

PN. ART-718  
92425

# THUNDER

---

USAID Global Bureau  
Center for Democracy

Democratic Governance:

A Conceptual Base for  
United States Economic and Technical Assistance

by

Robert LaPorte, Jr.  
&  
James S. Wunsch

Editing and Revisions by Edwin F. Connerley

March, 1995

Prepared for G/DG by:

Checchi International  
(Under subcontract to Thunder & Associates, Inc.)  
Delivery Order 9


With Assistance from Thunder & Associates, Inc.  
Delivery Order 11

Contract AEP 5451-I-2050-00

---

Thunder & Associates, Inc.  
719 Prince Street  
Alexandria, Va. 22314  
U.S.A.

Tel: (703) 684-5584  
Fax: (703) 684-3954  
Cserv: 72144.3635@compuserv.com



GLOBAL BUREAU  
CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY

**DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE:**  
  
**A CONCEPTUAL BASE FOR**  
  
**UNITED STATES ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE**

by

**Robert LaPorte, Jr.**  
**Pennsylvania State University**

and

**James S. Wunsch**  
**Creighton University**

**Editing and Revisions by**

**Edwin Connerly**

**March 1995**

**Prepared by Thunder & Associates, Inc.**  
**Contract AEP 5451-I-00-2050-00**  
**Delivery Order 11**

A

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The objective of this study was to "[c]omplete a review of USAID, multilateral donor and NGO experience in governance to be used by USAID/G/DG to develop a strategy for governance activities."<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, the two authors examined the scholarly literature on governance, reports and documents from United States Agency for International Development, the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme and other sources as well as reviewed past USAID program and project activities in the area of governance.<sup>2</sup> Interviews were also conducted of USAID officials in Washington, D.C.

The study was conducted over a four month period (September 1994 to January 1995). The authors examined key terms including "democracy," "governance" and "democratic governance" and placed them in both conceptual/theoretical contexts as well as in the practice of development. The failure of past democratic governance attempts were examined and guidance as well as a taxonomy of governance and governance interventions were developed.

Past USAID projects in the areas of decentralization and local government, public administration/management and policy reforms, legislatures and elected/deliberative bodies, constitutionalism and strategic assessments of democratic governance were examined to extract the "lessons learned" from these development investments.

Based on the above research, the study recommends that a governance initiative by USAID include five key concepts:

1. Development of a strong, integrated, analytical capability to support institutional, organizational and policy reforms in democratic governance.
2. Development of a body of administrative routines, procedures and skills explicitly linked to supporting the institutional, organizational and policy changes the analytical center will recommend.
3. Continued analysis of USAID and other donor experience in governance.
4. Training needs of participants to implement results of analysis must be highly applied.
5. Development of Social and Political Economic Analytic Capabilities in USAID or secured by USAID to make explicit factors which may mitigate against democratic governance.

---

<sup>1</sup>See Annex A, *Scope of Work for Governance Review*.

<sup>2</sup>See Annexes C (*Selected Bibliography on Democracy and Governance*) and D (*Extended Bibliography on Democracy and Governance*).

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....	i
I. INTRODUCTION .....	1
II. CONCEPTUALIZATION .....	1
A. Governance and Democracy .....	1
B. Democracy .....	2
C. Governance .....	5
III. GOVERNANCE: AN ANALYSIS AND TAXONOMY IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD .....	8
A. Models of Governance .....	8
B. Governance Failure and the Developing World .....	11
1. INSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS AND GOVERNANCE .....	11
2. SOCIAL-CONTEXTUAL PROBLEMS AND GOVERNANCE .....	12
3. POLITICAL (INTEGRATED)/SYSTEMIC-LEVEL PROBLEMS AND GOVERNANCE .....	13
C. General Guidance for Governance Projects .....	14
D. A Taxonomy of Governance and Governance Interventions .....	15
B. Public Administration/Management and Policy Reforms .....	18
C. Legislatures and Other Deliberative Bodies .....	19
D. Constitutionalism .....	19
E. Strategic Assessments .....	21
V. CONCLUSIONS: SUGGESTED INTERVENTIONS .....	24
End Notes .....	29
ANNEX A: SCOPE OF WORK FOR GOVERNANCE REVIEW .....	38
ANNEX B: EVOLUTION OF THE USE OF THE TERM "GOVERNANCE" IN DEVELOPMENT .....	40
Use in the Donor Community .....	40
USAID .....	41
THE WORLD BANK .....	42
THE UNITED NATIONS .....	43
Lower and Middle Income Countries .....	44
The Academic Community .....	44
End Notes .....	46

**ANNEX C: SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE**

.....	48
<b>Books</b> .....	48
<b>Chapters in Books</b> .....	50
<b>Articles</b> .....	50
<b>Documents</b> .....	52
<b>Reports to Sponsor</b> .....	54
<b>Speeches</b> .....	55
<b>Other Materials</b> .....	56
<b>USAID Project Documents</b> .....	56

**ANNEX D: EXTENDED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE**

.....	57
<b>PAIS</b> .....	57
<b>DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE</b> .....	57
<b>DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNANCE</b> .....	58
<b>PARTICIPATION AND GOVERNANCE</b> .....	58
<b>DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT</b> .....	58
<b>DEMOCRATIC THEORY</b> .....	64
<b>DEMOCRATIZATION</b> .....	64
<b>ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION</b> .....	70
<b>TOC</b> .....	71
<b>DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE</b> .....	71
<b>DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNANCE</b> .....	72
<b>DECENTRALIZATION AND GOVERNANCE</b> .....	73
<b>PARTICIPATION AND GOVERNANCE</b> .....	73
<b>DEMOCRATIC THEORY</b> .....	73
<b>ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION</b> .....	75
<b>American Political Science Review</b> .....	78
<b>Public Administration Review</b> .....	79

## I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report is to provide guidance to the Center for Democracy of the Global Bureau of the U.S. Agency for International Development in the development of a program of activities in "democratic governance."<sup>1</sup> Pursuant to the authors' Scope of Work (SOW), the report has been organized into several sections: (I) introduction; (II) conceptualization; (III) taxonomy and analysis of governance; (IV) projects; (V) interventions; and (VI) conclusions.

**Conceptualization** examines how democracy and governance can best be conceptualized to avoid logical contradictions and provide clear direction for USAID's democratic agenda.

Questions raised and discussed in this section include:

- o How does the concept of governance relate to and support the concept of democracy as currently understood by USAID?
- o How do the donor and academic communities understand (i.e., define and operationalize) the concept of governance? and
- o What issues need further clarification?

**Taxonomy and Analysis of Governance** deals with what approaches have been used in the past in pursuing good governance and raises and discusses the following questions:

- o Is there a basis for a "model" of good governance?
- o What appears to cause "governance failure"?
- o What guidance does this offer donors?
- o What taxonomy may be used to organize and highlight key features of governance activities and how can one choose among them?

**Projects** examines USAID past projects and raises and discusses the following:

- o What field activities have been pursued in governance programs? and
- o What are the lessons learned from these experiences?

**Conclusions: Suggested Interventions** examines the optimal strategies and content needed for pursuing an effective democratic governance program in AID's field operations.

## II. CONCEPTUALIZATION

### A. Governance and Democracy

A useful task in determining the domain of the concept of "governance" is first, to disentangle it from the concept of "democracy" and second, to clarify each concept. This is needed to show how governance activities might be reasonably expected to relate to sustainable democracy, to provide a clear and independent focus for an agenda of governance activities, and to clarify the relationship between governance and other democratically related activities. In all this, the reader must bear in

mind that there are a variety of ways of looking at these concepts, and no available pure forms ("Platonic" or otherwise) to measure them against. Because all definitions are matters of convenience we cannot hope to end the debate on these questions.

## **B. Democracy**

The purpose of this brief review is four fold. First, it is to argue that to commit oneself to "democracy" is to say little without a detailed exposition of what is meant by the term. For example, both Rousseauian (continental European) and Lockean-Hobbesan (Anglo-American) models of democracy are arguably democratic to most analysts, but they differ vastly: Rousseauian democracy was a system which emphasized equality, unity and authority at the center. Lockean democracy emphasized personal liberty, pluralism and local autonomy.<sup>2</sup>

Second, it is to suggest that one cannot intelligently develop or advocate a strategy to achieve "democracy" until the above exposition has been made. For while each of these is arguably "democratic," they differ significantly and what ought to be done to encourage their effective operation and survival will differ as well.

Third, it is to suggest that "democracy" itself is rarely simply an end. People choose various forms of democracy because they believe it will bring about goals they value: personal development and empowerment; an end to abuse by arbitrary rulers; broader mobilization of talent into government; better policy; greater personal liberty; revolutionary change; etc. The way democracy is defined implicitly identifies certain of these goals above the others.

USAID has not been without debate on its understanding of democracy. It has included in that debate a number of serious "think-pieces" from the several regional bureaus, as well as from its overall leadership.<sup>3</sup> Some have rather simplistically offered lists of features of democracy without specifying why these features rather than others were chosen. Others have discussed why some features may be argued to be critical, and given an overall conception of democracy as a purposive and coherent system. Except by administrative fiat though, no real consensus has been reached on this question.

Fourth, it may well be that you can't get "there" (to a workable program) from "here" ("democracy" in the abstract as the goal). This deserves further discussion.

Rather than thinking of "democracy" as something coherent and holistic, it is probably better understood as a variety of ways of making collective choices which are oriented toward broadly based accountability and lawful governance, in the pursuit of values that social units agree upon. Specific ways of making collective choices are chosen both because the mechanisms are valued in themselves, and because they appear likely to succeed instrumentally.

What agreement there is in USAID on "democracy" has, properly, avoided a fixed and holistic model; rather it has stressed a number of "bits and pieces" of democratic structure which appear relatively noncontroversial today: rule of law, elections and civil society. There is nothing wrong with this list,

except that they are "means" as much as ends, and what they are intended to serve as a "means to" is left unresolved except by the still undefined (and probably undefinable) term "democracy."

Some have broadened the "democracy" list to include such operational qualities as human rights, increased opportunity for women, expanded participation, enhanced rights for labor, etc. The only problem with these qualities is that merely stating them leaves unanswered the questions of how to attain them, and how they fit together to create and sustain a working system of governance. At the bottom line, what they offer is not a scheme or plan of governance as an operational system, but a set of desirable qualities. How they are to be achieved is still unresolved. How they should work together to resolve our partners' governance problems is not clear either.

USAID thus faces a number of problems of conceptualization and operation in trying to use the term "democracy" to define and integrate its democracy and governance agenda. If it defines democracy very specifically it may be vulnerable to criticism as ethnocentric, may foreclose a good deal of viable institutional diversity, and may seem irrelevant to the tangible and real-world problems in which the field and our partner governments are generally involved. While it avoids these problems with its loose and open definition, it lacks an integrating framework for its program and rationale for the pieces it supports.

If it broadens the definition to include normatively oriented operational features (respect human rights, broaden the opportunities of women, encourage broadened participation, etc.) it provides some operational criteria to guide its institutional agenda, but it does not offer a framework to integrate a governance program, nor does it answer a key question for partner-state leaders: while these may be good things to do, how will they help us solve our pressing operational problems? Absent those answers, perceptions of ethnocentrism, cultural imperialism and operational irrelevance may follow USAID's programs. Perhaps as important, limited commitment to our goals by partner countries will probably also follow. Finally, it is not clear that these operational qualities, important as they are, provide a compelling and complete definition of "democracy."

What has happened in recent years to open "political-development" for USAID's agenda is a remarkable agreement that prior regimes failed to achieve the most basic goals of development: economic growth, human freedom and social peace. There is also remarkable agreement on characteristics of these regimes which eroded or blocked these values: unaccountable and unresponsive governments; lawless governments; publicly insulated and over-centralized governments; corrupt governments; and policy-making and implementing-incompetent governments. While there is remarkably wide-spread consensus that governments have fallen seriously short in recent decades, and fairly wide-spread agreement on the causes of the shortfalls, the support for "democracy" as a specific set of institutional arrangements for achieving these goals is probably less firm.

Where does that leave us? Consider the following:

- IF:**
- o there is no agreed upon definition of democracy;
  - o there is no consensus powerful theory of achieving the various conceptions of democracy to guide and integrate USAID's program;

- o there is great institutional variability across the world which is arguably "democratic";
- o field missions and partner-governments are motivated by tangible problem solving, to which "democracy" seems abstract;
- o existing performance criteria (human rights, participation, etc.) are both too broad in that they lack context and not broad enough in that they do not explain how they will solve pressing real-world problems of government; and,
- o existing institutionally related activities lack an integrating framework and are likely to be incomplete remedies on their own for governmental failures;

**THEN:** o perhaps a better focal point for USAID would be a more tangible, operational, generally accepted, and clearly field-relevant goal: better management of public affairs, or "governance."

**HOWEVER:** o because of USAID's legal and policy commitment to democracy as a priority, this should be cast and implemented as "democratic governance," i.e., achieving better governance via democratic means.

Such an approach solves a number of pressing problems. First, "governance" is explicitly and by consensus accepted to be the "process of managing public affairs."<sup>4</sup> There is little disagreement that public affairs need to be managed, and managed well. Under "governance" the question becomes analytical rather than normative. Second, there are, historically and theoretically, many ways of "doing" "governance": monarchies, aristocracies, oligarchies, despotisms, theocracies, single-party-vanguard systems and military-rule, to indicate a few. These systems can be compared and evaluated on their performance in "managing public affairs" and on the fundamental values they exemplify and sustain in that management.

Third, if part of the agenda of governance is improving the management of public affairs, and in the AID context it is to focus on strengthening such qualities as "transparency" and "accountability," it cannot ignore the areas of elections, due process, or civil society.<sup>5</sup> All three play large roles--in theory and in common sense--in improving governance.

Fourth, USAID Missions are organized largely to be problem solving entities. On its face, democracy does not clearly solve problems. However, governance, with its focus on performance, does offer a tool relevant to their agenda, while a governance program can work as well on showing how democratic strategies can work to improve governance.

Happily for USAID, the vast weight of contemporary analysis points to the same conclusion: more broadly based, accountable, constitutional and lawful regimes (i.e., broad features that most would accept as "democratic governance") are, over the long-run, more successful ways to accomplish governance.<sup>6</sup> Thus, these reforms in a governance framework can be argued as operationally effective, not only as normatively justifiable.

This democratic governance conceptualization thus offers USAID an operational element that is probably more relevant to mission agendas (i.e., it is meaningful to speak of strengthening democratic

governance in a sector and thereby in solving sectoral problems, but democracy does not on its face appear to be a solution to such problems as collapsing health care). A more flexible agenda through democratic governance better fits the diversity of operational and philosophical "space" US-partner governments might be in, and strategies they might pursue. Democratic governance provides more tangible criteria to evaluate progress (i.e., a focus on performance); a normative bottom line on what is and is not acceptable in "governance" (democracy); and a framework to integrate the various aspects of the Center for Democracy's program.

Ultimately, perhaps the greatest advantage of a democratic governance focused strategy is that it focuses on the real-world bottom line agenda of the field: making governments operate better, but it leaves room to include normative boundaries, such as respect for human rights, due process, equality for women, elections, rights of labor, etc. Because the disciples of comparative political analysis, public policy and public administration have long focused on governmental performance, there is likely to be a good deal more theoretical and conceptual guidance for a democratic governance agenda than for a purely democratic one. The latter has been more the domain of philosophers than empirical social scientists. This report is not suggesting that USAID alter its fundamental commitment to sustainable democracy as one of its two core goals. Instead, it is arguing that democracy's conceptual generality and abstraction, as well as its diverse manifestations, mean it is unfeasible as a framework to organize, analyze and evaluate a field program. We believe that the more restricted and focussed concept of "democratic governance" is a better tool for these critical tasks.

"Democracy", perhaps understood as governance arrangements which emphasize broad participation, accountability, and rule of law, can and should remain at the purpose level as the core of AID's concern. "Democratic governance" becomes a framework to focus AID's activity on improving the management of public affairs within acceptable democratic norms: because we are proactive and interventionist at this level, we must know exactly what we are doing, why, and how it relates to our immediate goals. "Sustainable Democracy" becomes the overall criteria to judge the program: do governance arrangements consistent with broad understandings of democracy (broad enough to encompass the diversity noted above), survive? Because AID is not designing programs and projects at this purpose level, here it can work better with the real-world diversity and creativity our partners will bring to their long-term governance arrangements. They will and must vary greatly in their search for democracy, and AID's concerns must be whether their outcomes (and our contributions) fall within broadly understood democratic parameters.

### C. Governance

Governance as an identifiable and specialized concept first appears in the literature of social science in the 1960s. While there is no single bottom-line definition, there are a number of common concerns and general findings in its varied uses. Its first generalized use is regarding the governance of corporations.<sup>7</sup> Corporate governance dealt with the challenging question of managing organizations which were characterized by:

- o multiple groups to which they were accountable (i.e., stake holders), whose support was needed for effective operations (shareholders, financiers, labor);

- o multiple and complex production processes, operating in environments characterized primarily by change (in technology, consumer preferences, costs of inputs, production processes, value of capital equipment, competition, cash flows, etc.);
- o the need to achieve both stable (i.e. predictable) and dynamic (flexible and adaptable) relationships with key partners in the supply, production and marketing processes; and
- o obligations to conform to the lawful requirements of multiple governmental entities (local, state, national governments, regulatory agencies; court decisions, etc).

In this complex milieu, governance is understood not simply as managerial techniques and decisions, but as the operations of the institutional structure of the corporation. Specifically, it is the distribution of authority, prerogatives, limitations, resources, information and the like that creates a structure of incentives and disincentives to satisfy accountability, produce goods effectively, coordinate with other entities, and meet legal requirements successfully. Governance therefore is a far greater task than "management," and deals with the issues of systematizing effective internal and external transactions and operations; so the corporate entity can survive in its environment, both regarding external functions and internal cohesion. Issues commonly considered within the realm of corporate "governance" included the role of shareholder, the board of directors' authority, executive prerogatives, role of labor in decision-making; the balancing and respective roles of such functions as finance, marketing, production, research, development, legal counsel, public affairs (relations); decentralization of authority; nature of relationship with other corporate entities (contract, partnership, ownership); reward structures; personnel tenure; allocation of profits; etc. Some of these issues are settled by corporate articles; some by public law; some by private law (contracts) some by managerial and unit discretion; some by convention; and some are open questions.

In dealing with corporate operations, the literature on governance emphasized developing systems of rule-governed relationships that give key persons incentives to carry out actions that sustain its multiple goals and functions, and disincentives to avoid negative actions. Optimally, transaction costs, opportunity costs, uncertainty, spillovers and the like are considered in constituting such systems. Managerial discretion is nested in such systems in ways that tie incentives for organizationally functional actions to unavoidable ambiguities in information. Governance thus is the institutional (rule-governed) arrangements that deal with the particular functions of and conditions faced by a single organization, and transcend but certainly guide day-to-day management of its affairs.

The concept of governance first became a major subject of discourse regarding government in an arena remarkably similar to the corporation: U.S. metropolitan government.<sup>8</sup> Once again, this is a highly complex entity, accountable to many and diverse groups and interests, producing a diversity of services and goods, relating to other governments, in a highly changing environment, itself governed by the laws of numerous legal entities, and dependent on the continued input of resources from diverse sources. If anything, metropolitan government is even more complex than the corporation because it lacks even the illusion of a single directing entity: all U.S. metropolitan governments (even "uni-governmental" systems) are composed of many, independent and autonomous jurisdictions; and as a rule produce non-market goods as monopolies or oligopolies and therefore lack price signalling mechanisms to help provide information to guide allocations of resources. Since metropolitan governments employ millions of people, provide critical (life-related)

services for hundreds of millions of people, and spend billions, the effective management of their affairs is clearly critical.

Simple hierarchical models do not capture either the reality or even a desirable possibility for metropolitan government. While such models make thinking about metropolitan government far simpler and questions of democratic control superficially clearer, they are not adequate even in theory to the tasks faced by metropolitan governments. Large numbers of persons; producing vastly different services and goods (most with highly varying economies of scale); with different problems and opportunities for negative and positive spillovers; different production functions; varying collective-private good dynamics; and different consumer preference patterns; and with different needs and resources, and the like, far exceed the ability of any manager (or "mayor") to direct, or any single institutional structure to produce. Similarly, the competitors for the public's attention and concern, the costs of information, and the need to attend to legal requirements of other levels of government mean that any simple plebiscitarian system of public control is likely to be inadequate to genuinely inform or direct decision-making.

The metropolitan polity is characterized by a plethora of different, often overlapping public entities, producing diverse goods and services for diverse populations. Such an arrangement cries out for some form of organization: within the varying jurisdictions, among them, with their clients/citizens, and vis-a-vis other levels of government: but simple hierarchy would never succeed. As in the case of corporate management, the term governance seemed to capture this complex process: how is authority allocated among the diverse actors in the metropolitan polity to facilitate the effective, efficient, responsive and continuous production of goods and services. The conventional notion of "government," implying a single and defined locus of authority and responsibility, was not an accurate depiction of this reality. Similarly, the conventional notion of democracy (i.e., elections) did not capture the diverse ways the various jurisdictions related to and responded to their environment: a few via elections, some via joint boards and consulting mechanisms, some via close operation with interested parties, some via informal mechanisms, some in response to externally defined professional norms, and many in conformity to laws passed by other jurisdictions. Just as corporations' affairs were more than "management," metropolitan governments' affairs were more than "government": both could be better understood as engaged in a broader activity some have called "governance."

