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**A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT
OF THE POLITICAL ATTITUDES
OF ZAMBIAN CITIZENS**

by
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Introduction

This paper presents an exploratory account of the political attitudes of selected groups of citizens in a newly democratizing African country. The political culture embodied in the attitudes of ordinary people affects fundamentally whether such countries will be successful in installing and consolidating institutions of democratic governance. Stated more bluntly, the survival of democracy depends upon whether citizens are willing to defend it. The study focusses on Zambia, with particular attention to citizen knowledge of, and attachment to, democratic values. It was conducted some eighteen months after the country's landmark multiparty election of October 1991 that led to a peaceful transfer of power from one civilian political leader to another. Senior officials of the current Government of Zambia have repeatedly enunciated the need for "a new political culture" of individual responsibility which breaks with attitudes of political deference and economic dependency inculcated under one-party rule. This paper begins to explore whether such a culture currently exists.

Because Kenneth Kaunda's United National Independence Party (UNIP) regime restricted free speech and public opinion research, remarkably little is known about what Zambians actually think and feel about public affairs. The introduction by Frederick Chiluba's Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) government of a refreshingly open political atmosphere presents a unique opportunity to begin to examine the role of citizens in institutionalizing a democratic regime in African country. This paper initiates a series of studies which will provide the first comprehensive account of popular political attitudes undertaken in Zambia.

These studies will cover the following topics, among others:

- (a) the knowledge of citizens about the Zambian political system, including their own rights and responsibilities within it;
- (b) the attitudes of citizens about democratic values, including political tolerance, political trust, and civic competence;
- (c) the behavior of citizens in the political arena, including associational membership, voting, and actions to hold public officials accountable.

The preferred research instrument for political attitude studies is a survey questionnaire administered to a large national probability sample. Because, in an African context, researchers and respondents alike are relatively unfamiliar with attitude surveys on political topics, we have adopted a phased, learning approach for the development of a survey instrument. The first step in this process was to convene a series of so-called "focus groups" among Zambians from different walks of life. The number of participants was intentionally kept small and the groups were conducted in just three regions of the country. Therefore the results cannot be generalized to Zambia as a whole. Nevertheless, we consider it worthwhile to report preliminary findings as an initial contribution on a topic about which little is known and much more remains to be learned.

OBJECTIVES

The aim of the focus groups was threefold. First, we wished to obtain a "snapshot" of the prevailing values and behavior of various categories of citizen. In our view, this objective was best approached by initiating free-ranging and open-ended discussions in small groups. In the setting of a focus group, respondents would have the opportunity to relay their views on democracy, governance and

accountability in their own words. This would enable the researchers to discover what was on their minds and to learn about the local conceptual constructs used to frame political topics.

Second, we hoped to test in the field the feasibility of selected methods of asking survey questions. While surveys have been conducted before in Zambia, they have usually been used to elicit objective data (e.g. on household membership or crop yields) rather than subjective perceptions (e.g. on whether voters feel competent to influence political decision-making). Could we reliably tap such perceptions? Moreover, we wanted to know whether specialized data-collection techniques would work. For example, could non-literate persons make binary choices between two opposing sets of options or rank their opinions on a scale of "one to ten"? In short, could we design a survey instrument that would stand a good chance of engendering meaningful responses?

Thirdly, we hoped to get an initial impression of the level of existing civic knowledge among Zambian citizens and to identify major gaps in that knowledge. We did not intend to conduct an exhaustive assessment of civic education needs. But we hoped that the focus group discussions would reveal areas where citizens could learn more, and that this information might be useful to the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP, a non-governmental civic organization headquartered in Lusaka with volunteer committees countrywide), as well as to the University of Zambia, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services, the Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF), and other institutions planning to conduct civic education. Some suggestions for curriculum development on civic education are made at the end.

ACTIVITIES

The focus groups were planned and executed collaboratively by the researchers from Michigan State University and the University of Zambia who wrote this report. We were assisted in the field by two research assistants from the University of Zambia and by intermediaries from non-governmental bodies (such as FODEP, ZCF, and the Civil Servants' Union of Zambia) in each locality. These intermediaries helped to assemble participants for our meetings and, where necessary, provided translation services into local languages.

Between February 24 and March 7, 1993, we conducted 12 focus groups in four districts and three provinces of Zambia: Chipata and Petauke (in Eastern Province), Lusaka Urban (in Lusaka Province), and Choma District (in Southern Province). The research sites covered urban areas (27% of respondents), rural population centers (45%), and rural areas (28%).

The focus groups involved a total of 116 persons, of whom 55 (47%) were women and 61 (53%) were men. The average size of a focus group was 10 persons; the largest group contained 14 and the smallest was turned into a one-on-one interview when only a single participant showed up. In most cases, we sought homogenous groups that included persons of the same gender and of similar socioeconomic status and level of education. For example, separate groups were assembled of unemployed youths, market women, male civil servants and female farmers. We judged that, among peers, participants would feel comfortable in expressing opinions and that no small clique within the group would be able to dominate the conversation. This was an especially important consideration for women and young people who, in Zambian society, are acculturated to defer to the opinions of older men. A summary of the characteristics of focus group participants is provided in Table 1.

To repeat, we do not pretend that twelve focus groups conducted in three localities constitute a scientifically representative cross-section of the national population. We tried to draw from diverse communities but, inevitably, biases crept into our small sample. First, there may be a regional bias, with too much weight given to the views of residents of Eastern province, an opposition party stronghold. Second, our technique of recruiting participants through local NGO intermediaries probably brought us into contact with the activist element in the population. For example, the urban subsample contained more union members and the rural subsample more cooperative members than in the population at large. And, since participation was voluntary, those individuals with a preexisting interest in public affairs were most likely to self-select themselves to take part. Third, because we talked to two groups of young professionals-in-training (teachers and journalists), our sample was generally younger and better educated than the Zambian electorate as a whole. Thus, the results reported here should be interpreted with caution. They probably overestimate the prevalence of critical attitudes and levels of political knowledge and civic participation in the Zambian population.

METHODS

Focus groups are a small group interview technique in which the researcher aims to prompt a spontaneous exchange of views among participants on a given topic of interest. This method, based on natural conversation, excels in revealing not only what participants think but also why they do so. As such, focus groups tap not only attitudes and cognitions, but also basic values, the norms that underlie decisions. First used in test-marketing commercial products, focus groups are now commonly applied in political campaigns in Western countries to track how voters respond to candidates and policy positions (Kolbert 1992). Only rarely have they been tried in Africa (for an exception, see Charney and Booyen, 1992).

Recently, social scientists have adopted focus groups as a rapid appraisal research method. According to Stewart and Shamdasani, "focus groups...are particularly useful for exploratory research where rather little is known about the phenomenon of interest... (they) are often followed by other types of research that provide more quantifiable data from larger groups of respondents" (1990, 15; see also Ward et.al., 1991). Morgan comments that "the single most important way that focus groups can contribute to a project built around individual interviews is in devising the interview schedules" (1988, 30). At best, focus groups can generate fresh insights and new hypotheses for later testing by more rigorous methods. This was our intended use.

Our research team used a variety of methods to prompt discussion among Zambians about their perceptions of democracy and governance. We began by circulating to the assembled participants a series of news photographs borrowed from the library of The Daily Mail, a national newspaper. These depicted, among other things, people standing in lines, voters casting ballots, a confrontation between a paramilitary officer and a member of the public, a Cabinet meeting, and former president Kenneth Kaunda and current president Frederick Chiluba shaking hands. Participants were asked to analyse the content of the pictures through free association, mentioning any reaction or interpretation that came to mind. The key themes that emerged (and occasional bizarre reactions!) are summarized in section immediately below.

Next we asked direct questions on political knowledge (e.g. what does the National Assembly do?) and political participation (e.g. did you vote in the 1991 general election? if not, why not?) pausing to discuss any issue that the respondents identified as interesting or controversial.

