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WHEELING, DEALING, STEALING AND APPEALING: BASES OF VOTING IN THE BRAZILIAN CONGRESS

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THE BRAZILIAN CONGRESS

Barry Ames

This paper begins with a puzzle. Brazil's legislature ought to be active. The **system** is presidential; the electoral **system is** decentralized and candidate-centered; interest groups are well-organized and functionally specific; the executive is relatively open; committees are permanent and parallel the structure of the executive; parties are numerous. Such conditions all imply a busy legislature, and indeed, in the budgetary process the legislature is quite active. But on issues of national scope Brazil's Congress has accomplished little.

Legislative weakness can have three causes: excessive parties, procedural roadblocks, and an excess of members with little interest on broad legislation. The party system merits investigation, but fewer parties participated in the equally unsuccessful democracy of 1946-1964. Moreover, it is unclear how many parties qualify as "dangerous excess." Procedures also matter, but given that few deputies develop much seniority, the costs of removing procedural obstacles should be low. Thus I focus on motivations. If motivations matter, what mix of constituency pressures, ideology, electoral needs, and local interests determines them?

I examine the motivations of deputies by modeling two kinds of voting: broad issue areas in the Constituent Assembly of 1987-88 and Collor's emergency decrees of 1990. On the constitutional issues of congressional prerogatives, executive power, statism-welfarism **and popular democracy, the nature of the electoral system** makes a difference. Deputies with more clustered votes tend to be pro-Congress, anti-executive, supportive of state intervention and welfare, and supportive **of popular** democracy. **These** positions result, I suggest, from the greater accountability that vote clustering produces. Dominant deputies, by contrast, backed the executive and opposed a stronger Congress, and dominance gave deputies the autonomy to dissent from the mainstream of their parties.

The social characteristics of constituencies did influence congressional voting, though modestly: industrial areas elected **more** liberal deputies. Overall, however, socioeconomic conditions forged only weak ties **between voters and deputies. Brazilian** citizens exert pressure for pork-barrel programs, but on broader issues they have little control over their representatives. This should **come** as no surprise, because anyone observing **a** Brazilian election would doubt that many voters know anything at all about the positions of their deputies. Ironically, evangelical Protestant voters **may** have the tightest control over their representative, both in terms of ideological positions and in terms of pork.

Ideology played a large role in legislative voting. Former members of the ARENA party were consistently anti-Congress, pro-executive, anti-labor, and lower on support for popular democracy. Deputies with these values clustered in parties supporting President Collor in his decrees, and they were his strongest supporters even within the pro-government parties.

Powerful state governors influenced their delegations in discernible ways. The governor of Bahia cared about constitutional issues, and he polarized his delegation between partisans and opponents. President Jose Sarney, a weaker leader, mobilized his supporters only on the issue of executive strength, but his more conciliatory approach brought him support from opponents in the state as well.

Perhaps most striking was the importance of pork-barrel orientation as a predictor of broader positions. The coefficients of the pork measures are extraordinarily large, and the model's explained variance improves substantially with the pork variables included. In the Constituent Assembly, deputies truly could be bought. Deputies receiving public works for their bailiwicks were pro-executive, anti-Congress, anti-labor, and low on support for popular democracy. At the beginning of the Collor administration pork effects were **smaller, in part because the administration was somewhat disorganized and in part because it found other ways to corrupt politicians, but pork-oriented deputies consistently supported the executive.** The importance of direct benefits to deputies speaks volumes about the weakness of voter representative links, and it goes far toward explaining the overall weakness of the legislature.

The results of this paper should also be of interest to policy makers dealing with the restructuring of electoral and legislative systems in other newly democratic countries. The ineffectiveness of the Brazilian legislature is magnified by procedural rules that hinder the development of expertise and by an excess of parties (hampering negotiation), **but the weakness of the legislature is clearly related to an electoral system that promotes personalism, a focus on pork-barrel delivery, and a disinterest in national level issues.**

ABSTRACT

Why is Brazil's legislature extraordinarily active in the distribution of pork-barrel but largely inactive on national issues? This paper explores the question by illuminating the motivations of deputies. Emphasizing open-list proportional representation and executive dominance over resources, I develop a model of legislative voting based on the nature of Brazil's political institutions. I apply the model to voting in the Constituent Assembly of 1987-88 and to support for the administration of President Collor de Mello. The results reveal that the electoral system, especially in terms of geographic clustering and local dominance of vote bases, constrains deputies' preferences. Ideology also matters, but career backgrounds and the socioeconomic characteristics of deputies' constituencies only weakly affect their voting.

The eagerness of deputies to garner pork-barrel programs from the president profoundly affects broader voting patterns. Deputies receiving public works for their bailiwicks were pro-executive, anti-Congress, opposed to state intervention in the economy and to labor demands, and low on support for mechanisms of popular democracy. When the motivations of deputies favor deals maximizing local pork barrel and minimizing links to constituency demands, it is no surprise that the legislature devotes little attention to national issues.

"Balanced budgets are the rhetoric of incompetent politicians"

-- Orestes Quercia, ex-governor of São Paulo¹

The wave of democratization sweeping over Latin America and Eastern Europe is reawakening legislative research in comparative politics. Is there, for scholars of newly empowered legislatures, a central line of inquiry? I suggest that the central question is the relationship between legislative arrangements and public policy. How and why, in other words, does public policy differ across varying legislative systems?

The linkage between legislatures and policy is complex. It depends on the electoral system, which translates public preferences into legislative preferences. It depends on the party system, which aggregates legislative preferences and allows legislators a certain degree of freedom to express those preferences. It depends on the executive, who stands in a relation of dominance or subordination to the legislature. And, finally, the linkage depends on the legislature's internal rules, rules that facilitate or hinder the defense of parochial interests, the acquisition of specialized knowledge, and the propensity to engage in collective action.

Where will students of post-transition legislatures turn for guidance? For Latin America, where presidentialism holds absolute sway, the answer is surely the literature on the U.S. Congress. Methodologically the American literature is a bit intimidating, because legislatures in newly competitive nations cannot offer the enormous depth of empirical evidence on which so much congressional scholarship

¹ **Ciro Gomes**, the current governor of **Ceará**, claims that **Quercia** made this remark. The Portuguese is better: "**Equilíbrio financeiro é conversa de político incompetente**" (*Veja*, 1992, p. 9).

depends. Substantively the American literature is less intimidating than frustrating, because Americanists, with their "N" of one and their provincial, case study focus, rarely consider the relationship between broadly varying legislative arrangements and policy outputs.

