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DECENTRALIZATION: FINANCE & MANAGEMENT PROJECT

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Managed by  
**Associates in Rural Development, Inc.**

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In collaboration with  
Syracuse University • Metropolitan Studies Program/Maxwell School of Citizenship & Public Affairs  
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**DECENTRALIZATION AND EDUCATION  
IN CHAD**

**Decentralization: Finance and Management Project  
Associates in Rural Development, Inc.**

*Contract No. DHR-5446-Z-00-7033-00*

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## ACRONYMS

APE	Association des Parents d'Eleves Parents of Students Association
APECD	Association des Parents d'Eleves et de la Promotion Rurale du Canton Djokou Parents of Students and Rural Development Association of Canton Djokou
BELACD	Bureau d'Etudes et de Liaison des Actions Caritatives et de Développement Caritas
CSPSCO	Comité de Suivi des Problèmes Scolaires et Culturelles du Ouaddai Committee for Education and Cultural Problems of Ouaddai
FCFA	franc CFA CFA franc
GTZ	Coopération Allemande-Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit German Development Cooperation Agency
MEN	Ministere de l'Education Nationale Ministry of Education
ONDR	Office National de Développement Rural (Ministère de l'Agriculture) National Office for Rural Development (Ministry of Agriculture)
SECADEV	Secours Catholique pour le Développement Catholic Relief Services

## PREFACE

This study would not have been possible without the help of many people who drew valuable time away from their busy schedules to guide us in our work in Chad during November-December 1993. We wish to extend our thanks to the USAID Mission Director in Chad, Dr. Anne Williams, and to Mr. Samir Zogby, also of USAID. Special thanks go to M. Teguide Sig Doreba, Chief of the Ministry of Education's Division de la Formation Continue, and the Division's staff in Abéché, Bongor, and Sarh, respectively M. Ahmat Assab, M. Djraingue, and M. Nengaban Modjeral. Through their interventions on our behalf in N'djamena and other centers we were able to arrange many productive exchanges with inspectors and other MEN officials, donor agencies, officers of non-governmental organizations and, most important, representatives of 23 community schools in rural areas. In each of these communities we met with groups containing anywhere from 3 to 50 individuals, all of whom left important work in their fields and among their herds to walk long distances to meet with us. We are in debt to them for this sacrifice and hope that this report, by helping to stimulate actions that support their struggle to educate children, can eventually repay it.

## SUMMARY

The Segou Conference of 1989 concluded that governments and donors should design, finance, and manage public services in partnership with local communities. By helping to assure that provision of services is cost-effective and reflects the concerns of intended beneficiaries, such collaboration would lead to more rapid improvement of these services throughout the Sahel. The kinds of partnerships that conference participants envisaged in 1989 are still quite rare, however. This is unfortunate because evidence that there is much to gain from cooperation continues to mount. Public education in Chad is a case in point.

This country has the most financially-decentralized primary school system in the region. Acting through village associations, Associations of Parents of Students (APEs), and other local organizations, individual communities have financed an increase of almost 280,000 school places during the last fifteen years. The government, in contrast, supplied 10,000 over the same period. Communities now contribute a total of 500 million FCFA per year to schools and pay the salaries of more than half of all teachers. The Ministry of Education, with a budget of 3.8 billion FCFA for its primary personnel, pays the others. The difference in cost-effectiveness between community and state resources has a simple cause. Villages pay their teachers an average of 5,000 FCFA per month, the government no less than 42,000.

Though the process is in its early stages, financial decentralization is being followed by a shift in control of schools from the state to the communities that pay for them. A clear sign of this is the recent emergence of a new type of public facility we call the "community school." This facility differs from the traditional public school in several ways. One is that villages create it where and when they choose without state approval. Another is that it does not contain a state teacher to serve as director. The school, as a result, operates under complete control of the community. Teachers must answer to parents for their performance, not to the director or to the state inspector. Similarly, decisions regarding construction, procurement of books and supplies, numbers of grades to be offered, student-teacher ratios, financing mechanisms, and other matters are made by the community alone.

A further difference is that most villagers do not perceive the school as an autonomous entity. It is one component of a broader, integrated set of communal actions that includes improvements in water supply, health, agriculture, and so on. The school may sometimes be the first investment a village makes to promote its own development. At other times it may be the last. In either case villagers rarely make plans for the school, including financial plans, that are independent of plans for other sectors. Indeed, tuition, dues, and other charges that would seem to be only for the school are actually methods of general taxation through which to mobilize resources for other investments.

Because perceptions and socio-economic conditions vary from place to place and from one time period to the next, and because villages adapt actions to the realities of their milieu, community control results in wide inter-village variation in school characteristics, especially finance. Some mobilize resources only from families with students, and only in the village where the school is located. Others collect from all families regardless of whether they have students, and from surrounding villages as well as the one that has the school. Tuition varies from less than 50 to more than 200 FCFA per student per month, other fees from 70 to 4,000 FCFA per student per year, and collection rates for these charges from 25% to 100%. Resulting teacher salaries lie anywhere between 600 and 15,000 FCFA per month.

A few communities hope that the government will one day supply a state teacher, take charge of the school, and relieve them of their financial burden. Most, however, view assistance from the state and other outside actors as a potential supplement rather than as a substitute for their own resources. A state teacher, besides improving the quality of instruction (maybe) and giving a school official status, would not only encourage more parents to enroll children and pay tuition, but also allow local resources to shift to other educational purposes, such as materials and additional classes, and/or to other village investments. Some places are reticent about acquiring state instructors because it might mean losing control of children's education. Even with this reservation, the evidence shows that the majority of villages are looking to establish partnerships with the state and other outside entities so that they can do more with their own resources than is possible at present. Because villages finance and manage other services, the evidence also shows that partnerships are possible beyond the education sector.

Prospects for establishing these partnerships are hampered by the government's fiscal situation. A more fundamental constraint, testimony to the endurance of colonial ideas, is belief that the state is the only entity competent to supply education. This creed prevents even simple actions that can do much to improve schooling. One example is for the government to find an alternative way to give community schools official status. This would relieve pressure on the state to supply teachers, stimulate higher enrollment and willingness to pay fees and, by telling them that they are respected by high authority, raise the morale of village instructors. This falls short of the partnership that communities envisage, but it would be a step in the right direction that they would appreciate. Another example, for donors, is to talk with communities before planning projects. Many plans fail to reach their goals, especially financial goals, because they do not account for local realities or local priorities. Talk is not cheap, but it may be cheaper than the waste which occurs without it.

The challenge ahead for government officials, donors, and other entities that want to promote productive partnerships between central and local actors is to remove the creed that now prevents them. One way to do this is to strengthen the capacity of communities to help each other. The recent advent of federations of community organizations that act as intermediaries between groups of villages and the state indicates that this process has begun of its own volition in Chad. Demand for this kind of assistance exists. A second way, using the work of non-governmental organizations as reference, is by demonstration. Wherever

possible, state officials and donors should follow the recommendations of their representatives to Segou and design plans for public services in collaboration with communities. Education activities of the World Bank, the GTZ, and the Swiss Development Cooperation agency have begun to move in this direction in Chad. They and other donors and governments can do the same thing for all public services in all parts of the Sahel.

## I. INTRODUCTION

The 1989 Segou Conference, organized by CILSS and the Club du Sahel, concluded that public services in the region need to be provided not only by national governments but also by communities that benefit from the services. Conference participants were convinced that democratization of the design, implementation, and supervision of services would lead to better results than methods which depend only on the central state, especially when they do not account for concerns of the people that services affect. Since then the Club and CILSS, in parallel with the governments of Mali, Senegal, Gambia, Cape Verde, Niger, and Burkina Faso, and American, Dutch, Swiss, and Canadian donor and private voluntary organizations, have engaged policy dialogue, pilot projects, and applied research to look at possibilities and limitations of alternative approaches.

The Decentralization: Finance and Management (DFM) project, under which this study was completed, is one component of the applied research. Its purposes are to identify and describe cases in which entities other than the central apparatus supply services, to analyze the strengths and weaknesses these cases, particularly as regards governance, finance and management, and to derive lessons that governments and donors may put to constructive use. To realize these objectives DFM has looked at cases where supply of resource management, irrigation, health, education, and other services are organized more by lower tiers of government than by the center, and where they are financed and managed largely by communities (e.g., ARD, 1991).

In education, the project found that government and donor actions which deliberately or inadvertently transfer decision-making authority to non-state actors almost always yield noteworthy improvement in one or another characteristic of schooling. Sometimes these actions also make important contributions to participatory democracy at both the national and local level. Analysis of such cases in Gambia, Zambia, and elsewhere showed that positive outcomes for both education and democracy result from two factors. First, demand for education must exceed the fiscal capacity of states to supply it. This forces communities, if they want education, to pay directly part or all of its costs. Because there is close connection between paying for something and receiving value in return, this payment creates a potential for the shift in financial responsibility to be followed by a shift in responsibility for making decisions about use of the resources. That is, direct payment by communities can eventually lead them to take greater responsibility and exercise greater authority over education.

The second factor is the presence of actions in the education sector that, at minimum, do not impede the broadening of responsibility for schools and, ideally, that hasten it. This is important because history has endowed the Sahel with widespread belief that the central apparatus should hold absolute authority in public education. This colonial legacy, which has no parallel in the industrialized countries, slows the pace at which control of schools expands to include the communities that pay their costs. Actions that reinforce the belief are thus less conducive to progress than actions which undermine it.

Chad is especially interesting in this context because it has the most financially-decentralized education system in the Sahel. Over the last fifteen years communities have financed almost all growth in primary school places. Today more than half of teachers receive salaries directly from them, even though the government spends nearly 4 billion FCFA per year on salaries while communities - finding 2,000 to 15,000 FCFA per month rather than the state's minimum of 42,000 FCFA to be sufficient - spend about 500 million. As a result, average teacher salaries are the lowest in the region and the ratio of students to teachers is the highest.<sup>1</sup> *With enrollment and literacy rates comparable to nearby countries, financial decentralization has led Chad, for better or worse, to acquire the most cost-effective education system in the region.*

The process of democratization that follows on the heels of financial decentralization is only beginning to develop. It has been hampered by government and donor actions that, as elsewhere, impede the widening of responsibility and reinforce belief in the ultimate authority of the central apparatus. However, other government and donor interventions more favorable to democratization are beginning to counter the effects of these actions. More important, the actions are also being offset by non-state organizations of recent origin that demand or will soon demand voice in shaping education policies and practices on behalf of communities. We therefore think that if the government and donors avoid actions that restrain democratization, emphasize actions that support it, and seek ways to assist the emergence and growth of new organizations that represent the interests of parents and communities, the gap that now exists between financial decentralization and democratization will close sooner rather than later.

The purpose of the present study is to provide information that can help governments and donors interested in promoting decentralization and democracy to design appropriate actions. Although we look at one sector in one country, and although financial decentralization is more advanced here than elsewhere, public education systems in other parts of the region are on the verge entering the path that Chad has travelled for fifteen years. In other words, while historical and other circumstances may be unique to Chad, its experiences offer lessons of wider interest that other societies should note as they begin their own journeys.

We present the information in four parts. The first describes factors that led education to decentralize. The second details the ways that 23 communities financed schools in 1993-94. Third is an overview of organizational aspects, focusing on non-state entities that tie villages to the worlds around them. Finally, our conclusions emphasize three areas of action. One is to shift perspectives in the Ministry of Education and among donors from the illusion of centralized to the reality of dispersed supply of education. Another is to speed the emergence of organizations that encourage communities to help each other and to become full partners

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<sup>1</sup> CILSS. 1990. "Towards a Plan of Action for the Sahel Countries." Working Paper discussed at the Meeting of the Ministers of Education of the countries of the Sahel. Bamako. January 15-18.

with the state. Beyond education, the last is to persuade states and donors in all Sahelian countries to work in partnership with communities in the provision of all public goods and services.

## II. THE DECENTRALIZATION PROCESS


The French school in Chad, until recently, has always been the product of a partnership between the central state on one side and individual communities and parents on the other. Community participation in this partnership during the early days of colonization, when authorities relied on "hostage" schools to meet enrollment quotas, was often involuntary. This changed in 1946, after the French government not only reformed the education system to make it almost identical to that of the metropole but also declared its African colonies to be overseas territories (i.e., part) of France. With the potential advantages of schooling more obvious than before, parents wanting children to reach them became eager partners. This eagerness, and the number of communities that showed it, increased substantially after independence, in 1960, further enlarged prospects for government employment.

The operation of the partnership was straightforward until 1979. Creation of a school usually began when a village or quartier, sometimes directly but more often through the canton chief, communicated its desire to have a facility to the district inspector. If convinced that families could organize an Association of Parents of Students (APE) or other entity with the capacity to construct and equip a school, collect funds for supplies and repairs, and assure enrollment, the inspector found a teacher (or asked the community to wait for a short time if an instructor was not immediately available). The teacher, almost always a state employee paid by the Ministry of Education (MEN), then took charge of the school while the APE shifted attention to assuring its part of financing. This would sometimes include salary when a new teacher started work before the MEN could arrange payment, but the period was brief.

This period grew longer as events after 1979, which at the same time caused public resources to stagnate and demand for schools to accelerate, made it increasingly difficult for the MEN to pay teachers. The first event took place when the civil war between northern and southern forces reached N'djamena in February 1979. All southern people fled to their native towns and villages. The exodus included the bulk of government employees because the south, having schooled a much larger proportion of children than the north before and after independence, had produced the largest share of cadres for the administration (Illustration 1, see next page).

During the next three and a half years, until peace in the capital after June 1982 allowed their return, the refugees maintained the public services they valued, including schools. The availability of human resources was not a problem. The difficulty was finance. The south had its own sources of public revenue, state enterprises for example, but receipts were sufficient to cover salaries of only a limited number. The rest pursued farming, trade, and other economic activities. Since it was accepted practice for parents to pay part of the cost of schooling, they extended it slightly to also pay teacher salaries when necessary. Other than this, there was no other change to the procedure by which schools came into being.

Illustration 1  
 Taux d'inscription bruts  
 Gross enrollment rate  
 1965/66 - 1991/92



Sources: Gouvernement du Tchad, 1993a; Mbaïosso, 1990.

The scale of this phenomenon was limited at first, concentrated mainly in places where there were enough displaced families to support a teacher. Most other villagers were not involved because they had little interest in schooling. Some even mocked those that had been to school. What good is it, they asked, when people with advanced diplomas not only do the same things as unschooled villagers but are also less competent in farming and other work?

This skepticism faded as the schooled population demonstrated a heretofore unheard of capacity to organize themselves in order to reach specific goals. This included not only APES but also village associations to create and manage marketing and storage cooperatives, dispensaries, wells, and sometimes improvements in agricultural production. In other words, though people who had been to school were no more adept at doing what villagers already did, they showed a talent for reaching out beyond the boundaries of the village to introduce new things. By indirectly raising interest among parents who gave little thought to it before, the war heightened rural demand for schools.

A second event in the south, the diffusion of self-managed markets (*marchés autogérés*), gave rural demand a further boost. *Cotontchad*, a state enterprise that promotes cotton production, introduced these markets in 1975 as a way to lower its operating costs. In exchange for rebates, which were separate from payments to producers for their cotton, the market employees performed weighing, classification, maintenance, and other functions that would otherwise require more costly use of *Cotontchad*'s own personnel. Access to these rebates, however, was restricted to communities with village associations that could organize self-managed markets and that contained at least two officers literate in French. The self-managed market thus accomplished two things at once. It increased the incentive for rural communities to have people who were literate in French in their midst. Through the rebates, it also provided them with additional resources to realize this objective, by creating schools for instance.

Spread of these markets was initially hampered by the inability of communities to organize village associations or to convince *Cotontchad* to recognize the associations, especially in remote places that had no schooled inhabitants. To deal with this the *Office National de Développement Rural* (ONDR) launched a rural animation program to help villages organize associations, receive recognition from *Cotontchad* and, with the rebates, to initiate other actions such as social assistance, wells, dispensaries, and schools. The program gained momentum after hostilities subsided in 1982, and entered new zones as soon as fighting in them stopped. ONDR animators reached most corners of the south by 1989-90 and, in that year, self-managed markets in 2,000 villages processed 62% of total cotton production.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Gouvernement du Tchad. 1990. "Formation de ressources humaines pour le développement rural du Tchad à l'horizon 2000 (vol. 1)." Ministère de l'Agriculture. Ndjamena. Octobre.