Late in each session, we tested selected survey techniques. To elicit perceptions of political trust, we asked participants to pick numbers on a numerical scale between one and ten to portray how much they trusted various social groups and public institutions. To explore whether participants felt competent to exert their rights as citizens, we posed a set of forced binary choices between statements pertaining to political efficacy versus powerlessness. Educated respondents took to these approaches with alacrity; even non-literate persons, with a little coaching in local languages, were able to respond meaningfully. We concluded that scaled opinion items can be used in survey questionnaires in Zambia provided that enumerators are thoroughly trained and adequately supervised and motivated.

RESULTS

Political Perceptions: Key Themes

This section summarizes how focus group participants in three localities view recent political events and governance reforms in Zambia. The findings are based on opinions expressed by respondents in unstructured discussions, initially prompted by news photographs but sometimes ranging far afield. In an effort to capture authentic voices, we make liberal use of verbatim statements from focus group discussions. Such comments are signified by quotation marks.

Participants apparently knew and appreciated the difference between single-party and multiparty elections. They offered the opinions that, in the latter, "people are free to vote if they want to" and "have a right to choose their own leaders". Several respondents also suggested that "choosing not to vote is a democratic right". The most sophisticated interpretations of competitive elections included the following: "you feel as if you have participated in a fair game, whatever the outcome"; and, "by voting for MMD, we are returning to a single-party state; it is better to strengthen the opposition". Only two persons in the focus groups verbalized the connection that "where there is competition and criticism, development is possible".

Participants depicted free and fair voting in favorable terms when compared with the previous electoral regime. With reference to the lack of genuine choice among candidates under one-party rule, "voting in the Second Republic meant that we had appointed representatives". Referring to the unflattering electoral symbols allocated to unofficial candidates in single-party elections, someone joked that "it made no sense to vote for a frog that had no chance of winning". Respondents also clearly resented being forced to vote, decrying the UNIP vigilantes who prevented people from entering market places and other public facilities if they could not display indelible ink marks on their thumbs: "we were not free when we were forced to vote". The single party regime also bred political passivity: "in those days we just sat".

Participants in the focus groups credited multiparty politics with enabling accountability, at least in theory. Responses included "if one party doesn't do the right thing, then they can be corrected" and "its good to have many parties; they can learn from the mistakes of others". But in Eastern Province one lady rued the divisions and "disturbances" that accompanied multiparty campaigning: "In 1991 there was no oneness". An MMD official also complained that political competition could be abused: "opposition MPs bring confusion because they distort what they tell the electorate".

Despite approval of multiparty elections, voter turnout remains low in Zambia, registering

only 45 percent of registered voters in the presidential and parliamentary elections of October 1991 and less than 20 percent in the local government elections in November 1992. We wished to explore the reasons for this. The clear consensus in the focus groups was that people voted in 1991 because they wanted a change of government after almost three decades of mismanagement by UNIP. They had high and generally unrealistic expectations that concrete improvements in living standards would be forthcoming within a short period of time. Within a year of the first multiparty elections, many did not turn out to vote again because they felt that promises made by MMD during the general election campaign had not been fulfilled. Already discouraged, some even asked: "Why should I vote when I didn't get what I expected?". As another participant put it, "people were expecting miracles after the elections. Now they blame democracy".

Interestingly, in listing reasons for low electoral turnout, group members made only infrequent mention that voter registration lists were incomplete or that they feared violent intimidation at the polls.

Many participants perceived that newly elected leaders have already benefitted inordinately in a context where deprivation is deepening for ordinary people. About Cabinet Ministers and Members of Parliament they said: "they don't attend to pressing national issues but only to issues concerning themselves"; "they have granted themselves hefty salaries and big new (Toyota 4x4) Land Cruisers"; "most MPs don't go there (to the National Assembly) for charity reasons but to help themselves to a good standard of living"; and, "while asking us to sacrifice they are displaying choking (sic) luxury". It was only the rare respondent who tried to defend elected representatives: "some MPs are poor; they must be given the necessary materials to perform their duties diligently".

In this vein, a focus group of unemployed youths in Petauke generated a fascinating discussion about the qualities of leadership. Is it better, they asked, to send a rich man or a poor man to Parliament? A poor man is likely to sympathise with the needs of the community, but once in office he will be tempted to steal from the public purse. While a rich man may be out of touch with his constituents' situation, at least he has no need to be dishonest. Moreover, respondents saw themselves as clients of wealthy patrons: "if we elect rich people, they can take care of us" by spending personal resources on local "social events (like funerals) and development projects". This discussion then turned to the qualifications desired in a political representative: "It is not just a matter of richness, but also of cleverness"; "What about character; how did he obtain his riches?"; "What we really need is a person who is morally sound, someone we can trust".

Some elected leaders were perceived to be neglectful of constituency needs. A common view was that "these people (MPs and ward councillors) only report when the campaigning period comes again". One man, who felt unappreciated for the campaign work he had done for an MMD candidate, coined a bitter metaphor: "they treat us like matchsticks; they light their cigarettes and then throw us away". Mention must be made, however, of the exceptional perceptions of rural respondents in Southern Province who gave their MPs high grades for visiting constituents and delivering water and road improvement projects.

Participants, especially those who were MMD activists, volunteered that life had changed for the better since the 1991 elections. They cited the following positive changes, among others: a climate of free expression, an end to shortages of basic commodities, an effective response to the drought including a broadly popular food-for-work program, and the availability of drugs in some clinics and

desks in some schools.

But the prevailing mood in the focus groups was critical of the new government's performance. Participants' political attitudes were strongly colored by dire economic conditions, notably an inflation rate officially estimated in February 1993 at about 200 percent per year. The urban self-employed and unemployed have been particularly hard hit, with many being forced to eliminate from the family budget such essential commodities as meat, fish, beans, sugar, cooking oil and soap. The poorest can no longer even afford to buy maize meal in bags and spend each day scraping together enough money to buy smaller quantities sold in one-litre tins in the market. Women said they were adopting family planning practices for the first time because large families are too expensive to feed, clothe and educate. And there is a widespread loss of confidence in the kwacha (the national currency), whose purchasing power one participant described as "useless".

All respondents thought that economic conditions would continue to worsen in the short term. The urban low-income respondents had a particularly bleak outlook on their prospects, though smallholder agriculturalists felt that, given a good cropping season, they would be able to afford consumer goods again. The educated employed also hoped that standards of living would eventually improve as economic reforms took hold and were willing to allow the MMD government more time to tackle intractable inherited problems.

Widespread economic suffering raises immediate dangers for the MMD government. The erosion of political legitimacy, hard won at the polls, is evident in statements like "under UNIP it was cheaper" and (somewhat inaccurately) "at least UNIP gave us free food". Such disgruntlement may be partly of the MMD's own making. Clearly, President Chiluba called for sacrifice and hard work in the general election campaign and at his inauguration. But, as our respondents revealed, local MMD cadres electioneered with an opposite message, often promising voters that food prices would come down and that fees for government services would be repealed. Thus ordinary people cannot be wholly blamed for having harbored unrealistic expectations about what the new government would deliver.

The disillusionment of voters threatens not only the incumbent party, but the democratic system as a whole. Women marketeers struck a responsive chord among many other focus group participants when they opined that "many people will not be keen to vote next time because of the escalating cost of goods".

Political Knowledge

From Aristotle to John Dewey, democratic theorists have long argued that accountable governance requires an educated and well-informed citizenry. In order to participate intelligently in discourse over public policy, citizens require a thorough understanding of their national political system and of their own civil rights and responsibilities.

Do Zambians currently have such an understanding? We used the focus groups to begin to explore the awareness of respondents about citizenship. We started with three main areas of political knowledge: civil rights, political representation, and economic policy reform. In the time available we could do little more than scratch the surface of these topics; a more detailed inquiry must await later study.

Civil Rights. There was a widespread understanding among focus group participants that "voting is a right in the country one is born in" and that the practice of voting was worthwhile. Respondents said that they were willing to wait in long lines in order to vote, though they speculated that "some people might get tired and walk away". Interestingly, educated urbanites seemed to think that "the masses are ignorant of their right to vote", though we obtained the opposite impression from the focus groups.

