

WORKFORCE PLANNING

IN A.I.D.

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The Working Group wishes to express deep appreciation to the Agency Liaison Representatives and to the many Agency managers who were interviewed by the Working Group for their valuable insights which helped greatly in the preparation of this Report. (Lists of both groups are given in Annexes E and F.) At the same time, the conclusions, interpretations and analyses of this Report are strictly those of the Working Group, and we alone are responsible for the views expressed, and for any inaccuracies.

A final draft of this Report was vetted among the Bureaus. While there was general and sometimes enthusiastic support for the development of a workforce planning system, there were, of course, differences on specific points or on questions of emphasis.

We again wish to thank all who have helped to make this Report possible.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

WHY IS WORKFORCE PLANNING AN URGENT MATTER FOR A.I.D.?

Today, A.I.D. operates with an annual budget of \$7-8 billion, with a workforce of 9,300 employees worldwide, employed under a variety of hiring mechanisms, and administered under at least three distinct formal personnel systems. In addition, A.I.D. utilizes the services of over 10,000 people in its "extended" workforce. Together, this workforce manages, implements or otherwise supports 2000 discrete activities in 83 countries and the United States, from Argentina to Zimbabwe.

A.I.D.'s organization and operating systems have remained basically unchanged over the past 30 years. Notable in this regard is the absence of a long range human resources management policy and a workforce planning and management system. Some will argue that A.I.D. has operated well enough in the past without them through use of imaginative and highly flexible ad hoc approaches to staffing. More will argue that a high price has been paid for not placing greater reliance on these tools and concepts and that, as a result, serious distortions have crept into the workforce. Regardless, it is becoming increasingly clear that the past and future are rapidly catching up with A.I.D.

There are many reasons why the time has come for more systematic human resource planning and management. Four of the most obvious are: One, the world is changing very rapidly politically, economically, socially, technologically, and environmentally. Two, some of the long-standing major foreign policy rationales for US foreign assistance are disappearing;

new ones have yet to emerge; and foreign aid constituencies are shifting. Three, the US currently faces one of the most serious financial/budget crises in its history, and will continue to do so for some time. Four, convergent with these, are widely held perceptions that A.I.D. has not been well managed and is not in control of its human and financial resources. These are serious challenges which have major implications for the future of A.I.D. and the survival of its ideals and its development mission. Given the serious nature of the challenges and constraints, it is inconceivable that A.I.D. would choose to enter the 1990's without the benefit of a systematic human resources strategy.

The Administrator of A.I.D. has recognized this and has launched several initiatives over the past several months to better equip A.I.D. to meet the challenges and to overcome negative perceptions. In this context, he established a Working Group in September 1990, under the leadership of the Director of Personnel Management to consider the human resources needs of the Agency--now and in the future--and recommend how to best plan for and manage the future A.I.D.'s workforce. This report is provided in response to that request.

WHAT IS WORKFORCE PLANNING?

The Working Group developed its own working definition of workforce planning. Simply stated its basic objective is to get the "right person in the right job at the right time." To get to that point requires, for the first time in A.I.D., a process which combines workforce planning with long-term program planning. This requires a clear view of Agency objectives and directions at three to five year out and the involvement of top management at key points in the process.

This also involves a constant process of data collection, outreach to the Agency, analysis of the current workforce, and projections of future personnel needs, and translating those needs into workforce management objectives and strategies and then into policies and programs for recruitment, training and other personnel and management systems.

SOME EARLY CONSTRAINTS

From the beginning, the Working Group experienced several constraints. First, it could find no widely accepted definition of the A.I.D. workforce. Second, and perhaps because of the first, it could not find an accurate, agreed upon description of the components and composition of the workforce, or even an agreed upon set of numbers regarding who and how many are in the workforce. Third, beyond the Agency Mission Statement, we could not find an official and clearly articulated vision of A.I.D.'s future direction, role and objectives in the 1990's. Fourth, we could find no appropriate model of workforce planning within Federal Government, or much if any present or past workforce planning within A.I.D. on which to build. The first three factors were considered essential as points of departure and reference in assessing A.I.D.'s workforce needs in the 1990's.

WHO AND WHAT IS THE A.I.D. WORKFORCE?

In an effort to overcome these constraints, the Working Group developed a definition of the workforce, prepared a baseline study of the workforce based on this definition, conducted interviews with over 80 senior and mid-level managers to determine barriers to workforce planning and develop ideas for a proposed workforce planning system and received inputs from a Liaison group of Bureau representatives. This process produced a wealth of information on the structure and trends of the current workforce.

The Working Group defined the A.I.D. workforce, for purposes of workforce planning, as those who have an employer-employee relationship with A.I.D. In general, this includes all U.S. and foreign national direct hires and personal service contractors. Under this definition, A.I.D. has approximately 9,300 employees.

The definition excludes approximately 10,000 persons employed by other US Government agencies, manpower, institutional and services contractors and PVO's. The excluded workforce is referred to in the report as the "extended A.I.D workforce". The above totals are suspect, however, because of gaps in the data as reported and inconsistencies in current workforce reporting.

Defining the workforce allowed the Working Group to develop a general picture of the structure, composition and characteristics of the current workforce. For example:

--93% of the direct hire workforce is "tenured";

---the median age range for all US direct hires is 46-50;

--half of the senior foreign service is age 50 and below, all of which raises questions of flexibility in restructuring for the future the workforce?

The Agency recruits and assigns direct hire employees under surfeit of backstop codes-26 in all. It would appear from the data, and the interviews that A.I.D. has been "cloning itself", recruiting today to meet yesterday's needs. The grade structure of the foreign service also suggests serious distortions, and its distribution resembles a cross, not a pyramid.

FULL TIME TENURED EMPLOYEES

(as of 9/30/90)

314	Level 1
1828	Level 2
549	Level 3
542	Level 4

LEVEL 1: SES, SFS, EX, GS/AD 16+
LEVEL 2: FS 1-3, GS/GM/AD 13-15
LEVEL 3: FS 4-5, GS/AD 9-12
LEVEL 4: FS 6-9, GS/AD 1-8

Women and minorities are seriously under-represented in proportion to the rest of the workforce. It is also telling to realize how fast the non-direct hire portion of the workforce has been growing: 300% since 1980, and 220% from 1985 to 1990.

See Annex C for a fully detailed description of the workforce.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS OF THE AGENCY

Future workforce skill requirements depend on the future roles, directions and objectives of the Agency. The Agency Mission Statement provides only basic reference points. Prior to launching extensive interviews, and based on inputs from senior

managers, the Working Group developed a set of assumptions on Agency direction on what was referred to as the "Surprising Consensus." One of the major surprises from the extensive interview process is that there is a surprising lack of consensus on where A.I.D is going, especially with respect to the environment and delivery modes in which the Agency will be operating in the 1990's.

Major concerns with the assumptions were the degree to which A.I.D. will be permitted to reduce its product lines, to move increasingly to non-project assistance, and the adequacy of OE and direct hire levels.

Since the interviews, the Administrator has announced his "3+1" set of program and management initiatives. These, in conjunction, with the Agency Mission Statement, will help develop more understanding and agreement on future Agency directions. But a major conclusion of the Working Group is that much more detail needs to be made known, not only for workforce planning and determining future workforce requirements but also to engender a greater sense of shared and common purpose and esprit de corps among A.I.D. employees.

THE AID WORKFORCE NEEDS OF TOMORROW

Despite the absence of a widely shared sense of where the Agency is going, the Working Group endeavored to identify the most important skills and abilities A.I.D. will need in the 1990's. The overwhelming conclusion of most of those concerned is that A.I.D., given its current and projected constraints on funding and ceiling, and the prospect of a fixed or reduced direct hire workforce and the unlikely prospect for reducing the number of areas to which the Agency will be

expected to respond, will have to rely even more heavily on contracting out and on a non-direct hire and "extended workforce".


This will require a future direct hire workforce composed largely of generalists and broad-gauged technical managers, plus a small cadre of technical and other specialists. This in turn will put a premium on management and analytical abilities, as well as the negotiating and interpersonal skills of the direct hire workforce. Time and data constraints made it impossible during Phase I to determine how many of today's workforce fit the above categories, how many possess the kinds of skills mentioned, and the implications for recruitment, training, career development, etc. This determination is essential to workforce planning but will require considerable data collection and analysis. This should be a high priority task under Phase II and beyond.

MANAGING A.I.D. HUMAN RESOURCES IN THE 1990'S

The major conclusion and recommendation of this Report is the need for establishing a workforce planning system in A.I.D. as soon as possible. This includes establishing a small workforce planning staff in the Office of Personnel Management to serve as a focal point in making workforce planning into an effective, sustainable and collaborative process that benefits both the Agency and its employees.

The system proposed is described in detail in Section III of this Report, and is represented graphically in the following diagram.

KEY ELEMENTS OF WFP SYSTEM



As shown, the system is composed of six essential elements: (1) policy guidance from top management; (2) data gathering; (3) workforce analysis and planning; (4) management approval of draft workforce policies and strategies; (5) implementation of the workforce plan and strategy; (6) evaluation, monitoring and reporting.

The workforce planning system as proposed has four characteristics crucial to its success and sustainability and recognizing that we are dealing with many complexities in applying this system to A.I.D. For the first time in A.I.D., workforce planning would be integrated with program planning

and strategies from the outset of the program planning process. Two, this process must involve the Administrator and the top management of A.I.D. in establishing workforce objectives and guidance consistent with the formulation of long range program objectives. Three, the system must be flexible enough to accommodate the uncertainties that characterize the environment in which A.I.D. exists. Four, the system must be user-friendly, service-oriented and of demonstrable benefit to top management and the Agency's operating units, and one in which all units of the Agency participate in some form. In these terms, the workforce planning system proposed is unique not only within A.I.D. but possibly within the Federal Government as well.

The Working Group recommends, therefore, that A.I.D. implement as soon as possible a workforce planning system, including the creation of Workforce Planning Staff reporting to the Director of OPM, along the lines suggested above and proposed in more detail in Section III of the report.

The report also contains several major findings and recommendations concerning workforce management in general. For example, the Working Group feels strongly that the direct hire workforce should not decline further. To prevent this, the leadership and management of the Agency must make a stronger and more persuasive case to OMB and to Congress for adequate OE funding levels. The Working Group also believes that an institutionalized workforce planning system can improve top management's ability to make that case.

In addition, the Working Group recommends that much more use should be made of non-career, time-limited appointments for acquisition of many skills. This will increase management's

options and reduce the rigidities in the workforce structure. Reducing and broadening A.I.D.'s occupational groupings, called backstops, also would provide greater flexibility in developing a workforce with the skills needed in the 1990's. Other major recommendations involve more aggressive efforts to attract more women and minorities into the workforce. Also, it is recommended that the selection criteria for recruitment and training should be revised to reflect the new and additional skills needed in the 1990's. In this regard, restoration of the "The Old IDI Program" was high in the list.

IMPLEMENTING A WORKFORCE PLANNING SYSTEM

Section IV of the Report lays out a general implementation guide for institutionalizing the workforce planning system in Phase II. In Phase II, as envisioned, the workforce planning system will be put into operation, including the establishment of the Workforce Planning Staff. A Phase II Working Group would initiate implementation of the system and provide a transition to the Workforce Planning Staff. Priority implementation actions would include establishment of a reliable data base, provide a detailed description of the workforce planning system and how it would work, and would initiate the additional analyses recommended in this report, such as determining the composition and respective roles of the direct hire workforce. Phase II should culminate mid-1991 with a Workforce Planning System and Workforce Planning Staff up-and-running, and the development of a workforce plan for A.I.D. underway guided by a human resources strategy.

We recommend, therefore, authorization of the establishment of a Phase II Working Group to carry out the initial implementation actions to put a workforce planning system into operation, and to provide transition to the new Workforce Planning Staff.

CONCLUSION

A.I.D. has much to be proud of in its past. We have helped millions of people to achieve better lives. A.I.D. employees have helped our country in its pursuit of its best national interests, and they have served as a proud and grateful agent of the humanitarian spirit of the American people, and carried out our mandate successfully under frequently difficult circumstances.

But times are changing, and if we are to continue this exceptional heritage, without parallel in human history, it will be critical for A.I.D. to look to ways to do its job even better, to earn continued support from the American people and the Congress, and to make the very best use of the funds that are available to us.

The Working Group recognizes that Workforce Planning will not provide the answers or solutions to all of A.I.D.'s workforce or management problems and issues. But it is the strong belief of those who worked on this report that workforce planning can help the Agency significantly to better meet the changes and challenges of the 1990's. A.I.D. now has an historic opportunity not only to improve and modernize its own management techniques but also to carry out a pioneering management improvement effort within the Federal Government.

I. THE CHALLENGE

A. THE ASSIGNMENT

In a September 14, 1990 memorandum (see Annex A), Administrator Roskens stated that he "place[d] the highest priority on improving the efficiency and effectiveness of A.I.D." A key to this was "institutionalizing an effective Workforce Planning System." He asked that the Director of Personnel Management establish a Working Group to provide recommendations on establishing such a system.

The Working Group has attempted to do that in this study. And this study has led us to the firm conclusion that Workforce Planning is essential to A.I.D.'s improved management.

B. WHAT IS WORKFORCE PLANNING?

The Working Group developed its own working definition of workforce planning. It is a system that carries out two key actions concurrently: a) determines the long-range workforce skills requirements as they relate to A.I.D.'s long-range role, direction and program objectives; and b) takes the subsequent and subordinate actions, e.g. recruitment and training, to bring workforce requirements into line with program objectives, i.e., improving the chances of "getting the right person in the right place at the right time." To get to that point requires, for the first time in A.I.D., a process which relates workforce planning directly to long-term program planning. This requires a clear view of Agency objectives and directions

for a three to five year horizon, as well as the involvement of top management at key points in the process.

Workforce Planning must function within the strategy articulated by the Administrator and within the adaptations required by each Regional and Central bureau. This also involves a constant process of data collection, communication, analysis of the current workforce, and projections of future personnel needs. Those needs are translated into workforce management objectives and strategies, and further refined into policies and programs for recruitment, training and other personnel and management systems.

While our definition sounds relatively simple, its application in A.I.D. is quite complex, will involve further delineation and will require the strong support and participation of all elements of the Agency.

C. WHY IS WORKFORCE PLANNING AN URGENT MATTER FOR A.I.D.?

1. Rapid world changes: The world is changing rapidly and A.I.D. must change with it. The world A.I.D. will face in the 1990's will be far different than the world it faced in the 1980's and before. Already program objectives and priorities are changing to adjust to new global realities. A.I.D.'s rationales and constituencies are changing. The Agency has recently taken major steps forward in defining what it sees as its future priorities. The Administrator's Vision Statement and the "3 + 1" Initiatives in democracy, business, family and development and management provide basic guideposts for future A.I.D. directions and priorities. These will have major workforce and workforce planning implications. However, A.I.D. will not intuitively understand these implications. It must take a more systematic look at how the future workforce should be molded to harmonize with future program objectives.

2. Budget and resource constraints: The recent Federal budget agreement will have far-reaching effects on the U.S. Government workforce, including that of A.I.D. A.I.D. must make the necessary adjustments to budget realities, which in turn could have serious workforce implications. New legislation may also be required to modify program and personnel authorities. Workforce planning can help provide the essential basis for seeking adequate funding levels and necessary legislative changes, and help construct a workforce in size and composition that makes the best use of the budget available.

3. The need for A.I.D. management improvement initiatives: A.I.D. is in serious trouble in terms of Congressional and other perceptions regarding its ability to manage its affairs. To a great extent, these are misperceptions; nevertheless they persist. We must, therefore, tell the Congress how we are eliminating or reducing the Agency's vulnerabilities. If we do not, Congress will continue to be suspicious of any future proposals for resource increases. The existence of a comprehensive, constructive set of initiatives, including workforce planning and management, should help turn these negative perceptions into more positive attitudes. The new Management Initiative is an important step forward in this effort, of which the establishment of an actual workforce planning system is a major element.

4. Understanding and managing the current workforce: As an Agency we do not have a good picture of the current workforce, in terms of its definition, size, components, skills and its trends. The Working Group Study has produced some unexpected results. For example, there are some serious distortions in the current workforce. In many respects, we have been "cloning ourselves" and thereby running the risk of recruiting and training today for yesterday's workforce needs.

We are also seeing some of the effects of the Agency's past practice of "fits and starts" workforce management, i.e. frenetic hiring in plush times and hiring freezes in lean times, causing gluts and gaps and some marginal skills in the workforce. Since ninety-three percent (93%) of the current U.S. direct hire workforce is tenured, we have left ourselves with little flexibility to respond rapidly to the needs of the future.

5. Matching long-term program objectives with long-term workforce needs based on a human resources management (HRM) policy and strategy in A.I.D.: Several recent studies, including our own, have concluded that the lack of an overall HRM policy and strategy is affecting efficiency and effectiveness of the workforce. This includes the need for better definition of skill needs, career paths, and employee career development strategies, and for retraining, improved assignment processes, equal opportunity programs and more and better utilization of the Civil Service (CS) workforce. An institutionalized workforce planning system can provide the basis for and help stimulate and develop a coherent human resources management policy and strategy, consistent with Agency program objectives and employee interests and goals.

6. A.I.D. has not had workforce planning in the past: A.I.D.'s workforce has essentially developed in an ad hoc fashion. A.I.D. needs a formal workforce planning system responsive to evolving Agency priorities, with specific staffing needs based on coordinated input from the Bureaus and field Missions. We believe it can:

- Help assure that the workforce of the future is consistent with planned future program directions, and develops in a way to help shape the actual nature of those program directions.

- Enhance the capacity to generate Agency-wide workforce policy, guidance and insights about the workforce itself, determine how it is impacted by program change, and how we can better respond to this change.
- Bring development program needs and Agency-wide personnel strategies more closely into partnership, especially for recruitment, assignment, career development, training and attrition.
- Sharpen the Agency's capability to analyze its workforce problems and target solutions.
- Provide earlier identification of workforce problems to extend the time available for Agency responses.
- Develop and install a more complete and penetrating workforce data base for forecasting, analysis, planning and monitoring.
- Create a stronger institutional "home" for workforce planning, coordination and outreach.
- Be simple, realistic, flexible, and useful at all Agency levels.

The need for workforce planning has been a recurrent theme and plea in study after study of the Agency's management and personnel systems. A.I.D. now has an opportunity. Workforce planning will not solve all of the Agency's problems and its application in A.I.D. will be a complex task, but it has the potential to contribute significantly to preserving and enhancing A.I.D.'s relevance to new global realities and U.S. foreign policy and its credibility and leadership in the field of international development.

D. THE WORKING GROUP'S APPROACH

1. The Setting

From the outset, the Working Group has viewed its task as a formidable challenge as well as a great opportunity: A formidable challenge because of its awareness that A.I.D. had never done workforce planning to any significant degree; a great opportunity because of the considerable benefits possible from the use of workforce planning in A.I.D.

The immediate question arose as to why there had been no past workforce planning, and what made anyone think it could be done now. Part of the answer is presumed to lie in the fact that A.I.D. has had minimum control over its destiny, and has had to live in a world of uncertainty since its beginnings. Current and recent unexpected world events, several to which A.I.D. has already been called upon to respond, only highlight the uncertainty factor. But uncertainty is no reason not to plan. It can, in fact, be argued that this also heightens the need and opportunity to develop a system that is flexible, in order to accommodate a considerable amount of uncertainty, but at the same time is disciplined enough to enable the Agency to deal simultaneously with the workforce implications of whatever future issues may emerge.

Having said this, perhaps the main reason there has been little in the way of workforce planning in the past is simply that it was not accorded a high priority, despite its obvious benefits. This has been changed as workforce planning has become a key component of the new initiative "Toward a Management Strategy for A.I.D."

2. The Plan

In analyzing the rationale and the means to achieve an effective workforce planning system, the Working Group worked closely with a Liaison Group appointed by Bureau chiefs pursuant to the Administrator's request in his September 14 memorandum. The Working Group perceived its task in two distinct phases:

Phase I: To consist of this Report, which includes:

- Given the considerable limitations, the development of as accurate a picture as possible of A.I.D.'s current workforce and workforce trends.
- Identification of potential changes needed in the workforce to meet the evolving vision of A.I.D.'s future directions.
- Identification of those barriers which must be overcome to achieve a workforce relevant to the vision of A.I.D.'s future, and to permit better workforce planning and workforce management.
- Recommendations for the design, implementation, and institutionalization of a flexible workforce planning and management system that will effectively serve the needs of all levels of management.

Phase II: Which would begin to implement the recommendations in this Report, as approved or modified by the Administrator, and initiate or develop scopes of work for analysis of a limited number of the critical workforce subjects identified in

Phase I. As projected, Phase II is to be completed by mid-1991. The implementation plan and objectives for Phase II are described in Section IV.

It is anticipated that the completion of Phase II would see a Workforce Planning Staff in place and ready to begin full operations in the summer of 1991. This would be the beginning of the final phase and a permanent part of the continuing process toward effectively institutionalizing the concept in A.I.D.

3. Methodology

Early on, the Working Group became convinced of several things:

- a. That it would need to assemble a set of assumptions on the vision of A.I.D. in the 1990's, believed to be generally consistent with the main trends embraced by most of the Agency's leadership, in order to have a context in which to assess future staffing needs.
- b. That it should not go to Agency management with recommendations on A.I.D.'s future workforce and on a proposed workforce planning system unless and until it had a solid grasp of the current workforce, and of whether any workforce planning was taking place in the Agency, or elsewhere.
- c. That it could not simply pull a multitude of statistics out of the existing data base as the sole foundation of its analysis and recommendations.
- d. That it would have to go to the Agency's managers for their perspectives as well.

The challenge became how, in what form and with what questions. Determining the essential questions turned out to be a time consuming and difficult task. With input from many, the Working Group developed an information and questionnaire package for the interview stage (See Annex D), split the Working Group into teams of two, began the interview process and in the end conducted nearly ninety in-depth interviews with AID/W and field managers. (The list of those interviewed is given in Annex F.)

The interviews and the interview questions addressed three main aspects of workforce planning:

- a. A.I.D.'s workforce skills needs in the 1990's and why (including comments on the Working Group's set of assumptions on the future direction of A.I.D.);
- b. Major barriers (past, present and projected) to more effective workforce planning; and
- c. Suggestions for establishing a workforce planning system and unit in A.I.D.

Concurrent with the interview process, the Working Group embarked on what turned out to be a major effort to construct an accurate and meaningful picture of the current workforce and workforce trends, to serve as a baseline and point of departure in determining future needs. (The details of our analysis on the present workforce are provided in Annex C.)

The Working Group's analysis and conclusions, therefore, are based primarily on the following:

- a. The baseline picture of the current workforce;

- b. A synthesis of the results of the interviews (see Annex G);
- c. A review and analysis of various aspects of the A.I.D. human resources management and personnel systems, as revealed in previous studies and reports, including a draft of the report of the recently completed Tri-Sector Council Assessment of Future Workforce Needs in Agriculture, Rural Development and Natural Resources. (See Annex B for a summary of this and some of the earlier Agency studies);
- d. Inputs and comments from the Bureau Liaison Representatives;
- e. A review by the Director of Personnel Management and his staff; and finally
- f. The insights and experiences of the Working Group members themselves.

This process of consultation and analysis has led to this report. The Working Group's conclusions and recommendations are given in Sections II and III, with Section III devoted to outlining the type of Workforce Planning System and Staff which the Working Group recommends be instituted. Many of the conclusions and recommendations in Section II relate directly to the establishment and the most effective use of a proposed workforce planning process. Others only indirectly relate, but arise from a belief that with change and improvements, A.I.D. can structure and use its workforce in a more efficient manner and with greater equity. We hope that what we have offered in the conclusions and are proposing in the recommendations can help lead to a workforce of the future that will in all respects meet the program priorities of the 1990's envisioned by Agency leadership.

II. WORKFORCE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. FUTURE AGENCY DIRECTION

The Working Group's survey of Agency managers included a set of assumptions that was believed to represent a consensus on where the Agency is going in the 1990's. These assumptions, contained in Annex D, were based largely on what was referred to as "The Surprising Consensus," which evolved from the results of meetings among senior managers on the strategic direction of A.I.D. However, we found a surprising lack of consensus on "The Surprising Consensus." The number who "generally disagreed" with it was roughly the same as that who "generally agreed." Even those in "agreement" had specific caveats.

The major area of dissent was that A.I.D. would have fewer product lines, primarily because Congress would keep adding but allow no subtracting, especially in Basic Human Needs. Many felt the assumptions did not give enough attention to projects and technical assistance. Other differences of opinion ranged from questioning any rise in the level of future program budgets and A.I.D.'s continued role as lead development agency, to a belief that the assumptions did not sufficiently emphasize political realities -- A.I.D.'s role as an instrument of foreign policy.

The majority of respondents see, because of constrained OE or A.I.D.'s diminishing lead agency role, a future Agency with a total workforce about the same in size, or smaller, and direct hire (DH) numbers reduced. There is great concern that we will have inadequate staff to handle workload. Some believe that the existing DH workforce is too small and that there is no slack in the system to allow

for unforeseen demands or to take on additional workload as a consequence of accountability concerns. Virtually every respondent cited management and analytical skills as those the Agency needs most urgently.

In terms of program priorities and emphasis, the Workforce Planning Working Group concludes that policy reform, environment, democracy, U.S. competitiveness, private sector as the engine of economic growth, and the role of families will be or will continue to be major program priorities. Host country policy reform and policy improvement will take on increased importance in all sectors. Because of Congressional and other pressures, A.I.D. will not abandon its involvement in traditional sector programs (agriculture, health, nutrition, family planning, child welfare, AIDS and education) although the emphasis, approaches and priorities within these sectors will continue to evolve. In this context, and within the major management objective of doing fewer things, and doing them well, A.I.D. may not be able to reduce significantly the number of "product lines" on an Agency-wide basis, but will and should be able to reduce them in many individual country programs.

The Working Group believes that A.I.D. in the 1990's can maintain its leadership among U.S. agencies in the field of international development, but perhaps only if it is quick to: (a) define or redefine its role and establish a set of objectives that is clear, feasible, measurable and in consonance with basic U.S. domestic and foreign policy interests; (b) seize the leadership initiative within the U.S. Government; (c) update and streamline its assistance delivery systems and internal procedures; and (d) acquire the appropriate staff skills.

The Agency Mission Statement, plus the Administrator's recently published "3 + 1" Initiatives and a possible reorganization, set the general vision, direction and program priority areas of the Agency for the near term. We now need systematic elaboration and communication by Agency management to the staff of the Agency's role, general direction and objectives over the next three to five years that builds on but goes beyond the Agency's Mission Statement, the "3 + 1" Initiatives, and the Agency's comparative advantages that have been built up over time. More detail is needed to determine future workforce skills requirements and to engender a greater sense of shared purpose among A.I.D. employees. This should include and accommodate regional adaptations to overall strategy.

Workforce planning is dependent on such systematic guidance to develop a responsive human resources strategy. A clear vision of the Agency's program needs enables workforce planning to forecast estimates of the types and numbers of human resources called for in the future. This, in turn, permits these results to be applied to improving the planning and the responsiveness of human resources systems (i.e. personnel management, recruitment, training, assignment, etc.). Its ability to project actual program-related workforce requirements by category and number is limited when there is insufficient communication and guidance on direction and program emphasis.

Recommendation 1: Senior managers systematically and clearly communicate the future role, direction and skill requirements of the Agency staff, and include sufficient detail in its elaboration to engender a sense of common purpose and enable development of workforce planning within a long-range Human Resources Management Policy and Strategy.

B. OVERALL MANAGEMENT AND A.I.D. PROCESSES

The Working Group is aware of many efforts of the past or now underway in the Agency which are closely related to this Group's work or, by impacting on workload, have workforce implications. These include the Administrator's Management Initiative, of which this workforce planning task is a part, the proposed Agency reorganization plan flowing out of the Deloitte Touche study of organizational redundancies, proposals on revamping recruitment and setting up a modified International Development Intern (IDI) program, the Bollinger Report on Improving Agency Efficiency, and the recently announced Africa Bureau reorganization. The Working Group urges that the outcomes from all these studies and actions be coordinated so that recommendations from one or more may take fully into account the findings and implications arising from others.

Secondly, A.I.D. has formed task forces and working groups to investigate many problems in the past. Over the years, they have recommended streamlining A.I.D.'s program documentation and review systems, yet the problems persist. Annex B summarizes 12 reports which we could locate, all focused on workforce planning and related concerns. In addition, numerous Selection and other personnel boards have made pertinent recommendations on workforce planning topics over the last five years.

Agency personnel have become cynical about such efforts because of the lack of any apparent results in the majority of cases; A.I.D.'s failure to follow up on recommendations made and/or approved, even where reports include implementation plans; and inadequate communication throughout the Agency of outcomes and actions taken pursuant to such efforts.

Revised documentation and procedures, as well as organizational changes, while not directly within the purview of this Working Group, do impact on workforce planning. They are of import for workforce planning because they affect work performed by the workforce and the framework in which work is done; they indirectly bear on workforce concerns and the product and content of workforce planning.

It is critical that there be an appropriate means for coordinating the information and results among and between the various management studies, task forces and decisions made or being made so as to "harmonize" their outcomes. Moreover, decisions taken on recommendations made in this study and on recommendations by other studies undertaken as part of the Management Initiative, and on documentation and organizational changes should be widely publicized throughout the Agency and follow-up actions made known.

C. A.I.D. WORKFORCE DESCRIPTION

1. Workforce Definition


To assist in placing the Working Group's major conclusions and recommendations in context, issues on the definition and reporting of the A.I.D. workforce are included at this point, as well as a brief description of the current A.I.D. workforce. A more detailed treatment of these topics is contained in Annex C.

A.I.D. utilizes, in various ways, an indeterminate number of people worldwide to conduct its programs -- common wisdom of several years ago estimates 20,000. However, not all of these are part of A.I.D.'s workforce, although all impact upon the workforce in some manner. For workforce

planning purposes the Working Group has limited the A.I.D. workforce to only those persons with whom the Agency has an "employer - employee" relationship. A.I.D. is responsible for decisions affecting these people in recruitment, hiring, promotion and advancement, awards, career development and training, and employment termination. It also has certain legal obligations arising out of actions by employees which result from that relationship.

As defined here, the A.I.D. workforce totals some 9,300 persons and includes all U.S. (Civil Service and Foreign Service) and Foreign National Direct Hires and all U.S. and Foreign National Personal Services Contractors (PSC's*).

AID WORLDWIDE WORKFORCE



The PSC's (about 4,800 persons) which comprise the non-direct hire portion of the workforce as we've defined it, have in the past been omitted from most Agency descriptions of its workforce, which have included only the Foreign Service, Civil Service and FNDH, or a total of 4,534 personnel.

*Because of legal restrictions, PSC's are allowed only overseas.

The above definition of A.I.D.'s workforce, therefore, excludes those persons who are not employed directly by A.I.D. but who perform a wide range of services for A.I.D. or on A.I.D.'s behalf. We call this group the "extended workforce."* There is no accurate number for this extended workforce, but it has been estimated to be in the neighborhood of 10,000 persons. They may be employed by another U.S. Government agency, a manpower or services contractor, an institutional contractor or university, a PVO or grantee.

This extended workforce is a critical component of A.I.D.'s personnel resources, but it has a different relationship than those in the "defined" workforce. A.I.D. has greater flexibility in dealing with personnel in the extended workforce, such as removing unsatisfactory performers or changing types and/or numbers of staff to meet evolving situations, than is possible with direct hire staff. While the extended workforce is not part of A.I.D.'s workforce, as the Working Group defines it, it may carry out the following kinds of A.I.D. activities:

- Implement A.I.D. projects or grants and advise host governments;

* Defining who is in A.I.D.'s formal workforce is tricky business. Some have argued that the "official" workforce should be defined by function, since so many key elements of A.I.D.'s development and program effort are under institutional contracts, PASA's or other indirect mechanisms. The Working Group has taken this view fully into account and concurs that workforce planning must be fully cognizant of these and other components of the extended workforce. But for initial consistency and clarity, any definition of the official workforce must begin with those employees for whom the Agency has a fundamental and direct legal obligation -- USDH, FSDH, and PSC's. In Phase II, that definition will be examined further, and may be expanded. Regardless of an agreed-upon definition, however, workforce planning must become increasingly aware of A.I.D.'s total workforce, both the defined and the extended.

- Provide specialized manpower or services, such as printing, maintenance of facilities and data processing systems, payroll, security services, library and related documentation management, and others; and
- Provide specific and very specialized expertise to A.I.D. not found in its workforce, such as in the private sector, in financial and trade sectors, in highly specialized technical fields, and in administrative and financial management.

While not part of A.I.D.'s workforce per se, these personnel impact on the defined workforce by circumscribing the types of people A.I.D. itself directly employs and by constituting a major part of the management and monitoring workload of the Agency. These personnel also represent a claim on A.I.D.'s budget. Therefore, some real knowledge of this group and what it does is important for workforce planning as well as for budgeting, but such data need not be as extensive or detailed as that required on A.I.D.'s workforce.

Recommendation 2: For purposes of formal workforce planning, define the workforce as those people having an employer-employee relationship with the Agency and make that the working definition throughout the Agency.

2. Workforce Data and Reporting

However defined, A.I.D.'s entire workforce cannot at present be identified, categorized or analyzed with a high degree of accuracy and precision. The best data are available on the American Direct Hire component, but A.I.D. has little reliable information available on either the other components of the A.I.D. workforce, as we define it, or on the groups outside that definition who impact on the workforce and its workload.

Reporting from the field on A.I.D. workforce components is incomplete and/or inconsistent; this problem is more severe for the non-direct hire group (FN and US PSC's) than FNDH staff. Data which is available, such as in Annual Budget Submissions, needs to be shared more widely. Guidance issued by AID/W for reporting efforts, such as ABS preparation, may be interpreted differently by field respondents. Finally, A.I.D. data on non-direct hires include some persons who fall outside the Working Group's definition of this segment of the workforce, and may exclude some PSC's who fall within the Working Group's definition. Specifically, A.I.D. figures on non-direct hire personnel (6,843 persons) exceed our own estimate of about 4,800 PSC's. We believe the 6,843 figure itself is suspect mainly because of information inadequacies cited earlier.

Appropriate methods should be devised to collect and keep current internally consistent information on each of these components because of their importance to workforce planning. Data collection and reporting should be based on improvements to existing systems, and on improving compliance with existing requirements rather than on adding new reporting burdens.

Recommendation 3: Include in the Agency's existing personnel and budget reporting requirements all those personnel who are included in the definition of the workforce and determine what precise information is required for workforce planning purposes on FNDH and PSC's, as well as data needs on the extended workforce.

3. Brief Description of A.I.D.'s Current Workforce

The A.I.D. workforce is defined as all U.S. Direct Hires (USDH), Foreign National Direct Hires (FNDH), and non-direct

hires (US and FN PSC's). Most visible are Foreign Service and Civil Service members -- 3,466 persons in all, of which 3,230 are full time, permanent employees expecting to have a full career with A.I.D. and to retire at the end of their careers.

About 67% of USDH (both CS and FS) are based in AID/W with 69% of the FS assigned overseas. The USDH group is highly educated with 49% having an advanced degree. Judging by types of degrees, the majority of USDH personnel are largely "generalists," rather than "technical specialists."

The median age range for all USDH in the FS is 46-50. Half of the Senior Foreign Service (SFS) is aged 50 and below, as well, and thereby is 15 years or more from mandatory retirement. The median age for the CS and for the CS senior ranks is slightly younger.


About 93% of all USDH are tenured. On average, 275 persons leave A.I.D. employment each year, including about 10% of the SFS.

There are some non-career, untenured CS personnel in Schedule C appointments who must meet certain standards for these politically determined AID/W jobs. There are also persons serving under non-career Administratively Determined (AD) appointments. Experts and consultants are brought in on non-career bases. These three types of personnel are part of the A.I.D. workforce as defined above. Their positions are essentially temporary and their numbers tend to be relatively small and to fluctuate. Overseas, some CS personnel and highly qualified specialists may serve for specified periods under non-career, limited term FS appointments.

It is clear that A.I.D. should use unlimited appointments to the career service judiciously. Such appointments should only be used for core personnel who bring skills and qualities which will be a standard, continuing requirement for the Agency. Expanded use should be made of time-limited, non-career appointments to the FS and CS, especially for highly specialized technical skills or for personnel hired to enable A.I.D. to carry out activities not expected to be permanent features of A.I.D.'s program. In such hiring, A.I.D. will have to discipline itself so as to ensure non-career, limited term personnel are not converted to career status except in highly unusual cases where the needs of the Agency are overwhelming. More flexible use of CS personnel should be made to enable their greater availability to the field. Greater attention needs to be given also to utilization of spousal employment as a growing resource for the Agency.

USDH skills are categorized by backstop codes. Of the 26 codes now in use, the largest, representing only 11% of all FS and CS members, is for Program Analysts. The smallest backstops each have less than 1% of the USDH workforce.


USDH EMPLOYMENT BY BACKSTOP CODES
(Source: RAMPS 9/30/90)



Women and minorities are seriously under-represented in the FS overall and at the senior levels of both the CS and FS. The CS segment of the A.I.D. workforce is mostly composed of minorities and the largest group within the CS is women; the FS is predominantly non-minority and male.

The largest component of the A.I.D. workforce overseas is by far the Foreign National employees. This group generally is made up of citizens of the host country in which they work, but it may also include third-country nationals (TCN's).

AID OVERSEAS WORKFORCE




Source: 1993 AID-Table 9: FY 90 Estimates

Originally, all FN's were employed as direct hires, and these personnel considered working for A.I.D. to be a career. For administrative convenience in the early 1980's, A.I.D. began converting many of these personnel to contract status as PSC's or, more often, as employees of "umbrella" contractors set up and operated by U.S. Embassy recreation associations. However,

those converted did not change their roles, work performed or career expectations. More recently, due to a finding that recreation association contracts were improper, the personnel involved were placed under individual PSC's in order to continue their services.

These shifts in employment modes explain some of the sizable increase in FN PSC's since 1985. But Missions have also separately hired FN's as well as U.S. citizens under PSC's when needed skills and/or personnel were not available in the direct hire ranks.



Recommendation 4: Evaluate means by which there can be greater use of limited appointments in the A.I.D. workforce to meet specific and shorter-term requirements for specialized expertise, while taking fully into account possible difficulties in attracting personnel for short-term assignments.


Recommendation 5: Evaluate possibilities for greater flexibility in the use of CS employees to meet the Agency's staffing needs in the field.

D. THE SIZE AND ROLE OF THE DIRECT HIRE WORKFORCE

1. United States Direct Hires

Numerically, the size of the USDH category has declined over the years to 3,466, despite additions to A.I.D. programs and fluctuating appropriations. For some time, USDH have not been involved primarily in hands-on development activities; they conceptualize development programs and projects, oversee implementation by contractors and PVO's and manage the design, implementation, evaluation and assessment of impact of A.I.D. assistance.

