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**POPPY CULTIVATION IN
NORTHWEST FRONTIER PROVINCE
(N.W.F.P)**

ITS PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

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Sahibzada Raof Ali Khan

On the 23rd of October, 1991, in a wilderness five or six miles from the town of Turbat in Balochistan Province, 3,230 kilograms of high grade heroin were seized in a joint operation conducted by elements of Makran Scouts and Pakistan Narcotics Control Board. Believed to be destined for the Gulf (possibly Dubai), the seizure established a global record and, indeed, added a bright feather in enforcement authorities' cap. However, the other side of the coin calls for more serious consideration. The seized consignment represented, in opium equivalent, 20 % of Pakistan's estimated annual opium production obtained from a correspondingly similar percentage of the total area cultivated with poppies. This is not to suggest that the raw material for the seized contraband was produced in Pakistan nor indeed that the heroin had actually been processed in Pakistan. In fact it could have originated from anywhere in the Pak-Afghan complex of poppy growing areas and processed anywhere in either country. But it did demonstrate in bold letters the amount of risk, both financial and physical, taken by the traffickers and, even more boldly, easy availability of opium in the region for making up losses incurred through interdiction. It also demonstrates to a stunning degree the extent of illicit demand for the drug, both in Pakistan and abroad, which fosters a phenomenal volume of traffic. In Pakistan alone more than 80,000 acres are known to have been planted with poppies in 1978-79, yielding 800 tons of opium. Before 1979, and also thereafter, widely fluctuating trends of cultivation and yields have been recorded. These fluctuations were caused by varying factors ranging from weather conditions, availability of farm labor, prevailing farm-gate prices, etc., to development and enforcement interventions. But, an important factor has always been the demand situation which suddenly acquired a complexity in 1979 in so far as heroin was added to the simple retail demand for opium. In fact 1979 is a red letter year in the poppy perspective of Pakistan when administrative measures within the country interacted with political developments in neighboring countries to produce an altogether different pattern of demand for and supply of opium. It is the purpose of this document to analyze factors responsible for poppy area and acreage fluctuations, both in the past and after 1979, and attempt to anticipate future perspectives in terms of availability of opium in and from NWFP. Another objective of this study is to identify the exact nature of interventions - development, enforcement, demand reduction, or a mix of all in the right proportion - in order to meet the aims of the International treaties. Stated in plain terms, these aims are a total elimination of poppy cultivation, opium production and operation of heroin labs. The effort or, rather, the efforts made in the preparation of this document should be considered well spent if it succeeds in identifying strategies of intervention from policy and administrative to implementation levels.

It needs to be emphasized that observations made and opinions expressed herein do not reflect the views of USAID, nor indeed of any organ of the United Nations. Similarly, officials of the Government of Pakistan and N.W.F.P. interviewed or consulted during the study are responsible for the conclusions and recommendations embodied in the document.

It needs to be emphasized that this study was undertaken essentially as a mapping exercise with an interpretative text in order to identify possible future poppy scenarios in N.W.F.P. However, the design and scheme of study have been upset by lack of detailed data to be fed into the maps. In consequence, what can best be described as "sketch maps" have been produced, so that they can absorb, in future information as it comes in year by year, offering a comparative study on a continuing basis.

All maps presented with this document are based on the Survey of Pakistan maps on the scale of 1 : 500,000. All except Maps II, III and IV which depict the distribution of poppy cultivations are hand made facsimiles of the Survey of Pakistan maps, updated upto 1990-91 on the basis of information obtained from the Meteorological Department and the Federal Bureau of Statistics.

Map I delineates the administrative divisions of NWFP and serves as the base map for this study. All other maps are over-lays. It is unfortunate that Map I does not show District/Tehsil/Sub-Division boundaries, firstly, because since the last edition of Survey of Pakistan, many new Districts have been carved and new Tehsils formed; and, secondly, because the scale used is too small to permit all the administrative units to be shown without overcrowding the map. The remedy lies in having District Maps prepared on the scale of 1 : 250,000. Thus, a sort of poppy atlas of NWFP should be forthcoming as a companion document to the present report.

Maps II, III and IV illustrate poppy cultivation in acres, respectively, for growing seasons 1978-79, 1984-85 and 1990-91. These years were selected for 1978-79 being the peak year; 1984-85 the leanest year on record; and 1990-91 as the last crop before the present study. All the three maps vividly show that the northern half of the middle part of NWFP is more poppy prone than other parts of the Province.

Why that is so, is amply illustrated by Map V which relates poppy cultivation to the physiography of NWFP. In this connection, it is worthwhile to refer to part 5 of Chapter I of this report which describes the profile of poppy growing areas. Poppy locations would thus be found in altitudes above 2000 ft. and below 5500 ft. In case of any future shifts, they would find sanctuary between these two elevations.

Maps VI and VII relate existing poppy cultivation to climate, the first in respect of annual rain-fall, the second with regard to mean annual temperature. Both elements do not show up any concrete relationship to poppy. Thus, any well watered valley bottom which can retain moisture would be hospitable ground for poppy growing within the elevations mentioned above. Temperature by itself would hardly exert any decisive influence on the choice of an area for poppy cultivation except, perhaps, that warmer it is, shorter would be the growing season and earlier the crop's maturity. Again, part 5 of Chapter I sheds light on poppy's relationship with climatological factors.

Finally, Map VIII seeks to find a relationship between distribution/density of population and poppy cultivation. It is evident that densely populated areas in the plains, where it is more likely to invite enforcement reprisals, do not offer a home to poppy growing. Extremely thin population is also an unfavourable factor. On the other hand, comparatively well populated valleys where bulk of population is not well employed are more likely to be exploited for poppy growing (See the observation in Chapter I). Unfortunately, however, it has not been possible to illustrate this feature in Map VIII for lack of complete demographic data.

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Executive Summary

1. Pakistan and indeed most of NWFP did not have any poppy cultivations at the time of independence (1947). There was negligible (40 tons) production of opium from some of the tribal areas, mostly to feed the domestic opium eating habit and partly for smuggling across the frontiers, both eastern and western. Laws regulating poppy cultivation, as well as harvesting and possession of opium, were inherited at the time of independence, all having been framed in the last century. Retail trade in opium was legal through opium vends which were supplied opium by the government monopoly. The system continued till 1979 when the opium vends were closed in consequence of the promulgation of a religious law viz., The Prohibition (Enforcement of the Hadd) Order.
2. Following the International Opium Protocol of 1953, licit opium was produced in Pakistan under government controls as provided in the Opium Act of 1857 by notifying areas where poppy could be cultivated under license. All such areas came to be established in NWFP alone.
3. Controls exercised by the Federal government were transferred to the Provincial governments by virtue of the constitutional distribution of subjects under the Constitution of 1956. It has continued to remain vested in the Provincial government (of NWFP) under the subsequent Constitutions. On the other hand, obligations and commitments of the Federal Government created by its adherence to the International Drugs Control Treaties, specially the Single Convention of 1961, produced a conflict of responsibilities and administrative powers which did not resolve even after the setting-up of PNCB in 1973. At present the conflict seems to have abated though not altogether resolved by a series of coordinating mechanisms, understandings, and consultative conferences facilitated by governments of the same party at the federal and provincial levels. Thus the administrative modus vivendi found after almost two decades of drift is strengthened by a political will shared by the Federal and Provincial Governments.
4. Despite a clearly expressed political will, the issue of poppy cultivation and opium production has remained highly politicized in public; and political parties in opposition often take advantage of it in winning public support. A broad based political consensus is therefore necessary to lend public support to all activities undertaken to eliminate poppy cultivation. Information, awareness and prevention programs would help create public support.

5. International demand, soaring year by year, after the mid-sixties stimulated rapid expansion of poppy cultivation. Aided by a lean adm'nistration and virtual forgetfulness of the then recently ratified Single Convention, government controls completely broke down. Licensing operations under the Opium Act continued but their enforcement became farcical. Nothing could stop this down-hill drift until development interventions were dangled before the rowdy farmers. A price was demanded and conceded for the purpose of scaling down poppy cultivations until 1979 when at least in settled districts government controls were reinstated under a "poppy ban" which in fact amounted to implementation of the Opium Act of 1857.
6. The variety of administrative entities in NWFP did not permit, and does not still allow, the adoption of a uniform model of development interventions aimed at elimination of poppy cultivation. Conceding the imperative necessity of enforcement intervention at some stage of development, all projects have to conform to administrative contours i.e. settled districts, provincially administered tribal areas, or federally administered areas. Between the last two i.e. PATAS and FATAs, there is again a differential of accountability and lines of responsibility. While there is an administrative compulsion in each project being designed in accordance with the specific characteristics of any given area, versatility of concepts and approach is an undeniable factor in project design and implementation.
7. Appearance of heroin in 1980 for domestic illicit demand but equally in satisfaction of international demand, aided by the facility of locating its manufacturing capability in FATAs, has placed a heavier bulk demand on opium. The development interventions but more so enforcement modalities have acquired a more compelling nature. Further, the trend of poppy areas shifting to other 'less interfered' parts of the Province has become more manifest in the years after 1980. The need now is also to consider and identify not merely 'elimination' projects but also pre-emptive projects. However, the success factor of these projects will depend to a great extent on measures aimed at rendering the heroin processing zones less hospitable to heroin manufacturers.
8. There is a visible conflict of aims, at least theoretically, in the implementation of international treaties by the Federal Government and treaties with the various tribes to which the Provincial Government, specially the Governor of NWFP as Agent to the President of Pakistan, is understandably more beholden. The ground to reconcile the two conflicting aims needs to be discovered whereafter it should be easier to simplify the legal framework and to streamline both the development and enforcement interventions. In other words, the role of Political Agents/Deputy Commissioners should be to project and protect national interests rather than tribal considerations.