We discerned lower levels of knowledge about, and commitment to, other civil rights. In addition to economic hardship, respondents identified crime as a pressing national issue facing their families. Respondents tended to favor a tough stance on crime regardless of the cost to civil liberties, with a majority supporting the Minister of Home Affairs in calling for policemen to "shoot to kill" suspects fleeing from the scene of a crime. One woman said she would not care even if the victim was "my own son" and another man considered that "anyone who was running away must be guilty". In one group, the subject of banning pornographic literature came up but in this case the majority, all educated women, asserted the right of consenting adults to read whatever they wanted.

Perhaps the most striking demonstration of a gap in knowledge about civil rights came from cooperative society members in Mbabala village, Choma District. We held a focus group meeting in the cooperative warehouse on March 6, 1993, two days after President Chiluba had announced the reimposition of a state of emergency in Zambia. Of the thirteen persons present, only one had heard (that morning on the radio) that an emergency was in force and he was hard pressed to say what it was, or whether or not it was a good thing. We suspect that there are many other Zambians who do not realize that a state of emergency suspends the Bill of Rights in the the Constitution, potentially exposing them to abuses of executive power. Once informed that Zambian citizens could now be detained without trial, a few participants began to express doubts about the advisability of a State of Emergency. A majority, however, seemed unconcerned or actively favored strong government.

Political Representation. Are citizens acquainted with their political representatives? We did not make exact counts, but on the basis of focus group discussions, we estimate that about three-quarters of respondents can name the relevant ward councillor and perhaps two-thirds can name the local M.P. In a comparative context with other nations, these are positive results. Respondents had much greater difficulty in identifying the Cabinet Minister for the Province, with certainly fewer than one-third offering correct responses. Within the Cabinet, many people could name the Minister for Local Government (then Michael Sata), perhaps because he is a flamboyant populist whose often sensational exploits are frequently featured in the press. Ironically, only a handful of participants could correctly identify the incumbent Minister of Finance (then Emmanuel Kasonde) even though his policy and budget decisions have great impact on their lives.

The respondents disagreed about whom the MP represents. Better educated people know that he represents everyone in the constituency, but the less well-educated sometimes said that he represents only those who voted for him. We found this attitude most prevalent in Eastern Province where MMD partisans feel neglected by UNIP MPs.

On a related point, many respondents were confused about the distinction between party and government. When asked which branch of government is elected in general elections, some answered "the party". Posed a direct question about the different roles of party and government, farmers in Southern Province asserted that "there is no difference whatsoever". In the UNIP stronghold of Chipata,

people admitted that "we do not know (Finance Minister) Kasonde because he comes from the ruling party". They also erroneously believed that "if you are not in the ruling party you cannot form associations". Ideological indoctrination during the Second Republic about the fusion of "the party and its government" has clearly had a deep impact on the knowledge of the Zambian public about their political system.

Participants in rural areas and rural population centers were also vague about the distinctive roles of different branches of government. Question: where do MP's work? Answer: at State House (that is, presidential palace). Question: what does Parliament do? Answer: it meets with the President. Tellingly, not one trainee teacher in the focus group at Chipata Teacher Training College could say that Parliament's function is to legislate.

Of greatest concern, voters do not know how to make the the political system work for them. We asked people how they would go about transmitting a complaint to their representatives between elections. "We just observe. We cannot complain. Where would we take our complaints?" lamented one unemployed young man. Trying to be positive, another suggested that "there are channels to be followed. First you should group yourselves, then go to the headman". This provoked dissent: "that is a sheer waste of time; individuals should act before people languish and die". In Lusaka, someone suggested that people should "consolidate the civic organizations instead of relying only on the MPs."

When we suggested writing to the MP, one group retorted that "we don't even know his address". Despite the widespread belief in the right to vote, many Zambians interviewed say that individual citizens "do not have the right to call upon MPs to discuss our problems". We kept hearing that the correct channel of access to the MP lay through the local government councillor acting as an intermediary: "only a councillor can write a letter to an MP, not an ordinary person." This interpretation did not accord with our own understanding of the separate representational jurisdictions of central and local governments. Yet people in Lusaka and Choma kept insisting that "the work of councillors is to report to MPs". Finally we realized that, far from being misinformed, our respondents were accurately repeating what they had been told by MMD MPs during the election campaign.

A stratification of local and central government into a single hierarchy for purposes of political representation may be a pragmatic response to a situation where communications are sporadic between political center and localities. But we see several dangers in such an arrangement. It confuses voters, who do not learn that the two levels of government have separate functions and responsibilities. Where the MP and councillors both belong to the ruling party, it reinforces the erroneous impression that the party is the constitutional center of power. And where councillors belong to a different party to the MP, it reduces their effectiveness.

Economic Reform. We must admit that our efforts to probe people's knowledge about economic reform were an unqualified flop. Due to shortage of time, we did not raise this topic in every focus group; but, when we did, we encountered a communications breakdown. Especially for low-income groups, and even for middle-income government officials, abstract notions of "adjustment" and "liberalization" had no apparent meaning. As one respondent warned, "most people don't understand all this talk of a free market". In our concerned view, the MMD government has yet to build a basic understanding, let alone a popular consensus, on its radical program for economic restructuring.

We will have to completely recast our questions on economic reform for subsequent studies. We would prefer to generate generic questions that can apply to any respondent, for example by tapping attitudes to incentives, subsidies, regulation, and state ownership. Alternatively, we may be forced to resort to concrete questions on specialized issues facing particular producer groups: for example, how do farmers appraise the performance of the newly-privatized maize marketing system?

The focus group discussions also made us realize that further exploration is needed on the subject of government finance. Many respondents had only speculative ideas about where the government gets its money ("we think it comes from overseas"). Their conceptions of their own roles as taxpayers were incomplete: women in Macha village, for example, were under the impression that nominal clinic fees covered the full cost of medicines and services. And no-one offered the view that taxation enables representation, giving citizens a right to demand effective governance and financial accountability from public servants.

Political Trust

Democracy entails the distribution of political power among various branches of government and to ordinary members of society. In order for democratic institutions to function smoothly, citizens must be able to trust one another and government officials to use power wisely. They must believe, for example, that their compatriots will abide by decisions arrived at by democratic means such as elections. Societies which exhibit high levels of interpersonal trust and trust in public institutions tend to be fertile ground for the nurturance of democracy; societies in which such trust is lacking will have difficulty in consolidating democratic procedures and institutions.

The results of our inquiry on political trust are presented in Table 2. The figures represent the feelings of respondents on a scale of one to ten, where 1.0 signifies "I do not trust them at all" and 10.0 signifies "I trust them completely".

(a) Interpersonal Trust

On this scale, respondents unsurprisingly expressed the highest levels of trust (average score = 7.2) in members of their own immediate families, which were defined to include parents, siblings and children. Female relatives were generally better trusted than male relatives: one group of Lusaka technical college students exhibited complete trust in mothers (9.9), high trust in sisters (8.5), but much lower trust in fathers (6.4) and brothers (6.0). This makes one wonder whether respondents also harbor greater trust in female public officials. The main finding here, however, is that the family in Zambia, as in other countries, anchors the upper end of the interpersonal trust scale and provides a positive point of comparison for other social groups.

Against this standard, respondents showed significantly less trust in other categories of Zambian, whether members of their own ethnic group (5.4), members of other ethnic groups (5.1), or residents of their neighborhood (5.0). While, on the one hand, "neighbors lend you money when relatives are far away", they are also "the ones who steal our property".

We judge such levels of interpersonal trust to be "moderate", both in absolute terms (the quantitative results lie midway between 1 and 10), and in comparison to feelings about other, non-Zambian social groups. For example, participants regularly judged Malawians (5.7) to be more

trustworthy than fellow Zambians outside their own families. This finding held constant even in areas outside Eastern Province where there are fewer common ties of Nyanja language and culture. There also appears to be a revisionist view abroad in Zambian society with regard to the former colonial power: remarkably, respondents judged British people (6.9) to be the second most trustworthy of all social groups. This tendency was most marked among young people (7.4) who had had no direct experience of colonial rule. Reasons proffered for these results included: Malawians are "humble and honest" and the British "keep their word". The latter were also credited with helping to unify Zambia by introducing the English language and an improved communications infrastructure.

