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Final Report

# A.I.D. Mission Options for a Drug Control Strategy

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# Contents

<b>1. Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
Objective of Study	2
Scope of Work	2
History and Current Status of Opium in Afghanistan	2
Current Poppy Cultivation	3
Current Situation on the Use of Opium and Heroin in Afghanistan	4
U.S. International Drug Policy and Its Implications for Afghanistan	5
Implementation of Antinarcotics Programs in the Golden Crescent	7
History of U.S. and Other Anti-Drug Activities in Afghanistan	7
Narcotics Policy Options for Afghanistan	8
<b>2. Elements of a Strategy</b>	<b>13</b>
Introduction	13
Major Problems	13
Difficulty in Restoring Peace	13
Absence of a Strong Central Government	13
Serious Challenges to Peace and Development	14
Return of Millions of Refugees	14
Limited Job Opportunities for Large Urban Population	14
Substantial Resources Needed for Relief and Development	14
Increasing Prospects for Essential Assistance from Abroad	14
Narcotics and Economics	16
Essential Elements in Afghanistan's War on Narcotics—Improving Afghanistan's Economy	16
<b>3. Enforcement and Alternative Agriculture</b>	<b>19</b>
Design, Flexibility, and Timing of Enforcement and of Rural Development Projects	20
Project Design and Approach Options	21
Selection of Project Areas	21
Certification of Local Authorities	21
Local Participation	22
Linkage of Development and Enforcement	22
<b>4. Public Health Approaches</b>	<b>25</b>
The Challenge	25
Public Health Model	25
Narcotics Awareness	26
Education	28
Treatment and Rehabilitation	28

## Contents (*continued*)

5. Strategy Alternatives	31
Enforcement and Alternative Development	31
Public Health Approaches	32
6. Congressional Perspectives	33
Endnotes	35
Table 1. Opium Production in Afghanistan	4
Figure 1. Public Health Model	30

## Preface

This report was prepared in response to Delivery Order 25 of A.I.D. Contract 306-0205-C-00-9385-00, the Afghanistan Studies project. The work was carried out by the joint venture of Nathan Associates Inc. and Louis Berger International, Inc, with Educational Development Center as a subcontractor.

The field work, which occurred during August and September 1992, took place in Peshawar, Pakistan, and Washington, D.C. The field work and preparation of the draft report were performed by a team consisting of Mr. Robert Nathan, Dr. Thomas Timberg (team leader), Mr. Leigh Brilliant, Dr. Elham-Eid Aldredge, and Mr. Jeffrey Miller.

# 1. Introduction

Afghanistan is one of the world's largest producers of opium and heroin. The social and physical consequences of the last 15 years of war and turmoil have led to burgeoning production and, almost certainly, use of opium and heroin. The Soviet invasion undermined political and moral authority and undercut the population's alternative means of earning a living. The resulting drug economy poses a major danger to Afghanistan's own development as well as supplies illegal drugs to Europe and the United States.

Response to the drug problem in Afghanistan is inhibited by the devastation that has resulted from the invasion and occupation. The institutions and resources (e.g., government authority and the public health system) that are usually available to fight drugs are weak and decentralized. Any effective drug eradication program will have to address strengthening those institutions and will have to deal with them on a decentralized basis.

Afghanistan can only be ignored—from an antinarcotics and a developmental standpoint—at America's peril. A coordinated U.S. antinarcotics strategy is necessary, and A.I.D. could play a positive role in developing that strategy.

Specific initiatives we are proposing include (1) public health programs to increase awareness, promote education, and support drug treatment, (2) development efforts to provide substitute sources of income, and (3) a program for effective enforcement.

In choosing the appropriate strategy, A.I.D. must determine

- Which of the initiatives the Mission can and should undertake and which should be performed by others;
- Where to target A.I.D.'s funds, whether in poppy-growing areas or potential poppy-growing areas;
- The conditions required for the approval of antinarcotics projects, such as the extent to which A.I.D. is committed not to work in areas where enforcement and monitoring arrangements, and rights to access and alternative means of surveillance, are not satisfactory; and
- The level at which to fund these activities.

One option for targeting A.I.D.'s funds is to have International Narcotics Matters (INM), a section of the U.S. Department of State, concentrate on the heaviest poppy areas, such as Nangarhar and North Helmand, while A.I.D. conducts more extensive projects in surrounding areas and prepares to move into the "hardcore" areas when the first steps toward eradication have been completed. Parts of Badakhshan, Konar, and Paktia might be chosen because they are former poppy-growing areas in which farmers might readily return to growing poppy—as might Qandahar, because of its location on the main drug trafficking road between Helmand and Quetta.

As to the level of funding, for the next few years funds are likely to be so scarce for O/AID/REP that relatively small subprojects that are easy to monitor may be all that can be managed. But these funds may be as adequate to support the process of poppy eradication in Afghanistan as they have been in Turkey and Pakistan. A variety of technical assistance and interaction activities will be required.

## OBJECTIVE OF STUDY

This strategic options study is the third in a series of three narcotics studies conducted by Nathan Associates Inc. and Louis Berger International, Inc. (Nathan-Berger) for A.I.D. under the Afghanistan Studies Project and the 25th delivery order of the project. The objective of this study is to develop alternatives to combat drug production, trafficking, and use in Afghanistan.

The first of the three narcotics studies covered the opium subsector, including a survey of cultivation of poppies in Afghanistan as well as the processing of opium into heroin and subsequent distribution. The second study, a survey of attitudes toward drug use, extent of use, and media accessibility, is currently under way. Afghan members of the study team have returned from Afghanistan with completed questionnaires that are now being analyzed.

The current study is designed to build on the previous two studies—*Opium Subsector Survey* and *Survey on Afghan Drug Use, Attitudes, and Media Accessibility*. It draws heavily from the opium survey for information on production and consumption of narcotics on which the strategy options outlined in this report are based. Originally scheduled to be completed after the completion of the first two studies, the schedule for this study has been advanced because of changing A.I.D. priorities. Although we have preliminary observations from the attitudes study, these observations, as well as the strategy options dealing with consumption of narcotics, will likely change as the analysis of data from the attitudes survey is completed.

## SCOPE OF WORK

As part of the scope of work for this study, the team reviewed the two previous narcotics studies of the Afghanistan studies project; U.S. Government and U.N. antidrug work done in Afghanistan and Pakistan; the experience of A.I.D., Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and INM in combating drug production and use elsewhere in the world; General Accounting Office (GAO) and congressional comments on the experience of these three agencies; and U.S. legislation and foreign assistance policy that controls drug-related activity.

The scope of work also calls for the Nathan-Berger team to report on current drug production, trafficking, and use in Afghanistan and efforts to control it (including efforts by Muslim religious leaders). This study outlines strategic options for viable drug control activities by A.I.D. in Afghanistan. The study team will consider which responsibilities logically belong to A.I.D. and which belong to other agencies of the U.S. Government or other entities. The scope of work also directs the team to coordinate the strategy options with the U.S. Congress to optimize cooperation and to facilitate approval of subsequent A.I.D.-funded antinarcotics activities.

## HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS OF OPIUM IN AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan has a long history of cultivating opium poppy, largely for medicinal purposes. At the time of their 1972 study, *Poppies in Afghanistan*, Owens and Clifton found poppy cultivated in four provinces: Nangarhar, Qandahar, Balkh, and Badakhshan. Poppy was typically cultivated during the same seasons as wheat, that is, planted in the fall and winter and harvested in April and May, or was part of a double cropping pattern with corn, cotton, and vegetables.

Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan has increased dramatically since the Soviet invasion in 1979. Afghanistan now grows the largest amount of poppy in the Golden Crescent (Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran) and is now the second largest source of opium in the world for several reasons, including (1) general absence of government or central authority; (2) destruction of traditional

production, transport, and market systems; and (3) other effects of war-induced deprivation and poverty.

The increase of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan is marked by increased intensity of cultivation in some of the four provinces described in the Owens and Clifton study and its expansion to other provinces.

### Current Poppy Cultivation

The opium economy of the Golden Crescent must be treated as an integrated economic unit comprising the three countries of Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, although our concern here is with potential A.I.D. policies for Afghanistan.

U.S. Government figures show that the countries of the region produced 1,025 MT of refined opium in 1991, although numerous commentators insist that this figure understates the actual quantity. The United Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), for example, estimates that Afghanistan's production was 800 to 1,000 MT of raw opium in 1990 versus U.S. figures of 600 in 1991.

The countries in the Golden Crescent are major users as well as producers of opium and heroin, but a considerable surplus exists for export. Within the Golden Crescent, Afghanistan has become the major producer of raw opium, which is largely shipped to Pakistan, where much of it is converted into heroin in factories located in the Khyber Agency, Girdi Jungle, and perhaps elsewhere. However, much is now processed in Afghanistan.

The bulk of Afghan opium is produced in the southwest of the country, particularly (1) northern Helmand, (2) northern Qandahar, and (3) the eastern provinces (particularly Nangarhar). Poppy cultivation appears to be increasing rapidly in these regions.

