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**ASSESSMENT OF RWANDAN
LOCAL AUTHORITIES' CAPACITY
AND
FORMULATION OF STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT**

Final Report

May 1994



ESATD Contract no. 696-0130



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Study team

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CAPAD	Cellule d'Animation et d'Appui à l'Elaboration des Plans de Developpement communaux
C.C.	Conseil communal
C.C.D.F.P.	Centre communal de Développement et de Formation permanente
C.D.	Conseil de Développement
C.I.D.	Crédit intercommunal de Développement
C.P.M.	Contribution personnelle minimum
C.T.	Commission technique
F.A.B.	Fonctionnaire Assistant du Bourgmestre
FAC	Fonds d'Aide et de Coopération, France
F.D.C.	Fonds de Développement communal
FOSOC	Fonds de Solidarité communale
F.R.W.	Francs rwandais
GOR	Government of Rwanda
I.G.B.	Impôt sur le gros Bétail
I.S.A.P	Institut supérieur d'Administration publique
MINAGRI	Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage
MININTER	Ministère de l'Intérieur et du Développement communal
MINIPLAN	Ministère du Plan
MINITRAPE	Ministère des Travaux Publics, de l'Energie et de l'Eau
O.N.G.	Organisations non gouvernementales
PAC	Plan d'Action communal
S.P.D.	Système de Planification décentralisée
U.N.R.	Université nationale du Rwanda
U.S.A.I.D.	U.S. Agency for International Development

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Based on the Study Team's initial discussions with the personnel of MININTER (Ministère de l'Intérieur et du Développement Communal), both sides agreed that this report's analysis of the existing situation would be based principally on studies already conducted by various Government of Rwanda (GOR) and external agencies. As a result, the team was able to use limited time to devise a framework for communal decentralization and democratization instead of doing a detailed study that would necessarily duplicate much of the research of the August 1992 study by University of Rwanda (U.N.R.) professors.¹

The consultants focused on dialogue with the various representatives of the GOR, the Rwandan agencies and associations, and the donor community to determine the most feasible and complementary set of recommendations comprising the strategic framework for local government strengthening and development. The final meeting of the Study Team with the management team of the MININTER allowed consultants and clients to mutually confirm a strategy for meeting the changing and demanding environment Rwandan leaders will face during the two-year interim period before elections.

The assessment of the capacity of Rwandan communes is divided into four categories:

- institutions and administration
- finances
- service delivery
- local participation

The consultants assessed the findings and recommendations of preceding studies, roundtables, and workshops in light of their observations during site visits and interviews made during the course of this study. The results confirm previous research and policy dialogues and provide an update on the latest conditions following the peace accords and agreement to establish an interim government. The assessment establishes the base for a strategy to move from analysis and discussion to specific and coordinated action.

The objective of real reform to democratize and decentralize Rwandan communes has eluded proponents since the 1960s. Events of the transition period may likewise overcome reform again. However, MININTER representatives who spoke with the study team realize that past practices cannot continue or communal development will stagnate. MININTER, in its role of *tutelle* to communes, understands that relationships between central government and commune and between commune and citizen must change:

The strategic framework that evolved will combine GOR and donor effort and resources in a coordinated program of training, technical assistance, and a participation fund. All levels of

¹ Bugingo et al., Etude sur la commune du Rwanda, Août 1992.

government and society would participate: MININTER and other ministries and the prefectures involved in local government affairs, communal elected and appointed officials, and associations and organizations representative of citizens within communes.

The strategic framework calls first for national-level "white paper" conferences. These would address decentralization of authority to communes in detail sufficient to proceed quickly into legislation or regulation. The major themes would be:

- transfer of service responsibilities;
- transfer of revenues;
- administrative reform;
- fiscal reform; and
- local citizen participation.

It is critical that such conferences result in concrete reforms at the commune level. To promote action:

- high-level inter-ministerial representation must be present at such conferences;
- donors concerned with decentralization must actively participate in and organize such conferences;
- the results must be put into "white paper" reports that can be acted on by the Legislative Assembly or President; and
- deadlines must be set for action on resolutions and their implementation in communes.

I. INTRODUCTION

A democratic community is the principal external sign of the democratic beliefs among individuals.² The historian Charles Alexis de Toqueville is credited with the statement:

"Local institutions place liberty within the reach of a body of people who, through these institutions, see liberty in action and become accustomed to exercising it. Without local institutions, such a body cannot provide for its own free government."

To play its role fully, the structure of a democratic commune rests on four inalienable principles:

- (1) All of the commune's council members should be democratically elected.

It is vital that the commune's council members be elected democratically. But it is also vital that the mayor be appointed by the electorate or chosen from and by the elected council members.

- (2) A commune should be invested with its own specific areas of authority.

An effective decentralized government always seeks to establish the closest possible contact between those who benefit from a public service and those in charge of providing that service.

- (3) The commune should have its own financial means.

A country's tax policies should allow the country's communes to have genuine autonomy. If this autonomy cannot be achieved exclusively by taxes assessed on the citizens, as in the case of poor areas for example, the state's tax revenues should be adequately and objectively reallocated.

- (4) The supervisory function of the State should be kept to a minimum.

When a commune operates within the legislative powers it has been accorded, the State should restrict itself to supervising only the legality of the commune's actions; the political and administrative ramifications of a commune's decision are its own concern.

The context for the following assessment and strategic framework is the Rwandan commune, cornerstone of local development and administration; however, this institution has failed to match up to democratic principles of local government. The assessment shows much need to improve how local leaders are selected, what functions communes are charged with, what

²This text was inspired by a article written by Prof. Hermann Wunsch, Twin Sister Cooperation Rhineland Palatinate - Kwanda, in the *Revue Courier*.

revenues are available and how they are managed, and how to keep the role of the central government in local government affairs to a minimum.

With much room for improvement and much disappointment in the past, there is still hope for democratic reform of the commune in Rwanda. The strategic framework for addressing the obstacles to communal development presented in this study proceeds hopefully and pragmatically at the same time. Based on positive experiences of strengthening local governments elsewhere, particularly in Africa, the framework's components are designed to work together. National policy seminars, training and technical assistance, and a participation fund are presented here to provide the framework for an action program for decentralization and democratization in Rwanda during the upcoming transition period.

II. ASSESSMENT

A. Institutions and Administration

This section presents an assessment of the major constraints and reform options relating to the institutions and administrative structure that affect Rwandan communes. These constraints derive from the legal and regulatory framework and communal practice that have evolved in Rwanda under conditions of resource scarcity and population pressure. Strong central control and moves for more local autonomy have been at odds since the establishment of communes at independence. While such conflict characterizes central and local relations everywhere, in Rwanda now consensus exists that change must come to sort out responsibilities and prerogatives in a move toward decentralized authority.³

1. Major Constraints

Constraint: Competing lines of authority and responsibility

The absence of clear lines of responsibility and authority between the central government and the commune is a severe constraint on developing a strong local government system.⁴ The technical ministries that provide essential agricultural, health, water, and education services now work largely independently of the commune government.⁵ Communes, principally through the office of the burgomaster, are charged with coordinating the programs and activities of technical ministries but fall short of the task due to lack of organization and resources. Thus, some projects are not adequately maintained by the local population while others are entirely abandoned. Moreover, because of ineffective communication between local ministry and communal agents, redundancies and contradictions appear in their respective project activities.⁶ The existence of prefects and sub-prefects, also charged with coordinating roles, makes the administrative environment more complex in a way that undercuts the communal governments' powers to plan and direct services. The accompanying diagram (Figure 1) shows how central planning and oversight ministries and their deconcentrated representatives (prefect and sub-prefects), along with the technical ministries, have a negative impact on coordination of services in the commune.


³ MININTER. Colloque sur le Renforcement de l'Autogestion de la Commune Rwandaise (Octobre 1989). In the address by the Minister of Interior the first handicap to strengthening communes was a centralized legal and administrative framework that was top-heavy and confusing. pp. 4-5.

⁴ See Bugingo et al., op. cit., pp. 28-37. This study dramatically documented the overlapping and confusing areas of authority by surveying public and local authorities' perceptions of responsibilities.