OVERSEAS USDH FUNCTIONS ANALYSIS




Source: 1992 ABS-Table 9: FY 90 Estimate

Accordingly, for the USDH workforce, a premium is now placed on analytical, managerial, negotiation and interpersonal relations skills, with less emphasis given to technical skills, per se. In addition, A.I.D.'s USDH are responsible for planning, managing and evaluating the performance of outside contract resources, heightening the need for more contract management and financial accountability skills. This trend is important to the current workforce, especially its USDH component, in terms of redefined responsibilities, performance evaluation, career development and training. They also affect recruitment, screening and selection, and employment modality choices for the future.

The Working Group concluded that AID/W will likely be reduced in size with the elimination of functional redundancies between and among organizational entities. Reduction of these should reduce AID/W size and, by extension, reduce workload in the field. This means "savings" in headquarters positions; first priority for such savings should be direct hire staffing of new or understaffed program priorities, especially in the field.

AID/W USDH FUNCTIONS ANALYSIS



Workforce data reveals distortions within the USDH workforce vis-a-vis age, grade, tenuring, representation and advancement of women and minorities, and allocation of USDH among and between the Bureaus. This undoubtedly reflects A.I.D.'s failure throughout the years to apply workforce planning to decisions in recruitment and promotions, rigid and inflexible use of CS personnel, and tendencies to allow short-term budget constraints to take precedence over longer-term workforce planning considerations.

It is unlikely that the Agency's current programs will significantly decrease in size, although respective emphases may change, and new initiatives will be added. While the Working Group and the majority of the interviewees felt that the size of the direct hire workforce was about right, all anticipate and fear the number of USDH will decline further with a relatively greater decrease in AID/W. A.I.D. should maintain its field Missions, as these comprise the main element of its comparative advantage, but many Missions will become smaller in program scope, and with some downward changes in Mission size and staffing. To compensate, the trend of placing greater reliance on the non-direct hire workforce and on manpower and services contractors will continue. In this context, the Agency should experiment with optional field organization and assistance delivery models.

Thus, it is essential that A.I.D. clearly define the roles of its USDH staff and their relationships to other A.I.D. workforce components -- FNDH and non-direct hire personnel -- and then vigorously petition for increased OE resources to develop and retain the necessary size of its direct hire workforce. The relationship of the A.I.D. workforce to those who perform services for A.I.D. -- the extended workforce --


also needs definition. Because of expected continuing pressure to reduce work year and OE ceilings, the need for rational workforce planning is even more acute and essential.

Recommendation 6: Reduce or eliminate distortions or imbalances in the workforce in such areas as: grade structure, skills mix, methods of appointment, size, role and authorities of the current and future U.S. and local staff in relation to the size, diversity and geographic distribution of the Agency's programs.

2. Foreign National Direct Hires

FNDH numbers have decreased but FNDH staff now have more significant responsibilities in carrying out project management, financial management, clerical support and office operations.


FNDH FUNCTIONS ANALYSIS



Source: 1992 ABS-Table 9: FY 90 Estimate

AID/W has given too little attention to this component of the direct hire workforce, although its knowledge of this group and involvement in decisions affecting it are greater than for the non-direct hire component. The authorities accorded FNDH personnel in A.I.D. Handbooks and policies are limited. However, given their heightened roles in certain key functions, fewer USDH supervisors for larger numbers of personnel, and more supervision of foreign nationals by other foreign nationals (DH and/or PSC's), actual FNDH responsibilities now are greater than in the past. As the situation has evolved over time, FNDH and FN PSC personnel carry out similar work and take on similar responsibilities, though this may create inappropriate methods of operation. In fact, their roles may exceed those spelled out in in-house regulations.

FN-PSC FUNCTIONS ANALYSIS



Source: 1992 ABS-Table 9: FY 90 Estimate


A.I.D. should collect and maintain, in a regular and systematic way, accurate data on the FNDH workforce. It may rely on existing sources of information, such as the Annual Budget Submission, so long as it is more widely distributed in AID/W and more standardization is required in Mission staffing pattern submissions. There should be a better definition of the respective roles and responsibilities of FNDH, USDH and non-direct hire personnel, and either a revision or reaffirmation of existing A.I.D. regulations on authorities these personnel may or may not exercise. Moreover, the Agency must train FNDH staff to handle the roles that are defined for them and the jobs they are given. In short, the Agency needs to significantly upgrade its personnel system affecting the foreign national components of the workforce.

Recommendation 7: Decide what functions are more appropriately performed by USDH, FNDH, and FN PSC's in light of issues of accountability and vulnerability, supervisory responsibilities, and changed and expanded responsibilities increasingly being assumed by the FNDH and non-direct hire components of the workforce. Upgrade the FN personnel system to reflect this.

E. SIZE AND ROLE OF THE NON-DIRECT HIRE WORKFORCE

Increasingly, Missions are relying on non-direct hire personnel to carry out functions for which USDH are not available, as well as to provide support services to USDH. Non-direct hire staff have become extremely important to the Agency's ability to carry out its programs. The number of people in the non-direct hire category, within our defined workforce, may now exceed 4,800. All are hired under PSC's, and are only used overseas.


A.I.D. OVERSEAS WORKFORCE



Source: 1992 ABS-Table 9: FY 90 Estimate

These PSC's run the gamut from professional program and technical personnel to accounting technicians, personnel clerks, financial management specialists, and to support staff, carpenters, drivers, security guards and cleaners. The number of U.S. citizens employed as PSC's overseas has more recently grown as part of the workforce. US PSC's primarily, but not exclusively, carry out project management functions.

US-PSC FUNCTIONS ANALYSIS



Source: 1992 ABS-Table 9, FY 90 Estimate

A.I.D. is also increasingly reliant on the extended workforce. The Agency uses contract firms (manpower/services) to provide services such as printing, security, and payrolling, and as sources of special expertise, such as the private sector. A.I.D. also obtains needed expertise from IPA's, other USG agencies and universities. The Agency utilizes institutional contractors and universities to implement its development projects worldwide.

Expanded use of PSC's and the extended workforce is appropriate and can be efficient, effective and, in the case of foreign nationals, lower in cost. On the other hand, there are some areas of concern in this increased reliance on non-direct hires (PSC's and extended workforce): U.S. PSC's may be as costly as field USDH and institutional contractual sources of expertise

and services cost even more, due to high overhead charges. There is also a concern that USDH's are getting too far removed from the "front lines" of development. The expanded use of PSC's and the extended workforce poses a sizable contract management and supervisory workload for Missions' DH staff, not to mention the indirect impact on Mission staffing in general and OE funds in particular.

FNDH's and PSC's are now funded from Operating Expenses, Trust Funds and/or Program Funds. With the dollar value of Trust Funds subject to fluctuation, with continuing reductions in ESF appropriations (which generate a sizable share of all Trust Funds) with increasingly tight OE appropriations, and with OMB pressures to eliminate reliance on Trust Funds altogether, there is likely to be heavier pressure on OE resources to finance the FNDH and PSC segments of the workforce.

As the role and importance of the non-direct hire component of the workforce grows, it will be necessary for the Agency to consciously account for it and to consider its needs for training and delegation of authority to maximize its potential contribution. A.I.D. should consider granting more responsibility to its PSC's just as it does for FNDH personnel.

Recommendations 8: Include PSC's as a part of A.I.D.'s workforce planning, although specific hiring, firing, promotion and similar decisions should remain in the field where such staffing needs are best known.

Recommendation 9: On a continuing basis, collect data on functions performed by, and determine budget and staffing implications of the extended workforce, and assess their impact on numbers, skills requirements, training, etc. for the A.I.D. direct hire and non-direct hire defined

workforce. Such information should be part of regular data collection efforts, though it need not be nearly so extensive as for the defined workforce.

Recommendation 10: Employ, as many USAID's have done, many of the non-direct hire workforce, such as char force, maintenance staff, and possibly drivers (insurance and other liability considerations permitting) under institutional manpower contracts in those countries where this is possible. This would reduce contract management workload and trim the size of the workforce over which A.I.D. has employer-employee relationships.

F. THE ROLE OF THE GENERALIST AND "TECHNICAL MANAGER"

The Working Group believes that the majority of A.I.D.'s future permanent employees will be generalists and what many refer to as broad-gauged technical managers. Perhaps a better designation is "program manager," encompassing those who rise into this category from both generalist and technical backgrounds. Their primary responsibility will be to provide leadership and analytical skills and to manage programs and projects through managing contracts, non-direct hire personnel, and alternatively acquired technical and other specialists. As the role of the direct hire employee changes, the need for managerial and analytical skills will increase, as will contract management and other A.I.D. specific skills and knowledge. This will require greater emphasis on innovative cross-training programs.

While broad-gauged program managers with managerial and analytical skills are considered a major workforce need of the future, A.I.D. will need many highly skilled technical specialists in a variety of technical fields. Some of these

specialists will be direct hire but many of these skills are expected to be acquired under contract, or via other special means of recruitment, such as time-limited FS and CS appointments, from other USG agencies (PASA's), or from state and local governments (IPA's). Respondents in interviews noted that increased use of contracts is a long-established trend in the Agency, although several stressed the continued importance of DH technicians to maintain A.I.D.'s in-house technological competency and "watchdog" efficiency over non-DH implementers.

A.I.D should assess how it is using these flexible hiring authorities and ensure that they are being used as intended. The Agency should examine its many areas of flexibility in acquiring human resources. In many cases we have sought narrowly defined experts to bring into the career service and five years later discovered that either the Agency no longer needed their expertise or that their skills had become obsolescent.

The Working Group believes that, based on past performance and personal preferences, the existing DH career technical workforce will be separated into two groups: those who are willing and able to become the program managers the Agency will need in the future; and those who will continue or prefer to work as technical specialists. (It will be important for the Agency to permit movement from one track to the other where appropriate and to provide adequate incentives in its personnel system for both.) It is contemplated that career technical specialists will receive regular technical skills updates in order to retain their "cutting edge" expertise. Increasingly, specialists will be hired under non-career appointments and other mechanisms.

Recommendation 11: Determine the desired general composition of the direct hire workforce in terms of

program managers, both general and technical, and highly qualified technical specialists and develop a plan for reshaping the workforce along those lines. In that process, define the basic skills and/or qualities and abilities each should possess.

Recommendation 12: Conduct an individual skills profile of the existing workforce and analyze it in the context of the desired general composition of the direct hire workforce.

G. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INTERN PROGRAM (IDI)

In our interviews, there was near unanimity on the need to establish an IDI program more nearly patterned after its traditional forbears. This new IDI program would emphasize the hiring of relatively less experienced staff than has been the recent case. IDI candidate selection criteria can include relevant technical training, analytical and managerial ability or potential, language proficiency, cultural diversity/-sensitivity, interpersonal skills, geographic area knowledge/sensitivity and international interest and/or experience. The IDI program would provide fresh perspectives and, over time, a FS management cadre skilled in both international development and the processes and practices of the Agency. There is a strongly held view that staff brought up through the system, so that they become fully conversant with the Agency's goals and processes, will be in the best position to manage the Agency's future.

We agree and concluded that high priority should be accorded to an IDI program, as outlined in a recent PM analysis and Action Memorandum to the Deputy Administrator, in which the focus is on an uninterrupted annual entry of recruits, with some

preference for advanced degrees. IDI's should have had some experience relevant to A.I.D., preferably in international development or one of A.I.D.'s major sectors, have at least moderate language aptitudes, and possess a high degree of management and analytical skill or potential. They should demonstrate the potential to become the Agency's future career managers and leaders.

In returning to the IDI program of the past, some account must be taken of the changes in Mission staffing which have occurred and will occur, and how they will affect assignment and development of IDI's. The success of the old IDI program was not only due to the exposure and development that occurred as a result of the Mission's ability to rotate IDI's around a Mission without detriment to workload responsibilities and without "costing" the Mission a position.

It was also due, to a very large degree, to the structure of Missions, which were large enough to permit the recently graduated IDI to progressively occupy apprentice and journeyman positions before being given full responsibility for a Mission function. Many junior positions in today's Mission are staffed by FNDH or non-direct hire personnel. Because many missions are smaller today, and less "layered" with experienced USDH, it will be more difficult to assure the same degree of "mentoring" with on-the-job training, as in the entry-level IDI program of the past. It will be important to ensure that IDI's receive appropriate training in successive levels of personal development, including language training, and that a career ladder exists for their progression. It also will be necessary to develop a plan on the extent to which we continue to use mid-level entry recruitment so that IDI's are not blocked later by mid-level appointees.

In coordination with other PM units and the Bureaus, Recruitment should carry out a career progression analysis which projects the numbers of IDI's required based on future management needs, plots the likely career progression of the aggregate workforce vis-a-vis the IDI group, and ensures that appropriate entry and career progression slots will be available to them. It will also be necessary to analyze managerial potential, at time of entry, as an important element of screening and selection and to establish effective probationary reviews to ensure we have brought in the right career employees before their outside options are foreclosed. Finally, it will be necessary for A.I.D. to discipline itself so that those "who do not measure up" are weeded out before tenure.

Recommendation 13: Establish an IDI program, pursuant to the analysis in a recent PM analysis and Action Memorandum to the Deputy Administrator, which would ensure that entry level FS professionals are brought into the A.I.D. workforce on a continuous and uninterrupted basis. This would also assure that, over time, IDI graduates, with adequate experience and training, and who have developed as part of the system, would fill more of the Agency's management positions.

H. BACKSTOP CATEGORIZATION

The backstop system, with its 26 employee categories, is unduly compartmentalized and encourages replication of an overly specialized workforce, without regard to real skill needs. It inhibits the hiring of flexible, broad-gauged employees. It masks real employee skills since the personnel system pigeon holes them into overly narrow categories. It creates difficulty in matching personnel assignments to job requirements and blocks effective workforce planning.

Given the need for a flexible, broad-gauged workforce assigned on the basis of demonstrated skills rather than formal training, the backstop system is unnecessarily rigid, frustrating both employees and managers. For example, when there are only small numbers of people in highly specialized categories in the recruitment pipeline, an unanticipated opening cannot be filled until someone becomes available and valuable employees may go without assignment until one of the few available jobs becomes vacant. In more broadly drawn categories, more people would be available in each, and more vacancies would be available for candidates.

PM should design, in conjunction with the Bureaus and Offices of the Agency, changes to the system of categorizing A.I.D. employees and jobs and create a skills based employee categorization system. This, in turn, will require significant adjustments in staffing patterns.

Recommendation 14: Restructure the personnel backstop system to simplify, reduce and thereby broaden categories.

I. WOMEN AND MINORITIES

Women and minorities are seriously under-represented -- both throughout the the Foreign Service and in the senior ranks of the Foreign and Civil Service -- compared to their representation in the U.S. workforce. Non-minority males predominate in the FS and at senior levels of the entire USDH workforce. The FS and CS are in many respects reverse images of each other in terms of equal employment opportunity (EEO). The FS is composed predominately of non-minorities, males and professional white collar personnel, whereas the majority of the CS is minority, female and administrative and secretarial/ clerical staff.

Little change has occurred in the representation of women and minorities in the FS over the last ten years, reflecting in large part past Agency recruitment patterns. There have been increased numbers of women and minorities promoted to FS-1 and above, but their numbers in the SFS remain small. So long as their representation in the FS is low, prospects for improvements in advancement to senior levels will remain small. Despite the different composition of the Civil Service, the number of women and minorities in senior CS positions is also disproportionately small. Minority males are especially disadvantaged in comparison to other groups in the CS, as well as in the FS.

The establishment in December, 1990 of the Minority Recruitment Advisory Group (MRAG) to identify barriers to recruitment and retention of minorities and serve as an advocate for affirmative action throughout the Agency is a commendable step forward, and should be instrumental in helping to correct past deficiencies in this critical area of personnel management.

Recommendation 15: Tapping the newly created Minority Recruitment Advisory Group (MRAG), initiate more proactive and continuous recruitment of women and minorities and include women and minorities on recruitment teams. Assign a higher priority and take more deliberate steps to comply with Agency policy and Foreign Service Act provisions on making its workforce more representative of the U.S. population overall.

Recommendation 16: In conjunction with the MRAG, seek means in recruitment of increasing the available women and minority candidate pool to ensure that greater numbers of qualified women and minorities are included on the "best qualified" selection lists.

Recommendation 17: Continue the efforts by FS selection and tenure boards to identify promotable women and minorities, and to identify training which can enhance their promotability. Supervisors and managers of CS employees, as well as PM, working with the MRAG, should make more concerted efforts to identify well qualified CS women and minorities and encourage them to apply for advertised jobs.

J. VACANCY REPORTING

Of 4,243 FS and CS positions on the books, only 3,609* are staffed, but few of the unfilled positions are being considered for outside recruitment. (Of the 634 vacancies, 312 are CS positions and 323 are FS positions; 41% of the FS vacancies were announced as part of the FS Assignment System.)

With the large disparity between positions and employees, workforce planning cannot accurately analyze the real workforce needs of the Agency. The apparent lack of rigor in monitoring and managing positions (i.e., keeping vacant positions on the books) may encourage manipulation of the assignment and placement systems to give undue weight to managers' preferences for certain personnel.

Recommendation 18: Remove inactive vacancies from the system. Only real positions within Agency workyear ceilings should remain in the system against which assignments and recruitment decisions can be made.

*Includes a total of 80 Experts/Consultants, 35 LWOP, 28 Details-In, and 3,466 regular USDH employees.

K. SECRETARIAL SUPPORT AND AUTOMATION

The size of the Agency's secretarial and clerical workforce is a significant portion of the overall workforce. It is an even more significant percentage of the Agency's women and minorities. Turnover in these positions is high -- approximately 32 percent annually.

The high demand for secretarial support and the limited applicant pool of qualified candidates, especially at headquarters where competition is intense among all government agencies and the private sector, creates an ongoing need for recruitment and screening.

Complicating the issue are the changing roles and responsibilities of secretaries, principally as a consequence of automation and word processing. As more of the Agency's professional staff perform their own word processing, much of the typing workload of secretaries has been reduced or eliminated. Supervisors tend to perceive secretarial functions as limited solely to typing/word processing and to omit other functions critical to efficient office operations.

Any analysis of the secretarial and clerical workforce will result in the need to restructure secretarial positions and readjust their roles and responsibilities. Emphasis may be placed on office management and administration, enhanced computer skills (including knowledge of modern software applications such as spread sheet programs and desk top publishing and graphics), centralized communications centers and/or consolidated high production word processing units.

Recommendation 19: Redefine the roles and job content of the Agency's secretarial and clerical workforce to reflect the work they do now, and also reflect the significant impact of automation. Initial work on this should begin as part of Phase II.

L. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

Many of those interviewed perceive the personnel management system as an obstacle to be overcome rather than a source of program support and resource guidance. Concerns raised included recruitment, training and career development, classification, and assignments. There is also some dawning recognition of PM's seriousness about improving its systems and performance.

The Director of PM has issued a clear "invitation" to his staff to join in the new mandate to reach out to its clients and to strive to provide quality service to the employees and managers of the Agency. Workforce Planning can be instrumental in effecting this transformation in the following ways:

1. Recruitment.

Throughout the Agency, recruitment services are perceived as often unresponsive to actual staff requirements. Very often, the recruitment problem is due to "slots" being held hostage to the short-term budget process. Recruitment is passive, not reaching out to tap a broader range of highly qualified candidates in general and well qualified minority candidates in particular.

Recruitment needs reliable information on the program directions of the Agency in order to identify sources of talent which fit those directions, both minority and non-minority, and actively seek those sources. The past practice of responding to large numbers of unsolicited applications and then screening and qualifying them -- with a low probability of placement -- needs to be replaced with a targeted approach to recruitment that considers the real needs of the Agency and readily provides qualified candidates who are ranked, considered and selected.

In recruitment, screening and selection of new USDH, there should be an assessment of management experience or potential, analytical skills and interpersonal relations abilities. Potential methods of screening for managerial aptitude may include existing testing devices such as the General Management Aptitude Test (GMAT), assessment centers such as one day laboratory sessions employing case studies, role playing and simulated exercises, and others.

2. Training.

Training received high praise for its efforts to provide courses which address changing workforce needs. Both training and recruitment need to be done within the context of a well-articulated Agency direction and set of objectives and in the context of employees' career development and Agency workforce planning. In terms of our findings, this means a greater focus on developing the managerial, analytical, interpersonal and policy dialogue and negotiation skills of the "generalist" and "technical manager" categories and updating the skills of our cadre of technical specialists. We should, of course, recognize that training can never provide specialization at an acceptable level of cost. Training provided is too often employee driven, rather than based on agency needs. But the FNDH and PSC's, on whom we increasingly rely, have had very limited training opportunities.


It will be necessary to assess the workforce talent, skills needs and program training to ensure that the Agency obtains the skills required for future assignments. A.I.D. should assess current employee development and training programs to meet the changing skills needs and new roles identified for Agency employees, including managerial and analytical skills.

Training should also be expanded to the Agency's FNDH and PSC's to strengthen their performance commensurate with their heightened role and proportion in the Agency's work. FNDH and PSC's must regularly attend existing training courses.

3. FS Grade and Classification Structure

A.I.D.'s Foreign Service grade levels are not distributed in the traditional graphic pyramid: Seventy percent of the FS staff is at the grade of FS-02 and above.

FS GRADE DISTRIBUTION
(9/30/90)




This contrasts not only with A.I.D.'s more pyramidal Civil Service grade structure but also with the Foreign Service grade structures of State and USIA. Moreover, almost 88% of A.I.D.'s FS positions are classified at the level of FS-02 or above. It is unclear to what extent this reflects upward reclassification of existing positions to a higher level to attract employees, rather than simple elimination of positions at lower grades.

Since more position openings occur at the FS-02 level and above than there are lower graded employees available to fill them, many new employees are hired at this mid-career level where the openings are occurring, rather than at entry levels, where positions are not available. This has severe implications for the restoration of the traditional IDI program.

A first reading of the data seems to indicate that the Foreign Service is overgraded. On further analysis, that conclusion is less clear. It would appear that a large number of functions formerly performed by lower-graded USDH Foreign Service Officers overseas are now being performed by FNDH and PSC personnel. As a result of this situation, A.I.D.'s USDH Foreign Service staff has evolved primarily into supervisors and managers of a limited number of other Foreign Service Officers and a larger and increasing number of professional, responsible and well educated FNDH employees and PSC's, as well as monitoring large numbers of intermediaries under various contractual arrangements.

FS AND FIELD WORKFORCE



It will be important for the Agency to examine, in collaboration with appropriate PM offices, the position grade classification structure and criteria overseas and the

implications for AID/W staffing of the rotation of highly graded FS Officers into Washington positions. (Almost one-third of all FS are assigned to AID/W.) If the grade structure cannot then be justified, a downward grade restructuring may be indicated.

Recommendation 20: Develop an overall human resources management strategy under PM coordination with the full participation of all Bureaus and Offices. PM should be commended for, and encouraged to expand, its current efforts to develop a future and service oriented personnel system, and to do more "outreach" and become more in tune with and aware of Agency program directions and requirements.

Recommendation 21: Proactively track in recruitment the program directions of the Agency with an emphasis on management and analytical skills; ensure training for all components of the workforce (direct hire and PSC) is geared to future needs, and covers non-USDH effectively.

M. WORKFORCE PLANNING

The Workforce Planning Working Group believes that the foregoing analysis, conclusions and recommendations in this Section make a persuasive case for establishing a Workforce Planning System in A.I.D. In fact, the system being proposed is unique in the Federal Government, based as it is on a sophisticated and complex analysis of the program directions of the Agency and forward planning for revised and/or entirely new skills required by these new directions.

Recommendation 22: Create and install a Workforce Planning System and Workforce Planning Staff along the lines proposed in Section III.

III. THE PROPOSED WORKFORCE PLANNING PROCESS

The primary purpose of this study, pursuant to the September 14 memorandum of the Administrator, was to make recommendations for institutionalizing an effective workforce planning process in A.I.D. The Working Group believes there is a strong case for establishing a workforce planning capability in A.I.D. It believes that the workforce planning process proposed in the balance of this section, including establishment of a workforce planning unit, can make a significant difference in A.I.D.'s human resources management and the manner in which the Agency plans and manages its workforce to meet future requirements.

At the same time, we do not underestimate the complexity of establishing a meaningful workforce planning process. Time and effort will be needed to get it right, and many parts of the Agency, from top levels on down, must be involved.

The proposed process will integrate long-range workforce planning with long-range program strategies for the first time in A.I.D.'s history and seemingly in Federal Government history. The proposed planning process provides for the analysis of workforce needs three to five years into the future which, in turn, contributes to the more orderly and systematic planning of recruitment, training, career development, assignment, etc. It must entail cooperation among several organizational units of A.I.D. in developing and synchronizing a future-oriented human resource strategy for the Agency. The process provides for constant communication and outreach to keep workforce plans and strategies up-to-date and responsive to changes as they occur. It recognizes the need for flexibility, participation of all the Agency's organizational units, and especially the involvement of top management and

line managers in the workforce planning process. It is intended to be service- and client-oriented, not a master plan imposed from above, but based upon full cooperation with and input from the Bureaus and the field.


A review of other agencies of the Executive and Legislative Branches of the Federal Government revealed that there is only sporadic workforce planning elsewhere. While informal planning is done in almost every agency and there are numerous workforce measurement and turnover/succession planning systems in place or being proposed in highly quantifiable workforces such as the Social Security Administration, IRS and the Census Bureau, OMB and OPM knew of no long-range, goal-oriented system for projecting needs along programmatic lines and planning for the staffing of these needs. Among agencies queried, along with OMB and OPM, were State, USIA, Labor, GAO, Commerce and Transportation.

The following parts of Section III present: (A) an outline of the proposed workforce planning process with illustrations of how it would work; (B) a discussion of the location and staffing of the Workforce Planning Staff.

A. THE WORKFORCE PLANNING PROCESS

As shown in the following diagram, the workforce planning process will collect relevant information, perform analyses, and propose courses of action. It will monitor and evaluate the actions taken and feed back the results both to Agency managers and to the planning process itself.

WORKFORCE PLANNING PROCESS



The following description, largely illustrative, of what the workforce planning process would involve, is, for clarity, presented as a sequential series of steps or processes. The Working Group recognizes that, in reality, many of these steps and processes will take place concurrently, or rather, that the sequential process will start anew for each issue and that many issues will be under review at the same time.

1. Ascertaining Future Directions - Workforce planning formally begins with ascertaining the future program direction and anticipated role of the Agency. To start the process, the Workforce Planning Staff will receive or glean a portrait of future Agency directions, objectives, priorities and skill requirements from a variety of sources:

- relevant statements by the Administrator;
- the Management Control Review Committee (MCRC);
- managers responsible for Agency policy direction;
- Agency planning documents; and
- Legislation and Congressional directives.

While the Workforce Planning Staff will depend on the MCRC, or an equivalent group, as the key point for providing guidance on skill requirements and future direction, it will also need to continually maintain a communication outreach to the rest of the Agency to regularly update its understanding of programs and regional and other variations in pursuing overall Agency objectives. This will help to correct a long-standing problem within the Agency -- the lack of sufficient and effective communication between program managers and personnel managers on relating workforce needs to program priorities. Thus, in addition to periodic input from the MCRC, the Staff, working closely with PPC, will develop a network of contacts throughout the Agency and will participate regularly in appropriate Agency conferences, CDSS reviews and other events where reaffirmations or reorientations of A.I.D.'s program thrusts are likely to be signaled. This will facilitate assessment of future workforce needs and anticipation of the changes which may be required in the workforce in time to take timely and relevant action.

The kinds of information and guidance which must be communicated to those carrying out workforce planning would include, for example:

- the major programmatic thrusts foreseen over the next five years;
- the relative importance of the various modes of assistance: project, non-project, grants to intermediaries, bilateral government-to-government, buy-ins to regional or centrally-funded activities, direct assistance to the private sector, concessional financing, etc.;
- extent to which Missions are expected to engage in policy dialogue and exert leverage over policy change;
- extent to which Missions are expected to pursue donor coordination; just for exchanges of information or for more substantive coordination and even influencing of other donor positions;
- the nature and degree of differentiation among Bureaus and Missions regarding assumptions and plans for future roles, program direction and priorities; and
- The anticipated USDH skill requirements to properly design, implement and manage A.I.D. programs.

The Staff's perceptions of future directions must be consonant with those of the Agency's top management.

2. Data Gathering - Workforce planning will rely on many sources of information as the basis for analyzing the implications of workforce trends. Basic inputs on future staff needs will, of course, continue to come from the Bureaus. The

Workforce Planning Staff, which will be expected to provide analyses, will be responsible for collecting any additional data necessary. The intent is clearly not to collect data for their own sake, but rather to collect only data needed for workforce planning purposes. For USDH, the need for data is clearly the greatest, since data are used for projecting requirements and attrition and making assignments. For other than USDH, the most significant use of data would be to identify functions performed and to establish norms and trendlines which suggest how far we are able to go in using people other than USDH to carry out A.I.D.'s business.

a. For the USDH workforce, the RAMPS already collects and regularly updates a wealth of information about age, employment date, end of tour date, retirement eligibility, education, training, language skills, assignments, AOSC's, awards and promotions. No further information should be required for workforce planning purposes.

b. For FNDH, all PSC's and all members of the extended workforce who work within USAID Missions or AID/W entities, the data are incomplete. For the purposes outlined above, we need to know at regular intervals how many people we employ, what are their functional responsibilities and how long it is expected that they will stay. The Workforce Planning Staff would take the following steps, in collaboration with PPC:

-- review the existing sources to see what is being reported and to ascertain gaps, both as to completeness of the coverage and as to adequacy of the functional descriptions;

- design a data collection instrument to produce the needed data regularly in readily comparable fashion from each Mission and from Bureaus and independent offices in AID/W;
- establish a system for the regular entry and updating of the data.

At the same time, to permit the full panoply of analyses which the Workforce Planning Staff will perform, other kinds of data will also need to be collected at the outset and updated regularly. These include:

- a corrected list of USDH positions, with those no longer relevant having been deleted;
- a list of vacancies, with an indication of the time the vacancies have remained unfilled;
- a list of positions which have been requested;
- positions which are currently filled by FS officers whose personal grades are above or below the position grades to which they are assigned; and
- staffing patterns of all A.I.D. entities accurately reflecting the numbers and functions of all workforce and extended workforce individuals who are supervised at each organizational level.

Special studies may on occasion also be required to augment the information provided through outreach and the ongoing analysis of workforce data.

At all times in the data gathering process, close association and collaboration with PPC/SB and IRM, including exchanges of information and analysis and joint planning, will be maintained.

3. Analysis and Development of Policies and Plans - Using the guidance and information furnished on future role and direction and the data gathered, the Workforce Planning Staff will prepare both continuing analyses on the workforce and special studies. Most can be accomplished with the data to be collected. Some may give rise to the need for additional data. It goes without saying that these analyses and studies will be carried out in close collaboration with and with the assistance of appropriate PM Offices, and with Offices and units of other Bureaus.

Among the continuing analyses will be:

- analysis of the uses made of USDH and FNDH employees, US and FN PSC's and the extended workforce;
- analysis of trends as they appear in the use of other-than USDH;
- analysis of the predictability of attrition rates based on such factors as change of duties, resignation, retirement, death and disability; and
- various analyses of anomalous staffing, grading, assignment and organizational situations.

Examples of special studies would include:

- study of the various systems and the criteria which might be used to select new employees for the characteristics necessary in the future workforce;
- study of the various modes of possible employment to determine which ones are most reasonable and practical for which purposes; and
- study of the possibilities of greater flexibility in the use of CS and FS staff in traditional functions of the other service;
- develop a scope of work to be carried out by other offices to review issues arising from increased use of non-USDH, and include an analysis of variations in staff intensiveness among Missions of apparently similar portfolios and AID/W entities of similar roles.

Many of these studies would be carried out in conjunction with PM and other Agency organizations.

The main outcomes of these analyses will be proposed workforce policies, plans and strategies for approval by management. They will include workforce planning objectives and guidance to be incorporated into or to accompany Agency program guidance, and recommendations for recruitment, training, promotion, and retention policies and strategies. Special and periodic reports to assist Agency managers to follow trends in the Agency's workforce skills composition and utilization will also be produced.

4. Decisions - Proposals will be addressed to the appropriate level in the Agency for decision. Those dealing, for example, with recruitment targets, selection criteria, training courses to be developed, or promotion and assignment anomalies to be corrected would be addressed to D/PM for decision and execution. Others, such as those dealing with Mission structures, would be addressed to the Bureaus. Those affecting overarching concerns or basic Agency policy would have to go to the highest level for decision.

5. Execution - There is no direct role for the Workforce Planning Staff in this stage. By definition, the actions will flow from the analyses and proposals of the Workforce Planning process, and the decisions of senior management, and then become the responsibility of others: the Agency in general and PM entities such as recruitment and training, etc.

6. Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting - Monitoring, evaluation, and reporting are key elements. This process will include recurring and special reporting to top Agency management on the workforce status, composition, trends, forecasts, and on execution of staffing strategies. It will also provide timely and useful feedback to the organizational units responsible for execution. It will identify major workforce planning and management problems and issues emerging from the process.

As in any process or system, implementation of decisions and the actions flowing from them should be routinely evaluated. To do so effectively requires:

- a clear statement of the results expected from the recommended action and the time frame in which these results should be expected; and

- an identification of benchmarks and verifiable indicators to be monitored to determine whether the benchmarks and final results have been met.

The Workforce Planning Staff will be responsible for following the execution process and producing intermediate (formative) or final (summative) evaluations. It may perform these evaluations on its own or use other resources from within or without the Agency for this purpose. Regular and systematic feedback both to the Agency management level and to the workforce planning process itself will be assured.

B. LOCATION AND STAFFING OF A WORKFORCE PLANNING UNIT

Location, credibility and access are essential to the success of the workforce planning unit. The Working Group has given considerable thought to the unit's location and staffing.

1. Location

During the course of the interviews there were different views expressed regarding the appropriate placement of the workforce planning unit. The predominant view was that it belongs in PM. Other locations suggested were the Office of the Administrator or PPC, or decentralized in individual regional and functional bureaus. But the vast majority of respondents stated a preference for placement in PM.

The most compelling argument for placing workforce planning in PM is that, as Agency leaders and program managers periodically establish clear program objectives, priorities and skills needs, workforce planning then becomes essentially a human resources and personnel management function. Moreover, the

follow-on activities to workforce planning, the real payoff areas for workforce planning (recruitment, training, career development, and revised personnel policies and procedures) are primarily coordinated by PM. It is also likely that the comprehensive data base needed for effective workforce planning could be built upon PM's present reporting and data capabilities.

It has become very clear in our analysis and inputs from others that the key ingredients in making a workforce planning system work are:

- more structured and systematic communication between the program managers and the personnel managers of the Agency so that changing program directions, budgetary adjustments, and skills needs can be factored into the personnel management process on a timely basis; and

- the development of a better information system with which to better monitor and analyze the status, composition and trends in the Agency's workforce.

While PM would have a built-in advantage in undertaking the latter, its ability to play a leadership role in bringing about the desired communication with Agency managers has been questioned. PM has historically not played a key role in this regard and its experience with program and strategy considerations is limited.

The Working Group believes the objections to a significant role for PM as the main locus for workforce planning are outweighed by the positive aspects of potential PM involvement. Placing workforce planning in PM is a natural extension of the personnel management function and builds upon PM's existing data base; also it should help to ensure a longer-term

approach, critical to successful workforce planning, which might be elusive to capture if the function is located elsewhere.

PPC is another plausible location, particularly because of the ultimate close relationship between the budget function and the results of workforce planning. Moreover, the key to successful workforce planning is to ensure that plans are related to overall strategy and policy, an area in which PPC has prime responsibility and which will be enhanced in any reorganization. Also, PPC already has a unit (PPC/SB) devoted to such issues as the size and deployment of the current Agency workforce in relation to the budget process. The down-side, in the view of the Working Group and many interviewed, is that placing workforce planning in PPC would essentially subordinate the function to shorter-term budget considerations and might limit its ability to take a long-term perspective.

As our analysis indicates, the Administrator's Office must be involved in workforce planning in terms of setting the overall guidance and strategy and ensuring that workforce planning is a priority. But there is a question whether the Administrator's Office should be operationally responsible for the daily function of a workforce planning unit with the attendant data collection and routine activities that function would entail. And placing workforce planning here would seem to run contrary to the principles underlying the proposed reorganization plan.

Decentralization of workforce planning to the individual bureaus was examined but was not considered a plausible option. While bureaus will have the responsibility for implementing actions flowing out of workforce planning objectives, guidance and decisions, decentralizing the function to the bureaus would mean the absence of any central and

coordinated focus and would, in all likelihood, mean a continuation of the present situation -- a void in terms of relating workforce planning to long-term Agency objectives and program priorities.

In arriving at a determination of whether to have, and where to locate a workforce planning unit, several conclusions of the Working Group should be kept in mind:

-- Systematic, rational workforce planning, as conceptualized and described in this Report, will not occur in this Agency until a specific unit has been assigned responsibility for ensuring that it is carried out.

-- The unit's functions must be based upon a clear definition of long-range Agency direction from the Administrator, PPC, and other senior managers. The Working Group believes that a primary forum to help achieve this is the Management Control Review Committee, meeting on a periodic basis.

-- The workforce planning unit depends not only on program directions and guidance from a senior policy group, but also on a cooperative and institutionalized dialogue among the bureaus, the field, and personnel management.

-- The workforce planning unit must have ready access to a relatively centralized and comprehensive data and reporting base to carry out its analytical activities.

-- The workforce planning unit must actively conduct outreach within the Agency on defining the parameters of workforce planning, and on the effectiveness of areas of personnel management activities.

-- Finally, the workforce planning unit must be equipped with a small, but highly motivated staff with an appropriate mix of experience and skills, not burdened with other responsibilities not germane to workforce planning.

After giving serious consideration to all plausible options, the Working Group has concluded that the Office of Personnel Management is in the best position to respond to these precepts on a composite basis. We are therefore recommending that a Workforce Planning Staff be established within PM.

2. Staffing

The Working Group recommends that the Workforce Planning Staff be small in size. The experience, motivation, skill mix and vision of its leadership and staff will be crucial to its effectiveness and success. One of its most important functions will be to establish good rapport with and conduct frequent outreach to the Agency's senior managers in order to assure that workforce planning is current and consistent with and highly supportive of long range Agency objectives and program priorities and operations, both in terms of Field Missions and Headquarters operations. The staff must establish and maintain credibility and access to assure that these linkages are forged and maintained.

This will require a small but high-quality staff that can demonstrate vision, leadership and initiative as well as embody the required high level of excellent interpersonal, analytical and diplomatic skills. It will also require knowledge of workforce planning concepts and techniques, automation skills, as well as knowledge of the Agency personnel and administrative systems. This suggests a staff mix of both experienced Foreign Service and Civil Service Officers. The Working Group

recommends that the unit be headed by a Senior Foreign Service Officer with broad program management experience, vision and an enthusiasm for leading a pioneering effort for the Agency. The Staff should also include a senior Civil Service Officer with similar qualities and broad Agency experience. The balance of the staff should be a mix of Foreign Service and Civil Service Officers with excellent conceptual, analytical and verbal skills. An illustrative staffing configuration follows:

Chief	Senior Foreign Service Officer
Deputy	Senior Civil Service Officer
Senior Analyst	FS or CS Officer
Program Analyst	FS or CS Officer
Program Analyst	FS or CS Officer
Secretary	FS or CS Secretary
Total	6 FTE

Depending on the qualifications and experience of specific candidates, the Deputy and Senior Analyst could possibly be one and the same and reduce the total by 1.

