



DECENTRALIZATION: FINANCE & MANAGEMENT PROJECT

**DECENTRALIZATION, DEMOCRATIZATION, PUBLIC SERVICE
PROVISION AND GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT OF
RENEWABLE NATURAL RESOURCES: INITIATIVES AND
DILEMMAS IN CAPE VERDE**

Managed by
Associates in Rural Development, Inc.

In collaboration with
Syracuse University • Metropolitan Studies Program/Maxwell School of Citizenship & Public Affairs
Indiana University • Workshop in Political Theory & Policy Analysis

Sponsored by
Agency for International Development

**DECENTRALIZATION, DEMOCRATIZATION, PUBLIC SERVICE
PROVISION AND GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT OF
RENEWABLE NATURAL RESOURCES: INITIATIVES AND
DILEMMAS IN CAPE VERDE**

(An Abridgement of the Original Report)

ORIGINAL and FULL REPORT
February 14, 1993

Prepared by:

Eve L. Crowley
Claudio A. Furtado
Harlan H. Hobgood
Oumar Kamara
Daniel H. C. Mendes
James T. Thomson

with the assistance of:
Gil Evora

James T. Thomson, team leader and editor

Prepared under the aegis of:

The Club du Sahel
CILSS
Agency for International Development; Decentralization: Finance and Management Project

Managed by:

Associates in Rural Development, Inc.

This Abridgement prepared by:

by Harlan H. Hobgood
January 1994

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	i
PREFACE	ii
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND PORTUGUESE AND CRIOULO TERMS	iv
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	ix
I. CAPE VERDE: THE SETTING AND THE AGENDA FOR CHANGE	
National Institutions and the Policy Environment	1
A. Introduction	1
B. The Setting and the National Transition from One-Party Rule	1
C. National Elections - The Transfer of Power	3
D. The New Government's Policy Framework	3
E. Municipal Elections - The Structure of Local Government	3
F. The National Economy - Challenges to the New Regime	4
1. Foreign Aid	5
2. State Enterprises	6
3. Agriculture and Fisheries	7
4. Emigrant Remittances	8
G. Public Services - The Institutional Setting	8
1. Education	9
2. Education and Decentralization: Issues and Prospects	12
3. Health	12
4. Public Health and Decentralization	15
5. Social Welfare	16
6. Decentralization and Social Welfare	17
7. Non-Governmental Organizations, Social Welfare and Decentralization	18
8. Judicial Administration and Police	19
H. Natural Resources Management - The Ministry of Fisheries, Agriculture and Rural Extension (MPAAR)	21
I. Decentralization and Democracy in Cape Verde: A Summary of the National-Level Perspective.	22
II. MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT IN CAPE VERDE	
Case Studies of the Local Government Context	24
A. Introduction	24
1. Municipal Government in the National Context	24
2. Introducing the Two Case Studies: Ribeira Grande and Santa Catarina	27

B.	Approaching the Cases: Illuminating Issues not Comparative Administration	30
C.	Municipal Administration and Finance	30
	1. Municipal Finance	30
	2. Municipal Administration - Reaching and Serving Citizens	31
D.	The Welfare System	32
E.	Education	34
F.	Law Enforcement	35
G.	Public Health	35
H.	Municipal Institutional Capacity: A Summary of Findings	36
	1. Santa Catarina	37
	2. Ribeira Grande	38

III. CAPE VERDE'S RURAL COMMUNITIES

	Case Studies In the Dynamics of Survival and the Institutions of Governance	39
A.	Introduction	39
B.	Lagoa Povoacao on the Planalto Leste (Ribeira Grande Municipality-The Island of Santo Antão)	39
	1. Background and Setting	39
	2. Collective Action and Governance	40
	3. FAIMO Workfronts and Welfare	42
	4. Public Services: Health, Population and Education	42
	5. Renewable Resources, Farm Land and Tenure Rules	44
	6. Interactions: Organization of Control and Investments	47
	7. Interaction: Strategies to Control Management Rights	48
	8. Interactions: Conflicts and Conflict Resolution	49
	9. Outcomes of Land-Holding Strategies	50
	10. Perspectives on Improving Tenure Relations	51
C.	Ponta do Sol Fisher Community (Ribeira Grande Municipality-The Island of Santo Antão)	51
	1. Introduction	51
	2. Attributes of the Community and Public Services	51
	3. Fisheries Technical Attributes	53
	4. Fisheries Rules	55
	5. Interactions	56
	6. Outcomes	58
D.	Povoado of Mato Baixo and the Production Site of Tabugal (Santa Catarina Municipality-The Island of Santiago)	58
	1. Introduction: Background and Setting	58
	2. Attributes of the Community: Organizational and Cultural Characteristics	59
	3. Public Services	62
	4. Local and Overlapping Formal Institutional Arrangements and Markets	63
	5. The Production Site: Mato Baixo and Tchada Mato Baixo	64

6.	The Production Site: Tabugal	66
7.	Outcomes and Conclusions	69
E.	Povoado of Pico Leão, the Farmers and Herders (Praia Municipality-The Island of Santiago)	70
1.	Introduction and Setting	70
2.	Organizational and Cultural Characteristics	71
3.	Governmental Levels and Public Services	73
4.	Observations and Conclusions	75
5.	The Irrigated Production Site: Pico Leão	75
6.	Water Rotation, Water Supplements and Canal and Terrace Up-Keep	78
7.	Outcomes and Conclusions	78
8.	The Pastoral System in Pico Leao: the Châ d'Igreja	78
9.	Outcomes of Pastoral Interactions:	80
10.	Conclusions from Pico Leão for Decentralization in Cape Verde ..	80
F.	Povoado of Calheta, Farmers and Herders (Maio Municipality-The Island of Maio)	83
1.	Introduction: Background and Setting	83
2.	Attributes of the Community: Organizational and Cultural Characteristics	83
3.	Administrative Jurisdictions and Public Services	85
4.	Production Systems in Calheta: Fishing, Farming and Livestock ..	90
5.	Outcomes of Pastoral Interactions and Conclusions	96
IV.	CONCLUSIONS OF THE STUDY AND THE ACTION AGENDA	98
A.	Decentralization in Principle	98
B.	Decentralization in Action	100
1.	The Necessary Means	100
2.	Mobilizing Resources and Land Tenure Issues	101
3.	The Resolution of Conflicts	103
C.	Setting Priorities: A Calendar for Action	103
D.	Conclusion	105
	APPENDIX A: BIBLIOGRAPHY	106
	APPENDIX B: INTERVIEWS	109

PREFACE

The studies abridged in this report were carried out in the Cape Verde Islands during May, 1992 under the auspices of the Club du Sahel (OECD) and CILSS¹. Preparation of the full report of the studies and of this abridgement was supported by the Agency for International Development through the Decentralization: Finance and Management (DFM) Project. The study was authorized and supported by the Government of Cape Verde. It is the fourth in a series of analyses² conducted on prospects, within the CILSS member countries, for decentralization. The underlying problematic is whether decision-making and action in the areas of public service provision, and governance and management of renewable natural resources can be improved by devolving authority and power to sub-national governments within these countries.

In each of the earlier country studies, teams composed of host country and expatriate consultants collaborated to collect and analyze data. The Cape Verde study proceeded along these same lines. Interviews were conducted first in the national capital, then in two municipalities (Santa Catarina on Santiago, and Ribeira Grande on Santa Antão) at the municipal level. In these two jurisdictions, village-level case studies of service provision and governance and management of natural resources were also conducted. Village-level case studies were also conducted in the Municipalities of Praia and Maio, but time constraints precluded intensive investigations at the municipal government level in those jurisdiction.

This study is highly relevant in the context of the general moves towards decentralization and more democratic governance in CILSS countries. Control of the national government of Cape Verde and of most municipal governments passed peacefully in 1991 from the former ruling party, the PAICV, to the new MPD and affiliated parties.

MPD officials campaigned on a program of decentralization. They now confront the dilemmas involved in trying to devolve control in a highly centralized system, where most officials have been trained and have worked in a top-down, command and control mode. The goal of the decentralization policy is to encourage much greater citizen participation in affairs of governance that concern them directly, on the assumption that efficiencies will be improved, equity will be served, and citizens will benefit from higher quantity and better quality services and improved governance and management of renewable resources. One of the critical issues addressed at length in the study is land tenure arrangements and their impact on citizen capacity to participate in local governance.

¹ Comité inter-états de lutte contre la sécheresse au Sahel/Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel. The member countries are Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal.

² Earlier studies have been conducted in Mali, Senegal and Niger. The last focused specifically on public finance arrangements and issues within the country and their probable impact on prospects for devolving authority to sub-national governments.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The team would like to express its appreciation to those without whose assistance at many and various points this report could not have been completed. It is a significant indication of the interest of Cape Verdians, both citizens and officials, in the issues of decentralization and democratization addressed in this volume that we were allowed to go where we wanted, meet with whom we wished, and talk about topics of our choosing anywhere in Cape Verde.

The team divided its month in Cape Verde about equally between capital-city interviews and investigations at both the municipal and community (*povoado*) levels. We were received hospitably in six local communities: Lagoa and Ponto do Sol (Ribeira Grande); Mato Baixo (Santa Catarina); Pico Leão and Châ d'Igreja (Praia); and Calheta (Maio). In each of these places residents found the time, and the patience, to respond to our questions with care and concern. Those interviews provided us fundamental insights into the strategies people pursue to survive and to overcome their problems.

At the municipal level, the team met the same sort of reception. Council Presidents Celestino dos Santos Alamada (Santa Catarina), Jorge Mauricio Santos (Ribeira Grande) and Jacinto Abreu Dos Santos (Praia) met with team members several times, provided critical information about municipal operations and guided our subsequent investigations within their jurisdictions. Many national government technicians posted in those jurisdictions, whose names appear in Appendix B., also enriched our investigations, as the relevant chapters in this report attest.

At the national level, officials in many ministries proved uniformly helpful (see Appendix B). We gained from our discussions with them a clearer perception of the view from the center of the decentralization process and prospects in Cape Verde.

We would like to express our thanks for their support to officials of the Club du Sahel, CILSS, USAID and to the Cape Verdian CILSS representative, Alleliua Maria Andrade Barbosa. All contributed to organizing the study.

Finally, an observation and a disclaimer. Problem-solving, decentralization and democratic governance are all complicated issues. They admit of neither easy nor final answers. We have undoubtedly committed some errors of understanding, interpretation and analysis, but not through any fault of those with whom we spoke in Cape Verde.

The issue is whether decentralization is politically, legally and fiscally feasible, and whether those involved in the process as prime decision makers have the intellectual concepts necessary to conceive of a quite different system of governance based on citizen participation; multiple, autonomous centers of governance; negotiated rather than imposed solutions; and a reliance on the judiciary rather than administrative fiat to resolve disputes, not only between citizens and citizens and government officials, but between jurisdictions as well.

The team hopes information and analyses contained in this report will assist Cape Verdians, both citizens and officials, as they confront these dilemmas and seek solutions to them. Clearly this struggle will be a long one, but it can also be productive for all concerned if participants continue to seek new ideas that work for them where they live.

The Club and CILSS co-financed this study. Supplementary funding was provided by the United States Agency for International Development. The team wishes to express its appreciation for this support.