In the early 1980s, with the publication of Guidance, Control, and Evaluation in the Public Sector, the concept of governance was applied to the general provision of goods and services by governments.<sup>9</sup> A large and diverse collection of essays on governance in North America and Europe, it emphasized the inadequacy of simple hierarchical organizations and simple democratic procedures to provide goods and services in an efficient and publicly responsive way. It argued that effective choice of and delivery of goods and services by governments required attention, in particular, to such factors as multiple levels of accountability (upward, lateral, downward), effective information and feedback flows, organizational pluralism, organizational constitutionalism and rule-making, due-process, internal flexibility in service/production-system design, nested and lateral linkages to other organizations, resource flows linked to performance, and decentralization of decision-making to fit the relevant production and decision-making unit. Overall, the key findings of this literature are that the governance arrangements of any organization or system critically affect its subsequent

performance, and that usually multiple, layered and decentralized-nested institutional arrangements are necessary for effective governance.

### **III. GOVERNANCE: AN ANALYSIS AND TAXONOMY IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD**

#### **A. Models of Governance**

Since several World Bank reports in the early 1980s, governance has received increasing attention from donors and academics concerned with the developing world. From the maintenance of infrastructure to the delivery of human services, to creating and sustaining a favorable environment for investment enterprise and production, to the management of the public purse, to sustaining domestic peace and tranquility, to expanding opportunities for hitherto discriminated and deprived people, analysts came to recognize that the quality of governance was critical to virtually all developmental goals.<sup>10</sup>

As discussed above, governance currently is generally understood in the development community as the management of public affairs. This does not merely include the action of governments, but refers to the way a society, and communities within a society, organize to make and implement decisions on matters of general concern: to resolve matters that are seen as problems by a given society. Much governance will go on entirely outside the administration of government: non-formal education, private and religious schooling, community self-help, farmer, fishermen, and other cooperatives, labor organization, private charities, business activities, and the like. Legal frameworks (contract law, torts, incorporation, etc.) may well regulate these activities in a very general way, but to all intents and purposes, they are non-governmental governance.<sup>11</sup>

Mixed arrangements also exist, where non-governmental organizations participate in the management of affairs of general concern in a specific partnership with governments. These could include labor union officers charged with enforcing labor standards; women's groups involved in implementing family planning or pre-natal campaigns and clinics; local organizations negotiating with governmental officials on their role in setting and enforcing use rules for public infrastructure such as irrigation systems; and private banks implementing government-established credit systems to encourage certain forms of investment or enterprise. In each of these, key matters of public affairs are managed by rule-governed relationships which guide the actions of formal government agents or agencies, entirely private organizations, and private persons, but without the detailed management by a single locus of control. Governance also occurs through formal government organizations, which act in roles familiar to all, setting and implementing policies on matters of all sorts. And while they have critical roles to play in establishing legal structures and social prerequisites to guide and energize all this, the "management" that is necessary for the governance of a society is not the management of executives, but the organization of authority and responsibility relations among large numbers of persons, so that the decisions and actions necessary are taken to provide for the chosen collective good. Effective governance arrangements are not mechanisms of government control, micro-management, or rule: they are mechanisms that structure the activities of these diverse participants, often giving them real power, so specific and general goals can be reached!

Because of the complexity (technological, cost, time, space) of goods and services desired by human beings, because of the interdependencies people share, because human interaction is characterized by such recurrent problems as dealing with spill-overs, commons problems, public goods problems, and problems of individual advantage vs. collective and cooperative action, many and diverse governance arrangements have been found to be necessary. They work in multiple operational areas to define purposes and scopes of action and membership, clarify responsibility, control conflict, gather and share information, secure personal needs, stabilize expectations, assign duties, distribute costs and rewards, establish new political and governance arrangements, and the like. Optimally, they do this by providing individuals with incentives to cooperate in the production of generally valued outcomes and in the avoidance of generally accepted "bads."

Governance arrangements need to be understood as operating at two levels: (1) the arrangements which structure human activity around a given problem or goal (such as health service delivery, criminal and civil justice, basic education); and (2) the arrangements by which people make their choices.<sup>12</sup> Governments are critical as organizations which help establish each of these arrangements. Once established, they become but one player in the overall activity of governance. The belief that governments monopolized both the establishment and operation has contributed to many of the governance failures of the past, because it excluded information, players and checks, and encouraged error and abuse of power.<sup>13</sup>

Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues have done extensive research on governance arrangements in the management of commons systems and the maintenance of physical infrastructures throughout the developing world.<sup>14</sup> When their work is combined with the governance work cited above, a number of complimentary injunctions for designing working governance arrangements is suggested. Their approach presumes that the driving force of governance is individuals who engage in purposive behavior as affected by their contexts, resources and institutional (governance) arrangements. This work presumes a model of individuals who are: moderately self-interested; have the capacity to learn from their environment and change their actions; and are satisficing (rather than maximizing) actors. The goal of this analysis is to learn how to create environments where persons have the ability and incentive to develop and revise governance arrangements which respond satisfactorily to their problems and enhance general well-being, without externalizing costs on others. Based on this research, a pattern of prerequisites to good governance can be suggested. Specifically, this includes:

- o absence of severe asymmetries of power among participants (political equality);
- o participants select and can remove legislative and executive role occupants (political accountability);
- o there is linkage between actions and consequences for the actors and participants (policy consequences symmetry);
- o definition of unit of collective choice corresponds to the problem to be resolved (unit-problem appropriateness);
- o actors have the authority to take action on the problem and to revise the rules that structure their choice making process (authority capacity);
- o actors have adequate information to assess performance of their arrangements (sufficient information);

- o institutional arrangements are nested in broader arrangements that strengthen rule of law/ due process (procedural integrity); and
- o actors have limited ability to transfer resources from other arenas and dominate choice-making with those resources (institutional discretion).

Under these conditions, there are reasons to expect those involved in governance will learn from its performance, be directed by the consequences to those affected, and have the capacity to revise their arrangements accordingly.

It must be understood that this governance "model" reviews the general qualities this research and theory suggests ought to characterize decision-making arrangements for complex areas of governance, but not the specific applied decisions those lead to. Those must correspond to the particular priorities, needs, technologies and contexts which vary from governance arena to arena. The argument here is that these general arrangements over time will bring about specific decisions and policies likely to manage public affairs well. This would apply to the most complex and broadly gauged governance arena (national government), as well as to governance arrangements in other arenas: metropolitan government, health care, education, and the like.

It also focuses on the governance arrangements rather than the decisions themselves because the problems, needs, priorities, technologies specific to any arena will change. What is critical for good governance is arrangements that can deal with those changes. Indeed, governance arrangements themselves must be open to change. Governance arrangements are not perfected and left to operate on their own, but are continuously operated by changing individuals who must be led to govern well by the choice-sets, options and consequences they face. Because the problems they face and the contexts in which they work may change dramatically, they need choice-sets and options that enable them to revise and recreate governance arrangements that work well through and in those changes. Governance is thus a multi-iterative and multi-level process concerned with both making decisions which arrange and manage a set of activities and recreating the means by which it will do so in the future.

The model is by no means a detailed protocol to analyze all governance problems and direct detailed follow-on activities. Instead it is a broad analytical framework to help donor personnel: (1) determine what general (i.e., global) capacities they might need to respond to governance problems; (2) analyze and make strategic sense of the general governance problems faced by a given country, thereby helping inform the choice of specific design teams (i.e., in decentralization, rule of law, elections and accountability, etc.) to develop programs to ameliorate specific governance problems; and (3) in conjunction with both institutional specialists and specific sector specialists, analyze the governance problems found in a specific sector, and recommend appropriate follow-on project activities. In order to intervene effectively in the realm of governance, this report argues that USAID must:

1. agree on a model of institutional arrangements likely to bring about effective governance;
2. analyze what real-world policies, institutional arrangements, and conditions have impeded and compromised effective governance;

3. determine which of those it can most effectively work with to improve the prospects of good governance.

The above section has attempted to clarify a model of abstract qualities the absence of which are likely to produce governance failure. The next section (Section B) will attempt to review some of the causes of governance failure in the developing world. Section C, below will discuss their implications for USAID.

## **B. Governance Failure and the Developing World**

Good governance is not a simple thing. If it were, one could reasonably expect to find a lot more of it. Recent studies of governance, particularly in the developing world, suggest several types of problems that have impeded it, including (1) institutional-organizational (2) social-contextual, and (3) political-systemic. Specifically:

1. Institutional-Organizational
  - o institutional and political overcentralization;
  - o administrative shortfalls in skills and organization;
  - o flawed institutional design;
  - o poor policy making capacity;
2. Social-Contextual
  - o maldistribution of power;
  - o severe social inequality;
  - o ethnic, religious and caste particularism;
  - o pervasive discrimination;
  - o underdeveloped civil society;
3. Political-Systemic
  - o political personalism (patrimonialism) and patron/clientage;
  - o oligarchic and class rule;
  - o ideologically driven policy.

### **1. Institutional and Organizational Problems and Governance**

Effective governance can be undermined by a variety of flaws in institutional design. Over centralization is one of the clearest and can cause problems for accountability (those who make policy are far from the reach of those who live with it), inadequate information (distance, time and information leakage problems), inappropriate units of action (diseconomies of scale impede problem solving; overloaded decision makers do not respond to local problems), policy consequences (those who make policy do not live with its consequences) and political inequality (those in the periphery are far less politically influential than urban dwellers). Over centralization damages governance by

impeding action that could solve the real-world problems people face: authority is misplaced, initiative is penalized, resources are misallocated, and developmental activities and social services are produced sub-optimally.

Flawed institutional design can also hurt governance. Legislative bodies without staffs; ministers accountable only to presidents; budget procedures that exclude legislative input; electoral systems that systematically underrepresent certain groups or do not work at all; courts that are vulnerable to executive pressure via its control of salary, placement, tenure or personal security; local authorities without taxing powers; "decentralized" services without systematic local input; local governments whose personnel are selected, paid, promoted and demoted by a national civil service commission; etc. compromise governance on such criteria as: political accountability, sufficiency of information, clarity of policy consequences, sufficient authority to act, appropriateness of unit vs. responsibilities, procedural integrity, and political equality. Such flaws are found all the way from national governance arrangements to the organization of field/delivery components of human service bureaucracies.

Inadequate administrative skills also compromise governance. Without them virtually every governance function is weakened. They are particularly critical to maintaining sufficient information, political accountability, procedural integrity, and the capacity of appropriate units of governance. These weaknesses compromise the ability of governance arrangements to manage information, analyze what they are doing and how well they are doing it, develop new programs, and answer to those who are to govern them.

The organizational-managerial dimension of government is a critical source of governance problems. Because there are so many and quite different governance functions, there will never be a single "blueprinted" organizational design. What can be done is to clarify the governance functions an organization (or organizations) is to perform and then to analyze its (their) institutional arrangements to see how officials who are supposed to play key roles within it will have the authority, incentives and opportunities to take the actions necessary to perform the function. Many times governance problems are caused directly by organizational and institutional design flaws. While this may seem daunting at first view, for the donor or reformer it is a form of "good news," as these problems are among those more accessible to induced change.

## **2. Social-Contextual Problems and Governance**

Three general problems for governance lie in this area: inequality and discrimination, the development of civil society, and ethnic particularism. Inequality and discrimination undermine governance because they attack at root the ability of citizens to: authoritatively communicate critical information to officials, hold officials to account for failing to respond to that information, and thereby encourage them to improve performance and reform institutions. Inequality can also work to undermine procedural integrity (due process, rule of law, constitutionalism) and, by weakening already disadvantaged citizens, to weaken the performance of institutions of governance (local governments) otherwise appropriate to solve problems. Social inequality usually translates into political inequality and therefore into opportunities for some to abuse power over others.

Underdeveloped civil societies are important for many of the same reasons. Civil society acts as the "multiplier" for otherwise fragmented individual voices and helps overcome the problems of information, organization and decision costs. It helps compensate for the organizational advantage which governmental entities possess and thereby amplifies voices and interests otherwise not heard. It is particularly important in the governance dimension of accountability, equality, information, and assuring procedural integrity. Civil society can be a primary guardian against state lawlessness and abuse of power.

Ethnic particularism is a third social-contextual problem for achieving and maintaining good governance. Any type of systematic favoritism or discrimination will undermine the process of policy feedback and accountability essential to continuously refining and redirecting governance arrangements. It directly attacks procedural integrity, and can be used as well to mobilize resources to undermine institutional discreteness. Its existence can fragment otherwise appropriate units of action for shared problems. Not surprisingly, ethnic particularism can also engender social and political conflict which often destroys governance arrangements.

### **3. Political (Integrated)/Systemic-Level Problems and Governance**

The most difficult problems for governance are created when several problematic patterns are integrated into a single, complex, operating system. For example, consider the case of personalistic (patrimonial), patron-client systems. These are characterized by systems of ties between persons who have exceptional control over resources, and subordinates (clients) who offer allegiance and obedience to the leader (patron) in return for protection and a share of those resources. Historical, strong networks can exist in such systems, with each person developing downward his own clients, until the poorest farmer at the bottom ends the chain. These are often reinforced (or built upon) ethnic, caste and religious particularism.

Such systems can be powerful order-maintaining arrangements as long as: ample resources are controlled by the "senior" patron; each level passes down a sufficient share to take care of most beneath it; the income stream or flow of resources continues; those who try to opt-out or compete with it are punished; and the senior patron maintains a balance among his lieutenants that avoids competitive conflict. But patrimonial, patron-client systems embody several patterns which are quite problematic for governance. These include the bias toward distribution of goods rather than their production, the absence of lawful procedures for succession of power, the severe inequalities in power it maintains between lower and higher levels, the vulnerability of formal political institutions (judicial, administrative, legislative) and civil society to personal rule and the requirements of patron-client, and the fragmentation of collective action along patron-client networks.

The results for governance are quite severe. Accountability, both political and administrative, is blocked by patron-client interests. What accountability that exists benefits those already empowered and focuses on their all-consuming need to concentrate resources at the center for patrimonial distribution. Whether or not leaders are wise enough and skilled administratively to pursue strategies which sustain wealth production over the long-run is not certain. The fate of mineral extraction and small-holder agriculture in the last thirty years throughout Africa suggests that they are not. Due process and rule of law are also severely weakened by the informal and personalistic dynamics of patrimonialism, and genuine local government (except as a tool of selected patrons) is non-existent.

Indeed, any political institution which would allow individuals to solve their problems or improve their lives outside the patron-client structure is a threat to it, and therefore not tolerated. Thus sufficient authority for people to solve their own problems, the existence of appropriate units for collective action to occur, and institutional discreteness so persons can solve their own problems without interference from those at other levels, are all blocked. Information which might discredit such systems is also blocked. In such a vertical, top-down system, the units which make policy virtually never are the same as the units which live with the policy: indeed, as a rule they are consciously insulated from consequences via class, party or other elite status.

Patrimonial governance is extremely poor governance. Its dynamics thwart virtually every one of the prerequisites to good governance, and eventually lead to many of the governance failures listed above. Patron-client/patrimonial systems are extremely resistant to reform, until their (perhaps) inevitable contradictions destroy them: in their endless quest to subordinate all institutions and processes to asymmetrical, hierarchical personal ties; and to lubricate these with distribution of goods, they preclude rational policy-making and administration, fatally weaken downward accountability mechanisms which might correct poor performance, preempt community (and individual) entrepreneurship, deny security of law to persons and property, and subordinate efficient production to the requirements of patronage. They are prone to extreme policy error and bankruptcy and lack mechanisms to correct them.

While differing from patrimonialism in detail, other systemic patterns can be analyzed to show how they too lead to ineffective and costly governance. Narrow oligarchic and class-based rule, utopian and statist rule, rigid theocratic rule, each have their own patterns of political inequality; limited accountability; overcentralized authority; inadequate, distorted and opaque information; disjointedness between units which make and which live with policy; political interference with due process and rule of law, and the like.

### **C. General Guidance for Governance Projects**

The theory of governance articulated in this report would predict the eventual demise of these systems, whether spectacularly (the implosion of the USSR) or gradually (the gradual decline of much of Africa in the 1980s). Until that happens, there is probably little the donors can do as the multiple dysfunctional patterns are linked into mutually supportive, strong, even if flawed systems. After the collapse of these systems, however, and during the time leaders and societies are open to new governance strategies, donors can work with government and civil society personnel and interests which wish to adopt these new strategies. To do this, donors need both strategic and tactical guidance. Strategically, an overall vision of governance and specific problems associated with it is needed. Tactically, close and careful analysis of each individual case, in order to assess its particular problems and leverage points is essential.

Generalizing from the strategy suggested by this report's model of governance, two broad and complimentary areas of intervention appear promising:

1. organizational and institutional reforms; and
2. social and contextual reforms.

Continued support of systemic level pressures such as structural adjustment on complex and integrated counter-governance regimes, and which might force an opening for democratic governance reforms, may also be appropriate. However, once the complex and integrated systems have lost their hold, concern for political reform may call for easing these pressures. They can easily overload democratic-governance reforms before they take root.

As suggested earlier in this report (III-A), the governance model is not a detailed protocol of interventions, but an analytical framework to help focus our attention on what seem to be critical aspects of the governance process.<sup>15</sup> It could be used in several ways:

1. to help develop a general base of project resources to respond to the several aspects of good governance;
2. as an analytical framework to assess the governance capacity and problems of any given country, and to suggest which specific, specialized design teams might offer relevant skills in responding to these needs; and
3. as an analytical framework to guide the analysis of governance problems in any given sector by joint teams composed of persons skilled in institutional analysis and in the given sector.

A strong, centrally based governance program would require persons well-skilled in the several areas of governance intervention. These would include at least the rule of law, due process, elections, bureaucratic accountability, decentralization, local government, civil society, policy analysis and development, civil service, key sectors (health, agriculture, education, etc.), and perhaps others in order to analyze the specific needs in these areas and develop project responses to them. Such personnel ought to be able to analyze these areas as institutions (i.e., vis their own governance arrangements), as organizations and operations (how they are currently implementing their activities) and as personnel, and the links among these three levels. Appropriate interventions might frequently be expected to include activities at all three levels.

#### **D. A Taxonomy of Governance and Governance Interventions**

Governance-related interventions are as diverse as the many ways governance arrangements can be comprised. They also can be pursued at least three levels:

1. constitutional
2. organizational
3. personnel.

Both subjects will be explored in this section.

## 1. Governance Activities

There are many ways in which governance reforms can be pursued. These include:

### Organizational and Administrative

- o rule of law
- o due process
- o constitution building
- o decentralization
- o elections
- o sector-specific reorganization and reform
- o local government
- o civil service reform
- o deliberative/legislative institutions
- o policy making procedures
- o personnel development
- o administrative organization and procedures

### Social Equality/Civil Society

- o women in development
- o labor status/relations reform
- o small-holder agriculture activities (land tenure, marketing, extension)
- o media development
- o general civil society projects
- o civic education

In most cases, governance programs will require multi-faceted interventions. For example, if after a strategic assessment, it is believed that a key governance problem is insufficient and/or opaque information on government operations, an appropriate intervention may well require working with civil society to expand clientele and advocacy groups, clarifying authority for institutions or bureaucracies with key data gathering and analyzing functions, developing revised operational procedures for agencies, training officials in them, and strengthening due process oversight capacity and functions among judicial personnel.

Activities can be carried on at multiple levels. For example, at the constitutional level, activities deal with the core institutional arrangements and systems of governance. In decentralization, for example, constitutionally focused governance projects would focus on the allocation of authority and responsibility to decentralized entities including their discretion over personnel, revenue, budgeting, programs, ordinances and regulations, enforcement, grass-roots participation, their own reorganization, and the like: what they may do, may not do, and must do. An organizational-level intervention would focus on how they have organized their internal procedures and operations to undertake these activities: what systems they have for selecting, engaging, evaluating, developing, promoting and discharging their personnel; or, how they raise, manage, expend and audit their funds.

In other words, how are they undertaking their activities, how does it affect their performance, and how might it be strengthened to improve performance?

Finally, a personnel-level intervention would focus on the attitudes, skills, knowledge, role definitions/position descriptions of their personnel. How might these be altered to achieve better performance? The last strategy might include personnel assessments, organizational development, participant training, both generic and specific to single organizations. It will often be a critical complement to constitutional and organizational level interventions.

