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AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE STUDY GROUP

PN-ABT 540

DIGEST OF  
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE STUDY GROUP  
MATERIALS ON  
GENERAL APPROACH TO TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

VOLUME 5

USERS OF THIS DOCUMENT SHOULD FIRST READ THE  
ENTIRE INTRODUCTION IN VOLUME ~~2~~ THIS INTRO-  
DUCTION PROVIDES ESSENTIAL INFORMATION ON THE  
NATURE, VALUE, AND LIMITATIONS OF THE DIGEST.  
IT ALSO INCLUDES SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS CON-  
CERNING ITS DISTRIBUTION (SECTIONS E AND F).

MAY 1963

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INTRODUCTION

This document represents an organized digest of materials accumulated by the Technical Assistance Study Group of AID (TASG) through the date indicated on the cover sheet in one or more sections of the Group's research file. It is similar in form and purpose to digests which have been prepared covering data in some of the other TASG research file sections. 1/

In order to understand the nature, value, and limitations of this and the other comparable TASG digests, it is essential for a reader to be familiar with (1) the purpose, character, and history of the Technical Assistance Study Group; (2) the types of information that are contained in TASG files and the manner in which this information was collected; and (3) the purpose of, and the methods employed in compiling, these digests. This introduction is designed to provide the essential information on each of the foregoing three points. However, the introduction should also serve as a brief history of the now-defunct Technical Assistance Study Group itself. Since the nature and value of TASG digests are uniquely affected by TASG history, no one should attempt to use this digest without first carefully reading this introduction. In order to keep the body of this introduction short, there has been extensive resort to footnotes. These footnotes are collected at the end of the introduction, beginning at page 10.

A. HISTORY OF THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE STUDY GROUP

The Technical Assistance Study Group was established in the fall of 1959 as a result of a specific decision by the Under Secretary of State and the Director of the International Cooperation Administration that the Executive Branch should sponsor a major study of the entire subject of technical assistance. The study was to be in depth, was to extend over a period of 12 to 18 months, and was to be handled in accordance with sound research principles. It was to attempt to identify, and to assess the reasons for, successful and unsuccessful technical assistance activities in the U.S. bilateral program and, insofar as practicable and on a cooperative basis, to examine the comparable experience of other governments, multilateral organizations, and private institutions. Then, based upon this research and similar research which had been or was being undertaken by universities, foundations, and other private groups, the study was to endeavor (1) to isolate and evaluate the major factors which should govern the size, character, methods, techniques, and administration of future technical assistance programs until further long-term research

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could provide still more scientifically grounded guidelines and (2) to describe those areas in which such further long-term research was required.

Under the plans approved by Under Secretary Dillon and ICA Director Riddleberger, the study, while it was to receive financial, logistical, and administrative support from ICA and to capitalize on ICA technical resources, was to be conducted as an independent venture. It was to be under the full-time direction of one or two of the most competent experts who could be recruited from the private community, 2/ and the final report was to be filed with the Under Secretary of State, and probably be made available to the public. It was also anticipated that the study director would wish to employ a substantial number of outside consultants either as advisers or to undertake specific studies. ICA was to provide a small supporting staff primarily to furnish administrative and logistical support and to facilitate contacts with, and the collection of information from, ICA personnel. Although final determinations as to methodology were to be the prerogative of the study director when he was selected, it was thought he would wish to use a combination of techniques, including field studies, contracts, interviews, etc. 3/

In anticipation of the early selection of a director, the Technical Assistance Study Group was established in the early fall of 1959 as a formal ICA organizational entity. In addition, a small ad hoc ICA staff was assembled during the fall and winter so that the director would have competent staff support as soon as he assumed office. Unfortunately, however, a study director was never successfully recruited. After great initial enthusiasm, top officials of the aid agency and of the Department of State apparently lost interest in the study, and their recruiting efforts, desultory and sporadic even at the outset, gradually completely petered out. For this reason, and also because the establishment of a permanent AID research office greatly reduced the need therefor, the idea of a full-scale independent study of technical assistance was completely abandoned some two and a half years after it was first conceived. 4/

Meanwhile, during these thirty months of indecision, the small ad hoc ICA support group which had been assembled at the very outset was held together in the continuing expectation of the momentary arrival of a study director. Since this digest and other similar ones reflect the efforts of this staff to occupy itself constructively during this long period of uncertainty and waiting, it is important to describe this staff, assess its capabilities, and summarize its work.

At its peak the TASG support staff consisted of seven professional employees. These individuals had been selected with considerable care from the standpoint of having a group which could collectively

provide various types of administrative, logistical, and technical support to a study director and the large number of outside professionals whom he was expected to assemble. Six had served extensively with ICA and predecessor agencies overseas, as well as in headquarters assignments. Their aggregate field experience exceeded forty years and included one or more tours of duty in eleven different less developed countries. <sup>5/</sup> Four individuals were program personnel, one was a training officer, one an executive officer, and one a former mission director and agricultural technician. <sup>6/</sup> However, in spite of these varied capabilities, the group had not been chosen with a view to undertaking independent studies of its own. Its members were almost wholly without experience in social science research, and they possessed little academic background in the various disciplines most required for the study contemplated.

Other considerations besides staff capabilities circumscribed the group's activities. Nothing could be done that might prejudice the future director's freedom of choice as to methodology. Similarly, no expenditures could be made except those that would clearly be consistent with any approach that might subsequently be adopted. Given these circumstances, the group largely limited its work to the following basic endeavors:

(1) The preparation of a tentative outline covering the issues which required examination either as part of the study or as part of a continuing research program. <sup>7/</sup>

(2) The interviewing of individuals familiar with technical assistance and the recording, sorting, and filing of such interviews in the fashion described in more detail at a subsequent point in this introduction.

(3) The collection, sorting, digesting, and filing of some of the currently available literature on technical assistance.

(4) The preparation of summaries or digests of the materials which had accumulated in certain files as a result of the activities specified in (2) and (3) above, a process described more fully below.

In addition to the foregoing strictly TASG activities, individual members of the group were repeatedly called upon to undertake temporary assignments elsewhere in the agency or to perform special tasks that drew upon the data which had been gathered by the group. During calendar year 1961 such temporary assignments and special tasks probably consumed fifty per cent of the staff's time. <sup>8/</sup>

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B. DESCRIPTION OF THE INTERVIEW PROCESS EMPLOYED BY THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE STUDY GROUP

The Study Group conducted, and prepared reports on, approximately 1,000 interviews involving an estimated 1,100 separate individuals. 9/ These individuals may be very roughly categorized as follows: 350 ICA technicians who were returning for home leave from an overseas assignment; 200 ICA employees who were returning for home leave or for consultation from positions overseas as mission directors, deputy mission directors, training officers, executive officers, and administrative officers; 200 employees of participating agencies; 200 individuals employed in ICA/W (AID/W), many of whom had previously served overseas in technical or non-technical capacities; 100 individuals associated with U.S. organizations other than the U.S. government - foundations, universities, voluntary organizations, other governments, or foreign private organizations. The aggregate overseas experience of the American personnel interviewed probably exceeds 4,000 man-years. Most of such experience was in some form of foreign aid activity in less developed countries.

Most interviews ran for upward of two hours, and not infrequently they consumed as much as half a day. They were not structured in nature and everyone interviewed was encouraged to speak at such length as he wished on any aspects of technical assistance on which he felt that he could contribute valuable personal experience or useful opinions. The focus was as much on getting people to identify the problems which they thought were important as on obtaining their views on a series of predetermined issues. However, some effort was made with certain classes of those interviewed to cover a series of selected general topics. 10/

Due to circumstances such as the foregoing, and because the specific backgrounds and overseas experiences of those interviewed differed so markedly, there were tremendous differences in the emphasis and substantive coverage of the various interviews. At this point it is also appropriate to re-emphasize that no one on the TASG staff was professionally skilled in social science research methods or had had any prior experience in using scientific interviewing techniques or in the evaluation and analysis of materials produced through interviews. These observations must be kept in mind by anyone who has recourse to TASG files or who examines a digest based thereon.

Records of each interview (and most of the other materials collected by TASG) were filed in accordance with a rather elaborate system of multiple-filing which is described in a footnote. 11/ In most instances a complete copy of each interview was placed in four separate locations, and one or more additional copies were "cut up" and filed on a functional or topical basis. 12/ The quantities of materials

contained in, and the internal complexities of, the several different major file sections vary enormously. One section may consist of only a single folder and this folder may contain only a few items. Another section may have as many as a hundred separate subsections, each represented by one or more folders, and it may occupy an entire filing cabinet.

Each member of the TASG staff was assigned the following responsibilities: (a) to look at all aspects of technical assistance from the standpoint of one of the major geographic areas; (b) to examine technical assistance as it relates to one or two technical fields (e.g., public health and agriculture); (c) to cover several general problems of technical assistance which are not limited to any geographic area or any technical field (e.g., participant training); and (d) to study all of the technical assistance provided through one or more of the major non-U.S.-Government channels for extending aid (e.g., multilateral institutions, foundations, voluntary agencies). Assignment of responsibility for a subject carried with it responsibility for overseeing and digesting the files covering that subject. Moreover, in the case of a geographic area or a technical field, the assignment of responsibility included responsibility on the part of the individual concerned to emphasize that area or technical field in his interviews. 8/

C. DESCRIPTION OF THE DIGESTS OR SUMMARIES PREPARED BY THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE STUDY GROUP

It is of the utmost importance that users have a clear understanding of the purposes, nature, and method of preparation of the digests or summaries which have been made of the materials contained in certain TASG files. Each had as its primary, if not always its exclusive, purpose the organized, factual, item-by-item summarization of the specific materials which, as a result of the filing processes described above and in footnotes, had found their way into a particular file or group of related files. The digest was meant to be only descriptive and, except as the orderly arrangement of materials under logical headings and subheadings had this effect, was not intended to provide an analysis of the subject covered. Moreover, no effort was made in the digest to evaluate the materials summarized. Although the name, and usually some of the relevant work experience, of the person who was the source of each item digested were given, no comment was made on the person's reliability as a witness, or on the value of, or the weight to be accorded to, his views. 13/

The status of the summarization at the time that the Technical Assistance Study Group was dissolved is described in a footnote. <sup>14/</sup> The value and quality of the individual digests vary enormously. The early digests are largely of an experimental nature, and each of them covers only a portion (which sometimes is not representative) of the total volume of materials which has eventually accumulated in the file to which the digest relates. The later digests, in addition to summarizing all or most of the data finally placed in the files specifically briefed, in many instances include summaries of pertinent materials to be found in other related TASG files. The increasing tendency to cover appropriate portions of related files reflected the growing conclusion of the group that the file divisions originally established were not entirely satisfactory as well as a belief that it was useful to synthesize all the materials on progressively larger segments of the total subject.

Except in the field of personnel, in which some members of the group became involved in special projects, there was no opportunity for TASG to follow its digest activities with the logical next steps. These next steps would have been the analysis and evaluation of all the materials collected in order (a) to determine what, if any, conclusions could properly be drawn therefrom and (b) to identify the questions (of which there would be many) on which further study or research was required.

#### D. LIMITED DISTRIBUTION OF TASG MATERIALS, INCLUDING TASG DIGESTS

In reviewing its digests for release and in making available its file materials for general use TASG has been faced with a difficult non-security problem as well as with the normal problems of security classification. The nature of this non-security problem requires some elaboration. It arises from the fact that TASG, in order to obtain the frank and uninhibited views of those interviewed, was obliged to assure the latter that any confidences would be respected. Those interviewed were told that the views expressed and the information provided would be employed solely for purposes of research and that anything said by them which might be construed as a confidence or as otherwise privileged would not be made available to those outside the research community in a form which would permit the identification of its source. These commitments must, of course, be honored. The ability of the government properly to assess its own operations and to improve these operations by a careful examination of weaknesses and failures, as well as of strengths and successes, depends upon its ability and readiness to maintain the integrity of an interview process of the type employed by TASG.

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For the foregoing reasons all TASG interviews and all TASG research files have been marked "Limit Distribution to TASG Only." For this same reason, access to these interviews and files has been limited (1) to TASG personnel and (2) to other individuals who were both (a) engaged in legitimate research and (b) prepared to employ the materials in conformity with the foregoing assurances and in accordance with such specific safeguards as TASG might prescribe. These restrictions must continue to apply for some years in the future since many of those interviewed, and many of those criticized in the interviews, will continue to be employees of the foreign aid organization or will remain members of other organizations which might be embarrassed by, or react unfavorably to, some of the views expressed in confidence to TASG by their subordinates (e.g., United Nations Resident Representatives). Although perhaps 95 per cent of the materials in TASG files involve no confidences of any kind, the separation of such materials from the privileged materials represents a physically impossible task.

The foregoing problem has proved particularly troublesome in connection with the handling of this and other digests. As earlier indicated, the digests were originally prepared exclusively for internal TASG use. They were viewed as but an intermediate step in a research process in which other steps would follow, and their sole purpose was to provide TASG with an orderly and systematic method for getting control of, organizing, and factually describing the contents of, its rapidly growing research files. With these considerations in mind, and believing that each comment digested could subsequently be more readily appraised if its source were indicated, the digests uniformly included the name and experience of the individual whose interview was the basis of each digest item. Unfortunately, for the reasons indicated elsewhere in this introduction, the technical assistance study was abandoned before the digests could be put to their intended use, and this development forced a reconsideration of possible broader uses of these digests than was originally contemplated. The value of some of them was such that their non-availability for more general use in improving AID operations and training would represent a serious loss, and yet it remained imperative that sources should be protected in the case of items that derived from privileged communications.

In an effort to resolve the foregoing dilemma each digest was separately reviewed to determine whether it would be possible, consistent with the assurances given to those interviewed, to release it in either its original or a revised form. This review indicated that the digests fell into the following two categories:

- (1) Those which contained so many privileged communications that their deletion or the removal of source identification would involve an amount of work that would be disproportionate

to the additional value of making the digests available for more general use. Among digests in this class were the following: The Quality of Present ICA Personnel (TECH-IMP(16)); Purposes of Technical Assistance (PUR); Industry (ITECH(6)IND); Organization (ORG); Management and Administration (MANA); and Agriculture (ITECH(1)AGR). All copies of these digests have therefore been retained in TASG research files. They will be available exclusively for research use under proper safeguards by selected individuals, and normally only by individuals who are not employed by AID.

(2) Those which either (a) contained no materials which, in their digested form, appeared to violate the assurances given to those interviewed or (b) contained so few privileged communications that it was practical to delete them or to remove their source identifications. Among the digests in this class were the following: Contracts (CON); University Contracts (UCON); Education (ITECH(4)EDUC); Forms of Donor-Host Government Operational Relationships (REL(0), (1), (2), (3), (4), (8)); Promotion of the English Language (GA(20e)); Qualities Required in Technicians (TECH-T(2a)); The Importance of Foreign Language Capability for a Technician (TECH-T(2f)); Training and Orientation of Personnel for Overseas Service (TECH-IMP(3)); Follow-Up on Returned Participants (PART-T(15)); Selection of Participants and Required Qualifications for Participants (PART-T(8) and PART-IMP(1a)); Kinds of Training (PART-T(3)); Length of Training (PART-T(4)); Content, Emphasis, and Techniques of Training (PART-T(5)); Emphasis on Communication in Training (PART-T(6)); Participants - General (PART(0)); Techniques of Participant Training - General (PART-T(0)); Third Country Training (PART-T(2)); and General Approach (GA). In their original form, or revised to eliminate privileged references, some copies of certain of the foregoing digests have been or are being distributed to selected offices in AID, and other copies are being retained in TASG files for reference use by those having a legitimate interest therein and possessing the requisite security clearances.

It is quite possible that in reviewing the literally thousands of items which are contained in those digests which fall in the latter category some items which should have been excluded as privileged were overlooked and retained in the final documents. Moreover, as a result of (a) faulty initial reporting of interviews, (b) the inaccurate summarization of materials contained therein in preparing the digests, and (c) clerical errors, the views of some individuals on certain subjects are undoubtedly misrepresented in the digests. In either case, it is hoped that the individuals whose views are improperly included or inaccurately reported will recognize that the mistake was inadvertent and will appreciate that it was an unavoidable consequence of efforts to salvage something which might be of value in improving the foreign aid

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program from the aborted work of the Technical Assistance Study Group. However, because of these dangers, and in deference to any such individuals, the distribution and availability of digests falling in the second category should be limited to those in AID who have a need to know their contents as part of their official work and those who are engaged in research which furthers the interests of AID.

In the event that a wider use of this or any other digest in the second category should become desirable, it would be possible, by eliminating all source identifications and by deleting certain sensitive items, to prepare an edited version that could receive general distribution.

#### E. CLASSIFICATION OF TASG DIGESTS

A few TASG digests are classified "Confidential" or "Secret" and a few are completely unclassified. However, the largest number have been classified "Limited Official Use." There are two reasons. First, some of the individual items included therein require such classification due to their privileged source or substantive content. Second, some digests, or certain sections thereof, when considered as a whole, might, if released, cause offense to a foreign government or people. In many instances, moreover, individuals whose opinions are cited continue to be accredited to governments whose policies, practices, and personalities are criticized or discussed in these opinions.

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Footnotes to Introduction

1/ See footnote 1<sup>4</sup> for a complete listing of all TASG digests.

2/ The high quality of the expert who was desired to head the program is illustrated by the following individuals who were among those actually approached or considered for this role: Professors Edward Mason and Clyde Kluckhohn of Harvard University; Professor Theodore Schultz of the University of Chicago; John Gardner, President of the Carnegie Corporation; Clark Kerr, Chancellor of the University of California; and Professors Emile Despres and Vincent Barnett of Williams College.

3/ The purposes of, and plans for, the study are described in much greater detail in the following documents: The President's Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program for the First Half of Fiscal Year 1960 (pp. 41-45); A Proposed Outline for the Study of Technical Assistance to Less Developed Countries, dated February 22, 1960 (Parts I and III, pp. 3-9 and 139-47); memorandum from James P. Grant, ICA Deputy Director for Program and Planning, to John O. Bell, dated August 13, 1959 and entitled "Technical Assistance Review"; memorandum from John O. Bell to the Under Secretary of State, dated December 14, 1960 and entitled "Proposed Study of Technical Assistance"; memorandum from John Ohly to Dr. Edward Fei, dated January 30, 1962 and entitled "The Technical Assistance Study Group."

4/ A partial documentary history of the unsuccessful efforts to launch the study, including a description of the futile efforts to find a director, is to be found in: (a) the various memoranda forwarded by Mr. James Grant, Deputy Director for Program and Planning of ICA (or members of the ad hoc staff of the Study Group) to Mr. John Bell, Deputy Coordinator of the Mutual Security Program, on this subject (e.g., memorandum dated September 14, 1959 and entitled "Proposed ICA Study of Technical Assistance"; six memoranda entitled "Technical Assistance Study - Selection of Director" and dated respectively September 30, 1959, November 13, 1959, December 3, 1959, January 13, 1960, March 10, 1960, and March 23, 1960; memorandum dated March 1, 1960 and entitled "Selection of a Director for the Technical Assistance Study Group, ICA"; three memoranda dated June 6, 1960, June 13, 1960 and November 8, 1960 and entitled "Technical Assistance Study"); (b) a memorandum from Mr. John Bell to the Under Secretary of State, dated December 14, 1960 and entitled "Proposed Study of Technical Assistance"; and (c) a memorandum from Mr. Ohly to Dr. Edward Fei, dated January 30, 1962 and entitled "The Technical Assistance Study Group."

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5/ Countries in which some members of the group had served one or more full tours were: Brazil, India, Ceylon, Nepal, Ethiopia, Tunisia, Egypt, Indonesia, Burma, Japan, and the Philippines.

6/ Program personnel were: Julean Arnold, Carl Fritz, Karl Mathiasen, and John Ohly. The training officer was John Stabler and the executive officer Ralph Eyster. Paul Rose, the final member, had been ICA Mission Director in Nepal from 1954 to 1958.

7/ This outline, entitled "A Proposed Outline for the Study of Technical Assistance to Less Developed Countries" and dated February 22, 1960, was reproduced in quantity and distributed widely within ICA, in the academic and foundation communities, and to other governments and multilateral institutions.

8/ Some idea of the group's regular activities and of the duties of each staff member may be gained by examining a TASG staff memorandum dated February 4, 1960 and entitled "TASG - Tentative Initial Staff Assignments and Work Program." (There were some subsequent reallocations of duties to provide a better distribution of the workload and to reflect Mr. Rose's addition to the staff. These reallocations included the transfer of responsibility for community development (ITECH(3)CD), communications media (ITECH(2)CM), and Soviet Bloc technical assistance (CHAN(1b)) to Mr. Rose, and of responsibility for agriculture (ITECH(1)AGR) and for forms of organizational relationships between a donor and host government (REL) to Mr. Fritz.) Special related assignments undertaken by members of the group included the following: (1) the preparation of two reports for the Presidential Task Force on Foreign Aid, one on "Systems of Operation in Technical Assistance" and the other on "Organization for Foreign Aid - The Problem Viewed in Perspective"; (2) the analysis, at the request of ICA's Deputy Director for Operations, of the effectiveness of the first sessions of the African training program which was being conducted by Boston University under contract with ICA; (3) the conduct, at the request of the Director of Personnel and with the help of added special staff, of a study which resulted in a report dated March 19, 1962 and entitled "Report and Recommendations of the Task Force on Recruitment, Screening, and Selection for the Agency for International Development"; (4) service as staff for the AID Task Force on Training and Orientation, an activity which resulted in the report entitled "Training for AID" and dated October 1961; (5) participation in, and advice to, various task forces and committees on participant training; (6) the preparation, at the request of ICA's Deputy Director for Operations, of a report covering the thinking of ICA personnel, as reflected in the interviews, on certain major aspects of participant training; (7) the conduct of a study on the role of other federal agencies ("the participating agencies") in the planning and implementation of foreign aid programs, a study which culminated in a report dated July 23, 1962 to the Administrator of AID on "The Mobilization of Federal Resources in

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Support of the Foreign Aid Program"; (8) participation in the work of the International Committee of the Federal Council for Science and Technology, including preparation of a report for that committee dated April 18, 1961 and entitled "Technological Potential and Capacity as a Factor in Technical Assistance."

9/ These numbers include the special interviews conducted during a special study of participating agencies. However, they do not include the large number of interviews that were conducted in carrying out certain other special non-TASG activities with which certain members of the group were involved and which are described in the immediately preceding footnote.

10/ Each homecoming ICA employee was furnished, prior to his interview, with a memorandum which described the purposes of the technical assistance study and contained a list of suggested general topics for coverage during the interview (memorandum dated March 10, 1960 and entitled "Interview with Members of Technical Assistance Study Group"). Moreover, each member of TASG had a checklist of suggested interview questions (memorandum to TASG staff dated April 7, 1960 and entitled "Checklist of Suggested Interview Questions," together with two attachments thereto).

11/ The organization of the TASG research file and the system employed in filing materials therein are described in detail in a memorandum which is dated April 7, 1960 and entitled "TASG - Master Research File" and in the several attachments thereto. The major sections of the master research file are the following (the letters in parentheses following each section heading represent the symbol used in TASG to designate the section):

- Purposes of Technical Assistance (PUR)
- Nature of the Problems (NP)
- General Approach (GA)
- Methods of Operation (MO)
- Technicians (TECH)
- Participants (PART)
- Supplying Materials (SUP)
- Contracts (CON)
- University Contracts (UCON)
- Miscellaneous Methods of Operation (MISC)
- Projects (PROJ)
- Aid Channels (CHAN)
- Donor-Host Government Operational Relations (REL)
- Special Groups (SPG)
- Individual Technical Fields and Occupational Categories (ITECH)
- Indigenous Capacity (INDIG)
- Dependence of Technical Assistance on Other Resources (DEP)
- Comparative Costs (COCO)

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Collateral Effects of Technical Assistance (COLIA)  
Capabilities, Limitations, and Effects of Technical Assistance (CAPA)  
Programming of Technical Assistance (PROG)  
Program Execution (EXEC)  
Organization for Technical Assistance (ORG)  
Management and Administration (MANA)  
Research and Evaluation (RES)  
Special Technical Assistance Problems (SPROB)  
General Summary Questions (GEN)  
Methodology (METH)  
Interviews (INTER)  
Geographic Files (Regional and Country)

12/ A complete copy of each interview was placed in each of the following four locations insofar as this was appropriate: (a) a TASG file which is designated "Interviews" (symbol: "INTER") and which contains copies of all TASG interviews arranged alphabetically; (b) one of the bound volumes which include the original set of all the interviews conducted by the TASG interviewer involved (all of these volumes are assembled at one point in TASG files); (c) a country (or regional) folder which contains copies of all the interview and other materials collected by TASG that pertain to that country (or region); and (d) a technical field folder or an occupational category folder (always beginning with the symbol "ITECH") which contains a complete set of the interviews with all individuals who are experts in that particular technical field or who fall in that occupational category (agriculture and public health are representative technical fields; executive officer, program officer, and mission director are typical occupational categories).

13/ Summaries prepared by Mr. Rose in the field of community development represent something of an exception to the generalizations about the character of the digests. It should also be added that some of the digests, and particularly the later ones, were either preceded by an introduction or accompanied by a separate memorandum which analyzed, or gave the views of the compiler on, his product.

14/ The following is a description of the general status of file summarization when TASG was liquidated:

(1) Country files. With one minor unimportant experimental exception (Peru), no country files were summarized by the group. Moreover, except possibly in the cases of a few countries (e.g., Iran, India, Pakistan), the volume of interview material which has accumulated in any one of the more than 75 individual country folders is so scanty that its summarization would have only limited value and probably not be worth the effort which it would involve. However, if end-of-tour reports, which are often very numerous, were to be fully covered in country digests, one might reach a contrary conclusion.

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(2) Technical field files. Digests of one sort or another were prepared covering TASG files on agriculture (ITECH(1)AGR), education (ITECH(4)EDUC), industry (ITECH(6)IND), housing (ITECH(5)HOUS), community development (ITECH(3)CD), social welfare (ITECH(15)SOC), and advice on planning and on economic matters (ITECH(12)ECON; MISC(4)ADPL; MISC(5)ADEC). Of these digests only those on education (dated December 31, 1961), community development (prepared in segments in late 1962 and early 1963), and industry (covering materials filed through July 24, 1961) begin to cover the full amount of materials which finally accumulated in the folders in these several fields, and each of these has certain unique characteristics or definite limitations which should be mentioned. The digest on education suffers somewhat because much of the material in the file is incorporated in full in the summary, rather than digested; that on community development deviates radically from all the other digests by including very extensive narrative analyses and commentaries on the subject, as well as lengthy expositions by the compiler (Mr. Rose), based on his studies of the filed materials (much of it non-interview in character), of his own views on various aspects of community development; and the one on industry is of dubious worth because of the limited value and highly variegated nature of the materials which found their way into the industry file itself. The summaries on social welfare and housing were early experimental ones that were based largely on non-interview materials. They were completed respectively on September 23, 1960 and November 15, 1960; however, the quantities of material that have since accumulated in these files are so small as probably to make unwarranted the preparation of re-summaries. The digest pertaining to advice on development planning and economic advice was completed on April 1, 1961 and Mr. Arnold, the digester, feels that it should be brought up to date. The agricultural summary was also completed in April 1961, but it did not by any means represent a full coverage of the materials available in agricultural files even at that date. Mr. Fritz, its compiler, feels that a new up-to-date and quite differently structured summary would be valuable and he has expressed his views in this regard in section I of his memorandum of January 4, 1962 entitled "Present Status of Some of the TASG Materials for Which I Have Been Responsible." In other occupational fields, no summarizations were attempted. However, Mr. Fritz, in a memorandum entitled "Summary of Points Raised in the Field of Labor as of June 22, 1960," identified a series of 103 problems in the labor field which he felt required examination as a result of his review of the limited materials (largely of an interview nature) which had accumulated up to that time. It is his view that a digest of the labor file (ITECH(7)LAB) might now be desirable (see his memorandum of January 4, 1962, referred to above). The files on public health (ITECH(9)PH) and public administration (ITECH(8)PA) are the only other technical field files that may contain enough material to justify digesting.

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(3) Functional files. A considerable number of the functional files have been digested although large gaps in coverage still remain. There is completely up-to-date or reasonably up-to-date digest coverage of all file materials in files on the following subjects: the purposes of technical assistance (PUR) (materials as of October 31, 1961); general approach (GA) (materials as of December 1962); the use of contracts as a method of operation in technical assistance (CON) (materials as of December 15, 1961); the use of university contracts as a technique in extending technical assistance (UCON) (completed April 1, 1962); donor-donee operational relationships and mechanisms (REL) (completed in December 1961); and management and administration (MANA) (materials as of December 1, 1961). Major up-to-date digests also exist in the case of two of the most voluminous and most important files on personnel - those on the qualities required for personnel in overseas service (TECH-T(2a)) (materials as of February 1962) and on training and orientation for overseas service (TECH-IMP(3)) (materials as of August 1961). Both of the latter are supplemented by summaries of other related special studies and both of them provided a significant portion of the evidence which was used in preparing major reports in these two areas. Most of the other personnel files (TECH-T and TECH-IMP series) have not been digested at all, although there are summaries which cover the early materials collected on the following two subjects: the importance of foreign language capability for a technician (TECH-T(2f)) (completed in March 1961) and the quality of present ICA personnel (TECH-IMP(16)) (completed in May 1961). In addition, although not digested, the materials which had accumulated as of March 1961 in several files dealing with the effect of certain special factors on a technician's capabilities have been internally organized with great care and elaborately tabbed. These files include those on age (TECH-T(2b)); sex (TECH-T(2c)); possession of academic degrees, prestige, or eminence (TECH-T(2d)); and race and creed (TECH-T(2e)).

A considerable number, perhaps a majority, of the main files on participant training (PART) were digested at one time or another, but most of the digests are out of date and do not cover some six to twelve months' accumulation of new materials. The principal digests in this field are the following: (i) selection of participants and required qualifications in participants (PART-T(8) and PART-IMP(1a)) (completed September 6, 1961); (ii) the duties of a training officer and his proper position within the USOM organization (PART-IMP(8o)) (materials as of approximately December 1960); (iii) the value of participant training and the comparative value of participant training and local training (PART(0)) (dated March 13, 1961); (iv) third country training (PART-T(2)) (dated March 13, 1961); (v) kinds of training

(PART-T(3)) (dated July 14, 1961); (vi) length of training (PART-T(4)) (dated July 17, 1961); (vii) content, emphasis, and techniques in training (PART-T(5)) (dated July 17, 1961); (viii) emphasis on communication in training program (PART-T(6)) (dated July 17, 1961); (ix) follow-up on returned participants (PART-T(15)) (completed May 11, 1961).

The only other digests prepared by the group are the early one on the emphasis to be given to the promotion of the English language (GA(20e)) and the several early ones on the following organizational areas: U.S. organization for the extension of technical assistance (ORG-U.S. and ORG-REL) (completed in two parts respectively on February 24, 1961 and March 21, 1961) and organizational problems of aid recipients (ORG-REC) (dated May 1, 1961). No digests have been completed of the materials in any of the rather voluminous files on aid channels (CHAN), although Mr. Arnold, prior to his reassignment, had completed much of the work for digests covering the files on (i) multilateral organizations as aid donors (CHAN(1c)), (ii) the comparative advantages and disadvantages of multilateral and bilateral channels of aid (CHAN(2) and (2a)), and (iii) the problem of coordinating the technical assistance activities of multiple aid donors (ORG-REL-INTL). Similarly, but this is of lesser consequence since the materials involved are not so extensive or tend to be duplicated in other files, there are no summaries covering data in the files on research and evaluation (RES), programming (PROG), the nature of the problems (NP), projects (PROJ), technical assistance to special groups (SPG), execution (EXEC), and other miscellaneous subjects. However, certain materials in some of the files mentioned in the preceding sentence have been summarized in the digest on general approach (GA), along with significant portions of the materials in the also not as yet separately digested files on aid to dependent overseas territories (SPROB-DOT), termination of aid (SPROB-TERM), initiating an aid program in a new country (SPROB-NEW), indigenous capacity (INDIG), dependence of effective technical assistance on other non-technical assistance resources (DEP), and capabilities, limitations, and effects of technical assistance (CAPA).

P

TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR SECTION XPage

## Adaptation of Approach and Techniques to the Local Culture

A. The Essentiality of Adapting Approach and Techniques to the Local Culture -----	1
1. Suggested general principle -----	1
a. General comments -----	1
b. Comments expressed in terms of specific illustrations -----	7
2. Suggested corollary propositions -----	12
a. The variations in conditions among countries make it necessary to tailor-make the general approach and techniques applied in each country to the peculiar conditions existing therein. -----	12
b. An individual technician may have to make some accommodation in his personal habits to local culture in order to be effective. -----	19
c. USOM organization, facilities, and work practices, and customary procedures for extending assistance, may need to be adapted to the particular conditions existing in a specific culture. -----	19
3. Suggested caveats to general principle -----	20
a. Although adaptation is necessary, there may be a danger of a donor's overadjusting his approach to local cultural conditions. -----	20
b. Sometimes the differences between cultures may be more apparent than real. -----	21

Page

4.	Donors have frequently violated the foregoing suggested principle and its corollaries. Such violations may have been partly due to a failure by donors to make an adequate analysis of the local culture and to their consequent lack of the knowledge necessary to adapt their programs properly. -----	21
a.	General comments -----	21
b.	Specific illustrations -----	24
B.	Technical Assistance, Although It Must Be Adapted to the Local Culture, Must at the Same Time Result in Basic Changes Therein. -----	26
1.	Suggested general principle -----	26
2.	Possible corollaries to the suggested general principle --	31
a.	There may be some elements of a local culture which cannot be changed (or changed rapidly) and which should be accepted as premises in designing an approach. -----	31
b.	A donor should be discriminating in determining what elements of a local culture require change as a precondition to development and should not endeavor to change those elements which do not need to be changed. -----	32
c.	A donor's approach should recognize that many of the changes necessary can only be achieved slowly. ----	33
d.	When basic changes in the local culture are necessary for development or technological advancement such changes should be effected within the local cultural framework. Where possible a donor should build upon, or seek to change, existing institutions rather than to introduce entirely new institutions. -----	35
e.	Local cultural factors should be utilized to the maximum to support rational solution to local problems. -----	38

	<u>Page</u>
C. Non-Transplantability Without Adaptation to Another Culture of Foreign Institutions and Solutions to Problems -----	39
1. Suggested general principle -----	39
a. As applied to U.S. concepts, institutions, methods, solutions, and answers -----	39
b. As applied to concepts, institutions, methods, solu- tions, or answers which were successful in the European aid program -----	51
c. As applied to concepts, institutions, methods, solu- tions, or answers which were successful in other less developed countries -----	52
2. Possible corollaries to the suggested general prin- ciple -----	53
a. Preconceived donor solutions -----	53
b. Adaptation of donor materials -----	54
c. Possible greater applicability or adaptability of non-U.S. solutions -----	55
d. Acceptance of solutions unpalatable to the donor ----	56
e. Possible applicability of past U.S. experience -----	56
f. Possible applicability of donor's experience in dealing with tribal and other special groups in the donor country -----	57
g. Possible non-applicability of U.S. criteria in measuring progress -----	57
3. Implications of the suggested general principle and its possible corollaries to the design of specific approaches and techniques for the solution of problems in other societies -----	58
a. A donor should help the locals to solve their problems in their own way. -----	58

	<u>Page</u>
b. A donor should help the locals to make their own decisions by showing them alternative approaches, recounting past experience, presenting and analyzing problems, and other like techniques. ----	59
c. Foreign institutions, concepts, solutions to problems, etc., are much more likely to be locally acceptable if they are made to "look local." -----	59
d. Adaptation of foreign solutions, materials, etc., should be done by or with the locals. -----	60
4. Donors have repeatedly violated the suggested general principle and its corollaries, seeking to impose, or to transplant without adaptation, U.S. and other foreign institutions, concepts, methods, and solutions to problems. -----	60

## X.

## ADAPTATION OF APPROACH AND TECHNIQUES TO THE LOCAL CULTURE

## A. THE ESSENTIALITY OF ADAPTING APPROACH AND TECHNIQUES TO THE LOCAL CULTURE (see also X-C)

1. Suggested general principle: The approach and techniques employed in any country should take into account, reflect, and be fully adapted to, the local political, economic, social, and cultural environment. This principle is equally applicable to the design of a program, to the approach employed in its implementation, and to the techniques, approach, and attitudes of the foreign technicians involved.

a. General comments

Campbell (W-23) (O/PH; Brazil) (R-1) - Culture in which we are working is an important element affecting the program. Programs require adaptation in the light of the value system and its social setting. (GA(8))

Lawson (W-15) (O/PAD; Korea) - Social and economic environment is critical element in developing a program. Usually disregarded. (GA(8))

Sadler/Dilts (W-10) (O/IND; Brazil - O/IND) - Programs should be related closely to local cultural factors. (GA(8))

Harmon (T-14) (Iran - CD; Iraq) (R-4) - Adequate allowance must be made for existing cultural framework. (GA(8))

Brown (NT-23) (Libya - D; Iraq) (O-1) - Must understand, and take into account, social and cultural limitations of country when framing an approach to its development problems. (GA(8))

Shook (T-16) (Afghanistan - Transp.) (R-5) - Must frame approach in light of an understanding of the cultural absorptive capacity of the local people, a capacity which is often limited. (GA(8))

Mahony (T-21) (Oceania - Anthropol.) - Essential to adapt approach and program to local culture. (GA(8))

Ruffner (W-11-A) (O/ED; India) - Something like an education system must be integrated into, and become an organic part of, life of country. We must take into account indigenous and technical capabilities to support an educational system and the political, social, and religious factors that may dictate certain features of the system. (GA(8))

Thibodeaux (NT-28) (Japan - D) (O-1) - Precise technical assistance program to be undertaken should be carefully formulated within framework of the general economic, sociological, and institutional analysis of a country which is needed. (GA(8))

Bernstein (NT-18) (Nigeria - D) (R-1) - Should start with human product that we find and determine the end product that one wants - possessing certain qualities and capable of doing certain things - and then try to work out the most imaginative approach. Problem is that of developing a system that will accomplish the desired results in a particular environment. (E.g., in Nigeria, 80,000 teachers are needed and present procedures meet only 5% of requirements. How in the particular environment does one bridge the gap?) (GA(8))

Andrews (P/US-7-A) (Michigan State) - In each country we should determine what kind of structure will best operate in the particular environment which is involved, examining our experience elsewhere but not assuming that methods which worked one place will be uniformly effective elsewhere....(P/US-7-D) - Essential to adapt solutions (programs) to local economic, political, and cultural situation, our successes and failures being partially correlatable to past observance or disregard of this principle. (GA(8))

Groves (NT-34) (Paraguay - D; Brazil) (R-2) - Plan for a country should be based on a real evaluation of its present and future needs. (GA(8))

Muller (NT-26) (Somalia - D; Nepal - DD; Oceania) - Programs and approach should recognize the existence of and the necessity for dealing with various social attitudes. (GA(8))

Brink (T-6) (Libya - Ag. Exten.; NEF) (R-5) - Must make certain that any activity fits into the general cultural framework because no activity will succeed if it clashes with local cultural patterns. Are the things contemplated adaptable to conditions as they exist? (GA(8))

Grossman (NT-70) (India - Prog.) (R-3) - Programs should be adapted to local conditions. (GA(8))

Howe (NT-76) (Vietnam - Prog.; ICA/W) (R-2) - Need to adapt projects to local cultural setting and point of view, (e.g., Vietnamese attitude toward private investment). (GA(8))

Moyer (NT-66) (Korea - D; O/FE - D; Taiwan - D) (R-1) - Essential to find a way to deal with face as it expresses itself in each individual culture. (GA(0))

Berenson (NT-17-D) (Libya - D; Yugoslavia - D) (R-1) - Should furnish kind of education appropriate for the local environment, keeping in mind that dangers of educating people inappropriately are just as great as those of not educating at all....In general this means practical, rather than academic, training. (GA(5b))

Sales (NT-82) (Africa Survey; Morocco - Prog.; ICA/W) (R-4) - Emphasizes great importance of gaining real understanding of culture and peoples in an area in designing an approach. Discusses tremendous differences between Africa and Asia and their possible bearing on approach. (GA(8))

Nelson (NT-78) (Lebanon - D; ICA/W; Jordan - D) (R-1) - Since each culture has its individual peculiarities, each should be studied, understood, and taken into account in designing programs. Failure to observe this rule and its corollaries will prevent our getting inside of the local culture and its institutions. (GA(8))

Caldwell (M-47-A) (HEW) - Must understand, and adapt our approach to, basic elements in individual local educational systems. (GA(8))

Kitchen (NT-46) (Sudan - D; Liberia) (R-2) - Knowledge of cultural factors indispensable in development of sensible programs and programs should reflect these factors. (GA(8))

Hickey (P/US-24) (Vietnam - Michigan PA Contract) - Recognition that from an economic or sociological standpoint a country may be divided into a number of distinct and very different areas. (GA(8))

Roach (NT-49) (Ceylon - D; Spain; Greece) (R-2) - Essential to understand, and to adapt techniques to, the local culture. Must understand motivations of a culture and what values an individual attaches to various things, such as economic development or development of one's individual skills. Key question in technical assistance is how to communicate skills in a way that takes into account local values. (GA(8))

Mattusch (NT-81) (Korea - Prog. Econ.) (R-3) - Programs should be adapted to and respect the local culture. (GA(0))

Scholes (T/M-26) (Paraguay - PH; Bolivia) (R-4) - Adaptation to, and compromise with, factors in the local culture essential. We can't be rigid. One must make compromises one would never accept in U.S. (TECH-T(6))...As chief of division and director of servicio, he viewed his primary responsibility as that of developing programs (a) adapted to the country, (b) which the country wanted, and (c) which both locals and USOM thought were worthwhile and proper. (GA(5a))

Allen (NT-51-B) (Indonesia - D) (R-1) - Importance of understanding and adapting approach to local personality traits and attitudes. For example, in Indonesia, because locals are status minded and like to be considered in most favorable light, important not to approach so as to make them feel subservient or to look dumb. Also handling self so as not to give impression giving advice; flattering, showing interest in his views, hearing him out. (GA(8))

Adams (T-41) (Nigeria - Educ.; Cambodia; Vietnam) (R-3) - In designing a local education system, must first ask the question: What do the local people expect education to do? In answering, consider two elements: (1) kind of program that makes sense in terms of economics, and (2) kind of program that takes into account the most important local psychological factors. (GA(8))

Saccio (W-20-A) (Brazil - D; ICA/W - DD) (O-1) - Analysis of local culture essential in order to determine whether, and if so how, we should endeavor to bring about changes in the local society. ...He is presently disturbed about the criteria employed by U.S. personnel in judging local systems and the ways of doing things which we are trying to change. We cannot make judgments based on criteria applied in the U.S. (Example from Brazilian judicial concept.) (GA(8))

Garner (T/M-39) (Vietnam - Ag. Engr.; Thailand; Pakistan) (R-4) - You cannot drive people to doing things the way they are done here. You must direct your efforts to cutting a pattern to do things as they have been done there. To do this must get some insight into lives and culture of the locals...While in the technical and scientific fields there is really only one way to do things, in applying scientific knowledge there can be considerable variety. Job is to provide basic information, etc., with which they must work and which they must adapt. (TECH-T(6))

Coverley (ETR - TEHRAN TOICA A-641, 9/28/61) (Iran - Area Oper. Offr.; Afghanistan - DD; Ethiopia) (R-2) - Essential in initiating new projects in a country to determine what deep and basic problems of an ethical, cultural, or historical origin must be taken into account in conducting our activities and in determining what programs and projects can succeed, and which are predestined for failure (i) at the country's particular stage of development and (ii) in the framework of the local culture. (GA(5))

Hummon (T-29) (Liberia - CM; Libya) (R-3) - Special problems of approach in technical assistance to a Negro society - This issue needs study for few Americans have worked with Negroes as they will be required to do in daily life in Africa. Need to design our operating plans so that these problems are taken into account. (GA(8))

Forman (T-20) (Taiwan - Educ.) (R-4) - Since we are not going to be able to impose the American brand of capitalism and democracy on people who are not sophisticated and who are culturally unready to accept it, we should seek alternatives and attempt to identify ourselves with the best possible political and economic set-up which it is capable of developing. We must recognize basic facts of life. (GA(8))

Nelson (NT-78) (Lebanon - D; ICA/W; Jordan - D) (R-1) - Must recognize, and take into account, fact that local people have own variety of pride. (GA(8))

Huth (T/42) (Africa - CM Consultant) - Importance of technician relating himself and his technical assistance to the locals' world. Example: Africans appear to retain nothing, except in passing, unless it is related to world with which they are already familiar. Therefore, must start with, and build upon, what local conceives to be his own world. (GA(8))

McCaffery (NT-53) (Burma - D; Philippines; Austria) (R-1) - Special problems in approaching a neutral country - Discusses problem as it relates to Burma where local reaction to bilateral activities prevents the operation of a meaningful bilateral technical assistance program. See also separate discussion of USSR aid in which McCaffery notes: (1) willingness to accept specific offers of USSR, whereas we follow policy of doing nothing until local government affirmatively requests it; (2) greater receptivity in non-sensitive area (e.g., hospital). (GA(8))

Gant (M-35) (Ford) - Technical assistance should be considered from the point of view of the country to which it is provided. (GA(0))

Nasr (A/UN-26) (Egypt - UN Res. Rep.) - Donors, whether they are individual governments or a multilateral organization, need to make a careful determination of their purpose or objective in rendering technical assistance. They should formulate a clear concept of the attitude they wish to express and how to express it best in each particular region and country. (GA(0))

Moffat (NT-15) (Ghana - D; Burma; Greece) (R-1) - Describes soil conservation contract in Ghana which called for some half-dozen men, including chief of party, four technicians, and several equipment operators, to undertake straight agricultural work designed to implement a rigid land-planning philosophy which was then in vogue. Implementation of the philosophy would have required years, so contractor personnel simply went to work on a different basis, eliciting the cooperation and support of villagers. Change in approach and operational success broke down the rigidity of the ministry officials concerned and from a political standpoint was also a howling success. (CON-IMP)

Watt (PA-33) (HEW - Asst. Surgeon General and Chief of Div. of Intl. Health, PHS) - Describes at some length, from several standpoints, and with illustrations, the great differences in current health standards between the United States and the less developed countries and the consequences of these differences to the character of the activities which should be undertaken in the latter.

