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Democratic Governance and Sectoral Work: Toward Programmatic Integration

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1. Introduction

Over the last 18 months the Africa Bureau's Democratic Governance unit has been working with a group of scholars and practitioners to develop an analytical methodology for conducting macro-political assessments of democratic governance (DG). Understandably, the initial efforts of this working group focussed on assembling the conceptual and analytic tools needed to conduct a comprehensive diagnostic of governance patterns in African countries. However, as the assessment framework was refined, and particularly after it was used to guide actual country assessments, it became clear that broad examinations of governance patterns needed to be more closely related to sectoral issues and initiatives.

In part this realization was simply a recognition that USAID's resources, both human and programmatic, are largely organized and deployed along sectoral lines. More important, it was also a realization that in moving from a general diagnostic of democratic governance to the identification of a reform agenda and then to the specification of possible donor interventions, in-depth country knowledge and credibility become increasingly important. And as Missions and their programming are organized sectorally, it will be in those areas of concentrated attention where USAID will have the insight, track record, connections, and commitment necessary to launch and sustain governance reforms. Consequently, sectoral programming and DG reform need to be seen as inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing and *not* as disconnected rivals.

In support of this objective, the DG working group undertook a task intended to *initiate* the process of moving from the abstract realization of the interconnections between democratic governance and sectoral work to integrated programming. Modest resources limited this task to the first step in this process--attempting to establish a foundation for future discussions between those focussing on democratic governance and those engaged in sectoral work. Constructing such a foundation meant:

1. Identifying and characterizing the connections that exist between DG reform and sectoral activities, and
2. Establishing that there is a shared interest in pursuing more-integrated programming.

Again, because of resource limitations, the focus of this effort was in AID/Washington; in the Africa Bureau's Office of Sustainable Development (AFR/SD), where the region's sectoral technical support is located.¹ Starting discussions at this level seemed appropriate

¹ The Office of Sustainable Development is a product of the recent agency reorganization, representing the grafting of parts of the old Office of Operations and New Initiatives (AFR/ONI) on to the Office of Analysis, Research and Technical Support (ARTS). Transferred were private sector support and the DG unit. The result is an office organized into three divisions:

(continued...)

as AFR/SD is the source of guidance and technical advice on strategic planning and on crosscutting issues, like democratic governance.

Specifically, the task entailed having a (consultant) member of the DG assessment working group conduct two days of initial discussions with staff of AFR/SD (listed in Annex A). The aim of these discussions was to develop an understanding of sectoral research and programming priorities and the extent to which they confronted or raised governance issues. These discussions were supplemented with a review of background documents, particularly a number of sectoral and subsectoral strategic plans.² The findings and conclusions of this review were reported back to AFR/SD staff during the course of presentations on the macro-political framework by members of the working group in early February 1995.

The overall findings to emerge from this initial task are that *there are clear connections between sectorally-defined priorities and strategies and DG reform and that there is interest within the sectoral divisions to pursue them further.* More specifically:

1. There is considerable degree of consistency in the strategies adopted to guide the technical assistance and applied research directed to the sectors covered by AFR/SD. In general these sectoral strategies are increasingly *demand oriented* and thus represent a departure from the *supply-driven* approaches that had dominated sectoral work since the agency's creation.
2. Connections between democratic governance and sectoral programming occur at two levels. At a *strategic* level, those engaged in designing and implementing sectorally-based programs need to recognize and adapt to the changing political and policy environment resulting from democratization in African countries. At a more proactive, *programmatic* level, there is both the opportunity and the need to integrate sectoral programming and broader DG reform efforts.

¹(...continued)

- *Productive Sector Growth and Environment* (PSGE) which deals with agriculture, private sector support (largely agribusiness), and natural resource and environmental concerns.
- *Human Resources and Democracy* (HRD) which deals with health, population/family planning, and education matters. Despite this division's name, AFR/SD's DG unit is not located here. Rather it is attached to the office of the director of AFR/SD.
- *Strategic Analysis* (SA) which deals with economic analysis and policy reform at the macro- and sectoral levels.

² Discussions and document review concentrated on three the subsectors falling within AFR/SD's jurisdiction: the agricultural technology development and transfer and the natural resource management units of AFR/SD/PSGE and the family planning unit of AFR/SD/HRD.

