrally-funded Cooperating Agencies, e.g., AIDSCAP, SOMARC, which are working in the ESA region;
- Performing (since 1993) many of the functions in east Africa of the former Nairobi-based Regional Housing and Urban Development Office (RHUDO); and
- Serving as the official Controller for: (a) the two Nairobi-based Regional Inspector General Offices (RIG/I and RIG/A); the USAID Missions and Offices in Eritrea, Burundi and Rwanda; the Nairobi-based USAID/Somalia; and REDSO's own programs in Djibouti and Sudan; and (b) providing regular accounting and financial reporting for four other USAID Missions: Madagascar, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Zambia.

For most of its existence, REDSO has been directed by the Africa Bureau to concentrate its efforts on its service function and admonished not to pursue any new areas of activity (except, of course, those many new responsibilities assigned to REDSO by the Bureau itself). However, over the past two years -- with the active encouragement of the Africa and Global Bureaus -- REDSO has embarked on a number of new regional value-added initiatives, which support and enhance the quality of REDSO's services to its client Missions. The rationale for these regional value-added initiatives -- which lend a new dimension to REDSO and constitute one of REDSO's Strategic Objectives -- is provided in Section III.

B. REDSO's Own Operational Year Budget (OYB)

In FY 1995, REDSO's own Operational Year Budget totals approximately \$10 million, an amount considerably in excess of the OYB of many of the bilateral Missions which REDSO supports. It includes:

- \$1 million in ESF funds for Djibouti; these funds are controlled by the Department of State and normally are not allocated to REDSO until very late in the fiscal year, sometimes literally in the last week (or day) of September.
- \$2 million in DFA funds for initial funding of the (\$9.6 million LOP) CAFS III project;
- \$2 million in DFA funds for initial funding of the new (\$12 million LOP) HASP project; and
- \$5 million in DFA-funded grants, contracts and IQCs for which funding is channeled through a variety of Africa Bureau and Global Bureau projects; these funding

mechanisms are employed to finance all the REDSO "initiatives" mentioned above, as well as the costs of most of the PSCs and institutional contractors working for REDSO.

C. Organization and Staffing

REDSO's greatest resource is its professional staff. Indeed, REDSO is the repository of a significant portion of USAID's program and technical expertise in the ESA region.

REDSO has one or more persons who are skilled and experienced in program development; project design and implementation; economic, social and financial analysis; legal services; private sector development; agriculture; forestry; natural resources management; environment; democracy/governance; engineering; contracting; commodity management; family planning; health (including AIDS); child survival; health financing; women in development; evaluation and impact assessment; food aid and disaster relief; demobilization and reintegration; financial management; and housing and urban development.

Over the past several years, roughly two-thirds of REDSO's available staff time has been devoted to the provision of support services, and one-third to REDSO's many other program and management responsibilities.

The mix of REDSO staffing has changed dramatically over the past five years. This reorientation of REDSO's staffing pattern has reflected the strategic areas of concern of the Agency, the Africa Bureau, and the bilateral Missions in the ESA region. It has also been a function of shortages in the pool of available officers to fill the specific staffing requirements of the bilateral Missions.

In FY 1990, REDSO had 37 U.S. direct-hire positions and four U.S. PSCs. Today there are only 29 USDH positions, but 14 U.S. PSCs (and a number of institutional contractor positions). Given the direct-hire reductions which REDSO has had to absorb over the past five years, the additional PSCs and institutional contractors have been the crucial difference in REDSO's ability to cope with its increasing responsibilities.

REDSO's current organization and staffing is shown in Annex B. By far the largest organizational unit in REDSO (with 42 positions, mostly FSNs) is the Regional Financial Management Center (RFMC), which had been an independent office until it was merged into REDSO in 1990.

II. THE ASSISTANCE ENVIRONMENT IN THE ESA REGION

A. Significant Political and Economic Trends

The ESA region is a vast area of Africa and countries within the Indian Ocean that encompasses about 4.5 million square miles and approximately 300 million ethnically diverse people. The countries of the region are all at different stages of political and economic development. Some countries (Botswana, Swaziland, and Eritrea) are models of political stability, while others (Somalia, Sudan, Angola and Rwanda) are mired in political anarchy or civil war (with Burundi teetering on the brink). Several decades after achieving their independence, many countries are still struggling to establish viable political institutions and to introduce democratic processes of governance.

The past several years, however, have seen very encouraging political trends in many parts of the region, most notably: the overthrow of the Marxist military dictatorship in Ethiopia (1991); the independence of Namibia -- Africa's "last colony" (1990); the end of apartheid and the advent of majority rule in South Africa (1994); and the peaceful transition in Mozambique (1994). There has been a significant trend in the 1990's to more open and democratic societies, with multi-party elections in many of the region's most populous countries, including South Africa, Ethiopia, Zambia, Kenya, Malawi, Uganda, and Mozambique.

The combined Gross Domestic Product of the ESA region was near \$168 billion in 1993, or about \$575 per capita, somewhat higher than the \$530 per capita income for all of sub-Saharan Africa (But South Africa and its immediate neighbors skew the average). The GDP of the ESA region grew by about 1.75% during 1993, but an overall population growth rate of about 2.9% meant that per capita income declined.

Most of the economic growth in the ESA region over the past decade occurred in services and agriculture. Industrial growth has been disappointing, actually growing slower than the other two sectors, and accounting for a smaller percentage of regional economies. A major cause is the low level of investment in the region. Gross domestic investment averaged only 17% of GDP in 1993, below the world average of 22%, and below the 26% investment rate of other developing countries. Most ESA economies remain rural and based on agriculture. With the exception of the microstates of Djibouti and the Seychelles, only South Africa, at 50%, is primarily urban, followed by a 43% urbanization rate in Zambia.

The 24 ESA countries fall into four economic groups: those countries tied closely to South Africa, the former "frontline" states of southern Africa (and Malawi), the Indian Ocean island states, and the countries of East Africa. The group of countries integrated closely in the South African economy include only 16% of the regions' population; but it produces 71% of the region's GDP, two thirds of it in South Africa alone. The massive South African economy -- 41 million people and a per capita income of \$2,900 -- also provides a significant stimulus for the economic growth of Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland, and Lesotho. All but Lesotho have a per capita income over \$1,000 per annum. The table on the following page shows the economic performance of the ESA region in 1993, based on several World Bank reports issued in 1994.

ESA Regional Economic Growth in 1993

Country	% of Regional Population	GDP Per capita (US\$)	GDP Growth Rates, 1986-93	% of Regional GDP	% Contribution to Regional GDP Growth
Countries Economically Tied to South Africa					
South Africa	13.9	2,900	0.9	66.4	34.3
Botswana	0.5	2,590	8.8	2.4	12.1
Namibia	0.5	1,660	4.1	1.5	3.6
Swaziland	0.3	1,050	5.6	0.5	1.7
Lesotho	0.6	660	6.4	0.5	1.7
Subregion	15.8	2,584	1.3	71.3	53.3
Other Southern African Countries					
Zimbabwe	3.6	540	2	3.3	3.8
Mozambique	5.8	80	5.8	0.9	2.9
Malawi	3.2	220	2.8	1.2	1.9
Zambia	2.9	370	1.1	1.9	1.2
Angola	3.4	200	0.5	1.2	0.3
Subregion	18.9	257	2.1	8.5	10.2
Indian Ocean States					
Mauritius	0.4	2,980	6.4	1.9	7.2
Madagascar	4.3	240	1.2	2.0	1.4
Seychelles	0.0	6,370	4.6	0.3	0.7
Comoros	0.2	520*	1.2	0.2	0.1
Subregion	4.9	509	3.7	4.4	9.3
East African Countries					
Uganda	6.2	190	5.1	2.4	7.0
Kenya	8.7	270	3.7	3.3	7.0
Tanzania	9.1	120	5.8	1.6	5.4
Sudan	9.3	300*	1.9	3.6	3.9
Ethiopia	18.2	100	1.3	2.5	1.8
Burundi	2.0	180	3.5	0.6	1.2
Somalia	2.9	120	1.2	0.5	0.4
Rwanda	2.6	200	0.7	0.9	0.4
Eritrea	1.2	120	1.3	0.2	0.2
Djibouti	0.2	780	-0.7	0.3	-0.1
Subregion	60.3	151	3.0	15.9	27.1

* Other sources have these amounts much lower.

The other countries of southern Africa have not done as well. This sub-region contains 19% of the ESA region's population, but only 8.5% of its GDP, and it contributed only 10% of regional growth in 1993. Only Mozambique, now recovering from 30 years of civil war and years of Marxist economic policies, is beginning to show strong growth in this sub-region. Since the recent ceasefire, Mozambique has been progressing rapidly with the return of large numbers of refugees, new investment, and political stability. While it represents less than 1% of the ESA GDP, almost 3% of ESA growth took place in Mozambique.

Zimbabwe, with a per capita income of about \$540, has a diversified economy, but suffers from years of economic mismanagement. Recent efforts to liberalize the Zimbabwean economy have produced growth rates of 4% in 1993 and 4.5% in 1994. Zambia and Malawi both suffered from unstable political situations in recent years that reduced their economic policymaking ability and discouraged the growth of the private sector. However, both countries are beginning to introduce promising economic reforms. Angola has recently agreed to a ceasefire and may be poised for renewed growth.

Of the four Indian Ocean states, only Mauritius and the Seychelles are growing rapidly. Together, they represent only 2.2% of the regional economy, but 7.9% of regional economic growth. Madagascar and the Comoros represent the other extreme, with low growth rates (1.2%) that do not keep pace with population growth.

East Africa is much poorer than southern Africa. The sub-region holds 60% of the regional population, but in 1993 produced only 16% of the regional GDP. Nevertheless, a few well-performing economies have given the sub-region strong growth, allowing east Africa to produce 27% of regional GDP growth in 1993. Uganda has adopted liberal economic policies that have produced steady growth rates of 4% to 7% each year since the late 1980s. Tanzania has also embarked on a program to reduce the control of government, privatize much of the economy, and free up exchange rates. Together with Kenya -- whose large economy showed moderate growth following three consecutive years of drought -- these three countries accounted for over two-thirds of the GDP growth that took place in East Africa.

Two other east African countries -- Ethiopia and Eritrea -- are emerging market economies, based on a series of political and economic reforms launched since 1991. The four other countries of the sub-region--Burundi, Rwanda, Somalia and Sudan--are among the poorest in the world. They all suffer from civil strife, so their economic prospects remain dim as long as their internal political problems remain unsolved.

B. Regional Development Prospects and Constraints

The development prospects of the ESA region are mixed. The prospects are better for southern Africa, a sub-region endowed with more natural resources and currently enjoying a period of general political stability and absence of civil strife. Although the Republic of South Africa has been the cause of serious destabilization in much of southern Africa, it has emerged as a potential engine for stimulating sustained economic growth throughout the sub-region.

The development prospects of east Africa (a sub-region now being called the Greater Horn of Africa) are more problematic. The Greater Horn is currently beset by more civil strife -- in Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, and southern Sudan -- than any other part of the ESA region. The food security situation in the Greater Horn is more severe than elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa. Its natural resource base is highly uneven and limited in terms of production potential. Tanzania, Uganda and Sudan are relatively well-endowed in terms of land, minerals, water and bio-diversity, but poor economic policies and lack of vision and good management have constrained their growth over the years.

A recent phenomenon -- the "stateless state," e.g., Somalia -- is adding a thorny new dimension to the prospects for regional development in the Greater Horn. One outcome of the continuing political anarchy in Somalia (and the continuing civil war in southern Sudan) is closer political ties among other ESA countries, particularly Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda, to ward off the effects of the civil strife on their borders.

The development prospects for the four Indian Ocean states covered by REDSO vary greatly. Mauritius and the Seychelles have achieved the status of "aid graduates." Madagascar is struggling to establish a viable political structure, but its development prospects are uncertain at best. Comoros has very bleak prospects for improvements in its economic condition.

Broad-based, sustainable development of the ESA region is constrained by many factors. The most notable are:

- **Natural disasters**, particularly the severe droughts which periodically afflict vast areas of the region, are cyclical but persistent constraints. The semi-arid portions of east Africa suffered from a persistent drought during the period 1990-93. Based on historical trends, another drought of 1983-85 proportions may hit the northern countries of the region (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Djibouti) again soon. Most of the countries of southern Africa experienced well-below normal rains in late 1994 and the first months of this year. Nevertheless, the situation is not as bad as it was two years ago, when southern Africa suffered its worst drought in 50 years. Droughts and the plagues of locusts that often follow the return of the rains are a constant constraint in terms of agricultural production and food security in the region; and, by forcing donors to spend vast resources on humanitarian relief, severely curtail the resources otherwise available for long-term development programs.
- **Civil strife**, i.e., clan wars, tribal and ethnic clashes--are continuing conflicts that create millions of refugees and internally-displaced persons throughout the region. As of March 1995, the number of such persons "at risk" in east Africa alone totalled 12.6 million. (The good news is that the total exceeded 20 million in April of 1994.) When political anarchy and internal strife reach the proportions of a Somalia or a Rwanda, not only is long-term development severely constrained, but it is sometimes impossible to deliver humanitarian assistance to the people in need. Huge numbers of refugees are not only a considerable economic and social burden to the "host" country, but also create highly destabilized security situations.

- **High population growth rates of 2.9% (1994) for the region as a whole.** With population growth rates in many countries outstripping gains in agricultural production, the regional food security situation is clearly deteriorating. This situation is particularly true in the Greater Horn, where structural food deficits are growing in the two most populous countries, Kenya and Ethiopia. Population pressures also severely constrain progress in the social sectors and lead to deterioration of the limited natural resources base.
- **The burden of disease, i.e., preventable diseases significantly decrease the functional capability of a large portion of the economically-active populations of the countries in the ESA region.** Malaria is on the upsurge throughout the region. In sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, the disease burden, measured in lost years of healthy life, is more than twice the global average. This burden for the most productive portion of the population (ages 15-59) is the highest of any region in the world, and is 2-1/2 times the global average. It has a strong negative impact on economic growth in these countries, as it adversely affects productivity and diverts needed resources away from investments in other sectors, e.g., education.
- **The HIV-AIDS pandemic has its epicenter in the ESA region.** Nine ESA countries have seropositive rates over 10.0. In these countries (Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Botswana and Zimbabwe), a quarter or more of the adult urban populations are infected with HIV. Infant and child mortality levels are increasing. By 2020, life expectancy is expected to decline from 66 to 33 in Zambia, from 70 to 40 in Zimbabwe, from 57 to 33 in Malawi and from 61 to 35 in Tanzania. By 2000, sub-saharan Africa will have approximately 10 million AIDS orphans, 90% of the world's AIDS orphans. AIDS has wide-ranging economic consequences: treating all AIDS patients would consume 50% of total health expenditures in ESA; household economic security, human capital reserves, and national incomes are decreasing as a result of the pandemic. Recent studies suggest that by 2000, AIDS will reduce economic growth in Kenya and Tanzania by 15% and 20%, respectively.
- **Mismanagement and corruption that constrain growth, inhibit and distort investment, and create the foundation for continued conflict, are endemic though uneven among regional countries.** Nearly all governments experimented with socialist policies after independence, leaving a legacy of bloated civil services, a decaying infrastructure, investments in inefficient government parastatals and a policy framework that discourages private investment and trade. A large debt burden is also a significant constraint in most countries.
- **Limited progress in democratization and transparent governance continues to hinder equitable economic and social development in the region.** Perhaps the most encouraging case is Eritrea, where the Government is moving toward democratization and transparency. Malawi, too, looks encouraging at this point. Elsewhere, problems in achieving democratization and transparent governance fall into three categories:

- (1) Endemic corruption continues to impede development in Kenya, Zambia, Djibouti, and Tanzania. Namibia exhibits some early signs of starting down this same slippery path.
- (2) Governmental instability in countries burdened by legacies of serious political conflict has pre-empted a focus on transparency in Mozambique, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Angola, as well as in the near-failed states of Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, and Burundi. Though demonstrating most encouraging economic progress, Uganda, too, is absorbed by difficult and potentially very divisive issues concerning decentralization and the restoration of a multiparty system.
- (3) South Africa is a special case. The Government of National Unity faces the monumental tasks of transforming an apartheid-based government structure into one appropriate to a democracy, reconstructing local and some provincial governmental structures almost from scratch, and implementing its Reconstruction and Development Program.