9. Special Development and Enforcement Plan (SDEP) which was devised in 1983 has served a good purpose. But it should be remembered that most poppy clearance had been achieved before the Plan was formulated. All settled districts had seen the last of their poppies in 1979. Buner, Gadoon-Amazai and Malakand projects were well on their way by the time the plan was approved in 1985. But after the adoption of the plan and creation of its implementing arm, the SDU, new poppy areas have been identified and cultivation has been steadily increasing year by year in the new areas. This trend calls for a complete review and revision of the Plan, together with innovative restructuring of the SDU or, in the alternative, its abolition in which case Provincial P&D Department should assume its functions.
10. There is yet another reason, and a compelling one at that, for revision of SDEP and restructuring of the SDU. A national strategy for drug abuse control on the basis of the Master Plan Report submitted by UNDCP last year is now in the making as a self contained packet of initiatives built into the 8th Five Year Plan (1993-98). It seems expedient that SDEP in its revised form should become a local Master Plan for Poppy Elimination in order to attract more assistance and support both from donor countries as well as the Federal Government, whose Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON) should assume a larger funding role in poppy related development programs in tribal areas.
11. Past trends (pre 1979) of poppy cultivation have no longer much relevance to the existing situation on account of drastic changes in drug demand patterns. However, they have a cardinal lesson to teach and that is reliance on law enforcement as the key to ultimate achievement of goals. They also teach us another lesson that further the Federal and Provincial Governments drift from each other, more blurred the goals become. However this situation was rectified in 1979 to a great extent and at present better administrative mechanisms exist both for coordination and implementation purposes. It is imperative that the administrative gains made in coordination are further consolidated, improved upon, and institutionalized. In fact the area of coordination should be expanded not only vis-a-vis Federal and Provincial Governments but also in the inter-ministerial sphere at the Federal Government level. Current trends of poppy cultivations creeping towards more remote tribal areas dictate more sophisticated coordination.
12. There is also a vital necessity to expand the data base which is woefully lacking at present. Revision of SDEP and restructuring of SDU would not serve all the purpose unless data base is expanded, firstly, with a view to critically analyze the overall gains made so far and, secondly, to inject more realistic and meaningful concepts in future project designs. A model exists in the successful completion of the Gadoon-Amazai Area Development Project (and it is quoted in the text of this report), but, then, the design and implementation of other projects can improve even on this example if a larger data base was made available. One area of inter-governmental, inter-ministerial and inter-departmental coordination can be sharing of the requisite data whi

be housed in the restructured SDU, at the provincial end, and in the NCD at the federal end. Data base should include, among other factors, statistics on (i) population; (ii) human resources and their employment; (iii) pattern of settlements; (iv) infrastructure; (v) services and commercial activities; (vi) cottage industries; (vii) pattern of land holdings, their size, and utilization crop-wise; etc. Making use of the data base, the SDU should on a continuous basis undertake (i) crop intelligence, pre-sowing and pre-harvest; (ii) anticipatory identification of areas of possible shift of poppy crop; (iii) guiding enforcement actions in project areas; and (iv) yearly mapping of crop sowing and eradication activities. All this should, of course, visualize not only restructuring but considerable beefing up of SDU.

13. Some kind of legal framework for discouraging poppy cultivation in tribal areas has to be worked out whether by means of fresh treaties with the tribes in FATAs and enlargement of the scope of Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) in PATAs, or by any other means. This would naturally necessitate strengthening of the existing enforcement facilities in such areas but more specially and urgently in areas where various projects are on-going. A beginning can perhaps be made by raising "Narcotics Levies" by PAs/DCs concerned though a decision to that effect will have to be taken at government level.
14. Drug Abuse Prevention Resource Centre (DAPRC) at Islamabad should become the source of an "Information Programme" and an "Awareness Strategy" in respect of poppy cultivation and its elimination. In doing so, establishment of a two channel continuous link between DAPRC and SDU cannot be over-emphasized.
15. A strategy for storage and marketing of substitute crops in the project areas needs to be built into each project design.
16. Special attention is drawn to the necessity of organizing periodical training programmes at all levels. Administrators, Project Designers, Evaluators, Executives, Supervisors and target communities. Courses' contents should be so designed as to transform local interests into national interests, they should motivate all concerned, and impart awareness of the reasons for development/enforcement interventions so as to secure community participation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In making recommendations, all of which stem out from the text of this Report, attention diverts again and again to nearly 120 million US dollars and over 400 million Pak rupees, both in donor assistance and GOP funding, which have been invested from 1976 to date in depressing drug abuse control with a view to eventually eliminate the scourge in all its ramifications. In drawing up the recommendations, therefore, primary consideration is that this investment should not go waste; and that the gains achieved thus far should be absolutely consolidated and extended. This consideration is next followed by the political will of the Governments, both GOP and GONWFP, of which ample assurance has been extended in meetings and interviews. The recommendations made hereunder are only an effort to translate the expressed political will into administrative action. They are, therefore,

1. A complete re-evaluation and revision of the SDEP (with donor assistance, if necessary).
2. SDEP should form an integral part of the National strategy now being drafted for inclusion in the 8th Five Year Plan (1993-98), based on the Master Plan Report sponsored by UNFDAC (UNDCP) last year, i.e. 1990.
3. SDU in its existing format being rather in a facile stage should either be abolished or given a new life by extensively restructuring its charter as indicated in this document.
4. Administrative bottlenecks (e.g. tribal treaties) should be reviewed and, if necessary, revised to permit GOP to honour its international and national commitments.
5. As a corollary to administrative re-arrangements, raising of a new "Narcotics Levies" under the Political Agents/Deputy Commissioners, specially in the project areas should be actively considered. If found unfeasible, alternative enforcement tools be found and installed.
6. Enforcement Zones should be enlarged year by year and, concurrently, targets of reduced area be determined in pre-sowing meetings between GOP and GONWFP officials. A review of targets achieved should come soon after the harvest time.
7. DAPRC should be closely associated with SDU's activities and programmes.
8. For areas which have the potential of becoming poppy growing but are not actually so, pre-emptive strategies be considered and adopted.

9. SAFRON should have a much larger drugs related area development role than at present by allocating substantial development funds for the purpose and this should be reflected in the Master Plan.
10. Data collection and expansion of the existing information base being absolutely essential, more methodical procedures for acquiring data and information be adopted and adhered to. For this purpose SDU should be the provincial terminal and NCD the federal center for obvious reasons.
11. If SDU is retained and its charter revised as suggested, its manpower and operational resources will have to be augmented. This should be done on urgent basis. In a status and grade conscious bureaucracy, it is even more important that the rank of the Director General be enhanced and personnel of various grades should be given special allowances and service incentives.
12. Last, but not in the least, training courses be devised and carried out for all and sundry from top administrators of the programmes to the community itself. The age old institution of the jirga be adapted to organize consultative seminars at village level. A training advisory committee be immediately convened to identify number and types of courses for both development and enforcement components of the programmes.

I. BACKGROUND

1. Chronology

An account of poppy cultivation in Pakistan, its commencement, extension and expansion, efforts first to introduce it and then to regulate and control it and, finally, to eliminate it, emergence of trafficking in opium and then in heroin, use of opium to abuse of heroin, is at once fascinating and bewildering. It is something of a paradox that one international instrument (the Opium Protocol of 1953) indirectly resulted in the introduction of poppy cultivation while another international treaty (the Single Convention of 1961), again indirectly, influenced its propagation and expansion. At the same time constitutional, legislative, and administrative developments within Pakistan coupled with political events in and around the region and the nature and pattern of drug demand both at home and abroad intervened to make Pakistan (alongwith its neighbor Afghanistan) emerge as the most sizable drug producing, consuming, and trafficking region. In Pakistan itself, cultivation of poppy and the resultant yield of opium has come to be established in some parts of one province alone i.e., the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). Chronologically, the years 1947 (Independence) to 1953 constitute one phase; 1954 to 1956 another; 1957 to 1972 the third; 1973 to 1979 the fourth; and 1979 to date the fifth and, hopefully, the penultimate phase. These periods will be treated in extenso in Chapter II but it will do well to sketch an outline, period-wise, of predominant developments in each of them.

- i) 1947-53: Entire country poppy free; sporadic cultivation in quasi-autonomous tribal area (approximate annual yield 40 tons); licit opium demand met by imports from India; low-level opium smuggling from tribal areas; retail distribution of licit opium through licensed opium vends.
- ii) 1954-56: Imports from India cease in conformity with the International Opium Protocol of 1953; introduction of licit poppy cultivation in some selected areas (not in NWFP); establishment of the Government opium factory at Lahore; excise opium supplied to opium vends from Lahore factory; tribal areas' supply level unchanged.
- iii) 1957-72: Introduction of licit poppy cultivation in selected areas of NWFP and its cessation else-where; the Constitution of 1956 which, among other subjects, transferred control of licit cultivation of poppy and opium administration from Federal to Provincial government; transfer of Federal Opium Department and its staff to Provincial Excise Department of NWFP; progressive fall in recovery of opium from the licit fields; emergence of illicit international demand for opium and consequent emergence of progressively increasing illicit

poppy cultivation; lack of application of poppy laws, gradually establishing what was later called "traditional" poppy cultivations; ratification by Government of Pakistan (GOP) of the Single Convention in 1964 but no implementing mechanism set-up in pursuance thereof.

- iv) 1973-78: Pakistan Narcotics Control Board (PNCB) set-up at federal level in compliance with Article 13 of the Single Convention; poppy cultivation and opium administration continue under the Constitution of 1973 to be subjects vested in the Provincial Government; anomalies appear in the respective roles of the federal and provincial governments; controls over poppy cultivation, specially interdiction of illicit cultivation, collapse; illicit demand for opium specially from outside the country soars; illicit production of opium far exceeds licit production; enforcement/interdiction mechanisms found inadequate; development and crop substitution interventions sought from UNFDAC/USAID; Buner Pilot Project for Crop Substitution launched under federal government umbrella.
- v) 1979 to Date: Revolution in Iran and Soviet occupation of Afghanistan; unprecedented influx of Afghan refugees into NWFP which also becomes staging base for Afghan resistance; promulgation of Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, closing down opium vends and forcibly suppressing retail opium demand but not penalizing poppy cultivation; announcement of a "poppy ban" by NWFP Government; production of opium in 1979 hits all time high; appearance of locally manufactured heroin and immediate emergence of its demand; heroin demand soars from year to year very rapidly in both domestic and foreign channels but phenomenally within the country; new areas gradually come under poppy cultivation after a transitory reduction; identification of such areas; designing of a Special Development and Enforcement Plan (SDEP) and creation of a Special Development Unit (SDU) in NWFP; area/integrated development projects designed and launched with INM/NAU, USAID, UNFDAC assistance; sporadic enforcement action against heroin labs now and then but overall conversion capability (mostly within FATAs) increases.

2. Administrative Structure:

Having recounted the calendar of events above, it is necessary to explain the structure of provincial administration whose complexities eventually dictate the type and nature of interventions in giving effect to the requirements of national commitments, the key-note of which is the oft-expressed resolve to eradicate poppy cultivation and completely suppress production of opium, to identify and destroy heroin labs, to strengthen and intensify enforcement interventions, to suppress illicit traffic, and to develop demand reduction strategies. Currently, at the national level an exercise is afoot to design a long-term program to that effect so that it

forms part of the 8th Five Year Plan (1993-98). Since most of the basic activities will have to be focussed on NWFP a resume of the provincial administrative structure is called for.

