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# **USAID/Haiti Democracy Conference**

## **Summary of Proceedings**



**February 4, 1994  
Washington Sheraton Hotel  
Washington D.C.**

# **USAID/Haiti Democracy Conference**

## **Objectives:**

- ◆ increase coordination and team building with key democracy players;
- ◆ challenge the democracy program as it currently exists, instilling creativity and innovation to respond appropriately to the current political environment;
- ◆ develop a shared vision of the democracy strategy in which all participants feel ownership; and
- ◆ challenge current and potential contributors to the democracy program to engage themselves now.

**February 4, 1994  
Washington Sheraton Hotel  
Washington D.C.**

## **Agenda:**

- 8:30**            **Coffee**
- 9:00**            **Welcome and Introductions** by Jane Nandy, USAID/Haiti Democracy Officer and Linda Spink, Conference Facilitator
- Opening Remarks** by Ambassador Lawrence Pezzullo, Special Advisor to Haiti and Chair of Haiti Working Group, U.S. Department of State
- Opening Remarks** by Mark Schneider, USAID Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean
- 10:30**           **Break**
- 10:45**           **A Perspective on Haiti and Democracy** by Robert "Bob" Maguire, Inter-American Foundation Representative for Haiti
- 12:00**           **Lunch**
- 1:00**            **What Works and Doesn't: Project Experiences, Perspectives and Lessons** by Michael Miller and Ira Lowenthal, ADF; George Exceus, AIFLD, and Karen Poe and Jane Nandy, USAID/Haiti. Presenters will share their experiences, lessons learned, and perspectives on how to apply these lessons to democracy activities in Haiti's current environment.
- 2:15**            **Break**
- 2:30**            **Grantee Working Groups.** Grantees will discuss and prepare a brief summary of what they have attempted to implement, what new, bold ideas they could offer in order to push the envelop and respond to the A.I.D. and Embassy challenge, and what it would take for them to follow-through on these ideas.
- 3:00**            **Pushing the Envelop from the Grantees' Perspective** 10 min. presentations by each grantee
- 4:00**            **Next Steps and Recommendations**
- 5:00**            **End**

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## **USAID/Haiti Democracy Conference**

### **Conference Report**

#### **Introduction**

The USAID/Haiti Democracy Conference held February 4, 1994, at the Washington Sheraton Hotel, was attended by 35 participants representing six project grantees, the Haitian parliament, advisors to Aristide, the U.S. State Department, and offices of the Agency for International Development.

The conference was conducted in response to U.S. Ambassador to Haiti, William Lacy Swing's and U.S. Agency for International Development Mission Director to Haiti, Larry Crandall's challenge "to do more in Haiti now" to support and strengthen democracy. Specific objectives of the conference were to:

- ◆ **increase coordination and team building among key democracy players;**
- ◆ **challenge the democracy program as it currently exists, instilling creativity and innovation to respond appropriately to the current political environment;**
- ◆ **develop a shared vision of the democracy strategy in which all participants feel ownership; and**
- ◆ **challenge current and potential contributors to the democracy program to engage themselves now.**

The flow of the day was such that the morning was devoted to speakers who gave current information on policy, the situations facing grantees working in Haiti and lessons learned from previous work in the Haiti democracy program. The afternoon was structured around having small working groups address the challenges and identify new, bold and creative ways of reactivating planned activity and initiating new ideas. In the final session of the day the working groups developed messages to USAID/Haiti and the Ambassador regarding what they would like to see and would need in order to fully implement their ideas and respond to the challenges presented.

## **Morning Program Notes:**

### Opening comments:

On behalf of U.S. Ambassador William L. Swing, Department of State Special Advisor to Haiti, Ambassador Lawrence Pezzullo welcomed participants and provided remarks on the issues facing Haiti's democracy program. His key points were:

- ◆ the challenge was to help Haiti build a broad-based constituency within the country to lead the country out of crisis,
- ◆ the solution lies in developing a broad-based centrist coalition government within the parliamentary system which can simultaneously pass needed legislation and effect personnel transfers within the Governor's Island Accord framework.

Mark L. Schneider, Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), on behalf of USAID Mission Director to Haiti Larry Crandall, also welcomed conference participants and set the tone for the day -- an open exchange of ideas in search of what can be done to support democracy by strengthening the people on the front lines, who are exposed. Mark carried a strong message of desired involvement by the groups represented and he challenged them "to go beyond what you have planned and look at what you could do together, what more can the collective resources do to empower the Haitian people during this extremely difficult period." He asked each participant to "look at this as an opportunity to break out of your traditional role and try to further the resolution of the current political crisis within the framework of the Governor's Island Accord" and reminded them all that the "struggle for democracy in Haiti must continue until it succeeds".

### A Perspective on Haiti and Democracy

As a backdrop for further conversations, Bob Maguire, Representative, Inter-American Foundation, was asked to provide his perspective of and experiences in Haiti. In setting a context for his comments, Bob shared demographic data showing that 77% of Haiti's population is living in rural areas, roughly 1% of the population receive 60% of the gross national product, and 5 million people in Haiti live below poverty level. He observed that the 1991 coup had two targets: the removal of the President and the suppression of Haitian civil society so that the status quo remains the same. He noted the concerted efforts by the international community directed towards restoring the elected President but the almost complete abandonment of civil society and other democratic officials that were elected at the same time as the President. He observed that four of the six Democracy Enhancement Project grantees at the conference work with, what he

calls, the "Old Actors" - political and economic elites of the country. The remaining two grantees worked with the "New Actors" in civil society, namely civilian pressure and action groups and trade unions seeking improved socio-economic access for their members. These civic groups represent the 77% of Haiti's population who live in rural areas. He encouraged participants to work to empower the "New Actors" in civil society and local government bodies. Bob was not advocating that participants abandon working with the "Old Actors", instead he challenged them to work with these traditional partners in new ways to emancipate them from feudalism, mercantilism, and help them to see that "when the tide rises all boats go up". He challenged participants to find business and community leaders who question the status quo and are interested in empowering Haitians at the base to realize their legitimate aspirations. He shared a Haitian proverb that guides his work - "The mule works for the benefit of the horse" - and advised participants to obviate it when they look to support individuals and groups in Haiti.

