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## AID POLICIES IN THE CILSS COUNTRIES

Synthesis Report

UNIVERSITÉ DE PARIS-SUD (XI)



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des Économies Africaines

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Club du Sahel - OCDE  
2 rue André Pascal  
75775 PARIS cedex 16 - France  
Telephone : (33-1) 45-24-82-00  
Telex : F620160 OCDE Paris  
Fax : (33-1) 45-24-90-31

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**AID POLICIES  
IN THE CILSS COUNTRIES**

**Jean-Jacques Gabas, economist  
Anne-Sophie Boisgallais, agronomist**

translated by Elizabeth Hamilton

The ideas and the facts reported here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Club du Sahel, the CILSS or the Université Paris XI/Orsay.

January 1992

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**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**  
**AID POLICIES IN THE CILSS COUNTRIES**

*Will the beginning of the 90's mark the end of "business-as-usual" for aid policies? The last thirty years, which corresponded to the era of decolonization, can hardly be qualified as "thirty glorious years!" Foreign aid to sub-Saharan Africa, and to the Sahel in particular, has not led it to a take off, as was hoped. What's more, it has failed to "accompany" development.*

*Have the financial resources themselves lacked in the Sahel? Not at all. The northern countries remain generous donors: \$23 billion have been spent on the region from 1975 to 1989. France is the primary donor (19%), followed by the EEC (11%), the World Bank (10%), the United States (8%), and Germany (8%)... These are countries which give the most aid per capita because of their own prosperity. Aid reached astonishing proportions, indeed troubling: \$210 per capita to Cape Verde, \$130 to Mauritania, \$90 to Senegal... Official development assistance (ODA) accounts for nearly 60% of GDP in Guinée Bissau, 45% in Gambia, 25% at least in most of the other countries. A veritable transfusion, but with what results?*

*Massive aid does not necessarily mean effective aid. Moreover, massive aid transfers are not the main point of today's agenda. Northern governments follow the principle of not excluding Africa from the rest of the world. The first forecasts of the Development Assistance Committee (OECD) indicates that Sahelian Africa will probably not see a growth of its external public resources identical to that observed over the last fifteen years. These resources will be growing at a very slow rate.*

*Have private external resources lacked in the Sahel? Yes, and they have dried up slowly but regularly over the last ten years, with the notable exception of one country that some qualify as a "warehouse State"; the Gambia. The relay of ODA by investments of the private sector has not taken place. One fails to see today how a new flow of private investments could revitalize the Sahel's economies. The response to this challenge is in the hands of Governments and civil societies...*

*Who stands to benefit from the growth of external aid budgets and private investments? Eastern countries, most certainly. Those to which one extends "economic aid" and not "aid to development". But financial reallocation from the South toward the East undoubtedly comes along with a reorientation much more prejudicial to Africa: that of human resources, new ideas, and of creative thinking. The intellectual capital and lessons of experience are today being turned to the East. This is a cause of serious concern for many involved in cooperation with Africa.*

**Less Aid, Better Aid?**

*What does it take to provide better aid? Many factors need to be considered. Well short of miracle solutions, and without exhaustivity, we suggest a few factors which could "help move things forward": more coherent cooperation systems, more vigilant parliaments, a clear and rigorous vision on the part of Northern institutions, interested and balanced media, some clearly defined strategies in aid agencies...and above all, paying more careful attention to Sahelian society as it undergoes profound changes.*

*Most institutional mechanisms remain too heavy, too complex in their procedures. Political and operational responsibilities overlap or mingle, creating confusion. Clarification of objectives is sorely lacking. The line between aid to development and export promotion remains tenuous, unclear. Aid to development and the constitution of zones of influence are still entwined.*

*Do current institutional systems leave sufficient room for NGOs from the North and the South? The issue still appears muddled among the larger donors. The point is not to entrust everything to NGOs, but rather to leave open the domain that befits them most. Bilateral cooperation has demonstrated its inability to respond to the needs of the population, but evidently, it can't simply be set aside. Are NGOs not professional enough, or institutions too firmly set in their ways?*

*Among all donors, development cooperation is closely related to each donor's foreign policy, but what is good for diplomacy may not necessarily be good for development. Is it a fact that budgetary support which keeps some governments in place, favors public consumption and, consequently, political alliances? Yes. Can one say that that it necessarily works in favor of development? Obviously not.*

*In our societies too, the all-powerful State defines the orientations of cooperation policies and evaluates them. It is up to the civil societies and parliaments of donor countries to ensure that aid is directed towards humanitarian relief or development, and less politically inspired. Institutional mechanisms alone cannot guarantee this.*

*The media also have a role to play. Through oversimplification, the quest for sensationalism, they have often created an image of endless catastrophes making it hard to arouse opinion to local dynamics and to the importance of a long-term perspective. But they can also provide checks and balances by denouncing some inconsistencies of cooperation policies, by presenting in detail difficult but opportunity-laden situations.*

*To control all and to manage all: yet another feature of aid policies. What types of activities are to be financed through foreign aid? What actions should be considered as priorities? Over the last thirty years the practice usually consisted of choosing a sector as a priority: infrastructures, food self-sufficiency, satisfying basic needs, etc. with each sector fluctuating in ranking over time, often according to the day's fashions. It's true that basic needs: roads, food supplies, hospitals, schools, have been so gigantic that the action to satisfy one of them often resulted in forgetting the urgency of the others. The focus of actions accordingly wavered.*

*The early 90's are characterized by the fact that everything becomes a priority, in the discourse, at least. All sectors deserve attention, but not in isolation. Interventions in all sectors also involves "conditions". This is a quantum change. Conditions are built into the design of cooperation programs. Regardless of the specific sector of intervention, aid programs must satisfy the following conditions:*

- Reduce external debt and put in place sectoral adjustments (SAPs, FESAPs, etc.);*
- Make development projects consistent with environmental goals;*
- Reduce poverty (increase incomes, satisfy educational and health needs);*
- Decentralize Government interventions to the benefit of civil society;*
- Promote regional economic integration.*

*Of course, aid policies include actions in the food security area, but not only through a specific project-oriented approach; one rather aims now to promote the various conditions which themselves lead to increased food security.*

*With respect to this strategy, common to most cooperation agencies, what can we observe?*

- *The environment "a very high priority" these days, only receives 2% of total aid. Poverty alleviation, through educational and health projects, is hardly better off.*
- *Economic integration of West African countries is another Sahel priority. Before the 1990's this appeared simple: finance infrastructure, banks and regional organizations. But these institutions have not demonstrated their efficiency or usefulness. Today's aid agencies are expecting better ideas.*
- *Non-project aid, which contributes to the balance of payments and Government budgets, to sectoral and macroeconomic structural adjustment, has been increasing steadily since the beginning of the 1980's. This aid has more than doubled to reach over 30% of ODA in 1990.*
- *Food aid by the end of 1980s stood at less than 10% of ODA, on the average.*
- *Aid to infrastructure, telecommunications, and the mining sector remains important, around 20% of total commitments in 1990. This figure shows that these three sectors remain implicit priorities in cooperation policies.*
- *Aid to rural development projects showed no significant increase at the end of the decade, remaining at around 20 to 25% of total.*
- *Technical assistance has decreased over the last decade, notably in the case of France.*

*These five priority themes of the 1990's fit into a cross-sectoral strategy, itself part of a more global approach than the transfer of economic aid: democratic conditionality. The adage of the 70's is inverted: "today there is no development without democracy". In what sense can democracy be a factor in development? History provides few direct answers.*

#### *Democratize and decentralize...cooperation policies*

*At least one thing is sure, this new development "recipe" (democracy) confirms the pronounced trend of the last thirty years: donors increasingly intervene in the everyday decisions of all actors in the Sahel. Growing interference by richer countries in all aspects of economic and political life does not necessarily imply, however, a positive evolution. Thousands of reports explain the failure of development projects by the excessive imposition of a given model of society. How can we be attentive to these societies, and accompany them in development without unwisely trying to graft foreign models?*

*Democracy is clearly required if populations are to take charge of themselves; but this supposes a participative rather than a representative type of democracy. This also supposes a democracy which can express itself in local development through decentralized investments. Another condition may well be that Governments increasingly accept to entrust the development process to civil societies in the North and in the South, to local collectivities, and professional associations.*

## FOREWORD

This study is a response to the Club du Sahel's request for a critical analysis on the gap between realities and statements regarding aid programmes benefitting the CILSS member countries.

To give as true a picture as possible of the aid policies adopted by the major cooperation agencies, several research teams in each country were asked to participate. These teams were in close contact with aid agency employees whom they interviewed, but they were also in contact with research centres, non-governmental organizations, and sometimes journalists. Responsibility for the scientific aspect of this work was assumed by COBEA which consulted the following teams:

- Wolfgang and Aicha Hein (German Overseas Institute) and Jacqueline Bois for Germany's aid policies.
- Sheila Reines, consultant, for USAID aid policies, World Bank, Canada and the United Nations Development Programme.
- Ornella Arimondo, INEA/ROME agronomist, for Italian aid policy.
- Pascale Comlan, economist at COBEA/ORSAY, for Swiss aid policy.
- Anne-Sophie Boisgallais, agronomist and J.J. Gabas, economist, for French aid policies.
- P. Audinet and J.J. Gabas for LOME IV aid policy.
- Ineke Duijvestijn, for Netherlands' aid policies.
- Tove Degnbol et al. (COWconsult), for Danish aid policy.

Within the scope of this study, which represents only the beginning of aid-policy monitoring, it was not possible to approach every bilateral and multilateral agency.

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## INTRODUCTION

"We are at a turning point in history. The end of the Cold War has made our decision making criteria obsolete. Today, the themes which for so many years were the basis of policy and budgetary choices can no longer stand to determine future priorities." The 1990 CAD/OECD President's report, Cooperation and Development.

What can be said about aid policies in the Sahel as we move into the last decade of the 20th century? The question needs to be approached from several angles.

First, something needs to be said about the "institutional backdrop." What agencies or "donor organizations" form the aid committees in each country? Which agency does what in each country? How complex are these aid structures? How do the roles of the Assemblée Nationale, Congress, the House of Commons or the Bundestag differ according to the distribution of legislative and executive powers in the governments they are part of? How do these roles vary depending on the party in power? What kind of control and influence can these parliaments exert on aid policies?

Secondly, through "public opinion" the "medias" have an influence on decisions to aid developing countries. Where do media professionals stand in today's context of "afro-pessimism" and interest in Eastern Europe?

Aid agencies cannot function without actors to implement their policies both at home and in the recipient countries. This simple fact is the subject of many debates. First, what should be the relative roles of the state and the private sector in implementing aid (cooperatives, associations, private businesses...)? A key word in this debate is "decentralizing," decentralizing aid structures, decentralizing within a redefined relationship of civilian populations to each other, decentralizing donor decisions and responsibilities to non-governmental organizations in the recipient countries (southern NGOs). What kind of difficulties do agencies encounter when they attempt to aid populations directly?

The second debate concerns the volume of Official Development Assistance (ODA). Are ODA volumes destined for the Sahel a significant part of world ODA volumes? Is aid to the Sahel still a priority?

The third debate centers on the extent to which diverse donor agencies recognize the work of "northern" NGOs: why is it so long in coming?

Donors assist countries in the Sahel for reasons which are historic, economic, geostrategic or simply to coincide with "foreign policy." What are the current geographic priorities and how are they expected to change? Are major reorientations in the making? Is the political change in more than one country and region a factor likely to increase or decrease the flow of resources to the Sahel? More generally, is the Sahel still a "coherent" entity in the eyes of donors?

A donor's strategy is a function of the sectors it chooses to assist and the way it intervenes in them. What are the major donors' current policies for sectorial assignment? What are the underlying motivations and official justifications for financing one sector as opposed to another? Such choices are rarely logical. The justifications are seldom "economically sound" and almost never "culturally adapted." Nevertheless, a chart listing the official rationales for priorities and appropriations is revealing.

What do officials inside the aid agencies think about the soundness of their assistance programmes? For example, conditionalities in structural adjustment programmes, environmental action, the goal of reducing indebtedness, the priority that is made of "the war on poverty" (health and education)? What is their thinking about regional integration? Regional operations appear to be changing. What are the obstacles to development of regional operations? How do aid agencies intend to react to the new directions proposed by the IRAM-INRA-UNB report on regional integration through trade in the western sub-space?

In the beginning, international aid focused on projects in specific, priority sectors. Is it true that the approach is becoming ever more global, that every sector is perceived as a priority and that donors are refusing to intervene unless an increasing number of conditions are met? Can it rightfully be said that increasingly, eligibility for international aid requires meeting criteria which cut across every level of a country's economic life and often, eligibility is based on "democratic requirements" ?

Providing answers to all of these questions is not the purpose of this report, but while exploring them we hope to understand the decisive turns of aid policies.

Chapter I  
**AID AND ITS INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT**

### **I.1 Structures Simple and Complex**

Though administrative structures from one country to another are extremely diverse, they all divide tasks and responsibilities along three lines:

- policy/ operational responsibility
- bilateral/ multilateral aid
- technical/ financial support

These distinctions are a constant in Germany, Japan, France... though the complexity of the structures varies enormously.

**FRANCE**, with its multiplicity of actors, is a striking example of complexity: the Treasury, the Ministère de la Coopération et du Développement, the Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique (CCCE) and other ministries for technical cooperation. The role of the Treasury stands out. Directly, or indirectly through the CCCE, it manages nearly 50 per cent of all public aid, whereas the Ministry of Cooperation manages only 20 per cent.

There is a certain thematic logic in this multiplicity. Functions overlap, however, causing complications and sometimes incoherence, particularly for structural adjustment loans. Complaints about the lack of coordination eventually led to the creation (at the la Baule summit) of yet another agency, the Comité d'Orientation et de Programmation (COP, a planning and steering committee), for outlining sectorial cooperation (cf. the report on French cooperation policy, COBEA/ORSAY, September 1991). This institutional complexity is further complicated by another criteria, that of a beneficiary's having or not having a privileged relationship with France, of its being "in field" or "out of field" (pays du champ/pays hors champ). This distinction is often challenged because it does not correspond to France's former colonies, nor to the francophone area, nor to Africa. The treatment countries receive according

to their category is nonetheless extremely different: "in field"<sup>1</sup> countries benefit from development aid, whereas "out of field" countries are the object of commercial relations.

In **GERMANY**, though more than a few organizations are involved (cultural and economic cooperation, the Länder, the foundation for international development...), the **BMZ** (Ministry of Economic Cooperation) coordinates the activities as a whole. Most technical aid is commissioned to the **GTZ** (the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, a private society for implementing German aid policy) and financial aid is handled by the KfW.

In **ITALY**, foreign aid is an integral part of foreign policy. Law 49/87, which lays the foundations for new forms of cooperation in line with European policies and priorities, has sown confusion by adding an additional agency to the already numerous Italian aid institutions: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Treasury, the Interministerial Committee for Cooperation (which issues policy guidelines) and the General Directorate for Cooperation (operational organization for development and emergencies).

In **CANADA**, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs defines geographic priorities and governs the CIDA, an aid agency which manages all projects, bilateral or multilateral, financial or technical.

In **SWITZERLAND**, a law passed in 1976 divides tasks and responsibilities between two federal offices which work together in defining Swiss orientation. They are: the DDA (the Directorate for Cooperation and Development, which covers bilateral and technical aid) and the OFAEE (the Federal Office of Foreign Economic Affairs which handles financial and multilateral aid). These two institutions organize a yearly evaluation and assessment seminar to which all of the actors in cooperation are invited.

In **THE UNITED STATES**, Congress approves funding. USAID, which is part of the State Department, is in charge of geographical coordination, sharing out funds and implementing projects and programmes. Where foreign aid runs into questions of diplomacy, joint decisions are made by the State Department and USAID. The State Department decides Economic Support Fund assignments. Aid to Africa is handled by the DFA, the Development Fund for Africa, which was voted into being by Congress in 1989. Food aid is managed within the framework of PL480, a law which channels certain types of food aid through USAID and other types through the Department of Agriculture with a greater role accruing to USAID since 1990.

A recent report by A. Vivien notes the complexity of the French structure in these terms: "Compared to the German schema, for example, (one public institution and two major operators, one for grants and the other for loans), and all the more so compared to the extra-simple Swedish and Canadian structures (one organization for policy and another for practice), the French system and its wealth of guardians of policy (two ministries, one minister, one deputy minister, two secretaries of state) and its paucity of major operators (a single agency for financial cooperation with francophone countries and Portuguese-speaking Africa) seems to work upside down." (A. Vivien, rapport sur la coopération, La documentation française, Paris 1991).

Of course, no structure is better than another, but the complexity of some structures is nevertheless striking next to the simplicity or formalism of certain others. The more complicated the

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<sup>1</sup> A list of "in field" countries can be found in the annex. All the CILSS countries are "in".

structures, the more difficult it is to identify the responsibilities of each agency, both for those working on the inside of the structure and for those on the outside, vis a vis the beneficiary.

## **I.2 The Varying Roles of Consultative Political Entities**

Depending on the country, the role of consultative political entities is either very important, as in the United States, or very weak as in France.

In the **UNITED STATES**, Congress votes budget appropriations after a complicated negotiation process between diverse congressional committees and USAID. The role of Congress includes **approval of each project**. While a project lasts, any important modifications in it must also be approved by Congress. The law creating the DFA sets out the major themes of American aid to Africa since 1989. The DFA replaced the Sahel Development Program. Cooperation between Congress and USAID is stronger where Africa is concerned than it is for other regions.

In **CANADA**, Parliament approves but rarely modifies budgets: it proposes policy orientations but does not intervene. The ODA charter and "Sharing Our Future" outline the major policy positions in Canadian aid. These are then drawn by the permanent committee on foreign affairs and international commerce (SCEAIT). The Canadian parliament holds proceedings on foreign aid and policy.

The Bundestag in **GERMANY** provides orientation for German cooperation. Every two years the government must publish a policy report on development. The last of these was dated May 30, 1990.

In **SWITZERLAND**, the OFAEE consults the Federal Council, the Interdepartmental Committee on Cooperation and Development as well as Humanitarian Aid before formulating Switzerland's foreign policies, with regards both to foreign assistance and foreign affairs. The OFAEE deliberates on Official Development Assistance allocations.

In **ITALY**, since law 49/87, action is taken on the basis of guidelines issuing from Parliament.

In **FRANCE**, the budget for cooperation is reviewed every year by a poorly-attended session of the National Assembly. Aid agencies are under no obligation to furnish the parliament with reports on their activities. Certainly, the Assembly's role should be expanded through the nomination of one congressman and one senator to the Supervisory Council of the CCCE, the agency which handles most "in" country projects. There are no real debates on cooperation in France; the first parliamentary debate on the matter was in April 1989.

Every time the **EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT** votes a budget in, there is a true debate on the directions European aid should take and on scheduling assistance<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup> A good example of the terms of this debate in the European Parliament can be found in the July 1991 edition of the "Courrier ACP-CEE".

In the National Assembly in the **NETHERLANDS** proceedings focus more frequently on the amount of aid to be allocated (currently 0.98% of the GDP) than on the way the aid should be spent. Debate also concerns the choice of countries to receive assistance and this, on the basis of criteria having to do with social and economic policies and particularly human rights.

In **DENMARK**, decisions concerning foreign aid policy are made by the Parliament. Though Denmark's first law on foreign aid dates from 1962 and was updated in 1971, the major positions of Danish assistance are the subject of parliamentary debates every year. Four committees which report to Parliament are responsible for drafting aid programmes: the Financial Committee studies grants upwards of 20 million DKr, the Foreign Affairs Committee treats the foreign affairs aspects of aid, the EEC Committee reviews community aid issues and finally, the Foreign Policy Committee. All political opinions are represented in these committees. With respect to aid, Parliamentary proceedings concern human rights, the environment, and the choice of countries to receive aid.

Generally speaking, isn't food aid policy basically a way to guide a country toward development in a way fundamentally tied to the donor's foreign policy?

## Chapter II AID AND PUBLIC OPINIONS

### II.1 Checkered Generosity

One indicator of public attitudes towards problems in the third world is the volume of individual private aid, in other words, the donations made by private citizens through associations or national organizations. In France, for example, every inhabitant contributed, in 1985, FF 464 to the third world, 454 of which were levied through taxes and 10 francs of which were voluntary contributions. In this case, private aid is 45 times smaller than public aid. In absolute figures, Norwegians were ten times more generous than the French, the Swedish were eight times more, the Swiss were seven times more, and the Germans were six times more generous. The Belgians, Italians and Japanese furnish the same private aid levels as the French.

Generally speaking the correlation between private and public aid is very strong. The North-American system which consists of contributing two or three "public" dollars for every private dollar that is collected naturally increases this correlation. But usually, private citizens give because they are convinced that the giving is worthwhile, not because they hope for tax deductions or because they believe giving is not the State's role.

Since 1970, the total volume of private donations has remained stationary. However, private donations fell by 200 million dollars in the United States between 1970 and 1988. In Belgium, Canada, Italy, Japan and Norway, public support is equal to or larger than private support in the total resources of NGOs. In France and Germany NGO resources come mainly from private sources.

### II.2 Information, Belief and Semantics: The Media

Public opinion is subject to rumours, whims and inconsistencies. But these phenomena are also the result of those who, in one way or another, propose to form or influence opinions.

Three-quarters of Americans believe that living conditions in the third world have worsened over the last two decades, and Europeans say they don't believe that the problem of hunger will be eradicated before the end of the century. But on both sides of the Atlantic, the problem of development in the world falls far behind more immediate domestic concerns such as unemployment, crime and terrorism, and AIDS.

Nearly nine out of ten people in France agree that they are in favour of increasing grants to the third world (this proportion must be lower now that relations have opened with Eastern Europe), whereas only one out of two Americans will express the same opinion; 77 per cent of Americans believe that their government is doing enough or too much for the third world, and an average of 50 per cent believe the same thing in the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland and Sweden.

In 1987, nearly half of the Canadian population thought aid volumes were sufficient. This figure is now shrinking and the number of people who believe aid should be cut back is growing. In Canada, public opinion is more preoccupied with the third world's environment than with the poverty of its peoples.

In Europe as in North America, southern governments have a bad reputation, 88 per cent believe they swindle a portion of the money they receive. An almost as strong percentage believe a good part of aid is absorbed by the bureaucracies of aid agencies.

The German press of every political persuasion publishes long critical debates on development assistance (Rapport sur la politique allemande de coopération, COBEA/ORSAY, September 1991).

Since the beginning of the 1980s, opinion polls show that confidence in NGOs is growing, but opinion nevertheless favours decentralized assistance actions such as sister cities. For what types of projects? For fighting desertification and for emergency relief. Most young people want to "do something for the third world" and these media operations attract them.

A 1988 media analysis by the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) was without quarter: "In our analysis of the image of Africa on television, we have discovered a semantic opposition: to the West, the verb, action and history; to Africa, the noun, intransitive terms, nature. An exhaustive inventory of images dating from 1984 to 1986 reveals an image of Africa as a shapeless mass of helpless victims, an image constantly repeated and centered around one main character, the skeletal child."

