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**UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
BUREAU FOR AFRICA**

**U. S. MISSION TO NIGER**

**Proposed  
Country Strategy Plan  
1995 - 2002**



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## **NIGER STRATEGIC PLAN 1995-2002**

### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The United States has placed democratization and sustainable economic development at the center of its policy objectives for Africa. Accordingly, U. S. development programs in Niger are aimed at helping people gain a bigger say in their daily lives and sustain improved livelihoods. The Mission's goals and strategic objectives have been set towards those ends.

The USAID/Niger program supports a healthier Nigerien population growing at a slower rate that enjoys higher rural production, including of food, and better conservation of its environment. Three strategic objectives serve that goal:

- 1. Increase the use of family planning and other important maternal and child health services, and improve nutrition and food security of children in times of disaster, in order to lower mortality and fertility, .**
- 2. Increase market access for rural people, mainly by their use of local financial services.**
- 3. Increase adoption of practices for conservation and productive use of natural resources.**

Niger's social and economic need for democracy is as great as its political one. Helping people gain more responsibility and choice in their lives is a cardinal principle of the USAID approach. Niger's formal governmental structure and control has been weakened, and more Nigeriens are looking toward establishment of a freer, more decentralized system. Some already existing local interest-group associations, along with many new ones, are now flourishing in Niger's new, freer environment. This situation, in which a formal system is disintegrating but a new one is only taking form, provides opportunities for new approaches, as well as expansion of already successful small activities. At the same time, USAID will continue its policy reform dialogue with the Government of Niger (GON), backed up when appropriate with non-project assistance, to effect needed change at the national level.

In the area of maternal child health and family planning, the GON health system must be made more local and more oriented to preventive care. Charging fees gives health users more responsibility and choice and provides the government with funds to buy medicine. During cost recovery pilot tests, people visited clinics much more than usual. They came, they said, because the clinics had medicine for a change. That was a result of the fees patients paid. Cost recovery, now moving from the test to program stage, is an element of Strategic Objective #1.

Under this Strategic Objective, USAID plans to concentrate its activities in a limited number of districts, covering about 20% of Niger's population. It anticipates that within these districts, in five to eight years, Niger's infant deaths will fall by 20% from 123 per thousand to 100/1000. The child (age 1-5) death rate should drop almost 30% from 222 per thousand to 160/1000. The number of children born to the average woman should decline 10% from 7.4 to 6.7. The malnutrition rate should fall by about one quarter. In order to attain these goals in selected districts, several types of results will be necessary, as detailed in Part II and in the Performance Monitoring Plan Annex.

**SO#1 results in target districts will include:**

- a doubling in the use of health services
- family planning always accessible with maternal & child care, and is available in many communities
- long-term family planning methods at many centers
- child vaccination levels increase from 17% to 45%
- pregnant women's tetanus inoculation rises to 30%
- 80% of children get correct treatment at facilities

Also, national regulations on contraception will be eased, and use of contraceptives will rise from 4% to 9% by 2000.

USAID/Niger has long supported grassroots cooperatives, credit unions and other local financial agencies which are expanding in Niger's vibrant informal economy. They offer an important element of economic freedom in a

**SO#2 expected results include:**

- many more local financial agencies, especially rural
- agency customers rise 20% by 1997, many women
- agricultural exports rise 10% per year (target areas)
- transporters' bribes drop significantly before 1997
- several formal banks provide local financial services.

country whose rigid, formal economy is failing. We will continue this support, combined with continued assistance to the GON in its economic reform efforts, as part of our Strategic Objective #2. USAID/Niger will focus activities to increase rural people's access to markets, mainly through use of local financial services.

Strategic Objective #3 aims toward the widespread adoption of natural resource management (NRM) practices to enable the people in Niger's rural areas to produce more while using less of the fragile and dwindling resources. To significantly improve conservation and good use of forests, fields, waters and pastures, the results here are among those needed.

**SO#3 results leading to better NRM:**

- farmers practice better resource management: 5% more by 1997; 20% more by 2000
- 25 new NRM groups registered by 1997; 300 by 2002
- greater public familiarity with conservation measures
- farmers visit other villages to share information
- farmers get better market and weather information
- national conservation & NRM measurement in 1996

The strategic objectives are closely related. For example, many of Niger's farmers are also part time herders and entrepreneurs. They need credit to earn a living and invest to make their soil, trees and water more productive. And with greater savings they will be able to afford more health services. These interrelationships--along with the vital cross-cutting themes of democracy and governance, food insecurity, and training--is a central element of USAID's program in Niger.

USAID will employ a variety and combination of tools in order to achieve these results, including conditioned cash transfers, technical assistance and training. There will be considerable use of U.S. and local voluntary agencies for project implementation, as well as local currency programming. USAID will also draw upon regional Africa Bureau and Global resources. Table 1 summarizes the overall planned USAID budget by Mission strategic objectives and by Agency strategy directives. USAID/Niger proposes \$60.0 million from fiscal year 1995 through FY 1997--the first three years--as follows:

Strategic Objective 1: \$24.2 million  
Strategic Objective 2: \$15.0 million  
Strategic Objective 3: \$20.8 million

Global and regional sources would contribute another \$15.5 million over this period, bringing total USAID obligations, FY 1995 through FY 1997, to about \$75.5 million. Another \$140 million is estimated between 1998 and FY 2002. In areas of special Congressional interest, approximately 20% of the total Niger OYB will be used for population activities; 25% for child survival; 25% for protecting the environment; and 30% for encouraging economic growth.

To manage this portfolio, USAID/Niger will be staffed with U.S. direct hires, U.S. and third country specialists, and a full complement of Nigerien professionals employed directly within the Mission, with U.S. PVOs and contractors, and heading Nigerien non-governmental organizations.

As one of the Agency's re-invention laboratories, USAID/Niger has focussed on strategic planning. This plan reflects unusual efforts and success in consulting widely with Nigeriens. In preparing the plan, the impacts of past USAID efforts were studied. Our studies concluded that the best choices had been made based on the importance of sectors, U.S. comparative technical advantages, the investment patterns of other donors, and funding availabilities. The new plan continues to be based on these factors, but moves its emphasis from working primarily with the central government and being heavily involved with policy reform toward being more involved in rural areas and working more with local authorities and non-governmental organizations. The plan calls for much more geographic focus to facilitate implementation and maximize impact.

## **PART I: SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF ASSISTANCE ENVIRONMENT <sup>1</sup>**

### **A. Significant Macro-Economic and Socio-Political Trends**

After several years of standing still, Niger's agricultural economy is estimated to have grown about 8.5% [in real dollar terms] in 1994, thanks to good rainfall, currency devaluation and the energetic informal sector. The improvement gave a welcome boost to the food security and income of ordinary rural citizens—85% of the country's population. The stagnant formal economy, still dominated by the state, stayed static, and the overall GDP increase is estimated at 2.6%.

Agro-pastoral exports rose in real dollar terms, and inflation—while substantial—fell short of offsetting the trade advantage gained from devaluation.

These positive one-year signs are a long way from setting a trend, but they break a no-growth pattern dating to the last good rainy season in 1989. All progress took place outside the formal sector: informal economic operators hustled to seize the advantages offered by devaluation and rain. The formal economy, burdened with bad regulation, excessive taxes and chronic public sector strikes, failed to benefit from the same advantages. In the cities, social tension rose as Niger's government dropped further behind in paying its salaries. Many civil servants joined formal or de facto strikes.

A succession of governments derived from Niger's first freely elected National Assembly, seated April 1993 through October 1994, failed to break the stalemate with public sector unions, restore life to the formal economy or improve public finances. In the fall 1994, the prime minister resigned and legislative alliances realigned. The January 1995 elections confirmed the opposition coalition's small National Assembly majority, 43 of 83 seats. Amid much political maneuvering by both sides, the president, on February 21, appointed an opposition leader prime minister and announced the cabinet February 25. Managing a government in which the President and Prime Minister represent different political parties is a difficult challenge. In fact, this is the first time in West Africa that a government has accepted a Prime Minister from an opposition party.

With so little experience, Niger's new democracy is still trying to find its footing; expectations should be modest. Although it would be unrealistic to foresee bold leadership from government in the near future, better administration and more effective management of resources is not only possible but essential.

### **B. Overall Development Prospects**

With per capita GDP below \$300 a year, Niger is one of the world's poorest countries. Almost every economic and social indicator places it at the bottom. Moreover, its low-

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<sup>1</sup> Annexes B, C, D and E provide in-depth background on Niger.

resource, drought-prone environment in West Africa's inland Sahel threatens to buckle under the strain of a population that is doubling about every 20 years.

Working mainly through the public sector, the Government of Niger and official donors tried hard, in the three decades after independence, to stimulate economic development. In the 1990s, those efforts have largely collapsed, crushed by the cumulative weight of ineffective government during a lengthy political transition, exaggerated attention to a salaried elite (public employees) and recurring drought.

Recognition is growing on the part of the GON and its donors alike that to try to continue such public sector, top-down development would merely perpetuate past errors.

A vibrant informal sector, meanwhile, is daily making more evident its economic agility and resilience. Many development planners, including some in the GON, now believe that economic hope for Niger lies in this sector. The view that private, individual initiative can make for macroeconomic success is coming late to Niger, but it is coming. How readily and rapidly it takes hold will determine the country's development and perhaps its democratic prospects from here on.

The time is ripe for a development approach that supports the country's real entrepreneurs—its small scale farmers and informal business people. Many are already promoting their own economic interest vigorously, if not always efficiently. With some of its worst policies dropped or weakened through USAID/Niger-funded policy programs, government today is a declining negative force. That status is likely to prove permanent.

In sharp contrast, Nigeriens in the largely informal private sector have shown how well they can perform by their strong response to the more favorable conditions created by January 1994's fifty percent currency devaluation and a good 1994 rainy season.

USAID/Niger funds three pioneering, non-government microenterprise programs—implemented by private voluntary organizations—that stimulate grassroots economic development based on individual initiative. These successes prove that economic opportunities are there for energetic, ambitious Nigeriens. Opportunities are also there for carefully directed donor programs that help the ordinary person make a real difference in building Niger's economic future.

Of course, government has its proper role. In health and education it must provide most services indefinitely. In private enterprise development and even natural resources management, the GON should be lighthanded and supporting. Donors ought to insist that the GON deploy its people and remaining funds to meet real grassroots needs as effectively as the local context allows. USAID/Niger's longtime policy and implementation work with the Ministries of Health, Agriculture and Livestock, and Water Resources and Environment aims to accomplish that.

### **C. An Analysis of Constraints and Opportunities**

Some chief constraints on Nigerien development are evident:

1. Exploding population,
2. Low health and education status, especially of women and children,
3. Low level of trained skills,
4. Extreme poverty and food insecurity,
5. Poorly-endowed, vulnerable natural environment.
6. Over-centralized government.

1. **Exploding population.** At about 9 million in 1994, Niger's population has more than trebled since independence in 1960. No plausible scenario will prevent those 9 million people from doubling to 18 million by about 2015. The average woman bears 7.4 children. The population is young with a high ratio of dependents to working adults. Children under 15 and women of reproductive age make up approximately three-quarters of the national total.

Rapid increase is not new, but the rate has accelerated. The country's population today is over five times the 1920 estimate. Pressure on the physical environment began early as forests shrank and the already low soil fertility started to slip. Traditional fallow periods shortened. Today, all those factors are much worse. New land for cultivation is very scarce and produces little. Health, education and jobs lag far behind needs.

With such demography, Niger offers striking challenges to slow population growth, easing the strain on women, the children already born, its environment and social services. The United States is in an excellent position to build on the foundation laid by the first USAID population project, now nearing its completion.

2. **Low health and education status, especially of women and children.** The 1992 USAID Demographic and Health Survey estimated Niger's infant (under one year) mortality at 123 per thousand and child (1-5) mortality at 222 per thousand. These numbers paint one of the world's grimmest pictures for children in their first five years. Widespread malnutrition is a major reason for high mortality.

Women still marry very young and have a life expectancy of about 45 years. Adult literacy rates are believed to be 10-15% with women faring much worse than men. Of the children who survive to age five, only about one in four attends primary school, even briefly, and most of them are boys. This has necessitated USAID/Niger to launch programs in basic literacy and numeracy in the burgeoning village association and local NGOs.

As with population, Niger offers the donor an unparalleled opportunity to help improve health and education. USAID approaches family planning, maternal and child health, and preventive health care as a package. In education, USAID continues to train Nigeriens to lead national and local development efforts cutting across all strategic objectives.

**3. Low level of trained skills.** Closely associated with the high illiteracy rate is an inadequate supply of skilled human resources, which is a major constraint on all programs. USAID continues to train Nigeriens to lead national and local development efforts cutting across all strategic objectives and devotes increasing attention to improving the strategic impact of training programs. Over a fifth of the Mission's resources are devoted to training and associated follow-on activities. The Mission plans to launch distance education and Internet connections to better serve the needs of returned participants.

**4. Extreme poverty and food insecurity.** Among the 85% of Nigeriens who live in the countryside, extreme poverty in a semi-subsistence life is common indeed. That people live so close to the margin can itself be a severe impediment to development, for their attitudes and assets tend understandably to be geared to sheer survival. But the view that rural Nigeriens live in strictly subsistence style is a myth. The livelihood of most derives from a complex market and subsistence activities that may lead them, in any year, to farm or herd, trade, work as a laborer, be an artisan, and serve as truck farmer or transporter. They use traditional financial services from the flourishing informal sector (tontines, money-holders, moneylenders, cascading commercial advances that may reach them through traders and speculators). Inefficiency and official obstacles notwithstanding, Niger has considerable grassroots savings, along with mechanisms to invest them. Hence the semi-commercial livelihood of many ordinary people. The formal financial system does not work for them; banks are not interested in them.

For some years USAID/Niger has funded three approaches to providing rural financial services for ordinary households: bottom-up cooperatives controlled by their membership (CLUSA implemented), savings and credit unions similarly controlled (WOCCU implemented) and a microenterprise lending agency in Maradi (CARE implemented). In its own way, each project has seized opportunities to help develop the informal sector and relieve the worst of rural poverty. Various evaluations confirm their success and conclude that the USAID-supported projects in this field have found important niches in Niger's vigorous informal money-lending and are capable of becoming self-sustaining in the long haul.<sup>2</sup>

Simultaneously, on the macroeconomic front, USAID/Niger presses for additional policy reform to help open the economic system to all, to lower or remove obstacles that interfere with the economy, formal and informal. Working in tandem with USAID-sponsored rural financial services, this approach offers hope that ordinary, rural Nigeriens can raise themselves from poverty.<sup>3</sup> And those who earn some cash are more able to invest something in the soil, water and trees that provide part of their living.

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<sup>2</sup> For example, see "Rural Financial Systems in Niger", Development Associates, Inc., March, 1995. The Case Studies-Volume 2 is replete with many personal stories.

<sup>3</sup> "The Policy Analysis and Monitoring Research Program", USAID/Niger, March 1995, describes studies with and for policy makers, underway and planned, including financing the economy, promoting the private sector, improving fiscal policy and administration, and comparative advantages of products.

**5. Poorly-endowed, vulnerable natural environment.** Low and uncertain rainfall, infertile soil, few trees, famine and pests constitute the main challenges of the natural environment rural Nigeriens confront. They and their communities, moreover, lack firm control over the resources they use. Without clear tenure, incentive is weak to invest in the land, water and trees one uses. Government officials traditionally try to boss farmers and herders around. The few civil associations lack clout. Rural producers seldom receive good technical advice. Capital may be hard to come by.

How can such a bleak picture be improved? By a broad, persistent approach that exploits known local opportunities. For instance, a few simple, proven measures will boost crop yields and actually improve soil. Farmers may adopt them readily, attracted by the results and low cost. In famine, carefully targeted mitigation can head off the worst self-perpetuating effects and tie back into natural resource improvement. A national Rural Code to clarify tenure is gradually being implemented. Bad government policies continue to be tempered or abandoned. The example of political democracy encourages local people to seek other changes. Multiplying grassroots financial services helps to open the market economy, making semi-commercial livelihood more attractive.

USAID/Niger takes a strong hand in each of these innovations and proposes to press ahead, spreading the benefits to larger numbers of ordinary citizens.

**6. Over-centralized government.** From independence, Niger's government saw itself as the instrument of national development. It laid ambitious plans, created bureaucracies and undertook large tasks—without great positive effect. The first answers to early failures were larger budgets, more employees and even more elaborate plans. Today, government's empty indebted treasury has weakened the traditional heavyhanded approach.

Better yet, it has led to a debate on the proper role of government, not yet concluded, that is likely to reduce and simplify that role. With donor pressure, there may be greater concentration on vital services that only government can provide in Niger at this stage, for instance, education and health. In GON and donor offices in Niamey, it is now pretty well accepted that government cannot and even ought not try to micromanage the informal economy or farmers' behavior, or smallscale field conservation measures, to cite some examples. Getting the revised message out through the administrative system and re-training officials long set in their ways will take longer.

Democracy's arrival less than two years ago has its effect too, perhaps a more subtle one. The ballot now means something, in broad terms, to politicians who jostle for power and to voters. As in any democracy, there's no simple one-for-one connection between the individual vote and a specific political change. Still, the old days are gone, and former ways are changing. Politicians will take the ordinary person for granted at their peril. Many people may not be entirely sure what democracy is, but today they are more likely to question what government does and how it does it. Niger is better placed than ever before to evolve into a decentralized society where people look mainly to their own initiative for economic progress, while participating in their communities' political and economic affairs.

Promoting democracy, governance and grassroots empowerment is a cardinal, guiding principle of the USAID/Niger portfolio.

#### **D. Description of the Host Country Priorities and Development Plans**

To the outsider, Niger's government in early 1995 may seem preoccupied with political squabbling and the scramble to meet the public payroll. This outward appearance ought not to obscure the evolution taking place in government and national thinking about government and development. In important ways, the GON is now talking the talk, even if it cannot yet walk the walk; and since talk has to precede walk, that is progress.

True, meeting daily expenditures and learning how to make political "co-habitation" work consume much official energy. But years of dogged USAID/Niger effort in the policy reform vineyard are bearing fruit, as bad policies are progressively abandoned or softened. Better yet, the effect of this long labor is showing up in government officials' and donors' thought processes. Their thinking is slowly changing toward a more open, decentralized, grassroots, individual-empowerment model of development. This comes about as everyone better grasps the reasons for past failure and for the emerging success of independent, entrepreneurial individuals.

This evolution makes the old instinct for elaborate five-year development plans less compelling. What becomes more significant is the approach, the daily attitude of the government official, his or her view of what is appropriate government behavior. Those attitudes are starting to move—not as fast as private sector attitudes, but they are moving.

Officially, government planning today remains aimed mainly at stanching the hemorrhage of public finances. This means tightening tax and customs collections and also cutting back government expenditures. Another part is to continue to try to strike financial agreements with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, discussed below. These efforts must aim at restoring enough basic functions to permit health facilities (with the aid of USAID's non-project and project assistance) and schools to operate—to cite but two indispensable services.

Beyond that, much planning consists of talking about the need to encourage the private sector. The means of doing this are basically to get out of its way, through policy reform pushed by such donors as USAID. That approach enjoys the Mission's continued enthusiastic support—reinforced with today's non-project and project assistance sharply targeted in the private, microenterprise sector and at natural resources management and health.

With the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, the GON has been working on Policy Framework Paper (PFP) drafts for some time. The PFP is intended to set forth mid-term financial objectives and economic policy measures. With the new prime minister and his cabinet in place, a Bretton Woods team or teams are expected in Niamey by the end of March 1995 to push negotiations along.

Some measures long foreseen in PFP drafts were adopted in 1994 and early 1995. Last year, the GON cut civil service salaries an average of 25% [in undervalued terms]. The 1995 government's cabinet is drastically scaled back from 28 to 16 ministers, with allowances and benefits significantly curtailed.

The PFP drafts also propose more GON budget emphasis on local education and health, as the World Bank and other donors have long suggested. The GON has made a start in education, in cooperation with a new World Bank project. More spending in such key social sectors is likely to be a condition of any future Structural Assistance Program (SAP) with the Bank.

In the political transition that greeted Niger's short-lived Second Republic, earlier SAPs fell by the wayside. They were succeeded by unplanned structural adjustment accompanied by lengthy public employee strikes. The Bank and the GON will no doubt make another SAP effort. The negotiation will provide an early signal of the new government's economic seriousness. Likely targets are state enterprise reform and privatization—where incomplete, halting progress was made earlier. More difficult will be any attempt to reform a strait-jacket labor law that seriously discourages formal sector employers from changing staff in response to differing economic conditions.

Niger and the IMF signed a stand-by, stabilization agreement for 18.596 million SDRs in April 1994. A few months later, the IMF suspended the GON's drawing rights when revenue and expenditure targets were not met. Nearly 7.5 million SDRs remain undisbursed. No enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF) could likely be negotiated before the new government meets conditions that allow the IMF to reinstate the suspended stand-by agreement.

While France, by far Niger's largest source of external assistance, has shifted its emphasis toward project assistance, French budget support is expected to resume—in accordance with the policy of Prime Minister Balladur's government—if Niger concludes a new agreement with the IMF. France's project aid in 1994 amounts to about \$50 million in the following sectors: budget aid (\$16m); education and health (\$19m); research (\$5m); institutional development (plan, administration, justice: \$3m); infrastructure (\$6m). The French do not presently have a long-term future plan, but reportedly expect to continue with roughly the same levels and distribution in the future.

USAID is Niger's leading donor in stimulating the informal private sector, reforming the approach to natural resources management, slowing population growth, health sector reform, disaster response and non-francophone training. To become effective and economically efficient, the GON needs dedicated staff in each domain who understand the country's real problems, work hard to solve them, get paid their salaries and have some operating funds to carry out their duties. A GON that actually functions at headquarters and out in the field is important, therefore, to Niger's ability to realize the program objectives USAID and the GON have set forth. Hence, efforts by major financial donors like the World Bank, the IMF and France to help the GON put its fiscal house in order directly complement USAID's sector work and vice-versa. For instance, USAID's health sector reform can have little effect if health workers are on strike because they

haven't been paid. Conversely, health workers doing business as usual in an unreformed sector are probably ineffective at best—as Niger's dismal health statistics strongly suggest.

#### **E. Relevance of Other Donor Activities to the Achievement of the Strategic Objectives**

A number of like-minded donors work in Niger in ways that support and extend the effect of each of USAID's strategic objective results. There's plenty for everyone to do. The Mission tracks other donors' programs, and maintains complementary collaboration.

In health and population, UNICEF and the World Bank play key child survival roles in the Expanded Program of Immunization, with USAID support. The UNFPA and the Bank fund population programs, while France and the European Union's Fund for Development (FED, in french) are financing important health facilities. A group of donors including USAID supports the national campaign against AIDS. The USAID Mission is engaged every day with these other important actors on the health and population scene in Niger.

In economic reform and microenterprise stimulation, it is mainly the World Bank, the IMF and France that have provided national budget financing to leverage Niger's macroeconomic policy reform. This support is vital to keeping overall reform moving. Other than USAID, the UNDP, Germany, France, Canada, the European Union's FED and IFAD all offer financial services to microenterprise, although those donors deal more in resource transfers than building sustainable financial systems. They are actively interested in USAID's institutional approach. These donors participate in a Swiss-led informal network on decentralized financial services. Many also serve in a focus group USAID/Niger uses to refine its approach to this strategic objective.

In natural resources management (NRM), the World Bank and IFAD are major contributors. The Bank is moving into a community-based NRM program in five districts, even as its second energy project helps communities organize firewood sales and manage their natural forests. IFAD's second phase Special Program for Niger will promote community-based NRM among other activities; earlier USAID counterpart funds provided parallel financing for IFAD's phase one. These efforts complement and reinforce USAID/Niger's policy and field work in NRM.

#### **F. The Results of Relevant Lessons Learned from Prior Experience in Attempting to Achieve Similar Results in a Similar Context**

The context similar to Niger's is the least developed world in general and the rest of West Africa's inland Sahel in particular. USAID/Niger constantly mines that context for ideas and examples, while its own program serves as a resource for others.

Health and population results across the least-developed countries are directly relevant to USAID/Niger's work. Our 1992 Demographic and Health Survey gives the GON and all donors a better picture of Niger's true status than anyone has had before. This is thanks

to years of experience elsewhere at using and refining the DHS. Not only Nigerien reactions but also experiences in other parts of Africa persuade us that preventive health care, child survival, maternal health and family planning must be implemented together as a package if any part of it is to succeed.

Part of the inspiration behind USAID/Niger-funded microenterprise development projects came from the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, a very different but also strikingly poor, least developed Muslim country. Although broadly influenced by modern worldwide private enterprise thinking, our agro-pastoral export promotion work is basically home grown in the Mission.

Natural resources management's rise as a major sector follows years of Agency-led proselytizing across the Sahel, often under CILSS's aegis. Networks today are so dense and active that it might be hard to trace where an innovation started. The point is that donors and host countries are advancing together in our ability to perform well in this most difficult of development undertakings—whose vital role for Niger's future cannot be disputed.

#### **G. The Potential (or Lack Thereof) for Accountability by USAID and Its Partners**

Like any Mission in a least developed country, USAID/Niger has gained hard-edged experience as it battled to maintain financial and program accountability for its portfolio. People living in the extremely impoverished environment where our every move takes place often interpret our apparently lavish supply of technology, commodities and money as an open invitation to help themselves.

The compelling logic for partnerships in development is that accountability is among the most powerful of tools for development. Accountability is especially effective when allied with democratic values, market-friendly economies and human rights. USAID/Niger's and the GON's dedication to development will require an agenda which stresses purposeful actions, accountability and the means to carry them out.

The chameleon-like characteristic of domestic and international organizations to change form or status to adapt to a new context makes oversight difficult. True partnership must be forged. Partnerships need clear expectations. Each party must have something to gain, and each must have an understanding of its responsibility, with accountability for progress toward results. There must be careful attention to details, the creation and mobilization of good experience and expertise from both sides of the partnership, and steady sound management to resolve the inevitable conflicts and face up to failures and lessons learned revealed by constructive evaluations.

USAID/Niger expects ambitious results from the resources requested under its strategic objectives. At the same time, these results are tempered by our long experience of the powerful factors that bear on this Sahelian setting. The insights of partners, stakeholders and customers alike have enriched the Mission's thinking. We believe we are prepared for most eventualities during the strategic objective period, including natural disasters.

In the past, USAID has made a difference in Niger. This time we expect to do even better if promised Washington slashes in procurement delays, micromanagement and reporting are delivered. We welcome the parallel delegation of much greater authority and much greater responsibility to a field Mission.

As we prepared this Strategy Plan, the ambition to achieve great results and the light of hard reality each played on our judgment. The product strikes a judicious balance. We stand by it.

#### **H. A Brief Description of How Customer Needs Were Established and the Expected Sustainability Associated with Achieving the Selected Strategic Objectives**

**1. Health and Population.** The Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) was a massive 1992 consultation with rural customers that fed directly into this Strategic Objective. Customers' needs were further plumbed in 1993-1994 as USAID went through design of its new health and population sector program. Group and individual consensus-building in the departments of Hausa-speaking Dosso and Tahoua, and Djerma-speaking Tillabery preceded the collaborative Nigerien-American design, after which the draft project paper went through more discussion—with customer focus groups, among others. To bolster sustainability, the program will be implemented only where continuous consultation with affected individuals and communities can be assured. Coming before the BAA report, these consultations did not follow an exact re-engineering format, but USAID is confident that they represent the participatory spirit of the times.

**2. Economic growth and microenterprise development.** The primary customers, again, are rural Nigeriens whom USAID/Niger has engaged in discussion and consultation through innumerable field visits and studies over many years. The Mission's FSN staff—its memory and conscience—is indispensable to our understanding of customer needs. Re-engineering insights have helped us all delve deeper and learn more, using focus groups, strategic objective team meetings, workshops and field trips. Customers along with partners and stakeholders have shared in determining what we are about and accepting accountability for results. That means sustainable results are more likely today than before.

**3. Natural resources management.** Dialogue and consensus building (especially among partners and stakeholders) have long been a basis for the agreed natural resources management policy approach in the Sahel. Re-engineering has helped highlight the customers' role. In our consultations, rural community members now often present Mission visitors with their own action plan to develop their territory sustainably—an encouraging sign of rising self confidence. Famine mitigation is the product of intense give and take between customers and the Mission. Pilot mitigation projects serve as a ready consultation laboratory. USAID's approach testifies to its commitment to redefine government's role and push national policy away from rhetoric out to sustainable community management in the field.

## **I. Agency Goals in the Niger Context, a Sustainable Development Vision**

The foregoing analyses of country conditions, wide consultation with Nigeriens, study of Government of Niger plans and other donor activities led to a Mission statement of vision for more sustainable development in Niger: "*A healthier population growing at a slower rate, with greater rural production, including of food, and better conservation of the environment.*" This vision accords well with Agency goals.<sup>4</sup>

The foremost principle guiding development of this statement is that the fate of Niger should and will be determined by its own people. USAID is working to bring about an empowering environment that helps Nigeriens to realize their potential. Niger is transiting a period of profound political and economic restructuring while forming modern structures of civil society. The popular participation now emerging can better integrate all segments of society in political, economic and social processes that foster enduring development. Success will depend on synergies working across several sectors. The Strategic Plan described in Part II places special emphasis on the Agency's directive:<sup>5</sup> "...we must take an integrated approach to development. Isolated interventions, which do not take into account the complex but important synergies of different sectors and development efforts, are unlikely to yield lasting or significant results...We look to (missions)...to exploit wherever possible the complementarities and synergies between health and population, the environment, democracy, economic growth and humanitarian assistance."

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<sup>4</sup> USAID, *Strategies for Sustainable Development*, March 1994.

<sup>5</sup> STATE 205076, 1 August 94, Administrator to Mission Directors.

## **PART II: OBJECTIVES AND RESULTS**

### **I. Strategic Objective 1 (SO1):**

#### **A. Statement of Strategic Objective: Increase use of family planning and maternal/child health (FP/MCH) services and improve child nutrition for lower fertility and infant/child mortality rates.**

**SO1 addresses the health needs of the Nigerien family, specifically the family planning and maternal and child health (FP/MCH) needs of women and children. SO1 will be realized by 2002 and its results will contribute to Niger having a healthier population and, eventually, a economically sustainable rate of population growth. This strategy will be implemented in four specific sectors:**

- **within the public health sector at the district, departmental and national health levels**
- **in the private sector—private practitioners, NGOs and social marketing providers**
- **health policy and financial support sector; and**
- **the national food security sector.**

**The ultimate customers of SO1 will be children under 15 years of age and women of reproductive age. This group represents approximately 75% of Niger's population, providing the potential for reaching roughly 6.75 million people. USAID/Niger's program targets about 20% of this population in its SO1 public sector FP/MCH program, but its policy activities and vertical, private sector program will be national in scope. Intermediate customers include the district and departmental health care systems, the three national hospitals, private health sector services providers, and national policymakers and opinion leaders.**

**Based on thorough analyses the Mission has determined that with the human and financial resources expected during the five-to-eight year time period the SO1 activities will best fulfill the need for increased use of family planning and maternal/child health (FP/MCH) services. The following results, performance measures and targets are expected from the achievement of SO1. Performance measures and targets at the strategic objective level are as follows:**

#### ***Performance Measures:***

- **Prevalence of use of modern methods of contraception (CPR).**
- **Knowledge of modern methods of contraception.**
- **Knowledge of a source for modern methods of contraception.**
- **Desired family size.**
- **Measles immunization coverage in selected districts.**
- **Child malnutrition rates (children more than two standard deviations below WHO standard weight for height) in selected districts.**

**Targets:**

- CPR rises from 2.3 in 1992 to 9.3 in 1999.
- Percent of couples in target areas with knowledge of modern methods of contraception increases from 58% in 1992 to 75% by 1998.
- Knowledge of a source of modern methods of contraception increases from 38% to 50% by 1998.
- Desired family size drops to 7.0 from 8.2 for women and to 10.0 from 12.6 for men by 1998.
- Measles immunization (national) coverage rises from 19% in 1992 to 55% by 1999.
- Rates of child malnutrition decreases.

**B. Key Assumptions**

1. That providing decentralized services at the district level is a more appropriate method for addressing the demand for FP/MCH services. The Mission has supported the central level with few positive results. We assume that this new approach to supporting the district level directly is appropriate. Moreover, we assume that this approach will be more successful in better serving the community by making quality health services more readily available.

2. That an environment supportive of the private sector will result in an increase in the availability of health services and a reduction of the demand placed upon the public sector. We believe that the private sector can become a viable partner of the GON health sector. Services and goods provided by this untapped resource will complement and augment the services being provided by the GON. A supportive regulatory environment will encourage this relationship.

3. That customers will be willing and able to contribute toward the cost of FP/MCH services if these services are accessible, available and appropriate. A preliminary assessment of cost recovery activities conducted under NHSS suggests that this tool can be a substantial source of revenue for both public and private sector services provided that quality services are available.

4. That implementing health care outreach activities beyond a five kilometer radius of rural dispensaries is an appropriate and efficient strategy which will enable greater coverage of health services. It is assumed that opportunities can be created by extending health services to a broader geographical area.

5. That the GON, supported by the donor community, will not decrease current funding level of health care services, and will continue reforms of pharmaceutical procurement.

6. That the GON, with donor assistance, will be able to mitigate the effects of natural disasters.

**7. That there will be no policy changes that will undermine the implementation of SO1.** NHSS has achieved major policy accomplishments, particularly in the areas of health care financing and autonomy of the three national hospitals. Other donors have effectively reformed the pharmaceutical sector. These policies must remain in effect; the decentralization policy must be fully implemented; and, groups opposed to family planning must not be allowed to sway policy dialogue if SO1 is to succeed.

### **C. Problem Analysis and Results/Causality Framework**

Evidence abounds concerning the deplorable health conditions of most Nigeriens. Sources include the 1988 Census, the 1992 Demographic and Health Survey and voluminous studies on the causes of fertility, morbidity and mortality. Niger usually tops the scale on most negative health indices like population growth, maternal mortality and the mortality of children under the age of five years. Conversely, Niger ranks in the lower percentile of positive health indices like the rate of childhood immunization, vaccination against such illnesses like meningitis and maternal tetanus, and contraceptive prevalence.

These situations are seriously compounded by an ever-increasing population demanding more and better quality health care services. Niger's current delivery system is primarily restricted to the urban areas due to a lack of financial and human resource capacity which could be otherwise deployed to the rural areas. A broad range of comprehensive FP/MCH services is needed throughout this geographically vast country. Without question the GON cannot correct these health problems alone. Clinical, counseling, and management skills deficit require significant training efforts. The decision to continue USAID assistance to Niger's health sector is driven by a desire and a revised strategy to turn around the prevailing health status of the Nigerien population.

The RESULTS/CAUSALITY FRAMEWORK describes five areas of intervention: (1) health policy and budgetary support reforms; (2) the public sector consisting of national, departmental and district health care systems; (3) the nationwide private sector network of health services providers; (4) the national food security system and (5) an informed citizenry. Based upon experience the Mission believes that these five areas of intervention offer the best possible mix for attaining sustainable health development.

Most of SO1 PERFORMANCE MEASURES and TARGETS are expected to be achieved within five to eight years. The SO1 team will continue to refine the listing of performance measures and targets. Several data sources will be used to verify the achievement of SO1 targets. They include demographic and health surveys, epidemiological, service delivery and health status data collected through Niger's Health Information System (SNIS); national EPI surveys; activity monitoring information and evaluation data collected through a management information system; and, quality assurance surveys to name just a few. Depending on the type of measures, data will be collected quarterly, semi-annually, annually or every five years.

**Result 1.1: Improved FP/MCH services in the public sector (selected districts).** Selected tools and tactics for effecting the delivery of quality services and improving mortality statistics in the target districts are staff training in administration, management, financial and health skills development, leadership and governance, transparency, law and regulations and other democratic principles; community organization development, logistics, and information, education and communication (IEC).

***Performance Measures:***

- Health professionals trained.
- Provision of three long-term family planning methods: IUDs, Norplant and surgical contraception at referral centers.
- Couple Years of Protection in target districts.
- Access to family planning and maternal and child health services.
- Appropriate treatment of children with common illnesses.
- Immunization of pregnant women.

***Targets:***

- Three health care workers will be sent for long-term training each year.
- -TBD: percent of referral centers providing three long-term modern methods of contraception.
- CYP in target districts will triple from the baseline established at the start of activities.
- 50% (1998), up from 32% in 1992, of the women living are living within five kilometers of a fixed or mobile site providing at least three modern family planning methods (selected areas).
- By 1998 80% of children presenting at health facilities with malaria, acute respiratory infections (ARI), malnutrition and diarrheal diseases will be treated according to established national protocols.
- The proportion of pregnant women receiving two doses of tetanus toxoid will increase from 14% to 28% in 1998.

**Result 1.2: An expanded and improved private sector, including NGOs, providing FP and MCH promotion and services.** Public sector services can be extended by collaborating with the private sector. Private practitioners, clinics and pharmacies, social marketing entities, and local and international NGOs can play a vital role in the health sector. Opportunities will need to be further developed. Training in leadership and governance, IEC materials and transparency with regard to management and licensing information, laws and regulations and other democratic principles will equalize the partnership between community organizations, private health entities and NGOs, and the GON. Policies which encourage the participation of these private partners (R1.3), a better managed public sector advocating improved customer services (R1.1) and loans made available under the Mission's SO2 activities will be the catalyst for creating a more diversified health care system.

***Performance Measures:***

- Private sector facilities providing health services, commodities and information.
- CYP (selected areas).
- An active, nationwide social marketing program.

***Targets:***

- TBD: percent increase in number of private health facilities in target areas providing FP and/or MCH services.
- More of the target population live within 5 km of facility offering FP services by adding more private facilities and marketing outlets.
- TBD: The percent of target district residents purchasing private sector health services and products increases.
- TBD: The level of customer satisfaction with private sector health services and products.
- The Couple Years of Protection provided by NGOs and social marketing entities increases from 8,900 in 1994 to 25,000 by 1999.
- Area covered by social marketing program increases.
- Number of products distributed through social marketing increases.
- Number of social marketing campaigns increases.

***Result 1.3: Greater financial and institutional support for health services, including policy reform.*** This result can only be actualized by first achieving several sub-results—completing health policy sector analysis, monitoring current and planned policy reforms and engaging in purposeful policy dialogue which will generate subsequent reforms. The full implementation of appropriate health and fiscal policies will set the stage for the achievement of all other SO1 results.

***Performance Measures:***

- Policy environment with fewer restrictions on access to modern family planning methods.
- The creation of practical health policy and financial reforms supportive of the role of private health service providers.
- A National Health Information System providing decision-makers with relevant data.
- Cost recovery within the target districts and the three national hospitals.

***Targets:***

- The national health information unit will be the reference source for documenting the need for health policy reforms in 1995.
- Cost recovery in non-hospital facilities increases 51 facilities in 1994 to 314 by 1999 (545 facilities total).

A more definitive description of R1.3 targets will be made upon completion of the health policy sector analysis.

**Result 1.4: Improved capacity, through collaboration of the public and private sectors and the donor community, to predict and respond to food security and health-related disasters.** Niger is susceptible to disasters like drought, famine, floods and epidemics. National preparedness for combatting these perils will reduce enormous human suffering and loss. Achieving this result is closely aligned with results 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3.

**Performance Measures:**

- Households in identified vulnerable areas participating in mitigation activities increases.
- Distribution of food commodities by NGOs when needed to vulnerable areas within target districts.
- SAP/Emergency Fund will serve as a conduit for other donor contributions.
- Malnutrition rates (weight for height) among children living in target districts during episodes of food security and health-related disasters.

**Targets:**

- TBD: percent of households in vulnerable areas participating in mitigation activities.
- When needed, disaster mitigation NGOs will distribute up to 15,000 metric tons of food commodities to vulnerable areas within the target districts.
- Emergency fund is used by other donors.
- During periods of disaster child malnutrition rates will not increase.

**Result 1.5: A public better informed of key policies and legislation affecting citizens' rights and responsibilities (public health).** Result 1.5 is concerned with ensuring that individuals understand that they have the right to manage their own health care, and that they, as health care consumers, have certain rights and responsibilities. This effort will be directed at ensuring full implementation of Niger's decentralization policy, at dissemination of information about the family code and laws concerning availability of family planning, and in encouraging customers to form NGOs and local associations to provide services and to more fully represent their interests.

**Measures:**

- Awareness of key Family Code and health policy issues.
- Awareness of rights and responsibilities.

**Targets:**

- Percent of heads of households, both women and men, able to identify at least one health policy issues.
- Percent of heads of households, both women and men, able to identify statements of their rights.

#### **D. Relationship of SO1 to Agency Goals and Priorities**

SO1 specifically addresses one of the main elements of USAID's development strategy: stabilizing world population growth and protecting human health. Moreover, this objective is fully consistent with the February 1994 USAID/AFR Child Survival Strategy dated February 1994, which stresses the need for ". . . continual emphasis on successful focused interventions—immunizations, improved child nutrition, control of diarrheal diseases, child spacing, malaria prevention and control, management of ARI and AIDS/HIV prevention. . .", and ". . . strengthening of health systems".

#### **E. Performance Measures and Targets**

A summary of SO1 performance measures and targets appear in Section C, above, and in Annex A: Performance Monitoring Plan.

#### **F. Identified Approaches**

The approaches for implementing SO1 include infrastructural development, institutional strengthening, policy reform, human resource development and behavioral change of service providers, policy makers and customers. Although a more definitive identification of the tactics and tools to be used in implementing this objective will be made during the development of the results packages, we expect to use the tactics of delivering goods and services; donor coordination and mobilization of others' resources; training; food aid and disaster mitigation program; a technical assistance contract through an performance-based, "umbrella" institutional contractor (to be used primarily under Rs. 1.1 and 1.2); and, the tools of contract, OYB transfers (under Rs 1.1 and 1.2, specifically in policy dialogue, training and contraceptive commodities procurement) memoranda of understanding, cash transfers (under R1.4 and other Mission SO activities) and dialogue.

Drawing on lessons learned from the Mission's previous development assistance projects in the health sector, SO1 has been designed as an enhanced, revised approach to collaborating with the GON in the provision of essential health care services. SO1 activities will assist the private sector to expand its capacity to deliver goods, services and information under the social marketing program and other health and family planning activities. The capacity of private practitioners to substantially meet the demand for health care in Niger will also be strengthened by SO1 support. Finally, the national policy sector will be encouraged by SO1 activities to keep in place reforms instituted under former project efforts and to promote the implementation of subsequent health and fiscal reforms.