Table 1 shows the relative intensity of poppy cultivation in the major growing provinces. More extensive consideration of the accuracy, precise location, and volumes of poppy cultivation and opium production are contained in the Final Report of the *Opium Subsector Survey*.<sup>1</sup>

Much of Afghanistan might be suitable for opium cultivation under certain circumstances. The concentration in specific areas is the result of market forces, such as the location of heroin factories, and of the enforcement pattern of antipoppy bans by local commanders. For example, Konar was once a major poppy-growing area but is no longer so because of the efforts of the late Maulvi Jamilur Rahman. Cultivation has apparently declined in Badakhshan because of commanders such as Masood and the Ismailis. Gul Agha, Governor of Qandahar, and Abdul Shakur, Deputy Governor of Nangarhar, have been vigorously suppressing poppy cultivators. Most dramatically, poppy cultivation declined substantially in 1990 in North Helmand because of the efforts of Nasim Akhunzada, whose territory had been a major production center. Production was restored dramatically in 1991 in Helmand after Akhunzada's assassination.

Afghanistan's government has been party to several drug control treaties, including those of 1912, 1925, and 1931. It is also a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, but not to the 1972 UN Protocol amending the convention. The government is a party to the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Most recently (February 1992) it signed the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. In addition to international treaties, the Government of Afghanistan has enacted its own laws against opium poppy cultivation and trafficking in illicit drugs, and these laws are included in the penal code.

After the first signs of expanded illicit poppy cultivation in the late 1960s and early 1970s, government efforts were undertaken to suppress poppy cultivation, especially in Badakhshan and Helmand between 1973 and 1979. The communist government began to take steps against narcotics in 1989-1990. A State High Commission for the Campaign against Narcotic Drugs was established in

Table 1. Opium Production In Afghanistan

Province	1989		1990		1991	
	Number of hectares	Number of metric tons	Number of hectares	Number of metric tons	Number of hectares	Number of metric tons
Helmand	3500	110	200	—	3600	120
Nangarhar	9800	330	10400	360	11700	400
Paktia	1000	—	500	—	800	—
Uruzgan	2200	100	600	—	400	—
Bamyan	300	—	100	—	500	—
Konar	500	—	300	—	—	—
Badakhshan	4000	200	ND	ND	ND	ND

Notes: ND = no data. Dashes indicate production lower than 100 MT.

May 1990, a UN delegation concerned with drug control policy was received in 1991, and in May 1991 a new law on all aspects of drug control was passed by parliament and awaited the president's signature. The precise future of all these measures under the new free Afghanistan government is still unclear.

On June 30, 1992, President Rabbani, in his first speech on Kabul television, said that the new Islamic government would observe its international commitments and strive to prevent drug trafficking, production, smuggling, and use. He further stated "the state is eager to protect the youth from unscrupulous anti-Islamic elements that undermine the youth for financial gain."<sup>2</sup> The president added that efforts to rehabilitate addicts would be given priority, and he expressed hope that all Afghans, foreign countries, and the United Nations would assist in the antinarcotics effort.

Nevertheless, even the pre-1978 government was not fully able to suppress opium poppy cultivation, and no central government since then, communist or free, has had effective control over enough of the countryside to affect the level of cultivation. Control of cultivation has rested with the approximately 1,000 local commanders and local assemblies or *shuras* who control most of the country.

### Current Situation on the Use of Opium and Heroin In Afghanistan

Although opium was widely used as a medicine and opium addiction was common, heroin and the problems connected with the more severe addiction it produces were not common in Afghanistan before 1978. It is likely that, as in Pakistan and other major poppy-growing and transit countries, increasing numbers of addicts will emerge in Afghanistan as production of heroin increases. Three heroin detoxification centers open to Afghan heroin addicts have long waiting lists despite the centers' inaccessibility. Surveys of the refugee camps, which at their fullest contained more than 2 million refugees, indicated a considerable amount of addiction among the refugees. Large-scale antinarcotics awareness programs are being conducted in the camps under the sponsorship of the UNDCP, which also supports smaller projects inside Afghanistan. As stated previously, a companion study on use of and attitudes toward opium is attempting to gather more data on narcotics addiction.

Almost everyone who speaks publicly is opposed to narcotics use, but not necessarily to opium poppy cultivation. An extensive survey conducted in the refugee camps revealed universal opposition to drugs and concern that narcotics use is a national problem. Even those who do not oppose growing poppy because they believe it is a good source of income assume that the consumers of drugs are not Muslims.

There is a consensus among Muslims that narcotics use is prohibited by Islam—the single strongest factor leading many commanders and other local leaders to suppress poppy cultivation. Similarly, Islam in its various manifestations is undoubtedly the most important influence in policy making in contemporary Afghanistan, and therefore understanding how Islam affects opium cultivation is crucial.

Attitudes in Islam concerning opium exist on three levels: (1) one of practice, (2) one of casuistry in the nonderogatory sense, and (3) one of belief. Practically, the manner in which the beliefs of any religion affect practice is always problematic and must be understood in a particular context. Certain sins are committed and regretted, certain ones are not tolerated, and distinguishing between the two is difficult. Opium poppy cultivation and even opium use may be tolerated as violations of high principles that people are not expected to achieve.

A number of leaders have explicitly stated that poppy cultivation is permitted because the product is destined for nonbelievers, rather than Muslims, and thus does not abet Muslims in ignoring their religious duties [interview with Yunis Khalis, Voice of America (VOA)].

Popular knowledge about all aspects of heroin production, use, and attitudes toward it in Afghanistan is still in its infancy. Rudimentary programs are now conducted by UNDCP in the refugee camps, and UNDCP has also sponsored prevalence and attitude surveys that are currently under way.

Disseminating new information is still difficult in Afghanistan, which has one of the highest illiteracy rates in the world as well as a very low level of penetration by the communications media. Although a party press existed and has grown since the overthrow of the communist regime, circulations of news publications are low, and their impact is limited. Radio listenership is more widespread, particularly of foreign-supported Afghan language programs such as those of BBC and VOA. Education programs have experimented with folk art forms, posters, and the like, although their use has seldom been evaluated. The O/AID/REP has special opportunities because of its support of the majority of schools and medical clinics in the country.

### **U.S. INTERNATIONAL DRUG POLICY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR AFGHANISTAN**

The history of U.S. policy interest in opium and heroin can be traced to the early 1900s, when the United States was forced to deal with a large number of heroin addicts in the Philippines, which it had taken over from Spain. In 1909, representatives of 13 nations met in Shanghai at the request of President Theodore Roosevelt (who had by then left office) to consider methods of curtailing opium use.<sup>3</sup> In the following decades, conventions and protocols were signed to further the struggle against drugs. Among the strictest of these was the 1953 Protocol, which restricted the legal exportation of opium to seven countries but did not provide an effective control mechanism to enforce the restriction.<sup>4</sup> In 1970, the United States was the primary force behind the passage of UN Resolution 1559. This resolution established the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC), which was later transformed into the United Nations Drug Control Programme.

The U.S. struggle against illicit drugs has been conducted both inside and outside the United States. One of the key strategic elements in this struggle is to stop the production of illicit drugs in order to curb their availability.<sup>5</sup> This is done by helping countries to control and eradicate production,

stop transportation, and otherwise impede the flow of illicit drugs. Besides providing bilateral assistance, the United States seeks host country cooperation in prosecuting traffickers, seizing their assets, and blocking their financial transactions. The United States is also committed to support the major multilateral antinarcotics organizations.

Nine federal agencies are involved in the antinarcotics effort. Foremost among them are DEA, A.I.D., and INM. DEA provides assistance to host country law enforcement organizations in cooperation with INM and is the leading agency in drug enforcement; A.I.D., in cooperation with INM, provides development assistance to promote alternative economic development in areas where drugs are produced; and INM is responsible for overall coordination, including financing pilot development projects, and securing host country cooperation.<sup>6</sup>

On the international level, the struggle against narcotics is pursued in cooperation with various host countries, as well as with multilateral and international organizations. Generally, the large bilateral donors, other than the United States, operate through the United Nations rather than run bilateral antidrug programs. The United States recognizes the usefulness of international programs and has provided an important portion of their financial support, but it has also concluded that bilateral programs are a valuable part of the antidrug effort.

A 1979 amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 instructed A.I.D. to "give priority to programs which would help reduce illicit narcotics cultivation by stimulating broader development opportunities" in countries where such cultivation was practiced.<sup>7</sup> A 1985 amendment specifically authorized the use of resources made available as part of such projects for "increasing awareness of the effects of production and trafficking of illicit narcotics on source and transit countries" and mandated cooperation with other government agencies.

A.I.D. accordingly issued A.I.D. Policy Determination 1 on August 5, 1982, indicating that it

- Seeks to design projects to provide economic alternatives to farmers in narcotics-growing areas;
- Requires host countries to suppress narcotics cultivation in project areas by means of "poppy clauses" in project documents;
- Works to support involvement by the United Nations and other multilateral and private voluntary organizations in alternative economic development activities in poppy-growing areas; and
- Cooperates with other federal agencies to analyze, disseminate, and use information on development activities related to narcotics control as required by the 1979 Interagency Agreement for Sharing Information.