In France, upheavals in Eastern Europe and several corruption scandals carried in the press, have added to the general afro-pessimism and have brought on a certain mistrust of aid. But public debate on the underlying issues or on how to reorient aid policies is nearly absent. Debate centers around two extremes: "Stopping aid altogether because it encourages corruption and capital flight" and, another theme which is part of a conservative rationale for public safety, "increasing relief in the case of catastrophes and disasters to help stop the displacement of African populations in order to limit immigration." This last position is often nourished by political decision-makers. In a recent (15 June 1991) declaration on French television, Abdou Diouf, expressed the same opinion. Less well known to the public, André Postel Vinay has stated that France should concentrate its aid on West Africa and the Maghreb countries because of "the dangers threatening us." This idea that aid will limit immigration is found more and more in western media, especially with the upheavals in eastern Europe.

**Swiss** public opinion is poorly sensitized to problems of development and is unfamiliar with societies in developing nations, particularly Arab and African cultures. This "lack of interest," or better, "lack of knowledge," is a problem for the Swiss federation of aid agencies. Development assistance problems nevertheless appear periodically as themes in public opinion.

To begin with, as we have said above, Swiss society shows a certain disinterest in cooperation, a kind of lassitude which may be linked to the constant fund raising campaigns conducted by Swiss and foreign NGOs. In addition, the justification of development assistance is often challenged, particularly when the press reveals the embezzlement which fills the Swiss bank accounts of third world leaders. The outcry produced by the publication of a book on the whitewashing of narco-dollars written by Jean Ziegler, a university professor and parliamentary representative, is symptomatic of the resentment concerning such questions.

Recently, public debate on the embezzlement of development assistance funds was rekindled by the dealings of Moussa Traoré, former President of the Republic of Mali, a country which is one of Switzerland's principal aid beneficiaries. Finally, another trend in Swiss opinion, essentially supported by conservatives in the context of a "public safety" rationale, is a push for redirecting assistance to other geographical locations including Sri Lanka and Turkey as a means of limiting immigration to Switzerland.

It is difficult for television-nourished public opinion to understand that there is more to the Sahel than the unforgotten images of famine from 1974. The idea that there could actually be surplus production in the Sahel and that food aid often interferes with market mechanisms is not an easy idea to grasp. Creating enthusiasm for African initiatives is difficult when public opinion has been so "fatigued" by the barrage of images (particularly in **Denmark**) of a poor, passive, futureless continent.

Let us not underestimate the importance of circulating information: information carried by the media influences public opinion which itself influences political decision making: the links are strong. At the risk of repeating ourselves, we state once again: it is the media which influence public opinion, not the politicians; if the media's message has been heard by the citizens, then the politicians will take it into account in their decisions. In the current opening to the Eastern countries, it is essential to keep public opinion informed of the consequences of aid to Africa, and in particular to the Sahel, to analyze the economic situation of these countries, and to report on new kinds of aid relying increasingly on actors other than the State. We have to admit that the media too often oversimplifies issues. Aid agencies are in a dilemma: on the one hand they must change their ways (which very often means putting new ideas into practice) and on the other, these same agencies are hemmed in by public opinion.

African public opinion is another new factor in the information debate. All over Africa, and particularly in the Sahel, new journals and information sources are cropping up. They do not hesitate to criticize development assistance and are part of the pressure to eliminate aid which smacks of diplomacy and economic interest. Public opinion has its own media instruments which do not hesitate to criticize bilateral cooperation.

Chapter III  
**ACTORS IN AID: ENDING STATE PREDOMINANCE, YES, BUT HOW?**

There was a time when official development assistance was always handled by governments. There were a few non-governmental organizations (NGOs) but their involvement --in what was essentially considered affairs of state-- was minor; and it had not yet occurred to local community groups that they could have any role to play. Over the years, as failures accumulated, governments and multilateral agencies turned more and more often to the NGOs which were in direct contact with populations of the beneficiary countries. New terms came into the aid vocabulary: participatory development, the right to self-help, and so on, but the realities these words designate vary widely.

**III.1 "Governmental" versus "Non-governmental"**

Different governments have extremely different visions of the role of private associations in administering development assistance. The following table speaks for itself:

Table 1

**PUBLIC ASSISTANCE HANDLED BY NGOs**

(Figures for 1986 from the OECD)

Switzerland	14%	Sweden	3.4%
USA	11%	Italy and Japan	2%
Canada	10%	United Kingdom	0.7%
Belgium, Germany, Norway, and Netherlands	6.5% (* 8% in 1989)	France	0.3%

This table shows that **France** delegates almost no official development assistance (ODA) to French associations (0.3%), though the average for DAC member-countries is 6 per cent. This low figure for France is not due to lack of praise from experts, politicians or university specialists who do recognize the contribution of NGOs. Praise for the work of NGOs is increasing.

"NGOs have a very special way of handling aid policy: they can reach the poorest populations and the most isolated regions, inspire local communities to take on projects, work with the informal sector, the cost of NGO interventions is low, they are quick to adapt to local conditions and show ability to innovate... they can locate in diverse regions..." Stéphane Hessel, former French Ambassador to the UN, from an unpublished document.

Congress has given **USAID** instructions to channel 13.5% of its ODA through NGOs. In the Sahel, USAID cooperation with NGOs is strong.

Among multilateral agencies, the **European Community** possesses an active system for working in conjunction with NGOs, the NGO liaison committee, made up of elected representatives from the NGOs in each country. The Community concedes 8 per cent of its aid to NGOs.

The **World Bank** created a similar committee which is not much more than a footnote to the Bank's organization chart, a committee which has called several meetings to ask northern NGOs to what extent they would accept working to buffer the negative social effects of structural adjustment policies. The programme is moving forward with a few semi-public NGOs which have been put in charge of assisting populations hurt by structural adjustment.

Let's take a closer look at the case of **Switzerland**, the OECD country which spends the relatively largest part of its budget through NGOs. Funds used by Swiss NGOs in the CILSS countries in 1986, 1988 and 1989 show a tendency to decrease despite the diversity of situations involved;

- The countries which receive the most assistance from the NGOs are **Mali** (SF 8.6 million in 1986; 10 million in 1989), **Senegal** (9.1 million in 1986; 7.8 in 1989) and **Burkina Faso** (3.3 million in 1986, 6.8 in 1988, but 5.9 in 1989).
- Financial interventions through Swiss NGOs are diminishing in **Cape Verde** (SF 8,000 in 1989; SF 1 million in 1986), **Guinea Bissau** (SF 39,000 in 1989; 629,000 in 1986), **Gambia** (SF 28,000 in 1989; SF 159,000 in 1986) and **Niger** (SF 86,700 in 1989; SF 7.2 million in 1986). These heavy fluctuations are often due to sizeable contributions from the federal aid agencies for short-term projects.
- On the other hand, **Mauritania** (SF 323,000 in 1986; 759,000 in 1989) and **Mali** are countries in which private contributions are rising.

International organizations willing to open or expand collaborations with NGOs are faced with a double challenge:

- professionalism: will NGOs be capable of managing large sums of money? Can they persuade populations to participate on a larger scale, and in greater regions as efficiently as they are now doing on a much smaller scale? Whether or not they will prove capable of managing large aid programmes remains to be seen. Many NGOs have always worked by adjusting programmes to a place and a situation as they went along. The knowledge NGOs now have about specific field realities should be developed.
- political independence: public financing is often unstable and linked to sets of ideas about what development entails. If the World Bank requests NGOs to buffer the disastrous consequences of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) so that it can continue to create disasters, will NGOs accept? Will they continue to criticize programme-aid?

### III.2 Recognizing NGOs

On the whole, donors recognize that NGOs are capable of playing a role which other organizations cannot. NGOs can work with the poorest of populations, penetrate forgotten and formidable regions and persuade populations to participate.

The World Bank emphasizes the role of NGOs in its 1991 report on world development: "Beside their growing numbers and the increasing resources they mobilize, the importance of NGOs lies in their capacity to get local populations and associations to participate more fully in the development process and the fight against poverty"<sup>3</sup>.

**American NGOs** have played a role in emergency relief ever since the end of the last second war. Since the beginning of the 1970s, their involvement in local development has been increasing. The "Umbrella Grant" system is interesting in the way it works with NGOs: funds channelled through USAID are managed by an American NGO which forms a committee in conjunction with local NGOs and government representatives. Committee members propose projects for the committee's approval. American NGOs are organized into two large networks: **PACT** and **ACTION**.

From the little village association to the NGO which is almost as big as the official aid agency of its country (the case of the **Netherlands, United Kingdom...**), NGOs are as diverse as their methods of action (technical assistance, long-term development, emergency relief...). NGOs which have been asked by their governments to manage a certain percentage of the ODA budget are a particular case. This is the case in the **Netherlands** where four organizations are in charge of large programmes.

Canadian PVOs have traditionally played a significant role in aid programmes, working mostly at the grass level, on issues of community development and health. In addition to PVOs, there are many non-governmental institutions such as universities, cooperatives, etc.

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<sup>3</sup> The "fundamental" role of the NGOs is inscribed in the "long-term prospects study" in the 1980s.

The Canadian Agency for International Development (CIDA) has tried a number of different methods for channeling its resources to Canadian NGOs (more than 200 groups). The "**Canada-Sahel Solidarity**" project (CSS) was floated in 1985; its objective is to link 40 Canadian NGOs working in education and development to Sahelian NGOs in CIDA's priority countries (**Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger**). The programme works with a decentralized fund of C\$ 150,000 per country and per year.

Canadian NGOs are organized into two collectives (the AQOCI in Québec and the CCCI for anglophone and francophone Canada) which participate in government discussions on large programmes (**Mozambique, Haiti, Canada-Sahel...**). They also are very involved in public information and furnish educational materials and films on development.

In the **BMZ's** 8th report, NGOs are praised for encouraging self-help ("Aid to Populations to Help Themselves") and providing direct assistance to populations in need: NGOs do not necessarily have to go through diplomatic channels or upper-level government foreign relations. **Canada joins Germany in praising** NGOs, to the extent that they help populations to help themselves.

### **Non-governmental Actors in the South**

Economic actors in associations in the South now have direct access to public financing from the North. For a long time, southern NGOs (or village groups or any other informal grouping) could obtain this financing only through northern NGOs and this arrangement guaranteed independent cooperation between civilian associations of two different countries. Today, the barriers are more flexible, in particular because of the European Community's initiatives and, in a different way, the World Bank's efforts.

These new actors in Sahelian civil society are extremely diverse and have few references for their activities; unions are almost inexistent and the way people have traditionally pooled interests and work in the Sahel has little to do with associative traditions in Europe or in North America. Village groups, which are often informal (composed of youth and women...), are nevertheless stable enough to house the new social initiatives. Among southern NGOs some of which were originally northern NGOs but have since "Sahelianized" themselves, are groups which are gaining influence and serving as examples of good organization and management. From the "6S" group (Se Servir de la Saison Sèche en Savane et au Sahel, Using the Dry Season on the Savannah and in the Sahel) which after only three years since its founding now concerns some 70,000 persons in 80 villages through the "Nam Groups," to vast credit support networks, local development associations or even traditional "tontine" systems, Sahelian civil society is becoming more and more involved in the development it should benefit from. They remain nonetheless local grassroots organizations, with relatively informal management, sometimes scattered across wide territories. These facts have made it necessary to create steering committees or collectives to coordinate negotiations with the governments (the Aid Coordination Committee in Mali, the Private Aid Group in Niger, the CONGAD in Senegal...). These collectives keep evolving and do not always play the role they initially set out to fulfill, but each year they manage to achieve a growing number of initiatives. The right to associate is still not recognized in all Sahelian countries, but it should not be long before it is. For example, in Niger, associations can only have a legal existence through the national cooperative network. The National Union of Cooperatives, which has divided the country into districts, is an empty shell without resources. However, village farmer groups have adapted it for

organizing exchange and associations without any problem (the "for a green Africa" network). In fact, this situation is pressuring the government into reviewing the legal status of associations<sup>4</sup>.

Directly financing the southern NGOs is a favourite theme at the **German Ministry of Cooperation (BMZ)**. For this reason, German NGOs are calling for an evaluation of their southern counterparts' ability to absorb the proposed funding. In his "The Problems of Integrating NGOs into Official Assistance Strategies"<sup>5</sup>, Helmut Schaffer expresses the problem in these terms: "Generally speaking, the fragile structures of NGOs in developing countries are not ready to absorb funds in addition to what they are already receiving from northern NGOs, and they are particularly not ready to receive the large portions of development assistance a foreign government, or even more, a multilateral agency is capable of supplying."

In **France**, there is support for grassroots production initiatives through the CCCE, but the financing is very low: 4.7 million francs in 1990 for 9 countries (including Burkina Faso).

In the **United States**, the financing of local NGOs has increased substantially, rising from \$0.5 million in 1989 to \$8.7 million in 1991. Despite an inclination to work more directly with local NGOs, AID authorities require channeling funds through American NGOs. USAID agents agree with BMZ agents : that any direct transfer of funds would automatically be limited by the rudimentary planning and management capacities of local NGOs.

**Switzerland** (and to be more precise, the DDA) would like to increase contact and dialogue with southern NGOs because they are so close to the populations the Swiss government would like to aid and because the DDA also believes that the southern NGOs are the organizations most capable of evaluating and defining their true needs. The fact that southern NGOs may eventually "short-circuit" their northern counterparts who would then be relegated to an intermediary role is perceived as a positive eventuality by all concerned. It is also in keeping with DDA philosophy based on the idea that the initiative for change should come from the people most concerned (cf. the work on this subject published by the "Institut de Recherche et d'Etudes du Développement", IRED, the Institute for Development Research and Study).

Slowly but inexorably, this movement in Sahelian society is providing new partners for international assistance efforts. It has yet to culminate in a real decentralization of responsibility for aid, but is in the meantime the source of the democratic awakenings which have been shaking Africa for nearly two years. Working within the difficult context which is theirs, these new actors are making new partnerships possible and donor agencies should prepare themselves for meeting the new actors' fierce requirements for independence.

But are donor agencies listening to these associations before launching new assistance programmes?

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<sup>4</sup> In France the GAO network based at the National Agronomic Institute monitors a number of field experiments done by local associations.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. "La politique allemande de coopération avec les pays du CILSS," by Wolfgang and Aïcha Hein and J.Bois, COBEA/ORSAY, September 1991.

Have aid agencies and local governments really capitalized on past experiences with these associations?

Everyone agrees that development assistance should be founded on local initiative, but why, then, are funds for local initiatives so low compared to funds distributed through other channels? Is it really so difficult to get a project going with a local NGO? Is it much more difficult than working with the local state governments who get the biggest piece of the "assistance pie"? Are local NGOs really so few and far between? Can aid agencies do anything to encourage more of these associations? Haven't all these problems already been pinned down since the Segou meeting organized by the CILSS/Club du Sahel? What more is needed?

### III.3 Official Development Aid and Private Grants

Outside resources for countries in the CILSS come almost exclusively from foreign public agencies (between 90 and 100%). The private resources they do receive (from export credits, direct or portfolio investments) progressed until 1982 (from 20 M\$ in 1975 to 210 M\$ in 1982, a more than tenfold increase in less than ten years). Since 1982, private investors have pulled out almost completely and one of public financing's objectives for the Sahel has been to increase private investment, but to no avail (see boxes on disinvestment and on aid to the private sector pp. 17 and 18).

After a backslide in 1984-1985, the flow of private resources seemed to rally in 1986-1987 for direct investments or localized shares in a Sahelian country. Nevertheless, the general balance of private flows is so clearly negative (-72 M\$) because of a freeze on direct export financing to the countries in the Sahel. Apparently, new buyers' credits will not be made available until all of the outstanding payments on credits already granted have been paid.

In 1987, direct investment was less than 1M\$ for every country in the zone (except Senegal where it was 2.4 M\$). Niger is the only country in the zone to receive significant portfolio investments (16 M\$). However, Niger is also the country which has the largest negative balance for export credits. We can thus imagine that certain unreimbursed buyers' credits were changed from debts into assets. The smallest three in the zone (Guinea-Bissau, Gambia and Cape Verde) as well as Chad are the only member-countries where disinvestment is just beginning to make itself felt (see table below p. 18).

In 1988, the downward trend in public and private investments on market terms was confirmed and accelerated. Public bilateral and multilateral transfers on market terms were negative (-53 million US\$), as were private sector transfers (-96.5 millions of US\$.) Of course, Senegal is largely responsible for these figures, but countries which have been able to maintain positive flows are few and far in between; Guinea Bissau and Burkina Faso seem, for the time being, to have avoided financial repatriation (see graph below and table in the annex).

## PRIVATE DISINVESTMENT

*Disinvestment is due to shrinking local markets and deteriorating business conditions. It affects, to varying degrees, all sectors and business categories:*

- *industry: problems in competitiveness on foreign markets (the Sauptquet-Senegal shut down is a case in point) as well as on domestic or regional markets (the textile industry's problems in the Ivory Coast and elsewhere are an illustration).*
- *trade: selective disinvestment against a background of shrinking markets, a tendency for concerted retreat from the weaker markets instead of competition between groups;*
- *services: despite decreased turnover, services remain and there is strong competition between groups;*
- *banks: the trend is toward withdrawing and reducing purview (fusion of BNP-BIAO networks) with exceptions within the framework of privatizations (Madagascar) usually accompanied by restructuring (Senegal, Cameroon);*
- *construction, public projects and engineering: net reduction in direct proportion to a) reductions in public investment and b) the increase in default on payments (only those operations financed by donors are considered feasible);*
- *Smaller local businesses with French capital: difficult business conditions, small and medium-sized businesses continue to lose ground (import substitution, import-export, services).*

*This withdrawal is in part due to the strategies of groups established in several countries. These groups are attempting to reduce their business surface in Africa because of the losses accumulated over the years by their branches. Much rarer are private investors who choose to remain or even, in specific activities, expand (Bolloré group).*

*New investments which counter the general trend are few and generally limited in size.*

**The downward investment trend continued into 1989, particularly in Niger. The same is true for export credits which are "negative" for nearly all the countries in the region except for Gambia where export credits (123 million US\$) surpassed official development assistance (93 million \$US). This last figure is difficult to interpret, but other than the volume of trade with Senegal and other neighboring franc zone countries, what could explain why companies have decided to set up or consolidate business in Gambia? Doesn't this confirm Gambia's position as the "Warehouse Country" (John Igué's expression) ?**

Because of the acute and persistent crisis in Africa, firms are obligated to look for immediate profit. Consequently, many of them are leaving the continent and others invest on a short-term basis only. The President of the Council of Investors in Africa, Jean-Pierre Prouteau notes: "Contrary to the

### ***The Role of Aid in Expanding the Private Sector***

*How can development assistance help to create and support the financial systems and institutions necessary for efficiently using and distributing financial resources?*


*Assistance has not allowed the emergence of a strong private sector nor even has it been able to play the role of financial intermediary. It would seem that the extremely advantageous conditions of aid in its current forms work against the creation of a financial system based on market mechanisms. Isn't the value of capital underestimated with regard to labor?*

*How can aid be channelled to the private sector?*

*What can the role of aid be in improving the climate for investment in developing countries? How can investors participate in this discussion? Is it economically sound to use aid for creating joint-ventures in recipient countries?*

hasty generalizations sometimes made, not all French investors are leaving Africa: in the Francophone Region of black Africa, approximately 15% of activities have been closed, and one-third of the remaining subsidiaries of large groups are being restructured, the other two-thirds are breaking even or are making profits, and 50% indicate a willingness to reinvest as soon as the situation allows". Despite strong incentives to develop French business in Africa, public authorities have trouble convincing businessmen because of opportunities in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, the last few years have been marked by increasing business participation in outlining cooperation policies with the Ministry of Cooperation. The French private sector also participates in Franco-African commissions where bilateral policies are drafted. This represents progress.

### Ressources financières extérieures de l'ensemble du CILSS 1975-89



## Chapter IV WHAT GEOGRAPHIC PRIORITIES?

### IV.1 The Sahel's Place in International Aid

The volume of official development assistance commitments in 1989 to the member-countries of the CILSS is about **3.050 billion current US\$**. Compared with the preceding year, 1988, **this volume represents a slight growth.**

Nevertheless aid volumes nearly stagnated between 1987 and 1989. This evolution needs to be situated in the context of aid to developing countries as a whole which rose from 54 billion current dollars in 1987 to 62 billion in 1988 and 58 billion dollars in 1989. Subsaharan Africa, as a whole, saw commitments dip slightly between 1988 and 1989, from 22.9 to 22.7 billion current US dollars.

The picture of aid flows that these figures provide would be more accurately expressed in ECUs for the European portion which is, a large share. Evaluations, including the one above, are artificial when expressed in dollars due to heavy fluctuations in exchange rates during the 1980s. A more reliable aid estimation is obtained when examining the evolution of commitments in ECUs. In general, the average annual aid commitment growth rate is higher in ECUs.

Table 2

**OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITMENTS**

Years	in millions of current \$ U.S.	in millions of current ECUs
1980	1570	1126
1981	2035	1826
1982	1575	1613
1983	1822	1867
1984	2176	2757
1985	1889	2475
1986	2396	2434
1987	2983	2584
1988	2962	2505
1989	3050	2769
Average annual growth rate 1980-89	7,6%	10,5%

Source: calculations made from data provided by DAC/OECD

If one considers that 60 to 80 percent of aid received by the Sahel will be spent in the industrialized countries providing the aid, it is important to estimate the evolution of the real purchasing power this aid represents. With the exception of the two years which showed a decrease of aid in absolute value (1982 and 1985), purchasing power progressed steadily throughout the 1980s. This progression has nevertheless slowed in recent years, and has never regained the level of real purchasing power attained in 1984.

Table 3

**ODA COMMITMENTS IN REAL TERMS  
(in \$ 1987)**

1980	2072
1981	2792
1982	2214
1983	2569
1984	3136
1985	2692
1986	2756
1987	2983
1988	2765
1989	2871

NOTE: The GNP deflator for donor countries (base 1987=100), calculated by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), integrates the two essential components for calculating in real terms: exchange rate fluctuations and world inflation.

**In spite of an undeniable long-term increase, the evolution of official development assistance commitments to CILSS member countries is irregular** (see graphs on following pages). So it is that in the ebb years, 1982 and 1985, Sahelian countries saw a 20% fall in the resources they received. The drop in 1982 concerned all donors and stemmed from the debt crisis. The exceptionally high levels of aid the Sahel had obtained by the end of the 1970s largely corresponded to three actions: the dams in Diama and Manantali within the framework of the OMVS, the Nouakchott-Kiffa-Nema road, and the iron mines in Mauritania (Guelb-El-Rhein). The withdrawals in 1985 were not as global a phenomena: they were linked to the disappearance of nearly 3/4 of OPEC resources. In 1986, Italy and the World Bank were principally responsible for the observed increase in commitments. Equal credit is due the Netherlands and the European Development Fund (EDF) for their efforts. As for 1987, 50 per cent of the increase in ODA commitments, over 1986 levels, was the result of an EDF effort (\$300 million out of an extra \$600 million); the remaining \$300 million came from the principal donors: France, the African Development Fund (ADF) and Germany, each of which raised the total through their grants of approximately 100 million US\$.