This is not to say that respondents trusted all foreigners more than their countrymen. Very low scores were given to both white South Africans (3.5) and to Zaireans (1.7). The former were condemned by respondents for racist attitudes and for "exploiting cheap black labor"; the latter were stereotyped as poachers, conmen and smugglers. These views were widespread, regardless of whether respondents had actually met individuals from either group.

Slight differences emerged when the data on interpersonal trust were disaggregated by regional location. Rural dwellers evinced somewhat higher rates of interpersonal trust (5.8) than residents of urban areas (4.8). Interestingly, people who lived in rural population centers were more trusting of other ethnic groups than of their own tribesmates. They explained that "people from other tribes are helpful; people from the same tribe are proud" and "if anyone wishes you ill, it is likely to be a person from your own group", whereas "visitors from outside areas always have to be on their best behavior."

(b) Trust in Government Institutions

In order for a democracy to function efficiently, citizens must voluntarily surrender some of their sovereign power to elected representatives and appointed officials. In so doing, officials enter a social contract in which they promise to deliver accountable governance. One indicator of whether state officials are keeping their part of the bargain is whether citizens have a high level of trust in public institutions.

First we examined governmental institutions. As indicated in Table 2, focus group participants nominated the National Assembly (6.2) as the most trusted governmental institution. But this positive finding must be qualified by a major caveat: public trust in the National Assembly is sharply different in Lusaka Urban District (4.3) and rural Choma District (9.5). In Lusaka, respondents had more knowledge about the Assembly as an institution and judged that its members were self-serving. By contrast, most Choma farmers were unable to identify the functions of the National Assembly and tended to appraise the institution in terms of the performance of their Member of Parliament, with which they were very satisfied.

Indeed, we found that urban and rural respondents differed significantly in the trust they profess in the governmental system as a whole. For all government institutions taken together, rural dwellers are quite highly trusting (6.9) whereas urban dwellers are deeply cynical (3.4). Again, we attribute these stark contrasts in part to the political knowledge of the respective groups. Rural folk place more trust in remote national institutions than familiar local institutions. In general, the less people know about any given political institution, the more they are likely to blindly trust it; conversely, the more information they have, the more they come to doubt an institution's integrity.

The Zambia police lie at the bottom end of the trust scale for governmental institutions (scoring 4.0 overall, but only 2.8 in urban areas). Speaking from direct personal experience, focus group participants were anxious to relate horror stories about "Zambia's finest". The police were portrayed as easily bribed, unresponsive to emergencies, and sometimes drunk on duty. One woman complained that "when someone is being beaten, policemen just watch without doing anything". And as another man contemptuously asked, "how can I respect someone who stops me at a roadblock to beg for money?". A few people were willing to excuse police extortion because they are so "ill-equipped" and "badly paid". But, having identified crime as a major problem in their lives respondents clearly resented the governance shortcomings of the public institution charged to prevent it.

Indeed, our small sample of citizens gave low scores to most "street-level" governmental bureaucracies. All local institutions (including local government councils, local courts and the police) scored below 5.0 on the ten-point scale. The courts were seen as only occasionally offering fair judgements because dismissal of cases could sometimes be purchased by bribing a magistrate. Distrust of local government councils (4.2 overall, 2.3 in rural population centers) was traced by respondents, not only to corruption, but also to alleged ignorance among councillors about their proper duties: "They don't maintain the roads", "they don't repair our houses", and "they take money to allocate plots of land". People become particularly suspicious when local officials did not follow transparent procedures in handling public funds. "What happens to our PTA money?" and "how are the clinic fees spent?", asked respondents.

While we did not gather quantitative data on popular trust in the line ministries of government, people offered anecdotal assessments. These were generally critical of the quality of field governance in Zambia. For example, even though the nurses at the clinic at Matero, Lusaka "sometimes shout at sick people", clients are reluctant to complain in case their families are later "poisoned" (!) or denied service. At Macha village, Choma people volunteered that "we have no complaints about government workers except that the agricultural extension workers never come here". At Siasikabole village, one man was convinced that "election officials are sometimes corrupt; they can make you put your "X" (ballot mark) in the wrong place".

(c) Trust in Non-Governmental Institutions

Robert Putnam (1993) has argued that accessible and effective government is strongly related to the density of "civic community". By this he means the extent to which ordinary citizens are independently organized into a network of voluntary associations in which they can develop values of trust and egalitarianism, practice the art of democratic self-government, and demand accountability from the state.

The main finding here is that, among Zambians interviewed, public trust was somewhat higher for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (5.7) than for governmental institutions (4.8). Indeed, the Christian churches in Zambia receive the highest trust rating (6.8) of any public institution. It is worth noting that the standard deviation of responses was very high on this item, with practicing believers seeing churches as "fighting injustices and helping the poor", whereas skeptics charged that "they reap more than they sow". Respondents agreed that some church leaders used the pulpit as a platform from which to gain political influence in society, but there was no consensus on whether this was a desirable development.

Among other NGOs, trade unions were quite well trusted (5.9), especially among trade union members (7.7). Those respondents whom we asked about the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP) tended to withhold judgement (4.6), preferring to wait and see what FODEP would do. FODEP has yet to develop a clear identity in the field of civic education, tending still to be associated by respondents with the 1991 election monitoring effort of the Zambia Election Monitoring Coordinating Committee. They judged this effort in some cases to be unbiased but in others, according to one Lusaka respondent, to "working with Jimmy Carter to make Kaunda lose the elections". The respondents also felt ambivalent about the MSU/UNZA research team that conducted the focus groups (5.5). The number of respondents on the latter items was very small and these tentative results await confirmation during later studies.

We also enquired into trust in the mass media. For those who listen to news broadcasts on the radio, the most trusted source was unambiguously the World Service of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). The BBC scored the highest rating of any institution in the survey (8.0) and highest consensus (lowest standard deviation) among responses. Its strengths were felt to be that "it offers facts" and that "it is quicker (than local stations) in covering events". Radio Zambia was also viewed as being reasonably authoritative (5.8), especially among rural residents (6.4), who often had no other formal source of political news.

Newspapers appeared to be quite readily available (even if expensive!) in urban areas and rural population centers, but they rarely penetrated the countryside. It also seemed that mainly men read newspapers and listened to the radio, while women were preoccupied with work and household chores. Readers of newspapers expressed a clear opinion that the Weekly Post (7.2) was a more reliable source of information than either the Times of Zambia (6.0) or the Daily Mail (5.4), though the latter papers were ranked quite favorably for government-owned publications. The Weekly Post's investigative journalism was credited with "digging deeper" (the paper's own slogan), though some respondents felt that it excavated far too deeply into Ministers' "private lives".

Political Tolerance

Democracy thrives in a free market of ideas. But if untrammelled expression of political opinion is not accompanied by attitudes of tolerance, political pluralism can easily become a recipe for intense and unmanageable conflict. While Zambians have a reputation as a peace-loving people, political competition has sometimes spun out of control. For example, the multiparty elections held during Zambia's First Republic were often marred by partisan violence.

Because recent Zambian elections have been relatively calm, we did not make political tolerance a top priority item for focus group discussion. But our respondents did offer insights worth reporting. We asked them to view a photograph of UNIP-sponsored graffiti proclaiming "Watchtower, watchout!" that was scrawled on the wall of a building. They commented that such utterances were "against freedom of worship in Zambia", "showed disrespect for public property", and that members of the Watchtower sect were within their rights in refusing to take part in one-party elections. Others noted that "intimidation can be verbal as well as physical" and that "women are more susceptible than men to political threats". All told, the majority seemed to agree that campaigning by threats did not belong in a democracy.

Nevertheless, respondents in all three localities complained that some elements within

MMD had already adopted some of UNIP's unsavory tactics and had begun to display an intolerance for diversity within its own ranks. Said one, "in the Kafue by-election, MMD threatened to demolish homes if people voted for CNU (the Caucus for National Unity, an opposition group)". And another: "in the Rufunsa by-election, MMD imposed a candidate that the people did not want; hence voters did not participate". Others criticised MMD parliamentarians who are trying to muzzle the independent press for reporting the wrongdoings of MPs.

