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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN AID

by

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The purpose of this memorandum is (1) to clarify and isolate various ideas customarily associated with the term "political development," (2) to provoke thought about the more general considerations which might properly inform any serious efforts to facilitate "political development," and (3) to set the stage for discussion of the practical measures available to AID in supporting political development--in foreign and presumably less enlightened countries, of course. We shall, in short, be interested only in general orientations towards policy and not in advancing any particular programs of action.

Our discussion will be organized in three parts. In Part I we shall examine in brief form some of the issues and concepts which have frequently confused and addled discussion about political development. Part II will consist of a summary of a list of qualities of a political system which would belong in any statement of the generic concept of development or modernization. In Part III we shall seek to bring the discussion around to matters that lie closer to the immediate policy choices open to AID. In all three parts our presentation has to be highly schematic and suggestive, for this is only an outline and not a complete analysis or full elaboration of the subject "political development."

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## Part I

## THE CONFUSION OF TERMS AND CONCEPTS

The Novelty of the Concept

The notion of political development is not native to the discipline of political science. It is true that the classical political theorists, Aristotle and Plato in particular, were interested in questions of political change and classification. There was in fact a tradition among political philosophers of speculating as to how political systems might alter their form and also as to what might be the ideal political arrangements. Among nineteenth-century thinkers there was considerable interest in questions about how a modern state might be established and also about the dynamics of political progress and evolution. Two world wars and the rise of fascism and communism were enough, however, to jar most political scientists out of their easy views about progress and the inevitability of social development.

Contemporary political scientists have had a profound distrust of anything that might smack of being a unilinear belief in historical evolution and progress. At the same time, the great positive developments in American political science have been associated with a rejection of excessive concern with normative questions and a willingness to concentrate on merely explaining how political events and phenomena occur in practice. This emphasis upon empirical analysis and on trying to appreciate the dynamics of existing situations has been reinforced by the general drift in the social sciences toward cultural relativism and the rejection of any notions about the relative superiority or inferiority of societies and cultural practices.

In recent years, however, largely as a result of the manifest problems of economic and social development in the new states, there has been an increasing awareness among political scientists of the legitimacy of the problem of political development.

These observations about the discipline of political science are relevant in helping to explain why at this stage in history the scholarly world is not in a better position to provide useful knowledge as to how communities might go about building more effective polities. To state the matter bluntly, we do not now possess a body of sound knowledge upon which it might be possible to build valid doctrines for guiding policy on political development. We need to recognize this profound intellectual limitation. Hopefully, in the years to come some of these deficiencies in knowledge will be corrected, but at the moment policy must go ahead making do as best it can with the little systematic thought we have on the topic.

#### Ambiguities in the Terms "Political" and "Development"

Although the systematic study of political development is still a virgin field in political science, the discipline has been prolific in ideas and concepts which appear to be relevant to the subject. As a consequence, one of the problems that arises immediately at the outset of any discussion of political development is that people are likely to feel that they are on more familiar ground than turns out to be the case. Indeed, intellectually the problem is not one that calls for the scrapping of all the old ideas in the creation of new terms and concepts--this is contrary of course to

the fashion of the day in political science which is to coin new words in place of solving problems--but rather the need is to utilize many of the old concepts in a slightly new context. This situation means that before it is possible to proceed very far in the discussion of the problems of political development it is usually necessary to take the pains to clarify the extent to which we are using old concepts in new ways and to make quite explicit what we do in fact mean by the general concept of political development.

One of the first problems that usually arises is that of the relationship of democracy to political development. To what extent do we really have in mind the strengthening of democracy in the world when we talk about the American effort to support political development? In both intellectual discussions and the making of policy there seems to have been in recent years considerable confusion over the extent to which American policy should in fact be directed to the building of democratic institutions or to something else which we would want to call political development.

One of the difficulties in relating political development to democratic growth is the uncertainty we have as to what in fact should be taken as the appropriate standards of democracy. There is not only the question of how far Western institutions and practices can be realistically introduced into societies which have not had the historical evolution basic to Western civilization, but there is also the issue of how far democracy can in fact operate as a system of rule in societies with very low levels of education and social development.

Even if we were to assume that U.S. policy ought to take political development to mean the strengthening of democratic institutions, it is not clear that this would greatly simplify the problems of policy. There would still remain the difficult issue of how a society should properly go about building democratic institutions. There would be those who would argue that there are certain essential prerequisites to a democratic society and that every effort should be made to compel societies to fulfill these prerequisites. These people would counsel us to use all the influences of American policy to compel the other countries to adhere to the norms of a democratic and open society. There is, however, the other point of view which holds that it is right and proper to picture the process of democratic institution building as requiring different stages of development during which quite different norms of behavior are appropriate at different times. These people would counsel that we should not expect certain standards of behavior in the underdeveloped countries and that all the attention has to be focused on a tutelage process during which the stage might be set for an eventual introduction of more general democratic practices.