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND PORTUGUESE AND CRIOULO TERMS

<i>alambique</i>	cane alcohol distillery
<i>alqueir</i>	standard measure of land equivalent to 40 liters or 0.4 ha., most commonly used in Santo Antão.
<i>animadores</i>	social welfare workers
<i>asogueiro</i>	see <i>magarefe</i>
<i>agentes municipais</i>	multifunctional municipal agents
<i>auxiliares</i>	health care assistants
<i>bairro</i>	urban neighborhood
BADEA	Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa
<i>banquetas</i>	intermittent contour ditch used to conserve water in silvi-pastural areas.
BORNE Fonden	Danish/Scandinavian NGO foster parents program
<i>boto</i>	funeral association in which members contribute regular cash installments to cover funeral expenses when needed
<i>chafariz</i>	public water fountain, providing water for household consumption, and sometimes also for laundry and animals
<i>cabochefe</i>	administrator at the community level, during the colonial period
<i>comissão de moradores</i>	residents commission, lowest level of State recognized authority under the PAICV, functioning at the level of <i>povoado</i>
CARITAS	Catholic private voluntary organization
CILSS	Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (<i>Comité inter-états de lutte contre la sécheresse au Sahel</i>)
CVE	Cape Verde Escudos (currency)
<i>decima</i>	rural property tax equivalent to 10% of imputed rent

<i>djuda</i>	generalized reciprocity, offered gratis with no expectation of return. May take the form of assistance in agricultural or domestic tasks, construction, services, or small gifts.
<i>djunta mon</i>	situational mutual aid groupings, involving a reciprocal exchange of labor among households, calculated by equal exchange of person days and designed to provide supplementary labor in peak labor periods. Usually used in rainfed agriculture or roof construction.
EBC	Complementary Basic Education (fifth and sixth grades, primary school)
EBE	Elementary Basic Education (first through fourth grades, primary school)
EBI	Integrated Basic Education (planned first through sixth grade schools, primary education)
<i>educação em exercício</i>	teacher in-service training and certification program
EEC	European Economic Community
EMPA	Empresa Publica do Abastecimento, the parastatal procurement enterprise. In Vila, on the island of Maio, EMPA is in charge of commercialization since so few stores exist.
EMPROFAC	Specialized state enterprise for pharmaceuticals
ESC	Complementary Secondary Education (grades eleven and twelve, secondary school)
ESG	General Secondary Education (grades seventh through ninth, secondary school)
FAIMO	High Intensity Labor Fronts (<i>Frontes de Alta Intensidade de Mão d'Obra</i>)
FAM	National Government's Fund for Municipal Assistance
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization, United Nations

<i>freguesia</i>	parish, administrative division immediately below the level of the municipality, which groups several villages or <i>povoados</i> .
GATI	Technical support teams (<i>Gabinetes Tecnicos de Apoio Intermunicipal</i>)
GOCV	Government of Cape Verde
<i>grog</i>	locally distilled alcohol from sugar cane
ICS	Cape Verdian Institute for Solidarity (<i>Instituto Caboverdiano de Solidaridade</i>)
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
INC	National Institute for Cooperatives (<i>Instituto Nacional Coopertiva</i>)
<i>litro</i>	standard measure of land based on area that can be farmed using one liter of seeds, equivalent to a surface area of about 0.01 ha., 1 are, or 100 m ² .
<i>magarefe</i>	middleman who purchases and butchers livestock to resell as meat
MDR	Ministry of Rural Development (<i>Ministério do Desenvolvimento Rural</i>), 1976-85; also known as MDRA, (<i>Ministério do Desenvolvement Rural e Agricultura</i>)
MDRP	Ministry of Rural Development and Fisheries (<i>Ministério do Desenvolvimento Rural e Pesca</i> .) 1986-91
MINED	Ministry of Education
MORABEZ	parastatal textile manufacturer
MPAAR	Ministry of Fisheries, Agriculture and Rural Extension (<i>Ministério da Pesca, Agricultura, e Animação Rural</i>), 1992-present
MPD	Movement for Democracy (<i>Movimento para Democracia</i>)
<i>município</i>	municipality
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization

<i>nucleo de poder local</i>	local-level citizens' council
OMCV	PAICV-affiliated national women's movement
PAICV	African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (<i>Partido Africano da Independência de Cabo Verde</i>)
PAM	World Food Program (<i>Programme Alimentaire Mondial</i>)
PMI/PF	Maternal/Child Health and Family Planning (<i>Programa Materna-Infantil/Planeamento Familiar</i>)
<i>povoado</i>	village or settlement, lowest level administrative division usually composed of several neighborhoods or zones.
<i>Provisão Social</i>	Social Welfare
<i>quarta</i>	standard measure of land equivalent to 10 liters of land or .1 ha.
<i>regadio</i>	irrigated cultivation of sugar cane, vegetables, tuber and fruit crops.
SARDEP	Santo Antão Regional Development Project, financed by the Netherlands
<i>sequeiro</i>	rainfed cultivation of maize and beans in association
SISA	tax on property transfers
SOCAL	parastatal shoe-manufacturing enterprise
TACV	Cape Verde Airlines (<i>Transporte Aereos de Cabo Verde</i>)
<i>tchada</i>	agro-silvi-pasture areas held variously as common pool or open access resources
<i>trapiche</i>	animal or engine powered sugar cane press
UDD	A PAICV-affiliated political party in Ribeira Grande
UNICD	União Caboverdiana Independente e Democratica
UPICV-R	União do Povo para Independencia de Cabo Verde-Ressusitação

vereadores

aldermen

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. Introduction

Cape Verdians approved a multi-party regime in 1990 through a constitutional amendment. In the elections that followed, citizens voted into power a new party at the national level. That new party is committed to a policy of decentralization. The nation has held its first free elections for municipal officials and all of these localities now have local governors of their free choice.

The experiment to redesign a political system, based on the decentralization concept, is an important one. In an era when other CILSS states, e.g., Senegal and Mali, are contemplating or engaged in down-sizing national governments, limiting their range of action, and empowering localities by devolving authority and power, the Cape Verdian experience merits close examination. It can shed light on the dilemmas and problems other CILSS countries must overcome if they wish to redesign their political systems.

The Cape Verdian case highlights potential pitfalls of decentralizing as well as gains that may be achieved if the process is successful. Field studies in six different communities on three islands of the archipelago reveal appreciable problem-solving capacity and skills at the *povoado* level. These studies, as well as investigations at the national and municipal level, also reveal substantial difficulties.

These difficulties can be formulated as eight issues posed by the commitment to decentralization. They will have to be resolved, sooner or later, if the Cape Verdian experiment in institutional redesign is to go forward successfully. These issues are:

- what is the rationale for decentralization, i.e., what problems will be better solved by a system having multiple levels of decision-making and decision-makers?
- what is the appropriate division of authority and power between the national and municipal governments?
- what is the appropriate division of authority and power between the municipal government and grassroots units of governance such as the *povoados* (communities)?
- to what extent should citizens have a constitutional right to create new local governments, e.g., special districts aimed to improve governance and management of renewable resources or provision of public services?
- who should make these determinations, how and when, and how should they be formulated?

- what are the implications of the impoverished Cape Verdian resource base and man/land ratios as unfavorable as those found anywhere in CILSS countries for:
 - development prospects in rural areas?
 - education in an era where emigration possibilities are shrinking?
 - family planning?
- what is the impact of current land tenure arrangements on prospects for effective decentralization and democratic governance at the grass roots level?
- how should the disputes that are bound to arise at many levels be resolved (by whom, in what fora, using what body(ies) of law)?

The summary turns now to a discussion of these problems, after brief comments about the setting in which they occur.

B. Background and Potential Impediments to Decentralization

Five hundred years after colonization, in 1975, Cape Verde was granted independence. Governed for 15 years in a highly centralized manner by the PAICV, a single-party regime, Cape Verde opted for a multi-party regime in 1990. The transition was effected peacefully in 1991.

The new national government, led by the Movimento para Democracia (MPD) has committed itself to decentralize power and authority to the nations 14 municipalities. Officials now installed in power are grappling with details of effecting the transition and institutional redesign inherent in the commitment to decentralization.

Several factors bear heavily on their deliberations. First, Cape Verde has a very weak resource base. The difference between survival and disaster on an annual basis - even in the best of years, although problems worsen in drought years - are the funds repatriated by migrants, the massive food aid shipments donors have supplied since independence, and other donor financing.

Second, the entire society depends heavily on a welfare system that has managed thus far to keep people alive, but little more. Assuming (probably unrealistically) that one percent of the population continues to migrate annually and donors continue to make food aid available at gradually increasing rates, despite famines and food shortages in many other sectors of the globe, the system **may** continue to avert disaster. However, as designed, it cannot help recipients break the cycle of poverty.

Third, family and municipal and local community budgets are weak. Personal and public finances simply cannot underwrite much by way of development activity, although at the municipal level efforts to improve tax collection rates could yield more resources for investment.

Human capital, in any case, must be up-graded if the society is to have any chance of attracting new industries to employ people who can no longer survive on the land. Efficient innovations to address these problems must be found and implemented if living standards are to improve.

Fourth, the bulk of government employees are located in the national capital, Praia. Many are loathe to leave the relative comfort of the capital city for municipal or sub-municipal postings, and few if any wish to contemplate salary cuts that would put their earnings more in tune with the fiscal capacities of the 14 municipalities to which they might be seconded or permanently transferred.

Fifth, many national government officials and technicians appear loathe to devolve any of their power and authority to municipal governments, much less *povoados*. Their reticence seems to reflect professional concerns about whether the human resources exist at sub-national levels to produce the desired services; doubts about the capacity of municipal and local governments to finance government activities; lack of knowledge about local governance and service provision potential; lack of information about how service provision and resource governance and management can be organized in decentralized systems to obtain better returns for money invested through various co-production schemes; and a simple concern to retain power.

These factors will affect the decentralization process in Cape Verde.

C. The Issues

1. *Rationale for Decentralization*

The MPD asserts in its 1991 Program that:

...less central government, better government; more local government with popular participation, better government.³

These two propositions clearly imply that governance authority and power should be decentralized. The MPD believes that this policy, if implemented, will give people closer (and less costly) contact with officials and they, better informed about popular needs, concerns and desires, will make more apt decisions. If local officials have the means to implement decisions, without having to ask approval from the capital, the transaction costs of going from problem to solution will drop. As more is expected of local officials, their constituents will hold them accountable.

³

MPD Program, 1991, p. 6.

Sound as these general principles seem, they can only be judged in context. If, for instance, constituents are heavily dependent on welfare payments and FAIMO employment for survival, they may not feel they can run the risk of criticizing the officials who allocated money, foodstuff and jobs.

2. *Appropriate Divisions of Authority and Power: National and Municipal Governments*

Divisions of authority and responsibility must be worked out in light of the scale and complexity of problems to be addressed, and the kinds of resources required for effective action. Some officials and technicians interviewed, particularly in Ribeira Grande and in Praia, already have ideas about services they would like to see transferred. Yet none of these issues can be decided once and for all. They are too complex, and conditions vary too much from municipality to municipality. An experimental, incremental approach is indicated here. Even more appropriate is to start decentralizing some services. The National Police, for instance, have begun this process. Council presidents in Ribeira Grande, Praia and Santa Catarina face somewhat different situations and favor approaches adapted to their circumstances. These initiatives should be closely monitored for what they reveal about decentralization options.

3. *What Role for Povoados in a Decentralized System?*

An acute issue that has gone largely unaddressed to this point in Cape Verdian discussions of decentralization is how *povoados* and *bairros* fit into a new, decentralized order. National officials interviewed generally had few comments other than to suggest the issue was one for municipalities to decide. Some municipal officials have begun to address the question, but appear to have come to no firm conclusions thus far.

The starting point for analysis of this issue is the observation that municipal governments in Cape Verde are hardly grass roots institutions. With the possible exception of Mindelo, the municipalities contain many rural communities where over half the population resides. Many pressing service provision and resource governance and management problems arise at the *povoado* level. Efforts to address them are likely to be more successful if *povoado* residents are brought into discussions of the options, with a right of veto to ensure that unworkable options will not be imposed upon them.

Efforts to address such problems are also likely to be more successful if *povoados* can easily obtain formal authority, at citizen initiative, to make, modify and apply rules concerning behavior in these areas. In other words, communities should be allowed to determine how their natural resources are utilized; how services are provided within the limits of community willingness to pay; and who must pay the local costs of maintaining both resources and services. Community-level government should also be able to enforce its own rules, and resolve disputes relating to those rules. If these conditions are met, municipal officials may find that *povoado*

level government will develop the capacity to play a major role in community development and in solving their own problems. Encouraging communities to request formal authority to address local problems will certainly put initiative in their hands.

4. *Constitutional Authority of Citizens*

What can be done to create an enabling environment for self-governance? The concept of enabling environments fits well with the MPD's formal position of "less central government, better government," if part of the critique of over-centralized government is addressed to the issue of unnecessary regulation. An enabling environment is thought to reduce costs of action. Making it possible for citizens of a *povoado* to constitute themselves, at their initiative and at low cost, as an autonomous local general purpose government is likely to encourage formation of local governments.

The same logic applies equally to local special purpose governments. Such jurisdictions could be constituted, for example by users of resource such as irrigation systems and pastures to make it easier for them to govern and manage those resources. Constituting a local education district with authority to co-produce education, in collaboration with municipal and national government efforts, could encourage greater participation by parents and local communities in the education process. Lodging in the hands of resource users or their locally-chosen officials authority to:

- make rules governing access to, use of and investments in the target resource or public service;
- modify and enforce those rules in ways local people determine to be reasonable;
- resolve conflicts arising through application of those rules; and
- mobilize resources - labor, materials and cash - to put those decisions into effect

should create an environment in which those individuals interested in "entrepreneurial" new public activities face fewer barriers. Devolving authority to such local special purpose governments might also open avenues for collaboration with NGOs interested in supporting local self-help efforts.

5. *Who Should Decide on Decentralization Rules and How?*

Cape Verdians have opened up the arena for institutional redesign of their political system by creating multi-party governments at both national and municipal levels. That is a necessary, but not sufficient step. Few officials at present seem committed to moving towards decisions that will fix the terms and conditions under which responsibility for service provision and resource governance and management will be devolved from national to municipal and even down to local community governments. While current legislation suggests municipalities "may" provide services, municipal governments are wary of accepting responsibility for services when they see little prospect of financing them with current resources. A clear division of responsibility and authority, including authority to mobilize resources, is thus indispensable if the Cape Verde political system is to be decentralized.

