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**ZAMBIA DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE PROJECT**

**Monitoring and Evaluation Studies**

**BASELINE STUDY**

**INSTITUTIONAL PROFILES**

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## **Introduction**

The monitoring and evaluation component of the Zambia Democratic Governance Project begins with a baseline study. The baseline study consists of:

- \* a set of institutional profiles that assess the benchmark status of the institutions targetted for development in the Project; and

- \* a beneficiary profile which summarizes, through a pilot survey of the political attitudes of citizens, the benchmark status of potential Project beneficiaries.

This report presents the institutional profiles.

The report covers the four main components of the Zambia DG Project, namely policy coordination, legislative performance, media independence and civil rights promotion. The relevant institutions for these components are the Cabinet Office, the National Assembly, the Zambia Institute of Mass Communications (together with the Department of Mass Communications, University of Zambia), and the Foundation for Democratic Process. A separate briefing was given on the constitutional reform initiative based in the Ministry of Legal Affairs. A separate memo sketches the institutional capacity of NGOs other than FODEP in the civic education arena.

## **Acknowledgements**

The report was compiled from material provided by various contributors. Tina West and Harry Garnett of Management Systems International provided information and parts of the text for the Cabinet Office section. Jim Polhemus, DG Advisor to USAID/Zambia wrote almost all of the National Assembly section. John Rigby of Associates in Rural Development was responsible for the section on the media institutions. Dave Brown and Bill Leclere of the Institute for Development Research authored the section on FODEP. The report was designed, assembled, and edited by Mike Bratton of Michigan State University.

## **Framework**

In an effort to achieve rigor and consistency, the contributors followed a common framework. The profiles of each institution contain four basic types of information:

1. Updated Institutional Analysis. First, a narrative account is given of developments within the relevant Project institution through June 1993. This account updates the "technical and institutional analysis" from the Project Paper (Annex E) which was written in August 1992. It includes fresh information that has come to light on the strengths and weaknesses of the institution, especially in relation to its capacity to conduct Project

activities. For example, the contributors report on changes in organizational mission, turnover in key personnel, and the emergence of unforeseen budgetary or other capacity constraints. They also discuss whether the leaders of the various institutions understand, agree with, and are committed to, the goals and methods of the Project.

2. Indicators of Project Purpose. The purpose of the Project is to make public decision-making more accessible and effective. These core concepts have been operationalized in the PP Logframe as follows: accessibility means that stakeholders are involved in making public decisions; effectiveness means that public policies are implemented according to stated goals (see PP Logframe, Purpose Level, p.66).

The institutional profiles further operationalize these concepts in relation to each Project institution. The authors identify indicators for each institutions contribution to democratic accessibility and governance effectiveness in Zambia. Where possible, we also provide benchmark data on these purpose indicators as of June 1993. Where the data is an annualized measure, the relevant period is July 1, 1992 to June 30, 1993, except where otherwise indicated. In each case we have tried to provide quantitative values against which Project managers and evaluators can later assess the effect of participating institutions on Project purposes.

In this section we have been guided by the dictum to "measure results, not outputs" (See "The Art of Performance Measurement" in David Osborne and Red Gaebler, Reinventing Government, New York, Plume, 1993, 349-359).

3. Indicators of Project Outputs. In addition to contributing to a shared Project purpose, each participating institution aims at its own distinctive Project outputs (see PP Logframe, Output Level, pp.67-71). Indicators are specified and data provided on the current status of these activities at June 1993. Because the Project is introducing various activities for the first time, the current status may in some cases be "zero". Even so, the means to measure change are specified. Where possible, indicators and data are drawn directly from the workplans and targets that Project consultants have arrived at in consultation with participants in each Project institution.

4. Need for Management Information Systems. For the most part, Project institutions do not currently possess management information systems (MIS) which, as a matter of routine, capture data on institutional performance. Such systems are not only useful to evaluators, but are vital to institutional managers who wish to monitor progress towards Project targets on a day-to-day basis. Thus, the institutional profiles also provide a list of record-keeping systems that should be established within each

institution in order to enable managers and evaluators to do their jobs. The compilers of this report have already begun the process of negotiating agreed-upon performance measures with leaders of participating Project institutions. We recommend that, in future, Project consultants be tasked to continue this process, which includes helping to set up the necessary information systems.

### **Political Context**

The Zambia Democratic Governance Project was designed flexibly to allow adjustments to the rapidly changing political circumstances in a newly democratizing Third World country. Since the DG Project Paper was written, changes have occurred in the political context in Zambia. Trends in the country's political trajectory have become clearer.

The most important political event since the 1991 general elections was the Government's declaration of a State of Emergency on March 4, 1993. On the negative side, the SOE seemed to call into question the government's commitment to the protection of basic human rights and appeared to presage a reversion to the tight political controls of earlier regimes (see Africa Watch, Zambia: Model for Democracy Declares State of Emergency, June 10, 1993). On the positive side, President Chiluba made good on his promises to use emergency powers "surgically": while twenty-six suspected plotters were briefly detained without trial, ordinary citizens retained their newly won rights of freedom of movement and freedom of expression. The Emergency was lifted on May 25, 1993.

During April, President Chiluba moved to consolidate his hold on power with the first major Cabinet reshuffle since the election. The Ministers of Finance, Agriculture, Education and Mines were dropped and the Ministers of Legal Affairs and Information were effectively demoted. The reshuffle appears to have been driven by the President's desire to exercise greater discipline over independent-minded individuals in Cabinet. The net effect has probably been to reduce the influence of the coalitions for far-reaching political and economic reform within the MMD government. Nor did the reshuffle address the popular and press perception that there is a problem of corruption among certain leaders in the senior ranks of the ruling party.

Other trends that are worrisome for the consolidation of democracy include the following:

- \* persistent declines in living standards of ordinary Zambians in the face of raging, triple-digit inflation;
- \* very low voter turnout (below 20 percent) in the November 1992 local government elections and parliamentary by-elections held in 1992 and 1993;

\* the apparent willingness of the Office of the President to bend the rule of law, for example by impeding the Drug Enforcement Commission in its investigations of a Cabinet Minister;

\* the continued fragmentation of the opposition, including the splits within UNIP in the wake of the detention of some of its leaders, and the emergence of multiple small parties, some of which are based on regional, ethnic or linguistic identities.

On balance, the climate for DG work in Zambia is less conducive in June 1993 than as recently as one year ago. There are signs that the window of opportunity for further reform of the Zambian political system is closing. This has direct implications for the implementation of the Zambia Democratic Governance Project. The Cabinet has yet to formally consider and adopt the Project. The President and the new Minister of Legal Affairs now seem reluctant to press ahead aggressively with constitutional reform. Moreover, Government spokespersons have intimated that they do not intend to relinquish control of official media.

On the other hand, there is a considerable degree of commitment to the goals of the Project among top decision-makers in participating Project institutions. This is particularly true for the policy coordination and media independence components in the Cabinet Office and media institutions respectively. For other components, especially civic education in FODEP and constitutional reform in the Ministry of Legal Affairs, turnover of personnel has led to the loss of key Project advocates.

In assessing Project progress, mention must be made of administrative bottlenecks within the AID system. The original design of the DG Project called for housing the management of the Project within the USAID Mission itself, rather than with an independent contractor. This design soon proved unfeasible, as USAID/Zambia encountered difficulties in releasing funds for project start-up. Expected DG support from REDSO/ESA and the Implementing Policy Change (IPC) facility was either incomplete or late. Thus, despite the exemplary efforts of responsible USAID officers, significant time lags have occurred between Project approval and completion of threshold implementing steps for each Project component. Moreover, many aspects of Project implementation have to date been delegated to a changing cast of short-term consultants. The arrival of DG Adviser at post has already had a positive impact on this latter problem. It is to be hoped that the imminent award of a project management agreement to a U.S. HBCU will have a similarly positive effect on the the release of Project funds.

Let us note also that the very act of gathering information for purposes of monitoring and evaluation may run against the grain of the prevailing political culture. Not only has Zambia inherited remnants of a culture of silence from the

Second Republic but the changing political context includes more protective behavior by the new Government. Especially within the major organs of central government -- in this case the Cabinet Office and the National Assembly -- we have encountered a strong propensity on the part of senior officials to hold information close to the chest. Under directions or signals from above, subordinates err on the side of caution in managing, or even compiling, data that could be construed as critical of their institution's performance. This is not a healthy atmosphere for learning about how to build stronger and more open institutions. On one hand, evaluators must be scrupulous to avoiding placing in jeopardy the job or well-being of any Zambian informant. On the other hand, we must nevertheless use opportunities offered by the monitoring and evaluation component of the DG Project to encourage a free and public flow of information. Otherwise, we run the risk of complicity in perpetuating non-democratic forms of governance.

The political environment in Zambia must be constantly monitored. USAID/Zambia should check regularly whether the assumptions and conditions on which the Project is based continue to hold. For example, the Logframe states that the attainment of the Project goal rests on the key assumption that "the Government of the Republic of Zambia maintains or expands its commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law". Moreover, the Project purpose is predicated directly upon the assumption that "GRZ follows through on (its) expressed commitment to revise the Constitution". As of June 1993, there is reason to begin to question the fulfilment of both of these assumptions.

