PN-ABU-007
93118

A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

SUMMARY DOCUMENT

Work Performed Under Contract No. AFR-0542-Q-00-1109-00

Managed by: Associates in Rural Development, Inc.
In Association with: Management Systems International

Prepared by:

Ronald J. Oakerson

Prepared for the U.S. Agency for International Development

February 1995
Washington, D.C.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This document was prepared under contract to USAID's Africa and Global Bureaus. James Thomson and Tjip Walker provided comments on earlier drafts. Others who contributed to the development of the assessment framework include Scott Bruckner, Robert Charlick, Cheibane Coulibaly, Steven Dinken, Leslie Fox, Sheldon Gellar, Gary Hansen, Harlan Hobgood, Mamadou Kante, Shaheen Mozaffar, Robert Shoemaker, Tina West, James Wunsch, and Andree Wynkoop.

For further information on the document or for additional copies please contact:

Robert Shoemaker
AFR/SD/DG
Bureau for Africa
U.S. Agency for International Development
Washington, D.C. 20523-0049

A

INTRODUCTION

THIS DOCUMENT SUMMARIZES A FRAMEWORK DEVELOPED FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASSESSING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA.[1] THE FRAMEWORK HAS THE FOLLOWING FEATURES:

FRAMEWORK

- It provides a conceptual scheme for the conduct of a macropolitical assessment, one concerned with aggregate patterns of political behavior at a system-level.
- It is based largely on political theory that derives from an institutionalist orientation to politics, while drawing on the insights of a civil society approach.
- It aims at a diagnostic assessment of governance problems from which a continuing program of democratic reform can be derived.
- It views democratic reform as an incremental, iterative process that uses rule changes to reshape the incentives of political actors in order to modify aggregate patterns of behavior.
- It employs a multidimensional approach to democratic assessment that encompasses the full range of means by which "the governed" can participate in and influence the process of governance.

* *

GOVERNANCE

GOVERNANCE IS THE USE OF RULES TO REGULATE SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS. ALTHOUGH IT IS A UNIVERSAL PROCESS, GOVERNANCE CAN BE CONDUCTED WELL OR POORLY. AT A MINIMUM GOOD GOVERNANCE INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING BASIC DIMENSIONS:

SUBSTANTIVE DIMENSIONS OF GOVERNANCE

- Keeping the peace, both among individuals and among organized groups.
- Protecting fundamental human rights, securing common liberties and enforcing mutual obligations for all members of society.
- Defining property rights and enforcing contracts, fairly and effectively, establishing an enabling environment conducive to economic production and exchange.
- Resolving conflicts that develop among individuals and groups.
- Raising revenue, equitably and efficiently, in order to make provision for public goods and services.
- Providing for national security in ways that do not seriously threaten the integrity of public institutions with corruption by force of arms.

RULES AND DISCRETION

GOVERNANCE IS NOT EQUIVALENT TO MANAGEMENT OR ADMINISTRATION, ALTHOUGH IT DEPENDS ON BOTH. RATHER, GOVERNANCE REFERS TO THE USE OF RULES TO ASSIGN RIGHTS AND DUTIES WHILE ALLOWING LIBERTIES. THE USE OF RULES, IN TURN, DEPENDS ON THE USE OF DISCRETION-- IN FOUR WAYS:

PROCEDURAL DIMENSIONS OF GOVERNANCE

- First, discretion is used to prescribe a rule. This is the work of legislation or law-making. Prescription alone, however, produces words on paper, nothing more.

- Second, discretion is used to invoke a rule. Following prescription, a rule must be invoked in relevant circumstances. This happens when, for example, one party takes another to court, traffic cops write citations, an individual participating in a meeting raises a point of order, a prosecutor decides to prosecute, or a referee signals a foul in a ballgame. Un-invoked rules are effectively non-rules. By invoking a rule individuals or groups lay claim to its protection (for themselves or others) through the duties or obligations it imposes.

- Third, discretion is used to apply a rule. Invoking a rule is equivalent to asking "someone" to decide that the general rule properly fits the specific circumstances of a particular case. Application is usually thought to be the work of courts, although it often initially is done by administrative agencies.