New rules must be developed over time that clearly state adjusted spheres of competence for each level of governance. These adjustments should be incrementally and selectively applied, based on the size, conditions and competencies of each municipality and should allow new options for citizens to create limited-purpose **povoado** and special district governments. These rules must clarify what each level of authority **must do, must not do, and may do**. Without such clarity in the rule structure citizens cannot hold a specific set of elected authorities responsible, nor can they know which level of authority should be approached for problem resolution.

A third necessary condition follows from the second. To go beyond ballot box participation to direct citizen engagement in provisions and co-production of public goods and services, in governance and management of renewable natural resources, and in the creative process of local problem solving, citizens must know:

- what will NOT be done unless they do it;
- what means they are permitted to use to do the job; and
- the rules of engagement.

Until these second two conditions are met, inertia will assure that governance in Cape Verde will change little. If they are met, a decentralized and dynamic order can emerge with the gradual, experimental devolution of authority from national to lower-level governments.

6. *Implications of Weak Resource Base and High Man/Land Ratios*

Adapted Education as Social Investment

Development is clearly more difficult under the conditions prevalent in Cape Verde, and particularly those found in most rural areas. The agricultural resource base cannot support the population. In **good** years local output covers only fifteen percent (15%) of food needs. Unemployment is extremely high; emigration options are being throttled back by European countries and the United States. Migration prospects to much of Africa, even the Lusophone areas, are not particularly promising either.

This puts a premium on **relevant education adapted to local circumstances** to enable rural people to wring the most from their harsh environment and to permit surplus workers to move into towns. Job creation in urban centers rests on Cape Verde becoming attractive for investment, most likely in assembly plants. Now, in addition to policy and infrastructure disincentives, workers' skill and education levels are too low to justify a decision to install an assembly plant in the islands. Education quality and quantity should be improved, and the content modified with upper primary and secondary years allowing for more agricultural and vocational training.

Man/Land Ratios and Family Planning

The man/land ratios encountered in rural Cape Verde, the incredible dependence on FAIMO work, welfare payments and migrant remittances to avoid starvation, the dimming prospects for emigration abroad and high unemployment rates in the islands collectively can only be considered alarming. They raise serious questions about national policy on fertility and family planning.

In rural communities visited by the team, women regularly reported having five to 10 offspring, and often more. Public health conditions have improved markedly since independence under the PAICV. Current population growth rates are simply no longer sustainable under today's conditions. Elected officials of all parties must address the problem. Controlling human fertility under such circumstances would appear to be the very first step in self help.

7. *Land Tenure Implications for Effective Decentralization and Democratic Governance*

Demographics and land tenure arrangements in most parts of Cape Verde tighten into a vicious circle. Severely unbalanced man/land ratios leave most rural people exposed to the threat of eviction from land on which they depend for a portion of their income. The structurally-imposed need for most farmers to get access to land to survive creates powerful incentives for farmers to adopt a strategy of passivity and subservience to their landlords. In these circumstances, a good credit rating with one's landlord is achieved in large part by not making trouble.

Landlords' efforts to maintain control over their lands result in rules regarding land use that discourage both owner and tenant from investing to improve land. The landlord often resists because s/he must finance or pay for improvements to forestall a counterclaim to ownership by an enterprising tenant interested in improving productivity on land farmed.

Many tenants avoid making improvements, or sometimes even suggesting them, for fear of inadvertently threatening their landlords with cash outlays and increasing the risk of eviction. Some tenants also fear being evicted if enough improvements are undertaken to enhance productivity.

Land tenure relations run the gamut from relationships that come close to being mutually productive over generations, to those characterized by constant antagonism and cut-throat struggles for control of Cape Verde's scarcest rural resource. Of all the agricultural *povoados* visited by the team, only in the Maio community was land tenure a relatively unimportant issue. In the other sites in Ribeira Grande (Santo Antão), Santa Catarina and Praia (Santiago), all informants indicated some degree of concern about land tenure relations.

This situation raises troubling prospects for decentralization and democratic governance. Incentives for rural people to function as citizens are weakened by their concern to avoid land disputes. Seeking out new solutions to local problems and organizing to improve the quality of services and resources governance and management requires individuals able and willing to take some risks. The kind of financial base necessary to negotiate effectively with other jurisdictions depends in part on having a local tax base. If investments in land are risky, fewer will be made. Fiscal capacity will remain constrained. And the dependency cycle will be perpetuated.

Measures to address these weaknesses must be taken. The goal should be to encourage tenants, whether renters or sharecroppers, to invest in the land they farm. They need some measure of security against eviction, and they must be guaranteed a share in the gains made from their investments in the land. This is a complicated issue involving owners' property rights as well as tenants' incentives to enrich the resource base. It is also a survival issue for rural Cape Verdians over the next two decades. Despite the complexity, it should be addressed, starting now.

8. *Dispute Settlement*

If decentralization is to give rise to a series of autonomous governments at municipal and local levels, provision must be made to resolve disputes among those jurisdictions as well as between citizens and between citizens and officials. Jurisdictions will require fora in which to resolve disputes about competence and responsibilities in service provision, resource governance and management, and other issues. Citizens will continue to become embroiled in conflicts over land, etc. If, under the new system of democratic governance, citizens are to hold officials accountable, they will need judicial as well as electoral means to do so.

The judicial system in Cape Verde is at present struggling under a backlog of cases. National courts are not specialized. Local courts, or moots, exist, but lack authority to resolve land tenure and resource issues. Development of judicial systems at local, municipal and national levels that can respond quickly and cheaply to settle conflicts with solutions accepted by the parties as reasonable and equitable, and can maintain rules of fair play in interactions among jurisdictions, officials and citizens, appears imperative. Without such institutional capacity, efforts invested in trying to develop decentralized institutional arrangements may be seriously undercut.

I. CAPE VERDE: THE SETTING AND THE AGENDA FOR CHANGE

National Institutions and the Policy Environment

A. Introduction

This is an abridgement of a more detailed study that examines Cape Verde's new order of democratic governance initiated in 1991. Specifically it focuses on the new regime's announced policy of political and administrative decentralization at three levels: national, municipal and local. It analyzes key institutions to see what is actually transpiring and to assess both the capacity for change and the prospects for positive reforms. The study shows that a positive policy to decentralize services in education, health, social welfare, the administration of justice, and in governance and management of agriculture and natural resources is not matched by action underway or by plans to carry out the reforms.

Policy asserts that municipalities will be vested with the authority necessary to replace directive, top-down governing systems by participatory, bottom-up processes. But central agency officials have no national strategy to carry out the announced policy of "municipalization." They have no process of consultation with local authorities to build such a strategy. There is little understanding both locally and nationally of the forms that this local participation might take in self-governance, in public choice of services and service levels, in modes of co-production of services, and in innovative governance systems for local resource management and service delivery.

On the other hand, as this study maps the institutional setting - national, municipal and local - the analysis suggests various ways in which the leadership and the people could rewrite the rules to carry out their stated intent to recreate government as communal enterprise with a very human face.

B. The Setting and the National Transition from One-Party Rule

Cape Verde is one of Africa's smallest independent republics with 344,353 people on a land mass of 4,033 square kilometers. The archipelago of nine inhabited islands plus six other barren islets, lies 350 miles west of Senegal in the Atlantic Ocean. Discovered by Portuguese navigators in 1460, desertic and uninhabited, the islands with its harbors quickly became the key entrepôt on sea-lanes of trade and empire. Tiny plantations, vulnerable to cyclical drought and occasional pirate raids, were nested in valleys ridged by volcanic mountains. In the 15th century, Portuguese settlers brought African slaves to work their farms and tend harbors. From the 16th century, Cape Verde served as the base for Portugal's Africa-to-the-Americas slave trade. Portuguese settlers, sailors, traders and colonial administrators intermixed with these African peoples. A creole, Portuguese-West African, language and racial mixture evolved by the 18th century. The church and crown systematically displaced African tribal custom, social practice,

and native institutions with Portuguese culture and values. From the 19th through the early 20th century, Cape Verdian creoles were employed as Portuguese administrators in other African and even Asian colonies.

The islands' population quickly grew beyond the productive capacity of the land. And devastating droughts, which decimated the population in the 19th century, drove many to emigrate to the United States and Europe.

Following World War II, Cape Verdians played lead roles in the armed struggle for the independence of Portugal's African colonies. Led by Amílcar Cabral, son of a Cape Verdian father, rebels waged their guerilla war in the jungles of Guinea-Bissau, winning independence in 1975 following the fall of the Portuguese fascist regime and the restoration of democracy in the mother country. Under Cape Verdian leaders of the PAICV (the African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde) that directed the independence movement based in Guinea-Bissau, a moderate socialist regime quickly was implanted in this island-state.

For sixteen years the PAICV ruled as the nation's single legal party. Aristide Pereira, the party's Secretary General, beginning in 1975, was elected to three successive five-year presidential terms. The National Assembly confirmed Pedro Pires, Pereira's companion in arms in the independence wars, as Prime Minister following each election. Through the devices of "democratic centralism," the party under Pereira did hold leadership to account. The party, never numbering more than 8,000 members, elected representatives to party congresses and to the National Council (or central committee).⁴ The Council, and in turn local party units, advised on key appointments: secretaries of state, and heads of public enterprises, senior administrative posts, all municipal "council presidents", even to the selection of members in the *comissões de moradores*, the local community councils.⁵

On July 4, 1990, after two years of intraparty discussion and mounting pressure from donors and Cape Verdian opposition groups led by the *Movimento para Democracia* (MPD), President Pereira announced that presidential elections in 1990 would be held on a multi-party basis. The National Assembly, on September 28, 1990, amended the constitution, abolishing the PAICV's status as sole legal party.

⁴ Colm Foy, *Cape Verde: Politics, Economics and Society*, 1988, p. 77.

⁵ Foy, (1988), pp. 75-106

C. National Elections - The Transfer of Power

The National Assembly resolved that the multi-party elections would be held, first for Assembly seats in January 1991. They were to be followed by the presidential round in February 1991 and municipal elections later in that year. Three opposition parties quickly registered: (1) the MPD; (2) the *União do Povo para Independencia de Cabo Verde-Ressusitação* (UPICV-R), a pre-independence party revived under Jose Leitao da Graça; and, (3) the *União Caboverdiana Independente e Democratica* (UNICD), supported by the Cape Verde emigrant community in the United States. The UNICD soon chose to cooperate with the MPD.⁶ The entire electoral sequence was a remarkably civil and orderly process in the democratic transfer of power. In the January 1991 legislative round, 75% of the eligibles voted. The opposition MPD won 56 of 79 Assembly seats, the PAICV took 23. Prime Minister Pires immediately resigned his PAICV government. The MPD formed a transition government under Carlos Veiga as Prime Minister. The next month Antonio Mascarenhas Monteiro - a former Justice of the Supreme Court endorsed by the MPD - ran against Aristide Pereira for President. With 61.4% of eligibles voting, Monteiro won by 73.5%.

D. The New Government's Policy Framework

The new government's program, adopted by the Assembly in April 1991, laid out its policy agenda. The state's security police was disbanded. Freedoms of speech, press, assembly and association, the movement of persons, religion and political action were guaranteed. It promised to liberalize the state-dominated economy and to privatize most state enterprises. To reduce unemployment and dependence on welfare, the program proposed to diversify the economy and promote private initiative and new enterprise. The theme for public sector reform was "less central government, better government; more local government with popular participation, better government."⁷ The program prescribes transferring state power and resources to autonomous, elected local governments and forming policies and development plans from "the bottom up". The devolution of power was to begin immediately following Cape Verde's first free municipal elections in December 1991.

E. Municipal Elections - The Structure of Local Government

Two complementary bodies, following the Portuguese pattern, constitute the elected authorities of local government: the municipal council and the municipal assembly. The Council or *camara municipal*, the collective executive, has from 5 to 9 members depending on each jurisdiction's population. In elections, each party presents a council slate. The party with the

⁶ Miles Smith-Morris, "Cape Verde - Recent History," in Africa South of the Sahara, 21st ed., (1992), London: Europa Publications, pp. 321-323.

⁷ *Program*, (1991), p. 6.

most votes, majority or plurality, takes all seats. The council president, *Presidente do Conselho*, serves as a full-time executive. In larger municipalities, some council members, *vereadores*, may serve as working administrative commissioners.

The second elected authority, the *Assembleia Municipal*, is a legislative body with from 13 to 24 seats according to population. Parties contending in elections get seats based on their share in the popular vote. Local citizens groups may present slates for either the *Camara Municipal* and for the *Assembleia*. In open sessions each three months the assembly advises the council, enacts ordinances, and approves the budget.