Accordingly, we recommend that USAID/Zambia develop clear criteria for determining exactly when key assumptions can be held to have been violated. The same applies to conditions precedent for launching the second phases of Project components, notably at the National Assembly and ZAMCOM<sup>1</sup>. Whenever a key assumption or condition is not met, USAID/Zambia will have to decide whether Government action (or lack of action) on fundamental matters threatens attainment of Project goals and purposes sufficiently to warrant reconsideration of the future course of a Project component or the entire Project itself.

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<sup>1</sup>. Phase two of the legislative performance component is conditioned upon the Speaker of the National Assembly acting upon recommendations emanating from the Legislative Performance Study Group. The installation of a Media Resources Center, especially including a printing press, is conditional upon ZAMCOM's devolution from Government control.

**BASELINE INSTITUTIONAL PROFILES****CABINET OFFICE****Updated Institutional Analysis**

Shortly after the PP design team finished its work in August 1992, the Secretary to the Cabinet asked the Manpower and Training Division to present a restructuring plan for Cabinet Office. The work was delegated to the UNDP/MDP team, who completed the assignment in mid-September, and added revisions in December. The restructuring plan has been approved by the Secretary to the Cabinet, and has been partially implemented, although it is still waiting for Presidential approval.

The plan streamlines Cabinet Office to three divisions. The first is concerned with Management Development (the old Manpower and Training division) which is responsible for the policy functions that relate to the Secretary to the Cabinet's role as head of the civil service. This division is still charged with implementing the Public Sector Reform Program (also still awaiting Presidential approval, although the government committed to it at the April Consultative Group meeting). The second division is Administration, which plays a housekeeping function for both Cabinet Office and State House. The third is the new Policy Analysis and Coordination Division, which is charged with serving Cabinet. The new division comprises the old Economic and Finance stream (currently, 6 professional staff) and the Cabinet Affairs stream (6 administrative staff, several of whom are about to retire or have been seconded elsewhere). Each division is headed by a Permanent Secretary reporting to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet. Establishment Division (which deals with personnel numbers and record-keeping) and the Office of the Vice President have been clearly separated out of Cabinet Office.

The implications of the restructuring plan for the policy coordination component of the Zambia DG Project are as follows:

- \* the PAC Division now exists in practice with the responsibilities agreed in the Memorandum of Understanding;

- \* the President has not formally approved it, nor the overall Public Sector Reform Program;

- \* the Division has one additional responsibility (taking and producing Cabinet minutes) which was not included in the Memorandum of Understanding, but which is a logical inclusion and, in fact, supports the analysis and coordination functions by exposing staff to the process of policy decision-making in Cabinet meetings;

\* delays in the start of Phase I may have lost USAID consultants the opportunity to influence staffing decisions, but we would probably have had to live with the existing staff anyway. The project consultants will have to plan for gradual replacement and upgrading of staff over the next several years.

\* the restructuring plan calls for a staff of 14, plus support staff, which is significantly larger than the 8 to 10 envisaged in the Memorandum of Understanding, but 1) there is the additional minute-taking function, and 2) the Secretary to the Cabinet indicated on June 11 that he would like to keep the division to the smaller number because he doesn't want people "milling around." Conflict over numbers seems unlikely, and the Terms of Reference now call for 10 professionals. The staff of the Cabinet Affairs staff stand to lose out most; perhaps only two or three will be retained. But many are close to retirement and staff turnover, if it injects new blood, need not be a bad thing.

Two political problems have recently emerged, both related to the current work of the Economics and Finance staff. The staff is effectively serving as the secretariat to the Office of the Vice President; the Secretary to the Cabinet is aware of this work and expects it to go away when the Vice President gets his own staff (after the restructuring plan is formally approved and implemented). The Vice President is known to object to the diminution of his responsibilities relative to those held by the Prime Minister in the Second Republic. This may be part of the reason for presidential delay, and, in any case, may muddy the operations of the new unit if the Vice President continues to make heavy demands on the staff.

The other problem is that, apparently since Dr. Jacob Mwanza left as head of the E & F unit, a lot of work to do with representing Zambia on regional multi- and bilateral organizations, UN agencies and joint commissions has been undertaken by members of the unit, as well as reviewing monthly reports from Zambia's diplomatic missions and coordinating trade missions and reports from Zambians on official missions abroad. The PS reportedly spends up to 7 or 8 months a year out of the country. The IPC got the impression that the Secretary to the Cabinet was unaware of the extent of these activities and the likely resistance of staff to giving them up in favor of the PAC's core activities. Mr. Adamson will have to rule clearly on these peripheral activities and, even if they cannot be transferred elsewhere immediately, then staff time spent on core versus peripheral activities should increase.

There have been no major changes in personnel since last August, although the sad death of Mr Kawonga (PS, Management Development) may slow implementation of the PSRP. Comments by Mr. Adamson, the current Secretary to the Cabinet, indicate that we should not count on his presence for the life of the Project. But, as a short-termer with little to lose, Mr. Adamson can be expected

to fight quite hard for what he thinks is right, including the definition of jurisdiction and activities of the PAC discussed here.

Commitment to the Project remains strong from senior officials in Cabinet Office and from officials interviewed recently in the Ministry of Finance and NCDP. At the moment any problems with commitment to the PAC Division's objectives seem more likely to come from the staff of the old E & F unit than anywhere else. An official from the Vice President's staff attended the Project's June 1 team meeting in Washington and objected strongly to the creation of the Division; we are treating this input with caution.

Capacity constraints show in two areas. Civil servants are miserably paid; there is nothing that project funding can do directly, although some improvements to working conditions should result from project spending, as well as some development of the staff's marketable skills. Retaining good people is likely to be a problem, simply because civil service pay is so bad. The Division's procedures need to be designed with high staff turnover in mind. The second constraint is the unit will be staffed initially with people who have not had training in some crucial areas - basic management skills, basic computer skills, basic process skills plus analytical skills and thorough knowledge of civil service procedures - and the Division's new objectives call for them to become managers, data users and producers, and process coordinators. The work of the new Division will essentially require that professionals - mostly economists, plus the additional skills brought in - become managers.

### **Project Purpose Indicators**

The policy coordination activities of the Cabinet Office contribute directly to the Project purpose of making public decision-making more effective. The new Policy Analysis and Coordination (PAC) Division aims to ensure that policy-making accords with the stated goals of national leaders during both formulation and implementation stages.

Effective policy-making is addressed through the four main responsibilities of the PAC (see PAC Terms of Reference, June 1993). These responsibilities are listed below, followed by relevant indicators marked with an asterisk, and with data on current status provided in parentheses, where available.

1. Analyse Cabinet memoranda submitted by Ministries for consistency with government policy and for readiness to be forwarded to Cabinet.

\* PAC introduces a requirement that Ministry submissions to Cabinet are justified in terms of stated policy.

[Current status: not done. Cabinet Office lacks a comprehensive, computerized data base of government policies against which to test submissions for consistency.]

\* PAC returns increased numbers of Cabinet memoranda to originating Ministry with requests for (a) evidence of supporting data or resources (b) comments from affected Ministries and (c) reformatting in approved Cabinet memo style.

[At present, Cabinet Office staff are reluctant to exercise quality control over a Minister's submissions. Of the approximately 5 agenda memos and 6-7 information memos submitted for each biweekly Cabinet meeting, less than half are judged to be adequately prepared. Yet fewer than 10 percent are actually returned to the originating Ministry.]

\* PAC conducts training seminars with Ministry staff responsible for preparing Cabinet memos.

[Only one such effort to promote quality submissions was undertaken in 1992 and none so far in 1993. Even then, Ministries sent the wrong officials.]

\* PAC activates dormant Cabinet committees and diverts more Cabinet business to them.

[At present, only 6 of the 18 Cabinet committees have ever met since November 1991.]

2. Record Cabinet memos, comments, proceedings and decisions in a timely fashion.

\* PAC eliminates the "disappearance" of Ministerial submissions within Cabinet Office

[The Cabinet Office currently lacks a system to track the movement of memos, comments and supporting files. About one memo in 30 goes missing and may take more than a month to find and process through Cabinet. At June 1993, the average processing period after final submission is 14 days.]

\* PAC improves lead time for distribution of Cabinet memos and comments.

[Presently, Cabinet papers are supposed to be distributed on the Thursday before biweekly Monday Cabinet meetings but are routinely delayed until Friday or Saturday. Thus, Ministers may arrive unprepared at Cabinet meetings.]

\* PAC improves production time for Cabinet minutes.

[It currently takes at least ten days for four staffers and the Secretary and Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet to produce approved minutes.]

3. Monitor the implementation of Cabinet decisions on an ongoing basis

\* PAC interacts with implementing Ministries to negotiate workplans for implementation. These workplans would include specific targets for effectiveness, efficiency, and timeliness of implementation and agreed-upon schedules for regular reporting.

[Currently, Ministries learn of Cabinet decisions in three ways (a) the Minister responsible notes decisions and directly informs his/her Permanent Secretary (b) the Secretary to the Cabinet writes to each PS informing them of decisions that pertain to each Ministry, and (c) the Cabinet office compiles a comprehensive list of all Cabinet decisions for circulation to all Ministries. At this time, however, there is no system in place to follow up on implementation after Ministries have been initially informed.]

[The Cabinet Office has recently commissioned an analysis of the implementation of Cabinet decisions for the five-month period between November 1991 and March 1992. Preliminary evidence from very incomplete data (n = 18 decisions in 3 Ministries, out of the total of 126 decisions taken by Cabinet during this period) suggests that approximately 50% of decisions are implemented fully, 33% are implemented partially, and 17% are not implemented at all. These benchmark figures should be checked and revised when the study is completed. Clearance from the Secretary of the Cabinet will be required to get access to this data.]