- Fourth, discretion is used to enforce a rule. The application must be acted upon, supported if necessary by the use of coercive sanctions. This is usually understood as the work of the executive.

FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE RULES

PURELY FORMAL RULES ARE RULES-AS-PRESCRIBED. EFFECTIVE RULES ARE RULES AS INVOKED, APPLIED, AND ENFORCED. THE INTEGRITY OF A PROCESS OF GOVERNANCE REFERS TO THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE RULES PRESCRIBED ARE ALSO INVOKED, APPLIED, AND ENFORCED. GREATER INTEGRITY LEADS TO GREATER PREDICTABILITY AND ENHANCES THE SUBSTANTIVE FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNANCE.

RULES AND INCENTIVES

EFFECTIVE RULES NOT ONLY CREATE LEGAL CONSTRAINTS TEAT LIMIT BEHAVIOR IN OBVIOUS WAYS BUT ALSO CREATE INCENTIVES THAT SHAPE THE USE OF DISCRETION IN LESS OBVIOUS WAYS. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS INVESTIGATES THE EFFECT OF RULES ON INCENTIVES. TOGETHER, THE CONSTRAINTS AND INCENTIVES SUPPLIED BY RULES STRONGLY AFFECT THE WAYS THAT OFFICIALS, CITIZENS, AND CIVIC LEADERS CHOOSE TO ACT.

* *

DEMOCRACY

DEMOCRACY IS CONCERNED WITH THE CONDUCT OF GOVERNANCE IN THE INTERESTS OF THE GOVERNED.[2]

YET GOVERNANCE DEPENDS ON OFFICIAL DISCRETION THAT CAN BE SERIOUSLY ABUSED, USED NOT TO SERVE BUT TO EXPLOIT THE GOVERNED.[3] FOR THIS REASON THE PROCESS OF GOVERNANCE MUST BE ABLE TO DISCIPLINE THE USE OF DISCRETION IF IT IS TO SERVE THE INTERESTS OF THE GOVERNED. THE ROLE OF DEMOCRACY IS TO SUPPLY THIS DISCIPLINE.

BUREAUCRATIC REGIMES

THE PREDOMINANT INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENT PERMITTING SYSTEMATIC ABUSE OF DISCRETION IS A BUREAUCRATIC REGIME. MORE THAN A BUREAUCRACY THAT EXERCISES DELEGATED AUTHORITY, A BUREAUCRATIC REGIME IS A HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE THAT DOMINATES THE PROCESS OF GOVERNANCE--MAKING, APPLYING, AND ENFORCING RULES. CITIZENS THEN HAVE LITTLE RECOURSE OUTSIDE THE BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE. AMONG THE BEHAVIORAL CONSEQUENCES OF A BUREAUCRATIC REGIME ARE THE FOLLOWING:

- Pervasive rent seeking, inside and outside of government, using governance discretion for private and personal gain at the expense of others.
- Rampant corruption, the sale of discretion in the application of rules.
- Occasional resort to military rule, in an attempt to use military discipline to bring the process of governance under control.

DEMOCRACY CONSISTS OF INSTITUTIONAL EFFORTS TO COUNTERACT THE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, DISCIPLINING OFFICIALS TO ACT IN THE INTERESTS OF THE GOVERNED.

RULES OF GOVERNANCE

LIKE GOVERNANCE, DEMOCRATIC DISCIPLINE DEPENDS ON RULES. DEMOCRACY DISCIPLINES GOVERNANCE THROUGH RULES AND PROCEDURES THAT EXPOSE OFFICIALS TO ALTERNATIVE CONSEQUENCES, POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE, FOR THEIR ACTIONS AND INACTIONS. LIKE ALL RULES, GOVERNANCE RULES CREATE INCENTIVES THAT AFFECT THE USE OF DISCRETION.

BECAUSE GOVERNANCE HAS MANY DIMENSIONS, THERE ARE MULTIPLE DEMOCRATIC DISCIPLINES:

DEMOCRATIC DISCIPLINES

- Constitutional Discipline.
- Civic Discipline: An Open Public Realm.
- Electoral Discipline.
- Deliberative Discipline.
- Judicial Discipline: The Rule of Law.
- Multiple Levels of Governance.