By this time the incentive for schooling had expanded beyond the need to satisfy Cotontchad. Thousands of communities had opened themselves to the world outside. They were now more aware of new possibilities and of the utility of French literacy in gaining access to them. Even if a government post was unlikely, a community still needed people with French literacy in order to interact more effectively with state officials in the search for public goods and services. And an individual could aspire to become a "*petit fonctionnaire*," such as secretary of a village association, and thus be held in esteem by the community. People were also more aware of what illiteracy had cost them. They now understood that buyers, including Cotontchad purchasing agents, tricked them at the scale and deliberately miscalculated payments, and that inability to read things such as a summons from the police or directions for use of medicine could cost them dearly. French literacy was a method to defend individual and community interests.

These things did not mean that all adults had to learn French. A literate child made its parents literate by definition. Nor did it mean that all children should attend school. The experiences showed only that parents would benefit from having at least one child succeed in school and that communities would benefit from enrolling more children in the future than in the past, either by expanding existing schools or by creating new ones. But because schooling produces more schooling through the logic of demand, i.e., the success of graduates raises demand for schooling among parents of future students, these small beginnings were a major factor in the explosion of primary enrollment from less than 240,000 in 1979 to nearly 600,000 today (see Illustration 2 next page).


Growth in demand for schooling in the north also contributed, the initial push coming with evacuation of southerners from N'djamena and perception of increased state employment possibilities for northerners. The key event in many areas, however, having essentially the same character as in the south except for the direction of movement, was the uprooting of rural people and their relocation to towns. Though there were small movements whenever fighting erupted in a zone, the big shift came during the drought and famine of 1984.

Forced into large centers, refugees from isolated villages found themselves in worlds that they never imagined to exist. N'djamena, Abéché, and other places confronted them with new perspectives and for the first time introduced them to populations, in most respects similar to themselves, who were literate in French as well as Arabic. Many had never met a state employee, let alone one who was native to the north. Together with others who had similar experiences in Sudan, many refugees concluded that schooling was useful in preparing people for the unknown, and that it did not necessarily undermine their Arabo-Islamic identity - a consideration that kept parents from enrolling children in French schools since the start of colonization.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Khayar, I. 1969. Le refus de l'école, Librairie d'Amérique et d'Orient. Paris. 1969.

Illustration 2  
Enrollment - Inscriptions, 1938-92



The heart of the matter seemed to be defense, however. It was frustrating, not to mention life-threatening during a famine, to be unable to directly communicate with local populations, government officials, and personnel of relief agencies who did not speak or understand Arabic, to be unable to read important announcements and other French documents and, most important, to have no one of the village in positions of influence to act on behalf of community and family interests. People deeply affected by these circumstances returned to their villages resolved to take steps that would prevent repetition of what had happened to them and, at minimum, assure that children did not suffer the same fate. Though it was still secondary to Coranic instruction that prepared children for everyday life, French literacy did have some practical use. What they now had to do was convince others in their communities of this fact and then, when there were enough potential students to justify a school, ask the state for a teacher.

Unfortunately, by this time the state had passed the point where it could respond to every request. To stretch the budget as far as feasible, the MEN adjusted to new fiscal realities by abandoning the notion that all teachers had to be state employees. At least temporarily, only one state teacher was required in order for a school to have official status as a public institution. Aside from this "*instituteur*," who served as school director, other teachers could be paid by the communities they served as "*maîtres suppléants*."

This adjustment worked for only a short time. Parents, tired of waiting for a state teacher, asked inspectors and Canton chiefs to help them find individuals willing to serve as community instructors (i.e., *maîtres suppléants*) in the interim. As the interim grew longer, some places decided that while they would eventually inform authorities of what they had done, they did not need help in finding teachers. These places had ample supplies of young men, and sometimes women, who had returned to their communities after receiving some secondary education. Many were willing to take time from (or even abandon) their main economic activities as farmers, herders, traders, and so forth to teach in exchange for little or no compensation. True, a state teacher with more advanced training might offer better instruction, give the school official status, and relieve parents of a heavy financial burden, but in the circumstances something was better than nothing.

As the interval between creation of a school and receipt of a state teacher widened, an increasing share of non-private schools operated only with community teachers. Though the procedure by which they were created was little different than before, the MEN called these community schools "spontaneous" in order to distinguish them from private schools on the one hand and public schools with state teachers on the other.

The result of this process is that the financial features of public education are now very different from other countries. MEN statistics show that more than half of all primary teachers were paid directly by communities in 1991-92.<sup>4</sup> Most of these community teachers, about 3,665 (40% of all instructors), were in 1,788 state schools. Another 930 (10%) were in 547 community schools and the rest in 102 private schools (see Table 1 next page). MEN statistics also report that APEs expected to raise 400 million FCFA that year. After adjustment for the 20% of schools without APEs that did not provide information (mostly in the north), this might have been closer to 500 million. This amount, mainly for salaries, is small compared to the 3.8 billion FCFA that we estimate the MEN to have spent on salaries for its own personnel at the primary level. It could not be otherwise when state teachers received a minimum of 42,000 FCFA per month and community instructors an average of perhaps 5,000.

Size and impact should not be confused. Enrollment in 1979 when almost all teachers were state employees was about 240,000. For 1991-92 the student-teacher ratio (65 to 1) suggests that 3,825 state teachers covered around 250,000 of the 537,000 students in public schools. Thus the state sector with its billions had contributed an increase of only 10,000 school places after 1979 while the community sector financed the balance of 277,000 places.

These numbers are rough estimates. They nevertheless underscore that the state, while it may spend lots of money, is no longer the relevant actor with respect to financing the growth of primary education. With government resources too thin to pay current teachers, causing them to strike and the MEN to declare an "*année blanche*" (lost year) in 1992-93, and with large numbers of primary graduates now demanding access to secondary education, causing some communities to plan "spontaneous" CEGs (general secondary schools), prospects for the state to regain prominence in primary education are low. The future is in the hands of communities.

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<sup>4</sup> Gouvernement du Tchad. 1993. "Annuaire statistique de l'enseignement élémentaire : 1991-1992." Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale. Direction de la Planification, des Examens et Concours. Division des Statistiques. N'djamena.

Table 1 : Basic education statistics - Données de base sur l'éducation, Tchad, 1991-92

	State d'Etat	Community Communautaire	Private Privée	Total
Schools - Ecoles	1,789	547	102	2,437
Students - Elèves	484,144	52,981	31,525	568,630
CP1	30%	51%	25%	31%
CP2	20%	27%	20%	21%
CE1	18%	14%	17%	18%
CE2	12%	8%	14%	12%
CM1	10%	1%	12%	9%
CM2	10%	0%	11%	9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Promotion rate				
Taux de promotion				
CP1	44%	41%	71%	44%
CP2	58%	44%	71%	57%
CE1	48%	43%	69%	48%
CE2	57%	na	68%	57%
CM1	57%	na	72%	57%
CM2	35%	na	65%	36%
Students/book - Elèves/livre	1.4	6.9	1.2	1.5
Teachers - Enseignants	7489	929	708	9128
	3825	3664		
	(state teachers)	(comm teachers)		
	(maestres)	(maestres)		
Attainment - Niveau scolaire				
CEPT, 5ème, 4ème	19%	43%	23%	33%
BEPC, 2nde, 1ère	47%	45%	44%	44%
BAC	34%	13%	33%	23%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Student - teacher ratio				
Rapport élève - maître	65	57	45	62

Sources: Gouvernement du Tchad, 1993a; Esqueu et Peano, 1993

### III. FINANCING OF COMMUNITY SCHOOLS

Direct financing by communities pays a greater or lesser portion of construction, equipment, and supplies in most public and private schools, salaries of a large share of teachers in state facilities, and compensation to all teachers in what we call community schools. This last category, according to MEN statistics, contained 22% of schools and 10% of teachers in 1991-92, and 9% of enrollment - 80% of which is concentrated in CP1 and CP2 (Table 1 preceding page).


These figures are changing rapidly because community schools, in most cases located within 15 km of a state facility, are the fastest-growing segment of the education system. Villages created them when they realized that there was sufficient interest in schooling to fill one or two grades, that individuals in or near the community with some secondary education were willing to serve as teachers, and that a school was necessary because the long distance to an existing facility prevented parents from enrolling younger children or because the facility had become too overcrowded to accommodate more students in early grades. Most schools thus began and still act as satellites of a state facility. Growth in demand for access to higher grades is now causing state facilities to limit enrollment in these classes as well, however. Community schools, as a result, are adding grades as the need arises and resources permit.

The only problem with these schools, assuming the figures in Table 1 to be reliable indicators of performance, is that promotion in the first three grades is somewhat lower than in state schools. Scarcity of books was unlikely to be a factor because the student-book ratio was similar in state schools the previous year, before they received texts under the World Bank's Fourth Education project. The cause may perhaps lie in the lower level of education of teachers. This was also unlikely because it would have to explain why promotion rates in private schools are much higher than in state schools while the education of their teachers, of the state employees at least, are roughly the same. If there are causes, then chances are that they lie outside the statistics. Private schools, for instance, concentrate in towns and contain students with parents who are largely literate in French. Most state and almost all community schools serve students whose parents are not literate in this language.

Whatever may be their quality, community schools represent the form which growth of primary enrollment will continue to take. To better understand their characteristics, especially the methods used to finance them in different social and economic milieus, we visited 23 rural schools in three Inspections (i.e., school districts) during November-December 1993. First was Ouaddai, located in the prefecture of the same name bordering Sudan in the northeast (Illustration 3, see next page). It is a thinly-populated area in which the vast majority of inhabitants is Muslim and where enrollment is low. Village economies, mainly tied to pastoral activities, have recovered from the drought of 1984 and now permit communities to provide their schools with very strong support.

Illustration 3  
Tchad - Prefectures

 survey zones  
zones d'enquete



Bar-Koh was the second Inspection. It is located in Moyen-Chari prefecture, adjacent to the Central African Republic in the far south. This is a densely-populated area, mainly Christian, and has very high enrollment. Production of millet, peanuts, and cotton dominate village economies. Although this allowed communities to provide schools with adequate support in the past, recent difficulties in the cotton sector have undermined their capacity to maintain past levels of support.

The third Inspection was Mayo-Kebbi/Est, in Mayo-Kebbi prefecture bordering Cameroon in the southwest. This zone contains a mixed population of Muslims and Christians, and of natives and migrants. Population density and enrollment are lower than in Bar-Koh and higher than in Ouaddai. The economy depends mainly on millet and peanuts, with rice important in several places. Economic conditions at the time of our visit varied considerably within the area. While conditions in some communities permitted strong support for schools, famine threatened to close them in other places.

The data we collected in these Inspections, as well as secondary information we obtained about 14 additional schools in a fourth area, Canton Djokou (which we discuss in Part IV.E.), are too limited to show the full range of characteristics of Chad's community schools. They do, however, offer considerable insight into the processes by which communities in different circumstances create schools, the types of difficulties that they encounter afterward, and the challenges that confront them today.

#### **A. Ouaddai Inspection**

Seventy-nine schools functioned in Ouaddai at the start of 1993-94. Of these, 43 state and 23 community schools offered the French curriculum while 13 provided the Arabo-Islamic curriculum.<sup>5</sup> The schools contained a total of 157 teachers, 48 of them women (most in Arabic schools), and 14,500 students. This last figure implies a gross enrollment rate of 28% for the school-age population of 52,000, 45% for boys and 14% for girls (Table 2 following page).<sup>6</sup> This is double the rate of 14% for the prefecture as a whole because the

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<sup>5</sup> MEN statistics do not classify Arabo-Islamic schools (i.e., Medersas that offer both primary and secondary grades) in a manner that permits them to be easily identified as either public or private. Some reports refer to them in these terms while others simply call them Arabic schools without making the distinction. Also, because we were unable to find information to indicate the number of state and community teachers they contained, numbers for each type of teacher in Table 2 are too low (i.e., others are among Arabic teachers).

<sup>6</sup> Enrollment rates for 1993 are estimates that we base on data in Gouvernement du Tchad. 1993. "Recensement general de la population et de l'habitat 1993 : résultats provisoires." Ministère du Plan et de la Coopération. Bureau Central du Recensement. N'djamena, Juillet.

Table 2 :Données sur l'éducation - Education statistics, Inspection Ouaddai .

Schools - Ecoles	1991-1992		1993-1994			
	nb.	%	nb.	%		
state-d'état (french-français)	40	83%	43	54%		
arab-arabes	7	15%	13	16%		
community-communautaires	1	2%	23	29%		
<b>Total</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>100%</b>		
Teachers - Enseignants (93-94)	Man-Hommes		Women-Femmes		Total	
	nb.	%	nb.	%	nb.	%
state-instituteurs (français)	65	60%	13	27%	78	50%
instituteurs+communautaires (arabes)	19	17%	35	73%	54	34%
community-communautaires	25	23%	0	0%	25	16%
<b>Total</b>	<b>109</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>157</b>	<b>100%</b>
Students in - Elèves dans les (93-94)	Boys-Garçons		Girls-Filles		Total	
	nb.	%	nb.	%	nb.	%
state schools-écoles d'état (fr)	6,525	62%	1,586	40%	8,111	56%
arab schools-écoles arabes	2,083	20%	2,012	51%	4,095	28%
community schools-écoles communautaires	1,903	18%	386	10%	2,289	16%
<b>Total</b>	<b>10,511</b>	<b>73%</b>	<b>3,984</b>	<b>27%</b>	<b>14,495</b>	<b>100%</b>
Population 6 - 11 (1993)	23,300		28,900		52,200	
Enrollment rate-Taux d'inscription	45%		14%		28%	

Sources: Gouvernement du Tchad, 1993a; Inspector-Inspecteur, Ouaddai

Inspection contains two large centers, Abéché and Adre. It is still less than half the national average of about 60% because demand for French language schooling remains low in the countryside.

This demand is rising. MEN statistics for 1991-92 indicated only one community school. The 23 now in operation contain 16% of the Inspection's students. Earlier statistics may have overlooked some of them. Our visits to eight schools in three areas - Djaroko, Wala, and Guilane near Adre on the Sudan border; Mokorbo and Erning-Melek to the northeast of Abéché; and Facha, Chikchika, and Tiré southwest of the town - nevertheless confirm that they are all relatively new. Starting in 1990, and always in cooperation with the inspector to assure that they did it correctly, one community after another created a school.

### 1. *The Cases*

Except for Erning Melek, the schools originated in whole or in part in the *idea of defense* that we described earlier and receive strong support from the communities they serve. One of two main methods used to mobilize this support is a monthly tuition of 100 to 150 FCFA per student (see Table 3, page 16). This is the principal technique in Djaroko, Wala, Guilane, and Mokorbo. The second method is membership dues. These generate revenues equal to between 150 and 4,100 FCFA per student per year. Guilane and Mokorbo adopted this approach to finance initial construction and equipment only. Facha, Chikchika, and Tiré, which do not levy tuition, pay all operating costs from this source.

The tuition collection rate is at or near 100% in all cases. Almost all families with students pay the full fee. The collection rate for dues is similar. Here, however, 100% means that all families pay full dues, not just those with students (except for Facha, where fathers of students collect what the school needs from them every month). These high collections, which allow communities to pay teachers well, from 7,500 to 15,000 FCFA per month, stem from several factors. One is that economic conditions seem good. The dominant activity, animal husbandry, has recovered from the drought and prices for animals and animal products are stable. Though we do not know whether income is higher than elsewhere, it seems likely that a larger share of families in the Ouaddai communities we visited have means to pay requested tuition and dues.

Related to this, a second factor may be self-selection. French schooling is new here. In this situation children from higher-income families tend to be the first to enroll while those from lower-income families wait several years, until the value of schooling becomes clearer. High tuition collection rates can be expected when students come mainly from wealthier families.

