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CHAPTER FOUR

Preparation for and Organizational Changes in A. I. D. in Response to Title IX

I. Situation in the Agency Prior to the Passage of Title IX:

In the previous chapter, the Agency for International Development was discussed as a possible source for a political development initiative. In this section, it is important to examine in greater detail the situation which existed in the Agency prior to the passage of Title IX. Contrary to the previous chapter, the Agency in this chapter is seen not so much as a potential initiator, but rather as a "responder" to the Congressional initiative of Title IX. However, the experience of the Agency and the ideas concerning political development which had been formulated prior to 1966 played an important part in determining the type of response which would be forthcoming from the Agency. Thus, this section can be conviently divided into two separate areas. The first concerns the actual experience of the Agency in political development prior to 1966. The second concerns a "philosophy" of political development which was slowly evolving in the Agency.

A. Experience of the Agency in Political Development Prior to 1966

An adequate discussion of the first type of preparation, i.e., the experience of the Agency in the field of political development prior to 1966, would require research effort beyond the scope of the present study. In-

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deed, in certain respects, everything which the Agency has done has had "a political development effect". However, there are certain activities which are commonly cited as "antecedents" to Title IX.[1] On a general level, these concern such programs as the emphasis on cooperatives, the concentration on community development, the emphasis on the "youth" of the developing countries, and stress on private sector development.[2] Along with these Agency-wide programs, there are also particular projects, institutions or programs in specific countries which are commonly highlighted as examples of Agency experience in political development. One such institution is the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction which began operations on the mainland of China and then was transferred to Taiwan after the Communist takeover. This institution, run jointly by

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[1] Lists of these antecedent activities can be found in the appendix of the "Report to Congress." (U.S., Agency for International Development, " Report to Congress on the Implementation of Title IX," Washington, D.C., May, 1967, mimeo.)

Another such list was contained in an appendix to a letter written by Administrator William Gaud to Congressmen Morse and Fraser. (Willian Gaud, Administrator of the Agency for International Development, Letter to Congressmen Morse and Fraser, April 21, 1967) This list is 12 typewritten pages and is divided into such categories as "administrative competence," "national integration," "labor union development," and "development of local governments."

[2] It is significant that many of these emphases were initiated by sources outside of the Agency. The Humphrey amendment of 1961 emphasized the significance of cooperatives, the Zablocki amendment of 1962, stressed the role of community development, and the emphasis on youth can be traced to the influence of Senator Robert F. Kennedy. Concern with the private sector has long been an interest of Congress and of private groups as well. In fact, one high-level official stated in an interview with the author, that the great majority of new policy initiatives stem from influences outside the Agency. "It is the only way the Agency ever makes changes."

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American and Chinese representatives, was able to involve grassroots organizations, such as the Farmers Associations, in its decision-making and in its implementation of rural development programs. The result was an increase in economic and political pluralism in the rural areas of Taiwan.[3]

Another program, often highlighted as an antecedent to Title IX, is the Rural Works Program in East Pakistan. This program involved large numbers of the rural population in building waterways, roads, etc. In this way, it responded to the "participatory" element of Title IX. But more important, was the fact that funds for the program were channeled through local government organizations, the fundamental units of the Basic Democracies Program organized by President Ayub Khan. Thus the local units had responsibility for planning and administering the rural works program in their area, and U.S. aid funds served the dual purpose of promoting economic development and encouraging local institutions.[4]

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[3]The Foreign Assistance Act of 1966 carried a provision, i.e., Chapter 7, which provided for the application of the "JCRR Technique" to other recipient countries. Two studies which deal with this question are, John D. Montgomery, Rufus B. Hughes, Raymond H. Davis, "Rural Improvement and Political Development: The JCRR Model," (Papers in Comparative Public Administration, Special Series: No. 7, American Society for Public Administrative, 1964), and Richard L. Hough, "AID Administration to the Rural Sector: The JCRR Experience in Taiwan and Its Application in Other Countries: (AID Discussion Paper No. 17, April, 1968).

[4]See Edgar Owens, "A Democratic Strategy of Development," Unpublished manuscript, Chapter 7, for a discussion of the Rural Works Program. During my summer's work in the Title IX Division of AID, I was assigned the task of writing a study of this program in order to examine its relevance to Title IX. My study revealed that there were manipulatory elements in the use of aid funds in the East Pakistan case. In the administration of rural programs, the local units were carefully controlled from the central government. Also, the members of the local councils served as the electorate for national elections. There is some evidence that aid funds were used to insure the continuation of Ayub Khan's regime. See work done by Richard L. Blue, Dept. of State, summer, 1967.

The third example which is often cited as illustrative of Title IX is the Leadership Training Course administered by Loyola University in New Orleans under an AID contract. Through this course, potential leaders from Latin American countries are exposed to "political therapy" and become "inculcated with a commitment . . . that progress in their respective countries should and can be achieved only through the active and maximal participation of the people in the tasks of development.[5] The relationship of this type of program to political development and Title IX is quite apparent.

There are, thus, two types of Agency experience which relate to Title IX. The first is general, program-wide, stemming from outside sources of initiative. These include, the emphasis on youth, on cooperatives, on community development, and on the private sector. The second is specific, project oriented, drawing on concrete opportunities within recipient countries. Three examples of this type of experience have been given: the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction on Taiwan, the Rural Works Program in East Pakistan, and the Leadership Training program administered by Loyola University. They have been cited to show the type of activities which were widely believed to be antecendent to Title IX. It is important to note that they represent the best and

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[5]Csanad L. Toth, "Evaluation of the Leadership Training Course for the Youth of Central America, Panama, and the Dominican Republic" [Training Course given at the Inter-American Center, Loyola University, New Orleans, Louisiana] (Washington, D.C.: Agency for International Development, April, 1967) mimeo. p. 1.

certainly not the average work of the Agency in political development. Furthermore, they are specific projects. They tell us nothing about the degree to which political development was considered as a basic policy objective of the U.S. foreign assistance programs.

B. Agency Thinking on Political Development Prior to the Passage of Title IX

Along with the experience possessed by the Agency in the field of political development prior to the passage of Title IX, there was also an evolving "strategy" of political development with which the Agency came equipped to deal with the new legislation. It must be stressed that only a handful of people in the Agency had been thinking about political development and its consequences for the aid program. However, these were the people who were given responsibility for guiding the Agency's response to Title IX. Thus, an understanding of their thinking is crucial for any description of the Agency's response to the legislation.

As has been noted previously, it is not the purpose of this section to give an exhaustive account of political development in the Agency prior to 1966. However the "ideological" aspect of the Agency's preparation for Title IX has never been pieced together, and thus merits a certain amount of careful attention.[6] This discussion will focus on four documents

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[6]Miss Joan Nelson, referred to elsewhere in this chapter, has just published a book entitled, Aid, Influence and Foreign Policy (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968). Miss Nelson views herself as a "Rapporteur of ideas" developed from 1962 to 1966 by past and present members of the Program Coordination staff of AID. Although I did not have access to this book while drafting this chapter, I did have the opportunity to interview Miss Nelson after completion of my study.

judged to be of particular importance to the evolving "ideology". Two are products of the Office of Program Coordination within the Agency. One is a private Ph. D. dissertation study and the other is a speech by the Administrator of the Agency.

1. Annex B of the Long-Range Assistance Strategy Manual Order

One of the first evidences of a broad political development concern in the Agency is found in a set of instructions drawn up in the Office of Program Coordination in 1962. These were incorporated in an annex to the manual order[7] concerning the preparation of the "Long Range Assistance Strategy", designed to help the country missions set overall targets and formulate broad assistance strategies.[8] Annex B. of this manual order proposed, for the Missions' consideration, a series of questions which demonstrated an active concern for political development. Indeed some of the ideas which were later to develop into an Agency "approach" to political development first found expression in this document.

The first section of the annex asks the Mission personnel, when making long-term assessments, to analyze the broad social, political

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[7]A "Manual Order" is a section of the Agency's Program Guidance Manual. These "orders" are being revised and augmented continually. I received the impression from my interviewing that many Agency officials largely ignore these orders.

[8]These "Long range assistance strategies" were to be devised by only 12 missions, but elements of them were to be included in the "CAPs" (Country Assistance Programs) and "GPs" (Goal Plans). The LAS movement is an example of the Kennedy Era's emphasis on long-term economic development and country planning.

and administrative characteristics of the country in question.[9] It then asks, "What are the country's major social and political goals, within the next several years or decade?" Finally, and most importantly, it asks, "What should U.S. strategy view as the most important social and political goals in the country?" It admits that this question inevitably requires the making of value judgments, but it maintains that "since judgments of some kind are essential, it is preferable that they be systematic, considered, and prior to events rather than ad hoc, in response to events."[10] The annex thus explicitly recognizes that the U.S. has goals of a political development nature in recipient countries and requests that these goals be defined and planned for in the mission's strategy statement. This recognition could have important implications for the formation of U.S. foreign aid policy. The annex then goes on to examine the ramifications of such a policy. It recognizes that social and political goals may be complementary to economic targets, or they may conflict. It thus asks the missions to determine "the optimal balance between more immediately productive types of economic investment" and "social and political goals which may have only indirect and long-run economic impact."[11]

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[9]Sample questions concerning social analysis were "What are the groups within the population and what are their attitudes toward change?" Under political analysis, "What is the relationship between the political leadership and important segments of the population?" "What is the political recruitment and competition situation?" "How are popular demands articulated?" etc. The vocabulary of the Manual Order obviously reflects awareness of political development literature. U.S., Agency for International Development, "Long-Range Assistance Strategy, Manual Order 1022.2" in the AID Program Guidance Manual, August 27, 1962. pp.1-3.

[10]Agency for International Development, Manual Order 1022.2, p.5.

[11]Ibid., p. 6.

The final question in this annex contains the seeds of what was to become the dominant Agency strategy of political development. "What do the political and social goals identified above imply as to the direction and pattern of economic investment?"[12] [underlining mine]. This question implies that political development objectives can be achieved indirectly through the judicious use of economic resources.

Annex B is thus important, not only as one of the first indications of a concern with political development, but also for the degree to which it predicted actual Agency strategy in this area. It first stressed the importance of social and political analysis for AID programming. It then asked Mission officials, on the basis of this analysis, to formulate social and political goals. It also asked that these goals be balanced off against the importance of economic objectives in the particular country. Finally, it requested the Missions to consider how political and social goals could be achieved through the use of economic resources.

Thus, in 1962, the Agency had a sophisticated "political development doctrine" on its books. However it was tucked away in a little-read

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[12] Agency for International Development, Manual Order 1022.2, p. 7. The relevant questions were as follows: "Are there areas of development activity which contribute significantly to both major economic and major social/political goals?" "Should these areas be given higher priority?" "Are there development activities which contribute to major economic goals, but only at the expense of political or social goals?" "Can the undesirable effects be avoided by redesigning or undertaking auxillary activities?"

annex and thus was largely ignored.[13] Perhaps the best indication of the hesitant and tentative nature of this initiative is shown in the opening paragraph of the annex:

> The following outline is intended to suggest relevant areas for political and social analysis and should not be viewed as instructions or as a rigid format. Those working on each LAS analysis must judge whether these or other questions are most pertinent to the individual country.[14]

At the most, the annex served to show that a small, but interested nucleus for political development existed in the Office of Program Coordination. These people had some thoughtful ideas, but no real power to implement them. Moreover, those to whom the questions were addressed had neither the training nor the assigned responsibility to deal with this area of development.

2. "Foreign Aid and Political Development" Dissertation Study by Robert A. Packenham

Another important step in the evolution of an Agency approach to political development was the dissertation study by Robert A. Packenham.[15]

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[13] Robert Packenham, in his dissertation, maintained that the Annex B reflected the interest of only a half dozen people in PC. In his interview sample, he notes that almost no one mentioned Annex B. It also was not included in the condensed version of Agency policy distributed for Agency and public use. Packenham, "Foreign Aid and Political Development." pp. 186-87.

[14] Agency for International Development, Manual Order 1022.2, p. 1.

[15] Robert A. Packenham, "Foreign Aid and Political Development," Yale University, 1964.

Although the study is not, strictly speaking, an Agency document, it was read by and influenced those in the Agency concerned with political development during this period. The Packenham study made three important contributions. First, through a review of academic and historical literature, it focussed on the need for a political development rationale. Secondly, through a process of interviewing, it illustrated the inadequacy of AID's thinking with regard to political development. Finally, it made a series of specific and concrete suggestions as to how the Agency might remold its operations to better serve the goal of political development.

As for the first contribution, the political development rationale formulated, in part, by Packenham, contains two main elements, one practical and the other ideological. The practical element is as follows: Aid is already having unintentional political development effects. These should be examined, carefully considered, and then actually planned for to insure the optimal use of aid. The ideological element concerns the "ultimate" U.S. national interest in the recipient countries. It is basically a political interest and not an economic interest, states the rationale. Thus political development should be viewed not only as an inevitable by-product, but as the most important objective of our aid.

In making his second contribution, Packenham contrasted the importance of political development with the neglect it has suffered in the official aid program. Of the 54 AID officials interviewed by Packenham, only 17 showed evidence of according political development explicit attention in their work. Moreover only eight of these were

policy-making officials in the Regional Bureaus, and fully half of the eight were concentrated in only two countries, S. Vietnam and Laos.[16] Many AID officials did not even understand the term, "political development," confusing it with short-term political objectives or with economic development.[17] In general, Packenham found that aid was viewed as a politically neutral, technological instrument. The relations of aid to foreign policy and political change had "just not been thought through."[18]

Along with highlighting the neglect suffered by political development in the Agency, Packenham, for his third contribution, discussed several means of according it greater consideration. As was seen in Chapter II, Packenham falls into the school of thought which believes in "slanting" economic resources to serve political development purposes. Primary criteria for a certain project might be economic development, but secondary and tertiary considerations might involve political development. Attention to political development might also be given in terms of timing, and in the amounts and choice of countries receiving aid, rather than in the content of a program in a specific country.[19] Finally, Packenham recommended that the Agency take an incremental rather

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[16] Packenham, "Foreign Aid and Political Development" Yale University, 1964, p. 192.

[17] Ibid., p. 195-97.

[18] Ibid., p. 166.

[19] Packenham gives the example of a communications system, in which the primary reason for giving aid might be economic, but secondary considerations might relate to political development, how the system will be administered, who will benefit from it, etc. "Foreign Aid and Political Development," Yale University, 1964, p. 35.

than a comprehensive approach to political development. He was concerned about not "resting more policy weight on academic political development doctrine than it could bear."[20] Political development doctrines could provide insights to AID operators, but not pat answers and therefore should be considered mostly for their contribution in this regard.

In sum, Packenham's contribution to the future of political development in the Agency were two-fold. He gave publicity to the existing situation in the Agency with regard to political development, and proposed some concrete changes to ameliorate it.

3. Speech by David Bell, Administrator of AID, November, 1964.

During this period in the Agency, there were some indications of an interest in political development at a very high level in AID. Such an interest is shown in some informal remarks given by David E. Bell, then Administrator of AID, at a conference on Political Development at the University of Pennsylvania, November, 1964. These remarks were distributed to State Department and AID officials in Washington and in the Missions and thus were given attention by a wide variety of people.

In these remarks, Mr. Bell touches on both the practical and the ideological elements in the political development doctrine. The ideological is shown in his beginning paragraph in which he states

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[20] Robert A. Packenham, "Foreign Aid and Political Development", Yale University, 1964, p. 267.

economic development is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for progress toward "greater freedom and democracy around the world."[21] His underlying assumption apparently is that the United States is, indeed, interested in political development resulting in "greater freedom and democracy."

The practical element of the doctrine is very explicit in Mr. Bell's remarks:

> It seems clear that our foreign assistance programs have affected and must affect political change in other countries in many ways and to a considerable extent. But most of the political effects have occurred indirectly or accidently, and not as a result of deliberate intention to affect political development . . .[22]

The question then is, says Mr. Bell, "whether it would be feasible and desirable . . . .to adopt more direct policies to influence political development in other countries . . ."[23]

Thus, for both ideological and practical reasons, Mr. Bell appears to move in the direction of greater concern for political development. But then a sizeable portion of his speech is taken up expressing "the reservations of an economist."[24] He states that "in my observation we have an extremely limited analytical basis for understanding and evaluating the political effects that will, in fact, result from our assist-

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[21] David E. Bell, "Remarks before the Conference on Political Development" held at the University of Pennsylvania, Nov. 13, 1964, (Washington, D. C. :Agency for International Development, 1964)mimeo, p. 1.

[22] Ibid., p. 1.

[23] Ibid., p. 1.

[24] Ibid., p. 4.

ance efforts."[25] He goes on to ask, "Can the political scientists develop for us a framework of ideas about free and democratic political systems which will permit us to analyze . . . and design program 'political change . . . ?" The answer is "No, not yet, at least."

He thus backs away from political development as an analytical tool and stresses instead certain projects or programs which obviously have a political development dimension. In this context, he mentions the more obvious examples, i.e., community development efforts in India, Pakistan, and the Phillipines, and the development of cooperatives in Latin America. He also maintains that the leverage used by aid officials to achieve economic goals has had important political development effects. ". . . it is plain that many of the policy changes which we help to bring about through our assistance programs will have substantial political effects."[26]

In a statement very reminiscent of Packenham, Bell concluded:

> What I have been suggesting is that we can and should do a better job than we have of capitalizing upon the known political effects of activities which we now conduct. Rather than paying no attention to them, or regarding them as incidental by-products for which we take no responsibility, I am suggesting that we seek to understand as well as we can the full impact of what we are doing in the less developed

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[25] David E. Bell, "Remarks before the Conference on Political Development," University of Pennsylvania, Nov. 13, 1964. AID mimeo, p. 4.

[26] Ibid., p. 3.

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> countries. We should seek deliberately to maximize the kinds of changes which we are satisfied will represent progress toward freer and more democratic societies.[27] [underlining mine]

It is, however, one thing to make such a statement before a conference on political development and another thing to insure that something be done about it in the Agency. Mr. Bell, in making this speech, showed himself to be concerned about political development to a certain extent. His ideas are certainly in the mainstream of academic thought about political development and the aid program. However, little concrete result could be traced to his interest.

4. "Political Development and U.S. Economic Assistance", An AID Study, January, 1966

The period between Bell's speech and the passage of Title IX was a period of "discussion" in the Agency with regard to political development. Two political scientists, Miss Joan Nelson and Mr. Eugene Mihaly, located in the Policy Planning Division of the Office of Program Coordination, became actively concerned about the integration of political development considerations into the work of the Agency, Supervising their work was the Agency official who had been instrumental in the writing of "Annex B" referred to above. The Summer Research Program,[28]

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[27] David E. Bell, "Remarks before the Conference on Political Development," Univ. of Pennsylvania, Nov. 13, 1964 AID mimeo, p. 6.

[28] A program in which academicians spend a summer doing consultant work for the Agency, and then report the results of their findings before seminars in the Office of Program and Policy Coordination.

sponsored by the Agency, provided a forum for the discussion of political development in the aid program. This , in turn, led to a series of research probes by Mr. Mihaly and Miss Nelson undertaken between June and December, 1965.[29] These were a logical continuation of the work done by Packenham. They, too, were designed to determine the degree to which political development was considered in Agency planning. They, too, resulted in suggestions for improvement of the program. The results of the Mihaly-Nelson research were written up in a paper for the Agency dated January, 1966.

The Mihaly-Nelson study entitled "Political Development and U.S. Economic Assistance" reiterated the ideological element of the political development rationale, i.e., "political development objectives have a central place among overall U.S. goals in almost every country [and yet] AID is basically organized for and oriented toward promoting economic growth."[30] The activity which the Agency does do in the field of political development is usually "semi-accidental [in which political development has little effect in the design of the project or program] or the result of special circumstances, [such as in danger areas, N.E. Thailand or Brazil]. The basic assumption underlying AID's work in this area, according to Mihaly and Nelson, is that economic growth itself is the "best medicine" for many political development problems.

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[29] These probes consisted of a study of Country Assistance Strategy Statements, etc; discussions with 30 AID desk officers; and field trips to Kenya, Nigeria, Guatemala, Columbia and Bolivia. Eugene B. Mihaly and Joan M. Nelson, "Political Development and U.S. Economic Assistance", AID mimeo, Jan. 1966, Annex 1.

[30] Ibid.

The paper then goes on to list the following six political development objectives lying below the surface of AID's work: broadening political participation, creating a pluralistic society, influencing attitudes of key groups, alleviating or avoiding urban unrest, and integrating currently or potentially disaffected regions. The paper also discusses the assumptions commonly held about these objective, and the concrete proposals often suggested to implement them.[31] The final section of the Mihaly-Nelson study deals with specific suggestions designed to expand the capacity of AID to influence political development. Several of these suggestions were acted upon as the Agency responded to Title IX.

First is the suggestion that a specific office be assigned responsibility for political development efforts in the Agency. The authors' own office is suggested as the most likely locus for this responsibility. Secondly, seminars should be held, papers circulated, and case studies written to increase awareness of political development in the Agency. Thirdly, more social scientists should be hired by the Agency, more consultants should be used, and more AID officials should be sent back to school to study political development. Fourthly, "Political development considerations must be built into the program planning process at every stage from formulation of broad strategy to the design of major

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[31] Eugene Mihaly, and Miss Joan Nelson, "Political Development and U.S. Economic Assistance," AID mimeo, pp. 9-13.

individual projects."[32] Fifthly, political development in the Agency would profit from "better focussed and better utilized research."[33] Finally political development could be promoted through new activities and by the inclusion of new dimensions in existing ones.[34] With the exception of the last, all the suggestions made in the Mihaly-Nelson study concerned ways to approach the problem of political development in the Agency, and not ways to actually have political influence in the recipient countries. The approach seemed to be to cause awareness and discussion, and then hope that policies would change to give greater consideration to political development.

5. Summary

Thus, by the time Title IX was passed, there had been thinking about political development within AID and certain areas of common concern had begun to emerge. Although these areas have been touched on in the previous discussion, it is important to highlight them briefly here.

First, there was some uneasiness about the "economic development orientation" of the Agency. The two elements of the political rationale, one ideological and the other practical, appear in each of

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[32] The study recognizes that the LAS Annex B has "not been productive". Yet it does not explain why the "doing it through the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System" would be any more so. E. Mihaly and J. Nelson, "Political Development and U.S. Economic Assistance," AID mimeo, p. 17.

[33] Ibid., p. 21

[34] Ibid., p. 18. Most of these suggestions concern activities involving key groups, such as students, labor and military leaders, and legislators.

the four documents discussed. It was felt that political development was not a goal unto itself. It was also felt, however, that a stagnant economy was bad for political development, and that economic development, itself, did bring beneficial political effects. The main thrust of AID's work should remain in the economic and social fields. Thus it was wrong to establish a separate political development goal for AID, but it was certainly wise to pay more attention to political development.

Secondly, while the academic theory of political development was acknowledged to be weak, there were principles being developed which had relevance to the aid program. Because of the very real effect AID was already having on political development "semi-accidently and almost inadvertently" some analysis needed to be made. There was no need to wait for a broad framework of ideas from the academic community to proceed in the direction of greater concern for political development.

Each of the four pieces studied made a contribution to the development of an Agency strategy of political development. The 1962 L.A.S. Manual Order, and particularly its Annex B, formulated the types of questions which constructively could be asked in the area of political development. It also indicated the necessary tradeoff between economic and political development goals and the relationship between them. Most importantly, the Manual Order pointed the way to an "indirect" strategy, using economic resources to achieve political results.

Packenham's Dissertation study showed why the Agency, with the training and orientation of its personnel, was incapable of doing the type

of analysis demanded by the Manual Order. Packenham further developed the "indirect" strategy, i.e. achieving political development goals through the programming of economic resources. The Mihaly-Nelson study pinpointed some of the political development assumptions underlying on-going AID activities. It also suggested ways to remedy the problems in personnel and organization highlighted by Packenham.

Finally, the contribution of Bell's speech was to define the limits of a new political development initiative. The theoretical foundation of political development would not allow the Agency to make a comprehensive effort in this area. The main concern of the Agency would remain economic development. However, the political effects of past programs offered an excellent area for research. The initiative, if it came, would consist mostly of this type of analysis, and not of any specific new programs. It would rely a great deal on past Agency experience with political development in the field.

II. The Organizational Reponse of the Agency to Title IX

In the previous chapter, Congressional interest in political development, leading to the passage of Title IX, has been traced. In the preceding section of the present chapter, a similar concern in the Agency has been examined. It is now time to show the intersection of these two lines, i.e., the point at which the Agency became responsible for the implementation of Title IX. This section and the next chapter will deal, for the most part, with the first year of the Agency response to Title IX. An attempt will be made, however, to show changes in

emphasis with implications for the future of Title IX in the Agency.