There is the option of integrating or leaving separate the Personnel Systems and Program Evaluation Staff (PM/PSPE), which administers the current data base of personnel related information. It is comprised of a supervisor and five analysts who maintain the computer system, as well as perform various management analyses. The Working Group believes that there is a persuasive case to be made for integrating this function into the Workforce Planning Staff.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION

A. Important Assumptions

This section describes a proposed implementation plan, schedule and budget for initiating operation of a workforce planning system in A.I.D. We believe implementation of the proposed system can begin immediately, with actions phased in accordance with a logical sequence and order of priorities. It is envisioned that this process will begin under the aegis of a Phase II Working Group to initiate the process and to provide an orderly transition to a permanent operation. The Plan assumes the following:

1. The Administrator's approval:

a. to proceed with the development and establishment of a workforce planning system along the lines proposed in preceding section.

b. to establish a small Workforce Planning Staff. The Working Group recommends that it be placed in PM.

c. to establish a Phase II Workforce Planning Working Group, under the leadership of the Director, Personnel Management.

2. The availability of personnel and an adequate budget to fund a modest amount of operating costs and consultant services during Phase II and for the Workforce Planning Staff during the balance of FY 1991.

3. The commitment, cooperation and participation of all A.I.D. bureaus and office in this effort.

B. Implementation Plan For Phase II

Step I -- Establish a Phase II Working Group:

1. Appoint a Chairman and assign staff with an appropriate mix of skills and experience by February 18.

2. Develop a detailed scope of work for the Phase II Working Group by February 20. As currently envisioned, the scope of work will address the following tasks, in order of priority:

a. detailed description of the workforce planning system and how it will work.

b. procedures and actions necessary for establishment of a transition with the Workforce Planning Staff.

c. refinement and dissemination of workforce definitions and adjustment of data bases and reporting requirements accordingly.

d. ascertaining from and validating with senior managers a more detailed picture of future Agency program directions and skills needs. A key part of this will be accomplished by coordinating with the Management Control Review Committee (MCRC).

e. analyzing and estimating the workforce implications of this picture, including projections of the gaps between existing skills and future needs in major categories.

f. identifying the major short and long-range implications of this analysis for recruitment and training.

g. preparing an initial draft of A.I.D.'s first long-term rolling workforce plan based on the above analyses.

These implementation actions are discussed in more detail in the following steps, most of which can be initiated more or less concurrently. We propose that some of these actions be performed by the Phase II Working Group, others by the Workforce Planning Staff, and, where appropriate, some actions accomplished by other A.I.D. organizations. The actions are summarized below.

PHASE II SCHEDULING

<u>DATE</u>	<u>ACTIVITY</u>
2/15/91	Administrator approves priority workforce planning recommendations, including Phase II.
2/18/91	Appoint WFP WG-II chairman and staff.
2/20/91	Complete Phase II scope of work.
2/20/91	Establish Phase II Bureau Liaison Group.
3/01/91	Draft scope of work for mission staffing alternatives analysis.
3/15/91	Complete design and description of WFP organization.
4/01/91	Draft scope of work for analysis of future workforce requirements.
4/15/91	Draft specifications for revised WFP reporting system.
5/15/91	Results of Mission Organization and Staffing Alternatives.
5/15/91	Make recommendations for revised PM systems.
5/15/91	Provide first future workforce estimates.
6/01/91	WFP permanent staff selected.
6/01/91	Draft long-range workforce plan completed.
6/15/91	Permanent WFP staff in operation.

Target Date for Establishment of Phase II Working Group: Feb. 18

Target Date for Developing Scope Work for Phase II: Feb. 20

Step II -- Establish a Specific and Formal Relationship
Between Bureaus and Offices and the Phase II Working Group

1. Bureau Assistant Administrators will be requested to appoint personnel for liaison with the Working Group, and later with the Workforce Planning Staff. This will help create a basis for future cooperation which must take place to ensure that all parts of the Agency actively participate in workforce planning.

2. The Working Group and this Liaison Group will establish a definite process through which ideas will be shared on the dissemination of the actual workforce implementation plan, and the actual implementation of the system throughout the Agency.

Target Date: February 20.

Step III -- Describe the Workforce Planning System

Prepare a full and detailed description of all elements of the Workforce Planning System, the process, the linkages, and respective roles and responsibilities.

Target Date: April 1.

Step IV -- Establish A Workforce Planning Staff

1. Prepare a staffing pattern, position descriptions and functional statements, etc. for the establishment of the Workforce Planning Staff.

2. Make recommendations on the appropriate mix of skills and experience for this staff, with the expectation that recruitment and placement of staff can be effected as soon as possible but not later than June 1, 1991.

Target Date For Completion of Above Actions: April 15

Target Date for Workforce Planning Staff Fully in Place: June 1

Step V -- Determine Workforce Planning Information Requirements

1. Further refine and disseminate the definitions of the A.I.D workforce.
2. In close coordination with PPC, PM, IRM and the Bureau Liaison Group, determine what modifications are needed in workforce reporting to carry out workforce planning, including revised reporting formats.
3. In coordination with PPC and IRM, determine what modifications and enhancements are necessary to existing data processing systems and computer capabilities.

Target Date: April 15

Step VI -- Determine The Workforce Implications Of A.I.D.'s Future Directions

1. The Working Group will rely on the picture of future Agency directions that emerges from the Agency Mission Statement, the "3 + 1" Initiatives, the results of AID/W reorganization planning, if available, current Agency and Bureau strategies, and the advice and guidance of senior A.I.D. managers engaged with policy formulation and direction. The MCRC will play the principal role in defining future policies and skills requirements upon which workforce planning decisions will be based.

2. Prepare a Scope of Work and carry out analysis of the workforce implications of the picture that emerges of future A.I.D. directions and program priorities.

3. This analysis should address A.I.D.'s specific workforce needs in major skill and functional categories between now and FY 1997, with particular attention to the need for broad-gauged program managers, technical and other specialists and support staff.

4. This will require an analysis of the current workforce in these terms and an estimate of the gaps between existing skills and projected skills needs. It is expected that these analyses will produce quantitative as well as qualitative estimates and projections.

5. It will also be necessary to examine the basic roles of various components of the workforce, for example, the role of the direct hires versus non-direct hire employees, the role of foreign national direct hires versus PSC's, "generalist versus technical," the role of the highly skilled specialist, etc.

6. This is a major undertaking and on the first round it can be expected realistically to produce only a rough cut or crude approximations of future requirements. This will, however, provide valuable insights into the issues and experience with the process which will lay a foundation for continuous refinements by a permanent staff working collaboratively with the rest of the Agency.

Target Date For The Scope Of Work: March 15

Target Date For Producing Rough Estimates: May 15

Step VII -- Determine Alternatives For Mission Staffing And Organization

Develop a Scope of Work for examining alternative ways in which missions could choose to staff and organize their operations to meet future challenges and constraints. This examination would take into consideration suggested alternative assistance delivery modes, the "core mission staff" concept, redefining roles and authorities for and utilization of local direct hire and non-direct hire staff, non-career appointments, utilization of civil service employees, increased reliance on institutional contractors and private voluntary agencies, etc.

Target Date For The Scope Of Work: March 15

Target Date For Preliminary Study Results: June 1

Step VIII -- Determine Courses Of Action To Meet Future Workforce Requirements

1. Analyze the implications of the results of above analyses for recruitment, training, promotion, retention policies and strategies.
2. Identify and make recommendations on appropriate courses of action.

Target Date: May 15

Step IX -- Develop A Draft Long-Range Workforce Plan For A.I.D.

1. Prepare a draft long-range workforce plan for A.I.D. based on the results of the Phase I and Phase II studies and analyses. The draft plan should be developed within the context of a human resources management strategy (to be developed under PM leadership) and should include but not be limited to:

-- a statement of A.I.D.'s long-range (5 years) program objectives and general skills requirements derived from Agency policy guidance, the MCRC, etc.;

-- a statement of A.I.D.'s human resources management policy and objectives which relate to the program objectives;

-- a specific projection of long-range workforce skills requirements to meet program and human resources policy objectives;

-- a description of the current workforce base and trends;

-- policies, strategies and options for recruitment, training and other personnel management systems areas to meet long-range workforce needs; and

--implications for workforce guidance for bureau and field missions.

Target Date for Completion Of Preliminary Draft Plan: June 1

Step X -- Complete Transition From Phase II To Workforce Planning Staff

1. It is assumed that the foregoing steps will be completed on schedule, and that the recruitment and assignment and placement of a permanent Workforce Planning Staff will take place in the interim to enable a gradual and orderly transition from the Phase II Working Group to the Workforce Planning Staff.
2. It is envisioned that some if not all Workforce Planning Staff will be available to participate in the more important of the above implementation steps so that there will be a smooth transition to the many follow-on actions that will be required to refine the long-range workforce plan and improve the workforce planning process.

Target Date For Completion Of Phase II And Transition To The Workforce Planning Staff: June 15, 1991

C. Major Follow-On Actions (Inter Alia) For The Workforce Planning Staff

Following is a partial list of specific functions and tasks which the Workforce Planning Staff should concern itself with during the early months of its operation. It should also be understood that many of these, and those indicated in Section III form a part of a continuous cycle of data gathering, outreach, analysis, preparation of proposed plans and actions, execution and monitoring and reporting functions.

1. Circulate for comment and discussion the draft workforce plan within the Agency.
2. Secure top management's approval of a final plan.

3. Establish procedures and methods for effective communications, coordination and outreach within the Agency.
4. Refine the original projections of future workforce requirements.
5. Initiate an analysis of the desirability and feasibility of establishing and implementing a skills based inventory to facilitate matching employees with job skill requirements.
6. Examine in coordination with other concerned offices how increased cultural diversity in the workforce can be achieved and managed.
7. Examine in coordination with other concerned offices the workforce implications of the changing role of secretaries and clerical support as the result of automation.
8. Identify new and effective workforce planning techniques, and the need for specialized training of the Workforce Planning Staff.
9. Establish systems, procedures, and areas which the Workforce Planning Staff will monitor and report to management.

D. Proposed Budget For Phase II and For The Workforce Planning Staff In FY 1991

1. The budget estimate for Phase II priority activities is \$80,000. The bulk of this total is for estimated costs of needed consultant services, with modest amounts budgeted for travel.

2. The budget costs for the Workforce Planning Staff for the balance of FY 1991 are estimated to be \$35,000, mainly for consultant services and some travel.

E. Follow-On Actions To Phase I Recommendations For Which Other PM Offices Will Take Responsibility

1. Develop an overall human resources management strategy under PM leadership.
2. Reinstate the traditional International Development Intern (IDI) Program.
3. Restructure the personnel categorization system (backstop codes) to simplify, reduce and thereby broaden the categories.
4. Tapping the newly created Minority Recruitment Advisory Group (MRAG), initiative more proactive and continuous recruitment of women and minorities and include women and minorities on recruitment teams, while assigning a higher priority and taking more deliberate steps to comply with Agency policy and Foreign Service Act provisions on making its workforce more representative of the U.S. population overall.
5. In conjunction with the MRAG, seek means in recruitment of increasing the available women and minority candidate pool to ensure that greater numbers of qualified women and minorities are included on the "best qualified" selection lists.
6. Continue the efforts by FS selection and tenure boards to identify promotable women and minorities, and to identify training which can enhance their promotability.

7. Create a more visible and expanded organizational locus and focus for policies and initiatives for foreign national employee utilization and development, and in that context also review and revise, in conjunction with State, the salary and benefits packages available to FNDH and FN PSC;s in order to ensure it is competitive and can attract high caliber employees.
8. Remove inactive vacancies from the system. Only real positions within Agency FTE levels should remain on the system against which assignments and recruitment decisions can be made.
9. Assess the workforce talent and skills needs and program training to ensure that we get the skills required for future assignments. A.I.D. should assess current employee development and training programs to meet the changing skills needs and new roles identified for Agency employees, including managerial and analytical skills.
10. Expand training to the Agency's FNDH, FN PSC and other non-direct hire personnel to strengthen their performance commensurate with their heightened role and proportion in the Agency's work. FNDH and FN PSC's must be regularly scheduled to attend existing training courses.
11. Examine the position grade classification structure overseas and the implications for AID/W staffing of the rotation of highly graded FS Officers into Washington positions. If the grade structure cannot then be justified, a downward grade restructuring may be indicated.

12. Examine how many of the non-direct hire workforce, such as char force, maintenance staff, and possibly drivers (insurance and other liability considerations permitting) can be employed under institutional manpower contracts in those countries where this is possible. This shift would reduce contract management workload and trim the size of the workforce over which A.I.D. has employer-employee relationships.

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

320 TWENTY FIRST STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20523

ANNEX A

September 14, 1990

The Administrator

MEMORANDUM FOR: AA/PPC, Reginald Brown
AA/S&T, Richard Bissell
AA/MS, Michael Doyle
AA/FVA, Philip Christenson
AA/PRE, Henrietta Holsman
AA/AFR, Walter Bollinger (Acting)
AA/ANE, Carol Adelman
AA/LAC, James Michel
FM/CONT, Michael Usnick
PM/OD, Anthony Cauterucci

SUBJECT: Workforce Planning Initiative

I place the highest priority on improving the efficiency and effectiveness of A.I.D. We must pursue attainment of these objectives concurrently with the ongoing business of the Agency and as we also respond to new challenges. Each of you is responsible not just for the success of your bureau, but with me you share the responsibility for the success of A.I.D.'s total program. In order to meet the priorities of the '90s several initiatives, for example PPC's efforts to link O.E. and program funding levels, are underway intended to bring our program management organizational structure and workforce into alignment with program objectives and budget realities. A top priority initiative is institutionalizing an effective Workforce Planning System (WFP), an urgent task which I have asked the Office of Personnel Management (PM) to undertake. WFP is one of our most important management improvement measures on which I plan to report to the Congress every six months.

Establishing an effective workforce planning system from scratch is a complex, multi-dimensional process. In my view, and in an A.I.D. context, the major essential elements in that process involve: working from an evolving definition of A.I.D.'s future directions and role, and the organizational implications of that role; defining the number and type of workforce needed to carry out the major objectives under the Agency's future role and direction; establishing an accurate baseline picture of the present workforce and what it does;

defining the gaps between what we have and what we need for the future and developing a plan of action to fill these gaps; and putting in place concepts and systems that will keep these elements updated. It is essential that A.I.D. have a WFP system that can supply management with data on workforce trends and requirements to facilitate the decision making necessary to keep the Agency supplied with personnel relevant to its objectives.

The final product I have in mind is a system that optimizes matching the skills required to achieve our objectives with the skills of our workforce, while at the same time providing for maximum flexibility.

A good beginning has been made. The following initiatives are underway:

- Determining and focusing the direction of A.I.D. for the '90s;

- PPC's ongoing analysis of the relationships between program expenditures, the O.E. budget and the F.T.E. ceiling; and

- Improvement of Agency operations and avoidance of redundancies between central and regional bureaus.

All of the activities and elements mentioned above, plus others yet to be initiated, form the essential elements of an effective WFP system. You can appreciate immediately how interrelated these elements are and how critical it is to coordinate and foster an atmosphere of trust and cooperation among the units responsible for these elements. WFP, in all its dimensions, is a crucial objective that can only be attained if we all work together.

I have asked PM to establish a Working Group, and Peter Askin has been selected to lead and coordinate this WFP planning and implementation effort. Workforce planning, however, is not something PM can or should do alone. To succeed in this effort we must function more than ever as a team with the greater good of our Agency coming before the interests of our individual offices.

Effective and realistic workforce planning in my view must start and for the most part come from the operating and other organizational units that utilize the Agency's workforce. To assure this, I am asking each of you to designate one person,

plus an alternate in your organization, to be the primary liaison and resource person with the PM-led Working Group in mobilizing and carrying through with this effort. These persons should be of sufficient rank and position to be able to reflect knowledgeably and represent with authority your insights, perspectives and strategic direction. They should be available to the Working Group by September 17. Above all, the workforce planning effort must be presented and carried out in such a manner that it is not perceived or received by employees as a threat to careers or yet another element of uncertainty regarding A.I.D.'s future.

This assignment will have a tangible cost in staff time and funding, and may involve some logistic and travel support for the WG, the costs of which I expect each bureau/mission to assist in absorbing.

It is difficult at this point to estimate how long it will take for the WG to complete its task. We do know, however, that some results will be needed before submission of our FY 1992 program, while concurrently working on producing a system to effectively meet our workforce requirements over the longer term. I have asked Tony Cauterucci to keep us all informed periodically on the progress of this effort as it unfolds. I have also asked the Counselor to assist with any coordination requirements to the extent they are needed. We must succeed in this effort, and success will require the inputs and hard work and cooperation of all units of the Agency. I know I can count on your full cooperation.



Ronald W. Roskens

SUMMARY OF RELATED STUDIES - ANNEX B

There appears to have been a phethora of A.I.D.-sponsored studies and Agency initiatives, over the last two years especially, which pertain to the work of the Working Group and the Administrator's objective of bringing A.I.D.'s program management organizational structure and workforce into alignment with program objectives and budget realities. Including reports stemming from initiatives cited in the referenced memorandum, we have found so far a total of ten separate reports/studies, the earliest done before 1980, but most conducted over 1988-90.

The attachment summarizes information pertinent to our task from each report/study. But, overall, there is substantial unanimity among the findings:

- o A.I.D.'s human resources are taken for granted and do not receive the attention they require and merit.
- o A.I.D. does not do comprehensive workforce planning and needs to establish such a capacity ASAP for the Agency to do its job effectively and efficiently.
- o In the absence of workforce planning, staff recruitment, training and career development efforts are ad hoc, have limited effectiveness, do not reflect changed program directions and are not meeting A.I.D.'s needs.
- o Senior A.I.D. management must assign a higher priority and must give more guidance and direct support to workforce planning.
- o Changing program directions, changing technology and declining budget availabilities are having, and will have, significant implications for A.I.D.'s workforce, i.e. numbers of personnel, skills required, promotional opportunities, assignment prospects, hiring needs and so on.

There are some differences of opinion among these documents, largely due to the origins of the specific report/initiative and the particular interests being served. Differences relate to such questions as whether budget constraints or workforce requirements should drive workforce planning, who should be responsible for

such planning, A.I.D.'s future needs for technical expertise, and what future staff and skills needs are.

Most of the reports limit themselves to U.S. direct-hire, especially the Foreign Service, with little or no direct attention given to Civil Service, Foreign Service National, contractor, PASA and other personnel in A.I.D.'s total workforce. A.I.D. is not the only USG agency in this situation -- all are deficient in doing workforce analysis according to the GAO.

However, given the historical record in this Agency, as evidenced in the attachment, one must ask why so few of the recommendations, which focus not just on the need for workforce planning but pertinent organizational and policy changes, seem to have been implemented. We also need to consider just what it will take to prevent history's repeating itself yet again in respect to our assignment.

Attachment

1. Report of the Task Force on Personnel, Frank Kimball et al. 6/15/90.

This task force -- which was to be "the last Task Force" on personnel -- was to complement the work of two earlier groups reviewing A.I.D. recruitment and training. It was to assess the assignment process, career development, counseling and organization of PM, but the report is more comprehensive and draws on the earlier reports. The three together are especially useful, relevant and current.

There are 56 recommendations, of which 16 are characterized as "major." The report also includes an implementation plan. The group concluded A.I.D. must make fundamental changes in the way it manages its human resources, characterizing the current system as inefficient and a source of frustration for employees and managers. Some fundamental problems identified are: a) the complete lack of any meaningful workforce planning or forecasting of personnel requirements; b) a recruitment system focused only on replacing departing employees and ignoring both changed program directions and the need for a consistent junior officer intake program; c) training programs unrelated to career development; d) absence of comprehensive career development in A.I.D.; and e) the low priority accorded human resources management. "The importance of employees as critical resources for organizational effectiveness has been recognized and acted on throughout the management world but not by A.I.D. which takes its employees for granted."

One set of major recommendations is replacing PM with an Office of Human Resources reporting directly to the A/AID and to which Agency senior management, identified as DAA's and up, would give explicit guidance on future directions of the Agency and the types of human resources desired. OHR would contain a unit responsible for all human resource policy and workforce planning thereby consolidating in one place responsibilities in this area now scattered in four places in PM and in PPC. The Task Force further recommended 1) re-establishing the IDI program to hire entry-level people in all backstop (BS) codes, 2) development by OHR of an action plan for recruiting women and minorities, and 3) creating an implementation group to carry out its recommendations upon report approval. OHR was never set up, but some recommendations appear to be moving ahead, albeit on a piece-meal basis.

2. An Assessment of A.I.D. Staff Training Programs,
James R. Brady et al., 1/19/89.

The assessment team focused on training as a component of career development. It concluded that human resources management and accompanying programs of training and staff development need a higher priority in A.I.D. Training strategies, policies and programs and related decisions should flow, but in A.I.D. do not, from broader organizational planning regarding Agency operations, staffing and career development. As a result, A.I.D. training is ad hoc, and the primary responsibility for career development is vested in employees themselves and their immediate supervisors, with little senior A.I.D. management direction and involvement. The training A.I.D. does is as good as it can be in the circumstances, but it could be more effective if A.I.D. had a systematic approach based on program directions. Also, A.I.D. leadership needs to commit itself to staff development. GS employees do not benefit from A.I.D. training programs as much as FS personnel. There also needs to be more structure and a more focused approach to training Foreign Service Nationals (FSN's). A.I.D. needs 1) to identify new training needs resulting from changing program priorities and directions, i.e. in private sector, agribusiness, policy reform, sectoral assistance, international debt issues, natural resources management and the environment, and also, 2) to develop programs for cross-training in several fields for its staff.

3. An Assessment of the Foreign Service and Civil Service Recruitment Systems, Gwendolyn H. Joe et al., 11/88.

The longest, and in some ways most critical, of the three studies, this document asserts a) that even though people are A.I.D.'s most important asset, the Agency gives insufficient care to human resources and b) that it does less well in its recruitment efforts than it might do. The report cites three weaknesses in the recruitment system: 1) the absence of workforce planning other than for replacements for expected attrition, 2) inadequate resources for recruiters, and 3) the lack of confidence in, and communications between, recruiters and program managers. As a consequence, A.I.D. recruitment is ad hoc, is driven by short-fused emergencies and high-pressure interest groups, does not reflect any strategic vision of the A.I.D. program, its direction and changes, fails to incorporate any analysis of the skills needs and personnel mix relating to A.I.D.'s evolving programs, and does not receive

sufficient guidance and input from senior A.I.D. managers. These inadequacies affect especially seriously recruitment of women and minorities, hiring of clerical/secretarial personnel (named by this task force as one of A.I.D.'s largest human resource management problems), recruitment of Foreign Service personnel, and how new hires are treated.

In addition to stressing the criticality of A.I.D.'s introducing comprehensive workforce planning in order to improve recruitment, the report urges as a first critical step the conduct of better job analyses to ascertain what A.I.D. staff really do, so that A.I.D. can factor into workforce planning consideration of the Agency's increased focus on policy dialogue and sector programming, its demands for greater analytical capacity in its professionals, its expectation that staff will be managers of resources rather than hands-on doers, and the higher value placed on communications skills. The Task Force sees these demands as pertinent characteristics of the "Employee of the Future." Such employees will also be shaped by the prospect of more, smaller-sized field missions which will make greater use of generalists and by the evolution of the "Modernizing Asia" concept toward science and technology exchange. The group added, however, that even through A.I.D. is moving toward having multi-skilled staff, it will always require a core of technical specialists.

The team proposed immediate activation of an integrated workforce analysis unit to review all current and projected recruitment and to devise a short-term strategy compatible with overall A.I.D. needs. Work of this unit should be reviewed by the senior staff (AA's and the D/AID or C/AID), apparently through senior level approval 1) of an annual recruitment plan setting out hiring levels by occupational skills and 2) of a program for targeted recruitment of women and minorities. The task force also recommended a) reinstating the IDI and Management Intern programs as the major means for getting bright, entry-level people into the Agency and, b) consolidating backstops as a means for developing broad-gauged, cross-trained managers.

4. Report by the Comptroller General of the U.S.,
Federal Work Force Planning: Time for Renewed Emphasis,
12/80.

The GAO concluded that more attention needed to be given to methods and procedures for determining and managing human resource needs, observing that workforce planning generally has low priority throughout the USG. Rising

personnel costs and increased competition for limited funds made it essential, in the GAO's view, that workforce requirements and personnel management decisions be based on credible workforce planning systems and procedures. In the absence of such systems and procedures, the GAO stated that decisions regarding the size, composition, allocation, and development of an agency's workforce would be suspect, open to challenge, and could result in arbitrary and subjective resource actions which might, in turn, have negative effects on Federal programs and services.

5. Report on an Audit of the Foreign Service Recruitment Function; Booz, Allen and Hamilton, Inc., 10/19/88.

This audit is limited solely to A.I.D.'s recruitment practices, but it concluded that some fundamental decisions needed to be made on how Foreign Service recruitment could best accomplish its mission. With some FS occupations in short supply, "proactive" recruitment becomes more necessary. A.I.D./Recruitment should be provided projections of vacancies needing to be filled in future years, and it should allocate its budget toward the priority staffing areas.

6. The Bollinger Report, "Improving Agency Efficiency," Memo from A/AA/AFR Walter Bollinger et al., 11/6/90.

Organized to identify ways to improve operating efficiency and to conserve scarce OE resources, Mr. Bollinger and his team included improving personnel management and making administrative management more efficient among their five categories of recommendations. The group observed that work responsibilities of USDH now focused more on project management and accountability, while A.I.D. programs were giving more emphasis to sectoral assistance and policy dialogue accompanied by continuing staff reductions. The report recommends revising the way staff are used in Missions, filling future FSN vacancies through the PSC route to escape the rigidities of the FNDH system, assessing the impact of automation on work of secretarial support staff so as to reduce the number of such personnel and revise job descriptions and the work they and professional personnel do, reviewing U.S. PSC benefits, and combining program and OE funds.

8. Agricultural Personnel Analysis, R.C. Meyer, Part I Report, 9/6/88; Part II Report, 2/10/89.

This two-part study for ANE contains in Part I a profile of current staff in Agriculture, Backstop 10, and Rural Development, BS-14, but also has information on Food for Peace, BS-15, and Environmental, BS-30, specialists. Part II assesses some implications for these functional specialties of ANE's new agriculture rural development strategy as it evolves. The survey covers Foreign Service USDH and GS personnel in BS 10 only.

This survey is an example of workforce planning and has much useful information for Working Group purposes; it points out some ways that such data might be applied to concerns going beyond recruitment and training, for example, in the areas of promotion, special training and potential issues. Its utility is somewhat limited in that it seems to assume academic credentials equate to project management skills.

The Phase I Report stated that all personnel in the four BS categories had impressive academic credentials and were well qualified to manage the current portfolio. However, it cautioned that the development agenda is changing and involves new strategic trends. The author recommended A.I.D. begin creating a cadre of multi-skilled employees able to manage a variety of technically innovative activities. BS-10 staff are relatively young in terms of age and experience, so that there is a potential "experience gap" in the upper mid-levels which might become a problem if a significant number of senior ARDO's leave A.I.D. The study found evidence that BS 10, 14 and 15 personnel do relatively well in the frequency at which they are promoted, disproving the contention that technical specialists are disadvantaged in the promotion process. Mr. Meyer concluded that a changing role for ARDO's in the future would, in the absence of significant hiring authority, necessitate staff being cross-trained and, thus, having skills across all four backstops.

Some selected data taken from the Phase I report are:

BS-10/FS -- 61% under age 45; 69% have 1-10 years of experience; 72% are FS-2 and up; 25% are eligible to retire in 5 years.

BS-10/GS -- 64% are age 50 or older; 79% have 1-10 years of experience; 89% are GS/GM 14 and up; 18% are eligible to retire in 5 years.

BS-14/FS -- 88% are 36-50; 87% are FS-2 and up; 80% have 1-10 years of experience.

BS-30/FS -- group equally spread between ages 30-60; 80% have 1-10 years of service; 80% FS-2 and up; 30% are eligible to retire in 5 years.

BS-15/FS -- 67% are 45 years/under; 62% have 1-10 years of service; 71% FS-2 and up; 28% are eligible to retire in 5 years

The Part II Report concluded that A.I.D. would always need a core of technical specialists. More disturbingly, however, the author also found existing personnel in these functional areas were insufficient to deal with the diversity of subjects facing the Agency, given movement away from A.I.D.'s traditional agriculture research and production focus. In the absence of new hires due to OE constraints, the number of staff and skills mix is virtually static. Neither recruitment nor training can be counted on to revise the skills mix in favor of new program directions; such expertise will need to be obtained from outside A.I.D., i.e. from other USG agencies, the private sector, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, OPIC, agribusiness, PVO's and universities. Therefore, the Agency needs to strengthen its links with many of these. The outstanding A.I.D. technical manager of the future is described as having strong analytical skills, a mastery of the art of networking with individuals and institutions, and the ability to identify a problem. Such a manager can identify the type of expert needed, knows where/how to obtain such expertise, and sees that it is well used to further A.I.D.'s goals. Under these conditions staff training should focus on keeping A.I.D. personnel current on development concepts, management techniques, and new technological innovations. Training should also focus on cross-training programs. A.I.D. should not seek to transfer new technical skills to large numbers of employees.

9. Engineering in A.I.D., ACEC Research and Management Foundation, 6/90.

This report, "done by engineers for engineers," decided that the shift away from infrastructure projects over recent years had gone too far. The shift had been matched with cuts in engineering staff so that those USDH engineers remaining could not carry out legislatively mandated responsibilities. Citing as evidence the 25 active IQC's and the reported 300 current A.I.D. projects having engineering components, the report found engineering is still a significant part of the A.I.D. program. However, the 50 USDH engineers on the rolls were stretched too thinly. Without explanation or supporting documentation, the report also asserts that A.I.D.'s role in development over the next 10 years will be closely related to its engineering

component as manifest in activities expected in environment/natural resources, water, waste disposal, urban/rural development, new technologies, the Eastern Bloc and Pacific Rim. It proposes increasing USDH engineers from 43 (sic) to 94 in order to manage the current level of effort.

10. Report of the Commission on the Foreign Service Personnel System, John M. Thomas et al., 6/89.

The Commission looked at all Foreign Service agencies. While most of its recommendations are directed to the Department of State, many apply to A.I.D. and other USG agencies which, with State, make up the Foreign Service. Findings and recommendations pertinent to A.I.D. are:

- o There are failings in the Foreign Service personnel system and the implementation of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 which impact on the individuals involved and, also, are beginning to impact adversely on the conduct of American foreign policy. Lack of career stability contributes to diminished attractiveness of the Foreign Service (FS) and diminution of personnel's commitment to the FS as a career.
- o Promotions need to occur at a more measured pace, commensurate with a competitive but stable career in a pyramidal structure.
- o Institute long-range personnel planning capability.
- o Executive management of the personnel system requires that long-range budgeting be an integral part of the personnel system.
- o Workforce position structure must be defined with hiring and promotion numbers set against this structure.
- o Recruitment must be targeted toward attracting women, minorities and younger Americans.
- o Greater emphasis must be placed on career planning and the role of career development enhanced.
- o Training should be improved, take place regularly throughout a career, and be required for advancement.
- o The number of promotions should be limited to the number of positions at each grade and should be tied to actual vacancies.
- o Establishment of a fully automated personnel system.

- o Limited Career Extensions are not used to identify and retain individuals having needed skills. LCE's should be used for such purposes.
- o No effective workforce requirements have been established so that career development, promotion, training and assignments are being determined without relation to agency goals and objectives.
- o Recruitment does not necessarily bring in the employees best suited to the FS; it is not targeted toward needed skills and a broad representation of the American people.
- o Increased age of entry into the FS is not appropriate.
- o Rapid rates of promotion since 1980 have proved to be incompatible with provision of full careers for employees reaching the middle ranks and who remain competitive.

11. 1981 Administrator's Task Force on Personnel Ceiling Reductions

This group, drawn from each bureau and chaired by Bob Clark, FM/BUD, was set up in response to an OMB directive to reduce direct-hire personnel over FY 1982-84 as part of the President's effort to achieve a balanced federal budget by FY 1984. A.I.D.'s direct-hire workforce ceiling for FY 81 was 5,351 full-time employees in permanent positions of which 1,475 were USDH overseas, 1,850 were FNDH and 2,026 were USDH in AID/W. A.I.D. had to cut 700 DH slots in about equal increments over the three-year period. Accordingly, the task force was to identify for the A/AID options on how to make the reductions and also to identify concomitant program and policy changes required for the Agency to function effectively with fewer DH personnel, i.e. "to do more with less," to cite the phrase of that day. The Task Force focused on five areas of analysis -- program policy changes, alternatives to DH staff, changes in internal policies and procedures, administrative efficiencies, and reorganization/consolidation/elimination of functions. It identified ranges of staffing cuts under the following headings: Sector concentration; Mission staffing, methods of providing assistance; conversion of FSN's to contract; travel and transportation policies; office automation/modularization; data processing systems, and reorganization/consolidation/elimination (mainly within various bureaus and particular offices).

A problem with this report is its format. The Executive Summary is brief and sparse, so one must read each specific section to find actual recommendations. But, on the other hand, this Task Force, faced with a ceiling and budget situation similar to that which spawned our effort, looked at A.I.D. from an entirely different perspective.

The report contains a useful historical review of A.I.D. staffing levels and reductions thereto going back to 1961 on pages 8-10 (Attachment I).

Program policy changes recommended included concentrating DH personnel in fewer countries and sectors and using less intensive aid delivery mechanisms (program/sectoral support instead of projects), so as to have more meaningful impact with fewer people, i.e. "doing more with less." Two pertinent recommendations (page 17) were that A.I.D. resist its traditional pattern of hiring professional expertise to address new, highly technical development problems and that it retrain A.I.D. generalists with a year of specialized training to meet skills needs in new program areas, as was done in the early days of the population program.

In 1981 Education, Health, and capital projects and infrastructure were considered sectors of declining or terminating A.I.D. interest which could be eliminated altogether in a short time, thus generating significant staff savings. Increased use of "intermediaries" for participant training was recommended as another means to replace/reduce USDH BS-60 personnel. Institutional contracts were deemed the way to go. Offices such as WID, PRE, and FVA/PVC were seen as "lip service" to special interests and, thereby, not directly supportive of areas of program concentration. These were also recommended to be abolished.

This Task Force recognized that one of A.I.D.'s great strengths and sources of comparative advantage was its field Missions. It did not want to compromise that, but it found considerable variation in Mission staff levels not explained by program size. Following on from a 1979 PPC effort to develop a "core staff" concept, which failed to result in any policy decisions, this 1981 Task Force reviewed a recent FM effort to determine pertinent criteria for setting Mission size in relation to program factors. This, too, came to nothing as it found little consistency in the way Missions were staffed. FM concluded that virtually all Mission staffing decisions were made on a case-by-case, mission-by-mission, "subjective priority" basis. A very important criteria in such decisions was the management or operating styles of Mission Directors.

Overall, the task force concluded, "...there are too many significant variables which impact on mission size to allow for development of a fixed formula for determining optimum mission staff levels" (page 26).

Another conclusion was that Mission programs could be planned and implemented effectively within the staff available, with some program design/implementation changes and program management innovations. Sector support and Commodity Import Program efforts were recommended as being less staff intensive, as would be use of different modes to manage infrastructure projects (these modes were not identified). Efforts were to be made to institutionalize host country management, thereby reducing demands for A.I.D. staff. A.I.D. was to make greater use of PVO's, PCV's and other intermediaries and, also, of more co-financing of projects with other donors. A.I.D. was to encourage mission in-service training for FSN professionals and use contracts and resident-hire employment to hire more expertise locally.

Most pertinent to our Working Group's concerns were the 1981 Task Force's recommendations on converting FSN's to contract. Finding anomalies in modes of employment for FN's performing non-professional support services, e.g. chauffeurs, janitors, librarians, warehousemen, maintenance personnel, travel/transport staff, C&R, computer personnel and clerks, the group recommended all these types of personnel be contracted for, recognizing that conversion from DH status meant loss of their U.S. Civil Service retirement benefits. The conversion was to be completed during 1982-1985.

This 1981 Task Force also recommended contracting out A.I.D. travel services and endorsed the earlier Kivimae Task Force recommendation in September of that year on increasing delegations to bureaus and the field.

The "Clark Task Force," too, believed office automation would lead to reductions in administrative support staff, i.e. secretarial/clerical personnel, but it noted that there had been few personnel savings achieved to that point from automation. In fact, it observed that over the previous three years the number of professionals to each clerical employee had declined (the ideal ratio was set at 4:1, i.e. the figure in existence in 1978). No explanation was given for the decrease other than A.I.D.'s failure to maximize benefits of ADP. But later in the text the group also referred to additional work tasks which secretaries and professionals would be able to take on as a result of use of word processing.

Under the heading "Organization/Consolidation/Elimination" the group made a number of suggestions which may have been acted on and some consequences of which may be evident in some of the responses given during our interviews:

1. Transfer responsibility for A.I.D. security clearances and other security-related actions to State.
2. Reduce A.I.D.'s recruitment staff by 5.
3. Cut PM staff involved in promotion of employee rights and benefits, retirement programs, and awards by 5.
4. Cut PM/Training Division staff by 8-10 and contract out more A.I.D. training. The report states, "This option for reduction is offered without reference to a discussion of A.I.D.'s obligations under Sec. 703 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 which relates to in-service career development....The Agency's plans for meeting this section were included in the Secretary of State's June 2, 1981 report....This report noted the financial and staffing difficulties A.I.D. faces in complying with Sec. 703....The task force recognizes that the proposal presented here may impact on A.I.D.'s ability to implement these objectives."
5. PM should explore whether the RAMPS system is being utilized to its full potential and what should be done to use the system more effectively.
6. The functions of SER/Management Planning did not appear to support its staff level. No planning initiatives performed by SER/MP could be identified and its staff was doing little analysis (which was even then being contracted out). Ten-15 positions were to be cut.
7. A number of other central offices/bureaus were reviewed for overstaffing, redundancy, duplication/overlap with other units, and excessive layering -- SER/COM, SER/CM, SER/MO, PPC/E, PPC/PDPR, PPC/PB and S&T. Within the geographic bureaus the task force reviewed relationships/responsibilities among and between geographic desks, PD's, TR's and DP's; it concluded some staff reductions were feasible, but left the decisions to each bureau because of the different organizational and managerial styles encountered.

8. REDSO's, RFMC's and similar regional entities were cited as organizations to be replicated as feasible in Central America and the Caribbean.

12. 1977 MacDonald Study of A.I.D.'s Personnel System

The then Administrator's objective in directing this study be undertaken was to improve the personnel system so it would produce the kinds of people needed for A.I.D. to operate in timely way. It was conducted simultaneously with a crash recruitment program to fill field vacancies, and the study, deliberately excluded some personnel matters beyond its ken e.g. retirement, pay, benefits and allowances, awards, privacy, freedom of information, etc. While taking into account other studies on the future and organization of the A.I.D. program, Mr. MacDonald concluded, "Given the diversity of A.I.D.'s programs, the catholicity of skills they require, and the different ways we conduct them from place to place and over time, A.I.D. requires 'a personnel system for all seasons' all the time." (See page 2.)