Administratively, NWFP is unique among the four provinces of Pakistan. Carved out of the larger province of the British Punjab, it was created as a 'direct' responsibility of Central Government in 1901. Within the new Province two distinct administrative zones were demarcated. One of them was styled as "administered districts", more commonly known as "settled districts", under Deputy Commissioners like other provinces of British India with a range of laws applicable at par with the rest of the country alongside a special "Frontier Crimes Regulation". The other was designated as the "Tribal Area" divided into "Agencies" each under a Political Agent who did not have any laws to administer but exercised plenty of discretion and political wisdom in protecting and preserving the imperial interests of the British Government in India. The Government of India Act of 1935 preserved this duality while bestowing a large amount of local autonomy on the settled districts, creating for them a legislative assembly and an elected government. From then on, the Governor of NWFP has worn two hats viz; as constitutional head of the province in respect of the settled districts; and as Agent to the Viceroy/Governor General and, thereafter, to the President of Pakistan in respect of the Tribal Areas. The administrative status of these areas has not much changed after independence except that they are now formally styled as "Federally Administered Tribal Areas", or "FATAs" for short. There are at present seven such areas or, more properly, Agencies strung along or near the international frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan (the Durand Line). Six of them having co-extensive lines with this frontier are, from north to south, Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan. The seventh, not situated astride the Durand Line, is Orakzai Agency which is bounded in the east, north and west by Khyber and Kurram Agencies and, in the south by Kohat District.

Bulk of the rest of the Province is divided into Districts of which there are eighteen in all and the government thereof is carried out in accordance with the Constitution of 1973, by a cabinet of ministers headed by the Chief Minister, all of whom are responsible to an elected house called the Provincial Assembly. Five of the eighteen districts (Chitral, Dir, Swat, Buner and Kohistan) are not administratively at par with the settled districts in so far as they are concurrently termed as "Provincially Administered Tribal Area" (PATAs) and they differ from the settled districts in so far as the style of local administration is more discretionary. In other words, they are more like FATAs although they are subject to a wider range of applicability of laws, both federal and provincial. Included also in this category (i.e. PATAs), but not styled as a district, having at its head a Political Agent and not a

Deputy Commissioner, is Malakand. This leaves twelve districts which in the accepted terminology are settled districts. There is yet another administrative species termed as the "Frontier Regions", there being four of them and Deputy Commissioners of the adjoining districts being ex-officio Political Agents for them. They abut on Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts and for all intents and purposes are treated as FATAs.

At the bureaucratic/executive level, dual lines of responsibility are maintained in conformity with the administrative status of an area (a district or an agency) to which a subject matter may be related. Thus, the Home Secretary is responsible to the Governor in respect of FATAs and to Chief Minister in respect of PATAs as well as the settled districts. The Commissioner of Malakand Division is responsible to the Chief Minister in respect of all the districts of his Division but to the Governor in respect of Bajaur which is a FATA. So are Commissioners of Peshawar and Kohat Divisions too. Special Development Unit (SDU) of the Provincial Planning and Development Department, which is responsible for designing, implementing and monitoring of poppy related development programs, similarly follows dual lines of responsibility - one to the Governor and the other to the Chief Minister through the Additional Chief Secretary, Planning and Development Department of NWFP, depending on the administrative status of the area to which a project pertains.

Mention must also be made of Federal Government's Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON) which controls the Federal Annual Development funds for FATAs as well as the "Frontier Regions" but has no constitutional mandate for administering these areas, this being the responsibility of the Governor as explained in the foregoing paragraphs. In consequence, there is visible friction over decision making processes between SAFRON and GONWFP leading occasionally to delays in project approval and management procedures.

Finally, there is the Federal Ministry of Narcotics Control, set up only last year (in October, 1990), having graduated from being a Division of the Federal Ministry of the Interior. This Ministry oversees the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board (PNCB) which is the "special administration" set up in 1973 in response to Article 13 of the U.N. Single Convention, and whose erstwhile mandate, since appropriated by the newly created Ministry of Narcotics Control (NCD), is annexed at Appendix A. However, both NCD and PNCB have devised and established workable areas of co-ordination and cooperation with GONWFP. In this context, it should be stated that while Government of Pakistan is beholden to its international treaty commitments (and that is the *raison d'etre* both of NCD and PNCB), the focus of GONWFP's thinking is reflected more in its concern for "treaties" or agreements with the various Frontier tribes dating back to the days of the British rule and to

which respect has been continued to be paid. It is not the object of this document to analyze the contents of such agreements, although it is time they should be scrutinized in detail to determine how many or how much of their contents are actually repugnant to the International Treaties to which GOP has since become party. But it needs to be emphasized that the ground surely lies between the "tribal treaties" and the more recent International Treaties and Conventions entered upon by Pakistan as an independent, sovereign State, so as to reconcile the former to the later and, thus, to pave the way for an institutionalized frame work for poppy and/or heroin related interventions. In fact this ground would have been discovered by now were it not that political events in Iran and Afghanistan intervened to exert a procrastinating influence. Now that the Iranian horizon has cleared altogether and the Afghan situation is hopefully about to clear, it is opportune to clear the decks for unambiguous and clear headed strategies to be designed and launched.

3. Legal Framework

There has been, and is, no dearth of drug related laws in Pakistan, both Federal and Provincial. But, since this document is primarily concerned with cultivation of poppy and movements of such cultivations, detailed analysis of the entire corpus of drug legislation is not called for.

With regard to poppy cultivation per se, the existing law is 135 years old. The Opium Act of 1857 promulgated by the British Government in India prohibited the cultivation of opium poppy except under a government license in a general area previously notified by the Government. It also provided for the collection of entire opium so obtained by the Government itself at a sliding scale of prices determined according to the quality and morphine content of the harvest. It was a punishable act to plant poppies in any area not notified and, within the notified area, without a license. Illegal crop was invariably destroyed and its cultivator prosecuted. The law was administered by the Opium Department of the Government of India and operational activities of this Department were regulated by rules contained in the Opium Manual, made under the Act. The so called 'poppy ban' imposed in 1979 in the settled districts is actually based on the Act of 1857 which provides for prosecution of the farmers engaged in poppy cultivation.

This law was supplemented by another Opium Act in 1878 which regulated trading, retail sale, and possession of opium for personal use by an individual. Excise laws from Province to Province augmented these two Opium Acts so that complete control came to be established throughout British India including, of course, the settled districts of NWFP, over cultivation of poppy and production, sale, and use of opium. It remained so even after Independence. As stated earlier,

the situation changed in 1956 and GOP's interpretation of the International Opium Protocol necessitated introduction of licensed cultivation of poppy to meet the domestic demand for opium. After trials in some districts of the Punjab Province poppy licensing came to be established in some parts of the "settled districts" of NWFP in 1956-57. The narrative of its continuation and eventual explosion into vast tracts of illicit planting will be commented upon in Chapter 'II.

But to continue with the drug legislation, the next relevant law did not come into force till 1979 when the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance was promulgated. This law penalized everything from production and possession to transportation and conversion, but planting of poppies did not fall under its mischief. It was thought by the framers of this blanket law that the Act of 1857 abundantly provided for interdiction of poppy cultivation. In theory this supposition was correct but unlicensed cultivation had so extensively established itself between 1956 and 1979 that the practice had become hallowed as "traditional".

Another fact deserving consideration is that the law of 1857, as indeed other laws, was applicable only in the settled districts. In the British times, no law would apply sou moto to the tribal areas and this is the practice even today since "tribal treaties" preclude extension of any law applicable to the rest of the country without tribal elders' previous agreement. Another reason of considerable validity is the absence of a regular enforcement network in the tribal areas. Even in the provincially administered tribal territories where some selected laws have been extended after independence, regular police force is either non existent or very thinly distributed. Thus the "poppy ban" has practical validity only in the settled districts. Evidently, therefore, the facility with which poppy cultivation has rotated from one part of the province to the other is understandable. It is also easy to understand how varying categories of administrative status, varying degrees of applicability of legislation, and the consequent differential in law enforcement have combined to provide a favorable climate for continuance of poppy planting.

4. Enforcement Mechanism

Broadly speaking, enforcement agencies are grouped in three categories viz; Federal, Provincial and Tribal. Under Federal control are:

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| Ministry of Narcotics Control (NCD) | 1. Pakistan Narcotics Control Board (PNCB) |
| Ministry of Interior | 2. Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) |

3. Pakistan Rangers*
4. Coast Guards*
5. Frontier Corps
6. Frontier Constabulary

Ministry of Finance
(Central Board of Revenue
viz: CBR)

7. Pakistan Customs

Under the Provincial Government are:

Home Department

8. The Police

Revenue Department
(Provincial Board of
Revenue)

9. Provincial Excise
Directorate

Under the Tribal Administration there are:

FATAs as well as PATAs

10. Levies
11. Khassadars

(Both the Levies and Khassadars are locally raised. While the former are paid directly by Political Agent/Deputy Commissioner, the latter are paid through tribal chiefs by means of a lump-sum grant of money. Both are executive instruments of Political Agents'/Deputy Commissioners' policy rather than law enforcement organizations. Their territory of work is strictly limited to the Agency/District in which they have been raised).

Except the Police and the Excise, law enforcement responsibilities of the agencies listed above are rather ill defined. For our purposes i.e. identification and destruction of poppy cultivations, it is rather an ad hoc assembling of all the available provincial forces and launching of a joint operation under the direct control and direction of Political Agents/Deputy Commissioners, as the case may be. The program and strategy of these crop-destruction campaigns is laid out on a year to year basis in meetings of officials coordinated by NCD wherein "enforcement zones" are delineated in accordance with seasonal crop reports.

Another technique for crop destruction is aerial spraying of herbicide applied to selected and limited areas with questionable success. There is hardly any data available on this score to enable a judgment on its cost-effectiveness, though it is widely asserted that it is more of a deterrent for all the inhabitants of the locality rather than specific punishment for the individual poppy farmer. This philosophy of communal punishment is hard to understand.

*: Irrelevant as far as NWFP is concerned.

