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THE EXPERIENCE OF DECENTRALIZATION IN COTE D'IVOIRE, 1980-1993:

AN EVALUATION

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PREFACE

Côte d'Ivoire has implemented the most broadly-based and sustained decentralization effort in Francophone Africa. By 1985, some 135 municipalities were incorporated into the process. The problems that have developed in recent years require attention within the country and by those donor agencies, such as AID, that have been strong supporters of decentralization in the past. It is in this context that AID's regional office in Abidjan contracted Abt Associates to undertake a detailed review of the country's decentralization program, with the intent of informing AID's strategic planning process in its deliberations about future support.

The study team was led by Dr. Richard Stren, a specialist in African urban affairs and Professor in the Department of Political Science and Director of the Centre for Urban and Community Studies of the University of Toronto. Mr. Koffi Attahi, an Ivorian planner with extensive research experience on decentralization and an assistant professor at the National University of Côte d'Ivoire, served as the team's decentralization specialist. Mr. Nezam Motabar, a financial management expert, was the team's urban finance specialist.

The team carried out its field work over approximately four weeks in May and June of this year. The intense work period produced a substantial report that will prove extremely useful to both AID (and other donors) and those Ivorians concerned with decentralization.

The research could not have been carried out, of course, without the many Ivorians -- in the government and the *communes* -- who gave their time and provided their insights to the team. For their participation, we are grateful. The study also benefited throughout from the guidance of Ms. Carleene Dei, Chief of the Urban Development Division in the REDSO office.

John Miller
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The Experience of Decentralization in Côte d'Ivoire, 1980-1993

Executive Summary

1. Introduction

By the early 1990s, changes in many African countries involving a more market-driven economy, a more open and active civil society, and more competitive politics also brought a movement towards decentralization. Paradoxically, the focus for most of these changes has been the urban centers where the formerly centralized system was most firmly implanted.

Côte d'Ivoire, which was ruled by a single party for the first thirty years after Independence, and is still under the influence of the same President, began its decentralization exercise in 1978. Eventually, by 1985, some 135 municipalities throughout the country were incorporated into the framework. This is the most broad-based, as well as the most sustained decentralization exercise in Francophone Africa. But decentralization in Côte d'Ivoire has been experiencing a number of problems which need to be addressed both within the country and by donor agencies such as USAID which have in the past supported decentralization.

The objectives of this report are (1) to present a detailed review of the status of the GOCI decentralization program; and (2) to make recommendations for future USAID interventions in this field.

The study was carried out by three persons, a political scientist/urban planner, a financial expert, and an Ivorian planner. In addition to collecting materials and conducting interviews among GOCI officials and others in Abidjan, the study Mission visited four *communes* for brief field visits: Port-Bouet (a *commune* of the City of Abidjan), Akoupé, Abengourou, and Tiassalé.

2. Ivorian Decentralization: History and Overview

2.1. Economic and political context.

2.1.2. The changing economic environment. From Independence in 1960 through the late 1970s, Côte d'Ivoire enjoyed a period of economic growth almost unmatched in sub-Saharan Africa, with a growth rate of 6.8% per annum in GDP between 1965 and 1980. It also enjoyed political stability under the continuous leadership of President Félix Houphouët-Boigny and the ruling party, the Parti démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI). Growth during this period was based on four main factors: the development of high quality agricultural exports; the establishment of a large battery of parastatal organizations which involved all aspects of Ivorian economic life; strong incentives to foreign investment and tolerance of a large expatriate community; and the development of a well-trained and highly-paid national civil service structure. While there was some pressure within the country to open opportunities to Ivorians

at a more rapid rate, the government's strategy was minimally acceptable so long as there was a high level of economic growth and substantial disposal government resources.

By the late 1970s, as world prices for the country's primary products began seriously to erode, the GDP began to fall. From a figure of $1,222 in 1980, GDP per capita fell to $734 in 1991. At the same time, Côte d'Ivoire developed a massive foreign debt, the servicing of which significantly reduced its ability to meet its domestic obligations. In response to the World Bank and IMF, the GOCI developed a Medium-Term Economic Policy Framework, which *inter alia* attempts to cut public sector wage bills and reduce expenditures on social services.

During the buoyant period of the 1960s and 1970s, the urban population of the country was growing at a rate of approximately 10 per cent per year. With the onset of the *conjoncture* in the late 1970s, urban migration (at least to the large towns) subsided, with the result that during the 1980s Abidjan's population (estimated at approximately 2 million in 1993) grew at a rate of only 2.6% per annum. At the same time, during the 1980s the cities saw a much more explosive growth in their informal economies than had been the case previously.

2.1.2. Political evolution. The early political years of the current President of Côte d'Ivoire took place in France, as an active member of the French Constituent Assembly and subsequently the Fourth Republic. Following the elections of 1956 under the French *loi cadre*, Houphouët-Boigny became the elected Mayor of Abidjan. This arrangement was possible under a colonial law which had elevated Abidjan, Grand Bassam and Bouaké to "full exercise" *communes*.

Since Independence, commentators point to the pivotal nature of personal leadership in Côte d'Ivoire, as well as to the centrality of the single party. While the Party had weak horizontal integration, it was able to absorb a wide range of independent social activity in the country, through various umbrella organizations incorporating women, youth, and the trade unions. From 1960, the Party alone prepared lists for elections every five years; and only one candidate was presented for President. The first major change in this system came in 1980, when a "semi-competitive" system was put in place for the legislative elections. At this time, the regime was in the process of "cleaning up" the extravagant parastatal system, for what are seen as both economic and political reasons. Concurrently, the regime undertook to create a great number of new positions in the political system. Not only could different lists compete within the PDCI, but the President announced that municipal elections would be held for the first time in 37 *communes* (previously named in 1978). Then, in 1985 another 98 *communes* were created, in time to hold elections for councillors and mayors in 135 *communes* at the end of the year.

The most recent developments have seen multi-party elections in 1990, and the establishment of the office of Prime Minister at the end of the same year. The results of the municipal elections showed that participation levels were lower than ever, in spite of party competition. Of the 135 *communes*, elections in 3 were nullified, the PDCI won 123, and the opposition and independents took 9. Following the election and the establishment of the Prime Minister's office in the face of economic challenges to the country, there has been renewed

discussion of the arrangements for succession to the Presidency. The political climate is therefore uncertain at the moment.

2.2 Legal context and rationale

To understand the meaning of communalization and decentralization in Côte d'Ivoire, it is important to understand the history of the territory as a French colony. The structure of territorial administration that was implanted during colonialism was built upon by new, metropolitan-type central government institutions after Independence. As for communalization, the institution of the *commune* dates back to 1884 in France. By the modern period there were 36,000 *communes* in France, most of them very small in population. But beginning in 1982, the French government undertook a broad-ranging decentralization reform which has had ramifications in the Francophone African countries.

The first *commune*, in Grand-Bassam, was constructed in 1914 in Côte d'Ivoire. Over the years, there were various attempts to develop *communes* of three types: mixed, medium-exercise and full-exercise. The distinction derived from French law, and had to do with whether the mayor was elected (and by whom), and consequently how much functional autonomy could be granted. By Independence there were three "full exercise" and six "medium exercise" *communes* operating in Côte d'Ivoire although a further eight "medium exercise" *communes* had been designated but not put into operation.

With Independence the *communes* languished. What happened in Côte d'Ivoire reflected the pattern elsewhere in Francophone Africa. This is ironic considering that almost all Francophone African presidents at the point of Independence (with the sole exception of Léopold Senghor of Senegal) had been previously elected mayors of their *communes*. As the *communes* fell into disuse in Côte d'Ivoire, the territorial administration under the prefects was built up, along with an elaborate structure of central government and parastatal organizations.

A municipal initiative came to the National Assembly on 30 December, 1977, when a new law was voted that confirmed the establishment of the 2 existing "full exercise" *communes*, and proceeded to establish 26 more. In the event, elections did not take place in these *communes* until 1980 because of problems within the Party. Then, following the 7th Party Congress in October 1980, three major laws were passed which still form the basis of the country's municipal law. In 1985, 98 *communes* were added, for a total of 135. Following the municipal elections of that year, there were 3,910 elected councillors, 135 mayors (including the Mayor of the City of Abidjan, a supra-municipal government functioning on behalf of 10 Abidjan *communes*), and 423 assistant mayors.

Does the communalization initiative represent decentralization, or can it rather be described as deconcentration? This is an important question, but two initial observations must be made. In the first place, the term *municipalisation* in French conveys a much more limited political meaning than does the term "municipalization" in English. Moreover, the bulk of the

135 *communes* in Côte d'Ivoire would be considered small towns or even villages by international demographic standards. The second point is that the French sense of the term *decentralisation* has to be understood in the context of a long historical experience with a highly centralized and intrusive state. The Anglo-Saxon sense of "decentralization", which implies a high degree of disengagement by the state with respect to defined powers and functions, is not fully applicable in this context. To what extent has real decentralization (in the American sense) taken place through the communalization exercise? It is argued that a modest, but in the Ivorian context and under the circumstances, relatively significant and sustainable level of real decentralization has indeed taken place.

This positive evaluation of the communal initiative from the point of view of decentralization is based on four major criteria. First, in terms of the division of powers, the experience of the *communes* shows that they are increasingly gaining competence in the administration of the limited powers that they have been allocated. Second, with respect to the financial and budgetary experience, the total expenditure represented by the communal budgets amounted in 1992 to some 5.6% of the national total. In addition, the state pays the salaries of a wide variety of its agents who work either partially or completely under communal jurisdiction. If these transfers are included, the *communes* may represent close to 10% of the national budgetary total. A third area to consider is human resources. Currently, there are 12,103 employees working directly under the authority of the *communes*; a further 669 are directly appointed agents of the central government who manage the communal technical and administrative services. Since, given the investment budgets of the *communes*, each communal job has a multiplier effect of another .726 jobs, the total formal employment created by communal activity is substantial in a small country like Côte d'Ivoire. It can also be demonstrated that settlements which have been granted *commune* status are considerably more successful in collecting taxes and other revenues than are similar-sized settlements that have not been communalized. Finally, there is the political factor. It can be argued that, for various reasons, the *communes* have become a significant part of the political "game" in Côte d'Ivoire. Many of the mayors have become important political personalities, and they in turn are concerned to manage their towns effectively if they wish to be reelected. The evidence suggests that the government is strongly committed to supporting this exercise.

2.4 The emergence of new stakeholders

As the state disengages from some of its previously onerous responsibilities, it begins to position itself in a more interactive fashion with new "stakeholders" who also influence the policy process at the local level. The emergence of these stakeholders can be seen at both the local and the international level in terms of decentralization policy.

At the international level, there are at least eight international donor agencies working in the urban field in Côte d'Ivoire. France, which operates three grants for an approximate total of $3,751,000, and supports the Centre ORSTOM (which carries out significant urban research), is likely to become more involved in decentralization and urban management globally. Other

medium-sized actors in the field include USAID (with a $5 million project, most of which involves the training of communal agents); and the European Economic Community (through the FED) which works with 13 coastal *communes* through a $38 million project (and is developing a second project). But by far the largest and most important stakeholder in the decentralization field is the World Bank, with 7 very large urban projects since the 1970s, and a large ($66 million) current project on municipal development. Present sentiment at the Bank is in favor of continued support for this process. Nevertheless, the Bank feels that USAID plays an important role in this field.

3. The Structure and functions of communal governance.

3.1 Existing structure and division of powers.

A major recent overview of urban local government in the developing world shows the variation in functions and powers given to local authorities. There is no "optimal" allocation of powers, or of local government structure, independent of the political objectives of national governments. The structure and functions of local governments have been defined by specific legislation in Côte d'Ivoire, with a list of powers that fall under the tutelary authority, and another list of powers that are the responsibility of the mayor. On the basis of the legal texts, the main services for which the *communes* are responsible can be grouped into four sectors: general services, collective services; socio-cultural and human development services; and socio-economic services. The mayor is responsible for the carrying out of these services, though in practice the day to day administration is the responsibility of the secretary-general of the *commune*.

Although there is a substantial list of local functions reserved for the *communes* (whose actual work tends to concentrate on administering markets and removing garbage), some important powers are still reserved for the central government. The most important reservation involves control over land. Only in the small *communes* can municipal councillors make decisions on sub-division; in Abidjan, control over the allocation of, and development of land is almost entirely a central government power. While it could be argued that this situation is a logical one so long as the central government collects both land and business taxes, lack of control over land deprives local political groups of a major resource and basis for involvement. In addition to land, the central government retains some important (but not exclusive) powers over primary education, public health, and veterinary services, among others.

3.2. The role of central government agencies.

3.2.1. The Ministry of the Interior. While the Ivorian *communes* have a "moral autonomy" and a certain level of financial autonomy, they are very closely supervised by the national government through a structure known as *la tutelle* (close supervision). The second chapter of the basic municipal law spells out this relationship, which by Presidential decree in

1982, was put into the hands of the Ministry of the Interior. Supervision within the Ministry is carried out through the Direction Générale des Collectivités Locales (DGCL), an office of some 108 people operating out of cramped and poorly equipped quarters in downtown Abidjan. In order to relieve the burden on the DGCL, the Ministry has tried, over the years, to devolve some tutelary powers to the prefects. In 1992, the prefects were given the responsibility of vetting the budgets of all *communes* with an annual budget of 100 million FCFA or less. This measure covered fully 80% of the *communes*. Still, the larger *communes* still complain that their budgets take too much time before they are approved; and once a budget is approved, individual expenditure items still must be justified by a resolution of the council.

3.2.2. The Supreme Court Accounting Office. This relatively small office became important in the country during the late 1970s when the government decided to "clean up" the accounting practices in parastatal agencies. Since the early 1980s the office has played an important role in investigating financial malfeasance in the *communes*; as a result of its recommendations a number of mayors have been removed from office.

3.3. Case studies of communal governance.

The Mission paid field visits to four *communes*, in order to get a first-hand view of the day-to-day problems experienced at the local level, and to interview communal officials. The four *communes* visited were Port-Bouet, Akoupé, Tiassalé and Abengourou. Analysis of the four cases is organized around four main areas: the political and economic context, the functioning of communal institutions, the distribution of powers, the main areas of communal management, and the emergence of new local actors. While the individual cases show a lot of variation a number of general points can be made that apply to almost all. First, in discussing their work with senior communal agents (all of whom were central government officials), the point was often made that political officials have become very involved in using the resources of the *communes* for their own purposes. While this conflict between political and administrative uses for local resources is widespread, the Mission does not consider this cause for alarm, since it is simply one more example of the increasing importance of the *communes* within the Ivorian political system. Another current feature of communal management is the very slow process of approval of budgets by the DGCL, at the same time as the funds which are collected (from land and business tax, and from various municipal services) and deposited in the government's coffers are not being released. This "lack of liquidity" crisis is severely affecting morale among local employees, as the central government agents are getting their pay on time, while the communal officials are normally well over a week in arrears. The liquidity crisis has considerably empowered the municipal *receveur*, since it is he who decides who will be paid every month. This is frustrating to the mayors, whose budgeted requests for payment to suppliers are not honored, and who see their re-election chances slipping away if the situation is not rectified. Finally, the case studies also indicate that (except in the case of Port-Bouet, and Abengourou) the self-help dynamic is not strong at the local level. It may take some time before local communities realize that the state is not in a position to solve their problems without some initiative on their part.

4. Resource Mobilization

4.1 Introduction

Mobilization of communal resources is a particularly important question at the present time, given the problems of reduced allocation of taxes following the 1992 Finance Law, and the "lack of liquidity" in the national system. The analysis of mobilization of resources is divided into two parts (i) a review of the current resources of the municipalities with suggestions for increasing revenue from those resources; and (ii) recommendations for new sources of revenue.

4.2 The Communal Budgets

The major contributions to the revenues of the *communes* are from the following sources:

A. ADMINISTRATIVE BUDGET

TAXES AND LEVIES

Collections by the Treasury
- Real estate tax
- Business tax

Collections by the municipality
- Small business and other taxes

Municipal taxes and levies
- Gas stations and taxicabs

PROVISION OF SERVICES

General Services
- Notary and other registration services

Community Services

Economic Services
- Transport, and taxi and bus terminals
- Markets (the small business tax)

GOVERNMENT AND EXTERNAL AID

A substantial part of the revenues is spent as follows:

EXPENDITURE
- Staff compensation charges
- Motor vehicle running costs
- Materials and supplies
- Provision of community services

B. INVESTMENT BUDGET

REVENUES OR RECEIPTS

- Contribution from the Investment Fund
- Borrowing

EXPENDITURE

- Equipment for services

As a direct result of the lack of liquidity in the system, the actual realization of the investment budget is limited to the availability of cash.

The system of tax administration in Côte d'Ivoire is structurally patterned after the French system. The main feature of the Francophone system which separates and distinguishes it from the Anglophone system is its division of powers, and segregation of duties and functions within the administrative framework as a means of providing checks and balances. The Anglophone taxation system is an integrated system in that the administrative functions are not so separated and there is more emphasis on auditing to provide for accountability.

There are two major agencies dealing with tax collection at the central government level. *La Direction générale des impôts* (DGI) is vested with the tax assessment authority, while *la Direction générale de la comptabilité publique et du trésor* (DGCPT) has exclusive authority over all collections. Both agencies are located within the Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Planning.

In the case of certain taxes and levies, the administration of the tax collection activity is delegated, on an express or even a *de facto* basis, to the tax assessment authority, DGI. DGI is currently submitting a proposal to the Council of Ministers to allow it to integrate more collection functions under its own authority.

4.3 Analysis of the System in Operation.

Two general constraints impede a more effective functioning of the administration of public resources. One pervasive factor is the current "lack of liquidity" which separates different categories of staff in terms of remuneration and demoralizes the suppliers as well as the public in local government areas. Another is a lack of proper horizontal coordination between different central and local government agencies with similar interests in particular outcomes.

A detailed analysis of the communal budgets can logically begin with the administration and collection of the real estate tax. There are at least two ministries, plus the office of the Prime Minister, and four *Directions générales* that deal with the whole activity of real estate tax assessment and collection. The process starts with allocation of the land which, in theory,

belongs to the central government. The Ministry of the Environment, Construction and Urban Planning has, in general, power over most urban land and its distribution.

In theory, administration of the real estate tax is divided between two major agencies. The *Direction du cadastre* (DC) is responsible for tax assessment activity; while the *Direction générale de la comptabilité publique et du trésor* (DGCPT) is charged with tax collection activity. In practice, the system fails to function as it was originally intended for a multitude of reasons. A number of these factors include the following:

- Land allocation procedures. There are a number of considerations in allocation of urban land. Land is basically owned by the government and allotments are made on condition that the person receiving the allotment proceeds with construction on the land. There is a major inconsistency in this area in that, while the government does the zoning, subdivision and parcelling of the land, the allotments are often made according to traditional processes and criteria.

- Lack of coordination. There is little horizontal coordination between different departments of different ministries, resulting in lack of information and duplication of effort.

As for the business tax (*la patente*), it is considered a local tax and is basically collected at three different levels of the administrative system. For businesses with a turnover of FCFA 2,000,000 or more per year, the tax is collectible by the central government. For businesses with a turnover of less than FCFA 2,000,000 per year, the tax is collectible by the *commune*. However, this tax is collected either as the small business tax (*la petite patente*) or the market tax. While the small business tax is collected by the communal treasurer, the market tax is collected by tax collectors assigned to the local market.

The basis of assessment for the business tax is the rental value of the business property. The level of assessment is a function of the location of the business. There is accordingly a distinction between businesses conducted in Abidjan or elsewhere in the country. The method of assessment also takes into account the classifications by type of activity. Once the tax is collected by the central government, 60% is distributed to the *communes*, and 40% is held by the government.

The study to this point has described the recurrent, or administrative budget of the *communes*. There is also an investment budget, the total of which ranges from 10% to 30% of the recurrent budget. In terms of revenues for projects within this budget, the main source of funding is the Investment Fund. Otherwise, a limited number of municipalities, in line with the provisions of the projects undertaken by The World Bank under the Municipal Development Project, are able to borrow from the *Fonds de prêt aux collectivités locales* (FPCL). Lists of projects which are currently approved and funded as well as projects which are under review are included as annexes to this report.

4.4 Major Shortcomings in Resource Mobilization

1. Practical problems in the collection of the real estate tax. The system of taxation prior to independence was based on the then prevalent philosophy of collectibility rather than equity. Each colonial resident paid a fixed amount, regardless of income or economic activity. The current taxation system is a comprehensive system of taxation. This has resulted in fundamental dislocations in both assessment and collection of the tax. For example, there is a lack of proper administration and communication both within and between different government agencies charged with tax assessment and collection. Training of personnel is insufficient. There are inadequate funds to employ staff with technical specialties, such as certified surveyors and those with allied technical skills. The system lacks a basic ability to collect and analyze information by itself, relying on consultants (often financed by foreign donor agencies) for occasional studies when major problems inevitably arise. Adequate office equipment and transport support is lacking. And finally, there is a low level of political willingness to bring the individuals who evade compliance to justice.

2. Assessment and collection of business taxes. Of particular note in this area is the low level of coordination of different departments with respect to the collection of information relevant to business tax assessment. As for the market tax, which is collected by the *communes*, the system of issuing daily tickets to individual vendors is ineffective in many areas.

3. Sources of income from "other" and "non-tax" resources. Emphasis on different sources of revenue is misplaced, as economic activities change over time and are not taken into account as revenue sources. The *communes* are not fully responding to changes in the pattern of life in their communities.

4. Patterns of community expenditure. The bulk of the expenditure at the communal level comprises salaries and other compensation to the local staff. Consequently, the current approach to resource mobilization is driven more by administrative structure than it is a function of the activities of the community.

5. The effects of the recession on the current pattern of expenditure. The current liquidity crisis has crippling effects on the activities of the municipalities. Thus, disbursements which are requested by the *communes* are made by the municipal *receveur* according to a fixed schedule. First, are payments of civil servant salaries by the central government. Then, payments are made for the benefits (or *indemnités*) to the above individuals and elected officials, as well as salaries to the employees of the *commune* at the lower ranks. Third, payments are authorized for vehicle expenses and gasoline. And finally, all other payments are made at the discretion of *receveur*. The tax collector, therefore, exercises considerable influence over the pattern of expenditure.

4.5 Recommendations for Improved Resource Mobilization

The only legal vehicle through which outside project funds can effectively be allocated to the municipalities by donor organizations, without a loss of accountability, is through the setting up of a non-governmental organization (NGO).

The issues relating to the mobilization of resources are multidimensional. The approach taken by this study applies a matrix to all the elements involved. This can take account of both short-term and medium- and long-term considerations. In addition, recommendations will vary according to the type of municipality in question: that is, whether one is dealing with large municipalities (developed municipalities in urban areas), medium-sized (or semi-developed) municipalities, or with small (essentially rural) municipalities. Given these distinctions, there are three major constraints or considerations: the likely magnitude of the USAID budget and existing priorities for the agency; the practical feasibility of different approaches in the present circumstances, and the importance of using, as much as possible, common denominators for various approaches.

In the first place, it is necessary to develop a **general plan of action.** Such a plan will need to involve training at all the levels in the resource mobilization administration. It will also involve developing a list of priorities for human resources, which in the current circumstances seem to be the major available resource. Both skilled and unskilled labor should be included in this list of priorities. To complement manpower training, some direct financial support will be necessary. The recommendation is made to channel resources in this category through NGOs, either at a regional or local level.

Once the general plan is elaborated, **specific action plans** need to be worked out. Some requirements for such plans will involve: (i) the preparation by *communes* of a "needs list" to include manpower training and services required, along with prospective methods of achieving local financial sustainability for the services included; (ii) the identification of projects as a function of the most frequently requested services, that are easy to implement, and that represent relatively low capital costs; and (iii) the preparation of a few pilot projects for typical services and training schemes. In the development of these action plans, attention should be given to the use of mobile units, which can result in cost saving and help to achieve uniformity in administrative procedures.

The **choice of municipality** should be a function of the needs of other municipalities in that immediate region, also taking into account other criteria applicable to pilot projects which provide for replication. The process should also attempt to **pool resources** wherever possible at the regional level. This may lead to some level of regionalization of administration, but for equipment and certain kinds of services and infrastructure -- particularly for the smaller *communes* -- such a reorganization would be highly cost-effective. Finally, as part of the suggestions for more effective use of resources, a cumulative pyramid approach to the allocation of projects has been introduced. Once the municipalities are chosen based on the criteria stated above, the priority should be first given to the municipalities, which are willing, and who have

the capability and commitment to replicate their experience in other municipalities. The allocation should be made, based on the resources of the *communes* that can be utilized beyond their immediate means (contrary, perhaps to some extent, to the idea that the *communes* with lesser resources should be helped first).

4.5.1 Suggested projects for implementation. The overriding consideration in any selection of projects, other than the constraints mentioned above, is their duration. Two lists have therefore been developed, one for the short term, and the other for the medium and the long term. Based on the criteria which run through the body of all the recommendations are the following eight considerations: (i) the pursuance of increased effectiveness; (ii) training and continuing education (this involves starting at the top and going down through the ranks; and diffusing programs of awareness and sensibilization of the community); (iii) increasing efficiency; (iv) the setting up of equipment repair centers, regionalization and pooling of resources (including the centralization of artisanal activities); (v) keeping up the momentum by replication; (vi) identifying the *communes* where resources can be better mobilized for both their own benefit as well as for other *communes*, and starting the projects in those *communes*; (vii) implementing projects which perpetuate themselves, or if they involve a one-time assistance, that provide for a permanent improvement in operating methods; and (viii) providing for environmental sustainability wherever possible.

A number of projects for possible implementation may be listed:

In the short term

- A simplified property survey, for the real estate tax;
- A study to propose better coordination of work between different administrative agencies, while avoiding conflict of interest;
- Reorganization of the annual survey of businesses for the business tax;
- In the absence of an effective judicial system to enforce payment by delinquent taxpayers, the institution of a publicity campaign as a way of demonstrating the importance of paying property taxes;
- Provision of material and equipment support to selected *communes*.
- Reduction in expenditure to free up resources for other purposes. For instance, with a reasonable outlay, the system of roads and canals outside Abidjan can be properly constructed and maintained. The result will be a definite reduction in the cost of garbage collection and also a saving in health costs.

- Substitution of unskilled labor for capital intensive equipment and fuel costs (e.g. in the collection of garbage).

In the medium and long term

- Advocating policy change issues, such as the streamlining and even reorganization of the tax administration. For instance, the MEFP is currently making proposals to the Council of Ministers on the following matters:

  Decentralization and regionalization of the taxation authority.

  Consolidation of functions. This involves centralization of the tax assessment and the tax collection functions.

  Computerization and introduction of a management information system.

  Introduction of new tax laws and legislation.

- Modifications and even new concepts in the tax laws can be considered. For instance, the 15% tax rate on property taxes can be amended to take account of the following factors:

  Introduction of incentives and tax credits in order to encourage economies in the use of energy and other resources.

  Transfer of authority over the land to all *communes.*

  Introduction of laws with a view to income enhancement in direct response to the change in activity of the residents. What is needed is change, modification or repeal of laws no longer applicable neither as a source of revenue nor for providing a regulatory function.

  Change in the method of accounting to create special funds as in, for example, the United States.

- A comprehensive survey of urban properties, to improve the administration of the real estate tax.

- Coordination of work between different administrative agencies, while avoiding conflict of interest.

- Reorganization of the annual survey of businesses for the business tax.
- Institution of effective procedures to enforce payment and compliance by delinquent taxpayers.
- Establishment of centers for equipment selection and purchases.
- Encouragement of associations for professional and artisanal activities.
- Promotion of the idea that the *commune* is a partner, not an adversary of the central government.

5. Final recommendations

Given the argument of this study that the decentralization exercise in Côte d'Ivoire has been a positive one -- in spite of the economic difficulties which the whole country is currently going through -- USAID policy should support efforts of the GOCI to sustain and strengthen the *communes* as institutions of local democracy.

On the **resource mobilization** side, this means considering support for a wide range of both short-term, and medium- and long-term projects, as indicated in the previous section. The effect of support of such projects, in addition to the actual impact of the projects on local communities and target groups within the administrative system, would be to signal the strong approval of the United States government for what is, arguably, the most elaborate program of decentralization in all of black Africa. Support for decentralization channelled to the GOCI will not only demonstrate to the Ivorians that they are on the right track, but it will give USAID important leverage in the very influential Ministry of the Interior (presumably through the DGCL), and will send a signal to other countries in the region that an important donor supports decentralization.

As to the **modalities of support** for USAID intervention, it is important that the Agency attempt to work with some of the other donors in this field. Since the funding likely to be available is modest, and since a number of other donors -- such as the World Bank, the European Economic Community (through the FED), and even the French -- have significantly larger programs, USAID can more effectively position itself in this process through both bilateral and joint funding operations. The other donors may be pleased to include USAID in joint management structures for some of their projects, even if the agency's contribution is small.

Apart from the question of joint funding, USAID should, as much as possible, attempt to work with local or national NGOs in the urban field. Until now, such organizations are not numerous or important in Côte d'Ivoire, but if the experience of other West African countries is any example, they will become more significant in the near future. Working with NGOs has at least two advantages: it distances the donor from too strong an identification with official

structures, and thus one of the parties in a multiparty state; and it also tends to make accountability tighter and ensure that the impact of funding decisions on local target groups is more direct. To understand the potential of NGOs and community groups in the urban field, a consultant study is proposed -- to be carried out by a local group if at all possible -- of the range of NGOs and community groups in a representative sample of *communes* throughout the country. The study should also look systematically at the contribution which these groups do, and can make to the provision of basic urban services.

Finally, USAID should continue to work effectively in the **training** of municipal officials and elected councillors. Evidence from the study shows that there is a great need for more training on basic functions (such as accounting, the management of certain common services such as refuse collection and markets, and the collection of fees and taxes) in many of the *communes* across the country. So far, although the DGCL has established a training unit, it has no ability (given current financial constraints) to fund the activities of this unit. In the future, training activities can be extended to include small research-related projects (which can generate local information about services and various administrative questions), and to include more work with the prefects and sub-prefects, and perhaps even the municipal *receveurs* who have become so important in communal finances.

ACRONYMS

GOCI	Government of Côte d'Ivoire
PM	Premier Ministre
DCGTx	- Direction et contrôle des grands travaux
MEFP	Ministère delegué auprès du Premier Ministre chargé de l'économie, des finances et du plan
DGI	Direction générale des impôts
DC	- Direction du cadastre
DCT	- Direction de l'enregistrement et de timbre
DRDCF	- Direction des recettes domaniales et de la conservation foncière
DGCPT	- Direction générale de la comptabilité publique et du trésor
MI	Ministère de l'intérieur
DCGL	- Direction générale des collectivés locales
DCL	- Direction des collectivés locales (until 1991)
MECU	Ministère de l'environnement, de la construction et de l'urbanisme
DCU	- Direction de la construction et de l'urbanisme
SDPTU	- Sous-direction de la planification des terrains urbains
SDAUR	- Sous-Directeur de l'amenagement urbain et rural
PC	- Permis de construire
ILO	International Labour Organization
UVICOCI	Union des villes et communes de Côte d'Ivoire

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the study

By the early 1990s, some countries of the African continent had come almost full circle since independence. From a high level of political mobilization and public participation in the nationalist movements of the 1950s, single party regimes were established almost everywhere after independence, and levels of mass political activity subsided. When there had been contesting parties or movements at the point of independence, in almost all cases one party emerged. The President of this party became the single leader of the country, from whom all authority radiated. Military coups d'état which replaced the erstwhile single party did little to change the governmental system, which remained both highly centralized and inimical to free public discourse. This structure of politics -- based on the centrality and even the personality of the ruler, a centralized and hierarchical structure of government, and a politically inert and controlled population -- was the norm throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. In this system, there was little place for local government, whether democratic or not. The economic counterpart of the absence of local government and political competition was a tightly controlled and weakly developed domestic economy.

Little by little, this system began to transform itself, both economically and politically, under the harsh conditions of the 1980s. While there are many elements involved in this transformation to a more vibrant civil society and a more market-driven economic system, one of the most significant currents of change has been a movement to decentralization. On the one hand, many African governments are beginning to recognize both the immediate benefits and the long-term value of a more decentralized institutional structure. And on the other hand, local populations are beginning to take more responsibility for the effective delivery of services, and to consider the appropriate modalities for the mobilization of resources to ensure the proper functioning of these services. In the process, the profile of governance in Africa is being altered, probably irrevocably. Paradoxically, the focus for these changes has -- more often than not in Africa -- been the large urban centers where central government structures are most prominently implanted.