Ideally, the study of legislatures in formerly authoritarian regimes should be comparative, linking variations in 'public policy to variations in electoral systems, legislative preferences; internal rules, and executive-legislative relations. Though a growing body of descriptive literature is beginning to supply cross-nationally valid indicators for these concepts, we still need empirical work based on single-country studies, studies informed in part by existing comparative research and in part by the theoretical and empirical American literature.²

This essay explores the motivations of deputies in the Chamber of Deputies of the Brazilian Congress. By motivations I mean ideology, constituency characteristics, election prospects, and susceptibility to pork-barrel inducements. My objective is to develop and evaluate an argument linking these forces to voting in Brazil's National Constituent Assembly (ANC) of 1987-88 and in the first year of the administration of President Fernando Collor de Mello.

The paper proceeds in four sections. Section I examines the overall performance of the Brazilian legislature. Section II sketches a theory of legislative voting based on

² Some scholars offer comparisons of two or three countries as the best solution to this problem. I believe that most small sample comparisons really hold very little constant, and serve merely as cover for superficial empirical work.

the nature of Brazil's political institutions, with emphasis on the electoral system.

Section III presents and evaluates a model of voting in the ANC and on a set of emergency presidential decrees in 1990. Section IV discusses the implications of the empirical findings.

I. How well do Brazil's decision-making institutions work?

Both in the current democratic experiment and in the 1946-64 period, the Brazilian Congress has seldom been able to legislate on issues of national concern.³ The legislature's weakness was especially visible in 1987-88, when the Senate and the Chamber joined together as the constituent assembly. A 160-page constitution emerged; a constitution that placed ceilings on interest rates and granted life tenure to bureaucrats but left major issues in health care and education for future legislatures. The subsequent Congress, to no one's surprise, has resolved nothing, doing little more than reacting to President Collor's many emergency decrees and, ultimately, impeaching the President himself.

The current Congress approves only about 100 pieces of legislation per year, and on major issues it fails to legislate at all. The constitution required the Congress to produce a set of directives governing Brazil's abysmal educational system; it took five years to settle on a mostly meaningless set of directives. The nation's economic crisis produced monthly inflation rates averaging over 25% for most of 1989-94, but the

³ Some analysts attempting to explain the military coup of 1964, notably Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos (1979), have stressed the legislative immobility of the Congress at the end of the earlier pluralist period, but research on congressional elections or congressional behavior during the 1947-64 democratic period is scarce. See, however, Benevides, 1976, 1981, 1982; Soares, 1973; and Souza, 1976.

legislature was never part of any discussions of a social pact. For eight months in 1993 the Congress stalled a proposed tax while congressional parties bargained over second-level jobs in the executive. If the struggle over jobs had reflected attempts by the parties to increase their programmatic support in the bureaucracy, the delay would be understandable, but the dispute reflected no more than pure electoral clientelism. In June of 1993 the Chamber passed, with the support of both left-wing and right-wing parties, a salary readjustment bill clearly beyond the treasury's capacity. The bill had a single purpose: to force partisans of the Finance Minister to vote against a wage hike. Why embarrass the Minister? A successful stabilization program would make him a strong candidate in the 1994 presidential election.⁴

With the new constitution, the Congress once again participates in the budgetary process. The number of amendments added to the budget law jumped from 8,000 in 1989 to 12,000 in 1990 and to over 72,000 in 1991. Given their own electoral insecurity, fewer and fewer deputies avoid the temptation to reward their electoral bailiwicks or their financial patrons with roads, hospitals, schools, or other public works.

Why is the legislature so inactive on substantive policy questions? Actually, a comparison of Brazil's institutions with those of other nations might lead to just the opposite expectation. The system is presidential, with an open and decentralized

⁴ Attempts to modify absurd constitutional provisions, many understood as absurd by large majorities of deputies, have also failed miserably. A particularly egregious example is the provision giving bureaucrats lifetime tenure. Attempts at change have failed even to come to a vote.

executive; the electoral system is candidate centered and decentralized; interest groups are functionally specialized; parties are numerous, weakly organized, internally fragmented, and autonomous from external control; committees are permanent and parallel the structure of administrative agencies. In a recent comparative project, Michael Mezey found all these characteristics linked to greater legislative activity (Olsen and Mezey 1991, 201-214).⁵

The policy weakness of Brazil's legislature has three possible causes. The number of parties may have climbed to a level discouraging policy activity. The legislature's procedural rules may hinder policy making, either deliberately or through consequences no one anticipated. And finally, deputies may deliberately avoid serious policy making. It is this third cause, the question of motivation, on which this paper focuses.

I. To ward a theory of legislative voting

I begin with a description of the electoral system and a typology of the spatial distribution of deputies' voting support. This leads to the factors motivating vote choices. After linking each factor to indicators tapping an underlying issue dimension, I evaluate the model in a multiple regression framework.⁶

The Brazilian electoral system. Brazil's federal deputies are elected through a system of open-list proportional representation. Each state is a single, at-large, multimember

⁵ Mezey notes, however, that in two important cases weak parties led to greater activity but not greater action; i.e., the legislatures ultimately could not resolve issues (1991,207).

⁶ I make no claim to have derived all these hypotheses deductively. They come, rather, from the formal literature on legislative behavior, from interviews with deputies and staff, from observation of campaign and legislative behavior, and from analysis of committee and floor amendments. Needless to say, there is no research on legislatures in electoral systems like that of Brazil to draw on.

district.⁷ Seats per state range from 8 to 70, with small states overrepresented and large states, principally São Paulo, underrepresented. State parties -- states being meaningful arenas of political conflict -- select candidates in conventions, but parties cannot refuse to renominate incumbents. Voters may cast their single ballots either for the party label -- in which case their vote merely adds to the party's total -- or for individual candidates. Most opt for an individual. Candidate names do not appear on the ballot; instead, the voter writes in the candidate's name or number. The D'Hondt method determines how many seats each party earns; the individual ordering of votes then establishes which candidates receive these seats.

Legally, candidates may seek votes everywhere in their states, but in reality many concentrate their campaigns geographically, finding most of their support in one or more contiguous regions, regions popularly referred to as "electoral strongholds" (*redutos eleitorais*). Why concentrate in a specific area? For diverse reasons: the candidates' families have long held power in the region, a party leader sent them to the area, they appeal to its voters, they make a deal with a local political leader. Whatever the roots of local dominance, other aspirants from the same party, and perhaps other parties as well, avoid that fortress.

Are there modal patterns of spatial support?⁸ Two dimensions characterize spatial

⁷ *State* assembly members are elected in the same districts as Federal deputies. Thus they are all elected *at large*. Some extraordinary cross-campaign alliances result.