In reality, of course, each level is connected to the others. Problems met at the personnel level are often rooted in organizational-operational features and procedures. These in turn are often rooted in and cannot be resolved until constitutional-institutional features and provisions are changed. This, indeed, is precisely what the governance model would predict. While governance interventions can (and probably must) operate at all three levels to achieve lasting change, it is in focusing on the constitutional-institutional level and how that should be altered to support desired operational changes, that a governance strategy has the potential to make a unique and lasting impact on governance. It is here, if the research on governance discussed in part II-C of this document is correct, that the basic "direction" of the organizations involved in governance is set. While additional interventions can and should be pursued to fulfill the potential set by positive governance arrangements, if these arrangements are fundamentally wrong no level of organizational or personnel intervention will be likely to make a lasting difference. For example, in the Nigerian primary health care/decentralization reform, USAID and ODA analysts independently concluded that until significant responsibility for raising revenue was lodged at the local level and issues of inter-governmental relations were resolved, primary health care would never overcome problems of grass-roots apathy, local mismanagement, and corruption.

To reiterate, while constitutional-institutional analysis is fundamental to governance activities, the organizational and personnel levels are valuable and necessary complementary levels of analysis and intervention. It should be noted that constitutional-institutional analyses are not just for the center, nor are personnel interventions for the periphery. Local governments themselves create governance arrangements (for local services, problem solving) via the rules they promulgate and the relationship they develop with private interests; cabinet offices have personnel which may need training. These activities are not tied to "center" and "periphery," but to various "spheres" of existence of any governance arrangement.

Schematically it looks like this:

**Figure 1: Three Levels of Governance Interventions**

**Constitutional-Institutional Provisions**

**Organizational Operations**

**Personnel Actions**

## **B. Public Administration/Management and Policy Reforms**

Almost every student of public administration in the United States begins his/her studies by reading Woodrow Wilson's classic article, "The Study of Administration."<sup>16</sup> In this article, Wilson's call was two-fold: (1) for a neutral civil service to function in a government environment characterized by the separation of politics from administration and (2) for the development of a "science of administration" which is constrained by U.S. political values.<sup>17</sup> From the beginning, the study of public administration in the U.S. has been concerned with the relationship between the civil service and the people it serves as well as the civil service and the elected political leadership who supervise or manage the civil service. The terms "bureaucracy and democracy," "democracy and the public service," "democracy and the administrative state," and "representative bureaucracy" have been subject to academic scrutiny since the end of World War II.<sup>18</sup> Domestically, the U.S. has experienced a history of the development of public administration/management within a framework of democratic governance.

Vice President Al Gore enunciated five principles of "Governance and Modernization of the Democratic State" in his September 16, 1994, speech to officials of the Inter-American Development Bank. Four of his principles related directly to public administration/management,<sup>19</sup> while his fifth impacts on public administration/management.<sup>20</sup> J. Brian Atwood's two principles of participatory development deal with the "public" in "public administration."<sup>21</sup> The U.S. Congress through the appropriations process has encouraged USAID ". . .to manage the development of transformation policies and to implement reform programs to stabilize democracy and implement a market economy. . ." in reference to Central and Eastern Europe.<sup>22</sup> Currently, then, U.S. foreign policy encourages the development of public administration/management and policy reform within a democratic governance context.

With the "third wave of democratization" which has effected political systems in Africa, Asia and Latin America,<sup>23</sup> as well as the demise of the former Soviet Union, the "regime succession" which is being experienced by these countries has a substantial public administration/management and policy reform dimension. The so-called "windows of opportunity" appear to have opened in many countries which are trying to move from an authoritarian past to one which has the potential for democratic governance.<sup>24</sup> A very key ingredient to the transition from authoritarianism and democracy is the successful transformation of public administrative systems originally designed to maintain authoritarian governance to public administrative systems responsive to their citizens directly and indirectly through elected representatives of the people.

In the former Marxist-Socialist countries, the rigid, coercive public administrative systems (which Marx promised would "wither away" with the advent of communism) are undergoing change. In the former European colonies of Africa and Asia, the public administrative systems still maintain elements or traits associated with colonial bureaucracies even after several decades of independence.<sup>25</sup> The terms "transparency," "accountability" and "responsiveness" are being used by the people, their elected political leaders and the mass media in these countries. In fact, the terms have become demands for transparency, accountability and responsiveness. The point being made here is that the agenda for public administration/management and policy reform is still there but is being cast into a democratic governance context or framework.

At present, several factors have converged: (1) a history of public administration/management and public policy within a democratic governance context; (2) policy statements supportive of public administration/management and policy reform efforts within democratic governance contexts abroad; (3) USAID's "track record" in public administration/management and policy reform and (4) a global environment which is seeking, in some cases demanding, radical transformations in public administrative systems originally designed for authoritarian purposes. All four factors combine to present "windows of opportunity" for U.S. foreign economic and technical assistance.

### **C. Legislatures and Other Deliberative Bodies**

USAID's involvement in providing technical assistance to legislatures and other deliberative bodies has been minimal. In the search of USAID files using "legislative and political development" and "parliamentary systems" as key phrases from 1990 to the present, 16 entries involved either studies of legislatures or legislative training.<sup>26</sup> An additional 8 entries from 1975 through 1989 were also discovered.<sup>27</sup> Even though USAID assistance to legislative bodies has doubled since 1990 (in comparison to the 1975 to 1989 period), in comparison with either sector funding or other institutional development, assistance to legislatures has not been substantial.

Legislative bodies are the most political of political institutions. USAID's reluctance to become involved in projects which may have political land mines imbedded in them is understandable. As well, other U.S. agencies are involved in working with foreign legislatures--the United States Information Agency and its USIS is one which has provided funding for foreign legislators to make observation tours of other legislatures, in particular, those in the United States. On the other hand, requests for assistance to improve legislative information systems, train legislative staff, and technologies which might enhance informed decision making by legislative bodies are areas where most of the politics might be kept at arms-length and USIA/USIS does not operate. Assistance to legislative bodies might also be the basis of co-financed projects since other bi-lateral assistance agencies (the British, for example) have expressed interest in assisting the development of legislatures and the legislative process.<sup>28</sup>

### **D. Constitutionalism**

Constitutionalism is fundamental to good governance in general and sustainable democratic-governance in particular. It is not an area in which USAID has worked much in the past, but our ability to contribute to it may be important to sustain democracy in the future. Exactly how USAID might projectize this may require further study and discussion. However, a first step in this is to review the concept and its role in democratic governance.

At the core of a governance strategy is the need to institutionalize governance arrangements that are effective in managing the complex and diverse public affairs of a society. As noted earlier in this report, these arrangements exist at two levels:

1. the procedures, requirements, etc., which define what governments must do to make lawful decisions;

2. the way those decisions, once taken, affect specific operational areas of public affairs, such as the ability to raise revenue, track expenditures, deliver services, etc.

Constitutions are the bodies of law which establish the first of these sets of arrangements.<sup>29</sup> If, in fact, there exist general patterns of arrangements which are more conducive to better governance, as this report has argued, then establishing them in law (and in social norms) so they are valued, supported and respected is probably a key element of any effective governance strategy intended to achieve sustainable democracy: unless they are "institutionalized" as the foundation of detailed governance arrangements in the various sectors, any governance successes are likely to be ephemeral.

Constitutions are critical in governance for two reasons. First they allocate powers, authority, limits and obligations to various roles in government. In doing so they define how decisions are to be made, who is to make them, what limits there are to permissible government actions, who is accountable to whom, what recourse persons have in disputes, what the legitimate rewards of office are to be, and the like. This is important in that they establish the frame or skeleton of governance, and thus can "hard-wire" the political process in any of many directions: centralization vs. decentralization; information adequacy and transparency vs. opaqueness; accountability vs. arbitrariness, etc. They are also important because their existence is the primary protection against personalism: if a government is to be of laws and rules, and not of men, women, and powerful organizations, then it is here that the rules must first be asserted; it is from here that other rules will be protected.

Constitutionalism is, secondly, important because it can be used to discover, define and guarantee a social settlement. All societies are composed of diverse peoples with varying interests, values, fears and antagonisms, be they on religious, economic, racial, ethnic or other grounds. While constitutions are indeed technical documents in that they should establish governance arrangements conducive to good governance, they are also political documents, in that they must reflect a settlement acceptable to key elements of a society. These might include entrenched clauses, prohibited government actions, guarantees of regional autonomy or religious freedom and non-establishment, exceptional decision rules for certain areas of governmental activity, certain types of electoral systems (proportional representation) or executive arrangements (consociationalism), provisions for redistribution of wealth among various regions, specialized representative arrangements (corporatism), and the like.

Effective constitutions, an ongoing debate in political science since Aristotle, can take myriad forms. However, they seem over time, space and culture to share several features. For example one important feature of good constitutions is provisions to change themselves. Governance arrangements are never "completed." New requirements and problems require change in how decisions are made, what government's powers are, and the like. Thus there must be provisions in a constitution to change itself; otherwise extra-legal recourse must be taken. For a government to actually be "governed" by a constitution, of course, it cannot be able to casually and easily change that constitution. If it can, then there is no rule-of-law to control it, no sense the "social settlement" is somehow sacrosanct, and no protection from self-interested meddling in those governance arrangements by people in power. Instead, to serve their functions, constitutions must be amendable only by extraordinary procedures, ones generally outside the control of the government of the day: by popular vote, by a special convention, by ratification of sub-national constituencies or communities, etc.

Secondly, effective constitutions require mechanisms by which the people can enforce them against the government. Governments will violate constitutions: they always have and political and personal interests will mean they always will. But if the people have no recourse against this, there is no constitution. This usually requires an independent judiciary with authority as the ultimate arbiter of these issues, and a vigorous civil society to undergird it. Recent events in Ghana suggest such processes can work even in countries with a hitherto poor record on all these criteria.

Third, constitutions which endure clearly do not centralize all power in one branch or office. The potential for policy error, abuse of power, and defacto internal coup is too great for such constitutions to endure. Instead, and as noted by constitutional analysts such as Aristotle, Polybius, Ibin Kaldun, Montesquieu and Madison, as well as by noted political anthropologist Lucy Mair in pre-colonial Africa, power needs to be distributed and allocated among branches with the capacity and incentive to resist encroachment from one another. This can take many forms which allow room for diverse cultural traditions. But it must exist. Fourth, and finally, they must rest on a broad social settlement which involves and is acceptable to as much of the society as is possible.

Constitutions, of course, often fall short of these criteria. Broad post-war "social settlements" were not, for the most part, the basis of the developing-area's constitutions. Critical social divisions were not resolved in constitutional arrangements, with class and rural-urban gaps the most pronounced, and ethnic ones important often as well. Also, constitutions were often highly flawed, with all power concentrated in a few hands, and features not designed to encourage popular control, executive-legislative balance, or judicial autonomy. Grossly statist economic strategies concentrated power into the executive branch, sucking vitality and independence from civil society, the lawful opposition, and private citizens. Finally, social power was highly asymmetrical, leaving people outside elite classes with few resources to challenge government abuse of power.

Some of these problems can be changed. Others cannot. One advantage of today is the crisis faced by many regimes. Sometimes it has been nascent race-conflict and economic collapse (South Africa); sometimes general unrest, threatening the regime's hold on power (Korea, Thailand, Philippines); sometimes it has simply been economic collapse under the poor governance of authoritarian systems (Argentina, Zambia, Ghana, F.S.U states). Regardless, in moments of crisis there are openings for significant revision of constitutional arrangements. And, after the crisis has passed, there are significant windows of opportunity to help sustain and strengthen a new constitutional arrangement, both via technical assistance and broader social change. Persons must learn new roles; enabling laws, organizational reforms, technical needs must be defined and fulfilled. Social change can be sustained as former state property is redistributed. Much can be done, and a governance strategy should pursue it.

## **E. Strategic Assessments**

The need for economic "assessments" has long been recognized within the development community.<sup>30</sup> The World Bank, the IMF, and in some measure USAID and the other donors regularly conduct macro-economic analyses of their partner countries, and develop sector assessments out of those and other data. These are the basic descriptive and analytical resources which are used to develop country strategies, set priorities, and design programs and projects. They are also critical in gathering

base-line data for project assessment and in guiding policy agenda and dialogue with host countries. USAID would not consider trying to build an economic portfolio without such strategic, analytical work. Otherwise, how would projects take account of obstacles, and opportunities, complement one another, and avoid tripping-over the projects of other donors? How could projects be coupled with coherent policy-dialogue to support integrated economic reform? How could USAID meet congressional expectations for tangible evidence of progress toward project and program goals without a record of the baseline data?

Precisely the same logic applies in the governance sector, though even more so. All the needs mentioned are valid, but in the governance sector, sensitive strategic analysis is even more critical because of several additional factors:

- o as a relatively new area of donor activity, there is far less data accumulated already to draw on;
- o as USAID is a (the?) leader in this area, it cannot easily use data gathered by others;
- o as a relatively new area of donor activity, less is known about what does and does not work; this means aggressive data collection (and project monitoring) is critical to gather the lessons of experience;
- o as there is no single, accepted "numeraire" (unit of measurement) for democratic governance (unlike units of currency in economic development), qualitative analysis, doable only in the field, is critical to design and assess projects;
- o as a relatively controversial area of donor activity, where unexpected consequences are to be expected often, it is important USAID have the documentation available reasonably effectively to be able to explain how it chose to do what it did; and,
- o as a highly sensitive activity, early and strong linkages to host-country academic and NGO personnel need to be developed to guide and help build support for USAID activities: strategic assessments can be a foundation to begin these relationships.

USAID has not completed many "strategic assessments." Nonetheless, it has done several through the "Democratic/Governance" project, formerly of the Africa Bureau. These projects offer a number of lessons of experience for this activity:

- o democracy assessments need to be integrated through a single theoretical framework in order to assure a comprehensive picture is drawn, comparative knowledge is generated and learning can accumulate;
- o democracy assessments require sufficient personnel and time to be effective; specifically something in the range of 20 person weeks, allocated among three or four persons;
- o team members should include at least two in-depth country specialists, while the remainder of the team should be familiar with the general area;
- o a majority of team members should be very familiar with the analytical framework; the remainder must be willing to learn and work in it;
- o team members should be familiar with a diversity of political institutions (i.e., civil society, bureaucracy, legislative, executive, local government, etc.);
- o some field work should be done outside the capital city;

- o USAID, the Embassy and USIS must be comfortable allowing the team to talk with all relevant participants in the political process, and on all topics;
- o host-country personnel should be involved in the team;
- o scope of work should be developed multilaterally by the mission and, USAID personnel familiar with democratic governance assessments, and researchers who have already completed field assessments;
- o some team members should have extensive experience with USAID project and program modalities and options;
- o team members should be trained in political science, policy and related fields; and,
- o if program development and project design are desired by the mission, additional field time for selected team members is desirable.

While complete ad hoc-ery is one approach (i.e., develop a team for each country as it needs one), that has numerous disadvantages. Particularly, it would be very difficult to develop, sustain and learn from any analytical framework. There would be little learning curve to "travel" as the personnel, venues, and analytical frameworks would tend to be idiosyncratic to each country and task: some might go well, others less so, but little would be transferred. Furthermore, central learning would be impeded by the turnover in teams. We believe building a body of core personnel for each region to use in repeat assessments is much preferable.

Secondly is the question of the role of the core managerial staff. While a small, essentially logistical core may be appealing on cost grounds, we believe it would be a great mistake. A center able to play an active role in the intellectual task is far preferable because it will be able to:

- o better select and develop field teams;
- o better guide missions in determining what their democratic governance options are earlier in the process;
- o develop more realistic and effective scopes of work;
- o better evaluate and refine team performance;
- o enhance the learning process by and among the field teams by helping them interpret what they found and by passing it along to subsequent teams;
- o refine and develop a democracy/governance analytical framework;
- o assist coordination of the diverse "Democracy Center" resources in follow-on project development and design activities; and,
- o act as an analytical center to integrate the experience and findings of the various democratic governance projects, including the task of outcomes assessment.

Thus the authors of this report strongly urge a robust assessment capacity be designed into any democracy-governance capacity, and that these personnel play a major intellectual role at the core of the democracy governance program. This should include:

- o developing further an analytical framework for democracy/governance research;
- o beginning dialogue with missions on their democratic governance needs;
- o developing scopes of work for democratic governance strategic assessment;

- o identifying, preparing, coordinating, supporting democratic governance strategic assessment teams;
- o analyzing, evaluating and disseminating findings of democratic governance strategic assessments;
- o suggesting follow-on teams for program and project development for missions;
- o integrating and disseminating the lessons of democratic governance projects;
- o providing cross-regional services such as developing methods of assessing democratic governance projects and programs, developing objective verifiable indicators for democratic governance activities, and the like;
- o supervising publication of materials relevant to USAID's democratic governance program.

This is an ambitious list of activities. But they are all logically related, and build on the key role that can exist if one, ongoing group of democratic governance personnel skilled in both intellectual and applied democratic governance issues is tasked with developing an analytical framework, working with the missions, building assessment teams, evaluating their work, and coordinating follow-up activities. It would help keep a potentially sprawling democratic governance program focused and coherent.

## V. CONCLUSIONS: SUGGESTED INTERVENTIONS

It has become commonplace to recognize that economic development is produced out of the interaction and linkage among a variety of human and physical investments. The development of human resource (skills) and natural resources, physical and social infrastructure, technology, institutions: all these and much more must be expanded and integrated for sustainable economic development to occur.

The same applies to democratic governance. Human skills, multiple institutions, systems of making and implementing decisions, and linkage and balance among them are necessary for effective and democratic governance to be sustained. This is one of the key findings of our literature search and an important departure point for a central project in the democratic governance area. Guiding the interventions suggested by this report are four areas of activity: policies, institutions, organizations and people.

For the past several years, and if activities in public administration, local government and sector-focused reforms are included, for the past several decades, USAID has been active in democratic governance. However, hitherto (with perhaps a few exceptions via the Africa D/G project), these activities have not been systematic or integrated. They have tended to be individualized, stand-alone activities which, when studied later, appear to have had little impact on governance. One likely reason for their limited apparent impact on democracy or governance has been their fragmentation.

The Center for Democracy has an excellent opportunity to step beyond these parallel but fragmented efforts via its proposed "democracy" project. To accomplish this, there are four broad lessons of experience that the Center should build on.

First, USAID needs to develop an overall framework to guide and integrate the various activities that contribute to democratic governance and sustainable democracy. As this paper has tried to make clear, none of the traditional aspects of "democracy" alone will provide a sustainable and effective form of government. Elections without civil society are prone to plebiscitary despotism; civil society without rule of law or elections is interest group dominance; decentralization without central authority tends to petty local autocracies and fragmentation of policy efforts; a strong civil service without all the rest is elite rule. Balanced development is necessary to governance progress but "balance" while necessary is not sufficient.

The activities must also be integrated around an overall and theoretical governance framework which guides activities: which activity is critically needed; which ones less so? Which are the governance problems of top priority? In proposing the "governance framework" in Section III, this report has attempted to provide an example, based on field research (not abstract theorizing), of one such model. To repeat, the first requirement is for a framework or theory of effective democratic governance which can guide strategic assessment of host country governance problems, and to guide the interventions USAID would suggest. Nothing in the world is more practical or needed than good theory.

A second broad lesson of experience is the need to engage in systematic institutional and policy analysis focused on the governance problem at hand. Many governance projects which fall short of their goals (see Section IV, Projects, above), did so because activities were launched before a full assessment had been made of the obstacles and opportunities which affected the activities. This is particularly the case in decentralization and local government projects. Governance interventions require, as a rule, multiple and complimentary changes: in host country institutions, policies, organizations, and personnel. Systematic institutional and policy analysis must be pursued in order to determine how institutional arrangements (restructuring the authority to take actions, changing lines of accountability, altering roles of other levels of government, changing civil service systems, strengthening clientele groups, and the like) must be changed in order to provide a structure of incentives and disincentives likely to sustain the desired governance change. Absent this analysis and the capacity to deliver technical assistance to host governments (and USAID Missions supporting those governments), fledgling governance projects are likely to founder.

A third lesson of experience is the need to integrate a variety of skills to achieve effective management of public affairs. The effective management of public affairs requires transparency, participation, accountability and responsibility. It must also be responsive to the needs of the people. Rule of law, civil society, elections, governance (including decentralization, local government, public administration/management and policy analysis/reform, constitutionalism, legislative/deliberative bodies) all contribute to the effective management of public affairs. Thus, several bodies of skills are needed to fit critical field needs, and to supplement personnel from USAID already experienced in these areas.

The fourth "lesson" is that USAID must provide interventions which are relevant to the operational needs of USAID's host country counterparts in the field, sensitive to the power-relations which affect them, and likely to capture and retain their commitment. This fourth lesson reflects the need to move beyond U.S.-centered administrative system and procedures and classroom-oriented training. It also

recognizes the need to consider the configuration of advantage and disadvantage among key actors in the field, carefully assess when and where there is receptivity to governance reforms, and how these reforms might be pursued to take these into account. Finally, it recognizes the need to design processes which include host-country stakeholders in developing specific reforms in institutions, organizations and policies: to facilitate reform proposals which reflect their knowledge and engender their ownership.