There is probably no way in which we could resolve this issue and I would not want to encourage us to engage in an extended discussion of the nature of democracy. I do, however, feel it is important to observe one disturbing consequence that follows from the fact that we find it so difficult to arrive at even a working judgment as to what kind of norms of behavior are expected of those who proclaim that they are trying to build democratic societies. The difficulty is of course that without a satisfying theory about the

process of creating democratic societies, we are not in a good position to judge and evaluate the current behavior of other governments. Leaders in underdeveloped areas can often claim that their behavior should not be viewed in terms of the standards applicable to more advanced democratic societies, but what standards should apply? How are we to distinguish between honest limitations of the situation and idle rationalizations? This is a peculiarly difficult problem for those concerned with political development, because political leaders are generally skilled in the spreading of hogwash and bunkum and they are likely to make every kind of excuse for their failings, and above all they are prone to employ idealistic statements about democracy in order to cover over their most venal calculations.

If we are to encourage democratic development, the need of course is to be hard-headed; but as long as we do not have the sound knowledge of the dynamics of democratic institution building we lack the criteria for sound evaluation and judgment. The result is a tendency toward soft-heartedness or a resigned cynicism in evaluating the performance of the leaders of the underdeveloped countries.

The concept of political development is not, however, usually limited to just the notion of democratic development. Somehow our understanding of political development is broader and indeed we are inclined, for example, to think of the Soviet Union as also a developed country. If we go beyond the notion of democracy in searching for the basis of political development, we are likely to note that development is often associated with the concept of

stability. Stable political systems are assumed to be more developed than unstable ones.

If we are to view political development in terms of stability, the goal of policy thus becomes one of trying to reduce the likelihood of the unexpected occurring. Many people tend to have ambivalent feelings about placing such high importance on the goal of stability. Many of these people are disturbed by the suggestion that we should strive to maintain the status quo and are inclined to feel that possibly the goal of political development viewed in this fashion stands in conflict with the march of historical events.

Some of this feeling of ambivalence and uneasiness can be resolved if we distinguish between stability as meaning a static state of affairs and stability as meaning the capacity of a system to cope effectively with a wide range of problems. I think that we can put aside as irrelevant any consideration of the desirability of encouraging a static situation. On the other hand, if we think of stability as meaning the ability of a system to carry on purposeful action and not be merely the helpless object of social and historical forces, we may be able to arrive at a useful concept for thinking about political development. The goal of political development would thus be to help make it possible for societies and governments to deal with an ever-widening range of problems and pressures. Stability would thus be related to the capacity for effective political planning and action.

Concern with stability leads us to a third general concept which is usually related to any discussion of political development, and this is the building of more effective and efficient governmental

institutions. In this view political development entails simply the improvement of the operations of government. When this approach is taken, much of the concern with development tends to be concentrated on the improvement of public administration and the development of more competent bureaucracies.

We should note here that this view of political development <sup>has</sup> ~~is~~ possibly been historically the most congenial one for those responsible for inter-governmental programs of political development. Governments tend to deal with governments, and it is the most natural thing for one government, in thinking about how it can help another polity, to concentrate on improving the administrative operations of the other government. Aid programs have to go through the recipient government and there is no discounting the importance of effective administration in seeing that the economic development programs are efficiently carried out.

We should also note that historically the concept of political development has largely taken this form<sup>of</sup> a concern for the building of the authoritative institutions and structures of rule. The impact of colonialism was largely in this area, and, to the extent that we say that various colonial governments left behind more or less politically developed societies, we tend to judge in terms of the efficiency of the civil service that the new state has inherited. We should therefore recognize that to the extent that the United States, accepts this view of political development we are likely to be seen by others as following in the footsteps of the former colonial rulers.

It should be clear, I trust, from my remarks that I am not particularly satisfied with the concept of political development as being

democracy or stability or governmental institution building. Before exploring further, however, what might properly be the full dimensions of political development, I feel that it is appropriate to look at some of the issues and confusions relating to the politics of political development.

Confusion about the Politics of Political Development.

The lack of a coherent intellectual base for viewing the problem of political development affects not only our understanding of the problem in the underdeveloped country but it also creates some confusion about the place that political development should occupy in American foreign policy. As long as we are not too sure what political development is all about, we are likely to be unable to place it effectively within the context of American policy. It is not my purpose here to engage in any lengthy discussion of American foreign policy in general, but a few remarks do seem to be in order if we are to set the stage for effective discussion.

I do not think that we need to spend any time on such issues as the intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries or charges about neo-colonialism and the like. I do in fact want to keep the discussion as closely related as possible to the operational concerns of A.I.D., and thus in trying to clarify the politics of political development let us think about it at the same level as we usually discuss the politics of economic development aid.

