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THE BANGUI MARKET

Overview and Review of the Literature

--- Preliminary Draft ---

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Rural Enterprise Development Project

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Revision 1

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THE BANGUI MARKET
Overview and Review of the Literature

I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this document is to provide an overview of the Bangui market based on previous studies and published information. An administrative map of the Central African Republic and a map of Bangui are Figures 1 and 2.

This is a second draft. It is a revision of the draft of November 9, 1989, and is an attempt to pull together in one place and in a coherent fashion material relevant to the food crop markets of Bangui.

A. Data Reliability

For the most part, the data presented in this study is out of date, five or more years old, and undoubtedly suffers from the "data unreliability" disease that affects much of the published statistics in the world. But as a point of departure for our current research, these data sets provide some ground, albeit squishy, from which to take our first steps.

Some of the descriptive aspects of previous studies are simply out of date. The Government of the Central African Republic (GOCAR) has undertaken significant policy reforms (freed prices, eliminated some transport barriers, eliminated the system of agrée merchants) since 1985, in general, liberalizing the economy and removing government-imposed barriers to economic participation. Much of the structure of the markets and the categories of participants (wali-gala, 'Arab' merchants), however, have remained virtually the same since 1985 and are reported on in this document.

B. Agricultural Produce Marketing

The focus of the Bangui market study is primarily on basic agricultural produce; the foods that most Central Africans eat on a daily basis or produce for income. These foods are listed in Appendix A.

Without exhausting the list of topics related to the food chain, the Bangui market study is particularly interested in several key topics:

Market organization and product origin,
Number of sellers and commercial margins,
Transportation costs and margins,
Credit availability,
Production costs and margins,

Figure 1


Divisions administratives
Limites de préfecture
Limites de sous-préfecture
Capitale
Chef-lieu de préfecture
Chef-lieu de sous préfecture
Echelle
0 100 200km
VAKAGA
BAMINGUI-BANGORAN
HAUTE - KOTTO
HAUT-MBOMOU
OUHAM - PENDE
OUHAM
GRIBINGUI-ECONOMIQUE
KEMO-GRIBINGUI
OUAKA
MBOMOU
MAMBERE
OMBELLA-MPOKO
HAUTE - SANGHA
LOBAYE
BANGUI
BASSE-KOTTO
SANGHA-ECONOMIQUE
OMBELLA-MPOKO
1 BIMBO
2 Damara
3 Boali
4 Bossembélé
LOBAYE
5 MBAIKI
6 Mongoumba
7 Boda
SANGHA-ECONOMIQUE
8 NOLA
9 Bambio
HAUTE-SANGHA
10 BERBERATI
11 Gamboula
12 Carnot
NANA-MAMBERE
13 BOUAR
14 Baboua
15 Baoro
OUHAM-PENDE
16 BOZOUM
17 Bocaranga
18 Paoua
OUHAM
19 BATANGAFO
20 Markounda
21 Bossangoa
22 Bouca
23 Kabo
GRIBINGUI-ECONOMIQUE
24 KAGA-BANDORO
(ex Fort Crampel)
25 Mbrès
KEMO-GRIBINGUI
26 SIBUT
27 Dekoa
OUAKA
28 BAMBARI
29 Kouango
30 Grimari
31 Bakala
32 Ippy
BASSE-KOTTO
33 MOBAYE
34 Mingala
35 Alindao
36 Kemoé
MBOMOU
37 BANGASSOU
38 Ouango
39 Bakouma
40 Rafai
HAUT-MBOMOU
OBO
Zémio
Mboki
Djéma
HAUTE-KOTTO
BRIA
Yalinga
Ouadda
BAMINGUI-BANGORAN
NOLLE
Damongue
VAKAGA
BIRAO
Ouanda-Djalle

Figure 2


BANGUI
Echelle 1 : 50 000
N
GOBONGO
GALABADJA
Aéroport
de Bangui-Mpoko
ASECNA
I.C.A.T.
Usine Textile
FOU
BOY-RABÉ
MUSKINE
MALIMAKA
MUSTAPHA
MAMADOU-MBAIKI
CASTORS
KM 5
BACONGO
KOUANGA
LA COLLINE
NGARAGBA
NDRESS
OUANGO
PÉTÉVO
LE BONGO SOUA
OUBANGUI
ZAÏRE
1 - Alliances Européennes
2 - Air-Afrique
3 - Artisanat
4 - Building Administratif
5 - Centre Culturel Français
6 - Direction Générale du Tourisme
7 - Eaux et Forêts
8 - ENERCA
9 - Marché
10 - Musée Boganda
11 - Sûreté Nationale
12 - Temple
13 - U.T.A.

Consumer patterns,
Agricultural imports and exports,
Government policies,
Expat supermarkets and their significance,
Urban/rural population growth and its influence on demand,
Sufficiency of supply to meet demand.

C. Constraints to Commercial Development

Previous authors have identified the key blockages to market development and offered their recommendations as to how to attack them in a programmatic fashion. This document discusses those constraints.

D. Organization of this Document

First off, the Bangui markets and their relative importance are presented. The number of sellers, the origin of the Bangui food supply, the commercial entry points to Bangui and schematic view of the Bangui food distribution systems are reviewed. In addition, some market price data is presented giving an idea as to its seasonal and spatial variation. The limited information on commercial margins is also touched on.

Second, the key market players are discussed. Here are presented the wali-gala, the Moslem traders, the transporters, the civil guard and the government agencies. The consumers are, of course, the focus of the market activity and the producers have their role off-stage. Specific issues pertaining to the transformation, storage and marketing of manioc, corn and palm oil are featured.

Then, drawing from recent documents, the commercial policy perspectives of the Ministry of Rural Development and the World Bank are presented.

Finally, the constraints to commercial development, as perceived by the several authors who have addressed these issues, are described. Transportation constraints, food production issues, government regulations, credit, import competition, storage, lack of commercial information, product transformation and access to the sea are all highlighted in this section. The document concludes with a few notes on what might be done to improve Banguui commerce.

II. THE BANGUI MARKETS

A. Market Identification

The Bangui market is made up of 29-plus different markets. Most are officially recognized by the Bangui Mayor's office. Other markets have sprung up spontaneously and are neither recognized nor controlled. The Bangui market study's initial list of markets is found in Table 1.

Table 1. - The Bangui Markets

1.	Central	16.	Boy Rabé
2.	Centre-ville	17.	Fouh
3.	La Kouanga	18.	Miskine
4.	Maison d'Etat	19.	Mustapha
5.	Sica I	20.	Ngbenguéwé
6.	Sica II	21.	Pétévo
7.	Ngbaka	22.	Kassai
8.	Langbassi	23.	Ouango
9.	Yapélé	24.	Gobongo
10.	Abattoir	25.	Combattants
11.	Mamadou M'Baiki	26.	Bétail
12.	Kokoro	27.	N'Garagba
13.	Sambo	28.	Kolongo port (CNPAF)
14.	Ngawi	29.	Ouango port
15.	Soudanais		

Bangui is divided into eight arrondissements and, as viewed by the Mayor's office, each of these administrative subdivisions has a principal market (see Table 2).

Table 2. Principal Markets by Arrondissement

Arrondissement 1	Central
Arrondissement 2	La Kouanga
Arrondissement 3	Mamadou M'Baiki (KM5)
Arrondissement 4	Boy Rabé
Arrondissement 5	Miskine
Arrondissement 6	Pétévo
Arrondissement 7	Kassai
Arrondissement 8	Combattants

In the popular imagination, there are three main markets in Bangui: the Central market in downtown Bangui, the market at KM5 ("Kilomètre 5") down Avenue Boganda and Combattants market just off the road on the way to the airport. KM5 actually encompasses five contiguous markets: Mamadou MBaiki, Kokoro, Sambo, Ngawi and Soudanais.

B. Physical Condition of the Markets

The physical condition of the Bangui markets leaves something to be desired. Except for one or two cases, the markets providing the daily primary food supply to thousands of people have no sanitation facilities. In general, there are no latrines, no running water and irregular garbage pick-up. Drainage in and around the markets is inadequate. With the exception of the Central market, when it rains the markets turn to mud. It is a situation of great concern to those who work in the markets and one is left to imagine the health consequences of this situation.

In general, the physical structures - the stands and the covered areas - are in disrepair. The supports to the roof of the central selling area in the Boy Rabé market have weakened to the point where people worry about the structure falling down. The covered area in the La Kouanga market, in a similar state of disrepair, has been reenforced by measures recently undertaken by the Mayor's office. The market stands are rustic in all cases, dilapidated in most. In the Kokoro market, the market sellers present their produce on tables under the open sky spreading their produce out dirctly on the ground.

Some of the markets have outgrown the available space. Markets like Boy Rabé and Galaba are now too small to serve the neighboring population. At Galaba, the market tables wind down the lanes leading to the market place.

Secure storage facilities are nonexistent. The Mayor's office is refurbishing the second floor of the Central market and is being remodeled to include a storage area. Among the 25 or so Bangui markets, refrigerated storage is not to be found anywhere. Once there was a cold storage facility in the Central market, but it has long been in disrepair.

Improving the working conditions at the markets is one of the top priorities of the Bangui Mayor's office.

C. Market Organization

The Bangui markets are managed by the Bangui Mayor's office. The mayor and her council were democratically elected in June/July 1988 within the framework of the national governing party. She has appointed one of the elected delegates, Mme. Goro Cathérine, to the post of market supervisor. Mme. Goro supervises a division of civil servants who supervise the individual markets and collect market taxes.

Each market has its own market board with officers and delegates representing each of the major trade items (manioc, manufactures, fruits, etc.) Security is maintained by a locally organized security service (the "vigils"). They are the sons of the neighborhood and maintain order, reporting to the local police if serious problems arise. It is a popular service. Since its inception, crime in the markets has declined substantially.

Several categories of market taxes are a key source of funds for the Bangui city government. The daily market tax is levied on each seller according to the quantity of produce presented on the market; 100 CFA for small amounts, 500 CFA for large amounts. Shops and sales locations of a more permanent nature are rented. Financial penalties imposed for infractions of market regulations go in part to the mayor's office and in part to support the "vigils" program.

The Mayor's office is attempting to make market development a popular issue among the market participants. With limited funds, the second story of the Central market is being fixed up to provide better facilitates to cloth merchants and rented storage space. Urgent repairs have been undertaken. Plans have been drawn up for new market structures and some markets are to be reorganized with similar products grouped together. After one year of operation, the new city government is reported to have surpassed by 4 million CFA its goal of 13 million CFA in receipts.

D. Social Composition of the Markets

Apparently, no studies have been done showing the ethnic and sexual composition of the Bangui markets. A list of the ethnic groups used in the Bangui market study is found in Appendix B. Also lacking is information on how the markets subdivide into categories of sellers - wholesaler, retailer, peddler, etc.

E. Commercial Activity

Indicators relating to market activity are difficult to find. Tax receipts reported to the Mayor's office provide some information along these lines, but data qualtity poses a problem in this case. The current impression is that commercial activity in the Bangui markets is in decline, a view held by the market sellers themselves. Suggestive of this same diminished commercial activity is the reported decline in commercial license "patente" applications which have gone from over 600 in 1987 to 134 in 1989.

F. Size of Markets by Estimated Receipts

An estimation of the relative sizes of the Bangui markets in terms of receipts was made in 1975. A partial list is presented in Table 3.

TABLE 3. - The Relative Size of the Bangui Markets
Source: CASTEX, p. 89

DAILY RECEIPTS > 1,000,000 CFA (1975)
- Mamadou MBaiki (KM5)
- La Kouanga
- Central
- Miskine
- Sambo

DAILY RECEIPTS >250,000 <500,000 CFA
- Boy Rabé
- Galaba
- Pétévo
- Ngbenguéwé
- Ouango
- Kassaï
- Gobongo

DAILY RECEIPTS <250,000 CFA
- Yapélé
- N'Garagba
- Combattants
- Sica I
- Sica II
- Boing
- Fouh
- Maison d'Etat (Ngou ti Etat)

G. Number of Sellers

The number of sellers in the Bangui market was surveyed by LONGY in 1975, as reported in CASTEX, Annex 15. Market sellers were registered by product sold and 2,352 sellers were counted. By 1981, the wali-gala association counted 3,800 sellers. In 1989, according to the study conducted by the Mayor's office, there were more than 12,100 sellers of which some 5,600 sold foodstuffs.

The LONGY breakdown by product revealed a market where vegetable sellers were the most numerous, 27.6% of the total, manioc cossette and flour sellers combined 23.2% and peanut sellers 18.7% (see Tables 4 and 5). The Mayor's study of 1989 revealed a market where vegetables and condiments made up 17.8% of the total, manioc vendors 4.6% and peanut sellers 6.1% (see Table 6.

For each market in Table 4, the number of sellers of ten major food products are recorded. The food products are: manioc in cossette form, manioc flour, banana plantain, butchered meats, peanuts, peanut oil, palm oil, fresh fish, smoked fish and green vegetables. The total number of sellers of these ten products in each market is recorded in the "Totals" column. In the "Totals" row at the bottom of the table, the total number of sellers of that food product in all the markets is summed up. The percentage of the total number of sellers (2,352) of each food product total is indicated in the next row.

In Table 5, the percentage of the total number of sellers of each food product is indicated for each market. Among the Bangui markets indicated, La Kouanga is relatively important when it comes to sales of manioc in cossette form (10.4% of all manioc-cossette sellers), but not as important as the Mamadou M'Baiki market at KM5 (27.4%).

Table 4. - Number of food product retailers in the Bangui markets
July-August 1975 SOURCE: B. Longy 1975 (I-13), in CASTEX, Annex IV

MARKET	MAN-cos	MAN-flour	PLANTAIN	BUTCHERS	PEANUTS	PEANUT-OIL	PALM OIL	FISH-FRESH	FISH-SMOKED	GREN VEGES	TOTAL
GOBONGO	20	0	1	3	16	4	4	0	4	12	64
FOUH	8	0	2	2	19	2	2	0	0	35	70
BOY RABE	45	0	0	14	25	10	6	0	5	73	178
MISKINE	46	10	20	18	52	7	12	1	13	133	312
NGBENGUEW	18	0	0	2	27	13	18	0	1	17	96
GALABA	34	0	4	10	8	9	6	0	4	19	94
BOEING	16	10	0	0	22	8	5	1	4	50	116
MM-KM5	131	8	22	27	26	22	16	9	51	46	358
PETEVO	26	3	6	5	15	2	1	0	3	24	85
YAPELE	13	5	1	1	18	18	7	0	2	12	77
LAKOUANGA	50	10	15	30	50	20	13	6	20	90	304
CENTRAL	2	2	11	26	17	12	10	20	19	24	143
SICA I	7	2	1	1	5	4	2	0	1	13	36
SICA II	11	2	5	1	11	9	3	0	2	18	62
OUANGO	20	4	0	2	15	3	6	6	2	16	74
NGARAGBA	3	6	3	0	20	2	6	5	6	8	59
KASSAI	15	0	0	4	15	7	3	0	4	31	79
COMBATTAN	12	4	0	0	25	3	15	0	3	28	90
SAMBO	0	0	0	0	53	0	0	0	0	0	53
MAISON D'	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
TOTAL	479	66	91	146	439	155	135	48	144	649	2352
%	20.4	2.8	3.9	6.2	18.7	6.6	5.3	2.0	6.1	27.6	

Table 5. - Percentage of food product retailers in the Bangui Markets
July-August 1975 SOURCE: B. Longy 1975 (I-13). in CASTEX. Annex IV