Third is the ability of villages to arrive at binding decisions on their members, or what some observers call "social capital." In Ouaddai this social capital roots itself in Islam. Among other things this means that every community has a Mosque that acts as a focal point for discussion and for making communal decisions. Because the Mosque has always been the organizer of

Table 3: Community Schools - Les écoles communautaires, Inspection Ouaddai, 1993

	Diarok	Wala	Gulana	Mokorbo	Eming Malok	Facha	Chitchicka	Tira
Founded-oté	1991	1993	1993	1991	1991	1992	1992	1990
Distance Abeche (km)	195	200	205	42	54	26	35	23
Classes-salles								
straw-peile-sacko		1	1	2		1	1	2
brick-briques	2							
nothing-nen					:			
Furnishings-équipements								
tables	2	1	0	1	0	1	0	1
chairs-chaises	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
boards-tableaux	2	1	1	2	0	1	1	1
Textbooks-livres								
french-français	3	2	nd	4	2	2	2	2
math-calcul	3	1	nd	2	0	0	1	2
sciences	0	0	nd	1	0	0	0	0
arab-arabe	0	0	nd	1	2	1	0	1
other-autre	3	0	nd	0	1	1	0	0
Students/book-élèves/livre	17	18	nd	22	9	15	13	7
Enrollment-inscriptions								
CP1	80	53	80	124	46	60	40	16
CP2	71			37				17
CE1				17				
Total	151	53	80	178	46	60	40	33
% girls-%filles								
CP1	16%	13%	26%	2%	0%	25%	13%	13%
CP2	11%			0%				6%
CE1				0%				
Total	14%	13%	26%	2%	0%	25%	15%	9%
Teachers-enseignants								
number-nombre	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
students/teacher-élèves/maitre	151	53	80	89	46	60	40	33
ago	22	21	25	22	26	25	25	35
experience (yrs)-ancienneté (années)	6	2	3	2	3	1	3	8
attainment-niveau scolaire*	10	11	7	8	14	14	11	14
monthly salary-salaire mensuel	7,500	15,000	12,000	7,500	5,000	10,000	10,000	46,000
								state employee fonctionnaire
Financing-financement (FCFA per student-par élève)								
registration-inscription		150						
collection rate-taux de collecte		100%						
monthly tuition-écolage mensuel	125	150	150	150	100			
collection rate-taux de collecte	95%	100%	100%	100%	60%			
dues-cotation (per year-par an)			150	250		1,500	2,300	4,100
			whole village village entier	whole village village entier		students' fathers pères d'élèves	whole village village entier	whole village village entier

\*Attainment - niveau scolaire: 6=CM2, CEPT, 7=6ème, 8=5ème, 9=4ème, 10=3ème, 11=2nde, 12=1ere, 14=Terminale

(Islamic) education, it has incorporated the French school within its purview as well. The result is that major decisions, usually made after prayers when all family heads are present, are true communal decisions. Families are therefore obliged to respect them.

Fourth, especially pertinent to dues, is the belief that schooling is a "public" good that benefits the entire community. One meaning of this, noted earlier, is that everyone benefits from having more schooled people in a village. Another meaning, clear in Djaroko, Mokoibo, Chikchika, and Tiré, is that the school is part of a wider package of investment in community development that includes such things as wells and dispensaries. So even if families feel that they cannot benefit from schooling, the idea that they can eventually benefit from other parts of the overall effort allows them to feel that they have a stake in package, and therefore also in the school. This is especially the case where school revenues, as in Mokoibo and Tiré, finance not only the school but also other community investments.

The willingness of parents without students to pay dues has been very important. It launched the schools at Guilane and Mokoibo. It still sustains them at Chikchika and Tiré. Indeed, because families with students are a minority, the wide base of support yields much higher revenue than in villages that depend only on tuition. Chikchika collects 2,300 FCFA per student per year, or 255 per month, and Tiré 4,100 FCFA per year, or 455 per month. Erning Melek, by way of contrast, shows what happens when a community does not feel that it has a stake in schooling. Here the school does not have a building and, with tuition collection at 60%, cannot pay the teacher his promised salary.

### *Djaroko*

The APE requests tuition of 125 FCFA per month per student in cash and millet to pay the teacher. With almost all parents paying this obligation, the APE usually collects 18,500 FCFA per month. Though offered 10,000, economic difficulties in the village convinced the teacher to ask less, 7,500 FCFA (plus housing). Part of the balance of 11,000 FCFA is being set aside for a second teacher, now being recruited, while the rest is reserved for supplies and investment. The major investment at the moment is construction of two brick classrooms. Last year each family donated 25 bricks for the first class, and the APE used its reserve to pay a mason while SECADEV, a non-governmental organization, supplied metal sheets for the roof. About 19,000 FCFA are left over from the previous year. The APE is not sure what it will do with the funds after construction is complete. It might raise salaries, lower tuition, finance other village investments, or maintain the reserve to meet unexpected needs, such as classrooms if enrollment continues to grow. Still, because these funds are limited the APE asked the canton chief to help it either obtain a state teacher or to have the state pay the current teacher. This would permit a third instructor and thus more grades.

### *Wala*

Prompted by creation of the Djaroko facility, the school opened to serve Wala and five adjacent villages. The APE asks a registration fee of 150 FCFA when a child enrolls in school for the first time, and a monthly tuition of 150 FCFA reserved for the teacher's salary. Though the teacher asked for 10,000 per month, the village decided to pay 15,000 FCFA because it believes that he should be satisfied. Funds for other expenses are collected as required by the village as a whole. The APE plans to ask SECADEV for assistance with school construction. So if this organization eventually agrees to help, the village will mobilize a special collection to pay for construction. Though it plans to do it eventually, the village has not asked the state for a teacher.

### *Guilane*

In the beginning the APE collected a one-time donation (averaging 150 FCFA per student) from every family in four cooperating villages to create a revolving fund for equipment and supplies. It now asks a monthly tuition of 150 FCFA per student to cover the teacher's salary. The amount has yet to be negotiated with the teacher, but full collection of school fees from the 80 students enrolled allow the possibility of 10,000-12,000 FCFA per month. The APE's main concern, besides finances, is that children learn French. Looking ahead, it wants the school to eventually contain the four primary grades up to CE2, after which students can walk to Adre. Two teachers are necessary for this purpose and the APE believes that it can mobilize enough resources for both salaries. Still, it plans to request a state teacher, partly because this would lower the financial burden on parents but mainly because incorporation of the school into the state system may give better assurance that students receive the instruction that parents expect.

### *Mokorbo*

The school committee collected 250 FCFA from every family in six cooperating communities to finance construction and equipment. The monthly tuition that pays for salary and supplies is 150 FCFA per student. The teacher receives 7,500 per month in cash plus housing and food from individual families. Although tuition revenues of almost 27,000 FCFA per month are sufficient to raise the salary or to recruit a second teacher, the village has not yet decided on what it will do. This revenue is not only for the school because all families gave funds to start it even if they did not plan to enroll children. Revenues, according to the committee, should be invested in ways that benefit the whole as well, such as a dispensary. The school is only the first step in a process that will eventually include other community investments. In this framework the committee asked for a state teacher in order to reach two goals. One is to shift funds from salary to other development priorities. The second, part of the first, is to help support the current teacher while he advances his studies. The further a man advances in school the better his prospects for finding an important position in the world

outside. And the more important the position, the more the individual can do to help the village in that world. Investing in the individual is thus the same as any other community investment.

### *Erning Melek*

The canton chief ordered this school. Such enthusiasm as some parents might have had for the project was dampened when the teacher sent by the Chief taught only in Arabic. As long as the village was required to have a school, parents reasoned, it might as well be the same as others. They then replaced him with another, promising to pay 5,000 FCFA per month (plus food volunteered by individual families) with proceeds from tuition of 100 FCFA per month per student. Collection is usually poor, and the village asks for voluntary donations after prayers at the Mosque. The Imam is a strong supporter of schooling and wants every family to enroll at least one child. Powerless on this matter, he has been unable to raise the level of enthusiasm in the village, not even to the point where parents might be interested enough to form an APE let alone construct a building. Were it not for risk of offending the canton chief and inspector, the school might have already closed.

### *Facha*

The school's first instructor joined the state teacher's strike soon after his arrival. The APE, outraged, dismissed him and found another with the inspector's help. It was too late to save the year and students are now repeating their grades. Fortunately, this has not undermined enthusiasm. Each month the APE organizes a meeting with fathers of all students, after prayers, to collect whatever amounts the school requires. When construction was underway, for instance, the collection was higher. Now that the only cost is the teacher's salary of 10,000 FCFA, it works out to an average of 165 FCFA per student per month. Good relations with the inspector have helped the school receive chalk, writing books, a blackboard, and other supplies left over from the World Bank's Fourth Education project. Though it has not yet made the request, the APE wants a state teacher in order to make the school official because people are afraid that the instruction and certificates which students receive will not be recognized.

### *Chikchika*

The school did not begin well because its instructor disappeared when state teachers went on strike. The need for students to repeat their grades frustrated many parents and, as a result, enrollment is now much lower than last year. However, the APE believes that this is a temporary setback. The new teacher, though not from the region, worked as a rural animator for several years and is therefore likely to provide satisfactory performance. Because the school is viewed as a village investment, all families are asked to support it. The APE therefore mobilizes resources only when it needs to cover a school expense, the largest component being the teacher's salary of 10,000 FCFA per month (plus housing). The village

is trying to get the state to pay the current teacher or to supply a state teacher, mainly because this would allow the community's resources to shift toward investment in other development projects.

### *Tiré*

The school paid its first teacher 15,000 FCFA per month, collected through regular monthly dues from the whole village. The following year, thanks to intervention of a government minister who is native to the community, the school welcomed a state teacher who receives 46,000 FCFA per month. The school now has official status. The APE still collects the same revenues as before, partly for the school but mainly for other community needs. An urgent priority at the moment is repair of the water pump at the village well. The problem is that the need to send children to fetch water from a distant source has lowered enrollment. So the pump and the school are related to each other. Similarly, the APE has taken first steps to obtain a school canteen, which it believes would encourage more parents to enroll children and help to raise more money to finance construction of a clay-brick building for the school. Also, both as a means to release even more village resources for such things as a new pump and to encourage village labor in community projects, the APE plans to make contacts in town that may eventually bring a food-help program to the village. And there is no shortage of other things that the APE can do in the future on behalf of the community. In other words, the school, though it was an important point of departure for the process, is only one component of a broader development effort.

## 2. *Summary*

Good economic conditions, self-selection associated with the recent arrival of the French school, the presence of organized social capital, and belief that schooling is directly or indirectly a public good have combined in different ways to yield strong financial support for schools in Ouaddai. The case of Erning Melek, however, shows that these factors, though helpful, are not sufficient to produce high support by themselves. They must be preceded, at the very least, by strong demand for schooling.

In principle, one could add that villages must also have the ability to organize themselves to supply schools. This capacity, unlike demand, seems ubiquitous, however. All the people we met, community leaders, school officials, ordinary villagers, and teachers, including those in Erning Melek, are intelligent and thoughtful adults who have demonstrated the ability to identify and assess new ideas and, if appropriate, to carry them through to completion. The fact that they created schools on their own and continue to finance them without much in the way of outside help is obvious evidence of this capacity. The decision of 16 adjacent villages to collaborate in operating the schools at Wala, Guilane, and Mokorbo is another indication. It shows basic understanding of the need to draw from a larger population base in low-density areas in order to generate adequate enrollment and, to assure that schools can sustain themselves financially, adequate numbers of students from higher-income families.

Further evidence lies in the understanding of incentives, as when Wala decided to pay its teacher more than he requested and when the teacher at Djaroko decided to accept less than the community offered. These decisions show sensitivity to the need to create good working relationships between villages and teachers. At the same time, the dismissal of teachers at Erning Melek and Facha reveals that villagers know what they want from teachers and that they expect teachers to answer to the parents and others that pay their salaries. It goes without saying that additional information might allow communities to operate their schools more effectively and generate more funds. But this has nothing to do with their ability to put existing knowledge to good purpose, to use new knowledge when they acquire it, and to learn from experience.

The most telling evidence about capacity, however, may be the way in which communities perceive their schools. Specifically, the idea that a school is not an autonomous entity but rather one element in a wider array of community development initiatives is a sophisticated concept. National and international education specialists rarely see things this way. Yet the idea has considerable practical importance, especially in regard to the likely impacts of state and other external assistance. The cases show that all communities would like to receive such help. They also show that the primary reason for wanting it is not to ease financial burdens. The main reason, besides the fact that a state teacher gives a school official status, is that it would release resources that communities could shift to other productive uses, such as adding teachers, grades, and classrooms, or financing other development projects. *This implies that external resources are more likely to supplement than to substitute for internal funds and thereby increase total investment in schooling and other things.*

Ouaddai villages are not unique in this respect, or in respect to most of the other observations we have made about them. Communities in other Inspections have similar attributes. However, there are some important differences in conditions that cause financing to be different as well. In Bar-Koh, the Inspection to which we now turn, these differences include a much higher population density and enrollment rate. Collaboration between adjacent villages, as a result, is not as essential as in Ouaddai. The main difference, however, lies in economic circumstances. Resources in Bar-Koh have declined precipitously in recent years. School financing, as one might expect, has suffered.

## **B. Bar-Koh Inspection**

The inspector reported 43 state and 21 community schools at the beginning of 1993-94. They held a total of 193 teachers, of whom 87 were paid directly by parents (see Table 4 next page). There were 11,700 students, of which 11% in community schools. This gives a gross enrollment rate of 61% for the estimated school-age population of 19,200, 83% for boys and 40% for girls. This is about the same as the national average. Lacking towns or centers of size, it remains lower than the 80% for Moyen Chari prefecture.

Table 4: Données sur l'éducation - Education statistics, Inspection Bar-Koh

Schools - Ecoles	1991-1992		1993-1994			
	nb.	%	nb.	%		
state-d'état	43	83%	43	67%		
community-communautaires	9	17%	21	33%		
Total	52	100%	64	100%		

Teachers - Enseignants (93-94)	Men-Hommes		Women-Femmes		Total	
	nb.	%	nb.	%	nb.	%
state-instituteurs	104	55%	2	40%	106	55%
community-communautaires	84	45%	3	60%	87	45%
Total	188	100%	5	100%	193	100%

Students in - Elèves dans les (93-94)	Boys-Garçons		Girls-Filles		Total	
	nb.	%	nb.	%	nb.	%
state schools-écoles d'état						
CP1	1,617	25%	1,170	35%	2,787	27%
CP2	1,438	20%	912	27%	2,350	22%
CE1	1,583	22%	697	21%	2,280	22%
CE2	910	13%	310	9%	1,220	12%
CM1	820	11%	169	5%	989	9%
CM2	773	11%	89	3%	862	8%
Subtotal-soustrait	7,141	100%	3,347	100%	10,488	100%
community schools-écoles communautaires						
CP1	271	39%	232	43%	503	41%
CP2	190	27%	173	32%	363	29%
CE1	168	24%	87	16%	255	21%
CE2	66	9%	43	8%	109	9%
CM1	4	1%	2	0%	6	0%
CM2	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Subtotal-soustrait	699	100%	537	100%	1,236	100%
Total	7,840	100%	3,884	100%	11,724	100%

Population 6 - 11 (1993)	9,405		9,735		19,140
Enrollment rate-Taux d'inscription	83%		40%		61%

Sources: Gouvernement du Tchad 1993a; Inspector-Inspecteur, Bar-Koh.

The inspector's figures may not be fully up to date, nor those of the MEN for 1991-92 (which reported only 9 community schools in that year). We came upon some schools that were not on the inspector's list and heard reports of others during our visits to 7 schools in three areas. These were: Takira Fermé, Kalgoua (actually in the Inspection of Grande Sido), and Dobadana near the frontier of the Central African Republic; Moskilim, Goro-Mira, and Goro-Ndila to the southwest of Sarh; and Camp Maré (a private school that had not yet received state recognition) in the sugar cane zone southeast of Sarh. A few schools more or less make little difference in the overall picture. The picture shows that community schools began in Bar-Koh somewhat earlier than in Ouaddai. Two of the schools we visited started in 1986, others in 1989 and later, their dates of creation coinciding with the end of fighting in different parts of the zone and the subsequent arrival of ONDR animators, village associations, self-managed markets, and Cotontchad rebates. The picture also shows that financing of schools is very precarious.

### *1. The Cases*

Financing in Bar-Koh differs from Ouaddai in three ways. First, the dominant method of producing revenue is tuition (see Table 5 next page). There is no mobilization of dues from families without students. In part this is because most families contain at least one student. The exercise of taxing student-less families would thus provide little additional revenue. More important is that Cotontchad rebates, by supplying schools with a portion of each community's "public" resources, served the same function as dues in Ouaddai. Because these rebates have largely disappeared, the mechanism that remains is tuition.

The second difference is that monthly tuition, less than 60 FCFA per student in Takira Fermé, Kalgoua, Dobadana, and Goro-Mira, is lower than in Ouaddai. One factor here may be that schooling has a long tradition in the zone. Families at all income levels want to enroll children, at least one student in the case of lower-income families and more among those with higher income. Tuition rates, if they are to accommodate this demand, must be kept low in relation to income. The more likely explanation is that there is no need for higher tuition because teachers accept much lower salaries. Not only were they willing to start work for promised salaries of 4,000 to 5,000 FCFA, they also remain at their posts when actual salaries, as indicated in Table 5, seem likely to be as low as 600 FCFA in 1993-94. In some cases this is because villages were fortunate to find young people that see teaching either as their civic duty or as a supplement to their activities in farming. Most villages simply benefitted from the fact that the supply of secondary school graduates in the south, unlike Ouaddai, is much greater than the demand for them. With alternatives to teaching scarce, these individuals have little choice but to accept what communities are able to offer.