4. Coordinate the implementation of Cabinet decisions that involve more than one Ministry by facilitating communication among Ministries.

\* Where more than one Ministry is involved in important national policies, the PS of the PAC chairs meetings of relevant PermSecs to prepare coordinated implementation plans. PAC Policy Analysts are tasked to track implementation and to foster contact between implementors from different Ministries to break bottlenecks.

[Benchmark: this is not currently done.]

The Cabinet Office component will also address the Project purpose of democratic accessibility to the policy process. Greater transparency will be sought, in contrast to the secretive policy making processes of the Second Republic.

- \* More people (in Government, the National Assembly, the press, and the public) know how the policy process works and approve of how it is working. "User" satisfaction interviews would be conducted with Office of the President, Cabinet Ministers, Secretary to the Cabinet, senior civil servants in coordinating institutions and line ministries.

[Benchmark: IPC trip report, June 1993.]

[See also survey data from beneficiary profile on knowledge of political structures and economic policies.]

- \* Implementation workplans contain agreements on how Ministries would publicize policy initiatives and receive citizen feedback.

[Benchmark: this is not currently done.]

#### **Project Output Indicators**

See Logframe

See Workplan for Phase 1 Activities (to be produced by MSI consultants in July 1993)

- \* organizational restructuring
- \* training workshops
- \* equipment procurement, etc.

[Benchmarks at June 1993 = zero.]

#### **Information Systems**

To enable monitoring and evaluation, the following information systems are required by the PAC Division of Cabinet Office:

- \* a data base on government policies and Cabinet decisions
- \* a tracking system for the movement of Cabinet memos within Cabinet Office
- \* implementation workplans from line Ministries with regular reporting schedules

**NATIONAL ASSEMBLY****Updated Institutional Analysis**

Developments in the National Assembly since 1992 serve to underscore the validity of a number of the observations made in the Project Paper Analysis of the National Assembly and to undermine none of them.

\* The Project Paper said "the most important weakness in the National Assembly is that the staff form an independent unit of government not regulated by public service rules" where the "sole power to hire and fire is vested in the Clerk" and staff have "no recourse if they are fired arbitrarily," causing them to be "reluctant to risk their jobs by acting independently and on their own initiative." This was substantiated in the summary dismissal and non-replacement of the Deputy Clerk in early 1993 for reasons which were regarded in some quarters at least as stemming from his initiatives in supporting parliamentary reform. In April-May 1993 there was a staff reorganization and shake-up the details of which appear not to have been promulgated on paper even to members of National Assembly staff and have certainly not been made available to Project personnel. These developments have had a discernible chilling effect on National Assembly staff.

\* The National Assembly continues to experience budgetary problems, exacerbated by the Government's laudable insistence that all of its branches operate on a cash basis. Limited financial resources have served as a constraint on parliamentary reform activities.

\* Public access to the National Assembly continued to be extremely limited.

\* The National Assembly continued to be poorly equipped. It emerges that the library, apart from being inadequately stocked, does not even possess a photocopier.

\* Events following the March 1993 declaration of a State of Emergency exacerbated the appearance of the National Assembly as a less than transparent institution. Parliament played its constitutional role in debating and approving the SOE, but subsequent litigation on behalf of SOE detainees raised questions about whether the proper procedures had been followed. Repeated attempts to serve writs on the Speaker to obtain parliamentary documents which would enable judicial resolution of issues raised were spectacularly unsuccessful, creating the curious situation where Hansards did not appear to be public documents. The lifting of the SOE on 25 May, before parliament reconvened and was faced with the constitutional requirement to vote on continuing the SOE, avoided, at least temporarily, a potentially embarrassing debate.

But the whole episode did nothing to enhance the stature of the National Assembly.

On a more positive note, there were some indications of enthusiasm for legislative reform. The MOU for the Legislative Performance Project Component was signed on 26 February, 1993 but work in preparation for the activities of the Legislative Performance Study Group called for in the MOU was underway as early as November 1992. The LPSG, composed of one Government MP and one UNIP MP, two members of National Assembly staff, and two outsiders and chaired by the Deputy Speaker, commenced its work with a will. By mid-April it had held in excess of 20 meetings, had met with a variety of extra-parliamentary groups, drafted a plan of action which called for a workshop with MPs and a series of seminars in each of the nine provincial capitals, approved 3 of 4 study papers drafted by National Assembly research staff, and, with the assistance of Dr Stanley Bach of the US Congressional Research Service (the first consultant delivered to the National Assembly under the DG Project) agreed upon a series of three comprehensive questionnaires to be administered to MPs, National Assembly staff, and participants in the provincial seminars. The questionnaires, which will if they are properly administered and the resulting massive quantities of data properly coded and processed provide an invaluable resource both for the work of the LPSG and for the Project M&E baseline study, were reported to have been given the blessing of the Speaker. After some procedural delays, USAID had advanced the funds to the National Assembly which would enable the LPSG to carry out its workshops and provincial seminars.

At this stage proceedings ground to a halt. The Deputy Speaker, who had several times announced his determination that the outcome of the LPSG's deliberations should serve as an example for other states in the region, departed on a study tour to Cuba. The Speaker delayed in appointing an acting chair in his stead. In early May the Speaker appointed a new Chair to the LPSG, the Hon. Valentine Kayope, Deputy Minister of Local Government and Housing. The LPSG is gradually regaining its momentum under its new Chair and has already adopted a revised schedule of activities. However, the enthusiasm and interest on the part of its members which had previously characterized proceedings of the LPSG have diminished and the new schedule is already slipping due to uncertainties about when parliament will reconvene and when Provincial Permanent Secretaries, who are seen as playing a key role in arrangements for the Provincial seminars, will be appointed. The National Assembly is behind in its financial reporting to AID for the first tranche of money and has instead been focusing on requests for budget increases. Questions must be raised about the dedication of some of the key players in the National Assembly to the objectives of parliamentary reform.

## Project Purpose Indicators

(See Logframe, Purpose level, p.65.)

The legislative performance component of the Project contributes to Project purposes by enhancing the contribution of legislators to the policy-making process. On the one hand, M.P.s and the constituents they represent, are stakeholders with public policy interests whose enhanced performance will increase accessibility to the policy process. On the other hand, Parliament also exercises oversight over the implementation of government policy and reports its proceedings and findings to the public, in which sense its operations contribute to the effectiveness of the policy process.

Specific performance measures for these purposes include the following:

### 1. Accessibility: MPs exercise enhanced legislative functions

#### 1.(a) MPs introduce increased number of private members bills

\* Number of private members bills introduced. Number of private members bills passed.

[The Logframe refers only to bills introduced. It is essential to go beyond this to the number of such bills adopted. These are simple statistics which can be produced by year. Interpretation of them will require qualitative analysis of obstacles to introduction of private members bills and how these are addressed, if they are, during the Project period.]

#### 1.(b) MPs introduce increased number of amendments to executive branch legislative proposals

\* Number of amendments moved and seconded. Number of amendments passed.

[Again the Logframe refers only to amendments introduced, while the number of amendments passed is equally important. These data can be compiled from Hansard by year. It is important, however, to register the caveat that amendments also take place in Committees, whose proceedings take place in camera and are hence not accessible.]

### 2. Effectiveness: MPs exercise enhanced oversight functions

#### 2.(a) MPs improve quality of scrutiny of executive appointees

\* Number of executive appointees subjected to parliamentary scrutiny. Number ratified. Number rejected.

[The Logframe refers to "annual increment" as an indicator, which is hardly a qualitative one. Some indication of quality could be derived from recording the length and number of contributors to debate on executive appointments. The data are easily generated by year, but on their own would be an indicator of very little, except possibly of turnover through death, disgrace or disillusionment of senior members of the executive branch. In the normal course of events the indicator would peak at the commencement of a government, when the new team are put in place, and subsequent exercise of this parliamentary prerogative would occur only in the face of attrition or, more importantly but less likely, constitutional amendment expanding the scope of the prerogative.]

## 2.(b)MPs improve quality of question time

\* Number of questions asked. Distribution of questions among constituencies and between Government and Opposition.

[Analysis of question time can be carried out non-obtrusively from Hansards, but the resulting measures will be more quantitative than qualitative, as is implied by the Logframe.]

[NOTE: This institutional profile does NOT provide DATA on the above indicators for the baseline starting point of June 1993. Assembling this data will require a prodigious research effort. We propose that this be undertaken retrospectively under the direction of the DG Adviser by the MSU Research Fellow who is due to arrive in Zambia in January 1994.]

## Project Output Indicators

(Derived and elaborated from Logframe Outputs, Project Paper p. 70)

1. Current legislative performance is analyzed. Studies are completed (and recommendations implemented) on:

### 1(a) Legislature's relationship to the executive

\* Study is completed. Recommendations are made. Recommendations are accepted by Speaker. Recommendations are implemented.

[A paper titled "The Relationship of Parliament to Other Decision-Making Institutions. To What Extent Can Members of Parliament Participate Fully in Decision-Making? Are There Factors that Overly Constrain Their Participation?" was completed by NA Research Department in November 1992 and has been adopted by the LPSG. The study is largely descriptive, and includes historical background on the doctrine of separation of powers, but it does identify areas where the relationship between the legislative and executive under the 1991 Constitution is ill-defined and suggests extensions of legislative powers, for example making additional senior appointments subject to legislative ratification. A number of its points are extremely general. The paper, for example, does not

specifically flag the issue of what it means in practice for Cabinet, under Article 51, to be collectively responsible to Parliament. The Report concludes with recommendations most of which would require constitutional amendment. A recommendation to strengthen the committee system could be accomplished internally. The existing study is a useful point of departure, but recommendations need to be more specific. A number of relevant questions are included in the LPSG's questionnaires for MPs, members of National Assembly staff, and participants in the intended series of regional seminars. No progress whatsoever is discernible on implementation.]