⁵ See Bugingo et al., op. cit., "De la perception de l'intervention de l'Etat dans la commune: Responsabilité des communes par rapport aux Ministères Techniques". pp. 31-33.

⁶ The Burgomasters and other communal agents of the three Communes visited (Kigoma, Bwakira, and Kabarondo) were unanimous in stating that some of the Technical Ministries' activities were performed without their knowledge and sometimes despite their disagreement.

Figure 1: LACK OF COORDINATION AT THE COMMUNE LEVEL




As a result of constant central intervention, not only has the communes' decision making autonomy been greatly reduced, but communal personnel have lost much of their motivation to design and implement development plans, let alone to integrate local populations into the process. In turn, the communes have lost much credibility because they have not been responsive to the desires and needs of local populations.

Constraint: Centralized control over local institutions

The central government's traditional power and influence over local affairs now shows itself in the institutions most basic to communal self-determination--the burgomaster and the communal deliberative and advisory bodies. Burgomasters are appointed, rather than elected, and are placed under the authority of the Prefect. This gives central authorities strong control and monitoring powers over the activities of the commune.

The Communal Council, an elected body, is assisted in its development tasks by two appointed boards: the Technical Commission and the Council for Communal Development. (See Figure 2.) According to the Decree-Law of 1974 on the Organization of the Commune, the Technical Council's role is to assist the Communal Council in the identification, appraisal, preparation, and fund raising activities of local projects. All its members are appointed by the Minister of Interior. The Council for Communal Development's official role is to evaluate current projects and make recommendations to the Communal Council. Members of the Council for Communal Development include all members of the Technical Council, Communal Council, and heads of the locally represented technical ministries.

Figure 2: COMMUNE ADMINISTRATION



In practice these two communal organizations have usurped the Communal Council's decision-making autonomy: the Technical Council and the Council for Communal Development, rather than the elected body, approve and enact the communal development plans. Yet, because the largely-appointed bodies do not hold meetings on a regular basis and cannot achieve quorum when they do meet, they have proven to be an obstacle to communal development. More importantly, it is apparent that these two organizations are more representative of central authorities than of local populations. Even the Communal Council is not truly representative of the local population since all Communal Council members are informally approved by the burgomaster prior to communal elections.⁷

2. Analysis of Options

If reform is to be effective, it must address these two constraints: competing lines of authority and responsibility; and centralized control of local institutions. The current institutional and administrative framework of communal government in Rwanda calls for major reform to achieve a greater degree of decentralization and democratic participation.

Strengthening communal governments will require addressing constraints at both the central and local levels. To overcome these constraints, change must affect the technical ministries that provide services and the ministries that direct and monitor communal administration and planning, MININTER and MINIPLAN. MININTER must become an advocate for much increased communal self-management. MININTER's Local Government Division (Direction du Développement Communal) can play this advocacy role in its dealing with other ministries and with donors. By having an ambitious, results-oriented plan for training and technical assistance to communes, MININTER can begin immediately to move from a control orientation to one of helping communes.

At the local level, nothing less than the election of burgomasters is called for. This institutional change is necessary to make communal government participatory, but also accountable and open. The flight of appointed burgomasters from communes where citizens have rejected them and the subsequent election of burgomasters in these communes during 1993 point dramatically to the necessity of local elections to this principal local post.

A major local reform of communal government must be the establishment of real technical service divisions to complement those on the administrative side of the typical commune. This can proceed immediately, as needed, with market clean-up and sweeping, road repair, and waste pickup--the most elemental local services. With negotiations involving line ministries more substantial functions relating to education, health, forestry, and agriculture may be devolved.

At the local level, the lack of qualified and motivated personnel is constantly cited as a roadblock to communal development. In response to the inability of communes to hire and retain competent employees, some propose the creation of a local government personnel

⁷ See Nguyen Huu, Khiem. Propositions pour une Politique Generale de Developpement Communal, Mars 1993, pp 9-10; and Bugingo et al., op.cit, pp 41-48.

system that provides benefits and security similar to those of central civil servants.⁸ Pernicious, long-term human resource problems must be addressed, but we are skeptical of costly, centrally-administered programs that would remove the communes' control over staffing and remuneration. The emphasis of reform, we believe, should be in making the burgomaster's post an elected one and in delegating fiscal responsibilities to communes. When communes can meet payroll on time and pay wages appropriate to the local conditions, then they will have overcome the major obstacle to finding and retaining qualified local personnel.

Besides change at the local level, change must come to the *tutelle*, MININTER, so as to better support communes through technical assistance and training. There now exists no technical assistance and training unit of MININTER with the mission of supporting the management of communes. Analytical capability to monitor and review the personnel, service delivery, and financial status of communes exists in an embryonic stage. Many years of work and constant levels of financial support for training and analytical budgets will be required to transform the ministry's local government support role into an effective one.

B. Finances

Communal economic and social development is inhibited by the lack of financial resources available to the communes. Their total revenues represent approximately 4% of the national budget, although an increasing amount of developmental responsibility is devolved to communes. The central government's annual allocation of investment funds (internal and external) to the communes does not follow a clear and standard set of allocation criteria, thereby precluding any rational communal planning of the use of these transfer funds. To the contrary, this type of arbitrary resource allocation has enhanced the communes' dependence on central authorities and has made them focus on short-term objectives rather than long-range planning.⁹

The legal and administrative structures of Rwandan local government finances have been and should remain of critical concern to all who would intervene to strengthen communes. As testament to the importance of communal finances in Rwandan decentralization reform, they have been much reviewed and analyzed by the GOR and external agencies and individuals. Problems have been highlighted in three main areas: the structure of local revenues and expenditures, access and control of finances, and financial management practices.

1. Major Constraints

In these areas, three major groups of constraints have been identified.

Constraint: Fiscal legislation and practices

Existing fiscal legislation and practices hinder decentralization and democratization. The

⁸ See the statistical review and reform proposals in Bumbakare's and Benaissa's Les Moyens Humains des Communes Rwandaises (Juin 1991), especially pp. 35-36, Propositions.

⁹ See Nguyen, op.cit, p. 11; Bugingo et al., op.cit, p. 58; and The World Bank, Rwanda: The Role of the Communes in Socio-Economic Development, 1987, pp. 15-20.

underlying legal principle of this constraint is residual taxation: i.e., communes may only tax those sources not already taxes by the national government. The result is that all existing high yield revenue sources belong to the central government. Since no strong tax base, like a local property tax, exists for communes, their finances are systematically weak vis-à-vis the central government. This state of affairs runs contrary to principles of decentralized government.

Constraint: Rural and urban commune dichotomy

The existence of two distinct types of communes makes it difficult to apply a single type of fiscal solution for all local institutions; in the short term, it is an impossibility. Thus, in the few larger, more urbanized areas (Kigali and Butare principally) the existence and development of local infrastructure and services, accompanied by land registration reform, could open the door to a short-term operating budget equilibrium. Financing of capital infrastructure, even in these few localities, is quite another matter. For incurring long-term debt for financing capital expenditures, it is unlikely that local government themselves could access loan capital without central government or international guarantees, even if legal and regulatory restraints on communes' borrowing were inexistent.

A drastically different financial situation exists in smaller communes and areas with no urban characteristics. Small, rural communes are walking a fiscal tightrope that inhibits them from even hoping to balance their operating budget. The idea of raising own-source revenues for capital expenditures is illusory. For these communes and areas to push to the limit the existing local tax base without developing corresponding local services would only result either in severe taxpayer resistance or in having people vote with their feet, fleeing to communes of more lax enforcement.

Constraint: Lack of motivation and ethics

The third major constraint to improved communal finances is a lack of motivation and ethics commonly found in communal personnel, particularly problematic in accounting and collections staff. This lack is principally attributable to major breeches in the assignment of responsibilities to personnel that often do not have the authority and means to carry them out and that are simply not made accountable.

Organizing the reform proposals from the various sources is the purpose of the following table that presents, item by item, the current situation with proposed remedies. The material for this table was gathered and organized by the study team from previous documents and augmented and updated by interviews during the course of this study.¹⁰

¹⁰Ploquin, M. Projet d'expose des motifs de la loi portant reorganisation de la fiscalite locale (Annex 10) FMI/MINIFIN, 1993. pp. 75-81.

