



# FEWS Working Paper

USAID Famine Early Warning System

PN-ABU-055

93200

---

**THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF A NATIONAL FAMINE  
EARLY WARNING SYSTEM: THE CASE OF THE  
SYSTEME D'ALERTE PRECOCE  
REPUBLIC OF NIGER**

FEWS Working Paper 2.8

by  
Joseph B. Coblenz,  
Planning Assistance,  
Washington, D.C.

October 17, 1994

---

This document was prepared under the FEWS Project (Contract No. AFR-0466-00-9305-00) through the Tulane-Pragma Group.

## Table of Contents

I.	Introduction and Background .....	4
II.	Objectives, Structure and Process of Institutionalization of the Systeme d'Alerte Precoce .....	8
III.	International Support .....	23
IV.	Meeting the Challenges .....	32
V.	Conclusions .....	37
VI.	Recommendations .....	42

### Attachments

- A. Scope of Work for Case Study
- B. List of Study Participants
- C. Interview Guide
- D. Decree Establishing the Nigerien National Early Warning System (SAP)
- E. Chronology of Early Events in Development of the SAP
- F. Documentation Reviewed for the Study

## Abbreviations and Acronyms

AELGA	Africa Emergency Locust/Grasshopper Assistance
AID or AID/W	Agency for International Development/Washington offices
AGRHYMET	Agricultural/Hydrological/Meteorological Program
BOM	GON's Bureau d'Organisation et Methodes
CDC	Centers for Disease Control
CILSS	Comite Inter-Etat pour la Lutte Contre la Secheresse au Sahel
CNSAP	Comite National du Systeme d'Alerte Precoce
CRSSA	Cellule Regionale de Suivi de la Situation Alimentaire, Sanitaire, Nutritionelle
CSRSSA	Cellule Sous-Regionale de Suivi de la Situation Alimentaire, Sanitaire, Nutritionelle
DIAPER	EEC-funded CILSS project for the Permanent Diagnostic of the Food Situation
DPM	USAID-funded Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation Program
DPV	GON's Directorate of Crop Protection
DRU	USAID's Disaster Relief Unit
FAO	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
FED	EEC's European Development Fund
FEWS	AID's Famine Early Warning System project
FFR	FEWS Field Representative
GIS	Geographic Information Systems
GON	Government of Niger
GTI	Groupe de Travail Interdisciplinaire
GTS	Groupes de Travail Sectoriel
LSGA	Limited Scope Grant Agreement
NOAA	National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Agency
OPVN	GON's National Cereals Office
OYB	USAID's Operating Year Budget
SAP	National Early Warning System (Systeme d'Alerte Precoce)
SNIS	GON's National Health Information System
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development mission to Niger
USG	U.S. Government
USGS	U.S. Geological Survey

## **I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND**

### **A. Introduction**

The establishment and strengthening of governmental institutions capable of sustaining developmental benefits in a country has played a significant part in the development plans of governments and development institutions. Millions of dollars have been spent in institution-building efforts over the years, with varied results. Nevertheless, the process of institutionalization remains a high priority activity as development thinking has increasingly focused on "sustainable development."

Planning Assistance, in carrying out its mandate of providing technical and management assistance to developing country organizations, has often placed emphasis on strengthening governmental planning and management capabilities. It has found that enhanced planning and management skills help strengthen government institutions provided that the political environment allows these skills to be used and the financial resources are available to sustain institutional activities. However, in many countries, these political and financial conditions are not present. Furthermore, technical and managerial competence is not sufficient to offset political challenges and chronically scarce financial resources. Consequently, to enhance the long term effects of its participatory approach to transferring managerial and planning skills, Planning Assistance has been attempting to better understand the entire process of establishing and empowering governmental institutions.

At the same time, the FEWS project, originally focused on establishing and strengthening AID/W's ability to predict and respond to famine vulnerability in the Sahelian countries, had been increasingly focused on doing the same for governmental early warning and response systems in selected FEWS countries. As the second phase of the FEWS project was drawing to a close, therefore, the Tulane/PRAGMA group implementing it developed an interest in studying the effect of this assistance on a country where the national early warning system seemed to have been established and functioning. Tulane University thus became interested in carrying out a study of the system in Niger, where such a system, the *Système d'Alerte Précoce* (SAP), appeared to exist, and where the FEWS Field Representatives (FFRs) had worked with the system for several years.

Upon the recognition of this mutual interest, Planning Assistance proposed the present study to the Tulane/PRAGMA group in 1992. In the view of Planning Assistance, the descriptive methodology proposed appeared to be an efficient way of analyzing an institutionalization process, identifying the factors that contributed to its reaching its present status, raising issues and problems, and identifying lessons learned for institutionalization of food security-related institutions elsewhere. After reviews of the proposal by the Tulane/PRAGMA group, USAID/Niger and Tulane University in New Orleans, Tulane and Planning Assistance signed a subcontract under the centrally funded FEWS Project to carry out the case study in late May 1994.

## **B. Purposes, Objectives and Methodology**

The purposes and objectives of the study are contained in its Statement of Work (Attachment A). Basically, they included the documentation of the creation of the SAP as an example of a successful famine early warning system institutionalization process, highlighting the FEWS contribution to it. Accordingly, the study, using the perceptions of participants in the process, was intended to:

1. Determine whether the creation of the SAP was indeed successful;
2. Identify the factors that made it so, or;
3. Identify the factors that would be needed to make it successful;
4. Determine how the USAID/FEWS contribution supported the process; and
5. Identify major issues and problems and how they might be resolved, highlighting FEWS' potential role in their resolution.

Planning Assistance also hoped to make this study as useful to USAID/Niger as possible as they began implementing the \$20 million Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (DPM) program, which included a significant body of activities aimed at strengthening the SAP in both its early warning and response coordination roles, and as the USAID began an innovative reorganization to focus on economic growth. It was also deemed important to provide useful conclusions for the USAID and Tulane University on the present state of the institutionalization process, as well as practical recommendations on how the USG and other donor contributions to this process could be enhanced.

In the process of carrying out this study, it was anticipated that a modified version of the Harvard case study methodology could be applied to facilitate information presentation and analysis. If successful, this methodology could be applied elsewhere to assess the progress and problems of the institutionalization process in developing countries so as to improve its contribution to sustainable development. In the present study, since the process of institutionalization is broad and involves numerous aspects and actions, the case study method was modified. Accordingly, it was decided to state the current focus of the study as whether the SAP was institutionalized or not, provide background as to how the institutionalization process has been carried out, and draw a global conclusion as to whether the SAP has been institutionalized or not and what makes it so, or what would be needed to make it so, on the basis of interviews with study participants. Also, several key departures from the case study method included the addition of specific conclusions and recommendations of the type that an evaluation would normally produce in order to assist the USAID mission and Tulane University in carrying forward their work with the SAP.

### **C. Implementation of the Study**

Several days of preparation preceded the field work in Niger. The principle investigator became more familiar with the FEWS Project and read documentation about the SAP institutionalization efforts in Niger. A list of contacts was compiled and attempts were made to interview some of the contacts in Washington and Rome. In Niger, individuals in the GON and the donor community (Attachment B) were interviewed. Information and perceptions were sought primarily from SAP, FEWS, USAID and DPM/RONCO personnel. In addition, other early warning information gathering, analysis and dissemination project staff, such as technical specialists and representatives of organizations working with AGRHYMET and OPVN, were interviewed since these efforts provided information that was available to the SAP and the individuals had perceptions useful to the study. Overall, five participants were associated with FEWS, nine with USAID/Niger, three were members of the DPM technical assistance team, three were associated with UN organizations that have worked with the SAP, three were from the GON, including two from the SAP Permanent Secretariat, two were from other multi-donor funded early warning systems, and two were representatives of European technical assistance agencies that have worked with the SAP. Both past and present participants were interviewed. Interviews were conducted using a basic interview guide which elicited information and impressions on the evolution of the structure of the SAP, the process by which it carried out its mandate, the problems it was having and how they might be resolved (Attachment C). Participants were also asked to comment on whether they thought the SAP was institutionalized or not--by whatever definition--and to identify the factors that made them feel it was or not. Later in the course of the field work, specific questions were designed for certain participants in accordance with their particular roles in the institutionalization process.

It was hoped that all interviewing could be completed by the end of the second week in country. However, it was not possible to schedule meetings with several key participants until the following week, the final week of field work, when a draft of the case study was to be produced for mission comment. The investigator and USAID thus agreed that interviewing would continue during the final week of field work, while a briefing paper with preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations was being drafted. An exit briefing based on the paper was conducted to help USAID staff address critical issues.

The briefing paper was distributed on Thursday, July 21, 1994, and the briefing was given the following day. The briefing paper has formed the basis of the present case study.

Section II of this study discusses perceptions as to whether the SAP has been institutionalized and why--basically the problem definition of the case study. It also begins providing the background of the institutionalization process, focusing on the evolution of the SAP institutionalization objectives, its structure and its operations. The FEWS Project contribution at each stage is highlighted. Section III continues the background description by discussing international support to the institutionalization process and how the FEWS

project has interacted with the various multilateral and bilateral donor agencies. Section IV considers the problems that the SAP is presently encountering and their implications for the future of the institutionalization process. The FEWS contribution to solving them is discussed here as well. The fifth section presents conclusions of the study, the most important being whether the SAP is indeed institutionalized on the basis of the twin standards of permanence (sustainability) and efficiency of operations. Additional specific conclusions are presented in this section, and followed up in Section VI with recommendations as to how to strengthen the SAP institutionalization process.

## **II. OBJECTIVES, STRUCTURES AND PROCESS OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION**

### **A. The SAP as an Institution**

Throughout the study, all references to the SAP refer to a system of institutions created through various GON decrees since 1989. They include the following:

1. The National SAP Committee or *Comite national du système d'alerte précoce* (CNSAP)

The ministerial-level policy making committee for the entire SAP as a system. It is chaired by the Chief of the Prime Minister's Office and includes the secretaries-general of all the GON Ministries and the Permanent Secretary of the SAP.

2. The Permanent Secretariat

The day-to-day central SAP coordinating unit in the Prime Minister's Office, operating under a Prime Minister-appointed Permanent Secretary with ministerial rank.

3. The Inter-Ministerial Technical Group or *Groupe technique inter-ministeriel* (GTI)

The consultative body composed of the chairs of the Sectoral Working Groups that assists the Permanent Secretariat in synthesizing the information submitted by the work groups.

4. The Sectoral Working Groups or *Groupes de travail sectoriels* (GTS)

These groups are composed of sector specialists in specific areas. Their function is to synthesize data from their particular areas.

5. The Regional/Sub-Regional Food, Health and Nutritional Situation Monitoring Units or *Cellule régionale/sub-régionale de suivi de la situation alimentaire, sanitaire, nutritionnelle* (CRSSA/CSRSSA)

Operating respectively at the departmental and arrondissement levels, these units are composed of civil servants and ministry technical specialists. Their functions include identifying zones deficient in cereal production, determining populations at-risk, estimating food aid requirements and establishing food aid distribution mechanisms at the departmental level, and monitoring cereal deficit areas and managing local level interventions at the arrondissement level.

6. Assorted sectoral level information systems, for example, the health information system (SNIS) and the Directorate of Statistics of the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry.

References to any particular institution within the SAP will be made specifically, whereas reference to the SAP will mean the entire system of institutions.

Perceptions of whether the SAP was indeed institutionalized were varied, with perhaps as many stating that it was as perceiving that it was not. Three sets of perceptions emerged:

1. The SAP is institutionalized.
2. The SAP is not yet institutionalized.
3. The SAP is institutionalized, but with qualifications.

Those who believed that it was institutionalized considered it so because:

1. It has been legally established through a set of formal decrees at the national and regional (departmental) levels and increasingly at the sub-regional (arrondissement) level.
2. It was an idea that was born of a Nigerien perception dating back nearly 20 years that a systematic approach to famine early warning would help prevent future famines.
3. It is recognized as present at all levels of the government.
4. It is a structure with a theoretically unlimited lifespan and not merely a project with a specific beginning and end.
5. It has survived more than one change of government and one change of Permanent Secretaries, the key position in the SAP hierarchy.
6. Its central policy-making body is composed of high officials from a variety of ministries and GON agencies; and its key central coordinating unit, the Permanent Secretariat, is placed by decree in the Prime Minister's Office.
7. Although it is still evolving, the SAP has begun operating and making its presence known.
8. Current Permanent Secretariat staff have a self-improvement attitude. They are open to improvement, and are becoming clearer in the definition of their needs.

Those who feel that it has not been institutionalized considered the following as being needed for it to be so:

1. The GON until recently did not seem to want to take responsibility for the actions of the SAP. The push to establish the SAP, bringing both existing and new institutions and

processes into one coherent system, had to come from donors, especially USAID and the FAO. Additionally, USAID in particular has had to invite people to various meetings that SAP institutions should have. By contrast, the GON seems to feel more “ownership” toward the SNIS and other sectoral information systems than toward the SAP as a system that would include them.

2. Although the rudiments of institutionalization have been put into place (legal framework and functioning staff), it must institutionalize a methodology.

3. It would have to operate on GON resources and motivation. The GON lacks the resources for this to happen, and its dependence on donor support for even recurrent costs makes it too unstable to be an institution.