With these four "lessons of experience" in mind, this report recommends that a governance initiative include the following key components:

**1. Development of a Strong, Integrated, Analytical Capability to Support Institutional, Organizational and Policy Reforms in Democratic Governance.**

Democracy-related projects that have experienced problems have usually done so because they underestimated or did not consider fully the systematic nature of governance, and the multiple and interactive changes needed for a project to achieve its goals. A strong, centralized institutional and policy analytical capacity is needed to assure that the linkages among the multiple aspects of governance reform are considered and provided for. This applies to each level of activity (local, regional, sectoral and national) and must be capable of integrating the various levels as well. Work in decentralization, for example has repeatedly demonstrated the need to consider such issues as local revenue, local political activity, reform of national administrative law, revenue transfer/sharing from the national level, national planning, sector ministry plans and personnel, and intergovernmental relations. Progress in developing an overall model of democratic governance is essential. A strong analytical capacity, personnel versed in governmental operations at all levels, plus personnel experienced in processes of building consensus behind and ownership of new policies and procedures, are each critical to deal effectively with the need for and interest in the priority areas of decentralization and local government, complimentary areas of sector specific reorganization and reform, and the evolving role of central governments. This capacity is also necessary to deal with reforms at the center, in organizations and relationships among executive and legislative branches, and in reforms needed to strengthen transparency and accountability.

**2. Development of a Body of Administrative Routines, Procedures and Skills Explicitly Linked to Supporting the Institutional, Organizational and Policy Changes the Analytical Center Will Recommend.**

While systems and institutions are critical aspects of governance reform, personnel skills and abilities and administrative routines are critical to make these reforms work. The organization of administrative responsibilities, the existence of effective management information systems, effective civil service systems, budgeting practices and systems, accounting and auditing practices and systems, and procedures for disbursement, expenditure control and post audits are all critical to achieve sustainable democracy. These are critical to sustain decentralization and facilitate enhanced transparency and accountability. Effective stewardship of resources, effective delivery of services, sustained public trust requires no less. Any effective governance project must build these capacities into it, and must link them closely with the processes and activities described in (1) above. Public administration and management programs in the past have fallen short probably less technically than

politically. Mamado Dia's suggestive recent paper (**A Governance Approach to Civil Service Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa**) supports this conclusion and concern. Once again, personnel versed in these administrative and managerial skills and these systems at all levels of government, and under at times harsh resource constraints are critical to this project.

### **3. Continued Analysis of USAID and Other Donor Experience in Governance.**

Through the evaluation processes, USAID and other donors have accumulated significant information on past project performance. Every evaluation team, interim and final, is asked to provide "lessons learned" as part of their evaluation effort. This study did not systematically examine every USAID direct and indirect intervention in the area of democratic governance: there are hundreds. But this kind of analysis should be undertaken to fully benefit from the past.

USAID also has to do a better job surfacing of past project performance/lessons learned information. The authors of this report saw gaps in what was surfaced from USAID files and some of these gaps were important in understanding the way USAID has used the terms "democracy" and "governance" in the past as well as in gaining knowledge of mistakes and successes. Many projects for which the team had evaluation copies in its own **Governance** personal libraries cannot be found in USAID's information system. USAID's "institutional" memory needs strengthening.

### **4. Training Needs of Participants to Implement Results of Analysis.**

Management knowledge and skills regarding managerial routines (budgeting, personnel/human resources, logistics) for personnel responsible for managing new, reformed or rehabilitated institutions is critical to the pursuit of more effective management of public affairs. However, previous USAID-supported training which has relied on formal, classroom pedagogy have done poorly. Indeed, in many cases, they have not be able to draw and hold the very people who needed the activity most! Participant training of a very applied nature, using resident experts and locally-developed materials, developing local networks, engaging in team building, centering on specific and real world problems, and multi-iterative in nature is critical to the success of governance interventions. Classroom-focused and academic training is deadly and must be avoided. USAID must avoid supporting training that contributes to "brain drain," and to do top-down hierarchical administrative strategies.

### **5. Development of Social and Political Economic Analytic Capabilities in USAID or Secured by USAID to Make Explicit Factors Which May Mitigate Against Democratic Governance**

Governance reform cannot operate in a social vacuum. As the report has tried to make clear, as well as organization failures, severe class and social inequality, gender and other forms of discrimination, and the like can preclude governance reform before it begins. While these issues are frequently beyond USAID's leverage, governance interventions must take them into account and must work on them where it can. A capacity to engage in social and political economic analysis will markedly increase the ability of the project to take these issues into account, and either avoid lose-lose situations, redesign activities, or link governance activities with complimentary activities in such areas as land tenure, small scale enterprise, property rights, agriculture, WID, labor rights and the like.

Finally, a strengthened social and political-economic analytical capacity will enhance USAID's ability to select the optimal sites for democratic governance initiatives, avoid or deal with problematic power relations, and engage in policy-change processes which facilitate ownership by local actors.

In review, we would emphasize once again the five aspects we believe needed for an effective governance program:

- o a strong institutional and policy-oriented analytical capacity with particular focus on the interdependencies and linkages among the multiple dimensions of governance necessary to achieve reforms at the several venues of government activity: local, regional, sectoral, national, and the institutions and policy changes necessary to achieve improved democratic governance performance at each level;
- o a strong capacity in public administration and management, with particular attention to systems appropriate for use in decentralized activities and in local government;
- o a strong capacity in applied forms of management training and problem solving;
- o a strong capacity to learn from and continue learning from USAID and other donor governance projects; and
- o a strong analytical capacity in social analysis and political economy.

## End Notes

1. The term "democratic governance" is relatively new and a major purpose of this report is to explore its meaning in scholarly literature as well as in materials produced by international and bilateral development agencies. An example of its use in a very recent publication is as follows: "Only the governments in Japan, South Korea and the Philippines support the promotion of democratic governance and human rights as universal norms, and their support is somewhat mild. All other governments contest these norms." Source: Muthiah Alagappa, **Asia's Prospects for Democracy**, EWC Special Report, Honolulu: East-West Center, forthcoming.

2. Of course, elements of the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes also appear in the U.S. model. Hobbes' thesis that man in the State of Nature tended to be driven to destruction by his uncontrolled appetites. This appears in a slightly altered form in the **Federalist Papers**. James Madison in **Federalist Paper No. 51** wrote:

"...But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the greatest difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependency on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. . ."

3. For example, see:

- o Gary E. Hansen, **A.I.D. Support for Democracy: A Review of Experience**, Interim Report, Washington, DC: Center for Development Information and Evaluation, U.S. Agency for International Development; June 1991;
- o Heather McHugh and Michele Schimpp, **A Summary of Principal Lessons Learned from A.I.D. Experience in Democracy and Governance**, Washington, DC: Research & Reference Services, U.S. Agency for International Development, no date;
- o Ronald J. Oakerson, **Assessing and Assisting Democratic Governance Reform: A Framework**, Draft, Prepared for U.S. Agency for International Development, October 7, 1994;
- o Michele Schimpp, **A.I.D. and Democratic Development: A Synthesis of Literature and Experience**, Washington, DC: Research & Reference Services, Center for Development Information and Evaluation, U.S. Agency for International Development, May 1992;
- o Jerome M. Segal, **Goals and Concepts in AID's Democratic Initiatives**, Prepared for U.S. Agency for International Development, March 25, 1991;
- o U.S. Agency for International Development, **Building Democracy**, January 1994; U.S. Agency for International Development, **Democracy and Governance**, Washington, DC: Directorate for Policy, U.S. Agency for International Development, November 1991;
- o U.S. Agency for International Development, **The Democracy Initiative**, December 1990; Melissa Wong, **Perspectives on Democracy: A Review of the Literature**, Final Report, Prepared for Bureau of Asia, Near East and Europe, Office of Technical Resources, Human Resources Division, U.S. Agency for International Development, September 1990.

See also, speeches given by U.S. public officials including: The Honorable J. Brian Atwood, Administrator, USAID, "Statement of Principles on Participatory Development," November 16, 1993; and Vice President Al Gore, "Major Address to High-Level Officials of the Inter-American Development Bank," Part of the IDB's Forum on "Governance and Modernization of the Democratic State," September 16, 1994.

4. This is seen in a definition of governance by one political scientist: "We may define governance as the action of government plus its interaction with its nongovernment partners in the process of governing--in their collective relationship with the economy and public policy." William W. Boyer, "Political Science and the 21st Century: From Government to Governance," **PS: Political Science & Politics** 33:50-54, 1990, p. 51.

5. Vice President Al Gore emphasized transparency and accountability in his recent speech before the Inter-American Development Bank when he stated that the administration of the state must be honest and transparent. See: Memorandum from John Swallow entitled "Gore's Speech to IDB" dated Tuesday, September 27, 1994.

6. For but a very few of these studies and arguments, see:

- o Samuel P. Huntington, **Political Order in Changing Societies**, New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1968;
- o Samuel P. Huntington, **The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century**, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991;
- o Alexis de Tocqueville, **Democracy in America**, edited by J. P. Mayer, NY: Doubleday and Co., 1969;
- o Elinor Ostrom, **Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action**, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1990;
- o Elinor Ostrom, Larry Schroeder and Susan Wynne, **Institutional Disincentives and Sustainable Development: Infrastructure Policies in Perspective**, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993;
- o Edgar Owens and Robert Shaw, **Development Reconsidered: Bridging the Gap Between Government and People**, Lexington, MA: Heath, 1974;
- o Robert Chambers, **Rural Development: Putting the Last First**, London: Longman, 1983; and
- o Elinor Ostrom, **Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems**, San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1992.

The issue which often perplexes people is the occasional strong-man or authoritarian government which achieves rapid economic growth for a short period of time. There are many cases of this, but few which are sustained over the long run [Mohammad Ayub Khan from 1958-69 in Pakistan is one], because the lack of feedback loops and accountability mean error once introduced is difficult to detect and fix, and because the occasional enlightened despot gives way to unenlightened despots with no institutionalized means of changing them. Finally, economic growth itself introduces such complexity and diversity that the relatively simple cybernetic structures that are authoritarian regimes are progressively less able to sustain growth. Historically, patrimonialism gave way to feudalism, which gave way to Weberian democracy and the republic, for the same way that feudalism gave way to the bourgeoisie: the earlier institutional

structure created changes it could no longer sustain. Eventually, it either decayed or evolved into a new form.

7. The separation of ownership from management which began in the U.S. in the 19th Century marked the beginning of a new form of corporate governance. Chief executives responsible to boards of directors who, in turn were responsible to stockholders emerged as a primary form of corporate governance. Major figures in this body of research include Oliver E. Williamson, Robert Coase, Georger Akerlof, A. Alchian, and H. Demsetz and; and at a theoretical level, Douglas North. Major works include

- o Williamson, **Corporate Control and Business Behavior** (1970), Englewood Cliffs, NJ;
- o Akerlof, "The Market for Lemons," **Quarterly Journal of Economics** (August 1980), 74, 488-500;
- o Alchian and Demsetz, "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization," **American Economic Review** (December 1972), 62, 777-795;
- o Williamson, "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations," **American Economic Review** (May 1971), 61, 112-123;
- o Williamson, "Hierarchical Control and Optimum Firm Size," **Journal of Political Economy** (April 1967), 75, 2, 123-137;
- o R. H. Coase, "The Nature of the Firm," **Economica**, N.S., IV (1937), 386-405;
- o Williamson, **The Economics of Discretionary Behavior: Management Objectives in a Theory of the Firm**, NY: Prentice Hall, 1964; and
- o Douglas North, **Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance**, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1970.

An atheoretical but interesting historical review is Alfred Chandler, Jr., **The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business**, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977.

Regarding participative or participatory management and the involvement of workers in organizational decisions, the works of Barnard, Deming, McGregor, Argyris, Herzberg, and Ouchi should be consulted. In chronological order, see:

- o Chester Barnard, **The Functions of the Executive**, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938;
- o Douglas McGregor, **The Human Side of Organizations**, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1960;
- o Chris Argyris **Integrating the Individual and the Organization**, NY: Wiley, 1964;
- o Frederick Herzberg **Work and the Nature of Man**, Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1966; and
- o William G. Ouchi, **Theory Z: How American Business Can Meet the Japanese Challenge**, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1981.

W. Edwards Deming is in a class of his own. The "father" of Total Quality Management based on his famous "14 points" began exploring the world of work in the 1930s. A relatively recent book on his contributions to management is Mary Walton, **Deming Management at Work**, NY: Perigee Books, 1991.

8. A conceptual precursor to "good governance" was "good government" and it was in pursuit of good government that the Municipal Reform Movement of the early 20th Century was established. One objective of this movement was financial accountability at the local government level. The New York Bureau of Municipal Research, established in 1906 as part of this reform movement, initiated the adoption of budget classification by objectives of expenditure by the New York City Department of Health in 1907. See: Jesse Burkhead, **Government Budgeting**, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1956, p. 127. The literature dealing with metropolitan governance is also vast. Perhaps the key article which initiated a rethinking of the sterile, prescriptive approach which had about run its course in the 1950s was the article by Vincent Ostrom, Charles Tiebout and Robert Warren, "The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry," **American Political Science Review** (December 1961), 55:831-842. Further work on these questions has been pursued by Elinor Ostrom and numerous of her colleagues.

See: Elinor Ostrom, "Metropolitan Reform: Propositions Derived from Two Traditions," **Social Science Quarterly** (December 1972), 53:474-493.

Also see: Elinor Ostrom, "A Public Industry Approach to the Study of Local Government Structure and Performance," **Policy and Politics** (1983), 11, 3:313-341; and Elinor Ostrom and Roger Parks, "Suburban Police Departments: Too Many and Too Small?" in Louis Masotti and Jeffrey Hadden (eds.), **The Urbanization of the Suburbs**, Urban Affairs Annual, Vol. 7, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1973.

The work of Paul Peterson is very important here, particularly his **City Limits**, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981, and **School Politics: Chicago Style**, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. Finally, see: John Chubb and Terry Moe, "Politics, Markets and the Organization of Schools," **American Political Science Review** (1988), 82, 4:1065-1087.

9. F. X. Kaufman, G. Manjone and V. Ostrom (eds.), **Guidance, Control and Evaluation in the Public Sector**, Berlin and New York: 1986.

10. See: World Bank, **Governance and Development**, Washington, D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, April 1992; and The World Bank, **Governance: The Bank's Experience**, Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, May 1994. See also, Gary E. Hansen, **A.I.D. Support for Democracy: A Review of Experience**, *op. cit.*; and Ronald J. Oakerson, **Assessing and Assisting Democratic Governance Reform**, *op. cit.*

11. Governance arrangements often do start with state decisions (which themselves are products of governance arrangements). For example, most systems of private education are nested within state regulations and licensing regarding the minimum training of teachers, certain required core units of study, perhaps minimum numbers of hours of instruction and the like. Such a system is also guided by state laws regarding teacher contracts, employee rights, building codes, student rights, due process requirements, and more. Within those parameters, private school systems are separate governance arrangements where much is left to their discretion. At either level (the state or the school system), governance arrangements could be flawed and disrupt the provision of this good and service. Both are clearly involved in the "management of public affairs" (governance),

they are linked, and their effective operation is equally clearly of general concern. Shortfalls in this function could exist at the school system level, the state level, or in social conditions beyond either of their control. Governance interventions could conceivably address any of them, though their relative cost-effectiveness and likelihood of success might direct one's attention away from the society and the school system to the state, as the level most likely to be affected by an intervention, and most likely to have a good spread effect (i.e., pay off for many schools rather than simply resolve one school's performance problems). See John Chubb and Terry Moe, "Politics, Markets and the Organization of Schools," **American Political Science Review**, 82, 4:1065-1087, 1988; and Paul Peterson, **School Politics: Chicago Style**, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976.

12. The multi-level nature of governance is brought out well in Larry Kiser and Elinor Ostrom, "The Three Worlds of Action: A Metatheoretical Synthesis of Institutional Approaches," in Elinor Ostrom (ed.), **Strategies of Political Inquiry**, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982.

13. See: Alexis de Tocqueville, **Democracy in America**, *op. cit.* Also see: Vincent Ostrom, **The Political Theory of the Compound Republic**, Second Edition, Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1987.

14. See in particular: Elinor Ostrom, **Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action**, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

15. It could be also used as a means to stimulate co-financing by the donor community. In an interview conducted on August 4, 1994, the Mission Director of a USAID Mission in an Asian country indicated that "good governance is a theme of cooperation among the donors and that this might be exploited in further efforts. . ."

16. **Political Science Quarterly** 2 (June 1887).

17. Wilson stated that the science of administration was not created by Americans but by foreigners and what the U.S. should do is borrow this science:

We can borrow the science of administration with safety and profit if only we read all fundamental differences of condition into its essential tenets. We have only to filter it through our constitutions, only to put it over a slow fire of criticism and distil away its foreign gases. (*Ibid.*)

18. See: Charles Hyneman, **Bureaucracy in a Democracy**, New York: Harper and Row, 1950; Frederick C. Mosher, **Democracy and the Public Service**, New York: Oxford University Press, 1968; Emmett S. Redford, **Democracy and the Administrative State**, New York: Oxford University Press, 1969; and Samuel Krislow, **Representative Bureaucracy**, New York: Praeger, 1981.

19. The four principles are: (1) the administration of the state must be honest and transparent, if democratic institutions are to survive; (2) the administration of the state should be streamlined and as efficient as possible; (3) the government must decentralize as many functions as possible and

deliver services as close to the people as possible; and (4) democratic states must make provisions for the security of their people. John Swallow entitled "Gore's Speech to IDB," memorandum dated Tuesday, September 27, 1994.

20. His fifth is democratic societies must rely on an open and modern judiciary. (*Ibid.*)

21. In discussing participatory development, the Administrator maintained:

"There is nothing more basic to the development process than **participation**. That is a lesson we have learned over the years, but it is one that we have not fully appreciated in all of its implications.

**First, broad access by people to their country's economy and participation in their society's decisionmaking processes are results we seek to support; they are fundamental to sustained development; and**

**Second, our support is more likely to lead to these results if the development programs are relevant to people's needs, and for this there needs to be broad participation by people in defining development priorities and approaches.**

**Participation, therefore, describes both the end and the means; both the kind of results we seek, and the way that we, as providers of development and humanitarian assistance, must nurture those results."**

(The Honorable J. Brian Atwood, Administrator, USAID, "Statement of Principles on Participatory Development." November 16, 1993, p. 1.)

22. This quotation came from a U.S. House Appropriations Committee report which accompanied the FY 1993 SEED Act appropriation. Cited in: U.S. Agency for International Development, **Framework for Public Administration: Assistance to Central and Eastern Europe**, no data circa 1992.

23. The term "third wave of democratization" which is global in nature was coined by Samuel H. Huntington. See his book **The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century**, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, which is based on a series of lectures he presented.

24. Two German officials cited above observed that "democracy" and "good governance" ". . . are not the new development creed of Western donor countries. . ." and cite two examples: "Democracy and human rights are of fundamental significance for development," from the Memorandum to the Stockholm Initiative on "Joint Responsibility in the Nineties" signed **inter alia** by President Aylwin of Chile, the Zambabwean Minister of Finance Chidzero, the former President of Tanzania Nyerere, and Salim Salim, Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity; and "Good governance is basic to the economic and social progress of all countries," from the Action Programme adopted in Paris by the "Second United Nations Conference on Least Developed Countries" in September 1990. See: Hans Peter Repnik and Ralf-Matthias Mohs,

"'Good Governance', Democracy and Development Paradigms," *Intereconomics*, Vol. 27, (January/February 1992), p. 28.

25. Several years ago, Mrs. Indira Gandhi in an interview with the *Washington Post* remarked that one of her father's greatest regrets was that he had not reformed the Indian civil service. The interpretation of this comment was that despite India's development as the world's largest democracy, the public administrative system still maintained the structure and practices that it inherited from the British.