The third difference is that tuition collection rates are also low, sometimes down to 50%. All families pay something, but many do not pay the full amount. In most cases the cause is an inability rather than an unwillingness to pay. Because communities make allowance for poor families, a payment rate of 90% might be normal for Bar-Koh. But there is little tolerance of non-payment by families with sufficient means to pay. Barring special

Table 5: Community Schools - Les écoles communautaires, Inspection Bar-Koh, 1993

		Takina Farné	Kalouva	Dobedana	Moklim	Goro-Mira	Goro-Ndila	Camo Mari
Founded-crée		1986	1989	1985	1989	1989	1989	1991
Distance Serh (km)		80	58	46	18	70	65	25
Classes-salles	straw-paille-seeko	2	1	2	3	3	3	1
	brick-brques							2
Furnishings-équipements	tables	2	0	1	3	3	2	2
	chairs-chaises	0	0	1	0	3	0	0
	boards-tableaux	3	2	1	3	4	4	1
Textbooks-livres	french-français	4	6	3	5	5	7	5
	math-calcul	1	3	1	4	4	4	3
	sciences	1	1	0	2	2	2	1
	arab-arabe	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	other-autre	0	0	0	4	0	2	0
Students/book-élèves/livre		23	9	17	8	21	7	23
Enrollment-inscriptions	CP1	79	66	15	41	37	25	83
	CP2	19	10	29	26	48	31	65
	CE1	28	11	25	25	79	30	45
	CE2	14			22	64	24	17
	CM1						10	
	Total	140	87	69	114	228	110	210
	% girls-%filles							
	CP1	27%	48%	33%	39%	49%	40%	49%
	CP2	32%	0%	41%	35%	46%	29%	58%
	CE1	21%	0%	48%	16%	32%	43%	62%
CE2	14%			18%	34%	38%	24%	
CM1						37%		
Total	25%	37%	42%	29%	38%	40%	53%	
Promotion rate-taux (boys-garçons)	CP1	nd	nd	43%	74%	61%	nd	nd
	CP2	nd	nd	75%	76%	93%	nd	nd
	CE1	nd	nd		34%	84%	nd	nd
Promotion rate-taux (girls-filles)	CP1	nd	nd	73%	28%	71%	nd	nd
	CP2	nd	nd	78%	100%	86%	nd	nd
	CE1	nd	nd		75%	79%	nd	nd
Teachers-enseignants	number-nombre	2	2	2	3	3	3	2
	students/teacher-élèves/maître	70	44	35	38	76	37	105
	age/âge	30, 30	26, 25	25, 29	27, 29, 32	30, 32, 35	23, 30, 31	22, 24
	experience (yrs)-ancienneté (années)	6, 6	2, 6	5, 1	3, 5, 5	nd	1, 1, 5	4
	attainment-niveau scolaire*	10, 10	10, 10	12, 14	6, 10, 10	10, 10, 14	8, 11, 12	14, 14
monthly salary-salaire mensuel	1,700	600	1,500	4,200	3,600	2,750	10,000	
Financing-financement (FCFA par student-par élève)	registration-inscription							100
	collection rate-taux de collecte							100%
	monthly tuition-écolage mensuel	42	44	55	110	55	150	165
	collection rate-taux de collecte	60%	50%	85%	100%	90%	50%	85%
	dues-cotisation (per year-par an)					90	90	690
	other-autre sources				175			32,800
				school feed cramo scolaire			Adventist church église Ad-ventis	

\*Attainment - niveau scolaire: 6=CM2,CEPT, 7=6eme, 8=5eme, 9=4eme, 10=3eme, 11=2nde, 12=1ere, 14=Terminale

circumstances, their children cannot enroll. The one special circumstance we found is Kalgoua which, after its teachers joined the strike in 1992-93, experienced widespread loss of enthusiasm for schooling and for payment of tuition. The school decided to tolerate non-payment, at least for 1993-94, because there was need to rebuild community interest.

Low payment rates, therefore, mainly reflect declines in income related to deterioration of village economies. Indeed, except for Camp Maré (the private facility), which is tied closely to the fortunes of the sugar industry and the state enterprise that manages it (SONASUT), all the schools we visited faced serious difficulties as a result of the demise of Cotontchad rebates, the company's inability to pay producers in a timely manner, and lower cotton prices. In some cases economic difficulties were compounded by administrative factors. In Kalgoua and Goro-Ndila, for instance, the canton chief issued orders that lowered student-teacher ratios below financially optimum levels.

Most villages have tried to temper the effects of economic decline and other factors through creative financing. This includes: use of alternative crops to fund schools, such as peanuts in Goro-Mira and Goro-Ndila; establishment of school fields in Moskilim; remunerating teachers with labor by allowing students to work teachers' fields in Goro-Mira; maintenance of high student-teacher ratios in Goro-Mira and Takira Fermé; and, for those with the good fortune of having them, such as Dobadana and Moskilim, asking wealthy inhabitants to aid schools. However, there are limits to what creativity can accomplish. The main thing that would keep schools open in 1993-94 was the willingness of teachers to work for very little.

#### *Takira Fermé*

The village used Cotontchad rebates for supplies to create the school in 1986. The teacher received nothing at first, he volunteered to do it for the community. Villagers then noticed that he could not spend enough time in his fields and suffered as a result. The next year they collected 1 coro (about 2.5 kg) of millet per student per year on his behalf (125 FCFA per coro) and then increased this to 2 coros to cover a second teacher in 1988. Tuition rose to 3 coros in 1992-93, providing the school with a total of 200 coros, or the equivalent of 25,000 FCFA. Because Cotontchad rebates had become small and irregular, this was the total available. The APE used 5,000 FCFA to purchase supplies and then gave teachers 10,000 FCFA each as their salary for the year. In principle, the 140 students could produce more than 50,000 FCFA during 1993-94. The actual figure will be lower because many families cannot pay. Millet production and cotton prices have dropped. Cotontchad, in addition to not providing rebates, is delaying payment for the cotton it purchased. In this circumstance the APE will not insist on full payment. Maximizing enrollment always takes precedence over maximizing revenue. The village would like to obtain state assistance to add another teacher for the two final grades of the primary cycle (CM1 and CM2), pay for bricks and a metal roof, buy textbooks, and provide teachers with stable remuneration.

### *Kalgoua*

The APE asked 400 FCFA per year for each student to pay the salaries of two teachers in 1989, and used a portion of the 15,000 FCFA Cotontchad rebate in that year for construction and supplies. In its best year, 1991-92, the APE amassed 20,000 FCFA and each teacher received 5,000 FCFA. The balance went for two blackboards (6,000 FCFA), chalk, and other inputs. Though 1992-93 began well, parents became disillusioned when the school's instructors joined the strike. They are now less enthusiastic about their teachers, and about the school. Prospects for 1993-94 are therefore uncertain. Besides the loss of enthusiasm, the canton chief has aggravated the situation by ordering the village to build three new classrooms. This caused many parents to transfer older students and tuition payments to a nearby state school. Cotontchad's failure with rebates and payments for cotton, and the need to buy construction materials leaves the APE with little hope that it can raise enough to satisfy teachers or purchase enough supplies. Though the situation seems desperate, the APE believes that the crisis will pass. Most villagers, though frustrated at the moment, think schooling too important to allow current difficulties to compromise the future of children.

### *Dobadana*

Although the former village chief ordered creation of the school in 1986, it did not gain wide support until ONDR animators arrived in 1989 to help create a village association that could claim rebates from Cotontchad. When the first rebate came, in 1990, the association invested 35,000 FCFA in construction, equipment, supplies and other things that it believed might encourage higher enrollment. The strategy succeeded. Today the APE requests 600 FCFA per year for each new student and 500 for all others. This is an increase over last year, intended to offset the decline in rebates. Though the new charges can yield 35,000 FCFA, the APE has collected the full amount for only 30 students and 250-350 for the rest. This might change by February, when commodity sales peak and parents have more resources in hand. Even so, the APE expects to fall short of the 72,000 FCFA that it wants to pay the two teachers (i.e., 4,000 per month per individual). Given present economic circumstances, however, the APE would like to at least pay the same as last year. That was 12,000 FCFA for each teacher, which the (new) village chief supplemented with 18 coros of millet (2,250 FCFA) and with assignment of his bulls to plow the teachers' fields. He will do something similar if collections are again too small. The APE is nevertheless optimistic. It expects conditions to improve and allow parents to give more than today. When that happens it will embark on its list of priorities for the school, which are to construct a durable building, buy books, produce benches for students, and get a state teacher to improve instruction.

### *Moskilim*

Convinced that the war was over by arrival of ONDR animators in 1989, and further encouraged by a native of the village who returned from training at BELACD, a non-governmental organization, the community used part of its first rebate to create the school in 1989-90. Today the APE requests an annual tuition of 1,000 FCFA per student for each of the first two children that a family enrolls, and 500 for each additional child (i.e., a family with 4 students would pay 3,000). The collection rate is 100%. The APE therefore expects to get about 115,000 FCFA from this source to pay the salaries of three teachers, who are each supposed to receive 5,000 per month, or a grand total of 135,000. The predicted shortfall of 20,000 FCFA is less than last year's 30,000, which the village chief lowered to 20,000 FCFA by giving one teacher 10,000. The APE still owes two months of salary to the others. If it cannot find additional funds, by the end of 1993-94 it will have accumulated a combined debt to all three teachers of 40,000 FCFA. Prospects of finding this are dim. Production from community labor in the school's field is forecast at 160 coros of millet, or 20,000 FCFA. Rebates, which at their peak provided 80,000 FCFA, fell to 36,000 last year and are expected to be negligible this year. The 10,000 FCFA of chalk that the school financed from rebates in the past must therefore come from proceeds of the field, as must the purchase of other supplies. There will be little left over to reduce the debt. So the APE will carry it forward again, hoping that improvements in the cotton economy or arrival of a state teacher will one day allow it to be paid.

### *Goro-Mira*

Creation of this school resulted from the decision of the state facility in nearby Goro to limit enrollment of village children in lower grades to 25 per year. Today the APE asks an annual tuition of 500 FCFA per student to pay salaries, preferably in cash though some millet is acceptable. Receipts are usually 90% of the amount requested, and should yield a total of 102,000 FCFA. This is adequate to pay each of the three teachers a salary of 4,000 per month (for an eight-month school year in this case), but the margin is close. In 1992-93 the APE provided seven months of salary in cash. For the last month it gave each teacher 22 coros of millet, worth about 2,750 FCFA. In addition, because the village thinks that 4,000 FCFA is not enough, parents have agreed to allow students to help teachers in their fields. This the community's way of assuring teachers a minimum recompense for their efforts. The APE also asks parents to pay two coros of peanuts per student to finance school supplies and repairs. The collection rate here is less than 90%, and the price of peanuts varies greatly. Still, averaged out over the whole year, the APE usually manages to produce at least 20,000 FCFA. Though performance has been satisfactory thus far, growth in enrollment is causing headaches. Tuition from increased enrollment can cover the salary of another teacher, but these revenues cannot create a reserve to finance other important things such as more books for all grades, in-service training for teachers, and construction of additional classrooms. State assistance would therefore be helpful.

### *Goro-Ndila*

Financing of this school, which the village created in 1989 for the same reason as did Goro-Mira, two km away, started well. In 1989-90 the APE amassed almost 130,000 FCFA from tuition and rebates, and paid teachers 42,000 FCFA each, or an average of 4,700 per month. The next year there were no rebates, crops failed, and each teacher received 9,500 FCFA in total. Prospects for 1993-94 look better than 1990-91 but will still fall short of the goal of paying each of three instructors a monthly salary of 5,000 FCFA. It would get to this point if nearly all parents paid the 150 FCFA per student per month requested. The APE will think itself fortunate, however, to collect half the amount and to pay each teacher 20,000 FCFA this year. The same applies to its request for two coros of peanuts per student per year to finance purchase of books and supplies. If everyone paid and the price were near the annual average of 125 FCFA per coro, the APE would have another 25,000 FCFA instead of a probable 10,000. The factor that aggravates the APE's capacity to raise enough funds, made worse by the canton chief's insistence that the village support both its own and the state school, is that parents feel obliged to enroll younger children in the village and older ones in Goro. The student-teacher ratio is thus lower than it should be. Three teachers are necessary for the school's five grades, but in each grade they could cover twice as many students as there are at present. The APE would like to receive technical help in solving this problem because the Goro school is running out of space in CM1 and CM2, and has started to turn away students at these levels. Though the village has already responded by creating CM1, it has no books for this grade. Nor, looking ahead, does it have means to acquire books, supplies, and classroom space for the CM2 class that will soon become necessary.

### *Camp Maré*

This private school asks a registration fee of 100 FCFA for each new student, which gives the school about 8,000 FCFA, and a monthly tuition of 165 FCFA (or 1,500 FCFA per year). It actually collects about 85% of the tuition, or 270,000 FCFA in total. From this the APE uses 180,000 for the salaries of two teachers (one of which received in-service training from the MEN under the World Bank's Fourth Education project), who each receive 10,000 FCFA monthly. Other expenditures include books (15,000 FCFA), pedagogical materials (10,000), furniture (5,000), repairs (3,500), and undifferentiated general expenses (45,000). The village association, in addition, has collected 145,000 FCFA toward construction of a new building. For its part the Association of Adventist Churches which supervises the school has provided the salary of a third teacher, to arrive shortly (65,000 FCFA), books (500,000), supplies (50,000), furniture (730,000) and construction (6,000,000). Not surprisingly, the only things that this school would like to receive from the state, besides recognition, are more books and the opportunity for its instructors to study at one of the MEN's *Ecoles Normales d'Instituteurs*.

## 2. *Summary*

Although there are differences in the characteristics of financing between Bar-Koh and Ouaddai, underlying principles are the same. The case of Kalgoua, like that of Erning Melek, underscores the importance of demand in determining the degree of support that a school receives. For any given level of demand, all cases show the close relationship between economic circumstances, the cost of schooling, and the ability of communities to pay these costs. The crucial role of social capital, village associations and APEs in this instance, seems self-evident in the ways by which communities created and now operate schools. Although rebates are no longer available, it should also be clear that villages would not have used this resource to support schools if they did not see them as public goods. And the creativity with which communities tried to offset the effects of economic deterioration, their sensitivity to the incentives needed to attract and keep teachers at their posts, and their understanding of what to expect from teachers on one side and from parents on the other leave no doubt that people in Bar-Koh have a refined capacity to identify, assess, and execute useful ideas.

As in Ouaddai, this refinement shows itself especially in the way that communities view the purposes of external help. Notwithstanding their dire economic circumstances, villages did not seek state or other outside assistance in order to ease their immediate burdens. Most, in any event, were optimistic that the crisis would pass. They sought financial help to improve quality with books, equipment, and teacher training, or to permit their own resources to shift toward additional teachers, classrooms, and other things necessary for expansion (thus reducing the impact of enrollment limits in state schools). Villagers understood that growth in numbers of students would allow them to pay for more teachers. Books, equipment, supplies, and construction were nevertheless beyond their means without the rebates. *The suggestion here, therefore, was that external resources would probably serve as a substitute for rebates while Cotontchad did not pay them, and as a supplement to internal funds when these payments resumed. More interesting, cases such as Goro-Ndila showed that communities also understood that financial difficulties might result less from limited funds and more from limited knowledge about ways to mobilize and manage available resources, and that technical assistance might be able to help them make best possible use of what they had.*

Given the close correspondence between what communities want from the outside and what many outside actors in the education sector offer, the foregoing implies that external intervention has considerable potential to do good. At the same time, the experiences of Kalgoua and Goro-Ndila show that intervention can be harmful when it ignores local realities and local understanding of these realities. Canton chiefs may have had sound reasons for wanting communities to build classes and support the state school, but their decision to issue orders without prior discussion of the merits of their ideas or of the best ways to implement them produced few benefits and high costs. *Good intentions, by themselves, do not necessarily yield good results.*

Clear evidence of the potential utility of talking with communities before taking action comes from Mayo-Kebbi/Est, however. We say this because, even though our data indicate many similarities between this Inspection and the others, they also point to basic differences. The most important one is that Mayo-Kebbi/Est contains a much wider range of views about external help. A few communities see assistance mainly or only as financial relief. Some want to raise enrollment by lowering costs, to finance expansion, or to obtain nothing more than official status. Yet others, though they should be desperate for help, are not interested receiving it if it means losing control of their schools. For them, freedom to supervise the education of children is of paramount importance. *Such wide variation in views means that there is likely to be less correspondence between what communities in this Inspection want and what most outside actors offer. As a result, intervention, if it is not informed by talk with villagers, holds considerable potential for harm.*

### C. Mayo-Kebbi/Est Inspection

The inspector reported that 44 state, two private, and 30 community schools were open at the start of 1993-94. MEN statistics show no community schools in 1991-92. This is a mistake because we visited three that started before 1986. The inspector's list, as in Bar-Koh, was also out of date. We talked with the APE of one school that was not on the list and heard of several others. In any case, schools on the list contained 242 teachers, of which 69 (or 73 if one includes private facilities) received salaries from the communities they served (see Table 6 next page). There were 14,800 students in total, 15% of them in community schools. This gives a gross enrollment rate of 46% (72% for boys and 22% for girls) for the school-age population of 32,200. This is lower than the average of 68% for Mayo-Kebbi prefecture.