The commitment decrease observed in 1988, was essentially due to massive withdrawals of Italian bilateral aid (from 332 million in 1987 to 157 million in 1988), as well as to the cutback in aid from the ADF and to a lesser degree, to a decrease in German and other aid from European Community Members. Nevertheless, all other donors maintained or increased their levels of aid in 1988. It should be noted that aid from the OPEC countries and financial institutions climbed from 75 to 104 million dollars between 1987 and 1988, an increase benefitting mostly Niger and Senegal. OPEC simultaneously withdrew from Mauritania (a country which, at the beginning of the 1980s was heavily dependant on aid from OPEC countries and institutions, and particularly from Saudi Arabia).

In 1989 the slight growth is accounted for by an increase in commitments on the part of France, the Netherlands and Germany, as well as from OPEC countries and financial institutions. This increase made up for most of the fall in funding from the European Development Fund and the World Bank.

## **IV.2 Aid Commitments in the Sahel: Concentrating on a Few Countries**







The progression of aid commitment is not as clear cut for the period 1980-89 (+ 8%) as it is for the period 1975-80 (+ 13%). The 1980s were marked by two years of decrease in absolute value (1982 and 1985). Aside from a strong rally in 1983 (+30%), 1986 and 1987 were the years in which an increase was sustained (a progression of about 20%). The CILSS countries did not benefit equally from these increases: between 1975 and 1980, only warring Chad did not benefit from this financial windfall. Other countries such as Gambia and Cape Verde managed to draw larger benefits from international aid. In the 1980s, a post-war Chad received a resurgence of aid. Then in 1987, Gambia lost nearly a quarter of its support from the international community. Meanwhile, Guinea-Bissau seemed to receive preferential treatment. Senegal (already the principal recipient in absolute terms), continues to increase its share, and in 1989 it received 20% of total aid to the region. **At the end of the 1980s, almost two-thirds of aid to the Sahel was concentrated on Senegal, Mali, Burkina-Faso and Chad.**

## TENDANCE DES ENGAGEMENTS D'AIDE DES PRINCIPAUX DONATEURS AUX PAYS DU CILSS



sources: CAD/ OCDE  
Engagements exprimés en millions de dollars E.U

**TENDANCE DES ENGAGEMENTS D'AIDE DES PRINCIPAUX DONATEURS AUX PAYS DU CILSS (suite)**



sources: CAD/ OCDE

Engagements exprimés en millions de dollars E.U

Table 4

**GROWTH AND DISTRIBUTION OF ODA COMMITMENTS**

(in millions of U.S. \$ and%)

	Average 1980-82		1989	
	in U.S. \$	in%	in \$U.S	in%
Cape Verde	58	4	77.9	2.5
Chad	63	4	400.1	13
Gambia	69	5	120.4	3.9
Guinea-Bissau	65	4	193.9	6
Mali	213	14.5	646.4	21.2
Mauritania	203	14	266.7	8.7
Niger	224	15	270.8	8.9
Senegal	304	21	624.2	20.5
Burkina-Faso	265	18	450.3	14.7
Total aid	1464	100	3050	100

**IV.3 Aid Disbursements in the Sahel: the Slowdown**

As the disbursements for a given commitment are made over a period of time, commitments recorded in a given year generally exceed the net transfers for that same year. Annual transfers nevertheless represent 3/4 (and usually closer to 85%) of aid commitments contracted in the course of the year. Both the level of net transfers and the level of commitments ebbed in 1982 and 1983. After that date, transfers accelerated: = 7% in 1984, + 14% in 1985 and + 20% in 1986 over the level reported for the preceding year. This acceleration subsided in 1987, 1988 and 1989.

The evolution of net transfers by country is quite heterogeneous. Between 1980 and 1988, the progression was most significant for Chad which had just come out of war. Senegal received the most substantial transfers in absolute value. Between 1980 and 1988, most of the countries in the CILSS zone obtained transfers which progressed annually by an average of about 10% (Niger, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Mali). This progression was not as great (+ 5%) for Burkina-Faso and the Cape Verde islands. But the situation in Mauritania is more serious: transfers have not progressed since 1980, nor even since the middle of the 1970s (when transfer levels were exceptionally high due to the budgetary support of Saudi Arabia, the financing of the iron mines and the Nouakchott-Kiffa-Nema highway).

**There is nevertheless, since 1980, a growing gap between ODA commitments and net disbursements (see graphs which follow). Cape Verde, Gambia and Niger show the same tendencies for commitments and disbursements. For all other countries, the gap widens.** Interpreting this gap is difficult, but does suggest that the concern over the Sahel's capacity to absorb aid may be justified. The most striking example is the rate of disbursement under Lomé III: no higher than 30% in 1990. Several aid agencies have signaled delays in transfers related to projects.

These delays, they said, were due to lengthy procedures for initiating projects and were unrelated to absorption capacity. At present, it is difficult to determine why masses of aid are not disbursed.







#### **IV.4 Is the Sahel Still a Priority?**

Between 1975 and 1989, the CILSS member countries received public assistance commitments amounting to \$28 billion. Until 1982, the breakdown of this aid, was remarkably stable:

- some 52% came from OECD countries,
- 30% from multilateral agencies and,
- 18% from OPEC countries.

In 1983 two trends became apparent: first, aid coming from the OECD countries was reinforced (from 58 to 60 per cent), and accordingly, aid from the OPEC countries fell 15 per cent between 1983 and 1986. Following the 1986 crisis, aid from the oil-producing countries collapsed (2 to 3 per cent of the total). Conversely, since 1986 aid from multilateral agencies, inactive between 1982 and 1984, progressed steadily. In 1987 and 1988 there occurred a slight downward trend in bilateral DAC assistance, a considerable increase in multilateral aid and the retreat of the OPEC countries and institutions was confirmed.





ENGAGEMENTS ET VERSEMENTS D'AIDE



SOURCES: CAD/OCDE

TOTAL DES ENGAGEMENTS  
 TOTAL DES VERSEMENTS

ENGAGEMENTS ET VERSEMENTS D'AIDE (suite)



SOURCES: CAD/OCDE

— TOTAL DES ENGAGEMENTS

▨ TOTAL DES VERSEMENTS

Table 5

**THE TEN MAJOR DONORS IN THE CILSS COUNTRIES**

	Total Public Aid Commitments (1975-1989) Current U.S. Millions of \$	% of the global aid
FRANCE (FAC + CCCE)	5393	18.76%
EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND	3240	11.27%
WORLD BANK (IDA)	2803	9.75%
UNITED-STATES	2328	8.1%
GERMANY	2212	7.7%
UNITED-NATIONS	1842	6.4%
SAUDI ARABIA*	1225	4.3%
ITALY	1312	4.6%
CANADA	1171	4.0%
AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FUND	1297	4.5%
<b>PRINCIPAL DONORS : TOTAL</b>	<b>22823</b>	<b>79.4%</b>
<b>TOTAL ODA COMMITMENTS</b>	<b>28736</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

\*Figures for Saudi Arabia are the same as for 1988

Some forty donors (not including NGOs) participate in financing development in the Sahel. Yet, nearly 80% of the aid is contributed by ten donors. Of these principal ten, France remains the largest (nearly 20% of total aid) though EDF funds are quickly catching up.

Reasons for aiding each country vary from one donor to the next but also change as foreign policies dictate. Do official statements still consider the Sahel a priority region? And what of the current debate about an eventual reorientation of aid toward Eastern Europe?

For **ITALY**, a large donor to subsaharan Africa (61% of total Italian aid), the Sahel is no longer a priority. Resources are being redirected toward the SADCC and the horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Somalia, Mozambique and Tanzania). Italian priorities fluctuate from one year to the next, because cooperation policy is strongly linked to foreign affairs. Criteria for concentrating aid are very strong and fulfill the requirement of law 49/87 on cooperation. In the future, subsaharan Africa will no longer be a priority, Latin America and Eastern Europe should benefit from Italy's reorientation. Of the Sahelian states, only Senegal has managed to retain a priority position, it is one of a number of "second priority" countries. No CILSS country is one of Italy's "highest priorities."

For the **UNITED STATES**, geographical choices for development assistance are usually based on political criteria though this is less true for US involvement in the Sahel where food, ecological and human problems are considered more important. Though the Sahel is less frequently in the news since

the drought, Congress continues to show interest in the Sahel and for certain countries in particular such as Cape Verde because of an important Cape Verdian immigrant population in the US, Senegal because of its democracy, and Niger and Chad for security reasons. Major changes in US policy were observed in Burkina-Faso where aid dropped dramatically after 1982. The Sahel remains a priority recipient of PL 480 food aid. In 1988, the DFA stopped dealing with the Sahel as a separate entity and Sahelian countries now compete with the other African countries for US aid on the same basis: population, need, and initiating economic and political reforms. On this basis, four Sahelian countries are high priorities: Senegal, Mali, Niger and Gambia. These countries received 80% of US assistance to the Sahel between 1988 and 1990 whereas they had received 57% between 1985 and 1987. Recently, Chad and Guinea Bissau have also become US priorities. DFA assistance has been consistent though its part of total ODA is diminishing: US bilateral aid to Africa in 1990 was less than it was between 1981 and 1985. This drop is due to a reorientation of USAID priorities toward Latin America, Eastern Europe and the Persian Gulf.

For the **NETHERLANDS**, Mali and Burkina Faso have been priority countries since 1974. In 1990, the Sahel received 4.4% of the Netherlands' budget for development assistance. For the Netherlands, the Sahel comprises more countries than are in the CILSS: Cameroon, Ghana and Benin are also Sahelian. Dutch aid to Nigeria and the Ivory Coast has been discontinued. The political upheavals in Eastern Europe should have no effect on the budget for development assistance.

Development assistance from **JAPAN** to subsaharan Africa has recently increased and the region now receives 22% of Japanese aid. This diversification is part of Japan's growing role in international affairs. Since 1989, Japan has included Eastern European countries in its aid programmes (financial aid, technical assistance and emergency relief). Japan showed particular interest in the LDCs between 1989 and 1991: 15 to 25% of total aid. The major recipients in the Sahel are Senegal, Niger and Mali.

Until 1976, **GERMANY's** highest priority for foreign assistance was Asia. Now, it directs 30% of its aid toward subsaharan Africa. The Sahel's percentage of this aid is growing, from 18 to 30% between 1982 and 1990. In 1989 the top priority countries were Mali, Niger, Burkina-Faso and Mauritania until 1989 when Mauritania was dropped from the list in 1990. Since the Berlin Wall was torn down and the two Germanies were reunified, official declarations continue to stress that this will not bring about a decrease in German assistance to the third world, rather a "second window" needs to be opened for aid to what was once East Germany and the Eastern European countries.


The Federal law of March 19, 1976 on development assistance makes the Sahel a priority just as all the LDCs are a priority for **SWITZERLAND**. Switzerland committed itself to aid programmes in West Africa after the 68-74 drought and the creation of the CILSS in 1974. Swiss aid commitments for the period 1991-1994 are particularly high for West Africa which will receive 23% of Swiss aid; East Africa, 23%; Latin America, 16% and Asia, 38%. For the period 1991-1994, priority countries in West Africa are Mali (20%), Chad (15%), Niger (15%), Burkina-Faso (12%) and regional actions (30%).

Only **CANADA** is both a member of the Commonwealth and a Francophone country and 65% of its ODA is directed toward countries in one of these two groups, with an accent on Commonwealth countries. Aid to Africa is essentially based on humanitarian considerations and Africa receives special attention. Until 1987, Africa received 44% of CIDA programmes (in contrast to 39% for Asia and 16% for the Americas). Priority countries are Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso (which are part of the "Sahel programme") and Senegal. These countries received 95% of Canadian aid to the CILSS countries

between 1980 and 1990. As a result of budgetary cuts (linked to the opening of a new fund for Eastern European countries), Canadian aid to these four countries is expected to decrease between 1992 and 1997.

The organization chart which follows shows that 38% of FRANCE's bilateral development assistance goes to "in-field" countries. The member countries of the CILSS received 605 million US\$ in 1989 or one third of French bilateral aid to "in" countries in subsaharan Africa.

A breakdown of French Aid



Note: This organization chart is based on a French report to the DAC in 1989. Commitments expressed in millions of US\$.

Financial resources destined for "in" countries are subject to development assistance procedures which apply for the life of a project, from design to evaluation. These kind of resources represent 59% of total aid to Africa, which means that more than 40% of aid funds are not administered according to the same procedures. The Postel-Vinay report mentioned that "in order for foreign resources to be useful, they must exclude direct business interests and outmoded political preoccupations." France is the principal donor for the following CILSS countries:

Table 6

	ODA Disbursements in millions of US\$	France's Share of Total Aid
Senegal	216	31%
Mali	95	18%
Chad	78	28%
Niger	65	18%
Burkina-Faso	62	18%
Mauritania	61	32%

source: DAC/OECD

These figures show that "in" countries are not the priority official statements make of them. Additionally, it should be noted that France stands out from the other OECD countries which allot an average of 36% of their aid to subsaharan Africa: 68% of France's net disbursements are in favour of this same region. In France, the debate about concentrating aid or dispersing it (throughout developing countries as a whole) is not settled. The Postel-Vinay report takes an extreme position for concentrating aid on precise regions: "There must be a drastic cutback in these funds which we spread over a hundred or so countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia, with minimum efficiency for them and ridicule for us. Such dispersion cannot be justified given the dangers that threaten us." It is a position based on domestic security: France should "fight misery and the risk of anarchy" and "concentrate aid on North and West Africa<sup>6</sup>." On the other side of this question, the Vivien report, which shows the same kind of reasoning shown in the Hessel report, stresses, "it is in the national interest to expand and re-think our cooperation with the major countries in the Third World: China, India, Brazil and Mexico. Two other regions should benefit from the same strong interest France shows subsaharan Africa, these are: North Africa and Indochina." The official French position as expressed in the Samuel Lajeunesse report consist of maintaining the status quo, in other words, that all countries are priority countries: "To reaffirm the vigour and coherence of our African and Mediterranean policies, while expanding our scope of action in other regions of the world (orientation n°2)."

For **SWEDEN**, the Sahel itself is not a priority, but Swedish assistance is present in subsaharan Africa and Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau are among Swedish priority countries along with the SADCC countries.

The strategic outline for **DENMARK**'s official development assistance can be found in the "Action Plan" published in 1988, where a number of themes are presented clearly, among which are the goal of bringing ODA levels up to representing 1% of Denmark's GNP in 1992, maintaining equal levels of bilateral and multilateral aid, concentrating Danish aid in 20 to 25 countries and decentralizing DANIDA. Eight criteria for selecting countries to assist were approved by Parliament in May 1989,

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<sup>6</sup> One should note that during an interview, the president of the Republic of Senegal on French television on June 15, 1991, restated this very idea: western countries will be efficiently struggling against illegal immigration if they increase their aid transfers to Africa.



they include: GDP per capita, aid absorption capacity, the respect for human rights, the decentralization process, etc.<sup>(7)</sup>.

Danish bilateral aid to Africa represented 50 to 60% of its total aid between 1980 and 1990. The principal recipients are Tanzania and Kenya, with growing aid to Uganda, Mozambique, Egypt and Zimbabwe. The CILSS countries received no more than 4.2% of total aid in 1990. Between 1985 and 1990, aid to Burkina Faso rose; Niger, Mali and Gambia received sizeable but shrinking sums, as did Senegal and Mauritania. Because Denmark's strategy is to concentrate its aid on a few countries, it is possible that one or two CILSS countries (Burkina Faso and perhaps Niger) will become Danish priorities in the next few years, in which case, Denmark's part in aid to these countries would increase.



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<sup>7</sup> Cf. "Danish Assistance to the CILSS countries 1980-90" COWIconsult/Department of International Development Studies, October 1991. This report can be consulted at the Club du Sahel or COBEA/ORSAY.

## A FEW INDICATORS OF AID TO THE SAHEL IN 1989



## REPARTITION DE L'AIDE PAR GROUPE DE DONATEURS



### **Conclusions which can be drawn from this analysis:**

First, growth in aid to the Sahel since 1975 has been high (cf. the tables and graphs above) compared to aid growth in other developing countries. Sahelian countries receive the highest volume of aid per capita in subsaharan Africa. Donors are showing concern for the Sahel.

Next, this analysis demonstrates that it is not the Sahel as a region which is a priority for most agencies, but rather certain countries within the Sahel (even the definitions of "the Sahel" vary for different agencies). Senegal and Mali top the list, Burkina Faso and Chad follow. Next come Niger and Mauritania, then Guinea Bissau, Gambia and Cape Verde. A "Sahel bureau" or "Sahel programme" is a good indicator of an agency's paying special attention to the region. The World Bank has a Sahel department (for all the countries in the CILSS except Guinea Bissau) in its Africa Regional bureau. This is also the case for the United States and Canada but not for France and Switzerland. What does this disparity mean for regional approaches in the Sahel? Do donors have a strategy for the Sahel which is distinct from their strategy for the rest of subsaharan Africa? Do agencies consider "the Sahel" as a specific region? None of these questions are easy to answer.

### **IV.5 What Is to Become of the Sahel over the Next Decade?**

As for the question of "competition" for aid from the Eastern European countries, through the DAC the OECD countries have decided not to decrease their assistance to Africa and not to count aid to Eastern Europe as ODA. **Nevertheless, because changes in Eastern Europe are occurring "so quickly," most observers are morose about how aid to developing countries will evolve, and the Sahel is not excepted from this pessimistic outlook. The 1990s will probably be characterized by faint annual increases in aid of about 1 or 2%, and the percentage of the industrialized countries' GNP allocated for foreign aid is not expected to increase (<sup>8</sup>). The important aid increases which occurred for the Sahel at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s will not be repeated (<sup>9</sup>).** The stagnation of aid levels is not as much of a risk as the possibility that human resources, the energy and ideas which administrations have at their disposal, will be re-directed toward Eastern Europe. This is not only a financial problem, but also a problem concerning ideas for the best development of Africa.

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<sup>8</sup> *We can thus conclude that for the majority of donors, reaching the goal of 0.7% of GNP for aid will have to be put off until the 21st century.*

<sup>9</sup> *We do not object to this near stagnation of aid budgets for the Sahel in the decade to come. We are only making the fact clear because it is an important factor which major policy themes should be careful not to overlook.*

Two other factors may limit the growth of aid to subsaharan Africa : a growing demand for subsidies in the economies of the industrialized nations and the financial consequences of the war in the Gulf despite the fact that official statements have up to this point denied that the war would influence development assistance budgets. The first budget forecasts of aid to subsaharan Africa, as yet difficult to establish, as well as an informal sounding of aid agencies have led us to believe that these subsidies and the war are anything but minor factors<sup>10</sup>.

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<sup>10</sup> *The negative consequences of the Gulf war on aid budgets are clearly spelled out in the 1991 report of the president of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee.*

Chapter V  
**FROM SECTORIAL TO TRANSVERSAL PRIORITIES**

For many years, rural development was perhaps the highest priority in the Sahel. Today, structural adjustment, the struggle against indebtedness, environmental issues and the need for encouraging trade between African countries, are rank just as high. "Food self-sufficiency" and "health for all", standard slogans used frequently just a few years ago, can no longer be found in strategy papers of aid agencies. **We are in fact witnessing a change from a sectorial to a global approach to development.**

Though the World Bank has a major influence on the policies of other aid agencies, it is not alone in emphasizing the war on poverty. Since the adverse effects of structural adjustment have come to light, **spoken and written statements, indicate that all sectors are becoming priorities.** The World Bank has real influence on the aid policies of donors, be they bilateral or multilateral: this influence is clearly seen in program aid and in the dilution of sectorial priorities.

**Policy analysis is complicated** for a number of reasons:

First, it is difficult to persuade agencies to furnish strategy papers on their policies in the Sahel. The orientations of US, Canadian, Swiss and Dutch's policies are extremely clear. The World Bank's "Country Strategy Papers" are every bit as clear but they are also "confidential." The policies of other donors are not made explicit and France, the largest donor in the Sahel, issues no reference documents at all. Trying to pin down France's policy orientation consists of collecting all the various publications which are somehow related to the subject, and then interviewing various officials from the Ministry of Cooperation or the Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique (CCCE) or researchers in the large research centres or professionals in non-governmental organizations. The obvious risk in this kind of synthesis is that the impressions one gets about the intentions of a certain administration are not necessarily correct.

Secondly, the sectorial orientations which are stated in various "position papers" are often so general that it is difficult to guess at how they will translate into action<sup>11</sup> or to compare the sectorial appropriations of different donors.

**Finally, it should be noted that attributing a single position to a single agency masks what may be considerable differences of opinion and points of view between its technical assistants, officials and policy decision-makers.** The same can be said for discrepancies between policy as conceived in North American and European capitals and the way agents in the field actually apply and interpret those policies.

Though intentions often surpass what is actually accomplished, donors inevitably state priorities or make them manifest through funding. This is what we would like to demonstrate in the following overview of the policies of major donors before going on to summarize the way priorities are evolving. There has been a shift from values and ideas associated with the word "**development**" to those which are now attached to the word "**democracy**." We will confront the strategy outlines we present with the financial volumes allocated over the last decade and the volumes which have been planned for the decade to come.

After having for so long concentrated its aid on satisfying basic needs, **JAPAN** is now putting the accent on environmental problems and on stimulating grassroots participation in its projects. Japan has never supplied much technical assistance --in any case, never as much as the other OECD (member) countries-- and is now more interested in supplying grants than loans. Its bilateral contributions are growing (as much as 40% of its aid) particularly for structural adjustment via the World Bank, as Japan does very little adjustment on its own. After the "Summit Seven" in 1989, Japan planned a special fund of 600 million dollars for providing assistance to the Least Developed Countries with the largest debts. Beyond these general orientations, Japan has provided aid for fishing in the Sahel (Guinea Bissau and Senegal in particular).

**GERMANY's** 8th BMZ report emphasizes:

- protecting the environment (reforestation, soil conservation...);
- promoting the role of women;
- the fight against poverty;
- regional aid, particularly for agriculture;
- structural adjustment ("with increased emphasis on buffering the social effects").

In Germany, self-help is a frequent theme. Most German programme aid comes in the form of macro-economic adjustment: developing first agriculture and then industry; bringing electricity, drinking water and transportation infrastructures to where they are needed. German aid in the Sahel has placed a priority on reorganizing the cereal offices (the PAROC programme).

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<sup>11</sup> *In a report on the environment in the Sahel issued by the Club du Sahel in December 1991, Jacques Giri exposes the growing "verbiage" coming from aid agencies.*

Between 1985 and 1990, German financial aid to the CILSS countries as a group went to the following categories<sup>12</sup>:

Infrastructure:	37 %
Product and budgetary support:	34 %
Agriculture:	19 %
Environment:	4 %
Industry:	3 %
Health:	7 %

German technical assistance for the same period (lower in volume than financial aid) was concentrated as follows:

Regional development:	19.5 %
Agriculture:	18 %
Studies, consultants:	13.5 %
Infrastructure:	12.4 %
Forests, environment:	11 %
Industry:	10 %

At least as far as written and spoken statements are concerned for **FRANCE**, every sort of sector and activity is a priority. France's priorities, as stated in March 1991 at the Comité d'Aide au Développement (CAD), include: the fight against indebtedness, streamlining technical cooperation, increasing multilateral commitments, participatory development, cultural action and support for the French language, environment and democracy. More tangible are the cutbacks in technical assistance and an increase of grants and loans for structural adjustment. The drop in investment is startling.