As Title IX became included in the legislation, a major share of responsibility for implementation fell to the Policy Planning Division of the Office of Program Coordination. This was the office which had produced the LAS Manual Order and the Mihaly-Nelson study and thus constituted the most important political development "nucleus" in the Agency. In an interview, the ex-Deputy Chief of this office, Dr. Richard L. Hough, described the situation during this period:

> When I took over the position of Deputy Chief in the Fall of 1965, part of my "job description" was to handle the "bud" of political development. Actually I became very involved in organizing the P.P.B.S. System (Policy, Program, Budgetary System), but all the time I was looking for a policy framework to push "on the margin." We had a minimal staff on political development and a new piece of legislation (Title IX) dealing with it.[35]

Out of the interchange of ideas in the Policy Planning Division, certain elements of a policy framework for Title IX were developed. These found expression in the first circular airgram on Title IX sent to the Missions, also drafted by this Division.[36] Equally important were the organizational changes made in the Agency in response to

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[35] Dr. Richard L. Hough (Ex-Deputy Chief, Policy Planning Division, Office of Program Coordination, AID) private interview, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, Mass., April 18, 1968. I had the opportunity to spend several long hours with Dr. Hough discussing the Agency's response to Title IX.

[36] U.S., Agency for International Development, Circular Airgram XA 1063, "Promotion and Utilization of Democratic Institutions for Development," November, 1966.

Title IX. The two most important of these were the creation of a Title IX Division," and the establishment of an "Intra-Agency Committee on Title IX." Each of these will be discussed in turn.

A. The Title IX Division

1. Establishment of the Division

During the Fall of 1966 and the Spring of 1967, the Office of Program Coordination underwent a major reorganization, when it absorbed part of the now-extinct bureau, "Technical Cooperation and Research." Its name was changed to the "Office of Policy and Program Coordination" (PPC). The merger brought some new job positions to PPC, some of which were amenable to a "Title IX-type" responsibility. It was decided to organize a new division, utilizing these positions.[37] The new Division was to be called the "Title IX Division". It eventually found its place under the Associate Assistant Administrator for Program Policy, alongside the Sector and Market Analysis Division. According to Dr. Eric Thorbecke, who was responsible for both these Divisions, the reorganization showed an attempt to integrate the economic and the non-economic factors of development.[38]

Prior to the organization of the Title IX Division, the two political scientists who had been most interested in political development left the

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[37] Dr. Richard L. Hough, private interview, April 18, 1968.

[38] Dr. Eric Thorbecke, Associate Assistant Administrator for Program Policy, private interview, State Department Building, Washington, D.C., January 31, 1968

Agency (Eugene Mihaly and Joan Nelson).[39] The third, Dr. Hough, was given a special assignment at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy which took him out of Washington, D.C. Although contact was maintained with at least two of these individuals, the main responsibility for Title IX passed into the hands of a young, Harvard-trained political scientist, Dr. John Schott. Dr. Schott, who had been with the Agency less than a year, became the "acting chief" of the Title IX Division and remained so during the period under study. In May of 1967, another young political scientist, who had done contract work for the Agency, became the second member of the Title IX Division.[40] During the summer of 1967, two student aides were assigned to the Divison. As they left to return to school in the Fall, a third member of the Division, trained in International Affairs, was hired.[41] These three individuals "were" the Title IX Division during most of the period under study. They were assigned full-time responsibility for devising an Agency response to the Congressional initiative of Title IX. Their activities in this regard will be discussed in the next chapter.[42]

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[39]Mr. Mihaly, interested in a more "activist" role left for the Peace Corps, and Miss Nelson left for a research position at the School of International Affairs, Harvard University.

[40]Dr. Csanad Toth (Ph.D. American University). Dr. Toth was author of the Loyola University "Leadership Training Course" study referred to on p. 124. Dr. Toth was very generous with his time in discussing Title IX with the author.

[41]Mrs. Jutta Parsons (M.A. The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy). Mrs. Parsons arranged for many of the interviews for this study.

[42]Chapter Five is entitled, "The Ideological and Action Response of the Agency to Title IX".

2. Consequences of Establishment of the Division

It might be well, at this point to examine some of the consequences of the establishment of a "Title IX Division". First is that all of the full-time Title IX positions in the Agency were staff positions. There was no one in the line operations of the Agency who had, as his major responsibility, the implementation of Title IX. Consequently, the Division had difficulty being thoroughly effective. It was hard to see how Title IX could cause any change in the Agency's operations without penetrating to some degree the regional bureaus and the overseas missions. As Dr. Hough said, "If you put eager young activists in staff positions, they are bound to get frustrated easily as they see what little effect they are having."[43]

Secondly, all of the individuals in the Division were new to the Agency. None had been employed longer than a year. As a consequence, none were really familiar with the Agency's operations, or had the contacts necessary for influence in a bureaucracy.[44] The fact that the Division was in a staff office and was composed of people new to the Agency served to create a large gap between it and the actual operations of the Agency. This gap was reinforced by the name given the Division.

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[43] Dr. Richard L. Hough, private interview, April 18, 1968. This view was confirmed in an interview with Dr. Schott. He stated that in dealing with the Agency he felt as though he were "punching a pillow," which would spring back and show no effect of his action. Dr. John Schott (Acting Chief of the Title IX Division, Office of Program and Policy Coordination, AID), private interview, State Department Bldg., Washington, D.C., December 5, 1967.

[44] This view came out in many of the interviews I conducted with other Agency officials, and was recognized by at least one member of the Division, Dr. Csanad Toth, private interview, April 2, 1968.

By calling it the "Title IX Division," those naming it emphasized its Congressional origins. This fact served further to isolate the Division as it became associated with other temporary Congressional initiatives. Not only was it a staff office composed of "newcomers", but it was manifestly responding to stimulus outside the Agency.

A possible alternative to the establishment of a Title IX Division might have been to assign one or two officers in the centrally located PPC office to Title IX's overall coordination, and have other staff officers in the regional bureaus and in the overseas missions responsible for political development in their regions.[45] Such a move might have insured greater Agency experience in the formation of policies relating to Title IX and prevented the build-up of "visibility" at the staff level. It would also have insured better penetration and a more automatic integration of Title IX into Agency planning.

On the other hand, it was perhaps necessary to have a nucleus of staff officers to handle research and planning responsibilities and act as a center of stimulation and provocation for the rest of the Agency. Perhaps also it was necessary for new people to have major responsibility for Title IX. If responsibility had been given to older officers scattered throughout the line operations, Title IX might have resulted only in new rationales for old programs. Finally, it might have been necessary to

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[45] Suggestion made by Dr. Hough, private interview, April 18, 1968.

call the Division by its legislative rubric to avoid the troublesome connotations of an "office of political development" and to insure interested Congressmen that action was being taken on their proposal.

B. The Intra-Agency Committee on Title IX

The second organizational change which occurred in the Agency in response to Title IX was the establishment of an "Intra-Agency Committee" on Title IX. Its purpose was to "coordinate the Agency's response to Title IX and to catalyze efforts in the regional bureaus and allied offices to implement this legislation."[46]

1. Participants

The Committee was to be composed of officers "given a clear mandate to spend staff time and energy on Title IX."[47] It was estimated that "over the next few months" meetings of the Committee would be held every two weeks.[48] A circular went out to all the regional bureaus and to selected staff offices inviting their participation. In this memo, the function of the Committee was spelled out in greater detail:

> A) To assist in developing an increasingly specific policy framework for the implementation of Title IX.

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[46] U.S., Agency for International Development, "Action Memorandum to the Administrator from Gustav Ranis, Assistant Administrator for Program Coordination, May 20, 1967, mimeo.

[47] Ibid., p. 2.

[48] U.S. Agency for International Development, "Action Memorandum to the Administrator from Gustav Ranis, Ibid., p. 2.

B) To facilitate the exchange of ideas and information between the regional bureaus and relevant AID offices on project and program activities currently underway or contemplated.

C) To assist in the determination of priorities for research and special studies which may service regional bureaus and our missions in responding to Title IX.[49]

The following offices sent representatives to the first meeting, held April 28, 1967.

Staff:

Office of Public Safety
Office of Personnel Administration
Office of International Training
Voluntary Foreign AID Service
Office of Labor Affairs.
Office of Policy and Program Coordination
General Councel's Office
Office of Private Resources

Line:

Office of Development Planning-East Asia Bureau
Office of Development Planning-Near East and South Asia Bureau
Office of Development Planning-Africa Bureau
Office of Institutional Development-Latin America [50]

It will be noted immediately that the majority of the Committee members were with staff instead of line offices. Those knowledgeable

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[49] U.S., Agency for International Development, "Memorandum from Mr. Ranis to Selected Offices," March 22, 1967, mimeo.

[50] U.S., Agency for International Development, "Minutes of the First Intra-Agency Committee Meeting" held April 28, 1967, State Department Building, Washington, D.C. (typewritten)

about the formation of the Committee state that this composition was not purposeful. Offices were selected to get "adequate office coverage". The larger number of staff offices indicated simply the importance of AID staff members in "launching any new initiative".[51] However, it appeared to at least one member, that the the Committee was being "overloaded with staff members and academic types" who had a natural bias toward political development. He felt that the purpose behind this was to "isolate Title IX from the harsh winds blowing in the Agency."[52]

A glance at the academic backgrounds of the members shows that, with the exception of the Chairman, Mr. Donor Lion,[53] there were no economists represented on the Committee. There were also no technicians specializing in agriculture or public health, etc. Most of the members were of a fairly high grade level. Several were directors of their offices.

2. Activities of the Intra-Agency Committee

A) In Regular Meetings:

. In the first meeting of the Intra-Agency Committee, its chairman stated what he felt was the proper role of the Committee.

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[51] Mr. Richard Hough, private interview, April 18, 1968.

[52] Mr. Eric Thorbecke, private interview, January 31, 1968.

[53] Mr. Lion, a Harvard-trained economist, at this time was serving as acting Deputy Assistant Administrator of the Office of Program and Policy Coordination. He had previously been the Director of the AID program in Northeast Brazil, a program with definite political development dimensions.

"It should not simply be a discussion group or a communications link. Instead it should provide the ideological leadership function in the Agency. It should tell P. C. [Office of Program Coordination] how to go about Title IX including research, training, and relations with the outside world."[54]

A review of several months of Intra-Agency Committee meetings reveals the following as sample topics of discussion:

1. "Which countries should be chosen for particular Title IX emphasis?"

2. "Which consultants should be asked to join the Agency's rolls for Title IX?"

3. "What means should be used to educate Agency personnel in Title IX matters - seminars, conferences, etc.?"

4. "How can the airgrams and reports on Title IX sent out by the Agency be improved?"

5. "How should contacts on Title IX within and without the government be made?"

The most recurrent topic of discussion, however, concerned "the real meaning" of Title IX. During the summer of 1967, each of the Committee members were asked to submit a definition of Title IX. The definitions ranged from "Title IX asks 'who gets what, when and how from a project' ", to "Title IX means mass participation in democratic institutions."[55]

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[54] U.S., Agency for International Development, "Minutes of the First Intra-Agency Committee Meeting".

[55] The following chapter will discuss in greater detail the differences of opinion within the Intra-Agency Committee on Title IX.

The Committee also organized at least two subcommittees, one on communications and the other on research. The research subcommittee was fairly active, primarily because of the great interest of its chairman, Dr. Cudd Brown. Under his auspices a comprehensive bibliography was drawn up on political development listing both governmental and non-governmental sources, classified and unclassified.[56]

3. Evaluation of the Intra-Agency Committee

It is quite obvious to anyone who has scanned the minutes of the Intra-Agency Committee meetings that it did not provide "the ideological leadership function" emphasized in its first meeting. Several reasons can be given for this fact. The first is found in the basic nature of a committee. It is difficult for any group of 20 or so members to provide more than just a "communications link." This basic defect was compounded by the fact that little consensus existed between members as to what Title IX meant and what they wanted to accomplish. Emotions sometimes became very heated in the course of the discussion. One member accused the Committee of "not practicing democracy at home." "How can you begin to think of building democracy abroad, when it is not even an operating principle in this Committee?"[57]

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[56] U.S., Agency for International Development, "Working Bibliography on Political Development,")Division of Planning and Research, Office of Development Planning, Bureau for East Asia) July 1, 1967.

[57] Another member, when asked to evaluate the Committee, wrote that "the discussion often gets grandiose. The language is obscure and full of jargon. There seems to be preoccupation with new offices and staffs to be furnished, ways in which money can be spent, and individuals outside of AID to be pleased."

As time passed, it became clear that the Committee did fulfill several real functions. First, it served as a "sounding board" for the Title IX Division. The Division, by testing various lines of thought and action in the Committee, was able to predict to some degree the general Agency reaction to their implementation plans. It also allowed the "newcomers" in the Title IX Division to get a feeling for the Agency-at-large. For instance, the incomprehension and resistance to Title IX shown by old-line technical assistance and community development workers in the intra-Agency meetings undoubtedly contributed to the Division's decision to divorce Title IX from the work of technical assistance staffs and community development programs.

Another function of the Committee was to develop interest in Title IX. It sent members back to their offices, sometimes bubbling with enthusiasm, sometimes with irritation, but usually eager to talk to their co-workers. As one member said, "I think that the Committee certainly stirred people up. I know I talked at length to several people in my office about Title IX." A third function of the Committee was to acquaint the Title IX Division with other interested individuals scattered throughout the Agency. By their enthusiasm and the quality of their participation, "natural allies" revealed themselves. For instance, the Training Division of the Office of Personnel Administration was a key division for the implementation of Title IX. The training of AID officials obviously needed to be revamped if political development was to become an important concern of the Agency. The chief of this Training Division,

by his contributions to Committee meetings, showed himself to be an articulate and persuasive spokesman for Title IX. He made several proposals for seminars to be held, and even suggested that a "mass meeting" be conducted on Title IX so that "grassroots" interest in the Agency could be tapped.[58]

Along with revealing who were interested persons in key spots in the Agency, the Committee performed a liaison function with other Agency programs containing a political development dimension. It is doubtful that some of these "pockets of interest" would have been recognized without the Committee meetings. For instance, through contact provided by the Committee, the Office of Private Resources was revealed to have concerns quite similar to those of Title IX. As the Deputy Administrator of this Office told me, "The Watson Committee Report,[59] which set up this office, was really an expenent of the Title IX idea. Privateness cuts across traditional divisions in the aid business, i.e. education, agriculture, and so does Title IX. They both require the Agency to put on 'new glasses' for analysis."[60] The Office of Private Resources, therefore, as revealed in Committee meetings of

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[58] I was present as a student aide at this particular Intra-Agency Committee meeting, July 1967.

[59] Foreign Aid Through Private Initiative, the Report of the Advisory Committee on Private Enterprise in Foreign Aid. AID pamphlet, Washington, D. C, July, 1965.

[60] Another center of initiative, revealed by the Committee, was located in the East Asia Bureau where there was a political development staff, and a group of potential consultants on political and social problems (SEADAG).

I. The Ideological Response

During the first year of Title IX's implementation, there was a conscious effort to develop a "policy framework" for the legislation. This effort is clearly documented in a series of papers written in the Agency from November, 1966 to May, 1967. In addition to an examination of these papers, interviews were held with the main implementors during this period in order to obtain a perspective for this discussion.

A. Agency Documents on Title IX

1. XA-1063

The first Agency document written in response to Title IX was a policy message sent to all field missions in November, 1966. It was entitled "Promotion and Utilization of Democratic Institutions for Development".[2] This message was designed to inform the field missions that Title IX had been added to the Agency's legislation. Included in its body was the text of the amendment, and in an annex, the accompanying Congressional Report. But the drafters of this document did not merely quote Congress with regard to the promotion of democratic institutions. They also prepared a 4-1/2 page "discussion", clarifying and amplifying the legislation.

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[2] U.S., Agency for International Development, Circular Airgram 1063, "Promotion and Utilization of Democratic Institutions for Development," (unclassified version), November, 1966. This airgram also asked 22 selected missions to send responses, which are classified, and thus unavailable for analysis.

Many elements of this initial discussion were to become important themes in the Agency's response to Title IX, while others developed into sources of controversy within the Agency. They are as follows:

1. The Agency, initially, opted to take the broad view of Title IX. It was not simply described as popular participation or democractic institution-building, but as a variety of activities, all under the rubric of "political development." Title IX was described as giving emphasis to "improving the governmental and political framework within which economic and social development take place."[3] Further on, it was described as "giving more attention to the non-economic factors of development."[4] Finally it was described as urging the Agency to "try and anticipate and guide [its] impact on governmental and political evolution to the extent possible."[5]

2. This broad emphasis involved both "capacity" and "process" concerns, and thus included both the ideological and practical elements of the political development rationale.[6] This is clearly shown in the body of the airgram, in which four areas of particular concern

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[3]U.S., Agency for International Development, Circular Airgram 1063, "Promotion and Utilization of Democratic Institutions for Development," November, 1966. p. 1.

[4]Ibid., p. 1.

[5]Ibid., p. 3.

[6]For a fuller discussion of these points, see Chapter II of this study.

are delineated: a) Administrative Competence, b) National Integration, c) Legal Institutions, d) The Development of Democratic Institutions. Two of these areas are definitely concerned with the "capacity" of the political system, i.e. national integration and administrative competence, while one is definitely in the "process" area, i.e., "development of democratic institutions". The fourth, the development of legal institutions has elements of both "capacity" and "process".[7]

3. The approach advocated to achieve these goals was both indirect and programmatic. It was felt that there should not be separate "political development" activities as such, but rather that all activities should be analyzed for their potential political effects. This approach implied the use of economic resources as seen in the following quotation: "It should be noted that action of this sort would not be identified as distinct from economic and social activities." The key, then, was in the way economic resources were programmed. "In other words, a deeper and more penetrating analysis within the Agency's program planning system of the considerations relating to the political dimensions of development is required."[8]

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[7]According to the Airgram, the development of legal institutions is important "to facilitate commerce, encourage investment and rationalize property and contract relations and practices," and also "to afford its citizens a reasonable measure of justice and . . . rule of law . . ." U.S. Agency for International Development, Circular Airgram 1063, p. 3.

[8]U.S., Agency for International Development, Circular Airgram 1063, p. 4.

4. In order to affect the programming process, a different type of analysis was required. In describing how the Missions should begin this analysis, the document pinpoints the following:

a) The need for more systematic identification of weakness in the governmental and political framework . . .

b) The need for more attention to and analysis of the impact of our assistance programs as a whole . . .

c) The need for more imaginative consideration of specific ways to strengthen and animate public and private institutions . . .[9]

The above phrases indicate that new and better analysis is the primary requirement for the implementation of Title IX in the Agency.

5. The document clearly envisions that Title IX will be applied in different ways in each recipient country. "The particular problems of each country are unique, and different combinations of activity must be designed to meet them."[10]

6. The document foresees an incremental, rather than a comprehensive change, in Agency action in response to Title IX. In some countries nothing might be done because "current governmental structures and processes give adequate support to economic and social progress. There are other countries "where, despite grave weaknesses, there is little that we can do."[11]

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[9] U.S., Agency for International Development, Circular Airgram 1063, p. 1.

[10] Ibid., p. 4.

[11] Ibid., p. 4.

7. Finally, this document indicates that Title IX should be implemented "above board". "It is not our intention to interfere improperly in host country governmental and political processes or to attempt to manipulate or manage local political activity or the fortunes of particular leaders."[12]

This document, then, contained seven important themes of the Agency's ideological response to Title IX. They were: a) Broad definition of the legislation; b) Both "process" and "capacity" concerns; c) Indirect, programmatic strategy; d) Hence, importance of analysis; e) Incremental rather than comprehensive approach; f) Different changes in different countries; g) "Above-board".

2. ACED Issues Paper

During the next six months, there were further attempts to refine and clarify the policy framework for Title IX. In March, 1967, Title IX was the subject for a meeting of the Administrator's Advisory Committee on Economic Development.[13] In preparation for this meeting, a paper was drawn up in the Office of Program and Policy Coordination

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[12] U.S. Agency for International Development, Circular Airgram 1063, p. 4.

[13] A committee of academicians drawn up to advise the Administrator of AID on matters of broad policy. Members and guests present at this particular meeting were: Hollis Chenery, Emile Despres, Edward Mason, Max Millikan, Lucian Pye, Theodore Schultz, Robert Johnson, Joan Nelson, John Rielly, Robert West, Gregory Wolfe.

which set forth "four basic propositions representing the intent of the Congressional proponents" of Title IX. These were that:

> 1. Political development should be viewed as a legitimate and vital concern of the Agency . . .
>
> 2. Activities and programs which enable the people of the less developed countries to benefit directly from. . .and participate in . . .the development process. . . should be encouraged.
>
> 3. Institutional reforms pivotal to wide participation and orderly democratic progress should be encouraged
>
> 4. A different set of criteria than traditional economic indices will be needed to judge the success of these new objectives.[14]

These "four basic propositions" show some change in emphasis from the XA-1063 airgram. There appears to be a greater degree of attention given to the more specific "popular participation" interpretation of Title IX. The "four areas", i.e. administrative competence, national integration, legal institutions and development of democratic institutions, described in the XA-1063 airgram, are not part of the interpretation of Congressional intent. We should not, perhaps, draw an unfounded conclusion from the difference in emphasis. After all, the same Agency officials who wrote XA-1063 also worked on the ACED Issues Paper.[15] In addition, both papers were distributed to all the participants in the meeting.[16] However, it is significant that, when purporting to interpret

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[14] U.S., Agency for International Development, Administrator's Advisory Committee on Economic Development (ACED), Issues Paper, "Session on Utilization of Democratic Institutions for Development," March, 1967, mimeo, p. 1.

[15] Dr. Richard Hough was the main drafter of XA-1063. Dr. Hough and Dr. John Schott drafted the "Issues Paper".

[16] Thus participants were exposed to both the narrow and broad interpretation of Title IX.

the Congressional directive, the implementors stressed popular participation. On the other hand, when sending messages to the field, they felt at liberty to add more aspects of political development which they felt merited attention.

The remainder of the "Issues Paper" revealed the problems felt by the implementors to be most important "for immediate attention". The basic question was "How do we get started on Title IX?" Fully four of the six problems, (or issues) directly related to the major concern of those in the Agency responsible for implementing Title IX: i.e., "How do we get Title IX out of the realm of particular projects and into the realm of overall program analysis?" These issues were concerned with what research needed to be done, what changes in personnel were needed, and how attention could be focussed on particular country programs. In addition, the "issues" asked how qualitative criteria could be devised and how non-governmental organizations could be involved in the implementation of Title IX.

In the meeting itself, some of the already-devised Agency strategy was challenged by the experts called in.[17] However, in a memo to the Administrator, which reported the results of the meeting, the elements

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[17]One such challenge came from Professor Mason. He maintained that he would begin analysis at the project level and extrapolate upwards, rather than start at the level of program analysis and work down. U.S., Agency for International Development, Administrator's Advisory Committee on Economic Development, Issues Paper, p. 3.

of the policy framework discussed in XA-1063 remained, with one important exception. Although not explicitly stated, it was clear that the narrower "popular participation" interpretation of Title IX, rather than the broader "political development" interpretation of XA-1063 was held by the top-level officials in AID. The memo underplayed the importance of political development as such and stated that it should not become a separate goal of the Agency.

3. "Report to Congress on the Implementation of Title IX"

The most comprehensive and formal statement of Agency policy on Title IX was contained in a "Report to Congress on the Implementation of Title IX". This document was sent to the Congress in May, 1967, seven months after the passage of Title IX. The paper, 11 pages long, was divided into four sections, the first of which was entitled, "The Policy Framework". Most of the same seven elements identified in the XA-1063 can be found in this policy discussion. The following quotations are good examples:

a) Country-by country approach: "Our work to date suggests that Title IX cannot be implemented within the framework of a "grand strategy" of democratic development, applicable in all parts of the world. Rather, it requires a more selective, discriminating and flexible approach."[18]

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[18] U.S., Agency for International Development, "Report to Congress on the Implementation of Title IX", May 10, 1967, mimeo, p. 2.

b) Above-board approach: "We have concluded that Title IX should be implemented on a country-by-country basis, in open cooperation with host governments."[19]

c) Emphasis on analysis: "It is evident that the successful, long-run implementation of this provision requires a serious and extensive analytical effort on the part of the Agency into aspects of the developmental process to which inadequate attention has hitherto been given."[20]

d) Program approach: "For this reason, no single aspect of the development process and no single sector of a country's institutional fabric will necessarily be singled out for separate program emphasis. We intend, rather, to respond as appropriate and feasible to host-country needs as they are carefully identified within a broadly conceived analytical framework."[21]

e) Incremental, rather than comprehensive change: "In some countries, this may mean only reprogramming on-going activities to take Title IX objectives more explicitly into account. Elsewhere, it may mean giving greater priority to the intensification of traditional activities which have successfully contributed to democratic development."[22]

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[19] U.S., Agency for International Development, "Report to Congress on the Implementation of Title IX", May 10, 1967, mimeo, p. 2.