We visited eight schools in three zones. One, southeast of the town of Guelendeng on the main road between N'djamena and Sarh, contains Boudounassa and Kakalé Mberi. The second, a relatively prosperous area north of Bongor that benefitted from the activities of a state rice enterprise before the war, holds Wayanga, Mallang Saadi and Bougoudang. Last is an area between Guelendeng and Bongor, suffering from drought, that contains new communities established by migrants from the south. Sa-Nang, Timilh, and Moutassi Foulbé are here.

The oldest schools, Wayanga (1983), Mallang Saadi (1984), and Boudounassa (1985), emerged as soon as fighting stopped because interest in schooling, helped by proximity of the rice enterprise in the first two communities and of Guelendeng in the third, was present even before the war. Support for the schools was low at the start, in part because people expected a state teacher to arrive at any moment and in part because demand, though present, was not widespread. Funding increased when hope for a state teacher faded and when more parents took notice of the professional success of graduates that attended state schools before the war and the academic success of those who started in the community schools afterward. Because

Table 6: Données sur l'éducation - Education statistics, Inspection Mayo-Kebbi/Est

Schools - Ecoles state-d'état	1991-1992		1993-1994			
	nb.	%	nb.	%		
	42	98%	44	58%		
Private-Privées community-communautaires	1 0	2% 0%	2 30	3% 39%		
<b>Total</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>100%</b>		
Teachers - Enseignants (93-94) state-instituteurs français private - privées community-communautaires	Men-Hommes		Women-Femmes		Total	
	nb.	%	nb.	%	nb.	%
	160	69%	9	100%	169	70%
	4	2%	0	0%	4	2%
	69	30%	0	0%	69	29%
<b>Total</b>	<b>233</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>242</b>	<b>100%</b>
Students in Elèves dans les (93-94)	Boys-Garçons		Girls-Filles		Total	
	nb.	%	nb.	%	nb.	%
CP1	2,193	24%	880	29%	3,073	25%
CP2	1,656	18%	590	19%	2,246	18%
CE1	1,735	19%	597	20%	2,332	19%
	1,178	13%	414	14%	1,592	13%
CM1	1,131	12%	322	11%	1,453	12%
CM2	1,232	14%	247	8%	1,479	12%
Subtotal-soustrait	9,125	100%	3,050	100%	12,175	100%
private schools - écoles privées						
CP1	64	14%	28	23%	92	15%
CP2	67	14%	31	25%	98	16%
CE1	117	25%	24	20%	141	24%
CE2	70	15%	15	12%	85	14%
CM1	105	22%	15	12%	120	20%
CM2	51	11%	10	8%	61	10%
Subtotal-soustrait	474	100%	123	100%	597	100%
community schools-écoles communautaires						
CP1	969	60%	301	72%	1,270	63%
CP2	360	22%	76	18%	436	21%
CE1	149	9%	20	5%	169	8%
CE2	86	5%	17	4%	103	5%
CM1	30	2%	5	1%	35	2%
CM2	17	1%	0	0%	17	1%
Subtotal-soustrait	1,611	100%	419	100%	2,030	100%
<b>Total</b>	<b>11,210</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>3,592</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>14,802</b>	<b>100%</b>
Population 6 - 11 (1993)	15,675		16,500		32,175	
Enrollment rate-Taux d'inscription	72%		22%		46%	

Sources: Gouvernement du Tchad, 1993a; Inspector-Inspecteur, Mayo-Kebbi/Est.

these successes were also visible in surrounding areas, other villages created their own facilities. Bougoudang drew inspiration from Wayanga, Kakalé Mberi from Boudounassa. The number of schools rose further as migrants, carrying high interest in schooling with them, established new schools at Sa-Nang, Timilh, Moutassi Foulbé, and other places.

### *1. The Cases*

Financing of these schools relies on a mix of methods (see Table 7, page 34). All charge tuition that, except for 215 FCFA at Wayanga, was either 70 or 100 FCFA per month per student. The collection rate was good in all but three places. Famine in Sa-Nang and Moutassi Foulbé undermined the ability of parents to pay. The Timilh teacher's decision to strike last year undermined the willingness of parents to pay this year. Kakalé Mberi, Wayanga, Sa-Nang, and Bougoudang, in addition, charge dues averaging between 125 and 500 FCFA per student per year. Aside from Bougoudang, which pursued the Ouaddai model and charged everyone, villages collected dues only from families with students. And three communities, Wayanga, Timilh, and Moutassi Foulbé, charged a registration fee of 125 to 150 FCFA per student. Collections in the latter two schools, as one might expect, were low. Aside from Moutassi Foulbé, where dire economic circumstances threatened to close the school, communities expected the combination of methods to yield revenues sufficient to pay teachers between 3,000 and 7,500 FCFA per month in 1993-94 - a range much lower than in Ouaddai and much higher than in Bar-Koh. Though villages (and teachers) seemed to be satisfied with this salary range, many were not content with the tuition they paid to achieve it. It was too high.

#### *Boudounassa*

The APE is proud to report that several graduates of the school are now in secondary studies at Guelendeng (15 km) and that this has encouraged more parents to enroll children. It requests an annual tuition of 250 FCFA in cash and five coros of millet per student. At 125 FCFA per coro, the total comes to 875 per student and a monthly equivalent of about 100 FCFA. Though revenue flows are irregular, payments are usually made up in full by the end of the year. Each of two teachers are supposed to receive a monthly salary of 2,500 FCFA in cash plus 20 coros of millet, or 5,000 combined. They actually get this only if enrollment is high enough to pay it. Last year they received 3,250 per month. If enrollment remains at the present level of 82 students they will get 4,100. The APE wants the village to obtain a state teacher, which it requested three years ago, to lessen the financial burden on parents. Except for a blackboard provided by Catholic sisters, the school has received no outside help.

Table 7: Community Schools - Les écoles communautaires, Inspection Mayo-Kebbi/Est, 1993

	Boudounessa	Kakalié Mberri	Wayanga	Mullang Saadi	Bougoudang	Sa-Nang	Timih	Moutassi Foutah	
Founded-créé	1985	1982	1983	1984	1991	1993	1991	1991	
Distance Bongor (km)	72	75	38	37	30	60	32	15	
Classes-salles	straw-paille-secco	2	1			2	2	1	
	mud-terre-poto			1	1	2		1	
Furnishings-équipements	tables	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	chairs-chaises	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	boards-tableaux	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	
Textbooks-livres	french-/français	4	2	2	5	10	2	1	
	math-calcul	2	1	2	1	7	0	0	
	sciences	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	
	arab-arabe	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	other-autre	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Students/book-élèves/livre	10	20	23	19	13	64	56	12	
Enrollment-inscriptions	CP1	53	31	93	111	87	72	43	
	CP2	14	30	9	104	104	24	13	
	CE1	11		8	41	41	31		
	CE2	4		4					
	Total	82	61	114	111	232	127	56	
	% girls-filles								
	CP1	23%	35%	27%	19%	26%	31%	19%	
	CP2	21%	37%	11%	22%	22%	29%	31%	
	CE1	9%		0%	5%	5%	16%		
	CE2	0%		0%					
Total	20%	36%	23%	19%	21%	27%	21%		
Promotion rate-taux (boys-garçons)	CP1	32%	90%	10%	32%	37%	60%	nd	
	CP2	83%		25%	71%	71%	88%	nd	
	CE1	10%							
Promotion rate-taux (girls-filles)	CP1	44%	100%	12%	31%	52%	32%	nd	
	CP2	25%		0%	0%	0%	72%	nd	
	CE1	0%							
Teachers-enseignants	number-nombre	2	1	2	1	4	2	1	
	students/teacher-élèves/maître	41	61	57	111	58	64	56	
	age/âge	35, 46	30	16, 18	36	23-27	37, 33	31	
	experience (yrs)-ancienneté (années)	3, 6	6	2	9	2-4	2	nd	
	attainment-niveau scolaire*	7, 10	9	6, 9	nd	11, 12, 14	nd	nd	
	monthly salary-salaire mensuel	4,100	4,200	7,500/5,300	6,000	5,000	3,000	3,200	
Financing-financement (FCFA per student-par élève)	registration-inscription			125				150	
	collection rate-taux de collecte			90%				60%	
	monthly tuition-écolage mensuel	100	70	215	70	100	100	70	
	collection rate-taux de collecte	95%	95%	90%	95%	90%	85%	85%	
	dues-cotisation (per year-par an)		250	250		250-500	125		
			élèves/maître par élève	élèves/maître par élève		élèves/maître par élève	élèves/maître par élève		

\*Attainment - niveau scolaire 6=CM2,CEPT, 7=6ème, 8=5ème, 9=4ème, 10=3ème, 11=2nde, 12=1ère, 14=Terminale

### *Kakalé Mberi*

Set up at the instigation of a youth group that a Protestant missionary organized during the 1970s, the school asks annual dues of 250 FCFA from every family with a student (i.e., not for each student). This pays all expenses except salary. The 61 students now enrolled are from 46 families, so the APE has 11,500 FCFA available for equipment, supplies, and repairs. For salary the APE requests a tuition of five coros of millet per year per student, worth about 625 FCFA. If enrollment stays at 61, the teacher will receive the equivalent of about 38,000 FCFA, or 4,200 per month plus housing and (irregularly) food. The APE's main priorities are to obtain financing for a deep well at the school and to get a state teacher. With this teacher the village would have enough funds to both improve the school's construction and add two more grades (i.e., CE1 and CE2).

### *Wayanga*

Many graduates of this school have established successful careers and now act as helpful ambassadors of the village in N'djamena and elsewhere. Their success has expanded interest in the school and assured it strong community support. The APE requests a 125 FCFA registration fee for students entering for the first time; annual dues of 250 FCFA from each of 85 families that have at least one student; and tuition comprising 200 FCFA per student per month in cash plus one coros of millet (worth 125 FCFA) per student per year. With allowance for poor families that cannot pay the full amounts, these give the APE an annual budget of about 220,000 FCFA. From this the APE pays one teacher 7,500 FCFA per month and the other 5,300. Part of the 105,000 FCFA that remains is for supplies. Most of it finances investment, such as a well last year and construction of a new building this year. The village requested a state teacher in 1990. Although this teacher would enable the APE to either lower the financial burden on families or add two grades (i.e., CM1 and CM2), the main reason for the request is that there are still many parents that do not enroll children because the school is not official. A state teacher would change this. Parents might also become more interested if the inspector would visit from time to time, but he never comes.

### *Mallang Saadi*

Support for this school is also strong, for reasons identical to those in Wayanga. Here the APE requests tuition of five coros of millet per student per year, the equivalent of 625 FCFA, or a total of 69,000 FCFA from 111 students. Revenue may be higher if ongoing recruitment produces raises enrollment closer to the 210 children that attended in 1992-93. From this the APE pays the teacher a monthly salary of 6,000 FCFA, and uses the balance for supplies (mainly chalk), equipment (another blackboard), and construction of another classroom. The director of the state school recently supplied two textbooks that were part of the allotment he received through the World Bank's Fourth Education project. The village has submitted several requests for a state teacher since 1984, always through the canton chief, but never received a formal answer. Some APE members suspect that this is because the Chief does not want a state school in this locality. In any event, the main purposes of getting a state

teacher are to lower the average cost of schooling each child and to allow community resources to shift to other things. Lower tuition would help parents enroll more children while release of community resources would allow the APE to add classes for CE1 and CE2.

### *Bougoudang*

School revenues totalled 340,000 FCFA in 1992-93. Of this, 140,000 came from a monthly tuition of 100 FCFA per student, paid directly to the school director for the salaries of four teachers. Each instructor received 3,900 FCFA per month, less than the 5,000 the APE promised to pay. It carried the difference forward as debt to be paid in 1993-94. The other 200,000 FCFA came from the APE's collection of 250 to 500 FCFA per year in dues from every village family, including those with no students. About 40,000 of this paid a salary debt to the teachers left over from 1991-92 while the balance built additional classrooms and purchased equipment and supplies. The director of the state school in Gourcy provided a set of books. Although everyone seemed happy with the school, some people insisted that the state is obliged to send a teacher to take it over. In their view, because the purpose of a school is to prepare people for government employment, every school belongs to the state. It cannot belong to the community. Parents are responsible for educating children, not for schooling them. At minimum, these people said, the state should act as an active partner and support at least a portion of the school's operating costs. The APE president then added that villagers would never say that the facility belonged to them because this claim would give the state another reason to delay assistance.

### *Sa-Nang*

Migrants from the south created this village four years ago. They immediately enrolled children in a state school 10 km away. The distance was far but parents accepted it because their first priority was to dig a village well. Organizing for this project led to creation of a village association, which then turned its attention to constructing another well and initiating actions in agriculture and forestry. The school moved to the top of the agenda when state teachers went on strike. Two members of the association volunteered to teach for nothing. Recognizing that this was a major sacrifice - time in teaching was time lost from the fields - the association promised to try to pay each one 3,000 FCFA per month. For this purpose the association asks a monthly tuition of 100 FCFA per student. This is supposed to yield a monthly revenue of 13,000 FCFA. To pay for school supplies (mainly chalk), it also tries to collect dues of one coro of millet (125 FCFA) per year from each of 50 families with students. Construction and equipment expenses, however, in combination with lower actual revenue have thus far made it impossible to pay teachers what the association promised. Ongoing student recruitment may bring more income, as may a fund-raising effort scheduled for the association's next general assembly, but drought and famine in the zone make this unlikely. If the village cannot raise more funds for teachers, the association will regard the unpaid salary as a debt and will try, circumstances permitting, to pay it back next year. Though the village would appreciate both the lessening of the financial burden and the improvement in teaching quality that would likely result, it has not yet asked for a state

teacher. It wants the school to first demonstrate good performance. The association nevertheless emphasizes that the school is a community facility, like the well, and villagers will not change this view even with a state teacher. If this teacher were present, it would mean only that the state has supplied someone to work for the village (i.e., not for the state).

### *Timilh*

After receiving the inspector's verbal authorization to proceed, the village found a teacher and launched its school in 1991-92. The following year the teacher, perhaps assuming that the inspector's words made this an official school, joined the strike. So 1993-94 is the school's second full year of operation, with most of last year's students repeating their grades. Annual tuition is 600 FCFA per student. In principle this is sufficient to support the teacher's salary of 4,000 FCFA per month. However, the APE is uncertain if it will be able to raise enough to pay the full salary this year. If it does not, then that will be the teacher's loss. The APE will not carry the difference forward as unpaid debt. The teacher's decision to strike, apparently, did not upset the village enough to fire him but did diminish the enthusiasm with which it now pays him. The APE also requests a 150 FCFA registration fee from new and 50 FCFA from continuing students. In principle, this should yield 3,500 FCFA for supplies. But revenues have thus far fallen short, delaying purchase of sufficient quantities of inputs. These kinds of financial constraints on acquisition of simple things, according to the APE, make a state teacher worthwhile. It will make a request when it learns how to do this with high probability of success. For the moment, the village is satisfied that the inspector's words of 1991 give the school official status.