The Côte d'Ivoire is very much at the center of these important trends. Ruled by the same individual since 1960 through the mechanism of a one-party state, the Côte d'Ivoire in 1990 permitted multi-party elections for the first time. The country has also undergone a very significant decentralization exercise, which began officially in 1978, and which has by now incorporated some 135 municipalities throughout the country. While this exercise is the most broad-based, as well as the most sustained in Francophone Africa, it is not without problems. These problems -- which involve issues of finance, human resources, personnel, public services and infrastructure -- need to be addressed as openly as possible both within the country, and by donor agencies such as USAID which have in the past supported decentralization.

1.2 Objectives of this study

In presenting an overview and evaluation of the Ivorian decentralization experience to date, this report has two major objectives, as stated in the REDSO "Scope of Work" document. These are (1) to present a detailed update on the status of the GOCI decentralization program; and (2) to make recommendations for USAID interventions in support of this decentralization initiative.

1.3 Organization and methodology

To carry out this study, a team of three persons was assembled. The two external members were the team leader, a political scientist and African urban specialist; and a financial specialist with extensive experience in the Francophone world. The third member of the team was an Ivorian planner who has carried out wide-ranging research on the decentralization process. This team met together for the first time on May 20, 1993, and proceeded to develop an outline for the investigation. This outline was agreed to in general terms by the PMO/UD office. With the help of Ms. Mariame Folquet, program specialist at the PMO/UD office who made appointments with individuals, and Ms. Carleene Dei, the head of this office, who gave general advice, the team proceeded to put together a program of interviews with GOCI officials in Abidjan, and short field visits to four *communes* -- Akoupé, Tiassalé, Abengourou and Port Bouët -- in the southern part of the country.

In planning its research program, the team operated under three specific constraints. The first constraint was that, with the exclusion of weekends and public holidays, only 23 days were available for interviews and field visits during the period the team had available in the country. A second constraint was the limited availability of the Ivorian member of the team, who was already committed to leaving the country on another mission on June 13. The third constraint was the necessity, under the Scope of Work agreement, to complete a draft of the report by the time the outside members of the team had to leave Côte d'Ivoire; this meant that a number of days near the end of the stay had to be devoted to writing, and (in the case of the team leader) to translation of manuscript material from French to English. Taking into account these three specific constraints, the team was not able to extend its field investigations outside the southern part of the country (as this would have taken time that was not available); nor was it able to carry out any interviews after mid-June.

Notwithstanding the constraints just outlined, the team was able to gain access to many very helpful people, and to a great deal of both primary and secondary information. In Abidjan, the team was able to speak to a total of 45 people, either as a team or as individuals. And in visits to the four *communes*, the team was exposed to a wide and fascinating variety of both information and experiences which helped to complement the perspective that had been developed while working out of Abidjan. By now, a lot of information on the communal experience has either been published, or is available in government reports. And open discussion of the communalization experience is very much possible now in Côte d'Ivoire, as the political

system becomes more transparent, and as Ivorians realize the importance of this initiative for the future of their country. As is argued in the next section, the communal sphere has become one of the most important political arenas in the response of the Ivorian government to the current economic crisis.

2. IVORIAN DECENTRALIZATION: HISTORY AND OVERVIEW

2.1 Economic and political context

2.1.1 The Changing Economic Environment. From its independence in 1960 through the 1970s, Côte d'Ivoire enjoyed a period of economic growth almost unmatched in sub-Saharan Africa, with a growth rate of 6.8% per annum in GDP between 1965 and 1980. It also enjoyed political stability under the continuous leadership of President Félix Houphouët-Boigny and the ruling party, le Parti démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI). Aside from the hypothetical effects on the economy of this stable political structure (about which more below), economic growth during this period was based on four main elements: the development and effective promotion of high quality agricultural exports (including cocoa, coffee, palm oil, pineapples and raw timber); the establishment of a large battery of parastatal organizations which were involved in all aspects of Ivorian economic life; strong incentives to foreign investment (especially in tourism, agroindustry and import-substitution manufacturing) accompanied by encouragement of a high level of resident technical assistants (most of whom were French); and the development and maintenance of a well-trained and highly-paid national civil service structure. A substantial urban-based middle class was nurtured during this period, with generous overseas scholarships, high-quality subsidized housing, and a range of job-related benefits made possible through government transfers from the sales of primary products. Because of the convertibility of the CFA franc to the French franc, imported luxury goods and trips to Europe were within the reach of many. And to support the urban middle-class, the government developed the major towns with modern infrastructure and services, to a level which surpassed that of almost all other sub-Saharan African countries. The development of Yamoussoukro alone from a sleepy village to the new "political" capital of the country is estimated to have cost in the neighborhood of $42 billion.

Considerable controversy surrounds the pre-1980 development policy of Côte d'Ivoire. Some commentators speak of the "Ivorian miracle" and the success of the country in keeping growth rates high, attracting considerable foreign investment, and diversifying and extending export agricultural production. Others speak of the problem of foreign ownership and economic dependency; and the costs born both by the urban and rural poor, and by the vast number of foreign workers who occupy the lowest paying positions in the system[1]. Unlike many other African countries whose political leaders have promoted the indigenization of economic and administrative systems from the beginning, government policy in Côte d'Ivoire never supported *ivoirisation* whatever the cost. Indeed, for many years the watchword of the regime was "no Ivorianization on the cheap". Thus, as late as 1978, ownership of capital in the modern sector

[1] The best short exchange on the subject of the relative advantages and disadvantages of Côte d'Ivoire's development policies until the late 1970s can be found in two articles in **Africa Report.** See Alexander G. Rondos, "The Price of Development", and Jon Woronoff, "The Value of Development" in **Africa Report** (New York) Vol. 24, No. 2, and Vol. 24, No. 4, pp.4-8, 15-19; and pp. 13-19 respectively.

was controlled to a level of only 58% by Ivorian nationals; overall employment in the modern sector was only 63% in Ivorian hands, and educational positions were only 56.5% Ivorian.[2] The functions of this large foreign presence at the top of the modern economic and state system are subject to some disagreement. Yves-André Fauré, while noting the increase in foreign presence since independence, argued that the large number of French expatriates was the logical counterpart to the high level of French investment in the economy--a level which was part and parcel of the development policy of the regime. On the other side, one finds occasional incredulity on the part of Anglophone writers that an African state would permit such a high level of visible expatriate control. Few French writers expressed concern, with the notable exception of Louis Gouffern (a pseudonym) who wrote that the slow absorption of Ivorians in the upper ranks of the administrative and economic system in Côte d'Ivoire had an important political function. "Responsible for the effective functioning of the economy, and trustees of alliances with foreign financiers and industrialists, expatriates perform the function of 'screen' in order to limit the access of Ivorians to the control of business and resources. Thus it is in part to the expatriates that has fallen the responsibility to reform the parastatal system in the country".[3]

Resentment simmered at the slow rate of absorption of young Ivorians at the top of the system. But the government could contain such pressure as there was, so long as there was growth in the economy and the upward trickle of highly educated Ivorians could be absorbed by growth in both the public and private sectors. The World Bank, in its landmark country economic report, **Ivory Coast: The Challenge of Success,** had generally praised the "outstanding performance" of the country until the mid-1970s. At the same time, it pointedly cautioned that dependence on foreign capital and labor would be a major challenge in the next decade, and that future development would "depend on how successfully the economy can be Ivorianized in the true sense of the word".[4] "Until now" said the Bank, "the country has successfully stretched the span of its own resources by complementing them with resources from abroad, a very sensible decision that has helped the Ivory Coast to improve the income of all its citizens. However, the community of foreigners has grown faster than the Ivorian population itself, the cost of foreign capital has increased rapidly, and today the Ivory Coast is employing more foreign production factors in its economy than ever before. There are clear indications, from the supply as well as from the demand side, that the boundaries of the possible and desirable are gradually being approached."[5] As this statement was being published, the economy entered a long period of decline.

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[2] Yves-André Fauré et Jean-François Médard (sous la direction de) ***Etat et bourgeoisie en Côte d'Ivoire*** (Paris: Karthala, 1982) p.40.

[3] Louis Gouffern, "Les limites d'un modèle?" ***Politique africaine*** No. 6 (1982) pp.19-34.

[4] B. den Tuinder. **Ivory Coast. The Challenge of Success** (Washington: Johns Hopkins University Press for the World Bank, 1978) p.10.

[5] Ibid, p.194.

By the late 1970s, world prices for primary exports began to fall, and the government began to experience serious problems of debt repayment. Based on GDP figures, from income per capita of $1,222 in 1980, the figure fell to $829 in 1990. The equivalent figure for 1991 was $734.[6] During the 1980s, production in the Ivorian economy dropped significantly, reaching a low in 1984 of about 60% of what it had been in 1980. During the 1980s, as the government borrowed to maintain its level of activity in the absence of revenue from exports, its external debt figures rose drastically. Thus, from an estimated total of $256 million in public debt and $11 million in private debt recorded for 1970, the total reached $10,050 million and $4,372 million, respectively, in 1990.[7] Next to Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire had the second largest public debt in sub-Saharan Africa. Alongside increased borrowing, the Ivorian government has been running a current account deficit most years since the early 1980s. By 1989, the deficit had settled at a level of close to 17% per cent of GDP. According to published figures, this level fell slightly to 13 per cent in 1990, and 12 per cent in 1991.[8] The bulk of the deficit can be accounted for by debt repayment.

The government's financial difficulties have been both a reflection of, and an additional cause of a severe compression in incomes for both rural and urban Ivorians. The economic plight of the government was behind a number of draconian initiatives to freeze salaries and benefits, to cut back on staff, to reduce the number and size of parastatals, and to reduce services to the public. These measures are contained in the GOCI's **Medium-term Economic Policy Framework**, which includes five main components: liberalization of agricultural export pricing; balancing the budget, through reducing the public sector wage bill, reforming social services, improving public sector management, and restructuring the government's debt; policy reforms to increase industrial competitiveness; restructuring and privatization of parastatals; restructuring and reform of the financial sector.[9]

During the buoyant economic period of the 1960s and 1970s, the urban population in the country was growing at a rate of approximately 10 per cent per year (as against a national growth rate of some 4%). From 23% of the population in 1965, the urban population increased to 40% by 1990. But the onset of what Ivorians euphemistically called the *conjuncture* in the mid-1980s, and now openly call the *crise* led to much lower overall rates of rural to urban migration, and therefore much lower urban growth rates in the largest cities. Thus Abidjan, whose population had grown from approximately 1,400 in 1912 to a recorded figure of 1,934,000 in 1988, experienced a continuous growth rate (between various censuses) of from 10 to 12 per cent per annum until 1975. During the 1980s, however, Abidjan's population grew

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[6]MAPS Cote d'Ivoire: private Sector Description. Volume I. General Private Sector Assessment (December, 1992) p.5.

[7]World Bank. **World Development Report 1992**, p.258.

[8]Economic Intelligence Unit, **Country Report** (Côte d'Ivoire) No. 1, 1993, p.19.

[9]Roger Poulin. "An Overview of the Côte d'Ivoire Structural Adjustment Program" (Unpublished manuscript, REDSO, 1993) p.8.

at a rate of only 2.6 per cent per annum.[10] Urban growth during the 1980s and early 1990s was still substantial in the smaller towns, but overall rates of urban growth were not as explosive as they had been during an earlier period.

As in other African countries, the rapid growth of an urban population on a relatively meager productive base has led to the growth of a large informal economy. While the government maintains a large and relatively well-paid civil service (including teachers and the military), it is expected by external donors to keep the size of this group under control. Clearly, as many commentators have pointed out, the most dynamic area of the economy is the informal sector, which has developed a myriad of small trades and services, in an innovative response to the closing of opportunities in the large-scale, formal sector. While calling the multitude of small trading and productive activities a "sector" may overstate its coherence, there is no doubt that -- at least in the urban areas -- the activities of small enterprises in the field of urban service provision will be a key determinant of the future shape of the city and its quality of life.

2.1.2 Political evolution. Côte d'Ivoire became independent of France in 1960, under the leadership of Félix Houphouët-Boigny, who has remained President of the country until now. Houphouët, who is at least in his late 80s (no one is certain of his exact age), was born into a chiefly Baoulé family at Yamoussoukro. In an active career beginning as a deputy to the French Constituent Assembly in 1945, and as a member of several subsequent French governments, Houphouët created the PDCI, which became, after 1960, the country's only political party. Following the elections of 1956 under the French *loi cadre*, Houphouët was elected Mayor of Abidjan by the other 36 councillors of the municipal council. This arrangement was possible under the law of 18 November 1955, which had elevated Abidjan, Grand-Bassam and Bouaké to the status of full-exercise *communes*.

It is common to assert that, until recently, President Houphouët-Boigny has enjoyed uncontested control of both state and party. Formally, this is the case, since until 1990 no other political parties were permitted under the country's laws (although there was provision in the Constitution for additional parties), and there were no other contestants for President in the six elections held. Over the years, however, the regime has faced a number of challenges to its legitimacy including an alleged coup plot in 1963-64; an ineffective bid for secession by the Sanwi of the Aboisso region (backed by Nkrumah's government in Ghana); a revolt in the Bété region in 1970; and a military coup plot in 1973. These challenges were dealt with summarily. But in addition, there have been various periods of "dialogue" -- notably in 1969 and in 1989, when the President spoke openly with large groups of citizens about their problems and the possibility of changes in government policy.

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[10]Koffi Attahi, "Planning and Management in Large Cities: A Case Study of Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire" in UNCHS (Habitat). **Metropolitan Planning and Management in the Developing World: Abidjan and Quito** (Nairobi: UNCHS, 1992) p.37.

The pivotal nature of personal leadership in Côte d'Ivoire is a feature of the country's political system that is agreed by almost all observers. This, in spite of the fact that the highly centralized legal and institutional structure bequeathed by the French has been elaborated into a very complex governmental system. Thus, the influential analysis of Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg in their book **Personal Rule in Black Africa** suggests that the government of the country "has been the government of virtually one man: Félix Houphouët-Boigny, 'le vieux'." Writing in the early 1980s, the authors note how President Houphouët has systematically attempted to reduce the level of active political demands by strengthening a (relatively efficient) bureaucratic state ready to absorb qualified Ivorians, encouraging the private pursuit of wealth, and cleverly distributing resources throughout the system. They argue that the regime is heavily dependent on economic growth. But, they caution, "an abrupt decline or even a serious falling off in the rate of economic growth could make the regime vulnerable to political uncertainties that it has thus far been able and fortunate to avoid."[11] The economic stagnation of the 1980s has demonstrated the acuity of this observation.

In addition to the dominance of the leader, Côte d'Ivoire has been ruled by a single "mass" party for more than thirty years.[12] This Party (dominated of course by the President of the country) rests on a pyramid of local committees, sub-sections, and national organizations which direct its activities. The local organizational units of the party, based on local committees -- grouped into sections at the municipal level since 1980 -- are curiously not effectively related to each other horizontally, in spite of various attempts to achieve better administrative coherence over the years.[13] Moreover, the organization of the party from the local to the national level has often been criticized for lack of proper administration, absence of proper accounts, and poor or non-existent records. Secretaries-general (in charge of the sections), "are concerned essentially with their personal advantages, limiting their role within the party to giving information to the party leader... and to affirming their 'loyalty' and 'undying attachment' to him on each and every possible occasion".[14] In addition to the local committees of the party, there is a National Council (made up of party functionaries, high level government representatives, and representatives of socio-professional groups), and a Political Bureau. Linking the Party to the society are a youth section (the JRDACI), a women's organization

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[11]Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg. **Personal Rule in Black Africa** (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982) p.147.

[12] Writing in the early 1980s in the classic text on politics in Côte d'Ivoire, Jean-François Médard called this system "presidentialism with a single party". See "La régulation socio-politique" in Yves-André Fauré et Jean-François Médard, eds. **Etat et bourgeoisie en Côte d'Ivoire** (Paris: Karthala, 1982) pp.61-88.

[13]Jean-Noël Loucou. **Le Multipartism en Côte d'Ivoire** (Abidjan: Editions Neter, 1992) p.126. Since this author has been associated with the PDCI in the past, and is not a member of an opposition party, his critical comments on the Party may be taken at face value.

[14]*Ibid*, p.126.

(*l'Association des femmes ivoiriennes, AFI*), and an umbrella organization of trade unions (the UGTCI).

Since independence in 1960, elections have taken place every five years in Côte d'Ivoire. During the period 1960 until 1979, there were no local elections; and the PDCI alone could sponsor candidates for both the Presidential election, and the election for the National Assembly. Only one candidate was proposed for the Presidential post; and a single list was presented for the legislative elections. Since Ministers are traditionally not elected deputies, and have been selected directly by the President (or more recently by the Prime Minister), the system -- at least until 1980 -- was both restricted and centrally controlled by the President who was in charge both of the Party and the governmental machinery of the country. The first major change in this system came in 1980, when a "semi-competitive" system was put in place for the legislative elections. At the same time, as we shall discuss further below, municipal elections were held for the first time since independence in 37 *communes*. Although several candidates (who needed to be at least members of the PDCI) could present themselves for election for individual legislative positions, the municipal elections were based on the list system, with different groups within the Party competing with each other. These changes in the formal system have been attributed to the challenges of the *conjuncture*, which had given rise to a flood of political demands, and to a great deal of resentment against the government for the restrictive economic measures which were just beginning to be put into place. These restrictive measures (involving, for example, a census of civil servants, restriction of housing allowances, reform and restriction of parastatals, cut-backs in scholarships and in free health benefits) evoked a sharp response from a population hitherto accustomed to regular increases in government benefits.

> Strikes, demonstrations, and social movements agitated certain sectors of the population: doctors, taxi drivers, students, teachers, parents of students, and parastatal workers, among others, all made their point. Collective action did not originate with the poorest: indeed, experience shows that collective action is less proportional to the economic interests of social elements than it is to the means which they can bring to bear to express themselves. But, although all these movements were sporadic and without any real connection among themselves, they all demonstrated the degree of discontent, of frustrations and of pain which the people were experiencing. Professional aspirations were muffled, and incomes were reduced. The mechanisms by which such problems would have traditionally been absorbed--cooptation of those élites making demands, financial responses to social problems, etc.--were rendered inoperable by the economic crisis. The social and political arena, in face of a serious restriction of resources, had become incontestably tighter. [translation][15]

[15] Yves-André Fauré, "Nouvelle donne en Côte d'Ivoire. Le VIIIe Congrès du PDCI-RDA (9-12 octobre 1985)" **Politique africaine,** December 1985, p.99.

Given these severe political pressures on the regime, combined with a lack of real resources to respond, the decision was taken by the President to "open up" the previously tightly controlled system to new entrants at all levels.

Beginning in 1980, the Ivorian regime undertook to create an unprecedented number of new political positions. In that year, the Executive Committee of the Party was increased in number from 9 to 10 members. At the same time, as we have seen, the single list system was abandoned (thus expanding the number of Party members available to present themselves to the voters), and 37 new *communes* were designated for local elections. Then, at the Eighth Party Congress of October 1985, another 98 *communes* were proposed. At the same time, the *Bureau politique* of the Party was increased from 32 to 58 members, the *Comité directeur* was increased from 100 to 208, and elections were called for the 194 *sous-section* secretaries. Similarly, the National Assembly was expanded from 147 to 175 deputies, and the Economic and Social Council increased in membership from 85 to 120. "Globally" says Fauré, "the increase in the number of political positions and points of competition within the system was meant to permit the regulation to some extent of the aspirations of activists. These aspirations had been concertized by a virtual elective bolemia which was begun in 1980, and which the expansion in numbers of candidates during the autumn of 1985 did nothing to restrain."[16]

Aside from adding new positions to the system, and therefore coopting potential dissidents, the elections at the municipal and Party *sous-section* level served an additional purpose of *balayage* -- or cleansing the system of the so-called "barons" who had been in office too long, were demonstrably too corrupt or self-serving, and who had lost the trust of the people. It would also afford the opportunity of bringing into the politics those young "cadres" and members of the upwardly mobile generation that had been trying to gain entry to politics at the local level. That avoiding such a "fossilization" of the Party was a preoccupation of the President is clear from his speech to the 7th Party Congress in October, 1980:

> I am sorry to have to say that once Independence was gained, we were not able to recapture the same dynamism, the same cohesion, and the same level of mobilization of hearts and minds. To the degree that we have had economic and social progress, we have at the same time lost the combative intensity of our party activists and especially our educated people....The Ivorian people are no longer interested in the actions of their leaders, since they do not really participate in their selection. They have the feeling that they are on their own, even scorned by their leaders, who are no longer accountable to their original mandate...[but] our party activists at the local level have not lost their ideals and enthusiasm, and over twenty years they have gained considerable political maturity...they are now demanding that we return to our first principle of reciprocal confidence with the people, based on devotion and self-denial...the PDCI activists are demanding that we restore confidence in them through a free selection of their leaders,

[16]Fauré, "Nouvelle donne..." pp.105-6.

secretaries-general of party sections, municipal councillors, mayors and national assembly deputies.[translation][17]

By sanctioning competitive elections within the party at all levels (except the Presidency), the President could effectively purge the system of unpopular and ineffective individuals, without having to take personal and direct responsibility. This would enhance the legitimacy of the Party without damaging the President's own stature. At the same time, the degree of centralization in the country was significantly reduced. Whereas from 1960 through 1980 whoever controlled the party at the local level exerted absolute control over the single list system, the initiative of the President made multiple candidacies and lists possible, even within the single party. This was not "open season" within the party, however, since the *Bureau politique* and the Minister of the Interior could disallow lists or candidates so long as there was a legal reason for doing so.[18] But according to Alice Degni-Segui, the partisan dimension of political control was "abandoned" in 1980, "since the Head of State threw his 'barons' out on the street where the people could vote for them."[19]

The most recent development in the evolution of the Ivorian political system was the decision, taken on 30 April, 1990, to re-establish a multi-party system. Although a number of political parties were active during the period from just after the Second World War until the granting of Independence in 1960[20] the experience was largely negative. According to one author, the multiparty experience "carried with it an exacerbation of tribalism and regionalism, insofar as the colonial administration attempted to organize parties for its purposes based on the large ethnic and regional groupings...The struggles between 'progressives', 'independents' and the 'RDA' were intense, bringing to the surface hatreds, suspicions and antagonisms that even today are not yet totally forgotten."[21] In any case, although the 1960 Constitution allowed the possibility of other parties, only the PDCI and its related organizations could legally organize after Independence. By the late 1980s, this situation was becoming untenable. Prompted by foreign donors (especially by France, in response apparently to some pressure from the United States), the advent of *glassnost,* and an increasingly restive population in the grip of a serious economic downturn, the government began to give serious thought to further opening the

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[17] Loucou, **Le multipartisme...**, p.142; and Koffi Attahi, "*Urbanisation, réformes administratives et gestion urbaine en Côte d'Ivoire*" (Unpublished paper delivered at conference in Harare, November, 1989) p.35.

[18] Djézou Martin Bleou, "Parti unique et décentralisation. L'exemple ivoirien" in Centre de Valorisation de la Recherche. **La décentralisation. Etudes comparées des législations ivoiriennes et françaises** (Toulouse: Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse, 1989) pp.83-4.

[19] Alice Degni-Segui, cited in Bleou, *ibid.*

[20] According to Jean-Noël Loucou, there were nine registered parties in Côte d'Ivoire in 1951 (of which one was the PDCI-RDA); and seven in 1958. Loucou, **Le multipartism...** pp.100,123.

[21] *Ibid*, p.122.

political system. Thus, at the end of the *journées du dialogue* held from the 21st through the 29th of September, 1989, the President rejected calls for multipartism, but set up a committee to study popular demands. Then, in the wake of the government's announcement of its new budget in early 1990, a series of disturbances took place across the country, although they were focused in Abidjan. The immediate cause of the events was the announcement by the President on television that he was determined to "fully and completely" carry out a series of structural adjustment measures which included cuts in salaries. Resistance to this announcement started with University professors, and spread to other teaching ranks, then to the police, to young non-commissioned soldiers, and finally to doctors. Public demonstrations, marches, and strikes were the order of the day. At the hospital at Treichville, doctors refused to see any patients for several days; a number of patients died as a result. Bowing to mounting pressure, the government agreed to implement Article 7 of the 1960 Constitution, thus permitting other political parties to register. Within three months twenty-five parties were formally registered.

Elections under the hastily organized multi-party system were organized for the fall of 1990. In the first round, on 28 October, President Houphouët was re-elected for his seventh consecutive five-year term, with 81.7 of the valid votes cast. His only opponent was history professor Laurent Gbagbo, of the FPI (*Front populaire ivoirien*), the main opposition party, who took the remaining 18.3 per cent. Houphouët won handily, but his vote total of 2,445,365 was a sharp decrease from his total of 3,152,057 in 1985, when he obtained almost all the votes (with the exception of deliberate abstentions). Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, the level of participation in this election decreased to 69.16% from the 1985 recorded level of 95%. While both the opposition parties and the foreign (notably French) press claimed fraud and numerous irregularities in the vote, the low level of participation may have had other sources. Thus, when the votes were counted in the second electoral round for the Legislative Assembly (the elections for which took place on November 25), and the PDCI predictably won with 163 of the 175 seats, the level of participation was also very low -- this time at a figure of 40.02%, down from a level of 46% in 1985.

The third round of elections -- for the municipal councils in the 135 *communes* -- took place on December 30, 1990. The PDCI was able to win 123 of these council elections, with the FPI taking six, and independents obtaining 3 councils. (Elections in three councils, including the "home" *commune* of Laurent Gbagbo, were nullified). As in previous municipal elections, there was a high rate of "non-return" of sitting mayors, with only 65 of the mayors elected in 1985 being returned when the councils voted in January of 1991. Since all the 135 mayors were PDCI in 1985, this amounts to a level of 48.15%. To put this another way, over 50% of the 1985 mayors were not returned in the 1990 elections. In terms of participation levels, we did not compute global figures for the 1985 communal elections, although the vote in 1990 came in at an apparently low figure of only 34.52%. For the ten Abidjan *communes*, the level of participation was even lower: from 26.12% of the registered voters casting ballots in the 1985 elections, the level fell to 21.66% in 1990.

Explaining the paradox of a lower level of voter participation at all three levels of government, in spite of the advent of multiparty elections in 1990, Fauré has argued that hierarchical and personal political loyalties are very deeply entrenched in Côte d'Ivoire. As a result, he says, the PDCI -- by presenting rejuvenated lists of candidates in 1990 -- was able to retain its control over the electorate, albeit at a reduced level which demonstrated to the outside world that the opposition was not completely stifled.[22] The electorate, moreover, seeing the considerable power which the government held in respect to the management of the electoral process itself, did not generally choose to vote openly for the opposition. But we cannot exclude the possibility that both the size of the vote for the opposition and thus the overall level of participation was held down artificially by government action.

The last arena of political activity that we need to take note of is what can broadly be called "the politics of succession". Since 1985, when the President, by all odds well into his 80s even then, decided to run for office for yet another five-year term, there has been concern both internationally and domestically about the secession to his office should he die or (like Bourguiba) no longer be capable of discharging his duties. After a number of amendments to the constitution, it was stipulated in November 1990 that the president of the National Assembly would become the interim head of state and head of the party until the end of the current presidential term. On the one hand, however, frequent changes to the constitution over the succession question give contesting groups and individuals an incentive to change it once more should their chances of success be compromised under the current system; and on the other hand, it seems evident (at least to some) that Houphouët has no intention of stepping down or naming a successor while he is still alive. For Jeanne Maddox Toungara, this is a clear reflection of Houphouët's self-image as a traditional Akan chief.[23] Some limited degree of order and predictability was brought to this otherwise fluid and ambiguous situation by the President's announcement in late 1990 that he was naming a Prime Minister, as head of government. This individual was Alassane Dramane Ouattara, the 49 year old (and American educated) former governor of the Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEAO, the regional central bank). As Houphouët slips into the background, and as the new Prime Minister attempts to both develop his own political authority and to steer the country through structural adjustment, factional conflict both within the Party and (as a corollary) among Ministries and government departments is in 1993 as intense as ever in Côte d'Ivoire. It is in the context of this uncertain political climate that current attempts to support decentralization must be understood.

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[22] Yves-André Faure, "L'économie politique d'une démocratisation" **Politique africaine** (October 1991) pp.31-49.

[23] Jeanne Maddox Toungara, "The Apotheosis of Côte d'Ivoire's Nana Houphouët-Boigny" **Journal of Modern African Studies** Vol. 28, No. 1 (March 1990), pp.23-54.

2.2 The Decentralization Initiative: Legal Context and Rationale

The preceding section looked at the advent and pursuance of communalization and communal elections as a political initiative. The purpose of this section was to demonstrate that communalization and the three elections that have accompanied this initiative are part of a broader political strategy to coopt potential dissidents, to remove unpopular politicians, and possibly even to rejuvenate the PDCI. This section, turns to the legal and organizational aspects of communalization, in order better to understand how it is perceived by administrators and by municipal officers. Since government in Côte d'Ivoire is based on a complex and highly developed system of administrative law originally put in place by the French colonial regime, and since decentralization as a theme of governmental reform has been prominent in France since the early 1980s, an appreciation of the "French connection" is initially in order.

2.2.1 The French legacy. Colonialism and the centralized state. As was the case for most other French African colonies, the territory which later came to be known as Côte d'Ivoire was first penetrated by French commercial and military missions in the mid- to late 19th century. In 1893, Côte d'Ivoire became an "autonomous" French colony, attached later, in 1902, to the administration of French West Africa. Administratively, Côte d'Ivoire was managed according to French centralist principles, "since these methods and techniques were the only modern administrative examples which the country's inhabitants knew." This system involved the division of the country into *cercles administratifs* (similar in principle to modern French *départements*) each of which brought together several *postes* or *circonscriptions*, the development of a tight system of *commandants de cercle* under the control of the Governor, the elaboration of a sub-altern system of cantonal and village chiefs beneath the French local administrator, and the eventual integration of leading members of the Ivorian élite into French culture and politics. After Independence, the *commandants de cercle* were transformed into *préfets* and *sous-préfets*, and the *cercles* became *départements* and *sous-préfectures*. As Hughes Tay noted in 1974, French administrative influence persisted for many years after Independence in 1960 in the choice of new laws and institutions, "not as an inevitable legacy of the past, but by the deliberate choice of the government to be guided by the French metropolitan model. It should be emphasized that the introduction in the new states of [modern] institutions from the former metropole was considered a sign of emancipation, since it demonstrated that the country could dispense with the old colonial system based on administrative regulations."[24] By the mid-1970s, the key characteristics of the Ivorian administrative system were the persistent influence of the French administrative model, a certain economic "liberalism", and the importance of the single party.

Alongside the vertical territorial administration which was dominated at the local level by the imposing figure of the *préfet*, France had developed a system of local government based on the *commune*, as established by its so-called "decentralization" Law of 5 April, 1884. While the use of the term *decentralisation* has always been vague in France, the law led to the eventual

[24] Hughes Tay. **L'administration ivoirienne** (Paris: Editions Berger-Levrault, 1974) p.8.

formation of some 36,551 *communes*.[25] Many of these *communes* are very small. Currently, 21,574 of these have 500 or fewer inhabitants, and 32,157 have 2,000 or fewer.[26] The construction of *communes* of medium, mixed, and (so-called) full powers in the colonies was a direct reflection of the details of the French law. While the powers and functions of these *communes* were always somewhat circumscribed within an overwhelmingly centralized system dominated by Paris, the new Socialist government of François Mittérand (through the Minister Gaston Deferre[27]) decided in 1981 to initiate a broad-ranging *décentralisation* reform. This was pursued by the Law of 2 March, 1982. The law established elected officials at the departmental level, created 21 regions in mainland France with their proper elected councillors, lightened the supervision power of the central government, and (with subsequent laws of 7 January and 22 July 1983) both clarified and decentralized various powers and functions of the local levels of government in France.[28] According to observers, this legal decentralization has now become part of the French political "game" and thus incorporated into the political culture.[29] The three main criticisms of this reform, however, are that it was not accompanied by a parallel deconcentration of services from the state to the local level; that it was silent on the question of local finances; and that it added a multitude of new functions to local authorities which were

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[25] By contrast, the United Kingdom -- with almost the same population as France -- had some 400 local government authorities in the early 1980s.

[26] For these figures, and an excellent description of the current operation of local government in France, see Françoise Jouet and Eric Eugène, **Comment développer de bonnes relations avec les élus** (Paris: le cherche midi éditeur, 1992).

[27] It is interesting to note that Gaston Deferre, the popular former Mayor of Marseille, was the Minister most closely associated with passing the famous *loi cadre* of 1956 through the French National Assembly. This law provided the framework for individual colonial states to accede to independent status if they wished. When Deferre was asked by President Mitterand to take charge of the decentralization initiative in 1981, he immediately called his old friend Gaston Espinasse, who had been his right-hand man at the time of the *loi cadre* in 1956.

[28] For an overview and evaluation of these reforms, see Serge Regourd, "Le modèle français de décentralisation. Aspects politico-administratifs" in Centre de Valorisation de la Recherche. **La décentralisation...** pp.43-59.