#### 1(b) Structure and responsibility of parliamentary committees

\* Study is completed. Recommendations are made. Recommendations are accepted by the Speaker. Recommendations are implemented.

[The NA Research Department has completed an undated paper titled "The Committee System in the Zambian Parliament - An examination of the Current Structure of Committees, their functions and impact and whether they meet the Role that Parliamentary Committees Are Supposed to Play in the Governance of the Country in the Third Republic," which has been adopted by the LPSG. The paper identifies a number of problems and suggests some solutions, although the recommendations are scattered throughout the paper and must be teased out, rather than being clearly enumerated. A number of recommendations would require revision of Standing Orders as well as a substantial infusion of financial and personnel resources and an unprecedented degree of cooperation from the Executive Branch, for example in timely delivery of the Auditor General's report. Among the key recommendations are ones to make public a greater proportion of committee proceedings, all of which are now held in camera, and to make greater use of existing provisions for Select Committees, of which there have been only six between 1977 and 1992. Again the LPSG questionnaires contain a number of relevant questions. There has been no evidence of implementation of any significant changes to the Committee system as yet during the Project period.]

A point which needs to be born in mind in monitoring the enhancement of legislative performance in this as in other areas is the distinction between making more effective use of existing provisions under Standing Orders and making changes which address specific problems. A restructuring of parliamentary committees could be identified and would lend itself to narrative, qualitative evaluation. On the other hand, the creation and reporting of new Select Committee and the number of reports emanating from the existing eight "Watchdog" or Investigatory committees by year would provide a quick nonobtrusive measure of enhancement of legislative performance. A qualitative assessment of the impact of the outputs of such committees on the Executive branch would refine the indicator.

## 1(c) Parliamentary procedures and administration

\* Study is completed. Recommendations are made. Recommendations are accepted by Speaker. Recommendations are implemented.

[The LPSG has received two drafts of a study from the Research Department, which have been sent back for further work. It is possible that a third has not been accepted by the LPSG, but if so it is unseen by the project. Progress in this area is looming as a major problem, for it gets directly at the entrenched powers and interests of the Speaker and the Clerk.]

## 1(d) MPs' Constituency Relations

\* Study is completed. Recommendations are made. Recommendations are accepted by the Speaker. Recommendations are implemented.

[A background paper on "Constituency Relations" was completed by NA Research Department in December 1992 and has been accepted by the LPSG. The paper contains a number of specific recommendations. A number of relevant questions are included in the LPSG's three questionnaires, which can be expected to feed in to the final report of the LPSG to the Speaker. No progress has been made in implementation.]

NOTE: There are CONDITIONS PRECEDENT for all other activities in this component, as listed below (See Project paper, p.64: "Prior to the disbursement of funds relating to any activities... other than for phase one studies, evidence that the phase one studies have been completed, APPROPRIATELY CONSIDERED AND ACTED UPON shall be required.)

2. National Assembly staff provide improved legal, analytical and technical support to MPs.

2(a) National Assembly appoints new staffers.

\* Staff are appointed

[Because conditions precedent have not yet been met for approval of second phase activities, no new staff have been appointed. The Project Paper identifies three appointments which it is intended the Project will support for three years. Since the Project Paper was drafted the Deputy Clerk has been dismissed without having been replaced, and it would appear that there has been a net reduction in National Assembly professional staff. It should be noted that the number of staff alone is not a sufficient indicator; it will be necessary to take in to account the effectiveness of their deployment. Questions on the LPSG's questionnaires relate to this issue.]

## 2(b) MPs and staff participate in overseas study tours

## \* Number, destination and duration of overseas study tours

[No study tours have yet been approved under the second phase of the Project, and no specific arrangements are in view. At the same time, both MPs and staff have made a number, as yet undetermined, of overseas trips under the sponsorship of other donors and have attended meetings of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association and the Interparliamentary Union since the Project Paper was written. It should be possible to obtain reasonably complete data on these, as well as on tours under Project auspices. It should be noted that "overseas" study tours, while they have obvious appeals, may be less useful than tours to regional legislative bodies faced with similar issues stemming from the transition from Westminster to presidential systems and confronting comparable resource constraints.]

## 2(c) Selected library books and periodicals

## \* Additional books and periodicals are placed in Parliamentary Library and are used.

[Ten periodical titles have been identified for placement in the National Assembly Library and procurement is in process. As important as the placement of additional resources in the library is whether they are used. It should be possible to obtain circulation and library use statistics, but this needs to be verified. At present the Library has no photocopying facilities, which results in library materials being razored or removed from the library. A project aim should be the provision of a library photocopying facility with use statistics being maintained which would serve as a crude indicator of utilization of library resources by MPs.]

## 2(d) Legal drafting fund is established

## \* Fund is established and used

[Indicators would include the creation of the fund, establishment of procedures for its use, the amount of the fund, the amount expended by year, and the number of MPs availing themselves of it. Because conditions precedent have not yet been met, no progress whatsoever has been made in this area, and it has not been addressed.]

## 3. National Assembly removes bottlenecks in the production of official documentation

## 3(a) Committee Department installs computer system

- \* Computer system installed, supported and utilized

[Zero progress to date. The Logframe refers only to installation. Obviously, this is not sufficient. There must be training of personnel, effective maintenance, continuous supply of consumables, and utilization.]

- 3(b) Committee Department installs audio recording system

- \* Audic recording system installed, supported and utilized

[Zero progress to date. Same comments as above.]

- 3(c) Committee Department meets committee documentation needs

- \* Committee documentation produced.

[Since committee proceedings take place in camera and only become public at the beginning, when committee memberships are announced, and at the end when committees report, this may be difficult to operationalise. Data resulting from the MP questionnaire should provide a baseline.]

- 3(d) Publications Department installs printing equipment

- \* Printing equipment installed, supported and utilized

[Zero progress to date. Same comments as for 4(a)]

- 3(e) Publications Department adopts business plan

- \* Business plan adopted and followed

[Zero progress to date. Same comment as for 4(a).]

- 3(f) Publications Department improves timeliness and cost recovery of publishing parliamentary debates

[Zero known progress to date.]

#### **MIS Needs**

The MIS needs which might be identified by the project for Project monitoring and evaluation do not necessarily overlap completely with the MIS needs of the National Assembly itself. Accordingly, two sets of MIS needs can be identified:

#### **National Assembly**

To be specifically identified in the course of the project, especially when the three Project supported staff are placed in the National Assembly. Some obvious candidates are:

- \* budget and financial control system
- \* business plan for the Publications department
- \* library use and circulation figures
- \* attendance in the Stranger's gallery.

### Project

A series of "legismetrics" based on nonobtrusive techniques applied to Hansards, parliamentary documents, and public media. A wealth of such measures are possible, and constraints of time and resources suggest the necessity to be selective. At a minimum, it is proposed that systematic data be developed commencing with the beginning of the MMD government and continuing for the life of the project on. To repeat, we propose that this be undertaken retrospectively under the direction of the DG Adviser by the MSU Research Fellow who is due to arrive in Zambia in January 1994.

\* Duration of parliamentary sessions by year. Here it can not necessarily be assumed that more is better. As the background paper on "Constituency Relations" produced by the NA Research Department points out, MPs confront a "dilemma" stemming from their "double role" as constituency "custodian and representative" and member of parliament. Time spent in parliamentary sessions is necessarily at the expense of time spent in the constituency. A parliament in continuous session would be no more ideal than one which meets briefly and infrequently. No particular golden mean is proposed, but the identification of trends over time, which can be quickly and easily tabulated, given the constitutional power of the President to summon and prorogue Parliament at any time, will provide an indicator of legislative performance.

\* Questiontime. Data will be generated from Hansards by year, MP, MP party affiliation, Minister to which questions are addressed, and topic to provide an indicator of the extent to which all constituencies are having their interests articulated in Parliament.

\* Participation. Simple binary data will be generated by year and MP to establish an indicator of the extent to which constituencies are represented and the extent to which particular constituencies or parties are effectively stifled in Parliamentary representation.

\* Media coverage. Column inch coverage of National Assembly reportage in one or more of the print media will be generated by year.

