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**SOUTH AFRICA PREPARES FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGE**  
**The Report of the Pre-election Mission**

Lawyers Committee For Civil Rights Under Law

by

Dr. Makau Mutua  
Projects Director, Human Rights Program  
Harvard Law School

## A. Introduction

Under the direction of Gay McDougall,<sup>1</sup> the Southern Africa Project of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law ("Lawyers Committee") has for over two decades worked for the abolition of apartheid and the introduction of democracy in South Africa. In May 1993, the Lawyers' Committee created the South African Election Observer Project - based in both Washington and Johannesburg - to assist South Africans in making the difficult and complicated transition to democracy. The Observer Project, whose mission is to assist the observing and monitoring of the April elections, provides technical assistance to South African organizations engaged in observing and monitoring the elections and coordinating and supporting American and other non-South African non-governmental organization (NGOs) observer delegations.<sup>2</sup> The Lawyers' Committee also works closely with the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), the official South Africa body mandated to organize, administer, and conduct the elections, to assist in the training and deployment of election observers.

In order to better perform these duties and to enhance its ability to effectively observe the elections, the Lawyers' Committee sponsored and organized a week-long pre-election fact-finding mission to South Africa from March 20-27, 1994. The delegation, which was composed of internationally-recognized American and African lawyers and academics,<sup>3</sup> travelled widely in the Northwest Province of South Africa, particularly within the former "homeland" of Bophuthatswana ("ex-Bop"), and in the urban areas of Klerksdorp and Rustenburg. Just outside Mmabatho, the delegation met with a traditional chief and discussed with him plans for the upcoming elections. The delegation toured the area surrounding Mmabatho/Mafeking and investigated the extent of political party activity and security concerns in Itsoseng, the scene of some of the worst disturbances following the

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<sup>1</sup> Gay McDougall, an internationally-acclaimed human rights lawyer, was appointed commissioner with the Independent Electoral Commission, the official body mandated to administer and monitor the South African elections in April. Of the five international members of the IEC, Ms. McDougall is the sole American.

<sup>2</sup> The Johannesburg operations of the Observer Project were directed by Mark Quarterman.

<sup>3</sup> The delegates were Barbara Arnwine, the Executive Director of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; Margaret Burnham, a member of the Motsuenyane Commission and law partner at Burnham and Hines in Boston; John Douglas, Co-Chair of the Lawyers' Committee Observer Mission and a law partner at Covington and Burling in Washington; Ibrahim Gassama, Election Observer Project Coordinator for the Lawyers' Committee and an Assistant Professor of Law at University of Oregon Law School; Jayne Michuki, a leading Kenyan human rights lawyer and law partner at Kimani and Michuki Advocates in Nairobi; Makau Mutua, the Projects Director at the Harvard Law School Human Rights Program; John Payton, formerly the Corporation Counsel for the District of Columbia, now a law partner at Wilmer, Cutler and Pickering in Washington; Henry Richardson, Professor of Law at Temple University; and Emile Yakpo, the General Secretary of the African Society of International and Comparative Law.

collapse of the "state" of Bophuthatswana.<sup>4</sup> In Rustenburg, the delegation met with Mr. Sifora, head of the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa ("Contralesa")--an A.N.C. affiliated association of traditional authorities--and discussed with him the role of traditional leaders in the electoral process and in the future democratic South Africa.

In these areas, the delegation met with and interviewed a wide cross-section of South Africans, including Messrs. Mokgoro and van der Walt, the newly-appointed joint administrators of ex-Bop, officials of different government departments and offices of ex-Bop, human rights lawyers and activists, journalists, academics, businesspeople, private lawyers, traditional rulers, the Mmabatho/Mafeking Crisis Committee, officials of the IEC, peace monitors, political parties, charitable organizations, women's groups, church organizations, and officials of trade unions. In Johannesburg, the delegates met with Ms. McDougall and Messrs. Moseneke and Chikane, all IEC Commissioners; an official with the American Embassy; Mr. Dong Nguyen, an elections specialist with the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA); the Chieftainess of Bafoking; and the staff of the Lawyers for Human Rights who accompanied the delegation to the Sharpeville Day rally at Miami Beach Stadium.