[29] A recent and authoritative survey of local administration in France concludes: "the decentralization laws of 1982 and 1983 brought with them a major change in both the legal framework and the relations between the state and local authorities...Recalling the sharp criticisms of the reform, which certain experts thought were well taken at the time, we must admit, ten years later, that those who were most sharply critical of the measures taken have become veritable apologists of the same measures. Decentralization seems thus to have been unanimously accepted. To the extent there are criticisms now, their purpose is to improve the legal structure and, as a result, the functioning of the sub-national administration of the country." André Terrazzoni. **L'Administration territoriale en France** (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1993), p. 166.

never rationalized in a coherent form.[30] Whatever the shortcomings of this reform, it stands as one of the major political initiatives of recent years in France, and as such has had a major effect on political and administrative thought in the Francophone African states. While the Ivorian decentralization reforms began formally in 1978, three years before President Mittérand announced his plan, there had been a number of important reforms in France during the 1970s which "set the stage" for the 1982 law. In any case, the implantation of Ivorian communalization during the 1980s was very likely strengthened by the process of implementation of decentralization in France during the 1980s.

2.2.2 Decentralization in Côte d'Ivoire: Legal and administrative framework. Alongside the local administrative system which we have described above for rural Côte d'Ivoire, the French colonial authorities began, as early as 1914 to develop an institutional form for urban government. Based on the French legal framework, a local urban authority could be considered a *commune* which had its own rights and responsibilities; but there were three categories of *commune* -- mixed, medium exercise, and full exercise *communes*. In the first category were placed Grand-Bassam and Abidjan in 1914 and 1915, respectively. Then, in 1952, the second largest urban centre in Côte d'Ivoire, Bouaké, was added to the list. Finally, in 1953, six major towns in the southern forest belt (Gagnoa, Daloa, Man, Abengourou, Agboville and Dimbroko) were designated "mixed" *communes*. *Communes* in the "mixed" category were endowed with municipal councils made up of partly elected and partly nominated councillors, their mayors being nominated by the central government. In the Ivorian case, the "mixed" *communes* that actually operated were responsible for a very limited range of functions.

A second, and somewhat higher category of municipal institution under French law was the "medium exercise" *commune*. In such councils, which in principle had a slightly more advanced range of functions to perform, all the municipal councillors were elected, although the mayor was -- as in the case of the "mixed" *commune* -- nominated by the central government. After the French law of 18 November, 1955, this category of *commune* was implemented in the colonies. In the event, the only Ivorian *commune* benefitting from this status were the six forest belt towns originally designated as "mixed" in 1953. Although in 1958 another eight towns (Aboisso, Adzopé, Bondoukou, Dabou, Divo, Korhogo, Sassandra and Ferkessédougou) were designated, *commune* status was never applied in practice.

The French law of 18 November, 1955,[31] also permitted the designation in the colonies of "full exercise" *communes*. In this category of *commune* all the councillors were elected; they, in turn, elected the mayor from among their numbers. Immediately after the promulgation of the law, the former "mixed" *communes* of Abidjan, Bouaké and Grand-Bassam were elevated to "full exercise" *commune*. Elections took place in all three *communes*, and Félix Houphouët-

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[30] Guy Gilbert and Alain Delcamp, eds. **La décentralisation dix ans après** (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1993).

[31] This was the Law No. 55-1489 of November, 1955, "relative à la réorganisation municipale en A.O.F., en A.E.F., au Togo, au Cameroun et à Madagascar".

Boigny became mayor of Abidjan. At Independence, the country could count 3 "full exercise" *communes*, and 14 "medium exercise" *communes*.

Independence from France in 1960 was a mixed blessing for the *communes*. In retrospect, it is ironic that almost all the newly elected leaders of French African states had also been elected mayors in some of the 44 "full exercise" *communes* created by the 1955 law (Léopold Senghor of Senegal was the only exception); but after Independence none of the new leaders saw fit to continue the tradition of municipal democracy. In Côte d'Ivoire, the *communes* reverted to -- at best -- some version of the early colonial "mixed" status from which they had been elevated by the colonial government in 1955. As we have seen, the eight smaller *communes* made "medium exercise" in 1958 were never put into operation. As for the six forest-belt *communes*, their administration was put into the hands of *préfets* and they were managed as adjuncts of the territorial administration. With respect to the "full exercise" *communes*, no new elections were held for their municipal councils; and Grand-Bassam itself lost its status as a *commune* as a result of Law No. 2 65-259 of 4 August, 1965, at the first sign of apparent financial irregularities. Administrators were put in charge of Bouaké and Abidjan. And although the *commune* of Abidjan had in the early 1970s a budget of over 2 billion CFA francs and was able to discharge its functions without any subvention from the central government, only 17 councillors were left from the original 37, the rest having died, left for France, or retired.[32] Writing in 1974, Michael Cohen observed:

> In contrast to the growth of national urban policy institutions, local municipal governments have declined during the post-independence period. Municipal elections have not been held since 1956, resulting in declining members in the councils of the three *communes* de plein exercice...and six *communes* de moyen exercice...Local mayors have been increasingly controlled by the Ministry of the Interior, which has final authority in most municipal affairs. Case studies of Abidjan and Agboville revealed the lack of control over municipal affairs of the local governments. Administrative centralization has weakened the *commune* in both procedure and substance: they are dependent on central ministries for approval of actions, and because they are perceived as weak, they are no longer able to collect taxes from local populations ... Repeated inquiry about the revival of local government has been officially discouraged with the answer that the local areas are not capable of financial management. In fact, the government is afraid of the political activity which might be stimulated by local involvement in problem-solving.[33]

While there might have very been some political justification for the relative neglect of the *communes* in post-Independence Côte d'Ivoire, it is more than a coincidence that the period

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[32] Hughes Tay. **L'administration ivoirienne**, p.32.

[33] Michael Cohen. **Urban Policy and Political Conflict in Africa. A Study of the Ivory Coast** (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974) pp.32-3.

of their decline parallels the extensive development of the Ivorian state structure -- with its elaborate system of central government ministries, parastatal organizations and territorial administration. The multi-purpose territorial administration which is controlled by the Ministry of the Interior is a good example of this expansion: from 4 *départements* and 19 *sous-préfectures* at Independence, there were 6 *départements* and 107 *sous-préfectures* in 1963, 24 *départements* and 127 *sous-préfectures* in 1969 and 50 *départements* and 165 *sous-préfectures* in 1989. The impressive power of the *préfet* in the Ivorian system is derived from article 84 of the Law of 10 April, 1961 which states:

> The Prefect is the representative of the executive power in the department; he is under the hierarchical authority of the Minister of the Interior...In his quality of government delegate, he represents each of the Ministers as well as the national interest...He oversees the implementation of laws and governmental decisions...He is responsible, under the authority of the relevant Ministers, for the general management of the activities of civil servants in his department and in particular for the coordination of activities undertaken by different Ministries in respect to administrative, economic and social matters.

The *préfet*, in addition to this list of powers and responsibilities, is the presiding officer in the department in matters of internal security, and the delegate of the Ministry of the Interior with respect to the *tutelle* (or close supervision) of *communes* within his area.

The training and development of an effective cadre of *préfets* and *sous-préfets* was a preoccupation of Houphouët's government during the 1960s and 1970s. Given the President's well-known predilection for insisting on high levels of performance by agents of the Ivorian government, and the country's economic strategy to develop a strong infrastructural base for export agriculture, it is not surprising that -- given scarce administrative resources -- concern for the urban *communes* was notably lacking during this period. Lack of concern with urban management questions was the norm in virtually all other African countries during the same period, extending even into the 1990s in many cases.[34] According to Degni-Segui, a new municipal law was actually prepared as early as 1962 and presented to the President for his approval. But for political reasons it never got to the National Assembly. It was not until 1974 that the President raised the idea of "municipalization" as a general strategy, during a tour of departments in the north of the country. His justification at the time was that administrative and political cadres were by now sufficiently familiar with public management. After some active mobilization of support for this idea by Mathieu Ekra, the Minister of State for the Interior, a study group was established in July, 1974 "to look into the legal, administrative and financial aspects raised by the implementation of an administrative reform in order to develop a municipal

[34] Richard Stren and Rodney White, eds. **African Cities in Crisis. Managing Rapid Urban Growth** (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989).

bill. But this project was to lie dormant in the drawers of the National Assembly, awaiting the green light from the Head of State."[35]

The municipal initiative finally emerged in the National Assembly on 30 December, 1977, when a new law was voted to take effect in January. This was the Law No. 78-07 of 9 January 1978, which was, in effect, very general in its coverage and brief in content. The law included only six articles, of which, according to one expert, only one contained an innovation. The law confirmed the establishment of Bouaké and Abidjan as "plein exercise" *communes*, and proceeded to establish 26 more. These included the 6 existing *communes* de moyen exercise, the 8 *communes* de moyen exercise that had been legally established on the eve of Independence but never set up, Grand-Bassam, and 11 other towns. The criteria apparently applied in the choice were to reaffirm the status quo (for towns already chosen), to find towns whose economic health was such that they might support a new local government structure, and to respond to certain political imperatives.[36] Aside from actually establishing 26 new *communes*, the law, through its article 5 prescribed that the colonial laws of 5 April 1884 and 18 November 1955 and subsequent modifications of these laws were to remain in force. In any case, the new law remained a dead letter since the Party was not able to organize elections for new municipal councils without incurring considerable rancor in some towns. The President was not in agreement that elections should be held under such conditions.[37]

The "unblocking" of the process of communalization had perforce to wait until the 7th Party Congress in October, 1980. Following the democratic rennovative initiatives announced by the President at that Congress, three laws were quickly passed. All were to take effect the same day. The first, Law No. 80-1180 of 17 October 1980 defined the powers and institutions of the new communal institutions, elaborating a specific regime under which they would be controlled within a *tutelle*. The second, No. 80-1181 of 17 October 1980 defined the electoral system which would obtain for the election of councillors and mayors. The third, No. 80-1182 created 10 *communes* within the former single *commune* of Abidjan, presided over by the City of Abidjan, whose structure and powers were specified. As a result of this legislation, the stage was set for elections at the end of the year in 37 *communes*. The Mayor of the City of Abidjan was to be elected from among their numbers by the elected mayors of the 10 component *communes* of the greater Abidjan area.

These three "organic" laws were supplemented by a number of detailed, more technical legislative acts: the Law No. 81-1129 of 21 December 1981 on the financial system of

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[35] Alice Degni-Segui, "L'évolution du processus de décentralisation en Côte d'Ivoire" in Centre de Valorisation de la Recherche. **La décentralisation**, p.39.

[36] The political criterion was most noticeable in the selection of Jacqueville, which had little economic activity, and a population of only 6,455 at the time. But it had one very prominent resident, Philippe Grégoire Yacé, who was at the time the Secretary-General of the PDCI.

[37] Degni-Segui, p.28.

communes; the Law No. 81-1130 of 30 December 1981 on taxation; the Law No. 83-788 of 2 August 1983 with respect to roads; and the Law No. 84-1244 of 31 October 1984 with respect to eminent domain.

Completing and extending this legislative coverage, three important laws were passed by the National Assembly in 1985. Law No. 85-582 of 29 July 1985 made more explicit the transfers of powers from the state to the *communes* and to the City of Abidjan; Law No. 85-1075 of 12 October 1985 modified the original electoral law; and Law No. 85-1085 of 17 October 1985 added 98 new *communes* to the 37 which already existed, thus bringing the total number of municipal councils covered by the decentralization exercise to 135. With the physical extension of the communalization initiative to a large number of smaller towns and rural centers throughout the country, the proportion of the population brought into the decentralized administrative system rose from 30% in 1980 to close to 40% in 1985. At the same time, the number of elected councillors rose from 1,291 to 3,910, and the number of *adjoints aux maires* (or assistant mayors) from 160 to 423. With the possible exception of changes in the electoral system to allow for other parties to contest the 1990 elections (Law No. 90-1579 of 30 November 1990 did not change the operation of the *communes* themselves once the elections were held) there were no further important changes in the organization of the *communes* after 1985. It is reported that the Interior Ministry intends to extend the communal system to include the 61 remaining subprefectures (not yet made into *communes*), to create 187 new rural *communes* from the largest villages, and to subdivide Abidjan and Bouaké. The plans for this extension -- which strongly demonstrate the government's commitment to decentralization -- are presented in a hitherto unpublished document.[38]

The legal and administrative framework within which the current system has been elaborated is complex. We will discuss in detail the central government's supervisory role in this process below in Section 3.2. But by the Ministry of the Interior's own reckoning, the legal texts which were operative with respect to communal activities as of June, 1988 included 43 documents -- some of them very lengthy -- consisting of 9 laws, 25 official decrees, and 9 Ministerial decisions (*arrêtés*).[39] A collection of circulares, instructions, decisions and messages to the *communes* that were sent out by the *Direction génerale des collectivités locales* (DGCL) alone during the 10 years from 1981 to 1991 is 306 (largely single-spaced) pages in length.

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[38] The contents of the document, "*Réflexion prospective relative à la politique d'administration du territoire en Côte d'Ivoire*" (DGCL, June 1993) are indicated in Jean Mazurelle and Vincent Follea, **Decentralization Policy and Urban Investment Strategy in Côte d'Ivoire (1993-2000)** (Washington: Infrastructure Division, Occidental and Central Africa Department Working Paper, July 1993) p.6. The document was not given to the present Mission.

[39] Ministère de l'Intérieur. ***L'opération de communalisation. Deuxième phase 1986-1990. Bilan Intermédiaire au titre des années 1986 et 1987. Annexes*** (Abidjan: Ministry of the Interior, June 1988), Annex 4.

2.3 Decentralization: deconcentration or devolution?

Before summarizing the main elements of the overall experience of the Côte d'Ivoire in communalization, some attention must be given to the question of whether the exercise constitutes a substantial, or only a limited effort in the direction of real decentralization. In evaluations of decentralization, two distinctions need to be made. One distinction is between horizontal and vertical decentralization. In the former, the central authority shifts responsibility for (and possibly power over) certain important functions to an autonomous (or semi-autonomous) body at the same territorial level. Privatization of government functions, or the shift of functions from Ministries to autonomous parastatal organizations are the primary examples of horizontal decentralization. Vertical decentralization, on the other hand, involves a shift from national to more localized territorial levels of activity, as when the central government gives local government the responsibility for some function which was previously under its exclusive jurisdiction. In this report, the concern will be essentially with vertical decentralization, although it is important to remember that, beginning in the late 1970s, the Ivorian government began an important process of horizontal decentralization at the same time as it initiated the process of vertical decentralization which was discussed above.[40]

A second, and in this report, more significant distinction is that which is often made among three concepts: decentralization, devolution, and deconcentration. While decentralization generally refers to the whole process of transferring both power and authority from the national level to institutions at another spatial or functional level, devolution refers to the more limited transfer of authority, with or without an accompanying shift of political initiative. Deconcentration is the most limited transfer process, involving only a physical shift of the agents of the central government from a concentrated central point to a more dispersed spatial redistribution throughout the national territory. As was illustrated by the so-called "decentralization" exercise of the Tanzanian government in the 1970s, some African states have used the term "decentralization" when they were simply "deconcentrating" central officials in order more effectively to discharge central government functions at a desegregated spatial level. One of the reasons why governments (and donor agencies as well) may use the term "decentralization" to refer to a process that is closer to either deconcentration or devolution is that the objective of "decentralization" has been a desirable goal in both public administration generally, and in the international development world in particular, since at least the late 1970s.

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[40] On horizontal decentralization, see Bernard Contamin et Yves-André Fauré. **La bataille des entreprises publiques en Côte d'Ivoire. L'histoire d'un ajustement interne** (Paris: Karthala/ORSTOM, 1990).

Although a good case can be made for either decentralization *or* centralization, depending on the circumstances and the functions in question, these arguments will not be dealt with here.[41]

In the Ivorian case, to these administrative distinctions must be added the complication of language and institutional practice. Two semantic observations are in order. The first is that there is a tendency in Côte d'Ivoire to use such terms as *décentralisation*, *communalisation* and *municipalisation* interchangeably. In this report, we are focusing on the development of communal institutions (thus *communalisation*), as an aspect of *décentralisation*. Since the actions of the *communes* in the Ivorian system gain authority with reference to duly constituted meetings of the *conseils municipaux* (or municipal councils), and since the *municipalité* (made up of the elected mayor and his assistant mayors) is the executive body, the reforms leading to this system are often referred to as *municipalisation*. While these terms translate into English as "municipal councils", "municipality" and "municipalization", their use in normal English suggests relatively large cities with a highly professional staff. But it would be misleading to assume that the French terminology has much to do with English usage in this respect, since in 1985 five of the 135 *communes* had fewer than 5,000 people, 60 *communes* had 10,000 inhabitants or less, and 90 had 20,000 inhabitants or less. By United Nations standards, "urban" populations reside in settlements with populations of 20,000 or more. Not only were most of the *communes* "small towns" or even "villages" by international standards, but many had very low budgets as well. Thus in 1992, when the government decided to give power to the prefects to approve communal budgets which did not exceed 100 million CFA francs (or $400,000), it was found that 108 *communes*, or 80% of the total number, fell within this limit. Paradoxically, although only some 7% of the land area of the country is actually covered by communalization, and virtually all of the so-called "urban" population falls within communal boundaries, the *municipalisation* exercise -- particularly that phase which took effect in 1985 -- applies much more to what would in the West be called a "rural", rather than an "urban" population.

The second semantic observation has to do with the translation into English of the emotionally "loaded" term *décentralisation*. The French sense of *décentralisation* must be understood in the context of a long historical experience with a centralized state, along with an elaborate and highly developed discourse of public law. By contrast, the English (or American) understanding of "decentralization" must be set against a robust tradition (even in the United Kingdom, but much more so in the United States) of local communities and individuals asserting their identity and even substantial autonomy vis à vis a sometimes distant, but never (in the modern period) overpowering central government. Alexis de Toqueville's two classic studies which treat France and America -- **L'Ancien régime** and **Democracy in America** -- convey this difference in political culture superbly. Thus, when the first French decentralization reform was passed in 1884, there was only a vague idea of what this term involved. In general, says a

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[41] Interested readers are referred to the papers in the document produced by the World Bank, **Strengthening Local Governments in Sub-Saharan Africa. Proceedings of Two Workshops** (Washington: Economic Development Institute Policy Seminar Report No. 21, 1989). For the arguments for and against decentralization, see Remi Prud'homme, "Main Issues in Decentralization", pp.71-75.

French scholar, decentralization has always been conceived in France as "a means of representing the activities of the state, or as a simple organizational modality internal to the unitary state."[42] By contrast, decentralization in the Anglo-Saxon context implies a high degree of disengagement by the state with respect to defined powers and functions, which become the responsibility of either a regionally or functionally defined body, with its own structure of political accountability. While the central state always retains a residual role in certain aspects of decentralization, the purpose of the process is to invest the local institution with a high degree of both political and functional autonomy. To look at what is known as *décentralisation* in Côte d'Ivoire in the context of the conventional Anglo-Saxon understanding of "decentralization", then, could very easily lead to misunderstanding.

The extent to which a substantial degree of real decentralization -- in the sense that the term is used in the United States -- has actually taken place through the *communalisation* exercise in Côte d'Ivoire is not easy to assess. The question can be considered in terms of a number of criteria: the division of powers between the state and the *communes*; financial and budgetary considerations; the affectation and hiring of personnel; and the dynamics of the political process. While these criteria overlap in practice, they can be separated for purposes of analysis. The first three criteria will be discussed in much greater detail in Section 3 below, where the study looks at the structure and functions of communal governance. But an overall judgement on where to place the Ivorian *communalisation* initiative on the decentralization spectrum would be rather positive: *a modest, but in the Ivorian context and under the circumstances, relatively significant and sustainable level of real decentralization has already taken place.* What are the reasons for this conclusion? Briefly, there are four.

1. In terms of the ***division of powers***, the state has transferred a limited range of activities to the *communes*, to be managed by the *municipalité* and the small deconcentrated team of technical specialists and administrators despatched from Abidjan by the DGCL and paid directly by the central government. So far the major functions involve regulation and administration of markets and refuse collection. Although control of building and allocation of land is an important function in the smaller *communes*, it has been retained by the central government in the case of the Abidjan *communes*, presumably because of the political stakes involved.[43] Since the Abidjan *communes* alone account for about two-thirds of all public expenditure by the local authorities globally, this limitation in the area of land use planning and control is substantial. Nevertheless, in view of the intense political importance of subdivisional questions in the smaller *communes*, and the growing level of experience among all the *communes* in the area of markets and refuse collection, an evaluation with respect to division of powers can be modestly positive.

2. The ***financial and budgetary*** experience of the *communes* should be a sensitive indicator of the success of the overall initiative. The *communes* have helped to generate a

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[42] Serge Regourd, "Le modèle français de décentralisation..." p.48.

[43] Alphonse Yapi Diahou, "L'Etat et les municipalités en Côte d'Ivoire: Un jeu de cache-cache?" **Politique africaine**, No. 40 (December, 1990) pp.51-59.

considerable quantity of revenue (both for the state and for their own purposes when the funds are redirected into their budgets), and they have, in turn, spent at an increasing level for both recurrent and development purposes. Given the 1992 national budget of CFA 556 billion, the total communal budgets of CFA 31.4 billion represents some 5.6% of the national total -- a not inconsiderable amount. This proportion is even more important when it is realized that there is considerable room for improvement in the mobilization and collection of revenues at the communal level. In spite of there being room for improvement, it is worth noting that the amount collected per resident in local taxes which are centrally administered appears to be much greater in towns with *communes* status than those that are not. A higher level of collections per resident in *communes* is also evident for locally administered taxes and fees. This appears to be a function of "the closer association between public management and the urban tax base. A *commune* in practice has a certain amount of freedom to define its own financial resource base (taxes and fees). At the same time, the presence of *commune* status seems to promote, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, through closer followup of local economic activity...the recovery of these local taxes..."[44]

The budgetary figures indicate that, in 1992, an average of some CFA 4,359 (US $17.44 at CFA 250 per 1 US$) per local inhabitant was budgeted by the *communes* for expenditure. These figures do not include the salaries and other support payments transferred to the central government agents who work in the *communes*, since they are paid through a central budget. It is estimated that the annual total expenditure in this category is in the order of CFA 800 million.[45] Although, in the event, some of the communal funds were not made available by the state because of problems of liquidity during 1992 and 1993, the cumulative record of expenditure and investment locally is still impressive.

3. A third area of overall accomplishment is in terms of ***human resources***. Since the establishment of the 27 "interior" *communes* along with the City of Abidjan and its ten constituent *communes* in 1980, through the addition of 98 smaller *communes* in 1985, the staff complement which assures their proper function has increased enormously. While we could not obtain figures for the total time period, by 1992 there were some 669 *agents* of the central government detached to work in the *communes*, all of whom were remunerated directly by the state. These included the leading officers of the technical and administrative services at the local level. Based on our visits to four *communes*, it is clear that these *agents* are, by and large, both experienced and very competent to administer the *communes*. In addition to the central government personnel stationed directly in the *mairie* and working within the *commune* structure,

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[44] Mazurelle and Follea. **Decentralization Policy and Urban Investment Strategy in Côte d'Ivoire**, p.8.

[45] Based on figures supplied by the DGCL, we estimate the monthly salary payment to the 669 central government agents at about CFAF 66,271,000. Over a year, this would come to CFAF 795,252,000. The World Bank has estimated the annual figure (presumably using other calculations) at CFAF 1.6 billion. (See Mazurelle and Follea, **Decentralization Policy and Urban Investment Strategy**, p. 9.)

there are a number of other central government agents (such as the prefect and sub-prefect, and the municipal *receveur* who is an agent of the Treasury) who spend considerable time on communal matters. And working directly for the *communes* -- and taking orders from the *municipalité* -- were a total of 12,103 employees. These employees range from the *chef de cabinet du maire* to street sweepers, representing a considerable economic group that has a strong stake in the continued operation of the *communes*. In a small country like the Côte d'Ivoire in which only about 125,000 work in the formal public sector (broadly defined)[46] detached central government officials and communal employees together represent at least 10% of the sector. In large cities such as Bouaké (with 722 communal employees), the City of Abidjan together with the 10 constituent *communes* (with 4,801 communal employees all told), and Yamoussoukro (with 1,034 communal employees) the payroll of the *communes* has a substantial effect on the local economy. Even in the smaller towns of the interior -- where the formal economy is considerably smaller proportionally -- the communal employees are an economic force. In addition to direct employment, the investments and economic activities supported by the *communes* have a multiplier effect. For 1987, the DGCL has estimated that, in addition to 9,461 direct positions created by communalisation, there were an additional 6,865 formal sector positions created as a result of investment and other economic activity.[47] Thus, as long as the *communes* are in a position to spend all their budgeted funds (not presently the case), every 10 jobs created at the local level carry with them 7.26 additional local jobs.

4. The final criterion has to do with ***politics***. In spite of the undoubted importance of the new communal structure in terms of expenditure and investment, and in terms of employment and technical human resources, this structure will not take root securely until it establishes itself within the prevailing political system. To the extent that the *communes* have validated themselves as an *enjeu* (important element) in the political system, they will have at least partially satisfied an important prerequisite of real decentralization -- their relative autonomy in respect to the central government. In general, it is the sense of this study mission that the *communes* are well on the way to becoming an integral part of Côte d'Ivoire's political system. Not only has the President himself openly supported the objective of communal democracy, but he has taken an intense interest in local elections in many cases. In addition, the communal interest is represented by 4,137 elected councillors (of whom 136 are mayors, and 423 are deputy-mayors). Many of the mayors -- some of whom are also elected members of the National Assembly -- are important local and even national political figures. As past experience has shown, their political future is closely related in the voters' minds to their level of performance in terms of the delivery of services and other benefits by their *communes*. This is just as true of the PDCI mayors as it is of the relatively few opposition mayors. As a high proportion of mayors and their

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[46] Source of estimate: **MAPS Côte d'Ivoire: Private Sector Description. Volume I: General Private Sector Assessment** (Draft Report) (Abidjan: USAID, December 1992) p.16. This estimate is made up of 78,882 employees listed with government ministries, autonomous public agencies, civil defense, and hospitals and clinics; and an additional 50,000 estimated to be employees in state-owned enterprises. The estimate does not apparently include teachers.

[47] DGCL, ***L'opération de communalisation*** p.123.

deputies live in Abidjan[48] they are not only well-placed to defend the interests of the *communes* and meet with other locally elected officials through the medium of the *Union des villes et communes* de Côte d'Ivoire (UVICOCI), but they can also actively take part in the national political process. What will be important in the short- and medium term is to see whether the government is prepared to support the *communes* financially (in terms of paying their employees on time, and in terms of making funds available for budgeted purposes on a timely basis when the expenditures are properly mandated). The current liquidity crisis is hitting the *communes* hard (as we shall see below), with the partial result that voters are seeing ineffective service delivery and virtually no new development projects. If they hold the whole system responsible, both effective and ineffective mayors may go down to defeat equally in 1995.

In answer to the question: is the communalization exercise an example of decentralization or devolution, this analysis would suggest that the exercise is looking more and more like a modest form of decentralization. In spite of continuing structural controls from the top (exercised through the prefects and through various Ministries in the form of *tutelle*), the *communes* are becoming an integral part of the current political system. As this happens, and as they continue to have a major economic impact on the lives of both their numerous employees and the communities in which they are located, national political leaders will have great difficulty subduing them.

2.4 The emergence of new stakeholders

As the Côte d'Ivoire government struggled with its economic responsibilities both to its own citizens and to its external creditors, and began to devolve some level of responsibility to the private sector (in the case of the privatizations of parastatal agencies) and to local communities (in the case of decentralization), it was following the path of disengagement -- a route already tested by other African governments. The pattern of disengagement has varied from country to country, but it normally involves a number of more liberal economic measures such as those included in structural adjustment packages; the opening up of the political system to more democratic competition; and the reliance on the private sector and the civil society to discharge a range of public functions that were previously undertaken by various instances of the state. In Côte d'Ivoire, this process has been, and will be, complex. But as the state draws away from some of its former responsibilities, and reduces its level of activity in others, it will have to involve a greater range of players, or "stakeholders" in its decisions and programs. Implicitly, this has been happening through the *journées de dialogue*, through the sanctioning of many opposition political parties and publications, and through the incorporation of a wider selection of participants in the determination of party lists at the time of elections in 1990. In

[48] For the 1985-90 municipal councillors, the figures collected by the DGCL are striking. Of 3236 elected councillors in *communes* outside of Abidjan, 1133 or 35% lived in Abidjan. For the mayors, the figure was even higher; 74, or 59.2% of the 125 lived in Abidjan. See ***Ministère de l'intérieur et de la sécurité. L'Opération de communalisation. Deuxième Phase 1986 - 1990. Bilan intermédiare au titre des années 1986 et 1987*** (Abidjan: June 1988), pp.84-85.

terms more specifically of urban development, however, the emergence of new stakeholders in the policy system can be seen at two levels. Locally, there is some evidence of the activity of community groups (often organized in terms of informal sector activities) coming forward to deal with the problems caused by the economic crisis and by the withdrawal of state services in various areas. At the other extreme, a number of external donors have been entering the urban sector to support decentralization and urban development, particularly as the government itself can ill afford to play as central a developmental role as was possible in an earlier period.

2.4.1 The informal sector and community groups. Over the last decade, with a sharp degradation in the quality of the natural environment, and an increase in the incidence of poverty in Ivorian towns, the state has been reducing its support to the *communes* who, in turn do not seem able to respond to the new challenges. Partly as a result, social and economic groups have begun to mobilize in order to develop and even to manage urban services. Given the limited nature of their resources, these groups have often employed novel approaches, involving an intense use of manual labor to replace the ineffective use of high-capital equipment.

The areas in which groups have actively responded to local needs include hygiene and public health, social services and education, commercial services, and public safety. Our observations on the activities of these groups will differ depending on whether we are discussing community groups, or informal sector groups.

2.4.1.1. Organized community groups. These groups may be classified in two categories: service clubs, on the one hand; and development, and social and sanitary action committees on the other hand. In the first category should be mentioned the Junior Chamber of Commerce groups, the Lion's clubs, Rotary and Rotaract, and the like. The resources which these groups are able to mobilize in order to finance their activities come from donations from their own members, and from sales and various sponsored events. They focus on helping those in extreme misery and on improving the general urban quality of life. Much of what these groups do receives a lot of publicity in the media, although their work tends to be confined to the larger *communes*. But recently, some of the clubs have been helping hospitals with the purchase of equipment, and have been engaged in voluntary health care activities in some of the rural areas. Often, their work is supported by the communal authorities.

The development committees and the committees for social and sanitary action (CASS) are the work of volunteers who have been put in place by the *communes* to create activity in different quarters. Their activities have often required the support of officials from the Ministry of Social Affairs. Since the return of the Peace Corps to Côte d'Ivoire, some of their members have been working on an urban environmental program, supported by USAID, which involves creating and animating CASS committees. In Akoupé, one of the *communes* in which this program has been operating with relative success, some concrete actions have taken place already involving the building of small environmental facilities, and creating awareness among the population. But unless these CASS committees organize themselves cooperatively, they will not survive the withdrawal of support from the Peace Corps and USAID. Partly because of the internal political conflicts brought to the surface in the recent elections, the *communes* do not

appear able to continue this work. A major exception to this general observation is Port-Bouet where the communal authorities have had the remarkable idea of organizing an NGO to promote community participation. But even in this *commune*, to maintain a reasonable level of participation there is a tendency to look at the privatization of certain services (such as the pre-collection of household garbage), instead of working through cooperative forms.

2.4.1.2. Informal sector groups. These groups may be placed in two categories: local community associations, and small urban service enterprises. In the case of community groups, their projects tend to be organized through parents' associations, residents' committees, and associations of *resortissants* ("home-town associations"). What they do tends to involve physical structures in the local area -- such as schools, health centers, maternity clinics, cultural centers and the like. To carry out the work, there tends to be a division of tasks: construction materials and labor costs are borne by the associations, prototype plans are given by the relevant Ministries, and the *communes* help to construct the buildings and look after the work sites. At the end of the project, the state supplies the personnel, while the *communes* and the associations jointly maintain the facilities. There are more and more cases of such partnerships between *communes* and associations in which there is a roughly equal division of work between the two.

Finally, attention should be drawn to the emergence of small enterprises specializing in the pre-collection of household garbage, in cleaning and sweeping, in the maintenance of roads and public spaces, and in public surveillance. These small businesses, whose services are paid for through weekly fees by households using their services, have difficulties maintaining an adequate revenue flow. This is a special problem when one is dealing with common services, such as public surveillance or the maintenance of public roads, spaces and green areas. In some interior *communes* such as Tiassalé, there are moves afoot to privatize some of the communal services into the hands of small local businesses.

