

P2-ABR-486  
1994


---

# **PARTICIPATION IN ECONOMIC POLICY REFORM IN AFRICA: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE**

---

May 1994

**Prepared for:  
The Meeting of the Special Program for Africa (SPA)  
Working Group on Economic Reform**



**Contractor Team:**

**Management Systems International**  
(lead contractor)

**Abt Associates Inc.**

**Development Alternatives, Inc.**

United States Agency for International Development  
Bureau for Research and Development  
Project #936-5451

PA-AER-486

PARTICIPATION IN ECONOMIC POLICY REFORM  
IN AFRICA: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Derick W. Brinkerhoff  
and  
Nicolas Kulibaba

May 1994

U. S. Agency for International Development  
Implementing Policy Change Project

Paper prepared for the Meeting of the Special Program for Africa (SPA) Working Group on Economic Reform in the Context of Political Liberalization, March 27-28, 1994, Brussels, Belgium.

## Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	i
I. INTRODUCTION	1
A. Purpose and organization of the study	i
B. Methodology	1
C. Defining participation	3
D. Defining economic policy reform	4
II. PARTICIPATION IN ECONOMIC POLICY REFORM IN AFRICA	5
A. What kind of participation in economic policy reform?	6
1. policy analysis	6
2. policy design/adoption	8
3. policy implementation	10
4. policy monitoring/evaluation	13
B. Who participates in economic policy reform?	14
1. national government personnel	14
2. international donor agencies	15
3. local government	16
4. the private sector	17
5. non-governmental organizations	18
6. civil society and organized interest groups	19
7. local residents, the poor, and other disenfranchised groups	22
C. How does participation take place in economic policy reform?	24
1. impetus for reform	24
2. incentives for participation	25
3. institutional structures for participation	26
4. extent of participation	28
5. degree of empowerment	29

<b>III.</b>	<b>DOMINANT THEMES IN THE LITERATURE</b>	<b>29</b>
<b>A.</b>	<b>The political economy of the African state</b>	<b>30</b>
1.	participation and the state	30
2.	patronage politics and informal participation in the state	31
3.	regimes and reform success	33
<b>B.</b>	<b>The political economy of donor-recipient interaction</b>	<b>34</b>
1.	structure of donor-recipient interaction	34
2.	processes of reform initiation and negotiation	35
<b>C.</b>	<b>Institutional capacity for participation in policy reform</b>	<b>37</b>
1.	leadership	38
2.	capacity of the government bureaucracy	39
3.	interaction among leaders, bureaucrats, and external actors	40
<b>IV.</b>	<b>KEY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS</b>	<b>41</b>
<b>A.</b>	<b>Links between participation and successful policy reform</b>	<b>41</b>
<b>B.</b>	<b>Conditions facilitating participation in policy reform</b>	<b>42</b>
<b>C.</b>	<b>Techniques for promoting participation in policy reform</b>	<b>43</b>
<b>D.</b>	<b>Ongoing debates and research gaps</b>	<b>45</b>
	<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b>	<b>47</b>

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### I. Introduction

This study reviews the literature on participation in economic policy reform in Africa. It explores two basic premises: that the circumstances surrounding participation and the ways it occurs influence the economic policy reform process, and that changes to enhance participation can lead to improved policy outcomes. The review is structured around an analytic framework that looks at participation in terms of three dimensions:

- **What:** the steps in the policy process-- analysis, design/adoption, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E).
- **Who:** the categories of key actors in the policy process.
- **How:** initiative for reform, incentives for participation, institutional mechanisms, extent of participation, and degree of empowerment.

### II. Participation in Economic Policy Reform in Africa

The literature on participation falls into three broad categories. The first category, technical economic performance perspectives, contains analysis of structural adjustment programs, and focuses on how participation fosters or impedes appropriate policy choice and achievement of economic performance targets. The second, political economic analyses, contains several analytical streams: nature of the state in Africa, interest group interactions and sociopolitical dynamics, NGOs, the private sector, civil society, relative power distributions between donor agencies and individual countries, and the roots of political economy in indigenous cultural practices. The third, institutional and management perspectives, addresses topics such as institutional capacity, civil service reform and the role of bureaucrats in policy change, management tools and techniques that can help deal with interest group participation in policy reform, and the institutional requirements for effective participation of civil society.

#### A. What kind of participation?

Participation in policy analysis and design has, in general, been relatively restricted, both by weak African policy analytic capacity and lack of demand. The capacity constraint diminished during the 1980s as a result of training and increased experience. Indigenous demand for policy analysis is limited; African leaders are often more interested in politics than the technical side of policies. Regarding policy design/adoption, the impact of donor procedures and timetables is frequently noted. The design process is usually conducted by a small technical team. Institutional constraints limit African technocrats' effective role in the process. However,

participation in policy design is expanding via a range of consultation mechanisms, such as: national conferences, social marketing, involvement in polls and surveys. Sources agree that participation is more likely in democratizing countries.

Participation in policy implementation can be divided into two categories: participation by implementing agents and by groups that are the target of reforms. Regarding the former, the literature notes the issues of capacity, civil service reform, and the need for a stronger state apparatus to implement policies even if the role of the state in economic activity is reduced. State agents are often obstacles to policy implementation, given a perverse set of incentives for rent-seeking and patronage. But bureaucrats are not always simply the sum of the preference of their strongest patrons/lobbies; some are sincerely interested in reform.

Regarding participation by reform targets, their impact is greater in long-haul reforms than stroke-of-pen ones. Successful implementation over time highlights the importance of coalition-building among key stakeholders. Participation here is of two types: voice and exit. Formal voice options are: participation in national conferences, rallies, organized fora; policy/program review committees; information dissemination campaigns, media; through NGOs and other voluntary associations. Informal voice includes: spontaneous protests, rumor campaigns, one-on-one meetings with officials. Exit reflects such actions as: withholding support, non-participation in services or policy benefits, boycotts, retreat into the informal sector, evasion of policy provisions (bribery and side-payments), and migration.

Participation in policy M&E is relatively limited. There is not much M&E in inward-looking public sector agencies, and thus M&E capacity needs to be developed. Participation in policy impact surveys and reviews is one way of involving target groups in M&E. Civil society can serve an important governance function here as an independent watchdog; this is a role for NGOs, the media, and universities.

## **B. Who participates?**

The participation of national government personnel is critical, since they are frequently the major actors in the policy process. Sources note their capacity to subvert policies, the fact that bureaucrats are often beholden to special interests, and the weak institutional structures national staff operate within. International donor agencies are also key players, and their participation is critical to initiating reforms and determining reform targets and conditionalities. The private sector is often the target of reform efforts. The sector falls into two groups: formal and informal. The former is small, urban, male, and protected by close links to state. The latter is large and rural, contains many women, participates minimally in the policy process, but tends to be responsive to policy changes.

NGOs are the subject of lots of literature. They are important as interest aggregators, and play a mediating role between the state and individuals. International NGOs are a lobbying force, and operate in some African countries too. Besides NGOs, African civil society contains other,

diverse associational groups. Though not recognized by the state, there is a significant amount of informal participation by people in a wide range of horizontal voluntary associations. Experience with this kind of participation constitutes an important source of social capital, which can be tapped for reform. With political liberalization, civil groups and the media are more vocal, putting pressure on African governments for change. Local residents, the poor, and other disenfranchised groups have very limited direct participation in reform. The poor, however, are a topic of discussion by others regarding the impacts of adjustment.

### **C. How does participation take place?**

The impetus for reform is often donor-driven. The perceived need for reform by African leadership is linked to crisis situations, where the urge to reform develops as a function of the elimination of other options. Political liberalization in many countries, however, is accompanied by popular demand for economic liberalization, so it is too simple to say that reforms have been forced on Africa by donors. Incentives for participation are related to the classic interest-maximization principle, where the motivation for participation is a function of groups seeking to advance their interests. The uncertainty and complexity of policies, though, can make identification of interests difficult.

Institutional structures for participation have traditionally been dominated by the state, but governments are facing new demands for accountability and transparency from vocal civil society. Weak capacity constrains the effectiveness of the public sector, but a revised role for the state offers institutional space for civil groups to participate more broadly in reforms, for example, through NGOs and/or legally recognized local-level associations. The potential extent of broader participation is limited by policy type. More opportunities exist in long-term reforms, such as privatization. Regarding the degree of empowerment available for participants in the reform process, popular protest is often cited, but this is not the only mechanism for voice. Other options include, for example, lobbying, policy dialogue, and media campaigns, all of which can be used to bring pressure to bear on politicians and policy-makers. There is a need to focus on how groups can translate economic demands into political ones.

## **III. Dominant Themes in the Literature**

### **A. The political economy of the African state**

The state provides the principal context in which participation occurs, determining the kinds of contributions that civil society can make to policy reform and implementation. The literature finds no clear relationship between regime type and success in economic reform, although democratizing regimes offer more opportunities for participation in policy reform than do authoritarian ones. Most participation is largely informal, with interest groups able to influence policy decisions by petitioning "their" representatives in government to act in their favor.

Policy-making in this context is limited to a closed elite circle, is relatively arbitrary, and lacks the rationality and empirical content characteristic of technically-based policy-making. The African state has traditionally guarded information jealously, but transparency is vital to policy debate and consensus-building for reform. In many countries, civil society's demand-making capacity is growing, thus some increases in transparency can be expected.

## **B. Donor participation in reform**

Donor participation is strong, particularly in the analysis and design stages of reform, but involvement in designing technical policy prescriptions is not enough. Reform success requires education and consensus-building, negotiation and compromise, and reform "marketing." In addition to their technical role, donors can be "honest brokers" for reform. Donor procedures are cited as inhibiting country participation in the policy reform process, although local officials and technicians can be valuable participants in reform design and initiation. This situation is changing for the better as some donors are modifying their practices to incorporate participation more easily.

Policy-based aid is a mixed blessing for African governments. The access to quick-disbursing financial mechanisms to meet emergency expenditures is desirable, but engages leaders in a process that risks dismantling the instruments that assure their power base. Country cases show elaborate strategies for non-compliance, raising issues about commitment to reform. Conditionality can induce initiation of reform, but is not an effective tool for enforcing compliance or sustaining change. The reasons governments give for failing to meet conditionalities are often participation-related: the need for consultation with stakeholders, election calendars, democratization timetables, public unrest and insecurity, the need to train bureaucrats and other government agents, and the need to educate the public about reform rationale.

## **C. Institutional capacity for participation in policy reform**

The literature stresses the need for sufficient capacity on the part of the institutions involved in the policy process in order for participation to take place. Capacity to participate in reform is linked to: a) quality of leadership, b) capacity of the government bureaucracy, and c) the nature of the interaction among leaders, bureaucrats, and external actors. Regarding leadership, national leaders can create a favorable climate for reform, but they are not the major actors in the day-to-day implementation of economic policy. Senior technocrats are. If available from among this pool, a "policy champion" can enhance the chances of reform success by: organizing constituencies for reform, convincing leaders of the need for reform, overcoming bureaucratic barriers, and mitigating public outcry.

On the subject of public sector capacity, bureaucratic systems suffer from acute capacity weaknesses: inability to deliver even the most basic services, tendency of civil servants to

extract rents and/or take second jobs as salaries slip below subsistence levels, inappropriate and ineffective organizations for managing public services, low personnel competence levels, and failure to use appropriate technologies and management techniques. On the one hand, these bureaucratic systems need to be strengthened; but economic stabilization measures often call for reductions in the civil service at the same time that ambitious structural adjustment programs impose new challenges on public sector.

Compounding the capacity problem is the fact that the number of participants in the economic policy reform process is large. Because of the interlinked nature of long-term reform measures, and the increasingly recognized importance of sequencing, there is a risk that reform progress will be limited by the capacity of the policy management network's weakest member(s). This situation can provoke a "snowball effect" of delays, where one missed deadline leads to a cascade of postponements, deferrals, and suspensions. In the pressured environment of adjustment, the response of donors and recipient governments is often to devise makeshift interim modifications, and accept pro forma compliance with targets and conditions in order to keep tranche disbursements on track.

Regarding the interaction among leaders, the bureaucracy and external actors, increasing access to policy debates raises the possibility of more numerous and potentially conflicting demands being placed on decision-makers and administrative systems, and increases the risk of alienating supporters. In many African countries, however, ruling elites have to some extent been overtaken by events; liberalization has pushed governments to be more responsive. As a function of these changes, issues arise about the capacity of civil society to participate in the policy process. These deal with the demand side of participation in policy, as a complement to the supply side relating to government institutional commitment and capacity to cope with participation by external actors. Much attention in the literature focuses on the capacity of NGOs to aggregate interests effectively and communicate to members, politicians and policy-makers. For example, NGOs can help rural residents channel their view into national policy debates if the NGOs have sufficient technical expertise in the policy area, basic managerial skills, a willing constituency, and a recognized track record. The institutional strengths and weaknesses of the media are also critical given the centrality of information flows to the policy process.

#### **IV. Key Findings and Conclusions**

##### **A. Participation and successful policy reform**

- No single regime type is optimal for reform success. However, democratizing regimes offer more numerous and varied opportunities for participation than authoritarian ones. Similarly, many types of institutions, associations and media offer suitable fora for debate, negotiation, and consensus-building.

- Reform is not a mechanistic process and cannot be implemented by fiat. Reform is interactive, requiring negotiation, modification of views, compromise, concessions and management of risks. Even stroke-of-the-pen reforms require public education and political marketing. The key to success is the ability of government and stakeholders to forge consensus, deal with opposition, and develop reform strategies and sequencing that soften negative impacts for the most vulnerable while increasing the chances for intended long-term benefits.
- A society rich in social capital and associational life provides numerous channels for interest articulation and participation. However, broader participation becomes more likely when affected groups can translate their economic interests into political pressures.
- More participation in policy reform leads to better technical content in policies. Involvement of well-trained technocrats and informed stakeholders enriches the reform process and grounds reform prescriptions in local realities.
- More participation leads to greater sustainability because more affected interests can be included, but also to greater uncertainty. Governments are more willing to pursue reforms when their concerns about the political risks are addressed, and donors need to find ways of helping governments to overcome these concerns.
- More participation is harder to manage, and requires a flexible, strategic approach. This calls for new skills and institutional capacities.

#### **B. Techniques for promoting participation in policy reform**

- Better political and institutional analysis will help to anticipate policy blockages and problem areas. Analysis should be an ongoing part of implementation as well as input to policy design, and African policy managers need to be central participants in these analytic exercises.
- A collaborative design process that integrates implementation considerations into policy content builds participation and increases sustainability. Collaborative design fosters consensus, and increases technical efficiency.
- The technical content of reforms can be redesigned to increase opportunities for participation; e.g., matching grants, revenue-sharing mechanisms, development foundations, etc; or design of the M&E component, where research centers and/or local NGOs can be built in as participants in data collection on policy impacts.

- Institutional capacity-building is needed as a complement to reform. Policy champions are important but can't singlehandedly overcome ingrained institutional weaknesses. Targets of capacity-building are not just public agencies, but include NGOs, private sector groups, political parties, and the media.
- Reform is uncertain, and so is participation. Contingency planning is needed with more flexibility, openness to "mid-course" corrections in implementation, and less reliance upon pre-identifying targets and fixed disbursement triggers.

### C. Ongoing debates and research gaps

- Does the policy reform process operate more effectively when policy implementors are insulated from political forces or when they are subject to some type of "sunshine" mechanism that builds in transparency (e.g., public hearings, open committee meetings)?
- What is the relationship between political liberalization and economic policy reform? Political liberalization will neither eradicate the influence of corruption and self-interested regimes nor ensure the harmonious interplay of competitive interests.
- No recipes exist for the most appropriate balance between political and economic reform over the short term. Both external resources and country commitment are required to find the best mix. Further understanding is needed to bring to bear the wealth of existing indigenous institutional capital and to formalize policy space to facilitate its use.
- How can civil society be most usefully integrated into the policy process? Increased participation by external groups calls for a facilitative environment, but how to create one is the subject of differing views.
- Much of the literature focuses on how politics drives economics and reform. Individual cases suggest that this view is too deterministic. The interplay between politics and economics needs more clarification, particularly in terms of how economic and policy variables affect politics.

## **I. INTRODUCTION**

Africa's poor socioeconomic performance during the 1970s and 80s, and the resulting hardships for the continent's inhabitants, have been well documented and analyzed (e.g., World Bank 1994 and 1989a, Chole 1989). In comparison to the rest of the developing world, the 80s for Africa have been termed a "lost decade" for development, where both rural and urban populations ended up worse off by 1990 than ten years prior. More recently, however, the prevailing "Afro-pessimism" has begun to abate in the face of some degree of economic and political reform, which has led to the suggestion that Africa's decline can be reversed. As the trends toward increased economic and political liberalization evolve, decision-makers in African nations and in the international donor agencies that work in Africa are interested in the nature of the linkages between economic reform and political liberalization, and in how these twin trends can support and reinforce each other.

### **A. Purpose and Organization of the Study**

An issue central to both trends is participation. This study concentrates on participation in economic policy reform. The purpose of the study is to overview the literature on participation relating to economic policy reform in Africa. The working premises of the study are that the circumstances surrounding participation, and the ways in which it occurs, influence the economic policy reform process; and that changes to enhance participation can lead to improved policy outcomes. Improvement is taken to refer to enhanced sustainability, commitment, information flows, more adaptive implementation, and ultimately higher policy impact. The literature examination synthesizes: a) the major dimensions of participation in policy reform, b) critical issues involved in broadening participation in the policy process, c) examples of successful approaches to increasing participation, and d) research gaps in knowledge.

This report is organized in four sections. This introductory section reviews the purpose of the study, describes the methodology, and details the approach to defining participation. Section II provides a descriptive review of the literature. The third section analyzes the literature in terms of a set of dominant themes. Finally, Section IV presents key findings and lessons learned. A bibliography completes the report.

### **B. Methodology**

Literature reviews on any topic are immediately faced with two questions: What to look at? and Where to look for sources? This section describes our methodological approach to answering these questions.

Participation is an extremely broad concept, one that has over the years enjoyed what Cohen and Uphoff, writing nearly fifteen years ago, called "popularity without clarity" (1980).

That characterization still applies today, with perhaps even more salience than ever on the African continent as the trend toward more open forms of government and an expanded role for civil society continues to grow. The means-ends debate persists in many quarters with little abatement in intensity, but with some increase in sophistication (see Goulet 1989). To oversimplify, participation-as-end advocates call for it as a normative essential, for example, as the goal of empowering the poor, or of building democracy. The participation-as-means perspective concentrates on its instrumental contribution to governmental and socioeconomic development efficiency and effectiveness.

In keeping with its purpose, the present study limits its inquiry to participation in the economic policy reform process in Africa. This choice ruled out the vast literature on political and electoral participation, except as it relates to economic development. In addition, the study did not delve in-depth into the burgeoning literature on public sector reform and governance, since this topic is under investigation by a separate SPA study team. Further, the study takes an instrumental focus on participation, concentrating on literature that discusses what participation contributes, or doesn't, to the economic reform process. Thus, the review and analysis de-emphasized the literature whose major orientation to participation is in terms of human rights, cultural authenticity, moral imperatives, and so on. Within the bounds of participation in economic policy reform, the study takes a perspective on participation that is broadly descriptive. This approach avoids attempting a specific definition of participation, which can lead to muddy, unresolvable debates over whether a specific instance of participation is "authentic" or "genuine" (and therefore good), or "false" (bad). Our descriptive framework is overviewed in the next section.

Having clarified what to look at, we are left with the question of where to go for sources. The methodology here was to seek a balance between comprehensiveness and the constraints of time and resources. The study team brought together two researchers with broad and in-depth knowledge of participation, the policy process, and African experience. Their previous analytic work constituted the starting point for literature searches, covering the published, academic literature as well as the applied literature of international donor agencies, research centers, and consulting firms. A trio of African research support staff supplemented the team's search efforts. A visiting scholar in Harvard University's Mason Fellows Program identified African sources relevant to the study; and two African graduate students concentrated upon identifying additional literature, one at the University of Pittsburgh's Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, and one in Praetoria accessing the resources of the Africa Institute for South Africa. Another research assistant, based in Washington, conducted a search of several electronic data bases and of a targeted list of the policy and international development journals that, in the view of the study team, were most likely to contain relevant material.

While we attempted to bound the literature related to the topic at hand, the number of relevant sources included within the study's scope is enormous. We make no claims that the study's review is exhaustive; of necessity the team made choices to pass over some potentially applicable material. Regarding the sources we reviewed, space limitations precluded in-depth treatment of all aspects of their analyses and arguments.

## C. Defining Participation

Participation in development has remained an enduring topic on the international agenda for thirty years. International assistance agencies, academics, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and developing country counterparts have debated and discussed the definitions, roles, aims, and utility of participation in various fora over the years (see Nagle 1991). This study defines participation in terms of three dimensions that accommodate a range of activities, actors, and actions. The framework adapts earlier work done on rural development project participation to the larger sphere of policy reform (see Cohen and Uphoff 1980). The answers to three questions provide participation's defining features: participation in what? by whom? and how? Exhibit 1 summarizes the framework.

The "what" question addresses the kind of participation being undertaken or considered. The kinds of participation of major concern for our purposes relate to the sequential steps in the policy process. These are participation in policy: analysis, design and adoption, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. Taken together, these kinds of participation comprise a policy reform cycle, which over the life of a given policy reform can go through several iterations, with a variety of interactive feedback loops among, and refinements in, each of the steps. In the real world, the policy process is never unilinear.

Looking at who participates in economic policy reform, the

---

### Exhibit 1 Analytic Framework for Participation

- A. What kind of participation in economic policy reform?
    - 1. in policy analysis
    - 2. in policy design/adoption
    - 3. in policy implementation
    - 4. in policy monitoring/evaluation
  
  - B. Who participates in economic policy reform?
    - 1. national government personnel
    - 2. international donor agencies
    - 3. local government
    - 4. private sector
    - 5. NGOs
    - 6. other organized interest groups/winners and losers
    - 7. local residents and the poor
  
  - C. How does participation take place in economic policy reform?
    - 1. initiative for participation
    - 2. incentives for participation
    - 3. institutional structures for participation
    - 4. extent of participation
    - 5. degree of empowerment associated with participation
-

framework differentiates participants into several categories. External participants include international donor agencies, both multilateral and bilateral; and technical assistance providers. In-country participants can be divided into national government personnel, local government staff, private sector actors, NGOs, various interest groups at different levels (e.g., professional associations, unions, religious groups, students, political parties, etc.), and local residents (e.g., merchants, traders, farmers, women, laborers). Of concern for this dimension of the framework is specification of the interests of each category of actors, the resources they bring to the policy process, their motivation to use those resources, and their likely impacts. Determination of winners and losers is key.