Bob used the myth of Sisyphus to illustrate the enormity of the challenge for Haitians working to build a democratic society and to help workshop participants see they have choices of how to help this process. Those working to build a democratic Haiti are Sisyphus. Democracy workshop participants can strengthen Sisyphus in Haiti by working directly to strengthen the "New Actors" in civil society and local government, increase the players helping Sisyphus by identifying traditional partners who question the status quo, or lessen the gravitational pull on Sisyphus by promoting face to face dialogue between those who fear each other and reducing the isolation of democratic elements.

His last challenge was for participants to take advantage of the moment and not to wait for complete resolution of the immediate crisis. They could be doing something now that would keep people in civil society working for democracy in place and ready for when the time is right for them to further democracy in Haiti. He cautioned that democracy to obtain legitimacy cannot be top down; it must also happen in the countryside or it will not happen at all.

### Lessons Learned

The morning panel of Michael Miller and Ira Lowenthal, America's Development Foundation (ADF), George Excéus, American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), and Jane Nandy and Karen Poe, USAID/Haiti shared lessons learned and opportunities for democracy activities in Haiti. Major lessons from ADF's experience were summarized as follows:

#### General:

1. Grantees and donors must be prepared to take risks;
2. Identify and facilitate Haitian initiatives, initiatives cannot be perceived as transplanted; and
3. Keep your eyes on the ball.

### Public Perception:

1. Remain consistent and transparent.
2. Maintain an independent identity.
3. You cannot win - promoting moderation is bound to stimulate criticism from all sides.

### Democracy Under Attack:

1. Challenge our partners to be more creative and reflective.
2. Acknowledge and deal with the real dangers in Haiti.

### Keeping Up with a Constantly Changing Environment:

1. Monitor the evolution of the political context on an ongoing basis using all available sources of information, analysis, and insight - never depend on one source of data or interpretation.
2. Keep an eye open for opportunity and respond quickly.

AIFLD's experiences have been difficult and yet there is still a sense of hope and optimism that with more resources civil society will continue to move forward towards democracy.

Jane Nandy, USAID Democracy Officer in Haiti, acknowledged the difficulty and frustration of working in Haiti while at the same time also shared George Excéus' sense of hope and optimism that more can be done. She reminded participants of the Ambassador's personal challenge, "to develop creative solutions to how we can begin more activities in support of the democratic process in Haiti now" and his conviction that "there is an immediate need for an active international and U.S. presence here (in Haiti) to give Haitians hope that they can take charge of their lives. Our efforts to demonstrate support for the restoration of democracy in Haiti cannot stop." Jane urged participants to take risks, push the envelope, tear it up if need be and start over and she shared her belief that there was a willingness by USAID/Haiti to try new ideas. Her commitment to conference participants was that she would listen and carry back their message of how they could get involved and respond to the challenge by the Ambassador and USAID Mission Director.

Karen Poe, Chief of the General Development Office, which houses USAID/Haiti's democracy portfolio, shared her experiences in Haiti over the past four years. While concurring with many of the lessons presented by others, Karen observed that a very disturbing trend can be observed to be accelerating since the coup: a purposeful isolation of democratic players by the de facto government and anti-democratic forces. She noted that leading up to the successful free and fair 1991 elections, an increase in networking among democratic groups was noteworthy. There were democratic networks in each of the nine departments consisting of the traditional leaders; and there were networks of women's, youth

and farmer associations from the "new actors" in civil society. These coalitions have been broken. Local, regional and national association is blocked by fear. Now, more than ever in recent Haitian history, it is critical to "reknit the fabric of Haitian democracy groups" and breakdown the isolation of pro-democracy elements and workers - "someone should be there to show that they are not standing alone".

### **Afternoon Working Groups**

The afternoon work was structured around reviewing the many challenges that had been raised by the morning speakers, identifying creative ways of getting reinvolved in Haiti now, and expanding on what it would take to get involved. Small working groups were formed to discuss these issues.

The common themes that emerged from the group discussions were a need for:

- a) commitment at all levels (USAID, State, grantees),
- b) flexibility in responses and approval of activities,
- c) short-term activities to focus on functional areas,
- d) improved communication between USAID and grantees and among grantees,
- e) increased coordination of activities among grantees,
- f) combination of efforts geared towards both the informal democratic institutions in civil society and formal institutions, such as the Parliament and local government bodies,
- g) safe space for meetings,
- h) overcome or deal with the beacon light effect - where attention to a person may bring risk to their safety, and
- i) involvement of the private sector.