2.4.2 International agencies. There are currently at least eight international donor agencies working in the urban field in Côte d'Ivoire. Although France can claim the longest-standing bilateral arrangements, it has only recently begun working in the urban field. Globally, in the early 1990s France was allocating about $30 million to urban assistance, most of this funding through the *Fonds d'aide et de coopération* (FAC), and the *Caisse centrale de coopération économique* (CCCE). But a major policy statement, entitled "French Cooperation in Urban Development" indicates that France will, in the future, strengthen assistance in the urban field in two main areas: decentralization and urban management; and housing production and finance. Currently, France operates three grants in Côte d'Ivoire in the urban field, for an approximate total of $3,751,000.[49] The largest of these grants gives financial support to the Ministry of the Interior to support both decentralization activities at the center, and some activities at the communal level. It should also be noted that France supports the overseas research organization, ORSTOM, which has a substantial office in Zone 4 (Petit Bassam) in Abidjan, and is responsible for much of the world-class urban research carried out in Côte

[49] This figure, along with other grant and loan figures in this section, was supplied by USAID.

d'Ivoire (particularly in Abidjan) since the 1970s. Currently, there are five full-time French researchers in the urban field working out of Petit Bassam, in projects involving an equal number of Ivorians who work as associates. Two major research programs in the urban field involve a longitudinal study of the social and economic effects of structural adjustment on the urban population; and the development of a full-scale data bank on the Ivorian *communes*.[50]

By far the largest overseas donor in the urban field in Côte d'Ivoire is the World Bank. Since the 1970s, the Bank has undertaken seven major projects, beginning with the Abidjan Sewerage and Drainage Project, and the First Urban Development Project. Currently, the Bank is supervising two major projects: the Third Urban Development Project (PDU 3) which includes a variety of somewhat heterogeneous components (including financial support to small businesses in the informal sector, the improvement of transportation infrastructure, and the development of a mortgage refinancing mechanism for low to middle-income housing) and involves $120,000,000 of funding; and the Municipal Development Project (PGU), involving some $66,000,000 of Bank funding and an additional $27,000,000 from the UNDP/ILO, the GOCI, and other local sources.

As the Municipal Development Project is focused specifically on the communalization initiative, it requires some attention in this report. First, the project -- which is administered by the DCGTx -- has five main components: (1) a training component aimed at strengthening the monitoring capacity of the Department of Local Government (within the Ministry of the Interior); (2) a local taxation component including the preparation of a tax reform; (3) the setting up of a Municipal Credit Fund within the *Caisse Autonome d'Amortissement*; (4) the development of a program of small grants to a selection of 18 secondary municipalities; and (5) a number of miscellaneous studies which involve a cartographic program, the completion of the National Demographic Census, and a survey on the social costs of structural adjustment. The first component, a training program which focuses on the secretaries-general and the chief technical officers of the 135 *communes* (minus the Ville d'Abidjan) has been underway for 36 months, under the able direction of a UNDP/ILO technical officer. The program offers seminars in Abidjan, and follow-up visits by Ivorian training officers in the field. While the *communes'* technical officers attend 5-day seminars, shorter meetings have been arranged for the Mayors, who have less time available. According to the project coordinator, "there is already a municipal culture which is establishing itself" in the increasingly professional and committed behavior of the technical officers at the local level. A second major element in the larger project is the support of studies to reform the two major national taxes collected in the *communes* -- the real estate tax and the business tax (*l'impôt foncier et la patente*). After several false starts, the Bank and the DCGTx have agreed on a major study which will evaluate the current system and propose reforms, following the earlier report of Mr. Jean Thill, originally carried out in 1991. In particular, this report will look at the effects on the *communes* of the *Loi de Finances de 1992*, which changed the appropriations from the state to the *communes* from a 50/50 ratio, to

[50] See Bulletin GIDIS (Groupement interdisciplinaire en sciences sociales Côte d'Ivoire) No. 1 (February 1992) pp.28-34, and subsequent issues listed under *'pôle urbain'*.

a 75/25 ratio. In sum, as the Bank indicated in its initial design of this major project, and as it continues to demonstrate through imaginative promotion of the training and institutional aspects, it is a major supporter of communalization in Côte d'Ivoire, and an important stakeholder in the continual process of policy-making in this field.

Aside from France and the World Bank, there are a number of other donors working in this area -- the UNDP, CIDA (the Canadian bilateral agency), two German foundations -- but, aside from the USAID training project (which is not treated in detail in this report), the only other substantial project is a $38,000,000 European Development Fund (FED) scheme, which supports refuse collection and community facilities construction in 13 *communes* along the Ivorian coast. The FED is currently working on a further support mechanism, in order directly to finance budgeted expenses of the *communes* during the current economic crisis. There are close working relations among the FED, the Bank staff working in Côte d'Ivoire, and the French assistance program.

3. THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF COMMUNAL GOVERNANCE: AN EVALUATION

3.1 Existing structure and division of powers

As has been suggested, the decentralization exercise in a highly centralized state such as Côte d'Ivoire can best be seen as only a modest shift in power from the national to the local level. In comparison to the experience in other developing countries, however, the powers vested in the Ivorian *communes* are almost what might be expected. An important recent World Bank survey of urban government in the developing world has attempted to identify the most common local services:

> How true is the claim that the services provided by local governments are essential to developing the urban economy and to protecting the living conditions of the urban populace, especially low-income families? On the basis of our analysis of urban governments in developing countries, their common functions would appear to be markets, abbattoirs, fire protection, street cleaning and lighting, garbage collection, cemeteries, libraries, and minor public disease prevention services. Beyond these common functions, responsibilities vary widely...
>
> [for example]...many local governments have full or partial responsibility for the provision of physical infrastructure, in particular the construction and maintenance of streets, potable water supply, sewerage, and drainage. In contrast, telephone and electricity services are typically the responsibility of higher-level government agencies...primary education is frequently controlled by local government in developing countries. Health and welfare services, however, are rarely a local responsibility...Local housing programs are of importance in some cities, particularly in former British colonies where the British focus on local public housing has been retained...Urban mass transportation is frequently the responsibility of a local authority, and sometimes it is managed by private firms which are supervised by local or national authorities. Police protection is almost universally a responsibility of national authorities.[51]

In the survey, the authors note that there is no "optimal" allocation of powers to local authorities, nor is there any "optimal" structure of local authorities. Both the allocation of powers and the structure of local government are a function of the political objectives of the national government. "Experience, however, suggests", they conclude, "that local governments

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[51] Roy Bahl and Johannes Linn. **Urban Public Finance in Developing Countries** (New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1992) pp.16-17.

do a better job of urban management when they have greater authority over their own affairs than when their powers are limited and they must continually coordinate their actions with those of autonomous national or local entities that are also involved in the provision of urban services."[52]

The structure and functions of the *communes* in Côte d'Ivoire are established in the Law No. 80-1180 of 17 October 1980, modified by the Law No. 85-578 of 29 July, 1985. This is the basic municipal law of the country, supplemented by more specific legislation with respect to budgets and finance (Law No. 81-1129 of 30 December 1981); on taxation (Law No. 81-1130 of 30 December 1981); on roads (Law No. 83-788 of 2 August 1983); and eminent domain (Law No. 84-1244 of 31 October 1984).

The structure of the *communes*, as described in the basic municipal law (80-1180, as modified by 85-578) consists of a municipal council (made up of a specified number of councillors according to the population of the *commune*), directed by an executive body known as the *municipalité* (made up of the elected mayor and his assistants), and presided over by a Mayor who is elected at the first meeting of the new municipal council. These three elements are known as the "organs" of the *commune*. The municipal council is assisted by "at least" two permanent committees: one dealing with economic, financial and public domain affairs; and another dealing with social and cultural affairs (article 40). The administration of the *commune*, according to article 96, is "under the direct authority of the Mayor".

The powers of the *commune*, in law, are derived in the first instance from the statement in article 24 of the basic municipal law, which states that the municipal council regulates the affairs of the *commune*, and "in harmony with national policy, it plans and executes operations and development activities of the *commune* with a view to assuring the best living conditions for the whole of the population." Based on this general principle, there are lists of activities in article 27 and in article 61 that give an indication of the functions and powers of the *communes*. Thus, article 27 lists 18 activities which cannot be carried out by the *commune* unless approved by the municipal council and by the tutelary authority. And article 61 lists 11 general responsibilities of the Mayor, on behalf of the municipal council and with the approval of the tutelary authority. Article 61 is supplemented by a general clause relative to the municipal police which makes the Mayor responsible for the maintenance of order, security, peace and public health. Finally, article 53 of the budget and finance law (81-1129) lists 17 "obligatory expenses" of all *communes* (including, for example, "maintenance of the road system", "hygiene and public health", "waste removal...and public cleansing of streets, markets and public gardens"). Putting all this into budgetary form is illustrated very explicitly in Annex I to Decree No. 82-1092 of 24 November, 1982, where the accounting format is clearly shown in terms of sections, chapters, and individual articles (i.e. line items) of the budgetary instrument which the *commune* must submit to the tutelary authority.

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[52] *Ibid*, pp.478-9.

Based on these legal requirements, the main services rendered to the population, either directly or through contracts with private firms, can be grouped under the four major sectors of the budget protocol, as follows:

- *General services.* Registration and maintenance of vital statistics, legislation, census;

- *Collective services.* Street maintenance, public lighting, collection and treatment of household waste, use and maintenance of public lands, food inspection, plant nurseries, parks and gardens, water fountains, sanitary and storm sewers.

- *Socio-cultural and human development services.* Kindergartens, primary schools and related buildings, libraries, museums, theaters and local cultural centers, dispensaries, community health and maternity centers, social centers, women's clubs, pre-school education and day-care centers.

- *Socio-economic services.* Markets, slaughterhouses, cold rooms, bus stations, agricultural and animal farms, funeral services and cemeteries.

The administration of these services, as well as the general administration of the *commune*, is in the first instance the ultimate legal responsibility of the Mayor, but on a day-to-day basis is under the control of the secretary-general. The distinction between the two positions was brought out by the Minister of the Interior in various addresses to communal administrators. On the one hand, the Mayor should be "before anything else an animator, completely in touch with the real problems of the *commune*, knowing well its people, their preoccupations and their aspirations;...full of good sense, devoted and scrupulous...".[53] In comparison to this depiction of the Mayor as representing the needs of the people, the role of secretary-general was described as internal to the operation of the *commune*. "As animator and coordinator of all the activities of the communal administration, you must, in particular, look after the preparation of the meetings of the municipal council and the municipality, as well as the elaboration of the deliberations and decisions which result from these meetings. Then, you must make all necessary administrative preparations for their successful implementation, to the satisfaction of the elected councillors and the majority of the people in the *commune*...This is, in a fashion, your role as *chef d'orchestre*."[54] To support the administrative and technical activities of the *commune*, the

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[53] "Le profil du maire - le rôle des élus". Extrait d'un message du Ministre de l'Intérieur adressé aux maires, 19 june, 1989. In DGCL. ***1981-199. Dix ans de communalisation*** (Ministère de l'Intérieur, May 1991) p.28.

[54] "Responsabilités des élus et devoirs des personnels". Séminaire des Secrétaires Généraux de Mairie, Yamoussoukro 21 - 24 avril 1987. Extrait de l'allocution d'ouverture de M. Léon Konan Koffi, Ministre de l'Intérieur. In DGCL. ***1981-1991. Dix ans de communalisation*** (Ministère de l'Intérieur, May 1991) p.26.

secretary-general gives direction to the *chefs de service* of a number of technical departments. Along with the secretary-general, these chief officers are "detached" members of the national public service, paid according to a civil service salary level (with an addition for the responsibility which they hold). While their positions are not detailed in the municipal basic law, they are described in Ministry circulares, their activities are accounted for in the budget, and they appear on the "Model organigram of municipal services" published by the Ministry of the Interior. According to this organigram, there may be typically up to four technical departments in a *commune*: administrative services; financial services; collective (or technical) services; and economic and social services.[55]

The degree to which the powers enumerated above are actually carried out by the *communes* depends on a number of factors. One of the most important elements is certainly the level of resources -- in terms of personnel and finance -- which the *communes* have at their disposal. Not only do many of the smaller *communes* have small staffs and limited equipment, but the shortfalls in liquidity of the central government during the early years of the 1990s have further restricted their activities with respect to the powers which theoretically are in their jurisdiction.

But it is also important to point out that a great many powers are still reserved for the central government. Perhaps the most significant is the control over **land.** In the Anglo-Saxon tradition the disposition, subdivision, use, and taxation of urban land falls normally under the jurisdiction of some level of local government. Since what is "local" is above all related to the use of land, the most important issues in local politics tend to be related to the use of, and taxation of land. In Côte d'Ivoire, virtually all functions related to land use come under the authority of various agencies of the central government. While the details of the "land use planning and construction" functions are complex, they can be divided into four elements: (1) establishing urban master plans for a given communal area; (2) establishing a detailed plan for urban development; (3) developing subdivisional plans; (4) granting building permits. The City of Abidjan will be excluded from discussion, since it has an urban planning unit. But the general rule is that almost all these functions are, at best, consultative where the *communes* are concerned. The only deviation from this pattern is that the government has relaxed its controls over the decisions to subdivide and to allocate plots for the small *communes*; although for the Abidjan *communes* the controls still rest with the central government, through the Ministry of Urban Planning and Construction. The presumed reasoning behind this distinction between the Abidjan *communes* and the rest of the country is that the potential for malfeasance on the part of local elected officials, given the high market value of land in the Abidjan area, is too great to permit relaxation of central controls. In general, control over the use and disposition of urban land on the part of the state is the counterpart to the collection, by the state (through the DGCPT) of the *impôt foncier* (land tax) based on information supplied by the cadastral authorities.

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[55] DGCL. ***1981 - 1991. Dix ans de communalisation*** p.188.

Aside from the vexing question of urban land, which is almost entirely a central government responsibility, a number of other functions are characterized by divided responsibility. For example, in the area of **education** where the *communes* (by the Law 85-578 of 29 July, 1985) were given responsibility for the building of primary schools and the maintenance of the buildings themselves, the state pays the teachers, controls the teaching program, and regulates student entry into all programs. And in the area of **public health**, the *communes* can build and manage a variety of dispensaries, clinics and child care facilities; but the state determines the fees that will be paid, supplies all medications, and through the Ministry of Health pays all the professional medical staff -- including nurses and doctors. Similarly, with respect to **veterinary services**, the *communes* administer the facilities to maintain and dispose of animals, but the central government pays the salaries of the veterinarians through the Ministry of Animal Production. Given the small budgets and limited technical competence of most of the *communes* in the country, this overall policy of limited decentralization in areas of technical services seems warranted. But such a divided system creates a political problem for the Mayors, who in the eyes of the public are responsible for certain services. If -- because of national policy or financial stringency -- these services are inadequately discharged, the Mayors tend to be held responsible by the population.

That the Mayors are acutely aware of their current dilemma with respect to the inadequacy of national funding was clearly evident from interviews. This was the case not only for the one "opposition" Mayor interviewed, but also for the PDCI Mayors. Perhaps more surprisingly, the expressed position of the Ministry of the Interior has been in support of the Mayors. Thus, in its summary of the work of five committees of Mayors, dealing with current administrative and financial problems in the *communes*, the Ministry made the following observations:

> ...if, at the political level and with respect to the written legislation it is obvious that the decision in favor of decentralization is deliberate and irreversible, it is no less important to observe that on the ground, and in their daily administrative work, the *communes* are faced with difficulties and obstructions which bring their very survival into question. The most important difficulties and obstructions derive from the weakness, even the absence in some cases, of financial resources to carry on their work.
>
> This situation has been aggravated with the economic crisis which affects the state, and which has resulted in a drying up of public resources. With the scarcity of resources, the public treasury all too often finds itself in a situation in which it is impossible to release the funds necessary for the proper functioning of the *communes* and the City of Abidjan.
>
> Confronted with the treasury's chronic insufficiency, the Mayors have witnessed an accumulation of bills, requests for payment and even payment reminders that are not honored by the responsible authorities. This puts them in a very delicate situation vis à vis their suppliers, their employees and their

people, who cannot but observe a tangible deterioration in the services offered by the *commune*.[56]

3.2 The role of central government agencies.

3.2.1 The Ministry of the Interior. While the Ivorian *communes* have a "moral personality" and a certain level of financial autonomy, they are nevertheless firmly placed under the close administrative supervision of the state. Autonomy does not mean independence. The supervisory relationship, called *la tutelle* is clearly spelled out in Chapter II of the basic municipal law, before the major municipal institutions are described, and before any description of communal powers and functions. As the legislation states, the state's tutelary power over the *communes* consists of positive elements (such as support, assistance and advice) as well as control. This control can be expressed through approval, through previous authorizations, through suspension or revocation, through nullification, through substitution, and through inspection. While the basic municipal law does not itself specify the institutional modalities of this tutelary action, by Decree No. 82-140 of 27 January, 1982 the President of the Republic gave this power to the Minister of the Interior, to be exercised through what was then known as the *Direction des collectivités locales*. In the late 1980s, the office consisted of some 80 individuals, half of whom were highly qualified professionals. The staff was divided into four *sous-directions*: general affairs, development and budgets, domanial and financial affairs, and technical services. Including the Department office itself, there were 23 different administrative units in the DCL. In October 1991, this office in the Ministry was upgraded to the *Direction générale des collectivités locales* (DGCL). Unfortunately, because of financial restraints within the government, the budget of the agency actually shrank rather than increased in the 1990s. But in administrative terms, the upgrading of the DCL to the DGCL resulted in a much more complex structure at the Ministry (now known as the Ministry of the Interior and Internal Security). We have attached the organigram of the Directorate (the DGCL), under which are placed two Departments (Department of General Affairs of Local Authorities, and Department of Local Authority Development). Each of the two Departments (*directions*) has three sub-units (*sous-directions*), and each of the sub-units are further divided. All in all, one can count at least 60 administrative units and sub-units in the new Directorate, even if one does not count the horizontally attached units shown at the top of the chart. In 1993, the Directorate counted 108 total personnel (including secretaries and lower level workers), all of whom were located in a single, cramped building in the old "colonial" section of downtown Abidjan.

The expansion of the number of *communes* from 37 to 135 meant that the Ministry had quickly to develop a "streamlined" system of administering its tutelary authority. Briefly, the Ministry responded in two main ways. In the first place, an impressive stream of documents was produced for the new communal administrative and political "teams", explaining all the legal

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[56] Ministère de l'Intérieur, "Rapport de synthèse des travaux des commissions" (Abidjan: March/April 1993). Unpublished document, p.2.

aspects of the tutelary relationship. These elements were put together initially in a memorandum dated 30 December, 1985, containing 15 pages of single-spaced text. The second response was to instruct the prefects and sub-prefects of the whole range of actions they could, or should take with respect to communal activity. Thus, a list of 75 different activities (many of which were broken down into more than five sub-categories of action) was produced, showing the agent having direct responsibility for the tutelary action. The tutelary action could be the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior directly (through the DCL), the prefect, or it could be delegated by the prefect to the sub-prefect. Altogether, 166 separate actions by the *communes* would imply action by the DCL; while 146 separate communal activities would imply a response either by the prefect or the sub-prefect. There were no cases in which both would initiate action.[57] By sharply dividing the tasks between the DGCL and the prefects (including their delegates, the sub-prefects), the Ministry clearly hoped to spread the administrative burden more evenly among its agents. But the task remained very heavy, as is indicated by the length of time taken for budgets to be approved by the Ministry, once they are submitted by the individual municipal councils. Thus, in 1988, for budgets which were normally submitted well before the end of the calendar year, 27.2% were not approved until April of the following year, and 22.8% were not approved until May or later. "This situation, which was already alarming in 1987, became even more so in 1988."[58] Although subsequent figures from the Ministry were not available, apparently the rate of approval of communal budgets has not improved.

A recent decision, taken in February 1992 was intended to relieve the pressure on the Ministry. The decision, No. 30/INT/DGCL of 13 February, 1992 gave power to the prefect to approve, subject to a favorable ruling by the departmental committee on programs and budgets, the triannual investment programs and the annual budgets of *communes* which have an annual budget equal to, or less than 100 million FCFA. Totally, 108 *communes*, or 80%, were affected by this new ruling. At the same time, the *communes* were ordered to submit the records of their deliberations to the prefects, rather than to the DGCL, in the first instance. Assuming the prefects are in a position effectively to supervise this component of communal activity, this would amount to a considerable relief for Ministry officials in Abidjan. From 1986 through 1990, a total of 2,414 municipal council meetings throughout the country passed 14,411 resolutions, all of which had to be reviewed and approved by the Ministry. In principle, the new tutelary functions undertaken by the prefects should contribute to a new, more reflective and analytical approach to communalization at the Ministry. Before this intended shift can take place, however, the Ministry will have to have much better control over its sources of information, and much more efficient methods to deal with its many responsibilities under the law.

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[57] DGCL, ***1981-1991. Dix ans de communalisation,*** (Abidjan, May 1991) "Fonctions et attributions de tutelle de l'Etat sur les communes et la ville d'Abidjan en matière de contrôle. Recapitulation, procedurs et repartition des taches entre les echelons d'intervention", pp.62-81.

[58] Ministère de l'Interieur et de la Sécurité. ***L'opération de communalisation. Deuxième phase 1986-1990. Bilan intermediaire au titre des années 1986 et 1987.*** (Abidjan, June 1988) p.90.

ORGANIGRAMME DE LA DIRECTION GENERALE
DES COLLECTIVITES LOCALES



3.2.2. The Accounting Office of the Supreme Court. The *chambre des comptes* ("the accounting office") of the Supreme Court is one of four major divisions of that important institution. Its function is the control and verification of public accounts. In the late 1970s, the Supreme Court Accounting Office played a central role in the "cleaning up" of the mismanagement and corruption that had accompanied the first wave of development of the country's parastatals. In the early 1980s, it took as its mission the regularization of communal accounts. Upon request from the Minister of the Interior, the Office can examine the accounts of any *commune*, and propose reforms or even sanctions to the Minister. Based at least partially on its suggestions, the Minister has -- through the Council of Ministers -- revoked the status of six Mayors since the beginning of communalization. Indicating the seriousness with which he viewed the proper accounting procedures in the *communes*, the President of the Accounting Office observed that "the desired development of responsibility and of autonomy in the management of communal affairs are inseparable from the strict observance of the laws and regulations. The Supreme Court, through its inspection of budgetary, financial and accounting practices, will do its utmost to ensure respect for these principles."[59]

3.3 Case Studies of Communal Governance

The Mission paid field visits to four *communes*, in order to get a first-hand view of the day-to-day problems experienced at the local level, and to interview communal officials. The four *communes* visited were Port-Bouet, Akoupé, Tiassalé and Abengourou. Because of time constraints, the field visits were for one day each, but in two cases the field visits were preceded by lengthy discussions with elected officials from the *communes* who were residing in Abidjan. In the case of Port-Bouet, it was possible to obtain further information without travelling outside Abidjan. And in any case, the Ivorian member of the Mission was previously familiar with many aspects of the four *communes* selected. Analysis of the four cases is organized around four main areas: the political and economic context, the functioning of communal institutions, the distribution of powers, the main areas of communal management, and the emergence of new local actors.

[59] As noted in **Fraternité hebdo** No. 1276 (1983) pp.11-13.

ORGANIGRAMME DE LA MAIRIE DE TIASSALE



Case Study #1

The *commune* of Tiassalé

a. The local context. The town of Tiassalé, which became a *commune* in 1985, has also been the departmental headquarters since 1991. The area which forms the *commune* is made up of two distinct urban components: Tiassalé and N'Douci, 7 kilometers apart from each other, as well as five rural villages. The communal area is 16,800 hectares.

The 1988 census gave a population of 39,922 to the *commune*; if one assumes an annual growth rate of 3.3%, the *commune* would have had a population of 46,958 in 1993. This very heterogeneous population is made up of local Agni, Abbey, Baoulé, Souamélé, Abidji-Agni as well as a large stranger and foreign community dominated by the Malinké.

During the colonial period, the town of Tiassalé enjoyed a long period of relative prosperity, as a result of a highly developed plantation economy in its hinterland, and because of its location at the confluence of river and land-based trading routes. But since the end of the 1970s, local commercial activity has declined with the department's isolation from commercial routes due to the displacement of the northern highway away from the area, and the opening of the coastal route linking Abidjan to San Pedro. The three main components of the modern sector, which include the pineapple plant and two sawmills, have been operating at far less than capacity in recent years. Partly as a result, some local traders have left the town for Divo and San Pedro. In general, the crisis has affected the *commune* through economic decline in the agricultural sector, which accounts for 80% of the commercial activity in the area.

Since the colonial period, a single ruling family, closely connected with both the colonial and post-colonial administrations, has virtually dominated urban political activity in this area, with the result that the initiatives of the numerous *cadres* in the area have been confined to their respective villages. The municipal elections of 1985 saw a coalition of *cadres* of the region break this mould and defeat the existing urban power bloc.

b. The functioning of municipal institutions. Since the elections of 1990, communal affairs have been managed by a municipal council of 31 members, representing all political shades in the *commune*. The list, which was headed by the current Mayor, had the unusual feature of including only those who had been selected by local assemblies. These assemblies, in turn, designated their leading representatives in spite of their attachments to major national political groups. As a result, four activists from the opposition party were chosen for the council, and one of them, the local leader of the Ivorian Workers Party, was elected 4th assistant mayor. Out of the whole group of 31 councillors, 20 are resident in the *commune*, including 2 of the assistant mayors.

In terms of its institutional operation, the council has struck the two required statutory committees; but it has also struck a committee on the environment and quality of life. The deliberations of this particular committee have been concerned largely with developing a three year plan. The statutory number of committee meetings have been observed, the Mission was told, and the mayor has taken a keen interest in the work of the committees. Finally, the fact that the 2nd assistant mayor directs the Economic and Social Development Union of the town is seen as a positive factor in achieving a certain harmonization of local initiatives in the area of development.

c. The division and exercise of powers at the local level. The communal authorities in

Tiassalé are quick to recognize the authority of the Prefect with respect to the local supervision of their affairs. Aside from the periodic occasions when they are drawn together for work, they often seek his advice and counsel before taking important decisions. This good relationship is reinforced by the close personal friendship between the Prefect and the Mayor. The Prefect, whom the Mission met at their suggestion, feels that urban management is a complex task requiring different specialties and a real division of labor. He paid tribute to the ILO/UNDP training project for their work in the *communes*.

According to information made available, the Mayor, perhaps as a result of his management experience at the head of one of the country's major banks (now no longer operating), systematically delegates his responsibilities to others. The Mayor lives in Abidjan, and does not come to Tiassalé more than once a week. In fact, the first assistant mayor is really the principal administrator of the town, responsible for civil and legal matters, and for the control of the operations of the *commune* on a day to day basis. The second assistant mayor, who brings to the *commune* his extensive experience as an economist/manager with the Ivory Coast Electric Company is responsible for finances, the budget, resource mobilization and supervision of management. The third and fourth assistant mayors are, respectively, vice-chairs of the committees dealing with economic and financial matters, and with the environment and quality of life. In this capacity, they are responsible for follow-up of the committee's activities through the *municipalité* and the cabinet council. A point of pride among the elected municipal officials is that they have no *voiture de service* in the *commune*; they would rather use the funds for more important purposes, they say.

d. The main areas of communal management. The coordination of municipal services is the responsibility of the secretary-general; nevertheless, the definition of weekly work programs takes place within the *conseil de cabinet*, an institution that brings together the Mayor and his assistants, together with the secretary-general and the chiefs of the various service departments. The secretary-general, who has held this position since the beginning of the *commune* is the real work-horse of the administration. At the time of the field visit, he was out of the country with the Mayor on a mission to Belgium, putting the finishing touches on an agreement with a Belgian *commune* which he himself had initiated. The centrality of the secretary-general came out in an interview with the chief of administrative services, when it was revealed that the secretary-general himself, along with the Mayor and his assistants, takes personal charge of the *dossiers* of communal personnel. According to some in the town, the secretary-general (who is strongly supported by the Mayor) keeps too much of the power in the *commune* to himself. Management of personnel, which is in principle the responsibility of the chief of administrative services, involves recruitment, the drawing up of job descriptions, dealing with contentious issues in the workplace, giving permissions for absence from work, and related matters. But the management of central government agents working at the communal level, as well as training matters are the responsibility of the DGCL in Abidjan as well as various donor agencies who have developed training projects.

Following consecutive reductions in budgetary resources, the financial service has elaborated a strategy of mobilizing local resources. The implementation of this strategy has led to an augmentation in the budget which rose from 101,150,913 FCFA in 1991, to 149,660,000 FCFA in 1992. The two USAID studies of the level of resources and of commercial activities in the *communes* will contribute significantly, they feel, to helping them mobilize their own resources.

The technical services section is proceeding with an experiment in privatization in several service areas, in particular the sweeping and cleaning of the streets, bus station, public areas and market. The chief of this section is satisfied with the administration of the required contracts and with the level of services being rendered under the new arrangements. But in general, the technical services section has three major problems in its efforts to improve the cleanliness of the town: the maintenance of the small municipal fleet of trucks, the participation of the population in the effort to improve the urban environment, and the availability of heavy equipment which is currently in the Public Works depots in N'Douci and Divo. It remains to observe that the socio-cultural section of the *commune* is considerably handicapped by the lack of any facilities for sports, or for cultural and social events.

e. Other partners and actors in communal development. When in Tiassalé, the Mission made contact with a Peace Corps volunteer, who is working with the technical services section on an environmental program aimed at forming "sanitary and social action committees" (called CASS) in every neighborhood of the town. As this initiative has the political support of the Mayor, its implementation is running into some trouble from politicized sections of the population who apparently feel that to give assistance would be to contribute to keeping the current political group in power. A second problem with the environment initiative comes in the form of refusal by some groups of young people to work on the project, on the grounds that they are not being paid by the *commune*, which in their eyes has the means to pay them. Out of nine *quartiers* in Tiassalé, only two so far have a CASS; the municipal councillors have so far not associated themselves with this initiative. The Peace Corps volunteer appreciated the help she has received from the USAID program, in particular because the program has helped her understand better how to mobilize local resources and to develop a participative approach. As the economic crisis persists, and as other economic actors decline, the town is looking for additional sources of finance through twinning arrangements with European towns. The Mission was unable to find evidence of the development of spontaneous, self-help organizations responding to urban service needs at a local level. It was suggested that, in order to encourage more self-help activity, the town should have a social service center.

ORGANIGRAMME DE LA MAIRIE D'AKOUPE



Case Study #2

The *commune* of Akoupé

a. The local context. The town of Akoupé is the second largest *sous-préfecture* of the *département* of Adzopé. It became a *commune* in 1985. Its territory covers an area of 651 hectares for a population estimated at 55,569 in 1993. The *commune* is made up of the urban area of Akoupé, with 42.04% of the population, and eight villages, with most of the rest of the population, at 57.25%.

The *commune* owes its rapid growth to its location in one of the most prosperous plantation areas, where roads from the eastern and east-central parts of the country converge. The main products of the region are coffee, cocoa, plantains and vegetables. The development of a commercial trade and the need for manual labor led to a strong in-migration of strangers and foreign workers -- principally Malians and Burkinabè. A division of labor was established between the local landowners who concentrated on coffee, cocoa and plantains; and the foreigners who raise subsistence food crops and commercial vegetables, and who are engaged in commerce and transport. Since the fall in price of the two main elements of the local economy -- coffee and cocoa -- the whole system has been disturbed. The only economic activities which have resisted the pressures of the crisis are plantains, subsistence food production, and transport. The traditional coffee and cocoa planters are rapidly sliding into poverty. The main indicator of this fall in economic activity was the departure of four major Lebanese traders who moved to more economically hospitable areas.

The town disposes of a number of high-level administrative services and facilities, which explains its having been selected as the headquarters of the *sous-préfecture* -- this includes judicial services, and facilities of the Ministries of youth, sports, industry and commerce. The town also boasts a hospital at the category 3 level, a covered market, two important secondary schools, an abattoir, and a well-equipped town hall. In terms of formal banking facilities, the town depends on bank branches in Adzopé, the regional capital, although even that town does not have the regional office of the public treasury, which was built in Agboville. Finally, the Akoupé region can boast the highest level of basic education in the country -- at 95% of the whole population.