The how dimension addresses a number of issues that seek to clarify the qualitative aspect of participation. These issues are strongly associated with the sustainability of the policy reform. Here the framework looks at the source of initiative for participation: such as from an external donor agency or some domestic constituency, from the center or the grass-roots, from a broad set of actors or a single interest group. The incentives for participation are important; is participation voluntary, induced, or coerced? Another critical qualitative issue relates to the types of institutional structures used for participation (e.g., formal or informal, public or private, strong or weak, markets or hierarchies). The extent of participation deals with the time demands, the number and range of actors and activities involved, and the limits imposed. Finally, the how dimension considers the degree of empowerment associated with participation. This aspect is often singled out as the most important by many observers, and is the most frequently cited feature distinguishing whether participation is "genuine" or not.

#### **D. Defining Economic Policy Reform**

Policy reform encompasses a vast array of interventions taken by government to modify the behaviors of citizens. These can range from redefining the rules by which government and the citizenry relate to one another, and/or the mechanisms through which those rules are put into practice; changes in the degree and purpose of government intervention in the social, economic and cultural life of the polity; changes in development strategy that have effects on the structure and performance of the national economy or of certain sectors, and that alter the relationship and openness of the national economy to international markets. Given the breadth of possible actions that comprise the domain of policy reform, no single definition of economic policy reform was used in this research. In practice in Africa, the majority of economic policy reform is subsumed within International Monetary Fund (IMF) stabilization and World Bank structural/sectoral adjustment programs. These multilateral donor programs, and supporting bilateral agency ones, frame the definition of economic policy reform as treated in most of the literature reviewed.

To the extent that any further definition is necessary here, the study does, however, differentiate rhetorical political action (e.g., exhortations for change, expressions of political intent, or mere reordering of institutional personnel) and intentional, substantive efforts by government to make productive changes in the performance of government and/or its citizens.

Generally, the latter category of action--policy reform--will be carried out in order to achieve measurable socioeconomic outcomes. It includes a strategy for implementation as well as provision for both the resources and institutional means for achieving stated objectives.

## II. PARTICIPATION IN ECONOMIC POLICY REFORM IN AFRICA

This section summarizes the major points regarding participation made in the literature reviewed. There is necessarily some overlap in the discussion in the various sections, although each seeks to emphasize one particular dimension of the "what-who-how" participation framework for purposes of highlighting the perspectives of the literature.

The literature that touches on participation in policy reform can be grouped broadly into three categories: technical economic performance perspectives, political economy perspectives, and institutional and management perspectives. The first category contains much of the work commissioned or undertaken by donor agencies on structural adjustment, and focuses on how participation fosters or impedes appropriate policy choice and achievement of economic performance targets. Sources here include case studies of individual country performance with policy reforms and multi-country cross-case analyses (e.g., Abbott 1993, Husain and Faraqee 1994, Thomas et al 1991, Lieberson 1991, Vondal 1989, Berg 1990, Mills 1989, Zulu and Nsouli 1985). This category's orientation to participation is on its contribution to getting the policies right.

The second category, political economy, is the largest and contains several streams. A large literature addresses the nature and role of the state in Africa, and the implications for participation (e.g., Boye 1993, Callaghy 1990, Lemarchand 1992, Sahn and Sarris 1992, Shaw 1993, van de Walle 1994). Numerous authors analyze policy outcomes in terms of interest group interactions and politics in general (e.g., Gulhati 1990a and 1990b, Krueger 1993a, Skalnes 1993, Widner 1993). A number of these sources are individual country case studies (e.g., Chazan 1983 and Herbst 1993 on Ghana, Bates and Collier 1992 and Kydd 1989 on Zambia, Kiondo 1989 on Tanzania). Branching off from this literature stream are bodies of work on NGOs and the private sector (e.g., Bienen and Waterbury 1989, Bratton 1989b and 1990, Shaw 1990), including authors who examine issues around the participation of civil society in the policy process (Rothchild and Chazan 1988, Wunsch and Olowu 1990). Another distinctive stream contains authors who see participation mainly in terms of the relative power distributions between the international financial institutions and individual countries (e.g., Fearon 1988, Good 1989, Schoenholtz 1987). A sub-stream of African analysts focuses on the roots of political economy in indigenous cultural patterns and practices (e.g., Ake 1990, Ayittey 1990 and 1991, Heilbrunn 1993, Etounga-Manguelle 1991, Tadesse 1992). Literature in this category can be characterized as emphasizing participation's place in getting the politics of policy reform right.

The third literature category looks at the institutional and management dimensions of participation and policy reform. Major emphases here are on topics such as institutional

capacity, both as a constraint to participation in the policy process and an area for technical assistance (e.g., Hirschmann 1993, Lamb 1987, Sutton 1987); civil service reform and the role of bureaucrats in policy change (Brown 1989, Garvey 1991, Leonard 1991, Montgomery 1988); management tools and techniques that can help deal with interest group participation in policy reform (Crosby 1992a and 1992b, Grindle and Thomas 1990, Robinson 1990, White 1990a and 1990b); and the institutional requirements for effective participation of civil society in policy reform (Bratton 1989a, Hyden 1990, Talbott 1990). African public administration specialists constitute an identifiable sub-stream of literature in this category (e.g., Balogun and Mutahaba 1989, Kiggundu 1989, Mutahaba et al 1993). Authors and analysts taking this perspective offer the most operational options of the three categories for dealing with participation in policy reform. The viewpoint here can be summed up as concentrating on linking who participates and how to getting the institutions right for effective policy reform.

#### **A. What kind of participation in economic policy reform?**

As noted above, the policy reform process can be thought of as an interactive cycle of activities that begins with analysis; follows with policy formulation, design, and adoption, moves to implementation, and finishes with monitoring and evaluation. This section summarizes what the literature has to say about participation in each of these phases in the cycle. Reflecting the complex interconnections among the phases, almost none of the literature discusses only one phase. These are separated here for presentation purposes.

##### **1. Policy Analysis**

Various sources observe that the crisis facing Africa during the 1980s and into the 90s resulted from the interaction between a set of misguided economic policies and external shifts in the international environment, such as increases in oil prices and drops in world prices for primary commodities (e.g., Gulhati 1990a, Mills 1989, OECD 1988, World Bank 1989a). Among the policy flaws mentioned are: policy biases against agriculture and the private sector, overvalued exchange rates, weak tax policies, excessive public sector expenditures and overemphasis on public enterprises. The issue of participation in policy analysis is relevant here in terms of how these crisis-inducing policies came about, and how to reform them. Regarding the source of flawed national policies, the failure of African governments to conduct effective policy analysis is cited as a contributing factor. The performance and institutional streams in the literature converge in linking lack of participation in policy analysis to problems of capacity (World Bank 1991, Gulhati 1990b, Commonwealth Secretariat 1990, Mutahaba and Balogun 1992, Sutton 1987).

For example, problems of weak analytic capacity are noted in The Gambia's A.I.D. economic reform program evaluation (van der Veen et al 1990). Numerous World Bank publications cite the low level of technical analytic skills as an important constraint to African participation in policy dialogue (e.g., McCleary 1991, Nunberg 1990, Paul 1990). Increasing

this capacity is the goal of a World Bank initiative (World Bank 1991) as well as the intent of many technical assistance (TA) projects that accompany adjustment packages. A case study in Togo, for example, concludes that TA led to "greater awareness of and greater attention ... to economic and financial issues, [such that] the Government is nowadays better prepared to participate in and to benefit from a policy dialogue with the Bank and other donors" (Kjellstrom and d'Almeida 1987: 28). Interestingly, however, Nelson's worldwide study of adjustment concludes that limited technical analytic capacity is not necessarily a constraint to initiating policy reform (Nelson 1990: Ch. 8).

The political economy literature looks at participation in policy analysis from the demand as well as the supply side, noting that in many cases African leaders have been little interested in technical arguments for or against policies, being more concerned with regime maintenance and political survival (Bienen 1993, Crook 1990, Evans 1992, Hyden 1992). This factor is also mentioned in explaining why leaders pursued economically irrational policy regimes in the first place. In authoritarian regimes, the conduct of independent policy analysis, with its implied or explicit criticism of those in power, has been discouraged, thus limiting the growth of independent analytic capacity. Calls for increasing indigenous demand for policy analysis are related to efforts to increase African ownership for policy reform (World Bank 1991, Johnson and Wasty 1993).

The technical aspects of reform are more salient for the international financial institutions, who in fact have been the lead participants in policy analysis for economic reform. Seen from the African side, the dominance of international donor technicians in policy analysis often leaves little room for African participants with alternative technical perspectives, since the general parameters of reform are perceived to be predesigned in a "one-size-fits-all" package (see Browne 1992, Heillener 1986, Nelson 1990, Shaw 1991). In many cases, however, this perception is less than accurate, as donor agencies are more open to country input in practice than their paper procedures indicate (Atherton et al 1992, Brinkerhoff and Morgan 1989, White 1990c, Bhatnagar and Williams 1992).

At the end of the 1980s, an African alternative framework for structural adjustment was developed to counter the dominant IMF-World Bank model (UNECA 1989), reflecting an increase in African technical capacity to participate in policy and economic analysis (see Abbott 1993: 118-22, Browne 1992). Sandbrook, however, dismisses the framework as a limited "technocratic exercise," replete with exhortations in favor of democratization and popular participation, but lacking a viable approach for implementing its provisions (1993: 136-40). The weaknesses of the UNECA policy framework are echoed by Herbst, who notes the continued reliance on a major role for the state, despite the demonstrable evidence that government structures are nearly everywhere incapable of even the most basic public functions (1993: 140-44). Thus the extent to which the alternative framework, in and of itself, represents an increase in effective policy analysis capacity (as opposed to political maneuvering) is debatable. Nonetheless, in many countries, the technical quality of the policy dialogue between donor agency staff and African technocrats is significantly higher now than at the start of the 1980s.

## 2. Policy Design/Adoption

Regarding the design of stabilization and structural adjustment policy packages, participation in the technical design of the policy measures has been limited to a small team of donor agency technocrats, working with, for the most part, an even smaller team of technical counterparts representing the borrower/recipient government. McCleary observes that,

the degree of involvement of the government ... in the design of adjustment programs has varied by region as well. The government's role has tended to be ... weakest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Government involvement also tends to be weakest at the beginning of adjustment, when time pressures are the heaviest (1991: 210-11).

The technical design process, carried out by the donor and country teams of technocrats, elaborates and informs the policy dialogue that determines the specifics of the loan/grant negotiations. The highly technical and occasionally arcane nature of the content of the dialogue limits participation to those with the capacity to understand the issues and elaborate options (see Nelson 1990). Green (1983) documents this in Tanzania where he lays out the elements of the donor-country debate (see also Biermann 1988, Hyden and Karlström 1993). Points of difference lay in such areas as: sources of the economic crisis (e.g., IMF: excessive expansion of demand, Tanzania: external shocks), reform content (e.g., IMF: domestic demand compression, Tanzania: domestic supply enhancement emphasizing exports), and reform performance criteria (e.g., allowable quarterly credit ceilings, timing of tranche disbursements, automaticity of disbursements).

Factors cited in the literature as influencing the ability and effectiveness of African technocrats to participate in policy design include: level and sophistication of training, depth of experience in policy design and management, role of political leadership, autonomy and insulation from interest group pressures, degree and nature of control and/or influence over implementing agents, and the strength of the state as an interest group in and of itself (e.g., Mutahaba and Balogun 1992, Gulhati 1990a). Tanzania under Nyerere, for example, illustrates how political factors influenced technocrats' ability to participate in policy design and dialogue. Few countries in Africa were more committed to development as social engineering than Tanzania under the Nyerere regime. Structural adjustment in Nyerere's view was entirely a question of politics and ideology, and during the 1980s he treated policy dialogue as a political game, with the IMF and the World Bank as the main opponents. Nyerere framed the debate in ideological terms, which left little room for compromise. The political and ideological overtones were too strong to allow donor agency and Tanzanian technocrats to engage in serious technical discussion. Nyerere, as long as he remained president, continued to insist that Tanzania's economic crisis was not of its own making, but was the result of the international economic system (see Bierman 1988, Campbell 1992, Hartmann 1991, Hyden and Karlström 1993, Kiondo 1989, Mukandala and Shellukindo 1994).

The early-80s Tanzania case demonstrates the issue raised in numerous analyses of policy reform experience that a singular focus on the technical content of policies during design is a recipe for later implementation failure (e.g., Nelson et al 1989, White 1990b). Zambia's experience in the late-80s reinforces the importance of this issue (Callaghy 1990, Gulhati 1989, Hawkins 1991, Kydd 1989).

Other related points made in the literature touching on participation in economic policy design include the following. In general, involvement in design has been restricted to a narrow circle of actors with privileged access to national decision-makers (Gulhati 1990b). In many African countries, decision-makers have seen little need to consult elements of civil society as part of policy design or adoption beyond symbolic, tightly managed opportunities for popular ratification of policy choices already made, although political liberalization is modifying this pattern somewhat (Hyden and Bratton 1992, Nyang'oro and Shaw 1992). And, policy designs that incorporate actions intended to build political support for reform measures are more successful than those that do not (Corbo and Fischer 1990, White 1990a and 1990b).

In light of the negative experiences of reform packages designed by a small technical core of specialists and "sprung" on the public, participation in policy adoption (as well as implementation, see below) has received increased attention. On the one hand, this participation consists of government information and public relations campaigns to "sell" reforms to the general public and affected groups by explaining the program's rationale, objectives, and benefits (Corbo and Fischer 1990). On the other, is the use of national conferences and other organized fora that offer opportunities for debate of reform issues and for inclusion of different groups' views in the policy measures and implementation mechanisms ultimately adopted. Participation via national conference resonates with African cultural patterns (Heilbrunn 1993, Sall 1989) and carries over from the use of national conferences as part of the political liberalization process in numerous countries. In between these two types of participation in policy adoption are informal consultations with affected groups (see Atherton et al 1992, Monga 1994b, Vondal 1989).

This kind of participation appears more likely in countries whose political systems are relatively more open and democratic (Hyden and Bratton 1992). A country frequently cited as exemplary in this regard is Botswana (see Picard 1987, Wiseman 1990). There,

top officials have come to believe that government programs work better if the public can be induced to participate, even in a token form, in governing processes... The Government has sought to obtain popular consent for specific programs through public consultations. Elected councilors are asked to approve projects in their districts, and no village development takes place without a village kgotla meeting where government presents its proposals and listens to public reactions. Major economic initiatives, outside of mining and roads, are not undertaken without national conferences where public servants and interested members of public debate the problem and the proposed plan of action (Molutsi and Holm 1992: 82).

The situation is very different from one country to another. In Cameroon for instance, a country nominally classed as liberalizing, the official attitude is not to disclose information on upcoming policies. Even draft bills discussed in the National Assembly are kept secret until they have been adopted as new laws.

### **3. Policy Implementation**

All the streams of literature reviewed stress participation in implementation as having the most influence on the achievement or failure of policy objectives. The recognition that, in practice, policy implementation is not simply a mechanical process of carrying out measures decided upon previously is in large part responsible for the blurring of the boundaries between the steps in the linear policy process model and its recasting in terms of an interactive, multidirectional frame (see Brinkerhoff 1991, Grindle and Thomas 1991, Kulibaba and Rielly 1993, Thomas and Grindle 1990, White 1990a and 1990c). The treatment in the literature of participation in economic policy implementation distinguishes two major types: participation by implementing agents charged with official responsibility for some component of the policy reform, and participation by those who are the targets of, or see themselves as affected by, the policy reform.

#### **Participation by implementing agents**

The performance and institutional/management literature streams discuss this kind of participation largely in terms of capacity to carry out reforms. Comparative analyses of experience with structural adjustment frequently point out weaknesses in the institutional capacity of implementing agents as an explanatory factor in the relatively poor performance of African countries (e.g., Nelson 1990, Thomas et al 1991, World Bank 1989a). The public sector institutional requirements of economic reform policies differ significantly from the roles that African governments have played in past, which were "largely protectionist, welfarist, centralist, interventionist, and monopolist" (Mutahaba et al 1993: 32, see also Luke 1986). That African bureaucracies were, and remain, ill-equipped to fulfill these roles, much less deal effectively with the demands of managing policy reform, is richly documented (e.g., Chazan et al 1988, Lamb 1987, Gulhati 1990a and 1990b, Hyden 1990, Mills 1989, World Bank 1991).

That the solution is not simply to be found in shrinking the size and function of the state is also recognized, despite such catch phrases as, "moins d'état, mieux d'état" (e.g., Berg 1990). In fact, the requirements of stabilization and adjustment policies call for more, not less government, leading to what Callaghy (1990) terms the "orthodox paradox." In response to this problem, most adjustment programs, structural or sectoral, include institution-building projects whose purposes are, in effect, to increase the ability of public bureaucracies to participate in policy implementation. A substantial literature addresses the "nuts and bolts" of institutional development and public sector management reform, much of which includes or emphasizes Africa (e.g., Hirschmann 1993). Issues cited as important from this perspective are, among

others: the conditions of public sector employment and civil service reform (Brown 1989, Jreisat 1988, Luke 1986, Nunberg 1990, Silverman forthcoming), the institutional complexity of interorganizational networks required for policy implementation (Brinkerhoff 1991, Brinkerhoff et al 1992, Grindle and Thomas 1990, Lamb 1987, Paul 1990), the skills required to manage participatory implementation effectively (Blunt 1990, Brinkerhoff 1991, Bryant and White 1982, Crosby 1992a, Dotse 1991, Garcia-Zamor 1985, Kulibaba and Rielly 1993, Lindenberg 1992). Leonard's (1991) case study of Kenyan development managers and Montgomery's (1988) work on bureaucrats and participation provide a "mole's eye" view of day-to-day life in African public agencies. These two scholars, as well as the other sources cited here (see also Kiggundu 1989, Rahman and Norling 1991, Vengroff et al 1991), stress the importance of detailed understanding of policy implementors' institutional environments in making assessments of how participation can be made operational.

The political economy literature stream that addresses participation by implementing agents also examines capacity issues, but emphasizes how incentive patterns are a function of underlying political objectives and interest group interactions, thus explaining why agents appear bent on pursuing economically irrational policies (see Chazan et al 1988, chapters in Meier 1991, Nelson 1990, Nelson et al 1989). The country case studies cited in Section II.B.1, below, apply this perspective to explain the fate of individual reforms.

Many of these scholars are highly critical of state implementing agents, and view them as (at best) captives of vested interests, or (at worst) the predatory personification of the abusive state apparatus, driven by the desire to maintain elite control over public resources for rent-seeking and patronage purposes (see, for example, chapters in Rothchild and Chazan 1988, Garvey 1991, Lemarchand 1992). As Evans points out, "a good deal of the literature on adjustment shares the ... suspicion of state capacity, an implicit fear that increased state capacity will lead to expanding the state's role and is therefore a bad thing in itself" (1992: 177). For these analysts, implementing agents' participation in policy reform is something to be minimized, not enhanced, so as to limit rent-seeking opportunities and the derailing of reform measures.

Grindle (1991), however, counters the prevailing political economic pessimism, suggesting that policy implementors are more than the sum of the preferences of their strongest lobbies and/or patrons, and in fact will pursue technically correct policies out of enlightened self-interest and commitment to "doing the right thing." She is supported in this assessment by Leonard (1991), who answers the question of whether individual managers can make a difference with a qualified yes. Donor agencies implicitly adopt this perspective in searching for "policy champions" (see III.C.1 below) willing and able to spearhead reform efforts (Brinkerhoff 1992, Kulibaba and Rielly 1993, see also Rondinelli and Montgomery 1990).

## Participation by reform target groups

A wide range of kinds of participation in implementation by the groups of people who are the targets of policy reform are identified in the literature. These can be loosely grouped into the following two categories: voice and exit. Each has a formal and informal mode of expression. Relative to other phases of the policy cycle, implementation offers the most opportunity for participation. In their review of governance and economic policy in Africa, Healy and Robinson observe that, in general, "people have more capacity to influence policy implementation than policy formation" (1992: 73). It is noted that the specific degree of opportunity is influenced by the policy timeframe. Short-term, so-called "stroke-of-the-pen" reforms, such as exchange rate policies or policies lowering trade barriers, involve a small coterie of political and technocratic actors during a relatively limited time period. Structural and sectoral adjustment policies, however, are more of the nature of what Nelson (1989a) terms "long-haul" reforms. For these efforts, the availability of participation options by target group members, or others, is much higher. As the political economy literature documents, the potential for derailing reforms over a multi-year timeframe is great (e.g., Bienen and Waterbury 1989, CSIS 1992, Meier 1991, Monga 1994b, Nelson 1990). Much depends upon the patterns of coalition-building between implementors and key reform target groups willing and able to support reforms (e.g., Crosby 1992a, van de Walle 1994, Waterbury 1989). Hawkins (1991), for example, credits the failure to build such coalitions as a major contributor to the demise of Zambia's economic reform program under Kaunda (see also Bates and Collier 1992, Callaghy 1990, Gulhati 1989).

Participation through voice includes on the formal side such actions as taking part in national conferences, rallies and demonstrations, or other organized fora (Bratton and van de Walle 1992, Ouane 1990); serving on policy or program review committees or boards (USAID n.d.); conducting information dissemination campaigns, which can include writing articles or position papers, giving radio or TV interviews (see West and Fair 1993); or participating in any number of voluntary associations that represent particular interests (Widner and van der Veen 1993). Informal voice options comprise: participating in spontaneous demonstrations or protests, contributing to rumor or gossip campaigns (referred to as "radio trottoir" [sidewalk broadcasting] in the francophone countries), or holding small or one-on-one private meetings with officials or other decision-makers/power-brokers. The literature dealing with African political liberalization makes the distinction between voice for purposes of airing grievances and for expressing particular interests (Hyden and Bratton 1992, Monga 1994a). For much of civil society in newly democratizing countries, the opportunity to express displeasure or lack of agreement is a novel one. The targeted use of voice for lobbying is more directly relevant to experience with policy reform, although the vocal popular discontent found in many countries creates a climate of political pressure that indirectly influences the reform process.