The main issue which I feel needs clarification here is that because we do not have a firm body of theory about political development we will not be able to treat the problems of political development in the same technical fashion as we have been able to conceive of

many of the problems of economic development. It seems to me that the recent trend toward placing foreign economic aid on the basis of more sophisticated criteria depended entirely upon the prior existence of a substantial body of technical economic theory. We can, for example, argue that long-range considerations should hold sway over short-range ones in guiding economic aid, because we do in fact have some theories that suggest to us that we can make reasonable long-range predictions. It is somewhat more difficult to make the same claims with respect to political development because it is almost impossible not to be guided merely by ideological or value considerations in making long-range political predictions.

#### Confusion about Reform and Value Change

Another area of frequent confusion involves the question of how far the United States can go in seeking reform and changes of values in other societies as a part of our general efforts at assisting them in economic and political development. So long as we were able to convince ourselves that we were only trying to help other people to do what they themselves wanted to do, there was no problem here. We could assume that we were not thinking arbitrarily to impose new standards on others but rather that they themselves were interested in adopting new ways of life or that the inevitable pressures of history were compelling them in the direction of change and, presumably, progress.

Increasingly, however, we have come to realize that the people in the underdeveloped areas do not always want what we assume they do, or they have a disturbing tendency to want many things but are unwilling to pay what we would consider to be the proper cost for what they want, especially in terms of changing their values and their social structure and their habits of life.

The problem has thus become much more complex, particularly whenever it involves the question of whether it is our ways of doing things or their ways of doing things that will hold sway in our assistance programs.

These issues were almost certain to arise once we realized that the problems of the underdeveloped country involved something more than merely providing them with material capital and the knowledge of a few skills. It was certainly a much simpler world as long as we could avoid having to face up to questions about the appropriateness of different values and attitudes and social arrangements for the advancement of economic development and national power. The great difficulty, of course, is that we do not have a firm body of empirically tested knowledge which would inform us as to how much change from the old patterns is absolutely necessary in order to obtain the benefits of industrial society and modern ways of organizing power. It is easy enough to reject the extreme position of arguing on the one hand that all the countries must eventually copy the American model if they are to become advanced modern societies, or on the other hand that no traditional values need be changed for a society to gain the advantages of modern technology. The issue upon which few people can be really confident is that of what are the minimum changes necessary and what is the optimum pattern of adoption of new values which will lead to effective development.

These problems are particularly disturbing to Americans who for some time have become increasingly sensitive to the issues of ethnocentrism and the need to be more culturally relativistic. The question of how far we should go in seeking to impose our ways and standards on others conflicts with our uncertainty about how far such societies must in fact change themselves if they are to have progress.

We could spend some time discussing different types of situations in which the United States may be inclined to call for reforms and change. For example, we might note that there are situations in which we are concerned with change in governmental performance in order to increase the technical efficiency of the operations being carried out. We are constantly engaged in dialogues with other governments and agencies of other governments as we try to improve their efficiency and effectiveness.

There is, however, a second category of situations in which we ask for reform, and these reflect our political judgments of the condition in the foreign society. Most often we are concerned with how a government might be reformed in order to make it more popular with the masses of the people. Here our concern with reform usually takes the form of wishing that the government would adopt practices and attitudes more consistent with those which we feel are likely to be popular in our concept of what makes up world opinion and in terms of political constituencies which we are most familiar with.

A third situation in which we frequently find ourselves occurs when we feel that a government needs to change the attitudes and values of the entire society if there is to be effective development. In this situation we are calling upon the government to take the lead in introducing new values and attitudes to the entire society.

Finally, there are situations in which we request reform of a government largely because their current behavior is incompatible with our own values. In some cases we may feel that Congress will find the behavior of the foreign government repugnant and thus if we are to maintain aid programs the foreign government should be induced to alter its pattern. In other cases we may feel that

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the behavior of governments that we are supporting can bring discredit upon the image of the United States foreign policy which we are interested in creating. It is, for example, disturbing to some Americans that we should be supporting governments which seem too blatantly undemocratic.

It is impossible in this memo to analyze in much greater detail the very complicated and delicate problems which confront American decision makers when it comes to the matter of asking for reforms in foreign societies. There are, however, two points which I believe may be appropriately made here.

First, there is the very serious need for more research on the effectiveness of American governmental requests for reform in foreign societies. In the narrowest sense we need further research on the most effective ways of inducing people to change their attitudes and practices with respect to limited activities and programs. In recent years we have received considerable assistance from the anthropologists and students of cultural change on some of the problems that arise in trying to introduce new patterns of behavior. We have had very little research, however, on the larger issues of trying to induce foreign governments, as governments, to change their practices and behavior. This is the kind of research which probably can only be done effectively within government, since much of the data necessary for such studies are only readily accessible to people in government. Should we not by now have accumulated a useful fund of information as to the types of situations in which it is easiest to induce change and also the style and manner in which one can most effectively carry out this form of developmental diplomacy? Even more important, are there not certain forms of

pitfalls which we should seek to avoid? Do we not need more work on how to distinguish between symbolic and substantive reforms?