5. Development Interventions

It was widely acknowledged by early 70s that poppy cultivation in NWFP had assumed such alarming proportions that enforcement interventions alone could not root it out. Also, that a massive dose of development interventions was immediately required if the growing trends were to be arrested. Opium administration having been transferred from federal to provincial control in 1956, the GOP found itself in a difficult position to identify the mode and manner of injecting development assistance, as well as particular areas where such assistance was most called for. This situation was accentuated by the then prevailing political climate in the country which was anything but congenial to a meaningful policy making in respect of narcotic drugs, both opium and cannabis. In the wake of dismemberment of the eastern half of the country in December, 1971, and a rather chaotic restoration of democratic governments by elected representatives thereafter, NWFP found itself with a civilian government in opposition to the federal government, rendering it well nigh impossible to coordinate a rational policy or even to act in concert with each other, in their respective spheres, by GOP and GONWFP. Thus, when PNCB was placed on the boards by GOP in 1973, GONWFP hardly evinced any interest in fulfilling its obligations. Even though, a little later, the ruling party at the center succeeded in placing a government of their own in power in the NWFP, the issues concerning poppy cultivation had been highly politicized and there was seemingly no escape from adoption of development interventions before mounting enforcement measures even of the softest variety. The table below illustrates the point regarding apathy on the part of GONWFP in respect of opium collection from licensed fields:

Table-1

Year	Area under licit poppy cultivation (acres)	Opium yield in tons	Yield per acre in kilos
1970-71	1425	7.28	5.1
1971-72	3268	7.12	2.2
1972-73	6969	11.40	1.7

(Source - PNCB records in maunds and seers, converted into tonne and kilo approximation)

It needs to be emphasized that the above table is in respect of licit cultivation only. There were then no means of assessing the extent of and yield from illicit cultivation. However, it was believed that an estimated 20,000/25,000 acres were so cultivated both in settled and tribal areas with an average annual yield of approximately 250 tons. Buner subdivision, then of Swat district and now a district by itself, was identified as the largest yet most compact single area with actual cultivation ranging between 10000 and 15000 acres and an average yield estimated at 120 tons. Thus, Buner was selected for a Pilot Crop Substitution Project. Pre-project and preparatory activities started soon after the constitution of PNCB and an extensive socio-economic survey was undertaken which later served as the data base for project formulation. UNFDAC was requested for technical and financial assistance and the project itself was undertaken in 1976. This project being of a pilot nature aimed at:

- i) identifying crops which could be substituted for poppy.
- ii) use of available water resources in providing irrigation for replacement crops.
- iii) provision of irrigation, and other inputs such as seed, fertilizer, improved technology, land levelling etc., in return for written agreements on the part of farmers not to cultivate poppy.
- iv) remodelling the agrarian economy so that its dependence on poppy cultivation could be considerably reduced if not altogether eliminated.

On the negative side, the Project did not visualize any enforcement intervention nor even any punitive measures such as withdrawal of input facilities in respect of defaulting farmers. This evident weakness in the project design existed for the reason that while the development activities were proceeding under Federal Government's auspices, enforcement mechanism was wielded by the Provincial Government and both had not yet started seeing eye to eye with each other. Still, the project proceeded apace, leading up to some useful lessons embodying inter-alia the need for injecting enforcement component at an appropriate stage before the expiry of the life of the project.

In the meanwhile other areas for development intervention were being identified. The two next earmarked for project designing were Malakand Area Development/Agricultural Outreach and Gadoon-Amazai Programs. Major emphasis on a continuous follow up in all identifiable poppy growing areas came from U.S. Embassy, Islamabad, as well as PNCB. In January, 1978, the President of Pakistan directed the formulation of a master plan for the development of poppy growing areas with a view to elimination of poppy cultivation which finally emerged not as an overall Master Plan but in the form of a Special Development and Enforcement Plan (SDEP) in 1983. As early as

1979 it had been recognized that in the settled districts emphasis should be on enforcement and that unlawful agricultural activities (viz; cultivation of poppy) must be severely curbed while tribal areas, both federally and provincially administered, should be subjected to in-depth investigations to help evolve a concerted and self contained plan. This need was at least partially fulfilled by SDEP which was approved in 1984, stating categorically that after the emphatic enforcement of the poppy ban from 1979 onwards "all opium production had ended in the major irrigation systems"¹ and that the three on-going projects viz; Buner, Malakand, and Gadoon-Amazai, supported by donor assistance, were "combining development initiatives with enforcement of the poppy ban in remote rainfed areas"² of the Province. The Plan also visualized "other isolated areas as yet unreached by development benefits where poppy remains the major or sole cash crop, or could easily be introduced or reintroduced"³. The plan intended to "focus GOP's efforts, with donor assistance, to eradicate centers of poppy cultivation and to prevent the resurgence or introduction of opium production in non-producing areas"⁴. Further, it dove-tailed its project planning into the Special Development Plan for Tribal Areas, which reserved to itself major infrastructure projects in hitherto neglected tribal territories. SDEP focussed on specific areas such activities as agricultural extension, watershed management, small irrigation systems, health, education and communications. The "specific areas" selected for the purpose were Dir, Chitral, Kala Dhaka (Mansehra District), FATA (Bajaur and Mohmand). The plan established in 1985, with donor support, a Special Development Unit (SDU) under the NWFP Planning and Development Department to coordinate the initiatives visualized under the Plan with those activities which were then on-going under the Annual Development Program or the Special Development Plan for Tribal Areas.

In defining the Development Model, SDEP proposed carrying out each project's activities by concerned line agencies and representatives of the local population i.e., elected leadership in Union or District Councils or tribal leadership through jirgas. Enforcement Model in the plan calls for commencement of enforcement operations when development activity is apparent, and aims at "complete elimination of

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1. Planning Commission, GOP: Special Development and Enforcement Plan for the Opium Producing Areas of Pakistan, 1983.
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid

poppy cultivation prior to the planned termination of the development project"⁵. However, the Plan did not conceptualize enforcement methodology, nor even specific enforcement agency/agencies as and when development activity became, in its own terms, "apparent". It is clearly understood that enforcement is easiest in the settled districts, less easy in PATAs, and least easy (if not difficult) in FATAs. Nor is the "apparent" stage clearly delineated so that all and one would know that the enforcement stage was now to be embarked upon. Nor even the local elected/tribal leadership has been galvanized to lend a participatory hand in development but more so in the eventual enforcement activities. Other weaknesses in the SDEP concept are also evident but since the present study does not address itself to an evaluation of SDEP, it should suffice to emphasize only that time has come to revise and overhaul the Plan in depth. Perhaps a beginning could be made by establishing "Narcotics Levies", locally raised and paid in the manner of "Agency Levies". Perhaps, also, setting up a "Special Enforcement Unit" under the Wings of SDEP could be considered as a complementary partner of SDU. SDEP and its prime child, the SDU, have done very well indeed despite several constraints, but both should now receive a second look to strengthen the Plan itself and streamline the SDU in line therewith. In this context, it is worthwhile to mention that in October, 1990, a Frame work for a Master plan, prepared under UNFDAC sponsorship was submitted to the GOP with several recommendations for follow-up activities to be supported by the SDU and the involved donors. While the Master Plan document is now under the consideration of GOP as the basic working paper for devising a national drug abuse control strategy for inclusion in the 8th Five Year Plan (1993-98), the proposed revision of SDEP and restructuring of the SDU, will greatly help in implementing not only the Master Plan recommendations but also supplement the national strategy now in the making. If it is accepted that development activities are an absolute initial imperative for elimination or pre-emption of poppy cultivation (more specially in the tribal areas), then SDEP has to wear a new look; and the SDU not only continue to get support but also to acquire greater clout.

To summarize what has been said above, development interventions have been quite successful. Buner, Malakand, and Gadoon-Amazai are all success stories. Sizable gains made therein are at present being consolidated. Other on-going projects are in mid-development stages but they would have the making of success if their pace and momentum are kept up and not allowed to slacken. Appendix B which is a matrix on opium poppy related projects in NWFP is annexed in order to provide a bird's eye view of all development interventions thus far.

⁵. Ibid

5. Profile of a Poppy Growing Area

Opium poppy is said to be a versatile crop. Versatile it is indeed in so far as it has adapted itself to widely fluctuating climatic and physiographic regimes from humid tropical, through arid sub-tropical to temperate regions; and from wide open plains to sheltered valley bottoms in mountainous areas. In various stages of its growing and maturing, it is almost as tender and sensitive as it is versatile. Given these characteristics, it has both high and low yielding varieties with considerable variations in the morphine content of its produce i.e. the opium gum. In NWFP a relatively inferior breed has been standardized, with a longer stalk, smaller capsule, and yield of its latex rather lower than in other regions of the world. Afghan and Pakistani poppies perhaps belong to the same species though it is said that the Pakistani seed is inter-bred with that of Indian poppy which had evolved through a process of selection over a long period due to government opium monopoly management. It is also said that when licensed poppy cultivation was first started in Pakistan in 1953-54, the seed was obtained from India.⁶

Before the imposition of the poppy ban in 1979, the crop was cultivated in the most fertile tracts of the Hashtnagar Plain (Mardan-Peshawar Basin) under irrigation. Thus, rainfed areas could not compete in the extent of sowing and in yield of opium with the irrigated plains where bulk of such cultivation was then concentrated. However, phenomenal increase in demand both at home and abroad in the sixties brought considerable rainfed areas also under poppy cultivation, one example being that of Buner. Of course, Gadoon-Amazai had already been growing poppy (and in a true sense it was the only area which could be called "traditional" poppy growing area), long before its introduction in the neighboring Mardan-Swabi plains; and it continued to do so under the spur of increasingly higher demand year by year. After-all, in the settled districts there was always the shadow of law, involving risk of prosecution as well as destruction of the crop from which tribal areas were then free.

After the poppy ban, cultivation has shifted to higher elevations usually in valleys lying between 2000-5500 feet above sea-level. The use of word "area" in respect of poppy growing gives a rather distorted impression as regards overall land utilization. In fact, poppy is cultivated in small plots of one eighth to one fourth of an acre alongside other crops such as wheat, barley and mustard. The fields are usually closest to village settlements on relatively moisture-

⁶. Interview with Agha Muhammad Sharif, former Opium Department Official, now residing near Peshawar.

retaining soils in valley bottoms. Poppy is certainly a labor intensive crop not merely at harvest time but throughout its growth till its flowering and capsule bearing. Usually it requires hoeing and weeding 3/4 times before flowering. It is therefore a crop of better populated valleys where bulk of adult population is not employed or occupied elsewhere.

In defining areas which tend to attract poppy cultivation in NWFP, the following factors are of foremost consideration:-

- (i) Poppy cultivation is intimately connected with the size of farms in a given area. Generally speaking, smaller the average farm size, larger the proportion of tillable land occupied by poppy. Another factor which has encouraged poppy cultivation is progressive fragmentation of holdings. In 1979 it was found that in Swabi area more cultivation of poppy was resorted to on farms of 3/4 acre size rather than on larger farms.⁷ But this is a random observation. Pattern of land utilization in poppy growing valleys does not seem to have been closely studied in the past. In order to plan development more methodically, this aspect surely requires to be investigated thoroughly.
- (ii) After 1979, in the context of appearance of heroin, poppy growing areas have tended to draw closer to areas where opium is processed into heroin. Coupled with the important fact that lesser enforcement cover would encourage greater concentration of poppy cultivation, the existing trend is for the cultivations to converge towards remoter parts of FATAs and Dir district. In 1990-91, almost 90% of the total poppy cultivation in NWFP was located in Dir, Bajaur and Mohmand.⁸ Since most of the heroin laboratories within NWFP are situated in the nearby enforcement free Khyber Agency, their dependence for raw material (i.e., opium), is clearly reflected in the concentration of poppy cultivation in the above mentioned three areas. With development and successful enforcement in the project areas mentioned above, and with heroin laboratories presumably still working, poppy cultivation will certainly tend to shift into still closer valleys not within reach of effective enforcement.

