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LAND AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY
IN POST-WAR MOZAMBIQUE:
A VIEW FROM MANICA PROVINCE

by

Jocelyn Alexander
Oxford University



LAND
TENURE
CENTER

An Institute for Research and Education
on Social Structure, Rural Institutions,
Resource Use and Development

Land Tenure Center
1357 University Avenue
University of Wisconsin-Madison
Madison, Wisconsin 53715

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Land and Political Authority in Post-War Mozambique: A View from Manica Province¹

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An important test of the Mozambican peace will lie in the extent to which participation and reconciliation is achieved in the political sphere, and the degree to which people's economic aspirations are recognized and realized. For Mozambique's largely rural population, secure access to land and services, and accountable local institutions will be central issues. There are profound obstacles to achieving such goals. Post-war Mozambique is characterized by a contradictory combination of extreme disruptions, and continuities in older patterns of domination and inequality: while the recent history of armed conflict, migration, and state intervention has a powerful dynamic of its own, previous decades also weigh heavily on contemporary struggles, and cannot be ignored in current plans for reconstruction.

This study seeks to explore the legacy of war and state intervention for land access and local authority in areas of Sussundenga, Barue and Macossa Districts, all located in Manica Province. It expands on earlier research in Manica which, largely for reasons of security, has focused on areas under government control, within or near the Beira Corridor.² Though variable, areas outside the central districts of Manica and Gondola have generally received less private and state investment and have felt the consequences of war differently, and usually more directly. They have been a source, not recipient, of migrants and displaced people and are the 'areas of origin' to which displaced people are expected to return. Including Renamo-controlled zones within the scope of study is particularly important as large areas of the central provinces are outside the direct control of the government. Renamo administered zones are among the most devastated by war, and tend to be areas of colonial neglect and extraction. They have distinct political and administrative structures, as well as particular constraints to production.

¹ The research on which this report is based was funded by the Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin-Madison. The Land Tenure Center has an ongoing research project with the Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture. Greg Myers, director of the LTC project in Mozambique, and Harry West provided much appreciated support and advice during both research and writing.

² With regard to the themes under consideration here, see especially the Manica Province research of Chingono, 1993; Baptista Lundin, 1992, "Relatorio"; Myers and West, 1993.

Research was undertaken from September to December, 1993. Interviews were carried out with a range of officials in the ministries and departments of State Administration, Agriculture, Dinageca and Physical Planning; administrative and political representatives of Renamo were also consulted. The bulk of time was spent interviewing chiefs, local leaders of political parties, district administrative and agricultural officials and others in the rural areas of Sussundenga, Barue and Macossa. I relied on the translation and research skills of Erasmo Nhachungue and Herbert Sithole in the government held areas of Sussundenga and Barue, and of Leo Chikodzi in Renamo-controlled Macossa. The research was helped greatly by the guidance of Maria Augusto Joanisi in Sussundenga and Declinda Fulete Depangaro and Chamo Sixpence in Catandica, seconded from the district offices of the Ministry of Agriculture.

The first section of the paper focuses on settlement patterns, tenure rights, and population movements in the former Sussundenga Colonato, drawing comparisons to areas of Macossa and Barue. It explores how repeated state interventions and forced movements have created a range of claims to land which are strongly shaped in the current period by an official commitment to private agricultural investment and continued political insecurity. Drawing on a wider debate in government, opposition and academic circles, the second section addresses ideas about and structures of local authority, particularly 'traditional' authority. It explores implications for the relationship between central and local levels of the state, and the role of local authorities in political reconstruction.

I. Land: Legacies of War and State Intervention

Mozambican history as a whole is marked by massive movements of people in search of better opportunities, in flight from war and coercion, and in response to colonial and post-independence state interventions. Manica Province is no exception. At present, people as well as private and state sector investment are concentrated in the central districts of Manica and Gondola through which the Beira Corridor passes. This concentration reflects the preponderance of colonial investment in these areas, the great extent to which post-independence state investment reproduced this pattern, as well as the movements and destruction which followed from the most recent war: the corridor's relative safety made it a haven for people from surrounding districts and a relatively safe place for investment. In the post-war period, Renamo's continued control over large areas of the province, and the destruction of infrastructure therein, has sustained these patterns to a significant extent. Thus private applications for land have fallen largely in or near Manica and Gondola Districts, in areas which were previously held by state or colonial interests, and these two districts remain more densely populated than their neighbors.³

Outside the center of the province, private sector activity is much less significant and population densities lighter. Thus Macossa, entirely under Renamo control, has an estimated population density of only two people per square kilometer; it has no state agricultural investment and no recorded land concessions to the private sector, the only private activity

³ See Appendix 1.

being a timber concession to the Mozambican Impex company near Nhamagua.⁴ Barue is also relatively lightly populated (14 people per square kilometer), and falls partly under Renamo control; state agricultural investment is minimal and district records reveal private applications for a total of just over 2,000 hectares, and this almost entirely the initiative of a single individual in a particularly fertile area.⁵

In these two districts, competition for land from the private sector is at present relatively scant. The future may, however, be different. Local officials warned that some individuals were trying to establish exclusive, if unofficial, rights to abandoned colonial farms near Catandica, many of which had families resident on them. These aspirant landholders fell into two fairly porous categories: employees of the state and businessmen of local origin or from the urban centers of Chimoio or Beira, and 'family' farmers who had the capacity to expand their agricultural production.⁶ It is also an area into which large numbers of refugees and displaced people are returning, as discussed further below, possibly heralding conflict over land between these groups and private interests.

Sussundenga District, however, presents a more complicated picture in terms of private competition for land and the history of state intervention. The northern half of the district is largely under government control; its proximity to the corridor, and the existence of previous colonial and post-independence state investment has drawn private sector interest on a substantial scale. The following discussion focuses on the area of the former Sussundenga Colonato, an area which is illustrative of both the extreme disruptions of war and state intervention, and the powerful continuities which nonetheless shape current competition for land.

A. The Sussundenga Colonato: Background

The Sussundenga Colonato, located in the fertile and well-watered north western corner of Sussundenga District, was established as a Portuguese settler scheme in the early

⁴ Interview, District Director for Agriculture (DDA), Barue District, Catandica, 7/9/94; Administrator, Macossa District (Government), Catandica, 6/10/93. The DDA, Barue, reported that a South African enterprise had sought a hunting concession in Macossa in mid-1993 but had been refused by Renamo. Timber companies also faced considerable difficulties in September 1993, but Renamo finally agreed to allow access in exchange for the payment of 'tax' (in addition to fees paid to the government). The difficulty of operating in Renamo areas has been reported extensively in the national press; discussions with businessmen revealed that they often had to undergo lengthy negotiations in Maringue, the headquarters of Renamo, before being allowed to operate.

⁵ The 2,000 hectare concession, to one Farai Filimone Dzindua, is located in the Nhacapanga area of Choa, on the Zimbabwean border. Two other concessions, of 10 and 15 hectares respectively, were also recorded. Interview by Erasmo Nhachungue, Administrator, Barue District, Catandica, 10/11/93.

⁶ Interview, DDA, Barue District, Catandica, 7/9/93.

1960s.⁷ The colonial government cleared the land, constructed roads and water supplies, and built a house and warehouse for each farm. Machinery such as tractors and harvesters were made available to settlers; each settler was provided with the labor of eight workers free of charge for two years. Following a two year grace period, the costs incurred were to be paid back (in part) by the settlers, something which few succeeded in doing despite concessionary terms.⁸ In addition to Portuguese settlers, Africans were allowed conditional tenure on smaller farms in and near the colonato as so-called *pequenas empresas*, a policy whose justification lay in a desire to 'modernize' and increase African production through exposure to European methods.⁹

Prior to the establishment of the colonato, the land was occupied by members of the Ganda, Buapua, Xau and Cupenha chieftaincies, people whose relations with the Portuguese regime had previously focused on the latter's desire to extract taxes and labor. These families were, in some instances, forced to vacate the land they occupied, sometimes incorporated as tenant labor, and sometimes allowed to live within the colonato in the uncleared areas of land which lay at the margins of surveyed farms. As in many areas of Portuguese settler farming, the settlers' lack of capital and expertise, and their need for labor, protected previous inhabitants from wholesale eviction. Moreover, chiefly families were given land in designated areas of the colonato.

Those who remained within the colonato (including chiefs) were required to give up their livestock, and to cultivate a distance of 2 kilometers from the settler farmers, conditions justified in terms of the supposed propensities of Africans to theft and of their animals and crops to disease. The establishment of the colonato was recalled with anger and fear:

When the Portuguese made the farms, they moved people even if they had a brick house, even if they had mango and many other fruit trees. They had to go away with no payment.

When the Portuguese came to live, they said, 'this place is my place, you have to move'. People were very frightened and moved [out] to the mountains.¹⁰

⁷ Other sites of concentrated colonial settlement and production within Sussundenga District included areas surrounding the Bonde River (Mupandeia), Rotanda, and Dombe. Farms totalling approximately 18,000 hectares were surveyed in the colonial period. See Appendix 2.

⁸ Interview, DDA, Sussundenga District, Sussundenga Sede, 18/0/93.

⁹ See Borges Coehlo, 1993, Chapter 4, on the philosophy behind state support for white settler schemes in this period, and changes in policy toward African agriculture.

¹⁰ Interview, Ganda, Matica Locality, 28/10/93; Buapua, 3 de Fevereiro, 27/10/93, respectively. Interviews were usually with groups of people ranging from five to twenty, including local Frelimo secretaries, chiefs and others. In government areas, interviews were arranged with the help of district Ministry of Agriculture and Administration officials. Footnote references in the text refer only to the chieftaincy, location and date of the interview. The identity or office of interviewees is given in the text where it bears on the information

Many in fact moved to the mountainous areas to the south and west of the colonato, employing a familiar tactic of evasion, rather than comply with the restrictions and demands of the settlers.¹¹

The area of Sussundenga Sede and the colonato sustained only limited attack during the war for independence. Though there were sporadic contacts with guerrillas in outlying areas of the district in 1973 and 1974, *aldeamentos* (protected villages) were not established by the Portuguese nor were liberated areas established by guerrillas. Guerrilla activity was largely limited to mobilization and sabotage.¹² The war, and its conclusion, brought dramatic change nonetheless, as the vast majority of Portuguese settlers left the district. In the area of the Sussundenga Colonato, only two remained in place: Eugenio Augusto Nobre and Matias Farinha Alves, both with holdings located on the southern border of the colonato.

From 1976, much of the former colonato was converted into state farms and *aldeias comunais* (communal villages). Three state enterprises fell within the colonato: the Estacao de Experimentacao Agraria do Instituto Nacional de Investagacao Agraria (INIA), a research station situated in the Locality of Matica; '5 de Novembro', Unidade de Producao da Policia Popular de Mocambique (PPM), situated in the Locality of Sussundenga Sede; and, by far the largest enterprise, the Empresa Agricola de Sussundenga.¹³

Aldeias comunais were established in much of the district in 1979 and 1980. A controversial and ambitious component of Frelimo's rural policies, the *aldeias* were intended to concentrate settlement so as to improve the delivery of services, and to allow a transition

or opinion.

¹¹ Account of evictions based on Interviews, Cupenha, Muzoria, 25 and 26/10/93; Buapua, 3 de Fevereiro, 27/10/93; Ganda, Matica Locality, 28/10/93; President of Matica Locality Executive Council, Nhambamba I, 3/11/93.

¹² Frelimo opened the Manica and Sofala Front in July 1972, under the command of Fernando Matavele (alias Dick Tongane). The vast majority of fighting was concentrated north of the Pungue River, though a southern sector was opened in early 1973 under the command of John Jehovah. The main base for this sector was at Mavonde; sub-bases were established in 1973 and 1974 in the areas of Pungue, Vanduzi, Gondola, Mavita, Rotanda, Macate, Mussangaze and Goigoi. The number and scale of attacks in Sussundenga were, however, limited. Interviews, Manuel Sassita, Lambion Romao Ferrao, Francisco Manjasse and other members of the Associacao dos Combatentes da Luta da Libertacao Nacional na Provincia de Manica, Chimoio, 13,15,18/10/93. Also see Borges Coelho, 1993.

¹³ The latter was part of the GDR supported '120,000' hectare scheme. It had approximately 1,700 hectares of arable land. See Myers, West and Eliseu, 1993, Appendix 12, p. 186. Other state enterprises included a large IFLOMA estate (8,208 hectares) established in the Rotanda area, and an enterprise in the Dombe area, both of these also maintaining colonial patterns of agricultural investment.

to collective production, among other things.¹⁴ Within the colonato, many *aldeias* were sited within land formerly designated for *pequenas empresas*, displacing this group of colonial era African farmers. The labor needs of the state farms (over 600 workers) also affected the location of *aldeias*, with the goal of facilitating the provision of labor.¹⁵ These policies resulted in the movement of people who had been evicted from the colonato or evicted to the margins of farms within the colonato, back into central areas, this time in concentrated, state-planned settlements. In some cases production co-operatives were initiated in tandem with the villages; in others, residents (both locals and people recruited elsewhere) worked on state farms. In the majority, however, production continued to be organized on a family basis, even where other forms of production co-existed.

The interventions of the post-independence state thus initiated potentially dramatic changes in the settlement and production patterns of the late colonial period. However, these were in many cases shortlived, or never achieved, for a variety of reasons. Here I focus on the role which war played in re-shaping state agrarian policies, particularly that of the *aldeias comunais*.

B. Renamo: War and the Aldeias in Northern Sussundenga

The symbolic and physical presence of the state were central targets for Renamo's rural war: *aldeias* were an obvious and vulnerable object of attack. In Sussundenga, Renamo attacks produced transformations in many ways more dramatic than those resulting from nascent government policies. Attacks spread in southern and western Sussundenga in 1979 and 1980. They intensified dramatically, severely limiting government control, in 1982 and 1983.¹⁶ As discussed in more detail below, people initially gathered in outlying *postos administrativos*; as the war worsened, many of those living in Dombe, south of the sede, moved north. Others went further afield to Chimoio or Vila Manica, or crossed the border into nearby Zimbabwe. I focus on the devastating impact which war had on *aldeias*, before turning to state and private farms.

Today, many *aldeias* exist in little more than name: attacks often provoked their abandonment, sometimes within one or two years of their initiation. In some instances, people could only point to a cleared piece of land as evidence that an *aldeia* had ever existed. People returned to dispersed settlement patterns, or re-grouped in new areas, sometimes both

¹⁴ For further discussion of the political aspects of this policy see below. Also see *inter alia* Borges Coelho, 1995; Casal, 1988, and, in the context of Manica Province, Raposo, 1991. See Frelimo, 1976, pp. 77-97, for an early official elaboration of the goals and methods of implementation of *aldeias comunais*.

¹⁵ See Myers, West and Eliseu, 1993, Appendix 12, p. 186; Myers and West, 1993, pp. 11, 15-17.

¹⁶ See Vines, 1991, on the pre-1980 expansion of Renamo from bases in Rhodesia and Gorongosa, the severe set-backs in mid-1980 with Zimbabwean independence and the transfer of Renamo to South Africa, and the rapid re-expansion of Renamo attacks and areas of control (to levels never before achieved) in late 1980 and 1981.

in rapid succession. Rather than being perceived as a development intervention, *aldeias* were almost universally understood as, and in practice often were, counter-insurgency measures: they were in some cases described as continuations of Portuguese *aldeamentos*, and were regularly seen as having purely military goals and benefits. For example, people from an *aldeia* south of Munhinga described their experience in the following terms:

The *aldeias* were first introduced by the Portuguese. Frelimo was then saying don't move to these villages. So, we were surprised after independence to see Frelimo moving people into villages. Frelimo had the same objective: to control people, to keep them together, to hear what they say.¹⁷

The term 'aldeia' was commonly used to describe any government supported concentrated settlement. Thus people talked of the problems of living in *aldeias*, referring successively to rural villages, and then to settlements in administrative *sedes* to which they subsequently moved in flight from war.

A few examples will serve to illustrate the variable histories and legacies of *aldeias*. These views were expressed by elders and party leaders; none had lived under Renamo control and, however critical they were of government policies (see Section II), they invariably experienced Renamo as a wholly destructive force whose agents were intent on theft, abduction, forced labor and killing. Questions about Renamo mobilization were greeted with derision and surprise, as exemplified in the following responses:

The Matsangas [the local name for Renamo] never talked with people. They just stole food and kidnapped people. When you hear guns, you just run.

The Matsangas only organize destruction.

Matsanga only arrived to kill and fight, there was no time for talking. People always tried to hide from them, always ran. Matsanga killed many people, and made no distinction between men, women, children and the old. They took everyone, many died in their bases...

Renamo doesn't talk to anyone. If they find you at home, they only steal your things, only rob. They only kill animals and force you to carry them away. Everything they do is by force. They have no time to talk to simple people like us.¹⁸

Northern Sussundenga had too large a government military presence, and sufficiently efficient communications, to allow Renamo control. Instead, it comprised an area of predatory

¹⁷ Interview, Chikwizo, Sussundenga Sede, 30/9/93. Also see Baptista Lundin, 1992, "Relatorio," pp. 51-2 for the expression of similar sentiments in other areas of Manica and Sofala.

¹⁸ Comments from, respectively, Buapua, 3 de Fevereiro, 27/10/93; Cupenha, Munhinga, 27/10/93; Mavita, Mouha, 28/10/93; Ganda, Matica Locality, 3/11/93.

destruction.¹⁹

In areas outside the better protected colonato, *aldeias* had a particularly short life, and even their security function was minimal. This account came from the area of Chikwizo, southeast of Munhinga:

The *aldeia* started in 1977. The huts were built and then destroyed before anyone moved into them.... The *aldeias* had no schools, no clinics, no water, nothing. These couldn't be provided because Renamo attacked so quickly -- even now that area is inside the Renamo zone. People first ran away...at night, and slept in the forests. But then it became unbearable. Frelimo sent trucks and tractors to evacuate everyone in 1980. Only a few people stayed there.²⁰

The evacuation brought people to Sussundenga Sede, where they were allocated cleared plots of land and given material support by government and NGOs. These people were unable to return to their homes for the duration of the war; as discussed further below, many still reside in the Sede.

Residents of *aldeias* initiated in 1980 in the area of Mouha had a different experience. These *aldeias* were occupied in a symbolic manner. 'Residents' built houses and lit fires within the *aldeia* to signify their compliance with the policy but, as one person put it, "our lives were in our homes": animals were not kept in the *aldeias*, fields were not moved, and previous houses were kept intact.²¹ As in Chikwizo, it was war, rather than government policy, which forced the more dramatic adoption of new forms of settlement and production:

Renamo attacked here several times [in 1982 and 1983] -- it was worse to be in the *aldeia* than alone in the bush. Renamo killed many people here. They burned the houses.... They attacked at night and in the day. The *chefe de posto* went to live at the mine [located to the north east, and protected by government troops], and people left to the mine, to [Vila] Manica, to Chimoio, to Zimbabwe. Some people stayed here but not in the *aldeia*, only far in the bush. Everyone had left the *aldeia* by 1985. They would spend the night in the bush, not in their [pre-*aldeia*] house -- no one could stay in their house. You could only talk in a whisper. The wife and children had to leave the house at three to stay in the bush. The man stayed at home to hide the chickens -- they would be put in a big hole covered with grass and branches so that Matsanga wouldn't find anything.

¹⁹ See discussions of Renamo controlled areas below. For distinctions between 'control' and 'destruction' areas in the literature on Renamo see Gersony, 1988; Vines, 1991, pp. 91-7.

²⁰ Interview, Chikwizo, Sussundenga Sede, 30/9/93.

²¹ This symbolic compliance was also mentioned in areas of Munhinga, Interview, Cupenha, Munhinga, 27/10/93, and has been documented elsewhere by Geffray, 1991, pp. 128-9; Raposo, 1991.