The purpose of the Lawyers' Committee mission was to assess the overall preparedness for the April election. The delegation was interested in evaluating the extent to which governmental authorities, civic organizations, political parties, and private citizens were engaged in the electoral process. In particular, the mission sought to find out whether the political and security situation allowed for political mobilization and popular participation in the electoral exercise. Among the questions guiding the mission included the ability of citizens to gain access to voter information and education, the posture of security and armed forces in enhancing/impeding the climate for a free and fair electoral process, the potential for the intimidation of the electorate by interests and forces opposed to the election, especially the white right-wing and remnants and supporters of the fallen Lucas Mangope regime, and the ability of rural farmworkers to freely participate in the upcoming election.

The decision by the Lawyers' Committee to concentrate its attention on Bophuthatswana was made before the fall of Bop at a time when Lucas Mangope had sworn never to permit his subjects and "state" to participate in the elections. The Lawyers' Committee anticipated a difficult and violent political climate - one that would hinder independent political activity - in Bop unless President Mangope and his administration were incorporated into the electoral process. But as it turned out, a popular uprising, spurred initially by an insecure civil service, exploded into an open revolt, causing the implosion of the repressive authority on March 11. The following day, the South African government and

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<sup>4</sup> Bophuthatswana was one of the ten homelands created by Apartheid South Africa. But it was only one of four such homelands (the others were Ciskei, Transkei, and Venda) to accept "independence" from South Africa, which it did in 1977. Lucas Mangope, hand-picked by South Africa, repressively ruled the nominally "independent" territory until its collapse in March 1994. Today, the population of ex-Bop is put at 2.5 million.

the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) sent in the South African Defence Force (SADF) troops to restore public order and curtail widespread looting.

On March 14, the South African government and the TEC appointed Messrs. van der Walt and Mokgoro, joint administrators of ex-Bop, effectively bringing Bophuthatswana under South African control. On March 16, the joint administrators, acting under powers conferred on them by the government of South Africa, issued a decree suspending the Republic of Bophuthatswana Constitution Act, 1977.<sup>5</sup> The decree provided for and defined the functions of the joint administrators which included supreme executive and legislative authority over ex-Bop. Among other things, it empowered the administrators to "re-establish good government", take necessary steps for "the implementation of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa", and most importantly, take necessary measures "to promote free political activity and to facilitate the holding of free and fair elections in Bophuthatswana".<sup>6</sup> The decree in effect incorporates Bop into South Africa's Northwest Province. It was in this rapidly changing political situation that the Lawyers' Committee delegation sought to evaluate the region's state of readiness for the April elections.

#### B. The Re-establishment of Viable Government

The civilian uprisings in Bop - initially focussed on wage increases and pension payouts prior to the reincorporation of the homeland into South Africa - blossomed into open demands for participation in the April elections. President Mangope, who ruled by severely prohibiting and punishing all independent political activity, responded to the demands and demonstrations for change with an iron fist: by unleashing his repressive security forces against the people. But as the resistance heightened, many in the security forces switched sides, joining the demonstrators. In the aftermath, Mangope fled. At some point, he invited or acceded to the request of white right-wingers to come to his defense. On March 12, hundreds of right-wingers in pick-up trucks poured into the homeland and started shooting indiscriminately at civilians, killing twenty of them. But they quickly retreated when Bop security forces started to turn against them, shot and killed three of them, and SADF troops arrived. Governmental authorities had virtually collapsed before the SADF stabilized the security situation within a matter of days.

The Lawyers' Committee arrived in Mmabatho, the capital of ex-Bop on March 22, one week after the Bop joint administrators assumed their offices.<sup>7</sup> Although calm prevailed in all the areas visited by the delegation in Mmabatho/Mafeking and the surrounding areas - and most civilians appeared genuinely relieved that Mangope was gone - there was a great

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<sup>5</sup> Decree No. 1 of 1994, Joint Administrators of Bophuthatswana, March 16, 1994.

<sup>6</sup> Id., Article 5(a), (c), and (e).

<sup>7</sup> Mr. van der Walt was formerly the South African ambassador to Bop prior to his appointment as a co-administrator. Mr. Mokgoro was a policy analyst with the South African Development Bank.

deal of apprehension about the political and economic well-being of the territory. On a positive note, government departments were slowly coming to life again. The joint administrators were struggling to carry out their mandate, inform themselves about political and security conditions in the territory, and assert their authority over government agencies. But there were unmistakable signs that the wheels of a government that enjoyed the confidence of the people were beginning to turn again. Most civil servants had gone back to work and the delivery of public and essential services appeared to have largely resumed.