⁸ Since each state is a single at-large electoral district, any taxonomy of spatial support must characterize voting patterns at the level of the whole state. And because individual results vary so markedly across municipalities, the taxonomy should be based on electoral results in the particular municipalities furnishing the bulk of a deputy's support.

performance at the state level. First, for every deputy in each municipality, consider V_{ix} , deputy i 's share of all the votes cast in municipality x . These shares represent the deputies' *dominance* at the municipal level. Now use V_{ix} to calculate D_i , the average level of dominance for each deputy across all the municipalities of the state, *weighted by the percentage of the deputy's total vote each municipality contributes*. Deputies with higher weighted averages tend to "dominate" their key municipalities: those with lower weighted averages "share" these municipalities with other deputies. Thus "dominance-sharedness" is the first dimension of spatial support. The second dimension also begins with V_{ix} , the deputy's share of the total municipal vote. Now, however, consider the *spatial* distribution of those municipalities where the deputy does well. These municipalities can be concentrated, as close or contiguous neighbors, or they can be scattered. Combining the two dimensions yields four spatial patterns, as illustrated in Figures 1-4:

(Figures 1-4 About Here)

1. Concentrated-dominated municipalities. In the classic Brazilian "*reduto*" (bailiwick), a deputy dominates a group of contiguous municipalities. Typically, such *redutos* are based on the deputy's local reputation or family tradition. Figure 1, for example, reveals the "friends and neighbors" quality of the votes garnered by a first-time candidate who had been mayor of a large town in the center of his vote cluster.

2. Concentrated-shared municipalities. Some deputies specialize in a particular voter cohort like industrial workers, a cohort strong in contiguous municipalities. In heavily industrialized areas, such as greater São Paulo, workers are so numerous that

FIGURE 2: THE CONCENTRATED-SHARED VOTE OF AN ENVIRONMENTALIST

Personal and Municipal Shares of Fabio Feldmann, PSDB-Sao Paulo




FIGURE 1: THE CONCENTRATED-DOMINANT VOTE OF A LOCAL POLITICIAN

Municipal Vote Share of Said Ferreira, PMDB - Parana




FIGURE 3: THE SCATTERED-SHARED VOTE OF AN EVANGELICAL

Municipal Vote Share of Matheus Iensen, PTB - Parana





FIGURE 4-A SCATTERED-DOMINANT VOTE DISTRIBUTION

Municipal Vote Share of Jonival Lucas, PDC - Bahia



their votes elect many deputies. A deputy in São Paulo might also occupy an ideological space. Consider Figure 2: a deputy stressing “green” issues gets two-thirds of his vote in the city of São Paulo, but his share of the municipality is less than 3%. Only on one small island, where environmental issues are salient, is his municipal share greater than 10%

3. Scattered-shared municipalities. Deputies can appeal to voter cohorts that are quite cohesive but;- in any single municipality, numerically weak. Two examples are Japanese-Brazilians (important in São Paulo and Paraná) and, as Figure 3 reveals, *evangélicos*, Brazilian protestants who typically vote for evangelical candidates.

4. Scattered-dominated municipalities. Some deputies seek out local leaders willing to trade blocs of votes they control for pork. This pattern also results from the activity of deputies who once held state-level bureaucratic jobs, such as state secretary of education, a job with the power to distribute geographically separable goods. Figure 4 represents a deputy with considerable deal-making skills.

The distribution and evolution of spatial patterns. Regional and temporal variations are quite pronounced. “Dominant” deputies are more common in the traditional Northeast, where boss rule still holds sway, especially in rural areas. Deputies in the South and Southeast usually confront candidates of other parties and sometimes their own party, even in rural municipalities. Deputies from the more developed South and Southeast, however, have more *concentrated* votes. Indeed, the most concentrated distributions are found in Rio Grande do Sul, Paraná, Minas Gerais, and Santa

Catarina.⁹ Candidates in these states often win election with little or no support in their states' capitals, and their political careers typically begin in local politics rather than in business or the bureaucracy. Because their districts are effectively single-member, they seem more accountable to local voters and their interest in public works projects is high (Novaes, 1334).

Over the last four elections (1978-90), spatial patterns have changed significantly. Though the Northeast still has the highest average level of dominance, dominance has decreased everywhere. Few current deputies enjoy unchallenged preserves of voters. Concentration, on the other hand, has grown, with the greatest increases coming in the states that were the most scattered. These increases in concentration make more deputies accountable to local communities, but -- as the 72,000 budget amendments demonstrate -- they also increase deputies' interest in pork-barrel projects.

Final de tails. Before turning to specific determinants of legislative voting, let us highlight three pieces of the puzzle: party fragmentation and coherence, turnover, and campaign expenditures. Given open-list PR, high district magnitudes, and the absence of a meaningful threshold for attaining seats, it is no surprise that well over a dozen parties elect deputies. Most have only minimal programs, and few have much influence over their members."

⁹ I calculated a measure of spatial autocorrelation (Moran's I) for every candidate in congressional elections from 1978 to 1990. The ranking of states according to the concentration of vote distributions is based on the average of successful candidates from 1978-90.

¹⁰ Parties cannot legally prevent their deputies from changing parties during legislative sessions, and almost 40% of the members of the 1986-90 Chamber actually did change parties.

Turnover is very high. In 1990 only about 40% of the incumbent deputies were reelected for the 1991-94 term. Of the 60% not returning, about half retired or stood for other offices and half were defeated. Turnover rates from both retirement and defeat are highest in the developed South and Southeast. Their delegations, as a result, typically have less experience. Why such turnover? Because mayors have more control over programs and don't have to live in Brasilia, many deputies opt for executive offices. Other deputies switch to bureaucratic jobs to fatten their clienteles before returning to elective office. If the astonishing stability of the U.S. House encourages assuming that reelection is the primary goal of elected politicians, Brazil's high turnover rates raise a warning flag. For many Brazilian deputies, especially those from poor regions, politics is a business." Because politicians seek to maximize income over a whole career, they may choose to leave the Chamber, pursuing other avenues of mobility, only to return later. The expectation of a short career discourages investment in legislative expertise and encourages concentration on pork.

In large constituencies with fluid bailiwicks, substantial campaign expenditures are no surprise. Well-informed observers estimate that in 1990 the average successful candidate spent over US\$ 1 million.¹² TV and radio time is free; thus the bulk of campaign spending goes to rallies, campaign literature and automobiles, and to bribe local bosses. Most of the money is raised from corporate sources contributing through

¹¹ In some regions politics is a *family* business. In Bahia 40% of the deputies have a relative (of the same generation or older) holding political office. In São Paulo only 5% come from political families.