MININTER. La Reforme Communale au Rwanda. Juillet 1992. pp. 29-38. communal.

J-P Galland. Rwanda, Registre d'information de l'occupation fonciere urbaine. Ministere de la Cooperation et du Developpement et Ministere de l'equipement des Transports et du Tourisme. Aout 1993. pp. 75-81.

Bugingo et al., op. cit., pp. 57-84 et p. 132-144

Nguyen, op. cit., pp. 26-30 et pp. 32-41.

TAX ISSUES

The present situation	Proposed solutions
<p>1. The three main sources of revenue for the communes (minimal personal tax [C.P.M.], tax on high-value property [I.G.B], and market tolls) do not meet the communes' operating costs, and these sources of revenue account for only 3.5% of the Central Government's operating budget. This inadequate revenue gives rise to a number of small and unproductive taxes (33 taxes have been identified).</p>	<p>1. The many local taxes would be reduced by rewriting legislation to specify the share of tax revenues to go to the communes. It is recommended that an average budget of 20.9 million FRW be set aside for the communes. This would represent about 11% of the Central Government's operating budget.</p>
<p>2. The inability to operate within the budget stifles the transfer of development capital to the communes, thereby creating almost total dependence on the Central Government and on providers of funds (sponsors); as a result, local planning is weakened.</p>	<p>2. Only an extensive reform of the tax system can solve the problem of inadequate revenue. Nevertheless, even now local planning can be improved if the Central Government establishes policies which include investment conditions, limits, and criteria.</p>
<p>3. There are problems in the communes' tax revenues, which are residuals from the Central Government's tax revenues. These problems include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● little room for maneuvering; ● tax revenue is low, despite an 80% tax recovery rate prior to 1993; ● a crisis in tax recovery in 1993, due to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the multi-party system - disregard for the law - growing poverty 	<p>3. A thorough revision of the tax system and gradual transfer of resources to the local level are needed. Eliminate the concept of residual tax allocations and specify, through legislation, the communes' share of tax revenues.</p>
<p>4. There is a lack of legislation clearly defining the communes' areas of financial responsibility. There is lack of coordination on tax issues between the Central Government and the communes.</p>	<p>4. An overall reform of the tax system is proposed.</p>
<p>5. Tax revenue from different types of taxes varies depending on whether a rural or urban area is involved. Thus, in urban areas the communes' taxes provide 65% of local resources (99% in the Kigali prefecture), while head taxes provide 54% in rural areas (63% in Kibuye, Gitesi).</p>	<p>5. Two categories of tax solutions are proposed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Transferring from the Central Government to the local government tax revenues on improved and unimproved land, rental income, income taxes, and trade taxes. (N.B.: These taxes, combined with a percentage of corporate and industrial tax revenues, should amount to the targeted 11% of the Central Government's operating budget.) ● Extensively redesign Rwanda's local tax system, incorporating the following taxes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - trade tax increases; - land tax; - tax on dwellings; and - three compensatory taxes; site royalties, a tax on household waste collection and consular fees.

TAX ISSUES	
The present situation	Proposed solutions
6. The communes' true tax potential is misunderstood.	6. A thorough inventory of the communes' assets, an updated listing of the potential tax base, a classification of markets, and an improved method for collecting taxes are the main approaches proposed.

ISSUES CONCERNING HUMAN RESOURCES FOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT	
The present situation	Proposed solutions
1. There is a lack of local cooperation in decision-making on investments.	1. Community decentralization would result in increased local participation which, in turn, would promote economic development.
2. Personnel responsible for financial management are inadequately trained resulting in suboptimal use of personnel and questionable accounting practices.	2. The situation would be improved as a result of a more precise definition of the respective responsibilities of those involved: the prefect, mayor, authorizing officer, accountant, and auditor.
3. Salaries account for 80% of the communes' expenditure.	3. No quantitative recommendation is proposed on this point. Qualitatively, careful consideration of the use of local personnel and their status versus the State's employees is recommended.
4. There is a lack of motivation on the part of those in charge of financial operations. This situation is attributed to a lack of support for the communes' financial personnel. This lack of support is considered to result from a Central-Government that lacks resources, and insists on compliance.	4. Legislative coherence in the description of responsibilities and authority in fiscal matters. Programs of professional training for communal finance personnel must be developed and implemented.
5. The Central Government insists on compliance in difficult matters, rather than attempting to facilitate or even provide instruction on such issues.	5. The Central Government could play a facilitating and even an instructional role in a decentralized system.
6. There have been instances of corruption and disregard for regulations and the directives of those in charge, along with inconsistent punishments for infractions.	6. A more rigorous accounting system is recommended, by introducing a "visa" system for approving local financial transactions.

FINANCIAL ISSUES	
The present situation	Proposed solutions
1. The commune does not play a sufficient role in decisions regarding funds for development.	1. The participation of the mayors in FOSOC (Fonds de Solidarité Communale) would improve this situation.

FINANCIAL ISSUES	
The present situation	Proposed solutions
2. Access to providers of funds is haphazard; access to core funds is difficult to count on and the procedure is not clear.	2. Use FOSOC to redistribute funds fairly to the communes. FOSOC would be financed by the Central Government and by the international providers of funds, and would be managed by the mayors.
3. A complicated accounting system is in use.	3. Simplifying and modernizing the accounting rules and procedures is proposed.
4. Communes have inadequate or outdated equipment and supplies.	4. No solution is proposed on this issue.

1. Analysis of Options

Concerning communal fiscal legislation and practice, we strongly urge that the Government of Rwanda act as quickly as possible on fiscal reforms that would recognize the necessity of fiscal autonomy for local government. Action would entail both the delegation of certain lucrative taxes, such as property taxes, to local authorities and the redistribution (*perequation*) of certain national revenue; for example, import-export taxes, business taxes, or energy taxes. Recommendations along these lines should be addressed to the authorities by panels of experts including ministry officials, international experts, and leaders of Rwandan institutions. The format recommended to develop these recommendations is the national policy seminars described in the strategic framework section of this report.

To deal with the issue of the growing dichotomy between smaller, rural communes and the emerging more-urbanized ones, we suggest that for larger communes the property tax be seriously considered as the major local revenue and basis for long-term local fiscal autonomy. Many models and variations of property taxation worldwide attest to the importance of a land-based local revenue source. The simplified land register (*cadastre simplifié*) approach now being tested in Kigali and Butare¹¹ builds on experience gained in the African context and adapted to historical land tenure practices in Rwanda. It is our belief that a property tax, along with other fee-based secondary revenue sources, could produce in these larger communes an operating budget equilibrium in a relatively short time.

In smaller and more rural communes, practical and historical factors render property taxation quite difficult, if not impossible, in the short term. We recommend that solutions along the following lines be considered: reform of the fee-based revenues that would tie fees to identifiable services, accompanied by a reliable and predictable redistribution of national revenues. This would be accompanied by a system to transfer revenue from central to communal treasuries that would impose a balanced yearly operating budget on all benefitting communes.

For financing capital expenditures both large and rural communes are not prepared to

¹¹ Under the direction of the MINITRAPE and in collaboration with the local administrations of Kigali and Butare, the French (FAC) have provided technical assistance for surveying and assessing land holdings in preparation for property tax billing and collection. See Galland, op. cit.. The property tax activities are part of the World Bank's *Projet de renforcement des institutions urbaines* (R.I.U.).

manage long-term debt. The need for the creation of locally-controlled financial mechanism of national scope is widely discussed and generally accepted in Rwanda.¹² We share this belief and see this mechanism as a rationalizing instrument for international donor finance of local infrastructure projects. For such a mechanism to be acceptable to donors, policies to manage donor-imposed criteria and procedures for monitoring and auditing would be essential for the injection of such international funds. This idea will be elaborated in the strategic framework section.

Finally, to remedy the lack of motivation and ethics that plagues financial administration in communes, we propose two corrective measures. First, legislative coherence in the description of responsibilities and authority in fiscal matters is essential. Second, programs of professional training for communal finance personnel must be developed and implemented. Later sections on training and technical assistance will discuss how to proceed.