### *Moutassi Foulbé*

The school is not operating well. In part this is because there is famine in the area and many families that would normally pay the 150 FCFA registration fee for new students and the 100 FCFA per student monthly tuition are unable to do so. Also, other families are unable to support the school even though they send children to it because they have older children in the state school (12 km) and cannot support study in both schools at the same time. In fact, less than 60% of parents with students have paid any part of their obligations this year. The APE manages to collect only 25-50 FCFA per student on an irregular basis. It tolerates non-payment when the reasons for it are clear, such as famine, because the school should try enroll as many children as possible. However, if conditions continue to deteriorate the school may have to temporarily close as parents shift children to more urgent survival tasks. The APE has not yet established a salary for the teacher. Last year he received the total APE collection of 9,500 FCFA. He may receive less this year. The APE nevertheless assured us that he will not starve because villagers, regarding him as too important a resource to lose, will give enough to keep him at the school. Should the APE eventually gather the 6,000 FCFA per month that it is supposed to receive, it will recruit a second teacher, repair the school facility, and obtain equipment and supplies. All this suggests good reason to request a

state teacher. Parents are not sure that this is wise, however. The teachers' strike, during which students at the state school came to study in the village, highlighted the danger of not having direct control over school operations in general and teacher conduct in particular.

## 2. *Summary*

Needless to say, underlying principles concerning demand, economic circumstances, social capital, and perceptions of schools as public goods were as much in evidence in Mayo-Kebbi/Est as elsewhere. The same holds with respect to the population's ability to understand the milieu and its capacity to identify, assess, and execute ideas. There is one noteworthy difference, however. Community attitudes toward state and other external assistance were more diverse.

The only reason Boudounassa and Bougoudang gave for wanting assistance was financial relief. Echoing ideas heard in Ouaddai and Bar-Koh, Kakalé Mberi saw assistance as a way to finance expansion, and Timilh as a way to obtain additional supplies. Combining these perspectives, Mallang Saadi would use help to raise enrollment (by lowering tuition) and to simultaneously finance additional classes. Wayanga, for its part, was less concerned with funds than with obtaining official status which, for lack of alternative, meant acquisition of a state teacher. At the same time, the two communities that we would have expected to be desperate for help because of the famine, Sa-Nang and Moutassi Foulbé, were wary of it.

Sa-Nang, though it would appreciate help, cautioned that the village would still want to exercise control of its school. A state teacher, if one were to arrive, had to work on behalf of the community and not, as is their habit, on behalf of the state. Extending this theme, Moutassi Foulbé was not even sure whether to ask for a teacher. The experience of receiving students from a state school after its instructors went on strike underscored the risk to children when a community could not control the behavior of teachers. Of course, the issue of community control was implicit in the actions of all villages that disciplined teachers when performance was unacceptable and that tried to reward them when it was satisfactory. Sa-Nang and Moutassi Foulbé, however, were the only places that made explicit reference to first side-effect of financial decentralization: democratization of a public service.

One may imagine, therefore, that impacts might vary widely if external actors tried to implement uniform plans for helping schools in this type milieu, that such plans might incur considerable waste, and that they might also cause unintentional harm. Or, to make this argument constructive, evidence from all three Inspections indicate that it would be prudent to design plans in collaboration with communities. This is an indirect way of suggesting that there may be much technical merit in complementing the decentralization that has taken place in education with democratic approaches to designing plans for the sector.

#### IV. GOVERNANCE AND ORGANIZATION

All communities manage their schools in similar ways. Either by formal election or by implicit consent at general or special meetings, male heads of households with children in school choose a small group of men, literate if possible, to take charge on behalf of the community. Women rarely participate in these meetings or serve as members of the group. Their preferences, as in most other aspects of public life in the village and nation, are transmitted behind the scenes, through husbands (who usually do not or cannot ignore the opinions of wives).

Names of these groups vary. The most common is the Association of Parents of Students (APE). It is common because almost all state facilities have APEs (except in the north). In other words, villages that use the name want their schools to resemble state schools. Communities that organize themselves to promote wider objectives, such as village associations to operate self-managed markets or other development activities, may also contain APEs. Here, however, the group is one of several committees that the larger association established to supervise school-related activities. If resembling state schools seems important, then they call the committee an APE. If resemblance does not matter, or if it is important to emphasize that the school serves all families and not just those with students, then it remains the village association's school committee.

The same applies for places that have pre-existing methods of managing education, such as Mosque-centered supervision of Coranic instruction throughout the north. Here the need for another type of organization to deal with the French school is not self-evident. They may also call the committee that looks after it an APE, but only if resembling a state facility does not undermine the principle that a school exists for the benefit of everyone rather than families with students only.

All these groups, which for simplicity we call APEs no matter what their actual names, perform the same basic functions. They assist the teacher in recruiting students at the start of classes, maintain a permanent process of requesting, collecting, and disbursing resources (which usually involves considerable effort in storing and marketing commodities), organize ad hoc fund-raising efforts when regular payments fall short or when there are special projects such as construction, plan and supervise these projects, meet regularly with the teacher to discuss issues, serve as liaison between the teacher and parents, and represent the school in all external contacts with the inspector, the canton chief, non-governmental organizations, visitors, and so on. Individual members of the APE, though they may not have formal titles, take specific roles as treasurer, secretary, and president in order to simplify administration. The teacher often acts as the APE's secretariat when his relations with the community are good, or when he is the only sufficiently-literate person available.

Though it watches to assure that the teacher is in class during the appropriate hours and conducts himself correctly in his interactions with children and parents, the APE rarely, if ever, occupies itself with pedagogical matters. This is the teacher's exclusive domain. Parents entrust children to him in the same manner as they do to Coranic teachers and to individuals responsible for the initiation of youth. We encountered communities where some parents were curious to know more about what their children read. As a general rule, however, the APE does not intrude into the teacher's area except to ensure that he follows the national curriculum and helps an acceptable number of students become literate in French within a reasonable length of time.

Village and quarter chiefs, imams, and other community leaders may or may not be active in matters of schooling. Though it is rare for a school to exist where the leader opposes one, it is equally rare for him to oppose it when parents demand one. The hierarchical line of authority that APEs, village associations, and leaders follow is therefore to the canton chief. Often doubling as a traditional chief or sultan or sultan's delegate, the canton chief represents the state at the local level. In principle, all things that have to do with the state, requests for a state teacher for instance, must pass through him on their way to other parts of the apparatus, including the inspector.

The power of chiefs has diminished in step with growth in the number of secondary graduates who are now in positions where they can represent their villages to higher parts of the apparatus directly. This relationship may explain why some chiefs oppose schools while their subjects, at the same time, demand them. The chief is still a powerful figure, however, and can hinder creation of schools and their access to outside resources. Villages confronted with such chiefs were usually the ones that went directly to the inspector when they submitted requests for state teachers. But we did not hear many complaints about their opposition to schools (which is not surprising given that we visited only areas that contained schools). Complaints were usually about chiefs ordering actions which compromised the ability of APEs to mobilize enough resources, such as construction of classrooms at inopportune moments and dividing enrollment between state and community facilities, and (implicitly) about their inability to help schools acquire state teachers.

Beyond the canton chief most community schools operate in an institutional void. inspectors are supposed to visit them on a regular basis, but the MEN's budget allocations have rarely allowed them means to travel. Many state schools, let alone community ones, have not seen an inspector in ten years. School directors, teachers, and APEs must come to them. To maintain contact with the outside world most community schools depend on irregular calls from inspectors that discover unexpected travel possibilities (the inspector jumped at the chance to join us in Ouaddai), directors of nearby state schools, other MEN personnel that pass through on trips elsewhere, missionaries that operate in the vicinity, visits of village natives who reside in towns, and exchanges with people from neighboring communities during market days and similar occasions.

Where they occur, these irregular and informal contacts can produce tangible benefits such as books, supplies, and small cash grants. They sometimes yield useful information too. We encountered cases where creation of one school prompted creation of others nearby, with APEs of the first school sometimes helping neighbors to organize themselves for this purpose. A more important benefit of these contacts, however, may be their psychological impact. The fact that outsiders have heard of a school and think it worthy of a visit does much to encourage a community in its efforts. Visits show that a village has gained respect and is honored in the world outside, and that there is still reason to hope for eventual assistance and official recognition. Small things mean a lot in isolated places.

Some communities have been especially fortunate in this regard because they lie within the orbits of non-state entities that to some extent fill the institutional void in schooling and other matters. Most of these organizations introduced themselves from the outside, usually as extensions of church-based missionary work that started seventy years ago or as donor-based missionary work of more recent origin. They have strong links with foreign sources of finance and, in general, do the same things as their counterparts in other parts of the Sahel. We visited three: ALTAAWOUN, *Secours Catholique pour le Développement* (SECADEV), and the *Bureau d'Etudes et de Liaison des Actions Caritatives et de Développement* (BELACD).

More interesting, because they fill the institutional void by movements up from the base rather than in from the outside, are indigenous entities that emerged during the process of financial decentralization. They now serve as intermediaries between groups of communities and important actors in the larger environment, not only the state but also donors and their non-governmental affiliates. Such entities are rare, and for the moment consist of associations of APEs in a few scattered zones. Their number seems likely to increase because they are logical extensions of the fundamental idea that every community needs schooled people to defend and promote its interests in the external world. One individual representing one village can do certain things for one community. A group of individuals acting in concert to represent the collective interest of many communities in one area can do more.

Like the comments we heard at Sa-Nang and Moutassi Foulbé, these entities are small signs of the natural progression from decentralization to democratization of public services. We visited two of them. One is the *Comité de Suivi des Problèmes Scolaires et Culturelles du Ouaddai* (CSPSCO) in Abéché. The other, serving an area of Moyen Chari prefecture to the east of Bar-Koh, is the *Association des Parents d'Élèves et de la Promotion Rurale du Canton Djokou* (APECD).

## A. ALTAAWOUN

ALTAAWOUN, meaning mutual help in Arabic, is funded mainly by the Swiss Development Cooperation agency. It is the northern arm of the agency that calls itself SWISSAID elsewhere in Chad. It started activities in Ouaddai after the famine of 1984, and focusses on sanitation, water management, agriculture-animal husbandry, and schools, all of them implemented through village associations, agriculture groups, and APEs. With respect to schools, ALTAAWOUN begins by supplying animators to help villages organize APEs that can build and manage a facility and then, at the appropriate moment, provides start-up assistance to finance construction, materials, and equipment. It also provides guidance in the procedures and actions that a village must take to have the MEN recognize the facility as a state school, and fourteen of them have succeeded in reaching this goal.

Although 40% of its budget is for schools, ALTAAWOUN never undertakes actions in isolation from other village development operations. The activity is always one part of a more global effort that includes interventions in other sectors. Nor does it completely abandon a village once its operations are finished. A special unit, the *Cellule de suivi des activités des groupements* (CESAG), maintains contact with villages to help with difficulties as they arise. ALTAAWOUN is well-regarded and welcomed in most villages. The number of requests for assistance to create schools are such that the organization has more than enough work to keep it busy for the next ten years.

## B. *Secours Catholique pour le Développement* (SECADEV)

SECADEV, the development arm of the Catholic church in the north, prioritizes its activities as follows: food security-agriculture (including animal husbandry), water, and schools. It ranks activities in this order because that is the way most villages present their requests for assistance. According to SECADEV, the most pressing concern in villages is food production, which requires water for gardens, animals, and cooking. Schools are perceived as investments for the longer term. Villages want to equip themselves with people literate in French in order to increase future prospects for acquiring assistance from the outside. For this purpose they need a school that can add the necessary proficiencies to the basic education that children already receive from Coranic instructors and parents.

SECADEV offers to help with the school if a village organizes an APE that can assure broad community participation in construction and in salary support for the teacher. SECADEV's direct partner, however, is not the APE but the larger village council or association of which the APE is usually only one committee. If a village meets these requirements SECADEV provides building materials (metal sheets for the roof are usually the most appreciated), financial assistance to pay construction labor, and help in locating teachers. Because it insists that villages take all necessary action to do this, the organization also assists in obtaining state recognition for the school. In this context SECADEV notes that officials in

the zone strongly support creation of schools and, within their means, try to help them acquire state recognition. It also notes that most village leaders no longer oppose the French school. New ones are therefore likely to appear at an accelerating rate in the future.

**C. *Bureau d'Etudes et de Liaison des Actions Caritatives et de Développement (BELACD)***

Operating from administrative centers in Moundou, Pala, and Sarh, BELACD is the development arm of the Catholic church in the south. The unit at Sarh developed a strategy to assist community schools in 1987, began to implement it in 1991, and now reaches 24 schools within its zone, including the one we visited at Moskilim. The strategy has three elements. The first is to help community schools reach CE2. This may encourage parents that do not want children to stray far from the village to enroll them and also increase the probability that students receive the minimum four grades of instruction that BELACD believes can yield passable literacy in French.

The second element is experimentation with the curriculum, which BELACD considers insufficiently adapted to the circumstances of rural life. At the moment this effort focusses on helping APEs to organize school fields, to integrate them into the regular academic schedule, and to experiment with ways to add instruction about animal health. For these purposes it provides in-service teacher training and distributes low-cost texts to participating schools, if they want them, at a subsidized price of 300 FCFA (the production cost is 400 FCFA). With existing texts costing 3,000 FCFA in retail outlets, the price is attractive.

The last element encourages parents to become more involved in the school. The practice of assuming that whatever the teacher does is sufficient and acceptable, according to BELACD, is not a good way for communities to assure quality. Though this may be unavoidable where parents are unschooled, villages in this region have more than enough people with secondary education who can serve as inspectors on behalf of the community. BELACD also works with APEs to help improve financial and administrative capabilities. A sister that visits Moskilim every two months under BELACD's program, for instance, serves as the APE's financial manager as well the community's general advisor.

**D. *Comité de Suivi des Problèmes Scolaires et Culturelles du Ouaddai (CSPSCO)***

CSPSCO is a federation of APEs that represents the interests of eight French and eight Arabic schools in Abéché. Parents created it at the instigation of the president of the *Lycée Franco-Arabe*, who argued that they would be better able to deal with the state and promote their educational interests, verify teacher qualifications and conduct for instance, if they combined their efforts. Since then CSPSCO has engaged in several different types of activity. These include production, acquisition, and dissemination of slateboards and Arabic books to primary schools in Abéché and surrounding areas; trips by CSPSCO officers to rural areas to

encourage existing APEs and to promote creation of schools in villages that do not have them; guidance and orientation of state teachers newly-assigned to the region (i.e., from the south); lobbying the European Development Fund and the government, successfully, to finance a CEG (a general secondary school); and raising funds to equip the CEG's science laboratory.

It now lobbies and mobilizes resources to finance an Arabic CEG, a type of school that does not exist in Chad. This effort, among other things, stems from what some CSPSCO members view as an unwillingness by Medersas (i.e., modernized Arabo-Islamic schools that include subjects similar to those in French primary and secondary facilities) to improve quality. For CSPSCO this means stronger training in French as a second language and providing students with exactly the same secondary instruction (in Arabic) as offered in the French CEG. Such a school would eventually be able to produce people more qualified than current Medersa graduates to serve as bilingual teachers at the primary level.

CSPSCO's achievements derive from several factors. For one thing, its officers represent Abéché's most influential socio-economic strata, including owners of large commercial establishments, ranking clergy, school directors, professionals in government and non-government organizations, officials, and so on. Another thing is that the organization maintains good relations with the MEN. The inspector, for instance, serves as one of CSPSCO's counsellors. Last but not least, CSPSCO has permanent representation in N'djamena through which it maintains contact with the large number of individuals that moved there from Abéché. This allows CSPSCO to not only raise substantial sums from the emigrant population (e.g., through voluntary donations and sale of honorary membership certificates), but also to have direct contact with people of influence in government and non-government offices in the capital.

CSPSCO is confident that interest in French schooling will continue to spread through the zone because of growing realization that this type of school offers tangible benefit. The success of CSPSCO, not to mention those of villages blessed with French speakers and direct contacts in towns, is itself evidence that economic progress depends to a very considerable extent on progress in schooling.

**E. *Association des Parents d'Élèves et de la Promotion Rurale du Canton Djokou (APECD)***

APECD structures itself around a central committee in Sarh, a sub-committee in Kyabe, an office in the canton (80 km east of Sarh), and representation by individual members in N'djamena and other towns. It uses this network to reach four objectives: foster solidarity between parents living inside and outside the canton; develop community schools, socio-medical centers, pharmacies, and cooperatives to sell necessities; promote the status of women; and implement maternal health and agricultural modernization programs.