In the December 1991 balloting, the voter turnout, around 50% in most municipalities, was low compared to earlier national elections. Out of the 14 local contests, the MPD won in seven including the capital city, Praia. An independent citizens' slate took the second largest municipality of San Vicente with the nation's major commercial shipping center at Mindelo. Independents took three contests, although one of these, in Paúl on Santo Antão island, was clearly PAICV by another name. The PAICV won outright in two municipalities: Boa Vista and Fogo. Assembly seats everywhere were divided between two and sometimes three competing slates save in Boa Vista where the PAICV swept all seats.

F. The National Economy - Challenges to the New Regime

The International Monetary Fund⁸ characterized Cape Verde's historical economic management as follows:

Cape Verde's economic performance since independence has been impressive. Growth has averaged some five percent per annum in real terms (or 2-3 percent per annum in real per capita terms), inflation has generally been moderate, and fiscal policy has been cautious with an appropriate level of investment and avoidance of excessive reliance on domestic bank financing. Despite Cape Verde's lack of resources, the external sector has also performed well with foreign reserves maintained at a high level.

A note of warning, however, is sounded in the sentence that immediately follows the cited paragraph: "Despite this strong record, performance began to deteriorate during 1989-90, and this deterioration appears to be continuing in 1991." The portents were not good. The deterioration is associated with performance in the four pillars of the economy:

- foreign aid,
- public enterprises,
- agriculture and fisheries, and
- emigrant remittances.

⁸ Aide-Memoire, September 30, 1991.

1. *Foreign Aid*

Cape Verde's independence came in 1975, just as donor agencies mobilized food aid and special funds to address the disastrous drought afflicting the entire Sahel region. With one of the most limited and unproductive natural resource endowments in the region, a chronic food deficit and a vulnerable population far exceeding its agricultural productive capacity, Cape Verde immediately qualified for this assistance. **In good years** of well spaced precipitation during the July-September rainy season, **Cape Verdian agriculture can only yield 15% of the archipelago's food requirements.** In drought years, more common than the good ones, domestic agriculture produces only 3% to 5% of food needs.

Chronic food deficits had been, to some extent, underwritten by Portuguese subsidies through paid employment in public work projects and food imports. Since independence, foreign aid, much of it in the form of food, has been the first pillar of the economy. Until recently, the GOCV was able to cultivate a tacit donors' commitment to cover its food deficit under grants or highly concessionary financing. Commodities flow in through EMPA (*Empresa Pública de Abastecimentos*) - the parastatal procurement enterprise. EMPA sells to commercial agents and government enterprises, returning invoice value to the State and retaining a margin for costs and profit. The UN World Food Program (PAM) provides commodities for distribution by the social welfare department to the impoverished aged, destitute families and the disabled, to malnourished children and to child-care/kindergarten hot lunch programs. PAM also provides food to the Ministry of Education for daily hot lunches in all elementary schools.

Most donors require earmarking some proceeds from food sales to finance labor-intensive (FAIMO) "development" projects for environmental rehabilitation and public works. Some sales proceeds plus additional donor funds - grants and highly concessional loans - finance the government's investment budget.

The FAIMO program operates throughout the archipelago, employing adults in over half of rural households. The greater number is employed on afforestation and environmental works through the Ministry of Fisheries, Agriculture and Rural Development (MPAAR). Many work on roads and other public works through the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport (MIT). A small number work on municipal sanitation and streets maintenance. Although municipal agents identify those needing work, the two central ministries identify the projects, organize, manage and pay the workers. One foreign aid official noted that the compelling need for employment drives the FAIMO program with the project rationale, often written by a donor agency, overlaid

on this essentially welfare-employment system. Nonetheless, it is impressive to see huge areas where hillsides have been dyked, terraced and afforested with drought resistant trees. The network of stone-paved roads also testifies to the durable infrastructure FAIMO builds and maintains.⁹

In recent years official foreign aid has ranged from 70.7% of GDP in 1985 (a severe drought year) to a low in 1991 of 19%.¹⁰ Food and other aid may increase in a given year of severe drought, but overall aid trends are downward.

Table 1. Trends in External Aid Financing To Cape Verde 1985-91
(All figures are percent of GNP) Est. Est.

	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>
Grants	26.1	22.2	19.4	13.8	9.6	6.9	7.8
Capital Investments	34.1	29.1	23.6	16.2	13.4	10.6	10.1
Net Deficit Finance	10.5	6.2	2.6	0.5	1.7	1.5	1.1
Total	70.7	57.5	45.6	30.5	24.7	19.0	19.0

Source: Drawn from 1990 and 1991 IMF staff reports - actual figures through 1989; 1990 and 1991 estimates.

2. *State Enterprises*

The second pillar of the economy has been the state enterprises. Until recently, these monopolies have mostly operated at a profit, expanding with concessionary financing from donors, providing net transfers to the central government while husbanding operating returns.

⁹ Current estimates are that FAIMO employment figures in the budgets of 75% of the 35,000 to 40,000 rural households. Some work is year-round, but most falls in the six to seven month dry season, January- July. A base wage is 185 CVE (\$3.00) daily. Skilled jobs may be paid double or even triple that. Women make up over half the workers. Women head 40% of rural households. Most are unmarried; some have husbands working abroad or in one of the towns or cities.

¹⁰ IMF, *Cape Verde - Staff Report on the Interim Article IV Consultation Discussions, August 8, 1990*. Author's calculations from tables and annexes.

But for the past few years their positions - led by the national airline, TACV - have deteriorated because of excessive commercial borrowing, over-employment, inefficient use of capacity, and poor general management.¹¹ As a group the state enterprises closed 1991 with a 1,000,000,000 CVE deficit - largely covered by deferring foreign debt payments.¹²

At the close of 1988, 19 exclusively state-owned enterprises and 14 with mixed state-private capital accounted for 25% of GDP. Exclusively state owned enterprises are largely in services including utilities, import/export services, warehousing and ship yard services. In 1989 the state began to sell shares in such mixed industries as shoe manufacturing and textiles.¹³ State enterprises will suffer under liberalization as private competition reduces opportunities for monopoly profit. A danger is that state credit to its floundering enterprises could reduce credit available to the emerging private sector, constraining growth and private response to free market opportunities.

3. *Agriculture and Fisheries*

A paradox in Cape Verde's economy is that its vulnerable agricultural sector is still the primary source of livelihood for 50% to perhaps 60% of the population. In output, agriculture and fisheries contribute - in good years such as 1988 - not more than 20% of the GDP. In average years, such as 1987, its contribution to GDP will not exceed 15%. In the good years, Cape Verde farmers can produce 15% of national food needs. In drought years this will drop to 3-5%. Some 42,500 hectares are under production: 2,500 ha. under irrigation with 40,000 ha. in rain-fed cultivation. Irrigated areas might be increased to 5,000 ha. with modern drip techniques. On the other hand, as much as 30% of the rain-fed area is on severe slopes subjected to deep erosion. Experts argue that these lands should be targeted for afforestation and silvo-pastoral enterprise or simply left idle.

Fishing lags behind its promise as a growth sector. In spite of donor-assisted projects with development loans for fisheries from the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA), the FAO, the African Development Bank, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), and Japan, performance has not significantly improved. In 1981 the catch was estimated at 14,730 tons. It fell to 5,372 tons in 1988, with some hope of recovery to 14,000 in 1991.¹⁴ The industry is largely artisanal, noncompetitive with the foreign commercial fleets operating in near by international waters.

¹¹ IMF, 1991.

¹² Author's interview with José Floresvindo Barbos, Director General, National Budget Office, Praia, June 15, 1992 see also IMF Staff Report, September 30, 1991, pp. 4-5.

¹³ IMF 1990 Staff Report, August 6, 1990, p. 4.

¹⁴ Dede-Esi Amanor in *Africa South of the Sahara*, 21st ed. 1992, pp 323-325.

4. *Emigrant Remittances*

Some 700,000 Cape Verdians live and work abroad. Out migration has gone on for well over a century. For the past decade, at least 1% of the population emigrated annually, thus holding net population growth to about 2%. Remittances in cash and merchandise represent vital contributions to the economy. In nominal terms remittances grew from \$21.0 million in 1985 to \$40.0 million in 1989.¹⁵ As a share of GDP, however, they have been more constant through the half decade, running from 13 to 15%. The GOCV's 1985 policy encouraged emigrant deposits in the Banco do Cabo Verde by providing freely convertible savings accounts with interest pegged to EEC rates. In 1985 only 3.9% of the bank's time deposits were in emigrant accounts. By 1989 they represented 20.4% of such deposits.¹⁶ Even so, by 1991 with remittances at 14% and foreign aid at 19% of GDP the total of 33% was far from where it had been in 1985 at around 84% of GDP.

There is real concern about the future trend in remittances. The EEC is formally closing its doors to foreign laborers in 1994. Other countries, including the US, are also tightening the terms of emigrant entry. To compensate, the GOCV is encouraging other Lusophone countries in Africa - particularly Angola and Mozambique with their tremendous post-war reconstruction needs - to employ more skilled and semi-skilled Cape Verdians. Similar worker opportunities in Sahelian and other West African states are being sought. Unless major and rapid progress is made in reducing the 3+% per year natural population growth rate, even with a growing economy, 1-2 % annual out-migration from the islands will be needed. Given the limited elasticity in the domestic labor market and the vital role that migrant earnings play in the economy, people will continue to be Cape Verde's most important export.

G. *Public Services - The Institutional Setting*

Most public services are provided by national agencies. They have been organized since independence under a centralized command structure with small field delegations in each of the municipalities. The PAICV touted decentralization but its practice of "democratic centralism" fostered command and control processes. Central planning and socialist dirigisme required hierarchical discipline in both the social and economic order. Induced and guided participation through the party organs was vital in mobilizing health, literacy, public-order, and even social-welfare support systems among the populace. But these efforts admitted very little, if any, "unplanned" local initiative, even though they were called, in party euphemism, evidence of "decentralization." Indeed, local party cadres did, in their roles as the "protectors of the revolution," provide some local control over officials. Party organs evaluated field agents of

¹⁵ IMF, Staff Report, 1990, Appendix VI, "Workers' Remittances" p. 33. CVE conversion rate taken from IMF documents: 91.6 CVE = \$1.00 US in 1985; 70 CVE = \$1.00 US in 1989.

¹⁶ IMF, Appendix VI to *Staff Report*, 1990.

national ministries and centrally-appointed local officials and may well have attenuated corruption and administrative abuse. Numerous analysts have commented on the honesty in Cape Verdian administrative practice as compared to other one-party regimes in the developing world.¹⁷ (One senior official commented, that this was less a credit to PAICV practices than to the tiny size of the country. Since nearly everybody knows everybody else wrong-doing is hard to hide.)

1. Education

The education system has four basic components: the literacy program; primary education with four basic years compulsory and two more "complementary"; secondary education with three years of "general" education and two "complementary"; and teacher training. Additionally there is a limited pre-school program managed by non-governmental organizations, and very limited technical/professional training. All formal post-secondary training is done abroad, except for primary teacher formation.

In 1987 the GOCV and the World Bank undertook a major reform of the educational system, focussing on the primary cycles. Until then, with little modification, the Ministry of Education had merely built upon the system inherited from the Portuguese. With the reform just gearing up, it is the old structure that prevails in most of the republic today.¹⁸

Primary Education

Primary education is provided in two cycles. The first, grades one through four - is known as Elementary Basic Education (EBE). By law it is obligatory and meant to be available to all children ages six through ten. The second cycle, grades five and six, is called Complementary Basic Education (EBC). The reform will merge the two cycles into a six-year system called Integrated Basic Education (EBI). Planned for full implementation by 1994, it is lagging and will take several years before teacher retraining, class-room construction and curriculum materials are completed. Meanwhile trial installation goes forward.

Schooling in the EBE cycle now reaches 90% of the relevant age group. Of those entering first grade, 72% continue to the fourth or final EBE grade. Of those who start primary school 53% enter the EBC and only 40.5% reach the last or sixth year. Limited class rooms require doubled sessions - morning and afternoon in all schools. A few, greatly impacted neighborhoods, require a third, evening session.

¹⁷ See Foy, 1988, pp. 66-106.

¹⁸ Data cited was provided by the Ministry of Education's Director of Studies and Planning, Sra. Maria das Dores Marais from current (1991) statistical reports prepared with the assistance of World Bank advisors and the Bank's statistical program.

The Ministry of Education, with World Food Program commodities, provides a daily hot meal in all primary schools, a major attendance incentive for the poor. Families are asked to contribute at local schools 10 CVE (14 cents US) monthly for vegetables and condiments to add to the basic food issue. The program has had a marked effect on improving the nutritional standards of six to twelve year olds.