Production was transformed as the time which could be spent in fields was limited and as many active members of the labor force fled in order to avoid attack or abduction. Insecurity required other innovations such as hiding animals and increased male labor at times of vulnerability to attack. Here, *aldeias* were considered a liability, not a positive development in security terms. Though the nearby government military presence ensured Renamo did not gain control of the area, it was not secure from attack and the *aldeia* was a prime target. Safety was found in flight or dispersal, strategies which were long tried, having been developed in response to colonial demands for tax and labor, and which were particularly effective in this mountainous and heavily forested area.²²

Aldeias established close to Sussundenga Sede, or close to well guarded strategic sites, were affected by war less, or later. Those in the vicinity of the Revue electricity generator, south of Macate, for example, were relatively successfully protected from attack, and survived the war largely intact. Here, *aldeias* were established in 1980, at the same time as an **intensification of Renamo attacks**. According to one account:

The *aldeia* was a military measure. If you lived outside, you could be killed by Renamo. The Frelimo army thought we could be protected by living close together.... This *aldeia* was lucky because it was surrounded by other *aldeias*. There were only two attacks, and only one person was killed.²³

Other *aldeias* were protected for shorter periods: thus the Buapua (3 de Fevereiro) *aldeia*, established in 1979 in an area from which people had been evicted in the colonial period, was not attacked until 1982. In search of better security, residents moved several kilometers north, to the banks of the Chizizira River. Another attack in 1983 caused most residents to flee again, this time to Sussundenga Sede. While people maintained a residence in the Sede, they were near enough not to lose touch with their earlier homes: they returned to their fields, either spending the night in *macavas* (temporary shelters), or returning to the Sede in the afternoon. Here, once again, people maintained, "Security is the main reason for the *aldeia*":

The government put us in *aldeias* because of the war. The *aldeia* was good when there was war because you could see Matsanga was coming, and people could organize to go away. If you were alone,...if you are far away, Matsanga can attack with pangas and no one will know you have died. If you are alone, they could easily come to your house and take all your chickens and goats and force you to carry them to their base. When you were near their base, they could kill you, or just kick you if you are lucky.

Another advantage of the *aldeia* was that it facilitated aid distribution:

²² Interviews, Ma'ta, Mouha, 28/10/93. In other areas, a refusal to join the *aldeias*, or to flee to towns, was disastrous: residents of Munhinga described how close to 70 people who had refused to join the *aldeia* there, remaining instead scattered in the bush, were kidnapped *en masse* by Renamo. Interview, Cupenha, Munhinga, 27/10/93.

²³ Surrounding *aldeias* and a nearby saw mill were not so lucky. The saw mill and its labor force was moved to Guro after attacks in 1980. Interviews, Muriane, Muriane, 2/11/93.

In the *aldeias* there was a lot of support. We received clothes and tools, and seeds. It was easy to distribute emergency food. If you live alone, far away, you can't easily receive these things.²⁴

Aldeias were seen as inseparable from the exigencies of war, as well as from drought, the latter an increasingly important factor as the 1980s progressed

While better protected, even those *aldeias* near to Sussundenga Sede and between the Sede and the Beira Corridor were eventually threatened. In the northern colonato, they came under increasing attack in the mid-1980s and, in 1988, "People were forced to stay in *macovas*.... Everyone went to Sussundenga when it became very dangerous." The *aldeias* provided benefits in that, "we had support from government and the NGOs for food, clothes, oil, we had schools and a clinic. The *aldeias* were good because they were safer from attack; it was better than staying alone."²⁵

Repeated movements and security threats were highly disruptive. Movements into Sussundenga Sede had a dramatic impact on those already living in its bairros, as newcomers competed for land and services: land shortage was a major complaint for those unable to return to their fields surreptitiously, and the latter condition was far from ideal.²⁶ War also had a devastating impact on transport and trade, cutting off large areas of the district entirely. Some saw the restrictions on trade as a key cost of the war:

Without the war, we could have acquired things.... Before the war, you could sell vegetables in Chimoio, there was no problem to go there and sell things, and to buy soap and salt, and return in one day.²⁷

Marketing and production in the 'family' sector suffered as a result of the war, as well as due to devastating droughts in the mid and late 1980s and early 1990s.²⁸

The production of larger scale units also plummeted. A 1987 government report noted that only three cooperatives, all located in close proximity to Sussundenga Sede, still functioned: 3 de Fevereiro, Nhamarenza and Nhamatiquite.²⁹ Production and physical

²⁴ Interview, Buapua, Xau, 3 de Fevereiro, 27/10/93.

²⁵ Interview, Ganda, Matica Locality, 28/10/93. For more on this area, see the discussion of 'PDRM' villages below.

²⁶ E.g., Interviews, Chikwizo, Sussundenga Sede, 30/9/93.

²⁷ Interview, Chirenje, Mount Dzembe, Gondola District, 4/11/93.

²⁸ See SPPF, 1987; Billings, 1993. The latter also stresses the demise of Agricom, the state marketing board, as a major factor in constraints to marketed production.

²⁹ In 1987, 3 de Fevereiro had one functioning tractor, a motorized pump, two houses and one warehouse. In the 1986/87 season, it produced 2.075 tons of maize and 278.5 kgs. of sesame, as well as a small number of livestock. Nhamarenza, with similar infrastructure and

infrastructure on state farms likewise suffered.³⁰ Drought further undermined production, as did policy changes depriving state farms of credit and other support. The state farms ceased to function entirely in the late 1980s.³¹

The few private farmers also suffered attrition. Matias Alves left the district in 1984, leaving only Augusto Nobre's enterprise. Nonetheless, as the single representative of the private sector, Nobre marketed more agricultural produce than the entire Sussundenga state farm sector in 1987/88, though it was the family sector which dominated marketing.³²

In response to displacement and the collapse of production, a new intervention was undertaken in 1989. Originally mooted in a modified form in 1985, the Manica Province Rural Development Program (PDRM) sought to confront the problems raised by the combination of, first, concentrations of agricultural producers in areas where there was little or no land and, second, the vast areas of fertile land which had been abandoned by family, private, state or other enterprises. The intention of the project as a whole was to move 'deslocados' and 'recuperados' from the Beira Corridor and peri-urban and urban areas back into rural production, and to stimulate rural production and trade more widely by rebuilding

equipment, produced 1.8 tons of maize, 5.3 tons of tobacco, .4 tons of cotton, and a limited number of livestock. Comparable data does not exist for Nhamatiquite, though it seemed less well equipped and productive. See SPPF, 1987.

³⁰ In the 1986/87 year, two of the PPM's three tractors functioned. It produced maize and a small number of livestock. Only one of the research station's three tractors functioned. The Sussundenga state farm was a far larger affair but had similar problems with maintenance. Only 21 of its 42 tractors, 78 of its 125 *maquinas alfaias* (harvesters?), 10 of 11 combines and 8 of 13 trucks functioned. The farm had other machinery, infrastructure, buildings, electricity sources and services, all in various states of disrepair, as well as a work force of 464 men and women. In 1986/7, it produced 865 tons of maize, 33 of sunflower, 12 of mapira, 5 of beans as well as horticultural products and livestock. See SPPF, 1987. The state farm sector in Sussundenga marketed 346 tons of maize, .1 of sunflower, .1 of beans and .1 of mapira in the 1987/88 season. See CEA, 1988, Appendix 2.

³¹ The Sussundenga State Farm was termed *paralizada* in 1991, and divestiture had been underway since 1989. The many reasons for the decline of state enterprises included a lack of technical expertise and management skills; the high investment which had to be made in security; lack of transport, labor and credit; over-centralization of decision making, etc. See Tanner, Myers and Oad, 1993; Myers and West, 1993, pp. 15-21; and, on the fate of the Sussundenga state farm, see Myers, West and Eliseu, 1993, Appendix 12, p. 186, Appendix 13, p. 192, Appendix 19, p. 358.

³² Nobre's estate was reported to be equipped with 3 tractors and 2 motorized pumps in 1987. In the 1986/7 season, he grew maize on 117 hectares and produced 500 head of cattle, 80 pigs and 28 goats. See SPPF, 1987. In 1987/8, Nobre marketed 335 tons of maize, 22 of sunflower, .1 of rice, 2 of beans, 2 of sesame, and 3 of mapira. The family sector marketed 759 tons of maize, 25 of sunflower, 1 of rice, .3 of beans, 10 of sesame, and 5 of mapira. See Agricom figures in Appendix 2 of CEA, 1988.

infrastructure and bolstering security. Under the project, over 20 villages were created, located in Sussundenga, Gondola and Manica Districts. The project was funded and implemented by Cooperacao Italiana (the Italian equivalent of the British ODA or American USAID) in conjunction with the government, and with the support of NGOs.³³

Three PDRM aldeias -- Nhambambas I, II and III -- were established in the north of the Sussundenga colonato along the Nhambamba River, an area which was previously part of the Empresa Agricola de Sussundenga. Nhambamba I was settled largely with local people who had lived in nearby *aldeias comunais*. As mentioned above, attacks on the *aldeias* had caused people to disperse, or to flee to Sussundenga Sede. Some were subsequently regrouped in Nhambamba I. Nhambambas II and III consisted largely of people from other areas of the district or from outside the district. According to the President of Matica Executive Council, word of the availability of food and other aid within the villages spread in 1990. **People came from Catandica, Gorongosa, Dombe, and Zimbabwe.** A large influx followed the fall of Dombe Sede to Renamo control in November 1991. Much of the population of the administrative post of Dombe, the most populous in the district, had already **fled from their homes; many of those remaining were concentrated in or near the bairros of Darue and Mabaia.**³⁴ When Renamo extended its control to these areas, a large section of the population fled east to the national road. From there, they were taken to the Nhambamba villages in government transport.

Displaced settlers in the Nhambamba villages were allocated cleared plots of land by Cooperacao Italiana, and supplied with food and other support. Schools, clinics, shops and water sources were constructed, most notably in Nhambamba I. Security having been one of the most severe constraints to agricultural production, the villages were equipped with a militia of 150 armed soldiers: 90 supplied and paid by Cooperacao Italiana, largely recruited from demobilized members of the FAM, and 60 unpaid local people.³⁵

³³ For background on the PDRM projects see Governo da Provincia de Manica et al., 1990. Data provided below is drawn from this report unless otherwise noted. On the impact of the Belas villages, established under the program near Vanduzi, Manica District, see Myers and West, 1993, pp. 49-50.

³⁴ A 1987 report listed a population of over 50,000 people, roughly 10,000 families, in these bairros, and noted that no one lived in the surrounding localities of Matarara, Muboco, and Javela. According to seed distribution figures for 1993, the number of families resident in Renamo-controlled Dombe was 6,000 -- and this would have included some who had returned after the peace accord. SSPF, 1987; DDA, 1993.

³⁵ Interview, President of Matica Locality Executive Council, Nhambamba I, 3/11/93. Cooperacao Italiana worked closely with the government in providing security for the villages. Interview, Administrator, Cooperacao Italiana, Chimoio, 25/11/93. Despite the substantial military presence, the Nhambamba villages suffered attacks and casualties between 1990 and the signing of the peace accord: according to the President of Matica Locality, attacks took place in January of 1991 and on August 8, 1992. Three people were killed in the latter attack. The Cooperacao Italiana administrator noted that additional attacks took place in which both soldiers and civilians were killed.

The consequences of state policies and war for settlement and production within northwestern Sussundenga were thus dramatic: an amalgam of *aldeias comunais*, state farms and agricultural cooperatives replaced a colonial settler scheme. With the spread of the Renamo war, the latter were destroyed or transformed, often very quickly. *Aldeias* became not sites of development and new forms of production but counter-insurgency measures; where they could not be protected, settlements broke up, and people moved again, often more than once in a process of dispersal and concentration. State farms ceased to function, and large movements of people into the district sede created new dynamics between locals and outsiders, as well as within local communities. Finally, and somewhat ironically, the PDRM initiative reconcentrated people in rural areas on much the same model as the by then largely defunct *aldeias*.

C. Current Patterns of Land use in the Colonato

At the time of the peace accord, there were thus large concentrations of people in the colonato, with a range of histories, needs and future intentions. In October 1993, the DDA estimated that a total of 6,802 families, roughly 40,000 people, lived within the colonato, as compared to 26,000 in the Locality of Sussundenga as a whole (a considerably larger area) in 1987. The extent of concentration in the district sede was dramatic: in 1987, a survey recorded 1,161 families in the bairros of the sede; in 1993, this figure had nearly tripled to 3,194 families.³⁶ The PDRM villages in the northern part of the district were another site of concentrated settlement. In addition to local people, district DPCCN officials estimated 12,615 people from Dombe lived in the Nhambamba villages and the *aldeia* of Nhamarenza in 1993.³⁷

In terms of types of claims to land by family farmers, the legacy of war and state intervention was complex. A large number of the families and individuals settled on or near their current sites of residence with the backing of the post-independence state -- on state farms, as members of *aldeias*, or in villages created to accommodate displaced people and refugees. Others have claims to the land which date to the colonial and pre-colonial periods. The numbers of people within the colonato will increase with the return of those who fled into the corridor or into Zimbabwe, a process already underway.³⁸ On the other hand, pressure within the colonato will theoretically diminish as people, such as those from Dombe, return to their 'areas of origin'. This latter process is tentative as yet, for reasons discussed further below.

³⁶ SSPF, 1987; DDA, 1993. These figures are very likely to be underestimates, according to the DDA.

³⁷ Interview, district representative, DPCCN, Sussundenga, 4/11/93. The 1993 seed distribution records compiled by the DDA recorded a total of 1,791 families from Dombe in the Nhambamba and Nhamarenza villages. DDA, 1993.

³⁸ According to the Nucleo de Apoio dos Refugiados, 3,127 people had returned to Sussundenga District as a whole from other areas between January and October 1993. Interview, Provincial Director, Nucleo de Apoio dos Refugiados, Chimoio, 25/11/93.

In the meantime, many of these families, whether displaced or not, face competition for land from the private sector. It was precisely in those areas where large numbers of people were concentrated that the bulk of applications for land from the private sector were located, and for many of the same reasons: the concentration of private applicants also had its roots in historical processes, state policies and the legacy of war.

Private sector investment in land, as it pertains to the former state farms, is a complex and confused process. Myers and West write:

The issue of what types of land rights should be established and the mechanisms for issuing these rights has never been fully discussed at the central level. Consequently, it remains unclear at the provincial level who has the authority to distribute state farm land, to whom it should be distributed (or who should have the opportunity to acquire it), how this process is to be carried out, and precisely what ends should be pursued. It is also unclear what

types of rights people hold when they acquire land from a state farm or they buy [land] (or rights to it) on the market.³⁹

Many of the decisions regarding state farm divestiture, as well as other aspects of land use, are taken at local levels. It is the decisions taken at these levels which must be studied to understand processes of post-war agricultural investment.

The fate of the Sussundenga state farms located in the former colonato illustrate the confusion in policy as well as the continuing force of historical patterns of land use. The former state farms were attractive to private investors for a number of reasons: land could be exploited relatively easily given the development of roads, water sources, buildings, and the clearance of land, work which is prohibitively capital intensive for many private farmers now, as it was for colonial settlers.

Moreover, there is a great deal of continuity between colonial and current applicants for land, strikingly in the former *pequenas empresas* sector. Of those applicants listed at the district level, at least 34 held land titles in this sector before independence.⁴⁰ As noted above, there are also several Portuguese farmers whose tenure dates from prior to independence. Most significantly at present, the family of Eugenio Augusto Nobre and his son-in-law Aderito Augusto Parra (also from a colonial era colonato family) have applied for their

³⁹ Myers and West, 1993, p. 22. For a succinct summary of the procedures for private applications for land and the conditions of tenure, see Myers, 1993, pp. 6-9.

⁴⁰ Figure calculated from 'Lista Nominal Dos Requerentes e Ocupantes Das Machambas Dos Antigos Proprietarios e Outras Zonas Do Distrito de Sussundenga,' 1993. This and the following paragraph based on an analysis of the 'Lista' and Interviews, DDA, Sussundenga District, Sussundenga, 18 and 29/10/93; Ministry of Agriculture official, Sussundenga District, Sussundenga, 3/11/93; and other local people. For more information, see Appendix 2.

colonial holdings as well as for four other farms, totalling close to 1,000 hectares, almost 10% of all private applications recorded at district level.

Continuities flowing from post-independence agrarian policies are also striking. As in other areas of Manica Province, a significant section of the applicants for land come from the ranks of the employees and managers of the now defunct state farm enterprises, underlining the role of access to the state in current processes of private sector accumulation. They have had privileged access to the machinery of the state farms, particularly tractors, putting them in a better position both to make applications for land and to exploit the land profitably. In Sussundenga, at least seven of the current private applicants are former employees or managers of state farms; five of these acquired tractors from the stock of the state farms. Other applicants come from the ranks of local civil servants and businessmen, Frelimo leaders, officers of the Mozambican Armed Forces and *antigos combatentes* (veterans of the war for independence). Many of these have officially or unofficially gained privileged access to land and machinery. 'Ownership' of a farm is also a significant aspiration for elite 'family' sector farmers, and many have put a great deal of effort and investment into acquiring land. One not unusual local applicant had invested his savings from migrant labor in South Africa into a shop, saved enough to buy a tractor, and subsequently applied for a colonato farm.

Foreign investment does not seem particularly significant in Sussundenga, though some of this may be disguised: at least one farm within the colonato, a tobacco concern, was registered under a Mozambican name but employed a (white) Zimbabwean management and (black) Zimbabwean work force. The future impact of foreign investment may be significant, particularly in terms of Zimbabwean interests for which the relative land abundance and proximity of Manica Province is appealing.⁴¹

In addition to those above, the provincial director of Dinageca estimated over 200 applications for private farms to be at a stage of the application process too early to appear in provincial records. In addition, provincial officials as well as district officials in both Sussundenga and Barue concurred that only roughly 50% of all 'private' land users bothered to go through formal application channels. Officials explained this omission with reference to a number of factors: a desire to avoid having to meet, or an inability to meet, the costs of registration, estimated at 500,000 meticaís per hectare; a desire to avoid paying, or an inability to pay, tax on land used; ignorance of registration procedures or, alternatively, knowledge that provincial and district officials do not have the capacity to enforce land laws.⁴²

⁴¹ While Zimbabweans are not yet numerous in official lists of private applicants, their presence is visible, notably along the corridor, suggesting that they may be using Mozambicans to front for them. The possibility of colonial era Portuguese farmers returning and reclaiming 'their' farms, as they are legally entitled to do, does not yet appear to be happening on a large scale: only one title (located in Manica District) has thus far been 're-activated', according to the Director, SPGC, Chimoio, 11/10/93.~

⁴² Interviews, DDA, Sussundenga, Sussundenga Sede, 18/10/93; Director, SPGC, Chimoio, 11/10/93; and see comments from the Barue DDA at the beginning of this section.

Even among those farms which are registered, there are significant discrepancies between district and provincial records, an indication of the confusion in policy and lack of coordination. Thus provincial records list farms totalling 9,708 hectares (largely comprised by an IFLOMA estate in the Rotanda area) which are not listed in district records; district records list a large number of farms, totalling 10,682.5 hectares, which do not appear at provincial level.⁴³ Overall, the extent to which 'private' and 'family' claims may come into conflict is thus most significant in areas of former colonial and state investment, but may well expand to new areas as peace is firmly established, and the processes of accumulation noted above gain momentum.

D. Access to and Conflicts over Land

The pattern of conflicts over land, and initiatives undertaken by officials, family farmers and private applicants to confront these conflicts, is obviously shaped by the processes of war and state intervention outlined thus far. It is also shaped by the lack of clarity of policy and assumptions regarding the efficiency and productivity of different categories of farmers, as well as by political insecurity and the poverty, in terms of services and infrastructure, which characterizes Renamo zones. I consider the interplay of the private and family sectors in the Sussundenga colonato before turning to the broader question of movements of displaced people and the constraints to returning to Renamo held zones in both Sussundenga and Barue.

The Colonato: Private and Family Sectors

Sussundenga's district officials defended the rights of private applicants to colonato land on the basis of their greater productivity, and their liability to pay tax, a position with roots in colonial and post-independence policies and ideologies.⁴⁴ Local officials have given families occupying land for which there is a private applicant until the end of the 1993/94 agricultural season to move, and contend that relations between family farmers and private applicants will in future be subject to the desires of the private applicant. At first sight, local officials appeared to be washing their hands of a situation which the post-independence state was instrumental in creating, and in re-establishing some of the inequalities in land access which marked the colonial order. However the situation was far less clear, and the subject of much contestation.