The second general conclusion I would point to is that the emergence of this very issue of the need for reform should remind us that the problems of economic and political development can no longer be thought of as being largely of a technical nature. We must in fact recognize that in supporting political and economic development we are indeed making certain value commitments and maybe we would be better off if we articulated these value commitments clearly and did not try to assume that foreign assistance is a matter which can be left entirely to technicians. Here again we receive reinforcement for the argument that foreign aid must be seen in a larger content of history and of our total foreign relations.

In spite of these very severe limitations, it may still be useful to briefly comment on different types of political objectives for the use of political development aid according to categories which we have used in discussing the objectives of economic development aid.

1. Strengthening partisan foreign policy relations. One purpose for aid might be in support of the immediate foreign policy objectives of the United States. The goal for such aid would be the building of better relations with allies and in countering the Soviet appeals in the cold war. There has been a considerable body of literature arguing that such objectives are not worthy of the foreign economic aid instrument.

If we are thinking about the building of political community and the larger goals of political development, it is not quite as obvious that the good relations between the American polity and other polities is not of the highest order of importance. What may

appear to be short-run considerations in thinking about economic development can very easily be closely related to ultimate objectives and values when we think in terms of political relationships.

In raising the issue about the use of aid for effecting immediate foreign policy objectives, I do not intend to encourage a new debate over an issue which has been with us for quite some time. We have gone through these arguments for a good many years and it seems to me that the debate has become relatively sterile because it has been so tied to ideological considerations. I have, however, brought up this problem in the hopes of raising a question for those responsible for AID's research. It seems to me that it is about time that we had a careful study made of exactly what has been the record in the use of foreign aid for various short-run political objectives. How effective has the threat of cutting or expanding aid been as a means of affecting political relationships with other societies? It seems to me that we need to have a very cold and historically sound appraisal of how effective <sup>the</sup> foreign aid instrument can be in influencing short-run foreign policy objectives. If it turns out, for example, that the facts are that in only, say, 7 to 12 per cent of the cases has it had any influence at all, then I think we have a much clearer appreciation of the limitations of this instrument than we would if we merely continued to argue that for ideological reasons we ought to preserve the foreign economic aid in a pure and politically uncontaminated state. (Parenthetically, it should be added that if any such study should be made it ought to be complemented by a study of how effective has the threat of other countries been, i.e., to stop receiving our aid. Both Burma and Indonesia have at various times

terminated the receipt of American aid and this has had very clearly an unnerving effect on American policy makers. Similarly we ought to also determine whether the termination of aid programs in some of the African countries would be more disturbing to Americans or to the Africans involved.)

2. Influencing elite recruitment. A second objective that is somewhat more long range would be to use our foreign aid to affect the patterns of elite recruitment within the recipient society so that in time leaders whom we find more congenial are likely to emerge within these polities. Obviously such a use of aid is affected by how long a time span we are prepared to think in terms of; the longer the time span the more worthy the objective may seem to be, but also probably it would be more difficult to determine how effective aid has been in influencing development.

Others may want to talk about the advantages and disadvantages of trying to use aid to influence the power position of a particular individual. No doubt the case of Vietnam will come quickly to mind for everyone. Personally, however, I would rather cast the discussion in terms of some broader issues of policy. Specifically, I would like to suggest that we examine more carefully the common American goal of wanting to create middle-of-the-road types of leadership in transitional societies. Here again I think we may have a situation that calls for some very hard research which may give us the necessary guidance. Certainly the history of European politics has been one in which coalitions of the center have been dismal failures and almost invariably they have tended to provoke strong reactions at the extremes. Indeed, on the basis of the European

record, we should not at all be surprised that Betancourt is having such a difficult time in Venezuela. If we are going to try to build coalitions of the center in Latin America, we will certainly need to devise techniques for preventing the normal tendency of such coalitions to provoke a polarization of politics in time.

The point here is not, however, to argue the issues at all, but rather to suggest that if A.I.D. is going to concern itself more with political development it should engage in some systematic research of the problem. It might be added that if it were to do this it could strengthen its hand tremendously within the U.S. Government, largely because such kinds of policy-oriented research in depth have not in the past been prevalent within the U.S. Government.

3. Influencing institution building. Another category of political objectives involves the creation of effective institutions within the society. The assumption here is that we are less concerned with U.S. governmental relations with the foreign state and more with the long-run development of the institutions of government within that state. I believe that there is no need for me to discuss further this particular objective of policy since I have already alluded to it in discussing some of the concepts of political development. The main problem here, I think, is that of devising ways in which the United States does not appear to be supporting only authoritarian ways as it tries to create and strengthen the authoritative organs of government. The difficulty is that in most transitional societies there is a serious problem of creating a new form of public order. Clearly, many of the governments need a help in this, but this is the

kind of task which is not usually too popular. The need is, of course, to find some ways to counterbalance our necessary concern with strengthening the administrative organs of government with ways of reaching a larger community and developing community-wide associations. This is the heart of the problem of public administration and community development, a matter which we must treat under the next category of aid objectives.