In producing the report he took into account the views of AA's, office heads, USAID Directors, AFGE and AFSA, and SER/PM as well as those outside A.I.D. familiar with its personnel situation. The report covers workforce planning and control, recruitment and employment, internal assignment, promotion, dealing with less effective employees, and management of the personnel system.

One of the major problems examined was the existence of dual personnel systems (FS and CS). Mr. MacDonald concluded that a single system was not a panacea; that a single career system would not eliminate the duality inherent in having staff serving both overseas and in Washington; that it would be feasible, albeit with legislative changes, to have one career system patterned on the CS system, but it would not be feasible to change to a wholly FS system because so many AID/W jobs perform functions not suitable for inclusion in the FS; and that A.I.D. should utilize fully the flexibility accorded it under the FS system so as to maximize FS staffing service since no legislation would be required to do so. His other conclusions were:

1. That personnel administration was overly centralized and could be more effectively organized and run -- yet adequately controlled -- with significant decentralization of operations;
2. That age and grade curves would rise unless A.I.D. offered special retirement inducements and vigorously recruited new, young blood;

3. That renewed effort and resources must be given to recruitment throughout A.I.D.;
4. That supervisors had to be more honest and conscientious in evaluating employee performance, especially with regard to less effective employees;
5. That removal of ineffective performers should be more firmly pursued whether through dismissal for unsatisfactory performance or selection out;
6. That there needed to be more responsible adherence in practice by AA's and office heads to A.I.D. personnel criteria and precepts "which to a remarkable extent are accepted in principle but contested in practice (See pages 4-8)

Specifically with regard to workforce planning, Mr. MacDonald's report states the following:

"Problems:

1. A.I.D.'s workforce planning is reasonably effective in the short run. Forecasting the needs of field missions one or two years ahead, for example, is for the most part readily accomplished. However, controls over workforce have been excessively centralized to the extent that fulfillment of plans is slowed.
2. Moreover, while field missions forecast with substantial accuracy their needs in terms of numbers of, say, agriculturists 18 months ahead, they often have difficulty in pinpointing specific types and may not do that until much later in writing precise job descriptions by which time their need for the technicians becomes instant. Yet, the central service of finding, assigning and delivering them is not an instant process -- especially if outside recruitment is entailed.
3. Long range forecasting of workforce needs has rarely met with much success. The changing mix of program content and methodology over time has shifted emphasis from technicians cum capital development officers in one decade, to economists in the next, and then to generalists, etc. Moreover, gross changes in workforce levels -- the massive Indochina build-up, periodic budget cuts, etc. -- are unpredictable. Yet there is today a significant core of activity, the continuing workforce requirements for which are predictable and should be more regularly forecast.

Solutions:

1. In the short run, Regional Bureaus should be given greater authority to manage the workforce ceilings allocations to them by Central/SER. This authority would, of course, need to be subject to central recall in over-riding circumstances.
2. Also, in the short run, Regional Bureaus should take more initiative and responsibility for assuring that field missions submit not only staffing patterns, but position descriptions early enough to permit timely, central SER/PM response or lower their expectations for central recruitment/assignment and delivery service; conversely, SER/PM must improve its capacity to 'guesstimate' gross demand for particular skills and initiate more recruitment than it yet does against those estimates."

Review of Comments made by Selection, Tenure and Performance Standards Boards, 1985-1990:

Having reviewed the subject memoranda to identify common observations made over the years which are pertinent to the concerns of the Workforce Planning Working Group, we found more consensus on certain topics than expected and have grouped and summarized these below, indicating the year in which one or more Boards made the observation cited. With eight Selection Boards meeting each year plus memoranda from Tenure and Performance Standards Boards, we did not specify the panel responsible for each comment.

Senior Foreign Service

SFS Selection Boards, PSB's and Threshold Boards alike have repeatedly raised a similar set of questions. One is concern over the relative youth of SFS members (median age of 50 for the SFS as a whole and average age for the Counsellors group is the early 40's) and, therefore, the likelihood of future career dissatisfaction among this group and/or early loss of experienced personnel having key skills. Similarly, these Boards have noted the large size of the SFS relative to the total Foreign Service (FS) workforce (about 17% of direct-hire FS members compared to about half that level in State and USIS) -- and the excess of persons in the SFS and FS-01 grades over the number of jobs graded at those levels. (FE-OC graded jobs were characterized as being "anachronistic" in many cases by a 1990 panel.) In every year one or more of these Boards have also remarked on the lack of clear precepts for promotion and/or widespread misunderstanding of the precepts for

promotion into and within the SFS, the lack of understanding among the A.I.D. Foreign Service that FS-01 is the terminal grade for all but a few, and the oft-claimed "bias" against technical personnel. The "bias" may, however, be more a reflection of greater value's being given by A.I.D. in actuality to broad program, policy and management skills and experiences over the more narrow skills and job experiences of technical experts. Two Boards recommended lengthening the time in grade before SFS members can become eligible for promotion. Overall, 15 Boards, of the total of 24 Panel reports for all FS categories read, raised one or more of these concerns.

Skills Important for Promotion

The issue of the "technical bias" is also raised by other Boards but less frequently than those reviewing the SFS. But a number of Boards have made the following comments (not all of which are consistent with each other) which suggest what skills are really valued or are under-valued in the FS workforce:

- 1985
- To advance Economists are pushed toward work in project design and management and/or regular Program Officer functions -- far from the type of work the Economists expected to do when they came to A.I.D. Also, A.I.D. has difficulty in finding a balance between the macro- and micro-economics level of analysis.
 - Successful or good performance is measured by documentation production not contributions to economic/social development.
 - People in technical backstops do not function within the confines of their technical fields. Very good technicians carry out all aspects of A.I.D.'s Agriculture activities -- program conceptualization, project definition, policy and program negotiations, and project implementation.
 - Oral and written communications skills are cited as areas for improvement, regardless of class, backstop or overall rating levels.
 - At all grade levels supervisory skills are critical for GSO and Financial Management backstops.
- 1986
- A.I.D. is evaluating people on the basis of how well they process documents instead of their contributions to development.

- Limited numbers of positions are available for Agriculture Economists outside the largest Missions. They must do project design/ implementation. Those expecting to do analytical work are frustrated and unprepared for project management tasks.
- 1987
 - Those in implementation-oriented jobs have an advantage over those in more analytical ones, i.e. Economists, lawyers.
 - The narrowly-defined nature of Engineers' work makes them less competitive.
 - PhD's and those with only BA's are less competitive.
 - Deficient areas of performance among those referred to the PSB are interpersonal relations, oral and written communications, and analytical skills.
- 1988
 - Generalists are more dominant on promotion lists than their percentage in the A.I.D. population would indicate.
- 1989
 - Process is emphasized over substance.
 - Raters need to describe the implications and impact of what employees do.

Recruitment

A common refrain among SFS and Threshold Boards is the paucity of minorities, especially Black males, and women among A.I.D.'s workforce, (1985, 1986, 1988, 1989). Another common observation is the excellence of IDI's in general and the need to continue the IDI program as a means for bringing in high quality, highly-motivated career candidates (1985, 1986, 1988). A third is concern over the hiring and/or competitiveness for promotion of those brought in at the mid-career level (1985, 1987, 1988). The following comments illustrate this third concern:

- Mid-career new hires are not competitive with others in their class.
- There is an inconsistency between Agency hiring practices and needs; A.I.D. is hiring and tenuring narrow technical experts in an era of shrinking staff resources and despite A.I.D.'s increasing requirement for broad-gauged

individuals with a solid grasp of their technical fields and strong management, administrative skills who can perform across the Board in one or more sectors. Highly specialized experts, e.g. foresters, nutritionists, environmentalists, soil scientists, etc. should be hired under the PSC, PASA, and AD routes, not as career FS.

- People hired at FS-01 are expected to perform at the class standard before they are able to do so.
- Why are we employing 50-year old Engineers as career candidates?
- The large number of Engineers entering A.I.D. as FS-02's lack supervisory, management and development skills and are not competitive.

Personnel Support

This category includes observations on training, career counseling and supervision. The thrust of Board comments does not differ from the findings of various A.I.D. studies summarized in my memorandum of October 5 on prior efforts in the area of workforce planning. Some more notable comments by the Panels are:

- 1985 - Training for employees should be systematic and anticipatory rather than reactive. (By this the Board meant training should occur before one is in the particular job instead of after.)
- 1985 - The Panel questions the adequacy of supervision given employees. A.I.D. gives inadequate attention to preparing supervisors to guide recently hired technicians and IDI's, including supervisors' responsibilities for counseling staff and seeking training for them.
- 1986 - Counseling for FS-1's on precepts for entry to the SFS and frank counseling for all staff on performance weaknesses are deficient.
- 1989 - Less credit is given for supervision of FSN's than USDH despite the fact FSN's are an increasingly important part of the workforce.

Grade and Position Glut

Most selection Boards specify by grade and backstop (BS) the numbers of employees whom they review for promotion purposes. (Many also try to ascertain numbers and grades of minorities

and women, using names as indicators, with varying degrees of success, so that they can meet A.I.D. EEO objectives. Black males are the hardest group to identify.) From these tables the large numbers of personnel at the Counselor, FS-01 and FS-02 grades in the Foreign Service is readily apparent; about 1100 of the total 1,794 members of A.I.D.'s Foreign Service -- about 61% -- are concentrated in only these three FS grades. The Counselor group itself represents 72% of the SFS.

The scarcity of jobs for FS-1's and SFS members as well as FS secretaries (see below) was also noted by several Panels. The 1989 Program Direction and Development Board found an excess of BS-94's and a deficit of BS-02's during its review.

Special Issues--FS Secretaries and Small Posts

The 1985 and 1986 Program Operations and Management Boards and the 1990 Program Direction and Development Board expressed concern over the ability of personnel assigned to small Missions to distinguish themselves and "stand out" in comparison to those at larger posts. Recognizably, small Mission staff perform a broader range of tasks, but they are operating in smaller programs whose impact may be more limited. They are all rated by the same supervisor, sometimes for a number of years in succession, and they do not have the benefit of input to their EER's from Reviewing Officers and Unit Review Panels. The 1990 Board was especially concerned at the absence of second opinions in these EER's to balance those of the Rating Officers.

Similarly, the 1986 and 1990 Administration and the 1989 Program Support Panels stressed the lack of career and promotional opportunities faced by senior FS secretaries (grade FP-4) in Backstops 05 and 07. The 1986 Board observed that the senior secretary/Executive Assistant group is now required to have skills exceeding those in the standard job description. They are, in fact, office managers; C & R supervisors; trainer's of FSN's in office practices, word processing, filing, etc.; often are managers of ADP systems, and perform some personnel and Controller tasks, e.g. time keeping, voucher preparation, etc. They also are responsible for handling of all classified material. However, FP-4 is the highest grade open to them and promotions to this level are sparse indeed. The 1990 Board noted that 10 persons are FP-4's, three of whom now cannot receive step increases, and many have been in grade five years or more. Increasingly, most field Missions are being reduced to only one FS secretary, a fact underlying the 1990 Panel's statement that the 10 FP-4's are the "backbone of the Missions in which they serve". The 1986 Panel recommended upgrading these jobs to FP-3 and promoting some to the higher grade. The 1989 Board also proposed more targeted training to enable some of these individuals to cross-over or advance into other job categories.

The 1990 Panel noted that A.I.D. no longer had any cross-over training programs and proposed reinstating the FP-3 grade to allow for some recognition for the top FP-4 performers. Finally, the 1990 Board lamented that creation of more resident-hire positions was taking jobs from career Foreign Service secretaries and went on to question whether employment for spouses should occur at the expense of career personnel.

1990 Program Operations & Management Board, Section A

This Panel's report could have been written expressly for this Working Group. The Board made four major points:

- 1) The EER system emphasizes process over product; from ratings it is increasingly difficult to identify contributions to development. A.I.D. has moved toward programs centered on macro-planning and policy change in which quantifying the long-term impact is difficult and the short-term impact is nearly impossible to document.
- 2) A.I.D. must re-look at the make up of its professional staff to see if it has the qualifications or access to training so staff can carry out current A.I.D. program functions. The Panel found a mismatch between workforce skills and the workforce's current responsibilities and functions which, unless corrected, will result in a continued excess focus on inputs and internal A.I.D. processes. (The internal processes cited were marshalling A.I.D. documentation and the audit process.) These misplaced priorities, the Panel noted, have taken precedence over implementation of measurable programs. The Agency has technicians hired for their technical skills who are utilizing almost none of their skills while performing tasks, e.g. contract management, without the necessary expertise and minimum training.
- 3) All A.I.D. technicians are serving as contract managers. If A.I.D. is to continue to work primarily through contractors, it must hire or train employees to manage the contract process. A.I.D. does not now manage the process well so as to obtain the end results desired, and the situation will worsen in the future.

- 4) A.I.D. has now a gerontocracy rather than a meritocracy. There is a dearth of new ideas and fresh blood within and coming into the Agency, a reflection, in part at least, of the Panel's conclusion that too many former A.I.D. contractors were being brought on as direct hires. This Board stressed that A.I.D. must recruit and develop employees who can maintain the vitality of the system and that A.I.D. also had to revitalize its recruitment of "non-system" and minority personnel.

Conclusion

Three points stand out from this survey. First, Selection and other Board's observation's mirror very closely the findings of the various personnel studies regarding the absence of an adequate career development system, the shortcomings of A.I.D.'s recruitment and training efforts, the mismatch between much of A.I.D.'s workforce (especially technical specialists,) and A.I.D.'s program priorities now (and even less those of the 1990's), unrealistic career expectations within the Foreign Service, and misunderstood and/or wholly inappropriate bases for assessing performance which will complicate re-orienting USDH Foreign Service Personnel (and likely other workforce components as well) toward new and not-so-new program areas, and serious anticipated problems in motivating A.I.D. personnel.

A second common feature is the long period over which these observations have been repeated by widely different groups of Agency employees serving on Selection, Tenure and Performance Standards Boards. Boards are not allowed to see reports of prior year panels so that the repetition of similar concerns is even more striking. But this observation invariably raises the question of why nothing has been done to address the problems identified.

A third, not so obvious, point is the import the Boards' statements have for the 1990's:

- A career workforce still devoted to the traditional project mode of delivering assistance, largely composed of technical experts whose skills are outmoded, and heavily concentrated numerically in grades FE-OC, FS-1 and 2 is unlikely to be flexible and responsive to new program directions.
- The undervaluing of analytical skills and emphasis on process over product will be serious obstacles to Agency efforts to demonstrate to Congress et al. the development impact of A.I.D. programs. (Based on the Africa Bureau's stress

on demonstrating impact necessitated by the Development Fund for Africa legislation and presumably future legislative changes drawing on the DFA, finding ways to measure and prove impact will be increasingly necessary.)

- If we cannot "retool" technical and other staff, i.e. transfer a whole new set of technical skills to them via A.I.D. training programs, the Agency must at least seek to give them actual skills required, or to upgrade what skills they may have so as to enhance performance of the real work being done, i.e. project and contract management.
- Instituting a responsible and responsive system for recruiting new, entry (not mid-career) level employees, women, and minorities is a sine qua non for meeting current and future staff needs.
- More imagination must be applied and greater use made of hiring mechanisms other than those leading to career status in order to obtain needed skills, especially in technical areas. But by the same token, just what kind of employees and skills are needed in the career workforce need to be carefully defined, and that information used by Agency recruiters.

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APPENDIX C

THE A.I.D. WORKFORCE OF TODAY

A. Summary Findings

A.I.D. has in the past understated its workforce by including only direct hires within it, i.e. 4,534 persons. A.I.D. is heavily reliant on using non direct hire personnel, which fact needs to be reflected in considering the human resources base on which A.I.D. relies. Accordingly, the Workforce Planning Working Group has defined the A.I.D. workforce as being all persons with whom A.I.D. has an employer-employee relationship, i.e., all U.S. (Civil Service and Foreign Service) and Foreign National direct hires (FNDH) and all U.S. and Foreign National Personal Service Contractors (PSC's) in the non-direct hire group, i.e. about 9328 people. The definition excludes persons providing services to A.I.D. or performing functions on A.I.D.'s behalf but who are employed by some other entity--a private firm, university, other U.S.G. agency, etc. Many personnel excluded under this definition are currently included by A.I.D. in data on the non-direct hire category.

Although there are problems with the A.I.D. data which is available, and on which we relied, the Working Group believes the trends which the data indicate are valid. The data problems are most severe in the case of the non-direct hire workforce; for example, data available in AID/W is incomplete and may not be internally consistent; non-direct hire numbers also include persons who fall outside our definition of the workforce.

Many of the Foreign Nationals A.I.D. currently employs under Personal Services Contracts (PSC's) are now being included in figures on the workforce for the first time. They were not previously recognized as part of A.I.D.'s workforce for many years because of their mode of employment, e.g. umbrella Embassy recreation association contracts, even though they were originally FNDH personnel and have consistently carried out the same functions for A.I.D. under different modes of employment (DH, umbrella contract and PSC).

The majority of the data available to us is on U.S. direct hire Civil Service (CS) and Foreign Service (FS) personnel -- the USDH category. Numerically, this group has declined over the last 10 years, to 3,466 persons, while concurrently, A.I.D. appropriations have both risen and fallen and A.I.D. has added new program areas to its plate. A.I.D. has in part accomodated to these program and staffing changes by increasing its reliance on the

non-direct hire workforce, especially overseas, and by greater use, there and in AID/W, of manpower/services contractors in order to obtain staff and/or skills not otherwise available and in order to avoid some of the rigidities and/or complexities in the USDH personnel systems.

Other interesting characteristics of A.I.D.'s USDH, FNDH and non-direct hire workforce are:

- The USDH group is about equally divided between FS and CS -- a persistent feature of the workforce over time.
- About 67% of all USDH are in AID/W, but 75% of the entire workforce, as defined above to include non-DH staff, are in the field.
- 93% of all USDH are tenured, career employees.
- FS personnel are heavily concentrated in the senior grades with the majority (1,258 of 1,786 persons or 70%) in grades FS-2 and above; the CS is distributed more in accord with a traditional, pyramidal fashion.
- The median age of USDH personnel is in the 46-50 years range. The CS cadre is slightly younger.
- On average only 275 tenured USDH leave A.I.D. employment annually. Most FS departees are in the SFS and grades FS 1-2, but departees represent only 8% of all persons in these grades. Most of those retiring have been eligible for retirement nearly five years before they leave.
- The largest backstop code group for all USDH is Program Analysis, but this category represents only 11% of all USDH. The largest FS backstops are Project Development, Agriculture, and Program Analysis while the largest CS categories are Secretarial/Clerical, Administrative Management, and Administrative/Sub-personnel.
- Those backstops (BS) perceived to be strong in analytical skills contain 13% of the FS and 20% of all USDH.
- The fastest growing skills categories as indicated by BS numbers during the 1980's were Executive Personnel, Audit and Inspection, and Legal. Those declining the most were Secretaries, IDI's and Contract Management.
- There is no apparent relationship between changed program priorities, appropriations levels and personnel numbers.

- A.I.D. has a highly educated workforce with 47% having an advanced degree (MA or Ph.D.).
- Judging by principal fields of specialization among A.I.D.'s college degree holders, the majority of USDH personnel are "generalists" rather than technical specialists.
- With limited exceptions few USDH employees have received A.I.D. training in those skills deemed critical by the 83 senior A.I.D. officers interviewed by the Working Group.
- There are serious shortcomings in A.I.D.'s meeting its own EEO objectives. There has been some increase in the numbers of women and minorities promoted into the SFS, but women and minorities remain seriously under represented both at senior levels of the FS and CS and in the Foreign Service overall.
- Membership in the FS is overwhelmingly male and non-minority. Most of the CS workforce is composed of minorities, and it is predominantly female--the reverse image of the FS.
- Use of secretaries/clerks in AID/W presents special problems due to the EEO implications, the poorly understood impact on this group of automation, and special factors in the FS-CS relationship.
- For A.I.D. to make better use of, and to rely more heavily on, Foreign National direct hires and the non-direct hire workforce (as is widely expected to occur), it needs to give greater attention to them, including to issues of pay and benefits, to training, to the responsibilities A.I.D. regulations allow them to have, and to the need to factor in issues of accountability.
- The FNDH and the non direct hire workforce perform many of the same functions in field missions in administrative support, clerical support, financial management and project management. The majority of U.S. PSC's are overwhelmingly involved in project management and far less involved in the other functions. Most FNDH perform financial management functions, but FN PSC's predominate in this area.
- AFR is the largest employer of FN and U.S. PSC's and, thereby, most reliant on non direct hire staff. By contrast, ANE has the most USDH and FNDH personnel. ANE also has the fewest non-DH to DH staff and also the fewest FNDH and non-DH (combined) to USDH personnel of all the regional bureaus.

The Working Group has concluded that A.I.D. does not now carry out workforce planning in any systematic and comprehensive manner. There are some cases where specific offices and PM conduct workforce planning-like exercises, which are limited in scope, in order to serve their own purposes or in response to specific crises.

A.I.D. needs to improve its monitoring of the non-direct hire workforce. Much of this can be done by better, wider circulation of ABS' so that PM receives them; through more regular, consistent preparation and submission to AID/W by field missions of already required mission staffing patterns, and by close collaboration between PM, PPC and the bureaus on developing better guidance to the field on information to be included in the ABS and staffing patterns.

As the USDH workforce is now configured, there are a number of distortions which reflect 1) deficient recruiting practices, 2) "cloning" of previously existing skills in the workforce, 3) failure to relate skills needs to program changes, 4) inattention to EEO issues, 5) periodic hiring freezes, 6) responses to urgent needs for specific types of personnel driven by budget concerns and/or special interest groups, 7) failure to maintain a steady flow of personnel into and through the workforce, 8) some shortcomings in training which are part of the lack of a system for career development, and 9) dealing with human resource management from a short-term, rather than a long-term, perspective. Given the heightened reliance on contractual modes for meeting personnel needs, concerns arise over the adequacy of A.I.D.'s contract management capacity. There are also the issues of A.I.D.'s reliance on Trust Funds to finance a significant share of overseas OE costs and much of the FN staff, both DH and non-DH, and the possible conflict between A.I.D.'s heavy reliance on non-DH contractor personnel in the face of rising concerns over accountability and reducing vulnerability.

B. Who Is the A.I.D. Workforce?

At various times and for various different purposes, A.I.D. has defined the workforce in different ways to suit its ends of the moment:

- Foreign Service and Civil Service (CS).
- FTE and non-FTE's.
- Direct hires, contractors, AD's, PASA/RSSA's, IPA's, JCC's, AAAS', TAAACS.

- Americans and foreign nationals with the latter including both third-country and host-country nationals.
- Personnel on-board vs. positions authorized.
- OE-funded vs. Program-funded vs. Trust Fund-financed personnel.
- Professionals and support staff (blue collar and secretarial/clerical).
- Program Officers, PDO's, Controllers, agriculturalists, and the myriad other Backstop (BS) and/or AOSC categories.
- Technicians and generalists.
- AID/W and "field" Mission staff.

The various groupings are not mutually exclusive and in most cases overlap; however, in some cases a particular descriptive mode may omit large numbers of Agency personnel and thereby understate the workforce. Most often, in replying to Congress or for internal reporting purposes, we tend to characterize the workforce as being solely U.S. and Foreign National direct hires or in terms of FTE's for budget purposes. But sometimes, in dealing with State, for example, the universe is expanded to include personnel employed by institutional, personal services or manpower contractors or grantees with which A.I.D. has contracts or grants for provision of services, such as security and office maintenance, or for implementation of A.I.D. projects. Most often, however, the definition used omits a significant number of A.I.D. employees by restricting the workforce to direct-hires, i.e. Civil Service (CS) and Foreign Service (FS) Americans and foreign national direct-hires (FNDH).

Defining the A.I.D. workforce is also complicated by the lack of data and uneven and inconsistent reporting. The "information gap" is especially true for the non-direct hire workforce, which may now represent 65 percent of the total and which appears from the data to have grown significantly (see Table I). This group includes foreign national and U.S. Personal Services Contractors (PSC's) funded from several sources, but the data available also includes an indeterminate number of manpower/services contractors, RSSA/PASA personnel and persons on detail to A.I.D. who are not employed by A.I.D. even though they perform services for A.I.D. and/or provide staff who carry out various functions on A.I.D.'s behalf. A.I.D. does not hire or fire such people, nor does it have the

other obligations of an employer, i.e. to train, reward performance, reprimand and so on. Given the large size of the non-DH category, for A.I.D. to do workforce planning it will need a better understanding of this employment category, what they do, and the extent of A.I.D.'s reliance on them. (See Section B. 2 below.) Surprisingly, a similar and equally serious data gap exists for foreign national direct-hires.

For information on FNDH's, and FN PSC's PM/PCF receives numbers from missions periodically -- not all of which may be consistent or report the same things. The data is used in the W490 report. The data collection effort mounted by PPC, i.e. "the Nygard exercise," also has some. Prevailing opinion is that both sources have many errors. Mission staffing patterns also have pertinent data, but their content and timeliness vary, and AID/W does not have these from all posts. The Working Group has had to utilize the data available on FNDH as well as non-direct hires from these sources and Annual Budget Submissions (ABS'). While we recognize the problem with the numbers, review of the various sources used, the results of interviews, and the field experience of Working Group members suggest that trends revealed in numbers available are as accurate a representation of reality as is now available.

1. Definition

For purposes of workforce planning and dealing with long-term issues of recruitment, training, career development, promotion, retention, retirement and such, as well as short-term budget concerns, it would seem that the workforce for which the Agency must be responsible is:

- All individuals hired by A.I.D. itself without regard to the mode of employment (DH or PSC) or the source of funding (OE, Trust Funds, or Program), and
- Those paid directly by A.I.D. rather than by an intermediate private firm, organization or other U.S.G. agency, and
- Those who function as staff members of A.I.D. and its field missions, reporting to A.I.D. supervisors, rather than as staff or advisors of other governments or entities.

Put more simply, the A.I.D. workforce is comprised of all those individuals with whom the Agency has an "employer-employee" relationship. The definition per AID/GC of "employer-employee relationship" is:

- A.I.D. has asked an individual to do the work;
- The work is to be performed on A.I.D. property, and
- Negligence on the part of the individual would be A.I.D.'s responsibility."

"Employees" for Working Group purposes, thus, include the following categories: U.S. Direct Hires (USDH) except a small number of experts and consultants whose work is limited in duration, may be periodic rather than continuous, and may be specific to a certain end or task; Foreign Nationals (FN) whether direct hire or PSC; Intergovernmental Personnel Act personnel (IPA's); Joint Career Corps personnel (JCC's), and American Academy for the Advancement of Science Fellows (AAAS'). Some Participating Agency Service Agreement personnel (PASA's), and Resource Support Service Agreement personnel (RSSA's) as well as program-funded PSC's would also be included where their work meets the above criteria. The Agency should adopt this definition.

Non-Personal Services Contractors (NPSC's) meet some but not all of the criteria. In the case of NPSC's, the contract is awarded for a product which A.I.D. needs but which can be produced off-site according to pre-negotiated criteria or specifications. The number of NPSC's is relatively small. For the purposes of workforce planning they are excluded. Employees under institutional and manpower contracts hired to perform maintenance or other services or to implement projects or to provide manpower, i.e., or ADP or security, for example, on A.I.D.'s behalf are outside the definition and are also excluded from the A.I.D. workforce. The Working Group has designated these employees who work for A.I.D. but not in a direct relationship, "as the extended workforce."

During the course of the Working Group's interviews a former head of AID/Personnel reported a court suit brought against A.I.D. by a U.S. PSC claiming retirement benefits under both her DH and PSC status. She had been converted by A.I.D. from USDH to PSC status after marriage to a foreign national and had lost Civil Service Retirement benefits when converted. According to the report received, the U.S. court had found in her favor. We assume the decision was due to the employee-employer relationship existing under both the DH and PSC modes of employment as well as her U.S. citizenship and the circumstances of her case. Given the growing number of U.S. PSC's, this legal precedent might have significance for the Agency in the future.

2. Direct-Hire Americans

a. Number

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Direct-hire Americans, excluding experts and consultants, employed in the Foreign Service and Civil Service in all grades now number 3,466, or 30% of A.I.D.'s total workforce (Table I). The entire A.I.D. workforce of 11,401^{1/} is up 38% from the 1980 figure; since 1980, however, American direct hires have declined both in absolute numbers and as a proportion of the entire workforce (from 49%), even though between FY 1980 and FY 1990 program appropriations rose by 49% (Table II), and A.I.D. added a number of new program areas with staffing requirements.

b. Location

American direct hires (USDH) are about equally divided between FS (54%) and CS (46%) personnel - a relatively constant division throughout the 1980's. About 67% of all USDH are assigned to AID/W, reflecting the location of CS personnel and the assignment of 30% of FS employees (Table III). Equally important, about 75% of A.I.D.'s entire workforce, is located overseas. Within AID/W the S&T and Management Services Bureaus are the largest, followed by ANE and Africa, in that order. Overseas, ANE has the largest number of personnel followed by Africa, which has the most Missions, many of which are smaller than those in other regions.

Given S&T's greater size, one might question from the numbers whether such a concentration of staff there is warranted. Also, while ANE Missions have larger programs than most African countries, the widely accepted belief is that FN's there and in LAC are better educated, more sophisticated and more capable than is true for the majority of African posts. While we would, therefore, have expected to see higher FN numbers in AFR, we would also have expected to see the largest number of USDH assigned to that Bureau due to the greater number of posts and larger number of staff to be supervised. But, ANE with 432 USDH exceeds AFR (404). There is, therefore, a possible misallocation of USDH among the geographic bureaus as well as within AID/W. The Agency needs to review this question further and take appropriate action (see also Section III. B. 3 below).

^{1/}This number, taken from A.I.D. data, is probably high as we believe it may include possibly up to 2000 persons who are manpower and institutional contractors, and who by our definition are not part of A.I.D.'s workforce.

TABLE I

TOTAL A.I.D. WORKFORCE BY LOCATION AND TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT
AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1980, 1985 AND 1990

1980					1985					1990				
AID/W	USDH	FNDH	NON-DH*	TOTAL	AID/W	USDH	FNDH	NON-DH*	TOTAL	AID/W	USDH	FNDH	NON-DH*	TOTAL
OVERSEAS	1,512	1,900	1,917	5,329	OVERSEAS	1,481	1,281	2,903	5,665	OVERSEAS	1,256	1,070	6,308	8,634
TOTAL	4,058	1,900	2,298	8,256	TOTAL	3,623	1,281	3,113	6,017	TOTAL	3,488	1,070	6,843	11,401
<u>BREAKDOWN OF OVERSEAS TOTALS BY REGION</u>					<u>BREAKDOWN OF OVERSEAS TOTALS BY REGION</u>					<u>BREAKDOWN OF OVERSEAS TOTALS BY REGION</u>				
	USDH	FNDH	NON-DH	TOTAL		USDH	FNDH	NON-DH	TOTAL		USDH	FNDH	NON-DH	TOTAL
AFR	460	471	519	1,450	AFR	458	311	545	1,314	AFR	404	250	2,407	3,061
NR EAST	210	262	199	671	ANE	475	556	1,599	2,630	ANE	432	450	2,365	3,247
ASIA	264	553	710	1,527	LATIN AM	349	394	750	1,493	LATIN AM	308	348	1,498	2,154
LATIN AM	286	589	480	1,355	NON-REGNL &					NON-REGNL &	94	22	36	152
NON-REGNL & COMP	292	25	9	326	COMP	199	20	9	228	COMP	18	-	2	20
TOTAL	1,512	1,900	1,917	5,329	TOTAL	1,481	1,281	2,903	5,665	TOTAL	1,256	1,070	6,308	8,634
<u>BREAKDOWN OF AID/W TOTALS</u>					<u>BREAKDOWN OF AID/W TOTALS</u>					<u>BREAKDOWN OF AID/W TOTALS</u>				
	USDH	NON-DH	TOTAL		USDH	NON-DH	TOTAL		USDH	NON-DH	TOTAL			
AFR	217	18	235	AFR	191	15	206	AFR	190	14	204			
NR EAST	146	2	148	ANE	191	5	196	ENE	160	8	168			
ASIA	126	1	127	PRE	49	2	51	A/PRE	85	6	91			
LAC	132	5	137	LAC	125	8	133	LAC	122	6	128			
SUBTOTAL	621	26	647	SUBTOTAL	556	30	586	SUBTOTAL	557	34	591			
PPC	139	53	192	PPC	147	13	160	PPC	129	51	180			
MS	491	-	491	MS	382	66	448	MS	329	260	589			
S&T	383	257	640	S&T	267	82	349	S&T	228	98	326			
FVA	100	23	123	FVA	82	2	84	FVA	81	20	101			
IG	99	1	100	IG	94	-	94	IG	130	8	138			
SUBTOTAL	1,212	334	1,546	SUBTOTAL	972	163	1,135	SUBTOTAL	897	437	1,334			
ALL OTHER	713	21	734	ALL OTHER	614	17	631	ALL OTHER	778	64	842			
TOTAL	2,546	381	2,927	TOTAL	2,142	210	2,352	TOTAL	2,232	535	2,767			

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*Non-Direct Hire category includes U.S. and Foreign National Personal Services Contractors, employees from other U.S. Government agencies, and manpower contractors. Employees from other U.S. Government agencies as well as Manpower Contractors are excluded from the Working Group's definition of the workforce.

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A.I.D. Appropriations and Program Trends, FY 1980-90, (\$000 million)

Bureau/Office	1980				1985				1990			
	DA	ESF	FFP	Total	DA	ESF	FFP	Total	DA	ESF	FFP	Total
Africa	268.0	132.7	270.1	670.8	352.2	417.8	567.3	1,337.3	573.3	13.8	261.3	848.4
ANE	426.6	2,010.2	875.7	3,312.5	493.9	3,837.5	791.7	5,123.1	406.9	2,971.3	657.6	4,035.8
LAC	257.0	15.2	145.5	417.7	507.4	985.0	317.7	1,810.1	349.3	980.3	268.7	1,598.3
S&T	178.1	-	-	178.1	284.9	1.0	-	285.9	321.5	-	-	321.5
FVA	28.0	-	-	28.0	63.6	6.0	-	69.6	58.3	-	-	58.3
PPC	68.5	-	-	68.5	98.2	-	-	98.2	22.6	-	-	22.6
PRE	1.9	-	-	9.9	21.8	-	-	21.8	16.9	-	-	16.9
OFDA	-	-	-	-	28.2	-	-	28.2	-	-	-	-
TDP	3.8	-	-	3.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SCI	-	-	-	-	12.0	-	-	12.0	11.1	-	-	11.1
Other	-	-	-	-	0.1	-	-	0.1	57.0	1/ 21.6	-	78.6
	1,239.9	2,158.1	1,291.3	4,689.3	1,862.3	5,247.3	1,676.7	8,786.3	1,816.9	3,987.0	1,187.6	6,991.5

1/ Includes \$39,000 million in DA and \$18,000 million in ESF deob/reobs and \$2 million in DA for international training.

2/ Includes DFA (\$561.8 million) for Africa and small amounts allocated to Africa from central DA (\$11.5 million).

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TABLE III

U.S. DIRECT HIRES IN AID/W - EXCLUDING EXPERTS AND CONSULTANTS
AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1980, 1985, AND 1990

	1980			*	1985			*	1990				
	ES	CS	TOTAL		ES	CS	TOTAL		ES	CS	TOTAL		
AFR	87	129	216	*	AFR	85	106	191	*	AFR	83	106	189
NR EAST	48	94	142	*	ANE	85	106	191	*	ANE	63	96	159
ASIA	54	72	126	*	PRE	16	31	47	*	A/PRE	21	63	84
LAC	<u>49</u>	<u>81</u>	<u>130</u>	*	LAC	<u>61</u>	<u>63</u>	<u>124</u>	*	LAC	<u>55</u>	<u>67</u>	<u>122</u>
SUBTOTAL	238	376	614	*	SUBTOTAL	247	306	553	*	SUBTOTAL	222	332	554
PPC	25	113	138	*	PPC	27	120	147	*	PPC	20	109	129
MS	44	447	491	*	MS	40	341	381	*	MS	19	304	323
S&T	64	314	378	*	S&T	36	224	260	*	S&T	29	196	225
FVA	21	79	100	*	FVA	21	61	82	*	FVA	17	65	82
IG	<u>36</u>	<u>63</u>	<u>99</u>	*	IG	<u>37</u>	<u>55</u>	<u>92</u>	*	IG	<u>54</u>	<u>75</u>	<u>129</u>
SUBTOTAL	190	1,016	1,206	*	SUBTOTAL	161	801	962	*	SUBTOTAL	139	749	888
ALL OTHER	100	613	713	*	ALL OTHER	98	498	596	*	ALL OTHER	169	597	766
TOTAL	=====	=====	=====	*	TOTAL	=====	=====	=====	*	TOTAL	=====	=====	=====
	528	2,005	*2,533	*		506	1,605	*2,111	*		530	1,678	*2,208
	*PLUS 13 EXP/CONS = 2,546			*	*PLUS 4 PHOs & 27 EXP/CONS = 2,142			*	* 2 PHOs & 22 EXP/CONS = 2,232				

EXP = EXPERT, CONS = CONSULTANT, PHO = PUBLIC HEALTH OFFICER

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c. Career Status

Of the direct-hire workforce 93% are full-time, tenured employees (Table IV), leaving little flexibility for a radical restructuring in the short term within existing personnel ceilings and under current A.I.D. authorities (see further below). The percentages of both CS and FS personnel having tenure is well over 90% in grade levels 1-3 as defined in Table IV. Only 18 FS employees are without tenure in the Level 4 grade group whereas the untenured group in the CS is far larger (145 persons), virtually all of whom are secretaries/clerks.

d. Grade Levels

Among tenured CS and FS personnel 2,142 (66%) fall within the SFS/SES and the FS-3/GS-13 and higher grades (Levels 1-2). (See Tables IV-V.) This concentration is due to the FS grade structure; CS personnel are distributed more in accordance with the more traditional, pyramidal fashion one might assume to exist although their distribution is somewhat skewed toward the lower grades. But only 3% of FS personnel are in the bottom grade grouping compared to 39% of the CS.

A.I.D.'s Senior Foreign Service (SFS) represents 15% (266 persons) of the total FS whereas SES, EX, and GS/AD-16 and above, taken together, comprise only 3% (48) of the CS. (The SFS in State and USIA are only 8%-9% of the FS in each agency.) FS-2's are the largest FS group (537 or 30%) followed closely by FS-1's (455 or 25%). By contrast, GS 13-15's total 567 persons, far smaller than the number at the comparable FS 1-3 grades (1,304).