C. Service Delivery

Communal service delivery typically involves administrative activities. Thus communal staff consistently carry out functions of civil registry, land registry, and the hearing of court cases. Services that in most countries are organized in a technical division of local government, such as road maintenance, solid waste collection and disposal, bus and truck park provision and maintenance, and water provision do not exist except in the largest and most urbanized Rwandan communes.

1. Major Constraints

Constraint: Weak or nonexistent technical service divisions

Within communal boundaries the principal human- and business-related services are provided by central government personnel assigned to various geographical units, units that differ according to the ministries. The principal examples of these central personnel are: agricultural agents; water supply agents; primary and secondary school instructors, principals, and inspectors; clinic and hospital workers; and road maintenance teams.

Communes do coordinate and supervise the construction of infrastructure, principally buildings for schools and clinics. Financing for construction comes from external sources, mostly international donors. Expenditures for the repair and maintenance of infrastructure are not to be found in communal budgets. Instead, burgomasters must constantly seek external donors for renovation and repairs or allow infrastructure investments to crumble into unusable condition.

Constraint: Lack of credibility of technicians assigned to communes

Although the current practice of delegating central government technicians and of training these personnel centrally for communal service provision is generally regarded as necessary in the short term, in the long term we consider this approach a significant constraint on communal credibility. This is especially true for smaller and more remote communes, which

¹² See Nguyen, op. cit., pp. 32-37.

are considered to have little career potential.

2. Analysis of Options

Building technical service capacity and remedying the lack of credibility of technicians assigned to communes will require reducing the number of deconcentrated personnel in communes and their replacement by local staff. Any effort to improve service delivery at the local level must, sooner or later, be closely tied to developing human resources of a truly local character. A long-term approach to this constraint involves professional training of local and regional personnel who can find motivation at the communal level. It has been our experience that local and regional personnel often better understand the needs and aspirations of local populations and thus demonstrate a better quality of response, which will favor the development of credibility and trust among local citizenry toward communal administration.

To be practical, responsibility for the training of communal staff must be assigned in the short run to a central ministry, most directly MININTER. In a longer time frame, as the various local services evolve, more specific and specialized training should originate from the initiatives of communal staff associations, such as associations secretaries general, town accountants, and technical service directors found in countries with strong local governments.

D. Local Participation

Rwanda's experience with local participation in communal development has not been satisfactory. Although the communes have been called upon to act as the *cellule de base du développement communal* for the last two decades,¹³ the central authorities have not enacted the necessary transfers of responsibilities and resources for effective decentralization.

On the contrary, reforms have consistently reduced the communes' decision-making autonomy and reinforced their financial dependence on central authorities. As a result, most communes do not have sufficient resources to cover their operational budgets let alone design, execute, and monitor their development and investment plans.

Interviews with officials in Bwakira, the first commune to enact a communal development plan based on active population participation, revealed that their communal plan objectives were not only too ambitious but also relied too heavily--up to 70%--on external financing.¹⁴ Bwakira officials stated that the chronic lack of local resources induces them to design ambitious plans to increase their chances of interesting at least one external donor in financing part of their plan.

In most communes the lack of qualified human resources inhibits the design and implementation of communal development plans. This constraint stems from the perception that planning must be done by technically trained personnel. Thus, communal officials often claim to need some form of institutional strengthening and/or technical training to alleviate

¹³ Since the advent of the Second Republic, on July 5 1973, the Commune's administrative and political role was expanded to include social and economic development responsibilities.

¹⁴ See *Plan de Développement Communal 1988-1992: Document de Synthèse*, Commune de Bwakira, 1987, p. 56.

this deficiency. However, supplying all communes with an adequate number of qualified personnel is not a viable option in the current Rwandan economic context. Rather, the participatory approach to communal development planning, with adequate participatory mechanisms and structures, can alleviate this constraint.¹⁵

1. Major Constraints

Based on reports and interviews with local and expatriate development experts,¹⁶ the major obstacles to enhanced local participation in communal development can be grouped under the following three issues:

- excessive oversight by central authorities,
- lack of financial and human resources, and
- lack of participatory mechanisms.

Because the report has earlier discussed the first two constraints in the sections on institutions, finances, and services, this section will treat the lack of effective participatory mechanisms.

Constraint: Lack of participatory mechanisms

There are numerous associations, cooperatives, and other types of population networks throughout the communes. These networks sprung up mainly to acquire stronger "bargaining power" with the communal authorities in their land claims and other administrative requests. They are usually organized along economic sector lines (farmers, breeders, weavers, etc.) and tend not to associate with each other. Over the last 10 years, however, the activities of these groups have expanded to include such things as project management committees and credit and health mutuals.

Despite the existence of these groups, there has been a lack of either official or informal mechanisms for facilitating regular dialogue and debate between central and communal agents and local populations. As a result efforts to enhance participatory planning have not been successful. Even communes that have implemented development plans formulated with local participation have not achieved positive results, largely because of this lack of communication.¹⁷

During our interviews with the local associations of Bwakira, many representatives were not aware that a communal development plan had been elaborated, and those that were aware stated that only one meeting had been held to register their initial views and needs. All wished that more meetings would be held and wanted to be included in the final approval

¹⁵ See Nguyen, op. cit, pp 11-12.

¹⁶ The authors are particularly indebted to Mr. Celestin Gahamanyi, Mr. Khiem Nguyen Huu, and Mr. Said Benaissa for their insights on local participation and communal development.

¹⁷ See Séminaire sur les Stratégies et Politiques d'Aménagement et de Développement Régional et Local au Rwanda, Centre IWACU, PNUD, May 1993, Annexes 13-16.

stages of all projects.

In Kigoma, the commune has instituted a "Communal Development Projects Office" whose main objective is to help project staff communicate more efficiently with local beneficiaries. To the extent that this office uses established local population networks, it will gain credibility and it could lay the groundwork for future models of efficient participatory mechanisms and structures.¹⁸

2. Analysis of Options

The study team found that the topic of local participation has elicited numerous options. The principal proposals for building and institutionalizing local participatory development mechanisms can be categorized as follows:

- Create "light participatory structures" similar to the organizational structures of current associations and other small informal groups. The purpose would be to mobilize local populations and to reach consensus on objectives and implementation strategies of projects.
- Induce the creation of local business associations and give local private entrepreneurs "most favored status" in all public tenders.
- Create project monitoring and evaluation committees regrouping communal agents and local populations.
- Abolish the Technical Council and Development Council and use the FOSOC funds to help communes to identify and design tasks.
- Make all communal requests for project financial assistance contingent upon reaching a formal and consensual agreement with local populations.

While these options are largely untested in Rwanda, experience in the Kibuye region with *planification communale participante* methods have been endorsed by the MININTER and funded by Swiss Cooperation. While proponents of this method admit that a long time frame is required for results,¹⁹ this model benefits from its compatibility with an economic development orientation that appeals to the many physical planners, economists, and engineers whose expertise is infrastructure planning. We agree with the importance of strengthening communes in capital project planning for sound local investment, but would emphasize a management-driven rather than infrastructure-driven approach.


A management-driven approach to building participatory local institutions would be predicated on the principle that a commune administration that effectively communicates with the public on a whole range of issues will plan, build and maintain appropriate, sustainable infrastructure. Figure 3 diagrams the issues linking communes and the public, showing the

¹⁸ See Bureau de Promotion de Projets de Développement en Commune de Kigoma, Commune de Kigoma, 1990.

¹⁹ Nguyen, op. cit., p. 31.

importance of dialogue and communication about more than infrastructure planning. Communes are shown not only exchanging services for resources but also gathering information, especially about service preferences. A communal administration that is more open and accessible to the public requires new attitudes and skills that are teachable. Elections, the budget process, and public meetings represent key linkage issues between the commune administration and the public. Institutionalizing openness and accessibility into these key local procedures will move Rwandan communes closer to their strong democratic counterparts in North America and Europe.