⁷. PNCB: Report on Poppy Cultivation in NWFP, February, 1979.

⁸. PNCB: Estimates of Area under poppy cultivation, 1991-2 Report; also USAID correspondence on Assessment of opium poppy crop, 1990-91.

- (iii) Yet another characteristic of poppy is that it takes root in credit starved rural communities. Coupled with lack of employment, absence of a rural credit system in any area becomes a compulsive reason for resorting to poppy cultivation if demand for opium persists. Thus periodic socio-economic studies in both varieties of tribal areas - federal and provincial - can help in anticipatory identification of parts of the province where cultivations will continue or spring up afresh.
- (iv) Finally, poppy thrives in politically soft areas. Borderlands where social organization is tribal, governmental control marginal, and custom has precedence over written law provide the ideal political soil for poppy cultivation as well as heroin processing. Tribal areas of Pakistan as also those of Afghanistan, Shan States on Myanmar (Burma) - China border or Burmese - Thai frontier, Laotian frontier with Thailand, etc. share this feature despite their marked differences in climate and physiography. In the context of Pakistan, a determined 'forward' policy, though not a blitzkrieg, is best advised.

II. POPPY CULTIVATION

1. Past (upto 1979)

It has frequently been asserted both by leaders of public opinion and a cross section of administrative authorities that poppy cultivation in NWFP is traditional over a period of several centuries. This statement is rather fallacious. While it is correct that poppy seed and its sowing in the region goes back to Alexandrian invasion three centuries before Christ, commercial cultivation is not even half a century old. To assess the existing situation and to attempt to forecast its future prospects, one has to overlook rather scanty planting of poppies over the centuries which would provide just enough opium for local indigenous medicaments and a not-too-widespread opium eating habit. Even then, as early as the sixteenth century the need for government controls over cultivation and discouragement of the use of opium had been recognized. Later, after the advent of the British rule, elaborate laws regulated a government monopoly in opium both in its production and trading. Thus, if poppy cultivation is held to be traditional, government controls over its cultivation, etc. are even more traditional. Modern compulsions such as adherence to a series of global treaties and discovery and production of much more dangerous derivatives of opium, such as heroin, dictate the exercise of even more stringent and perpetual controls not merely on cultivation of the crop but also on manufacture of derivatives and their demand which is now universally recognized to be illegal.

Attention has been drawn to the fact (in the previous chapter) that at the time of Independence in 1947, all Pakistan except the tribal areas were poppy free. However, some tribal areas such as Gadoon-Amazai and parts of the Khyber Agency did have poppy cultivation and the resultant opium production, averaging 40 tons per annum, merged into the existing supply channels, bulk of which fed the licit demand. Part of it was indeed flowing into illicit channels as well, but the overall supply and demand pattern then prevailing would be altogether irrelevant to the situation which developed in early sixties.

The first break in the administrative 'tradition' came in 1953 when GOP permitted cultivation of poppy under the Opium Act of 1857 in order to secure an adequate quantity of opium both for retail sale through licensed opium vends and for meeting the quasi-medical requirements. In 1956 licensed cultivation of poppy came to be located in a limited area of the settled districts of Peshawar, Mardan and Hazara. In the following year the controls over licensing and collection of opium were transferred to the Provincial Government. Gradually and perceptibly the controls became relaxed for various reasons not the least of which were lack of experience on the part of

the provincial staff and rising trends of external demand. Illicit cultivation and production of opium as well as leakages from the licitly produced opium grew side by side. It is difficult to illustrate the then prevailing situation by means of charts and graphs since official records pertaining to that period are no longer available. However data in hand after the constitution of the PNCB illustrates the extent of cultivation and production in the following table.

Table-2

Growing Season by Years	Poppy Acreage Licit and Illicit	Estimated Opium Production in Tons
1975-76	25,000	265
1976-77	36,250	308
1977-78	57,500	511
1978-79	80,500	800

Source: UNFDA, Islamabad; Framework of a Master Plan for Drug Abuse Control in Pakistan, 1990.

Factors responsible for this spiralling increase in opium production from early sixties to 1979 were:

- i) Banning of poppy cultivation in Iran, projecting the Iranian demand eastward for supply.
- ii) Increasing demand for heroin internationally, specially after severance of the "Marseilles Connection".
- iii) Total ban on opium extraction from poppy crop in Turkey.
- iv) Coming into force of the end of limitation period in respect of Pakistan (1979) in accordance with the Single Convention of 1961.

It is evident from above that international factors rather than domestic developments were dictating the increased production. It is also evident that areas closest to the settled districts where licensed cultivation had been permitted since 1956 took to poppy cultivation, the prime example being Gadoon-Amazai followed by Buner. In 1975-76, two thirds of the entire poppy area was centered in these two localities. After the commencement of Buner Pilot Project, however, a visible shift started towards the west, creeping into Malakand and Dir which was later accentuated when Gadoon-Amazai and Malakand Area Development Projects were launched. But this part of the narrative belongs to the next section.

2. Present (1980-91)

The year 1979 was a watershed year in many ways. First, the announcement of a determined "poppy ban" which was in fact an administrative abbreviation for the Opium Act of 1857. In other words, it was a proclamation of closure of poppy licensing in settled districts. Secondly, the promulgation of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance which banned possession and use of opium besides closing down the licensed opium vends. This law came into force in February of 1979 while opium is recovered from the crop from March till May. This meant that the record opium harvest of 1979 could not immediately be marketed. This resulted in crash depression of farm-gate prices, thereby resulting in a steep decrease in the area of next crop sowing. But this was only a transitory phase to which all farmers of whatever crop are used. 1979 was the harbinger of a revolutionary change in the demand pattern for opium.

The Iranian revolution in the same year had made the heroin makers escape from there and to invest in heroin laboratories in the tribal areas of Pakistan (i.e. the FATAs). Their contacts in these areas had been building up ever since poppy cultivation in their own country had been banned and opium supplies had been obtained by them both from neighboring Afghanistan and Pakistan. (This explains the continuous increase in poppy cultivation in Pakistan prior to 1979). The relative freedom from surveillance and enforcement in FATAs afforded a haven of security with the added advantage of a bumper crop available for conversion to the last ounce. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan later that year and the resultant migration of Afghan people on a mass scale into NWFP through the tribal areas bestowed a laxity of conditions ideal to the purpose of heroin processors and traffickers. Yet it took them 3/4 years to consolidate during which both the area under poppy and the small yield of opium continued to decrease as per table below:

Table-3

<u>Growing Season</u>	<u>Poppy Acreage</u>	<u>Opium Production in Tons</u>
1979-80	8750	125
1980-81	8000	85
1981-82	7208	67
1982-83	6783	63
1983-84	6525	45
1984-85	5045	40

Source: As for Table-2.

It has been claimed that the above decrease was caused by determined enforcement of the poppy ban. But other contributory factors such as weather and lower farm-gate prices have also been conceded.¹ In this context the peak opium production of 1979 (800 tons) cannot be overlooked. Opium being a non-perishable commodity, evidently enough stocks were available for a fledgling heroin processing industry. If one adds 1979 production to that of all the years from 1980 to 1985, average per annum is 175 tons which is in fact higher than the average for after-years i.e., 1986 to 1991, as below:

Table-4

Growing Season	Poppy Acreage	Opium Production in Tons
1985-86	15085	130
1986-87	13657	118
1987-88	16297	130
1988-89	18661	130
1989-90	18720	150
1990-91	19906	160

Source: GOP (Narcotics Control Division)

It is evident therefore that demand/supply plateau has been determined by market forces and maintained, at least for the present, even though increased cultivation is being forecast for this year's sowing in view of the abnormally high farm gate prices attributed to stepped up enforcement activity resulting in record seizures of heroin in the recent months.

All the years following 1979 till to date make a difficult study for a researcher since basic data is often confusing and contradictory even from the same source. To give an example, statistics of "Poppy cultivation and Opium yield in NWFP" compiled in the Regional Office of PNCB at Peshawar (a) and PNCB Headquarters, Islamabad, (b) for the years 1986 to 1991 are reproduced below:

¹. Planning Commission, GOP: Special Development and Enforcement Plan, 1983. p.5

Table-5

Sr.No.	Year	Area in Acres .		Production in Tones	
1.	1985-86	(a) 12000	(b) 15085	(a) 130	(b) 130
2.	1986-87	(a) 8500	(b) 13657	(a) 80	(b) 120
3.	1987-88	(a) 28639	(b) 16297	(a) 205	(b) 130
4.	1988-89	(a) 14431	(b) 18661	(a) 130	(b) 130
5.	1989-90	(a) 14405	(b) 18720	(a) 128	(b) 150
6.	1990-91	(a) 13991	(b) 19906	(a) 125	(b) 160

Source: As indicated in the text.

Again, data supplied by Deputy Commissioners/Political Agents altogether differs from PNCB estimates, being generally on the lower side. A comparison of the data referred above with that gathered by satellite imagery and obtained through INM/NAU accentuates the divergence even further. It is also intriguing that in the years 1975-79 average yield per acre was estimated to be between 9 and 10 kilos (re. Table 2 ante); 1979-80 crop yield was estimated at a little over 14 kilos whereas in the period between 1981-85 the yield depressed below 12 kilos per acre (re. Table 3). These variations have been attributed to weather conditions but there is little doubt that the possible effect of weather is calculated rather arbitrarily. On the other hand it seems that yield cropwise, after 1985-86 as indicated in Table 4, has been far less than the accepted average of 10 kilos per acre. To take the last crop (1990-91) as a test, with 19906 acres established as cultivated, opium harvest should be nearer 200 tons rather than 150. It is also interesting that the Federal Minister for Frontier Regions established the total production of opium at 200 tons in the tribal areas, thereby contradicting the data given by N.C.D. It is apparent therefore that means and methods of crop and yield assessments have to be streamlined, together with yearly mapping of the general area under cultivation to determine the direction and level of development inputs and, equally important, to plan the intensity and depth of eradication operations. In fact the 'enforcement zone' which is defined on a year to year basis must be guided by carefully collected data on a continuous basis.