During the period between the collapse of Bop and the effective assumption of office by the joint administrators, the most organized civil political structure appeared to have been the Mmabatho/Mafeking Crisis Committee, the ad hoc civil service organization whose demands precipitated the fall of the Mangope regime.<sup>8</sup> The Committee pressed the TEC for incorporation into South Africa, the immediate intervention of the SADF to avoid killings by the Mangope security forces, and freedom to engage in independent political activity. Although Mangope collapsed before the TEC could respond to these requests, the Committee struggled to assert its own leadership and tried to fill the political vacuum left by Mangope. It demanded from the joint administrators, for an example, that all cabinet secretaries be suspended and replaced with less despotic officials.<sup>9</sup>

The Crisis Committee felt that governmental institutions could not be democratized and the freedom to conduct voter education among workers granted if the secretaries - who were Mangope loyalists - remained in their posts. The Committee claimed that the secretaries continued to provide the deposed ministers with access to their offices to destroy evidence of wrong-doing or alter official records to conceal their involvement in certain matters. The joint administrators agreed to remove the secretaries and replace them with new ones effective March 28. The secretaries were provided with what one of the administrators described as "good" severance packages. The resolution of this issue appeared to have paved the way for the restoration of public confidence in the territory's bureaucracy.

The other burning issues - the pension payouts and the future of public servants - on which the Committee had focussed were more complex and needed time to negotiate. It seemed unrealistic to expect the joint administrators to accede to all the demands of the civil servants before the elections. For one thing, it would take months to determine the state and health of pension plans. Furthermore, the re-incorporation of Bop into South Africa triggered other financial and personnel questions the full scope of which could not be settled

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<sup>8</sup> The Mmabatho/Mafeking Crisis Committee was composed of representatives of public servants, health care workers, and teachers drawn from all 12 regions of Bop and different governmental departments. It was created in February 1994 after the Mangope regime proscribed a working committee formed by workers to press for a trade union.

<sup>9</sup> The cabinet (departmental) secretary is the most senior civil servant answerable only to the minister who is a political appointee.

by the joint administrators in isolation from the rest of the country. The delegation was encouraged, however, to learn that the Crisis Committee appeared to comprehend the complexity of this issue. It seemed to show some flexibility on the pace of negotiation; there were no intentions to use the pension issue to hinder the electoral process. In all probability, the matter will be settled by the government elected to power in April. In the meantime, the Crisis Committee may well continue to have some influence in the governance of the territory's political life.

The ability of the joint administrators to successfully address some of the demands of the civil service and begin to address the security situation augurs well for the electoral process. Although they had been in power for only a week, they had already taken several "meet-the-people" tours to explain the new political dispensation and to call for cooperation with governmental authorities concerned with the electoral process. These confidence-building measures appeared to have energized the populace and lifted the deadly fear previously associated with independent political activity. The delegation was encouraged by the desire of the joint administrators to work closely together in spite of their dissimilar political and cultural backgrounds.

### C. The Security Situation: Hope and Fear

Throughout his long rein of terror, Mangope held on to power through his dreaded police force as well as the Bophuthatswana Defence Forces, which worked hand-in-glove with both the SADF and the South African Police (SAP). The fall of the Mangope regime was preceded by a two-way split in the homeland's key instrument of repression, the police force. The majority of the police force, drawn from the ranks of the poor in the territory, turned sides at the critical moment on March 11 and became supportive of the popular uprising while the senior officers remained sympathetic with the Mangope regime. The Bop Defence Force, whose senior leadership was believed to work closely with the white right-wing, remained hostile to the popular upheaval.

Although the SADF has taken over the territory from the Bop police and security forces - and put the latter under its effective control - many people interviewed by the Lawyers' Committee delegation expressed some apprehension about the potential for re-organization by units of police and security forces still loyal to the former regime. The delegation observed police and security force patrols around Itsoseng though their command structure was uncertain. There were fears that pro-Mangope remnants could organize in conjunction with the white right-wing to intimidate the electorate and impede voter education. The delegation also heard unconfirmed reports that units of the Bop Special Branch, reportedly a police intelligence unit loyal to Mangope, was still operational in the countryside.

