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**POLITICAL CULTURE IN ZAMBIA:
A PILOT SURVEY**

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Introduction

For various reasons -- empirical, theoretical, and methodological -- political analysts have revived the concept of political culture.

In the late twentieth-century, the tumultuous events surrounding the demise of the Soviet empire has breathed life into culturalist approaches to the study of politics. What Huntington (1991) has described as the third wave of democratization has often been accompanied by ethnic sub-nationalism, religious fundamentalism, and even civil wars. Responding to these trends, analysts have returned to earlier preoccupations with democratic stability, only now under the rubric of democratic "consolidation". They once again emphasise that, among a range of other important factors, the political attitudes of citizens help to determine the prospects for democracy (e.g. Dahl 1992; Finifter and Mickiewicz, 1992). They wonder whether, especially in poorer countries, a supportive political culture exists to sustain fragile democratic institutions in the long run.

At the same time, political theorists are expressing dissatisfaction with the applicability of economic models of rational choice to the study of politics. In debating the causes of political action, they are falling back on considerations of moral values (e.g. Etzioni, 1988), social capital (e.g. Coleman 1989), and a sense of civic community (e.g. Putnam, 1993). An inductive sociology of politics -- reflecting historical and cultural contexts -- is being deployed to correct for the deductive excesses of political economy. Harry Eckstein (1988, 789) has recently argued that "determining which of the two modes of theorizing and explaining -- the "culturalist" or the "rationalist" -- is likely to give the better results may be the single most important item now on the agenda of political science".

Moreover, there are methodological reasons for the political culture revival. As Almond (1980, 15) candidly reveals, the authors of the classic volume on The Civic Culture (1963) were stimulated by technical breakthroughs in research methods for attitudinal surveys such as sampling, interviewing, scaling, statistical analysis, and computerization. Some thirty years later, transitions from authoritarian rule have created unprecedented opportunities to extend proven quantitative research methods to places where surveys on political topics were previously banned. But, as Seligson has warned (1993, 166), the highest standards of rigor must be applied to the design, execution and analysis of any new round of political attitude surveys in the non-Western world.

In this paper, we report findings on political culture in Zambia in the wake of the multiparty elections of October 1991 which ousted the country's nationalist founding father, Kenneth Kaunda. Data on mass political attitudes were generated by means of a pilot national sample survey (n = 420), the first of its kind in fifteen years (see Ollawa, 1979). The survey, whose methodology is described in an appendix, was preceded by an exploratory series of focus groups (Bratton and Liatto-Katundu, 1993a). Sampling error for the results reported here is plus or minus five percent.

In this paper, we address a simple and conventional set of questions which will be familiar to anyone with even a cursory knowledge of an earlier generation of political culture studies (Almond and Verba 1963; Pye and Verba 1965; and Almond and Verba, 1980). What do people know about their political system? How do they feel about their government and their fellow citizens? Which political values do they hold dear? And, finally, how do they act politically? At the end, we also enquire into Zambian public opinion regarding the political and economic performance of the country's new, democratically elected government.

By listing attitudes first, we do not intend to privilege them or to imply that cognitive, affective and evaluative dispositions always drive action. Indeed, we conclude from the voluminous

literature on the sources of political culture (Barry, 1970; Fagen, 1969; Tucker, 1973; Mainwaring and Viola, 1984; Seligson and Booth, 1993), that culture and structure are interactive; political institutions can enforce patterns of behavior that, in turn, give shape to values. Indeed, we argue that the institutions of a single-party state have inbred a conformist pattern of behaviors that powerfully form the way Zambians think and feel about politics.

This paper is cast descriptively for two reasons. First, we think there is merit in describing phenomena about which little is known, in this case political attitudes as shaped by twenty five years of controlled politics in an African country. And second, we have only just begun the task of data analysis: the survey was conducted in June 1993 and the first results became available in September of the same year. To date, we have conducted crosstabulations mainly on the effects of demographic characteristics on political attitudes. Other analyses will follow. We invite comments, especially those that identify interesting avenues of inquiry.

POLITICAL ORIENTATION

Interest in Politics

The survey provides prima facie evidence that a solid majority of Zambians is attitudinally predisposed to become active citizens. Two-thirds of the survey respondents (66.6%) considered themselves somewhat or very "interested in politics". An almost identical proportion (68.0%) said that they "often" or "sometimes" discuss politics with other people. In sum, Zambians in 1993 were not inherently apathetic; they were primed for mobilization into political roles though, as will be shown later, this potential for participation has not always been fully realized.

The respondent's gender explains much about basic political orientations: in Zambia, men are much more likely than women to claim interest in politics and to say they engage in political discussion with others¹. Moreover, the data confirm the obvious point that respondents with higher levels of formal education are more likely to discuss politics. But, counter to our initial expectations, interest in politics is higher among rural than urban respondents, perhaps because, as is documented below, the latter have become more cynical about politicians.

The Scope of the Political World

Most Zambians apparently find local politics at the community level to be more relevant than elite politics in national arenas. Asked which political actors are "very important" in their lives, survey respondents most often cited members of their own family (91.7%), members of their own ethnic or language group (72.2%), and traditional leaders such as chiefs and headmen (70.1%). Fewer than half of the survey respondents felt that local government councillors (44.9%) and Members of Parliament (MPs) (46.3%) were "very important" in their lives, though a majority (74.8% and 74.3% respectively) were at least willing to concede that these representatives were at least "somewhat important". Many Zambians thus seem to operate day-to-day in a community-based political arena that remains largely disconnected from, and undisturbed by, the activities of central or local governments.

¹. Any relationship reported in the text reflects a chi-square association that is significant at the .05 level or better. For full statistical details see Bratton and Liatto Katundu, 1993b, Appendices A to F.

It is noteworthy that the salience of public officials in the eyes of ordinary citizens does not decline in a linear fashion from locality to political center. One might have predicted, for example, that local government councillors would be more important than MPs in the daily lives of ordinary Zambians. After all, councillors live in the locality and are responsible for small local government wards rather than large parliamentary constituencies. Yet respondents reported that councillors are no more important in their lives than MPs. We are not willing to argue that councillors are less relevant to constituents than MPs, even though they score lower on the "very important" scale; the difference between councillor and MP scores is within the range of sampling error for the survey. Rather, we hypothesize that citizens, perhaps being well-informed about the poor performance record of local government councils in Zambia, calculate that councillors can do little to help them.

The survey revealed that Zambians regard informal political contacts with "other powerful people in the community" to be just as important as formal interactions with public officials. Half of the respondents (50.1%) said that ties to influential patrons were "very important". Included in this group are businessmen, church leaders and professionals in the public and private sectors. Informal ties between such "big men" and local clients deserve further exploration. In fairness, however, we must mention that respondents nevertheless still reported that, in order "to get something done", they could be more effective by forming a group and stating demands in public (76.6%) than by making "private approaches to influential leaders" (23.4%).