By March 1985, A.I.D. had six specifically targeted antinarcotics programs in four countries, involving a total obligation of US\$62.4 million. The amount of A.I.D. spending for antinarcotics projects has continued to rise.

Other legislation has focused A.I.D.'s mandate to pursue an antinarcotics focus. Section 487 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended by as Section 4503 of the International Narcotics Control Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4285) states that foreign assistance is not to be provided to people either convicted of a narcotics violation or who are traffickers in narcotics. The general counsel's office of A.I.D. in Washington, D.C., is currently circulating draft regulations for the implementation of this amendment. Section 483, added in 1985, forbids the use of foreign aid funds "to reimburse persons whose illicit drug crops are eradicated." Both pieces of legislation make it more difficult to conduct A.I.D. projects in areas that are heavily involved in narcotics production. A.I.D. generally avoids such areas except when specific waivers are arranged in connection with antinarcotics projects, such the project in the Gadoon-Amazai region in Pakistan.

## Implementation of Antinarcotics Programs in the Golden Crescent

Despite the importance of the Golden Crescent as a source of opium and heroin, the United States has no bilateral antinarcotics program with Iran or Afghanistan, only a large program with Pakistan. Some of the increase in cultivation of poppy and production of heroin in Afghanistan may be the result of the effectiveness of suppression efforts in Pakistan, but it is primarily attributable to the increased turmoil in Afghanistan, which has made it difficult to cope with the large margin of income from poppy cultivation, compared with income from other crops.

The U.S. antinarcotics program in Pakistan calls for considerable cooperation with Pakistani authorities in assisting police in the extradition of narcotics suspects and in gathering antinarcotics intelligence. The United States and Pakistan are involved in dialogue on more effective legislation and enforcement. The United States supports alternative rural development programs in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), as well as narcotics demand reduction activities such as the Drug Abuse Prevention Research Centre (DAPRC).

Despite considerable activity and progress in some areas, the *1992 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report* indicated "mixed success." Opium production increased in the Golden Triangle region in 1990 and 1991 despite the reported destruction of 438 ha. of poppy. Pakistan, which is reported to have had no heroin addicts in 1979, is now estimated to have 1.2 million, one of the world's largest addict populations. Enforcement efforts, particularly in the federally administered tribal areas on the Afghanistan border, are often ineffective because of traditional Pakistani reluctance to intervene in these areas.

## History of U.S. and Other Anti-Drug Activities in Afghanistan

In view of its focus on suppressing the cultivation and use of narcotics, the United States has maintained a keen interest in Afghanistan, which currently is estimated to be the world's second largest producer of opium after Burma. Because of the difficulties in undertaking bilateral programs in Afghanistan, the U.S. Congress mandated in Section 2026 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (21 USC 801 Note) that the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations raise with delegations to an upcoming conference on drug abuse "the problem of illicit drug production in Iran, Afghanistan, and Laos, the largest opium poppy producing countries which do not have narcotics control programs." An international conference covering these matters was conducted in Islamabad in late September. The matter continues to be pursued through international channels.

During 1990-1991, A.I.D. implemented its Narcotics Awareness and Control Project (NACP) to counter drug production in Afghanistan. NACP initially provided assistance to areas controlled by commanders committed to suppressing production as well as to increasing public awareness of the dangers of drugs. Efforts to encourage alternative economic development in former poppy-growing areas were discontinued in early 1991 because of concerns about whether they contravened the 1988 legislation referred to above and because of the continuing lack of congressional approval. The reorganized project was canceled in December 1991 because of the lack of congressional approval.

Among the significant outputs of the project during its short lifespan were a 1990 update of the 1972 report *Poppies in Afghanistan*, surveys and analyses of drug use and awareness among Afghan refugees, surveys on the patterns of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, and educational materials. Because of political circumstances in Pakistan and Afghanistan in 1991, the survey of drug use and awareness focused only on Afghan refugees in camps in Pakistan.

Since the termination of the NACP project, A.I.D. antinarcotics programming in Afghanistan has been limited. To quote from the *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*:

At the present time, U.S. involvement in drug control in Afghanistan is limited to monitoring efforts conducted from Pakistan. All U.S. assistance agreements involving Afghanistan contain antinarcotics provisions, and the U.S. urges all other donors to require such provisions in programs they support in poppy-growing areas.<sup>8</sup>

However, U.S. policymakers generally agree that given Afghanistan's role as a major poppy producer and the decline of some other U.S. interests in the country with the end of Soviet influence, more active antinarcotics programs are called for. The persisting civil disorder and weakness of central authorities present serious challenges to any potential initiatives. INM is considering a small initiative with a budget of roughly \$200,000, DEA is preparing to launch a small program of cooperation with national law enforcement agencies, and the O/AID/REP is preparing a strategy to deal with drug problems.

### NARCOTICS POLICY OPTIONS FOR AFGHANISTAN

U.S. Government options for suppressing the narcotics trade in Afghanistan include a mixture of four types of initiatives. All of these should involve team efforts by all concerned government agencies and take a regional rather than a single country perspective. The four initiatives are as follows:

1. Enforcement action, in which DEA uses its authority and intelligence networks to assist host government law enforcement agencies in apprehending and punishing those involved in narcotics or to destroy the crops and transport and processing facilities they use, including confiscating the assets involved.
2. Political efforts to enlist the support of local authorities in suppressing the narcotics trade through enabling their own police and other agencies to pursue the same kinds of enforcement activities listed in the first initiative. This may be accomplished through moral suasion, offers of assistance, or threats of retaliation.
3. Support of a public health effort to increase public awareness and knowledge of the dangers of drugs and provide treatment and rehabilitation to addicts. This may lead to an increasingly popular antidrug consensus and might be translated by local authorities into activities to suppress the narcotics trade. But in any case it will create a moral and social onus against participating in that trade.
4. The development of alternative economic systems, particularly in regions now dependent on cultivating poppy, to facilitate the abandonment of poppy cultivation. This may be the result either of efforts targeted to such areas, or elements of general programs of agricultural development that promote higher-yielding crops and activities.

The extensive experience of the U.S. Government with all of these kinds of activities is reviewed in greater detail in the two empirical study reports, *Opium Subsector Survey* and *Survey on Afghan Drug Use, Attitudes, and Media Accessibility*, related to this report.

One general lesson is that many committed governments have been able to suppress narcotics cultivation, and that cultivation thrives either where it has political protection or in situations of anarchy such as in Burma and contemporary Afghanistan. Successful enforcement has typically been accompanied by campaigns for promoting antinarcotics awareness and programs for alternative economic development.

A.I.D.'s more extensive experience is with alternative economic development as well as awareness and education projects. Alternative economic development projects are treated extensively in the

*Opium Subsector Survey*, and awareness and education projects are treated in detail in the *Survey on Afghan Drug Use, Attitudes, and Media Accessibility*.

In the area of alternative economic development, the U.S. government recognizes the difficulty of replacing poppy income. According to the *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, success requires "a significant program of economic assistance, as well as improved trade and investment opportunities."<sup>9</sup> The programs of alternative economic development have involved some mixture of crop substitution, income replacement, and area development.

A key element of the heroin control strategy is "to garner worldwide recognition of the drug issue in both its health and national security dimensions...",<sup>10</sup> through demand reduction training and technical assistance in 28 countries.

According to a 1986 A.I.D. assessment, the general evolution of A.I.D.'s philosophy was from crop substitution to comprehensive area development. "The evolution reflects the growing recognition that no single crop can fully substitute for income lost by farmers who give up illicit crop cultivation."<sup>11</sup>

A.I.D. conducted a review of its projects in 1986 and scheduled a similar review for 1992. This review has not been conducted. The A.I.D. projects have included (1) elements promoting economic development in areas formerly dependent on poppy, (2) education and public awareness about drugs, and (3) support to law enforcement efforts. The latter has been prohibited by legislation for a number of years, however. The 1986 review team endorsed the effectiveness of all three project elements but emphasized that they needed to be flexibly adjusted by local project management to fit the particular economic and cultural situations of different areas.

Since 1986, there have been several evaluations of particular projects, including the Gadoon-Amazai project in Pakistan.<sup>12</sup> The Gadoon-Amazai project has been judged generally successful. Within Pakistan, A.I.D.-sponsored activities in Balochistan and the tribal territories were judged to have been less successful. Reviews of the Gadoon-Amazai project emphasized the importance of eradication for successful alternative agriculture and the importance of a comprehensive program for success. Despite its success in terms of its nominal goals, the project has been criticized because of (1) anticipated or reported "balloon effects" (the spread of poppy cultivation to new areas), (2) failure of substitute crops to produce as high a return as poppy, and (3) the project's heavy dependence on subsidies and its high costs. Steps have been taken in the second phase of the project to remedy these three faults. Newer projects, such as the Kala Dhaka Area Development Project, have also moved from an infrastructural to a more multisectoral and participative model of development. Forestry, livestock, and training are now emphasized as well as irrigation and roads.

During the final revision of our report, we received USAID/Pakistan's review of its antinarcotics projects and an INM official memorandum. Both items confirm our findings.