Despite the contradictions in data, pattern of a kind is clearly visible. It seems that 3/4 years after the initiation of development inputs in a project area, forcible eradication operations are started on a yearly basis until the area becomes poppy free. Surveillance continues thereafter alongside development consolidating activities. Gadoon-Amazai is perhaps the best example of this strategy where the project was launched in 1983 and, by 1986, the area had been softened to an extent which permitted commencement of enforcement

intervention. This intervention in 1986, for reasons which are not the subject of this study, resulted in 13 persons killed and a number injured. More well planned and much more massive drive having been launched in 1987, the area has since been poppy free. It is not that no poppy was planted thereafter but whatever was planted (and it was on a much reduced area) was eradicated to the last leaf and, year by year, planting has been reducing. The last crop, again completely destroyed, was only a remote fraction of what had been planted in, and before, 1986-87. Since Gadoon-Amazai project, its progress, and its achievements are best documented, it is worthwhile to illustrate what has been narrated above by means of figures which speak for themselves:




Figure 1




Figure 2




Figure 3

Similar successes have attended on Buner and Malakand Projects and, like Gadoon-Amazai, they too are in the stage of consolidation which is as important as the conceptual, formulation and implementation stages of any poppy elimination program. These three projects also highlight the hard earned lesson of invoking enforcement activities at about the mid development stage; and, while development proceeds on to consolidation stage, enforcement catches on in severity and continuity on a regular year to year basis. Overall situation at present is best reflected in Table-6 which provides the cultivated, eradicated and harvested acreages for the last four crop seasons from 1987-88 to 1990-91.

It will be observed from the above Table that:

- i) Total cultivated area seems stabilized at about 20000 acres per crop year.
- ii) Average annual eradication is less than 5% of the total cultivation.
- iii) Cultivation in the completed project areas is minimal and eradication therein is complete.
- iv) Major cultivation areas are the three on-going project areas namely, Dir (PATA), Bajaur, and Mohmand (both FATAs); and in all these eradication is minimal.
- v) Khyber Agency, another FATA, has scope for cultivation shift if no timely intervention taken place.

3. Future (Trend Analysis)

It is always difficult to anticipate future prospects with regard to drugs and drug production. In 1978, heroin seemed decades away from Pakistan's scene; yet it broke out like an epidemic less than two years later. Much depends on developments on the global level. Demand patterns and users' preferences are liable to sudden change. In Pakistan, it is even more difficult to venture an assessment of prospects since basic data in respect of all disciplines of drug abuse control is woefully lacking.

Yet, there seems to be no indicators at present to compel a major shift in the poppy growing areas in NWFP. It seems that the situation as reflected in Table 6 (see next page) is fairly stabilized and so long as major enforcement interventions remain lacking in Dir, Bajaur, and Mohmand, this situation should continue to prevail, possibly accompanied by a 15% to 20% increase in cultivation induced by rising farm gate prices.

However, there are several factors, some fore-seeable and others not, which influence the spread or shrinking of poppy cultivation. First and foremost amongst them is, of course, demand for opium. The only sector of such demand at present is heroin processing believed to be concentrated in Khyber Agency. It is very difficult to obtain data as to its location, number of laboratories, production capacity, manpower engaged, access to raw material other than opium, such as chemicals, and a host of other information. In fact every bit of information with regard to the laboratories is

Table 6

COMPARATIVE STATEMENT SHOWING ACREAGE OF POPPY CULTIVATION
DURING THE CROP SEASONS 1987-88, 1988-89, 1989-90, 1990-91.

(FIGURES IN ACRES)

	1987-88			1988-89			1989-90			1990-91		
	Culti- vated	Eradi- cated	Harves- ted									
SETTLED AREA												
1. Gadoon (Swabi District).	570	570	--	91	91	--	--	--	--	38	38	--
2. Amzai (Haripur District).	--	--	--	66	66	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
P.A.I.A												
1. Khudi-Khel area of Buner Distt.	360	335	25	273	12	261	370	--	--	207	207	--
2. Dir District.	8456	505	7951	6967	36	6931	6400	--	--	7416	560	6856
3. Malakand Agency.	300	280	20	18	18	--	--	--	--	19	19	--
4. Black Mountain area (Mansehra F.R.).	114	--	114	73	--	73	100	--	--	142	108	34
5. Barra-Adam-Khel (Kohat F.R.).	22	--	22	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
6. Chitral.	18	18	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
F.A.I.A.												
1. Bajaur Agency.	4733	--	4733	8754	--	9756	7500	--	--	9844	34	9810
2. Kohmand Agency.	1357	--	1357	1735	--	1735	2000	--	--	2374	81	2293
3. Khyber Agency.	1906	--	1906	906	--	906	2000	--	--	840	35	805
4. Orakzai Agency.	236	--	236	--	--	--	50	--	--	47	--	47
5. South Waziristan Agency.	--	--	--	--	--	--	300	--	--	61	--	61
TOTAL	18072	1708	16364	18883	223	18662	18720	--	--	20988	1082	19906

Remarks: Statistics for the crop season 1989-90 are estimated, as the PMCB did not carry-out regular survey on the order of PMCB HQrs Islamabad.
[SOURCE: PMCB Regional Office, Peshawar].

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more or less guess work. But presuming the processing facility to stay as it is, enjoying the comparative security as it does at present, and also presuming that the on-going poppy elimination projects will gradually become successful in achieving their objectives, cultivation is likely to shift southwards into Khyber Agency itself and into Orakzai Agency.

On the whole, future trends of cultivation will be dictated by degree of accessibility of the areas under cultivation. The more inaccessible an area to both development and enforcement interventions and closer it is to the manufacturing area, greater is its likelihood to take to poppy cultivation. However, some limiting factors do prevail in both Khyber and Orakzai Agencies, one of them being limited availability of culturable land and, the other, their comparatively higher altitude as well as severity of weather. Poppy, while needing moisture for its growth, does not thrive where precipitation is in the form of snow. Assuming a demand for about 200 tons of opium for heroin laboratories, now obtained from nearly 20,000 acres, Khyber and Orakzai Agencies by themselves may not be able to fulfil the demand. So, again assuming that on-going projects are successful, direction of another shift may be towards northern valleys of Dir district.

However, demand for opium by heroin processing laboratories does not limit the supply thereof to areas within NWFP alone. It is possible that an equal, or more bulk of opium is being supplied by adjoining areas of Afghanistan. It is also possible, conversely, that NWFP opium may be finding its way to laboratories situated in Afghanistan. There is increasing evidence of late with regard to heroin processing in southern and south western Afghanistan; and trafficking routes southwards through Balochistan are more frequented than through other parts of Pakistan. This puts existing poppy cultivations and opium production in a regional rather than in the national context, and, much less, in the provincial perspective. But so long as the region itself remains the principal manufacturer and exporter of heroin every single acre of poppy matters. In saying so, one has only to look at Table-6 and notice something striking. It is the appearance of poppy cultivation on 300 acres in South Waziristan, a FATA deep down in the south of NWFP, never reported to have produced opium in the past. This is a trend which calls for careful watch on a continuing basis.

While we are considering demand as the causative factor for poppy cultivation, it is well worth remembering that the heroin laboratories themselves reflect users' demand not merely in Pakistan but in the region and beyond. That is why they tend to be closest to easy points of exit like Marseilles, Sicily, Hong Kong in the past. Southern and south western Afghanistan now emerging as another center is also a manifestation of this characteristic. And proximity of Waziristan to these parts of Afghanistan cannot be brushed aside as coincidental.

Demand also governs the price of a commodity. If the price of opium crashes any time, poppy cultivation would automatically be curtailed next season as it happened in early eighties (after the bumper harvest of 1979). If, on the other hand, price escalates, more areas come under cultivation even :

they are far removed from centers of demand. One of the disturbing features of the present situation is a phenomenal rise in farm gate prices which, if the existing price-trend is maintained in the next year or two, would certainly stimulate more extensive cultivation in areas already under poppy or bring other areas under cultivation.

It should be of interest to study levels of farm gate prices over the entire period of this study for which price data is available.

Table-7

S.No.	Year	Farm gate price/kg of wet gum in rupees	Market price of dried opium per kg. in rupees
1.	1976	580	1000
2.	1977	700	1500
3.	1978	820	1600
4.	1979	832	1920
5.	1980	736	1520
6.	1981	900	1840
7.	1982	536	1120
8.	1983	420	800
9.	1984	328	640
10.	1985	288	480
11.	1986	312	640
12.	1987	260	776
13.	1988	290	880
14.	1989	280	840
15.	1990	350	800
16.	1991	420	1600

Source: PNCB: Regional Office, Peshawar

Apparently, the ratio of prices of green opium and dry opium has been approximately 1 to 2 upto 1985, the differential rose to 1:3 from 1986 through 1990 and, finally, almost 1:4 during the current year. This pattern coincides with increased acreage from 1986 onwards and, if the current price level is to be believed, the next crop (1991-92) may well be considerably over 20,000 acres and well beyond 200 tons.

Another factor determining poppy cultivation is the political and administrative climate. All tribal areas in NWFP are situated close to Afghanistan which is politically fragile on account of its recent history. Administratively, they are the least governed of all parts of the province as explained in the previous chapter. Within them, again, there are areas inaccessible to all kinds of intervention which can be best described as 'administrative cavities'. Such cavities exist even in Dir as well as fragments of territory deep in the interior surrounded by well administered districts. Kala Dhaka area in Mansehra, eastern parts of Swat district along the right bank of the Indus, and parts of Kohistan district may well be included in this category unless a process of infrastructure development is harnessed rather sooner than later.

III. CONCLUSIONS

It has often been argued that if the initial sin of permitting poppy cultivation in early fifties had not been committed and that if opium vends had been supplied by imported opium, poppy/opium problems would not have assumed the proportions they assumed in seventies and, whatever the spread of cultivation in late seventies in response to increasing international demand, the problem would have been much less intense and, perhaps more amenable to enforcement rather than massive development interventions. Further, that the closure of opium vends in 1979 was ill advised and that, if the vends were still open, there would have been so much less opium to spare for heroin labs. This line of reasoning, in the light of overall developments both domestic and global, seems to be rather speculative. It also ignores the political turmoil which overtook the region in 1979 of which Pakistan is only a fractional part though rather strongly integrated with the mainstreams of regional sociology, culture, and economics. In any case, what has come to be done cannot be undone and it is now a question of whether poppy cultivation can be banished altogether from NWFP and, also, whether heroin laboratories in this Province would ever cease to operate. Two parts of this question are seemingly inter related as if heroin processing in NWFP was dependent entirely on the Province's own production of opium. In truth, although NWFP's phenomenal production of 800 tons was surely a catalyst in favor of establishing heroin laboratories, they are not any longer dependent entirely on NWFP-produced opium. The factors sustaining the labs are in fact well beyond the pale of local opium production and it is best therefore to isolate, not altogether but for the time being in order to facilitate a step-by-step approach, cultivation of poppy from the manufacture of and trafficking in heroin. To address the basic question then, past experience has shown conclusively that poppy cultivation can be eliminated provided development initiatives are well conceived, consistently executed without letting procedural and technical hold ups, their results periodically evaluated, allowing a modicum of flexibility to accommodate any new ideas or methodologies of implementation, and making the community concerned share the objectives of development and necessity thereof with the project authorities. The last seems better said than done but past experience (Buner, for example) does reflect that lesson rather impressively. Provided also that there is a built in readiness to resort to enforcement initiatives, with force if necessary, and continue to do so till the objectives are gained. Provided further that the gains are consolidated patiently with enforcement as the dominant theme.