We assume that CS and FS officers at the same or similar grades perform comparable functions and have similar responsibilities, but from the numbers it appears that A.I.D.'s FS may be overgraded. There are far more jobs having senior-level responsibilities and offering potential for advancement open to FS, who serve both in AID/W and overseas, than there are in AID/W for CS personnel. Also, FS officers supervise the vast majority of the non-direct hire workforce and must monitor performance of institutional and manpower contractors as well as others outside the workforce carrying out work for A.I.D., so that one might conclude that the appearance of FS overgrading might not be the reality. But, the experience of at least one Working Group member recently returned from the field is that PM does not count FN's supervised by field FS officers in deciding on position grades, raising concerns about the number of jobs graded at senior levels and, in turn, the number of persons in senior FS grades. Since 1985, the number of SFS members has declined by 2% compared to an 11% fall in the total FS. Assuming an A.I.D. field workforce of 1256 FS USDH and about 5800 FNDH and non-direct hire staff, a ratio of 1:5 would not be consistent with the FS grade structure.

Table IV

AID EMPLOYEES BY LEVEL AS OF 9/30/90
(EXCLUDES EXPERT/CONSULTANTS & EMPS ON LWOP)

GROUP	ALL EMPLOYEES	FULL TIME TENURED EMPLOYEES
LEVEL 1		
SFS	266 1/	266
SES	34	34
EX	10	10
GS/AD 16+	4	4
SUB TOTAL	314	314
LEVEL 2		
FS 1 - 3	1304 2/	1293
GS/GM/AD 13 - 15	567	535
SUB TOTAL	1871	1828
LEVEL 3		
FS 4 - 5	169	160
GS/AD 9 - 12	405	389
SUB TOTAL	574	549
LEVEL 4		
FS 6 - 9	47	29
GS/AD 1 - 8	660	510
SUB TOTAL	707	539
TOTAL ALL GRADE LEVELS		
FS	3466	3230
CS	1786	1748
	1680	1482

1/ CMs = 13, MCs = 60, OCs = 193
2/ 01s = 455, 02s = 537, 03s = 312

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Table V

AID EMPLOYEES BY AGE, LEVEL AND TYPE OF SERVICE
 EXCLUDING 22 EXPERTS AND CONSULTANTS
 AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1990

AGE RANGE	LEVEL 1		LEVEL 2		LEVEL 3		LEVEL 4		TOTAL		GRAND TOTAL
	CS	FS	CS	FS	CS	FS	CS	FS	CS	FS	
16-25	-	-	-	-	10	-	169	-	179	-	179
26-30	-	-	6	2	50	7	118	3	174	12	186
31-35	1	-	40	44	52	45	67	3	160	92	252
36-40	2	-	76	196	50	48	72	8	200	252	452
41-45	14	32	128	363	79	29	75	6	296	430	726
46-50	13	107	136	365	70	17	56	12	275	501	776
51-55	9	86	83	189	46	15	33	6	171	296	467
56-60	4	27	58	99	26	7	38	5	126	138	264
61-65	4	14	24	45	10	1	19	3	57	63	120
65+	1	-	16	1	12	-	13	1	42	2	44
TOTAL	48	266	567	1,304	405	169	660	47	1,680	1,786	3,466

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LEVEL 1 = SFS AND SES, EX, AND GS/GM-16 AND ABOVE
 LEVEL 2 = FS 3-1 AND GS/GM 13-15
 LEVEL 3 = FS 5-4 AND GS 9-12
 LEVEL 4 = FS 9-6 AND GS 1-8

There are at the time of this writing 2,103 authorized SFS and FS positions of which only 1,787 are filled. Of these 967 are established for the SFS, FS-1 and FS-2 grades and 887 are occupied. There is obviously a significant difference between the number of jobs and of people to fill them and between the number of jobs filled and of people at the job's grade level:

	<u>No. Jobs Auth.</u>	<u>No. Jobs Filled</u>	<u>No. People in Grade</u>
SFS	367	344	266
FS-1	600	543	455
FS-2	835	681	537

Many, if not the great majority, of the "vacancies" are not under active recruitment and have not been for years. An unknown number of these excess jobs have been filled from the FNDH and/or non-DH ranks while others are not needed at all. Culling out the "no longer needed" from the listing of authorized positions has not been done, but it should be done so that AID/W and the field can have in the first instance a better grasp of just what positions, and the skills thereto, are essential. Secondly, the culling process if related to jobs FN's and U.S. PSC's are doing, or have done since the positions became vacant, should provide a better fix on where and to what extent FNDH and non-direct hire personnel have replaced, or substituted for, USDH.

Reviewing data on jobs filled, we learned that 52% or 923 jobs are occupied by persons with the same grade while the incumbents in 11% of the positions (190) have higher grades. In 38% of the cases jobs (674) are filled by employees with lower grades. These phenomena are most evident for the more senior grades as seen below:

	<u>No. Jobs Filled</u>	<u>Emps With Same Grade</u>	<u>Emps With Lower Grade</u>	<u>Emps With Higher Grade</u>
SFS	344	222	122	NA
FS-1	543	264	241	38
FS-2	681	302	255	124

This pattern raises a number of disturbing questions:

- With 11% of all FS jobs occupied by persons having a higher personal grade, does this suggest 11% of A.I.D.'s senior level people are overgraded?
- Does A.I.D. require all these senior-graded jobs?

-- Is it really necessary for 38% of all jobs filled to be occupied by persons of lower rank; how does this contribute to unrealistic career expectations and, possibly, to overgrading in the FS; what is the representation of women and minorities in the 38% (see section III.B.2.e, below); does this heavy reliance on lower graded persons to fill senior jobs -- 35% of all SFS positions, 44% of FS-1 slots and 35% of FS-2 jobs -- indicate A.I.D. is assigning responsibilities to persons before they are adequately prepared with the resultant heightened vulnerability in financial, administrative and executive management? FYI, one SFS technical position is occupied by an FS-3, and we know of an FS-1 graded Executive Officer slot to which an FS-4, IDI graduate was assigned. End FYI.

Whatever reason or reasons underlie the FS grade phenomena, it is clear that something is seriously wrong, but whether it is the grade structure, the job classification system, job numbers, A.I.D. organizational structure, or some combination of all these, we cannot determine from the data alone. We understand that all SFS jobs are graded by A.I.D. position classifiers as the equivalent of GS-15, reflecting the equivalency of that CS grade with the former FS-2 rank under the old grade system existing before the SFS was established ^{1/}. We have already mentioned omission of supervision of FN's from job classification decisions. Certainly, these "distortions" are a factor complicating the picture even further.

Finally, it still is disturbing to see so many FS personnel concentrated in the upper ranks and so few, relatively, in the "pipeline" below them. Those now outside the SFS face the clear prospect of having their career paths blocked by the large number of people more senior to them given age and attrition considerations set out below.

Based on repeated comments by FS Selection Boards since 1985, FS members have unrealistically high career expectations. They also have serious misperceptions regarding the terminal grade to be achieved in a normal career and regarding prospects for entry into the SFS. Several Boards have also expressed concern over too rapid

^{1/} Under the old FS grade system, FSR-2 (now FE-OC) equated to GS-15, the highest mid-level management grade. When the FS grade structure was revised, the intent was that SFS and SES jobs would be equivalent positions. Most AID/W Office Director jobs are now for FE-OC (Counselor) personnel while they are occupied by GS-15's. A decision in recent times to classify all SFS jobs as "FE" means in effect, that implementation has moved away from intent and that all SFS jobs, certainly in AID/W, equate to GS-15.

promotions within the FS and SFS and recommended longer time periods between promotions, a recommendation also made by the Thomas Commission set up to review the entire Foreign Service system in 1989. Unsatisfied expectations, even when unrealistic, can be a source of personnel discontent just as disparities in grade levels and job opportunities can be sources of tension between the CS and FS in AID/W.

The issue of the FS grade structure, and, thereby, A.I.D.'s overall grade structure merit further investigation since the picture resulting from data available is contradictory on whether or not the FS is overgraded. In future, too, evolution of Mission size and composition will bear on field staff numbers and responsibilities. Smaller missions, composed only of USDH managers and supervisors of FNDH and non-DH personnel, i.e., USDH "chiefs," may necessitate having a more senior-level workforce as well as fewer opportunities for providing adequate training and supervision for junior USDH personnel.

The Agency should consider grade levels together with the implications of smaller Missions, a smaller USDH workforce, proposals for re-instituting entry-level hiring and the IDI program, and greater reliance on the FNDH and non-direct hire personnel before making decisions on each of these issues. Together, they also raise questions on future A.I.D. organization and structure as well as issues on future composition and structure of the workforce.

e. Women and Minorities

AFSA wrote Congress last October 18 expressing deep concern over A.I.D.'s apparent lack of commitment to providing equal employment opportunity for women and minorities and A.I.D.'s failure to integrate EEO goals with overall workforce recruitment, assignment and promotion processes. Annually since 1985 both Selection Board and Tenure panels have cited in their reports to the Director of Personnel the paucity of minorities, especially Black men, and women within the Foreign Service workforce and, accordingly, the dearth of qualified candidates from within these groups for the panels to consider.

The imposition of hiring freezes almost annually and A.I.D.'s deficient recruitment practices have reduced intake of these groups. AFSA included in its letter data showing only 22% of FS new hires in FY 1989 were women. All were reportedly hired at grades FS-2 and below with the largest number of female new hires coming on board at grades FS 3, 4 and 5. According to AFSA, males outnumbered females 69 to 20; most (59) were hired in FS grades 2-4, and seven were brought on as SFS and FS-1's. (AFSA's numbers are not consistent with Table IX [later in the text] on total entrants to the workforce, but we have no reason to dispute the general picture given here [based on a check with AID/EOP].

None of the 85 senior A.I.D. officers we interviewed saw EEO requirements as a barrier to achieving A.I.D. objectives, which is encouraging; but only a few cited this as an area to which A.I.D. must give attention, a finding which is disturbing. While we are aware of some effort in the past to heighten A.I.D.'s sensitivity to EEO concerns re women and minorities, apparently the effort has neither been sustained nor institutionalized. Given the findings cited later on training attendance, problems with A.I.D. recruitment and material presented below (taken from A.I.D. sources), it seems safe to conclude that EEO considerations may receive the greatest attention from FS Selection Boards.

The Thomas Commission to review the overall Foreign Service personnel system was mandated by the 1988-89 Foreign Affairs Authorization Act. In considering the overall mission of the FS this group took as its starting point the 1980 Foreign Service Act which states, among other things, that the members of the service should be representative of the American people, aware of the principles and history of the U.S. and informed of concerns and trends in American life. The Administrator's "Equal Employment Opportunity and Affirmative Action" statement issued March 20, 1988, states, "Full equality of opportunity within A.I.D. is essential if we are to carry out our development agendas. An A.I.D. workforce that truly represents America's diversity is an asset beyond measure." It goes on to set the following six EEO goals for A.I.D.

- "Integrating affirmative action into ... (a) programs of recruitment and hiring (b) opportunities for promotion, training and development (c) reassignment (d) transfer (e) compensation and benefits and (f) separation.
- "Designing recruitment activities to reach qualified candidates from all segments of our population.
- "Developing programs that assure men and women of all racial and ethnic backgrounds a fair opportunity to serve in positions where they can make a maximum contribution to the Agency.
- "Implementing training programs that give all employees the opportunity to gain skills that will enable them to compete for higher level positions.
- "Incorporating equal employment efforts and affirmative action results into every manager's daily agenda... and
- "Determining ... annual performance raises and bonuses based on assessment of individual equal employment opportunity and affirmative action results."

These remain A.I.D.'s EEO policy targets according to AID/EOP.

Besides recommending institution of a long-range personnel planning capacity and establishment of a fully automated personnel system, the Thomas Commission noted continuing difficulties in recruiting adequate numbers of Blacks with the recruitment process discouraging minorities, women and younger employees. These findings apply to A.I.D. as well as to the other FS agencies.

Within A.I.D. EEO issues are manifest in at least four ways: 1) The overall problems of representation of women and minorities within the workforce; 2) issues of promotion and advancement to senior positions for women and minorities; 3) the problems within AID/W regarding use and supervision of the secretarial/clerical workforce group, which the November 1988 A.I.D. study of the FS and CS recruitment system named as one of A.I.D.'s largest human resource management problems, and 4) the lack of attention historically to the FN workforce. This fourth aspect is discussed elsewhere in this Annex so that we focus here on the other three points.

1) Representation of Women and Minorities

AID/EOP provided the Working Group with data from its records for 1985, 1988, 1989 and 1990 on numbers of women and minorities in A.I.D.'s workforce. A.I.D.'s automated personnel system contains such data, but due to OPM restrictions and current A.I.D. policy, only AID/EOP can access data on minorities. We urge that A.I.D. circulate EEO data more widely and routinely to A.I.D. managers and also that data collection, maintenance, and circulation on women and minorities be made the responsibility of workforce planning and the unit to be named as responsible for carrying it out. This should free up some staff resources within AID/EOP, which may now be insufficient to the task they face, for use on other EEO issues. Doing so will require a revision in A.I.D. policy.

Table VI demonstrates that the FS and CS workforces are almost reverse images of each other. The FS is overwhelmingly male (79%) and non-minority (85%). Non-minority males predominate (68%) within the FS. Minorities (Blacks, Hispanics, Asian Americans and Native Americans) constitute only 15%, and all women, (minority and non-minority), 21%, of the FS. The CS, by contrast, is about equally divided between non-minorities (49%) and minorities (51%) with the latter slightly in the majority. Women predominate making up 67% of the Civil Service and with minority females constituting the largest single group (42%). Minority males are the smallest group (9%) in the CS while minority females are the smallest portion of the FS (4.5%).

T. VI

Table VI

Women and Minorities
as a Percentage of FS and GS

	<u>Non-Minorities</u>				<u>Minorities</u>			
	<u>Males</u>		<u>Females</u>		<u>Males</u>		<u>Females</u>	
	<u>FS</u>	<u>GS</u>	<u>FS</u>	<u>GS</u>	<u>FS</u>	<u>GS</u>	<u>FS</u>	<u>GS</u>
1985	71.3	27.2	15.1	24.7	9.8	9.6	3.9	38.6
1988	69.4	25.7	15.9	23.7	10.1	10.1	3.6	40.6
1989	69.1	24.7	16.0	24.3	10.4	9.6	4.5	41.3
1990	68.4	23.9	16.6	24.7	10.5	9.4	4.5	42.0

Note: The FS columns all add to 100% as do all the GS columns.

The percentages of both women and minorities in the FS are far below their representation (about 50% and 20%, respectively) in the U.S. population en toto. Furthermore the representation of women and minorities in the FS has remained virtually stagnant during 1985-90 despite the 10% decline in the number of total FS direct hires. There has been a miniscule decrease in non-minority males (3%) and correspondingly insignificant increases in the presence of women (2%) and minorities (1%).

As there is no breakdown in the available data on FNDH and non-direct hire female employees, we cannot demonstrate whether the representation of women and minorities among U.S. PSC's is roughly in accord, or not, with their presence in the U.S. workforce, or in the case of foreign nationals, whether the presence of women is in accord with their countries' populations or the prevailing workforce profiles there. We assume that FN's employed by each Mission are nationals of that country so that "minority" considerations do not apply except maybe in possibly "unique" cases, e.g., South Africa. We believe Agency EEO principles apply to the entire workforce to the degree foreign country situations allow.

2) Promotion and Advancement

Although the SFS remained relatively stable in size between 1985-1990 (271 members then versus 266 now) the number of women SFS members has risen from 13 to 22, or from 4% to 8% of the SFS. The Counselor grade has the largest absolute number of women (14), representing 14% of the class. One of the 12 Career Ministers at the time of this writing is female, and 6 of 60 Minister-Counselors are women. (See Table VII.A.) Changes in minority membership in the SFS parallel that of women. Since 1985 the number of minorities in the SFS has increased from 19 to 25 with one minority male Career Minister and six minority (one a female) Minister-Counselors. There are now 18 minority Counselors, including three women. The four minority women in the SFS compare to 18 non-minority women.

However, despite these signs of progress males still make up 92% of the SFS, and non-minority males as a group predominate (84%). These figures far exceed the proportionate share all males and non-minority males have in the total FS and the USDH workforce as a whole.

Regrettably, the picture in the FS (grades 1-9) is not much better so that the prospect for significant change in composition of the SFS toward greater representation of women and minorities is very limited. Non-minorities are 84% of all persons in FS grades 1-9; males are 77%. Minority males constitute only 11% -- about half the representation of women. Although the largest absolute

Table VII A.

Representation of Women and Minorities
in the A.I.D. Foreign Service Workforce (FTE) by Grade
and for Selected Years

	1985						1988						1989						1990						
	Non-Minor.		Minor.		Total		Non-Minor.		Minor.		Total		Non-Minor.		Minor.		Total		Non-Minor.		Minor.		Total		
	M	E	M	E	M	E	M	E	M	E	M	E	M	E	M	E	M	E	M	E	M	E	M	E	
FA	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
CH	7	-	2	-	9	-	11	3	1	12	3	10	2	1	11	2	10	2	1	11	2	11	2	-	
MC	52	7	5	-	57	7	55	5	5	60	5	53	5	6	-	59	5	49	5	5	1	54	6	6	
CC	180	5	11	1	191	6	173	9	17	190	10	166	10	15	1	181	11	164	11	15	3	179	14	15	
SFS	240	12	18	1	258	13	239	17	23	262	18	229	17	22	1	251	18	223	18	21	4	244	22	22	
Totl																									
01	467	32	52	4	519	36	387	46	38	425	54	372	47	43	10	415	57	348	51	45	7	393	58	58	
02	448	76	78	20	526	96	393	75	65	458	96	382	74	65	22	447	96	370	77	66	22	436	99	99	
03	163	58	26	11	189	69	180	61	46	226	70	182	61	41	7	223	68	193	65	38	11	231	76	76	
04	49	36	10	8	59	44	51	42	9	60	58	53	47	13	15	66	62	52	49	12	13	64	62	62	
05	24	41	5	8	29	49	14	25	1	15	37	15	21	2	11	17	32	9	15	1	9	10	24	24	
06	-	36	1	15	1	51	2	17	1	11	3	2	13	-	10	2	23	1	11	-	10	1	21	21	
07	-	2	1	7	1	10	-	5	1	2	1	7	5	-	1	-	6	-	5	-	-	-	5	5	
08	-	1	-	1	-	2	-	1	-	2	3	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	2
09	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	-	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
FS	1151	282	173	75	1324	357	1027	272	161	1188	355	1006	268	164	79	1170	347	973	273	162	74	1135	347	347	
FS+																									
SFS	1,391	294	191	76	1582	370	1266	289	184	1450	373	1235	285	186	80	1421	365	1196	291	183	78	1379	369	369	

T. VII A

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numbers of minority and female FS members are in the FS-2 grade, they still are only 16% and 19% of all FS-2's. Minorities represent 12% and women, 13%, of all those in FS-1, the "threshold" for entry into the SFS.

Traditionally, those in BS-2 and 94 are perceived to have an advantage over other backstops in advancing to senior rank and higher positions within the FS. Whether "this common wisdom" is true, or not, women make up 26% of BS-2 and 22% of BS-94 while minorities are 19% and 14% respectively (Table VII.B). Similarly, these two groups are very under-represented in backstops reflecting the new program initiatives and economic/sectoral reform.

Minorities are most often in BS-2, 94, 10 and 8 while women are most often in BS-2, 94, 50 (Health), 5 (Secretaries) and 12 (Program Management). One-third of A.I.D.'s female FS members are categorized as BS-5, 50, 7 and 3 -- all of which are either traditionally considered as women's fields (secretarial and health) or are in those functional areas (administrative/subprofessional or administrative management) to which women have moved as a result of training or upward mobility programs. See Table XVII.B on FS by backstop.

The facts that Civil Service promotions are tied to job grades, the CS has a more nearly pyramidal grade structure, and the heavily female and minority composition of the CS workforce might lead one to assume that problems of advancement and promotion might be less serious in the Civil Service. But this is not the case per data in Tables VIII. A-B.

BS-1 (Executive Direction) has five minority numbers and seven women in its total of 25. This contrasts quite dramatically with BS-5 (Secretaries/Clerks) whose 300 CS female members are one-third of the total 913 females in the CS and 22% of all CS personnel. Minorities, without regard to gender, tend to be most frequently assigned to BS-5 (240) followed by BS-7 (Administrative/Subprofessional, 165) and BS-3 (Administrative Management, 100). Women tend to concentrate in the same backstops. This suggests that non-minorities prevail in the white collar and/or professional jobs and minorities and women, in the less prestigious positions.

Non-minority males (only 24% of the CS) still represent 74% of the SES and 51% of those in grades GS 13-15. Women are only 21% of the SES and 30% of those at the GS 13-15 level. Minority males constitute only 6% of the SES and 9% of the GS 13-15's, and minority females make up 3% of the SES and 11% of the GS 13-15's. Therefore, we conclude that minorities, especially minority males, are seriously under-represented and disadvantaged in the Civil Service as well as the Foreign Service.

T. VII B

TABLE VII-B

AID FOREIGN SERVICE, FULL TIME PERMANENT, AS OF 09/30/90
BY BACKSTOP

BACKSTOP	NON-MINORITY		MINORITY		TOTAL		TOTAL
	M	F	M	F	M	F	
00 NOT CODED	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
01 EXECUTIVE PERSONNEL	130	15	11	3	141	18	159
02 PROGRAM ANALYSIS	114	32	20	14	134	46	180
03 ADM. MGMT.	57	23	9	5	66	28	94
04 FINAN. MGMT	86	12	12	6	98	18	116
05 SEC. & CLERICAL	0	26	0	12	0	38	38
06 GENERAL SERVICES	3	0	2	1	5	1	6
07 ADM. SUBPROF.	1	8	0	8	1	16	17
08 AUDIT AND INSPECTION	109	8	22	1	131	9	140
10 AGRICULTURE	148	8	22	3	170	11	181
11 ECONOMISTS	47	5	7	1	54	6	60
12 PROGRAM MGT.	64	23	12	4	76	27	103
14 RURAL DEVELOPMENT	16	2	1	0	17	2	19
15 FOOD FOR PEACE	31	2	3	0	34	2	36
20 HOUSING URBAN COMM DEV.	23	6	2	0	25	6	31
21 BUS. INDUS. & PRIV. SECT.	30	2	2	1	32	3	35
25 ENGINEERING	30	0	7	0	37	0	37
30 NAT. RES & ENERGY	6	1	3	0	9	1	10
50 HEALTH, POP, & NUTR	51	38	8	2	59	40	99
60 HUMAN RES./ED. /PART. TRNG.	31	10	4	1	35	11	46
72 SOCIAL SCIENCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
75 PHYS. & SOC. SCI.	4	0	0	0	4	0	4
85 LEGAL	18	7	5	4	23	11	34
92 PROCUREMENT & PROP. DISP.	15	1	1	2	16	3	19
93 CONTRACT MGT.	28	9	4	1	32	10	42
94 CAPITAL PROJECTS/ & DEV. LOANS							
95 IDI							

TOTAL

T. VIII B

TABLE VIII-B

AID CIVIL SERVICE, FULL-TIME PERMANENT
AS OF 09/30/85
BY BACKSTOP

BACKSTOP	NON-MINORITY		MINORITY		TOTAL		TOTAL
	M	F	M	F	M	F	
00 NOT CODED	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
01 EXECUTIVE PERSONNEL	18	4	3	1	21	5	26
02 PROGRAM ANALYSIS	57	44	10	25	67	69	136
03 ADM. MGMT.	45	52	16	52	61	104	165
04 FINAN. MGMT.	31	6	8	18	39	24	63
05 SEC. & CLERICAL	3	100	3	206	6	306	312
06 GENERAL SERVICES	2	2	2	3	4	5	9
07 ADM. SUPPORT	11	42	46	126	57	168	225
08 AUDIT AND INSPECTION	14	0	3	3	17	3	20
10 AGRICULTURE	16	1	3	0	19	1	20
11 ECONOMIST	11	3	2	1	13	4	17
12 PROGRAM MGT.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
14 RURAL DEVELOPMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
15 FOOD FOR PEACE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
20 HOUSING, URBAN COMM. DEV.	2	0	0	0	2	0	2
21 BUS. INDUS. & PRIV. SECT.	23	4	3	7	26	11	37
25 ENGINEERS	5	0	1	0	6	0	6
30 NAT. RES & ENERGY	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
50 HEALTH, POP. & NUTR.	11	3	0	0	11	3	14
60 HUMAN RES./ED./PART. TRNG.	17	7	2	9	19	16	35
72 SOCIAL SCIENCE	3	2	0	1	3	3	6
75 PHYS. & SOC. SCI.	13	10	1	3	14	13	27
85 LEGAL	16	6	1	1	17	7	24
92 PROCUREMENT & PROP. DISP.	6	3	8	10	14	13	27
93 CONTRACT MGT.	24	11	3	7	27	18	45
94 CAPITAL PROJECTS/DEV. LOANS	5	3	3	1	8	4	12
95 IDI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	334	303	118	474	452	777	1229

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3) Supervision of Secretaries/Clerks

From data given above on composition of the CS workforce, it should be clear why work place problems or issues affecting this group can have an EEO dimension whether or not the cause is directly EEO related. We have raised elsewhere some questions regarding the impact of automation on secretarial/clerical personnel and the perception that this BS now has surplus people as a result. According to PM, A.I.D. has a deficit in its secretarial cadre. We do not doubt word processing has changed secretarial job content as the Bollinger Report says, but how, and what they do now is not recognized or understood. We do not believe that the response to such changes is as simple as a mere reduction in numbers. We also doubt that such changes have been reflected in standard position descriptions and position grades. And, finally, there is the fact supervisors may not always give secretarial staff credit for being just as "stretchable" as other personnel or for being able to do more than they do now, per the assertion of one interviewee.

The 1988 report for the DA/AID, "Assessment of the Foreign Service and Civil Service Recruitment Systems," concluded with regard to this workforce group, "The serious lack of qualified CS secretaries is one of our largest human resources management problems. Along with other federal agencies, A.I.D. finds it harder to compete with other employers. It needs a comprehensive outreach plan, tighter screening of CS secretarial applicants, active and creative efforts to improve non-compensation aspects of our secretarial positions that affect job satisfaction and retention, and some motivational techniques (e.g., an employee referral cash incentive program)."

The Recruitment Report found also that under-representation of women and minorities continued to be a serious problem in professional positions and recommended more diverse representation on Technical Review Committees, more outreach recruitment efforts, and better coordination between AID/EOP and PM recruitment staff.

In one Working Group interview with senior PM/CSP personnel, the interviewers were told of serious problems:

- a. In the way FS supervisors treat CS secretarial personnel.
- b. In the major disjunct between career development expectations among this group and the reality which A.I.D. offers; to wit, secretaries are in dead-end jobs and very frustrated by this fact.

The above-cited report confirms these problems exist and also identifies some others (pages 12-17):

- a. Lack of any strategy for recruiting secretarial personnel despite serious shortages of qualified CS applicants and numerous, long-term vacancies.
- b. Minimal qualifications and poor technical, language, telephone and human relations skills as well as serious work ethic shortcomings among new hires, with resulting, serious frustration among their supervisors
- c. Indications that large numbers of qualified CS secretaries were leaving A.I.D. positions due to their unreasonable expectations regarding pay and grade prospects and the poor attitudes of supervisory and managerial personnel.
- d. Loss of good FS and CS candidates due to the lengthy period required for security clearances.

Foreign Service secretarial personnel face a slightly different set of issues, according to the above report. One is the time required to bring them on board and another, complicating the first, is the question of availability of assignments in the field or AID/W suitable to their skills, experience and interest. In the field an FS secretary now is the only USDH BS-5 at post and actual work done includes C&R, FN supervision and training, management of ADP systems, handling of classified materials, office management, timekeeping, etc. responsibilities in addition to the usual secretarial duties of typing, filing telephone answering, shorthand and/or dictation, and keeping "the Boss's" calendar. Their experience overseas may color their perceptions and working relations with CS secretaries in AID/W leading to creation of serious tensions. Extremely limited promotions and chances for advancement also affect FS secretaries -- a fact lamented by Selection Boards in 1986, 1989 and 1990. One of these Boards characterized the FS secretaries as "the backbone of Missions in which they serve," yet A.I.D. no longer offers any upward mobility training.

As recommended earlier, A.I.D. needs to gain a better understanding of the effect of ADP on secretarial/clerical personnel and how their jobs are evolving. Resolving some of the other problems can be part of efforts to improve recruitment, to implement workforce planning, and to address training and career development concerns. But, it seems that there also needs to be greater sensitization of supervisors and FS personnel to the EEO issues which come into play in AID/W and more deliberate training in supervisory skills for those (both CS and FS) who are supervisors, especially in AID/W.

4) Conclusions and Recommendations on EEO Issues

A.I.D. has a major EEO problem to which it has given inadequate attention for too long and which makes the Agency vulnerable to Congressional and legal action. While in part the situation regarding women and minorities reflects overall recruitment shortcomings affecting the totality of the workforce, the EEO situation also has many aspects separate from recruitment which A.I.D. can and should begin to address immediately:

- a) Whether or not A.I.D. reforms its overall recruitment effort as urged by this Working Group, it must initiate more pro-active, continuous, and speeded up recruitment of women and minorities for the Foreign Service but also for Civil Service secretaries and minority males. Female and minority employees should be utilized as recruiters along with PM/RS staff on trips to secretarial training facilities in and around the Washington area, to HBCU's, to other universities, to annual meetings of professional associations, and to cities having large concentrations of particular minority groups, such as Miami for Hispanics. Recruiters need to be briefed/trained so that their presentations are honest about opportunities for advancement for secretarial personnel. The recruitment and hiring process must ensure that persons newly hired are not assigned to backstops based on sex or race and as a result find themselves disadvantaged over time with regard to advancement.
- b) Orientation and/or new entry training for all new employees needs to be revised along lines suggested by the 1988 recruitment report cited earlier and the 1989 training assessment done for PM.
- c) The socio-cultural and work ethic differences which were identified by the recruitment study and raised in some interviews and which exist between FS personnel (both officers and secretaries) and CS secretaries are a major cause of frustration and friction among and between both groups. A.I.D. must develop a program to sensitize FS supervisors to the problem; to give them means for dealing with performance shortcomings; and to instill in them a better grasp of changes in U.S. culture, of workforce attitudes and of the differences from their overseas experience and from their own expectations on return from prolonged time in the field. At the minimum, a required one-to-two day orientation of returning FS officers and secretaries having supervisory responsibilities in their new AID/W assignments could be conducted in September.

(Most FS personnel transfer during the Summer between school terms so that a September session would occur early in new assignments. A second session early in each calendar year could catch those FS supervisors missing the earlier one.)

- d) A.I.D. should review the possibilities for re-starting upward mobility programs for training secretarial personnel in fields which offer prospects for advancement beyond secretarial/clerical work and which would benefit those FS and CS secretaries demonstrating interest and potential.
- e) As part of a more concentrated effort at development for all personnel, A.I.D. should give more attention to training requirements for FS and CS secretaries to enhance their performance. It should be especially alert to courses which A.I.D. already offers and to new ones for which a need now exists. PM should reach out to identify those individuals who could benefit and ensure their attendance. The PM Career Development Officers, PM/CSP and PM/TD should jointly undertake this initiative.
- f) Selection and Tenure Boards should continue to look for promotable FS women and minorities, recognizing that any significant improvement in representation of these groups within the more senior grades (FS-1 and the SFS) will only come over the long term and as a result of an increase in recruitment of women and minorities into the FS. Where these Boards and Performance Standards Boards find cases of women and minorities as well as non-minorities needing training to correct performance shortcomings, or to enable these individuals to become more competitive, they should recommend training in letters sent by the Board simultaneously to the employees, to their supervisors, the pertinent Career Development Officers, and to PM/TD for follow-up action.

f. Age Factors

From Table V it appears that the combined CS and FS-USDH workforce is largely middle-aged with the median age between 46-50. The largest number of USDH staff (797) are in this age cohort. The FS segment mirrors this pattern, having a median age in the 46-50 range and the largest number of FS employees (501) in that same group. CS personnel are somewhat younger, having a median age of 41-45, which is the group where the largest number of employees are found. There are only 42 CS members aged 65 and over, compared to 203 persons in the FS who are 55 years old and over and within 10 years of retirement.

SFS personnel have the same median age, even though it ought, in the expected course of events, to be more "senior" in age as well as rank. With over half of the SFS aged 50 and below, one must ask a) what career opportunities, rewards and satisfactions A.I.D. can offer SFS members in future, and b) what are the implications for advancement for those outside the SFS and for women and minorities, given low attrition and prospects for a reduced USDH workforce (and thereby a smaller SFS) in future. These concerns have been raised by past SFS Selection Boards as well. The senior CS ranks also have some relatively "young" members with 30 of the 48 persons aged 50 or younger.

Table IX reinforces these FS grade and age-level concerns. Since 1985 the majority (317) of all new entrants to the FS (581) have been hired at grades 3 and above, and the average age at entrance for all new employees is 39.6 years. A 1990 Selection Board lamented the dearth of "new blood" and fresh ideas coming into the FS. There seems to be valid cause for the Board's concern.

g. Attrition

On average only 275 tenured FS and CS direct hires have left A.I.D. employment annually over the last three years (Table X) due to retirement, resignation or other reasons. Nearly half of those separating are in the "Level 2" grade category.

Over the last three years attrition has been heaviest, per Table XI, taking tenured and non-tenured staff together, in the administrative management, administrative support and secretarial/clerical backstops. (The large number in the last named group reflects the high one-third annual turnover rate among CS, untenured secretarial/clerical personnel which is the largest (numerically) single category of departures.)

Within the FS the largest numbers of personnel departing A.I.D. are in the Backstops for Executive Direction (1), Program Analysis (2), Secretaries (5), Financial Management (4), Economist (11), Agriculture (10), Program Management (12), Audit (8), and Administrative Management (3). Losses in BS 1, 2, 10, 11, and 12 may have some negative impact on implementing the new program directions while those in BS 4 may affect A.I.D. efforts to address accountability and financial vulnerability concerns.

Notably, the number of employees eligible to retire in any one year far exceeds the number who actually do leave (Table XII). A PM review concluded that there were no backstops from which individuals chose to retire

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T. X

ATTRITION OF AID EMPLOYEES FYS 88, 89 AND 90
EXCLUDING EXPERT/CONSULTANTS

		ALL EMPLOYEES		TENURED EMPLOYEES	
		THREE-YEAR TOTAL	YEARLY AVERAGE	THREE-YEAR TOTAL	YEARLY AVERAGE
LEVEL 1					
SES		11	4	10	3
SFS		84	28	84	28
EX		6	2	6	2
GS/AD 16+		3	1	3	1
SUB TOTAL		104	35	103	34
LEVEL 2					
FS	1 - 3	236	79	224	75
GS/GM/AD	13 - 15	158	53	141	47
SUB TOTAL		394	131	365	122
LEVEL 3					
FS	4 - 5	46	15	35	12
GS/AD	9 - 12	111	37	82	27
SUB TOTAL		157	52	117	39
LEVEL 4					
FS	6 - 9	49	16	13	4
GS/AD	1 - 8	637	212	228	76
SUB TOTAL		686	228	241	80
GRAND TOTAL		1341	447	826	275

8348z

T. XII

Table XII

RETIREMENT ELIGIBILITY OF AID EMPLOYEES
 COMPARED WITH ACTUAL RETIREMENT AND OTHER SEPARATION
 IN FY 1990
 EXCLUDING EXPERT/CONSULTANTS

		EMPLOYEES ELIGIBLE TO RETIRE IN FY 1990	ACTUAL RETIREMENTS FY 1990	OTHER SEPARATIONS FY 1990
LEVEL 1				
SES		5	1	3
SFS		127	19	3
EX		0	0	1
GS/AD 16+		0	0	1
SUB TOTAL		132	20	8
LEVEL 2				
FS	1 - 3	258	49	23
GS/GM/AD	13 - 15	64	14	41
SUB TOTAL		322	63	64
LEVEL 3				
FS	4 - 5	21	4	12
GS/AD	9 - 12	45	14	21
SUB TOTAL		66	18	33
LEVEL 4				
FS	6 - 9	8	0	0
GS/AD	1 - 8	42	15	111
SUB TOTAL		50	15	111
GRAND TOTAL				
		570	116	216

8399z

· significantly earlier than others, but those in BS' 94, (Project Development), 10, 4, 21 (Private Sector), 11, 25 (Engineering) and 20 (Housing) tended to leave slightly earlier. The review, done in March 1990, also found that personnel retire from A.I.D. almost five years, i.e. 58 months, after reaching eligibility. Given this fact and the age factors cited earlier, A.I.D. cannot rely on retirements as a means for bringing about a rapid, major restructuring of the American direct-hire workforce or as a means to enable the hiring of many new persons in "skills short" fields. We assume the 1991 senior executive pay raise for USG personnel may result in delayed retirements as candidates seek to maximize their "high threes." However, A.I.D. might seek authorities to encourage eligible individuals to retire sooner, so as to facilitate workforce change in the short term if it decides it must hire as USDH a large number of personnel with expertise in the new program initiatives, or to staff programs in natural resources/environment, or to cover staff shortfalls in those BS' where these can be identified and are deemed critical to ongoing operations, or to resume IDI recruitment, or to restructure the workforce to meet the needs of the future. Under current ceilings and OE realities there is little, if any, latitude for new hiring at present.

We reviewed the data for evidence of a heavy loss of A.I.D.'s most senior, experienced personnel with a consequent adverse impact on A.I.D.'s supervisory and senior-level, mid-level management capabilities. On average 103 SFS, FS 1-3's have left A.I.D. each year over the last three years (Only 28 SFS members are in that total figure, or about 10% of the SFS). While the senior group contributes 37% of the total average number leaving, it represents only 7% of all FS personnel at these grades. Also, retirees from A.I.D.'s Foreign Service in FY 1990 totaled 76 (and separations for other reasons, 38) compared to the 385 persons eligible to retire in FY 1990. The data, therefore, do not on the face of it validate the perception of a serious problem. Recognizably, numbers alone indicate nothing about the relative competency, quality and criticality of skills of the departees, either singly or taken as a group, or the significance to A.I.D. of the loss of their "experience." PM should look further at just who is within five or ten years of retirement from among the senior ranks and at how serious a problem, if there is one, would result from these individuals' departure.

g. Workforce Skills

1) By Backstop

Overall, reviewing A.I.D.'s system for categorizing direct-hire staff based on specific skills (Table XIII), one is, first, struck by the large number of backstops, most having very small numbers of employees and representing relatively small percentages of the workforce. In 1990 the largest categories of full-time, permanent direct-hires (FS-CS together) are Program Analysis (359), Secretaries (356), and Administrative Management (333) with a sharp drop off to the next largest groups -- Financial Management (234), Administrative/Subprofessional (219), and Agriculture (204). But BS-2, the largest of these, still represents only 11% of all American direct-hires while the smallest of the six, BS-10, is 6%. Notably, of the six largest backstops, four perform administrative and financial management and/or support functions and only two are on the program side of A.I.D. operations.

Based on the above, the Working Group believes there is merit to the proposal made by many of the 80-plus people interviewed to reduce and combine backstops into a smaller number of larger categories which are more general in nature. PM should pursue this idea, especially given the prevalence of the view that the A.I.D. employee of the future should be more broad-gauged, more flexible, and less technically specialized, albeit with a base of technical expertise. We further accept as valid interviewees' preference for retaining some means of categorizing staff as a guide to differing skills backgrounds.