26. These entries include (most recent first):

- (1) National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, **USAID Project Report-- Albania: Civic Education and Parliamentary Training, January 1 to June 30, 1993**, Interim Report to A.I.D. Bureau for Europe, Office of Development Resources, Washington, D.C., 30 June 1993;
- (2) North Atlantic Assembly, Brussels, **Final Report on the 1991 A.I.D. Grant to the North Atlantic Assembly**, A.I.D. Bureau for Europe, Office of Development Resources, Washington, D.C. (Sponsor), 4 November 1992;
- (3) Susan J. Atwood and Clive Kimber, **International Foundation for Electoral Systems [IFES] On-Site Technical Election Assistance Project: Georgia--August 10-October 24, 1992**, A.I.D. Office of Policy Analysis and Resources, Washington, D.C., and A.I.D. New Independent States Task Force, Washington, D.C. (Sponsor), 24 October 1992;
- (4) USAID/Nepal, **Democracy Project**, Project Paper, 10 July 1992;
- (5) Robert E. White, Martin T. Gahart and Jonathan R. Tumin, U.S. General Accounting Office, **Foreign Assistance: Evaluation of Aid to the Hungarian National Assembly**, April 1992;
- (6) Harry Blair and Raymond Gastil, et. al. **Nepal Democracy Strategy**, Ernst & Young report submitted to USAID/Nepal (Sponsor), June 1991;
- (7) Dennis C. Mueller, **Two Party Representative Government**, Working Paper NO. 15 by Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector, University of Maryland, to A.I.D. Office of Small, Micro and Informal Enterprise, Washington, D.C. (Sponsor), 1991;
- (8) Dennis C. Mueller, **Multiparty Representative Government**, Working Paper No. 16 by Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector, University of Maryland, to A.I.D. Office of Small, Micro and Informal Enterprise, Washington, D.C. (Sponsor), 1991;
- (9) Dennis C. Mueller, **Comparison of Two Party and Multiparty Representative Governments**, Working Paper No. 17 by Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector, University of Maryland, to A.I.D. Office of Small, Micro and Informal Enterprise, Washington, D.C. (Sponsor), 1991;
- (10) USAID/El Salvador, **Legislative Assembly Strengthening Project**, Project Paper, 2 April 1991;
- (11) Development Associates, Inc., **Legislative Enhancement**, Evaluation Report Submitted to USAID/Honduras, 28 December 1990;
- (12) USAID/Guatemala, **A.I.D. Cooperative Agreement No. 520-0398-A-00-0868-00 to Fundacion para del Desarrollo Institucional de Guatemala for providing job-related training to newly elected [Guatemalan] congressmen and the Centro de Estudios Estrategicos para la Estabilidad Nacional (ESTNA)**, 4 October 1990;

- (13) William S. Cole, et. al., **Program Strategy for Democratic Pluralism Initiative in Pakistan**, Ernst & Young report submitted to USAID/Pakistan (Sponsor), September 1990;
- (14) USAID/El Salvador, **Legislative Assembly Strengthening**, Project Paper, 29 August 1990;
- (15) USAID/Thailand, **A.I.D. Grant No. 493-0342-G-SS-0130-00 to The Asia Foundation for a Project Entitled 'Strengthening Responsiveness and Capability of Elected Government in Thailand,'** 17 August 1990;
- (16) Richard A. Nuccio and David Fleischer, **Report on the Center for Democracy: Evaluations of Regional Program, Central American Legislative Leaders Training Seminar (CALTS) and Guatemala Bilateral Project, Strengthening of Democracy**, Special Evaluation by Checchi and Co. Consulting, Inc., submitted to USAID/Guatemala (Sponsor), 28 March 1990.

27. From 1975 to 1990, USAID was involved in eight (8) activities related to foreign legislatures or legislative affairs. They include:

- (1) A.I.D. Bureau for Latin American and the Caribbean, **A.I.D. Cooperative Agreement No. LAC-0777-A-00-9022-00 with the Research Foundation of the State University of New York to Strengthen Democracy in Chile Through the Development of a Strong and Efficient Legislative Branch**, 5 June 1989;
- (2) USAID/Guatemala, **Limited Scope Grant Project Agreement Between the United States of America (Acting Through the Agency for International Development) and the Congress of the Republic of Guatemala as Grantee Institution**, 18 February 1987;
- (3) Center for Democracy, Boston University, **Report to the United States Agency for International Development on the Central American Legislative Training Seminar**, A.I.D. Bureau for Latin American and the Caribbean (Sponsor), 30 September 1987;
- (4) USAID/El Salvador, **Legislative Assembly Strengthening**, Grant Agreement, 30 September 1986; USAID/Honduras, **Project Agreement Between the United States Government Acting through the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.) and the National Congress of Honduras**, (Project Title: Strengthening Democracy--Legislative Orientation Program), 11 February 1986;
- (5) Arturo Valenzuela, **Origins and Characteristics of the Chilean Party System: A Proposal for A Parliamentary Form of Government**, Working Paper No. 164 by the Latin American Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, originally a paper presented at the Conference on the Role of Political Parties and the Return to Democracy in the Southern Cone, A.I.D. Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, Washington, D.C., (Sponsor) 9-12 September 1985;
- (6) Juan J. Linz, **Democracy: Presidential or Parliamentary--Does it Make A Difference?**, a paper presented at the Conference on the Role of Political Parties and the Return to Democracy in the Southern Cone, A.I.D. Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, Washington, D.C., (Sponsor) 9-12 September 1985;
- (7) James M. Dillard, The Asia Foundation, **Bangladesh Parliament Library**, USAID/Bangladesh (Sponsor), 10 August 1979; and
- (8) Malcolm Jewell and Chong Lim Kim, "Sources of Support for the Legislature in a Developing Nation: The Case of Korea," a paper presented at the Conference on

Alienation and System Support, Iowa City, 8-11 January 1975 (Sponsor: USAID/Washington, D.C.).

28. This appears to be the case in Bangladesh where discussions have taken place between British ODA, USAID, the United Nations Development Programme, The Asia Foundation and the Ford Foundation focusing on USAID's democracy initiative paper and how to better coordinate efforts.

29. The following section draws heavily on Ronald Oakerson's work, specifically **Assessing and Assisting Democratic Governance Reform: A Framework**, Burlington, VT: Associates in Rural Development, October 7, 1994.

30. This section has drawn heavily on two unpublished papers: Harlan H. Hobgood, "Why Democracy Assessments" (August 1994), mimeo; and Tina West, "Methodology for D/G Assessments" (October 1994), mimeo.

## ANNEX A: SCOPE OF WORK FOR GOVERNANCE REVIEW

The Global Bureau's Democracy and Governance Center has just been formed. One of the four major areas of initiative in this new center is governance.

Objective: Complete a review of USAID, multilateral donor and NGO experience in governance to be used by USAID/G/DG to develop a strategy for governance activities.

### Activities:

1. The primary focus of the review will be of USAID experience in supporting governance in developing countries. Experience of multilateral donors and NGO's will also be surveyed to determine the thrust and success of their governance experience.
2. Develop a framework to summarize the types of activities and major issues. Describe the characteristics of those which were most and least successful and implications for conducting similar types of activities in the changed conditions in developing countries. What are the lessons learned from this experience?
3. Review current literature on governance. Summarize (with cites) guidance and lessons important to consider as USAID/G/DG develops a strategy for governance activities.
4. Review current USAID strategy and implementation guidelines for democracy to orient recommendations of the review toward required characteristics of all USAID programs. What types of governance activities show most promise for promoting the objectives of democracy and sustainable development?

### Method:

1. Propose alternative definitions of governance and obtain agreement from G/DG staff on a working definition of governance for the paper. Present the framework for the paper to G/DG staff for approval within one month after work begins.
2. Every two weeks review progress with G/DG staff. The team will give a presentation of the draft to G/DG staff.

### Deliverables:

One 20 page paper with bibliography and an executive summary. Three copies of a draft will be submitted to G/DG for review and comment. Comments will be given to the contractor within two weeks after G/DG received [sic] the paper. The paper will be finalized incorporating comments within a month after comments are received. Three copies of the final paper will be submitted to G/DG.

Expertise:

The Contractor is requested to submit a proposal for a team. The team should have the following skill areas represented: experience and academic expertise in: public administration, development management, governance and democracy, public choice theory, new institutional economics, incentives, participation, decentralization, local governance, institutional analysis, policy implementation, sustainability of program benefits.

## ANNEX B: EVOLUTION OF THE USE OF THE TERM "GOVERNANCE" IN DEVELOPMENT

### Use in the Donor Community

Since the donor community has used definitions from English language dictionaries as their starting points in defining governance, it might be useful to begin by examining what an unabridged dictionary has to say about four terms, "democracy," "democratic," "governance" and "government:"

"democracy, n. [Fr. democratic; Gr. demokratia, democracy, popular government, from demos, the people, and kratein, to rule.]

1. government by the people, either directly or through elected representatives; rule by the ruled.
2. a country, state, community, etc. with such government.
3. majority rule.
4. the acceptance and practice of the principle of equality of rights, opportunity, and treatment; . . ."

"democratic, a. [Gr. demokratikos, suited to a democracy, from demokratia, a democracy; demos, the people, and kratein, to rule.]

1. of, belonging to, or upholding democracy or a democracy.
2. of or for all the people; as democratic entertainment.
3. considering and treating others as one's equals; . . ."

"governance, n. [ME. governance, governaunce; MFr. governance, gouvernance; ML. gubernantia, from L. gubernare, to govern, pilot.] exercise of authority; control; management; power of government."

"government, n. [Fr. gouvernement, from gouverner; L. gubernare, to govern.]

1. (a) the exercise of authority over an organization, institution, state, district, etc.; direction; control; rule; management;  
(b) the right, function, or power of governing.
2. (a) a system of ruling, controlling, etc.;  
(b) an established system of political administration by which a state, district, etc. is governed.
3. all the people who administer or control the affairs of a state, institution, etc.; administration.
4. any territory which is governed. . ."

(Source: **Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary Unabridged**. 1975. Second Edition. Williams Collins+World Publishing Co., Inc., pp. 483 and 789.)

It should also be pointed out that standard, abridged dictionaries do not differentiate between the words "governance" and "government." In **Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary** published by G & C Merriam Co. in 1980 defined "governance" as "noun: government."

### **USAID**

Improving the way government administers or manages its responsibilities is not a new economic or technical assistance agenda item. Starting from the early days of the Marshall Plan, the United States provided assistance to countries to improve their economies. This assistance, filtered through governments, provided the basis for the economic "miracles" in West Germany and Japan in the early 1950s and South Korea and Taiwan in the 1970s. However, as has been documented elsewhere, with the exceptions of U.S. occupation of West Germany and Japan, the form of government was not seen as a requisite for external assistance. Rather, economic and technical assistance, particularly from the U.S. standpoint, was directed towards containing the expansion of Soviet influence.<sup>1</sup>

The attempt to link democratic forms of government to U.S. foreign assistance has its origins in "...the enactment of Title IV of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, which cites building democratic institutions as one goal."<sup>2</sup> This action was Congressional encouragement for USAID to pay attention to ". . . democratic political development."<sup>3</sup> Further encouragement from the Congress is seen in the passage of Title IX of the FAA of 1967 which called for ". . . maximum participation in the task of economic development. . . through the encouragement of democratic private and local governmental institutions."<sup>4</sup> In the 1970s, the Congress attempted, first, to link U.S. foreign assistance to Basic Needs programs and, second, to link U.S. foreign assistance to the issue of human rights. Neither the advocacy of foreign assistance to extend basic needs nor the linkage of foreign assistance to the issue of human rights per se were examples of linking forms of government to development but these actions by the Congress helped to focus attention on direct measures of governmental exercise of its governance powers.

By 1985, USAID had begun to incorporate terms such as "human rights," "participation," and "democracy" into its planning documents.<sup>5</sup> By 1990, USAID had developed a policy statement which incorporated both the terms "democracy" and "governance."<sup>6</sup>

More recently, Clinton Administration officials have gone on record linking forms of government with development. Thus, J. Brian Atwood, Administrator, USAID, stated:

"There is nothing more basic to the development process than **participation**. That is a lesson we have learned over the years, but it is one that we have not fully appreciated in all of its implications.

**First, broad access by people to their country's economy and participation in their society's decisionmaking processes are results we seek to support; they are fundamental to sustained development; and**

Second, our support is more likely to lead to these results if the development programs are relevant to people's needs, and for this there needs to be **broad participation by people in defining development priorities and approaches.**

**Participation, therefore, describes both the end and the means; both the kind of results we seek, and the way that we, as providers of development and humanitarian assistance, must nurture those results."**<sup>7</sup>

As well, the content of a recent speech by Vice President Al Gore was described as follows:

"The Vice President listed five areas that are of greatest concern to him and this U.S. Administration in the democracy area, and he strongly implied that they were Summit of the Americas priorities, as well. Gore stated them both as principles and solutions. . .The five areas he stressed were:

1. THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE MUST BE HONEST AND TRANSPARENT, if democratic institutions are to survive. . .[used example of the Government of Chile's National Commission on Public Ethics, established under President Frei]
2. THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE SHOULD BE STREAMLINED AND AS EFFICIENT AS POSSIBLE. . .[used example of Argentina's deep cuts in the federal public sector payrolls under President Menem]
3. THE GOVERNMENT MUST DECENTRALIZE AS MANY FUNCTIONS AS POSSIBLE AND DELIVER SERVICES AS CLOSE TO THE PEOPLE AS POSSIBLE. . .[used example of Bolivia and its new Popular Participation Law]
4. DEMOCRATIC STATES MUST MAKE PROVISIONS FOR THE SECURITY OF THEIR PEOPLE [he praised Chile for leading the way in pension reform, offering a model for Argentina, Colombia and, most recently, Peru.]
5. DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES MUST RELY ON AN OPEN AND MODERN JUDICIARY [used Guatemala as example of opening and modernizing its judiciary and the Caribbean (CARICOM) drafting a "Charter on Civil Society"]."<sup>8</sup>

### **The World Bank**

The World Bank (formally, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) began to deal with the issue of governance in low and middle income countries publicly when it issued its 1983

**World Development Report.**<sup>9</sup> In focusing on management in development, the **WDR** called for systematic changes in the roles that governments played in their economies and for the improvement of the management of governmental responsibilities. This **WDR** created a great deal of internal debate because it called for relatively radical changes in the Bank's partners, i.e., governments of the countries receiving World Bank loans.

The World Bank report on Sub-Saharan Africa<sup>10</sup> was the first attempt by the Bank to link development to improved governance. The Bank, however, has refused to link forms of government with its assistance efforts and has concentrated on improving "governance:"

"Governance, in general, has three distinct aspects: (a) the form of a political regime (parliamentary or presidential, military or civilian, and authoritarian or democratic); (b) the processes by which authority is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources; and (c) the capacity of governments to design, formulate, and implement policies, and, in general, to discharge governmental functions. The first aspect clearly falls outside the Bank's mandate. The Bank's focus is, therefore, on the second and third aspects."<sup>11</sup>

Its reluctance to link forms of government to its loan programs may be due to its avoidance of politics. Rather, by linking governance to economics, it indirectly approaches democratic forms of government. In **Governance and Development**, the President of the World Bank, Lewis T. Preston, stated:

"Good governance is an essential complement to sound economic policies. Efficient and accountable management by the public sector and a predictable and transparent policy framework are critical to the efficiency of markets and governments, and hence to economic development. The World Bank's increasing attention to issues of governance is an important part of our efforts to promote equitable and sustainable development."<sup>12</sup>

The Bank's most recent approach to improvements in governance has involved traditional public administration/management:

"A substantial part of the governance work in which the Bank is currently engaged comprises traditional public sector management categories such as civil service reform, public expenditure management, and public enterprise reform. This is a reflection that these categories are central to how power is exercised and that in these areas there is a substantial agenda of rehabilitation, modernization, and change. At the same time, the Bank has extended its governance activities to new areas of support, specifically accountability, rule of law, and transparency."<sup>13</sup>

### **The United Nations**

In 1990, the Second United Nations Conference on Least Developed Countries concluded: "Good governance is basic to the economic and social progress of all countries."<sup>14</sup> The United Nations

Development Programme in its issuance of annual Human Development Reports has also emphasized the human rights dimensions of good governance.

### **Lower and Middle Income Countries**

The leadership of some low and middle income countries have endorsed the idea that democracy (as a type or kind of governance) is positively related to development. In a Memorandum to the Stockholm Initiative on "Joint Responsibility in the Nineties" signed *inter alia* by President Aylwin of Chile, the Zambabwean Minister of Finance Chidzero, the former President of Tanzania Nyerere, and Salim Salim, Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity, the signatures stated: "Democracy and human rights are of fundamental significance for development."<sup>15</sup> Other countries take a different view as illustrated in the following:

"Only the governments in Japan, South Korea and the Philippines support the promotion of democratic governance and human rights as universal norms, and their support is somewhat mild. All other governments contest these norms. . . Many [Asian] governments, while critical of human rights, have begun to accept this ideal as a worthy long-term goal. And at the non-governmental level, there is growing political consciousness and increasing support for both democracy and human rights. These values have now become part of the domestic political discourse in several countries and, as the elite are discovering, cannot be excluded by fiat. . . Asian leaders argue that undue emphasis on democracy and civil liberties can exacerbate domestic conflict and undermine political stability. In their experience, economic growth and law and order were achieved by enlightened authoritarian governments--and democratization, as in Taiwan, South Korea and Thailand, followed economic success and not vice versa. . . [At present, the international norms for governance in Asia are not pro-democratic. Promotion of democracy in Asia is likely to be more successful if the effort is directed toward strengthening long-term forces that will make democratic principles a durable part of the domestic political discourse rather than demanding quick political transitions. To fortify long-term forces, the West should promote socioeconomic development {provision of food, shelter, health and medical facilities, increasing literacy, education and occupational skills} and help to strengthen civil society.] If Western democracies can successfully rejuvenate their economies and make substantive progress in addressing their own social problems, then the West's democratic system, like its capitalist system, will be a more attractive model for emulation."<sup>16</sup>

### **The Academic Community**

The U.S. academic community has debated the relationship between governance and development over the post World War II period. Early on, a contributor to the debate was Seymour M. Lipset, the noted Sociologist, who maintained:

"Perhaps the most widespread generalization linking political systems to other aspects of society has been that democracy is related to the state of economic development."<sup>17</sup>

The debate has been long and relatively inconclusive. Most recently, two scholars maintained:

"The notion of economic development as a 'requisite' to democracy (Lipset 1959) has survived increasingly sophisticated statistical tests. . . On balance, it is clear that economic development substantially improves a nation's democratic prospects. However, the full magnitude of that effect depends on the location of the nation in the world system. As the nation moves from the core, to the semiperiphery, to the periphery, however, the effect remains statistically and substantively significant. Thus, around the world, economic development works to foster democracy. Indeed, our results indicate that the relationship works in that direction but not the other. To the extent that this finding holds for nations currently in democratic transition, the implication is that democratic reform by itself cannot be counted on to bring about the needed economic development. However, this is no counsel to dictatorship. Just as clearly, we found that democracy, while not apparently a direct cause of economic development, certainly does it no harm. Moreover, as the lag pattern of the structural model shows, past democratic performance breeds future democratic performance. Democracy, then, can be furthered for its own sake, without sacrificing economic development."<sup>18</sup>

## End Notes

1. USAID's **Democracy and Governance** policy statement makes the following observation:

"For much of the past 45 years, U.S. international relations have largely been focused on containing Soviet expansion. This was often the single most important consideration in American's dealings with other countries."

See: **Democracy and Governance**, USAID Policy, Washington, D.C.: Directorate for Policy, U.S. Agency for International Development, November 1991, p. 4.

2. **Democracy and Governance**, op. cit.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid. See also: Heather McHugh and Michele Schimpp, **A Summary of Principal Lessons Learned from A.I.D. Experience in Democracy and Governance**, Washington, D.C.: A.I.D., 1994; and Gary Hansen, **A.I.D. Support for Democracy: A Review of Experience**, Washington, D.C.: A.I.D., 1991.

5. "Human rights, participation and democracy are emphasized as an [sic] integral part of AID programming Agency-wide. . ." (Human Rights and Democracy in U.S. Agency for International Development. "Blueprint for Development." **The Strategic Plan of the Agency for International Development**. Washington, D.C.: Bureau for Program and Policy Guidelines, Agency for International Development, June 1985, pp. 56-57.)

6. See **Democracy and Governance**, op. cit.

7. The Honorable J. Brian Atwood, Administrator, USAID, "Statement of Principles on Participatory Development," November 16, 1993, p. 1.

8. Memorandum from John Swallow entitled "Gore's Speech to IDB" dated Tuesday, September 27, 1994. The memorandum does not quote Vice President Gore directly. The capital letters are Swallows.

9. World Bank, **World Development Report, 1983**, Washington, D.C.: Oxford University Press, 1983.

10. See: World Bank, **Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth: A Long-Term Perspective Study**, Washington, D.C.: 1989.

11. World Bank, **Governance and Development**, Washington, D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, April 1992, footnote 1, p. 58.

12. **Governance and Development**, Washington, D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, April 1992, p. v.

13. World Bank, **Governance: The World Bank's Experience**, Washington, D.C.: May 1994, pp. 55-56.
14. Action Programme adopted in Paris by the "Second United Nations Conference on Least Developed Countries" in September 1990 as quoted in Hans Peter Replik and Ralf-Matthias Mohs, "'Good Governance', Democracy and Development Paradigms," **Intereconomics**, Vol. 27, (January/February 1992), p. 28.
15. As quoted in Hans Peter Replik and Ralf-Matthias Mohs, "'Good Governance', Democracy and Development Paradigms," **Intereconomics**, Vol. 27, (January/February 1992), p. 28.
16. "Democracy in Asia: What Kind of a Future?" Asia Pacific Observer. Vol. 1, No. 2, October-December 1994. Honolulu: East-West Center, pp. 1-2. This article is based on: Muthiah Alagappa, **Asia's Prospects for Democracy**, EWC Special Report, Honolulu: East-West Center, forthcoming. Alagappa is Senior Fellow, Institute for Strategic and International Studies, Malaysia.
17. Seymour M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," **American Political Science Review** 53: (1959), p. 75.
18. Ross E. Burkhardt and Michael S. Lewis-Back, "Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis," **American Political Science Review** 88 (1994), pp. 903 and 907-908.