Knapp/Gardiner/Weigandt (PA-64) (Agriculture - Farmer Cooperative Service) - In describing the kind of mature, dedicated, and experienced person likely to be a successful technician overseas (particularly in the cooperative and credit fields), emphasizes the importance of a capacity to adjust from (1) an environment in which the initiative lies in the local agricultural communities and the role of central government is simply that of promotion and advice to (2) an environment in which the central government is playing, whether we like it or not, a much more dominant role in the development of cooperative. In many less developed countries, the initiative must be taken by the central government because it will not be taken in the villages, and one of the main tasks is to see that this initiative is handled in such a way that one doesn't end up with something like a government-directed commune.

Holmes (T/M-53) (India - PH) (R-2) - While there are certain basic rules re the art of consulting throughout the world, he found the Indian culture very different and thought that certain things must be particularized for India. Examples. (NP)

Williams (PA-40) (HEW - PHS; ICA/W; Peru) - The solution of the health problem in any less developed country requires a consciousness of something more than health. There are enormous differences between areas and countries, and it is essential to adapt one's approach to these differences. Such adaptation must be made at the local level.... The situations in Africa and Latin America are extremely different. In the former, as typified by Liberia, the biggest problem is the absence of an officialdom that gives a damn about improving health - the lack of any locals to work with; and therefore one must find incentives to stimulate leadership for the long series of steps that are necessary. In Latin America, as exemplified by Peru, there are the incentives, the drives, and all the other requisites except certain political ones.

b. Comments expressed in terms of specific illustrations

Neal (NT-59) (Liberia - DD; India - CD; Philippines) (R-2) - Our general approach, and the institutions which we foster, should be responsive to the (a) cultural character and (b) developmental stage of each country. Example: In Laos and Liberia, there has not yet emerged a recognition of special needs, and therefore we should probably attempt to approach villages and tribal communities through some sort of generalized extension service through which all technical groups operate and which aims at training of general village-level workers. (Extensive discussion of how this might be done.) (GA(0))

St. Clair (T/F-14) (Iran - Trade-Ind. Educ. Adv.) (R-5) - In Iran, recognizing high prestige of engineer in comparison to a teacher who has none, graduates of teacher training college were given certificates as teacher engineers. (GA(8))

Ladenheim (NT/F-3) (USRO; Iran - Prov. Dir.; India - Prog. Econ.) (R-4) - Long, fascinating description of specific adaptations in approach in Iran to take account of local cultural factors. For example: (1) use of stories in Koran, etc., to gain support (pure water; maternal and child welfare), (2) enlisting help of mullahs, etc. (GA(8))

Burgers (T/F-31) (India - Ind. Invest. Adv.) (R-3) - Believes credit rating agency in India would be useful tool to reduce dishonesty, cheating, graft, etc., in private business and lessen suspicion and government criticism of private enterprises. (GA(8))

Roberts (T/F-25) (Libya - Ag. Credit) (R-4) - Discusses problems created in Libya in developing credit system due to (a) lack of concept of any such things as chattel mortgages and fact that only ordinarily available collateral is personal guarantee of neighbors or merchants with whom he does business, and (b) fact that thrift, which is a cultural acquisition, is unknown in rural Libya....Describes steps taken to take into account, or to get around, cultural factors, such as (1) getting the farmer gradually accustomed to consider bank as a friend before expecting him to deposit his surplus in it; (2) establishing a loan committee including local farmers in local banks and procedure for review of larger loans by provincial bank, etc., to prevent bribery; (3) convincing borrowers whose religious scruples prevented payment of interest that latter was simply a charge to meet the expenses of the bank in operating. (GA(8))

See Wishart (P/NON-US/F-2) (IBRD) - Notes difficulty presented by traditions of family firms in efforts to expand enterprise and extend financing and ownership beyond family....Development bank can help in transition because families trust it more than other members of investment community. (GA(8))

Whitman (NT-61) (UAR - D; Pakistan - DD; Israel; Norway) (O-2) - In Egypt, one of relative bottlenecks is overly doctrinaire approach to industrial development (largely technical within an increasingly socialist framework), with inadequate attention to market analysis, cost-benefit ratios, etc., which would increase the contribution of a given amount of investment to growth of Egyptian GNP. Feels project to assess fields in which new industries might be established might provide opportunity to send good U.S. engineers to Egypt who might make contribution in this area, with collateral benefit in making Egyptians more receptive to approach followed by private enterprise even though enterprises carried on within governmental framework - i.e., much more independence and freedom from control. (GA(5b))

Miller (T/F-17) (Pakistan - Ag. Exten.; Iraq) (R-5) - Good description of obstacles encountered in field of agriculture in Pakistan, including: (1) local bureaucratic paper work delaying actions and preventing work in field; (2) unwillingness of government subordinates to assume responsibility or take initiative for fear of making mistakes (which were not tolerated) and getting into trouble; (3) the "sanction procedure" (see Killen, NT-12); (4) unwillingness of students to work; (5) fear of losing face (extension workers often unwilling to pass on existing information available to them whose value they doubt); (6) fatalistic Moslem approach ("If Allah wants me to grow big apples he will have me do so."); (7) prestige factor as it affects willingness to undertake various occupations. (GA(8))

Muller (NT-26-C) (Somalia - D; Nepal - DD; Oceania) (R-2) - Describes two case studies in Somalia showing relevance of local cultural factors to formulation and implementation of programs: (1) pilot small farmer's loan program; (2) range management demonstration project. (Detailed report) (GA(8))

Gardiner (NT-71-A) (Vietnam - D; Pakistan - DD) (R-1) - Of great importance to analyze and understand local culture for purposes of developing and implementing program. Examples from Vietnam: (1) reconstruction of canal; (2) establishment of maternity clinic. (GA(8))

See Foley (EPR - TEHRAN TOICA A-584) (Iran - PA) - In Iran, suggests introduction of incentive award system sponsored by top government officials as means of overcoming traditional subordinate refusal to suggest improvements. (GA(8))

See Reed (P/US/F-7) (Puerto Rico - Housing; Burma; Greece) - In developing housing program need to remember disparity in proportion of income devoted to housing in U.S. (25%) and elsewhere (e.g., 6% in Latin America). (GA(10a))

Grossman (NT-70) (India - Prog.) (R-3) - Programs should be adapted to local conditions. Examples: labor-intensive activities vs. automation in labor surplus society; participant training that does not encourage introduction by returnee of ideas having no present applicability in his country (e.g., training doctors dependent on non-available X-ray machines). (GA(8))

Atwood (W-25) (O/IA) - Recognition of trends permitted tremendous influence on process of adjustment in successful agricultural program, in business sphere, and in attack on land tenure problem in Chile. (GA(8))

Harmon (T-14) (Iran - CD; Iraq) (R-4) - In Iran, must recognize that people are expected to look after relatives and that one can't go too far in trying to gain efficiency by having them fire ineffective relatives. Loss of caste in community and detraction from his ability to do job. (GA(8))

Bernstein (NT-18) (Nigeria - D) (R-1) - In Nigeria, progress in education depends upon breaking certain vicious cultural cycles under which education has come to be predicated upon certain formal and irrelevant standards for jobs (e.g., degree) which are not based on any specific appraisal of what a man can do but which have come to have a cultural label of "quality." (GA(8))

Shook (T-16) (Afghanistan - Transp.) (R-5) - In Islamic world: (a) efforts to inculcate habits of saving (the reinvestment of profits in the interests of increased future production) encounter view that fate controls one's day-to-day business and that it is ridiculous to save because fate may intervene and turn benefits of what he has saved over to someone else; (b) efforts to improve health may encounter fact that society does not attach the same value to life that we do, that it is believed that if God wants the people affected to live he will see that they do, and that our measures to change the situation represent meddling with things in hands of Allah. (GA(8))

See Hyde (P/US-39) (Social Welfare) - Notes great difference in level of social work problem in U.S. and less developed countries where social worker must concern himself with large numbers of people (settlement house problem of half a century ago) instead of individual case-work.

Wigglesworth (ETR - TEHRAN TOICA A-2561, June 1961) (Iran - PA) (R-4) - In Iran, because of lack of agreement on system for the order of subordinate headings, numeric system of filing adopted rather than alphabetical. (GA(8))

Lapinski (NT/S-21) (Afghanistan - Prog.; Lebanon; ICA/W) (R-5) - Notes effect of purdah and of recent 60% disappearance of purdah in Afghanistan on program. (GA(8))

Galloway (ETR - TEHRAN TOICA A-1353) (Iran - Ag. Exten) (R-5) - In Jordan, inducement of cultural change must take into account that because geographic conditions have for centuries made life an unending struggle against nature, villagers and bedouin tribesmen seldom envisage any sudden improvement in way of living, are generally extremely practical and individualistic, and have high degree of personal honor which is often a more potent factor in their dealings than material gain. (GA(8))

Andrews (P/US-7-D) (Michigan State) - Essential to adapt solutions (programs) to local economic, political, and cultural situation, our successes and failures being partially correlatable to past observance or disregard of this principle. Examples: (a) JCRR in Taiwan - successful adaptation to local structure; (b) hybrid corn in Bolivia - failure to take into account many factors apart from adaptability of seed as such; (c) Jordan water project - failure to consult with, and to take into account customs of, nomads involved. (GA(8))

Weems (T/F-48) (Korea - Ind. Lab. Adv.) (R-3) - In Korea, among factors to be taken into account are following: (a) no underlying makes suggestions to superior, he waits for an order; (b) real decisions are made in coffee houses after hours, not in offices; (c) Korean is more politically minded than U.S. and goes through positioning process in every conversation; (d) different business methods and ethics; (e) family organization. (GA(8))

Miller (T/F-17) (Pakistan - Ag. Exten.; Iraq) (R-5) - In Pakistan, techniques of demonstration encountered initial difficulty because conduct of a field day, if handled on private property, imposed obligation on owner (which if not fulfilled caused loss of face, etc.) to feed (or at least to serve tea to) all those attending and owners were reluctant to assume such an obligation. (GA(8))

Ware (T-31) (Libya - Educ.) (R-5) - Cites difficulties encountered in making any progress in changing "white collar" to "blue collar" philosophy in Libya since he was never able fully to understand local value system which appeared to combine a desire for material benefits with an unwillingness to do the physical work which was a prerequisite to the enjoyment of such benefits. (GA(8))

Snyder (T/A-18) (Turkey - Pub. Safety) (R-4) - In the police field in the Middle East, must take into account attitude of people toward police (service concept of U.S. vs. concept of protection of people in authority - the wealthy and the powerful); attitude toward rigid law enforcement; lack of understanding of, and attitude toward, traffic regulations. (GA(8))

Di Venuti (T/F-30) (Laos - Prog.) (R-2) - Textbooks, organizational suggestions, etc., should reflect knowledge and understanding of local conditions. Illustrates from his own work in Puerto Rico with high school economic texts, etc. (GA(8))

Andrews (P/US-7-D) (Michigan State) - Need to adapt educational materials to local cultural background. Example of good adaptation of elementary textbooks in Vietnam. (GA(8))

Neal (NT-59-A) (Liberia - DD; Philippines - CD; India) (R-2) - In Liberia, educational needs are very different from our own, even at same levels of schooling, and we should devise (instead of trying to superimpose our own) a system responsive to local needs. (Detailed discussion.) (GA(8))

Adams (T-41) (Nigeria - Educ.; Cambodia; Vietnam) (R-3) -

In designing a local education system must first ask the question: What do the local people expect education to do? In answering, consider two elements: (1) kind of program that makes sense in terms of economics, and (2) kind of program that takes into account the most important local psychological factors. Examples: (a) Vietnam where, immediately after partition with social structure collapsing, education had to be related to dominant psychological factors (powerful pressure group represented by 10,000 almost educated people who couldn't obtain niches until deficiencies remedied), rather than to greatest economic needs, but where, this special group taken care of, it was then possible to shift emphasis in a way that met general aspirations for education and contributed to economic needs; (b) Cambodia where the situation has closely paralleled that in Vietnam, with the initial pressure group some 700 potential teachers; (c) Nigeria where it is possible to accommodate psychological and economic requirements simultaneously. (GA(0))

## 2. Suggested corollary propositions

- a. The variations in conditions among countries make it necessary to tailor-make the general approach and techniques applied in each country to the peculiar conditions existing therein.

(See also subsection III-A-1, relating to the dangers of generalizations about approach and technique in technical assistance, and section IX, which discusses indigenous factors to be taken into account in program development and execution.)

Geens (NT/F-2) (Laos - Prog.) (R-4) - Experience indicates that different cultures, languages, and experiences develop differences among people that must be recognized in dealing with peoples of different cultures. (GA(8))

Bell (T-34) (Spain - Ag.) (R-3) - There are great variations among the cultures of the many individual countries in which we have programs, a fact we sometimes overlook in our search for uniformity and standardization. (GA(8))

Poling/Barthel (PA-30) (Commerce - Coast & Geodetic Survey) -

In participant training in coast and geodetic field, the program for each participant must be carefully tailored and personalized to take into account the precise state of knowledge and the precise needs in the participant's native land as well as his individual background.

Kitchen (NT-46) (Sudan - D; Liberia) (R-2) - Notes great differences among less developed countries, classifying largely in political terms: (i) those long independent or which achieved independence without emotional upheaval and are western-oriented in terms of political attitudes, institutions, education, etc.; (ii) those headed in direction of a socialist state or toward association with Bloc, because of either honest belief, Commie subversion, or unwillingness of west to fill vacuum created by colonial withdrawal (e.g., Guinea and Egypt (?)); (iii) those countries believing they should remain aloof in cold war. (GA(8))

Alter (NT-43) (Nepal - Prog.; India) (R-3) - No two situations are wholly alike, and hence past experience as to what works or doesn't work in a comparable situation in another country is not an infallible guide to what will work in another context. (GA(8))

Moffat (NT-15) (Ghana - D; Burma) (R-1) - Generalizations are dangerous because of the differences among countries and the manner in which these differences affect emphasis and techniques. (GA(8))....(NT-15-A) - In West Africa, find tremendous variations in vitality of tribes and these variations appear to have a profound effect on character and rate of political and economic development. (Extensive discussion.) (NP)

Neal (NT-59) (Liberia - DD; India - CD; Philippines) (R-2) - Essential to analyze stage of a country's development, measured in sociological, political, and economic terms, and to recognize differences resulting therefrom. Example: Laos and Liberia in which there has not yet emerged local recognition of indigenous special needs as compared to country where these needs are understood. (GA(0))

Naylor (T-49) (Philippines - CD; Iran) (R-3) - In Africa South of Sahara, should take into account the great differences in the vitality and/or traditional dominance or subservience of different tribes in (a) development of program and (b) the selection of groups to work with each. (NP)

Andrews (P/US-7) (Michigan State) - Program must recognize that there should be vast difference between t.a. in (a) sophisticated countries and (b) less developed countries. So much depends on a country's ability both (a) to plan and (b) to execute (e.g., India, where inability to execute but theoretical planning capacity great). (See also P/US-7-A) (GA(8))

Watson (M-59) (Rockefeller Foundation - Latin America) - In Latin America must take into account enormous differences in potentialities of countries for self-help. (GA(8))

Hyde (M-47-H) (HEW - PHS) - Essential to recognize differing levels of development of different countries and consequent differences in problems. (GA(5b))

Killen (NT-12-B) (Pakistan - D; Eval.; Yugoslavia) (R-1) - Essential to recognize great variations among countries; no universal approach will work. In some countries one must be hard in negotiating; in others a soft approach is desirable. (GA(0))

Moyer (NT-66) (Korea - D; ICA/W - O/FE; Taiwan - D) (R-1) - Stresses great differences among countries and hence essentiality of separately analyzing each....Uncertain the extent to which basic characteristics of countries at same stage of development are similar. (GA(8))

Sales (NT-82) (Africa Survey; Morocco - Prog.; ICA/W) (R-4) - Discusses tremendous differences between Africa and Asia and their possible bearing on approach. (GA(8))

Caldwell (M-47-A) (HEW) - Should take into account, as ICA has not done, basic variations in educational patterns in different countries as a result of prior and often continuing metropolitan influence. (GA(0))

Laidlaw (T-39) (Taiwan - Transp.) (R-3) - Must take into account tremendous differences among major areas and the important differences within each of these areas (e.g., great differences between Japanese and Chinese cultures, and far greater differences between Far East and Africa). (GA(8))

Boyd (W-1) (O/Housing; Chile) - Cf. Afghanistan (with virtually no literate class) with Latin America (especially Argentina and Chile) with fairly high level of literacy and sophisticated educated class.

Dusenberry (T/F-47) (Ghana - Ag.; Nepal) (R-3) - Contrasts situation in Ghana, where people's prior training in missionary schools, etc., enables them to grasp extension principles, and that in Nepal, where, because of religious and cultural obstacles, it will be another generation before locals grasp similar concepts as readily as Ghanaians. (GA(8))

Babcock (NT-6) (Liberia - D; Paraguay - D; Eval.) (R-1) - Notes vast difference between Europe (and other relatively developed areas) and less developed countries and our failure to adapt procedures, policies, programming techniques, etc., to recognize this. (GA(8))

Yoe (NT-44) (Haiti - D) (R-1) - Should adapt our approach and the forms of our aid to the unique circumstances of individual countries or groups of countries. (Examples given.) (GA(0))

Von Seggern (T-33) (Lebanon - Ag.; Egypt; Turkey) (R-3) - Adaptation must reflect great differences in potentialities for development and self-sufficiency of various countries. (Contrasts: (1) Lebanon, already well on developmental road; (2) Iraq, Iran, Turkey, which have basic capacity to catch up; and (3) Egypt and Jordan, which seem lost causes in the absence of some spectacular breakthrough that will permit cultivation of lands which now defy all efforts for practical use. Approach in each group should be different.) (GA(8))

Bell (T-34) (Spain - Ag.) (R-3) - U.S. tendency, in search for uniformity and standardization of approach, to overlook variations among cultures. (GA(8))

Mosher ("A Review and Criticism of U.S. Efforts to Help Other People Improve Their Agriculture") (Cornell) - In agriculture, no two country t.a. programs should be the same, because of differences among countries in (a) economic resources, (b) stages of agricultural development, (c) types of political institutions, (d) patterns of public administration, and (e) general cultural values. Differences are further explained because t.a. should always be supplemental to the hosts' wholly domestic programs and should either strengthen or supplement those programs. In addition to finding a field that (a) country needs and (b) is appropriate for t.a., donor must choose activities that (c) country wants, and these felt needs vary enormously. (GA(5))

Pfisterer (T/M-51) (Costa Rica - Architect; Brazil) (R-3) - In his field, must be able to adjust to variety of different standards and this requires open-mindedness. Both design and materials must be adapted on a country-by-country basis. (TECH-T(6))

Wood (NT-60) (India - D; Eval.; Korea - D) (R-1) - In India, technical assistance presents a special problem for the following two reasons: (1) the size and diversity of country create problems which are both quantitatively and qualitatively different from those which must be solved by t.a. elsewhere; and (2) India is different from other countries because of the high level of competence of the Indians in many fields (a circumstance which necessitates technicians with a far greater degree of learning, experience, and reputation). (NP)

Roberts (NT/F-1) (Jordan - Prog.; India) (R-5) - Stresses great difference between technical assistance problem in India, where there is highly developed bureaucracy, a plan, and a capacity to decide what t.a. it needs, and in Jordan, where the government is unorganized, unaware of the nature of its problems, and in need of planning help. In latter practically no locals who can understand technician's ideas or the work the technician should do, so the latter must show more initiative and have the ability to consider areas outside of his specialty and act on them, not simply fill a particular technical niche where a specialist is needed, as in India. (TECH-T(6))

Haraldson (NT-31-A) (Taiwan - D; Vietnam - DD) (O-1) - There is no general formula for economic development. Each country presents a different case depending upon personalities, its history, and its stage of development. (GA(O))

Whitman (NT-61) (UAR - D; Pakistan - DD; Israel; Norway) (O-2) - By way of illustrating variations: in sophisticated country like Egypt, much of emphasis should be on transmittal of technological information, rather than on institution of sociological change, although even in Egypt there may be problems of developing proper motivation and attitudes and certain basic skills necessary to modernizing society. (GA(1))

Davidson ("National Efforts in the Field of Social Development") - Relative emphasis affected by (1) situation in particular country and (2) pattern and pace for social development set by a nation and reflecting its cultural patterns, value judgments, and national aspirations. In some countries, health and education may be sufficiently advanced to warrant economic projects; in others, the first attack may have to be on human resources; in fairly well advanced countries, further progress may be in direction of social welfare and insurance measures. (GA(5b))

Baron (NT-58) (Cambodia - DD; Philippines - Prog.) (R-2) - Priorities vary from country to country and it is impossible to establish any universally applicable rule for less developed countries. Compare the situations in (a) Cambodia, where education is of paramount importance because of the great need for a large number of trained people and (b) the Philippines, where there is an ample number of trained people but the absence of an economic climate in which there are opportunities for them to exploit. (GA(5b))

Kelly (T-44) (Pakistan - CD; Bolivia; Mexico) (R-3) - It is dangerous to generalize and to lay down hard and fast rules for t.a. on worldwide basis, but it may be possible to identify certain similar patterns of growth and characteristic problems in all or many countries at particular stages of development (e.g., nepotism and corruption; bridging gap between heretofore centralized authoritarian government and people at grass roots). (NP)...In Pakistan, in community development, as reflected in standard textbooks, must be adapted to circumstances of (1) particular country and (2) particular area of a country. (GA(8))

Brown (NT-74) (Laos - DD; Philippines, Indonesia, Mainland China, Korea - Agric. Attaché) (O-2) - Within Laos, inadequate attention by ruling Laotians to tribes, which represent half population and are of very different ethnic origin, with consequent difficulty of designing programs therefor in spite of the important roles they may play. (SPG(17))

Hickey (P/US-24) (Vietnam - Michigan PA Contract) - Should recognize that there may be major differences between different regions of a country. Differences may be economic and/or sociological, and differences profound. Vietnam, as example, where conditions in highlands vastly different from those in delta. (GA(8))

Rogers (NT-63) (Peru - D; Mexico; Panama; Haiti; Venezuela; Costa Rica) (R-1) - Approach must be tailored to individual countries; a standardized worldwide approach won't work. (GA(8))

Hamill (NT-73) (Nicaragua - D; Surinam; Chile; Paraguay; Brazil) (R-2) - Programs must be carefully tailored to individual countries. (GA(0))

Millikan (M-73) (MIT) - There is no single approach to development planning that will be uniformly successful. Approach must be adapted to particular local situation. Differences in culture and stage of growth must be taken into account. (Examples) (GA(8))

Maloy/MacIntosh/Christine (PA-28) (FAA) - Anticipates problems in providing satisfactory meaningful training to the large number of expected African participants in civil aviation. Stresses the essentiality of having adequate FAA representation in Africa to develop and transmit the information needed to design effective programs in advance of trainee arrivals.

Johns (T/F-37) (Greece - Labor Tech. Offr.) (R-4) - Fields of emphasis vary depending upon the particular needs of specific countries. In Greece, should emphasize (a) industrial skills (e.g., training workers in use of tools, etc.) and (b) improved labor management relations. (GA(5b))

Kotschnig ("Social Development and Foreign Policy") (D/S - IO) - There is no blueprint applicable to all countries covering development. Every country must establish its own guide posts in line with its stage of development, traditions, and special needs. (GA(5b))

Merson (T/S-40) (Tunisia - Manpower Adv.; Iran) (R-3) - Contrasts the situation in Iran with no colonial background with that in Tunisia. In the case of Iran, there was no infrastructure for an employment service and training had to proceed slowly; in Tunisia there was an infrastructure but it was run by French and Italians, who had been trained in European institutions. In Tunisia, the departure of half of the 255,000 foreign technicians present at time of independence has created great need for replacement; in Iran, this need does not exist. (GA(11c))

Gant (M-35) (Ford) - Technical assistance projects, since they are only parts, and often very small parts, of the total complex and diverse pattern of activity in a country, can affect the country significantly only as they are directly related to, and in harmony with, country's needs and own over-all programs for attaining greater self-sufficiency in professional and technical competence. (GA(0))

- b. An individual technician may have to make some accommodation in his personal habits to local culture in order to be effective.

This suggested corollary proposition is the subject of comments appearing in other subsections of section X as well as in section XII-D, relating to the attitudes and personal behavior characteristics that contribute to effective technical assistance. The following comment is included purely to illustrate the proposition suggested:

Mahony (T-21) (Oceania - Anthrop.) - In the case of the individual, some accommodation to local customs is necessary to gain natives' confidence. Example of eating native food in area where natives take great pride in food and won't pay any attention to what you say unless you do. (GA(8))

- c. USOM organization, facilities, and work practices, and customary procedures for extending assistance, may need to be adapted to the particular conditions existing in a specific culture.

Ramsay (ETR - TEHRAN TOICA A-1353) (Iran - Ag. Exten) (R-5) - In Iran, because prestige is an important factor culturally, important for USOM extension agent to have suitable office - not just a mud hole. (GA(8))

Reed (NT/F-8) (Libya - AD; Liberia - D) (R-2) - In Libya, adjusted USOM hours to local working practices. (GA(8))

Fitz (T/S-36) (Iran - Educ.; Ethiopia) (R-4) - In general we demand too many conditions and privileges, particularly in comparison to Bloc personnel who spend more time with the little people and are less ostentatious. We are trapped by our own mechanisms - the local government wanting aid but not all the mechanisms and conditions which we attach to it. For example, in Iran, where locals accustomed to doing business by oral agreement, long delays were caused in renting building because of our insistence on complicated written agreement. (GA(11b))

Neal (NT-59) (Liberia - DD; Philippines - CD; India)

(R-2) - ICA organization, with its technical divisions, makes it difficult to adapt approach to local conditions. Technical divisions oppose organization of USOM to blend disciplines in an attack on an interdisciplinary problem. Example: ICA/W reaction to proposed approach to education in Liberia....(NT-59-A) - Important to relate approach to country's stage of development and capabilities. Must distinguish particularly between (a) country which hasn't reached the take-off stage and one of principal problems is tying central government to grass roots and (b) country where take-off stage has been reached. In former, USOM director should have authority to use resources in whatever way is best adapted to building local framework through which variety of services can flow from center to mass users. In latter, can develop more highly specialized programs within several technical divisions to improve local competence in specific technical fields. (GA(8))

Beran (T/PR-3) (Libya - CD; Egypt) (R-4) - Our highly sophisticated, tightly compartmentalized form of organization - a projection of U.S. societal pattern - not well adapted for dealing with local problems.

### 3. Suggested caveats to general principle

- a. Although adaptation is necessary, there may be a danger of a donor's overadjusting his approach to local cultural conditions.

Haraldson (NT-31) (Taiwan - D; Vietnam) (O-1) - Sometimes we overadjust our approach to local cultural conditions and thereby fail to bring about changes in these conditions necessary to progress. Technicians have gone too far sometimes in adjusting attitudes to local societies and it is a mistake for technician to dilute his judgment to fit the witchcraft and progress-inhibiting customs which exist in many of these societies. Only as these things change, often radically, can society develop cultural patterns necessary for progress. (GA(8))

- b. Sometimes the differences between cultures may be more apparent than real.

Overend (T-37) (Iran - CM; Taiwan) (R-2) - Should recognize that many of the things we find and severely criticize in other cultures are often things which are closely similar to, even though they take a different form from, and are not superficially recognizable as, things in our own culture. (GA(8))

4. Donors have frequently violated the foregoing suggested principle and its corollaries. Such violations may have been partly due to a failure by donors to make an adequate analysis of the local culture and to their consequent lack of the knowledge necessary to adapt their programs properly.

a. General comments

See Von Seggern (T-33) (Lebanon - Ag.; Turkey; Egypt) (R-3) - Need better adaptation of programs than in past to reflect differences in potentialities for development and self-sufficiency of various countries....Notes failure of our programs to take proper advantage of operation of local communications complex. (GA(8))

Muller (NT-26) (Somalia - D; Nepal; Oceania) (R-1) - We have often ignored the part which social attitudes play in economic development. (Illustrations) (GA(8))

Heilpern (T-27) (Iran - Prog. Econ.) (R-3) - Total pattern of our projects lacks consistency because we have not developed them within framework of country's general needs and resources and with proper reference to its future economic position in relation to other countries. Nor have we thought through best techniques for working with governments or examined whether U.S. or USSR thinking and beliefs are closer to those in country. (GA(8))

See Overend (T-37) (Iran - CM; Taiwan) (R-2) - We now lack sufficient information to understand communications complexes of the countries with which we are dealing. (GA(8))

Hickey (P/US-24) (Vietnam - Michigan PA Contract) - Tendency to treat country as a unit without recognizing that, from the economic and sociological standpoints, it may be divided into a number of distinct and very different districts. (GA(8))

Langley (T-36) (India - CD) (R-4) - We have heretofore repeatedly made the mistake, and are doing so again in Africa, of failing to analyze thoroughly the local situation before making basic program decisions. Instead programs appear to be product of a desire to provide a quick symbol of U.S. support and of our particular recruitment capabilities in several fields (e.g., overboard on education in Africa when apparent that in many countries government incapable of supporting significantly expanded education program and at a time when unemployment of those with 6th-grade education is problem). (GA(8))

Kitchen (NT-46) (Sudan - D; Liberia) (R-2) - We do things completely at variance with the ethnic background of the people with whom we are dealing; and USOMs now lack the competence to consider, and hence do not take into account, the cultural factors that are important. (GA(8))

Yoe (NT-44) (Haiti - D) (R-1) - Fallen into bad habit of assuming that a uniform approach will work everywhere and that technical assistance necessarily has the same rules in every country in which we operate. (GA(8))

Campbell (W-23) (O/PH; Brazil) - Have failed seriously in not recognizing. (GA(8))

Lawson (W-15) (O/PAD; Korea) - Usually disregarded. (GA(8))

Sadler/Dilts (W-10) (O/IND; Brazil - O/IND) - In practice, and in spite of paper injunctions in this regard, there is little application of principle in field programming. We stumble along without reference to, and without applying, the anthropological and sociological factors. (GA(8))

Turner (NT-14) (USRO) (R-3) - Based on his observation of requests for third country training and third country technicians, most of programs fail to reflect the use of an analytical process whereby (a) objectives are determined by an analysis of the fundamental situation existing in a country and (b) a determination is made, based upon such analysis, and upon experience and research as to what will work, best points of leverage, and hence emphasis and priorities, for achieving such objectives. No country white in this regard, with most ranging from almost black to moderately black-gray. (GA(8))

Brown (NT-23) (Libya - D; Iraq) (O-1) - Tendency to overlook social and cultural limitations. (GA(8))

Price (P/NON-US-2) (Nepal - UN) - Approach has heretofore been often too much determined by economic rather than sociological factors, and there has been too much reliance on massive amounts of capital and ratio of investment to growth, without an adequate analysis of what it is by way of changes in human resources and institutions which must be combined with capital to achieve real growth. (GA(8))

Ruffner (W-11-A) (O/ED; India) - Tendency in some places to develop formal education system which is separate from, and largely unrelated to, the life of the country. We have given too little thought to the kind of educational systems that we should be trying to foster either generally or in specific countries, taking into account the various indigenous factors. (GA(8))

Groves (NT-34) (Paraguay - D; Brazil) (R-2) - Our tendency, at least in Latin America, has been to proceed by bits and pieces, allowing our programs to grow up like Topsy, without reference to any over-all program based on a thorough evaluation of present and future needs and to which individual program elements logically relate. We ourselves have been shining example of bad management in this regard; along with other national and multilateral donors. One result is that recipients cannot grasp and do not understand what U.S. is doing for them. (GA(8))

Hart (T/S-31, Annex II) (Haiti - Educ.; Brazil; Bolivia) (R-2) - In our desire to "get the job done," we sometimes forget we are in a foreign country which has a different culture, mores, and values. (GA(11c))

Neal (NT-59) (Liberia - DD; India - CD; Philippines) (R-2) - Past approach not consistent principle of being responsive to cultural character and developmental stage of individual countries...Our USOM organization is based on functional divisions that reflect functional divisions which were developed in a western civilization which has not had to contend for some 200 years with village and tribal cultures. Sometimes we attempt to structure our own historically forged institutions into the local culture to perform functions for which they are not necessarily adapted. (GA(0))

Saccio (W-20-A) (Brazil - D; ICA/W - DD) (O-1) - He is presently disturbed about the criteria employed by U.S. personnel in judging local systems and the ways of doing things which we are trying to change. We cannot make judgments based on criteria applied in the U.S. (Example from Brazilian judicial concept.) (GA(8))

b. Specific illustrations

Kershishnik (T/F-11) (Somalia - Ag. Credit; Afghanistan) (R-5) - In Somalia, preparation of loan procedures without reference to local and Italian laws resulted in unworkable program. (GA(8))

Syran (W-22) (O/TRANS; Japan - DOA) - Two illustrations from Japan: (1) proposed improved road transport for rice marketing would have cut production by eliminating cultivated land; (2) nutritionally desirable substitution of other crops for rice overlooked non-food uses of rice. (GA(8))

Atwood (W-25) (O/LA) - Failure to solve problem of what motivates the local people, largely responsible for failure to develop effective agriculture system in Venezuela and to solve problems generally in Bolivia. (GA(8))

Geens (NT/F-2) (Laos - Prog.) (R-4) - In Laos, attempt to disregard fact that Laotians work best when on their own schedule and to impose U.S. working hours did not succeed (cf. Fraleigh - T-38). (GA(8))

Tobler (NT-39) (Laos - D) (R-1) - In Laos, seriously handicapped and unable to develop rational basis on which to proceed because of insufficient knowledge of people in country as a whole. (GA(8))

See Hummon (T-29) (Liberia - CM; Libya) (R-3) - In Liberia and Libya, no analysis made of communications complex and this was handicap. (GA(8))

Kitchen (NT-46) (Sudan - D; Liberia) (R-2) - Failure to make a manpower survey in Sudan at outset of program a serious mistake for such a survey would have indicated the desirability of programs in many fields which would have been different from those which were actually approved (e.g., in fields of private investment, health, educational institutions). Results of a current survey will probably indicate the necessity for undoing things that have been started. (Kitchen notes Sudan is 50 years ahead of most other African countries in terms of educational facilities.) (GA(8))

See Di Venuti (T/F-30) (Laos - Prog.) - Discussing Puerto Rico. (GA(O))

Hickey (P/US-24) (Vietnam - Michigan PA Contract) - In Vietnam, USOM lacked much of basic data required to carry out a technical assistance program. Operating in dark without knowledge of what made villages "tick," of social organizations of the society, of what individuals or groups were best innovators, of techniques and methods already in use, etc. (GA(8))

See National Planning Association Report (TASG #161-65, pp. 18-19) (1960) - In Latin America, has been lack of any reasonably detailed picture of needs and potentialities of countries (and of specific U.S. goals).

Kelly (T-44) (Pakistan - CD; Bolivia; Mexico) (R-3) - In Pakistan, one of weaknesses in U.S. technical assistance in community development was failure of technicians (and of local community development workers as well) to recognize that general principles, as reflected in standard textbooks, must be adapted to circumstances of (1) particular country and (2) particular area of a country. (GA(8))

Grossman (NT-70) (India - Prog.) (R-3) - In many cases participant training is too advanced in the sense that participant receives ideas which are too modern or otherwise unadapted for conditions in his home environment. (GA(8))

See Adams (T-41) (Nigeria - Educ.; Cambodia; Vietnam) (R-3) - Description of his evaluation of 100-year-old southern mission school that was completely unrelated to surrounding socio-economic factors. Effect was nil in local community except to train, and drain off for service elsewhere, any local talent available. (GA(O))

Beran (T/PR-3) (Libya - CD; Egypt - CD) - In Libya, USOM disturbed because locals built crude walls around USOM-constructed resettlement buildings. We failed to understand that Moslem custom dictated barriers to prevent strange men from seeing their women except in purdah. (GA(O))

PHNOM PENH TOICA A-1263 (6/6/60) - Describes failure in practice of special "formulaire" developed by industrial investment adviser in Cambodia and intended to provide financial data necessary to design a loan application because (1) it was too complicated and involved terms and concepts not understood locally and (2) it aroused resentment due to fact that use of such technique was not part of the trade and financial customs of the country. (GA(8))

B. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, ALTHOUGH IT MUST BE ADAPTED TO THE LOCAL CULTURE, MUST AT THE SAME TIME RESULT IN BASIC CHANGES THEREIN.

1. Suggested general principle: Although a donor's approach and techniques must always be adapted to a local culture, indigenous development is usually dependent upon, and technical assistance must often be directed to bring about, profound changes in a local culture. These changes will normally include changes in values, standards, institutions, customs, and other basic elements of a society. Technological advancement is seldom possible without such cultural changes.