Figure 3: ISSUES IN LINKING COMMUNES WITH THE PUBLIC



III. Strategic Framework


A. Recommended Action Plan

The preceding analysis reveals that the effective decentralization of communes is constrained in strategic areas by two underlying conditions. The first is the lack of clear texts, laws, and national policies on the division of responsibilities between the central authorities, prefectures, and communes. This engenders an environment where the roles of each actor are ill-defined, where responsibilities are either appropriated or simply not assumed, and where officials do not feel accountable since they are not bound by clear official policies. The associated lack of motivation and ethics of communal staff perpetuates, rather than alleviates, the dependence of communes on the central authorities.

The second underlying condition is the lack of human and financial resources at the commune level. This results in financial mismanagement, inappropriate fiscal legislation and practices, weak technical services divisions, lack of credibility of communal administration, and ill-conceived local participation mechanisms. Consequently, central authorities have ample reasons not to institute the necessary transfers of financial and human resources.

To arrest this vicious cycle and to effectively implement decentralization, it is recommended that the MININTER adopt a three-pronged strategy. (See Figure 4.)

Figure 4: STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK: TARGETS AND INTERVENTIONS



- First, at the macro-policy level, it is recommended that a series of National Policy Seminars examine decentralization issues so as to initiate wide-ranging legislative and administrative reform;
- Second, it is proposed to institute pilot training and technical assistance activities in pre-selected communes;
- Third, it is recommended that a Participation Fund be created to complement and enhance the impacts of the pilot activities.

1. National Policy Seminars

Principles

The study team has read an impressive number of reports and seminar summaries none of which has resulted in the implementation of any concrete action plan. Yet, all of the essential decentralization issues and experiences have been analyzed, debated, and synthesized in detail. These documents can form a solid foundation on which to build the National Policy Seminars.

However, the main objective of organizing National Policy Seminars is to compel the central government to address crucial decentralization issues and to coalesce the political will to implement concrete strategies. It is critical to appreciate that the Policy Seminar component represents an essential condition for the ultimate success of the strategy. To ensure success, the GOR will have to formally endorse the seminars, be an active participant in all of the seminar activities, and prepare concrete proposals for the enactment of decentralization legislation.

Activities

The decentralization themes of the National Policy Seminars need to follow a specific path to insure optimal results and efficient use of donor funds. We recommend that the transfer of responsibilities be the first theme addressed. Once the division of responsibilities between the various levels of government has been established, the concomitant transfer of financial, human, and material resources can be more rationally evaluated and better addressed. The fiscal reform should be treated simultaneously with the financial resource transfer theme to avoid either redundancies or contradictions. The administrative reform will sanction and secure the agreed transfers of human resources. Finally, the local participation theme should follow and complement all the previous themes. It will also serve to elucidate the crucial role that local populations must play in the communal development.

This list is by no means intended to be exhaustive. It is illustrative and its ultimate content must depend on the priorities of the MININTER and other interested central authorities.

2. Training and Technical Assistance

Principles

Coordination of training and technical assistance throughout all parts of a program to decentralize and democratize communes is MININTER's responsibility. This is best institutionalized by the establishment of a unit within MININTER specifically for training and technical assistance to communes. The core of the unit should have training design and delivery skills sufficient to elaborate a plan and supervise its operation. On a modest scale at the beginning and over the next two years, it seems most appropriate for staff assigned to this unit to organize training in two or three critical topics and deliver these systematically to targeted sites. The same persons, staff or consultants, who would deliver training would be prepared to follow up with technical assistance visits to resolve implementation problems. Lessons learned from test sites would feed back into future courses, most specifically through formal case studies.

Activities

The activities entailed in developing, delivering, and institutionalizing training and technical assistance for communes will be coordinated by MININTER. According to the model demonstrated at the mini-seminar (see Annex C) by the study team, the following sequence of activities should be planned.

Select priority topics: Specific training topics to address and priorities for delivery of training and technical assistance will be dictated by the results of the national policy seminars. RTI's experience elsewhere with building local government institutions indicates that **financial management** (financial status assessment, revenue administration, and capital improvement planning) and **technical service administration** (organization of technical services and performance measurement) are essential topics. **Orientation and training of local elected officials**, councilors and eventually burgomasters, is important to success in contexts such as found in Rwanda, where a dramatic change of orientation for elected officials is required.

Design courses: Course design should ensure the participation of those necessary to effect the change sought. Often this means training a variety of participants; e.g., elected officials, communal agents, and private business people. RTI's experience in several West Africa countries since 1987 shows the impact to be achieved when project training and technical assistance assemble private and public groups at events that open up dialogue about local services and taxes. (See Annex C for more details about the mini-seminar that was part of the team's interaction with MININTER and USAID staffs.) The model just described does not preclude training directed solely at one class of official, for instance Communal Council Members. RTI experience attests to the importance of gathering together local finance officers or technical service directors, for example, in a training environment that uses the trainees' experiences to solve problems.

Use of Adult Learning Principles: Training to be effective must involve participants in an active manner that uses shared experiences to arrive at a greater understanding of how to make change. Course design (treated above) will require that trainers experienced in adult learning and participatory methods be brought in from the outside during an early period.

Training-of-trainers sessions for MININTER staff assigned to work closest with the program will be essential to transfer adult training skills to a core of staff who can reinforce and help each other over the long term. This scenario does not preclude the use, both in the short and the long term, of local trainers whether in the private sector or from other ministries, to organize and conduct courses, seminars, and workshops.

Follow-up Technical Assistance: To reinforce learning and to troubleshoot problems of implementing action plans developed by participants, follow-up is essential. Such visits on site should be scheduled regularly and budgeted in the initial effort. Experience shows that a core group in the local government support unit of the ministry should be assigned full-time to both train and perform follow-up in the field.

Evaluation: Development of measurable indicators should occur during training and be refined at follow-up. The results should be documented so the next training design will benefit from the findings. Our experience shows how important it is that the coordinating central agency keep precise records of training events and outcomes, both to constantly learn from experience and to improve the training product. Continued budgetary support and donor funding will eventually depend on documenting the training and technical assistance impacts.

3. Participation Fund

Principles

Experiences with communal development plans and other projects indicate that although numerous business associations and groups exist in all communes, the participation of local populations has not been adequate. Yet all of the business or social groups interviewed during this mission wished to be closely involved in the planning, execution, and evaluation activities of communal projects. In cases where local populations have not been involved in the initial development of the project, they did not feel that the project's objectives concerned them and they refused to get involved in either management or maintenance tasks.

The major constraining factor to enhanced participation is the lack of mechanisms and incentives to integrate local populations into the communal decision-making process. A number of the training and technical assistance activities recommended in this report are designed to overcome this problem. Through seminars, workshops, and other mechanisms, communal authorities, local associations, and other community members will learn how to collaborate by sharing information.

Although the main objectives of the pilot training and technical assistance activities are aimed at improving the financial and managerial capacity of communes, revenues that can be channeled to capital investment will not appear immediately. Thus, to enhance and complement pilot training and technical assistance in communes, we recommend that a **Participation Fund** be created and made accessible to communes selected by the project.

The purpose of the Participation Fund, as its name indicates, is to be an incentive and training tool to induce communal authorities to formally integrate local populations into the public project investment decision-making process. Because local participation has significantly improved project management and maintenance performances in countries like

the Ivory Coast and Guinea, we recommend that participatory procedures be made a condition of all funding requests of pilot communes.

A report²⁰ from the MININTER recommends that "light participatory structures" organized along the lines of associations be instituted so as to induce local participation. It is suggested that these structures remain "light", in the sense that they should not be bound by rigid official procedures. In other words, these structures should not be perceived as another administrative device to impose top-to-bottom views. Rather, they should be informal yet officially approved by the communal authorities.

The CAPAD (Cellule d'Animation et d'Appui à l'Elaboration des Plans de Developpement Communaux), a Swiss-financed project, will adopt this light structure strategy in the Kibuye region where an embryonic participation experience is underway. Another participatory mechanism to assess is the Kigoma Communal Development Projects Office. Although this is a formal structure set up by the commune, it has been getting positive responses from local populations. By using established population networks to provide and collect information, the office has gained credibility and is in a position to play an effective intermediary role between the commune and local populations.