### **Challenges for Haiti**

Before the group discussions, the following summary of the challenges for Haiti were reviewed. Participants identified the following creative opportunities for engagement:

- ◆ build broad-based political coalitions in touch with constituencies;
- ◆ enable the elite to play a role in the process;

- ◆ work with traditional partners in new ways to emancipate them;
- ◆ find business and community leaders who are working/interested in "empowering Haiti" at the base;
- ◆ empower the "new actors" in civil society and local government;
- ◆ reduce the isolation of democratic elements;
- ◆ break out of all activities being in Port-au-Prince;
- ◆ support Parliamentary and local government elections in December;
- ◆ reduce the gravitational pull on Sisyphus - break the syndrome;
- ◆ overcome logistical constraints;
- ◆ overcome the perception that the solution will come from outside Haiti;
- ◆ develop responsible leadership on the national level;
- ◆ promote face to face contact between those who fear each other;
- ◆ find opportunities for groups, made up of individuals from diverse institutions, and perspectives to go outside of Haiti to develop common knowledge and experiences, and develop stronger networks among themselves and outside institutions;
- ◆ keep the independent media functioning and link it to media groups outside of Haiti, and look at activities outside of Haiti which will catalyze and support the democratic actors and institutions within Haiti.

### Group Ideas for What to Do

**Group One:** As a context for their ideas, they reminded participants to be aware of the relationship between short-term conflict resolution and long-term institutional building. Their ideas were to:

- ◆ improve internal communications between Haitians and between Haitians and the diaspora (short- and long-term),
- ◆ develop community education program to emphasize how to strengthen roots of democracy while teaching people to protect themselves as advocates (short- and long-term),

- ◆ target, for dialogue, people who are affiliated with the military but who can be reached through education (short-term),
- ◆ develop community education for diaspora Haitians, in anticipation that they will eventually return (long-term),
- ◆ strengthen legislative and local government - teach politicians and their constituents to be more representative and responsive (short- and long-term),
- ◆ challenge people to work harder to overcome the duress of their environment (short-term).

They would need the following to implement their ideas:

- ◆ resources,
- ◆ stronger Haitian commitment to democracy,
- ◆ some assurance that people we identify to work with are going to be secure,
- ◆ commitment of USAID and Ambassador to supporting activities,
- ◆ more and better consultation with Haitians and with other groups providing assistance, and
- ◆ more information on logistics and how to get support we need on the ground.

**Group Two:** Their suggestions were to:

- ◆ set up a series of private meetings between Parliament, unions, businessmen, civil society and grass-roots organizations. Assist parliamentarians to make the constituency links they desire.
- ◆ organize and support the development of functional working groups in parliament. Provide meeting space/supplies and materials to improve the working environment.
- ◆ set up a series of forums between representative of various partners around a) functional issues, b) visiting personalities, and c) forum libres, to promote contact and interpersonal relationships.
- ◆ start programs as designed in the original project proposals, many are still valid and should not be neglected.

They would need the following:

- ◆ grantees must receive permission/clearance to start and must start quickly,
- ◆ serious consultation with counterparts,
- ◆ mechanisms for coordination/collaboration between grantees - once a month lunch,
- ◆ operationalize the holistic approach,
- ◆ build links, collaboration, coordination with other multi- and bi-lateral agencies, e.g., UNDP, UN-OAS Civil Mission, Canadians,
- ◆ identify and exploit existing forums, e.g., Forum Libre, and
- ◆ to expand activities outside PAP, they would need basic information on organizations, political, social, anthropological data of various areas.

**Group Three:** This group prioritized where they would place their efforts as: a) increase communication across sectors, b) give legitimacy and power to parliament, and c) engage civil society. To accomplish this they would:

- ◆ develop a resource center for members of Parliament;
- ◆ develop a membership directory that would list representatives and increase the focus on constituent service; and
- ◆ hold multiple town meetings with international participants.

They would need the following:

- ◆ monthly working groups of grantees to discuss opportunities for collaboration,
- ◆ quick response mechanism from USAID, including approval process and in-country clearance,
- ◆ equipment donations for all sectors,
- ◆ support for free media efforts by linking international news organizations in partnerships with Haitian groups, and
- ◆ to capitalize on existing links and strengthen them.

## **Group Four:**

Their ideas were to:

- ◆ support a communications/free speech "blitz" using off shore radio broadcasts (talk and civic programming - "Radio Louverture") and saturation with printed materials, publications, news, opinion articles in Creole;
- ◆ hold conferences with elected local officials, communal sections and municipal councils and with cross-sectoral civil society ("mini-conferences");
- ◆ train refugees prior to repatriation in areas of vocational training and civil education;
- ◆ develop materials for and moral support of parliamentary leaders (special attention to President of the Senate);
- ◆ convene parliamentary caucuses outside of Haiti to encourage free and open debate and develop draft legislation;
- ◆ provide education and outreach to explain the resolution process and key reforms required in Creole.

They would need the following:

- ◆ consistent, steadfast, clearly articulated policy and commitment to the process,
- ◆ and to begin now, logistical support, even including access to humanitarian gas if program is maintained and expanded, and
- ◆ real flexibility, including rapid turn-around on review and decisions and possibly delegation of authority, up to a limit, for targets of opportunity and "out-of-scope" activities.

## **Final Message**

The four working groups were asked to review the day's discussions and formulate a message they would like to send back to Larry Crandall, USAID Mission Director and U.S. Ambassador to Haiti, William L. Swing. The messages developed follow:

1. The organizations are ready to come back, they have concrete ideas

for short/medium/long term assistance. What they want is commitment that they can follow through on the ideas. They need a green light not an orange light. Stopping and starting activities undermines their credibility and exposes our Haitian partners to real harm when they have visibly engaged themselves in areas where we pull back.