4. Polity building. The broadest goal of political development would be that of trying to create the kind of polity that is appropriate to modern society in the transitional countries. Here we would be interested in going beyond just institution building and trying to see how the government fits into the total society. To clarify what we mean here we can possibly use an analogy with economic aid in which we could say that political institution building would be very much like a project focus in economic development while polity building comes closer to being like a program focus in economic development.

Clearly, in the abstract there is no question that it would be more desirable to be able to focus on polity building than just on institution building. The real question, however, is whether we really have the means available to effect total polity building. In part, the limitation ~~of course~~ is that of our inadequate knowledge, and in part it is merely the enormity of the problem itself. When we realize how marginal American aid must always be it may seem excessively pretentious for us even to assume that there is such a category as polity building as an appropriate objective of our assistance programs.

In spite of these very real limitations which I think cannot be ignored, I still believe it is desirable to try to take a somewhat broader view than merely institution building. The point is that there are very few institutions which can be effective except as their development is related to the larger environment in which they must operate. Thus planning must always encompass that environment to some degree. This is why I think it is so important that A.I.D. do what it is doing in treating public administration and community development as a common problem.

In discussing these various categories of objectives, it is clear that we have been skirting two major topics: one is the relationship of economic development to political development, and the other is the place of foreign aid in American foreign policy. Let us go on to the first of these topics and reserve for our last section a discussion of the second.

#### Confusion about Relationship of Economic and Political Development

If we can return to our initial theme of the inadequacies of political science, it is quite clear that we are not intellectually in a very good position to determine what precisely is the relationship between economic and political development. On the other hand, this clearly is the most crucial question in the whole foreign aid enterprise. Presumably there are very few people who would insist that we are interested in giving foreign <sup>economic</sup> aid merely because we have a fascination in improving economic performance as an end in itself. It would of course be nice if we could be assured that there is somehow an inherent harmony of the spheres so that we could be sure

that what is good in terms of the logic of economics will also inevitably be good in terms of the logic, let us say, of political development and that this in turn will always be consistent with the logic of American foreign policy objectives. All the evidence, however, suggests that the world is a much more untidy one; and that what makes good sense in one sphere or one approach is likely to conflict with what makes good sense in another one.

It is useful in advancing our discussion to point out some of the differing and even conflicting views about the relationship between economic and political development which frequently appear in general discussions about foreign aid.

There is, for example, the view, which I believe is possibly more prevalent in the implicit acts of policy and less in any explicit statements, that political development is that which makes economic development possible. The relationship is thus one in which politics can impede and hamper economic development and thus the proper relationship is seen as one in which these impediments are eliminated and the task of economic development can proceed unencumbered. This view is possibly congenial only with those people who have an inordinate intellectual fascination with economic theory or who have an overdose of empathy for the poverty-stricken; but for most people it does seem to be an excessively sterile view and one in which the cart is put before the horse.

There is also the converse view, in which economic development is seen as that which makes politics easier. The goal of economic development thus becomes one of finding some way of easing the lot of rulers and of those responsible for foreign policy making.

Again this approach to the question is very easily made into a caricature once it is pushed to its extreme.

The point I believe I'm trying to make is that much of the discussion of the relationship between economic and political development is of a highly artificial nature. We should recognize that the very categories of "economic" and "political" are abstractions of our own minds. Thus when we talk about the relationships between these abstractions we should recognize that this is more a problem of our own intellectual doing than a problem that is necessarily relevant to the real world. Indeed, I believe that much of the discussion about the relationship of economic and political development tends to become extremely sterile because the categories that we use in the discussion are hardly relevant to the main problem we have to deal with. For example, on the political side we have such categories, as we pointed out, as "democracy" and "stability" and "authoritarian" and "liberty" and the like, while on the economic side we have such categories as "rapid growth", "stagnant", "government control", "socialist", etc. To argue about the relationships among such categories is clearly to engage in ideological discussion, the relevance of which is not always obvious if our concern is with foreign policy.

It certainly seems to me that A.I.D. should try as hard as possible to avoid posing the problem in these terms, and rather should try to gain further understanding about more concrete relationships. It should be clear, for example, that there are authoritarian states which have had rapid economic development, and there are also authoritarian states which have had stagnating economies. Similarly,

we can point to democratic societies that have experienced very rapid phases of growth and also those which have had relatively slow economic development. Clearly, we need to break down the problem into discrete questions and try to find relations at a lower level of abstraction. At this level it should be possible for A.I.D. to support kinds of empirical research which will produce useful guidelines for policy. Let me just briefly suggest some of the types of questions which might be analyzed:

- 1) Relationship of different types of political leadership to different patterns of economic policy. Given different kinds of political leaders and styles of political rule, what are the limitations of economic policy?
- 2) Relationship of administrative skills to different forms of political and economic tasks. What kind of administrative skills are necessary in order to implement different kinds of economic policies and programs? Are civil services that are capable of <sup>effectively</sup> maintaining law-and-order missions going to be capable of taking on other kinds of assignments?
- 3) The politics of economic planning. What kinds of polities are able to respond effectively to planning commissions? What is the consequence of having "economic planners" located at various different places within the governmental system? Why is it that arrangements that work well in one political system may have very little effect in another?
- 4) The relative political and economic advantages of different forms of taxation and savings. What does it mean for the prospects of economic development that a system refuses to

tax significantly agriculture or land? etc. etc.