MARKET	MAN-cos	MAN-flour	PLANTAIN	BUTCHERS	PEANUTS	PEANUT-OIL	PALM OIL	FISH-FRESH	FISH-SMOKED	GRN VEGES	TOTAL
GOBONGO	4.18	0.00	1.10	2.05	3.64	2.58	2.96	0.00	2.78	1.85	2.72
FOUH	1.67	0.00	2.20	1.37	4.33	1.29	1.48	0.00	0.00	5.39	2.98
BOY RABE	9.39	0.00	0.00	9.59	5.69	6.45	4.44	0.00	3.47	11.25	7.57
MISKINE	9.60	15.15	21.98	12.33	11.85	4.52	8.89	2.08	9.03	20.49	13.27
NGBENGUEW	3.76	0.00	0.00	1.37	6.15	8.39	13.33	0.00	0.69	2.62	4.08
GALABA	7.10	0.00	4.40	6.85	1.82	5.81	4.44	0.00	2.78	2.93	4.00
BOEING	3.34	15.15	0.00	0.00	5.01	5.16	3.70	2.08	2.78	7.70	4.93
MM-KMS	27.35	12.12	24.18	18.49	5.92	14.19	11.85	18.75	35.42	7.09	15.22
PETEVO	5.43	4.55	6.59	3.42	3.42	1.29	0.74	0.00	2.08	3.70	3.61
YAPELE	2.71	7.58	1.10	0.68	4.10	11.61	5.19	0.00	1.39	1.85	3.27
LAKOUANGA	10.44	15.15	16.48	20.55	11.39	12.90	9.63	12.50	13.89	13.87	12.93
CENTRAL	0.42	3.03	12.09	17.81	3.87	7.74	7.41	41.67	13.19	3.70	6.08
SICA I	1.46	3.03	1.10	0.68	1.14	2.58	1.48	0.00	0.69	2.00	1.53
SICA II	2.30	3.03	5.49	0.68	2.51	5.81	2.22	0.00	1.39	2.77	2.64
OUANGO	4.18	6.06	0.00	1.37	3.42	1.94	4.44	12.50	1.39	2.47	3.15
NGARAGBA	0.63	9.09	3.30	0.00	4.56	1.29	4.44	10.42	4.17	1.23	2.51
KASSAI	3.13	0.00	0.00	2.74	3.42	4.52	2.22	0.00	2.78	4.78	3.36
COMBATTAN	2.51	6.06	0.00	0.00	5.69	1.94	11.11	0.00	2.08	4.31	3.83
SAMBO	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	12.07	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.25
MAISON D'	0.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.09
TOTAL	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Table 6. - Importance of Food Products (October 1989)

SELLERS	TOTAL	PERCENT
Manioc	562	4.64
Ignames/Taro	1	0.01
Peanuts	735	6.07
Rice	32	0.26
Corn	206	1.70
Millet/Sorghum	4	0.03
Plantains	237	1.96
Vegetables	1200	9.90
Condiments	955	7.88
Palm oil	330	2.72
Fruits	327	2.70
Foodstuffs	615	5.08
Eggs	8	0.07

LONGY's data also gives an idea of the relative importance of each Bangui market in terms of the number of sellers. In some cases, that of the Central market, for example, the relative importance of a market in terms of revenue and its relative importance in terms of numbers of sellers appear not to be the same (compare Table 3 with Table 7).

Table 7.- Relative Importance of Markets by Number of Sellers

MARKET	% of Total Sellers
MM-KM5	15.2
Miskine	13.3
La Kouanga	12.9
Boy Rabé	7.6
Central	6.1
Boing	4.9
Ngbenguewe	4.1
Galaba	4.0
Combattants	3.8
Pétévo	3.6
Kassaï	3.4
Yapélé	3.3
Ouango	3.1
Fouh	3.0
Gobongo	2.7
Sica II	2.6
Ngaragba	2.5
Sambo	2.3
Sica I	1.5
Maison d'Etat	0.1
TOTAL	100.0

SOURCE: B. Longy 1975 (I-13), in CASTEX, Annex XV

In October 1989, the Bangui Mayor's office conducted a partial survey of the markets, identifying the number of sellers by product category in each of the key markets. These results are presented in Annex C. This study showed that there were over 12,100 market sellers in 1989. Of the 12,100 market sellers counted, the relative size of each market is shown in Table 8. By all indications, the market of Combattants has grown substantially in the 15 years since 1975 to 20.6% of all sellers. The KM5 complex of Sambo I/II, Mamadou MBaiki and Kokoro accounts for 36.9% of all market sellers. The Central market leads the trailing markets with 8.2% of market sellers.

Table 8.- Relative Importance of Markets by Number of Sellers

MARKET	Number Sellers	% of Total (12118)
Combattants	2502	20.65
Sambo I/II	1858	15.33
MBaiki	1702	14.05
Central	997	8.23
Kokoro	910	7.51
Ouango	590	4.87
Miskine	584	4.82
Gobongo	444	3.66
La Kouanga	364	3.00
Kassaï	342	2.82
Ngbenguewe	341	2.81
Pétévo	277	2.29
Mustapha	266	2.20
Boy Rabé	249	2.05
Sica II	172	1.42
Yapélé	133	1.10
Langbassi	54	0.44

H. Origin of the Bangui Food Supply

The Bangui market is supplied primarily by producers (see Table 9 and Figure 3) operating within a 100 km radius. According to the DUAULT (1985) study, 50% (49.9%) comes from suburban Bangui (<10 km), 70% of Bangui's food supply originates within the 100 km of the city; 80% comes from within 250 kms. Bangui Gardens and nearby Bimbo are the key suppliers.

For the staple crop manioc, 47% originates within the 100 km belt around Bangui, as do 90% of all other tubers (ignames, taro). For corn, 53% is supplied from within 100 kms of Bangui as is 87.5% of the plantain supply. Fish supplies come largely from outside of Bangui, 59.9% other origins; only 37.9 % is supplied within the 100 km. production belt. As for peanuts, fully 80% come from outside of CAR.

Table 9 - Origin of the Bangui Food Supply

SOUS PREFECTURE	MANIOC	%	AUTRES TUB	%	ARACHIDE	%	MAIS	%	AUTRES CER	%	BANANE	%	POISSON	%	AUTRES PRO	%	TOTAL	%
0-100 ---------																		
BANGUI JARDINS	160377	22.4	14004	46.2	39	0.1	7214	20.1	1390	2.1	28152	19.6	61	3.2	17407	46.4	229144	21.0
BIMBO	95719	13.4	9377	31.0	252	0.7	2642	7.4	1248	1.4	70524	49.0	567	29.9	9984	26.6	190313	17.4
DAMARA	17350	2.4	118	0.4	15	0.0	520	1.4	972	1.1	36	0.0	33	1.7	217	0.6	19261	1.8
MBAIKI	29927	4.2	3481	11.5	0	0.0	180	0.5	600	0.7	27132	18.9	50	2.6	1640	4.4	63010	5.8
MONGOUMBA	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	12	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	12	0.0
BOALI	25370	3.5	248	0.8	30	0.1	280	0.8	300	0.3	24	0.0	6	0.3	173	0.5	26431	2.4
OUANGO	7290	1.0	0	0.0	15	0.0	9000	25.1	420	0.5	6	0.0	0	0.0	24	0.1	16755	1.5
Sous-Total	336033	47.0	27228	89.9	351	0.9	19836	55.2	5430	6.1	125886	87.6	717	37.9	29445	78.5	544926	49.9
100-200 -------																		
BOSSEMBELE	24710	3.5	110	0.4	750	1.9	160	0.4	5640	6.3	30	0.0	6	0.3	317	0.8	31723	2.9
BODA	4280	0.6	100	0.3	0	0.0	120	0.3	72	0.1	252	0.2	0	0.0	58	0.2	4882	0.4
SIBUT	28695	4.0	52	0.2	150	0.4	600	1.7	2988	3.4	30	0.0	6	0.3	703	1.9	33224	3.0
Sous-Total	57685	8.1	262	0.9	900	2.3	880	2.4	8700	9.8	312	0.2	12	0.6	1078	2.9	69829	6.4
200 + --------																		
BERBERATI	4820	0.7	8	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	36	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	4864	0.4
GAMBOULA	50	0.0	22	0.1	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1500	4.0	1572	0.1
CARNOT	1400	0.2	22	0.1	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	24	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1446	0.1
BOUAR	4900	0.7	0	0.0	30	0.1	0	0.0	240	0.3	24	0.0	0	0.0	360	1.0	5554	0.5
BAORO	150	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	150	0.0
BOZOUM	300	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	300	0.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	600	0.1
BOCARANGA	250	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	10	0.0	260	0.0
PADUA	2697	0.4	22	0.1	540	1.4	0	0.0	13860	15.6	0	0.0	0	0.0	12	0.0	17131	1.6
BATANGAFO	3240	0.5	22	0.1	0	0.0	0	0.0	9600	10.8	0	0.0	0	0.0	10	0.0	12872	1.2
BOSSANGOA	14550	2.0	44	0.1	0	0.0	0	0.0	1212	1.4	12	0.0	3	0.2	75	0.2	15896	1.5
BOUCA	20650	2.9	0	0.0	90	0.2	72	0.2	120	0.1	6	0.0	0	0.0	190	0.5	21128	1.9
KABO	320	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	320	0.0
KAGA-BANDORO	13660	1.9	0	0.0	60	0.2	240	0.7	1260	1.4	24	0.0	6	0.3	320	0.9	15570	1.4
MBRES	3630	0.5	0	0.0	495	1.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	40	0.1	4165	0.4
DEKOA	15640	2.2	0	0.0	45	0.1	10760	30.0	912	1.0	36	0.0	0	0.0	100	0.3	27493	2.5
BAMBARI	26020	3.6	22	0.1	1350	3.5	160	0.4	11760	13.2	24	0.0	0	0.0	236	0.6	39572	3.6
GRIMARI	74700	10.5	0	0.0	105	0.3	60	0.2	360	0.4	18	0.0	0	0.0	67	0.2	75310	6.9
BAKALA	400	0.1	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	6	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	406	0.0
IPPY	10870	1.5	0	0.0	120	0.3	0	0.0	12	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	52	0.1	11054	1.0
MOBAYE	2230	0.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	60	0.1	6	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	2296	0.2
ALINDAO	5250	0.7	22	0.1	1551	4.0	0	0.0	72	0.1	6	0.0	6	0.3	45	0.1	6952	0.6
KEMBE	1460	0.2	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	6	0.3	0	0.0	1466	0.1
BANGASSOU	6320	0.9	0	0.0	2055	5.3	60	0.2	240	0.3	24	0.0	10	0.5	310	0.8	9019	0.8
Sous-Total	213507	29.9	184	0.6	6441	16.7	11352	31.6	40008	44.9	246	0.2	31	1.6	3327	8.9	275096	25.2
AUTRE ORIGINE	107466	15.0	2612	8.6	30973	80.1	3654	10.7	34878	39.2	17343	12.1	1134	59.9	3654	9.7	201914	18.5
TOTAL GENERAL	714691	100.0	30286	100.0	38665	100.0	35922	100.0	89016	100.0	143787	100.0	1894	100.0	37504	100.0	1091765	100.0

Figure 3


BOSSANGOA
Bouca
Dékoa
200 km
75 km
100 km
100 km
148
213
112
213
76
157
141
107
85
93
Bossembélé
Damara
Goali
BANGUI
BIMBO
Boda
MBAÏKI
Mongoumba
Mausolée
Forêt de Vigoto
Ile Bassonga
Ile Libengué

I. Commercial Entry Points to the Bangui Market

The DUAULT study surveyed the entry points to the Bangui market (see Table 10) during the week of January 21-25, 1985. This was considered a typical week of the year and from that annual supply estimates were drawn.

Table 10. - Entry Points to the Bangui Market (1975)

	TOTAL(%)	MANIOC(%)
1. PK9 (Bangui-MBaiki Road)	18.09	10.37
2. PK12 (Bangui-North Road)	54.67	64.03
3. Combattants Market	.63	.72
4. Port State market	10.18	9.65
5. Sakaï (airport)	3.72	4.36
6. Cattin (Markets)	3.36	2.92
7. Port (slaughter house)	.40	.15
8. New port	1.09	1.41
9. Landja	1.27	1.73
10. Kolongo	.45	.22
11. Oil port	.32	.27
12. Ouango	2.57	3.48
13. Mpoko (ferry)	2.38	.29
14. Customs-port	.85	.40

J. Food Crop Distribution Systems

J.1 Introduction

The Bangui market for CAR-produced food stuffs is a consumer market. Food is brought to the market and consumed locally and not generally transhipped to other markets. Of these food stuffs, manioc and vegetables dominate the market.

From a general perspective, the food chain that serves Bangui is composed of the following functions:

Production
Transformation
Assembling/Packaging
Transport
Distribution/Packaging
Marketing

In this section, distribution systems serving the Bangui market are discussed. Later in the text, production, transformation and transportation issues are presented.

J.2 Village-level Distribution

At the village level, farmers are subsistence producers, producing primarily for their own consumption. Farmers also

produce for an inter-village trade between producing enterprises. This can be either a barter or a monetary transaction. In a third form of transaction, local consumers go to the "farm gate" to purchase directly from the producer. Finally, in a fourth form of transaction, village producers travel to the local market to sell their produce and there to intersect with the larger commercial sector. Travel is primarily on foot, quantities presented are small and the sellers are almost uniquely women specializing in a particular product (see the CASTEX schema, Figure 4).

With its 100-km production belt, the Bangui market retains much of the character of this "village-level" distribution system. Local Bangui consumers are often themselves weekend farmers, traveling back and forth to their farms. Furthermore, Bangui consumers also have a tendency to travel directly to the "farm gate" or to nearby rural markets to buy their farm goods from the producers. It is this village distribution system which has developed into the regional distribution system of the wali-gala, discussed in detail further on.

J.3 Regional-level Distribution

At the regional level, and particularly in Bangui, non-producing merchants participate much more in the marketing process. Here, there are two distribution systems, and perhaps a developing third: the wali-gala, the "Arabs" and, possibly, a cross-border trading network with Zaire. A schema of the "Arab" and wali-gala distribution systems was prepared by CASTEX and is reproduced in Figure 5. The regional systems are discussed further on in the text in the section on market players.

J.4 Inter-Regional Distribution

Inter-regional commerce appears to be served by what CASTEX calls the traditional distribution system, an hour-glass shaped schema (see Figure 6) where the many producers serve the many consumers through a limited number of intermediaries. The producers are small family yeoman farmers producing on small plots with short-handled hoes. They are generally self-sufficient in food stuffs and produce a surplus for the local market.

Because of the low population density and the distances separating farms, producers sell to traveling merchants either at the farm gate or at the local market. These merchants are large and small capitalists who gather together large quantities of the produce, separate it by quality, divide into lots, package it and arrange to ship it to wholesale merchants at a particular market.

Figure 4


++++
Autoconsommation
Echanges (troc ou monétaire)
intravillageois
+
+
+
+
+
Autoapprovisionnement par le consommateur
Vente au marché par le producteur
Consommation
Légende
Flux de produits vivriers
Sens du déplacement
Quantification des flux
++++ très dominant
+++ important
++ moyen
+ faible
ε insignifiant
Consommateur
Commerçant
Producteur

Figure 5


Produits de première nécessité
Paysans
Production
Commerçant "arabe"
Collecte
Marché de N'Gaoui
"Grande" "wali-gala" (grossiste)
Gros terminal
"Moyenne" "wali-gala" (grossiste)
Détail
Détaillante
Microdétaillante
Consommateurs
Consommation

Figure 6

Schéma de la distribution	Nature des agents économiques	Caractéristiques	Fonctions
	Producteurs	- artisans (petite production familiale) - atomisés	- production marchande (mais existe également l'auto-consommation) - mise en marché
	Marchés d'expédition	- artisans, dont "gros" et "petits" capitalistes	- collecte, allotissement, triage, conditionnement, expédition.
	Transporteurs	- artisans ou grandes entreprises de transport	- transport principal
	Marchés de gros terminal	- artisans, dont "gros" et "petits" capitalistes	- desallotissement, fractionnement, vente aux détaillants
	Détaillants	- artisans (petits commerçants) - atomisés	- fractionnement au consommateur
	Consommateurs		- consommer après approvisionnement au stade du commerce de détail

Transporters are smallest in number and according to CASTEX's schema are positioned at the neck of the hour-glass. They provide the transport of the produce and are either private operators or are part of a larger transport enterprise.

At the market destination, the produce goes to large and medium-sized capitalist wholesalers who divide it into smaller lots and sell them to retailers.

Retailers sell to the consumer in the Bangui market. They divide the produce into smaller lots for sale. These sellers tend to be private operators, generally unorganized family enterprises.