Despite the local political orientation of Zambian citizens, respondents were split (49.4% "yes", 49.4% "No") on the question: "should chiefs and headmen play a part in governing Zambia today"?. Especially among rural respondents, support for a continued political role for traditional leaders is motivated by a concern to improve communication linkages between the locality and the political center, particularly "to represent people to government" (22.5%), but also "to represent government to the people" (14.4%). These observations accord with findings reported from focus groups and elsewhere in this paper of a widespread perception of a lack of adequate opportunities for political representation.

In sum, while many Zambians live in relative political isolation (see Chambers, 1983) they do not necessarily do so voluntarily. Far from "retreating" in response to rapid social change (Merton, cited in Eckstein, 1988, 797), "exiting" due to the decline in the performance of the state (Hirschmann, 1970), or withdrawing to avoid "capture" (Hyden, 1980, 1983), most Zambians are predisposed to participate in politics. But they repeatedly say that Zambian political institutions provide too few opportunities for them to do so.

POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE

Political Information

Zambia's oral culture manifests itself in politics as in other facets of social life. Most Zambians gather political information from the radio rather than from newspapers or other printed sources. The dominance of the airwaves as a source of political information is revealed in numerous survey findings. Whereas 56.8% of households own a radio², only 27.5% regularly buy a newspaper. Whereas 69.0% of respondents sometimes listen to a news bulletin on the radio, only 51.7% ever read

² Our finding on radio ownership closely matches the 57% of households with a working radio set reported in a 1991 survey conducted by the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (Claypole and Daka, 1991, 63).

a newspaper. And, whereas 48.1% of radio listeners tune in to the news every day, only 15.7% of newspaper readers peruse the dailies with the same frequency. Newspaper readers usually see a paper just "several times a week" (39.5%).

The most popular source of political information on radio, among 80.5% of listeners, is the evening Radio Zambia news broadcast. The most widely read newspaper is the government-owned Times of Zambia (39.9% of readers), closely followed by The Daily Mail (32.3%). The independent Weekly Post reaches 20.0% of newspaper reading households, especially in urban areas. Most newspapers have multiple readers, with 42.2% of readers reporting that they share a newspaper bought by another person and 29.4% reporting that they sometimes buy, sometimes share.

Political Knowledge

Knowledge about the identity of political representatives reflects the orientation of many citizens to local politics. Half of the survey respondents could correctly name the incumbent local government councillor (52.3%) and Member of Parliament (50.4%) for their area. Beyond the local arena, knowledge about the identity of major political figures rapidly decays. Basic facts are fairly well known: for example, 69.5% of respondents could name Levy Mwanawasa as the current Vice President of Zambia (though one respondent in Eastern Province thought it was Robert Mugabe!). But a quarter or fewer respondents could correctly identify the Minister for the Province (25.6%) in which they lived and the Minister of Finance (then Ronald Penza) (18.4%).

When asked "what is a local government council supposed to do?", respondents overwhelmingly stressed developmental functions: development in general (16.7%), social welfare (13.8%), road-building and maintenance (13.1%), and provision of domestic water supplies (10.3%). Only 4.0% thought that local government councils offered a forum for the representation and deliberation of local community concerns. Instead, most respondents seemed to see local government as an extended arm of central government, perhaps because local councils in Zambia have long depended on the central government budget for core financial support. When asked whether there is "a difference between the central government and your local government council?", a sizeable minority (42.4%) replied that these institutions were "the same thing".

There was less unanimity among respondents about what the National Assembly should do, with only 19.2% saying it should "solve national development problems". While 24.0% correctly stated that the Assembly is supposed to make and amend laws, some 5.3% mistakenly thought that it should implement laws. Other respondents focussed on the Assembly's functions of representation (10.6% said "represent people") and deliberation (11.5% said "discuss national affairs"). One-fifth of respondents (20.7%) were honest enough to admit that they had no idea what the National Assembly was supposed to do.

Civic organizations also have an uncertain identity in the public consciousness. A mere 15.3% of respondents said they had ever heard of the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP), and one-third of these (36.5%) could not go on to identify FODEP's functions. Of those who had an opinion on what FODEP was "supposed to do", most cited election monitoring (20.6%) or words to the effect of "safeguarding democracy" (20.6%). Very few respondents mentioned civic education (4.8%).

There was considerable confusion among respondents about the distinct functions of political parties and governments. One out of two Zambians (47.0%) apparently believe that a party and a government are "the same thing". This aspect of Zambian political culture is directly traceable to the constitutional, ideological and pragmatic fusion of party and state functions during the single-party Second Republic, 1973-1991. We see this "statist" interpretation of political parties as further evidence that channels for interest articulation and political representation are underdeveloped or blocked.

C. POLITICAL ATTITUDES

Political Authority

In this section of the survey, we wanted to know whether Zambians accepted or questioned prevailing authority relations. We found mixed results, depending on whether respondents were considering general or specific situations. We found a general predilection to defer to entrenched authority, but a willingness to challenge the existing distribution of power in specific situations.

To tap such attitudes, we asked interviewees to respond to a series of statements about political authority on a five-point scale ("strongly agree," "agree," "can't say," "disagree," "strongly disagree"). We report the results by aggregating the responses³.

Generally speaking, Zambians express concern about the erosion of the traditional cultural norms that have maintained order in society. A clear majority (59.5%), especially among rural dwellers, support the notion that "these days in Zambia there is not enough respect for authority" (versus 39.3% opposed). Accordingly, respondents preferred to see political power concentrated in the hands of older people, expressing opposition (57.6%) to the idea that "this country would have fewer problems if young people were given more of a chance to hold public office" (versus 39.3% in support)⁴. We also found widespread deference in political decision-making to educated elites; for instance, most respondents (59.5%) reject the assertion that "people should be permitted to vote, even if they do not fully understand all the issues" (versus 38.8%).

On this last item, one begins to see an elitist and anti-democratic streak in mass political culture. A predilection to curb the voting rights of those who "don't understand all the issues" is especially strong among the young, among urban dwellers, and especially among educated people⁵. This seems to challenge the conventional wisdom that education tends to increase attachment to liberal values (e.g. Hyman, 1975).

Once confronted with specifics, however, many respondents reported more egalitarian political values. There was virtual unanimity among respondents (91.5%, with 69.8% "strongly agree"), for example, that "women should have the same right as men to vote in elections" (versus 6.9%

³. Public support for a statement is calculated by adding "agree" and "strongly agree" responses; public opposition to a statement is calculated from "disagree" plus "strongly disagree" responses.

⁴. Women are especially likely to disagree with young people holding office.

⁵. The chi-square relationship of this item with the respondents education level is significant at the .00000 level.

opposed). A majority also opposed the related proposition, though less resoundingly (76.9%), that "only men should be allowed to run for public office"⁶. We cannot necessarily read these responses as running counter to prevailing political norms, however, since women's equal participation in formal electoral politics has been embodied in the laws of Zambia for at least a generation. But such expressed values do contrast markedly with women's actual access to political power: for example, only 29 women have been elected or appointed to Parliament since independence in 1964.