3. The wide scope for integrated programming is due to the adoption of demand-oriented sectoral strategies. These emerging strategies, unlike the supply orientations they replace, have much in commons with democratic governance. They share views about individuals, incentives, and institutions, how they interact, and how best to induce change. This commonality of perspective creates real prospects of synergies between sector-based technical activities and efforts to promote democratic governance.

These findings are elaborated in the remainder of this report. Section 2 provides an overview of the DG assessment framework and the current directions of sectoral work in the Africa Bureau. Section 3 discusses the two levels of connection--strategic and programmatic--between DG reform and sectoral work. The analysis and examples presented in Section 3 establish that there is a firm foundation for further discussion on relating DG and sectoral activities more closely. Follow-on steps for extending these discussions are presented in Section 4.

2. Background

This section provides a brief introduction to both the framework that has been developed for assessing democratic governance and the current orientation of sectoral activities in the Africa Bureau. These introductions are by no means exhaustive. Rather they are intended to provide the necessary background to discussion of their inter-connection contained in Section 3. Fuller treatments of both elements can be found in the documents cited in the respective subsections.

2.1. Disciplining Discretion: A Framework for Assessing and Assisting Democratic Governance

The framework that has been developed to assess democratic governance is grounded in institutional analysis, a variant of the "new institutionalism" associated with the work of Douglas North, Oliver Williamson, Hernando de Soto, and others. Institutional analysis has been applied to a variety of micro- and meso-level issues, including irrigation management, social service delivery in US metropolitan regions, and economic policy reform in Africa.³ Assessing democratic governance was one of the first applications at the macro-political level.

At all levels of analysis, the same fundamental dynamics apply. In brief, individuals are seen to make decisions within a decision space. The decision space is bounded by

³ Oakerson and Walker (1995) provide an introduction to the literature and techniques of institutional analysis as well as an application to economic policy reform in Africa. See also Oakerson (1994) and Walker (1994) for other applications of the framework in Africa.

incentives. Incentives, at least in the governance context, are the product of rules.⁴ Rules establish what an individual must do, must not do, or may do in a particular situation and, together with the associated sanctions for transgressing the rule, form incentives that are factored into decision-making. Clearly, the kinds of applicable rules affect the size of the decision space. Situations where permissive rules apply (one "may do" a range of things) creates a large decision space that offers the decision-maker wide discretion. Situations where there are obligatory ("must" or "must not") rules creates a narrow decision space that restricts discretion. In the limiting case, the decision space may be so small that an individual may have "no choice" but to do "x".⁵

The fundamental problem of institutional design is to craft a set of rules that produce the desired incentives, decisions, and outcomes. At first blush, the most straightforward solution might seem to be a command structure of obligatory rules that severely restricts the decision space. This approach succeeds in some circumstances, but in situations that vary or are unpredictable--like governance--permitting those who govern some discretion is inevitable. The institutional design question then becomes one of constructing rules and incentives so that discretion is used in the service of some desired end. Many such ends are possible. In the African context, the end of political stability has been achieved through the creation of a polity of patrimonialism. As a result, rules are prescribed that create numerous opportunities for the exercise of governmental discretion and for wide discretion at each of these decision points. In a democratic policy, the desired end is to create the possibility of self-governance wherever possible and, where self-governance is not possible, to constitute governments that serve the interest of the governed. To do so, the discretion permitted to those who govern must be disciplined-limited in scope and subject to multiple sets of rules that create incentives for those who govern to attend to the people's business and for the governed to monitor them.

The analytic framework focusses on six democratic disciplines:

1. *Constitutional Discipline* emerges from the establishment of a set of fundamental rules that apply to the process of governance itself and to which all members in society are subject. These fundamental rules are usually codified in a written constitution. To sustain legitimacy, these fundamental rules must represent a social compact among those comprising that society.

⁴ At other levels of analysis, attributes of the physical world interact with rules to produce incentives. This is evident, for example, when the rules creating competitive markets interact with private goods to produce efficient outcomes, but fail miserably when interacting with public goods.

⁵ Crawford and Ostrom (1995) provides the most complete examination of rules from an institutional perspective.