Finally, at the bottom of the CASTEX hour-glass are the consumers.

J.5 National Distribution

A national distribution system, illustrated in Figure 7, appears to be moribund ever since the GOCAR liberalized its commercial policies and ended its system of assigned merchants known as "Commercant agréé".

J.6 International Distribution

A formal international distribution system exists whereby food products are shipped into and out of CAR. This commerce is controlled by the Ministries of Commerce, Transport and Finance (Customs). It is a system heavily subverted by clandestine commercial activities and smuggling. International trade in foodstuffs has an important influence on the Bangui market and issues pertaining to it are dealt with throughout the text.

Figure 7


Paysan
Production
Regroupement
"précoopératif"
(prévu mais rares)
Collecte
Magasins
d'expédition
(coopérative
Gros
Terminal
Commerçants
agrées
Magasin
de gros
terminal
grossiste
Magasin
de détail
Détail
Détaillants
(dont microdétail)
Consommateur
Consommation

K. Market Prices

The Mayor's office conducted a general price survey in October 1989, the results of which are recorded in Appendix D. Prior to that, the only available price data was provided by the Direction des Statistiques of the Haut Commissariat au Plan (see Tables 11 and 12). Until the liberalization program of 1986, prices for major food crops were established by the Government. The Government's official prices (1975-1985) for various food crops are found in Table 13. These official prices were largely ignored in the market place, where commodity prices were generally higher. With the liberalization of market policies, the skyrocketing rise in market prices that had been feared by some has not occurred.

Table 11. - Prices for Principal Agricultural Products

(CFA/kg)	1981	1982	1983	1984
Manioc	108	156	207	266
Peanuts	365	370	415	498
Corn grain	142	165	160	388
Millet grain	211	136	218	353
Sesame	616	645	608	604

Source: Dir. Statistique, Haut Commissariat au Plan

K.1 Traditional Price and Unique Price

In the Bangui markets there is no single price for any commodity. Prices vary and the analysis of prices is a multifaceted exercise. Behind the unique food crop prices reported in previous documents lies a richer and more complex dynamic.

There is, in the Bangui market, the concept of the traditional money value of a product. Manioc, for example, is 2500 CFA for a cuvette. This is a social concept of value, actual prices appear to be more flexible.

Table 12(a)

EVOLUTION DES PRIX AU KILOGRAMME DES PRODUITS AGRICOLES
AU NIVEAU DU PRODUCTEUR DE 1975 A 1985

Produits \ Campagnes	1975/76	1976/77	1977/78	1978/79	1979/80	1980/81	1981/82	1982/83	1983/84	1984/85	1985/86
Pomme de terre - 1er choix	60	60	60	60	60	150	150	150	150	150	150
Pomme de terre - 2e choix	45	45	45	45	45	45	125	125	125	125	125
Pomme de terre - 3e choix	-	-	-	-	-	90	90	90	90	90	90
Huile de palme	50	50	50	50	50	50	200	200	200	200	200
Poivre blanc	300	300	300	300	300	350	350	350	350	350	350
Poivre noir	250	250	250	250	250	300	300	300	300	300	300
Kola	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40
Igname et taro	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25
Orange	25	25	25	25	25	60	60	60	60	60	60
Mandarine	30	30	30	30	30	60	60	60	60	60	60
Avocat	35	35	35	35	35	70	70	70	70	70	70
Ananas	25	25	25	25	25	75	75	75	75	75	75
Banane plantain	10	10	10	10	10	50	50	50	50	50	50
Banane douce	15	15	15	15	15	60	60	60	60	60	60
Citron	10	10	10	10	10	50	50	50	50	50	50
Papaye	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Fève de calabou	45	45	45	45	45	60	60	60	60	60	60
Mangues sélectionnées	50	50	50	50	50	75	75	75	75	75	75
Oignon	40	40	40	50	50	60	60	60	60	60	60
Piment	75	300	300	300	300	350	350	350	350	350	350
Cacao	75	100	100	100	100	250	250	250	250	250	250
Mil et sorgho	25	50	50	50	50	35	35	35	35	60	60
Cire d'abeilles	250	300	300	300	300	350	350	350	350	350	350
Miel	75	75	75	75	75	200	200	200	200	200	200
Poisson fumé	75	75	75	75	75	200	200	200	200	200	200
Poisson salé	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85

Table 12(b)

Produits \ Campagnes	1975/76	1976/77	1977/78	1978/79	1979/80	1980/81	1981/82	1982/83	1983/84	1984/85	1985/86
Manioc en cossettes (seau de 10 litres) 1/	100	100	100	100	100	150	150	150	150	150	150
Coton blanc	45	50	50	50	50	60	60	60	60	90	100
Coton jaune	35	35	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	70
Arachides graines	60	60	60	60	70	70	70	70	70	120	120
Arachides coques	30	30	30	30	30	35	35	35	35	55	55
Roselle fibre	50	50	50	50	50	60	60	60	60	60	60
Roselle graine	45	45	45	45	50	60	60	60	60	60	60
Tabac	215	215	215	215	215	215	-	-	-	-	-
Café cerise Robusta	65	100	100	100	120	120	120	130	135	135	150
Café cerise Excelsa	50	50	50	50	50	60	60	60	60	60	60
Café marchand	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sésame	60	60	60	60	70	70	70	70	70	100	100
Courges	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40
Maïs blanc et jaune	20	25	30	30	30	35	35	35	35	70	70
Paddy	35	50	60	60	60	75	75	75	75	80	80
Riz blanc	70	70	100	100	100	175	175	175	175	225	225
Rauvolfia	150	300	300	300	300	350	350	350	350	350	350
Voacanga	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Palmistes	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Huile de karité	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

1/ NDR: 1 seau de 10 litres est égal à 5 kg environ de manioc en cossettes.

Table 13

EVOLUTION DES PRIX DE DETAIL A BANGUI DE QUELQUES PRODUITS ALIMENTAIRES 1981
(en FCFA)

Produits	Janv.	Fév.	Mars	Avril	Mai	Juin	Juil.	Août	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Déc.
Céréales												
Mil grain	208	187	163	264	185	244	202	192	380	275		
Maïs grain	164	120	164	128	192	161	169	74	117	154		
Riz blanc	245	244	246	254	258	259	262	272	281	292		
Tubercules												
Manioc en cossettes	122	115	109	112	130	152	156	161	173	165	177	142
Autres féculents												
Bananes plantains	80	80	82	111	87	103	120	108	137	121		
Légumes												
Tomates	215	581	448	546	632	1 072	764	421	391	343		
Oignons secs	693	520	357	375	377	395	462	460	624	703		
Salade verte	263	205	279	309	886	608	672	563	232	351		
Fruits frais												
Bananes douces	94	105	96	100	89	83	96	93	109	95		
Oranges	120	135	141	159	164	187	105	99	88	95		
Papayes	38	51	48	52	56	45	94	111	60	66		
Viandes												
boeuf sans os	613	824	827	825	780	772	879	790	813	808		
Antilope fumée	1 143	1 110	1 105	1 140	1 063	1 108	1 271	913	1 202	1 172		
Poulet d'élevage (vivant)	1 386	1 349	1 087	1 204	1 049	1 311	1 098	1 051	1 093	1 019		
Divers												
oeufs (1/2 douzaine)	450	450	422	450	450	450	450	450	450	450		
Arachide crue décortiquée	323	382	373	376	499	569	617	561	480	363		
Sésame	812	514	592	620	596	542	504	594	435	544		
Sucre en morceaux	425	425	425	425	425	425	425	425	425	600		

NB: Il s'agit des prix de détail ramenés au kilogramme (sauf pour les oeufs). Il s'agit du micro-détail (tas, petites assiettes) sauf pour le manioc dont l'unité considérée a été le seau de 10 litres et le sucre (prix par unité de 1 kg).

Source: Relevés des prix, Ministère du plan, de la coopération internationale et des statistiques. (d'après Castex).

K.2 Seasonal Fluctuations

Prices, including the traditional money value, of a product vary by season. Manioc prices, for example, are higher in the rainy season than in the dry season. DUAULT (1985) gives an idea of how prices for key food crops fluctuate seasonally; see Tables 14 and 15 and the chart, Figure 8. Marketing food crops (other than tubers) at the most advantageous time of the year is impeded by the general lack of food crop storage facilities.

Table 14. - Seasonal Variation of Price Indices for three basic food products -- 1981

	MANIOC cossettes	PEANUTS shelled	CORN grain
JANUARY	100	100	100
FEBRUARY	94.3	118.3	73
MARCH	89.3	115.5	100
APRIL	91.8	116.4	78
MAY	106.5	154.5	117
JUNE	124.6	176.2	98
JULY	129.5	191.0	103
AUGUST	132.0	173.7	45
SEPTEMBER	141.8	148.6	71
OCTOBER	135.2	112.4	93
NOVEMBER	145*	unknown	unknown
DECEMBER	116*	unknown	unknown

* Evaluation of personally gathered data from several markets and some partial data from the Ministry of Plan.
Source: Survey of the Ministry of Plan, International Cooperation and Statistics (as part of a program to prepare retail price indices). Indices calculated by CASTEX.

Table 15 - High-Low Months for Food Prices

Product	High	Low
Millet grain	September	March
Corn grain	May	August
White rice	October	February
Manioc en cossettes	March	November
Plantains	January-February	September
Raw unshelled peanuts	July	January
Sesame	January	September
Tomatoes	June	January
Dried Onions	October	March
Lettuce	May	February
Bananas	September	May
Oranges	June	September
Papayas	January	August
Beef	July	January
Live chicken	January	August
Eggs (6)	September	March

Source: Ministry of Plan in CASTEX.

Figure 8


VARIATIONS SAISONNIERES DES INDICES DE PRIX DE DETAIL
BANGUI 1981
Indice des prix de détail
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
Arachide
Mil
Manioc
Maïs
Sésame

K.3 Spatial Variation of Prices

DUAULT also indicates how prices vary depending upon the distance from Bangui. He indicates that the affect of the Bangui market does not extend beyond 250 kms (see Figure 9). CASTEX also looked at the spatial variation in market prices (see Figures 10 and 11).

K.4 Variation of Prices and the Demand for Money

Food crop prices also vary inversely with the immediate demand for money. When the demand for money is high, prices tend to fall. When the demand for money is low, the prices tend to be higher. In general, prices are higher in the morning and lower, as much as 30% in some cases, in the evening. Prices are more fluid around holidays such as Christmas, Easter, Ramadan, Tabaski, etc. where the need for money to fulfill family obligations is more acute. In individual case, illness, funerals, marriages prompt sales at lower prices. Illnesses in particular rapidly increase the demand for the money needed to buy medicines.

In rural CAR, the demand for money tends to be very weak, according to David Kaya, a university researcher studying the Bossangoa markets with Africare. In these cases, strict financial accounting is practically unknown in the market place. Marketing is done at a financial loss, in exchange for some greater unquantifiable personal or social gain. Here again, prices tend to be higher in the morning and lower at the end of the market as the market sellers count the money they have against their immediate money needs (food, medicine, transport, etc.)

Producer prices are commonly set by the producer with the greatest need for money. A merchant will go to a producer village, set a price lower than what the villagers are willing to pay and wait for the seller with the most urgent need for money to come and break the producer price solidarity. With this sale as precedent, the other producers are inclined to follow.

K.5 Social Position and Prices

Prices are often higher to strangers and one-time buyers than to neighbors and frequent purchasers. Producers will tend to keep their prices lower for a regular buyer with whom there is a long-standing commercial relationship.

Figure 9



USAID LIBRARY
YAOUNDE

Figure 10


90
70
KAGA BANDORO
70
120
90
KEMBE
BOUCA
DIKOA
110
Mbaiki
SIBUT
BRIKARI
140
110
DAMARA
160
200
250
BANGUI
Carte n° 49
PRIX DU SEAU DE 10 LITRES
DE MANIOC
NOVEMBRE 1975
Source : J.J. Pierman, 1975

Figure 11


Carte nº 46. Prix du manioc au producteur.
(Unité : cuvette "colalu", d'environ 20 kg)
FIGURE 12.
REPUBLIQUE DU TCHAD
BAMINGUI-BANGORAN
GRIBINGUI
OUHAM
OUHAM PENDE
BOSSANGOA
KEMO
SIBUT
OUAKA
BAMBARI
BOALI
BANGUI
BASSE SANGA
BANGASSOU
REPUBLIQUE DU ZAIRE
2500 (Janv. 9001)

K.6 Elasticities and Cross-Elasticities

Not much has been done in terms of analyzing elasticity of demand. Some even doubt that elasticity of demand exists in CAR (SEMKOW, p. 7). It is generally held, however, that manioc is very price inelastic; it's a traditional food and people will eat it no matter what the price. In 1983, when manioc was scarce on the Bangui market, consumers switched to millet and sorghum imported from northern CAR and to rice and corn imported as food aid.

Determining elasticities is not a simple matter in the best of circumstances. For starters, the demand theory, upon which elasticity concepts are based, may not apply in a commercial environment where the demand for money is not constant. In a more practical sense, isolating elasticity from amongst other market influences is difficult. Care must be taken to avoid facile calculations of "elasticity" as was done in SEMKOW. Elasticity relates to a given demand or supply curve. SEMKOW's analysis of the elasticity of wood demand over five years assumes that the demand curve for wood in 1980 was the same as in 1985, an assumption which is difficult to maintain.

A commercial environment such as Bangui's presents a singular opportunity for determining elasticities of demand. With prices varying as they do on a given day, a statistical analysis of morning prices and quantities sold and of afternoon prices and quantities sold can give you an idea of what the elasticity of demand might be.

K.7 Absence of Unique Market-Clearing Prices

Prices in the Bangui markets also tend not to be "market clearing." In the case of tomatoes, for example, commercial practices in the Central market are such that prices are not lowered sufficiently as the tomatoes begin to decompose. This downward price resistance results in the accumulation of rotting tomatoes in nearby garbage boxes.

K.8 Inflation

Since price policy was liberalized prices have not risen as fast as some people expected. Inflation trends as measured by bimonthly price surveys have indicated a steady rise in each of the five categories surveyed: food, clothing, manufactured products, services and energy, since 1981. Sharp declines in food and energy prices were recorded in the food and energy categories. These declines were important enough to pull the general price index down by 7% (see Figure 12).

K.9 Producer Prices

Recent data on producer prices is skimpy in the recent period of liberalized markets. In the period when most of the studies were conducted, producer prices were fixed by the government. Needless to say, producer prices based on actual costs of production are as important as market prices.

L. Commercial Margins

Data relating to commercial profit margins has been difficult to locate in the literature. LONGY (1985) likewise points out this fact. In 1975, he estimated that commercial margins were not excessive even if they did seem high. The seemingly high margins, he argued, were mostly hidden costs of transport and of labor devoted to supply and sales. A manioc wholesaler's net revenue was comparable with the SMIG and that a retailer's net revenue was even less than that. Writing in 1985, LONGY didn't think the situation vis-a-vis commercial margins had changed much.

In 1982, CASTEX presented the analysis of commercial margins shown in Figure 13. Here, the commercial margin for a cuvette of manioc (top curve) is presented in terms of the distance from Bangui. Margins from manioc purchased closer to Bangui are less than those earned from manioc purchased further away from Bangui. CASTEX then estimates a per cuvette per kg transport cost (slope of the bottom curve) and subtracts those estimated costs from the previously established commercial margins. This results in an estimate of commercial margins net of transportation costs (middle curve). These net margins vary between 900 (at 100 kms from Bangui) and 1,300 CFA per cuvette (at 190 kms from Bangui).

Figure 12


Indice des prix de 154 produits
170
160
150
140
130
120
110
100
Année
Indice des prix de 6 paniers
Energie
habillement
produits manufacturés
services
produits alimentaires
Année

Figure 13

Graphique nº 59. Marge commerciale totale sur Bangui. Coût de transport théorique et marge commerciale nette de coût de transport



Source : Relevés personnels de prix sur l'axe Bangui-Boali-Bossentélé -Bossangoa (voir 2ème partie).

(1) Il s'agit de l'axe Bangui-Bossentélé-Bossangoa.