A very serious security threat, however, was the presence in Bop of the Internal Stability Unit (ISU), the notorious special unit of the South African security forces. The delegation repeatedly heard from a wide cross-section of citizens expressions of concern

about the provocative and negative posture of this force. In at least one incident, the African National Congress office in Itsoseng reported being intimidated and harassed by the ISU. Although one of the joint administrators told the delegation that the ISU would soon be removed from the territory, it seemed as though the joint administration did not have direct civilian control of either the ISU or the SADF, and only uncertain information about the location of ISU units.

The joint administrators informed the delegation that they were in the process of creating a stable police force under the command of a popular officer<sup>10</sup> who enjoyed the confidence of the public. Plans for the introduction of programs for community policing were also under way. Although ironically the SADF enjoyed a high degree of trust and confidence in the populace, an effective and functioning police force is indispensable for the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of the right of the people to participate in the electoral process. It would reduce incidents of intimidation by those opposed to the elections. Concerns about violent disruptions of electoral preparations by the either the white right-wing or Mangope loyalists were mentioned quite often but not taken very seriously. The security situation - and the respect for basic human rights by security forces - in the ex-Bop appeared to have improved favorably two weeks after the overthrow of the Mangope dictatorship.

The delegation also visited Klerksdorp--which was not a part of Bop--and heard reports of intimidation of Africans by whites. Several witnesses told the delegation that African political activists who dared to approach farmworkers in the area were frequently threatened to be shot by right-wingers. In some cases, the right-wing was alleged to have shot at cars of political activists and beaten them up. Some Africans expressed fears that the right-wing would attack and sabotage schools and other facilities earmarked for polling.

Many of those interviewed alleged that the South African Police had done little to curb violence and intimidation of Africans by the right wing. In some instances, ANC activists claimed that the police had escorted right-wingers as they tore down ANC posters in the area. The biggest threat to security for the electoral process in areas of the Northwest province outside Bop is certain to remain the intransigence and opposition of the right wing to the election and the inability, reluctance, and in certain cases, cooperation of the security forces with the right to hinder the electoral preparations. Unless the security forces fully enforce the law and protect the right of citizens to receive and disseminate information, it will be difficult to carry out a free and fair election in areas under the effective control of the right-wing. However, we sensed a rising tide of confidence that the conditions for free and fair election were steadily improving.

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<sup>10</sup> The delegation learned that the new acting chief of police had been dismissed by President Mangope some years earlier.

#### D. Civil Society: Engaging the Political Process

Under the previous dispensation, any citizen of Bop attempting to independently organize or agitate for participation in the electoral process was subject to arbitrary arrest and detention, assault, or extrajudicial execution.<sup>11</sup> Other opponents of the state were simply deported out of the territory. The Mangope regime occupied virtually all political space and did not allow the development of an independent civil society. Professional organizations, such as the local bar association, had to steer clear of politics. Human rights organizations, such as Lawyers for Human Rights and the Mafikeng Anti-repression Forum (MAREF) operated at great risk to their workers. MAREF's activists were repeatedly arrested, harassed, and deported.

But in spite of intense repression, many individuals and organizations defied the authorities and exerted their right to organize, associate, and assemble freely. Noteworthy among these was the Mmabatho/Mafikeng Crisis Committee whose leadership led to the unravelling of Bop. Since the collapse of the Mangope regime, there has been a dramatic awakening of civil society. The delegation met and was highly impressed by the newly-formed Women's Forum, a non-governmental human rights organization committed to the empowerment of women. The Forum, which sensitizes the electorate about gender issues and informs the political process about women's rights, was planning voter education drives in conjunction with the IEC. Although it lacked resources and organizational capacity, its determined push for popular participation in the electoral process underscored the central role that the emergent civil society is going play in democratization.