USAID/Niger knows from experience that local communities are willing collaborators and can be engaged as village-based health care providers. SO1 activities will strengthen this capability by training and monitoring the district health facilities in staff supervision and procurement and distribution of health care commodities. Information-Education-

Communication and outreach activities will complement the strengthening of village health care providers and end users.

We have learned that channeling substantial Mission resources to the central level of government has not always "trickled down" to the ultimate customer. The SO1 approach will reverse this trend by concentrating approximately 80% of its funds to the district level of the GON instead of the central level.

There is evidence that the GON has yet to develop the capacity of being the sole and primary provider of health care services. Moreover, experience from other nations has shown that diversifying the network of health service partners establishes productive relationships for addressing health care demands. SO1 recognizes the viable role that can be played by the private sector in general and indigenous NGOs in particular. The SO1 approach will be to support and encourage the appropriate use of these non-governmental entities as primary health care providers, as medical supplies distributors, and as developers of IEC campaigns.

SO1 will continue an approach of use of NPA in the reform of health policies. Activities will concentrate on promoting the decentralization of the GON Health Ministry, instituting health cost recovery schemes and reforming the procurement and distribution of medical supplies. Most of its public sector (R1.1) activities within ten districts of two or three departments (there are 42 total). Selection of target districts will be determined based upon the absorptive capacity of the districts suggested by the Government of Niger (GON); the social cohesiveness and development of local areas within the suggested districts; the demand by local inhabitants for FP/MCH services; and the potential for complementing health services provided by other donors as well as additional development activities conducted under USAID/Niger's two other strategic objectives. Approaching the selection of target districts in this way will contribute to the efficient programming of Agency and USAID/Niger resources.

The SO1 approach will also incorporate the complementarity of three cross-cutting themes: food security and disaster mitigation, participatory training and democracy and governance. The Mission recognizes the importance of integrating these themes within all of its strategic objectives. Activities carried out under SO1 will protect food deficit areas, target health training activities and promote democratic principles. SO1 resources will, as much as possible, be mobilized to carry out activities with the purpose of increasing the awareness, knowledge and experience of Nigerien women and men about key processes essential to a democratic society.

Finally, SO1 will attempt to geographically target its activities within the locations of the Mission's other two strategic objectives. Clustering Mission resources in this manner will solidify our influence in the developmental assistance arena and will increase the probability of attaining health development sustainability.

## **G. The Consultative Process**

The development of SO1 passed through several stages of the consultative process. The first stage, a harbinger of the Agency's reengineering plan, was initiated under the former PID/PP process. In February 1993, the Mission convened a health retreat with participants from institutional contractors implementing the Mission health projects and with GON stakeholders. This retreat presented an opportunity to assess lessons learned and to solicit recommendations for the redesign of the Mission's health projects portfolio.

The next stages in this process occurred during the development of the PID and PP. A second series of consensus building workshops was held in spring 1994, attended by sixty participants from the GON central, departmental and district levels, representatives from Niger's private health care sector, donor representatives, NGOs and other stakeholders. The consensus drawn from this process was that project assistance (PA) and non-project assistance (NPA) can be effective tools in implementing decentralized FP/MCH services provided by rural and urban districts; in subsidizing the contributions of the private sector particularly urban outlets, private clinics and NGOs, in developing and providing FP/MCH services; and in the case of NPA, in leveraging the public sector to implement policies which will decentralized the national health system, institute cost recovery schemes and reform the pharmaceutical supply system.

Subsequently, several studies were conducted which further elaborated on the findings from the consensus building workshops. These studies assessed the determinants of fertility and mortality, and the socio-cultural parameters which affect utilization of modern health services. Substantial input concerning the health needs of communities and the various community organizations that can implement health and family planning activities was obtained by surveying potential customers residing in Tillabéry (Djerma ethnic group) and Tahoua (Hausa ethnic group) departments. Additionally, the Mission carried out a series of analyses to determine the technical, institutional, administrative, economic, financial, political, social and gender feasibilities of conducting SO1 activities.

In August 1994, a Project Design committee consisting among its members several Nigerien health experts was tasked with the redesign of the Mission's health and population projects portfolio. Their draft plan was vetted with representatives from the GON, donors, the private sector, and numerous potential consumer groups.

SO1 activities have been designed to institute an ongoing consultative process drawing on the insights from our partners, the ultimate customer and stakeholders. The strategic objective team and results package teams will include representatives from the GON, other donors, and the private sector. Additionally, the results package teams will engage ultimate customers residing in target districts as team collaborators and will, along with other team members, be held responsible for achieving SO1 results.

**H. Other USAID/Niger Health Projects and Activities**

Below is a list of all projects and activities within USAID/Niger's Health and Population portfolio. A more detailed description of each activity is given in Annex F.

**Projects and activities addressing health issues:**

Niger Health Sector Support Project/PA	(683-0254)
Niger Health Sector Support Project/NPA	(683-0276)
Niger Family Health and Demography Project 0258)	( 6 8 3 -
Africare/Diffa Child Survival	(683-0264)
Helen Keller International Vitamin A Project	(936-5116)
CARE, International Integrated Health Project	(683-0258/0272)
Technical Advisors in AIDS & Child Survival (TAACS)	(936-5970)
Health Care Financing and Sustainability	(936-5974)
Quality Assurance	(936-5992)
Johns Hopkins Child Survival Fellows	(936-6004)
Basic Support for Institutionalizing Child Survival (BASICS)	(936-6006)
AIDSCAP	(936-5972.31)
Combatting Childhood Communicable Diseases	(698-0421.83)
Onchocerciasis	(683-0277)

**Projects and activities addressing population issues:**

OPTIONS II	(936-3035)
Family Planning Logistics Management	(936-3038)
Social Marketing of Contraceptives (SOMARC)	(936-3051)
Family Health Initiatives	(698-0462.83)
John Hopkins Program for International Education in Reproductive Health (JHPIEGO)	(936-3045)
Central Contraceptive Procurement	(936-3057)

## II. Strategic Objective 2 (SO2):

### A. Statement of Strategic Objective: Improve access to markets especially through use of improved, decentralized financial services

This SO aims to help rural Nigeriens benefit more from the commercial marketplace by having access to savings and credit services geared to their needs. The informal economic sector is flourishing and savings exist. But ordinary producers cannot readily get credit or invest their savings to earn a cash return. A bank will not do business with them. What financial services they can find are usually informal, inefficient and scarce.

People will earn more if they can draw on an effective network of local credit unions, grassroots cooperatives and lending agencies. Three microenterprise programs have proved the worth of these endeavors. Under SO2, USAID will make them larger and more efficient and sustainable. Improving the formal economic environment—also an aim—may eventually encourage informal or semi-formal financial intermediaries to become formal. SO2's customer is mainly, the rural producer, be he or she farmer, herder, artisan, trader, microentrepreneur or any combination. Our attention is especially directed to women.

The feedback of microentrepreneurs is the basis for this Strategic Objective; their participation in customer surveys helped to shape SO2 Results. Those customers from on-going programs took pride in their independence and empowerment and agreed that more of the same services was needed. These were people using decentralized financial services (DFS) as well as producers and transporters of agricultural exports who have benefited from policy reform.

#### *Performance Measures:*

- Number of savings and credit agencies; number of independent agencies.
- Export of agro-pastoral products.
- Household expenditures for production.
- Customer satisfaction with GON and donor efforts.

#### *Targets:*

- To raise from 181 in 1995 to 1000 in 2002 the number, including branches, of savings and credit institutions (cooperatives, credit associations, credit unions, and semi-formal money savers or lenders).
- At least 125 institutions will have become independent of outside resources by 1999.
- From a 1996 baseline TBD, agricultural exports to increase an average of 10 percent per year. Total increase by 2002: 175%.
- TBD: Household expenditures for production.
- Each year at least 50% of SO2 customers to express increased satisfaction with GON and donor efforts.

**B. Key Assumptions**

**1. Despite continued difficulty in agreeing on structural adjustment, Niger's informal and agricultural sector will lead the economy's growth if minimal resources and technologies are available at a reasonable price and key sector policy reforms are achieved. The framework results below will be sufficient to turn this assumption into fact.**

**2. A stable government trying to promote sustained economic growth will be in place for the foreseeable future. This assumption is less than certain. For it to hold would strengthen prospects of meeting the SO. If not, we believe SO2 can still be attained. Because we are dealing mainly with the private sector and non-government organizations, only total renunciation of market principles would ruin our chances.**

**3. GON will issue and enforce regulations to protect the common interest, allowing voluntary associations to form credit unions, local cooperatives and other financial service organizations while still protecting funds. It will also implement the Rural Code land reforms (see SO3 below). Movement forward on these issues will certainly improve the financial services environment. But again, it is mainly a retreat from market policy that would endanger success. With the GON and other donors, we will push policy reform forward to the limit.**

**4. No further degradation of the formal banking sector will occur. The failure over recent years of state banks imposed high costs on modern financial services, and we are still feeling the effects. We will consult and encourage the formal banking system to become more active in rural finance. However, SO2 probably can still be attained without breakthroughs in the formal banking sector favoring DFS.**

**5. Decentralization will continue. Communities will be allowed to manage their resources with little central government interference. We do not absolutely need local self-rule to make a sound financial system work. But it will greatly improve the private sector environment, especially for microenterprise, if the government practices what it preaches.**

**6. Mitigation will keep Niger from complete devastation by disasters such as severe drought that are sure to occur sooner or later. Another 1973-1974 or 1984-1985 style disaster would destroy agricultural production and the microenterprises managed by our main customers. Village food banks and other mitigating efforts under this SO would, we believe, reduce the devastation enough so our objectives could still be achieved. The planned financial services mitigate a disaster's effects by providing an alternate form of savings to the livestock lost during a drought. They also increase diversity and reduce risk by encouraging income sources different from traditional agriculture. They can provide an additional nest egg on which members can draw.**

### **C. Problem Analysis and Results/Causality Framework**

There are two fundamental facts behind this SO: Niger has a vibrant informal economy but a bad business environment.

Despite many handicaps, the decentralized informal sector provides a living for the majority of Nigeriens. Most of the population's considerable savings are put to use one way or another. People work and produce. But they are not getting as much as they should from their efforts. Niger's most impressive sector has the potential, with the right help, to create much more wealth—decentralized wealth—than it is now producing.

The national environment does not promote business. Banking, tax, labor and business laws hobble commerce rather than encouraging it. Officials' attitudes and behavior, though evolving, still leave a lot to be desired. People are often in the dark on important information: producers do not get market news, transporters are ignorant of their rights, women are rarely literate and suffer economic restrictions unknown to men. Banks refuse to deal with ordinary producers. Most informal credit sources are limited or inefficient.

A flexible new banking law, for instance, would help semi-formal or informal services become more available and allow them to grow. USAID believes this would encourage transparency, leading to more services that are less expensive and more legitimate. More broadly, we are confident that a major training effort, to provide better information, basic literacy and numeracy, and communication skills, will bring about increased production.

Under SO2, USAID/Niger will assist informal sector producers (especially women) through decentralized financial services and press for policies that improve the national business environment. These outcomes are spelled out in the results packages below.

**Result 2.1: More decentralized, viable and transparent financial services.** To offer maximum benefit, this result also needs a better policy environment (R2.2), formal financial sector support (R2.3) and more women's participation (R2.4). Linkages also exist with cross cutting issues such as democratic governance and training and with SOs R2.1 and R2.3. Spreading these decentralized financial institutions is one way to develop civil society (decentralized institutions) and local governance. Through a sub-result, we link this result to specific democratic governance activities. Another sub-result is that every credit site will have the opportunity to create a food bank. A third is that health associations and social marketing subsidiaries can use the decentralized financial services. The fourth sub-result will be a two-way street: NRM training for qualified financial groups and financial services for NRM associations. Result 1 and every SO2 result will also have a training sub-result ranging from academic programs to national language courses. The Mission training plan will set targets for this sub-result.

#### ***Performance Measures:***

- Number of customers/members of decentralized financial institutions by gender.
- Volume of loans/savings accounts by gender.

- Loan repayment rate.
- Poverty lending (loans of less than \$300).
- Linkage between SO2 activities and cross-cutting and other SO activities (See Performance Monitoring Plan, Annex A, and last three targets below).

**Targets:**

- From 30,250 in 1994, the number of customers increases to 52,000 in 1997 and 73,000 by 1999.
- From F CFA 1.02 billion (\$88.4 million) in 1994, loans/savings accounts increase to F CFA 1.4 billion (\$140 million) in 1997 and F CFA 1.8 billion (\$180 million) in 1999.
- From none in 1995, the proportion of USAID-assisted decentralized financial institutions (DFIs) receiving democracy/governance training will be 40% in 1997 and 70% in 1999.
- The loan repayment rate will increase to 95% by 1999.
- TBD: poverty lending.
- From none in 1995, the proportion of drought vulnerable zones where there are USAID-assisted DFIs developing their own food banks and other drought mitigating measures will reach 20% in 1997 and 50% in 1999.
- From none in 1995, the proportion of USAID-assisted DFIs linked to or near health associations or social marketing initiatives will be 15% in 1997 and 30% in 1999.
- From none in 1995, the proportion of zones where USAID-assisted DFIs have or are near NRM programs will rise to 20% in 1997 and 35% in 1999.

**Result 2.2: Improved environment for microenterprises: Better policies, better laws, better information.** This result is important to attaining Result 1. Result 2 sub-results call for reduced illegal payments by transporters, greater popular knowledge of anti-corruption law, improved producers' market information, and boosted national capacity in economic analysis. (Other sub-results will come out of the sector assessment planned this fiscal year. That analysis will allow complete results packages to be developed.) Teaching people about the law that can affect them every day is democratic governance in action. And, as elsewhere, formally trained Nigeriens must be a cross-cutting sub-result.

**Performance Measures:**

- Amount of illicit payments made.
- Number of transporters trained in export and transport regulations.
- Marketing information system (MIS) expanded or additional systems operating.
- Customers find MIS helpful.
- Number of Ph.D. candidates in economics selected.
- Policy reform conditions.

**Targets:**

- From F CFA 54 per kilometer (1992), illicit payments will drop to F CFA 20 in 1997 and F CFA 10 in 1999.
- From none in 1995, the proportion of customers (transporters) who must cope with illicit payments and have received export and transport regulations training will be 20% in 1997 and 50% in 1999.
- Marketing Information Service expanded to include customer needs or second MIS in place by 1997.
- From none in 1997, the proportion of customers that want market information who have listened to expanded or new MIS and find it helpful will reach 25% in 1999.
- From none in 1995, the cumulative number of USAID-sponsored candidates for the Ph.D. in economics will increase to 2 in 1996 and 5 in 1997.
- Policy reforms in credit, cooperatives, rural banking, and information lending will be in place within specified period.

**Result 2.3: Bankers work more with microenterprises and informal sector.** Result 2.3 is clearly linked to R2.1 and R2.2. Under the first, more intermediaries will emerge for bankers to do business with. The second will improve the environment for both groups. A more flexible banking law will offer banks a carrot (making it easier) and provide a stick (competition) for seeking rural business. USAID is considering whether customer financial services are better offered through permanent intermediaries, as in our current projects, or top-down from outreach divisions in banks. Both may be possible, even desirable. One important sub-result here will test a top-down approach with one or more banks. Another will encourage bank staff to become more literate in local languages. To work effectively with empowered producers, bankers will need to use marketing and implementation tools (posters, application forms) written in their customers' own languages.

**Performance Measures:**

- Number of banks with decentralized financial services.
- Guarantee rates or leveraging ratios.
- Number of bank staff literate in local languages.

**Targets:**

- From baseline of one in 1995, the number of banks involved will rise to two by 1997 and three by 1999. (Note: there are at present only three banks USAID could work with in Niger).
- From a 90% guarantee in 1995, average guarantee or leveraging ratios will evolve to 80% or 1.5 times guarantee in 1997 and 60% or 2.0 times guarantee by 1999.
- From none in 1995, the number of bank staff literate in local languages will be two in 1997 and ten in 1999.

**Result 2.4: Increased number and size of women's enterprises.** Maximum success under Results 2.1 and 2.2 will not happen without much greater women's participation. That, in turn, will not come about unless women get massive amounts of basic training. Result 4 depends heavily on making many of the women and girls in our target zones literate and numerate. Beyond that, we intend under democratic governance to train these women in economic rights and democratic organization so they can move quickly into one of our financial programs when the opportunity presents itself. Another sub-result will be men sensitized to the importance of women's economic activities. A related sub-result will have women receiving loans in continually increasing numbers. Not less than half the public information messages will be addressed to women. In related results packages for other SOs, women should be as involved in health, social marketing and NRM training as men are.

**Performance Measures:**

- Of all loans given, percent given to women.
- Number of women and girls trained in skills for participation (literacy, numeracy, economic/civic rights and democracy).
- Number of men sensitized to women's important economic role.
- Percent of IEC trainees who are women and IEC messages addressed to women.

**Targets:**

- From 34% in 1994, the proportion of loans to women will increase to 40% in 1997 and 45% in 1999.
- Baselines and targets for the number of women completing literacy and numeracy courses will be determined.
- TBD: the number of women completing economic/civic rights courses.
- TBD: the number of men sensitized to women's important economic role.
- From TBD in 1997, the proportion of women IEC trainees rises 50% by 2002.

**RESULT 2.5: A public better informed of key policies and legislation affecting citizens' rights and responsibilities (financial services).** Result 2.5 is particularly concerned with getting across information that helps people function better in the marketplace. And teaching people about the law that can affect them every day is democratic governance in action. For example, transporters of agro-pastoral products who know of anti-corruption laws may be able to cope better with demands for illegal bribes along the road; there is already evidence of this. Producers who have access to current market information may be able to improve their profits. Women made more aware of their civic and economic rights are more likely to be able to move quickly into one of our financial programs when the opportunity presents itself and start their own microenterprises. Various kinds of training courses and publicity campaigns by radio are the most effective means of reaching large numbers of people in Niger with this kind of information.

**Measures:**

- Number of customers (transporters) trained in export and transportation regulations.
- Marketing information system (MIS) expanded or additional systems operating.
- Number of men sensitized to women's important economic role.

**Targets:**

- From none in 1995, the proportion of customers who must cope with illicit payments and have received democratic governance training is 20% by 1997, 50% by 1999, and 80% by 2002.
- MIS expanded to include customer needs or second MIS in place by 1997.
- From none in 1997, the proportion of customers that want market information who have listened to expanded or new MIS and find it helpful reaches 25% by 1999 and 50% by 2002.
- TBD: number of men sensitized to women's important economic role.

**D. Relationship of SO2 to Agency Goals and Priorities**

USAID/Niger's Strategic Objective Two specifically parallels the Agency's priority of encouraging broad-based economic growth that emphasizes strengthening markets and expanding access to them and the promotion of microenterprise, especially poverty lending. But our program could serve as a model for the Agency's efforts to integrate the entire portfolio. This SO's work on decentralized financial services and economic reform contributes indirectly to all other Agency priorities—environment, population and health, democratic governance. In this country, all priorities depend on and contribute to Nigeriens' ability to increase production. SO2 directly supports customer production and can act as a catalyst to achieve the other objectives. It is key to USAID's integrated approach toward Niger's most pressing problems.

**E. Performance Measures and Targets**

Under SO2 together with SO3, the Mission will launch regular national and area probability household sample surveys, comparable to the well-known Demographic & Health Survey. These surveys will be undertaken about four years apart. They will constitute a way to consult with the customer as reengineering encourages. In addition, SO2 activities will be thoroughly assessed from March-August 1995. We will further refine performance measures for savings, credit and market access, setting performance targets for 1996 to 1999 and improving collection, archiving, analysis and use of data for decision making. We have begun to measure our customers' program satisfaction and plan new measures such as percent who feel their quality of life is improving, percent who are aware of and benefit from our programs and percent of these who are satisfied.

Other SO2 performance measures and targets are summarized in Section C, above. Details are provided in Annex A: Performance Monitoring Plan.

## **F. Identified Approaches**

USAID/Niger has selected two closely related approaches to achieve the planned results and hence this Strategic Objective. The choice is based on lessons learned from our successes and difficulties. One approach is to pursue the sector policy reform and improved communication necessary to improving the environment for microentrepreneurs. The other is to keep building decentralized financial services (DFS).

### ***Tactics:***

Technical assistance (TA) is at the heart of assisting public and private sectors to choose effective policies that also help to develop local capacity. The TA will reinforce USAID's policy dialogue and the carefully planned conditions precedent that promote the environment we are seeking. Commodities and operating expenses for the institutions being strengthened, plus training funds, will amplify the TA's impact. We shall deploy many of the same tactics to attain Result 2.1 as well as Results 2.3 and 2.4 that bring formal bankers and women on board. But this will be done largely by financing sound DFS programs operated by IJSPVOs who also work to build the capacity of local NGOs, associations and the private sector in this field.

### ***Tools:***

An institutional contract will provide economic and financial expertise and some training. Several personal services contracts with Nigerians and Americans will assemble a USAID program support staff. USAID will procure vehicles, computers and other major commodities. Grants will be made to qualified applicants, mainly USPVOs that can contribute to attaining one or more results. GON entities will be assisted to help attain our objectives. We look chiefly to the HRDA and ATLAS projects for training. Budget support can be used to leverage sector policy reform. Even more important will be alliances with other donor programs. Our consultations have started with the World Bank on their planned microenterprise project. USAID collaboration with the Bank will make their work much better and offer us the possibility of major policy leverage to achieve some difficult reforms.

While technical assistance works to get the environment right, the programs we fund will be fine tuned and expanded, especially where we find a supporting government and civic environment. We will also promote food security, democratic governance, natural resource management, health and population, and training in parallel with the development of community-based financial service groups. Grain banks, paralegal services, natural resource management training for agricultural loan recipients, linkages to social marketing, and village learning centers are but a few of the activities that can be promoted, subject to full community co-sponsorship. Additional ones are possible through co-financed block grants to PVOs that propose long-term commitments and local NGO partnerships.

### G. The Consultative Process

Strategic Objective 2 emerged from USAID's thorough consultations with its customers on what was most needed to achieve economic growth in Niger. Our existing economic policy reform uses surveys of beneficiaries (customers) as the critical measure of success. In one survey, agricultural export transporters reported paying 52% less in bribes to government officials since they learned of anti-corruption laws. Our Policy Analysis and Monitoring project used grassroots surveys to make more realistic economic estimates than found in official statistics. The feedback from such processes went into the deliberations behind this Strategic Objective. Reengineering helped improve our consultations, especially those made directly by USAID staff. Customer survey type questions are now used routinely in field trips.

Very different focus group members reached consensus: for instance, answering "what new things should USAID produce to achieve SO2?", the Ministry of Plan's Economic Analysis Director suggested a timely, regular foreign market price report for Nigerien commodities. A woman credit association member in Zinder, answering the same question, said she needed to be able to estimate the future price for her peanut oil in Nigeria. (Our PAM project is acting on this answer). If reengineering actually cuts USAID/Niger's bureaucratic workload, such direct staff consultation can expand considerably.

The Mission maintains close dialogue with GON counterparts on economic issues and country needs and works with other donors, certain village organizations, NGOs and PVOs. The French, the World Bank and the IMF are leading macroeconomic reform donors, aiming mainly at increased GON revenues and reduced expenses. But they too want to improve the private sector environment. The French and Germans, becoming more involved in microenterprise and financial services, now work with U.S. credit intermediaries. Canada is planning additional projects, IFAD has a credit program it wishes to link to one of ours, and the European Union is working with ILO to promote credit to artisans. All perceive the potential sustainability of USAID's projects; several hope to link up with one of our success stories.

### H. Other USAID/Niger Microenterprise Activities

A brief description of these projects is found in Annex F:

Niger Economic Policy Reform Program/PA (NEPRP)	(683-0259)
Niger Economic Policy Reform Program/NPA (NEPRP)	(683-0263)
Policy Analysis and Monitoring (PAM)	(683-0266)
Rural Organizations Development (ROD)	(683-0260)
Niger Credit Union Development II	(683-0269)
Maradi Microenterprise Development	(683-0272)
Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation/PA (DPM)	(683-0271)
Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation/NPA (DPM)	(683-0279)
Niger Applied Agriculture Research (NAAR)	(683-0256)

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<b>Financial Sector Development Project (FSPD)</b>	<b>(940-0025)</b>
<b>Consulting Assistance for Economic Reform (CAER)</b>	<b>(940-0405)</b>
<b>Growth and Equity Through Microenterprise Investments and Institutions (GEMINI)</b>	<b>(936-5448)</b>
<b>Microenterprise Innovation Project</b>	<b>(940-0406)</b>
<b>Sahel Water Data Management III</b>	<b>(625-0973.83)</b>
<b>Famine Early Warning System (FEWS)</b>	<b>(698-0466.83)</b>
<b>Africa Emergency Locust and Grasshopper Assistance (AELGA)</b>	<b>(698-0517.83)</b>
<b>African Training for Leadership Skills (ATLAS)</b>	<b>(698-0475.83)</b>
<b>Human Resources Development Assistance (HRDA)</b>	<b>(698-0263.83)</b>
<b>Democracy and Human Rights Fund</b>	<b>(698-0541.83)</b>

### III. Strategic Objective No. 3 (SO3):

#### A. Statement of Strategic Objective: Sustained widespread adoption of management practices improving the conservation and productive use of Niger's forests, fields, waters and pastures

Niger's serious environmental deterioration and lagging rural productivity mean rural men and women need to take up practices that will produce more while using fewer natural resources. Their production methods must conserve and improve the fields, pastures and forests they live off and use to create products for sale. Under this SO, thousands of additional people in specific districts will be helped to use and sustain these practices. SO3 will also promote national use of improved practices by easing policy constraints that inhibit Niger's rural producers from adopting them. By 2000, 20 percent more families will adopt certain key practices, working in a decentralized, participatory context with GON officials and USAID partners.

The Mission will also help sustain the use of appropriate practices by reducing the impact of disasters that can force producers to abandon those practices. We continually monitor the vulnerability of Niger's communities, planning ways to contain drought, epidemics or insect infestation. Under SO3, USAID and its partners will annually assist 250,000 to 500,000 people facing disaster.

#### *Causal Assumptions:*

- The practices developed and adopted by rural producers with donor, NGO and GON support will increase productivity and decrease resource degradation.
- Long-term increases in NRM practices depend on reducing disruption in production systems from recurrent drought and insect infestation.

#### *Performance Measure:*

- Percent of heads of households, both women and men, that adopt selected individual or community forest, farm and pastoral practices. Specific practices will be chosen from an inventory of current NRM practices. Household surveys will determine rates of diffusion and adoption. Independent studies will monitor gender issues.

#### *Target:*

- 20 percent increase in use of new NRM technologies between 1996 and 2000, in those areas of Niger where NRM programs are active.

#### B. Key Assumptions

1. That decentralization will have a field impact during the strategic plan period. The GON plans to grant elected councils some key governing powers, including taxation and control of local resources—potentially a great boost to achieving SO3. But because decentralization might not have much field impact in five to eight years, the Mission will

also target its efforts directly at communities rather than relying exclusively on government reform.

**2. That the GON will continue to work towards SO3 results.** This includes support that empowers communities to manage natural resources and continued progress to implement the Rural Code. We manage risk by engaging in Niger's strategic planning rather than imposing, by coordinating our planning with government policy and other donors' views, programming NPA funds to enable and encourage the GON to achieve SO3 results, and looking to the private sector for results not in the GON's manageable interest. Thanks to these steps, only an unexpected about face on the part of the GON would put the results at major risk.

**3. That policy reform is an effective tool to achieve the objective.** Policy reform, mainly consisting of reduced government authority and activities, has achieved significant results in Niger. Achieving SO3 will require the GON to extend or revise its activity in some cases, notably the Rural Code. The effectiveness of this process remains to be proven, but progress so far leaves little doubt of the GON's commitment.

**4. That effective mechanisms can be developed to change policy.** The Mission currently uses conditions precedent (CP) to achieve legislative and institutional reform. But the lengthy process of CP development, in conjunction with the diffuse nature of GON authority, limits their effectiveness. The current strategy continues to rely on the NPA tool but intends to be more flexible in employing it.

**5. That Niger will suffer from drought and insect infestations during the strategic plan period.** The management of this risk is built into the strategy. Vulnerable communities are monitored; prevention and mitigation measures are on line. Support is going to the responsible GON institutions. Extreme drought expected sometime in the next five to eight years would shift emphasis from long-term planning to fast-response efforts without blocking strategic objective success.

### **C. Problem Analysis and Results/Causality Framework**

To counter the twin scourges of rapid environmental degradation and low productivity, SO3 results will promote sustained widespread adoption of improved practices. We will help Niger provide its rural producers 1) greater control over the natural resources necessary for production, particularly land, 2) information about improved practices and 3) access to capital to finance certain investments.

A number of improved practices are having good success: rock bunds to slow water and capture topsoil; half-moon shaped holes to trap water where crops or trees are planted; fallow management to grow more wood; small dams to check gully erosion; planted trees and fencing to help stabilize dunes.

To spread these practices to more rural producers demands a number of changes. The government must become a less intrusive, more capable supporter of rural producers. This

means legal changes (implementing the Rural Code and decentralization) as well as institutional change (modifying the role of extension agents). Civil society institutions need strengthening. NGOs can facilitate community organization and spread technical information. Experience shows that savings and credit unions, women's associations, NGOs and other groups need and respond very positively to targeted training and experience, especially in numeracy and basic group management skills. Local taxes or credit and savings associations can generate local financing. Although USAID will promote these necessary and sufficient conditions to achieve SO3, it cannot do so alone and does not intend to do so forever. To leverage resources and promote continued progress, the Mission must also help the GON become able to continue the work.

**Result 3.1:** Niger's rural producers, men and women, gain greater control over their productive environment.

***Causal Assumption:***

- Increased small producer control over the productive environment—particularly forest management, land tenure and sources of investment capital—will lead to more investment in sustainable production.

***Performance Measures:***

- Number of registered community institutions actively managing natural resources.
- Number of new community forest management schemes (cumulative).
- Number of registered Nigerien intermediary institutions (women's associations, village committees, NGOs).
- Number of sub-regional disaster response committees formed.
- Parties in formally adjudicated cases are aware of new land laws (by gender).

***Targets:***

- 35 registered community institutions actually managing natural resources by 1997, 300 by 2000 vs. 10 today.
- 25 new community forest management schemes by 2000.
- 15 intermediary institutions by 1997, up from five in 1995.
- From no sub-regional disaster response committees now, to 24 by the end of 1996.
- 80% of parties, both women and men, aware of new land laws by year 2000.

***Benchmarks:***

- Environmental laws or regulations cited in the National Conference revised and before National Assembly by 1997.
- 3 Rural Code implementing laws before the National Assembly by 1997.

**Result 3.2: Increased producer access to technical information.**

***Causal assumptions:***

- Information can be disseminated so as to increase knowledge both of technologies and of markets.
- Knowledge of technologies and markets will enhance the rate of adoption of NRM practices.

***Performance Measures:***

- Percentage of heads of households, both women and men, able to name at least one new NRM method.
- Percentage of heads of households, both women and men, in communities targeted by NRM projects able to describe at least one new NRM practice used in another village.
- Proportion of heads of household, both women and men, in target communities with access to market and climatic information.

***Targets:***

- 25% of producers able to name one new NRM method by 1997; 75% by 2000.
- 10% of heads of households able to describe one NRM practice used in another village by 1997, 80% by 2000.
- 70% of heads of households with market and climatic information access by 1999.

**Result 3.3: Increased capital available for communities and individuals to invest in NRM practices.**

***Causal assumptions:***

- Shortage of capital is a significant constraint to NRM investment.
- A significant proportion of newly available capital (NGO grants, savings and credit, cooperatives) will be invested in NRM practices.

***Performance Measures:***

- Percent increase in national financing of projects promoting community-level NRM activities.
- Percent of customers (by gender) reporting access to funding for NRM inputs.

***Target:***

- From baseline (1996, TBD) a 25% increase in heads of households, both women and men, reporting access to funds by 2000. (This will also be cross-linked to SO2.)

**Result 3.4:** National capacity to promote and sustain Results 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 is improved.

**Causal assumption:**

- The GON and partners will strengthen the mandate of the existing NRM and disaster preparedness coordination unit.

**Performance Measures:**

- Implementation of national short-term impact monitoring system.
- GON maintains updated NRM strategic plans.
- National disaster plan and coordination unit.
- Authorization for district-level disbursement of food security and disaster mitigation funds.

**Targets:**

- First application of short-term impacts monitoring system on a national scale by 1996.
- Creation of national NRM plan.
- Creation of a national disaster donor coordination unit.
- Creation of a national disaster management plan.
- District-level disbursement of funds.

**Benchmarks:**

- National sample frame developed and survey protocol drafted by the end of 1995.

**RESULT 3.5:** A public well informed of key policies and legislation affecting citizens' rights and responsibilities (natural resources). Result 3.5 aims especially at helping rural producers become more aware of information that can aid them to improve their NRM practices. At times, this may be legal information, such as awareness of land laws under the Rural Code that might help increase the security of their own land tenure. Or it may be information about technical practices that could be relevant to improving their productivity, income and the sustainability of the natural resources upon which they depend.

**Measures:**

- Parties in formally adjudicated cases are aware of new land laws.
- Percentage of rural producers, men and women, able to name one new NRM method.
- Percentage of heads of household in communities targeted by NRM projects able to describe one NRM practice used in another village.

**Targets:**

- 80% of parties, both women and men, aware by year 2000.
- 25% of heads of households, both women and men, able to name one new NRM method by 1997; 75% by 2000.
- 10% of heads of households, both women and men, able to describe one NRM practice used in another village by 1997, 80% by 2000.

**Benchmark:**

- 3 Rural Code implementing laws before the National Assembly by 1997.

**D. Relationship of SO3 to Agency Goals and Priorities**

USAID/Niger's SO3 applies three Agency priorities (as an example, protecting the environment, encouraging broad-based economic growth, and providing humanitarian assistance) in an example of how to integrate development approaches. Neither environmental protection nor broad-based economic growth is possible here without wide adoption of NRM practices. Adoption cannot be sustained without humanitarian aid to help people maintain their livelihoods during disasters. Trying to restore the environment without meeting the great need for more agricultural production is almost certain to fail. But any attempt to achieve economic growth from rapid agriculture increases that ignore Niger's fragile environment courts disaster. SO3 will work to restore an ecological-economic equilibrium by seeking changed behavior among Niger's rural people that will pay off for them economically and ecologically.

**E. Performance Measures and Targets**

In Niger, our strategic objective is to help change those behaviors which logically would lead to physical changes in the environment. With this in mind the Mission will undertake, at four-year intervals, national level, household area probability sample surveys to estimate rates of adoption of defined NRM practices. See Annex D for in depth discussion of measurement issues. USAID/Niger and other Sahelian missions are making every effort to improve measures of impact of NRM activities.

A summary of the other SO3 performance measures and targets is given in Section C, above. Details are shown in Annex A: Performance Monitoring Plan.

**F. A Brief Discussion of Identified Approaches**

USAID/Niger has many active NRM programs. A reengineering transition is underway that will shift from seeking objectives through separate projects to working in results package teams. Once this Strategic Plan is approved, the operational changes will be made formal. As earlier funds are used up, the Mission will draw on funds obligated in an SO3

agreement with the Government of Niger. We will earmark and commit these new funds based on the tactics and tools defined by our results package teams.

***Tactics and Tools:***

- Results (mainly in R3.1 and R3.4) that call for GON policy, regulatory or service delivery change will be encouraged by conditioned cash transfers, technical assistance and training.
- Results (mainly in R3.1 and R.2) to strengthen individual producers, community or NGO NRM efforts will be financed by joint local currency programming with NGOs and the Government of Niger, Peace Corps NRM programs and the grant to Africare for community interventions in Gouré.
- Results (throughout R.1, R.2, R.3 and R.4) that lead to better disaster responses will be promoted by conditioned cash transfers and jointly programmed local currencies.
- Results (mainly in R.3) that concern economic and financial aspects of NRM investments will be linked to SO2 results and implemented by joint results package teams. Tactics and tools will include conditioned cash transfers and grants to international PVOs.
- Research results (mainly in R.2 and R.4) will come out of training in collaboration with Global-funded CRSPs, HRDA, ATLAS and NAAR.
- Results (mainly in R.4) calling for greater coordination among Niger's donors will be obtained by dialogue among members of the Strategic Objective team.

***A Few New Illustrative Conditions Precedent:***

- GON technical services develop resource management agreements with 20 communities (such as community management of local forests or community plans for dune stabilization) including service agent commitments to provide specific technical information.
- Technical services jointly execute 20 projects in coordination with non-government organizations.
- Specific executive orders modify the qualifications of extension agents.

***Potential Activities:***

- Training, networking and assistance (technical, legal) to associations and NGOs that encourage communities to establish registered resource committees.
- District workshops for project officers, NGO staff and technical service agents at which cooperative strategies and action plans are developed.
- Focused study tours of key project sites by national policy makers.

**G. The Consultative Process**

Ongoing NRM and disaster mitigation activities have proven a rich source of customer input. In recent years, six NRM and four pilot mitigation projects brought Mission staff into direct contact with rural producers developing their own strategies. It has become

standard practice for community members to present Mission staff on evaluation trips with their action plan for the sustainable development of their territory.

Managers of ongoing projects have served as intermediaries who contribute to Mission strategic planning. The Mission's Gouré project, executed by Africare, perhaps best demonstrates this constant dialogue. Although field activities are more than 1,000 kilometers from the capital, the project receives as many as six visits from Mission staff a year. The project's Niamey-based policy advisor constantly feeds lessons learned to the Mission, the government and our partners.

Over 50 participants in the May 1994 Mitigations Options Conference discussed the joint USAID/OFDA-produced Famine Mitigation Intervention Options Manual, based on a survey of customers, partners and GON officials. A customer and stakeholder survey (November 1994) contributed to revising the DPM strategic plan, now integrated into SO3.

Through ASDG II, the Mission plays a critical donor and GON coordination role, helping the entire NRM community continue the process of discovery and consensus building which has developed NRM policy and the NRM approach in the Sahel. With this groundwork, the Mission called upon representatives of 60 partner institutions to help design the SO3 results framework. In four workshops, participants reviewed, rewrote, and added to the Mission strategic plan. The focus group will become part of the expanded SO3 team for achieving results.

Teamwork, with full participation, has built further understanding of the vast diversity communities face and their need to develop their own solutions locally. It has strengthened rural producers' confidence that they can manage their own natural resources. Herein lies the Mission's commitment to a redefinition of the role of the state, to pushing national policy away from rhetoric to community management in the field.

#### H. Other USAID/Niger NRM Activities

A brief description of these projects is found in Annex F:

Agriculture Sector Development Grant I (ASDG I)	(683-0246)
Agriculture Sector Development Grant II/PA (ASDG II)	(683-0257)
Agriculture Sector Development Grant II/NPA (ASDG II)	(683-0265)
Gouré Natural Resources Management Interventions	(683-0278)
Niger Applied Agriculture Research (NAAR)	(683-0256)
Small Project Assistance (SPA)	(683-0249)
Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation/PA (DPM)	(683-0271)
Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation/NPA (DPM)	(683-0279)
Sahel Water Data Management III (SWDM)	(625-0973)
Famine Early Warning System III (FEWS III)	(698-0466.83)
Africa Emergency Locust and Grasshopper Assistance (AELGA)	(698-0517.83)
Forest Resources Management	(936-5556)
Sahel Regional Institutions (SRI)	(625-0975)

Programs for Applied Development Research in the Sahel (PADRES)	(698-0980)
Development Strategies for Fragile Lands (DESFIL)	(936-5438)
Environmental and Natural Resource Policy and Training (EPAT)	(936-5555)
Environmental Education and Communication Project	(936-5839)
Sorghum and Millet Cooperative Research Support Program (CRSP)	(931-1254)
Soil Management Cooperative Research (TROPSOILS CRSP)	(931-1311)
Peanut CRSP	(936-4048)
Systems Approach to Regional Income and Sustainable Resource Assistance II (SARSA)	(936-5452)
Policy Analysis, Research and Technical Support (PARTS)	(698-0478)
African Training for Leadership Skills (ATLAS)	(698-0475.83)
Human Resources Development Assistance (HRDA)	(698-0263.83)
Democracy and Human Rights Fund	(698-0541.83)

#### IV. Strategic Plan Comparisons

Bureau for Africa guidance requests USAID Missions to indicate briefly how proposed new strategic plans differ from preceding plans. The charts on the next two pages summarize the respective plans. The first is drawn from USAID/Niger's 1992-1994 Concept Paper; the second summarizes the proposed 1995-2002 plan. The new Plan continues many activities begun over recent years. Our analyses indicated that good decisions had been made about sectors for emphasis. There are, however, several changes in approach.

Some national policy and institutional work will continue to support the GON under each SO. However, our activities over the next few years will place more emphasis on field implementation at local levels and support to decentralized, local government. This shift is possible because significant policy reforms have been and are being achieved under the present portfolio. The Mission's approach to non-project assistance now will entail having technical assistance teams in place to share responsibility for designing and monitoring NPA activities.

Over the next few years, USAID/Niger activities will be more integrated across the portfolio, and as a result will be more focused geographically. We are discovering many ways in which SOs activities can be mutually reinforcing for greater impact and more efficiency. Finally, we believe this Plan further than before in carefully integrating Global Bureau activities directly into Mission strategic objectives.