Alter (NT-43) (Nepal - Prog.; India) (R-3) - Although we may not be able to mold the thought processes of others in a particular preconceived fashion, progress is impossible unless the thought processes and methods of approach which do evolve are consistent with modernization of the society. (GA(8))

Haraldson (NT-31) (Taiwan - D; Vietnam) (O-2) - Only as changes (often radical) in cultural patterns occur, can society achieve preconditions for progress. (GA(8))

Bernstein (NT-18) (Nigeria - D) (R-2) - In Nigeria, in education, must find a way of introducing a new approach to education whereby the stamp of legitimacy is placed on new standards for employment and old formal and irrelevant standards (e.g., degree), which disregard man's actual capabilities, are set aside. (GA(8))

Lippincott (NT-11) (Lebanon - DD) (R-2) - Change in the traditional ways of doing things is the essential built-in purpose of technical assistance. Technical assistance always threatens the status of someone. In his own experience, provision of technical assistance is always irritating, creates problems of relationship, and in the short run is politically disadvantageous. (GA(8))

Chawner (T-17) (DD/P; Korea) (R-1) - Certain changes in deeply rooted institutions are indispensable conditions precedent to modernization and progress. Advances in technical areas are often impossible without first having social change. As example, in Korea, industrialization and competition in world markets are impossible without accommodation of the extended family institution to the conditions which are necessary for successful business enterprise. (GA(8))

- Hudson (P/US-14) (Rice) - In Arab world and probably elsewhere, must concentrate on changing cultural values, for without a revamping of their social systems and a radical change in cultural values, they are probably incapable of modern development. Must deal with causes and not merely symptoms. (GA(8))
- Brown (NT-23) (Libya - D; Iraq - D) (0-1) - Basic social patterns must be addressed (e.g., in Arab world (1) purdah and (2) traditional aversion to work). (GA(8))
- Muller (NT-26) (Somalia - D; Nepal - DD; Oceania) (R-2) - In terms of economic development, have often ignored part which social attitudes play. For example, (1) in Oceania, matter of being a good host more important than acquiring wealth, and while family feasts may seem ridiculous in poor society, they are social factors that must be recognized and dealt with before progress can be made; (2) in many countries, extended-family concept interferes with acceptance of concept of saving and this social fact must be dealt with if there is to be significant economic progress. (GA(8))
- Harmon (NT-14) (Iran - CD; Iraq) (R-5) - Although we repeatedly assert the contrary, the very purpose of our technical assistance is to effect changes in the local culture (e.g., practices, values). (GA(8))
- Barrows (W-27) (O/NESA; Vietnam - D; Greece - D) (0-1) - Almost all technical assistance directly affects values of other culture; rarely is technical assistance purely technical in character (i.e., the transfer of a useful item of technical information). (GA(8))
- Nelson (T-35) (Iran - CD; Philippines) (R-3) - The purpose of technical assistance is to help host country in making certain basic changes (rather than to win friends and influence people). (GA(8))
- Holcomb (T/M-10) (Liberia - Ag. Exten.) (R-6) - In Liberia, with 95% illiteracy and limited capital, necessary to effect some social change before much can be accomplished in any technical area. (GA(8))
- Astle (NT-56) (Brit. Honduras - D; Haiti - Ag.; Paraguay) (R-3) - Progress cannot be made without changing standards and values. (GA(8))
- Huth (T-42) (Africa - CM) (Consultant) - Great changes are necessary if there is to be growth. Essential task is to introduce these in a way that will find greatest local acceptance. (GA(0))

Andrews (P/US-7-D) (Michigan State) - In spite of our statements about working within the context of local culture, development can only occur as very major changes are brought about in culture (e.g., essentiality of concept of time for the operation of a modern society requires the introduction of this concept to replace traditional disregard for time - a profound adjustment). (GA(8))

See Kontos (NT-79) (Ceylon - DD; ICA/W) (R-2) - More attention should be given to problem of how to change attitudes. For example, how does one change desk-bound, abstract engineer and sophisticated theoretical agricultural researcher in Ceylon into individuals willing to get their hands dirty and to engage in constructive practical application....Suggests study of situations in which we have changed attitudes of various types of people in effort to find clues to approach with general applicability. (GA(5b))

Thurber (P/US-15) (Ford) - Changes in other cultures are necessary, but our knowledge of how to effect such changes cross-culturally is very limited. There has been virtually no research in this field. (RES)

Haraldson (NT-31-A) (Taiwan - D; Vietnam - DD) (O-1) - Except where achieved by guns or whips, as in Communist countries, economic development can only be achieved by providing incentives and motivations which will move the people. The real problem is the provision of these motives and incentives for individual and collective action, a procedure which frequently means a wholesale reorientation of a people's scale of values and a break with the past. (GA(0))....It will require altered personal relationships, sublimation of nationalistic outbursts, changes in attitudes toward work, etc. (GA(3))

Howe (NT-76) (Vietnam - Prog.; ICA/W) (R-2) - Should attempt to identify, and where desirable to affect, country's source of intellectual nourishment....In Vietnam, everything is patterned on French system (e.g., worship of academic rote and degrees and its relation to promotion; tax system; medicine) and French pattern is disadvantageous from standpoint of the development of a less developed country. (GA(0))

Coler (T-15) (Nepal - Trng. Offr.; Korea; Turkey; Mexico) (R-4) - Basic changes are necessary and we should be aware how difficult it is to effect them. Difficulty may be illustrated by considering how difficult it might be for us to accept some of the proposals which others might logically make to us and which might affect every facet of our lives (e.g., metric system; standard voltage system). (GA(8))

Haines (M-47-G) (D/Agric.) - Agricultural progress will only take place if we create the proper surrounding social and economic environment. Therefore, much effort should be directed to these environmental factors. (GA(8))

Killen (NT-12-B) (Pakistan - D; Eval.; Yugoslavia) (R-1) - Existing institutional patterns represent the greatest obstacles to bringing about economic, political, and social development. (GA(0))....(NT-12) - Can't help another government without interfering, and we should worry less about whether we are doing so constructively, and set about equipping local missions so that they can interfere with beneficial results. (GA(8))

Gushima (P/NON-US-7) (Japan) - Technical assistance must be more than technological; it must concern itself with social development and social reform. For example, doctors and hospitals are useless unless poor make use of them, and therefore we must attack economic and social factors that inhibit use of technically improved medical facilities created by technological help. (GA(1))

Moore (T/M-30) (Iran - Ag. Econ.; Nepal - Ford; Thailand - Cornell) (R-5) - In Iran, partly because of local unreadiness to accept the implications of social, political, and economic change and partly because of our approach in simply supporting old order's improvement rather than attempting real attack on basic problems, efforts are not only ineffective and wasteful but also destroy- ing present reservoir of good will. (PUR)

St. Louis (NT-32) (India - Prog.; Korea; Pakistan; Taiwan; Burma) (R-2) - In education, in order to make progress one must encourage a revolution in a local philosophy of education that is deeply rooted in the local culture. (E.g., in Moslem lands, obstacle is the domination of the church over education at a stage when doctrine of separation of church and state is not accepted; in Korea, where schoolchildren are considered pawns of state, with basic purpose to indoctrinate them with what to think, not how to think; in India, where education is viewed as an avenue to work without use of hands, a concept itself rooted in caste system and other Indian customs.) (GA(8))

See Fobes (NT-83) (India - Prog.; D/S; USRO) (0-2) - In India, still prevalence of many ancient, deeply rooted traditions which exercise conservative influence and obstruct progress. However, also serve to some degree to keep together and sustain those great masses who have so little hope (e.g., family). (GA(8))

- See Whitman (NT-61) (UAR - D; Pakistan - DD; Israel; Norway) (O-2) - Describes process of development in Egypt in relation to traditional Moslem culture, noting that enough elements of western culture have been accepted as a result of British influence to cause some basic changes in traditional Arab culture. Examples: (1) in spite of fatalistic philosophy, wide acceptance of idea one should work to improve his place in life; (2) certain rules of family relationship grounded in religion, including those of inheritance, attacked head on with acknowledgment changes were necessary in spite of Koran; (3) disappearance mullah control in schools. (NP) (Cf. Whitman infra.)
- See Rogers (T/F-30) (Iran - Forestry Adv.; Taiwan) (R-3) - Describes problem in Iran of getting improved forest practices. Ownership of most timberland is by a few rich people who gain enormous profits operating on a scarcity market. Such profits would not be enhanced by additional investment. Such investment, moreover, would require the training and education of common people who are now virtually slaves and who would then become dissatisfied. (INDIG)
- See Posey (T/F-6) (Philippines - Labor Prod.) (R-3) - One of weaknesses of our programs is that we are prone to give funds to the conservative status quo forces. (GA(8))
- See Palmer (NT-40) (Japan - D) (O-1) - Must remember the paradox of development whereby the more successful we are with development, the more people there are who are dissatisfied with their status. (GA(8))
- Shook (T-16) (Afghanistan - Transp.) (R-5) - Basic changes are necessary and we can't always expect friendly pat on the back when things we introduce involve values different from those of local culture (e.g., (i) savings system in culture where religious belief in fate discourages saving and encourages spending and (ii) improved public health where there is acceptance of idea that God wills existing conditions). (GA(8))
- Hyde (T/E-15) (Korea - Mining Engr.; Liberia; Burma; Japan) (R-3) - We overlook the fact that this is an educational problem and that we must change the basic concept of the people before they will accept change in the manner in which Americans accept it. (NP(3))
- Nasr (A/UN-26) (Egypt - UN Res. Rep.) - In place such as Yemen, his main value is to serve as a wedge for the introduction of new concepts which are completely alien to the culture. (NP(1))

Cf. Whitman (NT-61) (UAR. - D; Pakistan - DD; Israel; Norway) (0-2) - Feels we may be wrong in assuming modernization requires a change in all the old patterns of a culture, although many cultural practices must of course change. Examples: (a) in Japan, great accomplishments in post-war period without change in certain traditional patterns which we assumed must change to get efficiency (e.g., paternalism); (b) in Egypt, considerable efficiency achieved in spite of persistence of paternalism. (GA(8))

Cf. Galloway (ETR - TEHRAN TOICA A-1353) (Iran - Ag. Exten.) (R-5) - During past few centuries most social and cultural changes encouraged by "outsiders" have resulted in a change for the worse. (GA(8))

Cf. [REDACTED] - A good job of technical assistance leading to change in the villages is not in the interest of the government in Tehran and the wealthy people associated with it who are considered friends of U.S. In fact, techniques used by [REDACTED] and others would virtually lead to the overthrowing of the ruling clique. [REDACTED] concluded from this that a good job of technical assistance might not be wise. (GA(8))

2. Possible corollaries to the suggested general principle

a. There may be some elements of a local culture which cannot be changed (or changed rapidly) and which should be accepted as premises in designing an approach.

Myers (NT-13) (Japan - DD; Burma) (R-2) - We should use great care in picking our objectives, not trying to deal with those elements which are so deeply built into the society and economy of a country that changes in them cannot be wrought quickly or easily (e.g., the servant system in Southeast Asia which is a reflection of extended-family operation and a safeguard against insecurity). (GA(8))

Rouse (T/A-16) (Philippines - PA) (R-3) - In public administration in Philippines, following guidelines for technicians recommended: (1) distinguish between those factors which can be changed by t.a. and those which cannot be....(GA(8))

Taggart (P/US-33) (Michigan State) - Need for awareness and acceptance of fact that socialism is going to be a dominant factor in large number of less developed countries. (NP)

See Friedmann (M-31) (Korea - Prog. Econ.; El Salvador - PA; Brazil) (R-4) - Should be a complete separation of the political and economic aspects of aid. Economic aid in the form of investment funds and technical assistance should be clearly distinguished from ideological purposes, and its objectives clearly delineated as the most rapid economic progress possible within an appropriate institutional framework. The ideological nature of this framework should be determined by host. (GA(0))

Knapp/Gardiner/Weigandt (PA-64) (Agriculture - Farmer Cooperative Service) - In describing the kind of mature, dedicated and experienced person likely to be a successful technician overseas (particularly in the cooperative and credit fields), emphasizes the importance of a capacity to adjust from (1) an environment in which the initiative lies in the local agricultural communities and the role of central government is simply that of promotion and advice to (2) an environment in which the central government is playing, whether we like it or not, a much more dominant role in the development of cooperatives. In many less developed countries, the initiative must be taken by the central government because it will not be taken in the villages, and one of the main tasks is to see that this initiative is handled in such a way that one doesn't end up with something like a government-directed commune.

- b. A donor should be discriminating in determining what elements of a local culture require change as a precondition to development and should not endeavor to change those elements which do not need to be changed.

Chawner (T-17) (DD/P; Korea) (R-1) - Where there are deeply rooted institutions, we should have the most solid justification for any efforts that we make to change them. Is the change an indispensable condition precedent to the achievement of our objectives? (Contrasts necessity for changes in the institution of the extended family as a precondition to industrialization with concept of democracy in terms of its relevance to development of less developed society.) (GA(8))

Whitman (NT-61) (UAR - D; Pakistan - DD; Israel; Norway) (O-2) - Feels we may be wrong in assuming modernization requires a change in all the old patterns of a culture, although many cultural practices must of course change. Examples: (a) in Japan, great accomplishments in post-war period without changes in certain traditional patterns which we assumed must change to get efficiency (e.g., paternalism); (b) in Egypt, considerable efficiency achieved in spite of persistence of paternalism. (GA(8))

See Forman (T-20) (Taiwan - Asia Foundation) - If, as he implies, but does not state, our purpose is to make other people pro-western, then one must analyze carefully what are the elements that make a nation pro-western. We tend to assume erroneously (since they are not ready) that these elements include capitalism and democracy as we interpret them in our society. (PUR)

See Weems (T/F-48) (Korea - Ind. Labor Adv.) (R-3) - Essential to understand, and take into account, the foreign cultural environment...Americans forget this, and the further fact that others (Koreans) have different values, and they attempt to transpose U.S. methods which profoundly affect local relationships. For example, USOM industrial engineers attempt to introduce U.S. accounting practices and management principles of delegation and distribution of authority, not realizing these profoundly affect relationships among individuals; and they advocate labor-saving devices on the assumption that if labor is saved, this is good. They take the position that if Koreans want to industrialize, they must modernize as we do, but it is not clear that the American arguments necessarily stand up in oriental situation (e.g., bifurcated Japanese industrial society). (GA(8))

c. A donor's approach should recognize that many of the changes necessary can only be achieved slowly (see also XIII)

Haraldson (NT-31) (Taiwan - D; Vietnam) (O-1) - These changes often can only be achieved slowly and should not be urged in a hurry. (GA(8))

Brown (NT-23) (Libya - D; Iraq - D) (O-1) - We seem unable to understand why locals can't act like Americans over a short period of time. (GA(8))

Price (P/NON-US-2) (Nepal - UN) - Must proceed at a pace that involves bites of progress that can be adequately digested. (GA(8))

Shook (T-16) (Afghanistan - Transp.) (R-5) - Because of limited cultural absorptive capacity, and while it may be possible to instill new ideas of progress in a few people, it is very difficult to instill new ideas in large numbers of people so that the attitudes of the culture as a whole change quickly - to reach the man behind the plow as compared with the more liberal and progressive elements of a society with whom we deal and who represent only a tiny fraction of public. (GA(8))

Houston (NT-10) (India - D) (R-1) - Americans must realize, as they frequently do not do, that the social system of another country cannot be changed overnight. (GA(8))

Myers (NT-13) (Japan - DD; Burma; Greece) (R-2) - We are inclined to move too fast, responding to aspirations of small group with whom we work (and who may be way ahead of the bulk of the population) and trying to do things more rapidly than it is possible to do them, often supporting projects that have not been thought through in terms of indigenous capabilities. However, one must recognize that political factors, including Communist competing claims, may require doing things rapidly which logically should be done slowly. (GA(8))

Astle (NT-56) (Brit. Honduras - D; Haiti - Ag.; Paraguay) (R-3) - Changes in standards and values must be introduced slowly. If they are introduced too rapidly or if they represent too great a break with the past, resultant shock may cause local rejection. If gradual, and accommodated to local conditions, they may survive. (GA(8))

Gushima (P/NON-US-7) (Japan) - Transition from colonialism to self-sustaining independence must be gradual. An effort to move too quickly may result in complete failure or, alternatively, in disorder and bloodshed (cf. India and China). (GA(0))

Cf. Hudson (P/US-14) (Rice) - In Arab world and probably elsewhere, at present time cultural changes, and consequently economic changes dependent on cultural changes, are occurring too slowly (even though slower pace might be healthier) when one considers (a) rate of change in Communist world, (b) psychological impact of latter, and (c) intense desire for modernization. We cannot wait for change of a slow, orderly, evolutionary type. We must find ways by which to adjust or adapt their culture values to make them compatible with the realization of their aspirations to be western in a material and technological sense. (GA(8))

- d. When basic changes in the local culture are necessary for development or technological advancement such changes should be effected within the local cultural framework. Where possible a donor should build upon, or seek to change, existing institutions rather than to introduce entirely new institutions. (See also XIV-A.)

Alter (NT-43) (Nepal - Prog.; India) (R-3) - One must start with the present thought processes of the other individual, and gradually mold these. (GA(8))

Harmon (T-14) (Iran - CD; Iraq) (R-5) - While our objective may be changes in the local culture, efforts to effect such changes must be carried out within, and make adequate allowance for, the existing cultural framework. (GA(8))

Nelson (T-35) (Iran - CD; Philippines) (R-3) - In tackling education problem in Iran, must start with the resources available and develop a system from this base, rather than attempting to introduce a radically different approach (e.g., use of 8th-grade graduates as teachers rather than introduction of U.S. normal school standards). (GA(8))

Daenecke (EPR - TEHRAN TOICA A-2578, 6/12/61) (Iran - Pub. Admin. (Accounting)) (R-3) - Endorses statements of R.L. Stevenson that: (a) "you don't change ancestral feelings of right and wrong without what is practically murder"; (b) patience is essential; and (c) "you can only civilize the man in the line of his own civilization." (TECH-T(6))

Astle (NT-56) (Brit. Honduras - D; Haiti; Paraguay) (R-3) - Unless you (a) help locals identify what they really want, (b) provide their own institutions with an opportunity to adjust in a way that will permit them to achieve these things, and (c) offer them the help which they may need in making the adjustment required, you will find yourself fighting against both (i) the people and (ii) the existing institutions when you seek to introduce change. (GA(5a))

Neal (NT-59-B) (Sierra Leone - D; Liberia - DD; Philippines - CD; India) (R-2) - In Sierra Leone, would attempt to achieve modernization by process of grafting innovations to the existing tribal roots which go back a thousand years rather than seeking to destroy these roots, as the missionaries have tried to do without significant influence....In cases where we have been successful, it is largely the result of an individual technician who has learned enough about a village or tribal structure to help in the construction of indigenous institutions that were adapted to the culture. (GA(0))

See Traiber (T/E-25) (Guatemala - Tech. & Ind. Educ. Adv.) (R-5) - In Guatemala, key to effective literacy program lies in working through already existing organized agencies - the army, school system, and other private organizations - training people in them to do the job - using existing resources rather than developing new agencies and recruiting new people. (GA(O))

Huth (T-42) (Africa - CM) (Consultant) - Best approach is to strengthen local activities already under way and to build upon the improvements so made rather than to introduce entirely new and radically different approaches....This helps locals to gain confidence in themselves. (GA(2))

Nelson (NT-78) (Lebanon - D; ICA/W; Jordan - D) (R-1) - Build on existing institutions rather than superimpose entirely new ones. Given importance of local pride, one gets further by starting with something which is already theirs and, then subsequently, when entree has been gained, branching out to affect these institutions when opportunities present themselves. (Examples from (a) Jordan - wrong approach in vocational education, and (b) Lebanon - support of U.S. school and ignoring local established one.) (GA(8))

Naylor (T-49) (Philippines - CD; Iran) (R-3) - In Africa South of Sahara, should attempt to capture the support of the intelligentsia and elite for a process of change through modernization of existing patterns rather than their complete renunciation. (Description of contrasting trends.) (NP)

See Bakke (T/PR-26) (Libya - CM; Iran) (R-4) - In Libya, comments on lack of success of Italian efforts to revolutionize country by introducing improved housing, roads, irrigation, collectives, etc. These things are not being maintained. (GA(O))

Davidson ("National Efforts in the Field of Social Development") - Each nation must develop own pattern and pace for social development in light of its own circumstances, and while t.a. or financial assistance may be indispensable, it cannot provide the foundation on which national social development is erected. (GA(5b))

Liberia Evaluation Report (1957) - In Liberia, have made mistake in not building slowly and surely on what was there, recognizing that Liberia can't be changed to the United States overnight. (GA(5b))

Kerwin (T/S-13) (Iran - Educ.; Libya) (R-4) - Should build program on what already exists, or rather not tear down completely existing structure. In education the job is to help countries rebuild educational philosophy. (TECH-T(6))

See Gant (M-35) (Ford) - Technical assistance projects, since they are only parts, and often very small parts, of the total complex and diverse pattern of activity in a country, can affect the country significantly only as they are directly related to, and in harmony with, country's needs and own over-all programs for attaining greater self-sufficiency in professional and technical competence. (GA(0))

See Lippincott (NT-11) (Lebanon - DD) (R-2) - Essential to operate within the general political stream and to reach and get the influence peddlers to work. Acceptance of the idea of a technician working independently on a people-to-people basis outside the general political stream is best definition of how to fail in a technical assistance program. (GA(8))

Cf. Andrews (P/US-7-D) (Michigan State) - In spite of our statements about working within the context of local culture, development can only occur as very major changes are brought about in culture (e.g., essentiality of concept of time for modern society to replace traditional disregard for time - a profound adjustment). (GA(8))

Whitman (NT-61) (JAR - D; Pakistan - DD; Israel; Norway) (O-2) - Describes process of development in Egypt in relation to traditional Moslem culture, noting that enough elements of western culture have been accepted as a result of British influence to cause some basic changes in traditional Arab culture. Examples: (1) in spite of fatalistic philosophy, wide acceptance of idea one should work to improve his place in life; (2) certain rules of family relationship grounded in religion, including those of inheritance, attacked head on with acknowledgment changes were necessary in spite of Koran; (3) disappearance of mullah control in schools. (NP)

Cf. Schaffrath (T/M-8) (Taiwan - PH) (R-4) - Determination as to the kind of world we want will control (a) purposes to be sought and (b) methods to be used, including whether we wish to adapt existing cultures or, alternatively, to destroy and replace the existing. (PUR)

- e. Local cultural factors should be utilized to the maximum to support rational solution to local problems.

Ladenheim (NT/F-3) (USRO; Iran - Prov. Dir.; India) (R-4) -

One should make local cultural factors, customs, etc., work in support of solutions. While religion can be great obstacle to change, religious factor can be used to great advantage. Cites numerous illustrations of invoking Moslem law, etc., to support desired solutions. (GA(8))

C. NON-TRANSPLANTABILITY WITHOUT ADAPTATION TO ANOTHER CULTURE OF FOREIGN INSTITUTIONS AND SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS

1. Suggested general principle: Foreign concepts, institutions, techniques, methods of doing things, and solutions to problems cannot be imposed upon another society and they generally cannot be transplanted to another society without their adaptation to fit the particular local culture. Sometimes, even with adaptation, they may not be appropriate at all and, as a result, entirely new institutions, methods, solutions, or answers must be developed.

a. As applied to U.S. concepts, institutions, methods, solutions, and answers

Campbell (W-23) (O/PH; Brazil) - We must recognize adaptation necessary in light of local value system and its social setting. (GA(8))

Haraldson (NT-31) (Taiwan - D; Vietnam) (O-1) - American ideas and techniques must be molded to take into account the local culture, but caveat: don't go too far. (GA(8))

Mann (NT-42) (Cambodia - D; Vietnam) (R-1) - Transplantation of our own concept of doing things to local setting may be inappropriate because of local conditions or because of unwarranted belief that our own way of doing things is superior to that of other donors, etc. (GA(8))

Brown (NT-23) (Libya - D; Iraq) (O-1) - Must recognize that U.S. way of doing things is not the only way of doing things and that there may be other, better ways of doing these things for a person who is being trained to change his habits. Right technique is to find out the general ways in which locals do things and then to set out to develop methods by which they can do them better. (GA(8))

Houston (NT-10) (India - D) (R-1) - While we can use methods which are employed in U.S. elsewhere, they must be blended into, and adapted to the conditions of, local environment (e.g., agriculture). (GA(8))

Loren (NT-25) (Ethiopia - D; Thailand) (R-1) - Adaptation, rather than transplantation, of our knowledge, institutions, values, etc., in other countries in which they may not be wholly suitable as they are. (GA(8))

Nelson (T-35) (Iran - CD; Philippines) (R-4) - Adaptation rather than transplantation of U.S. ideas and institutions. The highly specialized character of our own society and institutions can't be effectively mirrored in the bureaucracy of host governments. (GA(8))

Roach (NT-49) (Ceylon - D; Spain; Greece) (R-2) - Key question in t.a. is how to communicate skills in a way that takes account of local values. (GA(8))

Di Venuti (T/F-30) (Laos - Prog.) (R-2) - Should not tell people to do things foreign to concepts; smacks of imperialism (e.g., insistence on Central American economic integration, sound as it is economically). (GA(8))

Heilpern (T-27) (Iran - Prog. Econ.) (R-3) - U.S. solutions to local problems usually will not work without adaptation. Methods of compromise must be found. (GA(8))

Barrows (W-27) (O/NESA; Vietnam - D; Greece) (O-1) - May often be incorrect in believing our values are the values that should be accepted locally.

Haines (M-47-G) (D/Agriculture) - Cannot, either in a physical or cultural sense, simply transplant U.S. solutions. Adaptations must be made in light of experience. (GA(8))

Moyer (NT-66) (Korea - D; ICA/W - O/FE; Taiwan - D) (R-1) - U.S. institutions, if suitable at all, must be adapted to local requirements. Whether suitable at all is a question to be considered on a country-by-country basis....Examples: (a) agricultural extension, which, in spite of O/FOOD to the contrary, Moyer questions as suitable vehicle to reach grass roots (notes own doubts in Korea and Heilman's feeling it was ill-adapted to Latin America) and (b) American democracy, which he feels is of questionable applicability in many less developed countries at their present stage of development and the applicability of which as a suitable form of government should be examined from the three following standpoints: (i) basic aspirations of locals, (ii) kind of government wanted by locals, and (iii) relationship of Communism to problem. (Extensive discussion.) (GA(8))

See Mattusch (NT-81) (Korea - Prog. Econ.) (R-3) - Programs should be adapted to and respect the local culture...In Korea, the tendency has been to the contrary - to overwhelm with characteristics of our own society. (GA(0))

Baron (NT-58) (Cambodia - DD; Philippines - Prog.) (R-2) - Even in the technical fields, must recognize that the proper solutions may come through devices that are different from, or less technically perfect than, those acceptable in U.S. (e.g., to Beltsville Agricultural Station). (GA(0))

Carreon (P/NON-US-5) (Philippines) - Necessary for adaptation of American solutions, techniques, and ideas to particular problems of a country. (GA(8))

Andrews (P/US-7-D) (Michigan State) - Replicas of U.S. institutions cannot be imposed on local countries. (GA(5))

Witte (Article from "Précis of 'International Cooperation for Social Welfare'") (Council for Social Work Education) - In social work field, donor must guard against imposition of its own social programs and services. (GA(8))

Green (M-47-F) (Commerce) - Introduction of standards of precision and quality involves more than transplanted of our own system. It requires translation of our own system into the language and culture of individual countries. However, hopefully, though of secondary consideration, system developed will be compatible with our own, because identity or comparability in standards facilitates introduction and conduct of U.S. enterprises. (PUR)

Neal (NT-59) (Liberia - DD; Philippines - CD; India) (R-2) - Where problem is one of effecting a transition from an authoritarian tribal or village culture to a culture with democratic institutions and a sense of individual responsibility, the transition will not follow U.S. patterns...(NT-59-A) - Should recall long process of evolution in reaching our own present solutions and fact that we tackled problems in different ways at different stages in our own development. Therefore shouldn't assume our present solutions are appropriate for others....In Liberia, educational needs are very different from our own, even at same levels of schooling, and we should devise (instead of trying to superimpose our own) a system responsive to local needs. (Detailed discussion.) (GA(8))...(NT-59) - In Africa South of Sahara, one of main problems is to develop training institutions which are close to existing tribal structure. Believes that U.S. experience in dealing with emancipated Negro has certain applicability to development of training institutions in Africa. Long discussion of Tuskegee, Berea, etc., considering factors that led to their success in acculturation of American Negro and relevance of these factors in Africa. Expresses belief these organizations might help us in developing African training institutions. (GA(8))

- Cf. Andrews (P/US-7-D) (Michigan State) - It is possible to transfer the philosophy underlying, or the substance of, American agricultural institutions but not an exact model thereof. Tendency has been to the contrary. (GA(2))
- Yamashiro (T/M-1) (Vietnam - Livestock Adv.; Oceania) (R-3) - We should not automatically assume that our own ways are better (e.g., Chinese method of hatching duck eggs). (GA(12b))
- Astle (NT-56) (Brit. Honduras - D; Haiti - Ag.; Paraguay) (R-3) - Changes in standards and values cannot be imposed; they must be induced... However, changes introduced may survive if they are gradual and accommodated to local conditions. (GA(8))
- Wood (T/M-49) (Haiti - PH; Indonesia) (R-3) - Should not try to make over other peoples in our own image. The answers we know best may well not be the answers required for problems in the local country. (TECH-T(6))
- Johnson (M-39) (India - PH; Mexico; Brazil) (R-3) - Essentiality of understanding that one is the product of one's own culture and of realizing that one's beliefs, valid in one's own experience, may have little or no place in the personality of host colleagues. (GA(8))
- Karam (T/PR-25) (Vietnam - Malaria Spec.; Liberia) (R-5) - You cannot force people to do what you want when you are an adviser. Learned this from experience in Vietnam... Must shelve some of U.S. technical standards to meet needs of some less developed countries or one's position is unrealistic and frustrating. (TECH-T(6))
- Snyder (T/A-18) (Turkey - Pub. Safety) (R-4) - In police work, need to know the general attitude of locals towards the police and how they think and react (illustration from Turkey), and as to their concept of moral laws (compares U.S. and Turkish reaction to strict enforcement of various types of laws). One cannot simply transfer the American pattern of police work or of police thinking into an alien culture such as Turkey. (TECH-T(6))
- Reed (P/US/F-7) (Puerto Rico - Housing; Greece; Burma) - In housing field should not impose American methods and materials. Programs should be simply conceived and contribute to local industry and labor. (GA(0))
- Caldwell (M-47-A) (HEW) - Must not attempt simply to transplant U.S. educational system (e.g., Philippines). (GA(8))

Wood (NT-60) (India - D; Eval.; Korea - D) (R-1) - Programs and institutions must be adapted to local conditions. Example: In India initially wrong approach of attempting to create land-grant colleges of the kind we have in the U.S. as key to agricultural extension system when we should have worked with the state agricultural departments with which the system was then, and is now, tied in. Universities are potentially important, but at present, since they are theoretically oriented, they are in no position to serve as anchors to operating extension system like our own. (GA(8))

Harris (P/US-32) (Indonesia - Ford; Germany - D; Sweden - D; France - Lab.) - Ordinarily not possible to transplant without adaptation, and sometimes impossible to transplant at all, the institutions of one country to another. Example: Ford-financed teacher training effort in Indonesia, in which personnel involved failed to remain long enough to gain real understanding, assuming average student already knew math, that statistics taught was same as in U.S., and that business cycle problem could be taught the same as in U.S. (GA(8))

Weems (T/F-48) (Korea - Ind. Labor Adv.) (R-3) - Americans forget the fact that others (Koreans) have different values, and attempt to transpose U.S. methods which profoundly affect local relationships. For example, USOM industrial engineers attempt to introduce U.S. accounting practices and management principles of delegation and distribution of authority, not realizing these profoundly affect relationships among individuals; and they advocate labor-saving devices on the assumption if labor is saved, this is good. They take position that if Koreans want to industrialize, they must modernize in our image, but is not clear American arguments necessarily stand up in oriental situation (e.g., bifurcated Japanese industrial society).

Nelson (NT-79) (Lebanon - D; ICA/W; Jordan - D) (R-1) - Should not attempt to ram own ideas and systems down locals' throats (e.g., the Dewey system in Lebanon in lieu of French-derived system). (GA(8))

Beyer (T/F-9) (Labor) - In field of technical education, where we should take broad view, training should be oriented to the particular industrial needs of a country, tying in with the particular requirements of industry - not a transplantation of historical U.S. methods. (GA(8))

Hyde (P/US-39) (Social Welfare) - In social work field cannot transplant American patterns without adaptation to local requirements. Social work has to do with relationships between individuals and between individuals and groups, and one must therefore take into account the cultural characteristics of those with whom one is working. This is true even if basic underlying principles of human behavior are applicable universally. (GA(8))

Myers (M-59) (Minnesota - Geneticist) - Important thing is to make certain that science and science education are built into the educational systems of less developed countries. Substantive scientific solutions less important because doubts that one can translate scientific experience of U.S. to other countries without adaptation. (ITECH(13)SCIENCE)

Reed (M-46) (Puerto Rico - Priv. Housing Adv.; Greece; Burma; Dominican Rep.) - Political institutions must be adapted to meet indigenous cultural characteristics. Example: inappropriateness, as reflected in history, of U.S. constitution in many Latin American countries. (GA(8))

Garner (T/M-39) (Vietnam - Ag. Engr.; Thailand; Pakistan) (R-4) - You cannot drive people to doing things the way they are done here. You must direct your efforts to cutting a pattern to do things as they have been done there. (TECH-T(6))

H.E. Aziz (KABUL F.S. DESP 191, 3/16/61) (Afghanistan - Deputy Planning Minister) - Critical of U.S. tendency to plan unilaterally in Afghanistan, particularly in fields in which social habits and cultural patterns were most important. As an example, he cited proposal for PTA as part of community school program, observing that any proposal for community schools must be an Afghan proposal, not something imported from U.S. without adaptation (USOM personnel defended particular case, while agreeing to principle). Wanted programs placed on a firm and sound basis of mutual development and participation. (GA(0))

Cf. Merson (ETR - TEHRAN TOICA A-2277) (Iran - Emp. Sec. Adv.) (R-3) - In Iran, following basic assumptions in employment security program: (a) Iran could not afford employment security system like U.S.;... (c) some U.S. experience could be adapted, particularly if basic concepts, tools, and techniques, rather than specific procedures, stressed;....(GA(8))

Troyer (ETR - RIO TOAID A-1131, 3/30/62) (Brazil - Geologist; Taiwan) - Found great difficulty from beginning to end of tour in making essential adjustments in his own professional thinking and class presentation pattern to the local department environment. (TECH-T(2f))

Hatten (ETR - MOGADISCIO TOAID A-367, 3/21/62) (Somalia - Ag. Exten.; Indonesia; India) (R-4) - In Somalia, must keep in mind that we are dealing with a pastoral type people in agricultural program and that they obey only those laws and customs which they have been taught for generations. Extension work, and particularly the 4-H phase, is very different from what it is in United States. (GA(8))

Miller (ETR - BEIRUT TOICA A-89) (Lebanon - Hortic. Adv.) (R-4) - In Lebanon an attitude of learning may prove to be the best way of teaching in horticulture....Horticulturist must first learn how locals meet own problems before suggesting changes, since present methods may better fit needs than a method used under American conditions. While it is important for adviser to know and understand American methods in extension and horticulture, great adjustment and adaptation of them are needed in Lebanon. (TECH-T(6))

Wright/Johnson/Butler (PA-100) (Interior - Fish and Wildlife Service) - U.S. training programs need to be adapted to meet a participant's actual requirements. Too often the tendency has been to the contrary - to modify the training programs required by and requested for a particular participant in accordance with the offerings, and in conformance with the criteria, of U.S. training institutions.

Garrett et al. (PA-106) (HEW - Office of Vocational Rehabilitation) - Assistance in the rehabilitation field must take into account the fact that conditions in less developed areas are very different from those which exist in the U.S. and that it will not be possible to transplant without adaptation the kind of programs operated in the U.S. to countries which are at a much earlier stage of economic development. And it is of greatest importance not to export unrealistic and unattainable goals or to stimulate programs which attempt to emulate those in the U.S. (Lengthy discussion of the reasons for this conclusion.)....Problem is a real one as regards participants in rehabilitation. It is difficult to convince them that they will not have available in their home countries the kinds of equipment used in rehabilitation in the U.S. and to persuade them that activities which they will be carrying out must be operated at a fraction of the cost of comparable activities in the U.S. Every effort is made to get them to think in terms of the best methods of applying the general approach and philosophy employed in U.S. with techniques that take into account limited local resources and other special factors.

Lawson (PA-17) (ESD - Pub. Admin.; Korea) - One danger in the projected agreement with the Internal Revenue Service (which is generally desirable) will be, if exclusive reliance is placed thereon, a too heavy overdose of U.S.-Revenue-Code-type advice in countries where various types of indirect taxation may be more appropriate than a sophisticated system of income tax.

Cf. Astle (NT-56) (Brit. Honduras - D; Haiti - Ag.; Paraguay) (R-3) - Notes that in Latin America all cultures but that of the Mayans (which has made the least progress) are in fact operating under an artificial set of institutions which were imposed from the outside - Spain, Catholic Church, Britain, etc.

Baker et al. (PA-103) (Interior - Geological Survey) - In describing the allegedly peculiar capabilities of the Survey and its personnel for work overseas in foreign aid, Baker stated that GS was not likely to make the kind of mistakes which other participating agencies might sometimes make when they attempted to superimpose U.S. institutions and U.S. technical solutions on a culture that was not sufficiently advanced to profit by them. Example from Liberia.

Grant/Roberts/Wallach (PA-82) (Labor - Bureau of Labor Standards) - At present time, due to our limited knowledge, the training programs of LBS do little more than describe how labor administration, labor laws, and safety activities are handled in the U.S. This is not enough for people who must go back and work in entirely different environments. Courses of instruction should give more emphasis to what is being done in various less developed countries and to the work of ILO in establishing international standards. While it is valuable for participants to know what we do in this country, it would probably be more meaningful to them if we could show them how various other less developed countries and the ILO have been approaching the problems with which they must deal themselves.

See Warnock (PA-88) (Labor - Bureau of International Labor Affairs) - Expresses doubt as to the desirability of using persons hired directly from American trade unions to work on matters of worker organization and worker education in a less developed country. A person working in these fields needs to understand the differences between the American scene and the typical less developed scene in terms of the status of trade unions and the role which they play in society.

Werts (PA-48) (Labor - Administrative Asst. Secy.) - There is a need for a thorough reexamination of our past approach to the problem of trade union development in less developed countries. The approach successfully employed in Europe by ECA of sending American trade unionists to work with European trade unionists has no applicability to the present situation. In Europe the problem was one of assisting people in already developed societies in which trade unions had long existed and performed functions comparable to those performed by unions in this country. In the less developed country the task is not necessarily that of promoting free trade unions as such. Rather one must address the problem of how best to work out the institutional relationships between management and labor and of the appropriate role, if any, of workers' organizations as an element in the development process at various stages of growth and in different cultural environments....Problems of the character which must be addressed require a form of approach which is different from that of the average trade unionist whose natural and laudable inclination is to go out and organize a union and through the union to endeavor to protect the workers from exploitation.... The kind of job that needs to be done is not going to be done by getting AFL and CIO officials whose natural tendencies are to transplant the patterns of this country.

Lally/Enochs/Whalen/Elsea/Myers (PA-75) (HEW - Social Security Administration) - There is a great difference in the character of the social welfare problems which have to be addressed in most less developed countries and those which are most pressing in the U.S. In the latter, the system attempts to deal with the very small residue of people who from time to time need help as a result of the flux of a highly dynamic and generally very prosperous society; it is an expensive system, and it can be expensive because it is concentrated on this residue. It would be entirely inappropriate for many less developed countries in which the social welfare system must reach a large portion of the population (e.g., Egypt - 90 per cent)....However, in spite of the great differences in the problems which must be addressed, the transition of a social worker from the U.S. to a less developed area is easier than the transition of technicians in most other fields because the essential qualification for a good social worker, whether here or abroad, is his ability to work with people. Social workers customarily begin their activities where people are, and ordinarily adapt their work to the particular needs of the specific people with whom they are dealing and, even within the United States, these needs differ significantly from city to city.

Cf. Lally/Enochs/Whalen/Elsea/Myers (PA-75) (HEW - Social Security Administration) - Identifies several features of social welfare in the U.S. which are stated to be unique and which can and should be transplanted to other countries. Among these unique features are: (1) social welfare in the U.S. proceeds on the assumption that the individual should be self-reliant (thus it contrasts with the paternalistic characteristics of the social welfare approach in Europe and most other places, which tends to dictatorship; and it is important to build the basic democratic strengths and characteristics of our own system into the process of growth of social welfare systems in countries where such systems are just getting under way); and (2) social welfare in the U.S. has emphasized, more than in any other country, planning, over-all policy development, and administrative training in the development of its social welfare workers.

Schwartz (PA-74; (Afghanistan - D; ICA/n; Ceylon - Ag.; Vietnam; Oceania; Egypt) (R-1) - Due to its interest in the development of international aviation, FAA has some tendency (not serious) to superimpose on the locals and to enforce the same standards of airworthiness, safety, etc., as our own. While sympathetic with FAA's objective, Schwartz notes that FAA forgets that the U.S. did not reach its level of technical efficiency in one day and that this level cannot be transplanted intact to other countries.

Watt (PA-33) (HEW - Asst. Surgeon General and Chief of the Div. of Intl. Health, PHS) - Much of current American medicine and medical training is now inapplicable to the problems of the less developed countries. Discussion and illustrations.