Secondary Education

Secondary education also has two cycles. General Secondary Education (ESG), grades seven, eight and nine, is followed by Complementary Secondary Education (ESC) which offers two final years. It is still a privilege to receive a secondary education in Cape Verde, with only seven ESG schools in the country: two in Praia and one each in Santa Catarina, Fogo, Sal, São Vicente and Ribeira Grande. In 1990/91 these schools had 7,880 students. The three schools at the ESC level, one each in Praia, Santa Caterina and São Vicente, enrolled only 820 children. Secondary education is beyond most families' means since it involves the cost of room and board away from home. Now, of the 100 students who enter primary school at first grade, only 23 will make it to seventh grade - the first year of ESG. Only 3 of those 100 children will continue through the 10th and 11th grades of ESC.

Teacher Training

The World Bank-funded educational reform hinges on teacher training. The new Education Institute trains 210 new recruits per year in a two year program and over several years will re-train 1,200 underqualified primary teachers. Teachers for the general secondary cycle are trained in-country in a three-year course. But teachers for the final secondary cycle require additional training outside Cape Verde. In time, the Government plans an in-country school of higher education, initially dedicated to teacher preparation.¹⁹

Literacy Program

Since independence all PAICV party organs campaigned to eradicate illiteracy with major financial support from Swedish international aid. Ministry data indicates that at independence in 1975, 60.7% of adults were illiterate. By 1991 this had been reduced to 29%. The current goal is to bring this to 12% by year 2000. The literacy campaign has been conducted in the work place, largely in the ministries and the public enterprises, and through "cultural groups" in communities. The program has relied heavily on dance, theater, songs and Cape Verdian literature. In 1986-7, of the 714 literacy workers, 62% were volunteers, mostly under 30 years of age mobilized through the PAICV. Classes are in two cycles of one year each. The first corresponds roughly to grades one and two of EBE and the second to grades three and four.²⁰

¹⁹ Foy, (1988) p. 157.

²⁰ Foy (1988) pp. 143-150.

In the 1988-89 school year, enrollments peaked at 8,424 in the two cycles, falling to only 5,208 in 1990-91. Many volunteer teachers had dropped out. One official indicated that as of 1992 the program had reached a crisis with donor funding in question, community support and volunteer teaching falling off, and effective demand down. Moreover, observers note evidence of considerable "deliteracy". Many rural adults, demotivated by limited access to reading materials and few opportunities to write, are losing acquired reading and writing skills. Some advocate complete "municipalization" of the program as the most hopeful means for its revival.

Vocational Education

Formal vocational education is highly limited in Cape Verde. The MINED-affiliated Mindelo Technical and Commercial School, managed by the Cape Verdian Institute for Solidarity (ICS), provided places in 1990/91 for only 635 day students and 253 night students in its commercial, mechanical and electrician training programs. The ICS's other vocational school in Praia had only 120 students - primarily studying agriculture, community development and electrical mechanics. The parastatal ship repair company CABNAVE in Mindelo has a small apprentice program as does the national Naval Training Center. Other government agencies provide some technical training: the Ministry of Agriculture for extension agents; the Ministry of Health in the teaching hospitals at Mindelo and Praia for nurses, and a small Public Administration Training Center (CENFA) in Praia for entry level public employees. There are many areas in which no technical/professional training is available. Among those most frequently mentioned are bookkeeping and accounting.

University Education

All university education occurs overseas. The Government administers some 200 donor-funded scholarships each year. The greatest number of students go to Portugal and Brazil. Some emigrant families in the United States and Europe privately provide university education for relatives. In the past, Russia, Cuba and Eastern European countries offered scholarships in economics and engineering and special training in areas such as social work, public health and police administration.

Private Education: The Informal Market

There is also a lively informal training market. Many secondary teachers and some qualified primary teachers run for-fee private night "schools," or tutorials to accommodate adults who want to get education equivalency certificates. There are no formal government-sponsored adult schools for this purpose. These private classes attract young adults who, as children, dropped out of the system or whose access to it was limited. Some graduates of the literacy program also enroll to continue their studies. Many of these students are preparing themselves for emigration. Only a few expect to improve job prospects in-country. A further few intend to get belated entry into a university abroad.

Pre-Schools and Kindergarten

Pre-schools and kindergartens are not formally overseen by the Ministry of Education but do receive food support from Social Welfare. They are run by private voluntary or semi-official NGOs such as the OMCV (Cape Verdian Women's Organization - until recently an arm of the PAICV), the ICS (also a PAICV affiliate until 1990), the Red Cross and Caritas. Some foreign NGOs, like BORNE Fonden on Santo Antão, have recently shown interest, given their potential for child care institutions for working mothers, as head-start programs, and for child nutrition support. In 1984-85, of the 30,000 to 50,000 three to five year olds, only 1,973 were attending the 13 preschools around the country (Foy, [1988], pp. 151-154). Officials estimate that both enrollments and the number of schools had at least doubled by 1992. Further expansion seems to be limited only by local NGO capacity and the availability of food.

2. *Education and Decentralization: Issues and Prospects*

Although all national authorities speak of education as an area in which some sort of "decentralization" should take place, only school building construction and maintenance seem to be on their substantive agenda for municipal action. There is no discussion of turning over primary schools to municipal school districts, with local taxing authority, with the power to hire and fire teachers, and with obligations to account to the community for results. Short of municipalization, officials need to examine the ways that parental participation can be built into the rules for governing each of the local schools. Until the stakes are greatly increased for citizen involvement, the long paternalistic traditions of a centrally directed educational establishment with minimal citizen coproduction will continue. At least decentralization could start with the failing literacy program and with local authority to initiate much needed small scale vocational schools.

3. *Health*

Public Health System Organization

The formal health care system of Cape Verde is five-tiered. At its apex are two general hospitals - one in the national capital of Praia to serve the leeward islands and one in Mindelo on São Vicente to serve the windward islands. At the next level are three regional hospitals in Ribeira Grande on Santo Antão, San Filipe on Fogo, and in Santa Caterina at the center of Santiago. At the third level are the health centers whose doctor and small staff can, in a limited facility, provide some general in-patient care, including birthing and post-natal maternity services. As of 1992 there is a health center with a physician in each of the nine municipalities where there is no hospital. At the next level are the community Health Posts, each staffed with a nurse. Finally, at the bottom level are the Basic Health Units, staffed by a health agent with minimal training (three months to a year at the local hospital or health center). The national Director General of Health, Dr. Julio Barros Andrade, says this agent, though an employee of the ministry, should, by policy, be selected by a citizen-controlled community health committee to better link

people to up-stream health services and to root preventive health action in the community. Field visits, however, revealed no active community health committees in operation. Health agents were being selected by physicians or nurses at the centers.

Maternal/Child Health and Family Planning Services

The Ministry of Health's Maternal/Child Health and Family Planning (PMI/PF) service concentrates on vaccination and on maternal education. A PMI/PF unit at each health center is headed by a nurse with trained assistants who work through the health posts and basic health units to carry out immunization campaigns and pre-natal education and care services. Referrals are made for professional medical care to health post nurses and to health center doctors. PMI/PF field workers identify malnourished children whose mothers are enrolled in the supplemental food program. Family planning counselling is routinely given to expectant women. Limited contraceptive services are also provided.

Thanks to the PMI/PF service in combination with the back-up services of the health-care system (the cold chain for vaccines), over 90% of Cape Verde's children are immunized against the major childhood illnesses. Only measles immunization lags at 75-80% coverage. Immunization, pre-natal maternal education, extensively available birthing assistance, plus PMI/PF maternal education for infant care and nutrition have all contributed to dramatic reductions in infant mortality. Infant mortality was 100-125 per thousand in 1975. In 1991 it was only 60-65 per thousand. This plus improvements in both preventive and curative health services for the general population explain why life expectancy has risen from perhaps 40+ at independence to above 60 in 1991. Gastro-intestinal and diarrheal diseases - still major concerns - have been significantly reduced by improvements in sanitation and the increased availability safe potable water. A UNICEF program, concentrating on Santiago and Santo Antão islands with the MPAAR is making a major contribution this area.

Under the PAICV party cadres played important roles in mobilizing communities for vaccination campaigns and for health education²¹ through local residents' committees (*comissões de moradores*) and community health committees. Though authoritarian and directive in their approach, they worked. With the dissolution of the single-party apparatus the top-down popular mobilization has disappeared and has yet to be replaced with a locally initiated, more voluntary structure.

Practitioner/Population Ratios and Infrastructure

There are 80 physicians in the national health service assisted by +/- 200 nurses. One doctor per 4,400 people and one nurse to 1,750 marks considerable progress but still strains curative service capacity - especially with the limits in local support services. The central hospitals in Praia and Mindelo are not fully equipped for trauma, heart and circulatory

²¹ See Foy (1988) pp. 163-72.

complications. Such special care cases must be air evacuated to Portugal. Likewise, local health centers and the regional hospitals, lacking adequate X-ray, laboratory, anesthesiological support, and other critical clinical infrastructure, often must evacuate surgical and trauma cases to the central hospitals in Praia and Mindelo or directly to Portugal.

Private Health Services

The generally free public health care system, though impressive in many of its results, is still wanting.²² At hospitals and health centers from early morning onward patients queue for attention under the first-come, first-served rule. This has given rise to an informal system of private health care. Although all physicians are in the public service, most offer private consultations by appointment after hours on a fee for service basis. The Ministry recognizes the practice, allowing services to be rendered in hospitals and clinics, which charge the physician some 30% of fees for use of facilities. Interviews indicate that most of the upper and middle class - civil servants and private business people - seek care only through these private arrangements. At \$10-20 US per consultation, patients consider the service cost effective in time saved, in privacy afforded, and in personal attention received. Physicians and their attending nurses can double salary income by working privately on Saturdays and a few week nights.²³

Pharmacies and Drugs

The pharmaceutical market is serviced by a specialized state enterprise (EMPROFAC) created in 1979. Its charge is "to centralize the bulk purchase and distribution of pharmaceutical products; establish and develop a local medications industry; and fix a pricing policy for medicines in the interests of consumers."²⁴ EMPROFAC manufactures some forty products, from bandages to non-sterile solutions. These and imported medications are sold to private stores throughout the islands and to the public health care system. Though some medication may be provided gratis at the health centers and posts, most patients must pay for their prescriptions at local private pharmacies supplied by EMPROFAC.²⁵

²² Employees of all public and most larger private enterprises are covered by compulsory employer financed health insurance systems. When seen at the public health service and attended as in- or out-patients, their insurance enrollment is established and subsequent billings made for the services.

²³ It is not clear that 30% of fees paid physicians offers adequate cost recovery to the public health system. Nor could we determine how the employer-paid health insurance system deals with private care arrangements.

²⁴ Cited in Foy (1988), p. 170.

²⁵ The pharmaceuticals pricing policy was not examined nor was the private commercial sales system assessed for coverage. Although most communities have small private drug stores, several health officials assert that cooperatively managed community pharmacies are needed to reduce medications costs. Such a system merits consideration in the context of decentralizing health services and as a means of exposing EMPROFAC costs to citizen oversight.

4. *Public Health and Decentralization*

A recent Public Health Ministry report and program statement,²⁶ underscores several issues relating to decentralization. First, it acknowledges the principal of co-production as its calls for greater "participation of the population in the promotion of its own health," as well as "in the management and evaluation of the system".²⁷ Moreover it proposes "a system of cost recovery for health care that takes into account the socio-economic situation of the people".²⁸ It proposes a "restructuring of services with a view to clarifying their respective competencies, their decentralization, their 'hierarchization,' and the participation of both clients and professionals." It calls for new rules to provide "attributions for municipal authorities to coordinate health services."²⁹ Unfortunately, this important document contains no plan of action to further its decentralization agenda.

Family Planning: A Void?

The ministry's major program document for 1991 has no discussion of the urgent health issue of family planning and population. It does not report on the serious imbalance between limited natural resources and population, on current high birth rates, unacceptably high net population growth rates, nor on the grave dependency ratio of the young and old (and the chronically unemployed) to the working population. There is no analysis of the low rates of contraceptive use. There is, consequently, no strategy to attack the problem. The new regime is reportedly trying to avoid clashing with the church, as the old regime had, when in the late 1980s, it legalized abortions and started to aggressively promote contraceptive use. Yet faced with reduced opportunities for out-migration, cruelly limited natural resources and the unsustainable structural welfarism of the economy, Cape Verde's leadership must urgently engage its people on this issue and propose realistic solutions. To have any prospect for near term success, an aggressive family planning program will have to be highly decentralized based on vigorous local participation.

²⁶ 1991/92 Public Health Program: Ministry working document.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 1-2.

²⁸ Ibid, p. 40.

²⁹ Ibid, p. 39.