4. The SAP really has no visible, operating structure. The current Permanent Secretary is the SAP, for all practical purposes.

However, those who believed the SAP to be institutionalized, but qualified their perceptions, stated the following:

1. The remaining arrondissement decrees forming the CSRSSAs need to be promulgated.

2. The SAP is a very young organization and is not yet technically able to carry out its mandate. Further technical assistance will be needed for some time to come.

3. The SAP has yet to be tested in a crisis. If it can carry out its functions in a food crisis situation of significant magnitude, or be recognized as being instrumental in preventing one, it can be said that it has become a lasting institution.

The summary perception is that the SAP, although it has existed for five years as a legally established set of entities, has not yet achieved a level of operation, recognized technical skill or political support where it commands the respect of all concerned with food security in Niger, especially on the national level. There is even a sense that a SAP coordinating mechanism already existed in the form of an inter-ministerial technical group, the GTI, which had the capability and authority to be the GON’s early warning system. The SAP decree, then, added an unnecessary layer of individuals and information handling that at best absorbed funds that were better used strengthening sectoral information systems feeding into the GTI rather than to create and sustain a new SAP coordinating structure at national level. Another participant maintained that the SAP is the Permanent Secretary only, and that it is thus presently fragile and unsustainable, with a weak management framework, weak relations with other GON sectors, and no real political support. In the section on conclusions, the perception of the SAP as an established institution will be revisited.

## **B. Objectives, Structures and Process**

### **1. History of Early Warning in Niger: Influence, Commitment and Responsibility**

There were differing perceptions of whether the process that resulted in a national early warning system was a GON-pushed or donor-pushed initiative. Much of the literature and a number of participants saw a clear GON awareness of the need to establish such a system, and pointed to institutions that preceded the present SAP. For example, during the first three regimes after independence, the various governments improved infrastructure within the context of relieving drought, famine and human resource problems, and decided to focus on food self-sufficiency. After the droughts of 1968-69 and 1972-73, national committees were set up to monitor the agro-pastoral season to provide better information in the event of a future crisis. Although the last of these committees dissolved after a series of good seasons, the famine of 1984-85 was credited by several participants as the stimulus for the creation in 1985 of an inter-ministerial committee to provide early warning and coordinate a response capacity, and for the subsequent development of a formal and permanent national early warning system structure. In 1987, during the Saibou (third) regime, the GON submitted a request to the UNDP to create and establish a national early warning system along the lines of the present one. This request was formulated by the Directorate of Economic Analysis of the Ministry of Plan. Donor assistance was provided at that point as a response to the request through the FAO, which provided a consultant to help draft a formal project paper-like document. When it was found that the GON project concept needed to be defined more clearly, the GON's Organization and Methods Office (BOM) in the Prime Minister's Office was given the task of doing so. The BOM completed the detailed project conceptualization by May 1988, and proposed an inter-disciplinary task force to formulate the main actions needed to establish a SAP. This work led to a series of FAO missions beginning in early 1989 that assisted the GON in completing the project paper for the donor funding needed to establish the SAP. The result of this work was the promulgation of the decree of August 1989 (Attachment D) that formally established the National SAP Committee and the Permanent Secretariat, incorporated them under the Prime Minister's Office, defined the objectives of the system and laid the groundwork of the regional and sub-regional establishment of information flow to the Permanent Secretariat.

Other participants, while acknowledging the presence of a certain GON sustained level of concern about the population's food security and the problems caused by drought, insects and the history of famines, expressed their impression that the donor push was needed to concretize the structures required of a SAP. Several point to the USAID efforts in 1988-89 on the part, specifically, of the mission's DRU Chief together with the FEWS Field Representative at the time to both work with the GON to formalize institutions and provide technical support in the early years. Others point to the importance of the FAO contribution to project conceptualization and technical support. Still others put emphasis on both the Canadian efforts in the 1980s to help restructure the GON, and to CDC interest in improving food security in Niger as being key stimuli to the

development of a national early warning system. Certain participants, however, pointed to the lack of a basic management framework, operational processes, and political support in sectoral ministries five years after the SAP's founding as a sign that the GON has not taken responsibility for the SAP created under the 1989 decree. Nevertheless, they also cite evidence of a GON concern for early warning through its sense of ownership of, and responsibility for sectoral information systems that are perceived as being able to provide sufficient early warning without the central, highly placed structures created under the SAP decree.

## **2. The FEWS Contribution**

The FEWS influence on SAP development varied in line with FFR access to the SAP.

Phase I of the FEWS project began in 1985. The first two FFRs, who spanned the period from November 1985 to May 1989, carried out their work before the 1989 decree was promulgated. They were not closely involved with the early SAP design work. However, they both helped improve the quality and operations of specific sectoral information systems destined to become an integral part of the SAP; especially those of the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Livestock. As a result, by May 1989, the following accomplishments were a direct result of their efforts:

1. The information systems of the Ministries of Health and Livestock were computerized, which lay the basis for the present livestock information system (LMIS) and the national health information system (SNIS).
2. The capacity of the Ministry of Health to carry out nutrition surveys was institutionalized.
3. A national early warning bulletin was published regularly. At the beginning, its information was heavily health oriented; by May 1989, it presented information from a number of indicators, which helped to lay the groundwork for a "convergence of indicators" approach to famine early warning in Niger.
4. USAID became interested in becoming an advocate for a national famine early warning system as GON efforts to establish one were reaching the culminating point of the decree that would be published a few months after the departure of the second FFR.
5. Other donors and the GON became increasingly conscious of the need to use varied indicators in assessing the food security situation in Niger.
6. One of the key GON SAP designers, a BOM staff member, was sent with FEWS funds to a UN-sponsored nutrition surveillance conference.

However, their mandate remained the provision of famine early warning information to AID/W and the USAID mission. Apart from the bulletin, their technical strengthening and advocacy work appeared to be informal. The FAO in particular was most prominent in supporting the design of the SAP and the drafting of the 1989 decree. In fact, when the decree was published, there was no FFR in country at all.

The FEWS contribution to the development of the SAP became quite substantial during the tenure of the third FFR (September 1989-October 1991). After a four-month period without a FFR, this individual arrived in Niger a month after the 1989 decree was promulgated. A number of key events occurring as she took up her post, and during several months thereafter, helped make the upsurge in FEWS impact possible:

1. Phase II of the FEWS project had begun. Phase I had been more of a disaster response by the USG to recurring droughts in the Sahel, and the previous FFRs had been maintained on short contracts with little logistical support. Phase II was a centrally-funded AID/W project. This FFR was therefore the first to be hired on a long-term basis with project-type logistical and administrative support. She could thus plan her work over a known period, become officially integrated into the USAID Disaster Response Unit (DRU) and receive a formal mandate to provide early warning information to USAID and, gradually over time, to help strengthen the SAP.
2. A dynamic Chief of the DRU came to Niger. This individual catalyzed the DRU and recognized the potential for using USG resources, especially those of FEWS, to strengthen the SAP. As a result, the DRU Chief and the FFR became a dynamic team whose advocacy efforts and technical support to the SAP were widely recognized by the GON, the USG and other donors.
3. Related to the arrival of the DRU Chief was mission efforts to buy into the FEWS project. In March 1990, the mission approved a Limited Scope Grant Agreement (LSGA) for a one million dollar buy-in that made it possible to ensure a substantial amount of FFR time and FEWS resources to strengthening the SAP. This LSGA remains the source of funding for USAID support to the SAP, and made possible not only the commitment of this FFR, but also funded a SAP Advisor in 1992-3. The work of this advisor will be discussed in a later section.
4. The FAO consultant who helped initiate this agency's support to the SAP was a colleague of the FFR's in a previous position elsewhere in Africa. As a result, they were able to develop a close working relationship which resulted in the FEWS project's being able to sustain the fledgling CNSAP and Permanent Secretariat financially until the FAO project actually came on line about midway through the tenure of the FFR.

These events converged with the energy and dedication of the FFR to accomplish the following:

1. Arrondissement-level food security committees (the CSRSSAs) were incorporated into the SAP structure. In the original SAP design and decree, this level was not contemplated.
2. FEWS I computer equipment was donated to the Permanent Secretariat. Until the FAO project came on line about a year later, this was the only equipment they had. As a result, they could begin functioning at a basic level, which helped improve the Permanent Secretariat's survivability.
3. Technical assistance to the Permanent Secretariat in mapping and satellite imagery, indicators development and national bulletin preparation was begun. FEWS also funded a number of field trips and training seminars focused on decentralized early warning and vulnerability assessment. This began to help reorient the SAP's dependence on cereals balance as the sole criteria for determining food needs and toward FEWS-like vulnerability assessment.
4. FFR advocacy efforts helped sensitize the GON and donors to the need to strengthen the SAP. Results included progress in the publication of missing legal texts and the appointment of staff for the Permanent Secretariat.

It is the perception of most participants that this support kept the SAP alive. For all intents and purposes, FEWS provided the only support--technical and financial--that the CNSAP and the Permanent Secretariat had for the year between the 1989 decree and the arrival of the FAO Technical Advisor and the FAO project's technical and financial support. Without it, the two national-level coordinating institutions might not have survived; certainly, the FAO would have had little to work with when it did arrive. By spending up to 50% of her time working with the SAP, this FFR generated technical and advocacy momentum that the SAP needed to begin operations and begin to carve out a space for itself in the GON.

By the end of this FFR's tenure (October 1991), the SAP had begun to take shape:

1. Legal texts for the creation of the GTSSs and most of the CRSSAs had either been drafted or promulgated.
2. More GON collaborators with the CNSAP and Permanent Secretariat had a sense of the SAP's purpose, and it had a perceived mission.
3. The Permanent Secretariat had become minimally operational.
4. Improved databases became available to the SAP through FEWS, and data accuracy improved.

However, the SAP as a system was still weak:

1. Key legal texts governing the CSRSSAs and defining staff and operating procedures for the Permanent Secretariat had not yet been drafted. FAO work on the latter had barely begun by then.
2. The SAP was overly dependent on donor funds for its operations. Even the simplest data collection and analysis could not be carried out without them.
3. The Permanent Secretariat staff did not feel secure enough to project scenarios or make recommendations for action in such a politically volatile area as food security, especially food aid. At the same time, donors were wary of SAP analyses because they seemed to lack coherence, consistency and only took cereals balances into account.
4. While it appeared that there was a recognition by some GON staff that a convergence of indicators approach was superior to a total reliance on cereals balances in assessing food needs and identifying at-risk populations, cereals balances remained the most important indicator used by the SAP in assessing food needs. Change in perception and practices would require more time, continued advocacy and technical assistance.
5. Basic management functions and tools had not yet been defined. There were as yet no job descriptions, operating procedures, written mission statement or systems for managing the Permanent Secretariat or the CNSAP. This aggravated data collection, processing, analysis and dissemination problems at all levels of the SAP.
6. While some staff had been hired for the Permanent Secretariat, it was still not adequate to the task. Positions were still unfilled, and those in place were not always sure what they were supposed to do.

The FFRs who participated in this study felt that the momentum generated during the tenure of the third FFR needed to continue for the technical assistance and advocacy efforts to take effect. In addition, greater attention needed to be given to the management of the SAP at all levels, especially the Permanent Secretariat, the key institution that was conceived to ensure coordination and cohesion. The FAO project was expected to be the main source of this type of assistance.

However, the momentum was not maintained. Near the end of the third FFR's tenure, the DRU decided to create the position of SAP Advisor, and to give this person the mandate of providing technical and managerial assistance to the SAP on a full time basis. As a result, it was deemed unnecessary for the FFR to work with the SAP at all. Consequently, by the time the fourth FFR arrived in Niger (October 1991), he was no longer authorized by USAID to work with the SAP; he was to supply early warning data analysis to AID/W and the USAID only, and act as the USAID's own advisor for early warning. Consequently, the formal relationship of the FFR with the SAP was broken (although LSGA funding for SAP operations continued).

It can be argued that if a SAP Advisor had been found quickly, it might have been possible to maintain some momentum, albeit not through the FEWS project. It might, however, have been possible for the FFR to maintain at least informal links to the SAP in coordination with the SAP Advisor, thus continuing some level of technical assistance and advocacy. However, events conspired to separate the FEWS project from the SAP strengthening efforts:

1. There was no SAP advisor until mid-1992. As a result, the SAP received no formal USG technical assistance at all for over six months.
2. The DRU Chief left post in early 1993 and was not replaced until 1994, after more than a year. Although the USAID General Development Officer and other direct hires in the General Development Office tried to assume some of the day-to-day duties, the FFR and other DRU staff had to assume some of these duties as well.
3. USAID has yet to formally authorize the FFRs to work with the SAP. However, by early 1993, individual USAID staff felt that the FEWS technical support was needed for the SAP. FFRs were thus encouraged to re-establish informal links to the SAP.

By working with the SAP Advisor once one did arrive, the fourth FFR was able to begin helping the SAP again through work with GON sectoral information systems and, informally, with the Permanent Secretariat. However, by the time he ended his tenure (September 1993), the level of assistance given under the FEWS project and the project's influence and impact were far from those experienced during the tenure of his predecessor. He felt that his only contribution was continued advocacy in favor of vulnerability assessment.