⁴³ See Appendix 2. Discrepancies between district and provincial levels do not appear to be unusual. For example, Meyers and West, 1993, p. 44, recorded private concessions (totalling 4,275 hectares) reported by the Executive Council, Vanduzi State Farm, Manica District, which do not appear in current provincial Dinageca records.

⁴⁴ Interviews, DDA, Sussundenga District, Sussundenga Sede, 18/10/93; Administrator, Sussundenga District, Sussundenga Sede, 29/10/93. On the pervasive and long standing official belief that family farmers are unproductive and inefficient relative to large scale production units see, *inter alia*, Hanlon, 1984; O'Laughlin, 1981, 1992; O'Meara, 1991; Myers, 1993; Saul, 1985; Wuyts, 1985.

District officials' views on private sector productivity and rights were in fact ambiguous. The DDA estimated that less than half of private applicants in Sussundenga had the capacity to exploit effectively the land for which they had applied.⁴⁵ They faced constraints in terms of access to capital, expertise and machinery: some 'private' farmers were barely distinguishable from so-called family farmers.⁴⁶ There were also cases of the misuse of state funds acquired ostensibly for the development of agricultural land. According to the DDA, "Many [private applicants] applied so they could use the lease as collateral to get a bank loan.... But the problem was people used the money for other things [than farming]."⁴⁷ A significant fraction of those applying for land seemed to be doing so, at least in the short term, for speculative purposes or economic accumulation in sectors outside that of agriculture.

Recognition that some private farmers were far from efficient, and officials' concern over the future of the large populations resident on some farms, led to a search for compromises. Most significantly, the DDA had sought to protect the rights to land of surviving agricultural cooperatives, more recently formed 'associations of peasants', as well as one of the Nhambamba (PDRM) villages. The DDA felt it would be far better if these farms were left in the hands of their current occupants. He has sought to find grounding for this position in the unclear policy statements emanating from central government, and the fact that official support in terms of training and machinery was still given to cooperatives.⁴⁸ Several other farms, largely the sites of former *aldeias*, have also been protected from private

⁴⁵ Interview, DDA, Sussundenga District, Sussundenga Sede, 18/10/93.

⁴⁶ The distinction between different sectors is difficult to define: private farmers can in part be distinguished on the basis of tenure but if economic criteria are used, or if private farmers who have not registered their land are considered, the distinction becomes blurred. Some family farmers may be more productive than some private farmers; moreover, many people fall through the slats of either type. For example, civil servants who live and work in Sussundenga regularly also farm: they use family labor and some hired labor and usually have not applied for titles. They do not clearly fall into the typical 'family' profile, but also lack the title, never mind the scale, capital and machinery that ostensibly characterize private farmers. Moreover, mobility between the two sectors is commonplace. See discussions in Myers, 1993, p. 5; Carrilho et al., 1990.

⁴⁷ Interview, DDA, Sussundenga District, Sussundenga Sede, 29/10/93. The Development Bank has tried to curb such practices by requiring invoices of purchases made with loans.

⁴⁸ The DDA is backing the applications of the Associação de Camponeses de Chizizira, the cooperatives of 3 de Fevereiro (approximately 210 families) and Nhambamba (approximately 196 families), and Nhambamba I for rights to the land they currently occupy. There do not seem to be initiatives, such as that in Gondola District, to create 'Protected Zones' for family sector farmers in the areas of the PDRM *aldeias*. On this interesting initiative, see Myers, West and Eliseu, 1993, Appendix 26.

applicants thus far, though whether this will remain so in future is unclear.⁴⁹ What, however, is clear, is that those who have organized themselves, and who receive state recognition and support, are in a far stronger position than the now scattered residents of *aldeias* and displaced people. As the DDA stressed, "Government policy is that you can't support individual peasants, only associations and unions [of cooperatives] because it's easier for the state."⁵⁰

In cases of scattered family farmers, there were nonetheless some instances where provision for access to land had been made, in much the same way as in the colonial period. i.e. family farmers were expected to farm on the margins of surveyed farms, in uncleared land, relatively far from infrastructure. Many private applicants had applied for only part of a colonial era farm: on the 91 farms for which there is adequate information, there was an average difference of 33 hectares between the total surveyed area of the colonial farm and the area for which the new private applicant had applied.⁵¹ The discrepancy was partly the result of a desire on the part of private applicants to avoid paying the higher registration fees and taxes that came with more land, and possibly to ensure a supply of labor where one was needed; it was also a strategy intended to minimize the displacement of families favored by local officials.

As with officials, local people's views on private sector claims to land were complex. Some (often a rural elite) tried to draw on post-independence state policies, such as the commitment to cooperatives, but for many the more important referent was the late colonial period. Surprisingly, there were few efforts to assert rights to land on the basis of ancestral claims within the colonato, as is a favored discourse in some other parts of Mozambique and in neighboring Zimbabwe.⁵²

In the case of the northern part of the colonato, family farmers propounded their own definitions of 'private' and 'indigenous' claims to land. While accepting the validity of private claims to land cleared in the colonial period, they did not accept such claims to uncleared land, or areas within the colonato where people had been allowed to live on the margins of farms or as tenants. As one elder male resident elaborated:

People who were living here [before the arrival of the Portuguese] don't expect to return [to pre-colonato homes] because they have so many trees where they live now. In the colonato, all the old trees and houses were destroyed by the caterpillars [bulldozers] and you can't build a house in a desert. Even now, we know that the private owners will kick us off [if we live there]. We never think of going back there....

⁴⁹ Fifteen farms within the colonato did not have private sector applicants at the time of research. See Appendix 2.

⁵⁰ Interview, DDA, Sussundenga District, Sussundenga Sede, 29/10/93.

⁵¹ See Appendix 2.

⁵² E.g., see *Noticias*, 20/12/93; Myers, Eliseu, and Nhachungue, 1993.

Referring to areas in which people now lived, largely on the margins of surveyed farms rather than *aldeias* -- "The *aldeias* were empty. So, after the peace, people saw no reason to return to the *aldeias*" -- he continued,

In these places, caterpillars never came to destroy the trees. But now the new *privados* [private applicants] asked us to move... I know that this land is not private, many people live in these old 'reserves' and some farms are bush now. I don't see why the *privados* want the land. They don't have any money or tractors to clear the land, so why do they evict people? The Portuguese came with machines but the new *privados* came with nothing, so how can they use the land? Much of the farms go unused so why can't we use the bush? The families who are here now have been here a long time. In the colonial times, the Portuguese used a system where people could live on the farm if they worked for the Portuguese but the new *privados* don't want the families because they don't work for them.⁵³

Claims to tenure were based most clearly on the existence of orchards, largely established after the movements attendant on the colonato's initiation. Little interest was expressed in returning to pre-colonato sites of residence and only very rarely were *aldeias* considered desirable (and this often only to displaced people, and often because of the availability of aid within them, or because they served as transit camps).

The common perception that legitimate claims to land dated from the interval between the establishment of the colonato and the initiation of *aldeias* diminished the possibility of conflict with new *privados* in areas where people had been wholly evicted from the colonato. Some people simply wished to return to the mountains to the south of the colonato, where they had made their homes in the early sixties. Here, they would be free from the interventions of both the state and the new *privados*. Thus some of those displaced to the bairro of Muzoria, Sussundenga Sede, had moved south (within government controlled areas) to live as *separados*, i.e. people who lived in dispersed settlements, not *aldeias*.⁵⁴ People in Buapua evinced a similar desire and, in fact, the movement from surviving *aldeias* and war-time concentrated settlements was everywhere a common occurrence.⁵⁵

Movements within government controlled areas were, however, tentative, and those to Renamo-controlled zones were even more circumspect. Below, I discuss some of the reasons behind, and consequences of, constraints and obstacles to movements.

⁵³ Interview, Ganda, Matica Locality, 28/10/93.

⁵⁴ Interviews, Cupenha, Muzoria, Sussundenga Sede, 26/10/93.

⁵⁵ Interviews, Buapua, 3 de Fevereiro, 27/10/93; Mavita, Mouha, 28/10/93; Muriane, Muribane, 2/11/93.

Political Insecurity, Services and Returning to Renamo

People's decisions regarding movement in Sussundenga and Barue were critically shaped by concerns over security and the sustainability of peace, access to services, and logistical constraints. These factors operated in different ways, producing a range of strategies and conflicts, but in all cases they highlighted how interconnected were concerns over the political future, as well as the importance of economic reconstruction. The latter issue underlined the economic aspirations of people in Mozambique's rural areas: they were not planning a life of subsistence production but desired access to markets and services.⁵⁶ The extremely problematic nature of returning to 'areas of origin', even where this was desired (which was not always the case), requires careful consideration.⁵⁷

For people moving relatively short distances, a common strategy was to keep two homes: they often maintained one home in or near district sedes while they rebuilt and planted in outlying areas. For example, people interviewed in the northern Sussundenga colonato, having recently returned from residence in Sussundenga Sede, said they still kept their property in the sede for fear that it might be stolen should the security situation deteriorate.⁵⁸ In Buapua, south of Sussundenga Sede, people expressed concerns about both security and access to services:

The houses here are only 6 months to one year old... Now, people have two houses, one here and one in Sussundenga. The children are left in Sussundenga if they are studying, only the parents come to make *machumbas* [fields].

⁵⁶ Officials were not unaware of people's concerns for infrastructure and services but felt this did not override private claims to land. The Sussundenga DDA commented, "The problem is there is no infrastructure or services [outside the colonato]. We need to build these so people will move. Now, they want to stay near infrastructure. Most people in the center of the colonato want to stay because there is no infrastructure where they come from. They may have to be forced out." Interview, DDA, Sussundenga District, Sussundenga Sede, 29/10/93.

⁵⁷ See Myers, 1993, pp. 13-17; Myers and West, 1993, p. 51 on these issues more widely. With regard to distinctions between those who do and do not wish to return to 'areas of origin', a resident of Mouha commented, "Those who were in Zimbabwe come back permanently but those in Chimoio and [Vila] Manica only come for a short time, only come to see people. People who have jobs won't come back -- they will keep their good positions there." Interview, Mavita, Mouha, 28/10/93.

⁵⁸ Interview, Ganda, Matica Locality, 28/10/93. Similarly, in Barue District, the administrator reported that he had met a delegation of people who had fled to Catandica from the mountains north of the sede in October 1993. They asked him for written assurances that they would be compensated for any losses of property should they return home and war subsequently resume. Interestingly, the administrator argued that if war were to break out again it would be an urban phenomenon, and thus they had nothing to fear. Interview by Erasmo Nhachungue, Administrator, Barue District, Catandica, 10/11/93.

Turning to the question of security, particularly demobilization, and raising the issue of those whose homes fell within Renamo controlled Dombe, one old man continued

The war is not finished because there is no *acantonamento* [i.e. the gathering of soldiers in UN supervised assembly points] until now... There are outsiders here from Rotanda and Dombe also making *machambas*... They won't go to Dombe because they are afraid of Renamo. How can you go to Dombe? You can see people with guns and there is a system of control [a reference to the 'border' posts at the entrance to Renamo areas]. What is this for? We are afraid even to go to the mountains because you can see someone with a gun. At independence in 1975 there was no one with a gun. But now there are many guns -- if they are hungry in Dombe they could come here to steal food.⁵⁹

Similarly, people in Mouha asked, "Renamo still has guns -- why don't they come and live with us if the war is over?"⁶⁰

Though the much delayed process of demobilization was initiated in December 1993,⁶¹ it may not allay people's fears as concern extended also to the question of elections. In both Sussundenga and Barue, people raised the example of Angola, of which they had heard on radios. They argued that peace would not be assured until after the elections had been held and the losing party had accepted its loss. Summing up a widespread sentiment, the President of Matica Locality Executive Council commented,

...many people don't believe in the peace. People are waiting for the elections -- they want to know who is in charge.... The signing of the [peace] accord is not the end: we have to have elections, and at the elections one will win. People are hearing of all these parties and they wonder who will actually rule the land, they want to see if the losers will accept their loss and let one person lead the government. They want to see that whoever wins will be accepted.⁶²

The elections were in fact widely seen not as a positive opportunity to exercise democratic rights but as a dangerous and destabilizing event to be regarded with trepidation.

Concerns for political security notwithstanding, some people had chosen to return to Renamo zones. A resident of Mouha held,

⁵⁹ Interview, Buapua, 3 de Fevereiro, 27/10/93.

⁶⁰ Interview, Mavita, Mochoa, 28/10/93.

⁶¹ There have been many hitches with the process of demobilization. For an account of recent obstacles, and their possible implications for the timing of elections among other things see AWEPA, "Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin," Issue 8, February 1994.

⁶² Interview, President of Matica Locality Executive Council, Nhambamba I, 3/11/93.

Many people have come here but are not from here. They are moving on to [Renamo controlled] Dombe and Mapunga. These people are not afraid, they think the war is over [a sentiment not shared by the speaker]. They have gone and checked the place and don't think there is a problem. They go and talk to people and drink beer.⁶³

Others displaced from Dombe were less confident. Their movements were piecemeal, not all in one direction, and affected by factors such as the length and conditions of residence away from home, and local intelligence on conditions at the destination in question. Some families resident in the Nhambamba villages had moved to land in Renamo-controlled Dombe, largely 'spontaneously' (people whom local officials dubbed *depressados*, i.e. people in a hurry). However, others were either not convinced that it was safe to do so, or found conditions too difficult. Thus, according to DPCCN estimates, 5,030 of 12,615 former Dombe residents displaced to the northern colonato had returned home, a relative mobility which probably reflected their short tenure in northern Sussundenga (since 1991) and a desire to leave the densely settled and unpopular Nhambamba villages. On the other hand, 1,000 *arrived* from Dombe between mid-February and mid-October. They built temporary shelters and applied for aid as displaced people in what was probably a short term strategy: recent returnees may have failed to establish themselves in time for the coming agricultural season, and those who had stayed in Dombe during the war may have come in search of aid available in the Nhambamba villages.⁶⁴

In other Sussundenga cases, movement in either direction was far less significant. Very few of the community displaced from Chikwizo, resident in Sussundenga Sede since 1980, had returned 'home', despite strong complaints that, "we don't have enough fields here." Their ties to the sede were stronger, and they made a case against immediate movement (though all those interviewed said they intended to move eventually) on the grounds largely of security. Drawing on local intelligence, often from relatives and friends within home areas, they listed a familiar range of disincentives: soldiers were still much in evidence, people travelling to Renamo areas were subject to searches, services were not functioning in Chikwizo. Most importantly,

A big problem is the land mines -- if it weren't for these, we might have gone back already. Because of the mines, the roads are not yet open, not yet cleared. So, where is the peace? We are still skeptical about peace, so we are staying here, monitoring the peace.⁶⁵

Most of the Chikwizo community had planted *in situ* for the 1993/94 season.

⁶³ Interview, Mavita, Mouha, 28/10/93.

⁶⁴ Interview, district officer, DPCCN, Sussundenga District, 4/11/93.

⁶⁵ Interview, Chikwizo, Sussundenga Sede, 30/11/93. There are likely to be substantial delays in demining, according to the provincial UNOHAC representative, Chimoio, 25/11/93.

The range of concerns and complaints recorded in Sussundenga was not unusual. The views of residents of Macossa Cruzamento, located at the entrance to Renamo controlled Macossa District, were also circumspect, stressing concerns over security. Many had fled their homes between 1987 and 1989 when the Armed Forces of Mozambique, with Zimbabwean help, briefly retook Macossa from Renamo. The secretary of a Dynamizing Group in one of the Cruzamento's bairros said that offers of transport to Macossa from the OIM (International Organization for Migration) had initially sparked interest among "hundreds" of families. However, following their own investigations of conditions in Macossa, all but 16 families withdrew, deciding to await demobilization, elections and "definite peace".⁶⁶

Residents of the Cruzamento were, however, making regular trips into Macossa, seeking information, starting to rebuild houses and prepare fields, visiting family and friends. Some, particularly those from the nearer parts of Macossa, were returning on a permanent basis on their own account (though they hoped to receive OIM help in transporting their belongings). As elsewhere, the conditions of displacement could act as an incentive to take risks in moving: people complained of small fields in the Cruzamento, and spoke of their desire to reunite with relatives within the Renamo held areas. Others who decided to go back had recently come from Zimbabwe and had a more difficult time sustaining themselves short of home. However, also as elsewhere, people tried to ensure their futures through maintaining homes outside Macossa, moreover, there were also movements of people in the opposite direction, out of Macossa.⁶⁷

On the whole, the question of services was a particularly weighty consideration for those returning to Renamo areas. Reconstruction was visibly proceeding in government held areas where NGOs concentrated their resources while the extent of destruction was greater and the pace of reconstruction slower in Renamo zones. Though there were efforts to rebuild and staff schools and clinics in areas such as Macossa, efforts which in November 1993 were starting to receive support from NGOs, they faced grave obstacles. Buildings were largely destroyed, skilled staff and funds were in short supply; other problems included a lack of clean water, mined roads, no milling facilities, and the almost complete absence of a market. People living around Macossa Sede and Nhamagua ground grain by hand and struggled against an almost total lack of manufactured goods: there were severe shortages of blankets, clothing, pots, buckets, tools.⁶⁸ Until these areas are reintegrated into a regional market, and receive substantial investment in services, infrastructure, and transport, such problems will continue to make Renamo zones unattractive, and thus inhibit the movements of people to 'areas of origin'.

⁶⁶ Interview by Erasmo Nhachungue, Secretary, Dynamizing Group, Macossa Cruzamento, Barue District, 18/11/93.

⁶⁷ Interviews by Erasmo Nhachungue, Macossa Cruzamento, Barue District, 17 and 18/11/93.

⁶⁸ Based on personal observation and interviews, Renamo District Administrator, Macossa Sede, Macossa District, 13/11/93; Chief Nhunge, Chief Nhaute, Macossa Sede, Macossa District, 17 and 18/11/93.

Clearly, people had developed a range of strategies to cope with obstacles and insecurities: they divided families, sending those who were fitter, out of school, and without employment first. These people were more able to walk long distances and carry heavy loads, as well as do the demanding work of building houses and clearing fields. Others stayed in district *sedes* and war-time encampments to look after children, to hold a second, safe, home, and to take advantage of aid where possible. People developed local intelligence networks to gather the latest news of conditions in various areas. These strategies could not, however, overcome the obstacles posed by the perception of continued political insecurity, the presence of mines and the lack of infrastructure and services. In the short term, the return 'home' was likely to remain a tentative and piecemeal process: significant numbers of people planned to wait until after the 1993/94 agricultural season to move.

In the meantime, the consequences of obstacles to movements complicated local struggles for land: competition for land occurred not only between 'family' and 'private' sectors but also as a consequence of the congestion of people in areas considered relatively safe as movements to home areas got underway from the cities and encampments of the Beira Corridor, Zimbabwe, government controlled district *sedes* and other areas. The 'pile-ups' at sites short of people's desired destinations occasioned by continued political insecurity and the logistical difficulties of moving had, in some cases, caused conflicts over land as returnees found land they claimed occupied by others. A number of strategies were employed to resolve disputes. They indicated both a well understood set of rights to land locally, as well as cooperative efforts among local authorities to enforce these rights where conflicts arose.