CONSTITUTIONAL DISCIPLINE

THE FUNDAMENTAL INSTRUMENT OF DEMOCRATIC DISCIPLINE IS A CONSTITUTION.

A CONSTITUTION IS AN INSTRUMENT FOR SUBJECTING THE PROCESS OF GOVERNANCE TO A SET OF RULES. IT PROVIDES A FUNDAMENTAL LAW THAT OVER-RULES ALL OTHER LAWS IN A SOCIETY.

CONSTITUTIONAL DISCIPLINE CREATES TWO IMPORTANT CAPABILITIES:

- An opportunity for the people (individuals and groups) who compose a society to make "mutual guarantees"[4] to one another, creating a social compact that places some decisions outside the bounds of acceptable politics.
- A means of using rules to distribute the discretion to prescribe, invoke, apply, and enforce rules among officials, civil- society groups, and citizens, creating incentives that affect the way this discretion is actually used.

CIVIC DISCIPLINE: AN OPEN PUBLIC REALM

AN OPEN PUBLIC REALM[5] ALLOWS THE GOVERNED TO VOICE THEIR INTERESTS, INDIVIDUALLY AND COLLECTIVELY. IT DEPENDS ON INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES INCLUDING FREE SPEECH AND A FREE PRESS, AS WELL AS LIBERAL RULES OF ASSOCIATION. IT ALLOWS CITIZENS TO GAIN ACCESS TO INFORMATION, TO PERSUADE OTHERS, TO PETITION OFFICIALS, AND TO ASSOCIATE FOR BOTH PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PURPOSES.

THE OPEN PUBLIC REALM DISCIPLINES GOVERNANCE IN TWO WAYS:

- It limits the conduct of government by exposing it to public scrutiny and criticism.
- It enables citizens to build a civil society, a structure of association based on willing consent, not force. Voluntary associations and contractual relationships form the social foundation of democratic governance. Many substantive functions of governance can then be performed primarily outside of government by groups in civil society. Government can then be used primarily as an institutional backup, available as a means "to relax the rule of willing consent"[6] and employ coercion only as needed to serve the interests of the governed.

ELECTORAL DISCIPLINE

GOVERNANCE REQUIRES THAT OFFICIALS EXERCISE WIDE DISCRETION EVEN WITHIN CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARIES. GOVERNANCE THEREFORE MUST ALSO BE EXPOSED TO ELECTORAL DISCIPLINE IF IT IS TO SERVE THE INTERESTS OF THE GOVERNED.

ELECTORAL DISCIPLINE WORKS IN THREE WAYS:

- It creates incentives for political actors to take into account the preferences or interests of the electorate in their discretionary decisions.

- It enables voters to provoke policy change and generate authoritative information about voter preferences.

- It enables voters to hold officials accountable for their performance.

ELECTORAL DISCIPLINE DEPENDS ON COMPETITION, WIDESPREAD SUFFRAGE, AND A MODE OF REPRESENTATION THAT EQUITABLY TRANSLATES VOTES INTO LEGISLATIVE SEATS.

ELECTORAL DISCIPLINE, HOWEVER, IS LIMITED IN WHAT IT CAN ACCOMPLISH. ITS PRINCIPAL LIMITATIONS ARE THREE:

- Individual voters lack a strong incentive to invest in the acquisition of costly information, making elections an information-poor process of decision-making;[7]

- Except in small, face-to-face communities, elections do not allow for deliberation among the members of the electorate;

- Elections are primarily vehicles for change,[8] not instruments of consistency and predictability. Good rule prescription depends on responsiveness to changing preferences, while good rule application depends on faithfulness to the rules previously prescribed.

ELECTIONS ARE THEREFORE A NECESSARY BUT NOT SUFFICIENT DISCIPLINE OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE.[9] THIS MEANS THAT ELECTORAL DISCIPLINE MUST BE SUPPLEMENTED BY OTHER SOURCES OF DISCIPLINE.