This, then, is a three phase poppy-elimination model involving a long drawn out (in length of time) activity requiring exercise of consistent patience and a readiness to invest more in efforts and money if such a course becomes necessary.

As to the question of eliminating heroin laboratories, it has to be borne in mind that lesser their number and their processing capability, more reduced would be the demand for opium on their account. This objective is evidently more enforcement-related than development oriented. Thus far, there has been a hit-and-run technique employed in respect of them rather than a concerted action plan which would certainly call for greater administr

and diplomatic skill than hitherto visible. In plain terms, lessons imprinted indelibly on the frontier's history have to be repeated. What the Political Agents used to achieve in larger imperial interests by exercise of discretion and political wisdom in British times has now to be done by their Pakistani successors in national interests. The concerted 'action plan' alluded to above would not be forthcoming unless those who administer FATAs and PATAs have the national interests and obligations upper-most in their minds. Given the qualities of superior wisdom and training alongwith the experience of administration which most of the administrators do possess, a policy aimed at total elimination of opium demand by heroin factories should not be long in the making. And, if the action plan born out of such a policy can go hand in hand with development initiatives/crop destruction campaigns/enforcement modalities, it would be the ideal course for presenting a clean slate in respect of international commitments to which Pakistan is obligated.

Before concluding the answer to the general question regarding the possibility of elimination of poppy cultivation, it is relevant to refer to the skeptical observations one encounters frequently in the course of a study such as this; and, they are:

- i) If all the poppy is eliminated in NWFP, opium will still be fed to NWFP's heroin makers from Afghanistan, and
- ii) If all the heroin labs are shut down in NWFP, they would spring up in Afghanistan and their opium intake would still be reflected in poppy growing areas in the Province.

Evidently, skeptics can never be silenced. (After all it is a recognized school of philosophic thought). But let it be said that if opium continues to be produced in Afghanistan, which it will surely be for many more years than in Pakistan, it would not be Pakistan's problem. Nor would it be so if heroin labs spring up in Afghanistan. In fact they are already there. And the twin edged cynicism can only serve to high-light the necessity of poppy elimination projects and total interdiction and closure of heroin laboratories going in tandem with each other, not allowing any gaps to occur.

Reverting to poppy cultivation and its elimination, three models have been identified in the preceding pages, each of them conditioned by the structure of administration, as follows:

- i) Settled Districts: Abrupt cessation after the imposition of poppy ban in 1979. Complete success obtained without development interventions.
- ii) PATAS:
 - (a) Gradual cessation of poppy cultivation after induction of development initiatives: Buner (UNFDAC), Malakand (NAU), Gadoon-

Amazai (USAID); Consolidation stage achieved; Enforcement intervention emphatically introduced and kept from year to year.

- (b) Dir (UNFDAC) where development intervention is in progress; it is tempered with enforcement activity still on a softer scale; consolidation stage will take time before development impact is fully established.

iii) FATAS:

Bajaur and Mohmand (both NAU):
Development impact yet to come;
Enforcement activity depending more on persuasion than action.

Focal point in each of the on-going Project areas is the Deputy Commissioner/Political Agent (except Kala Dhaka) who acts as Project Director for development purposes. As to enforcement activities he is independent of the SDU but subject to a general policy under the Home Secretary. As observed earlier, good progress has been achieved in combining the two interventions but a greater degree of planning and coordination is called for. In fact, it is strongly felt that enforcement resources at the disposal of Project Directors need augmentation. The need for revising SDEP and a coordinated enforcement mechanism being instituted has already been stressed in the previous chapter. In fact SDEP needs to be so revised that it should form part of the national Master Plan, alongwith a demand reduction annexe. Alongwith the revision of SDEP, strengthening of SDU both in number of staff and influence over implementation/execution of projects is urgently called for. All the lessons learnt so far should dictate the proposed revision and restructuring.

Strengthening of SDU has been acutely felt and a proposal to that effect has been made above. In this context, absence of an "Awareness and Prevention" component in its programs is worthy of notice. Awareness and prevention are usually associated with drug addiction and are therefore related to consumers' demand. However, in the course of the present study, demand of opium by heroin processors as the basic raw material for their 'industry' is the main factor of consideration in the backdrop of poppy elimination. This necessitates a kind of "information sub-program" to be designed by SDU so that poppy farmers can be made aware of the hazards and illegalities which their seemingly innocent agricultural activities aimed at generating more cash income from their postage stamp sized holdings are capable of generating. In this connection, donor assisted Drug Abuse Prevention Resource Center (DAPRC) at Islamabad, which is founded on a sound concept but most unfortunately still in its teething troubles, would stand in close coordination with SDU on a continuing basis.

Even though it has been established that income wise there is no substitute crop for opium poppy, multi-sectoral area development projects have proved successful by contrast. But even such projects are lacking in elements such as storage and marketing. For instance, potatoes, tomatoes and onions are said to have rotted in the field for want of any facility for their storing and marketing, making the farmers who gave up poppy and took to such substitute crops objects of ridicule and humiliation by those who continued to grow poppy. This is a sure inducement for honest and "converted" farmers to go back to poppy cultivation. So, it is not merely enforcement which should go along with development initiatives; in fact, development initiatives must expand in order to lend sustenance and permanence to the culture replacing poppy. It seems odd that a willing and cooperating farmer should face double hazard, first by the rotting of substitute crops grown by him and, then, after he switches back to poppy, by suffering enforcement action. In order for the development to consolidate and finally achieve its objectives, it must continue for a longer span of time than it has so far been thought. To sum up, the on-going projects should wear a "demonstration look" where one who has given up poppy appears a happier man than the one who hasn't. Also, development projects should not have a short implementation range but should cater to a long range consolidation target.

In an earlier chapter, the existing role of SAFRON has been referred to. It is said that despite a well funded development responsibility, this Ministry has had little concern with poppy related development programs in the FATAs. Surely this is not a deliberate omission but it could perhaps be due to lack of inter-ministerial coordination. Use of SAFRON development funds in poppy elimination-related development programs will expand the resource base and inject a measure of financial support hitherto untapped. This is not to suggest any corresponding reduction in donor assistance which, apart from its financial impact, lends valuable technical and professional advice without which all the Projects would have been so much poorer.

Before closing this chapter it is expedient to mention that a noticeable impression prevails both in Islamabad and Peshawar that since all kinds of aid and assistance is likely to dry up, it is not much use discussing the drug-related programs. There is a general attitude of sulkiness which, to say the least, has not been helpful in carrying out this study on more studious and analytical lines. There is a visible slackening of pace even in the thinking processes. It is felt that the forecast increase in poppy cultivation during the current crop (1991-92) has been occasioned, at least partly, on account of the anticipated cut off in aid resources. It will indeed be a most unfortunate development if the entire progress made since 1979 both in terms of financial inputs as well as in the emergence of drugs control related concepts is set at naught.

While loose ends of research and study leading upto the finalization of this document were being tied up, momentous geo-

political changes have taken place in what formerly was the Soviet Union. Whatever final shape these events will assume, they have already generated speculations regarding future patterns of trafficking routes of narcotic drugs produced and manufactured in Pakistan-Afghanistan region. There are many who anticipate a bigger boost in heroin processing in the tribal areas with a consequent increase in the demand for opium. There are others who see a bonanza round the corner in cannabis trafficking. Some authorities predict a switch from the seaward exit of drugs to overland trafficking through the fledgling Russian Commonwealth to Western Europe. In short, the situation is pregnant with all kinds of possibilities which could undermine the effort made thus far in development and enforcement sectors unless gains achieved thereunder are consolidated firmly and future activities quickened even more determinedly.

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LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED OR CONSULTED

1. Mr. Amir Gulistan Janjua, Governor of NWFP, Peshawar.
2. Mr. Mir Afzal Khan, Chief Minister, NWFP, Peshawar.
3. Mr. Abdul Qayyum, Secretary, Ministry of Narcotics Control, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.
4. Mr. Nazir Ahmad Malik, Chairman, Pakistan Narcotics Control Board, Islamabad.
5. Mr. Dil Jan Khan, Secretary, Ministry of States and Frontier Regions, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.
6. Mr. Samin Jan Babar, Home Secretary, GONWFP, Peshawar.
7. Mr. Amin Khattak, Director General, SDU, Peshawar.
8. Mr. Mahbub Ilahi, Joint Secretary, Narcotics Control Division, Islamabad.
9. Mr. James Magnor, US Embassy, Islamabad.
10. Mr. John O'Connor, US Embassy, Islamabad.
11. Mr. Frank Pavich, USAID/ARD, Islamabad.
12. Ms. Christine Scheckler, USAID/ARD, Islamabad.
13. Malik Muhammad Ashraf, Director, Planning and Development, Pakistan Narcotics Control Board, Islamabad.
14. Mr. Ralph Seccombe, Field Adviser, UNDCP, Islamabad.
15. Mr. Tariq Durrani, USAID/ARD, Peshawar.
16. Mr. Umar Muhammad, USAID/TADP, Peshawar.
17. Mr. Sohail Malik, USAID/ARD, Peshawar.
18. Agha Muhammad Sharif, former Opium Inspector, Central Excise and Land Customs Directorate, Central Board of Revenue, now residing in Peshawar.
19. Several persons from Peshawar, Mardan, Swabi, Gadoon and Buner who would wish to remain anonymous

RESOLUTION
Islamabad, the 8th March 1973
Pakistan Narcotics Control Board

WHEREAS Pakistan is a Party to the Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs, 1961, and ratified it on August 15, 1965;

AND WHEREAS article 17 of the said Convention requires that Parties to it shall maintain a Special Administration for the purpose of applying the provision thereof;

Now, with a view to effectively fulfil Pakistan's obligations under the said Convention, it is expedient to create such an administration by reorganizing the Pakistan Narcotics Board; the Federal Government, therefore in supersession of the Ministry of Finance (Revenue Division's Resolution No. 1, dated the 9th August, 1957 now adopts the following resolution:

1. The Pakistan Narcotics Board will henceforth be called the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board;
2. It will have a full-time Chairman assisted by a full-time Secretary and such other staff as may be determined by the Federal Government from time to time.
3. The Board will have as Member one representative from each of the undermentioned authorities:
 - (i) Provincial Governments;
 - to
 - (iv) States and Frontier Regions Division;
 - (v) Finance Division;
 - (vi) Health Division
 - (vii) Food & Agriculture Division;
 - (viii) Planning Commission;
 - (ix) Member, Central Board of Revenue
 - (x) Inspector General, Special Police Establishment
4. As soon as may be after the adoption of this Resolution, the Board will be invested with legal, administrative and financial powers to enable it to put into effect the provisions of the Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs, 1961, and carry out other international or bilateral commitments in this field and for this purpose necessary legislation will be enacted.
5. The Board will be an advisory, supervisory, co-ordinating and controlling agency in the field of narcotics and its functions and duties in this respect will include the following:

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to _____ and _____ the
in the t _____ so as to ensure its
conformity with the requirement of International
Conventions and Agreements and in accordance with
obligations thereunder;

- (ii) to survey the nature and efficacy of control over cultivation, production, distribution, supply and consumption of opium, other narcotics and dangerous drugs and to ensure that the agencies concerned take appropriate measures to improve such controls;
- (iii) to control and regulate import, export and transshipment of dangerous drugs;
- (iv) to control cultivation of opium, its manufacture and sale for export in accordance with the requirements of the Single Convention and to adopt suitable measures to eliminate its production for other than medical and scientific purposes within the stipulated period;
- (v) to adopt suitable measures against illicit traffic in narcotics, opium and dangerous drugs and to co-ordinate preventive and repressive action against such traffic and so assist enforcement agencies engaged in such action to mutual co-operation, exchange of information and similar other means;
- (vi) to survey the extent of addiction and to adopt measures to ensure that use of opium, other narcotics and dangerous drugs is confined exclusively to medical and scientific purposes in accordance with the requirements of International Conventions and Protocols;
- (vii) to survey, co-ordinate and advise on the administrative arrangements of the Provincial Governments in respect of opium, other narcotics and dangerous drugs;
- (viii) to keep under regular review the laws, rules and regulations relating to narcotics operative in the country and to advise on their amendment, modification or reformulation with a view to bringing them in conformity with international requirements and obligations;
- (ix) to direct enforcement agencies on all matters in the field of narcotics, and to control operations of all law enforcement agencies about illicit traffic and traffickers, and to exchange relevant intelligence with other similar organizations directly and through international channels and generally to facilitate co-ordination of efforts in the prevention and investigation of drug trafficking at operational level;

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Board and other International Organizations or as may be prescribed or considered necessary for the purposes of the Board;

- (xi) to institute enquiries, undertake surveys and make studies for keeping under regular review as a whole the problems arising from drug abuse and to recommend suitable measures to meet the situation;
 - (vii) to maintain liaison with the International Narcotics Control Board, other national or international organizations, bodies, associations and societies in the field of narcotics for pursuing the objectives of the Board;
 - (xiii) to deal with all international aspects of narcotics, including negotiations if necessary for bilateral or multilateral agreements for mutual assistance and co-ordination in the field of narcotics enforcement;
 - (xiv) to seek assistance if necessary from the United Nations Organizations and other countries on the basis of bilateral or multilateral agreements for pursuing the objectives of the Board;
 - (xv) to arrange and co-ordinate for training of personnel of enforcement agencies in various aspects of narcotics enforcement, rehabilitation of addicts, dissemination of information against addiction and allied matters;
 - (xvi) to study, advise, assist, and execute projects and schemes for eliminating the cultivation of opium and production of other narcotics and dangerous drugs for other than medical and scientific use.
6. The Board may appoint committees and study groups as may be necessary for specific purposes within the functions assigned to the Board.
 7. The Board will have its own Secretariat.
 8. Till further orders, the Board will be attached to the Planning Commission.

Orders that this resolution be published in the Gazette of Pakistan.

AFTAB AHMAD KHAN, T.Pk., C.S.P.,
Additional Secretary"

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REPORT ON OPINION RELATED PROJECTS IN NWFP - PAKISTAN
AS OF JULY - AUGUST 1990

SERIAL NO.	NAME OF PROJECT	DONOR	FUNDING LEVEL '000'	DONOR GOP	TOTAL	PROJECT LIFE FROM TO	PROJECT AREA	MAJOR ACHIEVEMENTS	FUTURE PLANS	REMARKS
I.	a) Malakand Area Development Project	USAID/US Embassy	6.350 \$	-	6.350 \$	1983 - 1990	Malakand Agency (Provincially Administered Tribal Area - PAYA)	- Opium crop eliminated from the area since 1985. - 15 miles roads, 8 feeder roads, 3 VOs, 20 schools, 38 WSS, 4 BHUs, 19 villages electrified, 4 tubewells and 15 other irrigation schemes.	Project may be completed by December, 1990.	Malakand Agency area is good candidate for rural development especially there is no opium crop. GOP would welcome any donor agency for funding assistance. GWP has prepared a pro for 8.3 million dollars but is paid. It is suggested that:
	b) Agricultural Outreach Program	USAID/US Embassy	3.000 \$	-	3.000 \$	1982 - 1990	-do-	Good start made for opium crop substitution program including fruit trees, oil seed crops, vegetables, pulses and afforestation activities.	Modest bridge funding by MAO in FY 1990-91 in Malakand, Akenrai and Zhyber.	a) GWP should be approached and convinced to revive their interest b) Project can be included under the TADP amendment proposed for US c) WFPADP may add another component for Malakand sub-project.
	c) Social Forestry	Dutch Govt.	51.182 Rs	2.431 Rs	53.613 Rs.	1991 - 1991	-do-	Work started on 16000 acres afforestation, 4380 acres fruit orchards, 168 acres fodder trials and nurseries.	Activities will continue until 1991.	
II.	a) Dir District Area Development Project	UNEPDAC	14.580 \$	27.355 Rs	258.107 Rs.	1985 - 1991	Dir District Area (PATA)	1012 acres land levelling, 84 irrig. schemes, 174 WSS, 22 bus roads, 6 villages electrified, 2000 tons wheat seed & 330 tons maize seed distributed, 180,000 fruit trees to farmers, 2060 crop trials, 120 Bamboillet runs, 5537 acres afforestation.	Project has been redesigned and more emphasis laid on developmental schemes in the opium crop growing belts, also 74 tons being upgraded.	The present project will last till 6 it may be possible to arrange funds phase II program. ** Includes 10.00 \$ million USID contribution per item V-c below.
III.	a) Buner Area Development Project	UNEPDAC	1.567 \$	17.874 Rs	115.287 Rs.	1976 - 1987	Buner Sub-Division of Swat District (PATA)	17 irrig. schemes, 8 tubewells, 93 bus roads, 12 WSS, 1855 acres levelling, 320 tons wheat seed, 60 tons maize and 60 tons sugarcane seed distributed, 520 acres fruit orchards. About 10,000 acres opium crop eliminated. This is a non-narcotic area development venture and has just started.	Opium crop eliminated in 1981 but resurfaced on small scale in some reaches. UNEPDAC has terminated this project in June 1987.	The project has now been taken over European Economic Community (EEC) for rural development objectives.
	b) Buner Area Development Project	EEC	205.500 Rs	95.000 Rs	300.500 Rs.	1988 - 1991	-do-		Rural development perspective but more emphasis on agric. and afforestation programs.	
IV.	a) Bajaur Area Development Project	USAID/US Embassy	12.500 \$	-	12.500 \$	1989 - 1993	Bajaur Agency (PATA)	These two projects started for implementation in June 1989. The overall projects' goal is to eliminate poppy crop from these two tribal agencies.		
	b) Mohmand Area Development Project	-do-	12.500 \$	-	12.500 \$	1989 - 1993	Mohmand Agency (PATA)			

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SERIAL NO. PROJECT TITLE
 FUNDING LEVEL '000' DONOR PROJECT LIFE FROM TO PROJECT AREA MAJOR ACHIEVEMENTS
 V.

PROJECT TITLE	FUNDING LEVEL '000'	DONOR	PROJECT LIFE FROM TO	PROJECT AREA	MAJOR ACHIEVEMENTS
a) Gadoon Component	42.000 \$	USAID	1983	7 Union Councils of Gadoon-Amazai area of Districts Swabi, Abbottabad and Swat.	47 miles road completed and 22 miles being constructed, 27 villages electrified and 27 being done, 55 schools, 10 tubewells, 48 dugwells, 124 irrig. schemes, 252 acres levelling, 60 WSS, 1382 crop trials, 1330 fruit orchards, 360 forest plots, 2175 persons trained, 116,813 acres provided with free wheat seed and fertilizers, 51759 farmers assisted, 30 WPE centers established, 985 long-term and 1600 short-term jobs provided, over 10,000 acres opium crop eliminated, 10 V.O.s & 1 BRU constructed
b) Kala Dhaha Component	8.000 \$	USAID	1993	Hausehra District Tribal Area	Work on 500 acres afforestation and 10 acres nursery raising has started
c) Dir Area Component	10.000 \$	USAID	1991	Dir Project Area	Read under Dir Project achievements per item II above
d) Drug Abuse Prevention Center	3.000 \$	USAID	1993	Drug Abuse Prevention Center at Islamabad	PC-I has been approved, building hired, 57 personnel trained in PCNY & 30 trainers for training

A mid-term evaluation was completed July/August, 1990. Major recommendations was a shift towards grass root level implementation. The new approach is strategized.

The project began phase-II as of 1989 and will consolidate the gains achieved in phase-I

The PC-I has been approved and design work for infrastructure schemes has already started

USAID provides funds to UNPDAC for implementing Dir Area Development Pr



Demonstration of school is in progress and support PCNY

ACRONYMS:


- WSS = Water Supply Schemes (Drinking)
- VD = Veterinary Dispensary
- BRU = Basic Health Unit
- PAYA = Federally Administered Tribal Areas
- FATA = Provincially Administered Tribal Areas
- MAF = Narcotic Affairs Unit (U.S. Embassy)
- USAID = United States Agency for International Development
- UNPDAC= United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control
- EDC = United Nations Development Program
- WFS = Non-formal Education

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ADMINISTRATIVE MAP OF N.W.F.P




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LEGEND


Province Boundary	--- (Long Dashed Line)
District Boundary	--- (Short Dashed Line)
Major Road	— (Solid Line)
Minor Road	- - - (Dotted Line)
Railway	— (Line with Cross-ticks)
Water	~ (Wavy Line)
Settlement	• (Dot)
Fort	□ (Square)
Other	• (Dot)

**POPPY CULTIVATION IN N. W. F. P DURING
1978-79**




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**POPPY CULTIVATION IN N.W.F.P
DURING 1984-85**



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**POPPY CULTIVATION IN N.W.F.P
DURING 1990-91**




LEGEND

- The extent of poppy cultivation
- The extent of poppy cultivation
- The extent of poppy cultivation

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
**N W F P PHYSIOGRAPHY AND POPPY
DURING 1990 - 91**



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
MAP NO 8

MEAN
TEMPERATURE



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1981



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