Numerically, the largest number of FS are in backstops for Project Development with 183 persons; Agriculture, 181, and Program Analysis, 180 -- all program related. Each of these groups represents, 5.7% (BS 94), 5.6% (BS 10) and 5.6% (BS 2) of the FS, respectively. The largest CS backstops are Secretarial-Clerical with 318 personnel; Administrative Management, 239, and Administrative/Subprofessional, 202.

Prevailing wisdom has it that there are too many BS-2's and 94's. As a rule, these backstops contain "generalists" and are also widely held to have stronger, more extensive analytical skills. Economists (BS-11) represent another category assumed to have strong skills critical to current program priorities. Together, BS 2, 11 and 94 make up just over 13% of the total FS workforce and 20% of all USDH. While this pool of analytical talent is not that large, neither is it as small as we might have expected based on the extent of concern expressed over the shortage of analytical skills.

TABLE XIII

U.S. DIRECT HIRE FULL TIME PERMANENT EMPLOYMENT BY BACKSTOP CODES 6/

	AS OF				AS OF				AS OF			
	9/30/80				9/30/85				9/30/90			
	NO.	%	NO.	%	NO.	%	NO.	%	NO.	%	NO.	%
	CS	TOT	FS	TOT	CS	TOT	FS	TOT	CS	TOT	FS	TOT
	EMPS	EMPS	EMPS	EMPS	EMPS	EMPS	EMPS	EMPS	EMPS	EMPS	EMPS	EMPS
01 EXECUTIVE PERSONNEL	35	1.0	109	3.0	48	1.5	158	4.8	36	1.1	159	4.9
02 PROGRAM ANALYSIS 1/	234	6.4	290	7.9	160	4.8	190	5.7	179	5.5	180	5.6
03 ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT	230	6.3	112	3.1	193	5.8	104	3.1	239	7.4	94	2.9
04 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT	79	2.2	131	3.6	63	1.9	126	3.8	118	3.7	116	3.6
05 SECRETARIES & GEN CLERICAL	418	11.4	160	2.7	315	9.5	63	1.9	315	9.8	38	1.2
06 GENERAL SERVICES	10	.3	45	1.2	9	.3	25	.8	17	.5	6	.2
07 ADMIN SUBPROFESSIONAL	273	7.5	39	1.1	234	7.1	30	.9	202	6.3	17	.5
08 AUDIT & INSPECTION	28	.8	94	2.6	20	.6	105	3.2	27	.8	140	4.3
09 GENERAL DEVELOPMENT 2/	4	.1	170	4.6								
10 AGRICULTURE	27	.7	187	5.1	24	.7	217	6.6	23	.7	181	5.6
11 ECONOMIST 1/					20	.6	64	1.9	27	.8	60	1.9
12 PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 2/					0		122	3.7	0		183	3.2
14 RURAL DEVELOPMENT 2/					0		34	1.0	0		19	.6
15 FOOD FOR PEACE	0		24	.7	0		40	1.2	0		36	1.1
20 HOUSING, URBAN & COMUNITY DEV 3/	47	1.3	38	1.0	2	.1	35	1.1	7	.2	31	1.0
21 BUSINESS, INDUST & PRIV SECT 2/					41	1.2	22	.7	60	1.9	35	1.1
25 ENGINEERING	16	0.4	93	2.5	7	.2	66	2.0	3	.1	37	1.1
27 EQUIP OPNS & MAINTENANCE	7	0.2	1									
30 ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT					0		10	.3	0		10	.3
50 HEALTH, MEDICAL & POPULATION	29	.8	96	2.6	17	.5	112	3.4	17	.5	99	3.1
60 EDUCATION	46	1.3	41	1.1	48	1.5	39	1.2	48	1.5	46	1.4
70 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION	0		3	.1								
72 SOCIAL SERVICE					8	.2	5	.1	14	.4	0	
75 PHYS & SOCIAL SCIENCE 4/					32	1.0	4	.1	31	1.0	4	.1
80 COMMUNITY & SOCIAL DEV. 4/	15	.4	34	.9								
85 LEGAL	31	.9	22	.6	25	.8	34	1.0	30	.9	34	1.1
91 PARTICIPANT TRAINING	19	.5	9	.3								
92 PROCUREMENT & PROP DISP 5/					27	.8	34	1.0	8	.3	19	.6
93 CONTRACT MANAGEMENT 5/	90	2.5	55	1.5	45	1.4	31	.9	67	2.1	42	1.3
94 CAPITAL PROJECTS/DEV. LOANS	26	.7	164	4.5	13	.4	200	6.0	7	.2	183	5.7
95 INTERNATIONAL DVL INTERNS	0		122	3.3	0		81	2.4	0		59	1.8
99 PRINTERS/DRIVERS	23	.6	0		11	.3	0		7	.2	0	
TOTAL	1687	46.0	1979	54.0	1362	41.1	1952	58.9	1482	45.9	1748	54.1

1/ IN 1983 ECONOMIST POSITIONS WERE SPLIT OUT OF BS 02 - PROGRAM ANALYSIS INTO THE NEW BS 11 - ECONOMISTS.
 2/ IN 1982 POSITIONS IN BS 09 - GENERAL DEVELOPMENT - WERE SPLIT AMONG TWO NEW BACKSTOPS, BS 12 - PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AND BS 14 - RURAL DEVELOPMENT.
 3/ IN 1983 SOME POSITIONS IN BS HOUSING, URBAN AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT WERE REMOVED AND FORMED A NEW BS 21 - BUSINESS, INDUSTRY AND PRIVATE SECTOR.
 4/ IN 1983 POSITIONS IN BS 80 - COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT WERE SPLIT AMONG BS 75 - PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE AND BS 72 - SOCIAL SERVICE.
 5/ IN 1983 SOME POSITIONS IN BS 93 - CONTRACT MANAGEMENT WERE REMOVED AND FORMED A NEW BS 92 - PROCUREMENT AND PROPERTY DISPOSAL.
 6/ INCLUDES EMPS WITH PERMANENT TENURE, EMPS ON CAREER CONDITIONAL/CANDIDATE APPOINTMENTS, AS WELL AS EMPS WITH APPOINTMENTS EXCEEDING ONE YEAR.

The question, therefore, arises whether the analytical skills problem is not just one of numbers, but whether the existing pool of analytical talent is well suited to A.I.D.'s present and future needs. A few insightful respondents did raise this issue during interviews. The Working Group cannot from the information it has determine whether existing skills are adequate, but there clearly is a need for A.I.D. to define better its analytical skills requirement before initiating recruitment efforts. It may also be incumbent on the Agency to re-orient its personnel to whatever new kind of analysis may need to be done in place of the current focus on identifying problems and solutions thereto versus a possibly broader, more integrative approach directed to assessing program impact and conceptualizing sectoral and macro-level reform programs.

Going beyond analytical skills per se, the backstop categorization tells very little about all the skills any one employee has because it is a means for labeling primary occupational specialty only. Some staff have changed backstops, and their original area of expertise is not reflected by their current BS code. Similarly, BS codes do not show particular A.I.D. experience or training which may go beyond or fall outside their current BS category and/or which may be pertinent to new program areas.

Finally, the BS code does not speak to how current one's knowledge of one's technical specialization is at present. There is a very widespread belief revealed in the interviews that the technical skills of most A.I.D. personnel may be largely out of date. Age factors, lack of opportunities for re-training, and lack of any Agency career development program which would include periodic refresher training in one's area of specialization give substance to this concern. Before launching major hiring and/or training programs PM should conduct a skills inventory of the direct-hire workforce. (We share the Tri-Sector Council's conclusion that there is little information available on just what skills the workforce has apart from BS codes.) The inventory should identify skills and prior A.I.D. experience not evident from Backstop codes and assess technical skills' currency.

Another group often cited as being in over-supply is Engineers. Table XIII shows a sizable reduction has occurred in BS-25. We have no way of knowing whether the 40 employees now in this category are too many or too few for A.I.D.'s needs for ongoing capital projects and for additional requirements stemming from new programs in natural resources and the business and development partnership. We note the Tri-Sector Council's findings

that currently employed Engineers may not have the skills pertinent to some environmental issues, e.g., acid rain and industrial pollution. We feel, however, that such specializations should undoubtedly be obtained through non-career modes of employment, but we would again urge that before starting any recruitment, PM review carefully actual skills now extant in the Workforce not revealed by BS codes.

The Working Group has learned that in conducting recruitment there may be a predilection to "cloning" skills already in the workforce due to the approach now in use. Recruitment, when it is done now, is for the purpose of replacing skills lost through attrition and/or to meet immediate staff shortages; it is sporadic due to periodic hiring freezes ordered in the face of OE budget crises, and it is passive with selection of candidates for employment being made from a largely "self-selected" pool of applicants submitting SF-171's on their own initiative. Further, members of the technical selection committees are mainly White, male, and long-time employees in the pertinent backstop. PM/RS does not seek out and reach out to a wider universe of potential candidates in universities, Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU's), professional organization's, etc. We have been told A.I.D.'s recruitment budget this year is only \$5,000. If true, we cannot conceive of adequate recruitment being done under the above or any other approaches with such a budget. The consequence, of course, is to continue hiring skills which may not be a priority or pertinent to current programs and to hire mirror-images of the current workforce.

2) Increasing Skills Levels

The fastest growing skills group among all the American FS and CS direct-hires during the 1980's per Table XIII were Executive Personnel (now 195 people), Audit and Inspection (167), Food for Peace (36), and legal (64). Those groups having the largest reductions were IDI's (-63 persons), General Services (-32), Secretaries/Clerks (-93), and Contract Management (-36). The other BS' basically changed by between 0 and 10% up or down. The numbers of people in BS' for areas of new or special program interest at 9/30/90 -- Economists; Business, Industry and Private Sector, and Energy/Environment -- now total 87, 95, and 10 direct-hires, respectively. These figures represent increases of three, 32 and zero employees, respectively, since 1985. None of these categories existed prior to 1983 although the skills were present earlier in an unknown number of persons in other BS'.

Table XIV shows numbers of USDH with selected technical specializations, as indicated by backstop codes, in comparison to changing functional account appropriations during 1980-90. Table XV shows funding changes for those

U.S. Direct Hire ^{1/} Technical Staff Changes
Compared to Program Funding Levels
(\$000 Millions)

	1980 <u>Amount</u>	1985 <u>Amount</u>	<u>%+/-</u> ^{2/}	1990 <u>Amount</u>	<u>%+/-</u> ^{2/}
ARD Funds	622.6	738.1	+19	630.9	-15
No. USDH in BS 10, 14 ^{3/}	214	275	+29	233	-19
HEA/POP/CS/AIDS	313.9	538.7	+72	567.7	+5
No. USDH in BS 50	125	129	+3	116	-11
ED/HR	94.8	179.1	+89	247.7	+38
No. USDH in BS 60, 70 ^{3/4/}	90	87	-4	94	-8
SelDelAct/PrSect, Envir. & Energy	100.4	179.1	+78	275.1	+54
No. USDH in BS 21,25,30 ^{3/4/}	109	146	+34	145	-1

FOOTNOTES:

1. Foreign Service and Civil Service together.
2. Changes in funds and personnel numbers are measured against the preceding column, i.e. over five years.
3. The groupings of backstops represent those having personnel which most often are used to meet these project management needs in field Missions. For example, BS14 (Rural Development) personnel may be designated to cover agriculture projects; Engineers often are assigned to energy and/or environmental activities.
4. Missions may assign such responsibilities to BS-2 (Program), BS-94 (Project Development) and/or BS-9 (General Development) officers whose work load permits their taking on extra work, when pressed to manage projects in new functional areas, and when more appropriate technical staff from the more pertinent BS are not assigned to post, when the project to be covered is an AID/W or regional project, or when the activity is in a relatively early stage of design.

Table XV

Changes in Functional Accounts Funds by Geographic, PRE,
PPC and S&T Bureaus, FY 1980-90 (\$000 Millions)

Functional Account/Bureau	FY 1980	FY 1985	FY 1990
ARD			
AFR	102.7	128.2	148.6 1/
ANE	293.8	290.6	188.7
LAC	147.4	183.3	136.9
PRE	2.4	8.5	5.5
PPC	30.6	47.9	8.3
S&T	<u>45.7</u>	<u>79.6</u>	<u>113.2</u>
Total	622.6	738.1	601.2
Health/Pop/CS/AIDS			
AFR	32.4	65.1	119.9 1/
ANE	94.6	136.4	127.3
LAC	42.6	106.3	86.3
PRE	-	0.6	2.5
PPC	32.8	43.8	5.1
S&T	<u>111.5</u>	<u>186.5</u>	<u>197.0</u>
Total	313.9	538.7	538.1
EHR			
AFR	30.3	35.4	115.6 1/
ANE	23.9	26.5	49.4
LAC	30.1	107.8	69.8
PRE	-	-	-
PPC	0.4	1.3	1.9
S&T	<u>10.1</u>	<u>8.1</u>	<u>4.9</u>
Total	94.8	179.1	241.6
SDA/Priv. Sector/ Env. & Energy			
AFR	26.1	20.1	132.9 1/
ANE	14.3	40.4	41.6
LAC	36.9	109.9	56.4
PRE	7.5	12.8	8.8
PPC	4.7	5.3	7.3
S&T	<u>10.9</u>	<u>10.7</u>	<u>6.3</u>
Total	100.4	199.2	253.3

Sources: PPC/PB/RPA and AFR/DP

Footnotes: 1. FY 90 figures for AFR represent amounts of DFA funds going to these type of activities plus some DA allocated from central funds to Africa programs for Health, Pop, CS, AIDs.

bureaus having program management responsibilities in functional account sectors and Table XVI tries to show both funding and bureau staff fluctuations. The most that can be said from these tables is that there is no relationship between funding and staff levels and program changes. Efforts in 1981 to try to establish objective criteria for identifying "core staff" and for determining optimum field mission size using program level, pipeline amounts, and numbers of projects managed came to naught. Per the December 1981 report of the Administrator's Task Force on Personnel Ceiling Reductions, their study found little, if any, direct correlation between size of mission and annual program budget, the number of projects in a mission, or the pipeline.

3) Is A.I.D. Short of Staff?

There is widespread belief that the Agency lacks sufficient personnel to meet current staffing needs. Interviewees named Economists, Controllers, Executive Officers, Health Officers, Private Sector Officers, Contracts Officers, Natural Resource/Environmentalists, and Social Scientists as well as personnel able to handle the new program initiatives (Democratization, and Business and Development Partnership) and the more intangible "managers" and "analysts," as being in short supply. What kinds of persons, prior experiences, and educational backgrounds are pertinent and/or needed for the new program areas and the "intangible" skills is not clear or understood. Such criteria need to be spelled out once a better understanding exists of what the new initiatives entail and what analytical/managerial skills are really critical and needed before A.I.D. tries to recruit or contract for pertinent expertise.

The number of unfilled, vacant, yet established and advertised, positions overseas at the end of the last assignment cycle was only 13; this would not seem consistent with a conclusion of many interviewees that A.I.D. is seriously understaffed with regard at least to ongoing (as distinct from the new) program initiatives. There is an excess of positions categorized for the FS over persons in the FS, but this fact does not prove that A.I.D. is short staffed either as discussed earlier. The existence of only 13 vacancies contrasted with interview results, changing requirements for more intensive local currency monitoring with the attendant staffing implications, staff needs for new programs, and at least one report that missions are hiring U.S. PSC's instead of asking for USDH in backstops where staff shortfalls exist, taken together do raise concerns over whether A.I.D. will have a sufficient number of personnel to meet all the demands being placed on it.

Changing Personnel Numbers (All Types) and Program Resource
by Bureau (\$000 Million)
1980, 1985, 1990

<u>Bureau</u>	<u>1980</u>		<u>1985</u>		<u>1990</u>	
	<u>Pers'l</u>	<u>Res.\$</u>	<u>Pers'l</u>	<u>Res.\$</u>	<u>Pers'l</u>	<u>Res.\$</u>
AFR	1,685	670.8	1,520	1,337.3	3,265	848.4
ANE	2,743	3312.5	2,826	5,123.1	3,415	4,035.8
LAC	1,492	417.7	1,626	1,810.1	2,282	1,598.3
PRE	-	9.9	51	21.8	91	16.9
PPC	192	68.5	160	98.2	180	23.6
S&T	640	178.1	349	285.9	326	321.5

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Comparing functional areas where reliance on the non-direct hire workforce has expanded (see below) to backstops from which USDH have left in the greatest numbers shows little correlation between the two except in the secretarial, and financial and administrative management functions. The implication is that either non-direct hire employment is excessive and out of control, which we doubt is the case because Missions must pay these persons from their OE budgets. It is more likely that work requirements have expanded such that Missions have had to utilize non-traditional sources of expertise in face of declining USDH numbers.

Congress is likely to add new priorities in coming years and based on past experience, will also continue to stress Basic Human Needs. (Once set, program priorities seem to drop off A.I.D.'s plate and represent a continuing need for A.I.D. staff to monitor them.) One implication of the above is that A.I.D. must have some "excess" capacity within its staff to react quickly to addressing new program requirements, to meet language and other training concerns, to respond to disasters, and to accommodate leave schedules while maintaining the needed amount of personnel to continue efforts begun in earlier periods. No such "slack" or excess capacity exists that we could find; in fact, too often A.I.D. has resorted to robbing one program area to meet the more immediate, pressing and high priority staff needs of another because there is no "slack" to take up the unexpected. Another implication is that non-tenured modes of employment -- limited CS and FS appointments and contracts, IPA's, JCC's etc. -- must be exploited more fully. A third is that the career workforce must continue to be flexible enough to adapt.

i. The Complement and the Issue of "Deadwood" or Excess Personnel

The Working Group heard many allegations of the existence on the complement of much "deadwood," i.e., personnel excess to A.I.D. needs and unable to meet performance requirements. The "complement" last September 30 included a total of 121 FS employees and 126 CS personnel. The FS group was made up of 50 employees awaiting reassignment, 30 in training programs, 26 on detail to other agencies, one on the medical complement, 10 on leave without pay, and four on separation status, i.e., close to retirement. The number on detail and on the reassignment complement is neither large nor can they be categorized as "deadwood" or "excess" without review of these individuals' performance levels and history as compared to those with assignments, and review also of the reasons why each is detailed or unassigned.

PM looked at the issue of the number of FS on the reassignment complement sub-category last July and

concluded the problem was due to rigidities institutionalized in the BS system which prevented transferability between BS, to past recruitment of persons having narrowly defined technical skills, and to changing requirements for professional personnel. The CS complement, by contrast, includes 34 persons in two recruitment complements, 10 on detail and 82 on various pre-employment and youth opportunity/summer employment complements. None of these seemingly could be considered "excess" or "deadwood." Therefore, letting go of everyone on the entire complement, or just letting go those on one or more components of it, is not a means for solving A.I.D.'s staffing problems.

Having said the complement is not synonymous with deadwood, the prospect still exists that A.I.D. has on its rolls personnel whose skills and/or interests are not suited to the new program initiatives or to the changing work demands now being made. A.I.D. is not -- and has not been for some years -- a "hands on" development agency, but it is now one which manages a "process," i.e., of documentation, contracting, evaluation, and so on and in which "hands on development" is done by contractors. Similarly a 1988-89 analysis of ANE's agriculture-rural development staff and the impact on them of changed program strategies found a serious disjunct between the staff's education, experience and orientation toward agriculture production and research and new agriculture sector program priorities - pricing/marketing policies, agri-business, agro-processing, private sector and natural resources management.

The above ANE effort at workforce planning obviously did not claim all technical personnel in these fields were deadwood. The study did find the current skills mix was fixed and static and was not susceptible to major re-direction and re-training, however. The study urged that A.I.D. hire more "technical generalists" for the future and also that it hire expertise in the new priority areas on contracts.

There are already in A.I.D. a number of persons having technical expertise, but who also are strong managers and who are skillful analysts. These are, we suspect, among the most successful of A.I.D.'s technical cadre and are the ones whose abilities "stand out" in comparison to others among A.I.D.'s technicians.

j. Educational Attainment and Training

Another way of looking at the USDH workforce is its level of educational attainment. From Table XVII it appears that A.I.D. has a highly trained USDH workforce. Like the general U.S. population, the level of educational achievement has risen over the last decade. The number of

TABLE XVII

EDUCATIONAL LEVELS OF USDM STAFF
EXCLUDING EXPERT/CONSULTANTS

	<u>9/80</u>			<u>9/85</u>			<u>9/90</u>		
	CS	ES	TOTAL	CS	ES	TOTAL	CS	ES	TOTAL
PhDs	98	198	296	88	248	336	95	245	340
Masters	320	881	1201	235	999	1234	307	987	1294
Bachelors	493	665	1158	415	563	978	419	452	871
No Degree	<u>1791</u>	<u>295</u>	<u>1386</u>	<u>899</u>	<u>176</u>	<u>1075</u>	<u>859</u>	<u>102</u>	<u>961</u>
Total	2002	2039	4041	1637	1986	3623	1680	1786	3466

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: USDH with PhD's has grown from 296 to 340 and with Master's degrees, from 1,201 to 1,294 despite the decline in the absolute numbers of the USDH group overall. The change is even more marked in the FS with holders of doctorates increasing from 198 to 245 and of Masters degrees, from 881 to 987. In 1990 47% of the A.I.D. workforce possessed an advanced degree compared to 37% in 1980. Ten percent now are Ph.D.'s and 37%, Masters degree holders.

Table XVIII looks at the level of educational attainment in terms of actual degrees received. The principal fields of study or specialization at the advanced degree level among all USDH are: Social sciences; business and management, including Economics; agriculture; law; public affairs and government, and health. These areas of specialization account for 82% of the advanced degree fields within the American direct-hire workforce. Leaving out agriculture, law and health, 937 USDH or about 57% have advanced degrees in various social science fields and might thereby fall into the broad-gauged, more analytical, generalist class perceived to be the type of employee required for the future. It would seem, therefore, that the majority of A.I.D personnel are already "generalists."

Comparing Tables XIII and XVIII, while 223 USDH in 1990 have degrees in Agriculture, A.I.D. has 233 persons in BS' 10, 14, and 30, categories in which one might expect to find persons with this particular educational background. We would assume, that there are persons in other backstop groups, such as BS-1, who have backgrounds in Agriculture. Similarly, there may be some unrecognized talent or people with pertinent experience, such as those involved in the 1960's with Title IX of the FAA - a predecessor to today's Democratization Initiative - who could contribute to the new program areas and who are already within the workforce. See the earlier recommendation for a skills inventory in Section III. B.2.g.1.

The Working Group also examined A.I.D. training. (See Attachment 1.) The heaviest attendance, as measured by the number of USDH employees trained, has been in data processing courses (1,403), project design/implementation (1,531), supervision and management (1,697), word processing (1,157), and "other" (1,708). A total of 775 persons have had some training in contracting, attending 1,370 courses in this area. The number of persons attending courses in Economics (192), Development Studies (426), executive development (104), finance and accounting (388), personnel management (272), private sector/business (209), and political science (150) has been markedly lower, reflecting the high priority assigned management skills and project implementation training by former Administrators. Attendance at courses representing administrative support subjects (184) and technical program sectors -- agriculture

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(171), education (49), engineering/transportation (128), energy (10), environment (88), health/population/nutrition (155) -- has generally been lower also. We note that courses in negotiating skills (17) and analytical skills, i.e., mathematics, statistics, financial analysis, etc. (216) have been very low. Although we cannot tell how many of those trained are still with A.I.D., with only a few exceptions -- contracting, management, and project design/implementation -- have employees had A.I.D. training in subjects which match the critical skills needs identified in interviews.

There is no data maintained on FN and/or U.S. PSC attendance at A.I.D. training courses. That fact alone, along with Working Group members' own experiences and a few interviewee's comments, lead to the conclusion that A.I.D. has not given the attention and priority it should to training of FN's -- DH and non-DH alike.

Looking at data on training for CS and FS personnel, it is evident that with few exceptions FS-USDH professionals have benefited far more (and disproportionately so) than have CS professionals and those CS secretaries who remain with A.I.D. over longer periods than is usual for this group. The sole exceptions are training in communications (English, writing, public speaking) and self-improvement (stress management, career management) courses at which attendance of both CS secretaries and professionals exceeds that of the comparable FS categories. Notably, FS secretaries have received by far the least training of all members of the USDH workforce.

One major complaint made by a significant number of those we interviewed was that A.I.D. training was not systematic or integrated into an overall program of career development for employees and that it was not directed toward overall Agency needs. The first-named criticism has been a finding of numerous previous studies of A.I.D.'s personnel system; one recent example is the 1989 study of A.I.D. staff training, but the complaint appears in earlier studies as well and in reports of Tenure and Selection Boards. A few interviewees also expressed concern about A.I.D.'s failure to provide training needed by technical and financial management personnel to keep them professionally registered and certified. In the case of accountants and/or CPA's, and possibly Engineers, regular, short-term training is, or may be, required to maintain their professional standing or certification.

Another major, and nearly unanimous, complaint heard in the interviews was with regard to language training. (About 83% of the Foreign Service tenured and career candidate USDH have met A.I.D.'s minimum language requirement of a '2'; and 54.7% have a '3' or better. Raising the standard

HIGHEST DEGREES OF USDH EMPLOYEES
EXCLUDING EXPERT/CONSULTANTS

	1980						1985						1990					
	PHD		MAST		BACH		PHD		MAST		BACH		PHD		MAST		BACH	
	CS	ES																
AGRICULTURE	13	29	6	134	3	57	14	40	4	152	1	40	12	42	5	127	6	33
ARCHITECTURE			2	13	3	5			2	25	1	3		1	1	25		1
AREA STUDIES		2	15	21	7	12		3	11	17	3	13	2	4	14	16	7	13
BIOLOGY	4	6	4	14	8	7	7	9	4	15	6	3	15	9	4	15	4	1
BUSINESS & MGMT		5	26	151	125	217	1	8	25	187	103	203	2	6	49	236	124	168
COMMUNICATIONS	2	2	6	1	7	7	1	4	5	1	17	4	1	6	4	2	12	3
EDUCATION	4	37	15	36	28	21	7	32	13	28	27	7	4	25	11	29	24	10
ENGINEERING	2	2	7	25	12	63	4	3	2	29	10	56	4	3	2	27	6	35
FINE ARTS			1	2	7	5				1	6	3			2	2	5	4
FOREIGN LANGUAGE	1		2	3	21	10	2		3	4	17	7	1		5	5	13	8
HEALTH	3	10	14	62	2	5	2	7	5	86	3	2	2	10	12	74	5	3
HOME ECONOMICS	1			2	4					1	2	1			2	1	2	
INFORMATION SCI			3						3						3	2	3	1
INTERDISCIPLINARY			1	3	9	5				2	6	6		1	2	2	4	6
LAW	1	3	45	64	6			4	38	70	9	2		1	50	73	4	2
LETTERS	2	2	3	4	28	19	3	1	2	3	24	19	1	1	4	2	15	10
LIBRARY SCIENCE			6	2	2				4	2	1				3	1		
MATHEMATICS	1		5	3	8	2			5		6	1		1	3		5	1
MILITARY SCIENCE					1												1	
PHYSICAL SCIENCE	4	1	1	2	6	6	4	2		4	5	5	2	1	1	1	2	5
PSYCHOLOGY	2	3	7	6	18	13	1	3	1	6	18	10	3	4	2	7	25	9
PUBLIC AFFAIRS	3	4	30	69	7	21	3	6	20	80	10	13	3	4	30	76	8	9
SOCIAL SCIENCE	55	91	119	261	181	187	39	125	87	282	140	164	43	126	98	263	144	130
THEOLOGY		1	2	3		2		1	1	4		1			2	3		
TOTAL	98	198	320	881	493	665	88	248	235	999	415	563	95	245	307	987	419	452

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(171), education (49), engineering/transportation (128), energy (10), environment (88), health/population/nutrition (155) -- has generally been lower also. We note that courses in negotiating skills (17) and analytical skills, i.e., mathematics, statistics, financial analysis, etc. (216) have been very low. Although we cannot tell how many of those trained are still with A.I.D., with only a few exceptions -- contracting, management, and project design/implementation -- have employees had A.I.D. training in subjects which match the critical skills needs identified in interviews.

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to a '3' for everyone, thus, would involve re-training for about 30% of the FS. One problem cited was lengthy delays in filling field vacancies where assignment of individuals to these jobs was followed by sending them to 6 months or more of language training before they went to post. A proposed solution is making such training itself "an assignment" so that persons being assigned to vacant jobs are already language qualified.

Another problem with language training, and one having some importance at times of budget stringency, is waste of such training by sending persons who have just qualified in a foreign language to posts where that language is not used. This necessitates costly re-training years later when the employee is sent to a country where he/she is expected to use that language. Worse yet is the prospect of qualifying people in one language and then never assigning them to a country in which the language is spoken, but later training them in a second foreign language needed for a specific assignment. We encourage PM to review the possibility of treating language training as an assignment in itself and of ensuring training is followed immediately by assignment to a country using the language in which one is qualified. This may require changes and/or more flexibility in tenuring procedures, including lengthening the period for being in career candidate status.

The contribution which training can make to career development and strengthening the ability of "weak" employees to carry out their jobs is not being fully realized by A.I.D. There is also the indication from Tenure/Performance Standards Boards' reports that minorities experiencing performance difficulties and deemed less competitive were less likely to have received training to improve their work than non-minorities even though suitable training was available.

We assume and urge that A.I.D. at a very minimum retain on its career, direct hire rolls a "core" of technical expertise "to keep contractors honest," and that many of the future's broad-gauged generalists will have some "technical" background, A.I.D. will need to adopt means to provide "refresher" training on a periodic basis as part of a normal career path. We do not feel it is practical or cost effective for A.I.D. to "retool" staff from one technical field to another greatly different; however, there may be some latitude for training BS-10 personnel in environment/natural resource management and, similarly, for retraining other technical personnel in fields of expertise closely related to their current area of specialization.

3. Foreign National Direct-Hires and the Non Direct-Hire Workforce

As stated at the opening of this discussion on who makes up the A.I.D. workforce, little is known about the FNDH and non-direct hire group beyond "numbers," which some feel are suspect. (The numbers we have had to use may inflate somewhat the non-direct hire segment of the workforce as we have defined it by including manpower/services contractors.) AID/W does not collect data systematically or maintain information on non-DH personnel. This has reflected a belief that the non-direct hire category somehow was not a proper concern for AID/W and was fully the responsibility of field missions even though AID/W has ordered controls on OE-financed PSC's and the duration of their funding.

The case of FN direct-hires is somewhat more mystifying. While their situation most likely reflects the same factors as non-DH, their numbers are reported to OMB et al. within the totality of A.I.D.'s workforce as delineated by FTE ceilings. Also, decisions on FNDH position classifications and wage survey outcomes are made in Washington not in the field. Overall, however, one has the impression that the two groups taken together "do not count" somehow and are largely "invisible" to AID/W. As an illustration, PM excludes the number and grades of FN's supervised from consideration in decisions on grading USDH jobs in field Missions, basing such decisions solely on USDH numbers, grades, etc. and program factors.

This neglect or inattention cannot continue if, as is widely believed, A.I.D. must make more use of these personnel, reduce USDH overseas, and transfer more authorities to FN's and U.S. PSC's. We have already pointed out that the non-direct hire workforce appears to be the largest segment numerically and an increasing proportion of A.I.D.'s total workforce. While work years do not equate to number of employees, from ABS data and using work years as a rough guide, in FY 1990 A.I.D. employed at least 4,800 FN and U.S. PSC's in the field in addition to the 1,027 FNDH staff. (See Table XIX.)

The sheer number of PSC's poses a heavy workload burden for field Contracts and Executive Officers, especially given AID/W-issued controls on OE funding which require frequent and repeated amendment of each and every PSC, most often at the start of each fiscal year. Taken together with increased reliance on manpower and services contracts, concerns expressed by interviewees about A.I.D.'s contract management skills, numbers of staff trained in contract management overall, reduced numbers of Contracts Officers and somewhat greater attrition among the Executive Officer cadre, there appears to be an issue regarding A.I.D.'s ability to manage the contracted segment of its pool of human resources.

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
 WORKFORCE WORKYEAR
 (source: TABLE 9 OF ABS *)

WORLD TOTALS:

BUDGET STAGE: BBS FISCAL YEAR: 1990

	TOTAL	U.S. DIRECT HIRES OE	FOREIGN NATIONAL DIRECT HIRES		U.S. PERSONAL SERVICES CONTRACTORS			FOREIGN NATIONAL PERSONAL SERVICES CONTRACTORS			OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES		
			OE	TRUST	OE	TRUST	PROGRAM	OE	TRUST	PROGRAM	OE	TRUST	PROGRAM
EXECUTIVE DIRECTION & MGMT	190.7	174.9	1.8	.0	.0	.0	.0	7.0	.0	.0	7.0	.0	.0
POLICY DEVELOPMENT	111.4	103.2	.0	.0	6.2	.0	1.1	.0	.0	.0	.5	.0	.4
PROGRAM PLANNING & BUDGET	272.7	179.4	25.4	11.1	6.5	.1	4.4	17.6	21.4	1.3	1.6	.0	4.0
PROGRAM ASSESSMENT & EVAL	251.8	150.9	14.1	5.9	5.5	1.0	14.2	23.1	15.6	6.7	.8	.0	14.0
PROJECT DESIGN & DEVEL	239.8	161.1	7.4	4.9	3.3	1.0	21.3	8.6	18.0	3.5	1.0	.0	9.7
PROJECT REVIEW & OVERSITE	171.3	99.2	4.5	10.5	4.8	.0	19.4	1.8	24.1	1.6	.8	.0	4.6
FIELD LIAISON	74.1	58.3	.0	.0	.1	.0	3.8	.0	.0	.0	.1	.0	11.8
INFORMATION SYSTEM MGMT	252.5	134.1	2.7	3.7	10.9	.0	3.3	33.4	48.0	1.9	7.7	4.5	2.3
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT	875.7	230.6	145.5	93.6	37.0	1.0	1.0	143.4	219.2	1.8	1.2	.0	1.4
ADMINISTRATIVE MGMT	311.1	310.9	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.2
LEGISLATIVE LIAISON	39.4	39.1	.0	.0	.1	.0	.1	.0	.0	.0	.1	.0	.0
GENERAL LEGAL FUNCTIONS	28.6	28.4	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.2
EXTERNAL LIAISON	101.2	94.9	.0	.0	1.3	.0	.6	.0	.0	.0	.5	.0	3.9
CONTRACT MANAGEMENT	276.7	134.8	18.7	15.4	13.0	1.0	2.5	28.2	63.1	.0	.0	.0	.0
SUPPORT: CLERICAL	1,783.4	452.0	81.6	78.7	45.2	1.3	7.3	451.5	604.5	50.5	6.3	.0	4.5
SUPPORT: OFFICE OPERATION	1,215.5	24.4	69.8	56.0	16.8	.0	.0	326.1	624.4	52.4	13.0	32.3	.3
SUPPORT: RESIDENTIAL OPS	282.4	1.3	3.5	7.9	9.7	.0	.0	27.1	165.6	.1	33.0	19.2	15.0
SUPPORT: MAINT/CUSTODIAL	181.0	2.3	1.4	1.0	.1	.0	.0	83.4	89.8	3.0	.0	.0	.0
ALL OTHER MANAGEMENT	469.3	91.0	56.3	29.9	46.0	4.3	4.1	99.0	100.5	9.8	12.7	12.2	3.5
ORG MGMT. SUBTOTAL	7,128.6	2,470.8	432.7	318.6	206.5	9.6	83.1	1,250.2	1,994.2	132.6	86.3	68.2	75.8
PROJECT MANAGEMENT	1,825.4	495.2	115.4	108.4	19.1	2.3	196.0	100.8	251.0	363.5	2.0	.0	171.7
MISC PROGRAM MGMT													
HOUSING GUARANTEES	21.7	10.2	.1	.2	6.0	.0	1.3	1.1	.4	2.4	.0	.0	.0
DISASTER	15.8	7.3	1.7	.4	.1	.0	3.7	1.5	1.0	.1	.0	.0	.0
FOOD AID	101.8	52.6	12.8	5.0	1.6	.0	4.5	5.5	14.5	5.3	.0	.0	.0
LOCAL CURRENCY	79.6	12.5	6.6	7.5	2.6	1.0	7.4	2.0	18.7	17.4	.2	.0	6.1
CENTRAL/REGIONAL PROJECTS	103.3	20.4	11.3	6.4	1.5	.0	24.6	8.1	11.8	16.8	.2	.0	6.1
MISC PROGRAM TOTAL	322.2	103.0	32.5	19.5	11.8		41.5	18.2	46.4	42.0	.2	.0	
FTNAL TOTALS:	9,276.2	3,069.0	580.6	446.5	237.4		320.6	1,369.2	2,291.6	538.1	88.5	68.2	253.8


In large part the "growth" in the non direct hire workforce is "illusory" since it has been due to AID/W decisions to convert FNDH to contract status over the years. The reduction in FNDH and rise in non-direct hire FN PSC's may not be so large as the numbers indicate, and the great majority of FN personnel now on PSC's may have always been with us. But, as some interviewees have said and as the experience of the Working Group members recently returned from the field confirms, increasingly Missions are turning to FN and U.S. PSC's for expertise not available from USDH sources in order to maintain their ability to manage on-going programs and/or to carry out new program initiatives, and to maintain administrative support services provided to overseas USDH. Regrettably, historical data is not available to confirm or refute conclusively the substitution of U.S. and some FN PSC's for USDH.

(The subsequent discussion on functions these personnel now perform is suggestive, however.) The following charts, (I-V), obtained from PM, show significant increases in the non-direct hire workforce world-wide and overseas between 1985 and 1989 concurrent with decreases in the number of direct-hires (U.S. and FN). They also show rising use of non-direct hires and manpower contracts by AID/W to the point that about 24% of persons in AID/W may now to fall within these two groups (Chart VI). The MS, PPC and S&T Bureaus have moved farthest in this direction.

The Working Group believes there has been a significant rise in A.I.D. reliance on non-direct hire personnel, both U.S. and foreign, within field missions. But even before 1985 the field was heavily dependent on the FN workforce however employed - Executive and Controllers offices have been almost 100% staffed by FN's for years and now most posts contain only a single USDH office head in these sections. Communications and Records and participant training functions were transferred to FN's years ago. More recently, a shift of project management functions is evident.


Table XIX, drawn from data in the last ABS' submissions, shows FNDH and the non-DH workforce mainly performing five functions -- clerical support, office operations support, project management, financial management, and other organizational management. But there are some interesting variations among and between work that FNDH, FN PSC and U.S. PSC staff do. Listed in descending order of priority, FNDH are heavily involved in financial management, project management, clerical support, office operations, and other management activities, as measured by cumulative work years world-wide. FN PSC's work mainly (again in descending order) in clerical support, office operations, financial management, project management, and other management. U.S.