2. ***Civic Discipline or an Open Public Realm.*** Rules establishing individual liberties (free speech, free movement, free press) and liberal rights of association disciplines governmental authority in two ways. First, these rules remove large areas of civic life from governmental control and thus increases the scope for self-governance. Second, these rules permit the governed to give voice to their interests and act on them.
3. ***Electoral Discipline.*** Regular, competitive elections provide incentives for elected officials to attend to the interests of voters. In the process, elections also serve to provide those who govern with information on the preferences of the electorate.
4. ***Deliberative Discipline.*** The opportunity for elected officials to engage in meaningful deliberation over legislation disciplines governmental discretion in several ways. It forces the government to defend its proposals. It provides opportunities for legislative oversight. And it improves the prospects that the government's action will respond to a broader range of interests.
5. ***Judicial Discipline or The Rule of Law.*** One of the most important means for disciplining discretion occurs when the governed raise a challenge that a decision-maker has overstepped the boundaries of his or her authority. For such a challenge to be effective, the governed must have recourse to impartial adjudicators who have the ability to sanction transgressors and make the sanctions stick.
6. ***Governance at Multiple Levels.*** Creating several layers of government (for instance, local, regional, and national), limits the discretion of any one layer by limiting the scope of its decisions. It also creates an inter-governmental check, as one layer protects its domain from incursions of other layers. Finally, autonomous local government brings governance closer to the governed. At the local level, the effects of governmental decision-making on people's lives is much more direct. The more direct this connection, the stronger the incentive for the governed to monitor the decisions of those who govern and to hold them accountable.

In conducting macro-political assessments, the analytical framework of democratic disciplines it is used diagnostically. First, an assessment team traces the patterns of governance prevailing in a particular country back to the existing set of incentives and rules. Then they assess the extent to which the existing rules exert democratic discipline. Next, the team constructs a reform agenda which points out where governance is weakly disciplined and what sorts of rule changes would be needed to strengthen it. The final diagnostic step is for the team to work with the USAID Mission, other donors, and the reform-minded in that country in identifying a strategic plan for promoting democratic governance. A number of factors need to be taken into consideration in winnowing down the governance reform agenda

into a manageable strategic plan. Some reforms may be set aside because they are not suited to donor involvement. Some reforms may be priorities because they are logically prior to other reforms. Some reforms may be particularly salient because of critical upcoming events, such as an election or constitutional convention. Finally, some reforms may be of high priority because they deal with governance patterns that are stymieing sectoral programming. This is one point where sectoral programming and DG reforms clearly overlap. The nature of this overlap is developed further in Section 3.

2.2. Demand-Driven Strategies: A New Direction for Sectoral Work.

Historically, sectoral work at the regional (USAID bureau) level has entailed supporting research on emerging sectoral issues in the region, conducting cross-country studies and analyses, providing technical support to Mission staff with sectoral responsibilities, and liaising with donors and other technically-oriented groups active in the region. At present that work in AFR/SD is guided by a series of strategic frameworks.⁶ These frameworks establish a general strategic orientation in a given sector or subsector and then identify the issues that will receive priority attention (the analytical agenda) from resources managed by AFR/SD--usually for a year or two at a time.

The strategic frameworks are taken seriously by sector staff for at least two reasons. First, the framework papers provide a connection between sectoral activities and the agency's overall management tool--the objective tree. Second, AFR/SD's major funding mechanisms--three large sectorally-focussed "umbrella projects"⁷--require the articulation of a strategic framework as a precursor and guide to how those funds will be spent.

The frameworks articulated by AFR/SD, and its predecessor AFR/ARTS, are still guiding sectoral activity notwithstanding the upheaval in technical responsibilities brought on by the agency's ongoing reorganization. For the time being at least, the sectoral strategic

⁶ Four strategic plans were reviewed: agricultural marketing and agribusiness development (USAID 1991), natural resource management (USAID 1992a), agricultural technology development and transfer (USAID 1992b), and population and family planing (USAID 1994).

⁷ Each of the three divisions of AFR/SD has one such project: PARTS (Policy, Analysis, Research, and Technical Support) for agriculture and environment, HHRAA (Health and Human Resources Analysis for Africa) for health, population, and education, and EAGER (Equity And Growth through Economic Research) for economic analysis and policy reform. The three projects are remarkably similar in structure. Each is a large (authorizations of at least \$40 million), multi-year (four years with a possible two-year extension) project intended to support applied research and technical assistance in the respective sectors. Each is an "umbrella" project in that funds can be used to support activities directly or to buy-into other centrally-funded projects or IQCs. However, activities and disbursements for each project are to reflect the priorities established by a strategic framework. This framework in conjunction with inputs from various collaborators then fixes the analytical or research agenda.

frameworks can be said to describe the direction and content of AFR/SD sectoral work, work which can then be related to the promotion of democratic governance.