5. *Social Welfare*

The Secretariat of State for Social Welfare (*Secretaria de Estado da Promoção Social*) is part of the Ministry of Health. It administers the extensive national welfare system through two regional offices one for the leeward and another for the windward islands.³⁰ Social Welfare estimates that 50,000 individuals - approximately **one-seventh of the population** - are direct recipients of their cash assistance and food distribution programs. In the basic program for indigents, some 7,400 individuals,³¹ who lack any other means of support, are provided 500 CVE monthly (\$7.35 US). Additionally, they receive a monthly ration of PAM provided corn, beans, oil, sugar and soy meal. Eligibles must meet standards of indigence and unemployability due to age, handicap or chronic illness. The total number who can receive cash aid was set shortly after independence and has not been increased since. All social welfare field offices have lists of qualified indigents waiting to be inscribed. These are provided with the same food ration as are those who also are on a cash stipend.

Three other groups, in addition to those on the hard-care indigents list, receive food assistance through the welfare department. Needy families - largely female headed households in rural areas - receive monthly food issues based on family size. With 2,000 to 3,000 families inscribed in this program, aid reaches 8,000 to 10,000 individuals. Separately, malnourished children aged six-months to six-years are identified by PMI/PF field agents and other health care providers. These mothers enter a nutrition surveillance and maternal training program which includes food supplements for the children until they reach age six.³² Finally, pre-schools and kindergartens receive food for their daily feeding program.

In addition to these programs, Social Welfare supports - with NGO participation - three care centers for the aged and two centers for needy children and juveniles. It also manages the +/- 200 medical evacuations to Portugal each year, for which 7,500,000 CVE was budgeted in 1991.

³⁰ Madalena Fortes, Director for the leeward island region provided information on that region; data on the windward islands was supplied by the Secretariat. Longitudinal statistical tables were unavailable. Field information came from the two municipal level case studies and five *Povoado*-level cases that follow in chapters II and III.

³¹ In 1991 the leeward islands welfare budget of 19,236,000 CVE provided 3,681 persons with monthly stipends. The windward islands budget of 19,554,000 CVE, would have aided some 3,700 persons for a rounded total of 7,400. No data was available on the number of persons "qualified" for monetary support but for whom there was no place on the frozen list. Estimates are from a low of 10% to a high of 50% additional would be eligible for such aid were funds available.

³² Unfortunately official reports with nation-wide data was not available on this program, nor were recent UNICEF and PAM documents that might provide precise program information. Our best estimates are that between 3,000 and 5,000 children are inscribed in the program each year.

Social welfare assumes no formal responsibility for the oversight or coordination of NGO programs not affiliated with its food distribution system nor is it operationally engaged in the centers for children and aged that it supports with food.

6. *Decentralization and Social Welfare*

Welfare workers depend on volunteer committees, largely holdovers from the PAICV regime, organized by groups of villages, to assist in identifying and certifying indigent individuals and families and to distribute food to them. For years these volunteers have been requesting formal compensation for their services. Some may now benefit informally from distributed food stocks. Beyond this network, which has no municipal oversight, there is little or no community support for the program. Field welfare agents say that neither they nor the volunteers have time for social work aimed at client rehabilitation into the productive economy. Both national and local officials agree that there must be greater community responsibility for the official social welfare program, though no municipalities studied had formed a group to coordinate or even study the social welfare issues in their communities. Some argue that municipalities should be mandated to form citizen groups - perhaps with the aid of national and foreign NGOs - for oversight and support of welfare to the indigent. Though there is no national plan in this sense, we found officials in Ribeira Grande ready to negotiate with the central agencies for such a transfer.

Pervasive Welfare Psychology

The psychology of welfare which pervades Cape Verdian society is a grave national problem. Including the FAIMO employment program, **official welfare programs and activities directly benefit a majority of the population.** One national official commented that even civil service employment is viewed as welfare by another means, a guaranteed stipend with minimal work expectations.

Yet one finds hard working and enterprising people throughout the society - engaged in hard-scrabble subsistence agriculture, artisanal fishing, and small enterprises. The enterprise and productivity of Cape Verdian emigrant workers is well established. One of the strongest arguments for local management of the welfare system is that it is at this level, in the municipalities and the communities, that a new spirit of "rehabilitation and self-help" could be built. The goal of becoming eligible for one welfare program or another needs to be replaced with a desire to overcome the need for aid. However, exhortation is not the answer. Neither is making the localities responsible for managing the current system sufficient motivation to create such a change, as necessary as it might be in that direction.

7. *Non-Governmental Organizations, Social Welfare and Decentralization*

Comparatively Cape Verde has only an embryonic network of NGOs. Two major factors explain this situation. First, under one-party rule, the PAICV saw itself as the sole instrument for mobilizing mass-organizations at the grass-roots level. Foreign NGOs were not permitted to engage in direct community action. Local groups were either instigated by the party apparatus or, if nascent locally, were quickly coopted or frozen out.

Secondly, as part of this policy, the government (and the party) created two key institutions to act as agents of NGO action: The National Institute for Cooperatives (INC) and the Cape Verdian Institute for Solidarity (ICS). Opinions vary on the degree of independence that either consumer or producer cooperatives came to enjoy. But clearly, international organizations offering assistance to cooperatives were only permitted to work with the INC, not directly with local groups. In the more general areas of NGO action, ICS has maintained a near monopoly on foreign NGO access to the country and on key areas of community level action not relegated to other party organs.

The ICS was created in 1975 to serve initially as the official channel for all foreign NGO assistance associated with the Sahel drought relief program. From the outset, it allowed no direct foreign NGO action. ICS's style of controlled external cooperation was supported by government policy through 1990. Several European NGOs accommodated to the ICS, providing substantial support to its core budget and to its programs of vocational training and care for pre-school children and the aged. The only indigenous NGOs that ICS tolerated were the party-affiliated national women's movement (OMCV), now an independent NGO, Caritas, the church's assistance agency, and the Cape Verdian Red Cross. Each of these agencies engaged in operating child-care, pre-school centers.

Under the new government's 1991 program that supports freedom of association and free access of private organizations to work in Cape Verde, this situation is changing, although ICS management is making strenuous efforts to maintain a semi-monopoly position with foreign NGOs and trying to discourage direct action by such groups in the hinterland. ICS argues that "Cape Verdians need no foreign NGOs to organize us." Even so, independent NGOs are forming and more foreign NGO collaboration without ICS is being solicited by localities. The UNDP is actively encouraging the government to support private association formation to undergird the civil society in the new democracy and for development action.

A 1991 UNDP study³³ urges a collaborative UN/GOCV program to form a semi-official national umbrella organization to coordinate, support and stimulate domestic NGO formation. Its strategy is faulty, however, in not recognizing the opportunity for localities to develop direct partnerships with foreign NGOs who in turn can be charged to assist in the formation of local action groups. This important source of funding and technical assistance for building indigenous NGO capacities has barely been tapped in Cape Verde. For example, as of 1992 not one of the hundreds of United States international development oriented PVOs is active in Cape Verde. The only major European NGO to escape ICS's monopoly control for local action is BORNE Fonden and its child sponsorship operation on Santo Antão. More than centralized coordination, the NGO movement needs local development. Localities should be encouraged to seize the initiative, shown how to contact international NGOs, and encouraged to engage them in partnerships. The two processes - national level support and coordination and local initiatives - can go on simultaneously. But Cape Verde does not need a new centralizing structure for NGO action that merely replaces ICS's suffocating paternalism with a new set of controllers.

8. *Judicial Administration and Police*

The Police and Law Enforcement

The national police are attached to the Secretary of State for Internal Administration. They are currently commanded by a former army captain, Abailardo Monteiro Barbosa Amado. Although the government program calls for the municipalization of police functions, the commander indicated that no decisions have been made regarding dividing law enforcement functions between the national and the municipal governments.

On taking power the new government did abolish the security police responsible for "political" investigations. It also initiated a program to clearly separate the police from the army, changing uniforms and giving police officers non-military ranks and titles. Police retraining is also underway with technical assistance from Portugal. It aims to sensitize the police to law enforcement in a democracy and their role as public servants. Much former training must be overcome in the process, since most of officers received their basic training in Eastern Europe, Algeria and Cuba.

³³ See Moussa Ba, PROBLEMATICA DAS ONG EM CABO VERDE: PROPOSTAS DE ACORDOS, Projecto RAF/87/001, UNDP, Praia, November 1991. This report is a prime source for much of the material in this section. In addition, the author interviewed Sra. Luisa Ribeira the Director of the Instituto Caboverdiano de Solidaridade (ICS) as well as members of her staff. An FAO advisor to the INC provided insights on the cooperative movement.

Now the police are organized into regional commands. In all there are 750 policemen, one for each 465 citizens. They are divided into functional areas: traffic, security, public order, frontier police and judicial police. The Minister of Justice, Dr. Eurico Monteiro, gives top priority to the transfer of judicial police to the jurisdiction of the courts. This is not meant to duplicate law enforcement and criminal investigation functions of the national police, but to serve the courts with advanced forensic skills and investigatory methods.

National authorities differ on how much police decentralization is right for Cape Verde. The Minister of Justice argues for the "municipalization" of most police functions in three steps: first assign police to localities to enforce ordinances related to "market place law;" second, give municipal police traffic enforcement and vehicular law plus basic law and order; finally, if all goes well, remaining police functions including criminal matters might be handed over. On the other hand, Police Commander Barbosa believes that municipalization should not go beyond step one. The rule of thumb that he and fellow officers would apply is that any policing that might involve arms, as in criminal law enforcement, should be left to the national police. At the time of this inquiry, 12 national officers were being detailed to the Municipality of Praia to start direct enforcement of municipal ordinances. Such details to other municipalities may be made soon, but actual transfer of personnel must be based on policy and budgetary decisions which the commander said have yet to be taken at the highest political levels.

The Courts and the Administration of Justice

Cape Verde's legal and judicial system follows the Napoleonic civil-law tradition. Sitting judges and prosecuting attorneys are magistrates; in their careers they may move between judicial and prosecutorial roles. The tribunals are headed by the Supreme Court which is the final appeal level for all criminal, civil and administrative cases and the court of first instance for constitutional matters including election issues. The Supreme Court is composed of five judges: two named by the President, two elected by Assembly and one chosen by the Superior Council of Magistrates. Justices serve four-year terms. If not renamed to the Court, they revert to the top rank of the judicial career. All nominees to the Supreme Court must have had at least seven years previous service in the magistrature.

The Procuror General (*Procurador General da Republica*) heads the "Public Ministry," a civil law concept that comprises the functions of Attorney General and public prosecutor with a broader duty to society to guard the legal rights of all citizens. Named by the President of the Republic on nomination of the Prime Minister, s/he serves a four-year term. All career magistrates serving as prosecutors are under his/her direction.

The Superior Council of the Magistrature is charged to guard the independence of the justice system to oversee the career system for magistrates. It's nine members include the President of the Supreme Court, the Procuror General, two members elected by sitting judges, two elected by prosecutors, plus three citizens representing the general public: two selected by Assembly and one by the President.

Currently there are six regional tribunals, one each in Praia, São Vicente, Santa Caterina, Fogo, Santa Cruz and in Sal (to be staffed by year's end). The other eight municipalities have sub-regional tribunals of first instance. Only the magistrates in the Supreme Court and in the regional tribunals are trained lawyers. Both judges and prosecuting magistrates in the sub-regional courts of first instance are secondary school graduates with a two-year apprenticeship in the judicial system.

There is a separate national Tribunal of Accounts which is the public auditing authority for fiscal entities both national and municipal.

The courts have an accumulation of cases equal to some two years of work. Regional courts at Praia and São Vicente are the most burdened. "Popular tribunals" that functioned during the early post-independence years for local dispute resolution have long been superseded by the formal system. To increase citizen access to the justice system for minor dispute resolution, the government plans to install less formal local small claims courts (*tribunals de pequenas causas*) to deal with a myriad of civil disputes. The Minister of Justice asserts that as these courts provide citizens a venue for dispute resolution and as police reforms proceed, the respect for the rule of law will increase.

H. Natural Resources Management - The Ministry of Fisheries, Agriculture and Rural Extension (MPAAR)

The MPAAR has prime responsibility for state policy and program oversight on natural resources. Since the change in government it has been reorganized. According to Minister Antonio Gualberto do Rosario, the intent was to provide operational autonomy to central functions that were not appropriate for direct political/administrative control. Thus five institutes, some pre-existing the reorganization, have or will soon have their own executive officers and boards of governors to operate with greater program independence. The minister believes that the new organization leaves him with a more appropriate range of direct program management responsibilities and more time and staff to concentrate on policy, sectoral planning with whatever regional bodies may emerge under the new constitution, donor coordination and new initiatives, including decentralization to the municipal level. He praised the Municipality of Praia for taking the lead in establishing the first municipal office of rural development. However, he was not clear about the functions the municipal office might undertake except in FAIMO work planning, doing rural needs assessments and providing inputs to sectoral planning.