Finally, the absence of a regional focus is one of the most significant constraints to development of the ESA region. Although many ESA countries face problems similar to those of their neighbors, they neither exchange information nor collaborate in finding common solutions. Regional collaboration is most advanced in southern Africa. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has grown into an increasingly effective institution for regional economic and political cooperation.

The countries of east Africa, however, are just beginning to understand that achieving sustainable growth has to be pursued in a regional context; but they have no institution comparable to SADC. The Djibouti-based Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) currently has a limited scope and does not function effectively.

Since the 1976 collapse of the East African Community (Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda), various other regional approaches have been tried, none with outstanding success. The Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA) was founded in 1981 and is headquartered in Lusaka, Zambia. Its aim is to improve commercial and economic cooperation and it has fostered modest institutional and monetary arrangements to facilitate trade. In 1992, the PTA member states agreed to deepen regional ties by setting up a Common Market by 2000. An eventual merger with SADC was also proposed. A treaty to become the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) was signed in November 1993, but was ratified by only 15 of the 23 members.

Several new regional bodies have begun to emerge in east Africa, including the Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in East and Central Africa (ASARECA). Other organizations, such as regional advocacy groups for women's rights, while nascent, appear to be gaining momentum. One of the oldest and the most promising is the Commonwealth Regional Health Community Secretariat, based in Arusha, Tanzania, with 13 ESA member states. This organization has direct access to health policy-makers and senior planners within its member countries. The Secretariat is beginning to see itself as a major catalyst to shape

policies throughout the region--policies that need to be shared between countries, if affordable and sustainable health solutions are to be found.

C. Opportunities and Regional Initiatives

President Clinton's Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) may provide the best opportunity in this decade for achieving effective regional cooperation and collaboration in east Africa. The central goal of the GHAI is a program of action to:

- Strengthen support for effective regional and national food security strategies;
- Increase the capacity in the region for crisis prevention and response, and conflict resolution;
- Improve regional collaboration in promoting sustainable economic growth and reducing population growth; and
- Implement regional and national strategies to ensure the transition from crises to broad-based sustainable development.

USAID has taken the lead within the U.S. Government in mobilizing an international donor and host country commitment to the goals of the GHAI. High-level political support for the GHAI is building throughout the region (particularly in statehouses in Addis, Asmara and Kampala) and the Initiative could become a major catalyst for achieving lasting solutions to the sub-region's political and development problems.

Southern Africa, which is undergoing major political, economic and social transitions, abounds in opportunities that seemed impossible only five years ago. With South Africa taking the lead in following up its historic democratic elections with vigorous efforts to accelerate and integrate its economy, and with several other countries in the southern Africa region also holding recent democratic elections, improving monetary and fiscal management, reforming investment regulations, and moving towards incentives which are more supportive of private enterprise, there is now an increased sense of optimism in southern Africa for peace, democracy, and economic progress.

Based on these encouraging signals, USAID launched a major Initiative for Southern Africa in late 1994. The Initiative is comprised of four elements: democracy and governance; indigenous business development; transport and telecommunications; and agriculture and natural resource management. The primary aim of the Initiative is to encourage the region to continue growth-oriented reforms, by supporting efforts already underway to expand economic and political cooperation, and the reintegration of South Africa's industrial, financial, and technical resources into the regional economy in a manner that stimulates mutually beneficial development.

D. Coordination With Other Donors

A veritable host of multilateral institutions, UN agencies, bilateral donors and NGOs are actively

engaged in providing economic and humanitarian assistance throughout the ESA region. USAID coordination with the other donors is primarily at the country level, e.g., by bilateral USAID Missions and Offices.

Nevertheless, REDSO also has substantial contact with other donors, e.g., in coordinating emergency relief operations in southern Sudan, as well as Somalia and Rwanda over the past several years. Since many of the offices of the international donor community in Nairobi have regional responsibilities, REDSO is well-positioned to dialogue with those donors on regional issues. This dialogue is expected increasingly to be the case as REDSO assumes a major role in implementation of the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative.

REDSO also coordinates closely with other donors in: various networking activities throughout the region; direct support for regional institutions, e.g., the Center for African Family Planning Studies (CAFS), monitoring of centrally-funded grants to the regional agricultural research centers, e.g., CIAT, IITA, CIP, ICIPE, etc. Donor coordination will become even more important for REDSO if, as proposed in this Strategic Plan, REDSO takes on responsibility for strengthening regional institutions, e.g., IGADD, in collaboration with other donors.

E. Accomplishments and Lessons Learned

REDSO can take pride in a number of significant accomplishments over the past several years. Its greatest accomplishment has been the contribution which the REDSO staff has made in the provision of support services to the bilateral Missions. REDSO staffers have played a key, often essential role in every major strategy exercise and program or project design effort in the ESA region: REDSO staffers are frequently in a leadership role, and are usually the most knowledgeable and experienced technical advisors on the design team. The quality of REDSO's support services is reflected in the ever-growing demand for REDSO's advice and assistance, and in the uniformly glowing reports on the performance of individual staffers that REDSO management receives from the Missions at EER time.

A corollary accomplishment is the fact that REDSO has been able to recruit and retain a highly skilled and experienced professional and technical staff, despite almost continual threats from USAID/W of massive staff cuts and the very difficult strain that frequent TDY travel places on REDSO staffers' personal lives and family situations.

During the Agency's "right-sizing" exercise in 1993-94, REDSO was initially directed to absorb a 33% cut in its U.S. direct hire staff and a 50% cut in its U.S. PSCs. The fact that REDSO ultimately was not cut at all (indeed, was given one additional USDH position to manage the southern Sudan emergency relief operation) can be seen as a very significant accomplishment in itself. It reflects the growing recognition that REDSO is a highly mobile and efficient resource.

REDSO can also point to a number of other accomplishments over the past several years:

- Launching the new, regional value-added initiatives described in various sections of this Plan;

- Successfully integrating the functions and staffs of the formerly independent Regional Financial Management Center (RFMC) and Regional Housing and Urban Development Office (RHUDO);
- Successfully absorbing (at USAID/W direction) a number of other new functions, e.g., Women in Development, monitoring the activities of the PHN Cooperating Agencies, and overseeing FEWS III operations;
- Responding quickly and effectively in crisis situations, e.g., Somalia, Rwanda, and the southern African drought, without reducing the level of its other support services;
- Convincing the Agency to terminate the REDSO-managed assistance programs in Mauritius and Seychelles, which no longer qualified for concessional aid, thereby freeing up staff resources for more critical functions; and
- Providing the initial impetus for what has now become President Clinton's Greater Horn of Africa Initiative.

With respect to "lessons learned," REDSO has come to realize that:

- Many of the development problems that the ESA countries face are regional problems that transcend national borders and lend themselves to regional solutions. Indeed, many of these problems can only be resolved on a regional basis, and national programs designed to address them in isolation can actually be counter-productive; and
- The REDSO staff that circulates around the region, knows what is happening in neighboring countries and is familiar with the bilateral Missions' programs, and is, therefore, in a unique position to contribute to the identification and resolution of regional problems. Indeed, this cross-fertilization component of REDSO's support service function is only beginning to be fully understood and appreciated. This Strategic Plan reflects a conscious effort on REDSO's part to institutionalize this cross-fertilization and maximize its effectiveness.

Over the past year, REDSO and the Agency as a whole have also learned that providing billions of dollars in humanitarian assistance is not in itself the answer. In order to create an environment in which future investments will result in sustainable development, the root causes of food insecurity must be addressed. This "lesson learned" is dramatically reflected in the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative.

A corollary lesson has also been learned: that it is crucially important in crisis situations to initiate recovery activities (especially agricultural rehabilitation activities) as soon as the security situation permits, in order to reduce the cost of emergency relief operations and speedily restore the affected population to self-sufficiency. This movement along the "relief-to-development continuum" is also reflected in the GHAI.

Perhaps the most important lesson that REDSO has learned is that USAID's programs must be constantly improved through innovations -- and the application of lessons learned. The dissemination of lessons learned in the ESA region is a major component of REDSO's regional value-added initiatives.

F. The Accountability Environment

Not being a traditional bilateral Mission, REDSO's accountability varies considerably in relation to its many and varied functions. REDSO is fully accountable for the programs and projects for which it is the grantee. This currently includes only the ESF-funded country program in Djibouti and the DFA-funded, Africa-wide CAFS project.

Accountability is not a serious issue in the case of Djibouti, because the program consists entirely of a cash grant to the Government for payment of its debt to multi-lateral institutions. REDSO's accountability for the effective utilization of some \$10 million in USAID grants to CAFS since 1981 has led to very heavy and successful REDSO pressure over the past two years for a major shift in CAFS' program strategy. The result is a substantial improvements in CAFS' management systems, as the quid pro quo for further REDSO financial support.

While REDSO is only responsible for "monitoring" the centrally-funded activities of a number of regional agricultural research institutions (the project managers for the grants to these institutions are in various USAID/W offices), REDSO does not take its monitoring responsibility lightly. Indeed, REDSO feels a strong sense of accountability for the funds that USAID provides to these regional research institutions, because it is not possible for the Washington-based project managers, who rarely have the opportunity to visit the field, to effectively exercise their responsibilities.

The "accountability environment" in the ESA region is marked by high levels of corruption that pervade all levels of the public and private sectors in most countries. This corruption, often tied to family and tribal affiliations, can crop up in regional institutions, including those receiving USAID financial support.

Thus, it was REDSO who commissioned the audits and evaluations of ICIPE several years ago that revealed very serious short-comings in that institution's program management, and very serious deficiencies in its financial control systems. REDSO took the lead in cutting off further USAID funding for ICIPE, and it was REDSO that pressed for a major shakeup in the institution--one in which a whole new management team was recruited to deal with the problems that the audits and evaluations had revealed.

The largest program in dollar terms that REDSO manages is the southern Sudan emergency relief effort. Technically, the accountability for the funds rests with the Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance in Washington. BHR's Food for Peace Office allocates the food resources from its Title II account; its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance makes the grants for other types of emergency relief from its disaster assistance account. Still, REDSO feels very accountable for these BHR resources, which it manages from Nairobi, with frequent travel into southern Sudan. The "accountability environment" in southern Sudan is probably the worst in

the ESA region, given a 13-year civil war -- with at least three major warring factions -- and all sides prone to use donor aid to sustain their troops. When allegations of the misuse of U.S. and other donor aid are heard, it is usually REDSO that is called upon to respond to the inevitable inquiries from the press and Capitol Hill.

(REDSO recently received reassurances that its management of the southern Sudan program has been effective. A comprehensive BHR evaluation of non-food relief programs, and a 1500 person-hour RIG/A audit of the emergency food programs, both praised the effect and efficiency of REDSO's efforts.)

One other aspect of REDSO's accountability bears notice. REDSO's Regional Financial Management Center (RFMC) serves as the official Controller for (a) the two Nairobi-based Regional Inspector General Offices (RIG/I and RIG/A); the USAID Missions and Offices in Eritrea, Burundi/Rwanda; the Nairobi-based USAID/Somalia; and REDSO's own programs in Djibouti and southern Sudan; and (b) provides regular accounting and financial reporting for four other USAID Missions: Madagascar, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Zambia. In all these cases, REDSO/RFMC has very real fiduciary responsibility for the considerable USAID funds being expended.

G. How Customer Needs Were Established

With approximately two-thirds of its staff resources devoted to the provision of support services, REDSO's most important "customers" are its "client" Missions in the ESA region.

Once a year, usually in the first half of November REDSO hosts a week-long Scheduling Conference in Nairobi. The conference brings together REDSO's entire professional staff, one or more senior officers from each of the ESA Missions, and as many as 30 officers from Washington Bureaus and Offices. The main purpose of the conference is to identify the support needs of REDSO's customers and to schedule the TDY support services of the REDSO staff for the next 12 months. At REDSO's most recent Scheduling Conference (November 1994), the Global Bureau was represented by seven senior officers who described the new responsibilities of their Centers and participated in the individual country scheduling sessions.

The TDY schedules, which are developed for each individual REDSO staffer during the Scheduling conferences, are put into REDSO's computerized Scheduling Tracking, Analysis, Reporting System (STARS). STARS is updated throughout the year, as REDSO receives new requests for support services -- and changes to the original schedules -- from the ESA posts. Annex C is a compilation of REDSO's projected support services -- by Division -- this fiscal year.

REDSO's customers' needs are also continually under review by REDSO management. The Director and Deputy make periodic visits to the ESA Missions to stay on top of their program priorities and ever-changing support needs. There is also continuous phone, fax, and E-mail communication between REDSO and the ESA Missions. When scheduling conflicts arise, priority is given to the Schedule "B" Missions. The ESA Missions are also the major customers

for the end-products of REDSO's various regional initiatives, though (as described further below) host country institutions and other donors are increasingly becoming customers as well.

The Africa Bureau's Office of Sustainable Development, and the Global Bureau's new Centers, constitute another set of REDSO's customers, whom REDSO assists primarily in terms of furthering their research and technical networking agendas.

Finally, REDSO serves various other customers in USAID/W whose needs are rarely established in advance. They are communicated to REDSO on an *ad hoc* basis, usually in the form of a phone or E-mail directive to respond immediately to a new Washington priority or imperative (e.g., rehabilitation of the Rwandan Government's Ministries, which the Africa Bureau laid on REDSO over the 1994 Christmas holidays). Most of these urgent demands come from the Africa Bureau, but a fair number are generated by the Bureau for Humanitarian Response, particularly its Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance. OFDA has increasingly relied on REDSO to support its emergency assistance operations in the Greater Horn (including providing office space and logistic support for its DART teams).

III. THE STRATEGIC PLAN

A. The Overall Goal

REDSO's goal is *broad-based sustainable development in the ESA region.*

This goal corresponds to the Agency's overall goal of promoting sustainable development. There was very little debate within REDSO on the formulation of this goal. From the outset, it was assumed that REDSO's goal in east and southern Africa would mirror the Agency's world-wide goal.