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<sup>12</sup> *BMZ figures. A country by country breakdown can be found in "La politique de coopération en Allemagne," German Overseas Institute and J. Bois, COBEA/ORSAY, September 1991.*

Here is a breakdown by sector and activity (in descending order) of the CCCE's aid (in millions of FF) to the Sahel for 1990:

Table 7

	in millions of FF	as a%
Structural adjustment	697	34%
Rural development 55% of which for PNGT*	285	14%
Mining (SNIM)	225	11%
Cotton	169	8%
Communications	163	8%
Urban development	156	8%
Infrastructure	149	7%
Fishing	92.3	4%
Rural waterworks	56	3%
Study funds	20	1%
Livestock (slaughter houses)	17.8	1%
Social reinsertion (Senegal)	10	-

\* PNGT, programme national de gestion des terroirs.

Of this total of 2 billion FF rural development, a category which includes the environment, and in the second highest priority in terms of actual allocations, absorbed 14% of French aid. **Financing for mining and infrastructure together (18%) outstrips by far assistance to rural development.**

Bilateral funds from the Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation (FAC) were used in 1990 as follows:

Table 8

**BILATERAL FAC ASSISTANCE IN THE CILSS IN 1990**  
(in millions of FF and as a%)

Country	Burkina Faso	Cape Verde	Gambia	Guinea Bissau	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Senegal	Chad	Total	as a%
<b>Sector</b>											
Rural development	13.5	3.3		12	5	17	19.2	12	28.5	110.5	33%
Sanitary engineering	1.6				1.6	6.6	1.5	4	2.2	17.5	5%
Teaching	6.9			1.4	11			4		23.3	7%
Cultural action	2.5			5.8	11		4	2		25.3	7%
General expenditures	7.3	4.2	0.2	1	8.5	8.7	6.2	15.2	17.7	69	20%
Industry						2.5		16	14	32.5	10%
Infrastructures						7.8	2.5		50	60.3	18%
<b>Total</b>	<b>31.8</b>	<b>7.5</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>20.2</b>	<b>37.1</b>	<b>42.6</b>	<b>33.4</b>	<b>53.2</b>	<b>112.4</b>	<b>338.4</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>%</b>	<b>9%</b>	<b>2%</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>6%</b>	<b>11%</b>	<b>13%</b>	<b>10%</b>	<b>16%</b>	<b>33%</b>	<b>100%</b>	

The FAC financed operations for African countries did not only involve CILSS countries. These operations in Sub-saharan Africa represented 12% of FAC commitments for the period 1984-90, or an average of 150 million FF per year.

The **WORLD BANK** has based its current strategy on a Long Term Perspectives Study (LTPS) for Africa in the 1990s. It has put the accent on seven themes:

- structural adjustment,
- the development of human resources,
- reinforcing institutional structures,
- renewing economic growth and creating jobs,
- preserving natural resources,
- regional integration and cooperation,
- political renewal (administrative and judiciary reform, rule of law... ).

The "right strategy" was outlined in the "1991 Report on World Development." For the coming years, strategy will be based on four themes:

- upgrading human resources (education, health...),
- improving market mechanisms (encouraging competition and investment in infrastructure),
- liberalizing trade and foreign investment,
- avoiding excessive budgetary deficits and inflation.

Throughout the 1980s, the World Bank's main priorities were agriculture and infrastructure (transportation), but the importance accorded to these has shrunk in the face of the new accent on non-project aid (structural adjustment). The results of the LTPS mean a reorientation toward the development of human resources (health, education), natural resource management (an approach integrating the environmental and agricultural aspects of land management) and regional cooperation.

Actual aid commitments in 1989/90 and 1990/91 broke down in the following manner:

Table 9

(in millions of US\$)

		1989/90	1990/91
<b>Agriculture</b>	Burkina-Faso (information campaigns)	42	
	Senegal (support for small operations)	16.1	
	Mali (information campaigns)		24.4
	Burkina-Faso (land management)		16.5
<b>Education</b>	Mali	26	
	Mauritania	18.2	
	Chad	22	
	Burkina-Faso (educ. proj. #4)		24
<b>Energy</b>	Mali (adjustment)	33	
	Guinea Bissau		15.2
<b>Structural adjustment support</b>	Gambia	23	
	Senegal	5.5	7.1
	Chad	16.2	
	Gambia	10	
	Guinea Bissau	5	
	Mauritania		4
	Burkina-Faso (1st SAP)		80
	Mali		70
<b>Health/Population</b>	Mali		26.6
	Senegal		35
<b>Infrastructures</b>	Cape Verde (adjustment)	4.7	
	Chad (adjustment)	60	
	Senegal (adjustment)		65
	Niger		20
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>281.7</b>	<b>387.8</b>

For Sahelian countries as a whole, sectorial and macro-economic adjustment programmes sponsored by the World Bank represented 56% of loans approved in 1989/90 and 57% in 1990/91.

**SWITZERLAND**, a country traditionally oriented toward agricultural assistance, is turning its attention to integrated regional development. There is also a revival of Swiss interest in forestry and most Swiss programmes attempt to reconcile agricultural and environmental interests. Swiss assistance works within the framework of the World Bank's structural adjustment programmes.

Though Swiss aid is relatively weak compared to aid granted by larger donors, it is perceived by recipient countries as "a breath of fresh air." To understand why, consider its aid programmes in Mali, Burkina Faso and Chad.

Since 1977, when the first technical cooperation agreement was signed with Malian authorities, this country has become the West African country in which the most (in financial terms) Swiss aid is concentrated. In 1990, the three principle themes of Swiss assistance in Mali were:

- an accent on local and regional development (support for basic services, groups,...)
- continuity and consistency in land development and management (advice on soil conservation and the environment, the legal aspects of land management),
- encouraging artisans and entrepreneurs.

Additionally, the Swiss intend to continue supporting the World Bank's Sectorial Structural Adjustment Programme (SSAP) in Mali. In 1990, the Swiss contribution to the programme was 10.5 million SF allocated for a fund to stabilize the cotton network. Nevertheless, for several reasons, Swiss perception of their intervention in Mali over the last couple of years is unclear. They believe they have lost their effectiveness with regard to the concentration, continuity and durability of their actions. The troubled political climate in Mali is a factor which jeopardizes the feasibility of certain segments of Swiss cooperation.

On the other hand, in Burkina Faso, a country where Swiss cooperation has kept a low profile because of the country's political difficulties, there is renewed opportunity to provide the kind of assistance the Swiss prefer, namely: self-help, managerial training for association leaders, and small economic groupings and support for decentralization.

In 1990, Swiss aid channelled through technical assistance came to 3,992 million SF and commitments for 1991, 1992 and 1993 are expected to amount to 5,575 million, 7,429 million and 7,560 million respectively.

Swiss priorities for technical assistance are:

- environmental protection and management through intensification of the village forestry programme; working with the various ministries (Environment, Tourism, and Water and Rural Engineering) to define their plans of action, and financing the education of engineers for the protection of the environment.
- support for self-help efforts in rural areas; underwriting the local associations movement (FUGN: Fédération des Unions de Groupement Nam; APSS, an association for promoting animal husbandry in the Sahel; the 6 Ss,... ); developing a programme for literacy and education, and another for encouraging traditional and contemporary technologies.

The Swiss plan to redirect part of their aid to Chad in the coming years. The Swiss give priority to the following activities: rural development, basic health care, training and counsel in administrative and educational matters, environmental protection. Switzerland is also involved in structural adjustment programmes.

To encourage "lasting development in the fight against poverty," the **NETHERLANDS** emphasizes:

- basic education,
- primary health care,
- re-establishing ecological balance,
- food security (less support for irrigated crops and more for rain-fed crops).

Programme aid is increasing to support structural adjustment. And recently, the Netherlands has given more importance to aid to countries which respect human rights.

In the **UNITED STATES**, until the end of the 1980s, the Sahel Development Program (SDP) determined the following sectorial priorities: rural development, health and education. Agriculture absorbed 45% of SDP resources until the beginning of the 1980s. Between 1984 and 1989 it absorbed about a third (not including the resources directed toward agricultural reform). Natural resources management received no more than 5 to 9% over the course of the 1980s (not including reform programmes which affected natural resource management). Health and education have never received important resources: between 7 and 15% of the total until 1990.

In the second half of the 1980s, the focus was on food production and reform policies. The Development Fund for Africa (DFA) reinforced its efforts in these areas by defining the following strategic objectives:

- stabilizing African economies
- reinforcing competitive markets
- increasing productivity
- improving food security.

The DFA approach was more conceptual than it was sectorial, and stressed follow-up and evaluation of its programmes.

In **CANADA**, priorities have changed since the mid 1970s. Originally concerned with rural development and human resources, Canadian assistance through the 1985-1990 Sahel programme aimed at re-establishing socio-ecological equilibrium. Priorities became the stabilization of ground cover, food security and energy. In 1987, Canada established an ODA charter which addressed the following six points:

- the fight against poverty,
- structural adjustment,
- increasing women's participation,
- protecting the environment,
- food security,
- making energy available.

"Lasting development" is the centerpiece of Canada's strategic focus on:

- developing human resources (self-help is a favourite theme in CIDA documents),

- protecting the environment,
- fostering regional integration.

According to the CIDA, aid programmes for the Sahel between 1992 and 1997 will be characterized by "continuity and consolidation of past initiatives"<sup>13</sup>, although rural development will lose fund rechanneled to establish macro-economic equilibrium in the Sahel. The aid package breaks down as follows:

Table 10

	BURKINA-FASO	MALI	NIGER
Rural devel.	40%	35%	35%
Structural adj.	25%	20%	30%
Human res.	25%	25%	25%
Infrastructure	10%	20%	10%

Aid in **DENMARK** is essentially based on combatting poverty by fostering rural development and supporting women's role in development. More than 80% of Danish aid to the CILSS countries went for water supply, energy, rural development and forestry activities. Democratic values are Denmark's guiding criteria. A recent analysis conducted by the Danish International Development Association (DANIDA) found that Danish aid concentrates on:

- institutional support: decentralization, assistance to credit organizations, etc.
- protecting the environment,
- supporting social infrastructure: literacy, building schools, basic health care, etc.
- support to infrastructures: water supply, electricity
- support for efforts to foster democratic processes and respect for human rights.

**ITALY's** aid strategy has been in a state of flux since 1989, policies as well as geographic orientations are being redefined. The main priorities were once food, agriculture and infrastructure (energy and communications). But assistance for balance of payment deficits is now increasing. Italian aid also emphasizes the role of women in development and environmental issues in development. The Italian are also becoming more involved in multilateral efforts.

**SWEDEN** emphasizes the environment and democracy. Sweden participates in soil conservation projects in the Sahelian countries.

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<sup>13</sup> "La politique de coopération du Canada avec les pays du CILSS," Sheila Reynes, COBEA/ORSAY, September 1991.

"Revue de programme, Cadre stratégique 1992-97, Sahel-Côte d'Ivoire," a document presented at the ACDI President's committee meeting, May 29, 1991.

The strategy of the **EUROPEAN COMMUNITY** is an integral part of the new LOME IV agreements. The two main themes are:

- supporting adjustment in ACP countries (10% of Lomé IV) and financing rapid disbursement programmes for sectorial or general imports, and
- improving STABEX.

For programme aid, four important orientations are:

- reorganizing existing hydro-agricultural installations,
- developing local initiatives (support for micro-realizations),
- fostering the development of the private sector,
- fostering regional cooperation.

Democratic prerequisites (democratic standards which must be met to qualify) for receiving aid are clearly spelled out in article #5 of the Lomé IV agreement. The EC raises questions about the management of counterpart funds from the sale of food aid, Stabex and rapid import programmes as well as the coherence of such funds with programme aid<sup>14</sup>.

This review of the strategies of each agency allows us to draw two large conclusions:

**The relation between financial flows and official statements is an inverse proportion.** Agencies elaborate policy themes which win general approval and are repeated as statements of faith. Who wouldn't agree that productivity should be increased, that poverty should be wiped out, that local populations need to participate or that desertification needs to be stopped? On the other hand, the more these themes are discussed (in articles, conferences and seminars), the less funding they receive (the exception, of course, being structural adjustment). The environment is high on the list of priorities and yet receives only 2% of total aid. The fight against poverty through health and education does not receive much aid. Proposals to allocate important sums to ecology and developing human resources are proposals which date back to the 1970s. On the other hand, infrastructure, telecommunications or the iron mines in Mauritania "are doing nicely" and receive substantial outside subsidies. The importance accorded these three sectors is no fluke, as it has been a recurring phenomenon for over two decades. True, efficiency in reaching a goal or the importance one attributes to it cannot merely be measured in terms of financial resources. Still, the gap between stated priorities and financial realities ought to be pointed out<sup>15</sup>.

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<sup>14</sup> Important reflection on the management of counterpart funds were conducted in 1990 and 1991 by the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex. In addition, the Commission of the European Communities has adopted a "Guidelines on Counterpart Funds" (DG VIII/3, Brussels, March 22, 1991, SPA working group on counterpart funds).

<sup>15</sup> COBEA/ORSAY uses a data base called "SAHAIDE" which contains a census of all assistance projects in the Sahel in 1988 and 1989; it is what has allowed us to draw these conclusions. It can be consulted at COBEA.

The second conclusion is that sectorial approaches lose their coherence when they are subject to structural adjustment and global conditionalities. Development is now approached through "transversal themes" which affect every project and aspect of development. It would appear that five of these themes are the new priorities, which is to say, they are the ones which recur in position papers:

- reducing indebtedness and sectorial and macro-economic adjustment,
- protecting the environment,
- the fight against poverty,
- decentralization and ending state predominance,
- fostering regional integration.

Chapter VI  
**THE FIVE CROSS SECTIONAL PRIORITIES**

### **VI.1 Adjustment**

Gradually adopted by every agency, structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) are not the same for every donor: the European Economic Community (EEC) proposes a "European" version which is less drastic and more social. France is more involved in sectorial adjustment programmes. Germany emphasizes buffering the social impact of SAPs.

Six CILSS countries have been SAP recipients; Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal (cf. the list in annex 2). Burkina-Faso had a sectorial SAP in 1985, a structural adjustment subsidy through the Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique (CCCE) in 1990 (after the la Baule summit) and a structural adjustment facility granted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in March 1991 for a period of three years. Cape Verde has never had a structural adjustment loan, and Chad only received adjustment subsidies from the CCCE in 1990<sup>16</sup>. **For the Sahel as a whole, budgetary support and structural adjustment represented 30% of total aid in 1989 in contrast to an average of about 12% between 1975 and 1981<sup>17</sup>.**

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<sup>16</sup> For more information see "La stratégie de la Banque Mondiale et l'état d'avancement des programmes d'ajustement structurels dans les pays du CILSS," Sheila Reines, COBEA/ORSAY, September 1991.

<sup>17</sup> The difference between project aid and programme aid is not always easy to establish. How do you account for rehabilitating an agricultural perimeter which is part of a project but which is also in line with a SAP? Consequently, there is a certain degree of error in accounting for adjustment aid.

The latest BMZ report emphasizes the following aid prerequisites:

- stop giving preference to urban areas,
- reinforce the capacity of target groups to help themselves,
- bring government services closer to the citizens,
- encourage farmers to participate in policy decisions,
- change the legal situation of rural populations,
- reduce inefficient state monopolies.

German programme aid is important part of total aid. **Spent in the form of product aid or budgetary aid, it represents nearly 34% of German financial assistance in the Sahel between 1985 and 1990.**

Because of France's important role in assisting the CILSS countries, recent evolutions in French aid should be examined<sup>18</sup>. The Franco-African summit which took place in la Baule in June 1990 marked an important step in French policy.

- Programme aid is exclusively allocated in the form of grants and structural adjustment programmes (SAP) are becoming structural adjustment subsidies (SAS) in the poorest African countries. In countries with intermediary revenues (Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroun, the Congo, and Gabon in particular), programme aid continues in the form of loans. **The distinction between budgetary aid administered by the Ministry of Cooperation and funds from the CCCE has been eliminated, and eligible countries will benefit from a single form of aid managed jointly by: the Ministry of Cooperation, the CCCE and the Treasury and implemented by the CCCE.**

This aid has the following characteristics:

- it is granted within the framework of IMF adjustment programmes and implemented in coordination with the Bretton Woods institutions.
- additional prerequisites are not macro-economic in nature but operational. Payments are made in installments and can be suspended if conditions are not met.
- it is more sectorial than macro-economic (emphasis on vertically integrated subsectors).
- structural adjustment aid is concentrated on "in field" countries.

France considers development and democracy closely linked. Establishing a rule of law and improving the integrity and reliability of administrations in the developing countries are considered an essential prerequisite for economic development and democratic evolution.

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<sup>18</sup> cf. see the report *"La politique française de coopération: dans les pays du CILSS," A.S. Boisgallais, J.J. Gabas; COBEA/ORSAY, September 1991.*

The CCCE's strategy<sup>19</sup> is consistent with the rest of French policy. The CCCE intervenes to redefine domestic structures over the long run. This means that the project approach is not systematically used and the CCCE's focus is on fostering a positive macro-economic and sectorial environment. Consequently, the CCCE intervenes on the technical side of French bilateral SAPs (after discussion with the Treasury and the Ministry and within the global macro-economic framework outlined by the IMF). The CCCE bases its action on the fundamental conditionality of the IMF, which is the determinant in the Country's Table of Financial Operations, or the financing of the budgetary deficit. The CCCE has a more active role in defining the scope of sectorial frameworks, for example, through its administrative role in agricultural SAPs or PASEF. In implementing structural adjustment funds, one of the principal tasks of financial agencies and the CCCE in particular, is to identify and negotiate with local authorities the areas to which the funds will be applied. Sometimes this leads to the re-targeting of actions and themes of intervention described in macro-economic SAPs. But there is no "fundamental" divergence between macro-economic aid and sectorial aid. Structural adjustment and the project approach are not carried out independently. Additionally, the project approach permits the CCCE to refine structural adjustment policies.

Conditionality falls into three categories:

- Redefining government roles and transferring responsibilities to other economic agents,
- Policy and fiscal measures: subsidy policy, the role of the market, market liberalisation incomes tax systems, etc.
- Financing mechanisms and the role of the banking system and savings.

Both in sectorial and project approaches, the main conditions are the following:

1. Restructuring agri-food networks by limiting government intervention. Government control, would be relinquished so that actors other than the government would be in administrative and management positions. Privatization could be considered.
2. Modifying sectorial fiscal measures. For example, eliminating tax levying before year end accounts are closed.
3. Eliminating traditional instruments of stabilization. Setting up internal mechanisms appropriate to each integrated subsector.
4. Eliminating certain taxes; particularly taxes on exports, in order to increase the competitiveness of export networks.
5. Fostering state disengagement.
6. Encouraging governments to have land policies (cf. Agricultural SAP in Mauritania), without obliging them to impose legislation "from the top down" and without asking

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<sup>19</sup> This presentation of elements of the CCCE's policy is the result of informal conversations with CCCE officials and CCCE documents.

governments to modify land codes. The CCCE that reforming land management is not something which can be done in the near future.

According to France's report to the Comité d'Aide au Développement (CAD) **French aid for economic and financial reforms has grown from 24% in 1985 to 38% in 1989, with a correlative drop in funding for investments and technical cooperation.** Between 1990 and 1991 this trend was confirmed when "financial aid" (budgetary support + structural adjustment loans + structural adjustment subsidies) rose by more than 43%.

In 1990, in accordance with the la Baule decisions, subsidies for structural adjustment to the CILSS countries were the following<sup>20</sup>:

Burkina Faso: 100 million FF for budgetary support in 1990-91.

Mali: 80 million FF for supporting postal and telecommunications services.

Niger: 112 million FF for budgetary support between October 1989 and December 1990, and 55 million FF for purchase of the out foreign debt.

Senegal: 100 million FF for budgetary support in 1990-91.

In addition to this support, Senegal received a structural adjustment loan of 100 million FF to reform its public administration; Mali received a loan of 90 million FF to finance state financial operations in 1990, and Mauritania received a loan of 60 million FF for an Agricultural SAP. **In 1990, these commitments amounted to more than 34% of the CCCE's financial activity in the CILSS countries.**

The American Congress authorized USAID to use the DFA for implementing sectorial reforms. These reforms focus on the following:

- improving debt and fiscal management,
- reducing the role of government in production, marketing and rural development,
- increasing competitiveness through liberalization trade.

USAID's reform policy strengthens the IMF's and the World Bank's stabilization and adjustment initiatives, particularly those which favour a sectorial approach over a macro-economic approach. Financial resources and food aid, technical assistance, studies and training are all integrated to reinforce the effectiveness of programmes aimed at reforming the banking and fiscal systems (in Senegal), restructuring agriculture and finances (Gambia), liberalizing markets and reducing government spending (Mali) as well as reorganizing export markets (Niger).

Simultaneously, Congress fixed a limit on non-project aid of 30% of total aid, in order to guarantee project aid levels. Expenditures over 20% require Congressional consultation. This indicates

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<sup>20</sup> *These figures do not take into account structural adjustment funds granted through projects.*

*A Structural Adjustment Programme in Agriculture:  
The Case of Mauritania*

*The PASA accorded Mauritania was designed and cofinanced in 1990 by the World Bank; French cooperation (CCCE and FAC), German cooperation and the WFP. The PASA amounted to about 40 million US\$. This sectorial programme has three main themes:*

- *general policy and institutional reform,*
- *balance of payments support (nearly 70 % of the financial volume of the programme),*
- *accompanying actions.*

*This programme benefitted from a certain number of positive factors, in particular:*

- *liberalization had already begun in the rice market,*
- *the private sector showed some activity (private rice fields and hulling installations),*
- *SONADER's management had been improved,*
- *land reform had been initiated (with good knowledge of the land situation in the Trarza region),*
- *efforts had begun to create pastoral organizations in certain parts of the country.*

*But the PASA also had to account for a certain number of weaknesses including:*

- *poor collection of agricultural credit, in liberalizing the consumer price of rice,*
- *delays in applying liberal measures to rice pricing for consumers,*
- *the effective role of the CSA in selling and restructuring food aid,*
- *lack of technical know-how in the field adapted to the needs of the private sector,*
- *weakness in the government division responsible for agricultural research,*
- *a tendency to expand installations rather than optimize existing ones.*

*The whole the PASA is intended to remedy these weaknesses. A series of conditions was stipulated for disbursement. The PASA "invites the Government to consider the rights of Mauritanian groups displaced after the events in April 1989, as a result of land reform in the river valley."*

Congress' intention of supporting the overarching goal of ODA, that is, promoting long-term growth rather than short-term stabilization. At the outset, Economic Support Funds (ESF) were used to support economic reform these represent USAID's traditional form of programme-aid. However, there is now a tendency to use DFA funds, as resources are allocated according to what are essentially political criteria. This compromises the implementation of economic reform. **Since 1988, nearly 25% of the DFA's aid in the Sahel has been used for supporting fiscal and banking reforms or programmes in agriculture, basic health and education.** There is a tendency to mix project and programme aid. A new grant to agriculture in Niger seems to be a model for future activities because

it groups diverse targeted budgetary support, budgetary support for investment, as well as projects to finance NGOs and the private sector (20% of project aid<sup>21</sup>).