The staff of the MPAAR, including institute personnel, is still highly centralized. With 549 employees, 363 are posted in Praia. No plan calls for their imminent deconcentration. The FAO representative cited the ministry's fishing programs as typifying the problem: most technical personnel are comfortably located in the capital city with little contact with the islands of Maio, Sal and Boa Vista where most of the fishing resources are, or with Santo Antão where most fishermen live.

The Minister says that the government has no illusions that increased agricultural production could play a major role in lifting the nation's economy. Fisheries, he said, may be the exception. But only small gains were possible in agriculture and livestock. A major problem, he observed, is the fragmentation of land holdings into uneconomic units. Land reform should be approached, he argued, as a technical issue, not as a political one. And in this regard, land should be seen as a commodity to be bought and sold. Any modest increase in production depends, in his view, on the adoption of drip irrigation technologies, as yet untried among Cape Verdian farmers.

It was noteworthy that MPAAR officials did not question the specialization and concentration of resources that their reorganization evidenced. Within a broad governmental policy of decentralization, one might have expected a move toward local level multifunctional support offices, a deconcentration of personnel to these field units, and new forms of municipal and farmer interaction, oversight and even management of these resources.³⁴

I. Decentralization and Democracy in Cape Verde: A Summary of the National-Level Perspective.

Cape Verde has made an exemplary, peaceful transition from self-perpetuating one-party rule to freely elected multi-party democracy. The new regime has enunciated a policy favoring decentralization aimed at replacing central command and control structures with an order based on local initiative and self-governance. The need for structural change is recognized, to one degree or another, in all of the key public service sectors of government. But none of the sectors has a systematic plan to put more staff in field offices or to devolve clearly defined responsibilities and corresponding authorities to local governments or to engage communities in self-managed development.

The education reform is not rooted in community participation and in the dynamic of familial co-production strategies. Local government roles in education are not just ill-defined, they are undefined. The public health system acknowledges no substantive role for local governments. Centrally-managed services are located at municipalities, not rooted within

³⁴ In spite of the years of environmental activity in Cape Verde, with emphasis on the geo-morphology of the watersheds and their ecological integrity in the production/conservation equation, it appears that officials have not considered these watersheds in their organization schemes. It has been observed that the most productive way to deploy technical resources and to organize producers (or to encourage them to organize themselves) is to do so in harmony with the attributes of the natural resources themselves. The flow of farmer credit, cooperative operations, tree planting and harvesting, water management and irrigation, all and more could be organized around individual watersheds or clusters of them with a compelling logic associated with the physical world. Decentralization in the natural resource arena in Cape Verde - whether done to and with municipalities or by the Ministry and its newly formed institutes with these local authorities and with one another - would do well to consider this axiom in shaping their programs and in deploying their resources. If the new institutional rules are out of harmony with the hard realities of the physical world they will not work. Only if they are in harmony, might they work.

communities. Central authorities seem singularly unconcerned about the lack of community-level involvement in preventative health and they appear to have given up on the major public health problem of untenable natural population growth rates which threaten national survival.

The pervasive social welfare system is a centrally-managed program of misery mitigation without a vision of community involvement to rise above despair toward social action and rehabilitative programs. The potential for non-governmental organization, private association involvement in the social welfare system has yet to be explored in public policy. While the administration of justice and law enforcement are undergoing some reorganization for better civil control and equity of access, there is no systematic program for devolving law enforcement functions to local governments or for engaging these governments in a dialogue on why, when and how the municipalization of any such responsibilities might improve the rule of law in society and improve the conflict resolution process. The recent reorganization of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources was undertaken without any evident consideration of reallocating human and technical resources territorially, based on need and productive resources potential and the natural features of major watersheds, nor was it undertaken with any apparent concern for the role that local governments might play in the sector.

In the following chapters, the study examines case material from two municipalities and from five distinct rural communities of farmers, pastoralists, and fishers to further assess the prospects for effective decentralization in Cape Verde today.

II. MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT IN CAPE VERDE

Case Studies of the Local Government Context

A. Introduction

After a general discussion of municipal government in Cape Verde, this chapter draws on two field case studies to highlight issues raised by an analysis of the institutions of local governance and the roles they may have in providing key public services in a more decentralized order.

1. *Municipal Government in the National Context*

Cape Verde is divided into 14 municipalities, small general purpose governments serving both urbanized and rural areas in the jurisdiction. Only two have significant urban centers: Praia, the capital city on the island of Santiago, and Mindelo, the commercial shipping center on the island of San Vicente. The other 12 local jurisdictions are like rural counties with the seat of government in the market center or a larger town. There major national agencies have their "delegations" for area field operations and there most local services are concentrated.

The themes of decentralization and municipal autonomy were sounded before the advent of Cape Verde's new democratic regime. In 1989 the PAICV government passed a law to replace appointed local officials with elected ones in 1990.³⁵ But national political developments overtook that reform; municipal voting was postponed so as to follow national multiparty elections in 1991 and the municipal electoral law was revised to conform to the new multi-party system.³⁶ While reiterating the principle of local autonomy, the new law devolved no specific functions from central government agencies to the localities, simply reaffirming local government's authority in the provision of basic services: water, sewerage, electricity, sanitation, and street maintenance. It allows (but does not mandate) local initiative in education, health, environment, social affairs, economic development, housing and urban planning, and law enforcement. Since the law does not specify how localities might engage in these later functions, national agencies are left in effective charge.

In 1991 of 12,000 public employees in Cape Verde, only 10%, or 1,200 were municipal workers. Municipal revenues - before central government subsidies - also represented about 10% of all public revenue. The municipalities have limited revenue sources and little discretionary authority over those that they do have. Taxes and tax rates, fees for

³⁵ This reform was approved in two parts: Lei no. 47/III/89 and Lei no. 48/II/89, 13 July 1989. Legislacao Autarquica - I, Secretaria de Estado da Administracao Interna, October 1991, Praia. Passim.

³⁶ Decreto-Lei No.52/A/90, 4 July 1990; Decreto-Lei No.123/91 and No. 122/91 both of 20 Sept. 1991, in Legislacao Autarquica-I, op. cit.

services which the municipalities may perform (rates range on water and electricity supply, sanitation services, and sewerage) and other license and service charges are established by national legislation. There is some discretion on the sale and permissible uses of municipal patrimony and on rents or service rates (such as admission fees at municipally owned cinemas; rates for public transport both privately and municipally owned; rents on leased properties for commerce and dwellings).

Often municipal enterprises are run at a loss as "social and cultural" investments with general revenues or national subsidies covering those losses. But the law does require that each annual budget must be balanced between current revenue and expenditures. These budgets must be approved by the Secretary of State for Internal Administration and they must show that the share of the budget going to personnel costs does not exceed 50% of the total.

In 1991, to increase local resources, the national assembly authorized the transfer to municipalities of the yields from four central taxes: on real property urban and rural, on property transfers, on alcohol production, and on sugar cane. But authority to collect these taxes or to change the tax rates was not transferred. Finance ministry officials continue to assess and collect these levies for deposit in the municipal accounts.³⁷

In 1991, the central government increased its subsidies to the municipal treasuries. In 1990 the subsidy for all municipalities was 145 million CVE or 3.8% of national revenues. In 1991 it was increased to 210 million CVE or 5.2% of national revenue. The following table shows the current allocation of subsidies to the municipalities. It shows how unequal local expenditures are on a per capita basis and how the national subsidy does nothing to bring about an equalization of financial resources among the localities.³⁸

³⁷

In all four cases tax rates are set nationally. Assessments are based not on market value but on owner declarations of rent - either actual or imputed. Not surprisingly declared rental values are a fiction, representing in the vast majority of cases a mere fraction of the real or potential income from these properties. Informed officials estimate that the actual yield of these taxes range from 25% to 50% of their potential.

³⁸

E.G.: Per capita, before the 1991 subsidies, Santa Catarina had the lowest municipal expenditure. Its share in the subsidy was also the lowest per capita. At the high end, Boa Vista had the highest per capita expenditure, yet it received the highest per capita share of subsidy. The Secretariat's policy for allocating subsidies to municipalities, seen in draft by the team, was devoid of any need-based rationale. The only performance-based rationale was amount of revenue collected with no consideration for quality and scope of services provided. Result: "to those who have, more shall be given." If any equalization was ever sought, none has been achieved.

Table 2
1991 Municipal Budgets and Central Government Transfers

Municipality	Population	1991 Budget	Per Pers.	CG Transfer	Per Pers.	CG/Transfer as %Bgt
Praia	83,575	181,639,360	2,173	37,037,800	443	20.4
San Vicente	51,745	106,543,000	2,059	27,327,300	524	25.6
Santa Catarina	41,668	41,743,500	1,002	16,186,170	388	38.8
Fogo	34,002	39,384,300	1,158	15,765,750	464	40.0
(San Filipe)	25,669	<i>see note below</i>				
(Mosteiros)	8,333	<i>see note below</i>				
Santa Cruz	25,967	38,818,918	1,495	12,612,600	486	32.5
Tarrafal	25,496	39,235,032	1,539	12,612,600	495	32.1
Ribeira Grande	21,109	30,939,352	1,466	15,135,120	717	48.9
Porto Novo	15,088	25,000,000	1,667	11,141,130	738	44.6
Sao Nicolau	13,907	26,638,323	1,915	11,561,550	831	43.4
Paul	8,202	15,000,000	1,829	10,510,500	1,281	70.1
Sal	7,904	34,148,400	4,320	11,561,550	1,463	33.9
Brava	7,107	17,210,900	2,422	10,090,080	1,420	58.6
Malo	5,067	21,911,100	4,324	8,618,610	1,701	39.3
Boa Vista	3,516	19,707,930	5,605	9,039,030	2,571	45.9
TOTAL	344,353	637,920,515	1,853	210,210,000	610	33.0

Note: Budget and CG transfer data from Secretariat, Local Administration files. Population data: 1990 census. Figures in CV Escudos.

Note: Though Fogo divided into two jurisdictions, Sao Filipe and Mosteiros in 1992, data was only available for Fogo as a whole.

National authorities acknowledge that any serious devolution of functions to municipalities must be accompanied by resources. But, contrary to notions of local autonomy, they favor national subsidies rather than giving localities discretion to establish taxes, service fees, and other incomes to finance services. Many national authorities argue that the administrative ability of municipalities limits their taking on new or expanded functions (and managing more resources). Well before the change in national government, the Secretariat for Local Administration had designed a program to provide assistance for improving local administration. It was based on a fairly successful program in Portugal where groups of municipalities were served by a technical staff, established by the central government, to assist them with engineering, urban planning and public works design;

financial administration; and other areas of technical expertise not available in the limited staff of each locality. In 1989, several municipalities were provided with a small technical staff called "*Gabinetes de Apoio Tecnico*" (GAT). Though originally conceived as advisory bodies to improve the local government administrative capacity, they were soon simply absorbed into the local administrative apparatus. In 1991 some 100 of the technical and administrative personnel working in the municipalities were employees of the central government.

As of early 1992 the Secretariat was reviving the GAT idea. It has been restated as a technical assistance program by the central government to further intermunicipal cooperation and promote regional development. Like the GAT plan, it involves a technical assistance arrangement, rechristened "*Gabinetes Tecnicos de Apoio Intermunicipal (GATI)*." Each GATI would include: a civil engineer, an architect, an economist, a sociologist, a statistician, a general administrator and a regional planner. One GATI would serve the municipalities of Sal, Boa Vista and San Nicolau. A second would serve Fogo and Brava. A third would serve the three municipalities on Santo Antão and a fourth would be based in Assomada to serve the municipalities on Santiago except Praia. This plan had not been vetted with the newly elected local authorities as this study was made. Nor is it clear that it has support from the national leadership outside the Secretariat for Local Administration.

2. *Introducing the Two Case Studies: Ribeira Grande and Santa Catarina*

Ribeira Grande

Ribeira Grande is on the island of Santo Antão, the northern most and second largest in the Cape Verdian archipelago. With 44,399 inhabitants Santo Antão is the third most populous island after Santiago with 176,706 and São Vicente with 51,745 people. Nationally 60% of the population was considered rural in 1988, in Santo Antão the estimate was 78% (SARDEP I, 1990, p. 2). Ribeira Grande is the largest of the island's three municipalities with 21,109 inhabitants. Porto Novo follows with 15,088; and Paúl is last with 8,202. Ribeira Grande's economy is very agricultural with some irrigated culture in its steep and narrow valleys, more extensive and precarious dry land farming on higher plateaus in Santo Antão's center, and fishing out of the port of Ponta do Sol. FAIMO employment is the mainstay to the majority of rural households.