A range of local leaders -- chiefs, Frelimo secretaries, presidents of executive councils, as well as the Ministry of Agriculture -- were involved in settling disputes. For example, in the mountains south of the Sussundenga colonato, local people were returning to land abandoned for periods of up to 15 years, usually their pre-*aldeia* homes, as discussed earlier. They did so in a context in which 'outsiders' were also opening land, both people stopping over on their way to points further south and west, and local civil servants and others who lived in Sussundenga Sede. Some people informed the local chief before settling, but the vast majority of land was opened without reference to any authority, according to chiefs and returnees. People interviewed were adamant that conflicts over land arose not because of land shortage but rather as a result of labor invested in land, the existence of orchards or other ties to specific pieces of land, and the presence of outsiders.⁶⁹

One case illustrates some of these dynamics. A resident of Sussundenga Sede, who had not previously farmed in the mountains south of the colonato, went to the area in search of a place to farm. He chose this area because of the growing insecurity within the colonato owing to the assertions of the new *privados*. After consultations with people living there, he ascertained that no one had farmed the land for upwards of ten years, though it had been previously occupied. After he had planted, the previous owner returned and demanded the land be vacated. The case was taken to Chief Buapua who adjudicated not on the question of whose rights to the land took precedence -- the former occupant's claim was considered valid -- but on the question of what compensation should be paid for labor invested by the

⁶⁹ E.g., Interviews, Buapua, 3 de Fevereiro, 27/10/93.

more recent occupier. The chief held hearings with both parties, eventually arriving at a figure of 80,000 meticais compensation. District Ministry of Agriculture officials were also involved in settling such disputes, taking the stance that those who had planted should be able to harvest their crops, but must leave if another claimant can show that they had farmed there before.⁷⁰ In the case above, however, the newcomer preferred to leave the land immediately, fearing that to stay on another's land against their wishes would bring misfortune.⁷¹

Similar patterns occurred in the government controlled areas of Barue. Conflicts again emerged from the process of return from the Beira Corridor or Zimbabwe, and the reluctance to move to outlying areas. Thus a resident of Catandica who had fled to Chimoio during the war might return to find that his or her field was occupied by someone who had fled from, for example, Guro, and who did not feel it was safe or did not want to return there. In Catandica, such cases multiplied in October 1993, the time of planting and of significant repatriations.⁷² Conflicts were concentrated in areas of dense settlement to the west of Catandica (in most other areas no conflicts were reported). The Ministry of Agriculture policy in Barue, as in Sussundenga, was that anyone who had to move should be allowed to harvest first. Also as in Sussundenga, it was largely local leaders who arbitrated in cases of disputes and, again, the rights of previous landholders were rarely at issue, rather it was a question of deciding what compensation should be paid, and the timing of removal.⁷³

Other types of conflicts over land hinged not on the question of occupancy of land claimed by another but on the designation of certain areas as sacred. This question will be

⁷⁰ Interview, DDA, Sussundenga District, Sussundenga Sede, 29.10.93. A similar stance has been taken by the Ministry of Agriculture elsewhere. See below and Myers, 1993, p. 19.

⁷¹ Interviews, Buapua, 3 de Fevereiro, 27/10/93; Ministry of Agriculture official, Sussundenga District, 3/11.93. In Sussundenga, it was only in Nhambamba that I found cases where the rights of a former occupant -- where these were accepted by local authorities -- were questioned: here, people who had stayed through the war argued that they had earned a moral right to the land which took precedence over the claims to tenure of people who had fled during the war. Interview, President of Matica Locality Executive Council, Nhambamba I, 3/11/93.

⁷² According to the Provincial Director of the Nucleo de Apoio dos Refugiados, Chimoio, 25/11/93, 6,752 people returned to Barue between January and October 1993. Though figures were not available, large numbers also apparently returned in November 1993.

⁷³ An unusual case in the area of Honde illustrated the limits of returnees' claims. A *repatriado* from Zimbabwe had found a locally displaced person on his former land. He demanded that he be paid compensation, effectively rent, for the time that his land had been used. The case went to the DDA who adjudicated with the help of local Chiefs Nyoni and Tansuguli, the Frelimo secretary, and the president of the locality, thus bringing together a range of local authorities. In the event, rent was not paid, being considered an unreasonable demand, though all agreed the more recent occupant had to leave the land. Interviews by Erasmo Nhachungue, Agricultural Extension Agents, Ministry of Agriculture, Barue District, 23/11/93.

discussed in the following section. Suffice it to say here that the occupation, usually by displaced people, of land defined as sacred by chiefs and others was a major concern and source of much politicking in the areas under consideration.

There remains the question of conflict over land among families within Renamo controlled areas. In remote and lightly populated Macossa, access to land was cast as the least problematic of agricultural problems; labor and access to inputs and markets were seen as the critical constraints.⁷⁴ However, in the southern Dombe area of Sussundenga, a region of great fertility and historically dense settlement, Jean Claude Legrande has suggested that Renamo redistributed the most fertile land to those who had stayed under their control as a way of building support in wartime. This may well cause conflicts with returnees to the area (and possibly explains the movements out of Dombe by some of those who had tried to return), especially if Renamo defends the rights of those who remained during the war.⁷⁵

In short, the legacies of colonial and post-independence government interventions in land use strongly shaped current claims to, and the nature of conflicts over, land. In the current period, these legacies interacted with perceptions of political insecurity and state backing for private sector accumulation. Contrasts between areas were significant: they highlight the importance of formulating flexible responses to the needs, views, and legacies born of previous decades. Thus areas of previous colonial and state investment present the greatest problems regarding competition between private and family sectors. The exceptionality of Renamo held areas also needs consideration: if security concerns and access to services were important factors behind the reluctance to move within government held areas, they were far more salient for those who wished to go to areas under Renamo administration, causing insecurity, a build up of population, and competition over land at areas short of people's desired destinations.

Despite considerable capacity to resolve disputes over land locally, the resolution of the broader problems at their root requires central state intervention. It is the central state and not local communities which has the necessary power and resources to produce or facilitate investment in services and infrastructure, a clear institutional and legal framework for resolving disputes over rights to land (one which is not blind to the validity of historical claims or to the vulnerabilities and inequalities produced by war), and a political dispensation capable of providing the security currently felt to be lacking. The following section broaches aspects of this latter challenge as it pertains to local level authorities.

II. Local Authority: Administration and the Question of Chiefs

People's perceptions of local authority, as with their perceptions of rights to land, have been shaped by a volatile history of war, displacement and state intervention. Overcoming

⁷⁴ Interviews by Erasmo Nhacungue, Macossa Cruzamento, Barue District, 17/11/93; Interviews, Nhunge, Nhaute, Macossa Sede, 17 and 18, 11/93.

⁷⁵ Interview, Jean Claude Legrande, UNICEF, Maputo, 7/12/93. Legrande was a key actor in the first distributions of land in Renamo areas of Manica Province after the signing of the peace accord. His views are based on personal observation in these areas.

what has often been a violent and authoritarian history, with little room for participation, little local capacity for holding powerful outsiders (a central state or armed groups) accountable, is critical to political reconstruction.

This section focuses on two related issues, both of which concern the future of chieftaincy in particular, and relations between local and central authority more widely: first, the current debates in academic and government circles over what role chiefs should play in post-war Mozambique, and the implications of recent changes in local practices in government areas regarding chiefs and other political structures; second, the consequences for local political authority of Renamo's wartime uses of 'traditional' leaders, its suppression of alternative authorities, and the challenges posed by the separate administrative structures now being consolidated by Renamo in the areas under its control.

In recent Mozambican debates, much attention has been focused on 'traditional' institutions. Within government circles, discussions over the future and, by necessity, the past of chieftaincy have taken place under the aegis of the Ministry of State Administration (Ministerio da Administracao Estatal, hereafter MAE). Irae Baptista Lundin has taken the intellectual lead in these debates, producing a range of papers and acting, since 1991, as the coordinator of a MAE project titled 'Traditional Authority/Power' (funded by USAID). Baptista Lundin's work is ground-breaking, going against the grain of some of the central tenets of Frelimo policy and ideology.⁷⁶ She argues that rural culture is not the reactionary obscurantism of Frelimo doctrine, that chiefs were not simply tainted and discredited collaborators. Rather, chieftaincy and its related institutions were important in providing social cohesion and cultural identity, in legitimating authority and regulating people's relations to the environment. Other analyses have made some of the same points. Thus academics such as Christian Geffray stressed the strength and resilience of rural cultural and social norms, constituted above all within the lineage and chieftaincy.⁷⁷

The urgency of these interpretations rests to no small extent on the contention that Frelimo's policies regarding chiefs and 'obscurantism', along with particularly the *aldeias comunais* policy, facilitated the spread of Renamo. Baptista Lundin posits that such policies transformed an "almost total acquiescence to Frelimo" into a "climate of distrust": whatever its origins, Renamo "capitalized on an internal discontent".⁷⁸ Geffray casts the post-independence state as an authoritarian, alien (and profoundly alienating) force devoid of understanding for the cultural mores of its rural constituency. Renamo's war was seen as an opportunity to recover, "the basic right to the free exercise of social life," here interpreted as a reassertion of traditional rural culture and institutions against Frelimo's 'modernizing'

⁷⁶ Baptista Lundin's views were prefigured to some extent by the pronouncements of senior Frelimo officials such as Minister of Culture Bernard Honwana. They were also anticipated, and shaped, by the attitudes and practices of local district and provincial officials of the MAE, as discussed further below.

⁷⁷ Geffray, 1991.

⁷⁸ Baptista Lundin, 1992, "Relatorio", pp. 38, 44.

policies.⁷⁹ From within government, calls have been made for the reinstatement of chiefs in some as yet vaguely defined capacity. Thus Baptista Lundin holds that chiefs "exercise of authority/power" is legitimate "in the eyes of their people"; chiefs, "will be ready to return to assume a role that was always theirs."⁸⁰ These calls, in conjunction with Renamo's endorsement and use of chieftaincy, have in recent years militated in favor of an increased role for chiefs in representation, administration and other aspects of rural life.

My own analysis, while drawing on those above and others like them, differs in its focus and interpretations.⁸¹ First, I focus on the question of power rather than culture, notably as it is expressed in the relationship between the state (or armed combatants) and local authorities. Culture is, of course, part of this relationship, but not as an immutable, uncontested body. Rather, it has been, and remains, a subject of negotiation and a bearer of group interests, an important ground of contestation within communities and between them and the state or military forces. Current debates tend to depict 'traditional' culture and chieftaincy as ahistorically static, romantically devoted to maintaining an uncontested set of social norms, strongly opposed to the alien intrusion of things 'modern'. They tend to devalue the conflicts and transformations within rural society, and to imply that 'traditional' culture and institutions can somehow be reconstituted, revived or simply recognized.

Second, I argue for a more nuanced analysis of the state's interaction with local authorities, rather than an emphasis on the state as solely an alien and authoritarian force. The state's success or lack thereof in mobilizing a constituency for its policies, its capacity to enforce policies, and the constraints set by its need for legitimacy, all need to be carefully assessed at the level of practice. The negotiated relationships among chieftaincy, other local political authorities and the central state tend to be neglected, though they were often transformative of culture and institutions. In the following discussion, I use the case studies under consideration to explore the colonial history of chieftaincy before turning to post-independence local political authorities and the dynamics behind the current prominence accorded chiefs.

A. An Historical Perspective: Barue, Macossa and Sussundenga

The history of the area which became Manica Province illustrates the dynamism and mutability of 'traditional' institutions and culture. Dynastic leaders in this region have long had to confront the demands of powerful outsiders: in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,

⁷⁹ Geffray, 1991, p. 54.

⁸⁰ Baptista Lundin, 1992, "Relatorio", p. 49. Other participants in MAE conferences have stressed similar sentiments even more categorically. However, there is still substantial opposition to the official recognition of chiefs within government. For example, some officials participating in the Instituto Superior de Relacoes Internacionais Conference on "Mozambique Post-War: Challenges and Realities", Maputo, 14-18 December 1992, argued that recognizing chieftaincy was tantamount to recolonizing the rural areas.

⁸¹ For other views, see particularly the criticisms of Geffray in Dinerman, 1993 and O'Laughlin, 1992.

kingdoms rose and fell, smaller dynasties were transformed by civil wars and migrations; the interventions of the Gaza Nguni and prazo holders were particularly disruptive to local political institutions while economic trends such as the expansion of labor migration set in process longer term changes. To find culturally discrete and homogenous units in which norms and values existed in an uncontested state would have been a rarity. Rather, transformations in notions of political community, in the organization of secular and religious authority, in identity and language were the norm; political boundaries and hierarchies were fluid and prone to rapid change.⁸²

The adaptive and violent politics of Mozambique's central chieftaincies constituted powerful political traditions which did not lose their relevance with the onset of colonialism. The early agents of colonialism were first interpreted as yet other powerful outside forces to be used in local struggles, strikingly in the cases of semi-indigenized prazo holders such as Gouveia. Nor were interventions always considered negative: some lineage leaders turned them to their advantage. In the case of the Barue kingdom, for example, the ruling elite was excluded from political office after the rising of 1917-21, allowing others to claim positions of authority in the new order. Thus the Nhaute and Nhunge chieftaincies, as they exist now, were born of this period, a feat which involved no small measure of ingenuity on their part.⁸³

With the consolidation of colonial rule, the uses made of chieftaincy forced a wider set of changes: the possibility of migration by political communities or open rebellion were limited; chieftaincy was subordinated to a central state and incorporated as a lower rung in an administrative hierarchy; structures of authority were created or renamed, formalized, and given new duties, notably tax collection and labor recruitment; boundaries were redrawn and chiefs opportunistically promoted or demoted.⁸⁴ In interviews, the confusion and debate which accompanied elders' discussions of chiefly hierarchies bore witness to the regularity of colonial, as well as pre-colonial, interventions. Terms used for chiefly office were variable and incorporated foreign titles alongside local languages. Thus the generic hierarchies of

⁸² See *inter alia* Beach, 1994, 1989, 1980; Borges Coehlo, 1993; Isaacman, 1976; Rennie, 1973. In interviews, chiefs rarely remembered pre-colonial rulers with any nostalgia, seeing, most notably, the Barue Macombes and the Gaza Nguni as rapacious and repressive, and depicting their excesses as critical to their fall.

⁸³ The histories of these dynasties are fascinating, and deserving of further research. In interviews, the current incumbents related how their predecessors had held subordinate positions within the Barue polity -- Nhunge as a gunpowder maker to the king, Nhaute as a sub-ruler. Following the rising, they had denied any relation to the ruling dynasty in order to achieve recognition from the Portuguese. In the case of Nhaute, this involved disguising the royal lineage's totem. Interviews, Nhaute, Macossa Sede, 13 and 17/11/93; Nhunge, Macossa Sede, 18/11/93.

⁸⁴ Baptista Lundin, 1992, "Relatorio", p. 37 and *passim*, stresses this point, but fails to see it as a long standing condition of dynastic politics: the claims which her informants made for the redrawing of boundaries, the recognition of demoted chiefs, reflect the interests of certain royal families at a certain point in history, rather than indicating that there existed a baseline of uncontested boundaries and hierarchies.

central Sussundenga district -- *Mumbo* or chief and its subordinate *Mfumo* -- had a third rank added by the Portuguese while a variety of alternative terms, drawn from Shangaan, ChiNdao and Portuguese were also used to describe offices. In Macossa a three tier hierarchy -- *Nhacuaua*, *Tsapanda*, *Mfumo* (or sometimes *Samwendo*) -- was held to be 'traditional', but so was the additional office *cabo de terra*, though it obviously dated from the colonial period. In western Barue, *Nhacuaua* was followed by the sub-offices of *Sabhuku* and *Samwendo*. 'Sabhuku' comes from the English word 'book' and is used in neighboring Zimbabwe, a testament to the regularity of cross border interaction. As with the origins of these terms, ethnicity was sometimes a subject of debate: in Muriane, elders first held that they were Matewe before contending that the ruling lineage was in fact Shangaan, and finally resolving that the only way to settle the matter was to consult the Portuguese administrative records in Sussundenga Sede.⁸⁵

The introduction of new terms and offices was in part a reflection of the needs of colonial administration: invented offices were often defined in terms of their tax collecting or labor recruiting duties. Portuguese rule was violent and extractive, a sign of its weakness and poverty. The pressures on chiefs were dire: they were subject to beatings with the feared palmatoria; many fled to avoid the responsibilities of their offices in favor of life as a migrant worker or as a commoner. The flight of members of royal lineages may even be seen as a 'tradition' in some areas. Chiefs stressed their powerlessness and inability to protect their followers from taxation and forced labor, though some were able to negotiate a more acceptable regime, and others exploited the administrative weaknesses of the Portuguese through evasion and avoidance.⁸⁶ Much resistance was, of course, independent of chiefs, notably in terms of the large scale flight of young men to the more attractive labor markets of Zimbabwe and South Africa. This was in fact a cause of tensions much cited by chiefs - the flight of young men left their parents with the responsibility of meeting their tax obligations, and made local labor recruitment more difficult.

Portuguese administration was not, however, wholly coercive: there lay a tension between the use of coercion and attempts to coopt and incorporate African political leaders. The Portuguese state and chiefs existed in a fraught interdependence: chiefs had to comply at least in part with the demands of the Portuguese to stay in office, a requirement which had to be balanced with the need to maintain some legitimacy within their communities; the Portuguese needed to achieve an effective level of order and extraction. Thus, alongside the daily brutalities of Portuguese administration, the Portuguese also supported rainmaking ceremonies, and granted concessions to chiefs (houses, salaries, exemption from tax and forced labor), particularly from the 1960s when rural administration was influenced by a 'community development' philosophy. Chiefs in Manica fairly uniformly held that the Portuguese -- both administrators and settlers -- made gifts of wine, sugar, cloth, even ivory,

⁸⁵ Interview, Muriane, Muribane, 2/11/93.

⁸⁶ For example, Chief Buapua was able to put a stop to the press-ganging of young men at random by arguing that the costs of forced labor should be spread evenly among families, and helping in the recruitment of labor. Interview, Buapua, 3 de Fevereiro, 27/10/93. Elders in more remote areas such as that of Chief Mavita claimed considerable success in evasion. Interview, Mavita, Mouha, 28/10/93. Also see Baptista Lundin, 1992, "Relatorio", pp. 37, 49.

in support of rainmaking and other ceremonies.⁸⁷ These were not only cynical manipulations of local culture but a real, if unequal, incorporation of the Portuguese rulers into a local cosmology.

The Portuguese combination of authoritarian and violent rule with support for certain aspects of 'tradition', and the interdependence created and institutionalized between chiefs and the state would, as we shall see below, re-emerge as important themes in post-independence politics. I first turn to a consideration of the roles chiefs played in the war for independence.

The War for Independence and Local Authority

With the spread of the war for independence, chiefs once again played a role in armed conflict. Though studies of the war in Manica and elsewhere have tended to underplay the role of chiefs, or to cast them solely as collaborators, my own interviews of former Frelimo guerrillas and chiefs in Manica revealed that they had been important players in the war, showing themselves able to make political allegiances beyond the bounded confines of their territories and to adapt to the diverse demands of guerrilla war.⁸⁸

The war heightened tensions between chiefs and the Portuguese as chiefs forged, or were forced into, new alliances. Chiefs came under variable pressures and reacted in diverse ways: some moved into a closer dependence on government, others were caught between guerrillas and government, still others solidly backed Frelimo. Divergences were in part shaped by the strategic location of chiefs' homes, and the variable effectiveness of Portuguese counter-insurgency measures. As noted in the previous section, Frelimo guerrilla activity was late in Sussundenga, and largely limited to bases in the densely forested mountains along the Zimbabwean border; Macossa, on the other hand, became a semi-liberated area. Below I explore the different consequences for chiefs' political role.

In Sussundenga, Chief Cupenha, situated in close proximity to well protected Sussundenga Sede, was courted with a house and other concessions by the Portuguese administration; he "saw no bullets" before independence: "The war for independence didn't arrive here. I lived among the whites, inside the farms of the whites."⁸⁹ Likewise, the chiefs and mediums of the Dzembe area said that, before independence, they had only heard of

⁸⁷ Such donations were commonplace in chiefs' accounts of colonial rule. E.g. in the Mount Dzembe area, the spirit medium Chirenje and Chief Katize recalled how, "In the colonial times, the administration would give Mambo Katize white and black cloths and these would be handed over to Chirenje. The colonial administration could also send sugar for the brewing of beer." Interview, Chirenje/Katize, Mount Dzembe, 4/11/93. In Nhaute, the Portuguese added elephant tusks to the annual offering made by the chief to the medium Samatenje. Interview, Nhaute, Macossa Sede, 13 and 17/11/93.

⁸⁸ The research of Borges Coehlo, 1993, in Tete is an exception to the general neglect of the role of chieftaincy in the war for independence. In many respects, his findings parallel the following accounts from Manica.

⁸⁹ Interview, Cupenha, Muzoria, Sussundenga Sede, 25/10/93.