Since its inception in 1985, the *commune* has had two political groups in charge. A PDCI group was in power from 1985 until 1990, followed by a group led by the main opposition party, the FPI. It is important to note that the Akoupé *sous-préfecture* showed the strongest support in the country for the FPI at the 1990 elections, returning an FPI deputy in the national legislative elections, and registering a very strong FPI vote at both the legislative and municipal elections. The polarization which this election reflected is still present, in spite of the dedication of the current municipal team. This group feels that, because of its political orientation, Akoupé has been singled out in the system and cannot expect achievement to be easy. Their strategy, as a result, is to put into practice the slogan of their party: "to govern differently" (*gouverner autrement*). But what exactly does this mean in practice?

b. The functioning of municipal institutions. The most important organ of the *commune* is the municipal council, consisting of 33 councillors. Two-thirds of these councillors reside in the *commune*. Of the four assistant mayors, two live in the *commune*. This is a relatively young group, whose members were, in effect, coopted by the community. The principles of selection of nominees for the list were involvement in local affairs, humility and

honesty. The council includes 15 educated members, active in the modern sector; 14 planters, and 4 "others". This team is concerned with an overall strategy for social and economic development in the *commune*. The two statutory committees and a third committee on urban planning and infrastructure have, in fact, been engaged in elaborate deliberations along these lines. The third committee is particularly important in this *commune*, where there is so much to accomplish with respect to public services, infrastructure, and even superstructure. This committee is headed by the first assistant mayor, a senior official in the port of Abidjan, and a public works engineer by profession.

The *commune* attempted to operate in Attié, the local language, by systematically translating its deliberations. But this experience was cut short because of the slowdown in work that resulted, and because most of the planters at least understood spoken French. Nevertheless they kept up the practice of speaking in their own language when expressing themselves publicly in council meetings.

The committee on economic and financial affairs, one of the two statutory committees, is charged with analyzing the budget submitted to it, and giving written advice to the council. As for the committee on social and cultural affairs, it pays attention to the expressed needs of the population, in order to incorporate the demands of the public into the investment decisions it takes. The work of the committee on infrastructure and urban planning looks at new projects, and at activity involving urban planning. The Mayor -- a young economist in his early thirties who works as a manager for a private company in Abidjan -- considers these committees an important resource whose reflections should guide his actions. He pays close attention to their deliberations and does not hesitate to follow their suggestions. The Mayor considers his mission to be success in a hostile political environment.

c. The division and exercise of powers at the local level. The *commune* maintains good relations with the local territorial administration. The prefect carries out his tutelary authority through the sub-prefect who keeps him regularly informed. At the local level, the principal central government official who works closely with the *commune* administration is the municipal receiver. Relations between this individual and the *commune* are somewhat strained, as a result of a lack of communication. But if the lack of liquidity is a general problem in the background, the climate of suspicion in the *commune* with respect to finance arises because the local political team feels the central government is attempting to sabotage its efforts. This is the reason why the municipal councillors express the hope that a portion of the resources they collect locally can be deposited in an account to which they have direct access. But even if such an account were not set up, they would like to see a more transparent approach to the management of public funds. Since the Akoupé budget exceeds 100 million FCFA, it is sent through channels by the prefect to the DGCL in Abidjan, which often takes a long time to approve it.

At the level of the communal administration, a point of interest is the manner by which the Mayor delegates responsibility to his various assistant mayors. Thus, he delegates responsibility for financial matters to an assistant mayor who is a trained accountant. He delegates responsibility for the technical services department to the second assistant mayor, who is a civil engineer. And the third assistant mayor, who is resident in the *commune*, is responsible for the registration section of the town administration.

d. The main areas of communal management. In his role as the overall director of municipal services, the secretary-general draws up, at the beginning of every calendar year, a summary table indicating meetings, working sessions and checks on various levels of service. This table, which programs the statutory

meetings (such as those of the municipal council and the municipality), also indicates committee meetings and other administrative activities. The program is then circulated among the other *commune* administrative personnel. Every Monday, the secretary-general meets in the morning with the heads of the technical departments, to review the events of the past week, and to discuss general issues for the coming week. The secretary- general spends a lot of his time on personnel issues. Since a seminar which was jointly supported by USAID and the Hans-Seidel Foundation on the subject of communal personnel, communal management in this area has been considerably improved. The town has an organigram (see attachment) which conforms to the Ministry's requirements for numbers of employees and work descriptions. In the absence of a head of administrative services (recently retired) his colleague, the chief financial officer, deals with this area. Although, as in all *communes* there is a tendency for political factors to play some part in appointments, here close attention is paid to the observance of proper procedures. Work contracts and personnel files are well maintained. There is an effective system in place to regulate absences from work, and a project to improve working conditions is being considered. They are working on a system of personnel evaluation. But in spite of the wish of the new municipal team to do away with old practices, the political factor in appointments makes discipline difficult.

In Akoupé the Mayor has delegated two of his assistant mayors with financial management tasks, and in 1991 proceeded to carry out a census of those who pay fees to the *commune* in public areas -- such as the market, the bus station, the roadside, and the abattoir. This census was done by occupation. The results of this work were an overestimate according to the Blanchard report, since more effective training of collectors had already led to a 30% rise in tax collection.

For the collection of household waste, the *commune* has 2 dump-trucks, of which one is out currently of service. Each is equipped with a driver, a supervisor and 3 laborers. A number of public collection points have been identified with the help of the CASS committees. These committees (about which more below) have been set up in the context of the work of two Peace Corps volunteers, assisted by the technical services department of the *commune*. Another activity supported by the technical services department is the inspection of requests for occupation and building permits. The main problem which confronts the department is the abuse of vehicles and other equipment by people in the *commune* who take advantage of political opportunity. The technical services chief would like to submit a project to the municipal council that would restrict the public use of these vehicles to Friday and Saturday, so that they can effectively be used for their intended purposes on the remaining days of the week.

e. Other partners and actors in communal development. The *commune* has appealed for regional help in carrying out two projects. One involves extension work on a secondary school, another the construction of a cultural center. Two committees have been established to help mobilize financial support from the population. On another front, contacts have been established with a number of Italian *communes*, which have already sent delegations to consider the support they can render for two projects -- one involving a dispensary costing 24 million FCFA, and another a maternity clinic at 20 million FCFA. A third area of non-traditional support involves the two Peace Corps volunteers who have been helping with the construction of environmental facilities in the town -- such as latrines, drainage ditches, and run-off channels -- as well as undertaking a campaign of increasing environmental awareness. The small projects they have undertaken are financed at a level of 75% from the Peace Corps itself, and 25% from the resources of the *commune*. Once the projects are identified, they have set up

social support structures which they call *comités d'action sociale et sanitaire*, or CASS. To date, the volunteers have been able to establish these committees in 5 of the 7 quarters of the town. In structure, the CASS have from 10 to 15 members, who meet in whatever areas they can find at the neighborhood level. The CASS are currently testing the effectiveness of the locations selected for 22 garbage-can shelters, before proceeding with construction. The relative success of CASS groups in getting established in Akoupé can be attributed to the support they have received from neighborhood elders in the town, who have spontaneously given their support to the project. It should also be pointed out that USAID has already put 628,200 FCFA into the purchase of materials; and that the technical services department has helped out while keeping discreetly in the background. The Peace Corps volunteers observe that one of the difficulties in mobilizing social and self-help activities in the town stems from the lack of any social center in which people can meet together.

Case Study #3

The *commune* of Abengourou

a. The local context. The *commune* of Abengourou is located at the center of the Eastern department in the forest zone. It serves as the administrative headquarters for the central East sub-prefecture. Covering an area of 225 square kilometers, the *commune* has a population of some 80,000, made up of 25% local people, 30% strangers from elsewhere in the country, and 45% foreigners. In the last group, the Burkinabè constitute 67% of the foreign population, while the Maliens constitute 22%. The total population of the *commune* has increased by some 4% on an annual basis. Some 80% of the population of the *commune* is engaged in agriculture.

The *commune* includes 15 urban neighborhoods, and 9 rural villages, with an overall density of 316 inhabitants per km^2. Its demographic size makes it the 7th largest *commune* in the country, after Abidjan, Bouaké, Daloa, Korhogo, Gagnoa and Man. It is also one of the oldest *communes* in the country, having been established as a "mixed" *commune* in 1953 at the same time as five other major towns. In 1956, Abengourou became a "medium exercise" *commune*; becoming a "full exercise" *commune* with the communalization reforms in 1980.

Abengourou and its surrounding region are well known for the production of coffee and cocoa, two crops which made the region prosperous as early as the end of the colonial period. Today, hard-hit by the fall in price of its two principal commodities, the region is trying to diversify its economy. The *commune* is the site of a number of regional headquarters of government Ministries, a training center, and since 1964 has been the headquarters for the Catholic bishop of the diocese. Abengourou is also the residence of the spiritual chief of the Agni of Indénié.

b. The functioning of municipal institutions. Since the last elections in 1990, the *commune* has been directed by a PDCI council of 43 members, of whom 10 (or 23.25%) are non-resident. Two criteria guided the selection of members of the council: the representation of different geographic sections of the *commune*, and the degree to which candidates were known by the people. A socio-economic profile of the council members shows that the largest constituent group is primary and secondary school teachers (at 20.93%), followed by planters and businessmen (at 18.60% each). Some 25% of the councillors are considered *cadres* (i.e. educated with responsible positions); their ability and experience is important for the work of the four standing committees. These committees are all presided over by the Mayor, who considers it important to attend their meetings. The Mayor, who because of national responsibilities (he is a member of the National Assembly) is often away from the *commune*, makes it his business to telephone the town hall at least twice a day to keep in touch. He normally attends to his business at the town hall from Friday through Monday. To assist him are 5 assistant mayors, of whom three are permanently resident in the *commune*.

The statutory number of meetings has in all cases been observed. The number of meetings of the *municipalité* (required to be once per month) may even exceed the guidelines. Council meetings tend to be long (although they do not last more than one day), since the Mayor feels it is necessary to hear the opinions of all members of the public who care to attend, before he comes to any conclusions. According to the secretary-general, the level of attendance at Council meetings by elected councillors is in the order of 60 - 70%. In addition to the council itself, the Mayor has established two standing committees -- dealing with equipment, and with

cultural affairs -- in addition to the two statutory committees. But the most original aspect of the management of this *commune* is the creation of a committee of elders presided over by the King, and consisting of the members of his court as well as the chiefs of the major ethnic and national groups resident in the *commune*. In a socio-political context in which traditional authorities continue to have influence in the management of the town (especially with respect to land rights, and the regulation of social and personal conflicts), this structure helps to coordinate the interventions and strategies of different actors, and to reduce tensions and crises. The elders' committee has already played a key role in negotiations over the site of the new municipal cemetery, and in the planning of a new residential subdivision. (The importance of traditional authorities is underlined by the fact that some 80% of all the land in the *commune* is held under traditional tenure, and is not accounted for in cadastral records.) The relationship with this committee is reinforced by the fact that the Mayor himself is a member of the royal family of the Indenié.

c. The division and exercise of powers at the local level. The tutelary unit in the prefecture has only a single officer to take care of the four *communes* of the region. The secretary-general and this individual meet regularly, but particularly at the time of the year when the recurrent and development budgets are being prepared. For his part, the Mayor consults the prefect on important decisions relative to the development of the *commune*. Nevertheless, communal officials feel that the budget approval process is too lengthy. For this year, it was not until the month of June that the budget was approved, six months after it was submitted. There is also concern about the municipal *receveur*, with whom relations -- as in most other *communes* visited by the Mission -- are strained and characterized by suspicion. The *receveur*, it is felt, acts arbitrarily in deciding who will be paid in a situati of chronic "lack of liquidity". Since his accounts are not accessible, "when he says the account is empty and he cannot pay, you cannot tell if this is true or false." The communal authorities feel the municipal *receveur* has a tendency to pay more attention to his position as regional treasurer than to his obligations to the *commune*, since he wishes to please his superiors in the Ministry of Finance and the Economy. The councillors feel that this situation is a result of the fact that the *receveur* is the only official operating within the communal arena over whom the Mayor has no authority. To avoid such a situation having an adverse effect on the *commune*, the secretary-general feels that a full-time officer should be appointed for groups of *communes* in a given region. On the more positive side, collaboration with the agencies responsible for collecting the land and business tax is very good; two collection agents with adequate means of transport are in the field.

As for the Ministries of Public Works, and of Town Planning and the Environment, collaboration with them involves, respectively, obtaining the use of heavy equipment for road grading, and exchanging certain files with respect to the implementation of various planning schemes. Communal requests are satisfied only when they do not conflict with work that the Ministries have already planned.

Finally, given the Mayor's connection with the royal family of the region, he takes great pains to work closely with the traditional authorities with respect to the management of the town. As a result of political divisions in the town which were brought to the surface at the time of the recent elections, the King chose to support no candidates officially. Thus the creation of the elders' committee which reinforces their age-old role in management of local affairs could be seen as non-political on the part of the Mayor.

d. The main areas of communal management. The secretary-general, although he has only recently been posted to the

commune, has considerable previous experience -- both within the DGCL and in the *commune* of Gagnoa. He is trained in public law. He has a close relationship with the Mayor and his assistants, and with the communal department heads. He organizes a meeting to consider their joint work program every Thursday afternoon. Although the secretary-general seems to enjoy the confidence of the Mayor, the management of certain key resources such as gasoline is in the hands of the *chef de cabinet* of the Mayor, who is none other than a younger brother of the Mayor himself.

The technical services department of the *commune* is directed by an experienced senior technical public works officer. Unfortunately, most of the road and construction equipment was out of service at the time of the Mission's visit, due to non-availability of relatively minor spare parts. Since he arrived on the scene, given the low level of cleanliness in the town and the large number of workers assigned to his department, he decided to develop a plan to use the resources available more rationally. When this plan was put into effect, the whole appearance of the town changed, but since the plan involved the consumption of a considerable quantity of gasoline, he was asked to reconsider his approach. The problem here is that the director does not have control over the budget for his department, which has already been approved. This is a political rather than a technical problem, since by now the technical officers in the *commune* are sufficiently trained and experienced to manage their departments correctly. Referring to his years of communal experience, the chief officer deplores the fact that Mayors often have "their" contractors, and when the work is carried out the technical officers are kept in the dark. He notes that the work carried out in the *commune* is not normally checked by a higher authority -- in any case the prefectoral tutelary unit is too small to effectively supervise the work, let alone indicate to the communal technical officers new approaches and appropriate innovations that they might consider in their work.

As for the hiring of municipal employees, the Mayor has the most influence over this process, although once individuals are engaged, the secretary-general and the chief of administrative services must set up the files. Each department head is responsible for the management of personnel within his jurisdiction. Currently, the organigram for the *commune* is in the process of being revised. The town has no list of job descriptions, nor is there any document regulating the internal administration of the *commune*. In short, the management of personnel in this *commune* is loose at best.

Finally, it should be noted that the town operates a kindergarten for children from 3-5 years old, but the old hostel which they occupy is in a serious state of disrepair because of poor management on the part of the previous town administration and because there have been rumors that the state is going to take over these municipal hostels once again. Under such uncertainty, the *commune* is not likely to make an investment in this facility.

e. Other partners and actors in communal development. The *commune* has no programs established with local service clubs, although when there is a request it is prepared to collaborate. The most important service club mentioned was the Junior Chamber of Commerce (*Jeune chambre économique*), but their work has not been closely coordinated with the activities of the *commune*. Recently the town supported a health care program initiated by the Rotaract club of Abidjan, with the participation of more than 50 doctors and pharmacists, involving the villages on the outskirts of the *commune*. The hope of the town leaders is that service clubs and NGOs would indicate their plans in advance, so that they can be programmed into the budget of the *commune*. The municipality supports the initiatives of parent associations that are undertaking school

construction in the town. The *commune* also works in close collaboration with businessmen in the town, in order to improve the general commercial environment and to strengthen revenue collection. Finally, Abengourou is twinned with the city of Ezhou in China and Man in Côte d'Ivoire. But these activities are just getting underway and cannot be evaluated at this time.

Case Study #4

The *commune* of Port-Bouet

a. The local context. The *commune* of Port-Bouet is one of the 10 *communes* which make up the "City of Abidjan". Located along the coast, it includes within its boundaries the main Abidjan airport, as well as the largest port-industrial complex in the country. All this makes it a rich and strategic economic zone. Both the advanced industrial activities, as well as more traditional fishing activities which include smoking and drying of fish have attracted a large and varied population, estimated in 1993 at 168,725 -- somewhat less than 1/10 of the total Abidjan population. This population is composed of 49.5% Ivorians -- most of whom are concentrated in low-cost housing estates, and 51.5% non-Ivorians -- most of whom live in different national communities in low-income, spontaneous housing zones. The type of housing which has been built in the peripheral areas, notably along the sea and along the road to Bassam represents 46.79% of the 800 total hectares of the urban residential areas of the *commune*. To the 11 *quartiers* of the communal area that were outlined in the 1980 municipal law, have been added 14 more. This multiplication of housing areas demonstrates both the high rate of spatial growth of the *commune* in the peripheral zones (a growth estimated at 6% per year), but also the necessity of dealing with the social and economic needs of a young, rapidly growing population.

With a total budget of 1,735,363,000 FCFA in 1992, Port-Bouet was third among the Abidjan *communes*, and sixth in the country. Since the *commune* was established in 1980, it has been led by Mme. Aka Anghui, a pharmacist by profession, former secretary-general of the powerful Ivorian Women's Association, and from 1986-1990 the Minister for the Status of Women.

b. The functioning of municipal institutions. Explaining her longevity as the Mayor of Port-Bouet, Mme. Aka observed that he wears three hats: one as an administrator, another as an animator, and the third as a builder. As administrator, she manages the *commune* as much as possible as if it were a private company. As an animator, over and above politics, she tries to organize the population in a rational manner with respect to its community development needs. And as a builder, the Mayor is concerned to at least maintain the infrastructural fabric to the extent possible, in order to respond to the needs of the people. To carry all this out, she needs a strong municipal council. This organ of the *commune* consists of 45 members. While she does not herself live in the *commune*, the Mayor was conscious of a number of important criteria in making up her list for the elections: involvement in community affairs, geographical, ethnic and national distribution, experience and competence.

In 1992 the municipal council met 12 times, exceeding by far the 4 statutory meetings prescribed in the municipal law. In fact, the *commune* seems to be very active, with the councillors divided into the two statutory committees as well as four others established for specific areas of activity. Thus, there is a committee on youth, sports and leisure; a committee on communication and external relations; a committee on roads, transport, welfare and public health; and a committee on housing and planning. These committees are directed by the councillors, but the 6 assistants to the Mayor follow their work closely on behalf of the *municipalité*. Finally, to ensure close liaison with the communal administration, the 25 *quartiers* are divided into four sectors, each of which is under the supervision of one of the assistant mayors.

ORGANIGRAMME DE LA MAIRIE DE PORT-BOUET



c. The division and exercise of powers at the local level. Located in Abidjan, the seat of political power in the country, the *commune* of Port-Bouet has the opportunity of being able to work directly with the Ministry of the Interior and the DGCL, and it takes advantage of this opportunity. Relations with the DGCL are excellent, as the Mayor is able to follow up when there is a problem, although this does not prevent her from observing that there are too many superfluous controls over the communal budgets. For example, is it really necessary to obtain an official council resolution before undertaking a specific expense, when the council and the DGCL have already approved the expense in principle? This budgetary practice, which does not obtain in the central government, cannot be justified. The whole system could well be simplified in order to make it more effective. She permits herself to hope that the new Director General of the DGCL will understand this, since he was previously a member of a communal team himself.

But the relationship is quite another matter when it comes to the municipal *receveur*. Faced with "lack of liquidity", this individual hardly responds to the needs of the *commune*. In 1992, for example, only 20% of the investment budget was actually spent as a result, and the rest has accumulated over subsequent budgets. The poor financial situation was illustrated at the time of the Mission's visit by the fact that on the 9th of the month, the communal employees still had not been paid, while their superior officers, seconded central government officials, had already received their checks. To avoid suffocating the *communes*, the Mayor proposes opening a local account, into which the revenues earned directly by the *commune* could be deposited.

With respect to relations with various central government Ministries, the Mayor observes that old centralist reflexes have remained, in spite of the publication of the municipal law that transferred functions to the *communes*. For example, the Ministry of National Education and the *Grands travaux* did not bother to consult with the *communes* before undertaking a major program of school construction and rehabilitation that was financed by a Japanese grant. She notes that no Mayor sits on the national committee on public health, itself established by their own Minister of the Interior, although the management of the urban environment is a constant preoccupation for all the urban *communes*.

She thinks that the *communes* have made a valuable contribution by undertaking programs which can attenuate social tensions at the local level; the contribution they make in managing the urban areas and seeking to perform functions which relieve the state of responsibility, is also very important. Her relations with the City of Abidjan are good, and she is called upon to represent the City on various occasions. To gain access to the fleet of heavy equipment under the control of the City, her technical services director must address a request to the head of the municipal garage one week in advance, stating the need and undertaking to supply the gasoline. The same procedure is in place when dealing with the regional Public Works depot. The only difference is that in the latter case the machinery is poorly maintained, and they themselves often have to repair the vehicles, without being assured that they will be able to finish the work they have started.

In managing the *commune*, the Mayor practices a policy of giving responsibility to others, particularly to her assistant mayors when it comes to communal administration. Nevertheless she has a tendency to lean heavily on her *chef de cabinet*, her right hand man, who acts as liaison between her and the population. This can create frustrations, as the last secretary-general in the post (the fifth to occupy this position) was simply replaced by the *chef de cabinet*.

The ASH company, which has the waste disposal concession from the City since September 1992, has not had good relations with the *commune* since it attempted to do away with local health committees which the *commune* had established. As for the French military camp of the 4th BIMA, located in communal territory, good neighborly relations are maintained between them and the *commune*.

d. The main areas of communal management. The *commune* of Port-Bouet has four major service departments, all well equipped and sometimes involved in rather unusual activities. All the service departments are coordinated by the new secretary-general, a former secondary school English teacher converted to municipal manager. He claims to be concerned with managing people, and with the confidence of the Mayor he operates with considerable authority. Under his authority are a number of smaller offices of administrative control, training and apprenticeship, computers, copying and archives.

The head of administrative services has taken a 3 month course in municipal management at the National School of Administration (ENA). He notes that there is an important anomaly in the management of communal personnel, since in effect according to the law communal employees are regulated under the Labor Code, the same Code that regulates the relations between employees and employers in the private sector, although they are remunerated like state employees. In fact, there is no fixed base for recruitment to communal employment. The City of Abidjan has established a salary level which can serve as a basis for the other *communes*, but this salary level has not been maintained. He stresses the fact that work at the communal level is both satisfying and very frustrating, partly because overtime is not compensated as it is in the public service. He maintains that, with new techniques being taught in training courses, the profession of personnel administration, previously the poor cousin among administrative services, can take its rightful place. In his department there are 12 persons, of which two are professionals, for a total communal staff of some 376.

Aside the typical responsibilities of this office, the head of financial services manages the municipal police. Under his direction, a systematic census of economic enterprises in the *commune* was carried out. The project was carried out by a private consulting firm to guarantee its scientific value and to avoid suspicion on the part of the population.

The technical services department, responsible for maintaining roads, as well as the means of access to residential *quartiers*, is also responsible for implementing the various projects written into the *commune*'s investment budget. The director of this department is a senior engineer specializing in public hygiene. After the success of "operation broom" and other projects carried out by the "Amazons of cleanliness" (*les amazones de la propriété*) and the "public health brigades", the technical services department set up "public health committees". The *commune* has 38 of these now, helping with the pre-collection of garbage and the sweeping and cleaning of public areas. Each household pays 50 FCFA per week for this service.

Contrary to the situation in most *communes*, in Port-Bouet the socio-cultural department is full of activity. The most important work of the department involve the Pilot Center for Youth which has been organized and managed for 10 years by French missionaries. This socio-educational complex was conceived as a social center, a place where young people could talk, and "hang out". Today the center has a library, a youth hostel and some training facilities. The center has established a training for artisans in such areas as refrigeration, woodworking, mechanics, masonry and painting. To help those who are trained get employment, there is a loan fund

which is guaranteed by the *commune*. This new means of financing development activities will especially benefit workers who are members of cooperatives, which AMCAV is helping to set up. Finally, since 1982, the social health section of this department, under the direction of a social welfare officer, offers services to those in particular distress in the *commune*.

e. Other partners and actors in communal development. Parallel to the health committees put in place by the engineer's department, the socio-cultural services department has set up Communal Development Committees (CCD). These voluntary organizations which are made up of both youth and adults, are given the responsibility for community development projects in the area of public health, security and public safety in neighborhoods, socio-cultural animation, and economic activities. These committees manage small neighborhood community centers, for which they receive some minimal support payments from AMCAV. In fact, Port-Bouet is the first *commune* to have created an NGO for its own social purposes. Established in April 1984, the Association for the Planning of Port-Bouet and the Improvement of the Quality of Life (AMCAV) has as its goal the improvement of housing and the living environment of the poorest members of the *commune* population. The organization benefits from three types of resources: a grant from the *commune*, a grant from the state, and funds from other international NGOs and donor agencies. AMCAV is managed by a legal and financial officer as well as an administrative assistant. Since its creation, it has built 9 blocks of public latrines (including 80 wc cabins), and four neighborhood social centers. From 1984 to 1992 AMCAV has invested some 37,418,572 FCFA in social equipment. Its main project, the construction of very low-cost housing, is still seeking financing sources. In addition to AMCAV, the *commune* supports other voluntary activities, such as service clubs and parents' associations.

3.3.1. The case studies of *communes*. Some general issues. While the individual cases show considerable variation, a number of general points can be made that apply to almost all. First, in discussing their work with senior communal agents (all of whom were central government officials), the point was often made that political officials have become very involved in using the resources of the *communes* for their own purposes. For example, Mayors are particularly adept in gaining the use of the communal *benne* for transporting chairs to funerals over week-ends, or even for transporting earth or heavy materials for themselves or their constituents. Another practice, hinted about if never openly stated, involves Mayors working privately with contractors and other suppliers to the *commune*, in order to realize private advantage when public funds are spent according to correct accounting procedures. While this conflict between political (or personal) and administrative uses for local resources is widespread, in most cases the magnitudes are low and the Mission would not consider the situation any cause for alarm. In the first place, the early stages of democratic local government in many Western countries (the United States is a good example) have seen similar patterns. In the second place, such deviations from the "pure" model of democratic and administrative performance are indeed derisory in a country like Côte d'Ivoire with its history of "creative accounting" and clientelistic relations at the national level. But finally, this pattern is simply one more example of the increasing importance of the *communes* within the Ivorian political system. The more local *élites* have a stake in the communal system, the more they will support it when it is threatened by other levels of government.

Another current feature of communal management is the very slow process of approval of budgets by the DGCL, at the same time as the funds which are collected (from land and business tax, and from various municipal services) and deposited in the government's coffers are not being released. This "lack of liquidity" crisis is severely affecting morale among local employees, as the central government agents are getting their pay on time, while the communal officials are normally well over a week in arrears. The crisis has united both opposition and PDCI Mayors in a recognition that the central government is taking unfair advantage of the *communes* to solve its self-induced economic problems. It has also brought them closer to the DGCL, which generally supports their case, in opposition to the Ministry of Finance and the Economy.

The liquidity crisis has considerably empowered the municipal *receveur*, since it is he (or she) who decides who will be paid every month. This is frustrating to the Mayors, whose budgeted requests for payment to suppliers are not honored, and who see their re-election chances slipping away if the situation is not rectified. Ironically, the increasing power of the *receveur* goes along with the generally declining power of the prefects, whose administrative power over influential Mayors has waned during the last decade. If some of this power was salvaged by the decision to give the prefects the responsibility of approving the budgets of the smaller municipalities, it was clear for the larger *communes* (those which the Mission visited) that the role of the prefect, in comparison to the Mayors, was not very important. But more generally, the increased influence of the municipal *receveur* suggests to many the notion that greater financial autonomy for the *communes* -- at least with respect to the fees which they collect for their own services -- is indicated. That such a discussion of appropriate financial

powers is taking place is further evidence that an important dynamic is underway with respect to the institutionalization of the *communes*.

Finally, the case studies also indicate that (with limited exceptions) the self-help dynamic is not strong at the local level. At the most, it could be said that this dynamic is in its early stages. In Tiassalé, for example, it was reported that support for neighborhood environmental committees is lacking, partially because support for the overall program would suggest support for a Mayor who is opposed by some sections of the population. The Mission was unable to find any evidence of self-help organizations responding to the needs for local urban services. And in Akoupé, where two American Peace Corps volunteers have effectively raised local environmental awareness, neighborhood elders are just beginning to support the program. But even in this case, USAID has made a substantial donation for the purchase of materials, and the technical services department has added its organizational support. In both towns, the observation was made that the *communes* cannot expect to develop a higher level of spontaneous organization in support of better delivery of services unless "someone or some agency" constructs a social center where local people can meet on a regular basis.

An apparent exception to the proposition that urban self-help is not strong in Côte d'Ivoire seems to be Port-Bouet. But even in this highly organized *commune*, the initiative for the organization of the Communal Development Committees (CCDs) and the Quality of Life Improvement Association (AMCAV) has come from the Mayor and her entourage; and these groups are supported by outside donor agencies. Only the elders' committee in Abengourou, with its close connections to the King of the Indenié, and representation from major ethnic groups living in the town, seems to have taken an independent role in the management of one of the four towns. As a politically significant institution, this committee acts to integrate the rural and urban parts of Abengourou with the more technical work of the *commune* in relation to the use of land. Taking the four cases together, it may take some time before local communities realize that the state is not in a position to solve their problems without some initiative on their part.

4. RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

4.1 Introduction

This part of the report deals with the financial and resource mobilization aspects of Ivorian municipalities. In the absence of a quantitative study on the mobilization of resources, the approach to be followed consists of two major elements. One element involves the analysis of methods to obtain a more effective and more efficient management of current resources. This element comprises three aspects, (i) revenue enhancement from current revenue sources; (ii) expenditure control for more cost-effective management; and (iii) the application of more efficient operational methods. The second element involves the potential generation of new sources of revenue. This second element comprises two main aspects, (i) improved income generation using current sources; and (ii) extension of the system to mobilize new sources of revenue.

The section begins by describing in detail the current resources of the municipalities, making suggestions for the increase of revenue from current sources. Following this description, recommendations for new sources of revenue will be developed. The extent to which any single resource can be better managed, utilized or exploited is a function of a number of internal factors relating to the municipality and its population, as well as of a number of external factors -- such as potential assistance from sources outside the community. The sources of revenue of concern can be represented in the following table.

Table 1. Ivorian Municipalities: Existing and Proposed Sources of Revenue

Sources of Revenue	From	
	Taxes, levies, other charges and assessments	Non-tax activities
Existing sources	I Increasing the rate of collection*	II Expanding the service base
Proposed sources	III Community-based activities, and user fees	IV Creating new activities

(*) For this report, changes in the method and the basis of assessment are not considered. A differentiation is made between simplifying the method and basis of assessment; and dealing with collection problems as such[60].

[60]The shortcomings in both the method of assessment and the system of collection of taxes are explained in detail below. The differentiation between these shortcomings is of particular importance. For instance, the changes in real estate tax based on the 1992 finance law were designed to simplify assessment. While this objective has partly been achieved, it has introduced complications in the tax assessment, and in the collection and distribution burdens, with long-term negative effects.

In the research for this report, and in discussions with officials, two predominant opinions were offered with respect to improved utilization of financial resources. One position had to do with the current system of keeping all municipal funds in a central coffer -- the system of *unicité de caisse*. Many officials (both appointed and elected) feel strongly that their *commune* has been marginalized as a result of this system. The *communes* tend to feel that their own collections (*les recettes propres*) should be available directly to them, and that these collected receipts should not be commingled with other funds in the common coffer. This argument is difficult to support, however, for two reasons. First, within the context of the current organizational structure of the *communes*, it is difficult to separate the various collections of funds. Second, given the amount of the tax liability and the location of taxpayers, the collection function can more effectively be performed at the level of the municipalities than by central government tax collectors. The attribution and allocation of collections between central and local governments already takes into account the costs and responsibility for collection. Regardless of these reasons, the *communes* wish to separate their receipts from those collected on behalf of the state since -- as we have seen -- the state has been extremely dilatory in paying local authorities out of the central coffer. This is a function of the "lack of liquidity", however, rather than any structural problem with the system.

A second complaint often heard at the local level, and among certain central government officials, is that the 1992 change in the percentage of allocation of the real estate taxes has resulted in an unfavorable allocation, on a total basis, to the *communes*. Now, it is true that the Finance Act of the National Budget for 1992 changed the real estate tax rate by removing a number of additional taxes as well as the method of allocation of these taxes. The municipalities now receive 25% of the collections from these taxes, versus the 50% which they received previously. But based on our analysis of the sources of revenue of the four municipalities -- as shown in the Annexes to this report -- the real estate tax alone represents a small percentage of the total revenues received by the *communes*. Furthermore, a summary analysis of the *revenus propres* of the municipalities shows that the nature of those particular collections is very similar to other income and taxes normally collected by the state. The main difference is that the revenues attributed to the *communes* are typically made up of small individual amounts, and are left to the *communes* for collection.