A.I.D. Employment Patterns Total Worldwide



REF. EMPTOTAL

A.I.D. Employment Patterns Total Foreign Nationals



REF. EMP TOT FN

PSC's are overwhelmingly involved in project management functions (217.4 work years) followed by their next most prevalent functions -- other management (54.4), miscellaneous program management (54.3), clerical support (53.8), and financial management (39). Compared to the role FNDH and FN PSC's have in the last-named function, the U.S. PSC role is marginal.

Table XX presents the same data but compares among the bureaus. Measured by work years, the ANE Bureau has the largest FNDH workforce and AFR, the smallest despite its greater number of field missions. However, AFR is the largest employer of both FN PSC's and of U.S. PSC's, thus being the Bureau most dependent on the non-direct hire field workforce. AFR employs more than two times as many U.S. PSC's as ANE and nearly 25% more than LAC. ANE and LAC, not surprisingly, are more reliant on manpower contractors than AFR, reflecting their relatively greater availability in those regions than is true throughout Africa.

Comparing total workyears for the DH workforce, both U.S. and FN, to the non-DH workforce overseas by bureau shows the following:

	<u>DH</u>	<u>Non-DH</u>	<u>Ratio</u>
AFR	666.8	1,939.2	1:2.9
LAC	538.0	1,119.7	1:2.1
ANE	868.4	1,573.4	1:1.8

The ratio of USDH work years to the total for FNDH and non-direct hire staff by bureaus is:

	<u>USDH</u>	<u>FNDH & Non-DH</u>	<u>Ratio</u>
AFR	397.9	2,208.1	1:5.5
LAC	253.9	1,403.8	1:5.5
ANE	417.3	2,024.5	1:4.9

Again, given the higher education levels and presumably greater capability in LAC's and ANE's foreign's national workforce, we would have expected to see somewhat different results. We had anticipated that ANE would be more reliant on FNDH and non-direct hire personnel and, again, very close to LAC in this regard with Africa least reliant. But the above review shows AFR most reliant on non DH and equally reliant with LAC on FNDH and non-DH staff. ANE is more reliant on USDH and all DH. We have previously recommended AID/W review the question of allocation of USDH among the Bureaus.

TABLE XX

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
 WORKFORCE WORKYEAR
 (source: TABLE 9 OF ABS *)

	TOTAL	U.S. DIRECT HIRES		FOREIGN NATIONAL DIRECT HIRES			U.S. PERSONAL SERVICES CONTRACTORS			FOREIGN NATIONAL PERSONAL SERVICES CONTRACTORS			OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES			MANPOWER CONTRACTORS		
		OE	TRUST	OE	TRUST	PROGRAM	OE	TRUST	PROGRAM	OE	TRUST	PROGRAM	OE	TRUST	PROGRAM	OE	TRUST	PROGRAM
AID/W**	2448.2	1934.4		0	0		13.3	0	34.0	0	0	0	24.1	0	51.5	269.8	0	121.1
Overseas:																		
AFR	2840.4	397.9		168.8	100.1		106.1	1.5	119.9	797.9	740.0	173.8	42.3	0	34.1	137.3	0	20.7
LAC	2024.8	253.9		90.1	194.0		62.9	6.4	93.4	93.5	699.9	163.6	7.6	54.7	107.6	24.2	173.0	0
AME	3121.6	417.3		298.7	152.4		40.0	5.0	63.9	420.3	851.7	192.5	5.9	13.5	59.4	221.0	268.0	112.0
IG OS	107.4	42.7		20.0	0		8.1	0	0	33.0	0	0	2.6	0	0	1.0	0	0
Non Reg	86.5	22.8		3.0	0		7.0	0	9.4	24.5	0	8.2	6.0	0	1.0	4.6	0	0
Sub Total	8180.7	1134.6		580.6	446.5		224.1	12.9	286.6	1369.2	2291.6	538.1	64.4	68.2	202.1	388.1	441.0	132.7
Grand Total	10629.1	3069.0		590.5	446.5		237.4	12.9	320.6	1369.2	2291.6	538.1	88.5	68.2	253.6	657.9	441.0	253.8

* PPC reports that the information contained in Table 9 as of November 30, 1990 had some minor data errors.

** IG in AID/W is not included in the ABS Table 9 information.

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F. XX

There is no data at all on educational attainment, or attrition, or, as previously noted, A.I.D. training received for FNDH and non-direct hire personnel. Working Group members' impressions are that, overall, these workforce components tend to be very stable with FN's, once employed, tending to stay with A.I.D. for long periods. Turnover tends to be heavier among secretarial staff. The exceptions are in cases where A.I.D. may not be especially competitive with other employers or where A.I.D.'s training of staff in ADP, secretarial skills, and/or language skills, is an incentive to employment and once training is gained, FN personnel leave.

Much data on FNDH and FN and U.S. PSC's already is available to parts of AID/W in Annual Budget Submissions in the Table VIII and IX series. There are, for example, ABS tables on FNDH and FN and U.S. PSC costs, showing job titles, number of employees, and work years, as well as the sources of funding (OE, Trust Funds and Program) in some cases. Missions have traditionally been expected to produce quarterly staffing patterns for internal use and to submit these to AID/W. The staffing pattern requirement has not been met over recent years by the field, nor has AID/W enforced it. (PM now has staffing patterns for about half of the Missions; these have different formats, content and dates of preparation.) ABS information has not been shared with PM, nor we expect, has it been the subject of any systematic review except occasionally in special circumstances, such as AID/W-ordered freezes on hiring U.S. PSC's and/or requirements for prior AID/W approval of hiring/retention of PSC's funded from the OE budget.

Therefore, claims that collection of data on the non-direct hire workforce would place a new, onerous burden on Missions are without foundation. Similarly, the claim AID/W has no concern with the non-direct hire workforce is disproven by the fact it asks for data in the ABS and has already injected itself into non-DH workforce decisions.

In reviewing AID/W data on the OE budget, which funds the majority of total workforce costs, the Working Group found that total OE costs in 1982 were \$335 million, of which 3% were funded with Trust Funds; in 1989 the total had increased to \$499 million and the portion covered by Trust Funds had risen to 13% (Chart VII). Field OE costs are about 64% of the overall OE budget (Chart VIII). Overseas, Trust Funds, i.e. local currencies generated from ESF programs and in some cases DFA in Africa, represented 20% of Mission's OE budgets in 1990 or about \$75 million (Charts IX-X). Trust Funds are used for Missions' administrative costs -- local salaries, rents, utilities, etc). In recent years the value of Trust Funds has fluctuated due to changing values of the U.S. dollar; at a time when OE budget constraints were growing, falling Trust

AID-O'Seas Employment

Direct Hire & Non-Direct Hire - Composition of On-Board Employment





Chart V


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REF: OSEMPPI

Growth of Funding of A.I.D. Operating Expenses * 1982-1989




* Excludes IG data for all years.
 ** FY90 is estimate
 REF: OETOTSTP (FM data)



REF: OETOTSTP

A.I.D. Operating Expenses O'Seas Costs - Major Segments



** FY90 is estimate.
REF: A_WOEFLD (FM data)

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Chart X

Fund availabilities have required Missions in Africa and elsewhere to cover the shortfall from within increasingly tight OE dollars. As ESF appropriations continue to decline, reflecting Congressional concerns over ESF, and as OMB continues to press AID/W to end its reliance on Trust Funds, the Working Group anticipates there will be heavier pressure on the OE budget to cover the FNDH and non-direct hire salaries.

We believe that monitoring of the field workforce is a legitimate part of workforce planning and that to monitor does not automatically mean AID/W interference. Decisions by Mission Directors on how many non-DH to hire and what skills to recruit for within their OE ceilings are perfectly compatible with AID/W monitoring of, and data collection on, the non-direct hire workforce. AID/W should have such information, for example, in considering the number and frequency of training courses to offer in any fiscal year in areas where this workforce segment would and/or should benefit. It also needs to be aware of budget implications. For AID/W to plan, hire and train the USDH workforce more effectively and efficiently it also must know what other segments of the total workforce are, what they do, and about their relationship to USDH personnel.

C. How Is Workforce Planning Carried Out and Managed Now in A.I.D.?

In terms of the definition of workforce planning put forth by this Working Group, the answer to the above question is simple -- A.I.D. does not do comprehensive workforce planning. The evidence for this contention is the skewed workforce structure pictured in the preceding section. But, also, the lack of workforce planning and the corresponding need to do it is cited repeatedly in a series of studies on personnel problems done for A.I.D. Three of these took place as recently as 1988-90 and covered recruitment, training and other personnel issues, i.e., career development, counseling, assignment and PM organization. But several go back to 1977 and 1981. Given the unanimity of the various study teams in making this same recommendation and the long period over which it has been made time and time again, we are perplexed and dismayed at A.I.D.'s failure to act. We add our own to those earlier voices that cried in the wilderness.

Having said that, there have been some tentative, limited and very recent steps toward using workforce planning in certain parts of the Agency. Three examples are the two-part 1988-89 analysis of agriculture personnel done for ANE, the Tri-Sector Council's effort now underway to do an analysis of skills needs for agriculture (BS-10), rural development (BS-14), and natural resources (BS-30) personnel, and a June 1990 study on engineering in A.I.D. There may also be a fourth underway on BS-50 (health) personnel requirements.

Less consistent with general workforce planning principles and the approach set out in this report have been "quickie reviews" of staff needs done in the face of staffing emergencies and specific program priorities, such as for environmentalists, or done in the face of perceived staff shortages, such as for Controllers, Contract Officers, and Economists, especially in times of OE budget crisis. These produce estimates of numbers of persons needed immediately, mainly due to attrition, in one or a few selected backstops. The result is hiring only for a few "special interest" groups, hiring them in large numbers, and/or hiring for mid-level entry. Over time such practices have caused the skewed age and other patterns seen above; they also lead to high attrition rates in these specializations occurring in a short period of time, thus re-creating in the future the original "staffing gap" crisis. They also do not address broader Agency staffing concerns, such as EEO issues, maintaining a steady flow of personnel in all skills areas and in all ranks through the system, and providing staff consistent with informed notions of where the Agency is going.

Recently, FM, like AID/GC and APRE/H earlier, has taken a more direct role in assignment and advancement decisions affecting its own BS-4 personnel. Using knowledge of its posts, their financial management requirements, and staffing situations, as well as knowledge of performance histories and capabilities of BS-4 individuals -- both gained from Controller (or "peer") reviews -- FM now largely controls all assignment decisions affecting BS-4. This step was a reaction to mounting financial vulnerability concerns, including some highly publicized and severe problems identified in certain countries (Ecuador) and in AID/W. FM's move also is a response to shortcomings of, and the widespread dissatisfaction with, the FS assignment process and, according to one interviewee, the perception that those BS-4's being promoted and rewarded by the system were not the most deserving in FM staff's eyes. While this approach has merit, it is open to abuse and bias. It also is limited strictly to one overall group of people and/or one skills area and does not serve the overall needs of A.I.D.

At one time in the past the former Office of Management Planning did undertake assessments of overall staffing needs, purportedly in order to relate these considerations to such things as promotions, training needs and so on. That unit was abolished in the early 1980's, possibly as one outgrowth of the 1981 Administrator's Task Force on Personnel Ceiling Reductions.

Some of those interviewed by the Working Group claimed that

the Bureaus are doing and/or should do workforce planning. The bureaus do play a strong role in the assignment process, but this is limited to filling vacancies and, to an increasing degree, for selecting in-house Bureau personnel to fill senior positions, i.e., "to take care of their own." But we found no evidence of efforts at the Bureau level to address longer term training and career development concerns on a regular, systematized basis, nor did we find any efforts, apart from those which were initiated by specific individuals and which were not sustained after they moved on, to address EEO concerns or deal with FN's.

Many interviewed as part of this study felt that in the past that PM has had a seriously limited authority and capacity to perform a leadership role in workforce planning. PM has been handicapped in this regard by the lack of any means for regular information exchanges between PM and those responsible for A.I.D. programming, hiring mainly to replace skills lost through attrition, training and career development shortcomings, the EEO situation, and the multiple problems affecting recruitment cited earlier. There are also questions whether A.I.D. has given this office adequate human and financial resources.

But PM does collect and maintain what A.I.D. personnel data base does exist. It has made (unsuccessful) efforts to collect data on FN's. PM has begun some workforce planning-type activities - analyzing the complement and attrition questions, assessing the problems posed by use of BS codes, and developing a proposed reorganization so that workforce planning might be done. PM also does determine number of promotions. But these initiatives so far have been limited in scope and tied to specific situations. Similarly, technical councils do participate in A.I.D. hiring in an effort to ascertain suitability of applicants' skills to A.I.D. needs, but again, this is done without attention to changing skills needs and has contributed to the "cloning" phenomenon. Finally, the ABS and CDSS processes try to project workforce needs in relation to expected future programs at the Mission level. They also contain data on the Mission workforce. But these efforts have not fed into overall A.I.D. forecasting, and data has not been shared.

Because there has been no effort (of which the Working Group is aware) to develop a comprehensive picture of A.I.D.'s workforce, such as that above, decisions made on numbers of promotions for the FS and SFS, numbers of Limited Class Extensions, training required by the workforce, hiring, or types and number of skills for recruitment have contributed to the workforce distortions

depicted earlier. [As one more example, we understand seven or eight SFS members were referred to the Performance Standards Board this year, the first time when restrictions imposed by the FS Act would not inhibit or defer selection out. Yet, no one was selected out. We further assume that LCE's were granted again to the majority of those eligible. These events occurred when A.I.D. is under pressure to hire new staff to meet new program priorities yet lacks the ability to do so given its budget and ceiling problems. Fewer, more selective granting of LCE's and full use of authorities on selection out under the FS Act would be a partial step toward gaining some flexibility on new hires.]

Relating decisions on such matters as LCE's, selection out, etc. to a broader picture and understanding of A.I.D.'s workforce -- FS, CS, FNDH and non-DH -- can over time make the workforce more productive, more effective and more efficient and make the A.I.D. workplace a more satisfying environment. This is the intent of workforce planning and management.

Attachment I

SUMMARY OF USDH EMPLOYEE TRAINING
INCLUDES ALL AID-SPONSORED TRAINING OF ACTIVE EMPLOYEES
As of September 30, 1990

		NO. EMPS WHO REC'D TRAINING	NO. COURSES TAKEN
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INTERN PROGRAM			
	CS	PROF	14
	FS	PROF	14
TOTAL			400
			405
			414
			419
ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT (Admin, Supply, GSO)			
	CS	CLER	4
	CS	PROF	5
	SUB TOTAL		33
	FS	PROF	34
			37
TOTAL			147
			181
			184
			220
AGRICULTURE			
	CS	PROF	10
	FS	PROF	16
TOTAL			161
			241
			171
			257
ANALYTICAL (Analytical Skills, Math, Statistics)			
	CS	CLER	12
	CS	PROF	14
	SUB TOTAL		66
	FS	PROF	81
			78
TOTAL			138
			153
			216
			248
COMMUNICATIONS (English Skills, Public Speaking, Writing)			
	CS	CLER	291
	CS	PROF	537
	SUB TOTAL		335
	FS	CLER	610
	FS	PROF	1147
	SUB TOTAL		626
TOTAL			13
			16
			194
			237
			207
			253
			833
			1400
CONTRACTING			
	CS	CLER	30
	CS	PROF	36
	SUB TOTAL		245
	FS	CLER	494
	FS	PROF	530
	SUB TOTAL		275
TOTAL			4
			5
			496
			835
			500
			840
			775
			1370

DATA PROCESSING (Systems, Mainframe and PC Programming Languages)

	CS	CLER	281	646
	CS	PROF	512	1806
	SUB TOTAL		793	2452
	FS	CLER	17	39
	FS	PROF	593	1228
	SUB TOTAL		610	1267
TOTAL			1403	3719

DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

	CS	CLER	1	1
	CS	PROF	64	66
	SUB TOTAL		65	67
	FS	PROF	361	394
	SUB TOTAL		361	394
TOTAL			426	461

ECONOMICS

	CS	CLER	2	2
	CS	PROF	60	98
	SUB TOTAL		62	100
	FS	PROF	130	164
TOTAL			192	264

EDUCATION

	CS	CLER	3	4
	CS	PROF	19	21
	SUB TOTAL		22	25
	FS	PROF	27	29
TOTAL			49	54

ENGINEERING/TRANSPORTATION

	CS	CLER	78	82
	CS	PROF	30	33
	SUB TOTAL		108	115
	FS	CLER	4	4
	FS	PROF	16	17
	SUB TOTAL		20	21
TOTAL			128	136

ENERGY				
	CS	PROF	2	2
	FS	PROF	8	8
TOTAL			10	10
ENVIRONMENT				
	CS	PROF	12	12
	FS	PROF	76	77
TOTAL			88	89
EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT				
	CS	PROF	41	54
	FS	PROF	63	73
TOTAL			104	127
FINANCE/ACCOUNTING/AUDITING				
	CS	CLER	24	40
	CS	PROF	123	242
	SUB TOTAL		147	282
	FS	PROF	241	329
TOTAL			388	611
HEALTH/POPULATION/NUTRITION				
	CS	CLER	4	4
	CS	PROF	42	52
	SUB TOTAL		46	56
	FS	PROF	109	142
TOTAL			155	198
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS				
	CS	PROF	3	3
	FS	PROF	4	4
TOTAL			7	7

NEGOTIATING SKILLS

	CS	CLER	1	1
	CS	PROF	9	9
	SUB TOTAL		10	10
TOTAL	FS	PROF	7	7
			17	17

OTHER

	CS	CLER	58	72
	CS	PROF	349	667
	SUB TOTAL		407	739
	FS	CLER	42	62
	FS	PROF	1259	1999
TOTAL	SUB TOTAL		1301	2061
			1708	2800

TOTAL	FS	PROF	19	20
			29	34

PHYSICAL SCIENCES

	CS	PROF	4	7
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PROJECT DESIGN/IMPLEMENTATION

	CS	CLER	9	10
	CS	PROF	263	310
	SUB TOTAL		272	320
	FS	CLER	3	4
	FS	PROF	1256	1743
TOTAL	SUB TOTAL		1259	1747
			1531	2067

POLICY

	FS	PROF	1	1
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PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

	CS	CLER	37	63
	CS	PROF	143	410
	SUB TOTAL		180	473
	FS	CLER	3	3
	FS	PROF	89	123
	SUB TOTAL		92	126
TOTAL			272	599

POLITICAL SCIENCE

	CS	CLER	22	25
	CS	PROF	70	96
	SUB TOTAL		92	121
	FS	PROF	58	72
TOTAL			150	193

PRIVATE SECTOR/BUSINESS

	CS	CLER	15	23
	CS	PROF	52	63
	SUB TOTAL		67	86
	FS	CLER	1	1
	FS	PROF	141	156
	SUB TOTAL		142	157
TOTAL			209	243

SECRETARIAL

	CS	CLER	223	395
	CS	PROF	106	198
	SUB TOTAL		329	593
	FS	CLER	25	47
	FS	PROF	19	27
	SUB TOTAL		44	74
TOTAL			373	667

SELF-IMPROVEMENT (Stress Management, Career Management, et al)

	CS	CLER	67	70
	CS	PROF	134	141
	SUB TOTAL		201	211
	FS	CLER	2	2
	FS	PROF	56	57
	SUB TOTAL		58	59
TOTAL			259	270

SUPERVISION AND MANAGEMENT

	CS	CLER	150	219
	CS	PROF	500	1255
	SUB TOTAL		650	1474
	FS	CLER	8	14
	FS	PROF	1039	1520
	SUB TOTAL		1047	1534
TOTAL			1697	3008

SOCIAL SCIENCES

	CS	CLER	13	14
	CS	PROF	49	62
	SUB TOTAL		62	76
	FS	CLER	1	2
	FS	PROF	24	25
	SUB TOTAL		25	27
TOTAL			87	103

WORD PROCESSING

	CS	CLER	493	1100
	CS	PROF	328	561
	SUB TOTAL		821	1661
	FS	CLER	39	83
	FS	PROF	297	363
	SUB TOTAL		336	446
TOTAL			1157	2107

GRAND TOTAL			13037*	21706
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*Employees who have received training in more than one subject are counted in each of the categories.

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WORKFORCE PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT

MANDATE AND PURPOSE

The A.I.D. Administrator has made Workforce Planning one of his major management initiatives. A Working Group has been established to produce by December 31, 1990 report to the Administrator which will include:

1. A picture of the current workforce.
2. Changes needed in the workforce to meet the evolving Agency "Consensus" vision of the future (see below).
3. Barriers which must be overcome to achieve a workforce relevant to the "Consensus" and to permit better workforce planning, and some realistic options and opportunities to overcome the barriers.
4. A set of recommendations on the design, implementation and institutionalization of a Workforce Planning and Management System that will effectively serve top management and line managers.

The Working Group will base its findings and recommendations on an analysis of current workforce data and trends, maintaining close liaison with Bureau representatives, conducting extensive interviews throughout the Agency based on a set of key questions and reviewing the results of previous and on-going studies.

THE CONSENSUS FOR THE FUTURE

The WFPWG has assembled a broad basic set of assumptions that have been distilled from the Agency's Mission Statement, studies, think pieces, recent workshops and conversations. While they do not represent official policies or decisions, they do represent a fairly wide consensus within A.I.D. and provide some basic compass points to guide and discipline the Workforce Planning Assessment. If interviewees can review these in advance of the interview it would be most helpful.

Assumptions

--A.I.D.'s major program concentrations will be those contained in the current Agency Mission Statement, i.e. broad-based economic growth, strengthening free market forces, improving individual economic and social well-being, strengthening democracy, prudent environment and natural resources policies and management, and disaster relief.

--Despite domestic budget constraints and increased interest in international development on the part of other USG Agencies, A.I.D. will continue as the lead agency in US non-military foreign assistance and is likely to be responsible for even more program resources than currently. Food aid will be a critical component of assistance.

--Operating expense budgets will not rise proportionately, however, forcing A.I.D. to seek even more efficient and economical means of managing its responsibilities, and to rely on other than OE funding.

--This will translate into the following:

- o Reduced number of "product lines" or development areas in which A.I.D. will concentrate in general and by country and mission.
- o Even greater shifts towards wholesaling assistance and less emphasis on project assistance, while maintaining imaginative technical assistance in critical areas.
- o Greater concentration of effort on national and sectoral policy reform, with assistance increasingly tied to host country performance and less to short-term U.S. political objectives, thus permitting execution of more consistent A.I.D. development strategies.
- o A premium will be placed on management and analytical skills, and personnel that can blend management and technical skills.
- o A.I.D. will initiate and implement several new management initiatives involving improved and more state of the art management, information, monitoring, evaluation, and accountability systems that will improve efficiency and A.I.D.'s image and credibility.
- o Smaller A.I.D. Direct Hire organization with smaller A.I.D. missions and a reduced and consolidated A.I.D./W. Greater reliance on contracting.
- o A.I.D. also will likely rely more on regional organizations, PVO's, foundations, etc. in wholesaling its assistance.

	U.S. DIRECT HIRE FULL				PERMANENT EMPLOYMENT 6/				AS OF ...			
	AS OF ...				AS OF ...				AS OF ...			
	9/30/80				9/30/85				9/30/90			
	NO.	%	NO.	%	NO.	%	NO.	%	NO.	%	NO.	%
	CS	TOT	FS	TOT	CS	TOT	FS	TOT	CS	TOT	FS	TOT
	EMPS	EMPS	EMPS	EMPS	EMPS	EMPS	EMPS	EMPS	EMPS	EMPS	EMPS	EMPS
01 EXECUTIVE PERSONNEL	35	1.0	109	3.0	48	1.5	158	4.8	36	1.1	159	4.9
02 PROGRAM ANALYSIS <u>1/</u>	234	6.4	290	7.9	160	4.8	190	5.7	179	5.5	180	5.6
03 ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT	230	6.3	112	3.1	193	5.8	104	3.1	239	7.4	94	2.9
04 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT	79	2.2	131	3.6	63	1.9	126	3.8	118	3.7	116	3.6
05 SECRETARIES & GEN CLERICAL	418	11.4	100	2.7	315	9.5	63	1.9	318	9.8	38	1.2
06 GENERAL SERVICES	10	.3	45	1.2	9	.3	25	.8	17	.5	6	.2
07 ADMIN SUBPROFESSIONAL	273	7.5	39	1.1	234	7.1	30	.9	202	6.3	17	.5
08 AUDIT & INSPECTION	28	.8	94	2.6	20	.6	105	3.2	27	.8	140	4.3
09 GENERAL DEVELOPMENT <u>2/</u>	4	.1	170	4.6								
10 AGRICULTURE	27	.7	187	5.1	24	.7	217	6.6	23	.7	181	5.6
11 ECONOMIST <u>1/</u>					20	.6	64	1.9	27	.8	60	1.9
12 PROGRAM MANAGEMENT <u>2/</u>					0		122	3.7	0		103	3.2
14 RURAL DEVELOPMENT <u>2/</u>					0		34	1.0	0		19	.6
15 FOOD FOR PEACE	0		24	.7	0		40	1.2	0		36	1.1
20 HOUSING, URBAN & COMMUNITY DEV <u>3/</u>	47	1.3	38	1.0	2	.1	36	1.1	7	.2	31	1.0
21 BUSINESS, INDUSTRY & PRIV SECT <u>3/</u>					41	1.2	22	.7	60	1.9	35	1.1
25 ENGINEERING	16	0.4	93	2.5	7	.2	66	2.0	3	.1	37	1.1
27 EQUIP OPNS & MAINTENANCE	7	0.2	1									
30 ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT					0		10	.3	0		10	.3
50 HEALTH, MEDICAL & POPULATION	29	.8	96	2.6	17	.5	112	3.4	17	.5	99	3.1
60 EDUCATION	46	1.3	41	1.1	48	1.5	39	1.2	48	1.5	46	1.4
70 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION	0		3	.1								
72 SOCIAL SERVICE <u>4/</u>					8	.2	5	.1	14	.4	0	
75 PHYS & SOCIAL SCIENCE <u>4/</u>					32	1.0	4	.1	31	1.0	4	.1
80 COMMUNITY & SOCIAL DEV. <u>4/</u>	15	.4	34	.9								
85 LEGAL	31	.9	22	.6	25	.8	34	1.0	30	.9	34	1.1
91 PARTICIPANT TRAINING	19	.5	9	.3								
92 PROCUREMENT & PROP DISP <u>5/</u>					27	.8	34	1.0	8	.3	19	.6
93 CONTRACT MANAGEMENT <u>5/</u>	90	2.5	55	1.5	45	1.4	31	.9	67	2.1	42	1.3
94 CAPITAL PROJECTS/DEV. LOANS	26	.7	164	4.5	13	.4	200	6.0	7	.2	183	5.7
95 INTERNATIONAL DVL INTERNS	0		122	3.3	0		81	2.4	0		59	1.8
99 PRINTERS/DRIVERS	23	.6	0		11	.3	0		7	.2	0	
TOTAL	1687	46.0	1979	54.0	1362	41.1	1952	58.9	1485	45.9	1748	54.1

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1/ IN 1983 ECONOMIST POSITIONS WERE SPLIT OUT OF BS 02 - PROGRAM ANALYSIS INTO THE NEW BS 11 - ECONOMISTS.
 2/ IN 1987 POSITIONS IN BS 09 - GENERAL DEVELOPMENT - WERE SPLIT AMONG TWO NEW BACKSTOPS, BS 12 - PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AND BS 14 - RURAL DEVELOPMENT.
 3/ IN 1983 SOME POSITIONS IN BS 20 - HOUSING, URBAN AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT WERE REMOVED AND FORMED A NEW BS 21 - BUSINESS, INDUSTRY AND PRIVATE SECTOR
 4/ IN 1983 POSITIONS IN BS 80 - COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT WERE SPLIT AMONG BS 75 - PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE AND BS 72 - SOCIAL SERVICE.
 5/ IN 1983 SOME POSITIONS IN BS 93 - CONTRACT MANAGEMENT WERE REMOVED AND FORMED A NEW BS 92 - PROCUREMENT AND PROPERTY DISPOSAL.
 6/ INCLUDES EMPS WITH PERMANENT TENURE, EMPS ON CAREER CONDITIONAL/CANDIDATE APPOINTMENTS, AS WELL AS EMPS WITH APPOINTMENTS EXCEEDING ONE YEAR.

TOTAL A.I.D. WORKFORCE BY LOCATION AND TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT
AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1980, 1985 AND 1990

1980					1985					1990				
AS	USDH	FNDH	NON-DH	TOTAL	AS	USDH	FNDH	NON-DH	TOTAL	AS	USDH	FNDH	NON-DH	TOTAL
	2,546	-	381	2,927		2,142	-	210	2,352		2,232	-	535	2,767
AS	1,512	1,900	1,917	5,329	OVERSEAS	1,481	1,281	2,903	5,665	OVERSEAS	1,256	1,070	6,308	8,634
TOTAL	4,058	1,900	2,298	8,256	TOTAL	3,623	1,281	3,113	8,017	TOTAL	3,488	1,070	6,843	11,401
BREAKDOWN OF OVERSEAS TOTALS BY REGION					BREAKDOWN OF OVERSEAS TOTALS BY REGION					BREAKDOWN OF OVERSEAS TOTALS BY REGION				
AS	USDH	FNDH	NON-DH	TOTAL	AS	USDH	FNDH	NON-DH	TOTAL	AS	USDH	FNDH	NON-DH	TOTAL
AFR	460	471	519	1,450	AFR	458	311	545	1,314	AFR	404	250	2,407	3,061
ANE	210	262	199	671	ANE	475	556	1,500	2,630	ANE	432	450	2,365	3,247
LATIN AM	264	553	710	1,527	LATIN AM	349	304	750	1,493	LATIN AM	308	348	1,498	2,154
NON-REGNL & COMP	286	589	480	1,355	NON-REGNL & COMP	199	20	9	228	NON-REGNL & COMP	94	22	36	152
TOTAL	1,512	1,900	1,917	5,329	TOTAL	1,481	1,281	2,903	5,665	TOTAL	1,256	1,070	6,308	8,634
BREAKDOWN OF AID/W TOTALS					BREAKDOWN OF AID/W TOTALS					BREAKDOWN OF AID/W TOTALS				
AS	USDH	NON-DH	TOTAL	AS	USDH	NON-DH	TOTAL	AS	USDH	NON-DH	TOTAL			
AFR	217	18	235	AFR	191	15	206	AFR	190	14	204			
ANE	146	2	148	ANE	191	5	196	ANE	160	8	168			
PRE	126	1	127	PRE	40	2	51	A/PRE	85	6	91			
LAC	132	5	137	LAC	125	8	133	LAC	122	6	128			
SUBTOTAL	621	26	647	SUBTOTAL	556	30	586	SUBTOTAL	557	14	591			
PPC	139	53	192	PPC	147	13	160	PPC	129	51	180			
MS	491	-	491	MS	382	66	448	MS	329	260	589			
S&T	383	257	640	S&T	267	82	349	S&T	228	98	326			
FVA	100	23	123	FVA	82	2	84	FVA	81	20	101			
IG	92	1	100	IG	94	-	94	IG	130	8	138			
SUBTOTAL	1,212	334	1,546	SUBTOTAL	972	163	1,135	SUBTOTAL	897	437	1,334			
OTHER	713	21	734	ALL OTHER	614	17	631	ALL OTHER	778	64	842			
TOTAL	2,546	381	2,927	TOTAL	2,142	210	2,352	TOTAL	2,232	535	2,767			

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AID EMPLOYEES BY AGE, LEVEL AND TYPE OF SERVICE
AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1990
ELVAG90A

AGE RANGE	LEVEL 1		LEVEL 2		LEVEL 3		LEVEL 4		TOTAL		GRAND TOTAL
	CS	FS	CS	FS	CS	FS	CS	FS	CS	FS	
16-25	-	-	-	-	10	-	181	-	191	-	191
26-30	-	-	6	1	51	6	117	3	174	10	184
31-35	1	-	41	45	54	46	75	3	171	94	265
36-40	2	-	75	193	49	47	77	9	203	249	452
41-45	14	32	133	365	79	30	85	6	311	433	744
46-50	13	107	136	368	70	17	73	13	292	505	797
51-55	9	85	83	194	47	14	43	6	182	299	481
56-60	4	28	59	99	26	10	62	5	151	142	293
61-65	4	13	24	46	10	1	39	3	77	63	140
65+	1	1	16	1	12	-	30	1	59	3	62
TOTAL	48	266	573	1,312	408	171	782	49	1,811	1,798	3,609

LEVEL 1 = SFS AND SES, EX, AND GS/GM-16 AND ABOVE
LEVEL 2 = FS 3-1 AND GS/GM 13-15
LEVEL 3 = FS 5-4 AND GS 9-12
LEVEL 4 = FS 9-6 AND GS 1-8

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ENTRANTS/REENTRANTS INTO THE FOREIGN SERVICE
(EXCLUDES RESIDENT HIRES)

YEAR	GRADE	NUMBER	AVERAGE AGE AT TIME ENTERED	YEAR	GRADE	NUMBER	AVERAGE AGE AT TIME ENTERED
1985	OC	3	49.1	1988	MC	1	57.4
	01	2	48.1		OC	1	50.4
	02	4	45.8		01	10	49.6
	03	10	41.4		02	15	41.0
	04	8	33.6		03	34	41.1
	05	3	32.3		04	16	40.2
	07	1	45.9		05	4	35.4
	SUB TOTAL	31	40.4		06	4	32.0
					SUB TOTAL	85	46.6
1986	CM	1	59.1	1989	MC	1	55.0
	MC	1	46.8		01	8	45.1
	OC	2	51.1		02	27	40.5
	01	8	47.3		03	18	39.5
	02	16	43.0		04	20	37.1
	03	14	37.1		05	5	33.8
	04	9	32.7		07	1	39.5
	05	6	33.4		SUB TOTAL	80	39.6
	08	1	41.4				
	SUB TOTAL	58	40.2				
1987	MC	1	49.1	1990	MC	2	47.7
	01	8	43.3		OC	1	55.4
	02	16	40.4		01	6	51.6
	03	72	40.8		02	15	43.5
	04	22	34.0		03	20	42.4
	05	25	33.1		04	16	36.1
	06	4	42.0		05	2	34.9
	07	2	41.9		SUB TOTAL	62	42.1
	09	1	38.3				
	SUB TOTAL	151	38.7				
				GRAND TOTAL		581	39.6

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QUESTIONS

The basic purpose of this exercise is for the Working Group to develop recommendations on a Workforce Planning and Management (WFP) model or system. This WFP model could theoretically be used under a variety of program and structural scenarios.

At the same time, in order to give more meaning to the study, we are assuming that the vision of the "Consensus" (see above) is essentially where we are headed, and where we will likely be in the mid-1990's.

A. WORKFORCE

1. Assuming the "Consensus" is the wave of the future, what changes must be made in your workforce and in the Agency's total workforce, to carry out effectively what is envisaged?

a. Size

b. Kinds of skills (i.e. program management, technical expertise, technical management, administration and general management, line or staff roles, overall planning vs operations, etc.)

c. Mix of Skills (i.e. country knowledge, policy analysis, economic analysis, support skills, etc.)

d. Level of skills (i.e. senior people, juniors)

e. Types of employment (i.e. GS, FS, FSN, Consultants, Contractors, other Agency personnel)

f. Organizational arrangements (i.e. A.I.D./W-Field relationships, degree of delegation to Missions, Geographical Regional offices, etc.)

g. Implications for recruitment and training.

2. Does A.I.D. now have in its present workforce an adequate mix of skills to meet its future workforce needs? If not, what skills are going to be in short supply or over supply?

3. Are there trends already underway in the Agency staffing moving toward the type of workforce envisaged in the "Consensus?"

4. To what extent do you use non-Direct Hire staff to meet your staffing needs? In what categories? How has that changed (as far back as 10 years if possible)? What further changes do you see for the future?

5. Do you agree with the "Consensus?" If not, where and how does that alter your answers, i.e. from your point of view, if you could have your own preferences in moving toward the future, what changes in workforce would you want to make?

B. BARRIERS

Our Working Group is very much aware that there are many barriers to the most effective deployment of our workforce, now and in the future. Some of these are external to A.I.D.. Many of these barriers deal with the flexibility of the workforce itself. Others deal with the workplace -- how well or poorly our management systems and management decision-making create a workplace in which the workforce can be most productive.

1. What are the most serious constraints (either within A.I.D. or outside of it) to making the most effective use of your overall workforce resources, now and in the future? (You may respond to the following examples, but feel free to discuss other factors). How can these barriers be overcome?

EXTERNAL

- a. Congress: Earmarks, restrictions
- b. Other Agency: OMB, State, etc.
- c. Political elements- Foreign and Domestic
- d. Budgetary
- e. Others

INTERNAL

- a. What present overall A.I.D. policies and programs require modification to move to an Agency, and an Agency workforce envisaged in the "Consensus?"
- b. What Agency PM policies or regulations do you feel limit the ability to meet present and future staffing needs? What changes would you recommend?

- Prompts: Ceilings
 OE Funding
 Recruitment
 Skills Shortages
 EEO and Minority
 Language Training
 Recruitment &
 Assignment by Backstop

c. What internal documentation, review and procedural workload systems or contracts can be reduced, increasingly automated, or transferred to non-Direct Hire staff to make more effective and efficient use of Direct Hire staff?

1. Some allege that A.I.D. is slow in making program/management decisions and in implementing these and administrative actions. What needs to be done to change this condition?
2. In what ways, and to what extent do policies or procedures for A.I.D. management systems preclude or hinder the most effective utilization of the workforce?

C. THE DESIGN OF THE WORKFORCE PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Our Working Group will be developing a proposed new workforce planning and management system for A.I.D.. We want that system to really work -- and to give Agency leadership the tools and data it needs to direct workforce planning efforts.

1. What guidance, direction and support from A.I.D. leadership will be regularly needed in order to permit effective workforce planning?
2. What are the key AID organizational actors which must be involved to have effective workforce planning?
3. How could Agency workforce planning better support your present and future workforce management needs?

- Prompts
- Keep staffing more responsive to policies and regulations
 - Better information exchange on meeting staffing requirements
 - Responsiveness to special needs

4. Should a separate workforce planning system be established, responsive to top management priorities, and related to but not dependent upon the normal budget and programming process? What are the advantages and disadvantages?

5. Are the barriers identified earlier (particularly the external), so important, in your experience and judgement, to preclude any rational attempt to plan our workforce several years into the future? How can we best take these factors into account in workforce planning?