[20] Ibid., p. 1.

[21] Ibid., p. 3.

[22] Ibid., p. 1

There were, however, two shifts in emphasis in this document written for Congressional consumption. First, the "newness" of Title IX was stressed in this document more than in papers written for use in the Agency:

> ". . . Title IX has policy implications, and points to opportunities, which go beyond previous AID activities and traditional economic development considerations. Title IX requires AID not only to consider new types of activities, but to view the development process in different and much broader terms than before . . . . Title IX involves AID in a new approach toward development."[23] [underlining mine]

Secondly, although the document mentions both "process" and "capacity" aspects of political development, it is the former which is given greater attention. It is the "popular participation" interpretation which is particularly stressed: "The principle of popular participation will provide a major guideline for the selection or redirection of activities in support of Title IX."[24]: ". . . Title IX suggests an emphasis upon activities designed to reach larger numbers of people with our aid, so that they benefit more directly from it and, just as importantly, so that their creative participation will, in turn, contribute substantially to modernization and development."[25]

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[23] U.S., Agency for International Development, "Report to Congresson the Implementation of Title IX", May 10, 1967, mimeo p. 1.

[24] Ibid., p. 3.

[25] Ibid., p. 3.

B. Analysis of the Agency's Ideological Response

Thus, in the initial ideological response of the Agency, there was a degree of consensus on the main elements of a political development strategy. Many of these elements had been developed in the Agency prior to 1966 and thus were rapidly incorporated into post-1966 thinking on Title IX. Basically, the main thrust of the Agency's strategy was that political development would have to be tackled indirectly through the use of economic assistance resources which, in turn, would require more long-range and comprehensive political analysis.

There was, however, disagreement as to how broadly the legislation should be interpreted. The political scientists in the Title IX Division felt that the "popular participation" formula was inadequate as a frame of reference for their overall concern with political development. This was true, even though the wording of the legislation clearly focussed on the "popular participation" aspect of political development. Congressman Fraser, the sponsor who would have liked to see the legislation cover a broader expanse of political development concerns, recognized that Title IX was "just a foot in the door," and did not cover most aspects of political development.[26]

The Title IX Division, however, tended to embrace Title IX as the entire entity of political development, instead of just its "foot".

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[26] Donald M. Fraser, private interview, February 27, 1968.

This fact brought a certain amount of confusion to the implementation of Title IX. For instance, the members of the Division often stated that the analysis demanded by Title IX might result in programs designed to decrease the amount of popular participation in a recipient country's political system.[27] In this case, the analysis "demanded" by Title IX would actually contradict the thrust of the legislation itself.[28] It is obvious where the difficulty lies. The legislation was not, in the last analysis, directed toward overall political analysis, but toward popular participation and institutional development. Yet, "Title IX concerns" very soon became synonomous with overall political analysis as far as the Title IX Division was concerned.

The private opinion of those in the Title IX Division, as expressed in interviews with the author, shows an even greater tendency to view Title IX as an umbrella for more comprehensive concerns. In the earliest document of Agency policy after the passage of Title IX, (i.e. XA-1063), the legislation was quoted in conjunction with a discussion of the role of political development, but the legislation was not equated with it.

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[27] Dr. John Schott expressed this idea in an interview with me, March 12, 1968. I also heard it repeated many times while I was employed in the Division.

[28] The confusion was shown clearly in two interviews with Agency officials who both saw the need for "curbing" popular participation in certain circumstance. One stated that this was "what Title IX demanded", while the other stated that "Title IX would have to be ignored in this case."

As time passed, however, Title IX became more and more comprehensive. As one officer in the Division explained, "Title IX, in the broadest sense, is not just the promotion of democratic institutions. It is stressing factors other than economic, i.e., social, political, attitudinal." Another Title IX officer stated simply that "Title IX, in the last analysis, gives us the right to ask questions we haven't asked before."[29] Finally, the acting Chief of the Division, in an extremely revealing statement, showed the comprehensive nature of his Title IX strategy:

> What is important to realize is that we didn't just take the legislation (Title IX) and implement it in order to please the Agency or Congress. We made it something bigger. We organized in our minds the logical progression by which people in the Agency can be convinced of the innate logic of Title IX.
>
> 1. First, we will try to get them to look at the political ramifications of the aid they are giving. They will see that it does have political ramifications.
>
> 2. Then we will point out that certain projects are almost exclusively for political development, i.e. coops.
>
> 3. Then they will realize that, in planning, political development should be taken into consideration.
>
> 4. Finally they will see that political development is, indeed the responsibility of the Agency.[30]

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[29] Jutta Parsons, private interview held in the New State Department Building, Title IX Office, Washington, D.C. April 2, 1968.

[30] Dr. John Schott, private interview held in the New State Department Building, Title IX Office, Washington, D. C., March 12, 1968.

The result of this "stretched" interpretation was that the Title IX Division was obliged to change the emphasis of its interpretation as its "audience" changed. In the survey of Agency documents on Title IX, these changes have been described. For one type of audience, i.e., the field missions, the broad definition, including "capacity" analysis, was stressed (the four "areas"). For another audience, i.e., the top-level AID Administrators, Title IX was narrower in scope, not to be an independent objective, in harmony with economic and social objectives. For still a third audience, the Congress, Title IX was to involve AID in a definitely "new approach toward development." Instead of "capacity" analysis, "process" concerns were stressed.

C. Other Ideological Viewpoints in the Agency

Not all of those responsible for Title IX in the Agency had in mind the broad interpretation described above. As the implementation process proceeded, a difference in viewpoint between the political scientists of the Title IX Division and their economist supervisors in PPC became apparent. In particular was a conflict between the acting chief of the Title IX Division, Dr. Schott, and an economist, Dr. Eric Thorbecke, who took over the chairmanship of the Intra-Agency Committee in January, 1968. The latter also became the direct supervisor of the Title IX Division.[31] His viewpoint was quite different than that of the Title IX

[31] He was given the position of Associate Assistant Administrator for Program Policy and thus took over major Title IX responsibilities from Donor Lion. He joined AID after a career as an academic economist.

Division group described above. As he stated in his interview, "The problem is not to define Title IX in its broadest sense, but in its most specific sense. The reason we need to be more concrete is so we can communicate with each other and know what we are talking about. Now we are terribly confused."[32]

This move toward greater concreteness and specificity among Title IX implementors centered on the "popular participation" interpretation of Title IX. According to Dr. Thorbecke, the best definition of Title IX "is popular participation." This, in turn, has three aspects:

a) popular participation in income distribution
b) popular participation in the development process
c) popular participation in the decision-making process[33]

By using the above definition, states Dr. Thorbecke, "we can be analytical about Title IX." The regional bureaus have to be convinced about Title IX in order to convince the missions. To do this, we need to be concrete, give specific guidelines. If we just give them paperwork, they will simply ignore the legislation."[34]

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[32] Dr. Eric Thorbecke, private interview held in the New State Department Building, Washington, D.C., January 31, 1968.

[33] A "task force" consisting of Joan Nelson, Irma Adleman and Bill Morgan originally formulated this definition of popular participation for the Agency. See also Miss Nelson's book, Aid, Influence, and Foreign Policy (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968).

[34] Dr. Eric Thorbecke, private interview, January 31, 1968.

There is, in the above approach, an impatience with the overall political analysis emphasized by the Title IX Division. There is a strong desire to simplify, to render a definition of Title IX which is precise, but which thus loses some of its value. Part of the conflict stems from the nature of the two academic disciplines involved. On one hand, Dr. Thorbecke, an economist, stated that his discipline actually has more to offer in the implementation of Title IX . "Political Science is back where the economists were twenty years ago. The economist has much more experience at systematic policy formulation. There has been a backlog of both theory and practical policy formation in economics. The methods of economics are applicable to political questions and should be used."[35]

Dr. Schott, acting chief of the Title IX Division, felt otherwise: "Economics discards all the really important variables in order to make a pure science. Our science is stickier, but much more realistic. We deal with the complicated human variables."[36]

Two different types of suggestions were given by the economist supervisors of the Title IX Division in an attempt to "pin the legislation down". First was the suggestion that "popular participation" should be regarded as another factor in overall economic analysis done by the Agency.

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[35]Dr. E. Thorbecke, private interview, January 31, 1968.

[36]Dr. Schott, private interview, March 12, 1968.

"In the past, we have been somewhat concerned with programming for price stability, greater output, better income distribution and better employment opportunities. These are all forms of 'popular participation'. They will be given additional weight in our programming."[37]

The second type of suggestion was that Title IX should really involve concentration on certain types of activities or programs. The three areas most often stressed as being "Title IX-related" were:

a) activities which trained and educated people in the recipient countries,

b) activities which developed local institutions,

c) activities which encouraged the central government to loosen up the private spheres of development.[38]

The Assistant Administrator for PPC, an economist, was one of those who made this type of suggestion. He began his interview by saying that Title IX should be included in everything the Agency does, and then went on to describe only these specific activities without any apparent awareness of a contradiction. It was clearly difficult for him to disassociate Title IX from specific types of activities.

Neither of these types of suggestions were agreeable to the members of the Title IX Division. The first type did use an apparent program

[37] Dr. E. Thorbecke, private interview, January 31, 1968.

[38] Dr. Paul Clark, Assistant Administrator for Program and Policy Coordination, AID, private interview, New State Department Building, Washington, D.C., March 26, 1968.

approach to Title IX, which was advocated by the Division. As a "plug" in an economic model, popular participation would, theoretically, be included in everything done by the Agency. But the "plug" was only one limited aspect of political development, accordingly to the Title IX Division. Its consideration alone would not bring the overall political analysis felt to be so important by the Division. By simplifying and rendering concrete the legislation, this suggestion missed the point made by the Title IX Division.

The second type of suggestion was obviously a retreat back into the realm of specific projects and programs. As such, it was not viewed with favor by the Title IX Division. As one officer explained, "[These approaches] show a monstrous lack of sensitivity to the development process as it is seen in the Title IX Division."[39]

D. The Agency's Ideological Response: A Summary

Although the "political analysis" and the "popular participation" viewpoints diverged on many issues, they both stayed within the framework of economic assistance and did not advocate direct political development aid. This is in clear contrast to some of the suggestions made by the Congressional sponsors. Both Agency viewpoints foresaw a gradual change in A.I.D. policy. Both embodied a "programming" approach. The difference between them, basically, concerns a question of means

[39]Mr. John Schott, private interview, March 12, 1968.

and ends. The "overall political analysis" school is advocating a "means". The question then immediately arises, "overall political analysis for what?" The answer was rarely articulated by those advocating this approach. If pressed, some would state that they were concerned with "more responsible government", or a government which respects the rights of the individual."[40] Others would say they were more concerned about integrating aid programs with the U.S. national interest.

Those advocating the narrower "popular participation" interpretation appeared to view it as an end in itself. But would they really be satisfied with popular participation alone? The way the terms were carefully defined,[41] and stress placed on the "quality" and not the "quantity" of participation leads to the conclusion that this school, also, was interested in an end result of "more responsible" government. Thus, there was much left unsaid in each of the two schools of thought. Overall political analysis is not an end in itself, neither is popular participation. Both appear to lead toward a rather vague political goal of "more responsible government."[42] Thus the two schools are not as far apart as

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[40] I heard this point made in discussions both in the Intra-Agency Committee on Title IX and in the Title IX Division. I remember Dr. Schott stating that "What we are really concerned with is a government that respects the individual."

[41] i.e., participation in development, in decision-making, in income distribution.

[42] Except for those advocates of overall political analysis who contend simply that such analysis will bring about a better integration of U.S. national interests through the instrumentality of the aid program in a particular country.

they might appear at first. One is more specific about how the goal can be achieved, i.e. by increased popular participation. The other feels that the answer is not so simple. This second viewpoint relies on the hope that good political analysis will point the way to responsible government in a specific country situation. The big question seems to be whether political analysis has developed to the point at which it can provide specific guidance. The "popular participation" school appears to be more concrete because it describes the "method" to be used. Although it can be demonstrated that popular participation is not always the best approach. The burden is on the "political analysis" school to show what can take its place. This is why a concrete example of "overall political analysis in a specific country situation and the resulting program changes would be of infinitely more value than the simple statement that "political analysis must be done."

II. The Action Response of the Agency to Title IX

Two schools of thought among those responsible for Title IX have been described. One viewed Title IX as requiring the overall political analysis of the Agency's economic development programs. The other viewed Title IX as stressing increased popular participation in those same development programs. The task of this section is to describe what was actually done in the Agency in response to Title IX. Each school of thought described in the previous section has its own organizational and action implications. It might be useful to delineate the logical action implications of these two schools of thought. They, then, will be com-

pared with the actions actually taken in the Agency to determine which, if any, ideology directed Agency action.

A. Logical Action Implications

Those advocating the political analysis approach would logically place research and training at the head of their priority list. The intellectual challenge of this type of analysis was important. Furthermore, there was little concrete material from the academic community which could be readily absorbed and utilized by the Agency. The great need was to decide what could and should be done in the Agency vis-a-vis political development. This had to be decided before any arguments could be developed, any suggestions given, any pressure exerted on behalf of Title IX.

This, apparently, was the approach of those having primary initial responsibility for Title IX. According to Dr. Hough, one of the first of Agency officials assigned to implement the legislation: "We decided to reject an 'activist' approach to Title IX. This was a watershed period in the history of political development in the Agency. We had to know what AID had been doing in the past in this area and we had to decide what it should do in the future. If we jumped right in, we would have ended up concentrating on certain projects, nothing more."[43]

[43] Dr. Richard L. Hough, private interview, April 18, 1968.

There were several action implications of this approach. First, according to Dr. Hough, an "emphasis on operational policy research" was needed. The decision was made not to push "the promotion of democratic institutions actively in the field."[44] "Retro-active studies of the political effects of past Agency activities" were considered more important than "new activities or projects for their own sakes."[45]

The second implication was the rejection of a "macro" approach. "We tried to push an inductive, pilot approach, where a combination of factors seemed to make the situation promising, i.e. where a key actor (a mission director or program officer) was interested in Title IX or where the host government was receptive. When these factors were present, then we pushed a pilot country approach."[46] The logical tactics resulting from these considerations, according to Dr. Hough, were "definitely low-key. We were not pushing for penetration in the regional bureaus, particularly line offices, at this stage."[47]

The "popular participation" approach brought in its wake much more concentration on action. The goal was relatively clear-cut and uncomplicated i.e., "involve more people in development." The Agency had past experience with the "people" approach. Certain projects and pro-

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[44] Dr. Richard L. Hough, private interview, April 18, 1968.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid.

grams had definitely produced more involvement. There was not the need for a great deal of thinking and research to implement Title IX.[48]

Advocates of this approach were much more likely to advocate general guidelines on Title IX. They saw no reason why quite specific instructions could not be sent out to all field personnel on Title IX. They were impatient with the "research and analysis" deemed so important by the Title IX Division.

A conflict developed during the first year of Title IX's implementation which illustrates the difference in these two approaches very clearly. The economist supervisors of the Title IX Division wanted a "manual order" drawn up on Title IX. This would explain to the Mission officers what their "specific Title IX responsibilities" were. It would, according to one advocate, give the Missions "something they could get their teeth into."[49]

The pressure for a Manual Order was steadily ignored by members of the Title IX Division. According to Dr. Hough, "we thought it was impossible to mount political development initiatives on general guidelines. Upper Volta and India are just too different. Therefore any general instructions would meaningless."[50]

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[48] More research and thinking would be required to implement the "program-oriented" popular participation approach discussed in the last section.

[49] Dr. Eric Thorbecke, private interview, January 31, 1968.

[50] Dr. Richard Hough, private interview, April 18, 1968.

At the bottom of this disagreement was the differing conceptions of Title IX's purpose: popular participation vs. overall political analysis. Other disagreements between the Title IX Division and its supervisors in the Office of Policy and Program Coordination can be traced to these differing concepts.[51] None, however, was more important than their "expectations" concerning Title IX. The Title IX Division viewed its emphasis on research and training as a prelude to a "new approach" toward development. Its economist supervisors viewed Title IX as adding only a few more considerations to the programming process at best, or even emphasis on a few select projects.

Thus, during the early stages of implementation, those foreseeing the most significant long-range consequences of Title IX, also saw the need for the most research and careful planning. These individuals advocated a gradual, but ultimately comprehensive approach. In the words of Dr. Hough, "The tactics we used were low key. We were not, at this stage, pushing for penetration in the regional bureaus."[52]

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[51] Another good example of this conflict concerned an airgram which the economist supervisors in PPC wished sent out. It was entitled "utilizing popular participation in development". The Title IX Division delayed this airgram also, and Dr. Schott told me that the concept behind it was not his own, but pressed on him from above. It did not have the "overall" approach of which he approved.

[52] Dr. Richard L. Hough, private interview, April 18, 1968.

B. Changes in Strategy as Implementation Progressed

If research and thinking were of greatest priority, then the best location for the Title IX office would be on the "staff" side of the Agency's organizational setup.[53] Also, if thinking were of greater priority than Agency penetration, such a group as the Intra-Agency Committee would not be of great value. Indeed as Dr. Hough said, "I was against the establishment of an Intra-Agency Committee on Title IX. I felt that it would have nothing to offer except past experiences and conversation. I could have predicted that it would become a 'fringe group'."[54]

But, as the implementation of Title IX progressed, the emphasis of the Title IX Division on thinking and research, which was the logical result of its collective conception of Title IX, was diluted by other pressures, inside and out of the Agency. What came to be viewed as the greatest threat of all was that "nothing would change" as a result of Title IX. This became a greater fear than that the "wrong thing" would be done. The Congressional sponsors wanted to see evidence of Agency "action" on their amendment. The Division itself had a vested interest in seeing more and more done on Title IX. The result was an increasingly greater stress on action, on having an "impact", rather than on thinking or research. The acting chief of the Division was aware of this shift in emphasis. In an interview with the author, he posed the following

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[53] This is where it was actually placed. If action were of immediate concern, then a staff office would have more difficulty than a line officer in implementation.

[54] Dr. Richard L. Hough, private interview, April 18, 1968.

question and then answered it. "Should the research come first, or should we plunge ahead with operational changes? The opponents of Title IX would like to see just research. It is safer that way. It will not result in concrete program changes. Research is really a way of killing Title IX, don't forget that."[55]

Another responsible official showed his emphasis on "action", and on "penetration" of the Agency with this statement. "The substantive goal of the Agency in implementing Title IX is to get the field missions to reflect on the legislation, its approach, its objectives and goals, its strategy. When you judge how the Agency has fared in implementing Title IX, this is the basis on which you must judge us. Our general plan of attack has been to assist the regions here in Washington, who, in turn, will assist the Missions to implement Title IX."[56]

During the entire first two years of Title IX's implementation, this tension in the Agency's action response existed. The conception of Title IX which the implementors wished to promote called for a great deal of prior research and thinking. And yet the implementors wanted and needed to show evidence of "doing something". The brief survey of actions undertaken in the Agency will serve to illustrate this tension.

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[55] Dr. John Schott, private interview, December 6, 1967.

[56] Dr. Donor Lion, private interview, January 29, 1968.

C. Survey of Actions in the Agency vis-a-vis Title IX

This survey is not designed to cover in any definitive way all the actions undertaken in the Agency in regard to Title IX. Many of these are classified and thus inaccessible to the outside observor. However, this survey should show the types of changes which were made with respect to Title IX and illustrate more concretely the tension in the Agency response described above.

1. The Research and Training Response

As indicated in the previous section, the "overall political analysis" interpretation of Title IX would logically place emphasis on research and training activities. In order to determine to what degree this interpretation of Title IX was followed in the Agency, we need to first describe the types of research and action activities undertaken by the Title IX Division and then assess their importance in the total Agency response.

Because this section and the following deal with current programs and activities, distinctions will be made, whenever possible, between activities actually completed, those just begun and those only projected.

a) Research:

There are several different types of research which could be associated with the "overall political analysis" approach.

1) "Basic" research: First, research could be undertaken with regard to the fundamental nature of political development in the less developed countries. This would be equivalent of "basic research"

in the physical sciences and no policy implications would necessarily result from it. Evidently little research of this type was either contemplated or done in connection with Title IX. All the discussions on this subject in the Title IX Division and in the Intra-Agency Committee centered on what was termed "operationally-oriented research." Evidently the field of political development itself was viewed with such skepticism that to invest limited Agency resources into studies with no direct policy ramifications was out of the question. And yet, if the commitment to political development had really been made, then basic research would appear to be of foremost importance, given the acknowledged "weak state" of academic theory in this area.[57]

2) Research relating academic findings to the Aid Program: A second type of research activity would be that which relates the already completed research findings of academicians to the work of the aid agency in this field. During the two year period under study, contacts were made with the academic community, although there was no systematic attempt to relate their findings to the work of the Agency as a whole. There were, however, plans drawn up for extensive future contacts between the academic community and AID officials. These contacts occurred

[57]Some of the research proposed by the Fletcher School might be interpretated as basic research, although in the "Request for Funds" these studies were related to aid policy demands.

during August, 1968 when academicians and Agency officials met for a six week conference at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to discuss the role of political development in the aid program.

During the period under study, however, the implementors seemed to have "postponed" academic investigation until the projected MIT Conference.[58] Also, by stating that "a general theory of modernization was unrealistic" and would have "only limited operational significance," the implementors perhaps tended to downgrade the role of past and current academic research.[59] If so, such an attitude would certainly be incompatible with a real concern for overall political development.

There were ways, however, in which academic research was to be injected into the aid program during this period of the Agency's response. One of these was by the use of consultants "placed on the Agency's rolls" to work with the Intra-Agency Committee. During the summer of 1967, five political scientists with expertize in the field of political development were contacted by the Agency in connection with Title IX.[60] If given assignments, they certainly would have used academic findings in their areas. However, being "on the rolls" and being actively utilized

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[58] This attitude can be seen in a comment by Mr. Csanad Toth. "The MIT Conference will be crucial. It will represent the best of American academic thinking. Now the Title IX Division is so bogged down; it is just holding the line, not moving forward." Dr. Csanad Toth, private interview, New State Department Bldg., Washington, D.C. April 2, 1968.

[59] U.S., Agency for International Development, "Report to Congress on the Implementation of Title IX," p. 2.

[60] Those contacted were: Samuel P. Huntington (Harvard), W. Howard Wriggins (Columbia), Robert B. Stevens (Yale), Aristide Zolberg (Chicago), and Fred R. von der Mehden (Wisconsin).

by the Agency are two different things. During the period under study, none of these academicians performed any significant work for the Agency with regard to Title IX.

There is another possible way in which academic findings could have been introduced into the aid program during this period. In projected seminars and study courses, aid practitioners would be exposed to the academic literature on political development. But this exposure would consist mostly of general, introductory material designed to stimulate thinking, and would not, consequently, contribute to policy formation. This approach will be discussed in greater detail in the "Training" section which follows.

Along with the proposed M.I.T. Conference, the other major contact with the academic community made during this period was with the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. In the same year that Title IX was passed, the Fletcher School created a new program of International Development Studies, "with objectives congruent with those of Title IX."[61] The Director of this program, Dr. Robert L. West, submitted a request to the Agency for supporting funds under Section 211D of the Foreign Assistance Act. A grant was made and "a long-term relationship" was established between the Agency and the School. One aspect of this relationship concerned "Research on Title IX Issues and Problems."[62] In the sense that on-going research would be related to

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[61] Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, "Request for Grant Support under Section 211D of the Foreign Assistance Act" (Medford, Massachusetts, 1967) p. 1.

[62] Ibid., p. 7.

the aid program, some of Fletcher's contribution would fall into this category. However, there is a very thin line between relating already completed findings and organizing new research with hoped-for policy implications. Most of Fletcher's contribution falls into the latter category and will be discussed below.

3) Sponsored research with policy implications: There were two Agency research contracts made during the period under study which fall into this category. One, as mentioned before, was with the Fletcher School. In its overall design, the Fletcher School research was intended " to examine political and social obstacles to development, evaluate past and current development assistance programs . . . and to test criteria for appraising results . . ."[63]

The studies already undertaken or "immediately prospective" were divided into the four "political development categories" delineated first in the 1063 airgram and then mentioned in the "Report to Congress". (i.e. strengthening national integration, development of democratic institutions, strengthening administrative competence, and development of modern legal institutions.)[64]

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[63] Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, "Request for Grant Support under Section 211 D of the Foreign Assistance Act", p. 8.

[64] This research is discussed on pages 7-19 in the Fletcher School's "Request for Funds".