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Chawner (T-17) (DD/P; Korea) (R-1) - Our own political and economic concepts are not the only ones that have had acceptance and at times they may not be adapted to the situation confronting a particular country. The adoption of a free competitive economic system or of a political system comparable to our own way may not provide the right answer. In Korea, for example, an effort to make democracy work on our model would quite possibly frustrate any efforts to achieve economic development on a major scale. Strong authoritarian government may represent essential ingredient in poor country trying to develop rapidly....Discussion of (a) problem of industrialization and successful business enterprise in the face of the institution of the extended family; and (b) the applicability of U.S. political and economic systems under conditions existing in many less developed countries where (a) economic development within a democratic framework and a free competitive system may not be possible or (b) concepts are inconsistent with those held locally. (GA(8))

Wilson (P/US-34) (Philippines - Asia Foundation; Pakistan - Educ.) - Should be prepared to support administrative authoritarianism but not metaphysical authoritarianism. (Extensive discussion.) (GA(8))

Gushima (P/NON-US-7) (Japan) - Successful development is impossible without strong central authority and direction. Most less developed countries not ready for democracy though to a certain degree it can be fostered (e.g., in Indonesia, so-called "guided democracy" close to dictatorship but probably unavoidable). (GA(0))

Taggart (P/US-33) (Michigan State) - Need for awareness and acceptance of fact that socialism is going to be a dominant factor in large number of less developed countries. (GA(8))

Kitchen (NT-46) (Sudan - D; Liberia) (R-2) - Must accept the fact that, in spite of our democratic ideals, strongly centralized governments may represent the best medium-term solution in newly independent countries. (GA(8))

Forman (T-20) (Taiwan - Educ.) (R-4) - Our own political and economic concepts may not be adapted to people who are not sophisticated and who are culturally unready to accept them. We must find alternatives that will work... We must be prepared to search for and accept other alternatives than capitalism and democracy in a western sense where people are not culturally ready to accept them. We must seek alternatives which represent the best possible political and economic set-up which locals are capable of developing and identify ourselves with it. (GA(8))

Neal (NT-59) (Liberia - DD; Philippines - CD; India) (R-2) - Where problem is one of effecting a transition from an authoritarian tribal or village culture to a culture with democratic institutions and a sense of individual responsibility, the transition will not follow U.S. patterns... Development of democracy at local level must be on a realistic rather than simply a philosophical basis... Democracy must probably be built up from bottom and not down from top. Discusses Philippine experience, contrasting failure of efforts of central government to superimpose democracy at barrio level without training with growing success of developing capacity for responsible government at local level. Comments favorably on Ayub experiment in Pakistan in developing democracy at village level. (GA(8))

Allen (NT-51) (Indonesia - D) (R-1) - In Indonesia, and probably other recently emancipated countries, institutions of a working government will not be "free institutions" except in form. (GA(8))

Friedmann (M-31) (Korea - Prog. Econ.; El Salvador - PA; Brazil) (R-4) - The character of many of our country programs has been shaped by a desire to impose American (= democratic?) ideas and institutions on less developed societies, regardless of indigenous values and aspirations. The promotion of ideology frequently appears more important than promotion of economic growth, particularly in the fields of education, community development, and public administration. Also reflected in strong agrarian bias of ICA programs and active advocacy of free enterprise capitalism. This policy of attempting to impose American institutions and ideas has not generally furthered basic long-term interests of U.S. (GA(0))

Moyer (NT-66) (Korea - D; O/FE - D; Taiwan - D) (R-1) - American democracy is of questionable applicability in many less developed countries at their present stage of development. Its suitability as a form of government should be examined from three following standpoints: (i) basic aspirations of locals; (ii) kind of government wanted by locals; (iii) relationship of Communism to the problem. (Extensive discussion.) (GA(8))

Cf. Maxwell School of Syracuse (Report to Senate Foreign Relations Committee on "The Operational Aspects of U.S. Foreign Policy") (TASG #133, No. 6, pp. 35-37) - Must recognize that U.S.-supported programs in fact have significant political effects, and U.S. operations should, after careful analysis of the direction of internal political and social change in a country, represent a deliberate effort to help the country develop the institutional structure most conducive to self-government and cooperative participation in building a world order in which change can take place without major violence - to induce the kind of changes we want (and resist the kind not wanted). (GA(5))

Cf. Neal (NT-59) (Liberia - DD; Philippines - CD; India) (R-2) - Gives high priority to development of democracy at local level. Would withhold aid where government refuses to take steps to encourage such development and provide supporting help where government is willing to go ahead. Recognizes, however, that there is need for some accommodation in view of Communist threat. (GA(8))

Cf. Posey (T/F-6) (Philippines - Lab. Prod.) (R-3) - Should aim at promotion of democratic institutions in assisting industrial development; should not seek industrialization at expense of such institutions. Does not subscribe to view that dictatorship should be accepted in countries where it seems difficult to achieve economic development through democratic means. (GA(5b))

Cf. Muller (NT-26) (Somalia - D; Nepal - DD; Oceania) (R-2) - It is possible to build institutions and to develop skills without at the same time developing the kind of attitudes we want (e.g., Germany and Italy, pre-WW-II, with strong economies and elaborate social structure, but also dangerous national attitudes). Programs directed toward this end should have more attention (e.g., (1) village-level development program as training ground for democratic procedures; (2) literacy program when attention is given to reading materials provided). (GA(8))

b. As applied to concepts, institutions, methods, solutions, or answers which were successful in the European aid program

Haraldson (NT-31) (Taiwan - D; Vietnam) (O-1) - Marshall Plan solutions (money) are not appropriate to the Far East. (GA(8))

FitzGerald (W-21) (DD/0) - Techniques of technical assistance which were extremely productive under European conditions have become less and less appropriate as the areas of our concentration have shifted. (GA(8))

Baird (NT-7) (Indonesia - D; Pakistan) (R-1) - Techniques useful in Europe where education was universal, technical skill high, and an industrial society well developed cannot be effective in places where the absence of these factors represents the prevalent characteristic of the local scene. (GA(8))

Dickerman (P/US-30) (Philippines - Syracuse Contract) - Marshall Plan approach to industrial development, emphasizing engineering and more efficient use of labor, not well adapted to countries where labor is plentiful and cheap. More emphasis needed on marketing and financing. (GA(8))

Babcock (NT-6) (Liberia - D; Eval.; Paraguay - D) (R-1) - Because big-money programs, in past to Europe, dominated formulation of policies, programming, procedures, etc., we have tended to take a set of relationships established under such programs between ourselves and a certain group of host governments and, without adequate adaptation, to transplant this set of relationships to entirely different areas, failing to recognize the vast distinctions between, and the differing requirements for, relatively developed, educated, salvageable-through-large-sums-of-aid countries and less developed countries. (GA(8))

Werts (PA-48) (Labor - Administrative Asst. Secy.) - The approach successfully employed in Europe by ECA of sending American trade unionists to work with European trade unionists has no applicability to the present situation in less developed countries. In Europe the problem was one of assisting people in already developed societies in which trade unions had long existed and performed functions comparable to those performed by unions in this country. In the less developed country the task is not necessarily that of promoting free trade unions as such. Rather one must address the problem of how best to work out the institutional relationships between management and labor and of the appropriate role, if any, of workers' organizations as an element in the development process at various stages of growth and in different cultural environments

c. As applied to concepts, institutions, methods, solutions, or answers which were successful in other less developed countries

Andrews (P/US-7-A) (Michigan State) - Our methods are over-rigid in that we tend to assume that methods of operation effective one place will be effective in all other places. (GA(8))

Babcock (NT-6-A) (Liberia - D; Eval.; Paraguay - D) (R-1) - In countries like Liberia, traditional concepts of technical assistance may not apply. Illustrated by problems in education. (GA(8))

Alter (NT-43) (Nepal - Prog.; India) (R-3) - (GA(8))

Nelson (NT-78) (Lebanon - D; ICA/W; Jordan - D) (R-1) - Great care must be shown in applying solutions that have worked elsewhere (in the U.S. or a third country) to a country's indigenous problems. Even where the principle is good, the blueprint may need to be radically adapted. (Examples: Jordanian efforts to copy U.K. parliamentary and permanent under secretary systems.) (GA(8))

Harris (P/US-32) (Indonesia - Ford; Germany - D; Sweden - D; France - Lab.) - Ordinarily not possible to transplant without adaptation, and sometimes impossible to transplant at all, the institutions of one country to another. Example: UN efforts to impose Indian community development concepts in Indonesia, forgetting the great difference in societal structure. (GA(8))

Edwards (ETR - KHARTOUM TOICA A-1390, 6/8/61) (Sudan - Trade Ind. Educ. Adv.) (R-5) - In Sudan, found that syllabus employed in Technical Institute was British-inspired and more suited to the needs of people living in Britain than in the Sudan....Based on study of use and needs in Sudan, developed a course that would meet local needs and practices. Enthusiastically received by students. (TECH-T(6))

Knapp/Gardiner/Weigandt (PA-64) (Agriculture - Farmer Cooperative Service) - In the field of cooperatives, it would be desirable to undertake research to determine what kind of arrangements and techniques which may have succeeded in one area might be applied in other areas. Examples.

## 2. Possible corollaries to the suggested general principle

Comments listed under the several possible corollaries set forth below are only illustrative. Additional relevant comments will be found in X-C-1 above and in other sections to which cross-references are given.

- a. Preconceived donor solutions: In extending technical assistance a donor should not start with preconceived solutions for the problems of another society.

Alter (NT-43) (Nepal - Prog.; India) (R-3) - We should not start with specific preconceived notions as to the right solutions. In endeavoring to effect necessary changes in current thought processes and bringing about new methods of approaching problems, we should not start with any specifically preconceived notions as to the precise shape of the changes, because we will probably find this is not adapted to the local setting (e.g., one can't expect the Nepalese to think precisely as Americans do). (GA(8))

Ladejinsky (P/US-37) (Vietnam - priv.; Vietnam; Taiwan) - Less developed countries must be approached without preconceptions. (GA(8))

Yamashiro (T/M-2) (Vietnam - Livestock Adv.; Oceania) (R-3) - Must have open mind and not try to impose ideas you bring with you. (GA(8))

Pendleton (T/M-29) (Costa Rica - Agron. Adv.; Nepal; Afghanistan) (R-4) - One must proceed cautiously at the start and not rush in with solutions (illustration from Nepal of 30-day TDY industry adviser who followed wrong approach). (TECH-T(6))

- b. Adaptation of donor materials. Application of the foregoing suggested principle means that materials, equipment, etc., may need to be adapted for use in the local culture or may not be useful at all. (See also IX-C.)

Reed (P/US/F-7) (Puerto Rico - Housing; Greece; Burma) - In housing field should not impose American methods and materials. Programs should be simply conceived and contribute to local industry and labor. (GA(0))

Gorton (T/F-40) (Brazil - Agric. Econ.; Turkey; Lebanon; Oceania) (R-3) - To demonstrate that equipment suitable in U.S. cannot be applied universally elsewhere, describes effort in Guam to substitute garden tractors for native-type hoe, the former causing erosion because of torrential downpours and proving to be unsatisfactory substitute. (GA(10c))...In general, and specifically in Brazil, American should not attempt to write textbook for foreign country. Rather, at least where there are people with writing competence, American should help, or collaborate, with local. Only locals can do the adaptation needed. Similarly, local language translations of American texts are not satisfactory (e.g., Spanish edition of U.S. book on farm management). (GA(8))

Hummon (T-29) (Liberia - CM; Libya) (R-3) - Must determine and use the kind of materials which will be the most effective vehicles for communication in the local culture - not stereotypes of Madison Avenue. (GA(8))

Di Venuti (T/F-30) (Laos - Prog.) (R-2) - e.g., textbooks and training courses. (GA(8))

Andrews (P/US-7-D) (Michigan State) - Need to adapt U.S. educational materials to local cultural background. Example of good adaptation of elementary textbooks in Vietnam. (GA(8))

- c. Possible greater applicability or adaptability of non-U.S. solutions. A solution to a problem which is appropriate in another country (and particularly another less developed country) may have greater applicability, or be more easily adapted, to the solution of a similar problem in a third society than a U.S. solution. (See also IX-C-2-e(1); IX-C-4; V-J; V-K.)

Carreon (P/NON-US-5) (Philippines) - Suggests Philippines might play role in bringing U.S. solutions down to the level of Asian requirements - like transformer in reducing electric current from a high to low potential. (GA(8))

Andrews (P/US-7-D) (Michigan State) - Most crucial task of all is that of training the locals to administer government in a way consistent with the development and operation of a modern society...However, feels U.S. is least equipped of all potential aid donors to perform this task, since it involves boring into and becoming associated with the administration of the local government and hence creates suspicion and invites charges that we are interfering in internal affairs. Possibly UN can be more effective or, in some cases, other countries better able to provide advice needed by a local government which is based (as so many are), and will probably continue to be based, on a rigid unitary system. (GA(5b))

Sen (P/NON-US-8) (India - UN-TAB) - Use of Japan as third country training area in agriculture due to similarity, particularly in case of India, of agricultural problems in South and Southeast Asia to those already solved in Japan. (GA(8))

Fraleigh (T-38) (Laos - CD; Taiwan) (R-4) - It might be better to place greater emphasis on transplantation and adaptation of simple techniques employed in one less developed country to other less developed countries with comparable problems. Often requires small cost since involves the use of an idea or technique for the more effective use of resources already indigenously available. (Examples of application of principle in Laos: uses of bamboo; use of grass fibers; pottery glazing; forge-welded hoe-tips; proposed farmer exchanges.) (GA(8))

Grant/Roberts/Wallach (PA-82) (Labor - Bureau of Labor Standards) - At present time, due to our limited knowledge, the training programs of LBS do little more than describe how labor administration, labor laws, and safety activities are handled in the U.S. This is not enough for people who must go back and work in entirely different environments. Courses of

instruction should give more emphasis to what is being done in various less developed countries and to the work of ILO in establishing international standards. While it is valuable for participants to know what we do in this country, it would probably be more meaningful to them if we could show them how various other less developed countries and the ILO have been approaching the problems with which they must deal themselves.

- d. Acceptance of solutions unpalatable to the donor. Application of the foregoing suggested principle may mean that a donor must accept solutions to local problems that are not only ideologically or technically different from his own but also sometimes unpalatable to the donor.

(See comments with respect to socialism, authoritarianism, etc., in the latter portion of X-C-1-a above. See also V-B-2-b.)

- e. Possible applicability of past U.S. experience. Solutions which were appropriate in the United States and other presently developed nations at earlier periods in their growth may sometimes have applicability to other societies today. A donor may be able to draw useful lessons from its own historical process of development.

Haraldson (NT-31) (Taiwan - D; Vietnam) (O-1) - We tend to forget our own history and the factors which were important in our own national growth (e.g., the slow build-up of our own education system using first grade school, then high school, and only much later, normal school graduates, to teach primary school children). (GA(8))

Coler (T-15) (Nepal - Trng.; Turkey; Mexico; Korea) (R-4) - Notes the necessity, in place like Nepal, of approaching build-up in education as was done in the United States years ago. (GA(8))

Neal (NT-59) (Liberia - DD; Philippines - CD; India) (R-2) - In Africa South of Sahara, one of main problems is to develop training institutions which are close to the existing tribal structure. Believes that U.S. experience in dealing with emancipated Negro has certain applicability to development of training institutions in Africa. Lengthy discussion of Tuskegee, Berea, etc., considering factors that led to their success in acculturation of American Negro and the relevance of these factors in Africa. Expresses belief these organizations might help us in developing African training institutions. (GA(8))

Baron (NT-58) (Cambodia - DD; Philippines - Prog.) (R-2) - Example of Japanese model farm in Cambodia which uses principles applicable in Japan 40 years ago. (GA(5b))

- f. Possible applicability of donor's experience in dealing with tribal and other special groups in the donor country (e.g., Indians).

Fryer/Phillips/Edwards (PA-99) (Interior - Bureau of Indian Affairs) - Discussion of peculiar capabilities of the Bureau to assist in less developed areas. Its employees work on reservations where societal conditions are comparable to those which exist in areas where AID is now conducting programs, and Fryer believes that there are few areas elsewhere in the world that do not have their counterpart in one or another of the reservations.

- g. Possible non-applicability of U.S. criteria in measuring progress. In measuring progress in another culture, local rather than U.S. criteria may often furnish a better standard for measurement.

Shook (T-16) (Afghanistan - Transp.) (R-5) - Objectives must be established and progress measured in local rather than U.S. terms, and this requires understanding of cultural absorptive capacity of local people (e.g., (i) 10 to 20% crop yield increase may represent tremendous progress to farmer where production levels have remained static for generations; (ii) establishment of saving system may not be viewed as progress by people whose religious beliefs, emphasizing fate, may make saving unimportant; (iii) improved public health facilities may be considered unimportant if society attaches different value to life than we and considers individual's status willed by God). (GA(8))

Hart (T/S-31) (Haiti - Educ.; Brazil; Bolivia) (R-2) - We should be sure that measuring stick for evaluating success and progress, and for the time of these discussions, is identical to measuring stick being used by host. (GA(11a))

Wigglesworth (ETR - TEHRAN TOICA A-2561) (Iran - PA) (R-4) - System introduced was worked out by Iranians in own way with U.S. advice, and while by U.S. standards it is not too good, it is very good by Iranian standards, is far better than the system in other ministries, and is the subject of wide interest in latter. (GA(10c))

3. Implications of the suggested general principle and its possible corollaries to the design of specific approaches and techniques for the solution of problems in other societies

The points which follow are all considered at greater length in sections XI and XII, which relate to the approaches, techniques, and attitudes of a donor which facilitate or impede the extension of effective technical assistance. They are listed here only to make clear some of the possible implications and applications of the broad general principle and related corollaries which are suggested in B-1 and B-2, and perhaps equally to the general principle and corollaries suggested in A-1 and A-2. Several of these points also follow from other general principles which are brought out in sections XI and XII. Comments included below are merely illustrative; additional comments on these and related points are included in sections XI and XII.

a. A donor should help the locals to solve their problems in their own way.

Andrews (P/US-7) (Michigan State) - Technique should be to help them to solve problems in their own way rather than in our way. (GA(8))

Plagge (T/M-32) (Vietnam - Med. Educ.) (R-3) - In Vietnam, must not try to build Little America but rather to help Vietnamese to do things a little better in their own way, remembering that we are there only temporarily and that they feel strongly about their sovereignty and want to get rid of foreigners as soon as possible. (TECH-T(6))

Garner (T/M-39) (Vietnam - Ag. Engr.; Thailand; Pakistan) (R-4) - While in the technical and scientific fields there is really only one way to do things, in applying scientific knowledge there can be considerable variety. Job is to provide basic information, etc., with which they must work and which they must adapt. (TECH-T(6))

Wigglesworth (ETR - TEHRAN TOICA A-2561) (Iran - PA) (R-4) - In introducing public administration systems in Iran, U.S. emphasized the principle, leaving Iranians to work out methods and procedures in their own way. (GA(10c))

Allen (NT-51-B) (Indonesia - D) (R-1) - We must help host country to find its own way and not try to superimpose our way. Example of Ford-financed Wisconsin team in economics in Indonesia. (GA(8))

- b. A donor should help the locals to make their own decisions by showing them alternative approaches, recounting past experience, presenting and analyzing problems, and other like techniques.

Schuck (T-10) (Ecuador - PA (Banking & Educ.)) - One approach is to show what is wrong and simply suggest approaches which locals might take. Speaking of development of banking system in Ecuador. (GA(8))

See Randall (NT-49-A) (Philippines - DD; Thailand; Japan) (R-1) - In public administration, approach should be to the effect, "These are the various types of techniques, approaches, and procedures that have worked to accomplish certain ends elsewhere" and not "This is the way in which you ought to administer a particular program or agency." (GA(8))

Steffey (T/F-50) (Iran - Housing; Korea; UAR) (R-3) - In working in Iran, emphasized to locals that housing program was their job and insisted that they take the responsibility for decision-making. Would make suggestions from "his point of view," but always make clear his advice might "be unsuitable for their requirements." (TECH-T(6))

Allen (NT-51-B) (Indonesia - D) (R-1) - May be better to approach teaching or technical assistance in certain fields (e.g., economics, socialism, etc.) through the presentation and analysis of problems rather than the exposition of theories (e.g., in economics, state the problem and then present and discuss how, in their several environments, certain countries had used free enterprise, socialism, etc., to attack it). (GA(0))

- c. Foreign institutions, concepts, solutions to problems, etc., are much more likely to be locally acceptable if they are made to "look local."

Brink (T-6) (Libya - Ag. Exten.; NEF) (R-5) - Thing done should look as local as possible. In Libya, for example, it is important that the things which are done look as Libyan as they can and not represent simply a replica of something in the U.S. (GA(8))

See Huth (T-42) (Africa - CM) (Consultant) - Great changes are necessary if there is to be growth. Essential task is to introduce these in a way that will find greatest local acceptance. (GA(0))

Yamashiro (T/M-1) (Vietnam - Livestock Adv.; Oceania) (R-3) - Important to make your ideas their ideas and to create impression that the ideas you planned in fact originated with them.

- d. Adaptation of foreign solutions, materials, etc., should be done by or with the locals.

Gorton (T/F-40) (Brazil - Ag. Econ.; Turkey; Lebanon) (R-3) - In general, and specifically in Brazil, American should not attempt to write textbook for foreign country. Rather, at least where there are people with writing competence, American should help, or collaborate, with local. Only locals can do the adaptation needed. Similarly, local language translations of American texts are not satisfactory (e.g., Spanish edition of U.S. book on farm management). (GA(8))

4. Donors have repeatedly violated the suggested general principle and its corollaries, seeking to impose, or to transplant without adaptation, U.S. and other foreign institutions, concepts, methods, and solutions to problems.

Campbell (W-23) (O/PH; Brazil) (R-1) - Tend to approach others as Great White Father, sure of our own way. (GA(8))

Mann (NT-42) (Cambodia - D; Vietnam) (R-1) - Frequently unduly concerned about transplanting our own concept of doing things to the local setting when (a) local conditions make inappropriate or (b) other concepts may be superior (e.g., in the medical field in Cambodia in setting up medical schools). (GA(8))

Brown (NT-23) (Libya - D; Iraq) (R-1) - Tendency, in spite of differences in cultural background, to believe that locals must be trained to do things in American way. (GA(8))

Loren (NT-25) (Ethiopia - D; Thailand) (R-1) - One of our weakest points is frequent attempt of our technicians to transplant our own knowledge, institutions, values, etc., to countries where they are not wholly suitable, instead of endeavoring to adapt them to local circumstances. (GA(8))

Baird (NT-7) (Indonesia - D; Pakistan) (R-1) - We too often superimpose programs that meet our scheme of things rather than theirs. (GA(8))

Chawner (T-17) (DD/P; Korea) (R-1) - Should curb enthusiasm of Americans to create Little Americas everywhere else. (GA(8))

Bernstein (NT-17) (Nigeria - D) (R-1) - Our tendency is to apply techniques developed in an area different from the one in which they are to be applied. (GA(8))

Andrews (P/US-7-A) (Michigan State) - We must get over our tendency to set up a structure which is pleasing to us and not necessarily to locals who are involved....Our tendency to assume that methods effective in one place will be effective in all others....(P/US-7-D) - U.S. tendency to introduce, without adaptation, replicas of U.S. institutions (e.g., agricultural extension). (GA(8))

Barrows (W-27) (O/NESA; Vietnam - D; Greece) (R-1) - Our usual belief is that our values are those which should be accepted locally. (GA(8))

Babcock (NT-6-A) (Liberia - D; Eval.; Paraguay - D) (R-1) - Difficult for average technician to question traditional concepts that we have heretofore been applying and to think in radically new terms that reflect local conditions and need to telescope historical development process into short period (e.g., education in Liberia). (GA(8))

Brink (T-6) (Libya - Ag. Exten.; NEF) (R-5) - Too often try to transplant the precise method of carrying out a particular service that is practiced in U.S. and saddling the economy with a burden it can't support (e.g., autos, instead of bicycles or camels, to give mobility to extension workers in Libya). (GA(8))

Nelson (T-35) (Iran - CD; Philippines) (R-4) - Americans are somewhat captives of their own backgrounds and too often try to transplant a successful local experience into a foreign locale. This is partly due to the form of ICA and U.S. government organization, both of which reflect the highly specialized character of our society. Also must start with, and frame solutions around, resources available (e.g., school teachers in Iran). (GA(8))

Roseman (W-26-A) (FE; Cambodia - D) - Too much tendency at present to superimpose American patterns on other countries, particularly in our agricultural technical assistance. (GA(8))

Arnold/Flesher (W-31) (DD/PE) - Our tendency is to import the thinking of a sophisticated and specialized society into a local setting to which it is not adapted. (GA(8))

Di Venuti (T/F-30) (Laos - Prog.) (R-2) - Frequently are telling people to do things foreign to their concepts. (GA(8))

Beyer (T/F-9) (Labor) - In technical education, ICA has carried overseas our own historical arguments with regard to the fields of apprenticeship training and vocational education; and our technicians have taken with them their rivalries in these fields. The result has been uncoordinated projects, waste and disillusionment. (GA(8))

Nelson (NT-78) (Lebanon - D; ICA/W; Jordan - D) (R-1) - Americans have tendency to disregard principle that programs must be adapted to a local culture - to think that the American way of doing things is the only way and to develop a sort of purity of outlook that doesn't exist in the U.S., forgetting U.S. suffers from many imperfections. (GA(8))

Schaffrath (T/M-8) (Taiwan - Hosp. Admin. Adv.) (R-4) - We should not assume, as we have a tendency to do, that U.S. contemporary culture is the norm to be approached. Must appreciate the differing scales of values of other countries. Most of our technicians, and many missionaries (who do more harm than good), do not think in such terms....Notes in foregoing connection that mechanization often throws people out of work and that mechanization, even where it can be afforded, immediately raises social value problems. (GA(8))

Moyer (NT-66) (Korea - D; ICA/W; Taiwan - D) (R-1) - One of the primary needs is operative government institutions that reach the people and through which activities can be carried out and information flow....The institutions should (a) be responsive to local needs and conditions and (b) be built on what the country already has, adapting existing institutions to carry out new or changed functions involving relationships between a government and its people. We, however, often make the mistake of assuming that the comparable U.S. institution is transplantable (cf. extension approach in Korea (wrong) and Taiwan (right)). (GA(5b))

Baron (NT-58) (Cambodia - DD; Philippines - Prog.) (R-2) - Tendency to require technical solutions conforming to, and as perfect as, our own. (GA(0))

Caldwell (M-47-A) (HEW) - Must understand, and adapt our approach to, basic elements in individual local educational systems... Must not attempt simply to transplant U.S. system (e.g., Philippines)...ICA has shown basic lack of interest in such adaptation. (GA(8))

Hudgens (P/US-10) (IDS) - Tendency of U.S. technicians to adopt approach based on preconceived ideas as to what should be done. Appear powerless to accomplish their purposes unless they are in complete administrative control of situation in which they are to operate whereas in foreign land they do not have this administrative control. Big problem is to develop an administrative framework into which to fit arriving technician and in which he can be effective. (GA(8))

Neal (NT-59) (Liberia - DD; Philippines - CD; India) (R-2) - Where problem is one of effecting a transition from an authoritarian tribal or village culture to a culture with democratic institutions and a sense of individual responsibility, the transition will not follow U.S. patterns....Unfortunately we often attempt to impose highly sophisticated U.S. patterns. (GA(8))....Past approach not consistent principle of being responsive to cultural character and developmental stage of individual countries....Sometimes we attempt to structure our own historically forged institutions into the local culture to perform functions for which they are not necessarily adapted. (GA(O))

Killen (NT-12-B) (Pakistan - D; Eval.; Yugoslavia) (R-1) - In agriculture, work has generally been a failure because:...(b) has consisted usually of efforts to transplant U.S. agricultural extension methods; and....(GA(O))

Wood (T/M-49) (Haiti - PH; Indonesia) (R-3) - Should not try to make over other peoples in our own image, but this is our tendency and one we must guard against. The answers we know best may well not be the answers required for problems in the local country. (TECH-T(6))

Maloy/McIntosh/Christine (PA-28) (FAA) - Highly critical of ICAO activities because its technicians (all short-term and all without badly needed training and orientation) attempt to impose their own ideas as to what should be done in other lands even though those ideas are at variance with the requirements.

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ - Discussing the possibility of obtaining overseas staff from the Social Security Administration and the ability of SSA to provide effective training to participants, he concludes that the training of SSA people in the social welfare field doesn't fit them for such assignments ordinarily. The social security worker abroad frequently plays a very different role from the social welfare worker in the U.S., and particularly those in SSA, who are experts in the case work rather than the settlement house approach. Personnel in SSA have been unable to understand the irrelevance of what we have to offer; they do not appreciate that what may make sense in the U.S., U.K., and Sweden makes no sense in Cambodia.

Jacobs (PA-9) (ESD - Educ.; Thailand; Ethiopia) (R-2) - Critical of view held in USOE that it is in a position, in spite of its unfamiliarity with local scene, to rewrite PIO/P....Also doubts wisdom of general expansion in USOE role because, among other reasons, an agency not exposed to the program in the field and which is so completely molded by American experience, can't be in a position to make decisions or give directions in the conduct of a program directed toward cultural change in foreign lands.

See [REDACTED] (AID/W [REDACTED]) - In discussing weaknesses of the USOE training office, states that the employees of that office are inclined to look at their responsibility as that of designing technical programs for foreigners in the U.S., forgetting the important political and economic considerations that should be taken into account. This is partly because they deal with an isolated segment of the total foreign aid activity and have not been given the opportunity to be geared into the over-all program.

Buschman (T/M-5) (Cambodia - Well-Drilling Adv.) (R-5) - Tendency of U.S. technicians to organize programs the way they would in the United States when things are not the same as they are in the U.S. (Illustrations) (TECH-T(6))

Hummon (T-29) (Liberia - CM; Libya) (R-3) - Sometimes we use materials not adapted to local needs. Tendency of graphics, etc., people to transplant slick Madison Avenue approach and to develop materials that will look good from a Washington viewpoint, and not to provide the kind of materials that will be effective vehicles in local culture - materials that are literal, simple, inexpensive, related to things which are familiar to, understood by, and closely tied in with, the daily existence of the natives. French and various missionary groups are way ahead of U.S. in this regard in Africa. (GA(8))

Grossman (NT-70) (India - Prog.) (R-3) - In many cases participant training is too advanced in the sense that participant receives ideas which are too modern or otherwise unadapted for conditions in his home environment. (GA(8))

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Chawner (T-17) (DD/P; Korea) (R-1) - Our inclination is to insist on a free, competitive economic system of the kind with which we are familiar. (GA(8))

Forman (T-20) (Taiwan - Educ.) (R-4) - We tend to operate on the assumption that countries must embrace capitalism and a democratic form of government if they are to be pro-western and thereupon set out to convert them. In most cases they are not ready for these concepts as we interpret them, and our success has been limited by our conduct of programs on the assumption that they are ready. We should demonstrate a greater degree of flexibility and search for, and be prepared to accept, other alternatives than capitalism and democracy in a western sense. (GA(8))

Friedmann (M-31) (Korea - Prog. Econ.; El Salvador - PA; Brazil) (R-4) - The character of many of our country programs has been shaped by a desire to impose American (=democratic?) ideas and institutions on less developed societies, regardless of indigenous values and aspirations. The promotion of ideology frequently appears more important than promotion of economic growth, particularly in the fields of education, community development, and public administration. Also reflected in strong agrarian bias of ICA programs and active advocacy of free enterprise capitalism. This policy of attempting to impose American institutions and ideas has not generally furthered basic long-term interests of U.S. (GA(0))

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Babcock (NT-6-A) (Liberia - D; Eval.; Paraguay - D) (R-1) - Tendency of technician to carry over attitudes and approach developed from experience in other areas, particularly Europe, to new areas which are culturally different (e.g., Liberia). (GA(8))

Haraldson (NT-31) (Taiwan - D; Vietnam) (O-1) - We are still attempting to transplant the Marshall Plan to the Asian scene, trying to solve problems through the use of money in circumstances where time and patience are the most important ingredients of any solution (e.g., Vietnam and Taiwan). (GA(8))

FitzGerald (W-21) (DD/O) - Uneasy feeling that we have failed to adapt techniques of technical assistance in Marshall Plan sufficiently to meet our purposes in less developed countries. (GA(8))

Dickerman (P/US-30) (Philippines - Syracuse PA Contract) - Tendency to emphasize more efficient use of labor, in accordance with Marshall Plan approach to industrial development, and this engineering efficiency approach not appropriate where labor is plentiful and cheap. (GA(8))

Baird (NT-7) (Indonesia - D; Pakistan) (R-1) - Notes efforts to transfer European experience to areas where it has no application. (GA(8))

Bond (T/S-26) (Tunisia - Educ.; Afghanistan; Haiti; Liberia) (R-3) -

In Tunisia, program suffered because of projection of Marshall Plan experience by USOM executives, who forgot that, unlike Europe, there was no backlog of trained people, and hence over-emphasized capital projects, focussed the little educational assistance on business administration when, as requested by locals, help in engineering and science was needed and wanted, and showed insufficient interest in education. (GA(0))

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Geens (NT/F-2) (Laos - Prog.) (R-4) - In Laos we have been less adaptable than British and French with respect to avoiding the imposition of our own patterns of doing things (e.g., attempting to impose U.S. working hours although Laotians work best when working in accordance with own schedule). (GA(8))

Raper (W-42) (M/PERS; Iran; Japan; Taiwan; Philippines) (R-3) -  
In Iran, community development program broke down because we attempted to impose the kind of system we wanted and Iranians did not want. (GA(8))

Tibbetts (W/M-5) (Congo Survey, ICA/W; Congo) (O-2) - Distressed  
during Congo Survey to find so many U.S. technicians trying to force countries to learn and accept the U.S. way of doing things. (GA(0))

H.E. Aziz (KABUL F.S. DESP. 191, 3/16/61) (Afghanistan - Deputy Planning Minister) - Critical of U.S. tendency to plan unilaterally in Afghanistan, particularly in fields in which social habits and cultural patterns were most important. (As an example, he cited proposal for PTA as part of community school program, observing that any proposal for community schools must be an Afghan proposal, not something imported from U.S. without adaptation (USOM personnel defended particular case, while agreeing to principle)). Wanted programs placed on a firm and sound basis of mutual development and participation. (GA(0))

Mattusch (NT-81) (Korea - Prog. Econ.) (R-3) - In Korea the tendency has been to overwhelm with characteristics of our own society. (GA(0))

Liberia Evaluation Report (1958) - In Liberia, tendency to assume that a simple transfer of American techniques was sufficient, without going through the difficult process of first adapting the techniques to Liberian conditions. (GA(0))

Allen (NT-51-B) (Indonesia - D) (R-1) - Example of wrong approach by Ford-financed Wisconsin team in economics in Indonesia. (GA(8))

Weems (T/F-48) (Korea - Ind. Labor Adv.) (R-3) - Americans forget the fact that others (Koreans) have different values, and attempt to transpose U.S. methods which profoundly affect local relationships. For example, USOM industrial engineers attempt to introduce U.S. accounting practices and management principles of delegation and distribution of authority, not realizing these profoundly affect relationships among individuals; and advocate labor-saving devices on the assumption if labor is saved, this is good. They take position that if Koreans want to industrialize, they must modernize, but is not clear American arguments necessarily stand up in oriental situation (e.g., bifurcated Japanese industrial society).

Wood (NT-60) (India - D; Eval.; Korea - D) (R-1) - In India, initially wrong approach of attempting to create land-grant colleges of kind we have in U.S. as key to agricultural extension system when we should have worked with the state agricultural departments with which the system was then, and is now, tied in. Universities potentially important, but at present, theoretically oriented, they are in no position to serve as anchors to operating extension system like our own. (GA(8))

Andrews (P/US-7-D) (Michigan State) - In Iran (?), introduced equipment in technical training institute which was too advanced. Example: electric furnace for foundry which is not useful for training since this type of furnace will not be employed generally in country for 20 years. U.S. technicians developed oil-burning models well-adapted to wide local use as substitutes. (GA(10a))

Rouse (T/A-16) (Philippines - PA) - Criticizes effort in Philippines to transplant outmoded U.S. GSA organization pattern to GSA in Philippines and, by implication, to pattern local organization in all respects on U.S., simply because it was U.S. (GA(18))

Huber (NT/A-12) (Cambodia - Prog. Econ.) (R-6) - In Cambodia, have developed pattern of technical assistance based too much on our own U.S. institutions. Agricultural extension is example. Our agricultural extension organization and method of teaching or communicating extension abroad assume that we are dealing with literate and fairly sophisticated farmers. Also assume, in Cambodia at least, that nationals whom we train will be working closely with the farmers, understand them, and be accepted by them as agricultural trainers. However, the agricultural school in Phnom Penh trains 20-year-olds who are government civil servants with no agricultural experience. Latter not accepted by Cambodian farmers as being in position to teach them anything.... Moreover, originally we employed technique of model farms for demonstration purposes, to be copied by the Cambodians; but the Cambodians were rarely inclined to copy them; they regarded them as foreign institutions, not adaptable locally. (TECH-T(7))

TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR SECTION XI

	<u>Page</u>
Local Participation, Cooperation, and Support as Essential Ingredients of Effective Technical Assistance - Herein of the Relationships between a Donor and Donee, and between Donor and Donee Personnel	
A. Analysis -----	1
B. Local Participation Therein Is Essential to the Success of Any Project, Program, or Activity. -----	4
1. Suggested general principle -----	4
2. Phases of a program, project, or activity in which local participation is suggested to be essential or desirable -----	9
a. Joint determination of, or at least mutual understanding as to, the purposes of a technical assistance program and of the objectives of a program, project, or activity -----	9
(1) Can and should a donor have hidden objectives? -----	11
b. Joint planning and programming -----	12
(1) General comments -----	12
(2) Joint programming and planning mechanisms as a device to achieve local participation in planning and programming and to make approach mutual -----	16
(3) Development of a joint long-term technical assistance program by the host and all aid donors might be desirable. -----	17
c. Implementation, operation, or execution of a program project, or activity -----	18
d. Decisions with respect to a program, project, or activity -----	19

	<u>Page</u>
e. Miscellaneous phases -----	19
(1) Documentation -----	19
(2) Choice of donor technicians -----	20
(3) Surveys of needs -----	20
(4) Evaluation of a program, project, or activity ---	20
3. Reasons why local participation ("mutuality," "joint action," "partnership") may be necessary or desirable --	21
a. General comments -----	21
b. Superimposed programs, projects, or solutions to local problems usually don't work. Successful programs, projects, and solutions require joint collabora- tion. -----	21
c. Local participation is necessary in order that programs and projects, measures taken, and solu- tions proposed may properly respond to local needs. -----	21
d. Necessary local support is not likely to be forth- coming and local responsibilities are not likely to be carried out effectively unless the locals participate fully. -----	22
e. Local participation is necessary if the locals are to learn what the donor is trying to communicate to them - if they are to gain the capacity to carry on comparable activities by themselves. -----	22
f. Host views may be superior to those of donor. -----	23
4. Donors and donor personnel have frequently violated the foregoing suggested principle by acting unilaterally ---	23
C. In Addition to the Need for Local Participation as Such, the Success of a Project, Program, or Activity Is Usually Dependent on Various Types of Host Support, Contributions, and Cooperation -----	27
1. Suggested general principle -----	27

	<u>Page</u>
2. Specific kinds of host support, contributions, complementing actions and cooperation which may be desirable or necessary -----	35
a. Analysis -----	35
b. Supplying of adequate counterparts -----	38
(1) In general -----	38
(2) Maintaining continuity in counterparts -----	41
c. Contributions of local currency (or other financing) -----	41
(1) To meet program and project costs -----	41
(2) To meet administrative support costs -----	46
(3) Special problem in certain colonial and post-colonial areas -----	46
d. Provision of administrative support to donor aid mission or personnel -----	46
e. Provision of administrative support for programs and projects -----	48
f. Measures necessary for the effective utilization of technical assistance provided -----	52
(1) Steps required to institutionalize the benefits of technical assistance furnished -----	52
(2) Effective utilization of returned participants -----	52
(3) Local leadership for program -----	52
g. Miscellaneous forms of operational cooperation and conditions -----	53

	<u>Page</u>
h. Adoption of local attitudes, basic governmental policies or practices, or other local measures necessary either (a) to the success of a specific technical assistance program, project, or activity or (b) to the significant economic or social progress of the host country to which the donor's aid program is intended to contribute -----	54
i. Political conditions -----	56
3. Factors which may materially affect the extent and kind of support, contributions, and cooperation that can be appropriately expected and requested of the host -----	57
a. Local capacity to support, contribute to, and cooperate with, technical assistance programs and projects -----	57
b. Local interest in, and local understanding of the value of, technical assistance generally or a particular technical assistance program or project -----	57
c. Extent and character of host participation in the selection, planning, and conduct of a technical assistance program or project - the degree of "jointness" or mutuality -----	57
d. Extent of local confidence and trust in the donor and in the donor's program -----	58
e. Presence of special incentives for support, contributions, or cooperation -----	58
4. Miscellaneous principles suggested for application in determining (a) the conditions which should be stipulated and (b) the support, contributions, and cooperation which should be expected and requested by a donor -----	59
a. There should always be a careful pre-evaluation of local capabilities for compliance with different conditions and of the probabilities with respect to host support, contributions, and cooperation. -----	59
b. Unnecessary conditions should not be established. ----	59

	<u>Page</u>
c. The conditions stipulated, and the support, contributions, and cooperation sought, should be realistic in terms of all the local circumstances, including local capabilities and interests. There is a practical limit on the extent to which a donor can effectively impose conditions and through them exercise control over host actions. -----	60
d. Cooperation should not be equated with or taken to mean: host subservience; the subordination of all other host activities to a donor's technical assistance program; or host acceptance of all donor recommendations. -----	61
5. A study is needed of the problems of cooperation, conditions, and controls. -----	62
D. Nature and Principal Attributes of the Proper Relationships Between a Donor and Donee, and Between Donor and Donee Personnel -----	63
1. Analysis -----	63
2. The relationship should be a cooperative one which has many, if not all, of the characteristics of a partnership - a relationship in which, to use various characterizations thereof, there is "mutuality," "jointness," "association in a common venture," or "sharing." -----	66
a. In this connection the suggestion is sometimes made that the role of the technician should not be described as that of an "adviser" but rather as that of an "associate." -----	68
3. The relationship should be one which is marked by (a) close personal relationships and (b) mutual confidence and trust among the individuals concerned in the relationships. -----	68
a. At the level of the USOM director and the USOM executive staff -----	68
b. Generally or at the level of the technician -----	70
(1) Close personal relations -----	70

	<u>Page</u>
(2) Friendship -----	73
(3) Rapport -----	74
(4) Getting along with locals -----	75
(5) Local acceptance -----	76
(6) Personal confidence and trust -----	76
(7) Respect and regard -----	79
(8) Mutual understanding -----	80
4. The relationship should be one in which primary responsibility for a program, activity, project, or operation is placed on, and assumed by, the donee and its personnel, and which emphasizes the development of the latter's capabilities to assume exclusive responsibility therefor at the earliest practicable date. -----	80
a. Assuming the position that full ultimate responsibility for a program, project, or activity is that of the host -----	80
b. Treating any project, program, or activity as that of the locals -----	81
c. Getting the locals to make the decision -----	81
d. Deferring to local priorities -----	82
5. The relationship should be one which results in progressive increases in the self-confidence, sense of responsibility, and stature of donee personnel who are involved. -----	83
6. The relationship should be one in which the atmosphere is that of an association of people who, as people, if not in terms of their specific skills and talents, are equals. -----	83
7. The relationship should not be one in which the donor, and particularly its personnel, take (or, alternatively, appear to take) a dominant or dominating position. ----	84

	<u>Page</u>
8. Possible desirability of developing institution-to-institution relationships between a U.S. government technical agency and its counterpart ministry in a host country -----	84
E. The Principle of Self-Help -----	86
1. Analysis -----	86
2. The importance of self-help as an ingredient of successful technical assistance -----	88
3. Methods of stimulating self-help -----	90
4. Illustrative self-help activities and projects -----	90
a. Self-help housing -----	90
b. Other types of self-help projects -----	93

## XI.

LOCAL PARTICIPATION, COOPERATION, AND SUPPORT AS ESSENTIAL  
INGREDIENTS OF EFFECTIVE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE - HEREIN  
OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN A DONOR AND DONEE, AND  
BETWEEN DONOR AND DONEE PERSONNEL

## A. ANALYSIS

Many commentators express or imply a general belief that the success of any technical assistance program, project, or activity is ordinarily dependent upon the presence of all of the following conditions:

(1) Extensive donee participation in some or all phases of the program, project, or activity.