The present FFR and FEWS Assistant both see their current mandate as including support to the institutionalization of the SAP, but this part of their mandate remains informal. They have emphasized the application of constantly improving vulnerability assessment techniques to Niger's famine early warning needs, both for their AID/W and mission early warning responsibilities and for the SAP. They have helped upgrade the technology available to the SAP, now in close collaboration with the DPM program. This latter work presently centers on introducing sophisticated GIS, satellite imaging and other FEWS, USGS and NOAA information analysis and management software to the Permanent Secretariat, and training Permanent Secretariat staff in its use. The FEWS database is also being installed in the Permanent Secretariat. The present goal of the FEWS staff is to complete this installation by the end of 1994, when the LSGA expires, and train appropriate Permanent Secretariat and DPM technical assistance team members in the use of the software. To do this, the FFR hopes to increase his time devoted to SAP strengthening activities from about 10% to about 30%. It is anticipated that this particular FEWS effort will allow the Permanent Secretariat to gather, analyze and synthesize more complete and timely information through state-of-the-art famine early warning and vulnerability technology.

The FEWS team is now looked to by the newly arrived DPM technical assistance team and DRU Chief as important collaborators in their efforts to help the SAP improve the quality of its data and its capabilities in projecting food needs. It appears that a new FEWS technical assistance momentum could be generated through the DPM program, and will benefit the SAP if it is.

### **3. Objectives**

Two key issues surfaced here. One concerned the objectives of the SAP itself, and the other related to the objective that USAID in particular had for its own SAP institutionalization efforts. With regard to perceptions of the SAP's objectives, there was some sense of confusion between its role in early warning and in coordinating response efforts. It appeared that early conceptions of what a national early warning system should do centered around the strict early warning function. Thus the committee of the late 1960s and early 1970s focused on information flow, synthesis and dissemination to decision-makers. By the mid-1980s, about the time of the inter-ministerial early warning committee and the development of a GON five-year development plan, some participants felt that the idea of adding a response capability to the institution responsible for early warning had begun to take shape within the context of ensuring that food crises would not impede overall development efforts. Generally, USG participants saw the two functions as logical, complementary capabilities under one institution, whereas most European participants in this study were troubled by the addition of the response function to an institution that should remain strictly focused on early warning. SAP Permanent Secretariat participants in this study tended to agree with the dual functions under one institution approach. Other GON participants, however, stated that the early warning and response functions should not be together in one institution. In any case, the 1989 decree contains language that many participants acknowledged as being unclear about SAP response-related objectives. USAID, however, felt it necessary to eliminate ambiguity as to where a response coordinating capacity should be institutionalized by creating a set of conditions precedent to the USAID DPM program that would require the establishment of a response capacity in the Office of the Prime Minister, though not necessarily in the Permanent Secretariat, at the same time as the SAP's early warning capability would be strengthened. This program, approved in 1992, has begun operations and is currently negotiating with the GON the placement of the response coordination capability within that Office, while other donors and elements of the GON continue to express concern about this placement as an excessive concentration of power in too few hands. This latter issue will be re-explored later.

Institutionalization objectives for the SAP, according to many study participants, generally centered around the creation of a GON famine early warning system that would be permanent and efficient. This basic objective went through a process of clearer definition over the years. Permanence has come to imply institutional and financial sustainability or survivability. Meanwhile, the concept of efficiency appears to have centered increasingly around objectives concerning increased methodological, analytical, management and advocacy skills, especially with respect to the Permanent Secretariat.

The DPM and FEWS projects, as well as other donor projects (present technical assistance through the EEC, for example), aim to increase these skills throughout the SAP system, especially within the sectoral information systems that are considered to be part of the SAP. As discussed above, the FEWS contribution has always been in the methodological, analytical and advocacy areas.

#### **4. SAP Structures**

##### **a. Issues**

The study participants identified two key issues of lasting importance related to the evolution of the SAP structure:

1. Top-down vs. bottom-up development; and
2. New people in a new layer vs. same people in either a new or familiar configuration.

With respect to the first issue, those who saw its formation as a top-down development pointed to the 1989 decree that established the national SAP entities as a priority, and put lesser emphasis on the now defunct Regional Coordinating Committees as key elements in the information flow to the Permanent Secretariat. These participants also saw the food and government crises of 1990-91 as creating an urgent impetus to the establishment of the national entities at the expense of regional and subregional ones. They also emphasized that regional decrees were not all promulgated until September 1991, and sub-regional decrees have not yet all been issued to institutionalize the SAP entities at this level. Other proponents of the top-down perception pointed to the idea that it took a presidential decision to take recognized early warning coordination authority out of the Ministry of Health and subordinate the existing information systems of that and other ministries to a new early warning coordination layer in the Prime Minister's office. Indeed, as discussed above, the FEWS FFRs in the 1989-91 period worked to increase SAP coverage at the subregional level, a level that was not contemplated in the original decree, and to move forward the drafting of the needed regional and subregional legal texts, as the ones for the national level SAP institutions had been drafted from the beginning.

Those participants who saw the formation as a largely bottom-up phenomenon pointed to the already existing food security-related information flows from the arrondissement level to the national level (through sub-prefects and technical working groups through their sectoral ministries to the GTI), and the consequently questionable need to formalize the CRSSAs and CSRSSAs. Some of these same participants, however, also stressed that the GON has had a sustained interest in decentralization that maintained pre-1989 information flows and will serve to strengthen the regional and sub-regional committees over time. One participant even felt that the crises of 1990-91 caused the GON to strengthen regional SAP components over national entities rather than the other way around.

The second issue of new people and layers centered around concern over the SAP's credibility within the government, especially vis a vis sectoral information sources with which the CNSAP and Permanent Secretariat are to work. Some participants indicated that prior to the SAP decree, interministerial working groups and an early warning capability had begun to be developed within the Ministry of Health. It appeared that the original SAP idea called for the SAP to second line ministry technical staff into a cross-sectoral analytical interministerial committee, or house the national SAP coordinating function within the Ministry of Health or Agriculture. Its placement in either Ministry would have given it respect through recognition of the perceived primacy of agricultural and health information in early warning. This idea would have allowed experienced professionals who had been doing early warning for a long time to continue working together, and not create a new funding drain on the GON because the participants in this committee would receive their salaries for the jobs they already did. Thus, the creation of the two national-level entities (CNSAP and the Permanent Secretariat), placing the Permanent Secretariat in a more influential position than that of the experienced professionals and bringing new people into this information coordination unit caused bad feeling that continues. This bad feeling, grudging cooperation and lack of ownership of, or feelings of participation in the SAP stem from a perceived subordination of sectoral importance in the SAP system.

In their work with the SAP, the most recent FFRs have perceived a general acceptance of a SAP role. However, there are differing expectations among GON technical staff as to its mission, and varied degrees of willingness to share information with the Permanent Secretariat.

#### **b. Operations**

The various entities in the SAP are indeed perceived as having spotty performance thus far:

1. The CNSAP is supposed to meet once per quarter according to the 1989 decree to provide policy guidance to the Permanent Secretariat, but has only met once since its creation. Reasons given include the perception that the members are at too high a level to gather regularly, there is little really for them to discuss and donor-GON disagreements on food security management structures. This latter issue will be discussed below.

However, one participant stressed that the CNSAP is not dependent on the donors to meet, and can, in fact, call the donors to a meeting. It has indeed done so in the past. Meanwhile, the absence of regular policy guidance to the Permanent Secretariat needs to be remedied.

Since the CNSAP has not met regularly, the Permanent Secretary and Chief of the Prime Minister's Office, who chairs the CNSAP, poll the other members when operational decisions on which they should consult need to be made. During the field work for this

study, however, the CNSAP was scheduled to hold a meeting. It had to be postponed because invitation letters from the Chief of the Prime Minister's Office were not sent to the other members in time. As the investigator left Niger, the CNSAP meeting was rescheduled for the end of July. Permanent Secretariat and USAID participants in this study were hoping for the meeting to be held, citing the need to decide on mechanisms for GON-donor coordination on food security (authority to decide on food assistance has also been vested in the Chief of the Prime Minister's Office), and on where to place the response function in accordance with the conditions precedent for the DPM project.

2. The **Permanent Secretariat** was not fully staffed for some time after the 1989 decree, and even now does not have its full complement of staff. Nevertheless, it is operating, attempting to increase staff skills, educating the GON and the donors about its purpose and relevance, and developing basic management tools, like job descriptions and operating procedures, that it still lacks. With the assistance of the SAP Advisor, they drafted a mission statement and began developing basic direction and control tools for day-to-day management. However, the staff are keenly aware of their fundamental lack of a management system, which makes it extremely difficult to gain respect and carry out their technical functions to the degree needed to make the Permanent Secretariat sustainable. From a technical standpoint, however, the current staff are highly competent individuals seconded from other ministries who are taking advantages of training opportunities and are aware of the benefits of forging links with their counterparts in other Sahelian countries, especially Mali and Burkina Faso, where national SAPs operate.

3. The six **GTSs** meet from time to time, with some more active than others. This has occurred even though some of the legal documentation establishing operating guidelines for them has not yet been signed. However, the completion of the legal texts for the establishment of the GTSs for agriculture and livestock; pest monitoring; crop production forecast and stock estimates; and the livestock markets is a condition precedent of the DPM project. With that, all six GTSs will be legally established.

4. The **GTI** met regularly during the two years of the FAO support project. It has met irregularly since, but shows promise of picking up activity. For example, the Permanent Secretary has been successful in having it meet before each bulletin is published. In addition, it met during the period of field work for this study to discuss coming SAP-related events, the next bulletin, vulnerability criteria to be used for early warning and preparation for the upcoming CNSAP meeting. However, this meeting was apparently not well attended.

5. Some **CRSSAs** and **CSRSSAs** operate better than others, depending on the diligence of the members and the degree to which they have specific tasks. For example, committees that have had to deal with food shortages and subsequent relief have worked quite well. Several participants remarked that it was quite something that they functioned at all, considering that not all their decrees have been signed, and they lack funds, a clear methodology and operating procedures, as well as encouragement. The current Permanent Secretary has begun diligently following up on the drafting and passing of the

legal texts required to legally establish the CSRSSAs where this step is lacking (about half of all CSRSSAs) and to specify their tasks. Although not originally part of the SAP structure, the importance of the CSRSSAs has been recognized by many participants, were included as part of the SAP through the advocacy efforts of one of the FFRs together with an FAO consultant, and they have been targeted for strengthening under the DPM program. This is seen by participants as crucial because the CRSSAs and CSRSSAs clearly have both early warning and response functions.

It appears that all of these structures lack resources, operating procedures and sustained motivation from within the GON, yet those that have operated have done so when they have had to confront a crisis, complete specific tasks or make specific decisions.

### **5. Information Flow and Use**

The Permanent Secretariat is not meant to be a primary data collector and processor. Consequently, it depends on the inflow of information from sectoral ministries, donors, NGOs and other information sources that can be cultivated. It also receives information through the CRSSAs and CSRSSAs, who themselves receive information from the canton chiefs (local level authorities). Although, in theory, the Permanent Secretariat is not seen by most study participants as the body to process and analyze information, much raw data reaches it, requiring Permanent Secretariat staff, the GTI and GTSs to spend a great deal of time processing and analyzing information before it can be synthesized and disseminated by the Permanent Secretariat.

Data flows are varied in Niger, and not all of them pass through the Permanent Secretariat. Among the various flows are:

1. Sectoral Ministry information services, such as the Meteorological Service, the Directorate of Crop Protection (DPV), the Agricultural Statistics Directorate, the Health Information System (SNIS), the locust/grasshopper control network and the National Cereals Office (OPVN).
2. Sahelian early warning systems located in Niger, such as AGRHYMET and FEWS.

These data sources have received donor technical assistance and funding to improve their capabilities over the years, and most participants have felt that the quality of this information has been improving. However, the Permanent Secretariat still receives incomplete or questionable information, and must either seek missing information itself with its own studies or attempt to convince other information sources to provide it. This is a problem that will be discussed fully in Section IV.

Recently, the Permanent Secretary has attempted to encourage NGOs to provide information to the SAP. This effort has only just begun, and such organizations have not apparently provided much information yet.

In spite of active advocacy and technical assistance by FEWS FFRs and under other projects, the Permanent Secretariat still relies largely on food production data, such as the CILSS cereals balances, to determine deficits and thus help target food aid. They then identify deficits with arrondissement-level village deficit lists. This process is completed by the end of the year relating to an agro-pastoral season that ended a few months earlier. FFRs and others have tried to convince SAP staff at the national level to broaden its approach to include vulnerability assessments, but this methodology is not yet the primary vehicle for identifying areas in crisis and potential responses. Consequently, the cereals balance methodology continues to form the basis for deficit identification. Still, the Permanent Secretariat is gradually receiving software through FEWS and the DPM program especially, with a view to acquiring, analyzing and synthesizing information electronically from a wider variety of sources. In addition, the present Permanent Secretary, in office only since late 1993, clearly believes in the utility of vulnerability assessment, and, with FEWS and DPM assistance, seems likely to gradually begin applying it.