The USAID/Pakistan review concluded that, in Pakistan,

- Enforcement of poppy bans is critical to project success;
- Development activities can reduce local opposition, particularly if they are conducted with local participation and help to provide alternative economic activities to poppy cultivation. Villagers prefer income-generating projects to social projects.
- The Pakistani government has the capability to implement antinarcotics projects, but time and money are necessary for project effectiveness.

In relation to Afghanistan, the USAID/Pakistan review emphasizes

- The value of the poppy clause in keeping projects out of poppy-growing regions, and

- The attractiveness of irrigation and high-yielding crops (on the basis of the NACP experience) to local leaders in gaining their support for suppressing poppy cultivation.

In a recent memorandum, an INM official suggested the following lessons that were learned through INM work in Pakistan. Projects should be simple and flexible, overhead should be low, and the use of local talent should be maximized. Government commitment, donor control, and poppy clauses are critical. Roads and access facilities serve both alternative economic development and enforcement purposes.

In addition to the A.I.D. projects in Pakistan, the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) of the U.S. Embassy has some small projects in Pakistan. A project in Malakand has been completed, two projects in Mohmand and Bajaur with budget levels of \$12.5 million are being implemented, and a third project is about to begin in Khyber. The focus of the NAS programs has been road building, which facilitates both enforcement and market development by providing easier access. The projects in Malakand and Mohmand are judged to have been effective. A UNDCP project in Buner was supported by the European Community, and a UNDCP project in Dir is awaiting funding for its second phase. The Buner project was reported to have been less effective in terms of wiping out poppy until the Pakistani government began enforcement activities.

A.I.D. has also implemented antinarcotics projects in other regions. An evaluation of the Upper Hualaga Area Development Project in Peru concludes that little progress was made because of "poor coordination." The scheduled services were eventually delivered, but the region's agriculture remained stagnant, and coca cultivation increased. The enforcement activity that should have accompanied the area development effort never occurred.<sup>13</sup>

A review of the Mae Chen Watershed Development Project in Thailand revealed that some agricultural development occurred and that there was a 60 percent reduction in narcotics acreage.<sup>14</sup> Several studies were conducted in connection with the first Chapare Project in Bolivia. These studies concluded that, in the absence of enforcement, decreasing the amount of coca cultivation was not very successful. One study suggested that development elsewhere in Bolivia might dissuade potential migrants from moving to the rapidly growing Chapare area.<sup>15</sup>

Although no systematic review has been conducted of A.I.D. experience with narcotics awareness projects since 1986, individual evaluations have been conducted of such projects in Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Panama, as well as a review of narcotics awareness activities in eight countries in Asia.<sup>16</sup> The reviews, with the exception of the Ecuador evaluation, reported favorable effects on all audiences. For example, the Peruvian review reported that

Public awareness efforts appear to have been effective, with 90% of Peruvians now perceiving drug production, trafficking, and abuse as problems which warrant government attention. This high level of concern is in sharp contrast to perceptions prior to project initiation. However, most Peruvian elites do not share the general public's support for coca eradication. A recent ... survey of 2,500 Peruvian leaders indicates widespread opposition to large-scale eradication programs. Instead, the leaders recommend that crop substitution programs be implemented before threatening peasants with crop eradication.<sup>17</sup>

For optimal antinarcotics results, Afghanistan would have an effective central government, whose commitment could be secured for an antidrug program. Such a government may not emerge for some time. Also, large regions of the country may not be subject to central control, but rather to shifting coalitions of local commanders and councils. The latter may well be the case for the immediate future.

Any Afghanistan program for the next few years may therefore have to be formulated under circumstances of decentralized power, although the United States will surely focus on the importance of developing central government apparatus. Situations similar to that in contemporary Afghanistan

certainly existed for long periods in China in the first half of this century—and at other periods in other countries—and the United States has taken varying positions in each case.

Because of the importance of limiting the potential for destabilization in Afghanistan and the importance of meeting the challenge posed by its large-scale poppy cultivation, developing a pragmatic and effective drug policy is desirable. Individual areas and the local commanders and councils in control of them might be dealt with under general policy guidelines, permitting full-scale programs of antidrug assistance subject to free access and effective monitoring of the suppression of poppy cultivation and heroin processing facilities.

Establishing any such policy would involve having to negotiate some sort of understanding with the central government. It would face "balloon effect" challenges, but ones that are no different in principle from those posed elsewhere in the world.

## 2. Elements of a Strategy

### INTRODUCTION

Afghanistan's dubious distinction as the second largest poppy grower in the world is not likely to change until significant progress is made toward restoring peace in the country and accelerating development. After a decade and a half of political upheaval and the disastrous Soviet invasion and occupation, Afghanistan faces major obstacles to peace and development.

### MAJOR PROBLEMS

#### Difficulty in Restoring Peace

Despite numerous tribal distinctions the people of Afghanistan had lived in relative peace and harmony for many generations before the communist coup and Soviet invasion. The war has filled the private arsenals of Afghanistan, while undercutting social control over their use. Active warfare and damaging violence will likely be brought to an end, but restoration of pre-Soviet stability will be difficult to achieve in a short time.

#### Absence of a Strong Central Government

The kind of government leadership, administration, and stability that will evolve in Afghanistan once the current warfare has been brought under control is difficult to project. Even before the communist coup and the Soviet occupation, the central government in Afghanistan was not strong. The military's influence will be greatly enhanced over its role in the pre-communist years. Arriving at national policy decisions that can be implemented will be increasingly difficult. Tribal and regional differences may well make central control more difficult than heretofore. The disruptive influences of the Hekmatyar followers might continue to be a strong barrier to firm central authority in Afghanistan.

The lengthy Soviet occupation has decimated the civilian leadership. It is not only the killing of many civilian leaders by the communist forces that greatly weakened the central authority; as many of these leaders left the country as were killed. Many who escaped have died abroad or will not return under any circumstances. Their experience will be sorely missed. Afghans who remained in the country and continued to serve the government were probably not assigned responsibilities that would qualify them for higher-level policy assignments.

Because of the continuing strife in the country, the expectation that a new central government in Afghanistan will be able to suppress poppy cultivation, and perhaps opium processing, in the immediate future is likely to prove unrealistic. However, this does not suggest abandoning a variety of constructive developmental policies and programs that can bring gradual success in reducing and ultimately eliminating the narcotics problems of Afghanistan.

## SERIOUS CHALLENGES TO PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT

### **Return of Millions of Refugees**

Millions of Afghan refugees are still in Pakistan and Iran, and smaller numbers are elsewhere. Most of the refugees in countries adjacent to Afghanistan will return. Once they have returned, the total population of Afghanistan will be considerably larger than it was before the Soviet invasion. However, although the population has increased relative to prewar levels, the resources essential for everyday life will have shrunk. Such resources include arable land per capita, housing, education and health facilities, usable roads and fields (devoid of mines), irrigation, potable water, and a stable government.

### **Limited Job Opportunities for Large Urban Population**

Afghans' insecurity under communist rule led to migration to cities as well as abroad. Can or will many Afghans return to rural life? What impact will the returning refugees have on urban viability? Water, light, housing, heat, police forces, and education and health facilities will likely be inadequate in urban areas. Especially serious will be the lack of job opportunities in cities.

### **Substantial Resources Needed for Relief and Development**

Defining and measuring resources needed for relief as distinct from those needed for development will be difficult. Both should be available simultaneously. Progress toward the goal of reasonable self-sufficiency will reduce relief needs, but it will take time. The cost of both will be substantial.

### **Increasing Prospects for Essential Assistance from Abroad**

One of the most serious problems relates to the negative factors that will affect the levels and promptness of technical and material assistance available for Afghanistan's rehabilitation and economic development. These negative factors include the situation in Eastern Europe; the weak economy in the United States and in other potential donor countries; and a lack of understanding of past, current, and future needs of Afghanistan. Some observers contend that with the withdrawal of the Soviets and the fall of the communist government, the current fighting among mujahideen factions warrants only modest, if any, aid to Afghanistan. However, as long as the conflict remains confined to the Kabul area, relief and development efforts in the rest of the country can have a substantial positive impact.

### ***Russian Reparations***

Large-scale reparations from the Soviet Union are fully justified, but Russia and the other nations of the former Soviet empire have substantial needs for development aid themselves. No matter how strong the justification for large reparations from Russia, such funds are not likely to be forthcoming for Afghanistan. That also applies to the commitments of some \$600 million by the Soviet Union to a former United Nations High Commissioner for support of Afghanistan's reconstruction needs.

### ***German Assistance***

There had been reason for optimism that Germany, which had long been friendly to Afghanistan, would provide substantial assistance to a liberated Afghanistan. But Germany is now burdened with

the task of finding many tens of billions of dollars to build a strong economy in eastern Germany, now liberated from Russian control. Even if Germany does come through with aid, the level will be much lower than what it would have been before German reunification.

### ***Middle East Support***

Middle Eastern countries, especially Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the Emirates, have the financial potential to provide a substantial portion of the funds for Afghanistan's recovery and development needs. The magnitude of such assistance cannot be determined at this time. Clearly, huge financial resources exist in these OPEC nations; however, the substantial rebuilding and military expenses arising from the Gulf War may limit the amount of funds available from these countries.