2. The organizations want to go back to Haiti. They are ready to take risks to create opportunities rather than wait for them, they expect setbacks but are prepared to carry on. They expect support from USG partners.
3. Here are our ideas. USAID and the Embassy need to review and prioritize these initiatives. Establish a working group of the democracy grantees, USAID/Haiti and a personal representative of the Ambassador's choice, with the authority and mandate to implement them.
4. We are prepared to work in areas of our competency as may be feasible subject to consistency of policy and level of resources/commitment to do the job.

Jane Nandy provided closing comments indicating that this conference has been the green light requested by the groups. USAID does not have the answers but is committed to working together with the grantees to get some answers. Suggested next steps included:

- 1) a follow-up conference in Haiti with Haitian partners to build on the key ideas reviewed in the present conference.
- 2) grantees will review the conference ideas and develop short, concise implementation proposals within their competencies and mandates.
- 3) USAID/Haiti, in consultation with the Ambassador, will also review the conference ideas with the intent of identifying areas that might evoke the best probable response.

The conference got results. While it underscored that the road ahead will require considerable vision and skill to meet the challenges of creative engagement in Haiti now, it successfully set in motion a commitment and process to do that.

## **Attachments:**

- A. List of participants
- B. Reporting Cable
- C. Mark Schneider's (AA/LAC) Talking Points
- D. Lessons Learned by ADF

**Attachment A**

**LIST OF PARTICIPANTS**

**Presenters**

Ambassador Lawrence Pezzullo	Special Advisor to Haiti, Department of State
Mark Schneider	Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean, U.S. Agency for International Development
Robert "Bob" Maguire	Inter-American Foundation Representative for Haiti and Jamaica and Chairman, Haiti Studies at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI)

**Special Guests**

Michael Barnes, Counsellor to President Aristide  
Leslie Voltaire, Advisor to President Aristide  
Senator Emmanuel, Haitian Parliament

**U.S. Agency for International Development Mission to Haiti (USAID/Haiti)**

Karen Poe, Chief, General Development Office  
Jane Nandy, Democracy Officer  
Bill Radlein, Coordinator, Democracy Enhancement Project

**America's Development Foundation (ADF)**

Michael Miller, President  
Ira Lowenthal, Chief of Party, ADF Haiti Office  
Jean Paul Poirier, Financial Advisor, ADF Haiti Office  
Karen Diop, Institutional Development Specialist, ADF Haiti Office

**American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD)**

William Doherty, Jr., Executive Director  
Michael Verdu, Regional Director  
George Excéus, Deputy Director, AIFLD/Haiti

**Center for Democracy (CFD)**

Allen Weinstein, Consortium Coordinator  
Caleb McCarry, Consortium Chairman  
Lionel Delatour, Consultant  
Stephen Horblitt, Consultant

**Congressional Human Rights Foundation (CHRF)**

Paul Meek, Vice President  
Jennifer Deaver, Inter-parliamentary Assistant  
Robert Baratta, Consultant (Civil-Military)

**DATEX, Inc.**

Ajit S. Dutta, President  
Curt Beach, Senior Project Manager

**International Republican Institute (IRI)**

Karen Harbert, Vice President for International Programs  
Janine T. Perfit, Regional Program Director, Latin America and the Caribbean

**National Democratic Institute (NDI)**

Ken Wollack, President  
Sean Carroll, Executive Officer

**State Department (STATE)**

Nancy Jackson, Haiti Desk Officer  
Ellen Engels, Assistant Haiti Desk Officer

**World Learning**

Bonnie Ricci, Director, Development Management

**Observers USAID, Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC)**

Sharon Isralow, LAC Democratic Initiatives Office (LAC/DI)  
Debra McFarland, Deputy Director, LAC/DI  
Letitia K. Butler, Deputy Director, Office of Caribbean Affairs (LAC/CAR)  
Susan Reichle, Special Assistant, AA/LAC  
Patrick Pierre, Senior Democracy Advisor

**Attachment B**

**Reporting Cable**

AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE  
SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE  
INFO HAITI COLLECTIVE

FOR AA/LAC, LAC/CAR, LAC/DI, PPC/POL/SP  
INFO STATE/ARA FOR AMB. PEZZULLO, NJACKSON

SUBJECT: USAID/HAITI DEMOCRACY CONFERENCE

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SUMMARY  
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1. IN A ONE-DAY CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON SPONSORED BY USAID/HAITI, EIGHT ORGANIZATIONS WORKING ON DEMOCRACY PROJECTS IN HAITI EXPLORED MEANS FOR INCREASING THEIR EFFORTS TO SUPPORT INITIATIVES TO MOVE BEYOND THE PRESENT CRISIS. RECOGNIZING KEY CONSTRAINTS, THE CONSENSUS WAS TO EXPLORE INNOVATIVE AND FLEXIBLE STRATEGIES FOR ACTIVE ENGAGEMENT NOW; SEEK DURABLE, ADAPTIVE HAITIAN PARTNERS; INVOLVE BROADER GEOGRAPHIC NETWORKS OF ORGANIZATIONS, RESOURCES AND PERSONS TO CONNECT ISOLATED DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES AND PLAYERS, AND WORK COLLABORATIVELY DRAWING ON EACH OTHERS AREAS OF INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCY. THE CONFERENCE HIGHLIGHTED THAT THE SUCCESS OF USAID/HAITI'S DEMOCRACY PROGRAM WILL DEPEND UPON: FLEXIBILITY TO RESPOND RAPIDLY WHEN OPPORTUNITIES PRESENT THEMSELVES; OPEN COMMUNICATION AMONG PLAYERS; AND, WILLINGNESS TO COLLABORATE CREATIVELY TO SUPPORT THE INITIATIVES OF HAITIAN INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUALS COMMITTED TO BUILDING BROAD CONSTITUENCIES WITHIN THE COUNTRY. THE ROAD AHEAD, THE CONFERENCE CONCLUDED, IS ARDUOUS BUT HOPEFUL. END SUMMARY.