In response to the picture of Kenneth Kaunda and Frederick Chiluba shaking hands, a female respondent commented that "there is no need to bear a grudge against anyone in a democracy". A man from Petauke cautioned however, that Chiluba should not touch his enemy because he could fall prey to a magic spell. He added that "all candidates should use herbs to protect themselves in elections". While this group agreed that "there are no potions that can make a voter vote a certain way", at least one person continued to insist on the possibility of electoral manipulation because "maybe magic can occur in the (ballot) boxes!".

Some respondents had internalized attitudes of intolerance. One group of farmers in Southern Province, an MMD stronghold, concurred that "if you have different views to the government, you should not say them out", "if you are in opposition you should keep quiet", and that "if you want to speak out, you should join the ruling party".

From this mixed picture we conclude that the issue of political tolerance currently hangs in the balance in Zambia. While some citizens show a proclivity to live and let live, others express authoritarian political norms derived from earlier (traditional, colonial and postcolonial) regimes. We suspect that tolerant attitudes are more widespread among the general population than among the militant fringes of political parties, especially as personified by party "youth". Whether tolerant attitudes come to predominate in Zambia, however, depends very much on the example set by political leaders.

Political Competence

The political science literature suggests that a sense of political competence (sometimes called political efficacy) is another underlying requirement of democratic citizenship. Elizabeth Colson has used the concept of political competence in a Zambian context to refer to "the manipulation of persons and events", especially the ability of individuals to control channels of influence (1967, 92-3; see also Dahl, 1992). In order to become politically effective, people must feel an innate capacity to affect, not only the direction of their own lives (personal competence), but also the outcomes of political processes in local and national arenas (citizen competence).

We asked a sample of focus group respondents (n=51) to reflect on binary pairs of statements relating to political competence. We then asked them to choose the statement that came closest to their own opinion. For example, among five pairs of questions on personal competence, we asked whether they believed that "what happens to me is a result of my own effort" or that "I don't have enough control over the direction of my life". And to assess citizen competence, we posed another five pairs of statements, including "I have a right and a duty to vote in elections", versus "voting is a waste of my time". The results of answers to these questions are reported in Table 3.

The good news is that overall levels of political competence among the participants in the Zambian focus groups was quite high. Out of a total of 355 responses, 223 were positive; in other

words, almost two out of three (63%) answers reflect a sense of political competence on the part of the respondent (see "percent positive" in Table 3).

But a puzzle emerges when this result is analysed. One would expect levels of personal competence to be at least as high, if not higher, than levels of citizen competence. After all, how can people who feel powerless to affect the course of their own lives be convinced that they can exert influence in wider political arenas? Yet this is precisely what our preliminary data from Zambia suggest. The focus groups participants expressed levels of citizen competence (81%) far higher than levels of personal competence (40%).

Further analysis reveals that this paradox derives almost entirely from the rural areas. Among urban respondents, levels of expressed personal competence (68%) approach levels of citizen competence (73%). In the city of Lusaka we were probably observing a single phenomenon, namely a population that believes itself to be both personally competent and efficacious as citizens. For example, all urban respondents felt themselves to be capable of taking initiative and planning ahead for problem-solving (statements 3A and 5B). At the same time they unanimously expressed confidence that they could influence others in political discussions and could recruit others to join in collective endeavors (statements 6A and 7B).

Among rural respondents, however, there are dramatic divergences between personal competence (31%) and citizen competence (94%). The farmers interviewed were consistently fatalistic ("It is not wise to plan too far ahead, because many things turn out to be a matter of good or bad luck") and other-regarding ("I put my main effort into improving the life of my children and other younger relatives"). They also preferred to work in groups rather than alone and to let others take the initiative in problem-solving (statements 2A and 3B). Yet these attitudes did not inhibit them from feeling that they could influence the views of others in political discussions (statement 6) or get others to join in a group to solve a problem (statement 7).

What explains these results? Two possibilities suggest themselves. First, our definition of personal competence, which assesses the ability of individuals to control their own lives, may be culturally biased. Perhaps civic competence derives from cooperative rather than individualistic behavior in Zambian cultural contexts. Second, our sample of rural dwellers was biased towards members of the agricultural cooperative movement as identified by our ZCF contact persons in Choma. Therefore, we guess that the unexpected conjunction between low personal competence and high political competence is an artifact of respondents having internalized norms of the cooperation from both traditional society and the cooperative movement. It remains to be seen whether these interesting results will be reproduced in other rural areas of Zambia that have been less mobilized by cooperatives than has Southern Province. They suggest the interesting hypothesis (consistent with Putnam, 1993) that involvement in civic associations, including cooperatives, may be a more important determinant of political competence than a self-centered sense of personal efficacy.

Overall, it is encouraging to report that the Zambians in our sample do not feel powerless. On the contrary, the overwhelming majority stake a claim to act as citizens (94%), as reflected in their view that they have "a right and a duty to vote in elections" (statement 10A). We must note, however, a creeping sense of political cynicism among urban dwellers as reflected by a minority who, disillusioned with rising prices and elite corruption, say they are unlikely to "waste time" by voting.

Political Participation

The MMD administration in Zambia has promised accountable government, in part by encouraging participatory political behavior among citizens. There are better methodologies than focus groups, however, for estimating levels of actual political behavior, methods (e.g. survey questionnaires, electoral returns, participant observation) that will be employed in subsequent studies. For the moment, let us simply record a few observations on political behavior as revealed by group discussions and by social background questionnaires filled in by each participant.

Focus group participants were exactly evenly split between political activists (50%) and non-activists (50%) (See Table 1). We did not specify the referents for "activism", allowing the respondents to interpret this term and assess themselves subjectively. Some chose to mention that they were office-holders in the local branches of political parties. Given MMD's overwhelming victory in the 1991 general election (and its capture of at least one seat in every local government council nationwide, including all districts in Eastern Province), we were not surprised that most respondents claimed affiliation with the ruling party (58%). The large proportion of persons claiming no affiliation (33%) probably reflects as much an unwillingness to divulge partisanship as a genuine political neutrality. We know that at least some of our respondents (e.g. market women) still fear retribution for belonging to the "wrong" party.

Most respondents also said they were registered voters (64%). But, of the 15 persons aged 21 or below, only 4 (approx. 27%) had registered; members of this age group complained that they had never had a chance to obtain voter cards even though they wished to participate in elections. A majority of focus group participants claimed to have voted in the 1991 national poll. But not one person in this sample of Zambians mentioned ever having written a letter to an M.P.

We suppose that membership in voluntary societies leads to other participant behaviors. Thus we were troubled when women in Petauke and Chipata related recent experiences in which they had tried to form community organizations only to see them collapse. In both places the respondents attributed this problem to schisms within the community in which members of one party refused to join with members of another, even for nonpartisan, developmental purposes. This suggests that a return to multiparty politics at the local level might actually make face citizens with more difficulties in engaging in participant political behaviors. This hypothesis awaits further testing.

Civic Education Needs

The selected groups of Zambians we spoke to repeatedly expressed a strong demand for civic education. From their perspective, "more people should be taught why it is necessary to vote". They also thought that "if people were educated they would not submit to threats" and that "once you are familiar with electoral processes, it is difficult to be cheated by a polling official".

A civic education program in Zambia is likely to be most effective if it focusses on increasing political knowledge, rather than trying to change basic values and attitudes. The proposals below for curriculum development reflect this emphasis.

In our opinion, the needs for civic education go well beyond the mechanics of voting. We see a need for improved knowledge on basic civil and political rights, the structure of government, and (especially) the channels for political representation. Accordingly, we suggest that any civic education program should begin with the topic of political representation. Such an emphasis would address a common complaint voiced in the focus groups, namely that people do not know how to get their councillors and MPs to attend to pressing community problems. Hence curriculum development for civic education would do well to start by providing information on: (a) rights of political representation (i.e. freedom of conscience and expression, freedom of association, the right to vote); (b) the functions of representative institutions (with special emphasis on the separate roles of central government institutions, local government councils, and political parties); (c) methods of political representation between elections (e.g. forming civic associations for self-help activities, inviting political representatives to community-led meetings, writing letters and petitions, contacting the media); and (d) the role of taxation in representation (i.e. using taxes and fees as vehicles to demand accountability from public officials).