(2) In addition to donee participation as such, the continuing performance by the donee of certain more specific affirmative actions which are variously described by different commentators as "compliance with essential conditions," "host contributions," "host support," "self-help," etc.

(3) The existence, as specifically applied to such program, project, or activity, of a relationship between the donor and the host (and between the personnel of both) which has certain specific attributes - a relationship which is often described as a sort of partnership and which is frequently characterized by commentators as mutual, cooperative, or joint.

This section of the digest examines each of the foregoing allegedly essential conditions in three separate successive sections. The next section of the digest (section XII) considers the kind of attitudes, personal behavior patterns, methods, techniques, and approaches on the part of a donor and donor personnel which are likely to facilitate or impede the establishment of these conditions and, given such conditions, otherwise to help or hinder the extension of effective technical assistance.

The great variety of terminology employed by different commentators, coupled with a certain artificiality in attempting to draw distinctions between (i) affirmative actions by a host in the nature of support, self-help, or compliance with conditions and (ii) the essential attributes of a satisfactory on-going donor-host relationship, has made it difficult to arrange the comments in an orderly and meaningful fashion. The same circumstances have also made it hard to penetrate

beneath the foregoing broadly stated generalizations to identify common or divergent patterns of thought with respect to the specific content or real meaning of each of these generalizations as they are used by the commentators. The problem of arrangement is further complicated by the following considerations:

(1) Below the level of broad generalization, the specific content or the real meaning contemplated by a specific commentator sometimes, but not always, appears to be conditioned by:

(a) certain factors that vary significantly as between countries (e.g., the stage of a country's development and hence its capacity to take various types of action and its readiness to enter into certain types of relationships);

(b) the ultimate purposes of technical assistance which the commentator has in mind (cf. democratization of the host with contribution to the host's economic development);

(c) the specific type of technical assistance which the commentator is discussing - whether it involves purely performance technical assistance (e.g., a survey of mineral resources or the provision of technicians to replace expatriates in line or advisory positions in a host government) or communication technical assistance; and

(d) the particular target of the commentator's remarks - whether he is talking about governmental or individual (e.g., counterpart) relationships; whether he is discussing a country program as a whole or a particular project; and what kinds of specific actions or general patterns of action by a host his comment is concerned with.

In other words, each commentator is speaking from a somewhat unique platform that bears the imprint of his own peculiar experience and outlook; and he may be addressing any one or more of the many aspects of a wide spectrum of problems that range from formal intergovernmental arrangements to interpersonal relationships.

(2) Different commentators in using such terms as "conditions," "contributions," "support," and "self-help," or in talking of "joint action," "cooperation," "mutuality," "partnership," and "common participation" often have in mind either (a) different concepts or (b) different types of specific actions by a host government or host personnel. Such differences as to concept or with respect to the types of actions which are required of a host may or may not be mutually exclusive or inconsistent.

(3) The basic reasons given by two commentators for the same generalized, or even specific, conclusion may in fact be very different. Such differing reasons may complement or support one another, or they may be mutually exclusive or inconsistent, reflecting the possibility that behind the commonly expressed conclusion there lies a basic divergence in views that could have significant consequence.

(4) Certain comments clearly relate to technical assistance as such (or specifically distinguish technical assistance from other forms of aid). Others are addressed to U.S. aid activities as a whole and either (a) do not distinguish among various types of aid activities or (b) indicate affirmatively that such a distinction cannot, or should not, be made with respect to the particular point under consideration.

Because of the difficulty of classifying comments and because of the effort to analyze the subject in depth, the same comments often appear repeatedly under various headings and subheadings.

B. LOCAL PARTICIPATION THEREIN IS ESSENTIAL TO THE SUCCESS OF ANY PROJECT, PROGRAM, OR ACTIVITY.

1. Suggested general principle: Performance technical assistance sometimes excepted, wholehearted local participation is generally necessary for the full success of any technical assistance program, project, or activity. Such participation requires more than merely compliance with stipulated conditions, the furnishing of specific contributions, or the rendition of physical or financial support. It requires the integral involvement of the locals in the program, project, or activity - an involvement which is sufficient to make the endeavor "joint" or "mutual" - sufficient to establish a relationship with the type of attributes described in XI-C.

Hubbell (W-43) (O/NESA - GTI) - Host government operation of, or full participation in, technical assistance activities essential to success. (GA(11a))

Power (A/UN-25) (Pakistan - UN Res. Rep.; Iran; Libya) - Critical of U.S. approach in both Libya and Iran because operations, while within the framework of joint services, were too much unilateral U.S. operations. The American element in Libya seemed to handle everything, or at least the Libyan government agencies seemed to think so; on the other hand, these agencies sensed that the UN projects were "theirs." In Iran, similarly, the Iranians were not given a big enough role and they therefore regarded the program as U.S. rather than as an Iranian or joint program. (GA(11))

Workinger (NT-62) (Yemen - D; Jordan - DD; Ethiopia - DD; Iran) (R-3) - Successful technical assistance is dependent upon the full participation of locals. U.S. tendency, as reflected in the average technician, is toward undue domination of projects - toward taking over the job to the exclusion of the locals. (Examples from Jordan and Iran covering early wrong approach and later right approach; description of difficulties in Yemen.) (GA(11a))

H.E. Aziz (KABUL F.S. DESP. 191, 3/16/61) (Afghanistan - Deputy Planning Minister) - Critical of U.S. tendency to plan unilaterally in Afghanistan, particularly in fields in which social habits and cultural patterns were most important....Wanted programs placed on a firm and sound basis of mutual development and participation. (GA(0))

Hodson (NT/A-56) (Vietnam - Prog.; Lebanon, Syria - UNWRA) (R-4) - In Vietnam, program suffers from a lack of participation in its development on the part of the local government, and a tendency to analyze projects from a U.S. rather than from a joint U.S.-Vietnamese point of view. (GA(11c))

Kontos (NT-79) (Ceylon - DD; ICA/W) (R-2) - More emphasis on advisory and training activities than on "doing" because effective t.a. depends upon sufficient enlistment of locals' participation for locals to gain comprehension and understanding of the essentials of activity involved and to acquire knowledge of technicians' technique and approach. (GA(1))

Hart (T/S-31) (Haiti - Educ.; Brazil; Bolivia) (R-2) - First and most important, any action taken must be mutual....The percentage of effort, men, money, and material given by each party to these programs is not important, remembering that the issues in any country are so interlocked that to take action in one sector oblivious to those of another is to court disaster for the whole. At first U.S., vis-à-vis host, may have to contribute greater percentage, provided it should never be 100%. The important items are mutuality of interest, understanding, cooperation, and action without reference to percentages. (GA(11a))

Shaha (Memo of Conv.) (Nepal - Min. of Finance) - Expressed view that ropeway and telecommunication projects, while considered successful by most people, were not in fact successful because the Nepalese, in effect, received a completed package to which they contributed very little. (GA(11c))

Loren (NT-25) (Ethiopia - D; Thailand)(R-1) - Where project entirely controlled by Americans, what is done may not respond as closely to country needs as would have been the case if locals, even though not fully trained, had participated from the outset. But in Ethiopia, difficulty persuading locals to take positions in institutions we are endeavoring to create. (GA(11c))

Hummon (T-29) (Liberia - CM; Libya) (R-3) - Participation of locals is essential in any activity....Technician must work through nationals and decisions should be joint so that people who will be operating and making the decisions several years hence will learn how to operate and make decisions. (GA(11c))

Yoe (NT-44) (Haiti - D) (R-1) - If locals do not participate, they will not acquire the capacity to run things on their own. (GA(11c))

Chable (T-30) (Ecuador - Ag.) - Unless counterpart is induced to take increasing responsibility for a project, he will be no better off than before. Moreover, local knows more about country than foreigner can ever know - its cultural background and all the social and economic factors that should be taken into account in solving a particular problem. (GA(11c))

Nelson (T-35) (Iran - CD; Philippines; (R-4) - Wholehearted participation and support of locals essential to success of any technical assistance activity. (GA(11c))

Raper (W-42) (M/PERS; Taiwan; Philippines; Iran; Japan) (R-3) - Essential that decisions be made and operations be carried out within the framework of people who must ultimately exercise responsibility for operations, and a person is not likely to do a good job in operations if he does not have genuine responsibility for such operations. The counterpart, not the American, must be in the forefront and exercise the leadership. (GA(12b))

Campbell (W-23) (O/PH; Brazil) - To be effective, program must be bilateral as to planning, programming, and execution, but unfortunately trend has been away from mutuality in approach. (GA(11c))

Price (P/NON-US-2) (Nepal - UN) - (GA(11c))

Andrews (P/US-7-C) (Michigan State) - (GA(11c))

St. Louis (NT-32) (India - Prog.; Pakistan; Korea; Taiwan; Burma) - A genuinely joint U.S.-host approach from commencement of a program is most important ingredient in a program's success, and we have been very weak in this regard. Unilateral operations will not work. (GA(11c))

Coffman (ETR - TEHRAN TOICA A-2648) (Iran - PA) (R-2) - In future public administration programming in Iran, should emphasize involving officials of host government as much as possible in every step of the process of program planning, execution, and evaluation. (GA(11c))

Berenson (NT-17-B) (Libya - D; Yugoslavia - D) (R-1) - Success is dependent on the readiness and willingness of locals to cooperate effectively. If locals' attitude is to the effect that they will depend on us to do the job, success impossible. (GA(5a))

Plagge (T/M-32) (Vietnam - Med. Educ.) (R-3) - Should do everything possible to stimulate the feeling of mutuality, providing every conceivable opportunity to host to gain the sense that it is repaying us in some way for our assistance. (GA(11c))

Barnhart (ETR - RIO TOICA A-739, 9/25/61) (Brazil - Elem. Educ.; Panama; Bolivia) (R-4) - Stresses importance (and success in her work in Brazil) in changing (1) initial idea that cooperation consisted of asking us to do things for them and allowing us to carry out our plans to (2) understanding that we would assist them in making plans and guide them in solving problems. This led them to join in sharing responsibility. (GA(11a))

Thompson (NT-3-A) (India - DD) (R-1) - In India, must accept fact that we are present as partners. Our program must therefore be within the framework of the five-year plans and the conditions under which we will jointly work must be jointly established. (GA(0))

Reid (T/S-32) (Indonesia - Educ.) (R-4) - Desirable that program be really mutual so that recipients do not develop a sense of inferiority. This means that we should be willing to accept advice and services from them. (GA(11c))

Allen (NT-51-A) (Indonesia - D) (R-1) - Foreign assistance should be true mutual help partnership assistance at pivotal points where the need is greatest and the resources of the assisting agency can best be applied. (GA(0))

American Universities Field Staff (EAB-14-'55 - "That Spirit of Jointness") - Indicates skepticism as to whether in 1955 there was a joint or cooperative approach in Iran....Implies that the unacceptable negative requirement for interference in local internal affairs to prevent waste and misdirection of American funds can only be met by the positive idea of a cooperative effort. (GA(11c))

Cottam (NT-69) (Brazil - D) (0-1) - Most fundamental precondition to successful t.a. program is to make it mutual in terms of real interest of host therein....Principal criteria for determining existence of real mutuality of interests: (1) willingness of host to give it the kinds of support which are a condition precedent to its success and (2) willingness of host to take steps necessary for the institutionalization of any activity involved. ...Most important step in developing and conducting effective t.a. program (as well as in accomplishing other U.S. objectives, such as those of exchange programs) is to establish and in effect to institutionalize a dialogue on technical assistance with host - a continuing exchange of information and ideas at all levels from the president of country on down to individual technicians, including contractor personnel - the purpose being to gain a mutual understanding of objectives and to stimulate host government to understand the limitations and possibilities of technical assistance and relationship of their objectives to ours, to form intra-society links at many levels....In Brazil such a dialogue never achieved. (Discussion of techniques for achieving and related concept of "Diplomatex.") (GA(0))

Adler (W/E-8) (C/FE - Exec.; Vietnam; Greece) (R-2) - It is desirable to obtain maximum participation by the host government in program planning, administrative support, and in every area of implementing projects. Where the host government lacks the capacity, then USOM must do it itself, but should do it in such a way that it represents a demonstration operation for the host and is tied in as closely as possible with the host government, for the development of administrative capacity by a participating government is a function of technical assistance. Such capacity is necessary if a donor country is to withdraw from established projects at the proper moment. It is our duty to point out host responsibilities in these respects and its response is an indication of its interest in the program. Where this interest is lacking it is our duty to create it...Capacity of countries varies with lack of organization, facilities, personnel and funds being limiting factors. (INDIG)

International Survey of Programmes of Social Development (UN, E/CN, 5/322, 1959 - "Programmes of Rural Development") - Organized self-help represents basic principle of extension. Participation (a) helps train rural leaders, (b) stimulates local feeling of responsibility, (c) promotes extension programs that meet felt needs of people, and (d) brings extension programs closer to people. (GA(4))

Tibbetts (W/M-5) (Congo Survey; ICA/W; Congo) (O-2) - In Congo, important for people to play a part in our programs. At present they have no feeling of responsibility because they lack any feeling of attachment and involvement. Programs will not succeed unless they are involved. (GA(O))

Schuck (T-10) (Ecuador - PA (credit & Banking)) (R-3) - It is important they themselves should do the work and develop the pride that comes with doing the work, and that our function should be confined to supervision and advice. (Developing banking and credit system in Ecuador.) (GA(4))

Mahony (T-21) (Oceania - Anthropol.) - People themselves must get involved in projects; otherwise they won't follow through (e.g., technician-dug wells in Somalia not repaired since local didn't participate). (GA(4))

Haraldson (NT-31) (Taiwan - D; Vietnam) (O-1) - Only locals can improve themselves; we can only create conditions which enable them to do so. (GA(4))

Killen (NT-12) (Pakistan - D; Yugoslavia; Eval.) (R-1) - Nothing can substitute for locals' own efforts; technical assistance can be only a supplement and is useless where efforts do not exist. (GA(4))

Thibodeaux (NT-28) (Japan - D) (O-1) - Full responsibility for performance (for "doing" and "undoing") must be that of host government; we can only help in their efforts to help themselves. (GA(4))

Kershishnik (T/F-11) (Somalia - Ag. Credit; Afghanistan) (R-5) - Can't expect to be of help in Somalia until the Somalis are ready to help themselves. (GA(4))

2. Phases of a program, project, or activity in which local participation is suggested to be essential or desirable

The comments under various headings in this subsection are in most instances merely illustrative. Numerous other comments to the same or a similar effect are often to be found in other sections of the digest dealing with related points.

- a. Joint determination of, or at least mutual understanding as to, the purposes of a technical assistance program and of the objectives of a program, project, or activity (see also XII-B-3)

Berenson (NT-17-B) (Libya - D; Yugoslavia - D) (R-1) - Should make clear from outset that training of locals for self-sufficiency rather than completion of physical projects is objective. In Libya, failed to do so and hence Libyans not ready and willing to take over projects we have started. (GA(11c))

Hart (T/S-31) (Haiti - Educ.; Brazil; Bolivia) (R-2) - Necessary to "sell" an understanding of program to host government, not present it on a "sign-or-else basis." (GA(11c))

Harris (P/US-32) (Indonesia - Ford; Germany - D Sweden - D; France - Lab.) - One of most important things is to find or develop a specific statement of objectives covering a project or program that is both (a) accepted by the locals and (b) really understood by them. (GA(11c))

Nesbitt (NT/E-7) (Indonesia - Pub. Safety) (R-4) - Comments favorably on fact that in his project in Indonesia, government participated to a very great extent in conception of project and definition of its objectives. (GA(11c))

Wolcott (T/A-59) (Iran - Pub. Admin.) (R-4) - Before further aid is provided in public administration in Iran, it is important, as is not presently the case, that Iranians should have a better understanding of what is meant by public administration, which he defines as "that discipline which deals with the organization and procedures for governing." They must come to realize that it isn't simply the "plumbing aspects of management," useful as they are, or simply the adoption by law or regulation of a reform, but, in addition, its implementation (illustrations). (GA(5b))

Cottam (NT-69) (Brazil - D) (O-1) - Most important step in developing and conducting effective t.a. program (as well as in accomplishing other U.S. objectives, such as those of exchange programs) is to establish and in effect to institutionalize a dialogue on technical assistance with host - a continuing exchange of information and ideas at all levels from the president of country on down to the individual technicians, including contractor personnel - the purpose being to gain a mutual understanding of objectives and to stimulate host government to understand the limitations and possibilities of technical assistance and the relationship of their objectives to ours, to form intra-society links at many levels. (GA(O))

Liberia Evaluation Report (1958) - Notes that in Liberia USOM found out through trial and error what projects were appropriate for Liberian conditions. Selection progressively reflected the accumulation of USOM experience of working under tropical conditions and a greater understanding on part of local government of purposes of technical assistance. (GA(O))

Blackwell (T/E-14) (Philippines - Highway Engr.; Pakistan) (R-4) - In Philippines, host did participate in, and concur with, the conception of the project and the definition of its objectives. Similarly in Pakistan, but to a lesser degree. (INDIG)

See Lippincott (NT-11) (Lebanon - DD) (R-2) - Should be agreement on common objectives between donor and those affected. However, need not be with donee government. May be with revolutionary groups in other society who may in turn bring about changes in the donee government (presumably not an explicit agreement). (GA(11c))

See Price (P/NON-US-2) (Nepal - UN) - (GA(11c))

Von Seggern (T-33) (Lebanon - Ag.; Turkey; Egypt) (R-3) - Should be mutual understanding between the United States and host government as to the purposes of technical assistance. This situation has not prevailed, partly because original Point IV approach of spending as much money and sending in as many technicians as possible was wrong and because annual program basis tended to lead to superior position of U.S. programs without explanation of purpose or opportunity to discuss problems with locals. Even in Lebanon, where advanced status makes communication relatively easy, situation in this regard unsatisfactory. (GA(11c))

Moyer (NT-66) (Korea - D; ICA/W - O/FE; Taiwan - D) (R-1) - Our purpose should be attainment of things which are of joint or common interest to both donor and donee. In essence it must be helping locals to achieve their legitimate aspirations, but in a way which ties our own interests in with the achievement of such aspirations. (GA(11c))

Larrimore (ETR - SEOUL TOAID A-303, 12/8/61) (Korea - Pub. Safety; Thailand) (R-6) - Before projects are started there should be a meeting of minds of local officials and USOM re project goals, end results, and what is expected of both parties. This should not be superficial; terms and meanings should be defined so that each party has clear understanding of what is expected to be accomplished by the project, how and when it is expected to be accomplished, and what each party is expected to contribute. Would eliminate much misunderstanding and roadblocks. (GA(0))

Keithahn (T/S-28) (Brazil - Elem. Educ. Adv.; Honduras; Paraguay) (R-4) - (GA(11a))

(1) Can and should a donor have hidden objectives?

Morris (T/E-22) (Chile - Trans. & Ag. Engr.; Venezuela) (R-4) - Notes inability, due to problems of acceptability by host government, of specifying in program documents some of original or accreting objectives of technical assistance (e.g., in Chile, the revision of curriculum of College of Engineering or production of Hoover Commission-type report on Ministry of Public Works), and resultant difficulties with ICA/W and necessity for subsequent amendments....Problem particularly acute in public administration and education....Some system should be found for programming and budgeting these "hidden objectives." (GA(11c))

b. Joint planning and programming(1) General comments

Campbell (W-23) (O/PH; Brazil) - Should be joint planning and programming. (GA(11c))

Price (P/NON-US-2) (Nepal - UN) - In addressing host problems, donor and host should agree as to direction in which to go and make mutual commitments with respect to measures to be taken. Joint approach a better vehicle for training, and will result in more careful planning of projects from economic, engineering, logistic, and other standpoints. (GA(11c))

Andrews (P/US-7-C) (Michigan State) - Many of our programs fail because of a lack of genuine joint planning, locals going along because they do not wish to offend us. We should take them into our confidence and not treat as second-class citizens. (GA(11c))

St. Louis (NT-32) (India - Prog.; Pakistan; Korea; Taiwan; Burma) (R-2) - One cannot develop a program which is responsive to local needs and for which there will be local enthusiasm unless there is joint approach and a joint working group. (GA(11c))

Nelson (T-35) (Iran - CD; Philippines) (R-4) - Should be joint planning and programming. Cites approach in Iran of hammering out (i) new community development program and (ii) general development program jointly around table with appropriate ministries. Host should be involved in programming process to same degree and in same manner as he feels various elements of the mission should be involved. (GA(11c))

Roseman (W-26-A) (O/FE; Cambodia - D) - Joint planning with host essential. (GA(11c))

Von Seggern (T-33) (Lebanon - Ag.; Egypt; Turkey) (R-3) - Projects must be ones on which there is clearly mutual agreement between the U.S. and host government. (GA(11c))

National Planning Association Report (TASG #161-65, pp. 19-20) (1960) - In Latin America, joint analyses, projections and programming on a bilateral or multilateral basis, à la Marshall Plan, desirable. This should be done irrespective of the danger, actually not great, that such action by U.S. will be taken as a commitment. (GA(11c))

Coffman (ETR - TEHRAN TOICA A-2648) (Iran - PA) (R-2) - In future public administration programming in Iran, should emphasize involving officials of host government as much as possible in every step of the process of program planning, execution, and evaluation. (GA(11c))

Hannum (M-61) (ICA/W - O/LA; DLF; Libya - Exec. Dir.; Egypt) (R-2) - Describes approvingly joint planning operation employed in launching EARIS in Egypt. (GA(11c))

Andrews (P/US-7-D) (Michigan State) - Should engage in honest-to-God joint planning with local government, for its own sake and because of the important by-play of personal relations which it involves. Haven't generally done so (e.g., Thailand, earlier in India).

Thompson (NT-3-B) (India - DD) (R-1) - In India, program suffered because there has never been a serious understanding with ~~the~~ Indians as to the activities to be undertaken jointly. Partly Indians' fault; partly inability of any U.S. organization to negotiate on all aspects of aid. Example: lack of mutual understanding re (i) development grain storage capacity for PL 480 imports and (ii) fertilizer policy to be followed by Indians. (GA(11c))

American Universities Field Staff (EAB-14-'55) - "That Spirit of Jointness" - Government-to-government cooperation in the administration of aid worked reasonably well in Europe, largely because the actual mechanics of administration were left to parallel national agencies, with the degree of "jointness" left somewhat flexible. The essence of cooperation lay in the discussion of a project prior to approval, in which technical equals in the two governments participated on a daily basis. It was cooperation between equals enjoying mutual respect. (GA(11c))

Robertson (ETR - BANGKOK TOICA A-1338, 11/1/61) (Thailand - Sanitarian) (R-3) - In commenting on already significant success of village and health sanitation project in Thailand, ascribes much of success to fact project was carefully planned over almost a year by joint USOM-Thai Health Department committee. (GA(0))

Weems (T/F-48) (Korea - Ind. Lab. Adv.) (R-3) - In Korea, recently approach is to help Koreans to do what they want to do - to give them a greater voice in programming. However, it is appropriate through quiet missionary work to stir up local interests in new ideas and to find capable Koreans interested in sponsoring activity. Asia Foundation uses this technique. Procedure increases chance of a successful project. (GA(11c))

Parker (P/NON-US-4) (FAO; India - Ag.) - Both generally as to a country, and as also with respect to individual ministries, desirable to establish joint committees of all donors and host government representatives to develop, and periodically bring up to date, long-term technical assistance plans. (GA(11c))

Cf. Pray (NT/S-1) (Greece - Trng. Offr.; Netherlands) (R-3) - In Greece it was difficult to make long-range plans jointly because of fear that Greeks would consider them to represent commitments. (GA(11c))

Britton (T/M-12) (Pakistan - Plant Pathologist) (R-5) - Planning and implementing projects require a joint approach and too often we use a unilateral approach. Our own views as to what is needed are meaningless unless the government itself feels the need and makes the request. (GA(11c))

Cf. [REDACTED] ([REDACTED] - [REDACTED])  
([REDACTED]) - [REDACTED] program is, and should remain, a political one, and shouldn't try to make economic sense out of it. We should avoid "planning" with [REDACTED] because plans are in effect commitment and anyway they don't want a real economic plan. [REDACTED] submit a shopping list and then bargain with both west and the Bloc. (GA(11c))

Scholes (T/M-26) (Paraguay - PH; Bolivia) (R-4) - As chief of division and director of servicio, he viewed his primary responsibility as that of developing programs (a) adapted to the country, (b) which the country wanted, and (c) which both locals and USOM thought were worthwhile and proper. (GA(5a))

Hart (T/S-31) (Haiti - Educ.; Brazil; Bolivia) (R-2) - Best approach in working with foreign government personnel is to help them plan joint projects by putting ideas in their minds so that they will think they are their own ideas. Hopefully this will result in local support and measures necessary for implementation. (GA(5a))...Necessary to "sell" an understanding of program to host government, not present it on a "sign-or-else" basis.... Must always be ready to discuss, consult, explain, justify, and carefully present our plans, proposals, and suggestions orally and in written drafts with the willingness to modify them before a final rigid legal document is presented for formal bilateral action....Should not follow the practice so often followed of trying to get agreements, signatures to legal documents and action approval with insufficient consultation and exchange of ideas.... (GA(11c))

See Lebosquet (T/M-36) (India - San. Engr.) (R-3) - Notes difficulty in India in getting approval of any program that is not included in or, if you are willing to make additional resources available, supports (and does not expand) India's own Five Year Plan. (GA(11c))

Brazil Evaluation Report (1958) - In Brazil, regards technical assistance of type already in operation as integral part of a comprehensive U.S. program, jointly developed and fully coordinated with Brazilians. (GA(5b))

H.E. Aziz (KABUL F.S. DESP. 191, 3/16/61) (Afghanistan - Deputy Planning Minister) - (GA(0))

Hodson (NT/A-56) (Vietnam - Prog.; Lebanon, Syria - UNWRA) (R-4) - (GA(11c))

Barnhart (ETR - RIO TOICA A-739, 9/25/61) (Brazil - Elem. Educ.; Panama; Bolivia) (R-4) - (GA(11a))

Cottam (NT-69) (Brazil - D) (0-1) - (GA(0))

Adler (W/E-8) (O/FE - Exec.; Vietnam; Greece) (R-2) - (INDIG)

Carson (NT/F-11) (Iraq - Trng. Offr.; Egypt - Ford) (R-6) - (GA(0))

Moffat (NT-15-A) (Eval.(Korea); Ghana - D; Burma - D; Greece; U.K.) (R-1) - (GA(5a))

See Owen (M-74) (UN-TAB) - Insistence on country programming with respect to proffered aid as a means of inducing locals to undertake planning and to establish planning units. (Example of induced priority decision in Tanganyika) (GA(5b))

Edwards (A/UN-20) (Pakistan - UNICEF) - (GA(11c))

Darby (ETR - DJAKARTA TOAID A-446, 1/9/62) (Indonesia - Higher Educ. Adv.) (R-4) - Recommends enlarged program based on jointly considered and jointly identified needs. The scope, as well as detail, of the enlarged program should be based on a careful and realistic evaluation of the national needs in higher education. The program should be worked out by a commission of both Indonesians and Americans. (ITECH(4)EDUC)

Nesbitt (NT/E-7) (Indonesia - Pub. Safety) (R-4) - Host government participated to a great extent in conception of Indonesian police project and definition of its objectives. Factor in success. (REL(3))

(2) Joint programming and planning mechanisms as a device to achieve local participation in planning and programming and to make approach mutual

Andrews (P/US-7-C) (Michigan State) - Joint task forces tied into ministries may be useful approach, particularly when tied in with jointly developed plan. (GA(11c))

St. Louis (NT-32) (India - Prog.; Pakistan; Korea; Burma; Taiwan) (R-3) - There must be a joint mechanism of U.S. and host officials, involving both ministerial and technical levels. It can be informal (e.g., India) or formal (Korea). Includes description of present devices in India, Pakistan, Taiwan, and Korea, commenting favorably on each. (GA(11c))

Patterson (NT-36) (Argentina - D; Chile; Paraguay) (R-1) - Discusses desirability and character of a cooperative arrangement at presidential level. (GA(11c))

Roseman (W-26-A) (O/FE; Cambodia) - One of first steps in a country is to set up effective mechanisms for joint planning. Ascribes recent problems in Korea to breakdown of Combined Economic Board as a result of the proliferation of committees and their embroilment in bureaucratic procedures, with the consequence that decisions were made elsewhere, often unilaterally. (GA(11c))

Edwards (A/UN-20) (Pakistan - UNICEF) - In Philippines, relationships between USOM and Philippine government have deteriorated in past two years and advisory relationships with counterparts were largely ineffective. Closer relationships must be rebuilt, and a strong joint U.S.-Philippine planning entity along the lines recommended by Galbraith is needed. (GA(11c))

Bell (T/A-62-A) (Senior Economist and V.P. of Surveys and Research Corp.) - Expresses serious reservations about Galbraith proposal for joint development planning authorities, involving as it does the locally unacceptable idea of a host merging its government with that of the U.S. - certainly in Indonesia, and most Far Eastern and Middle Eastern countries, though perhaps not in some Latin American nations. (GA(11c))

Parker (P/NON-US-4) (FAO; India - Ag.) - Both generally as to a country, and also with respect to individual ministries, desirable to establish joint committees of all donors and host government representatives to develop, and periodically bring up to date, long-term t.a. plans. (GA(11c))

Shavell (NT/A-35) (Korea - Econ. Adv.) (R-2) - Detailed description of Combined Economic Board in Korea, its sub-structure and method of operation....Advantages: (1) it pulls Korean government into decisions on virtually all aspects of aid program, making all the participating ministries feel that they are co-partners in this venture; (2) it is an effective, cooperative public administration exercise which is well worth the investment in people and money (much of the practical training provided rubs off on locals so that Koreans are likely to continue some such form of interdepartmental planning after U.S. leaves); and (3) it enables U.S. to influence Korean economic decisions on matters not directly related to the aid program. Disadvantage: high cost in terms of money and people. (GA(11c))

Hendershot (ETR - TEHRAN TOAID A-151, 11/27/61) (Iran - Educ. Adv.) (R-2) - Study of problem of expanding education into Iranian villages - Ministry accepted suggestion for a committee: joint Ministry, USOM, UNESCO, and NEF. Factor in success. (REL(3))

Conn (A-36) (Thailand - Educ.) (R-5) - Development of education centers in Thailand - Pattern of seven schools in each center based on agreement between U.S. and Thailand. In the Chiangmai center, the schools were selected jointly by USOM Education Division and Thai Ministry of Education. Teams for surveying needs of each center, including seven schools, were each composed of two Thais and one USOM representative. Factor in success. (REL(3))

Tibbutt (T/M-24) (Turkey - Ag.) (R-3) - Development of agricultural development project in Turkey - Committee approach chosen as means of creating awareness and participation on part of all (21 local agencies involved) in all areas of project concern. Factor in success. (REL(3))

- (3) Development of a joint long-term technical assistance program by the host and all aid donors might be desirable.

Parker (P/NON-US-4) (FAO; India - Ag.) - Desirable for host government to develop jointly with all donors a long-term technical assistance program or plan, covering perhaps 3-5 years and related to general country development program. Provision for annual review and up-dating....Coordination in initial planning process would obviate much subsequent trouble....Might be prepared by committee on which representatives of all donors and local government personnel. (GA(5))

c. Implementation, operation, or execution of a program project, or activity

Carson (NT/F-11) (Iraq - Trng. Offr.; Egypt - Ford) (R-6) -  
In Iraq, first USOM assumed too much project administration and control, a factor which led to over-identification of program with old regime and a consequent unwillingness of new regime to continue the program. Same factor resulted in collapse of programs instituted upon withdrawal of USOM technicians....In retrospect, attributes policy to desire of ICA/W to accomplish something and feeling on part of all technicians (accentuated by jurisdictional competition among technical divisions) that they must produce something. (GA(0))

Beran (T/PR-3) (Libya - CD; Egypt - CD) (R-4) - In Libya, failed to involve locals in operations to extent we should have. (GA(0))

Coffman (ETR - TEHRAN TOIGA A-2648) (Iran - PA) (R-2) - In future public administration programming in Iran, should emphasize involving officials of host government as much as possible in every step of the process of program planning, execution, and evaluation. (GA(11c))

Raper (W-42) (M/PERS; Taiwan; Philippines; Iran; Japan) (R-3) - (GA(12b))

Campbell (W-23) (O/PH; Brazil) (R-1) - (GA(11c))

Adler (W/E-8) (O/FE - Exec.; Vietnam; Greece) (R-2) - (INDIG)

Workinger (NT-62) (Yemen - D; Jordan - DD; Ethiopia - DD; Iran) (R-3) - (GA(11a))

Britton (T/M-12) (Pakistan - Plant Pathologist) (R-5) - (GA(11c))

Brenden (T/E-11) (Philippines - Engr.) - Counterpart to adviser on irrigation project was Director of Public Works and Chief of the Irrigation Division. Brenden always requested that his counterparts participate in everything he did or their employees participate. Necessary that ideas of local counterparts always be considered and that there be an understanding of the conditions under which these people work. (REL(3))

d. Decisions with respect to a program, project, or activity

Little (T/S-17) (Thailand - Teacher Educ.; Dominican Rep.) (R-3) - In Thailand general education project, USOM took stance that this was a Thai, not a U.S., project and that unilateral decisions would not be made by U.S. technicians. While causing short-term delays, insistence that locals do the job produces best results in long run. (Detailed illustrations) (GA(O))

Locher (T/M-27) (Brazil - Ag. Engr.; Iraq) (R-2) - Favorable to servicio because of its joint nature - the fact that all decisions must be taken jointly. (Notes other weaknesses of servicio arrangement.) (GA(11c))

Lachman (NT-22) (Italy - Prog.) (R-2) - Participation of "local" locals in decisions on projects affecting them is essential to support required. Illustrates from Sardinian project. (GA(11c))

Hummon (T-29) (Liberia - CM; Libya) (R-3) - (GA(11c))

Raper (W-42) (M/PERS; Taiwan; Philippines; Iran; Japan) (R-3) - (GA(11c))

Campbell (W-23) (O/PH; Brazil) (R-1) - (GA(11c))

Mills (T/F-16) (Pakistan - CD; Korea) - (GA(5b))

e. Miscellaneous phases(1) Documentation

Hart (T/S-31, Annex II) (Haiti - Educ.; Brazil; Bolivia) (R-2) - Must always be ready to discuss, consult, explain, justify, and carefully present our plans, proposals, and suggestions orally and in written drafts with the willingness to modify them before a final rigid legal document is presented for formal bilateral action....Should not follow the practice so often followed of trying to get agreements, signatures to legal documents and action approval with insufficient consultation and exchange of ideas. (GA(11c))

(2) Choice of donor technicians

Rex (NT/S-16) (Tunisia - Tech. Service Chief; ICA/W) (R-3) - Emphasizes importance attached by Tunisians to the right to pass on the qualifications of any proposed police adviser. (GA(0))

(3) Surveys of needs

Harris (P/US-32) (Indonesia - Ford; Germany - D; Sweden - D; France - Lab.) - Locals should participate fully in conduct of surveys and studies of a country's needs and the ways to meet these needs. Illustrations from Indonesia of non-application and application of this principle in successive ICA and Ford studies of vocational education needs. (GA(3))

(4) Evaluation of a program, project, or activity

Wengert (M-54) (Oregon) - Desirability of studying effectiveness and techniques of t.c. and economic development programs through joint U.S.-host examination of particular projects. (GA(11c))

Coffman (ETR - TEHRAN TOICA A-2648) (Iran - PA) (R-2) - In future public administration programming in Iran, should emphasize involving officials of host government as much as possible in every step of the process of program planning, execution, and evaluation. (GA(11c))

See Wolcott (T/A-59) (Iran - PA) (R-4) - Indicates his belief in frank personal discussions with local key officials by describing his critical pre-departure conference in Iran with key officials concerning successes and failures in public administration in Iran and the measures necessary to get better public administration. (GA(0))

3. Reasons why local participation ("mutuality," "joint action," "partnership") may be necessary or desirable

The comments under this heading are merely illustrative. Each of the points made is supported more fully by comments to be found elsewhere in the digest.

a. General comments

St. Louis (NT-32) (India - Prog.; Pakistan; Korea; Taiwan; Burma) (R-3) - Arguing in favor of a joint planning mechanism, cites the following arguments: (1) without such a mechanism it is impossible, given stringent demands of annual program cycle, effectively to implement unilaterally developed program; (2) simpler approach and more orderly and logical; (3) consistent with spirit of bilateralism; (4) keeps host intimately conversant with USOM thinking and activities; and (5) permits properly relating U.S. program to broader government plans within which our programs should fit. (GA(11c))

b. Superimposed programs, projects, or solutions to local problems usually don't work. Successful programs, projects, and solutions require joint collaboration. (See also particularly V-B and X-C.)

Howe (NT-76) (Vietnam - Prog.; ICA/W) (R-2) - Projects cannot ordinarily be superimposed. (GA(5a))

Heilpern (T-27) (Iran - Prog. Econ.) (R-3) - U.S. solutions usually won't work without adaptation, and compromise must be worked out with locals. (GA(11c))

H.E. Aziz (KABUL F.S. DESP. 191, 3/16/61) (Afghanistan - Deputy Planning Minister) - (GA(0))

St. Louis (NT-32) (India - Prog.; Pakistan; Korea; Taiwan; Burma) (R-2) - (GA(11c))

Nelson (T-35) (Iran - CD; Philippines) (R-4) - (GA(11c))

c. Local participation is necessary in order that programs and projects, measures taken, and solutions proposed may properly respond to local needs. (See also V-B.)

Loren (NT-25) (Ethiopia - D; Thailand - DD) (R-1) - (GA(11c))

- d. Necessary local support is not likely to be forthcoming and local responsibilities are not likely to be carried out effectively unless the locals participate fully.

Raper (W-42) (M/PERS; Taiwan; Philippines; Iran; Japan) (R-3) - (GA(11c))

St. Louis (NT-32) (India - Prog.; Pakistan; Korea; Taiwan; Burma) (R-2) - (GA(11c))

Hart (T/S-31) (Haiti - Educ.; Brazil; Bolivia) (R-2) - (GA(5))

Shavell (NT/A-35) (Korea - Econ. Adv.) (R-2) - Detailed description of Combined Economic Board in Korea, its substructure and method of operation....Advantages: (1) it pulls Korean government into decisions on virtually all aspects of aid program, making all the participating ministries feel that they are co-partners in this venture....(GA(11c))

Brenden (T/E-11) (Philippines - Irrigation Engr.) (R-3) - In general, host supplied administrative support for his irrigation project in the Philippines, and it was best that could be expected within local capabilities....In cases where projects had been forced on host, the administrative support was not so good, as might have been expected. (INDIG)

- e. Local participation is necessary if the locals are to learn what the donor is trying to communicate to them - if they are to gain the capacity to carry on comparable activities by themselves.

Kontos (NT-79) (Ceylon - DD; ICA/W) (R-2) - (GA(1))

Hummon (T-29) (Liberia - CM; Libya) (R-3) - (GA(11c))

Yoe (NT-44) (Haiti - D) (R-1) - (GA(11c))

Chable (T-30) (Ecuador - Ag.) (R-5) - (GA(11c))

Raper (W-42) (M/PERS; Taiwan; Philippines; Iran; Japan) (R-3) - (GA(11c))

Price (P/NON-US-2) (Nepal - UN) - (GA(11c))

Owen (M-74) (UN-TAB) - (GA(5b))

Shavell (NT/A-35) (Korea - Econ. Adv.) (R-2) - Detailed description of Combined Economic Board in Korea, its sub-structure and method of operation....Advantages:... (2) it is an effective, cooperative public administration exercise which is well worth the investment in people and money. Much of the practical training provided rubs off on locals so that Koreans are likely to continue some such form of interdepartmental planning after U.S. leaves. (GA(11c))

3. Host views may be superior to those of donor.

Jones (NT-86) (Turkey - AD; ICA/W; India - Ford) (R-2) - Quite often host's ideas superior to own concerning (a) programs to be undertaken and (b) manner of carrying out. (GA(11))

Chable (T-30) (Ecuador - Ag.) (R-5) - Local knows more about a country than foreigner can ever know, and the things he knows must be taken into account in solving local problems. (GA(11c))

4. Donors and donor personnel have frequently violated the foregoing suggested principle by acting unilaterally.

For further extensive comments on this subject see X-C and V-C-6 relating to donor tendencies respectively to impose unilateral solutions to problems and to develop programs and select projects without reference to local desires and locally felt needs.