Again at a general level, most Zambians are willing to countenance an expansion of governmental authority in order to obtain social tranquillity; respondents clearly rejected (56.8%) the general proposition that "the police have too much power in this country" (versus 38.9% in support). But respondents once again qualified such sentiments in specific situations by asserting the rights of the individuals to be protected from arbitrary behavior by government agents. For example, they resoundingly opposed (74.6%) the then Minister of Home Affairs' widely debated proposal that "the police should be allowed to shoot anyone fleeing from the scene of a crime" (versus 24.9% support). They also clearly concurred (73.3%) with the notion that "the government should not be allowed to detain people without first giving them a fair trial" (versus 26.0% opposed). This question may have been particularly meaningful to respondents since the survey was administered just three weeks after President Chiluba had lifted a state of emergency and released political detainees on May 25, 1993.

Corruption and Accountability

In some respects, Zambians feel that they receive fair treatment from public officials. Probably as a consequence of former President Kaunda's policy of balancing political appointments and public investments on ethnic and regional lines, respondents could comfortably concur (75.7%) that "one's tribe makes no difference in politics and government". Almost half of all respondents (46.2%) denied that "the President's region of the country gets more government services than any other region" (36.7% opposed). The unusually large proportion of undecided responses (17.1% "can't say"), however, suggests that opinion is not firmly formed on this item and could easily change.

Respondents had some difficulty (as we do) in distinguishing the legitimate duty of a political representative to "bring home the bacon" from favoritism in the distribution of development resources. Once sampling error is taken into account, respondents were essentially split (54.5% support, 44.0% oppose) on the proposition that "there is nothing wrong with a Minister helping his home village with development projects". They especially favored Ministers contributing money from their "own" pockets.

Any generosity toward public officials largely disappears when direct questions are posed about official corruption. A sweeping majority (70.7%, with 40.7% "strongly") oppose the statement that "bribery is very rare among public officials in Zambia". Indeed, we note the presence of deep cynicism in the Zambian populace about the motivations of political leaders, with almost three out of four respondents (72.5%, 48.9% "strongly") supporting the notion that "most government officials and politicians are mainly concerned with enriching themselves" (24.4% opposed). Respondents diverged on whether "corruption was a worse problem under the old UNIP government than these days". Whereas 43.5% supported this statement, 49.7% opposed (and 6.7% were undecided). Nevertheless, incumbent

⁶. Disagreement with reserving political office-holding for men is positively and significantly related to education.

leaders cannot take comfort from this finding since it indicates that fully half the respondents think that the new regime is more corrupt than the one it replaced.

The social background of respondents goes a long way in explaining attitudes on political accountability. Women and rural dwellers are consistently more likely to give political leaders the benefit of the doubt and to infer honest behavior on the part of public office-holders⁷. By contrast, educated people are more cynical and more likely to suspect corruption⁸.

Political Trust

In the survey, respondents were asked to rank various social groups and political institutions according to how much trust they place in them. On a scale of one to ten, 1 signified a response that "I do not trust them at all" and 10 that "I trust them completely".

Unsurprisingly, Zambians show greatest trust in social groups with whom they have direct personal contact and whom they know best. Respondents reported most trust in persons within their immediate community⁹ (mean score = 7.98), intermediate levels of trust in other Zambians (6.35), and least trust in non-Zambian foreigners (3.81). Within the community, family members are most trusted (9.44) and neighbours least (6.33). The survey did not confirm the focus group finding that female relatives are more trusted than male relatives.

The results on political trust for Zambians from different regions were biased by the ethnic composition of the sample; we await more definitive results from a sample in which Westerners and Northerners are better represented. We nonetheless observed a rather narrow gap in reported levels of trust between a respondent's own ethnic group (7.15) and for Zambians from other regions (6.15), suggesting a real presence of national identity and interethnic tolerance in the country. It will be important to track whether this finding holds up as politicians increasingly promote ethnic identities and exploit ethnic fears as means of electioneering.

Among foreigners, Zaireans are least trusted (2.39) and the British are most trusted (5.22), confirming earlier focus group findings.

The trust trend is reversed for governmental institutions. Interestingly, respondents tended to show less trust in agencies that have a presence in the local community and more trust in distant bodies with which they have little personal contact. For example, the survey revealed somewhat less trust in local government institutions (e.g. police and local government councils, mean score = 6.29) than central government institutions (e.g. National Assembly and Cabinet = 6.61). We interpret this to mean that Zambians are predisposed to put faith in governmental institutions, but that their direct experience with the poor performance of grassroots-level officials has undermined this initial confidence.

⁷. Urban location is positively and significantly related to five of the six questionnaire items on corruption and political accountability. Respondent's gender is related to four of these items.

⁸. Education is positively and significantly related to three of the six accountability items.

⁹. Community is defined here to include family, relatives and neighbors.

The respondents showed considerably more confidence in non-governmental organizations (mean score = 7.45) than they did in the apparatus of the state (6.45). The mean political trust score of 9.00 for the churches describes an attainable target for both civic organizations (FODEP's mean trust score = 5.32) and Zambian public institutions.

Zambians show relatively high levels of trust in the public media, particularly for Radio Zambia (7.88), ZNBC TV (7.17), and the Times of Zambia (7.09). The survey showed lower levels of trust for the Weekly Post (6.46) and the British Broadcasting Corporation World Service, but we consider that these results are contaminated with too many responses from non-readers and non-listeners.

Political Efficacy

Compared with Westerners, Zambians generally share an underlying ethic of solidarity and reciprocity in interpersonal relations. Almost all respondents (90.9%) say they put their "main effort" into improving the lives of their children and younger relatives at the expense of improving their own lives. Respondents also report that they prefer to work in groups (71.5%) rather than alone.

At the same time, most Zambians say they feel unconstrained by a sense of fatalism in which life events are seen to be beyond an individual's influence or control. Most respondents (69.8%) reported actively "try(ing) to plan ahead" and did not subscribe to the view that life outcomes are "a matter of luck". This sense of personal efficacy extends to political affairs, at least within immediate locality of kin, friends and neighbors. A similar proportion of respondents (66.2%) is confident that they can "influence the opinions of others" in discussions about politics.

These data suggest an interesting proposition: collective cultural values may be entirely consistent with an individual's sense of personal and political efficacy. In Zambia, one does not have to express a sense of individual responsibility in order to feel that one can be effective in the world, including the world of politics. Indeed, we hypothesise that collective action in a kinship or community setting provides individuals with a base from which to test political roles, and even launch political careers, in broader local and national arenas.

Respondents reported feeling much more powerless, however, in relation to national politics. Most (66.7%) acknowledged the need to gain political knowledge, agreeing that "government sometimes seem so complicated that I cannot really understand what is going on". Most (59.0%) also rued the ineffectiveness of their efforts at political representation, agreeing that "we are usually unable to make our councillors and MPs listen to us".

To a lesser degree respondents also doubted the capability of national leaders "to solve national problems". Slightly more people (55.5%) saw the government as "not very effective" than saw it as efficacious (44.5%) which would suggest the need for national leaders to do more to gain public confidence.