Other important aspects of political knowledge can be addressed in subsequent phases of the civic education campaign: (a) basic human rights (and the potential for abrogation under a state of emergency); (b) the proper functions of other branches of government (executive and judiciary, especially police and magistrates); and (c) the rationale for economic adjustment.

The focus group respondents had their own ideas about the best ways to conduct a civic education campaign. One woman warned that "a door-to-door campaign could be dangerous" because people might think that the civic educators were militants of a particular party. Young people wanted an alternative to the political education "propaganda" disseminated in civics textbooks during the Second Republic which was "boring" and "biased". One man commented that "it is O.K. to use the radio or booklets, but we also want an opportunity to ask". In sum, interactive approaches were preferred in which the learners would have a chance to actively participate. We would only add that MPs and councillors should be involved in civic education workshops, providing they accept that they are there to learn as much as to teach.

Conclusions

By way of conclusion, we will summarize and interpret the political attitudes revealed by focus groups conducted among selected groups of citizens in a newly democratized African country. In so doing, we wish to remind the reader of the main caveat of this exploratory study, namely, that all findings are tentative. They await confirmation or modification by more systematic research methods.

The Zambians who participated in the focus groups saw themselves as competent to engage in public affairs. They were confident that they could take control, if not of their own lives, at least the political direction of their country. A syndrome of both personal and civic competence was particularly marked among urban dwellers. The participation of a broad cross-section of Zambian voters in a peaceful electoral transition in 1991 was an achievement of which all were justifiably proud. Their attitudes of competence are a major resource for consolidating democratic institutions.

Yet, to a certain extent, citizen confidence is misplaced because the focus groups also revealed notable shortcomings in political knowledge. These gaps can be attributed partly to limited opportunities for formal education among low-income communities and partly to misinformation

disseminated by political authorities during the previous regime. We discovered blurred images in the public mind of the structures and functions of different branches and levels of government. For many people, the distinction between the government and the ruling party was entirely absent. These institutions may have been "delinked" in the Constitution of Zambia, but they remain fused in the popular imagination.

Moreover, the majority of citizens interviewed seemed to think that political participation begins and ends with voting. While most respondents vigorously asserted their right to vote, few understood that they also have a right to hold their representatives to account between elections. Instead, ordinary folk feel abandoned by their MPs and councillors, whom they see "eating while we starve". The focus group discussions pointed out an urgent need to close what might be called a "representation gap" between constituents and elected officials. Initiative for improved representation will have to come significantly from below. Regrettably, whatever participants professed about political competence or cynicism about politicians, we perceived them awaiting guidance from above instead of taking the initiative to demand action from their elected leaders.

At the same time, the focus groups revealed moderate levels of political trust among citizens. A dose of skepticism about public institutions and officials can be healthy in a democracy, especially if it leads to pressure for political accountability. But in Zambia, distrust also seems to run quite deeply at the local and interpersonal levels. In some places it has been fueled by official corruption, posing obstacles to the rehabilitation of run-down institutions like local government and the police. Elsewhere, lack of political trust undermines efforts at community cooperation and slows the emergence of a dense network of voluntary associations. Yet, we were struck that, where local associations were active, there seemed to be a greater sense of citizen competence and a more optimistic view of the direction that the country could take. We sense that there is a positive connection between community organization and effective democratic representation that needs to be explored much more thoroughly.

We suspect that the political attitudes expressed in the focus groups are shaped by powerful cultural values and national economic trends. The most singular threat to the consolidation of democracy in Zambia is the growing disillusionment among almost all classes of citizen with worsening economic conditions. On one hand this gives rise to growing lawlessness and invites harsh government responses such as the March 4, 1993 declaration of a State of Emergency (the Emergency was repealed on May 25, 1993). Increasingly, too, vulnerable members of the citizenry may be tempted to blame democracy for their travails and to withdraw their support from elections and public institutions. In this context, the need for initiatives to support the consolidation of institutions of democratic governance becomes all the more pressing. But expectations about the impact of such initiatives on the course of Zambia's political development must be modest at best.

Table 1
Characteristics of Focus Group Participants

Number of participants	116
Location	
Urban	31 (27%)
Rural Population Center	53 (48%)
Rural	32 (28%)
Gender	
Females	55 (47%)
Males	61 (53%)
Age Group	
under 30 years	60 (52%)
31 to 45 years	45 (39%)
Over 46 years	11 (9%)
Religion	
Catholic	19 (16%)
Protestant	73 (63%)
Other	16 (14%)
None	8 (7%)
Church attendance	
Often	71 (61%)
Sometimes	37 (32%)
Never	8 (7%)
Education	
Higher	37 (32%)
Secondary	37 (32%)
Primary	34 (29%)
None	8 (7%)

Table 1 (continued)

Ethnic Group	
Tonga	35 (30%)
Chewa	19 (16%)
Nsenga	18 (16%)
Ngoni	15 (13%)
Tumbuka	6 (5%)
Bemba	5 (4%)
Other	18 (16%)
Occupation	
Farmer	23 (20%)
Public sector worker	48 (41%)
Private sector/self-employed	34 (29%)
None	11 (10%)
Monthly Income	
Up to K10,000	87 (75%)
K10,001 to K50,000	27 (23%)
K50,001 or more	2 (2%)
Registered Voter	
Yes	74 (64%)
No	42 (36%)
Party Affiliation	
MMD	67 (58%)
UNIP	8 (7%)
Other	3 (3%)
None	38 (33%)
Politically active (self-assessment)	
Yes	58 (50%)
No	58 (50%)

Table 2
Responses to Questions on Political Trust
 (mean scores, scale of one to ten)

	Urban Areas	Rural Centers	Rural Areas	All Areas	(Rank)
Social Groups	4.8		5.8	5.1	
Family	7.2	6.9	7.4	7.2	(1)
Neighbors	4.8	4.3	5.7	5.0	(6)
Own Ethnic Group	4.7	4.7	6.4	5.4	(4)
Other Ethnic Group	4.3	6.0	5.3	5.1	(5)
Zaireans	1.5	2.0	1.5	1.7	(8)
Malawians	5.8	6.5	4.2	5.7	(3)
White South Africans	4.3	2.7	-	3.5	(7)
British	6.5	7.3	-	6.9	(2)
Government Institutions	3.4		6.9	4.8	
Police	2.9	3.0	6.3	4.0	(6)
Army	3.6	5.5	8.2	5.1	(2)
Magistrates' Courts	3.5	4.8	6.5	4.8	(3)
Local Councils	3.5	2.3	6.5	4.2	(5)
National Assembly	4.3	6.1	9.5	6.2	(1)
Cabinet	2.5	6.7	-	4.8	(3)
N G O s				5.7	
Churches	6.4	6.2	7.3	6.8	(1)
Trade Unions	5.9	-	-	5.9	(2)
FODEP	4.6	-	-	4.6	(4)
Interviewers	-	-	5.5	5.5	(3)
Media				6.2	
Times of Zambia	6.0	6.0	-	6.0	(3)
Daily Mail	5.4	4.5	-	5.4	(6)
Weekly Post	6.6	7.5	-	7.2	(2)
National Mirror	6.0	-	-	5.9	(4)
ZNBC TV	4.8	-	-	4.8	(7)
Radio Zambia	5.1	6.4	6.2	5.8	(5)
BBC radio	7.6	9.0	9.2	8.0	(1)

Table 3
Responses to Statements on Political Competence
(percent positive)

	Statement No.*	Urban	Rural	Overall
Personal Competence		68	31	49
	1	50	45	48
	2	33	18	31
	3	100	40	67
	4	55	16	36
	5	100	0	74
Citizen Competence		73	94	81
	6	100	92	97
	7	100	82	94
	8	60	-	-
	9	20	-	-
	10	85	100	94

***Statements**

Personal Competence

- 1.A. What happens to me is due to my own effort
 B. I don't have enough control over the direction of my life
- 2.A. I usually do better working with a group
 B. I usually do better working alone
- 3.A. I usually take the initiative in solving problems
 B. I usually let others lead the way in solving problems
- 4.A. I put my main effort into improving my own life
 B. I put my main effort into improving the lives of my children or other younger relatives
- 5.A. It is not wise to plan too far ahead, because many things turn out to be a matter of good or bad luck
 B. I always try to plan ahead because I feel that I can make my plans work

Citizen Competence

- 6.A. In discussions about politics with friends and neighbors, I can influence the opinions of others
 B. As far as politics is concerned, friends and neighbors do not listen to me
- 7.A. If I tried to form a small group to solve a problem, people would not cooperate with me
 B. If I tried to form a small group to solve a problem, people would join in
- 8.A. I am able to make our local government councillor listen to the problems of our community
 B. I am unable to make our councillor listen to us
- 9.A. I am unable to make our Member of Parliament listen to the problems of our community

B. I am able to make our M.P listen to us

10.A. As a citizen, I have a right and a duty to vote
B. Voting in elections is a waste of my time

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Field Number _____

Respondent No. _____

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY/UNIVERSITY OF ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE PROJECT
Civic Attitudes Questionnaire

Good day. My name is [Enumerator: say your name]. I am from the University of Zambia. I do not represent the government or any political party. The University of Zambia is studying the views of citizens about the system of government in our country. As part of this research project, I would like to ask you a few questions.