Workinger (NT-62) (Yemen - D; Jordan - DD; Ethiopia - DD; Iran) (R-3) - U.S. tendency, as reflected in the average technician, is toward undue domination of projects - toward taking over the job to the exclusion of the locals. (Examples from Jordan and Iran covering early wrong approach and later right approach; description of difficulties in Yemen.) (GA(11a))

Carson (NT/F-11) (Iraq - Trng. Offr.; Egypt - Ford) (R-6) - In Iraq, as in most other cases, original program was not really bilateral, being rather the product of bartering supplies for the acceptance of technicians. (GA(0))

Britton (T/M-12) (Pakistan - Plant Pathologist) (R-5) - Planning and implementing projects require a joint approach and too often we use a unilateral approach. Our own views as to what is needed are meaningless unless the government itself feels the need and makes the request. (GA(11c))

Hodson (NT/A-56) (Vietnam - Prog.; Lebanon, Syria - UNWRA) (R-4) - In Vietnam, program suffers from a lack of participation in its development on the part of the local government, and a tendency to analyze projects from a U.S. rather than from a joint U.S.-Vietnamese point of view. (GA(11c))

Weems (T/F-48) (Korea - Ind. Lab. Adv.) (R-3) - In the past in Korea, U.S. has tended to think up projects, assuming that an appropriate local sponsor would be available and, if he is not, forcing the project down the locals' throats, the result usually being a Korean political football man as the counterpart. In other cases have "shanghaied" Koreans into making requests. More recently, approach is to help them to do what they want to do - to give them a greater voice in programming. (GA(11c))

Kontos (NT-79) (Ceylon - DD; ICA/W) (R-2) - Many technicians not sure whether they should be operators or advisers and fail to enlist sufficient local participation. (GA(1))

American Universities Field Staff Study (EAB-14-'55) - "That Spirit of 'Jointness'" - Notes that at the outset in Iran U.S. paid for the so-called joint program, and observes that, in light of developments, Iranians must now contribute substantial sums if program is to remain joint. Questions whether spirit of "jointness" ever really existed, but concludes this is not a reflection on U.S. and that program has been successful, noting Iran is still a free nation. (GA(11c))

H.E. Aziz (KABUL F.S. DESP. 191, 3/16/61) (Afghanistan - Deputy Planning Minister) - Critical of U.S. tendency to plan unilaterally in Afghanistan, particularly in fields in which social habits and cultural patterns were most important. (GA(0))

Humnon (T-29) (Liberia - CM; Libya) (R-3) - Terrible temptation and tendency for technician to make own decisions, since it is easier, whereas important they be made jointly with those locals who will have to make decisions on their own several years hence. (GA(11c))

Campbell (W-23) (O/PH; Brazil) (R-1) - We must get away from, but are increasingly tending toward, unilateral decisions, a trend that began with the formation of FOA and has continued with subsequent creeping assimilation into State. (E.g.: (1) unilateral decision to abolish public health cooperative in Iran, a decision whose repercussions are still being felt; (2) USOM director's insistence on cutting off public health program in favor of agricultural concentration in spite of country's preference for health activities already in mid-stream.) (GA(11c))

Andrews (P/US-7-C) (Michigan State) - Lack of genuine joint planning cause of many program failures....(P/US-7-D) - We have failed to engage in real joint planning with the local governments. In Thailand, operation is really U.S. planning operation, and this was formerly true in India, though encouraging counter-developments....(GA(11c))

[REDACTED] (Somalia [REDACTED]) In Somalia, requested to draft [REDACTED] program without consulting Somalis or Italians to determine their thinking, as he desired, although accepted by Somalis pronto. (GA(11c))

St. Louis (NT-32) (India - Prog.; Pakistan; Korea; Taiwan; Burma) (R-2) - One of most basic weaknesses in U.S. program has been tendency to approach problems unilaterally. The initial bilateral, with its cooperative provisions, is allowed to become dead letter, with many missions developing their annual programs without reference to the requirements of the host as viewed by the host and implementing the same in a similarly independent fashion. Approach produces chaos, confusion, and resentment. With notable exceptions (Korea, Taiwan), programs are in fact unilateral and this constitutes serious organic weakness. Illustrations: past programming in India and in Pakistan, and still earlier in Korea before the CEB. (GA(11c))

Von Seggern (T-33) (Lebanon - Ag.; Turkey; Egypt) (R-3) - Because of pressures to obligate money and send technicians to the field (the consequence of original Point IV approach and annual program basis), we have superimposed our ideas as to staff patterns and programs on the host countries, never explaining what we were trying to do or providing real opportunity to discuss problems of technical assistance. (GA(11c))

National Planning Association Report (TASG #161-65, pp. 19-20) - Critical of approach in Latin America because of failure to undertake programming on a joint or multilateral basis. (GA(11c))

BEST AVAILABLE DOCUMENT

[REDACTED] (Pakistan [REDACTED]) - Criticizes unilateral cutback of CD programs in Pakistan, and without notice to technicians, creating embarrassing situation for latter in their relations with counterparts. (GA(5b))

Edwards (A/UN-20) (Pakistan - UNICEF) - In Philippines, relationships between USOM and Philippine government have deteriorated in past two years and advisory relationships with counterparts were largely ineffective. (GA(11c))

Moffat (NT-15-A) (Eval. (Korea); Ghana - D; Burma - D; Greece; U.K.) (R-1) - In Korea, too many things undertaken that Koreans didn't desire. Agreed only as a result of extensive persuasion, and agreement did not signify real acceptance. (GA(5a))

See Berenson (NT-17-B) (Libya - D; Yugoslavia - D) (R-1) - (GA(11c))

See Wolcott (T/A-59) (Iran - PA) (R-4) - (GA(5b))

See Andrews (P/US-7-D) (Michigan State) - Importance of finding way of effecting indigenous change without overly dominating the country being assisted. Unfortunately, in some areas (e.g., Pakistan), the weight of our money is virtually dictating the course of a country, and the response is purely submissive; our USOM tends to become a shadow government and, with strong people, creates a feeling of inferiority on part of ministries. (GA(0))

C. IN ADDITION TO THE NEED FOR LOCAL PARTICIPATION AS SUCH, THE SUCCESS OF A PROJECT, PROGRAM, OR ACTIVITY IS USUALLY DEPENDENT ON VARIOUS TYPES OF HOST SUPPORT, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND COOPERATION.

1. Suggested general principle: In addition to its dependence on general host participation of the character described in XI-B above, a successful program, project, or other activity ordinarily depends upon certain supporting actions, contributions, and cooperation by the host government and its personnel.

The following comments stress the general importance of host government support, contributions, and cooperation to the effectiveness of technical assistance. Some of these speak in terms of the host government, others in terms of counterparts and other involved locals. In later sections, comments with respect to specific types of support, contributions, and cooperation are enumerated.

Green (T/A-47) (Haiti - Prog.; D/S posts) (R-3) - Should not provide aid (even to preclude Soviet or Castro aid) unless the locals are ready to take the essential complementary measures. (GA(11))

Cottam (NT-69) (Brazil - D) (O-1) - Criteria for projects: ... (3) Is host prepared to take all supporting measures required? (4) Is host prepared to institutionalize activity involved?... Most fundamental precondition to successful t.a. program is to make it mutual in terms of real interest of host therein... Principal criteria for determining existence of real mutuality of interests: (1) willingness of host to give it the kinds of support which are a condition precedent to its success and (2) willingness of host to take steps necessary for the institutionalization of any activity involved. (GA(0))

Berenson (NT-17-B) (Libya - D; Yugoslavia - D) (R-1) - Success is dependent on readiness and willingness of locals to cooperate effectively. Impossible if local's attitude is to effect that he will depend on us to do the job. (GA(11a))

Rogers (T/F-36) (Iran - Forestry Adv.) (R-3) - In Iran, while we obtain lip-service cooperation at the top, there is a lack of cooperation at lower levels which he believes the top, if really sincere, could do something about. Makes program ineffective. (GA(11a))

Hazleton (NT/S-20) (Pakistan - Trng. Offr.; Iraq; Saudi Arabia) (R-4) - Notes complete failure of Saudi program due to lack of local interest and hence lack of cooperation. (GA(11a))

Moyer (NT-66) (Korea - D; ICA/W - O/FE; Taiwan - D) (R-1) - Effective t.a. is dependent upon obtaining the cooperative efforts of a host government on many matters, including not only those matters undertaken jointly but also those which the host must undertake independently and which are indispensable to the success of a project which is joint (e.g., funds, counterparts, passage of legislation, etc.)....To date we have not been too successful in making clear, and gaining acceptance of, the essentiality of mutuality and cooperation. This is certainly true in Korea....However, there is a distinct limit on the controls that may be exercised over local government in (a) the handling of aid received and (b) the performance of related measures. Too great interference is not desirable because (a) spoon-feeding does not encourage local development of responsibility, (b) locals won't allow it, and (c) problems of subsequent disengagement become difficult. (GA(11))

Stein (T/M-19) (Vietnam - Malaria Spec.) (R-3) - In Vietnam, encountered many difficulties at outset of malaria program because of unwillingness of [REDACTED] to go to top of local government...in order to provide a clear understanding at all levels of the government of the long-range nature and fiscal requirements of the program. Without stronger support, assurance of funding, higher local salaries, and speedier administrative techniques on part of locals program would fail. Matters finally rectified. (GA(11a))

Williams (ETR - ANKARA TOICA A-853, 11/3/61) (Turkey - Irrigation Farm Adv.) (R-4) - Close teamwork between USOM advisers and General Directorate of Soil Conservation and Farm Irrigation has been responsible for extraordinary progress in developing directorate and getting its program under way....Suggests increased effort to encourage self-help principles by reducing ICA funding. (GA(11a))

Kennan (TASG #37, p. 42) - Should not give aid (economic aid) unless people want it "very, very badly" and unless the local government is prepared to support it in full before its own people. Local government should take full responsibility for asking for it. Whenever aid gets the tinge of something being forced on locals we ought to get out. (GA(11))

Nelson (NT-78) (Lebanon - D; ICA/W; Jordan - D) (R-1) - Real cooperation, which is key to all effective t.a., impossible unless locals (a) are behind and (b) really want program being undertaken. All programs must respond to felt needs....Otherwise necessary local support will not be forthcoming. (GA(5a))

Howe (NT-76) (Vietnam - Prog.; ICA/W) (R-2) - Genuine local support an essential element in the success of any project.... However, it is appropriate to start projects where support is likely to develop because this is sometimes the only way to test out, or to develop, local enthusiasm therefor. (GA(O))....  
In Vietnam, agriculture credit program appears to have been great success because of (a) excellence of U.S. technicians; (b) confidence gained of locals; (c) high quality local officials; (d) enthusiastic local government support; (e) local inclination to save. (GA(O))

Jones (NT-86) (Turkey - AD; ICA/W; India - Ford) (R-2) - Cannot formulate and operate programs on unilateral basis. Cooperation essential and this means compromise as to (a) activities undertaken and (b) manner of implementation. (GA(11a))

Tibbutt (T/M-24) (Turkey - Agronomy Adv.) (R-3) - Suggests that one should make an inventory of what contributions the locals can make - (a) at the national level, by the country to its people through its government, and (b) at the local level, of the resources available. U.S. contribution should be the minimum necessary to supplement such resources, his assumption being that if locals don't think it important enough to contribute what they can, U.S. shouldn't. (GA(11a))

Johns (T/F-37) (Greece - Labor Tech. Offr.) (R-4) - In Greece, reports only show progress in certain management-labor reforms because government not yet convinced such reforms in best interests of country. Hence, lack of requisite ministerial cooperation, which he hopes can be overcome by additional pressure on ministry. (GA(5b))

See Little (T/S-17) (Thailand - Teacher Educ.; Dominican Rep.) (R-3) - In education in Dominican Republic, policies of government and attitude of political ministers, who overruled professional educators, made it difficult to give assistance. (However, in peculiar circumstances, he nonetheless advocated continued assistance in order to keep a U.S. presence and retain good will already gained.) (GA(11a))

Taylor (T/M-52) (Vietnam - Malaria Adv.) (R-4) - The major requirements of his job are locating the right people, organizing their efforts, and obtaining their effective cooperation. (TECH-T(6))

Miller (ETR - BEIRUT TOICA A-89) (Lebanon - Hortic. Adv.) (R-3) - After six years of horticultural work in Lebanon, record shows very little of a tangible nature because of unwillingness of locals to cooperate. (GA(11a))

Saccio (W-20-A) (Brazil - D; ICA/W - DD) (O-1) - In Brazil, malaria program is in a mess because of the mistaken assumption that there was enough Brazilian technical competence to carry the program through. Lack of local administrators, absence of local drive, and failure of Brazil to furnish currency promised are among causes. (GA(O))

See American Universities Field Staff Study (EAB-14-'55) ("That Spirit of 'Jointness'" - Iran) - Notes that at the outset in Iran, U.S. paid for the so-called joint program, and observes that, in light of developments, Iranians must now contribute substantial sums if program is to remain joint. Questions whether spirit of "jointness" ever really existed, but concludes this is not a reflection on U.S. and that program has been successful, noting Iran is still a free nation. (GA(11c))

Anderson (ETR - RIO TOICA A-740, 9/25/61) (Brazil - Educ. Admin. Adv.) (R-3) - No project agreement should be executed or extended unless reasonably certain assistance offered is genuinely desired and will be supported in an effective manner by the host. In Brazil, success depends on performance of agency being assisted. Effectiveness of project as a cooperative effort must be criterion. (GA(11a))

Hubbell (W-43) (GTI - O/NESA) - Effective technical assistance depends upon the willingness of host to support the activities proposed. Principle disregarded in Iran where U.S. operated directly apart from government. (GA(11a))

Liberia Evaluation Report (1958) - In Liberia, major factor in past difficulties has been a lack of willingness and ability of locals to cooperate on U.S. projects, this being affected by cleavage between elite and tribesmen and by newness of idea of change. (GA(O))

Caribbean Evaluation Report (1959) - In Trinidad, lack of cooperation prevented successful implementation of a program. (GA(O))

Bunting (NT-64) (Pakistan - DD; O/FE) (R-1) - Where technical assistance involves projects designed to give general miscellaneous help but having no terminal date and not directed toward the creation of a specific institution, one must make certain that (i) the local incentives for cooperation are present (that locals concerned will have incentive to learn and to disseminate what they learn) and (ii) that there exist operative local administrative mechanisms (institutions) to make effective. (GA(O))

House Foreign Affairs Committee (Report on Foreign Policy and Mutual Security - 1957) (TASG #37, pp. 40-41) - Assistance should not be given unless recipient is willing to make the institutional changes necessary to assure its greatest effect. ...Conditions on aid are necessary, even though the Bloc threatens alternate sources of supply, but conditions should be those required to accomplish the purposes which we seek. Conditions are needed because internal situations in less developed countries are such that assurances are needed that aid will be used to maximum efficiency....No assistance should be extended unless a country wants it, shows an understanding of the possible consequences of the program, and is willing to make the necessary institutional changes its success may require. (Example of a highway project and consequences.) Any reluctance of recipient to make necessary changes warrants aid suspension. (GA(11))

McIntosh (W-13) (O/FOOD; Pakistan; Colombia) (R-1) - One of our really major problems is that of obtaining proper support and adequate contributions from the host government. Reasons: (1) lack of specific agreements; (2) failure to be hard-boiled; (3) inadequate planning of project detail; (4) low level of agreements. (GA(11))

McGlaufflin (W-34) (BOB) - One of major problems is that of obtaining host government cooperation, support, and contributions, citing Liberia as case in point and contrasting Ghana and Nigeria. Notes causes for lack of support. (GA(11))

Patterson (NT-36) (Argentina - D; Chile; Paraguay) (R-1) - Help should be proportionate to host efforts. Central rule. (GA(11))

Harkins (T-24) (Ecuador - Educ.) - Obtaining necessary host cooperation a major problem. (GA(11))

Liggit (NT-29) (Iraq - DD) (R-2) - Host cooperation a major problem (e.g., community development in Iraq). (GA(11))

Zeller (NT/S-29) (Afghanistan - Prog.; Ghana; Indonesia; Pakistan) (R-3) - In Afghanistan, UN (while generally weaker) does a better job than U.S. in getting local support for its projects. Reason is fact that (a) UN demands this support in the beginning whereas (b) U.S. starts from a position of weakness and then tries to bargain for something better....If U.S. would demand more local support, recipient attitude toward projects would be more serious. (GA(11b))

Hart (T/S-31) (Haiti - Educ.; Brazil; Bolivia) (R-2) - First and most important, any action taken must be mutual....The percentage of effort, men, money, and material given by each party to these programs is not important, remembering that the issues in any country are so interlocked that to take action in one sector oblivious to those of another is to court disaster for the whole. At first U.S. vis-à-vis host may have to contribute greater percentage, provided it should never be 100%. The important items are mutuality of interest, understanding, cooperation, and action without reference to percentages. Only as time, circumstance, and successes move programs into high gear, should we discuss increased support. For each country the timing will be different, as Latin American experience proves. We should not be in a hurry even though the costs are great. (GA(11a))

Walinsky ("The Needs for Economic and Technical Assistance in South and Southeast Asia") (Twentieth Century Fund) - Lists things hosts should do themselves, including: (1) establishment of law and order; (2) elimination of corruption in government; (3) improved standards of public service and administration; (4) more realistic planning; (5) reasonable economic policies geared to development objectives, including encouragement of private investment, etc.; (6) enlistment of widespread voluntary participation in their development efforts; (7) promotion of new attitudes and values necessary to economic growth.... Requires a readiness to read the "price tag" on economic development and a willingness to pay that "price." (GA(11a))

Weems (T/F-48) (Korea - Ind. Lab. Adv.) (R-3) - In the past in Korea, U.S. has tended to think up projects, assuming that an appropriate local sponsor would be available and, if he is not, forcing the project down the locals' throats, the result usually being a Korean political football man as the counterpart. In other cases have "shanghaied" Koreans into making requests. More recently, approach is to help them to do what they want to do - to give them a greater voice in programming. However, it is appropriate through quiet missionary work to stir up local interests in new ideas and to find capable Koreans interested in sponsoring activity. Asia Foundation uses this technique. Procedure increases the chance of a successful project. (GA(11c))

Zeller (NT/S-29) (Afghanistan - Prog.; Ghana; Indonesia; Pakistan) (R-3) - In Afghanistan there was insufficient support but this was due to the locals' inability to provide this support, not their unwillingness to do so. (GA(11a))

Goins (NT/E-16) (Liberia - Controller; Ghana) (R-4) - In African countries, where indigenous capacity is very low at the beginning of a program, ICA should provide everything necessary in connection with the program... However, there should be a specific agreement at the outset which so provides and which also provides for decreasing U.S., and increasing host, support. While it creates a bad impression immediately to insist on a contribution (the locals questioning sincerity), also psychologically desirable to build in the idea of contribution - to avoid resentment against being only a recipient. (INDIG)

Ostergaard (NT/E-4) (Lebanon - Admin. Offr.) (R-6) - Feels host should provide all office space necessary for projects, secretarial services, utilities, etc. In Lebanon, host provided only odds and ends.... At outset of mission, bilateral agreement and/or subsidiary documents should specifically specify what the host government is to provide in the way of administrative support for technicians and projects. There is far too much pampering of host and hesitation to ask that it fulfill its responsibilities.... Administrative support for projects and procurement of equipment therefor should be provided by the host government even though dollar project funds should be used, if necessary, to finance the same. When administrative support is handled otherwise (i.e., by USOM), the results are bad (e.g., activities with Ministry of Agriculture in Lebanon); however, once this pattern is established, its reversal is difficult and it may be necessary to continue the wrong approach of giving administrative support through the USOM. (INDIG)

McCarty (T/E-9) (Thailand - Highway Engr.) (R-3) - Description of very limited host contributions, beyond a right of way, to his highway department project in Thailand.... Notes lack of real interest of Thai Highway Department in the project, although he doesn't know the reasons, and its failure to supply counterparts, a deficiency partly compensated for by placing 12 Thais with U.S. contract consulting engineers and thus providing them with training necessary for planning and engineering of new roads in future. (INDIG)

See Kelly (T-44) (Pakistan - CD; Bolivia; Mexico) (R-3) - In Pakistan, concerned over Killen's cutback of those elements of program related to the primary concerns of individual (e.g., health, agriculture and community development), basing action on lack of interest of government in activities and consequent unwillingness to support those measures necessary to make ICA aid worth. Agrees, at least as to health and CD, that interest has been little, but feels (a) this may be due to insufficient imagination on our part and (b) one must show more patience and stick with task for longer time. (GA(5a))

See also following related comments implying that good cooperation on the part of the host was a factor in a successful t.a. activity:

Keithahn (T/S-28) (Brazil - Elem. Educ. Adv.; Honduras; Paraguay) (R-4) - In Brazil in her project, host government cooperation was in general quite satisfactory. (GA(11a))

Button (T/M-28) (Libya - Agric. Info.; Iraq) (R-4) - In Libya felt he had good cooperation and support, particularly since he was asking his counterpart (Nazir) to destroy the prestige and power of his own office which had rested on what he could give the farmer and to take the latter on as a partner. (GA(11a))

Keefer (T/S-25) (Vietnam - Educ.; Peru) (R-3) - In Vietnam, cooperation of host government on whole good in field of education. However, a few problems about placement of returned participants in teacher training. (GA(11a))

Jones (ETR - MOGADISCIO TOAID A-377, 3/23/62) (Somalia - Highway Engr.; Honduras) (R-4) - Recites (1) inability of Somali government, because of limited education of people, to select personnel who can be trained within reasonable time to fill positions required in highway organization and consequent failure for 16 months to appoint a counterpart; (2) lack of local finances to maintain existing roads; and (3) limited interest in assistance made available, except financial assistance. Concludes: there is little excuse for pouring money into the country until GSR is willing to accept and fulfill its own responsibilities and do intelligent planning. (GA(11))

Cf. Ward (ETR - MONROVIA TOAID A-178, 1/15/62) (Liberia - PH; Taiwan) (R-3) - In public health activities in Liberia, the probability of success bears an inverse ratio to the amount of GOL cooperation necessary to achieve success. Thus we should concentrate our efforts on those projects that can bring some health improvement in spite of GOL failure to carry their part of the burden. For example: some years ago the U.S. gave a complete dental bus to the GOL; it has been a white elephant ever since. It has never been used during my 4 years in Liberia. About a year ago the West Germans gave the GOL a similar bus; it was not moved for 3 months. Then the Germans sent a dentist who has been out in it and done a good job as well as receiving much credit. They provided a complete service in one area. It paid off. We should learn by such examples. I will suggest such projects, if requested, for incorporation into the AID program. (ITECH(9)PH)

2. Specific kinds of host support, contributions, complementing actions and cooperation which may be desirable or necessary

a. Analysis

In addition to the views expressed by many commentators with respect to the general importance of host government support, contributions and/or cooperation, various commentators (including some of those cited in XI-C-1 above) have indicated specific types of support, contributions, complementing measures, and cooperation which they consider to be essential or desirable (or not essential or not desirable) for the effectiveness of programs, projects, or activities, generally or under certain circumstances. The specific types of action discussed by different individuals cover a very wide range, are of greatly varying degrees of significance, and reflect a variety of different purposes. Although it has not been possible to group the many applicable comments in this precise fashion, it has seemed desirable, as a background for their examination and analysis, to attempt to identify the major categories of host actions which are discernible among these comments considered as a group. They are:

(1) Actions by a host which are integral parts of a specific program, project, or activity AND which either (a) are necessary to its implementation or (b) materially affect the character or the cost of the assistance which must be provided thereto by the donor. There may be certain actions which only the host can take and which represent absolute preconditions to the execution of the undertaking; in their absence, the immediate steps contemplated by the undertaking cannot go forward and no action by the donor can serve as a substitute therefor. There may be certain other actions, equally crucial to implementation, which it would be desirable for the host to take but which, if not taken by the host (due to its lack of capacity), can be wholly or partially compensated for by actions of the donor. In this general category might be listed: the provision of adequate counterparts, the furnishing of administrative, logistical, and other forms of support required to carry out the specific project or activity, the contribution of local currency financing, etc.

(2) Actions by a host which, though not strictly integral parts of a specific program, project, or activity, nonetheless are closely related thereto AND which either (a) are necessary to its effectiveness or (b) control the degree of its effectiveness or its rate of progress. Such actions might include: steps to institutionalize a program, project, or activity; measures to extend the benefits of the program, project, or activity to a wider circle of people than those

directly participating therein; the adoption of policies or measures upon which beneficial results from the program, project, or activity are ultimately dependent, etc. Thus a host might take every stipulated step in providing personnel, logistical, financial, and administrative support necessary to carry out a project as such while at the same time failing to take extra-project measures which are needed if the project is to make any significant contribution to host development. For example, a government might cooperate fully with a donor in a project that successfully raised the agricultural production capabilities of an area by introducing new techniques, new seed, and fertilizer, but neglect to take measures necessary (a) to provide an inducement for the farmers to produce (e.g., price, tax and land tenure measures) or (b) to enable farmers to procure requisite equipment and materials (e.g., suitable credit). Or, again, a government might do everything needed to carry out a project to train 20 agricultural extension agents but nothing to institutionalize a continuing training program for the thousands of additional agents necessary to mount a real extension program or nothing to provide an institutional framework within which those trained as agents could make effective use of their newly acquired skills.

(3) Actions by a host which, though not directly connected with the specific program, project, or activity, nonetheless are necessary or important in creating the kind of general local political, economic, or social conditions which are needed if the specific program, project, or activity, or perhaps any program, project, or activity, is to make any significant contribution to indigenous development. Thus particular undertakings in a country, while wholly successful in themselves, may have no significant impact on the local situation because, without different economic policies, civil service reform, the creation of a climate favorable to private enterprise, land reform, or other social changes, little that is done by way of external assistance can change the mainstream of local events or materially contribute to local development.

(4) Actions by, or developments in, a host country which are wholly unrelated to, and do not directly affect the economic success of, any specific project, activity, or program of a donor (or even its total assistance program), but which the donor, because of its political or other objectives, considers to be a purpose of its assistance and may stipulate as a condition thereof. Illustrations might include such specific host actions as the following: the granting of base rights; the furnishing of military support; the provision of access to strategic materials; the extension of trade concessions; or the taking of certain diplomatic measures. They might also include such developments within a host society as the

progressive democratization of its institutions, the establishment or maintenance of a domestic climate friendly to the donor, the evolution of an atmosphere favorable to private enterprise, or the creation or continuance of a certain foreign policy posture. Some such actions or developments may be ones that a host government or specific individuals within a host country can take, or bring about, by concrete affirmative measures, while others may simply represent hoped-for consequences in the host society.

(5) Actions by a host which, though not integral parts of any specific program, project, or activity, either (a) affect the ability of the donor to maintain an aid mission or generally to conduct an effective technical assistance program in the host country or (b) affect the cost or the character of the measures required of the donor in order to do so. Examples might be: the furnishing of administrative, logistical, and other forms of support to a donor's mission and its personnel; contributions of local currency for such purposes; the supplying of information necessary for intelligent programming by the donor; the publicizing of the donor's aid activities; the establishment of appropriate governmental machinery for the handling of aid problems with the donor; the maintenance of friendly and cooperative working relationships at the governmental level with the donor aid mission; and the adoption and enforcement of laws, regulations, or procedures necessary for the generally effective use of any aid furnished.

These distinctions should be borne in mind in considering subsequent sections which deal with (a) the factors which should be considered, and the principles which should be applied, in determining which of such host actions should be sought, or stipulated as conditions, in connection with specific projects, programs, or activities (or a donor's total aid program in a country); (b) the behavioral characteristics, attitudes, and actions of donor personnel which are most likely to induce or to discourage such host actions; and (c) the kinds of measures and courses of action at the government level (or mission level) which may be appropriate or inappropriate in seeking such actions.

As to certain of the subdivisions below, the comments included are only illustrative. In some of these instances, the subject involved is covered more fully elsewhere in this or other TASG digests. In other instances, the subject considered is more related to aid generally than to technical assistance as such, or is otherwise tangential, and hence was not discussed extensively in TASG interviews.

b. Supplying of adequate counterparts(1) In general

Moyer (NT-66) (Korea - D; ICA/W - O/FE; Taiwan - D) (R-1) - Satisfactory counterparts indispensable to the success of any joint project. (GA(11))

Weeks (T-23) (India - Audio Consultant) - Notes difficulties encountered in India in obtaining satisfactory counterpart, partly due to rigid bureaucratic civil service regulations preventing assignment of qualified people. (GA(11a))

McIntosh (W-13) (O/FOOD; Pakistan; Colombia) (R-1) - Obtaining satisfactory counterparts is a problem area. (GA(11a))

Loren (NT-25) (Ethiopia - D; Thailand) (R-1) - Participation of locals essential to success of any activity even though not fully trained to do so at outset. However, in Ethiopia, found difficulty in persuading locals to take positions in institutions we are creating. (GA(11a))

Davis (T/A-6) (Indonesia - PS) - In Indonesia, obtaining a satisfactory counterpart in public safety a problem. (GA(11a))

Roach (NT-49) (Ceylon - D; Greece; Spain) - In Ceylon, notes frequent failure to assign counterparts to work with foreign technicians. Partly due to failure to realize value of technical assistance. (GA(11a))

Moore (T/M-30) (Iran - Ag. Econ.; Nepal - Ford; Thailand - Cornell) (R-5) - "Assistance in funds" should only be provided to the degree that there is some indication on part of host that it would provide counterparts who (a) had the necessary responsibility and (b) would be willing to make efforts involved in successfully completing projects. In Iran found (a) little appreciation of essential nature of the counterpart effort required and (b) feeling, which he deprecated, that USOM's only duty was to support other country with big money and that latter's duty was to accept it with gratitude. (GA(12a))

Hazleton (NT/S-20) (Pakistan - Trng.; Iraq; Saudi Arabia) (R-4) - In Saudi Arabia, progress impossible due in part to non-availability of effective counterparts. Saudi counterparts knew no English; Lebanese who were there were merely riding out for money. Illustration: Maternal and Child Health Center for which Saudis provided no locals. (GA(0))

Phillippi (T/PR-20) (Ceylon - Water Res. Adv.; Korea; Thailand) (R-2) - Among obstacles in Ceylon:...(2) difficulty obtaining good counterparts;...(GA(10a))

Wood (NT-60) (India - D; Eval.; Korea - D) (R-1) - Wood feels, and Indian government agrees, that every technician should have a counterpart. Otherwise technician simply perpetuates himself. Indian government's early record in this regard was poor, but recently it has instituted absolute rule to this effect. Ford Foundation has adamantly insisted on this policy and as a result has good record of turning over projects to Indians. (GA(11a))

Sellers (T/M-32) (Pakistan - Exten. Adv.; India) (R-4) - Counterparts are an indispensable element; however, in the period of selling a program, lack of a counterpart may be justified. (Example from extension in Pakistan.) (GA(11a))

Pfisterer (T/M-51) (Costa Rica - Hospital Architect; Brazil; Central America - PASB) (R-3) - Because counterpart's attitude was antagonistic, found he could not proceed, as he had planned, to train him. Antagonism was not personal but rather against intrusion of any foreign element in ministry. (GA(11a))

Liberia Evaluation Report (1958) - In Liberia, still confronted with absence of counterparts on several projects, and these may be available only in the distant future. However, continuation of these projects is "presumably essential" to Liberia's development. (GA(0))

Hazleton (NT/S-20) (Pakistan - Trng. Offr.; Iraq; Saudi Arabia) (R-4) - In Pakistan, one of most serious problems is lack of counterparts for USOM technicians. It has been difficult to get GOP to live up to its commitments. (GA(11a))

Merson (T/S-40) (Tunisia - Manpower Adv.; Iran) (R-3) - In Iran, unlike most other technicians, he insisted on a qualified counterpart, with the result that he was one of the few U.S. personnel with a trained individual with whom to work. (GA(11c))

- Davis (T/M-7) (Bolivia - Exten. Adv.) (R-4) - Emphasizes the essentiality of a counterpart. (TECH-T(6))
- Lebosquet (T/M-36) (India - San. Engr.) (R-3) - Only possible way to accomplish anything - to get the message we have to impart to stick - is by working with counterparts in host country. (TECH-T(6))
- Nicolai (W/E-13) (ICA/W; Chile - Exec. Offr.) (R-3) - Host government must supply counterparts. Referring to servicio-type organization, our technicians should act as advisers to counterparts who are responsible for projects and who develop their own organization with the advice of the technician. This facilitates the absorption of the organization by the ministry when the time comes. (INDIG)
- Gray (T/E-8) (Bolivia - Highway Equip. Spec.; Venezuela - priv.) (R-5) - In the case of his project in Bolivia, host did not supply counterparts, but counterparts were developed by training servicio employees within framework of servicio, a process which worked well. (INDIG)
- Blackwell (T/E-14) (Philippines - Highway Engr.; Pakistan) (R-4) - In both Philippines and Pakistan, had very good relations with his counterparts who were in every case most cooperative. (INDIG)
- Daramy (M-42-IV) (Sierra Leone - Local) - In Sierra Leone, there is a lack of personnel who can serve as counterparts. Hence first role of trainer may be to develop people who, at some future stage, will be qualified to serve as counterparts. (Example from Sierra Leone in field of statistics.) (GA(5b))
- Smith (ETR - QUITO TOAID A-596, 4/12/62) (Ecuador - Horticult. Adv.) (R-4) - More emphasis should be placed on providing counterparts for U.S. technicians. Each technician should have, and is capable of training, at least two Ecuadorian counterparts and occasionally three. (GA(11))
- Nasr (A/UN-26) (Egypt - UN Res. Rep.) - In country such as Saudi Arabia, expert can serve useful purpose whether or not he has a counterpart. He can do so by simply making one office of a ministry, the ministry itself, or better yet the head of state, aware of its own problems. The sheer weight of repeated complaints from experts makes locals aware of fact that there is a problem, and latter may then be open to advice. (GA(3))

Keen (A/UN-28) (Caribbean - UN Res. Rep.; India) - Western donors should emphasize need for more vigorous donee efforts. He believes there has been a decrease in counterpart effort in many countries, particularly evident in Caribbean, and to a considerable extent in India. Attributes this in part to increases that have occurred in economic assistance and competition between east and west through loans and grants. (GA(11))

McCarty (T/E-9) (Thailand - Highway Engr.) (R-3) - Describes difficulties in his highway project in Thailand due to failure of local government to supply counterparts. (INDIG)

Jones (ETR - MOGADISCIO TOAID A-377, 3/23/62) (Somalia - Highway Engr.; Honduras) (R-4) - Notes adverse consequences of failure of government to supply counterpart during his 16 months in Ethiopia. (GA(11))

(2) Maintaining continuity in counterparts

Hamill (NT-73) (Nicaragua - D; Surinam; Chile - Ag.; Paraguay; Brazil - priv.) (R-2) - One of greatest obstacles to effectiveness is lack of continuity on part of host counterparts. (Illustration from Chile) (GA(O))

c. Contributions of local currency (or other financing)

(1) To meet program and project costs

Moyer (NT-66) (Korea - D; ICA/W - O/FE; Taiwan - D) (R-1) - Notes importance of such contributions. (GA(11))

Saccio (W-20-A) (Brazil - D; ICA/W - DD) (O-1) - Failure to provide funds among reasons for failure of malaria eradication in Brazil. (GA(O))

Anstee (A/UN-14) (Bolivia - Dep. UNREP; Uruguay, Colombia, Philippines - UN) - Criticizes hard and fast UN rule requiring contributions from host. There should be flexibility in the cases of countries which can't afford to pay - they are often the ones needing t.a. most. (GA(11a))

See Tibbutt (T/M-24) (Turkey - Agron. Adv.) (R-3) - Suggests that one should make an inventory of what contributions the locals can make - (a) at the national level, by the country to its people through its government, and (b) at the local level, of the resources available. U.S. contribution should be the minimum necessary to supplement such resources, his assumption being that if locals don't think it important enough to contribute what they can, U.S. shouldn't. (GA(11a))

Van Sant (ETR - PORT AU PRINCE TOICA A-157) (Haiti - Pub. Health Lab. Adv.; Brazil; Ecuador) (R-5) - In Haiti in public health, great lack has been absence of local funds necessary to finance maintenance, expendable materials, and daily running expenses of activities (e.g., national laboratory, hospital and health center laboratories). Trained personnel, good facilities, and fine basic equipment are not alone enough. (GA(11a))

Tibbutt (T/M-24) (Turkey - Agron. Adv.) (R-3) - In Turkey in his seed processing activities, he took the position that while it might be appropriate for U.S. to finance cost of original equipment, the project, if successful, should thereafter pay its own way and locals, if they considered it sufficiently important, should finance replacements.... In Turkey, government, with support of USOM, financed one pilot project in each village, but beyond this they supplied only seed and other essential elements not available locally. (GA(11a))

American Universities Field Staff Study (EAB-14-155) ("That Spirit of 'Jointness'" - Iran) - Notes that at the outset in Iran, U.S. paid for the so-called joint program, and observes that, in light of developments, Iranians must now contribute substantial sums if program is to remain joint. Questions whether spirit of "jointness" ever really existed, but concludes this is not a reflection on U.S. and that program has been successful, noting Iran is still a free nation. (GA(11c))

Adams (T/S-39) (Paraguay - Educ.; Thailand) - In Paraguay, notes that lack of funds in local ministry has precluded full support of certain projects and the take-over of others from servicio. (GA(11a))

Stein (T/M-19) (Vietnam - Malaria Spec.) (R-3) - In Vietnam, encountered many difficulties at outset of malaria program. No clear understanding at all levels of government of the fiscal requirements of the program. Without assurance of funding...program would fail. Matters finally rectified. (GA(11a))

Brandt (NT/S-4) (Paraguay - Trng. Offr.) (R-5) - Notes without comment the fact the Paraguayan government only went for projects which involved no financial contribution by them. (GA(11a))

Zeller (NT/S-29) (Afghanistan - Prog.; Ghana; Indonesia; Pakistan) (R-3) - Critical of make-believe local financial support whereby we get locals to establish trust fund and then proceed to generate local currency for them by means of a commodity import program. (GA(11b))

Dodson (NT/A-33) (UAR - Prog.; Nepal) (R-5) - Expresses doubt with respect to apparently automatic assumption that t.a. is good for any less developed country and that we can't go wrong by inaugurating a program. In Nepal, feels that other types of aid (e.g., rupee stabilization program because of inability, as in other less developed countries, to deal with local revenue requirements) might have been more useful (or at least a useful accompaniment), that successful t.c. depended on local administrative support costs which were high in proportion to locals' capacity to absorb them, and that logistical requirements to support an alien t.c. group present very major problems. (Appears to be arguing not for no t.c. but for much smaller staff and for some means of financing local currency costs.) (GA(0))

Pfisterer (T/M-51) (Costa Rica - Hospital Architect; Brazil) (R-3) - After describing failure of ministry in Costa Rica to comply with many provisions of its verbal agreement with servicio with respect to support for, and the use of, the health demonstration and training centers, concludes that there should be a very tight description of the obligations of both sides in any project, including assurances by both parties that necessary funds will be made available. (GA(11e))

Suma (T-40) (Greece - Ind.) (R-6) - In Greece, found that one way to get the government to support and underwrite the local costs of a project was to underwrite all or a substantial part of the initial financing so that there was an opportunity not only to demonstrate its value but to establish rapport with local Greek officials concerned... Many useful projects never got under way because of our unwillingness to make this kind of initial contribution. (GA(11e))

Castleman (NT-38) (Surinam - D) (R-2) - In Surinam, no problem to date, since government has more funds than it can effectively use. As development expands, government will encounter difficulty in making necessary funds available. (GA(11a))

Sawyer (NT-33) (Ethiopia - DD) (R-2) - In Ethiopia, great difficulty in obtaining agreed-to contributions from local government. Raises question of whether, particularly in Ethiopia, and given difficulty of obtaining agreed-to contributions, we are always wise or realistic in insisting that operations with which we are connected should be partially financed by locally derived funds. (GA(11a))

Cohen (A/UN-12) (UN Spec. Fund; Yugoslavia) - Emphasizes Special Fund's insistence on recipient contributions - local costs of supporting project. (GA(0))

McIntosh (W-13) (O/FOOD; Pakistan; Colombia) (R-1) - Obtaining necessary local contributions is a problem area.