From Concept Paper, for Years 1992-1994,  
USAID/Niger Objective Tree: Goal and Targets

**P R O G R A M   L O G   F R A M E**  
**GOAL**

PROMOTE SUSTAINABLE MARKET-BASED  
ECONOMIC GROWTH WHILE EMPHASIZING LOCALLY  
MANAGED RESOURCES AND REDUCED POPULATION GROWTH

**STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES**

INCREASE QUALITY,  
COVERAGE AND USE OF  
FAMILY PLANNING,  
MATERNAL AND  
CHILD HEALTH

INCREASE THE OPPORTUNITIES  
FOR SUSTAINABLE  
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION  
AND RURAL ENTERPRISES

**TARGETS**

DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT  
SUSTAINABLE COST  
RECOVERY AND CONTAIN-  
MENT SYSTEMS

INCREASE INDIVIDUAL  
AND COMMUNITY CONTROL  
OF NATURAL RESOURCES

ALLOCATE INCREASED  
PERCENTAGE OF HEALTH  
RESOURCES TO BASIC  
HEALTH SERVICES


INCREASE PARTICIPATION  
IN AND OUTPUT OF  
PRIVATE SECTOR  
ACTIVITIES

EXTEND AND INTEGRATE  
PRIORITY FAMILY  
PLANNING, MATERNAL  
AND CHILD HEALTH  
PROGRAMS IN PRIMARY  
HEALTH CARE FACILITIES  
AND IMPROVE SERVICE  
DELIVERY EFFECTIVENESS

PROMOTE SYSTEMS TO  
FORECAST AND RESPOND  
APPROPRIATELY TO  
NATURAL DISASTERS

Target of Opportunity: Democracy and Governance

**Chart 2: Mission Vision, Objectives, and Planned Results  
1995-2002**



*Program Results are synergistic across Objectives; USAID strategy encourages joint  
planning and contiguity of activities across S.O. teams and Objectives*

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## PART III: RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS

### A. Estimated Resource Requirements by Year to Achieve Objectives<sup>1</sup>

Part III provides estimated resource requirements needed to achieve the results described in Part II. Budget exercises built on results frameworks developed by each of the three strategic objective teams. Table III-1 shows how the proposed Niger program fits the main goals of the Agency for Fiscal Years 1995 through 1997.<sup>2</sup> Requirements by year and by Mission strategic objective, including funding levels proposed from USAID/W sources, appear in Table III-2. USAID/W requested a Plan based on a "straightline" bilateral level of an average annual \$22 million and, also, plans for two options: 1) a 15% reduction in bilateral program funds (about \$18.7 million per year and 2) a 30% reduction, or about \$15.4 million per year. These are in Tables III-3 and III-4, with proposed U.S. Direct Hire full-time (USDH-FTE) and operating expenses.

**TABLE III-1: ILLUSTRATIVE NIGER PROGRAM SUMMARY, FY95 - FY97**  
by Agency Directives and Mission Strategic Objectives  
(\$ millions)

Agency Goals USAID/Niger Strategic Objectives	Encouraging Economic Growth	Stabilizing Population Growth	Protecting the Environment	Building Democracy	Totals
<b>S.O.#1: Increase use of FP and other M/CH services</b>					
Dev. Fund for Africa	13.9	8.1	-	.7	22.7
Dev. Assistance Fund	1.9	2.6	-	-	4.5
<b>S.O.#2: Improve decentralized financial services for production and marketing</b>					
Dev. Fund for Africa	12.4	-	.8	.2	13.4
Dev. Assistance Fund	2.0	-	-	-	2.0
<b>S.O.#3: Improve land management practices for sustainable agricultural and livestock production</b>					
Dev. Fund for Africa	6.3	-	13.9	.6	20.8
Dev. Assistance Fund	-	-	.8	.5	1.3
<b>Cross-Cutting Issues (mostly DFA):</b>					
- Democratic Governance	-	-	-	1.2	1.2
- Food Security, Disaster Mitigation and Humanitarian Assistance	4.1	-	1.7	1.0	6.8
- Human Capacity Building	1.5	.3	.8	.2	2.8
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>42.1</b>	<b>11.0</b>	<b>18.0</b>	<b>4.4</b>	<b>75.5</b>

<sup>1</sup> USAID/Niger's Plan is based on Business Area Analysis, USAID/W guidance in "Making a Difference for Development", Operations BAA Core Report: February, 1994, especially Chapter 2, *Strategic Planning*.

<sup>2</sup> Agency priorities for Mission plans were given in "Strategies for Sustainable Development", March 1994; and as reflected in the FY 1996 Congressional Presentation.

Table III-1 summarizes planned budget allocations by Agency goals or strategy directives and by USAID/Niger Strategic Objectives over the period, FY 1995 through 1997, based on detailed budgets developed by the SO teams after results and sub-results frameworks (summarized in Part II) had been completed. This table indicates how investments in Niger fit overarching Agency priorities. The three-year period was characterized in some detail. Out years, of course, can not be projected with confidence since performance in achieving results will determine the pattern of future investment. Agency AC/SI coding was applied to individual activities in order to arrive at a broad picture of allocations.

The \$42.1 million total for "Encouraging Economic Growth" includes \$15.8 million directed to Child Survival and Health, per current Agency coding convention. If this is not included, the amount proposed for promoting *economic* activity would be \$26.3 million, or about 35% of total planned resources. Note that the Mission attributes almost 30% (\$6.3 million) of SO3 (NRM) activities to "Encouraging Economic Growth", as distinct from "Protecting the Environment".

The \$11 million planned directly for "Stabilizing Population Growth" activities constitutes 17% of the total. Resources aimed directly towards "Protecting the Environment" amount to \$18 million, or 24% of the total.

Table III-1 illustrates the unusual degree to which USAID/Niger's activities have become inter-related and jointly planned across Objectives. This is a direct result of efforts to find greater efficiencies and greater impact—a process that was accelerated by Mission reengineering in recent months. Though Mission strategic planning and re-organization are designed around three SO teams, "Cross-cutting issues" appear as a break-out in keeping with the CP 1996 format, and to signal key features of this Mission's programming process. However, virtually all of the funding shown for these areas will be programmed under the three objectives by their respective teams as part of their results frameworks. These funds will be incorporated into Strategic Objective Agreements with the Government of Niger.<sup>3</sup> Funds for Human Capacity Development likewise have been carefully allocated to each objective.<sup>4</sup>

Democratic Governance will be a partial exception wherein \$1.2 million will fund: 1) special efforts to strengthen local government resource mobilization in one or two *arrondissements* where other USAID activities are concentrated and 2) technical assistance for national and local electoral processes. This funding is attributed almost equally across the three objectives in the following tables.

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<sup>3</sup> In consequence, for example, modification of the main, on-going TA contract under Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation (DPM) may further align it with the results under SO's #1, #2, and #3. Obligations planned for DPM, then, should become part of the allowances for each of the three Objectives; this leads to almost 30% of DPM to SO1 and 70% to SO3.

<sup>4</sup> USAID/Niger Country Training Strategy Plan, with HRNS, March 1995.

**TABLE III-2: NIGER STRATEGY PLAN ANNUAL BUDGET, FY95 THRU FY02**  
**Straightline, average \$22 million per year**  
 (\$ millions)

	FY95	FY96	FY97	('95-'97)	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	FY02	Total
SO#1	7.4	8.8	8.0	24.2	8.0	8.0	8.0	8.0	8.0	64.2
SO#2	2.8	5.8	6.4	15.0	6.4	6.4	6.4	6.4	6.4	47.0
SO#3	5.8	7.4	7.6	20.8	7.6	7.6	7.6	7.6	7.6	58.8
Totals	16.0	22.0	22.0	60.0	22.0	22.0	22.0	22.0	22.0	170.0
AID/W	3.5	6.0	6.0	15.5	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	45.5
TOTALS	19.5	28.0	28.0	75.5	28.0	28.0	28.0	28.0	28.0	215.5
USDH-FTE	10	10	10	-	10	10	10	10	10	-
OE	2.8	2.8	2.8	-	2.8	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	-

Three-year sub-totals for FY 1995 through FY 1997 are based on fairly detailed plans for obligations over this period—based on results frameworks. Beyond FY 1997, details available vary by Objective. We assume constant funding levels by Objective after FY 1997, based on prediction that the proportions by Objective will average out in this manner; actual annual obligation levels will depend on comparative progress in achieving intended results leading toward each Objective. These figures reflect the Mission's intent and represent reasonable predictions based on what we now understand about costs-for-results.

All funds shown from USAID/W are derived from budget plans within each Strategic Objective.<sup>5</sup> When USAID/W funding allocations are apportioned by Objective (not shown) and these are added to the bilateral funding, the totals for the 3-year (FY95-97) period are: SO#1—\$32.6m; SO#2—\$18.7m; and SO#3—\$24.2m; or, 43%, 25% and 32%, respectively, of total resource flow.

USDH-FTEs and OE estimates are simply carried forward, based on straightlining USAID/Niger's FY 1996 CP estimates.

<sup>5</sup> Most agreements are already negotiated with Global Bureau and the Bureau for Africa. Estimates of USAID/W figures are precise for FY 1995, and provide a good basis for estimating the out-years.

## B. Strategic scenarios for 15% and 30% reductions in OYB levels

The objective of the Niger mission in responding to sizable reductions in program and/or operating expenses will be to preserve the humanitarian assistance capabilities in food security and disaster mitigation, and to preserve much of the maternal and child health activities.

1. A 15% reduction in OYB would lead to some reduction in SO1 activities, but the main impact would entail cutting effort in economic reform and microenterprise by 45%. Further support for economic policy reform, both project and non-project assistance, would almost cease. Support for decentralized financial institutions (DFI) would continue and many of these expected results possibly still could be attained—though over a longer period and without as much sustainability, lacking needed policy improvements. In SO1, the \$600,000 reduction would be applied to the public sector, mainly slowing decentralization and cutting one *arrondissement* from Result 1.1.

TABLE III-3: Minus 15%, average bilateral annual \$18.7 million

	FY95	FY96	FY97	total
SO#1	7.4	8.2	8.0	23.6
SO#2	2.8	3.1	3.1	9.0
SO#3	5.8	7.4	7.6	20.8
total	16.0	18.7	18.7	53.4
USAID/W	3.5	5.0	5.0	13.5
Totals	19.5	23.7	23.7	66.9
US-FTEs	9	9	9	
OE	2.6	2.6	2.6	7.8

Training levels across the portfolio would diminish, probably by about \$200,000 per year, mostly in SO2, but also in SO1 and SO3. One FTE would be removed from the SO1 team and additional Nigerien professional staff would be sought, with some increase in USAID/W technical assistance required.

TABLE III-4: Minus 30%, average annual bilateral \$15.5 million

	FY95	FY96	FY97	total
SO#1	7.4	8.0	7.8	23.2
SO#2	2.8	0	0	2.8
SO#3	5.8	7.4	7.6	20.8
total	16.0	15.4	15.4	46.8
USAID/W	3.5	5.0	5.0	13.5
Totals	19.5	20.4	20.4	60.3
US-FTEs	8	8	8	
OE	2.4	2.4	2.4	7.2

2. A 30% reduction in OYB: the Mission would reduce USDH FTEs to eight, make no more obligations to activities under SO2, and continue work towards the results of SO1 and SO3. The Mission Strategic Plan, however, would have to be re-drawn to accommodate changes in Results Frameworks. Under this scenario, some funding for DFIs would be taken up under SO1 and SO3 in order to assure some presence of DFIs in areas where local public health and NRM associations are established, but there would be little growth in numbers of DFI perhaps no more than a net increase of fifty to one hundred over a period of two to three years. SO1 would drop another *arrondissement* in order to re-allocate

resources towards assuring a minimum of DFIs. SO1 management would be broadened more than desirable. Under this scenario, though USDH FTEs would drop to eight, there would be some compensating increase in local hires. The resident, US contract team would be reconfigured to assure a proper skill mix. If USDH FTEs were dropped further, to seven and there were no increases in local hires, it would be difficult to continue any support to DFIs, even as part of the other SOs. This would require a new Strategic Plan and Mission re-organization. This would change the Mission from Schedule A to Schedule B, which probably would require further support from REDSO/WA.

### **C. Information on Other Donor and Partner Commitments which relate to the Implementation of USAID/Niger's Proposed Strategic Plan**

External assistance provides the main part of Niger's budget for development activities. U.S. assistance constitutes an important part of total external assistance; the U.S. on average over recent years has been the fourth largest bilateral donor to Niger, after the French, EU, and the Germans.

#### **1. Strategic Objective 1**

USAID works with approximately ten other multilateral and bilateral donors in the population, health and nutrition sectors in Niger. USAID and other donor support for primary and preventive care is complemented by French, Belgian, Italian, and United Nations support for hospital-based curative care. This collaboration continues within areas of USAID focus: family planning and maternal and child health service delivery, where USAID works with European Economic Commission, (EEC), French Assistance agencies (FAC and FVC), the Netherlands assistance agency (SNV), and various United Nations agencies such as IDA, UNFPA, UNICEF and WHO to improve access to family planning and health services and build more efficient and sustainable systems. USAID also works with a number of international and U.S private voluntary agencies (PVOs) such as AFRICARE, CARE, and Helen Keller, International and Nigerien non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to improve health care and family planning programs and broaden community and private support for these services.

#### **2. Strategic Objective 2**

Other donor contribution to SO2 is considerable. The figures in the table that follows are rough estimates of average yearly expenditures for on going projects and programs straight lined out over the next seven years. Most of this effort is in credit programs. However, most other donors consider these to be resource transfer programs rather than sustainable credit systems. Only USAID has programs which are considered by all, including the other donors themselves, as being potentially viable. The World Bank is, in effect, buying into the USAID program through a contract or grant to WOCCU to expand into those areas where the Bank is planning Natural Resource Management interventions.

Most of the estimated \$5 million per year of the Bank however, is a portion of their and IMF budgetary support which will be forthcoming only if certain sectoral adjustments such as labor law reform, tax reform, and possibly reduced government payroll are implemented. These reforms are extremely valuable to the microenterprise sector as well as to other parts of the private sector. USAID enjoys unusually close collaboration with the Bretton Woods Institutions to assist in formulating these conditionalities and carrying-out policy dialogue to satisfy them. USAID's work is also the most critical to the GON's success in actually getting reforms implemented even after they have been made into law.

### **3. Strategic Objective 3**

The SO3 team has found opportunities to leverage USAID resources through close collaboration with NRM activities supported by other donors and partners. While Mission progress in NRM policy and institutional reform strengthens all other activities in the sector, three particular projects have been identified for particularly close collaboration:

1) The World Bank NRM Project (NRMP, \$41 million, 1995 - 2000) will help boost community-based NRM activities in 280 villages over the next five years. NRMP has also been designed to reinforce national level policy development, project coordination, and monitoring. The USAID SO3 team is in the process of identifying specific activities within NRMP in which the mission has a comparative advantage, and which can either be wholly undertaken through mission resources, or complemented by them. The strongest areas of overlap are: the impact monitoring of NRM projects and the integration of lessons learned into policy decisions.

2) The World Bank Energy II/III project, (1995 - 2000; \$9 million). The Energy II project has provided fiscal legal and institutional incentives to enable and encourage communities to manage their natural forests and organize the marketing of fuelwood through "rural markets". The next phase planned for 1996-2000. While such markets and forest management is within the manageable interest of an estimated three hundred communities in Niger, Energy III has been able to establish no more than fifty. USAID could tap into Energy II at three levels: a) taking advantage of the legislation put in place under the Energy II project and establishing altogether new rural markets; b) developing community forest management plans for the rural markets not funded under Energy II project; and c) developing and implementing local-level NRM plans in those communities already equipped with rural markets and managed natural forests.

3) FAO/FIDA is planning a second phase to their Programme Spécial Niger (1995 - 2000; \$15 million). Phase II components include: community-based resource management (the gestion de terroirs approach); small irrigation; pastoral associations; and credit. USAID contributed approximately \$300,000 to Phase I, through ASDG I tranche 6 counterpart funds. The SO3 Team is currently considering the possibility of continuing collaboration.

Table III-5: Proposed Scenarios Based on Niger Performance

SCENARIOS	Program Options Objectives	Illustrative Funding Levels: DFA-OYB	Illustrative Staff Levels
<b>1. Reversal</b> - Democratic Process Falters - Economic Reforms Reversed	- Humanitarian Assistance - Disaster Mitigation - Some Child Survival/Health	\$3-15,000	1 - 5
<b>2. Mixed Progress</b> - Democracy Holds - Economic Reforms Stall	- Disaster Mitigation - SO#1: PHN - SO#2: Econ Ref/Credit - SO#3: Nat'l Res Mngt	\$15-20,000	5 - 10
<b>3. Steady Progress</b> - Economic Reforms Continue - Democracy Holds	- SO#1: PHN - SO#2: Econ Ref/Credit - SO#3: Nat'l Res Mngt	\$20-25,000	10 - 11
<b>4. Significant Progress</b> - Local Elections, GON Decentralization - Strong Fiscal Measures Taken - Adoption of Much of the Family Code; Rural Code Strengthened - Regional Economic Integration	- Add to Existing Portfolio - Agricultural Marketing & Regional Integration - Primary Education?	\$25,000 +	11 +

The principal criteria for allocation of funds at the country level include: USAID/W availability; country performance in democratization and in economic policy; and a weighted formula that combines size, need and performance towards other development objectives. The illustrative scenarios in Table III-4 suggest the scale and order of priorities attached to elements in the strategy, given the need to assure that USAID humanitarian assistance and child survival needs are met, at a very minimum.

## LIST OF ACRONYMS

<b>AC/SI</b>	Activity Codes/Special Interest	<b>IFAD</b>	International Fund for Agricultural Development
<b>AEDES</b>	Association Européenne pour le Développement et la Santé	<b>ILO</b>	International Labor Organization
<b>AELGA</b>	Africa Emergency Locus and Grasshopper Assistance	<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund
<b>AIDSCAP</b>	AIDS Control Project	<b>IUD</b>	Intrauterine device
<b>ASDG</b>	Agriculture Sector Development Grant	<b>JHPIEGO</b>	Johns Hopkins Program for International Education in Reproductive Health
<b>ATLAS</b>	African Training for Leadership Skills	<b>MCH</b>	Maternal and child health
<b>BASICS</b>	Basic Support for Institutionalizing Child Survival	<b>MIS</b>	Marketing Information System
<b>C/GRN</b>	Cellule de Gestion des Ressources Naturelles	<b>MOPH</b>	Ministry of Public Health
<b>CAER</b>	Consulting Assistance for Economic Reform	<b>MT</b>	Metric ton
<b>CILSS</b>	Comité Interafricain de Lutte contre la Sécheresse au Sahel	<b>NAAR</b>	Niger Applied Agriculture Research
<b>CLUSA</b>	Cooperative League of the USA	<b>NEPRP</b>	Niger Economic and Policy Reform Program
<b>CPR</b>	Contraceptive prevalence rate	<b>NHSS</b>	Niger Health Sector Support
<b>CRSP</b>	Cooperative Research Support Program	<b>NRM</b>	Natural Resources Management
<b>CYP</b>	Couple years of protection	<b>PADRES</b>	Programs for Applied Development Research in the Sahel
<b>DESFIL</b>	Development Strategies for Fragile Lands	<b>PAM</b>	Policy Analysis and Monitoring
<b>DFI</b>	Decentralized financial institution	<b>PARTS</b>	Policy Analysis, Research and Technical Support
<b>DFS</b>	Decentralized financial services	<b>PFP</b>	Policy framework paper
<b>DHS</b>	Demographic and Health Survey	<b>PTMS</b>	Participant Training Management System
<b>DPM</b>	Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation	<b>QA</b>	Quality Assurance
<b>DS</b>	Direction de la Statistique	<b>ROD</b>	Rural Organizations Development
<b>EEC</b>	European Economic Commission	<b>SAP</b>	Système d'Alerte Précoce (early warning system)
<b>EPAT</b>	Environment and Natural Resource Policy and Training	<b>SAP</b>	Structural Adjustment Program
<b>EPI</b>	Expanded Program for Immunization	<b>SARSA</b>	Systems Approach to Regional Income and Sustainable Resource Assistance
<b>ESAF</b>	Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility	<b>SNIS</b>	Système National d'Information Sanitaire
<b>EU</b>	European Union	<b>SNV</b>	(Netherlands assistance agency)
<b>FAC</b>	Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation	<b>SO</b>	Strategic Objective
<b>FAO/FIDA</b>	Food and Agriculture Organization	<b>SOMARC</b>	Social Marketing of Contraceptives
<b>FED</b>	Fonds Européen de Développement	<b>SPA</b>	Small Project Assistance
<b>FEWS</b>	Famine Early Warning System	<b>SRI</b>	Sahel Regional Institutions
<b>FP</b>	Family planning	<b>SWDM</b>	Sahel Water Data Management
<b>FSDP</b>	Financial Sector Development Project	<b>TA</b>	Technical assistance
<b>FVC</b>	French assistance agency	<b>TAACS</b>	Technical Advisors in AIDS and Child Survival
<b>GDP</b>	Gross domestic product	<b>TBD</b>	To be determined
<b>GEMINI</b>	Growth and Equity Through Microenterprise Investments and Institutions	<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Program
<b>GON</b>	Government of Niger	<b>UNFPA</b>	United Nations Fund for Population Activities
<b>HRDA</b>	Human Resources Development Assistance	<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children Fund
<b>IEC</b>	Information, education and communication	<b>WOCCU</b>	World Council of Credit Unions

## ANNEXES

- A Performance Monitoring Plan for Vision
- B Niger Macro-Economic Structure and Performance
- C Democratic Governance
- D Natural Resources
- E Determinants of Mortality and Fertility
- F USAID Activities in Niger by Objective
- G Sections 118/119 of the 1961 FAA

## PERFORMANCE MONITORING PLAN FOR VISION

PERFORMANCE MEASURE	DEFINITION OF MEASURE	DATA SOURCE	METHOD/ APPROACH	FREQUENCY OF DATA COLLECTION	DATA CURRENTLY COLLECTED?	RESPONSIBLE OFFICE
<b>Vision: A healthier population growing at a slower rate improved rural production and better conservation of the environment.</b> <b>Proposed measures:</b>						
Age-specific fertility rate	Number of children/1,000 women in age group (e.g., 20-24)	Niger census DHS	Sample survey	Every 5 years (1992, 1997)	yes	SO1 team PROG
Age-specific mortality rate	Annual age-specific death rates (1q0, 2q1...2q5)	Niger census DHS	Sample survey	Every 5 years	yes	SO1 team PROG
Population growth rate	(Number of births/1,000)- (Number of deaths/1,000)	U.S. Bureau of Censuses UNDP	Niger census Sample surveys	Decennial Ad hoc	yes	PROG
Total fertility rate	Average # of children/woman, assuming current age-specific birth rates remain constant	DHS	Sample survey	Every 5 years	yes	SO1 team PROG
Life expectancy at birth	Actuarial average life span	U.S. Bureau of Censuses UNDP Directorate de la Statistique	Census data Demographic surveys	Decennial Ad hoc	yes	PROG
Agriculture sector growth	Percent growth of all primary agricultural and livestock products	IMF WB Ministry of Plan	Compilation of district data	Continuous	yes	PROG
Agriculture and GDP	Agricultural, livestock and other microenterprises as percent of total GDP	IMF WB Ministry of Plan other GON	Compilation of district data	Annual	yes	PROG
Per capita food production	Total CY12-month food estimates/mid-year population estimate	IMF WB Ministry of Plan other GON	Compilation of district data	Annual	yes	PROG

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## VISION: BASELINE, PERFORMANCE TARGETS AND ACTUAL RESULTS

PERFORMANCE MEASURES <sup>1</sup>	BASELINE DATA		PERFORMANCE TARGETS AND ACTUAL RESULTS						
	YEAR	VALUE	1993 Actual	1994 Actual	1995 Actual (Target)	1996 Actual (Target)	1997 Actual (Target)	1998 Actual (Target)	1999 Actual (Target)
Vision: A healthier population growing at a slower rate with greater rural production and better conservation of the environment.									
Proposed measures:									
Age-specific fertility rate (age groups: 15-19,...40-44)	1992	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Age-specific mortality rates (age groups: 0-1, 1-4,...75+)	1992	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Population growth rate	1992	0.033	0.033	0.033	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.031)
Total fertility rate	1992	7.4	7.4	7.4	(7.4)	(7.3)	(7.3)	(7.3)	(7.2)
Life expectancy at birth	1989	45 yrs.	45 yrs.	45 yrs.	(45 yrs.)	(45 yrs.)	(45 yrs.)	(45 yrs.)	(46 yrs.)
Agricultural sector growth	1992	0%	3.5%	8.5%	(5.0%)	(5.0%)	(5.0%)	(5.0%)	(5.0%)
Agricultural, livestock and other microenterprises as percent of total GDP	TBD	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Per capita food production index	1986	100	114	123	(129)	(135)	(142)	(149)	(156)

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<sup>1</sup> Tables are set up for use in the 1995 Assessment of Program Impact.

## PERFORMANCE MONITORING PLAN FOR STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1

PERFORMANCE MEASURE	DEFINITION OF MEASURE	DATA SOURCE	METHOD/ APPROACH	FREQUENCY OF DATA COLLECTION	DATA CURRENTLY COLLECTED?	RESPONSIBLE OFFICE
<b>Strategic Objective 1: Increase use of family planning and maternal/child health (FP/MCH) services and improve child nutrition for lower fertility and infant/child mortality rates.</b> <b>Proposed measures:</b>						
Prevalence of use of modern methods of contraception (CPR)	Percent of women, age 15-49, who are currently using a modern method of contraception	Niger Demographic and Health Survey (DHS)	Sample survey	Every 5 years	1992 DHS completed, next DHS 1997	SO1 team
Knowledge of modern methods of contraception	Percent of women age 15-49 who know a modern method of contraception	DHS Project data	Sample survey	Every 5 years	yes	SO1 team
Knowledge of a source for modern contraceptives	Percent of women age 15-49 who know a source for obtaining modern contraceptives	DHS Project data	Sample survey	Every 5 years	yes	SO1 team
Desired family size	Mean number of children for an ideal family (for both women and men)	DHS	Sample survey	Every 5 years	yes	SO1 team
Measles immunization coverage in selected districts	Percent of children age 12-23 months who received measles immunization before 12 months of age	Nat'l EPI Program MOPH Nat'l Health Information System (SNIS) DHS	Service statistics SNIS database Sample survey	Quarterly  Every 5 years	yes	SO1 team
Child malnutrition rate in selected districts	Percent of children more than two standard deviations below WHO standard weight for height	DHS SNIS SAP AEDES	Sample survey	Annual	yes	SO1 team
<b>Results 1.1: Improved FP/MCH services in the public sector (selected districts).</b> <b>Proposed measures:</b>						
Health professionals trained	Number of health care workers sent for long-term training	PTMS	Records review	Annual	yes	SO1 team
Provision of three long-term family planning methods at referral centers	Percent of referral centers offering IUDs, Norplant and surgical contraception	Contractor	Service statistics	Annual	yes	SO1 team

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PERFORMANCE MEASURE	DEFINITION OF MEASURE	DATA SOURCE	METHOD/ APPROACH	FREQUENCY OF DATA COLLECTION	DATA CURRENTLY COLLECTED?	RESPONSIBLE OFFICE
Couple Years of Protection (CYP) in selected districts	Estimate based on commodities distributed or sold to the user through MOPH facilities	Directorate of Family Health, Division of Family Planning	Service statistics	Quarterly	yes	SO1 team
Access to public sector FP/MCH services, selected districts	Percent of population living within 5 km of a FP/MCH service delivery point providing at least three modern family planning methods (fixed or mobile unit)	SNIS Directorate of Statistics	Service statistics Census	Annual	yes	SO1 team
Appropriate treatment of children presenting with malaria, acute respiratory infections, malnutrition and diarrheal disease, selected districts	Percent of children treated according to established protocols	QA	Records review	Semi-annual	no	SO1 team
Pregnant women receiving two doses of tetanus toxoid, selected districts	Percent of pregnant women receiving two doses of tetanus toxoid	SNIS DHS	Service statistics Sample survey	Quarterly Every 5 years	yes	SO1 team
<b>Result 1.2: An expanded and improved private sector, including NGOs, providing FP and MCH promotion and services.</b>						
<b>Proposed measures:</b>						
Private sector facilities providing health services, commodities and information, selected areas	Percent increase in the number of private facilities providing FP and/or MCH services	Situation analysis	Sample survey	Biennial	yes	SO1 team
	Percent of target population within 5 km of facility offering FP services	SNIS	Records review	Annual	yes	SO1 team
	Percent of target district residents purchasing private sector health services and products	DHS	Sample survey	Every 5 years	yes	SO1 team
	Level of customer satisfaction with private sector health services and products	Situation analysis	Sample survey	Biennial	yes	SO1 team
Couple Years of Protection (CYP), private sector	Estimate based on commodities distributed or sold to the user through social marketing and private sector NGOs	Project data	Project reports	Quarterly	yes	SO1 team

PERFORMANCE MEASURE	DEFINITION OF MEASURE	DATA SOURCE	METHOD/ APPROACH	FREQUENCY OF DATA COLLECTION	DATA CURRENTLY COLLECTED?	RESPONSIBLE OFFICE
Active nationwide social marketing program	Area of coverage	Contractor (TBD)	Project reports	Quarterly	no	SO1 team
	Number of products distributed	Contractor (TBD)	Project reports	Quarterly	no	SO1 team
	Number of Informational campaigns	Contractor (TBD)	Project reports	Quarterly	no	SO1 team
<b>Result 1.3: Greater financial and institutional support for health services, including policy reform.</b> Proposed measures:						
A policy environment which advocates fewer restrictions on access to modern family planning methods	TBD: (e.g., regulations regarding tubal ligation)	GON				SO1 team
Creation of practical health policy and financial reforms supportive of the role of private health service providers	TBD (e.g., reduction in administrative requirements on cost control for private sector)					SO1 team
A National Health Information System providing decision-makers with relevant data	Functioning of system	System reports	National Statistics	Weekly	yes	SO1 team
Cost recovery in selected hospitals and districts	Percent of hospital facilities in target areas recovering costs	Project data Other donor reports	Project reports	Quarterly	yes	SO1 team
	Percent of non-hospital MOPH facilities (total 545) with user fee collection system	SNIS	clinic records	Annual	yes	SO1 team

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PERFORMANCE MEASURE	DEFINITION OF MEASURE	DATA SOURCE	METHOD/ APPROACH	FREQUENCY OF DATA COLLECTION	DATA CURRENTLY COLLECTED?	RESPONSIBLE OFFICE
<b>Result 1.4: Improved capacity, through collaboration of the public and private sectors and the donor community, to predict and respond to food security and health related disasters.</b>						
<b>Proposed measures:</b>						
Disaster mitigation activities by NGOs	Percent of households in identified vulnerable areas participating in mitigation activities	SAP	Project reports	Quarterly	yes	SO1 team
	Distribution of food commodities (MT) by disaster mitigation NGOs to vulnerable areas within the target district	NGOs	Service statistics	Annual	yes	SO1 team
SAP/Emergency Fund as a conduit for other donor contributions	Number of times Emergency Fund is used by other donors	SAP	Project reports	Quarterly	yes	SO1 team
Child malnutrition rate during periods of food insecurity, vulnerable areas	Percent of children more than two standard deviations below WHO standard weight for height, vulnerable areas during episodes of food insecurity	DHS SNIS SAP AEDES	Sample survey Service statistics	Every 5 years Annual	yes	SO1 team
<p>NOTE: Result 1.5 can be found on p. 19.</p> <p>*CYP calculation: 1 CYP = 13 cycles hormonal pills, 1/3 IUD (average use 3 years), 150 foaming tablets, 150 condoms.</p>						

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## STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1: BASELINE, PERFORMANCE TARGETS AND ACTUAL RESULTS

PERFORMANCE MEASURES	BASELINE DATA		PERFORMANCE TARGETS AND ACTUAL RESULTS						
	YEAR	VALUE	1993 Actual	1994 Actual	1995 Actual (Target)	1996 Actual (Target)	1997 Actual (Target)	1998 Actual (Target)	1999 Actual (Target)
<b>Strategic Objective 1: Increase use of family planning and maternal/child health services and improve child nutrition for lower fertility and infant/child mortality rates.</b>									
Proposed measures:									
Prevalence of use of modern methods of contraception (CPR)	1992	2.3%	3.3%	(4.1%)	(5.1%)	(6.3%)	(7.3%)	(8.3%)	(9.3%)
Knowledge of modern methods of contraception	1992	58%						(75%)	
Knowledge of a source for modern contraceptives	1992	38%						(50%)	
Desired family size	1992								
•Women		8.2						(7.0)	
•Men		12.6						(10.0)	
Measles immunization coverage in selected districts	1990/2	19.0/ 20.4	20%	15%	(20%)		(35%)		(55%)
Child malnutrition rate in selected districts	1992	16%							
<b>Result 1.1: An expanded and improved private sector, including NGOs, providing FP and MCH promotion and services.</b>									
Proposed measures:									
Health care workers sent for long-term training	1992	2	2	1	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)
Referral centers offering IUDs, Norplant and surgical contraception	TBD								
Couple years of protection (CYP)	1990	29,948	61,758	(80,000)	(100,000)	(135,000)	(150,000)	(190,000)	(220,000)
Population living within 5 km of public sector FP/MCH services delivery point providing three modern family planning methods (fixed or mobile unit)	1992	32%	32%	32%				(40%)	
Children presenting with malaria, acute respiratory infections, malnutrition and diarrheal disease treated according to established protocols	TBD							(80%)	
Pregnant women receiving two doses of tetanus toxoid	1992	14%						(28%)	
<b>Result 1.2: More effective and efficient provision of FP and MCH services in the private sector.</b>									
Proposed measures:									
Private facilities providing FP and/or MCH; percent change	TBD								
Target population within 5 km of private facility offering FP services	TBD								
Target district residents purchasing private sector health services and products	TBD								
Customer satisfaction of private sector health services and products	TBD								

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PERFORMANCE MEASURES	BASELINE DATA		PERFORMANCE TARGETS AND ACTUAL RESULTS						
	YEAR	VALUE	1993 Actual	1994 Actual	1995 Actual (Target)	1996 Actual (Target)	1997 Actual (Target)	1998 Actual (Target)	1999 Actual (Target)
Couple Years of Protection (CYP) •SOMARC •NGOs	1994	8,900 0		8,900	(11,500)	(13,000)	(15,000)	(20,000)	(25,000)
Area covered by social marketing efforts	Tn								
Number of products distributed through social marketing efforts	TBD								
Number of social marketing campaigns	TBD								
<b>Result 1.3: Greater financial and institutional support for health services, including policy reform.</b>									
Proposed measures:									
Policy environment which advocates fewer restrictions on access to modern family planning methods	TBD								
Practical health policy and financial support reforms									
National Health Information System functioning					(X)				
Hospital facilities recovering costs	1993	0	0	3	(3)			(10)	
Non-hospital facilities in target areas with a user fee collection system	1992	0	18	51	(95)	(128)	(150)	(164)	(314)
<b>Result 1.4: Improved capacity, through collaboration of the public and private sectors and the donor community, to predict and respond to food security and health related disasters.</b>									
Proposed measures:									
Households in identified vulnerable areas participating in mitigation activities	1994		2	2	(50)	(50)	(50)	(50)	(50)
Distribution of food commodities (MT) by NGOs when needed (vulnerable areas)									
SAP/Emergency Fund use by donors	1993	0	0	0	(1)	(1+)	(1+)	(1+)	(1+)
Child malnutrition rate during episodes of food insecurity, vulnerable areas	1992	16%							

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## PERFORMANCE MONITORING PLAN FOR STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 2

PERFORMANCE MEASURES	DEFINITION OF MEASURE	DATA SOURCE	METHOD/ APPROACH	FREQUENCY OF DATA COLLECTION	DATA CURRENTLY COLLECTED?	RESPONSIBLE OFFICE
<b>Strategic Objective 2: Increased access to markets through use of improved decentralized financial services.</b>						
<b>Proposed measures:</b>						
Credit institutions providing small loans	Number of branches of credit institutions including credit unions, cooperatives, women's groups, banks, semi-formal money savers and money lenders	WOCCU, CLUSA, CARE	Project reports	Quarterly	yes	SO2 team
Credit institutions and money lenders/handlers independent of outside resources	Number of institutions not dependent on donors	WOCCU, CLUSA, CARE	Project reports	Quarterly	yes	SO2 team
Volume of agro-pastoral exports* •Onions •Skins and hides •Cowpeas •Livestock	Exports of agro-pastoral products in metric tons (three year moving average)	Customs Department Direction de la Statistique, Dept. of Agriculture	Records review	Annual	yes	SO2 team
Household expenditures for production	Expenditures for production (measure being developed)	Contractor (TBD)	Sample survey	Every 4 years	no	SO2 team
Satisfaction with USAID and partner's efforts	Percent satisfied/dissatisfied	Customer survey	Sample survey Focus groups	Annual; Field reports	no	SO2 team
<b>Result 2.1: More decentralized, viable and transparent financial services.</b>						
<b>Proposed measures:</b>						
Participation in credit institutions in target areas	Number of customers/members of decentralized financial institutions by gender	WOCCU, CLUSA, CARE	Project reports	Quarterly	yes	SO2 team
Volume of loans/savings	Amount of money lent and saved (FCFA) by gender	WOCCU, CLUSA, CARE	Project reports	Quarterly	yes	SO2 team
Loan repayment rate	Percent of loans repaid	WOCCU, CLUSA, CARE	Project reports	Quarterly	yes	SO2 team
Poverty lending	Percent of loans at \$300 or below by gender	TBD				

PERFORMANCE MEASURES	DEFINITION OF MEASURE	DATA SOURCE	METHOD/ APPROACH	FREQUENCY OF DATA COLLECTION	DATA CURRENTLY COLLECTED?	RESPONSIBLE OFFICE
Linkage between SO2 and other SO activities	Number of credit institutions receiving democracy and governance training	Training Office D/G grantees	Records review Project reports	Semi-annual	no	SO2 team
	Number of credit institutions in drought vulnerable areas with mitigation activities	WOCCU, CLUSA, CARE	Project reports	Quarterly	no	SO2 team
	Number of health associations with or near financial services	WOCCU, CLUSA, CARE	Project reports	Quarterly	no	SO2 team
	Number of NRM associations with or near financial services	WOCCU, CLUSA, CARE	Project reports	Quarterly	no	SO2 team
<b>Result 2.2: Improved environment for microenterprises: Better policies, better laws and better information.</b> Proposed measures:						
Bribe payments	FCFA per kilometer (1992 FCFA)	Drivers Association, Vehicle Owners Association	Sample survey	Annual	yes	SO2 team
Transporters trained in export and transportation regulations	Number of drivers trained	Training Office D/G grantee	Records review Project data	Semi-annual	no	SO2 team
Availability of marketing information	Expansion of or additional MIS services in place	Policy monitoring activity	Project data	Semi-annual	no	SO2 team
Customers find MIS helpful	Percent of interested customers who listen to the expanded MIS or new MIS and find it helpful	Contractor (TBD)	Sample survey	Annual	no	SO2 team
Ph.D. candidates in Economics	Cumulative number of candidates	PTMS	Records review	Periodic	yes	SO2 team
Policy reform: •Credit union legislation •Cooperatives legislation •Rural banking institution legislation	Passage of relevant legislation	GON	Legislation Executive decrees	Variable	yes	SO2 team
<b>Result 2.3: Bankers work more with microenterprises and informal sector.</b> Proposed measures:						

PERFORMANCE MEASURES	DEFINITION OF MEASURE	DATA SOURCE	METHOD/ APPROACH	FREQUENCY OF DATA COLLECTION	DATA CURRENTLY COLLECTED?	RESPONSIBLE OFFICE
Banks with decentralized financial services	Number of banks	Bank records	Project reports	Semi-annual	no	SO2 team
Guarantee rates	Percent of volume of loans guaranteed	Bank records	Project reports	Semi-annual	no	SO2 team
Leveraging ratio	Multiple of guarantee fund which banks will provide in credit	Bank records	Project reports	Semi-annual	no	SO2 team
Bank staff literate in local languages	Number of staff trained	Bank records	Project reports	Semi-annual	no	SO2 team
<b>Result 2.4: Increased number and size of women's enterprises.</b>						
Proposed measures:						
Loans to women	Of all loans given, percent given to women	WOCCU, CLUSA, CARE	Project reports	Quarterly	yes	SO2 team
Women and girls trained in skills for participation	Number of women and girls educated in literacy, numeracy, economic/civio rights and democracy	WOCCU, CLUSA, CARE	Project reports	Semi-annual	no	SO2 team
Sensitization of men to women's economic role	Number of men completing sensitivity training	WOCCU, CLUSA, CARE	Project reports	Semi-annual	no	SO2 team
IEC MARKETING training for women	Number of women trained Percent women among trainees	WOCCU, CLUSA, CARE	Project reports	Semi-annual	no	SO2 team
<p>NOTE: Result 2.5 can be found on p. 19.</p> <p>*Export data from the Customs Department is considered unreliable. Indeed, there is wide variance between data on livestock exports as provided by the Livestock Department and Customs Department. Because of U.S. legal constraints, USAID is unable to provide assistance in data processing and analysis to the Customs Department. Consultant report (Zella, July 1993) recommends onion production as the best indicator of export activity.</p>						

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## STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 2: BASELINE, PERFORMANCE TARGETS AND ACTUAL RESULTS

PERFORMANCE MEASURES	BASELINE DATA		PERFORMANCE TARGETS AND ACTUAL RESULTS						
	YEAR	VALUE	1993 Actual	1994 Actual (Target)	1995 Actual (Target)	1996 Actual (Target)	1997 Actual (Target)	1998 Actual (Target)	1999 Actual (Target)
<b>Strategic Objective 2: Increase access to markets through use of improved decentralized financial services.</b>									
<b>Proposed measures:</b>									
Credit institutions providing small loans	1985	0	98	148	181	(254)	(314)	(520)	(625)
•Credit unions	1989	0	20	37	60	(80)	(100)	(120)	(140)
•Cooperatives	1989	0	28	49	54	(80)	(90)	(160)	(220)
•Women's groups	1992	0	38	48	53	(70)	(90)	(180)	(140)
•Maradi Microenterprise Bank branches	1985	0	12	14	14	(14)	(14)	(20)	(25)
•Semi-formal Money Savers/Lenders	1995	0	0	0	0	(10)	(20)	(40)	(100)
Credit institutions independent of outside resources	1989	0	7	20	(35)	(50)	(75)	(100)	(125)
Agro-pastoral exports (MT)	TBD								
•Onions									
•Skins and Hides									
•Cowpeas									
•Livestock									
Household expenditures for production	1996	TBD							
Satisfaction with USAID and partners' efforts	1995	TBD							
<b>Result 2.1: More decentralized, viable and transparent financial services.</b>									
<b>Proposed measures:</b>									
Participants in credit institutions in target areas	1987	0	24,714	30,250	(40,000)	(45,000)	(52,000)	(60,000)	(73,000)
•Men			15,539	19,890	(25,000)	(27,000)	(30,000)	(33,000)	(37,000)
•Women			9,175	10,370	(15,000)	(18,000)	(22,000)	(27,000)	(36,000)
Volume of loans/savings accounts (billions FCFA)	1987	0	0.837	1.022	(1.2)	(1.3)	(1.4)	(1.6)	(1.8)
•Men				0.777	(0.888)	(0.910)	(0.910)	(0.960)	(0.990)
•Women				0.245	(0.312)	(0.390)	(0.490)	(0.640)	(0.810)
Loan repayment rate (%)	1993	93%	93%	95%	(90%)	(95%)	(95%)	(90%)	(95%)
Percent of loans at \$300 or below (poverty lending) by gender	1987	0	7	7	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD
Credit institutions receiving democracy and governance training	1995	(0%)	0%	0%	(0%)		(40%)		(70%)
Credit institutions in drought vulnerable areas with mitigation activities	1995	(0%)	0%	0%	(0%)		(20%)		(50%)
Health association with or near financial services	1995	(0%)	0%	0%	(0%)		(15%)		(30%)
NRM associations with or near financial services	1995	(0%)	0%	0%	(0%)		(20%)		(35%)

PERFORMANCE MEASURES	BASELINE DATA		PERFORMANCE TARGETS AND ACTUAL RESULTS						
	YEAR	VALUE	1993 Actual	1994 Actual (Target)	1995 Actual (Target)	1996 Actual (Target)	1997 Actual (Target)	1998 Actual (Target)	1999 Actual (Target)
<b>Result 2.2: Improved environment for microenterprises: Better practices, better laws and better information.</b>									
Proposed measures:									
Illicit payments (1992 FCFA per km.)	1992	54		26	(24)	(22)	(20)	(15)	(10)
Drivers trained in export and transport regulations	1995	(0%)	0%	0%	(0%)	(10%)	(20%)	(35%)	(50%)
MIS expanded							(X)		
Customers find MIS helpful	1997	(0%)					(0%)		(25%)
Ph.D. candidates in economics (cumulative)	1995	(0%)			(0)	(2)	(5)		
Passage of legislation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Credit union legislation</li> <li>•Cooperatives legislation</li> <li>•Rural banking legislation</li> <li>•Legalization of semi-formal lenders/savers</li> </ul>				(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)		
<b>Result 2.3: Bankers work more with microenterprises and informal sector.</b>									
Proposed measures:									
Banks with decentralized financial services	1995	(1)	1	1	(1)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(3)
Guarantee rates	1995	(90%)	100%	90%	(90%)	(85%)	(80%)	(70%)	(60%)
Leveraging ratio	1995	(0)	1	1	(0)	(1.2)	(1.5)	(2.0)	(2.0)
Bank. st. trained in local languages	1990	1	1	0	(0)	(1)	(2)	(5)	(10)
<b>Result 2.4: Increased number and size of women's enterprises.</b>									
Proposed measures:									
Of all loans given, percent given to women	1994	34%		34%	(37%)	(40%)	(42%)	(45%)	(49%)
Women and girls trained in skills for participation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Literacy</li> <li>•Numeracy</li> <li>•Economic/civic rights</li> <li>•Democracy</li> </ul>	1996	TBD							(80,000) (80,000) (40,000) (40,000)
Sensitization of men to women's economic role	1995	TBD							(20,000)
IEC/marketing trainees who are women	1997	(30%)					(25%)	(30%)	(35%)

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### PERFORMANCE MONITORING PLAN FOR STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3

PERFORMANCE MEASURE	DEFINITION OF MEASURE	DATA SOURCE	METHOD/ APPROACH	FREQUENCY OF DATA COLLECTION	DATA CURRENTLY COLLECTED?	RESPONSIBLE OFFICE
<b>Strategic Objective 3: Sustained widespread adoption of management practices improving the conservation and productive use of Niger's forest, fields, waters and pastures.</b> Proposed measures:						
Adoption of improved NRM practices by gender	Percent of heads of households, both women and men, reporting use of one or more new NRM technologies	C/GRN (Interministerial coordinating unit) Direction de la Statistique (DS)	Sample survey	Every 4 years	no	SO3 team
<b>Result 3.1: Niger's rural producers, men and women, gain greater control over their productive environment.</b> Proposed measures:						
Community institutions	Number of registered community institutions actively managing natural resources	C/GRN DS	Records review	Annual	no	SO3 team
Community forest management schemes	Cumulative number of community forest management schemes	Department of Environment (DE) Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Records	Records review	Annual	yes	SO3 team
Nigerian intermediary organizations specializing in NRM	Number of Nigerian organizations specializing in NRM registered with the GON and implementing activities	Ministry of Finance and Plan, NGO division	Records review	Annual	yes	SO3 team
Sub-regional disaster response committees	Number of sub-regional response committees	SAP (Early Warning System)	Records review	Annual	yes	SO3 team
Awareness of new legislation by gender	Percent of parties, both women and men, aware of new laws in adjudicated land tenure cases	Permanent Secretary of the Rural Code	Records review Sample survey	Annual Every 4 years	no	SO3 team

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PERFORMANCE MEASURE	DEFINITION OF MEASURE	DATA SOURCE	METHOD/ APPROACH	FREQUENCY OF DATA COLLECTION	DATA CURRENTLY COLLECTED?	RESPONSIBLE OFFICE
<b>Result 3.2: Increased producer access to technical information.</b> Proposed measures:						
Knowledge of technical information	Percent of heads of households, both women and men, able to identify at least one new NRM method	C/GRN DS	Sample survey	Every 4 years	no	S03 team
Awareness of new NRM technologies	Percent of heads of households, both women and men, in communities targeted by NRM projects able to describe at least one NRM practice used in another village	C/GRN DS	Sample survey	Every 4 years	no	S03 team
Access by rural producers to marketing and climatic information by gender	Percent of heads of households, both women and men, in target communities with access to market and climatic reporting services	C/GRN DS	Sample survey	Semi-annual	no	S03 team
<b>Result 3.3: Increased capital available for communities and individuals to invest in NRM practices.</b> Proposed measures:						
National NRM project financing levels	Level of financing, and percent increase, of projects promoting community-level NRM activities	C/GRN	Records review	Annual	no	S03 team
Access to funding	Percent of heads of households, both women and men, reporting access to funds	C/GRN DS	Sample survey	Every 4 years	no	S03 team
<b>Result 3.4: National capacity to promote and sustain results 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 is improved.</b> Proposed measures:						
Implementation of a national-scale short-term impact monitoring system	Application by GON and NGOs	C/GRN	Official documents	Annual	no	S03 team
National NRM plan	Creation by GON with donor approval	C/GRN	Official documents	Occasional updates	no	S03 team
National disaster coordination unit	Creation by GON with donor approval	GON SAP	Official documents	One-time	no	S03 team

PERFORMANCE MEASURE	DEFINITION OF MEASURE	DATA SOURCE	METHOD/ APPROACH	FREQUENCY OF DATA COLLECTION	DATA CURRENTLY COLLECTED?	RESPONSIBLE OFFICE
National disaster management plan	Creation by GON with donor approval	GON SAP	Official documents	Occasional updates	no	SO3 team
District disbursement of funds	GON authorization for district-level disbursement of funds	GON SAP	Official documents	One-time	no	SO3 team
NOTE: Result 3.5 can be found on p. 19.						