There are no right or wrong answers. Instead, we are interested in what you think.

You are not obligated to take part in the survey and you may refuse to answer any particular question. Your name will not be used and your answers will be kept strictly confidential, so you can feel free to answer openly and honestly. The interview will take about one hour. Do you wish to proceed?

[If yes, fill in box below]

Date _____	Name of Enumerator _____	Standard Enumeration Area _____
Province _____	District _____	Town _____
Village/Compound _____		

Political Participation

1. Are you a registered voter? Yes ___ No ___

2. [If not] Why not? _____

[If not a registered voter, Go to Q.7]

3. Did you vote in the October 1991 general elections? Yes ___ No ___

4. [If not] Why not? _____

5. Did you vote in the November 1992 local government elections? Yes ___ No ___

6. [If not] Why not? _____

7. How interested would you say you are in politics? Very interested ___ Somewhat interested ___ Not interested ___

8. How often do you discuss politics with other people? Often ___ Sometimes ___ Never ___

9. I am going to give you a list of people. Can you tell me how important these people are in your life?

Your family	Very important ___	Somewhat important ___	Not important ___
Your ethnic or language group	Very important ___	Somewhat important ___	Not important ___
Chiefs and headmen	Very important ___	Somewhat important ___	Not important ___
Your local government councillor	Very important ___	Somewhat important ___	Not important ___
Your Member of Parliament	Very important ___	Somewhat important ___	Not important ___
Other powerful people in the community	Very important ___	Somewhat important ___	Not important ___

10. In which of the following activities have you participated during the last five years?

11. [If not] Might you participate in the future?

attending a community meeting	Have done _____	Might do _____	Would never do _____	DK _____
attending an election rally	Have done _____	Might do _____	Would never do _____	DK _____
working for a political candidate or party	Have done _____	Might do _____	Would never do _____	DK _____
going to a headman for help to solve a problem	Have done _____	Might do _____	Would never do _____	DK _____
going to a councillor for help to solve a problem	Have done _____	Might do _____	Would never do _____	DK _____
going to an MP for help to solve a problem	Have done _____	Might do _____	Would never do _____	DK _____
writing a letter to a newspaper	Have done _____	Might do _____	Would never do _____	DK _____
attending a lawful demonstration	Have done _____	Might do _____	Would never do _____	DK _____
participating in a violent demonstration	Have done _____	Might do _____	Would never do _____	DK _____

12. [Enumerator: Identify highest level action] What were you trying to achieve with this action?

13. To your knowledge, how many times has your local government councillor held a meeting in this area during the past year?

_____ times

14. To your knowledge, how many times has your Member of Parliament held a meeting in this area during the past year?

_____ times

Associational Life

15. Are you a member of any community organization such as a church, club, union or cooperative? Yes _____ No _____
[If No, go to Q.21]

16. Which community organization(s)? [Enumerator: use lines below]

17. For how many years have you belonged?

18. Which leadership position, if any, do you hold in any of these organization(s)?

Orgs.	1. _____	Years _____	Position _____
	2. _____	Years _____	Position _____
	3. _____	Years _____	Position _____

19. In the past year, how many meetings of your community organization have you attended? All, most, some, or none?

All _____ Most _____ Some _____ None _____

20. What are the problems, if any, in the way your community organization works? _____

21. [If No to Q. 15] Why don't you belong? _____

Political Authority

Please say whether you agree or disagree with the following statements. Remember, there are no right or wrong answers. We are simply interested in your views.

22. These days in Zambia, there is not enough respect for authority.

Strongly Agree ___ Agree ___ Can't Say ___ Disagree ___ Strongly Disagree ___

23. Women should have the same right as men to vote in elections.

Strongly Agree ___ Agree ___ Can't Say ___ Disagree ___ Strongly Disagree ___

24. The police have too much power in this country.

Strongly Agree ___ Agree ___ Can't Say ___ Disagree ___ Strongly Disagree ___

25. People should be permitted to vote, even if they do not fully understand all the issues.

Strongly Agree ___ Agree ___ Can't Say ___ Disagree ___ Strongly Disagree ___

26. Only men should be allowed to run for public office (such as councillor or MP).

Strongly Agree ___ Agree ___ Can't Say ___ Disagree ___ Strongly Disagree ___

27. The police should be allowed to shoot anyone fleeing from the scene of a crime.

Strongly Agree ___ Agree ___ Can't Say ___ Disagree ___ Strongly Disagree ___

28. The government should not be allowed to detain people without first giving them a fair trial.

Strongly Agree ___ Agree ___ Can't Say ___ Disagree ___ Strongly Disagree ___

29. This country would have fewer problems if young people were given more of a chance to hold public office.

Strongly Agree ___ Agree ___ Can't say ___ Disagree ___ Strongly Disagree ___

Political Accountability

30. Bribery is very rare among public officials in Zambia.

Strongly Agree ___ Agree ___ Can't Say ___ Disagree ___ Strongly Disagree ___

31. One's tribe makes no difference in politics and government.

Strongly Agree ___ Agree ___ Can't Say ___ Disagree ___ Strongly Disagree ___

32. There is nothing wrong with a Minister helping his home village with development projects.

Strongly Agree ___ Agree ___ Can't Say ___ Disagree ___ Strongly Disagree ___

33. Most government officials and politicians are mainly concerned with enriching themselves.

Strongly Agree ___ Agree ___ Can't Say ___ Disagree ___ Strongly Disagree ___

34. The President's region of the country gets more government services than any other region.

Strongly Agree ___ Agree ___ Can't say ___ Disagree ___ Strongly Disagree ___

35. Corruption was a worse problem under the old UNIP government than these days.

Strongly Agree ___ Agree ___ Disagree ___ Can't Say ___ Strongly Disagree ___

Political Knowledge

36. Can you tell me the names of the following people:

the councillor for this area? _____ [Correct___ Incorrect___ DK___]

the Member of Parliament for this area? _____ [Correct___ Incorrect___ DK___]

the Minister for this Province? _____ [Correct___ Incorrect___ DK___]

the Minister of Finance? _____ [Correct___ Incorrect___ DK___]

the Vice-President of Zambia? _____ [Correct___ Incorrect___ DK___]

37. What is a local government council supposed to do? _____

38. What is the National Assembly supposed to do? _____

39. Have you ever heard of FODEP (the Foundation for Democratic Process)? Yes___ No___

40. [If yes] What is FODEP supposed to do? _____

41. In Zambia, is there a difference between a political party and a government, or are they the same thing?
Different___ Same___

42. Is there a difference between the central government and your local government council, or are they the same thing?
Different___ Same___

43. Should chiefs and headmen play a part in governing Zambia today? Yes___ No___

44. [If yes] What role? _____

45. Does your household own a radio? Yes___ No___

46. Do you ever listen to news bulletins on the radio?
[If No, Go to Q.49] Yes___ No___

47. How often do you listen to a news bulletin?
Every day___ Several times a week___ Weekly___ Monthly___ Less often than monthly___