Frelimo through Portuguese propaganda depicting them as terrorists.⁹⁰ Those outside or on the margins of the colonato came under greater pressure. For example, Chief Buapua, situated on the southern border of the colonato, was contacted by guerrillas and gave them support with disastrous consequences:

Some guerrillas came to my home and explained the reasons for the war and asked for help, for food. We gave them *satazi*. The guerrillas explained that the Portuguese were outsiders, exploiters, they beat people, that we can't live with them: they have to go back to their country. I was caught by the Portuguese and taken to Macequece and beaten and beaten in the end of 1973. Some friends died there. I refused to say I saw Frelimo or gave them food. In 1974 I was taken to Beira jail and beaten there, and refused food. They said they knew I had contacts with Frelimo but I denied it. Many friends died there in jail. They eventually let me go because I wouldn't say anything.⁹¹

The then Chief Ganda, on the margins of the northern colonato, found himself in a potentially similar position in 1974. His son and successor, Mandisozinha Ganda, recalled that his father had contacts with guerrillas and provided them with food: "My father kept his contacts with the guerrillas secret and no one informed on him." The younger Ganda fled to the mountains along the border, joining guerrillas in "very thick forest and bush, like night."⁹²

These experiences contrasted with those in far more hotly contested Barue and Macossa. Barue was subject to the Portuguese counterinsurgency (and quasi-development) measure of *aldeamentos*, or protected villages. *Aldeamentos* were constructed along the main Tete road from 1972 to 1974.⁹³ Chiefs Sanyatunze and Sabao, for example, were moved into heavily regulated villages established on the outskirts of Catandica (Vila Gouveia), the site of one of the most significant Portuguese military bases in the province. Both said they had

⁹⁰ Interview, Chirenje/Katize, Mount Dzembe, 4/11/93.

⁹¹ Interview, Buapua, 3 de Fevereiro, 27/10/93.

⁹² Interview, Ganda, Matica Locality, 3/11/93. The guerrilla base was located on a mountain called Nhamukutu. In the area of Chief Chikwizo, guerrillas only passed through, and were supplied with food. Others were, of course, also subject to the pressures of the Portuguese: for example, PIDE arrested several local shopkeepers suspected of provisioning guerrillas in Chikwizo. Only one returned.

⁹³ Borges Coehlo, 1993, pp. 205-7, divides the *aldeamentos* policy into three phases: 1) 1964-1968 when *aldeamentos* were hastily constructed along the Tanzanian border; 2) 1968-1971 when attention shifted to the new theatre of Tete; 3) 1972-1974 when the Tete program was expanded and Vila Pery (Manica) and Beira (Sofala) received attention. The construction of *aldeamentos* closely followed and sought, but failed, to prevent the infiltration of guerrillas. The development aspects of *aldeamentos* were far more pronounced in early cases, as opposed to those hastily constructed in Manica and Sofala.

had no contact with guerrillas, though they had in the last years of colonial rule refused to execute certain of their duties such as tax collection, an indication of the weakening of state capacity.⁹⁴

Chiefs in Macossa were not, however, so successfully isolated. Remote, little developed, and heavily forested Macossa, a former 'indigenous reserve', was ideal guerrilla territory. It had no settler presence, while government officials were largely restricted to the administrative sede of Macossa, a vulnerable site at the end of an 85 kilometer dirt road. The Frelimo detachment commander in the Macossa area, Lambion Romao Ferrao, established a base close to the home of Chief Nhunge, northeast of Macossa Sede. Though Nhunge was initially "a great friend of the Portuguese," he was convinced to support the guerrillas and became, "the most important sympathizer with Frelimo" in this area. According to Ferrao, he

would even travel to our base with information about the Portuguese. He took the guerrillas to the area where the Macombes [the Barue rulers] hid during the war [against the Portuguese], he explained the rules of the area, he would collect food and meat for us. When the Portuguese started to organize *acampamentos* [low-budget versions of *aldeamentos*] at Macossa, the chief went and mobilized people to leave the *acampamentos* to live with the guerrillas in the bush. The chief went and insulted the Portuguese.⁹⁵

The local knowledge which Chief Nhunge imparted, according to Ferrao, ranged from ways of interpreting the roaring of lions to identify Portuguese troop movements, to ceremonies in aid of finding food, to techniques for conserving grain or hunting game; the military history of the Barue kingdom was invoked to legitimize and aid Frelimo's war.⁹⁶ Chief Nhunge was imprisoned in 1973, but his son, the now incumbent chief, carried on in the same vein.

A strong contrast to Nhunge was provided by his neighbor, Chief Nhaute. Ferrao described him as follows:

Regulo Nhaute was a friend of the Portuguese. He never supported the guerrillas and the *sipais* [police] could work in his area freely. He was an enemy of Nhunge.... Nhaute never gave food to the guerrillas, nothing. Many

⁹⁴ Interview by Erasmo Nhachungue, Sanyatunze, Catandica, 19/11/93.

⁹⁵ Interview, Lambion Romao Ferrao, Chimoio, 18/10/93.

⁹⁶ Such relations between guerrillas and chiefs were not unusual in Manica. A former Frelimo guerrilla (now President of Munhinga Locality Executive Council in Sussundenga) who had operated in the districts of Sussundenga and Manica commented, "The *regulos* had to explain the rules of the bush -- where you can and can't stay, where you can't wear shoes etc. Only the *regulos* know that. The bases were in the forest and this is where the rules are needed. If you don't follow the rules, you will have problems." Interview, Cupenha, Munhinga, 27/10/93. Also see Wilson, 1992, pp. 549-50.

people were arrested in this area. They were taken to the administration and could be killed because they supported Frelimo. All Nhaute's *Mfumos* were mobilized against Frelimo.

Ferrao's views on the reasons for Nhaute's position were pragmatic: "Nhaute was very close to Macossa [Sede], he had *sipais* at his home, he was very near to the Portuguese. This is why he supported the Portuguese."⁹⁷ Nhaute himself merely maintained, "I heard news that Frelimo was fighting the whites but I had no contact with them. They had a base in the bush...and attacked whites on the road."⁹⁸

On the whole, Ferrao and other guerrillas who had operated throughout Manica as well as in Tete shared the view that recruiting chiefs, and old men more widely, was critical to success. Old people were the "easiest to talk to," they "could influence the young": "The old people suffered alot -- they had *chibalo* [forced labor]...but the young hadn't suffered, they didn't know. The old men helped to mobilize the young." The attitude to chiefs was generally positive -- "some *regulos* resisted alot but in general they helped alot" -- and, on the whole, "The *regulos* were the best politicians.... [They] were very important to help Frelimo. If you don't go to the *regulo* first, he will be angry. If you go to the *regulo* first, he will support you and won't tell the administration of the guerrilla presence."⁹⁹

Chiefs' relations to guerrillas should not, however, be romanticized. Chiefs perceived themselves to be in a dangerous and vulnerable situation. Even where they did support guerrillas they felt guerrillas did not fully trust them, despite the sacrifices they made. Thus the currently incumbent Chief Nhunge commented,

At first, the guerrillas were suspicious of the traditional elders but after the *Nhacuaua* [his predecessor] was arrested, we worked together. Still, the guerrillas didn't trust us totally and would give 'ordinary' people positions: none of the members of support groups were *Nhacuauas*, *Tsapandas* or *Mfumos*. But it was the *Nhacuauas* and *Tsapandas* who had to provide food -

⁹⁷ Interview, Lambion Romao Ferrao, Chimoio, 18/10/93.

⁹⁸ Interview, Nhaute, Catandica, 6/10/93.

⁹⁹ Interviews, Antigos Combatentes, Chimoio, 15 and 18/10/93. The importance of chiefs to the success of Frelimo's war effort should not, however, be exaggerated: guerrilla successes in Macossa were in the end strongly predicated on the demoralization of the Portuguese army. In this case, Ferrao was contacted by the Portuguese base commander towards the end of the war: they came to an agreement whereby the Portuguese troops would not seek to engage the guerrillas so long as the sede was not attacked, an agreement which allowed Ferrao's detachment to concentrate attacks on the road to Catandica and other communications. Earlier, Portuguese troops already showed signs of malaise -- only pretending to pursue guerrillas after attacks, refusing to take offensive action, cutting patrols short, etc. Also see Munslow, 1983; Henriksen, 1983, on local cease fires and negotiations between guerrilla and Portuguese commanders.

- if we didn't give food we were afraid we would be killed. "

Parallel to the elders, Frelimo recruited young men in military roles, and usually older people as chairmen and secretaries. While these structures worked together, and guerrillas certainly valued the contributions of chiefs, they were not one and the same

Such tensions notwithstanding, the war for independence created further political transformations. Frelimo guerrillas perceived chiefs as influential mobilizers and mediators, as sources of knowledge about the Portuguese and local ecology, economy, religion and ritual. They were 'the best politicians', if not the only ones. Guerrillas sought to recruit influential elders and, where they were successful, chieftaincy functioned in tandem with Frelimo military structures in logistical and spiritual capacities. Chiefs thus made alliances which broke out of 'traditional' politics and into the realm of Frelimo's mobilization, understood locally as a war against 'the whites', a nationalist struggle. For their part, the Portuguese saw chiefs and their subordinates as a means of keeping control over, and the loyalty of, populations. Chiefs responded in diverse ways, both as supporters of guerrillas and as collaborators. For those who sided with guerrillas there was, however, to be little reward.

B. Political Authority After Independence: Frelimo Policies

Frelimo's rural policies held little regard for the alliances and allegiances of the colonial period and war for independence; nor were they seen as in any way heralded by wartime mobilization. Justified in terms of a radical modernizing agenda, Frelimo sought to create a wholly new political hierarchy of variously appointed and elected Frelimo secretaries and officials. Chiefs were doubly offensive to the Frelimo project, being representatives of rural 'obscurantism' and collaborators. They were excluded from office, along with others cast as collaborators or exploiters. As discussed above, many commentators have seen this step, in conjunction particularly with the *aldeias comunais* policy, as dealing a severe blow to the support enjoyed by Frelimo at independence. Here, I wish to explore the extent to which there was a constituency for the transformations desired by Frelimo; the capacity of the central party-state to implement its policies; and, where such capacity was limited, or became limited as a consequence of economic decline, opposition and war, the nature of the compromises which followed.

In the districts under consideration, chiefs' accounts of their post-independence treatment were remarkably uniform: they were informed at Frelimo rallies that there was no room for them in the new political order, that they "had Caetano's ideas in their heads," that they did not exist.¹⁰¹ Chief Cupenha recalled, "...the government said they didn't want the *regulos*, that the *regulos* didn't have power, they should just stay at home as citizens. All the *regulos* were invited to a meeting where they were told there are no *regulos*."¹⁰² These

¹⁰⁰ Interview, Nhunge, Macossa Sede, 18/11/93.

¹⁰¹ Such phrases were commonly used by chiefs, e.g., Interview by Erasmo Nhachungue, Sanyatunze, Catandica, 19/11/93; Interview, Buapua, 3 de Fevereiro, 27/10/93.

¹⁰² Interview, Cupenha, Muzoria, Sussundenga Sede, 25/10/93.

pronouncements took chiefs, as well as people who had worked in the colonial administration in other capacities, by surprise.¹⁰³ The extreme nature of the exclusion also surprised former guerrillas. For example, the President of Munhinga Locality, formerly a Frelimo guerrilla, wondered why chiefs should be excluded when, "Frelimo used *regulos* in the war, had friendships with *regulos*... The *regulos* supported us with food and traditional ceremonies."¹⁰⁴

However, the President of Munhinga Locality went on to say that the exclusion of chiefs did play on popular resentment for the old order.

The *regulos* worked with the colonial government so how could they lead the government after independence? Many people who were *regulos* had relations with the Portuguese. So people in this area were very angry with the *regulos* and with the whites. All of them were attacked. The people pressured the government to put away the *regulos*.¹⁰⁵

Frelimo's denunciations of chiefs created space for the expression of popular resentment. Chief Buapua, then recently returned from jail in Beira, recalled his treatment,

After independence, they said they didn't need any *mambos*, that it was all finished.... They said, 'you made people suffer, we don't want you here. We will choose new people.' People began to laugh at the *mambos*. When we went to a beer drink we would be made fun of. I used to just stay at home. I was treated very badly, humiliated.¹⁰⁶

Frelimo's policies regarding chiefs seemed to have had a rural constituency amongst those who had been excluded from political authority in the past. Rural society was divided; there were struggles afoot reflecting a range of local interests.

Feelings about the constitution of the new Frelimo committees were variable. Some maintained fear and arbitrariness were the order of the day. In Chikwizo, for example, elders complained that:

Things took a dramatic turn at independence. The whites were chased away and the chiefs were stopped. Chiefs were replaced by secretaries. People were told the secretaries could not be former employees of the colonial government or chiefs.... Anyone could be chosen, there were no criteria -- a total stranger could be chosen. People from the party would visit the area, hold a rally, and

¹⁰³ Raposo, 1991, recounts a case where former colonial *sipais* arrived at the local Frelimo office to offer their services after independence.

¹⁰⁴ Interview, Cupenha, Munhinga, 27/10/93. - Interviews with members of the *antigos combatentes* association, Chimoio, 10/93, produced similar reactions.

¹⁰⁵ Interview, Cupenha, Munhinga, 27/10/93.

¹⁰⁶ Interview, Buapua, 3 de Fevereiro, 27/10/93.

they could just point at someone and say, 'we want this one'. Everyone would agree and clap their hands. They were afraid of Frelimo.¹⁰⁷

However, in many more areas, chiefs, elders, and current Frelimo secretaries described those who took up the new positions as people of integrity, as well-liked in the community, and as chosen in an uncoercive if not wholly democratic atmosphere.

Thus, a desire to exclude the colonial era rural political elite from office was not without a local constituency; nor, in many areas, were new Frelimo structures considered unwanted impositions. There was, however, little support for certain of Frelimo's policies or for, critically, the rapid re-establishment of an authoritarian political culture closed to debate over the most basic aspects of people's lives -- how they would live and farm, their struggles **with witchcraft and jealousy**. It was **less the creation of new structures than their repressive subordination to the Frelimo hierarchy and its agenda** which created a loss of support. The **post-independence political climate with its many 'mobilizations'** was described as rife with intimidation; the possibility of openly objecting to policies was considered laughable. Particularly resented were the suppression of avenues for redress against witchcraft resulting from the attack on 'obscurantism' and the *aldeias* policy. I consider witchcraft first.

A meeting with two elder brothers of the incumbent Chief Muriane, both men well over 60, and two younger Frelimo secretaries was revealing for the agreement it showed with regard to witchcraft, and the authoritarian nature of the new regime. The two old men held,

Witchcraft was dealt with very differently after independence. Before Frelimo, witchcraft cases were closely examined and the accused can be made to pay the one who suffered a loss. After independence, the [Frelimo] *Comites* would say we told you there are no witches, no *n'angas*. Some could go to the extent of calling a *n'anga* to testify. The *Comite* would treat the *n'anga* very badly, could beat him and accuse him of lying, ask, 'Where were you? How do you know of witchcraft?' He would be accused of spreading witchcraft.

The results were catastrophic: "Witchcraft is hard to control so the policies of that time encouraged witchcraft and it increased, it could operate under the cover of government policy."¹⁰⁹ Such perceptions were repeated time and again in interviews, and have been recorded elsewhere.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ Interview, Chikwizo, Sussundenga Sede, 30/11/93.

¹⁰⁸ E.g., interviews, Muriane, Muribane, 2/11/93; Buapua, 3 de Fevereiro, 27/10/93; Sanyatunze, Catandica, 19/11/93.

¹⁰⁹ Interview, Muriane, Muribane, 2/11/93.

¹¹⁰ For example, Chief Buapua held, "Frelimo said they didn't want *regulos, curandeiros* - no one could say there was a witch -- you would be accused of obscurantism if you said **someone was a witch, you would be put in jail**. The witches were free to do anything." Likewise, Chief Cupenha lamented, "[Witches] could do anything without punishment. The

Turning to the Frelimo secretaries, I asked what view they had held of these developments. One responded,

At that time, people had no say in what was happening -- we could only do what Frelimo said. The *Comite* represented Frelimo so what they said had to be followed. But most people thought this treatment of witchcraft was very bad.

The Muriane brothers confirmed this point of view:

The *Comite* was only reproducing what Frelimo said. People knew in their hearts that witches and *n'angas* and the chiefs were there but they couldn't express any opinion different from that of Frelimo -- you would be humiliated in front of a rally or you would be beaten. It was only fear. The changes were always coming from outside the community -- we didn't even know where they came from. People would just come to a rally and speak. Everyone thought it came from the authorities in Sussundenga. The only question you could ask was, 'I don't quite understand' and they would just repeat what they had said.

Blame for what had been a divisive and sometimes violently repressive time was laid on external authorities, absolving local actors of wrongdoing: "There was always someone who could enforce the policies -- not because anyone agreed with the policy but because they don't want to be seen contradicting a policy," maintained the Muriane elders.¹¹¹

Frelimo secretaries' accounts of the enforcement of such policies echoed chiefs' accounts of the necessity of enforcing measures such as tax collection and forced labor under the Portuguese: both stressed their inability to confront directly the power of the incumbent regime. However, and as in the colonial period, the exercise of authority by people empowered under a particular regime benefitted particular groups and left deep divisions. An elder from Chikwizo, for example, commented bitterly on both the attitudes of higher ranking Frelimo officials and the local people whose views had been privileged:

Frelimo told people that what they said was the only truth, it couldn't be disputed. They said, 'If you don't agree, we will put you through the barrel of a gun.' We knew this meant they would kill you because no one could fit through the barrel of a gun. No one could tell their idea if they hadn't served in the guerrilla army -- The first question was always, 'how many years were you a guerrilla?' If you weren't a guerrilla, then you couldn't speak. Even if you had a good idea, you had to keep quiet. Chiefs and others would only talk

curandeiros had all their materials burned at independence. They were attacked by the administration at the moment of mobilization, [they were] attacked as obscurantist in many meetings." Interviews, Buapua, 3 de Fevereiro, 27/10/93; Cupenha, Muzoria, Sussundenga Sede, 26/10/93. Also see particularly, Baptista Lundin, 1992, "Relatorio".

¹¹¹ Interview, Muriane, Muribane, 2/11/93.

in pairs about the problems of Frelimo. Frelimo had vigilantes who watched to make sure no one criticized Frelimo. This was when the silent suffering started.¹¹²

The new criteria for authority were deeply resented. Nonetheless, a strong dividing line was drawn between local and 'outside' authority, between Frelimo secretaries drawn from within communities and higher ranking officials of the party and state.

The problems associated with anti-obscurantism, and the inability to object to directives issued from above, were compounded by the introduction of *aldeias comunais*. As discussed in the previous section, people in Sussundenga perceived *aldeias* as primarily a counter-insurgency measure and, as such, as positive (in some cases) for the security and **benefits in terms of aid which they had brought**. However, even where *aldeias* were seen as justified in these terms, they were also cast as a fairly unmitigated social, economic and ecological disaster, as one of the direct and terrible costs of war.¹¹³

In discussions of *aldeias*, the question of witchcraft and other problems such as disease figured prominently. The post-independence boom in witchcraft was linked not only to the suppression of avenues for redress against it, but also to the tensions introduced by living closer together, as well as other economic and political changes. Elders in the Ganda area complained,

The houses were very close and the village was full of *feiticeros*. *Feiticeros* were free to make their job because if you are living in an *aldeia* they can see everything -- they can see who has money or good food, so jealousy and witchcraft were a big problem.¹¹⁴

Similarly, elders and Frelimo secretaries in Cupenha held:

There were many problems of thieves in the *aldeia* which didn't happen when we lived far apart -- the only problem then was with wild animals. [In addition,] in the *aldeia* you couldn't say that there is witchcraft -- people will take you to the police station for being obscurantist. You will suffer alot if you say there is *feitico*. The witches were completely free in the time of the *aldeia*.¹¹⁵

¹¹² Interview, Chikwizo, Sussundenga Sede, 30/11/93.

¹¹³ E.g., Interviews, Muriane, Muribane, 2/11/93; President of the Matica Executive Council, Matica Locality, 3/11/93. Such views were pervasive elsewhere. See *inter alia* Baptista Lundin, 1992, "Relatorio"; Borges Coehlo, 1993; Geffray, 1991; Casal, 1988.

¹¹⁴ Interview, Ganda, Matica Locality, 28/10/93.