Inherent in REDSO's linkage to the Agency's overall goal is a strong linkage to the Agency's basic strategies of:

- Encouraging broad-based economic growth;
- Stabilizing world population and protecting human health;
- Protecting the global environment;
- Promoting democracy, human rights and good governance; and
- Providing humanitarian assistance and preventing crisis.

All of REDSO's Strategic Objectives contribute directly or indirectly to the achievement of the Agency's basic goal and five-part strategy. Implicit in REDSO's Strategic Plan is a commitment to address cross-cutting development issues that bear on the achievement of the overall goal and strategy.

B. Sub-Goals:

REDSO has identified three sub-goals that together lead to the achievement of the overall goal. All three focus on the **strengthened capacity** of various individuals and institutions to contribute to the achievement of the overall goal on a national or regional basis. REDSO believes the Strategic Objectives selected can significantly advance these subgoals.

Sub-Goal #1: *Strengthened capacity of all ESA Missions to achieve their strategic objectives.*

This sub-goal is based on the assumption that the combined Strategic Objectives (which probably number 75-80) of the bilateral ESA Missions that REDSO supports all contribute to the overall Agency goal. Initially, REDSO considered making the achievement of its client Missions' SOs one of REDSO's own Strategic Objectives. But this approach was determined to be beyond REDSO's manageable interests, and therefore the achievement of the client Missions' SOs was raised to the sub-goal level.

Sub-Goal #2: *Strengthened regional capacity and cooperation to achieve sustainable development.*

This sub-goal is based on what REDSO believes to be an unassailable assumption, i.e., that many of the development problems of east and southern Africa are regional problems, which must be addressed on a regional basis. Although there is some effective regional cooperation (particularly in southern Africa), the ESA region as a whole is neither thinking nor acting effectively on a regional basis. There is, therefore, a compelling need for enhancing the capacity of individuals and institutions at all levels to operate and collaborate effectively on a regional basis.

Sub-Goal #3: *Strengthened regional capacity to prevent and respond to crisis situations.*

The rationale for this sub-goal mirrors that of sub-goal #2, except that it pertains to the lack of effective regional approaches and mechanisms for preventing and responding to crisis situations. This sub-goal recognizes that crises create an environment in which (to quote Agency guidance) "sustainable development may not be possible until the crisis is over." Implicit in this sub-goal (and in the two Strategic Objectives that support it) is the assumption of an increased focus on the "relief-to-development continuum" by REDSO and all its partners.

C. Strategic Objectives

REDSO has developed four Strategic Objectives. One of them is technically a Strategic Support Objective. These Strategic Objectives are expected to contribute substantially to the achievement of the three sub-goals and, therefore, the overall goal described above.

Figure 1 on the following page shows REDSO's Strategic Objectives Tree and depicts the synergistic relationship of the four Strategic Objectives to the three sub-goals. Two of the Strategic Objectives (#2 & #3) are shown as contributing to the achievement of more than one of the sub-goals.


The Strategic Objectives Tree is the outcome of long and sometimes heated debates within REDSO, as well as intensive consultations with numerous partners, customers and technical advisors. Originally the idea was to have two trees -- one covering REDSO's technical and program support function and the other covering all of REDSO's other programs and activities. One tree, however, was selected as the more appropriate way to demonstrate the important synergies among the four Strategic Objectives.

More than a dozen iterations of the tree were produced before the final version presented in Figure 1. The most difficult part of the process was deciding on Objectives that are clearly in REDSO's manageable interests. Early versions of the tree had REDSO taking on the responsibilities for achieving broader objectives than those ultimately selected. Nevertheless, the four objectives described in detail below represent a significant expansion of REDSO's historical mandate.

REDSO/ESA STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES TREE

Figure 1

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Strategic Support Objective #1: Effective program and technical support to all ESA Missions.

This Strategic Plan advances the hypothesis that the provision of the effective program and technical support services under SSO #1 will materially enhance the achievement of the results embodied in sub-goal #1. Traditionally, this achievement has been accomplished through REDSO assembling a highly qualified and experienced staff that established a record of flexible and quick response to the priority requests of its ESA customers. Easy access to such scarce and appropriate expertise insures that the critical, short-term staffing gaps that often exist throughout the region are filled. By continuing to utilize this proven support function, bilateral Missions will be better able to complete their essential analytic and operational tasks. Therefore, bilateral ESA Missions will be in a better position to overcome many of the programmatic and technical obstacles that inhibit the successful and timely achievement of the results envisioned in their Strategic Plans.

(1) Rationale and Justification for Selection

The major assumptions that REDSO has made related to the achievement of SSO #1 are:

- USAID (and the U.S. Government) will remain committed to the allocation of substantial resources for the promotion of broad-based sustainable development of the countries in the ESA region;
- Civil conflict and humanitarian crisis situations in the ESA region will not erupt to the point where broad-based development becomes impossible;
- The Agency's Operating Expense constraints will negate any possibility that the bilateral Missions can be staffed up to the point of self-sufficiency, i.e., they will continue to rely on REDSO for much of their design and implementation work;
- REDSO itself will not be subject to severe staffing cuts; and
- REDSO will continue to attract and recruit skilled program and technical staff who are able to meet the ever-changing requirements of the ESA Missions.

The provision of support services to the bilateral USAID Missions in the ESA region has, since its inception, been the major rationale and justification for REDSO's existence. The need to adjust to continual staff shortages and periodic changes in the mix of expertise required by the bilateral Missions is a determining factor in the selection of the appropriate REDSO staff mix of programmatic and technical advisory skills. REDSO's unique regional repository of talent not only supports the achievement of the strategic objectives that have been selected by the ESA Missions, but it also fully reflects the Agency's overall strategic and programmatic orientation. The support function remains the primary *raison d'etre* of REDSO's role in ESA.

Nevertheless, whenever a crisis dominates the situation in which REDSO is called upon to provide support, the Program Outcomes under SSO #1 will no longer serve as the guiding focus

of REDSO's involvement. In such cases, the conflict resolution and food security elements of SO #3, and the provision of humanitarian assistance along the relief-to-development continuum (SO #4), will serve as the major focus of REDSO's activities.

In the last few years, there has been increasing recognition, in both USAID/W and in the field, that the very nature of REDSO's support function creates a body of expertise with a unique regional perspective on ESA development issues. This regional outlook enhances the probability of REDSO staff applying the "*lessons learned*" in designing or implementing bilateral strategies or programs to those of other bilateral Missions in the region. This regional perspective provides the impetus for REDSO staff to formulate and manage a number of innovative and useful undertakings that do not easily fall within the scope of responsibilities of a more traditional bilateral Mission. It is this synergy between SSO #1 and SO #2, and to a degree SOs #3 and #4, that guarantees the adoption by REDSO of a holistic regional approach to the development problems that confront the ESA countries.

(2) Problem Analysis and Strategic/Results Framework

REDSO's supporting role encompasses all three of the primary functions performed by every operational unit in the Agency, i.e., planning, achieving, and judging. The ability to quickly call upon skilled and experienced, in-house USAID staff to fill urgent, short-term and/or long-term staffing gaps has proved itself, over time, to be an invaluable and irreplaceable development tool in the ESA region. A high-level of customer satisfaction--demonstrated by a continuing demand for the services REDSO provides--is only one indication of the successful achievement of the Program Outcomes associated with SSO #1.

Each of SSO #1's Program Outcomes (shown in Figure 2 on page 25) defines a specific, results-oriented accomplishment that REDSO staff will strive to attain. Each is a component of the Agency's operational cycle that logically and continually feeds into the next cycle. For example, *judging* at the end of the cycle captures lessons learned and thus feeds back valuable inputs to *planning* (through designs), while at the same time such lessons learned may also improve a bilateral client Mission's *achieving* of the desired results (through re-designs) of SOs and related Results Packages. The ultimate result is a better performance by REDSO customers, as well as a synergistic strengthening of REDSO's ability to achieve the results envisioned in the other three Strategic Objectives articulated in this Plan.

(3) Relationship to Agency Goals and Priorities

REDSO's staff recruitment and its wide range of regional activities and services are aimed at supporting the achievement of the Strategic Objectives of the bilateral USAIDs in the region. Therefore, the attainment of the results envisioned under SSO #1 will definitely bolster the Agency's ability to promote sustainable development in the areas of democracy and governance; population, health and nutrition; environmental protection; economic growth; and humanitarian assistance.

As a result of incorporating a broad scope of program and technical support services under the REDSO umbrella, it is essential that REDSO management continually assess the relative urgency

of each assistance request within the context of overall regional requirements. Adjustments can then be made to individual work plans and travel schedules so as to prioritize the provision of scarce support services within the guidelines established by the Africa Bureau. Thus, REDSO will be able to maintain a skilled pool of expertise that is not only oriented to the needs of its clients, but is also flexible and responsive enough to adapt to the ever-changing situation in the ESA region.

(4) Performance Indicators

At the Strategic Support Objective level, REDSO has selected "*customer satisfaction and demand*" as its dual performance indicator. Through a well-established consultative process, REDSO will continue to solicit information from client bilateral Missions on their annual requirement for support services. The resulting compilation of Mission-level requests will serve as a significant indicator of the demand for those services.

In addition, REDSO intends to develop a methodology for a new annual survey that will expand upon the existing process of annually canvassing client bilateral Missions for inputs to individual EERs. This new methodology will serve as a qualitative measurement of the services provided by REDSO staff and the types of skills required by the Missions.

At the Program Outcome level, i.e., planning, achieving, and judging, specific indicators have been selected to verify the extent to which each outcome is achieved. REDSO anticipates that the additional data needed to measure these indicators will be obtainable either from existing or soon-to-be established sources, e.g., the AID Worldwide Accounting and Control System (AWACS).

The performance indicators for SSO #1 outcomes depicted in Figure 3 on page 26 include:

- **Planning:** The percentage of approved, reengineered ESA Mission Strategic Plans that are in place, and the percentage of REDSO-assisted Results Packages that are approved and initiated.
- **Achieving:** The measurement of the shortening of the time required for bilateral Mission programs to move from the planning stage to implementation and the number of REDSO-assisted Mission Operational Systems and Results Packages that are established and/or strengthened.
- **Judging:** The extent to which REDSO-assisted Performance Measurement Plans are in use, and the number of REDSO-assisted Results Packages that are redesigned and improved because of the adoption of "lessons learned."

(5) The Consultative Process

REDSO intends to design one or more annual survey methodologies related to the measurement of "customer satisfaction." This surveying will entail close collaboration with the bilateral Missions, as well as host country counterparts and REDSO's regional partners, e.g., other

donors and NGOs. Such newly-initiated exercises will attempt to understand and measure the effectiveness not only of the provision of REDSO services, but also the utility of the regional initiatives that the REDSO staff are supporting under the auspices of SOs #2, #3, and #4.

These surveys will be designed to obtain critical information on program outcomes without becoming a burden on REDSO or the bilateral Missions and partners who will be surveyed. Such a participatory approach will require several months of effort. Thus, initial measurements of REDSO's Strategic Plan results may not be available until sometime in FY 1996.

In the interim, REDSO plans to prepare draft documentation on the new survey questionnaires and/or methodologies. Drafts will be distributed to bilateral client Missions prior to the next Scheduling Conference, tentatively planned for early November 1995. At that Conference, REDSO will hold a coordination/planning meeting to discuss the draft survey instruments and reach a consensus on final versions that can be distributed in FY 1996.

In order to adequately measure results at the Program Outcome level for the planning, achieving, and judging functions, the ESA Missions will be requested to collect information related to such indicators as: approved reengineered Mission Strategic Plans; designed or re-designed Results Packages; functional operating systems; and the extent to which they have a functioning Performance Measurement Plan. These data will be collated and compared to internal REDSO reports and to Agency-wide computer data-base information, in order to develop a comprehensive annual assessment of the progress that REDSO has made in achieving the results envisioned in this Strategic Plan.

(6) Current and Planned Activities

REDSO's many and varied activities to achieve SSO #1 cover the entire range of program and technical support services required by the ESA Missions to design and implement their programs and achieve their Strategic Objectives. Annex C provides an illustrative example of the demand versus actual number of person-days of TDY services that REDSO expects to provide this fiscal year with its current staffing. These activities include:

- The Project Development and Program Support Division's assistance in program design, implementation and evaluation, and specialized assistance in private sector development;
- The Regional Financial Management Center's provision of complete and/or partial budgeting, accounting, payment, financial analysis and reporting, and consultation services;
- The Population/Health Division's technical and analytic services in health, nutrition, family planning, AIDS, child survival and female education;
- The Analysis Division's technical and analytical services in economic analysis, program impact, the behavioral and social sciences, democracy/governance, public finance, and women in development;

- The Food for Peace Division's assistance in designing and implementing Title II and Title III food programs;
- The Agriculture and Natural Resource Division's technical and analytic services in agriculture development, natural resources management, and environmental protection;
- The Procurement Division's assistance in procurement (both contracting and commodity management) planning, execution, administration and monitoring;
- The Regional Legal Division's assistance in interpreting applicable laws and regulations, and drafting, negotiating and executing agreements, contracts, grants and other official program documentation;
- The Urban and Infrastructure Division's housing and urban development activities, and its engineering and environmental (green and brown) support services. With the limited potential for housing guaranty lending in east Africa, and the expansion of urban development programs in southern Africa, the former RHUDO functions which REDSO inherited in 1992 will be phased out entirely at the end of this summer;
- REDSO's critical and detailed technical review and concurrence in all programmatic actions of the Schedule "B" Posts; and
- The formal and informal training of bilateral Mission staff, including assistance in establishing standard operating procedures, and (most recently) implementing the new reengineering concepts.

A further break-down of these activities, and their relationship to Program Outcomes, appears in Figure 2 on the following page. They include two Indefinite Quantity Contracts (IQCs) established by REDSO. One is with three Nairobi-based financial/accounting firms, to give the ESA Missions ready access to short-term, task-oriented financial management services related to the design, implementation and evaluation of the financial aspects of their programs.

The other, also with three Nairobi-based firms, provides the ESA Missions with a rapid response for short-term assistance in private sector development, including: economic and business policy analysis and dialogue; organizational development (business associations); business support services to micro and small scale enterprises (SMEs); business and the environment; export and investment promotion; and workshops and training.