¹² Personal communication with David Fleischer.

their “*caixa dois*,” their hidden accounts. Although the most varied corporations contribute to congressional candidates (including multinationals like Mercedes-Benz), the biggest contributors are probably large construction companies, the *empreiteiras*. Dependent on government projects for their very existence, the *empreiteiras* expect their deputies to pressure ministers to liberate previously authorized funds and to sponsor amendments and bills yielding lucrative contracts.

III. *Voting in the Constituent Assembly and on Color’s emergency decrees*

Measuring voting preferences

Although the legislature’s inactivity and its reluctance to record its votes hinders role call analysis, two sets of votes are available. The first comes from the Constituent Assembly of 1987-88.¹³ Kinzo (1990) has fashioned a series of issue scales from key votes in the ANC. I selected four of these scales as indicators of basic dimensions of voting.¹⁴ The four scales include “support for expanded congressional prerogatives,” “support for expanded executive authority,” “statism-welfarism” and

¹³ The Chamber and Senate met each morning as the ANC, then separated each afternoon to conduct normal legislative business. In all, the ANC held 1021 votes. In 550 the losing side cast at least 50 votes. Timothy Power and I constructed an archive with all the contested votes of the ANC. Scholars interested in the archive should contact Power at Louisiana State University.

¹⁴ From Kinzo’s discussion it is unclear whether the groups of votes are true scales or merely indices. I applied standard scale tests, retaining only those votes meeting scaling criteria. Logit analyses of individual votes are generally consistent with regressions based on the multi-vote scales, but these scales are preferable because they minimize the effects of absentee voting and other peculiarities specific to particular votes. I call Kinzo’s “Economic Conservatism” scale “Statism-welfarism,” because the items really measure willingness to support government intervention in the economy and defense of issues championed by unions. I have renamed her “Support for Democratic Values” scale “Support for Popular Democracy,” because a number of its items facilitate class-action lawsuits and direct democracy, while others hinder military intervention. David Nixon implemented the scale tests.

“support for popular democracy.” The second set of votes comes from the same legislature. When Fernando Collor de Mello assumed power in early 1990, Brazil’s economy teetered at the edge of hyperinflation. In short order Collor promulgated a series of draconian measures. The most significant and controversial decrees reformed the structure of central government ministries, fixed prices and salaries, established a privatization program, regulated the conduct of civil servants, altered business taxes, eliminated fiscal subsidies, and -- the most dramatic of all -- sequestered private financial assets. Collor’s decrees went to the legislature as “*medidas provisórias*,” emergency measures. Though the decrees became law immediately, they would become null if the legislature failed to approve them within a set time period. Given that the President’s party had few legislative seats, passage depended on the persuasive power of Collor and his allies, both legislative and executive.¹⁵

Explanatory Variables

Dominance and clustering. How should the spatial distribution of electoral support, i.e., dominance and clustering, influence deputies’ voting? Remember, dominant deputies are mostly found in less developed, more rural areas. If we hold the wealth of constituencies constant, we should find that deputies dominating their core municipalities oppose state economic intervention and short-term welfare measures. Dominance is impossible without the support of a community’s economic elite, and local elites rarely support agrarian reform or expanded workers’ rights. Dominant

¹⁵ The appendix details the votes utilized in the construction of each issue scale and the index of support for Collor’s emergency measures.

deputies should also support executive power. As dominance increases, deputies are better able to “claim credit” for the pork they deliver, so they work harder at bringing pork home (Shepsle and Weingast, 1987). Because in Brazil the executive controls most pork-barrel programs, good relations with the president are a must. Moreover, dominant deputies tend to be more senior, so they are around long enough to develop good relations. Finally, dominant deputies should be reluctant to expand congressional authority, because increases in the prerogatives of the Congress would weaken the monopoly on access enjoyed by the old guard.

Clustered votes make deputies more accountable to voters and less responsive to local or regional bosses. Face-to-face contact in clustered constituencies is greater, community organizations participate in campaigns, and deputies are more likely to root their careers in their core regions. Accountability makes deputies more likely to promote a *legislative* agenda; hence they seek expanded congressional power. Greater accountability, however, also encourages deputies to maximize pork, and since the executive plays a central role in pork distribution, we might expect clustered deputies to support expanded *executive* power. But public attitudes in the South were so hostile to President Sarney that Southern deputies were likely to seek reduced executive authority, even though they might individually try to maintain good relations with the President. Clustered vote bases should produce deputies with a populist bent; hence they will tend toward economic interventionism and favor the demands of organized labor. Finally, support for popular democracy is likely to be higher among clustered-vote deputies, because they are rarely dependent on deals with local elites.

Constituency attributes. Wealth and industrial development are so highly correlated that we seek only the overall relationship between these indicators and voting. In the political context of late 1980s Brazil, deputies relying on industrial voters should be pro-Congress, anti-executive, and statist-welfarist on economic issues.¹⁶ At the same time, the control exerted by constituencies over deputies should depend not merely on the wealth and industrial level of a deputy's voters; it should also depend on the constituency's *homogeneity*. Imagine two constituencies with the same mean level of income or industrialization. In one, most municipalities are near the mean on these characteristics; in the other, the communities are more diverse. In the more homogeneous constituency voters' interests are clearer because the municipalities are similar; in a heterogeneous constituency interests are diverse and conflictual.

In order to test the relationship between constituency wealth, the cross-municipal variation of wealth, and voting behavior, I created dummy variables for deputies with constituencies of high, medium and low heterogeneity. I then multiplied these dummies by the measure of wealth. The results show the effects of wealth in each range of heterogeneity.

Career path. Though many paths lead to the Chamber, they can be roughly grouped into three modal career trajectories: local, business and bureaucratic. "Local" deputies

¹⁶ Per capita income is a reasonable indicator of the economic development of an areal unit,' but the concept is more difficult to operationalize when actual voters, rather than a fixed district, define a constituency. I define the per capita income of a given deputy's voters as the average per capita income of the municipalities in which the deputy received votes, weighted by the percentage of the deputy's total vote received in each municipality. The homogeneity of the constituency is defined as the coefficient of variation across municipalities of these same weighted per capita incomes.

are those who served as mayors or on municipal councils in one of their two jobs prior to the Chamber of Deputies. A "Business" career means the deputy acted primarily in the private sector. "Bureaucratic" deputies held high-level jobs in state or federal ministries. On the basis of extensive conversations with Brazilian informants (journalists, academics, and deputies), I expect business types to differ fundamentally from other kinds of deputies. Many business types see their activities in the Chamber as an extension of their personal economic interests. When deputies lobby for privately run hospitals, the construction industry, or poultry processors, they are not merely representing important constituents -- indeed, the economic interest may hardly function in their districts. Instead, such "corporatist" deputies represent their own *personal* interests." Obviously not all business deputies embody a corporatist representational style, but they adopt it more often than deputies with local or bureaucratic backgrounds. Given both the weakness of the legislature and the strong regulatory power of the executive and bureaucracy, business deputies should be anti-legislature and pro-executive. Their economic attitudes, given their position as private-sector employers, should be anti-statist and anti-welfarist. Support for popular democracy is likely to be low, because many of the scale's items involve anti-business mobilization.