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### STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3: BASELINE, PERFORMANCE TARGETS AND ACTUAL RESULTS

PERFORMANCE MEASURES	BASELINE DATA		PERFORMANCE TARGETS AND ACTUAL RESULTS					
	YEAR	VALUE	1995 Actual (Target)	1996 Actual (Target)	1997 Actual (Target)	1998 Actual (Target)	1999 Actual (Target)	2000 Actual (Target)
<b>Strategic Objective 3: Sustained widespread adoption of management practices improving the conservation and productive use of Niger's forests, fields, waters and pastures.</b>								
<b>Proposed indicators:</b>								
Heads of households, both women and men, reporting improved NRM practices: soil & water conservation measures; agro-forestry; natural forest management; soil fertility measures; livestock/range management	1996	TBD			(+5%)		(+20%)	
<b>Result 3.1: Niger's rural producers, men and women, gain greater control over their productive environment.</b>								
<b>Proposed measures:</b>								
Registered community institutions actively managing natural resources	1995	10	(10)		(35)			(300)
Community forest resource management schemes (cumulative)								(25)
Registered Nigerian Intermediary organizations specializing in NRM	1995	6	(5)		(15)			
Sub-regional response committees	1995	0		(24)				
Parties in land-tenure cases aware of new laws (by gender)								
<b>Result 3.2: Increased producers access to technical information.</b>								
<b>Proposed measures:</b>								
Heads of households identifying one new NRM practice (target areas, by gender)	1996	TBD			(25%)			
Heads of households able to describe one NRM practice used in another village (target areas, by gender)	1996	TBD			(10%)			
Access by heads of households to marketing and climatic information (target areas, by gender)	1996	TBD					(70%)	
<b>Result 3.3: Increased capital available for communities and individuals to invest in NRM practices.</b>								
<b>Proposed measures:</b>								
Level of financing of community-level NRM projects Percent change	1995	TBD						
Access to funding by heads of households (target areas, by gender)	1996	TBD						
<b>Result 3.4: National capacity to promote and sustain results 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 is improved.</b>								
<b>Proposed measures:</b>								
Application of national-scale short-term impacts monitoring system by GON and NGOs					(X)			
Creation of national NRM plan								
Creation of a national disaster coordination unit								
Creation of a national disaster management plan								

PERFORMANCE MEASURES	BASELINE DATA		PERFORMANCE TARGETS AND ACTUAL RESULTS					
	YEAR	VALUE	1995 Actual (Target)	1996 Actual (Target)	1997 Actual (Target)	1998 Actual (Target)	1999 Actual (Target)	2000 Actual (Target)
GON authorization for district-level disbursement of funds								

BEST AVAILABLE DOCUMENT

**PERFORMANCE MONITORING PLAN FOR CROSS-CUTTING RESULT 1.5, 2.5, and 3.5**

PERFORMANCE MEASURE	DEFINITION OF MEASURE	DATA SOURCE	METHOD/ APPROACH	FREQUENCY OF DATA COLLECTION	DATA CURRENTLY COLLECTED?	RESPONSIBLE OFFICE
<b>Result 1-3.5: A public well informed of key policies and legislation affecting citizens' rights and responsibilities.</b>						
<b>Proposed measures:</b>						
Knowledge of local government functioning and role	Number of local councils trained in local governance and local policy issues (in target areas of SO1, SO2 and SO3)	Ministry of Interior	Records review	Annual	no	DG, SO teams
<b>SO1: Public health.</b>						
Awareness of key Family Code and health policy issues	Percent of heads of households, both women and men, able to identify at least one health policy issue	C/GRN DS	Sample survey	Every 4 years	no	SO1 team
Awareness of rights and responsibilities	Percent of heads of households, both women and men, able to identify statements of their rights	C/GRN DS	Sample survey	Every 4 years	no	SO1 team
<b>SO2: Financial services.</b>						
Transporters trained in export and transportation regulations	Number of drivers trained	Training Office D/G grantees	Records review Project data	Semi-annual	no	SO2 team
Availability of marketing information	Expansion of or additional MIS services in place	Policy monitoring activity	Project data	Semi-annual	no	SO2 team
Customers find MIS helpful	Percent of interested customers who listen to the expanded MIS or new MIS and find it helpful	Contractor (TBD)	Sample survey	Annual	no	SO2 team
Sensitization of men to women's economic role	Number of men completing sensitivity training	WOCCU, CLUSA, CARE	Project reports	Semi-annual	no	SO2 team
<b>SO3: Natural resources.</b>						
Awareness of new legislation	Percent of parties, both women and men, aware of new laws in adjudicated land tenure cases	Permanent Secretary of the Rural Code	Records review Sample survey	Annual Every 4 years	no	SO3 team

**BEST AVAILABLE DOCUMENT**

PERFORMANCE MEASURE	DEFINITION OF MEASURE	DATA SOURCE	METHOD/ APPROACH	FREQUENCY OF DATA COLLECTION	DATA CURRENTLY COLLECTED?	RESPONSIBLE OFFICE
Knowledge of technical information	Percent of heads of households, both women and men, able to identify at least one new NRM method	C/GRN DS	Sample survey	Every 4 years	no	SO3 team
Awareness of new NRM technologies	Percent of heads of households, both women and men, in target communities able to describe at least one NRM practice used in another village	C/GRN DS	Sample survey	Every 4 years	no	SO3 team
NOTE: Some of these repeat measures already included under SO results.						

### CROSS-CUTTING RESULT 1-3.5: BASELINE, PERFORMANCE TARGETS AND ACTUAL RESULTS

PERFORMANCE MEASURES	BASELINE DATA		PERFORMANCE TARGETS AND ACTUAL RESULTS						
	YEAR	VALUE	1993 Actual	1994 Actual	1995 Actual (Target)	1996 Actual (Target)	1997 Actual (Target)	1998 Actual (Target)	1999 Actual (Target)
<b>Result 1-3.5: A public well informed of key policies and legislation affecting citizens' rights and responsibilities.</b>									
<b>Proposed measures:</b>									
Local councils trained in local governance and local policy issues	TBD								
<b>SO1: Public health.</b>									
Heads of households identifying at least one health policy issue	TBD								
Heads of households identifying statements of their rights (by gender)	TBD								
<b>SO2: Financial services.</b>									
Drivers trained in export and transportation regulations	1995	(0%)	0%	0%	(0%)	(10%)	(20%)	(35%)	(50%)
MIS expanded							(X)		
Customers find MIS helpful	1997	(0%)					(0%)		(25%)
Sensitization of men to women's economic role	1995	TBD							(20,000)
<b>SO3: Natural resources.</b>									
Parties in land-tenure cases aware of new laws (by gender)									
Heads of households identifying one new NRM practice (by gender, target areas)	1996	TBD					(25%)		
Heads of households able to describe one NRM practice used in another village (by gender, target areas)	1996	TBD					(10%)		

## **ANNEX B: NIGER MACRO-ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE<sup>1</sup>**

### **Highlights of Niger's macro-economy:**

- **Eighty percent of Nigeriens rely on subsistence farming, made difficult by poor soil and arid conditions of the Sahel.**
- **The "formal" sector was estimated in late 1994 to include no more than about 80,000 workers; public enterprises are the principle source of employment in the formal sector, including about 35,000 employees.**
- **Uranium is the principal source of income and foreign exchange in the small modern sector. A boom in uranium prices in the late 1970's lead to overspending and borrowing by the GON--a problem which persists in the form of large fiscal deficits and heavy indebtedness.**
- **Low revenues resulting mainly from poor tax collection, has been a major problem for the GON since the early eighties; finding ways to increase revenues vis-a-vis expenditures is a main challenge facing the government.**
- **Nigeriens until recently have engaged in little systematic economic analysis or policy-making due to political and security instability and a lack of local capacity.**
- **Niger is a member of the West African, UEMOA (Union Economique Monetaire de l'Ouest Africain) franc zone, yet its economy is heavily affected by economic (and political) conditions in its much larger, economically dominant neighbor, Nigeria.**
- **50% devaluation of the CFA currency in January, 1994 was followed by Paris Club rescheduling and some forgiveness of a substantial portion of Niger's high external debt burden; domestic arrears remain very high.**
- **CFA/Naira parallel exchange rates in 1994 appreciated in favor of the CFA; exports to Nigeria resumed. Impacts of the devaluation followed a classical model: imports declined, exports and inflation increased; these changes favored rural producers.**
- **Niger reached a stabilization, Stand-by Agreement with the IMF in April, 1994; Niger's special drawing rights, however, were suspended later in the year until the GON finds a better formula for meeting revenue/expenditure targets.**
- **Niger's immediate economic challenges are to: adjust to the January, 1994 CFA devaluation and accompanying inflation; increase revenues; reduce domestic debt; avoid greater external debt; and reach a satisfactory economic restructuring agreement with the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.**

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<sup>1</sup> Adapted from a paper by Ousmane Samba Mamadou, Program Economist, USAID/Niger, August, 1994.

**A brief economic history:**

- 1960-1974: The First Republic, led by Hamani Diori, included the 1973-74 drought and ended with the coup led by Lt. Colonel Seyni Kountché, who suspended the constitution. A major drought caused long-term population displacements. Uranium prices rose.
- 1975-1981: Large increases in the price and quantity of uranium produced in this period enabled the new regime to undertake a major expansion of public expenditures. However, in 1979 uranium prices began a steep decline and President Kountché initiated a "self-designed and implemented" severe economic austerity program.
- 1982-1985: A period of shock and efforts toward economic restabilization. Following drastic reductions in the price of uranium, the GON engaged IMF assistance to help master persistent macro-economic and financial problems.
- 1986-1988: Adjustment and tentative moves toward democracy. A Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) with World Bank and assistance from the International Monetary Fund began. Following the death of President Kountché in 1987, Colonel Saibou became head of state. A partial democratization resulted in the drafting of a new constitution and the creation of a civilian, one-party state approved by referendum. The one-candidate Presidential election held in 1989, led to promulgation of Niger's Second Republic.
- 1989-1992: The Second Republic and transitional government provided the backdrop for a forced and unorganized adjustment period. Under pressure from the powerful trade union (USTN) and the Nigerien Students Association, the government permitted multiple political parties and called a National Conference. The transition period lasted until a new constitution was adopted, legislative elections held and assumption of power by a new government at the end of March, 1993. The transitional government introduced a short term emergency stabilization program to deal with immediate macroeconomic problems, but this failed to help achieve the required fiscal balances. The Nigerien economy rapidly declined. Nigerien officials seemed aware that refusal to adopt structural policies was not preventing the economy from a forced and disorganized adjustment process, but instead was plunging Niger's economy into a deeper crisis requiring an even more severe adjustment program.
- 1993-present: Niger's very successful transition to constitutional, democratic government in April, 1993 establishes the Third Republic. Main macroeconomic events include the CFA devaluation, abrupt changes in Nigerian export and monetary policies, and resumption of negotiations between the GON and the Bretton Woods institutions. On January 12, 1994, all members of the WAMU (West African Monetary Union) agreed to a 50 percent devaluation of the CFA vis-à-vis the French franc, to which the CFA had been pegged at the rate of FF 1 = CFA 50. The main objective was to restore competitiveness, growth and employment in the CFA countries by ending the overvaluation of their real exchange rate and helping them achieve an effective structural adjustment. These countries also created the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UMOA) to strengthen integration of their economies, although Nigeria remains outside that framework. Though Niger and the U.S.A. enjoy excellent bilateral relations, there is little in their relationship of a strategic nature, notwithstanding the fact that Niger borders Libya, Nigeria and five other countries.

## II. ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

The uranium boom in the late 1970s produced many distortions in Niger's overall economic performance. On the demand side, Niger's economy behaved asymmetrically, fully adjusting during the seventies uranium boom to meet the increase in domestic income, but avoiding needed adjustments during the price fall in the eighties. On the supply side, distortionary producer price policies discouraged production of tradeable agricultural products. Both problems required reforms.

### 1. The Structure of Gross Domestic Product

*The rural agriculture and livestock sector* accounts for almost 40 percent of Niger's GDP and provides employment for about 80 percent of the population. Less than 20 percent of Niger's land is used for agricultural production. Related problems include limited and declining rainfall, rapid population growth and low crop yields.

Among the major cash crops in Niger, cowpeas, groundnuts, cotton and onions accounted (together with green beans and gum arabic) for about 14 percent of export earnings during 1989 and 1992. Because of a lack of domestic and external demand, groundnut production declined by 31 percent in 1989-92 as compared to the 1985-88 period. Onion production increased significantly in recent years and became the second largest export crop after cowpeas; onion production rose from an average of 230,000 tons per year in 1985-88 to 309,000 tons in 1989-92.

According to the IMF, this improved performance resulted from the abolition of indicative producer prices and the greater involvement of the private sector in marketing and processing following the liquidation of the official marketing agency, SONARA.<sup>2</sup> Part of this improvement was due to the substantial reforms introduced by the GON under USAID's Niger Economic Policy Reform Program (NEPRP), which involves reductions of informal taxes and costs of transportation of exports of livestock and other cash crops.

The livestock sector accounted for about 13 percent of Niger's GDP and 14 percent of its export earnings in 1989-92. Though gradually recovering from the 1984 drought, by 1992 the stock of cattle was still estimated to be 46 percent below its pre-drought size. The decline in the nomadic population, from an estimated 10 percent of the population in 1980 to about 3.6 percent by 1992 is both a cause and an effect of these changes.


*The manufacturing sector* consists mainly of production of basic import-substitution and processing of domestic agricultural products. It employed about 3,000 people in 1992, but accounts for only one percent of the GDP and four percent of the value added by the modern sector. The growth of this sector is constrained by the narrow domestic market, the lack of skilled labor, low per capita income and a low level of entrepreneurship. During the 1980s, the loss of external competitiveness due to the real exchange rate overvaluation—in particular vis-à-vis the naira—worsened the vulnerability of this sector.

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<sup>2</sup> Recent Economic Development, IMF, September 1994.

During the uranium boom period, the share of *the mining sector* in the GDP more than doubled, from 5.9 percent in 1975 to 12.6 percent in 1980.<sup>3</sup> A *construction and public works* boom was stimulated by the revenues from this boom, and its share of the GDP doubled from 3 to 6 percent between 1975-1981 and now accounts for about eleven percent in recent years. Commerce, transport and services have accounted for about 35 percent of GDP for some years. Government and import taxes and duties account for the remainder of the GDP, declining slightly over recent years to 11 and two percent, respectively.

In the 1975-80 period, Niger's economy experienced an unprecedented prosperity as a result of substantial increases in revenues from the uranium sector, good rainfall, and a substantial inflow of external aid. This resulted in a 5.6 percent average annual real GDP growth rate and a 2.8 percent real GDP per capita annual growth rate.



As a result of the uranium price slump and of the stabilization (fiscal and monetary) measures that

followed, real GDP per head fell by an annual rate of 5.7 percent over the 1980-85 period, worsened by the 1984 drought. It rose slightly in 1985-88 with the adoption of a structural adjustment program but slumped again in 1988-92 when social turmoil and political crisis led the government to abandon the SAP program. The transitional government's short-term stabilization reform program had no real success in reducing domestic demand.<sup>4</sup>

**1.2- Overall demand (absorption): Evolution and trade-offs**

While the uranium boom resulted in a significant increase in Niger's overall expenditures, domestic absorption was slow to adjust when the situation was reversed in the 1980's. Such asymmetric behavior, with the GON trying to postpone the necessary adjustment, further worsened Niger's macroeconomic crisis. Further evidence of mismanagement of the "shock" in Niger can be seen by looking at the structure of domestic absorption. During the adjustment periods, there was a trade-off in the demand behavior in favor of consumption so that only domestic investment seems to have supported the burden of adjustment, with all the negative consequences on Niger's long term growth this implies (see table 1).

<sup>3</sup> The share of mining in the total GDP had declined to 5.6 percent by 1992. IMF, RED, 9/93.

<sup>4</sup> Note: thanks to a second straight year of good rainfall, devaluation of the CFA and exchange rate appreciation of the naira, and strong rural responses, the GDP was estimated to have grown at least 2.6% in 1994, of which the agricultural sector contributed about 8.5% growth.

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Table 1: Domestic Absorption indicators - Average levels

Average values	1970-74	1975-82	1983-88	1989-92
Real Final Consumption (base 1987)-billion cfa	297.13	537.74	623.89	689.81
Real Domestic Investment-in cfa	36.46	161.94	81.70	59.10
Real Fin. Cons./capita (thousand cfa)	67.36	100.24	93.66	85.31
Real domestic Inv. per capita-thsd(?) cfa	2.90	20.02	11.95	7.17
Ratio Fin. Cons./GDP	0.50	0.90	0.94	0.97
Ratio Dom. Inv./GDP	0.06	0.26	0.12	0.08
Final Consumption in billion cfa	101.00	349.12	614.77	620.44
Domestic Investment in billion cfa	12.80	110.50	78.70	55.29

Sources: Author's calculation based upon data from the DSCN, *Direction de la Statistique et des Comptes Nationaux* (Ministry of Plan)

### 1.3- Employment, wage and prices

The vast majority of Nigeriens work in subsistence agriculture. Thus, changes in wages and the consumer price index has limited impact on average standards of living, especially since many do not receive wages and are not in the "money" economy. Nevertheless, links between urban and rural people are strong, and policies and processes in the formal and urban sector reveal interesting features of Niger's recent economic history.

The GON's employment and wage policy partially explain some of the figures in Table 1. During the 1980's, and despite the financial crisis that Niger's economy was experiencing, the GON's policy of systematically offering jobs to newly graduated students resulted in a steady growth of civil service employment. While private and parastatal sector employment decreased from levels reached during the uranium boom<sup>5</sup>, government employment increased at an annual average rate of four percent from 23,600 people in 1980 to 39,000 people in 1992. During the same period, the government wage bill rose from CFA 16.6 billion to CFA 38.9 billion (IMF).


After tripling between 1975 and 1984, the African (as opposed to the European) consumption price index slightly declined in 1984-92 (see Table no.2).<sup>6</sup> With the exception of the six percent increase granted in 1988 by the newly nominated president, nominal wage rates in government administration have remained unchanged. Following a 45 percent increase in the CPI in 1980-84, the average annual real wage decreased from about CFA 924,000 per capita

<sup>5</sup> According to IMF (1992) levels currently are about the same as at the beginning of the 1980's.

<sup>6</sup> The African CPI doubled from 1975 to 1980. See *Annuaire Statistique*, DSCN (Ministry of Plan).

in 1980 to CFA 657,000 in 1984.

As a result of price stability and some disinflation in 1984-92, real average wages per annum increased to CFA 1,080,000 per civil servant in 1992 (see Table 2). Though nominal average wage per civil servant increased by an annual average rate of about seven percent, the nominal minimum guaranteed wage (SMIG) has remained fixed at CFA 109/hour since 1980 as



part of self-designed austerity measures by Kountché's government. As a result, price increases have most affected poor civil servants. From 1980 to 1992, increases in real average wage per civil servant have been higher than those of the poorer class (i.e., those earning the SMIG). In the case of decreases in real earnings, losses appear to be much lower for the non-poor (see Table 2). Distribution of income among civil servants thus widened during the eighties, mainly because highly educated people continued to be hired by the GON, while those already hired continued to benefit from regular promotions.

In 1993, as part of its effort to contain public expenditures, the newly elected third government reached an agreement with the powerful trade union (USTN) on a substantial civil service wage cut. Following the CFA devaluation, the GON decided to raise civil servants salaries by 5 to 12 percent, after having cancelled the already agreed 1993 wage cut. However, the USTN demanded a 30-50 percent increase. After a series of short-term strikes followed by a two month strike, an agreement was worked out by which each civil servant received a lump-sum nominal increase of between 7 and 10 thousand CFA in addition to the initial 5 to 12 percent salary re-evaluation.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> The GON was still in arrears on salary payments as of March, 1995.

**Table 2:** Average Salary per Civil Servant and per year in Niger (relative periodic difference in %)

	1980	1984	1989	1990	1992
Nominal Average wage per civil servant (000 cfa)	711.8	735.55	932.15	980.15	997.44
Constant 1987 Average wage per civil servant (000 cfa)	923.74	657.27 (-28.7%)	973.18 (+47.9%)	1,006.5 (+3.44%)	1,083 (+7.6%)
Nominal Minimum guaranteed wage per year (000cfa)	226.776	226.776	226.776	226.776	226.77
Constant 1987 yearly SMIG (000cfa)	294.13	202.84 (-31%)	236.71 (+16.7%)	237.71 (+0.4%)	246.22 (+3.6%)
Average African CPI base 100 1987	77.1	111.8	95.8	95.4	92.1


Source: Author's calculation based upon data from IMF reports and Ministry of Plan (DSCN) statistics

### III - MACROECONOMIC POLICY CONSTRAINTS AND EFFECTIVENESS

#### 1- Public Finance: Fiscal Policy Constraints and Effectiveness

Despite the recommendations in almost all adjustment programs signed by the GON since 1983--designed to reduce governmental intervention--Niger's economy continues to rely heavily on the public sector as the principal economic agent, employing the major part of the modern sector labor force and providing the most important outlet for local economic operators. Niger's fiscal policy is characterized by the following features which constrain overall growth of the economy:

-1) *A distortionary tax collection system and declining tax-to-GDP ratio.* The tax system encourages informal sector development and seriously hurts expansion of the modern sector, which bears virtually the entire fiscal burden. As a result, tax revenues have been declining, seriously undermining the GON's capacity to undertake social and long term development programs. The tax-to-GDP ratio, which averaged 11 percent in 1976-81, (already a very low level as compared to other countries in the sub-region), averaged 9.5



percent during the adjustment period and further fell to 7.45 percent in 1989-92. For the FY 1993, this ratio was estimated at 6.6 percent (see Graph).


-2) To meet its revenue targets, *the GON resorted to non-optimal expenditure structures and trade-offs*. From an average 9.2 percent in 1976-81, the current expenditure ratio to GDP rose to about 12.3 percent in 1989-92, while the capital expenditure ratio fell from 11.9 to 6.6 percent during the same period. By 1993, these ratios were estimated at 12.9 and 5.1 percent, respectively. Relatively high current expenditures have thus been maintained in the context of serious revenue constraints. This has led to accumulation of important domestic payments arrears and also affected informal sector growth.

As a consequence of stabilization measures adopted between 1982 and 1988, all fiscal deficits (overall, primary and current) were reduced during that period as compared to the preceding one (1976-81). Moreover, even better results were obtained during 1986-88 (the SAP period) compared to the pure stabilization period (1982-85), as a result of better coordination by donors (IMF, World Bank, France, USAID and EC) in defining their conditionalities. The situation worsened, however, in the 1989-92 period when large budget deficits resumed. In 1993, the overall deficit (excluding grants), represented about 5.5 percent of GDP versus 0.6 percent in 1986-1988. The wage bill in early and mid 1994 was about 80% of total tax revenue; by mid to late 1994 the wage bill had risen to over 110 percent of tax revenues.

Severe fiscal deficits primarily are due to: (1) increased movement of the economy towards the informal sector during the adjustment period and resultant tax loss; (2) abandonment of the WB/IMF Structural Adjustment reforms as a result of growing social troubles and the loss of government authority to carry out economic reforms.

Consequently, the short-term emergency program introduced by the transitional government in 1992 failed to deal with more immediate financial problems. Unable to increase fiscal revenues and obtain more external financing, the GON resorted to accumulation of large (mostly domestic) payment arrears to finance increasing deficits.

So far sheltered from the macroeconomic crisis and considered the most dynamic part of the Niger's economy, the informal sector increasingly is affected by the accumulation of domestic arrears. On the demand side, this is occurring because actions by the government, the principal economic agent in Niger's economy, have significant multiplier effects on the



informal sector's activities through its expenditures on wages. By reducing civil servants' purchasing power, salary arrears reduce informal sector incomes. On the supply side, domestic arrears constrain the capacity of entrepreneurs (most of whom are in the informal sector) to expand their activities by limiting availability of finance capital.

In addition, accumulation of *external payment arrears* have discouraged *external capital inflows* and further constrain the GON's long-term development strategy.

These fiscal problems remain as central features of the 1994 GON budget. While forecasts of tax revenues, grants and expenditures have been increased to take into account the possible impacts of the January 12, 1994 CFA devaluation, under-performance in tax collection still persists (see Table 3). As of May 1994, only 23 percent of the revised tax revenue forecasted for 1994 had been actually recovered while 40 percent of the civil servants salary had been paid. In nominal terms, while CFA 15.8 billion of planned taxes had been collected, about CFA 19 billion had been paid for salaries. This clearly demonstrates the role played by the substantial external assistance the GON received following the decision to devalue the CFA and adopt structural reforms.<sup>9</sup>

A joint IMF/WB mission to Niger to assess the management of the post-devaluation economy noted (May, 1994) that while monetary policy targets had been met by the GON, serious weaknesses remained in the management of fiscal policy. Despite the revision of the initially assigned revenue target for the first quarter of 1994 from CFA 12 billion to CFA 9 billion, the GON had not met the revised objectives, primarily as a result of a 21-day strike in the customs office.<sup>9</sup>

Public expenditure management showed similar problems. While some progress has been made in controlling wage rate increases, the GON decided to pay three months of wage bill arrears instead of only one month, as agreed with the IMF. Thus, external assistance comes to be used to pay domestic wage (suppliers') arrears while reducing development investments. The payment of cumulative domestic arrears to domestic suppliers is a main issue raised by IMF/WB teams and other donors. Low revenues, resulting from poor tax collection, is the major macroeconomic constraint that the GON has been facing since the early eighties, and finding ways to increase revenues vis-a-vis expenditures is the main challenge facing the government.

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<sup>9</sup> 47% of expected external financing (44.3 % of expected grants) were received by May.

<sup>9</sup> For this reason, in late 1994 Niger's drawing rights were suspended under the IMF Stand-by Agreement.

Table 3: GON Budget FY 1984, Impact of Devaluation and Actual Accomplishments by May 1984

	Initial FY 84 forecasts (before devaluation)- in billion cfa	FY 84 Budget revised after devaluation billion cfa)	Percent increase	% accomplishment in May 84
Total budget revenues	57.60	78.70	36.8%	23.3%
Tax revenues	49.17	68.62	39.6%	23.0%
Tot. External Financing of which	87.36	238.70	173.2%	46.8%
- Loan	25.50	82.70	224.3%	17.1%
- Grants	37.50	81.70	117.9%	44.3%
- Exceptional	42.14	105.30	148.9%	66.3%
Tot. Expenditure (commitment basis)	140.13	231.1	64.9%	25.0%
Current Expenditure of which	76.61	121.18	58.2%	29.7%
- Wage bill	36.00	47.65	32.0%	40.0%
- Domestic interest	1.07	2.8	161.7%	20.0%
- External interest	8.22	23.5	185.9%	16.9%
Capital expenditure of which	62.70	109.56	74.7%	21.3%
- grant financed	31.90	54.08	69.5%	37.0%
Changes in arrears	-12.12	-23.37	92.8%	306.0%

Source: Author's calculation base upon the Ministry of Plan (DAEEFF) data.


## 2- Domestic Credit, Monetary Policy and External Debt Problems: Foreign and Domestic Finance in Niger

During the uranium boom of 1975-81, Niger's economic agents (private and public) increased their consumption and investment both in real terms per capita and as a percentage of GDP. This increase in domestic absorption also was stimulated by expansion of domestic credit to the economy from the banking sector. From 1975 to 1982, credit of all types, especially short term, expanded both in real terms per capita and in percentage of GDP.<sup>10</sup>

During the same period, the ratio of outstanding debt to GDP significantly expanded, as the GON used uranium as collateral to borrow heavily from abroad, mostly from private financial institutions. Thus, the ratio of outstanding debt to GDP began to increase sharply after 1978, when a second uranium mine opened.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Long-term credit plateaued by 1979 while short-term continued to expand until 1983.

<sup>11</sup> From 1979-83 Niger's authorities launched a 5-year ambitious economic and social plan that required heavy external financing.




When the uranium boom ended, Niger refused to cut back on expenditures, instead maintaining past, unsustainable levels of consumption.<sup>12</sup>

However, as a member of the West African Monetary Union Niger had to follow a rigorous monetary and fiscal policy to avoid unbearable deficits and inflation. The GON circumvented this principle during the shocks in the 1980s. On the one hand, it effectively restricted short-term

domestic credit to the economy in accordance with the monetary union recommendations; on the other, it resorted to substantial external borrowing to finance high, unreasonable consumption.

The external borrowing strategy adopted during the seventies boom resulted in a substantial increase in the debt service in the early 1980's. The GON was less and less able to finance both its balance of payments and fiscal deficits. Accumulation of both domestic and external payments arrears became the new strategy of deficit financing in 1982. Through this strategy the GON evaded the WAMU restrictive principle that would otherwise have obliged it to adjust in the early days of the uranium shocks. As a result of this postponement of adjustment measures, the real exchange rate appreciated and competitiveness continued to fall. This made eventual adjustment both more difficult and unavoidable.



<sup>12</sup> Its price and demand in the international markets collapsed as of 1982

#### IV - EXTERNAL TRADE, PAYMENTS AND DEBT

In analyzing this aspect of Niger's economy, the following caveat must be kept in mind: Niger's foreign trade statistics are not fully reliable because they do not reflect informal cross-border transactions, particularly with Nigeria. The main characteristic of Niger's exports are their concentration on a few commodities: especially uranium (which still accounts for about 70 percent of total export earnings) and on agricultural products (livestock, hides and skins, cowpeas, onions, etc.).<sup>13</sup> Food, petroleum products, energy, intermediate and capital goods constitute the major part of Niger's imports.

During the uranium boom, despite the substantial increase in uranium exports, the trade deficit has expanded sharply in 1976-81. The sudden rise in national income and resultant consumption demand permitted or encouraged fiscal and monetary mismanagement. The boom in the uranium mining sector constrained development of other industries. This occurred as domestic resources flowed into uranium and left other sectors of the economy underdeveloped. Niger's imports increased greatly to accommodate the boom while domestic industries were starved of resources. Thus, ironically, Niger's uranium boom resulted in an increased trade deficit. As mentioned earlier, imports of equipment and consumption goods were stimulated by the expansive budgetary policy and external borrowing strategy adopted by Niger's government during that period.

Table 4: Niger's Exports in Billions of CFA by Products (Percentage of Total Exports)


Product	1986	1988	1990	1992
Uranium	88.7 (77.3%)	81.9 (74.2%)	60.4 (73.1%)	50.300 (67.2%)
Livestock & Livestock Products	10.3 (9.0%)	12.7 (11.8%)	12.12 (14.8%)	11.600 (15.4%)
Cowpeas	7.8 (6.8%)	5.1 (4.6%)	1.3 (1.6%)	1.600 (2.1%)
Other Agriculture Products	8.0 (7.0%)	10.2 (9.3%)	8.7 (10.5%)	11.500 (15.3%)
Total	114.800	109.900	82.600	74.900

Sources: Niger - Recent Economic Development, IMF, Sept. 1994

Despite the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) adopted by the GON in 1986-1990, Niger's exports fell significantly. The relative rigidity of imports permitted substantial cash transfer (NPA) assistance from the IMF, WB, USAID and other donors, resulted in a slight deterioration of Niger's trade balance. While Niger's import levels were more or less maintained, there was an increase in imports of consumption goods, while the share of intermediary and capital goods decreased.


<sup>13</sup> Mainly exported to Nigeria, most of these agricultural product suffered loss of competitiveness during the mid-1980's mainly due to the Structural Adjustment Program adopted by the Nigerian government, and to the resulting depreciation of the naira.

After the suspension of the SAP agreed to with the Bretton Woods institutions, a two-year period (1990-92) of forced and disorganized adjustment began. Very strong constraints on Niger's capacity to import (most external aid had been suspended) resulted in a slight improvement in the trade balance. However, the composition of imports continued to move more strongly toward consumption and away from capital goods.



As domestic investment exceeded domestic savings (increasing the resource gap) and as fiscal deficits increased, the current account deficit (the sum of fiscal deficit and resource gap) increased significantly. Further, while government revenues fell (due mainly to the slump in uranium export revenues and to growing problems in tax collection), high levels of imports and consumption (private as well as public expenditures) were maintained.<sup>14</sup>

Both trade and current account balances deteriorated during the seventies and worsened in the eighties, when debt repayment problems began. Since 1986, the current account deficit (excluding official transfers) stabilized at about 10 percent of GDP versus a 17 percent average in 1980-82. However, all current transaction deficits (with or without official transfers) have been decreasing since 1987 (during the forced



adjustment period). In the early 1990's it became clear that more sacrifices and structural adjustment measures were needed to meet the increasing macroeconomic problems.

## V- FUTURE GROWTH PROSPECTS

### 1- The CFA devaluation and Nigerian policies

Deep economic and institutional changes have taken place within the CFA zone since 1993 when the three basic principles of the Zone were questioned and revised.

<sup>14</sup> Interest payments on external debts increased sharply and also other current expenditures, especially civil servants' salaries).

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1. In early August 1993, the Central Bank of West Africa (BCEAO) suspended repurchase of CFA banknotes circulating both outside and within the Franc Zone (i.e. between the WAMU and Central African countries), thus limiting the "free transfer of money" that has characterized the Franc Zone.

2. The "common management of exchange reserves" principle which assures an unlimited convertibility of the CFA through the French franc, whatever the size of external deficit incurred by the member countries, also was affected by the August 1993 repurchase decision.<sup>15</sup> The CFA situation has changed from one of unlimited to limited convertibility.

3. The CFA-FF parity, fixed since 1948, was halved in January 11, 1994 when the CFA countries decided to devalue their currency. The only principle which remains is the use of CFA as "common currency" by all the member countries.

At the same time, dramatic political and economic changes occurred in Nigeria, whose new economic policy strongly enforced external trade restrictions and returned Nigeria to the fixed exchange rate regime. The Naira was pegged to the US dollar at twenty-two to one.<sup>16</sup> These changes occurred only three days before the CFA devaluation. Following these changes in both Niger's and Nigeria's economic policies, the CFA/Naira parallel exchange rate appreciated in favor of the CFA. As a result, Niger's exports to Nigeria resumed. By late 1994, however, the naira/CFA exchange rate in parallel markets had risen rapidly from 85/1000 to 130/1000.

Suspension of CFA repurchasing, CFA devaluation, and naira revaluation have induced growing problems of high liquidity in Niger banks. Chronic problems over recent years have led to the closure of numerous Nigerien banks. Since January 1994, the few remaining banks have accumulated large stores of CFA, yet credit in the formal sector is very limited. Banks state that their loan policies are restrictive due to poor repayment rates.

Nevertheless, although there are several adverse trends which CFA devaluation has not corrected, it seems too early to make a reliable assessment of the effects of the CFA devaluation on Niger's competitiveness. For the population as a whole, preliminary impacts appear to follow a classical model: imports are down, exports and inflation have increased; and these changes generally have favored rural producers.<sup>17</sup>

#### 4.2- Regional Integration

Monetary integration through the WAMU has not yet brought about discernably stronger trade between the members of this union.<sup>18</sup> According to some experts, the intra-WAMU trade is less than 3 percent of the total external trade of these countries. However, because the

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<sup>15</sup> This principle works through the "Operation Account" opened in the French Treasury books, in which member countries are to deposit at least 65% of their official foreign assets in counterpart of France guarantee of the CFA franc convertibility at the rate of FF 1 = CFA 50.

<sup>16</sup> The rate of exchange had been around Naira 44-48 = one dollar when the naira was allowed to fluctuate.

<sup>17</sup> Early effects on cross-border trade have been documented in USAID/Niger cables #01177 in February, 1994.

<sup>18</sup> Benin, Burkina, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo.

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CFA is pegged to the FF (with an overvalued real exchange rate), France has remained the principal formal trade partner of all these countries, particularly for their imports. The recent CFA devaluation should be an opportunity to reinforce regional trade links by encouraging WAMU members to shift their trade towards each other.

Following the devaluation, Niger and the other WAMU countries actively worked to transform this monetary union into an Economic and Monetary Union. The seven Heads of States signed a treaty in Dakar at the same time that they decided to devalue their common currency (January 11, 1994). The WAEMU has been in effect since August 1, 1994 and observers think it should improve prospects for Niger's agricultural and manufacturing development.