Information is disseminated by the Permanent Secretariat through its bulletins, the press and conferences. The current Permanent Secretary sees his role as stimulating and coordinating the more timely and accurate flow of information. After the initial two FFRs managed to ensure a regularly published early warning bulletin through the Ministry of Health, few bulletins have been published. As discussed earlier, information from the sectors remains incomplete, slow in arriving and, according to some study participants, inaccurate. In addition, the lack of funding from the FAO, with whose funding the Permanent Secretariat has published bulletins, has been a key factor in the irregular publication of this early warning bulletin, which was to have been the continuation of the Ministry of Health/FEWS bulletin. However, a bulletin was recently published again, and the Permanent Secretariat is attempting to publish bulletins three times a year with GON funding.

Once the information is disseminated, reactions by international donors and other GON entities have varied, and linkage to response mechanisms is perceived as being poor, at least partly because the capability to respond to potential food security crises has not been clearly placed within the GON to everyone's satisfaction.

In summary, there is a wealth of information and data that flows into the SAP from the field and numerous other sources. Its processing and analysis are imperfect, however, and there are considerable challenges to its being accurate or complete in some cases. However, the situation appears to be improving with the addition of software and training, and an effort by the Permanent Secretary to enhance relations with GON staff that manage key information flows.

### **III. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT TO INSTITUTIONALIZATION**

A number of donor agencies have contributed to the strengthening of the SAP, especially in technical areas. In carrying out their work, the FEWS FFRs and the FEWS Assistant have worked closely with them, to strengthen some of them, exchange information, advocate for a national early warning system, encourage methodological improvements within the SAP and provide technical assistance to the SAP.

#### **A. USAID**

USAID's assistance to both the SAP in particular and early warning in general has been both substantial and varied, given through several projects. Among the major ones are FEWS, a long-term SAP Advisor, AGRHYMET and the new DPM program. FEWS impact on the SAP has been discussed in an earlier section. The others are described below:

##### **1. Long-Term SAP Advisor**

The long term technical advisor worked with the Permanent Secretariat during the latter part of 1992 and all of 1993. The purpose of this activity was to help the Permanent Secretariat improve its management framework and its technical performance. When the USAID created this position, it made the FEWS FFR its own advisor for early warning and charged the long term technical advisor with working directly with the SAP, as discussed above. The specialist was an experienced disaster prevention, preparedness, recovery and mitigation specialist, and had the potential to fill a gap in management support and improvement left when the FAO Advisor departed and not replaced. However, his consultancy met with numerous administrative and political challenges. Procurement of necessary SAP equipment was lengthy, the contracting of outside technical assistance took many months, and USAID funds for Permanent Secretariat per diems, gas and recurrent costs, all funded under the FEWS LSGA, were often not available when needed because of administrative requirements and slow processing. One result was the consultant's inability to spend significant time on his managerial and technical assistance duties because of his having to attend to USAID administrative details instead. One major consequence was the inability of a managerial assistance team, slated for a series of workshops early in 1993, to arrive until the last month of the overall consultancy. This delay dramatically set back the managerial strengthening efforts, the very area where improvement was most needed. In addition, political and bureaucratic difficulties in dealing with the GON in general and the Permanent Secretariat in particular significantly slowed the consultant's work.

Nevertheless, the advisor was able to accomplish the following:

1. Sufficient managerial assistance was arranged to help the Permanent Secretariat draft a mission statement for the SAP, and begin developing job descriptions, operating

procedures and various direction and control tools. This work still has a long way to go, however.

2. SAP automatic data processing requirements were assessed by the current FEWS FFR while he was still an independent consultant. In addition, he made recommendations concerning the development of GIS capabilities for the SAP. His reports on these two consultancies remain excellent bases which can be updated, and are indeed being used by FEW/Niger staff (See Attachment F).
3. In conjunction with FEWS staff, SAP technicians received technical training.
4. The new Permanent Secretary, who was appointed near the end of the consultancy, became aware of ways of measuring cereals consumption and measuring vulnerability other than the traditional CILSS cereals balance methodology. This reinforced the several year long FFR efforts to change the SAP's analysis orientation.
5. Pre-famine policy issues critical to the development of the DPM program were flagged.

The two FFRs who overlapped with the advisor worked closely with him to help revive and continue the invaluable FEWS technical assistance in the areas of data accuracy, and in methodology, software and database development. However, as noted earlier in this study, this work was informal and intermittent for a time under the fourth FFR. Under the present FFR, however, this relationship, though still informal, is increasing, as shown in an earlier section, and has gained momentum through the FFR's relationship with the SAP that predated his becoming FFR, through his two consultancies during the tenure of the technical advisor.

## **2. AGRHYMET**

This project began as a CILSS initiative with multiple donor funding, including the UN, France, Italy and USAID. Its original purpose, according to AGRHYMET participants in this study, was to be the principal famine early warning system for the Sahel. Accordingly, it has developed its data collection and analysis capacities in physical, meteorological and satellite data over the years. It presently publishes its own bulletin and produces highly sophisticated greenness maps every ten days.

USAID support has recently become the most critical as other donor support has waned in the wake of budget cuts. It has thus been able to install state of the art technology. Their greenness maps can show 1 km. areas on the ground. In addition, USAID funding has helped fund two WMO specialists as technical assistance to the AGRHYMET regional center in Niamey. The regional center specialists are currently guiding efforts to upgrade the technology of the work groups in each country, concentrating especially on GIS and satellite imaging, and have already helped improve the quality of rainfall and production data throughout the Sahel.

So far, AGRHYMET early warning has been a separate data stream. There appear to be few points of contact or collaboration with the SAP. This, however, is changing as the DPM program begins helping the SAP become aware of, and familiar with, state-of-the-art data analysis and management techniques. Indeed, during the field work for this study, the DPM technical assistance team was active in meeting with AGRHYMET to help increase information and software sharing between AGRHYMET and the Permanent Secretariat, especially in the areas of local area mapping and GIS.

In addition, all FEWS FFRs have worked closely with the AGRHYMET center in exchanging data, attending each others' seminars and other joint activities. As the DPM program has come on line, the FFR, the DPM data specialist and AGRHYMET meet frequently and are collaborating on sharing satellite technology and specialized software with the Permanent Secretariat.

### **3. Other USAID Support to the SAP**

In addition to these two major early warning and information system support projects, USAID is helping to improve the quality and timeliness of data generated by various sectoral information systems that feed into SAP entities. Among these are the AELGA locust and grasshopper control program of the DPV, the livestock market information system (LMIS), the SNIS and other agricultural, meteorological, health and market monitoring systems that are supposedly part of the SAP. USAID assistance has provided funds and technical assistance to purchase equipment and supplies, improve management and improve the quality and timeliness of the information provided.

Much of this assistance will continue to some extent under the DPM program, which will now bring together and rationalize the various streams of USAID support to early warning and information systems.

FFRs and the FEWS Assistant have worked closely with many of these systems to exchange information, provide training, computerize their systems and generally improve the usability of the data that they produce. The first FFR, as we recall, was instrumental in computerizing the health and LMIS information systems, laying the groundwork for the present SNIS and LMIS. This technical support to sectoral information systems has been perhaps the longest sustained contribution of the FEWS project in Niger.

### **4. Niger Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation Program (DPM)**

The DPM program has a five-year LOP that aims at strengthening the early warning capacity of the GON and institutionalizing a response capacity therein. A four-person technical team has arrived in-country to provide the technical assistance, managerial support and training needed. In addition, as stated above, USAID assistance funds and administrative responsibility for early warning, response and related information systems that has been channeled through the USAID mission, FEWS, AELGA, the DRU and elsewhere will be channeled through the DPM program. The DRU is now headed by

the Project Manager for the DPM program, and the FEWS, other DRU and AGRHYMET staff will report to her administratively. In fact, her arrival in country filled a vacancy of more than a year in the DRU Chief's position and makes it possible for the FEWS team to concentrate once again on the technical aspects of their work, including the informal but increasing work with the SAP.

This project is a true innovation in the sense that it accomplishes the following:

1. It takes the administrative challenges that made past assistance to the SAP difficult out of the mission and channels it through what is hoped will be a fast-moving administratively simpler system.
2. It provides a strong, multi-skilled technical assistance team for the type of long term targeted assistance that the SAP urgently needs in a wide variety of areas for a sustained period, particularly management.
3. It provides a comprehensive effort to set up and strengthen a response capability in the GON as it strengthens early warning.
4. It channels the considerable technical assistance that now funnels through FEWS and other past USG-funded efforts for greater effect.

This effort has just begun, however. The technical assistance team had been in-country for less than six months by the time of the field work for this study. It is thus not possible to expect major results. Yet expectations have been high. The team itself has felt that little happened in key technical and managerial areas in the Permanent Secretariat because key GON and donor agency staff expected the DPM to solve the most pressing SAP problems and build the response capability quickly. However, the project design appeared to some participants in this study to assume that the basic management strengthening would be completed by the time of the technical assistance team's arrival. The team would thus be able to concentrate on enhancing the quality of the SAP products, namely, complete, timely information that assisted decision-makers to assess a crisis and respond, and a coordination capacity for that response. Upon their arrival, however, the team has found that much groundwork in basic management practice at the SAP has not been accomplished. As discussed above, nearly all SAP entities except perhaps the sectoral information systems still lack operational procedures, job descriptions and basic day-to-day management procedures. As a result, the technical team has found itself having to concentrate on these basic practices even as it tries to strengthen the SAP in the areas where the DPM program design anticipates that it will.

Indeed, the DPM technical team participants in this study see their focus as being institution building with the SAP and the Prime Minister's Office. This orientation implies a slower, more methodological approach than that which would meet the current expectations. For this reason, the production of the four-year plan on which the team is working with the SAP is an achievement of great importance. This plan sets forth

incremental steps to improve both SAP management and products, involving the consolidation of all accomplishments even as the next logical initiatives are undertaken. Thus, for example, the DPM team is helping the Permanent Secretariat buy into satellite imaging technology, then meteorological analysis, and then price data, all of which the FEWS FFRs have been working to get the SAP to adopt with mixed results. Facility with this technology should help raise the SAP's profile and win respect for their technical capacities. Another DPM parallel effort will involve a methodical training needs assessment, followed by the design of training strategies, assessments of national, regional and overseas training resources, and only then will training begin for all SAP levels. For some time to come, accomplishments in the DPM project will be measured by small achievements.

The third FFR, the same one whose efforts had the strongest FEWS impact vis a vis the SAP, wrote parts of the AID project paper for the DPM program, especially the high quality and thorough history of the SAP in Annex II that has proved so useful to USAID, AID/W and the present study. Now that the DPM program has begun, as discussed at various places in this study, the FEWS-DPM link has been established both on paper and in working relationships that are already developing. The current FFR, under whom the DPM program has begun, works on an almost daily basis with one or more members of the DPM team, concentrating on database and technology transfer and data sharing. He meets with other SAP-strengthening teams in-country in conjunction with the DPM team to coordinate technical assistance efforts and share data. This relationship is already well along, cordial and mutually productive, and is likely to continue with USAID encouragement until at least the end of the FEWS LSGA.

## **B. FAO**

The current FAO Representative has been in Niger since 1988, and has thus personally been part of the SAP institutionalization efforts. He was an early and strong advocate of a national early warning system to monitor the food security situation and sound the alert in cases of looming food shortages that would require outside assistance. He saw this SAP strictly as an early warning system, with the purpose of collecting, analyzing, synthesizing and disseminating information to decision-makers, using data from the agriculture, nutrition and health sectors. Accordingly, he helped facilitate the various FAO missions that supported the finalization of the design and early implementation of the SAP.

From 1990 to 1992, the FAO was thus instrumental in helping the SAP become established through a \$1 million project funded by the UNDP. This project provided a technical advisor to the Permanent Secretariat, helped ensure the appropriate legal framework for the SAP, helped begin the process of establishing a management framework for the Permanent Secretariat and trained staff in their roles. Progress was made in establishing, monitoring and reporting on national-level indicators, and some equipment, including computers and software, were procured. However, there was little emphasis on regional, sub-regional and local indicators and monitoring, and only some of

the management objectives were met. The project was not extended, partially because it was thought that USAID would support operations while the FAO would concentrate on the technical quality of SAP output. As we recall, this was the period during which the SAP advisor that USAID was to hire had not been yet been found, and the FEWS staff was not able to provide assistance to the SAP. Consequently, there was a crucial break both in the technical strengthening of the SAP, as discussed above, and in the managerial strengthening until the SAP advisor arrived in Niger and the FEWS FFR could begin collaborating the SAP informally. In addition, some key FAO officials apparently felt frustration with the GON in that the GON was perceived as not wanting to take responsibility for the SAP. With the change in government since 1992 and the coming of the present Permanent Secretary, FAO/Rome has begun to believe that they can work more closely with the SAP in the future. Accordingly, a new \$60,000 FAO project is being contemplated that will focus more on the GTSSs and CRSSAs. By the writing of this case study, funding for this project was still pending.

The FAO also collaborates with the CILSS to carry out a pre-harvest assessment in all CILSS countries, usually in September or October. The countries are expected to prepare data beforehand, and thus the GON relies on the SAP to coordinate this preparation.