Participation through exit is manifested in a number of ways. The classic action, noted in the earlier literature on rural development as well as analyses of policy reform, is individual withholding of support, often expressed through failure to take advantage of the services a program provides. Analyses of rural development participation emphasize understanding the

interests, constraints, and survival strategies of targeted beneficiaries as a way to deal with this form of exit (Bamberger 1988, the chapters in Kumar 1993). Formalized withholding of support is reflected in the use of boycotts, something that several countries have experienced in the course of policy reforms.

Another form of exit much discussed in the literature is retreat into the informal economy, an option frequently exercised by the poor and other marginalized groups, such as women. MacGaffey et al's (1991) study of Zaire amply illustrates this situation in one of the continent's most extreme cases of political and economic chaos. Many economic actors whose behaviors are among the targets of policy reform straddle the formal and informal economies; their participation in policy implementation is characterized by evasion of policy provisions. This can take a number of forms: e.g, relating to trade policy, underreporting of imports and/or exports on shipping invoices; relating to tax policy, failure to file taxes or underreporting of income earned, property held, and so on. The more active side of evasion of policy provisions shades into another form of exit, which is bribery, where actors seek to enlist the acquiescence or support of implementing agents in their efforts to evade policy measures and regulations. The vast literature on rent-seeking and corruption deals with this aspect of participation (e.g., Bates and Krueger 1993). Several of the African case studies delve in-depth into the dynamics of the relationship between state agents with policy implementation authority and the interest groups that seek to bend the rules to their advantage. For example, Holtzman and Kulibaba (1991 and forthcoming) describe the formal and informal transactions between regulators and regulated in the regional Sahel livestock trade, which illuminates the reality of policy implementation at the administrative "grassroots."

Finally, the most drastic form of exit-- the ultimate in non-participation in policy reform-- is migration. Many African countries have substantial numbers of citizens residing outside of national boundaries. The financial support this group provides in the form of remittances is an important factor in their economies. In some cases, members of this group also play a long-distance role in lobbying for or against political and economic policy changes (see, for example, Kom 1993).

#### **4. Policy monitoring/evaluation**

Another kind of participation is involvement in policy monitoring and/or evaluation. As with implementation, the distinction can be made between monitoring and evaluation (M&E) by implementing agents and by outsiders. M&E by implementors is often included as part of the policy management task, monitoring being one of the functions necessary to make adaptations during the course of the implementation process (e.g., Brinkerhoff 1991, White 1990a). One of the well-recognized features of African bureaucracies, however, is their dominant inward-looking orientation to administrative routine, to the near exclusion of outward-looking strategic concerns (Brinkerhoff 1991, Kiggundu 1989). The economic performance and management and institutional literatures examine issues such as the institutional placement of policy analysis and monitoring units (e.g., the chapters in Mutahaba and Balogun 1992, Wiesner 1993), tools and

techniques for M&E (e.g., Brinkerhoff forthcoming, Hermann 1986, the chapters in Kumar 1993), and the benefits of national staff participation in the operation of M&E systems (Ernst and Last 1993). The political economy literature points out that political leadership's real motivation for technical policy monitoring, as opposed to their espoused statements, is slight given that politics not economics is of primordial interest (e.g., Meier 1991).

Participation in M&E by members of target groups is a long-standing element of participatory project management (Bryant and White 1980, Finsterbusch and Van Wicklin 1987). Donor agencies have also undertaken program evaluations and sector reviews that bring outsiders into the process, either as informants or more actively as analysts (Brinkerhoff 1985, Bhatnagar and Williams 1992, Talbott 1990). Wiesner (1993) proposes the strengthening of evaluation capacity as critical for managing the technical aspects of market-oriented reforms, as well as for contributing to making governments more politically accountable.

The governance literature discusses the links between democratic governance and the presence of various "watchdog" mechanisms to help ensure accountability and transparency (see Charlick 1992). Several democratizing countries use independent "observatories" for this function, supported by donor resources. The role of the media is widely discussed in terms of its potential for economic policy monitoring, although, as noted below, there are issues relating to their capacity to do so effectively. Similarly, NGOs and local universities and research centers are mentioned as independent institutional mechanisms for policy monitoring and collection of data on policy responses by various groups that are the targets of reform.

## **B. Who participates in economic policy reform?**

This section summarizes what the literature says about the major categories of actors involved in economic policy reform. An important feature of policy reform that emerges from the discussion is the increase in number and breadth of relevant participants in the policy process in comparison to participation in rural development projects.

### **1. National Government Personnel**

This category of actors lies at the heart of participation in policy reform. From the policy dialogue that initiates the reform process, through policy adoption and implementation, to policy monitoring and evaluation, national government officials and technocrats remain key players in the policy change cycle. All the literature reviewed addressed the role of government actors in one way or another with varying assessments of the degree to which they are part of the problem or of the solution (see Evans 1992).

A frequently cited characteristic of the government as actor is its limited capacity to act. The notion of the nation-state connotes the effective exercise of power by some central authority, yet a key feature of state authority in Africa is how little power those at the center truly possess.

The reasons for this situation are debated; frequently cited as contributing factors are the legacy of colonialism (e.g., Boye 1993), the impact of indigenous cultures and social relations (Etounga-Manguelle 1991), economic dependence (Chilcote 1984, Shaw 1993), lack of capacity and resources (Balogun and Mutahaba 1989), and so on. However, there is general agreement that African governments, for the most part, remain critically weak and inefficient (see Sahn and Sarris 1992, Wunsch and Olowu 1990).

As the political economy literature points out, the wheels of government, whether of newly democratizing single-party liberal, or authoritarian regimes, are driven by variations on the spoils system, supported by coalitions of ethnic, political, economic, and other special interests. While the levers of power nominally available to leaders may appear impressive, in practice regimes can rarely afford to take policy stances that go against the short-term interests of their major supporters (Garvey 1991). Governments, operating through patronage, are largely beholden to groups that favor the status quo, thus room to maneuver is limited, a point made by numerous analysts (Gulhati 1990b, Hyden and Bratton 1992, Kjellstrom and d'Almeida 1987, Hunt 1984). Grindle and Thomas (1989) note that the more fragile the government, the greater the attention to maintaining the regime in power at the expense of other policy objectives (see also Herbst 1990).

On the other hand, government actors are widely credited with a strong ability to act in ways that deflect or sabotage policy reforms. This issue is threaded throughout the writings on country commitment as well as the political economy literature (Johnson and Wasty 1993). Bureaucrats are not simply willing cogs in a policy implementation machine, but have their own particular interests, many of which are threatened by the policy reforms included in stabilization and structural adjustment packages. Callaghy's observation (1989: 131) that, "state officials can quietly undercut the effectiveness of reforms by not fully implementing them or by providing 'back-channel' input to non-state actors ... that want to blunt them" is confirmed by numerous country case studies of reform implementation, for example: Bates and Collier (1992), Gulhati (1989), Kydd (1989) on Zambia; Berg (1990) on Senegal; Ouedraogo and Adoum (1993) on Mali; Crook (1990), Widner (1993) on Ivory Coast; Leith and Lofchie (1993), Herbst (1993), Rothchild (1991) on Ghana; Rielly (1993a) on Madagascar; and Truong and Walker (1990) and Rielly (1993b) on Cameroon. Further, bureaucrats do not always restrict their interest expression to subtle footdragging on policy implementation. In an analysis of popular protests during 1989-90 in 15 African countries, Bratton and van de Walle rated the role of civil servants in protest activity as medium or high in nine of the countries (1992).

## 2. International Donor Agencies

Observers are unanimous in noting the high levels of participation of international donor agencies in the analysis and design phases of economic reform policies, as well as in policy monitoring (Nelson 1990, Healey and Robinson 1992). During the 1980s the IMF and the World Bank became increasingly influential in Africa as more countries undertook stabilization and adjustment programs. More radical perspectives see this participation as undermining the

sovereignty of African states, and as a further manifestation of the North's post-colonial domination of the South (Amin 1977, Chilcote 1984). Reviews of country experiences with adjustment, however, conclude that the ability of donor agencies to use their participation in policy analysis and design to control the policy process and outcomes in a given country has been limited (see Nelson 1990: Ch.8, Mosley et al 1991: Ch. 9).

The literature that debates the use and effectiveness of policy conditionality reflects the varied perspectives on how donor agencies can and should intervene in the domestic policy process of aid recipient countries (see Berg 1991, Cohen et al 1985, Hermann 1985, Kahler 1989, McCleary 1991, Nelson and Eglinton 1992, Pietrobelli and Scarpa 1992, Vondal 1989), as well as the practical limitations of conditionality as a coercive mechanism (Mosley et al 1991; Taylor 1987; Kulibaba and Rielly 1993). The more recent debate on this issue has been to some degree sparked by rising donor agency interest in increasing the level of participation in their country programs. For example, the World Bank formed a learning group on participation (see Bhatnagar and Williams 1992), and A.I.D.'s new leadership has expressed strong support for participatory development (see Atwood 1993). In the economic policy reform context, this interest is based on the view that wider participation in policy debates will make it easier for governments to maintain commitment to reform conditionalities (see Johnson and Wasty 1993).

### 3. Local Government

Local governments are rarely cited as central actors in the economic policy reform process. Given the centralized administrative structures prevalent in most African countries, local governments tend to play either a nonexistent or highly limited role in policy decisions, and represent the moribund antennae of an already overstretched and ineffectual central state (Silverman 1992, Wunsch and Olowu 1990). To the extent that administrative systems are decentralized and local governments have some operational capacity, they have served in some cases as policy implementors; for example, Kenya's District Focus for Rural Development (Oyugi 1994, Wallis 1990). The anglophone eastern and southern African nations are relatively more decentralized than the francophone countries (see de Valk and Wekwete 1990, Mutizwa-Mangiza 1990).

Overall, however, local governments' capacity to participate effectively in any phase of the policy process is severely circumscribed. Olowu and Smoke succinctly summarize what the literature finds:

Local sources of revenue are poorly developed and administered, and local service needs are not well met. There are insufficient staff, and many employees lack adequate professional training. Civil services are badly organized and suffer from low pay scales and poor incentives. Recordkeeping is primitive, and managerial procedures are underdeveloped or non-existent. Central governments exert stifling and inefficient bureaucratic control over many aspects of local authority operations, and there is extensive political interference in local

administration (1992: 3).

Nonetheless, a World Bank seminar reached the optimistic conclusion that local governments, if sufficiently empowered, offer the potential to help mitigate the negative effects of structural adjustment policies by helping to finetune resource allocation and monitor impacts on the poor (World Bank 1989b).

#### 4. The Private Sector

Historically, the dirigiste orientation of African regimes in all regions of the continent has limited the role of the private sector in economic development in favor of state-led strategies (Callaghy 1990). The private sector and the profit motive were widely mistrusted. A key component of stabilization and structural adjustment programs has been to create a policy environment that encourages private sector investment. Within the African private sector, however, a distinction needs to be made between: a) the formal private sector, made up of a small number of for-profit business operators (generally male), often with links to European firms; and b) the informal private sector, made up of large numbers of small traders and operators/producers, often rural agriculture-based, with significant numbers of women participants. These two groups have responded differently to economic policy reform programs.

Regarding the formal private sector, in most African countries, investor response has been relatively weak compared to Asia and Latin America (Gordon 1991, Winrock 1991). "Most observers view the indigenous business class in Africa as weak, embryonic and lacking in independence because it has usually grown up under the protection and privileged support of the state elite" (Healey and Robinson 1992: 75). Businesses seek less to shape policy than to seek exceptions and/or special deals for their individual firms. Private sector interests are varied, and business people are not always aware of where their true interests lie in the long-term. Because of their traditional safe haven under the wing of protectionism, private sector operators are also hesitant to invest under the uncertainty of liberalizing markets (see Oshikoya 1992).

As a result, private sector actors have generally lacked the motivation and the skills to participate in the policy formulation process. Several donors have specifically targeted the indigenous private sector for assistance to increase its capacity for such participation. For example, A.I.D. is supporting the creation of national and regional networks of private entrepreneurs in West Africa with the aim of helping the private sector to engage in effective policy dialogue with governments and donor agencies (Orsini 1993). To date this effort has worked almost exclusively with the formal private sector. Another A.I.D. and World Bank funded effort has been working with both the formal and informal private sector, supporting operators in the livestock sector in Mali, Ivory Coast, and Burkina Faso to enable them to influence governments in the region to lower regulatory and operational restrictions in sub-regional trade (Holtzman and Kulibaba 1991 and forthcoming).

Privatization programs offer opportunities to involve private sector actors in policy implementation (see Bienen 1990, Bienen and Waterbury 1989, Young 1991). In Africa, progress in moving beyond the mutually beneficial coalition between statist governments and protected industries to new patterns of participation has been slight. Getting formal private sector actors to change their institutionalized modes of interaction with government has been difficult, for example, in the agriculture sector in Cameroon (Rielly 1993b, Truong and Walker 1990) and Malawi (Christiansen and Stackhouse 1989), where issues of weak incentives and skills have proven to be central. However, the supply response of informal private operators/producers to policy changes in agricultural and commodities markets has been quite positive (see Kulibaba 1993a and 1993b, Levine and Stathacos 1993, Ouedraogo and Adoum 1993). In general, the informal private sector is participating in new policy regimes to a greater extent than formal for-profit operators.

## 5. Non-Governmental Organizations

NGOs figure prominently on the development scene in Africa, both in individual countries and internationally. As various national governments rethink the appropriate and feasible role of the state, local development and service-delivery NGOs have emerged as a "third" force or sector between the state and the private sector (Clark 1991, Shaw 1993). NGOs are a component of civil society, but because there is a significant body of literature that targets NGOs as a topic, they are treated as a separate actor category here. The political economy literature concentrates largely on NGO-government interactions within the context of the shifting boundaries between state and polity in Africa (Shaw 1990). A critical issue is the degree of autonomy allocated to NGOs. Governments welcome NGOs' local capacities for service delivery, which has in many cases relieved them of popular pressure for rural outreach, while at the same time they remain nervous about their potential for grassroots political mobilization and pluralism (Bratton 1989b, Clark 1991). Nevertheless, African governments reaffirmed their espoused commitment to broad participation and a central role for NGOs at a 1990 conference in Tanzania, sponsored by the UN's Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA 1990). This conference brought together a large number of African NGOs, and produced the "African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation."

The leadership in the emerging democracies of francophone West Africa has also accorded a role in policy discussions to NGOs, inviting them to participate as officially recognized entities in national conferences and fora on policy issues, for example, in Mali on the issue of land tenure policy. Similarly, in South Africa, participation by NGOs in national issues fora has been a key factor in building consensus in the process leading toward majority rule, although there has been internal debate over whether participation in government-established political frameworks constitutes "selling out" to the dominant power structure (see Gibson 1990).

NGOs have long been associated with participatory rural development projects, and have proven to offer a practical means for building local capacity and self-reliance (Cernea 1988, Uphoff 1988) and contributing to project effectiveness (Finsterbusch and Van Wicklin 1987, see also Edwards and Hulme 1992). As participants in policy reform, however, NGOs have less experience, although the potential exists. Several authors suggest that NGOs can help rural people channel their views into national policy debates, if the NGOs have the requisite technical and managerial skills and a mobilizable political constituency (Bratton 1990, Hall 1988). VanSant considers that NGOs can participate successfully in the policy process to the extent that: the policy deals with an area in which the NGO has expertise, credibility, and a demonstrated track record; the NGO's activities in the policy area are relatively large scale and visible; the policy environment is favorable to NGO involvement and is not characterized by adversarial relations; and the NGO has established links to key government officials, donor agencies, and other supporters (1989: 1724).

Within the institutional and management category of literature, sources note that NGOs have served to demonstrate policy implementation options in several sectors in Africa, notably in natural resources policy (Brinkerhoff et al 1992, Talbott 1990). These experiences have been used as input to policy dialogue between donors and national governments. Because of donor willingness to fund programs that involve NGOs and of the NGOs' increasing capacity to articulate previously underorganized interests, their involvement in policy discussions has increased dramatically in the recent past as a function of their growing clout (Clark 1991, Edwards and Hulme 1992, Korten 1990). Some of the large international NGOs have become major lobbyists on particular issues, for example, the environment, the impact of adjustment on women, poverty-focused development, population, and so on.

## **6. Civil Society and Organized Interest Groups**

This category of actors, long obscured by the literature that focused on the consolidation of the African state in the post-colonial era, constitutes in most respects that great mass of stakeholders whose participation, whether opposition or compliance, is ultimately critical to the outcome of socioeconomic policy reform efforts. Comprising professional associations, labor and trade unions, student organizations, political parties, and voluntary associations of many types, this is a most diverse group (see Bratton 1989a, Widner and van der Veen 1993). Its members are sometimes officially sanctioned and sometimes not, while their interests sometimes compete and often overlap. Whatever their role, their collective influence invariably leaves its imprint on the political and economic life of a nation.

The sheer variety of civic associations present in Africa and the dynamism of their influence over time makes it difficult to characterize their particular influence. This task is further complicated by the political changes currently underway, as African states undertake efforts to liberalize governance and create new opportunities for political participation by organized groups in civil society.

There is a rich, if fragmented, literature on civic life in Africa, much of which focuses on the "low politics" of communal interactions and points toward the contradiction inherent in the "strong societies/weak states" situation, where associational influences and lobbying that are formally excluded from the political process exercise influence informally on the quality and conduct of government. This was made possible, if not necessitated some authors argue, by efforts of African regimes to subsume and co-opt the diverse interests at play in civil society through the creation of single-party states and a machinery of governance that sought to absorb professional, gender, and age groups as instruments of party loyalty. Typical of the position held by many authors is Chazan's observation that, following independence in much of Africa, "although the associational landscape became more heterogeneous than in the past, independent social groups were enveloped and their range of maneuverability severely confined. Patron client networks were institutionalized" (1992b: 17-18). Other authors point to the emergence of informal, ethnic- and/or gender-based, political and economic associations in politically repressive environments (Améthier 1989, MacGaffey et al 1991, Monga 1994a).

Two types of association can be cited: voluntary associations include a wide range of horizontal (non-hierarchical) interests that are sanctioned by the state, or overlooked by its control mentality: trade unions, professional associations, religious societies, mutual aid societies, rotating credit associations, and sports clubs. Because of their voluntary nature and the importance of social capital to their survival, these tend to be indigenous meritocracies, whose leadership is selected on the basis of competence and the ability to best represent members' interests (Klitgaard 1986, Chazan 1982).

Ascriptive associations, i.e., those whose members share an ascriptive or geographically limited definition of membership, include ethnic and kinship associations, language-based associations (in states such as Cameroon, which incorporated formerly British and French colonies), and regionally-based associations. These groups emerged primarily in towns and cities, where non-native communities were implanted by migration and the quest for economic opportunity. Their *raison d'être* is both an expression of group solidarity as well as the provision of mutual assistance in alien environments. Unlike voluntary (horizontal) associations, they are inclined to "import" the indigenous hierarchical tendencies and values of their geographical or regional origins.

One analytic stream has underlined the importance of collective action as fostering the development of "social capital;" that is, communal norms of reciprocity and trust that strengthen networks of civic engagement. Once established and implanted, these norms may then be externalized to promote higher expectations of performance and accountability by governmental and other institutions (Hirschman 1984, Putnam 1993). As Coleman notes,

Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence...For example, a group whose members manifest trustworthiness and place extensive trust in one another will be able to accomplish much more than a comparable group lacking that trustworthiness and trust... (1990: 302).

Good examples of social capital put to work include the rotating credit associations (tontines) of West Africa (Améthier 1989), communal arrangements for the management and improvement of natural resources (see Brinkerhoff et al 1992), informal associations of women traders in Ghana, or neighborhood watch and sanitation brigades in many African cities (Landell-Mills 1992).

To date, studies of the relationship of social capital and civic action have been confined to theoretical discussion or monographs examining the phenomenon in Latin America and Western Europe. Although this approach has not yet been applied to sub-Saharan Africa to any significant degree, hypotheses that investigate causal linkages between social capital, responsive governance and economic development merit serious consideration through comparative research.

A number of studies have shed light on how collective action is exercised in the policy process. Over ten years ago, Bates (1981) pointed out the fallacy of the dominant assumption that rural Africans were largely quiescent and disengaged from policy-making due to their geographical dispersion, low socioeconomic status and the rigors of agrarian life. He argued that not only were farmers engaged in collective action, but that variation in the extent of agrarian organization was a consequence of whether there were large farmers with a special stake in more favorable policy; whether the loyalty of larger, more militant farmers could be purchased or co-opted through selective administration of subsidies, and whether or how much heads of state and political elites derived personal income or support from rural constituencies (see also Bates 1988).

Similar conclusions can be drawn about other interest groups, underlining the fact that absent opportunities for formal participation in the policy process, stakeholders devise their own subtle yet highly effective means of exerting influence on policy outcomes. As Colbourn (1989) notes, strategies of non-compliance (including foot dragging, feigned ignorance, false compliance or sabotage) provide a means by which sociopolitical actors outside the official government apparatus (e.g. rural farmers) or even within government (bureaucrats) can "critique" policy, without drawing down on themselves the wrath of the authorities (see also Ela 1992). In situations where political expression through formal channels is prohibited or otherwise difficult, non-political or "horizontal" sociocultural affiliations (e.g. ethnicity, gender, religion, or regional origins) or economic behaviors (e.g. market manipulation) may be mobilized as channels for the expression of interests (Bratton and van de Walle 1992, Robinson 1992, Widner and van der Veen 1993). Several sources note that religious groups are likely to become increasingly prominent actors in political and economic arenas (Boyle 1992, Bratton 1989a, Roberts and Seddon 1991). For example, the politico-economic importance of the Mouride brotherhoods in Senegal is well recognized (e.g. Magassouba 1985).