DELIBERATIVE DISCIPLINE

ANOTHER NECESSARY SOURCE OF DEMOCRATIC DISCIPLINE IS DELIBERATION AMONG ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES. GROUP DELIBERATION CONSISTS OF FACT-FINDING AND DEBATE THAT PROVIDES A BASIS FOR COLLECTIVE CHOICE. IT PROVIDES TWO IMPORTANT CAPABILITIES:

- Deliberation generates <u>information</u>. <u>While elections are information-poor, deliberation is information-rich.</u> Information is essential to elucidate the interests of the governed.

- Deliberation provides opportunities for the settlement of differences based on <u>negotiation</u>. The interests of the governed are not entirely homogeneous. Governance in the interests of the governed depends on settling differences.

DELIBERATIVE DISCIPLINE DEPENDS ON ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES WHO HAVE INCENTIVES TO ENGAGE IN OPEN DISCUSSION AND MAKE USE OF INFORMATION IN DECIDING HOW TO VOTE. SIMPLY PROVIDING INFORMATION IN THE ABSENCE OF INCENTIVES TO USE IT DOES NOT FOSTER DELIBERATIVE DISCIPLINE.

DELIBERATION ALSO HAS ITS LIMITS--CAUSED MAINLY BY THE TIME AND EFFORT THAT MUST BE EXPENDED DURING THE PROCESS. SOME DECISIONS COME WITH BUILT-IN DEADLINES. DELIBERATION IS COSTLY AND CANNOT BE EXTENDED INDEFINITELY.

JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE: A RULE OF LAW

ELECTIONS PLUS DELIBERATION ARE INSUFFICIENT TO DISCIPLINE THE PROCESSES OF INVOKING, APPLYING, AND ENFORCING RULES. THESE REQUIRE MEANS FOR INDIVIDUAL CITIZENS TO ASSERT THEIR INTERESTS.

JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE IS CONCERNED WITH THE EXTENDED PROCESS OF TRANSLATING RULE PRESCRIPTIONS INTO CONSISTENT APPLICATIONS AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS. IT AFFECTS THE DISCRETION TO INVOKE, APPLY, AND ENFORCE RULES:

- If rules are to serve the interests of the governed, then individuals must be able to claim the protection of the rules. This means that individual citizens must have significant authority to invoke the law.

- Once invoked, rules must be consistently and fairly applied. Following the principle that "no one is a good judge of his or her own cause,"[10] rule application depends on disinterested "third parties" who apply law in individual cases. Institutionally, this can be fulfilled by an independent judiciary that adheres to norms of impartiality and fairness.

- Judicial discipline depends on enforcement actions that are consistent with and supportive of judicial applications.

- The rule of law requires that the official use of coercive power submit to judicial discipline. Before employing coercive sanctions against an individual, officials must first get permission from a court of law.[11]

DESPITE THE FOREGOING DEMOCRATIC DISCIPLINES, GOVERNMENT IS STILL SUBJECT TO DOMINANCE BY SOME WHO SEEK TO EXCLUDE OTHERS. THE INTERESTS OF THE GOVERNED ARE DIVERSE. IF A SINGLE SET OF INTERESTS IS ABLE TO DOMINATE ANY ONE OF THE FOUR GOVERNANCE PROCEDURES--PRESCRIBING, INVOKING, APPLYING, OR ENFORCING RULES--GOVERNANCE IN THE INTERESTS OF THE GOVERNED IS THREATENED.

MULTIPLE LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE

TO SAFEGUARD AGAINST THIS POSSIBILITY DEMOCRACIES CAN SET UP MULTIPLE LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE THAT FUNCTION CONCURRENTLY,[12] DEVOLVING AUTHORITY FROM CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS TO REGIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. THIS CREATES TWO IMPORTANT CAPABILITIES:

- Each level of governance can be used to discipline the conduct of government at other levels. Citizens whose interests are not well served at one level have recourse to other levels. This possibility constrains action at each level.

- Multiple levels create the possibility of following a principle of subsidiarity, vesting governance functions primarily in the lowest feasible level. Subsidiarity limits the abuse of discretion by tying consequences more closely to actions, both for citizens and officials.