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CONFERENCE OBJECTIVES  
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2. USAID/HAITI SPONSORED A ONE-DAY DEMOCRACY CONFERENCE ON FEBRUARY 4 AT THE WASHINGTON SHERATON HOTEL. IT BROUGHT TOGETHER 35 PARTICIPANTS REPRESENTING SIX DEMOCRACY PORTFOLIO GRANTEEES (AMERICA'S DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION, AIFLD, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE, INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY, AND THE CONGRESSIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION), TWO SUBGRANTEEES (WORLD LEARNING AND DATEX, INC.), A HAITIAN SENATOR, SENIOR ADVISORS TO PRESIDENT ARISTIDE, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE

STATE DEPARTMENT HAITI WORKING GROUP AND REPRESENTATIVES OF USAID FROM HAITI AND WASHINGTON. THE CONFERENCE WAS IN RESPONSE TO A CHALLENGE TO DO MORE IN HAITI NOW AND SOUGHT TO:

- A) INCREASE COORDINATION AND TEAM BUILDING AMONG KEY PLAYERS IN THE DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES SECTOR;
- B) CHALLENGE THE EXISTING DEMOCRACY PROGRAM;
- C) DEVELOP A SHARED VISION OF THE DEMOCRACY STRATEGY IN WHICH ALL PARTICIPANTS FEEL A SENSE OF OWNERSHIP; AND
- D) CHALLENGE CURRENT AND POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTORS TO THE DEMOCRACY PROGRAM TO ENGAGE THEMSELVES NOW.

PLENARY SESSION SPEAKERS OFFERED CURRENT INFORMATION ON POLICY, THE CONSTRAINTS FACING GRANTEES WORKING IN HAITI, AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM PREVIOUS WORK IN THE HAITI DEMOCRACY PROGRAM. WORKING GROUPS IDENTIFIED CREATIVE WAYS OF REACTIVATING PLANNED ACTIVITIES AND INITIATING NEW IDEAS. IN THE FINAL SESSION, PARTICIPANTS REACHED AGREEMENT ON WHAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO DO AND WHAT THEY WOULD NEED IN ORDER TO FULLY IMPLEMENT THEIR IDEAS.

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THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT  
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3. AMBASSADOR LAWRENCE PEZZULLO EMPHASIZED THAT:

- THE CENTRAL ISSUE IS BUILDING A BROAD-BASED CONSTITUENCY WITHIN THE COUNTRY TO BRING THE COUNTRY OUT OF CRISIS,
- THE SOLUTION LIES IN DEVELOPING A BROAD-BASED CENTRIST COALITION GOVERNMENT WITHIN THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM WHICH CAN SIMULTANEOUSLY PASS NEEDED LEGISLATION AND EFFECT PERSONNEL TRANSFERS WITHIN THE GOVERNOR'S ISLAND FRAMEWORK.

AA/LAC MARK SCHNEIDER URGED PARTICIPANTS TO WORK TOGETHER TO SUPPORT PEOPLE WORKING TO BRING ABOUT NATIONAL CONSENSUS. HE CHALLENGED THE GROUPS TO BREAK OUT OF THEIR TRADITIONAL ROLES AND WORK TOGETHER NOW. HE ENCOURAGED ORGANIZATIONS IN THE DEMOCRACY PORTFOLIO TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF EACH OTHER'S EXPERTISE TO DEVELOP A COLLABORATIVE PLAN OF ACTION WHICH WOULD EMPOWER HAITIAN INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUALS TO SEEK AN END TO THE CRISIS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE GOVERNOR'S ISLAND ACCORD.

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NEED FOR TIMELY ACTION  
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4. AS A BACKDROP FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS, ROBERT MAGUIRE, INTER-AMERICAN FOUNDATION REPRESENTATIVE FOR HAITI, PROVIDED A PERSPECTIVE ON HAITI. HE OBSERVED THAT THE 1991 COUP HAD TWO TARGETS: THE REMOVAL OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE SUPPRESSION OF HAITIAN CIVIL SOCIETY SO THAT THE STATUS QUO REMAINS. HE NOTED THE CONCERTED EFFORTS BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY DIRECTED TOWARDS RESTORING THE ELECTED PRESIDENT BUT THE ALMOST COMPLETE

ABANDONMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND OTHER ELECTED DEMOCRATIC OFFICIALS. HE OFFERED TWO CHALLENGES. FIRST, WORK WITH CIVIL SOCIETY, THE NEW ACTORS WHICH REPRESENT CIVIC PRESSURE AND ACTION GROUPS SEEKING IMPROVED SOCIO-ECONOMIC ACCESS FOR THEIR MEMBERS. DEMOCRACY TO OBTAIN LEGITIMACY CANNOT BE TOP DOWN; IT MUST ALSO HAPPEN IN THE RURAL COUNTRYSIDE OR IT WILL NOT HAPPEN AT ALL. SECOND, TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE MOMENT, DON'T WAIT FOR COMPLETE RESOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL CRISIS.