Another path marks one of the ANC's most notorious factions, the roughly forty Protestant ministers called *evangélicos*. They were widely seen as quite pork oriented,

¹⁷ Henry Jackson was often called the "Senator from Boeing," but the label referred to the importance of Boeing to his home state, not to personal business interests.

willing to grant the executive practically anything in exchange for public works benefitting their religious ministries.

Seniority and electoral insecurity. In a legislature with high turnover, few deputies have much seniority. The rules, in addition, barely reward seniority: committee chairs retain their positions for only two years, senior deputies have no additional staff allowance, and the dominance of party proportionality as a criterion for committee appointment (coupled with the large number of parties) gives senior members little advantage. But senior deputies have time and motivation to establish close ties with ministries supplying constituency-specific goods. They are also frequent occupants of ministerial positions; so they are likely to be pro-executive. Because a more powerful legislature would benefit newer deputies, senior members are unlikely to support expanded congressional prerogatives

In an open-list proportional system, all deputies know how close they were to defeat in the last election. The further from the top of the party's post-election list, the weaker the deputy. Low-ranking deputies are particularly vulnerable to executive pressure, because the president controls the pork that might bring a few more votes at the next election.

State unity and state interests. A state's deputies will vote as a bloc when they have a common interest or when a state leader demands unity. Do states have common interests on constitutional issues and presidential decrees? On economic and social issues some delegations may be predominantly populist or neo-liberal, but such positions represent voter preferences, not geographical interests. States in the North

and Northeast, however, hold more congressional seats than their populations merit and receive a disproportionate share of pork, so their deputies ought to support expanded congressional prerogatives. But because these same deputies tend to be quite senior, they profit from close ties to strong executives.’ Overall, then, constituency issues are too diffuse to incline state delegations in any particular direction. At the same time, state politics matters in Brazil, and in some states strong governors lead powerful machines. These “caciques” may have little to gain on constitutional issues, but their influence grows if they can deliver blocs of deputies. On the President’s emergency measures the votes of delegations depend on state economic interests and, once again, on the political interests of governors. Given these multiple constraints, firm convictions as to the strength or effects of state unity are impossible, but I explore the issue by including dummy variables for the dominant parties of two states, Bahia and Maranhão, both known for strong state machines.

Political party. When political parties are stable and disciplined, we confidently predict voting behavior on the basis of party affiliations. Brazilian parties are so weak, however, that deputies jump ship with absolute impunity, even in the middle of legislative sessions. Between 1987 and 1990, for example, 40% of all deputies changed parties, mostly during the Constituent Assembly. Deputies switched for both electoral and ideological reasons, but in either case the implication is the same: party in the long term is *endogenous*. Rather than a *determinant* of issue positions and electoral tactics, party is a *consequence*.

If party affiliations are useless as explanatory variables during a time of party

switching, can we still measure ideological position? One possibility is the deputy's party *during the military regime*. Until 1982 the right-wing military regime allowed only two parties. The National Renovating Alliance (ARENA) supported the government; the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) opposed it. After 1982 ARENA became the Democratic Social Party (PDS), but former ARENA members constitute the most conservative elements in almost every party (Power, 1993, 86-93). I expect former ARENistas to be pro-executive and anti-Congress, opposed to state intervention and the demands of organized labor, and (given their role in the military regime), less supportive of popular democracy.

By the time the Chamber voted on Collor's emergency decrees, party membership had stabilized. Now we can more confidently utilize party as an explanatory variable. The Workers' Party (PT) and the Democratic Workers Party (PDT) opposed Collor; the PDS and the Liberal Front Party (PFL) supported him; the centrist Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) and the clientelistic Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) divided.

The pork barrel. In a single-member system, all deputies should be equally interested in pork-barrel projects, because all are able to claim credit for the projects built in their districts. In multimember constituencies, the ability to claim credit decreases as the number of vote-getting deputies increases. Brazil's left-leaning deputies often share working-class constituencies where credit claiming is impossible and where national economic issues take precedence over public works. Thus in the long run pork-oriented deputies tend to be anti-labor and pro-executive. In the short run the executive may offer specific inducements to attract deputies. President Sarney, for

example, utilized pork to recruit deputies on key constitutional issues, including a five-year term for himself and future presidents, and presidentialism over parliamentarism. Collor claimed to be above such “politics,” but the revelations surrounding his impeachment indicate that his administration reached new depths in corruption.

Fortunately, success in attracting pork is measurable. “Pork Payoff to Municipality” is the probability that a deputy could claim credit for an intergovernmental transfer made between in 1988 to municipalities where that deputy received votes.¹⁸ “Pork Payoff to Deputy” refers to a 1988 social assistance program of the Ministry of Planning (SEPLAN). Specific deputies sponsored the program in each municipality. “Radio and TV License” calculates the probability that the Ministry of Communications granted a concession during the ANC to a municipality in which the deputy had an electoral base.¹⁹ Finally, “Ministerial Request” indicates that in 1990 the deputy met

¹⁸ Municipalities, not deputies, receive intergovernmental transfers. If a deputy wins all the votes in a municipality, then clearly that deputy gets all the credit. Suppose, however, a group of deputies shares a municipality’s votes. Do all deputies claim credit equally? Do they divide the credit in proportion to their vote shares? Does the leading vote getter get all the credit? Does the credit go to deputies from the president’s party or is it divided in terms of party vote shares? Most informants believed that either the leading vote getter of any party or of the president’s party would get the pork. I tried various formulations, achieving the best results by assuming that only the leading candidate in a given municipality could claim credit, but that leader could be of any party.

If a deputy received credit for pork in a municipality contributing only a minute fraction of the deputy’s total state-wide vote, the credit would do little electorally. In aggregating the individual municipal probabilities, I therefore weighted each municipality’s probability by the fraction of the deputy’s total vote the municipality contributed. In effect, the indicator measures the probability that someone voting for deputy x actually benefitted from an intergovernmental transfer. The precise period of pork delivery, May-June, 1988, corresponds exactly to President Sarney’s campaign for a five-year term and for presidentialism. Longer periods produced weaker but similar results.