The FEWS FFRs worked closely with the FAO throughout the development of the SAP and since. The first FFR assisted the CILSS/FAO pre-harvest assessment teams. The second exchanged data with the FAO. The third, as related above, worked very closely with the FAO consultant who helped the GON develop the SAP and the FAO's strengthening project, and ensured funding for the fledgling SAP until the FAO project came on line. She also collaborated with the consultant in advocating the inclusion of the subregional food security committees in the SAP structure and in pushing for the drafting of key legal texts for SAP structures, as discussed above. This collaboration had a strong impact during the early months of SAP existence, without which, as some participants in this study state, there would have been no SAP. Since then, the collaboration between the FAO and the FFRs has been more along the lines of information exchange.

### **C. Other Donor Support**

#### **1. Germany**

The German government has been providing assistance to the OPVN for 20 years as part of their food security technical assistance to Sahelian countries. There is presently a technical advisor to the OPVN in country, whose firm has been contracted by the GTZ to either bring the OPVN up to an adequate level of operation and relevance in food security management, or to close out German assistance to it. The present advisor, who has been in-country for a very short time, has already shown that he is prepared to collaborate with other donors in finding ways of managing food security in Niger, but maintains that the OPVN has been the customary coordination entity for food security efforts, and must be a key player in continuing efforts by donors and the GON.

This assistance to the OPVN has begun to bear fruit for the SAP. The price monitoring unit has been moved away from the main OPVN complex, and is now connected electronically with the FEWS office. FEWS can thus download information through its modem on cereal prices. This is one of the technologies that FEWS staff is attempting to install at the Permanent Secretariat.

## **2. CILSS/DIAPER**

The DIAPER project has been funded by the EEC as a Sahel-wide effort among CILSS countries. Its purpose has been to improve national statistics quality and monitoring as a permanent "diagnostic" mechanism of the food security situation. Under this effort, consultants have been provided to the SAP, some funding has been provided for training, SAP workshops and office equipment, and primary data collection, especially of agricultural and related data by sectoral ministries, has improved.

A new DIAPER project (phase III) has been approved, and is now housed within the regional AGRHYMET center. Its purpose remains to improve the quality of agricultural statistics. It is thus planned that computers and other field equipment will be given along with technical assistance. However, there is a condition precedent to establish a joint donor-GON commission to manage food security which has caused a continuing discussion between the European donors in particular and the GON, and the donors amongst themselves, as to what form this commission is to take and at what level it should operate. A longer discussion of the controversy is included in Section IV of this case study since it relates to concern about the placement of the early warning and response capacity within the GON, a discussion that has not yet reached a conclusion in spite of the DPM program's implementation.

Nevertheless, the DIAPER project strengthens the SAP inasmuch as it strengthens the all-important agricultural statistics capability of the GON.

From the second FFR on, FEWS staff have collaborated in various ways with the DIAPER project. It appears that DIAPER data was important to the early warning bulletin published with the assistance of the second FFR. The third FFR worked with the DIAPER representative on the design of the SAP until he passed away suddenly and was not replaced. The fourth and present FFRs have exchanged information with DIAPER, and maintain the same kind of technical contacts that they have had with all information systems in Niger.

## **3. Association pour le Developpement Economique et la Sante (AEDES)**

This European organization has developed a rapid food security assessment methodology, and has used it to provide technical assistance to the national famine early warning systems of Mali and Chad with EEC funding. The technical assistance to the

Niger SAP was provided with 92 million CFA of EEC funding, and lasted until August 4, 1994, only a few months. A three-person team worked directly with the Permanent Secretariat to do some primary data collection through special studies and assessments to help fill in missing data and improve data collection and analysis in general. This funding has also provided vehicles. The AEDES assistance is fairly new, but has produced a series of studies using the rapid food security assessment methodology. Their studies helped confirm the location of some of the food deficits after the 1992-3 agro-pastoral season when there was serious doubt among donors about the GON's figures. The team had hoped to develop the methodology and adapt it better to the Niger situation, but were unable to do so, apparently because of the short duration of the contract.

There is a difference in perception as to whether the AEDES was called in upon the request of the GON or whether EEC pressure caused the GON to agree to its intervention. GON participants in this study saw the former as the case; since the EEC's development fund (FED) representatives had been among the most critical of the SAP's food deficit figures and methodology, the GON requested the EEC to fund technical assistance. European participants stated that they believed that EEC pressure on the GON caused the latter to reluctantly accept AEDES assistance. These same participants noted their concern that current negotiations for a longer-term AEDES technical support effort to the SAP are being affected by GON reluctance to have them continue. Nevertheless, Permanent Secretariat participants in this study expressed their satisfaction with the work of the AEDES team, their cordial working relationships and their hope that AEDES assistance will continue.

The present FEWS team has collaborated with the AEDES effort. The DPM team, the FEWS team and members of the AEDES team had two meetings while this study was taking place, during which the transfer of software to the Permanent Secretariat and improvement of SAP data quality were discussed. It is clear that this type of collaboration will continue if AEDES succeeds in continuing its work with the SAP.

#### **4. Nigerien Technical Support**

Although not international, it seems fitting to speak of this assistance here. Apparently some high quality professionals in Niger have proven helpful to the Permanent Secretariat. University professors, data specialists and individuals from the BOM, a group of management specialists, all provide important guidance to the SAP. The BOM, for example, has sponsored recent management and planning workshops with DPM participation and is helping to develop the four-year workplan on which the DPM technical assistance team is working as well. In addition, at least one of the BOM specialists, the key individual who has worked with the Permanent Secretariat for some time, is slated for advanced training under the DPM program.

As discussed above, one BOM staff member attended a nutritional surveillance conference with FEWS funds, arranged by the FFR at the time. Although this is the only specific instance of support to the BOM that was mentioned, current FEWS staff is aware

of the BOM role in strengthening the SAP and the support given to them by the DPM team. The groundwork is thus laid for collaboration between the FEWS team and the BOM if it appears to be fruitful.

#### **D. A Closing Thought on Technical Support**

It is clear that the SAP has received a great deal of attention over the years, and will continue to receive it. As the next section will suggest, however, study participants are still concerned about some of the very areas where technical assistance has been given, such as basic management practice and data analysis and dissemination. Perhaps one reason is the continuing discussion about who should be responsible for early warning, response and related responsibilities, which perhaps inhibits progress in the structure to which the GON has assigned even the early warning responsibility. It is also possible that the first Permanent Secretary failed to give the vision, political support and facilitation needed to ensure that this assistance would meet its objectives, as several participants have suggested. It is also probable that the interruptions in the FEWS, FAO, DIAPER and USAID technical assistance before their efforts bore substantial visible fruit broke the continuity needed to ensure a gradual improvement in SAP technical capabilities and management while GON changes were occurring. In brief, the question of why the SAP is not the efficiently-managed, early warning mechanism that many believe that it should be in spite of millions of dollars and thousands of person-months of assistance looms large as we discuss the problems faced by the SAP and how they might be addressed.

#### **IV. MEETING THE CHALLENGES**

Study participants discussed numerous problems that the SAP seemed to be having. Each is complex, but possible solutions have been identified. The problems seemed to fall into three groups: data, responsibility and resources.

##### **A. Data**

Study participants have stated that information disseminated by the SAP and conclusions drawn by the GON based on it have often been unreliable, incomplete, late and politically slanted. This was especially the perception of the donor community after the 1992-3 agro-pastoral season. According to the participants, there are a number of manifestations and causes of the basic data problem. The following are some of the major ones:

##### **1. Problems**

- There is lack of agreement as to what methodology the SAP is to use, or how to use the methodology it has, to collect, process and analyze its information.
- The information and analysis seem never to be updated after the December Maradi conference.
- Conflicting data series often emerge, and different conclusions are often drawn by the SAP and others, especially the donor community.
- Regional and subregional food security committee membership is unstable, membership is too rigidly defined, and data from these levels are consistently incomplete, and rarely analyzed sufficiently for the Permanent Secretariat to use without further time-consuming analysis.
- Permanent Secretariat links to the line ministries and other primary data collectors are not consistently strong or trusting.
- Permanent Secretariat staff is too small to do the leg work needed to collect and confirm complete information.
- Too much data reaches the Permanent Secretariat, far more than the amount necessary for early warning.
- There are numerous data streams that rarely converge on the Permanent Secretariat in a way that makes data useful. Many GON and donor information systems publish their own syntheses of information and make conflicting food crisis predictions.

- Some confusion may be purposeful, so that officials can favor particular cantons and villages over others for political reasons.

The major consequence seems to be a lack of institutional credibility, both internal and external. Internal credibility involves a distrust by line ministries of the SAP's analysis of data that they collect. Some study participants even stated that some line ministries accuse the Permanent Secretariat of changing their numbers when it is more likely that they are objecting to the Permanent Secretariat's synthesis of their figures. External credibility relates to donor distrust of SAP conclusions, particularly with respect to food deficits. In recent years, the GON, based on SAP analysis, has requested food assistance. However, the FAO and other donors came to different conclusions in their own pre-harvest and deficit assessments, and do not seem to understand how the SAP came to its conclusions. The result is far less food aid than requested and an atmosphere of distrust and bad feeling that affects crisis response.

## **2. Possible Solutions**

The following are some of the solutions proposed for these problems:

- Ensure that the SAP, especially the Permanent Secretariat staff, stay current on methodological developments in the field of needs assessment and the monitoring of food security indicators/vulnerability assessment, and work with donors and line ministries to standardize a methodology with which all are willing to work.
- Improve SAP data analytical skills at all levels. Continue the transfer of databases available at FEWS and elsewhere in country, as well as the installation of state-of-the-art information analysis and management software, such as SPACEMAN, NDVI and similar "canned" programs.
- Allow the Permanent Secretariat to collect some primary data itself, especially when data supplied from elsewhere is incomplete or needs confirmation.
- Foster close collaboration with other data flows with a view to sharing information, software and analysis, and for transferring skills.
- Strengthen regional, subregional and local information flows. Ensure that data analysis is done transparently at the regional and subregional levels, and that data flows in a timely manner to the sectoral ministries, GTs, GTI and the Permanent Secretariat in turn.
- Explore the possibility of seconding more line ministry technical specialists as additions to present SAP staff to help strengthen collaboration between the SAP, especially the Permanent Secretariat, and the sources of its information.

- Complete the strengthening of Permanent Secretariat management skills as soon as possible: job descriptions and operating procedures are still lacking, and hinder the carrying out of technical responsibilities.
- Carefully identify the information that is really needed for early warning, and developing mechanisms to ensure that only this information reaches the Permanent Secretariat in a form that it can use.
- Strengthen the technical basis for identifying communities as food deficient/famine vulnerable to help lessen the strongly perceived effect of political considerations in the process. Make the technical criteria for identification known and adhere to them consistently in a wholly transparent identification and food aid/relief targeting process.

The impression is that many of these efforts have been going on for some time. Nevertheless, a related impression is that they have only begun in earnest since late last year with the coming of the present Permanent Secretary. His coming has apparently opened the doors of receptivity to technical support, and earlier technical assistance efforts began to bear fruit at that time. The DPM program, and future FEWS, DIAPER, FAO and other efforts will all accelerate the process.

## **B. Responsibility**

There is considerable discussion about where in the GON early warning and response responsibilities should be situated. There is not even unanimous support for the SAP as the early warning institution. It appears, in fact, that study participants have identified four responsibilities related to food security crises whose responsibilities need to be fixed to GON and donor satisfaction: early warning, response coordination and execution, decision-making and financial control of the early warning and response functions.

### **1. Early Warning**

Most participants were willing to accept the SAP as the early warning mechanism of choice. There was unanimity on this point from the USAID participants in this case study and the FEWS FFRs. A few participants, especially GON participants not part of the Permanent Secretariat, felt that this responsibility should have remained in the Ministry of Health, or in some other technical ministry. There was even a strong current of support for the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry. Still others, some European participants in particular, felt strongly that the OPVN should have early warning responsibility. Some of those who supported the SAP also emphasized that it should remain committed wholly to early warning, defined as the study, analysis and dissemination of food security/vulnerability data, avoiding actions related to response, and not becoming involved in even the collection of data.

## **2. Response**

USAID has established that the response coordination responsibility should be under the Chief of the Prime Minister's Office, and has concretized this position within the DPM program. Whether it should be in the SAP or not is another question, as its response objectives as stated in the decree establishing it are unclear. Other participants felt strongly that doing so would give too few individuals too much power, especially considering the resources involved. One set of participants believed that response coordination should be in the hands of a joint donor-GON committee, who would manage the resources, with the OPVN taking the lead in carrying out response activities through its food distribution mechanism (see the *Program Assistance Approval Document* for the DPM program, pp. 30-31, for a discussion of this mechanism). Most others saw coordination as being under the Chief of the Prime Minister's Cabinet, and execution of activities spread over a wide range of individuals and institutions, such as donors, OPVN, ministries, NGOs and local coping/mitigation mechanisms.