In **CANADA**, using credit lines, bilateral aid and food aid as direct support for structural adjustment began in 1987 and has not grown steadily. Projects approved by the CIDA amounted to 85 million C\$ in 1987/88 and to nearly 155 million C\$ in 1991 when they represented 20% of bilateral agreements. The use of these funds has increased in francophone Africa since 1990. The broad strategic orientations for spending these funds are flexible and allow for direct transfer of liquid assets or subsidizing imports to support balance of payments. There is no strict limit on non-project aid. Current policy would tend to increase Canada's influence in defining adjustment programmes and above all in determining the soundness of economic choices.

Currently, Canadian adjustment programmes in the Sahel are limited to Mali and Senegal. The liquid asset transfer programme in Mali, which amounts to 31 million C\$, began in 1989 with a view to help diminish the deficit and to support reform of public enterprise. The programme in Niger of 14 million C\$ was approved in 1990 and will be used to restructure the energy sector; the funds will permit the import of electricity and paying 75% of public arrears to the NIGELEC company. In Canada's Sahelian programme for 1992-97, 20 to 30% of the resources for each country concerned are destined for "macro-economic stability" through contributions to World Bank programmes or through direct transfers. In Senegal, 40 million C\$ have been appropriated as non-project aid (credit lines and food aid) for 1989-94 as well as for short-term budgetary support and support for the balance of payments.

**Overriding each agency's approach is the controversy over structural adjustment.** Implicit criticism of the World Bank's adjustment policy can be found in every agency<sup>22</sup>. In a long interview with "Courrier ACP-CEE" in July 1991, the President of the European Parliament's Development Commission, Henri Saby, was adamant: "As soon as the Bretton Woods institutions roll out their Chicago Boys programmes in countries that are strangled by debt, it only strangles them more. The twelve representatives at the World Bank are blind to everything but Chicago Boys criteria, it's out of hand." Henri Saby continues, "Through Lomé IV, the Community is trying to exert real pressure so that in the structural adjustment programs that we have planned, we can change the criteria of the World Bank and the IMF to move closer to real life and genuine chances for restructuring and development in these countries." Criticism does not only come from the European Parliament, it also comes from the French Parliament. When Alain Vivien was a deputy he noted "... a quicksand effect in black Africa where our resources go for dubious adjustment programmes to keep sinking administrations afloat. It's perpetuating a policy of Treasury loans for large export contracts when what's needed is to help these countries get out of debt." The period of skepticism is over and we're moving into a period of sharp criticism. There is not a single agency where officials don't implicitly criticize the current structural adjustment programmes. But this criticism does not seem to have any effect on the programmes

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<sup>21</sup> Cf. "Learning from Experience: Aid Programs for Economic Reform in Senegal and Mali (AERPS), Impact Evaluation Series, n° 74 and 77, USAID 1990.

<sup>22</sup> Sometimes the criticism is explicit. For example, J. Giri quoted by J.H. Guilmette (director of the Club du Sahel): "the experience of structural adjustment shows the persistence of the idea that what works well in the West will work everywhere."

themselves which continue at full speed<sup>23</sup>. Officials note that results are lacking, that the approach is "too financial" and that the social effects are adverse. This is not news. Does anyone have a constructive suggestion? Has anyone clearly formulated an alternative to adjustment?

A group of European researchers is trying to convince the World Bank to try **decentralizing aid and lending** as an alternative to adjustment, but the financial experts are not convinced by socio-economic arguments.

Will adjustment programmes continue through the 1990s? Most certainly. Despite all of the questions raised by the CAD/OECD about the "risks" inherent in such programmes, programme aid will absorb more than a third of aid to the Sahel (not including food aid and technical assistance).

### **Foreign Debt: Where do We Stand? What are the Prospects?**

Initiatives to allow countries in the Sahel to reabsorb their debts have been numerous. Nevertheless, debt levels in the Sahel remain high.

In May 1989, at the Francophone summit meeting in Dakar, the President of the French Republic announced an unconditional bilateral annulment of loans granted in the past for 35 poor and indebted countries in sub-Saharan Africa.

France initiates the orientations arising from the July 1989 summit meeting in Paris on reabsorbing debt:

- encouraging a reduction in outstanding debts as well as a reduction in debt servicing charges, rather than stimulating new loans to cover these charges,
- guarantee debt payments by making public loans available to middle-income countries.

In June 1990, at the summit in la Baule and later in Houston, France encouraged the Club du Sahel in Paris "to continue examining other options for processing debt service charges" for middle-income countries (particularly Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Cameroon and the Congo), and to "lengthen the deadlines for reimbursement" for the poorest countries. Swapping debt for payment in kind is not a widespread practice; in the Sahel it only a few countries engage in this activity and for very small amounts.

In financial terms, foreign indebtedness as a whole has been shrinking since the end of 1989. For the CILSS countries, it is about 13 billion US\$ (compared to 8 billion in 1984) and should reach 11.6 billion US\$ dollars by the end of 1991 (according to World Bank calculations). Until the year 2000, foreign indebtedness is expected to shrink by about 1 billion US\$ a year<sup>24</sup>.

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<sup>23</sup> *Do some officials in bilateral agencies adopt SAPS merely because they are relatively easy to implement? (rapid and simple disbursement, a uniformity of method for all countries).*

<sup>24</sup> *See the annexes for debt service charges and outstanding debt for each country in the Sahel between 1984 and 2000, according to the World Bank's calculations.*

## VI.2 Environment

Gradually, economic policies and instruments are integrating environmental preoccupations, Germany has decided to use a procedure to examine the ecological compatibility of all its projects. In the African countries, developing strategies for lasting development from an environmental point of view and on a national level is something which transcends purely ecological factors. Strategies for long-term development are closely tied to natural resource management capacities on the institutional and political levels.

The connection between environment and economic growth, as well as the international scope of a question which knows no political boundaries, raises particularly complex problems of coherence for international cooperation and assistance.

All countries insist that populations should be more involved in caring for their own environments: no one better than concerned populations knows how to make rational use of the natural resources which surround them. This "expressed desire" is often dashed by donors who seem to know exactly what is to be done and spell it out for recipients.

Currently, each country is elaborating its own strategy **in the Sahel, soil conservation and the fight against desertification are causes which mobilize everyone**. Rarely is the problem of urbanization raised, though the growth of cities has grave consequences for the environment. **Environmental problems are perceived as problems of forestry, grasslands or agriculture, with no mention of growing urbanization.**

**The United States has abandoned project approaches to the environment. Instead, it emphasizes policy reform to allow the fight against desertification to take place in a healthy economic context.** The World Bank and the CCCE (cf. projects in Niger for supporting land management, the PIGREN project) propose integrating natural resource management and agricultural management through the "native soil" approach (approche terroir). USAID is the only agency to cite themes elaborated at the CILSS/Club du Sahel meeting in Segou. Yet, weren't the principal elements related to environmental questions cited and analyzed? What more do agencies need to increase their assistance for environmental activities?

France is a country which likes to publicize its commitment and ideas. In June 1989, President François Mitterrand had 24 representatives from countries in Europe, Africa and Latin America sign an appeal for preserving the world's natural heritage, with a clause allowing for national sovereignty in managing certain resources. The **nature/debt swap** idea (which is not as interesting for countries in the franc zone as elsewhere, though it will soon begin in Senegal and Mali) has already proved successful in Latin America and Madagascar. The World Climate Agreement and global facilities from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) are French ideas. France is responsible for the Observatory of the Sahara and the Sahel and is also the country that invited 850 NGOs from all over the world to meet in Paris in December 1991 to prepare the Rio de Janeiro meeting. More than any other country, Japan makes international appeals on environmental questions and has created a special fund for the environment of 700 million dollars/per year for three years. France, on the other hand, is only appropriating 2.5 million dollars to environmental cooperation with Africa. The rest (50 million dollars) is for IBRD's "global facility."

Italy and Canada are the only countries which in their environmental policy statements mention "Our Common Future" or the Brundtland report (The United Nations Commission on the Environment and Development) in elaborating their development strategies in favor of the environment.

Germany and Japan deplore the fact that the environment is rarely a priority for countries receiving development aid. Unlike other donors, Germany emphasizes sharing what has been learned from the struggle against desertification in the Sahel.

Forests mobilize strong interest: Germany (cf. the German mission to the CILSS), Switzerland and Canada have made forestry a high priority they stress **integrated approaches (energy alternatives to firewood, agro-pastoral integration, etc.)**.

Switzerland is the only country to explicitly mention global risks (the ozone layer, the greenhouse effect) in its policies of cooperation. These risks have been mobilizing governments around the world over the last two years. The United Nations conference in Rio may be on "The Environment and Development," but the global risks are what have motivated so much interest.

The gap between environmental policy and programming aid for environmental issues is not as wide as the gap between the different ways environmental questions can be approached. Although they are cross-sectional, problems environmental can be broken down into "sectors" : forests, soil erosion, biodiversity, endangered species, etc. But the environment can also be the subject of an integrated approach combining issues in education, rural development, institutional and macro-economic reform. The World Bank sets the tone where reform is concerned. Whatever the case, this is certainly what donors will most need to discuss and coordinate in the coming years.

### **VI.3 The War on Poverty**

After the push to satisfy basic human needs (in 1967-68) came the war on poverty, a contemporary approach which coincides with the exclusion of a large part of the world's population from the generosities of development.

The goal does not sound new because the problems have not changed: illiteracy has been with us for some time, as have infant mortality and hunger<sup>25</sup>.

Sweeping policies to solve these problems have not worked and today "the poor" are back. This term --and the vocabulary which goes with it-- make their reappearance, interestingly enough, just as the world is discovering the disastrous social effects of structural adjustment<sup>26</sup>. Consider the programmes for combatting poverty through education.

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<sup>25</sup> *The recent United Nations Development Programme report on "human development" gives statistics on health and education which show how long the road ahead is.*

<sup>26</sup> *The reader may refer to the study "Poids de l'Etat et réformes budgétaires dans les pays du CILSS", Pascale Comlan, COBEA/ORSAY, May 1991.*

Education is an investment in the future, and is without exception a priority on the agenda of every aid agency. Education is a classic theme for foreign aid but the way it appears in budgets does not correspond to the urgency of the situation. In the Sahel in particular, an average of 70 to 85% of the population is illiterate depending on the country and 95% of women are illiterate. The situation has hardly changed in thirty years.

Six of the 10 most illiterate countries in the world are CILSS countries (Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, Chad, Senegal and Gambia). UNESCO's call for making 1980-90 the decade of basic education, was a response to a desperate situation which foreign aid has not been able to solve.

The portion of foreign assistance which goes to education has always been modest: less than 9% of total aid in the Sahel (R. Pons, 1990). What is even more striking is that out of this modest 9%, primary education gets very little.

Most of the funding for education (particularly funding from France) goes to training elites and the military. In 1989, only 7% of aid for education in the Sahel went to primary education, 16% went to secondary education, 33% went to technical and professional training (including teacher training) and 34% went to higher education.

Foreign assistance accentuates the tendency of African governments to finance education for the city-dwelling bourgeoisie, which is to say for the families of African leaders, public officials, military servicemen and large merchants.

Compounding matters, education was the first casualty of structural adjustment: teaching materials became unavailable, teachers were hard to find and infrastructures deteriorated. Government appropriations for education, already extremely modest (2 to 4% of the GNP) in the CILSS countries, have fallen since 1980, particularly in Mali and Niger. The former Minister of French cooperation, Jacques Pelletier remarked, "In the domain of education, international initiatives are often blocked by World Bank and IMF representatives in Africa." (October 1988).

For example, Swiss assistance for education, which has traditionally amounted to 15% of this country's commitments, has fallen to 13%. France applied 16% of its aid fund to training and education in 1981 and 8% in 1990. In the United States, education and population sectors are combined. Education attracted a vague interest in 1988, because Congress noted the disparity between USAID's educational policy and the funds it allocated. Germany has never targeted more than 3% of its assistance for education in the Sahel (as technical assistance. Financial aid is rather like 0.3%).

Under such conditions, it is difficult to understand how the World Bank can claim that "Structural adjustment, revitalization and growth policies have had a beneficial effect on literacy and mathematical skills." The World Bank has been encouraged to focus less of its attention on secondary education and more on primary education by encouraging the access of girls to grade school. Such specific advice falls outside of the jurisprudence of the World Bank's policies which deal with educational issues as a facet of population-health-nutrition (PHN) concerns.

"The War on Poverty," a new catch phrase, is an opportunity for aid agencies to discuss basic education. But is this war they are waging a priority, and are they being consistent?

### ***The Bamako Resolution, Where do we stand?***

*This is a resolution which was drafted in Bamako in 1987 at a meeting of the then African ministers of health, WHO and UNICEF. After the meeting's review and evaluation of the principle obstacles to spreading basic health care (since Alma Ata), the Bamako resolution was proposed as a new health strategy.*

*The resolution proposes circumventing the bankrupt African health care systems through the sale of basic medicine at the community level in order to generate a renewable fund for buying more medicine. The management of the fund would be handled by the nurse at the health care centre and a community member. The new strategy was adopted by WHO in 1988; it was provided with a slogan, "Universal Care" and was to be supported by 200 million US\$ worth of financing between 1990 and 1992. So far, 20 million dollars have been disbursed essentially for feasibility studies.*

*Resolution after resolution, each resembling the last, is adopted without consideration for the best interests of the people concerned, as if they did not already have a history with the problem: they live from the failure of one resolution to the failure of the next. The Bamako resolution was supposed to be based on decentralization and community participation, but in the field it worked against both.*

*This is an extract from "The Impact of UN Slogans on the technical assistance programmes of Doctors without Borders," MSF, Paris, February 1991.*

#### **VI.4 Decentralization and the End of State Control**

To stay solvent, countries were obliged to adopt the structural adjustment programmes proposed by the World Bank and the IMF. Adjustment policies initially slowed economies and had negative effects on the poorest. The World Bank has attempted to reconcile these adjustments with new economic growth policies. For growth to take place, the Bank has suggested quickly liberalizing the economies of the countries in question.

The fact is that very often governments have favoured the public sector. Most development policies were based on the government's ability to organize a country's economy. In Africa, where modern entrepreneurs were lacking, governments went about organizing the activities they thought were needed: trade, transportation, manufacturing, production, mining, etc. The resources required for these investments and their administration came mainly from taxes levied on imports and exports. But as administrations grew to gigantic proportions, taxes no longer provided sufficient revenues. By the end of the 1980s, activities such as trade, transportation, banking and so on were in a state of disaster. The World Bank proposed privatization, but buyers were not to be found. Consequently, the and the Bank came up with other solutions such as encouraging market mechanisms, and small businesses.

If the government share in African economies is to be reduced, new institutions will have to take charge of credit, supplying electricity and water, banking, education, research, health, public information, etc. Privatization is faltering and limiting the activities of the state is not the same thing as decentralization. It is not just from too much government that African countries are suffering, but also

from centralization. Foreign assistance is also very centralized. There is a need for creating organizations built on associative models for managing the common good and stimulating private enterprise, and also to create local public collectives to manage public property (on the scale of the village, supra-village, region).

Obviously, there can be no institutional system valid for all places or all times. Each society has its own institutions to manage public, private, and common goods. Sometimes they define rules of access, levy local taxes, and impose sanctions. All these rules emerge from very lengthy negotiations.

For example, within the framework of a reform programme set up by USAID in Niger (entitled ASDG II), subsidy payments are not made until the reforms are made in particular as concerns the decentralization of natural resource management to local authorities<sup>27</sup>.

The World Bank is testing new "native soil" approaches involving community management of natural resources at the grass-roots level. Each community involved is to take responsibility for design and execution of a plan of action making optimal use of land in each sector: anti-erosion measures, water recycling, improvement of pasture land, agriculture and forestry activities. Reforms will gradually delegate management and training responsibilities to the communities. Such 15 or 20-year programmes would be cofinanced by France, Germany and Norway in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Chad.

Today, government services need to adapt to the idea of decentralizing their prerogatives. If governments undertook this decentralization, it would mean a complete transformation of the institutional landscape. This transition could be helped along if international aid would also decentralize.<sup>28</sup>

It is very clear that decentralization of this sort can only take place within a rule of law context. Under rule of law, associations and local collectives could receive money from donors wherever that investment was needed without government involvement.

After 30 years of Government to Government cooperation, is a new era of decentralization and local development beginning? Nothing is less sure. After its "All-State" phase, the World Bank is tending toward an "All-Market" phase, a liberalism which is often difficult for poor countries to bear. The decay of public services is followed by oligopolies of opportunity incapable of guaranteeing the expected growth.

What donors are proposing is to end state control to benefit the market. But will it benefit civil society? Limiting the role of the state and liberalization go together. Can we be certain that expanding the role of the market will increase market access for traders and producers? Of course, the access of private citizens to the market will need developing, but liberalism cannot do everything.

Nevertheless, in the aid agencies, politicians and technicians are calling for cooperation with actors other than governments. But apparently, it is difficult to find those other actors and to set up

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<sup>27</sup> *The decentralization experiment in Niger is a prototype for projects USAID has planned in Mali and Senegal. It is also an experiment to test the Segou resolution.*

<sup>28</sup> *At the French Ministry of Cooperation there is a decentralized aid office, but decentralized aid represents less than 0.3 % of total French aid to Subsaharan Africa.*

the kind of financing they need. **Aid agencies would certainly benefit by sharing their experiences in this domain<sup>29</sup>.**

## **VI.5 Regional Integration: think regionally, negotiate bilaterally**

The attitudes donors adopt toward regional integration or regional cooperation are often different. Aid agency policies are not yet formalized and many questions persist. However, for agencies across the board, in financial terms, regional projects are few and have declined throughout the 1980s.

Before analyzing the evolution and global changes in regional approaches over the last decade, what are the strategies and programmes of the principal donors?

The **UNITED STATES** began approaching development regionally in the 1970s with an independent regional programme and a regional bureau offering direct support for the strategy and activities of the Club du Sahel. The Sahel Development Program (SDP) was an alternative to the traditional bilateral approach. After its initial year it was carried into an additional year within the framework of the SADCC. Tension occurred as a result of the SDP's basing national programmes within the framework of a regional strategy developed by a group of donors and recipients. The SDP was perceived by country missions as an initiative coming from Paris and Washington for outlining national programmes and directing resources toward regional institutions. The revised 1984 SDP strategy suggested a compromise: "think in regional frameworks and negotiate in bilateral ones."

But the bilateral bias persisted, visibly so in the abolishment of regional planning teams in 1985 and in the integration of the development programmes in the river basins into bilateral programmes. More recently, the bias has been visible in the delayed responses bilateral programmes have made to regional trade, something which will accentuate when programme responsibilities are decentralized to field missions.

From the beginning of SDP, USAID has encouraged regional cooperation through a portfolio of specific projects destined to resolve endemic common problems, strengthen regional institutions, and minimize the duplication of development activities. Nearly 30% of SDP funds (252 million US\$) was spent for regional projects between 1978 and 1987. Regional funding increased rapidly from 1979 (15.4 million US\$) to reach a peak of 40.2 million US\$ in 1984, after which it dropped from 22.9 million US\$ in 1975 to 10.9 million in 1988. A sectorial breakdown reveals that in 1983-84, 67% of funds were allocated to agriculture and river basin development, 13% went to social sectors and the rest went to financing studies on the recurrent costs of cereal and ecological policies. By the end of the 1980s, the number of categories had increased; in 1987, 34% went for human resource development and setting up institutions; 13% went to health and family planning, 20% for agricultural reforms and the private sector and 13% for improving financial management.

The first regional programmes concentrated on infrastructure in river basins and support for the CILSS. In the mid 1980s, the emphasis was on management support to CILSS institutions and fostering regional cooperation through coordinating food aid programmes and policies for trade and cereals.

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<sup>29</sup> *As part of its work on decentralization and the private sector, the Club du Sahel has sponsored this kind of experience sharing.*

USAID has consistently supported crop protection programmes, the fight against onchocercosis and training, but funding for such programmes has fallen away from the Sahel and is now directed towards African regional projects led by the DFA. The number of regional projects managed by the Africa Bureau has dwindled from about 30 in 1980 to 5 in 1990. These projects mainly concern supporting such regional institutions as AGRHYMET and CERPOD by more than 78%. This change in scope of the Bureau's activities designate it for more policy analysis in relation with the CILSS/Club du Sahel rather than for the implementation of projects.

Supporting the CILSS and its specialized institutes has been a priority since 1978. Recently accent has shifted from technical assistance to improving management: USAID has actively contributed to the restructuring of CILSS. INSAH's funds have been dropping since 1987 and CERPOD's population policies have received more attention. Support for INSAH, limited in recent years to research on food security, will be modified in 1992 through the initiation of institutional reform programmes and a 5 million US\$ project for data base management. Support for AGRHYMET has been high and constant (about 1.7 million in 1978 and 1989) and centered on harvest forecasts. Half the growth in annual contributions to the secretariat of the CILSS --from 400,000 US\$ to 600,000 US\$ in 1989-- was used to finance a consultant in planning.

New research priorities have appeared now that regional trade and a stronger private sector are considered to be the means for attaining food security, just as the decentralization of natural resource management is considered to be the key to re-establishing ecological equilibrium. In 1989-91 DFA funds went to studies and activities in trade (20%), the private and informal sectors (28%) and natural resources including land resource management and certain aspects of decentralization (20%).

The growing tendency to consider the Sahel as part of larger West Africa was encouraged by an official mandate to use DFA funds for fostering the integration of African production, markets and infrastructure. AID has encouraged studies of cereals and livestock trade since 1970 for the preparation of regional conferences such as Nouakchott, Mindelo and others. Since the middle of the 1980s, this emphasis on market development has concentrated research on the links between the Sahelian countries and the coastal countries as a basis for inter-regional trade. Through studies on the effects of currency rates on cereal prices, a current research subsidy in the "Western Sub-space" is trying to examine the monetary barriers to regional trade. The United States and the World Bank are cofinancing a plan to liberalize markets and stimulate the growth of animal products in the central corridor. The United States actively participated in creating CINERGIE, a unit for regional integration, by contributing an initial 600,000 US\$.

Through regional projects, the CIDA simultaneously approaches problems shared by neighboring countries or intervenes in countries where it has not set up any programmes. In West Africa, the first projects for developing regional cooperation began in 1975 with PANAFTEL (a typical example of a regional project designed without regional organization), the OMVS, and support granted to the CILSS and the Club du Sahel. These projects absorbed major investments. Between 1980 and 1990, 148.3 million dollars or 15% of bilateral aid were invested in regional projects in the Sahel. Funding levels oscillated between just over 20 million and 6 million dollars over the decade as projects developed. Despite the fact that funding for regional projects in francophone Africa is expected to decrease between 1992 and 1997, regional funds for the Sahel will rise.

Canada's regional projects in the Sahel concentrate on institutional support as well as research and development for infrastructure. In the past, these projects have essentially been management

mechanisms for establishing economies of scale, but this imposed a heavy administrative burden (for example, coordinating the work of agencies in five different countries for PANAFTEL). These projects absorbed half of the regional programme resources in 1985-90. Aid for the Club du Sahel and the CILSS represented 30% of regional resources; 15% went for supporting research to reinforce Sahelian institutions. The remaining 5% were directed to regional integration through the development of infrastructures and institutional liaisons.