However, very strong economic and social links exist between Nigeria (which remains outside the WAEMU process) and Niger. Despite formal restrictions often imposed by their respective governments, many people in both countries are engaged in an informal and natural integration process. Discovering ways to achieve a regional integration beyond the WAEMU framework, taking into account these strong links (e.g., through ECOWAS) should be an important challenge for the Government of Niger. Niger's development is interdependent with that of Nigeria. Because of its limited size and resource base, Niger's future economic growth must be found in a regional context.

### 3- Medium term objectives and policy

In collaboration with the World Bank and the IMF, the GON has for some time been preparing a Policy Framework Paper (PFP) in which mid-term strategic objectives and economic policy measures have been developed. The main macroeconomic objectives for the period 1994-97 are as follows:

- A 3.9 percent increase in real GDP by the end of 1994 (estimated actual in 1994: 2.6%) and more than 4 percent in the following years to largely offset the annual 3.3 percent population increase. Taking advantage of the recent devaluation, real GDP growth can *build upon the expansion of the agro-pastoral production and exports* that now are possible due to Niger's increased competitiveness. Despite Niger's low rainfall and fragile environment, increased production of meat, hides and skins should exploit Niger's comparative advantage in the livestock sector.
- On the fiscal side, *an equilibrium for the current budget deficit* is expected after 1996. The inflation rate is expected to be reduced from about 36.7 percent in 1994 to 7.3 percent in 1995 and 2 percent by 1997. This will allow the achievement and maintenance of a 40 percent real depreciation in domestic currency terms.
- Regarding the balance of payments, the GON expects to *limit the rise in the current account deficit* from 7.5 percent of the GDP in 1993 to 16 percent in 1994 and then reduce it to around 12 percent by 1996.
- To achieve these objectives and restore external competitiveness of the economy, the GON is determined to *accelerate structural reforms*, particularly liberalization of the markets and the economic system, public enterprise reforms, promotion of the private sector, and human resources development.

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The GON also plans to increase the domestic investment-to-GDP ratio from 5.3 percent in 1993 to 15.5 percent by 1996 and 1997. This investment will be increasingly financed by domestic savings, the ratio of which is expected to rise from 1.3 percent in 1993 to 7.7 percent in 1996 and 9.3 percent in 1997. As a result of this fiscal improvement, public saving is expected to increase from 1.5 percent of GDP in 1993 to 2.4 percent in 1996 and 3 percent in 1997.

The GON signed a stand-by agreement with the IMF in March 1994 and currently is discussing an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility with the World Bank which will build upon the Policy Framework Paper. However, as above, the drawing rights were suspended pending more progress in balancing current accounts. A joint IMF/WB macroeconomic team is scheduled to visit Niger again in late March/early April, to examine plans with the new GON leaders. USAID/Niger believes that there will be serious but surmountable issues concerning Niger's current accounts deficits, limited progress in revenue collection and possibly the absence of convincing strategies for the management of internal and external debt. There is a profound new start in the political domain with the advent of electoral politics in 1993. A non-violent transition is underway and Nigerien leaders are putting in place a democratic system that can manage a painful economic re-structuring, a process that will take years. This is an exceedingly fragile time during which more pain than benefit is being experienced by many, especially urban, people. We are guardedly optimistic that Niger will make progress in adjusting its economy and will receive continued support from the international community.

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**ANNEX C: IMPROVING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT  
A STUDY OF CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN NIGER  
SUMMARY VERSION OF DRAFT REPORT <sup>1</sup>**

**INTRODUCTION**

During the second half 1994, the U.S. Mission to Niger undertook a broad-based democratic governance assessment designed to:

- provide in-depth information and analysis for the Country Program Strategy Plan (CPSP) related to democratization and governance (DG);
- identify governance constraints to progress in sustainable development in both Nigerien society and government;
- suggest areas of long term support through which existing USAID/Niger projects and programs can promote solutions to democratic governance constraints; and,
- suggest a conceptual approach through which USAID/Niger might identify new activities to further democracy and more effective governance.

**THE POLICY QUESTION AND APPROACH OF THE STUDY**

The approach adopted by the team was based on a policy-oriented use of Institutional Analysis. The key organizing question of the study was the following, "How do governance behaviors manifested by actors at all levels of Nigerien society affect the capacity of the Nigerien people to achieve sustainable improvements in the quality of their lives, and what can donors like USAID do to enhance behaviors which will support that goal?"

The institutional analysis adopted is based on a very simple proposition: the choices people make, including the way they choose to organize themselves to manage their public resources, are rational. Choices are facilitated through an understanding of the rules of the game, i.e., formally or informally institutionalized norms. Since independence in 1960, Nigerien political actors have made these choices according to a set of rules determined by pre-existing political values and by the logic of political action in a one-party state and the subsequent narrowly-based personal regime dominated by military officers. Since 1988 these rules have been evolving, leading to the political transition to a formal democratic system which was manifested by the free election of a new government under the Constitution of the Third Republic in April 1993.

This study explores how political institutions and behaviors have been affected by the interplay of this new set of democratic rules and older, well institutionalized patterns of

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<sup>1</sup> Report submitted by Associates in Rural Development; assessment team: Robert Charlick, Team Leader, Sheldon Gellar, Tina West, Leslie Fox, Pearl Robinson; field work, August, 1994. Political events after August, 1994 are not reflected. Views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Mission.

political behavior. It explores the incentives for political actors to play by the newly adopted democratic rules of the game. It documents the "action tendencies," i.e., the dominant trends in behavior, which seem to be emerging after one year of formal democratic governance. It explores these trends at a number of levels, ranging from an analysis of the formal constitutional rules established, to the operation of the institutions of national government, to the efforts to "decentralize" government, to the organization and functioning of civil society. It also analyzes the functioning of two important institutions which we call linkage structures, political parties and the media, in order to learn what their contributions have been to political behavior.

The study starts from an understanding of Nigerien society and political life and notes how Nigerien political behavior has begun to incorporate a number of political behaviors which, it is posited, constitute the basis of effective democratic governance. Specifically, it asks how Nigerien society attempts to:

- limit abuses of executive power;
- broaden opportunities for more Nigeriens to participate in national public policy decisions;
- establish a rule of law under which all Nigeriens, including those in positions of authority, are held accountable for their actions under the same rules; and,
- make their governance processes more effective and responsive to the interests of the Nigerien public.

Having established the dominant behaviors, the study discusses their implications for the achievement of sustainable development, including the deepening of a pattern of managing public resources which is increasingly democratic.

The study concludes with a strategic approach suggesting how donors should support the reform of governance in Niger in the direction of effective democratic governance, what each donor is currently committed to do to assist Niger, and what USAID might do as a function of its current and proposed strategic objectives, program outcomes, and project activities.

#### **ANALYSIS and FINDINGS**

In general, the Nigerien people have taken a giant step in improving their governance patterns over the past four years. It is now widely acknowledged (Carter, Africa Demo: Freedom House, 1994 Report), that Niger must be counted among the "free" societies in Africa which have completed an initial transition to democratic rule. This is in dramatic contrast to Niger's ranking as "not free" or on an ambiguous path to democracy only a few years ago. In addition, Niger's democratically elected government has been able to agree to and commence implementing some difficult economic reform measures recommended by international financial institutions. The dramatic devaluation of its currency, the CFA franc in January 1994, has also restored considerable confidence in its ability to resume its progress to a sounder economic development base. Together these improvements have fully warranted the 1994 placement of Niger in the category of a "focus," or "sustainable development" country where USAID can maintain and even consider expanding its development assistance program.

It is in this general context that we offer our analysis of specific changes in governance patterns, of the emergence and persistence of political behaviors, and of areas in both government and in the society at large where current patterns seem to limit the deepening and consolidation of Nigerian democracy.

Finally, to the extent that our specific analysis and findings are based on our understanding of what movements toward specific institutional changes and reforms reinforce the prospects for further consolidation of democratic behaviors and practices, this is not intended to hold Nigeriens up against a gold-standard or idealized norm. Rather, we see all societies as evolving political institutions and behavior in a number of domains and unevenly and incompletely. The function of this analysis is to point out where certain patterns of behavior may logically limit further governance reforms either by failing to provide the proper incentives, or by providing perverse or incompatible incentives.

#### **A. Formal Rules and the Nigerian State**

Nigeriens have made very significant progress in adopting a set of formal legal understandings to govern political behavior in the Third Republic. This has produced a set of rules (a regime) for the conduct of politics which is sharply at odds with those of the First and Second Republics and to the military regime (the regime d'exception). The Nigerian Constitution places a number of important limits on the exercise of executive power. These limits have opened up important opportunities for political actors, including non-state actors who previously had very little legal authority to act. A careful analysis of the Nigerian Constitution leads to the following observations:

- the constitution retains a heavy bias toward a powerful centralized state;
- the constitution provides for an executive that is more powerful than the legislature or the judiciary;
- it provides the basis for constructing a rule of law and an independent judiciary, but allows very little access or recourse to ordinary citizens through appeals to constitutional principles in court processes;
- the constitution and electoral laws provides some potential political representation to minority ethnic groups, which could increase the protection of minorities in law;
- it provides the basis of broadly representative government by assuring the right of multi-party competition, coupled with the electoral principle of proportional representation. At the same time, through various devices, including in its highly idealized notion of public interest representation and banning of ethnic, gender-based and regional parties and associations, it limits the actual opportunity of ethnic minorities or women to gain representation.
- it provides for broad freedom of association and expression and the establishment of particular institutions (the Supreme Council for Communication, for example) to help guarantee these rights.

At the Constitutional level, then, the Nigerian Third Republic has emerged as a political system which has greatly improved both political rights and political liberties, compatible with the development of democratic governance practices, while retaining provisions which could limit incentives to broaden participation and effective representation.

### **B. Dynamics of State Institutions**

In principle, Nigeriens who framed the Third Republic wished to reduce the power of the President and provide an effective counter-balance in a more powerful legislature and independent judiciary. The reality of how the institutions of the Third Republic have been functioning after approximately 18 months is, however, somewhat less encouraging.

**1. Legislative Dynamics:** Thus far, the National Assembly remains weak as a deliberative and representative body, although there are some indications that its governance role is already expanding. Its weakness has been due in part to practical and material constraints on the possibilities for legislators to initiate and draft legislation, to review bills introduced by the government, or to broaden the public debate on these bills by organizing public hearings. It is further weakened by its heavy dependence on the executive branch for information, research and analysis and the limitations of its own technical staff. On the other hand, the legislative commission system is now functioning, and the Finance Commission gives National Assembly deputies the opportunity to examine all laws which have financial or budgetary implications. Given the absence of an auditor general, and the fact that it is the Supreme Court, with its own institutional limitations, that is charged with holding government accountable in budgetary matter, the legislature is not yet capable of exercising sufficient budgetary control.

There are also constraints embedded in the legislature's constitutional authority. For example, while the legislature may request that government ministers provide answers to questions, or may establish special commissions on inquiry, it has no power to force the government to cooperate with these efforts.

A principal reason for the weakness of the legislature as a countervailing institution must be traced to the logic of coalition politics, notably the imperative of maintaining a working majority in order to play the game of majoritarian politics. Because the coalition of nine parties is so fragile, and because it is so vital is it to keep the coalition together in order to distribute virtually all the benefits of victory and control of the state, deputies have had little incentive thus far to vote independently, or even engage in extended debate. This logic of majoritarianism, or winner takes all, has been expressed in the legislature through a series of straight party-line votes, on internal rules, parliamentary immunity, and the motion of censure. By June 1994, however, the underlying political norm of limitation of victory and reconciliation was beginning to be manifest in the appointment of members of the parliamentary opposition group to leadership roles in the National Assembly President's Conference as well as to chairmanships of several of the parliamentary commissions. Given the fact that the single most important party in parliament, the MNSD, has been in opposition, this is a significant development in broadening participation in deliberation. As of the time this study was conducted, however, the coalition majority still used its domination of the President's Conference to set the legislative calendar and agenda so as to deny the opposition the possibility of introducing legislation.

Despite heavy incentives for majoritarian voting, the legislature has been a useful arena for publicly airing complaints against the executive, largely by attacking the Prime Minister and his government instead of taking on the President directly. In this manner, deputies, even from major parties in the majority coalition, have been able to play watchdog functions.

Finally, the concept of representation does not appear to have advanced beyond the traditional view of linkage to power through personal intervention and clientelism, and the value of the legislative representative in even this capacity has not significantly grown. Despite the maxim, carried over from the Second Republic, that deputies are supposed to be "national" rather than representatives of local constituencies or interests, most politically involved Nigeriens see their deputies at best as channels for furthering complaints ("doleances") and look to executive branch politicians and administrators rather than to legislators for action. This is compounded by the fact that legislative constituencies are so large that few people actually know their representatives. Thus far, there is little evidence that organized interest groups even look to legislators for support, although recent efforts by the unions to draw representatives into a mediational role with government over the strike may constitute a beginning in that area.

**2. Judicial Dynamics:** The judiciary is the one national governmental institution in Niger which has been able to maintain considerable legitimacy, even when the principle of "rule of law" was severely weakened by the military regime. In principle, Niger's judiciary should be able not only to play an important role in adjudication and conflict mediation, but in limiting the abuses of executive power and majoritarianism. The Constitution accords the judiciary important authority for furthering the rule of law and establishes the principle of judicial independence. This is reinforced by professional norms, relatively good salaries, and by the fact that the political "winners" can make no political appointments to the judiciary, making it one branch of government that cannot easily be politicized.

Our study reveals significant limitations on the role which the judiciary can currently play in furthering Nigerien democracy, both at the constitutional level and the level of practical political matters. Because of constitutional limitations, judges and courts are obliged to play a fairly passive role in invoking the law or in ruling on the legality of executive action. Only individuals who have been directly injured by such governmental actions have standing in this regard. Coupled with the near total absence of private sector lawyers, this probably unduly limits access of individuals to the legal system, not only as watchdogs, but as complainants. This means that much of the watchdog role for the enforcement of legal limits on the executive behavior must come from only a few groups in civil society such as human rights associations. Given the extreme paucity of resources available to these groups and the limited number of legally trained specialists who can carry such cases forward, they can play only a limited role in testing the law and in invoking legal limits. Efforts on the part of donors to support the activities of these groups in legal rights education and related matters are laying the foundation for righting this imbalance, but the process will be a long one.

Practical limitations are paramount in limiting the role of the judiciary. Judges complain about the severe lack of material resources to support their operations, including the very vital role of investigation in a system which depends on a "judge of instruction" instead of the adversary process conducted by lawyers and prosecutors to bring forward evidence. Judges lack timely access to current law and legal decisions, weakening their capacity to function well as professionals. Judicial processes are slow, too distant from most people, and too costly in time and travel to serve most ordinary Nigeriens, even most businessmen. These

practical limitations force judges to be excessively dependent on executive branch support, and with the high level of politicization of the executive, this poses serious problems about the effective independence of the judiciary. There have already been complaints from the media, for example, that political pressure is being brought to bear on judges in cases where individuals in the executive branch bring defamation cases against the private sector media owners and journalists. In general, however, the Nigerien judiciary is considered to be relatively free from direct political intervention, which is a very hopeful sign for the progressive establishment of a rule of law.

**3. Executive Branch Dynamics:** In creating a semi-presidential regime, the designers of the Third Republic provided the executive with ample authority to dominate all other national political actors. Clearly, the President has far greater powers than does the Prime Minister. Incentives to build and reinforce the powers of the executive and particularly of the President are strong, especially given the norm of coalition political behavior which predominated at the time this study was conducted, i.e., to use the power of the State to allocate as much of the benefit as possible to the winners, to the exclusion of the losers. As long as the winning coalition holds together, the logic on the part of winners will continue to be to maintain and even strengthen executive, and notably Presidential, dominance. Only the losers—those excluded—have strong incentives to try to limit executive power by, among other means, the invocation of legal and constitutional norms.

Given that the winners have been a very broad and substantially incoherent coalition of nine political parties, there is relatively little internal incentive to resolve difficult and potentially divisive political issues, or to develop a strong and consistent policy based on clear ideological or strategic perspectives. Interministerial coordination and policy implementation is also likely to be weak where different parties in the alliance, sometimes with significantly different positions and interests, hold top positions in different ministries.

Instead, what the holders of executive power share is the common desire to reinforce the power of the central state, keep the coalition intact, and weaken the opposition. What potentially divides and troubles them are their differential desire (depending upon how they see their base of support) to respond to demands of particular interests and to address the policy demands of donors in order to keep external resources, which they can then allocate and distribute, flowing. In such a context, the internal logic of good governance, i.e., of effective decision making, efficiency, merit, professionalism and honest management of public resources cannot be high; nor can the abstract desire to play by constitutional rules, which may restrict the winners scope of effective action, be strong.

The major limitation on majoritarianism and questionable governance practices is the capacity of factions of the politically involved elite to mobilize "public opinion." Admittedly both the politically active elite, and the involved public are small, but both are important to the survival of the state. Factions involve not only opposition groups, but even groups within the majority which are striving to improve their position. They use Niger's remarkably free media to criticize actions of the executive in ways which often seem irresponsible, but also seem somewhat effective in cautioning blatant and personal use of state power in ways which violate legal norms. Still, dependence on mobilization of public opinion cannot substitute for a well functioning institutional mechanism to promote political and financial accountability.

As for the administrative apparatus of the executive branch, there is little to indicate that its working rules and dominant behaviors have been altered for the good thus far by political

democratization. Nigerian bureaucracy still discourages initiative and merit, and rewards seniority and personal loyalty. Managers have few tools available to sanction poor performance, even if they wish to do so. Working rules still favor centralization and extreme hierarchy in administration, with little opportunity on the part of subordinates, particularly in the field, to influence implementation. When the bureaucracy does come in contact with the public the paternalistic notion of guardianship (*tutelle*) in which it is assumed that it is the state which knows best and can best protect the public interest, guiding the people for their own good, still operates as a powerful justification for continued central control. All of this is hardly unique to Niger, but it all negatively impacts on the effective functioning of the administration.

The logic of majoritarian coalition politics has compounded the problem by emphasizing political party loyalty above professional norms and political work over professional duties. It has also resulted in significant wastage of scarce trained manpower as opposition administrators have been excluded from meaningful work, compounded by rapid turnover in personnel following the elections of 1993. In one way, democratic politics has introduced a factor which could conceivably reduce bureaucratic centralization, with greater attention to staffing localized administrations (regions, arrondissements, municipalities) with people from that region or linguistic/ethnic group. Certainly the new regime did not invent the use of ethnic and regional criteria in the recruitment of administrators. It has, however, made it more explicit and localized. This can give rise either to the hope that the administration will be more locally responsive, or to the fear that it will be more easily captured by local interests which are often portrayed as corrupt. Thus far, a battle is still raging between the effort of central political leaders to orchestrate this process to enhance their own and the "public" interest, and local political leaders.

Thus far as well, the administration has not yet been able to deal effectively with several critical governance issues--notably with revenue management, bureaucratic accountability, and administrative and effective decentralization. In the first two instances adequate formal rules exist to improve performance, but informal rules and incentives have not yet shifted, and have in fact been negatively affected by the extreme politicization of the bureaucracy. Although politicization has slowed down local tax collection, especially in former MNSD strongholds, the bulk of the revenue problem does not lie here since both accountability and incentives on the part of local traditional authorities to participate in tax collection is still significant. Rather, the problem still resides with control of state employees who are in a position to gain rents because they control and regulate access to scarce and valued resources such as licenses and trade opportunities. Economic liberalization as well as policy conditionalities are already helping reduce these opportunities, but partisan control over unions of state officials and the participation of those parties in the government alliance undercuts efforts to improve accountability at the same time.

Decentralization poses more serious difficulties because here even the formal rules are only now being tentatively put into place, and they confront long standing preferences for centralized control on the part of those who control the state. Decentralization also poses serious problems of uncertainty, which thus far Nigerian democratic politicians have been anxious to avoid. Uncertainty arises from the fact that meaningful decentralization would give opposition parties, and even smaller parties within the majority coalition, opportunities to win control over councils, council presidencies, and even mayoralties of significant municipalities. Thus far, the response has been a reluctance to hold municipal elections, redistrict the country, bring local government closer to the people by extending it beyond the

arrondissement level, and make it more representative by reducing the size of constituencies and perhaps altering electoral rules to make representatives more accountable to specific people. A number of these changes are being considered or are already mandated in broad outline legislation, but there are serious disincentives to their full implementation anytime soon. Not the least of these disincentives is the desire to appear firm against the Tuareg rebels who are demanding just such changes (with others that appear significantly less democratic as well). The failure to implement effective decentralization, on the other hand, reduces the government's capacity to improve governance performance in such vital areas as local economic development, service provision and natural resource management.

In the absence of effective decentralization, the role of traditional authorities in territorial administration continues to loom large. Niger's traditional authorities, operating most importantly at the canton and provincial levels occupy a strange place in a constitutional democratic regime since for some purposes they must be viewed as unelected representatives recruited largely on the basis of birth-right rather than on the promise of accountability or merit, and on the other hand they have characteristics of agents of the state without the status, protection or theoretical accountability of civil servants. What is notable for the present is that, despite being under heavy attack in some quarters for their support and association with the authoritarian regime and its corporatist mobilization structure — the Société de Développement—they emerged from the National Conference and the transition with more powers and roles, particularly in local development and resource management matters. This outcome may be attributed to two things—the exceptional level of organization and advocacy of the "chiefs" as a "professional" interest group, and the reluctance, thus far at least, on the part of the new regime to decentralize and allow more popularly accountable local institutions to develop and play governance roles. To this must be added the strong and persistence political norm of deference to authority which most Nigeriens, even those who are highly educated and western trained, display for both the secular and religious authority of chiefs.

### C. Dynamics of Civil Society

In general, civil society has been the domain that Niger has changed most dramatically in the past four years. Without question, institutions of civil society have flourished — they have become much more numerous and diverse as new formal rules of political liberalization and democratization have been put into place, and as a combination of external pressure and internal changes have made the operation of these institutions a practical working reality.

Like state institutions and constitutional principles, civil society can, and in fact must, come to play several roles in the consolidation of democratic governance. It must assist in limiting the exercise of state power to reduce abuses which threaten not only democracy, but ultimately associational autonomy. It must help deepen democratic behavior and beliefs by offering more opportunities for participation in national political life than are available solely from the functioning of state institutions and political parties alone. They can further help support the development of a more democratic political culture by offering opportunities locally to lead, to monitor and control leadership, and to associate across narrow and parochial lines so that attitudes of greater trust, tolerance and mutual interest can eventually emerge. Finally, they can help improve governance by providing greater opportunities for self-governance. This is a great deal to ask of any civil society, much less one that has emerged from decades of suppression in a society which never clearly distinguished the notion of "state" and "society" in its own historic development. Progress, then, must be viewed from

this perspective as "developmental," rather than as the full blown emergence of a civil society fully capable of performing all of these roles effectively in the foreseeable future.

Having said this, it is obvious that Nigerien civil society is just beginning to emerge and begin playing some of these roles. At its current stage of development, it is unrealistic to expect that Nigerien civil society can be a significant counterweight to governmental and particularly to executive power.

**1. Evolution of Civil Society Institutions:** The most important feature of civil society conceptually is that it must involve voluntary association neither mandated from above, nor required by a collective, often ascribed, identity over which the individual or interest group has no control. In Niger, opportunities for association on this basis traditionally were limited to very small and informal associations, usually for informal work arrangements, for friendship or for social activity. While, at this level, association was normally based on at least nominal equality, in virtually every other form of associational life Nigeriens were associated on the basis of hierarchy, power and status inequality. Under both colonial and post colonial regimes voluntary forms of association were either openly suppressed or marginalized, even when their function was ostensibly spiritual or recreational, because such associations were seen as potential competitors for power and influence to those fostered by the State. This certainly included cooperatives and other official producer associations. There is ample ethnographic research to demonstrate that this tendency also described many residential associations, such as villages, where people were obliged to settle and become "sedentary" for administrative convenience, whatever their real preferences. Subsequent "development" and "relief" activities, such as reserve grain storage schemes, collective groundnut cultivation, or "village cooperatives" constructed on the model of the residential community as a unit of voluntary cooperation, reciprocity and trust, often encountered sharp resistance or passive neglect because these assumptions were incorrect and the actions they prescribed often were not viewed by "villagers" as in their interest.

In the virtual absence of voluntary associational life, which assists individuals and groups with their life problems, Nigeriens have tended to adopt a different voluntary associational model based on individual loyalty and the exchange of unequal benefits. This system, broadly called a system of patron-client relations, was very well developed among most of Niger's societies. While it served to help individuals secure their material well-being, it did little or nothing to limit the exercise of power on the part of superiors, or to enhance the bargaining power of individuals in a similar life or work situation.

The principal exceptions to this rule emerged in urban settings where people began to associate around common occupational and professional interests. The most important of these were unions and student associations in which the state attempted, with less than total success, to control membership and often leadership positions. It now appears that a similar development may have also been emerging for religious associations. It has only been since the 1980s that these urban associations have begun to assert some autonomy, often beginning by forming clandestine voluntary associations paralleling the officially mandated ones. Apart from these clandestine groups, the only voluntary associations to emerge in the 1980s were formed and fostered by international non-governmental associations, principally in the context of their work to combat famine and environmental degradation. All other professional groups, including those grouping lawyers, journalists, and "traditional" authorities, were formed and regulated by the state in corporatist fashion. The same was true of associations of women and youth.

Since 1991 there has been a virtual explosion of voluntary associations, particularly formally recognized associations most of which are urban-based. Fully 61% of Niger's total voluntary associations, and 95% of its recognized indigenous associations were formed just prior to or following the 1991 National Conference. In addition to social and religious associations, these associations have included human rights and democracy groups, gender-based associations, and de facto local development associations started by urban dwellers originally from a particular area or town.

Simultaneously, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of informal associations both in rural settings and in the urban informal private sector. No systematic survey has been conducted as yet to permit an accurate description of either the range or scale of these groups, but our informal work permitted us to identify the importance of the phenomenon. In the rural sector, many of the new associations are growing out of the work of international NGOs such as IRED, CLUSA, WOCCU, 6S etc. Others are building on the experiences of previous development projects, particularly in irrigated agriculture, at times with the support of educated people from the region now working with local people either as informal consultants or in new Nigerian development NGOs.

**2. Characteristics of Civil Society Actors:** For the most part, voluntary associations are organizationally and financially weak, and heavily dependent on external financing for their survival. Reflecting their newness, their management capacities are usually rudimentary and technical skills are limited. Few have permanent office space, communications capability and staff. Relatively few civil society institutions in Niger are truly membership based organizations linking base-level groups to higher levels of association and eventually to a national apex body. In Niger, only unions really fit this description. Few other associations have any real capability to play roles as intermediaries. Most other formal associations are "public interest" groups grouping a small number of individuals who associate around a common issue or need. Internal governance of Niger's embryonic formal associations is not generally very democratic. Unions now retain some national accountability of leadership and do seem to offer some opportunities on the part of member groups to have input in national decisions. Most "public interest" NGOs, on the other hand, appear to be elite-led and often one-person dominated. Even the alternative woman's association, the RDfN, seems to be replicating the model of a centrally controlled association providing little opportunity for local chapters to influence its policies or governance. Interestingly, some of the best organized and seemingly most participatory associations in the country today are Islamic associations which are having a major impact on public policy decision making through broad resistance to government legislation which they do not like.

An additional characteristic of much of Niger's newly created associational life which is worth noting is its increasing politicization. To the extent that major urban interest groups have become associated with particular political parties, their capacity to maintain their autonomy and play a constructive role in monitoring and dealing with government once the parties they support either win or lose power is seriously constrained. This tendency toward politicization and loss of autonomy appears to be much less serious today than it was two years ago, offering prospects that civil society may be able to develop some independent role.

**3. Behavioral Dynamics in Civil Society:** Niger's civil society today operates in one of the most favorable and progressive legal enabling environments in Africa. This is truly one of the remarkable accomplishments of the country's democratic transition. Apart from some restrictions on ethnic and regional association, stemming from fears based on recent history, Niger's laws offer generous tax and customs advantages to NGOs, and make legal registration fairly inexpensive in terms of monetary and transaction costs. On the other hand, there definitely is a need to complete work on legislation governing cooperative associations and assuring them of their autonomy and legal standing. Draft legislation is highly encouraging in regard to fostering flexible forms of truly voluntary association and reasonable financial incentives. The framework law for the Rural Code also provides a very valuable legal basis for a variety of rural associations, and the finalization of fully enabling legislation may be able to clarify and specifically authorize certain types of associations which will work on land use, water management, and other natural environment related issues.

To the extent that associational life is authorized and even encouraged by law, it is clear that what Niger has been doing is establishing an alternative set of rules and potential incentives which will do battle with some very deeply ingrained political norms (hierarchy, central "guidance"). It can be expected that many civil servants will view these new developments with suspicion and even hostility. On the other hand, a number of new incentives are emerging which powerfully support some changes in Niger's civil society. Not the least of these is the collapse of the state as the super-client, provider and employer of last resort. As more trained Nigeriens are forced to seek employment in non-state associations and as more civil servants view this as a possible option for the future, resistance, at least to formal, urban-based NGOs should decline. The association of civil society actors with political parties, on the other hand, can go either way. There is, of course, significant danger that these groups will be "re-incorporated" into the state apparatus as their political parties win. Conversely, in the context of vigorous multi-partyism, at least some parties will have an interest in defending the interests and autonomy of particular interest groups. What is much less clear is who, in the short term at least, will speak for and defend the interests of rural associational life, which is as yet too weak to defend itself.

**4. Assessing the Impact of Civil Society:** Thus far, the record of Niger's civil society in limiting the exercise of state power is mixed, due mainly to its newness and its limited capacity. In general, Niger's human rights and legal associational community has made significant contributions in dealing with some human rights problems particularly in the North (DLD and ANDDH), the on-going problem of slavery (Timidria), prison conditions (ANDDH), and arbitrary arrest and detention (RIDD-FITILA, and the Association of Women Jurists). There are important issues, however, which they hesitate to take on, such as defense of women's rights particularly against Islamic associations, defense of journalists against a rash of defamation suits, and public sector corruption. In addition, no "watchdog" NGO seems particularly interested or capable of taking on the government on issues of constitutional law and interpretation. In the absence of this, and with the narrow basis of standing for individuals in many cases, there is little incentive on the part of government to hold closely to constitutional principles.

The role which organized urban NGOs have played in promoting participation in policy has been very limited. No NGO currently takes on the task of monitoring and publicly reporting, much less assessing government performance on a range of public issues. With the assistance of international NGOs, Nigerien NGOs have begun to get involved in advocacy for legislation in such areas as the family code, the cooperative law, the credit union law, and

national environmental policy. Unfortunately, these associations are not, in general, membership associations linking to the base and mobilizing a great many Nigeriens for political action. The Nigerien associations which the international NGOs support, thus far, have very limited capacity in analysis and policy formulation. Private sector associations, thus far, also reveal no capacity to get involved in decisions most directly affecting them such as trade, investment, taxation and tariffs.

Slowly, some base-level civil society actors are beginning to offer some experience in democratic decision-making at the local level, which over time can become the basis of a greater understanding of the rules of democratic processes at the national level. But even where local associations are not democratically managed, voluntary membership itself can constitute a powerful lesson and restraint on abuses of authority by local leaders.

Slowly, as well, Niger is beginning to develop some experience in local self-governance through its newly empowered civil society. Density has not yet reached the point where this has yet become a major feature of society, and capacity to manage will clearly need to be built up over time. This will probably require the continued active presence of international NGOs for some time in order to build a critical base of self-governance capability.

## GOVERNANCE IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USAID IN NIGER

### **A. A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO SUPPORTING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE**

Having been requested to review and comment on the Mission's newly proposed strategic objective (SO) for democratic governance we have framed our general recommendations in terms of a modified D/G SO and a corresponding set of programmatic (project) outcomes (Pos) which cut across the development sectors currently being supported.<sup>2</sup>

**1. Promoting Democratic Governance from the Ground Up:** Promotion of democratic governance is often viewed as something to tag on to a mission's activities, at best a set of activities that may help to stimulate or reinforce some part of an emerging national democratic process, but that does not seem related to USAID's fundamental development tasks and specific strategic objectives. In this study we have argued for a concept of democratic governance that is embedded in the way people at all levels of society -- at the local self-governing level as well as the central state -- manage public resources. We have identified a number of governance patterns and trends in Nigerien society, within central government, in proposals for and actions to decentralize government, and in the broader society. This analysis has led us to a number of conclusions about where the opportunities exist and the most serious constraints are to be found.

Nigerien society today still bears the marks of a highly centralized state which, while appearing powerful relative to civil society, is nonetheless limited in its capacity to govern Niger in a creative and responsive way that promotes public welfare. We note three major asymmetries in power relationships expressed as gaps in Niger's governance pattern: (i) a gap within authority patterns of the central state, i.e., between executive power and deliberative (legislative) and adjudication (judicial) processes; (ii) a gap between central and local

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<sup>2</sup> The Mission carefully studied the recommendations in this paper and accepted them in the main. However, much deliberation led to NOT framing Democratic Governance as a separate strategic objective, but to incorporate it as a special theme (cross-cutting issue) in each of the three chosen objectives.

government which limits the effective decentralization of authority and the appropriateness of governance decisions; and (iii) gaps between state power and the people, or civil society.

The gap between the state and civil society development has not only compromised broad-based economic growth and environmental management, but has resulted in only the most marginal involvement of the vast majority of Nigeriens in public decisions. The era of democratization has changed that. Opportunities now exist that greatly expand the effective power of Nigeriens over their lives; eventually they should be able to play more significant roles in the development activities which directly effect their welfare and in the broader political system. For the moment, political parties contribute little to this empowerment of most of the people. The media, while a very bright spot in the national-level democratic discourse, has yet to serve the rural mass well.

Based on this analysis, how should USAID/Niamey prioritize its actions in the area of supporting democratic governance? Our study identifies a number of opportunities in specific areas, but for us the overwhelming need and opportunity is in supporting associational life, particularly at the local level. This proposition embodies a way of looking at "democracy support" that links it to an overall approach of promoting empowered participation throughout Nigerien society, primarily by supporting rural voluntary associational life. Without a viable and growing associational life at the base and a growing horizontal network of these associations, there is little reason to "do democracy" for most of the people of the country. For most people, democracy will have meaning and relevance related to particular functions and interests that they attempt to pursue in order to improve their lives and those of their families.

**2. Why a Strategic Objective for Democratic Governance:** The mission's newly formulated program goal is cast in terms of creating an environment for and increasing empowered participation among Nigeriens at all levels as a means of promoting sustainable improvements in their social and economic welfare. Therefore, from our perspective, the entire program's success can also be portrayed in terms of progress made in promoting a system of democratic governance. Our conclusion is that broadening participation and the basis for voluntary association, which, at a minimum, implies the capacity for some meaningful action outside the control of the central state makes the most sense at this stage in Niger's evolving democracy.

USAID/Niger's proposed democratic governance strategic objective is:

**Increased Awareness of and Active Commitment to Democratic Principles of Governance.**

We think this SO should be re-formulated for the following reasons:

- (i) The SO does not clearly connect to either participation or empowerment, major emphases of the mission's new country program goal; and,
- (ii) It does not make clear which aspects of democratic governance are most critical for USAID to support in order to increase the effectiveness of its current and proposed program portfolio.

The assessment team thus proposes the following modification to the mission's SO:

**To expand empowered participation on the part of all Nigeriens, particularly with regard to their capacity and opportunity to undertake self-governance, and to participate in the political process beyond the local level.**

We have broken this SO up into a number of discrete project outputs (Pos) which form the basis of our general set of recommendations. We believe that this SO is intimately tied to the mission's overall goal, and that it addresses both the concerns of those involved at the sectoral and project level, and those concerned about trying to influence the broader macro environment. We also believe that this SO starts from where Niger is at now, in terms of our analysis, and offers some significant promise of assisting in promoting both a more effective governance structure and a more democratic one (over the long term).

This SO and the corresponding set of Pos outlined below do not address all the constraints and opportunities identified in our analysis, nor advance all the possible recommendations which flow from them. Rather, we have developed the following set of recommendations based on our understanding of the mission's desire to increase the impact of its current and proposed programs and projects. USAID/Niger may want to weigh how some of the additional issues raised, but not recommended for consideration, might either fit into the SO and Pos proposed here, better be handled by other donors, or be the subject of another activity which is projectized. Specifically, we refer to the absence, at this point, of recommending a discrete program of assistance for state institutions, particularly the national assembly and judiciary. While the following recommendations do propose some very limited support to these two state institutions, it is only insofar as it contributes to the strengthening of voluntary associational life and emerging civil society, primarily at the local level.

Although it has been our understanding that the mission does not want or anticipate a stand-alone, multi-component D/G project as those undertaken by USAIDs in other African countries, we believe that our analysis, including the conceptual approach used, provides the necessary data and analytic framework to fashion an activity which includes support to the state sector. With this in mind, we now turn to the set of project outputs-cum-general recommendations which support our proposed strategic objective.

## **B. Program Outputs and General Recommendations**

In reviewing each of the six proposed program outputs (Pos) which follow, we provide a discussion in terms of (i) the purpose being addressed; (ii) the set of activities and implications arising from the recommendation; and (iii) a brief summary of possible impact measurements.

### ***PO 1: Increase the density of voluntary local associations***

**Purpose addressed:** In and of itself, an increase in both the numbers and diversity of associational life is a condition to be valued in the development of a pluralist democracy. Civil society's landscape should be populated by a wide range of associational forms that have a multiplicity of interests and a range of capacities. Some will pursue narrowly defined group interests, others may, over time, identify their own interests with those of the larger community within which they operate. Density and diversity in associational life provide individuals with a choice among competing interests and thus decreases the possibility of cleavages building up around single issues or affiliations which are often found to be sensitive or contentious.

**Activities and Implications:** The actions required to achieve this PC are within the current mission portfolio: to maximize the formation of and work with voluntary local associations in health, including family planning extension, credit and credit management, natural resource management, and disaster mitigation. While increasing the density of voluntary associations is to be encouraged as discussed above, there are obviously a number of "operational" problems that must be dealt as a result. The primary issue concerns the ability of USAID, or any donor, in selecting good investments among the many new associations, NGOs, etc. that have and continue to enter the civil society arena. The second issue concerns the means (mechanism) for providing assistance to these small-scale, local level and non-USAID registered associations.

**Measuring Impact:** This should be a fairly straightforward undertaking. We can simply count the number of new associations supported through USAID-financed activities, and, over a period of time, ascertain the total number of survivors. To do this, a good base-level associational inventory must be done (we have proposed such a Nigerien-led study in annex 4 of this report). It might also be possible to count the total number of associations of these types because of the presumption that there will be some synergism and spontaneous associational formation as a result of USAID interventions.

**PO 2:** *Increase the capacity of these voluntary local associations to manage their affairs in a way which broadens participation and which increases the accountability of leadership and members.*

**Purpose addressed:** PO 2 refines the notion of democratic governance to three basic principles: a) self-governance capacity; b) broadened opportunities for participation; and c) leadership accountability. Niger's blossoming base-level voluntary associations are at a very early stage in the development of internal management capacity and working rules for inclusion, exclusion and resource control. This PO addresses the basic need of Nigerien society for a growing democratic governance base by focusing efforts on fostering the capacity of voluntary associations to undertake the specific governance functions associated with the expansion of rural economic interest groups for credit and savings, the extension of health and family planning service, and environmental action.

**Activities and Implications:** To achieve this objective USAID should focus in all its work with local associations; including primary cooperatives, credit unions NRM user groups, and possibly base-level health management units, either directly or through PVO/NGOs: on capacity building and skill transfer. Two other principal capacity building dimensions, in addition to administration and financial management are: (i) strategic planning and management, looking at, among other issues, internal governance structure, long-term planning and sustainability; and (ii) technical expertise in such sectoral pursuits as micro-enterprise on-farm and off-farm activities, natural resource protection and management, and primary health care provision and management.

**Measuring Impact:** Capacity building or institutional development is no longer considered an open-ended process or domain. Particularly in the area of indigenous NGO capacity building, a great deal of work has been done by USAID and U.S. PVOs to establish benchmarks and indicators for measuring the effectiveness of capacity building interventions. It should not be difficult, therefore, to establish a set of management skills and practices, and internal rule designs and enforcement practices on which data could be collected from a sample of

associations. The baseline study discussed above could as well be used to establish the starting point for local associational capacity.

***PO 3: Increase opportunities for Nigeriens to participate in the democratic governance process beyond the local self-governing level by promoting horizontal information sharing (among local associations) and by encouraging the formation of horizontal networks and secondary level associations.***

**Purpose addressed:** Horizontal association is a prerequisite for effective growth in the capacity of voluntary associations beyond the local level and for participation in the political process in ways that enable members to defend their associational interests, engage in democratic processes and, eventually, assume responsibilities in the area of civic action, including policy formulation and advocacy. Our study reveals that Nigerien horizontal networks and associations are in their most preliminary stage. The promotion of networking and federating will not only accelerate the sharing of information and lessons learned relative to USAID's sectoral interests, but will constitute the basis for the growth of rural-based civil society.

**Activities and Implications:** Attainment of this PO will in many cases require an additional perspective for project managers. One of the major conclusions of our analysis is that the previous corporatist structuring of associational life in Niger not only inhibited horizontal linkages from developing internally, but also isolated Nigerien voluntary associations from their counterparts in the subregion who, for the most part, have built up far greater experience as civil society actors. Thus our recommendation that both internal and external networking figure prominently in a Mission strategy.

**Measuring impact:** Possibilities include: (i) the number of exchanges or contacts that take place between Nigerien voluntary associations, including the number of exchanges initiated by local associations themselves; (ii) the number of exchanges that take place between Nigerien voluntary associations and counterparts within the subregion; (iii) the existence and frequency of written or other media-communicated information across groups, particularly the increase in "associational" media forms; and (iv) the increase in the number of secondary associations that are created from horizontal collaboration among primary level associations and their institutional development.

***PO 4: Increase opportunities for Nigeriens to participate in democratic governance matters by expanding the knowledge of local level association leaders and membership concerning their legal rights and obligations; and those of intermediary specialized civic organizations that work to advance the interests of local self-governing associations.***

**Principle addressed:** This PO promotes civic education targeted to specific legal and political rights and processes of functional utility to potentially interested associational members. With the relatively rapid accession to a pluralist democratic system, Nigeriens have witnessed a corresponding proliferation in new laws which, among other legal areas, govern the nature, formation, and operations of voluntary associations. Broad-gauged or generic civic education programs probably have little relevance to the immediate needs and interests around which most local voluntary associations are formed. To support those more specialized and formal civic organizations that have been established to limit the states exercise of authority, and

specifically its abuse of power, continued use of 115(e) funding would complement the types of local association support recommended here.