5. A PANEL CONSISTING OF GRANTEES WITH OPERATIONAL DEMOCRACY PROGRAMS AND USAID/HAITI STAFF SHARED LESSONS LEARNED AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR DEMOCRACY ACTIVITIES IN HAITI DRAWING FROM THEIR PRE-COUP AND CURRENT EXPERIENCE. MAJOR LESSONS INCLUDED:

GENERAL:

- GRANTEES AND DONORS MUST BE PREPARED TO TAKE RISKS.
- IDENTIFY AND FACILITATE HAITIAN INITIATIVES, INITIATIVES CANNOT BE PERCEIVED AS TRANSPLANTED.
- KEEP YOUR EYES ON THE BALL.

PUBLIC PERCEPTION:

- REMAIN CONSISTENT AND TRANSPARENT.
- MAINTAIN AN INDEPENDENT IDENTITY.
- YOU CANNOT WIN -- PROMOTING MODERATION IS BOUND TO STIMULATE CRITICISM FROM ALL SIDES.

DEMOCRACY UNDER ATTACK:

- CHALLENGE OUR PARTNERS TO BE MORE CREATIVE AND REFLECTIVE.
- ACKNOWLEDGE AND DEAL WITH REAL DANGERS IN HAITI.
- REVERSE THE TREND OF ISOLATION OF DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS AND REBUILD THE FABRIC CONNECTING HAITIAN DEMOCRACY GROUPS.

CONSTANTLY CHANGING ENVIRONMENT:

- MONITOR THE POLITICAL SITUATION ON AN ONGOING BASIS USING ALL AVAILABLE SOURCES OF INFORMATION, ANALYSIS AND INSIGHT - - NEVER DEPEND ON ONE SOURCE.
- KEEP AN EYE OPEN FOR OPPORTUNITY AND RESPOND QUICKLY.

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CREATIVE ENGAGEMENT  
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6. PARTICIPANTS IDENTIFIED THE FOLLOWING CREATIVE OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENGAGEMENT:

- BUILD BROAD-BASED POLITICAL COALITIONS WHICH ARE IN TOUCH WITH THEIR CONSTITUENCIES;
- WORK WITH TRADITIONAL PARTNERS IN NEWS WAYS; FIND BUSINESS AND COMMUNITY LEADERS WHO QUESTION THE STATUS QUO AND ARE INTERESTED IN EMPOWERING HAITIANS AT THE BASE TO REALIZE THEIR LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS;
- BREAK OUT OF ALL ACTIVITIES BEING LOCATED IN PORT-AU-PRINCE;
- EMPOWER THE "NEW ACTORS" IN CIVIL SOCIETY AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT BODIES;
- REDUCE THE ISOLATION OF DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS;
- SUPPORT ELECTIONS IN DECEMBER;

- OVERCOME THE PERCEPTION THAT THE SOLUTION WILL COME FROM OUTSIDE HAITI;
- PROMOTE FACE-TO-FACE CONTACT BETWEEN THOSE WHO FEAR EACH OTHER;
- ENABLE THE ELITES TO PLAY A ROLE IN THE PROCESS;
- LOOK AT ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE OF HAITI WHICH WILL CATALYZE AND SUPPORT THE DEMOCRATIC ACTORS AND INSTITUTIONS WITHIN HAITI;
- KEEP THE INDEPENDENT MEDIA FUNCTIONING AND LINK IT TO MEDIA GROUPS OUTSIDE OF HAITI; AND
- FIND OPPORTUNITIES FOR STUDY TOURS FOR GROUPS MADE UP OF CROSS-SECTIONS OF ELITES, BUSINESSMEN, LABOR, EDUCATORS, PEASANT GROUPS FROM DIVERSE INSTITUTIONS AND PERSPECTIVES, TO GO OUTSIDE OF HAITI TO DEVELOP COMMON KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCES, DEVELOP STRONGER NETWORKS AMONG THEMSELVES AND OUTSIDE INSTITUTIONS.

7. TO MOVE FORWARD ON THESE OPPORTUNITIES, PARTICIPANTS IDENTIFIED A NEED FOR THE FOLLOWING:

- A COMMITMENT AT ALL LEVELS (USAID, STATE, GRANTEES);
- FLEXIBILITY IN RESPONSES AND RAPID APPROVAL OF ACTIVITIES;
- IMPROVED COMMUNICATION BETWEEN USAID AND GRANTEES AND AMONG GRANTEES;
- INCREASED COORDINATION OF ACTIVITIES AMONG GRANTEES;
- COMBINATION OF EFFORTS GEARED TOWARDS BOTH THE INFORMAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN CIVIL SOCIETY AND FORMAL INSTITUTIONS, SUCH AS THE PARLIAMENT AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT BODIES;
- OVERCOME OR DEAL WITH THE BEACON LIGHT EFFECT -- WHERE ATTENTION TO A PERSON OR GROUP MAY BRING RISK TO THEIR SAFETY;
- SAFE SPACE FOR MEETINGS;
- INVOLVEMENT OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR.

8. THE PARTICIPANTS FORMULATED THE FOLLOWING CONFERENCE MESSAGES FOR CONSIDERATION BY USAID AND THE EMBASSY:

- THE ORGANIZATIONS ARE READY TO COME BACK, THEY HAVE CONCRETE IDEAS FOR SHORT/MEDIUM/LONG-TERM ASSISTANCE. WHAT THEY WANT IS COMMITMENT THAT THEY CAN FOLLOW THROUGH ON THE IDEAS. THEY NEED A GREEN LIGHT NOT AN ORANGE LIGHT. STOPPING AND STARTING ACTIVITIES UNDERMINES CREDIBILITY AND EXPOSES OUR HAITIAN PARTNERS TO REAL HARM WHEN THEY HAVE VISIBLY ENGAGED THEMSELVES IN AREAS WHERE WE PULL BACK.
- THE ORGANIZATIONS ARE READY TO TAKE RISKS TO CREATE OPPORTUNITIES RATHER THAN WAIT FOR THEM, THEY EXPECT SETBACKS BUT ARE PREPARED TO CARRY ON. THEY EXPECT SUPPORT FROM USG PARTNERS.
- HERE ARE OUR IDEAS. THEY NEED TO BE REVIEWED AND PRIORITIZED AND A WORKING GROUP ESTABLISHED CONSISTING OF THE DEMOCRACY GRANTEES, USAID/HAITI AND A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE AMBASSADOR'S CHOICE WITH THE AUTHORITY AND MANDATE TO IMPLEMENT THEM.