Regional integration will be strategic for programmes between 1992 and 1997 in francophone Africa and the Sahel. As it becomes more important, the concern over regional integration is progressively modifying the nature of CANADA's regional programmes. According to provisions, the 1992-97 programme will channel resources through 15 operational projects which will contribute to resource integration (15%), support institutions through promoting dialogue between researchers and aid coordinators (30%), research support (15%) and make regional mechanisms available for project management (40%). Investments are being restructured to work more directly for regional integration: a regional indicative programme amount has been requested and the additional resources should permit backing institutions which foster economic integration (CINERGIE, for instance). The programme is becoming more flexible via mechanisms that encourage regional cooperation: opening of partially untied credit lines for goods from African sources.

CANADA<sup>30</sup> continues to work for integration through its support for creating sub-regional groupings around economic and political centres of influence. The way such poles of economic or political influence overlap for the Ivory Coast, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger is an illustration. Because Canada supports development based on comparative advantage, its first priority is not market development, but rather improving infrastructures in order to enlarge production systems and establish a basis for allowing products to circulate. In light of the obstacles to growth in inter-regional trade, this work will continue but will be modified according to the follow up measures suggested by "Western sub-space" research. The CIDA did not directly participate in this research because its programme is centered on "Central sub-space," but it intends to participate in future studies as well as in the formulation of strategies or to participate in some programmes according to their definition. It is also planning to participate more actively in research on the "Central sub-space" as well as exploring relations between Niger and Nigeria.

The state of quasi-disfunction of a number of organizations as well as the lack of political will of ECOWAS members to take action against customs barriers, raises a certain number of questions about the future of regional integration, at least formally. The CIDA is interested in informal exchange and can, resources permitting, provide funding for a CERPOD study on migration and urbanization in West Africa. The IDRC has initiated a series of research projects on regional integration with the universities in Abidjan, Dakar, Accra, Lagos and Ouagadougou. Several seminars will take place in 1991-92.

The **WORLD BANK** approaches difficulties on the regional scale through thematic initiatives and supporting regional institutions. Recently, the World Bank and the Netherlands led operations to create a Global Coalition for Africa (GCA) in order not to lose sight of the specifics of the region, and to coordinate actions concerning orientation of LTPS (these studies are now undertaken by the UNDP

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<sup>30</sup> For detailed information on Canada's support for regional organizations including the CILSS and the Club du Sahel, see "La politique canadienne de coopération avec les pays du CILSS" Sheila Reines, COBEA/JORSAY, September 1991. The CRDI's regional programmes are also presented and analysed.

on a national scale in several countries). The GCA was originally designed as a small autonomous entity to complement sub-regional bodies; it emphasizes the domains incumbent on LTPS action programmes. By pushing market integration, the Bank has led efforts to develop sub-regional trade, such as coastal links with the Sahel. The creation of a regional team has helped resolve difficulties encountered in the framework of trade policy. A gradual approach is what is recommended here: short-term at first, by using specific products in a limited number of countries convened to develop integration models; and in the medium-term, it will accelerate the extension to other groups of countries and other product categories until most of West Africa is covered and integrated. The Bank has helped get the process started by emphasizing livestock products and cereals (which make up a large part of the West African market); it commissions studies on commercial flows and the evaluation of local currencies and gives preference to studies of meat in the central corridor zone. The role of the ECOWAS or of the WAEC will depend on the capacity to eliminate trade barriers and harmonize policies pertaining to customs duties taxes. A study on trade reform policy, made by the Bank.

**FRANCE** is beginning to think about regional integration in more than one way and notably with the CILSS/CLUB DU SAHEL. Several policy initiatives have been taken at the Ministry of Rural Development in Senegal, now known as the "Cissokho initiative" as well as in the framework of the "franc zone."

The Minister of Rural Development's initiative seeks to:

- create a regional common market in West Africa for agricultural and agro-industrial products,
- take coordinated measures for developing the export of agricultural products and the production of import substitutes by stimulating competition.


The ministers of the franc zone, at a meeting in Ouagadougou the 25th of April 1991, decided to begin a process of economic integration based on their common currency which would also improve the chances of the franc zone's long term viability. The idea is to harmonize the instruments of economic policy in the franc zone rather than lay the foundations of a common market. The six main areas are as follows:

- insurance in the franc zone (reforming regulation and institutions),
- managing and harmonizing fiscal and savings systems,
- regional business law (this will arise from the emergence of of a true regional business space),
- launching a regional financial work plan,
- creating a regional establishment for education in economy and finance and a regional observatory for statistics (in the franc zone),
- regional integrated approach for restructuring of public enterprises for social insurance.

This indicates a change in donor attitude over the last decade. Regional financing concerns infrastructure, regional development banks or intergovernmental organizations. Regional institutions are

now in an acute crisis <sup>31</sup> because their efficiency and purpose are no longer clear. This is a widespread opinion among donors. But how else can the regional idea be translated? Can regional institutions be entirely eliminated? Certainly not. Shouldn't there be some sort of formal framework for discussion? Isn't the ECOWAS (all 16 countries in the region are members) the appropriate framework? Governments have not been able to keep up with regional institutions. In the future, the difference in regional and national trends should be accounted for. Shouldn't regional organizations foster, or at least not stand in the way of, limited agreements between countries? Shouldn't countries be encouraged to share information and diagnostics? This is why CINERGIE was created.

## REGIONAL INTEGRATION



Source : COBEA/ORSAY - Université Paris 11

Regional financing seems to be "on hold" until more efficient regional institutions can be found. The same can be said for projects with a regional dimension and these are in most of the sectors.

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<sup>31</sup> We mean regional institutions in charge of economic integration like the CEAO and UDEAC. The efficiency and purpose of institutions whose activities are more specific and "sectorial" like the OCLALAV and AGÏHYMET, are not being challenged.

Projects directly financed by agencies, designed on the regional framework and negotiated bilaterally (isn't this what was suggested at Lomé IV?) are only embryonic in the beginning of the 1990s. They could certainly be "second generation" projects to follow those designed by regional organizations. Productive investments can no longer be imagined without exploring market outlets in neighboring countries, or without concerning the eventual harmful effects to neighboring economies, or without thinking in terms of economies of scale. It also appears that financing reform measures that foster trade between countries is a preferred donor strategy. (See diagram above.) The CILSS/Club du Sahel symposia in Lomé (November 1989) and Bamako (May 1991) allowed a better understanding of how regional trade really works. Now aid agencies are wondering how to take these regional realities into account and if it would not simply be better to try and harmonize countries and eliminate nuisance without going through regional institutions. But how can regional relations actually be strengthened?

Regional relations are defined in "sub-regional terms" of expanding markets and increasing trade between countries starting with cereals and meat. The World Bank, the European Development Fund (EDF), Canada, the United States and the Netherlands all support this new approach. Germany and Italy adhere to older conceptions. As for France, though it wishes to promote regional integration and trade, it has its own action in the region through the franc zone and this zone has a different geographic coherence than integration between the Sahelian and the coastal countries. More generally, within which regions are these actions to be undertaken? There seems to be no single answer to that question. In any case, there needs to be flexibility in the definition of these sub-spaces so that they conform to the appropriate products. Finally, discussions on regional trade and on the parity of currencies being used in West Africa should be linked.

## **VI.6 Conditional Cooperation**

Adjustment, cross-sectional approaches, reducing the role of government or full market reliance, make "cooperation" less a question of working together than a question of the recipients accepting a donor's conditions.

From the project approach we have come to the cross-sectional approach championed by the World Bank. This cross-sectional approach concerns all of the sectors to which is added the conditionality of democracy.

These various phases are sequential and build on each other. Donors want to have everything under control before committing financial resources. From offering a step by step approach in terms of project development we have moved to a macro-economic and political approach can no longer be said that development is the explicit intent of aid.

Consequently, foreign and local government investment has dropped and donors are increasingly free to interfere in recipient countries. Interference occurs when donors define the economic and political criteria for receiving foreign aid.


In such a context, what is the point of talking about decentralization or civil society in development? The question remains even if eligibility involves democratic criteria. Has "cooperation" become an empty word? Democracy did not come to Eastern Europe from the outside. Multipartyism is not a sufficient sign of economic, political or social democracy in Africa.

Can civil society succeed where governments have failed? Can foreign aid accompany civilian aspirations on a large scale (decentralized power)? Policy elements are not appropriated by the populations: reforms are often global and do not take local conditions into account. Is there not a tendency toward uniform approaches on the part of donors? According to Michel Grifon: "After the phase of government to government bilateral cooperation which lasted for twenty years following independence, and after the structural adjustment phase financed by multilateral aid, **it is necessary to diversify relations between societies and to reinforce a third channel of cooperation between decentralized public and private partners and associations working together for local development.**"

This opinion is shared by a few independent experts and researchers and does not appear in the explicit strategies of donors. Donors forged African governments and continue to make them what they are: **if economic and democratic conditionalities are respected, aid is granted but always within the framework of a centralized State which cannot guarantee local government.** Aren't diplomatic and geostrategic considerations which have a wide gap between their statements on development (which in itself is not objectionable) and practices which impose their public sector logic (democratic conditions, for example...) incompatible with local development?

# WHEN ASSISTANCE BECOMES INSISTENCE

How the question of development became a question of democracy



<p>Chapter VII <b>NEW DEMOCRATIC PREREQUISITES</b></p>
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**From development to democratic assistance?**

Donors are not responsible for having made aid contingent upon democracy. Rather it is due to the awakening of populations which began in 1989 in Eastern Europe and in Africa, and a bit earlier in Latin America. The end of dictatorships, some of which had lasted quite a while, was in some cases facilitated by donors but was never their initiative. Even today, there are donors who do not disapprove of certain heads of state who are frankly and unanimously despised by their countrymen.

France is an exemplary donor on more than one count: first, for its attachment to Africa; secondly, for its international image as the country of Liberty and finally, because France cannot do without the zones of influence which make it "a world power." The first link between a country and its zone of influence is "cooperation".

**-The Turning Point of the la Baule Summit: grants and democracy**

A small statement made by President François Mitterrand at the press conference which closed the Franco-African **la Baule summit** (June 1990) was highly significant: "Of course French development assistance for countries with authoritative regimes that refuse to evolve toward democracy is not as hearty as aid for countries who take the big step with courage." This comment, which marked a turning point in French cooperation with Africa (at a time when other bilateral and multilateral donor attitudes were also changing), was not to the liking of a number of African leaders who were surprised by this kind of talk. This occurred at the same time that the French President, announced the decision to turn all Least Developed Countries loans into grants: "France was once the largest supplier of grants but also of loans for the least developed countries, but we will no longer lend them our financial support in any other form but grants. This decision will have far-reaching effects and calls for reflection, which I have set in motion, as to its implementation. After the measure which annulled debts owed us at the Dakar Summit, debts which amounted to more than 25 billion francs, France confirms its position as the top donor in sub-Saharan Africa, top donor in quality as well as quantity."

Democratic conditionalities are combined with the increase in assistance, but this can be dangerous according to E. Simmonds, President of the ACP-EEC Assembly, "When aid to a developing country is suspended because of human rights violations, it is not the leaders who suffer, it's the population in general."

Political requirements are also becoming important for **CANADA**. The Parliament has asked that bilateral and multilateral aid for economic adjustment be accorded on the basis of the extent to which Canadian values --democratization, human rights, freedom of expression-- are respected. An explicit and "coercive conditionality" plus less-direct supports for holding elections, freeing the press and institutional development, are Canada's means for encouraging democracy. But won't this kind of political condition for aid work against local appropriation of development programmes? The CIDA's response to this question is contained in the way it defines "conditionality" as a means of guaranteeing that the agreements which regulate aid are respected. This approach can also include measures which call for more participation from actors other than the state.

Aid for democracy has become an essential theme for the **UNITED STATES**. The commitment to democracy is rooted in the conviction that democracy will facilitate the transition to a market economy. In accordance with DFA objectives, democratization is considered less an end in itself than a tool for stimulating lasting economic growth; a means for establishing a favorable climate for free enterprise and initiative. Exactly what this means in practice is yet to be worked out and major questions remain unanswered, these are: to what extent will political conditions weigh on development activities? To what extent does aid for democratization serve ends that are not linked to development?

The **WORLD BANK**'s implication in democratic processes is limited by its statutes forbidding "interference" in the political affairs of its member-countries, or even considering factors other than economic ones for approving a loan. Nevertheless, the World Bank has some latitude in defining loan conditions to foster the democratic spirit through liberalization, the fight against monopolies and greater recipient participation in projects. The World Bank could take action in other controversial areas such as nepotism and corruption by commissioning conceptual studies through the Global Coalition for Africa.

But what about development?

In his address to his fellow ministers in June 1990, a jubilant Jacques Pelletier had this to say about French cooperation's new directions: "The year 1990 opened with profound changes to the South as in the East. France is measuring these changes, analysing the crisis and listening to the profound democratic aspirations expressed in Africa. At the la Baule Summit, the President of the Republic has just encouraged the move toward political and economic pluralism as well as increasing the role of populations and civil society."

"Though the conditionalities which accompany our aid are technical in nature, they often have a political dimension : they may call for organizing producers, for revenue sharing or setting up institutions, for urban and rural planning, decentralization, rigorous management, or for anything else which can lead to a State of law and find a place for democracy in the heart of development. Naturally, each of our partners in cooperation must be able to progress at their own pace."

Donors almost all agree on the "objective" criteria for democracy: multipartism (an easy criterion to meet which several African heads of state have signed into existence), freedom of the press (there

is a strong emergence of newspapers which have trouble keeping solvent) and general elections for the head of state (this is not as easy to do but fake elections have existed for a long time). Few allusions are made to a fourth but fundamental criterion for local development: **the freedom to associate**. As for economic democracy, that is to say, reducing inequality, only Germany proposes to measure this with an evaluation grid based on twelve criteria. (See boxed paragraph below).

The breakdown of development strategies has favoured the overthrow of what had become an adage: "no democracy without development." By encouraging African governments to be more democratic, donors show that they believe the two are inseparable<sup>32</sup>. It should briefly be noted that in the 1970s hopes for the take off of Cameroon and the Ivory Coast's economies were no doubt due to the fact that they were single-party countries.

Now that democracy has become a universal value and the right to interfere has been accepted, development theories are being marginalized.

Isn't this rush for democracy "from the top down" risky? It is rather extraordinary to watch dictators simulating democracy through a façade of multipartism (in Zaire they call it multimobutism), which donors credit with a capacity to transfer power. Democracy is certainly not a new concept in Africa: re-elections with 99% of votes have existed for a long time. The general corruption is such that having an elected government in office is no reason for being optimistic. Multipartism is no guarantee against corruption or waste (just take a look at Nigeria or our own democracies). Didn't Liberia furnish an example of fake democracy under Samuel Doe? Thomas Hobbes, (English philosopher 1588-1675), expressed his thoughts on democracy as follows: "The prosperity of a people governed by an aristocratic or democratic assembly is not due to the aristocratic or democratic system, but to the obedience and accord of its subjects: and if the people flourish under a monarchy, it is not because a single man has the right to rule but because people obey him." This idea that prosperity is not linked to this or that system should be reason enough to reflect upon the natural limits of judging a political situation in a country, even if it is possible to define objective criteria (democracy as an empirical rather than theoretical notion). Manuel Marin, Vice-President of the European Economic Commission, says it in these terms: "We should be aware that democracy cannot be imposed from the outside... Our immediate priority should be to foster what might be called economic democracy in which every stratum of the population has equal access to economic resources and a stronger role in development... This pursuit of the principal of "good governance" implies that internal controls already exist for use of development funds."

How many Africans still do not know that they could play a role in their country's political life? That the government in place is termed a dictatorship, or a democracy matters little to them. Governmental actions, whatever their intentions, will not have any democratic legitimacy until they become local. Local development has a large role to play in teaching civic education and responsibility. Despite its having fallen from grace with the media, the old adage is back in a new form, "no democracy without local development."

We handled development with certainties, what is to prevent us from doing the same to democracy? Doesn't it seem that what democracy lacks today is decentralization? That is to say, that

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<sup>32</sup> Claude Werthier, "Afrique: démocratie et tribalisme," *Libération*, Thursday, August 8, 1991.

there should be the possibility for all communities to be culturally autonomous and make their own developmental choices and decide on the best foundation for their own democracy?

*Shouldn't democracy in Africa be structured and forged through values other than Western values? The basis of European democracy is "one man, one vote." In societies where community is more important than the individual, why couldn't democracy have other bases: the village, the family, the ethnic group... tribalism? Tribalism is not a situation to reject without thinking. Freudian analysis presents the tribe as a social group which recognizes itself in a totem and has got an organization of production and trade of its own. The tribal idea this definition describes is not necessarily a sign of conflict. Over these socio ethnic groups, States have been set up in which a single party and ethnic group holds power. The examples in almost every African country are instructive. In such a context, inter-ethnic conflict has often been driven by the exclusion of an ethnic minority from the economic and political system. In such cases, the party in power had no legitimacy in the eyes of the minority. Wouldn't it be possible to build a representative system based on ethnic groups rather than on arbitrary administrative zones? Wasn't Athenian democracy based on tribal representativeness?*

*Except from the ACP Letter, July-August 1991*

### **National Conferences**

The conference which took place in Cotonou in February 1990 served as a model for many West African countries. In Mali, Zaire, Niger, Togo and Chad students are demonstrating to call for a similar conference in their own countries. The donors, beginning with France, are preparing to finance referenda, polls, and the administrative details. What is the significance of these national conferences and what are their limits? Apparently, the idea is to divest the head of state of any real prerogatives and give the reins of government to a sovereign organization representing popular will. It is probably illusory to believe that such a dramatic political change could take place if it were not in favour of the elite. But we should remain vigilant and remember that the participants to these conferences designate themselves without much obstacle. At the conferences, representatives of any real opposition rub elbows with the party bosses of the single party who would like to be rehabilitated, something which does not promote efficiency. It is true that no one has ever claimed democracy was efficient.

Though the representativity of these conferences is challenged, they are nevertheless an important step toward national dialogue, a place for exchanging points of view such as Africa has not seen for a very long time. A current fashion, these national conferences pay tribute to all trends. Still, they are certain proof of a change in mentalities and a redistribution of initiative within African societies. Any concrete transformations will probably be long in coming, and the problems of development will be back before too long. Won't these revived spirits of independence oblige donors to establish renewed relations with African countries?

Things are moving quickly, very quickly. Though it must be remembered that there are no hard and fast economic laws, and that something which occurs in a given country at a given time may not appear in similar situations elsewhere, it is nevertheless instructive to cite the example of an Eastern European country that is "opening," Poland. There, democratization has been accompanied by a

disenchantment with politics which became apparent during the last legislative elections. This "refusal" of the political sphere is due to the fact that the incomes and prices demanded by the Poles cannot be satisfied within the framework of adjustment and of opening a market economy. The democratic process in Africa which denounces corruption and non-representative government is also calling for a more equitable distribution of incomes. Won't this have an effect on structural adjustment policies? **Aren't democracy and adjustment going to conflict?** How will aid agencies resolve this contradiction?

## CONCLUSION

No one would deny that development assistance policies are at a turning point. But where are they going? The way political events have accelerated since 1989 certainly influenced cooperation methods: the growing importance attributed to the economy, the intensive focus on Africa, the way donors have recognized the World Bank's preeminence and have used their own capacity for initiative and the way non-governmental organizations are realizing that recognition for their work is growing.

These changes are also the fruit of experience, of thirty years of assistance which has not lead to development. Donors have made enormous sums of money available to developing countries. Before debt became a terrible burden, didn't loans represent a fabulous opportunity? Were technical assistance, expertise, and technical means insufficient? Couldn't governmental cooperation take the place of grassroots initiative? Today, it is possible to answer these questions and a number of donors admit: "Most important was the profit we thought we could get out of this aid," "recipients were to be future buyers," "we never did manage to make a priority of the cultural approach," "objectives in the field ran contrary to political objectives,".

To claim that these mixed results of thirty years of failure are going to make a revolution in aid policy is unrealistic. Changes can be measured. But changes do not necessarily mean improvements.

### **An Absence of Priorities**

Is the absence of priorities due to a need to perfect discourse or to adapt to a new context? Whatever the case, the traditional sectorial priorities such as education, health and agriculture are dated. In their stead, have come the cross-sectional priorities which involve all sectors: the war on poverty (reminiscent of the "fundamental needs" campaign in the 1960s), structural adjustment, protecting the environment, regional integration and state disengagement.

Statistics show that sectorial aid is subject to a certain inertia. Structural adjustment is the only truly new category with a real macro-economic dimension.

Rural development projects have always been involved with environmental protection, as Mr. Jourdain had always been speaking in prose. Today the environment is attracting so much media attention that some countries like Japan, Canada and the United States, have created special funds for it. Other countries have not changed their aid levels for environment, they have just changed their stated policies.

The stagnation of global aid levels is striking. Aside from the Scandinavian countries, no donor has yet to reach the symbolic official development assistance levels of 0.7% of their GNP. In the last decade, aid to the Sahel has grown by an average of 7% a year, the strongest growth for any developing region the world over.

### **Interest in the Sahel rallies slightly...**

Africa as a whole is a major development priority for all donors. The economic gap vis a vis other continents is growing, which explains the increasing grants and particular arrangements created to relieve the debt burden of the poorest countries which are concentrated on this continent. Still, the interest shown Africa in the 1980s may fall off both in terms of human interest and the willingness to help financially: the enormous needs of the Eastern Europe economies, added to the outbreak of social exclusion in the industrialized countries and the cost of the war in the Gulf, are factors enough to diminish interest in Africa in general and interest in the Sahel in particular. The only domain which will probably keep attention centered on West Africa is the regional integration project.

### **... due to the idea of regional integration**

The file on regional integration is a heavy one. But aside from Germany and Italy, which continue to conceive regional integration as a matter of common infrastructures and institutions this is important too, most donors have turned toward financing reform measures to stimulate trade between countries (particularly in cereals and livestock). Though there is a near consensus as to methods, the zone to integrate is less clear. France would support a CFA zone which does not correspond to trade zones. How can this concept be enlarged to integrate English-speaking and Portuguese-speaking countries? With this in mind, the Sahel is just one region among many. The idea being to promote the complementarity of Sahelian and coastal countries.

### **New actors**

If there is any evolution which appears definitive and has become noticeable, it is the movement which gives increasing weight to non-governmental organizations, associations, village groupings, and local collectives. The failures of the past are largely due to the lack of local involvement and experts and bureaucrats are beginning to recognize this. There is still much progress to be made as far as budgets and legality: can a northern government directly finance a civil society in the south? Even when it is channelled through international associations of solidarity in the North, aid to southern NGOs is still weak, particularly French and Italian aid.

Asking these kind of basic organizations to participate does not necessarily imply a change in policy: for instance, the World Bank has created an NGO consultative committee to involve NGOs in reducing the social costs of structural adjustment, while numerous civil society organizations are

requesting a complete revision of adjustment policies. The democratic wave in Africa is setting the populace against reimbursing what their leaders have put in private bank accounts. If the trend continues, donors will have to reckon with these decentralized organizations to define developmental priorities.