Figure 3

LEVEL	INDICATORS	INFO/DATA SOURCE	RESPONSIBLE OFFICE(S)
<p>Strategic Support Objective #1:</p> <p>Effective program & technical support to all ESA Missions</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Customer satisfaction and customer demand 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Annual Customer surveys ● Annual Mission requests for REDSO services (STARS) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● REDSO/ESA ● ESA client Missions
<p>Program Outcome 1.1</p> <p><u>PLANNING:</u></p> <p>Improved basis for development activities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● % of ESA Missions with approved, reengineered Strategic Plans ● % of REDSO-assisted Results Packages approved & initiated ● Customer satisfaction and customer demand 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● AWACS records ● REDSO/ESA and ESA Mission records ● Annual Customer Surveys ● Annual Mission requests for REDSO services (STARS) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● REDSO/ESA ● ESA client Missions
<p>Program Outcome 1.2</p> <p><u>ACHIEVING:</u></p> <p>(a) Improved Mission management systems</p> <p>(b) Improved Mission program performance</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Shortened timeline from planning to implementation ● Increased number of REDSO-assisted Mission Operational Systems and Results Packages are established and/or strengthened ● Customer satisfaction and customer demand 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● AWACS records ● REDSO/ESA and client Mission records ● Annual Customer Surveys ● Annual Mission Requests for REDSO services (STARS) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● REDSO/ESA ● ESA client Missions
<p>Program Outcome 1.3</p> <p><u>JUDGING:</u></p> <p>(a) Mission Performance Measurement Plans operationalized for achievement of S.O.s</p> <p>(b) Utilization of 'lessons learned'</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Extent to which REDSO/ESA assisted Performance Measurement Plans are in use and all indicators are being monitored ● Number of REDSO/ESA-assisted Results Packages redesigned and improved by 'lessons learned' 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● REDSO/ESA and client Mission records ● REDSO/ESA Trip Reports ● Annual Mission Requests for REDSO services (STARS) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● REDSO/ESA ● ESA client Missions

Strategic Objective #2: Increased utilization of critical information by USAID and other decision-makers in the ESA region.

A major purpose of this second strategic objective is to enhance REDSO's primary mandate of Mission support, as reflected in SSO #1. SO #2 will achieve this through the increased availability and use of critical information on priority ESA development issues of regional and global significance. The term "information" is defined here in its broadest sense to encompass much more than raw data and the information produced through its analysis; it includes such important information concepts as lessons learned, models, technologies, and other types of formal and informal communications exchange.

Similarly, the term "critical" is defined here as information that REDSO and the ESA Missions believe to be of fundamental importance to the successful achievement of USAID objectives in the ESA region. It includes: (1) shared development problems, which are common to at least several Missions or countries throughout the region; (2) transnational issues of regional scope or magnitude, as defined through geographic boundaries, comparative advantage and/or potential impact; and (3) certain regional or global issues considered to be a high priority for furthering the achievement of USAID objectives in the ESA region.

According to these latter criterion, the GHAI could be considered for inclusion under SO #2; however, as a result of its great prominence and special problems within the region, the GHAI has been accorded its own strategic objective within the REDSO strategic framework. Nevertheless, it must be noted that benefits derived from the achievement of SO #2 will also flow to the GHAI (SO #3), as they will for the service function described under SO #1. Thus, while each of these objectives defines separate developmental objectives, each works in a synergistic manner to contribute to the successful attainment of the others.

REDSO views achievement of this objective as a responsibility shared with other Agency operating units, particularly the cognizant technical units of the Global Bureau, the Africa Bureau, and the ESA Missions themselves. While REDSO accepts full responsibility for accomplishing the outcomes and targets specified under this objective, it also recognizes that these results can only be achieved through the coordinated action of many different collaborating units and stakeholders. Consequently, REDSO will pursue this objective through a concerted team effort.

(1) Rationale and Justification for Selection

By their very nature, most bilateral Missions tend to focus largely on their own country-specific programs. Often they are unaware of what is happening in adjoining countries that might be of importance to their programs. At the same time, Mission personnel continually seek information from REDSO staff about what is occurring in similar programs in the region. REDSO staff have traditionally played a catalytic role in the region by facilitating the sharing of information, technologies and lessons learned between Missions. To date, this cross-fertilization has largely been done on an *ad hoc*, person-to-person basis. As a consequence, much of what is learned in individual country programs has not been shared with or utilized by other Missions in the

region, with the result that Missions often "reinvent the wheel" and do not maximize the impact of USAID and host country resources.

Given its regional presence and mandate, REDSO is in a unique position to provide "value-added" to its service role by furnishing the ESA Missions with information critical for the successful attainment of their respective bilateral development objectives. This "value-added" function will accrue to Missions both directly through the provision of critical development information and, indirectly, through strengthening host country capacities in information generation, analysis, dissemination and use. The generation, dissemination and sharing of information and lessons learned across countries in the region will result in an enhanced capacity of USAID Missions and host country collaborators to develop and implement more appropriate programs. This enhanced capacity, especially with regard to host country institutions and individuals, is expected to lead to increased sustainability of these information-sharing efforts. More appropriate and sustainable programs will, in turn, lead to increased people-level impacts.

Certain development issues, because of their regional prevalence, scope or prominence, do not lend themselves to resolution through normal bilateral mechanisms or channels. Examples include transnational or international bodies of water, ecosystems and/or animal movements; AIDS and other pandemic diseases; regional trade relationships; and regional research strategies and agendas. Although difficult to resolve within a normal bilateral context, these issues are critically important to the successful attainment of a Mission's bilateral objectives and the Agency's global development priorities.

Under SO #2, REDSO will work collaboratively with its technical partners in the Africa Bureau and the Global Bureau Centers and other partners to develop, analyze, disseminate and use critical information on agreed-upon priority regional development issues. REDSO will serve as an on-the-ground extension of USAID/W technical leadership and expertise within the ESA region. This field-based extension function is considered to be critical, as the Agency moves towards a more participatory, customer-oriented and consultative development process. REDSO believes it has the capacity to fulfill this critical, technical liaison or broker role for more effective achievement of the Agency's global sustainable development goals and objectives.

(2) Problem Analysis and Strategic/Results Framework

One of the major constraints to development in the ESA region is a lack of regional focus. Common problems transcend country boundaries and many can be resolved only on a regional basis. Yet the individual countries continue to deal with them, generally without the benefit of learning from the experience of their neighbors. Regional cooperation and collaboration remain at a nascent stage in the region.

Fundamental to the development of regional approaches and solutions is the wide availability, sharing and utilization of information about what can be done to deal successfully with these problems. REDSO has a unique capacity to facilitate the long-term development of regional capacity for improved information generation and sharing. REDSO is also in a position to foster

greater collaboration among partners in the region, leading to more effective problem-solving by decision-makers.

To achieve SO #2, five Program Outcomes, depicted in Figure 4 on page 36, have been identified as within REDSO's manageable interests. The selection of these outcomes is based on REDSO's considerable collective knowledge and experience in the region. In many cases, REDSO has already implemented activities that show that achievement of the outcomes is feasible.

Program Outcome 1: Improved Availability of Regional Information in Priority Development Areas

Information available in the Agency's priority areas is severely lacking or inadequate for most countries of the ESA region. Gaps in information are continually being identified that adversely affect the capability of decision-makers to develop and implement programs to effectively deal with emerging development issues and constraints. At the same time, a considerable body of existing information about lessons learned is not effectively analyzed or shared across countries and programs.

REDSO will identify the information and databases that are available and make them more accessible to USAID's customers in the ESA region. In doing so, REDSO will work with its partners in the Africa Bureau, Global Bureau, Missions and African organizations to identify emerging issues and gaps in knowledge considered necessary for effective decision-making. REDSO will foster the development of region-wide research agendas that will serve to provide the needed information. Program Outcome 1 is considered crucial for the attainment of SO #2, as it will make information available to decision-makers.

Program Outcome 2: Improved Models, Technologies and Approaches for Use in Priority Development Areas

Despite the enormous development activity within the region, the lessons learned in one country in the region tend not to be utilized or drawn upon in the development and implementation of similar programs in neighboring countries. This can largely be attributed to the fact that the information is either not available, or is unavailable in a form which is usable across countries and programs.

REDSO will identify relevant models, approaches and technologies that have the potential to address priority development problems in the region. It will identify and develop mechanisms for disseminating this information, so that it is readily usable by decision-makers in the region. REDSO will also work with its development partners--the Global and Africa Bureaus, Missions, NGOs, the regional Cooperating Agencies, other donors, and the private sector--to stimulate the development of new and improved models, approaches and technologies for implementing more effective development programs in priority, cross-cutting areas.

Program Outcome 3: Enhanced Dissemination of Critical Regional Development Information

REDSO and its other development partners have identified many cross-cutting issues that impact on development programs in the ESA region. Yet, recognition of these issues by Mission staff and host country counterparts is sporadic. Even though success in these areas may be crucial in supporting a Mission's Strategic Objective(s), they may be perceived as outside of its manageable interests and dealt with only as an assumption in the Strategic Plan.

REDSO will utilize its considerable breadth of regional activities and talents to disseminate information about and draw attention to emerging issues, raise the awareness of both Missions and host countries about these issues, and, when possible, participate in developing a consensus among development partners in order to effectively marshal activities and resources. Wider distribution of this information and appropriate attention to raising awareness and developing a consensus on such issues (among both partners and customers) is assumed to engender better utilization of the information disseminated.

Program Outcome 4: Increased Regional Collaboration in Addressing Critical Regional Development Issues

The availability of data, information on lessons learned, and relevant experience are of little use, unless utilized in policy and program development. A USAID, World Bank, or DANIDA activity in one country, even if very successful, is not typically seen as directly relevant to a neighboring country or not likely to be adapted to a neighboring country. Since development is usually approached on a country-by-country basis, no agency or country is responsible for the greater, regional point of view. Even when the absence of a transnational perspective appears extremely short-sighted and wasteful, borders still seem to prevail. Little effort or initiative focuses on meaningful collaboration within the region.

REDSO has already begun regional collaborative activities. Increased collaboration will continue to be fostered through such activities as study tours, regional seminars, workshops, and conferences, and through strengthening existing African regional networks.

Program Outcome 5: Strengthened Human and Institutional Capacity to Generate, Analyze, and Use Critical Regional Development Information

In most ESA countries the capabilities to generate and analyze relevant development data and information are limited. Where information is available, key individuals often do not know how to interpret it or to apply it for effective decision-making.

REDSO will support training and other capacity-building activities on a regional basis. This will assist both partners and customers to design and conduct more effective research and data generation activities, to analyze available data and, with respect to policy and decision-makers, to effectively utilize these data in better program and policy development.

(3) Relationship to Agency Goals and Priorities

Population and Health: SO #2 will support the attainment of the Agency's strategic goal and objectives for the population/health sector by assisting Missions to deal more effectively with cross-cutting issues and problems. Decision-makers in the ESA region, both within and outside USAID, need relevant information if they are to deal with them effectively. In particular, REDSO will focus its regional efforts in the population/health sector on the issues/problems associated with: integration of HIV/AIDS activities with family planning and maternal/child health services; decentralization of health systems; financial sustainability of health systems, including the involvement of the private sector in public health programs; and the quality of services.

Environment: At the 1992 "Earth Summit" in Rio, rich and poor nations alike agreed that economic growth and environmental stewardship must both be pursued together to ensure truly sustainable development. In recognition of this critical relationship, the new USAID environmental strategy calls for a renewed emphasis on integrating environmental issues into all aspects of USAID's development assistance programs, from the long-term global environmental threats of biodiversity loss and climate change to promoting sustainable economic growth locally, nationally, and regionally by addressing environmental and economic practices that impede development and are unsustainable.

This linkage between sound environmental management and economic growth is nowhere more evident than in Africa, where economic prosperity is very closely tied to the natural resource base. In appreciation of the importance of such concerns, since 1988 the Africa Bureau has been pursuing its "Plan for Supporting Natural Resources Management in Sub-Saharan Africa", focusing on the priority issues of unsustainable agricultural practices and loss of tropical forests and other critical biodiversity habitats.

Because of the cross-cutting nature of many of these regional problems, REDSO is uniquely positioned to assist its various partners in USAID/W and in the region to ensure that ESA development is achieved in an environmentally sound and sustainable manner.

Economic Growth: Most observers in east and southern Africa would agree that economic liberalization has taken hold, albeit with varying degrees of commitment. A market orientation is widely accepted as necessary for optimal resource allocation. Strengthening markets, investing in people, and enhancing opportunity and access will catalyze the private sector's role as the engine of economic growth in the ESA region and ensure that equitable resource allocation takes place.

While bilateral Missions address these issues, a regional approach will have positive externalities. Analyzing and transferring the experiences of one country for application to another country can best be accomplished by a regional organization, such as REDSO. Strengthening markets entails defining a proper role for government: making and enforcing the rules under which economic activity takes place to ensure access and opportunity. This is a crucial task in the region. Other areas in which a regional link can leverage bilateral resources include trade, productivity, gender issues, agriculture and food security, and analyzing the

experiences of economic policy reform.

Democracy and Governance: SO #2 will support the Agency's priorities in democratization and governance through the creation of professional networks. These networks of public and private sector institutions and individuals will strengthen civil society, through information-sharing, collaborative focusing on shared problems, and by facilitating early warning and prevention of conflicts with the potential to disrupt civil order.

SO #2 will also directly promote the regional application of two of the overarching principles of the reengineered USAID: building indigenous capacity and fostering participation of both customers and partners in the development and implementation of USAID programs.

(4) Performance Indicators

Performance indicators, data sources, and means of measurement for SO #2 are presented in Figure 5 on page 37. The means of measurement will be built into the activities undertaken to achieve the SO. With the exception of customer surveys, special data collection activities are not anticipated. REDSO recognizes that additional effort will be needed to monitor and report on the indicators, using existing activity reports. Nominal indicators that reflect presence or absence of outcomes (for example, the presence of models, technologies, and agendas) will be used in certain instances to compensate for the lack of baseline data.

(5) The Consultative Process

The strategic framework and associated activities of SO #2 have been largely determined by the expressed needs and priorities of the ESA missions and their respective host country counterparts. On average, REDSO staff complete over 4,000 TDY days per year to the various ESA countries. Consultations on critical development topics of cross-cutting or regional importance are conducted with Mission and host country collaborators during each of these visits. These field-based interactions are complemented by an ongoing dialogue with Africa Bureau and Global Bureau partners, focusing primarily on Agency priorities of regional or global significance. The results of these extensive consultations constitute the primary impetus for the framework and activities described under this SO. REDSO will continue these consultations to ensure that the activities pursued under this objective continue to address critical development constraints and solutions within the region.

(6) Current and Planned Activities

The following are brief descriptions of the various ongoing and planned activities which will contribute to the attainment of SO #2. The activities in **Population and Health** include:

- **The CAFS III Cooperative Agreement**, which supports the institutional development of CAFS as a self-reliant institution capable of providing the range of family planning training, research, and technical assistance services required by institutions in Africa.
- **The Cooperating Agencies Activity Tracking System (CAATS)**, a computer-based system developed to allow REDSO/PH to track and monitor the activities of the PHN CAs with a regional presence; capture the lessons learned from these CA activities and feed this information into the large Regional Health Networks Activity; foster greater awareness of the CA activities both on the part of ESA missions and other CAs; keep USAID/W bureaus informed of what the CAs are achieving in the ESA region; and keep REDSO/PH staff better informed of CA activities in order to enhance their advisory role with ESA missions.
- **The Regional Strategies in Child Survival, HIV/AIDs, and Female Education/Adolescent Reproductive Health**, being developed to foster regional approaches and programmatic solutions for cross-cutting issues. The Strategies will be based upon REDSO advisors assembling regional information and facilitating the development and implementation of regional research agendas.
- **The Regional Health Networks Activity**, a four year activity jointly funded by the Africa Bureau SD/HHRAA Project and Global PHN field support, facilitates the exchange of information, lessons learned and relevant experience between countries and missions in the ESA region, and fosters collaboration of regional countries and missions in dealing with cross-cutting issues. This activity will be accomplished through study tours and exchanges of personnel among countries, the setting of relevant research agendas based on identified gaps in knowledge, and appropriate dissemination of information and lessons learned.