It is recommended that MININTER monitor the CAPAD and Kigoma experiences and, if they are successful, replicate them in training seminars in selected communes. Creating permanent participatory structures, formal or informal, will remain a task for the local populations and the communal authorities. These structures may change from commune to commune depending on the types and dynamics of local associations. The important point is that the local population should actively participate in the decision-making process and the communes should be provided with incentives to integrate them into that process.

Participation Fund Eligibility Criteria

We recommend that the following criteria be met before the communes gain access to the Participation Fund:

- Communes must actively engage in the training and technical assistance activities. By linking the three components--training, technical assistance, and participation fund--the impact of funds will be optimized.
- Public investment projects requiring financial assistance from the Participation Fund should demonstrate that the selection and design of projects were the result of a consensual agreement reached between the communal authorities and representatives of the local population.
- Overall financial management (measured, for example, through tax collection efficiency) must have improved to a pre-determined level. This performance criteria should not be set so high that it will delay the activation of the fund.
- Financial requests should be matched with local counterpart funds of a modest

²⁰ See Nguyen, op. cit. pp. 18-19.

but significant pre-determined percentage. Ideally, the local populations or the beneficiary associations should also contribute towards the project.

B. Implementation Strategy

1. National Policy Seminars

MININTER must be prepared take a strong lead in the interim government in putting the seminars on the agenda and seeing them implemented. As the study team exit Rwanda, the transfer to the interim period was in a state of such uncertainty that little could be said about the organizational environment--within MININTER and other ministries--that would not immediately be out of date.

The study team was able, however, to outline the following implementation strategy for the national policy seminars. The National Policy Seminars should be preceded by a series of Technical Workshops and followed by a Policy Implementation Calendar.

The Technical Workshops at the ministerial level will prepare "working papers" on such themes as:

- transfer of responsibilities;
- transfer of resources;
- fiscal reform;
- administrative reform; and
- local participation.

Each workshop agenda should be organized around a set of precise issues to be addressed and objectives to be achieved. For example, in the case of the transfer of responsibilities, the following questions should be raised:

- areas of responsibility of each ministry by sector;
- areas in which communes have the capacity to assume responsibilities;
- ways of improving communication between the central authorities, technical ministries, and communes; and
- ways of improving the organizational and functional structure of the communes.

Although these workshops may require multiple sessions, it is important that they be completed within a specified period of time so as to benefit from the momentum generated and to lend credibility to the process as a whole.

Participants in these workshops should include representatives of:

- all the ministries concerned with the specific workshop topic;
- all external donors concerned with decentralization and democratic initiatives;
- a selection of representatives of communes and prefectures.

A series of National Policy Seminars should be held following the Technical Workshops, to formalize the results achieved. To benefit from the synergy and credibility created by the workshops, these seminars should be held soon after the completion of the Technical

Workshops.

The National Policy Seminars' main objectives are to reach a consensus among policy and law makers on the legislative implications of the workshop recommendations. A Policy Implementation Calendar, developed at the National Policy Seminar, will specify decentralization policies to be officially enacted within pre-determined time intervals.

Participation in these seminars should be restricted to:

- high-level decision-makers of the Central Government;
- members of the National Assembly; and
- major donors representatives.

Consistent with the Democratic Initiatives and Governance project, we advise that the media (press, radio, television) be allowed access to the seminars. This will insure the efficient dissemination of the seminar results and openly demonstrate the political will and credibility of the central government.

2. Training and Technical Assistance

The concern and rationale for setting up a division of Training and Technical Assistance within MININTER has been treated earlier in this report. The study team sees the need for external funding to pay for non-salary expenditures over the interim period. MININTER, therefore, needs to put together a budget for office expenses, travel, and consultant services to establish and operate this office.

In the study team's vision of how local government strengthening should proceed, I.S.A.P. (Institut Superior d'Administration Publique) is seen to be a most valuable resource in conceptualizing and implementing local government reform in Rwanda. Based on the 1992 study and the continuing role it has in the education of future Rwandan public administrators, I.S.A.P. is situated to play an important consultant role in future decentralization-related training and technical assistance events.

Even though the links between I.S.A.P. and MININTER are well-established, probable delays in contract approval and the limited availability of the teaching staff to perform consultancies and conduct major training events were found to be major obstacles to I.S.A.P.'s collaboration in a major program of local government strengthening. The consultants interviewed the German Konrad Adenauer Foundation, the donor agency responsible for funding much of I.S.A.P.'s operations, to learn of long-term plans and to discuss the matter of the institute's ties to the University of Rwanda (U.N.R.). These discussions led to the recommendation that I.S.A.P. try to establish a more autonomous status within the university's umbrella, one more consistent with its mission of local government training, research, and consulting.²¹ (See Figures 5 and 6 for comparison of current and proposed organization charts.)

²¹ The proposed model is similar to Quebec's Ecole Nationale d'Administration Publique (ENAP) and to the State of North Carolina's (USA) Institute of Government.

The proposed organization chart shows I.S.A.P. still closely affiliated with U.N.R. but not in the same relationship to university administration as found in a traditional department. Successful models of the relationship we outline have the university budget paying core faculty salaries but allowing for flexibility in contracting training and consulting tasks and in hiring temporary staff to work on these tasks.

Figure 5: PROPOSED ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE





Figure 6: CURRENT ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE



3. Participation Fund

A major concern of MININTER is the proliferation of project-specific funds available to communes. Officials assert that they have engendered "pockets" of development, without insuring an equitable financial redistribution across communes, and have generated a communal-donor relationship based on clientage. To prevent this situation from becoming institutionalized and, given the Central Government's will to decentralize communes, MININTER created FOSOC (Fonds de Solidarité Communale).

Established in 1991, FOSOC's purpose is to be a communal development stabilization fund. Given the skewed resource allocation pattern of the last two decades, FOSOC ultimately wants to have all internal and external project funds dedicated to communes channeled and redistributed through its auspices.

Within the context of stabilization principles, FOSOC has three major objectives:

- assist the operational budgets of communes;
- assist communes in their social investments; and
- assist communes in developing their human resource capacity.

To have access to FOSOC, each commune must meet the following criteria:

- contribute 5% of its effective annual operational revenues to FOSOC;
- warrant a real need of FOSOC financing;
- demonstrate satisfactory communal tax collection performance;
- insure adequate management of communal funds and assets; and
- involve local populations in the appraisal, elaboration, and execution of projects.

Thus it can be seen that although FOSOC has a much wider range of goals, it nonetheless meets the objectives of the Participation Fund.

Implementing the Participation Fund does not preclude integrating it into FOSOC. However, the following questions need to be answered before making the Participation Fund part of FOSOC.

- Given the stabilization objectives of FOSOC, how compatible is it with the Participation Fund's focus on pre-selected communes?
- Can FOSOC manage funds dedicated to specific objectives? For example, the Participation Fund is meant to be used only for capital investment purposes rather than to provide financial assistance to the communes' operational budgets.
- When will FOSOC be fully operational? Given that funds need to be available approximately six months after the start of the training and technical assistance activities, will FOSOC be operational at that time?

- Who will manage FOSOC once the Burgomasters are elected and begin assuming only political rather than administrative functions? Does the answer to this question depend upon the pending administrative reform?

If MININTER can provide clear answers to the above concerns, then there is no reason why the Participation Fund could not be integrated into FOSOC.

4. Conditions for Successful Implementation

Many factors found in Rwanda favor a reform program to significantly strengthen local government. Rwanda's limited size and geographical accessibility make the logistics of holding seminars and conducting training far less costly and more feasible logistically than in larger countries. A physical infrastructure that offers two major training centers and multiple communal buildings fit for community meetings and seminars exists in Rwanda, unlike in many developing countries in Africa or elsewhere. Rwanda's common local language is a positive factor when preparing training materials and disseminating successful innovation. Rwanda is the recipient of significant international aid that is likely to increase as the country moves toward fuller democratization and economic liberalization, wrenching though this change must be. The commune, as the basic unit of decentralized administration and development, has a thirty-year history in a developing world where "decentralization," while often alluded to, cannot be evoked directly in policy dialogue.