The association was formed in 1979 by individuals who left the canton to pursue studies and government careers. They were among the first to graduate from the canton's only school, at Gondeye, and to achieve positions from which they could help their villages. Outside help was important because flooding isolated the 5,000 inhabitants from the rest of the country between June and December, and sometimes into February. Health, education, agricultural, and other public services were poorly developed as a result and people suffered when floods prevented travel to obtain essential goods and services. APECD members visited the canton to implement a strategy of action soon after its formation, but only had time to facilitate the opening of a second state school before the war closed both schools in 1980.

The effort resumed when stability returned in 1986. Initial actions focussed on helping to organize village associations that, depending on priorities in the 22 participating communities, contained a health committee, an agricultural committee, and an APE. Outside the canton APECD members pursued their roles as ambassadors by soliciting funds and services from individuals, government, and non-government organizations. BELACD was first to respond with a grant of 7,000,000 FCFA in 1986. Donations during the next six years, mainly from foreigners, provided 8,000,000, including 1,500,000 from an education project supported by the Swiss Development Cooperation agency which the MEN passed to APECD to pay for teacher training in 1991. In addition, APECD's membership dues of 500 FCFA per month from its 50 members, could yield up to 300,000 FCFA per year.

These resources allowed APECD to finance many things, the main one being schools. Members did not expect this. In 1986 they assumed that re-opening the two state schools would suffice, but interest had grown and many villages wanted them. The canton chief, himself a member of APECD, backed their demands while insisting that communities create their own facilities and not wait for the state or APECD to do it for them. Nine opened in 1986-87, two in 1987-88, and three more in 1988-89.

APECD assisted these schools in several ways. It recruited teachers and organized training for them in 1987 and 1991. It convinced the MEN to assign state instructors to four schools in 1988 and 1989. It procured equipment, books, and supplies for all schools at the start of every year. And it interceded whenever crises required outside mediation. For instance, it intervened in Gondeye when students went on strike to protest parents' unwillingness to pay their dues in 1988. It supported an APE's demand that a village chief return a bull and plow that he appropriated from the school. It defended the right of parents to take disciplinary action when teachers acted irresponsibly, such as being absent without cause, unilaterally closing schools, and taking commodities from APE stocks without permission.

Through such actions, not the least important of which have been visits to offer encouragement, APECD also tempered the decline in enthusiasm that accompanied communities as they made the difficult transition from high hopes in 1986 to more realistic perspectives today. As others before them, parents are adjusting to the possibility that the state will never relieve them and that their support of teachers must be permanent if they are

to have a school. Similarly, instructors are adjusting to the fact that teaching does not automatically make them state employees. They must answer to parents, not to the state. And both groups (as well as APECD), in a microcosm of the challenge that faces Chad with respect to government employees, struggle to make sense of the inconsistency between promised salaries and economic realities.

Specifically, APECD has asked parents pay a flat tuition of 1,000 FCFA per year for their first one or two students plus 500 for each additional child, a charge similar to that in nearby Bar-Koh. At the canton's average student-teacher ratio of 70 to 1 (in 1991-92), this can yield 20,000 to 35,000 FCFA per teacher, or roughly 2,000 to 4,000 per month depending on collection rates. However, APECD also asks each village to provide dues of 30,000 FCFA per teacher per year in cash, the main source of which is cotton, peanuts, beans, and Cotontchad rebates. To this APECD adds 15,000 FCFA per teacher from its own membership dues. Instructors are therefore supposed receive between 7,000 and 9,000 per month from all sources. This target, very high compared to schools Bar-Koh and Mayo-Kebbi/Est, has proven hard to reach.

Though most parents paid the tuition every year, dues have been erratic because of flooding, decline in commodity prices, reduction of rebates, and so on. As indicated in Table 8, (see next page), few APEs were able to come close to the target of 30,000 FCFA per teacher in relatively good periods, such as 1989-90 and 1991-92. Half were unable to raise any cash for teachers in 1990-91, a disastrous year. Parents were hard-pressed to maintain their enthusiasm for schooling in these circumstances. Teachers, most of whom thought of the work as employment rather than civic service, were equally frustrated by the inability of villagers to pay what they promised. Still, absent better alternatives, parents paid what they could and teachers stayed at their posts. Enrollment in the canton's first nine schools during 1991-92 was about the same as in 1986-87 (Table 9, on page 48).

The crisis came in 1992-93. An APECD letter requesting release of students who were needed by their families for field work was misinterpreted as a request to show solidarity with the state teacher's strike. Four instructors remained in school while the rest went to their fields. The year was lost by most students, who have now returned to repeat their grades. Parents are not happy.

For its part, APECD is in a reflective mode, trying to draw lessons from the past that can guide the future. Its main conclusion thus far is that it did not invest enough in encouraging inhabitants to take greater charge of their destinies. Villagers are still too passive with respect to schooling and other development activities. Those who do not wait for a state that will never come now wait for APECD resources and for members to tell them what to do. A sustained process of community conscious-raising seems in order. Thanks to a vehicle and two *mobyettes* acquired through Swiss funds made available by the MEN, and to a new generation of young people rising in APECD to carry on the work launched in 1979, this has started. Access to an experienced individual who can show these young people how to pursue an appropriate type of animation would be helpful, but finding such an individual is hard.

**Table 8: APE Dues-Cotisations**  
**Community Schools- Ecoles Communautaires**  
**Canton Djokou, 1989/90 - 1991/92**  
(cash only - en espèces seulement)

	Teachers Enseignants	1989/90 FCFA	1990/91 FCFA	1991/92 FCFA
Ngondeye	2	23,500	36,000	44,500
Boyama	1	25,000	37,000	25,000
Dagui Mono	1	5,000	0	0
Kossibolo	1	11,500	0	15,000
Ngoh	1	9,500	0	0
Ndjoko Sako	1	15,700	0	13,000
Borgoto	1	15,500	0	22,500
Kayengo	1	26,300	12,500	16,650
Djobada	1	9,250	0	19,000
Kayao Bombi	1	23,500	13,400	21,000
Bolgaba	1	12,000	15,000	15,000
Mouraye	1	22,000	15,500	5,000
Ndjoko Koh	1	3,000	8,000	15,500
Oua Village	1	5,000	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>206,750</b>	<b>137,400</b>	<b>212,150</b>

Source: APECD

Table 9: Enrollment - Inscriptions, Canton Djokou, 1986/87-1991/92

	1986/87			1987/88			1988/89			1991/92		
	Boys	Girls	Total									
	Garçons	Filles		Garçons	Filles		Garçons	Filles		Garçons	Filles	
Ngondeye	68	27	95	92	28	120	94	25	119	68	25	93
Boyama	52	26	78	50	22	72	43	23	66	73	28	101
Dagui Mono	48	17	65	53	17	70	31	12	43	54	34	88
Kossibolo	53	16	69	51	19	70	31	11	42	37	23	60
Ngoh	45	15	60	39	15	54	34	9	43	43	15	58
Ndjoko Sako	53	17	70	51	27	78	31	18	49	45	25	70
Borgoto	42	11	53	29	10	39	30	6	36	33	10	43
Kayengo	76	24	100	75	22	97	70	15	85	81	36	117
Djobada	65	15	80	65	24	89	73	30	103	56	8	64
Total	502	168	670	505	184	689	437	149	586	490	204	694

Source: APECD

## V. CONCLUSIONS

All the villages we visited had, are having, or will have experiences similar to those in canton Djokou. It is hard for parents and teachers to alter their traditional beliefs about the role of government in supplying education, or to abandon all hope that the state will one day resume its customary responsibility. Change in perspective is especially hard when people must confront the financial reality of decentralization. This reality, at the very least, becomes more tolerable when viewed as a temporary sacrifice rather than a permanent one. The passage of time slowly changes things, however. Though the process has been underway for fifteen years, most communities are too isolated to be aware of this. They do not know the implications of financial decentralization until the instant that they create a school. This instant, and not 1979, marks the start their required adjustment. What matters, therefore, is not the experiences but rather what communities learn from them as they move forward.

In the case of canton Djokou, it would be premature to suggest that people now realize that their expectations about resource mobilization may be unrealistic, or that what communities produced in the past is probably no more than what they are likely to produce in the near future. It would be equally premature to say that teachers have fully accepted the notion that their salaries are linked directly to the economic circumstances of the communities they serve, not to the government's salary structure, that the security of their employment depends on how well they respond to the expectations of parents, not to the inspector, and that it is the community which has authority over them, not the state. And it would be no less premature to imply that parents and teachers fully understand that the state may never respond in the manner they hope for or that schooling, now and the future, is primarily in their hands. Given that most people we spoke with in the three Inspections seem to have moved toward these realizations on their own, some farther than others but all in the same direction, there is little doubt that the same thing will eventually happen in the canton, and in every other community that decides to supply itself with a school.

More difficult to guess is whether the historical process that has led villages to struggle with the challenge of schooling will accelerate or slow down. Though it seems reasonable to suppose that the state will not announce a drop in state employee salaries, at least not to the market rate of 5,000 to 10,000 FCFA per month, and that its financial situation will not improve enough to have significant impact, the future of demand remains uncertain. Important incentives to enroll children emerged during the last decade which more than offset reduced prospects for government employment. Some of these incentives, and the availability of resources to act on them, have diminished. Cotontchad is one example. If its difficulties are permanent then communities that depend on it may lose their enthusiasm.

Still, it seems safe to predict that the process will continue and that a reversal is unlikely in the foreseeable future. As such, the time may have come for the partners that produce public education, not only the state and communities but also donors that work with them, to view community schooling as a permanent fact of life and adjust their perspectives and practices in this light. To the extent that other Sahelian societies have started or will soon start along an identical path, they should prepare to do the same.

Three matters warrant special attention in this regard. One is reform of existing institutions, mainly the MEN and some donors that work with it. Here there is need to accelerate the speed at which perspectives shift from the illusion of centralized to the fact of dispersed supply. If successful, this reform may hasten arrival of the day when practices become more consistent with reality than is presently the case, and help rather than hinder expansion of French literacy.

Second, looking to the longer term, is promotion of the growth and spread of organizations that can fill the institutional void in which communities find themselves. Such structures, as CSPSCO demonstrates for the schools it represents in Abéché, would allow APEs of different schools to help each other and to promote common interests with greater effect. Through this the organizations might enable communities to extend beyond individual schools, engage themselves in the process of reforming central institutions, and eventually serve as full partners in shaping the characteristics of the larger education system.

Extending beyond education, and beyond Chad, the third matter is to widen this promotion to include all public goods and services. Communities concern themselves with many things, the school being only one element in a wider array of actual or planned activities. Village entities that oversee these activities, in effect, are local governments that have received authority from citizens to levy taxes and fees for the common good. All countries in the Sahel have these entities. Therefore, states and donors everywhere have scope to establish constructive partnerships with them and thereby do more in the future than they have in the past to improve well-being of the region's population.

#### **A. Institutional Reform**

Progress in education is hampered by perspectives and practices in the MEN that are out of touch with realities in the sector. A glaring example of inconsistency is its national education plan, called "*Education-Formation-Emploi*," or EFE. This plan, developed with UNESCO assistance during the last few years, envisages sustained increases in primary enrollment and, in order to balance the supply of graduates with future employment possibilities, only modest expansion of general secondary education. The emphasis at the secondary level is on faster growth in a small number of technical schools.

Future enrollment statistics may coincide exactly with those forecast by the plan. If they do the result will be coincidence because the state no longer has direct control of primary enrollment. Recent talk and action to create "spontaneous" general secondary schools, the proposed Arabic CEG in Abéché being only one of several examples, suggests that the state is about to cede control of secondary education as well. Since the main goal of enrolling children is to have them reach the highest level, and since parents want them to achieve this goal for reasons that extend beyond the narrow issue of employment, there is little the government can do to stem the tide. Plans that assume control where it does not exist are not particularly useful. Even less useful are proposals that seek to re-impose control.

An example of this type of proposal is a study of private and community schools prepared by a team of national and foreign UNESCO consultants.<sup>7</sup> The study suggests that although the government should acknowledge the right of villages to create schools in areas where coverage by state facilities is deficient, exercise of this right must be implemented in a regulatory framework allowing the state to retain control of the "*carte scolaire*" and quality of instruction. It then recommends that community schools, in order to qualify for donor assistance, must first satisfy the requirements of the *carte scolaire* (e.g., distance from a state school), provide guarantees of permanence, and possess teachers with a minimum level of secondary education (e.g., at least the *3ème*). Also, to qualify for state supervision of instruction, communities must promise to maintain buildings and book stocks, assure salaries and operating costs, and participate in construction and repair.

Communities already do everything that the study recommends to qualify for supervision, but receive this help very rarely. With regard to qualifying for donor assistance, it is true that communities do not respect the *carte scolaire*. They know nothing about it of course. Even if they had a copy, one that was not hopelessly out of date and out of touch with what is on the ground, few would refuse to school children just because the action is inconsistent with a distant piece of paper. The same applies to the other thing that communities do not respect, the level of secondary education of teachers. If all schools were obliged to have teachers that attained at least the *3ème*, this would mean dismissal of over 60% of teachers in community schools, about 25% of those in private schools, more than 40% of community teachers in state schools, and almost 20% of state teachers. Where Chad might find 3,000 replacements to fill these positions is a question the study does not answer. It is hard to fathom the route by which its authors arrived at their recommendations. Still, the suggestions are not at issue. Their incongruity, like much of EFE, can be ignored. The problem is the waste of effort. Time spent in useless exercise is time not spent identifying useful actions.

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<sup>7</sup> Esquieu, P. et Péano, S. 1993. "L'enseignement privé et spontané dans le système éducatif tchadien." Institut International de Planification de l'Education (Projet PNUD/UNESCO CHD-91-001). N'djamena, Octobre.

The MEN suffers no shortage of people qualified by experience (i.e., rather than by formal training) to devise such actions. Most of its personnel whom we met in the capital and outside impressed us with their grasp of the basic issues, ability to envisage workable ways to address them, sensitivity to the sacrifices that parents make for their children, understanding of the fundamental difference between "controlling" and "improving" quality, and many other things. They educated us, and along the way made several sensible suggestions.

One was that the MEN should look for other ways to define a "public" or "official" school. The term "spontaneous" only reinforces the false impression that a school has a different origin than others and masks the fact that it really refers to a facility without a state employee. It serves no useful purpose. All parents want their schools to be recognized as integral parts of the education system because they do not wish to invest resources and children in hopeless exercises. If the only way to assure that the exercise is not completely hopeless is to get a state teacher, then they will never stop asking for one. Thus if the MEN were to adopt and legalize a classification system that made clear to parents that their schools were as public, as official, and as recognized as others, then this might not only lower the pressure it feels to supply state teachers but also encourage higher enrollment and stronger financial support of community schools.

Another suggestion was for the MEN to look for other terms to describe teachers who are not state employees because the title "*maître suppléant*" causes harm without offering any compensating benefit. For one thing, it creates the impression that these teachers are less competent than "*instituteurs*." While this may be true for some or many it is not true for all. Similarly, the title suggests that all these teachers have less schooling than *instituteurs*, which is also false. Almost 20% of state teachers had less than the *3ème* in 1991-92. The problem here, again, is that it drives communities that wish to improve the quality of instruction to demand *instituteurs* instead of other things that might do more to help them realize their objectives, such as teacher training or regular inspection. And to the extent that the title causes instructors to have a lower sense of self-worth because they are not seen as "real" teachers by the state or the community, it undermines their willingness to try to improve their performance. Given low prospects for becoming a state employee, anything the MEN can do to encourage teachers by showing respect for their efforts may be helpful.

A third suggestion was to formalize activities that many MEN personnel already undertake in the field on a voluntary basis. The MEN could, for instance, subdivide Chad's 44 Inspections into smaller units, each of which is centered on a key state school. Directors of these schools, acting as intermediaries between distant inspectors and nearby community facilities, might then take responsibility for providing information, assistance, and encouragement to teachers and APEs in surrounding communities, most of which are within walking distance. Many directors do this now, and all the schools we visited that had contact with them appreciated the relationship. If nothing else, it showed communities and their teachers that someone in the MEN respected their efforts and cared enough to visit. Formalization of this practice, as with the other things mentioned, can do much good at relatively low cost. And it could be a good way to keep the *carte scolaire* up to date.

There were other suggestions too.<sup>8</sup> However, the basic point is that the MEN, as a whole, does not suffer a shortage of sound ideas about policies and practices consistent with a dispersed education system. The problem is that these ideas do not percolate up to higher reaches of the MEN's decision-making apparatus. We do not know why this is so, though we suspect that failure of ranking officials or donors to solicit them may be important.