48. At which time of day do you listen to news bulletins? Morning___ Lunchtime___ Evening___ All___

49. Do you ever read a newspaper?
[If No, Go to Q. 53] Yes___ No___

50. Do you buy this newspaper yourself or share a copy with another person? Buy___ Share___ Both___

51. Which newspaper(s) do you read?
Times of Zambia___ Daily Mail___ Weekly Post___ Other (specify)_____

52. How often do you read a newspaper?
Every day___ Several times a week___ Weekly___ Monthly___ Less often than monthly___

Political Trust

[Enumerator: Show ten point scale and explain it]

I DO NOT TRUST
THEM AT ALLI TRUST THEM
COMPLETELY

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

53. On a scale of one to ten, how much do you trust the following people?

[Enumerator: Enter numerical score between 1 and 10. DK = don't know]

Your immediate family	_____	Zambians from Southern Province	_____	Zaireans	_____
Your male relatives	_____	Zambians from Western Province	_____	Malawians	_____
Your female relatives	_____	Zambians from Northern Province	_____	White S. Africans	_____
Your neighbors	_____	Zambians from Eastern Province	_____	British	_____
Your own ethnic group	_____				

54. On a scale of one to ten, how much do you trust the following institutions?

The police	_____	Churches	_____	Times of Zambia	_____
The local council	_____	Trade Unions	_____	Weekly Post	_____
The National Assembly (MPs)	_____	FODEP	_____	ZNBC TV	_____
The Cabinet (Ministers)	_____	This interview team	_____	Radio Zambia	_____
				BBC	_____

Political Efficacy

I am going to give you several pairs of statements. Please tell me which statement is closest to your own opinion. Please choose A or B.

55. A. I usually do better working with a group _____ A _____
B. I usually do better working alone _____ B _____
56. A. I put my main effort into improving my own life _____ A _____
B. I put my main effort into improving the lives of my children and other younger relatives _____ B _____
57. A. It is not wise to plan too far ahead, because many things turn out to be a matter of luck _____ A _____
B. I always try to plan ahead because I feel I can make my plans work _____ B _____
58. A. In discussions about politics with friends and neighbours, I can influence the opinions of others _____ A _____
B. As far as politics is concerned, friends and neighbors do not listen to me _____ B _____
59. A. Government sometimes seems so complicated I cannot really understand what is going on _____ A _____
B. The way that government works is generally understandable to people like me _____ B _____
60. A. To get something done, it is best for individuals to make private approaches to influential leaders _____ A _____
B. To get something done, it is best to form a group and to state your demands in public _____ B _____
61. A. As a community, we are generally able to make our political representatives listen to our problems _____ A _____
B. We are usually unable to make our councillors and MPs listen to us _____ B _____
62. A. Government leaders are capable of solving the problems that the country presently faces _____ A _____
B. The government is not very effective at carrying out programs to solve national problems _____ B _____

Policy Preferences

Please tell me which of these statements is closest to your own opinion. Please choose A or B.

- 63. A. It is better to have goods in the market, even if the prices are high A
 B. It is better to have low prices, even if there are shortages of goods B
- 64. A. It is better to have free schooling for our children, even if the quality of education is low A
 B. It is better to raise educational standards, even if we have to pay school fees B
- 65. A. Our leaders should provide us with government jobs, even if this is costly to the country A
 B. The government cannot afford so many public employees and should lay off some of them B
- 66. A. Government ownership of factories, businesses and farms should be expanded A
 B. Private ownership of factories, businesses and farms should be expanded B

Political Tolerance

- 67. A. If people have different views than you do, they should be allowed to express them A
 B. It is dangerous and confusing to allow the expression of too many different points of view B
- 68. A. If people want to form a community organization, they should affiliate with the ruling party A
 B. If people want to form a community organization, they should be free to do so independently B
- 69. A. Even though the President says Zambia is a Christian country, Muslims should be allowed A
 to form an Islamic political party B
 B. Muslims should not be allowed to form an Islamic political party
- 70. A. In Zambia, the use of violence is sometimes justified in reaching political goals A
 B. The use of violence is never justified in Zambian politics B
- 71. A. The best form of government is a government elected by its people A
 B. The best form of government is a government that gets things done B
- 72. A. In Zambia today, we now have a real choice among different political parties and candidates A
 B. In Zambia today, we are well on our way to becoming another single-party state B
- 73. A. To compromise with one's opponents is dangerous because you betray your own side A
 B. The only way we can all get along in this world is if we accommodate each other B

Life Satisfaction/(Post) Materialism

74. How satisfied are you:

with the work you are doing?

Very satisfied _____ Fairly satisfied _____ Not very satisfied _____ Not at all satisfied _____

with your financial situation?

Very satisfied _____ Fairly satisfied _____ Not very satisfied _____ Not at all satisfied _____

with the state of your health?

Very satisfied _____ Fairly satisfied _____ Not very satisfied _____ Not at all satisfied _____

overall, with the life you lead?

Very satisfied _____ Fairly satisfied _____ Not very satisfied _____ Not at all satisfied _____

75. When you look at your life today, how satisfied do you feel:

Compared with one year ago?

Much more satisfied _____ Slightly more satisfied _____ Slightly less satisfied _____ Much less satisfied _____

Compared with five years ago?

Much more satisfied _____ Slightly more satisfied _____ Slightly less satisfied _____ Much less satisfied _____

76. When you look forward at your life prospects, and those of your children, how satisfied do you expect to be:

In one year's time?

Much more satisfied _____ Slightly more satisfied _____ Slightly less satisfied _____ Much less satisfied _____

In five years' time?

Much more satisfied _____ Slightly more satisfied _____ Slightly less satisfied _____ Much less satisfied _____

77. Presently, which national issues do you consider to be most important to you and your family?

78. There is a lot of talk these days about what the goals of this country should be over the next ten years. Here is a list of goals. [Enumerator: if the respondent is literate, show list]. Which of the following goals would you choose as your top priority?

79. And what is your second choice?

A. Maintaining order in the nation	First choice _____	Second choice _____
B. Giving people more say in government decisions	First choice _____	Second choice _____
C. Fighting rising prices	First choice _____	Second choice _____
D. Protecting freedom of speech	First choice _____	Second choice _____
E. Don't know	First choice _____	Second choice _____

80. Is crime a major problem in your life? Yes _____ No _____

81. [If yes] In what way have you changed your life because of crime? _____

82. What are some things that MMD has done better than UNIP? _____

83. What are some things MMD has done worse than UNIP? _____

84. What is your overall assessment of the performance of the new MMD government?

Very Good _____ Good _____ Fair _____ Poor _____ Very Poor _____

Economic Knowledge

85. In your opinion, who is responsible for current economic conditions in Zambia?

The old government _____ The new government _____ The IMF/World Bank _____ The people of Zambia _____

Other (specify) _____

86. In your view, why have maize-meal prices risen? _____

87. If public services are to be improved (such as roads, clinics, water and sewage), the Government must raise money to pay for them. In your view, where should this money come from?

88. Do you think the Government should encourage foreigners to invest in Zambia?

Yes _____ No _____

Why? _____

Social Background

I would like to finish this interview with a few questions about yourself and your household. Remember that we will not ask your name, so you can feel free to answer honestly and openly.

89. [Enumerator: fill in respondent's gender]

Male _____ Female _____

90. In which year were you born? _____

91. What is your tribe? _____

92. How many years of formal education have you had? _____

_____ years

93. Do you have a job which earns some money?

Yes _____ No _____

94. What sort of job? _____

95. How much do you earn? _____

kwacha per month (or _____ kwacha per year)

96. How much does your spouse earn? _____

kwacha per month (or _____ kwacha per year)

97. How many people live in your household? _____

98. Do you support a political party?

Yes _____ No _____

99. [If yes] Which one? _____

100. Do you have a membership card for this party?

Yes _____ No _____

101. Do you have any other comments? _____

THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

I DO NOT TRUST
THEM AT ALL

I TRUST THEM
COMPLETELY

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

- A. Maintaining Order in the Nation**
- B. Giving People More Say in Government Decisions**
- C. Fighting Rising Prices**
- D. Protecting Freedom of Speech**