This first research contract obviously ranged widely over the spectrum of political development problems. The second contract, however, was much narrower and, very significantly, had a much more limited conception of Title IX. This is the grant made to the Stanford Research Institute to do "three in-depth country studies". Briefly, the research was to accomplish the following two goals:

1) Contribute to the development of concepts, methods, data classification and evaluative criteria which could help establish programming guidelines to achieve more broadly-based and effective participation by the peoples of the developing countries in economic and social development.

2) Identify the most effective assistance instruments to increase participation in development.

In order to do this, the Institute proposed to a) identify cases in the aid program in which increased popular participation has occurred. b) Explain the factors (host government and AID) which allowed participation to increase, and c) give suggestions as to how AID can program to achieve this goal.

It will be noted immediately that the Stanford research project focussed on the "popular participation" interpretation of Title IX, whereas the Fletcher School proposal was much more comprehensive. It is, perhaps, equally significant that the Fletcher grant was made earlier than the Stanford grant. This fact gives an indication that the popular participation definition was increasing in importance, while the more

comprehensive definition decreasing. In addition to these two research contracts, other on-going Agency contracts were "revised" to better address Title IX problems. No information, however, is available on these.

4) "In-House" Research: The fourth category of research concerns work conducted within the Agency by Agency officials. The first significant research probe of this type consisted of the 1063 airgram, described in the previous section. This airgram, which discussed Title IX in its broadest sense, was circulated to all the Missions. Twnety-three of them were asked to analyze their country programs in terms of the legislation. In this regard, three questions were asked of the Missions: (1) Are there major weaknesses of governmental or political organization, processes and attitudes which interfere seriously with economic and social progress? (2) What measures might address these problems? (3) Can we encourage or support such measures as part of the economic assistance program?[65]

The replies which came in served two purposes. The first was to inform those responsible for Title IX as to what the Agency was already "doing" in the political development field. In this connection, an inventory was made by the regional bureaus and the Office of Program and Policy Coordination which described all on-going AID activities with a "Title IX Dimension". The result was a 12-page summary of activities listed by

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[65] U.S., Agency for International Development, Circular Airgram 1063, "Promotion and Utilization of Democratic Institutions for Development," pp. 3-4.

the recipient country under the following seven categories: Administrative competence, national integration, legal institutions, labor union development, agricultural cooperatives and rural development, development of local governments, and cooperatives and credit unions. There was no analysis of any of these activities[66]. Indeed, it appears that this initial "inventory" was not designed to lead into more substantive research. It was drawn up in response to a request from F. Bradford Morse and was evidently designed to please him rather than to inform responsible officials as to what was actually occurring in the Agency.

The second purpose of the 1063 responses was more significant. The replies gave strong indication to the Title IX Division as to which missions were knowledgeable about and receptive to the idea of political development. According to Dr. Schott, acting chief of the Division, the majority of 1063 replies were disappointing in this regard.[67] Some showed no interest in Title IX and were content with just a routine listing of activities. Others missed the point of Title IX completely and answered in terms of short-term political goals. But some few appeared to be very interested in the challenge posed by the legislation.[68]

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[66]For instance, under the heading "Administrative Competence", the following was listed for Peru - "The Agency is supporting the nationwide program of the Cooperation Popular, the Government's community development agency which has, in one year, established 48 field centers, completed 2,000 projects, and currently has 4,000 additional self-help activities under way.

[67]He mentioned this several times to me during the summer of 1967 while I was employed in the Division.

[68]Later, at least one mission was disappointed because money was not forthcoming for "Title IX work", after they had been chosen as "country for special emphasis".

This fact allowed the Division to focus particularly on those interested missions as it moved into the second stage of its internal research on Title IX. This stage can be described as the "Title IX country emphasis" stage. At the meeting of the Administrators Council on Economic Development (referred to in the previous section) one of the issues discussed concerned the following question:

> How do we best inaugurate an action program under Title IX? If we are not simply to intensity and multiply certain traditional activities, should we narrow our focus of attention to four or five selected countries where a systematic redefinition of key country objectives and a redesigning of relevant parts of country programs would be feasible? Or should we try to react to as many opportunities as financially possible in as many different countries as possible?[69]

The issue was decided in favor of the "concentration" approach. It was felt that the intensive program review and supplemental research activities required by Title IX could not be done on a large scale throughout the Agency. The decision was made to concentrate on four or five countries. The factors which were considered in making this choice were described in the "Report to Congress on Title IX". They were: "Likely host government receptivity to such activities, the existence of program opportunities relating to important development problems specifically falling within the Title IX mandate, the existence of on-going programs

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[69] U.S., Agency for International Development, Advisory Committee on Economic Development, Issues Paper, p. 3.

which can be in part restructured so as to make a substantial contribution to the objectives of Title IX; and the presence of AID officials in the Mission with the experience and analytical capacity to cope with these relatively new problem areas."[70]

The plan was to study the ongoing Agency programs in these countries and then suggest program changes which would enhance their political development effects. The "country emphasis approach", as understood in discussions in the Intra-Agency Committee and in the Title IX Division, embodied the overall political analysis viewpoint. The selected programs were to be examined for their total political effect and changes were to be suggested on that basis. Five countries were actually selected, but the Division ran into unexpected problems in getting all the necessary approval from Mission Directors and State Department officials.

Contacts were made and some field trips taken in connection with the proposed research. Moreover the "country emphasis" plan was referred to in the May "Report to Congress" and on all summary listings of activities undertaken or proposed by the Agency in connection with Title IX.[71]

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[70] U.S., Agency for International Development, "Report to Congress on the Implementation of Title IX'. p. 5.

[71] Ibid., pp. 4-5.

However, the Title IX Division changed hands during the Spring of 1968. All the Title IX officers, who had served during the two year period under study, left the Agency.[72] The new chief of the Division, Mr. Princeton Lyman, in an interview held on September 25, 1968, stated that the country emphasis approach had been abandoned . He did not specify the reason why or what had taken its place.

The country emphasis studies, although not carried to completion, were to be the major internal research effort of the Agency on Title IX. There were some other attempts by the Title IX Division, however, to study certain on-going Agency programs which had developed a reputation for having a "political development impact". These included such activities as the Rural Works Program in East Pakistan and the revolving municipal water loan fund in Brazil.[73]

In addition, Dr. Richard L. Hough was assigned the responsibility of writing an in-depth study on the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction in Taiwan.[74] It was concerned with both the political relevance and the transferability of a past Agency program, and thus related to Title IX. It should be noted, however, that the study was not written in direct response to Title IX, but rather in response to

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[72]One officer did not actually leave the employment of the Agency but was not an active formulator of Title IX after this time. He was assigned to the Fletcher School to do liaison work for the Agency.

[73]Mr. Harold Payson and I were assigned the study of these programs when we were employed by the Agency as "student aides."

[74]Dr. Richard Lee Hough, "AID Administration to the Rural Sector: The JCRR Experience in Taiwan and its Application in Other Countries," (AID Discussion Paper, No. 17, April 1968).

Chapter 7, Section 471 of the 1967 Foreign Assistance Act which specifically highlighted the Joint Commission for further Agency study.

b) The "Training" Response

Along with research, the second important component of the "political analysis" approach was the education and training of AID officials. This was stated explicitly in the "Report to Congress":

> The quality of personnel required to be effective in addressing the problems to which Title IX directs our attention is unusually high. AID's past emphases have led to heavy reliance upon personnel with experience and expertize in the economic, technical and quantitative aspects and measures of development and modernization. The need to focus on popular participation, democratic institution-building and social modernization, which only partially overlap with the more traditional approaches to development, calls for a widening of AID's existing analytical and technical capabilities. New problems, new directions require new and higher skills.[75]

Many of the actions undertaken in the Agency with regard to Title IX had an "educational" dimension. In a sense, the creation of an Intra-Agency Committee was an attempt to acquaint more people with the new legislation. The 1063 airgram also served this purpose. The lines dividing research, training and action tend to blur on close analysis. The first two are necessary components of the last.

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[75] U.S., Agency for International Development, "Report to Congress on the Implementation of Title IX", p. 5.

In the area of training, however, a distinction can be made between Agency attempts to "inform" and Agency attempts to "educate". In the former category are such Agency initiatives as the inclusion of a "Title IX presentation" in the orientation program for new officials. Dr. Csanad Toth, the Title IX officer who handled this responsibility, stated that he talked for approximately one hour on Title IX in the course of three or four days of orientation.[76] The result of such a short exposure was certainly not real "education" in the sense of changed attitudes and methods. Rather the new officers were "informed" that a Title IX was "on the books" and they had some responsibility for implementing it. There was also a book drawn up by the Training Office in AID which was designed to serve as a "primer" on Title IX.[77]

In addition, a "briefing book" was assembled on Title IX, which included much of the relevant material on the legislation from Congressional, academic, and Agency sources. It was distributed widely in the Agency with the apparent purpose of informing as many people as possible about Title IX.[78] Also in the "informative" category were a series of

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[76] Mr. Csanad Toth, private interview, April 2, 1968.

[77] Dr. Princeton Lyman, Chief, Title IX Division, Agency for International Development, private interview, New State Department Bldg., Washington, D.C., September 25, 1968. [Dr. Lyman replaced Dr. Schott as Chief of the Title IX Division during the summer of 1968]

[78] Whether it served this purpose or not is debatable. One officer I interviewed pointed to the large book on his desk and said, "How can they ever expect anyone to read such a thing?" It was perhaps too comprehensive to be truly informative.

airgrams drawn up by the Title IX Division and sent to the field missions.[79]

In an intermediate category, between the poles of information and education, were a series of seminars on Title IX designed to provide an intensive, but brief exposure to the "Title IX idea". In this connection, an "Executive Seminar on Political and Economic Development was held for senior AID officials in the Latin American Region. This seminar, which met in June, 1967 in Guernevaca, Mexico, included some of the leading academic authorities on political development.[80] It was conducted by the Brookings Institution and from reports of those present, it resulted in some valuable discussion and debate.[81]

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1. AIDTO Circular LA51, October 4, 1966
   Subject: "Title IX-Utilization of Democratic Institutions in Development."
2. AIDTO Circular 1063, November 8, 1966
   Subject: "Promotion and Utilization of Democratic Institutions for Development"
3. AIDTO Circular XA2015, February 24, 1967
   Subject: Promotion of Youth Corps for Development"
4. AIDTO Circular LA150, March 24, 1967
   Subject: Title IX
5. AIDTO Circular 161, April 14, 1967
   Subject: "Promotion and Utilization of Democratic Institutions for Development" - Title IX
6. AIDTO Circular A-220, May 24, 1967
   Subject: "Promotion of Democratic Institutions for Development"

[80] Among these authorities were Dr. H. Field Haviland, Jr. and Dr. Robert A. Packenham.

[81] This seminar was discussed with enthusiasm at one of the Intra-Agency Committee meetings I attended during the summer, 1967.

Partially because of the success of this conference, others were projected for the future. A major drive under the heading of "Title IX Regional Seminar Series" was designed to provide more intensive training in political development. Two seminars were to be held in the Latin American Region and at least one in each of the other regions. These seminars had difficulty being held because of "budgetary reasons", but, according to Princeton Lyman, current chief of the Title IX Division, they were finally scheduled for winter, 1968-1969.

In addition to the airgrams, briefing books and seminars, the enactment of Title IX placed the spotlight on two on-going Agency training programs: The Asia Training Center in Hawaii and the Leadership Training Course sponsored by Loyola University.[82] These programs stressed the importance of attitudinal change for development and thus embodied the "multi-faceted" approach associated with Title IX. The enactment of the legislation undoubtedly gave new support to their activities.

The most comprehensive training program connected with Title IX, and definitely in the category of "education", was the Fletcher School program. In the words of the Fletcher "Request for Funds", one of the goals for this program would be to improve "the quality of personnel available to AID, particularly by developing the professional skills re-

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[82] The latter was the study of the study by Dr. Toth referred to previously, "Evaluation of the Leadership Training Course for the Youth of Central America, Panama, and the Dominican Republic," April, 1967. Agency for International Development, mimeo.

quired to deal with the Agency's new Title IX responsibilities."[83] In order to accomplish this goal, "new subjects, new teaching materials, and new techniques of instruction" would have to be developed. "A marriage of academic disciplines and contemporary operational experience is called for . . . . The analysis . . . requires methods distilled from the research and teaching frontiers of several social sciences."[84]

It can be seen from the above quotations that the Fletcher Program was to be comprehensive, more so than any other training initiative. Several mid-career AID officers are now enrolled in this program. In summary, the training initiative connected with Title IX ran the gamut from an hour's discussion in AID's orientation program to several years of academic work.

:) Attempts at Direct Policy Influence

Each of the other initiatives, research, training, etc., constitute an "indirect" approach to Title IX. Research, for instance, was a necessary preliminary step to any implementation of the legislation, but there was no guarantee that changes indicated by the research would actually be incorporated into ongoing Agency programs. Similarly,

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[83] Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, "Request for Funds" under Section 211d of the Foreign Assistance Act, p. 20.

[84] Ibid., pp. 20-21.

the concept behind the "training" initiatives was that as AID officials became more aware of the political development dimension, they would incorporate it more fully into their policy decisions. In both cases, there was no guarantee that Title IX would have any significant effect on policies, and certainly there would be no immediate changes. Yet, the concept held jointly by the Title IX Division definitely indicated the "indirect" route to implementation, i.e. emphasis on research and training.

The Title IX Division, however, was not content to spend its limited resources and energies on the "indirect" route. Perhaps because of Congressional pressure, perhaps because of the need to show " something accomplished" on Title IX, the implementors, while pushing research and training, also tried to inject Title IX into the mainstream of Agency policy formation. This was done in several ways.

First were the more or less ad hoc attempts at direct policy influence. These were of several types. First was the "informal contact" approach. A member of the Title IX Division might hear about a possible "Title IX opportunity" in one of the country programs. He then would read available Agency material on that particular country, and inform himself as to who might be a "responsive" contact in the regional bureau involved. Then he would try to talk the individual(s) into doing "something concrete" about Title IX.

The second was the "issues paper" approach. When country programs came up for their annual review, the Office of Program and

Policy Coordination was required to prepare an "issues paper" for the Administrator, highlighting problems and suggesting possible alternatives for country programmers. The Title IX Division, on several occasions, tried to inject political development "issues" into these papers, hoping to have some direct policy influence.[85]

In addition to the "informal contact" and "issues paper" approaches, certain aid instruments came to the attention of the Title IX Division and were highlighted for their possible contribution to political development. For instance, the "specific project authority" was studied as a "low cost and low risk experimental source" of funds. Used at the discretion of the Mission Director without the need for approval from Washington, it was a natural "Title IX instrument". There was some attempt to rewrite the Manual Order on this "special project authority" to recommend its use in the political development area.

The two most important attempts at direct policy influence, however, were more comprehensive and more carefully planned than the ad hoc approaches described above. It is significant that one of these embodied the "political analysis" approach while the other stressed the "popular participation" approach.

The most logical, the most carefully planned attempt at direct policy influence, was the "country emphasis" program, described under the section entitled, "In-House Research". This was research, true,

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[85] This fund, amounting to about $25,000 was rarely used in actual practice.

but research with direct and significant policy implications. Because the Mission Directors and personnel would have an important role in deciding the research to be done, they would be able to focus it in areas of most importance to themselves, and hence most likely to result in policy changes. The end result projected with regard to the "country emphasis" program was no less than a "revamped" country program with political development being an explicit and important objective. As was pointed out, the country emphasis approach embodied the "political analysis" conception of Title IX. It was concerned with the entire country program and with a broad conception of political development.

The second planned attempt at direct policy influence was through the channel of the Program, Planning, Budgetary System (PPBS). As shown earlier, this channel was not used voluntarily by the Title IX Division, but rather was pressed upon them by their economist supervisors in PPC. In the words of one Agency memo on this subject:

> The integration of Title IX components into all stages of the planning-programming-budgetary system is one of our immediate tasks. Although several mission program submissions for FY 68 had already reflected Title IX objectives and criteria as a result of our initial country surveys and policy messages, world-wide guidelines in effect for the coming fiscal years incorporate Title IX. They require the Missions to present a broadened view of development objectives in light of Title IX and to produce a clear statement of how particular activities contribute to social, political, as well as economic objectives.[86]

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[86] U.S., Agency for International Development, "Memo on the Progress of Title IX in the Agency" drafted by Csanad Toth, January 29, 1968, (typewritten) p. 7.

In the majority of these direct attempts at policy influence, with the important exception of the "country emphasis" program, the "popular participation" definition of political development dominated. Without the preliminary steps of research and training, this definition was really the only one amenable to immediate application. In the "PPBS system" approach, for instance, the popular participation conception is very explicit:

> Three considerations are paramount for the incorporation of popular participation into the FY program strategy:
>
> a) The manner in which AID activities are eliciting an equitable distribution of the benefits of development-in terms of goods, services and opportunities . . .
>
> b) The extent to which AID activities are causing the active participation of large numbers of individuals and groups in efforts contributing to overall development ; and
>
> c) The degree of involvement of the host country population in determining developmental priorities at all levels of the society.[87]

It was shown earlier that the economists in PPC advocated a program approach to Title IX, but only with regard to the limited definition of "popular participation". It follows logically that the

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[87] U.S., Agency for International Development, "Memo on the Progress of Title IX in the Agency", p. 7.

instrument they would choose for the implementation of Title IX would be (a) the Manual Order; and (b) the statements of general policy in PPBS approach.

It is difficult to know how much, if any, influence was had by these activities on actual country programs. All relevant documents are classified. But the comments of Agency officials interviewed in the next two sections, indicate that the direct approach was not an extremely productive means of implementing Title IX.

CHAPTER SIX

Sampling of Opinions in the Intra-Agency Committee on Title IX

From January, 1968 through March, 1968, a series of interviews were conducted with thirty officials in the Agency for International Development. There were two purposes for this exercise. The first purpose was to examine the attitudes and actions of those individuals in the Agency most responsible for the implementation of Title IX. The second purpose was to determine how typical these attitudes were of the Agency in general and how far the penetration of Title IX had gone beyond the immediate hard core group of those responsible for its implementation. It should be possible, as a result of the interviews, to construct a picture of Agency reaction principally in Washington, to the Congressional directive of Title IX.

I. Methodology

A. Structure of the Sample

The interview sample consists of three separate groupings. First, there are those individuals who were given specific responsibility for Title IX. These include the Assistant Administrator for Program and Policy Coordination, who is in charge of the staff planning unit in the Agency, and individuals under him who were at various times and

in various ways responsible for Title IX.[1] This group also includes one full-time consultant to the Agency in the Latin American region who was hired particularly to work on Title IX. Altogether there are eight individuals who fall into this group. An analysis of the responses of this group are included in the previous section entitled "The Implementation of Title IX in the Agency".

The second and third groups are the major concern of these two concluding chapters. The second group consists of members of the Intra-Agency Committee on Title IX. The history of and the rationale for the establishment of this Committee are discussed in Chapter IV. Nine members of the Committee were interviewed constituting approximately three-fourths of the members of the Committee. As explained previously the membership of the committee was somewhat fluid, as people dropped out and substitutes were sent to take their place. The variations in the Committee itself, (such as the erosion of line people, and the addition of staff; the increase in lower-level as opposed to higher-level officials) indicate some interesting conclusions about the Committee and were discussed in Chapter IV.

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[1]Included in this group are the Associate Assistant Administrator for Program Policy, the Associate Assistant Administrator for Programming and Resource Budgeting (both at various times chairmen of the Intra-Agency Committee), acting chief of the Title IX Division, two staff members of the Title IX Division , and one official on detail to the Fletcher School who was associated with Title IX in its early stages.

It was felt, in choosing the members of the Intra-Agency Committee to be interviewed, that as many different viewpoints as possible should be represented. Consultation with members of the staff of the Title IX Division was obtained before choosing those to be interviewed, in order to insure that every shade of opinion in the Committee would be represented. It should be noted that the Committee had been meeting for approximately one year before the interviews were conducted, and hence, by process of elimination, those still active in the work of the Committee were probably more favorable toward Title IX than those who had dropped out.[2]

Of the nine included in the Intra-Agency group, six were from staff offices representing the following;

1. Training Division, Office of Personnel Administration (trains AID officials)

2. Voluntary Foreign Aid Service (provides liaison with private groups in the Foreign Aid Field, i.e. C.A.R.E., Catholic Relief Service, Church World Service, etc.)

3. The Office of International Training (provides for the training of foreign nationals in the United States or in third countries)

4. Office of Public Safety (staff office concerned with police forces in the less developed countries)

[2]This is substantiated by one interview which was included in the Control group. It was discovered that this man had been an original member of the Intra-Agency Committee, but had only attended one or two meetings. His attitude on Title IX was one of the most negative in the entire interview sample.

5. Office of Private Resources (new office with dual function (a) provides incentives for American business to invest abroad, (b) is concerned about private sector development in the less developed countries.)

6. Office of Labor Affairs (staff office concerned with labor organizations in recipient countries)

The remaining three members interviewed in the Intra-Agency Committee were associated with the "regions", the line organizations of the Agency.[3] But even these were not in the line operations themselves, but were in the planning offices in each region. The offices represented were as follows:

1. Office of Development Planning, Bureau for Africa
2. Office of Development Planning, Bureau for Latin America
3. Office of Development Planning, Bureau for East Asia

It is important to realize that the Intra-Agency Committee consisted almost entirely of staff personnel. Even the representatives of the "regional bureaus", the line organizations in the Agency, were performing staff functions within their bureaus. The reason seems to be that staff offices typically play a major role in new policy initiatives within AID. All the members had political science backgrounds, and, as one respondent explained it, were the "academic types in the Agency."

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[3]In the Agency for International Development at the present time there are five regional bureaus, one for Latin America, merged with the State Departments Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, one for Africa, East Asia, Near East and South Asia, and Vietnam.

It might be asked then, why the members of the Intra-Agency Committee were interviewed at all if it could readily be seen that they would be untypical of the Agency as a whole. Two considerations played a role in this decision. First, it was felt that these individuals had had more exposure to Title IX, more time to think and reflect about it, and consequently might be more valuable respondents than a random sample in the Agency, which might not have heard of Title IX at all. Secondly, it was felt that this group was important to the implementation of Title IX in that they provided the major feedback to the Title IX Division with regard to its strategy for implementation. Because the Committee was untypical of the Agency as a whole, it could be said that the feedback they provided gave a distorted picture, but, nevertheless, this was how the Committee was constituted, and their attitudes consequently were considered important.

B. Content of the Interviews

The interviews lasted from forty-five minutes to two hours, with the medium being one hour in length. The respondents had been contacted by phone by a staff member of the Title IX Division to ask if an interview could be arranged.[4] With one or two exceptions, all those contacted

[4] It might be surmised that having the initial contact made by a person from the Title IX Division might tend to associate me with that Division in the minds of the respondents. It is difficult to know whether this is true, but I felt generally that the respondents were frank with me in their criticisms of the work of the Agency. Initially it was felt important to have some official backing for the interview, but as the work progressed, I made more and more of my own contacts with little difficulty.

agreed to the interview. They knew beforehand that I was interested in Title IX, and a few in the Control group admitted that they had looked up the legislation before I came "to refresh their minds" about Title IX. Several in the Intra-Agency group had collected some material produced either by themselves or their offices on Title IX to give to me.

The interview questions were decided upon after a) consultation with staff members of the Title IX Division and b) after two or three trial interviews had indicated which questions were too broad or too narrow to be useful. Three basic areas were covered in one form or another in each of the interviews: a) the respondent's definition of Title IX, b) his suggestions for implementing Title IX, c) actual concrete activities being undertaken in his office to implement Title IX.

Sample questions covering those areas are as follows:

1. Everyone seems to have their own definition of Title IX. What do you think it means? What is the Agency's official position on it? What do most of the people in the Agency think it means? What did Congress mean by it?

2. What, in your opinion, does "implementing Title IX mean? When will it be implemented? What is the function of the Intra-Agency Committee? of the Title IX Division? What is the Agency's strategy in implementing it? Do you agree with it? Is it working out all right? Do you think this is what Congress expected in the way of implementation? What support does Title IX have on the Hill?

3. What is your office doing to implement Title IX? What do you expect to do in the future? What do you predict the long range effect of Title IX will be?

Other areas of interest which were touched on in most of the interviews concerned: a) relations with Congress ("How much support does Title IX have in Congress? Can it serve some useful purpose in promoting the Agency's popularity on the "Hill" ?), b) why was AID

chosen "to do" Title IX rather than another government Agency?, c) what are the sources of Title IX? New academic field of political development, ethnocentric Americanism? d) what other activities are going on in the Agency which relate to Title IX?

II. Interview Analysis

This section will discuss the first two of the three areas covered by the interviews. The question as to actual, concrete activities taken as a result of Title IX has been discussed in Chapter 5. This section, then, deals with the definitions of Title IX and suggestions for its implementation offered in the Intra-Agency Committee for Title IX and in the Control group.