**Activities and Implications:** As USAID works, through its projects, with associations in specific sectors it should consciously incorporate into its projects this kind of educational information focused on understanding rights, laws and processes pertaining to the groups' primary goals and orientations such as the establishment and management of rural credit and savings institutions; the establishment and management of decentralized health services and health resources; and the creation of local level associations involved in the management and development of actions to deal with environmental degradation, such as forestry and irrigated agricultural resources. USAID actions should not only support this kind of targeted civic education for members, but it should consider, as a corollary measure, enhancing the analytic capacity and communication skills of members of the private, associational and public media.

**Measuring impact:** This PO will primarily be measured in terms of outputs, (e.g., number of training activities undertaken by intermediary civic organizations with primary level associations; the number of media articles that deal with specific sectoral legal issues or associational rights) but with adequate base level data, it would be possible to measure increases in knowledge and understanding in areas of specific rights at the level of different population groups.

***PO 5: Improve opportunities for democratic participation in voluntary associations by improving the legal basis for the growth of local-level association life.***

**Principle addressed:** Creating a legal or enabling environment which favors associational formation at all levels is the objective of this PO. Specifically, we are proposing discrete assistance to concerned state institutions and agencies that are responsible for the drafting, passage, execution, and interpretation of laws pertaining to the legal environment which promotes associational growth. While our analysis portrays and concludes a relatively favorable legal environment related to formal association and NGO registration and official recognition at the national level, this particular PO, as part of our overall strategic approach, targets the local associations and their legal rights and obligations which are just beginning to be defined under such laws as the Rural Code and decentralization law.

**Activities and implications:** We propose a set of activities to deal with issues that have emerged as constraints in our analysis, and which do not all fit in neatly to specific sectoral portfolio, activities or concerns. These include: support for the refinement and passage of specific legislation concerning the standing and viability of local voluntary associations at levels below the arrondissement; support for harmonizing various laws governing associational rights, and in particular the rural code provisions, with laws affecting associations in the codes on forestry, water, livestock, cooperatives, and credit unions; support for improving knowledge of associational laws on the part of judges and particularly justices of the peace; and specific support could be considered to increase the capacity of parliamentary commissions to deal with public (civic actor) input on legislation that affects associational rights in a variety of ways.

**Measuring impact:** Here the impact must be measured in terms of the development and promotion of the formal rules and their harmonization, not in terms of their direct impact on associational proliferation (see above). A study of perceived problems and constraints, as part

of a follow-up to the base-line associational inventory, could provide some impact data at the level of the effect of legislation.

***PO 6: Improve opportunities for democratic participation in voluntary associations by supporting the capacity of the informed public (organized in associations with expressly civic purposes) to have some influence on the deliberation and application of these laws.***

**Principle addressed:** A pre-requisite to the development and maintenance of associational rights is a growing demand for those rights with some groups performing a watchdog function over the law's creation and application, and over the general maintenance and development of a rule of law culture. This cannot be done solely or even primarily by the kinds of associations and members discussed above, but requires a growing set of civic actors. Ideally, primary level associations which regroup around shared interests and needs into higher level regional or national federations (e.g., cooperatives, credit unions, water user and logger associations) would undertake this advocacy and lobbying function for their local level members.

**Activities and implications:** USAID should continue to support such civic actors as human rights groups, associations of lawyers and legal experts, and urban-based development NGOs that wish to get involved in issues of rights of citizens to popular choice and enhanced government accountability, free expression, as well as freedom of association. It should, at the same time, pursue activities which support the creation and capacity building of higher level federations as proposed in PO 3, above.

**Measuring Impact:** At a very basic level, the easiest means for measuring impact of USAID support would be to look at the number of advocacy and lobbying contacts that occur between NGOs and civic organizations with concerned agencies of the state. Next, a means for determining whether these actions have actually led to the drafting and passage of relevant legislation; or whether civic organization oversight of the state's enforcement of current legislation leads to interventions being taken to curb state abuse of authority when its actions are found to be inconsistent with the intent of a specific law.

***The Specific Issue of Women:***

Many donors now target their associational and organization activities specifically at women. There are good historic reasons for doing so, and good evidence from field experiences to confirm the wisdom of this approach in terms of its outcomes.

The question is how should this be handled in USAID/Niger's SO and Pos. There are two options: (i) attention to women can be handled as a specifically separate PO, or it can be embedded in all of the Pos noted above (mainstreamed). We have opted for recommending the latter course, although this means that a special effort must be made to assure that women are free to organize and that their organizations will get the targeted attention of projects and not simply pass through "village development committees" which are invariably male run. In some instances, such as the CLUSA credit cooperative scheme, women are already a targeted group. Efforts to extend health and family planning services below the Rural Dispensary level should also carefully target women as a separate activity.

(O:L...An-edg.sum, Mar 95)

# 1. Niger in 1994<sup>1</sup>

## 1.1 Changes in the Status Quo

In March 1993, Niger moved from 33 years of authoritarian and single-party rule to its first democratically-elected government. In January 1994 the overvalued CFA franc, long cited as an insurmountable obstacle to economic development, was devalued by 50 percent. The Rural Code process to clarify and formalize resource tenure has moved into full swing since 1990-91. It has changed the stakes for rural resource access, and is altering the economic options for resource management. For the first time, Niger has a free and flourishing press. Energized by the collapse of authoritarianism, new parties and new interest groups have joined the political fray. Political awareness and participation are both higher than they have ever been. Under conditionality agreements with USAID and other donors, Niger has committed itself to major structural reforms in agricultural marketing, natural resources, health delivery systems, enterprise development and other areas.

We do not know if things will get better, get worse or continue on the same trend. But whatever the outcome, the structure and dynamic of Nigérien society is fundamentally different than it was 24 months ago. It calls for a fresh start in donor strategies. Without bloodshed, Niger has taken bold steps to put its house in order. It is a fragile time during which, as yet, more pain than benefit has come from the reforms. Arguably, Niger has earned the support of the international community for its development strategy.

## 1.2 The Backdrop for Change

Since 1991, the country has sunk into the worst fiscal crisis in its history, more the result of past rather than current management failures. The disintegration of the Ali Seibou régime accelerated capital flight, both out of the country and from the formal to the informal (non-taxed) sector. Declining uranium prices have made the situation worse. The government is unable to pay its bills, and barely able to pay salaries. A demoralized civil service has faced several months at a time without a paycheck. Workers and students are increasingly vocal political players as their resources shrink. Devaluation has sharply reduced urban purchasing power, further irritating already raw urban nerves.

Three potential impacts of devaluation are important to its success: the shift in urban demand away from imports and toward domestic goods, which are, in principle, now twice as competitive as before; a steady growth in exports, particularly to Nigeria and coastal countries, which currently import large volumes of meat and other food from Europe and South America; a viable supply response in both rural and, eventually, urban production.

Neither import substitution nor export needs can long be satisfied without: (a) increased efficiency in production, commercialization and marketing; and (b) diversification of production to meet a broader range of demand, particularly urban demand. Devaluation has established an important precondition for diversified domestic production, but other hurdles must now be overcome, including access to scarce foreign exchange for essential inputs to agricultural intensification. The potential power of devaluation is evidenced by the surge in sales of cattle on-the-hoof to Nigeria, and by an uptick in agricultural investments elsewhere in the Sahel.

## 1.3 USAID's Assistance Strategy

The Mission has three Strategic Objectives: (i) reductions in long-term population growth trends through immediate and on going efforts to reduce fertility, improve maternal and child health and increase access to the means of controlling births as a function of desired family size; (ii) conservation of the natural environment and the productive resource base through improved natural resources management by households and communities, better defined local resource management rights and responsibilities and adoption of key national and local policy reforms to enhance incentives for sustainable resource stewardship; (iii) promotion of rural credit.

Jointly, these objectives seek to stabilize the rural production system, reduce the imbalance between resource potential and demographic pressure and increase the prospects for new forms of productive

<sup>1</sup>Summary of report submitted by International Resources Group, "Capitalizing on Change," by Asif Shaikh (IRG) and Michael McGahuey (USAID/AFR), September 1994. The full report is available from IRG or USAID/Niger.

economic activity by reducing the ratio of dependent to working populations, with particular emphasis on reducing the social and economic burdens on women in the coming transition. Thus AID's strategic objectives are very much a part of Niger's development strategy, and sacrifice nothing in development relevance in order to achieve a manageable Mission portfolio. These are also the themes around which other donors have coalesced.

Important cross-cutting themes in the Mission's strategy include the on-going need for disaster mitigation in the near term, coupled with continued progress on governance, economic liberalization and human resources development as cornerstones for long-term development. Finally, the Mission's portfolio stresses the importance of structured monitoring and evaluation. The Mission's program is future-oriented, and must therefore distinguish between what can be influenced in five years, vs. in ten, fifteen or twenty years.


## 2. Population and Natural Resources

### 2.1 Population as a Driving Force

Niger's population growth rate is among the highest in the world. The 1988 census found a total population of just under 8 million. With a 3.2% growth rate, and allowing for variations in migration, 1994 population is estimated to be 9.5 million. Total population is expected to double within 25 years. Economic and political conditions in Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Benin and Togo have reduced the role of outmigration as an economic and demographic safety valve.

In 1950, Niger's population was about 2.5 million. The ratio of population to natural resources and land area allowed shifting cultivation and long fallow cycles to restore fertility. The first beneficial effects of contact with modern technologies started to be felt 40 years ago, when mortality rates, including infant mortality, began their long decline. The widening difference between births and deaths has yielded unprecedented levels of population increase.

Niger Age Pyramid (Females)



After 40 years of rapid growth, future growth is built in to the population age structure. Forty-eight percent of Niger's female population today is under 15. There are nearly 50% more girls between 0 and 15 than women between 15 and 35. There are 83% more girls in the bottom three age quintiles (0 to 15) than in the next three (15-30). Population growth rates will remain high for decades as these girls reach maturity. The next generation of women who will have babies has already been born.

The key variables that drive population growth are the *number of women of child-bearing age* and the *number of children per woman* of child-bearing age. The age pyramid ensures that the number of women of child-bearing age will continue to grow. Whether each of these women has as many children, on average, as in the past is reflected in the fertility rate.


Fertility rates in Niger are very high, and to date there has been little progress in bringing them down. For reasons of culture, politics, the perceived needs of the rural economy and women's low social and economic power, fertility control has been slow to take root. But the situation is beginning to change. In all areas of rural development, efforts are being made to enhance the empowerment of women. This is perhaps most pronounced in natural resources management efforts, driven both by conviction and by the key role women play in NRM efforts. The huge increase in seasonal outmigration has made women single heads of household for nine months of the year.

The evidence is now clear that people see and feel the impact of population pressure. Many, including men who will become fathers, now perceive the absence of fallow and the loss of trees, wild game, water and wood. This perception has not yet been transformed into a conscious desire to control fertility. But the economic calculus that has caused farm families to prefer large families has changed, even if tradition and social expectations have not. If the optimistic growth scenario is met, falling fertility rates will bring about gradual reductions in the rate of population growth over the next 20 years.


But even the optimistic scenario will not result in an appreciable difference, by 2025, between high and low growth scenarios. *Niger's total population 30 years from now is likely to reach at least 17 million, no matter how successful fertility reduction efforts prove to be.* This fact is self-evident to the population community, but has important and less obvious implications for the link between population, environment and development. These implications are discussed in Section 3 of this report.

*Unless fertility reduction efforts begin now, even a successful economic and environmental transition will be crushed under the weight of a further doubling of population in the next generation.*

Long Term Differences in Niger's Population



Age Pyramid in 2025



Even in 30 years, however, there can be important changes in the age structure of Nigérien population: a lower ratio of dependent to working age populations, with major social benefits, particularly for women in an increasingly urbanized economy.

**2.2 Shifts in the Urban-Rural Balance**

Rapid urbanization is an important demographic trend as is total population growth. Burgeoning cities and towns (demographically if not economically) have absorbed some pressure on agriculture and livestock

production, but they also create demand and opportunities for unsustainable exploitation of rural resources, such as fuelwood. Very weak employment generation in urban areas stands as a major challenge to macroeconomic sustainability. A faltering urban economy inhibits long-term conservation strategies. Conversely, a healthy urban economy can play a very positive role in the agricultural and ecological transformation.


The urban population growth rate of 7% implies a doubling time of ten years. If this rate continues, urban population will reach 8 million, or nearly half of total population, by 2025. Major unknowns will influence the 30-year projection, including: absorption capacity in coastal economies, the impact of deteriorating urban conditions on rural outmigration, and the potentially important role of communications technologies in reducing the social isolation that now dominates village life. Whatever the final outcome, all of the major projections suggest *at least a five fold increase in urban population by the year 2025.*

Throughout Africa, efforts to reduce the rate of urbanization have failed. There is a clear link between rural outmigration and economic hardship in the agriculture and livestock sectors, as Niger's experience in drought demonstrates. But the steady decline of rural production also creates a steady flow of migrants, both seasonal and permanent. Economics is not the only factor driving urbanization. Quite possibly, it is not even the most important one. Consumption and social aspirations in villages have been transformed by contact with the outside world, especially among the young. In many villages, virtually all able-bodied males practice *l'exode rural* during nine months of the year. It has, in the words of the extension agent in Samdi Seydou, "become a way of life". For each group that leaves during part of the year, some percentage does not return. The "city lights" continue to attract the young.

There were 2.5 million Nigériens in 1950, with only three substantial provincial towns. There was forest, rangeland, fallow, wild game and "space". Within the span of one lifetime (by 2025), there are likely to be between six and eight million urbanites, including many second- and third-generation city dwellers. In addition to traffic, crime, sewage and television, two contrasts stand out: an entirely new socio-economic framework, and the need to *purchase* in order to live. The difference between 1950 and 2025 is not mainly a difference of numbers, but of structure as well.

There are major opportunities present in urbanization. Urbanites must eat, and their food will originate from outside the cities. The devaluation of the CFA suggests that less food will be imported. There are, however, several unanswered questions, most of which revolve around the classic issues that have plagued development planners: the need to stimulate domestic production, both urban and rural; the need to define comparative advantages for exports while gradually reducing dependence on imported food and consumer goods (see box). *There is nonetheless a growing potential for urban-rural economic linkages.*

Shifting Urban-Rural Balance



#### Unanswered Questions

Can the urban economy generate the jobs and purchasing power to absorb huge population increases? Can the rural economy absorb 3 million more and still generate a surplus to feed the cities? How will monetized urban demand affect the returns to agricultural investment? What is the potential for growth in commercial production and industrial food processing for urban demand? Even if urban-rural trade develops, can rural exports grow to offset the inevitable increase in import demand which urban consumption will create?

Urban demand for food and other rural products will continue to grow, and will provide increasing opportunities for commercial production in the agriculture and livestock sectors. The percentage of rural production that is monetized is likely to grow sharply. In revenue terms, the primary sector of Niger is likely to undergo the same transformation as have most previously agrarian societies, with a much higher proportion of revenue coming from marketed goods than from subsistence production. Much of this change has already occurred near urban centers. The devaluation of the CFA has also made Nigérien primary exports, including livestock and onions, more competitive in Nigeria and coastal markets, further strengthening this trend.

#### Potential Influence of West African Trends

It is impossible to separate what will happen inside Niger in the next 30 years from trends in the larger West Africa economic region. Land scarcity, urbanization, economic specialization and opportunities for trade will grow *throughout the region*. The fate of Nigeria (and, to a lesser extent, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire) will have as much, and possibly more, impact on Niger's prospects as will purely domestic concerns.

Regional issues add new uncertainties: regional immigration policies, currency agreements, market growth, political stability, or political and economic integration are all purely speculative at this point. Yet any or all of these factors can significantly influence Niger's choices. On the whole, they are likely to *reinforce opportunities for a successful agricultural transformation and heighten dangers of political, social or economic disruption*.

Two facts remain: (1) we cannot ignore regional trends in thinking about Niger's strategy; (2) selection and pursuit of a national strategy cannot simply await what would be a very speculative "comprehensive" analysis of regional futures. However, there is increasing attention to regional analysis at the OECD, the World Bank, the European Community, CILSS, ECOWAS, the African Development Bank and USAID. Mission strategy should formalize links, probably through ARTS/FARA, to those engaged in regional studies, and should regularly update national strategic priorities in light of regional feedback and changes.

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## 2.3 Natural Resources and Rural Productive Capacity

### Maintaining the Nutrient Balance

The organizing principle of traditional agriculture was the effort to maintain the nutrient balance of land under cultivation. With an abundance of land relative to population, long fallow periods allowed *natural renovation* to make the principle contribution to restoring soil fertility. The other key contribution was made by the *organic matter* from livestock during the transhumance. The interaction between herding and agriculture represents one of the most complex pieces of the whole, both biophysically and socially (the interdependence of "specialized" ethnic groups). This interaction is often poorly understood by outside analysts and planners. Finally, *vegetation* served as the custodian of ecological equilibrium, providing forage for the animals, supplying forest products and fallback foods for communities, cycling nutrients and protecting the soil from the impact of wind and water erosion. Therefore, despite the absence of external inputs and modern technologies (or perhaps to compensate), traditional land use patterns in Niger were relatively complex.

### Ecological Disequilibrium

Under the pressure of rapid population growth, traditional equilibrating mechanisms no longer work.

In the first instance, it has been possible to temporarily extract more nutrients from the soil than are put back in. This practice, known as *soil mining*, has been documented in several scientific studies throughout the Sahel, including in recent studies by the Royal Tropical Institute (KIT) and by the Centre for Agrobiological Research (CABO), both in Holland.<sup>1</sup> Over the last generation, shortening fallow periods have contributed to a decline in agricultural productivity through widespread mining of the soil. The strategy has been successful for a number of years in obtaining higher than sustainable yields. However, the long-term cost is an accelerating loss of resiliency in the ecological system. Demographic pressure, which has forced resource mining in the first place, is now causing the other shoe to drop: throughout the country, fallow is rapidly disappearing as a farming systems option. As a result, the present situation is more acute. *Jachère contrainte* ("forced fallow") involves simply abandoning land that will no longer produce, but does not necessarily assure access to more productive land. Often the *glacis* (crusted over soils denuded of vegetation) offer the best available option for restoration and intensified management.

Farmer-herder relationships are under stress, but have by no means broken down, because both sides need each other. The mutually beneficial relationship is under stress because both sides are now competing for *primary access* to the same resources: agriculture is moving into herding zones, vegetation for forage and for fuelwood is scarce, and the transhumant corridors are closing as agricultural settlement becomes more dense. Nevertheless, there are also farmers who are willing to pay herders to graze animals on their land in order to help restore the nutrient balance.

Nitrogen	
Exports	Uptake by Crops (54%)
	Leaching (6.6%)
	Erosion (17%)
	Volatilization (22%)
Imports	Residues (11%)
	N Fixation (5.2%)
	Deposition (18%)
	Manure (5.2%)
	Fertilizer (13%)
	Deficit (47%)

Source: van der Pol, Floris, *Soil Mining: An Unseen Contributor to Farm Income in Southern Mali*, Royal Tropical Institute, the Netherlands, 1994.

Vegetative cover has been in slow decline for decades. The recurrent demand for fuelwood, construction materials and forage have all kept pace with the tripling of rural population since 1950. Each new rural inhabitant also requires approximately 0.5 hectares of agricultural land. Since 1950, at least 4 million hectares of vegetated land has been converted to agriculture. *Sustainable yields* from the forest are well below consumption in all parts of Niger, both as a result of increasing demand and a shrinking number of vegetated hectares. The gap is being filled by *resource mining* - eating into the resource stock and further aggravating future imbalances.

Fuelwood supplies between 70% and 80% of household energy needs (both rural and urban). Urban energy demand has been particularly destructive to the environment because urban energy is purchased,

<sup>1</sup> see, for example, Floris van der Pol, et al., *Soil Mining: an Unseen Contributor to Farm Income in Southern Mali*, Royal Tropical Institute, 1994.

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not self-collected. Consequently, it creates powerful cash incentives for using modern technologies and transport for uncontrolled forest exploitation.

Whether the process taking place is called "ecological disequilibrium", "natural resources degradation", "desertification" or whatever else comes into fashion, its implications remain clear: *traditional rural production systems require environmental balance in order to function. Given population pressure and even the current level of resource depletion, the key to the restoration of both rural income and the environment is a new set of equilibrating mechanisms that go beyond what traditional systems can provide.*

### **Capacity to Respond: Biophysical Potential**

The key policy question is whether Niger has the biophysical capacity to restore equilibrium and to sustainably support a growing population. It does not lend itself to a simple "yes" or "no" answer. The answer is a qualified "yes".

Given current population and traditional land-use practices, biophysical capacity is not only insufficient to increase production, it cannot even maintain current production. The KIT (van der Pol) studies from Mali, under similar ecological and land-use conditions, estimate that 47% of the nitrogen, 3% of the phosphorous and 43% of the potassium used up in crop production comes from depleting the soil of these nutrients. In Niger, the situation is the most severe in areas where the ratio of population to fertile land is highest. This includes the arid (350 mm rainfall) "upper reaches" of the agricultural production zone, and the relatively fertile but more densely populated areas between Niamey and Gaya. Land availability varies more widely in the "prime" agricultural belt from Niamey to Zinder, but all available evidence suggests that, even in this zone, natural renovation is no longer able to restore soil fertility from one production cycle to the next, primarily because fallow periods are getting shorter as population increases. Even if a given area is not now in deficit, it will be within the next decade or so.

*Improved natural resources management can allow increased production for a number of years: it "buys time".* Nutrient losses through erosion and leaching can be reduced. Inputs - manure, residues, nitrogen, water, etc. - can all be better managed. But how much time can be bought? The answer depends on the rate of depletion and on how much has already been taken from the soil in the past. It will, obviously, vary in different parts of the country. However, we believe that improved NRM can buy between 20 and 30 years during which production can be maintained at acceptable levels. Depending on the rate of adoption, probably 10 to 15 years of *yield and production increases* are reasonable. If nothing else happened but the widespread adoption of improved land-use management based on natural resources alone, a generation of population increase would eventually bring things back to where they are today.

*A combination of improved NRM, small-scale infrastructure and use of external inputs, including chemical fertilizers, can extend the horizon of stable or growing per capita production another 20 to 40 years.* Once again, the van der Pol and CABO studies suggest that the longer-term scenario, to be sustainable, will require external inputs.

We return to the central strategic policy concern: Does Niger have the biophysical capacity to restore equilibrium and to sustainably support a growing population? We find: (i) *biophysical capacity will support real per capita growth in agricultural output of 2%-4% per year for the next generation, if improved management practices are widely adopted, and if this also eventually leads to the use of external inputs;* (ii) *realizing biophysical potential cannot be separated from changes in the incentives system, in the cost-benefit of specific land-use and investment choices, from the growth of markets and from trade and commercial production.* The devaluation of the CFA, the growth of urban markets and regional economic and trade impacts, particularly vis-à-vis Nigeria, are likely to have a dominant impact on the transition.

## **3. Changes in the Rural Economy**

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If democracy, devaluation, structural adjustment, policy reforms and urbanization dominate the macro scene, they are matched at the micro level by changes that are at least as far-reaching.

### **3.1 The Base of Field Operations**

The authors of this document have been directly involved over the past decade in efforts sponsored by USAID and other donors to build an understanding of what land-use management choices rural populations

in the Sahel are making and why. The base of evidence from which we can draw consists of several hundred field observations, primarily in five countries: Niger, Mali, Senegal, Burkina Faso and The Gambia.

In Niger the study team, Mission personnel and close colleagues have conducted a series of field reviews, including *Opportunities for Sustained Development* (Shaikh et al., 1988), *Le Sahel et la lutte contre la désertification* (Rochette et al., 1989), and many other short- and long-term surveys and study tours conducted from 1990 through March 1994. The authors were also directly involved in environmental and production system stabilization in Niger in the 1960s and 70s, and therefore add a long-term perspective to the lessons drawn from more recent studies.

### **3.2 The Approach to Field Observations and Monitoring**

This approach builds on the Africa Bureau's NRM Analytical Framework and the understanding of: a) what factors influence household land-use management decisions, and b) how those decisions affect production, natural resources and sustainable income.

Within this framework, the field observation approach has been to:

- Identify successful or promising initiatives
- Understand the contributors to success
- Feed lessons into USAID programs
- Calibrate USAID programs based on this feedback in order to broaden their impact

This approach is an *ongoing* process, in which initial lessons are refined during program implementation based on what is working at the field level.

### **3.3 What are People Doing?**

**Investing in grain production.** While field studies in Niger since 1990 have shown a trend to invest available labor and cash for production of commercial outputs, the 1994 field tour shows for the first time evidence of cash investments for grain production. The main reason cited was that the shortage of fallow land was forcing farmers to maintain production on the land they had. The team noted a progression in the strategies of households who were making such investments: the initial investments (such as for *demi-lunes*) increase the return on further investments, because they establish the conditions for making more efficient use of all inputs. We believe it is important to monitor these trends closely in the future.

**Diversifying.** The combination of necessity and opportunity is transforming rural production, especially around cities and market routes, through both spontaneous and project-sponsored adoption of improved NRM techniques. Most households face three basic choices, and are already practicing some mix of: subsistence production of foodgrains, small scale on-farm commercial production, and off-farm non-agricultural income. Having broken through the "subsistence barrier," many families near urban areas have developed *recurrent sources of cash income*, which in turn give rise to recurrent cash expenditures for agricultural inputs, although this trend remains on a relatively small scale.

**Leaving the land.** There is a marked trend towards emigration and urbanization, with the majority of working age males absent from every village the team visited. *L'exode rural* is an important part of the rural household strategy that brings increased and sometimes recurrent cash income. Its negative consequences include a deep-rooted disruption of social and household structure and extraordinary new burdens on women.

### **3.4 What Has Changed?**

**Perceived urgency of resource degradation.** The past five years have seen a dramatic change in perception of the need to do something to compensate for degrading resources. The vision of what to do is still evolving, although some form of intensification seems to be the most common response. As more farmers have intensified production to offset falling yields, the benefits of intensification are more visible. In each village visited, some farmers have significantly increased production and income while stabilizing resources.

**Income differentiation is growing.** There is a growing gap between farmers who have pursued a successful transition strategy and those who have not. Subsistence production in villages is less and less viable due to resource degradation and the long-term effects of resource mining. Those dependent on it

face worsening income and food security, while farmers who have broken through the subsistence barrier enjoy increased income and capital accumulation. The positive aspect of this phenomenon is that a growing number of rural households can now follow the successful examples that have been set. Of concern, however, is the political and social impact of inequality, which only exacerbates an already difficult economic transition for the rural poor.

**Enabling conditions affect NRM decisions.** A principle finding of the *Opportunities* study, the Segou Roundtable and the Africa Bureau's analytical framework is that the highest payoff role of the public sector is to help establish a set of enabling conditions that favor resource-sustaining land-use management decisions by households acting in their own self-interest. The study team's comparison of two similar villages in the Dallol Basso area provides a dramatic case in point:

The village committee of Samdi Seydou is based on *broad community participation*, including women; it encourages individual initiatives, promotes conflict resolution, and seeks credit and other support for community members. At the opposite extreme is the village committee of Zindarou, which has been locked in internal struggles over control, with *dominant groups reluctant to share power* with other members of the community.

Samdi Seydou has achieved significant improvements in production, income, investment, health and education indicators, and in the number of farmers who have adopted new techniques and successfully intensified production. In Zindarou, the same set of indicators shows little or no improvement.

**Primary interest in income generation and stabilization.** Successful programs to manage communal resources have capitalized on this interest of local populations by making cash income from sustainable harvesting and sale of forage and other forest products an organizing theme for projects. The most active and widespread participation has been for initiatives to protect or increase household income through improved NRM. The primary interest of rural households has been in initiatives that affect *farmlands*, rather than in common property resources that do not generate income.

**A greater sense of ownership of natural resources.** The *gestion de terroir villageois (GTV)* approach shows some promise for increasing incentives by giving the community clear-cut rights and responsibilities over a defined area of land. While this has led in some cases to tensions between farmers and herders, both sides have come to view natural endowments as economic "resources" to which they want access and which they seek to protect, at least from others if not yet from themselves. The idea of rights over resources is closely tied to democratization, and some rural populations are already relating to public authority in a different way. The use of public authority (e.g. the forestry agent) as a guarantor of community rights not only represents a change in the sense of local empowerment, it advances the perception of the *terroir villageois* as an economic resource.


### 3.5 USAID's Role in "Getting the Conditions Right"

USAID/Niger has played a central role over the last 15 years in helping establish enabling conditions for local resources management and in testing and proving concepts in the field. Many of the models developed with USAID support have now become key elements of the approaches on which Niger's NRM strategy is based. Particularly noteworthy areas on USAID's long-term support include:

- Promotion of common interest cooperatives
  - Village-level democratization
  - Governance skills
  - Access to markets/inputs/capital/credit
- Support of rural and forest codes
- Reducing costs of market transactions
- Reorientation of forestry services from policing to outreach

The figure below is a schematic illustration of the various factors that influence land-use management decisions, the effects these decisions have on sustainable ANR growth, and how they are related to analysis, planning and programmatic actions.

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## 4. Implications for Development Strategy

### 4.1 A Working Definition of Sustainability

"Sustainable development" is clearly the goal of USAID's assistance to Niger, but the term is so widely used that it has come to mean different things to different people. Because its definition has implications for USAID's assistance strategy, a brief summary of issues is in order.

**Natural sustainability** refers to maintaining the balance between inputs and outputs through purely natural phenomena, such as natural renovation of the soil during the fallow cycle and vegetation growth. Niger's traditional low-population systems of 50-100 years ago approached natural sustainability.

**Ecological sustainability** means maintaining the input-output balance of the ecosystem, whether through natural means or through actions of man, including infrastructure, resource management and the use of external inputs. Niger's biophysical endowment will permit maintenance of ecological sustainability even while increasing per capita production and supporting a growing population, *if cost were no object*.

**Economic sustainability** requires, in addition to maintaining the ecosystem's input-output balance, that the measures required to maintain equilibrium also be financially and economically feasible. Specifically, soil restoration investments (money, labor, resources) and the purchase and application of external inputs must pay off for farmers, or they will not happen—and they will certainly not be sustainable. Given Niger's public budgetary constraints, recurrent subsidies through payments, food-for-work or "non-replicable" intensities of extension or project attention are also not economically sustainable.

A viable development strategy for Niger must seek to maintain ecological balance primarily through initiatives that pay off for the households undertaking them. The only affordable—and hence the only strategic—use of public resources is to focus on: a) creating a favorable climate for private choices that enhance resources, and b) targeting limited public investment budgets on efforts that will spur private initiative (infrastructure, demonstration projects, etc.) and will yield recurrent revenues at least equal to any recurrent costs.

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Development realities in Niger imply that *economic sustainability* is essential to the prospects of achieving *ecological sustainability*. However, what is economically sustainable changes over time, as the structure and built-in incentives in the economy change. Economic structure and incentives are very likely to undergo profound change in the next 30 years as a result of population growth, urbanization and regional trade. The key question is therefore *how can ecological sustainability best be achieved within the context of underlying economic change?*

## **4.2 Capitalizing on New Opportunities**

In the simplest terms, the NRM and the development strategies of Niger depend on the ability to capitalize on new opportunities. Population and past degradation no longer permit a stable environment based on traditional subsistence production, however desirable the goal of self-sufficient subsistence producers may be.

Environmental instability and economic flux are also powerful catalysts for change. At the macro level, the potential for positive change clearly exists, given the *converging dynamics* of demographic, biophysical and economic transformations:

- Farmers are increasingly aware of the need to invest in the land; they often have no immediate option.
- Over time, external inputs will be required to maintain ecological equilibrium.
- Recurrent use of external inputs will depend on recurrent cash income, from both commercialized production and non-agricultural sources.
- Urban cash demand for rural products is likely to grow eightfold from urbanization trends alone. This impact may be even greater if devaluation stimulates demand for more domestic products over imports.

Devaluation also creates the potential for increased exports, both within West Africa and outside the region.

# **5. Indicators of Progress**

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## **5.1 Background**

Since 1970 there has been an enormous amount of theoretical and applied analysis of ENR indicators. One result has been an *excess of indicators* coupled with a *shortage of consensus* on which ones are important or what they mean.

## **5.2 What Do We Want to Know About?**

In order to develop useful indicators, we must first determine what we want to know about (program success, resource status, risk factors, etc.), and we must clearly state what is the desired outcome and what constitutes success.

## **5.3 Approach and Criteria for Indicator Development**

An indicator should be easy to observe and should also be correlated with changes we want to know about, but which may be difficult to observe directly. For purposes of USAID/Niger's programmatic need for indicators, we seek to create a strong *conceptual model* that establishes a correlation between proposed indicators and the outcomes the program wants to bring about.

**Methodology.** The following methodological steps are necessary for indicator development, and remain relevant even after an initial set of indicators has been developed, because they guide subsequent iterations of feedback and adjustment:

- Clarification of objectives

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- Developing the conceptual model
- Determining the candidate indicators
- Preliminary evaluation of candidate indicators
- Selection and final evaluation of indicators

**Indicators and criteria of quality.** Each candidate indicator must be evaluated according to the type of information it can provide, the availability of data and the resources to collect and analyze the data, and on the needs of the indicator users. Criteria for selecting indicators include: accuracy, precision, consistency, efficiency, sufficiency, redundancy and comprehensibility.

The relative importance of these criteria depends on the uses to which the indicators may be put. Thus, if the intended use is for public education, a comprehensive indicator may be preferred to an accurate indicator. Qualities of efficiency and sufficiency are generally desirable regardless of the intended use. However, it is sometimes desirable to trade efficiency for redundancy when the quality of the indicators is uncertain.

#### **5.4 Program Objectives and Intended Use of Indicators**

There are two purposes implicit in USAID's desire to develop natural resources indicators: for monitoring the status of the natural resources base in Niger, and for program management.

Indicators of the status of the natural resources base will provide feedback to the GON, USAID and the NRM and funding communities on whether the situation is improving, staying the same or getting worse.

Program indicators will provide feedback to help USAID and the GON determine whether USAID's program is making progress towards its objectives, and to better allocate resources in the future if progress is insufficient or not uniform.

Resource status indicators provide a level of *credibility* and *comprehensibility* that program indicators alone do not provide. The GON, the US Congress and other decision makers need to know whether programs are having final impact that goes beyond their internal objectives. The task is therefore to develop a hierarchy of indicators that together provide useful feedback for program management and at the same time provide credible evidence of final impact.

**Implications for Development of Niger NRM Indicators.** When outcomes are non-quantifiable, the relationship between indicators and outcomes is necessarily judgmental. More rigorous scientific objectives (e.g. whether children are immunized against polio) allow for more useful indicators. If indicators are simply based on judgment and are not quantified, progress can only be measured ordinally (i.e. "more" or "less"). Hence the importance of defining indicators that: a) move in the same direction as the objective being monitored, b) are quantifiable whenever possible, and c) are relatively independent and objective. If the candidate indicators entirely fail to meet these criteria, they add little to what can be known without them.

## **6. Natural Resources Indicators for Niger**

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### **6.1 Recommendations for Selection and Application**

**Tracking progress toward the goal.** The Mission's goal statement includes "to promote sustainable market-based economic growth while emphasizing locally-managed resources." The best proxy for tracking progress toward the goal is the increase in the number of rural producers who adopt land-use management practices that increase productivity and reduce degradation.

**Tracking Strategic Objective 2,** to "increase the opportunities for sustainable agricultural production and rural enterprises," establishes the incentive structure for millions of rural producers to change the way they pursue their livelihoods. Although ambitious, it has been achieved in many local cases, and the challenge is to build on localized cases in order to achieve broad-based impact. A heuristic process—not a prescriptive recipe—is required, and USAID/Niger has been a leader in promoting the self-learning process.

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## 6.2 Summary of Recommendations

Before discussing the selection and use of indicators, we summarize our principal recommendations to the Mission:

- Conduct M&E as part of an ANR information system that both tracks progress and increases program effectiveness.
- Use ANR information systems to validate/update assumptions on causal relationships linking program inputs with people-level impacts.
- Use NRM Framework to organize information according to various levels of causal relationships.
- Develop/implement action plan for information system that uses several tools including: relational database, KAP/PRA surveys, GIS, videography.
- Focus on community-level data while working toward aggregate measures of progress.
- Use changes in land-use management practices as proxy of impact and focus on a limited number of practices.

## 6.3 Establishing a Dual-Purpose Information System

Indicators for both the Goal and Strategic Objective 2 should be part of an overall information system with two linked purposes: to track progress toward program objectives and goals, and to increase program effectiveness.

Tracking progress will help the Mission tell its story, and this depends on intermediate indicators that are plausibly linked to impacts. The second purpose aims at increasing program effectiveness by: a) pushing up the learning curve about the levels of causal linkages that connect program inputs with people-level impacts, and b) identifying sites where people are most likely to change the way they make land-use management decisions.

## 6.4 Using the NRM Framework to Organize Assumptions about Goal and Strategic Objective 2

Achieving the Goal and Strategic Objective 2 requires changes at the levels of rural producers, the host government, the private sector and donors. Each of these changes is attributable to various causes and has several effects. Understanding these causal relationships is critical to achieving the Goal and SO2. The NRM Framework was designed to graphically display these relationships that function at five levels:

<b>Level V</b>	Changes in yields and productivity
<b>Level IV</b>	Changes in the rate of degradation
<b>Level III</b>	Land-use management decisions
<b>Level II</b>	Determinants of land-use management decisions (manageable/non-manageable)
<b>Level I</b>	Programmatic actions to establish Level II conditions

Analysis of the relationships starts with Level III, where the decision to adopt a practice leads to the outcomes of Levels IV and V. If the sector is to contribute to achieving the Program Goal, productivity must increase and rates of degradation must decrease. At Level II there are both manageable and non-manageable (Level II-A) factors that influence land-use management decisions. Manageable factors include those that can be influenced by the GON and private sector, which make up the "Enabling Environment" leading to broad-based adoption of appropriate practices. Likely candidates include perception of tenure security, access to capital and markets, first-hand knowledge of production options, skills required for managing community-based enterprises, access to technical assistance and sufficient labor.

The causal relationships linking Levels II and III are the most critical, the most complex, and are also constantly evolving. Consequently, the program's information system will need to track these internal dynamics.

The assumptions made in the design of a program about causal relationships should be challenged during the program's implementation. The Conceptual Framework allows for feedback at each level and suggests that the Mission include the testing of the strategy's assumptions by comparing the expected versus actual outcomes at each level.

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### 6.5 Candidate Indicators for USAID's Natural Resources Program

Table 1 on the following pages contains the 18 recommended candidate indicators in natural resources. They are organized by level, according to the Africa Bureau's NRM Analytical Framework. The mix of indicators includes both national and local information, in order to maximize the useful feedback for program management and resource monitoring.

**Time frame for indicators by level.** Changes in natural resources management take time: time to develop information and knowledge about diverse local conditions, time to transfer information to the populations who actually manage decentralized resources, time for people to understand and verify the value of new approaches, time to eliminate policy obstacles and establish an enabling environment, time for behavior change, and time for nature to convert human labor and investments into a stronger natural resources base. Yet the most pressing constraint in resource degradation is time, as population growth and increased poverty make environmental restoration more difficult as time passes. In this context, we present below the time frame for needed changes at the various levels.

**Level V and Level IV changes** are not likely to become visible on a national scale for at least a decade. As they do, however, indicators at these levels become the best and most objective measures of success, as they rely on objective methods such as national statistics, videography and satellite imagery.

**Level III changes** rely more heavily on sample surveys, most of which can yield purely objective data on practices and adoption rates. Level III feedback is likely to show the most significant changes in local areas, with nationally significant changes some years away.

**Level II changes** may occur in the short to medium term, and rely on a combination of objective indicators (such as participation in credit programs) and indicators of changes in *perceptions*, which are less objective but equally important to the long-term process of change.

**Level I indicators** are both objective and easily collected, relying primarily on direct observation and reporting.

### 6.6 Three Applications of Indicators and Information

**Learning from doing.** Thanks to past efforts in Niger and elsewhere in West Africa, planners are more aware that causal relationships linking inputs and impacts are complex and ever-evolving. Sometimes the most important products of projects have been the assumptions in the design that were proven incorrect. The people who implement a project should learn more than those who designed it, and ignoring lessons learned during implementation is costly.

**Capitalizing on the unexpected.** In addition to challenging assumptions about causal relationships, the ANR information system should keep the antenna up to capitalize on the serendipity of the unexpected. In the face of an ever-evolving dynamic characterized by increasing challenges and improving opportunities, thousands of farmers, herders and woodcutters—forever in pursuit of a more secure and prosperous livelihood—are searching for new and more productive ways to manage their lands. Some are helped by programs, while others are doing it their own way. Together, they have produced a number of unexpected examples that have helped planners understand Level II elements and expand their focus from just the development of practices to address the "necessary and sufficient" set of conditions for sustainable rural development.

**Identifying areas most likely to change.** An ANR information system that aims to take into account what is going on across the country is able to identify indicators showing that a particular region or village will be more receptive to change. For example, we noted that people were investing more in regions where there was little or no fallow. It is probably no coincidence that farmer-managed natural regeneration took off first in areas north of Maradi where options are most stark. With this knowledge, planners may want to focus attention on areas where fallow is limited.

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	LEVEL	WHAT BEING MEASURED?	SCALE	INDICATOR	DEFINITION
1	V	Changes in productivity	National	Per capita production	Agricultural production over rural population
2	V	Effectiveness of NRM practices	Local	NRM vs non-NRM yields	Ratio of NRM to non-NRM yields
3	IV	Changes in rates of degradation	National	Changes in composition and density of vegetation	Useful biomass over area
4	IV	Changes in rates of degradation	National	Changes in soil characteristics	Tons of soil lost per hectare; loss of nutrients per hectare
5	IV	Changes in rates of degradation / effectiveness of NRM practices	Local	Changes in degradation rates on NRM vs non-NRM areas	Same as 3 & 4 above
6	III	Rates of adoption of NRM practices	National & local	Rates of adoption of soil & water conservation measures	Number of hectares with improved S&W measures
7	III	Rates of adoption of NRM practices	National & local	Rates of adoption of agroforestry	Number of hectares with agroforestry
8	III	Rates of adoption of NRM practices	National & local	Rates of adoption of natural forest management	Number of hectares under community management
9	III	Rates of adoption of NRM practices	National & local	Rates of adoption of soil fertility measures	Number of hectares treated
10	III	Intensified management	Local	Adoption of more than one improved NRM practice	Percentage of respondents adopting more than one improved NRM practice
11	II	Security of resource tenure	Local	Perception of tenure security	Percentage of positive respondents in sample communities
12	II	Devolution of authority	Local	Perception of local resource management rights	Percentage of positive respondents in sample communities
13	II	Access to credit	Local	Credit participation	Percentage of respondents receiving credit
14	II	Access to markets and diversification	Local	Marketed products	Percentage of respondents marketing products
15	II	Diffusion of knowledge	Local	Breadth of knowledge of NRM options	Percentage of respondents indicating knowledge of more than three improved NRM options
16	I	Programmatic actions	National	Policy changes	Number of targeted policies changed
17	I	Human resource changes	National	Number of people trained	Number of people trained
18	I	Human resource changes	Local	Number of people trained locally, including site visits	Number of people trained

## **7. Action Plan for a NRM Information System**

This section proposes a Mission Action Plan for establishing and using an NRM information system with a twofold purpose: to track progress and to increase program effectiveness. Most of the activities would be carried out by MAG/EL personnel. The ASDG II approach is a revolutionary change in the way programming is conducted. By writing the scopes of work for studies and managing those studies, GON personnel take on the role of the analysts. They are closer to policy makers and have to live with their decisions, and they will be in a position to test the outcomes of the analyses over time. The Action Plan should focus on building an information system within the MAG/EL and on addressing the questions raised during project design and other relevant questions.