Political Tolerance

Tolerance of political diversity is a core component of democratic values. The survey suggests that many Zambians possess this particular attribute of democratic citizenship, though residues of intolerant attitudes can still be found.

Take attitudes toward for selected human rights. A clear majority of survey respondents (75.4%) supported the right of freedom of expression, even for those with differing views to themselves, and even if "confusion" resulted from a diversity of opinion. Respondents were less certain about the right of freedom of association, perhaps due again to indoctrination under one-party rule. Only a bare majority (52.3%) agreed that community organizations should be free to form independently without affiliating with the ruling party, a result that could be attributable to sampling error.

On one human rights item, however, respondents gave a contrary signal. With reference to freedom of religion, they convincingly rejected (80.7%) the right of Muslims to form an Islamic political party. This result, the most strongly held opinion in the tolerance battery, was probably influenced by the following facts: most Zambians are Christians, many respondents had never had personal contact with Muslims, and President Chiluba (who is a "born again" Christian fundamentalist) had recently asserted publicly that Zambia was "a Christian country".

Despite such ambiguity about human rights, the respondents clearly favored the accommodative style of politics associated with tolerance of political diversity. For example, they overwhelmingly favored compromise with political opponents (83.4%) rather than blind adherence to "one's own side". Moreover, three-quarters of the respondents (75.4%) condemned the use of coercion to reach political goals, proclaiming that violence is never justified in Zambian politics.

Even at this early stage of democratization in their country, many Zambians express attachment to the idea of democratic governance. As a whole, respondents tended to agree (63.4%) that "the best form of government is a government elected by its people", even when forced to choose between this form of government and an effective government "that gets things done". An even larger majority (74.5%) was willing to credit the political transition of 1991 with the installation of real democratic gains: far from "becoming another single-party state", the current regime was thought to offer Zambian citizens "a real choice among different political parties and candidates".

D. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Associational Life

Zambians are "joiners". When each survey respondent was asked whether he or she was "a member of a community organization such as a church, club, union or cooperative", 83.8% answered affirmatively. The overwhelming majority of these respondents (75.6%) belong to a Christian church, most commonly the Roman Catholic Church (13.6%), the Seventh Day Adventists (10.5%), or the United Church of Zambia (7.1%)¹⁰. Of the remaining voluntary associations, membership is most common in cooperatives (7.1%), sports clubs (3.1%), and trade unions and women's clubs (both 2.4%)¹¹.

¹⁰. These percentages refer to the subsample of members of community organizations, not to the sample as a whole.

¹¹. The figure on union membership may appear low in a country that is associated with powerful trade union movement. Yet, given the fact that only 9.7% of the adult population is formally employed, we are reporting that one in four of these is a union member.

Voluntary association is a relatively recent political phenomenon in Zambia with more than half of the participants (53.9%) belonging to their respective groups for less than ten years. We infer that associational life expanded in the 1980s, especially under the protective umbrella of the churches, as opportunities for political participation were proscribed systematically in the single-party state. We further expect that membership in secular voluntary organizations was encouraged by the political openings of the early 1990s, though may be tapering off by now.

Within their associations, Zambians seem to be reasonably active. Almost two-thirds (64.5%) claimed to attend "all" or "most" association meetings, and more than a quarter (27.6%) said they held positions as association leaders. Considering the large amounts of time ordinary Zambians have to devote to ensuring economic livelihood, it is remarkable to find such high levels of reported political activism at the community level. Further analysis and research is required to confirm the reliability of the finding and to understand its possible positive relationships to economic problem-solving.

Almost half of all association members perceived that their associations work well, citing "no problems". The remainder mentioned, in order of importance, funding constraints, membership apathy, and internal factional conflict. In this regard, voluntary associations in Zambia do not differ from similar organizations in neighboring countries.

Party Identification

Perhaps because, in an earlier era, Zambians were coerced to become members of the United National Independence Party (UNIP), survey respondents showed limited enthusiasm for joining political parties. A full 43.5% of survey respondents insisted that they do not "support a political party", preferring either neutrality or to keep their partisan attachments secret. Of the 56.5% who were willing to publicly associate themselves with a party, the vast majority (86.8%) predictably claimed affiliation with the governing Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). Many MMD supporters are recent "converts" since the time of the 1991 election campaign, and the depth and intensity of their attachments is unknown. Only 36.6% of all respondents (64.7% of party supporters) said that they carry a party membership card, suggesting weak attachments.

Forms of Participation

The 1991 general elections marked the remobilization of many Zambian citizens into national politics. This is partly reflected in the 58.7% who said that they had attended an election rally in the last five years. Also, a remarkably high 25.0% claimed to have "worked for a political candidate or party", though this question was surely misinterpreted by some respondents to mean more casual levels of participation than being an official campaign agent. By the same token, 25.0% ruled out the prospect of ever assisting in an election campaign.

Between elections, mass political participation is quite extensive, but confined largely to community arenas. Two-thirds of respondents (66.9%) reported having attended a community meeting in the past five years, and one-third (32.9%) having gone to a traditional leader such as a headman for help in solving a problem. The data confirm the common sense expectation that rural folk are more likely than urbanites to make representations to traditional leaders. But they also reveal the perhaps less obvious fact that most of these representations are made by men, indicating that problems of political access for women begin at the grassroots.

All other forms of political participation occur infrequently. Only 17.4% of citizens reported having approached a local government councillor for help in solving a problem and only 6.9% had approached an MP. It is noteworthy that councillors are contacted far more often than MPs, but at only half the rate of headmen. We suspect that these patterns reflect the nature of problems experienced by citizens (with headmen fielding many complaints about family and community disputes), and the relative physical proximity of leaders to their constituents (with councillors, though judged unimportant or ineffective, having the virtue of at least being more accessible than MPs).

The low level of contact between constituents and their political representatives is due partly to the fact that, the latter make few constituency visits and schedule few public meetings. Respondents reported that, in the course of the year from mid-1992 to mid-1993, councillors held an average of only 2.02 meetings in their wards, and MPs held an average of 1.77 meetings in their constituencies. Obviously, these mean figures should be used with caution because they mask wide variations between representatives who take their duties seriously and those who don't.

Zambians rarely participate in politics by writing letters to newspapers (6.5%) or joining in peaceful (6.5%) or violent (3.6%) demonstrations. Predictably, educated people are significantly more likely to use written means to express political opinions.

Voter Registration

When eligible voters were asked whether they were registered to vote, only two-thirds (65.1%) answered in the affirmative. The placement of the question on voter registration as the first on the questionnaire may have induced some non-registered voters to feel that they must answer positively, perhaps inflating this survey estimate¹².

Political apathy is a principal reason for non-registration, with approximately one-third of those without a voter's registration card (30.7%) stating that they were "not interested" in voting. A further one-third missed the registration exercise, either because they claimed to be in ill-health (14.3%), absent from the area, (10.7%), "otherwise engaged" (2.9%), or for reasons unspecified (8.6%). The high frequency of illnesses cited suggests a population with a genuinely poor health status; but it is also possible that at least some respondents concocted excuses as a cover for a lack of intention to register. Relatively few respondents reported technical problems, for example being under age at the time of registration (5.7%) or having lost a national registration identification card (10.0%).