The general complaint with respect to the effect on the *communes* of the 1992 *Loi des finances* needs to be investigated by a thorough quantitative evaluation of the effect of the

change in the real estate tax[61]. But a summary review of both the old and the current real estate tax and the current business tax (*la patente*) demonstrates the inability of the government in collecting taxes generally:

> The tax revenue is a function of both the tax legislation resulting in the tax assessment, as well as an effective collection of those taxes. What happens in practice, in varying degrees, is that in order to obtain an increase in revenue, in the absence of an effective tax collection administration, the government is forced to use the same tax base, and the same tax incidence (i.e. those who pay the tax). This is particularly the case in the current circumstances in this country.

The problem of lack of liquidity has also exacerbated the precarious financial situation of a majority of the medium-sized and smaller municipalities. The analysis has, however, tried to factor out the effect of these considerations to the extent that they may have an immediate impact on the current development of the *communes*. Nonetheless, the practical effects of these two factors -- the reduced allocation of taxes, and the lack of liquidity -- influence the operation, attitude and reaction of the staff of the *communes* throughout the country.

4.2 The Municipal Budgets

The resources of each *commune* are listed in its annual budget. The sources of revenue of each municipality are a function of all the activities which are taking place in that municipality as well as the financial support provided by the central government. The provisions for expenditure represent administrative costs as well as the cost of providing services to the community and the purchase of items of a capital nature. Based on a review of the budget of the four municipalities which the Mission visited and studied, the sources of revenue and the composition of the expenditure accounts of the municipalities may be listed.

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[61]The DCGTx is in the process of awarding a study of the effects of the changes in the real estate tax. As a result of the way the new law is structured, it has done away with all of the temporary exemptions. This measure has long-term negative repercussions on construction activity as well as other negative macro-economic considerations. Nonetheless, it will in the short term increase real estate tax collection. The basic real estate tax is 4%. The increase to 9% and 15% (the law in fact sets it at 15% and then reduces it to 9% and 4%) represents a tax on real estate income rather than a tax on real estate. This being the case, there is little justification from a purely tax point of view that this income should be shared with the *commune*. This is an example of the structural problem in the administration of the tax. In any system of taxation (whether Francophone or Anglophone) there should be a balance between tax assessment and tax collection. In other words, the authority in charge of taxation should be in a position to effectively collect the tax, which is a basic canon of taxation. Ignoring the fairness, equitability, social and political considerations -- though each of these is extremely important -- there are negative practical consequences which a weak tax collection administration will exert on the whole tax system.

The budget is made up of two parts: the recurrent budget (*budget de fonctionnement*) and the investment budget (*budget d'investissement*). Total recurrent budgets up to 100,000,000 FCFA are submitted to the prefect of the *département* within which the *commune* is located. As has been seen in section 3.2.1, this process began in 1992, and applies to some 108, or 80% of the *communes* in the country. Alternatively, when budgets exceed this amount, they are submitted directly for approval to the DGCL in Abidjan.

The components of the recurrent budget are made up of the following elements:

1. REVENUES

1.1 TAXES AND LEVIES

1.11 Collections by the Treasury
- Real Estate Tax
  - Built Property
  - Unbuilt Property
  - Uncompleted Property
  - Transfer Taxes
- Business Tax
- License Charges

1.12 Collections by the Municipality
- Professional Location Tax
- Small Business Tax
- Furnished Accommodation Tax

1.13 Municipal Taxes and Levies
- Gas Stations
- Transport - Hand Carts
- Theatres & Galas
- Cinemas

1.14 Other Municipal Taxes
- Taxicabs
- Advertising (Posters)

1.2 PROVISION OF SERVICES

1.21 General Services
- Notary Services
- Birth Certificates
- Other Services
- Sequestration

1.22 Community Services
- Demarcation Fees
- Trash Collection Fees
- Other Services

1.23 Economic Services
- Transport Services

- Taxi and Bus Terminals
- Slaughter Houses and Meat Markets
- Markets

1.3 INVESTMENT INCOME

1.31 Income from Property

- Income form Leases
- Occupied Property

1.4 GOVERNMENT AND EXTERNAL AID

1.41 Government Contribution

- Minimum Allocation
- General Payment
- Special Payment

1.5 SUNDRY RECEIPTS

1.51 Sundry Receipts by the Municipality

- Other Receipts
- Miscellaneous Revenues

2. **EXPENDITURES**

(As by nature most of the expenditures are the same in each group, they will be listed only once, under General Services.)

2.1 GENERAL SERVICES

- Staff Compensation Charges (including payroll taxes, travel and transport)
- Motor Vehicle Running Costs
- Material & Supplies
- Provision of Community Services
- Other and Miscellaneous Expenditure

2.2 COMMUNITY SERVICES

2.3 PUBLIC HEALTH AND CULTURAL SERVICES

2.4 ECONOMIC SERVICES

2.5 SUNDRY EXPENDITURE

The **investment budget** is reported as part of the administrative, or recurrent budget. It represents between 10% and 30% of the said budget. Funds are allocated to this budget as a function of the requirements of each municipality within the above percentages. The investment budget has ten major components, divided into the revenue and the expenditure categories, as follows:

1. REVENUES OR RECEIPTS
Income from Transfer of Properties
Contribution from the Investment Fund
Borrowing
Government and External Support
Charities and Donations

2. EXPENDITURES
Equipment for General Services
Equipment for Community Services
Equipment for Socio-Cultural Services
Equipment for Economic Services
Financial Transfers and Operations

In general, the central government through its tax collection arm, *La Direction générale de la comptabilité publique et du trésor* (DGCPT), collects all the taxes and levies. The DGCPT is also charged with disbursing the budgeted expenditure of the *communes*. In practice, a number of taxes are collected by the municipalities themselves. Nonetheless, where the tax authority *La Direction générale des impots* (DGI), and/or the municipality collect the tax, they do so in a fiduciary capacity as agents of the DGCPT[1]. Both central government agencies are incorporated in the current Ministry of the Economy, Finance, Commerce and Planning. For a better appreciation of the system as it was originally planned to function and the way it is functioning in practice; and in order to situate the whole municipal tax and financial system in that broader context, a brief description of the tax administration system in Côte d'Ivoire will now be offered.

The system of tax administration in Côte d'Ivoire is structurally patterned after the French system. The main future of the French system which separates and distinguishes it from the Anglophone system is its division of powers, and segregation of duties and functions within the administrative framework as a means of providing checks and balances within the system. The Anglophone taxation system is an integrated system in that the administrative functions are not so separated and there is more emphasis on the formal audit to test for accountability.

In practice, the operation of the Francophone and Anglophone accounting and tax administration systems tend to be relatively similar, if they are properly set up. For example, there are administrative checks and balances in Anglophone systems, and independent auditing exists in Francophone systems. But if there are deficiencies in the administrative organization of the Francophone system, the element of accountability will be completely undermined. In the latter system, the functions are separated from the top and run downwards through different levels. And in order to respect the necessary segregation of duties, there is little collaboration at the lower levels of the administration. As a result, to exercise control in the system, one has to channel the request back through to the top at each major administrative unit, which given the nature of modern government can be a time consuming and counter-productive process. This issue will be clarified further below where we describe the tax assessment and collection procedures in the Francophone system as they are applied in Côte d'Ivoire.

The division of functions between the DGI and the DGCPT is important. Thus, the DGI is vested only with tax assessment authority, while the DGCPT has the total and exclusive authority over all collections. As a result of this division of functions, the resolution of conflicts or ambiguities between the two agencies must be addressed further up the system at the level of the *chef du cabinet du ministre* or even at the level of the Minister of the Economy and

Finance (who is also the Prime Minister) himself. The administration of tax assessment and collection becomes even more complicated in the absence of full and corresponding representation at the local and regional levels. For example, the DGCPT has tax collection centers in all the municipalities across the country, while there are only sixteen (or perhaps seventeen) regional tax assessment centers. Another anomaly is that in the case of certain taxes and levies, the administration of the tax collection activity is delegated, on an expressed or even on a *de facto* basis, to the tax assessment authority -- the DGI. It is, nonetheless, clear that the collection activity is carried out on a proxy and a fiduciary basis on behalf of the DGCPT. The Mission has learned that proposals have been made by the DGI, currently being discussed at Cabinet level, which are designed to integrate further the collection function within the DGI. Given the premise of internal checks and balances, these patterns and initiatives may appear contradictory. The study now turns in more detail to the tax collection procedure relevant to the *communes*, as each of the sources of revenue is discussed.

4.3 Analysis of the System in Operation

4.3.1 General Considerations. Given the scope and importance of resource mobilization in Côte d'Ivoire, it will be necessary to make a number of preliminary observations in order to provide a perspective for our findings.

The first point concerns terminology. The terms and usages that are employed in this part of the report, particularly where they are translated directly from French into English may create some confusion. In general -- as was indicated in an earlier section of the report in the discussion of decentralization -- these terms do not normally intend, mean or have the same significance or scope in both languages. The Treasury, decentralization, deconcentration, devolution and even regionalization serve as examples. These terminologies will be expanded upon in the relevant sections of this part of the report. But to avoid ambiguities resulting from a possible translation of the administrative structure into English, the reference to the office and office holders are stated in French and are shown in italics.

The issues involved in the discussion of resource mobilization are multidimensional. Partly as a consequence, the general issues will be dealt with first, with reference afterwards to a number of major exceptions. In reviewing the procedures of the municipalities which were visited, certain practices were encountered which are not of a general nature, and which will probably be abandoned following a training program. These practices are a byproduct of the absence of accountability in the system. They will be referred to on a selective basis.

Otherwise, there are a number of general constraints which to some extent impede a more effective functioning of the administrative system, given the current level and potential of the available resources. A number of those issues were briefly discussed in the introduction to this part of the report, such as the lack of liquidity, and the existence of the "common coffer". These factors, however, have contributed to the prevailing attitude among administrative personnel. The staff (at both national and local levels) considers its function to be the execution of work

at hand rather than the management of the available resources. This attitude is the result of a number of factors. Chief among these is the structure of the administration. The present preoccupation of the government with payment of salaries as a political priority has exacerbated the situation. The staff considers the payment a right rather than a compensation for its services. This has also contributed to making the administrative structure completely reactive. In some cases, however, the lack of funds has resulted in crisis management[62]. In other instances, the staff only reacts to executing the requests made by the claimants; and at the more senior level, undue effort is spent in gathering and providing basic information which should be readily available[63]. The presence of these factors is not conducive to a pro-active management approach. Establishment of a better management information system should help to some extent in the reorientation of the functions.

4.3.2 The Coordination of Functions. While there is a reasonable flow of information and documentation within each Ministry and also within the departments in that Ministry, there is little evidence of coordination between different Ministries other than what is absolutely necessary under the law. In general, as directives flow vertically downwards through each administrative unit, there is no standard method of feedback and exchange of information. It is normally left to the *directeur* to provide guidelines on the feedback of information. However, as feedback is not effectively used in the decision-making process, especially at the lower levels of government, it is usually left to each individual to obtain the information considered necessary for the performance of his or her function. For example, the Ministry of The Environment, Construction and Town Planning has small offices in various localities. In the office files, there is usually some type of information available on land allocations on which construction has not yet or necessarily taken place. However, this information -- crucial for real estate tax collection -- is not automatically provided to the tax collector (*le percepteur*). Nonetheless, in Tiassalé, the tax collector had requested a copy of this information and obtained it.

There is also little horizontal coordination between departments (*directions* or *services*) in different Ministries. This is especially true as one moves down in the administrative structure. The result is that there is a sizeable amount of unnecessary duplication in actual execution of work which has an inverse relationship with the administrative function. Thus as one moves downward in the system through the levels of *sous-direction*, *service* and local *agents*, there is an increasing amount of duplication of work. For instance, the annual survey of businesses for the assessment of the business tax (*la patente*) is separately done by both the DGI in Abengourou

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[62]For instance, in the *commune* of Port-Bouet, the general secretary had to pay personally for the gas in order to enable the garbage collection truck to pick up the garbage which had not been collected for about a week and was creating traffic problems, let alone sanitary and health problems. The cost per liter of gasoline in Côte d'Ivoire is extremely high by world standards.

[63]The information on expenditure in the *communes*, which appears as an annex to this report, had to be specifically prepared for a meeting at the Ministerial level involving a decision on further expenditure for the *communes*. The nature of the information is such that it should automatically have been produced and updated regularly.

and the municipality, though one is done more comprehensively than the other. Nonetheless, there is no regular coordination or automatic exchange of information between them.

4.3.3 Detailed Analysis of the Municipal Budget. The study will now describe in detail the sourcing and collection procedures for the items composing the budget of the *commune*. Each municipality prepares at least three types of financial information: (i) the annual budget, as discussed above; (ii) the administrative accounts, which describe the implementation of the budget, and (iii) the management accounts, which are submitted to the DGCPT, for verification and a compliance audit. Otherwise, the accounting function, to a large degree, is limited to accounting for receipts and the payment of expenditure in line with the budgeted provisions. The accounting system at the large municipalities is semi-computerized; in the smaller *communes* this work is still done manually.

A brief description of the laws and regulations governing the sourcing, basis of assessment, and method of collection of each of the major revenue components of the *communes* will now be presented. This will involve a discussion of the **annual recurrent budget.** In the absence of a readily available consolidated budget or other information on the sources of revenue for all the *communes*, the sources have been limited to those appearing in the four *communes* which were visited. Nonetheless, the present listing, though not totally exhaustive, should be practically complete. Sources which are not included are extremely rare. The first major group of revenues which must be considered is related to the real estate tax (*l'impôt foncier*).

1. REVENUES
   - 1.1 TAXES AND LEVIES
     - 1.11 Collections by the Treasury, DGCPT
       - Real Estate Tax
         - Built Property
         - Unbuilt Property
         - Uncompleted Property
         - Transfer Taxes

The Finance Act for the fiscal year 1992 (article 13) aimed at consolidating and simplifying the law on property taxes. It was estimated that the changes in the law would increase the level of tax collection; and while the percentage allocated to the *communes* was reduced from 50% to 25%, it was projected that the *communes* would receive about FCFA 5 billion for the year 1992 from this tax. This amount represented a 25% increase over the amount actually allocated to the *communes* in 1991. The 1992 law -- presently in force -- effectively does away with the temporary exemptions provided under the previous law. These exemptions had a debilitating effect on the basis of assessment. Hence, the assumption of about 150%

increase in collection was based on the premise that there would be a significant expansion of the tax base[64].

As regards administration and collection of the real estate tax, there are at least two Ministries, plus the office of the Prime Minister, and four *directions générales* that are active in this area. The process which culminates in the generation of revenue from real estate taxes, starts with allocation of the land which, in theory, belongs to the central government. The process then follows through the construction of the building on the designated piece of land, finishing with the assessment of the tax thereon and its collection.

The administration procedures relating to land allocation are complex. The power over the land and its designation, division, distribution and allocation are vested with the Ministry of the Environment, Construction and Urban Planning (MECU). (The organigram for this Ministry is attached.) In practice, however, there are a number of important exceptions. For instance, the DCGTx which falls administratively under the office of the Prime Minister, is also involved in the processes of allocation and land-use planning[65].

There are a number of other considerations in allocation of the land. Land is basically owned by the government, which makes allotments on condition that the person receiving the allotment proceed with construction on the land. There is a major anomaly in this area in that, while the government, through MECU and/or DCGTx, does the zoning, subdivision and parcelling of the land, allotments are made by traditional processes in some of the regions as well as in Abidjan[66]. As these traditional structures, in spite of exercising significant discretionary powers, are not articulated with the formal administrative system and are therefore not accountable in the normal fashion, the implementation process in these instances, cannot be centrally administered. As a result, the level of feedback of information and reporting is extremely poor and there is a clear lack of accountability through "normal" democratic channels.

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[64]The effective tax rate of 27.5% was reduced to a maximum of 15%. The total collection was projected to reach about FCFA 20 Billion, which would represent 250% of the 1991 collections. Twenty-five percent of this total would be the FCFA 5 billion expected to be remitted to the *communes*.

[65]There are, however, a certain number of limitations, major restrictions, and various political considerations which come into play in the actual planning, zoning, subdividing, allocation, allotment and distribution of urban land. (See, for example, the discussion of the differences between Abidjan and the smaller *communes* in Section 2.3 above.) On the other hand, traditional systems of land ownership still exist in the country, mainly in the eastern region and in Abidjan.

[66]There is a system of Kings and village chiefs functioning in the more eastern regions as well as in Abidjan. In such cases, it is the King or the village chief who decides on the allotment of the land. For instance, in the greater Abidjan area there are 55 traditional villages where land is still held under traditional forms of tenure. And in Abengourou -- as we have seen in the case study -- the King participates, though informally, in communal activities. Important decisions on land are made after consultation with the King.


MINISTERE DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT DE LA CONSTRUCTION ET DE L'URBANISME
SERVICES EXTERIEURS
DIRECTIONS REGIONALES
DIRECTIONS DEPARTEMENTALES
CABINET
INSPECTION GENERALE
SERVICE DES LOGEMENTS ET BATIMENTS ADMINISTRATIFS
SERVICE DU DOMAINE URBAIN
COMMISSION NATIONALE DE L'HABITAT
CONSEIL NATIONAL DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT
DIRECTION DES AFFAIRES ADMINISTRATIVES ET FINANCIERES
SOUS-DIRECTION DES PERSONNELS, DE LA FORMATION ET DE LA DOCUMENTATION
SOUS-DIRECTION DU BUDGET ET DE LA COMPTABILITE
DIRECTION DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT
SOUS-DIRECTION DE LA PLANIFICATION DES POLITIQUES ENVIRONNEMENTALES
SOUS-DIRECTION DE LA PLANIFICATION ET DE LA PROTECTION DES MILIEUX
SOUS-DIRECTION DE L'EDUCATION ET DE LA SENSIBILISATION
DIRECTION DE L'ASSAINISSEMENT ET DES INFRASTRUTCTURES
SOUS-DIRECTION DE L'ASSAINISSEMENT ET DU DRAINAGE
SOUS-DIRECTION DES VOIRIES URBAINES ET DES RESEAUX DIVERS
SOUS-DIRECTION DE LA GESTION DES DECHETS
DIRECTION DE LA CONSTUCTION ET DE L'URBANISME
SOUS-DIRECTION DE L'ARCHITECTURE, DE L'HABITAT ET DU PERMIS DE CONSTRUIRE
SOUS-DIRECTION DE LA MAINTENANCE DU PATRIMOI- ET DE LA REGLEMENTATION DES MARCHES
SOUS-DIRECTION DE L'AMENAGEMENT FONCIER URBAIN ET RURAL
SOUS-DIRECTION DE LA PLANIFICATION ET DE L'EQUIPEMENT DES TERRAINS URBAINS

Furthermore, the whole land allocation system, while in principle workable, lends itself to malfunctioning and potential abuse as there is little built-in accountability in the system as a whole. There is a limited process to monitor compliance at all the levels involving land allocation to building an structure on the land. In certain instances, the procedures are so cumbersome that applicants find it easier to circumvent them rather than to go through the process of complying with official requirements.

The assessment of real estate tax, as set out under the provisions of the Finance Act of 1992, is based on a real estate tax rate set at 15% of the annual rental value of the property. This tax is then reduced (i) to 9% on properties which were previously enjoying the temporary exemptions anywhere from 5 to 25 years; (ii) to 4% for all occupiers who own the property, and who are occupying it as their principal residence; or (iii) to 4% on all vacant properties.

The Ministry (delegated by the Prime Minister's Office) in charge of the Economy, Finance and Planning (MEFP) administers the taxation activity, through its two separate and independent *directions générales*. The *Direction générale des impôts* (DGI) through the *Direction du cadastre* (DC) is charged with is responsible for the administration of the tax assessment activity. The *Direction générale de la comptabilité publique et du trésor* (DGCPT) is charged with, accounts for, and, in principle, administers the tax collection activity.

The DGI in Abidjan, through the DC is responsible for all the tax assessments in the country, in areas where the property is properly registered and entered into the cadastral records. Again DGI, through its *Direction de l'enregistrement et du timbre* (DET), collects the tax in Abidjan on behalf of the DGCPT. This is an exception to the general rule that the DGCPT collects taxes and the DGI assesses them. However, it is the local office of the DGCPT (there is one in each municipality all across the country) which is responsible for the collection of the tax outside Abidjan. Where the property is not registered, then the regional offices of DGI (there are 16 or 17 of them) performs both the assessment and the collection functions. They perform the latter function as agents of the DGCPT.

In the current circumstances, the responsibility for and the level of tax assessment and its collection are functions of three major factors: (i) the status of the properties in the locality, (i.e. either there is a property register, a *cadastre*; or the properties in the locality are not registered, *non-cadastrées*); (ii) the geographical location of the property (i.e. whether the property is in Abidjan or elsewhere in the country); and (iii) the authority over the land (i.e. whether the land is government owned, or controlled by a King or village chiefs).

As part of the allocation process, a certain level of inter-ministerial and inter-departmental activity is required. For example, all land allocations require payments to be made to the government through the DGI. In principle, therefore, the DGI should be in a position to have information on all land allocations. But in practice, the system fails to function as it was originally intended for the reasons cited above.

- Business Tax
- License Charges

The business tax (*la patente*) is considered a local tax. The basis of assessment and the calculation of the business tax include a number of principles and steps. In the first place, the basis of assessment is the rental value of the business property. The method of assessment is then based on a set of tariffs. Assessment is consequently a function of the location of the business according to the level of tariffs set. There is accordingly a distinction between businesses, based on whether they are conducted in Abidjan or elsewhere in the country. The method of assessment also takes into account various classifications by type of activity.

The total tax liability under the *patente* is composed of six different elements: (i) the standard amount (*droit fixe* or *taxe déterminée*); and (ii) the variable amount (*droit proportionelle*), which represents 10% of the annual rental value of the business location. The total of (i) and (ii) make up the business tax (*montant de la patente*). The four additional elements of this tax are (iii) the national additional tax (*contribution nationale sur la patente*), which represents 10% of (i) + (ii); (iv) a tax on the rental value of the business property (the TVLLP), which represents 50% of the variable amount, i.e. 50% of (ii); (v) an additional tax on the business tax itself (the TC/P), which again represents an amount equal to the standard amount as in (i); and (vi) an additional tax on the variable amount (the TC/DP), which represents 50% of the amount in (iv) or equally 25% of the amount in (ii).

The business tax is collected at two different levels. First, for businesses with a turnover of 2,000,000 FCFA or more per year, the *patente* is collected by the central government. In practice, tax is collected by the DGCPT if the business is already registered[67]. The tax is collected by DGI if there is no valid registration. Second, in the case of businesses with a turnover of less than 2,000,000 FCFA per year, the business tax (often called *la petite patente*) is collectible by the municipality[68]. However, the tax is collected either as the small business tax or the market tax[69].

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[67] The *patente* is paid directly to DGI instead of DGCPT, by new businesses; by businesses moving to a new locality; and by businesses which exceed the threshold of 2,000,000 FCFA in annual turnover during the fiscal year.

[68] A distinction should perhaps be made between the delegation of administrative powers especially where tax or other monetary collection issues are involved and the right to those collections. In the case of the business tax, the municipalities are, *a priori*, better placed than the central government to collect the tax where the business is small.

[69] The method of collection of small business tax and the market tax are different even though, in a sense, they are both a tax on small businesses. The small business tax (*la petite patente*) is usually collected in advance through issue of a certificate, while the market tax is collected by way of issuing tickets in the market on a daily basis.

The allocation of these business taxes varies according to whether they are collected by the central government or by the *commune*. Thus, for the tax collected by the central government, 60% is distributed to the *communes*, and 40% is held by the central government. This allocation applies to the business taxes collected by the state on annual turnovers of 2,000,000 FCFA and more, whether through a notice of assessment (*par voie des roles*) or on a summary basis (*par anticipation*). By contrast, the business taxes collected by the municipalities (the small business tax and the market tax) are totally allocated to the municipalities.

1.12 Collections by the *Commune*

- Professional Location Tax
- Small Business Tax
- Furnished Accommodation Tax

These collections represent basically the same taxes that are collected by the central government. However, at the lower end of taxable amounts the collection activity is passed on to the *communes* which have a better knowledge of the small taxpayers, given the size of the majority of the *communes*. The *commune* then pays the funds over to the local agent of the DGCPT or deposits the amount in the bank account of the DGCPT.

1.13 Municipal Taxes and Levies

- Gas Stations
- Transport - Hand Carts
- Theatre & Galas
- Cinemas

1.14 Other Municipal Taxes

- Taxicabs
- Advertising (Posters)

The *commune* is again given responsibility for the collection of tax in these instances. These taxes and levies are, in the main, a type of business tax which are levied on the respective activity. In effect, for some activity, the collection represents the only tax payable by the individual involved in that activity. In this regard, these taxes and levies represent an income tax on the activity of the provider. In general, some of these levies are for a nominal amount as the main intention is to exercise a regulatory function, rather than to generate revenue. Thus, the amounts collected are relatively unimportant, as, in most instances, the rates are fixed and have not been updated for a long time. As is shown in an Annex to this report, the taxes which are significant in this category are the tax on gas stations and the tax on taxicabs. However, the overall contribution from this category, for the *communes* outside Abidjan, are negligible. Given the low level of returns, one should weigh the relative value of such collections from two separate perspectives, namely the cost of collection to the municipality (the monetary cost); and the inconvenience factor to the taxpayer (the social cost). Combined, these costs may well outweigh the benefits that the collections provide to the *communes*. This is an especially important consideration when, as a result of the proverbial "lack of liquidity", the *communes* are

receiving less than the total amounts in this category of receipts that are provided for them in the budget.

1.2 PROVISION OF SERVICES

1.21 General Services

- Notary Services
- Birth Certificates
- Other Services
- Sequestration

These registration services which are carried out by Francophone municipalities around the world, tend to reinforce the perception among the community that the *commune* performs the functions of the central government. The revenue generated from these activities are negligible as they represent a regulatory rather than a revenue generating function.

1.22 Community Services

- Demarcation Fees
- Other Services
- Trash Collection Fees

1.23 Economic Services

- Transport Services
- Taxi and Bus Terminals
- Slaughter Houses and Meat Markets
- Markets

These services are the most relevant to local government. However, the level of provision of these services and the degree of each *commune*'s involvement varies greatly for different services within each *commune* and between different *communes*. All the municipalities have a need for these services. But there are major financial, and human resource constraints which impede or restrain provision of these services. There are also a number of practical problems. For instance, the billing for the collection of garbage is included in the electricity bill. The *communes* normally use the services of the *Compagnie ivoirienne d'electricité* (CIE), for collection of the fees. As the CIE is now privatized, it has practical problems in disbursements of the amounts thus collected. The *communes* (the problem was common to all that were visited) resort to a barter system, in that they withhold payment on their electricity bills.

1.3 INVESTMENT INCOME

1.31 Income from Property

- Income from Leases
- Occupied Property

The income from these sources does not currently constitute a significant amount of revenue for the municipalities. There are, however, a number of possibilities for a reasonable increase in income from these sources.

1.4 GOVERNMENT AND EXTERNAL AID

1.41 Government Contribution

- Minimum Allocation
- General Payments
- Special Payments

From what the Mission was able to learn, central government contributions to the *communes* are not based on a consistent and objective set of parameters. A major parameter, based on an analysis of the amounts contributed to different municipalities, is political. In general, however, there is a fixed minimum allocation which is the same for a large number of municipalities, as shown in the Annexes to this report. Otherwise, any shortfall in revenue or collections which has of necessity to be met (such as employee compensation) is compensated by a transfer (not previously provided in the budget) in the form of a general or a special payment.

Aid by external organizations and donors is generally based on their own criteria, and perhaps, subjective evaluations by donor officials.

1.5 SUNDRY RECEIPTS

1.51 Sundry Receipts by the Municipality

- Other Receipts
- Miscellaneous Revenues

These receipts represent collections by the *commune* of tax for previous years, as well as other sundry receivables. The information on these collections can help in the administration of certain delinquent accounts. Such information is not, however, currently utilized.

2. EXPENDITURES

2.1 GENERAL SERVICES

- Staff Compensation Charges (including payroll taxes, travel and transport)
- Motor Vehicle Running Costs
- Material & Supplies
- Provision of Community Services
- Other and Miscellaneous Expenditure

2.2 COMMUNITY SERVICES

2.3 PUBLIC HEALTH AND CULTURAL SERVICES

2.4 ECONOMIC SERVICES

2.5 SUNDRY EXPENDITURE

The bulk of expenditures at the level of the *commune* represent staff compensation. Staff compensation involves the payment of benefits -- not salaries, as these are paid by the central government -- to the government employees seconded to the *communes*, as well as to the elected officials, plus salary payments to the direct employees of the *communes*. The latter represents lower ranking communal officials and workers. The next major item of expenditure represents motor vehicle running costs, especially gasoline. In the current situation of "lack of liquidity", these two items of expenditure are paid first. In the absence of available funds to meet other expenditures, it is left to the municipal *percepteur* at each location to decide on who (or what items) should get paid first.

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Related to the **annual recurrent budget**, which has just been discussed in detail, is the **investment budget**. While this budget is attached to the recurrent budget when submitted, it includes different line items and therefore different revenues and expenditures. The magnitude of the investment budget falls generally between 10% and 30% of the recurrent budget.

B. THE INVESTMENT BUDGET

1. REVENUES OR RECEIPTS
   - 1.1 Income from Transfer of Properties
   - 1.2 Contribution from the Investment Fund
   - 1.3 Borrowings
   - 1.4 Government and External Support
   - 1.5 Charities and Donations

2. EXPENDITURE
   - 2.1 Equipment for General Services
   - 2.2 Equipment for Community Services
   - 2.3 Equipment for Socio-Cultural Services
   - 2.4 Equipment for Economic Services
   - 2.5 Financial Transfers and Operations

The main source of available funding for this budget is the contribution from the government's Investment Fund. Otherwise, a limited number of municipalities, according to provisions in the World Bank's Municipal Development Project (administered by the DCGTx), are eligible to borrow from the "Local Authorities' Loan Fund", or *Fonds de prêt aux collectivités locales* (FPCL). Lists of projects which are currently approved and funded as well as projects which are under review are included as Annex Four to this report.

FPCL represents the only organization that lends to the *communes*. Since the *communes* are so directly under the control of the central government, especially as regards, their income and expenditure, it would be difficult for them to obtain credit on their own from either local banks and external sources. Approval of any type of credit would normally require an

undertaking by the central government with respect to debt service and repayment conditions. Besides, in the current state of affairs, it would be exceedingly difficult for the municipalities not only to identify projects with a return in excess of the rate of interest on their FPCL loans (currently at about 11%), but also as a practical matter, to service the debt. Nevertheless, the FPCL is well placed to objectively evaluate the feasibility of any proposed project.

4.4 Resource Mobilization in Côte d'Ivoire: Analytical Conclusions

4.4.1 General Observations. As was explained above, the 1992 Finance Act (article 13) intended to consolidate and simplify the real estate tax. It has achieved its purpose to the extent it has instituted a single tax assessment. However, based on inquiries, there is no knowledge of any studies undertaken prior to the passage of this legislation intended to determine the possible effects of such a change[70]. On the other hand, one may now consider, in hindsight, the changes in emphasis that the passage of this law has brought about over the year and a half since it was instituted.

In the first place, the change in the law could have long term effects on the construction and infrastructure development in the *communes*. There are a number of *communes* where there has been new construction activity, which will be now adversely affected as a result of the change. At the same time, building activity, particularly for the rental property should be also affected. As the new law essentially targets rental accommodation, it should have negative effects on the development in a number of other important *communes*. It should not be forgotten that a major element in low-cost housing construction in Côte d'Ivoire is "courtyard" housing, which is ideally suited for rental occupation.

The fact that the owner/occupier is subject to a 4% tax on rental value, while an owner who rents or leases out the property is subject to a 15% levy (9% if in the transition period), illustrates that the tax is not a pure real estate tax. It is also -- and perhaps more importantly -- a tax on rental income. As a result, as a source of revenue it favors the larger municipalities where there are a larger number of buildings for rental purposes at the expense of the smaller localities.

By comparison, the business tax has multiple layers of tax assessment, a consolidation and simplification of which would be very desirable. However, it should be observed that this pattern of multiple layer taxation is normal in Francophone systems. It is considered more cost-effective to tax the same base over and over again. Nevertheless, this practice is questionable in a system where tax collection activity is weak and where the government -- in an effort to keep its income base intact -- resorts to taxing the individuals who already pay the tax instead

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[70]The DCGTx is currently in the process of commissioning a study (financed under the Municipal Development Project) to evaluate the financial and taxation effects of the change in the law based on the collections made for the year 1992.

of those who do not. What follows is a discussion of more specific weaknesses in the resource mobilization system that have been highlighted in the research for this study.