These examples are not meant to be particularly exciting or provocative; my only purpose is to suggest some of the confusion over the issues of the relationship between economic and political development can be avoided if we think in terms of specific problems which would certainly have both their economic and political aspects.

This may seem to be such a trivial point that it should hardly deserve mention. I think, however, that it is in fact a rather profound issue which could affect much of the thinking within A.I.D. I believe what I am saying does challenge a rather comfortable point of view which I think would be congenial for many people responsible for foreign aid decisions. This point of view is that it is possible to separate clearly economic and political considerations and that there is a technical economic way of viewing these problems and thus there is the integrity at least of the economic point of view which can and should be preserved by such an agency as A.I.D. Clearly, such an approach has its advantages and should be carried on within certain parts of A.I.D. There is the great danger, however, that others will conclude that A.I.D. is excessively preoccupied with considerations which follow from narrow and technical economic analysis and thus the thinking of A.I.D. is not in line with the tremendous importance of the historical issues of development in American foreign policy. We need not dwell here on why the technician is invariably subordinate to the generalist and why even the most sloppy political reasoning can usually triumph over the most rigorous economic analysis when it comes to human affairs. There is of course the dilemma and the paradox that the more technical economic considerations are

elevated within A.I.D. the more it may strengthen internal decision making but it is likely to weaken the external relations of A.I.D., particularly the position of A.I.D. within American politics.

I assume that there should be little need for us to dwell long on this point because the very fact that we are having this discussion about the relationship of A.I.D. to political development should indicate an awareness that the political base of A.I.D. has been eroded away at an alarming rate by an exaggerated concentration on technical economic criteria for aid. It should be recorded, however, that outsiders viewing A.I.D. are possibly likely to see, in somewhat exaggerated form, the extent of this trend because they are likely to believe that there has been an even greater decline in the role of technical assistance and the human factors in foreign aid than in fact has been the case. The impression in some quarters is that the Peace Corps has taken over most of these activities and that A.I.D. has become merely a banking operation; and hence public opinion may find it disturbingly easy to accept the notion that foreign aid should very shortly be handed over entirely to those engaged in lending or banking operations. Only if we can begin to show that it is impossible to separate economic and political considerations will it be possible to reestablish an appreciation for some of the very essential nature of foreign aid as an instrument of American policy.

We must cease this line of discussion for it is certain to take us into the territory of the politics of A.I.D. and not the problem of aid to political development. Indeed, since we are in danger of possibly creating more confusion rather than clarifying the concepts of development, I believe the time has arrived to move on to a more historical analysis of what seem to be the problems and the characteristics of political development.

## Part II

CRISES IN DEVELOPMENT  
AND THE DEVELOPMENT SYNDROME

In Part I, I sought to bring up a wide range of matters with the hope that some of them may touch on concerns that are of interest to A.I.D. and the members of the Committee. In Part II, I would like to present in very summary form a particular point of view about the problems of political development. I'd like to say at the outset that this approach is based on the assumption that modernization or development is a process in which all of its aspects--economic, political, cultural, psychological--are a part of a common historical process, at the heart of which is the development of the nation-state system as it has emerged out of Western European culture. The particular set of ideas that I will be outlining has come out of some of the extensive discussions among members of the Comparative Politics Committee of the Social Science Research Council.

I would like first to present a series of crises or problems which seem to be inherent in the developmental process as political systems become more modern nation states. What we have sought to do is to survey all the types of problems that seem to plague political systems that are experiencing transition or development, and then to relate these problems under certain general headings. The result is a tabulation of six "crises." It should be noted that in the history of the European development these crises tended to come in more or less the order I'm presenting them to you but that in the contemporary world the states are faced with all these crises simultaneously.

Our assumption is that the way in which a society copes with one set of crises will affect its ability to deal with the others, and thus we could conceive of different patterns of development according to the ways in which the crises are met.

I can only very briefly mention the crises and give a few remarks on them. I trust that the advantages and limitations of such an approach will be immediately apparent to all of you and that I will not have to elaborate very extensively.

A. The Identity Crisis. The first crisis is that of a society coming to feel that it really is a polity and that it is a distinct nation. This of course is the problem of gaining a national conscience. In many of the African and Asian societies the crisis of identity involves minority groups and tribal associations accepting the notion of the nation as the prime basis of community identification. In more subtle forms the identity crisis tends to plague both the leaders and the followers of the developing societies, since they tend to have ambivalent feelings of commitment to the nation.