### **No development without democracy**

In the new set of "conditionalities" for aid, the most recent addition is democratic conditionalities. This tends to reverse most historical processes. Aid has always been a political weapon (food or financial aid); whether it be in Chili or Nicaragua, or more recently, Haiti or Zaire, aid is a means of applying diplomatic pressure more concerned with politics than development (also because aid is essentially governmental). In the Sahel, the political aspect of aid is less a determining factor. Nevertheless, after the war in the Gulf, aid to Mauritania, which until then was noticeably increasing, fell off. On the other hand, Gambia and Guinea Bissau are receiving larger shares to the detriment of Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali.

Subjecting aid to democratic criteria raises a number of issues:

- First, donors appear fixed on multipartism as an indicator of democracy. Experience has shown that this is insufficient if not just plain false.
- Secondly, why did democratic criteria suddenly appear in 1989 and 1990 though aid had shamelessly been going to dictators for decades? This observation seems to prove that aid will continue to be handled mainly by governments.
- Lastly, do we need reminding that the goal of aid is development, not interfering in other countries' affairs? Cooperation becomes conditional instead of helping the emergence of organized groups in civil society. Belief that the State, or worse, that the market, can do everything, shows a poor understanding of what democracy and development mean.

Now that the instruments of cooperation have matured, they deserve careful use so as not to become exclusively political tools.

The Scandinavian countries, which have always been more vigilant on human rights issues, have developed concrete measures to support democracy for development which deserve to be better known ("General Popular Assemblies", civic education).

### **Aid Fatigue in Public Opinion**

Today, public opinion in the North can no longer bear the failure of development policies and has turned toward internal problems (unemployment, AIDS...) or symbolic micro-actions which have no real effect on development. In Europe, as in the United States, leaders on all sides are blamed for the failure. Mistrust of government and civic life results. Opinions are shaped by the media which are often reductionist. Are the media capable of blocking worthy initiatives through misperceptions they transmit to the public? Non-governmental organizations cannot escape this malaise, and because of it,

have trouble renewing their working methods and the enthusiasm of their donors because of it. "The Third World" is no longer the center of public attention, though Africa remains a priority because of publicity for its catastrophes. Ethiopia and the Sudan mobilize the most, and the Sahel still retains an image of a drought stricken region. Only the most recent developments in Africa, in which southern public opinion is making itself felt, are capable of inspiring solidarity in the "general public".

### **Obsolete institutional structures**

Donors must face the new cooperation situation with old institutions of varying complexity, tainted to various degrees by the colonial experience. Cooperation is being "democratized" in the North by parliaments demanding to be consulted and non-governmental experts demanding to be heard. The way aid is administered varies heavily from one country to another: certain governments are required to publish annual reports on development assistance (United States, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands), for others, assistance is an affair of state or even a presidential affair (France).

In any case, bilateral agencies rarely maintain regional bureaux (such as a Sahel bureau) for making development policy more coherent for recipients. On the other hand, multilateral institutions are more likely to have a regional office (The European Commission, World Bank) and are thus leaders in this field.


Cooperation policies have much to do if they are to successfully negotiate the turns as we move into this last decade of the century. Change is taking place beginning with a new awareness both of past failures and of the need for establishing dialogue with all of the actors in development. Let us hope that the new trend to political democracy in Africa will provide a unique opportunity for democratizing and decentralizing cooperation as well.

## ANNEXES

## ANNEXES

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# Annexe 1 LES INSTRUMENTS DE LA COOPÉRATION



## DANS LE CHAMP DU MINISTRE DE LA COOPERATION ET DU DEVELOPPEMENT

### AFRIQUE

Angola  
Bénin  
Burkina Faso  
Burundi  
Cameroun  
Cap Vert  
Comores  
Congo  
Côte-d'Ivoire

Djibouti  
Gabon  
Gambie  
Guinée  
Guinée-Bissau  
Guinée équatoriale  
Madagascar  
Mali  
Maurice  
Mauritanie

Mozambique  
Namibie  
Niger  
Rép. Centrafricaine  
Rwanda  
São Tomé et Príncipe  
Sénégal  
Seychelles  
Tchad  
Togo  
Zaire

### ANTILLES

Antigua et Barbuda  
Dominique  
Haïti  
St-Christophe et Nieves  
St-Vincent et Grenadine  
Ste-Lucie  
Grenade

## HORS CHAMP

### LES AUTRES PAYS EN DEVELOPPEMENT

CHART 1

## EVOLUTION OF THE AID COMMITMENTS FOR EACH DONOR OVER 1975/88

## 1. OECD COUNTRIES

(In millions of U.S. dollars)

DONORS	AVERAGE 1975-79	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
AUSTRALIA	0,704	0	0	0	0	0	0,6	0	0,1	0,1	0,1
GERMANY	110,864	93,509	209,76	164,517	112,8	81,2	148,43	144,71	233,4	202,8	263,5
AUTRIA	0,598	0,833	2,904	0	1,5	2,1	2,49	2,89	3,0	3,0	10,6
BELGIUM	14,406	21,591	24,161	15,887	14,7	9,9	22,6	17,6	18,4	13,0	17,7
CANADA	73,779	10,73	69,727	38,82	94,3	164,5	32,65	39,05	103,7	136,0	111,4
DENMARK	3,807	19,16	2,116	7,306	23,6	24,3	11,48	16,4	18,5	61,7	2
UNITED- STATES	96,916	130,111	143,322	144,36	190,2	314,6	244,83	179,38	148,4	161,2	174,9
FINLANDIA	0,045	0,519	0,618	0	0,4	0,5	2,27	0,7	0,1	8,1	0,9
FRANCE	219,515	319,216	384,068	302,281	328,2	458,88	416,79	415,1	509,7	520,1	627,6
UNITED- KINGDOM	12,529	8,798	6,83	7,21	5,6	4,5	13,03	14,84	14,4	15,7	28,1
NETHERLAND	43,322	86,883	49,437	23,058	55,8	61,7	49,84	116,04	127,4	100,6	144,4
IRLANDIA	0,149	0,029	0	0	0	0	0,03	0	0,1	-	-
ITALY	0,999	0,71	2,55	0	120,1	41,6	123,65	388,3	332	150,9	150,7
JAPAN	18,403	38,747	26,59	25,27	36,6	40,5	49,84	61	76,8	143,7	136,9
NORWAY	7,677	3,969	1,851	0	0,9	19,1	1,68	10,15	16,2	1,5	12,8
SWEDEN	5,254	16,384	2,962	8,365	8,2	9,5	15,5	16,59	0	27,9	19,2
SWITZERLAND	10,637	11,967	38,556	22,661	21,7	14,2	30,02	37,31	34,9	54,1	31,8
<b>TOTAL OECD</b>	<b>619,604</b>	<b>763,156</b>	<b>965,452</b>	<b>759,735</b>	<b>1014,6</b>	<b>1247,08</b>	<b>1165,19</b>	<b>1460,76</b>	<b>1637,1</b>	<b>1600,4</b>	<b>1732</b>

CHART 2

EVOLUTION OF AID COMMITMENTS FOR EACH DONOR OVER 1975-1988

2. MULTILATERAL FINANCIAL ORGANIZATIONS  
(except OPEC)

(In millions of current U.S. dollars)

DONORS	AVERAGE 1975-79	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
I.D.A.	98,04	122,00	166,30	93,20	138,00	92,00	204,00	385,40	339,60	375	345
F.E.D.	153,224	180,06	239,22	202,47	133,00	175,20	117,12	162,02	488,70	486	256,1
F.A.D.	38,559	34,33	58,64	73,71	51,20	76,80	76,46	103,00	217,60	152	242,8
F.I.D.A.	8,725	22,40	19,70	10,99	12,90	4,70	3,90	10,80	36,10	23	28,5
A.C.C.T.	1,091	2,03	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	-	-
Special program A.C.C.T.	0,205										
B.O.A.D.		5,81									
F.M.I. Trust Fund		22,45									
aid UNITED- NATIONS	53,377	101,23	97,79	72,02	139,90	161,10	220,20	183,20	188,50	220,9	202,1
<b>TOTAL MULTILATERAL</b>	<b>352,021</b>	<b>490,03</b>	<b>581,657</b>	<b>452,393</b>	<b>475</b>	<b>509,8</b>	<b>621,68</b>	<b>844,42</b>	<b>1270,5</b>	<b>1257,5</b>	<b>872,4</b>

CHART 3

EVOLUTION OF THE AID COMMITMENTS FOR EACH DONOR OVER 1975/1988

3. OPEC FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION AND COUNTRIES

(In millions of current U.S. dollars)

DONORS	AVERAGE 1975-79	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
A.F.E.S.D.	15,35	0,00	0,00	6,67	31,28	21,96	12,06				
A.F.T.A.A.C.	0,31	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00				
ALGERIA	0,79	2,00	0,10	0,00	3,50	0,33	5,90				
ARABIAN SAUDI	88,27	67,90	102,22	160,06	79,01	237,18	50,15				
BADEA	15,86	0,00	0,33	9,00	15,05	0,15	5,05				
EMIRATS ARABES UNIS	13,39	13,26	53,75	50,55	1,50	0,00	10,00				
FONDS SPECIAL OPEC	15,59	34,00	59,52	41,06	30,60	15,23	11,15				
IRAN	1,56	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,05	0,00	0,00				
IRAK	11,58	46,61	48,18	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00				
KOWEIT	33,03	40,46	136,00	26,37	56,62	59,33	10,41				
LIBYA	4,81	34,68	1,40	0,00	30,13	10,63	1,60				
NIGERIA	4,77	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,11	0,00	0,00				
QATAR	3,93	3,30	0,00	0,00	1,00	0,00	1,10				
FASAA	4,58	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00				
BISD	9,21	6,00	24,21	8,11	15,43	67,73	18,14				
<b>TOTAL OPEC</b>	<b>223,01</b>	<b>248,21</b>	<b>425,71</b>	<b>301,83</b>	<b>264,26</b>	<b>412,54</b>	<b>125,56</b>	<b>64,70</b>	<b>75,60</b>	<b>104,4</b>	<b>243,6</b>

CHART 4

GENERAL EVOLUTION OF THE AID COMMITMENTS RECEIVED BY EACH SAHEL COUNTRY BETWEEN 1975 AND 1988

(In millions current U.S. dollars)

	CAPE VERDE ISLANDS	CHAD	GAMBIA	GUINEA BISAU	MALI	MAURITANIA	NIGER	SENEGAL	BURKINA FASO	TOTAL GENERAL
AVERAGE 1975-79	40,70	104,951	7,692	65,3	188,558	201,259	158,521	209,406	162,412	1168,799
1980	76,339	35,682	98,519	68,8	208,586	274,694	208,917	287,664	250,473	1509,674
1981	60,428	69,237	64,052	63,4	243,225	188,841	272,247	354,622	326,014	1647,066
1982	36,87	82,868	46,049	62,4	182,172	144,178	192,244	268,75	218,16	1233,691
1983	97	109,8	66,4	122,6	302	163,1	256,1	431,2	252,7	1800,9
1984	94,1	143,9	84	76,2	410,7	190	345,6	446,53	246,7	2037,73
1985	61,97	210,55	33,28	62,6	449,14	231,83	271,11	316,76	249,99	1887,23
1986	89,1	256,91	118,61	63,09	351,63	180,76	442,83	639,48	253,79	2396,2
1987	93,4	333	90,5	169	368,6	250,8	464,70	892,4	321	2983,4
1988	117	310	137	91	567	261	471	643	367	2963
1989	77,7	400	120,4	193,9	646,4	266,7	270,8	624,2	450	3050

CHART 5

GENERAL EVOLUTION OF THE AID NET DISBURSEMENTS

(In millions of current U.S. dollars)

DONORS	1971	1976	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
CAPE-VERDE ISLANDS	0	24,8	64,4	50,3	54,9	59,2	63,9	69,70	109,5	86,4	86,8	74,7
CHAD	30,6	62,3	35,3	59,8	64,7	95,3	115,4	181,50	164,9	198,2	264	242,2
GAMBIA	3,7	12	54,4	59	47,6	41,1	53,6	50,00	100,7	103,3	81,9	93,1
MALI		30,2	89	229,4	229,4	210,3	214,9	320,4	379,20	372,2	364,5	454,7
MAURITANIA	12,2	180,2	175,9	233,7	187	175,6	171,6	215,5	186,6	177,8	184,2	244,2
NIGER	38	129,6	170,2	193,4	257,5	175	162	304,4	307,9	348,1	371	297,1
SENEGAL	53,1	126,8	263	396,7	284,8	322,3	368,3	294,5	567,6	642,1	567,9	650,5
BURKINA FASO	28,7	84,1	212,3	217	212,8	183,7	188,6	197,6	284	283,5	297,9	281,1
GUINEA BISSAU	0	0	59,5	65,2	65,2	64,2	55,2	57,8	71	104,5	99	102,2
<b>TOTAL SAHEL</b>	<b>196,5</b>	<b>708,8</b>	<b>1287,1</b>	<b>1504,5</b>	<b>1384,8</b>	<b>1331,3</b>	<b>1499</b>	<b>1750,2</b>	<b>2164,6</b>	<b>2308,4</b>		

ANNEX 3

**German Criteria for Aid**

- a1) The degree of constitutionality (Rechtsstaatlichkeit) and confidence in public administration:**  
"Rare resources are for a large part arbitrarily allocated" (classing a country in this category should make it ineligible for aid) or,  
"Rare resources are allocated according to dependable and fair markets and fiscality."
- a2) Macro-economic fiscality and the concept of planning:**  
"Planning calls for general intervention in the market" (quantitative assertions) or,  
"Planning is generally adapted to the market" (oriented according to general conditions).
- b) Competitivity: the degree of monopolization**  
"The markets in the different branches are controlled by a firm/group of firms without competition," or  
"There is strong competition in the markets of the most important commodities."
- c) Regulation of Foreign Resources, importation of investment goods:**  
"Access is controlled by state licensing," or  
"Access is regulated by competition."
- d1) Market Regulation, the labour market:**  
"The government heavy-handedly fixes salaries," or  
"Salaries are negotiated autonomously by the partners concerned."
- d2) Market Regulation, the capital market (access of small farmers and entrepreneurs to capital):**  
"Small farmers and entrepreneurs generally do not have access to investment credits from the formal banking sector," or  
"Small farmers and entrepreneurs have the same access to investment loans as all other investors."
- e) Regulation of the Market for Goods, the role of semi-public agricultural product boards:**  
"For the most important agricultural products, private marketing is not possible (the boards are controlled)," or  
"The private sector has a free hand."
- f) Regulating the Creation of Small Businesses:**  
"Direct or indirect regulations prevent small business creation," or  
"The government directly or indirectly encourages it."
- g) Social Policy, education of young girls in rural areas:**  
"In rural areas, less than 50% of young girls attend school," or  
"More than 50% do."

### **German Criteria for Aid**

**h) Social Policy, the right of small farmers to associate:**

*"Farmers' cooperatives are mandatory, free association (not state controlled) and other kinds of unions are forbidden," or*

*"Free association and participation in farmers' groups."*

**i) Environmental Policy, regulation of industrial waste in larger cities:**

*"Regulation is lax or non-existent," or*

*"Regulations correspond to international standards."*

**k) Environmental Policy, protection of natural resources (underground, water, forest, wildlife, monuments):**

*"No real regulation for protection, priority is given to short-term economic interests," or*

*"Adequate and consistent measures exist."*

**l) Demographic policy:**

*"The government is indifferent to demographic problems," or*

*"The government's engagement in demographic policies is adequate."*

*Even if this index does not constitute an official basis for conditionality of cooperation policy, it is a basis for intense political discussion at the BMZ and GTZ (see GTZ-info, No 3/91) and plays an important role in policy dialogue between the German government and Third World countries.*

ENGAGEMENTS FINANCIERS POUR L'ANNEE 1989  
En millions de \$ U.S. courants

Pays du CAD	BURKINA FASO	CAP-VERT	GAMBIE	GUINEE-BISSAU	MALI	MAURITANIE	NIGER	SENEGAL	TCHAD	TOTAL
AUSTRALIE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,1	0	0	0,1
AUTRICHE	5,3	2,7	0	0,8	0,1	0	0	1,7	0	10,6
BELGIQUE	1,2	1,8	0	0,2	0,9	0	4,8	8,4	0,4	17,7
CANADA	15,9	0,2	8,2	0,2	48,3	0,4	13,5	24,5	0,2	111,4
DANEMARK	0	0	0,4	0	0	1,7	0	0	0	2,1
FINLANDE	0	0	0,1	0	0	0,1	0,1	0,6	0	0,9
FRANCE	62,5	4,8	0,5	8,8	142,6	63,1	60	179,5	105,8	627,6
RFA	45	8,1	4,2	5,7	50,8	57,5	42,2	20,8	29,2	263,5
ITALIE	6,7	8,3	5,9	17,1	23,4	9,3	7,6	65	7,4	150,7
JAPON	2,3	0,2	2,8	0,1	39,6	5,9	28,1	57,9	0	136,9
PAYS-BAS	33,1	10,9	1,3	9,5	45,4	6,1	5,8	25,1	7,2	144,4
NORVEGE	0	0	2,2	0	8,6	0	0	2	0	12,8
SUEDE	0	8,3	0,2	10,7	0	0	0	0	0	19,2
SUISSE	7	2,4	4,2	0,1	3,2	0,4	1,9	6,9	5,7	31,8
R.U	0,5	0,1	15,5	0,1	4,9	0,3	1	5,3	0,4	28,1
U.S.A	13,5	5	5,2	2,9	39,9	8,3	27,5	54,5	18,1	174,9
Sous Total	193	52,8	50,7	56,2	407,7	153,1	192,6	452,2	174,4	1732,7
Multilateraux										
FAD	44,6	0,3	21,8	53,4	26,4	16,7	24,2	4,1	51,3	242,8
FED	53,1	8	7	5,9	93,7	5,5	7,8	6,8	68,3	256,1
FIDA	0	0,3	4,2	0	0,1	11,4	5,3	7,2	0	28,5
IDA	64	0	23	52	59	0	0	87	60	345
Sous Total	161,7	8,6	56	111,3	179,2	33,6	37,3	105,1	179,6	872,4
Nations Unies	26,3	14,8	10,7	11,2	25,5	17,8	33,9	29,6	32,3	202,1
AUTRES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
arabes agence	33,6	1,5	3	5,3	13,7	59,7	4	29,1	9,3	159,2
PAYS ARABES	35,7	0	0	9,9	20,8	2,5	3	8	4,5	84,4
Sous Total OPEP	69,3	1,5	3	15,2	34,5	62,2	7	37,1	13,8	243,6
TOTAL	450,3	77,7	120,4	193,9	646,4	266,7	270,8	624,2	400,1	3050,8

VERSEMENTS FINANCIERS POUR L'ANNEE 1989  
En millions de \$ U.S. courants

Annex 5

Pays du CAD	BURKINA FASO	CAP-VERT	GAMBIE	GUINEE BISSAU	MALI	MAURITANIE	NIGER	SENEGAL	TCHAD	TOTAL
AUSTRALIE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AUTRICHE	5, 2	2, 9	0, 1	0, 5	0, 2	0, 1	0	1, 1	0	10, 1
BELGIOUE	1, 2	1, 8	0	0, 2	0, 9	0	4, 8	8, 4	0, 4	17, 7
CANADA	11, 4	0, 5	0, 7	0, 4	21, 2	0, 6	18, 9	29	0, 4	83, 1
DANEMARK	7, 8	0, 1	10, 4	1	2, 2	2, 2	5, 8	1, 3	0	30, 8
FINLANDE	0	0	0	0	0	0, 1	0, 1	1, 7	0	1, 9
FRANCE	70, 1	4	3, 5	8	108, 2	60, 3	60, 2	255	78, 1	647, 4
RFA	33, 3	4, 4	5, 2	1, 7	39, 9	62, 3	34, 3	20, 2	13, 9	215, 2
ITALIE	16, 1	12, 6	6	16, 5	27, 8	11, 1	21, 6	72, 3	12, 4	196, 4
JAPON	11, 8	1, 2	2	1, 3	27, 6	6, 6	0, 3	482	0	532, 8
PAYS-BAS	31, 3	7, 1	3, 7	8, 3	29, 2	3, 9	13, 3	10, 4	6, 7	113, 9
NORVEGE	0, 4	0, 8	3	0	13, 6	0, 6	2, 3	1, 1	0, 1	21, 9
SUEDE	0	8, 3	0, 3	10, 7	0	0	0	0	0	19, 3
SUISSE	4, 5	1, 8	4, 2	1, 9	5	0, 4	6, 6	10, 5	6, 6	41, 5
R.U	0, 5	0, 1	7, 1	0, 1	1, 9	0, 3	0, 5	5	0, 4	15, 9
U.S.A	14	3	10	3	23	12	31	41	9	146
Sous Total	207, 6	48, 6	56, 2	53, 6	300, 7	160, 5	199, 7	939	128	2093, 9
Multilateraux										
FAD	8, 6	3, 3	5, 9	2, 9	31, 9	22, 2	6, 1	5, 4	23, 2	109, 5
FED	14, 9	4, 4	7, 5	11, 7	50, 4	36, 5	16, 9	22, 3	35, 5	200, 1
FIDA	0, 9	0	0, 9	0, 9	3, 9	0, 5	0	0, 7	0	7, 8
IDA	24	3	15	19	46	9	33	48	23	220
Sous Total	48, 4	10, 7	29, 3	34, 5	132, 2	68, 2	56	76, 4	81, 7	537, 4
Nations Unies	21, 3	10, 4	9, 3	8, 9	22, 4	14, 7	26, 4	24, 8	28, 6	166, 8
AUTRES	5, 2	4, 4	1, 5	2, 3	3	3, 1	7, 4	4, 8	3, 8	35, 5
arabes agencies	-1, 4	0, 1	-1, 9	0, 6	-5, 7	2, 2	5	-3, 6	0, 1	-4, 6
PAYS ARABES	1	0, 5	-1, 3	2, 3	2	-4, 5	2, 6	11, 7	0	14, 3
Sous total OPEP	-1	0, 6	-3, 2	2, 9	-5, 5	-2, 3	7, 6	8, 1	0, 1	9, 7
TOTAL	281, 1	74, 7	93, 1	102, 2	454, 7	244, 2	297, 1	650, 5	242, 2	2440, 7

SERVICE DE LA DETTE  
( en millions de \$ U.S. )

Annex 6

	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
BURKINA FASO	18, 1	25, 1	31	28, 6	35, 3	31, 7	46, 2	47, 8
GAMBIE	4, 7	1	8, 2	13, 5	10, 1	11	19, 9	24, 5
MALI	18	34, 2	30	31, 6	45, 6	35, 4	124	139
MAURITANIE	41, 8	75, 5	74, 8	93, 4	110	79	170	198
NIGER	85, 2	95, 2	112	128	130	90	154	157
SENEGAL	103, 4	103, 5	196	279, 5	284	278, 2	534	467
TCHAD	3, 3	12, 1	4, 7	5, 4	6	5	9, 9	12, 6
TOTAL	274, 5	346, 6	456, 7	580	938, 7	530, 3	1058	1045, 9

PREVISIONS DU SERVICE DE LA DETTE  
de 1992 à 2000  
(en millions de \$ U.S.)