¹¹⁵ Interview, Cupenha, Muzoria, Sussundenga Sede, 25, 26/10/93.

In Muriane, people stressed the additional problem of adultery: "When we lived far apart it was difficult for a person to be looking at a girl, but living close together is like in town -- you are always seeing people, so the cases were worse."¹¹⁶ In Buapua, disease was a major concern: "If you have a cough everyone will get it. During the night it sounds like music. It was very bad, there was no disease control."¹¹⁷ Other commonly, and vehemently voiced complaints included the lack of space for livestock to graze near to homes, the poor siting of villages, and long distances to fields.

The impact of *aldeias* in these respects was, however, uneven and should not be exaggerated. As discussed above, in many areas of Sussundenga, *aldeias* were shortlived, or never effectively implemented. In Barue, the Portuguese *aldeamentos* which followed the main Tete road were renamed and converted with little modification into *aldeias comunais*: the *aldeamentos* were blamed for many of the problems described above.¹¹⁸ In the mountains surrounding Catandica, *aldeias* faced grave and sometimes prohibitive obstacles for reasons of geography.¹¹⁹ In Macossa, the great push for *aldeias* in 1980/81 was followed very shortly by Renamo's occupation of the area, and their destruction. As Chief Nhunge succinctly commented, "*Aldeias* were established in 1981 and destroyed in 1982."¹²⁰

The failure to implement policies raises questions regarding state capacity: in practice, the Frelimo party-state was not so monolithic or hegemonic to be invulnerable to the need for locally negotiated compromises as a means to both bolster its legitimacy and increase its administrative capacity. Compromise was in fact commonplace, though it has been little recognized. It played on the progressive weakening of the state under pressure of opposition, economic decline and war, as well as on local officials' often sympathetic beliefs as regards 'tradition'. Far from the alien and ideologically coherent state depicted by Geffray in particular, local officials' views were often pragmatic, diverse, at times opportunistic. Local leaders' use of traditionalist critiques of the state were not, in the circumstances, surprising: they drew on the sympathies of local officials, on wartime uses of 'tradition' by both government and Renamo, and on Portuguese precedents. Ironically, Frelimo's anti-obscurantism gave the cultural a new force as a discourse of criticism and revived the Portuguese legacy with a vengeance as chiefs critically compared the concessions of the Portuguese with the egregious acts of Frelimo. Recourse to a traditionalist critique did not flow from a simple opposition between immutably traditional rural communities and a modernizing state: rather, it was an effective, historically grounded critique of the authoritarian implementation of centrally generated and deeply flawed policies, a rejection not of modernization *per se* but of failed and coercive modernization in the context of attempts to assert local control over processes central to rural life.

¹¹⁶ Interview, Muriane, Muribane, 2/11/93.

¹¹⁷ Interview, Buapua, 3 de Fevereiro, 27/10/93.

¹¹⁸ Interview by Erasmo Nhachungue, Sabao, Catandica, 16/11/93.

¹¹⁹ Interview, DDA, Catandica, Barue District, 7/10/93. Also see Raposo, 1991.

¹²⁰ Interview, Nhunge, Macossa Sede, 18/11/93.

Some Sussundenga cases illustrate the complexity of the relationship between officials, local party secretaries and chiefs. Particularly important in this context were debates over rainmaking ceremonies. The case of the Chirenje medium was particularly dramatic. Situated at Mount Dzembe just over the northern border of Sussundenga, the Chirenje family claimed to have come from Zimbabwe at the behest of the then ruling Karanga dynasty in a time of devastating drought. At a large meeting held with chiefs, Frelimo secretaries, church officials and others at Mount Dzembe, the Chirenje medium recounted his first encounter with Frelimo in 1976:

Frelimo came looking for me because there was a drought -- they accused me of causing the drought, of not making rain, and arrested me. They said I should be killed for causing a drought. I said, 'Did you look for us? Did you explain what you want? How were we to know?' When I was arrested they brought me to a meeting, they had prepared ropes to hang me. I cried. I explained that if they had come to me we could have held a ceremony, it could have rained. So they changed their minds and asked me what I needed to make rain. I asked for 12 men to construct a house for rain ceremonies [*chihungwene*]. Frelimo asked to be involved in the ceremonies, but I said they couldn't be because no soldiers or guns could be there. Either I did it [alone] or Frelimo did it alone. They let me proceed and on this day it rained heavily. From then, when the hut was constructed, Frelimo respected the rainmakers, even asking the local Frelimo people why they hadn't told them about the rainmakers -- these were the people they were looking for.¹²¹

Rural 'obscurantism' was thus brought into alliance with Frelimo structures as the Chirenje medium served yet another political authority in need of rain.

In a less dramatic but equally revealing case, a locally negotiated compromise was struck in the Ganda chieftaincy. The northern 'block' of the *Empresa Agricola de Sussundenga*, the district's largest state farm, was situated in close proximity to Ganda's home. The current Chief Ganda described his relations with Frelimo and the *chefe* of the state farm 'block':

When Frelimo entered this area, they said there are no *regulos*, no *curandeiros*, no religious people. They could only stay at home. But I didn't stop making rain -- even the party members contributed maize and mapira for rain.... Ceremonies stopped [only] from 1974-1979 but when there was a drought in 1979, the *chefe* of the state farm block asked the *regulo* why there was no rain. I said, 'because you ordered us to stop the ceremonies.' The *chefe* talked to the administration and they sent *pombe* [opaque beer] and chickens for a rain ceremony because the drought was hurting the state farm enterprise.¹²²

¹²¹ Interview, Chirenje/Katize, Mount Dzembe, 4/11/93.

¹²² Interview, Ganda, Matica Locality, 28/10/93.

The flexibility and needs of local officials thus led to the reintroduction of a banned ceremony only a few years after independence: again, the reigning authorities perceived themselves to be dependent upon a local chief's knowledge and authority. Likewise, in Barue, chiefs said that, though they had been rudely removed from their houses, deprived of their salaries, and prohibited from political office, they were never stopped, and were even supported, in their rainmaking capacities. As Chief Sanyatunze put it, "The rain ceremonies continued because the new regime also intended to eat."¹²³

Appeals to chiefs were also germane in other spheres of state intervention. In one case, an attempt to install a generator on the Revue River in the absence of local consultation forced another recognition of local spiritual authority. A civil servant who had participated in the project recounted:

Before 1983, they were using diesel engines [to produce power]: we had no electricity. So, we asked to use the Revue [Dam's] power -- some engineers came to prepare the generator. Two times they put the engine near the river, and for two times it was moved to a new area. The generator is in *Regulo* Muriane's area -- he came to talk to the administrator, complaining about the noise, and saying people don't want this noise. He told the administrator you have to ask for permission. He asked the administrator to bring five liters of wine, black, white and red cloth, and to leave these things there at the generator. [He said,] 'If the things were still there the next day, you cannot put the generator in place, if the things are gone, then you can go ahead with the project.' All the people who worked on the project, including the [ex-patriate] engineers, went to a meeting with Muriane. We took off our shoes and sat on the ground, and made a ceremony with *pombe* -- the administrator had to bring the *pombe*. We prepared a small party for five minutes and then there was a big wind and we couldn't see anything at all for five minutes, not even the hand in front of your face.... Since then, there have been no problems with the power supply.¹²⁴

Chief Muriane was himself an eclectic politician: he was not only chief but also the Frelimo village secretary. When the *aldeia* was established in Muriane in 1980, he was active in its formation. "He did not do that in his capacity as chief but as a party activist," recounted his elder brothers, "He was placed in charge of the village. He was chosen in the same way as the [Frelimo] *Comite*, by the people."¹²⁵

The incidents cited above occurred in the 1970s and early 1980s. Chissano's accession to power in 1986 led to a more overt official recognition of trends towards tolerance, though

¹²³ Interview by Erasmo Nhachungue, Sanyatunze, Catandica, 19/11/93.

¹²⁴ Interview, Ministry of Agriculture official, Sussundenga, 3/11/93.

¹²⁵ Interview, Muriane, Muribane, 2/11/93. That 'traditional' leaders sometimes attained or maintained positions of authority after independence has also been noted by e.g. Geffray, 1991 and O'Laughlin, 1992.

policy with regard to chiefs has remained unclear and open to interpretation by local officials. Chiefs recounted that they were told they had official authority to conduct rain and other ceremonies. The President of Munhinga Locality Executive Council described communicating this information to chiefs:

In 1986, we were told *regulos* could do their ceremonies by Chissano.... From 1986, they decided to revive the *regulos*. I asked the *regulos* to talk. [They] were very surprised and asked, 'why do you talk to us now?' I said the new government wants to see you working with us, making your ceremonies. From then on, we have worked well together.

At the same interview, Chief Cupenha's nephew commented on not only the recognition given chiefs but the more tolerant political milieu:

In the time before Chissano, no one could say, 'this is my opinion', they could only say, 'yes, yes'. When Chissano came, people could say what they think. People told Chissano they wanted *regulos* so they could have ceremonies. People asked the government for *regulos*. It could even be the same people who said in 1975 that they didn't want *regulos*.¹²⁶

Unlike previous locally negotiated alliances, this change was seen as bearing the stamp of central authority.

The opening of official attitudes created opportunities for, or merely recognized, increased activism on the part of 'traditional' authorities, and the acceptability of collaboration in this by Frelimo secretaries and others. The interactions among local leaders could be both shocking and enlightening. In the above case, the Munhinga Council President recalled his attendance at a revived rain ceremony in 1991. As a Zionist, he had been horrified: "I saw people dancing, naked women with no capulanas, asking me to be their husbands, grabbing me and pulling me. So I ran away.... The rain ceremony itself is very bad for young boys." The Council President and Chief Cupenha's nephew exchanged views on the topic with great humor, content to allow each other their differences.¹²⁷ This mutual respect and tolerance was vividly demonstrated in Muriane in a debate between two Frelimo secretaries and two elders of the royal family over a shortage of chairs at the outset of the interview: both fell to trying to grant the better seats to each other in a mini-theatre of the respect they were now able, and needed, to accord one another, and of the goodwill on which political institutions will need to draw in future.

In recent years, other initiatives on the part of chiefs were directed at peace and reconciliation. In Barue, chiefs organized ceremonies intended to bring an end to the war in 1989 and 1990. The ceremonies consisted in filling a length of cane with snuff, taking it to a sacred tree (the site of post-harvest ceremonies), and appealing to the ancestors to intervene

¹²⁶ Interview, Cupenha, Munhinga, 27/10/93. Similar views were expressed elsewhere e.g., Interview, Mavita, Mouha, 28/10/93.

¹²⁷ Interview, Cupenha, Munhinga, 27/10/93.

to stop the war. Subsequently, a ceremony to allow elders to thank the ancestors for the end of the war was held in November 1992; another ceremony for the public was planned for December 1993.¹²⁸ Chiefs in Sussundenga sought to confront some of the legacies of the war by organizing ceremonies intended to invoke a heavy and cleansing rain to 'wash away' unburied, unidentified bodies whose presence was held to cause a range of problems.¹²⁹

At a more mundane level, chiefs were involved where other local authorities felt unable to deal with problems and conflicts. In northern Sussundenga, the President of Matica Locality Executive Council emphatically argued that chiefs made a positive and necessary contribution. The council met with Chief Ganda twice monthly; the President held that Ganda's court was preferred over the more formal district court. More widely, he felt,

The change with regard to chiefs is good. In this culture there are many things which need to be respected, there are traditions only the chiefs know, which the government doesn't know.... The chiefs have to be custodians, they know what the traditions mean. For example, when Nhambamba II [one of the PDRM villages discussed in Section I] was formed [in 1989] people died mysteriously and no one knew why. We asked the chief to make ceremonies and the problem stopped. When the chiefs are ignored, it can complicate the way of living.¹³⁰

Cooperation with chiefs thus allowed a more effective resolution of problems which other local authorities did not feel capable of confronting.

The new openness did not, however, succeed in fully overcoming the distrust and bitterness engendered by Frelimo's earlier policies and authoritarian practices. While maintaining that things had indeed changed dramatically, chiefs and others remained circumspect. Cupen'aa's nephew commented: "The *regulos* aren't working 100%. We're not sure we're legal, we have doubts. We don't know if the government is only experimenting - we might be rejected, so we will wait and see."¹³¹ Others wished for an explanation of the reversal in policy: Chief Chikwizo commented with some bitterness, "Frelimo says they made a mistake the first time. If it was possible, we would like to ask Frelimo why we were stopped in the first place, but you can't go back and ask them now."¹³² Many saw the years of repression as bearing permanent costs in terms of a loss of knowledge by the younger generation, as well as by elders of chieftaincies. While recent changes were certainly positive in many respects, the construction of an alternative political culture still faced profound obstacles.

¹²⁸ Interview by Erasmo Nhachungue, Sanyatunze, Catandica, 19/11/93.

¹²⁹ Interview, Cupenha, Muzoria, Sussundenga Sede, 26/10/93.

¹³⁰ Interview, Matica, 3/11/93.

¹³¹ Interview, Cupenha, Munhinga, 27/10/93.

¹³² Interview, Chikwizo, Sussundenga Sede, 30/11/93.

Moreover, the reasons behind official concessions to chiefs need to be carefully assessed. They were not wholly motivated by a desire to reverse previous intolerance. In part, the greater role granted chiefs flowed from Renamo's wartime competition for their allegiance, and its current appeals for their support.¹³³ Concessions to chiefs also flowed from the blow to Frelimo structures which had followed from Renamo's attacks upon them,¹³⁴ and a wider demoralization brought about by disaffection with Frelimo's policies and methods, and economic decline: from a practical point of view, officials needed alternative structures to implement and enforce policies.¹³⁵

Reflecting these pressures, recent concessions increasingly drew chiefs into state-backed roles, changing the nature of their activities and power relations within local communities. These initiatives drew on Portuguese traditions of indirect rule: chiefs were in some instances promised a return of the houses built for them; by the Portuguese,¹³⁶ officials' donations of cloth and other goods to rainmaking ceremonies followed directly in Portuguese precedents. In some cases chiefs were used to enforce policies. Chiefs often constructive role in resolving disputes over land, for example, could take on quite another implication: in one instance, local officials called upon a chief to aid in the eviction of 'family' farmers from 'private' land, i.e. to serve state, and certain economic, ends in an invented traditional role.¹³⁷

Much as the implications of officials' attitudes toward chiefs need to be carefully assessed, so do those of chiefs. Chiefs' vision of a desired contemporary role mirrored Portuguese 'community development' rather than some more ancient golden era: their existence in relation to the state was taken for granted, their vision of a desired future defined in relation to it. Many chiefs straightforwardly offered their services to the state, sometimes seeing this role as simply one of resuming their colonial duties. For example, Chief Chikwizo commented,

¹³³ See Wilson, 1992, pp. 548-51 on Frelimo's military uses of spiritual authorities and magic in an effort to combat Renamo's use of the same. Lauriciano, 1990, dates this change to the mid to late 1980s. With regard to the current period, one of the few aspects of Renamo's political program known in government held areas was its pledge to reinstitute chiefs. E.g., Interview, Sanyatunze, Catandica, 23/11/93.

¹³⁴ That Renamo targeted Frelimo officials in its attacks is widely documented. To quote just one gruesome account from the Frelimo Locality Organizing Secretary in Muribane: "The Frelimo secretaries were targeted -- Renamo would cut their ears off, roast them and force the secretaries to eat them, as well as many other punishments. This weakened Frelimo because people were reluctant to be elected. They would know they were targets... People wanted to avoid it." Interview, Muriane, Muribane, 2/11/93.

¹³⁵ This point of view was overtly stated by e.g. the Sussundenga District Administrator. Interview, Sussundenga Sede, 29/10/93.

¹³⁶ E.g., Interview by Erasmo Nhachungue, Sabao, Catandica, 16/11/93.

¹³⁷ Interviews, Cupenha, Muzoria, Sussundenga Sede, 26/10/93; Administrator, Sussundenga Sede, Sussundenga District, 29/10/93.

Frelimo is the one that has to give us instructions -- Frelimo told us to go away, and now Frelimo says to come back. So Frelimo should say what our duties are. If necessary, we could go back to the administration and ask for the records from the Portuguese time -- [there] are records of our duties, and we are willing to resume them.¹³⁸

Others were concerned over the question of status and recognition, wanting the state's material and other backing in reasserting their authority within their communities. Chief Ganda held,

In the future, we think the government must help us to be in our place. Now no one can know who is a *mambo* or *mfumo*. We have no uniform: we need a uniform like in the Portuguese days, so we can be identified. Even in the army you have a hierarchy of uniforms -- so the government needs to pay attention to this so people can respect us.¹³⁹

Chief Cupenha maintained, "I need to prepare this place [his home] as a place of power.... Now that I'm back to power I must prepare a house." The administrator had in fact promised to seek funds for a house from Chimoio.¹⁴⁰

Requests for official recognition of their status in terms of houses or uniforms went hand in hand with chiefs' desire for material support more widely, and for the authority to enforce what they portrayed as 'traditional' rules which had broken down due to war and Frelimo's earlier policies. Chief Buapua maintained,

The *mambos* would like to travel to places to explain the rules, but we can't move easily now. The role of the *mambo* which I want to explain is that I have *mfumos* who must control people in the area, to stop fighting, to produce well, to refrain from witchcraft. If there are witches, the family affected must go to the *mfumo* and to the *mambo*.

Buapua was also greatly concerned over a lack of money to purchase the black and white cloths necessary for rain ceremonies.¹⁴¹ Chief Mavita's advisor likewise made a plea for material support:

The *regulo* has a problem in that many people who ran away from the war are coming back and they ask the *regulo* for help. They have nothing, no tools, axes, pots. The *regulo* finds it embarrassing because he has no solution -- he wants to ask the government to help people.

¹³⁸ Interview, Chikwizo, Sussundenga Sede, 30/11/93.

¹³⁹ Interview, Ganda, Matica Locality, 28/10/93.

¹⁴⁰ Interview, Cupenha, Muzoria, Sussundenga Sede, 25/10/93.

¹⁴¹ Interview, Buapua, 3 de Fevereiro, 27/10/93.

Mavita's advisor maintained that, "the *regulo* has to do all the things the government orders," but sought to cast this in terms of a patronage relationship.¹⁴²

In the case of Mavita and others, the question of breaking rules often touched on sacred land. Chiefs wanted the authority to evict people, usually those displaced by war, from these areas; they linked the question (along with other issues) to drought. Thus Mavita's adviser held that one cause of drought was, "the people who are making *machambas* in forbidden places":

They know that these places are sacred but because the government said the *regulo* can't give rules, he had no power to protect the areas.... Since Chissano said *regulos* could do their ceremonies in 1986, we have been telling people about the rules. Now there are still people in the sacred areas, people who refused to leave. They want this land because it is very fertile. Land near the sede is tired. That area is sacred because the mountain is where the secret of the rain is -- the spirits will be angry if you make *machambas* there.¹⁴³

Similarly, Chief Ganda maintained: "The war caused disorder -- many people are making *machambas* in sacred places, in cemeteries, there is no good behaviour. Now we are ordering people to stop. This should help people to behave well, to show respect for sacred areas, to learn the rules. All this broke down."¹⁴⁴

These initiatives were not simply the expression of a resurgent rural culture: they represented claims to power and control over resources by specific groups, usually autochthonous lineages; they threatened the interests, in these cases the access to land, of others, often displaced people or others described as 'outsiders'. Questions regarding authority and access to land were not clear cut, but hotly debated within communities. The tensions in the Chirenje area were illustrative.¹⁴⁵ A local Frelimo secretary explained:

There are problems which we discuss at drinking places. For example, the people displaced by war who are cutting trees and cultivating in the mountain [the sacred Mount Dzembe]. People are now accusing the chief and the rainmakers of not controlling this -- they say those people cultivating there must have paid the chiefs and rainmakers. But the chiefs gave them up to this season to move, because they went there due to war. But some are refusing to move. We are worried now because people are accusing the chief of being paid.

¹⁴² Interview, Mavita, Mouha, 28/10/93.

¹⁴³ Interview, Mavita, Mouha, 28/10/93.

¹⁴⁴ Interview, Ganda, Matica Locality, 28/10/93.