**MEDIA INDEPENDENCE INSTITUTIONS:  
ZAMCOM and UNZA**

**Updated Institutional Analysis**

(a) Generally

Since the completion of the Project Paper there have been significant developments external to the Media Independence Component but of potentially major significance for the Component (and the principal institutions, ZAMCOM/UNZA). These developments, potentially constraining Component progress and clearly leading to some current uncertainty as to effective Component scope, include the following:

- o The interruption in March 1993 of the comprehensive Constitutional Reform effort, which was expected to produce a Constitutional amendment explicitly recognizing freedom of the press;
- o The April 1993 removal of Rodger Chongwe as Minister of Legal Affairs, and of Dipak Patel as Minister of Information and Broadcasting Services. Mr. Patel had been a driving force behind the media reform effort, and the senior governmental contact for the Media Independence Component. Mr. Chongwe had been the senior governmental signatory to the overall Project agreement, and was actively pressing for the constitutional and legislative reforms undergirding the media reform efforts;
- o A current (June 1993) public feud between the Government (up to the level of the President) and the most significant independent newspaper, the Weekly Post; public and private statements by both sides suggest a hardening of respective fears: Government (MMD) fear that independent press attacks threaten Government credibility and public standing; press fears that Government will react to legitimate press criticisms through oppressive measures permitted under existing law and traditional practice in Zambia. In addition to a war of words, newly commenced judicial proceedings<sup>2</sup> heighten tensions concerning media freedom in Zambia.
- o The State House counselor for Press and Media Affairs (Richard Sakala, previously head of the Press Association) has been increasingly harsh in his criticisms of the independent press, the current leadership of the Press Association, and

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<sup>2</sup> The Weekly Post has filed the civil law equivalent of a "freedom of information" request against the Government seeking records on military air crashes; a prominent Cabinet member has threatened law suit against the Post for printing allegations of prior and current corrupt acts.

others who have been promoting media reform in Zambia; the situation is complicated by the fact that Mr. Sakala has established his own newspaper (the Weekly Standard) and at the same time is in the process of being added to the Board's of the State-owned Times, Daily Mail, Zambia Printing, and PrintPak. Thus, there is both the potential of his personal gain from curtailment of competitive private media outlets as well as a disturbing signal that the Government condones a widely perceived conflict of interest.

While there are uncertainties as to the extent of top level Government and MMD commitment to press freedom, there remains a very widespread (and deep) level of support -- including within the MIBS -- for media reform. This includes recent commencement of effort within MIBS staff to develop a comprehensive media policy on parallel track (and consistent with) the substance of the Media Reform Committee (discussed immediately below).

Other relevant events more directly related to the Project and the Media Independence Component include the following:

- o On May 7, 1993, the new Minister of Information and Broadcasting Services (Hon. Remmy Mushota) signed a DG Project Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with USAID/Zambia Mission Director Fred Winch. This MOU was also signed by Bridget Mwanakaoma, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Legal Affairs. This MOU covers Phase I of the Media Independence Project Component of the DG Project (through September 30, 1993). The MOU states that its objective "is to promote freedom of the press and the development of a free and independent media in Zambia." The MOU covers preliminary planning for ZAMCOM's media resource center and training, and for UNZA training. In addition, the MOU provides for Project support of GRZ studies of (i) the legislative environment for media freedom and independence, and (ii) privatization of government-owned media institutions.

[USAID/Zambia will provide this support through short-term technical assistance in July-August secured through the Africa Bureau's DG support contract of ARD/MSI. See discussion below.]

- o In October 1992 (and in part stemming from discussions

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<sup>3</sup> This MOU was initially drafted in November 1992, and a refined draft was prepared in February 1993. The time lag between USAID/Zambia project approval and completion of these threshold implementing steps corresponded with steady closing of the window of opportunity for comprehensive media reform. It would be useful to study the factors, including within the A.I.D. system, that caused the delays.

generated by this Project's design and its approval by USAID/Zambia and the Government), a week-long seminar on "Democracy and the Media" was convened by the MIBS. This widely attended (and well reported) meeting surfaced major issues relevant to media freedom, and identified a broad-based non-State and State coalition supporting comprehensive media reform. The October meeting led to the formation of a 20-member Government/Press/Public Media Reform Commission whose work directly affects (and is affected by) the DG Project Media Independence Component.

A March 1993 draft report of the Media Reform Committee (based on separate reports by various subcommittees) endorses a Constitutional Amendment for Freedom of the Press, major decentralization and privatisation of the media and related industries, establishment of a self-regulatory and non-governmental Media Council, a wide range of legislative reforms to eliminate potential means of governmental constraints on a free press, and the institutional and programmatic course for ZAMCOM specifically intended by the USAID/Zambia DG project.

The work of the Media Reform Committee has lagged in the several months following interruption of the Constitutional Reform efforts and the Ministerial changes described above. However, as of June 1993, the MIBS is actively encouraging completion of the Media Reform Committee's work.

[USAID/Zambia, through the ARD/MSI Africa Bureau DG Support Contract, is supporting an additional meeting of the Media Reform Commission -- tentatively scheduled for July 22-23, 1993 -- and production of its final report, which covers law reform, privatisation, professional standards, etc. Final ARD/MSI reports on this activity should be consulted for further baseline information.]

o In November 1992, ZAMCOM (with support of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation and in conjunction with the MIBS) convened a meeting specifically on media law reform as part of the Media Reform Committee. This law group (chaired by Fred M'membe, Managing Editor of the Weekly Post, and with active participation by Zambian journalists, attorneys, and Governmental officials), has drafted a comprehensive "Media Law of Zambia." The MIBS is reviewing this draft legislation and will provide a report with recommendations for the Cabinet on media reform legislation.

[As per the May 7, 1993 MOU with MIBS, USAID/Zambia will provide short-term TA through the ARD/MSI Africa Bureau contract to assist in preparing these recommendations. This work should be completed in August 1993.]

o In November 1992, the MIBS commissioned (in conjunction with ZPA) a study by Coopers & Lybrand on privatisation of the government-owned media and media-related entities, taking into account various recommendations that had surfaced at the October 1992 meeting on "Democracy and the Media." Coopers & Lybrand project that they will deliver their report on July 2; they will recommend substantial privatization of both print and (eventually) broadcast. This report will be available for review and discussion at the July 22-23 final meeting of the Media Reform Committee. Following this meeting, the MIBS will provide a report with recommendations for the Cabinet on media privatisation.

[As per the May 7, 1993 MOU with MIBS, USAID/Zambia will provide short-term TA through the ARD/MSI Africa Bureau contract to assist in preparing these recommendations. This work should be completed in August 1993.]

o Because of the delays in the proceedings of the Constitutional Reform Commission, the Law Association of Zambia inaugurated its own study on necessary constitutional reform in Zambia. The LAZ report is expected to be completed by mid-July, and will include a recommendation for a constitutional amendment specifically for freedom of the press. The LAZ plans to recommend that this constitutional amendment be considered even in the absence of a comprehensive constitutional reform effort at this stage. There were some indications during the baseline studies that Vice President Mwanawasa (whose former law partner is President of the LAZ) supports renewal of the reform effort.

[Any LAZ recommendations on constitutional press freedom guarantees can be considered at the July 22-23 Media Reform Committee meeting and in the subsequent formulation of MIBS recommendations to Cabinet.]

o As of June 1993, the private sector Weekly Post was actively considering acquiring its own printing press, to meet its needs as well as those of other independent journals as/if they emerge. This development could affect the feasibility of the proposed printing facility through ZAMCOM. At the same time, Weekly Post management advised the baseline study team that USAID funding of a printing press at ZAMCOM might serve to deter establishment of a truly independent printing capacity in Zambia.

(b) Specific ZAMCOM Update

It is important to note that in July 1993, USAID/Zambia will provide TA to Zambia (through the ARD/MSI contract) specifically for (a) feasibility study of the Media Resources Center proposal in this Project, and (b) detailed planning for training activities

under the Project. (This TA was specifically called for in the May 7, 1993 MOU between USAID/Zambia and the MIBS.) The final report of the ARD/MSI team will provide important detailed information on the current institutional state of ZAMCOM and its readiness for its proposed activities under the Project.

There has been no change in ZAMCOM's organizational mission since preparation of the Project Paper. Top management see Zamcom's mission as upgrading the skills and competence of mass media practitioners, technicians, and managers.

There has been no turnover in key personnel at ZAMCOM since preparation of the Project Paper. It should be noted, however, that by early 1994, ZAMCOM's Senior Lecturer (Dr. Jarislav Novotny) will depart Zambia after some ten years of service with ZAMCOM. Dr. Novotny was the Friedrich Naumann Foundation (FNF) representative in Zambia (seconded to ZAMCOM) until 1988, and has been Senior Lecturer for the past five years. We do not foresee any negative impact from the departure of Dr. Novotny, which will mark the end of a decade of residential FNF assistance to ZAMCOM.

No new significant capacity constraints have arisen since the time of the Project Paper other than the death (in March 1993) of ZAMCOM's librarian; a successor has not been recruited, so the library has fallen several months out of date. ZAMCOM expects to hire an interim replacement in late June 1993, although final configuration (and staffing) of the library will await the July 1993 feasibility study on the Media Resources Centre.

During the baseline studies, ZAMCOM officials expressed some concern that there is a relatively small pool of Zambians available as trainers at ZAMCOM. The training needs assessments to be carried out by ARD/MSI at ZAMCOM in July 1993 will explore this more carefully. ZAMCOM management believes that there are substantial media and journalism technical skills available in Zambia, but few of the practitioners have the required training skills. Thus, ZAMCOM intends to engage in "training of trainers" for better exploitation of the Zambian talent.

Since the completion of the Project Paper ZAMCOM has begun to more consciously incorporate gender considerations into its regular course content. ZAMCOM is currently discussing possible training courses in conjunction with the Zambia Media Women's Association (ZAMWA).