4.4.2 Major Shortcomings in Resource Mobilization in Côte d'Ivoire

1. Practical Problems in the Collection of the Real Estate Tax. Apart from the general negative attitude of the public to taxation as a whole[71], there are a number of practical problems that result in a very low level of collection. Many of these problems have already been covered by other studies[72]. In effect, there are two main issues. In the first place, we have pointed to a lack of proper administration and communication at and between different organizations, such as the MECU, the DC, and the DGCPT. Among the reasons for this lack of effective communication are (i) a lack of adequate training; (ii) an inadequate budget to employ staff with technical specialties (such as certified surveyors and the like); (iii) the lack of a proper system for the collection and analysis of information necessary to management decisions; and (iv) "ecological" factors such as the lack of adequate office equipment, transport vehicles, gasoline, and the like. In the second place there seems to be a lack of willingness to bring the individuals who evade compliance to justice. While comprehensive procedures exist for the pursuance of those who violate rules and regulations in land and construction matters as well as for those who evade taxes, the authorities stop short of bringing them to justice[73]. It seems that there is little willingness on the part of the government to go through the required legal steps to secure compliance.

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[71]There is still a degree of resentment towards tax payments in general, as taxation is seen as one of the remaining legacies of the colonial era. There is also the fact that the wealthier and more powerful members of the population are apparently able to avoid payment of the tax. The problem is confounded by the fact that the post-independence government, in an effort to dispel the image that taxation had previously created (as it had been designed to be to be collectible rather than equitable), resorted to the adoption of a comprehensive system of taxation, following the European model.

[72]See, for example, the report prepared by Cabinet Blanchard on the analysis of the real estate tax assessment and collection (Unpublished report for USAID: February, 1993).

[73]For instance, the law provides that a judgement has to be served by a bailiff. In practice, the Ministry of Justice does not issue certifications to register individuals as bailiffs. Therefore, according to MECU officials, the judgements obtained by the Ministry cannot be served. Similarly, the DCGPT is powerless in executing orders for seizure of goods, or in obtaining restraining orders. Paradoxically, at a much lower level of income, the municipalities do not appear constrained in physically confiscating hand-carts in order to make the owners pay local fees and taxes.

2. The Assessment and Collection of Business Taxes. Apart from the effects of recession on the collectible amount of the business tax[74], there are a number of practical shortcomings. For example, different government departments are not able to coordinate their efforts with respect to the annual survey of businesses. The result is that many businesses try to avoid the tax by pretending to one department that they have registered with another department, in that their category is different from the one that they are currently being surveyed (at the point of the FCFA.2,000,000 break in annual turnover). Another example is a lack of organization in collection of the market tax. The system of issuing daily tickets (as is the case in Akoupé) to the individual petty vendors is completely ineffective, both as regards cost of collection and control over vendors.

3. Sources of Income from "Other" and "Non-tax" Resources. A review of the administrative and management accounts by comparing budgets with actual collections shows that the emphasis on different sources of revenue is misplaced. Thus, sources of revenue in a municipality should follow the evolution of the indicated activities. As the range of activities is gradually changing and the *communes* evolve, the conventional sources that are currently taxed gradually disappear over time. New regulations are needed to take care of this evolutions. For instance, as can be seen in the Annexes to this report, a number of levies fall short of the provision in the budget, meaning that the level of activity is going through a downward trend, while collections from other activities surpass the provision in the budget or in some cases no collection is even budgeted for that type of activity. One can, therefore, only conclude that the municipalities are not fully taking account of the change in the pattern of life in the community.

A general review of the sources of revenue and of the basis and methods of tax collection demonstrates that the approach to revenue generation and income enhancement at the local level faithfully follows that of the central government. In fact, the philosophy is exactly the same, even as regards revenue generation from non-tax sources. The central government taxes sources of income and activities. While this approach should be maintained to a certain degree at the communal level, the *commune* should then, by right, also collect levies from users of the services, rather than only from those who provide those services. The reasoning behind this suggestion is that the resources of the municipality are utilized to enable the user to enjoy various services. An example is the audience who frequent the cinema, theater and galas. The tax currently collected from the provider of the service -- in this case the cinema owner -- constitutes an income tax on his activity.

4. Patterns of Communal Expenditure. As discussed elsewhere in this report, the bulk of the expenditure in the *communes* comprises salaries and other forms of staff compensation. These figures do not even take into account the staff who are civil servants (including, generally, all *chefs de service* and a majority of the elected officials who are *cadres* working for the

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[74]For instance, collections of the small business tax (*la petite patente*), which is an arbitrary amount between 2,000 FCFA to 5,000 FCFA per month (payable on annual turnovers of less than 2,000,000 FCFA, as discussed above) have drastically been reduced, as a direct result of a fall in sales and business activity. This is the case in all the four *communes* that were visited for this study.

government), although they do include the *indemnité* paid to mayors and their assistants. Consequently, the current approach to resource mobilization is more administrative, than it is a function of the activities of the community. To put this another way, the staff do not perceive their salaries as being related to the degree to which the local population is satisfied with the services which they provide. The approach currently taken by the municipalities to remedy this deficiency is to farm out various services to outside businesses. This approach, nonetheless, weighs heavily on the already meager resources of the *communes*, since it deprives them of funds for services which they might otherwise obtain, while requiring them to pay their own staff to supervise these activities.

5. Effect of the Recession on the Current Pattern of Expenditure. It would be useful to describe the current pattern of expenditure at the communal level, as a result of lack of funds and a poor cash flow situation. This review is limited to the four municipalities which were visited as case studies. Their problems are common to all the other municipalities in the country.

As was briefly discussed in the introduction to this part of the report, there is a persistent lack of liquidity, not only at the municipal level, but also at the central government level[75]. This condition has had crippling effects on the activities of the *communes* since both the staff the senior elected officials spend much of their time attempting to arrange payments, either for themselves or for third parties. It is interesting to note that communal officials tend to put a lot of weight on the absolute amounts actually collected at the local level and do not, a priori, equate lack of liquidity with the shortfall in collections as compared to the provisions in the budget. A review of the administrative accounts of the *communes* as shown in the Annexes to this report demonstrates that expenditure is limited to the collections, which are, as a rule of thumb, about 90% of the original budgetary provisions. Once the expenditures are mandated and the proper authorizations obtained, actual disbursements (a number of suppliers have not yet been paid for amounts due them at the end of last year) at year end are about 75% of authorized expenditures, which gives a rate of budget realization (at the year end) of less than 70% of original budgeted expenditure. This has added a new dimension to the negative image of the *communes* in the minds both of suppliers and of the local population. The pattern of expenditure and payments for the *communes* in Abidjan are to a large degree at variance from the above practice, as the Annexes show. The Mission was unable to obtain an explanation for this divergence in practices and procedures.

Under current circumstances, disbursements follow strict priorities given the acute shortage of funds. First to be paid are central government salaries. This means that (as stated above) the majority of the elected officials as well as all *chefs de service* of the municipality get paid first. Next in line are payments by the *communes*, of benefits (*indemnités*) to the above individuals, as well as salaries to the employees of the municipality at the lower ranks. Usually

[75] For example, the tax collector at the local office of DGCPT in Akoupé stated that he had travelled to three different locations to meet with his superior in order to arrange for funding to pay their own salaries, to no avail.

this level of payments comes some time after the first group of payments is made[76]. Third are the payments for motor vehicles, their operating expenses, and in particular for gasoline. All other payments are at the discretion of the individual at DGCPT responsible for payments of communal expenditure (*le receveur municipal*). This individual is in fact the tax collector himself representing the Treasury. As was explained above, the payment procedures which invest so much arbitrary authority in this individual are in the process of eroding the authority of other local officials, such as the prefect and the Mayor. It is completely left to *le receveur* to decide, who, and how much should be paid as well as when the payment should be made. In practice, therefore, the municipalities consult him before expenditure is incurred. It is not clear to what extent *le receveur* is accountable for his decisions. But this double function is a potential source of conflict of interest.

4.5 Recommendations

4.5.1 General observations. The approach taken in this study to making recommendations for the mobilization of resources is limited to the functions involving accounting and financial matters. Therefore, when making reference to the Ministries and their agencies, this section will refer essentially to accounting and financial functions at those organizations to the extent they relate to the *communes*. The basis for these recommendations, consists of a number of principles:

The total tax burden. In making any recommendations to increase the level of tax collection, not to mention tax assessment, one should take into account the degree of the total tax burden according to both the level of income as well as the standard of living.

Administration of the tax. The principle of segregation of duties suggests that in a given administrative system, irrespective of its weaknesses, an overlap of functions among personnel because of manpower shortages will weaken performance. The current approach to tax collection constitutes deconcentration, as opposed to decentralization, of major functions. This objective would be better served by administration on a regional basis; by the use of a mobile unit extending from the government office which is responsible for the execution of work; or by a combination of these or similar arrangements.

The balance between assessment of the tax and its collection. As discussed in detail in other parts of this report, there is a need to improve implementation at the level of tax collections. The tax laws require simplification and consolidation. Nonetheless, rather than blaming the taxpayer for avoiding payment by invoking the complexity of the tax assessment system, it is worth pointing out that the taxes are not effectively collected.

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[76] On the Mission's second visit to Akoupé, on June 11, 1993, it was told that while salaries of the civil servants had been paid before the end of the first week in June, the benefits and salaries had not yet been paid by the municipality.

Increasing public awareness and understanding of communal functions. One of the main elements in the development of the *communes* is the degree of public support that they can obtain from the people in the community. The *communes* should carry out awareness and publicity campaigns to explain their needs and functions; and they should openly publish full details of their financial situation[77]. The municipality should develop the philosophy that it is a partner with the residents in the task of improving their quality life. Unfortunately, a number of activities carried out by the *communes* such as the collection of taxes, make this a difficult approach to the extent that the performance of those administrative functions leaves the municipality in an antagonistic posture vis à vis its residents.

Coordination of functions between different administrative agencies. This objective should be pursued as a matter of policy. It should also be considered as one of the main axes in the training programs discussed below.

Ideal organizational structure for project implementation. As has already been described, the *communes* are a part of the central government for accounting and financial purposes. The only legal means through which funds can be allocated to the municipalities by donor organizations, without loss of accountability is through the setting up of a non governmental organization. Port-Bouet, is the only municipality with an active NGO, an organization which the *commune* itself, in conjunction with donors, established. The implementation of any project which requires direct financial support should be through an NGO.

4.5.2 The structure of our financial recommendations: A matrix approach. As has already been mentioned, the issues relating to the mobilization of resources are multidimensional. It would, therefore, be useful to demonstrate this approach by way of applying a matrix to the elements involved. The recommendations should take into account the elements in Table 1 in Section 4.1 above. In addition, one should develop, at least, a second matrix which would consider, for the sake of simplicity, a minimum of two other elements, namely, the time horizon and the population mix. As regards the time horizon, one should, at least, identify two perspectives, the short term, and the medium and the long term. By *short term* is meant the next three years. Projects within this time period can be implemented without little change in policy; they require relatively limited training; they need only modest financial resources; they require few infrastructure improvements; and they can be easily introduced and do not hinder or create conflict with medium- and long-term plans. By *medium and long term* is meant beyond three years. Projects carried out within this time frame would structurally change the system, both at the policy and the implementation levels. The requirements in this case are more taxing on all

[77] Article 39 of the law governing creation of the *communes* provides for the access to the accounts and information on the financial situation of the municipality for each individual residing in the community. But this article does not enjoin the *commune* or the government to publish this information.

the available resources. Given the scope of this work, it is possible to make only limited recommendations aimed at the medium and long term.

A second issue is the type of municipality. With respect to population, there are at least three types of municipalities. In this connection, any recommendation should be a function of the size of the *commune*. The criteria for the size should be the area, location, population, size and type of business activity and mix of the inhabitants (rural, urban, civil servants and private businesses, and degree of ethnic representation). In the absence of an objective evaluation of these criteria, within the scope of the current work, the annual budget can be used as a basis for identifying different municipalities[78]. On this basis there are at least three types. In the absence of a more appropriate terminology, they may be ranked as large, medium and small. This designation should be taken as a measure of the size as well as the degree of development of the municipality. Thus, **large** represents developed, fully urban *communes*; **medium** represents semi-developed *communes*; and **small** represents rural *communes*. The elements of the proposed approach may now be presented in the form of a matrix as shown below in Table 2.

Table 2.
Approaches to Communal Support for Resource Mobilization as a Function of Size and Time Perspective

Time Span	Large Municipalities	Medium-sized Municipalities	Small Municipalities
Short Term	Approach i	Approach ii	Approach iii
Medium and Long Term	Approach iv	Approach v	Approach vi

If the first matrix (from Table 1) is superimposed on to this matrix, 24 potential approaches are produced. This number can, however, significantly be reduced for the purposes of the present report through the introduction of the following constraints:

- The USAID budget and priorities;
- The feasibility of different approaches in the present circumstances, and;
- The use of common denominators for various approaches.

[78]The budget is, in itself, a subjective evaluation within the context of various political considerations. However, total budget allocations, including salaries paid to the government officials (appointed as well as elected) by the central government in conjunction with the population of the *communes*, should constitute a more appropriate measure for dividing the *communes* into different categories.

These factors are taken into account in developing the plans of action that are described below.

4.5.3 Development of a general plan of action. In developing any plan for improving the effectiveness of mobilization of the resources both from a revenue as well as an expenditure point of view, a number of parameters and considerations should be taken into account. First, any plan should be general enough so that the benefits from its implementation be perceptible at the level of a majority of the *communes*. The most general plan should encompass, at least, two main courses of action. The first course of action should be to provide training at all levels of the administrative system. This would involve developing a list of priorities for human resource investment. Human resources, under current circumstances, seem to be the major resource available in the country.

Human resource planning, or manpower utilization can be approached on two fronts, namely that of skilled labor, and that of unskilled labor. (The mass of unskilled labor constitutes a major available resource in most communities, which can be effectively used instead of, or parallel with activities which require intensive capital expenditure.) Deployment of training activities should start at two distinct levels, with two dimensions, namely (i) at the level of the heads of *sous-directions* and *services* in the Ministries involved with communal activities. Training should be provided by outside trainers, covering specific areas (ILO is already providing a general training); then this training should incorporate those who have already been trained, to themselves train the lower echelons in the administration (it may even include writing up simple and standard job descriptions); (ii) at the level of elected officials and *chefs de service* in the municipalities, with separate approaches, however, for each of them.

The second course of action involves provision of direct financial support. Here, an important principle is to use NGOs wherever possible as a vehicle for the execution of projects. As there are limited resources, implementation of projects requires provision of direct financial support. The support can be provided in a variety of forms, for instance through the setting up of NGOs. The training program itself can be provided through an NGO. Another principle involves the allocation of resources. Resources can be allocated as a function of the work carried out by skilled workers. In this connection, resources should be allocated in relation to the importance of administrative and operational jobs. While administrative work represents, in general, the activity of collection and analysis of information for submission to the decision makers, operational jobs represent the work which directly influences the final accumulation of resources, whether it be the collection of taxes and other revenues or the administration of expenditures. This distinction is important in deciding the level, type, and timing of the assistance.

Examples of this administrative/operation distinction are as follows:

At DGCL, Abidjan The functions at this *direction générale* are more administrative than operational by nature. They include the collection of budgets from the municipalities and their verification for compliance of

expenditure with the budget, laws, and the regulations; and obtaining the Administrative Accounts from the municipalities, with a view to consolidation for decision-making[79].

At DGCPT, Abidjan The work of this *direction générale* is to obtain the Management Accounts from the *communes* in order to review compliance with the laws and the regulations governing the management of funds (rather than resources) at those locations.

Contrary to the above, the following functions are operational functions:

At MECU Agencies of this Ministry perform all the necessary work (in cooperation with **DCGTx**), dealing with town planning, making subdivisions and administering allocation of the land.

At DGI This *direction générale* carries out surveys and issues tax assessments.

4.5.4. Development of specific action plans. Once the general plan is elaborated, **specific action plans** need to be worked out. Some requirements for such plans will involve: (i) the preparation by *communes* of a "needs list" to include manpower training and services required, along with prospective methods of achieving local financial sustainability for the services included (see the various cells in Table 1 above); (ii) the identification of projects as a function of the most frequently requested services, that are easy to implement, and that represent relatively low capital costs; and (iii) the preparation of a few pilot projects for typical services and training schemes. In the development of these action plans, attention should be given to the use of mobile units, which can result in cost saving and help to achieve uniformity in administrative procedures.

The **choice of municipality** should be a function of the needs of other municipalities in that immediate region, also taking into account other criteria applicable to pilot projects which provide for replication. The process should also attempt to **pool resources** wherever possible at the regional level. This may lead to some level of regionalization of administration, but for equipment and certain kinds of services and infrastructure -- particularly for the smaller *communes* -- such a reorganization would be highly cost effective. Finally, in our suggestions for more effective use of resources, we have introduced a cumulative pyramid approach to allocation of projects. Once the municipalities are chosen based on the criteria stated above, the priority should be first given to the municipalities, which are willing, and who have the capability and commitment to replicate their experience in other municipalities. The allocation

[79]This work is not currently performed due to lack of computer equipment, personnel and other resources.

should be made, based on the resources of the *communes* that can be utilized beyond their immediate means (contrary, perhaps to some extent, to the idea that the *communes* with lesser resources should be helped first).

A cumulative pyramid approach illustrates how to choose municipalities for the most effective use of resources. As discussed above, the municipalities should be divided into three types, as follows:

Category of *commune*	Total number
Abidjan and 10 large cities	20
Semi-developed *communes*	46
Rural *communes*	69
Total	**135**

As shown in the diagram below, one can start with, say, six municipalities at the top, then after the implementation of a designated project, those municipalities each help in the implementation of the project in two other municipalities. Then, the three municipalities help in implementation of another four. At this point, the first set of municipalities will be phased out. Then, the municipalities in the second and the third rank implement the project in other municipalities. In the end, a project is implemented in all the eligible municipalities.

In this presentation, for the sake of completeness, it has been assumed that the project needs implementation in all *communes*. This may be unreasonable, since, if a project fails, for various reasons, to produce any tangible results it may be discontinued somewhere along the line.

There are also political considerations which, by the nature of the activity, have to be built into the model. In this case, however, an attempt has been made to leave political considerations out of the matrix, as they would introduce yet another dimension to the shortcomings at hand. For instance, a politically sensitive project in a given community, may prove difficult to implement, but may be more successful in a succeeding municipality. There may also be instances where a successful project in one municipality is considered to be unsuitable for replication in other municipalities as a result of an analysis of the factors which make the project successful in that municipality alone.[80]

[80]The experience of building a two story market in Treichville, where it is successful and replicating this experience in Abobo -- where it has not been successful and the market remains partially empty -- demonstrates that performance of a feasibility analysis is crucial to the success of a project at this scale.

Diagram for a Cumulative Pyramid Approach to Project Implementation

FIRST TYPE OF MUNICIPALITY												SECOND TYPE OF MUNICIPALITY												THIRD TYPE OF MUNICIPALITY											
1				1						2		1										2		3											
2		3		3		4		5		6		4		5				6		7		8		9											
4	5	6	7	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21												
8		12		15		19		23		27		22		26		30		34		38		42													
9		13		16		20		24		28		23		27		31		35		39		43													
	10	14		17		21		25		29		24		28		32		36		40		44													
	11	15		18		22		26		30		25		29		33		37		41		45													
16	18		31		35		39		43		46		50		54		58		62		56														
17			32		36		40		44		47		51		55		59		63		67														
19				33		37		41		45		48		52		56		60		64		68													
		20		34		38		42		46		49		53		57		61		65		69													

TOTALS

20	+	46	+	69	=	135

4.5.5 Suggested projects for implementation. The overriding consideration in any selection of projects, other than the constraints mentioned above, is their duration. Two lists, one for the short term, and the other for the medium and the long term have therefore been developed. Based on the criteria which run through the body of all the recommendations are eight considerations: (i) the pursuance of increased effectiveness; (ii) training and continuing education (this involves starting at the top and going down through the ranks; and diffusing programs of awareness and sensibilization of the community); (iii) increasing efficiency; (iv) the setting up of equipment repair centers, regionalization and pooling of resources (including the centralization of artisanal activities); (v) keeping up the momentum by replication; (vi) identifying the *communes* where resources can be better mobilized for both their own benefit as well as for other *communes*, and starting the projects in those *communes*; (vii) implementing projects which perpetuate themselves, or if they involve a one-time assistance, that provide for a permanent improvement in operating methods; and (viii) providing for environmental sustainability wherever possible.

A number of projects for possible implementation may now be listed.

In the short term

- A simplified property survey, for the real estate tax.
- A study to propose better coordination of work between different administrative agencies, while avoiding conflict of interest.
- Reorganization of the annual survey of businesses for the business tax.
- In the absence of an effective judicial system to enforce payment by delinquent taxpayers, the institution of a publicity campaign as a way of demonstrating the importance of paying property taxes.
- Provision of material and equipment support to selected *communes*.
- Reduction in expenditure to free up resources for other purposes. For instance, with a reasonable outlay, the system of roads and canals outside Abidjan can be properly constructed and maintained. The result will be a definite reduction in the cost of garbage collection and also a saving in health costs.
- Substitution of unskilled labor for capital intensive equipment and fuel costs (e.g. in the collection of garbage).

In the medium and long term

- Advocating policy change issues, such as the streamlining and even reorganization of the tax administration. For instance, the MEFP is currently making proposals to the Council of Ministers on the following matters:

  - Decentralization and regionalization of the taxation authority.

  - Consolidation of functions. This involves centralization of the tax assessment and the tax collection functions.

  - Computerization and introduction of a management information system.

  - Introduction of new tax laws and legislation.

- Modifications and even new concepts in the tax laws can be considered. For instance, the 15% tax rate on property taxes can be amended to take account of the following factors:

  - Introduction of incentives and tax credits in order to encourage economies in the use of energy and other resources.

  - Transfer of authority over the land to all *communes*.

  - Introduction of laws with a view to income enhancement in direct response to the change in activity of the residents. What is needed is change, modification or repeal of laws no longer applicable neither as a source of revenue nor for providing a regulatory function.

  - Change in the method of accounting to create special funds as in, for example, the United States.

- A comprehensive survey of urban properties, to improve the administration of the real estate tax.

- Coordination of work between different administrative agencies, while avoiding conflict of interest.

- Reorganization of the annual survey of businesses for the business tax.

- Institution of effective procedures to enforce payment and compliance by delinquent taxpayers.
- Establishment of centers for equipment selection and purchases.
- Encouragement of associations for professional and artisanal activities.
- Promotion of the idea that the *commune* is a partner, not an adversary of the central government.

5. FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Given the argument of this study that the decentralization exercise in Côte d'Ivoire has been a positive one -- in spite of the economic difficulties which the whole country is currently going through -- USAID policy should support efforts of the GOCI to sustain and strengthen the *communes* as institutions of local democracy.

On the **resource mobilization** side, this means considering support for a wide range of both short-term, and medium- and long-term projects, as indicated in the previous section. The effect of support of such projects, in addition to the actual impact of the projects on local communities and target groups within the administrative system, would be to signal the strong approval of the United States government for what is, arguably, the most elaborate program of decentralization in all of black Africa. Support for decentralization channelled to the GOCI will not only demonstrate to the Ivorians that they are on the right track, but it will give USAID important leverage in the very influential Ministry of the Interior (presumably through the DGCL), and will send a signal to other countries in the region that an important donor supports decentralization.

As to the **modalities of support** for USAID intervention, it is important that the Agency attempt to work with some of the other donors in this field. Since the funding likely to be available is modest, and since a number of other donors -- such as the World Bank, the European Economic Community (through the FED), and even the French -- have significantly larger programs, USAID can more effectively position itself in this process through both bilateral and joint funding operations. The other donors may be pleased to include USAID in joint management structures for some of their projects, even if the agency's contribution is small.

Apart from the question of joint funding, USAID should, as much as possible, attempt to work with local or national NGOs in the urban field. Until now, such organizations are not numerous or important in Côte d'Ivoire, but if the experience of other West African countries is any example, they will become more significant in the near future. Working with NGOs has at least two advantages: it distances the donor from too strong an identification with official structures, and thus one of the parties in a multiparty state; and it also tends to make accountability tighter and ensure that the impact of funding decisions on local target groups is more direct. To understand the potential of NGOs and community groups in the urban field, a consultant study is proposed -- to be carried out by a local group if at all possible -- of the range of NGOs and community groups in a representative sample of *communes* throughout the country. The study should also look systematically at the contribution which these groups do, and can make to the provision of basic urban services.

Finally, USAID should continue to work effectively in the **training** of municipal officials and elected councillors. Evidence from the study shows that there is a great need for more training on basic functions (such as accounting, the management of certain common services such as refuse collection and markets, and the collection of fees and taxes) in many of the

communes across the country. So far, although the DGCL has established a training unit, it has no ability (given current financial constraints) to fund the activities of this unit. In the future, training activities can be extended to include small research-related projects (which can generate local information about services and various administrative questions), more work with the prefects and sub-prefects, and perhaps even the municipal *receveurs* who have become so important in communal finances.

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ANNEX 1.a

DISTRIBUTION OF THE TOTAL BUDGET

YEAR 1991

TOTAL BUDGET (CFA Francs) LOWER BAND	HIGHER BAND Inclusive	NUMBER OF COMMUNES	CUMULATVE NUMBER COMMUNES	CUMULATVE % COMMUNES
LESS THAN	50,000	64	64	47%
50,000	100,000	31	95	70%
100,000	150,000	14	109	80%
150,000	200,000	6	115	85%
200,000	250,000	5	120	88%
250,000	& MORE	16	136	100%

ANNEX 1.b

DISTRIBUTION OF THE TOTAL BUDGET

YEAR 1991

NUMBER OF COMMUNES	PERCENTAGE TOTAL BUDGET	CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF COMMUNES	PERCENTAGE OF COMMUNES	CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE OF COMMUNES
1	28%	1	1%	28%
14	46%	15	11%	74%
26	12%	41	30%	86%
47	9%	88	65%	95%
48	5%	136	100%	100%
16	0%	152		100%

ANNEX 1.c

DISTRIBUTION OF THE TOTAL BUDGET

YEAR 1991

CENTRAL GOV'T CONTRIBUTION FCFA 000'S	NUMBER OF COMMUNES	NUMBER OF COMMUNES	TOTAL AMOUNT	TOTAL AMOUNT
0	5	5	0	0
16,303	1			16303
16,649	1			16649
21,779	1			21779
22,219	5			111095
22,229	1			22229
22,766	1			22766
23,489	27			634203
24,985	1			24985
25,393	22			558646
28,568	17			485656
29,782	1			29782
29,825	1			29825
31,742	9			285678
32,631	11			358941
33,329	10			333290
34,916	4			139664
38,852	6			233112
39,677	3			119031
44,439	1			44439
46,027	1	1	46027	46027
47,584	1	1	47584	47584
49,281	1	1	49281	49281
62,214	1	1	62214	62214
70,352	1	1	70352	70352
114,575	1	1	114575	114575
602,214	1	1	602214	602214
680,400	1	1	680400	680400
0	136	13	1672647	5160720

ANNEX 2

TOTAL BUDGET ALLOCATION FOR THE MUNICIPALITIES

YEAR 1991

No.	COMMUNE	1991 TOTAL BUDGET CFA 000'S	PERCENTAGE	CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTION
1	VILLE D'ABIDJAN	9,491,300	28.13%	680,400
2	TREICHVILLE	2,639,193	7.82%	0
3	PLATEAU	2,321,478	6.88%	0
4	BOUAKE	1,676,485	4.97%	114,575
5	MARCORY	1,530,000	4.54%	0
6	PORT-BOUET	1,258,560	3.73%	0
7	COCODY	1,177,425	3.49%	29,782
8	ADJAME	943,617	2.80%	0
9	YAMOUSSOUKRO	928,392	2.75%	602,214
10	ABOBO	634,893	1.88%	49,281
11	YOPOUGON	624,493	1.85%	47,584
12	DALOA	585,426	1.74%	24,985
13	KOUMASSI	577,340	1.71%	46,027
14	SAN-PEDRO	372,139	1.10%	70,352
15	KORHOGO	303,415	0.90%	62,214
16	GAGNOA	289,624	0.86%	22,766
17	ABENGOUROU	246,048	0.73%	21,779
18	BEOUMI	231,211	0.69%	33,329
19	MAN	230,338	0.68%	22,229
20	ATTECOUBE	221,534	0.66%	29,825
21	AGBOVILLE	209,913	0.62%	16,303
22	DIVO	189,161	0.56%	38,852
23	GRAND-BASSAM	181,960	0.54%	38,852
24	DABOU	166,566	0.49%	38,852
25	DAOUKRO	157,693	0.47%	34,916
26	DIMBOKRO	154,526	0.46%	16,649
27	SOUBRE	151,976	0.45%	33,329
28	BOUAFLE	147,135	0.44%	32,631
29	ADZOPE	136,640	0.41%	38,852
30	ABOISSO	135,323	0.40%	38,852
31	KATIOLA	133,072	0.39%	32,631
32	ANYAMA	123,706	0.37%	44,439
33	SASSANDRA	120,000	0.36%	32,631
34	FERKESSEDOUGOU	114,108	0.34%	32,631
35	AGNIBILEKROU	111,977	0.33%	31,742
36	BONDOUKOU	111,898	0.33%	38,852
37	BOUNDIALI	110,118	0.33%	32,631
38	TIASSALE	107,300	0.32%	39,677
39	JACQUEVILLE	105,223	0.31%	32,631
40	ISSIA	105,000	0.31%	33,329
		29,056,211	86.13%	2,536,624

All monetary figures are expressed in CFA.
50 CFA = 1 French Franc.
All monetary figures are in CFA 000's and are accordingly rounded.

No.	COMMUNE	1991 TOTAL BUDGET CFA 000'S	PERCENTAGE	CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTION
41	BINGERVILLE	104,848	0.31%	31,742
42	BONOUA	100,000	0.30%	32,631
43	DUEKOUE	100,000	0.30%	34,916
44	DANANE	98,823	0.29%	33,329
45	TOUMODI	96,445	0.29%	32,631
46	OUME	93,000	0.28%	34,916
47	TABOU	92,496	0.27%	25,393
48	SEGUELA	83,799	0.25%	32,631
49	SIKENSI	83,526	0.25%	31,742
50	GUIGLO	83,261	0.25%	32,631
51	LAKOTA	83,000	0.25%	33,329
52	SINFRA	81,824	0.24%	39,677
53	ODIENNE	79,847	0.24%	32,631
54	AKOUPE	78,438	0.23%	39,677
55	VAVOUA	77,615	0.23%	31,742
56	BOROTOU	72,651	0.22%	22,219
57	BONGUOANDOU	70,537	0.21%	34,916
58	OUELLE	69,932	0.21%	25,393
59	TANDA	69,187	0.21%	28,568
60	DABAKALA	68,814	0.20%	25,393
61	BIANKOUMA	67,500	0.20%	33,329
62	ZUENOULA	66,300	0.20%	33,329
63	TENGRELA	63,267	0.19%	33,329
64	ADIAKE	62,291	0.18%	25,393
65	GUITRY	57,929	0.17%	28,568
66	SAIOUA	55,766	0.17%	33,329
67	TIEBISSOU	54,386	0.16%	28,568
68	BOUNA	54,267	0.16%	28,568
69	OUANGOLODOUGOU	53,767	0.16%	25,393
70	M'BATTO	53,418	0.16%	31,742
71	ARRAH	52,900	0.16%	28,568
72	AFFERY	52,211	0.15%	33,329
73	BROBO	48,247	0.14%	31,742
74	MANKONO	48,227	0.14%	28,568
75	DIABO	47,310	0.14%	28,568
76	AYAME	46,999	0.14%	28,568
77	NIABLE	46,944	0.14%	25,393
78	BLOLEQUIN	46,545	0.14%	28,568
79	TOUBA	45,900	0.14%	28,568
80	GUIBEROUA	45,785	0.14%	28,568
81	NIAKARAMANDOUGOU	45,566	0.14%	23,489
82	GRAND-LAHOU	45,500	0.13%	22,219
83	HIRE	43,506	0.13%	31,742
84	BANGOLO	42,589	0.13%	28,568
85	BONIEREDOUGOU	42,244	0.13%	23,489
86	ZOUAN-HOUNIEN	42,040	0.12%	31,742
87	SINEMATIALI	41,606	0.12%	28,568
88	AZAGUIE	41,395	0.12%	25,393
		32,158,659	95.32%	3,979,929

All monetary figures are expressed in CFA.
50 CFA = 1 French Franc.
All monetary figures are in CFA 000's and are accordingly rounded.