While Healey and Robinson argue, with some degree of exaggeration, that "there is little or no literature on how African governments consult interest groups in formulating policy" (1992: 51), the current trend toward political liberalization in Africa provides, on an almost daily basis, rich new data on the opportunities for, and the difficulties of, promoting effective

participation in civic life. The incidence of national conferences and policy fora, which began in West Africa in 1991 and which are prevalent in South Africa's transition to majority rule, have underlined both the speed with which interests can coalesce when opportunities for interest articulation are presented, and the difficulty of governments in devising and prioritizing responses to newly legitimized special interests (Boye 1993, Skalnes 1993, USAID 1993, Hyden and Bratton 1992, Monga 1994a and 1991).

Among the linchpins of political liberalization is the restoration of liberty of expression, which in some countries has triggered a blossoming of the news media. Far from fulfilling Ghanaian President Nkrumah's once optimistic vision of the media as a revolutionary tool for African liberation, the first decades of independence saw strict political control of the media as governments sought to limit or manipulate any expression of alternative viewpoints (see Wedell 1986, West and Fair 1993). Until recently, the media were, for the most part, irrelevant to the concerns of the public (Domatob and Hall 1983, Mwakawago 1986), although the Botswana case is an interesting exception (Zaffiro 1993). In the wake of this pattern, African newspaper publication and circulation, radio broadcasting and ownership, and television programming trails the rest of the world, including other developing regions, by a wide margin (Sandbrook 1993).

In the wake of political liberalization, many countries have experienced a rapid growth in media outlets, especially radio and press (Wedell 1986). In the area of economic policy, the new freedom of expression has led to both emotional and well-grounded discussions of reform issues in the African media. A topic of particular concern is the impact of stabilization and structural adjustment policies on the welfare of various groups in society (e.g., Ouane 1990, Matlosa 1991, Monga 1992, Sachikonye 1992). Given the importance of information flows to both political and economic liberalization, several sources note the need to increase the capacity of the African media to understand economic issues and to separate reporting from editorializing. A number of donors have initiated projects designed to strengthen media capacity.

## **7. Local Residents, the Poor, and Other Disenfranchised Groups**

The literature on rural development project participation attests to what has come to be the conventional wisdom regarding project design and implementation, that projects are more effective and sustainable to the extent that local beneficiaries are involved (Bamberger 1988, Cohen and Uphoff 1980, Finsterbusch and Van Wicklin 1987, Garcia-Zamor 1985, Kottak 1985, Lineberry 1989, Tacconi and Tisdell 1992). Donor agencies worked with African governments to reach out to local residents to devise ways to increase their participation in, until the mid-1980s for the most part, state-initiated development schemes. Both donors and African governments have sought to modify, in varying degrees, their operating procedures to make it easier to pursue participatory projects (Atherton et al 1992, Bryant 1980, Bryant and White 1982, Montgomery 1988, Midgley 1986, Uphoff 1985), including most recently the World Bank (Bhatnagar and Williams 1992).

However, the evidence of active, direct participation of poor and marginalized groups

in the economic policy process in Africa is slight. Except in some isolated instances, the poor's participation in policy reform enters into the process as a discussion topic used by actors with access to the relatively limited policy-making arena. The major thrust of this topic has been a debate among donor agencies, recipient/borrower governments, and scholars on how the poor have been affected by economic policy outcomes.

The economic performance stream of literature focuses on the poor's participation in policy outcomes in terms of the burdens imposed by economic stabilization and structural adjustment policies. UNICEF's "human face of adjustment" findings focused African government and donor agency concerns on the negative impacts of these policies in the context of the worldwide economic downturn (Nelson 1989b, Taube 1993). Suggestions for making changes in the IMF-World Bank policy packages were advanced that included policy measures meant to target the poor and disenfranchised (e.g., women, children) more directly (Jolly 1988, Lele 1990). Members of the international NGO community lobbied UNICEF strongly on such policy modifications. The World Bank began to put in place multisectoral, quick-disbursing compensatory programs to accompany adjustment; these include Chad's Social Development Action Program, Ghana's Program of Actions to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment, Guinea's Socioeconomic Development Support Project, Guinea-Bissau's Social and Infrastructure Relief Project, and Madagascar's Economic Management and Social Action Project (Zuckerman 1991).

An ongoing debate in the economic performance literature on the poor's participation in policy outcomes turns around a variety of technical issues. Among these are, for example: the definition of the poor and the different categories, e.g., poorest of the poor or ultra-poor, the vulnerable poor (young children and pregnant women), the bottom 30 percent (mostly rural), or the urban poor and near-poor (Nelson 1989b); and the determination that the changes in socioeconomic status of the poor, however defined, are the result of adjustment programs, the inheritance of past misguided development strategies (Zuckerman 1991), or the failure to apply adjustment measures (Berg 1990). A large research effort undertaken by the Cornell University Food and Nutrition Policy Program conducted a series of African country case analyses to test the hypothesis that structural adjustment has caused a decline in the living standards of the poor. The results indicate that adjustment programs have led to a marginal increase, on average, in the poor's welfare although the income gains were too small to contribute significantly to poverty alleviation; and that the welfare losses from adjustment were mainly among the urban non-poor (see, for example, Sahn 1990, Sarris 1990, Sahn and Sarris 1991). There is also a growing stream of analysis focusing on the gender aspects of structural adjustment impacts (e.g., Gladwin 1991, USAID 1991, World Bank 1993).

The African literature also addresses the poor's participation in policy "bads," with many of these sources being highly critical of the IMF and the World Bank (e.g., Ela 1992, Ayittey 1991, Shaw 1993 and 1991, Schoenholtz 1987). The Economic Commission for Africa's alternative framework for structural adjustment represents an indigenous response to dealing with policy impacts on the poor (UNECA 1989).

The political economy literature discusses the poor's participation in policy reform mainly in terms of the difficulties that marginalized groups experience in making their voice heard by decision-makers. The substantial exit of the poor from the formal economy in response to rent-seeking officialdom, perverse policy regimes, and deteriorating economic conditions is noted throughout Africa. In several countries, such as Zaire, the informal economy has made survival possible in the face of the failure of the official system (see MacGaffey et al 1991). This exit, though driven by basic survival needs, is also a political act since, by the definition of the ruling regime, the informal economy is illegal. Modifying this situation and substituting voice by the poor in policy matters for exit is also political, in the sense that it requires the state to create policy space for the poor's participation (see the chapters in Hyden and Bratton 1992, and Mikell 1989).

In addition to the ongoing supply-side issues in participation and the poor of increasing the capacity of policymaking and implementing agencies to reach out to the poor, the demand side is critical. (Bratton 1990: 89) states that the challenge for the 1990s is "how can the poor majority reach the makers of public policy?" The academic literature has few specific answers to this question beyond what those writing on governance propose as necessary to redress the balance between state and civil society in general. Already mentioned is the use of NGOs as an interest articulation mechanism for local people's views and needs. Several sources report anecdotes of ways the poor and others have sought to reach policymakers, for example, Malawian women using songs to pass political messages to the president during traditional ceremonies (Hirschmann 1991). The applied literature offers some suggestions; for example, an A.I.D. review of participatory practices in African field missions cites several mechanisms in use for the design and implementation of non-project assistance (NPA) programs (USAID n.d.). These include structured consultations, conferences/workshops, studies and surveys, work with NGO consortia, direct beneficiary participation, and the creation of oversight committees.

### **C. How does participation take place in economic policy reform?**

Much of the above discussion has addressed this question in the context of examining the "what" and "who" dimensions of participation. This section highlights some specific issues relating to the "how" question to add extra flavor on the dynamics of participation in policy reform.

#### **1. The impetus for reform**

During the 1980s more than two-thirds of all sub-Saharan African countries initiated major economic reform programs supported by the international donor community, in response to economic crisis. A critical issue for looking at where the impetus to pursue reform comes from is to examine perceptions of economic crisis as a precursor to doing something about it. Numerous authors debate whether economic crisis is a necessary precondition for major

economic reform. The literature makes several important points here. First is that crises appear more clearly definable as such in retrospect, and that decision-makers perceive crisis gradually over time. Thus, the impetus for reform can take a long time to build up. Kulibaba and Rielly (1993) refer to the process of forestalling reform in the midst of ongoing decline as "the leaking roof syndrome," where the need for reform becomes obvious only during periods of acute crisis, when leaders' room to maneuver becomes constrained. The political calculus involved in any decision to embark on reform in this context accords greater weight to short-term risks of alienating vital, personal constituencies than to the longer-term interests of the economy. With greater concern about preserving state power, most leaders chose to change course only when the risks to their political survival outweighed benefits. During intermittent crises— cyclical downturns in the economy— the focus of government was on the identification of short-term solutions, rather than on systemic adjustments in policy or performance. Cyclical upturns, on the other hand, provided optimal conditions for maintaining the status quo.

A second point is that the impetus for reform grows as a function of the elimination of other options, finally leaving governments with little choice but to "bite the bullet." Recent A.I.D. studies of agricultural policy reform in seven African nations (Kulibaba 1993a, 1993b, Levine and Stathacos 1993, Ouedraogo and Adoum 1993, Rielly 1993a, 1993b, Widner 1993) conclude that regimes were likely to engage in reform only once political alternatives to reform were exhausted. Over time, then, economic crisis softens resistance to change by narrowing political options for the regime in power, and creating opportunities for reformers (Nelson 1990, Mosley et al 1991, Bates and Krueger 1993, Krueger 1993, Grindle and Thomas 1991). The governance literature argues that this process is facilitated by transparency and accountability (Hyden 1992, 1990).

A third point is that the literature reveals the oversimplification of the conventional wisdom that economic reforms have been forced upon African countries at the initiative of the international donors. While it is true that resource-starved governments have desperately needed the funds provided through stabilization and adjustment programs, the actual process of negotiating and implementing reforms involves a large degree of joint initiation of proposals and counterproposals (Berg 1990 and 1991, Brinkerhoff and Morgan 1989, White 1990c). Increasingly, donor agencies are seeking innovative ways of expanding the range of groups consulted in the design and implementation of policy reform packages (Atherton et al 1992, USAID n.d.).

## **2. Incentives for participation**

A key principle underlying the analytic approaches of all streams of the participation-related literature is that people behave so as to increase the likelihood that outcomes they desire will be achieved. This is the classic interest-maximizing perspective of both economics and politics (see Liddle 1992). The implication is that groups, or individuals, will be motivated to participate in policy reform to the extent that they see their interests being served. Much of the literature examines incentives for participation in terms of winners and losers in the policy

reform process (e.g., Grindle and Thomas 1991, Meier 1991). The institutional and management literature offers tools for helping to identify winners and losers (stakeholder analysis) as input to policy design and implementation (Brinkerhoff 1991, Crosby 1992b).

In an examination of eleven cases worldwide, including Africa, Bates and Krueger (1993), express surprise at the degree to which the intervention of interest groups failed to account for the initiation, or lack of initiation, of policy reform. They also note wide variation in the effectiveness of interest groups in supporting or opposing policies when they were implemented. They conclude that, "in the context of comprehensive economic policy reform, it is difficult for particular groups to calculate where their interests lie. Ideological struggles therefore can outweigh competition among organized interests as a determinant of policy change" (1993: 456). This finding suggests that key variables in determining incentives for participation are: a) how different groups perceive the policy and its impact on them, and b) how they define their interests as they relate to the policy and its impact.

Grindle and Thomas (1990) pursue this kind of analysis in a study of 12 reform cases to explore the link between features of the policy reform and patterns of support and opposition by various interest groups. They note the impact of the nature of the benefits and costs that the policy generates as among the major determinants of whether groups perceive their interests to be positively or negatively affected by a given policy. Factors playing a role are, for example: the degree of visibility of benefits and costs, their immediacy of impact, the extent to which benefits are clear improvements in the current situation and to which costs are clear reductions in the status quo, the degree to which benefits and costs are generalized across societal groups or concentrated. Other scholars also use these factors in their analyses to explain policy success and/or failure. A common conclusion regarding adjustment policies in Africa and governments' ability to sustain commitment to measures agreed to is that reform costs are immediate and clearly hurt key government constituencies while benefits are diffuse, uncertain, and take a long time to be realized (Bienen 1990, Johnson and Wasty 1993, van de Walle 1994). Some authors suggest strategies for addressing this pattern of incentives. For example, based on the Zambian reform experience, Hawkins (1991) suggests four possible strategies that could help to deal with winners and losers: repress opposition, appeal to patriotic sentiment, promote new constituencies among winners, make short-term transfer payments to loser groups.

### **3. Institutional structures for participation**

The institutional channels and mechanisms for participation in economic policy reform play a central role in the patterns of participation that are found in various African countries. In the neopatrimonial, single-party African governments that predominated during much of the post-independence period, policy-making structures were generally closed, opaque, personalistic, and served elite impulses to consolidate political and economic power. Given the low levels of official accountability for policy choices, few formal participatory institutional structures existed (Chazan et al 1988). In the context of political liberalization, however, many of these structures are in a state of flux, with many previously informal participatory structures moving toward

formal incorporation (Chazan 1982). Members of civil society are testing out their new freedom of expression and association, both as individuals and through various mediating organizations, something reflected in the rapid growth in indigenous NGOs (Chazan 1992b, Widner and van der Veen 1993). Governments are facing increased demands for accountability and transparency from their own citizens as well as from the international donor community (e.g., Monga 1994a).

As the previous sections on the "what" of participation described, the institutional structures through which the economic policy process flows are predominantly public bureaucracies. These are by all accounts plagued with capacity problems, and dominated by policy elites, who remain for the most part relatively insulated from institutionalized and independent sources of countervailing power, influence, or expertise. Increasing decentralization holds some potential for rearranging the balance between center and periphery participation in the policy process within the public sector (Silverman 1992). These institutional structures, with their strengths and weaknesses, are the major focus of international donors' attention regarding economic policy in part because, as Section III below discusses, borrower/recipient government agencies are their primary interlocutors, and it is through their channels that donors seek to promote increased participation.

According to political scientists, however, the "real action" in the sphere of institutional structures for participation in economic policy lies outside of the state. The reduction in the size and role of the state apparatus in much of Africa creates space for the development of alternative non-governmental channels for interest articulation and participation (Rothchild and Chazan 1988, Wunsch and Olowu 1990). Although these institutional channels are relatively weak and fragmented (Bratton 1989a), they are growing stronger and more numerous as evidenced, for example, by the explosive growth in the number of indigenous NGOs recorded in official registries throughout Africa. Further societal processes are underway that are beginning to order the newly available institutional space, phenomena Monga (1994a) discusses under the rubric, "the anthropology of anger." Woods, in his analysis of civil society in Africa, observes that,

an organizing principle is emerging in several African countries based on the idea of political accountability and a sharper separation between public and private interests. ... [A]n urban middle class is forming the basis of a public opinion that is highly critical of the postcolonial state ... [consisting] of lawyers, teachers, syndicalists, journalists and private sector operators. ... While there is nothing [yet] that unifies these social categories together into a set of stable and cross-cutting associations, they do have common life-experiences in a crisis-ridden society and economy (1992: 91).

As this quote illustrates, and as touched upon in the "who" section above, institutional structures favor the participation of some groups over others. The poor are especially marginalized due to their lack of access to institutional channels that serve their needs and interests. The vibrancy of the informal sector is both an unspoken commentary on the impermeability and inaccessibility of postcolonial formal economic policy institutions, and an expression of the resilience and capacity of nonformal institutional mechanisms to order

economic pursuits while resisting the arbitrariness of state power (e.g., Chazan 1982 and 1992b, MacGaffey et al 1991). An interesting example of how rural people have been successful in exploiting the policy space made available by the shallow penetration of the state in rural Africa comes from the natural resources sector. In the Sahel, local village groups have shown themselves able to regulate access to forest resources more effectively than government forestry services through the use of traditional governance mechanisms (see Brinkerhoff et al 1992).

#### 4. Extent of participation

How extensive the opportunities for participation in policy reform are varies along a number of dimensions. Different types of policies provide vastly disparate points of entry for various groups. Policies that call for highly technical background analysis, determination of appropriate policy provisions, and then stroke-of-the-pen implementation offer little scope for participation beyond a small team of donor and national technocrats in the finance ministry and the central bank. These are what van de Walle (1994) calls "price-based policies." At the opposite extreme are policies whose implementation requires the coordinated action of a wide array of actors over a long time period. A good example of this kind of policy is privatization (Bienen and Waterbury 1989). The complexity of the policy process increases almost exponentially under these circumstances, given the vast scope for participation and the inherent uncertainties that are introduced into the policy cycle. Bienen brings this complexity to life in his analysis of trade liberalization,

Governments cannot estimate precisely the political impact of economic policies. Elites frequently hedge their bets, since they know that the consequences of their actions may be great but they cannot estimate the effects of particular policies. We have seen this as governments cut subsidies, face opposition, cancel the subsidy cuts, and then reimpose the subsidy cuts later. ... Or governments cut subsidies but announce wage increases. In trade, they may move from direct controls to a phased controlling of foreign exchange, as Kenya did (1990: 723).

As noted in the governance and political economy literatures, the type of political system influences the extent to which participation is possible, although the evidence linking reform success with regime type is equivocal (e.g., Bates and Krueger 1993, Lindenberg and Devarajan 1993, Moore and Scaritt 1990). Authoritarian regimes and imperial bureaucracies can pose significant barriers to participation by all but the ruling elite despite a policy package that, under other circumstances, lends itself to popular input. Even in liberalizing political environments, the institutional weaknesses noted elsewhere constitute barriers to anything beyond relatively limited involvement in policy matters by civil society. However, as many sources observe, these barriers are under siege by the increasingly outspoken elements in civil society calling not just for political democracy, but economic liberalization. In a number of African countries, potential increases in the extent of participation in economic policy are probably more likely to be demand-driven than supply-led, although the direct access of donor agencies to support and further such increases is mainly, but not exclusively, on the supply side (Landell-Mills 1992).

## 5. Degree of empowerment

As the above discussion of voice and exit options for participation in policy reform shows, how empowered participants are, or perceive themselves to be, influences their behavior vis à vis particular policies. The African cases where policy-makers and implementors have mismanaged responses to policy measures and provoked riots in the streets have entered the folklore of structural adjustment, for example, Zambia (CSIS 1992, Gulhati 1989). These cases are taken as object lessons in both the strength of empowered public opinion (on the part of civil society), and the limits of state power. To focus on popular protest, as the press has done on occasion, is to overlook the other ways that empowerment relates to economic policy reform. As Bratton and van de Walle (1992b) found in their study of popular protest and government responses in fifteen African nations during the late 1980s, popular protest of economic policies has, in and of itself, been an insignificant catalyst for reform. Only when economic grievances escalate and expand to the political realm, challenging regime composition or legitimacy, are governments likely to react with substantive policy reform, and then only following unsuccessful attempts to co-opt or suppress political expression (see also Monga 1994a).

While visible and vocal outbursts in opposition to specific policy effects may cause governments to seek tactical policy adjustments in the short-term, long-term empowerment of disenfranchised groups to participate in the policy-making process in liberalized systems is strongly related to their ability to translate economic demands into political ones. Bates and Krueger (1993: 455) argue that, "there is in fact but a weak relationship between economic conditions and policy responses... Lying between economic circumstances and policy reform is a political process, by which the needs for economic adjustment translate into effective political demands for policy change." One means of achieving this transition for marginalized actors is to increase their participation in the mainstream economy (e.g., IFAA 1992 and Sethi 1989 on South Africa). The political economy literature reinforces this point in various analyses of interest group politics and how access to decision-makers is beginning to expand beyond being based exclusively on informal, ethnic, and political ties to include economic clout (e.g., Chazan 1982, USAID 1993). Illustrative here is the increased role for private sector operators in policy dialogue throughout the continent (Orsini 1993, Woods 1992). Landell-Mills comments on the potential strengthening of civil society as a result of a more prosperous private sector, which in the past had limited "surpluses available to fund associational activities" (1992: 564).

## III. DOMINANT THEMES IN THE LITERATURE

As the above overview makes clear, the participation literature is vast and relatively diverse. This section singles out a set of topical areas that emerge from the literature as dominant themes and issues. These are grouped into three categories. The first looks at the nature of the African state and its implications for participation in economic policy reform. the second focuses on the interaction between international donors and borrower/recipient country governments. And the third addresses the issue of institutional capacity for reform.

## A. The Political Economy of the African state

As the principal context in which participation occurs, the state plays a major role in determining the kinds of contributions that civil society can make to policy reform and implementation. This is particularly true for those who are concerned about the role of institutional conditions as a precondition for reform success. This section reviews the major themes raised in the literature with regard to how the state limits or creates opportunities for participation in the policy reform process.

### 1. Participation and the State

A vast body of literature discusses the nature of the state in sub-Saharan Africa. Chazan et al's definition of the state as "a set of associations and agencies" that exercises control over defined territories and their populations through decision-making structures (executives, parties, parliaments), decision-enforcing institutions (bureaucracies, parastatal organizations, and security forces) and decision-mediating bodies (primarily courts, tribunals, and investigatory commissions) is useful in that it places emphasis on the organic functioning of institutions. "The character of the state in any particular country is determined by the pattern of organization of these institutions at specific points in time" (1988: 37). Efforts to identify how variations in the configuration of institutions have, however, led to much academic hairsplitting, examining such features as the relative weight of military and civilian authority in Africa, degrees of adherence to constitutional regimes, relative willingness of legislators to challenge executive decree, the saliency of coercive and control mechanisms, etc.

In examining participation, it is important to distinguish among the structures of the state itself (the aggregate of institutions of power), regimes (the norms, rules principles and modes of interaction between state organs and the populace), and government (the occupants of public office who are elected, appointed, or who seize control of the state apparatus). Many sources argue that the most relevant of these elements is regime, whose character is reflected in the quality of governance and the opportunities for participation in political processes through formal and informal channels.

Gulhati (1990b: 1147) points out that for many years the analytical framework of welfare economics and development economics failed to appreciate problems of economic policy performance because of their inappropriate vision of the state as "monolithic," "a guardian of the long-term interest of society," and the belief that the state "had an unambiguous preference function which coincided with that of society." The failure to distinguish between the personal objectives of civil servants and politicians, bureaucratic imperatives of government ministries, and aggregate social preference functions effectively distorted the understanding by donors and academics alike of problems of policy failure in Africa. An additional failing of these approaches was an inability to fully incorporate informal channels of participation into an appreciation of how the African state functions.