### ***Japanese Assistance***

With huge foreign exchange holdings, Japan could be a significant contributor to funding Afghanistan's recovery and growth, but Japan's response is highly uncertain. Japan might more generously join in a combined effort with other countries or multilateral institutions rather than provide independent funding. Although Afghanistan could provide Japan a venue for achieving its desired increase in international political influence, a large part of Japan's resources and attention may well flow to other areas, such as Cambodia and Eastern Europe.

### ***The United States Role***

After having been a substantial and generous contributor to Afghanistan's development for several decades and a strong factor in achieving the withdrawal of Soviet armed forces from Afghanistan, the United States would be expected to provide strong support to Afghanistan for reestablishing its economy as well as for increasing its productive capacity. But the continuing economic recession in the United States, the huge and increasing government debt, an unprecedented large net foreign indebtedness, and large current budget and trade deficits make the size of the U.S. contribution uncertain.

In addition, many groups in the United States are exerting strong pressure to reduce foreign assistance. There are also many other demands for the limited amount of U.S. foreign assistance money. Aid to Eastern Europe to help economic restructuring and minimize social instability will likely be given high priority.

### ***Multilateral and Regional Institutions***

Afghanistan should receive assistance from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Of these entities, ADB and IBRD have strongly supported many Asian countries in their pursuit of more rapid economic progress. The IBRD and the IMF can be expected to provide funding—it is hoped with terms that take into consideration Afghanistan's limited resources, substantial needs, and inability to comply with strict structural reforms.

## NARCOTICS AND ECONOMICS

The raw materials for narcotics, such as poppy, are, as with most goods and services, produced in response to demand. Use of narcotics is promoted by pushers and by the pressures from existing users or prospective users.

The cultivation of poppy for production of morphine and heroin is more profitable than growing other crops, especially in less developed countries. An especially strong inducement to produce poppy exists where farmers' income from the production of their traditional crops is very low.

Afghanistan's narcotic experience is similar to that of Burma's, a nation with considerable natural resources that has been ravaged by a cruel and corrupt military dictator for 30 years. Burma's farmers had been improving their income until the destructive policies and practices of General Ne Win and his military associates brought impoverishment to the country. The result was a large increase in the production of poppy. Similarly, disorder and poverty in Afghanistan have led to an increase in poppy cultivation. Poor countries lack the financial resources needed for effective enforcement against narcotics. Not only has Afghanistan been a low-income nation, but also its economic situation worsened greatly during the 15 years of communist rule and the destructive Soviet invasion and occupation.

Clearly, effective enforcement of antinarcotics measures in every aspect of poppy cultivation, processing, trafficking, and use is important. But in general the enforcement of laws and policies has been a major problem in Afghanistan because of the lack of economic and political resources. Enforcement must and can be improved, but it will require funding and technical assistance for ensuring alternative economic opportunities as well as political consolidation.

Antinarcotics enforcement and education are discussed elsewhere in this report. These actions are essential, but the greater the income margin between poppy cultivation and production of other crops, the more difficult, costly, and delayed will be the suppression of narcotics through enforcement and education.

### ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN'S WAR ON NARCOTICS— IMPROVING AFGHANISTAN'S ECONOMY

Success in reducing poppy cultivation in Afghanistan will be difficult and costly and will require both persistence and commitment. The fight against narcotics must be part of a total program that encompasses such diverse matters as facilitating the return and integration of Afghan refugees from Pakistan, Iran, and elsewhere. Returning refugees will need money and may thus turn to poppy cultivation. Adequate supplies of fertilizer, seeds, and other equipment must be provided for greater and more efficient production of farm products other than poppy—this will be costly. Programs that improve storage and processing and transportation facilities must be pursued—these will be costly. Incentives and technical assistance must be provided, and, through promotion, new industries must be encouraged for the provision of job opportunities, especially for urban job seekers—these will be costly. More and improved education will also be costly.

If the developed nations and the official international and regional agencies share in the costs, the results will not only be manifest in enhanced peace and development and higher living standards of Afghans, but will also help achieve a major reduction in poppy growth in Afghanistan and thereby ensure an important step forward in the overall war on narcotics. Assistance from donors will benefit not only Afghans but also all nations engaged in the war on narcotics.

A.I.D.'s role will depend on decisions in the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. Government and the understanding that the war on narcotics must encompass a war on poverty and

stagnation and the sense of hopelessness in the many poor countries where poppy cultivation is looked upon as an important means of improving quality of life. A.I.D. knows that progress and development in nations such as Afghanistan require technical assistance, capital goods, improved infrastructure, wise financial policies, incentives for private investors, better education, and many other costly programs and resources. The key lies in financial, material, and human resources that the more advanced and more prosperous nations can and must supply if opium production in Afghanistan is to decrease.

What is promptly needed in Afghanistan from all assistance programs might be described as the contents of a *survival kit* that is essential for overcoming the damages associated with the Soviet invasion and occupation. But a survival kit will not be adequate for a war on poppy cultivation in Afghanistan; such a war will certainly require an *economic development kit* that will narrow somewhat the income gap between producers of useful goods and services and producers of harmful narcotics.

### 3. Enforcement and Alternative Agriculture

One of the prime lessons learned from earlier antinarcotics programming is the critical nature of effective enforcement as the sine qua non of drug eradication. Enforcement will be particularly problematic in Afghanistan because of the lack of a strong national authority. Consequently, the A.I.D. antinarcotics strategy for Afghanistan must include as a paramount element a comprehensive and well-coordinated narcotics law enforcement plan for opium poppy-growing (or potential poppy-growing) areas. These are where A.I.D. will need to carry out development activities. The enforcers will need to be supported by a narcotics intelligence effort focused on the locations in which A.I.D. will be involved, as is currently done, under an interagency agreement.

Responsibility for development of the law enforcement plan cannot, by statutory mandate, be placed on A.I.D. but should be handled by the Narcotics Coordinating Committee of the U.S. Mission to Afghanistan. Until such a Mission is established, development of the plan should be the responsibility of INM/NAS and DEA.

Further, the Embassy—and in the interim before an embassy exists, Pakistan/NAS Counselor for Narcotics Affairs, with the assistance of the O/AID/REP—should be responsible for obtaining from the appropriate Afghan local authorities agreement to develop and implement the enforcement plan. Such local agreement is key to implementing the plan.

The enforcement plan should have two major objectives: (1) obtaining voluntary or quasivoluntary compliance with the restrictions placed on opium poppy cultivation, and (2) securing sufficient police force to eradicate the standing crop of poppy and punish those who grow and traffic in opium or heroin.

The first of the two objectives, securing voluntary compliance, implies instilling in the authorities the political will and providing the means to enforce, by force if necessary, the required restrictions on opium poppy cultivation and trafficking. There is a strong opinion in several Pakistan/Afghanistan DEA quarters that the effective strategy is not to concentrate on poppy cultivation, which involves a politically complex conflict with large numbers of farmers. Rather, they urge that the focus should be on the destruction of processing facilities, which are relatively few in number, and on arresting traffickers and processors. The problem is that poppy cultivation is, of necessity, an open-air activity. Processing is fairly unobtrusive and mobile. Efforts on all fronts will be required. The task of enforcement, and the related determination of strategy, is primarily the responsibility of INM and DEA, with the advice and support of A.I.D.

Securing voluntary compliance also requires persuading farmers of the importance of abandoning cultivation of opium poppy. This requires, to a considerable extent, programs of alternative economic development and awareness promotion.

Voluntary or quasivoluntary compliance with the ban against poppy cultivation in the poppy-growing areas of Afghanistan will require a *quid pro quo*; that is, something will have to be given to the farmer to induce him to stop growing poppy. The vast number of farmers grow poppy for the same reason other farmers grow apples or grapes; that is, to acquire *cash* so that he and his family can obtain the necessities of life.

If the farmer is to stop growing his cash crop—opium poppy—another means of his obtaining needed cash must be provided. There should be a real expectation that the farmer or his children will

have the opportunity to improve their standard of living. *The success stories have been projects that have combined alternative economic development, narcotics awareness, and law enforcement.*

Both the INM Malakand Project, in a Provincial Administered Tribal Area (PATA) of Malakand Division/Pakistan, and the A.I.D. Gadoon-Amazai Project, legally in a settled area, but in practicality also a PATA of the Swabi District, Pakistan, were successful income replacement and rural development projects with phased and effective law enforcement. Opium poppy cultivation in each area has been eliminated.

In contrast, the UNDCP Buner Project in Buner District, NWFP, Pakistan, a settled area, was an income replacement and rural development project that relied on persuasion and demonstration that opium poppy as a cash crop was not necessary. In fact, the Buner Project successfully introduced crops and farming techniques that provided the farmer with an equal or better standard of living than could be obtained by cultivating opium poppy. Unfortunately, the farmers accepted the improvements but continued to cultivate poppy as well. Only when enforcement was applied, did the cultivation of opium poppy stop. Poppy continues to be grown in the parts of Buner District not covered by a development project.