M. Standardized Measures.

Precise, standardized measures are uncommon in the Bangui markets. For example, a cuvette (a large wash basin) is the common measure for manioc cosettes, but its contents varies. In harder times, the bottom is sometimes dented to reduce the quantity presented without seeming to do so. The use of bottles and the concept of a liter does provide some basis for standardizing liquid measures. Vegetables are generally sold by number, though potatoes in front of the Bangui supermarkets can now be bought by weight.

Products produced industrially are packaged according to standard units of weight and volume. Imported rice, brought in bulk and repackaged, is now found in plastic sacks of equivalent volume; a practice which, at first glance, seems to be promoted by the "Arab" merchants.

The adoption of standardized measures is further complicated by a strong attachment to the idea of a post-sale gift to supplement the amount purchased and to reenforce social relations. As in the case of the dented cuvette, this allows the merchant to adjust a price without seemingly doing so.

The lack of standardized measures makes the evaluation of quantities sold, sale prices per unit and commercial margins that much more difficult. The lack of packaging poses, of course, permits easy contamination of the food supply, resulting in additional health problems, as food is brought through the food chain to the consumer.

The list of measures employed by sellers in the Bangui markets is found in Table 16.

N. Food Imports

A long-term study by Auguste TENE-KOYZOA, from 1960 to 1983, shows that imports make up an average of 13.8 percentage of the PIB as compared to 30% for Congo, 21% for Gabon and 18.6% for Cameroon. Of those imports, food products make up only 14.5% with a tendency to decline. These statistics aren't very reliable and only give an idea of the relative order of magnitude since they come from different sources (FAO, GOCAR) and do not include imports from UDEAC countries.

In general, commercial and food aid imports are dominated by flours, cereal grains, sugar, milk products and oils. They provide an idea of the direction an import substitution policy might take. Palm oil, peanut oil and sugar cane factories are operational though at a loss and without meeting national demand.

Table 16. - Measures Used in the Bangui Markets

A. CUVETTES
- A1. Large cuvette
- A2. Large dented cuvette
- A3. Medium cuvette
- A4. Small cuvette
- A5. Large solid cuvette

B. BUCKETS
- B1. 1 liter (150 CFA)
- B2. 3 liters (250 CFA)
- B3. 5 liters (500 CFA)
- B4. 10 liters
- B5. 15 liters

C. BARRELS
- C1. 30 liters
- C2. 60 liters
- C3. 100 liters
- C4. 200 liters

D. BASKETS
- D1. Basket-less than one cuvette
- D2. Basket of one cuvette

E. SACKS
- E1. Flour Sack-2 cuvettes
- E2. Corn Sack-3 cuvettes
- E3. Marine Sack-4 cuvettes
- E4. Deformed Sack-15/17cuvettes

F. BOTTLES
- F1. Beer bottle (66 cl)
- F2. One liter bottle
- F3. Half-liter bottle
- F4. Coke/Fanta bottle-33 cl
- F5. Small bottle-20 cl
- F6. Small bottle-10 cl

G. GLASSES AND CUPS
- G1. Beer glass
- G2. Macaroni cup
- G3. Locally made cup

H. STACKS
- H1. Stack of 2-sm,med,lge
- H2. Stack of 3-sm,med,lge
- H3. Stack of 4-sm,med,lge
- H4. Stack of 5-sm,med,lge
- H5. Stack of 6+-sm,med,lge

J. BUNCHES
- J1. Small bunch
- J2. Large bunch

K. REGIMES
- K1. Small regime-4-6 hands
- K2. Large regime-7+ hands

Food aid arrives on a small scale, with the exception of the 1983-84 season when a drought resulted in a sharp decline in agricultural production. Since 1985, the EEC has stopped all food aid since the food situation had improved. The principal food aid countries are France, United States, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Cuba and the EEC.

Food imports from neighboring countries (Zaire, Chad, Sudan, Cameroon, Congo, and Gabon) are difficult to estimate since they are not generally registered by the customs officers, at least for the major portion of food stuffs. In general, CAR imports the following:

From Sudan: cattle, cotton oil, some manufactured items (cigarettes, textiles).
From Chad: cotton oil, peanuts and peanut oil, smoked and dried fish, sesame, sugar, dates, onions.
From Cameroon: peanut oil, sugar, chocolate, fish, shrimp, rice and milk.
From Congo: salted fish.
From Zaire: palm oil, goats, fruits, vegetables, game and fish.
From Gabon: sugar, fish and shrimp.

And CAR exports the following to:

To Sudan: hunted game, fruits and vegetables.
To Chad: manioc, fruits, coffee, vegetables.
To Cameroon: peanuts, chickens, goats and sheep.
To Congo: cattle, hunted game, manioc cossettes, palm oil, vegetables, fruits, goats and chickens, potatoes.
To Zaire: beer.
To Gabon: vegetables, fruits, hunted game, smoked fish.

O. Parallel or Underground Economy

Price structures and the behavior of supply and demand are influenced by the underground economy, based on trade conducted outside the law. SEMKOW says this economy is an integral part of the socioeconomic fabric of the country. In an informal study, a market basket of 12 goods costing 20,720 CFA on the legitimate market costs 14,270, or 31% less.

This economy is based on smuggling across primarily the Zaire and Cameroon borders. The case of Zaire was discussed further on. The case of Cameroon smuggling stems from the high price of transport and is involves primarily the transport of goods from Cameroon to RCA.

Two distinct smuggling networks exits, one traditional and one modern. The traditional smuggling network operates on the country's borders. It is somewhat more than simply an amateur operation since it, like any commercial operation, requires investment capital, operating funds, technical competence and a commercial network. It is a commerce that is very hard to control.

The modern smuggling network qualifies as a full-fledged business sector. It has its own financial sources, transport, distribution system and retail outlets. Often smuggling is conducted in parallel with legitimate commerce. This smuggling is conducted on the main roads and involves frequently the use of false merchandise declarations, either in terms of product or in terms of quantity. Sanctions, when imposed by the government, are regarded as normal business risks and the added costs have only a marginal impact on profits.

III. MARKET PLAYERS

A. Introduction

Markets serve a variety of interests. There are, of course, the buyers and the sellers for whom the market is the primary place of exchange. The buyers of food products are typically the consumers of those same products, but there are cases where the food products are bought for resale elsewhere.

In the food chain, the market sellers are also the buyers, or the agents, of food crops from either the producer or from an intermediaries. These intermediaries in the Bangui market are typically members of the wali-gala (literally, market ladies) and the "Arab" community, African foulah or Haussa Moslems.

In addition to the producers mentioned above, truckers play a role in getting the food to market and groups of "vigils", a local guard, provide additional market security.

Throughout, representatives of the CAR government participate in active and important ways. The Ministries of Commerce, Finance (Customs), Interior (Police), Health and Rural Development, as well as the Mayor's office, each has an interest in the Bangui markets.

B. Market Sellers

The people actually sitting in the market tending to the stalls and actually selling the food stuffs to the passing buyers are of several obvious categories.

There are the people in the stalls and out and around the market buildings, protected or not from the sun under large umbrellas. These are the retail sellers, selling to Bangui its daily ration of food stuffs.

Then there are the peddlers (micro-détailants), often younger children, circulating around with trays of various foods and manufactured goods. These peddlers also circulate in the residential quartiers selling from door to door.

Finally there are the wholesalers, large and medium-scale operators (grossistes and demi-grossistes). They are typically found in and around shops or in constructions which serve as warehouses to store as inventory sacks of manioc cossettes or peanuts, or whatever, that is being marketed.

B.1 The Wali-gala

The commerce conducted in the Bangui markets is dominated by a spontaneously organized association of market ladies, called the wali-gala. (There is a smaller association of market men, the koli-gala, largely auxiliary to the wali-gala.) This is a hierarchical, structured organization, officially part of the UDFC (Union Démocratique des Femmes Centrafricaines) and is made up of delegates, each representing a sales activity (orange sellers, manioc sellers, etc) in one of the Bangui markets. The organization handles day-to-day market issues internally. Those which cannot be handled internally are presented to the competent government authority for resolution.

More importantly, the wali-gala are the intermediaries between the food crop producers and the consumers (review Figure 5). The wali-gala go out to the producers' fields and buy wholesale (cash for product, sometimes on credit) the product of entire sections of field and garden produce. These purchases may be arranged even before the product comes to maturity. At harvest, the crop is harvested and shipped to Bangui where it is broken up into smaller bundles for retail sale either in the stalls or by peddlers. These sellers may, or may not be, considered agents of one particular wali-gala.

Wali-gala are typically classified by the size of their operation, large, medium or small. Small-scale wali-gala's are the retailers and have a market stall and may send family members around as peddlers. They typically buy as independent businesses from larger wali-gala and are not involved in producer purchasing operations. Medium-scale wali-gala typically sell at the retail level but also are involved in buying produce from producers. Large-scale wali-gala are involved in retail, buy from the producers and have some storage capacity for wholesale operations in Bangui. Characteristically, every wali-gala is engaged in retail sales on the market to the consumer.

Typically, these wali-gala have no independent means of transport. As independent agents, they generally ride to the producers' villages on available passenger transport and contract with local truckers the transport services required to get the produce to market. Some wali-gala get together collectively to rent a truck, others may simply hitch-hike. As few have their own truck or "camionette," these wali-gala are very sensitive to price developments in the transport sector.

The wali-gala as group have, until recently (1986), been illegal operators on the Bangui markets. The system of "patente" and "agréé" licensing attempted to control under what conditions a person could engage in commerce. The wali-gala were almost entirely outside this officially-sanctioned commercial system and, as the government says, helped bring about its elimination.

In spite of their role in liberalizing commerce in Bangui, the wali-gala so dominate the market scene for food products that they have been criticized for monopolizing this sector, dictating low prices to the producer and high prices to the consumer.

B.2 "Arab" Merchants

The so-called "Arab" merchants, African foulbé and Haussa Moslems, are essentially international traders, providing entrepots for agricultural produce and manufactured items. They work primarily the commercial routes between Bangui and the Chadian and Cameroonian markets. Interestingly enough, these merchants are the only ones to still engage in "commerce de trait", trading through either barter or cash transactions, products of first necessity (salt, sugar, kerosene, textiles, etc.) for agricultural produce. These traders are primarily concentrated in the KM5 markets, selling peanuts, onions, garlic, and other products typically of northern origin.

C. Consumers

Very little is written on the Bangui market consumer himself. There have been no consumer surveys that have yet come to light. The Bangui individual's need for basic foods stuffs has been assessed by the MINH and FAO studies and provide a basis for a rough estimates at what the overall demand for foodstuff should be in Bangui, providing reasoned, albeit debatable, proxies for demand.

D. Transporters

Transporters in CAR are organized into an association called the GTC, the Groupement de Transporteurs Centrafricain. A GOCAR parastatal agency, BARC (Bureau d'Affrêtement routier Centrafricain), regulates international road traffic quotas and provides services to transporters. It establishes transport prices for commercial goods (33 CFA/km for bulk, 49.5 CFA/kg for diverse cargo) in the country and imposes several fees and tariffs on transported goods.

For truckers who are part of the BARC program a 6% commission based on the transport costs is paid to BARC, for non-participants it's 10%. A trucker who loads up in Douala, for example, is required to pay 10% of the transport costs to BARC once he arrives in Bangui. An example of how BARC affects transport costs is provided by SEMKOW. Taxes and fees add up to 1,319,239 CFA or about 10% of the transported value (see Table 17).

Table 17 - Transport Costs: An Example

1. Value of a coffee shipment at Bangassou	13,157,601 CFA
2. Transport to Bangui-official rates	563,920
3. BARC commission on transport (10%)	56,392
4. TCA-16.5% tax on interior transport	93,047
5. Fixed fee	48,000
6. Miscellaneous fees (total of 6)	1,015,300
7. Transport to Douala-official rates	710,000
8. BARC commission on transport (10%)	71,000
9. TCA-5.0% tax on international transport	35,500
Cost of 20 t. of coffee delivered to Douala	5,750,760

These practices have come under review by the World Bank's Structural Adjustment teams and they have proposed major changes in the way BARC operates.

In 1987, according to the Direction Générale des Transports de Surface, the private sector had 893 vehicles licensed to transport people and 49 vehicles with a capacity of 550 tons licensed to transport merchandise. These figures do not include project vehicles or the 450 vehicles used by the government.

Transported tonnage by these vehicles declined by 23% from 1896 to 1987, from 76,500 t. to 58,700 t. SEMKOW believes that these figures underestimate the tonnage actually transported.

In the review of the literature, no survey of the transporters themselves has come to light.

E. Production and Transformation

There is considerable information about producers in CAR. The ROUAN study, for example, details production in the traditional surplus production regions of Ouham and Ouham-Pendé. The current focus, however, will be on production in and around Bangui and the transformation of the key food items: manioc, corn and palm oil.

E.1 Bangui Gardens

Several studies have addressed the Bangui gardens. The following discussion is adapted from the study conducted by MENYIE.

Much of the food supply of Bangui comes from the Bangui gardens, a general term for the numerous gardening activities that take place in and around Bangui. In Bangui, basic food stuffs farming is readily visible in both the urban and suburban areas of the city. Numerous houses are transformed into gardens, mango, avocado, orange orchards. It is primarily a non

commercial, auto-consumption activity. Bangui, in effect, has perpetuated a subsistence economy in a city environment.

While the importance of urban and suburban agriculture may be declining as increased pressures of urbanization are felt, an important section of the Bangui population has kept a strong agricultural tradition and live off these revenues. In 1984-85, the inspection agricole counted 2,923 agriculturalists farming 408.02 ha. MENYIE's investigations showed that 30% of the women farmed, of which 2% were in the administration. Her study of the Galabadja quarter indicated that fully 50% of the population lived off their own agricultural resources.

Earlier studies also indicated the importance of the Bangui gardens. In 1961, it was estimated that 40% of Bangui families were engaged in agricultural activities. In 1970, PRIOUL estimated that 60% of Bangui households take 10-20 kg of food from their own parcels. In 1979, 14% of Bangui population claimed to be part of the agricultural sector.

According to MENYIE, the viability of urban agriculture is related to the stagnant industrial and commercial sector which are providing few employment opportunities.

In CAR, subsistence agriculture is the role of women; men clear the fields when it is a question of strenuous physical effort. Women farm from about 5:30 am to 4 pm. The fields are several kilometers from their homes in town and it often takes one to two hours to get there. Some women are able to farm small parcels in land already surveyed within the city limits.

MENYIE suggests that some women escape their dislike for life in town via their agricultural activities. For others, it primarily a means to gain some financial independence from their husbands by selling their surplus harvest on the market. More wives of workmen, the unemployed and retirees farm than do the wives of government workers. The number of gardeners is indicated in Table 18.

Table 18. - Number of Gardeners
(Inspection agricole, June 1984)

Fatima	42 effectives
PK10	20
PK14	6
West I	14
West II	35
North-east	4
Castor-Saidou	31
Kokoro	31
Ngara	2
Total	184

The main products are manioc, corn, peanuts, sweet potato, taro, ignames bananas and "amarante." The commercial market for European-style vegetables has grown over the years, a production activity in which men engage more than women. The demand of the Bangui market can not be met by Bangui producers alone, and supplies are brought in from Bouar and imported from Europe itself.

E.2 Manioc (adapted from MKOUNGA)

Manioc by far is the most-consumed, least-expensive staple food crop on the Bangui market. To people in CAR, manioc is more than a meal, it is a fundamental tradition. From a production standpoint, manioc is hardy, able to grow in poor soils and not sensitive to the periodicity of the rains. It requires relatively little soil preparation and is propagated via cuttings that resist insect attack. Once established, manioc requires little to no weeding and stores in the ground, making it available year round. It does suffer from some diseases (mosaic, for example) and pests, and harvests have been known to fail (1983 in CAR).

Already a solid producer using traditional methods, improved farming practices, production can be increased substantially. PRODEROM, a rural development project in the Bangui area, reports production increases of 26% from 2,378 kg/ha to 3,000 kg/ha using improved practices (see Table 19).