ANNEX E - LIST OF AGENCY LIAISON REPRESENTATIVES

Katherine Blakeslee, S&T
Bernard Block, AFR
Peter Bloom, LAC
David Johnson, MS
Hariadene Johnson, APRE

Carol McGraw, PPC
Leonard Rogers, ENE
Janet Rourke, FM
Carlos Quiros, FVA

ANNEX F - LIST OF THOSE INTERVIEWED

Carol Adelman, AA/ENE
Jan Barrow, PM/CSP
Richard Bissell, AA/S&T
John Blackton, AA/PPC
Peter Bloom, LAC/DR
Walter Bollinger, USAID/India
Laurance Bond, AA/PPC
Margaret Bonner, AFR/DP
Timothy Bork, AFR/PD
Elena Brineman, LAC/DR
Reginald Brown, AA/PPC
Anthony Cauterucci, PM/OD
Career Dvl Officers, PM/FSP
Eugene Chiavaroli, AA/S&T
Philip Christenson, AA/FVA
Richard Cobb, AFR/TR
Charles Costello, USAID/Ecuador
Leslie Dean, AFR/SA
Michael Doyle, AA/MS
Mark Edelman, DA/AID
John Eriksson, PPC/CDIE
William Furtick, S&T/FA
Antonio Gayoso, S&T/HR
Duff Gillespie, S&T/HP/POP
Myron Golden, AFR/CCWA
Roberta Gray, APRE/EMS
Robert Halligan, AA/PFM, ret'd
Kay Harley, S&T/EMS
Lois Hartman, PM/OD
Allison Herrick, USAID/Zimbabwe
retired
John Hicks, AFR/SWA
George Hill, PPC/PB
Henerietta Holsman-Fore, AA/APRE
Gwendolyn Joe, ES
Hariadene Johnson, APRE/SPEE
Jerry Jordan, LAC/EMS
Francis Kenefick, A/AID
Peter Kimm, APRE/H
James Kunder, XA
Bradshaw Landmaid, AA/S&T
George Laudato, AA/APRE
John Lee, MS/MO
Betty Lind, ENE/EMS
Alexander Love, A/AID
David Lundberg, AFR/EA
Mark Matthews, FM/CONT
Robert McDonald, PM/EPM
Carol McGraw, AFR/EMS
David Mein, ES
David Merrill, AA/ENE
Richard Meyer, ES, ret'd
James Michel, AA/LAC
Vivikka Molldrem, ENE/MENA
Sally Montgomery, AA/FVA
John Mullen, GC
Robert Nachtrieb, ENE/PD
Andrew Natsios, OFDA
James Norris, USAID/Pakistan
Richard Nygard, AA/PPC
John Owens, AA/MS
Jessalyn Perndarvis, EOP
Donald Pressley, ENE/EUR
R. Ray Randlett, AA/LEG
Lewis Reade, USAID/Indonesia
Lois Richards, formerly USAID/Somalia
Raymond Riffenberg, USAID/Dom Rep
Leonard Rogers, ENE/DP
Janet Rourke, FM/EMS
Lawrence Saiers, AA/AFR
John Sanbrailo, USAID/Honduras
Frederick Schieck, AA/LAC
Bastiaan Schouten, LAC/DPP
Douglas Sheldon, S&T/PO
James Shelton, S&T/HP/POP/R
Kenneth Sherper, APRE/DR
William Sigler, PM/OD, ret'd
Michael Trott, PM/PPOM/PP
Henry Ulrich, PM/PPOM
Michael Usnick, FM/CONT
Ann VanDusen, S&T/HP/H
Reginald VanRaalte, formerly
USAID/Bolivia
Jack Vanderryn, S&T/EN
Robert Ward, FVA/EMS
Paul White, ENE/PCAP
John Wilkinson, SDB

ANNEX G - SYNTHESIS OF INTERVIEWS

The Working Group carried out interviews with Agency employees from AA's to office directors and below. The set of questions used is in ANNEX C. What follows is a summary of the results of those interviews. We have tried to lay out the portrait of responses as clearly as possible while reserving some impressionistic license due to the versatility, variety and imaginativeness of the respondents' replies. In our basic underlying analysis, we have quantified responses to the extent practicable. In general however, only by implication have we shown that quantification in this paper. It is our regret that given the quality of the responses, we were not able to interview many more of the Agency's employees. What we heard was stimulating and provocative, and in several areas, there were identical patterns of views and concerns, but not in all.

1. Consensus:

There was a surprising lack of consensus on the "Surprising Consensus" among respondents to our interviews (see key assumptions describing the "Surprising Consensus" on the Agency's future in Annex C). The number who "generally disagreed" with it was roughly the same as those who "generally agreed." And even those stating general agreement frequently had specific cases of disagreement. Moreover, there were a number of others who seemed to be unaware of the "Consensus."

The most frequently heard disagreement was with the assumption that A.I.D. would have fewer product lines; the respondents felt that Basic Human Needs programs, i.e. health, basic education, child survival, family planning and AIDS, would continue, and that Congress would keep adding new priorities to the list of program areas without directing or permitting A.I.D. to drop old ones. Many felt that the assumptions did not give enough emphasis to projects and TA, and questioned the concept of wholesaling of aid. Others doubted that the program budget would grow. There was also concern expressed that the "Consensus" did not give sufficient emphasis to political realities. Another point at issue was whether A.I.D. could continue as the leader in U.S. foreign aid.

The conclusion from the above is that a Consensus may not exist at all in A.I.D. Alternatively, if there is a "Consensus," it may exist only among a very small number of senior A.I.D. staff. Either way, much more needs to be done to communicate A.I.D.'s future directions to Agency employees.

2. Future Workforce:

a. Size:

The majority of respondents see A.I.D.'s workforce as not growing, or as continuing to shrink during the 1990's despite a widespread belief the workload will not diminish. The reasons given are a reduction in OE, a reduction in the overall A.I.D. budget, and losing out on some programs to other agencies, such as EPA, Treasury, USDA, etc.

A large number see AID/W as still being too large with "central bureaus" i.e. S&T, MS, and PPC, singled out more frequently as being the culprits. But there were a number of respondents who contended the current workforce was already too small, or nearly so, with no "slack" to meet emergencies or unforeseen requirements or to react quickly and flexibly to new program initiatives, or even to cope with existing programs and accountability problems. A large number of respondents expressed concern over A.I.D.'s being able to meet accountability requirements and the amount of time now being diverted from program implementation to accountability concerns.

b. Kinds/Mix of Skills:

Management was named by virtually every respondent as a "skill" of which the Agency "needs more and better". Improved management was stressed as being needed across all operational areas -- project management, contract management, financial management, program management, personnel management -- as well as from the top down in A.I.D. Analytical skills were cited by many as high priority -- in policy analysis for sectoral reform; in carrying out supporting skills, i.e. economics, negotiation; and for assessing the impact of foreign aid efforts. A third area often cited was contracting, regulations and oversight. All three sets of skills are seen as continuing areas of weakness or deficiency. The need for new skills in environmental subjects, Democratic Initiatives, private sector, trade and finance were also frequently cited.

Skills needs were also cited in both technical fields and in administrative areas, such as Controller and Executive Officer, where serious staff shortages now exist per various interviewees. These respondents noted that the reasons for more staff in all these areas include: higher levels of A.I.D. activity in health, basic education, capital/infrastructure, and in environment/natural resources fields; pressures for using increased funding allocations; and accountability concerns.

There is a fairly general consensus that the A.I.D. direct hire employee of the future will be more broad-gauged and more of a generalist although with some technical expertise in a field of importance to A.I.D. Often mentioned was the concept of the "technical manager" -- a generalist but with some basic professional skills -- to run future A.I.D. programs (it was apparent from the interviews that a clearer definition is needed of that concept).

An M.A. degree is preferred. Hiring PhD's was questioned by some due to A.I.D.'s needs for broad, versatile, practical personnel instead of more theoretical, research-oriented, and narrowly specialized ones. Ideally, future A.I.D. direct hires should have some overseas experience and be able to demonstrate during recruitment some analytical and managerial capability (how these are to be ascertained was a question even for those making this assertion). More specialized technical skills, especially those at "the cutting edge," and most technical implementors are expected to be hired under limited-term direct hire appointments, or under contract, and, also, to be sought through more intensive use of IPA's, JCC's, APAS', etc. There is a broad-based belief that A.I.D. must have some high-level technical expertise hired in a mode in which they are "A.I.D.'s people" rather than advocates of contractors or other outside interests. Moreover, some asserted the continuing need for middle to senior-level DH technical staff in the future. These are needed for technical review of contracts, effective technical dialogue with the host country and design of projects and programs, and maintenance of AID's substantive competency in technical areas. But the majority view was clearly that most future technical expertise would be brought in from the outside, as needed, through non-career vehicles.

A few interviewees pointed to the need to reassess the type of secretarial/clerical personnel skills which A.I.D. now requires, given the advent of word processing. Some assumed that the number of these personnel can be reduced. An equal number stated that there are other duties beyond typing which these personnel carry out and which need to be considered and that work may be expanding to eliminate time savings created by word processing.

c. Level:

Opinion was mixed on whether A.I.D. should be hiring more junior or more senior (in terms of age and grade) personnel. Many said we need to hire both. There were strong sentiments in favor of restoring the traditional entry-level IDI program, and some clear dissatisfaction was expressed with experience from A.I.D.'s recent pattern of hiring older, more senior (FS 1-2) technical experts who still require time to master A.I.D. processes and regulations. Many stated that staff brought up in progression through the system are better able to manage

A.I.D.'s development work. That the SFS is possibly too large and the FS is both aging and very senior in grade per WFPWG data and in the eyes of many, also underlie the preference by many for more junior personnel. At the same, some interviewed expressed concern at a perceived heavy loss in the period ahead of many of A.I.D.'s most experienced senior-level personnel with an attendant loss of supervisory and management competency

d. Types of Employment:

Many noted that the Foreign Service (FS) is the most important element in our future because of our mandate as a foreign affairs agency and the nature of our work, implying a reduction in the numbers of Civil Service (CS) employees. It was also suggested by some that there be more flexible use of the CS -- specifically, in assignments overseas or in the ability to switch back and forth between FS and CS.

There also appears to be strong consensus that more use must be made of FSN's as well as of the non-direct hire "cheaper" component of the A.I.D. work force (U.S. and FN PSC's), while stressing that the issue of accountability must be addressed; and that there needs to be more use of limited tenure (non-career) appointments in FS and CS hiring for technical and specialized skills. Limited appointments would help fill direct hire needs of a new or relatively short-term nature. It would also allow bringing in some "fresh talent" while making it possible for A.I.D. to keep current overall DH workforce technical skills. Contracting, said many, would be the main source of technical skills with only a "core" of technical expertise employed as direct hires. This core must manage contractors "to keep them honest" and to ensure they do what A.I.D. wants.

Exploiting the FN and non-direct hire workforce (including PASA's, IPA's and other special means of recruitment) and using them more effectively (under DH supervision) would require changes in authorities and responsibilities that are currently allowed under A.I.D. regulations, many interviewees noted. A small number of respondents also suggested more use be made of institutional/manpower contractors for performing Executive and Controller Office functions, thereby removing personnel in these offices from the DH A.I.D. workforce entirely.

e. Organizational Changes:

The field presence is seen as a real source of strength and of "value added" to A.I.D. programs, as well as a key factor in A.I.D.'s comparative advantage among foreign aid donors and other U.S. agencies. There were, however, mixed views on the numbers and size of the missions of the future. There were, not surprisingly, strong views that A.I.D. must continue to have extensive delegations of authority to the field. Some

suggested centralizing support functions, but only two respondents said that we should abolish missions and run the program out of AID/W.

A few respondents noted that A.I.D.'s organizational structure has remained unchanged since the 1960's despite its now being far smaller and faced with much change, suggesting that this, too, is an issue to be faced.

On another level, a number of respondents described (positively) efforts of the Africa Bureau a) to categorize countries as a means for guiding program size, complexity, and funding and staffing allocations; b) to reallocate responsibilities within the Bureau so as to strengthen geographic offices and reduce the duplication among DP, PD, and TR, c) to reduce size and responsibilities of the regional offices (REDSO) so they perform only a few service functions, and d) to take AID/W out of project oversight and focus it on broader program and management concerns.

f. Recruitment and Training:

There was much agreement among respondents that major changes are required in A.I.D.'s present recruitment practices. Suggestions made included:

- o Make the operation more pro-active.
- o Undertake active outreach to sources of candidates for direct hire employment.
- o Represent more accurately what A.I.D. work really is to candidates.
- o Direct recruitment over time rather than the "on and off" pattern of recent years.
- o Take directly into account the Bureaus' needs for skills, including those for emerging program areas (rather than limiting new hiring to replacements for those lost due to attrition and/or urgent immediate priorities arising from shortages in certain skills).
- o Enable A.I.D. to recruit more women and minorities.
- o Develop an effective career development effort starting with recruitment.

There were mixed notices on training; many training courses are viewed as being in pertinent areas, e.g. management, DSP, new entry, state of the art courses, etc. It was also suggested by various individual respondents that more courses be offered in contract management, financial management, and the new program

areas to which A.I.D. must be sensitive. High-impact courses rather than long-term training seem to be preferred.

A major concern expressed about A.I.D. training is that it is not systematic or integrated into an overall program of career development for employees and that it is not geared more directly toward overall Agency needs. Some also said that more needs to be undertaken in the training of AID's FNs if they are to play the expanded role expected of them. Considerable concern was also expressed about AID's language training program and follow-on assignments. The training is often insufficient and the assignments frequently to posts where the language learned is not used.

g. Does A.I.D. have an adequate mix of skills to meet its future workforce needs?

Among those who commented, there was nearly an even split between those who feel we have the talent needed for the future (with appropriate re-training), and those who believe we do not. Skills cited by some as being in short supply are private sector, trade and investment, management, environment, democratization, accountancy and analytical skills. Others suggested that many of the technical skills of A.I.D. may be out date for today's changing needs. There was little that was noted as being in over supply. Examples cited included engineers and "academic technicians" and a very few cited excess personnel on the complement. Some said it is difficult to answer this question until we have a clear sense of Agency directions.

h. Are there trends already underway in the Agency staffing moving toward the type of workforce envisaged in the "Consensus?"

Among trends to the future cited as consistent with the "Consensus" are PRE's bringing in private sector skills through AD appointments, ENE/TR's restructuring into agri-business, health delivery systems, private sector and environment, and AFR's DFA, its field restructuring, and performance budgeting, etc. Others noted we are still involved in many sectors and see little change. Greater focus, priority setting and concentration are needed.

i. Use of Non-DH Staff:

It is very clear from interviewees that there is already substantial reliance on the non-direct hire work force, including institutional contractors, both overseas and in AID/W, and that this flexibility is vital to AID's future and explains to a large degree how it has managed "more with less." Many noted that in the field, FNDH and FN PSC personnel perform virtually all the work in the Missions'

Executive and Controller Offices, most of which now are headed by a single USDH. The Communications and Records and Participant Training functions were transferred to FN's years ago. Increasingly, project management functions are being carried out by FN's and U.S. PSC's, and there is a perception that economists and similar jobs, where USDH are short, are being filled by PSC's. In AID/W, ENE, S&T, ANE/TR, AFR/DP and LAC, among others, report use of some non-direct hire personnel while FM, PPC/CDIE, IRM and MS as well as other units rely heavily on manpower contracts for functions, such as payroll, printing, mail handling, records/library management, etc.

There are many reasons given by interviewees for the trend. One is the need to fill in for or replace USDH who are not available. Another is the ability to hire more skilled personnel and fire non-performers with greater flexibility than is possible under the FS and CS systems. A third is cost, as FN's in general and locally hired PSC's are cheaper than USDH. On the other hand, some expressed concern at the cost of institutional contractors due to the large overheads they charge and of U.S. PSC's hired from the U.S. or third countries.

Respondents said that the large increase in FN PSC's overseas was explained by several events. In 1981 and more recently AID/W directed transfer of FSN's from the direct hire rolls to a contract basis as a means to meet lower FTE ceilings and reduce OE costs for Civil Service Retirement programs for these personnel. In the mid-1980's, AID/W and State directed the end of "umbrella" FSN employment contracts operated usually through U.S. Embassy Recreation Associations. As such contracts employed the great majority of Mission FSN personnel, these FSN's were at AID/W's directive converted to PSC's.

3. Barriers:

Among external barriers, the most frequently cited were Congressional earmarks and inadequate OE. Many felt that "Congress is the Agency's planning unit" and that there was little we could do to change that. A very few, however, felt that there was an opportunity to work with Congress to achieve a shared sense of direction on the Agency's future role, and thus reduce the number of earmarks and Congressionally mandated detail.

Other constraints noted were the addition of new program areas on top of FTE ceiling cuts; constraints on personnel decisions growing out of the Foreign Service Act (several interviewees believed that now, 10 years after the F.S. Act's passage, was a good time to revise it to correct problems experienced and rigidities affecting our ability to reshape A.I.D.'s workforce); special interest groups -- particularly those such as PVOs and universities interested in maintaining BHN programs; and the State Department with its own priorities (although there was little sense of State as "opposition").

Internal barriers covered many areas. One major constraint mentioned by many was AID's complicated documentation and review and approval processes. Several noted that studies have been undertaken on this problem, but, they had seen little evidence of reform or of the studies themselves. Several believed that too many AID/W staff, and redundancies in responsibilities, have led to cumbersome procedures. To cut future workload many said A.I.D. should cut or reassign AID/W staff.

Perhaps the main internal barrier noted by respondents centered on the personnel system, seen by many to be inflexible and poorly staffed (characterized by one interviewee as a "hurdle to be overcome and a mystery rather than a help in doing your job.") The several comments in this area touched on such factors as the following:

- o The FS Assignment Board system;
- o Language training, which impedes timely filling of personnel vacancies and is often wasted;
- o Too slow and ineffective personnel recruitment;
- o Too many backstop codes;
- o A lack of workforce planning;
- o An inadequate personnel data base;
- o An aging workforce;
- o The "inflexible" CS workforce;
- o The need for improved communication between PM and the bureaus; and
- o A requirement for improved career development practices.

Questions about the IG and accountability demands on staff time are also a concern of many. Slow, complex, and risk averse contracting and procurement systems were also cited.

Overall management and leadership were cited as shortcomings by a few.

4. Workforce Planning Unit:

This section of the questionnaire elicited the briefest and most general responses in the interviews. Many indicated they were not clear on what is involved in workforce planning or able to conceptualize a process or a unit that would undertake it, and how it would fit into the A.I.D. organizational structure. Some queried whether A.I.D. could do meaningful work force planning given constantly increasing and/or changing program priorities.

There was general consensus that for workforce planning to work, it has to have strong, visible support by top A.I.D. management, i.e. the A/AID, D/AID, C/AID, AA's and DAA's. There was much less of a sense of how that support would be manifest except it was agreed the A/AID had to give clear directions on where A.I.D. is going. We need a clear strategy; we need a "business plan," said many.

Most who had views on organizational arrangements saw the A/AID, D/AID, or C/AID as having to make final decisions on workforce questions and resolve disputes among bureaus. A few felt the D/AID or C/AID might be appropriate levels at which to make such decisions.

Organizationally, more interviewees favored placing a work force planning unit in PM than elsewhere. PPC was also mentioned as was the Office of the Administrator. It was recognized that budget concerns and FTE ceilings are part of work force planning, but there was also some concern about having annual budget levels drive longer-term personnel decisions which most properly are part of workforce planning. The link between workforce planning and implementation of personnel decisions stemming from it seemed to work in PM's favor. Nearly all agreed on PM's central role in implementation.

Widely recognized was the fact that for workforce planning to work, there would have to be much closer relations between PM and the bureaus and far better information sharing on programs and future skills needs. Several noted that the primary input on skills/staff needs must come from the bureaus/field missions. It was assumed by a very few interviewees that the ABS or other Bureau documents would generate data on projected workforce numbers, skills needs, etc. for each Mission, which would be reviewed within each Bureau. The interviewees did not raise the question of to what extent the non-DH workforce should be included in formal WFP. There were those, however, who noted the trade-offs between DH and non-DH hiring and such problems as diminished Trust Funds and a weakened dollar impacting on local staffing availability.

Those interviewees who commented were generally uncertain as to how often workforce planning projections or reviews would be conducted. Some said the tie to the ABS would suggest an annual review and, by extension, one might infer forward rolling workforce planning over five-year periods with annual updates, just as occurs with the budget cycle. At the other extreme, a very few seemed to suggest a one-time only effort.

Two other comments by those interviewed also merit recognition. Several individuals stressed the necessity of the former Senior Operations Group being reconstituted as part of workforce planning. What role the SOG might play was not clear. The second was the observation that A.I.D. needs to do "workload planning," rather than workforce planning.

Other Voices:

We have above laid out in general the prevailing themes stemming from the interviews, and we have pointed out variations within these themes. There were also isolated strong opinions of a vastly different nature, or emphasizing a point of view with special intensity, which merit special mention here because of the extent of their diversity and because they represent elements of articulate and key leadership within the Agency. One is that A.I.D. should change completely the way it does business. Missions should be abolished and programs run out of Washington, but not by regional bureaus -- who represent parochial interests -- but by functional bureaus who will better reflect actual needs and more efficiently administer programs.

A second theme given special force from one quarter was that A.I.D. is in deep trouble in its present operations. The Agency does not have sufficient staff; it continues to make the same management and operational mistakes year after year. The Agency refuses to face up to the fact it cannot do business the way it used to in the absence of sufficient numbers of staff; it is losing credibility on the Hill because of its serious difficulty in maintaining thorough accountability for its programs.

ANNEX H - LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: Senior managers systematically and clearly communicate the future role and direction of the Agency to the staff, and include sufficient detail in its elaboration to engender a sense of common purpose and enable development of workforce planning within a long-range Human Resources Management Policy and Strategy.

Recommendation 2: For purposes of formal workforce planning, define the workforce as those people having an employer-employee relationship with the Agency and make that the working definition throughout the Agency.

Recommendation 3: Include in the Agency's existing personnel and budget reporting requirements all those personnel who are included in the definition of the workforce and determine what precise information is required for workforce planning purposes on FNDH and PSC's, as well as data needs on the extended workforce.

Recommendation 4: Evaluate means by which there can be greater use of limited appointments in the A.I.D. workforce to meet specific and shorter-term requirements for specialized expertise, while taking fully into account possible difficulties in attracting personnel for short-term assignments.

Recommendation 5: Evaluate possibilities for greater flexibility in the use of CS employees to meet the Agency's staffing needs in the field.

Recommendation 6: Reduce or eliminate distortions or imbalances in the workforce in such areas as: grade structure, skills mix, methods of appointment, size, role and authorities of the current and future U.S. and local staff in relation to the size, diversity and geographic distribution of the Agency's programs.

Recommendation 7: Decide what functions are more appropriately performed by USDH, FNDH, and FN PSC's in light of issues of accountability and vulnerability, supervisory responsibilities, and changed and expanded responsibilities increasingly being assumed by the FNDH and non-direct hire components of the workforce. Upgrade the FN personnel system to reflect this.

Recommendations 8: Include PSC's as a part of A.I.D.'s workforce planning, although specific hiring, firing, promotion and similar decisions should remain in the field where such staffing needs are best known.

Recommendation 9: On a continuing basis, collect data on functions performed by, and determine budget and staffing implications of the extended workforce, and assess their impact on numbers, skills requirements, training, etc. for the A.I.D. direct hire and non-direct hire defined workforce. Such information should be part of regular data collection efforts on the A.I.D. workforce, though it need not be nearly so extensive.

Recommendation 10: Employ, as many USAID's have done, many of the non-direct hire workforce, such as char force, maintenance staff, and possibly drivers (insurance and other liability considerations permitting) under institutional manpower contracts in those countries where this is possible. This would reduce contract management workload and trim the size of the workforce over which A.I.D. has employer-employee relationships.

Recommendation 11: Determine the desired general composition of the direct hire workforce in terms of program managers, both general and technical, and highly qualified technical specialists and develop a plan for reshaping the workforce along those lines. In that process, define the basic skills and/or qualities and abilities each should possess.

Recommendation 12: Conduct an individual skills profile of the existing workforce and analyze it in the context of the desired general composition of the direct hire workforce.

Recommendation 13: Establish an IDI program, pursuant to the analysis in a recent PM analysis and Action Memorandum to the Deputy Administrator, which would ensure that entry level FS professionals are brought into the A.I.D. workforce on a continuous and uninterrupted basis. This would also assure that, over time, IDI graduates, with adequate experience and training, and who have developed as part of the system, would fill more of the Agency's management positions.

Recommendation 14: Restructure the personnel backstop system to simplify, reduce and thereby broaden categories.

Recommendation 15: Tapping the newly created Minority Recruitment Advisory Group (MRAG), initiate more proactive and continuous recruitment of women and minorities and include women and minorities on recruitment teams. Assign a higher priority and take more deliberate steps to comply with Agency policy and Foreign Service Act provisions on making its workforce more representative of the U.S. population overall.

Recommendation 16: In conjunction with the MRAG, seek means in recruitment of increasing the available women and minority candidate pool to ensure that greater numbers of qualified women and minorities are included on the "best qualified" selection lists.

Recommendation 17: Continue the efforts by FS selection and tenure boards to identify promotable women and minorities, and to identify training which can enhance their promotability. Supervisors and managers of CS employees, as well as PM, working with the MRAG, should make more concerted efforts to identify well qualified CS women and minorities and encourage them to apply for advertised jobs.

Recommendation 18: Remove inactive vacancies from the system. Only real positions within Agency workyear ceilings should remain in the system against which assignments and recruitment decisions can be made.

Recommendation 19: Redefine the roles and job content of the Agency's secretarial and clerical workforce to reflect the work they do now, and also reflect the significant impact of automation. Initial work on this should begin as part of Phase II.

Recommendation 20: Develop an overall human resources management strategy under PM coordination with the full participation of all Bureaus and Offices. PM should be commended for, and encouraged to expand, its current efforts to develop a future and service oriented personnel system, and to do more "outreach" and become more in tune with and aware of Agency program directions and requirements.

Recommendation 21: Proactively track in recruitment the program directions of the Agency with an emphasis on management and analytical skills; ensure training for all components of the workforce (direct hire and PSC) is geared to future needs, and covers non-USDH effectively.

Recommendation 22: Create and install a Workforce Planning System and Workforce Planning Staff along the lines proposed in Section III.

MISSION WORKFORCE ALLOCATION MODEL

A. ASSUMPTIONS:

-- That the levels of staffing for field operation are limited by the Operating Expenses budget appropriation.

-- That concern for vulnerability and accountability require a minimum core presence when bilateral assistance programs are underway.

-- That the construction of the program, the level and mode of assistance utilized, has a direct relationship to the level of staffing required.

-- That a rational workforce allocation process is dependent on the establishment and implementation of program development criteria and controls.

B. MINIMUM CORE MISSION STAFFING:

When a bilateral assistance program is instituted, experience has dictated that a minimum core staffing level in country is required to protect Agency and U.S. Government stewardship of appropriated funds. A core staffing model for a bilateral Mission would include:

MINIMUM CORE STAFFING MODEL

Principal A.I.D. Officer

A.I.D. Controller

A.I.D. Executive Officer

Program Officer/Project Development Officer

The minimum core staffing model assumes that Legal and Contracts Officer expertise is available on a regional, TDY or shared bilateral basis.

C. COUNTRY PROGRAMMING PRINCIPLES and GUIDELINES:

To control and rationalize country workforce allocation levels, it is essential that a set of models be established the basis of which will determine staffing levels beyond the minimum core staffing requirements. The following is an initial attempt at creating these models:

Segregate Programs by principal driving force:

Development Programs

- Category 1 - Large (\$30 mil) - Multi-Sector - Good Perf. (15 -20 people)
- Category 2 - Med. (\$15-30 mil) - 2-3 Sectors - Good Perf. (10-15 people)
- Category 3 - Small (Less than \$15 mil) - 1 Sector - Good Perf. (5-10 people)
- Category 4 - Buy-Ins (Less than \$15 mil) - 1 sector Adequate perf. (0-5 people)

Political/Security Programs:

- Category 1 - Large, highly visible, U.S. Nat'l Interests. \$30 million or more (15 or more people)
- Category 2 - Medium - strategic - \$15-30 Mil. (5-15 people)
- Category 3 - Reconstruction (Emerging Democracies) (1-5 people)

Advanced Developing Country Programs:

Beyond concessional assistance, S&T focus, Private Sector, program level, per se, not directly relevant. (0-5 people)

Emergency Relief Programs:

- Countries where sole purpose is disaster relief - Ethiopia, Sudan, Liberia etc. (1-5 people)

D. VARIABLE FACTORS:

Within staffing parameters by program category, additional personnel will be added as necessary, taking into consideration:

Numbers of Sectors
No. of activities or management units
Pipeline size
Avail. and Competence level of FSN staff
Degree of Sophistication of LDC Institutions
Sector/Program/Project Assistance Mode
P.L. 480 (type and amount)
Local Currency generations
Policy Reform Focus

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	ESTIMATED OBLIGATIONS PL 480				ESTIMATED OBLIGATIONS PL 480				STAFFING		NOTES	
	DA	ESF TITLE III	SAI		DA	ESF TITLE III	SAI		Current	Proposed		
AFRICA:												
Angola	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0	0		
Benin	8,000	--	--	--	8,000	--	--	--	0	5		
Botswana	7,000	--	--	--	7,000	--	--	--	8	5		
Burkina	3,000	--	--	--	3,000	--	--	--	5	5		
Burundi	15,000	--	--	--	18,000	--	--	--	7	10		
Cameroon	20,000	--	--	--	24,000	--	--	--	15	15		
Cape Verde	3,000	--	--	--	3,000	--	--	--	2	5		
Central African Republic	4,000	--	--	--	4,000	--	--	--	0	0		
Chad	15,000	--	4,100	--	15,000	--	34,000	--	9	10		
Comoros	700	--	--	--	700	--	--	--	0	0		
Congo	1,000	--	--	--	1,000	--	--	--	0	0		
Cote d'Ivoire	7,000	3,000	--	--	7,000	4,000	--	--	0	5		
Djibouti	--	3,000	--	--	--	3,000	--	--	0	0		
Equatorial Guinea	1,000	--	--	--	1,000	--	--	--	0	0		
Ethiopia	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	5	5		
Ethiopia (North)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--				
Gabon	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--				
Gambia	6,000	--	--	--	8,000	--	--	--	5	5		
Ghana	25,000	--	12,000	--	28,000	--	10,000	--	11	15		
Guinea	25,000	--	10,000	--	26,000	--	10,000	--	12	15		
Guinea-Bissau	5,000	--	--	--	5,000	--	--	--	4	5		
Kenya	26,000	--	10,000	--	26,000	--	10,000	--	21	17	a/	
Lesotho	7,000	--	--	--	7,000	--	--	--	7	5		
Liberia	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0	0		
Madagascar	44,000	--	6,800	--	28,000	--	7,000	--	11	15		
Malawi	39,950	--	--	--	34,000	--	--	--	15	15		
Mali	33,000	--	6,782	--	30,000	--	65,000	--	16	15		
Mauritania	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	2	0		
Mauritius	1,500	--	--	--	1,500	--	--	--	0	0		
Mozambique	42,000	--	16,640	--	36,000	--	19,500	--	13	20		
Namibia	7,000	--	--	--	7,000	5,000	--	--	5	5		
Niger	26,000	--	--	--	26,000	--	--	--	16	15		
Nigeria	11,000	--	--	--	11,000	--	--	--	4	5		
Rwanda	15,000	--	--	--	20,000	--	--	--	8	10		
Sao Tome	420	--	--	--	300	--	--	--	0	0		
Senegal	22,000	1,000	10,000	--	20,000	3,000	10,000	--	20	15		
Seychelles	--	3,300	--	--	--	3,300	--	--	0	0		
Sierra Leone	540	--	--	--	540	--	--	--	0	0		
Somalia	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	8	5	b/	
South Africa	39,500	--	--	--	40,000	--	--	--	13	15		
Sudan	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	8	5		
Swaziland	6,000	--	--	--	6,000	--	--	--	10	7	c/	

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	ESTIMATED OBLIGATIONS			ESTIMATED OBLIGATIONS			STAFFING		NOTES
	DA	ESF TITLE III	SAI	DA	ESF TITLE III	SAI	Current	Proposed	
Tanzania	30,000	--	--	30,000	--	4,000	8	20	
Togo	9,000	--	--	10,000	--	--	4	5	
Uganda	41,000	--	10,000	38,000	--	10,000	13	20	
Zaire	23,000	--	7,000	23,000	--	7,000	22	15	
Zambia	5,000	--	20,000	10,000	--	18,000	7	10	
Zimbabwe	10,000	--	--	10,000	--	--	12	15	
S Africa Regional/SADCC	50,000	--	--	50,000	--	--			Included in Zimbabwe
REDSO/ESA							30	15	
REDSO/WCA							36	19	
France							1	1	
Total	634,610	10,300	113,322	623,040	18,300	204,500	393	394	

- a/ Includes 3 administrative positions, 2 of which are attributable to support of other Nairobi units, i.e., REDSO, RHUDD, IG.
- b/ Assumes a disaster relief program is approved.
- c/ Includes 2 positions for SA regional support - Legal Advisor & Contracts Officer.

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21-May-91

TABLE OF A.I.D. COUNTRY PROGRAM FUNDING AND STAFFING LEVELS
 FY 1991
 ESTIMATED OBLIGATIONS
 PL 480

	ESTIMATED OBLIGATIONS PL 480				PL 480				STAFFING		NOTES
	DA	ESF TITLE III	SAI		DA	ESF TITLE III	SAI	Current	Proposed		
ASIA & PRIVATE ENTERPRISE:											
Bangladesh	50,683	--	69,700	--	62,000	--	66,000	--	33	30	
Bhutan	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--			
Fiji	5,421	10,300	--	--	9,250	10,300	--	--	8	5	
India	19,876	--	--	--	22,000	--	--	--	18	15	
Indonesia	38,082	5,000	--	--	45,250	5,000	--	--	36	20	
Korea	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--			
Laos	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--			
Maldives	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--			
Malaysia	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--			
Micronesia	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--			
Mongolia	2,000	--	--	--	4,000	--	--	--			
Nepal	12,245	--	--	--	15,000	--	--	--	0	5	
Papua New Guinea	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	16	10	
Singapore	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--			
Solomon Islands	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--			
Sri Lanka	10,164	--	45,900	--	19,300	--	38,700	--	18	15	a/
Thailand	9,134	--	--	--	12,300	--	--	--	12	6	
Affected Thai Villages	2,500	2,500	--	--	--	2,500	--	--			
ASEAN	2,710	--	--	--	3,300	--	--	--	2	2	
Afghanistan Humanitarian	30,000	30,000	--	--	30,000	30,000	--	--	18	20	
Cambodia	18,000	7,000	--	--	20,000	5,000	--	--	2	15	
Pakistan	25,000	100,000	--	--	25,000	100,000	--	--	42	30	
Philippines	40,000	120,000	--	160,000	40,000	120,000	--	160,000	43	30	
Total	265,815	274,800	115,600	160,000	307,400	272,800	104,700	160,000	248	203	

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ESTIMATED OBLIGATIONS
 PL 480

FY 1992

	ESTIMATED OBLIGATIONS PL 480			ESTIMATED OBLIGATIONS PL 480			STAFFING		NOTES
	DA	ESF TITLE III	SAI	DA	ESF TITLE III	SAI	Current	Proposed	
NEAR EAST:									
Algeria	--	--	--	--	--	--			
Egypt	--	815,000	--	--	815,000	--			
Israel	--	1,850,000	--	--	1,200,000	--	98	93	a/
Jordan	--	35,000	--	--	30,000	--	6	0	
Lebanon	3,750	3,750	--	4,000	2,000	--	17	15	
Morocco	12,500	20,000	--	23,000	12,000	--	0	0	
Oman	--	15,000	--	--	15,000	--	26	20	
Tunisia	--	3,000	--	--	3,000	--	5	5	
West Bank/Gaza	--	12,000	--	--	12,000	--	12	5	
Yemen	2,900	--	--	3,000	--	--	0	1	
Total	19,150	2,753,750	0	30,000	2,089,000	0	174	144	

Note: Model was not applied to Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, West Bank/Gaza.

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FY 1991
ESTIMATED OBLIGATIONS
PL 480

FY 1992

	FY 1991				FY 1992				STAFFING		NOTES
	DA	ESF TITLE III	SAI		DA	ESF TITLE III	SAI	Current	Proposed		
EUROPE:											
Austria	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--			
Cyprus	--	15,000	--	--	--	3,000	--	--	0	0	
Finland	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--			
Greece	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--			
Iceland	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--			
Ireland	--	20,000	--	--	--	--	--	--			
Luxembourg	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--			
Malta	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--			
Portugal	--	42,000	--	--	--	40,000	--	--	0	0	
Spain	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--			
Turkey	--	250,000	--	--	--	75,000	--	--	0	0	
USSR (Armenian Earthquake)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0	0	
Total	0	327,000	0	0	0	118,000	0	0	0	0	
EASTERN EUROPE:											
Bulgaria	6,150	--	--	369,675	--	--	--	400,000			
Czechoslovakia	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		1	
Hungary	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		1	
Poland	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		2	
Romania	3,000	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1	4	
Yugoslavia	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		1	
Total	9,150	0	0	369,675	0	0	0	400,000	1	10	

a/ Model was not applied to Egypt.

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TABLE OF A.I.D. COUNTRY PROGRAM FUNDING AND STAFFING LEVELS
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 PL 480

21-May-91

	ESTIMATED OBLIGATIONS PL 480				ESTIMATED OBLIGATIONS PL 480				STAFFING		NOTES
	DA	ESF	TITLE III	SAI	DA	ESF	TITLE III	SAI	Current	Proposed	
LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN:											
Argentina	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--			
Bahamas	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--			
Belize	6,359	--	--	--	7,500	--	--	--			
Bolivia	22,906	77,000	25,100	--	22,500	125,000	20,100	--	7	5	
Brazil	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	21	20	a/
Chile	400	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1	1	
Colombia	--	50,000	--	--	400	--	--	--	1	1	
Costa Rica (ADC)	81,630	25,000	--	--	--	50,000	--	--	1	1	b/
Dominican Republic	9,970	--	--	--	8,000	20,000	--	--	18	10	
Ecuador	13,971	--	--	--	13,000	5,000	--	--	18	15	
El Salvador	54,984	120,000	--	--	15,000	--	--	--	17	15	
Guatemala	28,426	30,000	--	--	55,000	120,000	--	--	40	30	
Guyana	--	2,000	--	--	28,225	30,000	--	--	27	20	
Haiti	28,302	12,000	21,370	--	--	2,000	--	--	0	0	
Honduras	33,625	50,000	14,000	--	38,750	24,000	20,000	--	21	15	
Jamaica	13,721	10,000	--	--	41,000	50,000	14,000	--	39	25	
Mexico	--	--	--	--	16,500	15,000	--	--	19	15	
Nicaragua	11,000	150,000	--	--	--	--	--	--	1	1	
Panama	--	--	--	--	22,000	150,000	15,000	--	18	20	
Paraguay	--	--	--	--	17,000	10,000	--	--	12	10	
Peru	9,738	--	30,000	--	--	--	--	--	1	1	
Suriname	--	--	--	--	15,700	100,000	20,000	--	16	15	c/
Trinidad/Tobago	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--			
Uruguay	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--			
Venezuela	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1	1	
RDO/Caribbean	17,029	2,150	--	--	20,800	3,000	--	--	21	15	
RDCAP - Guatemala	17,307	--	--	--	18,000	--	--	--	11	10	
Total	349,368	528,150	90,470	0	339,375	704,000	89,100	0	311	246	

a/ FY 1992 ESF includes \$100 million ESF Andean Narcotics Initiative.

b/ FY 1992 ESF includes \$50 million ESF Andean Narcotics Initiative.

c/ FY 1992 ESF includes \$100 million ESF Andean Narcotics Initiative.

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