Clearly, each sectoral or subsectoral strategic framework addresses technical matters specific to that sector or subsector. This specificity would make the drawing of connections to democratic governance rather cumbersome were it not for a remarkable convergence of perspective among them. To one degree or another, these frameworks have adopted strategies that are *demand oriented*. Essentially this means focussing resources on activities that: (1) remove constraints to the articulation or expression of demand for goods and services and/or (2) better direct the delivery of goods and services toward the fulfillment of extant demand. For example, a major element of the strategy for promoting family planning relates to removing constraints to demand. In this case, the objective is the elimination of medical and non-medical barriers to the demand for contraceptives and other family planning services. Similarly agricultural technology development and transfer is now expected to be directed toward responding meeting extant demand--those expressed directly by farmers and those expressed indirectly by consumers through the market.

This new strategic position represents a profound shift from the previous *supply orientation* where the emphasis was on improving the supply of goods and services offered by the government. The difference between the two approaches is well-drawn by the authors of the strategic framework covering agricultural technology development and transfer (USAID 1992b). With a supply orientation, stress was placed on identifying the highest yielding varieties of crops suited for particular agro-ecological zones. Only when the varieties were identified did attention turn to farmers and then it was in the form of cajoling them into adopting the new varieties whether they were initially interested or not. With a demand orientation, the underlying presumption is that research should be demand driven. It should respond to the demands of farmers and the demands of consumers and not reflect the agendas of researchers or ministry bureaucrats. As the authors of this framework paper note, such a shift in perspective is significant and "may require agents and institutions--both public and private--to make major changes in modes of operation." (USAID 1992b: 1) Among the changes specified are efforts to: diversify the supply of agricultural technology, including the private sector as well as the government; include new groups in the setting of research priorities; and reform the legal and regulatory environment particularly with respect to securing property rights to land and intellectual property (for improvements in seed or mechanical technology). As this example demonstrates, as sectoral programs become more and more demand-driven, issues of democratic governance arise with greater frequency. Here again the overlap between sectoral programming and DG reform are clearly evident.

3. Connections Between Sectoral Strategies and Democratic Governance

The connections between sectoral strategies and democratic governance occur at two levels: at a strategic level and at the programmatic level. At a strategic level there is a connection

as the focus and context of sectoral work will undoubtedly be affected by the trend to more democratic government. At the programmatic level there is the prospect of real synergy between sectoral work and DG. This synergy arises because both demand-orientated strategies and democratic governance share a common understanding of individuals and institutions and thus share a common vision of how to initiate reform. These two connections are examined in turn.

3.1. Connections at the Strategic Level

Although the pace may have slowed over the last year, Africa is still democratizing. Such a fundamental change in regime orientation will undoubtedly affect the structure and content of sectors and sectoral work. There will be new actors involved, new issues raised, and new relationships to be discovered and developed. Thus democratization and democratic governance must become a strategic consideration for those engaged in sectoral work.⁸ To a large degree, the ability of USAID and its Missions to sustain effective sectoral programs in democratizing countries will depend on their ability to take advantage of the opportunities opened up by democratization and respond to the challenges it raises.

The DG framework and its constituent democratic disciplines aid strategic planning by providing a means for thinking systematically about the opportunities and challenges to sectoral priorities resulting from increasingly democratized governance. This strategic analysis can be conducted at a number of levels. At the regional level, analysis of the democratic disciplines can help to identify a range of governance issues that might affect sectoral programming across the continent. An initial attempt at such an analysis is presented in Table 1. Clearly more detailed sectoral or subsectoral analyses can be conducted. But even at the level of generality represented by Table 1, a number of critical, "bottom line" strategic issues emerge that deserve attention, particularly within AFR/SD.

The democratic disciplines can also be applied at the country level, either to one sector or the entire Mission portfolio. An example, drawn from the Niger assessment, is presented in Table 2 (Charlick and others 1994). At the time of the assessment (August 1994), USAID/Niger's programming in the health sector included a pilot program of support to the decentralization of health clinic management in rural areas. The Mission was interested in expanding the program and asked the DG assessment team to identify governance issues which an expanded project would need to address. The team identified significant governance challenges related to five of the six disciplines (see Table 2). Such an effort is an obvious extension of the macro-assessment, but as it has turned out the Niger assessment was one of the few cases where sectoral programming has been explicitly examined.