¹⁹ The calculation was analogous to the “Pork Payoff to Municipality” variable. I adjusted the probability where I knew a particular deputy owned the radio or tv station.

with the Ministers of Infrastructure, Agriculture, Education, or Social Action. These meetings were not about the weather.²⁰

Results. Table 1 presents the model's results for four basic dimensions of voting in the ANC. Consider first the results for dominance, clustering, and constituency income. Deputies dominating their vote bases were more likely to back the executive and less likely to support congressional prerogatives. Dominance was unrelated, however, to statism-welfarism or support for popular democracy. Dominance does not, therefore, simply predict deputies' left-right positions. Rather, it leads to a purely "political" tactic: stay close to the executive and minimize support for a Congress whose present structure already affords privileged access to dominant deputies (Novaes, 1994).

(Table 1 about here)

Vote clustering produced effects that support and amplify my expectations. Both inside and outside the South, deputies with clustered vote bases supported congressional power and statist-welfarist issues. But clustering led to anti-executive positions only in the South, and it led to more support for popular democracy only outside the South. These regional differences come from context: outside the South support for a strong executive is widespread, and even clustered deputies succumb to executive pressure. At the same time, oligarchical rule is still prevalent outside the South, so only when deputies cluster do we find the responsiveness to voters that

²⁰ The parliamentary liaisons of these ministries maintain lists of deputies meeting with ministers. While requesting that individual names remain confidential, they allowed me to copy the lists.

TABLE 1:

Ordinary Least Squares Estimates for Voting in the Constituent Assembly

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	Congressional Power	Support for Executive	Statism- Welfarism	Support for Popular Democracy
Constant	-.176 **	.136 *	.113	-.076
Municipal Dominance	-.110 **	.131 **	-.037	.002
Clustering in South	.019 **	-.024 **	.015 *	.008
Clustering outside South	.029 **	-.009	.025 *	.024 *
Wealth * High Variance	.035	.146	.101	.232
wealth * Medium Variance	.061	-.115 **	.091	.104 *
Wealth * Low Variance	.104	-.061	.090	-.027
Local Career	.033	-.001	.052	-.002
Business Career	-.112 **	.142 **	-.143 **	-.158 **
Bureaucratic Career	-.059	.044	-.046	-.034
Evangelical	-.204 **	.194 **	-.095 **	-.126 **
Terms in Office	-.037	.045	.007	-.029
Rank in Party List	-.005	.113 **	.004	.003
Bahia * PFL	-.108 **	.087 **	-.130 **	-.162 **
Bahia * PMDB	.103 **	-.149 **	.116 **	.071
Maranhao * PFL	-.028	.076 **	-.043	-.032
Maranhao * PMDB	-.011	.036	.027	-.003
ARENA	-.304 **	.190 **	-.342 **	-.266 **
Pork to Municipality	-.104 **	.059	.070	.113 **
Ministerial Audience	-.156 **	.145 **	-.193 **	-.182 **
Radio-TV License	-.065 *	.079 **	-.097 **	-.141 **
Pork to Deputy	-.142 **	.215 **	-.122 **	-.095 *
R(2) =	.34	.38	.33	.27
R(2)w/o pork variables	.17	.28	.24	.18
F =	9.25	10.89	8.87	6.63
N =	403	403	403	403

Entries are standardized regression coefficients.

** p < .05, two tailed-test.

* p < .10, two tailed test-

leads to support for mass, democratic politics.

Wealth and industry had the expected effects -- anti-executive, economically statist welfarist, supportive of popular democracy -- but only in constituencies of moderate heterogeneity. In other words, increasing wealth failed to affect voting precisely where I expected the strongest effects, i.e., in the most uniform constituencies. Why? Uniform constituencies, it seems, tend to fall into two groups. One includes deputies picking up nearly all their votes in big cities and industrial suburbs. Such deputies have shared-concentrated constituencies, and they mostly vote left: anti-executive, welfarist, etc. The other cluster includes deputies constructing constituencies by making deals with local bosses, typically in a scattered-dominated pattern. Such deputies usually vote on the right, the opposite of their big city colleagues. These groups tend to cancel each other: wealthy big cities, especially São Paulo, are more industrial and hence more supportive of PT candidates: wealthy scattered municipalities are likely to be agricultural and more conservative.

The career variables confirmed the informal observations of deputies and journalists: politicians with business backgrounds supported executive power, opposed congressional influence and opposed labor's economic demands. They also oppose -- perhaps in defense of their economic interests -- popular democracy. Bureaucrats and local politicians manifested no tendencies at all.²¹ Evangelicals, as expected were pro-executive, anti-Congress, anti-labor and anti-democratic.

²¹ The absence of differences for bureaucratic deputies contradicts Power (1993), who found a strong executive orientation.

How important were seniority and electoral insecurity? Many of the most senior deputies had served in the Congress during the period of military rule. Their votes are indistinguishable from junior deputies on economic and popular democracy issues, and they are weakly but positively supportive of executive power. What is striking is that the Congress' most senior deputies *oppose* increasing congressional influence over policy. Electoral insecurity influenced on only one of the issue scales, but that linkage is critical: because the executive controls crucial electoral resources, weak deputies are pro-executive.

Strong state leaders matter politically, but their strength has varying consequences. Some governors polarize their delegations. The single most dominant state-level organization, the Liberal Front of Bahia's Antonio Carlos Magalhães, exercised considerable power over its deputies: PFL deputies in Bahia stand out as a coherent bloc. But Bahia's PMDB deputies emerge as a vigorously *opposing* bloc. Thus the "extra" right-wing Bahian PFL was matched by an "extra" left-wing PMDB. In Maranhão, the Sarney organization, even with its chief in the presidency, unified only on the key issue of executive power. On that issue the PMDB was almost as pro-executive as Sarney's PFL. Thus, Brazil's folk wisdom is right: ACM polarized politicians; Sarney reconciled them.

Former members of the pro-military ARENA party behaved as predicted: pro-executive, anti-Congress, opposed to labor's economic demands, and low on popular democracy. Essentially, the ARENA variable measures long-term ideological predispositions. While many former *ARENistas* have moved into centrist or even mildly

leftist parties -- maximizing electorability -- their positions remain obdurately conservative.

Finally, consider the effects of pork. Overall, deputies receiving pork benefits voted to weaken the legislature and strengthen the executive, and they tended to oppose statism-welfarism and popular democracy. Though a few coefficients are insignificant, the directions are always correct, and the insignificant cases occur on the fuzziest indicator, i.e., where it was difficult to identify the deputy benefitting from a public works project. Moreover, without the pork variables the model's R^2 declines by an average of 28%. In sum, *pork buys deputies*.