Thus, for all the uncertainty of the transition period and the chaos of emerging multi-party politics, strengthening local government in Rwanda should be judged a viable task for the new government and the donors that assist it. Two conditions, however, must prevail if a program to strengthen communal administration is to succeed: (1) donors must cooperate to a far greater extent than in the past in Rwanda, and (2) both Rwandans and their foreign benefactors must commit to a long-term endeavor.

Donor Cooperation

The study team, while commissioned by USAID under the Democratic Initiatives and Governance (DIG) project, conducted this task directed by MININTER's senior staff charged with communal affairs. The scope of the study is larger than the DIG project's time frame and resources. Other donors must be engaged by the GOR to effect the program's objectives laid out in this report. Donor cooperation, however, is the exception in Rwanda. Can major donors coordinate their efforts around a program of strengthening communal administration, fiscal reform, service delivery, and public participation? It remains to be seen if the impressive individual efforts of GTZ and KAF, the World Bank and UNDP, Swiss Cooperation and FAC, and USAID can work in tandem with one another under the initiative and direction of MININTER assisted by MINIPLAN, MINITRAPE and other ministries with a role in communal affairs.

Realistic Time Frame

Assuming that GOR and the donor community make major efforts to coordinate their efforts around the theme of decentralization and democracy to improve communal institutions, the long-term nature of the commitment must be understood from the start. A five-year, coordinated effort along the lines proposed in this report will be necessary to show real impact in selected communes and in the central training, technical assistance, and information management institutions of local government support. A successful first five years will set the stage for a second phase of equal or longer duration when the program can be expanded to all communes. Commitment to the long-term development of local government institutions is what is required, in a partnership between GOR and major donors. Insistence on a realistic long-range time frame does not lessen the need to act immediately and forcefully to begin the movement using the strategy we have outlined here.

ANNEX A
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ANNEX B
LIST OF CONTACTS

List of Persons Contacted

MININTER

Aloys NGENDAHI MANA Directeur Général

Gaspard MUNYANDINDA Chef de Division des Affaires Politiques et Administratives

François HARELIMANA Directeur des Affaires Politiques et de l'Administration du Territoire

Célestin GAHAMANYI Directeur du Développement Communal

Oswald HABARUGIRA Chef de Division des Finances Communales

Callixte KAYIHURA Chef de Division de Promotion du Développement Communal

J-Baptiste HABARUGIRA Chef de Division d'Administration du Territoire

J-Léonard KAGABO Service des Projets

François BYUMBA Responsable ONG - Jumelage

Khiem NGUYEN-HUU Conseiller de la Coopération Suisse au près du MININTER.

Saïd BENAÏSSA Conseiller pour la Réforme Administrative

Jean-Pierre GALLANT Conseiller pour la Réforme cadastrale, Préfecture de Kigali

Communes

Célestin UGIRASHEBUJA Bourgmestre, Kigoma

Tharcisse KABASHA Bourgmestre, Bwakira

Octavien KIBUNGO Bourgmestre, Kabarondo

Agents communaux

- Recensement
- Comptabilité
- Perception des taxes
- Affaires économiques
- Affaires administratifs
- Coordination de la formation
- Entretien des adductions d'eau
- Justice
- Police
- Planification

Agents des ministères deconcentrés

--Agriculture

--Education

--Santé

Représentants des associations locales

--Cultivateurs

--Menuisiers

--Association des femmes

MINIPLAN	Joseph HABUMUREMYI	Chef Division Investissement
	Anastase NTEZIYAREMYE	Chargé de la Division des Stratégies de Développement Communal et Régional
	Telephore BIZIMUNGY	Directeur Général
Centre IWACU	J.E NAYIGIZENTE	Administrateur du Centre IWACU
	Alexandre HAHIRWABEMERA	Formateur, Centre IWACU
	Nkinko NSENGIMANA	Directeur du Centre IWACU
CCOAIB	Mme. LANDRADA	Directrice
MINIFIN	Marc PLOQUIN	Expert-Reforme Fiscale, FMI
ISAP	Marie-Thérèse KAMPIRE	Professeur
	Emmanuel BUGINGO	Professeur
	Valérien MUKENDI	Professeur
Centre Murambi	Emile BUDARA	Directeur
USAID	Dirk DIJKERMAN	Program Officer/Project Officer of Democratic Initiatives and Governance (DIG) Project
	Bernadette JOERGENSEN	Project manager/DIG
Fondation Konrad Adenauer	Hermann WUNSCH	Représentant
GTZ	Hermann BODEMEYER	Directeur Projet DRIM
Délégation CEE	Nunez de CARVALHO	Economiste
Coopération Suisse	Jean-François ROUX	Conseiller

ANNEX C

**MINI-SEMINAR ON
STRENGTHENING COMMUNES**

Summary of Mini-Seminar on Strengthening Communes

Kigali, Hôtel des Mille Collines
15 September 1993

OBJECTIVES: The two objectives of the mini-seminar were: 1) for the seminar participants from the MININTER, an understanding of RTI's experiences in local government management strengthening and 2) for the consultant team, an understanding of interventions appropriate in the Rwandan context.

PRESENTATION: The consultants started the program by conveying to participants the basic principles and key activities of RTI's approach to local government strengthening.

A 15-minute video followed the consultants' presentation. Telling the story of the USAID-financed Programme de Soutien au Développement Municipal (PSDM), the video showed townspeople in Côte d'Ivoire interacting with local government officials in training and technical assistance activities.

To realize PSDM's goal of strengthening democratization at the local level and implementing administrative decentralization, RTI has organized and carried out training and technical assistance to make mayors and town councils more responsible and make administrative systems more transparent and effective.

PSDM's methodology requires the participation of various private sector and community groups in the decision making process, alongside the local government officials, elected and appointed. The project activities are both regional and local, targeted at selected areas so as not to lose effectiveness by attempting to perform beyond the project's resources. During the seminars, participants representing wide community interests must deal with specific service and management issues, such as public market infrastructure and related fees collection. An action plan negotiated by the parties represents the concrete output of these seminars. Follow-up to provide further advice and experience and to review progress on the action plan is an essential part of the methodology.

REACTIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS: The consultants asked the participants to voice their reaction to the presentation and video. One-by-one around the table, MININTER and USAID guests spoke in turn. Then, for more than an hour of open dialogue, all participants struggled with the main constraints to communal development and decentralization and the appropriate methodology for local government strengthening in the Rwandan context.

SYNTHESIS OF MAJOR POINTS: Three major issues emerged from a synthesis of the participants' reactions.

Participation:

How to solicit and structure the participation of citizens in the process of local development? The model of community participation in the communal planning process was cited as an experiment from which to learn. The past experience with collective labor, umuganda, was cited, along with the recent experience with multi-party reactions against the institutions of the single-party system.

Lack of Local Resources:

The poverty of the overwhelmingly rural population was often cited by participants. From this, the lack of resources of the communes was cited as an obstacle to improved management.

Training:

The lack of training for communal officials was frequently cited as a major obstacle to development.

ACTIONS TO PURSUE:

The principle actions needed to strengthen communes that emerged from the discussion were the following:

- Establish clear responsibilities among levels of government
- Reform fiscal policy and improve financial resources of communes
- Develop means to ensure citizen participation
- Train personnel at all levels
- Establish a means to motivate communal personnel.

MINI-SEMINAIRE SUR LE RENFORCEMENT DES COMMUNES
Mission USAID/RTI

Kigali, Hôtel des Milles Collines
15 septembre 1993

OBJECTIFS: (5 min.)

- 1) Connaissance des expériences du RTI pour le renforcement de la gestion municipale
- 2) Appréciation des interventions appropriées dans le contexte Rwandais

PRESENTATION: (30 min.)

Présentation verbale
Vidéo

REACTIONS DES PARTICIPANTS: (65 min.)

SYNTHESE DES POINTS MAJEURS: (5 min.)

ACTIONS A SUIVRE: (15 min.)