⁸ By the same token, sectoral strategies and priorities must also be a strategic concern for those engaged in promoting democratic governance--as this report attests.

Table 1. The Democratization of Governance: Strategic Considerations for Sectoral Work

Democratic Discipline	Opportunities	Challenges
Constitutional	New constitution or willingness to adhere to existing constitution may raise the salience of substantive guarantees of education, health, land, etc.	Preoccupation with "large" constitutional questions may reduce interest in sectoral issues until new arrangements are sorted out.
Open Public Realm	Greater openness stimulates information flow; fewer restrictions allows more and different types of groups to form whether to make demands, offer services, or respond to commercial opportunities.	Openness increases demands for broad information dissemination and consultation with interested groups; more groups may make it more difficult for donors/host government to set the policy agenda for the sector.
Electoral	Sectoral issues (agricultural pricing/marketing, economic liberalization, family planning) may become more salient if they become election issues.	Politicizing sectoral issues may create blockages to preferred donor policies.
Deliberative	Greater legislative discussion of sectoral policies may increase leverage of disadvantaged groups--farmers, urban poor	Policies negotiated with the executive may be unravelled by an independent legislature.
Judicial (Rule of Law)	ROL increases individuals/groups to invoke rules either to prevent capricious gov. action to protect rights (property rights, contracts, etc.)	Some invocations may delay or obstruct implementation of sectoral strategies.
Governance at Multiple Levels	Decentralization increases range of potential strategies and prospects that they will be well adapted and accountable.	Multiple levels of governance increases demands on donors for consultation, information dissemination, technical assistance, etc.
Bottom Line	Do USAID Missions in Africa presently have the tools--research results, intervention options, staffing, or programming modalities--to take advantage of the opportunities provided by democratization or respond to the challenges it creates? If not, is AFR/SD engaged in providing Missions with these tools?	

Table 2. Governance Issues in Niger's Health Sector

Democratic Discipline	Issue
Constitutional	New (1992) constitution embraces a unitary state, prohibits federalism, and endorses decentralization; with limited provision for constitutional review, apparent conflict may stymie significant decentralization
Civic (Open Public Realm)	Certain classes of associations are not recognized or given standing under existing law; prevents these groups from legally constituting or opening bank accounts
Electoral	Vigorous multi-partyism and strong party discipline has politicized the bureaucracy, making coordination within and between ministries more difficult
Deliberative	
Judicial	Legal authorization for decentralized management of funds is an ad-hoc exception to a body of law supporting a single government fund (<i>caisse unique</i>)
Governance at Multiple Levels	Pilot efforts at decentralized health delivery engineered by the national government (with strong donor urging) without consultation with local officials or representatives; taxing authority of newly created local units still unclear; no recognition of special districts; "villages" lack standing

Nevertheless, this one example clearly demonstrates the utility of the DG framework for identifying strategic considerations for sectoral programming and implementation.

3.2. Connections at the Programmatic Level

Simply including democratizing governance as another strategic consideration in sectoral programming is a fairly passive response. It is one of accommodation and not action. However, a more proactive response is possible; a response that recognizes and furthers the inherent compatibility of demand-oriented sectoral strategies and democratic governance.

Table 3. Demand-Oriented Sectoral Strategies and DG: A Common Foundation

Element	Shared Understanding
Individuals	All humans are rational, creative beings. Each individual understands his/her particular situation better than anyone else and is thus in the best position to make decisions affecting his/her welfare. Consequently, self-governance is possible. Where self-governance is not chosen, then the aspirations, needs, and demands of individuals need to be taken as the starting point.
Incentives	Individuals develop personal strategies and make decisions based on their particular situation and the incentives that impinge on them. Incentives operate most effectively when they are clear and certain.
Institutions	Incentives emerge from institutions, which are simply sets of rules. Rules (and therefore institutions) are human creations. Sectoral policies and regime configuration are both complex aggregations of rules.
Inducing Change	Change occurs when individuals alter their personal strategies and decisions. This is brought about most directly through modifying incentives. Incentives are modified through changes in rules at some level- for example the sectoral or regime level.