Table 19. - Increases in Production due to PRODEROM interventions

	initial (kg/ha)	Stage 1	Stage 2
Manioc	2378	2996	---
Peanuts	440	537	977
Corn	510	765	1270
Sesame	390	---	---

The transformation of manioc into edible form is a time-consuming process which, if not done correctly, can lead to illness, even death. The problem is "hydrocyanide" (HCN) which is lethal to humans in doses greater then 1 mg per kg of live weight, 50-60 mg will kill a man. Lesser doses can be tolerated. HCN is processed out of the manioc by rinsing and evaporation as well as by cooking and fermenting (see Table 20).

Table 20. - HCN Content of Manioc

Fresh shredded pulp	165.5 mg/kg
Immersed 5 days in water	35.9
Immersed 5 days + 48 hours drying in sun	25.5
Immersed 5 days + 96 hours drying in sun	19.6

Source: KETIKU, 1977.

HCN itself does not exist in the manioc plant but is bound with a sugar into a non-soluable, non-toxic form, glycoside cyano-genetic. When the manioc is picked, this glycoside is hydrolyzed by an enzyme into a sugar and a aglycone, which in turn decomposes into HCN and either a aldehyde or a cetone.

The transformation of manioc into consumable form is a labor-intensive process, apparently more time consuming the actual production of the manioc tuber itself. The basic transformation process for raw manioc is the following:

1. Wash roots
2. Within the hour after harvest, remove bark, inedible fibers and other inedible parts (épluchage).
3. Place in weak running water for three to five days (rouichage). This weakens the bonds that hold the manioc pulp together and is very effective in eliminating HCN.
4. Cut into morsels, called cossettes, to help further remove fibers.
5. Put into a basket, cover with banana leaves and press with a large, heavy rock. Leave for three days to remove liquids within the cossettes.
5. Dry in sun for two to three days.
6. Pound or crush the dried cossettes into smaller pieces.
7. Sift for flour.

Shorter methods are used. The simplest is to dry in the sun after removing the bark and breaking up into cossettes. Of the manioc sold on the Bangui market, 75% is prepared in one of these two ways.

As a nutrient, manioc is not very good (see Table 21), having essentially no protein, no lipids and no vitamins. It is also associated by some with an acquired inability to metabolize iodine, resulting in hyperthyroid problems.

Table 21. - Content of a manioc tuber

	Sour manioc		Sweet manioc	
	unpeeled	peeled	unpeeled	peeled
Water	68.1 %	71.5%	68.1%	79.5%
Dry matter	31.9	28.5	31.9	28.5
NUTRIENT CONTENT IN PERCENTAGE OF DRY WEIGHT				
Raw protein	2.71	2.58	2.38	1.66
Lipids	0.53	0.46	0.65	0.65
Raw fiber	3.09	0.43	1.95	1.60
Carbon hydrates (glucides)	91.0	94.1	92.1	90.8
Ashes	2.61	2.41	2.89	5.23

Once harvested, it is difficult to store raw manioc tubers and deterioration starts by the end of the second day. The high water content of the roots prevents long storage in the humid conditions of the CAR. The roots also age, deteriorating physically with deep blue rays forming at the edge moving toward the center of the root. They are also subject to infestation by microorganisms. Microorganisms that attack manioc while they are washing give manioc cossettes a unique flavor. In the form of marketable cossettes, manioc keeps better, but is subject to attack by molds in the humid climate of Bangui. The Tropical Products Institute (United Kingdom) has been developing storage techniques which would keep manioc in acceptable for two to six months. In general, however, manioc is processed, consumed and sold immediately after harvest.

The behavior of manioc prices is seasonal with prices going up in the rainy season when people are out in the fields and it is difficult to dry the cossettes. Some seasonal price speculation is reported, but this is limited by the poor storage performance of the crop. Manioc transformation is also a problem, but less so, in the dry season when water streams dry up inhibiting washing that might otherwise have been done.

Manioc prices are thought to be very inelastic given the traditional attachment of Central Africans to this food staple. The Ministry of Plan estimates that the daily ration of manioc is 253.4 grams of manioc flour per day and 4.7 kg of sweet manioc in Bangui itself while outside of Bangui, daily individual consumption averages 372.9 grams of manioc flour and 11.6 kg of sweet manioc. This translates into an estimated annual demand of 46,985,400 kg of manioc per year for Bangui alone.

Prospects exist for the industrial transformation of manioc into flour. Plans for a 3,000 metric ton factory to be located in Baoli were presented as early as 1978. In addition to flour, the factory would produce animal feed, ethanol for motor fuel and a starch for the local textile plant (UCATEX).

E.3 Corn (adapted from COSSOCIM)

Corn appears on the Bangui market in a geminated form (ndjobo) and is used for alcohol. Corn flour is also to be found but on a small scale. There are three major industrial outlets for corn in the CAR: the chicken farm AVICOM, the breweries MOCAF and CASTEL, and the world food program PAM.

AVICOM is a farm with 70,000 chickens and other fowl raised in 30 units. It produces 100,000 eggs per day and supplies 12,000 chickens per month to Bangui, Bouar, Berberati, Bambari and other towns in CAR. It has silos and warehouses capable of storing 500 to 600 metric tons of grain. It buys corn locally and imports soy bean and cotton cake from Chad as well as 600

tons of millet and sorghum. It buys locally only when the quality and delivery requirements are respected.

MOCAF and CASTEL import all of their corn starch from Europe MOCAF, for example, imports 1,200 metric tons per year of 98% pure corn starch for MOCAF, which equals 1,440 tons of cracked corn. The brasseries could buy as much as 2,000 metric tons of cracked corn if the price was low enough to offset the costs of converting corn grits to corn starch. MOCAF would also consider buying cracked rice locally if the problem of "charancons" could be resolved. There is currently no corn mill in CAR capable of producing corn starch for the breweries.

PAM an aid agency imports some 2000 metric tons of corn flour each year for distribution to hospitals, to local clinics and to the Children's Fund. PAM could buy locally if price and quality were both satisfactory. The HUSACA grain mill could supply PAM's needs.

E.4 Oils (adapted from COSSOCIM)

Three kinds of oil are produced in CAR: peanut oil, cotton oil and palm oil. In addition, shea butter is also found on the local market along with imported butter and margarine. Peanut and palm oils are produced by traditional means. On the industrial scale, four high-volume vegetable oil refineries have been built in the Republic.

The SOCADA refinery in Pendé can produce 900 metric tons per year of cotton oil and 2,300 tons of cotton seed cake from an input of 6,500 tons of cotton seed. The factory has been closed since 1980 but the equipment is still in good shape and there appears to be no technical problems putting this factory back on line.

The SOCADA refinery in Alindao can produce 1,200 tons per year of peanut and/or sesame oil and 1,500 tons of seed cake from an input of 3000 tons of peanut/sesame seed. This factory has also been closed since 1980 due to insufficient supplies of peanuts and sesame seeds.

The HUSACA (ex-STCPAD) oil refinery in Bangui has a 7,500 metric ton per year capacity and is producing peanut oil again after its financial restructuring. For the most part, the peanuts used come from Chad and Zaire, not CAR.

The Centrapalm oil refinery in Bossongo came on line in 1986 with an eventual (year 2000) capability of producing 7,000 tons of raw palm oil and 1,500 tons of "palmiste." In its first year of operation (1987), Centrapalm produced 1,500 tons of raw oil and 260 tons of "palmiste." Centrapalm is, however, selling its oil at a loss, producing a liter of oil for 356 CFA, a liter which sells retail for 270 CFA (see Table 22).

Table 22. - Costs of production of palm oil

	CFA/liter*	% Total Cost
I. Production		
Labor	14.95	4.2
Inputs	18.94	5.3
II. Transformation		
Harvest and transport	3.81	1.1
Transformation and packaging	22.06	6.2
General costs	219.84	61.7
III. Marketing		
Transport	2.87	0.8
Other costs	73.60	20.7
IV. Total Production Costs	356.07	100.0
V. Sale prices		
Wholesale	230.00	
Retail	275.00	
Preferential	207.00	
VI. Margins (Loss)		
Wholesale	(126.07)	
Retail	(81.07)	
Preferential	(149.07)	

Source: Centrapalm, May 1988
* 1 liter=1 kg of palm oil

The marketing of oil is complicated by the presence of contraband palm oil from Zaire. This oil crosses the Ubangui River in small boats at Ouango and at the Customs port and is distributed as far north as Bossangoa. It is generally maintained that, unless suppressed, the Zairian palm oil will force the closing of the Centrapalm factory. This Zairian oil is produced by traditional means and is of an inferior quality to that produced by Centrapalm. For Central African consumer the advantage of better quality palm oil does not justify its higher price suggesting a highly elastic demand for Centrapalm oil.

The price of 200 liter barrel of palm oil from Zaire costs between 30,000 CFA and 35,000 CFA at the river edge. A liter then costs between 150 and 175 CFA (see Table 23). The retail price for this same oil varies between 250 and 300 CFA per liter on the markets of Pétévo, Fouh, Boy-Rabé and KM5. Given the limited funds available to most Central African households, Zaire palm oil is not sold by liter, but in smaller quantities: a half liter for 150 CFA, a third liter for 100 CFA, a quarter liter plus "gift" for 75.

The real price of Zaire palm oil on the Bangui market is 230 CFA per liter but, given the way its marketed, the price reaches 300 CFA/liter making it more expensive than the oil sold by Centrapalm. Evidently the idea of a "cadeau" added to the agreed sale gives the consumer the impression albeit false of having gained more for less.

Centrapalm has adopted a marketing strategy which features well-marked boutiques in the local Bangui markets and have increased its sales due largely to the increased availability of its product. In the long term, however, it is thought that the Centrapalm production capacity is insufficient to meet the demand for palm oil in CAR.

Table 23. - Structure of Zaire Imported Palm Oil

I. Sale at Zaire factory (200 l barrel)	3500-4000 zaires
	FCFA/barrel
II. Purchase price at Zongo, Zaire by the Wali-gala (10000-11200 zaires)	25000-28000
(average price)	26500
III. Costs between Zongo and Bangui	
* Transport to River	500
* Loading of boats	1000
* Payment to Zaire Customs agents	1000
* River transport	1000
Sub-Total	3500
IV. Price delivered at Bangui	30000
V. Price after customs (3 approaches)	
A. No-customs payment	30000
B. Payment to Customs agent (5000 CFA/barrel)	35000
C. Payment of full Customs duties (10670 CFA/barrel*)	40670

Source: ICEA/SOCADA survey on the oil and fatty substances market in RCA, November 1987.

* Based on a value of 22,000 CFA a barrel:
Customs duties are 20% (4,400 CFA/barrel)
Entry rights are 15% (3,300 CFA/barrell)
TCA is 10% of 29,700 CFA (22,000+4,400+3,300)
or 2,970 CFA/barrel

For the CAR in general, oil imports are estimated to be between 3,500 and 4,500 metric tons per year generally entering the country illegally from Zaire, Chad, Sudan and Cameroon (see Table 24). The importance of these imports reflects persistent problems with price and tax policies, production issues and the overvaluation of the CFA vis-a-vis Zairian and Sudanese currencies. Official imports are between 1,100 and 1,700 tons per year (1984-86) coming from Zaire (450 tons), from Europe and the United States (500 tons including food aid). National demand for commercialized oils (doesn't count production for home consumption) is put at between 4,500 and 6,000 tons per year, about 1.7 kg per habitant per year.

Table 24. - Vegetable oil imports to CAR

Market	Central	KM5	Miskine	Dias	Bamag
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC					
Palm oil (Centrapalm)	275	275	275	---	---
Palm oil (traditional)	---	275	375	---	---
Peanut oil (traditional)	800	700	800	---	---
Shea oil (traditional)	1000	900	900	---	---
Peanut oil (industrial)	500	475	500	---	1250
ZAIRE					
Palm oil (traditional)	350	275	375	---	---
CHAD					
Cotton oil (industrial)	500	450	500	680	---
SUDAN					
Cotton oil (industrial)	---	500	---	---	---
FRANCE					
Olive oil	3500	3500	---	3250	3925
Soy bean oil (industrial)	---	---	---	1020	1250
Corn oil (Lessieur)	---	---	---	---	1450
Sunflower (Lessieur)	---	---	---	---	1175
HOLLAND					
Cotton oil (industrial)	500	500	500	680	---
Vegetable oil (industrial)	500	---	---	---	---
WEST GERMANY					
Vegetable oil (industrial)	450	500	---	---	---
PORTUGAL					
Olive oil	3210	---	---	---	---

Source: COSSOCIM Survey, April 1988.

F. Government Agencies

Several government agencies play active roles in the Bangui market and its development. They are the Ministry of Rural Development, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Health, the Mayor's office and the local neighborhood chiefs who sponsor the "vigils".

Without going into great detail, the Ministries have the role of forming and implementing national policies that influence the markets.

The Ministry of Rural Development sponsors agricultural development with a mind toward increasing the supply of foodstuffs on the Bangui market. In the Bangui area, the focus of this interest has been on the PRODEROM rural development project.

The Ministry of Commerce promotes marketing in CAR while the Ministry of Finance is responsible for customs. The Ministry of Transport plays a key role in the conditions under which foodstuffs are brought to the Bangui market while the Ministry of Health is interested in the food nutrition and the healthiness of

the markets themselves. The Ministry of Foreign Affaires has a role to play to the extent that some border issues affecting commerce are diplomatic issues between nations as well.

As was mentioned earlier in the text, the Mayor's office plays a major role in the day-to-day operation of the Bangui markets. The Mayor's office sells marketing tickets at a modest fees providing sellers with the right to sell. Stalls are also rented for fixed periods of time. These revenues are used to help defray the costs of monitoring and maintaining the markets themselves. The Mayor's office, in conjunction with the authorities in each neighborhood, have organized a local force of "vigils" who serve to enhance market security and help keep it clean. They are volunteers, but are fed by the market ladies and benefit, it is reported, from sales of confiscated goods.

IV. COMMERCIALIZATION POLICY

A. As Viewed by the Ministry of Rural Development

The Ministry of Rural development's view of the food commercialization situation in CAR was exposed in the May 1989 document "Perspectives et Stratégies du Développement Rural, Consultation Sectorially Agricole." The following section is translated from that document (pp. 19-21).

The authors categorized commercialization at the village level and at the regional level. At the village level, exchange takes place between producers themselves, between producers and local artisans, and between producers and nomadic cattlemen. Revenues from these transactions make up a relatively important part of the family resources.

At the regional level, exchange is essentially nonexistent between regions. There does exist a commerce between the farmers in the immediate vicinity of each urban area and the urban markets themselves, as is the case with Bangui. The difficulties in developing regional commerce are laid to difficulties in communication between regions and as a result a lack of relevant information between producers and merchants. Only those productive regions located near the major, well-maintained roads are able to get their surplus production to market.

Furthermore regional trade is hampered by the absence of a rational system for collecting and distributing produce making the foodstuff commerce random and precarious.

The liberalization of foodstuff commerce since 1986 has not had any negative effects on consumer or producer prices and has stimulated commerce and the exchange between town and country. Demand for cereal imports (wheat flour and rice) is still relatively weak given the overwhelming preference by urban and rural consumers for manioc.

As for gardening, the big centers are around Bouar and Bangui. Bouar produces vegetables in sufficient quantity to supply part of Bangui's needs. A better organization of the means of transport as well as a better fit of supply to existing demand throughout the year, should encourage the development of gardening and a clear reduction in the import of fresh vegetables.

In light of these observations, the MDR proposes that:

1. The commercialization of food stuffs be reorganized to facilitate contacts between buyers and producers.
2. Farmers should be better organized within their groupements.

3. Commercial credits should be made available to merchants.

In related areas, the MDR further proposes that:

1. Agronomic research respond better to the needs of producers and their working conditions, putting the accent of their research on time-saving techniques.
2. Using more efficient and better adapted tools will increase labor productivity freeing up time for other productive activities.
3. Itinerant cultures give way to sedentary cultures.
4. Improved storage conditions and product transformation techniques will make producers less dependant on buyers and allow then to sell their produce at better prices.
5. Demographic growth, especially in the urban areas, will, over the next few years, contribute to increased demand for agricultural products.