The specific financial budgetary issues which must be addressed by ZAMCOM, and will be covered by the July ARD/MSI studies, result from the confluence of the following factors:

- o The extent to which the government will continue to provide financial support to ZAMCOM as and after ZAMCOM is converted into a non-state public institution (assuming that

this recommendation of the Media Reform Committee, supported by MIBS, is approved by Cabinet and the National Assembly); the rationale for continued government funding will be that for the foreseeable future there will be government media personnel (particularly in TV and radio) who will be trained at ZAMCOM;

- o The impact of the ZAMCOM commercialisation program; even prior to a Media Resource Centre, ZAMCOM is now securing some 25% of its operating revenues (i.e., exclusive of capital equipment costs) from user fees and sales of services;

- o The financial impact of the proposed Media Resource Centre, which is intended not only to serve the needs of independent journalists in Zambia but also contribute to ZAMCOM's financial sustainability; and

- o The impact of termination (by 1994) of financial support from the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, including the extent to which prior FNF support will be subsumed by USAID support under this Project.

Interviews with key ZAMCOM personnel during the baseline institutional study -- including with principal MIBS officials involved with ZAMCOM<sup>4</sup>-- reinforce that ZAMCOM leaders fully understand, agree with, and are committed to the goals and methods of the Project. An indication of this was the substantial ZAMCOM and MIBS attention and cooperation during the baseline institutional study, as well as well as the substantial ZAMCOM attention to preparation for the July USAID/Zambia-supported technical assistance activities.

#### (c) Specific UNZA Update

There have been no fundamental changes at UNZA which might affect the Project participation of UNZA's Department of Mass Communication. One development worth noting is the fact that that in January 1994, UNZA will launch a Master's Program in Mass Communications, likely to attract Regional students as well as Zambians. The Department Director (Prof. Francis Kasoma) advises that this will increase both the interest and the capacity of UNZA to participate in research activities in the DG Project's Media Independence Component.

Prof. Kasoma was not actively involved in the 1992 design discussions for this project. In his absence (on sabbatical), UNZA representation in the design phase was the Acting Director, Sister Rose Nyondo. Prof. Kasoma is generally familiar with the Media

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<sup>4</sup> This includes the MIBS Permanent Secretary, Josephine Mapoma, who serves as Chair of the ZAMCOM ruling Council.

Component but is not conversant with the overall Project structure or aims.

UNZA has not, as of June 1993, settled with USAID/Zambia on the full scope of support that UNZA will receive nor the expectations as to its participation. UNZA is currently in negotiation with USAID/Zambia for support (through this Component) of a substantial upgrading of its capacity for training students in desk-top-publishing; their request is for up to 25 terminals. They are also seek Project support for field-oriented equipment (video cameras, portable sound recorders) for the Development Support Communications elements of the new Master's program. They are also seeking Project support to top off the salary of a U.S. Ph.D. in Mass Communications for two year service in helping launch the Master's Program.

There is agreement that two UNZA candidates will be supported for graduate level training in the States. One has already been selected (for a Master's in Broadcast Communications); Prof. Kasoma intends that the other candidate specialize in Print Journalism. The particular aim in this overseas study is to improve UNZA's capacity for education of media managers; Prof. Kasoma believes that their capacity for education of working journalists is reasonably sound at this point.

UNZA is very willing to take on Component research, monitoring and evaluation tasks (through faculty and students, as required). Professor Kasoma expresses particular interest in the following topics:

- o Baseline research on incidence of citizen critique of government and citizen opinion on public policy issues as expressed through the media (State and non-State), with on-going monitoring over time to determine change; and
- o Research on the correlation between media independence and increased governmental transparency, and the ability to track this over time and accounting for significant variables.

#### **Project Purpose Indicators**

The Mass Media Component will support activities (a) to develop independent (non-State) mass media in Zambia, (b) to establish a more open environment in which the independent mass media may operate, and (c) to improve the competence and performance of the mass media generally in Zambia. The Media Independence Component aims with these activities to contribute to the Project purpose of making public decision making more accessible and effective.

The primary participants in this Component will be ZAMCOM and the University of Zambia's Department of Mass Communications. ZAMCOM/UNZA will join with other actors in this Component --

including MIBS and USAID/Zambia -- in supporting the process of generating an enabling environment and opportunities for independent mass media operations in Zambia. ZAMCOM/UNZA as institutions will be guided, and evaluated, in this Project primarily by their contributions to mass media competence. The Component will provide institutional strengthening for both institutions.

Independent, responsible media contribute directly to the Project Purpose of citizen accessibility to public decision-making and only indirectly to the purpose of effectiveness of public decision making. In the discussion below, suggested indicators are marked by asterisk, with baseline information following in brackets.

(a) Enabling Environment for Press Freedom In Zambia

The objective of the Media Independence Component, as reflected in the language of the May 7, 1993 Memorandum of Understanding between the Zambian Government Ministries and USAID, "is to promote freedom of the press and the development of a free and independent media in Zambia."

\* Legal and institutional constraints on media independence are removed.

[Constitutional reform which specifically recognize: freedom of the press -- not enacted as of June 1993.]

[Comprehensive media legislative reform, generally along the lines of the recommendations of the Law subcommittee of the Media Reform Committee; this legislative reform to include amendment of the ZAMCOM legislation<sup>5</sup> to establish ZAMCOM as a non-State public entity -- not enacted as of June 1993.]

[Government enactment and implementation of a program for privatization of State-owned mass media resources, generally along the lines of the recommendations of the Media Reform Committee (and to be set forth in the Coopers & Lybrand privatization study) -- not enacted as of June 1993.]

At the time that this Project was designed and approved by USAID/Zambia and the Government of Zambia in September 1992, the three actions -- constitutional reform, media law reform, media privatization program -- were assumed to be forthcoming, based upon representations by Government officials at the time. As pointed out in the updated institutional analysis above (section 1(a)),

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<sup>5</sup> The Zambia Institute of Mass Communications Act, No. 9 of 1991 (6 September 1991). Amendment of the Act to establish ZAMCOM as an independent entity is not only assume, it is a PRE-CONDITION to the principal ZAMCOM funding under this Project Component.

these steps can no longer be assumed, particularly since the key Government officials who made the representations have been (involuntarily) moved from their positions. USAID/Zambia will have to determine, over time, whether delay or dilution in Government action in these fundamental matters threatens attainment of Project purposes sufficiently to warrant reconsideration of the future course of the Project or the Component.

In accordance with the May 7, 1993 Memorandum of Understanding with the MIBS and the Ministry of Legal Affairs, USAID/Zambia is called upon to take actions in this start-up phase of the Project which will increase the likelihood that these earlier assumptions about the enabling environment for the mass media will be realized. Activities which will be undertaken include the following:

- o Staging (at ZAMCOM) of final meeting of Media Reform Committee (July 1993).
- o Preparation of MIBS "Green Paper" for Cabinet on Media privatization (August 1993).
- o Preparation of MIBS "Green Paper" for Cabinet on Media legislative reform (including free press constitutional amendment and ZAMCOM independent status legislation).

(b) Reduction In State Media Dominance

The mass media in Zambia are predominantly State-owned and managed. A declining share of State-controlled media coverage will indicate greater opportunity for citizens to have objective information on government policies, procedures, actors, and action.

- \* Citizens and journalists have opportunity for increased access to non-State media resources.

[Baseline data:

[(i) Number of mass media outlets as of June 1993:

[State-owned mass media:

National dailies: 2 English (Times of Zambia  
and Zambia Daily Mail)

Vernacular monthlies: 6 (Intanda, Liseli, Ngoma,  
Tsopano, Lukanga, Imbila)<sup>6</sup>

Television: 1 English

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<sup>6</sup> In 1992, because of funding shortages, only 4 editions of each vernacular newspaper were published.

Radio: 2 English, 1 vernacular

Wire Service: 1 (ZANA: monopoly supplier of foreign news wire)

[Non-State-owned mass media:

Weekly tabloids: 3 English (Weekly Post,  
Weekly Standard, and National Mirror  
(Church)]

Monthly tabloid: 1 Bemba (Catholic Icengelo)

[(ii) Coverage of mass media outlets as of June 1993:

[State: National dailies: Times 30,000 copies  
Mail 25,000 copies  
Vernacular monthlies: est. 10,000 copies each  
Televisions: (1990 Census Data) 271,000 TV sets  
32% of urban households, 6% rural  
Radios: (1990 Census Data) 1,038,000 radio sets  
61% of urban households, 58% of rural

[Non-State: Weekly tabloids: Weekly Post 30,000 copies  
Weekly Standard 15,000 copies  
National Mirror 15,000 copies  
Monthly tabloid: Icengelo 80,000 copies]

(c) Increased Citizen Access to Media Fora

\* Zambian citizens have increased access to media as fora for expressing views on public decisions.

[June 1993 data, above, on the number and coverage of media, outlined above, provides baseline for measuring growth in independent media capacity which may be accessed as fora for expressing public opinion.]

[June 1993 data specifically on citizen use of letters to the editors are found in DG Project Baseline Study: Beneficiary Profile (in response to questions 11 and 12).]

[UNZA will undertake retrospective content analysis of Zambian press for June 1993 to determine incidence in State and

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<sup>7</sup> A 1989 UNESCO study reported that even in optimum conditions, radio cannot be received by more than 60 percent of Zambia's population. Broadcasting for Development In Zambia, UNESCO, Paris (May 1989). See, also, Annex 1. A ZNBC 1991 audience survey indicates that radio is the most important news source in Zambia.

independent print media of (a) citizen critique of Government, and (b) citizen opinion on public policy issues. This tabulation will distinguish between critiques/opinions expressed in letters to editors and those reported as news items.]

(d) Increased Media Competence = Increased Reliability

A major thrust of the Project outputs through ZAMCOM and UNZA is increasing the skills level, competence, and reliability of journalists and media managers.