**Selecting and Organizing the Questions.** To identify reliable intermediate indicators and to increase program effectiveness, a number of questions need to be addressed regarding the information system, at every level of the conceptual framework. The tools for addressing and assessing them are discussed in the following sections. Who asks these questions and conducts the analyses may be just as important as the quality of the analyses. Those with the most ownership are the most likely to use the products of the analyses.

**Videography.** Videography has very high potential to identify the biophysical endowments at Level II-A, degradation rates at Level IV and yield changes at Level V. It is less useful for identifying factors at Levels I and II.

**Community-Level Surveys.** GON planners and policy makers need to know the inventory of appropriate practices and the Level II conditions that distinguish adopters of these practices from non-adopters. Two effective survey tools to obtain these data are Knowledge/Attitude/Practice (KAP) surveys and Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA), both of which have been used successfully in a number of countries in the region.

**Relational Database.** The above data would be organized into a relational database, where each row represents one site, be it a village, forest, crop field or rangelands. This allow for comparison across sites to find characteristics that distinguish users of more productive, less degrading practices from other users. Policy makers would have a tool that uses the mass of field-level data to make and test policy empirically.

**Literature Review.** To the extent possible, the Mission should use the relational database to collate information from the thousands of reports available on NRM in the Sahelian subregion.

**Sharing Tasks with ARTS/FARA.** ARTS/FARA is willing to serve as coordinator among Missions and to provide specific assistance in establishing a database, conducting KAP and RRA surveys and sharing the task of reviewing the literature.

**Selecting API Indicators.** During the first five to ten years of the program, point source data (e.g. fuelwood prices in the major towns) are probably not reliable proxies for measuring impact. It is recommended that current API indicators, which include the number of hectares under improved NRM, be changed to track only a few selected practices in order to provide more reliable and useful information.

**Developing Criteria for Assessing Prospects.** The Mission should be able to use intermediate indicators to assess the prospects for impacts to be sustainable and to become broad-based. A number of questions need to be addressed with regard to criteria and indicators for these assessments, including the following.

- **Assessing prospects for impacts to be sustainable:** Is productivity accompanied by increases in rates of degradation? Is the adoption of practices attributable to artificial incentives?
- **Assessing prospects for impacts to become broad-based:** Are the impacts from management of a limited natural resources endowment? Are the impacts attributable to the adopters having positions of privilege?

## **ANNEX E: The Determinants of Mortality and Fertility in Niger <sup>1</sup>**

### **1. Population in Niger: What Is at Stake?**

Niger has among the highest mortality and fertility rates in the world. Despite the present extremely high mortality levels, corresponding to a life expectancy at birth of about 45 years, and fertility levels of about 7.5 children per woman, the natural rate of population increase is still more than 3% per year. The country's population has grown from 1.7 million in 1920 to nearly 9 million in 1994—more than a fivefold increase—and it will certainly double in the next 20 years. *If the current population growth rate does not change, Niger's population will almost triple by the year 2020.*

To this gloomy economic and demographic picture corresponds an equally grim social situation. For example, in education, only one child out of four of primary school age is actually attending school. In health, it is estimated that only one person out of three has access to health services. Moreover, as minimum levels of education and health are recognized as important preconditions to sustainable development, rapid population growth, if allowed to continue unabated, might well prevent Niger from ever realizing any sort of development, making it perpetually dependent on external assistance.

The negative consequences already experienced by Niger because of rapid population growth also should not be overlooked. The most visible one is probably the degradation of the environment, resulting from overuse of good soil and recourse to marginal lands. Unfortunately, this encroachment has not prevented a growing food deficit. Rapid demographic growth that continues unabated can only exacerbate these phenomena and imbalances, which in turn may trigger other even more dramatic consequences, such as social unrest, civil war, surge of religious fundamentalism, etc., as already seen elsewhere in Africa.

### **2. Mortality and Health**

Niger has one of the highest infant and under-five mortality rates in the world. One-third of all children die before their fifth birthday. This mortality experience is similar to but even worse than in other African—particularly West African—countries.

The Niger case is somewhat different from that of other countries in that the mortality experience is so persistent during the early years of life. Further, according to 1992 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data, early childhood death in Niger is an event linked to a series of illnesses—respiratory infections, malaria, and diarrhea—in a classical pattern.

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<sup>1</sup> With the assistance of USAID/Global Bureau, USAID/Niger commissioned this study to help clarify demographic issues in preparing its 1995-2002 Strategy Plan. The objective was to identify and prioritize main factors that influence fertility and infant and child mortality in Niger. The Futures Group International, completed the exercise under contract no. 683-0261-0-00-4266-00, Resources for the Awareness of Population Impacts on Development (RAPID IV). USAID has adapted the following from the Summary of *Striving for Mortality and Fertility Decline in Niger*, December 1995, by R. Scott Moreland (Research Triangle Institute) and Jean-Pierre Guengant (consultant, The Futures Group). The full report is available from the authors or from USAID/Niger.

## **2.1 A Framework for Analyzing Mortality**

The situation in Niger is best explained through the Mosley-Chen-Barbieri framework (Barbieri, 1991; Mosley, 1984; Mosley and Chen, 1984). There are two key contributions of the Mosley-Chen framework. The first is the multidisciplinary analysis of mortality and morbidity, combining social and medical science. The second, related to the first, is the idea of "cause of death" being not a strictly medical concept, but rather one that involves social factors.

### ***Mortality and the Dependent Variable***

Although it may be biologically correct to identify the causes of death in Niger (as in other countries) as malaria, acute respiratory infections (ARIs), malnutrition, etc., such a focus does not get to the reasons for the incidence of these diseases. Just as fertility researchers focus on the social as well as the biological determinants (women's education as well as postpartum amenorrhea), mortality researchers should focus on similar interdisciplinary sets of variables.

### ***Proximate Determinants***

The Mosley-Chen framework consists of a "proximate determinants" approach that combines epidemiological aspects with social, economic, and cultural considerations. Another important aspect of their approach is that infant and child deaths are rarely the result of a single disease episode and hence of a single cause. The Mosley-Chen proximate determinants are: maternal factors; environmental contamination; nutrient deficiency; injury; and personal illness control.

Barbieri (1991) condensed and recategorized the five Mosley-Chen proximate determinants into three, based on epidemiological principles. She pointed out that the process of death by disease involves three stages: contact and contraction of the disease organism, struggle between the disease organism and the affected person's immune system, and use of (medical) therapy to counter the disease.

### ***Socioeconomic Factors in Child Mortality***

Whereas the proximate determinants are *directly* responsible for mortality, Mosley and Chen see the *indirect* socioeconomic determinants as acting on and through the proximate determinants. That is, the socioeconomic factors influence the risk of contracting a disease or the fatality of the disease.

Both Mosley and Chen as well as Barbieri group the socioeconomic factors into three categories (with examples in parentheses):

- individual-level variables (tradition, education, skills, and health of parents),
- household-level variables (clothing, housing conditions, access to broadcast media), and
- community-level variables, up to the national level (physical, political, and economic environments).

## 2.2 Relevant Evidence for Niger

### Background

Although numerous studies concerning the causes of infant and child mortality have been conducted for other developing countries, the evidence for Niger is relatively sparse. Two recent reports for Niger are the most relevant. The first is the study *Les déterminants de la mortalité infantile au Niger* (1991). The second study, *Nutrition et santé des jeunes enfants au Niger* (Oumarou, Nestel, and Rutstein, 1993) is an analysis of the 1992 Niger DHS. We also looked at studies of other West African countries that could help in understanding the Niger situation. Studies of particular interest include a study of Senegal by Diamé et al. (1990), another for Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire by Benefo and Schultz (1994), and a DHS analysis for Liberia by Conteh, David, and Bauni (1990) were of interest. Lastly, we conducted our own secondary analysis of the 1992 DHS, based on the Mosley-Chen-Barbieri framework (see next section).

In the 1991 Niger study, age of the mother was found to have some impact on infant mortality but only for *older* mothers. Infant mortality rates among the youngest mothers (15-19) were slightly lower than in the next group. This is in contrast to many other countries and might reflect an under-reporting of infant deaths (and births).

Rural-urban differences were clear in both studies, with urban rates being less than half of rural rates. This was true for all age groups. Similarly, the education level of mothers had a strong influence on infant and child mortality. The 1991 study found infant mortality rates for mothers with no education were about double those for mothers with some education.

In terms of occupation, some evidence exists that parents either being without a profession or engaging in agricultural activities is related to increased infant mortality, but it may be that this finding is more a function of rural-urban differences than anything else. The 1991 Niger study showed differences in infant mortality according to the profession of the head of household, whereas the DHS-based study showed that the relative risk of being stunted in growth was higher for children whose mothers worked in agriculture.

In terms of household environmental variables, construction material for the walls of the house was looked at in the 1991 Niger study whereas the roof was considered in the DHS analysis (in correlation with stunting). Both results support the hypothesis that early childhood health conditions may be worse in households living in houses made with more traditional building materials.

With regard to sanitation, the two Niger analyses show similar results. In the 1991 Niger survey, infant mortality rates were lowest in households with modern toilets, and lower in households with latrines than in those with no facilities at all. The Niger DHS analysis again looked at the effects on stunting or weight-for-age and found that the presence of toilets in the house led to significantly lower risks for child illness.

As regards the source of water, both Niger studies confirmed that piped water in the house led to better health conditions relative to other sources. However, among "other sources of water" (public standpipes, public wells, traditional wells), the differences were not great.

### **2.3 Trends in Mortality**

Arguing from the available data, *the mortality situation in Niger today is not very different from what it was 30 years ago*. The clearest pattern that can be identified is that both infant and under-five mortality were modestly declining until the mid-1980s, when they increased quite quickly during the mid-decade drought years.

### **2.4 Infant and Early Childhood Morbidity in Niger**

Evidence of morbidity comes from various sources. Although data from different sources can be difficult to compare, they show similar patterns. Babies under one year had the highest incidences of the three major disease categories (fever, diarrhea and acute respiratory infections). For fever and diarrhea, the incidence stayed high and, particularly fever stayed high, affecting one-third of the four year olds.

Socioeconomic variables predicting morbidity are similar to those seen for mortality rates. Higher education levels of mothers corresponded to lower morbidity rates for fever and diarrhea, but respiratory infections (coughs) did not seem to be much affected. Differences in residence, however, were important. The morbidity rate in Niamey for diarrhea was more than 10 percentage points below the rate for rural areas, and for fever it was 20 percentage points lower. The rural-urban difference is seen in both the DHS data and in the 1985 morbidity and mortality survey.

### **2.5 Nutrition**

In Niger, child nutrition is as important as morbidity in the study of early childhood mortality. A pattern of breastfeeding in combination with other foods and liquids almost immediately after birth, poor diet, contaminated water, and poor nutritional intake all contribute to low nutritional status. These and other environmental and socioeconomic conditions that contribute to high morbidity also lead to the high levels of infant and child mortality found in Niger.

Malnutrition is worst during months 12 through 23, and after that diminishes in importance while remaining high. These morbidity and nutrition patterns are accompanied by high death rates until the 36th month, when the mortality rate falls by half. Morbidity and malnutrition rates also improve by month 36.

One of the most important factors in determining a young child's nutrition is the breastfeeding practice of the mother. While nearly all babies in Niger eventually are breastfed, there is a *delay in breastfeeding during the postpartum period and a lack of exclusive breastfeeding during the first 6 to 9 months of life*. According to the DHS, only around 20% of babies are breastfed immediately after birth and only 30% during the first 24 hours of life. This means that the newborn not only does not receive the beneficial effects of the colostrum, but also is at risk for exposure to contamination from unsanitary conditions associated with the alternative foods offered. Exclusive breastfeeding is practically nonexistent in Niger.

### ***Socioeconomic Determinants of Nutrition***

In addition to age and rural-urban residence, there are many other factors that can influence nutrition and growth. The DHS-based report on nutrition and health of young children in Niger (Oumarou, Nestel, and Rutstein, 1993), shows that there are statistically significant differences in the three nutritional status indicators for various categories, when they are taken one category at a time. In that study, the following categories were found conducive to better nourishment of young children:

- educated mothers,
- mothers who had a small business (vs. other types of jobs),
- younger mothers,
- mothers in monogamous marriages,
- fathers living at home,
- wealthier families,
- drinking water from private well or tap,
- toilet in the home,
- house with cement floors or with tile roofs, and
- child's caregiver being a maid.

### ***2.6 Access to and Use of Health Care Facilities***

#### ***- Access***

In 1991, barely one-third of the population was "covered" by health facilities in the sense that they were within 5 kilometers of some kind of health facility. Moreover, this 33% coverage rate masks a large rural-urban disparity, despite the small percentage of the population living in urban areas. Health facility access in rural areas was extremely low. The most accessible type of health facility, the public dispensary, covered only 15% of the rural population.

#### ***Use of Existing Facilities***

Whereas a small proportion of the population had access to health facilities, an even smaller number were *using* the available facilities. There is much speculation as to why the usage rate of modern medical facilities is so low. Possibilities include preference for traditional medicine, lack of knowledge, and the belief that facilities have no medicines.

#### ***Illness Control: Vaccination and Health Service Coverage***

Personal illness control is one of the main "proximate determinants" of mortality. This can, in turn, be broken down into *preventive* measures and *curative* (medical) treatment. In reviewing the situation in Niger, we looked at vaccination coverage for childhood diseases as a measure of preventive actions and access to health facilities for curative medical treatment.

***Immunization.*** In terms of childhood immunizations, Niger has recently made some progress, but it still has a long way to go before it reaches the 80% "universal coverage" target set by the World Health Organization. While the DHS reported that the percentage of children under five who had received all of their vaccinations doubled in the 4 years prior to the survey, by 1992 it had only reached 13%.

***Socioeconomic Correlates of Vaccination Coverage.*** The data for Niger show that there was significant variation in vaccination coverage between regions and between rural-urban areas, a pattern we have seen often with other health indicators. Once again, Niamey had a significantly wider covering as compared to other districts.

The DHS also reported a significant difference between the vaccination coverage of children whose mothers had some education vs. those whose mothers had none. For example, 47% of young children with educated mothers had received the third diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis (DPT) shot in comparison to only 17% with uneducated mothers. *Education, especially of women, seems to be a necessary condition for progress in this area.*

#### ***Trends in Health Facilities Access***

As mentioned above, barely one-third of the population lived within 5 km of a health facility in 1991. Whereas this is an improvement over the 10% access reported 30 years ago, since 1978—when the rate was 30%—there has been hardly any improvement.

### **3. Fertility**

Niger, with a total fertility rate of about 7.5 children per woman, has one of the highest rates in Africa and in the world. This is primarily the result of very early age at marriage, of marginal contraceptive use, and of a high average number of desired children. This combination occurs under poor socioeconomic conditions characterized by subsistence or below-subsistence levels of income for the vast majority of the population, widespread illiteracy, limited access to health facilities (more so among women), and the highest recorded child mortality rate in the world (UNICEF, 1994).

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As early as 1984, the government's concern about rapid population growth led to the opening in Niamey of the country's first family planning center, the "Centre National de Santé Familiale." In 1985-86, various information and education activities using radio and TV were launched. In February 1992, the government adopted an official population policy. However, implementation has been slow, and the momentum gained in the late 1980s and early 1990s may be waning. Currently, within government circles and the donor community, those who doubt the need to further expand family planning activities seem to outnumber those who believe in such a need.

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### 3.1 A Framework for Analyzing Fertility

#### *The Theory of the Demographic Transition: Mortality Threshold*

The theory of the demographic transition was developed from the European experience of the 19th and early 20th centuries (Chesnais, 1986). Two main features characterize this theory. First, mortality decline is supposed to occur before fertility decline, suggesting, at least implicitly, that a significant mortality decline is a prerequisite to fertility decline. Second, the whole process of demographic transition as presented has been associated with socioeconomic development, suggesting that the demographic transition should be seen as a consequence of socioeconomic development, and conversely that without such development, mortality and fertility declines cannot be envisioned.

The Third World experience with transition to fertility decline is diverse but quite different from the diversity of European experience. The least developed countries generally have the highest total fertility rates (TFRs) and the lowest contraceptive prevalence rates (CPRs). But there are considerable variations among countries. Indeed, several countries of this group already have reached contraceptive prevalence of at least 20% in recent years. In these countries, the 1992 gross domestic product (GDP) per capita varied from about US \$200 (Nepal, Bangladesh, Rwanda) to about \$1000 (Morocco). Life expectancy at birth was at least 55 years in all countries but one (Rwanda) and around 60 years in most countries; Nepal, Bangladesh, and Rwanda were the only exceptions. Last, adult illiteracy rates varied considerably, from two-thirds or more illiterate adults in Nepal and Bangladesh, to half in Rwanda, India, Egypt, and Morocco; one-third in Kenya and Zimbabwe; and one-quarter in Bolivia.

These results point out two important features. First, family planning programs can be successful and initiate a fertility transition even in an "unfavorable" socioeconomic environment, especially if local governments support and are committed to these programs (McGreevey, 1985). Second, a minimum level of mortality, or a "threshold," might well be necessary before fertility decline can begin. In fact, it has been noted, based on an analysis of fertility and mortality transition in the Third World, that "no fertility transition has been observed to start in any developing country until expectation of life at birth had stayed above 50 for at least 5 years and finally reached at least 53" (Bulatao and Elwan, 1985). Even if this threshold of 53 has almost always been a *necessary* condition for fertility transition, however, it is not a *sufficient* condition. In several developing countries, fertility transition started only when life expectancy at birth was around or above 60. Moreover, many developing countries have not yet started a fertility transition even as long as 20 years after they have reached the 53-year level of life expectancy. This threshold, which corresponds to an infant mortality rate of about 100 per thousand, is higher than the levels reported for most European countries when they started their fertility transition. This underlines the important differences between historical and contemporary transitions in the developing world.

Surprisingly, the above findings on fertility transition do not imply that no family planning activities should start before a minimum level of mortality is reached. Putting a family planning program in place takes time, resources, and political effort. Having a program ready ahead of time may ensure a quicker fertility decline once mortality is sufficiently low.

A threshold like that discussed here may vary from one part of the country to another. It may also change or even disappear with advances in biomedical and social technologies for fertility control or with changes in patterns of societal development. Thus, whatever the socioeconomic conditions of the country, and whatever the mortality level, the earlier a family planning program is put in place the better.

#### *The Proximate Determinants and the Bongaarts Model*

"Proximate determinants" or "intermediate variables" (Bongaarts and Potter, 1983) can be defined as "the factors through which, and only through which, social, economic, and cultural conditions can affect fertility" (Bongaarts, 1982). The major proximate determinants of fertility are (Bongaarts, 1982; Bongaarts and Stover, 1986): marriage or union patterns; contraceptive use and effectiveness; prevalence of induced abortion; duration of postpartum infecundability (which is a function of length of breastfeeding and/or postpartum abstinence); and prevalence of permanent, pathological sterility.

#### **3.2 Application of the Bongaarts Model to Niger Data**

Niger belongs to the Phase I group of countries that have not started their fertility transition. Application of the Bongaarts model to Niger using the 1992 DHS results confirms the minor role of marriage and contraceptive use as inhibitors to natural fertility. Indeed, at the national level, postpartum infecundability appears as the only inhibiting factor of some importance to natural fecundity. However, for Niamey and to a lesser extent for the other towns, lower proportions of married women and substantial levels of contraceptive use contribute to lower total fertility rates.

Let us examine first the data and the results for the whole country. In Niger, marriage occurs early and is quasi-universal. Indeed, in 1992 among women of childbearing age—15 to 49 year olds—85.5% were married.

The impact of contraceptive use is even more marginal. Only 4.4% of married women were using a method in 1992. Moreover, half of them were using traditional, inefficient methods—mostly talismans, called "gris-gris"—which resulted in a very low average contraceptive use-effectiveness: 0.64, or a failure rate of 36%! Such a low method mix efficiency and poor contraceptive use rate have virtually no impact on fertility. In fact, in 1992, contraceptive use reduced fertility by a mere 3% of what it would have been in the total absence of any contraceptive use.

Next, the mean duration of postpartum amenorrhea was estimated at 15.2 months for the whole country. This was mainly the result of long periods of breastfeeding: 20.4 months on average. By contrast, postpartum abstinence was quite short by sub-Saharan African standards: only 3.9 months on average. Accordingly, postpartum infecundability reduced fertility by 41% of what it would have been otherwise, thus confirming its major inhibiting effect on fertility. Last, only 3.4% of the ever-married women aged 40 to 49 years were found to be childless. This is only slightly above the 3% standard rate of childlessness used in the Bongaarts model. As a result, at least at the national level, pathological sterility had no significant negative impact on fertility.

The combination of these indices with the observed total fertility rate, 7.38, yields a total fecundity rate of 14.11. This estimate falls within the range of 13 to 17 children per woman found by Bongaarts, indicating that the data used in the model are of reasonably good quality.

The decomposition of the difference between the total fecundity rate found in the model and the observed total fertility rate allows us to gain a rough idea of the respective importance of each proximate determinant. Logically, from the previous results, 85% of the 6.73-child difference between the fecundity rate and the total fertility rate is attributable to postpartum infecundability. This fact underscores the importance of encouraging women to maintain a long period of breastfeeding as a means of controlling fertility, along with promoting changes in marriage patterns and contraceptive use.

The application of the Bongaarts model by zone of residence clearly indicates the potential benefits of such an association. Delayed and lower frequency of marriages in Niamey and in the other towns compared to the marriage patterns in rural areas are illustrated by the lower proportion of married women: respectively 70% and 80%, as opposed to 87% in rural areas. This translates, especially for Niamey, into an important inhibiting effect of marriage as reflected by lower indices of marriage: 0.75 in Niamey, 0.88 in the other towns, and 0.93 in rural areas.

The combined effects of the proximate determinants on fertility vary by zone. More significantly, the percentage distribution of the contribution of each factor results in quite different patterns (Table 1). In Niamey, only half of this difference is attributable to postpartum infecundability, as opposed to 73% in the other towns and 90% in the rural areas. This means that in Niamey, marriage patterns and contraceptive use already contribute to half of the difference between total fecundity and actual fertility—each roughly 25%. In the other towns, both contribute—again about equally—to 27% of the difference between total fecundity and actual fertility. From this analysis, the full importance of each proximate determinant in designing programs to reduce fertility should be clear.

Table 1. Percentage Distribution of Proximate Determinants in Inhibiting Fertility

Inhibiting Factor	Niger 1992	Niamey	Other Towns	Rural
Marriage patterns	10.2	27.0	13.5	8.3
Contraception	3.8	25.3	13.7	1.6
Abortion	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Postpartum infecundability	84.7	47.7	72.8	90.1
Primary sterility	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

The fertility transition is not merely a question of decline in the total fertility rate, and population policy should not be reduced to family programs focusing only on increasing use of contraceptive methods. In the formulation of population programs, breastfeeding practices and marriage patterns should be considered as important variables to be influenced, as are contraceptive use and use of efficient methods.

### 3.3 Niger's Fertility Pattern: "Too Early, Too Close, Too Late, and Too Many" <sup>2</sup>

Age-specific fertility rates for the period 1986-1992, as given by the 1992 DHS, reveal that childbearing starts very early in Niger and continues throughout all of a woman's childbearing years. The corresponding fertility pattern is typically a "too early, too close, too late, and too many" pattern, to use the World Health Organization's definition for high-risk pregnancies.

Niger's fertility rate among 15- to 19-year-olds, 230 per thousand, is one of the highest in the world. This rate corresponds to a median age at first birth of 18 years and means that by age 20, about 70% of Nigerien women already have at least one child. This is a pattern of very early exposure to the risk of pregnancy. Furthermore, more than one birth out of four occurs less than 2 years after the previous birth.

#### Niamey

Fertility varies according to certain socioeconomic variables. First, we examine age-specific fertility rates by zone of residence; Niamey, other cities, and the rural area exhibit quite different patterns. The rate differences are generally larger for the youngest age groups,

<sup>2</sup> See the report for detailed exposition of issues and projections concerning targets and assumptions about proximate determinants.

and to a lesser extent for the oldest age groups. Teenage fertility rates for Niamey in particular are half of the rural rate and almost half of the other towns' rate.

The logical outcome of these different fertility patterns is that the total fertility rate for Niamey is much lower than the total fertility rate of the other towns, which in turn is slightly lower than the total fertility rate of the rural area. Most of these differences—about three-quarters—are due to the "delayed and less prolonged" pattern of fertility in Niamey.

With regard to education, a difference of "only" 0.74 child exists between the total fertility rates for women with some education (6.32 children per woman) and women with no education (7.06 children). This is likely the result of a "delayed and less prolonged" fertility pattern among educated women (who indeed are largely concentrated in Niamey) coupled with a higher use of contraceptives by these women.

Unfortunately, both the population of Niamey and the women with some education still represent a small percentage of the total population, about 7% and 10% respectively; hence the low impact of these two variables on the total fertility rate of the country, which remains largely shaped by the fertility pattern prevailing in the rural area. This is, of course, the case for all the variables.

#### *Knowledge of Modern Contraceptive Methods: Still Far from Universal*

Knowledge of contraceptive methods and of a source of supply for modern methods were both relatively low in Niger in 1992. Overall, about three out of four women declared knowledge of at least one method, either traditional or modern. This shows that the concept of family planning is not new within Nigerien society. Two out of three women declared knowledge of a traditional method, mostly "gris-gris." Only slightly more than one out of two women knew a modern method.

#### *Marginal Contraceptive Use*

Not surprisingly, overall use of contraception among married women was low for the whole country at 4.4%. In addition, about half of these contraceptors were using traditional methods, mostly "gris-gris," which are not effective. Thus, use of modern methods involved only 2.3% of married women.

Contraceptive use by education level mirrors urban patterns of use. Among married women with some education, one in six (16%) was using a method, and for most of them (68%) it was a modern method. Conversely, among married women with no education, only 3.5% were contracepting, but the majority (57%) were using a traditional method.

#### *When the Road is Just Too Long to Get Services*

It can be argued that the persistent high levels of fertility and low contraceptive use in Niger are primarily the result of poor health infrastructure, or lack of adequate services, often referred to as the "lack of supply" argument. For half of Nigerien women, family planning services are not available even 15 km or more away from their home. *For these Nigerien women, given the poor transportation system, it takes at least 2 hours to arrive at the facilities where family planning services can be obtained.*

### *High Ideal Number of Children*

The demand for children is indeed very high in Niger. When asked during the DHS what was the "ideal number of children" they would like to have, more than one out of three women (36%) answered 10 or more children. As a result, the average ideal number of children stood at 8.2 for the whole country, which is about one child *more* than the actual total fertility rate.

Apparently contradicting the previous results, a significant demand for family planning services seems to exist in Niger. For the whole country, about one woman out of four claimed to need family planning services: a quarter for limiting reasons and three-quarters for spacing reasons. In Niamey, one woman out of two claimed to need family planning, nearly a third of those for limiting reasons. In the other towns, one woman out of three declared a need for family planning services. All these findings are encouraging signs of a large latent demand.

### **3.4 Socioeconomic Determinants of Fertility and Contraceptive Use**

In this section we look at a few of the main socioeconomic variables that can influence fertility, through a multivariate analysis of the 1992 DHS data set. Among the "core" set of variables that have consistently been found to be significantly related to fertility in a multivariate context are:

- education, particularly of the mother;
- rural-urban residence;
- work status of the mother;
- age of the mother;
- knowledge and access to family planning;
- assets of the family, or wealth; and
- religion.

We looked at two dependent variables for fertility. First, we took CEB as a measure of actual fertility behavior. Second, we looked at fertility desires. In a high fertility-low contraceptive prevalence society such as Niger, one of the main concerns of program planners and policy makers should be to understand preferences for high levels of fertility since family planning services, if available, will not be used unless there is a demand for them. We therefore took the "ideal number of children" as measured by the DHS (variable IDEAL) as the other of our dependent fertility variables. Lastly, we looked at current contraceptive use, one of the proximate determinants, as a third dependent variable. These equations, measuring desires, experience, and control, provide some additional insight into the behavior of Nigerien women.

The independent or explanatory variables included fertility behavior (CEB), rural-urban (NIAMEY, CITES, VILLES), education (ECOLE), mother's work status (TRAVAILF), radio (RADIO), and mother's age (AAEF). The results of the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for ideal number of children (IDEAL) showed that all six independent variables that were included were statistically significant and had the expected signs. Urban residence decreased the desired number of children, as did higher education level and having a radio. In a second equation, age of the mother (AAEF) was added. The coefficients of the other independent variables were stable, but woman's employment

became insignificant. There was an apparent decrease in the desired number of children because older mothers wanted more children than younger mothers did.

With regard to "children ever born" equations, the results from a statistical standpoint are not as significant as those for the ideal number of children. This may reflect the crudeness of this measure of fertility or it may mean that when all variables are simultaneously entered, some of the strong bivariate relationships decline in significance. Nevertheless, all of the right-hand-side variables maintained the same signs as in the IDEAL equation. The variables that remained significant were NIAMEY and ECOLE when age was controlled for. When age was not controlled for, TRAVAILF became significant.

Finally, we examine the results of the logistic regressions for contraceptive use. The dependent variable here measures whether the woman was currently practicing some form of contraception, whether it be traditional or modern. We used the same independent variables here as in the fertility regressions and included IDEAL on the right-hand side. This time, of course, we expected that the signs of the coefficients would be the *reverse* of those for fertility. A negative sign was expected for the coefficient of IDEAL.

Nearly all of the variables remained significant (at the 10% level) with the expected signs, except the work variable and the IDEAL variable.<sup>3</sup> The result for TRAVAILF variable is not surprising, given the instability of this variable in the fertility regressions. *The insignificance of the IDEAL variable could be interpreted as meaning that reproductive intentions do not result in fertility regulation through contraception when other factors are accounted for.* The contraceptive use regressions show that urban residence and education are by far the most important predictors, followed by radio possession.

#### 4. Lessons from Other African Countries: Achievements are Possible

Having looked at the situation in Niger and the factors that influence mortality and fertility, we now turn briefly to the experience of other countries, particularly African countries, to see what lessons may be learned and applied to Niger.

##### 4.1 Neonatal, Infant, and Under-Five Mortality

Most African countries have experienced substantial mortality declines. Neighboring Burkina Faso has an unmistakable downward trend in all three mortality indicators, as do Senegal and Nigeria.

##### 4.2 Major Childhood Diseases

Niger has relatively low rates of respiratory illness compared to other countries. On the other hand, the prevalence of fever in Niger in 1992 was exceeded only by Liberia and Senegal in 1986 among the countries with DHS surveys. The elevated incidence of diarrhea in Niger is second only to Mali among the African DHS countries. Temporal comparisons, however, show that large improvements are possible. Between 1986 and 1993, Senegal managed to reduce its incidence rate by more than one-half.

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<sup>3</sup> In fact, IDEAL was *almost* significant, with a significance level of 12%.

#### **4.3 Access to and Use of Health Care: Urban Successes**

Niger has the lowest level of prenatal care among African countries. Only the 1987 data for Mali come close to the results for Niger. This last-place ranking, however, is due entirely to the low levels of prenatal care in *rural* Niger. Over 90% of pregnant *urban* women in Niger made at least one prenatal visit, a figure similar to those found in other West African countries. On the other hand, prenatal care in rural Niger is the lowest (at less than 25%) among the rural areas of Sahelian countries.

#### **4.4 Nutritional Status**

Only the children in Madagascar and Burundi are more undernourished than children in Niger. Again, rural Niger is undernourished relative to urban Niger, but in this case the differential is not out of line with the differential observed in other Sahelian countries. Higher incidences of diarrheal disease are associated with higher rates of malnutrition, and in countries where malnutrition is more prevalent, under-five mortality is also higher.

#### **4.5 Persisting High Fertility and Low Contraceptive Use**

Results of the various fertility surveys (World Fertility Survey, DHS, and other surveys) undertaken in Africa over the past 15 to 20 years confirm that the total fertility rates have remained high—generally above 6 children per woman—and use of contraceptives have remained very low in most countries of the region. However, there were considerable variations.

Contraceptive prevalence varied from less than 5% in Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Ivory Coast, and Zambia to about 30% in Togo, Kenya, Botswana, and Namibia, and to 40% or more in Zimbabwe, Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia. Among these countries, total fertility rates were relatively low only in the countries where the use of modern methods was substantial, underlining, again, the low impact of traditional methods on fertility even if they are widely used.

#### **4.6 Slow Progress in Contraceptive Use, but Some Reversing Results <sup>4</sup>**

Looking at trends in contraceptive use for African countries that have at least two fertility surveys indicates the following: only the North African countries that had a contraceptive prevalence rate of at least 20% fifteen years ago, registered major contraceptive use increases—at least 1.5% per year—during the 1980s. Among the sub-Saharan countries, only Kenya made such rapid progress in the 1980s; while in North Africa, Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt registered similar average yearly increases over roughly the same period. If one assumed that at the end of the fertility transition about 75% of married women would be using a contraceptive method, a yearly increase of 2% in prevalence would mean that the fertility transition would be achieved in 35 years, and with a yearly increase of 1.5% it would be achieved in 50 years. Sub-Saharan African countries are far behind such a schedule since, for most of them, the average yearly prevalence increase has been less than 1%.

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<sup>4</sup> See the full report for a discussion, "Tapping Latent Demand for Contraception".

Planners must clearly understand why the need is unmet if they are to meet it, but the pessimistic attitude that nothing can be done because "no one" wants family planning is not demonstrated by the data; not only is the demand there, but it can be expected to increase as use expands. Perhaps the recent successes in East Africa, which only a few years ago seemed unattainable, are more easily understood in this light.

## 5. What Can Be Done?

As we have seen, the mortality, morbidity, and nutritional situation in Niger is among the worst in the world. It is of first importance to reduce infant and child mortality, not only for itself, but also as a precondition for fertility decline. High infant mortality only exacerbates, and in turn is made worse by, the accompanying high levels of fertility. Resolution of this longstanding situation is of critical importance not only for humanitarian reasons, but also as part of the overall development strategy for the country.

### 5.1 Capitalizing on Synergy

Strategies for reducing mortality and fertility should capitalize on the synergy between the two areas, as well as recognizing that underlying poverty and ignorance are at the base of the problem. *Moreover, programs should be implemented first where success is likely to be the easiest and most effective. This means urban areas (Niamey, other towns), the educated segment of the population, and radio listeners.* While this may seem like a limited, almost elitist approach, it is designed to trigger a diffusion process through imitation and increased acceptability of changed behavior. A multi-sectoral approach is necessary to reduce both fertility and mortality. Improved education (especially of women) and improvements in the economy should be seen in this context. *Also, whereas mortality reduction is a necessary condition for fertility reduction, programs aimed at fertility reduction should not wait.* As seen, there is already a considerable level of unmet need in Niger. This level would be sufficient to support an ambitious family planning program.

*Accordingly, Niger and the donor community should adopt a goal of reducing the infant mortality rate to around 100 per 1000 and under-five mortality to 200 per 1000 within the next 5 to 10 years.* This goal is less ambitious than the one recently adopted at the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, to which Niger is a signatory. On the basis of the experience of other countries, including other African countries, such mortality reductions are achievable.

### 5.2 Mortality

In Niger and similar countries, no single or even main cause of death can be identified, not because of the lack of epidemiological data but because death is but the final event in a process. The picture we have of child survival in Niger is one of malnutrition and disease, leading to high mortality in an environment of poverty, ineffective traditional and modern solutions, and ignorance. In such a situation there are no *sufficient* solutions, only

*necessary* ones; reducing early childhood mortality can only be achieved if solutions are aimed at each element of the problem.

### *Strategies to Reduce Mortality*

Strategies for improvement in child survival must include improvements in preventive and curative care and will require better facilities, personnel, and information, education, and communication (IEC). The major incontrovertible obstacle seems to be lack of facilities and the poor functioning of existing ones. However changes in detrimental behavior—for example, poor diet and breastfeeding practices and the use of traditional solutions that do not work—must also take place and even be given priority over improvements in facilities. In other words, the strategy must be concerned not only with supply but also with demand. If this is not done, there will be no sustainability.

### *Measures to Improve Mortality Rates*

For these strategies to be implemented, specific programmable measures are necessary. These fall roughly into "demand-side" measures to change behavior and "supply-side" measures aimed at improving access to health services. Despite the lack of medical facilities in rural areas, we *recommend that emphasis be placed first on the demand side*; without behavioral change, supply provision will not be sustainable. Specific measures might involve:

- A massive and effective vaccination campaign that achieves universal childhood immunization within 2 years.
- Radio IEC campaign for nutrition, breastfeeding, health care, etc.
- Distribution of free or reduced-price portable radios with program logo.
- Distance learning program through televisions placed in villages, either in schools or in other "strategic" locations.
- Training of health workers for village-level IEC, curative care, and preventive primary care, including family planning.
- Mobilization and use of complementary sectors; for example, schools could be used as sites for vaccinations.
- Improvements in public health facilities linked to policy change. The project should consider supporting some improvement/addition of public facilities on a limited basis. However, the Ministry of Public Health must undertake policy changes.

### **5.3 Fertility**

Niger's data clearly indicate that early and universal marriage and low use of efficient methods are the main immediate causes of high fertility. As seen in the mortality section, high fertility is clearly detrimental to the health of children and mothers and contributes to the persistently high level of child mortality and maternal deaths.

### ***Strategies to Reduce Fertility***

For reaching the above objectives, we propose several strategies based on the present behavior of the population—too-early marriage, wide confidence and reliance on traditional inefficient methods; and on the shortcomings of the existing program—inefficient integration of services, and poor overall performance of the public health system. These strategies are:

- promote change in marriage patterns to postpone age at first sexual intercourse and/or at first marriage;
- increase voluntary use of modern methods in order to postpone first birth, encourage adequate spacing, and discourage pregnancies after age 35 or 40;
- multiply sources of supply of modern methods; and
- ensure access to adequate facilities, both in number and in quality, for distribution of contraceptives, follow-up, and treatment of side effects.

### ***Measures to Reduce Fertility***

The loss of momentum and the pessimism with respect to family planning activities largely are the result of a waning political commitment; lack of information on population-health-environment problems among community, religious, and other civilian leaders; and the low visibility of contraceptive users and those with an unmet need for family planning services. Therefore, in order for Niger to achieve the objectives and strategies listed above, the following measures are suggested:

- a policy campaign to establish political commitment of (public and private) leadership through policy dialogue over a 4- to 5-year period;
- IEC campaigns on reproductive health through radio and TV—the main source of information on many subjects, as evidenced by the DHS results; and
- service of the latent (unmet) demand for family planning by providing high-quality and diverse services through NGOs, private clinics, community-based distribution programs, and public health facilities, particularly in areas (Niamey and the other towns) where this demand is already significant.

## **ANNEX F: USAID Activities in Niger by Objectives: 1995**

**A. Activity Descriptions:** Projects are grouped according to the Mission's Strategic Objectives and the special themes that are accented in the program. These objectives are: SO1: Population and Health; SO2: Economic Policy Reform and Microenterprise; SO3: Natural Resource Management. The special themes: Democratic Governance; Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation, and Human Capacity Development.

### **I. SO1: Population and Health**

#### **Niger Health Sector Support (683-0254/0276) LOP: \$10.5m (NPA) and \$10.8m (PA)**

This project facilitates Nigerien health sector reforms, mainly to increase the amount and effectiveness of resources available to this sector. The NHSS provides NPA budget support and TA to the GON to facilitate cost recovery/cost containment, resource management, and health and population national planning activities. Achievements include GON adoption of a population policy; extension of family planning services; expansion of cost-recovery services; granting of semi-autonomous status to the three national hospitals; development of personnel, management and accounting systems in the MOPH; use of an essential, generic drugs list in all Public Health facilities; development of a national health information system, and; formulation of a National Health Development Plan. Counterpart funds are used to support selected health activities, particularly in Child Survival. All of the conditions precedent (CPs) for the five NPA tranches have been satisfied, and the final tranche of \$1.5 million is expected to be released in March. This project will end in FY95; some activities will be incorporated in the proposed Population and Health Services Project (1995-2002).

#### **Niger Family Health and Demography (683-0258) LOP \$21.5m**

The NFHD project assists the GON in achieving a population growth rate consistent with Niger's economic growth. Through an institutional contractor and several buy-ins and sub-projects, it is helping improve GON capacity to deliver family planning services, conducting a pilot health services quality assurance project, procuring contraceptives, providing TA in population policy development and demographic data collection and utilization, initiating social marketing of contraceptives, developing and integrating a reproductive health curriculum into medical and nursing training, and supporting three regional PVO projects. Largely as a result of this project, an integrated infrastructure for delivery of family planning services has been established in many health facilities. The number of these facilities offering FP services has more than doubled. Training has been provided for over 800 health workers. An IEC component has improved health provider capacity to develop and disseminate information, and has increased client awareness and acceptance of family planning. A Demographic and Health Survey has been completed and its results disseminated. Many of these project activities are expected to be included in the proposed new Population and Health Services Project.

#### **PVO projects under FH&D:**

#### **CARE Zinder Integrated Health Project (624-0258-2101) (LOP: \$738,000)**

This project provides training for rural dispensary nurses and village health workers (VHW) in child survival activities. Family planning activities, funded through a matching grant, have been incorporated. Studies have been conducted on malnutrition and cost recovery for VHW medical kits. The project is coordinated with Zinder Department health personnel.