No.	COMMUNE	1991 TOTAL BUDGET CFA 000'S	PERCENTAGE	CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTION
89	DIDIIEVI	41,231	0.12%	28,568
90	AGOU	41,000	0.12%	31,742
91	YAKASSE-ATTOBROU	40,034	0.12%	28,568
92	M'BAHIAKRO	39,675	0.12%	25,393
93	FACOBLY	39,517	0.12%	28,568
94	FRONAN	39,303	0.12%	23,489
95	NAPIE	39,249	0.12%	28,568
96	TOULEPLEU	39,158	0.12%	25,393
97	OUANINOU	38,385	0.11%	25,393
98	ALEPE	37,249	0.11%	25,393
99	TAFIRE	37,100	0.11%	25,393
100	BOCANDA	36,868	0.11%	25,393
101	KOUTO	35,719	0.11%	23,489
102	RUBINO	35,703	0.11%	25,393
103	OURAGAHIO	35,488	0.11%	25,393
104	DIKODOUGOU	35,291	0.10%	25,393
105	NIELLE	35,230	0.10%	23,489
106	M'BENGUE	34,893	0.10%	23,489
107	PRIKRO	34,395	0.10%	25,393
108	KOUIBLY	32,915	0.10%	25,393
109	BOTRO	32,826	0.10%	23,489
110	BIN-HOUYE	32,330	0.10%	25,393
111	GOHITAFLA	32,172	0.10%	25,393
112	KANI	31,591	0.09%	23,489
113	FRESCO	31,292	0.09%	23,489
114	ZOUKOUGBEU	31,268	0.09%	23,489
115	DIAWALA	31,098	0.09%	23,489
116	KOLIA	30,830	0.09%	23,489
117	NASSIAN	30,383	0.09%	23,489
118	LOGOUALE	30,304	0.09%	25,393
119	KOUN-FAO	30,157	0.09%	22,219
120	SIRASSO	30,152	0.09%	23,489
121	BETTIE	30,133	0.09%	23,489
122	SATAMA-SOKORO	30,007	0.09%	23,489
123	KOUASSI-KOUASSIKRO	30,000	0.09%	23,489
124	ZIKISSO	29,812	0.09%	25,393
125	GBON	29,526	0.09%	23,489
126	SIPILOU	29,418	0.09%	23,489
127	MINIGNAN	29,384	0.09%	23,489
128	MADINANI	28,873	0.09%	23,489
129	KOUASSI-DATEKRO	28,210	0.08%	23,489
130	BODOKRO	28,000	0.08%	23,489
131	KASSERE	27,837	0.08%	23,489
132	TIENINGBOUE	27,732	0.08%	23,489
133	TIEME	27,318	0.08%	23,489
134	SAMATIGGUILA	26,708	0.08%	23,489
135	TEHINI	26,352	0.08%	22,219
136	BASSAWA	25,298	0.07%	22,219
		33,736,073	100.00%	5,160,720

All monetary figures are expressed in CFA.
50 CFA = 1 French Franc.
All monetary figures are in CFA 000's and are accordingly rounded.

ANNEX THREE
FINANCIAL INFORMATION FOR FISCAL YEAR 1992

Name of Commune: D'AKOUPE
Source of Information: ANNUAL FINANCIAL REORTS

A. ADMINISTRATIVE BUDGET — Year 1992

1. REVENUES

	TOTAL BUDGET FCFA 000	ACTUAL RECEIPTS	PERCENTAGE ACTUAL RECEIPTS	EXCESS (DEFICIT)	PERCENTAGE EXCESS (SHRTFL)
TOTAL RECEIPTS	109,895	80,365	100%	(29,530)	-27%
1.1 TAXES & LEVIES	11,098	7,324	9%	(3,774)	-34%
Collections by the Treasury					
Real Estate Tax					
Built Property	889	580	1%	(309)	-35%
Unbuilt Property	10	6	0%	(4)	-40%
Uncompleted Property	20	12	0%	(8)	-40%
Transfer Taxes	40	25	0%	(15)	-38%
Business Tax	2,267	1,408	2%	(859)	-38%
License Charges	116	29	0%	(87)	-75%
Subtotal 1.11	3,342	2,060	3%	(1,282)	-38%
Collections by Municipality					
Professionl Location Tax	84	0	0%	(84)	-100%
Small Business Tax	5,198	3,654	5%	(1,544)	-30%
Furnished Accomm. Tax	0	0	0%	0	0%
Subtotal 1.12	5,282	3,654	5%	(1,628)	-31%
Municipality Taxes & Levies					
Gas Stations	1,380	540	1%	(840)	-61%
Transport – Handcarts	306	140	0%	(166)	-54%
Theatres & Galas	27	95	0%	68	252%
Cinemas	0	3	0%	3	0%
Subtotal 1.13	1,713	778	1%	(935)	-55%
Other Municipality Taxes					
Taxicabs	744	747	1%	3	0%
Advertising (Posters)	17	85	0%	68	400%
Subtotal 1.14	761	832	1%	71	9%

All monetary figures are expressed in CFA.
50 CFA = 1 French Franc.
All monetary figures are in CFA 000's and are accordingly rounded.

	TOTAL BUDGET CFA 000	ACTUAL RECEIPTS	PERCENTAGE ACTUAL RECEIPTS	EXCESS (DEFICIT)	PERCENTAGE EXCESS (SHRTFL)
1.2 PROVISION OF SERVICES	54,366	24,913	31%	(29,453)	-54%
General Services					
Notary Services	933	888	1%	(45)	-5%
Birth Certificates	1,500	1,127	1%	(373)	-25%
Other Services	100	115	0%	15	15%
Sequestration	254	291	0%	37	15%
Subtotal 1.21	2,787	2,421	3%	(366)	-13%
Community Services					
Demarcation Fees	30,000	45	0%	(29,955)	-100%
Other Services	0	20	0%	20	3908%
Trash Collection	2,000	140	0%	(1,860)	-93%
Subtotal 1.22	32,000	205	0%	(31,795)	-99%
Economic Services					
Transport Services	290	291	0%	1	0%
Taxi & Bus Terminals	1,250	1,486	2%	236	19%
Slaugthr-Hse & Meat Mart	39	213	0%	174	446%
Markets	18,000	20,297	25%	2,297	13%
Subtotal 1.23	19,579	22,287	28%	2,708	14%
1.3 INVESTMENT INCOME	2,052	1,757	2%	(295)	-14%
Income from Property					
Income from Leases	2,000	1,403	2%	(597)	-30%
Occupied Property	52	354	0%	302	581%
Subtotal 1.31	2,052	1,757	2%	(295)	-14%
4. GOVERNMENT & EXTERNAL AID	39,677	39,677	49%	0	0%
Government Contribution					
Minimum Allocation	13,225	9,919	12%	(3,306)	-25%
General Payment	13,226	9,919	12%	(3,307)	-25%
Special payment	13,226	19,839	25%	6,613	50%
Subtotal 1.41	39,677	39,677	49%	0	0%
1.5 SUNDRY RECEIPTS	2,702	6,694	8%	3,992	148%
Sundry Receipts by the Municipality					
Other Receipts	1,769	1,747	2%	(22)	-1%
Miscellaneous Revenues	933	4,947	6%	4,014	430%
Subtotal 1.51	2,702	6,694	8%	3,992	148%

ADMINISTRATIVE BUDGET
2. ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE
2.1 GENERAL SERVICES

	TOTAL	General Admin.	Financl Admin.	Collectn Admin.	Police & Order	Payroll
Payroll	24,893	14,371	5,530	2,424	2,568	24,893
Payroll Taxes	1,632	697	530	151	254	
Transport	513	285	180	48	0	
Motor Vehicle costs	4,398	3,498	400	200	300	
Supplies	4,844	3,166	1,423	179	76	
Utilities	1,205	1,205	0	0	0	
Repairs & Maintenance	1,904	1,619	215	70	0	
Services Rec'd	1,798	1,380	418	0	0	
Expended Amount	41,187	26,221	8,696	3,072	3,198	
Unexpended Balance	4,093	2,965	539	14	575	
Total 2.10	45,280	29,186	9,235	3,086	3,773	

2.2 COMMUNITY SERVICES

	TOTAL	Road Maintnce	Town Pinning		Garbage Collectn	Payroll
Payroll	6,411	1,488	899		4,024	6,411
Payroll Taxes	486	147	0		339	
Transport	139	139	0		0	
Motor Vehicle costs	8,000	4,000	0		4,000	
Supplies	2,427	1,073	0		1,354	
Utilities	0	0	0		0	
Repairs & Maintenance	1,314	981	0		333	
Services Rec'd	0	0	0		0	
Expended Amount	18,777	7,828	899	0	10,050	
Unexpended Balance	1,491	1,008	1		482	
Total 2.20	20,268	8,836	900	0	10,532	

2.3 PUBLIC HEALTH AND CULTURAL SERVICES

	TOTAL	Public Health	Family Aid	Sport & Holidays	Cultural Activits	Payroll
Payroll	816	816	0	0	0	816
Payroll Taxes	0	0	0	0	0	
Transport	0	0	0	0	0	
Motor Vehicle costs	0	0	0	0	0	
Supplies	160	90	0	0	70	
Utilities	0	0	0	0	0	
Repairs & Maintenance	0	0	0	0	0	
Services Rec'd	195	0	95	0	100	
Expended Amount	1,171	906	95	0	170	
Unexpended Balance	1,945	10	205	900	830	
Total 2.30	3,116	916	300	900	1,000	

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ADMINISTRATIVE BUDGET

2. ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE

2.1 GENERAL SERVICES

LOCATION BY TYPE OF EXPENDITURE

	Payroll Taxes	Transport	M Vhicle Costs	Supplies	Utilities	Repairs Mntnce	Services Rec'd	Total	%AGE Total
Payroll								24,893	23%
Payroll Taxes	1,632							1,632	1%
Transport		513						513	0%
Motor Vehicle costs			4,398					4,398	4%
Supplies				4,844				4,844	4%
Utilities					1,205			1,205	1%
Repairs & Maintenance						1,904		1,904	2%
Services Rec'd							1,798	1,798	2%
Expended Amount								41,187	37%
Unexpended Balance								4,093	4%
Total 2.10								45,280	41%

2.2 COMMUNITY SERVICES

LOCATION BY TYPE OF EXPENDITURE

	Payroll Taxes	Transport	M Vhicle Costs	Supplies	Utilities	Repairs Mntnce	Services Rec'd	Total	%AGE Total
Payroll								6,411	6%
Payroll Taxes	486							486	0%
Transport		139						139	0%
Motor Vehicle costs			8,000					8,000	7%
Supplies				2,427				2,427	2%
Utilities					0			0	0%
Repairs & Maintenance						1,314		1,314	1%
Services Rec'd							0	0	0%
Expended Amount								18,777	17%
Unexpended Balance								1,491	1%
Total 2.20								20,268	18%

2.3 PUBLIC HEALTH AND CULTURAL SERVICES

LOCATION BY TYPE OF EXPENDITURE

	Payroll Taxes	Transport	M Vhicle Costs	Supplies	Utilities	Repairs Mntnce	Services Rec'd	Total	%AGE Total
Payroll								818	1%
Payroll Taxes	0							0	0%
Transport		0						0	0%
Motor Vehicle costs			0					0	0%
Supplies				160				160	0%
Utilities					0			0	0%
Repairs & Maintenance						0		0	0%
Services Rec'd							195	195	0%
Expended Amount								1,171	1%
Unexpended Balance								1,945	2%
Total 2.30								3,116	3%

2.4 ECONOMIC SERVICES

	TOTAL	Industry Commerce	Markets			Payroll	Al
Payroll	1,368	528	840				1,368
Payroll Taxes	135	52	83				
Transport	0	0	0				
Motor Vehicle costs	0	0	0				
Supplies	180	0	180				
Utilities	193	99	94				
Repairs & Maintenance	64	0	64				
Services Rec'd	0	0	0				
Expended Amount	1,940	679	1,261	0	0		
Unexpended Balance	165	2	163	0	0		
Total 2.40	2,105	681	1,424	0	0		

5. SUNDRY EXPENDITURE

	TOTAL	Payabls Supplrs	Commnty Meetngs	Insrnce Charges	Transfr Reserve	Payroll	Al
Payroll	0	0	0	0	0		0
Payroll Taxes	0	0	0	0	0		
Transport	0	0	0	0	0		
Motor Vehicle costs	1,500	1,500	0	0	0		
Supplies	2,221	1,999	222	0	0		
Utilities	0	0	0	0	0		
Repairs & Maintenance	78	0	78	0	0		
Services Rec'd	8,544	0	206	1,302	7,036		
Expended Amount	12,343	3,499	506	1,302	7,036		
Unexpended Balance	26,783	4,001	544	108	22,130		
Total 2.5	39,126	7,500	1,050	1,410	29,166		
TOTAL EXPENDED AMOUNT	75,418				75,418	33,488	
TOTAL UNEXPENDED BALANCE	34,477						
GRAND TOTAL	109,895						
Commitments	5,886						

2.4 ECONOMIC SERVICES

LOCATION BY TYPE OF EXPENDITURE

	Payroll Taxes	Transport	M Vhicle Costs	Supplies	Utilities	Repairs Mntnce	Services Rec'd	Total	%AGE Total
Payroll								1,368	1%
Payroll Taxes	135							135	0%
Transport		0						0	0%
Motor Vehicle costs			0					0	0%
Supplies				180				180	0%
Utilities					193			193	0%
Repairs & Maintenance						64		64	0%
Services Rec'd							0	0	0%
Expended Amount								1,940	2%
Unexpended Balance								165	0%
Total 2.40								2,105	2%

5. SUNDRY EXPENDITURE

LOCATION BY TYPE OF EXPENDITURE

	Payroll Taxes	Transport	M Vhicle Costs	Supplies	Utilities	Repairs Mntnce	Services Rec'd	Total	%AGE Total
Payroll								0	0%
Payroll Taxes	0							0	0%
Transport		0						0	0%
Motor Vehicle costs			1,500					1,500	1%
Supplies				2,221				2,221	2%
Utilities					0			0	0%
Repairs & Maintenance						78		78	0%
Services Rec'd							8,544	8,544	8%
Expended Amount								12,343	11%
Unexpended Balance								26,783	24%
Total 2.5								39,126	36%
TOTAL EXPENDED AMOUNT	2,253	052	13,898	9,832	1,398	3,360	10,537	75,418	69%
TOTAL UNEXPENDED BALANCE								34,477	31%
GRAND TOTAL								109,895	100%

Commitments

ANNEX 4

BUDGETARY ALLOCATIONS TO COMMUNES IN ABIDJAN, 1990

	PAIEMENTS EFFECTUES 1990								ECARTS			
			FOURNISSEURS				PAIEMENTS PUBLICS	TOTAL GENERAL	ECART ENTRE PREVISIONS ET RECOUVREMENTS	ECART ENTRE RECOUVREMTS.ET PAIEMENTS	% DE RECOUV. PAR RAPPORT AUX PREVISIONS	% DE PAIEMT. PAR RAPPORT AUX RECOUVREMTS.
COMMUNES	SALAIRES	CARBURANTS	SOGECI	CIE	CI-TELCOM	AUTRES FOUR-NISSEURS						
Ville d'Abidjan	1.155.779.751	165.134.964	50.025.680	0	40.861.099	6.121.955.196	94.479.693	7.628.227.383	2.302.039.034	351.940.583	77.61	95.59
Treichville	425.637.929	0	0	0		1.302.602.542	25.921.349	1.754.161.820	168.018.399	885.030.831	94.01	66.47
Koumassi	185.022.934	0	0	0		328.123.649	14.387.850	537.534.433	186.176.648	8.075.919	74.56	98.52
Port-Bouet	234.119.856					1.424.550.744	27.787.980	1.686.458.580	1.052.591.251	(1.195.862.437)	31.79	343.76
Marcory	302.460.887					1.058.483.305	59.811.754	1.420.755.946	1.698.601.000	(1.420.755.946)	0.00	ERR
Adjame	276.609.382					920.515.478	170.193.677	1.367.318.537	472.720.533	(685.669.070)	59.05	203.59
Attecoube	71.673.168					118.798.766	5.845.674	196.317.608	21.339.118	9.571.274	90.61	95.35
Yopougon	136.719.674					741.580.427	67.539.411	939.839.512	250.294.252	(326.234.764)	71.03	153.17
Cocody	175.708.296					364.274.151	24.590.556	564.570.993	298.634.529	106.271.478	59.30	84.16
Plateau	229.626.815					1.944.881.451	43.142.904	2.217.651.170	1.181.350.495	(204.996.665)	63.01	110.19
Abobo	158.003.453					560.200.083	7.711.159	725.914.705	146.813.800	(207.530.513)	77.93	140.03
TOTAL	3.355.351.135	165.134.964	50.025.680	0	40.861.099	14.885.965.792	541.412.017	19.038.750.687	7.778.579.017	12.680.159.310	67.77	116.38

SOURCE: DGCL

Annex 5a

ETAT DES ACTIVITES FINANCIERES DU FPCL - PRETS ACCORDES

ETAT AU 31 - 05 - 93

COMMUNE	PROJET	MONTANT OPERATION	MONTANT DU PRET	DATE CONVENTION	AUTOFIN. AU 30 - 04 - 93	SITUATION DE L'OPERATION
BOUAFLE	MARCHE CENTRAL	195 300 000	150 704 700	19/7/91	25 398 000	Marché dans le cicuit de signature MEFP
M'BATTO	MARCHE CENTRAL	104 000 000	77 800 000	19/7/91	13 200 000	Travaux en cours depuis le 11/3/93
BOUNDIALI	MARCHE CENTRAL	110 000 000	80 935 000	19/7/91	16 670 000	Travaux en cours depuis le 25/3/92
DABAKALA	HOTEL DE VILLE	28 000 000			600 000	Marché approuvé le 25/1/93
DABAKALA	CAMPEMENT HOTEL	17 000 000	37 350 000	21/4/92	2 350 000	
DABAKALA	MORGUE	8 000 000			1 600 000	En attente de livraison
SOUBRE	MARCHE CENTRAL	190 000 000	156 200 000	21/4/92	27 100 000	Travaux en cours depuis le 26/8/92
BOUAFLE	HOTEL DE VILLE	105 000 000	30 000 000	21/4/92	0	Appel d'Offres en cours
ABENGOUROU	HOTEL DE VILLE	85 000 000	51 000 000	2/3/93	0	Appel d'offres en cours
	MARCHE CENTRAL	230 000 000	178 000 000			Marché dans le circuit de signature MEP
GUITRY	MATERIEL A ORDURES MENAGERES	15 000 000	9 750 000	2/3/93	5 081 985	En attente de livraison
SOUBRE	HOTEL DE VILLE	90 000 000	52 900 000	2/3/93	0	Travaux en cours depuis le 3/93
TOTAL		1 177 300 000	824 639 700		91 999 985	

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DEMANDES DE PRETS EN COURS D'INSTRUCTION AU 31/05/93

COMMUNE	PROJET	MONTANT OPERATION	PRET ENVISAGE	SITUATION DE L'INSTRUCTION
AGNIBILEKROU	DISPENSAIRE	31 000 000	25 000 000	Instructions terminées Dossiers transmis au sécrétariat technique du FPCL
AGNIBILEKROU	HOTEL DE VILLE	125 000 000	81 250 000	
BINGERVILLE	MARCHE CENTRAL	76 500 000	85 000 000	Instructions terminées Dossiers transmis au sécrétariat technique du FPCL
	GARE ROUTIERE	34 000 000		
DIVO	MARCHE CENTRAL	330 000 000	280 500 000	Attente de dossiers techniques et délibération
FERKESSEDOUGOU	MARCHE CENTRAL	150 000 000	127 500 000	Attente de dossiers techniques et délibération
KOUIBLY	GARE ROUTIERE	100 000 000	85 000 000	Intruction en cours
KOUIBLY	ABATTOIR			
KOUIBLY	MARCHE CENTRAL			
BONDOUKOU	HOTEL DE VILLE	112 000 000	72 800 000	Début d'instruction
AYAME	MATERIEL O.M.	16 200 000	10 200 000	Début d'instruction technique (instruct. financière achevée)

DEMANDES DE PRETS EN COURS D'INSTRUCTION AU 31/05/93

COMMUNE	PROJET		MONTANT OPERATION	PRET ENVISAGE	SITUATION DE L'INSTRUCTION
SINFRA	MARCHE	Terrasse + plateforme Dallage extérieur Sanitaires	50 651 011	43 053 359	En attente des dossiers de demande de prêt
	GARE	Terrasse + Génie civil Sanitaires			
	ABATTOIR	Terrasse + plateforme Bâtiment Autre			
BIANKOUMA	MARCHE	Terrasse + plateforme Dallage extérieur Sanitaires	53 081 977	45 119 680	En attente des dossiers de demande de prêt
	GARE	Terrasse + Génie civil Sanitaires			
	ABATTOIR	Terrasse + plateforme			
DUEKOUE	MARCHE	Dallage extérieur Sanitaires	57 020 754	33 072 037	En attente des dossiers de demande de prêt
	GARE	Terrasse + Génie civil Sanitaires Signalisation			
	ABATTOIR	Terrasse + plateforme Bâtiment Autres			

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ADMINISTRATIVE BUDGET
2. ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE
2.1 GENERAL SERVICES

	TOTAL	General Admin.	Financl Admin.	Collectn Admin.	Police & Order	Payroll
Payroll	24,893	14,371	5,530	2,424	2,568	24,893
Payroll Taxes	1,632	697	530	151	254	
Transport	513	285	180	48	0	
Motor Vehicle costs	4,398	3,498	400	200	300	
Supplies	4,844	3,166	1,423	179	76	
Utilities	1,205	1,205	0	0	0	
Repairs & Maintenance	1,904	1,619	215	70	0	
Services Rec'd	1,798	1,380	418	0	0	
Expended Amount	41,187	26,221	8,696	3,072	3,198	
Unexpended Balance	4,093	2,965	539	14	575	
Total 2.10	45,280	29,186	9,235	3,086	3,773	

2.2 COMMUNITY SERVICES

	TOTAL	Road Maintnce	Town Pinning		Garbage Collectn	Payroll
Payroll	6,411	1,488	899		4,024	6,411
Payroll Taxes	486	147	0		339	
Transport	139	139	0		0	
Motor Vehicle costs	8,000	4,000	0		4,000	
Supplies	2,427	1,073	0		1,354	
Utilities	0	0	0		0	
Repairs & Maintenance	1,314	981	0		333	
Services Rec'd	0	0	0		0	
Expended Amount	18,777	7,828	899	0	10,050	
Unexpended Balance	1,491	1,008	1		482	
Total 2.20	20,268	8,836	900	0	10,532	

2.3 PUBLIC HEALTH AND CULTURAL SERVICES

	TOTAL	Public Health	Family Aid	Sport & Holidays	Cultural Activits	Payroll
Payroll	816	816	0	0	0	816
Payroll Taxes	0	0	0	0	0	
Transport	0	0	0	0	0	
Motor Vehicle costs	0	0	0	0	0	
Supplies	160	90	0	0	70	
Utilities	0	0	0	0	0	
Repairs & Maintenance	0	0	0	0	0	
Services Rec'd	195	0	95	0	100	
Expended Amount	1,171	906	95	0	170	
Unexpended Balance	1,945	10	205	900	830	
Total 2.30	3,116	916	300	900	1,000	

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2.4 ECONOMIC SERVICES

	TOTAL	Industry Commerce	Markets			Payroll	Al
Payroll	1,368	528	840				1,368
Payroll Taxes	135	52	83				
Transport	0	0	0				
Motor Vehicle costs	0	0	0				
Supplies	180	0	180				
Utilities	193	99	94				
Repairs & Maintenance	64	0	64				
Services Rec'd	0	0	0				
Expended Amount	1,940	679	1,261	0	0		
Unexpended Balance	165	2	163	0	0		
Total 2.40	2,105	681	1,424	0	0		

5. SUNDRY EXPENDITURE

	TOTAL	Payabls Supplrs	Commnty Meetngs	Insrnce Charges	Transfr Reserve	Payroll	Al
Payroll	0	0	0	0	0		0
Payroll Taxes	0	0	0	0	0		
Transport	0	0	0	0	0		
Motor Vehicle costs	1,500	1,500	0	0	0		
Supplies	2,221	1,999	222	0	0		
Utilities	0	0	0	0	0		
Repairs & Maintenance	78	0	78	0	0		
Services Rec'd	8,544	0	206	1,302	7,036		
Expended Amount	12,343	3,499	506	1,302	7,036		
Unexpended Balance	26,783	4,001	544	108	22,130		
Total 2.5	39,126	7,500	1,050	1,410	29,166		
TOTAL EXPENDED AMOUNT	75,418				75,418	33,488	
TOTAL UNEXPENDED BALANCE	34,477						
GRAND TOTAL	109,895						
Commitments	5,886						

ANNEX 4

BUDGETARY ALLOCATIONS TO COMMUNES IN ABIDJAN, 1990

	PAIEMENTS EFFECTUES 1990								ECARTS			
			FOURNISSEURS				PAIEMENTS PUBLICS	TOTAL GENERAL	ECART ENTRE PREVISIONS ET RECOUVREMENTS	ECART ENTRE RECOUVREMTS.ET PAIEMENTS	% DE RECOUV. PAR RAPPORT AUX PREVISIONS	% DE PAIEMT. PAR RAPPORT AUX RECOUVREMTS.
COMMUNES	SALAIRES	CARBURANTS	SOGECI	CIE	CI-TELCOM	AUTRES FOUR-NISSEURS						
Ville d'Abidjan	1.155.779.751	165.134.964	50.025.680	0	40.861.099	6.121.955.196	94.479.693	7.628.227.383	2.302.039.034	351.940.583	77.61	95.59
Treichville	425.637.929	0	0	0		1.302.602.542	25.921.349	1.754.161.820	168.018.399	885.030.831	94.01	66.47
Koumassi	185.022.934	0	0	0		328.123.649	14.387.850	537.534.433	186.176.648	8.075.919	74.56	98.52
Port-Bouet	234.119.856					1.424.550.744	27.787.980	1.686.458.580	1.052.591.251	(1.195.862.437)	31.79	343.76
Marcory	302.460.887					1.058.483.305	59.811.754	1.420.755.946	1.698.601.000	(1.420.755.946)	0.00	ERR
Adjame	276.609.382					920.515.478	170.193.677	1.367.318.537	472.720.533	(685.669.070)	59.05	203.59
Attecoube	71.673.168					118.798.766	5.845.674	196.317.608	21.339.118	9.571.274	90.61	95.35
Yopougon	136.719.674					741.580.427	67.539.411	939.839.512	250.294.252	(326.234.764)	71.03	153.17
Cocody	175.708.296					364.274.151	24.590.556	564.570.993	298.634.529	106.271.478	59.30	84.16
Plateau	229.626.815					1.944.881.451	43.142.904	2.217.651.170	1.181.350.495	(204.996.665)	63.01	110.19
Abobo	158.003.453					560.200.083	7.711.159	725.914.705	146.813.800	(207.530.513)	77.93	140.03
TOTAL	3.355.351.135	165.134.964	50.025.680	0	40.861.099	14.885.965.792	541.412.017	19.038.750.687	7.778.579.017	12.680.159.310	67.77	116.38

SOURCE: DGCL

DEMANDES DE PRETS EN COURS D'INSTRUCTION AU 31/05/93

COMMUNE	PROJET	MONTANT OPERATION	PRET ENVISAGE	SITUATION DE L'INSTRUCTION
AGNIBILEKROU	DISPENSAIRE	31 000 000	25 000 000	Instructions terminées Dossiers transmis au sécrétariat technique du FPCL
AGNIBILEKROU	HOTEL DE VILLE	125 000 000	81 250 000	
BINGERVILLE	MARCHE CENTRAL	76 500 000	85 000 000	Instructions terminées Dossiers transmis au sécrétariat technique du FPCL
	GARE ROUTIERE	34 000 000		
DIVO	MARCHE CENTRAL	330 000 000	280 500 000	Attente de dossiers techniques et délibération
FERKESSEDOUGOU	MARCHE CENTRAL	150 000 000	127 500 000	Attente de dossiers techniques et délibération
KOUIBLY	GARE ROUTIERE	100 000 000	85 000 000	Intruction en cours
KOUIBLY	ABATTOIR			
KOUIBLY	MARCHE CENTRAL			
BONDOUKOU	HOTEL DE VILLE	112 000 000	72 800 000	Début d'instruction
AYAME	MATERIEL O.M.	16 200 000	10 200 000	Début d'instruction technique (instruct. financière achevée)

DEMANDES DE PRETS EN COURS D'INSTRUCTION AU 31/05/93

COMMUNE	PROJET		MONTANT OPERATION	PRET ENVISAGE	SITUATION DE L'INSTRUCTION
SINFRA	MARCHE	Terrasse + plateforme Dallage extérieur Sanitaires	50 651 011	43 053 359	En attente des dossiers de demande de prêt
	GARE	Terrasse + Génie civil Sanitaires			
	ABATTOIR	Terrasse + plateforme Bâtiment Autre			
BIANKOUMA	MARCHE	Terrasse + plateforme Dallage extérieur Sanitaires	53 081 977	45 119 680	En attente des dossiers de demande de prêt
	GARE	Terrasse + Génie civil Sanitaires			
	ABATTOIR	Terrasse + plateforme			
DUEKOUE	MARCHE	Dallage extérieur Sanitaires	57 020 754	33 072 037	En attente des dossiers de demande de prêt
	GARE	Terrasse + Génie civil Sanitaires Signalisation			
	ABATTOIR	Terrasse + plateforme Bâtiment Autres			

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DEMANDES DE PRETS EN COURS D'INSTRUCTION AU 31/05/93

COMMUNE	PROJET		MONTANT OPERATION	PRET ENVISAGE	SITUATION DE L'INSTRUCTION
AKOUPE	MARCHE	Terrasse + plateforme Daffage extérieur Sanitaires	49 105 000	41 739 250	En attente des dossiers de demande de prêt
	GARE	Terrasse + Génie civil Sanitaires			
	ABATTOIR	Terrasse + plateforme			
TIASSALE	MARCHE	Terrasse + plateforme Daffage extérieur Sanitaires	55 500 000	47 175 000	En attente des dossiers de demande de prêt
	GARE	Terrasse + Génie civil Sanitaires			
	ABATTOIR	Terrasse + plateforme			
TIEBISSOU	HOTEL DE VILLE JARDIN PUBLIC MARCHE SALLE POLYVALEN AMENAGEMENT DE PONT		37 500 000	31 875 000	Instruction en cours
TOTAL			**1 277 558 742**	**1 009 284 326**	

ANNEX 6

List of Persons Interviewed

REDSO/WCA

Carleene DEI	Chief, Development Division

US EMBASSY

Edgard KAGAN	Political officer

RESEARCH TRIANGLE INSTITUTE

Jean-Michel LEBRETON	Resident expatriate training director
Jeff HUGHES	Waste management adviser
Julie Aberg ROBISON	Resident expatriate trainer

UVICOCI

Victor AMAGOU	Maire de Marcory et secretaire général, UVICOCI

ORSTOM/PETIT BASSAM

Bernard CONTAMIN	Director
Dominique COURET	Researcher
Richard CROOK	Visiting researcher
Marc LE PAPE	Researcher

WORLD BANK

Jean MAZURELLE	Project manager, Western Africa technical division.

CABINET BLANCHARD

Aissatou YACE	Economic, legal and fiscal matters
Jean-Blanchard YACE	Management and engineering matters

FED

Vincent FOLLEA	Consultant

DCGTx

M. KIPRE	SADEC
Mme. Amélie CISSE	SADEC
Jean ST. VIL	Communal data base
Mamadou SOUMAHORO	AUVI

DIRECTORATE DU CADASTRE

Mme. Danielle SARAKA	Directeur des recettes domaniales, de la conservation foncière et du cadastre
Albert LEY	Technical adviser
Jean-Claude GOHOU	Responsable du Projet CADASTRE

DGCL

Albert HOBA	Directeur général des collectivités locales
Idrissa KONE	Directeur du budget
Mamadou Ahmed SIDIBE	Sous directeur de la tutelle financière et des comptes

COMMUNE OF AKOUPE

Atsé Benjamin YAPO	Maire
Achiépo AKACHIBY	Premier adjoint au maire
Aimé KAPHET GNAKO	Secretaire général
Kwadio LOGON	Chef, services techniques
Gnagne Agnés NESTOR	Controleur du Trésor.

COMMUNE OF ABENGOUROU

Dominique KOREKI BILE	Premier adjoint au maire
Ettiégne Julien KWAKU	Troisième adjoint au maire
Bitra Appoline PALLE	Cinquième adjoint au maire
Adou BOUA	Conseiller municipal
Kouamé AMOAKON	Sec/gén PDCI
Kouadio KOUASSI	Directeur financier

COMMUNE OF PORT-BOUET

Mme. Hortense AKA ANGHUI	Maire
Ludovic N'DRI YAO	Secretaire général
Michel K. KOUAO	Chef des services financiers
Yves ADOTEVI	Conseiller juridique, chargé de projet AMCAV.

COMMUNE OF TIASSALE

M. le Préfet
Premier adjoint au maire
Secretaire général
Chef des services techniques

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