Although the question was never explicitly asked, it was fairly easy to determine those who basically approved of the "thrust" of Title IX and those who did not. It was discovered that there was an intimate relationship between the definition the respondent gave and his attitude toward the legislation.

The Intra-Agency Committee on Title IX had, as a group, a favorable attitude toward Title IX. This, in itself, is not too revealing, as the members were chosen with the evident idea that they were the people in the Agency with the most expertise and interest in the political side of development. As one respondent explained, "the Intra-Agency Committee insulated Title IX from the harsh winds blowing in the Agency." Those who could be expected to be most negative, the professional

economists and representatives of the line organizations, were sparsely represented on the Committee. Twelve members of the Committee were interviewed; however, three of these had direct action responsibility for Title IX and so their replies are included in the previous section. The nine remaining all expressed a favorable attitude toward Title IX. However, their reasons for support, as perceived in the interview, varied widely. While it is true that each had several reasons for feeling favorable toward Title IX, in most cases one stands out and allows for a typology to be constructed. There are three types of definitions offered in the Intra-Agency Committee: A. "Title IX Points to the Importance of People in the Development Process"; B. "Title IX Points to a New Analysis in Agency Programming"; C. "Title IX Points to a Revolutionary Foreign Policy Goal."

Under each category, the composition of the group will be described and its collective definition of Title IX delineated. Then the question will be asked: What is the relationship between the definition offered of Title IX and suggestions for its implementation? This large question can be broken down into a series of smaller questions: a) what specific suggestions did the individual make for the implementation of Title IX?; b) what are the problems each group foresees in its implementation?; c) what future does each see in Title IX? ; d) how does he feel it is being "handled" by those responsible for it in the Agency?

A. "Title IX Points to the Importance of People in the Development Process"

1. Composition of the Group

Three out of the nine in the Intra-Agency Committee sample fall into this group. They were all members of staff organizations, one was Director of his staff, and the other two were Deputy Directors. The staffs represented were the Office of Labor Affairs, Voluntary Foreign Aid Service, and the Office of International Training. The amount of time employed in the Agency did not seem to be a significant factor. However, all of these men had been in their respective fields for twenty years or more, even though time in the Agency ranged from 2 to 16 years. They also were older men, all in their fifties, with much practical experience in their fields of work.

2. Definition Ascribed to Title IX

The members of the Intra-Agency Committee in this group felt that Title IX pointed to the importance of "people" in the development process, that it showed an awareness of the "grassroots" nature of development. They each felt that the development of human resources were more important than capital assistance. Consequently, they felt that Title IX strengthened the technical assistance work of the Agency against the economists and their "macro-economic" plans. One respondent stated specifically that Title IX was a direct descendent of the Community Development program in the Agency, and made him think back ten years or more to his experience in the field.

There was some understanding on the part of two of this group that Title IX involved a new type of analysis, but this was secondary in their minds to the "grassroots" facet of Title IX. One, however, was very hostile to the idea of a new analysis, and felt that the Title IX Division had taken too "intellectual" an approach to Title IX. He seemed to see Title IX in terms of a U.S. advisor in a foreign country using emotional appeal and his own "vibrant" personality to get people in the village mobilized for development work. He stated that this is what Title IX is all about - "Getting people to work together". He felt that this was the Congressional intent of Title IX and seemed to be mystified by the interpretation given by the "youngsters" in the Title IX Division. He intimated that his experience in the field might be a threat to them. At any rate, he said, that communication between his office and their office was very poor.

This group either did not mention the need for research done by outside consultants or were adamantly against it. As one man said, "We have the expertise we need here in the Agency. We don't need a bunch of experts to tell us what to do." They all felt that Title IX could provide a platform for their own ongoing programs, but were skeptical as to the amount of change which would occur as a result of the amendment. As one man said, "We want to get as much mileage as possible out of Title IX. That is its importance to us."

In summary, the men who took this position on Title IX were older men, who had reached responsible positions in their respective offices, although they were not a real part of the decision-making group

in the Agency. The main reason for their support of Title IX appears to be their realization that it could provide a platform for their own ongoing programs. There was little feeling that a new analysis was demanded or that research and outside consultants were important. Finally, there was the dominant belief that nothing would or should change in the Agency as a result of Title IX, except that perhaps more activities would be initiated in their specific areas.

3. Specific Suggestions for Implementation of Title IX

As noted above, this group identified Title IX with technical assistance and human resource development. This identification shows up in their suggestions as to how to implement Title IX. As one respondent said, "Technical assistance is very important in Title IX. Community development and trade union development are good examples of Title IX work." Another one felt that his main objective was to see technical assistance regain "its rightful place in the sun." Perhaps Title IX might lead in that direction.

Logically following from this association of Title IX with technical assistance, comes a whole host of specific suggestions. Title IX meant that more people should be sent abroad. One man mentioned that the recent cuts in the numbers of AID officials stationed in the less developed world would hamper the implementation of Title IX. Title IX was something to be done by U.S. officials abroad. Another man, agreeing with the importance of the U.S. official, talked about the sensitivity needed by the foreign advisor in a less developed country,

about personality factors, etc. He stated that Title IX was essentially a question of the attitude of U.S. people abroad, and not of programming changes. He talked about putting the Mission Directors through a sensitivity training program. He mentioned, as an example of "doing Title IX before it was named as such" a Mission Director in Latin America who, in his words, "walked and talked with the people."

This stress on more sensitive and better administered technical assistance was combined with emphasis on the need for more money for specific projects. One respondent felt that the only way to get anything accomplished with Title IX was to "add more money to the Mission Directors' budget to spend on Title IX type of activities." This, he felt, was more important than holding seminars or doing research on Title IX.

As seems typical with staff in the Agency, each of these individuals felt that their work held a special key to Title IX. The representative from the Voluntary Foreign Aid Service stated that it was really the voluntary agencies who were the embodiment of Title IX in the United States. He stated that they were the "spontaneous growth of organizations to help people in need." It was also these agencies, he felt, who were penetrating to the grassroots level in the less developed countries, through their charitable work and thus could play an important role in implementing Title IX.

The representative from the Office of International Training felt that his office had a solution to Title IX. He felt that the foreign nationals who had gone through AID's training programs, the so-called "returned participants" could be the nucleus for Title IX activity in tl

recipient country. "These people return to their country, move up in decision-making and have much more influence beyond their particular speciality. We should do a follow up study on these participants. They provide a nucleus for democratic participation."

This group, then, has in common, a belief that Title IX means specific projects, which, in turn, entails more money. Title IX is something which U.S. officials do abroad, and they must show interest in the people to do it. Each member of this group had "helpful" suggestions from his own office as to how it could be done.

4. "Problems in Implementing Title IX"

What did this group see as the most important problems in implementing Title IX? Tying in very closely with the picture of Title IX as specific projects, this group felt that the lack of funds and the recent cuts in AID's budget would hamper the implementation of Title IX. They also felt that higher-level officials in AID did not have much commitment to Title IX. They mentioned the economic orientation of the Agency as a hindrance to Title IX. One man thought that the Office of Program and Policy Coordination, the staff planning office, was dominated by economists and was not giving needed support to Title IX work.

There was also the feeling that Title IX would be interpreted too broadly. One man mentioned the "Mason Committee" (the Administrator's Advisory Committee on Economic Development), a group of academicians consulting with the Agency. "These professors talked about Title IX as being involved in political structures, parties, etc. They talked about

toppling governments, etc. I think this is the wrong approach to Title IX. Since then, I think the Agency has modified its position. It has leaned toward popular participation as the goal of Title IX rather than revolution." In conclusion, this group sees democratic evolution as a primary aspect of Title IX, but this will come through the traditional activities of AID , more of them and better administered to be sure, but nevertheless the same. Title IX does not require new analysis or a new goal for the Agency.

5. Criticism of the Agency's Implementation of Title IX

Two of this group were reasonably satisfied with the progress being made on Title IX. Their statements indicate this: "The Title IX Division is doing what it can." "This is the milling around stage on Title IX. People are groping for a handle to the legislation. This is to be expected." It is significant that these two showed some comprehension of the Title IX Division's work and its interpretation of the legislation.

The third member of this group was quite critical of the Title IX Division's work. He resented the fact that the Division had tried to make Title IX into something new. "Title IX has been implemented for a long time. What we are talking about is the total image of the United States in the world." He thought there was "too much thinking and not enough action" going on in the Agency. "We can't just read and write papers about Title IX." He suggested a type of action research, in which "the Agency would try something and then keep tabs on it."

Finally, he criticized the way the Intra-Agency Committee had operated. "Democracy should begin at home," he stated. "The Title IX Division has not succeeded in listening to other people and in getting people involved."

6. The Future of Title IX in the Agency

There are three strains of thought as to the future of Title IX which can be separated and analyzed. On one hand Title IX, in this group, is identified with some widely recognized and obviously valuable aid procedures, such as increased sensitivity of the foreign advisor, the importance of "reaching the people" in the recipient country, the validity of using democratic procedures, etc. In this sense, the future of Title IX is somewhat "inevitable", as the aid program progressively learns from its experiences. As one man said, "I don't know whether Title IX has a future, but I know democracy has one, whether with Title IX or not."

On the other hand, Title IX is also thought of by this group as requiring the specific allocation of funds for certain categories of projects. In this respect, the future of Title IX is not bright, they think. Comments such as "This is a lean, hard year for the Agency," "I don't think Title IX will bring in more money", etc. abound in this group's discussion. The third strain of thought concerns the reorganization of the Agency. There is a dominant feeling in this group that the only way something will be done with Title IX is if AID is revamped. "Nothing will be done on Title IX unless there is a restructuring of AID.

Then technical assistance will be given a higher percentage of funds. Then Title IX might have new programs." And in another respondent's words, "AID, as now constituted, won't do anything with Title IX. We are a series of miscellaneous activities, with no central purpose. Title IX, not by itself, but as a set of policies, would mean, if fully implemented, the restructuring of AID. I would support this. Human resources development is more important than economic development."

This group, then, has a somewhat ambiguous attitude on the future of Title IX. As it has grown from past experiences of the aid program, it is almost inevitable. "If you talk about something long enough, and it makes sense, then something will happen to it." But as it pertains to specific programs, AID will have to be restructured to implement it.

B. Title IX Points to a New Analysis in Agency Programming

1. Composition of the Group

The composition of this group is interesting. There are two representatives from staff offices, Office of Public Safety and Office of Private Resources, and two representatives from the regional bureaus, East Asia and Africa. Three out of the four in this group had been exposed to multi-disciplinary studies, at such schools as JohnsHopkins and Harvard. One was leaving the Agency to become a professor of political science. Their academic interest in political science and related fields seemed to be the factor which led them to a

favorable opinion of the analysis they felt was demanded by Title IX. One held the rank of Associate Assistant Administrator in his staff office, the other three were middle level officers, not centrally involved in Agency policy-making. The time spent in the Agency ranged from 5 to 14 years, and all were in their thirties or forties.

2. Definition Ascribed to Title IX

This group had a favorable reaction to Title IX primarily because they felt that it injected political analysis into AID's programming process. They were not as concerned with the "grassroots" dimension of Title IX dwelt upon by the first group, nor did they feel Title IX proposed a new goal for the Agency's work as did the third group. They joined, however, with the first group in their attack on the economists and the "macro-economic" orientation in the Agency, but for a different reason. The first group opposed the "economists" because they felt that human resource development and technical assistance (their areas of speciality) were more important for the development process than capital expenditures. In a sense, they harked back to the Agency's past, represented by the Point 4 program. The second group saw Title IX as pointing, not backward, but forward to something new, something which the Agency had not had before, i.e., longer range and more systematic political analysis. This can be seen most clearly by comparing the attitude of the two groups on Community Development. For the first group, Title IX was a "direct descendant" of the Community Development program, whereas one respondent in this second

group saw a danger in Title IX and a problem in its implementation, its association with the "defunct Community Development program". There was more of a feeling in this second group that Title IX represented a break with the past, and ongoing activities and existing staffs were not helpful for its implementation.

The first group, the "grassroots" group, were more concerned with where AID resources were spent, whether at the grassroots, local level, or at the national level. Title IX could only be implemented by spending at the local level. The second group was more concerned with how resources were spent. They would have no objections to spending at the national level provided vital political factors were considered.

There seemed to be some ambiguity on exactly the type of analysis required by Title IX in the answers of this second group. On one hand, the analysis seemed to be within the aid program itself, providing a more overall view of the program. "We have been doing the Title IX type of thing, i.e., agricultural coops, labor assistance, but the work has not been interrelated. Title IX should provide an interrelated framework for these activities." On the other hand, the type of analysis seemed to be broader--how does our aid program affect the whole social and political system of the recipient country? In some respondents' view, the analysis seemed to take on the character of the political and social problems involved in development, in others' the political and social effects, and in still others', separate political and social goals apart from development. Whatever the type described, analysis was what the second group felt was the great challenge of Title IX. One

respondent went on to say that Title IX required change, not only in the thinking of the Agency, but in the graduate schools and training centers in social science throughout the United States. The scope of analysis envisioned by this group was indeed ambitious. One respondent stated that a person, to be truly responsive to Title IX, must not only be a technically competent person, but he must also have a knowledge of economics. Not only that, he must understand the relationship of economics to the other facets of development, both political and social - a large order indeed! Finally, there was some feeling that Title IX comprised all the aid activities, from private sources, and from other donors in a particular country - all needed to be analyzed to see their total impact on the recipient country.

This group definitely had a concept of a body of knowledge, outside in the academic world, which should and could be applied to AID's work. In this respect, they differed greatly from the first group. They felt that a key to Title IX would be provided by outside consultants. In fact, one respondent described Title IX as "a way to bring the scholars in." They admitted that the academic field of political development was rudimentary, but felt that it still offered insights into the work of the Agency.

In keeping with this concept of a body of knowledge, this group tended to shy away from any value orientation in Title IX. One respondent stated that he objected to the word "democratic" in the legislation, as being too value-laden. This group was more afraid than any other

of the possible ethnocentric interpretation of Title IX. They constantly felt the need to clarify that Title IX did not stem from any desire to transplant American institutions abroad. For them, Title IX referred to a process in the Agency by which decisions were made. For a majority, it did not change the goal of the Agency, defined by most as "national development", just the means of achieving the goal.

This group is aware, as is the third group, that Title IX might be considered as "upsetting the political applecart". They speak about a possible conflict with the State Department in this respect. But unlike the third group, they are eager to reassure "State" that they are not interested in revolution, and they stress the fact that Title IX must be "above board".

The staff members show the same tendency as was noted in the first group of "getting as much mileage as possible" out of Title IX. Both staff members felt that Title IX related to their work in the Agency, and helped it along. But it was not Title IX in the sense of any specific activity, but in the sense of a new analysis which helped their "cause" in the Agency. This can clearly be shown by a statement of the Private Resources representative. He stated that Title IX caused the Agency to put on "new glasses". It cuts across the traditional divisions in the Aid business, education, agriculture, etc. This, he observed, is exactly what "privateness" does, the "main concern" of his office. It requires the same broad analysis as Title IX. The other staff member, from the Office of Public Safety, felt that the analysis demanded by Title IX was already recognized in her office. "As far as Title IX is

concerned, Public Safety has recognized the political and social factors in development. We have known for a long time that we must take all these into consideration." And later in the interview, "The dimension is already here in our work. I don't see how we can improve. We have been doing Title IX in its every facet." These two staff members felt that it was not their office which needed Title IX, but the rest of the Agency. And what was needed was analysis, not specific activities.

The representatives from the regional bureaus, included in this group, differ from the two staff members in that they have a more modest approach to the analysis demanded by Title IX. There is not the feeling, which was present in the staff group, that Title IX helped them personnaly or the work of their office. They both wanted to make clear that Title IX was not political development, as such, to the, but an increase in political analysis. One described Title IX as bringing a "balance back into Agency thinking." Economic factors had been stressed too much, now there was need to stress social and political factors. The other one saw a danger in Title IX in that it might be considered a "carte blanche" to those in the Agency who wished to stress political development over everything else. "We are involved in the political and social areas not for their own sakes, but as they are barriers to economic development. I'm not opposed to political development as such, but we don't know enough about it, and this Agency isn't the right place to do it."

3. Problems in Implementing Title IX

As might be expected from the definition of Title IX offered by this group, each member emphasized the lack of political awareness and analysis in the Agency as the main problem in implementing Title IX. Following logically from this emphasis are a number of related problems highlighted by this group. First, and perhaps foremost, is the problem of personnel in the Agency qualified to do the type of analysis demanded by Title IX. "We don't have the personnel to view development problems in these terms. What we have are mostly technicians who understand their work, but don't understand its relationship to the development process." Some members of this group seemed to interpret the lack of political analysis as bureaucratic stubbornness, but the majority felt that it stemmed from a lack of capability. In the words of the Private Resources Representative, "Title IX is a problem of understanding, not will. It requires a good deal of imagination and analytic ability to think in Title IX terms."

Related to the difficulty of political analysis is the problem of coming up with clear-cut results on Title IX. "It is much easier to point to a dam, or to a percentage increase in G.N.P. than to political results of our aid." We have enough problem justifying the aid program on economic grounds, much less on nebulous political grounds." There was the feeling that both operations in the Agency and the necessity of justifying aid before Congress made a political emphasi difficult.

Along with the problems of personnel and the problems of identifying results, comes the problems of research in the Agency. Much mention was made of the scattered research responsibility in the Agency. "There is no collective memory in the Agency. Case studies applicable to Title IX exist, but there is no way to uncover them."

Because this group defines Title IX as analysis, it is relevant to ask, who is going to do this analysis? Is there a "key group" in the Agency which must be "converted to Title IX" for it to take hold? Some members of this group were vague as to who needed to do this analysis. As one respondent said, "Title IX will go on forever, it will be built into everything we are doing." A majority, however, isolated the Mission Directors and the Program Officers as being the crucial implementors of Title IX. The structure of the Agency, thus became a problem in the implementation of Title IX. "The Mission Directors are a group of prima donnas. They are almost autonomous, and can't be forced to consider anything they don't want to. Some of them have their own political patrons in Congress." The conclusion, then, of a majority of this group was that Title IX would have to come from a re-education of crucial people in the Agency, that it would have to grow from the grassroots in the Agency to be effective, and that it would have to be voluntary to do any good.

There were some problems highlighted by the representatives of the regional bureaus in this group which were not mentioned by the staff members. One such problem concerns the sensitivity of the host

government. "When a country is singled out for Title IX study, the government will think we are criticizing them for not being democratic or socially responsible." This man recognized the need for research, but wanted to keep it within the Agency, i.e., "in-house", and somewhat under cover. The regional representatives also stressed the need for country-tailored analysis. This is the only way Title IX would be useful to the Missions in their work abroad. As one man said, "If the recipient country is undertaking social reforms itself, then AID doesn't need to worry about this kind of think. Title IX is more important in some countries than in others. We need individual country research to determine this."

In summary, this group felt that the problems growing out of the need for a new analysis were much more important than money for specific activities, or even the need for high-level commitment to Title IX. There was some difference between line and staff groupings as to how this analysis should best be carried out.

4. Specific Suggestions for the Implementation of Title IX

Differences between staff and line personnel, noted in the problems they highlighted, are even more apparent with regard to their specific suggestions for the implemention of Title IX. The regional representatives were very cautious about making specific suggestions. As one man said, "We must be aware of putting the wrong foot forward. The Missions are inundated with paper work. What we send must be either

short and well-thought-out general pieces on political development, or the messages must point directly at their country situation." Another man refused to give any specific suggestions. "What does the implementation of Title IX mean at this stage? It means research. It means an analysis of the country situation and the aid program in that country. The results of such studies would point to what the 'implementation' would be."

The two staff members, on the other hand, had several specific suggestions to make, particularly as to how their office could help in the implementation of Title IX. The representative from the Office of Private Resources felt that the main thrust of Title IX ran parallel to the Watson Committee Report and hence parallel to the work of his office.[5] The real implementation of Title IX, he felt, would come from Private Resources. AID should be used like a foundation. "We should identify the areas we think are important, and then get the right groups in the United States to work in these areas. What we need to do is use AID resources to get a multiplier effect with private resources in the less developed countries." How does this suggestion relate to Title IX? It would help Title IX because, "it would strengthen private institutions, and it would provide a way not to go through the AID presence in a country."

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[5]Report of the Advisory Committee on Private Enterprise in Foreign Aid, "Foreign Aid through Private Initiative," (Washington, D.C.: Agency for International Development, July 1965). This report spoke about private sector development in the recipient country, instead of just U.S. private investment abroad. The Office of Private Resources in AID was organized to carry out this Report. Arthur K. Watson of IBM was chairman of this Committee.

The representative from the Office of Public Safety felt that her office had a major contribution to make to Title IX. "Without minimum law and order in the recipient country, then democratic development won't be effective. Development creates discontent. Political aspirations outrun economic accomplishments. The police are needed to keep dissident elements under control."

This group, then, more than any other, saw Title IX in terms of analysis. Yet staff and line differences became apparent as the representatives of the regional bureaus were more hesistant and more aware of host country sensitivity in undertaking the analysis required by Title IX. The staff office representatives made numerous specific suggestions as to how their office could help implement Title IX.

5. Criticism of the Agency's Implementation of Title IX

More than any other group, this group approved of the way Title IX was being handled in the Agency. However the regional representatives had a clearer idea of what the role of the Title IX Division should be in implementing Title IX than did staff members. They felt very strongly that the operational responsibility belonged to the Regional Bureaus. The job of the Title IX Division should be to provide to the regions "the staff to do the type of analysis required by Title IX." These regional representatives were somewhat critical of the materials produced by the Division. "The Title IX Division, so far, has produced too many general pieces on political development. The Missions don't need this. The help of the Title IX Division needs to be more 'programmatic'."

6. The Future of Title IX in the Agency

This group had an optomistic view of the future of Title IX in the Agency. They tended to see the implementation of Title IX as being a gradual affair, with Agency personnel slowly realizing the importance of political analysis. There would be re-education in the Agency, and also people would be hired who had been exposed to inter-disciplinary studies in the academic world. There was a feeling that the analysis demanded by Title IX was "in vogue", and necessary, and eventually would penetrate the Agency. There would not be a radical transformation of the Agency. Not one respondent felt this was necessary for the new analysis to "take hold". The "incremental" nature of this approach is shown in comments sprinkled throughout these interviews, "Title IX may modify attitudes." "Title IX might mean a reorientation of some of our larger aid programs", "Hopefully Title IX might penetrate some of the thinking in the Agency." By the very fact of its somewhat modest goals for Title IX, this group is hopeful of its success.

C. Title IX Points to a Revolutionary Foreign Policy Goal

1. Composition of the Group

This group was definitely a minority within the Intra-Agency Committee, only two, whereas the first group had three and the second group had four. These men were both young, one had been trained in law, the other had received an inter-departmental M.A. covering

economics, political science, anthropology, and sociology. Both were new to the Agency, three years and four years, and both had been abroad. It is interesting that both had been associated with the Peace Corps, one as a volunteer in Latin America, and the other as Peace Corps Director in Eastern Nigeria. One was in a planning office in the Latin American Regional Bureau, whereas the other was in a staff office, i.e., chief of the training division, Office of Personnel Administration.

2. Definition Ascribed to Title IX

For this third group in the Intra-Agency Committee, the new type of analysis described by the second group, figured somewhat in their favorable attitude toward Title IX, but much more important was the goal to which they felt Title IX pointed. For these men, Title IX had revolutionary implications and possibilities beyond that of introducing a new type of analysis. The real importance of Title IX for these men was its call to "join the side of the masses" in the less developed countries. One respondent described Title IX as the "most revolutionary time-bomb to hit the State/AID complex", because "it asks the U.S. Government to accept more political risk." Both of these men saw a contradiction between the role of the State Department and AID in the less developed countries. One man stated that Title IX asked the U.S. Government to take a more direct role in the development of the less developed countries, to actually alter the process of development. "The State Department doesn't want to take this

risk. It wants to stabilize - their job is to protect and predict. If factors are constant, then their job will be easier." Unlike the second group, this third group wanted to make no attempt to reassure the State Department of Title IX's unrevolutionary nature. They felt AID should continue the revolutionary course indicated by Title IX, "sub-rosa if need be."

Strange as it might seem, there is some overlap between this group, which stresses the revolutionary potential of Title IX, and the first group which stressed grassroots development. The members of that first group envisioned political change in the recipient countries, and saw increasing U.S. involvement in that change. But they saw the change coming from coops or community development which bring increasing experience with the democratic process. Several in that first group expressed a fervent belief in democracy and its relevance to the less developed countries. This third group seems not as concerned with transplanting a process of decision-making as with identifying U.S. interests with a certain group in the less developed countries. There is more of a Marxian class-analysis or perhaps American populist tradition, involved in this group's thinking. This is brought out in one man's answer, "Where do our interests really lie in the less developed countries? With the 99% on the bottom or the 1% on the top. This is what we need to ask ourselves. Our long-range interests might demand that we support revolution, although it might be uncomfortable in the short-run." He went on to say that this revolution would not be peaceful.