The activities relating to **Economic Growth** include:

- **The Regional Trade Activity**, a series of analytical activities designed to increase intra-regional trade in east and southern Africa by examining trade policies, formal and informal trade relationships, agricultural comparative advantage, and constraints to increasing trade, and by assisting in the design and implementation of projects and programs geared toward increasing the incentives for private entrepreneurs to trade and invest in the region.
- **The All Africa Business Women's Association (AABA)**, which offers a forum for African businesswomen to exchange experience and learn how to overcome constraints facing women-owned businesses, and provides an opportunity for other types of information exchanges. The information will assist the growing number of African women entrepreneurs to become more fully integrated into the formal sector, expand their activities, and generally contribute to regional economic growth.

- **The Agricultural Impact Assessment Training Workshop**, one of a series of modest support activities designed to strengthen local capacity to better assess the people-level impacts of ongoing ESA regional agricultural research that USAID has been supporting through a variety of mechanisms for many years.
- **The Economic Reform Process**, a series of studies to analyze the dynamics of economies undergoing economic reform. A better understanding of regional issues affecting the economic reform process will better enable REDSO to assist governments (primarily through bilateral Missions) to reform their economies.
- **An Assessment of USAID Private Sector activities in the ESA Region**, to review and quantify the impact of private sector development projects/programs and policy reform activities throughout the region, and to share the findings and lessons learned with bilateral Missions and other REDSO customers and partners.
- **A Business & Trade Association Inventory**, to catalogue the types and numbers of such associations in the region; assess what mechanisms are used by such associations to mobilize resources to assist member companies in increasing export business and potential; determine what such associations can do to promote joint business ventures, transactions, and international trade; and promote networking, seminars, and inter-country study tours by association membership.

The main activities relating to the Environment are:

- **The Coastal Resources Management Demonstration Activity**, designed to: demonstrate how to formulate effective, participatory approaches and strategies for addressing coastal resources management problems in the east Africa region; begin to build the local, national and international/donor support for implementation of effective CRM strategies, especially at two pilot demonstration sites; promote regional learning about coastal management and information exchange among regional coastal management practitioners and concerned communities; and, enhance the capacity of UNEP-OCA/PAC and their UN partners to assist member nations to manage their coastal regions and resources.
- **The Environmental Governance in East and Southern Africa activity**, which is based on the premise that sustainable development and sound environmental management depend upon citizen responsibility and governments' responsiveness to natural resource management issues. It is assisting the African Centre for Technology Studies (ACTS) to carry out research on applying the concept of governance to environment and sustainable development.
- **The Trade in Wildlife Medicinals activity**, which will document trade in animal and plant medicinals originating within east and southern Africa, identify traded species of conservation concern, produce data on trade dynamics and markets, and determine which species merit additional field investigation to ascertain actual volumes and impacts of harvesting.

- **The Mobilization of Indigenous Environmental Resources** activity, which aims to increase indigenous knowledge, capacity, and participation in regional environmental and natural resource management. It supports short-term workshops, training and pilot demonstration activities, such as the National Environmental Strategic Planning Networking Workshops sub-activity, implemented by IUCN's (World Conservation Union) East Africa Regional Office.

The activities in the **Democracy and Governance** sphere will focus on the establishment of information networks. These networks will include several diverse groups:

- Judges, lawyers, public interest NGOs, and human rights NGOs to strengthen respect for the rule of law and human rights;
- Parliamentarians and civil servants to support and strengthen a shared quest for greater governmental transparency;
- Election officials to address common problems in electoral law and practice; and
- Political party leaders to support the development of shared codes of fair political competition and accountability.




Figure 5

LEVEL	INDICATORS	INFO/DATA SOURCE	RESPONSIBLE OFFICE(S)
<p>Strategic Objective #2:</p> <p>Increased utilization of critical information by USAID and other decision makers in the region</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Increased proportion of investment in critical regional development areas by ESA Missions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Mission ABSs, reports of Global Field Support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● REDSO ● Bilateral Missions ● Global, AFR Bureaus
<p>Program Outcome 2.1:</p> <p>Improved regional information in priority development areas</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Presence of appropriate data bases in priority development areas ● Presence of regional research agendas 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Activity reports/evaluations ● Activity reports/evaluations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● REDSO ● Bilateral Missions
<p>Program Outcome 2.2:</p> <p>Improved models, approaches and technologies for use in priority development areas</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Number of existing models, approaches and technologies identified and evaluated ● Number of new models, approaches and technologies developed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Activity reports, CAATS ● Activity reports, CAATS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● REDSO ● Bilateral Missions ● AFR Bureau
<p>Program Outcome 2.3:</p> <p>Enhanced dissemination of critical regional development information</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Number of users receiving critical regional development information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Activity reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● REDSO ● Bilateral Missions
<p>Program Outcome 2.4:</p> <p>Increased regional collaboration in addressing critical regional development issues</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Number of stakeholders collaborating in intra-regional events in REDSO priority regional development areas 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Activity reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● REDSO ● Bilateral Missions
<p>Program Outcome 2.5:</p> <p>Strengthened human and institutional capacity to generate, analyze and use critical regional development information</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Number of African stakeholders generating, analyzing, or using critical regional development information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Activity report 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● REDSO ● Bilateral Missions ● CAFS

Strategic Objective #3: Establish a Strong Basis for Implementation of the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative

(1) Rationale and Justification for the Selection

President Clinton's Greater Horn of Africa Initiative has its antecedents in REDSO. The GHAI is the direct outgrowth of an east Africa emergency assistance coordination conference that REDSO organized in Nairobi in early February 1994. The conference brought together 35 senior State Department and USAID officials, from Washington and the field, to focus on the growing crisis in the Greater Horn. There were, at the time, more than 14 million people "at risk" in the region. That was two months before the holocaust in Rwanda in which up to a million people died and several million more were added to the numbers "at risk."

REDSO proposed and the conferees accepted several recommendations for "next steps" to deal with the immediate crisis and begin to address the root causes of famine, civil strife and poverty in the Greater Horn. One of the recommendations was for REDSO to immediately begin work on an Inventory of East Africa's Emergency Assistance Assets and Infrastructure. REDSO was also asked to take the lead in drafting a "long-term regional strategy" to deal with the continuing crisis in the Greater Horn.

REDSO completed the Inventory in May 1994. But the responsibility for preparing the "long-term regional strategy" was shifted to Washington in June, given the even greater crisis in the region precipitated by the horrific events in Rwanda, and following a highly publicized visit to the region by USAID Administrator Brian Atwood. Members of his party wrote the first draft of a Concept Paper for the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative during that trip. The final paper entitled "Building a Foundation for Food Security and Crisis Prevention in the Greater Horn of Africa" was drafted by a Washington-based USAID/State Task Force and issued last November.

The paper was then widely distributed to the major bilateral and multilateral donors, the UN and other international agencies, and scores of NGOs. In addition, members of the Washington Task Force visited many of the donor capitals to hear their views on the concepts contained in the paper, and to engage them as full partners in the Initiative. Further consultations (described in more detail below) were held in February and March of this year in the Field.

Early in 1995, USAID/W directed REDSO to design a Horn of Africa Support Project (HASP), to serve as a funding mechanism for various field-based "start-up" activities for the GHAI. The GHAI embodies a clear principle: success requires "African ownership" and a field focus, even though there must be many players, including supporting actors in Washington and other donor capitals.

Given REDSO's role in launching the GHAI, and its experience and expertise in dealing with all of the problems that the Initiative will address, REDSO is the obvious choice as the facilitator in "establishing a strong basis" for the GHAI. Given the very high priority which the Administration attaches to the Initiative, REDSO has determined that it warrants the status of an independent Strategic Objective. This decision has the unanimous support of the USAID Directors in the Greater Horn.

This SO is supported by both SO #1 and SO #2 activities, reflecting strong synergism among the array of REDSO programs, staff support and available technical skills. SO #4 is also fully consistent with the GHAI and strong linkage with this SO will contribute significantly towards regional food security, crisis prevention and response, and the transition from crisis to sustainable development.

Several key assumptions underlie SO #3. Foremost is that regional partners, particularly the political leadership of the GHAI countries, will recognize the advantages of thinking and acting in a regional manner about issues now inappropriately viewed nationally. Following this lead, other partners must see sufficient value in new ways of thinking and acting to generate the will to change. The role of REDSO as a regional facilitator must also be recognized by the array of partners, regional leaders and the general international community. In as much as the leadership on this Initiative is to come from national governments, continued commitment to cooperate is fundamental. Furthermore, financial and human resources sufficient to achieve the critical mass to effect change must be committed by other partners, e.g., bilateral donors, international agencies, NGOs, and host governments.

(2) Problem Analysis and Strategic/Results Framework

REDSO is well-positioned to undertake responsibility for establishing a basis to decrease food insecurity and resolve conflicts in the region. Figure 6 on page 42 illustrates the five outcomes and activities identified for SO #3. REDSO has substantial experience in providing support to bilateral Missions for similar outcomes, such as food security, population stabilization, economic growth and disaster assistance. Some of the areas are new, not only for REDSO and USAID, but for the international community as well. REDSO will, therefore, have to engage in a collaborative "learning by doing" approach with its customers and partners. Methods and procedures for conflict early warning, for example, are not well-developed; nor is there a generally accepted framework for the transition from crisis to sustainable development.

Some GHAI activities have already begun under other REDSO initiatives that will link directly into this SO. Other illustrative activities will be defined through a process of participation with partners and customers, but each activity reflects areas in which REDSO has an appropriate, comparative advantage. Because the GHAI is a complex undertaking, and because some of the areas being addressed and methods are new ways of thinking and acting, a complete set of outcomes and activities cannot be prescribed *a priori*.

(3) Relationship to Agency Goals and Priorities

The GHAI must be seen as a model, combining all the Agency's sustainable development strategies toward a single goal of achieving food security in an historically strife-torn and disaster-prone region. The President has declared that this Initiative is in the U.S. national interest and is a harbinger of the reengineered USAID. There is perhaps no more risky environment in which to operate. Nevertheless, establishing a foundation for achieving this Initiative is of the highest priority for USAID -- and therefore REDSO as well.

This SO closely integrates all five of the Agency's strategic focus areas, including targets in economic growth, democracy and governance, environment, population and humanitarian assistance. Throughout the participatory implementation of these activities, environmental impacts and gender integration will be closely monitored and judged, so as to improve performance. At this stage, REDSO emphasis is on establishing the foundation through participation and collaboration of partners for the achievement of long-term people and customer-level-impacts.

(4) Performance Indicators and Targets

Figure 7 on pages 43 and 44 gives the performance indicators for SO #3. Some of the indicators are process-oriented, measuring progress toward regional collaboration on solving food security and conflict problems. The number and breadth of stakeholders that meet to discuss these issues is a proxy for regional collaboration. Measuring actions that occur as a result of these discussions and meetings is thought too difficult to measure directly. A matrix of partners/stakeholders --with the types of collaboration and outputs achieved -- will be used by REDSO as a management tool to better measure the quality of results for this SO.

The actual commitment of regional government and donor resources to GHAI objectives might be a more direct measurement of the SO achievement. Since REDSO is only concerned with laying the foundation for accomplishing major gains in regional food security and conflict prevention -- gains that are likely to be fully achieved only within the span of a generation -- the proposed measurements appear to be sufficient.

REDSO has modeled program outcomes upon the objectives stated in the GHAI Concept Paper. Together they constitute the necessary outcomes to achieve the SO. Indicators for the POs are specified in process terms, in order to measure progress toward regional stakeholder agreement and collaboration on regional food security strategies, crisis prevention and response, sustainable economic growth and reduced population growth, and strategies for transitions from crises to sustainable development. Measurements will focus on strategies, agreements and meetings that take place on specified subjects, because the actual outcomes of these events are not in REDSO's manageable interests. The establishment and sharing of regional data reflects the goal of establishing a strong basis for the GHAI. The means of measurement will be built into the activities undertaken. With the exception of customer surveys to assess the effectiveness of networks and information sharing, no other assessments are anticipated in order to generate data for the indicators.

(5) The Consultative Process

Consultations on the GHAI have been widely held on the GHAI concepts in order to gauge stakeholder interest in the Initiative and achieve some level of African "ownership". To date, some 68 meetings with over 1,000 participants have been undertaken by various USAID officers based in Washington and the field. The consultations have embraced a wide representation of stakeholders, communities, NGOs and other donors at the headquarters and field level. East African Heads of State, other senior host country officials, and the U.S. Ambassadors in the Greater Horn countries have all participated actively in these consultations.

Results of these consultations have been uniformly positive, with general agreement on the root causes of food insecurity and conflict and a consensus that the international community needs to think and act differently to prevent future crises. Less consensus exists among those consulted on what steps can or should be taken to achieve the goals of regional food security and conflict prevention. Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda appear to have the strongest commitment to the GHAI at this point.

REDSO has also undertaken a separate consultative process with the USAID Missions, USAID/Washington, and many of its regional partners, e.g., NGOs, International Agricultural Research Centers, and international organizations, concerning an appropriate role for REDSO in the Initiative. The formulation of this SO stems from these consultations, all of which resulted in a consensus that the GHAI will have many partners and customers and that it should be field-driven.


(6) Current and Planned Activities

REDSO is already engaged in a wide array of activities bearing on this SO, the largest of which is the new Horn of Africa Support Project (HASP). Currently in the design process, it will be modestly authorized at \$12 million over four years, with an initial FY 1995 obligation of \$2 million. HASP will support the five program outcomes under this SO and provide resources to measure progress and coordinate the GHAI from a "Secretariat," to be established in REDSO.

The other REDSO activities that will support SO #3 are arrayed under each Program Outcome in Figure 7, on the following page. Many fall under several other SOs as well. Some of the planned activities, such as conflict early-warning and prevention, are little understood phenomena that will require development of new methodologies and procedures. Since the GHAI is intended to be implemented with regional leadership, it will need to be responsive to Africans' expressed interests. REDSO's response to this challenge will require maximum consultation and flexibility in the identification and execution of activities.

Four "virtual" teams, with their core members in USAID/W, and other members residing in the ESA Missions and REDSO, have been established to provide staff support, analysis and coordination for the GHAI. These teams roughly coincide with the four GHAI objectives and REDSO's five program outcomes under SO #3.