PRESENTATION VERBALE

OBJECTIF 1: Connaissance des expériences du RTI pour le renforcement de la gestion municipale

A) Principes de base:

- . renforcement institutionnel: niveaux central et local
- . intégration formation et assistance technique
- . participation du secteur privé, ONGs, communauté
- . recherche et promotion des communes ayant enregistré des bonnes performances.

B) Activités clés: Assistance technique et Formation

- . finances municipales
- . prestations de services urbains
- . systèmes des collectivités locales

(cf. RENFORCEMENT DE LA GESTION MUNICIPALE PAR LE BIAIS DE L'ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE ET DE LA FORMATION)

OBJECTIF 2: Appréciation des interventions appropriées dans le contexte Rwandais

A) Préparation d'un Schéma Directeur pour le renforcement des communes

POLITIQUES ET STRUCTURES ADMINISTRATIVES:

- . Statut juridique
- . Compétences de la commune
- . Organisation et fonctionnement de la commune
- . Moyens humains de la commune
- . Finances communales
- . Tutelle

COLLABORATION INTER-MINISTERIELLES:

- . Mininter
- . Miniplan

COLLABORATION AVEC LES BAILLEURS DES FONDS:

- . Coordination des programmes
- . Interventions proposées

B) Préparation d'un Plan de Formation

STRUCTURE DES INSTITUTIONS DE FORMATION DES FORMATEURS
ANALYSES DES BESOINS EN FORMATION
THEMES PRIORITAIRES EN FORMATION

POINTS MAJEURS DU VIDEO

1. Hypothèses:

- . Démocratisation politique;
- . Décentralisation administrative.

2. Objectifs du Programme de Soutien au Développement Municipal (PSDM):

- . Gouvernance et Transparence du système administratif;
- . Responsabilisation des Maires;
- . Efficacité des techniciens des municipalités.

3. Principes Directeurs du PSDM:

- . Participation accrue de la collectivité locale dans toutes les décisions concernant le Développement socio-économique de la municipalité.
- . Amélioration de la capacité de gestion financière des responsables et techniciens du secteur public.

4. Méthodologie et Activités du PSDM

A) Séminaires Régionaux:

- Participants: . Responsables élus et Techniciens des gouvernements locaux des Communes de la Préfecture.
- Activités: . Sensibilisation, discussions et débats sur politiques et orientations de la municipalité;
. Approche thématique ou sectorielle;

B) Séminaires Locaux:

- Participants: . Responsable élu et techniciens de la municipalité.
. Représentants du secteur privé et des groupements locaux.

Activités:

i) Formation:

- . Gestion et Analyse Financière;
- . Planification et Budgétisation;
- . Mobilisation de Ressources;
- . Prestations de Services Municipaux;
- . Participation Locale;
- . Privatisation-Contrats.

ii) Plan d'Action:

- . Objectifs réalistes
- . Indicateurs de performance

C) Assistance Technique:

- Court Terme: . Conférences sur thèmes spécifiques
- Long Terme: . Suivi permanent des Municipalités sélectionnées.

RENFORCEMENT DE LA GESTION MUNICIPALE: ACTIVITES CLES

1. FINANCES MUNICIPALES
 - MOBILISATION DES RECETTES
 - INFORMATISATION DES RECETTES
 - TECHNIQUES D'ETABLISSEMENT DU BUDGET DE FONCTIONNEMENT ET D'INVESTISSEMENT
 - INSTITUTS DE FINANCEMENT DE L'INVESTISSEMENT
 - REFORME DU SYSTEME DES DONS CENTRAUX
2. PRESTATIONS DE SERVICES URBAINS
 - ANALYSE DE L'INFRASTRUCTURE ET DES SERVICES POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT ECONOMIQUE
 - EXPLOITATIONS ET ENTRETIEN
 - MESURES DE PERFORMANCE
 - ETUDES DU TARIF
 - PRIVATISATION
3. SYSTEMES DES COLLECTIVITES LOCALES
 - RELATIONS LOCALES/CENTRALES
 - SYSTEMES DU PERSONNEL
 - EVALUATIONS DE LA GESTION
 - CADRE JURIDIQUE

RENFORCEMENT DE LA GESTION MUNICIPALE PAR LE BIAIS DE LA FORMATION

1. SOUTIEN AUX ETABLISSEMENTS DE FORMATION
 - EVALUATION INSTITUTIONNELLE
 - FORMATION DES FORMATEURS EN TECHNIQUES FORMATION POUR ADULTES
 - ELABORATION DE PLANS D'ETUDES
 - RENFORCEMENT DE L'ADMINISTRATION DE LA FORMATION
2. EVALUATION DES BESOINS EN MATIERE DE FORMATION
 - AXES SUR LA PERFORMANCE
3. REALISATION DE LA FORMATION
 - PLUS DE 60 ACTIVITES DE FORMATION SUR LE TERRAIN CES CINQ DERNIERES ANNEES
 - STAGES SUR LES FINANCES MUNICIPALES A RTI DEPUIS 1985
 - FORMATION PROFESSIONNELLE EN COLLABORATION AVEC DES UNIVERSITES

EXEMPLES DE PROJETS

MAROC

- FORMATION ET ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE A COURT TERME EN MATIERE DE:

INFORMATISATION DES RECETTES
BUDGETISATION
ANALYSES FINANCIERES
MESURES DE LA PERFORMANCE DU SERVICE
DEVELOPPEMENT ORGANISATIONNEL DES
MUNICIPALITES

INDONESIE

- MISE EN PLACE DE MECANISMES DURABLES POUR LE FINANCEMENT DES INVESTISSEMENTS
- PLANIFICATION DE L'INFRASTRUCTURE COORDONNEE AVEC REFORME DES FINANCES LOCALES
- 4 CONSEILLERS RESIDENTS DANS 3 MINISTERES

AFRIQUE DE L'OUEST

- DEPUIS 1986, PROGRAMME DE FORMATION REGIONALE POUR SOUTENIR LES POLITIQUES DE DECENTRALISATION
- PROGRAMMES DE FORMATION ET RENFORCEMENT DES ETABLISSEMENTS DE FORMATION

INDE

- ASSISTANCE A L'INSTITUT NATIONAL DES AFFAIRES URBAINES DANS LE DOMAINE DE LA RECHERCHE ET DE LA FORMATION AU NIVEAU DES:

FINANCES MUNICIPALES
PARTICIPATION COMMUNAUTAIRE
PRESTATIONS DE SERVICES URBAINS
ENVIRONNEMENT
POLITIQUE URBAINE NATIONALE

MALAWI

- EVALUATION DU SYSTEME DES COLLECTIVITES LOCALES
- RECHERCHE DE CONSENSUS CONCERNANT REFORMES AU NIVEAU DES:
FINANCES
PERSONNEL
FINANACEMENT DES INVESTISSEMENTS
CADRE JURIDIQUE

**EXEMPLE DE LA CONSISTANCE D'UN COUR DE FORMATION "MOBILISATION
DES RECETTES COMMUNALES"**

(RTI/COTE D'IVOIRE 1992)

Modules:

- I. Connaissance de la matière taxable
- II. Organisation d'une structure optimale d'un service d'exploitation des taxes communales: La Régie des Recettes
- III. Traitement de Valeurs Inactives (V.I.) [tickets, quittances, timbres, etc.]
- IV. Organisation sur le terrain de l'activité de collectes aux moyens de V.I.
- V. Relations de coopération interne et externe en vue d'améliorer le taux de recouvrement des taxes communales
- VI. Les procédures de suivi et de contrôle

Procédures de suivi:

1. élaboration d'une base de données
2. réapprovisionnement
3. attribution de retrait de places
4. collecte
5. versements des espèces
6. tenue des documents (enregistrement)
7. réunions d'information-sensibilisation
8. saisie-fourrière

Procédures de contrôle:

1. Bureau:
 - élaboration de tableau de indicateurs
 - contrôle a priori et a posteriori
 - contrôle physique - décomptes des V.I.
2. Terrain
 - contrôle inopiné

Procédures d'analyse de gestion:

1. cellule de suivi et contrôle de gestion
2. séance d'analyse de gestion mensuelle
3. rapport de séance

VII. Supports des informations (documents)

VIII. Plan d'Action