Other civic and human rights organizations that can now operate freely in the ex-Bop are the Lawyers for Human Rights, MAREF, the local bar associations (the Black Lawyers Association and the National Association of Democratic Lawyers), the academic staff union at the University of Bophuthatswana, the Lions Club of Tlhabane near Rustenburg, and the MADIBA Regional Crisis Committee. Most of these organizations were poised to fully re-enter the political process through voter education and other advocacy strategies. In Klerksdorp, the MATLA Trust, a non-governmental civic organization and the South African Council of Churches (SACC), were intensely engaged in voter education campaigns. In Rustenburg, the delegation met with the National Union of Miners (NUM) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and learned first-hand of their extensive efforts to educate workers about their rights in connection with the electoral process. The delegation left the region convinced that civic and professional organizations - the crucial elements of any civil society - were increasingly asserting their influence over the political process and that they would welcome supportive outside assistance in this regard.

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<sup>11</sup> Amnesty International, "South Africa: Hostages to a Rightwing Agenda - Human Rights violations against Bophuthatswana residents on the eve of the South African elections", March 11, 1994, at 1.

## E. Political Party Activity

Under Lucas Mangope, only his ruling Bophuthatswana Democratic Party<sup>12</sup> (BDP) was free to operate within the territory; all opposition political parties were subject to severe restrictions. Any political party that was not registered in Bop - such as the ANC - required the permission of the Minister of Law and Order (who was Mangope himself) to hold meetings. Not surprisingly, Mangope never granted the ANC any permits for meetings, essentially driving the party underground. Detentions, killings, and deportations of ANC activists and leaders in the territory were commonplace.<sup>13</sup>

Even prior to the collapse of Bop, ANC support among the populace in the territory was reportedly so strong that Mangope seemed certain to suffer a humiliating defeat in a fair and free electoral contest. This would explain his membership within the defunct Freedom Alliance and his reluctance to enter the April electoral process. In its tour of ex-Bop, the Lawyers Committee delegation noted the strong support enjoyed by the ANC in the region; in fact, there was no evidence of significant activity by other political parties after the failure of Mangope's Northwest Democratic Party to comply with registration requirements for the April ballot. The delegation visited a well-tended ANC office in Itsoseng; neither the National Party (NP), the Pan African Congress of Azania (PAC) or Inkatha freedom Party (IFP) had any discernible presence in the territory. The delegation heard reports of an insignificant presence of AZAPO activists.<sup>14</sup>

In Klerksdorp, the delegation met with representatives of the NP, ANC, PAC, the ANC Youth League, the ANC Women's League, the Democratic Party, and the South African Communist Party. The predominantly white parties, such as the NP, DP, and CP did not complain of bias by the authorities; except the NP asserted that it had been unable to canvass for support in the black townships because of the "hostility of blacks".<sup>15</sup> The ANC, on the other hand, cited a number of cases of harassment and intimidation by right wing elements operating in cahoots with the security forces. The ANC believed that it was being denied equal treatment. In particular, the ANC decried the denial of access to black farmworkers by Afrikaner farmers. In spite of these problems, the electoral exercise appeared to be gaining momentum even in this deeply conservative Afrikaner-dominated part of the Transvaal. In Rustenburg, NUM and COSATU (both aligned with the ANC) and NP appeared to be operating without much difficulty.

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<sup>12</sup> He later renamed it the Northwest Democratic Party.

<sup>13</sup> Africa Watch, "South Africa: Out of Sight - The Misery of Bophuthatswana", September 16, 1991, at 4-8.

<sup>14</sup> The delegation heard that Azapo was peacefully organizing an elections boycott campaign since it was opposed to the April elections. Many of those interviewed did not take the campaign seriously and did think that it would have any significant effect on voter turnout.

<sup>15</sup> Lawyers Committee interview with an official of the National Party, Klerksdorp, March 24, 1994.

## F. Preparations for the Elections

The task and responsibility of mounting the electoral process lie with the IEC and the government of South Africa. Political parties, civic organizations, and individuals must have the freedom to educate and mobilize the electorate without intimidation. The guarantees of security and freedom for political mobilization are the primary responsibilities of the government of South Africa. Here the IEC plays the crucial role in the entire exercise. It must administer, organize, supervise, and conduct the elections; it must promote the conditions conducive to free and fair elections; it must conduct voter education; and finally, it must certify whether the elections were free and fair. The IEC is mandated to make and enforce regulations to achieve these results.