Figure 6



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Figure 7

LEVEL	INDICATORS	INFO/DATA SOURCE	RESPONSIBLE OFFICE(S)
<p>Strategic Objective #3</p> <p>Establish a strong basis for implementation of the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● No. of partners/stakeholders represented at major GHAI policy/issue meetings and workshops (by type of participant) ● Quantity of Government resources committed to GHAI objectives ● Quantity of Donor resources committed to GHAI objectives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Policy/issue meeting minutes and workshop reports complemented by a data matrix of breadth and depth of participation on each issue (This can be used to report on how many participants (male and female), % of GHAI countries represented and type of institution involved.) ● Government budgets (\$ plus \$ value in kind contributions divided by GDP or other measure for standardization) ● Donor budgets/reports to GHAI coordinating body 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● GHAI secretariat, HASP, Washington Working Group including Global, AFR and BHR ● GHAI secretariat, HASP ● GHAI secretariat, HASP
<p>Program Outcome 3.1</p> <p>Strengthened support for food security in the region</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● No. of country food security strategies adopted ● % of GHAI countries covered by integrated regional food security database meeting a pre-determined standard for quality of data; types of data collected; quantity, frequency and dissemination of reports ● IGADD member states adopt a regional food security strategy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Strategy documents complemented by a matrix to track the degree to which strategies meet the pre-determined standards including human and institutional capacity for operationalization ● Food security data bases ● HASP project reports, GHAI secretariat progress reports, minutes of IGADD food security meetings complemented by a matrix to track progress towards adoption to be developed by IGADD 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● HASP, FEWS III, REDSO/FFP, Washington working group, GHAI secretariat, FAFSAS ● HASP, FEWS III, FAFSAS, GHAI secretariat ● HASP, GHAI secretariat

Figure 7

LEVEL	INDICATORS	INFO/DATA SOURCE	RESPONSIBLE OFFICE(S)
<p>Program Outcome 3.2</p> <p>Capacity established for crises prevention and response</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● % of GHAI countries covered by crises early warning system (includes data on political, economic and social factors being defined, collected, analyzed and broadly disseminated) ● No. of partners (types of institutions and individual men and women) engaged in crisis prevention and response 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Early Warning System Data Base reports complemented by a matrix to track progress by country to be developed by implementing partners ● HASP project Reports, REDSO conflict prevention and resolution adviser reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● HASP, GHAI secretariat, REDSO/FFP, Washington Working Group ● HASP, GHAI secretariat, REDSO/APD, BHR/OTI
<p>Program Outcome 3.3</p> <p>Greater regional collaboration for sustainable economic growth</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● No. of formal consultations by regional economic decision-makers in both private and government sectors ● No. of Inter-Government Agreements on economic growth 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● HASP and REDSO SO2 results package reports plus minutes of consultative meetings complemented by a matrix tracking gender and level of participants, and types of groups/institutions represented for each issue discussed to be developed by HASP ● Agreement Documents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● HASP, REDSO offices, Washington Working Group, GHAI secretariat ● GHAI secretariat, Activity Managers
<p>Program Outcome 3.4</p> <p>Greater Regional Collaboration for reducing population growth rates</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● No. of partners/stakeholders collaborating in inter-regional events related to reducing population growth rates 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Meeting/activity reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● REDSO/PHN, CAFS, HARRA, Global, AFR
<p>Program Outcome 3.5</p> <p>Strategies Developed for transition from crises to sustainable development</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● No. of new methods and practices identified 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● HASP, REDSO/APD, REDSO/FFP reports, Washington Working Group reports, BHR/OTI reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● HASP, REDSO/APD, GHAI secretariat

Strategic Objective # 4: Effective Delivery of USAID's Humanitarian Assistance

(1) Rationale and Justification for Selection

The United States has a long and generous tradition of providing assistance to the victims of man-made and natural disasters. Humanitarian assistance has traditionally been viewed as both an act of national conscience and an investment in the future. It is integral to USAID's overall strategy to achieve sustainable development. A single natural disaster can eradicate years of development progress in a matter of minutes, and civil conflicts can destroy social, political and economic institutions. Both can set the development process back immeasurably.

In the ESA region, USAID is presently funding significant humanitarian assistance programs in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Mozambique and Angola. Funding totalled more than \$550 million in FY 94 (PL 480 Title II/III and OFDA funds), considerably more than what USAID spent on development assistance programs in the entire ESA region (an estimated \$463 million).

As seen on REDSO's Strategic Objectives Tree, there is a direct linkage between SO #4 and SO #3. Both objectives are mutually re-enforcing. They recognize the need to address the underlying causes of food insecurity through preparedness and prevention measures, and the importance of moving as fast as possible along the relief-to-development continuum by supporting recovery and rehabilitation activities. Many of the SO #4 activities will likely be funded by the REDSO-managed Horn of Africa Support Project (HASP). The synergy between SO #3 and SO #4 will also contribute directly to the achievement of sub-goal #3, strengthened regional capacity to prevent and respond to crisis situations. This, in turn, will enhance the potential for achieving the overall goal of broad-based sustainable development in the ESA region.

Two main customer groups will benefit from the achievement of SO #4: vulnerable groups targeted to receive various forms of humanitarian assistance, and the USAID Missions where such programs are operating. The people-level impact of USAID's humanitarian assistance is unquestionable: it has saved millions of lives and reduced the suffering of populations at risk; it has protected economic assets; it has built local capacity to prepare for and respond to disasters; it has facilitated a return to normalcy and local self-sufficiency in the aftermath of emergencies and disasters through effective rehabilitation; and it has helped affected populations return to the path of social and economic development over the longer term, through reconstruction and other development assistance programs.

REDSO has been instrumental in assisting Missions to design and implement a variety of humanitarian assistance programs. In addition, through the interaction with its main implementing partners, the NGOs, UN agencies, and other international organizations, REDSO has played a proactive coordination and communication role, that has been critical in responding effectively to disasters and emergencies.

Two key assumptions underly SO #4: (1) major disasters will continue to occur in the ESA region, both natural and man-made, which will require the international community

to support humanitarian assistance interventions; and (2) the USG will continue to support significant levels of humanitarian assistance to address such crisis situations.

(2) Problem Analysis and Strategic/Results Framework

The magnitude of food insecurity in the ESA region constitutes a compelling human crisis. At the root of this alarming rise in food insecurity is an unstable social and political environment that precludes sustainable economic growth. A number of factors converge to create instability. They include poor economic policies that have inhibited the development of agriculture. Population pressures, combined with a lack of investment in human resource development, further stress the natural resource base. Civil strife and a scarcity of democratic institutions undermine sustainable growth strategies.

Significant constraints in the region over which there is little or no control include: (1) variable weather conditions; (2) serious security situations, which often limit access to crisis-hit areas; (3) regional transport systems, which often are overwhelmed by serious humanitarian crises; and (4) the budget constraints that most donors are facing.

In order to achieve SO #4, REDSO will focus on three strategic Program Outcomes: (1) improved preparedness in the ESA region for effective responses to crises; (2) more effective USAID responses to problems as they arise; and (3) enhanced target population capacity to re-establish people's livelihoods following a crisis. The outcomes are depicted in Figure 8 on page 49.

REDSO will develop an improved preparedness capacity for the entire ESA region (PO 4.1), mainly through the implementation of FEWS III. FEWS III will provide host country and US decision-makers with timely and accurate information on potential famine conditions to guide appropriate interventions. The achievement of this program outcome will also be supported through HASP preparedness and mitigation activities in the GHAI countries. Another important activity required to achieve this program outcome will be the preparation of more thorough MDRPs by USAID, starting with those countries having the highest levels of food insecurity, i.e., the most disaster-prone. In order to learn how to respond better to complex disasters/crises, REDSO plans to perform a number of impact evaluations and develop a list of lessons learned.

To achieve a more effective USAID response to crises as they arise (PO 4.2), REDSO will work closely with AFR/DRCO, BHR/OFDA, BHR/FFP and other implementing partners (NGOs, UN agencies and IOs) to conduct needs assessments and improve logistical and monitoring systems. Activities under this PO are necessarily demand driven, with a corresponding increase in responses with the onset of new crises or the escalation of ongoing ones.

To enhance people's capacity to restore their livelihoods following a crisis (PO 4.3), REDSO will ensure that appropriate assistance strategies are in place following a crisis, so that rehabilitation and recovery activities can be established. Flexibility in the use of DFA and BHR resources for this program outcome will be required. The use of Title II resources for well-targeted feeding will be stressed.

(3) Relationship to Agency Goals and Priorities

Effective delivery of humanitarian assistance is integral to USAID's overall aim of achieving sustainable development. REDSO's strategy for humanitarian assistance follows closely Technical Annex E, Humanitarian Assistance, issued by BHR under USAID's Guidelines for Strategic Plans last February. REDSO's Strategic Plan recognizes critical linkages between development and humanitarian assistance. Appropriate development policies in USAID's four other priority areas play key roles in protecting development progress by preventing disasters or mitigating their effects. Appropriate disaster preparedness and emergency relief measures, coupled with development assistance programs, can help not only to save lives and alleviate suffering in the wake of disasters, but can also initiate rehabilitation and reconstruction. Together, they can speed the return to continued development.

(4) Performance Indicators

Figure 9 on page 50 depicts the performance indicators for SO #4 and its three program outcomes. In most cases, means of measurement will be provided in reports prepared by the grantees or contractors implementing the humanitarian assistance activities. In their monitoring of humanitarian assistance interventions, REDSO or Mission personnel will verify a number of the indicators. The regular reports to be prepared by the FEWS III staff will be identified in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the FEWS contractor, ARD, and USAID. Nutritional surveys carried out on a regular basis by PVOs and/or UNICEF will provide REDSO with a good indicator of the impact of humanitarian interventions on the levels of acute malnutrition within the target population. Impact assessments undertaken after serious humanitarian crises will determine the effectiveness of USAID's response and lessons learned.

(5) Consultative Process

The provision of humanitarian assistance is a continuing and highly consultative process among REDSO and Mission staff, target populations (the customers), our implementing partners (NGOs, UN agencies, and contractors/consultants), the donors, and USAID/W. Through this consultative process, all parties have recognized that the root causes of food insecurity in the region must be addressed, and that there must be a greater capacity in the region for crisis prevention, early warning, and response. Strategic coordination with customers, partners and other donors at all levels is critical in addressing these issues.

(6) Current and Planned Activities

REDSO's role in providing effective humanitarian assistance is more or less demand driven, depending on the magnitude and type of disaster or emergency. At present, REDSO has direct management responsibility for only one major humanitarian intervention, the large relief effort in southern Sudan. With no end in sight to the 13-year civil war in Sudan, this effort will doubtless continue to be a major REDSO activity.

Along with the incorporation of the Sudan Field Office into REDSO's Food For Peace Division, REDSO has a new role: the oversight of the FEWS Field Representatives

(FFRs) who have been assigned to Nairobi under FEWS III. The FFRs will work closely with REDSO/FFP staff in preparing vulnerability assessments and assessing the threat of food insecurity to at-risk populations. FEWS III will also assist in determining how to improve use of USAID resources in responding to humanitarian emergencies. This is an important expansion of FEWS' previous mandate and will add to REDSO's capacity to achieve SO #4.

Several other activities related to SO#4 for which REDSO may play an indirect role, or act as a monitor, include: grants to NGOs, UN Agencies and International Organizations (IOs); impact evaluations; training; implementation of humanitarian assistance activities by our partners; health/nutritional surveys; market activity assessments; D/G assessments; conflict mitigation; procurement and transport of relief commodities/services; seeds/tools distribution and other agricultural rehabilitation activities; coordination meetings; etc.

Beyond these *ad hoc* activities, there looms the possibility of another major disaster that will require a REDSO effort. Over the past several years, REDSO played a major role in initiating the U.S. airlift from Mombasa into northern Kenya and Somalia, and in mounting U.S. relief operations in Somalia and Rwanda prior to the arrival of DART teams from the U.S. With the recent evacuation of all U.S. personnel from Somalia, USAID/Somalia has again moved into a REDSO office in Nairobi. If the security situation in Somalia worsens, it is conceivable that REDSO would be given full responsibility for relief and rehabilitation in Somalia, as was the case throughout 1990-92.

For more than a decade, REDSO has managed an ESF-funded bilateral program in Djibouti. The rationale for the program is political: an annual cash grant helps the Government of Djibouti pay its debt to multi-lateral institutions and assures continued U.S. access to Djibouti's strategic port and airports. Those facilities were used by U.S. military forces during the Gulf War, and they were a valuable asset during U.S. military deployment in support of relief operations in Somalia over the past several years.

Because the Djibouti program does not fit neatly into this Strategic Plan, REDSO considered calling it a Target of Opportunity. Then REDSO decided to list it as one of the activities under SO #4, because the U.S. uses Djibouti's facilities primarily to support its humanitarian assistance operations in the Greater Horn.

The annual ESF funding level for the Djibouti program is determined by the Department of State. The FY 1994 level was \$1 million. REDSO has received no word on the FY 1995 level, but a rumor persists that the Department may drop Djibouti as an ESF recipient this year. Should this be the case, then USAID may wish to consider a modest DFA-funded program in Djibouti, not necessarily to secure U.S. access to the ports, but because Djibouti (the home of IGADD) is becoming an important player in the GHAI context.




Figure 9

LEVEL	INDICATORS	INFO/DATA SOURCES	RESPONSIBLE OFFICE(S)
<p>Strategic Objective #4: Effective delivery of USAID's humanitarian assistance</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Proportion of target population served appropriately ● Mortality rates among target population 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Grantee reports and end use monitoring reports ● Base line data vs data prepared at regular intervals 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Grantees, REDSO/FFP USAID Missions, OFDA ● PVOs, UNICEF
<p>Program Outcome 4.1 Improved preparedness in ESA region for effective response to crises</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● No. of Mission Disaster Relief Plans (MDRP) prepared/ revised ● FEWS III regular reports received on schedule, as per MOU ● % of major USG humanitarian interventions for which impact evaluations are prepared 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● MDRPs ● FEWs reports ● Impact Evaluation Reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● USAID Missions ● FEWs staff ● BHR/OFDA, AFR/DRCO
<p>Program Outcome 4.2 More effective USAID responses to crises as the arise</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Time between field recommendations and AID/W approval ● Time between AID/W approval and delivery of commodities to target beneficiaries ● % decrease in levels of acute malnutrition in target populations ● % of target population receiving USAID resources on schedule 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Cable traffic ● Cable traffic ● PVO nutritional surveys ● Receipt of status reports from partners 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● REDSO/FFP, USAID Missions ● PVOs, UNICEF ● REDSO, USAID Missions
<p>Program Outcome 4.3 Enhanced target population capacity to re-establish their livelihoods following a crisis</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Increased use of agricultural inputs by target population during the next main growing season after a major intervention begins ● Increased availability and variety of agricultural commodities in local markets ● Proportion of resources going to recovery and rehabilitation activities versus relief activities (OFDA vs DFA resources) ● Proportion of serious crises having USAID humanitarian assistance strategies in place within 3 months of initial response 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Baseline data vs field data from partners ● Observation & reports received from partners ● Grant agreements ● Approved humanitarian assistance strategies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● PVOs, WFP, UNICEF ● PVOs, WFP ● REDSO, USAID Missions ● BHR/OTI, AFR

IV. MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS OF THE STRATEGY

A. Resource Requirements

The implementation of this Strategic Plan and the achievement of its four Strategic Objectives requires a modest increase in REDSO's resources -- primarily its *human* resources -- over the next several years.