B. The Legitimacy Crisis. The second crisis involves the problems of accepting the legitimacy of the government and the development of a feeling of political consensus as to what should be the rules of political action in the society. The legitimacy crisis touches on a whole range of constitutional issues as a people must decide what kind of government they are to have and what are to be the ultimate aims of their political community. In most transitional societies the legitimacy crisis takes the form of the people having to decide to what extent they are going to accept the Western

institutions that were introduced under colonial rule and in what ways they are going to be able to give political expression to their unique nationalistic traditions.

C. The Penetration Crisis. This is the crisis which relates to the problems of a government reaching down into its society and touching various aspects of life. In most of the transitional societies the penetration crisis takes the form of a central government being unable to effect developments within the rural sector. At heart the penetration crisis involves the issue of how to get government to the people. It obviously makes quite a bit of difference as to how this crisis is resolved as to what form and in terms of what issues the government tries to reach the population.

D. The Participation Crisis. The next crisis is in a sense the converse of the penetration crisis, and this is the problems that occur as increasing numbers of people in the society seek admission into the political arena. The expansion of political participation is certainly a feature of national development. This crisis involves what we used to think of in terms of the problems of political mobilization and the need to organize the population for more effective action.

E. The Integration Crisis. The next crisis involves the problem of integrating the various structures, both governmental and non-governmental, into a coherent, interacting political system. The government itself must be to some degree integrated so that it is effective, and at the same time there is the need to relate the informal associations and groups that make up the power structure of the society to the governmental system.

F. The Distribution Crisis. The last crisis is that involving questions of how the political system is going to mobilize and allocate resources within the society. Obviously this is the crisis that comes quite close to many of the problems we think of in discussing economic development. The crisis, however, also involves some larger issues, including the feelings for what should constitute justice and welfare within the system and also the old issue of how far government should intervene in the economic affairs of the community.

It should be apparent that policy could differ according to which of the various crises pose the most crucial problems at any particular time. This is the reason it is quite impossible to arrive at any single over-all strategy for political development in all countries at all times. Their problems are obviously different depending upon which of the crises is dominant.

It should also be clear that it makes quite a difference what means are used to resolve the various crises. Historically, for example, the identity crisis was usually resolved in terms of building up a basic feeling of loyalty toward the state that went beyond any feelings of partisan commitment to particular political groups. The resolution of <sup>the</sup> identity crisis thus involved an appreciation that the state represented a system that belonged not to any particular party or class or ruling group. In contrast, historically on the European scene the distribution crisis tended to be one that was fought out very heavily in partisan terms and thus involved a somewhat different level of the political process. It would seem that at present in some of the transitional societies the ruling groups are trying to resolve

their identity crises by focusing on some of the means usually related to handling the distribution crisis. This raises the question of what is likely to be the character of loyalty in societies in which the feeling for national identity is built around the expectation that the government will provide for material needs.

Other strange permutations may be noted. For example, in some of the countries the government is involved in extensive mass mobilization; this may give the impression that it is dealing with the participation crisis, but in fact the government is really engaged in extending its penetration and controls.

If we are to utilize this scheme in our thinking about the problems of A.I.D. it becomes apparent that the more narrowly conceived focus of economic development aid involves almost entirely concern with the distribution crisis. If we expand our concept of economic development it may include the relationship of the distribution crisis to the other crises. Thus some of the problems of facilitating economic development take on the form of having to help solve the problems of penetration, let us say, or more effective integration. If, however, we are going to take a much broader view of the problems of political development, then possibly we need to move away from the focus on just the distribution crisis and ask ourselves how it might be possible to provide direct assistance to other countries as they cope with the other five crises.

We could spend a great deal more time discussing both the nature of these crises and also the policy questions of how A.I.D. might be able to most

effectively influence the outcome of each of the various crises. Possibly during our meeting we will want to go into these matters. In this memo, however, I would like to shift attention to a larger issue now arising. I would like to point out that if we do take seriously such a notion as is inherent in this approach--that there are various types of political problems or crises that occur in different ways in different societies--then it is essential for us to accept the idea that A.I.D. will have to adopt quite different policies in different societies and be willing to discriminate among different countries. This runs contrary to a recent trend in A.I.D. which was in favor of standardization of all programs and projects. There is no question that increased standardization in our aid-giving does facilitate the establishment of firm and universal criteria and it does make it easier to judge the apparent performance of different societies. The difficulty of standardization is that what is relevant to the development of one society may be quite irrelevant for another.

It would seem that A.I.D. would have a larger role in American foreign policy the more it is prepared to discriminate in terms of the degrees of development of the various foreign countries. It is up to A.I.D. to make the case that different patterns of development in the different countries call for quite different patterns of relationships between the United States and the different countries. If A.I.D. can demonstrate that discrimination is called for, in terms of the inherent logic of development of the particular societies in question, then A.I.D. will be able to justify a stronger voice in determining our total political relationship with the societies.