## ANNEX C: SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE

### Books

- Almond, Gabriel A. and Sidney Verba. 1963. **The Civil Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations**. Boston: Little, Brown and Company
- Berger, Peter L. (ed.). 1993. **Institutions of Democracy & Development**. Woodbridge, VA: ICS Press for the Sequoia Institute.
- Bratton, Michael and Goren Hyden. 1992. **Governance and Politics in Africa**. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Brinkerhoff, Derick W. 1991. **Improving Development Program Performance: Guidelines for Managers**. Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Chrislip, David D. and Carl E. Larson. 1994. **Collaborative Leadership: How Citizens and Civic Leaders Can Make a Difference**. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers.
- Copp, David, Jean Hampton, and John E. Roemer, (eds.). 1993. **The Idea of Democracy**. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Dahl, Robert A. 1989. **Democracy and its Critics**. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Dahl, Robert A. 1956. **A Preface to Democratic Theory**. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Diamond, Larry (ed.). 1993. **Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries**. London & Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- DiIulio, John J. Jr. (ed.). 1994. **Deregulating the Public Service: Can Government Be Improved?** Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Gastil, Raymond D. 1989. **Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1988-1989**. New York: Freedom House.
- Hadenius, Axel. 1992. **Democracy and Development**. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Samuel P. Huntington. 1968. **Political Order in Changing Societies**. New Haven, CN: Yale University Press.
- Huntington, Samuel H. 1991. **The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century**. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.

- Hyden, Goran and Michael Bratton. **Governance and Politics in Africa**. Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Hyneman, Charles. 1950. **Bureaucracy in a Democracy**. New York: Harper and Row.
- Kettl, Donald F. 1993. **Public Governance and Private Markets**. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Krislov, Samuel. 1981. **Representative Bureaucracy**. New York: Praeger.
- Mitnick, Barry M. (ed.). 1993. **Corporate Political Agency: The Construction of Competition in Public Affairs**. Newbury Park: Sage.
- Mosher, Frederick C. 1968. **Democracy and the Public Service**. New York: Oxford University Press.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe C. Schmitter and Lawrence Whitehead (eds.). 1991. **Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracy**. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press.
- Osborne, David and Ted Gaebler. 1992. **Reinventing Government**. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. **Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action**. NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Peters, Thomas and Robert Waterman. 1982. **In Search of Excellence**. New York: Harper & Row.
- Redford, Emmett S. 1969. **Democracy and the Administrative State**. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Roberts, Jennifer Tolbert. 1994. **Athens on Trial: The Antidemocratic Tradition in Western Thought**. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Rondinelli, Dennis A. 1987. **Development Administration and U.S. Foreign Aid Policy**. Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Sartori, Giovanni. 1962. **Democratic Theory**. [Based on the author's translation of **Democrazia e definizione** (2nd edition).] Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
- Selznick, Phillip. 1957. **TVA and the Grass Roots**. New York: Harper and Row.
- de Tocqueville, Alexis. 1960. **Democracy in America**. Specially edited and abridged for the modern Reader by Richard D. Heffner. Second Printing. NY: The New American Library.

### Chapters in Books

- LaPorte, Robert Jr. 1994. "Pakistan: Another Try at Democracy." In **Contemporary Problems in Pakistan**, ed. J. Henry Corson, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Wunsch, James S. 1994. "African Political Reform and International Assistance: What Can and Should Be Done?" In **African Development and Public Policy**, ed. Stuart S. Nagel, NY: St. Martin's Press.
- Wilson, James Q. 1994. "Can the Bureaucracy Be Deregulated?" In **Deregulating the Public Service: Can Government Be Improved?**, ed. John J. DiIulio Jr., Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

### Articles

- Albala-Bertrand, Luis. 1994. "Democratic Culture and Governance: Latin America on the Threshold of the Third Millenium." **Journal of Development Studies** 30:527.
- Arat, Zehra F. 1988. "Democracy and Economic Development: Modernization Theory Revisited." **Comparative Politics** 21:21-36.
- Bollen, Kenneth A. 1980. "Issues in the Comparative Measurement of Political Democracy." **American Sociological Review** 45:370-90.
- Bollen, Kenneth A. 1986. "Political Rights and Political Liberties in Nations: An Evaluation of Human Rights Measures." **Human Rights Quarterly** 8:567-91.
- Bollen, Kenneth A. 1993. "Liberal Democracy: Validity and Source Biases in Cross-National Measures." **American Journal of Political Science** 37:1207-30.
- Boyer, William W. 1990. "Political Science and the 21st Century: From Government to Governance." **PS: Political Science & Politics** 33:50-54.
- Burkhart, Ross E. and Michael S. Lewis-Back. 1994. "Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis." **American Political Science Review** 88:903-910.
- Cohen, Joshua. 1992. "Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance." **Politics and Society** 20:393.
- Franck, Thomas M. 1992. "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance." **American Journal of International Law** 86:46.
- Gilligan, John J. 1993. "A Search for Community: The Problem of Governance in a Democratic Society." **University of Cincinnati Law Review** 62:101.

- Huntington, Samuel P. 1984. "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" **Political Science Quarterly** 99: 193-218.
- Immergut, Ellen M. 1992. "An Institutional Critique of Associative Democracy." Commentary on "Secondary Associations and Democracy." **Politics and Society** 20:481.
- Jun, Jong Sup. 1985. "Decentralization and Local Administration: A Step Toward Democratic Governance in Korea." **Political Studies Review** 1:53-73.
- Kitschelt, Herbert. 1992. "Political Regime Change: Structure and Process-Driven Explanation?" **American Political Science Review** 86: 1028-1034.
- Lipset, Seymour M. 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." **American Political Science Review** 53: 69-105.
- Moe, Ronald C. 1994. "The Reinventing Government Exercise: Misinterpreting the Problem, Misjudging the Consequences." **Public Administration Review** 55:
- Morgan, Edward. 1984. "Technocratic v. Democratic Options for Educational Policy: Lay versus Professional Control of Educational Decision-Making and Localism versus Centralization in Educational Governance." **Policy Studies Review** 3:263-78.
- Moss, Geoffrey. 1991. "Restructuring Public Schools for Internal Democratic Governance: A Circular Approach." **School Organization** 11:71.
- Muller, Edward N. and Mitchell A. Seligson. 1994. "Civic Culture and Democracy: The Question of Causal Relationships." **American Political Science Review** 88:635-652.
- Munoz, Heraldo. 1993. "The OAS and Democratic Governance." **Journal of Democracy** 4:29.
- Remmer, Karen L. 1990. "Democracy and Economic Crisis: The Latin American Experience." **World Politics** 42: 315-335.
- Repnik, Hans Peter and Ralf-Matthias Mohs. 1992. "'Good Governance', Democracy and Development Paradigms." **Intereconomics** 27:28-33.

#### Unpublished Papers

- LaPorte, Robert Jr. and Syedur Rahman. "Attempts to Improve Governance in Bangladesh Through Public Administration Reform." A paper presented at the Annual Conference on South Asia, Madison, Wisconsin, November 4, 1994.
- Oakerson, Ronald J. "Democracy as a Discipline." Draft. May 9, 1994.

Serageldin, Ismail and Pierre Landell-Mills, "Governance and the External Factor." A paper presented at the Annual Conference on Development Economics, The World Bank, April 25-26, 1991.

### Documents

Blair, Harry and Gary E. Hansen. **Weighing in on the Scales of Justice: Strategic Approaches for Donor-Supported Rule of Law Programs.** USAID Program and Operations Assessment Report No. 7. Washington, DC: Office of Evaluation, Center for Development Information and Evaluation, USAID. February 1994.

British High Commission, Dhaka. "Bangladesh: Assistance for Democracy and Good Government." 22 June 1993.

Dia, Mamadou. **A Governance Approach to Civil Service Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa.** World Bank Technical Paper Number 225, Africa Technical Department Series. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 1993.

Hansen, Gary E. **A.I.D. Support for Democracy: A Review of Experience.** Interim Report. Washington, DC: Center for Development Information and Evaluation, U.S. Agency for International Development. June 1991.

Memorandum to the Stockholm Initiative on "Joint Responsibility in the Nineties" signed *inter alia* by President Aylwin of Chile, Zambabwean Minister of Finance Chidzero, former President of Tanzania Nyerere and Salim Salim, Secretary General of the Organization for African Unity. No date.

McHugh, Heather and Michele Schimpp. **A Summary of Principal Lessons Learned from A.I.D. Experience in Democracy and Governance.** Washington, DC: Research & Reference Services, U.S. Agency for International Development. No date.

National Performance Review. 1993. **Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less: Report of the National Performance Review.** Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

Nunberg, Barbara and John Nellis. **Civil Service Reform and the World Bank.** WPS 422. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, May 1990.

Ozgediz, Selcuk. **Managing the Public Service in Developing Countries: Issues and Prospects.** SWP 583. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, July 1983.

Paul, Samuel. **Accountability in Public Services.** A PRE Working Paper. Washington, DC: Policy, Research, and External Affairs Complex, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

- Schimpp, Michele. **A.I.D. and Democratic Development: A Synthesis of Literature and Experience.** Washington, DC: Research & Reference Services, Center for Development Information and Evaluation, U.S. Agency for International Development. May 1992.
- "Second United Nations Conference on Least Developed Countries." Action Programme. September 1990.
- United Nations Development Programme. **Management Development Programme--Pakistan: A Programme to Support Implementation of Pakistan's SAP.** July 1994.
- United Nations Department of Economic and Social Development. **Administrative Structure and Civil Service Systems in Asian Countries.** Draft, 1993.
- United Nations Development Programme. **Governance, Public Sector Management, and Human Development: A UNDP Strategy Paper.** Draft. NY: Programme Development and Support Division, Bureau for Programme Policy and Development, UNDP. December 1993.
- United Nations Development Programme. **Human Development Report, 1991.** NY: Oxford University Press, 1991.
- United Nations Development Programme. **Report of the Public Administration Sector Study, Bangladesh.** July 31, 1993.
- U.S. Agency for International Development. **Building Democracy.** January 1994.
- U.S. Agency for International Development. **Democracy and Governance.** Washington, DC: Directorate for Policy, U.S. Agency for International Development. November 1991.
- U.S. Agency for International Development. **Democracy Implementation Guidelines.** Technical Annex C. Draft. June 6, 1994.
- U.S. Agency for International Development. **The Democracy Initiative.** December 1990.
- U.S. Agency for International Development. **Framework for Public Administration Assistance to Central and Eastern Europe.** 1993.
- U.S. Agency for International Development. **Guidelines for Strategic Plans.** Draft. June 20, 1994.
- U.S. Agency for International Development. **The Implementing Policy Change Project.** Washington, DC: Center for Democracy & Governance, Global Bureau, USAID, April 1994.
- U.S. Agency for International Development. **IPC Resource Materials.** Prepared by Management Systems International, Abt Associates Inc. and Development Alternatives, Inc.

U.S. Agency for International Development. "Blueprint for Development." **The Strategic Plan of the Agency for International Development**. Washington, DC: Bureau for Program and Policy Guidelines, Agency for International Development, June 1985.

World Bank. **Governance: The Bank's Experience**. Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, May 1994.

World Bank. **Governance and Development**. Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, April 1992.

World Bank. **Issues of "Governance" in Borrowing Members--The Extent of Their Relevance Under the Bank's Articles of Agreement**. Memorandum of the Vice President and General Counsel. December 21, 1990.

World Bank. **Managing Development: The Governance Dimension**. A Discussion Paper. No date (circa 1983).

#### Reports to Sponsor

Associates in Rural Development, Inc. **An Assessment of Politics and Governance in Madagascar**. Draft Report. April 24, 1994.

Associates in Rural Development, Inc. **USAID Governance Initiative in Nigeria: A Strategic Assessment of Primary Health Care and Local Government**. Prepared for USAID Affairs Office, Lagos, Nigeria, February 1994.

Checchi and Co., Consulting Inc. and UNICONSULT International Ltd. **Report of the Public Administration Efficiency Study**. Several volumes. Prepared for USAID/Dhaka, November 1989.

Chemonics International Consulting Division. **Local Development II-Provincial: End of Contract Final Report**. Volume I: Achieving the Project Purpose. Prepared for USAID/Cairo, December 1992.

Charlick, Robert. **The Concept of Governance and its Implications for A.I.D.'s Development Assistance Program in Africa**. Prepared for the Africa Bureau, USAID. June 1992.

Coopers and Lybrand. **The Bangladesh Democracy Program (BDP) Assessment**. Prepared for USAID/Dhaka, June 1992.

Dukesbury, John M. **Decentralization and Democratic Pluralism: The Role of Foreign Aid**. Prepared for U.S. Agency for International Development. July 1991.

Ernst and Young. **Program Strategy for Democratic Pluralism Initiative in Pakistan**. Prepared for U.S. Agency for International Development/Pakistan. October 1990.

Fox, Leslie, et. al. **An Assessment of Politics and Governance in Madagascar.** Draft. Prepared for U.S. Agency for International Development. April 24, 1994.

Hopkins, Raymond F. **The Role of Governance in Economic Development.** First Draft. Prepared as a Conceptual Paper for the Task Force on Development Assistance and Cooperation (Agriculture 2000). November 14-15, 1990.

International Management Consultants Limited. **Bangladesh: Reforms in Budgeting and Expenditure Control, Final Report.** Colchester, Essex, UK. Prepared for the Government of Bangladesh, June 1993.

International Management Consultants Limited. **Bangladesh: Reforms in Budgeting and Expenditure Control, Final Report--Project Implementation Documentation.** Colchester, Essex, UK. Prepared for the Government of Bangladesh, June 1993.

LaPorte, Robert Jr. **Support for Democratic Institution Building in Pakistan: A Conceptual Evaluation.** Evaluation of The Asia Foundation's Assistance Programs to the Legislatures and the Judiciary in Pakistan. August 30, 1994.

Oakerson, Ronald J. **Assessing and Assisting Democratic Governance Reform: A Framework.** Draft. Prepared for U.S. Agency for International Development. October 7, 1994.

The Pragma Corporation. **Local Development Assistance Program (LDAP): Impact Evaluation and Decentralization Assessment.** Final Report. Prepared for U.S.A.I.D./Philippines. 11 November 1992.

Segal, Jerome M. **Goals and Concepts in AID's Democratic Initiatives.** Prepared for U.S. Agency for International Development. March 25, 1991.

Wong, Melissa. **Perspectives on Democracy: A Review of the Literature.** Final Report. Prepared for Bureau of Asia, Near East and Europe, Office of Technical Resources, Human Resources Division, U.S. Agency for International Development. September 1990.

Wunsch, James S. and Dele Olowu. **Primary Health Care and Local Government in Nigeria: An Agenda of Key Policy Issues.** Prepared for U.S. Agency for International Development. July 1994.

### Speeches

The Honorable J. Brian Atwood, Administrator, USAID. "Statement of Principles on Participatory Development." November 16, 1993.

Vice President Al Gore. "Major Address to High-Level Officials of the Inter-American Development Bank." Part of the IDB's Forum on "Governance and Modernization of the Democratic State." September 16, 1994.

James Q. Wilson. "Reventing Public Administration." The Ninth Annual John Gaus Lecture delivered at the 1994 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in New York. Reprinted in **PS: Political Science & Politics** 37: 667-673.

#### Other Materials

Academy for Educational Development. **Annual Report, 1993-1994**. Washington, DC: AED, 1994.

Alagappa, Muthiah. **Asia's Prospects for Democracy**. EWC Special Report. Honolulu: East-West Center, forthcoming.

**The Participation Forum**. Papers from Sessions No. 1 through 6 (February 17, 1994 - July 21, 1994).

**The Transition to Democracy: Proceedings of a Workshop**. Washington, D.C.: National Research Council, National Academy Press, 1991.

United Nations Development Programme. **Management Development in Progress**. Newsletter produced by the Staff of the Management Development Programme. Vol. 2, Nos. 2 and 4, April 1994 and August 1994.

#### USAID Project Documents

**Decentralization and Democratic Governance Reform Project (DDGR)**. Executive Summary, Concept Paper, and Annex. No date.

United States Agency for International Development. **Contractor Team: Management Systems International (lead contractor), Abt Associates Inc. and Development Associates, Inc.** Project #936-5451. No date.

U.S. Agency for International Development. **Governance and Local Democracy (GOLD) Project Paper**. USAID/Manila, July 1994.

## ANNEX D: EXTENDED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE

The sources listed below were surfaced by conducting a literature search of two computer files, the Public Affairs Information Service (PAIS) index and the Table of Contents (TOC) index. The search was conducted for the years 1979 to 1994. In addition, the last five years (1990 to 1994) of two professional journals, **American Political Science Review** or APSR (the journal of the American Political Science Association) and **Public Administration Review** or PAR (the journal of the American Society for Public Administration), were searched manually. The key phrases used were "democratic governance," "development and governance," "participation and governance," "democracy and development," "democratic theory," "democratization," and "economic liberalization." If an item had in its title or text the key phrase or word, the computer would display the item.

Additional key phrases and words were used to search both PAIS and TOC just to see what would surface. The following table reveals the results.

Key Phrase or Word	Number Found in PAIS	Number Found in TOC
"governance"	280	551
"democratic"	1,596	1,289
"sustainable development"	0	584
"civil society"	45	184
"rule of law"	70	225

The source materials which follow are arranged by index and, within each index, by key phrase for PAIS and TOC. Given the relative paucity of materials in both the APSR and PAR, they are presented under the journal.

### PAIS

#### Democratic Governance

Jun, Jong Sup. 1985. "Decentralization and Local Administration: A Step Toward Democratic Governance in Korea." **Political Studies Review: The Journal of the Association of Korean Political Scientists in North America** 1:53-73.

Morgan, Edward. 1984. "Technocratic v. Democratic Options for Educational Policy (Lay Versus Professional Control of Educational Decision-Making, and Localism Versus Centralization in Educational Governance; United States)." **Policy Studies Review** 3:263-78.

Rainey, R. Randall. 1993. "The Public's Interest in Public Affairs Discourse, Democratic Governance, and Fairness in Broadcasting: A Critical Review of the Public Interest in the Electronic Media." **Georgetown Law Journal** 82:269-372.

Russett, Bruce. 1990. **Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security**. Harvard University Press.

### **Development and Governance**

Based on Papers Presented at a Conference Held at the Stockholm School of Economics, September 1991. 1994. **The Japanese Firm: The Sources of Competitive Strength**. Oxford University Press.

“Changing Approaches to the Solution of American Urban Problems.” 1987. **National Civic Review: making Citizens Democracy Work** 76:9-58+.

Moore, Mick. 1993. “Declining to Learn from the East? The World Bank on Governance and Development.” **IDS Bulletin** 24:39-50.

Repnik, Hans Peter. 1992. “Good Governance, Democracy and Development Paradigms. Responsibility of Governments of the Third World for Appropriate Use of International Aid.” **Intereconomics: Review of International Trade and Development** 27:28-33.

United States, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance. 1986. “Corporate Takeovers: Public Policy Implications for the Economy and Corporate Governance: A Report.” **99th Congress, 2d Session** viii:126p.

### **Participation and Governance**

Henderson, Lenneal J. 1990. “Metropolitan Governance: Citizen Participation in the Urban Federation.” **National Civic Review: Making Citizen Democracy Work** 79:105-17.

United States, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. 1980. “Staff Report on Corporate Accountability: A Re-examination of Rules Relating to Shareholder Communications; Shareholder Participation in the Corporate Electoral Process and Corporate Governance Generally.” **96th Congress, 2d Session** 782p.

### **Democracy and Development**

Agh, Attila. 1993. “Europeanization Through Privatization and Pluralization in Hungary.” **Journal of Public Policy** 13:1-35.

“Attempts to Restructure the Economy to Reduce Dependence on Foreign Aid and transition to Democracy; 6 Articles.” 1992. **Courier** 24-41.

Bauzon, Kenneth E. 1992. **Development and Democratization in the Third World: Myths, Hopes and Realities**. Taylor and Francis.

Bernier, Barbara L. 1992. “Economic Development in Ravaged Haiti: Is Democracy Really the Answer?” **Dickinson Journal of International Law**. 11:49-75.

- Berry, Jeffrey M. 1993. **The Rebirth of Urban Democracy**. Brookings Institute.
- Bowman, Larry W. 1991. **Mauritius: Democracy and Development in the Indian Ocean**. Westview.
- Curry, Robert L., Jr. 1986. "Adaption of Botswana's Development Strategy to Meet Its Peoples' Needs for Land, Jobs: The Southern African Capitalist Democracy Can Maintain Its Growth by a New Problem-Oriented Policy.": **American Journal of Economics and Sociology** 45:297-312.
- Democracia y Desarrollo en America Latina**. 1985. Grupo Ed Latinoam.
- "Democrazia e Sviluppo in Africa." 1991. **Pol Internaz.** 19:41-93+.
- "Democracy and Growth." 1994. **Economist** 322:15-17.
- "Democracy in Production as a Factor in Development." 1987. **World Marxist Review: Problems of Peace and Socialism, Theoretical and Information Journal of Communist and Workers' Parties' Throughout the World** 30:60-73.
- Diaz, Harry. 1991. **Forging Identities and Patterns of Development in Latin America and the Caribbean**. Can Scholars' Press.
- "Efforts to Establish Democracy, Dissolve Some Power to Various Ethic Groups and Move Towards a Market Economy; Since 1991; 7 Articles and 2 Interviews." 1994. **Courier** 16-40.
- "Focus: NGOs Face The Challenges of a New Decade." 1991. **Grassroots Development** 15:1-37.
- "Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1994: Hearings and Recommendations for U.S. Foreign Assistance to Africa: Pt. 7, April 29-May 19, 1993." 1994. **103rd Congress, 1st Session** v, 238p.
- Fowler, Alan. 1993. "Non-governmental Organizations as Agents of Democratization: An African Perspective." **Journal of International Development**. 5:325-39.
- Gonzalez Casanova, Pablo. 1983. **No Intervencion, Autodeterminacion y Democracia en America Latina**. Siglo Veintiuno.
- Green, Rosario. 1990. **Democracia y Recuperacion economica en America Latina**. Dian en Libros.
- Green, Jerrold D. 1991. "USAID's Democratic Pluralism Initiative: Pragmatism or Altruism?." **Ethics and International Affairs** 5:215-31.