Age is a powerful explanatory factor of voter registration in Zambia. Whereas 79.6% of persons aged 45 or older report being registered, only 41.2% of eligible voters aged 26 or younger so report. This is one of the strongest and most significant relationships between a demographic variable and a political behavior or attitude found so far in the data set. The result is largely understandable in terms of the large numbers of young people who came of voting age since the last supplementary voter registration in Zambia in September-October 1990. It points to an urgent need to update the voters' register.

¹². Given that there are some 4.074 million persons in the population of eligible voters in Zambia, then approximately 2.652 million persons would appear to actually registered in 1993. This figure is considerably lower than the official figure of 3.2 million on the electoral rolls in 1991 as reported by the Electoral Commission, Lusaka (NDI, 1992, 33).

Electoral Turnout

Post-election surveys in other countries invariably show that more respondents claim to have voted than are documented in official electoral turnout figures (Clausen, 1968-69). Zambia is no exception. For the October 1991 general elections, just over half of the eligible voters surveyed claimed to have voted (54.9%) whereas just under half of registered voters actually cast a ballot (estimated 45%) (NDI, 1992, 67). For the 1992 local government elections, the claimed participation rate from the survey (39.9%) was almost three times the national turnout figure of 13 percent¹³. These discrepancies may be attributable to the natural human inclination of not wanting to admit one did not engage in the behavior under study, especially where there was an implied moral duty.

Voting behavior varies by gender. Male respondents were more likely than female respondents to say they voted in elections. For example, in the 1992 local government elections, 70.1% of registered males claimed to vote versus 51.9% of registered females. For the 1991 general elections, urban voters turned out in greater proportions than rural voters.

The immediate reason that eligible voters stayed away from the historic multiparty polls of the early 1990s was that they were not registered to vote. This reason accounts for 77.3% of the nonparticipation in 1991 and 58.7% in 1992. In addition, about one of five registered non-voters consistently cited technical obstacles; they explain that they have either lost their voter registration cards¹⁴ or are registered to vote in area other than the one in which they are now living. Despite these reasons, the dramatic indication of voter indifference in the 1992 local government elections demands explanation. For this election, the survey revealed different answers than the focus groups conducted in March 1993. Earlier, we reported that many voters did not vote in 1992 because they said they already felt disillusioned that the new MMD government had not delivered on its promises (Bratton and Katundu, 1993a, 6; see also FODEP, 1993). In the June 1993 survey only 3.1% of respondents said they were disillusioned or had lost interest since the last election. This discrepancy, which may be a function of research methods, remains to be resolved.

E. POLICY PREFERENCES

Economic Knowledge

When interviewees were asked "which national issues do you consider most important to you and your family", by far the most common response concerned the high prices of consumer goods (43.9%), often with specific reference to maize-meal, the staple food. Respondents next referred to inadequate education (11.5%) and health services (9.8%) and to the high prices of agricultural inputs (6.2%). As might be expected, rural and urban dwellers had different concerns¹⁵. Generally, though,

¹³. Calculated from Republic of Zambia, 1992/93 Local Government Elections: Official Election Results (Lusaka, Elections Office, December).

¹⁴. Technically, they should have been able to vote with a substitute certificate in the 1991 elections, though few people knew about this option at the time (NDI, 1992, 35).

¹⁵. Whereas rural dwellers identified the high price of agricultural inputs, urban dwellers stressed the low standards in schools.

survey respondents revealed a profound anxiety about the rising cost and declining standard of living in their country.

Asked to analyse the reasons for rising food prices, respondents sometimes seemed vaguely informed. Just one in ten could point to the withdrawal by government of consumer price subsidies (10.6%), with a greater percentage (22.9%) citing increased costs of production and marketing inputs like fertilizer and fuel. Others cited drought in the 1991/92 growing season (11.0%) or loosely blamed farmers or political leaders (14.6%).

In this vein, many respondents conferred responsibility on "the new government" (i.e. MMD) for creating current economic conditions (39.7%), without at the same time exonerating "the old government" (i.e. UNIP) (33.4%). Even though the majority that blamed MMD could conceivably be due to sampling error, there is no gainsaying the fact that at least one-third of the electorate already regards the new government as the primary cause of their economic plight. In passing, let us also note that very few respondents were willing to lay responsibility at the feet of either the people of Zambia (14.2%) or international financial institutions (5.5%).

Respondents were willing to assume personal responsibility, however, for helping to rehabilitate run-down public services. Asked where the money should come from to improve roads, clinics and water supplies, almost half (47.2%) conceded that taxes would have to be raised. Some open-ended responses implied that such taxes could be broad-based, and not only targetted at "the rich". Few respondents thought the answer lay in foreign aid or loans (16.9%).

Economic Policy Preferences

Zambians appear to be divided over the advisability of the economic reform program on which the Chiluba government has embarked. Survey respondents accepted some aspects of the program, while at the same time rejected others. Overall, there was greater support for fees-for-service and market pricing than for privatization and public sector retrenchment. This suggests that mass publics in countries like Zambia are deeply attached to the public provision of employment and are slow to accept the need for rapid structural adjustments in the economy.

A clear majority of respondents accepted the need to pay for educational services, provided such services improve. Faced with a choice of statements on this subject, 72.5% agreed that "it is better to raise educational standards, even if we have to pay school fees", whereas only 27.3% chose to say that "it is better to have free schooling for our children, even if the quality of education is low".

Notwithstanding mass anxiety about price inflation, a slim majority of respondents is apparently willing to tolerate market pricing for consumer goods as long as such reforms are accompanied by other benefits. Whereas 44.7% think that "it is better to have low prices, even if there are shortages of goods", 54.5% prefer "to have goods in the market, even if the prices are high". Support for market pricing is "soft" (being within the range of sampling error) and could easily be undermined in the face of prolonged price inflation.

A clear majority (60.7%) also thinks that "the Government should encourage foreigners

to invest in Zambia" (38.8% opposed). The supporters of foreign investment said that government policy to this effect will create jobs (27.0%), attract capital (19.4%), and improve the availability of goods (14.3%). The opponents of the policy fear that foreign investment will compromise Zambia's independence (26.4%) ("they will rule us again") or lead to the appropriation of the nation's resources (21.9%)¹⁶.

Respondents were wary about the privatization of public enterprises, saying that they would rather expand government ownership of "factories, businesses and farms" (59.9%) than expand private ownership (39.4%). For at least two reasons, this item requires further research: first, opposition to privatization may be driven by reluctance to sell existing assets to foreigners and, second, some survey enumerators reported difficulty in winning respondent comprehension in local languages of the abstract concepts of public and private ownership.

Respondents had little difficulty understanding the implications of public sector retrenchment and came out firmly opposed to this aspect of the adjustment package. Whereas 32.7% were willing to concede that "the government cannot afford so many public employees and should lay off some of them", more than twice as many respondents (67.3%) proclaimed that "our leaders should provide us with government jobs, even if this is costly to the country". The popular expectation that political patrons will deliver public employment may be one of the deepest attitudinal legacies of one-party rule, and will be one of the slowest to change.