This might change soon, during implementation of the World Bank's Fifth Education project. Making an overdue but nonetheless important concession to reality, the project includes two components that depart from the Bank's prior practice in Chad (and in the Sahel in general). One is finance of in-service training for 3,700 community instructors, which is to say almost all of them.<sup>9</sup> Though the MEN included these teachers in previous projects sponsored by the Bank and other donors (e.g., the Swiss Development Cooperation agency), the scale was never as large as contemplated by the new project. The significance of this component is that it may give instructors new standing as qualified teachers in the eyes of the people they serve, raise their self-esteem and, for community facilities, provide parents the satisfaction of having them recognized as legitimate public schools.

The other component is a pilot program to improve the quality of instruction and APE management in about 100 community schools. The German cooperation agency, GTZ, will manage the program while non-governmental organizations, such as SECADEV and BELACD, are expected to implement it under contract. Descriptions of the program include details, such as adult literacy training for APE members, that we doubt will prove successful. Such details seem unlikely to cause difficulty because the GTZ, according to the representative with whom we spoke, plans a flexible approach. GTZ assistants will learn what to do as they proceed in collaboration with MEN personnel close to the affected communities and, if the non-governmental organizations decide to participate, with many other individuals that have much experience in the community sector. This collaboration guarantees nothing. It does increase the chance that ideas such as those presented to us by MEN personnel will be solicited and thereafter find their way into the MEN's higher reaches and planning units. This is a small action compared to the kind of institutional reform that we think necessary. But it is a beginning and, as communities emphasized time and again, something is always better than nothing.

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<sup>8</sup> Other suggestions were politically more complicated. One was that the MEN should assign a minimum of one state teacher to every school. This means transfer of about 600 teachers from state schools with more than one to all community schools. Without growth in the number of state teachers this would leave the MEN with 3,200 in the 1,800 state schools that now exist, and thus 1,400 teachers still available for assignment to new community schools as they materialize. What the MEN might do after exhausting this supply is unclear.

<sup>9</sup> e.g. World Bank. 1993. "Basic Education Project (Education V)." Republic of Chad. Staff Appraisal Report. Washington D.C., March 18.

## **B. Organizational Development**

Movements of refugees in the south and north, arrival of Cotontchad agents and ONDR animators, spread of missionaries and non-governmental organizations, and the return of secondary graduates to their native villages have had profound impact on thousands of communities. The end of isolation brought on by these and other productive contacts with the surrounding world marked the start of new initiatives, the most important of which was creation and spread of autonomous local organizations that mobilized resources to supply education and other public services.

This process has not been accompanied by comparable growth in local knowledge about ways to finance and manage services, or by increases in the capacity of communities that pay for them to influence pertinent policies at the center (e.g., EFE). This lag between financial and other dimensions of decentralization hinders progress in two ways. First, because information tends to move vertically between communities and national or regional centers rather than horizontally (i.e., if it moves at all), a considerable amount of learning from experience remains inaccessible to villages. This slows the rate at which services spread to places that do not yet have them, narrows the range of available ideas that places with services can use to improve their quality, and undermines the ability of the state and donors to interact with communities as competent partners. Second, extending this last item, the inability of villages to influence the central apparatus in forceful ways slows the process of institutional reform that we described above and, therefore, delays arrival of the day when all partners engaged in the production of public services establish realistic, productive, and mutually-beneficial modes of thought and action.

In education we mentioned that contacts between adjacent villages could sometimes yield productive outcomes, such as collaboration to establish a single facility for all, and APEs of existing schools that helped neighbors organize their own. Beyond these and a few larger clusters that operate within the orbits of non-governmental organizations, communities seemed unaware of the ways in which a problem that they were confronting was solved somewhere else or the way in which their own solution to a different problem might help another village.

*This isolation from the flow of potentially useful information constitutes a tremendous waste of Chad's most valuable resource: APEs, village associations, and similar entities. They have a lot to teach each other, and outsiders. School fields, student labor in teachers' fields, organizing one school for several adjacent villages rather than separate schools for each, promoting the idea of schooling as a collective good for all families rather than just for those with students, timing tuition collections to coincide with peak sales periods, diversifying the range of commodities used for school support, promoting student-teacher ratios that are optimum in different local economies, assigning bulls and plows of village notables to work teacher fields, and other variations on the theme of finance that come from experience at the base, for instance, are not appropriate or feasible in all places. Nevertheless, they are practical ideas that have been tested somewhere at some time by some villages. When APEs asked us*

for suggestions about ways to improve finance or management the best answers we could give, even though we visited only a minuscule total of 23, came from our notes about how things were done in other communities.

In addition, though APEs did not ask for it, these same notes contained potential counsel about how to deal with teachers, the responsible as well as the irresponsible ones, how to think through the relative benefits and costs of acquiring state teachers, how to narrow the gap in enrollment between boys and girls when this was desirable, and how to treat many other items of greater or lesser importance. In a wider perspective the notes also contained interesting ideas concerning alternative ways to place a school within the larger enterprise called community development. It could be the only activity of the enterprise, the first or the last in a sequence of projects, or one of several parallel activities taking place in different sectors at the same time. Each option had its particular advantages and disadvantages. All of them, at the very least, were food for thought.

And because villages seemed to have very little information about the characteristics and condition of the center, we speculated about what our notes might contain if both we and they had hours to spend in exploration of this area. For example, we wondered what communities would say or do if they learned the true nature of MEN finances and of probabilities for receiving assistance. Would they still hope, as in canton Djokou and elsewhere, for eventual deliverance by a state that may never come? Would they sit idle and resign themselves to fate if convinced that the MEN might never send a state teacher? Would they think about alternative ways to acquire official status and then organize themselves to obtain it? Would they ignore the issue of recognition altogether and focus on actions to encourage the best possible results from their teachers?

Moving from the state to other actors, how might communities then deal with the insistence of ALTAAWOUN and SECADEV that they seek official status? What should they make of BELACD's attempts to ruralize the curriculum when the purpose of primary schooling has nothing to do with learning agro-pastoral techniques and everything to do with advancing to the secondary level and beyond? Would they accept this as the price to pay for getting assistance from the organization? Would they refuse, as in most parts of the Sahel, to cooperate on this matter? Or, recognizing that reform of primary education must start at the top and work down, would they join other voices in Chad that increasingly call for establishment of agro-pastoral secondary schools? Similarly, what would be their reactions if agents of the World Bank's Fifth project, should they decide to follow to the letter the details of the document that describes it, insist that APEs submit themselves to adult literacy training, raise girls' enrollment rates, and experiment with the curriculum? Would communities embrace these proposals, accept them with resignation as in Erning Melek, reject them, or decide to try to educate the agents in the logic and purposes of community schooling?

Turning to the issue of capacity to influence the central apparatus, we also wondered how MEN and donor projects might look today if villages were not condemned to only react to outsiders. What would activities in the education sector look like if communities were already sufficiently organized to tell central actors precisely what they wanted and what they were prepared to offer in exchange? Suppose every canton, subprefecture, and prefecture possessed entities such as CSPSCO? Suppose there was a national federation of such entities? Would the EFE plan exist? Would UNESCO permit consultants to talk about imposition of state control? Would there be need for studies such as ours, or would the information it transmits be as widely available at the center as ignorance seems to be at present?

The point of these questions is that it is important to recognize that there are few structures in place through which scattered communities can exchange ideas with each other and with agents of the center, or through which they can raise old and discover new questions and then search for individual or collective answers. They are trapped in an institutional void. Some have been able to organize entities such as CSPSCO that demonstrate what is possible. Others have established groups like APECD that hold promise of eventually following CSPSCO's lead. Their number will certainly grow as word about them spreads. Left completely to its own devices, however, this process of organizational development will move forward very slowly.

*In brief, we are convinced of four things. First, communities are capable of creating schools and maintaining teachers without assistance from the center. Second, their combined knowledge about methods to improve upon what they do is superior to anything the center can offer them at the moment. Third, the speed with which French literacy spreads through the society is now mainly constrained by the absence of structures that, at the same time, can facilitate the flow of ideas among communities and transform them into effective courses of individual and collective action, including actions to reform the center. Finally, although such structures will take a long time to evolve, we believe that central actors that wish to accelerate the spread of schooling and literacy can realize this goal by also working to accelerate the process of organizational development.*

The way to begin is straightforward. It involves engaging in the art of conversation with communities for sustained periods. It is therefore essentially the same as ONDR, ALTAAWOUN, SECADEV, BELACD, APECD, and others use in their work. There is, however, a basic difference in form and content. For example, animators do not deal with villages independently of each other. Their function is to bring together APEs and other entities that would normally have little or no contact, perhaps at the canton level at first and larger areas later, and then guide discussions into the organizational realm by asking questions that participants and outsiders do not usually ask. Further, if asked for counsel, the animator never offers a direct reply. Every answer refers to what some other community elsewhere in the country (or in another country) might have done or, if there is no example, he or she says this and then indicates that participants need to devise their own solution because they are the only experts on the subject.

These conversations are costly to arrange and to sustain, and can prove frustrating to participants because the territory is new and because the animator, breaking with the centralist tradition of telling people what they must do to qualify for tangible assistance, seems to offer nothing of practical value while consuming a lot of their time. And the procedure is not nearly as simple in practice as we make it appear on paper. Success thus depends on finding the right people to serve as animators. They are difficult to find today. Though there is no shortage of individuals with animation experience, few if any have dealt with organizational development at a scale larger than a village. But if not immediately available, the process can produce the people it needs as it proceeds. There were few experienced animators when ONDR launched its work. It produced them as the work expanded. There is no reason why the same thing cannot happen again.

Although potential demand for such a program is high, the question of whether it can lead to faster emergence of the grander forms of organizational development that we imply above is uncertain. The ultimate result will never be known until one or more actors decide to take the first step. We understand that the Swiss Development Cooperation agency is planning such a step, and hope that it proceeds because Chad and other Sahelian societies will gain much from the experience.

### **C. Beyond Education**

If circumstance had not steered us to education this report might have focussed on self-managed markets, water supply and irrigation, agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, health, or any one of several other areas where local finance and management has become or is in the process of becoming more important than that of the central apparatus. Exploration of another sector would have yielded observations different from those we document here. But there would have been similarities, about the roles of demand, economic circumstances, social capital, and the perceived "public" character of things, for example, and about the capacity of communities to understand their milieus and to assess and execute new ideas.

One may therefore imagine that our conclusions might be similar too. We might not say that villagers are capable of creating, financing, and managing every type of service without external assistance. Nor might we say that their knowledge about ways to improve upon what they do is superior in all instances. But for many cases we would probably suggest that lack of organizational structures to promote the flow of knowledge and to change policies at the center slows the rate at which a new or improved service spreads through the society. From this we would argue that actors wishing to increase the rate could help themselves and their target populations by working to create and strengthen pertinent local organizations. We might ignore CSPSCO. APECD would have a place if the subject were health or agriculture.

Had we focussed on a group of services rather than one, a new theme would be that communities which supply goods and services for themselves engage in the process of local governance. More important, the village associations, sectoral committees, and other entities responsible for finance and management of this supply are embryos of what may later become recognized forms of local government. Most important, in fundamental respects these embryos already function as local government, at least informally, because their origins satisfy the definition of government in most societies. That is, on their own or with help of outside consultants (e.g., ONDR animators), people of a territory collectively decide to create a new organizational structure for the common good to deal with matters that they cannot address via existing mechanisms. In the process they voluntarily transfer to the new entity the right and authority to exercise direction and control over the actions of specific individuals (e.g., teachers, parents) in specific areas of communal life (e.g., schooling).

It requires only a little stretch of imagination to view the APE or school committee that works within the framework of a village association as the local government's community education department. This department has a financial section which alone or in conjunction with the larger entity collects school taxes in the form of dues and user fees in the form of tuition and registration charges, incurs public debt when tax revenues are less than expenses (e.g., to teachers), transfers surpluses to the community's treasury for use by other sectoral departments when expenses are less than revenues, and initiates special fund-raising actions if required. The public works section organizes construction and repair of buildings and equipment. Procurement obtains books and materials. Personnel recruits teachers, negotiates salaries, supervises performance, and, if necessary, sanctions or dismisses them. External relations cultivates and maintains contact with the inspector, non-government organizations, donors, alumni (i.e., village natives that live in towns), and chance visitors.

*Whether one does or does not accept the idea that community entities are local governments, adopting the view that APEs and committees such as those we met act like branches of government offers insights that seem relevant to improving or expanding all services in all countries of the Sahel. One is that they show the existence of a willingness in communities to self-tax for the common good when it is clear that common good will result and when they are assured that they have control of the uses to which their resources are put.*

Second is that tax rates are respected by village taxpayers when they are part of the process of deciding the rates. This respect is reinforced by the sophistication of local taxation systems. These usually show a finely-tuned capacity, based on a high level of knowledge of village economic circumstances, to adjust rates according to the ability to pay. When the economy falters, as in Bar-Koh and parts of Mayo-Kebbi/Est, everyone knows who suffers and who can or cannot pay. Tax rates and fees, as a result, tend to be progressive. The same knowledge also allows entities to assess willingness to pay. By being intolerant of this, unwillingness to pay on the part of those who have the resources, they limit the problem of "free riders" (i.e., people that use a public service but choose not to pay for it) that bothers taxpayers in all countries. Progressive taxation and minimization of free riders help to maintain the credibility of tax assessors and collectors everywhere.

Third is that this sophistication extends to fiscal resourcefulness, which further nurtures the respect of taxpayers. An example is the jointly-financed education service arranged by adjacent villages in Ouaddai. Similar arrangements in the United States, made for the same reasons as in Ouaddai, led to the evolution and institutionalization of the "special school district" that today serves as the single school administration for groups of towns. Another example is the deliberate flexibility accorded to the student-teacher ratio. This is also one of the ways that education systems adapt to economic and fiscal disaster in wealthier countries.

Together, these insights suggest that there is considerable scope for successful devolution of tax authority to individual communities because taxpayers will view the local system as fair. Given the tremendous inter-village differences in conditions and tax rates that we have seen with respect to community schooling, such systems are at the very least likely to be regarded as fairer than rates devised by outsiders, such as the implicit charges imposed by canton chiefs on Erning Melek, Kalgoua, and Goro-Ndila, unrealistic charges requested by APECD in canton Djokou, and flat taxes and user fees that governments and donors often propose as means to co-finance services in other parts of the Sahel.

Expanding this theme, we have also seen considerable inter-village variation in perceived priorities between sectors and within them. Schooling could as readily be the most or least important item in a list of planned community actions that includes wells, dispensaries, health, agriculture, and other items. Within education, the relative importance accorded to construction, expansion, books, supplies, salaries, state teachers, training, official status, debt repayment, and the like also varies. In most instances community rankings seemed eminently sensible. When it is hard to find, water should be ahead of education. When a village cannot enroll children because state schools turn them away, or when an existing facility cannot protect students and materials from the rains for two or three months, construction should take precedence. Similarly, as noted earlier, if the only way to raise enrollment and/or willingness to pay is to obtain official status, and if the only way to get this status is by obtaining a state teacher, then this is the right thing to strive for.

Because it reflects understanding of immediate realities, a community's general or sectoral development plan, to paraphrase what we said about taxation, is likely to be regarded by villagers as reasonable and, therefore, is also likely to elicit the resources required to implement it. This plan may have flaws, but it will be less flawed than plans prepared by outsiders who do not understand local priorities or grasp why they are what they are. Non-governmental organizations may have good reason to insist that villages obtain official status for their schools or experiment with the curriculum. The state and donors may have equally good reason to insist that communities respect the *carte scolaire*, accept adult literacy training for their APEs, and narrow the difference in enrollment rates of boys and girls. Still, these things have more to do with the priorities of the outsiders than the priorities of communities. This is usually a main reason that external plans do not reach many of their goals, especially goals related to local resource mobilization.

The implication in this instance is that there also exists considerable scope for successful devolution of responsibility for planning public services. This is because communities are better equipped than outsiders to know whether an action will result in improvement of the common good and, as with taxation, are more likely to respect and support the plan if they are part of the process of designing it.

It follows that national governments and donors have much to gain by treating the embryonic local governments that villages have created for themselves as full partners in the design and implementation of all public goods and services. They also have much to gain by actions that can strengthen the community entities that already exist and stimulate their emergence where they are absent. The activities and experiences of ONDR, ALTAAWOUN, SECADEV, and BELACD, though we may question some of the things they do and some of the ways they think, together with the information we collected during visits to community schools, provide ample evidence that mutually beneficial co-financing, cost sharing, and joint planning is possible in Chad. If it is possible in Chad then it is also possible in every other country of the region. What is required is the will to begin, as we've already said, by talking with communities.

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