#### **DESIGN, FLEXIBILITY, AND TIMING OF ENFORCEMENT AND OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS**

The project design of the first-stage projects must call for rapid and flexible action, precisely because these projects are intended as pilot efforts for more extensive projects and will proceed one area at a time. Each project must be flexible enough to allow for continued readjustment. In fact, responding to another lesson learned from past projects, it must adjust flexibly to differing local circumstances in different areas. Such projects are actually composed of a series of miniprojects, each of which involves a negotiated enforcement plan and a negotiated development and awareness program responding to local needs and circumstances. A continuous process of joint monitoring and review with local authorities should guard against serious waste of resources and should also institutionalize local participation and management capacity. Initially the targets for development are likely to be obvious and have high returns—the restoration of roads and irrigation systems and operational support for schools, training centers, and clinics.

The lessons learned from earlier projects include the importance of flexibility in choosing sectors in which to invest, adaptation to the details of local circumstances, and coordination with effective local enforcement. Sustainability requires a low level of subsidization and continuous monitoring and feedback on development efforts.

Time appears to be of the essence. Literally hundreds of thousands of refugees have returned to Afghanistan, and undoubtedly hundreds of thousands more will return over the next 12 months. A substantial increase in opium poppy cultivation has apparently resulted from the following: damage to and mining of farmlands, roads, and particularly, damage to water sources and distribution systems; orchards needing replacement or substantial rehabilitation to become productive; and the ready market for opium at a high farmgate price. Action against production must be taken now in as comprehensive a manner as funds permit.

Speed and flexibility would be assisted by minimizing, as much as possible, the complexity of regulations and procedures applied to these projects. A.I.D. has several fast-track procedures for approving projects that might be used. In addition, interagency cooperation with INM might permit the use of some of its less onerous procedures. Congress might be willing to waive some of its requirements as it has in INM's case.

Monitoring arrangements, including aerial and satellite surveillance and regular visits and open access to ground observers, would serve as a check on the conduct and impact of the subprojects supported.

### PROJECT DESIGN AND APPROACH OPTIONS

Two broad types of project design options appear to be available, both of which have proved to be successful in eliminating opium poppy cultivation.

**Option 1:** The design and development of a comprehensive alternative economic development project such as the Gadoon-Amazai project. These projects have typically pursued crop substitution with high-return crops, and human-resource development through manpower training, and have tried to narrow the gap between the rate of return from poppy cultivation and its replacement.

**Option 2:** The design and development of targeted alternative economic development activities that satisfy the immediate requirements of the authorities and the populace, resulting in the political will of the authorities to enforce the restrictions placed on poppy cultivation; and obtaining the consent of a large segment of the populace to abandon opium poppy cultivation and voluntarily comply with the restrictions on cultivation. These Option 2 projects seek the minimum development consistent with poppy eradication.

Declining A.I.D. funding levels, combined with a realization that heavy subsidies often result in unsustainable development, indicate that smaller projects, unfolding at a more gradual rate, are called for. We recommend that Option 2 be the approach to project design in the immediate short term, that is, over the next 5 years.

INM has found that relatively low levels of expenditure have been effective in Pakistan. However, Afghanistan is far less developed than Pakistan. In any case, programs will have to be viewed as investments for the long term—acquiring experience as central political stability returns to Afghanistan.

### Selection of Project Areas

Project areas must be selected carefully; the area selected must currently cultivate opium poppy. A strategic alternative is to leave these areas to INM, because of the greater legal latitude it enjoys, and concentrate A.I.D. efforts on areas that have recently abandoned poppy (Konar and Paktia) or are in danger of becoming involved with it. As INM eliminates poppy cultivation in heavy poppy-growing areas, these areas could "graduate" to A.I.D. The A.I.D. programs would serve as the reward for sustained participation in eradication activities.

INM and A.I.D. should pursue a closer relationship, even permitting transfers of funds when appropriate because of Section 487 considerations.

### Certification of Local Authorities

The local authorities involved, whoever they might be—commanders, local *shuras*, local *jirga*, or local *maliks*—must exercise viable local authority, and, *must not* themselves be involved in narcotics trafficking. In general, the process of certification under Section 487, at least as envisaged in current regulations, should ensure that local authorities are not involved in narcotics trafficking. Section 483 is probably not an obstacle to programs of the type discussed.

Continuing certification would depend not only on careful monitoring by local authorities, but also by project personnel and air and satellite surveillance, if possible. Continuous physical access to project areas should be a condition for development assistance.

### **Local Participation**

A request should come from the local authorities for assistance, along with their agreement to eliminate opium poppy. They should be intimately involved in designing alternative economic development and awareness programs, although these programs must be judged to be feasible, justifiable, and sustainable by A.I.D. technical staff. However, local participation helps to avoid too narrow a fixation of the sectors and types of development assistance to be provided.

Tensions may arise with local authorities about key A.I.D. emphases, such as the promotion of women in development, environmental preservation, or even human rights questions. However, these issues will have to be pursued flexibly but determinedly as they are in other A.I.D. programs. An explicit agreement, parallel to the enforcement agreement, should specify the commitment of all participating entities.

### **Linkage of Development and Enforcement**

Having said all of the above, we doubt that farmers in areas in which farmlands are marginal and land holdings are small can be made to abandon opium poppy as a cash crop solely through use of alternative economic development. Incomes from alternative crops are likely to be considerably smaller than incomes from poppy cultivation. No project that attempted such an approach in such areas has been successful. The success stories have been projects that combined alternative economic development with law enforcement.

A.I.D. can provide no assistance in the form of operational costs, materials, or technical advice for implementing enforcement of restrictions on opium poppy cultivation because such assistance is prohibited under current U.S. law. Such a restriction on A.I.D. assistance may be helpful. The development organization or its personnel should not be seen by the farmers as enforcers. The farmers should look upon the developers as friends, who are trying to be of assistance. It would be helpful if the farmers perceived the developers as being on their side, both of whom will be threatened by the authorities if opium poppy cultivation continues.

The linkage between development and elimination of opium poppy must be made very clear by the development personnel, who must remind the farmer that the farmer and developer must work closely together and that the farmer must eliminate the cultivation of opium poppy or "the enforcers" will make the developers stop assisting the farmer.

This passive attitude of the developer toward the farmer will ensure some level of security for development personnel working in the field. It can also strengthen the farmer's acceptance of the restrictions on the cultivation of opium poppy.

The actual enforcement will, of course, be the responsibility of the local authorities and their enforcement personnel. Any assistance in the form of operational costs, material, and technical advice should be provided by INM/NAS and DEA as appropriate.

Monitoring the project should be the responsibility of the local authorities, who should use clearly identified "police patrols" that are seen frequently in the project area. These police patrols should know the farmers and which farmlands belong to which farmer. The police patrols should observe what is being planted, and if opium poppy is planted against restrictions they should warn him that the crop may be destroyed.

In addition to monitoring by the authorities, a covert method of reporting opium poppy cultivation by project personnel should be developed and implemented, including reporting on planting to U.S. government project personnel whenever feasible. If a trusted means of reporting cannot be established, it should be abandoned because the relationship between the field project personnel and the farmer must be maintained.

### **Active Enforcement**

#### ***Crop Destruction***

The local authorities must develop their operational plan to destroy the crop with or without the cooperation of the farmer. They must also decide whether to use the threat of force to persuade the farmer to immediately destroy the poppy and replace the land with another crop, such as wheat. They may wish to wait and destroy the crop just before harvesting.

Exactly how the authorities wish to enforce their restriction on opium poppy cultivation should be left to their senior officers. The U.S. government preferably should recommend that the most humanitarian approach be used.

#### ***Interruption of Trading in Opium***

A program designed to intercept traders who advance funds to farmers to plant opium poppy should be pursued. The traders, once identified, should be arrested and incarcerated. News of the arrest and incarceration should be widely disseminated.

In addition, a program should be designed to intercept the collection and transportation of raw opium by traders or farmers to wholesalers or refineries. Such collectors and transporters should be arrested and incarcerated, and news of this should also be widely publicized.

A program designed to locate and arrest owners and workers at refineries should also be pursued. DEA should expand its operational intelligence activities to include locating refineries in Afghanistan, and the timely passing of this information to INM/NAS for transmission to the local-authority enforcement authority. Obtaining permission for DEA to open an office in Jalalabad in support of this critical effort should be sought.

One major force stimulating the cultivation of opium poppy is the demand for raw opium by heroin refineries in Afghanistan and Pakistan. If this demand can be eliminated or substantially reduced, the farmers can be more easily persuaded to abandon opium poppy cultivation. If enforcement action against refineries is completely successful the farmer will substantially reduce opium poppy cultivation because of the decreased demand.

### **Regional Cooperation**

*Regional cooperation and coordination is imperative if a meaningful reduction of heroin in the United States is to be accomplished.* However, the method of implementing a meaningful program is not easily determined.

Developing a cooperative and coordinated regional effort should be given priority, *not* at the expense of bilateral efforts, but in addition to such efforts. As a start, it is strongly urged that efforts be made by the U.S. government to obtain cooperation and coordination from both the Afghan and Pakistani authorities.