- THE PARTICIPANTS ARE PREPARED TO WORK IN THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS OF COMPETENCY AS MAY BE FEASIBLE SUBJECT TO CONSISTENCY WITH POLICY AND THE LEVEL OF RESOURCES AND COMMITMENT MADE AVAILABLE TO DO THE JOB.

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THE ROAD AHEAD  
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9. THE CONFERENCE PROVIDED A ROADMAP FOR CREATIVE ENGAGEMENT NOW. SUGGESTED NEXT STEPS INCLUDED:

- A FOLLOW-UP CONFERENCE IN HAITI WITH HAITIAN PARTNERS TO BUILD ON THE KEY IDEAS REVIEWED IN THE PRESENT CONFERENCE.
- GRANTEES WILL REVIEW THE CONFERENCE IDEAS AND DEVELOP SHORT, CONCISE IMPLEMENTATION PROPOSALS WITHIN THEIR COMPETENCY AND MANDATES.
- USAID/HAITI, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE AMBASSADOR, WILL ALSO REVIEW THE CONFERENCE IDEAS TO PRIORITIZE AND IDENTIFY AREAS THAT MIGHT EVOKE THE BEST PROBABLE RESPONSE.

THE CONFERENCE GOT RESULTS. WHILE IT UNDERScoreD THAT THE ROAD AHEAD WILL REQUIRE CONSIDERABLE VISION AND SKILL TO MEET THE CHALLENGES OF CREATIVE ENGAGEMENT IN HAITI NOW, IT SUCCESSFULLY SET IN MOTION A COMMITMENT AND PROCESS TO DO THAT.##

**Attachment C**

**MARK SCHNEIDER, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, LAC  
TALKING POINTS: HAITI DEMOCRACY WORKSHOP**

- I first would like to thank each of the grantees for coming here today to think more creatively about your engagement in supporting democratic institutions and processes in Haiti at this critical Juncture. We appreciate the flexibility and willingness you have shown in the past to meet the demands of a very difficult and fluid environment.
  
- When President Aristide was elected in December 1990, many Of you were there to show support for Haiti's first democratically elected president. After the coup d'etat in September 1991, your programs were suspended for almost 22 months until the Malval cabinet was ratified in August 1993. During each of these periods you have been responsive, dependable and innovative in your approach.
  
- We now find ourselves operating in a different environment as a result of the intransigence of the military. While we should not ignore this setback, we now must search for positive ways to support democracy, protect human rights and empower the haitian people. This is not a time for recalcitrance. The Haitian people need hope and I believe we can play a critical role.

- As Ambassador Pezzullo said, only the haitian people can solve the current political crisis in Haiti. However, our role is to serve as a catalyst and energize the haitian people in their struggle for democracy.
- This workshop is really an invitation for you to take risks, think creatively and discuss new ideas about how we can empower the haitian people during this extremely difficult period. I ask each of you to look at this as an opportunity to break out of your traditional role and try to further the resolution of the current political crisis within the framework of the Governor's island Accord.
- We need the help and cooperation of each of you here today to develop and strengthen Haiti's fragile institutions, to empower courageous individuals who are committed to human rights and to ensure that civic and community groups -- the lifeblood of every young democracy -- are nurtured and flourish.
- I challenge each of you here today to work together in designing an innovative approach which will facilitate a Haitian solution to the current political crisis. I look forward to hearing your ideas and hope that you will accept this challenge. The struggle for democracy in Haiti must continue until it succeeds.

## Attachment D

### **LESSONS LEARNED BY THE AMERICA'S DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION (ADF)**

#### **BASIC ISSUES**

##### **Be Prepared to Take Risks**

Democracy promotion is a brand-new field, and democracy is relatively new to Haiti, and many of the institutions that this program is designed to support are still in their formative stage. We must thus be prepared to take risks, and devote the best of our efforts to organizations and individuals with relatively limited capacity, experience and track records. This requires a significant investment of time and resources, an investment which in other spheres, where more mature and adept collaborators are plentiful, might even seem inordinate to some. Nonetheless, in our area of interest, this effort is mightily warranted and must be seen through.

##### **Defer to Haitian Initiative**

At the same time, democracy programs like most, it seems, work only if they are "owned" entirely by the local organizations, institutions and government bodies that this project is committed to assist. We are here (or, actually, there) in order to give voice and scope and effectiveness to the efforts of Haitians themselves, and we must hold ourselves strictly to the standards of humility and non-directiveness that this delicate task demands.

##### **Breaking New Ground**

Because of the project's commitment to promoting democratic pluralism in as many sectors as possible, most components of the DEP will be engaged in a significantly different kind of enterprise than that typical of most "development" projects. Rather than seeking the single most efficient or cost-effective means to achieve a desired impact or goal, the DEP explicitly targets the very diversity of democratic society and politics for stimulation and reinforcement. In fact, a significant measure of our success will ultimately be the multiplicity of Haitian efforts to achieve a given objective, rather than how rapidly or efficiently the objective itself is achieved.