- Harrison, Reginald J. 1980. **Pluralism and Corporatism: the Political Evolution of Modern Democracies**. Harper Collins.
- Henry, Paget. 1983. **The Newer Caribbean: Decolonization, Democracy and Development**. Institute for the Study of Human Issues.
- Hojman, David E. 1993. **Chile: The Political Economy of Development and Democracy in the 1990s**. University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Ihonvbere, Julius O. 1994. **Nigeria: The Politics of Adjustment and Democracy**. Transaction Publications.
- Ihonvbere, Julius O. 1990. "Why African Economies Will Not Recover." **Iranian Journal of International Affairs**. 6:146-73.
- Ingavata, Chaichana. 1990. "Community Development and Local-Level Democracy in Thailand: The Role of Tambol Councils." **Sojourn: Social Issues in Southeast Asia**. 5:113-43.
- Jonge, Hans de. 1993. "Democracy and Economic Development in the Asia-Pacific Region: The Role of Parliamentary Institutions." **Human Rights Law Journal** 14:301-7.
- "Kenya: Democracy; Winning the Hearts and Minds of Wananchi." 1991. **Courier** 11-29.
- Larrain, Felipe. 1991. "Os Desafios Economicos do Desenvolvimento Democrático no Chile." **Pesquisa e Planejamento Económico** 21:25-53.
- Lee, Kuo-Wei. 1991. "The Road to Democracy: Taiwan Experience." **Asian Profile: Asia's International Journal Devoted Exclusively to Multi-disciplinary Study of Asian Affairs** 19:489-504.
- Lewis, Paul G. 1994. **Central Europe Since 1945**. Longman.
- "L'Imperatif Democratique Dans Les Relations Internationales." 1992. **Trim Monde** 21-35+.
- Mbaku, John Mukum. 1993. "Political Democracy, Military Expenditures, and Economic Growth in Africa." **Scandinavian Journal of Development Alternatives**. 12:49-64.
- Mbaku, John Mukum. 1992. "Political Democracy and the Prospects of Development in Post-Cold War Africa." **Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies** 17:345-71.
- MacDonald, Laura. 1994. "Globalizing Civil Society: Interpreting International NGOs in Central America." **Millennium** 23:267-85.
- MacDonald, Scott B. 1986. **Trinidad and Tobago: Democracy and Development**. Praeger Publishers.

- Maguire, Robert. 1986. "Standing Tall: Balanced Development in Haiti." **Grassroots Development** 10:8-11.
- Makinda, Samuel M. 1993. "Demokratie and Entwicklung in Afrika." **Europa-Archiv** 48:567-76.
- Marcella, Gabriel. 1986. "Security, Democracy and Development: The United States and Latin America in the Next Decade." **Air University Review: The Professional Journal of the United States Air Force** 37:2-14.
- Marschalek, Renate. 1983. **Rot-Grüner Anstoss: Mit Einem Vorwort von Kurt Steyrer**. Jugend und Volk.
- Mason, Ronald M. 1982. **Participatory and Workplace Democracy: A Theoretical Development in Critique of Liberalism**. Southern Illinois University Press.
- Motley, Langhorne A. 1984. "Central America Democracy, Peace and Development Initiative(Act of 1984: Proposed Legislation Based on the Recommendations of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America)." **Department of State Bulletin: The Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy** 84:72-4+.
- "Multinationals, Development and Democracy: An Interview with Harry Geylin (President, Council of the Americas; Conditions in Brazil, Chile, and Nicaragua)." 1980. **Multinational Monitor** 1:12-16.
- Muller, Edward N. 1985. "Dependent Economic Development, Aid Dependence on the United States and Democratic Breakdown in the Third World." **International Studies Quarterly: The Journal of the International Studies Association** 29:445-69.
- National Research Council, Commission on Behavioral and Social Science and Panel on Issues in Democratization. 1992. **Democratization in Africa: African Views, African Voices: Summary of Three Workshops**. National Academy Printers.
- Neher, Clark D. 1994. **Southeast Asia in the New International Era**. 2nd ed. Westview.
- Nyang'oro, Julius E. 1993. "Development, Democracy and NGOs in Africa." **Scandinavian Journal of Development Alternatives** 12:277-91.
- Ollawa, Patrick E. 1979. **Participatory Democracy in Zambia: The Political Economy of National Development**. Stockwell.
- Olsen, Gorm Rye. 1994. "Africa and the Middle East in the New International System: Democracy, Aid and Security." **Journal of Developing Societies** 10:125-47.
- Oppenheim, Lois Hecht. 1993. **Politics in Chile: Democracy, Authoritarianism and the Search for Development**. Westview.

Organization for Economic and Cooperative Development. 1992. **Development and Democracy: Aid Policies in Latin America.**

Organization for Economic and Cooperative Development. 1994. **Redefining the State in Latin America.**

Pac, Sung Moon. 1992. **Korea Leading Developing Nations: Economy, Democracy and Welfare.** University Printing America.

Payne, Julian H. 1992. "Economic Assistance to Support Democratization in Developing Countries: A Canadian Perspective." **Development: Journal of the Society for international Development** 12-16.

Pennar, Karen. 1993. "Is Democracy Bad for Growth? It Doesn't Ensure." **Business Week** 84-6.

"Plant Closings, A Critical Challenge to American Democracy: A Statement by the Research and Policy Committee of the Committee of Economic Development." 1987. **American Journal of Economics and Sociology** 46:257-260.

Pontusson, Jonas. 1992. **The Limits of Social Democracy: Investment Policies in Sweden.** Cornell University Press.

Proceedings of a Conference Organized by the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, January 28-30, 1993. 1993. **Human Rights at the Dawn of the 21st Century.**

"Problems Related to Transforming a Socialist One-Party State into a Free-Market Multi-Party Democracy." 1993. **Courier** 32-47.

Przeworski, Adam. 1991. **Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America.** Cambridge University Press.

Radojkovic, Miroljub. 1984. "Eight Considerations on New Information Technology and the Development of Democracy." **Gazette: The International Journal for Mass Communications Studies** 33: 51-8.

Ramet, Sabrina P. 1992. "Balkan Pluralism and Its Enemies." **Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs** 36: 547-64.

Randall, Stephen. 1993. "People's Education and Nation Building for a New South Africa." **Review of African Political Economy** 58:43-60.

Reding, Andrew A. 1984. "Backing Democracy and Development(Commenting on the united States-Led Invasion and Economic Aid Policies in the Post-Invasion Period)." **World Policy Journal** 1:653-67.

- Rizvi, Gowher. 1993. **South Asia in a Changing International Order**. Sage Publications.
- Rogerson, Christian M. 1994. "Democracy, Reconstruction and Changing Local and Regional Economic Planning in South Africa." **Regional Development Dialogue** 15:102-18.
- "Regional Developments and Issues and Trends in Economic Development, Human Rights and Democratization; 11 Articles and 3 Interviews." 1994. **African Report** 39:4-83+.
- Rueschemeyer, Dietrich. 1992. **Capitalist Development and Democracy**. University of Chicago Press.
- Saba, Raul P. 1986. **Political Development and Democracy in Peru: Continuity in Change and Crisis**. Westview.
- Security, Democracy and Development in U.S.-Latin American Relations**. 1994. University of Miami Press.
- Social Equity and Changing Production Patterns: An Integrated Approach**. 1992. U.N. Agent.
- Stein, Eduardo. 1992. **Democracia sin pobreza: Alternativa de Desarrollo para el Istmo Centroamericano**. San Jose: DEI.
- Stuth, Reinhard. 1984. "Boliviens Widerspruch: Der Weg Zur Entwicklung Heisst Demokratie." **Die Politische Meinung: Zweimonatshefte Fur Fragen Der Zeit** 29:46-51.
- Sustainable Development for a Democratic South Africa**. 1994. St. Martin's Press.
- "The New South Africa." 1994. **Black Scholar** 24:2-47.
- "Tropical Africa: The Way Out of the Crisis; Dakar Round Table on Current Development in Africa and the Problems of Democracy." 1986. **World Marxist Review: Problems of Peace and Socialism, Theoretical and Information Journal of Communist and Workers' Parties Throughout the World** 29:54-64.
- United States, House Committee on Foreign Affairs. 1988. "The Panama Democracy and Economic Recovery Act: Hearing, October 6, 1988, Before the Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade and on Western Hemisphere Affairs on H.R. 4703." **100th Congress, 2d Session** iii, 85p.
- United States, House Committee on Government Operations, Legislative and National Security Subcommittee. 1992. "U.S. Assistance Efforts in Panama: Hearing April 17, 1991." **102nd Congress, 1st Session** iii, 316p.
- Vick, David. 1991. "Economic Tide Turns Africa Toward a New Economic Era." **African Business** 10-13.

Vorhies, F. 1989. "Liberty and Development in Africa." **South African Journal of Economics** 57:279-291.

Watts, Michael. 1991. "Entitlements or Empowerment? Famine and Starvation in Africa." **Review of African Political Economy** 9-26.

Wolf, Charles, Jr. 1991. **Promoting Democracy and Free Markets in Europe**. Rand Corporation.

### **Democratic Theory**

Fletcher, Joseph F. 1989. "Mass and Elite Attitudes About Wiretapping in Canada: Implications for Democratic Theory and Politics." **Public Opinion Quarterly** 53:225-45.

Gant, Michael M. 1993. "Democratic Theory, Nonvoting and Public Policy: The 1972-1988 Presidential Elections." **American Politics Quarterly** 21:185-204.

Selucky, Radoslav. 1979. **Marxism, Socialism, Freedom: Towards a General Democratic Theory of Labour-Managed Systems**. London: St. Martin's, MacMillan.

### **Democratization**

Alshayji, Abdullah K. 1992. "Kuwait at the Crossroads: The Quest for Democratization." **Middle East Insight** 8:41-6.

Arato, Andrew. 1985. "Some Perspectives of Democratization in East Central Europe." **Journal of International Affairs** 38:321-35.

Bao, Huang Ti. 1989. "Democratization in Vietnam: Renewing the Party for the Sake of the Renewal of Society." **Review of International Affairs: Politics, Economics, Law, Science, Culture** 40: 21-3.

Bauzon, Kenneth E. 1990. "The Multilateral Assistance Initiative and Democratization in the Philippines." **Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Quarterly Journal of International and Strategic Affairs** 12:120-33.

Beattie, Kirk J. 1991. "Prospects for Democratization in Egypt." **American-Arab Affairs** 31-47.

Berman, Daniel K. 1984. "The \$100 Billion Question: Can Brazil's New Democratization Survive the IMF?(Whether Brazil's Moves Towards Democracy Will Survive the Country's Economic Problems)." **Multinational Monitor** 5:10-15.

Berman, Daniel K. 1992. **Words Like Colored Glass: The Role of the Press in Taiwan's Democratization Process**. Westview.

Boyer, William W. 1991. "Democratization of South Korea's National Universities." **Korean Studies** 15:83-98.

- "Brazil in Transition: Democratization, Privatization and Working-Class Resistance." 1994. **Latin American Perspectives** 21:3-131.
- Brynen, Rex. 1992. "Economic Crisis and Post-Revolution Democratization in the Arab World: The Case of Jordan." **Canadian Journal of Political Science** 25:69-97.
- Burg, Steven L. 1991. "Nationalism and Democratization in Yugoslavia." **Washington Quarterly** 14:5-19.
- Casanova, Jose. 1983. "Modernization and Democratization: Reflections on Spain's Transition to Democracy." **Social Research: An International Quarterly of the Social Sciences** 50:929-73.
- Ceausescu, N. 1987. "Gorbachev Visits Rumania: At Rally, Ceausescu Asks Better Economic Toes, Voices Interest in Soviet Restructuring; Gorbachev Cites Party Reform, Need for Ethnic Sensitivity, Democratization Drive." **Current Digest of the Soviet Press** 39:12-15.
- Clinton, William J. 1993. "Executive Order 12872: Blocking Property of Persons Obstructing Democratization in Haiti, October 18, 1993." **Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents** 29:2103
- Colton, Timothy J. 1990. "The Politics of Democratization: The Moscow Election of 1990." **Soviet Economy** 6:285-344.
- Connors, Donald L. 1986. "Public Trust Doctrine and Private Rights: The Democratization of Trust Resources by the Judicial System Leads to Uncertainty About Owners' Settled Expectations." **Real Estate Review: A Quarterly Journal** 16:51-8.
- Cornelius, Wayne A. 1994. "Mexico's Delayed Democratization." **Foreign Policy** 53-71.
- Crook, Richard C. 1994. "Four Years of the Ghana District Assemblies in Operation: Decentralization, Democratization, and Administrative Performance." **Public Administration and Development** 14:339-64.
- "Democratization Despite the Aggression." 1985. **New Times: A Soviet Weekly of World Affairs** 22-3.
- "Democratization in the Middle East." 1991. **American-Arab Affairs** 1-130.
- Downs, Charles. 1987. "Regionalization, Administrative Reform and Democratization: Nicaragua 1979-1984." **Public Administration and Development: An International Journal of Training, Research and Practice** 7:363-81.
- Ekiert, Grzegorz. 1991. "Democratization Processes in East Central Europe; A Theoretical Reconsideration." **British Journal of Political Science** 21:285-313.

- Entelis, John P. 1988. "Algeria Under Chadli: Liberalization Without Democratization or, Perestroika, Yes; Glasnost, No!." **Middle East insight** 6:47-64.
- Esposito, John L. 1991. "Democratization and Islam." **Middle East Journal** 45:427-40.
- Ford, G.W. 1984. "The Democratization of Work in Australia." **Economic Analysis and Workers' Management** 18:77-102.
- Fowler, Alan. 1993. "Non-governmental Organizations as Agents of Democratization: An African Perspective." **Journal of international Development** 5:325-29.
- Fuller, Elizabeth. 1993. "Transcaucasia: Ethnic Strife Threatens Democratization." **RFE/RL Research Rept** 2:17-24.
- Galjart, Benno. 1989. **Democratization and the State in the Southern Cone: Essays on South American Politics.**
- Gorbachev, M.S. 1987. "Gorbachev Outlines Party's Changing Role: As Second Stage Restructuring begins- Democratization, Rejection of Old Pressure Methods, Preparation for Economic Reform; Are Main Tasks." **Current Digest of the Soviet Press** 39:10-12.
- Hudson, Michael C. 1991. "After the Gulf War: Prospects for Democratization in the Arab World." **Middle East Journal** 45:407-26.
- Hyden, George. 1992. "Foreign Aid in a Period of Democratization: The Case of Politically Autonomous Food Funds." **World Journal: The Multi-disciplinary International Journal Devoted to the Study and Promotion of World Development.** 20:1253-60.
- Karl, Terry Lynn. 1985. "After La Palma: The Prospects for Democratization in El Salvador(Particularly the Role of the Christian Democratic Party)." **World Policy Journal** 2:305-30.
- Laba, Roman. 1991. **The Roots of Solidarity. A Political Sociology of Poland's Working Class.** Princeton University Press.
- Lederer, Albert L. 1985. "The Democratization of the Computer(Falling Hardware Prices and High Level Languages Are Making Computers Available to More People, Resulting in More End User programming)." **Business Forum** 10:22-5.
- Leung, Joe. 1986. "Community Development in Honk Kong: Contributions Towards Democratization. Evolution and Achievements of Neighborhood-Based Organizations Since 1949." **Community Development Journal: An International Forum** 21:3-10.
- "Liberalization and Democratization in the Soviet union and Eastern Europe." 1991. **World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of international Relations** 44:1-138.

- Lie, John. 1991. "Democratization and Its Discontents: Origins of the Present Crisis in South Korea." **Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine** 42:38-52.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1990. "The Southern European Examples of Democratization: Six Lessons From Latin America." **Government and Opposition: A Quarterly Journal of Comparative Politics** 25:68-84.
- Liu, Leo Y. 1991. "Self-determination, Independence and the Process of Democratization in Taiwan." **Asian Profile: Asia's International Journal Devoted Exclusively to Multi-Disciplinary Study of Asian Affairs** 19:197-205.
- Liu, Wen-fu. 1992. "Politics on Taiwan: Democratization and Relations with the Mainland." **China Newsletter** 2-7+.
- Mainwaring, Scott. 1987. "Urban Popular Movements, Identity and Democratization in Brazil." **Comparative Political Studies** 20:131-59.
- Mbachu, I.O. 1991. "Democratization and the Economy." **Africa: Rivista Trimestrale di Studi e Documentazione dell'Istituto Italo-Aficano** 40-53.
- Medvedenko, Anatoly. 1985. "Uruguay: Democratization- An Uphill Battle." **New Times: A Soviet Weekly of World Affairs** 26-7.
- Messas, Kostas. 1992. "Democratization of Military Regimes: Contending Explanation." **Journal of Political and Military Sociology** 20:243-55.
- Middlebrook, Kevin J. 1989. "Union Democratization in the Mexican Automobile Industry: A Reappraisal." **Latin American Research Review** 24:69-93.
- Misztal, Bronislaw. 1988. **Democratization Processes as an Objective of New Social Movements.** JAI Press.
- Moody, Peter R., Jr. 1991. "The Democratization of Taiwan and the Reunification of China." **Journal of East Asian Affairs** 5:144-84.
- Mucha, Janusz L. 1991. "Democratization and Cultural Minorities: The Polish Case of the 1980s/90s." **East European Quarterly** 25:463-82.
- National Research Council, Committee on Behavioral and Social Science and Educational Panel on Issues in Democratization. 1992. **Democratization in Africa: African Views, African Voices: Summary of Three Workshops.** National Academy Printing.
- Nechemias, Carol. 1994. "Democratization and Women's Access to Legislative Seats: The Soviet Case: 1989-1991." **Women and Politics** 14:1-18.

- Neher, Clark D. 1991. "Democratization in Southeast Asia." **Asian Affairs: An American Review** 18:139-52.
- Nozawa, Masanori. 1982. "The Alternative Economic Strategy in Japan (Democratization of the Economy)." **Kyoto University Economic Review: Memoirs of the Faculty of Economics in the Kyoto University** 52:38-63.
- Nugent, Margaret Latus. 1992. **From Leninism to Freedom: The Challenges of Democratization**. Westview.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1988. "Challenges to Democratization in Brazil." **World Policy Journal** 5:281-300.
- Payne, Julian H. 1992. "Economic Assistance to Support Democratization in Developing Countries: A Canadian Perspective." **Development: Journal for the Society for International Development** 12-16.
- Palterovich, D. 1988. "Competition and Democratization." **Problems and Economics: A Journal of Translations** 31:60-77.
- Ranis, Peter. 1986. "The Dilemmas of Democratization in Argentina." **Current History: A World Affairs Journal** 85:29-33+.
- Ryan, Jeffrey J. 1994. "The Impact of Democratization on Revolutionary Movements." **Comparative Politics** 27:27-44.
- Sanford, George. 1992. **Democratization in Poland: 1988-1990: Polish Voices**. London: St. Martin's, MacMillan.
- Savitskii, Valerii. 1990. "Democratization in the USSR: Toward the Freedom of the Individual Through Law and Courts." **Criminal Law Forum: An International Journal** 2:85-110.
- Schultz, Cynthia B. 1990. "Economic Development, Democratization and Environmental Protection in Eastern Europe." **Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review: A Quarterly of Law and Science** 18:53-84.
- Shiu-hing, Lo. 1992. "Taiwan: Business People, Intellectuals, and Democratization." **Pacific Review** 5:382-9.
- Sigur, Gaston J., Jr. 1986. "Prospects for Continuing Democratization in Korea." **Department of State Bulletin: The Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy** 86:46-8.
- Sihbudi, Riza. 1994. "Islamic Fundamentalism and Democratization in the Middle East." **Iranian Journal of International Affairs** 6:119-28.