(Post) Materialism

Inglehart (1971) has predicted that mass populations in industrial societies, especially younger cohorts, are likely to display a "post-materialist" set of values which emphasises individual freedom, self-expression and the quality of life. These post-materialist values are posited to be conducive to democratization. Inglehart and Abramson (1993) further propose that the value priorities of poorer populations in pre-industrial societies with low GNPs will reflect "materialist" preoccupation with economic and physical security. Even so, they expect to find higher proportions of postmaterialists among younger people, "provided that the given society has had sufficient economic growth during the past four or five decades so that the younger cohorts have experienced significantly greater economic security during their (formative) pre-adult years" than older generations (pp. 19-20). Results from the 1990-91 World Values Survey conducted in Nigeria confirm these expectations. The data show both high levels of materialist values and negligible intergenerational value differences, which the authors attribute to the fact that Nigeria had "virtually no increase in real income per capita since the 1960s" (p.22).

We included one item from the World Values Survey battery on postmaterialism in the Zambia political attitudes questionnaire. Respondents were asked to choose from a list of policy options the "top priority...goals for the nation...over the next ten years". They gave their first choice as follows: fighting rising prices (54.2%), maintaining order in the nation (32.3%), giving people more say in government decisions (8.2%), and protecting freedom of speech (4.6%). Materialist preferences clearly predominated. And, as in Nigeria, we could find no significant intergenerational value differences in Zambia, a country in which per capita national income declined by 2.1 percent over the last two decades (World Bank, 1993).

¹⁶. The percentages are calculated from the supporter and opponent subsamples (n = 252 and n = 155 respectively), rather than from the total number of valid responses listed in the table (n = 408).

Instead, a respondent's party identification is apparently important in his or her orientation toward postmaterial values. MMD supporters are much more likely than UNIP supporters to give first priority to protection of rights to free speech and political participation.

Let us follow up on the expressed concern about lawlessness, identified as the respondents' second highest policy priority. Two-thirds (67.8%) said that crime was "a major problem" in their lives. Those who reported prevalent crime had adjusted behavior by restricting their movements, especially at night (29.6%), becoming "more fearful" (19.5%), and taking anti-theft measures to protect their property (13.0%). We infer that crime has become a pressing social problem. Perhaps this a joint consequence of political and economic reform, with crime rising as the state relaxes political controls over society and as marketization undermines living standards in the short run.

Despite these findings, we have reason to question the post-materialist thesis that only the rich can afford to value freedom. For example, it does not square with the evident attachment of many Zambians to the right of free expression, as reported above. We would argue that economic poverty does not displace an individual's need for autonomy and self-actualization. Moreover, Anderson's survey research in Nicaragua (1990) suggests that economic insecurity is not the only factor motivating poor people to become politically active. When we asked Zambians who had participated in politics what they were trying to achieve, they listed a variety of motivations. In order of priority these were "to express a political opinion" (23.4%), "to obtain political information" (16.2%), and "to solve a social problem in the community" (15.1%). All of these non-economic reasons were listed with greater frequency than the goal of "solving an economic problem" (14.0%).

Significant differences in materialist attitudes exist among demographic subgroups. Urban folk are more likely than ruralites to be motivated into politics "to solve an economic problem", but they still cited this reason less frequently than "to solve a community social problem". Women, unlike men, do not seem to be primarily motivated by economic concerns, more often taking political actions "to solve domestic disputes" and "to engage in social interaction". This finding is surprising in the light of other evidence that women have been particularly vulnerable to the effects of economic contraction in Zambia (Geisler and Narrowe, 1990; Mudenda, 1991). As for educated people, their prime motivation for political activity is "to express a political opinion", a post-materialist value.

Until we can explore these issues further, we remain agnostic whether materialist values are the sole, or even main, engine of political mobilization in Zambia.

Life Satisfaction

The respondents in the survey expressed a moderately positive view of their circumstances, with 58.9% saying they were "very" or "fairly" satisfied with the lives they were leading (with 41.1% complaining that they are "not very" or "not at all satisfied"). Respondents are most satisfied with their health status and least satisfied with their financial situations, with the latter factor being the strongest determinant of overall life satisfaction.

How can one interpret a professed satisfaction with life in the midst of objective deprivation? Is this a manifestation of the stereotype of complacency that Westerners sometimes use to portray Zambians? We remain puzzled by this paradox, which warrants further investigation.

Responses were split evenly on whether people felt better or worse about life today than one year ago (49.2% versus 50.6%) and five years ago (50.3% versus 49.6%). Many respondents found difficulty in anticipating the future, perhaps because so much of their attention is devoted to day-to-day economic survival. Again, approximately the same proportions thought that life would get better in the future as thought it would get worse.

Among other factors, we anticipate that life satisfaction and future expectations influence attitudes toward economic reform. Duch (1993) reports from a survey in the former Soviet Union that "those who expect their personal financial situations to deteriorate are more likely to oppose free-market initiatives" (1993, 599). From the Zambian data, we can confirm a strong and significant positive relationship between respondents' optimism about their life prospects and their willingness to tolerate market prices.

Assessments of Government Performance

Finally we turn to public opinion on the performance of the government of the day. Survey respondents were asked: "What are some things MMD has done better than UNIP?". They replied as follows, in order of priority: effectively distributed drought relief (26.0%); improved the availability of consumer goods (19.0%); upgraded the quality of roads and transportation services (8.0%); and raised standards of health care delivery (7.6%). The second most frequent response, however, was that MMD had "done nothing better" (19.2%).

The respondents were also asked: "What are some things MMD has done worse than UNIP?". They replied as follows, in order of priority: allowed the prices of consumer goods to rise (55.1%¹⁷), and "they have done nothing worse" (18.8%).

This apparently mixed view of government performance was clarified somewhat when respondents were asked directly: "What is your overall assessment of the performance of the new MMD government". Opinion broke down thusly: "very good" (16.7%); "good" (27.5%); "fair" (34.1%); "poor" (13.5%); "very poor" (7.7%).

Patterns and trends in popular support for the MMD government are already evident. First, in June 1993, after twenty months of the Chiluba administration, Zambian citizens apparently give their leaders a better than average performance rating.

Second, despite the government's overwhelming victory in urban areas in the historic October 1991 elections, urban dwellers now rate governmental performance less favorably than do rural dwellers. Third, educated Zambians are far more skeptical of the government's achievements than those with primary or no education. Finally, and predictably, political partisanship influences citizen approval of leadership performance: MMD supporters are much more likely than opposition party supporters to think that the government is doing a good job.

At the same time as giving guarded approval to the new regime, Zambian citizens wish to remind the government that a solution to the problem of falling real living standards remains the key to their political satisfaction in the long run. They are also concerned about perceived corruption among

¹⁷ A very high concentration of responses for an open-ended question.

public officials and they desire stronger measures to ensure democratic accountability. Events in Zambia since the survey was conducted, such as the relentless march of inflation and revelations of official corruption at the highest levels, are likely only to have intensified the demands of citizens for clean and capable government.