## **3. Decision-Making**

Many participants felt that the decision to trigger appropriate responses based on information provided through the early warning system should not be made by the same people who implement or coordinate the response. Only USG-related participants believed that the Office of the Prime Minister should have this power, along with early warning and response coordination. Suggestions from other participants included the Council of Ministers, the Chief of the Cabinet, one of the ministries (preferably Agriculture) or a donor-GON committee. Most participants felt that it is important to make this decision so that clear lines are drawn when a crisis looms and no questions should be asked or doubts expressed. The political nature of this authority has caused great concern among some of the donors, especially European donor agency representatives. At present, the Office of the Prime Minister has the authority to coordinate national early warning and food aid targeting and distribution. With USAID insisting, through its support to the DPM program, that this office should make the decision to trigger response to any disaster, and with the Chief then coordinating the response, European donors are concerned that too much power would thus be invested in a highly political office which, they say, has a history of using its power to direct food aid to favored localities and regions. These same participants argue further that the placement of the SAP coordinating entities within the Prime Minister's Office overly politicized the Permanent Secretariat, which got them apparently associated with inappropriate targeting of emergency food assistance. At present, it appears that all participants felt that the GON should make the decision to trigger response to disasters, although the institutions involved could be developed with donor support. One participant made the point, however, that once it is clear who should make the response decision, the donors should accept the decision and support it.

#### **4. Financial Resource Control**

The resources involved in early warning and response are considerable, as recognized by practically all participants. Here, a joint donor-GON committee and the Chief of the Prime Minister's Office were the most popular suggestions for who should be responsible. One set of participants warned of the dangers of concentrating control of these resources in too few hands, which placing financial control under the Chief of the Prime Minister's Office or the Permanent Secretary of SAP would do.

Thus, responses ranged from concentrating all four responsibilities under the Chief of the Prime Minister's Office to spreading them out over many institutions and individuals. Nevertheless, the institutional issue remains whether to concentrate authority and control for decisive analysis and action or to diffuse some or all of the disaster prevention, mitigation and response authority over numerous governmental and non-governmental institutions to prevent an over-concentration of authority. Only USAID has resolved this issue to its satisfaction and is moving ahead with the configuration proposed under the DPM program, whereas the GON is going along, albeit uncomfortably in some quarters. Most of the European and UN participants in this study remain unconvinced that the USAID plan is the best, and a few European donors have decided to go their own way in terms of response implementation and financial resource control.

#### **C. Resources**

The GON is highly dependent on donor funding for many of the most basic expenses. As a result, the SAP is as well. Donor funding even pays for gas and per diems for SAP staff travel in country, with USAID funding under the FEWS LSGA being one of the most consistent and generous sources. Field trips become complicated as the Permanent Secretariat tries to borrow vehicles from other GON agencies when donor vehicles are unavailable. In addition, the use of SAP operating funds becomes embroiled in donor-related administrative delays that hinder its fulfilling its most basic responsibilities. Even when funding is budgeted for the SAP in the GON budget, there have been times when the Finance Ministry does not have funds available due to low revenues, or the budget development and approval process itself delays the availability of funds.

The consequences of this situation are clear. Operations are delayed, staff become frustrated, and technical assistance is hampered when planned actions cannot be carried out or are delayed for lack of funds. Also, the dependence on outside funding requires the GON to constantly seek funds, and go along with donor ideas because they see themselves as too weak to resist. From a purely technical standpoint, several participants explained how crucial this extreme dependence is; even the current level of primary data collection will not be sustainable without major sustained donor intervention for some time to come.

The participants could not recommend any easy solution to this problem.

## V. CONCLUSIONS

The following conclusions are offered in the interest of helping to provide insights that may help use GON and donor resources more efficiently to strengthen the SAP.

### A. Great Expectations

When examining the chronology of events relating to SAP development (Attachment E), it becomes apparent that the SAP is a young institutional system. It is only five years old, and has not had a smooth development track. Government and food crises in 1990 and 1991 all contributed to delays in developing the system. It took a number of months for the Permanent Secretariat, the key coordinating element in the SAP, to begin operations. It also introduced a new layer of technicians into the traditional early warning scheme of sectoral and decentralized information systems and data flows, which has not as yet been accepted fully by all sectors on which the SAP depends. Additionally, crucial donor technical and managerial support was interrupted at crucial times, before their objectives were met and the SAP could operate efficiently and confidently.

In spite of its youth, it has developed the qualities of a nascent institution. It has survived government upheavals and permanent secretary changes, as well as donor attacks. Key GON players in early warning have also shown a commitment to making the SAP work, and the USAID, through FEWS and the DPM program, has committed major financial and technical resources to its strengthening and expansion.

Nevertheless, expectations are quite high. Some participants felt that the amount of technical assistance provided over the years should at least have resulted in a sound basic management system and higher quality system output, namely, analyzed, synthesized and disseminated data that are used by decision-makers to trigger appropriate responses, and, according to some participants, sound recommendations as to what those responses should be. When these expectations are not perceived as being met, it affects collaborative relationships with the frustrated parties that further contribute to a lack of credibility for the SAP.

Recent events, however, bode well for the future. The present Permanent Secretary is the type of leader now needed to redress perceived past weaknesses, provide a vision of what the SAP needs to be, advocate and educate effectively both within the GON and among the donors, and educate the public about the nature and capabilities of the SAP. He has shown that he is open to assistance and ideas, has a good idea of what is needed to build an improved base for future improvement, and has a deep understanding of the multi-sectoral complexity of food security as now understood by the current state of the art worldwide. He is also a GON insider who has developed a wide range of key contacts in the GON over his years of government service as a high level advisor, and appears to possess the dynamism and commitment to raise the SAP's profile while carefully making it clear what can and cannot be done. Donor participants feel that he is an excellent government collaborator with whom much will be done if he remains

Permanent Secretary long enough to have an impact. At the time of this study, he had been Permanent Secretary for perhaps 10 months; not nearly enough time to have an impact.

### **B. Focus of Future Technical Assistance**

Nevertheless, it is apparently of some concern that technical assistance needs still include basic management practice for the Permanent Secretariat. As discussed previously in this study, there are no job descriptions for Permanent Secretariat staff, GTSs and other elements of the SAP and there are few operating guidelines or procedures. Until recently, there was not even apparently a strategic plan of some sort for institutional development. It was hoped that the DPM program would be able to spend less time on the management of the early warning system and more on improving its products, while it put much of its emphasis and resources into helping to establish and strengthen a response capability in the GON. However, much of the management assistance was interrupted before it had met its objectives (FAO 1990-92), or hampered significantly by donor administrative delays that brought much of the management assistance to bear toward the end of the consultancies (the USAID SAP Advisor in 1992-3).

These basic management needs will have to be addressed before significant technical improvement can be expected. The current Permanent Secretary is keenly aware of these needs, and is working to develop job descriptions and operating procedures. A mission statement was developed and some basic direction and control techniques were developed as part of the SAP advisor's work, and the Permanent Secretary is attempting to carry this work through. Also, the DPM technical assistance team and the Permanent Secretariat have begun working on strengthening SAP management and planning capabilities through the development of the DPM four-year plan. A preliminary work plan submitted to USAID recently appears sound, and will be excellent input to the development of the strategic plan, which was to have been completed by late July.

### **C. Weak Donor Coordination**

All participants felt strongly that this area needed improvement. Past conflicts apparently have been serious, and have harmed donor-SAP collaboration. One cause seems to have been individual incidents that have soured the EEC especially, even though the individuals most closely involved have left and been replaced by generally collaborative people. Disagreements appear now to revolve around the assignment of responsibilities for early warning, response, decision-making and control of funds and food aid resources, as discussed in the previous section. The consequences of current disagreement include the establishment of separate emergency funds for disaster response that could cause considerable confusion should they have to be used in a crisis; considerable reluctance to use, or even trust, what the SAP produces; and the delay of needed funding to the GON for food security management.

Stronger donor coordination is crucial to the development not only of sustainable early warning institutions, but also response mechanisms and coordination entities in a country where the population is perpetually at-risk of crisis-level food deficits. Donor funding in large amounts is needed for GON disaster prevention, mitigation and response; and focused, sustained donor technical and managerial assistance is necessary for the strengthening of GON institutions involved in these areas. Greater good faith efforts are clearly needed to ensure that these resources flow in a coordinated matter to avoid duplication and gaps.

#### **D. The SAP as a Nascent Institution**

As discussed at the beginning of this study, one of the early institutionalization objectives for the SAP contained the elements of permanence and efficiency. Permanence itself can be seen as sustainability in the face of challenge and change, the idea being that a recognizable entity will continue to exist and strive to fulfill its mission no matter what happens around it. Institutional permanence seems to involve a legal element: a governmental institution needs a series of legal texts that establishes its existence, defines its purpose and names the elements of its structure, at least. It also involves a financial element: without resources, no institution can function. Ideally, a governmental institution will have budgeted resources at its disposal, with donor resources able to be called upon when needed to ensure financial support. Institutional permanence also seems to require a sustainable level of respect on the part of institutions with which it is to collaborate regularly and on which it will depend to carry out its mission. Efficiency implies operational capacity: resources are used efficiently to carry out the institutional mission.

It can be argued that the SAP has been institutionalized by the permanence standard. It has a legal basis that is nearing completion. It has survived major changes internally and in its environment. An increasing number of people apparently see it as useful. However, the Permanent Secretariat suffers from a lack of recognition and acceptance from some of its sister GON institutions, even some of those on which it depends to fulfill its own mission. Some participants in this study felt that the Permanent Secretariat, and therefore a national early warning system operating out of the Prime Minister's Office, existed only in the person of the Permanent Secretary, although this is probably an extreme view. In addition, the SAP suffers from the same financial impermanence from which the entire GON suffers. However, some donors in Niger are displeased with, and distrustful of SAP synthesis and conclusions about food aid needs, and are thus skeptical about its usefulness as it presently operates.

By the efficiency standard, much remains to be done. As shown in previous sections, the SAP management framework is incomplete, working relationships are not as productive as needed for the Permanent Secretariat to be accepted and there are greatly differing perceptions on the part of key funders and supporters as to the SAP's linkage to a response mechanism, key to focusing on-going institutionalization efforts.

Seen as a process, however, institutionalization of the SAP has been successful so far because it has remained a part of donor and GON efforts to enhance economic development. Ongoing, new and planned donor projects continue to formulate objectives related to the institutionalization of a long term famine early warning and response capability within the GON that will help lessen the disruptive effects of food crises on Niger's development. Still, the SAP itself is a fragile institution in need of urgent strengthening of its management framework, a higher profile within the GON and a more favorable image among some of the donor agencies. It will remain fragile until its organizational framework and management practice are firmly established, and it is more clearly respected for its technical mission and production.

### **E. Impact of the FEWS Project**

Viewed over the long term, the FEWS project's impact on the institutionalization of the SAP has been considerable. FFRs have worked with most of the key information systems that are part of the SAP. They have contributed tremendously to SAP technical strengthening efforts, especially in the areas of data management, technology, equipment and training. To a lesser, but no less significant extent, some have been visible advocates of the need for a national early warning system and the further need for continuous donor support for its operations and institutional strengthening. All FFRs and the FEWS Assistant have supported the SAP as the national early warning system of choice in Niger, and have striven to support it, even when working directly with the SAP was removed from their formal mandates.

Expressing this impact another way, if the FEWS project and its FFRs and Assistant had not made the efforts and accomplished what they did, it is probable that the following might have happened:

1. The FAO project that began in 1990 would not have found even a minimally operational set of institutions with which to work. Until their arrival, there would have been no funding or equipment for the SAP, few if any databases, and no staff apart from the appointed Permanent Secretary.
2. It would have taken a lot longer for certain key sectoral information systems to become computerized, and thus more able to process and analyze data quickly for the consolidation and dissemination work of the GTI and Permanent Secretariat.
3. The concepts of decentralization of the SAP and vulnerability assessment might not have been introduced in a timely manner into the thinking of key GON technical staff. It would have taken even longer than was the case for the SAP staff to reach the point where they could take advantage of the most recent enhancements of the FEWS vulnerability assessment.
4. It would have taken a great deal of time for key databases and software to reach them.

However, the FEWS project did not influence the management of the SAP, nor was the FEWS project expected to do so. As a result, technical improvements occurred in an environment where they could not be used as efficiently as they could have been if there were a strong management base, especially in the Permanent Secretariat. Perhaps this base would have been established if the FAO project had begun at the same time as DIAPER and FEWS support were offered to the SAP: the FAO project would have helped set up the management structure, procedures and tools, and the other two projects would have helped improve the technical quality of the SAP's products. Later, one participant spoke of a further opportunity when a successor FAO project was envisaged that would have provided technical strengthening while USAID provided managerial strengthening. However, this opportunity was also lost, as discussed above in the section on the FAO.

In addition, government changes and considerable staff rotation have occurred at certain levels of the SAP since 1989, causing confusion and delays in all GON operations, as well as a drought crisis in 1990-91 that required the new institution to act quickly with whatever resources it had, thus foregoing institutional development. All of this was out of the control of FEWS. Nevertheless, it appears that the FFRs and the Assistant continued to assist the SAP as much as they could, except at times during the interruptions that occurred in their contacts with the SAP caused by USAID reorganization of the DRU and administrative distractions, as discussed in earlier sections.