B. As Viewed by the World Bank

The World Bank addressed CAR's agricultural commercialization prospects in the document "Report and Recommendations of the President of the International Development Association to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Credit of SDR 28.9 million to the Central African Republic for a Second Structural Adjustment Program," May 17, 1988. The following section is adapted from that document (pp. 24-25).

"The country's production potential for foodstuffs is considerable, but output is severely limited by marketing constraints. The small size of the urban population offers only a limited market for food crops and livestock products, export possibilities are limited while an inadequate network of rural roads substantially raises internal transportation costs. Furthermore, until recently, food crop marketing was hampered by excessive government regulation. Under SAL I, Government took a series of measures to promote the consumption of local food crops, with the abolition of administrative barriers to trade and decontrol of consumer prices. Under SAL II a number of measures will be taken to further expand local markets. Control of illegal imports and food products (e.g., palm oil and sugar) will be stepped up in line with increased government efforts to repress parallel trade. The tariff structure for food products will be reviewed with the goal of providing an adequate level of protection to local foodstuffs including meat and milk. Food aid that competes directly with local production will be eliminated (i.e., all food aid except special funding programs for infants and women and some "food for work" projects) and to the extent feasible, the Government will negotiate for food aid to be substituted with gifts of inputs and equipment (e.g., Japan Food Production Grant program). To further expand domestic markets for agricultural products, the Government will undertake two key

studies by October 1988: first, it will explore means to develop small scale agro-processing enterprises, including pre-feasibility studies and identification of potential entrepreneurs; second, it will formulate and action plan for the maintenance and construction of rural roads."

V. MARKET CONSTRAINTS

A. Transportation

On everyone's list of constraints to commercialization in CAR is the question of transport. This issue typically subdivides into 1) the state of road network, 2) the state of transport vehicles and the availability of spare parts, 3) the delays caused by numerous road barriers, 4) government regulation of transport, and, ultimately, 5) the cost of transportation services.

A.1 The Road Network

At the beginning of the 1980's, CAR roads were in a simply horrible state of disrepair. The Ministry of Transportation (Politique et Programme du Secteur Transports) reports that at that time it took 20 hours to go the 450 kms from Bangui to Bouar. Since then considerable progress has been made in reconstructing the road network (434 km are paved) and maintaining it. Still, the network is deficient.

There are several views of the problem. First, it rains heavily in the CAR during the rainy season and most of the roads are not all-weather roads. As a consequence, there is a regular erosion of road quality to contend with. To help mitigate the problem posed by the rains, physical barriers keep vehicles from operating on the soft, muddy surfaces preventing further degradation. Commercial traffic is put at a disadvantage by the rains; delaying the movement of commercial produce and increasing the wear and tear on the trucks themselves.

Second, the layout of the current road network may not be the most conducive to increased commerce. The road network tends to radiate out to the north - to Bossangoa, Bouar, and Sibut - and to the southwest - to MBaiki. Commerce tends to develop along trade routes that lead from one market to the next. In the case of Bangui, the road network gives it the appearance of being "at the end of the line. Road transport south into Zaire, for example, is hampered by the lack of a bridge over the Ubangui. Roads southwest to the Congo and Gabon are impracticable and east to the Sudan rudimentary, to be polite. There is no direct route between Bangui and the mining center at Bereberati and the road to the Cameroon difficult. As a whole, the eastern region barely has a road network at all. The Trans-African highway, connecting Lagos to Nairobi, is drawn through Bangui, but remains unfinished.

A.2 Transport Vehicles and Spare Parts

The physical condition of the transport trucks in CAR is pretty bad. The poor road conditions exact a huge toll on trucks. Equipment failure in transit is common. Margins appear to be too small for truckers to renew periodically their equipment. Spare parts, when they are available, not to mention new trucks, are extraordinarily expensive. Delays imposed by road authorities for deficient equipment a routine. Transporters are caught in a no-win situation. Profit margins are estimated to be too low to maintain the trucks let alone replace them.

A.3 Road Barriers

The presence of road barriers appears to be on most everyone's list of impediments to commerce. There was a time several years ago (before 1983) when it seemed that every arm of the government had a physical barrier constructed along the major access roads. In addition to the road department's rain barriers and the border posts, there were police barriers, customs barriers, local prefecture, sous-prefecture and mayoral barriers and conservation (Eaux et Forêts) barriers. At each barrier, the transporter was required to stop and fulfill whatever obligation was required at that control point. Each barrier imposed an extra time delay on road commerce and, along with it, added costs. Since the liberalization program began in 1983 and renewed in 1985, however, many of the road barriers were eliminated leaving only the rain barriers and the frontier posts in place.

A.4 Government Regulations

Road transportation in CAR is regulated by the BARC, Bureau d'Affrêtement Routier Centrafricain. The future role of BARC in the context of a market economy, and in particular, the abolition of its monopoly and the identification of services it can perform, is the subject of a study sponsored by the World Bank.

The study concluded (November 1989) that, prior to any negotiations leading to IDA credits for the CAR transport sector, BARC's monopoly on freight transport and its 10% commission on contracts to which it is not a party should be ended. It further advised that the new agreement between the Cameroon and CAR, dividing land transport between the two countries on a 60%/40% CAR/Cameroon basis, should not be a pretext for giving the BARC new authority. It also observed that these conditions were required by the World Bank as part of the agreement leading to the second Structural Adjustment Loan.

In the context of the liberalization of the CAR economy, part of the Structural Adjustment process, the World Bank has encouraged the GOCAR to take the following emergency steps (Report and recommendations, May 1988, pp.61-62):

1. Base for determining parch turnover tax and commission: the official reference rate, fixed by the State, will be abolished and replaced by an indicative tariff to be based on market prices and revised every three month in the light of price fluctuations. The BARC and GTC will make joint proposals on tariffs based on their invoices;

2. Turnover tax on export goods: the Government will apply a 5% maximum rate for the transport of all goods destined for export (the domestic rate will be maintained at 16.5%). This tax will be levied at the production site. Goods in transit through the CAR will also be subject to the 5% rate;

3. BARC commission rate: the Government will apply a blanket rate which will be as low as possible taking into account the cost of the service and after consultation with BARC, GTC and other operators. The level of this rate will be fixed by a ministerial decree no later than June 1988. In the absence of an agreement by that date, the Government will set the rate at 6%.

4. Voluntary use of BARC: initially, and for domestic transport, it will no longer be compulsory to use BARC services if loading is done in a place where BARC is not represented. Moreover for transport from the interior to Bangui or between places in the interior, the transporter will be free to choose whether or not he wishes to use parch services and payment will be made to BARC only if its services have actually been used.

A.5 The High Price of Transport

Eventually, the problems with transport are regrouped together into what is considered by some to be the exaggerated price of transport in the CAR. This point of view is generally held by the wali-gala who have traditionally used the transport services provided by the transport sector. The studies that have treated the issue, while agreeing that transport prices are high, point out that the profit margins realized by transporters are, in fact, quite small, and evidently insufficient to finance the maintenance of a rolling stock worthy of the name.

A.6 Road Development Prospects

A World Bank mission (10 October-4 November 1989) sent to evaluate the transport sector developed a 119.52 million $US transport sector project which it has proposed for eventual funding. A final project document is due in Bangui in February 1990. This project would:

* Strengthen existing institutions, sectorial planning capabilities, financial management, accelerate procedures for the creation (passation) of public markets, and the reform and redefinition of several of the agencies under the Ministry of Transport (BARC, CCAC, ASECNA-RCA);

* The definition of a priority road network and of a new strategy for maintaining it; the promotion of private central African road construction companies and the improvement of navigation on the Ubangui River;

* The adoption of the principle of a 10% rate of return on road investments; the adoption of a coherent policy for road financing, and the improvement in the recovery of infrastructure expenses;

* The liberalization of the transport sector and the suppression of the monopolies of certain agencies (BARC, CCAC); the reduction of controls, the continued liberalization of tariffs and the harmonization of terms of competition between different types of transport;

* The establishment of a program of road security, improving security at the Bangui airport and the continuation of policies designed to protect the environment.

In the matter of the road network and its development, the project would rehabilitate the 401 km of paved road; resurface 24 kms of deteriorated road, strengthen the shoulders of 125 kms of road, conduct repaving activities to maintain another 242 kms and conduct a major overhaul of the first 35 kms of the Bangui-Damara road. A program of local self-help will be instituted to help in the permanent maintenance of the roads.

Starting in 1990, 19 kms of RN1 will be rebuilt as a result of its inondation by the lake building up behind the M'Bali dam.

While RN3 linking Bangui with the Cameroon is included in the priority list of roads to be paved. The mission concluded, however, that the economics of the road were not sufficiently high and proposed that work on this road take place after priority investments are financed and attained.

The Project proposes a full program of maintenance and rehabilitation of 2,960 kms of dirt roads. The responsibility for rural tracks, previously assigned to the Ministry of Rural Development, has been transferred to the Ministry of Transport. The project proposes to rehabilitate and maintain 240 kms of priority track each year. A budget for emergency repairs is also planned.

B. Food Production

The food production system of the CAR is, in one way or another, on peoples' list of problems inherent in food commercialization. This issue also takes several forms: 1) the physical location of CAR farms; 2) the low-productivity and income levels; 3) the extension services, and 4) the labor-instensive transformation of manioc

B.1 Physical Location of Farmers

In a nutshell, the location of farms is such that collecting surplus production, when it is available, is a relatively costly operation.

For starters, the CAR is not a very densely populated country. On average, it has a population density of 4.2 persons per square km.; only 1% of the surface area is under cultivation (début 1985). Then, by Colonial and later GOCAR decree, the farm populations were forcibly resettled along the main axes roads in the country (see Figure 14). While this located the population within easy reach of the Government, it had some negative influences on the development of commercializable agriculture.

By placing the population along the major access roads, the land available for farming was reduced to that within 10 kms (walking distance) of the road, a 20 km corridor. Dispersed and newly settled along the roads, there was little natural tendency for the farmers to gather around major collection points where the many farmers could bring their surplus produce to one collection point where the merchant or his representative could buy it. Rather along the road developed multiple collection points drawing from a reduced farming base.

The agricultural development model suggested by some marketing specialists would disperse farmers in villages in the interior away from the main roads. Here the people of each village could work the land within essentially a 10 km radius. The surplus would be brought in from the fields by the farmers; the surplus being taken to a larger market serving the multiple villages. In this fashion, collecting costs to the transporter are reduced by lowering the number of collecting points to only the principle ones and raising the quantity of surplus agricultural product furnished at each point.

In the following example, it is shown how production potential can be increased by moving farming settlements off the main axis roads. In Figure 15, the farming population is located along the main road, limiting farming to the 20-mile corridor along it. In this example, the road passes through a zone 100 kms by 40 kms. The land available to the farmers in this first case equals 100 kms times 20 kms or 2000 sq. kms., equalling 50% of the land in the zone.

Figure 14



Figure 15



Figure 16



Figure 17



By moving the villages 10 kms away from the road (see Figure 16), the farmers have access to all the land within 10 kms walking distance. Each of 10 village can access 314.16 sq. km., or a total of 3141.6 sq. km. This is a potential increase in productive land of 57%, and 78.5% of the zone is now available.

In the third case (see Figure 17), farmers are kept along the road and 10 villages are established at a distance of 10 km from the road. Now the total land accessible to the farmers equals 3,570.8 sq km, a 78.5% increase in accessible productive land from the first case and a 13.7% increase from the second case. Total land available for productive purposes is now up to 89.3% of the zone.

It is not clear that the rural populations living away from the urban peripheries is sufficiently dense to justify a resettlement effort along the theoretical lines discussed above. However, according to some observers, a process of resettlement in the interior away from the main axis roads is already taking place.

B.2 Low-Productivity and Income Levels

According to DUAULT (1985), the productivity of food crops has stagnated since 1970 (see Table 25).

Table 25. - Productivity of Food Crops

	1970	1975	1980	1982
Production per rural inhabitant (in kg equivalent to manioc)	306	330	270	267
Available Production per inhabitant (in kg equivalent to manioc)	229	226	175	170

This reduction in productivity has also been associated with a reduction in land farmed from 58 ares/rural inhabitant in 1975 to 45 ares/rural inhabitant in 1982.

Monetary revenue in the agricultural production sector is held to be insufficient to trigger a dynamic of commercial exchange between the urban centers and the countryside. The value added by the rural sector, as estimated by the Direction des statistiques, was, in 1982, around 38 billion CFA. Given the estimate that 30% of that was commercialized, the monetary revenue per person was about 7,300 CFA/rural inhabitant per year, or about 36,000 CFA per year per rural family of five. Adding in estimates of money earned from the sale of livestock and cash crops, the individual rural inhabitant earned about 25,400 CFA/year, 2,100 CFA /month an average amount not taking into consideration the great disparities between cash crop and cattlemen on the one hand and subsistence farmers on the other.

The weak purchasing power of the rural sector restricts the level of consumption in general and of goods from the non-agricultural sector in particular. It encourages the development of production belts around the cities; developed by members of the urban population itself for its own food self-sufficiency and as supplement to income. It discourages the specialization essential to a developed system of commerce. The weak purchasing power also affects the development of industrialized transformation facilities. The economy simply doesn't generate enough revenue to buy enough transformed product to make the factories profitable.

B.3 Extension Services

Due to a lack of financial means and technical themes to address, the principal production zones around the cities have not benefited from a technical extension program equivalent to that received by farmers in the cash crop (cotton and coffee) zones. The PRODEROM project in and around Bangui has been established to address that aspect of the problem. In general, however, the technical extension services are not numerous enough or effective enough to organize farmers in ways which will improve their farming techniques and will afford them access to the credit required for more modern farming.

Training is generally unavailable for involved in commercial development. Accounting and marketing courses are often cited as a need for people interested in business development either as entrepreneurs or as members of cooperatives. A training program of this nature is part of the Structural Adjustment Program sponsored by the World Bank but it has been slow to start.

C. Credit

A third aspect of the commercialization problem on everyone's list is credit services available to farmer, merchant and transporter. The BCAD - Banque de Credit Agricole et de Développement - was created in 1983 with an initial capital of 600 million CFA and a 66% private ownership. It is the only credit institution, in 1989, willing to provide seasonal agricultural credit, "crédit de campagne" to farmers having sufficient collateral. The commercial banks, BIAO and others, provide credit to cotton and tobacco farmers, but, as a rule, not to food crop farmers.

Recently, the BCAD has found itself in financial difficulties. Loans granted to farmers in the coffee and cotton sectors, guaranteed by future cotton and coffee sales, are the source of the problems. With the fall in world prices in both these commodity markets, these loans are largely in default. As a consequence, the central bank (BEAC) in Bangui and the BCAD

are engaged in discussions regarding the BCAD's future effectiveness as a supplier of credit.

Typically credit to farmers has been available through the cotton production promotion project, SOCADA, the Ouham/Ouham-Pendé development agency ACADOP; and the coffee production promotion group ADECAF. Each of these agencies has had difficulties in securing acceptable payback rates.

According to popular wisdom, credit is still available within the Moslem community to promote extension of essentially family enterprises. There is as yet no independent documentation to support this particular view Tontines also play a role as a means of accumulationg personal savings..

D. Imports and Exports

Imports of food stuffs to the Bangui market come primarily from the two neighboring countries to the north, Chad and Cameroon, from Zaire across the Ubangui River and from a variety of Western countries, most notably in the form of food aid.

Cameroon provides to the CAR its most convenient access to the sea. The road/rail link to Douala is well developed in Cameroon and rudimentary between Bangui and the Cameroon border. A variety of food stuffs and manufactures travel this road, primarily on Cameroonian vehicles.

Trade with Chad is primarily centered on agricultural and livestock products from the north. In particular, Chadian peanuts compete effectively with Central African peanuts in the markets and at the oil refinery.

The import of food aid that competes with locally produced products has been largely suspended.

It is trade with Zaire that generates the most concern. Food products, particularly palm oil and peanuts, produced in Zaire are shipped illegally across the Ubangui River at various points and sold on the Bangui markets at a lower price to the consumer. Hence the concern among local merchants, particularly the wali-gala.