"Now we are killing people for the wrong reasons. We might still be killing people this way, but it would be for the right reasons." This same man felt that Title IX was naive in that it talked about "democratic institutions." "Title IX points to the right end, when it talks about broadening the people base, but we can't do it by promoting democratic institutions. Title IX points to the right end, but the wrong means. We need to capture the revolution in these countries, and we can't do it by promoting schoolboards."

There was a sense of urgency in both these respondents' thinking about Title IX. As one said, "Our house is on fire in the less developed countries." They showed impatience at the slow rate of change in AID's thinking about the less developed countries.

3. Problems in Implementing Title IX

The men in this group stressed the lack of commitment in Congress and among high-level State Department and AID officials to the goal of Title IX as the major problem in its implementation. It is significant that for the "new analysis" group, the Mission Directors and Program Officers were the "key group" for the implementation of Title IX. For the "revolutionary foreign policy" group, the Mission Directors and program officers are powerless to fully implement Title IX. It is only the highest level policy-making official, Congress, and finally, the American public, who need to give the direction which would later be transmitted down to all the officials, not only in AID, but in all the agencies concerned with foreign policy implementation. This

"large view" of Title IX is shown is the comment of one official: "Who needs to be serious about Title IX for it to work? The people who will have to take the responsibility for the risks, the top State Department people, AID people, and Congress."

This group agreed with the "grassroots development" group that the allocation of money was important for Title IX. But it was not so much the allocation of money for certain specific AID activities, but the fact that where the money went was indicative of the basic commitment of these high-level policy makers. Does our aid money tend to uphold the status-quo in the recipient country, or does it promote change? -- This is the basic question asked by this third group. "The big question is where we put our money. This cuts to the heart of the whole problem." "What are the policy and operational priorities at the top? This is crucial."

This group joined with the other two groups in its attack on the economic orientation of the Agency, but not because it overshadowed technical assistance, or because it prevented adequate political analysis. This third group objected to the "reign of economics" in the Agency, because it was not revolutionary enough. As one official said, "We need to forget about this stability junk. This is one of AID's built-in assumptions - that economic development is supposed to lead to stability, and that stability is needed for continuing economic development. Stability isn't what we are after in the world, and anyway the assumption [that it stems from economic development] just isn't true!" Another man objected to the economic orientation of the Agency because it was inadequate in an ideological sense. "Now we are giving the less developed

countries Rostow's 'Stages of Economic Growth'. This won't turn people on. This is economics. We need to figure out how to take our ideology, which is embedded in the Declaration of Independence and Jeffersonian thought and make it applicable to these countries." The major problem, then, for this group in the implementation of Title IX, is to get a commitment to the far-reaching purpose of the legislation from those in the government who make foreign policy. Economic development is absolutely not what we are after in our relations with the less developed countries. Neither is democratic development, for that matter. We need to line our interests up with the masses in the less developed countries, for Title IX to be fully carried out.

4. Criticism of the Agency's Implementation of Title IX

This group makes three criticisms of the method being used by the Agency in implementing Title IX. The major criticism is that the Agency is not moving fast enough to implement the legislation. One man described the Agency's response as "honest, but bureaucratic." He mentioned the committees, subcommittees, memoes, coordination attempts. He felt that Title IX had something to say about our relations with the less developed countries, but that it was getting lost in a bureaucratic jungle. "When your house is on fire, you don't set up a committee, was his response.

A related criticism concerned the academic orientation of the Title IX Division. "I think that the Title IX Division recognizes that a major analytical task needs to be done on Title IX. It tends to rely on academic analysis. The result is that no action gets done. We need to move ahead without the analytic work behind us." The "grassroots development" group was concerned about the academic emphasis of the Title IX Division, but those men gave the impression of not quite understanding what the analytical work was all about. The men in this third group show good understanding of the analysis emphasized by the Title IX Division, but they feel that action has a higher priority.

This group also offers the criticism that the Title IX "movement" in the Agency is too "ingrown". There is a feeling that other groups could offer experience in the transmittal of political power to the masses, and should be consulted. Groups commonly suggested include, The Office of Economic Opportunity, the Peace Corps, state and local groups; individuals such as Stokely Carmichael, and Saul Alinsky.

5. <u>The Future of Title IX in the Agency</u>

The respondents in this group feel that the necessary high-level commitment to Title IX among Congressmen and high-level officials will not be forthcoming in the near future. Hence they feel that Title IX will have to rely on individual initiative, of people in the field and in the Agency, for its implementation. As one man characterized the situation, "Now, with Title IX, someone can come up with a project

which is not economically important, but which has social impact. Title IX is a place where they can hang their hat." Another man characterized this stage as the period of "watchful-waiting". "The question is how far do Mission people, who are interested in moving in this direction [toward greater change], how far do they dare move out on a limb? They are watching Washington to see how sincere we are about Title IX." One contribution of the activities of the Agency, bureaucratic though they may be, is, "that it has made the risk of taking a stand not so great. It becomes acceptable to refer to Title IX as a justification for risk-taking."

The loose bureaucratic structure, mentioned by the other groups as a problem in the implementation of Title IX, is felt by this group to be an advantage. "Yes, it is true that Mission Directors are quite independent. This structure makes independent action on Title IX possible. This is probably what you will see more of in the future."

Over the short-run, then, this group has a surprisingly modest view of what Title IX will cause to happen. "Over the next two years, there will be increased study of the problem. More money will be spent on community development, labor programs, and coops. There is, however, the possibility of doing some new things. Channeling funds to local governments seems to work. We can study legislative and judicial problems in the developing countries. Tax laws and land-title are important areas we could move in."

6. Specific Suggestions for the Implementation of Title IX In the Agency

In the short-run, the possibilities listed above are mentioned as concrete areas in which the Agency could move. Added to these are such things as better cross-cultural skills, better training programs in the Title IX area, etc. But in the long run, the only way to implement Title IX suggested by this group, is the establishment of a new Agency entirely. As one man siad, "AID is not the instrumentality to 'do' Title IX. It is too closely connected with U.S. foreign policy. Also sending Americans abroad doesn't work. We should be the funding organization for the kinds of activities we've been talking about."

The thoughts of one man in this group on the subject of a new institution had carried him to the point of writing a book. Basically this man felt that the United States has something to learn from the Russian and Chinese example, because those governments are able to maintain relations with a legal foreign government, and yet still engage in subversion. "The only agency in the United States which promotes subversion is the Central Intelligence Agency and this is without an ideology. It is ad-hoc, short-range. We need a new institution, combining the best technical assistance in AID, the cross-cultural experience of the Peace Corps, and the skills of the "Green Berets". We could have this institution, plus the government-to-government aid of the Development Loan Fund."

This group, then, in suggesting the goal of a new foreign policy, is most committed to a basic change in Agency operations, to the point of advocating the creation of a new Agency entirely.

III. Conclusions

There are two separate types of conclusions which can be drawn from the interview data presented above. First, there are conclusions which relate to the type of Agency official likely to favor one or the other definitions of Title IX. These conclusions should highlight the differences within the Intra-Agency Committee with regard to staff or line position, time in the Agency, level of position, etc.

The other type of conclusion relates to the fact that there are a variety of definitions of Title IX and consequent suggestions for its implementation. Title IX provides a wide umbrella for Agency officials. What are the factors uniting each of these groups around Title IX and where are there likely to be conflicts as the implementation of Title IX progresses in the Agency?

A. Conclusions Relating to Sampling Categories

It is significant to note that the Intra-Agency Committee on Title IX had been meeting approximately every two weeks for a year at the time the interviews were held, and yet there was wide divergence in definitions and suggestions for implementation of the legislation. It is possible to draw some conclusions of the first type described above, although the Control Group provides a wider, and thus, better sampling, for this type of conclusion. One of the most striking differences which can be pointed to in the Intra-Agency Committee is the difference be-

tween representatives of the staff offices and the representatives of the regional bureaus.[6]

The staff representatives were scattered throughout each of the three groups expressing different definitions of Title IX. All four members of the first group, the "grassroots development" group, were staff officers, as were two out of four in the second group and one out of two in the third group. The staff representatives tended to be more enthusiastic about Title IX, no matter what definition they ascribed to the legislation. The regional representatives did not appear to have the feeling that Title IX brought direct benefit to them or to their offices, and hence were more subdued about the legislation, seeing more problems in its implementation than the staff representatives.

The regional representatives also had fewer concrete suggestions to make about the implementation of Title IX. The staff representatives had gone much further in relating Title IX to their own work and to that of their offices. The regional representatives seemed to feel that "more" had to be done on Title IX (whether they defined this "more" as research, analysis, or just allocation of money), before they could become actively concerned with its implementation. The regional representatives also showed more concern about host-country sensitivity

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[6] It must still be noted that the regional representatives on the Intra-Agency Committee were all from planning rather than from operational offices.

than did the staff representatives. They were also more pessimistic about the possibility of getting the Regional Bureaus and the Missions as a whole to take Title IX seriously.

Along with these differences between line and staff representatives, there does appear to be an interesting correlation between the official's academic background and his attitude toward Title IX. This is true, even though many academic backgrounds were not represented on the Committee, such as economics and purely technical specialties. The two different types of background which were represented on the Committee are first, those individuals who might have had some traditional political science or public administration training back fifteen or twenty years ago, and since then have been active in their fields of endeavor, whether labor affairs, or work with voluntary agencies, etc. The second group are those who have received training much more recently, often having been sent back to school by the Agency. This group was much more likely to be exposed to inter-disciplinary studies of the type offered at Johns Hopkins, The Fletcher School, or the University of Chicago. The relevant fact does not seem to be in what field they were trained, but when they received their training- how long ago? In fact, one of the respondents who showed the best understanding of the "new analysis" demanded by Title IX had not been trained in political science, international affairs, or in inter-disciplinary studies, but in law. But he had received his training within the last seven years.

It is significant then, that those officials in the "grassroots development group" who saw Title IX in terms of specific activities,

who had little understanding of a new analysis, who looked back to something in the Agency's past, should be those who had been trained more than twenty years ago. These men were all in the fifties, none of them had been exposed to inter-disciplinary studies, all of them had been in their respective fields for twenty years or more.

On the other hand, both the "new analysis" and the "revolutionary foreign policy" groups were composed of younger men, who had received their training more recently. Because they are the same "type" of individuals, it is interesting to inquire why some would lean to the more modest definition of Title IX as a new analysis, and why others would see far-reaching revolutionary implications in Title IX. Two factors seem to be relevant here. One is that the "new analysis" group has, on the average, been in the Agency quite a bit longer than the "revolutionary foreign policy" group - nine years vs. 3.5 years. The second is that the "revolutionary foreign policy group" had spent more time abroad, specifically working for the Peace Crops. It appears that the Peace Crops experience leads to a more radical view of foreign policy. On the other hand, only one member of the "new analysis" group had been abroad, the rest had spent their career in the Agency in Washington, D.C.

In summary, there are definite differences within the Intra-Agency Committee on Title IX which can be correlated with such factors as line or staff position, academic background, time in the Agency, time spent abroad, etc. It was not possible, in the case of the Intra-Agency Committee to detect differences relating to level of position,

because all the members come from approximately the same level. Also, since there were only three representatives from the regional bureaus, it was not possible to draw conclusions as to the differences between the various regions on Title IX.

B. Conclusions Comparing the Three Definitional Groups

It is extremely significant to note that all three groups were united in their opposition to what they considered was the "economic orientation" of the Agency, and this was the only facet of Title IX on which all three agreed. They all approved of Title IX because they felt that it, in some way, pointed away from economic analysis, away from large-scale capital transfers, away from the influence of the economists in the Agency. Although they were united in their opposition to the "reign of economics" in the Agency, they each had a different reason for being so. Group 1 was concerned that economic analysis and the consequent program loans and capital transfers overshadowed traditional technical assistance activities in the Agency. Group II felt that the stress on economic analysis had overshadowed the need for political and overall program analysis in the Agency's programming. The third group resented the economic orientation of the Agency because they felt it did not have the necessary ideological component needed by the United States in its relations with the less developed countries.

What are the consequences of such a variety of reasons for opposing the dominance of economics in the Agency? The consequences show up most clearly when possible areas of conflict are considered as the implementation of Title IX in the Agency progresses. Four possible areas of conflict can be spotted. First, there is the controversy over specific projects as the key means for implementing Title IX. Second is the conflict on the importance of research and analysis. Third is the disagreement over which is the key group to be converted to Title IX, and fourth is the conflict on the importance of money allocation.

Most clearly, in the first area of possible conflict, is the fact that the "grassroots development" group stresses the importance of specific projects in the implementation of Title IX. Title IX is seen in terms of more labor activities, more community development work, more agricultural coops. The individuals in this group relate these projects to past activities in the Agency. Individual activities are emphasized rather than their interrelationship. Equally clearly, the second group opposes the concept of Title IX as a series of specific activities. They feel that this concept is a direct threat to their concept of Title IX as analysis. Less clear is the position of Group III in this question of Title IX and specific activities. Although this group did not stress specific activities to the extent Group I did, there is an area of agreement here between these two groups. It is significant that both Groups I and III want aid to benefit a certain group in the recipient country, i.e. the alienated, the disenfranchized, those removed from the traditional power structure. But Group I stresses institution-building

and democratic processes in extending aid, whereas Group III stresses the identification of the United States with the "revolution" of the masses. When it comes right down to the question as to how this group in the less developed countries can gain from United States aid, both groups end up with suggestions of labor unions and coops, at least in the short run.

This discussion of specific activities leads into the question of the role of research in Title IX. It is significant that Group II stands alone in suggesting the importance of research and analysis. This suggestion is opposed most strongly by Group I, whose members show little understanding of what the research and analysis is all about. These officials are suspicious of the claim of "newness" for Title IX, which they see as something the Agency has done for many years. They see the academicians as, somehow, taking advantage of Title IX to get more research done. Group III does not have as hostile a reaction to the need for research as Group I; their attitude is more one of impatience. They show much great understanding of Group II's position, and might support research if it can be shown that it has direct action relevance. Group III agrees with Group II that Title IX is "new", but neither Groups I or II would support Group III's concept of Title IX as being "revolutionary" in any sense. To both Group I and III, Title IX is something to be done in the less developed countries, whereas to Group II it is something to be done within AID's decision-making process.

Moving on to the third area of possible conflict, each group spotted a different "key group" in the implementation of Title IX. For Group I, there are two "key groups". First, there are those high level AID officials who decide between allocation for technical assistance and capital projects. They need to show a commitment to technical assistance in the allocation of their funds. Secondly, "the man in the field" is a key factor in the implementation of Title IX. It is he who needs to be sensitive and well-trained to obtain cooperation from the villagers.

For Group II, the key group for Title IX are the decision-makers in the Agency, i.e., the program officers, the mission directors, and the officials in the Office of Program and Policy Coordination. Since Title IX is essentially analysis, these decision-makers are the people to implement the legislation. For Group III, on the other hand, the planners are not at a high enough level. For the long-run implementation of Title IX, it is the highest level of foreign policy makers in Congress, State and AID who need to be convinced of Title IX. In the short-run, the key group are the people in the Agency who want AID to move in a more revolutionary direction, and thus can be expected to take more initiative under the amendment. These are the people who can be "freed to move" under Title IX.

The last area of possible conflict concerns the importance of money allocation to the three groups. It is significant that both groups I and III felt that the allocation of money is a significant factor in the

implementation of Title IX. Group I wanted it channeled in the direction of technical assistance, while Group III wanted it channeled down to the masses and away from central governments and the preservation of the status-quo. For Group II, the allocation of money was not a significant factor in the implementation of Title IX, at least for the short run. There was a feeling that Title IX demanded changes in thought processes, and a re-education of officials in the Agency. Thus money was a secondary consideration. This group did admit that money for more research would be valuable. But, because they saw Title IX as a "consideration" which should be present in all of the Agency's planning, the allocation of specific funds to specific activities was not crucially important for the implementation of Title IX.

From the above conclusions, it can be seen that Group II, advocating a new analysis, is more isolated than either of the other two groups on most of the issues. Both Groups I and III advocate more specific projects to implement Title IX, both are opposed to a central role for research and analysis in the implementation of Title IX, both feel that the allocation of money is of central importance for the future of Title IX. Finally Group II is caught between the other two groups in its assessment of the overall significance of Title IX. It agrees with Group III that Title IX is new, but agrees with Group I that it is not revolutionary. This isolation of Group II holds particular relevance as they are the group most closely aligned with the work of the Title IX Division, and most sympathetic to its interpretation of the legislation.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Sampling of Opinion in a Control Group in the Agency

I. Methodology

Besides those directly responsible for Title IX, and those on the Intra-Agency Committee, a third group was interviewed, a control group taken from the Agency at large. The rationale for interviewing this group was to provide a basis of comparison for the "directly responsible" and "Intra-Agency Committee" groups. The purpose was to see how typical or untypical the first two groups are in the Agency, and to detect any new strains of thought which might be present in the Agency as a whole, but not represented in either of the first two groups.

This group of twelve officials was chosen with the following six divisions in mind;

a) Line vs. Staff

b) High-level officials (above Division Chief) vs. middle and low level officials (Division Chiefs and below)

c) Officials in the Agency over ten years vs. those under ten years

d) Officials with field experience vs. those with 'home' experience, (i.e., Washington, D.C.)

e) Officials with economics backgrounds vs. those with general or technical backgrounds

f) Regions Represented

The Control Group can clearly be broken down in terms of the above six groupings listed above:

a) Line vs. Staff (It was found that beside the line-staff division, there was another group, somewhat in the middle. These were people associated with the regional bureaus, but in advisory or staff positions.)

Line

1. A country desk officer in the Near East and South Asia Region
2. Deputy Mission Director in East Asia Region
3. Deputy Assistant Administrator in East Asia Region
4. Assistant to the Administrator for Programs (Note: this man had served as Mission Director to two countries, and so it was felt he would represent line opinion.)

In Regions but in Staff Positions

1. Chief, Planning Division (Near East and South Asia Region)
2. Director, Office of Development Planning, (Africa)
3. Deputy Director, East Asia Technical Advisory Staff
4. Special Assistant to the U.S. coordinator for the Alliance for Progress
5. Agriculture Branch Chief, Office of Technical Support (NESA)

Staff

1. Advisor, Office of Private Resources
2. Chief, Development AdministrationDivision (Office of Program and Policy Coordination)
3. Congressional Liaison Officer (Africa)

b) High vs. Low Level Officials: three of those interviewed had a position above Office Director or Division Chief, and one additional man was considered in close enough communication to represent high level thinking on Title IX, bringing the total to four. The remaining eight were middle or low level officials.

c) Length of Time in the Agency: six respondents had been in the Agency less than ten years, the other six had been in for ten years or more.

d) Time Spend Abroad:

Completely in AID/Washington	- 5
Abroad less than 5 years	- 1
Abroad more than 5 years	- 6

e) Academic Background:

Political Science or related field (Law, Public Administration)	- 6
Economics	- 3
Technical Field	- 1
Other	- 1

f) Regions Represented:[1]

Near East and South Asia	- 3
Africa	- 1
Latin America	- 1
East Asia	- 3

The apparent de-emphasis on Africa and Latin America in the Control sample is compensated by the fact that those two regions were more heavily represented in the Intra-Agency Committee than were the other two regions. It was felt particularly important to get a heavy sampling from the Near East and South Asia Region, as it was not represented in the Intra-Agency Committee sample, and was reputed to be the most negative region toward Title IX.

II. Interview Analysis

There are two significant differences which become immediately apparent when the body of the control group interviews is placed alongside those of the Intra-Agency Committee. First, whereas all the

[1] The absence of Vietnam region from the sample is apparent. I attempted to arrange an interview, but was not successful.

members of the Intra-Agency Committee could be said to have a positive attitude toward the legislation, albeit for a variety of reasons, five out of twelve, or almost one-half of the control group were doubtful about or actually negative toward the legislation. The definitions they ascribed to the legislation, as was observed in the Intra-Agency Committee, were very significant in determining their attitudes toward Title IX.

The three definitional categories, analyzed in connection with the Intra-Agency Committee, are also present in the control group. The difference is that, while these definitions resulted in favorable attitudes in the Intra-Agency Committee, there was a division in the Control Group between those who approved of the "thrust" which they ascribed to Title IX and those who did not.

The second significant difference which becomes apparent between the two groups is the inclusion of two additional categories in the control group which were not represented in the Intra-Agency Committee. One is the category in which the respondents gave no particular definition to Title IX, with the result that their attitude toward the legislation was based on factors other than definitional. The second category did not really give a definition of Title IX either. Instead this group viewed Title IX as an "opportunity" to develop and expound their own views as to the relationship between foreign aid and political influence. This group was not represented on the Intra-Agency Committee at all.

The procedure for analyzing the results of the Control Group interviews will remain basically the same as for the Intra-Agency Committee sample. The five categories of definitions will be described and the suggestions given for the implementation of the legislation delineated. This will be done for both the positive and negative respondents. An attempt will also be made to compare and contrast the various categories.

A. Title IX Points to the Importance of People in the Development Process

There are four men in the Control Group who have a conception of Title IX similar to the "grassroots development" concept found in the Intra-Agency Committee. Two of these men enthusiastically support this thrust of the legislation, whereas the other two are more negative toward it.

. Positive

a) Composition of the Group

Both men in this group are connected with staff officers, but have some close connection with line operations. One man is Deputy Director of the East Asia Technical Advisory Staff, while the other man is an advisor to the Office of Private Resources. The former, then, is in a staff position in a regional bureau, whereas the latter had very recently been in the field, working for the AID Mission

in Hondurus.[2] Both men had had a rather long experience with the Agency, one being employed for sixteen years and the other for nine years. Both had served abroad for at least half of that time. Both were trained in public administration, with one leaning toward the academic field of political science while the other had more experience in business administration.

b) Definition of Title IX

The fact that both these men agree basically with the "grassroots development" concept is shown by their comments quoted below:

> "That is what Title IX is - helping people at the local level"
>
> "Implementation of Title IX will occur when the little man is considered."
>
> "Technical assistance is more important than loans or money matters. Title IX calls attention to this."
>
> "Title IX will help technical assistance people counterbalance the influence of the economists in the Agency."

Both of these men, while they supported Title IX, felt that it was something which the Agency had been doing for a long time. As one man explained, "When I first heard about Title IX, I said to myself 'Well, it's old hat.' All the institution-building in AID has been and is being directed toward increasing popular participation in development'."

[2] This officer had been in the field when the 1063 circular was received by his Mission Director and he had been asked to work on drafting a reply.

If Title IX is not new, then why do these men have a favorable reaction to it? The answer is, quite simply, that both these men see Title IX as supporting their work in the Agency. One man was quite frank about his use of Title IX in this regard. "We've been doing Title IX all along, but it is good - at least we can cite it to the Mission Directors. It doesn't change anyone's thinking, but at least it means that Congress is with us." He then gave a specific example of how he had been able to "use" Title IX. "You know, we are just starting work with legal institutions. In our requests for funds, we wrote that, in the Agency's Report to Congress,[3] it stated that one of our objectives was to improve legal institutions overseas. We used this statement as a justification in our request for funds." The other man, while on the Mission Staff in Honduras, had developed a project in response to Title IX.[4] He was grateful for the legislation also. "Without Title IX, this project might not have gotten the support of the Mission Director at this particular time."

c) Specific Suggestions for Implementing Title IX

As with the Intra-Agency Committee members in this category, these men in the control group had a number of specific suggestions for the implementation of Title IX. Only two of these

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[3]See the Chapter on the Title IX Division for an analysis of this Report.

[4]This is one of the few projects I could discover which had been directly "caused" in any sense by Title IX.

will be cited as examples. The representative of the East Asia Technical Advisory Staff felt that these same technical advisory staffs throughout the Agency were the logical implementors of Title IX. He called them the "missionaries for Title IX", and stated that he had urged the Title IX Division to use them for this purpose. He felt that the best way for Title IX to be carried throughout the Agency was by conversations between interested people. The technical advisory staffs would be the "logical group to carry out Title IX in this way."

The other man felt that the Mission Director's Fund[5] seemed to be the best mechanism for funding Title IX activities. His idea was that an inventory of the small needs of the villages could be developed and then a few chosen at a time to work on. From these specific suggestions, and from their definitions, it is clear that these men envision Title IX as demanding work with local communities and emphasis on grassroots development .

d) Problems in Implementing Title IX

One man stated bluntly that the problems in implementing Title IX were the same as those for technical assistance in general. As was true for the Intra-Agency members in this category, money for

[5] A relatively small amount of money (in 1967 set at $50,000) which is at the Mission Director's disposal to use for activities with immediate impact. It is organized to avoid the necessity of going through the normal channels of budgeting and funding. These funds, for the most part, have been used very infrequently.

specific projects and additional men overseas were considered to be crucial for Title IX. These men also saw the same need for better, more sensitive foreign advisors - "For people who can work effectively in the villages."