No net increase in OE-funded, U.S. direct-hire positions (FTEs) is required. But several additional program-funded positions will be needed in order for REDSO to: provide increased technical support in critical areas (SO #1); implement the regional value-added initiatives (SO #2); and manage the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (SO #3).

Figure 10 on page 56 shows that the main personnel cost increases will occur in the first year of the planning period, i.e., FY 1996. Subsequent increases in personnel costs primarily reflect projected inflation over the five-year (FY 1996-2000) period.

However, as shown in Figure 11 on page 57, REDSO's *overall* costs are projected to *decrease* in the out-years of the Plan period, as many of the costs associated with HASP, CAFS and the regional value-added initiatives are forward-funded in the early years. The following is a summary of REDSO's resource requirements, directly linked to the achievement of each Strategic Objective.

Strategic Support Objective #1: the majority of REDSO's staff time will continue to be devoted to the achievement of this SO--"effective program and technical support to the ESA Missions."

Although REDSO has traditionally fallen short in meeting the demands for support services from its "client" Missions, no additional direct-hire positions are proposed in order to close the gap between supply and demand in FY 1996 and beyond. The gap is expected to be closed considerably as a result of a number of positive factors:

- The establishment of two new direct-hire Contracting Officer positions in southern Africa, which will greatly ease the pressure on REDSO's Contracting staff;
- The recent filling of all five of REDSO's Project Development Officer positions; only two or three were filled at any given time over the past five years;
- The arrival this summer of two senior officers to fill long-standing vacancies in REDSO's Analysis and Food for Peace Divisions; and
- The addition of several new institutional contractor personnel, who will work primarily on REDSO's regional initiatives, but should contribute to the provision of technical support services as well.

That being said, REDSO plans to add two new positions in order to meet the particularly heavy demand for technical support services in the areas of democracy/governance and private sector development.

- A second U.S. PCS Regional Private Sector Advisor, with responsibility for: developing activities focused on the growing requirement for private sector development/economic growth as part of the GHAI; providing advice to ESA Missions on the development and strengthening of capital markets, e.g., stock markets, venture capital funds, and other financial instruments for Small and Medium Enterprise (SMEs); and expanding ESA policy initiatives aimed at creating an enabling environment for private sector development; and
- A second U.S. Democracy/Governance Advisor, to be funded by an institutional contract, i.e., the incumbent would not be a PSC. The position will entail two main responsibilities: helping REDSO's existing D/G Advisor respond to the growing demand for D/G assistance from the ESA Missions; and working closely with the GHAI Secretariat, in the new area of crisis prevention and conflict resolution.

REDSO will also need an additional OE-funded PSC position -- a Program Evaluation Specialist -- to design methodologies and indicators, collect and analyze data, and produce reports on outcomes and the impact of REDSO's efforts to achieve SO #1, as well as the other three SOs. REDSO plans to recruit an African professional, who has been doing Program Impact Assessments on a short-term contract, to fill this new position.

Strategic Objective #2 - Most of the regional value-added initiatives grouped under this SO have already been launched and the required staff (direct-hire, PSC, and institutional contractor personnel) are being funded this year and are already on REDSO's rolls. Additional personnel who may be required over the next several years would be program-funded institutional contractors, not requiring an increase in REDSO's direct-hire or PSC ceilings.

Strategic Objective #3 - REDSO has already devoted a great deal of staff time to the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, e.g., the REDSO Director and the Chief of the Agriculture and Natural Resources Division have each spent about a third of their time on the GHAI over the past year. With REDSO now assuming a major facilitative role for the GHAI, several new positions are required to handle the workload on a full-time basis. They are:

- An OE-funded U.S. direct-hire position, tentatively to be designated as an Assistant Director, to coordinate all of REDSO's GHAI work;

The new GHAI position will not require a net increase in REDSO's FTE direct-hire ceiling (28 from the Africa Bureau and one from the Global Bureau). The Global Bureau FTE is currently held by the UID Division Chief, whose position will be abolished upon his departure from post in September. The Global Bureau FTE can then be allocated to REDSO and used for the new GHAI position.

- A U.S. PSC HASP project manager, to be funded by the project; and

- Two FSN/PSC positions, to staff REDSO's GHAI Secretariat, also to be funded by the HASP.

Strategic Objective #4 - No additional staff resources are projected to achieve this objective. But this assumes that three positions -- currently vacant -- will be filled over the next several months: an FFP officer, an FFP International Development Intern (not counted in REDSO's FTE ceiling), and the third FEWS (institutional contractor) position recently funded by FEWS III.

Figure 12 on page 58 is a matrix that shows the projected allocation of REDSO's resources by Strategic Objectives and by Agency priority areas.

All of the above is based on the assumption that REDSO will be allocated the DFA money required to fully fund CAFS III and HASP at their authorized levels, and that the Bureau for Humanitarian Relief will continue to provide the required resources in food aid and OFDA grants for southern Sudan emergency relief. What the Department of State does in terms of further ESF funding for the Djibouti program remains to be seen.

* * *

If the additional positions described above -- and the funds to support them -- are not provided to REDSO in FY 1996 and beyond, then the achievement of this Strategic Plan will be placed in serious jeopardy. REDSO is hopeful that USAID/W will agree that this Plan is worthy of the investments required to assure its achievement.

If REDSO's OE and program funds are straight-lined or reduced in the coming years, very painful decisions will have to be made. Trade-offs among the four Strategic Objectives would not be easy, because none of the four is free-standing: each has important synergies to the others; and most of the REDSO staff contributes to several (or all four) of the SOs. In a worst case scenario -- substantial cuts in OE and program funding -- REDSO would be forced into a very painful *triage* situation, requiring the elimination of entire functions and activities.

In this situation, REDSO would make every effort to protect the resources required to achieve Strategic Support Objective #1 (REDSO's raison d'etre), as well as Strategic Objective #2 (the regional value-added initiatives).

REDSO would begin by cutting the activities under Strategic Objective #4. First to go would be management of the bilateral program in Djibouti. This would be followed by oversight of the FEWS III effort, then support for the DARTs, and, lastly, the responsibility for managing the emergency relief operation in southern Sudan. If these activities were curtailed, REDSO would no longer have a basis for Strategic Objective #4. However, some other organizations would presumably have to be found to take on the responsibility for the activities which REDSO was forced to drop.

The Djibouti program (if it were not completely terminated) would have to be managed by the U.S. Embassy, or from either USAID/W or USAID/Ethiopia. Oversight for FEWS III would

have to come from the Africa Bureau in Washington or USAID/Kenya. The Bureau for Humanitarian Relief would have to re-assume the full responsibility for managing southern Sudan relief; and its DARTs would have to operate without REDSO support. Some REDSO Food for Peace activities would conceivably continue, but as technical support services under SO #1.

Deeper cuts would have to be absorbed by reducing or fully curtailing the planned activities relating to Strategic Objective #3. REDSO would have to drop its overall coordinating/facilitative role for the GHAI; forego project management responsibility for the HASP; and curtail funding for the HASP itself. Taken together, these reductions would effectively eliminate Strategic Objective #3.

Some may question why REDSO would propose to drop SO #3 (the GHAI) before SO #2 (the regional value-added initiatives), in view of the priority which the Administration attaches to the GHAI. There are several reasons for this REDSO position.

Most of the regional value-added initiatives have already been launched, or will be shortly; and most of the staff to lead those initiatives is on board, or will be shortly. The GHAI, on the other hand, is still in the conceptualization stage; none of the organizational structure and staffing required for its implementation is as yet in place. Thus, cutting back on SO #2 would mean curtailing activities in which there has already been a substantial investment in human and financial resources. Whereas cutting back on SO #3 means refraining from new and relatively costly investments.

Moreover, while REDSO considers itself the most obvious and best-equipped organization to facilitate the GHAI, one of the other USAID Missions in the Greater Horn (USAID/Ethiopia comes immediately to mind) could also perform this function. But no organization -- other than REDSO -- has the capacity to design and implement the regional value-added initiatives reflected in SO #2. And, most importantly, SO #2 directly supports SO #1, REDSO's *raison d'etre*.

If REDSO were left with only two Strategic Objectives (SO #1 and SO#2), it would still have a major and highly-justifiable mandate. Indeed, in the current climate of shrinking budgets, closing Missions, and greater emphasis on regional approaches, the need for an office like REDSO to perform the kinds of activities included in SO #1 and SO#2 assumes a heightened utility and importance.

B. Implementing the Plan: Next Steps

This Plan will be sent to Washington (AFR/DP and AFR/EA) on April 22, 1995. Copies will also be sent the following week to all USAID Missions in the ESA region. They will be asked to review the Plan and send their comments to REDSO and the Africa Bureau within two weeks. Thus, their comments will be available when this Plan is officially vetted in USAID/W, according to the following schedule:

- The week of May 15-19, inter-Agency meetings chaired by AFR/DP to identify/clarify "issues;" and

- The week of May 22-26, inter-Agency review meetings, chaired by AA/AFR.

Assuming that the outcome of the latter meetings is positive, i.e., that REDSO's Strategic Plan is generally approved, then the next steps in implementing the Plan will be as follows:

- Completion of REDSO's FY 1997 Action Plan (June 1995);
- Refinement of the Strategic Objectives Indicators and the development of annual SO targets and baseline (June/July 1995);
- Development of an outline of Customer Survey Plans (July/August 1995);
- Sharing of Customer Survey Plans with bilateral Missions and other customers (September/October 1995);
- Finalize the Monitoring Evaluation and Reporting (MER) Plan for the Strategic Objectives (November 1995);
- Finalize the Customer Survey Plan (November 1995);
- Begin Customer Surveys (December 1995); and
- Finalize REDSO's first Assessment of Program Impact (February 1996).

Figure 10

**REDSO PERSONNEL RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
FY 95 THRU FY 00 (\$000)**

Funding Category (OE/Program)	FY 95	FY 96	FY 97	FY 98	FY 99	FY 00	FY 96-00 TOTAL
Operating - Personnel							
Number of FTEs	28	29	29	29	29	29	
Program							
Reg. Env. Advisor	0	260	270	280	290	300	1,400
Reg. NRM Advisor	408	132	270	280	290	300	1,272
Reg. Ag. Econ. Policy Advisor	256	260	270	280	290	300	1,400
Reg. Ag. Advisor	245	260	270	280	290	300	1,400
Reg. Ag. Econ. Policy Advisor	61	65	70	75	80	85	375
Reg. Hlth. Policy Advisor	250	260	270	280	290	300	1,400
Reg. Health Financial Advisor	200	260	270	280	290	300	1,400
Democracy/Gov. Advisor	280	240	270	280	290	300	1,380
Democracy/Gov. Fellow (IC)	260	160	210	220	230	240	1,060
Reg. Beh. Science Advisor	0	260	270	280	290	300	1,400
Reg. Program Impact Advisor	230	260	270	280	290	300	1,400
Reg. Program Impact Advisor	50	65	70	75	80	85	375
Reg. Econ. Markets Advisor	230	260	270	280	290	300	1,400
Reg. Political Econ. Advisor	230	260	270	280	290	300	1,400
Reg. Private Sector Advisor	260	260	270	280	290	300	1,400
Reg. Private Sector Advisor	0	200	220	230	240	250	1,140
WID Advisor	50	55	60	65	70	75	325
Reg. Ch. Surv. Advisor (IC)	0	350	350	350	350	350	1,750
Fem. Educ. Advisor (IC)	50	260	270	280	290	300	1,400
TAACS Advisor (IC)	200	350	350	350	350	350	1,750
CAFS Manager (spouse)	170	90	0	0	0	0	90
HASP Project Manager	0	260	270	280	290	300	1,400
TOTAL OE + Program	6,366	7,841	8,214	8,482	8,753	9,027	42,318

Projected costs include all REDSO Direct Hire, PSC and full-time institutional contract personnel costs, but not OFDA-funded PSC positions.

OE total increases by 3%/year for inflation.

REDSO's FTE level will increase to 29 in FY 96 with the addition of a GHAI Coordinator. But the FTE for the Chief of the UID Division (not currently counted in REDSO's ceiling) will no longer be required.

IC = Full-time institutional contract personnel.

REDSO/ESA REGIONAL STRATEGY – PROJECT FUNDED ACTIVITIES AND PSCs
FIVE-YEAR RESOURCE ALLOCATION PLAN

PROJECT NAME/NO.	NAME (PSC)/ACTIVITY	FY 1995	FY 1996	FY 1997	FY 1998	FY 1999	FY 2000
PARTS (696-0478.23) OR EPM (936-5517.23)	REG ENVIRONMENTAL ADVISOR	0	260,000	270,000	280,000	290,000	300,000
	REG NATURAL RES MGNT ADV	408,232	132,000	270,000	280,000	290,000	300,000
	REG AGR ECON/POLICY ADVISOR	256,484	260,000	270,000	280,000	290,000	300,000
	REG AGRICULTURAL ADVISOR	244,732	260,000	270,000	280,000	290,000	300,000
	REG AGR ECON/POLICY ADVISOR	60,572	65,000	70,000	75,000	80,000	85,000
	REG TRADE & ITS IMPACT	450,000	500,000	0	0	0	0
	E.A. ENVIR COLLABORATION	180,000	300,000	300,000	300,000	300,000	300,000
	ACTIVITY TO BE IDENTIFIED	0	0	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000
	TOTAL PARTS/EPM	1,800,000	1,777,000	1,450,000	1,495,000	1,540,000	1,585,000
HHRAA (696-0483.23)	REG HEALTH POLICY ADVISOR	250,000	260,000	270,000	280,000	290,000	300,000
	REG HEALTH FINANCIAL ADVISOR	200,000	260,000	270,000	280,000	290,000	300,000
	REG CHILD SURVIVAL ADV (INSTL)	0	350,000	350,000	350,000	350,000	350,000
	FEMALE EDUCATION ADV (INSTL)	50,000	260,000	270,000	280,000	290,000	300,000
	ESA HEALTH NETWORKS	500,000	500,000	500,000	0	0	0
	ACTIVITY TO BE IDENTIFIED	0	0	0	500,000	500,000	500,000
	TOTAL HHRAA	1,000,000	1,630,000	1,660,000	1,190,000	1,220,000	1,250,000
D/G (936-5466.23)	DEMOCRACY/GOVERNANCE ADV	280,000	240,000	270,000	280,000	290,000	290,000
	DEMOCRACY/GOVERNANCE ADV	280,000	160,000	210,000	220,000	230,000	240,000
	DEMOCRACY/GOVERN ACTIVITY	0	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000
		TOTAL D/G	540,000	500,000	580,000	600,000	620,000
EAGER (696-0546.23)	REG BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE ADV	0	260,000	270,000	280,000	290,000	300,000
	REG PROGRAM IMPACT ADV	230,000	260,000	270,000	280,000	290,000	300,000
	REG PROGRAM IMPACT ADV	60,000	65,000	70,000	75,000	80,000	85,000
	REG ECONOMIC (MARKETS) ADV	230,000	260,000	270,000	280,000	290,000	300,000
	REG POLITICAL ECONOMY ADV	230,000	260,000	270,000	280,000	290,000	300,000
	AABA ADVISORY GROUP	200,000	100,000	0	0	0	0
	ACTIVITY TO BE IDENTIFIED	0	150,000	600,000	600,000	600,000	600,000
		TOTAL EAGER	950,000	1,355,000	1,750,000	1,795,000	1,840,000
APEF (696-0544.23)	REG PRIVATE SECTOR ADVISOR	260,000	260,000	270,000	280,000	290,000	300,000
	REG PRIVATE SECTOR ADVISOR	0	200,000	220,000	230,000	240,000	250,000
	ACTIVITY TO BE IDENTIFIED	0	0	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000
		TOTAL APEF	260,000	460,000	590,000	610,000	630,000
WIDSR/WOP (930-0100)	WID ADVISOR	50,000	55,000	60,000	65,000	70,000	75,000
TAACS (936-5970)	AIDS & CHILD SURVIVAL ADV	200,000	350,000	350,000	350,000	350,000	350,000
CAFS III (623-0005)	CAFS PROJECT MANAGER	170,000	90,000	0	0	0	0
	CAFS COOP AGREEMENT	1,830,000	1,910,000	1,500,000	1,200,000	900,000	0
		TOTAL CAFS III	2,000,000	2,000,000	1,500,000	1,200,000	900,000
PD & S (698-0510.23)	PD & S	400,000	450,000	450,000	450,000	450,000	450,000
HASP (623-0006)	HASP PROJECT MANAGER	0	260,000	270,000	280,000	290,000	300,000
	HORN OF AFR SUPPORT PROJ	2,000,000	3,740,000	3,730,000	1,720,000	0	0
		TOTAL HASP	2,000,000	4,000,000	4,000,000	2,000,000	290,000
DJIBOUTI NPA (603-00244)	PROGRAM SUPPORT GRANT II-ESF	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000
	TOTAL BUDGET	10,000,000	13,577,000	13,390,000	10,755,000	8,910,000	8,175,000