As should be apparent from the discussion in Section 2, the compatibility starts at a fundamental level. Table 3 summarizes the basic similarity of the two strategies with respect to views of the individual, incentives, institutions, and inducing change. Demand-driven sectoral strategies apply these concepts first to the decisions of those operating in the sector. If those participating in the sector are dissatisfied with the prevailing patterns of interaction and demand change, attention then shifts to the incentives that produce the unwanted patterns. Incentives are then related to the

institutional arrangements from which they emerge. Reform starts with rule change which in turn alters incentives and patterns of interaction. If the reform is successful, the new patterns of interaction will more fully satisfy the demands of those participating in the sector(though it may take several iterations of rule changes to achieve satisfactory results). This logic is exactly the same as that of the institutional analysis underlying the DG framework which was described in Section 2.1. To the extent that sectoral strategies are successful in pressing for rule (policy) changes that limit the opportunities for self-governance, they are also pressing for democratic governance. Similarly, to the extent that the promotion of democratic governance entails pressing for rules that establish rights of expression and association, the rule of law and secure property rights, multiple levels of government, and popular sovereignty through elections, it is also promoting elements of demand-driven sectoral strategies.




Figure 1. The Programmatic Connection Between Democratic Governance and Sectoral Programming

One way of capturing the fundamental programmatic connection between democratic governance and demand-driven sectoral strategies is depicted in Figure 1. The horizontally oriented rectangle at the top of the figure represents the prevailing patterns of governance in a particular country. These are the patterns that would be identified in the course of a macro-political assessment. The vertically oriented rectangles represent sectorally-based patterns of interaction. The shaded regions represent the areas where sectoral and governance patterns overlap. The previous discussion argues that these areas of overlap are strategically important and programmatically significant whether one considers them from the standpoint of increasing democratic governance or from the perspective of implementing demand-driven sectoral programs.

The double arrows in Figure 1 are intended to suggest an approach for integrating DG reform efforts and sectoral programming. The key idea is that a central tactic for furthering democratic governance is to target those reform measures needed to advance sectoral programs and that a central tactic for advancing sectoral reforms is to include them as part of an overall DG reform agenda. In other words, the areas of DG and sectoral overlap are confronted from two directions--from within the sector and as part of a crosscutting DG agenda. The logic for stressing sectoral governance reform as part of an overall DG program is that many reforms designed to address sectoral constraints can have wide

spill-over effects. And the logic for addressing DG reform from within sectors is that it is within sectors that donors will have the best opportunities of mobilizing constituencies in support of reform.

These dynamics can be illustrated by USAID/Cameroon's support to cooperative law reform from 1990 to 1992 (see Oakerson 1994: 44-47). Throughout the 1980s, the donors and the cooperative movement became increasingly disenchanted with Cameroon's cooperative legislation. The law permitted the government wide discretion over all aspects of cooperative activities. Pervasive government interference prevented cooperatives from operating as efficient economic organizations, instead turning them into vehicles of government control and patronage. Calls for new legislation became more frequent and urgent in early 1990 culminating in the inclusion of cooperative law reform as an element of the World Bank's first structural adjustment loan. Although USAID was generally supportive, it did not become seriously involved in cooperative law reform until it embarked on a policy reform initiative to liberalize and privatize the arabica coffee subsector. In designing the reform program it quickly became apparent that new cooperative legislation would have to be an important component. Cooperatives were heavily engaged in arabica coffee marketing. They would have to be freed from government interference if they were going to be able to compete with private firms not subject to government control.

Once the connection was made between a successful (sub)sectoral program and a crosscutting reform, USAID pursued cooperative reform with vigor, though always from a sectoral perspective. First, cooperative reform was added to the Mission's ongoing policy dialogue with the Cameroonian government and was successfully negotiated as a condition precedent in the coffee reform program. Second, PD&S funds were used to advance the drafting of new legislation including hiring a world-renowned expert in cooperative legislation to help prepare a draft law, sponsoring sessions to review the draft law throughout the country, and retaining Cameroonian lawyers to work with members of the Ministry of Agriculture and then the National Assembly in making the final adjustments. Finally, the Mission used the contacts and goodwill it had developed in designing the coffee reform program to mobilize the support of cooperatives and reform-minded government officials for new legislation. The combined efforts led to the enactment of the new cooperative law in August 1992. It has had the desired and expected effect in the arabica coffee subsector, but perhaps more importantly, it has invigorated democratically-organized entrepreneurial activity in other sectors as well.