INSTITUTIONAL VARIETY

A RANGE OF INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE USED TO SUPPLY EACH DEMOCRATIC DISCIPLINE. THERE IS NO ONE BEST WAY. SOCIETIES MUST DEVELOP THEIR OWN MIX OF INSTITUTIONS BASED ON THE SPECIFIC GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS THEY FACE.

* *

DEMOCRATIC BEHAVIORS

DEMOCRATIC DISCIPLINE PRODUCES DEMOCRATIC BEHAVIOR. IMPORTANT DEMOCRATIC BEHAVIORS INCLUDE--

- Transparency and accountability on the part of government officials--this due to the multiple sources of scrutiny and recourse (electorate, legislature, courts, public opinion, other levels of government) created by the democratic disciplines.

- Participation in governance on the part of citizens--this due to multiple opportunities to participate in various ways (e.g., voting, speaking out, going to court, joining voluntary associations engaged in self-governance, and using officials at one level of government as leverage in dealing with other levels).

- Pervasive contestation over policy among public officials--this due to multiple and repeated opportunities to challenge proposed policies throughout the governance process (e.g., legislatures that no longer "rubber-stamp" policies proposed by the executive.)

DEMOCRATIC BEHAVIORS MUST BE UNDERSTOOD AS AN EFFECT PRODUCED BY INSTITUTIONAL INCENTIVES. WHEN ABSENT, SUCH BEHAVIORS CAN ONLY BE PRODUCED BY MODIFYING THE RELEVANT INCENTIVES THROUGH RULE CHANGES.

* *

MACRO-ASSESSMENT

MACROPOLITICAL ASSESSMENT IS ROUGHLY ANALOGOUS TO MACROECONOMIC ASSESSMENT. IT PRODUCES A DESCRIPTIVE PROFILE OF AGGREGATE PATTERNS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR AT THE SYSTEM LEVEL, EXPLAINED IN TERMS OF THE JOINT EFFECT OF THE SEVERAL DEMOCRATIC DISCIPLINES. INCLUDED ARE THE FOLLOWING PRODUCTS:

- An estimate of the general action-tendencies that emerge from present institutional arrangements.

- An estimate of the progress made toward democratic governance. Institutional progress can occur on one or more disciplines even if the aggregate effect on the behavior of government officials is not very much changed.

- An estimate of the potential for further progress. Democratic discipline on one dimension can be used to advance democratic discipline on other dimensions. One of the first disciplines likely to emerge is the open public realm. This provides a basis for seeking reform on the other dimensions.

- A diagnosis of existing problems, one that identifies specific obstacles to democratic discipline.

- Suggestions for a reform agenda to address the problems that have been identified.

- Recommended steps for implementing the reform agenda.

USES OF ASSESSMENTS

MACRO-ASSESSMENTS HAVE MANY USES, BOTH FOR DONORS AND FOR HOST-COUNTRIES:

- For donors, macro-assessments are useful in

  - allocating levels of efforts among countries,

  - monitoring political developments,

  - guiding policy dialogue with host-countries,

  - supporting pro-democracy activities in the civil society and elsewhere, and

  - planning programs for each country in view of the constraints and opportunities offered by its system of governance--sectoral program managers gain from a more effective knowledge of the context in which they work.

- For host-countries, macro-assessments are useful in informing the broad range of actual and potential participants in the governance process, both inside and outside of government, about the strengths and weaknesses of their present arrangements.

- For both, macro-assessments provide the means for charting a meaningful and practical course of reform, while continuing to enlighten the reform process as it proceeds.

REFORM

DEMOCRATIZATION DEPENDS ON SUSTAINED EFFORTS OF REFORM DESIGNED TO STRENGTHEN DEMOCRATIC DISCIPLINE. REFORM IS BASED ON CHANGES IN THE RULES THAT APPLY TO GOVERNANCE. RULE CHANGE IS NEEDED IN ORDER TO MODIFY INCENTIVES.