Conclusions

What, then, is the nature of mass political culture in Zambia in the aftermath of a transition to multiparty politics? While the evidence is mixed, elements of a "proto-democratic" culture can be discerned among citizens. Our survey suggests that clear (and partly overlapping) majorities of Zambians are interested in politics, tolerant of political differences, and mindful of the importance of political accountability. In this regard, the Zambian data complement recent findings from the former Soviet Union about the existence of a constituency for political reform (Gibson and Duch, 1991; Finifter and Misciewicz, 1992; Duch, 1993). There is thus some reason to hope that Zambian citizens may be moved to defend their newly won democratic rights against abuse by power holders.

But proto-democratic values are by no means universally shared by all nationals of Zambia, or even consistently held by individuals. Our preliminary analyses indicate that popular political knowledge, attitudes and behaviors do not hang together into a coherent cultural "syndrome"¹⁸. Instead, Zambia seems to display a thoroughly hybrid political culture which mixes "subject", "parochial", and "participant" orientations (Almond and Verba, 1963; see also Inglehart, 1988; Putnam, 1993).

Specifically, support for democratic values is piecemeal. Take several examples. The expression of egalitarian values by Zambian nationals (e.g. in support of women's political rights) is regularly offset by yearnings for strong authority and political order¹⁹. At the same time as many Zambians profess high levels of interpersonal trust, they also reveal a deep suspicion about the motivations of public officials. While most Zambians can identify prominent political personalities (and enjoy jesting at their foibles), they cannot clearly distinguish the functions of political institutions. And, finally, while they display a sense of political efficacy, most Zambians nonetheless prefer to depend on government for the provision of employment and development.

Perhaps the starkest disjunction in Zambian political culture is between values and action. Contrary to folk wisdom, Zambians are not inherently "apathetic". They did after all, shake off the unpopular Kaunda regime. Instead, the survey results confirm that Zambians are predisposed to participate in politics but that they feel, often on the basis of bitter experience, that channels of participation are blocked. People want to hold their political representatives to account, but they discover that they cannot reach them. They hold strong political preferences but are unable, or do not wish, to vote. Most seriously, Zambians are losing faith that the country possesses leaders with the personal integrity necessary for democratic governance. In the wake of the mass mobilization of 1991 there is a popular tendency to withdraw again from politics. But this trend is driven, not by apathy, but by a cynicism born of disappointed expectations.

¹⁸. For example, the application of reliability analysis (Cronbach's alpha) to batteries of questionnaire items on political authority, accountability, tolerance, and efficacy did not discern the existence of valid "scales".

¹⁹. The desire for order may be interpreted in the light of the violent conflicts that have prevailed in bordering countries such as Angola and Mozambique.

In the face of dissonance among political values, and between values and action, we are led to endorse Eckstein's expectation that "in postcolonial tribal societies...changes in political cultures that occur in response to social discontinuity should initially exhibit considerable 'formlessness'" (1988, 796). Zambian author Naboth Ngulube puts the same point in different words: "many Zambians are now caught in the web of cultural ambiguity...(they) have one leg in the traditional which is dying very fast and another in the modern...in which they cannot function adequately. That is the nature of the cross-roads" (1989, 161-2).

Zambia's political culture is thus an admixture of democratic and hierarchical values. This hybrid culture is a reflection of the transitional state of the country's political institutions. On one hand, democratic values are manifest in an exuberant celebration of free speech through new institutions like a free press, civic organizations, and competitive political parties. On the other hand, habits of submission and conformity also persist because political leaders continue to demand such behavior through the institutions of a dominant party and an unchecked executive. As such, the creation of a democratic political culture remains an unfinished task. Like the formal institutions of democracy in Zambia, democratic values have a fragile presence that still has to be consolidated.

Yet all is not lost. The survey data suggest a few promising directions for analysis and action. First, within the population at large, there are distinct subcultures whose values are somewhat more coherent than average figures reveal. In explaining political attitudes, the most powerful demographic factor is residential location. Urban dwellers consistently express more democratic orientations than their rural cousins. In a large country with unusually high urbanization rates and a state with limited outreach capacities, the urban-rural cultural divide is particularly stark in Zambia. The urban areas, notably the Copperbelt, have always been the fount of political movements in Zambia and any efforts to consolidate democracy are likely to originate in these areas.

Second, the survey reveals that Zambians are active participants in community affairs and voluntary associations (such as churches, sports clubs, unions, and cooperatives). We have not yet determined whether involvement in "civic community" is positively related to a proto-democratic value set, though this question is high on our research agenda. We can report preliminary evidence, however, that membership in community organizations is a stepping stone to political participation in wider national arenas²⁰. This suggests that the consolidation of democratic institutions might best be approached from below, by strengthening the web of voluntary organizations through which citizens can practice self-governance and assemble the political strength to hold their leaders accountable.

At the time of writing, in early 1994, the MMD government was beset by scandals over alleged leadership corruption. In the absence of voluntary adherence to high ethical standards by leaders, the task falls to Zambian citizens to demand accountability. Can a "crisis of public confidence" in Zambian governmental institutions (World Bank/GRZ, 1993) be channelled to positive ends? Can the fragile promise of civic engagement by active citizens counteract the trend of cynical withdrawal of voters from the political system? In important part, the prospects for democracy in Zambia lie in answers to questions like these.

²⁰. Reliability analysis of six participation items revealed an underlying scale of political participation in national politics (Cronbach's alpha = 0.676). Membership in community organizations is positively and significantly related to this scale.

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APPENDIX: SURVEY METHODOLOGY

Survey Activities

- * The survey was planned and executed collaboratively by researchers from Michigan State University (MSU) and the University of Zambia (UNZA)¹. Survey planning and design of a 120-item questionnaire instrument took place in May 1993. Field tests of some questionnaire items had been conducted earlier during focus group interviews conducted in Zambia in February and March, 1993. We undertook further field testing in the environs of Lusaka in the last week of May, following which the length of the questionnaire was significantly reduced (to 100 items) and the wording of selected items was refined. Because the survey was exploratory, we did not opt for extensive precoding and left many items open-ended. The questionnaire was then translated into four local languages (Bemba, Nyanja, Tonga, and Kaonde).
- * In liaison with colleagues from the Central Statistical Office, Lusaka², the authors drew a multistage random sample of survey areas across the country. Maps were prepared for each survey area. The authors then designed a frame for drawing a quota sample in each area. Details of sampling procedure are provided in the next section.
- * Twelve survey enumerators were recruited from UNZA research institutes and from among recent UNZA graduates in the social sciences³. They underwent a three-day training program which emphasised sampling procedure, interview technique, and correct recording of responses. The enumerators were divided into three teams of four persons according to language ability (dubbed the "North", "East" and "South" teams). Each enumerator was given several opportunities to conduct practice interviews in English and local languages. Inter-enumerator reliability was maximized through group discussion to resolve problematic questionnaire items or translations.
- * Survey teams were deployed to the field for ten to twelve days between June 10 and June 21, 1993. Each team covered one urban district and either one and two rural districts. The research sites were Choma District (Southern Province), Kitwe Urban District (Copperbelt Province), Lusaka Urban District (Lusaka Province), Mumbwa District (Central Province), Petauke District (Eastern Province), and Solwezi District (Northwestern Province).
- * In the field, survey supervisors⁴ were responsible for ensuring that the sampling quotas were correctly filled and that questionnaires were accurately completed. Each interview took approximately one hour and each enumerator completed an average of four interviews per day. Supervisors checked the completed questionnaires each evening to try to correct mistakes, capture missing data, and remove contradictory responses. Thanks to the enthusiastic efforts of the field teams in Zambia, data collection was accomplished quickly and accurately.
- * An in-depth debriefing was conducted on June 22, in which supervisors and enumerators made useful recommendations about the administration of sampling and, especially, the rewording of certain questionnaire items. These suggestions will be incorporated into later stages of research.