##### **Keep Your Eye on the Ball** (Situation conspires ... )

2,204 government officials were democratically elected in the December 16, 1990 and January 20, 1991 elections; one was overthrown by a military coup. The international community's almost obsessive attention to the deposed President's predicament and prospects only reinforces one of the longstanding weaknesses of traditional Haitian

politics -- an overemphasis on centralized power embodied in the person of an all-powerful president. It is easy to get caught up in this, and to focus unduly on the single issue of "resolution" -- what can be done to hasten it, what can we do after it has been achieved. This is a misleading distortion, and we must all strive to transcend the limitation it imposes on our thinking and creativity. Haitian democratization will proceed irrespective of the outcome of this particular crisis, and we must all find ways to make a meaningful contribution over the long term, and get beyond the single issue focus of current concern.

## **PUBLIC PERCEPTION**

### **Consistency and Transparency**

It is a given in the Haitian context that the intentions and sincerity of our actions - our basic credibility - will always be subject to doubt and suspicion. This requires that the project's approach and philosophy - *not* just its mechanics - be clearly and consistently articulated from the outset. This is what we mean by "transparency." However, "transparency" in this connection does not mean simply being open and totally honest with everyone, all the time. Relationships and impressions must be *managed*, actively, carefully and instrumentally, if only in order to maintain our effectiveness in working with a wide range of beneficiaries, colleagues, critics, friends and even erstwhile adversaries. This is nothing more than common sense.

### **Maintain an Independent Identity**

USAID/Haiti long ago determined that its democracy support activities were best implemented by intermediary organizations, rather than through direct USG financing. This determination was based, at least in part, on the recognition that many potential beneficiaries in this sector might be reticent to ally themselves directly with a USG agency. Consistent with this concern, we must actively strive to establish and preserve our independent identities, and offer to those who work with us the possibility of receiving much-needed and well-deserved support while still maintaining an "arm's length" relationship with the USG. This certainly does not mean that any of us should be hiding the source of our funds or our basic orientation in this endeavor. Rather, we must continue to try to position ourselves as the "good-faith brokers" that USAID itself wisely intended us to be, and avoid the natural counter-tendency that would have us serve as mere extensions of USAID housed in outlying offices.

### **You Just Can't Win**

In an environment that is characterized by increasing polarization, any significant attempt to define a middle ground and promote moderation is bound to stimulate criticism from all sides. In a single week last month, the UMU was publicly accused (1) of training popular leaders in the use of heavy weapons (by the Port-au-Prince police); (2) of subverting the commitment of those who have come to advocate compromise and reconciliation after more than two years of frustration (by a leading leftist weekly); and (3) of demobilizing the entire

popular movement by actively promoting the asylum application process (by progressive politicians). In sum, we must be doing something right.

## **DEMOCRACY UNDER ATTACK**

### **Challenge our Partners**

In times of stress or crisis, people - especially public figures and politicians - tend to fall back on rhetoric and demagoguery, techniques which provide facile, but usually ineffectual, answers to difficult and complex issues. One of the most valuable kinds of assistance we can offer under these circumstances is to challenge these leaders to be more creative and reflective precisely at such times, in order to raise the level of debate and action to achieve real progress in addressing the root causes of problems encountered.

### **Acknowledge - and deal with - the Dangers**

Pro-democracy forces in a repressive, hostile environment like today's Haiti face enormous risks. As outsiders trying to help, we must obviously be prepared to follow the courageous lead of our Haitian partners -- neither dampening their resolve by our own trepidation, nor down playing the dangers in our enthusiasm to move forward. Both are tempting at times. To a lesser but perhaps no less significant degree, we must also be prepared to acknowledge that our own positions at what is at least at times the cutting edge of pro-democracy efforts will sometimes subject us to virulent criticism and potential threats to our own security. Again, a fine line must be walked between the bravado and timidity that such an exposed position invariably inspires. Support and understanding from our funding agency and head offices can also prove critical at these difficult junctures.

## **KEEPING UP WITH A CONSTANTLY CHANGING ENVIRONMENT**

### **Information gathering, analysis and management**

It is essential to monitor the evolution of the political context on an ongoing basis, exploiting all available sources of information, analysis and insight. Never depend on any single source for data or interpretation. "All sources are biased; all analyses are subjective." The task, which can only be successfully undertaken over a relatively long period, is to be able to work from a composite of sources toward an understanding of the true "sense" of events going on around us, as they directly affect project implementation.

By the same token, our own project activities and actions -- in effect, our choices - no matter how minor or seemingly innocuous, will themselves become part of the overall flow of information and will trigger responses based on political and often politicized interpretations. All project "moves" in this sense, are meaningful, and will be taken seriously; they may well carry symbolic import far beyond that intended. Special care must be exercised to avoid sending unwanted or undesirable signals in this regard.

### **Keep an Eye Open for Opportunity**

Because the situation is always evolving, assumptions are always being challenged. Opportunities can develop quickly, and be lost quickly. We must establish mechanisms for quick decision making to take advantage of opportunities once they are recognized. The normal decision-making process is too heavy for the type of rapid response that may be required. Nevertheless, it is essential that agreement is reached on the concept of prompt action to attain targets of opportunity, and that systems are established by which this can be done.

*[Flexibility is quite difficult, in practice, given inst. investments and normal course of "contract" implementation, plus burdensome decision-making and review apparatus.]*