ASSUMPTIONS

- (1) Some FY 1995 request include "Additive Resources" (HHRAA-Female Education Advisor, TAACS-AIDS & Child Survival Advisor, and HASP).
- (2) \$10,000 (less than 3%) increase each FY for US PSCs and \$5,000 for FSN PSCs.
- (3) \$9.6 million, CAFS III LOP funding obligated through FY 1999.
- (4) \$12.0 million, HASP LOP funding will be obligated in four tranches.
- (5) FY 1995 funding is not part of the "5-Year Budget" for Strategic Plan.

Figure 12

ILLUSTRATIVE REDSO/ESA PROGRAM SUMMARY, FY 96 – FY 00
(\$ millions)

REDSO/ESA Strategic Objectives	AGENCY GOALS					TOTALS
	Encouraging Economic Growth	Stabilizing Population Growth	Protecting the Environment	Building Democracy	Humanitarian Assistance	
SO #1 TOTAL	1.20	1.25	0.31	0.36	0.32	3.44
OE	5.02	4.05	1.38	0.74	1.61	12.80
Development Fund for Africa TOTAL	6.18	5.20	2.13	2.32	0.51	16.35
(Development Fund for Africa Personnel)	6.07	5.09	2.02	2.21	0.40	15.79
(Development Fund for Africa Activities)	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.56
SO #2 TOTAL	0.95	1.48	1.77	1.20	0.58	6.07
OE	0.31	0.25	0.09	0.05	0.10	0.80
Development Fund for Africa TOTAL	6.27	12.56	2.61	1.45	0.28	22.39
(Development Fund for Africa Personnel)	2.53	2.12	0.92	0.84	0.17	6.58
(Development Fund for Africa Activities)	3.66	9.81	1.61	0.61	0.11	15.81
(DFA Additive Request)	0.08	0.63	0.08			0.78
SO #3 TOTAL	4.51	2.88	1.94	0.35	2.22	13.90
OE	0.83	0.51	0.17	0.09	0.20	1.60
Development Fund for Africa TOTAL	3.88	1.88	1.37	3.24	2.02	12.39
(Development Fund for Africa Personnel)	1.01	0.85	0.34	0.37	0.07	2.64
(Development Fund for Africa Activities)	2.87	1.03	1.03	2.87	1.95	9.75
SO #4 TOTAL	0.83	0.78	0.37	0.34	1.00	3.32
OE	0.31	0.25	0.09	0.05	0.10	0.80
Development Fund for Africa TOTAL	0.62	0.53	0.28	0.29	0.14	1.87
(Development Fund for Africa Personnel)	0.51	0.42	0.17	0.18	0.03	1.31
(Development Fund for Africa Activities)	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.56
ESF					5.00	5.00
OFDA					75.00	75.00
PL 480					100.00	100.00
Total	23.50	25.56	8.20	8.24	164.07	248.78
Account Totals						
OE						16.00
DFA						53.01
ESF						5.00
OFDA						75.00
PL 480						100.00

Notes:

PD&S split evenly among SOs and among agency goals.

DFA includes OYB (all years) and additive resource requests for FY 96 (PARTS 150K, HHRAA 500K, TAACS 125K).

ANNEX A. PROCESS AND METHODOLOGY

This Strategic Plan was developed over the six-month period November 1994 to late April 1995. Initial planning for the exercise began at the REDSO Scheduling Conference held in Nairobi October 30 - November 4, 1994.

Over the next several months, REDSO collected and digested all of the many Agency guidance documents pertaining to the strategic planning process and the drafting of a Strategic Plan. The first draft of the outline for the Plan was completed in January. It was subsequently approved in USAID/W, following several meetings in Washington in early February in which a senior REDSO staffer participated.

In February and March, the REDSO Director chaired an *ad hoc* group of senior REDSO staffers who met periodically to develop a draft Strategic Objectives Tree. The draft Tree went through many iterations before the group settled on a final draft in late March. During the last days of the Tree drafting process, REDSO had the benefit of technical advice and assistance from three persons from Washington: Harriet Destler (PPC), Tim Mahoney (GLO), and Carolyn Barnes (PRISM).

The draft Tree was tabled by the REDSO Director at the GHAI meeting in Addis (March 26-28) which brought together the Directors of all USAID Missions and Offices in east Africa, as well as several high-ranking Africa Bureau officers. The comments received at that meeting were important inputs to the final Tree design -- particularly in the decision that there be a separate Strategic Objective for the GHAI.

Immediately following the Addis meetings, the entire REDSO professional staff went on a three-day Retreat to finalize the Tree and develop the supporting program outcomes, performance indicators, activities, required resources, etc. (Tim Mahoney and Carolyn Barnes also participated in the Retreat.) Based on the intensive analytical work at the Retreat, the final Plan was written by the REDSO staff in the first three weeks of April.

Also in April, draft sections of the Plan were sent by fax or E-mail to REDSO's "client" Missions for review. The comments received from the Missions were taken into account in the final Plan, which was sent to Washington on April 22, 1995. There was not enough time to send the final Plan to the ESA Missions for review before sending it to Washington. However, copies were sent to them in late April, with a request that their comments be communicated to Washington prior to the inter-Agency review of the Plan in mid-May.

REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SERVICES OFFICE FOR EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA (REDSO/ESA)**OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR**

Regional Director Fred C. Fischer
 Deputy Regional Director Ronald D. Harvey
 Executive Assistant Marilyn Holt 2/
 Secretary Jessica Lung'aho 3/

LEGAL DIVISION (RLA)

Supv Legal Ofcr Anthony Vance
 Legal Ofcr Tamera A. Fillingier
 Legal Ofcr Susan D. Page
 Legal Asst Sarinder M. Kapila 4/
 Secretary Jane T. Kairo 3/
 Secretary Anita Oberai 3/

AGRICULTURE AND NAT. RES. DIVISION (ANR)

Supv Agr Dev Ofcr John B. Flynn
 Agr and Nat Res Dev Officer Eric Loken
 Agr Econ Joe W. Carvalho 1/
 Nat Res Mgmt Adv (Vacant) 1/
 Agr Adv David Martella 1/
 Reg Env Adv Charlotte Bingham 1/
 Agr Dev Ofcr Hudson J. Masambu 4/
 Secretary Patricia Ogwang 3/

POPULATION/HEALTH DIVISION (HPN)

Supv Pop Dev Ofcr James Kirkland
 Hlth/Pop Ofcr Joan LaRosa
 Health Policy Adv Richard Sturgis 1/
 Health Fin Adv Oscar Picazo 1/
 Child Survival Adv Melinda Wilson
 Health Network Coord. Sophia Ladha
 AIDS/Adv (Vacant) 1/
 Pop Asst (Vacant) 2/
 Secretary Margaret H. Jandy 3/

PROCUREMENT SERVICES DIVISION (PSD)

Supv Contract Ofcr Richard F. Webber
 Contract Ofcr Ray L. Edler
 Contract Ofcr (Francis Donovan, ETA 6/95)
 Contract Negotiator Sharon Halvosa 2/
 Contract Negotiator Andrew Jeffrey 2/
 Contract Mgmt Spec Beatrice Diah 4/
 Contracts Admin Asst Francis Kavulu 4/
 Comm Mgmt Ofcr Christine E. Lyons
 Comm Mgmt Spec Njuru K. Ng'ang'a 4/
 Secretary Anne Busaka 3/
 Secretary Amira Fazaldeen 3/
 Secretary Elizabeth Mburu 3/
 File Clerk/Typist Margaret Onyango 3/

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 Proj Dev Ofcr Dean Alter
 Proj Dev Ofcr Thomas H. Staal
 Proj Dev Ofcr Cheryl Anderson-Kiai
 Proj Dev Ofcr Robert Kirk
 Priv Sec Adv Michael Klesh 1/
 Proj Mtrg Spec Loise H. Mukira 4/
 Admin Assistant Elizabeth Webber 2/
 Librarian Patricia Wanzalla 4/
 Secretary Grace Kahare 3/
 Secretary Alice Makura 3/
 Administrative Control Unit
 Chief Menelik Makonnen 3/
 Secretary Alice Ochieng 3/
 Mail/File Clerk Heshon Bulimu 3/

ANALYSIS DIVISION (APD)

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 Prog Econ Anthony Chan
 Beh Sci Adv Ruth Buckley 1/
 Prog Impact Adv (Vacant) 1/
 Prog Impact Adv Joseph Mwangi 4/
 Dem/Gov Advisor John Harbeson 1/
 Public Finance Advisor Larry Forgy 1/
 WID Adv Wanjiku Muhato 4/
 Macroecon Adv (Vacant) 1/
 Office Automation Tech Mary Muiruri 4/
 Secretary Esther Muchiri 3/

URBAN AND INFRASTRUCTURE DIVISION (UID)

Supv Housing and Urban Dev Ofcr Howard J. Sumka
 Supv Engr Ofcr Shank Gupta
 Proj Spec (Local Gov) Richard Mwangi 4/
 Budget Anal Annie Ngumbi 4/
 Secretary Mary T. Nyanchoka 3/

REGIONAL FINANCIAL MGMT CENTER (RFMC)

Director Harry Dorcas
 Controller Rashmikant Amin
 Supv Fin Mgmt Ofcr Allan McKenna
 Fin Mgmt Ofcr John Seong
 Fin Anal (Vacant) 2/
 Secretary Vida Matano 3/
 Professional FSNs (24)
 Clerical FSNs (12)

FOOD FOR PEACE DIVISION (FFP)

Supv FFP Officer Joseph Gettier
 FFP Ofcr (David Songer, ETA 7/95)
 FEWS Rep Michele McNabb 5/
 FEWS Rep Rob Rose 5/
 Asst. FEWS Officer David Muxembi 4/
 Secretary (Vacant) 3/

SOUTHERN SUDAN FIELD OFFICE (SFO)

Chief, Larry Meserve
 Disaster Coordinator (Vacant) 1/
 Prog. Spec. Maurcen Mericle 1/
 Secretary (Vacant 2/12/95) 3/
 Secretary Susan Nzii 3/

Footnotes	Positions	On Board
DI/U.S.	28	25
1/ PSC (Prof)	15	10
2/ PSC (RH)	6	4
3/ PSC/FSN (Clerical)	20	18
4/ PSC/FSN (Prof)	13	13
5/ Inst. Contractor	2	2
RFMC FSNs	36	36
	120	108

As of March 31, 1995

REDSO/ESA TDY SERVICES - FY 1995

Office	Skill	TDY Days Requested	TDY Days * Provided
REDSO/DIR			
	Director (USDH)	37	27
	Deputy (USDH)	47	44
	TOTAL	84	71
REDSO/PDPS			
	Proj Dev Off (USDH)	750	351
	Priv Sect Adv (PSC)	279	160
	Prog Mgmt Spec (FSN)	89	22
	TOTAL	1118	533
REDSO/RFMC			
	Controller (USDH)	166	57
	Financial Mgmt Off (USDH)	87	56
	Accountant (FSN)	67	59
	Financial Analyst (FSN)	69	53
	Finan Sys Adv (FSN)	9	9
	TOTAL	398	234
REDSO/PRO			
	Contract Off (USDH)	436	210
	Commodity Off (USDH)	134	116
	Contract Neg (PSC)	127	106
	Contract Neg (FSN)	25	11
	Commodity Off (FSN)	8	8
	TOTAL	730	451
REDSO/LEG			
	Legal Officer (USDH)	286	170
	Legal Officer (FSN)	3	3
	TOTAL	289	173
REDSO/UID			
	Engineer (USDH)	128	132
	Urban Dev Off (USDH)	121	77
	TOTAL	249	209

*Includes actual and projected for remainder of the fiscal year.

Office	Skill	TDY Days Requested	TDY Days* Provided
REDSO/FFP			
	Food for Peace Off (USDH)	371	227
	TOTAL	371	227
REDSO/ANR			
	Agr & Reg Env Off (USDH)	319	152
	Agr Dev Off (USDH)	247	95
	Agr Dev Off (FSN)	158	127
	Agr Economist (PSC)	472	265
	Environment Adv (PSC)	218	143
	Nat Res Dev Off (PSC)	85	67
	Agriculture (TBD)	115	0
	TOTAL	1614	849
REDSO/APD			
	Economist (USDH)	340	209
	Economist (PSC)	305	204
	Behav Scientist (PSC)	370	162
	D/G Advisor (PSC)	310	173
	Prog Impact Adv (PSC)	78	51
	Prog Impact Adv (FSN)	117	98
	WID Adv (FSN)	300	181
	Technical Assistance (TBD)	5	0
	TOTAL	1825	1078
REDSO/PH			
	Pop/Hlth Off (USDH)	385	263
	AIDS Adv (PSC)	39	15
	Child Survival (PSC)	50	23
	Health Fin Adv (PSC)	121	98
	Health Pol Adv (PSC)	140	85
	TAACs, HIV/AIDS (PSC)	38	16
	TOTAL	773	500
TOTAL		7451	4325

*Includes actual and projected for remainder of the fiscal year.