The problem is complicated by a financial question, the relation of the zaire, Zaire's money, to the CFA used in CAR. According to some witnesses, producer prices for corn, for example, are the same on both sides of the Ubangui. Zairian corn is brought to the Bangui markets and sold for CFA. The CFA is exported to Zaire where it is converted to zaires. The profit is made not on the sale of corn, but on the sale of CFA. This advantage allows the Zairian corn to be sold at a lower price on the Bangui market than local CAR-produced corn.

The Zaire producing areas around Bangui are a natural part of the Bangui market area. Bangui market will always draw agricultural products to it and planners and policy makers will formulate their long term strategies for Bangui's market development accordingly.

E. Storage

Some authors mention the lack of storage facilities at each level of the food chain as an impediment to commercialization. The various players are not able to take effective advantage of seasonal price variations to increase the value of their commodity.

At the village level, LONGY (1985) reports, some groupements have storage facilities and projects have, in some cases, provided incentives for their construction. In Bangui, there are two warehouses, the 2000 t. SICPAD and the 1000 t Caisse de Stabilisation facilities. Merchants, advises LONGY, don't have storage facilities worthy of the name. In general, there is a serious lack of storage capacity for food crops other than manioc. As a rule, manioc and other tubers are stored in the ground until they are readied for market.

F. Lack of Information

Communications problems between producers and merchants is often cited as a problem area. Producers don't know what their product is worth on the Bangui market; merchants don't know where agricultural surpluses are to be found and the local market prices.

G. Transformation

The issue of transformation technology is developed by several authors. In CAR, transformation is conducted using non-industrial technologies. In the case of food crops, initial transformation activities focus on turning manioc into cossettes and flour, shelling corn and peanuts, threshing and winnowing sesame, millet, sorghum and rice. Industrial transformation activities have focused primarily on vegetable oil plants (SOCADA and HUSACA). These factories turn cotton seed, sesame and peanuts into cooking oil. The financially troubled SICPAD, now HUSACA, once operated a wheat flour mill as well as a "provenderie" and a soap factory. In recent years, a sugar refining mill has opened in the Bambari prefecture.

Basically, the ability to transform an agricultural commodity provides increases its marketing potential; agricultural demand is influenced by the multiple demands for a wider set of products rather than the single demand for the raw product. The demand for product, whiskey, made from corn for example, is stronger than the demand for the product, grain corn, itself. The demand for honey and vegetable oils are also pertinent examples of this derived demand. Some products, like manioc, are sought exclusively in transformed state (cossettes, flour).

To the extent that transformed products are not brought forth to the Bangui market, commercial prospects for basic foodstuffs are diminished. Clearly, previous attempts to industrial transform corn, sesame and cotton seed into vegetable oils from have not been encouraging. However, while particular transformation technologies may have been found uneconomical, the case for promoting transformation is sound.

With manioc serving some 60% of the food needs of Bangui consumers, the labor intensive character of the preparation of manioc for consumption has to be considered when considering impediments to commercial development.

H. Improving Market Conditions

As discussed earlier in the text, the physical conditions in the markets are pretty bad. Their sheer unattractiveness, except for those who like quaint African markets, must be considered a constraint to the commercial development.

I. Access to the Sea

The fact that CAR is located in the African interior should be mentioned as a handicap to commercial development.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS -- SOME THOUGHTS

Finding ways to improving Bangui commerce in a budget-conscious and practical manner is the ultimate objective of the Bangui market study. Among the many things that must be done, however, are few that can be done. Of those that can be done, still fewer can be recommended. In this final section are some thoughts on ways of improving the Bangui markets.

A. SATISFYING EVERYBODY

The discussion must begin with the inherent conflicts of interest between market players. Producers want *higher* prices for their farm produce, that way they will be encouraged to produce more. Intermediaries want *lower* producer prices so that their commercial margins will be higher. It's the same with transporters. They want *higher* prices; the intermediaries want *lower* prices. Then there are the consumers. They want *lower* prices while the merchants want to charge *higher* prices and the government wants *"fair"* prices so that everyone will be happy.

Making everyone happy is a tall order and, practically speaking, it can not often be done. It has happened when, for example, technological developments help lower costs and these supply-side savings are transferred through the commercial distribution system. When hybrid corn produced more corn at a lower cost, the farmer's commercial margins improved. The lower farm gate price helped the intermediaries by increasing their margins and allowing them to lower their retail price to the consumer.

It can also happen when demand increases and consumers are willing to pay more for a product or for products made from a particular food crop. An increased demand for beef in the US can increase demand for corn, stabilizing or raising the corn price. A demand-led price increase can benefit everyone in the commercial sector right down to the initial producer.

B. COST-SAVING TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

In the farmer's case, technological change to lower costs of production and operating costs is desirable. Hoe farming can be improved upon technically even if the economics of the technological change often prevent it. The introduction of improved varieties and fertilizer is a possibility. Oxen power, too, is a possibility, but it's a technology that is expensive and not well adapted to forest terrain and to tubers like manioc. The introduction of improved farm management techniques and general agricultural knowledge is a way of making the farms more efficient and opening each farmer up to new possibilities for enterprise. While not denying the importance of the effort to

introduce technological change in the agricultural sector, it has proven to be a long, slow and expensive process.

Cost-saving technological change in either the transport or commercial sectors is harder to imagine. Perhaps, lower cost vehicles and spare parts will be possible; certainly not lower-cost petroleum. With the possible exception of business management training, interventions leading to technical change in the commerce and transport sector seem unlikely.

C. TRANSFORMATION

The development of transformation technology should be developed for the basic food crops in CAR. By introducing new products derived from raw agricultural produce, demand for the new products can translate into increased effective demand for the raw product itself. This increased demand does, from the consumer side, what a cost-saving technological change does from the producer side. When consumers are willing to pay more for a product, merchants can maintain or raise their prices, increasing their profit margins. This demand-led strengthening of price can then be transferred through the marketing chain right down to the producer.

D. ADVERTISING AND IMPROVED MARKETING

The same effect can be had with improved advertising and marketing. When advertising and good marketing increase demand, prices throughout the commercial system can be reinforced to everyone's satisfaction.

Rehabilitating the markets themselves can be viewed in this same framework. Pleasant environments encourage more clients to come to the market effectively increasing demand.

E. CREDIT

Making credit available to the commercial and agricultural sector must be addressed if any sustainable development of CAR's commerce is to occur. Credit is needed to allow commerce and agricultural sectors to grow through investments capable of yielding future returns.

According to BOYER's report on Bangui credit institutions, none is prepared to deal with small-scale credit except through project able to provide loan guarantees. However, small-scale credit is just the kind of credit that would help the market sellers and their suppliers. Furthermore, there is no effective mechanism for harnessing savings and turning these resources into intelligent capital investments at the economic level where most of CAR's population finds itself. Here, perhaps, USAID's

experience with locally controlled credit cooperatives would be advantageous.

F. ROAD IMPROVEMENTS

Improving the roads in CAR is an obvious candidate for an intervention designed to promote the commerce sector. The development of the road infrastructure serves to lower transport costs in practically every category, savings which can be transferred throughout the commercial distribution system. It also opens up markets to new participants, providing the Bangui market with increased supply as effectively as might any improved variety.

Roads, however, are very costly and must be economically justifiable. And, they have to be paid for. Government revenues from the commercial sector, a key issue, must be sufficient to amortize the investments made in roads.

The recent World Bank study has made an important contribution to the eventual improvement of CAR's roads. In the case of Bangui, and to the extent that it is not already in the World Bank plan, provision should be made for improving the access roads leading to each of Bangui's markets.

G. STORAGE AND REFRIGERATION

Storage and refrigeration facilities, like roads, are a missing part of the commercial infrastructure. They would be helpful to have and would probably have the net effect of marginally lowering costs for merchants. The economics of storage and refrigeration services, however, must be looked at carefully. Development of storage and refrigeration facilities may make more political than economic sense. Less downward price resistance, so as to clear the market, might be yet the most economical solution to the storage/refrigeration problem.

H. ZAIRE IMPORTS

From a purely economics point of view, the border between Zaire and CAR creates artificial problems. Bangui is the natural market for agricultural production on the Zaire side of the Ubangui River. However, problems that economics would prefer to ignore, politics and the integrity of financial zones imposes. The idea of keeping Zairian products off the Bangui market is short-sighted, even if it may be a popular one for some.

The conversion of the CFA into zaires is an example of a demand-led price strengthening activity. Agricultural produce (manioc and palm oil) is transformed, via sales, into CFA, the demand for which is quite high in Zaire. This results in an

increase in the price of Zairian products bought with zaires, reaching the point where the loss in selling food products on the Bangui market will approach the gain realized in selling CFA for zaires. All this is predicated, of course, on stable currencies in Zaire and in the CFA zone.

The question of the Zaire production areas' participation in the Bangui markets is one that must be addressed at the political level between CAR and Zaire. Commerce in both northern Zaire and in CAR would benefit from policies of stable currency and lower tariffs.

I. GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND INCOME LEVELS

Government, the commerce sector and the agricultural sectors have to work hand in hand if commercial development is to proceed. Each needs the other. The commerce and agricultural sectors need the government to help maintain security, negotiate trade and transport issues with CAR's neighbors, and to establish the "level playing field" (stable currency, contract rights, capital accumulation for long-term national investments, etc.) in which commerce and agriculture can grow. The revenues generated by the commerce and agricultural sectors must help pay for these services through taxes.

The relationship between government and the commerce and agriculture sectors is, of course, a well-studied one. If history is any guide, representatives of the commerce and agricultural sectors must have a strong voice in determining how its taxes are spent. Issues affecting commerce and agriculture need to be addressed regularly in a manner (technical) and at a level (political) where decisions can be made and executed.

Income levels are related to this government, commerce and agricultural collaboration. Without income, consumer demand loses its effectiveness as a stimulus to commercial development. Technological developments alone can not do the job. Some care must be taken to develop policies that gets money flowing in the agricultural and commercial sectors, that gets savings involved in the national investment process, and credit systems in place which serve to generate income streams.

J. INFORMATION SYSTEMS

The provision of information about market prices and regional supply conditions has been proposed by some authors not the least of which is LONGY in his report to the FAO. In this the information era, better information between producers and merchants and consumers will work towards everyone's benefit. While affirming the importance of information to production and commercial sectors, has the economic return to an investment in an information program been sufficiently addressed?

The provision of information usually means the establishment of an information service, a bureaucracy to manage information flows. Without direction and without a vision to guide it, such a service can lose its way. Providing weekly price data to a nation such as the CAR is not sufficient justification for recommending a public intervention in the area of information.

In today's era, information services must be multimedia environments where radio, video and the printed word each have a role. The radio must have an active rural radio service such as the one that has served Burkina Faso so well over the years. New video technologies have created new possibilities in the use of information to educate target populations.

The printed word, the oft-forgotten stand-by of our grandfather's era, has a role too. Technical information that must be referred to again and again can be supplied inexpensively in printed form to an ever more educated rural population. Journals presenting news of and features about the agricultural and commercial sectors are familiar in the developed world and have been used to good effect in Burkina Faso and, more recently, in Togo

The key to all of these media is journalistic involvement with the people of CAR and the technical issues which concern them. People will read only if there is something interesting to read. People will learn if there is something important to learn. Radio, like video and the printed word, must focus on the common man striving to improve himself, to record what works and what doesn't in his own context. The material can not come out of a central office in Abidjan or in Yaoundé must originate in CAR and reflect its people and its times. In this context, an investment in information systems might be appropriate.

APPENDIX A
LES PRODUITS VIVRIERS

TUBERCULES
- A1 Manioc-cossettes
- A2 Manioc-farine
- A3 Manioc cru
- A4 Manioc frais
- A5 Igname
- A6 Taro
- A7 Patate douce

PLANTAIN
- B Toutes variétés

MIL/SORGHO
- C1 Petit mil
- C2 Petit mil rouge
- C3 Gros mil blanc
- C4 Farine de mil

MAIS
- D1 En èpis
- D2 En farine
- D3 En grain
- D4 Germè
- D5 Pop corn

ARACHIDES
- E1 Gros arachide blanc en coque
- E2 Gros arachide blanc dècortiquè
- E3 Petit arachide rouge en coque
- E4 Petit arachide rouge dècortiquè
- E5 Petit arachide blanc en coque
- E6 Petit arachide blanc dècortiquè
- E7 Pâte d'arachide

RIZ
- F1 Première qualité
- F2 Deuxième qualité

SESAME
- G1 Sésame blanc
- G2 Sésame noir

CONDIMENTS/LEGUMES LOCAUX
- H1 Gumbo frais
- H2 Gumbo sec
- H3 Feuilles de manioc
- H4 Piments
- H5 Onions
- H6 Gousa
- H7 N'gago
- H8 Gboudou
- H9 Koko
- H10 L'ail
- H11 Haricot vert
- H12 Haricot blanc
- H13 Feuilles d'haricot
- H14 Douga
- H15 Karanzanzi
- H16 Kaoya
- H17 Ngbain
- H18 Nguiriki
- H19 Gougou
- H20 Poivre noir
- H21 Thym
- H22 Laurier
- H23 Girofle
- H24 Sel

LEGUMES EXOTIQUES
- J1 Carottes
- J2 Salades laitue
- J3 Poivre vert
- J4 Tomates
- J5 Persil
- J6 Norvet
- J7 Betteraves
- J8 Radis
- J9 Concombres
- J10 Aubergine local
- J11 Aubergine europeene
- J12 Poireaux
- J13 Pommes de terre
- J14 Choux
- J15 Choux-fleur
- J16 Poivron (v,r,j)
- J17 Céleri
- J18 Courges

APPENDIX A (continued)

FRUITS
- K1 Pamplemousses
- K2 Oranges
- K3 Citrons
- K4 Papayes
- K5 Mandarines
- K6 Goyaves
- K7 Corossols
- K8 Ananas
- K9 Manges
- K10 Bananes
- K11 Raisins
- K12 Noix de coco
- K13 Pommes
- K14 Pommes cythère
- K15 Avocat
- K16 Poires
- K17 Clémentine

POISSON
- L1 Toutes variétés

PALME
- M1 Huile de Palme
- M2 Noix de Palme
- M3 Huile d'Njika

APPENDIX B

LES ETHNIES en RCA

1. Ali
2. Banda
3. Bangando
4. Bangi
5. Basiri
6. Bianda
7. Biri
8. Bofi
9. Bokare
10. Budigri
11. Buli
12. Buraka
13. Dagba
14. Dakpa
15. Dendi
16. Djeto
17. Fulbé
18. Gbanu
19. Gbanziri
20. Gbaya
21. Gbendi
22. Gbeya
23. Gobu
24. Gula
25. Hausa
26. Isongo (MBati)
27. Kaba
28. Kaka
29. Kara
30. Kare
31. Laka
32. Langba
33. Langbasi
34. Luto
35. Manza
36. MBaï-Vale
37. MBala
38. MBati
39. MBimu
40. MBororo
41. MBré
42. MBum
43. Monzombo
44. Moruba
45. N'Zakara
46. Ndri
47. Ngama
48. Ngambaye
49. Ngao
50. Ngbaka
51. Ngbaka-Manza
52. Ngbugu
53. Ngundi
54. Pambia
55. Pana
56. Pande
57. Pygmées
58. Runga
59. Sango
60. Sara
61. Sudanais
62. Suma
63. Tali
64. Tambago
65. Togbo
66. Valé
67. Vidri
68. Yakoma
69. Yakpa
70. Yangere
71. Zaïrois
72. Zandé