Following independence, the majority of African states began a rapid process of transmutation, in which the Western-style institutions implanted by colonial authorities were discarded by leaders who sought to consolidate economic and political power. While the outlaw behavior of military regimes has become a cliché of the post-independence syndrome, less visible is the role of foreign donors, whose policies of rapid industrialization and import-substitution were based on the flawed assumption that only the state could muster adequate capital and expertise for rapid economic development (Toye 1991, Kulibaba 1993a). Hyden (1992) characterizes regimes along a continuum ranging between "statist", where the state serves as the primary mechanism for resource allocation, and "libertarian," which are market-based and in which citizens are autonomous actors. According to Hyden's model, after independence the majority of African states proceeded to slide toward the statist pole, with constitutional regimes abandoned once the need for compromise was surpassed. The African state that emerged, with few exceptions and many variations, was one in which pluralism was suppressed and political choice was limited.

Gordon and Lancaster note how the drift toward statist government, and the reasons behind the ultimate unraveling of the statist framework, came in the form of a political compact, in which certain freedoms were traded off against the promise of development:

These regimes promised effective economic performance and rising living standards through state-directed development and through heavy regulation of the private sector. In return, they claimed the right to maintain a centralized and authoritarian system of governance. With very few exceptions, African states have failed as promoters of development. This failure served to substantially weaken their claims to political legitimacy, especially among urban middle classes who have formed the core constituency for reform efforts all over Africa (1993: 135).

## **2. Patronage Politics and Informal Participation in the State**

The critical need to distinguish between state, regime and government is illustrated by Chazan (1982), who provides insight into one effect that the consolidation of power in the African state had on political thought as well as civic life during the years following independence. As regimes actively sought to suppress real or imagined opposition, they attempted at the same time to develop political machines to manipulate or curb the expression of popular opinion. Chazan argues that, "by the mid-1970s the process of departicipation was considered to be so complete that the relationship between participation and political development was viewed as being in need of drastic reassessment" (1982: 171). The frequency and rhythm of autocratic recidivism during this period was so intense that Huntington (1958) in the West, and a growing number of African thinkers contended that the development of institutional capacity must be a prerequisite to participation in the process of political development. The rapid collapse of African democracy could be attributed to the fragility of institutions in those new states.

Departicipation, as defined in the 1970s, was the sclerotic narrowing of the channels for participation in formal political processes, and voluntary withdrawal from channels for participation erected by party-state regimes as a means of creating the illusion of populist government. The flaws in this hypothesis are numerous, however. Limiting the definition of participation to voting and other aspects of the democratic process was excessively narrow, and overlooked other modes and structures of participation below or beyond the level of national politics.

The suppression of political diversity in the paradigmatic African state of the 1970s and 1980s was endemic. The fate of dismantled and suppressed political parties is often neglected, yet the literature suggests that this may be a key to understanding the dynamic character of political participation in institutionally adverse conditions. When the statist regimes of the post-independence era emerged, the formal political parties that challenged them were, in most instances, relatively young and institutionally ill-prepared to mount adequate defenses against autocratic government. Their response, as suggested by Chazan (1982) and others (Linz 1978, Manor 1991) was to dissolve into their constituent parts (voluntary and ascriptive associations). As sociopolitically legitimate interests in the paradigmatic state, these groups were left with a limited voice, but a voice nonetheless.

As numerous authors point out, the single-party statist regimes of the post-independence period were careful to distribute power and privilege using "ethnic arithmetic": ensuring that representatives of key ascriptive and other interests were built into the power structure. However, the rules of engagement in such regimes relied more on instruments of personal power than on the simple representation. As Hyden notes, such regimes encouraged "clientelist relations that...generate trust on a dyadic (two-person) basis but that discourage the growth of new forms of trust and reciprocity that transcend such rudimentary and narrow relations" (1992: 23-24). The sole advantage of such personalization of power was to create strong personal loyalty among political actors, while its principal cost was to necessitate the politics of patronage. Policy-making in this context, however, "lacks the logic and empirical content that typically characterizes such an activity in other contexts" and leads to the creation of "governance structures that are largely informal and subject to arbitrary change" (Hyden 1992: 23). As Klitgaard (1986) argues in a study of elitism and meritocracy in developing nations, where meritocracy is replaced by clientelism, *objectivity* in administration or policy-making is a practical improbability.

As informal or sanctioned interests, the associational remnants of the pre-autocratic state are able to influence specific policy decisions by petitioning "their" representatives in government and parastatal institutions for specific policy responses or service provisions or, in cases where they believed their interests to be poorly represented, lobbying those whom they trusted to have "their" representatives replaced. In extreme instances, people also resort to more radical actions, taking to the streets to protest inadequate consideration of their communal needs.

Bakary points out that while the presence in government of political entrepreneurs is of considerable use in helping to "buy ethnic peace", this tendency is nonetheless "anti-democratic"

and opportunistic. Over time, the accumulated inflation of demand for state provision of education, health services, employment and other primary needs in such as system prove to be both politically and economically costly. "Economic inefficiency naturally results from the attempt to match the politics of distribution with the continuous sophistication of 'ethnic arithmetic' in order to avoid divisive tendencies" (1993: 68).

A second realm of informal participation that emerged following independence has been referred to as "black market government", parallel structures of persuasion and influence that guide economic policy, but which are neither publicly acknowledged nor formally sanctioned.

Studies by Ziegler (1978), Péron (1983), Smith, Combeaud and Moutout (1990) and Smith and Glaser (1992) focus on the influence of private interests on policymakers, noting how the patterns of interlocking mutual interests create policy distortions that favor elite personal and commercial interests.

### 3. Regimes and Reform Success

The re-emergence of the democratic impulse in Africa has given rise to considerable optimism among those who presume that the virtues of democracy will create new opportunities for successful policy reform. "Political reform advocates tend to see democratization as a precondition for economic liberalization and sustained growth. They are persuaded that the authoritarian, patrimonial state has been anti-developmental and cannot be otherwise. The failure of such regimes to achieve economic development is what has led to public demands for political liberalization" (USAID 1993: 5). However, political scientists and others find that the relationship between regime type and success in economic reform is not so clearcut. Early experience with stabilization and adjustment led to what became the conventional wisdom that implementing reforms called for authoritarian regimes that could cope with the political and populist unrest that accompanied removal of subsidies and other drastic measures. With the advent of political liberalization, this "wisdom" was increasingly questioned (Haggard and Kaufman 1989).

A number of multi-country studies have investigated this link (see, for example, chapters in Haggard and Kaufman 1992, Greenaway and Morrissey 1993, Lindenberg and Devarajan 1993, Sirowy and Inkeles 1990). The synthesis chapter by the editors of one of the most recent of these analyses, an eleven country study, sums up the findings:

We found little evidence for a relationship between economic reform and political authoritarianism. Nor have others who have also conducted comparative case studies. More important still, the systematic analysis of large-scale data sets has failed to find significant differences between democratic and authoritarian governments in terms of their ability to engage in policy reform...Fairly precise differences in the rules for political competition appear to make big differences in the behavior of politicians. As a consequence, large differences emerge in the choices of political elites operating within democratic political systems. As a

result, differences between authoritarian and democratic systems appear relatively insignificant.. (Bates and Krueger 1993: 459).

## **B. The Political Economy of Donor Participation in Reform**

The literature stresses the prime role played by international donors in the reform process in Africa. This section reviews the major themes raised in relation to donor participation, and how the policy process is influenced. It addresses issues of the structures and processes of donor-country interactions, including differences between multilateral and bilateral donors, and the use of conditionality.

### **1. Structure of donor-recipient interaction**

Views of donor participation in reform efforts have evolved during the past decade, as structural adjustment efforts and experiments in policy-based assistance have been tested in numerous settings around the world. The earlier literature focuses largely on the role of donors in the technical processes of policy analysis and the formulation of reform efforts. The issues and debates that dominate the literature of the 1980s concentrate on the efficacy of policy reform prescriptives and encompassed a range of observations: that market liberalization must be a precondition for economic growth in Africa (World Bank 1981, 1985); that, however necessary systemic changes might be, structural adjustment and policy-based lending were theoretically unproven (Cassen 1986, Zulu and Nsouli 1985); that linkages between policy targets and conditionality were bound to be arbitrary and inadequately enforceable (Williamson 1983). An additional, and extensive, body of the literature targets how donors might best enhance the environment for the management of reform efforts.

Political economists point out that a principal failing in donor efforts to promote economic policy reform has been a flawed perception of the reform process itself; that the technical approach of international financial institutions, principally the IMF and the World Bank, views the policy process as being mechanical, rather than political or linear, rather than interactive (Bates and Krueger 1993, Grindle and Thomas 1991, Klitgaard 1991, Kulibaba and Rielly 1993). The economic validity of reform prescriptions, they argue, is merely one virtue that donors bring to bear on an otherwise comprehensive process that requires consensus-building, negotiation, compromise and contingency planning.

The structure of donor participation in the reform process is, of course, limited in the first instance by the institutional mechanisms through which assistance is provided (multilateral organizations or bilateral agencies), the rules governing those agencies, and the array of instruments available to donors to promote and support economic reform efforts (the "alphabet soup" of ESAFs, SALs, SECALs, TALs, NPA, and so on). Clear distinctions can be drawn on the basis of institutional character: the IMF and the multilateral development banks are membership institutions, in which sovereign members hold an equity interest. Their charters

mandate institutional interactions with national government entities in negotiating lending agreements. These institutions are also characterized by the high degree of ostensible insularity between institutional policy-making and technical decision-making with regard to individual country requests for assistance. Hence, while they are well-suited to respond to the technical requirements of policy analysis and formulation, they are operationally restricted in the most sensitive area of the reform process: political risk management by regimes and implementing agents.

Bilateral donor organizations are, of course, somewhat different. Although they operate, for the most part, on a government to government basis, requiring at a minimum the approbation by recipient-country governments for any lending or grant-making agreement, their reach can be significantly greater. Because they are agents of government, their agendas cannot help but reflect the political trends and pressures "back home" as well as in the choice of nations in which they operate. Political pressures are also reflected in their technical emphasis and the "spread" of activities across various sectors; the earmarking of funds for specific regions and types of activities, and the linkage of aid to political or commercial objectives (Berg and Gordon 1989, Jepma 1991). In cases where structural ties remain strong between former colonial powers and recipient countries, this is likely to be reflected in such domains as trade or monetary and exchange rate policies (Berg and Berlin 1993, Dowe 1993). Bilateral donor interest in promoting economic reform may, in such cases, be driven as much by domestic considerations as by technical assessments of the benefits of reform to the recipient (Chafer 1992, Medard 1993).

One particular advantage enjoyed by bilateral agencies is their ability to broaden participation in reform by working directly with stakeholders through policy dialogue. In what might be appropriately labelled "microadjustment", such bilaterally-funded efforts can target narrowly-defined elements of reform, incorporating government as well as private sector interests in the design and implementation of policy change (see Vondal 1989). Commenting positively on A.I.D.'s efforts to increase consultation in the design and implementation of sector reforms, Atherton et al conclude that, "many of the innovative and successful strategies currently employed to encourage participation are the result of having experienced and dedicated USAID personnel in the field and working closely with local individuals and groups" (1992: 28). Particular examples include USAID-funded programs to eliminate fertilizer subsidies in Malawi (Kulibaba 1993b) and Cameroon (Rielly 1993a), and to liberalize grain marketing in Mali (Ouedraogo and Adoum 1993). Although multilateral donors have the same technical institutional capacity, their lack of a permanent on-the-ground presence combined with an emphasis on macro-level policy has limited the set of participants they are easily able to include in policy dialogue.

## **2. Processes of reform initiation and negotiation**

The first task that donors face when they begin working with governments is that of building consensus on the diagnosis of the problem at hand and, second, in identifying one or

several policy solutions that are acceptable to all parties concerned. Typically this process begins with technical assistance missions in which local officials or technicians may be active participants, or merely serve as informants.

Case studies of reform experiences in the early 1980s portray vividly the skepticism of donors with regard to the technical capacity as well as the political integrity of borrower country policy staff, and are rife with examples of IMF and World Bank technical missions challenging the reliability of national data, and choosing to override the conclusions of African policy analysts. (Toye 1991, Harrigan 1991, Mosley et al 1991, Herbst 1993). It is difficult to discount concerns about the technical capacity of African ministry staff during the first years of the adjustment era. It is equally important, however, to recognize the demoralizing effect that such marginalization of technocrats had in some instances and how this may have ultimately contributed to bureaucratic reticence during the subsequent implementation of reforms.

A perennial problem in the initiation phase of reform has been the difference of views between donors and recipient governments on the underlying problems of African economies. Although these differences are often reduced to Western critiques of the role of the state in the economy, Grindle (1991) argues that the neoclassical economic theory that informs adjustment-oriented policy prescription is based on an inherent overestimation of the extent to which self-interest governs the behavior of policy-makers and technocrats. Not only does this perspective overlook the ongoing processes of political participation in developing countries, but it also introduces a bias of suspicion and distrust that can create obstacles to genuine collaboration between African regimes and donor institutions. The growing roster of regimes that are engaged in political and economic liberalization suggests that a more benevolent and enlightened view of political dynamics is called for in donor-recipient interactions.

For African regimes, policy-based grants and loans are a mixed blessing (e.g., Winter 1984). They provide access to quick-disbursing finance to meet emergency expenditures, but also engage leaders in a process where they may be obliged to dismantle the very political and economic instruments from which they have derived power. Case studies cited throughout this document suggest, that in agreeing to the conditions tied to policy-based assistance, political leaders not only fear the worst, but enact elaborate strategies for non-compliance (Kulibaba and Rielly 1993).

If it is true that the negotiators of reform may have substantially different perceptions of the problem to be solved, so too do they have substantially different agendas. For donors, the mechanistic prescriptions of adjustment are ostensibly apolitical. Yet if those prescriptions are implemented, they are certain to have political outcomes (Cohen et al 1985). This technical orientation, accompanied by the avowedly apolitical nature of reform prescription, often leaves donors without explicit strategies for dealing with the political reservations of African leaders. The problem of conflicting views and agendas can be further compounded by the absence from the negotiating table of key stakeholder groups whose compliance with or opposition to reform is ultimately critical (Brown 1987, Brinkerhoff and Morgan 1989, Crosby 1992b).

While donor conditionality can be used to induce government to initiate policy change, it is not an effective tool for either enforcing compliance with reforms or for sustaining reform (Berg 1991, White 1990c, see also Hermann 1986). Characteristically, conditions attached to policy-based financial transfers are seen as a way to lower resistance to change by allowing the recipient greater financial maneuverability during the period of policy transition. Conditionality is often the subject of heated debate during pre-reform negotiations. However, political opposition, and a government's willingness or lack of willingness to override it, becomes more likely to emerge at the implementation stage. The failure of a recipient government to live up to its commitments is possible because political leaders are well aware of donors' and lenders' reticence toward any action which might jeopardize the reform effort by disrupting disbursement schedules. A lender's dilemma is further enhanced when the possibility arises that invoking conditionality sanctions will endanger prospects of recovering the loan.

A second pitfall of conditionality meriting attention is the risk of conflicts among the various conditions negotiated. Most African countries have multiple policy-based grant and lending agreements, each with its own set of conditionalities. This situation can create contradiction and conflict between competing policy agendas. This phenomenon results not merely from confusion or inadequate communications between donors and recipient governments, but often from poor internal coordination in donor agencies. Harrigan (1991) cites an example from Malawi that is the stuff of which legends are made, where a World Bank team negotiating the country's third structural adjustment loan attempted to remove a fertilizer subsidy for small farmers which was fundamental to the success of the National Rural Development Programme, which the Bank's own project division was itself financing.

Surprisingly, the reasons offered by governments seeking to delay adherence to conditionality sound participation-related themes: the need for negotiation or consultation with stakeholders; election calendars or democratization timetables; responsiveness to public concerns and insecurity; the need to train bureaucrats and other government agents, or the need to educate the public about reform rationale (Kulibaba and Rielly 1993). Although such reasoning is often legitimate, it is also sometimes little more than game playing (Berg 1991).

### **C. Institutional capacity for participation in policy reform**

A theme stressed throughout the literature is the need for sufficient capacity on the part of the institutions involved in the policy process in order for participation to take place. Capacity to participate in reform is linked to: a) quality of leadership, b) capacity of the government bureaucracy, and c) the nature of the interaction among leaders, bureaucrats, and external actors (Gulhati 1988). This section highlights several key issues emphasized in the literature.

## 1. Leadership

The features and characteristics of national political leadership have a significant influence on the patterns of participation in economic policy-making and implementation. In Africa, where systems governed by personal rule are more commonplace than other regions, leaders take on a particular importance. The absence of institutionalized checks and balances in the postcolonial state allows the African leader to control closely who has access to resources and decision-making (Adamolekun 1988). The chosen few that benefit from the patron-client relationship pattern are presented opportunities for active participation, while those excluded withdraw from formal politics, and/or from the economy (witness the rise of the informal sector). African analysts also recognize the need to modify the leadership framework for policy reform, as the contributions in Obasanjo and d'Orville (1991) demonstrate.

As noted above, however, in many African countries the power of the political leadership as patron is in fact circumscribed by the need for support from key clients so as to remain in power. A critical lesson from efforts to implement reform in Zambia, for example, is that policies harmful to the urban population, the major client group for many African leaders, are difficult to pursue (see Hawkins 1991).

The role of national leaders stands out in several country cases of economic policy reform; for example, Rawlings' remarkable achievements in Ghana's economic recovery (Chazan 1992a, Jeffries 1991) turned a radical, Libyan-style revolutionary regime into one of the few success stories of adjustment in Africa. Malawi's President Banda and the Ivory Coast's Houphouet-Boigny, on the other hand, held off deep institutional reform while preserving pro-business approaches to development (Harrigan 1991, Pryor 1990, Widner 1993). Tanzania's Nyerere's commitment to African socialism, coupled with his personal charisma, created an ideological atmosphere that stifled progress toward market reforms, which only became possible upon his retirement from power (Bierman 1988, Campbell 1992, Kiondo 1989). The transitional military junta that overthrew Mali's President Traore in 1991 not only sustained the impetus of ongoing economic reforms, but set out to systematically liberalize political institutions as well (Ouedraogo and Adoum 1993). Gulhati, in his review of policy-making in Africa, concludes that, "there is no doubt that a ruler can make a decisive difference in determining the climate for economic reform" (1990b: 1157). Bratton and van de Walle note the differences in the style, commitments, and skills of African political leaders in overseeing reform, but they conclude that, "resource availability tends to determine whether leaders can successfully pursue a chosen survival strategy" (1992: 47).

As the "who" section above (II.B) details, national leaders are not the major actors in the day-to-day implementation of economic policy. Structural adjustment programs typically allocate lead implementation responsibility to a senior technocrat (or a team of technocrats) in the ministry of finance, planning, trade and industry, and/or the central bank. Sectoral adjustment programs would include the relevant sectoral ministry. Ideally, this person has a technical understanding of the policy area, good connections within the government bureaucracy and among critical constituencies (without being captured by them), and a commitment to the policy

objectives (see Leonard 1991). Particularly in the highly personalized administrative systems in Africa, the presence of a "policy champion" has proven instrumental to seeing the economic reform process through to achieve results.

Policy champions, those technocrats who can organize constituencies for their ideas both in government and among interest groups in the society at large have often been essential in convincing political leaders and interest groups to back reform, or brokering cooperation between them. In so doing, they may seek to limit both bureaucratic barriers to implementation and mitigate outcry from parts of the citizenry negatively affected. In some instances, they may perform an educational function by mobilizing natural clienteles— people whose interests are favorably affected by reform but who are initially unaware of the anticipated benefits of reform-- and recruiting them as partisans for progress. The combination of political management skills, bureaucratic access, and technical training enabled these leaders to stem opposition among the political elite and influence policy change at the level of the presidency.

Policy champions often are willing to take positions that go against the interests of their own socio-economic class backgrounds. In Madagascar, for example, the Special Economic Adviser to the President used compelling technical arguments to promote politically difficult rice marketing reforms, even though reform meant the end of a system of privileges benefitting the political elite of the country, of which he was a member (Rielly 1993). In Ghana, President Rawlings' recruitment of, and continued support for, a select team of policy champions lent credibility and integrity to the nation's economic adjustment program and enhanced, over time, the quality of the country's collaboration with donors (Herbst 1993, Rothchild 1991).

In any country, however, such superstar participants in the policy process are in short supply. Donors sometimes end up competing for the same pool of committed, technocratic talent to fulfill the policy champion role. In addition, an all-too-frequent outcome is that the champions leave their government jobs to take staff positions in the donor agency funding the reform program.

## 2. Capacity of the government bureaucracy

Policy champions and other public sector actors in the reform process operate within a government bureaucratic system that, in the near unanimous view of the literature, suffers from acute capacity weaknesses. Numerous sources paint a dismal picture of the inability of African public bureaucracies to deliver even the most basic services, and of civil servants' tendency to extract rents and/or take second jobs as salaries slip below subsistence levels (e.g., Balogun and Mutahaba 1989, Wunsch and Olowu 1990). Mutahaba et al single out four factors as mainly responsible for the administrative inefficiencies of the African public sector:

inappropriateness and inefficaciousness of the organization systems for managing the public services; low competence levels on the part of public service personnel; inadequate compensation packages; and the failure to use appropriate technolog

ies and management techniques in running the services (1993: 79).

Ironically, IMF stabilization measures often call for reductions in the civil service at the same time that ambitious structural adjustment programs impose new challenges on the public sector, particularly in the financial sector (tax administration, budgeting, etc.). Lamb (1987) makes two important points here: a) for the majority of African countries, policy institutions are very weak and the pool of skilled and experienced human resources is small, and b) implementation responsibility often falls to agencies whose institutional interests run counter to the policies the reforms seek to put in place. These observations highlight the difficulty that can arise in separating capacity from commitment problems. Not all delays are caused solely by inability to cope with the administrative or technical requirements of the policy process, although those can be daunting. As Waterbury notes, "Over the long term, winning the cooperation of public sector managers for the reform process will be crucial" (1989: 44).