Like almost every supporter of Title IX, these men felt that the "macro-economic" orientation of the Agency was a major hindrance to the implementation of Title IX. "We are concerned with foreign exchange gaps, rates of savings, rates of GNP growth. We concentrate on programs loans. But we cannot see where these go, how they filter down to the local level."

e) Future of Title IX in the Agency

There was a feeling, on the part of both these men, that Title IX, itself, would not change much in the Agency. "It doesn't change anyone's thinking" was the comment of one man. The other stated that "I am pessimistic about the effect AID itself can have in this area. We are engaged in a long-range trend toward giving loans which have to be paid back. Title IX requires grants." He was also concerned because he did not feel that Title IX, in the sense of helping the little guy, was central to the aid program. "We are not really concerned about social progress. Our spirit of altruism floats on water. There will be no revolutionary change because of Title IX. Its effects will be sporadic."

Both of these men came up with the same suggestion as was found in the Intra-Agency Committee, i.e., that of reorganizaing the Agency to give more stress to technical assistance. In the words of one respondent, "I can't imagine another President going to Congress to support the present system after the attacks it has suffered. An independent Agency is a lightening rod in that it takes all the attack. Maybe we should scatter aid-giving functions throughout the Government. Then perhaps, Title IX will have more of a role." The other man simple stated that "maybe a new Agency would be the answer. I think we lost a lot when we merged technical assistance and the loan program. Technical assistance got submerged as a result."

f) Criticism of the Agency's Handling of Title IX

The men in this category, contrary to those in the Intra-Agency Committee, had no conception of Title IX as indicating a new type of analysis. They had had little contact with the Title IX Division, not enough to even be mystified by its interpretation of Title IX. They had, however, been exposed to the material written in the Agency on Title IX, and it was their major target of attack. In the words of one man, "You can't spread the Title IX gospel by sending airgrams. They are too long, and nobody reads them. Title IX has got to be passed along by interested people."

2. Negative

a) Composition of the Group

It is very significant to note that each of these two men who had a negative attitude toward Title IX were in the line operations of the Agency. One was agricultural branch chief in the Near East and South Asia Region, and the other was Deputy Director of the Mission in Laos.[6] Both men were long-time officials of the aid program, the first being employed for nineteen years and the second for seventeen years. Both men were in their fifties. Neither had had training in political science or related fields--one was an agricultural economist and the other had a more general background. Both men had been abroad more than one-half of their time in the Agency.

b) Definitions of Title IX

The following comments illustrate their conception of Title IX:

> "Title IX asks what kind of activity AID can do to lead to more activity at the community level."

> "Congress specifically gave the illustration of coops when it talked about possible Title IX types of activities. I think that's the right idea of Title IX."

> "Title IX talks about felt-needs on the local level. These are more or less universal. The rural population wants better transportation, education, health, etc., in every country."

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[6] I was able to speak with him while he was on "home leave" for several days.

"Title IX is self-help. We know we can build a dam. We have not gained anything if that's all we accomplish. Title IX says don't build it for them."

"We have had a long-standing division in this Agency between technical assistance and loans. Title IX gets back to technical assistance."

It appears that it would be hard to argue with the value of Title IX as indicated by the above definitions. Actually these individuals can see benefit in local grassroots development as described in their definitions. Why do they, then, have a negative attitude toward Title IX? There are several reasons for their negative attitude, some of which can be pointed out now and others which will reveal themselves as we discuss this group's specific suggestions for the implementation of Title IX.

One clear reason for this group's negative attitude is that its members see no particular benefit coming from Title IX. We have noted that the positive group defined Title IX in basically the same way - as grassroots development and something that the Agency had been doing all along - but there is a difference. The positive group saw some advantage in the legislation because it supported activities in which they and their offices were interested. This is not true of the negative group. They see Title IX as a criticism, as an implied threat. They resent the implication that the Agency has not been interested in grassroots development before and spent a major part

of their interviews telling of specific examples of "Title IX work" before the passage of the legislation.[7]

Secondly, this group thought that Title IX, as expressed in the legislation, was extremely naive. As one respondent said, "Title IX is a lot of blarney." It wants to promote democracy in the less developed countries. There are a lot of missionaries who want to go around promoting democracy, but the question is 'how'?" This group, as discussed below, felt that they had the answer which the sponsors of Title IX did not.

c) Specific Suggestions for the Implementation of Title IX

Both members of this group felt that the key to the implementation of Title IX was its relevance to the local situation in a particular country. Title IX could only be approached indirectly, and the great fault of the legislation was its lack of subtlety. In the words of one man, "You can't do Title IX directly. It talks about building democratic institutions, but an institution must be organized to do something specific (in the economic sense). It doesn't do any good to go around preaching the philosophy of coops in the abstract just because you think cooperation is a good thing. It must lead somewhere in the economic sense."

[7]Some of the following activities were given as examples: a home-economics program in Iran, the Panchyaat system in Nepal, the Rural Works program in Pakistan, the Iranian agricultural extension program, the "juntos barrios" system in Costa Rica, and the Rural Cluster program in Laos.

d) Problems in the Implementation of Title IX

Another reason for the negative attitude of this group becomes apparent as the problems involved in Title IX are discussed. As we have noted above, this group is not negative to the idea of grass-roots development, but they feel that the Agency is doing everything it can in that direction and any more activity will "backfire". The problems they cited are not things to be "overcome", but are overpowering obstacles which allowed nothing further to be accomplished.

The first problem was cited also by every other respondent, both in the Intra-Agency Committee and in the Control Group, who defined Title IX as specific grassroots projects. All pointed to the lack of money and personnel in the Agency. "Title IX takes 'bodies'. It is not like capital assistance in this respect. The present budget cuts hurt."

Another problem, stressed particularly by the Deputy Mission Director, involved the overall thrust of U.S. foreign policy. The problem was that popular participation was "not central to the United States' objectives in every country." The Agency has certain aims in each country. Do we want to achieve development with stability, development with democracy, or development willy-nilly? This is the decision we need to make."

Finally, this group mentioned that AID could not be expected to move in the direction of long-term institution-building because AID is

a temporary organization. They felt that Congress had not established the aid program to do this type of work, and the organization and funding of AID was inadequate for it.

e) The Future of Title IX in the Agency

This group tended to look upon Title IX as a "fad" which would not have a long life in the Agency. In the words of the Deputy Mission Director, "Congress has asked us to do a variety of things on numerous occasions. It has asked us to improve the investment climate in recipient countries, to operate more through international agencies. Title IX is just one of these." However, "if Congress continues to express interest in Title IX, then a larger percentage of AID funds will go into Title IX activities."

f) Criticism of Agency Handling of Title IX

There was little awareness of any formal Agency response in this group. The members were highly critical of the literature written by the Agency on Title IX at which they had looked. It was called "vague", "irrelevant", etc. This group was also suspicious of a pressure group building up in the Agency for Title IX. "The people who make the presentation to Congress want a maximum amount of Title IX activity - for their own presentation's sake. The problem of whether we can 'afford' Title IX must be resolved at the field level. Then, later, there is a blending of views between Washington and the

field." Finally, there was the following criticism: "We Americans are excited about influencing political development, but we don't know how to do it. Political development moves on the vehicle of economic development. The recipient doesn't like what he hears about our own political situation - the prejudice, the race riots, etc. It is sometimes good to admit that we don't have all the answers."

B. Title IX Points to a New Analysis in Agency Programming

There were only two respondents in the control group who had any conception of Title IX as demanding a new analysis. One had a favorable reaction to Title IX in this respect, and the other a negative reaction. It is fairly easy to detect why these men had this conception of Title IX, it is more difficult to determine the reason for their different reactions to it. Of all the members in the control group, these men were the only two who had had contact with the Title IX Division to any great degree. One man was chief of the Development Administration Division in the Office of Program and Policy Coordination, the same office where the Title IX Division was located. He had had numerous conversations with members of the Division. The other man, chief of the Planning Division in the Africa Regional Bureau, had been an original member of the Intra-Agency Committee, but had dropped out by sending substitutes after two or three meetings.

1. Positive

a) Composition of the Group

This man, as described above, was located in the Office of Program and Policy Coordination. His major concern was the public administration programs of the Agency, and he had been trained in political science and public administration. He had been with the Agency for about fifteen years and was in his forties. He had not been stationed abroad during his sojourn in the Agency. He had recently had a year at the Johns Hopkins School of International Affairs, and was acquainted with the field of political development and inter-disciplinary analysis.

b) Definition of Title IX

There was some ambiguity in this man's definition of Title IX. A new type of analysis was a dominant strain in his conception, but there were other strains also. For instance, he stated that "What we need is more systems analysis. None of our work can exist in a vacuum - it is part of the political process around it." This appears to be a clear-cut definition of Title IX as analysis. But later in the interview, he says that "Title IX is only one priority among many. Development should be our major goal." And again, "When I interview a man from the field, Title IX is only one of a number of questions I ask him about. Local institutional development is only one of several things we are interested in."

This man seems to have a conception of Title IX both as interrelated analysis, applicable to all of AID's work, and as local institutional development, applicable only in certain situations. This brings some confusion to his responses. Nevertheless, this man had a very enthusiastic attitude toward the rather "fuzzy" concept he had of Title IX. He felt that it was "very exciting". "My background leads to this, I guess." He stated that he wished he could devote full-time to Title IX analysis.

c) Concrete Suggestions for the Implementation of Title IX

As with other staff officers, this man felt that public administration, the major concern of his own office, held an important key to the implementation of Title IX. Title IX, in his mind, indicated building up local governments, but he felt that this could only be done indirectly. "We should work with groups not directly under the central government. I don't think we can promote local governments directly, but what we can do is help those institutions, such as schools of public administration in the less developed countries, which, in turn, have an effect on local governments."

One of the most interesting suggestions made by anyone, with regard to the analysis dimension of Title IX, came from this man. He felt that there should be assigned certain people in each mission the analytic task of examining whether particular projects fulfilled Title IX at the local level. "Was popular participation encouraged?"

"What was the quality of this participation?" "Was there institutional development as a result of the project?" "How did it operate?" These were the questions to be asked at the level of particular projects.

Then, there would be others assigned to look at the "whole integrated macro-economic and political scene" in a particular country and decide what the top priorities were for the overall development of the country. Finally there would be someone who had perspective on both levels, to tie the two together - to make sure that particular projects tie into overall priorities. This would insure AID's responsiveness to Title IX at both the project level and in its entire effect on the country as a whole.

d) Problems in Implementing Title IX

The problems this man identifies are definitely related to his conception of Title IX as a new analysis, and resemble those given by Intra-Agency Committee members with the same conception of Title IX. Below is a sampling from his interview:

1. "AID is organized into traditional boxes - there is no general realization of anything."

2. "The big problem with Title IX is developing criteria. How do we know when something is successful in a Title IX sense?"

3. "We don't know how to fit Title IX into the programming process. What are Title IX considerations? What would effective programming for them consist of ?"

4. "There is an enormous problem of re-education in the Agency. Re-education is essentially a problem in or-

ganizational behavior and communications within the bureaucracy. Policies are not self-executing. They won't trickle down to the field missions or to the recipient country scene without lots of change and effort."

The themes of analysis, programming, developing criteria, and re-education of Agency personnel were also clearly apparent in the Intra-Agency Committee Group having a similar definition of Title IX.

e) Future of Title IX in the Agency

This man was fairly optimistic about the future of Title IX. In his view, "Title IX will really be implemented when it becomes part of the intellectual baggage of the Agency, i.e., when there is no separation between economic and political requirements." This would require a slow process of education in the Agency. It was already in "the intellectual wind" so to speak, and was just a matter of time before it appealed to more and more "thinking men". It did not require more funds, or even high level commitment to be an eventual part of Agency programming. Thus, its prognosis for success was good.

f) Criticism of Agency Handling of Title IX

Because the Title IX Division's interpretation of the legislation was closely aligned to his own, this man basically approved of what was happening in the Agency with respect to Title IX. He saw two dangers, however. First, those officers working with Title IX in

the Agency and its Congressional sponsors had a vested interest in keeping Title IX a thing apart, in creating a Title IX Division, in labeling projects as Title IX projects, etc. This could prevent Title IX from becoming absorbed in Agency planning. "Title IX needs to become so engrained in the Agency that it disappears altogether. The existence of a piece of legislation, called Title IX, could prevent this."

He saw a second danger - that Title IX will be interpreted too directly. "It must be indirect to be successful." It should be related to other development goals. The Agency should not get involved in political development for its own sake. He foresaw a danger in Title IX in its "over-enthusiastic" handling in the Agency.

2. Negative

a) Composition of the Group

This man had a very similar background to the positive respondent described above. He had also received training in political science and public administration, was about the same age and had spent about the same amount of time in the Agency. He also had not been abroad at all during his career in the Agency. The big difference appears to stem from the fact that this man was associated with a regional bureau, instead of with a staff office. His perspective on Title IX was, consequently, different.

b) Definition of Title IX

This man understood that Title IX was associated with the academic field of political development and resented it on those grounds. His attitude was, "Yes, the political effects of aid are important. But we don't need this amendment and the jargon which it brings into the Agency. We can 'do' Title IX better in our own way."

There is the same defensive reaction which was noted in the first negative group on Title IX. "There is a feeling that we should be giving greater concern for fashioning our aid so that its benefits go directly to the people and don't just 'trickle down.' I think this attitude represents a misconception about U.S. foreign aid. We have been aware of this. A dimension of aid has certainly been concerned with non-economic advancement."

There is an interesting contradiction apparent in many of the interviews in which the respondent is negative toward Title IX. On one hand, he is eager to show how the Agency is already doing Title IX, whether he defines it as grassroots development, new analysis, or whatever. On the other hand, he is eager to show how impossible Title IX is to do , how many problems are involved. This paradox is clearly shown in the two reasons this respondent gives for his objections to Title IX. "First, I object to Title IX because it has been going on in AID for some time. It is not just a latent sentiment, but has actually been quite dominant." And second. "I object to Title IX

because we just can't solve the problems which Congressman Fraser is pointing to. This is a government-to-government Agency. We can't fo political development work."

c) Specific Suggestions for the Implementation of Title IX

Because this respondent was so negative to the way Title IX had been handled so far in the Agency, I asked him what he would do differently in the implementation of Title IX. He felt that the basic problem with Title IX was that it was "still on the fringes in the Agency. The only way it could ever hope to cut "to the heart" of Agency programming was to influence key people in the Agency. Consequently, he would take the high-level line people, in the regional bureaus in Washington, and get them together for a day and a half to think hard about how to absorb Title IX into the planning of the Agency. They, then, could influence the Mission operations.

The Agency should not just send out memoes asking, "What are you doing about Title IX?" This accomplishes absolutely nothing and just increases the paperwork of the Missions. This man felt that the Conference to be held at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the summer of 1968 would not serve this purpose.[8] "It will be overloaded with academics. The crucial people won't be there."

[8]Refer to Chapter Five for a discussion of the M.I.T. Conference.

Finally, this man felt that there were people in the Office of Program and Policy Coordination who could help integrate Title IX into the decision-making process. They understood how the Agency operated and could influence decisions. So far, these men had not given Title IX Division the support it needed. They should be tapped immediately.

d) Problems in the Implementation of Title IX

Besides the basic problem that "AID is a government-to-government Agency and cannot do political development work", this respondent cited three other problems. The first concerned the "fadishness" of Title IX. "This Agency is so tired of 'new initiatives' and the like. They go up like fireworks on the Fourth of July and disappear. Title IX is too much like one of these."

Secondly, the approach to Title IX had been too much "across the board". "There is the impression that Title IX should be implemented everywhere. It can't always receive top priority as its sponsors in Congress and in the Agency seem to want. For instance, in Africa, the economic problems are more basic. There is low literacy. Children are dying from malnutrition. These problems need to come first."

The third problem cited by this respondent concerns the handling of Title IX in the Agency. It will be discussed under heading (f).

e) The Future of Title IX in the Agency

This man's prognosis for the future of Title IX was not bright. He stated that it was not a "cause celebre" in the Agency. Only a few people are really interested in it, and they are concerned either because their office had something to gain by it, or they were "political development types", and Title IX appealed to them on academic grounds. So far, these people are on the "fringes" in the Agency, and a great impact has not been made in any sense.

f) Criticism of the Agency's Handling of Title IX

After citing all the objections listed above to Title IX, this respondent finally concluded that "Title IX is not a bad idea, but the Agency has fouled it up completely. I think some of the material we've been asked to look at is absolute junk. There has been bad leadership and poor analysis. There has been no impression made on people in the field. They have been submerged by words from the Title IX Division."

C. Title IX Points to a Revolutionary Foreign Policy Goal

There were two men in the Control Group who felt that Title IX pointed to anew foreign policy goal. One had a positive attitude toward Title IX in this respect, and the other a negative attitude.

1. Positive

a) Composition of the Group

This man had the position of Special Assistant for Political Affairs to the U.S. Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress. As such, he did not consider himself to be part of the AID bureaucracy at all, but stated that his only role was to "feed advice" to the present U.S. coordinator. He did not wish to elaborate on his academic or career background other than to say that he had been involved in "activist politics" in Eastern Europe. He was a man in his forties.

b) Definition of Title IX

This respondent felt that Title IX pointed to the spread of democracy abroad, "which is a goal the United States should be pursuing in our relations with the less developed countries." Some of the phrases he used to describe Title IX paralleled those of the "revolutionaries" on the Intra-Agency Committee. "Actually Title IX deals with our whole foreign policy. How badly do we want to spread democracy abroad? How many resources are we willing to devote to it? How many risks are we willing to take?"

c & d) Problems and Specific Suggestions in the Implementation of Title IX

The problems this man saw and the specific suggestions he gave for the implementation of Title IX are intimately related and consequently will be discussed together. The major problem he saw related to the nature of any government bureaucracy, and indeed, to

human nature in general. He decried the fact that "there are very few real political activitists in the world." AID officials, like bureaucrats all over the world tend to see their job as "simply fulfilling the bureaucratic responsibilities and duties of their offices." At the present time, this means pursuing economic development and not democracy.

The solution to the problem would come only if the high levels of AID personnel changed their orientation and provided direction for the pursuit of democracy in the less developed countries. Because human nature is resistant to change, the only way to implement Title IX is to change the structure of rewards and punishments at AID. "It isn't a question of hiring a lot of new people. AID officials could learn the political skills. They have some of them already. You should see all the 'tricky' things which go on around here. People just need to be oriented to having an impact in the field, instead of in the organization. Bureaucratic goals are now rewarded instead of activism."

e) Future of Title IX in the Agency

In the Intra-Agency Committee, the respondents in this category stressed the importance of high level commitment to the new foreign policy goal proposed by Title IX. They felt, however, that such a commitment was unlikely, and consequently, turned their hopes to individual actions on the part of people in the field. This representative of the Control Group also feels that such high level commitment to the far-reaching goals of Title IX is unlikely. In confirmation of

this fact, he stated that the coordinator of the Alliance for Progress, the man he reports to, is in a position to "do something" about Title IX, and is interested in the legislation. Yet, he, too, is a prisoner of the bureaucracy. "He has to answer questions on the 'Hill,' meet people, review papers for the Secretary of State and the President. He doesn't have time to really do anything for Title IX." It is difficult to see how Title IX can be implemented from the top, if an official who would like to do something and is in a position to do something, can't change anything with regard to the present course pursued by the Agency.

This man did not turn to the hope of individual action as the "salvation of Title IX", but he shared with the "revolutionaries" on the Intra-Agency Committee the feeling that AID should be radically re-vamped. "It is very possible that AID might not be the right place for Title IX. The Agency does not consider itself committed to democratization, but to economic development. Maybe we should take the people interested in Title IX and put them in a separate organization."

f) Criticism of the Agency's Handling of Title IX

This man had no specific criticism of the work of the Title IX Division, and his criticism of the Agency is included in the sections above.

2. Negative

a) Composition of the Group

This respondent was a "regional" operator, chief of the Planning Division for the Near East and South Asia Region. He had received a Ph.D. in economics and had been in the Agency four and one half years. Half of this time he had spent in the field. He was in his early forties.

b) Definition of Title IX

The primary thrust of this man's argument against Title IX concerns its ideological component. Just as the "positive" official described above, felt that AID should be engaged in establishing democracies abroad, this man felt just as strongly that this should not be a primary aim of the Agency. "We say in our general statement of philosophy that we hope we are promoting democratically-oriented governments. But we are not really sure that this is what the less developed countries want or need.

He specifically felt that Title IX might be on the wrong track in supporting local governments. "Our local governments in the United States certainly haven't been better than our central ones. They have been more corrupt. Maybe Title IX is on the wrong track altogether."

c & d) Problems and Specific Suggestions for the Implementation of Title IX

This respondent saw a great many problems in the implementation of Title IX, besides his basic doubt as to its worth as a

foreign policy goal. He felt that Title IX was not AID's "business". First, he stated that it belonged in the domain of the State Department. "We don't train people in democracy in AID. That is the State Department's business." Then he stated that it wasn't the business of the United States at all. "It is really the recipient country's business. It is something like Canada telling us how to handle our race problem. We wouldn't go for that, would we?"

Even though the above comments indicate that this respondent was afraid that Title IX spelled out a far-reaching change in the work of AID, his next comment paradoxically contradicts this. "What is the problem with Title IX? We just don't understand how to do anything differently than we have been doing."

Even more paradoxically, after giving all the above reasons why Title IX was "unrealistic" and "on the wrong track", this respondent came up with a number of specific suggestions on his own as to how Title IX could be implemented. He thus disapproved of Title IX on ideological grounds, but, as a functionary of AID, knew that the legislation had to be implemented, and was ready with his own suggestions in this regard.

First, he was sure that Title IX must be done indirectly. He gave the example of "program-building" and the rural works program in East Pakistan, in which the economic rationale was dominant and the political benefits were an added bonus.[9] This was the ideal type

[9]See Chapter Four for a discussion of the Rural Works Program in East Pakistan.

of Title IX activity. Secondly, the Title IX Division should attempt to understand the work of the Agency from the inside, and not just try to impose something from the outside. Finally, the material from the Title IX Division had been too general. This respondent felt that what was needed was a manual order, giving specific examples of Title IX activities and explaining how Title IX could be done. There was a very strong feeling that Title IX should be based on the experience of the Agency.

D. Support or Rejection of Title IX for Reasons Other Than Content

The major characteristic of this group was their lack of any particular definition of Title IX. This did not, however, preclude their having strong feelings about the legislation on other than definitional grounds. The positive member of this group welcomed Title IX as indicative of valuable Congressional interest in the work of AID, the negative member resented the organizational problems which he felt Title IX brought to the Agency.

1. Positive

a) Composition of the Group

This respondent was a Congressional liaison officer. He had been in the Agency for six years, and before that he had worked on the "Hill" for nine years. He had been trained in political science and was in his thirties. He had been in Washington, D.C. during his entire career.

b) Definition of Title IX

This man's function in the Agency was central to his attitude toward Title IX. As he explained it, his job was to make the work of the Agency understandable and attractive to Congress, and to make Congressional positions comprehensible to the Agency. Sometimes, he said, he felt like a "double agent". He was concerned particularly about improving relations between AID and the "Hill". Consequently, the type of interest shown by the Title IX amendment on the part of Congress was welcomed enthusiastically by him. It was a happy contrast to what, he felt, was the pattern of restrictive amendments and financial probes coming from Congress. This respondent was only vaguely aware of the implications of Title IX, had never been in contact with anyone in the Agency directly responsible for Title IX, and had not formulated his own definition of the legislation.

c & d) Specific Suggestions and Problems in the Implementation of Title IX

The extremely noteworthy thing about this respondent was the action he had taken with respect to Title IX. Without any direction or request, apparently on his own initiative, he had talked to twelve people in the field about Title IX, and had addressed one seminar group in the Agency on the subject. He felt that the younger people in the Agency should think about Title IX, the "management interne"

type, and not the old agricultural advisor. He felt that the internes in the field "could study the institutions existing in a particular country, how good and bad they are, and then AID could try to work with the strongest."

e) Future of Title IX in the Agency

This respondent felt that the great contribution of Title IX was that it offered a fresh approach, a new image for the Agency. He felt that the Agency was "dead on its feet" and badly needed a new look in its relations with Congress. His attitude toward Title IX was a curious mixture of optimism and pessimism. On one hand, he did not think, for the present, Congress was too interested in Title IX. He said that he had recently been to a briefing session in which only one or two Congressmen had heard of Title IX. He also felt that the House Foreign Affairs Committee was not an extremely important Committee, and the members, who had taken the initiative on Title IX were junior members without much power.