Harkins (T-24) (Ecuador - Educ.) - In Ecuador, government has been remiss in providing local matching funds to carry out agreed-upon substantive programs, and in fact level of contribution has decreased from previous years. A problem for which he doesn't know answer. However, notes reluctance locally to contribute to servicio, preference being to appropriate for programs operated as regular part of government. (GA(11a))

Hart (T/S-31) (Haiti - Educ.; Brazil; Bolivia) (R-2) - First and most important, any action taken must be mutual...The percentage of effort, men, money, and material given by each party to these programs is not important, remembering that the issues in any country are so interlocked that to take action in one sector oblivious to those of another is to court disaster for the whole. At first U.S. vis-à-vis host may have to contribute greater percentage, provided it should never be 100%. The important items are mutuality of interest, understanding, cooperation, and action without reference to percentages. Only as time, circumstance, and successes move programs into high gear, should we discuss increased support. For each country the timing will be different, as Latin American experience proves. We should not be in a hurry even though the costs are great. (GA(11a))

Mason (M-72) (Harvard) - Suggests requirement for substantial local financial contribution may have the psychological effect of developing a local interest in planning advice that would not be generated by a grant. (GA(5))

Demuth (M-68) (IBRD) - One way of making certain that a request for a survey represents a felt need is to insist on partial host government financing. (GA(5a))

Womelsdorf (T/F-45) (Chile - Housing; Colombia) (R-4) -  
Endorses charges to cooperatives in housing for operation and maintenance costs of USOM-supplied equipment (even if it can only be nominal) on ground it gives cooperative a sense of responsibility. (GA(11a))

See Killen (NT-12) (Pakistan - D; Yugoslavia; Eval.) (R-1) -  
Assistance should not be provided too cheaply. (GA(11a))

See Beyer (T/F-9) (Labor) - Suggests we may be mistaken in not charging something for our assistance, but not in case of technical advice. (GA(11a))

Long ("Comments on India") (ICA/W; India - Tenn. Agric. Contract) - Examples of how t.a. activities in agriculture in India are greatly hampered by the lack of local currency made available by Indian government. Feels PL 480 local currencies should be earmarked for such activities as part of original negotiations. (GA(13))

Mann (NT-42) (Cambodia - D; Vietnam) (R-1) - Capacity to finance local costs of construction and other items of non-operational character should not be a precondition. U.S. should be prepared to provide local currency, as well as foreign exchange, costs for construction of facilities necessary to carry out educational and training programs sponsored by our technical assistance when local government lacks the resources and could only finance by forgoing other equally urgent expenditures. This is common situation in many emerging countries. (GA(10a))

See Van Dyke (NT-45) (Turkey - D; AFE) - Capacity to finance local costs should not be precondition. Success in Turkey due in large measure to large-scale use of counterpart to cover such costs. (GA(10a))

See Riley (NT-52) (Turkey - D; DD/M) (R-1) - Capacity to finance local costs should not be a precondition. (GA(10a))

(2) To meet administrative support costs

Nicolai (W/E-13) (ICA/W; Chile - Exec.) (R-3) - Costs of U.S. technicians, plus office space, transportation, secretarial services, etc., should be paid out of dollar appropriations or counterpart by USOM rather than by servicio or host. (INDIG)

Falk (W/E-11) (M/PERS; Iran; Pakistan) (R-3) - While administrative support of technician should be under control of USOM, host should pay for the cost of these things as an expression of its interest in program. (INDIG)

(3) Special problem in certain colonial and post-colonial areas

Camerounian Study Team Report (1960) - Notes that any activity that would impose local currency contributions on the government in the Camerouns would result in increasing the contributions of the French who now underwrite the budget deficit. For this reason, and because of necessary French language requirement for technicians, recommends limitation of t.a. to (a) participant training and (b) engineering surveys by TDY consultants or engineering firms. (GA(1))

d. Provision of administrative support to donor aid mission or personnel

Givens (NT/E-5) (Turkey - Exec. Offr.) (R-3) - In Turkey, obtaining administrative support (offices, interpreter services, etc.) from government provided no problem, although there were some "cracks" in it (like the failure to provide adequate heating) which USOM executive officer must fill. (INDIG)

Matson (NT/E-21) (British Guiana - Exec. Offr.; Paraguay; Peru; Bolivia) (R-5) - Describes how, in British Guiana, planning and arrangements for a much larger USOM are making little progress because the inadequate host government organization lacks the capacity to participate in the planning or to implement any of the plans. This is the kind of situation in which a servicio could operate with benefit, and USOM is trying to establish a joint board and a joint fund. (INDIG)

Rex (W/E-4) (M/ADSER; Libya - Exec. Offr.; Paraguay; Peru; Bolivia) (R-3) - Administrative capacity of host varies with stage of development and affects the extent of administrative services for which USOM can rely on host...Where local administrative capacity is low, feels that a servicio or joint fund is essential to provide administrative support needed. (INDIG)

Shea (W/E-9) (ICA/W - PAD; Morocco; Egypt) (R-3) - Character of administrative services to be provided by host and USOM respectively should vary depending upon country's stage of development. Might be possible to group countries into categories, and ICA/W policy guidance on this is needed. (INDIG)

Ostergaard (NT/E-4) (Lebanon - Admin. Offr.) - Feels host should provide all office space necessary for projects, secretarial services, utilities, etc. In Lebanon, host provided only odds and ends...At outset of mission, bilateral agreement and/or subsidiary documents should specify what the host government is to provide in the way of administrative support for technicians and projects. There is far too much pampering of host and hesitation to ask that it fulfill its responsibilities. (INDIG)

Armstrong (NT/E-14) (Israel - Admin. Offr.; Korea - UNRRA) - In Israel, where locals have the capabilities, administrative support for USOM should be supplied by them, including the provision of housing. This was not the case, however, although insistence on this course would make a big difference in USOM operation and reduce the cost of technical support greatly. (INDIG)

Falk (W/E-11) (M/PERS; Iran; Pakistan) (R-3) - Administrative support of technician (e.g., physical needs, transportation) should be under control of USOM, but with host paying for cost of these things as an expression of its interest in program. (INDIG)

McIntosh (W-13) (O/FOOD; Pakistan; Colombia) (R-1) - Getting locals to provide adequate facilities represents a problem area. (GA(11a))

Davis (T/A-6) (Indonesia - PS) - In Indonesia, one problem was to get locals to provide appropriate facilities. (GA(11a))

Roach (NT-49) (Ceylon - D; Greece; Spain) - Notes with favor system in Ceylon, under which USOM insists government provide office space, secretarial assistance, and other administrative support to all USOM technicians. Resulting relationship good. (REL)

e. Provision of administrative support for programs and projects

Eyster (Memo dated 2/9/60) (Tunisia - Exec.; Indonesia; Laos; Burma; Japan - priv.) - Should, but frequently do not, place burden of administration on host, and donor should at the very beginning of a program make clear to host that it must assume administrative responsibilities as soon as it is capable of doing so. Advantages of doing this at outset are threefold: (1) necessity of inculcating the idea in the minds of local officials at an early point or finding that this may be impossible to do at a later date; (2) the advantage of starting in when program is small and only a small local government organization is needed and of gradually helping this organization to grow so it can assume more responsibilities as the program increases; (3) the early initiation of training designed to provide local capabilities. ...Assumption of administrative responsibilities by donor adds a heavy additional burden which may inhibit the development of the program and affect the attitude, and therefore the efficiency, of technicians....Frequently the needs of the donor technician and his counterpart and the administrative needs of the project may all merge and be part of the project, and they should all be equally planned in advance. (Illustration from Tunisia) (INDIG)

Dick (T/E-17) (Guatemala - Housing) (R-3) - Because there was a servicio in the case of building programs (housing; school), problems of host administrative support never arose. (INDIG)

Ashcanase (W/E-2) (O/CO; Korea; Thailand; Iran) (R-3) - Administrative capacity to support projects varies depending on a country's stage in development. To the extent possible local government should be asked to provide such support, but we should be careful not to seek support which it does not have the capacity to give, and the project agreement itself should recognize these limitations in capacity so that the project agreement as written can be carried out. (INDIG)

Goins (NT/E-16) (Liberia - Controller; Ghana) (R-4) - In determining the administrative support which USOM must provide to projects, a country's stage of development must be taken into account....In countries where public administration help is needed before project support can be indigenously provided, some USOM-host agreement should spell out specifically what project support is to be given by the USOM and where and how such support is to be taken over by the host government. (INDIG)

Vestrich (NT/E-17) (Afghanistan - Area Oper. Offr.) (R-7) -  
In Afghanistan, government not administratively concerned in a great many projects. He doesn't know what locals' capabilities to provide administrative support are, but he suspects that as shrewd bargainers and with the opportunity to play the Americans and Russians off against one another they are trying to get the Americans to carry as large a load as possible. However, program office feels Afghans can't afford to provide more administrative support. (INDIG)

Goodrich (NT/E-13) (Taiwan - Exec.) (R-3) - In Taiwan, most of administrative support for projects was provided by host, including procurement, with USOM generally limiting itself to advice...Where it is not possible to get the host government administrative organization for the provision of administrative support and the channeling of local currency to pay for such support, then USOM must undertake such support and should pay for it out of program dollars, with host fully acquainted with this fact (but there may be exceptions). (INDIG)

Falk (W/E-11) (M/PERS; Iran; Pakistan) (R-3) - Where channels do not exist for host government support of projects, it is up to the USOM to give financial support for the creation of institutions that will provide such channels. In Iran, this situation necessitated the creation of an entirely new organization, the Joint Fund and the Joint Services, which was subsequently integrated into the ministries. Any such institutional development must be done cooperatively with the host government since its support is essential to the success of the program and, in framing a program, we must consider the capacity of the host government to support it. (INDIG)

Brenden (T/E-11) (Philippines - Irrigation Engr.) (R-3) - In general host supplied administrative support for his irrigation project in the Philippines, and it was best that could be expected within local capabilities...In cases where projects had been forced on host, the administrative support was not so good, as might have been expected. (INDIG)

Falk (W/E-11) (M/PERS; Iran; Pakistan) (R-3) - Support of the project itself (e.g., supplies, equipment, funds) should be institutionalized within host government and projects should be administered through host channels. In Africa, will be a complete lack of institutions through which host government administration of programs can be channeled. When such limitations exist, the alternative is to do it oneself. (INDIG)

Delp (W/E-3) (M/PERS; Laos; Iran) - The ability of a host government to absorb technical assistance is generally limited by its administrative ability to operate. Hence donors, without their own administrative organization, are also likely to be ineffective, like the UN and foundations which cannot support themselves, and like small (as contrasted to big) contractors who cannot afford to set up their own administrative organizations or who have to devote a very disproportionate amount of their time to administrative matters....Administrative support to be provided by a country should be determined by its stage of development and it might be practicable to divide up countries into three categories for purposes of deciding what services each country should get....Decision as to what administrative services should be supplied by host should be made before a new mission is established. (INDIG)

Strange (ETR - SEOUL TOICA A-611) (Korea - Home Econ.; Iraq) (R-3) - Administrative failure on part of national government in Korea to provide technical leadership to home extension program causes her to recommend deletion of funds for national administration (with certain exceptions) and concentration of efforts at provincial level, with recruitment of additional technicians held in abeyance pending evidence of positive support and leadership at national level. (GA(11e))

Morris (T/E-22) (Chile - Highway Engr.) (R-4) - In Chile, capacity of government to manage or administer projects limited by (i) financial limitations and (ii), because of such limitations, by the poor quality and inadequate number of government employees, who are poorly paid and overworked. In spite of this fact, administrative support was generally satisfactory, with the real difficulty being the inability of host officials to give adequate attention to projects, due to overwork. (INDIG)

Ostergaard (NT/E-4) (Lebanon - Admin. Offr.) - Administrative support for projects and procurement of equipment therefor should be provided by the host government even though dollar project funds should be used, if necessary, to finance the same. When administrative support is handled otherwise (i.e., by USOM), the results are bad (e.g., activities with Ministry of Agriculture in Lebanon); however, once this pattern is established, its reversal is difficult and it may be necessary to continue the wrong approach of giving administrative support through the USOM. (INDIG)

Davis (T/A-6) (Indonesia - PS) (R-3) - In Indonesia, one of problems was that of getting locals to establish general administrative procedures necessary. (GA(11a))

Armstrong (NT/E-14) (Israel - Admin. Offr.; Korea - UNKRA) (R-4) - Host government should provide project administrative support to the extent of its capacity, and in Israel where locals were well able to provide this he followed the practice of turning down Israeli requests to the USOM to give administrative support in small ways. Stage of development of a host country has great effect on host government's ability to provide administrative support and hence on the methods of USOM operation. (Illustrations from Israel) (INDIG)

Adler (W/E-8) (O/FE - Exec.; Vietnam; Greece) (R-2) - Host should be encouraged and required to give the most administrative support of which it is capable, including vehicles, housing, etc., if possible, and to establish the administrative organization needed to provide program support. (Extensive discussion)...It is desirable to obtain maximum participation by the host government in program planning, administrative support, and in every area of implementing projects. Where the host government lacks the capacity, then USOM must do it itself, but should do it in such a way that it represents a demonstration operation for the host and is tied in as closely as possible with the host government, for the development of administrative capacity by a participating government is a function of technical assistance. Such capacity is necessary if a donor country is to withdraw from established projects at the proper moment. It is our duty to point out host responsibilities in these respects and its response is an indication of its interest in the program. Where this interest is lacking it is our duty to create it....Capacity of countries varies, with lack of organization, facilities, personnel and funds being limiting factors. (INDIG)

Stein (T/M-19) (Vietnam - Malaria Spec.) (R-3) - In Vietnam, encountered many difficulties at outset of malaria program. Without stronger support...higher local salaries, and speedier administrative techniques program would fail. Matters finally rectified. (GA(11a))

f. Measures necessary for the effective utilization of technical assistance provided

(1) Steps required to institutionalize the benefits of technical assistance furnished

Cottam (NT-69) (Brazil - D) (O-1) - Should insist that host agree, as a precondition to aid, to measure that will result in the institutionalization of activities for which aid is requested, such as training of individuals to take over and carry on program permanently. Such process of training must go on simultaneously with action program so trained individuals are available by the time needed. (Example: proposed community development program in Brazil) (GA(11a))

House Foreign Affairs Committee (Report on Foreign Policy and Mutual Security - 1957) (TASG #37, pp. 40-41) - No assistance should be extended unless a country wants it, shows an understanding of the possible consequences of the program, and is willing to make the necessary institutional changes its success may require. (Example of a highway project and consequences.) Any reluctance of recipient to make necessary changes warrants aid suspension. (GA(11))

(2) Effective utilization of returned participants

Keefer (T/S-25) (Vietnam - Educ.; Peru) (R-3) - In Vietnam, cooperation of host government on whole good in field of education. However, a few problems about placement of returned participants in teacher training. (GA(11a))

McIntosh (W-13) (O/FOOD; Pakistan; Colombia) (R-1) - Effectively employing returned participants represents a problem area. (GA(11a))

(3) Local leadership for program

Strange (ETR - SEOUL TOICA A-611) (Korea - Home Econ.; Iraq) (R-3) - Administrative failure on part of national government in Korea to provide technical leadership to home extension program causes her to recommend deletion of funds for national administration (with certain exceptions) and concentration of efforts at provincial level, with recruitment of additional technicians held in abeyance pending evidence of positive support and leadership at national level. (GA(11e))

g. Miscellaneous forms of operational cooperation and conditions

Nelson (NT-78) (Lebanon - D; ICA/W; Jordan - D) (R-1) - Some simple controls practical of observance by local government are necessary. However, one must (a) not set unrealistic standards of perfection for local government or (b) impose regulations that are too complicated and confusing. (GA(11b))

Huth (T-42) (Africa - CM Consultant) - Operational strings are necessary if projects are to succeed. (GA(11c))

Carson (NT/F-11) (Iraq - Trng. Offr.; Egypt - Ford) (R-6) - In Iraq, under resumed program, USOM took the position that it would only conduct programs to the extent government could plan them in an orderly fashion, and this posture, adhered to relatively strictly, has gradually paid off in terms of cooperation. (GA(0))

Caribbean Evaluation Report (1959) - In Trinidad, operation of USOM first impeded by refusal of local government to permit duty-free entry of equipment in accordance with agreement and by other obstacles. Lack of cooperation prevented successful implementation of a program. (GA(0))

Roach (NT-49) (Ceylon - D; Greece; Spain) - Cooperation in timely obligation of participant funds represents a problem in Ceylon. (GA(11))

Dodson (NT/A-33) (Egypt - Prog.; Nepal) (R-5) - In Egypt, one contract was long delayed because of insistence and slowness of local government in reviewing proposed consultants thereunder and because of the premium it placed on the degrees of the candidates. (GA(11a))

Carson (NT/F-11) (Iraq - Trng. Offr.; Egypt - Ford) (R-6) - In Iraq, have recently insisted that government be completely responsible for developing the project documentation, the theory being that even though the government chooses the wrong project and makes mistakes in its programming, the process of actually and specifically developing the E-1 forms or the revelation of their mistakes in subsequent implementation will enable them to learn. (GA(0))

Wood (NT-60) (India - D; Eval.; Korea - D) (R-1) - In India, notes replacement of early suspicion of U.S. motives by development of increasing government confidence in what ICA is doing, with marked improvement in relations with Planning Commission and much better sharing of information. (GA(11e))

- h. Adoption of local attitudes, basic governmental policies or practices, or other local measures necessary either (a) to the success of a specific technical assistance program, project, or activity or (b) to the significant economic or social progress of the host country to which the donor's aid program is intended to contribute.

Little (T/S-17) (Thailand - Teacher Educ.; Dominican Rep.)  
(R-3) - In education in Dominican Republic, policies of government and attitude of political ministers, who overruled professional educators, made it difficult to give assistance. However, in peculiar circumstances, he nonetheless advocated continued assistance in order to keep a U.S. presence and retain good will already gained. (GA(11a))

Johns (T/F-37) (Greece - Labor Tech. Offr.) (R-4) - In Greece,  
agrees USOM decision to phase out labor activities because of unwillingness of government to permit a genuinely free union movement. (GA(11b))

Bohning (P/US/S-10) (India - Ohio State Contract) - Feels that  
USOM should actively push Indian government to lessen governmental interference in Indian universities since aid will not be effective unless these institutions become autonomous. USOM is unwilling for fear that this would be considered interference in the internal affairs of India. Bohning, feeling the contractor is helpless to influence the Indians, indicates that contract should be cancelled unless situation changes. (GA(11e))

Moyer (NT-66) (Korea - D; ICA/W - O/FE; Taiwan - D) (R-1) -  
Passage of necessary legislation. (GA(11))

[REDACTED] (R-1) - In Philippines, U.S.  
needs to adopt a tough attitude, "slapping down the candy-grabbers" in host government and making certain that benefits of our assistance are spread as widely as possible and not limited to a few select officials. (GA(11c))

Workinger (NT-62-A) (Yemen - D; Ethiopia - DD; Jordan - DD; Iran) (R-3) - Feels there is need for (a) over-all economic analysis by USOM and (b), even if only for internal guidance, the fashioning of economic development plan. Would prefer to make requirement for host government development plan a prime condition of aid. (Discussion in terms of Yemen.)  
(GA(5))

Naughten (NT-48) (Thailand .. D) - Impossible to get the necessary local reforms - to enforce the conditions of aid - except by (a) long and patient efforts, (b) day-to-day efforts of continuing mission group working to help the locals do the things they need to do, and (c) the provision of the necessary "quid." Although sometimes must be hard-nosed, naive to expect reforms to occur simply because stipulated as conditions. (Examples from Thailand of (i) tax reform and (ii) agricultural credit.) (GA(11e))

Haines (M-47-G) (D/Agric.) - In some countries, training and other forms of technical assistance cannot be utilized fully until basic national government policies and practices are changed. (Example of status and compensation of scientists in some countries as obstacle to effective use of trained scientists.) (GA(10a))

Haraldson (NT-31-A) (Taiwan - D; Vietnam - DD) (O-1) - In more sophisticated countries and developed areas we should exert more pressure to induce the adoption by locals of rational, reasonable, time-tested economic policies. (GA(O))

Dodson (NT/A-33) (UAR - Prog.; Nepal) (R-5) - In Nepal, given some plan for financial support of the country, feels that we should emphasize administrative and fiscal reform as a prerequisite to assistance in other fields such as health, agriculture, and education. (GA(O))

Editorial in Bulawayo Chronicle of Salisbury, Rhodesia (SALISBURY TOICA A-74, 10/13/61) - Strongly endorses its interpretation of new U.S. aid policy under which aid is to be conditioned upon willingness of local regimes to bring about social reforms. Supports corollary of denying aid to those who can't be trusted to spend aid wisely in the interests of all, even risking Communist revolution in some of the states involved. (GA(11b))

Green (NT/A-47) (Haiti - Prog.; Brazil, Venezuela, Cuba, Chile - State) (R-3) - In order to achieve basic purpose, which is political, of getting people in Haiti on our side, principal tool is aid for economic development. However, effectiveness of this tool depends upon creating a climate for such development, and to create such a climate we must be hard-boiled in insisting on conditions for aid and we should spell out specifically the domestic measures needed. (Examples from Haiti) (GA(11b))

See Baron (NT-58) (Cambodia - DD; Philippines - Prog.) (R-2) -

The advice that we give and the relationships which we establish should have the purpose of influencing the ways in which a country uses its whole resources. The resources we provide are necessarily only marginal. (GA(11e))

See Fitz (T/S-36) (Iran - Teacher Trng. Adv.; Ethiopia) (R-4) -

In Iran, one of initial problems that of convincing local governor that he should make better use of his existing resources. (GA(0))

i. Political conditions

When one gets into the area of political conditions one is close to the question of the appropriateness and effectiveness of technical assistance and/or other forms of aid for political purposes. For comments on this general subject see the separate digest on the Purposes of Technical Assistance. The following sketchy comments merely raise certain aspects of the general subject:

Reinhardt (Cairo message) (UAR - Amb.) - The attachment of political conditions to aid to UAR would be counter-productive because of: (a) Arab psychology; (b) history of U.S.-UAR relations; (c) failure of Bloc successfully to attach such conditions. Success of t.c. program in altering past image of U.S. from one of hostility to one of friendly helpfulness would be fatally affected in case of Syria. (GA(11b))

Brougham (T/A-53) (Indonesia - Trans.; Police Adv.) (R-4) -

Sees no reason why political strings should not be tied to our aid (apparently having in mind democratic political institutions which he believes we should extol and show we are proud of). (GA(11b))

Neal (NT-59) (Liberia - DD; Philippines - CD; India) (R-2) -

Gives high priority to development of democracy at local level. Would withhold aid where government refuses to take steps to encourage such development and provide supporting help where government is willing to go ahead. Recognizes, however, need for some accommodation in view of Communist threat. (GA(8))

3. Factors which may materially affect the extent and kind of support, contributions, and cooperation that can be appropriately expected and requested of the host

a. Local capacity to support, contribute to, and cooperate with, technical assistance programs and projects

This factor, which is considered by most commentators to be one of the most significant factors in determining the extent and character of the support that can be anticipated and properly sought, is examined at length by commentators under IX-B. It will also be noted that many of the comments listed under XI-C-2 above advert to and discuss this factor.

b. Local interest in, and local understanding of the value of, technical assistance generally or a particular technical assistance program or project

This factor, which is also considered by many commentators as among the most important in determining the degree and nature of the local support, contribution, and cooperation that can be properly expected for a technical assistance program as a whole, or for individual projects, is dealt with at length in II-B, which relates to the general importance attached to technical assistance by various donees, and in V-B, which concerns the extent to which local desires and interests (felt needs) should control (a) the selection of technical assistance programs and projects, (b) the determination of program priorities, and (c) the choice of solutions and methods of operation. Many references to this factor are also to be found in the comments listed under XI-C-2 above.

c. Extent and character of host participation in the selection, planning, and conduct of a technical assistance program or project - the degree of "jointness" or mutuality

As brought out in the comments listed under XI-B and XI-D, which relate respectively to (a) the importance of local participation in any activity and (b) the character of the relationship which should be established between donor and donee, many commentators feel that the extent and nature of the support, contributions, and cooperation that can be obtained from a host government or host personnel are materially affected by the degree to which, and the manner in which, the donor involves the donee as a participant (partner, joint venturer, etc.) in the program or activity.

d. Extent of local confidence and trust in the donor and in the donor's program

Many commentators stress the importance of local confidence and trust in the donor, its program, and its personnel in establishing the most propitious donor-donee relationships for effective technical assistance as a factor which affects the degree and character of the support, contributions, and cooperation that a donee can be expected to give. The following comments are illustrative:

Wood (NT-60) (India - D; Eval.; Korea - D) (R-1) -

In India, notes replacement of early suspicion of U.S. motives by development of increasing government confidence in what ICA is doing, with marked improvement of relations with Planning Commission and much better sharing of information. Comments on effects. (GA(11e))

Fobes (NT-83) (India - Prog.; D/S; USRO) (O-2) - In India, growing confidence in U.S. and its views, and this has facilitated open discussions. (GA(11))

e. Presence of special incentives for support, contributions, or cooperation

Some commentators suggest that the presence of various types of appropriate incentives or inducements (e.g., the prospect of material aid along with technical assistance) may sometimes be an important factor in gaining, or eventually leading to, greater support, contributions, or cooperation from the locals.

4. Miscellaneous principles suggested for application in determining (a) the conditions which should be stipulated and (b) the support, contributions, and cooperation which should be expected and requested by a donor

In addition to, or in considering the importance of, factors listed in XI-C-3 above, various commentators have suggested that one or more of the following might be appropriate principles for application in determining the support, contributions, or cooperation which should be sought by a donor or stipulated as conditions.

- a. There should always be a careful pre-evaluation of local capabilities for compliance with different conditions and of the probabilities with respect to host support, contributions, and cooperation.

Rogers (T/F-36) (Iran - Forestry Adv.; Taiwan - D/Agric.) (R-3) - Should always be evaluation of whether locals can live up to conditions stipulated in project agreements including administrative support. (GA(10a)).... In Iran, we should, prior to starting further activities, make investigations to see whether the government is actually ready to support cooperative activities. (GA(11a))

Tibbutt (T/M-24) (Turkey - Agron. Adv.) (R-3) - Suggests that one should make an inventory of what contributions the locals can make - (a) at the national level, by the country to its people through its government, and (b) at the local level, of the resources available. U.S. contribution should be the minimum necessary to supplement such resources, his assumption being that if locals don't think it important enough to contribute what they can, U.S. shouldn't. (GA(11a))

- b. Unnecessary conditions should not be established.

Fitz (T/S-36) (Iran - Educ.; Ethiopia) (R-4) - In general we demand too many conditions and privileges, particularly in comparison to Bloc personnel who spend more time with the little people and are less ostentatious. We are trapped by our own mechanisms - the local government wanting aid but not all the mechanisms and conditions which we attach to it. For example, in Iran, where locals accustomed to doing business by oral agreement, long delays were caused in renting building because of our insistence on complicated written agreement. (GA(11b))

- c. The conditions stipulated, and the support, contributions, and cooperation sought, should be realistic in terms of all the local circumstances, including local capabilities and interests. There is a practical limit on the extent to which a donor can effectively impose conditions and through them exercise control over host actions.

Johnson (NT-85) (Pakistan - Prog. Econ.) (R-3) - Should not stipulate and insist on conditions that can't possibly be complied with by recipients. (GA(11b))

Ladejinsky (P/US-37) (Vietnam - priv.; Vietnam; Taiwan) - Opposes "criteria approach" (i.e., the arbitrary stipulation of host actions as a precedent to aid). It is unrealistic to expect the host quickly to take many of the measures desired even though they should be among our priority objectives. (GA(O))

Nelson (NT-78) (Lebanon - D; ICA/W; Jordan - D) (R-1) - Some simple controls practical of observance by local government are necessary. However, one must (a) not set unrealistic standards of perfection for local government or (b) impose regulations that are too complicated and confusing. (GA(11b))

Moyer (NT-66) (Korea - D; ICA/W - O/FE; Taiwan - D) (R-1) - While must stimulate local government to take essential measures, over-stimulation, in terms of too many proposals, simply will not work, for there is limit to local government absorptive capacity (cf. growing youth). (GA(3)).... For aid to be effective, host government must comply with certain conditions. However, there is a distinct limit on the controls that may be exercised over local government in (a) the handling of aid received and (b) the performance of related measures. Too great interference is not desirable because (a) spoon-feeding does not encourage local development of responsibility, (b) locals won't allow it, and (c) problems of subsequent disengagement become difficult. (GA(11))

Saccio (W-20-A) (Brazil - D; ICA/W - DD) (O-1) - While self-help is sound concept, much of our talk about self-help is meaningless, at least in the context of Brazil.... We act as though locals did not want to help selves, when in fact they do, and their problem is a lack of resources and of capacity to solve their difficulties as we think they should. It would be better to help them in solving these difficulties than continually to castigate them. (GA(11))

- d. Cooperation should not be equated with or taken to mean: host subservience; the subordination of all other host activities to a donor's technical assistance program; or host acceptance of all donor recommendations.

Henry (P/NON-US-3) (France) - Cooperation by host doesn't require subservience, acquiescence, or lack of vigor on its part. Should not consider aid program unsuccessful because it results in bringing people into power who are more difficult to deal with than predecessors, possibly an older generation. On the contrary, it may mean progress in terms of more competent, hardheaded locals taking over government. Illustration from Lebanon, where young reform group replaced older generation which had been running things and are doing a far better job, even though they are more difficult to cooperate with. (GA(11a))

Cason (T/F-19) (Israel - Agric.; Honduras) (R-4) - Technician should realize that a country can't accept his recommendations wholesale. (TECH-T(6))

St. Louis (NT-32) (India - Prog.; Pakistan; Korea; Taiwan; Burma) - We can't expect locals to drop everything else to work with us on technical cooperation. Far too prevalent U.S. attitude in headquarters organization, and particularly our planning units, that government's only worry is the U.S. technical cooperation program. In fact, of course, particularly in country like India, t.c. is just drop in the bucket, and we cannot expect top government officials to devote all their time thereto and should not become incensed and disturbed when they do not. (GA(11a))

See Moyer (NT-66) (Korea - D; ICA/W - O/FE; Taiwan - D) (R-1) - Problem of conditions and controls is difficult in Korea, and will progressively increase as country gains the capacity to stand on its own feet. (GA(11))

5. A study is needed of the problems of cooperation, conditions, and controls.

Moyer (NT-66) (Korea - D; ICA/W - O/FE; Taiwan - D) (R-1) -

The problems of cooperation, conditions, and controls need further study, and an evaluation of our past experience in this regard should help us. (GA(11))

Johnson (NT-85) (Pakistan - Prog. Econ.) (R-3) - Haven't handled "matching" principle properly in technical assistance. Need mutual understanding of responsibilities of both parties and development of expectation certain criteria will be complied with. Should examine operation of this principle in U.S. federal-state relationships for possible lessons. (GA(11e))

D. NATURE AND PRINCIPAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE PROPER RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN A DONOR AND DONEE, AND BETWEEN DONOR AND DONEE PERSONNEL

1. Analysis

Subsection XI-B summarized comments on the importance of local participation in most types of technical assistance projects, programs, and activities, and subsection XI-C digested comments dealing with the necessity for, or the desirability of, various forms of local contributions, support, and cooperation. This subsection is concerned with a closely related subject, namely, the character of the relationships which should exist between a donor and donee, and between the personnel of both, as they jointly carry out a program or undertaking in which they are both participants and in which various forms of local contribution, support, and cooperation are needed. What are the respective positions, roles, and responsibilities of each party (whether two governments, or a technician and his counterpart) in the "cooperative arrangement," "partnership," "joint undertaking," "common venture," or "mutual effort" in which both are engaged? What should be the nature, and what should be the principal attributes, of the relationship itself?

As a practical matter, we are seldom dealing with only a single relationship. On the contrary, in almost any country we are concerned with a series of different types of relationships. The following are among the principal of these:

- (1) The relationship between two governments (or countries).
- (2) The relationship between the USOM and the appropriate organizational units of the host government.
- (3) The relationships between individuals at the governmental level (between the USOM director and his opposite numbers, or between USOM division chiefs and their ministerial opposites), relationships which may or may not, depending on the country and circumstances, be counterpart-type relationships.
- (4) The relationship between a technician and his counterpart.
- (5) The relationship between a technician and other non-counterpart locals who are involved in, or directly affected by, the technician's activities.

(6) The general relationships between USOM personnel and locals insofar as those relationships set the climate for, or directly affect, the technical assistance efforts of such personnel.

While there may be certain characteristics or attributes which should be common to all of these several types of relationships, there are obviously many elements in the relationship between governments or between the institutions of two governments which must be different from the elements in the relationships which exist between individuals. Similarly, although there will probably be certain attributes which should characterize inter-personal relationships of any kind, it is also likely that certain optimum characteristics of the relationship between a USOM director and his ministerial opposite may not always be among the desired characteristics of the relationship between a technician and his counterpart.

Some commentators make these distinctions, and some do not. This fact has complicated the task of classifying comments, although less so than might be expected, because the great majority of comments are concerned with inter-personal relationships, and primarily with ones involving counterparts. The task has also been complicated by the existence of certain other variables, such as the stage of development of a country and the sophistication of its personnel, the character of the technical assistance involved (cf., for example, the situations of a technician rendering performance technical assistance as a line employee in a ministry of another government and a technician working in extension with a counterpart), and the purpose of the technical assistance. Where practicable, such distinctions and variables have been reflected in the arrangement that follows, but reference to the source material itself will be necessary to analyze them properly.

It should be noted that this section does not deal, except tangentially, with special organizational arrangements or mechanisms, such as servicios, joint funds, combined planning boards, etc., which are designed to provide a formal institutional framework or vehicle for joint planning, programming, and/or operations. Rather it is principally concerned with the substantive elements that should permeate and dominate the relationships regardless of the formal structure in which they are cast. However, in this connection, one important observation is required - the existence, and if so, the character of any formal structural relationship may set the tone for, define responsibilities in, and materially affect the nature of the inter-personal and inter-institutional relationships that characterize, the activities within its framework. As to this general subject the REL files and the summaries thereof should be consulted.

Two further remarks are appropriate about the comments which follow and their arrangement.

First, this subsection is centered on the nature and attributes of the relationships which should be established rather than upon the actions, attitudes, behavioral characteristics, and approach of a donor or a donor's personnel which are necessary in order to create and maintain relationships of this character. The latter subject is dealt with in the next section of the digest (XII). However, because of the close interrelationship of cause and effect, this distinction at times becomes somewhat artificial, and it has often been difficult to decide whether certain comments belong in one category or the other. These difficulties have been handled in several different ways. In some cases the same comments have been included in both categories and used to indicate both (a) attributes of the relationship and (b) donor actions, attitudes, and behavioral characteristics that contribute thereto. In other cases it has seemed sufficient to include some of the comments in this subsection and other similar comments in section XII. In a few cases, where an attribute of the relationship represents simply the logical end-implication of a set of comments relating to donor actions, attitudes, and behavioral characteristics, the attribute is listed without the inclusion of any supporting comments and cross-reference is made to the appropriate subdivision of section XII.

Second, for purposes of simplicity in presentation, suggested attributes of the relationships have been stated affirmatively in somewhat dogmatic and universal form without including some of the obvious qualifications and limitations which should be read into these statements and without reference to the fact that some of the comments listed may be somewhat at variance with the statement. In other words, although each statement of an attribute represents a generalized proposition which appears to be supported by a preponderance of commentators, such proposition, even though it should be accepted as valid in its generalized form, may be subject to exceptions or qualifications in particular situations. Such exceptions or qualifications may be occasioned by such things as cultural and developmental differences among countries and variations in the purposes sought through, or the role to be played by, technical assistance.

2. The relationship should be a cooperative one which has many, if not all, of the characteristics of a partnership - a relationship in which, to use various characterizations thereof, there is "mutuality," "jointness," "association in a common venture," or "sharing."

The foregoing statement of this attribute of the relationship is intentionally very general and to some extent carefully qualified because, although some commentators use the term "partnership" in a rather glib fashion, the listing of other attributes which follows suggests that this term, except as it suggests an element of sharing, joint participation, or voluntary association of two principals in a common activity, is not fully descriptive of the relationship. To some extent it appears to make a difference whether one is talking about the philosophic rationale for technical assistance and of the relationship between donor and donee nations implicit therein; about the tone of, or the spirit that should permeate, the relationship; about the legal or formal relationship at the governmental level; or about the on-going working relationship between a technician and a counterpart.

The comments that follow should be read along with other somewhat similar ones that emphasize the importance of local participation (see subsection XI-B) or discuss the images of donor purpose that are acceptable to donees (see subsection XII-B-1).

Campbell (W-23) (O/PH; Brazil) (R-1) - Must get more of spirit of partnership into our approach, a relationship of jointness that permits working on basis of equality. (GA(12b))

Ware (T-31) (Libya - Educ.) (R-5) - Must provide real evidence effort is in fact a cooperative one. Not possible if our posture is that of a rich uncle or patronizing dispenser of charity to the poor. (GA(12b))

Overend (T-37) (Iran - CM; Taiwan) - Must emphasize idea that our purpose is to share with others the skills and other benefits that we have in order that they in turn may develop. (GA(14))

Plagge (T/M-32) (Vietnam - Med. Educ.) (R-3) - Should do everything possible to stimulate the feeling of mutuality. (GA(11c))

Moyer (NT-66) (Korea - D; ICA/W - O/FE; Taiwan - D) (R-1) - Our purpose should be the attainment of things which are of joint or common interest to both donor and donee. (GA(11c))

Hoffman (M-71) (UNSF) - Underlying philosophy of t.a. is that of jointly responding to the total needs of a world in which, due to its shrinking character, all nations are increasingly dependent on an expanding world economy. Basis is mutuality, partnership, and common obligations in a joint venture. (GA(0))

Berenson (NT-17-D) (Libya - D; Yugoslavia - D) (R-1) - Should make clear that purpose...is also an honest effort to help other countries in the spirit of partnership, to build and maintain the foundations of healthy, stable, and responsible governments. (PUR)

Killen (NT-12-A) (Pakistan - D; Eval.; Yugoslavia - D) (R-1) - Approach should be posited on a relationship between donor and donee that is realistic and acceptable - the interdependence of developed and less developed countries, the commonness of their objectives, and the indispensability of collaboration if these objectives are to be attained. (GA(12a))

Haines (M-47-G) (D/Agric.) - Our approach should be this: "We are trying through our assistance to make a better world in which both we and you can all live, and you as well as we can help in this effort." (GA(12a))

Rhoad (ETR - KHARTOUM TOICA A-732) (Sudan - Teacher Trng. Adv.; Iran) (R-5) - Feels technician and counterpart should be jointly responsible, with neither in a subservient position. Based on experience in Iran and Sudan, when project control is vested in either party, there is mismanagement, arrogance, frustration, and inefficiency. U.S. technician who is unwilling to share in responsibility should go home. (TECH-T(6))

See Brent (NT-20) (Morocco - D; Taiwan; Thailand; Eval.) (R-1) - Technician must make people feel he is working with them, and not looking down at them. (GA(12b))

Heilpern (T-27) (Iran - Prog. Econ.) (R-3) - Attitude of individual technician: "We have certain experience; let's share it." (GA(12b))

Barnhart (ETR - RIO TOICA A-739, 9/25/61) (Brazil - Elem. Educ.; Panama; Bolivia) (R-4) - Stresses importance, and success in her work in Brazil, of changing (1) initial idea that cooperation consisted of asking us to do things for them and allowing us to carry out our plans to (2) understanding that we would assist them in making plans and guide them in solving problems. This led them to join in sharing responsibility. (GA(11a))

- a. In this connection the suggestion is sometimes made that the role of the technician should not be described as that of an "adviser" but rather as that of an "associate."

Andrews (P/US-7-D) (Michigan State) - Role should be that of an associate rather than an adviser. The pure adviser rarely accomplishes anything, because his advice isn't sought and because the adviser position implies a degree of superiority. The associate is like a co-partner, who shares in failures as well as successes, and he can stimulate his counterpart and force decisions in a way the passively waiting adviser cannot do. (GA(1))

See Johnson (T/F-7) (Iran - Agric. Credit Coop. Adv.) (R-5) - Most people dislike advice, and perhaps title of "adviser" should be abolished. (TECH-T(6))

See Campbell (W-23) (O/PH; Brazil) (R-1) - Concept of adviser not acceptable around the world because it implies lack of equality and idea we are superiors exporting "know-how" to ignorant foreigners. (GA(12b))

3. The relationship should be one which is marked by (a) close personal relationships and (b) mutual confidence and trust among the individuals concerned in the relationships.

While the terms "close personal relationships," "mutual confidence," and "trust" appear to be the ones that are most commonly used, and hence are incorporated in the above statement, there are many other words or phrases that are also frequently used in describing this general aspect of the relationship and which either (a) are intended to convey the same, or a slightly different shading of the same, idea or (b) are designed to identify the kind of interpersonal relationships that are likely to produce "mutual confidence" and "trust."