¹. The authors took shared responsibility for designing the questionnaire, training enumerators, planning survey logistics, and writing this working paper. Beatrice Liatto-Katundu took the lead in implementing the survey and Michael Bratton was responsible for overseeing data entry and conducting data analysis.

². Messrs. Chipako, Banda and Akende, whom we thank.

³. The enumerators were Tekani Chirwa, Herbert Kakonkanya, Peter Mashinkila, Sylvia Michelo, Maybin Mbulo, Paul Mumeno, Lizzie Peme, Samuel Sandi, Richard Shimishi, Felix Simeo, Hudson Unene, John Zulu.

⁴. The field supervisors were Royson Mukwena, Lecturer in Political and Administrative Studies, University of Zambia (UNZA) and Mapanza Nkwilimba, formerly National Coordinator of the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP). Dr. Katundu led the third team.

* The survey data were coded, cleaned, and entered for computer processing in East Lansing, Michigan during the months of July and August by MSU graduate research assistants⁵. Data were entered using Lotus 1-2-3 and, during September 1993, were analysed with SPSS/PC+. A complete data set and multiple copies of the data codebook were sent to UNZA at the end of this period.

Sampling Procedure

* The target population for the survey was eligible voters in Zambia as of June 1993. The sample of survey respondents thus included Zambian citizens who were at least 18 years old on the day of the interview. Non-Zambians, or persons under 18, were excluded.

* The sample was designed to constitute a representative cross-section of the population of eligible voters. By paying careful attention to the representativeness of the sample, we sought to establish grounds on which to make scientifically valid inferences about the population of Zambian citizens as a whole. The accuracy of a sample, and the risk of error that a researcher is willing to accept, are determined primarily by sample size. In selecting the size of our sample, we opted for standard parameters commonly used for the type of categorical (i.e. non-interval) data generated by our survey questions. These parameters included a confidence level of 95 percent and a confidence interval of plus or minus 5 percent. Thus, the reader can be sure in 19 cases out of 20 that a reported mean score on any given variable will differ by no more than 5 percent in either direction from what would have been obtained by interviewing all Zambian adults. Sampling theory allows that, within these parameters, reliable results can be generated with a minimal sample size of 385 (Rea and Parker, 1992, 125-131).

* The sample was designed using a mixture of random and quota methods, in multiple stages. In the first stages, we used random methods to pick provinces, districts, census supervisory areas (CSAs) and standard enumeration areas (SEAs).

* Below the standard enumeration area, at the level of individuals, we employed a quota sampling method to select survey respondents. This was necessary because, according to the Central Statistical Office, there is no readily available list of individuals in Zambia that can serve as a sampling frame. A quota sample identifies potential respondents in the proportions in which they are known to exist in the survey population. We used data from the 1990 census of population and other published statistical sets to discover empirical frequencies for various subgroups in the national (and, where possible, provincial and district) populations.

* Three main criteria were used to establish quotas for sampling: gender, age and social status. First we stratified the population by gender in order to determine how many men and women should be included in the sample. Then we stratified the population of eligible voters by age into three equal-sized groups of "young" (aged 18-26), "middle-aged" (27-44) and "old" (45 years and older). Finally, we stratified the population by social status. In urban areas, we distinguished persons in formal employment on the one hand from those who were either informally employed or unemployed. In rural areas, we attempted to overcome the spatial bias which inhibits researchers from perceiving rural poverty (Chambers, 1983, 13-16). Here we conceived of social status in spatial terms (understanding that location correlates to some degree with socio-economic opportunity and status), distinguishing those who lived "on-the-road" (within 5 kilometres of a main communications artery) versus "off-the-road" (beyond 5 kms.). The quotas were then adjusted to account for subgroup variations due mainly to patterns of population migration, again based on available census data. For example: the sample included more young males in urban areas than rural areas, and a smaller proportion of women than men in formal employment.

* Each of the three interview teams were asked to conduct 140 interviews, for a total planned sample size of 420.

⁵. Julie Alderfer, Philip Alderfer, Kathleen Dowley and Michele Gorman. Special mention is due to Philip Alderfer, who provided valuable technical assistance in software selection, data preparation, and programming for analysis.

interviewers's expectations¹⁴. A survey of political attitudes, particularly in a country that has recently emerged from a political regime in which citizens were urged to suppress their individual preferences in favor of official party views, runs the risk of giving too much weight to non-attitudes. Thus caution is required to avoid assuming that the patterns of attitudes reported here are more tangible and immutable than they really are.

* This caveat is especially important with regard to attitude change. While we are not measuring changes in attitudes in this pilot study, we may wish to do so later. Sample designs that return to the same panel of respondents and questionnaires that use exactly the same questions can help to address the problems of measuring attitudinal change. But inevitably, we run the risk of mistaking ephemeral non-attitudes for real attitude change.

* The more concrete the topic, the more salient it is likely to be to the respondent; the more abstract the ideas to be tapped by the question, the less meaningful the answers. Thus, among the results reported here, the most reliable data probably refer to the respondents's social background, political participation and involvement in associational life. By contrast, data on respondent attitudes about political authority, political accountability, and political tolerance are probably less reliable. Somewhere in between are reported attitudes which, while abstract, evoke strong and clear emotional responses, on topics like policy preferences, political trust, and life satisfaction.

* Respondents in the current survey of political attitudes apparently found the survey questions to be meaningful. People said they were grateful to be asked their opinions on civic life, that no-one had bothered to do so before, and that the survey questions were "the kinds of things we talk about all the time". Many respondents asked the enumerators to present their opinions to the Government of Zambia.

¹⁴. How real are the public attitudes revealed by surveys? People often do not have attitudes on the topics that researchers consider important. Not wanting to appear uninformed, respondents may proffer answers even though they do not understand, or have never thought about, the question. For their part, interviewers, seeking to maximize the amount of useable data, may press respondents to choose answers on an "agree-disagree" scale when their preferred response is "I have never thought about it". According to Weisberg and Bowen, "the respondents are not at fault in these situations; it is the researcher who is asking the questions before the public has had a chance to crystallize their opinions" (1977, 83).