¹⁴⁵ Paragraph based on Interview, Chirenje/Katize, Mount Dzembe, 4/11/93.

The Chirenje medium elaborated:

Those people are plowing there because of the war and because of Frelimo taking all our powers -- so we couldn't enforce rules, tell people to stop. That's how they went there to begin with. It's also an internal problem. These people came from Katize to cultivate on the mountain -- they should have paid a fine for cultivating there and then they should move. The fine was paid and taken to *Mumbo* Katize but then the fine should have been brought back to Chirenje so we could make a ceremony. But the money disappeared with Katize. Now, we didn't get anything but people are accusing us of taking the money. And because we never made the ceremony to apologize to the spirits, the people never moved. They say, 'we paid, but there was no ceremony. So, the money was to buy the land, and we can stay.' I went to ask the people to move but they demanded their money back.

These accusations accompanied others directed against Frelimo secretaries charged with collecting contributions for rainmaking ceremonies: the medium held that they kept the money for themselves, and that this behaviour also contributed to poor rainfall. Ideas about legitimate authority, about ritual and control over resources, were extremely controversial: they require debate and negotiation, they cannot be simply 'recognized' or 'reinstated'.

It bears stressing that official recognition for chieftaincy will not necessarily transform relations of power between local communities and the state: the issue requiring redress is less the earlier repression of things 'traditional' than the authoritarian relation between central and local authority which was its source. Indeed, a strong state intervention on the side of chieftaincy runs the risk of silencing emergent debate, of tipping a fragile balance now emerging in government held areas among local Frelimo, 'traditional' and other authorities. Such a stance may well give the state an avenue for administrative intervention, legitimized through an appeal to 'tradition', and allow chiefs to become less accountable to their constituencies. Creating an administrative and political framework which can accommodate conflict resolution, represent diverse constituencies and mediate effectively with a central state requires a more complex and subtle solution than the endorsement of a re-emergent alliance between official and 'traditional' authority.

Many of the challenges faced in government held areas were far graver in those controlled by Renamo. I now turn to a consideration of the recent history of political authority in these areas.

C. Renamo, Royals and Rainmakers

As discussed in Section I, the spread of Renamo's war caused massive population movements and transformations in land access, use and tenure; local economies were badly undermined. War, migration and economic collapse also had a dramatic impact on structures of political, administrative and religious authority: Renamo's particular brand of wartime control, and its subsequent peacetime administration, affected vast areas of Manica Province. Below, I discuss the uses made of political authority in the Renamo zones of Macossa, and **the impact on neighboring government-controlled Barue, as well as on Sussundenga.**

According to local accounts, Renamo first arrived in Macossa in 1979 and subsequently consolidated its control in 1982. The history of the area prior to this was not dissimilar to the areas discussed above: chiefs had been denounced -- told they "belonged to Caetano"¹⁴⁶ -- and excluded from political office, regardless of their war-time politics. However, the attitudes of chiefs interviewed in Macossa were distinctly more critical and less forgiving than those encountered in government controlled areas: none gave any credence to Frelimo structures, instead contending that they had been chosen at random, in the presence of soldiers, and did not even draw on those 'ordinary' people who had held Frelimo positions during the war.¹⁴⁷ The briefly established *aldeias* had further contributed to disaffection. Nonetheless, Renamo's arrival was not greeted with any popular enthusiasm, though some chiefs held that the way had been paved for at least their own sympathy as a consequence of Frelimo's denunciations.¹⁴⁸ Many people fled in the early 1980s: some "left the aldeias for the bush to hide"; others went to government held Barue, settling in Catandica, in camps along the Tete road, or further afield.¹⁴⁹ Members of Frelimo structures were particularly likely to flee as, like elsewhere, they were targeted for attack. Chief Nhunge understatedly commented, "Renamo used to threaten them, so many ran away."¹⁵⁰

Between 1982 and 1987, Renamo placed severe restrictions on movement, threatening death to those who tried to flee.¹⁵¹ Another outflux was only possible in 1987/88 when the Zimbabwean army in conjunction with the FAM briefly retook areas of Macossa, including the sede, an offensive which involved aerial bombardment and mining, and which allowed the brief re-establishment of a skeletal government presence.¹⁵² The government's subsequent military withdrawal was accompanied by additional flight and 'recuperations', i.e. the movement of people out of areas under threat by, or under the control of, Renamo. Subsequently, the government administrator for Macossa lived in Catandica, the administrative sede of Barue District. His authority extended only over those displaced from Macossa to camps in Barue.

¹⁴⁶ Interview, Nhaute, Macossa Sede, 17/11/93. As elsewhere, this and other phrases were recalled with remarkable uniformity.

¹⁴⁷ Interviews, Nhaute, Macossa Sede, 17/11/93; Nhaute, Catandica, 6/10/93; Nhunge, Macossa Sede, 18/11/93.

¹⁴⁸ Interviews, Nhaute, Macossa Sede, 17/11/93; Nhunge, Macossa Sede, 18/11/93.

¹⁴⁹ Interview, Nhunge, Macossa Sede, 18/11/93.

¹⁵⁰ Interview, Nhunge, Macossa Sede, 18/11/93.

¹⁵¹ Interviews by Erasmo Nhachungue of people displaced from Macossa, Macossa Cruzamento, 17/11/93. Also see Wilson, 1992, p. 534 on Renamo attempts to control population movements.

¹⁵² Interviews by Erasmo Nhachungue of people displaced from Macossa, Macossa Cruzamento, 17/11/93.

Government and party structures were not the only ones to undergo disruption. Renamo control over Macossa, and over the central Gorongosa mountains onto which Macossa abuts, also created ruptures, if less dramatic ones, in local and regional structures of 'traditional' authority. Holders of chiefly offices suffered attrition as they fled or were 'recuperated' in the wake of offensives by both sides, leading to another wave of reshuffling and restructuring of Macossa's chieftaincies.¹⁵³ For example, Chief Clever Nhaute left Macossa in 1988 because: "the Zimbabwean army brought me out with others when they attacked the area." He took up a job as a cook in a Catandica hotel and was subsequently replaced as chief by his cousin Langton Nhaute. Langton was himself displaced within Macossa: he was moved from his home to a more secure area under Renamo control in 1989, only returning in 1993.¹⁵⁴

The Chigwinene chieftaincy had similar troubles: Shadreck Chigwinene recounted how his elder brother, Ken, the then chief, had fled, "to the *aldeias* in Catandica" when Renamo first arrived. In 1982, Shadreck was appointed chief in his place. Renamo nonetheless sought to recapture Ken and eventually succeeded. Shortly thereafter, however, the Zimbabwean army captured him once again.¹⁵⁵ Shadreck remained as chief, exercising authority over not only his own area but also those of neighboring Chiefs Mpanzi and Sawenje, both of whom had "run away" according to Shadreck, though at least the latter office had simply lain vacant since just before independence.¹⁵⁶ Renamo kidnap attempts also extended to chiefs and the *mhondoro* medium; Magodo, who were based in Barue. According to Chief Sanyatunze:

Renamo looked for the chiefs several times without success. Only my wife was taken, but she was returned when they realized they had kidnapped the wife of the chief.... Renamo tried to capture Magodo three times, but they failed because of Magodo's powers. Magodo thought to teach them a lesson - - when they came to steal him, they then tried to leave but they couldn't find the path. Only after asking to be released were they able to get to their bases.

¹⁵³ Disruptions of chieftaincy associated with wartime displacement were also common in Sussundenga, e.g. in the cases of Chikwizo and Xau. The disruptions of Renamo's war should be seen in historical perspective. As discussed earlier, chieftaincies had undergone many reorderings previously; in Macossa this was strikingly the case following the Barue rebellion. At an everyday level, it should be noted that chiefly succession rarely followed set rules, instead passing through a range of relatives who were present and influential, or simply appealed to the reigning regime, at times of interregnum.

¹⁵⁴ Interviews, Nhaute, Macossa Sede, 17/11/93; Nhaute, Catandica, 6/10/93.

¹⁵⁵ Interview, Chigwinene, Nhamagua, 22/11/93. Whether the Zimbabweans specifically sought to compete for control over chiefs is unclear, but is certainly a possibility.

¹⁵⁶ The Sawenje chiefly office was vacant from 1974, following the death of the then incumbent. At the time of research, Bairro Sawenje had just been appointed chief, on 20 October 1993. Interviews, Chigwinene and Sawenje, Nhamagua, 22/11/93.

This did not, however, imply any political allegiance on Magodo's part. "Magodo didn't support any side during the war, he was independent."¹⁵⁷

Renamo's use of mediums in the war was in fact widespread, and has received attention elsewhere: the impact on political authorities dependent upon mediums has, however, been neglected. The war and Renamo's occupation disrupted chiefs' pilgrimages to, and ceremonies associated with, regional rainmaking shrines in both Macossa and Sussundenga: the mountains in which regional shrines fell were militarily important, and their mediums became embroiled in the war.

Samatenje, located in Renamo's Gorongosa heartland, is of great importance to the chieftaincies of Macossa, as well as more widely. In theory, Chief Nhaute makes an annual pilgrimage to Samatenje; other chiefs such as Nhunge and Chigwinene hold local rainmaking ceremonies, appealing to Samatenje via Nhaute only in cases of drought.¹⁵⁸ Langton Nhaute said that he takes (at least) *mapfunde* and maize seeds and a *badza* (hoe) to Samatenje. Samatenje then climbs the mountain where he consults the ancestors via his sister, the *svikiro* (medium). (According to Nhaute, the *svikiro* must be a woman -- she may marry but must stay in the area). Samatenje subsequently reports to Nhaute who undertakes the journey home, during which he must not speak to anyone or wash his hands should he eat sadza.

Chiefs in Macossa held that the war, and the economic hardships which had accompanied it, had played havoc with their abilities to carry out these rainmaking ceremonies properly, a cause of great concern particularly in the devastating droughts of the late 1980s and early 1990s. They complained that, since 1980, their isolation from markets and the absence of state support had prevented them from taking black and white cloths to Samatenje, as had been the norm under the Portuguese. In 1991, drought had prevented the pilgrimage altogether as Nhaute and other chiefs such as Chigwinene were unable to procure even the necessary seeds; Nhunge said he had been asked to contribute kudu meat in the same year, but had likewise been unable to comply. High hopes (and, as it turned out, fulfilled ones) accompanied then ongoing preparations for the 1993/94 season.

The war also had more direct costs. Langton Nhaute explained:

The war has had a bad effect on rainmaking. Samatenje's mother was raided by Renamo in 1986 [following the successful Zimbabwean offensive against Gorongosa] and placed in the Zambezi area.... Dhlakama suspected that she was helping the Zimbabwean soldiers who were here at the time. But this wasn't the case: Samatenje isn't for war, only for rain. As a result..., Samatenje was disturbed and couldn't do his job.

Other accounts held that Samatenje was not so innocent of wartime alliances. These contend that Samatenje (the brother? the sister? both?) established a 'peace zone' in roughly 1987 by

¹⁵⁷ Interview by Erasmo Nhachungue, Sanyatunze, Catandica, 19/11/93.

¹⁵⁸ The following account is based on interviews, Chigwinene and Sawenje, Nhamagua, 22/11/93; Nhaute, Macossa Sede, 17/11/93; Nhunge, Macossa Sede, 18/11/93.

convincing Renamo commanders that any abuses of people or carrying of weapons in the area would result in the offender dying from the bite of a snake or attack of a lion. They also suggest that Samatenje sold war medicines to both Renamo and Frelimo: Karl Maier reported that Renamo radio transcripts captured at Gorongosa recorded military maneuvers by the spirit lions of Samatenje.¹⁵⁹

Whatever the case may be, the difficulties which chiefs perceived in their relations with the Samatenje medium were held to have exacerbated drought, forcing chiefs to compensate by relying on local ceremonies which were themselves hampered by lack of access to markets, cloth and materials for brewing beer, etc. The displaced Clever Nhante compensated for his own lack of access by turning his attentions to the *mhondoro* medium, Magodo, whose influence covered the Catandica area from north of Honde to Nhazonia: he stressed the importance of this medium, rather than Samatenje, and kept in contact with local Chiefs Sabao and Sanyatunze, as well as the government administrator for Macossa, himself also 'displaced' to Catandica.

In the less well known case of Sussundenga, rumors abounded regarding the Ma'ate authorities' powers and response to the war. Chief Ma'ate acts as intermediary to the medium Chimerera. Via Chief Muriane, most chiefs in Sussundenga appeal to him in times of drought.¹⁶⁰ Local accounts held that the Ma'ate area had become impenetrable to soldiers of either side. A former Frelimo militia member who had operated throughout Sussundenga during the war recounted:

At Ma'ate's place there is a big forest. At the beginning of the war, Renamo went there but had no contact with Ma'ate. The spirits then guided the government troops to Renamo -- Renamo was forced to go away from Ma'ate's place, not far, out outside his zone of influence. Government troops destroyed the Renamo base and then decided to stay there. But Ma'ate didn't want them there, they didn't follow the rules, so they got in and had to return to Sussundenga. No one can stay in Ma'ate's bush. Ma'ate helped FAM to drive away Renamo thinking they would [then] leave.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁹ See Lauriciano, 1990; Maier, 1991; Vines, 1991, p. 110; Wilson, 1992, p. 557.

¹⁶⁰ Accounts differed over whether Chimerera was related to the Ma'ate royal family. However, there was agreement that it was the accepted practice in times of drought (i.e. when local rainmaking ceremonies had failed) for the Sussundenga chiefs to gather and meet with Chief Muriane who would then send Chief Chikwizo to speak with Chief Ma'ate. Ma'ate was the only one with direct access to the medium. Some variations were also reported, e.g. Chief Mavita and Chief Buapua held that they could also communicate directly with Ma'ate. Interviews, Buapua, 3 de Fevereiro, 27/10/93; Chirenje, Dzembe, 4/11/93; Ganda, Matica Locality, 28/10/93; Muriane, Muribane, 2/11/93; Mavita, Mbuha, 28/10/93; Chikwizo, Sussundenga Sede, 30/11/93.

¹⁶¹ Interview, former Frelimo militia member, Sussundenga, 25/10/93. The same person described a similar case in the area of Muchamba, also within Renamo controlled southern Sussundenga: "Muchamba is a place where lions are chiefs. It is a very bad place, with many

Ma'ate thus succeeded in constraining the scope of armed forces, acting with an autonomy granted by his access to spiritual powers. However, as in the case of Samatenje, the creation of a 'neutral zone' did not allow continued interaction with the chiefs who relied upon Ma'ate for rainmaking.

From the perspective of the chieftaincies in northern Sussundenga, the separation from Ma'ate was disastrous. Chief Cupenha, in Sussundenga Sede, commented.

We couldn't prepare ceremonies during the war, we couldn't go to the bush at all, we were only in town. To do the ceremonies, we have to go to the bush, and the war was there. For almost 15 or 16 years we couldn't do the ceremonies. The tradition was completely stopped.¹⁶²

Buapua, along with other chiefs, confirmed, "...the [recent] drought was caused by war because you can't go to the place where the ceremony is held. Before last year, from 1975 to 1991, there were no ceremonies [at Ma'ate]."¹⁶³ This state of affairs had, as in Macossa, led to attempts to compensate. Chief Cupenha explained, "During the war we had problems doing the ceremony but we were lucky because one of Ma'ate's grandsons lives in Sussundenga and he could do a ceremony." The Chirenje medium simply went it alone:

Ma'ate and Chirenje are the two big rainmakers -- [in the past] we couldn't do rain ceremonies without each others' knowledge. But now, we don't even know where to find Ma'ate because he is in the Renamo zone. It is difficult because no one is coming from there. Ma'ate used to send someone to *Mumbo Ganda* and Ganda would come here. This is not happening now, but we are still doing our ceremonies.¹⁶⁴

Chiefs and mediums proved flexible and adaptable: they relied more on those who were accessible, e.g. the Chirenje medium and Ma'ate's grandson in Sussundenga, the Magodo medium in Barue, and on those local ceremonies it was still possible to enact. This was, of course, far from ideal, and, in the local view, had contributed to drought and a disruption of relationships with the spirit world, one which was only partially and tentatively re-established with peace.

taboos. If you see a place to sit, you may sit down and then not be able to get up again. If you go to drink water from a river with a glass or your hands you will die. You can only drink with your mouth as animals do. Both Frelimo and Renamo suffered in Muchamba's place because they didn't know the rules."

¹⁶² Interview, Cupenha, Muzoria, Sussundenga Sede, 25/10/93.

¹⁶³ Interview, Buapua, 3 de Fevereiro, 27/10/93; also Chikwizo, Sussundenga Sede, 30/11/93.

¹⁶⁴ Interview, Chirenje, Mount Dzembe, 4/11/93.

In Renamo areas, chiefs faced other challenges as they were drawn upon in a variety of roles supportive of Renamo's war effort.¹⁶⁵ In areas it occupied, Renamo gave 'traditional' hierarchies pride of place, unsurprisingly given the lack of an alternative, and the direct challenge such a move posed to Frelimo's ideology. Renamo's wartime administration was, however, far from restorationist. Not surprisingly, Renamo created new positions, new titles, new duties and responsibilities. For example, in Macossa (as elsewhere), Renamo established *Mujiba*, a quasi-police force recruited locally; the judicial posts of *Mucuzu* were renamed *Matubo*. From the perspective of local elders, these initiatives did not, however, denote a radical break with previous political practices, a sentiment indicative of the regularity of upheaval. Chiefs' views were historical and sanguine, products of a volatile history: from the depredations and demands of the Barue Macombes and prazo holders, to the suppression of the Barue rebellion, to the semi-liberated areas of Frelimo, to the early control established by Renamo, Macossa had been the subject of violent contestation. From the point of view of elders within Macossa's chieftaincies, the introduction of new posts and duties by Renamo followed earlier precedents and was, in itself, uncontroversial.¹⁶⁶

Renamo's relations with chiefs had, in fact, a strong Portuguese resonance, combining support for certain aspects of 'tradition' with violence and extraction. Chiefly hierarchies were charged with providing food and labor, the latter usually for portage, and incorporating outsiders, generally captives, as well as with other roles.¹⁶⁷ Chiefs' descriptions of life under Renamo combined praise for the respect accorded the recently much maligned 'traditional' authorities with deep resentment for coercion and extraction, particularly forced portage. Chief Chigwinene stressed that Renamo soldiers did not enter his area without consultation: "Renamo always asked permission: they had a rule of always consulting chiefs in the area in which they were operating."¹⁶⁸ Chief Nhunge was happy that, "Renamo worked with the *Nhacuava*, *Tsapandas* and *Mfumos*" but complained of demands for food and the fact that

¹⁶⁵ Though I do not seek to make any distinctions here, largely because my research is not detailed enough to allow it, it seems that Renamo's wartime structures of control changed over time. In local accounts of Macossa, there seemed to be a transition roughly in 1986, subsequent to the fall of Gorongosa, and possibly due to an influx of senior Renamo leaders. Some held that abuses were curtailed at this point, and that structures were reformed, e.g. *Mujiba* were renamed *Policia* and had their powers curbed.

¹⁶⁶ Nhaute and Nhunge elders dismissed the issue, noting that all outside rulers followed such practices; others found precedents for Renamo posts in Portuguese offices. Thus Chief Chigwinene held *Mujiba* were 'traditional' because they were similar to the Portuguese *cabos de terra*. Interviews, Nhaute, Macossa Sede, 17/11/93; Nhunge, 18/11/93; Chigwinene, Nhamagua, 22/11/93.

¹⁶⁷ The recruitment of soldiers and prevention of flight were considered military duties. Interestingly, in interviews, elders described recruitment practices as bearing a strong continuity from the days of the Barue Macombes, through Frelimo to Renamo. E.g., Interview, Nhaute, Macossa Sede, 13/11/93.

¹⁶⁸ Interview, Chigwinene, Nhamagua, 22/11/93.

people were forced. "to carry things too much [meningue]"¹⁶⁹ Displaced Chief Clever Nhaute, who had "lived with Renamo" from 1982 to 1988, commented, "Renamo respected me as a *Nhacuaud*" and "*Curandeiros* were very important in the Renamo areas.... Renamo men can't tell them to do anything, they can move freely." While this was positive, he went on to complain. "Renamo forced people to be porters, to carry very heavy things from Gorongosa. People were very unhappy, but if they complained they would be punished."