Compounding the capacity problem is the fact that the number of participants in the economic policy reform process is large. Thus, the level of capacity of each member of the network of agencies with a role to play in analysis, design, implementation, and M&E becomes important. Because of the interlinked nature of long-term reform measures, and the increasingly recognized importance of sequencing, there is a risk that reform progress will be limited by the capacity of the policy management network's weakest member(s). This situation can provoke a "snowball effect" of delays, where one missed deadline leads to a cascade of postponements, deferrals, and suspensions. In the pressured environment of adjustment, the response of donors and recipient governments is often to devise makeshift interim modifications, and accept pro forma compliance with targets and conditions in order to keep tranche disbursements on track. Berg's in-depth study of Senegal illustrates the negative consequences of these dynamics for intended policy outcomes (1990).

### **3. Interaction among leaders, bureaucrats, and external actors**

The traditional dynamics of the policy process in Africa reduce the opportunities and possibilities for participation by external actors. "Little effort is made to build up a genuine consensus among the parties inside and outside government affected by a policy change. There is very little public debate and very little consultation. Decisions are made on a piece-meal basis and there is little awareness of the logical linkages among them" (Gulhati 1990b: 1154). These dynamics create special problems for participatory approaches to policy reform. In most African countries, policy-making is confined to a narrow circle of elites (Gulhati 1990b, Healey and Robinson 1992). Increasing access to policy debates raises the possibility of more numerous and potentially conflicting demands being placed on decision-makers and administrative systems, and increases the risk of alienating supporters. Increasing information flows and transparency can reveal the points of corruption where government resources are diverted through patronage to supporters and/or used to extract rents, thus calling into question the legitimacy and probity of the regime (van de Walle 1994). These factors contribute to creating disincentives for participatory policy reform processes.

In many African countries, however, ruling elites have to some extent been overtaken by events; the popular clamor for political liberalization has pushed governments to be more responsive in order to avoid unrest, or at the extremes, a fall from power (Bratton and van de Walle 1992). Thus the nature of the interaction between public policy management institutions and external actors is changing in the African countries where democratizing forces are at work. As a function of these changes, another theme relating to institutional capacity that emerges strongly from the literature is the issue of the capacity of civil institutions to participate in the policy process. This concern deals with the demand side of participation in the policy process, which is the complement to the supply side relating to government institutional capacity to cope with participation by external actors. As discussed above in the "who" section, a great deal of attention is focused on the capacity of NGOs to aggregate interests effectively and communicate both outward to constituent members and upward to politicians and policy-makers (Bratton 1989b and 1990, Chazan 1982).

The institutional strengths and weaknesses of the African media are also critical factors, given the centrality of the content and control of information flows to interactions among national leaders, the state, and citizens. As Zaffiro observes in his institutional analysis of the media in Botswana, "to study the press and broadcasting [in contemporary Africa] is to unavoidably and deeply enter the realm of political and social policy analysis" (1993: 7). West and Fair echo this perspective in pointing out that, "political decisions made by African governments have precluded decentralization or democratization of mass media forms such as newspaper or radio" (1993: 98).

#### **IV. KEY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS**

This final section presents our major findings and conclusions, synthesized from the literature reviewed. The section concludes with the identification of areas of continuing debate and issues calling for further analysis and research.

##### **A. Links between participation and successful policy reform**

- Even in a democratic society, there are preserves of governance and policy-making that are justifiably limited to a small, insulated core of participants because of their requirements for technical rigor (monetary and foreign exchange policy), impartiality (judicial decision-making), or their sensitive nature (national defense). Nonetheless, no area of governance or policy-making should be off limits to public debate or accountability. Such accountability can be participative in nature, coming in the form of legislative debate or appropriations, juridical oversight, and constitutional safeguards on the abuse of power.
- There is no easily identifiable form of government or regime-type that is most conducive to optimal reform success (Bates and Krueger 1993). Effective adjustment policies have

been implemented by quasi-authoritarian regimes (see Rcthchild 1991 on Ghana), clientelist party-state regimes (see Ouedraogo and Adoum 1993 on Mali) and emerging democracies (see Levine and Stathacòs 1993 on Zambia). The key to successful reform is, instead, the ability of government and civic associations to forge consensus, overcome opposition, and negotiate reform sequencing that softens negative impacts for the most vulnerable or politically-volatile populations.

- The experience of structural adjustment programming in Africa clearly demonstrates that economic reform is not a mechanistic process and cannot simply be implemented by fiat. Instead, reform is an interactive process, requiring negotiation, modification of views, compromise, concessions and management of risks. Even stroke-of-the-pen reforms require a process of public education and political marketing, particularly with regard to those most likely to be affected by reform outcomes.
- To the extent that it is feasible, principal stakeholders in reform outcomes should be consulted for their views (including variations on proposed reforms), incorporated into strategies for compensation and sequencing, and informed about the anticipated outcomes of successful reform. As demonstrated by a number of bilateral reform initiatives (e.g., USAID fertilizer marketing reform in Cameroon and regional livestock marketing reform in Mali, Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso), donors can become involved as "honest brokers" for reform and initiate negotiation and strategy development among policymakers, government agencies and the private sector. Donors can also support the use of local universities and research centers to conduct impact surveys, opinion polls, and focus groups to collect data on the views of various stakeholders; not all consultation can or should be face-to-face. These kinds of indirect participation in the policy process increase the feasibility of involving larger numbers of stakeholders' views on policies and their outcomes.
- Donors may be optimistic that the harsh lessons learned about the difficulties of structural adjustment reforms in the 1980s will yield progress over the short term. If the impulse toward reform has taken longer than hoped to become an impetus toward reform, the sustained process of public education, capacity-building and negotiation undertaken over the past decade has transformed Africa in numerous ways. Reform is no longer the bitter pill of foreign manufacture that it once was. In many countries it has become an aspiration for which regimes will be held accountable by increasingly activist citizens.

#### **B. Conditions facilitating participation in policy reform**

- As African nations undertake liberalization, the proponents of increased participation in government and policy-making sometimes tend to equate populism and participation. These are not, of course, synonymous. A sociopolitical environment that preserves freedom of expression, provides opportunities for public debate and the articulation of divergent interests, that is governed by the rule of law, imposes restraint on political

authority and is accountable to its citizenry is participative. Policymaking by referendum is, in other than exceptional circumstances, not merely populist, but untenable for institutions so complex as national governments. As Sandbrook points out in his discussion of socialist regimes, "The survival of democratic tendencies...depends on the central leadership's commitment to mass participation; however, even a dedicated leadership will judge the slow process of genuine participation an unendurable hindrance to its dealing effectively with urgent problems. Unchecked, the party/state apparatus will decline into authoritarianism and inefficiency" (1993: 118).

- A society rich in horizontal associations--voluntary groupings organized around common cultural, gender, social, or economic interests that promote norms of cooperation--is likely to provide numerous avenues for participation and opportunities for the effective articulation of stakeholder interests (Chazan 1982). The contributions of social capital to the development of norms of governance, institutional performance, and the value of economically productive behaviors should not be underestimated (Charlick 1992). If effectively invested, social capital can contribute to long term economic and sociopolitical development.
- The involvement of well-trained, disciplined technocrats capable of independent judgement is an asset in any reform situation. Their presence enriches the planning process, improves the quality of cooperation with donors, and grounds the planning process in local realities. When technocrats are constrained by institutional weakness and inadequate role definition, or when they are marginalized by donors or political leadership, the viability of reform initiatives is likely to be undermined (e.g., Grindle and Thomas 1991).
- When policy-based grants or loans are driven by donor conditionality, reasonable political and economic misgivings of African leaders and technocrats may be forced underground. Opposition to reform is often not expressed during the design phase, both out of fear that challenging a reform prescription will result in delayed disbursement of funding assistance and out of uncertainty about the political costs of reform. Opposition is, hence, most likely to resurface at the implementation stage, often in the form of reticence, delay, partial implementation, or even abandonment of the reform initiative when the "disbursement dilemma" weakens donor resolve. For this reason it is essential that donors broaden the topical field of reform negotiations to explicitly include such issues as concerns about political risk and negative sociopolitical eventualities of the reform process (see Johnson and Wasty 1993).

### **C. Techniques for promoting participation in policy reform**

- Better political and institutional analysis needs to be undertaken to anticipate policy blockages and problem areas. This is a uniform conclusion in A.I.D.'s African policy reform program impact evaluations (see summary volume, Lieberman 1991), and also in

the World Bank study of country ownership of reform programs (Johnson and Wasty 1993). Such analysis should be an ongoing part of policy implementation as well as input to policy design. Further, African policy managers need to be central participants in these analytic actions, not simply external donor teams (e.g., Mutahaba and Balogun 1992).

- A collaborative design process that includes implementors and effectively integrates implementation considerations into the structuring of policy content builds participation and increases the probability of sustainability (e.g., Robinson 1990, White 1990a and 1990b, Bhatnagar and Williams 1992). Collaborative design helps to foster consensus as well as increases technical efficiency. This is linked to political and institutional analysis in that the results of analysis will help to identify key progressives and decision-making elites whose participation is essential to framing a consensus. In addition to top ministry officials, it is crucial to involve technical officers from the relevant ministries (e.g, Vondal 1989).
- The technical content of policy reform packages can be redesigned in many cases to increase opportunities for participation at various levels. A good example is reforms that decentralize financial/fiscal resources: regional/local block grants, revenue-sharing mechanisms, development foundations, etc. For instance, A.I.D.'s education sector program in Mali provides matching grants to local parents' associations to increase their capacity to participate in school management and discussion of educational policy (Gordon 1991, see also Fass 1992). Another example is the design of the monitoring component of the package, where universities, research centers, and/or local NGOs can be built in as participants in data collection on reform stakeholders' perspectives on policies and impacts using techniques such as participatory rural appraisal, focus groups, and so on (see Kumar 1993).
- Continued attention needs to be given to the importance of institutional capacity-building as a complement to reform packages, recognizing the long-term nature of institutional development (e.g, Hyden 1990, Nunberg 1990, World Bank 1991). Donors have been prone to the quick fix of putting all their policy "eggs" in the "basket" of a policy champion and relying on that person's ability to persevere with reform. But no policy champion can singlehandedly overcome ingrained institutional weaknesses (see Brinkerhoff 1991). Given the range of actors whose participation is key to policy reform, the appropriate targets of capacity-building are not just public agencies, but include NGOs, private sector groups, political parties, and the media.
- Far from being a single event, policy reform is an ongoing interactive process rife with uncertainty, and so is participation. Over time, as different groups take positions in favor of or opposing policy measures, these stances become new realities that policy managers need to take into account during implementation. The potential for derailing of reforms over a multi-year timeframe is great, particularly since the bulk of the reforms threaten the economic interests of powerful stakeholders. A strategic blend of

participation to cajole and co-opt key players, plus on occasion means to restrict the participation of opponents, is called for (e.g., Hawkins 1991). There is a need to plan for political contingencies, while safeguarding the integrity of the reform process. Participation is not cost-free, and more participation should not be the automatic solution for successful policy reforms. This dynamic uncertainty has implications for both African governments managing the reform process and the donors. It calls for greater degrees of flexibility and openness to "mid-course" corrections in policy implementation, and less reliance upon identifying targets at the start and building those in as fixed disbursement triggers (e.g., Fessenden 1992, Hermann 1985).

### **E. Ongoing debates and research gaps**

- One of the defining features of African policy implementing agencies is their vulnerability to special interests and rent-seekers. In response, some analysts suggest that policy-makers and implementors need to be insulated from excessive participation by such groups. However, state implementing agents are themselves a central special interest group, and one that historically has been predominant and predatory. The governance perspective is that increased transparency and accountability will improve effectiveness and responsiveness. But, for example, Sandbrook warns that, "... liberal democracy is no panacea for mismanagement and politically generated inefficiencies" (1993: 117). Thus, one debate revolves around whether the policy reform process operates more effectively when policy implementors are insulated from political forces or when they are subject to some type of "sunshine" mechanism. Ongoing work in the governance analytic stream should help to clarify this issue.
- Another debate, incorporating a range of issues, turns on the relationship between political liberalization and economic policy reform. Given the equivocal evidence that any particular regime type is optimally equipped to implement reforms, the literature does not reach any unified conclusions. Political liberalization and the restoration of pluralism to African governments, however desirable, will neither eradicate the influence of corruption and self-interested regimes nor ensure the harmonious interplay of competitive interests. "Multiparty politics in Africa is ... unlikely to eliminate the clientelistic basis of unproductive resource allocations and poor public management. However, combined economic and political liberalization may at least restrict the scope of clientelistic criteria while maintaining political stability" (Sandbrook 1993: 118).
- Research is unlikely to provide any recipes for the most appropriate balance between political and economic reform over the short term. The need to optimize the contributions of scarce donor resources mandates improvements in governance and accountability on the part of recipient nations. At the same time, however, donors should remain receptive to and supportive of well-intended efforts by African leaders to reconfigure political and economic institutions in response to African realities. While the political failures of Africa's recent past give donors justifiable cause for skepticism, we

would do well to keep in mind Ayittey's argument that "Africa can only be developed by building upon its existing institutions" (Ayittey 1991: xlv). Nonetheless, there is a place for the donors to keep pushing African governments to recognize the wealth of existing indigenous institutional capital and to formalize policy space to facilitate its use.

- Many questions remain regarding how civil society can most usefully integrate into the policy process. However, the literature on African society and government makes clear the compelling need for public policy-making institutions that are more inclusive in their interests and representational in their operation. Donors cannot command participation. They can, though, contribute much to the creation of an environment favorable to the development of civil society: promoting cooperative agencies and institutions, supporting an expanded flow of economic information, assisting institutional reforms that safeguard the scarce capital of private actors and facilitate its flow through markets, and providing assistance that enables institutions to improve their capacity for control and accountability.
- Much of the political economy literature is driven by assumptions regarding the primacy of politics over economics, and of the determinism of self-interest over autonomy and individual discretion (Grindle 1991, Liddle 1992). The broad brush of these assumptions has a tendency to paint over the fine grain of case-specific situations; for example, political factors weigh more heavily in some policy areas than others, and vary also depending upon decision-making level. It appears that it is precisely in the details of these cases, involving particular actors, that lessons lie for how to design and implement reform policies more effectively. This points to a research gap related to clarifying the nature of the interplay between politics and economics, particularly in terms of how economic and policy variables affect politics. This clarification calls for ongoing investigation of the policy-making process in terms of which actors are involved and with what resources, and of what kinds of strategies work best under various conditions to achieve policy outcomes.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abbott, George C. 1993. Debt Relief and Sustainable Development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Adamolekun, Ladipo. 1988. "Political Leadership in Sub-Saharan Africa: From Giants to Dwarfs." International Political Science Review. Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 95-106.
- Agyeman-Duah, Baffour. 1989. "Ghana, 1982-1986: The Politics of the P.N.D.C." Journal of Modern African Studies. Vol. 25, No. 4. pp. 613-642.
- Ahiakpor, James C. 1991. "Rawlings, Economic Policy Reform, and the Poor: Consistency or Betrayal?" The Journal of Modern African Studies. Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 583-600.
- Ake, Claude. 1990. "Sustaining Development on the Indigenous." In World Bank. The Long-Term Perspective Study of Sub-Saharan Africa. Volume 3. Institutional and Sociopolitical Issues. Washington, DC: Author, pp. 7-22.
- Améthier, Jean-Baptiste. 1989. Mobilisation de l'épargne en milieu rural: l'exemple ivoirien. Abidjan: Editions CEDA.
- Amin, Samir. 1987. "The State and the Question of Development." In P.A. Nyong'o, ed. Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa. London: Zed Press, pp. 1-13.
- Amin, Samir. 1977. Imperialism and Unequal Development. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Atherton, Joan S., Daniel Devine, Curt Grimm, Jill Harmsworth, and Paul Nelson. 1992. "Local Participation in the Design and Implementation of DFA Programs: Some Lessons from the Field." Washington, DC: U. S. Agency for International Development, Bureau for Africa, November.
- Atwood, J. Brian. 1993. "Statement of Principles on Participatory Development." Washington, DC: Address presented at Academy for Educational Development, USAID Forum on Participatory Development, November 16.
- Ayittey, George B. N. 1991. Indigenous African Institutions. New York: Transnational Press.
- Ayittey, George B. N. 1990. "Indigenous African Systems: An Assessment." In World Bank. The Long-Term Perspective Study of Sub-Saharan Africa. Volume 3. Institutional and Sociopolitical Issues. Washington, DC: Author, pp. 22-32.

- Bakary, Tessa D. 1993. "‘An Ambiguous Adventure,’ Transitions from Authoritarian Rule and Economic Reforms in Africa." In U.S. Agency for International Development. Economic Reform in Africa’s New Era of Political Liberalization: Proceedings of a Workshop for SPA Donors. Washington, DC: Author, April, pp. 65-80.
- Balogun, M. Jide and Gelase Mutahaba, eds. 1989. Economic Restructuring and African Public Administration: Issues, Actions, and Future Choices. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press.
- Bamberger, Michael. 1988. The Role of Community Participation in Development Planning and Project Management. Report of a Workshop on Community Participation Held in Washington, DC, September 22-25, 1986. Washington, DC: World Bank, EDI Policy Seminar Report No. 13.
- Bates, Robert H. 1988. "The Political Basis for Agricultural Policy Reform." In Stephen K. Commins, ed. Africa’s Development Challenges and the World Bank: Hard Questions, Costly Choices. Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner Publishers, pp. 115-32.
- Bates, Robert H. 1981. Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Bates, Robert H., and Paul Collier. 1992. The Politics and Economics of Policy Reform in Zambia. Oxford, England: Centre for the Study of African Economies, February.
- Bates, Robert H. and Anne O. Krueger, eds. 1993. Political and Economic Interactions in Economic Policy Reform: Evidence from Eight Countries. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Beckman, Björn. 1992. "Empowerment or Repression? The World Bank and the Politics of African Adjustment." In Peter Gibbon, Yusuf Bangura, and Arve Ofstad, eds. Authoritarianism, Democracy and Adjustment: The Politics of Economic Reform in Africa. Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, pp. 83-105.
- Berg, Elliot. 1991. "African Adjustment Programs: False Attacks and True Dilemmas." Washington, DC: The American University, Department of Economics. Paper presented at the Conference on Structural Adjustment: Retrospect and Prospect, March.
- Berg, Elliot. 1990. "Adjustment Postponed: Economic Policy Reform in Senegal in the 1980s." Alexandria, VA: Elliot Berg Associates. Report prepared for U.S. Agency for International Development/Dakar, October.
- Berg, Elliot and Phillip Berlin. 1993. "Exchange Rate Issues in the Franc Zone." Bethesda, MD: Development Alternatives Inc. Background Note prepared for U. S. Agency for International Development Seminar on the CFA Franc, January 22.

- Berg, Robert J. and David F. Gordon, eds. 1989. Cooperation for International Development: The United States and the Third World in the 1990s. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Bhatnagar, Bhuvan and Aubrey C. Williams, eds. 1992. Participatory Development and the World Bank: Potential Directions for Change. Washington, DC: World Bank, Discussion Paper No. 183.
- Bienen, Henry. 1993. "Leaders, Violence, and the Absence of Change in Africa." Public Science Quarterly. Vol. 108, pp. 271-283.
- Bienen, Henry. 1990. "The Politics of Trade Liberalization in Africa." Economic Development and Cultural Change. Vol. 38, pp. 713-32.
- Bienen, Henry and John Waterbury. 1989. "The Political Economy of Privatization in Developing Countries." World Development. Vol. 17, No. 5, pp. 617-632.
- Biermann, Werner. 1988. "Tanzanian Politics under IMF Pressure." In Michael Hodd, ed. Tanzania after Nyerere. New York: Pinter Publishers, pp. 175-83.
- Blane, Dianne, Michael Fuchs-Carsch, David Hess, and Jane Siefert. 1991. The A.I.D. Economic Policy Reform Program in Cameroon. Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, Impact Evaluation Report No. 78, June.
- Blomström, Magnus and Mats Lundahl, eds. 1993. Economic Crisis in Africa: Perspectives on Policy Responses. London: Routledge.
- Blunt, Peter. 1990. "Strategies for Enhancing Organizational Effectiveness in the Third World." Public Administration and Development. Vol. 10, pp 299-314.
- Boye, A. K. 1993. "State and Society in Sub-Saharan Africa (Primarily in the Sahel Countries): Aid Agencies, Civil Society and the Operating Logic of the State." Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Club du Sahel. Discussion Paper for the Donors' Advisory Group Meeting, Berlin, April.
- Boyle, Patrick M. 1992. "Beyond Self-Protection to Prophecy: The Catholic Church and Political Change in Zaire." Africa Today. Vol. 39, pp. 49-67.
- Bratton, Michael. 1990. "Non-governmental Organizations in Africa: Can They Influence Public Policy?" Development and Change. Vol. 21, pp.87-118.
- Bratton, Michael. 1989a. "Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa." World Politics. Vol. 41, No. 3, pp. 407-30.

- Bratton, Michael. 1989b. "The Politics of Government-NGO Relations in Africa." World Development. Vol. 17, No. 5, pp. 569-89.
- Bratton, Michael and Nicholas van de Walle. 1992. "Toward Governance in Africa: Popular Demands and State Responses." In Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton, eds. Governance and Politics in Africa. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 27-57.
- Brinkerhoff, Derick W., ed. forthcoming. Policy Analysis Concepts and Methods: An Institutional and Implementation Focus. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, Policy Studies and Developing Nations Series.
- Brinkerhoff, Derick W. 1992. "Linking Applied Research and Technical Cooperation in Strategic Management for Policy Change." Washington, DC: U. S. Agency for International Development, Implementing Policy Change Project. Research Note No. 1, June.
- Brinkerhoff, Derick W. 1991. Improving Development Program Performance: Guidelines for Managers. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Brinkerhoff, Derick W. 1985. "Strategic Planning Through Participation: Joint Program Evaluation in the Sahel." In Jean-Claude Garcia-Zamor, ed. Public Participation in Development Planning and Management: Cases from Africa and Asia. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 51-67.
- Brinkerhoff, Derick W., James D. Gage, and Jo Anne Yeager. 1992. "Implementing Natural Resources Management Policy in Africa: a Document and Literature Review." Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, Implementing Policy Change Project, April.
- Brinkerhoff, Derick W. and E. Philip Morgan. 1989. "The Dance of Structural Adjustment: Policy Reform as Partisan Mutual Adaptation." Miami, FL: American Society for Public Administration, Paper presented at the 50th National Conference, April 9-13.
- Brown, David. 1989. "Bureaucracy as an Issue in Third World Management: an African Case Study." Public Administration and Development. Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 369-380.
- Browne, Robert S. 1992. "Alternative Policy Frameworks for African Development in the 1990s." In Julius E. Nyang'oro and Timothy M. Shaw, eds. Beyond Structural Adjustment in Africa: The Political Economy of Sustainable and Democratic Development. New York: Praeger Publishers, pp. 71-82.