In summary, a technical support intervention of the type that the FEWS project has provided to the SAP in Niger can have great impact if it is sustained over a period of years, is carefully coordinated with other donor efforts of the same type, is carried out in conjunction with management strengthening efforts, and is done with a national early warning system that both receives sustained funding and is receptive to the technical support. These elements are now in place under the DPM project. The FEWS team in Niger is thus well-placed to have the kind of impact that the project had during the period 1989-91.

## **VI. RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. Perhaps the most important recommendation for all involved is to recognize the Permanent Secretariat's efforts to improve itself, its desire for appropriate support, and its need to be respected, and give it the time it needs to improve according to its developing four-year plan. As the present Permanent Secretary says, time, work and patience are the key words in SAP improvement.
2. The Permanent Secretary and the rest of the Permanent Secretariat staff, like dedicated, dynamic people everywhere, are motivated, but understandably frustrated at times. It is important for USAID especially, as the key donor to the SAP, to verbalize its support and back it up with appropriate resources at appropriate times. Administrative delays should be minimized. The DPM program potentially provides a fast-reacting, sustained resource channel for the SAP, and should be used as such.
3. The invaluable FEWS work with the SAP should be continued after the expiration of the current mission buy-in. As noted in the previous section, conditions are now most supportive of the FEWS team in its efforts to contribute to SAP technical strengthening. Ideally, it should continue for at least the LOP of the DPM program. Minimally, an additional year's funding should be provided, perhaps as an additional add-on to the DPM program. In addition, the USAID should formally restore authority to the FEWS team to work directly with the SAP, and structure the technical relationship between the DPM technical team and the FEWS team in the manner that it is already evolving informally. This formal recognition of the present *de facto* situation will ensure greater coordination between the DPM and FEWS, and between them and other donor projects, and enhance the FEWS advocacy efforts on the SAP's behalf. If possible, the FEWS team should be involved in any DPM planning for FEWS development.
4. Donor coordination needs to be improved. The present improved dialogue appears productive, but every avenue should be explored. At the very least, the various donor-funded data streams should converge so that the SAP analysis and donor analyses, although probably always different in detail, will no longer diverge globally in their conclusions where peoples' lives are concerned. It may be tolerable to have different conclusions about how large a food deficit may be, but there should never be doubt that there is one large enough to trigger action when action is needed. At some point, the donor community should have sufficient confidence in the conclusions of the GON that they will lend their support decisively with appropriate interventions. This is crucial: if, for whatever reason, the donor community that advocates democratic governance does not respect a new, fragile democratic government, it is unclear how one expects the citizens of the country to do so.
5. For a response mechanism to work properly in any country, there needs to be agreement by all players as to who is responsible for each part of it. Should the early warning system predict a crisis, there should be no doubt that there is one. There should be clarity as to who makes the determination, acceptance of the criteria used to make it,

and a clear chain of command and execution of all appropriate actions such that the coordinators of the response mechanism can trigger appropriate action quickly. Everyone needs to know what to do, when to do it and how to do it so that crises can be forestalled or mitigated. In Niger, it appears that such clarity does not exist in its entirety. Placement of the response coordination mechanism in the Prime Minister's Office is not universally accepted by key disaster resource providers. Indeed, elements of a response mechanism may exist at all levels, but chains of command, disaster determination criteria and appropriate response structures have not been fully mapped out. The necessary decisions need to be made as soon as possible.

6. The four-year plan for SAP strengthening should include early actions to complete the establishment of appropriate management practices in the Permanent Secretariat, then in the rest of the SAP. Staff should become familiar with aspects of strategic planning, annual planning and budgeting, organization and staffing, directing and controlling in which they are still weak. As stated earlier, continued weakness here will hamper efforts to enhance the SAP's technical skills.

7. The Permanent Secretariat, especially the Permanent Secretary, needs to redouble their advocacy and education efforts for early warning in general and the SAP's role in it in particular. The public, the press, civil and military authorities, and especially line ministry collaborators need to become more supportive. The current Permanent Secretary clearly understands that the power of the Prime Minister's office in a democratic system does not stem from use of office to impose, but rather from a vision of how things should work that his level can provide and the use of office to gain a hearing so that consensus building and willing collaboration can begin. He should be visibly supported in this orientation. The FEWS team could be very useful here.

8. The Permanent Secretariat should make greater efforts to use local talent to enhance their capabilities. As stated earlier, they have already used university professors and the BOM well. It would, however, be even more productive if the SAP could make use of former Permanent Secretariat staff who have moved on, as well as sectoral people with experience in early warning and data analysis and management. It appears that the Permanent Secretariat has not been able to do so as yet. For example, consideration could be given to seconding additional sectoral specialists to the Permanent Secretariat for brief consultancies to improve data analysis and management. This could help improve relations in the future. Consideration could also be given to providing training opportunities to BOM and other potential Nigerien consultants to the SAP, through the DPM and/or FEWS.

## ATTACHMENTS

ATTACHMENT A

EXHIBIT A

A.I.D. FEWS PROJECT  
CONSULTANCY TO EVALUATE  
THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF FAMINE EARLY WARNING IN NIGER

Purposes

1. To document the creation of the Niger Système d'Alerte Précoce (SAP) as an example of a successful famine early warning system institutionalization process.
2. To document the USAID/FEWS contribution to that process.

Objectives

1. Determine whether the creation of the SAP was successful, and why.
2. Using the perceptions of the main decision-makers involved in developing the system, identify the factors that made that process and structure a success.
3. Determine how the USAID/FEWS contribution helped in the creation of the SAP, and how that assistance helped achieve the stated objectives.
4. Identify any problems that the main decision-makers saw in creating the system, how they were resolved, and FEWS' role in resolving them.

Strategy/Methodology

1. Develop a case study that provide a descriptive analysis of the process and present structure of the institutionalization, including success factors, problems and alternative solutions.
2. Identify the success factors.
3. Identify the problems and the solutions that the informants saw as the most appropriate.

Activities

1. Review of documentation on the Niger famine early warning system, and interviews with FEWS, OFDA and AID staff in Washington on the same subject to learn system background. General preparation for the case study, including identification of key in-country informants for interviews (1-1/2 weeks).

2. Based on interviews with key informants in Washington and Niger (and possibly in New York and Rome), draft the case studies. Two types of studies will be drafted: the success case and the problem case (2 weeks in Washington, New York and Rome; 2 weeks in Niger).

a. Success factors, per the perceptions of key decision-makers from FEWS, USAID/Niger and Government of Niger, and possibly FAO/Rome and UNDP/New York, will have the following parts:

- 1) Statement of how the institutionalization process and present structure of the system in Niger are a success.
- 2) Description of the background of system development and its present structure and operation.
- 3) Description/analysis of the factors both internal and external to the institutionalization process and structure that contribute to their being a success.
- 4) Summary of the success factors and a restatement of the success statement from the first part with greater precision.

b. A problem case, done per the same perceptions, with the following parts:

- 1) Statement of the major problems encountered in the institutionalization process and structure.
- 2) Description of the background of system development and its present structure and operation.
- 3) Description/analysis of information relevant to defining the problems both internal and external to the system.
- 4) Identification/analysis of alternative solutions.
- 5) Restatement of the problem situation.

3. Draft a final report with the following contents:

- a. A description of the case study process;
- b. The results of the case study(s);
- c. An assessment of the degree to which the purposes and objectives of this study were met;

d. Recommendations as to:

- 1) Follow-up actions in Niger to consolidate the successful institutionalization process, and to solve the highest priority problems; and
- 2) The potential applicability of the case study methodology used in this effort to assessing the degree of success in the institutionalization of famine early warning systems elsewhere in Africa, as well as to identifying constraints to success in that process.

(one week in Niger and one week in Washington for report drafting)

Level of effort

Activity	Person-weeks
1. Review of documentation and preparation for case study(s)	1.5
2. Drafting of case study(s)	4.0
3. Drafting of Final Report	2.0
TOTAL LEVEL OF EFFORT	7.5

D R A F T 25 April 1994

ATTACHMENT B

FEWS-Niger CASE STUDY  
CONTACTS LIST

<u>Name</u>	<u>Connection</u>
Shawn Baker	First FEWS Field Rep. in Niger
Sarah Gavian	Second FEWS Field Rep. in Niger
Charles Kelly	Former Chief of DRU
Charlotte Sharp-Lucas	Third FEWS Field Rep. in Niger
Robert (Robin) Wheeler	Fourth FEWS Field Rep. in Niger
Helen Soos	General Development Officer at USAID/Niger
Mesrak Yousoufou	FEWS Assistant in Niger
Mark Longworth-McGuire	Present Field Rep. in Niger. Consultant to SAP before that
Dale Puffenberger	SAP Advisor with USAID
Barbara Huddleston	FAO/Rome. Division Chief who coordinated FAO/UNDP assistance to the SAP
Cherif Chacko	Present SAP Permanent Secretary
Michael Sullivan	USAID/GDO Special Projects Officer
Keith Simmons	USAID/DEO Chief
Gary Merritt	USAID/Program Officer
Roger Guichard Patrick Thomas Jeffrey Mazilli	Members of DPM Technical Team
Winfield Collins	USAID/GDO AGRHYMET Project Mgr.
Gabriel Ayih	WFP Director of Operations in Niger
Joachim Gromotka	GTZ Technical Advisor to OPVN
Maikorema Zainabou Baderi	Secretary of State for Agriculture & former SAP technical staff member
George Eaton	Former USAID Mission Director

Name

Connection

Mamdou Maimouna

Admin. and Training Specialist in  
SAP Permanent Secretariat

Hama Kontongomde

GIS Specialist, AGRHYMET

Andrew Stancioff

WMO Advisor to AGRHYMET

Leopold Wantisse Siry

FAO Representative in Niger

Christie Collins

Present Chief of DRU

Michiels Denis

Chief of the AEDES Technical Assistance  
team

ATTACHMENT C

INTERVIEW GUIDE

A. Defn. of Terms

1. Do you believe that the SAP has been institutionalized?
2. If so, what indicates to you that it is? [What factors tell you that it has been institutionalized?]
3. If not, what does the SAP have to do, or what has to be done to/for the SAP, so that it will become institutionalized?

B. History

Original Institutionalization Objectives

1. Describe the factors that influenced the decision to develop a SAP in 1985.
  - Why was the decision made to establish it?
  - What was it established in response to?
2. What, as you see it, were the original institutionalization objectives of the SAP?
3. Who defined them? In what forum?

Changes in Institutionalization Objectives

4. How, as you see it, did the institutionalization objectives change in theory and practice over the years?

Original Structure and Process

5. Describe the original structure of the SAP.
  - Was it established as a "top-down" or "bottom-up" structure? Did this change over time?
  - Why was that structure decided upon (as opposed to something else)?
  - What ministries/GON agencies were involved?
  - What, as you see it, were each supposed to do in:
    - Data collection
    - Data analysis
    - Data reporting
    - Decision-making on follow-up
    - Implementing follow-up
  - What foreign support was provided (what and by whom)?

BEST AVAILABLE DOCUMENT

6. Describe the original process by which the SAP did its work.
  - What did each ministry/agency **really** do.
  - What did the USAID mission, the FEWS project, FAO, UN, other internationals (?) **really** do?

### C. Changes in Structure and Process

1. Describe how the original structure changed.
  - What ministries/GON agencies became involved:
    - By the one-year point
    - By the two-year point
    - By the three-year point
    - [By each year point]?
  - What, as you see it, did each do at each point in:
    - Data collection
    - Data analysis
    - Data reporting
    - Decision-making on follow-up
    - Implementing follow-up
  - How did foreign support change at each point (how and by whom)?
2. Describe how the original process changed by each point.
  - What did each ministry/agency **really** do (at each point)?
  - What did the USAID mission, the FEWS project, FAO, UN, other internationals (?) **really** do (at each point)?

### D. USAID/FEWS Contribution

1. Describe the evolution of the USAID and FEWS contributions to the SAP [just be sure that this is brought out in structure and process questions on foreign support above].

### E. Problems

1. Looking at the present structure and functioning of the SAP, do you see any problems that inhibit its operations or continued/enhanced institutionalization?
2. If so, what are they and how might they be solved?

BEST AVAILABLE DOCUMENT  
BEST AVAILABLE DOCUMENT

REPUBLIQUE DU NIGER  
CONSEIL SUPERIEUR D'ORIENTATION NATIONALE  
CABINET DU PREMIER MINISTRE

DECRET N° 89-003/PM

du 23 Août 1989

portant création d'un Comité  
National du Système d'Alerte  
Précoce (CRSAP).

## LE PREMIER MINISTRE

- VU la Proclamation du 15 Avril 1974 ;
- VU l'Ordonnance N° 89-01/PCSON du 18 Mai 1989 portant organisation des pouvoirs publics ;
- VU le Décret N° 89-01/PCSON du 19 Mai 1989 fixant la composition du Gouvernement ;
- VU le Décret N° 83-17/PCMS du 1er Février 1983 relatif aux attributions et à l'organisation des services du Premier Ministre ;
- VU le Décret n° 83-34/PCMS du 23 Février 1983 fixant les avantages à accorder aux membres du Cabinet du Premier Ministre ;
- VU le Décret N° 78-155/PCMS/MP du 28 Décembre 1978, instituant une indemnité de responsabilité au profit des directeurs nationaux des services administratifs ;
- VU l'Arrêté N° 12/PM du 2 Novembre 1987 portant création, attributions et composition d'un Comité Technique de Suivi et de Coordination de l'Aide alimentaire ;

DECRET

Article 1er : Il est créé au Cabinet du Premier Ministre un Comité consultatif nommé Comité National du Système d'Alerte Précoce (CRSAP).