## Part III

## CONCLUSIONS FOR POLICY THINKING

As we stated at the beginning, we have not intended this memorandum to be addressed to any particular set of immediate policy problems for A.I.D. We hope, however, that some of the discussion has been relevant to various issues and that those responsible for A.I.D. policy will take the initiative in singling these out and guiding our discussion toward them during the course of our meeting. There are, however, a few points and observations which I feel are appropriate to make by way of setting the stage for policy thinking.

First of all, I think we should note that a persistent bias throughout this whole discussion has been in the direction of urging the need for greater concern with problems of political development. We note that A.I.D. ought to adopt a broader approach because (1) the problems of even political development in the transitional societies can not be effectively coped with if we adopt too restricted a view, and (2) the problems of A.I.D. as an institution within American society are likely to become compounded by too narrow a concentration on <sup>merely</sup> economic matters.

It should also be apparent in this analysis that any increased concern of A.I.D. for the problems of political development is likely to cause A.I.D. to have to adopt a larger role in the foreign policy making complex of the United States. The question must be raised as to whether it is not likely that the more A.I.D. moves away from a narrow specialization in the area of capital grants and loans the more readily it will be able to resolve its own "integration crisis" in becoming both a fuller part of the foreign policy making team and also

more accepted within the dynamics of American politics.

At the same time we must recognize that another of the dominant themes in this whole analysis is that we do not have a very solid body of knowledge to guide policy with respect to political development. Thus an increased emphasis on political development would mean that A.I.D. would have to move away from the more secure guidelines of economic theory and assume the very considerable risks of dealing with all the uncertain issues relating to values that are at the heart of politics.

Operationally within A.I.D. these conclusions suggest that there is a need for even more serious attention being given to the area of technical assistance. I realize that this is not an easy conclusion for those responsible for administrative decisions. At our last June meeting we all questioned the possibility of measuring the effectiveness of technical assistance programs, and we all expressed the wish that we could discover some firm guidelines for policy in the field of technical assistance.

The problem is that technical assistance cannot be based upon a body of widely shared assumptions, such as those that technical economic theory provide for capital grants programs. Matters of basic assumptions and opinions and values have to be dealt with constantly in the areas of technical assistance and there is no escaping into the realm of apparent order which the systematic elaboration of generalized theories provides.

Consequently technical assistance and, in the larger sense, political development inevitably mean different things to different people. One man's ideal project can be another's waste of resources. Yet is there not a tradeoff here, in that the more we move away from the relative security of

technical matters the more we are likely to come into touch with the really vital issues for both the underdeveloped countries and our own foreign aid program.

In suggesting that A.I.D. should assume a broader responsibility in the development of policy toward the underdeveloped world, I am quite conscious of the seriousness of my proposal. And I want to make it clear that this is not being casually done. I think that a very strong case can be made that in the underdeveloped countries it is quite impossible to try to separate out the economic sphere from all the other spheres of life, and thus it is impossible to intellectually devise policies that would only affect this one sphere of the societies. Indeed, one of the distinctive characteristics of traditional and transitional societies is the fact that they do not have distinct and separate political, social, and economic spheres. It is in these societies that political association tends to follow the patterns of social relations and personal contacts. The converse of this rule is that it is in these societies that politics tends to become peculiarly intense because it is impossible to have a shift in ruling groups without having serious consequences for the social and economic patterns of life. In developed societies it is possible to have a politics of the center in which the transfer of political control of government will only damage different groups at the margin and very few groups need feel that they will be the object of punitive actions. In the underdeveloped countries a quite different situation usually exists, in which the loss of power can bring severe social and economic deprivations. (This is of course one of the important reasons why it is difficult to talk about reform in these societies in the same manner as we think of reform in more developed systems.)

same manner as we think of reform in more developed systems.)

It is not just the nature of transitional societies that calls for A.I.D. to assume a broader mandate. It seems that there is no other agency within the United States government that is in a comparable position to be able to devote full-time energy to conceptualizing all the problems inherent in the developmental process. If A.I.D. does not pose the problems of development in this broader form then there is no one else that will logically do it.

If A.I.D. is prepared to assume a broader set of responsibilities then it will have to creatively design more general strategies for development than has been necessary in the past. It will, for example, have to think about the problem of allocation of resources in much more general terms. We would have to seek to gain systematic knowledge on how we could best cope with the various typical problems or crises that we believe occur in the developmental process. We would have to ask, for example, how we could best allocate resources so as to change a people from being merely subjects of government into participating/<sup>as</sup>citizens, and thus help resolve the participation crisis.

It should also possibly be made clear that the suggestion that A.I.D. take on a greater concern with the problems of political development does not necessarily imply that A.I.D. will require significantly more resources. There is no a priori reason for assuming that a broader concept of the strategy for development would necessarily entail the use of more resources than has been the case with the more narrow view of economic development as the