- Bryant, Coralie. 1980. "Organizational Impediments to Making Participation a Reality: 'Swimming Upstream' in AID." Rural Development Participation Review. Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 8-10.
- Bryant, Coralie and Louise G. White. 1982. Managing Development in the Third World. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Callaghy, Thomas M. 1990. "Lost Between State and Market: The Politics of Economic Adjustment in Ghana, Zambia, and Nigeria." In Joan M. Nelson, ed. Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 257-321.
- Callaghy, Thomas M. 1989. "Toward State Capability and Embedded Liberalism in the Third World: Lessons for Adjustment." In Joan M. Nelson, et al. Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economic Adjustment. Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, pp. 115-34.
- Campbell, Horace. 1992. "The Politics of Demobilization in Tanzania: Beyond Nationalism." In Horace Campbell and Howard Stein, eds. Tanzania and the IMF: the Dynamics of Liberalization. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Center for Strategic and International Studies. 1992. The Politics of Economic Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, DC: Author. Final Report prepared for U. S. Agency for International Development.
- Cernea, Michael M. 1988. Nongovernmental Organizations and Local Development. Washington, DC: World Bank, Discussion Paper No. 40.
- Chafer, Tony. 1992. "French African Policy Towards Change." African Affairs. Vol. 91, pp. 27-51.
- Charlick, Robert. 1992. "The Concept of Governance and its Implications for A.I.D.'s Development Assistance Program in Africa." Washington, DC: Associates in Rural Development, Inc. Paper prepared for U. S. Agency for International Development, Africa Bureau Democracy and Governance Program, June.
- Chazan, Naomi. 1992a. "Liberalization, Governance, and Political Space in Ghana." In Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton, eds. Governance and Politics in Africa. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 121-143.
- Chazan, Naomi. 1992b. "The Dynamics of Civil Society in Africa." Jerusalem: Hebrew University. Paper presented at the International Conference on Civil Society, January.

- Chazan, Naomi. 1983. An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics: Managing Political Recession, 1969-1982. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Chazan, Naomi. 1982. "The New Politics of Participation in Tropical Africa." Comparative Politics. Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 169-89.
- Chazan, Naomi, Robert Mortimer, John Ravenhill, and Donald Rothchild. 1988. Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Chilcote, Ronald H. 1984. Theories of Development and Underdevelopment. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Chole, Eshutu. 1989. "The African Economic Crisis: Origins and Impact on Society." In Jide M. Balogun and Gelase Mutahaba, eds. Economic Restructuring and African Public Administration: Issues, Actions, and Future Choices. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, pp. 3-29.
- Christiansen, Robert E. and Lee Ann Stackhouse. 1989. "The Privatization of Agricultural Trading in Malawi." World Development. Vol. 17, No. 5, pp. 729-40.
- Clark, John. 1991. Democratizing Development: The Role of Voluntary Organizations. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press.
- Cohen, John M. and Norman T. Uphoff. 1980. "Participation's Place in Rural Development: Seeking Clarity through Specificity." World Development. Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 213-35.
- Cohen, John M., Merilee S. Grindle, and S. Tjip Walker. 1985. "Foreign Aid and Conditions Precedent: Political and Bureaucratic Dimensions." World Development. Vol. 13, No. 12, pp. 1211-30.
- Colbourn, Forrest D. 1989. Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc.
- Coleman, James S. 1990. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Commonwealth Secretariat and African Association for Public Administration and Management. 1990. Enhancement of Public Policy Management Capacity in Africa. London and Addis Ababa: Authors, Report of the High-Level Working Group Meeting, Mahe, Seychelles, 24-27 September.

- Corbo, Vittorio and Stanley Fischer. 1990. "Adjustment Programs and Bank Support: Rationale and Main Results." Washington, DC: World Bank. Paper presented at Conference on Policies for the Recovery of Growth: Adjustment Lending Revisited, September 13-14.
- Crosby, Benjamin L. 1992a. "Management and the Environment for Implementation of Political Change: Part One, Political Mapping." Washington, DC: U. S. Agency for International Development, Implementing Policy Change, Technical Note No. 4.
- Crosby, Benjamin L. 1992b. "Stakeholder Analysis: a Vital Tool for Strategic Managers." Washington, DC: U. S. Agency for International Development, Implementing Policy Change, Technical Note No. 2.
- Crook, Richard. 1990. "Politics, the Cocoa Crisis, and Administration in Cote d'Ivoire." Journal of Modern African Studies. Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 649.
- Christensen, Cheryl. 1990. "Adjustment and Agriculture: Issues for the 1990s." Washington, DC: Abt Associates Inc., APAP II Collaborative Research Report No. 304, April.
- de Valk, Peter and K. H. Wekwete, eds. 1990. Decentralizing for Participatory Planning? Aldershot, England: Gower Publishing Co.
- Domatob, Jerry K. and Stephen W. Hall. 1983. "Development Journalism in Black Africa." Gazette. Vol. 31, pp. 9-33.
- Dotse, F. Mawuena. 1991. "The State of Training in Public Policy Management in Ghana." Public Administration and Development. Vol. 11, pp. 525-539.
- Dowe, Jones. 1993. "Du rififi à CFA City." In Serge Michailof, ed. La France et L'Afrique: Vade-mecum pour un nouveau voyage. Paris: Editions Karthala, pp. 461-468.
- Duffield, Mark. 1992. "The Emergence of Two-Tier Welfare in Africa: Marginalization or an Opportunity for Reform?" Public Administration and Development. Vol. 12, pp. 139-154.
- Edwards, Michael and David Hulme, eds. 1992. Making a Difference: NGOs and Development in a Changing World. London: Earthscan Publications.
- Ela, Jean Marc. 1992. Quand l'Etat pénètre en brousse, les ripostes paysannes à la crise. Paris: Editions Karthala.
- Ela, Jean Marc. 1982. L'Afrique des villages. Paris: Editions Karthala.

- Ernst, Ulrich F.W. and Duncan Last. 1993. "Managing Policy Reform in Mali." Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates, Inc. Report prepared for U.S. Agency for International Development/Mali, Policy Reform for Economic Development Project, November.
- Etounga-Manguelle, Daniel. 1991. L'Afrique a-t-elle besoin d'un programme d'ajustement culturel?. Ivry-sur-Seine: Editions Nouvelles du Sud.
- Evans, Peter. 1992. "The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Structural Change." In Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, eds. The Politics of Economic Adjustment. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 139-82.
- Fass, Simon M. et al. 1992. "Democracy and Political Participation in the Sahel: The Place of Education." Washington, DC and Paris: U.S. Agency for International Development and OECD/Club du Sahel. Final Report, August.
- Fearon, James. 1988. "International Financial Institutions and Economic Policy Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa," The Journal of Modern African Studies. Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 113-137.
- Fessenden, Abbe. 1992. "Lessons Learned in the Design of Sector Grants in Niger: A Summary." A.I.D. Evaluation News. Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 18-22.
- Finsterbusch, Kurt and Warren A. Van Wicklin III. 1987. "The Contribution of Beneficiary Participation to Development Project Effectiveness." Public Administration and Development. Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 1-23.
- Garcia-Zamor, Jean-Claude, ed. 1985. Public Participation in Development Planning and Management: Cases from Africa and Asia. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Garvey, Brian. 1991. "Patrimonial Economics and Informal Bureaucracies: Public Administration and Social Reality in the Least Developed Countries of the 1990's: a Review Article." Public Administration and Development. Vol. 11, No. 6, pp. 591-600.
- Gibson, Nigel. 1990. "Why is Participation a Dirty Word in South African Politics?" Africa Today. Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 23-52.
- Gladwin, Christina H., ed. 1991. Structural Adjustment and African Women Farmers. Gainesville: University of Florida Press.
- Good, Kenneth. 1989. "Debt and the One-Party State in Zambia." The Journal of Modern African Studies. Vol. 27, No. 2, 297-313.

- Gordon, David F. 1991. "Beyond Policy Reform in Africa: Sustaining Development Through Strengthening Entrepreneurship and the Non-governmental Sector." Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development. Implementing Policy Change Project, Working Paper No. 2, November.
- Gordon, David F. and Carol Lancaster. 1993. "The Implications of Political Change in Africa for SPA Donors." In U.S. Agency for International Development. Economic Reform in Africa's New Era of Political Liberalization: Proceedings of a Workshop for SPA Donors. Washington, DC: Author, April, pp. 135-49.
- Goulet, Denis. 1989. "Participation in Development: New Avenues." World Development. Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 165-78.
- Green, Reginald H. 1983. "Political-Economic Adjustment and IMF Conditionality: Tanzania, 1974-81." In John Williamson, ed. IMF Conditionality. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics and MIT Press/Cambridge, pp. 347-81.
- Greenaway, David and Oliver Morrissey. 1993. "Structural Adjustment and Liberalisation in Developing Countries: What Lessons Have We Learned." Kyklos. Vol. 46, pp. 241-261.
- Grindle, Merilee. 1991. "The New Political Economy: Positive Economics and Negative Politics." In Gerald M. Meier, ed. Politics and Policy Making in Developing Countries: Perspectives on the New Political Economy. San Francisco, CA: ICS Press, pp. 41-69.
- Grindle, Merilee and John Thomas. 1991. Public Choices and Policy Change: The Political Economy of Reform in Developing Countries. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Grindle, Merilee and John Thomas. 1990. "After the Decision: Implementing Policy Reforms in Developing Countries." World Development. Vol. 18, No. 8, pp. 1163-81.
- Grindle, Merilee and John Thomas. 1989. "Policy Makers, Policy Choices, and Policy Outcomes: The Political Economy of Reform in Developing Countries." Policy Sciences. Vol. 22, pp. 213-48.
- Gulhati, Ravi. 1990a. The Making of Economic Policy in Africa. Washington, DC: World Bank, Economic Development Institute.
- Gulhati, Ravi. 1990b. "Who Makes Economic Policy in Africa and How?" World Development. Vol. 18, No. 8, pp. 1147-61.

- Gulhati, Ravi. 1989. Impasse in Zambia: The Economics and Politics of Reform. Washington, DC: World Bank, Economic Development Institute.
- Gulhati, Ravi. 1988. The Political Economy of Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, DC: World Bank, EDI Policy Seminar Report No. 8.
- Haggard, Stephan and Steven B. Webb. 1993. "What Do We Know About the Political Economy of Policy Reform?" The World Bank Research Observer. Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 143-163.
- Haggard, Stephan and Robert R. Kaufman, eds. 1992. The Politics of Economic Adjustment. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Haggard, Stephan and Robert R. Kaufman. 1989a. "Economic Adjustment in New Democracies." In Joan M. Nelson, et al. Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economic Adjustment. Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, pp. 57-75.
- Haggard, Stephan, and Robert Kaufman. 1989b. "The Politics of Stabilization and Structural Adjustment." In Jeffrey Sachs, ed. Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance. Volume 1: The International Financial System. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Hall, Anthony. 1988. "Community Participation and Development Policy: A Sociological Perspective." In Anthony Hall and James Midgely, eds. Development Policies: Sociological Perspectives. New York: Manchester University Press.
- Harrigan, Jane. 1991. Malawi." In Paul Mosley, Jane Harrigan and John Toye. Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy-based Lending. London: Routledge, Vol 2: Case Studies, pp. 201-267.
- Harsch, Ernest. 1993. "Accumulators and Democrats: Challenging State Corruption in Africa." The Journal of Modern African Studies. Vol. 31, pp. 31-48.
- Hartmann, Jeannette. 1991. "The State in Tanzania: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow." Helsinki, Finland: Paper presented at the University of Helsinki, Institute of Development Studies. February.
- Harvard Institute for International Development. 1990. The Political Economy of Economic Policy Reform: Summary of a Workshop. Cambridge, MA: Author, Development Discussion Paper No. 328, February.
- Hawkins Jr., Jeffrey J. 1991. "Understanding the Failure of IMF Reform: The Zambian Case." World Development. Vol. 19, No. 7, pp. 839-49.

- Healey, John and Mark Robinson. 1992. Democracy, Governance and Economic Policy. Sub-Saharan Africa in Comparative Perspective. London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Heilbrunn, John R. 1993. "Social Origins of National Conferences in Benin and Togo." The Journal of Modern African Studies. Vol. 31, pp. 277-299.
- Helleiner, Gerald K., ed. 1986. Africa and the International Monetary Fund. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
- Herbst, Jeffrey. 1993. The Politics of Reform in Ghana, 1982-1991. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Herbst, Jeffrey. 1990. "The Structural Adjustment of Politics in Africa." World Development. Vol. 18, No. 7, pp. 949-58.
- Hermann, Chris. 1986. Information Planning for Policy Reform Programs. Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, Evaluation Occasional Paper No. 13, August.
- Hermann, Chris. 1985. Implementing Policy and Institutional Change via Performance Disbursement. Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, Evaluation Occasional Paper No. 1.
- Hirschman, Albert O. 1984. Getting Ahead Collectively: Grassroots Experiences in Latin America. New York: Pergamon Press.
- Hirschmann, David. 1993. "Institutional Development in the Era of Economic Policy Reform: Concerns, Contradictions, and Illustrations from Malawi." Public Administration and Development. Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 113-28.
- Hirschmann, David. 1991. "Women and Political Participation in Africa: Broadening the Scope of Research." World Development. Vol. 19, No. 12, pp. 1679-1694.
- Holtzman, John S. and Nicolas Kulibaba. forthcoming. "Analytic Approaches to Reducing the Costs of Corruption: West African Livestock Marketing and Trade Policy." In Derick W. Brinkerhoff, ed. Policy Analysis Concepts and Methods: An Institutional and Implementation Focus. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, Policy Studies and Developing Nations Series.
- Holtzman, John S. and Nicolas Kulibaba. 1991. Liberalizing Regional Markets for Livestock Products: An Action Plan for the Mali, Burkina and Côte d'Ivoire Corridor. Washington, DC: World Bank, Sahelian Department, Country Operations. Green Cover Report No. 9799-AFR.

- Hunt, Diana. 1984. "Policy 'Implementation': IFAD and Rural Poverty in Kenya." In E. J. Clay and B. B. Schaffer, eds. Room for Manoeuvre: An Exploration of Public Policy Planning in Agricultural and Rural Development. Rutherford, NJ: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, pp. 101-26.
- Huntington, Samuel. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Husain, Ishrat and Rashid Faruqee, eds. 1994. Adjustment in Africa: Lessons from Country Case Studies. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Hyden, Goran. 1992. "Governance and the Study of Politics." In Hyden, Goran and Michael Bratton, eds. 1991. Governance and Politics in Africa. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 1-27.
- Hyden, Goran. 1990. "Creating an Enabling Environment." In World Bank. The Long-Term Perspective Study of Sub-Saharan Africa. Volume 3. Institutional and Sociopolitical Issues. Washington, DC: Author, pp. 73-81.
- Hyden, Goran and Michael Bratton, eds. 1991. Governance and Politics in Africa. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Hyden, Goran and Bo Karlstrom. 1993. "Structural Adjustment as A Policy Process: The Case of Tanzania." World Development. Vol. 21, No. 9, pp. 1395-1404.
- Institute for African Alternatives. 1992. "Grassroots Power: From Protest to Development? Papers presented to an IFAA symposium held at the Ipelegeng Community Centre, Soweto." Johannesburg, South Africa: Author, February.
- Jeffries, Richard. 1991. "Leadership Commitment and Political Opposition to Structural Adjustment in Ghana." In Donald Rothchild, ed. Ghana: The Political Economy of Recovery. Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 157-72.
- Jepma, Catrinus. 1991. The Tying of Aid. Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
- Johnson, John H. and Sulaiman S. Wasty. 1993. Borrower Ownership of Adjustment Programs and the Political Economy of Reform. Washington, DC: World Bank, Discussion Paper No. 199.
- Jolly, Richard. 1988. "Poverty and Adjustment in the 1990s." In John P. Lewis et al. Strengthening the Poor: What Have We Learned?. Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, pp. 163-74.

- Jreisat, Jamil E. 1988. "Administrative Reform in Developing Countries: a Comparative Perspective." Public Administration and Development. Vol. 8, pp. 85-97.
- Kahler, Miles. 1989. "International Financial Institutions and the Politics of Adjustment." In Joan M. Nelson et al. Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economic Adjustment. Overseas Development Council, U.S.-Third World Perspectives, No. 12. New Brunswick, CT: Transaction Books, pp. 139-59.
- Kiggundu, Moses N. 1989. Managing Organizations in Developing Countries: An Operational and Strategic Approach. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press.
- Kiondo, Andrew Salehe Zuakuu. 1989. "The Politics of Economic Reforms in Tanzania: 1977-1988." University of Toronto, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation.
- Ki-Zerbo, Joseph. 1978. Histoire de l'Afrique noire. D'hier à demain. Paris: Hatier.
- Kjellstrom, Sven B. and Ayite-Fily d'Almeida. 1987. Institutional Development and Technical Assistance in Macroeconomic Policy Formulation: A Case Study of Togo. Washington, DC: World Bank, Discussion Paper No. 13.
- Klitgaard, Robert. 1991. Adjusting to Reality: Beyond "State Versus Market" in Economic Development. San Francisco: ICS Press, International Center for Economic Growth.
- Klitgaard, Robert. 1986. Elitism and Meritocracy in Developing Countries. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Kottak, Conrad Phillip. 1985. "When People Don't Come First: Some Sociological Lessons from Completed Projects." In Michael M. Cernea, ed. Putting People First: Sociological Variables in Rural Development. New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, pp. 325-57.
- Kom, Ambroise. 1993. "Intellectuels africains et enjeux de la démocratie: misère, répression et exil." Politique Africaine. No. 51, pp. 61-9.
- Koulibaly, Mamadou. 1992. Le libéralisme: une solution pour l'Afrique. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Korten, David C. 1990. Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press.
- Krueger, Anne O. 1993. Political Economy of Policy Reform in Developing Countries. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

- Kulibaba, Nicolas. 1993a. Improving the Effectiveness of Policy Reform in Africa: Cocoa Marketing Reform in Ghana. Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, Agricultural Policy Analysis Project, Phase II.
- Kulibaba, Nicolas. 1993b. Improving the Effectiveness of Policy Reform in Africa: Marketing Reforms in Malawi. Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, Agricultural Policy Analysis Project, Phase II.
- Kulibaba, Nicolas and Catherine Rielly. 1993. Improving the Effectiveness of Policy Reform in Africa: A Synthesis of Lessons Learned. Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, Agricultural Policy Analysis Project, Phase II.
- Kumar, Krishna, ed. 1993. Rapid Appraisal Methods. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Kydd, Jonathan. 1989. "Zambia in the 1980s: The Political Economy of Adjustment." In Simon Commander, ed. Structural Adjustment and Agriculture-Theory and Practice in Africa and Latin America. London: Overseas Development Institute, pp. 127-44.
- Lamb, Geoffrey. 1987. Managing Economic Policy Change: Institutional Dimensions. Washington, DC: World Bank, Discussion Paper No. 14.
- Lamine Gakou, Mohammed. 1983. Crise de l'agriculture africaine. Paris: Silex.
- Lancaster, Carol. 1991. African Economic Reform: The External Dimension. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
- Landell-Mills, Pierre. 1992. "Governance, Cultural Change, and Empowerment." Journal of Modern African Studies. Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 543-67.
- Lehman, Howard P. 1992. "The Paradox of State Power in Africa: Debt Management Policies in Kenya and Zimbabwe." African Studies Review. Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 1-34.
- Leith, J. Clark and Michael F. Lofchie. 1993. "The Political Economy of Structural Adjustment in Ghana." In Robert H. Bates and Anne O. Krueger, eds. Political and Economic Interactions in Economic Policy Reform. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, Ltd., pp. 225-294.
- Lele, Uma. 1990. "Structural Adjustment, Agricultural Development and the Poor: Some Lessons from the Malawian Experience." World Development. Vol. 18, No. 9, pp. 1207-19.
- Lele, Uma. 1986. "Women and Structural Transformation." Economic Development and Cultural Change. Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 195-221.

- Lemarchand, Rene. 1992. "Uncivil States and Civil Societies: How Illusion Became Reality." Journal of Modern African Studies. Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 177-91.
- Leonard, David K. 1991. African Successes: Four Public Managers of Kenyan Rural Development. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Levine, William and Charles Stathacos. 1993. Improving the Effectiveness of Policy Reform in Africa: Maize Marketing Reform in Zambia. Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, Agricultural Policy Analysis Project, Phase II.
- Liddle, R. William. 1992. "The Politics of Development Policy." World Development. Vol. 20, No. 6, pp. 793-807.
- Lieberson, Joseph M. 1991. A.I.D. Economic Policy Reform Programs in Africa: a Synthesis of Findings from Six Evaluations. Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, Program and Operations Assessment Report No. 1, December.
- Lindenberg, Marc. 1992. "Making Economic Adjustment Work: The Politics of Policy Implementation," Policy Sciences, Vol. 22, pp. 359-394.
- Lindenberg, Marc and Shantayanan Devarajan. 1993. "Prescribing Strong Economic Medicine: Revisiting Myths about Structural Adjustment, Democracy, and Economic Performance in Developing Countries." Comparative Politics. Vol. 25, No. 2. pp. 169-182.
- Lineberry William P., ed. 1989. Assessing Participatory Development: Rhetoric Versus Reality. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Linz, Juan. 1978. The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lowenthal, James, Gerard Chambas, John Lewis, and James T. Smith. 1990. The A.I.D. Economic Policy Reform Program in Senegal. Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, Impact Evaluation Report No. 77, September.
- Loxley, John. 1990. "Structural Adjustment in Africa: Reflections on Ghana and Zambia." Review of African Political Economy. Vol. 47, pp. 8-27.
- Luke, David Fashole. 1986. "Trends in Development Administration: the Continuing Challenge to the Efficacy of the Post-Colonial State in the Third World." Public Administration and Development. Vol. 6, No. 1, pp 73-85.