**AFRICARE Diffa Child Survival (624-0258-2111) LOP: \$1.06m**

AFRICARE has been working in Diffa on health and child survival since the 1970s. The current project focusses on control of diarrheal disease, malnutrition, contraception, HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases, immunization coverage and ORT and post-natal care. Emphasis is placed upon training of VHWs, both in literacy and health.

**Vitamin A Prevention and Control (624-0258-2102) LOP: \$700,000**

Objectives of this project, carried out by Helen Keller International (HKI), are to reduce the incidence of blindness caused by Vitamin A deficiency in a number of areas of Niger. Activities both preventative and curative include Vitamin A capsule distribution, assessments of Vitamin A deficiency, training of rural dispensary nurses, and working with village theater and communications campaigns to promote consumption of foods rich in Vitamin A.

**Recurrence of Onchocerciasis in Niger (624-0277) LOP: \$400,000**

This centrally funded project, administered by HKI, supports monitoring into potential Oncho-prone zones to assure that the current prevalence rate of 0.2% does not increase. The successful 20 year multi-lateral oncho program has made safe for human occupation some relatively high potential agricultural zones in SW Niger.

Note: Analyses and program re-design in this sector are described later and in Chapter II. Most other donors also are engaged in some aspect of assistance in the health sector, especially UNICEF, the French, and EU. The US is the lead donor in family planning; the UNFPA, World Bank, and/ Germans also are major contributors.

**Central Contraceptive Procurement (CCP 936-3057) \$900,000 (OYB)**

This provides funds for procurement and shipping of condoms, contraceptive pills, Depo-Provera, and Norplant.

USAID's Global Bureau and Bureau for Africa make important contributions to Niger's development in the population and health sector. This collaboration brings vital technical assistance and provides USAID/Niger high quality, efficient administrative and management support. The types of activities and levels of Global Bureau participation projected for FY 1995 and FY 1996 are described below. These are very good illustrations of the types and levels of collaboration that likely will be continued across the strategy plan period. Amounts shown are for 1995 only; most but not all, are incorporated in signed agreements between USAID/Niger and the Global Bureau.

**Contraceptive Social Marketing III (936-3051) \$300,000 ("G"-\$100,000, OYB-\$200,000)**

This activity supports the NGO and commercial sector activities in social marketing of condoms. Lay foundation for other social marketing commodities through short-term technical assistance, clinical and related supplies and materials, support for field costs, headquarters and regional technical and operations support.

**JHPIEGO (936-3069) \$150,000 ("G")**

This activity provides short-term technical assistance, training materials and related supplies in order to assist the GON in instituting a national curriculum in reproductive health and to establish a national quality standards for reproductive health services.

**Family Planning Logistics Management (936-3038) \$50,000 (G)**

Works with the Ministry of Health and NGO consortium in the preparation of contraceptive procurement tables and projections, development and implementation of a contraceptive logistics management system, and related training.

**Population Policy (936-3078) \$250,000 ("G")**

Works to increase awareness of Nigerien policy makers, parliamentarians, opinion and religious leaders and high level public sector managers in population and to build a stronger commitment towards population activities and public support in family planning. The project provides technical assistance through short-term visits as necessary and as agreed with Mission: support for working meetings and workshops; observation travel tours in population and family planning.

**CARE (936-3058) \$189,000 ("G")**

This provides technical assistance (visits) to for CARE to continue provision of family planning and primary health care services in selected districts of Zinder province. This is supplementary to assistance funded in earlier years through the Family Health and Demography Project.

**AIDSCAP (936-5972.31) \$100,000 ("G")**

This continues and expands HIV/AIDS interventions among high risk groups in Niger through short-term technical assistance as agreed by the Mission, the National AIDS program and the contractor.

**Health Care Financing and Sustainability (936-5974) \$142,000 ("G")**

This provides bridge funding for technical assistance to continue and consolidate progress made in improving management and cost recovery in hospital and non-hospital sector.

**Quality Assurance Program (936-5992) \$500,000 ("G")**

Project is providing technical assistance to continue QA activities in the Tahoua Department.

**Health and Child Survival Fellows Program: (936-6004.08) \$304,000 ("G" 250,000, OYB \$54,000)**

This project provides Child Survival Fellows to support the Mission FP/MCH program.

**PopTech: (936-3024) \$100,000 (\$50,000 "G", \$50,000 OYB)**

This project provides design TA for the new population and health services NPA program.

**Under negotiation:**

**Technical Advisors in AIDS & Child Survival (TAACS), (936-5970)**

**Basic Support for Institutionalizing Child Survival (BASICS), (936-6006)**

**OPTIONS II, (936-3035)**

**Family Health Initiatives, (698-0462.83)**

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## II. SO2: Economic Reform and Microenterprise

### **Niger Economic Policy Reform (683-0259/0263) LOP \$21.9m (NPA), \$3.37m (PA)**

This project promotes Nigerien policy and institutional reforms concerning administrative and regulatory barriers, informal (parafiscal) taxation and informational impediments to improved export of agro-pastoral products. With support from this project, the GON has implemented measures to improve the policy environment for regional trade, including elimination of agro-pastoral export taxes, rescinding of quotas on livestock exports, acceleration of customs clearances for perishables and decentralization of all agro-pastoral export licensing. The GON has met the Cps for the release of the first four tranches, and should shortly meet the CPs for tranche 6. Satisfaction of the fifth tranche requiring reduction of parafiscal payments to public officials in the trade of agro-pastoral products still awaits completion of an ongoing publicity campaign. The NEPRP has been amended and extended, adding FY94 AEPRP funds for post-devaluation assistance and to permit design of a follow-on activity for economic reform and microenterprise to commence in FY 1996.

### **Policy Analysis and Monitoring (683-0266) LOP \$5m**

Nigerien capacity to develop and advocate policy options and analyze their impact in order to make necessary implementation adjustments is being reinforced by this project. The project assists development of a Nigerien policy research network capable of carrying out, evaluating and diffusing policy studies to be used in developing reform programs. About 20 research studies, under four major themes, are expected to be completed. For each of these themes, a policy paper for the highest level of the GON will be prepared. Nigerien researchers—part of an analytical unit within the Ministry of Finance and Plan—are supported through short-term training and expatriate assistance. Five Master's degree candidates are in the U.S.; two have graduated and are contributing to PAM studies. Several studies of the effects of devaluation have been carried out and other major studies are in preparation. This project will be merged into the new project for economic reform and microenterprise in FY 1996.

### **Credit Union Development II (683-0269) LOP \$8m**

Implemented by the World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU), this project continues activities (funded in Phase 1 by local currency generated under ASDG I) aimed at developing a Nigerien credit union program capable of promoting savings and extending credit to members, using local rather than external resources. Credit union promotional activity has been extended into the Departments of Maradi and Tillabery and a National Credit Union Association, responsible for establishing a central credit facility and providing member credit unions with related services, will be established and supported. The total savings of members in this program has risen from \$157,000 in 1990 to \$88,400 in 1994. The reimbursement rate is 100%. Many of the credit unions are sufficiently mature for significant lending activities.

### **Maradi Microenterprise Development (683-0272) LOP \$7.2m**

This project, being implemented by the U.S. PVO, CARE, follows a project that utilized local currency generated under ASDGI. It works to encourage private sector initiatives and develop the economy of the Department of Maradi. A rural bank and a technical school have been established to provide loans to small enterprises, income-generating groups and individuals for working capital and equipment purchases and technical training to individuals in Maradi Department. The project is working toward the privatization both of the BRK and a technical school established under the project, to enable them to function after the 1996 PACD. As of late 1994, a total of 25,679 new microenterprises had been created (over 30 times the

number planned), 31,358 new jobs created (a third of them for women), and over \$1 million in loans disbursed. Progress is expected to continue through 1995, but more emphasis will be placed on nurturing sustainability.

**Rural Organizations Development (683-0260) LOP: \$7.5m**

Implemented by the PVO NCBA/CLUSA, the ROD project continues work of an earlier project, aiming to expand and institutionalize the private sector role in rural areas through development of cooperatives engaged in productive economic activities. TA is provided to the Ministry of Agriculture to encourage adoption of policies supporting the cooperative movement. Under this project, about 138 cooperatives and 88 women's groups have been organized, over many have received literacy and/or numeracy training, a loan guarantee fund has allowed many of the cooperatives to receive loans to market their member's produce and small village stores and pharmacies have been established. Over \$460,000 has been disbursed as loans to cooperatives for economic activity since 1989. The reimbursement rate in 1996 was over 96%. New legislation grants more freedom to cooperatives. A Nigerien NGO (APOR) has been created to support establishment of viable rural enterprises, and a credit service (KOKARI) has been set up to link formal sector resources with credit needs of rural organizations. This project will be extended 1996 to provide minimal support to APOR and make KOKARI completely independent financially.

The six above projects pertaining to Strategic Objective #2, Economic Reform and Microenterprise will be consolidated during FY 1995. A new PA and NPA activity is expected to be established in FY 1996 and FY 1997 (See Table 1) with emphasis on further growth in associations for savings and credit and related analyses and reforms in the fiscal sector.

Support to this SO is also being provided by the Global Bureau, of which \$280,000 is expected to come from "G" funds and \$525,000 from Mission OYB resources. Most of this is for assessment and design both of individual projects and for the SO sector. The Mission is also considering buying into the new Program for Innovation in Microenterprises (PRIME) fund of the Global Bureau's Microenterprise Innovation Project, which will co-finance Mission designed and managed microenterprise projects.

The following Global Bureau activities feature the Niger program:

**Financial Sector Development Project (FSPD), (940-0025) LOP \$1.6m**

**Consulting Assistance for Economic Reform (CAER), (940-0405) LOP \$1.25**

**Growth & Equity Through Microenterprise Investments and Institutions (GEMINI), (936-5448) LOP \$2m**

**Microenterprise Innovation Project, (940-0406)**

**Democracy and Human Rights Fund, (698-0541.83)**

### **III. SO3: Natural Resource Management**

#### **Agricultural Sector Dev. Grant II (683-0257/0265) LOP: \$20.0m (NPA) & \$7.972m (PA)**

This project assists rural Nigeriens to better control and better utilize their natural resources while improving agricultural productivity. The project funds technical assistance, training, evaluation and audits. The release of non-project assistance funds, which provide budget support to GON institutions and private entities dealing with NRM, is contingent upon GON satisfaction of Conditions Precedent involving reforms related to land tenure, resource use, and the roles of specific private and public institutions involved in rural development. The GON has adopted and begun implementation of a Rural Code establishing a policy framework for land tenure and has liberalized regulations affecting NGOs. Tranche I has been released, and rapid progress is being made toward release of all of Tranche II. The NGO/private sector sub-component is about to be implemented by the U.S. contractor who will manage a \$5.5 million local currency, non-governmental/private sector program to build voluntary associations for natural resource management.

#### **Gouré Natural Resource Management Interventions (683-0278) LOP: \$5.0m**

This project, implemented by the PVO AFRICARE in the Gouré region, integrates environmental conservation and sustainable agricultural development under a comprehensive village-level natural resource management (NRM) plan. It builds on activities funded through local currency generated under an earlier ASDG I project. Environmental aspects include protection of dry-season cuvettes from animals and sand encroachment through planting of living fences and establishment of pastoral wells, stabilization of shifting sand dunes and stabilization of cultivated soil through use of agro-forestry techniques. Increased emphasis is being given to collaboration and participation of the local populace in the development and implementation of this program. The 10 villages involved in this project have elected management committees, developed management plans and signed engagement contracts. They have submitted 54 proposals for project funding. By the end of 1994, 21,000 trees have been planted in windbreaks and woodlots, and 50,000 seedlings produced in the municipal nursery. Dunes have been stabilized. Activities will soon be expanded to other villages.

The NRM sector was the subject of intensive analysis in 1994 with special emphasis on relationships between population and environment, and on indicators for measuring progress (See Annex D for a summary). The ASDG II PA and NPA projects were thoroughly evaluated during the last half of FY 1994. During FY 1995 ASDG II will be amended and extended for at least three years, with continued emphasis on land reforms and additional emphasis on promotion of local voluntary associations and common interest groups in the productive sector. The U.S. plays a leadership role in this sector, especially in policy. The World Bank, the Belgians, Dutch and a few other donors also are active in NRM.

A number of projects under this SO are being carried out with the support of the Global Bureau are shown below. Funding is for FY 1995 only and has not been finalized.

#### **Forest Resource Management (936-5556) \$400,000 (OYB)**

The project will support efforts of Peace Corps volunteers in Natural Resource Management activities in rural Niger.

**Soil Management/Cooperation Research (931-1311) \$200,000 (G)**

In collaboration with the National Agriculture Research Institute (INRAN), the CRSP will provide technical assistance to continue work on soil management constraints to NRM.

The following Global Bureau activities feature the Niger program:

**Sorghum and Millet CRSP (931-1254) \$100,000 (G)**

Work with the National Agriculture Research Institute (INRAN) to plan current season collaborative work and develop with Mission possible collaborative activities through the provision of short-term technical assistance, related supplies and materials, support for field costs; headquarters and regional technical and operations support.

**SARSA II (936-5452) \$15,000 (G)**

Work with the Africa Bureau PARTS project in applying research knowledge to Natural Resource Management systems in Niger. Project will provide research support through short-term visits as agreed with Mission; headquarters and regional technical and operations support.

**Peanut CRSP (936-4048) \$150,000 (G-requested)**

In collaboration with the National Agriculture Research Institute (INRAN), the CRSP will extend work on crop variety development and nitrogen fixation as they relate to NRM. Technical assistance will be provided through a series of visits from US collaborators, related supplies and materials, and technical and operations support from headquarters and regional offices.

**Development Strategies for Fragile Lands (DESFIL- 936-5438) (\$20,000- G ?)**

Project will work with TA from the Africa Bureau PARTS project to improve regional and Mission NRM strategies and in planning monitoring and evaluation system for NRM Strategic Objective.

**Environmental and Natural Resource Policy and Training (EPAT- 936-5555) \$20,000 (G?)**

Project will work with TA from the Africa Bureau PARTS project to improve Mission NRM strategies and environmental policies for NRM Strategic Objective.

**Agriculture Sector Development Grant I (ASDGI), (683-0246)(past; counterpart fund) LOP \$32**

**Small Project Assistance (SPA), (683-0249)**

**Sahel Regional Institutions (SRI), (625-0975)**

**Programs for Applied Development Research in the Sahel (PADRES), (698-0980)**

**Environmental Education and Communication Project, (936-5839)**

**Policy Analysis, Research and Technical Support (PARTS), (698-0478)**

**Democracy and Human Rights Fund, (698-0541.83)**

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## Special Themes

### 1. Democratic Governance

During 1994 the Mission began to introduce democratic governance as a theme into all of its main activities. This means more attention to helping GON decentralization in public health, and natural resource management especially, but also brings a new way of looking at work in our rural financial systems. USAID/Niger also manages Section 116(e) activities for democracy that aim at informing and educating, men and women in Niger about their rights and responsibilities as citizens, empowering them to participate in a democratic society. In 1994, a total of \$169,000 in 116e funds were used for (1) support to upcoming local and municipal elections; (2) a seminar focusing on the independent role of the judiciary in a democracy; (3) a seminar focusing on human rights issues in nomadic and semi-nomadic zones; (4) equipping 51 Radio Club listening centers in rural areas to promote village level discussions on democracy and human rights issues; (5) printing the summaries of the Nigerien Supreme Court decrees; and (6) financing the establishment of two women's legal clinics in two semi-urban cities of Niger.

In FY 1995, USAID is providing a total of \$208,000 in 116(e) funds for the following activities: (1) financing a legal assistance center for women to improve the legal environment affecting women and children; (2) a seminar on the role of law clerks in a democratic society; (3) training for Radio Clubs to conduct village level discussions of specific democracy and human rights, following nationwide radio broadcasts; (4) training for penal staff on regulations and the rights of prisoners and improving conditions in prisons; (5) establishing a journalism prize to promote informed debate on democracy and human rights principles and to encourage the Nigerien press to take a more active role in defending democracy and investigating human rights cases; (6) producing democracy and civic education manuals for primary and secondary level teachers and holding a training-of-trainers seminar; and (7) establishment of four women's legal clinics in selected semi-urban cities of Niger to improve the understanding of laws and regulations in rural areas.

In addition, using AREAF funds, the Mission provided a grant of \$142,000 to NDI for training of both governmental and civic groups in the operations of the January 1995 legislative elections. In FY 1995, USAID/Niger will begin a small annual investment in one or more USAID regional programs, with special emphasis on decentralization and mobilizing local resources. Some of the proposed Global Bureau programs will receive OYB funds from that source. A few other donors are active in this domain, but the U.S. Mission provides the most active support.

The Mission also plans to utilize the resources of the Global Bureau, and has requested the following projects:

**International Foundation for Electoral Services (IFES), (936-5451) \$75,000 ("G") \$25,000 (OYB)**

In partnership with the IFES project, this will provide technical assistance to assist the GON in preparations for local elections, and their execution in selected areas.

**Democracy Sector Support Project (DSSP) (936-5468) \$75,000 ("G") \$50,000 (OYB)**

There are several aspects of this activity which will be supported primarily through short-term visits. These are: 1) Development of Mission results framework D-G indicator system; 2) Rule of Law: reforms in judicial independence and administration of law and access to law; 3)

implementation of Niger's Rural Code and, as appropriate, formulation and implementation of the proposed Family Code. Conferences, training, information dissemination and networking form the core of needed assistance.

## **2. Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation**

### **Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation (683-0271/0279) LOP: \$11.0 (NPA) and \$8.0m (PA)**

This project aims to promote food security by minimizing the negative impact of disasters on Nigerien economic development. The project will strengthen Nigerien capabilities to assess and effectively respond to disasters, especially food-related emergencies. The main activities are development of a vertically integrated early warning and response system, an increasing shift from relief and free food distribution to mitigation activities encouraging self-help and community participation, improved donor coordination, and setting up an Emergency Fund (NPA counterpart funds) to be utilized by the GON for short-term emergency needs, including local food purchase and transport. Two pilot mitigation projects as well as studies on institutional and legal aspects of early warning and response have been completed. The conditions for release of the first NPA tranche have been satisfied, and \$1 million will be disbursed shortly. An additional \$1.0 million was added to the DPM project from AEPRP for post-CFA devaluation assistance aimed at most vulnerable groups. The Germans, Italians and Europeans are quite active in this arena, though the U.S. may be the largest single donor.

### **Famine Early Warning (FEWS) System (698-0466.83) LOP: \$1.1m**

This regional project assists the Mission's capacity to forecast and address emergency food situations. It also assists the GON's SAP in institutionalizing its own capacity in this sector. It provides regular reports to FEWS/W on the status of food availability and population at risk. FEWS activities will continue under a new contractor.

### **Sahel Water Data Network and Management III (683-0973) LOP: \$14m**

The AGRHYMET project, set up by CILLS in 1975, receives multi-donor support. The project aims to improve agricultural production and support development of a regional system, including national elements, to record, process, interpret, transmit, disseminate and document timely, accurate and meaningful weather, climatic and hydrological information on the Sahel. Emphasis is being placed on further Sahelization and institutional strengthening. Although funded regionally, USAID's implementation is the responsibility of the Mission, through a grant agreement with the World Meteorological Society.

### **Africa Emergency Locust/Grasshopper Assistance (AELGA) (698/625/683-0517) LOP: \$3.9m**

This project helps prevent/minimize grasshopper and locust damage to crops and pasture. It provides logistical support to the Directorate of Crop Protection (DCP) for survey and control operations and provides training in crop protection to DCP agents and farmers. The DCP sprays approximately 500,000 hectares of fields annually; and it is estimated that this secures food for about 570,000 persons. It is providing \$300,000 to help avert a potential infestation in late 1995. AELGA activities will be absorbed into the DPM project after 1995.

### **3. Human Capacity Building (Applies to Mission Objectives)**

**African Training for Leadership and Skills (ATLAS)** Identifies and provides U.S. graduate training for the highest qualified participants. Participating U.S. universities participate in the selection process and provide scholarships for selected candidates. USAID/Niger has bought into the project at \$500,000 per year for the last several years.

#### **Human Resources Development Assistance (698-0463.83)**

This project is utilized to address Nigerien training needs not taken care of through the sectoral projects, particularly the private sector, management and women. Over the past two years, the Mission has moved from a third country emphasis to U.S. training. The Mission has been obligating between \$400,000 and \$850,000 a year for this project. As of early 1995, 1,003 Nigeriens had been, or were being trained under this project, 80% of them through in-country training.

#### **Niger Applied Agricultural Research (683-0256) LOP: \$20.0m**

Between 1987 and 1992, this project supported research activities carried out by the Niger Institute for Agricultural Research (INRAN), including assistance to research sub-stations. The PACD has been extended until 1997, to fund training activities, including follow-on programs through distance learning technologies, and establishment and support for a U.S. trainee alumni association.

The Mission also expects to access Global Bureau support for development of a Mission training plan and, through the HERNS project (\$175,000-"G"), develop a long distance education system through WORLDNET.

**Note on Human Capacity Building:** As Table 1 makes clear, human capacity building constitutes a major part of USAID investments in Niger, about 20% of the total portfolio LOP. USAID-funded participant training programs in Niger date from the mid-1960s. Until FY 1994, training had been spread broadly across health, agriculture, higher education, management and a variety of technical fields. Beginning in FY 1994 USAID/Niger aligned virtually all participant training towards the Mission's new strategy objectives. This strict alignment will continue across the five-year CPSP period.<sup>1</sup>

## **CONCLUSIONS**

The foregoing describes the existing base upon which USAID/Niger's strategy for the years 1995 through 2002 has been developed. Changes in specific projects and subject areas expected over the next five years are indicated in Table 1. Our strategy calls for continuing the flexible framework of Agency activities in Niger that evolved over the past decade, with (1) its range of sub-sectors, (2) its mix of non-project, policy-oriented activities and technical assistance-oriented projects, and (3) its pattern of relative investment by Strategic Objective. We propose some shifts in priorities and portfolio organization, but these are not large changes. Our plan builds on a good foundation.

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<sup>1</sup>See "USAID/Niger Country Training Strategy Plan, March 1995."

A revised approach to non-project assistance deserves mention. Experience in Niger with NPA suggests that: (1) USAID should have technical assistance (PA) projects that complement NPA activities, probably in every sector, and (2) these PA activities ought to *precede* the NPA and be involved, with the Government of Niger and USAID, in developing reform conditionalities and their monitoring. Absence of this approach explains some of the past difficulties with slow disbursing NPA funds in Niger. We believe the new approach improves the prospect for NPA activities in the future that are more policy-effective and rapid disbursing.

USAID/Niger project investments are roughly equally divided between GON, PVOs (U.S. and Nigerien), and technical assistance by U.S.-based contractors. An analysis by USAID for the GAO of our investments in Niger since FY 1990 revealed that: (1) a fairly uniform 30% of annual obligations go to mostly U.S.-based PVOs; (2) these investments are beginning to shift towards local Nigerien PVOs; (3) that the remaining 70% of funds mostly were obligated to the GON but were about equally divided between funds for the GON and funds for U.S.-based technical assistance/contractors. Budget planning through FY 1993 suggests that this pattern will continue into the foreseeable future, under our main Scenario. USAID will endeavor to shift contract work more towards Nigerien and other African sources.

Table 1 summarizes the activity profile at the beginning of FY 1995. It shows existing USAID project starting and ending dates, and total plan and cumulative funds obligations. Activities (and cumulative obligations) are grouped by Objective. Planning levels of investment in training are given in column 5. Note that PACD/end dates for nearly all projects are in FY 1995 and 1996; this is a "mature" portfolio. Sectoral assessments and redesign are underway in the first two subject areas, and are planned for the third area (SO 3) in FY 1995. Entering FY 1995, "mortgages" are low—about 19% of total planned obligations. "Pipelines" (not shown), likewise, are now about 38% of cumulative obligations. USAID/Niger disbursed about \$50 million in FY 1994.

It reveals a portfolio of older projects and an unusually low overall mortgage level. Pipelines were greatly reduced during FY 1994, and sizable further disbursements will take place over the next few months. The latter should reduce this Mission's overall pipeline to well below prevailing Agency levels. This is a portfolio now ready for the changes proposed in this strategic plan

Activities under each of the three SOs are being thoroughly analyzed and redesigned. That process already is completed for SO1. The process already is well underway and will be completed by mid-1995 for SO3. Analyses, redesign and consolidation of activities under SO2 already are beginning as part of our Mission FY 1995 Work Plan; the most important features of this redesign will be completed in early FY 1996, and the new economic policy reform activity will begin in FY 1996 or 1997. The Mission's main design actions under this CPSP Plan, then, would be complete in 1997, assuming a straightline funding scenario.

**ANNEX F, Table 1: USAID/Niger Projects  
15 March 1995**

1 <i>STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE</i> Project Number & Name/Type	2 Date of 1st Obligation	3 Plan (million \$)	4 Total Funds Obligated	5 Human Capacity Building	6 PACD (end) Date
<b>S.O. #1: POPULATION &amp; HEALTH</b>		<b>\$641m (31%)</b>			
683-0276 - Niger Health Sector Sup. (NPA)	8/28/86	10.50	10.50	0.67	8/31/95
683-0254 - Niger Health Sector Sup. (PA)	8/28/86	10.80	10.80	0.30	8/31/95
683-0258 - Family Health & Demography	8/16/86	21.50	19.70	2.25	7/31/95
<b>S.O. #2: ECONOMIC REFORMS &amp; MICROENTERPRISE</b>		<b>\$44m (34%)</b>			
683-0263 - Niger Econ Policy Reform Prog (PA)	8/29/88	3.37	3.37	0.75	12/31/95
683-0259 - Niger Econ Policy Reform Prog (NPA)	8/29/88	21.90	21.90		12/31/95
683-0266 - Policy Analysis & Monitoring	8/24/90	5.00	3.50	0.94	6/30/96
683-0272 - CARE Maradi Microenterprise	7/31/91	7.20	6.00	0.37	7/31/96
683-0278 - Niger Credit Union Dev. WOCCU	8/21/92	8.00	3.00	0.23	8/31/97
683-0260 - Rural Organizations Dev. CLUSA	8/25/89	7.50	6.40	2.95	12/31/96
<b>S.O. #3: NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT</b>		<b>\$23 (15%)</b>			
683-0275 - Gouré NRM interventions	8/26/92	5.00	4.00	0.03	6/30/96
683-0265 - AG. Sector Dev. Grant (PA)	8/24/90	7.97	6.97	0.05	12/31/95
683-0257 - AG. Sector Dev. Grant (NPA)	8/24/90	20.00	11.14		12/31/95
936-5556 - Forestry Res. Management/PC **	2/87	2.00	0.80	0.05	N/A
<b>Year of Opportunity: DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE</b>					
698-0541 - Democracy & Human Rights (Niger) **	6/30/92	0.25	0.25	0.08	N/A
625- - Mobilizing Local Resources (REDSOIA) *	7/91	0.40	0.00	0.00	N/A
<b>Year of Necessity: DISASTER PREPAREDNESS &amp; HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE</b>		<b>\$17M (13%)</b>			
683-0271 - Disaster Preparedness & Mitigation (NPA)	9/29/92	11.00	6.00		12/31/97
683-0279 - Disaster Preparedness & Mitigation (PA)	9/29/92	8.00	6.50	0.40	
698-0466 - Famine Early Warning Systems **	6/90	1.10	1.10	0.11	12/31/97
625-0973 - AGRHYMET *	9/1/87	(15.50)	(14.00)	0.18	12/31/95
698-0517 - African Emergency Locust & Grasshopper	6/88	3.30	3.30	0.06	12/31/94
<b>- HUMAN CAPACITY BUILDING</b>		<b>\$21m (16%)</b>			
698-0463 - Human Resources Dev. Ass. *	7/14/88	2.76	2.76	17.2	9/30/97
698-0475 - African Training Leadership *	7/23/90	1.43	1.43	2.80	
683-0256 - Niger Applied Agriculture Research	8/10/87	20.00	17.30	2.77	5/31/97
<b>TOTALS</b>			161.74	130.91	37.19

\* Africa or Sahel Regional

\*\* Centrally based management Column 5 = LOP funding estimation

**BEST AVAILABLE DOCUMENT**

## **ANNEX G: SECTIONS 118/119 OF THE 1961 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT**

### **Tropical Forest/Biodiversity Assessment Background**

**USAID/Niger** has long recognized that resource degradation is one of the important constraints to Niger's development, and the Mission program has been consistent with measures required for the conservation of the resource base, including tropical forests and biodiversity.

Niger's principal ecosystems can generally be describe as desert of sand and sand dunes, desert mountains up to 2000 meters, oasis with shallow subterranean water, shrub savanna, wooded savanna, riverain zones of the Niger river and semi-permanent desert and savanna wetlands. These ecosystems contain a diverse mixture of flora and fauna. The flora in particular has economic importance providing food (including indigenous species of food grains), medicine, forage, energy, and construction. While not generally considered to be a "hot spot", Niger does have mammal and bird species classified as rare and considered of international importance, e.g. addax, dama gazelle, cheetah, ostrich. Areas around Lake Chad, and the Niger river provide important habitat for migratory birds. An IUCN study of bird species found in Niger, now nearing completion, is expected to add considerably to the knowledge of migratory birds in Niger.

Principal conservation efforts at protecting the biodiversity center around the management of one national park (Park W @ 200,000 ha), two buffer zone reserves adjacent to Park W @ 382,000 ha, one national natural reserve (Air and Tenere @ 7,736,000 ha), one wildlife reserve @ 76,000 ha and 79 classified forests @ 617,809 ha.

Niger has a forest cover of approximately 14,000,000 hectares. It is estimated that approximately 4.4 million can be effectively managed, of which approximately 500,000 hectares are currently the subject of studies and/or management (principally for fuelwood, but in some cases also grazing). Forests are of major economic importance, providing 100% of rural energy needs, wood and grass for construction, watershed protection, grazing and natural habitat for much of the country's biodiversity.

With the establishment of the first classified forests in the 1930s the primary management focus was essentially protectionist. Beginning in the 1960s, reforestation was emphasized through the establishment of plantations. This was not successful, and attention turned to natural forest management through a decentralized approach allowing local populations increased authority to manage forests for multiple uses. The approach is integrated with other actions involving regional management plans, land use planning, protected area management, watershed planning, soil conservation, energy and environmental impact.

Over 30 years of declining rainfall, punctuated by two severe droughts, a population growth of over three percent and expanding agriculture, have had a severe impact

upon Niger's forests and biodiversity. Forest cover and natural habitat have declined, with official protected areas subject to intense pressure from grazing, wood harvesting and clearing for agriculture. For example, in 1954 classified forests covered an area of 11,659 hectares, today the cover is 4,500 hectares.

While not having conducted a tropical forest assessment per se, the Mission has since the mid-1970s been actively involved with issues of forest conservation and management. USAID/Niger sponsored Niger's first formal biodiversity assessment in 1991 which provided a general overview of the state of the country's biodiversity, its economic value and use and institutional questions with respect to the conservation of biological diversity.

### **Mission Strategy and Sections 118/119**

The actions necessary in Niger to conserve forests and biological diversity are wide ranging and require the collaboration and cooperation of government, non-government, and donor institutions, and most importantly the effective participation of the rural producer. The following actions contribute to broad based sustainable development: improved policies and planning, improved management of resources (technical and financial), increased productivity, local empowerment, improved and appropriate technologies, research and information and training and education.

The Mission strategy, with respect to Sections 118/119, is centered around Strategic Objective three, which focuses on a program designed to promote sustainable development through more effective control by local producers over the management of natural resources. It is recognized that this requires close cooperation with the other development actors, and is intertwined with other necessary actions.

Present and past Mission interventions have supported programs and activities aimed at slowing and/or reversing resource degradation. These approaches have directly or indirectly supported the conservation of natural habitat and/or its exploitation in a rational and sustainable manner. With respect to necessary actions the Mission strategy will be supportive of Sections 118/119 in the following manner:

#### **Action Required: Improved Planning and Policy**

##### ***Mission Response:***

- Financial and technical assistance to an interministerial council for coordination of Niger's natural resource management programs
- Technical assistance to Niger's national program strategy for environment and sustainable development. This strategy will integrate the objectives of a national environmental action plan and a national action program for desertification
- Financial and technical assistance for the testing and implementation of a Rural Code which empowers local communities and groups with increased tenure over the natural resources essential for rural production

- Technical assistance for revision of the forest code to increase emphasis on local level management

**Action Required: Improved Resource Conservation Practices**

***Mission Response:***

- Technical assistance to identify improved practices which support sustainable farming practices and increase farm productivity, reducing the need to clear new lands
- Technical assistance to identify income generating activities which provide alternatives to practices that are destructive to forest resource

**Action Required: Improved Information and Communication**

***Mission Response:***

- Financial and technical assistance to increase access to technical information by supporting NGOs programs, and farmer to farmer visit programs
- Cooperation with other donors to establish a national environmental monitoring system
- Technical assistance from the regional based AGRYMET program to improve mapping and monitoring of natural resources

**Action Required: Local and PVO Involvement**

***Mission Response:***

- Financial and technical assistance to local and international NGOs and private sector to:
  - support action research to identify local level constraints and solutions
  - assist villages to formulate and manage natural resource management activities, including local forests
  - train local populations in utilization of resource conservation practices
  - extend appropriate resource conservation practices
- Financial and technical assistance to increase financial services to rural producers, thus helping to provide financial wherewithal for adoption of more sophisticated resource conservation practices
- Financial assistance to the U.S. Peace Corps biodiversity program to promote practices which help stabilize farming practices adjacent to protected areas



U.S. AGENCY FOR  
INTERNATIONAL  
DEVELOPMENT

April 6, 1995

**MEMORANDUM**

**TO:** See Distribution

**FROM:** Lucretia D. Taylor, Director, AFR/WA

**SUBJECT:** The Niger Country Strategic Plan and Review Schedule

Program Week Review for the Niger Country Strategic Plan is scheduled for April 24 - 27, 1995. This will be preceded by a session on "Re-Engineering and Strategic Planning in Niger" on Monday, April 18; and an Issues Meeting on Tuesday, April 19. Information on these reviews can be obtained from Louise Werlin, the Niger Country Development Officer, at 647-8125.

Schedule of Meetings

<b>RE-ENGINEERING AND STRATEGIC PLANNING IN NIGER</b>	<b>Tuesday, April 18, 1995 11 am - 12:30 pm, Room 6941</b>
<b>ISSUES MEETING:</b>	<b>Wednesday, April 19, 1995 10 am - 12 noon, Room 3676 NS</b>
<b>PROGRAM WEEK:</b>	<b>Monday, April 24, 1995 2 pm - 4 pm, Room 6941 NS</b>
	<b>Tuesday, April 25, 1995 2 pm - 4 pm, Room 6941 NS</b>
	<b>Wednesday, April 26, 1995 2 pm - 4 pm, Room 6941 NS</b>
	<b>Thursday, April 27, 1995 2 pm - 4pm, Room 6941 NS</b>

## **Introduction: Niger as a Country Experimental Lab**

Re-engineering is taking place throughout the Agency. Most re-engineering efforts in the field are currently focused on nine Country Experimental Labs (CELs) -- missions which volunteered to put re-engineering principles into operation. Four of the Labs are in Africa: Niger, Mali, Senegal, and Madagascar.

Labs are involved in re-engineering in one of two ways: strategic planning, for which they prepare full or updated strategies following core re-engineering principles; or obligation by strategic objective (S.O.), for which they prepare S.O. agreements and "results packages" that will achieve the desired results. USAID/W looks to these Labs, and the Labs look to each other, as prototypes from which we can all gain valuable on-the-ground experience as the Agency prepares for the October 1, 1995 "rite of passage" into re-engineering.

**Niger, which has selected strategic planning as its mandate, is the Africa Bureau's first Mission to develop a full strategic plan following re-engineering precepts.**

In developing its Strategic Plan, Niger has embraced the core re-engineering principles of customer focus, teamwork, results orientation, and empowerment. These values have permeated the entire planning process and have been incorporated in this strategy. This review thus not only gives us an opportunity to discuss the development challenges and opportunities in Niger, but a forum to learn how re-engineering is working in a field setting and how its principles can be incorporated in our strategic planning and management processes.

### **The Strategic Vision**

The attached Country Strategic Plan (1995-2002) represents Niger's first full strategy. Up to now the program has operated under an interim Strategy/Concept Paper approved in 1992.

The sustainable development vision for Niger, as articulated in the proposed strategy, is "A healthier population growing at a slower rate, with greater rural production and greater conservation of the environment."

Three strategic objectives support this vision:

SO #1: Increase the use of family planning and other important maternal and child health services, and improve nutrition and food security of children in times of disaster, in order to lower mortality and fertility.

SO #2: Increase market access for rural people, mainly by their use of local financial services.

SO #3: Increase adoption of practices for conservation and productive use of natural resources.

## The Strategy Review

Because Niger is a Country Experimental Lab with a "first-of-a-kind" strategic plan, we have decided to slightly modify the procedures for Program Week. Besides the normal issues meeting and four "program week" meetings (see below), we are adding an initial session on:

**Tuesday, April 18, 1995. 11 am -12:30 pm. Room 6941 NS.**

**"Re-Engineering and Strategic Planning in Niger".** The goal of this session is threefold: (1) to inform all participants of the re-engineering process USAID/Niger used in developing its strategic plan; (2) to review and discuss some strategic planning concepts and constructs developed under re-engineering; and (3) to determine how we can best review the strategy through our re-engineered eyes. Representatives from USAID/Niger, along with members of the USAID/W Strategic Planning Directives Team, will facilitate the discussion.

**Wednesday, April 19, 1995. 10 am - 12 noon. Room 3676 NS.**

**The Issues Meeting.** The purpose of this meeting is to identify issues and concerns for the strategy review; and to finalize the agenda for Program Week. Centers, Bureaus and Offices are invited to submit issues and are strongly encouraged to attend the meeting. Please note that there is nothing more frustrating in an Issues Meeting than to have an issue on the table with no one present to explain or defend it. To the extent possible, the Centers and external bureaus/offices (i.e., those outside the Africa Bureau) should limit their participation to one representative per unit. Africa Bureau offices are to be represented by those assigned to strategy review and support roles.

Issues to be raised should be submitted via e-mail attachments to Cheryl A. Williams, AFR/WA/PDEA, and Louise Werlin, AFR/WA/NIGER, in advance of the issues meeting, **but no later than c.o.b. Friday, April 14, 1995.** We encourage you to draw your issues from knowledge of the Nigerien situation, the proposed strategy and the proposed review criteria (see below). This will help to focus the discussion on the major issues and concerns.

To facilitate preparation of the Issues Paper, each suggested issue should be presented in the following standard format, and should be no more than one page in length:

- a. **Issue:** briefly state the issue you would like to see addressed during Program Week;
- b. **Discussion:** provide brief background for the issue, your reason for raising it;
- c. **Recommendation:** briefly state your recommendation or preferred option.

For concerns, just describe what they are, using no more than a short paragraph for each.

If time permits, our office will distribute a draft Issues Paper to Program Week participants for review. We will then distribute the final Issues Paper before the first meeting of Program Week.

**Program Week - Procedure and Purpose:** Program Week is designed to enable senior Agency and Bureau management to review the operational unit's strategic framework and objectives, to plan for programming assistance over the next few years and to agree, in some detail, upon programs, priorities and implementation actions for the next two years.

The emphasis of Program Week will be first-and-foremost to gain an understanding of (1) the development context in Niger, highlighting key constraints and opportunities; (2) the Mission's response to this challenge, focusing on USAID/Niger's comparative advantages, strategic choices, and strategic objectives; (3) the types and levels of results the Mission expects to achieve in implementing its objectives; and (4) the level of resources needed to produce those results, factoring in various development scenarios. Overlaying these themes will be the core values of re-engineering, and linkages to DFA objectives as well as Agency sustainable development priorities.

Strategy guidance suggests that the USAID/Niger Country Strategy Plan should:

- 1) provide a brief overview of the Nigerien development situation;
- 2) discuss the experience of USAID, other donors and development organizations, and Niger's public and private sectors in taking advantage of opportunities and relieving constraints;
- 3) layout the proposed assistance strategy to support Nigerien development in the form of a "strategic or results/causality frameworks", containing a sustainable development vision, strategic objectives, and performance measures which capture achievement; and
- 4) present the Mission's plan for achieving results, focusing on the level and use of resources; performance monitoring, evaluation, and reporting; and the policy agenda.

Mission representatives will provide supplemental information to the strategy document during the Program Week Review.

Based on the above, and following re-engineering principles, the strategic plan should be assessed on the basis of:

- 1) the degree of analytical support for strategic choices and objectives;

- 2) the way the Mission proposes to match USAID/Niger's needs and available resources;
- 3) the degree of focus in defining strategic objectives which are in the manageable interest of the mission;
- 4) the extent to which the accomplishment of objectives will be measurable;
- 5) how the USAID/Niger program reflects the interests and unique capacities of the United States and the American people;
- 6) the responsiveness of the proposed Niger strategy to the Agency strategic foci, and AFR's emphases; and
- 7) the extent to which principles of customer focus, results orientation, teamwork and empowerment add value to the strategic planning process.

The outcome of the review week should be:

- 1) USAID/W endorsement of the Mission's objectives, as represented in a management contract;
- 2) identification and, to the extent possible, resolution of implementation issues involving USAID/W and USAID/Niger; and
- 3) determination of how USAID/W can best support implementation of the Mission strategy in the upcoming years.

To achieve this outcome we have scheduled four meetings during Program Week:

### **PROGRAM WEEK**

#### **Monday, April 24, 1995, 2:00 pm, Room 6941 NS**

- Introductory remarks by the Chairperson: Nate Fields, DAA/AFR;
- Presentation of the Niger Strategy by Mission Director Jim Anderson. This will include an overview of past program performance, a discussion of the development challenge and analytical basis for the Niger Strategy, and the role "reengineering" has played in developing the strategic plan.

**Tuesday, April 25, 1995, 2:00 pm, Room 6941 NS**

- Introductory remarks by the Chairperson: Nate Fields, DAA/AFR
- Discussion of programmatic issues and concerns, i.e., those relating to strategic choices, objectives, outcomes, and magnitude of results.

**Wednesday, April 26, 1995, 2:00 p.m., Room 6941 NS**

- Continued discussion of programmatic issues (as needed); discussion of issues and concerns relating to resource requirements.

**Thursday, April 27, 1995, 2:00 pm, Room 6941 NS**

- Discussion of remaining issues (as needed).
- Summary and Recommendations.
- Agreement on a contract.

Any additional meetings that are required between the issues meeting and the end of Program Week will be scheduled accordingly. Requests for such meetings should be directed to Louise Werlin, AFR/WA/Niger, 647-8125.

**Attachment: USAID/Niger Country Strategic Plan: 1995-2002**

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