- a. At the level of the USOM director and the USOM executive staff (see also XII-B-5)

Moyer (NT-66) (Korea - D; O/FE; Taiwan - D) (R-1) - One key to effective cooperation is establishment of close personal relationships and mutual confidence between top USOM and top local government officials. (GA(11))

Workinger (NT-62) (Yemen - D; Jordan - DD; Ethiopia - DD; Iran) (R-2) - Close relations USOM director and top local officials vital because (a) character of relations controls climate for all other lower-level operating relationships and determines whether they will be effective and (b) necessary to provide leverage in obtaining action by and cooperation of customarily independent and autonomous ministries....Lack of such relations has handicapped activities in Yemen, and in Iran in Mossadegh days....Point of relationship varies; in some cases it may be Prime Minister, in others the Minister of Economic Affairs. (GA(11))

Baron (NT-58) (Cambodia - DD; Philippines - Prog.) (R-2) - Essential for top USOM officials to establish real basis of friendship with top host officials. If the latter have confidence and believe in you, avoids trouble. Particularly important when, as in Cambodia, Bloc officials are competing with you. (GA(12b))

Morris (T/E-22) (Chile - Agric. Engr.; Venezuela) (R-4) - Character of approach affected by the kind of relationships and confidence USOM director can establish with key locals - whether he can make the arrangements within which a project can proceed smoothly. (GA(0))

See Locher (T/M-27) (Brazil - Agric. Engr.; Iraq) (R-2) - In working in a local government agency, technician can only be successful if he has top-level support and confidence within agency. Otherwise subordinates in the agency feel no compulsion to follow his recommendations. (TECH-T(6))

Cf. Workinger (NT-62) (Yemen - D; Jordan - DD; Ethiopia - DD; Iran) (R-2) - Except at outright political level, effective technical assistance dependent on a foundation of personal confidence and trust between technician and counterparts, etc. (GA(11))

Kitchen (NT-46) (Sudan - D; Liberia) (R-2) - For programs to be effective, must gain confidence of top local leaders. Establishment of such a relationship depends on continued attention of a person with stature who knows local problems and can effectively present their character to the local leaders. (GA(12b))

Raper (W-42) (M/PERS; Taiwan; Philippines; Iran; Japan) (R-3) - Single most important thing in conduct of effective t.a. program is to establish close personal contact with people with whom we are working, whether they are heads of government or village chiefs. We have too often failed in this respect. (GA(12b))

Patterson (NT-36) (Argentina - D; Chile; Paraguay) (R-1) - Under the characteristic Latin American governmental set-up, with a relatively powerful president and a series of constantly changing autonomous and independent ministries, the best type of arrangement may be the establishment of a direct relationship between the local president and the USOM director, etc., so as to obtain the benefit of presidential authority over the ministries and his control of the budget. (GA(11e))

See Wilson (P/US-34) (Philippines - Asia Foundation; Pakistan - Educ.) - Important to establish USOM relations with host government at a high level, partly because this affects the level of the relations of the whole USOM with the local hierarchy and hence degree of influence on local actions. (Two contrasting approaches in Pakistan.) (GA(11))

See Thornburg (M-76) (Harvard) - While appropriate to endeavor to change the goals of decision-makers, this cannot be done by simply attaching conditions to our aid because there are too many potential suppliers. Can do by (a) working through local intellectuals, (b) publicity and propaganda, and (c) continuing in direct association and interchange with the decision-makers. (GA(0))

See Fobes (NT-83) (India - Prog.; D/S; USRO) (O-2) - In India, there is growing confidence in U.S. and its views, and this has facilitated open discussions and improved effectiveness. (GA(11))

b. Generally or at the level of the technician

(1) Close personal relations

Prince (T-48) (Ethiopia - PH) (R-3) - Important to develop close inter-personal relationships with local counterparts. (GA(12b))

Carreon (P/NON-US-5) (Philippines) - In order to develop the kind of confidence and mutual respect necessary for effective technical assistance must develop close personal relations with locals, relations that go far beyond official relationships. (GA(11c))

- Brown (T/E-23) (Cambodia - Marine Engr.) (R-4) - Effective technical assistance depends upon the development of intimate relationships and the utmost confidence between technician and counterpart. Practice of assigning technician to ministry is only way of achieving this. (GA(0))
- Kerwin (T/S-13) (Iran - Educ.; Libya) (R-4) - You must become personally acquainted with counterparts, both socially and professionally, or you will not be sure that they understand what you are talking about. (TECH-T(6))
- Johns (T/F-37) (Greece - Labor Tech. Offr.) (R-4) - Technician cannot be effective unless he meets and makes friends with the locals, and thus breaks down barriers of resentment. Travel and personal association important in this regard. (TECH-T(6))
- Madamba (T/E-24) (British Guiana - Agron. Adv.; Cuba; Indonesia) (R-4) - In Indonesia, followed the practice of getting to know his counterparts well, learning their language, and inviting them into his home. Close association with one's counterpart is the only way in which technician can gain the latter's respect and learn about local conditions - can achieve the necessary exchange of information. (GA(0))
- Hubbell (W-43) (GTI - O/NESA) - Stresses importance of close personal contacts with counterparts...Indicates belief can be strengthened by informal contacts, such as weekly lunches. (GA(11c))
- Raper (W-42) (M/FERS; Iran; Taiwan; Philippines; Japan) (R-3) - Single most important thing in conduct of effective technical assistance program is to establish close contact with people with whom one is working, whether they are heads of government, village chiefs, etc. (GA(11e))
- Zeller (NT/S-29) (Afghanistan - Prog.; Ghana; Indonesia; Pakistan) (R-3) - Stressed extent to which his success was due to his close personal relationships with Afghan government officials. (TECH-T(6))
- Wood (NT-60) (India - D; Eval.; Korea - D) (R-1) - In India, the establishment of closer working relationships with Indians, and the mutual understanding and sharing of information resulting, have led to better performance by Indians of their responsibilities under programs. (GA(11e))

See Fraleigh (T-38) (Laos - CD; Taiwan) (R-4) - Essentiality of working closely with locals. (GA(12b))

Turkus (T/A-11) (Vietnam - PA (Econ.)) (R-3) - Working constantly with counterparts and seeing them as much as possible outside the office on social occasions as means of winning confidence, overcoming suspicion, and convincing them he was acting only in their interests. (GA(12b))

Kiernan (ETR - RIO TOICA A-1254) (Brazil - Railway Transp. Adv.; Nepal; Ceylon; Spain, Chile - priv.) (R-3) - In an effort to make his knowledge and experience available in Brazil, endeavored to build up relationships of mutual amity and regard with locals so that they would be encouraged to seek his advice, traveling widely with railway officials and in this manner building a close association in which real interchange was possible. (TECH-T(6))

Huth (T-42) (Africa - CM Consultant) - Effective t.a. dependent upon technician developing a basis of personal confidence with the locals. Any project or work done depends in the last analysis on the relationship of two people; if the person assisted doesn't have confidence in the assister, the arrangement won't be effective. The importance of close personal relations is even more important in Africa than elsewhere. (GA(11c))

Rouse (T/A-16) (Philippines - PA) (R-3) - In public administration in Philippines recommends following technician guidelines:...(3) cultivate friends among nationals at all levels;...(6) associate with the nationals as much as possible. (TECH-T(6))

Davidson (T/F-49) (Libya - Credit Coop. Adv.) (R-4) - Emphasizes the importance of close personal relations with locals. (GA(20d))

Blackwell (T/E-14) (Philippines - Highway Engr.; Pakistan) (R-4) - In both Philippines and Pakistan, had very good relations with his counterparts who were in every case most cooperative. (INDIG)

Mattusch (NT-81) (Korea - Prog. Econ.) (R-3) - Close personal relationships with counterparts a pre-condition of effective t.a. - an "elbow-to-elbow" relationship. In Korea, most personnel have not established such a relationship. (GA(0))

Brown (T/E-23) (Cambodia - Engr.) (R-4) - Develop intimacy with counterpart. (REL(3))

Norton (ETR - GUATEMALA TOAID A-334, 2/26/62) (Guatemala - Elem. Educ. Adv.) (R-5) - Encountered some reluctance at beginning, and even at the end, of Guatemalans to admit their condition and need for technical assistance.... Difficult to gain acceptance of new ideas, but found that ideas planted were often picked up six months or even a year later as their own ideas, with no credit given to donor technician and none was expected by him...Patience, demonstrated sincerity, effectiveness of a few recommendations, a desire to improve, and close association contributed to breaking down reluctance and resistance.

See Bryant (PA-61) (Libya - DD; ICA/W; Korea; Chile; Iran; Jordan) (R-1) - Strongly convinced that effective t.a. depends upon associating as many people as possible directly with the local governments concerned and getting away from huge centralized mission staffs. While the mission must work out the program with the host, once this has been accomplished, the foreign technicians should work out of the local government offices rather than those of the mission.

## (2) Friendship

Sawyer (NT-33) (Ethiopia - DD) (R-2) - Winning friendship of locals as a means of gaining confidence necessary to make effective progress or development. (GA(12b))

Cf. Myers (NT-13) (Japan - DD; Burma; Greece) (R-2) - Mere fact technician loved and gets along doesn't mean he won't fail. (GA(12b))

Roland (T-18) (Vietnam - PA (Insur.)) - Must show personal interest in people and develop real friendships. (GA(12b))

Johnson (T/F-7) (Iran - Agric. Credit Coop. Adv.) (R-5) - To be successful must treat locals with sincerity and dignity. This is necessary in order to gain their respect and friendship which are essential to a good working relationship, and without such relationship technical competence becomes useless. (GA(12b))

Kiernan (ETR - RIO TOICA A-1254) (Brazil - Railway Transp. Adv.; Nepal; Ceylon; Spain, Chile - priv.) (R-3) - Endeavored to build up relationships of mutual amity and regard so locals would be encouraged to seek his advice. (TECH-T(6))

Rouse (T/A-16) (Philippines - PA) (R-3) - In public administration in Philippines following guidelines for technicians recommended:...(3) cultivate friends among nationals at all levels; (4) beware of cultivating nationals who are not acceptable to own groups;...(6) associate with the nationals as much as possible. (TECH-T(6))

Johns (T/F-37) (Greece - Labor Tech. Offr.) (R-4) - Technician cannot be effective unless he meets and makes friends with the locals, and thus breaks down barriers of resentment. Travel and personal association important in this regard. (TECH-T(6))

Blackwell (T/E-14) (Philippines - Trans.) - Technician must make friends with his counterpart. (TECH-T(2a))

SAIGON TOAID A-1281 (3/30/62) - Commenting on critical end-of-tour report of Stein (malariologist), USOM notes that he was unsuccessful as chief malariologist in Vietnam because, among other things...relationships with Vietnamese colleagues were far from friendly and he had little sympathy for the point of view of others. (GA(12b))

Vintinner (PA-47) (O/IA; O/PE; Peru; PHS) (R-2) - The key to success in developing local institutions and in getting real programs going locally is the development of effective relationships with, and a thorough understanding of, the locals. Things get done many places simply because of the friendships between the technicians and their local counterparts and not because they have persuaded the latter that a particular action is technologically sound. The development of effective relationships takes time; usually two years is too short a time.

### (3) Rapport

Allen (NT-51-B) (Indonesia - D) (R-1) - Essential to establish rapport with locals because (a) permits more effective communication, (b) enables technician to put things in perspective, and (c) gives feeling of belonging. (GA(12b))

Chapman (EIR - TEHRAN TOICA A-1354) (Iran - PA) - Building rapport and confidence vital to success of his activities in Iran. Only way to reduce local reticence. (TECH-T(6))

Barnhart (ETR - RIO TOICA A-739, 9/25/61) (Brazil - Elem. Educ. Adv.; Panama; Bolivia) (R-4) - Most important problem for technician to solve is how to establish and maintain rapport with his associates (both U.S. and locals), thus strengthening his position as an adviser. Qualities of importance in achieving this end: (1) sharing ideas and stimulating action without imposing his own will and methods of work; (2) recognizing value of local culture and indicating no superiority; (3) confidence in the ability of locals eventually to work out own problems; (4) patience; etc. (GA(12b))

Milins (PA-49) (HEW - PHS; India) - The establishment of rapport with the locals is perhaps the most important and difficult aspect of an overseas technician's role. A person who is a PHS officer can, simply by reason of that fact, get on a more effective working basis with the locals than an equally qualified health officer who does not have a PHS attachment.

(4) Getting along with locals

Baker (T/F-44) (Turkey - Labor Trng.; Thailand - Educ.) (R-4) - Mutual understanding most important element in a successful t.e. job. Technician cannot succeed if he fails to understand or does not get along or mix with locals. (GA(12b))

Scholes (T/M-26) (Paraguay - PH; Bolivia) (R-4) - In Paraguay, most important factor in success is getting along with locals, and technical ability, while tremendously important, is less important than this factor. (TECH-T(6))

Hume (T/M-11) (India - PH) (R-1) - Technician must be able to get along with locals. (TECH-T(2a))

See Moore (T/M-18) (Laos - Agric.) (R-4) - Necessary also to have the ability to get along with other people. (TECH-T(2a))

See Armstrong (NT/E-14) (Israel - Exec.) (R-4) - First qualification is the ability to get along with people. (TECH-T(2a))

See McIsaac (T/E-21) (Iran - Railroad Adv.) (R-3) - First qualification is ability to get along with people; 75% is in this category; 25% is related to technical ability. (TECH-T(2e))

See Gray (T/E-8) (Bolivia - Trans.) - Next to technical competence, must be able to get along. (TECH-T(2a))

See Karam (T/PR-25) (Vietnam - PH) (R-5) - Choose technicians with most patience, adaptability, and ability to get along with people. (TECH-T(2a))

See Nesbitt (NT/E-7) (Indonesia - Prog.) (R-4) - Technician must have ability to get along with Indonesians. (TECH-T(2a))

Bell (T-34) (Spain - Agric.) (R-3) - Technician should be able to meet with and work effectively with other people; must understand what makes other people tick and have aptitude to deal with all ranges of people. (TECH-T(2a))

(5) Local acceptance

Johnsen (T/M-23) (Pakistan - PH Nurse; Iraq) (R-5) - Adviser's first step is to become part of, and gain acceptance in, the organization to which he is attached. This done, adviser can talk about faults without encountering as much sensitivity. (GA(2))

See Traiber (T/E-25) (Libya - Educ.) (R-5) - Technician should be person who is easily accepted by people with whom he works and be able to accept them easily as well. (TECH-T(2a))

(6) Personal confidence and trust

Workinger (NT-62) (Yemen - D; Jordan - DD; Ethiopia - DD; Iran) (R-2) - Except at outright political level, effective technical assistance dependent on a foundation of personal confidence and trust between technician and counterparts, etc. (GA(11))

Brown (T/E-23) (Cambodia - Marine Engr.) (R-4) - Effective technical assistance depends upon the development of intimate relationships and the utmost confidence between technician and counterpart. Practice of assigning technician to ministry is only way of achieving this. (GA(0))

Locker (T/M-27) (Brazil - Agric. Engr.; Iraq) (R-2) - Building of confidence is first step in providing advice; without such confidence technician is badly hampered. The best way to do this is primarily by presenting and discussing his own views for locals' consideration. (Illustration from personal experience in Brazil.) (TECH-T(6))

- Huth (T-42) (Africa - CM Consultant) - Effective technical assistance dependent upon technician developing a basis of personal confidence with the locals. Any project or work done depends in the last analysis on the relationship of two people; if the person assisted doesn't have confidence in the assister, the arrangement won't be effective. Even more important in Africa than elsewhere. (GA(11c))
- Mast (T/M-17) (Libya - Range Mgt. Adv.) (R-5) - To operate successfully must obtain confidence of people in and out of government in one's own technical field. (TECH-T(6))
- Barton (T/S-15) (Vietnam - Trade Ind. Educ. Adv.; Philippines - UNESCO) (R-4) - Main thing is to secure confidence of counterparts. (TECH-T(6))
- Garner (T/M-39) (Vietnam - Agric. Engr.; Thailand; Pakistan) (R-4) - In his job in Vietnam, which has involved the clearing and reclamation of lands for agricultural purpose, the essence of his work lies in the handling of people, and this involves figuring out how best to deal with the locals. First step was to instill confidence in people with whom he was working. (GA(12b))
- Madamba (T/E-24) (British Guiana - Agron. Adv.; Cuba; Indonesia) (R-4) - Emphasizing importance of gaining counterparts' respect. (GA(0))
- Baker (T/F-44) (Turkey - Labor Trng. Adv.; Thailand) (R-4) - Important to gain confidence of locals. (TECH-T(6))
- Sawyer (NT-33) (Ethiopia - DD) - Stresses importance of winning confidence of locals in order to have effective progress. (GA(12b))
- Turkus (T/A-11) (Vietnam - PA (Econ.)) - Stresses importance of winning locals' confidence. (GA(12b))
- James (ETR - AMMAN TOICA A-901, 4/5/61) (Jordan - Highway Equip. Spec.; Pakistan) (R-6) - Emphasizes essentiality of using tact, common sense, patience, and friendliness to gain the confidence of Arabs. (TECH-T(6))
- Lebosquet (T/M-36) (India - San. Engr.) (R-3) - while it is important to know when to be patient, it is equally important to know when you should lose patience and push as hard as you can, and the latter course is only possible after gaining the confidence and support of locals. (Illustrations from India) (TECH-T(6))

Carreon (P/NON-US-5) (Philippines) - In order to develop the kind of confidence and mutual respect necessary for effective technical assistance, must develop close personal relations with locals, relations that go far beyond official relationships. (GA(11c))

Wood (NT-60) (India - D; Eval.; Korea - D) (R-1) - Can't get locals to open up, tell you the real facts, and discuss problems frankly until you establish a relationship of mutual trust and confidence with host government officials. (Example of Calcutta port storage facilities in India) (GA(11c))

Chapman (ETR - TEHRAN TOICA A-1354) (Iran - PA) - Building rapport and confidence vital to success of his activities in Iran. Only way to reduce local reticence. (TECH-T(6))

O'Connor (T/S-5) (Ethiopia - Educ. (Eng. Lang. Adv. ); Philip- pines - priv.) (R-4) - Technicians should work quietly and gain the confidence of their counterparts. (TECH-T(6))

Kraft (ETR - SEOUL TOICA A-3914, 6/2/61) (Korea - Ind. Adv.) (R-3) - In Korea found that top industrial management receptive to technical advice as soon as mutual confidence established. (TECH-T(6))

Yamashiro (T/M-1) (Vietnam - Livestock Adv.; Oceania) (R-3) - In Guam and Vietnam, found he could get knowledge disseminated by gaining the confidence and trust of the village priests - convincing them he was there to help locals - the priests occupying an important leadership role in the communities. (GA(O))

McCarthy (NT/E-9) (Thailand - Trans. Adv.) - Technician must be able to convince local people he knows his job and must be able to inspire confidence in them. (TECH-T(2a))

Button (T/M-28) (Libya - Agric.) - Technician must, among other things, be able to establish mutual trust and confidence which permit a free exchange of ideas. (TECH-T(2a))

SAIGON TOAID A-1281 (3/30/62) (Vietnam) - Commenting on critical end-of-tour report of Stein (malariaologist), USOM notes that he was unsuccessful as chief malariaologist because, among other things, locals lacked confidence in his leadership. (GA(12b))

Barbour (ETR - RIO TOAID A-1031, 3/20/62) (Brazil - Pub. Adm.) (R-4) - Considers that perhaps his greatest accomplishment was to have achieved measure of acceptance and confidence by the Brazilian technicians with whom he sought to work. Describes slow process. . . Necessary to overcome reasonable skepticism of locals as to the amount of help which could be given by an American unable to speak Portuguese fluently, unacquainted with traditions and practices of Brazilian public service, and in Brazil for a relatively short stay. Skepticism diminished considerably as technician demonstrated ability to grasp local situation and to offer workable solutions to problems. (GA(11))

(7) Respect and regard

American Universities Field Staff (EAB-14-'55) - "That Spirit of 'Jointness'" - Government-to-government cooperation in the administration of aid worked reasonably well in Europe, largely because the actual mechanics of administration were left to parallel national agencies, with the degree of "jointness" left somewhat flexible. The essence of cooperation lay in the discussion of a project prior to approval, in which technical equals in the two governments participated on a daily basis. It was cooperation between equals enjoying mutual respect. (GA(11c))

Johnson (T/F-7) (Iran - Agric. Credit Coop. Adv.) (R-5) - To be successful must treat locals with sincerity and dignity. This is necessary in order to gain their respect and friendship which are essential to a good working relationship, and without such relationship technical competence becomes useless. (TECH-T(6))

Kiernan (ETR - RIO TOICA A-1254) (Brazil - Railway Trans. Adv.; Nepal; Ceylon; Spain; Chile - priv.) (R-3) - Endeavored to build up relationships of mutual amity and regard so locals would be encouraged to seek his advice. (TECH-T(6))

Madamba (T/F-24) (British Guiana - Agron. Adv.; Cuba; Indonesia) (R-4) - Close association with one's counterpart is the only way in which technician can gain the latter's respect and can learn about local conditions - can achieve the necessary exchange of information. (GA(0))

(8) Mutual understanding

Baker (T/F-44) (Turkey - Labor Trng.; Thailand - Educ.)  
 (R-4) - Mutual understanding most important element in a successful technical assistance job. Technician cannot succeed if he fails to understand or does not get along or mix with locals.... Gaining mutual understanding with locals in Turkey was condition precedent to success. Far more important than getting technical job done. (TECH-T(6))

Bemis (ETR - RIO TOAID A-1029, 3/20/62) (Brazil - USC Pub. Admin. Contract) - Most important accomplishment in two years has been development of understanding between the U.S. and Brazilian faculty members relating to both academic and administrative matters. This is necessary foundation for proper working relationships. (GA(11))

4. The relationship should be one in which primary responsibility for a program, activity, project, or operation is placed on, and assumed by, the donee and its personnel, and which emphasizes the development of the latter's capabilities to assume exclusive responsibility therefor at the earliest practicable date.

a. Assuming the position that full ultimate responsibility for a program, project, or activity is that of the host

Thibodeaux (NT-28) (Japan - D) (O-1) - Full responsibility for performance and accomplishment must be that of host. We can do no more than help in their efforts. In the last analysis, local government must be responsible for "doing/undoing," not the aid donor, whose role is limited to that of cooperation. (GA(11c))

Mack (T/PR-7) (Paraguay - CM; Iran) (R-3) - Observations on approach:...(2) one should maneuver people into position of accepting responsibility. (TECH-T(6))

White (ETR - VIENTIANE TOICA A-201, 9/5/61) (Laos - Water Res. Adv.; Iran) (R-3) - In Laos, found natives:...(d) make more effort the more responsibility that is given. (TECH-T(6))

Raper (W-42) (M/PERS; Taiwan; Thailand; Japan; Iran) (R-3) - Locals should assume responsibility for operations. (GA(12b))

Garner (T/M-39) (Vietnam - Agric. Engr.; Thailand; Pakistan) (R-4) - In his job in Vietnam, which has involved the clearing and reclamation of lands for agricultural purpose, always made plain that it was the prerogative of locals to follow own methods rather than to take his advice, adding that if the road became bumpy they would have to take the bumps themselves. Never attempted to tell them to follow a particular course; instead planted ideas which he hoped would result in proposals by them to him. Tried to make them feel they had the responsibility, that they were capable of exercising responsibility, and that, in the process, they would make mistakes....Often the best way for locals to learn is by making mistakes. (TECH-T(6))

b. Treating any project, program, or activity as that of the locals

Little (T/S-17) (Thailand - Teacher Educ.; Dominican Rep.) (R-3) - In Thailand general education program, USOM took stance that this was a Thai, not a U.S., project and that unilateral decisions would not be made by U.S. technicians. While causing short-term delays, insistence that locals do the job produces best results in long run. (Detailed illustrations) (GA(0))

Steffey (T/F-50) (Iran - Housing; Korea; UAR) (R-3) - In working in Iran, emphasized to locals that housing program was their job and insisted that they take the responsibility for decision-making. Would make suggestions from his point of view, but always made clear his advice might "be unsuitable for their requirements." (TECH-T(6))

Taylor (T/M-37) (India - Soils Adv.) (R-5) - Imperative that technician remember it is the locals' program, not our own - that job is to show them how they might be able to do the work themselves. (TECH-T(6))

c. Getting the locals to make the decision

Astle (NT 56) (British Honduras - D; Haiti; Paraguay) (R-3) - A key to successful technical assistance lies in getting the locals to make their own decisions and to establish institutions through which collective decisions can be made. (GA(11c))

Steffey (T/F-50) (Iran - Housing; Korea; UAR) (R-3) - In working in Iran, emphasized to locals that housing program was their job and insisted that they take the responsibility for decision-making. Would make suggestions from his point of view, but always made clear his advice might be "unsuitable for their requirements." (TECH-T(6))

Baron (NT-58) (Cambodia - DD; Philippines - Prog.) (R-2) - Locals, not technicians, should make substantive decisions. Technicians should remain advisers and trainers. (GA(1))  
 ...In assisting in the development of a banking system, foreign advisers should be careful to restrict themselves to advice and training and to avoid taking over the job of reviewing and acting on specific lending applications. Locals must make the decisions even though, since this is part of the learning process, they make mistakes and there are occasional bankruptcies. (GA(5b))

Raper (W-42) (M/PERS; Taiwan; Thailand; Japan; Iran) (R-3) - Assuring that it is the counterpart rather than the technician who makes the decisions and carries on the operations. Although the technician might make a better decision, it is better that the decisions be made within the framework of people who must ultimately exercise responsibility for operations and that a person is not likely to do a good job in operations if the operations are something for which he does not have genuine responsibility. (Example from Taiwan.) Difficult for American not to follow contrary course of interjecting himself aggressively when he feels his knowledge is superior. (GA(12b))

Nicolai (W/E-13) (ICA/W; Chile - Exec. Offr.) (R-3) - Referring to servicio-type organization, our technicians should act as advisers to counterparts who are responsible for projects and who develop their own organization with the advice of the technician. This facilitates the absorption of the organization by the ministry when the time comes. (INDIG)

d. Deferring to local priorities (see also section V-3)

Nelson (NT-78) (Lebanon - D; ICA/W; Jordan - D) (R-1) - Local priorities, rather than U.S. priorities, should prevail provided former are somewhere within latter. (GA(5a))

5. The relationship should be one which results in progressive increases in the self-confidence, sense of responsibility, and stature of donee personnel who are involved.

Smith (T/M-3) (Bolivia - Home Econ.) (R-4) - Her main purpose was to build the confidence of her counterpart but to stay behind the scenes. (TECH-T(6))

Hornback (NT/S-13) (USRO - Prog.; Laos) (R-3) - Main job of technician is to work with his counterparts, nursing them along and giving them courage. (TECH-T(6))

Williams (T/M-44) (Liberia - Health Educ. Adv.; Burma, Egypt - WHO) (R-4) - Technician must create a delicate balance between advice and operations. It can be neither one nor the other. He should not take over operation; he should be able to integrate advice and service in a way which will strengthen counterparts, and never in a way that will make counterparts feel inadequate. (TECH-T(6))

Locher (T/M-27) (Brazil - Ag. Engr.; Iraq) (R-2) - Technician should not push himself into forefront, but rather build up his counterparts and co-workers so that they gain prominence and respect. (TECH-T(6))

Keyes (PA-65) (AID/W - Trng.; Philippines - Health Educ.) (R-4) - Feels that AID sometimes over-protects the participant and thereby gives him a sense of inadequacy....Patterson (also present during interview) feels that one must treat participants as adults and give them the maximum amount of responsibility that they can accept.

6. The relationship should be one in which the atmosphere is that of an association of people who, as people, if not in terms of their specific skills and talents, are equals.

Gales (T/F-39) (Korea - CD) (R-6) - In approaching Koreans, USOM technicians should (a) exude friendliness, (b) speak as equals, and (c) demonstrate that they have Koreans' interests at heart. (TECH-T(6))

Britton (T/M-12) (Pakistan - Plant Pathologist) (R-5) - Must not, as many Americans do, treat locals as subordinates to be ordered around. (TECH-T(6))

Alter (NT-43) (Nepal - Prog.; India) (R-3) - Treat locals as just other individuals. (GA(12b))

Bell (T-34) (Spain - Ag.) (R-3) - Realize other people, while different, are not any better or worse than technician is. (GA(12b))

See Slaughter (T/E-'8) (Haiti - Area Oper. Offr.) (R-2) - Technicians must have the ability to associate with locals on an equal level. (TECH-T(2a))

See Button (T/M-28) (Libya - Ag.) (R-4) - Technician must be able to accept a man who dresses, eats, and prays differently and realize differences do not connote inferiority. (TECH-T(2a))

7. The relationship should not be one in which the donor, and particularly its personnel, take (or, alternatively, appear to take) a dominant or dominating position. (See also section XII-E-4)

Andrews (P/US-7-D) (Michigan State) - Importance of finding way of effecting indigenous change without overly dominating the country being assisted. Unfortunately, in some areas (e.g., Pakistan), the weight of our money is virtually dictating the course of a country, and the response is purely submissive; our USOM tends to become a shadow government and, with strong people, creates a feeling of inferiority on part of ministries. (GA(0))

8. Possible desirability of developing institution-to-institution relationships between a U.S. government technical agency and its counterpart ministry in a host country

Williams (PA-40) (HEW - PHS; ICA/W; Peru) - Foreign ministries of health are anxious to find some device to establish a beneficial day-to-day working relationship with the U.S. Public Health Service, which is generally regarded as the fount of all wisdom. He believes the development of such a relationship is desirable.

Atkins (PA-49) (HEW - PHS; India) - In field of public health, may be desirable to develop an increasingly professional relationship between local ministries of health and PHS (and similar relationships in other technical fields might also be desirable). Other countries desire the creation of such a relationship.

Kline/Osborne/Ernst (PA-56) (HEW - PHS) - Great advantages would derive from promoting closer professional ties between PHS and local health ministries. The basis for such ties already exists in many cases due to the extensive individual associations developed in the past. The development of relationships based primarily on a mutuality of professional interests should minimize the often unfortunate political connotations that attach to relationships that are purely on a government-to-government basis, as is necessarily the case in extending assistance.

Vintinner (PA-47) (O/LA; O/PH; Peru; PHS) (R-2) - Describes strong desire in other countries to develop a continuing relationship between their ministries of health and PHS because PHS is the health organization of the U.S. Government. This wish stems not only from a desire to have direct channels for obtaining technical information but also from the typical professional man's desire to be associated directly with his professional colleagues elsewhere. Implies belief that the development of such ties with local health ministries is a good thing.

Bryant (PA-61) (Libya - DD; ICA/W; Korea; Chile; Iran; Jordan) (R-1) - Might be desirable to develop direct ties between USPHS and local health ministries provided one guarded against the possibilities of (a) PHS performance of local ministry tasks in lieu of training local ministry staffs and (b) PHS sponsorship or encouragement of activities which the local ministry did not generally want and was not ready to support.

Davis (PA-76) (ESD; India - Ag.; Taiwan - JCRR; ECA/W; Japan) (R-1) - The Department of Agriculture as an institution would be better received by local governments than agricultural technicians who were simply associated with an AID mission. The Department, like the Public Health Service, has a stature of its own which means something in these other countries and the latter would welcome a direct tie therewith.

Saccio (PA-107) (Brazil - D; ICA/W - DD) (R-1) - Based upon his experience with GS in Brazil, he believes that the development of institution-to-institution relationships between U.S. agencies and counterpart local government institutions is desirable, often leads to the most effective kind of technical assistance, and should be encouraged.

## E. THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-HELP

1. Analysis

Although such a procedure results in considerable repetition of materials which are included in the several preceding subsections and elsewhere in this digest, it nonetheless seems desirable to include a special subsection on "self-help." In the jargon of technical assistance the term is used in several ways.

Many individuals speak of the "principle of self-help" and describe it as a central concept of technical assistance. This represents a shorthand way of stating that the objective - or process - of technical assistance is that of helping others to help themselves - of providing the advice, guidance, information, etc., which individual locals require in performing tasks on their own. Or, stated negatively, where the locals are unwilling to help themselves technical assistance will not be effective unless its purpose and likely consequence will be the stimulation of a will for self-help. The technician supplies the advice or information and the local employs it. The principle applies with equal force to the foreign technician working with natives and to the native technician extending technical assistance to his countrymen (e.g., a local extension agent). Where this element of "self-help" is not present - where the technician does something for the local in lieu of advising the latter on how to do it - some commentators would say that the assistance is economic rather than technical. They would probably also say that "doing" by a technician, regardless of how this action is categorized from an aid standpoint, destroys or lessens the possibility that his activities will result in the successful communication to the locals of new capabilities.

Other individuals use the term "self-help" to describe those measures which they believe the locals must or should take as a precedent or concurrent condition to the receipt of external assistance, either generally or for specific projects or programs. Such measures may be ones as to which the locals require technical assistance or they may be ones which the donor believes or assumes that the donee can undertake on its own without outside help. The measures may be ones that are an integral part of, and necessary to the execution of, a particular donor program or project. On the other hand, they may be unrelated to any specific donor program or project but represent steps which the donee must take if the donor's specific programs and projects, however successful they may otherwise be as discrete activities, are to have a significant effect in the donee's society or are to contribute significantly to the donor's objectives in extending assistance. We refer in this

latter connection to such claims as the oft-repeated assertions that technical assistance and other aid programs will not be effective unless the host government undertakes land reform, reorganizes its governmental structure, revises its tax systems, etc. - measures described frequently as "self-help measures."

Still other individuals employ the term "self-help" in characterizing a specific type of technical assistance project or activity in which a group of locals, usually at the grass roots level and typically a village, collectively undertakes, with guidance and sometimes material assistance from an outsider, measures for its self-improvement. The outsider may be a foreign technician or a native technician; it is the nature of the activity rather than whether it is or is not part of a foreign technical assistance program that warrants the "self-help" characterization. Self-help housing and community development activities are commonly described as "self-help" activities. Such activities, it should be noted, represent the application in a collective context of the "principle of self-help" referred to above. Sometimes self-help activities are viewed primarily as ends in themselves - as a means to solving concrete problems (e.g., the provision of badly needed housing through an aided self-help housing project), although they may also be desired for their collateral demonstration value in other communities facing similar problems. More often, perhaps, the activities are considered as means to another end, namely, the development among the projects' local participants of a capacity for, and an understanding of the potentialities and value of, community action in other activities, and in the political as well as the economic spheres. They are thought of by many as the best vehicle for instituting democratic processes at the grass roots.

This subsection is concerned with comments involving "the principle of self-help," and to a lesser extent, and largely to provide specific illustrations of the principle, with comments on "self-help projects." It does not cover "self-help measures" as a condition of aid, a subject dealt with in subsection XI-C.

The subject of "self-help" is included at this particular point in the digest because it concerns the character of the relationship between the foreign technician and the local - the extent and character of the latter's participation in any project or program and the respective roles of both donor and donee in any technical assistance activity, subjects which are covered in the immediately preceding subsections. Comments on those subsections and in this subsection are to a considerable extent mutually supporting. The "principle of self-help" could have equally well been dealt with in other sections.

2. The importance of self-help as an ingredient of successful technical assistance

- Mahony (T-21) (Oceania - Anthrop.) - People themselves must get involved in projects; otherwise they won't follow through (e.g., technician-dug wells in Somalia not repaired since locals didn't participate). (GA(4))
- Haraldson (NT-31) (Taiwan - D; Vietnam) (O-1) - Only locals can improve themselves; we can only create conditions which enable them to do so. (GA(4))
- Killen (NT-12) (Pakistan - D; Yugoslavia; Eval.) (R-1) - Nothing can substitute for locals' own efforts; technical assistance can be only a supplement and is useless where efforts do not exist. (GA(4))
- Thibodeaux (NT-28) (Japan - D) (O-1) - Full responsibility for performance (for "doing" and "undoing") must be that of host government; we can only help in their efforts to help themselves. (GA(4))
- Coler (T-15) (Nepal - Ind. Trng. Adv.; Korea; Turkey; Mexico) (R-4) - Development of motivation for self-help critical. (GA(4))
- Lippincott (NT-11) (Lebanon - DD) (R-2) - Must have desire on part of locals to help themselves. Can't jam things down other people's throats except for a short period. (GA(4))
- Kershishnik (T/F-11) (Somali Republic - Ag. Credit; Afghanistan) (R-5) - Can't expect to be of help in Somali Republic until the Somalis are ready to help themselves. (GA(4))
- Campbell (W-23) (O/PH; Brazil) (R-1) - Principle of self-help is central concept and throughout organization we have lost this concept of helping people to help themselves. (GA(4))
- Schuck (T-10) (Ecuador - PA (Credit & Banking)) - It is important they themselves should do the work and develop the pride that comes with doing the work, and that our function should be confined to supervision and advice. (Developing banking and credit system in Ecuador) (GA(4))
- Galloway (ETR - AMMAN TOICA A-310) (Jordan - CD) (R-2) - Village decision to carry out self-help activities is big step in learning how to make democracy work. (GA(3))

Astle (NT-56) (British Honduras - D; Haiti; Paraguay) (R-3) - Self-help is a key element in successful technical assistance. Illustrated by aided self-help housing program in British Honduras. A means of helping people to build their own institutions (e.g., cooperatives) and to learn to work together. Institutions which people create themselves, though with our help, will survive after U.S. aid withdrawn. (GA(4))

Astle (NT-56) (British Honduras - D; Haiti; Paraguay) (R-3) - We sometimes assume that a strong desire for change exists when, as a matter of fact, reaction of locals to present environment is mild and has continued in much the same form for years. In this type of situation it might be better if we did not tamper. In other cases, where the locals express their dissatisfaction vociferously and show a desire to express themselves and engage in self-help, the situation is ripe for assistance. (GA(5a))

International Survey of Programmes of Social Development (UN, E/CN, 5/322, 1959) - "Programmes of Rural Development" - Organized self-help represents basic principle of extension. Participation (a) helps train rural leaders, (b) stimulates local feeling of responsibility, (c) promotes extension programs that meet felt needs of people, and (d) brings extension programs closer to people. (GA(4))

See Watson (M-59) (Rockefeller Foundation - Latin America) - In Latin America there are enormous differences in potentialities of countries for self-help. (GA(0))

Brown (NT-74) (Laos - DD; Philippines, Korea, Indonesia, Mainland China - Agric. Attaché) (0-2) - Description of successful self-help activities in rural development in Laos. (GA(4))

Davidson (T/F-49) (Libya - Credit Coop. Adv.) (R-4) - In the past in Libya have been doing too many things for Libyans (e.g., repairing cisterns, dipping sheep). This creates an expectation of future services and decreases willingness to undertake self-help. (GA(20d))

3. Methods of stimulating self-help (see also V-B; IX-D-3)

Stradley (W/S-25) (ICA/W; Korea - D/Ag., Educ.) (R-4) -

Discusses techniques for securing self-help in Korea in local school construction: (1) the "primer approach," used successfully by both UNKRA and AFAC, of offering enough aid for three classrooms out of 18 needed - a quid pro quo arrangement; and (2) efforts (a) to get local community, through school head and community leaders (and sometimes PTA), to think through the problem and to determine what resources they had and were prepared to offer; (b) to get provincial and national government to review adequacy of proposed contribution; and (c) to see what assistance could be given by higher echelons. (GA(0))

Brown (WT-74) (Laos - DD; Philippines, Korea, Indonesia, Mainland China - Agric. Attaché) (O-2) - Self-help concept may have to be introduced from outside. Villagers may not automatically engage in self-help projects or immediately conceive of such projects. (Examples from Laos)...Should handle self-help activities in such a fashion that they do not create demands for central government help that out-run capacity to meet them. (GA(4))

Naylor (T-49) (Philippines - CD; Iran) (R-3) - Because of characteristic tribal tradition of an individual's obligation to the community, there is basis in African village for projects of self-help or cooperative community nature. (NP)

4. Illustrative self-help activities and projects

a. Self-help housing

Some of the comments which follow go beyond the bounds of technical assistance as such. They are included because they may throw some light on the potentialities and limitations of self-help projects and therefore affect the extent to which, and the conditions under which, technical assistance (a) should be used to support such activities or (b) should utilize activities of this nature as a means for the development of general self-help capabilities.

Reed (P/US-7) (Puerto Rico - Housing; Burma; Greece) - Discusses self-help in housing at length, noting that: (a) self-help has been overdone and is becoming a less valuable tool; (b) there are many areas where it will not produce a satisfactory solution to housing problems because it is of maximum use in cheap land areas and urbanization is increasing cost of land (necessitating multiple housing), introducing complications like sewers, transport, etc., and establishing working hours inconsistent with cooperative community efforts at reasonable price. (Discusses modifications of self-help approach.) (GA(4))

International Survey of Programmes of Social Development (UN, E/CN. 5/322, 1959) - "Programmes and Measures for Meeting Problems of Rapid Urbanization" - Précis of an extensive, excellent discussion of housing problems in urban areas (e.g., low-income migrants reluctant and/or unable to pay higher rents, coupled with lack of societal funds to solve problems) and of possible measures, including self-help and aided self-help. Comments: self-help housing projects are only means of reaching people in greatest need in housing field in less developed countries; (2) such projects have possible value in providing vocational training for unskilled; (3) because it involves hope of securing better homes, self-help housing may be one of the more effective ways of stimulating local initiative; (4) self-help housing is rarely successful in improving dwellings of thoroughly destitute and unskilled people; and (5) success usually dependent on committees and individuals involved having previously engaged in cooperative action and mutual help. (GA(4))

Boyd (W-1) (Housing) - Self-help housing more successful to date in urban than rural setting due to greater multiplier effect. In rural areas technically sound demonstration not repeated widely. Doubtful whether desirable to provide materials without technical aid; average house beyond ordinary skills. (GA(4))

Abrams (see Boyd (W-1)) - Doubts value of self-help housing on grounds it doesn't provide skills useful in society. (GA(4))

Laidig (NT-68) (E. Caribbean - D; ICA/W) (R-3) - No way yet found to get aided self-help housing going on massive scale. Most of it reaches only a few people, with no satisfactory means discovered of getting multiplication of individual demonstrations. (GA(5b))

Womelsdorf (T/F-45) (Chile - Housing; Colombia) (R-4) -

Describes self-help housing project in Chile in which the provision by USOM of small amount of equipment (cement mixer, saws, etc.) enabled and encouraged locals to go ahead...Draws certain generalizations from the experience, including following: (a) self-help housing represents an effective impact program, provided U.S. identification is made clear (illustrations of local Chilean reactions); (b) programs are easier to handle in urban than rural setting because can get more cooperators together (thus reducing per unit administrative costs), materials are more available, and scheduling of available timing easier (people do not work according to whether sun shines or the season). In Chile, self-help housing programs are of a modified type in that, in addition to land, sewer and water supply may be provided through contract arrangements, or a bathroom, or several habitable rooms in which people can live while working on rest of house. Techniques must be adapted to particular local social problems encountered. (GA(4))

Astle (NT-56) (British Honduras - D; Haiti; Paraguay) (R-3) -

Illustration of aided self-help housing in British Honduras, in which USOM adviser convinced group of locals that if they would save and undertake other measures of self-help (construction of blocks with loaned ICA block-making machinery), they could then go to the government for assistance in putting these savings to work, the primary assistance being the land on which to build. They created a cooperative to protect their savings and take title to the blocks, and this has resulted in additional cooperatives which have formed a federation. The government, adverse at the outset cannot ignore this new institution which it is now helping. (GA(2))

Boyd (PA-14) (ESD - Housing; Chile) - More attention should be given to encouraging self-help housing. In the case of most past projects, monthly cost to the owner is less than his prior monthly rent, and at the same time he is in process of acquiring ownership. Moreover, the projects when properly set up provide for the automatic reinvestment of the capital, and this has an important bearing on whole problem of capital formation.

Weissman ("Mutual Aid in Low Cost Housing") (UN) - The use of unskilled labor through self-help and mutual aid has definite limitations. Not a substitute for highly productive building industry necessary to deal with problem of urban development and reconstruction to meet population growth and respond to growing aspirations...Mutual aid, self-help and cooperatives only really effective if following basic principles observed: (a) unskilled labor can only be economically used for work not requiring specific skills (uneconomic to develop skills for one-shot activity); (b) sufficient (i) capital, (ii) technical personnel, and (iii) organizing and administrative skill available to use latent potential of capital formation inherent in self-help; (c) housing and community improvement programs using self-help must, as a matter of national policy, be part of (i) general housing programs and (ii) rural or urban program of general improvement and development; (d) self-help housing must not become the "ghetto"; (e) self-help labor must be combined with economically justifiable application of machines to assure enough productivity to make effort worthwhile. (GA(4))

i. Other types of self-help projects

- Galloway (ETR - AMMAN TOICA A-310)(Jordan - CD) (R-2) - Description of village self-help loans and grants project in Jordan. Designed to meet requirements for effective implementation of recognized felt-need projects to promote increased economic production and to establish and improve community facilities - and in the process to provide procedural and organizational experiences at local level aimed at improving welfare on self-help basis. (GA(4))
- Ramsay (ETR - TEHRAN TOICA A-1353) (Iran - Ag. Exten.) (R-5) - Description of village self-help organized around village agricultural extension committee in Ostan Fars in Iran which planned own programs to reflect own needs and wants, an approach which beneficially supplemented prior hit-or-miss extension approach. (GA(4))
- Botch (ETR - BENGHAZI TOICA A-399) (Libya - Prov. Dir.; Iraq) (R-3) - Description of rural self-help activities in Fezzan in Libya. (GA(4))
- Babcock (NT-6-C) (Liberia - D; Eval.; Paraguay - D) (R-1) - Description of Zor Zor self-help plan in education in Liberia. (GA(4))

Springfield/Ryan/Mills (T/F-16) and Adams (NT/F-5) -

Community development is means of organizing village-level people for self-help efforts. Saves government money and fairly successful. (GA(4))

Nelson (T-35) (Iran - CD; Philippines) (R-4) - In Iran, the government lacks the money, and its ministries lack the organization and technicians, to do directly all the things necessary to bring about real rural improvement. Hence, rural development depends upon a combination of (a) mobilizing rural population to do everything it can on its own behalf and (b) finding ways by which limited central technical services available can be applied with maximum effectiveness in supporting rural self-help efforts. Community development is a real process which facilitates both steps. (GA(4))