BASIC CHANGES IN POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR WILL NOT OCCUR WITHOUT NEW AND DIFFERENT INCENTIVES. NEW TECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION, TRAINING, AND FACILITIES ARE INSUFFICIENT TO IMPROVE GOVERNANCE WITHOUT RULE CHANGES. NEW GOVERNANCE RULES ARE A PREREQUISITE TO SIGNIFICANT ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE.

REFORM PROCESS

SUCCESSFUL REFORM DEPENDS ESPECIALLY ON TWO CONDITIONS:

- A common understanding among those who prescribe, invoke, apply, and enforce governance rules--legislators, civic leaders, judges, and executives. Without a common understanding of the meaning and purpose of a rule, it is unlikely that the rule can be appropriately invoked, consistently applied, or faithfully enforced.

- Incentive compatibility in the way the discretion to prescribe, invoke, apply, and enforce rules is distributed. Unless the governance rules create incentives to use discretion appropriately, reform will fail to achieve its purpose. This component of reform depends on careful institutional analysis of proposed reforms.

CONCLUSION

MACRO-ASSESSMENTS PROVIDE CONTEXTUAL KNOWLEDGE THAT IS ESSENTIAL TO SOUND DONOR ASSISTANCE IN THE ON-GOING PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIC REFORM TO IMPROVE GOVERNANCE. THERE IS NO STANDARD FORMULA THAT CAN GUIDE DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE IN SPECIFIC COUNTRIES, ANY MORE THAN THERE IS A STANDARD CONSTITUTION THAT ALL COUNTRIES SHOULD ADOPT. THE ONLY WORKABLE APPROACH IS TO FOLLOW A SYSTEMATIC PROCESS: TO SPECIFY A FRAMEWORK AND USE IT SERIALLY IN COUNTRY ASSESSMENTS, WHILE LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE. THIS PROCESS HAS BEGUN. TO CONTINUE THE PROCESS OF COUNTRY ASSESSMENT IS TO BUILD ON THIS WORK AND SUSTAIN THE LEARNING NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN DONOR ASSISTANCE OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE.

ENDNOTES

1. For a fuller discussion of the framework see Oakerson (1995).

2. Democracy is difficult to define only if one seeks an institutional definition. This is because each of the democratic disciplines can be exerted through a number of alternative institutional arrangements. In terms of purpose, the meaning of democracy seems clear enough: to serve the interests of the governed. Then, if one presumes that individuals are usually best fit to judge their own interests (see Vincent Ostrom, 1987), arrangements that allow the governed to assert their interests, both individually and collectively, become imperative in the institutional repertoire of democracy.

3. James Madison in Federalist 41: "...[I]n every political institution, a power to advance the public happiness involves a discretion which may be misapplied and abused." See also Vincent Ostrom (1987).

4. The idea and phrase belong to Robert A. DahL (1990).

5. The concept is developed by Vincent Ostrom (1991).

6. This formulation is drawn from the work of Vincent Ostrom.

7. This proposition is derived from the work of Anthony Downs (1957).

8. See E.E. Schattschneider (1975).

9. This is Madison's proposition, articulated in Federalist 51, where he refers to a "dependence on the people" as essential to "republican form," but argues the need for "auxiliary precautions" as well.

10. This proposition appears variously in the work of Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, and James Madison, Federalist 10, and elsewhere.

11. This is an essential part of what is called "due process of law."

12. See Vincent Ostrom (1991).

REFERENCES

Dahl, Robert A. (1990). After the Revolution? Authority in a Good Society. Rev. Ed. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Downs, Anthony (1957). The Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.

Madison, James, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay (1788). The Federalist. New York: The Modern Library.

Oakerson, Ronald J. (1995) Assessing and Assisting Democratic Governance Reform: A Framework. Washington, D.C.: Associates in Rural Development.

Ostrom, Vincent (1987). The Political Theory of a Compound Republic, 2nd ed. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Ostrom, Vincent (1991). The Meaning of American Federalism: Constituting a Self-Governing Society. San Francisco: ICS Press.

Schattschneider, E. E. (1975). The Semisovereign People. Hinsdale, IL: Dryden Press.