\* Zambia citizens have greater access to reliable information on public decision-making.

[Public perception over time of the reliability of media is an indicator of the usefulness of media as an information source. The June 1993 status of Zambian trust in mass media as sources of information is reported in the Baseline Study: Beneficiary Profile (in response to question #14). See, also, Annex 1, a 1991 ZNBC survey on distribution of sources of news on Zambia relied upon by the public.]

**Project Output Indicators**

(a) ZAMCOM Output Indicators

(i) Upgrading competence of journalists and media managers.

\* ZAMCOM provides training courses (up to 12 weeks) for journalists and media managers on news analysis, economic reporting, investigative journalism, professional standards, legal responsibilities, press freedom.

[In 12 months ending June 1993, ZAMCOM conducted 6 short courses (3 weeks) covering most of these topics, with enrollment of 84.]

\* ZAMCOM provides training courses in communications skills for non-media specialists (e.g., natural resource managers, civic education specialists, health specialists, etc.).

[Number of such courses in 12 months ending June 1993 = 2, with enrollment of 25.]

\* ZAMCOM provides training in desk top publishing.

[ZAMCOM capacity for this in June 1993 = zero.]

\* ZAMCOM provides training in press photography.

[ZAMCOM capacity for this in June 1993 = zero.]

\* ZAMCOM provides training in computer-network data base research.

[ZAMCOM capacity for this in June 1993 = zero.]

(Note: In July 1993, pursuant to the May 7, 1993 MOU, USAID/Zambia will assist ZAMCOM to undertake a detailed training needs assessment of media practitioners and educators. In addition to refining the intended areas of instruction and developing a training plan, the study will outline the technical assistance needs required to development new curriculum and course materials and the extent to which new equipment resources will be required. Consult ARD/MSI technical assistance report following July study.)

\* ZAMCOM (in conjunction with the USAID/Zambia DG Advisor) arranges for journalists and media managers from independent media to have internships with US media organizations.

[Media internships in 12 months ended June 1993 = zero.]

(ii) Independent media resources are augmented.

\* ZAMCOM establishes and maintains Media Resources Center for independent journalists:

- media library,
- desk-top publishing equipment
- sound and video equipment
- photographic unit
- E-mail/electronic data base capacity
- telex
- facsimile equipment

[Not in existence as of June 1993. Detailed feasibility study on components, users, fees, to be undertaken in July 1993 by ARD/MSI technical assistance team. This study is a condition precedent to establishment of Center is enactment and implementation of legislation establishing ZAMCOM as autonomous institution, independent of government control. See Project Paper, pp. 86-89, and May 7, 1993 MOU, p.3.]

(iii) ZAMCOM financial management capacity improved.

ZAMCOM's conversion from a State-controlled institute to a non-State public entity, together with the specific undertakings of this Project (particular absorption of the proposed Media Resources Center) will require substantial changes in ZAMCOM's financial management systems and practices.

\* Financial management system suitable for non-State institution with multiple funding sources.

[ZAMCOM's financial management system as of June 1993 is essentially a sound accounting system appropriate to a government institution. The system requires substantial revision in order to accomplish all of the following objectives: (a) provide financial information adequate for management programming and budgeting decisions; (b) provide accounting records in a timely basis suitable for reporting to multiple donors (including USAID); and (c) provide accurate cost data to permit sound pricing of ZAMCOM facilities and services (including the proposed Media Resources Center). The July ARD/MSI study team will assess the existing system and make recommendations on steps (including staffing, training, and technical assistance) required to get a proper system in place.]

(b) UNZA Output Indicators

As noted above in the UNZA institutional update (section 1(c)), the only firm agreement between UNZA and USAID/Zambia at this point on Project participation is as follows:

- \* UNZA media educators obtain advanced degrees abroad.

[Two Masters level studies will supported.]

**MIS Needs**

ZAMCOM has adequate systems and staffing to maintain the performance records on ZAMCOM's training activities supported through the Project. These records will include:

- ZAMCOM course reports
- participant grade/graduation records
- participant trip reports

The July 1993 feasibility study of the proposed Media Resources Center will include recommendations on MSI requirements for monitoring use of the Center

**Annex: 1991 ZNBC Survey**

[These tables are derived from information provided to baseline study team by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services. This information was obtained in a 1991 survey by ZNBC in conjunction with BBC World Service in which 2,949 persons were interviewed. The survey was designed and overseen by Graham Mytton, Head, International Broadcasting & Audience Research of BBC World Service. The baseline study team does not have the full survey report. The information from this survey should be compared with the responses to questions 45 - 48 (on radio listenership) and 49 - 52 (on newspaper readership) in the DG Project "Baseline Study: Beneficiary Profile."]

Table 1: Ownership of Radio/TV Sets (%)

	<u>Urban</u>	<u>Rural</u>
Had radio set	61	58
In working order	92	83
Needed batteries	2	9
Had TV set at home	32	6

Table 2: Sources of News About Zambia (%)

	<u>National</u>	<u>Urban</u>	<u>Rural</u>
Radio 1	48	44	50
Radio 2	43	46	24
Newspapers/ Magazines	35	51	24
Other people	29	26	31
Radio 4	16	33	3
TV	15	23	10

Radio 1 is broadcast in the vernacular; Radio 2, 4, and TV are in English.

Radio and TV are broadcast from medium wave transmitters along the Livingstone-Lusaka-Copperbelt "line of rail." Radio 1 and 2 are also broadcast on shortwave while Radio 4 is broadcast on FM in urban centers only.

## FODEP

**Updated Institutional Analysis**

During the November 1992 local government elections (and parliamentary by-elections in 1992 and 1993) FODEP resuscitated its historic election monitoring role. It performed credibly as a watchdog of campaign and polling procedures in elections which were marred by disappointingly low voter turnout. The FODEP National Coordinator hired a temporary field officer who helped coordinate FODEP's provincial and district volunteer network for the elections. Continuing to work under severe staff and financial constraints, FODEP maintained its national image as an "honest broker" in elections.

The FODEP Board of Directors organized subcommittees on Civic Education and Fundraising. Neither committee appears to have been active in the final quarter of 1992, though FODEP did produce some civic education materials for the elections (e.g., "Why Vote?") and arranged several TV and radio programs for voter education. By the end of the year stress between the Secretariat staff and Board of Directors was taking a serious toll. The stress seems to have been caused by several factors:

1. Because FODEP was known to NGOs in other African countries facing similar electoral transitions, members of the Board and Secretariat were often invited out of Zambia to offer advice and technical assistance. As FODEP tried to respond, communications became more difficult among staff and Board. These out-of-country trips were coveted by staff and Board members and disagreements about who should represent FODEP created tensions among them.
2. Clarity about Board and Secretariat roles, responsibilities, and decision-making authority was never established. Documents used to register FODEP in April provide vague guidelines about operating procedures. In the face of ambiguous or conflicting guidance from the Board, the National Coordinator made decisions that he thought were appropriate and some Board members thought were not. Late in 1992 and early in 1993, the Board met seldom and never as a whole -- since all Board members were volunteers with full-time responsibilities elsewhere.
3. As a spontaneously-created, volunteer-driven and action-oriented organization, FODEP never set up an effective financial management system. In the heat of the 1992 local elections, money came in from a variety of sources, was put into a central account, and was disbursed to meet immediate demands with very little accounting. It should be stressed that the resulting problems have the earmarks of ineptness rather than malfeasance. But those problems contributed to

the organization's current financial crisis and to unease among donors, including USAID.

4. Early in 1993 it became clear that USAID was seriously considering substantial assistance to FODEP, as evidenced by discussions with various USAID officials and consultants. Somehow the FODEP Board came under the misapprehension that most of the Zambia Democratic Governance Project resources were targeted for FODEP.

These forces came together at a special meeting of the Board of Directors in January 1993. At that meeting the Board decided to terminate the National Coordinator, who was out of the country at the time. This decision has been perceived as a consequence of the growing tensions between the Secretariat and some Board members, notably the President. The decision created a serious hiatus in Secretariat leadership, from which FODEP has not yet fully recovered. There is still some possibility that this decision will be contested in the courts.

Nonetheless, a member of the Board was appointed Acting National Coordinator, and the position was advertized. A new National Coordinator was named in early May, and the Field Officer, hired on temporary assignment for the Fall elections, was kept on as a second professional staff member. A new secretary began work on May 31, and the organization continues to occupy temporary quarters on the outskirts of Lusaka (which also serve as the residence of the National Coordinator). But understandably the five months between the dismissal of the original Coordinator and the arrival of his replacement has been marked by reduced activity and many questions about what FODEP should do.

In spite of internal difficulties, FODEP continued to have a national profile during the first five months of 1993. A FODEP Board member was appointed to the Commission on Human Rights established by the President in May 1993 and the FODEP President was appointed to the newly established Council of Economic Advisors.

When consultants from the Institute for Development Research arrived the last week of May, they found a largely dispirited Secretariat staff, volunteers in the provinces complaining about lack of contact and directions, and a subdued Board of Directors. Fundraising had largely ground to a halt, and the Secretariat staff were not being paid promptly due to lack of funds. Board and staff displayed hope that our arrival might mark an upswing in the fortunes of FODEP. When asked (individually and in groups) what they saw as the major strengths of FODEP, Board and staff both cited "credibility and reputation."

Levels of understanding of the goals of the Zambia Democratic Governance Project were not high among FODEP leaders.