In Table 2 the model is applied to deputies' support (high scores represent support for the President) for the eight emergency measures. Though broadly similar to the ANC model, the regression includes a number of important modifications. First, issue positions -- the object of explanation in the first model -- become explanatory variables. Second, the model categorizes deputies both by their actual parties and by their previous affiliation (if any) with ARENA. Why suddenly add current parties to the model? The party switching of the ANC period had settled down by 1990; party now could really mean something. Adding parties also allows us to measure dominance separately for deputies from the right-wing PFL and PDS and from the centrist PMDB. With these two dummies we can examine the hypothesis that dominance gives deputies autonomy from party leaders.

(Table 2 About Here)

Both vote distribution and constituency wealth continue to constrain voting.

TABLE 2:

Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Determinants
of Support for Collor's Emergency Decrees

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE

Intercept	-.080	
Dominance * PFL-PDS	-.073	**
Dominance * PMDB	.080	**
Clustering in South	-.003	
Clustering outside South	.078	
Wealth * High Variance	.057	
Wealth * Medium Variance	-.117	**
Wealth * Low Variance	-.040	
Business Career	.048	
Bureaucratic Career	.014	
Evangelical	.080	**
Terms in Office	-.027	
Rank in Party List	-.014	
Bahia * PFL	.011	
Bahia * PMDB	.008	
Maranhao * PFL	.008	
Maranhao * PMDB	.015	
ARENA	0.207	**
PDT	-.166	**
PT	-.235	**
PFL	.046	
PDS	.120	*
PMDB	-.301	**
Congressional Power	.009	
Support for Executive	.117	**
Economic Conservatism	.127	**
Democratic Values	-.023	
Pork to Municipality	-.021	
Ministerial Audience	0.125	**
Radio-TV License	0.055	
Pork Payoff to Deputy	0.008	
R(2) =	.56	
R(2) w/o pork variables	.52	
F =	14.62	
N =	379	

Note: Entries are standardized regression coefficients.

** p <.05, two tailed test.
* p <.10, two tailed test.

Dominant PFL and PDS deputies opposed the President. Remember that the PFL as a whole neither backed nor opposed the President, and the PDS **supported** him only weakly. Dominant PMDB deputies also dissented from their party -- **they backed the President** while the party as a whole opposed him. Thus, in both cases *dominance facilitated autonomy*. In an open-list system, it is easy to see why dominance frees deputies, but why should autonomous deputies *want* to oppose their party leaders? PDS-PFL defectors tend to be located in states where most deputies opposed the President, and PMDB defectors are mostly in supportive states, so perhaps we are seeing a movement toward the center of the state political context.

Constituency wealth affects voting behavior only for deputies whose vote bases are moderately heterogeneous. The cancelling effects of the two kinds of low-variance constituencies -- scattered rural municipalities and concentrated big city bases -- again seems the most likely explanation.

The only personal characteristic affecting support for the emergency decrees is "Evangelical Background." Ex-Protestant ministers supported the President more than deputies with other backgrounds. Seniority and electoral weakness had no effect.

Do powerful governors influence their deputies? Once again, the model estimates the strength of Antonio Carlos Magalhães (ACM) and José Sarney. In neither case did the deputies stand out in their voting behavior from the Chamber as a whole. This result differs from our ANC model, where the Bahian governor polarized his delegation. The difference, I suggest, stems from nature of the two kinds of votes. In the assembly, deputies resolved questions of long-term ideological significance. On the

emergency measures, they decided immediate pocket-book issues. Economic interests, especially state interests, overwhelmed ideological disputes. ACM remains a mighty force in national-level politics, but the emergency measures affected him little, so his delegates voted along other criteria.

Ideology and party count independently. Pro-executive, anti-legislature, anti-labor deputies supported the President. Members of the Workers' Party (PT) and Brizola's PDT opposed Collor, while PDS and PFL members were supportive. The centrist PMDB and the highly clientelistic Brazilian Workers' Party (PTB) fell in the middle. Previous affiliation with ARENA contributed independently; i.e., ARENA's heirs were strongly pro-Collor. This seemingly banal result is important: in spite of their fragmentation and incoherence, parties still matter in the legislature.

Finally, one pork measure strongly influenced presidential support. Deputies meeting with ministers ended up voting with the president. Of our four indicators of pork barrel, this was the sharpest, since the identity of the deputy benefitted is unambiguous. We have reaffirmed, therefore, the strength of the pork-presidential support linkage.

IV. Discussion and Conclusion

This paper began with a puzzle. Brazil's legislature ought to be active. The system is presidential; the electoral system is decentralized and candidate-centered; interest groups are well-organized and functionally specific; the executive is relatively open; committees are permanent and parallel the structure of the executive; parties are numerous. Such conditions all imply a busy legislature, and indeed, in the budgetary

process the legislature is quite active. But on issues of national scope Brazil's Congress has accomplished little.

Legislative weakness can have three causes: excessive parties, procedural roadblocks, and an excess of members with little interest in broad legislation. The party system merits investigation, but fewer parties participated in the equally unsuccessful democracy of 1946-1964. Moreover, it is unclear how many parties qualify as "dangerous -excess." Procedures also matter, but given that few deputies develop much seniority, the costs of removing procedural obstacles should be low. Thus I focus on motivations. If motivations matter, what mix of constituency pressures, ideology, electoral needs, and local interests determines them?

I examined the motivations of deputies by modeling two kinds of voting: broad issue areas in the Constituent Assembly of 1987-88 and Collor's emergency decrees of 1990. On the constitutional issues of congressional prerogatives, executive power, statism-welfarism and popular democracy, the nature of the electoral system made a difference. Deputies with more clustered votes tended to be pro-Congress, anti-executive, supportive of state intervention and welfare, and supportive of popular democracy. These positions resulted, I suggest, from the greater accountability vote clustering produces. Dominant deputies, by contrast, backed the executive and opposed a stronger Congress, and dominance gave deputies the autonomy to dissent from the mainstream of their parties.

The social characteristics of constituencies did influence congressional voting, though modestly: industrial areas elected more liberal deputies. Overall, however,

socioeconomic conditions forged only weak ties between voters and deputies. Brazilian citizens exert pressure for pork-barrel programs, but on broader issues they have little control over their representatives. This should come as no surprise, because anyone observing a Brazilian election would doubt that many voters know anything at all about the positions of their deputies. Ironically, Protestant voters may have the tightest control over their representatives, both in terms of ideological positions and in terms of pork.

Ideology played a large role in legislative voting. Former members of the ARENA party were consistently anti-Congress, pro-executive, anti-labor, and lower on support for popular democracy. Deputies with these values clustered in parties supporting President Collor on his decrees, and they were his strongest supporters even within the pro-government parties.