While varied and formal arrangements are being arranged, we urge that the U.S. government do all within its diplomatic power to increase the enforcement efforts against opium refineries in Pakistan

and, more specifically, in NWFP. The Frontier Corps organization could provide immediate and favorable results in this regard.

The NWFP Frontier Corps commander is reported to have stated that he needs only "two golden words—'go ahead.'" He believes that he could eliminate the refineries in the NWFP. The favorable actions of the Frontier Corps in Balochistan, who have been given the "go ahead," sign, support the statement of the NWFP Frontier Corps Commander.

Eliminating or substantially reducing the refinery activities in Pakistan will serve to substantially reduce and eliminate opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, while also helping the Pakistan government maintain its political authority.

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## 4. Public Health Approaches

### THE CHALLENGE

The devastating effects of the war on Afghanistan have already been discussed. The war has almost certainly generated increased drug abuse among both the resident and the refugee populations. Heroin has become the drug of most concern, followed by hashish and opium. Unfortunately, there is a lack of hard data to support any definite evaluation of the drug abuse situation. Despite this fact, some estimates have been made of the prevalence of drug addiction. For example, abuse among returning refugees is said by some sources to run as high as 40 percent, whereas surveys of refugee camps abroad indicate a high of 10 to 15 percent among 15- to 35-year-olds.<sup>18</sup> The fact that the number of heroin addicts in neighboring Pakistan is estimated at about 1.2 million leads us to believe that some level of heroin addiction exists in Afghanistan, and this was confirmed in a companion study to this one.

Although this report focuses on drug abuse problems and recommends alternative strategies related to poppy growing and drug addiction, it is important to point out that the nation's public health standards as a whole have suffered greatly as a consequence of the war. The level of health services available before the war was inadequate and deteriorated further during the war.<sup>19</sup> This situation exacerbates the difficult problems inherent in solving the drug abuse and addiction problem.

In studying public health issues, reducing drug abuse is normally discussed as part of an overall effort to produce healthy people. This effort, by building an antidrug consensus, operates to promote demand reduction and to inhibit drug use, production, and trafficking. It is a natural complement to enforcement, which protects society from drugs by reducing supply and demand and by building popular support for enforcement. Also, such an effort is normally conducted as part of and by the same means as other public health programs. In Afghanistan, most of these means are lacking.

Drug abuse in Afghanistan is not only facilitated by a public health system in disarray, it also impedes economic development. Development efforts will not succeed if the population is handicapped both physically and mentally because of drug addiction.

Neglecting to build on the limited experience and institutions that do exist would be a mistake. Existing institutions include health and educational facilities: 1,000 schools, 1,300 health posts, and more than 230 clinics and small hospitals supported by A.I.D. These facilities include the communications media that exist in this largely illiterate and parochial society, and they also include narcotics demand reduction programs that have been launched with help from UNDCP and private support. The formal and informal education connected with Islam are crucial elements in antidrug work. A.I.D. must find means to build on development efforts already initiated and to coordinate development efforts among all of the donor agencies in Afghanistan.

### PUBLIC HEALTH MODEL

The public health model focuses on community-level health issues, and on making recommendations that the community can implement to achieve better health for all its members. Public health approaches are presented here within the framework of using various methods of enforcement and development to achieve a sizeable reduction in poppy growing and of narcotics use and addiction. This

section of the report focuses on three major elements of the public health model in response to the issues at hand: (1) narcotics awareness, (2) education, and (3) treatment and rehabilitation. These topics are presented as an indispensable part of an overall narcotics control policy. In fact, the strategies we propose will not succeed if each is implemented separately. For example, a successful enforcement strategy must necessarily be supported with public information and awareness about drug abuse and means to curtail its use; both of these are inherent or related elements of the public health model. Moreover, an antidrug strategy is not sustainable without treatment and rehabilitation.

### **Narcotics Awareness**

Awareness programs have proved to be successful in increasing the awareness of the dangers associated with certain health behaviors. Good examples of such programs are the extensive U.S. campaigns carried out by the National Cancer Institute of the National Institutes of Health on smoking, heart disease, and nutrition; and the drug abuse prevention campaigns carried out by the Office of Substance Abuse Prevention, Department of Health and Human Services. Many of these campaigns were implemented on various levels and targeted special populations, such as pregnant women, adolescents, hard-to-reach populations, ethnic minorities, and the like. Several of the drug and alcohol prevention campaigns, for example, gained endorsements and support from school systems, parent organizations, health clinics, the criminal justice system, and transportation authorities so that all of these agencies were communicating the same message. U.S. data have shown a direct link between the foregoing campaigns and improved health behavior.

Awareness campaigns have also succeeded in less developed countries in modifying health behavior in family planning, oral rehydration, and immunizations. In the area of drug education and awareness, A.I.D.'s project to increase public awareness of drug abuse, production, and trafficking in Peru has gained wide international recognition, and Bolivia's narcotics awareness program has been generally successful.

Narcotics awareness programs are crucial for drug control programs in Afghanistan and will succeed if

- Scientific data are collected on which to base the development of awareness programs,
- The programs are implemented on various community levels,
- The programs use community resources to the fullest,
- The programs use culturally relevant messages, and
- The programs provide new resources as needed.

In a largely illiterate environment, the awareness campaign cannot depend solely on the printed media, but must use other media and rely on intermediaries and surrogates to transmit its message. As discussed above, Afghanistan does not have a strong central government, and the country is still suffering the ravages of war. Power remains distributed in the hands of various local bodies—commanders and *shuras*. This means that awareness campaigns may have to be developed locally rather than nationally. It is hoped that this situation will change as stabilization occurs and a central government is established. Also, Afghanistan is a developing nation and the availability of modern technologies and mass media, especially in rural and remote areas, is very limited. This limits access of many aspects of awareness campaigns to certain areas of the country. We therefore cannot depend solely on messages disseminated through mass media.

Our strategy for narcotics awareness involves (1) data collection, (2) community leaders as intermediaries, and (3) Islam.

### ***Data Collection***

Accurate data must be collected on community and individual beliefs, knowledge, and attitudes toward poppy growing; prevalence and incidence of drug abuse; the social and psychological characteristics of individuals abusing drugs or individuals in treatment; paths leading individuals to drug use and paths to treatment (e.g., Is it possible that addicts want to be detoxified only to lower their tolerance to drugs so they can resume their habit?). Collecting baseline data is essential to policy and program development.

Although data collection has traditionally meant that researchers develop questionnaires and administer them to a sample of respondents, these methods have not always been successful. For example, data collectors for the attitude and use surveys conducted under the NACP have reported reluctance on the part of respondents to provide reliable data on their patterns of drug use and levels of addiction. As a result survey methods of data collection should be combined with ethnographic research. In using a multimethod approach to data collection, better estimates might be obtained about the prevalence of drug abuse and addiction.

### ***Community Leaders as Intermediaries***

Awareness campaigns must gain the support of various community leaders and "change agents"—such as political leaders, commanders, local religious leaders, school teachers, employers, social welfare specialists, and medical professionals and paraprofessionals—so that they can adopt the campaign as their own and further disseminate the message. For example, if the campaign gained the support of the religious leadership in the community, the leaders might demonstrate their support by preaching against narcotics during the Friday sermon. Again, when we gain the support of school teachers, they can disseminate the message in the school system. Medical professionals may use posters, banners, and stickers in their clinics.

A similar approach was used in the NACP where, to increase awareness of the narcotics problem, the project followed a two-tier strategy. First, leaders of Afghan communities were trained to conduct antinarcotics meetings and courses for all members of the community, and second, these leaders actually conducted the meetings and the courses, transmitting the message to the general public. Under the education component of that project, various graphic and electronic media devices with antinarcotics messages were produced for use during the meetings. The project staff was able to mobilize a large number of community leaders who were willing to take a stand against narcotics, and their videos and drama group presentations were well received.

### ***Islam***

A discussion of increasing awareness and education regarding narcotics control would not be complete without pointing out the crucial role of Islam. Islam is fervently opposed to addiction of any sort. In fact, although there has always been some abuse of opium and cannabis in Afghanistan the majority of the population has generally looked at such abuse as un-Islamic. Despite the fact that some religious leaders appear to have condoned poppy growing because of the economic devastation of their regions, they all recognize that it is un-Islamic to use drugs. Both campaign and curriculum materials should use this fact to their advantage. As John Dixon, coordinator of the Narcotics Awareness Unit of NACP, wrote in his end-of-tour report, "the Koran turned out to be our greatest asset and by no means a barrier or problem in our activities ... The Koran's admonition against using intoxicants and drugs thus became the centerpiece of our entire antinarcotics campaign. We discovered that even poppy growers realized that their activities are not approved by Islam."

## Education

The second element of the response to the drug issue is education, including the development of curriculum materials for schools and clinic use. These materials would address a wide range of topics covering both prevention and treatment. Examples of prevention topics are (1) the negative consequences of narcotics use and addiction on the individual, the family, the community, and the world; (2) the relationship between poppy cultivation and addiction, opium being the source of heroin—a highly addictive substance; (3) Islam and addiction; and (4) the social and health consequences of use, abuse, and dependence, especially for at-risk populations such as youth and pregnant women.