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
BURKINA FASO	49, 3	51, 3	53, 2	54, 3	52, 6	50	50	46, 8	47, 3
GAMBIE	27	27	26	21	19	16	15	14, 9	12, 8
MALI	156	157	158	155	149	126	101	106	115
MAURITANIE	202	189	165	138	132	184	133	130	115
NIGER	159	156	145	133	79	60	56, 9	58, 6	56, 7
SENEGAL	390	340	320	280	250	230	210	195	190
TCHAD	14, 2	14, 7	15, 5	16, 5	17	19	21	24	25
TOTAL	997, 5	935	882, 7	797, 8	698, 6	685	586, 9	575, 3	561, 8

EN COURS DE LA DETTE  
( en milliards de \$ U.S. )

	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
BURKINA FASO	0,702	0,671	0,99	1,17	1,17	1,179	1,088	1,056
GAMBIE	0,25	0,274	0,323	0,375	0,384	0,431	0,403	0,385
MALI	1,558	1,822	2,12	2,456	2,415	2,643	2,539	2,43
MAURITANIE	1,753	1,959	2,195	2,416	2,339	2,337	2,677	1,932
NIGER	1,119	1,352	1,615	1,942	1,961	1,764	1,594	1,491
SENEGAL	2,41	2,761	3,365	4,255	4,195	4,446	4,016	3,685
TCHAD	0,273	0,293	0,338	0,472	0,62	0,733	0,657	0,651
TOTAL	8,065	9,132	10,946	13,086	13,084	13,533	12,974	11,63

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PREVISIONS DE L'EN COURS DE LA DETTE  
de 1992 à 2000  
(en milliards de \$ U.S.)

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
BURKINA FASO	1,02	0,98	0,95	0,91	0,871	0,832	0,792	0,755	0,71
GAMBIE	0,36	0,34	0,32	0,3	0,29	0,27	0,26	0,25	0,24
MALI	2,3	2,1	2	1,92	1,79	1,69	1,61	1,52	1,44
MAURITANIE	1,77	1,63	1,5	1,39	1,29	1,13	1,02	0,91	0,81
NIGER	1,38	1,27	1,16	1,05	0,99	0,94	0,9	0,86	0,82
SENEGAL	3,4	3,16	2,93	2,71	2,53	2,35	2,19	2,04	1,89
TCHAD	0,64	0,637	0,63	0,62	0,61	0,6	0,58	0,56	0,55
TOTAL	10,87	10,117	9,49	8,9	8,371	7,812	7,352	6,895	6,46

Annexe 8 : Ressources financières totales des pays du Sahel en 1989

	BURKINA FASO	CAP-VERT	GAMBE	GUINEE BISSAU	MAI	MAURITANIE	NIGER	SENEGAL	TCHAD	TOTAL
CAD										
APD	207,6	48,5	56,1	53,4	300,6	160,3	201,9	536,4	128,1	1692,9
(XOF)	-0,9		0	7,5	0,5	1,6	10,7	5,1	-0,5	24
Privés										
ID	1,3	0	-0,2	0,5	-1,3	-0,1	-0,1	10,1	-1,7	8,5
IP	-0,5	0	0,1	1,1	-0,6	-1,8	-20,1	-6,3	-0,1	-28,2
CE	9,1	0	123,1	-3,6	-7	-22,5	-12	-38,4	0,2	48,9
MULTILATERALES										
APD	74,7	25,5	39,9	45,8	157,8	86	90	106	114,1	739,8
(XOF)	2,7		-0,4	-1,6	1,4	-15,2	-3,7	-11,7		-28,5
OPEP										
APD	-0,4	0,6	-3,2	2,9	-3,7	-2,3	7,6	8,1	0,1	9,7
(XOF)										
Sous-Total										
APD	281,9	74,6	92,6	102,1	454,7	244	299,8	650,5	242,3	2442,7
TOTAL	293,6	74,6	215,4	106	447,7	206	274,3	609,3	240,2	2467,1

**ANNEX 9**

## REGIONAL INTEGRATION THE NETHERLANDS

Policy orientations	In Practice and Programmes
<p>A positive but critical attitude toward current regional aid.</p> <p>Regional Integration too costly and the efficiency of multilateral institutions challenged (AGRHYMET overgrown, possible political and administrative problems).</p>	<p>10/M. florins/year go to regional operations, usually through the CILSS or WHO.</p> <p>The Netherlands contributes to CERPOD (Centre de recherche sur la population et le développement), ARI, EPI and OCP.</p>

## REGIONAL INTEGRATION EEC/EDF

Policy orientations	In Practice and Programmes
<p>Under Lomé III, regional cooperation was thematic, sectorial or functional. Lomé IV emphasizes two aspects: economic and political harmonization and intensifying trade in economic sub-spaces in West Africa for food security (marketing products and cutting costs).</p>	<p>Until 1985, programmes for concerted regional action emphasized transportation and telecommunications.</p> <p><b>Lomé I:</b> 10% of aid went to regional programmes.</p> <p><b>Lomé III:</b> 14% of commitments, but only 6% are disbursed.</p> <p><b>Lomé IV:</b> 25% of aid planned for regional programmes (unpaid funds may be redirected toward balance-of-payments deficits).</p>

## REGIONAL INTEGRATION FRANCE

Policy orientations	In Practice and Programmes
<p>Not much stimulus to regional integration in official statements. The Vivien report stated that faced with the doctrine of international division of labour and the theory of comparative advantages, "the alternative is to build economic spaces to expand domestic markets to respectable size."</p> <p>Despite opposition, on the part of the World Bank, France does not intend to devalue the CFA (Bérégovoy, April 1991)... France and the World Bank disagree on protection levels at borders.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Financed the study on "regional cereal subspaces" (Western Sahel + coastal countries).</li> <li>• Support for "CISSOKHO action."</li> <li>• Support for CENERGIE.</li> <li>• Programme for standardizing administrative indicators (social security, insurance...).</li> <li>• CFA Zone.</li> </ul>

## REGIONAL INTEGRATION GERMANY

Policy orientations	In Practice and Programmes
<p>The 7th BMZ report states, "Regional cooperation in developing countries is for sharing experience and building the regional institutions of these countries." The report makes no other mention of the subject (1990).</p> <p>Cooperation with regional organizations considered inefficient, but regional coordination plays an important role.</p> <p>At the end of the 1970s, all German aid to the Sahel was coordinated through Germany's PA-CILSS for food security and ecological equilibrium. It was a response to the United Nations conference on desertification in 1977.</p> <p>The BMZ concentrates on single problems in particular areas so intently that Germany's CILSS has become an inter-donor programme for coordinating the fight against desertification.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• "Important Financing" contributions to BAD, FAD... large development banks.</li> <li>• Support programme for cereal boards (security stock management) PAROC.</li> </ul>

## REGIONAL INTEGRATION UNITED STATES

Policy Alignment	In Practice and Programmes
<p>The "Sahel Development Program" began in the 1970s, but local missions were reticent to regional approaches.</p> <p>In 1984, a revised SDP strategie proposed "thinking in regional frameworks and negotiating bilaterally." But bilateral bias persists.</p> <p>The Sahel regional bureau devotes less time to project implementation than to policy analysis with CILSS/Club du Sahel.</p> <p>From 1992: initiation of institutional reforms at INSAH and a data-management project.</p> <p>A growing tendency to treat the Sahel as part of a larger West African whole was encouraged by a mandate to use DFA funds for fostering the integration of African production structures, markets and infrastructure.</p>	<p>1978-1987: 252 M. US\$ (30% SDP) 1988: 10.9 M. US\$ (dropping since '84).</p> <p><b>1983-84</b>, sectorial breakdown: - 67% agriculture/river basins - 13% social sectors - 20% Studies (recurring charges, cereal policy, ecology.)</p> <p><b>1987</b> 34% human resources, creating institutions. 13% health, family planning. 20% policy reforms for agriculture and the private sector. 13% improving financial management.</p> <p>Regional projects managed by the regional bureau dropped from 30 in 1980 to 5 in 1990 (AGRHYMET, CERPOD...).</p> <p>The USA and World Bank cofinanced a plan for liberalizing markets and increasing the production of livestock products in the central corridor. The USA helps create CENERGIE with an initial grant of 600,000. US\$.</p>

## REGIONAL INTEGRATION CANADA

Policy orientations	In Practice and Programmes
<p>Canada is abandoning "regional" projects (i.e. present in several countries) in favor of support for regional integration.</p> <p>What was promoted indirectly through infrastructure and institutional links is now done directly.</p> <p>Along with environment and human resources, regional integration is strategic for lasting development.</p> <p>Expanding the regional concepts of programmes should permit untied scholarships funds for students in African institutions, eventually to support regional SAPs (World Bank).</p> <p>Particular attention is paid to regional sub-space approaches.</p>	<p>1980-1990: 148 M. C\$, or 15% of bilateral aid to the Sahel. Projects concern infrastructure research and institutional support.</p> <p>Between 1992 and 1997, 550 M. C\$ planned for Francophone Africa and 40 M. C\$ for specific regional projects such as (PANAFTEL, Pan-African telecommunications).</p> <p>The 1992-1997 Sahel programme is comprised of 15 operational projects (research support, aid coordination...).</p> <p>A 10% increase in means has allowed the financing of institutions for economic integration and the possibility of financing projects sponsored by WAEC or ECOWAS, as well as CINERGIE, CERPOD...</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Financing research activities through the Sahel Centre at Laval University.</li> <li>• Financing a common data-base project between France, Canada, the USA, and Sahelian countries.</li> </ul>

## REGIONAL INTEGRATION WORLD BANK

Policy orientations	In Practice and Programmes
<p>Gradual approach for fostering trade between Sahelian and Coastal countries, first with a limited number of countries and products (meat and cereal products as the heart of the West African "common market").</p> <p>To harmonize, or not, around the WAEC or the ECOWAS depending on their capacity to eliminate trade barriers and harmonize tax and customs duty policies.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Study of commercial flows of meat in the "central corridor."</li> <li>• Creating a team for regional integration at the Bank.</li> <li>• Between 1980 and 1990, 4 years of regional projects were financed. The most important effort in 1984, 3% of total Bank commitments.</li> </ul>

**ANNEX 10**

<b>Environment</b>	<b>Technical Priorities</b>	<b>Means of Action</b>
<b>United States</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• From projects to drafting reform policies (macro-economic, sectorial and institutional.)</li> <li>• Reference to "Ségou."</li> </ul>	10 M. \$ in 1991 (environment in the Sahel + higher indirect investments). <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Senegal, Gambia, Mali, Niger.</li> </ul>
<b>Germany</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reforestation, soil fertility.</li> <li>• Evaluation, sharing experience.</li> <li>• Examining all projects for compatibility with the environment.</li> </ul>	10 M. \$ in 1991 (environment in the Sahel + higher indirect investments). <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Senegal, Gambia, Mali, Niger.</li> </ul>
<b>France</b>	Initiating ideas on the international level (debt/nature swap, climate agreement, IBRD facility.) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Water, soil fertility, natural and genetic heritage.</li> </ul>	25 M. for African environment programme (debt/nature swap Mali and Senegal). 50 M. \$ for IBRD facility.
<b>Canada</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lasting development policies.</li> <li>• reorientation for forestry, firewood alternatives, integrating fight against deforestation into agro-pastoral projects.</li> </ul>	50 M. \$/year for environment all LDCs. Niger, Mali, Burkina, Senegal.
<b>World Bank</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• "Local resources approach"</li> <li>• Integrated management of natural resources and agriculture.</li> <li>• Institutional support.</li> </ul>	Between 1980 and 1990, 26 M. \$ for forestry projects in Mali, Niger and Senegal. Priority countries: Mali, Niger, Chad, Burkina (local resource approach)
<b>Switzerland</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reforestation/agriculture.</li> <li>• Global action (ozone layer, toxic waste).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Annual agriculture/sylviculture programme averages 8 M. US\$. Contribution, facility according to IBRD objectives: 50 M. \$/year for 4 years.</li> </ul>
<b>Japan</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reforestation, natural catastrophe prevention.</li> <li>• Sanitation, water management.</li> <li>• Multilateral contributions.</li> </ul>	Special fund for environmental assistance 700 M. \$/yr. for 3 yrs.
<b>Italy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reference to Brundtland commission.</li> <li>• Health/environment reports.</li> <li>• Debt/nature swaps.</li> </ul>	Little action.
<b>United Nations Denmark EEC/EDF</b>		

## ENVIRONMENT FRANCE

Policy orientations	In Practice and Programmes
<p>Many speeches on protecting the environment at international conferences: the Summit of the 7, IBRD, Declaration in La Haye...</p> <p>Associating NGOs, environmental associations, research centres (cf. June 1991 round table).</p> <p><b>Priority Themes:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Managing water resources (water solidarity programme CEFIGRE - training centre...)</li> <li>• Soil fertility (cf. Manuel Pieri, La Documentation Française, 1990).</li> <li>• Treating hazardous wastes.</li> <li>• Protecting the ocean and coastal zones (Abidjan Convention, January 1989).</li> <li>• Natural and genetic heritage (deforestation, natural parks, disappearing species...)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In 1990, the environment programme for Sub-Saharan Africa amounted to 14 M. FF (2.5 M. US\$).</li> <li>• Insufficient means incite France to join international organizations for nearly all themes.</li> <li>• Creation of the observatory of the Sahara and the Sahel in 1989.</li> <li>• Creation of a facility for the world environment at the IBRD (900 M. FF for 3 years).</li> <li>• Promotion of debt/nature swap idea. Mali and Senegal should be recipients as of 1991. Until now, no CILSS countries were concerned.</li> </ul>

## ENVIRONMENT WORLD BANK

Policy orientations	In Practice and Programme
<p>The five special operational priorities include "environment/forest and natural resources."</p> <p>Developing natural resources is one of seven themes in the Long-Term Perspectives Study and is stated as top priority for the Sahel.</p> <p>New policies do not neglect social and environmental aspects.</p> <p>In the Sahel, programmes are less centered on the fight against desertification and vast agricultural projects in order to stimulate approaches integrating natural and agricultural resources. The idea is to decentralize government services and extend the population's control over natural resources and land.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Bank has assumed the role of coordinator for other donors.</li> <li>• Perfection of the "local resources approach" programme involving communities in the conservation of resources: a long experimental period (5 yrs.) to allow populations and local authorities to define optimal use of resources (anti-erosion measures, water recuperation, making pastures profitable...). A programme cofinanced by France, Germany and Norway.</li> </ul>	<p>From 1981 to 1990, 26 M. \$ lent to Mali, Niger, Senegal for forestry projects other than environmental aspects of rural projects.</p> <p>The Bank develops environmental action plans for specific countries and selects new projects since 1990.</p> <p>A programme spread out over 15 to 20 yrs. ("local resources approach") will begin in 1991 in Burkina Faso, and will later include Mali, Niger and Chad.</p>

## ENVIRONMENT THE UNITED STATES

Policy orientations	In Practice and Programme
<p>1. Improving natural resources management is an integral part of the DFA (1989-91). Five action levels are outlined:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increasing food productivity and security.</li> <li>• Improving the fertility of the soil, biodiversity and controlling agricultural pests.</li> <li>• Call on new actors: NGOs, local collectives, the private sector.</li> <li>• Sectorial macro-economic reform: land tenure and system, market organization...</li> <li>• Institutional reform (research, credit...)</li> </ul> <p>2. All projects drafted in the Sahel foster optimal land use combined with natural resource management.</p> <p>3. Effort is being redirected from project intervention to drafting policy reform.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 12 M. \$ for the environment in 1978.</li> <li>• 6 M. \$ on the average between 1980 and 1990.</li> <li>• 10 M. \$ in 1981 (as an illustration, many things not counted here).</li> <li>• Growing indirect investments: drinking water (health), resource conservation methods (agriculture), revision of rural codes as in Niger (reform programme).</li> <li>• Funds for the Sahel are being used more often for evaluating natural resource management (Senegal, Gambia, Mali, Niger) and for the definition of programmes "in the spirit of Ségou."</li> </ul>

## ENVIRONMENT GERMANY

Policy orientations	In Practice and Programme
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Since 1988, all bilateral aid projects are submitted to an evaluation of their compatibility with the environment. However, the 8th BMZ report declared that the criteria of this evaluation were better adapted to industrialized countries and not to the LDCs.</li> <li>• The BMZ considers the protection of natural resources as the most important theme in cooperation. This priority is not always shared by the recipient country.</li> <li>• The German CILSS mission has 3 commitments:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Policy discussions with recipients.</li> <li>- Supporting national plans against desertification.</li> <li>- Evaluating and sharing experiences (cf. "Le Sahel en lutte contre la desertification," R.M. Rochette, 1989, ed. GTZ), and the publications of E. Winkler, Programme Director of the German programme to the Sahel. Winkler believes prevention in the area of environment is inefficient. He proposes helping populations when they are ready to change behaviour, ie. when their ecosystems are threatened.)</li> </ul> </li> <li>• The new trend is not to fight desertification through government measures alone, but also through the participation of the population. The key-words are "farmer reforestation."</li> <li>• In Germany, ecologists pressure the government to push for the above.</li> </ul>	<p>Two priorities,</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the fight against deforestation, and</li> <li>• improving the fertility of the soil</li> </ul> <p>represented 7% of German aid to the Sahel between 1985 and 1990 (72 M. DM or 57 M. US\$).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Amounts comparable to US amounts.</li> <li>• For example, 60% of aid to Burkina Faso concerns natural resource management.</li> </ul> <p>German action takes place in:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Senegal</li> <li>- Mali</li> <li>- Burkina Faso</li> <li>- Gambia</li> <li>- Niger</li> </ul>

## ENVIRONMENT THE NETHERLANDS

Policy orientations	In Practice and Programmes
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Re-establishing ecological equilibrium is ranked as high a priority as food security, basic health, drinking water supply and basic education.</li> <li>• Supporting the legal recognition of village groups to allow them to initiate projects.</li> </ul>	

## ENVIRONMENT CANADA

Policy orientations	In Practice and Programmes
<p>The Canadian aid charter (1987) contains 6 objectives, one of which concerns the environment and another, available resources in energy.</p> <p><b>Three areas for action:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Redirecting the resources of industrial plantations to rural forestry (1985).</li> <li>• Fighting desertification within the framework of agricultural and pastoral projects.</li> <li>• Research on energy substitutes for firewood, increasing fodder to reduce deforestation.</li> </ul> <p>In the course of bilateral negotiations, the CIAD confirmed it would not finance structural adjustment to the detriment of the environment (though it happened in Niger).</p> <p>For CIAD, <b>lasting development</b>, has 3 strategic categories:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- developing human resources,</li> <li>- protecting the environment,</li> <li>- promoting regional integration.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Canada devotes an average of 65 M. C\$ per year to the environment, for all LDCs, 28% of which goes to forestry.</li> <li>• No support for industrial plantations, but support for natural woodlands parks, fight against forest fires, mapmaking and interpretation of satellite photographs.</li> <li>• Village water works (animal watering, wells in Niger, Mali and Burkina.)</li> <li>• Sylviculture: village seed beds and nurseries, agro-forestry, natural forest management. Between 1985 and 1992, Senegal is receiving 19.5 M C\$ for dune stabilization and forest management.</li> <li>• Improving soils and crops, intensifying production through biological methods, drainage, terraces...</li> </ul>

## ENVIRONMENT ITALY

Policy orientations	In Practice and Programmes
<p>Italy explicitly supports the principles of the Brundtland Commission and proposes systematically integrating environmental issues into cooperation policy by stressing 4 points:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Expanding dialogue with recipients, particularly NGOs, private sector, local authorities.</li> <li>• To grant the poorest countries resources in the form of bonuses.</li> <li>• Develop technical assistance and institutional capacities.</li> <li>• Debt/nature conversions.</li> </ul> <p>Saving the environment is written into the 49/87 law on Italian cooperation.</p> <p>Particular attention is paid to the relationship between health and environment.</p>	<p>Up until now, limited resources have been devoted to concrete actions. But Italy has contributed to village waterworks, 2,950 watering holes, wells, etc., have been created since 1985 and provide 1.4 million Sahelians with water.</p>

## ENVIRONMENT JAPAN

Policy orientationsAlignment	In Practice and Programme
<p>Two priorities have been identified:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The fight against deforestation in tropical zones.</li> <li>• Support for developing countries to increase their capacity to manage on their own the problems linked to environment.</li> </ul> <p>Until recently, 70% of Japanese aid to the environment concerned sanitation, water and waste management. Aid is being redirected toward aid to support forest conservation and the prevention of natural catastrophes.</p> <p>Japan recognizes that the environment is not a priority in recipient countries.</p>	<p>Japan has decided to increase its environmental aid to 2.2 M US\$ between 1989 and 1991 (announced at the "Seven-country summit" in 1989.)</p> <p>Japan makes significant contributions to international funds (UNEP, FAO, CGIAR, ITTO...).</p>

## ENVIRONMENT SWITZERLAND

Policy orientations	In Practice and Programme
<p>Switzerland was providing environmental cooperation before other agencies. Switzerland now asserts that traditional environmental activities (reforestation, soil conservation...) are not enough and that global action needs to be taken (ozone layer, toxic waste, greenhouse effect...).</p> <p><b>5 objectives:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Soil conservation and reforestation.</li> <li>◦ Strengthening institutions and training.</li> <li>• Impact studies.</li> <li>• Contributions to global international programmes.</li> <li>• Sizeable support for village communities.</li> </ul>	<p>In 1991 and in addition to bilateral action, 300 M. FS (240 M. \$) were allocated for treating global environmental issues over the next four years.</p> <p>Sylviculture is an integral part of the agricultural development efforts which absorbed an average of 26% of Swiss aid yearly between 1980 and 1991.</p>

**ANNEX 11  
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- Frankfurter Rundschau du 30/4/91 publie sur toute une page un article de documentation sous le titre : "...ET CE QUI RESTE EST UNE TERRE QUI N'A PLUS QUE LA PEAU SUR LES OS". C'est en fait un extrait d'un livre consacré par Josef Herkendell et Ekkehard Koch à la "Destruction du sol sous les tropiques"
- Frankfurter Rundschau consacre, dans deux éditions successives des 4 et 6 mai derniers, chaque fois une pleine page à des extraits d'un livre dont une deuxième édition entièrement revue et complétée vient de paraître. Il s'agit d'un livre blanc sur l'Afrique. Le titre donnée à ces extraits est : "L'AFRIQUE ENTRE LA DEMOCRATISATION INTERNE ET LA DICTATURE EXTERNE - Les pressions économiques restent / Pas de pcestroïka dans les relations Nord-Sud"
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ANNEX 12
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CIDA	Canadian Agency for International Development
BMZ	German Ministry of Cooperation
CAD	Comité d'Aide au Développement
CCCE	Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique
WAEC	Communauté des Etats d'Afrique de l'Ouest
ECOWAS	Communauté Economique des Etats d'Afrique de l'Ouest
CILSS	Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel
CRDI	Centre de Recherche pour le Développement International
DFA	Development Fund for Africa
ECU	European Community Unit
EDF	European Development Fund
ESF	Economic Support Fund
FAC	Fonds d'Aide et de Coopération
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation
GTZ	German Cooperation Society
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDA	International Development Association
IRED	Institut de Recherche et d'Etudes du Développement
KfW	Credit Institute for Reconstruction
LPTS	Long Term Perspective Study
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OFAEE	Office Fédéral des Affaires Etrangères
WHO	World Health Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

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