Their understandable preoccupation with financial survival made it difficult to focus on mission, strategy and organization building in the service of civic values, though all of the actors do subscribe to these purposes. It is still unclear to them how USAID will help develop FODEP as an institution.

When the consultants visited FODEP's District Coordinating Council Chairmen in the rural districts of Chongwe and Mumbwa, they were impressed with the latter's energy and sophistication. But FODEP field volunteers also expressed frustration at the lack of leadership and coordination from the organization's Secretariat in Lusaka. There appears to be a significant reservoir of talent and commitment at the grassroots level for FODEP's work, though the problems at FODEP\Lusaka have undermined its ability to capitalize on this network.

### **Project Purpose Indicators**

The purpose of the Zambia Democratic Governance Project is to increase the accessibility and effectiveness of public policy decision-making and implementation in Zambia. While FODEP intends to continue its monitoring of elections, it has also proposed to expand its activities to strengthen democratic institutions and processes that support the accessibility and effectiveness of public decision-making.

At present FODEP functions as a highly centralized, Lusaka-based organization between elections. Board members announce "FODEP positions" from the capital, but provincial and district Committees are currently unconnected to these activities. Indeed, some Board members announce FODEP policies without even consulting with the Secretariat, a practice that simultaneously demoralizes the Secretariat and undermines FODEP's precious credibility with the media. Nor is FODEP itself a transparent organization, with Board agenda and minutes closely held. Some local level committees meet periodically, but the number and quality of such meetings is largely unknown at FODEP headquarters.

The Secretariat and Board intend to use the momentum and resources brought by the Zambia Democratic Governance Project to stimulate wide public participation in the political process. The FODEP Constitution adopted in 1992 describes the organization's mission ("basic objective") as working "to strengthen the institutions and operations of democracy in Zambia."

While the Constitution does not articulate strategies for accomplishing this mission, it does list fifteen activities of FODEP. The Secretariat worked with the IDR consultants to identify five basic strategies that underlie this range of activities, including:

1. Citizen education to enable voters to participate in democratic institutions and processes;
2. Leadership education that clarifies the responsibilities of government officials and policy-makers;
3. Monitoring and refereeing to identify and challenge violations of democratic procedures and institutions;
4. Moderating and mediation to promote problem-solving and conflict management in elections and other key decision-making situations; and
5. Information services that provide accurate and non-partisan information about key issues to citizens and other interested parties.

To carry out these strategies, the Board and Secretariat also intend to redesign the FODEP organization structures and management systems. They hope to increase the reach of the network beyond the periodic monitoring of election activities, and to improve the quantity and quality of communications from provincial and district committees with FODEP/Lusaka. They also plan to develop clearer terms of reference for the Board, the Secretariat, and the network members, and to engage in a publication campaign to serve the provinces and the districts.

The following indicators, marked with an asterisk below, can be used for assessing FODEP's contribution to the Zambia Democratic Governance Project as a whole. Where data are available, rough counts of FODEP activity during the year from July 1, 1992 to June 30, 1993 are included in parentheses.

- I. Accessibility of Public Decision-Making: Increased stakeholder involvement in making public decisions.

\* Citizens who participate in FODEP civic education programs demonstrate increased civic awareness:

**Knowledge changes:** Citizens display increased knowledge of the political system and their own rights and responsibilities within it.

**Attitude changes:** Citizens display increased acceptance of rights and responsibilities of citizenship, more interest in political issues, and increased tolerance of political differences.

**Behavior changes:** Citizens engage in more political discussion and debate, more efforts to influence policy, more reading on political issues, and more participation in campaigns and elections.

[The June 1993 status of political knowledge, attitudes, and behavior among potential Project beneficiaries is reported in the Baseline Study: Beneficiary Profile. A subsample of beneficiaries identified by FODEP Field Coordinators can be broken out of the survey sample. A report with this data will be available by September 1993]

\* Violations of citizen access to decision-making processes are identified and publicly challenged.

[During 1992-93, FODEP monitored local elections and four Parliamentary by-elections in 1992-3. Written field reports exist for 6 provinces].

[A FODEP deputation protested the State of Emergency by visiting the State House and also by visiting detainees].

\* Citizens request information from FODEP on public issues.

[Current status is more than zero, but cannot be measured in the absence of an information system. We recommend that FODEP establish a request log.]

II. Effectiveness of Public Policy-Making: Public policy implemented according to stated goals.

\* FODEP publicly challenges policy implementation that violates the stated goals of government.

[3-5 challenges in 1992-93]

\* FODEP mediates and moderates contacts across political differences to encourage problem-solving instead of polarization.

[Church leaders sponsored several mediation meetings between political parties during 1991 election campaign. Zero meetings in 1992-93].

\* Citizen actions based on FODEP's educational activities encourage more responsive legislative and administrative behavior.

["Why Vote?"/radio programs may have increased voter turnout in 1992 local elections, but no evaluation was done to determine the size of any effect]

## Project Output Indicators

The Zambia Democratic Governance Project also seeks to strengthen FODEP as an institution. At the moment, however, FODEP Board, Secretariat and networks have not agreed on a clear mission and a coherent strategy. The FODEP constitution is quite vague and ambiguous. Secretariat-Board relations are fuzzy and decision-making authorities are overcentralized, loosely-coordinated and poorly documented. The loss of the first National Coordinator, whatever the merits of the decision, has created a leadership vacuum at the Secretariat during an important period.

FODEP does not now have a working financial control system. Current funding comes from stopgap loans from local sources (e.g., Christian Council of Zambia, Catholic Secretariat) and small grants from a few international donors (e.g. US\$ 14,000 from USAID; SEK 250,000 from SIDA; NOK 273,000 from NORAD; and 250,000 kronor from FINNIDA). There has been little or no support from the Zambian business or labor communities. The financial system makes reliable information difficult to obtain, so even these figures are very tentative. Irregularities in past accounting have delayed further support from USAID, though the final audit is available as of the June Board meeting.

Relations with the network of provincial and district coordinating councils are sporadic, disorganized, and undocumented. Although the provincial groups appear able to respond to mobilizing efforts to monitor elections, they also complain of lack of contact or direction from FODEP/Lusaka.

In short, there is much to be done in the way of institutional development at FODEP. Dealing with these issues will be central concerns for the next six to eight months. Indicators against which progress can be tracked are listed with an asterisk below. Where data are available, rough assessments of FODEP activity during the year from July 1, 1992 to June 30, 1993 are included in parentheses.

I. Expanded FODEP Activity: FODEP programs that implement its strategies should be further developed.

\* **Citizen Education:** Programs of citizen education on democratic rights and responsibilities.

[Prior to 1992 elections, four TV programs on councils, monitoring and democratic process; training programs for 10-20 local election monitors in each province.]

\* **Leadership Education:** Programs that clarify the roles and responsibilities of elected officials and policy-makers.

[Board approved creation of financial system in June, 1993]  
 [Provincial Coordinating Committees are activated in 8  
 of 9 provinces as of June 1993].

\* Board and Secretariat roles are clearly defined and understood.

[Not existing in 1992-93]

\* Funding base includes significant resources from  
 Zambian sources as well as diverse international  
 donors.

[Small grants received from SIDA, USAID, FINNIDA, and  
 NORAD in 1992].

\* FODEP mobilizes networks for civic education and  
 monitoring in all provinces and districts.

[In 1992, workshops held for monitors of local  
 elections of 10-20 people in each province]

[Meeting minutes available at FODEP for a few  
 districts.]

\* FODEP regarded as a credible resource by donors and  
 international audiences as well as Zambian populace and  
 government.

[FODEP members are invited to comment on national  
 issues and to serve on key commissions (e.g., Human  
 Rights)]

### **MIS Needs**

To enable monitoring and evaluation, the following  
 information systems are required by FODEP:

- \* Register of officeholders/ members/ participants in  
 FODEP network
- \* Reporting system for activities of Provincial and  
 District FODEP Committees
- \* Log of citizen requests to FODEP (by letter, by phone, in  
 person)
- \* Accounting systems

[Zero in 1992-93]

\* Referee/Watchdog Activities: Efforts to identify and challenge violations of democratic process and institutions.

[Monitoring and assessment of local election and four by-elections in November 1992. Challenges to State of Emergency and preventive detention in March, 1993.]

\* Mediating and moderating: Interventions to foster discussion of diverse viewpoints and problem-solving.

[Zero in 1992-93]

\* Non-partisan Information Source: Provision of accurate information to grassroots, national and international audiences.

[Publication of materials for local elections (e.g., "Why Vote?" "Summary of Local Government Elections Act," "Monitor's Manual for Local Government Elections")]

[Publication of analyses of elections and by-elections e.g., Chadiza, Nkana, and Nalikwanda by-elections; Local Government Election Report].

[Participation in 2 international election monitoring efforts (Kenya, Malawi) and 2 international conferences (U.S., Vienna).]

\* National and International Visibility: Increased access to media and opportunities for influencing mass audiences.

[FODEP was mentioned at least 19 times in articles in the Times last year, and frequently in other papers]

[FODEP Board and Secretariat were invited to participate in several (exact number unknown) international conferences and meetings last year.]

[FODEP hosted a National Workshop on Civil Society and Consolidation of Democracy in February, 1992.]

## II. Increases in FODEP's Institutional Capacity:

\* Mission and strategy clearly understood and widely shared, internally and externally.

[Not existing in 1992-93.]

\* Appropriate organization structures and systems are operating, especially financial and communication systems.

[Board approved creation of financial system in June, 1993]  
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 of 9 provinces as of June 1993].

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