Powerful state governors influenced their delegations in discernible ways. The governor of Bahia cared about constitutional issues, and he polarized his delegation between partisans and opponents. Jose Sarney, a weaker leader, mobilized his supporters only on the issue of executive strength, but his more conciliatory approach brought him support from opponents in the state as well.

Perhaps most striking was the importance of pork-barrel orientation as a predictor of broader positions. The coefficients of the pork measures are extraordinarily large, and the model's explained variance improves substantially with the pork variables included. In the Constituent Assembly, deputies truly could be bought. Deputies receiving public works for their bailiwicks were pro-executive, anti-Congress, anti-

labor, and low on support for popular democracy. At the beginning of the Collor administration pork effects were smaller, in part because the administration was somewhat disorganized and in part because it found other ways to corrupt politicians, but pork-oriented deputies consistently supported the executive. The importance of direct benefits to deputies speaks volumes about the weakness of voter-representative links, and it goes far toward explaining the overall weakness of the legislature.

Future directions. How does a legislature with so many parties and so little motivation get anything done at all? One avenue of inquiry leads to an informal group called the *colégio de líderes*, the college of leaders. Led by the leader of the largest party, the group meets weekly, in public and private, to discuss the *substance* of proposals. . No voting occurs in these substantive meetings, the leaders have no formal authority over their members in subsequent floor votes, and unless all the leaders agree, the group cannot modify legislation.

Little is known about the nature of bargaining within the leaders' group and between it and the president. We do know that parties differ sharply in their ideological consistency. The PT, PSDB, and PL take consistent positions, while members of the PTB, PFL, PMDB and PDS care mostly about public works and political jobs; in Strom's terms (1994, 116), they are essentially office-seeking parties. In addition, many deputies from non-ideological parties really represent quite narrow private interests (Novaes, 1994). One deputy represents the construction industry; a second speaks for private hospitals; a third argues for military salaries. The executive (wielding an item veto), is also a key actor as a veto player with monolithic

preferences (Tsebelis, 1994).

Future investigations, both in Brazil and in other transitional legislatures, should explore bargaining in multidimensional environments and its effects on different kinds of legislation. Such research need not be as quantitative as the present essay. Case histories, for example, could trace particular proposals moving through the legislative process to ultimate failure or passage. The results of such inquiries, coupled with our knowledge of deputies' motivations, could shed some light on the complex relationship between differing legislative and electoral arrangements and public policy.

APPENDIX

Issue scales from the Constituent Assembly

CONGRESSIONAL POWER SCALE

Vote 0272: March 16, 1988. On the selection of the members of the Tribunal de Contas da **União (TCU)**, which verifies government accounts. The amendment gave the Congress power to choose all the TCU members, rather than share selection authority with the executive.

Vote 0274: March 17, 1988. Amendment would make Congress the only power able to authorize the purchase of rural real estate by foreign corporations.

Vote 0277: March 17, 1988. Would transfer Senate oversight powers on foreign economic policy and foreign debt to the Congress as a whole.

Vote 0279: March 17, 1988. Reaffirms original language providing that normal congressional decisions could be taken by a simple majority of the members present, as long as the simple majority was greater than or equal to one-fifth of the total membership.

Vote 0290: March 18, 1988. Reduces congressional recess from 3 months to 2 months.

Vote 0315: March 23, 1988. Amendment introducing presidentialist system of government **rather** than the original draft language, which called for a switch to parliamentarism.

Vote 0354: April 7, 1988. New rules for the selection of for the highest appeal court. Includes selection of justices **by** Chamber of Deputies.

Vote 0471: April 21, 1988. Changes language concerning the budget authorization law, **adding** two elements giving Congress more authority.

Vote 0477: April 22, 1988. Would require the Congress to approve the federal budget. If the budget were not approved by the end of the legislative session, the president would be able to implement it by decree. Provides that **the** legislative session will not end until the budget is approved.

SUPPORT FOR EXECUTIVE

Vote 0005: January 28, 1988. Rewords the preamble. Removes allusions to direct democracy.

Vote 0624: June 3, 1988. Five-year term for incumbent president, **José** Samey.

Vote 0320: March 23, 1988. Five-year mandate to future presidents.

Vote 0965: August 31, 1988. The question of whether runoff elections for mayor would take effect for the first time in 1988. YES means suspend runoffs this year, NO means maintain them. YES 293, NO 221, approved.

Vote 0633: June 15, 1988. Postpones municipal elections scheduled for 1988.

STATE ECONOMIC INTERVENTION-WELFARE

Vote 0048: February 10, 1988. Amendment on right to property removes language whereby the right to private property is subject to owner's observance of its "social function. "

Vote 0090: February 24, 1988. Two dozen amendments to a conservative version of the chapter on social rights. The chapter would now protect against arbitrary dismissal of a workers by an employer, but leaves the details up to further legislation.

Vote 0785: August 17, 1988. On the right to strike. Suppresses language giving workers competence to decide when they should strike.

Vote 0485: April 27, 1988. On language regarding the "Economic and Social Order." Centers on the definition of "national firm. "

Vote 0131: March 1, 1988. Deals with indemnity paid to workers fired unfairly by employers.

Vote 0102: February 25, 1988. Establishes a basic six-hour day for workers in continuous duties but adding the phrase "except as provided for by collective bargaining. "

Vote 0136: March 2, 1988. Confirms that only one union should represent each sector of workers.

Vote 0943: August 30, 1988. On the legality of expropriating productive land for agrarian reform.

DEMOCRATIC VALUES

Vote 0061: February 11, 1988. Institutes collective writ of mandamus (permits class action suit).

Vote 0149: March 3, 1988. Provides for referenda, plebiscites, peoples' initiatives, and peoples' veto.

Vote 0291: March 18, 1988. Puts certain of the Rules of Congress (Regimento Interno) into the constitutional text: proportionality of party representation on the leadership and in committees, and the responsibilities of committees.

Vote 0402: April 13, 1988. Prohibits the military from intervening to maintain internal order.

Vote 0756: August 10, 1988. Allows death penalty.

Vote 0959: August 31, 1988. Whether censorship is disallowed for artistic as well as political and ideological reasons.

2. Collor's Emergency Decrees

150: Reorganizes executive branch of government. Eliminates various ministries, creates a new superministry of the economy. Moves other programs to new ministries.

151: Reorganizes executive branch. Eliminates a series of autarchic entities.

154: Establishes a new system of readjustments of prices and salaries.

155: Creates the National Privatization Program.

159: Creates a disciplinary code for civil servants.

161: Modifies incomes tax, eliminates certain regional subsidies and incentives.

168: Confiscated for 18 months a substantial part of private savings.

185: Regulates right to strike and government intervention in strike activity.

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