APPENDIX C - MAYOR'S MARKET STUDY

PRODUITS VIVRIERS	CENTRAL	LAKOUANGA	COMBATTANTS	SAMBO 1	SICA II	GABONGO	KASSAI	NGBENGUEWE	SAIDOU	SAMBO II	TOTAL	POURCENTAG
Manioc en cossettes	17	14	21	20		35	20	15		27	169	2.36
Manioc humide		9	22								31	0.43
Manioc cru			55		10			7		6	78	1.09
Ignames											0	0.00
Arachides	6			70		23	25		8		132	1.84
Arachides decortique		81						20	5	123	229	3.19
Arachides en cocque		21									21	0.29
Huile d'arachide				10		21	13		8	12	64	0.89
Pate d'arachide			20							23	43	0.60
Arachides grillees	1					10	9		4		24	0.33
Riz								10	2	18	30	0.42
Mais		3	27							17	47	0.66
Mais grain			26							4	30	0.42
Mais farine			6					8		10	24	0.33
Mais huile											0	0.00
Cereales											0	0.00
Plaintain	33	22	19		2						76	1.06
Legumes	151	31	396	42	33	105	55	63	40	103	1019	14.21
Oignons	12	5	20							49	86	1.20
Tomates			156					12	7	50	225	3.14
Patates								4		29	33	0.46
Courges			12			50	20			26	108	1.51
Pomme de terre				15						3	18	0.25
Salade								5		15	20	0.28
Melon			2							4	6	0.08
Koko		17	13							7	37	0.52
Concombre										5	5	0.07
Pomme citère										30	30	0.42
Piments										31	31	0.43
Gombo										39	39	0.54
Huile de Palme	9	16	49	15	8	26	5	13	2	54	197	2.75
Noix de palme											0	0.00
Bananes douces						2				10	12	0.17
Oranges	24		97					10		20	151	2.11
Papayes										19	19	0.26
Citron										22	22	0.31
Denrees alimentaires	97	46	263		69						70	0.98
Oeufs	4										4	0.06
AUTRES TRANSFORMATIO												
Pains	21	4	4	8	2				14	10	63	0.88
Beignets	7				7	20	15			17	66	0.92
Bouilles	3	1	27		2	11	5	7	4	17	77	1.07
Camembert indigene										8	8	0.11
Gargotes	11		10		2						23	0.32
Cafeterias	20	3	23		5	7	20		11	19	108	1.51
Boissons indigenes	12		42								54	0.75
Boissons industrille	6		6								12	0.17
Moulins		5	10			3	6				24	0.33
Moulier											0	0.00
AUTRES PRODUITS DE B												
Boucheries	59	4	59	10	12	16	5	16	4	7	192	2.68
Viandes bocanees	23	3	5		1	8	7	7			54	0.75
Cabris	12										12	0.17
Volailles										12	12	0.17
Tortaux volailles											0	0.00
Chauve souris											0	0.00
Chenilles			25								25	0.35
Poissonnerie	6										6	0.08

APPENDIX C (continued)

	CENTRAL	LAKOUANGA	COMBATTANTS	SAMBO I	SICA II	GABONGO	KASSAI	NGBENGUEUE	SAIDOU	SAMBO II	TOTAL	POURCENTAG
Poisson frais	38	4									42	0.59
Poissons fumes	24	7									31	0.43
Crevettes			16		3	5	8	7		4	43	0.60
Cafe decortiquee			10								10	0.14
Cafe en poudre			7								7	0.10
Sel		11	5	10		8	25	6	10	44	119	1.66
Chicouangue	25	7	29			10		12	13		96	1.34
Feuilles d'emballage		6	14					3			23	0.32
Tabac indigene			4								4	0.06
Charbon		2	1								3	0.04
Natron				11						25	36	0.50
Bois			1			6	5			2	14	0.20
Planches											0	0.00
Socs	11										11	0.15
Savons	12	6	9	5		15	8		5	40	100	1.39
Nattes				5						15	20	0.28
SECTEUR NON-AGRICOLE												
Kiosques		12	28	12	14	13	15	8	6	6	114	1.59
Depot	38	10				20					68	0.95
Fripperie			20								20	0.28
Habillement	93		1	85						40	219	3.05
Coupons				65						149	214	2.98
Tailleurs			3							21	24	0.33
Chausseurs	56	2	14			15	10			13	110	1.53
Cordonniers			5						3	7	15	0.21
Quincaillerie	34		22		2					14	72	1.00
Grandes assiettes										30	30	0.42
Forgerons	6										6	0.08
Pharmacie	14		3							8	25	0.35
Bijouteries	3									3	6	0.08
Livres	2									15	17	0.24
Beaute			6			15	6			6	33	0.46
Chouiateries	12	3	29	25					4	17	90	1.26
Divers	28	9	850	45			60	108		50	1180	16.46
Divers (nouirihi)										45	45	0.63
Lunettes	44										44	0.61
Cassettes										5	5	0.07
Goulets	23										23	0.32
Yaourt											0	0.00
Produits enfants											0	0.00
TOTAL	997	364	2502	453	172	444	342	341	150	1405	7170	100.00

APPENDIX C (continued)

	OUANGO	KOKOLO	FETEVO	MBAIKI	BOY RABE	MUSTAPHA	MISKINE	NGAKA	LANGBASSI	YAPELE	TOTAL	POURCENTAG
PRODUITS VIVRIERS												
Manioc en cossettes	50	47	22	13	20	20	20	26	3	16	237	4.79
Manioc humide	0	15									15	0.30
Manioc cru	8	20				4					32	0.65
Ignames		1									1	0.02
Arachides	0	77					25				102	2.06
Arachides decortique	30					30		10	1		71	1.43
Arachides en cocque	0										0	0.00
Huile d'arachide	10				6		3				19	0.38
Pate d'arachide	0	14							4	6	24	0.49
Arachides grillees	0		1	1		3				1	6	0.12
Riz	0							1		1	2	0.04
Mais	20		8	31	7	4					70	1.41
Mais grain	20										20	0.40
Mais farine	0	4				8		3			15	0.30
Mais huile	0										0	0.00
Cereales				4							4	0.08
Plaintain	5	79	17	31			10	12		7	161	3.25
Legumes	50		15		50	27		23		16	181	3.66
Oignons	16	5									21	0.42
Tomates	30	20			11	16		5			82	1.66
Patates	25					8					33	0.67
Courges	7	7					19				33	0.67
Pomme de terre	0										0	0.00
Salade	0										0	0.00
Melon	0										0	0.00
Koko	0		24			12	50				86	1.74
Concombre											0	0.00
Pomme citère											0	0.00
Piments						5					5	0.10
Gombo		60		11		4	12				87	1.76
Huile de Palme	10	28	15	32	4	7	22	7	3	5	133	2.69
Noix de palme						4	4				8	0.16
Bananes douces	0					2	12	4			18	0.36
Oranges	7	16		38	9		20	4	3	2	99	2.00
Papayes											0	0.00
Citron						5		1			6	0.12
Denrees alimentaires	40	120	70	163	60			44	5	43	545	11.01
Oeufs	0			4							4	0.08
AUTRES TRANSFORMATIO												
Pains	11	3	5	3	10	2	3	2	5	4	48	0.97
Beignets		2		11	10	5	16	1	4	3	52	1.05
Ecuilles		6	3	7	7	1	9	1		4	38	0.77
Camembert indigene											0	0.00
Gargotes		2		6							8	0.16
Cafeterias	15			3	5	3	4	3	5	3	41	0.83
Boissons indigenes		1									1	0.02
Boissons industrielle											0	0.00
Moulins		16	4	6		4		3	1	2	36	0.73
Moulier				5							5	0.10
AUTRES PRODUITS DE B												
Boucheries	4		7	79	4	4	13	4		3	118	2.38
Viandes boucaees		30	6	30	5		30	5		1	107	2.16
Cabris											0	0.00
Voleilles				12							12	0.24
Tortaux volailles				8							8	0.16
Chauve souris		1									1	0.02
Chenilles	30	68				6	15				119	2.41
Poissonnerie				7			1				8	0.16

APPENDIX C (continued)

	OUANGO	KOKOLO	FETEVO	MBAIKI	BOY RABE	MUSTAPHA	MISKINE	NGBAKA	LANGBASSI	YAPELE	TOTAL	POURCENTAG
Poisson frais				27							27	0.55
Poissons fumes		6	9	58	6	5	20	11		5	120	2.43
Crevettes		4									4	0.08
Cafe decortiquee		7	4	1			10				22	0.44
Cafe en poudre		7			4		8				19	0.38
Sel	60	12	6	10		7	13				108	2.18
Chicouangue	16	1	3	12	8			1	6	3	50	1.01
Feuilles d'emballage		22					53				75	1.52
Tabac indigene		7	3	4		4					18	0.36
Charbon											0	0.00
Natron											0	0.00
Bois											0	0.00
Planches		81									81	1.64
Sacs				13							13	0.26
Savons		8	8	33		12		6	2		69	1.39
Nattes		19									19	0.38
SECTEUR NON-AGRICOLE												
Kiosques	12	10	28	54	21	4	10	2	10	5	156	3.15
Depot		1									1	0.02
Fripperie	16	20	9	123	2		41	2			213	4.30
Habillement				421							421	8.51
Coupons											0	0.00
Tailleurs				2		1					3	0.06
Chausseurs			6	254							260	5.25
Cordonniers	4	1		8							13	0.26
Quincaillerie		1		37			25				63	1.27
Grandes assiettes		1									1	0.02
Forgerons				3							3	0.06
Pharmacie		2									2	0.04
Bijouteries				3							3	0.06
Livres		2		27							29	0.59
Beaute	7	3		33			13				56	1.13
Chouisteries	5	1				2	3	2	2	3	18	0.36
Divers	80	45	4	70		47	90				336	6.79
Divers (nguirikii)											0	0.00
Lunettes	2			4							6	0.12
Cassettes											0	0.00
Goulets											0	0.00
Yaourt		7									7	0.14
Produits enfants							10				10	0.20
TOTAL	590	910	277	1702	249	266	584	163	54	133	4948	100.00

APPENDIX D
PRIX DES PRODUITS SUR LES DIFFERENTES CATEGORIES DE DENREES

A.	BOUCHERIE	
	Viande de boucherie	1 kg à 1,000F
	Tripes ou abats	1 kg à 500F
B.	PRODUITS DE CHASSE	
	Viande fraiche	1 morceau à 1,500F
	Viande boucané	1 morceau à 2,000F
C.	PETIT BETAIL SUR PIED	
	Cabri	13,000 à 15,000F
	Mouton	20,000F
	Cochon	50 kg à 80,000F
	Autres bêtes domestiques	2,500 à 3,000F
D.	VOLAILLE	
	Poulets	1,800 à 2,000F
	Canard	2,500F
	Autres oiseaux	2,500F, 1,000F, 500F
	Oeufs	100F chaque
E.	PRODUITS DE PECHE	
	Poissons frais	1,500F, 2,000F, 3,500F
	Poissons fumés	1,800F 2,500F
	Tas de frétins (sardines frais)	200F
	Tas de frétins (sardines fumés)	100F
F.	CEREALES ET FECULENTS	
	Manioc (roussage en gros)	---
	Manioc (roussage en détail)	---
	Manioc en sac, cuvette ou panier	25,000F, 3,000F, 2,500F
	Manioc en seau de 5l à 10l	350F
	Manioc en frine (assiette mesure)	3,000F
	Tubercule de manioc en tas	100F
	Bananes plantins (régime)	1,500F à 2,000F
	Bananes en tranche détail	200F
	Mais (épis ou graines) en sac	2,700F
	Mais (épis ou grains) en détail	100F
	Ignames en sac, cuvette, panier	1,000F en panier
	Ignames en détail	500F
	Taro en sac, cuvette, panier	500F le panier
	Taro en détail	200F
	Courge en sac, cuvette, panier	6,000F, 2,000F
	Courge en détail	100F
	Riz en sac, cuvette, panier	6,000F, 2,000F
	Riz en détail	100F
	Wandjo (gbakoro)	
	-- en sac, cuvette, panier	8,000F
	Wandjo frais ou cuit en détail	1,000F, 100F
	Arachide (coque graines)	
	-- sac, cuvette, panier	36,000F le sac

APPENDIX D (continued)

F.	CEREALES ET FECULENTS (cont.)	
	Arachide (coque gaines) en détail	8,000F la cuvette
	Arachide en pate	50F, 25F
	Racines de ronier	
	-- (frais ou cuit) détail	30F, 25F, 15F
G.	LEGUMES ET CONDIMENTS	
	Feuille de manioc en botte	100F, 50F
	Feuille de Karakanzi	100F, 50F
	Feuille de Ngago	100F, 50F
	Feuille de Goussa	100F, 50F
	Feuille de melon "Kaoya"	100F, 50F
	Feuille de Gboudou	100F, 50F
	Feuille de Ngbain	100F, 50F
	Gombo en détail	200F, 100F, 50F
	Ngériki en detail	200F, 150F, 50F, 25F
	Canne à sucre	100F, 150F, 50F, 25F
	Persil	50F, 25F
	Norvet	25F
	Betteraves	25F
	Radis	50F
	Concombre	50F
	Chou	500F
	Aubergine	500F
	Salade laitue	100F
	Tomates	500F
	Feuille de laurier	200F
	Poireau	500F
	Pimet frais ou en poudre	299F
	Douga	100F
	Natron en sac, cuvette, panier	25,000F le sac
	Natron en détail	100F
	Dadawan la boulette	50F
	Oignons en seau, cuvette, panier	2,000F le seau
	Oignons en détail	100F
	Huile de palme en détail	400 F le litre
H.	FRUITS	
	Frruits verte en véhicule	100F le sac
	Avocat en gros	500F le tas
	Avocat en détail	50F
	Ananas en gros	200F
	Ananas en détail	200F
	Bananes douces en gros	1,000F le régime
	Bananes douces en détail	100F
	Mandarines en gros	
	Mandarines en détail	
	Mangues en gros	30F
	Mangues en détail	
	Noix de coco en gros	
	Noix de coco en détail	100F, 200F
	Pommes cythère en gros	
	Pommes cythère en détail	25F à 50F
	Pampplemouse en gros	

APPENDIX D (continued)

H.	FRUITS (cont.)	
	Pamplemouse en détail	40F
	Papaye en gros	
	Papaye en détail	200F
	Oranges en gros	
	Oranges en détail	100F le tas
	Goyaves en ggros	
	Goyaves en détail	100F le tas
	Kola en gros	
	Kola en détail	50F à 100F
	Noix de palme	
	-- et autres fruits sauvages	25F
	Citron	25F
I.	GARGOTTES, RESTAURATION, CAFETERIA	
	Repas, cuisson à l'eau ou roti	250F
	Repas à la grillade	150F
	Boissons modernes	---
	-- et autres produits glacés	150F à 250F
	Mouleau de glace	800F
	Boissons locales	
	Hydromel	100F, 75F le calie
	Bière de mil	50F
	Bière de mais	50F
	Vin de palme	175
	Alcool de fraite	500F le litre
	Cidre de piment	50F
	Gateaux	25F, 50F
	Pains	75F
	Galettes ou beignets	10F, 25F
	Thè, café, Nescao et autres	50F
	Michoui	100F, etc.
	Chikouangue	25F, 50F
	Bouille	50F
J.	ALIMENTS DIVERS	
	Huitre	100F
	Escargots	200F
	Chenille	100F
	Termites ailés	100F
	Termites à pinces	100F
K.	MATERIAUX LOCAUX DE CONSTRUCTIUON ET AUTRES	
	Briques parpines	15F, 25F
	Bottes de paille	500F
	Tuiles de bambou	500F
	Bois de constructions	1,500F
L.	MATERIAUX MODERNE DE CONSTRUCTION ET AUTRES	
	Briques "agglomerés"	150F
	Grilles portaille	
	-- et objets de ferronnerie	30,000F environ
	Bois ou planches de sciage	1,500, etc.

APPENDIX D (continued)

M. ARTISANAT	
Tailleur	1,500 le pantalon
Coiffeur	250F etc.
Coordonier	500F etc.
Objets de forge	200F etc.
Objets de poterie	800F etc.
Réparation montres	1,000F etc.
Réparation cyclomoteurs	2,000F etc.
Pneumatiques	300F, etc.
Berceau	15,000F etc.
Meubles et matières liteie	12,000F etc.
Nattes, chapeaux et autres	1,500F etc.
N. MATERIELS DE MENAGE	
Bois de chauffage en gros	2,000 F etc.
Bois de chauffage en détail	50F
Charbons de bois en gros	2,000F le sac
Charbons de bois en détail	100F
Balais	75F
Moulin à manioc	suivant la quantité
Marchandises diverses	---
Effets d'habillement	---
Instruments musique	---
Tabac à priser	100F

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