The Lawyers Committee mission in the Northwest Province identified a number of challenges that face the IEC and other political actors in effecting a successful electoral process. These fall into three component parts: voter education (information about the political process and the upcoming elections), voter identification, and polling day logistics. Africans in the Northwest province have never experienced a democratic election and most, excluding those living in ex-Bop, have never voted in their entire lives. The concept and process of a democratic election are alien. This problem is compounded by high levels of illiteracy - in some areas as high as 80% - among Africans.

The delegation was pleased to note that the IEC had already established offices in Mmabatho/Mafeking and Klerksdorp from which it had launched campaigns to inform the general public about the political process underway and their responsibility to register and vote in the elections. In particular, the existence of the IEC's Operation Access was known to many of those interviewed by the delegation. The mission was told of IEC efforts to provide residents of ex-Bop with posters and leaflets about the electoral process although it was unclear how widespread or successful this campaign had been. Similarly, the delegation was told of plans by local IEC officers to hold a major rally for the electorate in Mmabatho/Mafeking and the surrounding areas on March 23. According to the IEC, other similar rallies were also being planned for different locations within the following weeks. Information about these rallies did not appear to be widespread.

The delegation was disturbed by the prevalence of ignorance about the wide powers of the IEC with regard to the electoral process. Many of those who talked to the delegation did not know what constituted violations of the electoral laws and where they could report those violations. Given the hostile relationship between most African communities and the security forces, it was highly unlikely that violations would be reported to either the SAP or the SADF. This left the IEC as the only available channel for complaints although many people did not know that the IEC had the powers to receive, investigate, and resolve violations of the electoral laws.

The main contributing factor to the absence of adequate information about the IEC was that it was just beginning operations in most of this area. Active and concerned IEC

offices are absolutely essential for areas such as Klerksdorp where anti-election right-wingers have considerable strength. The delegation was also greatly disturbed by reports of white farmers allowing only certain conservative political parties access to farmworkers to organize voter-boycott campaigns. That strategy seems intended to depress the support of the ANC among the farmworkers and discredit the electoral process. The local IEC office informed the delegation that it did not yet have the authority or means to address this issue in spite of the enormous powers that farmers wield over the employees whom many hold in virtual servitude.

A major problem cited by all those interviewed by the Lawyers Committee delegation was the "electoral black-out" imposed by white farmers on farmworkers. The workers, who total in the hundreds of thousands in the Northwest Province live in isolated, self-contained plantations in conditions that approximate slavery. Many of them are never allowed to leave the farms or to be visited by political activists or IEC officials. As a result, many of them are simply unaware of the political process and the upcoming elections. The delegation heard reports of farmers confiscating IDs from workers and providing them with "ballots" to vote early. In other instances, the workers had been given fraudulent ballot-marking instructions. But something must be done to bring these workers into the political process and to overcome and defeat this campaign which is intended to shut them out. In addition to seeking the cooperation of individual farmers and publicizing the abuses, the IEC should consider seeking access to the farms to carry out voter education meetings. IEC officials informed the delegation about some of the strategies that they were developing to deal with this problem. The delegation believes that access to these farms could be facilitated by the promulgation of regulations giving the IEC explicit powers of access to facilitate voter education meetings.

Another matter of serious concern was the lack of knowledge about the documentation required for voting. More efforts to publicize the required documents and instructions about the places to obtain them--presumably government offices and mobile voter registration vans--will be essential for the documentation of the youth, farmworkers, and many of those who cannot read or write in the rural areas. Other concerns expressed by those interviewed related to logistics on election day. The location of polling stations was seen as a primary issue: there were concerns that the stations not be located on private property where access could be denied and that many stations should be located close to major work sites. Many felt that transportation for the elderly would be essential in the rural areas. Many also wanted the visible presence of security forces to ensure safety on polling day.

In general, the Lawyers Committee delegation left South Africa impressed by the determination of the people of South Africa to bring the dreadful history of apartheid to a close on election day. The herculean efforts of the IEC to mount the election in the face of serious security difficulties and resource constraints - in the backdrop of a long history of human degradation and deprivation - were admirable. With the further mobilization of public opinion and voter education by civic organizations, the IEC, the media (including the Bop Broadcasting Corporation), and the political parties, plus a little luck, the residents of

the Northwest Province should be ready to make history by casting their first democratic vote in a free and fair election from April 26-28.