Article 2 : Le Comité National du Système d'Alerte Précoce est chargé de prévenir et détecter les situations de crise et en alerter les autorités, de suivre et d'évaluer les situations conjoncturelles et structurelles, dans les domaines alimentaire, socio-économique, sanitaire et nutritionnel.

Il est chargé notamment des tâches suivantes :

- Proposer au Gouvernement toute mesure visant à enrayer ou réduire l'effet de tout phénomène lié à l'instabilité de l'environnement naturel et socio-économique, et tendant à perturber conjoncturellement ou de façon durable, l'équilibre alimentaire, sanitaire, nutritionnel, socio-économique ;

- Proposer au Gouvernement les actions ponctuelles et les actions de développement visant à mieux sécuriser les populations contre les situations critiques, pour les aider à renforcer leur capacité d'autosuffisance alimentaire,

BEST AVAILABLE DOCUMENT

conformément aux politiques et orientations définies par le Gouvernement ;

- Proposer au Gouvernement en temps utile les mesures nécessaires pour détecter les situations de crises structurelles et conjoncturelles, y remédier, suivre leur mise en oeuvre, et en évaluer l'impact ;

- Préciser toutes les autres mesures en faveur des populations victimes des situations de crises.

Article 3 : Le Comité est composé comme suit :

Président : Le Directeur de Cabinet du Premier ministre

Vice-Président : Le Secrétaire Général du Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Environnement

Membres :

- les Secrétaire Généraux des Ministères :

du Plan

de l'Intérieur

de la Défense Nationale

de l'Hydraulique

des Ressources Animales

de la Santé Publique

des Affaires Sociales et de la Condition Féminine

des Transports et du Tourisme

du Commerce, de l'Industrie et de l'Artisanat

de l'Information ;

- le Président de la Commission Nationale du Suivi de la Conjoncture ;

- le représentant du Secrétariat Général de la Présidence ;

- le Secrétaire Permanent du Comité National du système d'Alerte Précoce.

Le Comité peut entendre toute personne désignée, en raison de ses compétences, par son Président.

Le Comité peut, en cas de besoin, déléguer une partie de ses pouvoirs à un comité de crise composé du Président, du Vice-Président, du Secrétaire Permanent et de trois (3) autres membres choisis en son sein. L'objectif et la durée du comité de crise sont définis au procès-verbal de la réunion ayant décidé de la mise en place dudit comité.

Article 4 : Le Comité National du Système d'Alerte Précoce se réunit au moins une (1) fois par trimestre en session ordinaire. En outre, il peut se réunir en session extraordinaire autant de fois que le besoin, sur convocation de son

Président ou, en cas d'indisponibilité du Président, de son Vice-Président, ou à la demande d'un tiers au moins de ses membres, suivant l'urgence et la gravité de la question.

Sept (7) jours avant les sessions ordinaires, un ordre du jour détaillé et un dossier comprenant tout document et toute information nécessaires aux travaux du comité sont adressés à tous les membres.

Il est établi un procès-verbal des délibérations. Le procès-verbal des délibérations du comité est signé par son Président.

En cas de partage des voix, la voix du Président est prépondérante.

Article 5 : Au niveau régional, le Conseil Régional de Développement (CRD) siègera en cas d'urgence pour retenir les résolutions locales, et concourir ainsi à la bonne exécution, dans leur ressort régional, des missions assignées au Comité National du Système d'Alerte Précoce.

Le Président du Conseil Régional de Développement est tenu d'informer dans les meilleurs délais, le Président du Comité de toutes les propositions et décisions prises par le Conseil Régional de Développement au niveau régional, sous-régional et local.

α Article 6 : Le Comité National du Système d'Alerte Précoce est doté d'un Secrétaire Permanent dirigé par un Secrétaire Permanent ayant rang et prérogatives de Conseiller du Premier Ministre.

Le Secrétaire Permanent est assisté dans sa mission de cadres nationaux choisis en fonction de leur compétence et ayant rang de Directeurs Nationaux de services administratifs.

Le Secrétaire Permanent et les cadres nationaux qui l'assistent sont nommés par arrêté du Premier Ministre.

Article 7 : Le Secrétaire Permanent est chargé de coordonner, de suivre et d'animer toutes les opérations visant à détecter et à prévenir en temps utile les crises dues à une conjoncture défavorable, ou à déceler les tendances à long terme de l'évolution de l'équilibre alimentaire, sanitaire, nutritionnel, et socio-économique, de proposer des mesures appropriées pour y remédier, et d'en évaluer l'impact. A ce titre, il est chargé notamment des tâches suivantes :

- prévenir ou détecter toute situation de crise grave, et en alerter les autorités ;

- élaborer et mettre en oeuvre un système de prévention, de détection et de suivi des situations critiques dans les domaines agro-pastoral, sanitaire, nutritionnel, et socio-économique ;

- préparer et soumettre au Président du Comité, le programme annuel des actions à entreprendre, en définissant entre autres les objectifs, les ressources requises, les termes de référence, les modes de financement et le calendrier prévisionnel, et en assurer le suivi et l'évaluation ;

- valider les signaux d'alarme en spécifiant lieu, nature, ampleur, coûts, délais, modes d'intervention à mettre en oeuvre, et engendrer toute mesure d'action corrective ;

- créer selon les besoins, animer et coordonner les composantes et groupes de travail multidisciplinaires opérant dans le cadre du Système d'Alerte Précoce (SAP), et au besoin, agir auprès d'eux comme arbitre ;

- suivre la gestion des ressources engagées par le Gouvernement et les Donateurs pour la réalisation des programmes et projets approuvés, et en valuer l'impact ;

- assurer par ses propres moyens, ou créer les structures nécessaires à la collecte d'information spécifique dont le recueil ne fait pas l'objet d'un groupe de travail ;

α- constituer et gérer des banques de données sur tous les domaines d'intervention du SAP ;

- analyser les études, enquêtes, programmes sectoriels et opérations d'urgence relatives aux zones sinistrées ou "à risques" ;

- organiser l'échange d'information et sa diffusion ;

- élaborer à des périodes opportunes et en fin d'année un rapport d'activités faisant état de l'évaluation de la situation alimentaire, nutritionnelle, sanitaire, socio-économique et les perspectives à venir ;

- gérer les moyens mis à la disposition du Secrétariat Permanent pour assurer son fonctionnement ;

- assurer le Secrétariat du Comité National du Système d'Alerte Précoce.

Article 2 : L'organisation et les modalités de fonctionnement du Secrétariat Permanent du Comité seront fixées par arrêté du Premier Ministre.

.../...

Article 9 : Le présent décret qui abroge toutes les dispositions antérieures contraires, notamment l'arrêté N° 12/PM du 2 Novembre 1987 sus-visé, sera publié au Journal Officiel de la République du Niger./.

Pour ampliation  
DIRECTEUR DE CABINET



MAMADOU DAGRA -

Signé : MAMANE OUMAROU -

BEST AVAILABLE DOCUMENT

## ATTACHMENT E

### CHRONOLOGY (Through end of 1993)

Events directly related to development of the SAP are underlined.

#### 1985:

July: FEWS created simultaneously in 6 Sahelian countries,  
Shawn Baker begins term as FEWS Field Rep.

Interministerial committee formed to monitor FS and devise permanent structure for detecting and preventing food crises.

- Seen as response to drought of 1984-85.
- First to define objectives for a SAP.

#### 1987:

July: Ministry of Plan becomes involved in definition of SAP objectives.

End September-Early October: Joint FAO/CILSS workshop on Strengthening national EW and food info. systems in CILSS countries held.

- Recomm: need for natl./reg. SAP structures with highly-placed tech. coordinating unit (high enough to make quick, binding decisions).
- Emphasis on agro-pastoral production estimates, cereals balance, id. of at-risk pops. (i.e. production oriented)

November: Ministries of Plan, Ag., Environment, Livestock, Hydrology, Interior, Health, Transportation become involved in defn. of SAP objectives.

Proposal for national EW system completed; submitted to UNDP for funding.

- Formulated by Directorate of Economic Analysis and Planning of Min.Plan.

#### 1988:

February: Sara Gavian begins term as FEWS Field Rep.

April: FAO/UNDP mission comes to study project document for support to SAP under DIAPER project. Cannot be completed because of need for more precise project conceptualization.

- Dossier moved from MinAg. to BOM.

June 10: BOM-drafted document detailing global SAP structure adopted by interministerial committee chaired by Chief of Prime Minister's office.

September: TA from CILSS/DIAPER and USAID/FEWS made available for informal coordination of nascent SAP structure.

BEST AVAILABLE DOCUMENT

1989:

February: UNDP mission comes to revise project document for SAP TA.

May: Gavian ends term as FFR.

June:

FEWS II begins. Operated in 7 Sahelian countries.

PM's Cabinet drafts legal text creating "Comite de Pilotage."

Charlotte Sharp becomes FEWS Field Rep.

August 23: Arrete no. 89-003/PM creating CNSAP is signed.

August 24: Permanent Secretary for CNSAP appointed.

October 14: Permanent Secretariat begins operations with office and staff.

November: FAO mission comes to finalize and submit project document for FAO/UNDP support.

Late in year: Informal negotiations between USAID and Perm. Secretary of CNSAP re: FEWS TA to SAP.

1990:

Early in year: Project document for FAO project approved.

February: Prefectoral decrees creating at least some of the CRSSAs (departmental piece of SAP network) signed.

March:

LSGA signed between USAID and GON outlining FEWS support to SAP.

- One million dollar buy-in from mission OYB provides:
- PSC Technical Advisor to the SAP (first, paid for FFR time. See 1993).
- Funds for gas, per diem, most other direct costs of running the SAP.

Mesrak Youssoufou begins term as FEWS Assistant.

May: Computer donated by FEWS installed at Perm. Secretariat.

July 26: Arrete no. 010/PM creating GTSs at national level signed.

August: First training seminar for national and regional SAP reps. held to introduce new instl. structure (funded under FEWS LSGA).

November: FAO TA to Permanent Secretariat arrives.

1991:

February: Joint SAP, FEWS, FAO field trip to every dept. capital to introduce vulnerability assessment concepts to CRSSAs.

BEST AVAILABLE DOCUMENT

April: Sub-prefectural texts creating CSRSSAs (arrondissement piece of SAP network) drafted (not yet complete).

May: Second training seminar for national and regional SAP representatives held to define various participants' responsibilities (jointly funded by FAO/UNDP, CILSS/DIAPER, FEWS LSGA).

August: Field trips to each arrondissement to outline responsibilities of CSRSSAs.

September: Robert (Robin) Wheeler begins term as FEWS Field Rep. Overlaps with Sharp for a month.

September: Third training seminar for national and regional SAP representatives held to identify health and nutrition parameters essential to SAP (jointly funded by FAO/UNDP, CILSS/DIAPER, FEWS LSGA).

1993:

Arrival of Dale Puffenberger as TA to SAP under FEWS buy-in.

September: Mark McGuire begins term as FEWS Field Rep. Robin Wheeler departs.

October 14: Cherif Chacko becomes Permanent Secretary.

December: Dale Puffenberger TA ends.

BEST AVAILABLE DOCUMENT

## ATTACHMENT F

### Bibliography

1. Gavela, Manver B., *Rapport de mission du 19 novembre au 14 décembre 1989*, FAO Project NDR/87/020/01/12, Niamey, Niger, December 1989.
2. Government of Niger, *Préparation de la table ronde sur le développement rural: Projet de création et de mise en place d'un système d'alerte précoce (SAP)*, Niamey, Niger, January 1985.
3. Lazar, David and Georges Labaki, *Cadre légal pour l'atténuation des désastres*, Final Report, Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc., IQC #AOT-0542-I-00-2006-00, Work Order #8, Washington, D.C., February 1994.
4. McGuire, Mark J., *ADP Requirements Assessment for Niger's National Early Warning System (SAP)*, Niamey, Niger, April 1993.
5. McGuire, Mark J., *Recommendations Concerning the Development of Geographic Information System Capabilities for Niger's National Early Warning System (SAP)*, Niamey, November 1993.
6. Niger Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation Program, *Program Assistance Approval Document*, (683-0271/0279), Vols. I and II, June 1992.
7. SAP/AEDES, *Evaluation rapide de la situation alimentaire à Bouza: Analyse synthétique*, Niamey, Niger, June 1994.
8. SAP/AEDES, *Evaluation rapide de la situation alimentaire 93/94: Enquête socio-economique à Tahoua*, Niamey, Niger, July 1994.
9. Snyder, Jesse, *Dispositions institutionnelles pour la gestion des désastres au Niger*, Final Report, IQC#AEP-5154-I-00-2025-00, Work Order #3, Checci & Company Consulting, Inc., sub-contract with Thunder & Associates, Washington, D.C., November 1993.
10. Wheeler, Robert J., and Mesrak Meskel Youssoufou, *Famine Early Warning System: Project Manual for Niger*, Niamey, Niger, October 1993.