While chiefs spoke of the very limited grounds they had for negotiation within these roles, neither they nor 'tradition' were wholly captured by Renamo. As in the dramatic cases of 'neutral zones' established by mediums, chiefs were able to place some restrictions on the behaviour of Renamo soldiers, usually by appeal to spiritual authority. For example, Chief Chigwinene said that one (of many) taboos pertaining to behaviour in his chieftaincy was that people could not have sex in the open without drawing the wrath of lions (unless they tied grass into a circle, as a symbol of the roof of a hut). Offenders must ask the chief to appeal to the ancestors for forgiveness on their behalf. Though elders maintained that such rules had been followed much more carefully in the past than today, there were still cases of people being harrassed by lions. Chigwinene gave two examples, both involving Renamo soldiers' relations with local women:

In one case, a Renamo soldier who was trying to rape a woman was attacked by a lion; in another, a Renamo soldier was having sex with a woman at a well [i.e. in the open] and lions came to disturb the couple. Lions became such a problem that the Renamo commander had to call me to talk to the ancestors. I then explained the rules about having sex.¹⁷¹

Chief Nhunge held that his, and other elders, appeals to the ancestors were able to "protect them a bit from war," to "give good luck to people." His ability to discern troop movements from the roaring of lions (a skill he had also employed on behalf of Frelimo guerrillas in the war for independence) enabled him not only to warn Renamo of enemy soldiers' arrival but also to evade Renamo.¹⁷²

Despite some local control, Renamo's coercive demands and, as importantly, the damage done to the local economy, created deep disaffection and left a legacy of fear, brutality and deprivation for the post-war period. In the past several years, Renamo has

¹⁶⁹ Interview, Nhunge, Macossa Sede, 18/11/93.

¹⁷⁰ Interview, Nhaute, Catandica, 6/10/93.

¹⁷¹ Interview, Chigwinene, Nhamagua, 22/11/93. On abuses of women, and attempts to control them, in other Renamo areas see Wilson, 1992, pp. 533-6.

¹⁷² Interview, Nhunge, Macossa Sede, 18/11/93. Also see Wilson, 1992, pp. 552-3, for other cases of chiefly autonomy, including far more dramatic instances of chiefs attempting to establish their own military forces.

struggled to contend with this legacy in its attempts to create a peacetime administration.¹⁷³ Ironically, above the level of chiefs, Renamo's new administration in Macossa mimicked the Frelimo model, with bureaucratic and centralized hierarchies for administration and services reaching from 'national' (i.e. Maringue) level to locality level, as well as cadres of political officers. These structures were, however, low budget in the extreme: Renamo labored under conditions which made government held areas look prosperous.

Material constraints for the most basic aspects of administration in Macossa were severe. For example, paper, pens, candles etc. were in short supply and much covered; there were no offices save the bombed, roofless relics of the Portuguese administration and thatch huts; there was no electricity or clean water supplies. Communication was largely by handwritten note, carried on foot over long distances, a necessity reflected in the measurement of distances in terms of walking hours. 'Officials' received no remuneration. The lack of material support for administration demanded continued extraction from the civilian population, again largely in terms of food and labor, thus straining relationships and inhibiting efforts to re-establish the markets and services so critical to economic reconstruction and to displaced people's return to Renamo zones. Extractive practices were, however, somewhat mitigated by the recent flows of aid into Macossa. Thus in 1993/94 officials lived off food aid rather than requiring locals to plant fields for them as they had in 1992/93, and used aid in the form of capulanas in exchange for labor. The methods of aid distribution were, however, themselves a source of tension between Renamo and civilians.

The recent mint of administrative structures also contributed to their weakness. They were often staffed by young and inexperienced recruits, drawn from the educated men of the urban areas of Chimoio or Beira and former soldiers. At the time of research, some of Renamo's administrative structures, especially those at locality level, were still in the process of being established; others had only operated intermittently. The quality and efficiency of administration was highly variable. Moreover, tensions between the still very present and influential military, and the newer, younger, and better educated administrative and political hierarchies were much in evidence.¹⁷⁴

In this context, Renamo's reliance on chiefs as a component of administration reflected not only its traditionalist stance but also its weakness and poverty. Chiefs and their subordinates played a role in communication, in aid distribution and in the provision of labor. Though chiefs were in some respects undergoing a process of incorporation into Renamo's civilian administrative structures, their links with Renamo also showed signs of weakness: as the pressures of war receded, chiefs unilaterally re-established links with mediums across regions and fairly autonomously ran courts and presided over other aspects of rural life.

¹⁷³ This account of contemporary Renamo administration is based on personal observation in Macossa and discussions with administrative officials, military commanders, soldiers, chiefs and others resident there.

¹⁷⁴ Tensions were observed over such things as access to aid deliveries, places to billet travelling soldiers, the separation of powers between military and administrative structures. Seasoned military commanders criticized the newer administrative recruits for their lack of experience, and sometimes their lack of the requisite language skills.

Chiefs in Macossa seemed less keen or reliant on an alliance with 'official' authority than chiefs in government areas. This was partly simply because there was little in the way of material benefits which Renamo could offer, as well as due to a continued fear of coercion, and a reluctance to carry out unpopular duties.

The particular history and current constraints to administration and political participation in Renamo zones need recognition in the process of reconstruction. Unlike in government areas, there was little basis for negotiated compromises between different political authorities; fear was still pervasive. The opportunities for participation and for establishing a minimum of accountability were narrow, while the challenges to economic reconstruction were daunting. Measures which allow an expansion of local representation, a further civilianization of administration, and an influx of resources with which to rebuild services and infrastructure are desperately needed. An important first step in this process will be breaking down the divisions between government and Renamo areas, a step which will require building trust between local and national Renamo and Frelimo officials, as well as a much more wide-ranging debate over the future of local political and administrative structures.

III. Conclusion

There are no easy prescriptions for political and economic reconstruction in Mozambique. Decades of war, displacement and state intervention have left a legacy of extreme vulnerability and variability. Variability requires flexible and sensitive responses which can only be realized through a decentralization of decision-making powers to local levels. Such a decentralization will itself have to contend with the diverse ideas about authority and structures of power found in Manica's rural areas: it will not be possible to apply a blueprint across such diverse regions. Nor will decentralization alone be enough: the vulnerabilities and inequalities which characterize contemporary struggles for land and efforts to rebuild infrastructure and services cannot be overcome without the intervention of the central state. The redistribution of resources to areas which have suffered most, and the establishment of rules and institutions which can resolve conflict among individuals, companies and other actors are beyond the scope of the local level.

APPENDIX I

Manica Province: Records of Private and Other Applications for Land

Sources: SPGC, Manica Province, 'Registo de Terrenos', Chimoio, 12/10/93; Interview, Director. SPGC, Chimoio, 11/10/93.

Several provisos apply to the following information. First, according to the the director of SPGC, Manica, there are many private individuals and organizations opening land without going through formal channels. Second, provincial records do not fully reflect concessions made at district levels (See Appendix 2).

There were 112 farms, totalling 109,287.79 hectares, in the process of registration to private or other applicants in October, 1993. Below I detail the Sector, Use, Year of Registration, and Location and Concentration of Farms.

Sector:

Private -- 100 farms, totalling 58,823.79 hectares.
 State -- 5 farms, totalling 50,004 hectares
 Cooperative -- 6 farms, totalling 453 hectares
 Miscellaneous -- 1 farm, 7 hectares

State sector applications are almost entirely to IFLOMA, the state forestry enterprise. The IFLOMA estates are currently on the market but have yet to find a buyer, in part apparently because they must be purchased in toto, i.e. including expensive infrastructure such as the Messica housing estate. The miscellaneous category is a farm run by the OMM, the Organization of Mozambican Women.

Use:

Agricultural -- 66 farms
 Agricultural and Livestock -- 20 farms
 Construction -- 2 farms
 Forestry Exploration -- 4 farms
 Livestock -- 4 farms
 Forestry Production -- 4 farms
 Fish Farming -- 2 farms
 Agricultural, Livestock and Forestry -- 1 farm
 Mining -- 2 farms
 Agro-Industrial -- 1 farm

Crocodile Production -- 2 farms
 Tourism -- 1 farm
 Agro-Livestock and Commercial -- 1 farm
 Bird Farming -- 1 farm
 Agriculture, Livestock and Fish -- 1 farm

Uses of land are concentrated in agricultural, livestock, and forestry sectors. The forestry estates are disproportionate in extent, despite their small number.

Year of Registration:

1988 -- c.24
 1989 -- c.1
 1990 -- 55
 1991 -- 24
 1992 -- 17
 1993 -- 12

Note that all but four of those farms registered in 1988-89 were re-registered in 1990-91. I calculated the total number of farms as the 108 registered or re-registered from 1990 on, plus the four farms that were not re-registered from 1988-89, though the latter may be defunct.

Location and Concentration of Farms:

Farms are concentrated in 17 'folhas', the (largely) 1:50,000 maps on which concessions are recorded by the SPGC, each comprising a 10 km by 10 km. area. Eight folhas account for over 100,000 hectares (of the total 109,000). Just 2 folhas (820 and 821, in the vicinity of Chimoio City) account for over 60,000 hectares, largely in the form of forestry and mining concerns. See Map 1 for the location of the folhas.

Folha 805 -- 5 farms, 4,000 hectares
 Folha 819 -- 1 farm, 14 hectares
 Folha 820 -- 23 farms, 29,816 hectares
 Folha 821 -- 6 farms, 30,893 hectares
 Folha 822 -- 3 farms, 1,150 hectares
 Folha 836 -- 1 farm, 250 hectares
 Folha 837 -- 7 farms, 10,934.67 hectares
 Folha 838 -- 10 farms, 4,677 hectares
 Folha 839 -- 16 farms, 7,901.5 hectares
 Folha 840 -- 2 farms, 1,100 hectares
 Folha 851 -- 12 farms, 3,280 hectares
 Folha 852 -- 1 farm, 100 hectares
 Folha 863 -- 1 farm, 1,000 hectares
 Folha 864 -- 1 farm, 500 hectares
 Folha 838 -- 15 farms, 4,525.62 hectares
 Folha 18 -- 3 farms, 8,505 hectares (1:250,000)
 Folha 'Chimonica' -- 1 farm, 60 hectares (1:100,000, no number)

Appendix 2

Sussundenga District: Applications for Land

Sources: DDA, Sussundenga, 'Lista Nominal dos Requerentes e Ocupantes das Machambas dos Antigos Proprietarios e Outras Zonas do Distrito de Sussundenga,' 18/10/93; Interviews, Venancio Chacai Veremos, DDA, Sussundenga District, Sussundenga Sede, 18,22,29/10/93; Maria Augusto Joanisi, Ministry of Agriculture, Sussundenga District, Sussundenga Sede, 3/11/93; and others.

Areas Surveyed, Applied for and Exploited:

The following figures are estimates, and should be treated as indicative rather than definitive. There are 116 surveyed farms, totalling 18,563.5 hectares, listed for Sussundenga. The area for which applications have been made totals 11,423.5 hectares, 101 farms. The difference between the latter two figures is a consequence of:

- 1) 15 farms, 2,570 hectares, for which there is no applicant;
- 2) eight farms, 1,540 hectares, for which there are applicants but for which there is no figure for the total farm area;
- 4) applicants applying to use only part of a surveyed, colonial era farm. Of the 91 farms for which there is sufficient information, the total area is 14,426.5 hectares and the applied for area is 11,422.5 hectares, a total difference of 3,004 hectares and an average difference of 33 hectares per farm.

Of farms with an applicant, 47 have figures for total area, applied for area, and exploited area. The applied for area is 5,406, and the exploited is 2,835, or 52%.

Provincial/District Discrepancies:

At provincial level, a maximum of 12,276 hectares are listed for Sussundenga. (The number is undoubtedly lower than this due to Folha 851 being largely located in Gondola District. Unfortunately, I don't know which of the 12 farms [3,208 hectares] listed in this folha fall within Sussundenga). Only 3 Sussundenga farms, comprising 360 hectares, are listed both at provincial and district levels:

Folha 18 -- 100 hectares registered to Antonio de Brito Chefo on 10/4/91 (M-44); 200 hectares registered to Joao Jamal on 18/4/91 (M-29);

Folha 'Chimonica' -- 60 hectares registered to Manuel J. Chitupila on 1/6/93 (M-28).

Farms listed at provincial level but not at district level:

Folha 863 -- 1,000 hectares, Goncalves Chazoita Manguenon, 13/11/90;

Folha 864 -- 500 hectares, Chingore Oliveira Sixpence, 12/11/90;

Folha 851 -- unknown;
Folha 18 -- 8.208 hectares, IFLOMA.

Ignoring the nebulous folha 851, a total of over 20,000 hectares appears in the combination of district and provincial levels, i.e. 9,708 listed at provincial but not at district level plus 10,682.5 listed at district level but not at provincial level

Farms for which the current applicant is the same individual, or of the same family, or same organization as the 'Antigo Proprietario', i.e. the colonial era land holder:

1) Former colonial era privados:

M-51 -- Eugenio Augusto Nobre (also applied for M-50, M-52, M-55, M-59; M-61 applied for by Luis Maria Nobre, a relative of E.A. Nobre)

M-56 -- Aderito Augusto Parra (the antigo proprietario was Abilio Maria Parra, a relative. A.A. Parra is E.A. Nobre's son-in-law.)

2) Colonial era pequenas empresas, i.e. black colonial era landholders

M-80 -- currently the responsibility of the son-in-law of the antigo proprietario, Maquina Jecinau Chindondo, who was killed by Renamo.

M-81 -- currently the responsibility of the son of the antigo proprietario, Joaquim Franela.

M-84 -- currently exploited by the son (Jorge Mangira Cipriano) of the antigo proprietario. Cipriano Dos Santos Barros.

M-S/N-6 -- Cuechete Caravina

M-S/N-7 -- Andre Festa Bofu

M-S/N-8 -- Goncalves Chimoio Simbe (Simbi?)

M-S/N-9 -- Lucas Ganje (also applying for M-22)

M-S/N-10 -- Mufirei Jose Bobo

M-S/N-12 -- Agostinho Chambica Joaquim

M-S/N-14 -- Luis Gumissai Macanza

M-S/N-17 -- Gueda Joaquim Joao

M-S/N-18 -- Joao Mutenda Jose

M-S/N-21 -- Afonso Fumaiaramba

M-S/N-22 -- Victor Oniasse

M-S/N-24 -- Chinhate Edsone Ferro

M-S/N-27 -- Salvador Gabriel Santos Mabunda

3) Other

M-57 -- Missao. Igreja Catolica

There appears to be a great deal of continuity between pre and post independence patterns as concerns the pequenas empresas sector. This pattern was confirmed in interviews with district Ministry of Agriculture Officials, and extends beyond those listed above: the 16 farmers listed above are those who have stayed on the same farm. In addition, there are approximately 18 former colonial era pequenas empresas who have moved to new farms, sometimes because their former farms became the sites of aldeias comunais after independence.

As far as white Portuguese settlers are concerned, there is far less continuity -- E.A. Nobre and A.A. Parra are currently the only former colonial Portuguese farmers. Nobre's holdings are significant: not only is he farming on his former colonial holdings but he has also applied for four other farms. An additional two farms have been applied for by relatives of Nobre. The total number of hectares applied for by Nobre and his relatives is close to 1,000 hectares. (Within the province, Nobre and his family hold other agricultural, transport and business interests.) The dearth of white Portuguese currently making applications for land was confirmed for the province as a whole by the director of SPGC. Whether or not this pattern will change in future is open to question.

Farms on which district records indicate 'populacao', i.e. family farmers of a variety of backgrounds:

The designations used below are those used in district records. NER is Nao Esta Requerida, i.e. not applied for by a private sector applicant. PDRM refers to the Programa de Desenvolvimento Rural na Provincia de Manica, the villages established with the support of Cooperacao Italiana. 'Populacao' refers simply to people, but means family sector farmers. populacao deslocada refers to people displaced by war, and populacao afectada refers to people not displaced but affected by war and/or drought.

1) Those farms for which there is currently no private sector applicant:

M-7 -- populacao and populacao deslocado
 M-11 -- NER, Associacao de Chizizira
 M-12 -- NER, Coop. Agric. 3 de Fevereiro
 M-16 -- NER, Coop. Agric. Nhamarenza
 M-19 -- NER, populacao deslocado
 M-25 -- NER (?), populacao PDRM
 M-26 -- NER, populacao deslocado
 M-34, M-36, M-40 -- NER, populacao PDRM
 M-62 -- NER (?), populacao afectada
 M-64 -- NER, populacao
 M-83 -- NER, populacao

2) Farms for which there is a private sector applicant and 'populacao' of one type or another:

Populacao deslocado -- M-4, M-13, M-20, M-27, M-28, M-30, M-31, M-48, M-S/N-30
 Populacao PDRM -- M-23, M-32, M-33, M-35, M-37, M-38, M-39
 Populacao afectada -- M-42, M-43, M-57

The number of farms with family farmers on them in fact far exceeds the above list, according to the DDA. A total of 6,802 families, approximately 40,000 people, (including those for whom protection against a loss of rights is being sought) are estimated to be living on farms which have or which may have in future, a private applicant. This estimate of population is also considered conservative by the DDA.

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Government Officials and NGOs

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- Administrator, Barue District. Catandica, 10/11/93. (By Erasmo Nhachungue)
- Administrator, Macossa District. Catandica, 6/10/93.
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- Director Provincial. Nucleo de Apoio aos Refugiados, Manica Province. Chimoio. 25/11/93.

Director Provincial Serviço Provincial de Geografia e Cadastre, Manica Province. Chimoio, 11/10/93.

District Officer. DPCCN, Sussundenga District. Sussundenga Sede, 4/11/93.

Ministry of Agriculture official, Sussundenga District. Sussundenga, 3.11.93 and other dates.

Local Leaders and others

Interviews were almost always held with groups of people from a variety of backgrounds in a given rural location. The list which follows is organized by place; it is not comprehensive of those interviewed and, in most cases, does not provide names in an effort to ensure some anonymity for informants.

Barue District

Catandica. District Sede. Interviews by Erasmo Nhachungue of Chief Sabao, 16, 22/11/93; Chief Sanyatunze, 19, 23/11/93

Catandica. District Sede. Interview of former Chief Clever Nhaute, 6/10/93.

Macossa Cruzamento. Settlement of displaced people. Interviews of Frelimo secretaries and a series of people displaced from Macossa, 17 and 18/11/93.

Gondola District

Mount Dzembe. Aldeia. Interviews of Chirenje medium and advisors, Frelimo secretaries, Chief Katize, Zionist church leaders and others, 4/11/93.

Macossa District

Macossa. District Sede. Interviews of Langton and Clever Nhaute, 17/11/93; Chief Nhunge, 18/11/93; Mfumos, Tsapandas and other elders of Nhaute chieftaincy, 13/11/93; Renamo administrator, representatives for information and refugees, political officers, military commanders, soldiers and others, various dates.

Nhamagua. 'District' Sede. Interviews of Chiefs Chigwinene and Sawenje, and advisors. Renamo administrator, representative for refugees and others, 22/11/93.

Sussundenga District

- Buapua. Aldeia.** Interviews of Mambos, Mfumos, 'advisers' and others of Buapua and Xau chieftaincies, 27/10/93.
- Matica Locality.** Interviews of Chief Ganda, his subordinates and advisors, 28/10/93. President of the Matica Locality Executive Council, 3/11/93.
- Mouha. Aldeia.** Interview of Chingore of Mavita chieftaincy and others, 28/10/93.
- Muribane. Aldeia.** Interview of older brothers of Chief Muriane and locality level Frelimo officials, 2/11/93.
- Munhinga. Aldeia.** Interview of 'Mfumo' and President of the Munhinga Locality Executive Council, 27/10/93.
- Muzoria. Bairro, Sussundenga Sede.** Interviews of Chief Cupenha and subordinates, other members of chieftaincy, and Frelimo secretaries, 25 and 26/10/93.
- Sussundenga Sede. Bairro.** Interview of Mambo Chikwizo and advisers, women, Frelimo soldiers and others, 30/11/93.