- Silva-Michelena, Jose. 1988. **Latin America: Peace, Democratization and Economic Crisis**. Zed Books.
- "Special Issue: The Global Context of Democratization." 1991. **Alternatives: A Journal for Social Transformation and Humane Governance** 16:119-274.
- Stubbe Ostergaard, Clemens. 1990. "Swans Scolding the Tiger? Scandinavian Foreign Policies Toward Democratization." **Cooperation and Conflict: Nordic Journal of international Politics** 25:171-94.
- Su, Zhenxing. 1988. "On Latin America's Process of Democratization." **Latin American Perspectives: A Journal on Capitalism and Socialism** 15:18-25.
- Suvorova, G.F. 1989. "Greater Freedom of Choice for Teachers Selecting Curriculum and in Structure of the School Day and School Week; Rural Areas." **Russian Education and Society** 34:16-22.
- Szeftel, Morris. 1994. "Ethnicity and Democratization in South Africa." **Review of African Political Economy** 21:185-99.
- United States, House Committee on Foreign Affairs. "Prospects for Democratization in Burma, Mongolia and Nepal: Hearing and Markup, May 8, 1990, Before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and international Organizations and on Asian and Pacific Affairs." **101st Congress, 2d Session** iii, 119p.
- United States, House Committee on Foreign Affairs. "Referendum in the Soviet Union: Implications for Democratization: Hearing, March 13, 1991, Before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East and on Human Rights and International Organization." **102nd Congress, 1st Session** iii, 55p.
- United States, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. "The Status of Democratization Efforts in the Republic of Korea; Hearing." **100th Congress, 2d Session** iii, 43p.
- Vanhanen, Tatu. 1990. **The Process of Democratization: A Comparative Study of 147 States, 1980-88**. Taylor and Francis.
- Vanhanen, Tatu. 1992. **Strategies of Democratization**. Taylor and Francis.
- Walter, Knut. 1993. "The Military and Democratization in El Salvador." **Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs** 35:39-88.
- Wang, Shuan-chi. 1980. "Chinese Communist Democratization and Modernization(Commenting on Statements Made and Actions Taken at the 3rd Session of the 5th National People's Congress, Held Aug.30-Sept. 10, 1980)." **Asian Outlook** 15:46-50.

Yang, Winston L.Y. 1992. "Taiwan Since 1988: Democratization, Foreign Policy and Relations with Peking." *American Asian* 10:42-61.

### **Economic Liberalization**

Asakawa, Ayako. 1993. "GATT Membership Issue Promoting Reform and Economic Liberalization." *China Newsletter* 2-6.

Chaudhry, Kiren Aziz. 1991. "On the Way to the Market: Economic Liberalization and Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait." *Middle East Report* 21:14-23.

Choksi, Armeane M. 1986. **Economic Liberalization in Developing Countries**. Blackwell, Basil.

Clark, Cal. 1992. "Economic Development and Political Liberalization in the R.O.C.: Interdependence or Contradiction." *American Asian* 10:1-27.

Clausen, A.W. 1984. "Priority issues for the World Economy(Economic Policies and Performance, Trade Liberalization, Capital Flows and Growth in Developing Countries)." **International Tax and Business Lawyer** 2:322-30.

**Economic and Political Liberalization in the Middle East**. 1993. Tauris: St. Martin's Press.

Gebremariam, Yilma. 1993. "Obstacles to Trade Liberalization and Economic Cooperation Among West African States." *Journal of International Development* 5:79-92.

Gibson, Heather D. 1992. **Economic Integration and Financial Liberalization: Prospects for Southern Europe**. London: MacMillan.

Hamilton, Clive. 1989. "The Irrelevance of Economic Liberalization in the Third World." **World Journal: The Multi-Disciplinary International Journal Devoted to the Study and Promotion of World Development** 17:1523-30.

Kate, Adriaan Ten. 1992. "Trade Liberalization and Economic Stabilization in Mexico: Lessons of Experience." **World Development: The Multi-Disciplinary International Journal Devoted to the Study and Promotion of World Development** 20:659-72.

Kohli, Atul. 1989. "Politics of Economic Liberalization in India." **World Journal: The Multi-Disciplinary International Journal Devoted to the Study and Promotion of World Development** 17:305-28.

Koves, Andras. 1991. **Foreign Economic Liberalization: Transformations in Socialist and Market Economies**. Westview.

Krause, Lawrence B. 1991. **Liberalization in the Process of Economic Development**. University of California Press.

- McKinnon, Ronald I. 1991. **The Order of Economic Liberalization: Financial Control in the Transition to a Market Economy.** John Hopkins University Press.
- Moore, Mick. 1993. "Economic Liberalization, Political Pluralism and Business Associations in Developing Countries." **World Development** 21:1895-1912.
- Murphy, Emma. 1994. "Structural Inhibitions to Economic Liberalization in Israel." **Middle East Journal** 48:65-88.
- Political and Economic Liberalization in Mexico: At a Critical Juncture?.** 1993. Lynne Rienner Publishing.
- Reno, William. 1993. "Economic Reform and the Strange Case of Liberalization in Sierra Leone." **Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration** 6:23-42.
- Shaw, Antony. 1985. "Somalia: Barre's Balancing Act." **Africa Report: America's Leading Magazine on Africa** 30:26-9.
- Singh, S. Nihal. 1982. "India's Halting Steps Toward Economic Liberalization." **Wall Street Journal** 200:9.
- "Stabilization, Liberalization and Devolution: Assessment of the Economic Situation and Reform Process in the Soviet Union." **European Economy** 45:7-187.
- Sullivan, Lawrence R. 1988. "Assault on the Reforms: Conservative Criticism of Political and Economic liberalization in China, 1985-86." **China Quarterly: An International Journal for the Study of China** 198-222.
- Tesche, Jean. 1994. "A Note on Economic Liberalization in Hungary and Egypt." **Comparative Economic Studies** 36:51-72.
- Thomas, Scott. 1989. "Zaire's Economic Liberalization and Its Impact in the Agricultural Sector." **Development Policy Review** 7:29-50.
- Vandewalle, Dirk. 1991. "Quadhafi's Perestroika: Economic and Political Liberalization in Libya." **Middle East Journal** 45:216-31.
- Waterbury, John. 1985. "The Soft State and the Open Door: Egypt's Experience with Economic Liberalization, 1974-1984." **Comparative Politics** 18:65-83.

## TOC

### Democratic Governance

- Cammack, Paul. 1994. "Democratic Culture and Governance: Latin America on the Threshold of the Third Millenium Edited by Luis-Albala Bertrand." **Journal of Development Studies** 30:527.

Cohen, Joshua. 1992. "Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance." **Politics and Society** 20:393.

Dennison, John. 1994. "The Case for Democratic Governance in Canada's Community Colleges." **Interchange; A Quarterly Review of Education** 25:25.

Franck, Thomas M., 1992. "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance." **American Journal of International Law** 86:46.

Gilligan, John J. "A Search for Community: The Problem of Governance in a Democratic Society." 1993. **University of Cincinnati Law Review**. 62:101.

Hirst, Paul Q. 1992. "Comments on Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance." **Politics and Society** 20:473.

Immergut, Ellen M. 1992. "An Institutional Critique of Association Democracy, Commentary on Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance." **Politics and Society** 20:481.

King, Andrew. 1991. "Deeds Done in Words: Presidential Rhetoric and the Genres of Governance; Democratic Eloquence: The Fight Over Popular Speech in Nineteenth-Century America; and Presidential Debates: The Challenge of Creating an Informed Electorate." **Rhetoric Society Quarterly** 21:52.

Levine, Andrew. 1992. "Soft on Capitalism: Prospects for Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance." **Politics and Society** 20:487.

Moss, Geoffrey. 1991. "Restructuring Public Schools for Internal Democratic Governance, A Circular Approach." **School Organization** 11:71.

Munoz, Heraldo. 1993. "The OAS and Democratic Governance." **Journal of Democracy** 4:29.

"The Three Rs of Democratic Governance." 1992. **Young Children** 48:2.

### **Development and Governance**

Anders, Gary C. 1994. "American Indian Policy: Self-Governance and Economic & Development." Edited by Lyman H. Legters and Fremont J Lyden. **American Indian Culture and Research Journal** 18:214.

Landell-Mills, Pierre. 1991. "Governance and the Development Process." **Finance and Development** 28:14.

Leftwich, Adrian. 1993. "Governance, Democracy and Development in the Third World." **third World Quarterly** 14:605.

Linback, David R. 1993. "Volunteers, Leadership Development and Governance." **Food Technology** 47:12.

Lyman, Brad. 1992. "Colonial Governance in the Development of Urban Primacy." **Studies in Comparative International Development** 27:24.

Porter, Douglas R. 1992. "Development Regulations: Tough Choices: Regional Governance for San Francisco." **Urban Land** 51:36.

### **Decentralization and Governance**

Vengoff, R. 1992. "Assessing the Impact of Decentralization on Governance, A Comparative Methodological Approach and Application to Tunisia." **Public Administration and Development** 12:473.

### **Participation and Governance**

Bahrawy, Aida A. 1993. "Increasing Nursing Faculty Participation in University Governance." **Journal of Nursing Education** 32:282.

Ball, Colleen D. 1991. "Regulations 14A and 13D: Impediments to Pension Fund Participation in Corporate Governance." **Wisconsin Law Review** 1:175.

Goforth, Carol. 1994. "Proxy Reform as a Means of Increasing Shareholder Participation in Corporate Governance: Too Little, but Not Too Late." **American University Law Review** 43:379.

Gamage, D.T. 1993. "A Review of Community Participation in School Governance, An Emerging Culture in Australian Education." **British Journal of Educational Studies** 41:134.

Hansmann, Henry. 1993. "Worker Participation and Corporate Governance." **University of Toronto Law Journal** 43:589.

Henkin, Alan B. 1992. "Faculty as Gatekeepers: Non-academic Staff Participation in University Governance." **Journal of Educational Administration** 30:52.

Miller, Michael T. 1993. "Faculty Leader Perception of Improving Participation in Higher Education Governance." **College Student Journal** 27:112.

Swinton, Katherine. 1993. "Comment: On Labour Participation in Workplace Governance." **University of Toronto Law Journal** 43:793.

### **Democratic Theory**

Beitz, Charles R. 1990. "Political Equality: An Essay in Democratic Theory." **American Academy of Political and Social Science** 510:178.

- Bohman, James F. 1990. "Communication, Ideology and Democratic Theory." **American Political Science Review** 84:93.
- Brandhorst, Allan R. 1990. "Schema Theory and Democratic Values, A Response to Lopach and Luckowski." **Social Education** 54:14.
- Buttigieg, Joseph A. 1994. "Sue Golding, Gramsci's Democratic Theory: Contributions to a Post-Liberal Democracy; Renate Holub, Antonio Gramsci: Beyond Marxism and Post-Modernism." **Science and Society** 58:347.
- Cain, Bruce E. 1991. "Voting Rights and Democratic Theory." **Brookings Review** 10:46.
- Dahl, Robert A. 1991. "Reflections on a Preface to Democratic Theory." **Government and Opposition** 26:292.
- Dizerega, Gus. 1991. "Elites and Democratic Theory, Insights from the Self-Organizing Model." **Review of Politics** 53:340.
- Dryzek, John S. 1993. "Reconstructive Democratic Theory." **American Political Science Review** 87:48.
- Eldersveld, Samuel J. 1990. "Political Elites in Modern Societies: Empirical Research and Democratic Theory." **American Academy of Political and Social Sciences** 512:194.
- Gant, Michael M. 1993. "Democratic theory, Nonvoting and Public Policy, The 1972-1988 Presidential Elections." **American Politics Quarterly** 21:185.
- Ingram, David. 1993. "The Limits and Possibilities of Communicative Ethics for Democratic Theory." **Political Theory** 21:294.
- Kitschelt, Herbert. 1993. "Social Movements, Political Parties and Democratic Theory." **American Academy of Political and Social Science** 528:13.
- Klare, Karl E. 1991. "Legal Theory and Democratic Reconstruction, Reflections on 1989." **University of British Columbia Law Review** 25:69.
- Mamdani, Mahmood. 1992. "Africa: Democratic Theory and Democratic Struggles." **Dissent** 39:312.
- Norman, Wayne J. 1993. "A Democratic Theory for a Democratizing World? A Reassessment of Popper's Political Realism." **Political Studies** 61:252.
- Offe, Claus. 1991. "Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe." **Social Research** 58:865.

Oyugi, W.O., Odhiambo, A., Chege, M. et al (eds). 1988. "Democratic theory and Practice in Africa." **Politikon** 17:159.

Petracca, Mark P. 1991. "Rational Choice Approach to Politics, A Challenge to Democratic Theory." **Review of Politics** 53:289.

Pildes, Richard H. 1990. "Slinging Arrows at Democracy, Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism and Democratic Politics." **Columbia Law Review** 90:2121.

Redish, Martin H. 1994. "Democratic Theory and the Legislative Process, Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation." **Tulane Law Review** 68:803.

"Residential Segregation: Where Do We Draw the Line? A View of United States V. Yonkers Board of Education and Democratic Theory." **Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems** 23:467.

Richter, Emmanuel. 1991. "Upheavals in the East and Turmoil in Political Theory, Comments on Offe's Capitalism by Democratic Design?." **Social Research** 58:893.

Riemer, Neal. 1990. "Democratic Theory and Socialism." **Philosophy of the Social Sciences** 20:515.

Santoro, E. 1993. "Democratic Theory and Individual Autonomy, An Interpretation of Schumpeter's Doctrine of Democracy." **European Journal of Political Research** 23:121.

Saxe, David Warren. 1994. "A Democratic Theory of Education for Civil Competence." **Theory and Research in Social Education** 22:107.

Sigelman, Lee. 1990. "Toward a Stupidity-Ugliness theory of Democratic Electoral Debacles." **Political Science and Politics** 23:18.

Snauwaert, Dale T. 1990. "Wendell Berry, Liberalism and Democratic Theory, Implications for the Rural School." **Peabody Journal of Education** 67:118.

Warren, Mark. 1992. "Democratic Theory and Self-Transformation." **American Political Science Review** 86:8.

Weissberg, Robert. 1990. "Political Tolerance: A Case Study in the Study of Public Opinion and Democratic Theory." **Research in Micropolitics** 3:119.

### **Economic Liberalization**

Agarwal, Manmohan. 1993. "Implications of Economic Liberalization for India's Foreign Policy." **International Studies** 30:131.

- Agyemang, Augustus Asante. 1990. "Trade Liberalization Under the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States: Some Preliminary Highlights of Legal and Economic Highlights." **Journal of World Trade** 24:57.
- Akram-Lodhi, A. Haroon. 1992. "Does Aid Work in India: A Country Study of the Impact of Official Development Assistance/Economic Liberalization, industrial Structure and growth in India." **Journal of Contemporary Asia** 22:116.
- Aricanli, T. 1990. "An Overview of Turkey's Experience with Economic Liberalization and Structural Adjustment." **World Development** 18:1343.
- Booth, David. 1994. "Economic Liberalization, Real Markets and the (un)-Reality of Structural Adjustment in Rural Tanzania." **Sociologia Rurals** 39:45.
- Breitenecker, Rudiger L. 1992. "The Caribbean Basin Initiative: An Effective U.S. Trade Policy Facilitating Economic Liberalization in the Region: The Costa Rican Example." **Law and Policy in International Business** 23:913.
- Burkett, Paul. 1993. "Financial Liberalization, Development and Marketization: A Review of McKinnon's The Order of Economic Liberalization: Financial Control in the Transition to a Market Economy." **Comparative Economic Studies** 35:59.
- Chang, Chen-pang. 1992. "The Fourteenth Party Congress: Economic Liberalization Without Political Reform." **World Outlook** 1:29.
- Chaudhry, Kiren Aziz. 1994. "Economic Liberalization and the Lineages of the Rentier State." **Comparative Politics** 27:1.
- Corbridge, Stuart. 1991. "The Poverty of Planning or Planning for Poverty?: An Eye to Economic Liberalization in India, World Bank India: An Industrializing Economy in Transition. India: Poverty, Employment and Social..." **Progress in Human Geography** 15:467.
- Dias, Sriyani. 1991. "Economic Liberalization and the Development of Manufacturing in Sri Lanka." **Asian Survey** 31:613.
- "Economic Liberalization: A Move Towards the Globalization of the Thai Economy." **Bangkok Bank Monthly Review** 33:8.
- Kagatsume, Masaru. 1991. "Economic Effects of Wheat Trade Liberalization in the EC: An Economic Study." **Osaka Economic Review** 41:167.
- Khanin, G.I. 1994. "Sober Thoughts of an American Economist Ronald McKinnon, The Order of Economic Liberalization: Financial Control in the Transition to a Market Economy." **Problems of Economic Transition** 36:51.

Riker, William H. 1993. "The Economic and Political Liberalization of Socialism, The Fundamental Problem of Property Rights." **Social Philosophy and Policy** 10:79.

Tesche, Jean and Sahar Tohamy. "A Note on Economic Liberalization and Privatization in Hungary and Egypt." **Comparative Economic Studies** 36:51.

Wiseman, John A. 1992. "Economic and Political Liberalization in Africa: Complementary or Contradictory?." **Africa Today** 39:61.

#### American Political Science Review

Bahry, Donna and Brian D. Silver. 1990. "Soviet Citizen Participation on the Eve of Democratization." **American Political Science Review** 84:821-847.

Bohman, James F. 1990. "Communication, Ideology and Democratic Theory." **American Political Science Review** 84:93-109.

Ross E. Burkhart and Michael S. Lewis-Back. 1994. "Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis." **American Political Science Review** 88:903-910.

DiQuattro, Arthur. 1991. "Political Theory-Political Equality: An Essay in Democratic Theory by Charles R. Beitz." **American Political Science Review** 85:992-993.

Duch, Raymond M. 1993. "Tolerating Economic Reform; Popular Support for Transition to a Free Market in the Former Soviet Union." **American Political Science Review** 87:590-608.

Judd, Dennis R. 1993. "American Politics-Progrowth Politics: Change and governance in Houston by Robert D. Thomas and Richard W. Murray." **American Political Science Review** 87:224-225.

Klesko, George. 1992. "Political theory; Democracy and Moral Development by David L. Norton." **American Political Science Review** 86:785.

Love, Nancy S. 1994. "Political Theory- Postmodernism and Democratic Theory by Aryeh Botwinick." **American Political Science Review** 88:732.

Maxfield, Sylvia. 1993. "International Relations- Debt, Development and Democracy: Modern Political Economy and Latin America, 1965-1985 by Jeffrey A. Frieden." **American Political Science Review** 87:540-541.

McDonagh, Eileen Lorenzi. 1992. "Representative Democracy and State Building in the Progressive Era." **American Political Science Review** 86:938-950.

- Komaki, Teruo. 1992. "North Korea Inches toward Economic Liberalization." **Japan Review of International Affairs** 6:155.
- Kuznets, Paul W. 1991. "Liberalization in the Process of Economic Development." **Journal of Asian Studies** 50:890.
- Lawson, Fred H. 1992. "Economic Liberalization in Syria and Iraq During the 1980s, The Limits of Externalist Explanations." **New Political Science** 21/22:185.
- Liu, Lawrence S. 1990. "Legal and Policy Perspectives on United States Trade Initiatives and Economic liberalization in the Republic of China." **Michigan Journal of International Law** 11:326.
- Lopez, Ramon. 1994. "The Environment as a Factor of Production, The Effects of Economic Growth and Trade Liberalization." **Journal of Environmental Economics and Management** 27:163.
- Marer, Paul. 1991. "Foreign Economic Liberalization in Hungary and Poland." **American Economic Review** 81:329.
- McKinnon, Ronald I. 1990. "Financial Liberalization and Economic Development, A Reassessment of Interest-Rate Policies in Asia and Latin America." **ASEAN Economic Bulletin** 7:138.
- Moore, Clement Harry. 1994. "Economic and Political Liberalization in the Middle East." **Middle East Journal** 48:367.
- Nafziger, E. Wayne. 1993. "Debt, Adjustment and Economic Liberalization in Africa." **Journal of Economic Issues** 27:429.
- Norville, Elizabeth. 1990. "Thomas F. Cargill and Shoichi Royama, The Transition of Finance in Japan and the United States: A Comparative Perspective; Leon Hollerman, Japan Disincorporated: The Economic Liberalization Process." **Pacific Review** 3:187.
- Odling-Smee, John. 1992. "The Order of Economic Liberalization by Ronald McKinnon." **Finance and Development** 29:49.
- Onis, Ziya. 1992. "Redemocratization and Economic Liberalization in Turkey, The limits of State Autonomy." **Studies in Comparative International Development** 27:3.
- Penrose, Edith T. 1992. "Economic Liberalization: Openness and Integration- But What Kind?." **Development Policy Review** 10:237.
- "Privatization, Economic Liberalization in Latin America." 1992. **Offshore** 52:35.

Olson, Mancur. 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy and Development." **American Political Science Review** 87:567-576.

Warren, Mark. 1992. "Democratic theory and Self-Transformation." **American Political Science Review** 86:8-23.

Weaver, R. Kent. 1994. "Comparative Politics- Democracy and Development by Axel Hadenius." **American Political Science Review** 88:778-779.

#### **Public Administration Review**

deLeon, Peter. 1992. "The Democratization of the Policy Sciences." **Public Administration Review** 52:125-129.