However, he could foresee valuable use of Title IX in the future. He went so far as to say that when a reorganization of the Agency came along, Title IX "would stick out like a sore thumb." It would be "an area we have done little with, and it would not require much money. It will definitely get more attention in case of a reorganization." Although there was not much movement behind Title IX at present, it may very well have an important role in the future.

f) Criticism of Agency Handling of Title IX

This man was not well enough acquainted with the work of the Agency with respect to Title IX to make any real criticisms, but he did have the feeling that the Agency had not exploited Title IX as fully as it might in improving its relations with Congress.

2. Negative

a) Composition of the Group

This respondent was a desk officer in the Near East and South Asia region. He had received training in economics and had been in the Agency for five years. He had been located in Washington, D.C. during the entire time. He was in his early thirties.

b) Definition of Title IX

This man gave a definition of Title IX as "something to do with institutional development", but he did not object to it on those grounds. He felt that Title IX was "just another drag" on the Missions. The Missions are required to pay attention to many specific recommendations from Congress and the Executive Branch - such things as the War on Hunger, Labor, Nutrition, and Family Planning. He explained that Title IX is another specific recommendation. "There is no priority given to any of these requests. They are all sent out to the Missions without any statement concerning their importance. If

AID/Washington cannot make choices among the many demands made upon it, then how can it expect the Missions to?" The result, according to this respondent, is "hogwash", with the Missions saying exactly what they think AID/Washington wants to hear.

c & d) Specific Suggestions and Problems in the Implementation of Title IX

According to this respondent, Title IX was really superfluous because, "if the host government is really serious about supporting economic development, the rest will follow." If AID can make sure that the country is growing economically at a rate of 6% or over, there is no need to worry about the political situation. The population will be optimistic, according to this man, and a good political environment will exist.

If the direction of Title IX is superfluous, according to this man, the result of Title IX is actually harmful. "The real problem faced by foreign aid now is that the Agency is being choked to death by special staffs. A good organization would involve concentration on the regional bureaus. Now the Agency has developed huge staff offices to deal with the special interests of Congress and others. We have been running scared in the last couple of years, and now when Congress says to 'jump', we jump." He further says that "a lot of trouble with Title IX comes from an increasing split between the regions and the staffs. I never go to the staff for help, even if I need it. It takes too long. I

don't trust lots of people nosing around in my problems." He thus sees Title IX as contributing to the organizational problems of AID in that another "special staff" has been set up to deal with it as a special concern of Congress.

e) Future of Title IX in the Agency

This respondent was pessimistic about the future of Title IX. He felt that Congress was not very interested in Title IX, and that it might have a harmful effect in our relations with Congress. "It seems to promise that we can do something significant in the area of political development and this is bound to lead to frustration, ... Congress is not enamoured of foreign aid, and will probably end it someday, but right now U.S. foreign policy is too dependent on the various benefits we get from it."

f) Criticism of the Agency's Handling of Title IX

The great objection to Title IX voiced by this respondent was the bureaucratic overloading it caused. Other than this, he made no specific comments regarding the specific work of the Agency on Title IX, and did not appear to be familiar with the material on Title IX.

E. Title IX: An Opportunity to Discuss Strategy and Political Influence

This category is one of the most difficult and fascinating to analyze. The Title IX amendment specifically mentions the development of local governmental and private institutions. Yet the respondents in this category speak of Title IX as high level political pressure aimed at the central government of the recipient country. They are both favorable toward Title IX in this respect.

1. Composition of the Group

It is very significant that both respondents in this group hold high positions in the Agency. They are the two highest officials in the control group. One is the Assistant to the Administrator for Programs, and thus is strategically located in the Administrator's Office with important influence in the Agency. This same respondent has had wide experience in the Agency, and has been a former Mission Director in two important missions. The second respondent is Deputy Assistant Administrator in the East Asia Region and thus has had direct responsibility for line operations in this important area of the world.

The perspective which came from their high positions in the Agency seemed to be the only factor which these two respondents had in common. Time in the Agency, or academic background did not

appear to be crucial factors. One had been in the Agency for twenty years, the other only six. One had been trained in law, the other in economics. One had been abroad for sixteen years, the other had never served in a field position at all.

2. Definition of Title IX

These two men approved of Title IX's interest in the politics of the recipient countries. They fully realized the interrelationship of the factors of development and the importance of institutional development. They do not, however, conclude from this that AID should be "building institutions" in the recipient countries. This, they felt, no outsider could do. Hence they seem to differ from the group advocating grassroots institutional development. They also differ from those advocating a new analysis because they do not say that for every project, political implications should be considered. Instead they say that there should be an overall political strategy, aimed at the governmental elites of the recipient countries. In the words of one respondent, "We need to look for the point of maximum leverage on this problem. We actually have the greatest impact by working on a few key officials in government, say in the Ministry of Finance, than by sending out large numbers of Americans to work in rural institutions."

Although both respondents advocate the political pressure strategy described above, the ultimate goal to be achieved differs in the two interviews. To one man, the goal was basically political.

It was "to get more people in the less developed countries to make decisions about their own futures." To the other man, the goal was economic and social, but the means were political pressure and change. The first man believed in using economic resources "because this is the area of our mutual interest with the less developed countries." But the real function of these economic resources would be to induce political change indirectly by influencing key officials in the recipient country's government. The second man believed in developing a well thought-out political strategy for achieving economic development. This he called developing a "constituency for development." He stated that a lot of Mission Directors use leverage, but they need to be more explicit about their "macro-politics" as he termed it.

3. & 4. Specific Suggestions and Problems in the Implementation of Title IX

There are two different types of specific suggestions given in this group. One concerns the implementation of Title IX in the Agency, and the other concerns implementation in the field. The following are representative of the first type:

1. Title IX needs to be built into programming instructions in the form of questions which raise political issues.

2. In-service training needs to be gradually strengthened. It is very important to get people after they have had some experience in the field to think about these things.

3. We need to get better people who understand the importance of political leverage. This is a very difficult and important skill.

4. Each mission needs to develop a well-organized political strategy. A lot of Mission Directors know how to use leverage, but

they should be more explicit about their macro-politics. It should be written down and then used as a master plan. Everything the Mission does should be placed against it.

Suggestions of the second type are as follows:

1. Title IX should be done indirectly. "In the past we have talked about organizing groups to discuss constitutions and talk about the importance of the rule of law. But we don't know how effective this kind of thing is, and besides it might pose a threat to the regime. However, there is another approach we can take. A lot of businessmen are squeezed between the desire for economic development and the old inefficient ways of doing business. When they feel the squeeze, then we can come in with our lectures on business law, etc. It would deal with the same sort of question as the first type of conference, but it would relate to a concrete need."

2. We need to identify one or two institutions which are providing bottlenecks to the development process and work on them to bring them up to the level of the rest of the instituions in the country.

3. We are too prone to categorize the bad guys and the good guys. This is a static analysis, and doesn't look at future trends. We know that in a situation of extreme disorder in a country, we can't make much progress. The government has to be able to govern. We need to create a sufficient amount of order and then build. In some cases we need an authoritarian government, if it follows constructive policies.

5. Future of Title IX in the Agency

This group's positive attitude toward Title IX is interesting. Rather than actively seking to discover what the Congressional sponsors had in mind, they prefer to define it in terms acceptable to themselves. Thus they are optimistic about Title IX, or rather about the future of "political pressure as a tactic in the aid program." In the words of one respondent, "Title IX has come along in a useful way, at a time

when AID has more experience to pay attention to this dimension."

Both these men had obviously done a great deal of thinking about the political dimension of AID's work and welcomed any indication that other people, especially in Congress, were thinking along similar line. For these men, it was not a question of a "future" for Title IX, but a future for the aid program. In this regard, Title IX was on the "right track".

6. Criticism of the Agency's Handling of Title IX

There was a feeling communicated in these interviews that, although Title IX was on the "right track", those responsible for it in the Agency were not experienced enough to use it to best advantage. As one respondent said, "Title IX is getting bogged down in jargon and a lot of airgrams. The Mission Directors need Title IX, but they don't need airgrams. What they need is some straight talking about political influence, in plain simple English." He went on to say that he had been trying to exert pressure on Mission Directors in his region. "The Mission Director of (x) country is just after greater rice production. He is missing the point entirely. He should be developing a constituency for development. Get people to have a vested interest in development, then they will put pressure on their own government to achieve it."

III. Conclusions: Control Group

A. Conclusions Relating to Sampling Categories

In the concluding section, the same outline will be followed as was used for the conclusions of the Intra-Agency Committee Analysis. First, conclusions relating to sampling categories, such as line-staff differences, academic background, time in the Agency, etc., will be examined. Secondly, conclusions will be drawn relating to the definitional groups.

1. Line vs Staff

The line vs staff differences, which were apparent in the Intra-Agency Committee for Title IX, are even more pronounced in the Control Group. Very significant is the fact that all the negative responses to Title IX came from representative of the regional bureaus, the line organizations of the Agency. All the staff officers in the Control group viewed Title IX with some degree of approval. What are the reasons for this clear split between line and staff? They appear to be related both to the "form" of Title IX, and to its "content". Each shall be examined in turn.

As far as the "form" of Title IX is concerned, the negative line respondents objected to Title IX for two basic reasons - because it was a "new initiative" and because it came from Congress. There is a great feeling of weariness in the Agency, which was reflected in attitudes

toward Title IX, about any new initiatives. There is a "jaded" attitude on the part of many officers interviewed about anything "new". One respondent explained that as good bureaucrats, Agency officials must protect themselves from outside influence and pressure. Otherwise their work would be in a constant state of chaos.

Along with its newness, the source of Title IX is resented. There is a strong feeling among negative members of the Control Group that Congress both misunderstood and criticized the Agency with the passage of Title IX. Several respondents mentioned their belief that if Congress really understood the work of the Agency, Title IX would not have been necessary. Some needed no understanding of Title IX beyond the fact that it was a Congressional initiative to develop a negative feeling toward it.

As far as the content of the legislation is concerned, two contradictory attitudes were apparent. First, the negative members of the Control Group gave numerous reasons why Title IX was impossible to "carry through". The Agency did not know enough about political development to do anything with Title IX. The United States has enough "political development problems" of its own. It was not AID's business to get involved in political development. It was either the State Department's area of concern, or it belonged exclusively to the recipient government. Political development was not central to U.S. purposes in the less developed countries. Title IX might backfire, etc., etc.

The other common refrain among this group was completely contradictory to the first. It was not that Title IX was "impossible", but that AID had been and was doing Title IX already! Several officials spent large portions of their interviews giving specific examples of "Title IX activity" in the countries to which they had been assigned. Often the "We can't do it" - "We are already doing it" dictonomy appeared in the same interview.

What conclusions can we draw from these objections to Title IX. It is apparent that there are objections from regional operators both as to the "form" of Title IX, and as to its "content". In addition is the fact that Title IX requires effort of the regions. Often negative individuals will make statements agreeing with certain aspects of Title IX without relating them to the legislation at all. One objection to Title IX appears to relate simply to the fact that it is a "bother", and requires additional work from the regional and mission representatives. This is felt without regard to the possible merit of its content.

2. Differences in Position Level

There is one important difference between the middle and low level officials and the high level officials of which note should be taken. The attitudes described above are more common of the former officials. All the negative officials were middle or low level. At the higher levels, there is more of a tendency to relate Title IX to the individual respondent's previous experience and thoughts. If necessary, at the high levels,

there is a tendency to "twist" Title IX to support the individual's views. As an example, there appears to be very little logical connection between "macro-politics" as described by two high Agency officials, and the development of institutions spoken of in Title IX. Yet, these individuals have a sympathetic and positive feeling for the legislation, on the basis of the definition they have given to Title IX. The higher level individual is more likely to separate the legislation from the Agency's handling of it, and then proceed to define the goal of the legislation to suit themselves. They, then, can criticize the Agency's handling of it because it does not fit their concept. At the lower levels, this separation is not made and a negative attitude toward any mention of Title IX is the result.

3. Academic Background

As expected , there was a tendency for those with academic background in economics to be more negative than those with other academic backgrounds. Three out of five in the negative group had been trained in economics. But this correlation is much more hazy than at first expected. These men are also all regional operators. More significant appears to be their position in the Agency, than their academic background.

As one high level economist, favorable to Title IX, said, "I think there is a misconception about economists in the Agency. When we talk about investment resources and other such terms, we are

using a short-hand. It doesn't mean that we forget about the other things. I would say that it is hard to find an economist who is not aware of the social and political implications of what he is doing."

4. Time in the Agency

There appeared to be no correlation between the time the individual had been with the Agency and his attitude toward Title IX. The average of the negative group was eleven years and that of the positive group was 9.5 years. The man with the longest time in the Agency had a positive attitude toward Title IX and the man with the next longest time had a negative attitude. Again position in the Agency appears to be the most relevant factor.

B. Conclusions Relating to Definitional Categories

As far as the first three definitional categories are concerned, many of the conclusions derived from the Intra-Agency Committee sample are also applicable to the control group. It is significant that in both the Intra-Agency Committee and the control group, the "grass-roots development" definition of Title IX occurred most frequently. Approximately one half of the members in each group defined the legislation as pointing to increased participation of the people in either the political or economic sphere. It is significant that the popular participation concept, which was dominant among Congressional respondents and gaining ascendency in the Agency, was also the most

frequent definition given in the Control Group. The other four categories of definitions were equally represented in the Control Group, each having two representatives.

The concept of Title IX as "high level pressure aimed at the recipient central government" was unique to the high level officials in the Control Group. It was not represented at all in Congress, among implementors in the Agency, or in the Intra-Agency Committee on Title IX. It is not actually a definition of Title IX, but rather is a means of looking at the other categories by top management officials. Thus it indicates a breath of perspective and a willingness to adapt, not shared by the other advocates of Title IX.

Finally, there is the significant fact that "Title IX as interdisciplinary analysis" is not well represented in the Control Group. Only two men have any conception of Title IX as analysis, and only one is positive with regard to this interpretation.

It is my impression that the great majority of AID officials would not be adverse to the systematic study of political consequences of specific projects, or to the overall political consequences of an aid program in a specific country. But because many of the Control Group became familiar with Title IX through the wording of the legislation, they thought of it in terms of popular participation and democratic institution-building, not analysis. When Title IX is defined as political analysis, it gets away from popular participation. It is a concept which

is difficult to get across to the Agency at large. The one officer in the Control Group who had a positive conception of Title IX as analysis, was located in PPC and was directly in contact with the Title IX Division. The message about Title IX which could really make a difference has not gotten through, it has not even penetrated the entire Intra-Agency Committee.

There is no doubt that the written materials on Title IX have not been widely read, and when read, they have been dismissed as "jargon". What appears to be needed is a different means of communication, other than paper, and a different language, coming from inside AID instead of outside in the academic world. An even more important need is a concrete commitment by top management of the Agency, State Department, and Congress to the type of analysis pointed to by Title IX.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Political Development as a Program Objective of U.S. Foreign Assistance: Summary and Conclusions

This study has focussed on the history and present status of political development as a program objective of U.S. foreign assistance. Its particular point of attention has been Title IX of the 1966 Foreign Assistance Act, which, along with its subsequent amendments, is the latest and most comprehensive directive from Congress in the area of political development.

Political development, particularly as defined as the growth of democracy, has been a continuous rationale given for the various programs of U.S. assistance throughout the past 25 years. In the Marshall Plan, it was assumed that the transfer of economic resources would contribute to political stability. The concept of political development, however, as opposed to political stability, only became relevant when the focus of the aid programs shifted to the less developed world.[1] It then became apparent that these countries had a different set of problems than that of post-war Europe, problems of "development" as opposed to problems of "restoration."

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[1] It could be said that the U.S. attempts to promote a "United States of Europe" through the Marshall Plan was a form of political development.

At first, under Point 4, there was the hope that the provision of technical assistance would provide the necessary catalyst for development. Private foreign investment was to fill the vacuum for capital, and political development would cease to be a problem as economic distress was alleviated. Less developed countries would identify with the political system of their U.S. benefactors, and individual technicians would project a positive image of the "American way of life."

But economic development was slow to result from technical assistance. The U.S. national interest became more directly involved after the Korean War, particularly in those countries around the periphery of the Communist world. Economic development assistance was given under the guise of "defense support", PL. 480, and other such programs. But, as the Communist threat lessened, "mutual security" programs gave way to "economic development" programs. The establishment of the Development Loan Fund in 1957 and the Kennedy reorganization of the aid program in 1961 were clear evidences of this change. A growing body of academic theory gave support to the economic development rationale. Political development, when considered at all, was thought to "move on the vehicle of economic development."

But then, in the middle 1960's, a number of questions began cropping up about U.S. programs of foreign assistance. Certain of these concerned what was termed the "economic orientation" of the

Agency. Did the United States have a vested interest in the economic development of recipient countries? Or was a broader view of development more appropriate? Were we overconcerned with the economic "facet" of development to the detriment of political and social factors? These questions were definitely in the minds of Congressmen Morse and Fraser when they proposed the Title IX amendment in 1966.

The amendment itself was couched in innocuous terms. It focussed on "popular participation" through the development of "democratic private and local governmental institutions." To some Congressmen, the legislation merely reiterated previous Congressional directives concerning loans to small farmers, cooperatives, and community development. To others, it extended previous directives to include all popular participation and institution-building activities. But to at least one sponsor, it was only a "foot in the door" to a comprehensive concern with political development.

The accompanying Congressional Report permitted a broad interpretation of the legislation, and yet, in specifying concrete activities, it only relisted previous Congressional directives. In 1967 and 1968, the Congress added other amendments, largely responding to the particular interests of individual Congressmen. The House Foreign Affairs Committee also held hearings, specifically on communications and rural development in Asia, which reiterated the importance of political development. Several junior members of the

Committee became interested in the amendment and some pressure was exerted on the Agency to implement the legislation.

Interest in political development manifested itself on the Senate side in 1967 and 1968, particularly in connection with a review of the Alliance for Progress held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. A paper on the "political aspects" of the Alliance by a staff consultant stimulated hearings on the subject in which the U.S. Coordinator for the Alliance reiterated the importance of political development.

Meanwhile, the passage of Title IX did not find the Agency for International Development totally unprepared. A small nucleus of interested individuals in the Program Coordination office had exchanged ideas and written papers concerning the inclusion of political development considerations in the aid program. Awareness of the problem had been shown in other quarters, including the top Agency echelon, as shown in a speech given by the Administrator of the Agency in 1964. However, the Agency, as a whole, had little awareness of political development, either as an academic field, or as a practical consideration. This fact was illustrated very well by the survey work done among Agency officials by Robert A. Packenham in 1964.

Within the small nucleus of interested individuals in the Agency, several preliminary ideas had been developed concerning political development and the aid program. These were elaborated upon by the newly-formed Title IX Division and in May, 1967, the Agency was able

to announce to Congress its "policy framework" for Title IX. This policy framework contained four important themes which included:

a) A broad definition of Title IX;

b) A concern with both the capacity of the political system and the processes by which government was organized and administered;

c) A belief that an indirect, programmatic strategy, using economic resources, was the best way to implement the legislation;

d) A reliance on overall political analysis, along with the more traditional economic analysis, to determine the allocation of AID resources.

The initial reaction of Agency implementors was to think about overall strategy rather than act in terms of specific projects. This orientation became diluted as implementation progressed in the Agency. The economics trained supervisors of the Title IX Division felt that a popular participation interpretation of the legislation was more amenable to their work than the overall political analysis deemed so important by the Title IX Division. The Division itself felt under pressure to show some concrete results on Title IX. In addition, the Congressional sponsors were pressuring top Agency officials to show concrete action on Title IX.

The result of these conflicting pressures was that, during the first two years of implementation, a number of "starts" were made in a variety of directions, in research, in training, and in programming

(PPBS analysis). However, few concrete program changes could be pinpointed as a result of Title IX. Likewise, it did not appear that much progress had been made toward "overall political analysis" during the first two years, beyond the May 1967 "general framework".

Therefore the answer to the central question of this study, i.e., "Has political development become a program objective of AID as a result of Title IX?" must be as follows: Political development has been a theme, a rationale, of the aid program throughout its history. It has become a topic of interest, a source of debate, in recent years. It can claim some Congressional and executive branch proponents. But it has not become, in any real sense, an actual program objective of the Agency for International Development at the present time.

The major reasons for this conclusion can be found in Chapters 2, 6 and 7 of this study. The first concerns the diversity of definitions of political development found in the academic community (Chapter 2). In order for political development to become a program objective along the lines envisioned by the Title IX Division, there must be, in existence, objective political development criteria. If U.S. institutions are discarded as a model, if ad hoc judgments of AID officials in the field are deemed inadequate, and if economic development criteria are considered insufficient, there must be something else to fill the theoretical void. At present, the academic theory of political development cannot fill this void.

Secondly, there is no agreement on a political development goal for the Agency among its own officials (Chapters 6 and 7). The Agency implementors, the members of the Intra-Agency Committee, and the representatives of the Control Group presented a multitude of definitions of the Title IX amendment. It is virtually impossible to consider political development a program objective of AID while some of its officials are talking about the development of cooperatives, others are talking about academic analysis, and still others are talking about a revolutionary foreign policy in the less developed countries. The expectations concerning Title IX and the specific suggestions which flow from these diverging definitions are too contradictory to allow confidence in a meaningful implementation of the legislation.

But what of the future possibilities of political development as a program objective of AID. The future of political development is intimately tied to the overall future of the aid program, which is, in turn, intimately tied to a changing view of U.S. national interest in the less developed countries. On the negative side, there is a new isolationism appearing as a result of the war in Vietnam. There is a shifting of national priorities due to the domestic strife of recent years. Indeed, there is fear for the future of the aid program in its present form.

On the positive side, there is the growth of a "new liberalism" which seeks to return power into the hands of the people. There is a new Presidential administration which might find the newness, the emphasis on the private sector, and the potential money-conserving element of Title IX appealing.

Finally, there are new areas of consensus emerging in the Agency as to its objectives and goals. While these do not relate directly to Title IX, the ledger would not be complete without describing their indirect influence. First, there appears to be a growing consensus that the Agency is not just involved in economic development, but in "national development" or "overall modernization." There was an oft-expressed feeling that economic development, by itself, was too limited a term to describe the work of the Agency. Thus, there has been a change in Agency feeling since the 1963-64 period in which Robert Packenham did his interviews.

It was a commonly expressed concept, even to the point of being platitudinous that development was a "multi-faceted" process, with many overlapping areas. In addition, there was the feeling that "national development" should have some components of the democratic process "We are after a more democratic orientation of individuals than are the local level." "We are interested in getting the elites of the country to pay attention to their own poor" - these were typical comments.

From AID's goal as "national development" with democratic overtones, it would appear logical to assume that development should be attacked on a variety of fronts by AID, that more equal attention and resources should be given to all the "facets" of a multi-faceted process. But this is not the consensus which emerged from the interview sample. Quite the contrary - it was felt that the economic facet

and economic resources were the rightful concern of AID. Quite a few respondents seemed to have thought through this apparent contradiction between the goal of national development and the reality of a dominant concern with economics. There was a common feeling that adequate knowledge was not available about these other areas of development. A typical comment was, "We, Americans, are excited about influencing political development, but we don't know how to do it." Another reason given for not becoming directly involved in the other areas of development was that "in our relations with the less developed countries, we must operate in the area of our overlapping interest. This means, in most cases, economic development." There are also the common feeling that economic development itself had beneficial political consequences. Few negative consequences of economic development were mentioned. There was also a feeling that the other areas of development were too sensitive. Finally, there was a feeling that AID activities in the less developed countries must have an economic rationale to be successful. Things undertaken for sociological or long-term political reasons were somehow considered to be unrealistic. Thus there is the commonly accepted goal of AID's work as national development with democratic overtones. But there is also a consensus that, for the variety of reasons cited above, AID's main thrust should remain economic development.

There is one remaining problem which should be highlighted. Whether defined as economic development, national development,

democratic development, or political development, these definitions present a single goal for AID's work. There is still no real conception of AID's work as being part of U.S. foreign policy toward an individual recipient country. This is true, unless such single goals have first priority in every country and each country is as important as every other - a very unrealistic assumption.

It is the conclusion of this paper that political development deserves to be a valid concern of AID officials. But political development as a new rationale, hailed under its own Congressional "Title IX", tends to further separate the aid instrument from overall foreign policy. However, political development as a subtle analytical technique, within AID's programming process, could enhance and improve the performance of foreign aid as an aim of U.S. foreign policy.

It is the above definition of political development which deserves to be pursued in connection with the aid program, and Title IX both helps and hinders it. It helps because it calls into question the economic rationale and focusses attention on the political aspects of development. It hinders because it concentrates on popular participation rather than political analysis and tends to substitute another single goal for U.S. aid programs.

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