This case shows the value of working on reform from within sectors. Deep understanding of sectoral dynamics, a respected track-record, and credibility allowed USAID/Cameroon to be an effective catalyst for change. Moreover, participants in the arabica subsector could readily see the need for, and benefits from, legislative reform and were willing to take an active part. The case also shows that reforms emanating from one sector may spill-over to other sectors. Although the Cameroon case did not involve a DG assessment, the same dynamic can be harnessed. Indeed, one of the major conclusions of the DG assessment in Mali was that USAID and other donors should use the education sector as a wedge for

knocking down the government's obstructions to meaningful decentralization (Kanté and others 1994). Behind the team's recommendation was the realization that laws permitting autonomous private schools would have spill-over effects--to other sectors and to the furtherance of a democratic civic culture. The team also selected education because USAID was already involved in the sector, understood its dynamics, and could mobilize them in support of legal and other reforms.

Promising though this approach may be, two caveats are in order. First, support for democratic governance cannot rely exclusively on removing sectorally-defined constraints. Democratic governance increases only as progress is made along all of the democratic disciplines. Since some of the disciplines, such as constitutional or deliberative discipline, are not as suited to a sectoral approach as some of the others, other types of DG interventions will also be necessary. Second, the approach only makes sense as an adjunct to a rigorous macro-political assessment. It is only after a comprehensive diagnostic exercise that a reform agenda can be specified, both those elements that need to be addressed with specific DG initiatives and those that can be addressed in a sectoral context but have important spill-over effects.

4. Next Steps

The effort begun with this task to relate democratic governance to sectoral strategies should not end with this report. The connections developed in the previous section and the positive reaction to them during the recent presentations, suggests that a foundation for further discussion has been established. The remainder of this section identifies some possible next steps in advancing this effort. These next steps are organized into two groupings: those that clearly can be taken with the resources presently committed to the Democratic Governance Program Development Support Project and those that will require additional inputs.

Two additional steps can be taken within existing resource levels. First, the work conducted to date on integrating democratic governance and sectoral programming needs to be disseminated more widely within the Africa Bureau. At a minimum, a presentation and discussion session should be conducted with staff of AFR/SD representing all of the sectoral and subsectoral units. The audience could also be expanded to include interested staff from AFR/DP and the country desks. This presentation would necessarily have to cover the DG framework, however the focus would be on drawing the connection to sectoral activities.

Second, the advances in thinking about the relationship between DG and sectors need to be incorporated into the basic DG framework paper (Oakerson 1995). This step is fully consistent with the views reflected during the October 1994 meeting of the DG assessment working group. At that meeting it was agreed that the basic framework paper would contain a section devoted to applications of the framework in addition to descriptions of the democratic disciplines. One of the recommended applications was sectoral programming.

The next obvious step beyond these two would be to undertake a subsector by subsector review of connections to democratic governance. Such a review would produce a subsector-specific analysis of strategic considerations, along the lines of those identified in Tables 1 and 2. Obviously an important consideration would be the extent to which sectoral programming staff had the applied research results and technical resources necessary to deal with the opportunities and challenges afforded by democratization. Identified shortcomings could be redressed through modifications to the research agendas of the respective umbrella project (PARTS, HHRDA, and EAGER). To the extent possible the review would also identify areas where integrated programming could be pursued. Such discussion could set the stage for active efforts at integrated programming, either by including appropriate sectoral specialists on DG macro-assessment teams or adding a DG specialist to teams designing sectoral projects.

However, conducting these reviews and supporting follow-on activities is quite time consuming and is unlikely to yield much unless there is a clear commitment within AFR/SD to pursue the integration of sectoral and DG programming and a willingness to support that commitment with additional resources. Ideally this review would be conducted by a member of AFR/SD's DG staff working in collaboration with a designated contact from each subsectoral unit. However, this arrangement would require expanding the DG unit as it is presently staff-poor and not presently in a position to assume significant new responsibilities. Contracting the review out to a consultant, while technically feasible, is less desirable since the objective of the review is not so much to complete a discrete task as to initiate a process that will be ongoing.

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Annex A: AFR/SD Staff Interviewed

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Curt Reintsma	Chief, AFR/SD/PSGE
David Songer	Unit Leader, Agricultural Technology Development and Transfer, AFR/SD/PSGE
Phil Jones	Unit Leader, Natural Resource Management, AFR/SD/PSGE
Robert Halladay	Population Officer, AFR/SD/HRD
Lannie Kangas	Population Advisor, AFR/SD/HRD
Peter Thorman	Chief, AFR/SD/SA