- MacGaffey, Janet, Vwakyanakazi Mukohya, Rukarangira wa Nkera, Brooke Grundfest Schoepf, Makwala ma Mavambu ye Beda, and Walu Engundu. 1991. The Real Economy of Zaire: The Contribution of Smuggling and Other Unofficial Activities to National Wealth. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Magassouba, Moriba. 1985. Sénégal: demain les mollahs?. Paris: Editions Karthala.
- Manor, James, ed. 1991. Rethinking Third World Politics. London: Longman Press.
- Marshall, Judith. 1990. "Structural Adjustment and Social Policy in Mozambique." Review of African Political Economy. Vol. 47, pp. 28-43.
- Matlosa, Khabele. 1991. "Impact of IMF Structural Adjustment Programmes on Lesotho." Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly. Vol. 4, No 3-4, pp. 12-15.
- Mbembe, Achille. 1993. "Déflation de l'Etat, civilité et citoyenneté en Afrique noire." Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania. Unpublished paper.
- Mbembe, Achille. 1988. Afriques indociles, christianisme, pouvoir et état en société post-coloniale. Paris: Editions Karthala.
- McCleary, William A. 1991. "The Design and Implementation of Conditionality." In Thomas, Vinod, Ajay Chibber, Mansoor Dailami, and Jaime de Melo, eds. Restructuring Economies in Distress: Policy Reform and the World Bank. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 197-215.
- McCleary, William A. 1989. "Policy Implementation under Adjustment Lending." Finance and Development. Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 32-4.
- Medard, Jean-Francois. 1993. "The Patrimonialization of Franco-African Relations: Political Exchanges, Economic Exchanges, and Social Exchanges." Leyden, Netherlands: University of Leyden, Paper prepared for a Workshop on Changing Forms and Dimensions of Public Corruption, April 2-8.
- Meier, Gerald M., ed. 1991. Politics and Policy Making in Developing Countries: Perspectives on the New Political Economy. San Francisco, CA: ICS Press.
- Michailof, Serge, ed. 1993. La France et L'Afrique: Vade-mecum pour un nouveau voyage. Paris: Editions Karthala.
- Midgley, James. 1986. Community Participation, Social Development and the State. London: Methuen and Co. Ltd.

- Mikell, Gwendolyn. 1989. "Peasant Politicisation and Economic Recuperation in Ghana: Local and National Dilemmas," The Journal of Modern African Studies. Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 455-478.
- Mills, Cadman Atta. 1989. Structural Adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, DC: World Bank, EDI Policy Seminar Report No. 18.
- Molutsi, Patrick P. and John D. Holm. 1992. "State-Society Relations in Botswana: Beginning Liberalization." In Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton, eds. Governance and Politics in Africa. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, pp. 75-95.
- Monga, Célestin. 1994a. Anthropologie de la Colère. Société et démocratie en Afrique. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Monga, Célestin. 1994b. "Social Responses to Trade Liberalization in Cameroon. Time Inconsistency and Compatibility Issues in the Franc Zone." Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, unpublished seminar paper, January.
- Monga, Célestin. 1992. "Cinquante propositions pour sauver l'économie du Cameroun, part I." Jeune Afrique Economie. No. 158, August, pp. 113-119.
- Monga, Célestin. 1991. Légitimité politique et gouvernabilité. Douala: GERDES.
- Montgomery, John D. 1988. Bureaucrats and People: Grassroots Participation in Third World Development. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Moore, Will H. and James R. Scaritt. 1990. "IMF Conditionality and Polity Characteristics in Black Africa: An Exploratory Analysis." Africa Today. Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 39-60.
- Mosley, Paul, Jane Harrigan, and John Toye. 1991. Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy-based Lending. New York: Routledge, Vol. 1.
- Moyo, Sam. 1992. "A Preliminary Review of Zimbabwe's Structural Adjustment Programme." Harare: Zimbabwe Environmental Research Organisation, Working Paper No. 14.
- Mukandala, Rwekaza S. and William Shellukindo. 1994. "Tanzania: Moving Beyond the One-Party State." In Michelle Garritty and Louis Picard, eds. Policy Reform for Sustainability in Africa. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 67-79.

- Mutahaba, Gelase, Rweikiza Baguma, and Mohamed Halfani. 1993. Vitalizing African Public Administration for Recovery and Development. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press.
- Mutahaba, Gelase, and M. Jide Balogun, eds. 1992. Enhancing Policy Management Capacity in Africa. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press.
- Mutizwa-Mangiza, N.D. 1990. "Decentralization and District Planning in Zimbabwe." Public Administration and Development. Vol. 10, pp. 423-25.
- Mwanza, Allast. 1991. "Structural Adjustment Programmes in Tanzania and Zambia: Some Lessons for Late-Starters in SADCC." Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly. Vol. 4, No. 7, pp. 4-11.
- Nagle, William J. 1991. "Policy and Practice of Community Participation in the U.S. Agency for International Development." Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, Office of Education, Social Sector Policy Analysis Project, November.
- Nelson, Joan, ed. 1990. Economic Crisis and Policy Choice. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Nelson, Joan M. 1989a. "Overview: The Politics of Long-Haul Economic Reform." In Joan M. Nelson, et al. Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economic Adjustment. Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, pp. 3-27.
- Nelson, Joan M. 1989b. "The Politics of Pro-Poor Adjustment." In Joan M. Nelson, et al. Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economic Adjustment. Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, pp. 95-111.
- Nelson, Joan M. with Stephanie J. Eglinton. 1992. Encouraging Democracy: What Role for Conditioned Aid?. Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, Policy Essay No. 4.
- Nelson, Joan et al. 1989. Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economic Adjustment. Overseas Development Council, U.S.-Third World Perspectives, No. 12. New Brunswick, CT: Transaction Books.
- Nunberg, Barbara. 1990. Public Sector Management Issues in Structural Adjustment Lending. Washington, DC: World Bank, Discussion Paper No. 99.
- Nyang'oro, Julius E. and Timothy M. Shaw, eds. 1992. Beyond Structural Adjustment in Africa. The Political Economy of Sustainable and Democratic Development. New York: Praeger.

- Obasanjo, Olusegun and Hans d'Orville, eds. 1991. The Leadership Challenge of Economic Reforms in Africa. New York: Crane Russak.
- Olowu, Dele and Paul Smoke. 1992. "Determinants of Success in African Local Governments: an Overview." Public Administration and Development. Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 1-17.
- Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 1988. The Sahel Facing the Future: Increasing Dependence or Structural Transformation. Paris: Author.
- Orsini, Deborah. 1993. "The West African Enterprise Network: Concept Paper." Washington, DC: U. S. Agency for International Development, Implementing Policy Change Project, March.
- Oshikoya, Temitope W. 1992. "Macroeconomic Adjustment, Uncertainty and Domestic Private Investment in Selected African Countries." Abidjan: African Development Bank.
- Ouane, Habib. 1990. "La pérestroika et l'économie africaine." Afrique 2000. No. 1, pp. 33-46.
- Ouedraogo, Ismael S. and Carol M. Adoum. 1993. Improving the Effectiveness of Policy Reform in Africa: Cereals Market Policy Reform in Mali. Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, Agricultural Policy Analysis Project, Phase II.
- Ouma, Stephen O.A.. 1991. "Corruption in Public Policy and its Impact on Development: The Case of Uganda since 1979." Public Administration and Development. Vol. 11, pp. 473-490.
- Oyugi, Walter O. 1994. "Kenya: Contextual Factors and the Policy Process." In Michelle Garritty and Louis Picard, eds. Policy Reform for Sustainability in Africa. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 81-99.
- Paul, Samuel. 1991. Accountability in Public Services: Exit, Voice, and Capture. Washington, DC: World Bank, Country Economics Department, PRE Working Paper No. WPS 614, March.
- Paul, Samuel. 1990. Institutional Reforms in Sector Adjustment Operations: The World Bank's Experience. Washington, DC: World Bank, Discussion Paper No. 92.
- Péan, Pierre. 1983. Affaires africains. Paris: Fayard.
- Perkins, Dwight H. and Michael Roemer, eds. Reforming Economic Systems in Developing Countries. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Institute for International Development.

- Picard, Louis A. 1987. The Politics of Development in Botswana: A Model for Success?. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Pietrobelli, Carlo and Carlo Scarpa. 1992. "Inducing Efficiency in the Use of Foreign Aid: The Case for Incentive Mechanisms." Journal of Development Studies. Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 72-92.
- Pryor, Frederic. 1990. Malawi and Madagascar: The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity and Growth. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, World Bank Comparative Study.
- Putnam, Robert, with Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y. Nanetti. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Radelet, Steven. 1992. "Reform without Revolt: The Political Economy of Economic Reform in The Gambia." World Development. Vol. 20, No. 8, pp. 1087-1099.
- Rahman, Syedur and Frederick Norling. 1991. "Managerial Thinking: A Study of Public Managers from Developing Countries." Public Administration and Development. Vol. 11, pp. 111-25.
- Rielly, Catherine. 1993a. Improving the Effectiveness of Policy Reform in Africa: Rice Market Liberalization in Madagascar. Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, Agricultural Policy Analysis Project, Phase II.
- Rielly, Catherine. 1993b. Improving the Effectiveness of Policy Reform in Africa: Fertilizer Reforms in Cameroon. Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, Agricultural Policy Analysis Project, Phase II.
- Roberts, Pepe and David Seddon. 1991. "Fundamentalism in Africa: Religion and Politics." Review of African Political Economy. No. 52, pp.3-8.
- Robinson, Brandon. 1990. "Collaborative Sector Analysis: A Foreign Assistance Technique for Improving LDC Sector Management." World Development. Vol. 18, No. 7, pp. 1015-29.
- Rothchild, Donald, ed. 1991. Ghana: The Political Economy of Recovery. Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner Publishers.
- Rothchild, Donald and Naomi Chazan, eds. 1988. The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

- Rondinelli, Dennis A. and John D. Montgomery. 1990. "Managing Economic Reform in Africa: An Alternative Perspective on Structural Adjustment Policies." Policy Sciences. Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 73-93.
- Rugh, Michael A., Jerry Cashion, Donald Harrison, Paul Mulligan. 1990. The A.I.D. Economic Policy Reform Program in Mali. Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, Impact Evaluation Report No. 74, March.
- Sachikonye, Lloyd M. 1992. "The New Labour Regime Under SAP in Zimbabwe." Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly. Vol. 5, No. 7, pp. 41-44.
- Sahn, David E. 1992. Adjusting to Policy Failure in African Economies. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University.
- Sahn, David E. 1990. Fiscal and Exchange Rate Reforms in Africa: Considering the Impact Upon the Poor. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, Food and Nutrition Policy Program, Monograph No. 4, August.
- Sahn, David E. and Alexander H. Sarris. 1992. The Political Economy of Economic Decline and Reform in Africa: The Role of the State, Markets, and Civil Institutions. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, Food and Nutrition Policy Program, Working Paper No. 25, April.
- Sahn, David E. and Alexander H. Sarris. 1991. "Structural Adjustment and the Welfare of Rural Smallholders: A Comparative Analysis from sub-Saharan Africa." World Bank Economic Review. Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 259-89.
- Sait, Abdoulaye. 1989. Mali: L'Organisation du Monde Rural du Mali (1910 - 1988). Bamako: Editions-Imprimerie du Mali.
- Sandbrook, Richard. 1993. The Politics of Africa's Economic Recovery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sarris, Alexander H. 1990. A Macro-Micro Framework for Analysis of the Impact of Structural Adjustment on the Poor in Sub-Saharan Africa. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, Food and Nutrition Policy Program, Monograph No. 5, September.
- Schoenholtz, Andrew I. 1987. "The I.M.F. in Africa: Unnecessary and Undesirable Western Restraints on Development." Journal of Modern African Studies. Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 403-433.

- Sethi, S. Prakash. 1989. "Economic Rights for the Disenfranchised Citizens of South Africa: A New Approach to Black Economic Empowerment." Sun City, South Africa: National African Federated Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Paper presented at 25th Annual Conference, August 7.
- Shaw, Timothy M. 1993. Reformism and Revisionism in Africa's Political Economy in the 1990s: The Dialectics of Adjustment. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Shaw, Timothy M. 1991. "Reformism, Revisionism, and Radicalism in African Political Economy in the 1990s." Journal of Modern African Studies. Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 191-212.
- Shaw, Timothy M. 1990. "Popular Participation in Non-Governmental Structures in Africa: Implications for Democratic Development." Africa Today. Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 5-22.
- Silverman, Jerry M. forthcoming. "Analyzing the Role of the Public Sector in Africa: Implications for Civil Service Reform Policy." In Derick W. Brinkerhoff, ed. Policy Analysis Concepts and Methods: An Institutional and Implementation Focus. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, Policy Studies and Developing Nations Series.
- Silverman, Jerry M. 1992. Public Sector Decentralization: Economic Policy and Sector Investment Programs. Washington, DC: World Bank, Technical Paper No. 188.
- Sirowy, Larry and Alex Inkeles. 1990. "The Effects of Democracy on Economic Growth and Inequality: A Review." Studies in Comparative International Development. Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 126-57.
- Skalnes, Tor. 1993. "The State, Interest Groups and Structural Adjustment in Zimbabwe." The Journal of Development Studies. Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 401-428.
- Smith, Stephen, Jean-Louis Combeaud and Corinne Moutout. 1990. La guerre du cacao: histoire secrète d'un embargo. Paris: Calmann-Lévy.
- Smith, Stephen and Antoine Glaser. 1992. Ces Messieurs Afrique: Le Paris village du continent noir. Paris: Calmann-Lévy.
- Sutton, Francis X. 1987. "Building Competences for Policy Analysis and Management in Developing Countries: Asian and Latin American Experience with Relevance to Africa." Washington, DC: World Bank, June.
- Tadesse, Zenebeworke. 1992. "African Debates on Social Movements and the Democratic Process." Journal of The Society for International Development. Vol. 3, pp. 34-37.

- Tacconi, Luca and Clem Tisdell. 1992. "Rural Development Projects in LDCs: Appraisal, Participation, and Sustainability." Public Administration and Development. Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 267-78.
- Talbott, Kirk. 1990. "Public Participation in African Environmental Action Plans." In World Bank. National Environmental Action Plans in Africa. Proceedings from a workshop organized by the Government of Ireland, the Environmental Institute, University College, Dublin, and the World Bank. Dublin, Ireland, December 12-14, pp. 37-47.
- Taube, Günther. 1993. "Social Dimensions of Adjustment: Conceptual Issues and Empirical Evidence from Tanzania and other African Countries." Afrika Spectrum Vol. 28, No. 2, 165-183.
- Thomas, John W. and Merilee S. Grindle. 1990. "After the Decision: Implementing Policy Reforms in Developing Countries." World Development. Vol. 18, No. 8, pp. 1163-81.
- Thomas, Vinod, Ajay Chhibber, Mansoor Dailami, and Jaime de Melo, eds. 1991. Restructuring Economies in Distress: Policy Reform and the World Bank. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Toye, John. 1992. "Interest Group Politics and the Implementation of Adjustment Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa." In Peter Gibbon, Yusuf Bangura, and Arve Ofstad, eds. Authoritarianism, Democracy and Adjustment: The Politics of Economic Reform in Africa. Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, pp. 106-26.
- Truong, Tham V. and S. Tjip Walker. 1990. "Policy Reform as Institutional Change: Privatizing the Fertilizer Subsector in Cameroon." In Derick W. Brinkerhoff and Arthur A. Goldsmith, eds. Institutional Sustainability in Agriculture and Rural Development: A Global Perspective. New York: Praeger Publishers, pp. 115-33.
- United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). 1990. African Charter for Popular Participation in Development. Addis Ababa: Author.
- UNECA. 1989. African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP). Addis Ababa: Author, June.
- U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). 1993. Economic Reform in Africa's New Era of Political Liberalization: Proceedings of a Workshop for SPA Donors. Washington, DC: Author, April.
- USAID. 1991. Gender and Adjustment. Washington, DC: Author, June.

- USAID. n.d. "Achieving Participation: A Collection of the Africa Bureau's 'Best Practices.'" Washington, DC: Author, Bureau for Africa.
- Uphoff, Norman. 1988. "Assisted Self-Reliance: Working With, Rather than For, the Poor." In John P. Lewis, et al. Strengthening the Poor: What Have We Learned? Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, pp. 47-60.
- Uphoff, Norman. 1985. "Fitting Projects to People." In Michael M. Cernea, ed. Putting People First: Sociological Variables in Rural Development. New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, pp. 359-97.
- van de Walle, Nicolas. 1994. "Political Liberalization and Economic Policy Reform in Africa." World Development. Vol. 22, No. 4 (forthcoming).
- van der Veen, Jan H., Thomas D. Hobgood, and Melanie J. Mariett. 1990. The A.I.D. Economic Policy Reform Program in The Gambia. Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, Impact Evaluation Report No. 76, September.
- VanSant, Jerry. "Opportunities and Risks for Private Voluntary Organizations as Agents of LDC Policy Change." World Development. Vol. 17, No. 11, pp. 1723-33.
- Vengroff, Richard, Mohamed Belhaj and Momar Ndiaye. 1991. "The Nature of Managerial Work in the Public Sector: an African Perspective." Public Administration and Development. Vol.11, pp. 95-110.
- Vondal, Patricia. 1989. Operational Issues in Developing A.I.D. Policy Reform Programs. Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, Program Evaluation Discussion Paper No. 28, October.
- Wallis, Malcolm. 1990. "District Planning and Local Government in Kenya." Public Administration and Development. Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 437-452.
- Waterbury, John. 1989. "The Political Management of Economic Adjustment and Reform." In Joan M. Nelson, et al. Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economic Adjustment. Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, pp. 39-57.
- Wedell, George, ed. 1986. Making broadcasting useful: the African experience: the development of radio and television in Africa in the 1980's. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press and The European Institute for the Media.
- West, Harry G. and Jo Ellen Fair. 1993. "Development Communication and Popular Resistance in Africa: An Examination of the Struggle over Tradition and Modernity Through Media." African Studies Review. Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 91-115.

- White, Louise G. 1990a. "Implementing Economic Policy Reforms: Policies and Opportunities for Donors." World Development. Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 49-60.
- White, Louise G. 1990b. Implementing Policy Reforms in LDCs: A Strategy for Designing and Effecting Change. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- White, Louise G. 1990c. "Policy Reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa: Conditions for Establishing a Dialogue." Studies in Comparative International Development. Vol. 25. No. 2, pp. 24-42.
- Widner, Jennifer A., ed. 1993. Interest Groups and Medium-Term Structural Adjustment in Cote d'Ivoire. Abidjan: U.S. Agency for International Development/REDSO.
- Widner, Jennifer A. with Atta Brou Noel. 1993. Improving the Effectiveness of Policy Reform in Africa: The Politics of Agricultural Policy Reform in Côte d'Ivoire. Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, Agricultural Policy Analysis Project, Phase II.
- Widner, Jennifer A. and Maurits van der Veen. 1993. "Associational Life and Economic Development in Africa: A Review of the Literature." Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Center for International Affairs. Paper presented at Workshop on Associational Life and Economic Development in Africa, May 7-8.
- Wiesner, D. Eduardo. 1993. From Macroeconomic Correction to Public Sector Reform: The Critical Role of Evaluation. Washington, DC: World Bank, Discussion Paper No. 214.
- Williamson, John, ed. 1983. IMF Conditionality. Cambridge: Institute for International Economics.
- Winter, Carolyn. 1984. "Structural Adjustment Lending: Boon or Blow for Malawi?" Journal of Contemporary African Studies. Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 103-18.
- Winrock International Institute for Agricultural Development. 1991. African Development: Lessons from Asia. Arlington, VA: Author. Proceedings of a Seminar on Strategies for the Future of Africa Sponsored by the Africa Bureau, U.S. Agency for International Development and Winrock International at the Radisson Plaza Lord Baltimore Hotel, Baltimore, MD, June 5-7.
- Wiseman, John A. 1990. Democracy in Black Africa: Survival and Revival. New York: Paragon House Publishers.
- Woods, Dwayne. 1992. "Civil Society in Europe and Africa: Limiting State Power through a Public Sphere." African Studies Review. Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 77-100.

- World Bank. 1994. Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results, and the Road Ahead. New York: Oxford University Press, World Bank Policy Research Report.
- World Bank. 1993. Paradigm Postponed: Gender and Economic Adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, DC: Author, Africa Region Technical Department, Human Resources and Poverty Division, Technical Note, August.
- World Bank. 1991. The African Capacity Building Initiative: Toward Improved Policy Analysis and Development Management. Washington, DC: Author.
- World Bank. 1989a. Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth. Washington, DC: Author.
- World Bank. 1989b. Strengthening Local Governments in Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, DC: Author, Economic Development Institute, EDI Policy Seminar Report No. 21.
- World Bank. 1985. Financing Adjustment with Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1986-90. Washington, DC: Author.
- World Bank. 1981. Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action. Washington, DC: Author.
- Wunsch, James S. and Dele Olowu, eds. 1990. Failure of the Centralized State: Institutions and Self-Governance in Africa. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Young, Ralph. 1991. "Privatization in Africa," Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 51, pp. 50-62.
- Zaffiro, James J. 1993. "Mass Media, Politics and Society in Botswana: The 1990s and Beyond." Africa Today. Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 7-25.
- Ziegler, Jean. 1978. Main Basse sur l'Afrique. Paris: Editions Seuil.
- Zuckerman, Elaine. 1991. "The Social Costs of Adjustment." In Vinod Thomas, Ajay Chhibber, Mansoor Dailami, and Jaime de Melo, eds. Restructuring Economies in Distress: Policy Reform and the World Bank. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 247-71.
- Zulu, Justin B. and Saleh M. Nsouli. 1985. Adjustment Programs in Africa: The Recent Experience. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, Occasional Paper No. 34.