Educational materials should cover topics on the availability of treatment, the rehabilitative results of treatment, and of attitudes toward drug addiction and the addict. Families may be hiding the addict because of the stigma associated with addiction. Shame and family pressure may be even more intense for female addicts. Education is key to helping people understand that addiction is a cyclical disease (social and medical); that addicts experience high levels of denial, but once they admit they need help (or are forced to get help) they can be rehabilitated and resume an acceptable level of functioning. Educational materials should emphasize that treatment and rehabilitation can help individuals regain their self respect. In an interview with a treatment unit director, he stated that he believed that wanting to regain their self respect was the most motivating factor for addicts coming into treatment.

Our education strategy is closely tied to our awareness campaign strategy because curriculum materials could be used in training courses targeted to community leaders and other professionals. For example, videos and related written materials developed for our awareness campaigns can be used with text materials to inform medical professionals about addiction and how they might help their patients who may be addicted. The materials might also be used in the teacher training curriculum supported by A.I.D. These materials can be incorporated in social studies and science units on health, well-being, family life, agriculture, and so forth. Because A.I.D. supports a large number of schools, these texts can be incorporated into the elementary school curriculum. Not only can these materials be used in A.I.D.-supported schools, but also throughout the country. Informed students can then act as "change agents" and perhaps influence the behavior of their families and peers.

## Treatment and Rehabilitation


Prevention and treatment go hand in hand. Just as prevention aims to prevent people from becoming users, treatment aims to change users to nonusers or, at least, to reduce the level of their use. As a result, addiction treatment, including rehabilitative therapy, is also an integral part of any drug control policy. It is important to point out that without treatment no antidrug program is sustainable. Treatment focuses people's attention on the existence of a problem. Treatment helps addicts to be rehabilitated and reintegrated into mainstream development activities and builds overall support for antinarcotics activities.

To gain an understanding of treatment availability and process, we interviewed three knowledgeable persons in the field. All of them agreed that addiction is a tremendous problem in Pakistan. One respondent estimates that 1.2 million Pakistanis use heroin and about 5 million use some other drug every day. Although scientifically based data are not available on addiction among the Afghan population, the problem is also serious among Afghans. In fact, one respondent, an Afghan medical doctor, was frustrated that his program, which only consisted of a four-bed unit, could not serve more Afghan addicts because he believed there was a great need for it. He also expressed concern that two mental health clinics, which also treated addicts, were recently closed in Kabul and

Nangarhar. He estimated that in Kabul alone, there are about 5,000 heroin addicts, and he believes that this number will grow as those individuals who were alcoholics during the Soviet invasion will now turn to heroin to satisfy their addiction. Alcohol was readily available to Afghans while Soviet troops were stationed in Afghanistan, but it is no longer available.

According to the attitudes survey, treatment services consisted of medical detoxification, and the primary focus was on heroin addiction. Various medications were used, such as opium, tranquilizers, analgesics, and antihypertension medication. In a newly initiated out-patient program, rehabilitative treatment was followed. These treatment programs are described in greater detail in *Survey on Afghan Drug Use, Attitudes, and Media Accessibility*. Figure 1 is a graphic representation of the public health model.

**Figure 1. Public Health Model**



## 5. Strategy Alternatives

### ENFORCEMENT AND ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT

A.I.D.'s first strategic alternative is an extensive community development program in one or more areas, with firm local leadership ready to cooperate and in a position to be certified under Section 487. With careful enforcement, awareness promotion, and an ambitious but realistic development plan, comprehensive local area development could be successfully undertaken.

The second alternative is to undertake a much more modest community development program in somewhat the same spirit as the first alternative, but with more limited resources. This program might prove to be adequate to support a poppy elimination effort and permit a much wider area to be served than the first alternative. Of course, there is a minimum level below which a program will not be effective.

The third alternative is to conclude that no workable antinarcotics program can be developed under current anarchic conditions and to limit Mission involvement to the following:

- Ensuring that Mission programs do not assist poppy-growing areas.
- Encouraging antinarcotics awareness and alternative development activities as part of other Mission-supported programs, including private voluntary organization (PVO) grants and work with primary schools and primary health care clinics.
- Continuing to monitor the narcotics situation and support a certain level of research and pilot activity.

Although the third action is not a policy of inaction, it does represent minimal commitment. We believe a meaningful level of activity is possible, and that A.I.D.'s legally mandated interest in narcotics control requires an active antinarcotics stance in a country that is as important a source of narcotics as Afghanistan.

A fourth alternative, not necessarily excluding the previous three, is to promote overall, broad-based economic growth on the assumption that a prosperous and stable Afghanistan will not involve itself in narcotics. The problem is that the magnitude of resources and support required to sustain a level of development that would affect heavy poppy-growing areas may well be beyond that which the United States and other prospective donors would realistically provide. In addition, without vigorous enforcement this alternative is likely to be unsuccessful.

In this report we do not address the extent to which these alternatives should be pursued by A.I.D. and INM, but we recommend that the responsibilities be worked out cooperatively case by case. Also, we believe that it is a matter of indifference whether activities are funded through one or more projects or as subschemes of other projects. We do suggest, for each project, a single point of contact for Afghan local authorities, and a single point of authority with responsibility for project support. Funding arrangements have to be flexible in terms of the sectors and types of activities supported. They must respond both to expressed local needs and an objective assessment of their likely impact and sustainability.

## PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACHES

Public health approaches are not alternatives to development and enforcement as described earlier. The team unanimously concluded that effective enforcement and alternative development required a vigorous program of awareness promotion, education, and treatment and rehabilitation.

The first and preferable approach is to closely connect awareness promotion and education activities with local area enforcement and alternative development programs. It is desirable that these activities include support for treatment and rehabilitation of addicts. Such activities have been found to build support for the suppression of heroin because they emphasize the United States' commitment to helping countries face their drug problems and because they draw attention to the dimensions of the drug problem.

A second approach is to launch such programs on an untargeted, nationwide basis. This would deprive targeted enforcement and development efforts of needed synergy and is well beyond any conceivable available level of funding from the United States or other sources.

Third, awareness, education, and especially treatment might be neglected, either on the assumption that they do not require external resources or because they are not seen as necessary. The team notes that almost all successful programs, even those that started without a treatment, awareness, and education plan, have been compelled to add such a plan.

## 6. Congressional Perspectives

Active participants in determining U.S. international narcotics policy are few in number. They include the major executive agencies coordinated by INM and several members of congress and congressional staff who are concerned either with international narcotics policy in general or with the affairs of specific countries. International narcotics initiatives must therefore be based on broad consensus, must be carefully communicated to all parties, and must be open to criticism and discussion.

The professionals involved in this field often have many years of specialized experience with narcotics, whereas concerned A.I.D. personnel, quite properly, have extensive experience in general development. The necessity of liaison with the experienced members of the antinarcotics community is critical. They are generally in agreement with higher levels of A.I.D. support for enforcement activities, and if sometimes impatient with the elaborate restrictions under which A.I.D. often works, they generally are willing to defer to A.I.D. expertise in development matters.

It is our impression that the U.S. policy community concerned with Afghanistan is generally supportive of any meaningful antinarcotics initiative, although they naturally have broader and sometimes cross-cutting concerns. For the moment, they are likely to be supportive of any program, particularly if it emerges from initiatives on the part of Afghans.

If the broader community is supportive, and if Congress is consulted and informed throughout the process of project formulation, Congress is likely to support A.I.D. antinarcotics projects.

## Endnotes

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7. Sept. 4, 1961, P.L. 87-195, Part I, Ch. 1, @ 126 as added Aug. 14, 1979, P.L. 96-53, Title I, @ 110, 93 Stat. 363; as amended Aug. 8, 1985, P.L. 99-83, Title VI, @ 603, 99 Stat. 228; Nov. 5, 1990, P.L. 101-513, Title V, @ 562(d); 104 Stat. 2031 found in 22 USCS @ 2151x (1992).
8. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, March 1992, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992.
9. *Ibid*, p. 4.
10. *Ibid*, p. 26.
11. Kumar et al, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-19.
12. *Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Northwest Frontier Area Development Program*, Islamabad: USAID, 1987. This report also contains some material on the UNFDAC program in Dir, which was funded by USAID. See also Maurice Williams and Ludwig Rudel, *U.S. Economic Assistance to Pakistan: A Review of the Period 1982-87, Final Report*, Washington, D.C.: Devres, Inc., 1988.
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14. Alan D. Roth, Paul Luou, et al, "Second Evaluation of the Mae Chen Watershed Development Project, Thailand," Washington, D.C.: Development Alternatives, Inc., 1987.

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17. Project Evaluation Summary, Drug Education and Public Awareness Project, Evaluation Study No.1; p. 527-590.
18. United Nations International Narcotics Control Board, Action to Ensure the Execution of and to Improve Compliance with the International Drug Control Treaties, Report on Mission to Afghanistan: February 16-24, 1991, page 6.
19. For details of the status of general public health services in the country, please see Macroeconomic Data Development: Phase II, Nathan Associates, December, 1991.