In the 1991 local elections, the MPD slate won 83.9% of the popular vote against the UDD slate. (UDD was a local party made up of former PAICV politicians.) In addition to taking the Council with Mauricio Santos as President and its six other seats, the MPD also won 15 of the 17 Assembly seats, with two going to the UDD.

The new council president is about 40 years old, a civil engineer trained for his seven years of advanced studies at the University of Moscow in Russia. He is an energetic man with apparent capacity and enthusiasm for systematic planning and organization. He has excellent connections with the MPD on the national level, having been first elected in the February electoral round as a deputy to the National Assembly. His decision to head the MPD slate for the *Camara Municipal* suggests the importance that he and the party now give to local administration as compared to national legislative office, from which he had to resign.³⁹

The Council and its president firmly support the MPD's national program to decentralize central government functions to the municipalities. The president is well ahead of most national thinking in seeking increased authority and resources to strengthen Ribeira Grande's role in social, economic and cultural development and to take the initiative in these areas. His administration favors rapid and complete municipalization in most areas, including all public works and all social welfare functions with expanded NGO participation. He wants full responsibility for all school construction and maintenance along with significant shared authority over teacher selection and placement, authority to start a vocational education program and to run literacy education. He believes that the authority to enforce local ordinances should be given to the municipality, but criminal law enforcement should stay national. To carry out these functions, along with management authority over FAIMO and water resources and power to be engaged in local economic development initiatives, Mauricio Santos wants central resources - including personnel - to be transferred to the municipality along with broad local discretion over new taxes and fees.

Santa Catarina

Santa Catarina encompasses 274 square kilometers or 28 per cent of Cape Verde's main island of Santiago. It straddles the island's central volcanic spine with arid peaks in the 3,500 to 5,000 foot range and a network of valleys radiating through mountains and plateaus toward the coasts. With a 1990 population of 41,668 it is the third most populous of the island's 15 municipalities, following Praia with 84,000 and San Vicente with 52,000. Assomada, the urban center of the Santa Catarina jurisdiction, is located at Santiago's central crossroads. All-weather stone-paved roads connect it with the capital, Praia, some 75 kilometers away on the island's southern point; with Tarrafal, the port city on the northern tip of the island, about 100 kilometers away; and with the coastal municipality of Santa Cruz, some 50 kilometers to the East. Assomada serves as a busy midway transport hub and

³⁹ It is true that the role of National Assembly deputy is indeed a weak one. The Assembly normally meets only four times a year, for about a week in each session. Deputies are paid per diem only during these meetings. Municipal council presidents, on the other hand, are full-time officials and receive a good salary, the same as a Secretary of State.

market center for the entire island. Livestock grazing on sparse scrub over wide areas of dry terrain along with dry land farming on the plateaus and hillsides and limited irrigated culture in narrow valleys form the main pursuits of the rural population. About half of rural households depend on FAIMO employment for cash income.

Local elections in December 1991 pitted the MPD against a pro-PAICV local party called GALIS. With a 50.3% turnout the MPD won 75% of vote. Celestino dos Santos Almada headed the slate which took the nine member council. 16 Assembly went to the MPD and 5 seats to GALIS. The new leadership supports the general policy on decentralization and municipal-led self-governance. But local leaders are cautious. Council President Almada indicated that they were "disposed to assume any functions that the **central government might want to give the municipality** so long as resources, both human and financial, come with them." The Municipal Assembly, in its meeting the day before our interview with Almada, registered a bipartisan consensus to take no action on local initiatives toward decentralization without careful study, leaving the lead to the central government.

President Almada indicated three areas in which national action toward decentralization would be welcomed. The first was for local control of law enforcement,⁴⁰ though the council would support a new judicial police force attached to the regional tribunal at Asomada. Their view is that local police should be separated from the central command structure in Praia so that enforcement officers are directly accountability to **local** authorities not simply under municipal control. The second priority for some local control was in agriculture and soil conservation.⁴¹ He felt that both technical services of the Ministry of Agriculture and the soil conservation program (labor intensive public works or FAIMO) needed local direction and greater sensitivity to local conditions. Thirdly, he indicated that the central direction of the program for school construction and maintenance needed to be replaced with a municipally managed program supported by substantial central funding.⁴² Neither the president or other councilors suggested that they needed more authority to

⁴⁰ Just before our visit Municipal authorities had clashed with the regional police commander in Asomada over a lack of responsiveness to local law and order issues in the municipality. On May 9, 1992, the Municipal Assembly asked the Government to replace the police commander. As of our visit he was under suspension, pending a decision on his replacement. No doubt these immediate events had influenced the Council President in giving police services his top priority for decentralization. (See, "Santa Catarina: Assembleia Municipal faz recomendacoes ao Governo," VOZ DIPOVO, no. 1236, 12 May 1992, p. 16).

⁴¹ The local head of the MPAAR office had also clashed with the new governing authorities of the municipality. Although somewhat complex, the case centered on whether MPAAR's people or municipal officials would determine who would be on the FAIMO employment lists and what areas of the municipality would be targeted for works.

⁴² Over several months the MINED delayed approval of a budget to construct 6 badly needed schools. These schools were to have been built under the World Bank's sector loan. Municipal authorities were not consulted until after Bank funding was exhausted in other municipalities. Angry, but determined, they negotiated a municipal/national funding package only to see the agreement reopened by the national government.

establish local taxes or to set rates for fees, rather, the plea was for larger central government subsidies for their general budget and more discretion over its uses.

B. Approaching the Cases: Illuminating Issues not Comparative Administration

The detailed studies of these two municipal governments, from which this summary is drawn, have yielded considerable information for an analysis of key issues related to institutional change and decentralization in Cape Verde. This summary offers only the salients from those studies, sometimes from one jurisdiction, sometimes the other, occasionally from both. It is intentionally selective and illustrative, by no means a thorough effort at comparative institutional analysis. What follows is offered to highlight issues. The objective is to understand how local government now functions, what public services are like and who provides them, and what the prospects are for decentralization. In the process we seek to understand the context in which grass-roots communities are nested, how they may shape and be shaped by municipal governments, what the issues are for achieving life enhancing outcomes through institutional change, and what tendencies are now afoot.

C. Municipal Administration and Finance

1. Municipal Finance

Both Ribeira Grande and Santa Catarina have the rudimentary consolidated, line-item budgets common to all Cape Verdian municipalities. Both investments and current expenditures are incorporated in a single document. There are no program units nor are there performance indicators. As required by national law, budgets are precisely balanced between total expenditures and revenues; personnel costs were reported to be well below the 50% of total costs legal limit (38% in Santa Catarina and 25% in Ribeira Grande). In both places, building and maintaining modest municipal facilities, streets, market places, parks and theaters takes 30%-35% of the budget. Operating costs run around 20%-25% and the water and electrical services another 20-25%. In both jurisdictions major income sources were fees, licenses and service charges to businesses and individuals; water services; electricity charges; municipal theater income; and transportation (Santa Catarina only) and renting out municipal equipment (Ribeira Grande). The balance of income is made up of a general head tax, and some miscellaneous 30 service charges, fines and fees, plus, the national government's transfer.

In both budgets it first appears that the water service is a profitable operation with receipts well above operating costs. However, neither jurisdiction places a value on the water nor are investments in the water system charged against current operations. In Ribeira Grande, as a UNICEF/Finland financed water system is turned over to the municipality, the issue of costing the system's amortization/replacement and maintenance and properly pricing this scarcest of all resources will become more and more critical. The issue is similar for the

municipal electrical enterprises in both places. The budgets and fee structures make no allowance for depreciation of current generating equipment or in lieu thereof a sinking fund for equipment replacement. Nor is there any provision for expanding energy networks to the large unserved areas of these municipalities.

In 1992, with the transfer of property taxes plus the sugar cane and alcohol production taxes to the municipalities, there was a significant opportunity to increase local revenues. Ribeira Grande could double its collection in these categories, Santa Catarina could do even more. It had, in 1991, one of the lowest collection efforts in these taxes of any municipality. Its urban property tax return of 2.5 million CVE was equal to Ribeira Grande's which has less than half of the Santa Catarina (Asomada's) urban property base and probably only 50% of its reasonable potential. Santa Catarina's collection represented only 5% of the national total while its population is over 12% of the nation. Its rural property tax collection was even worse at only 448,000 CVE, a good 10% below that collected in Ribeira Grande, half its size. Based on probable values, the rural land tax yield should have been at least four to six times greater.⁴³ Both of these taxes are assessed and collected by local delegations of the Ministry of Finance and unless the function is passed to the municipalities a serious enforcement effort would require close collaboration with the ministry officials.

An increased tax and service fee enforcement effort by a municipality carries with it considerable political risk. However, if citizens perceive the new municipal regime as providing them with better and more public services, with tax increases linked to their priorities for better services, fairly provided and honestly administered, then the risk will be greatly reduced. Without new taxes, no municipality can expand its local development role, provide more and better services in response to citizens except by better enforcement of the taxes on the books.

2. *Municipal Administration - Reaching and Serving Citizens*

Since the fall of the PAICV regime most "residents commissions" in rural villages and urban neighborhoods have been dissolved. The old field administrative agents (7 in Santa Catarina and 4 in Ribeira Grande) are being replaced. The new political leaders are planning to replace the residents commissions with local elected councils. They have begun to replace former administrative agents with new people. Neither jurisdiction has defined to what extent

⁴³ Collections from property transfers, which are assessed by the local delegation of the Ministry of Justice based on the values shown in the property registry at time of sale, (the SISA tax) reveal how poorly these other two taxes are now enforced. In this category, Santa Catarina ranked third in the nation, as it might be presumed to as the third largest jurisdiction. The SISA tax return was 3.2 million CVE or 12% of the national total (roughly the same as Santa Catarina's 12% share of the population). The SISA is the easiest of the property-based taxes to collect, but in principle is an indicator of the returns the other two taxes on imputed value of property should be producing.

the agents, so important in preparing lists for FAIMO employment and in representing general municipal authority and services, will answer to the to-be-formed citizen councils or to the administration.

In both jurisdictions officials say that any new functions given to local government will require transfers of resources and personnel from national agencies. The council president of Ribeira Grande, however, does approach the provision of some services differently. For example, he characterizes his management of the public works department as "like a commercial enterprise." That is, jobs are set up as task orders or "contracts" between management and the department. When executed with quality and on-time, bonuses are paid - up to 75% on top of salary for engineers and architects, 60 % for foremen, and 50% for technical people. If there were private firms on his island, he would contract out for most public works and other services. A recent large job, the construction of a school, was put out for bids nation-wide, attracting firms from São Vicente and Santiago. The president hopes that qualified firms will soon set up local permanent offices. He argues that when municipalities are enabled to expand the services they provide, they would be better advised to contract the work to private firms and persons to stimulate the local economy and to keep down the public payroll.

D. The Welfare System

As explained in Chapter I, welfare in various forms is all-pervading in Cape Verde. As part of the Ribeira Grande case study, data on participation in key elements of this system on the island of Santo Antão was collected. As illustrated below, it demonstrates that at least 67% of the population receives welfare assistance in one form or another.

Municipal administrative agents, now that the old PAICV "residents commissions" do not exist, have primary responsibility for determining eligible lists for FAIMO employment. Given the vital importance of FAIMO pay in family survival and in the local economy, this is a powerful and important function. The president of the Ribeira Grande council asserts that not only this task, but the task of coordinating and managing all aspects of the social welfare system should be municipalized for oversight by municipal officials to assure local management and control. He observes that as now managed, through the Social Welfare department (indigent aid, food to needy families, rations to malnourished children), the Ministry of Education (school feeding), and the NGO managed pre-school programs, they are resource wasteful, are uncoordinated, and in the case of Social Welfare's indigent's program, have no concern for rehabilitation.

Table 3
Santo Antão - The Welfare Assisted Population

	# Benefiting Units Individual or Family by program type	Probable Number Individuals benefited assisted by program
National Public Works -FAIMO Program (cash)	6,885	22,000
Social Welfare Programs -Assistance to Indigents: -Aged, Infirm/Handicapped (Cash and Food) -(Food Only) -Food Aid to needy families -Malnourished Children (6 mos. to 6 yrs.) -Preschool centers operated by NGO: PAM food stocks	1,900 (1,672) (200) 787 1,399 703	1,900 2,200 2,000 703
School Feeding -Children/Primary School daily meals	8,792	9,000 (includes staff)
Privately Funded Programs -BORNE Fonden (Danish NGO) child/family sponsorship	3,200	15,000
Sum of beneficiary incidence in all programs:		52,803
Likely # individuals reached by at least one:		30,000+
Total Island Population		44,399
Min. Est. % Pop. Benefiting in at least one:		67.6%

Note: Table 2 data based on field interviews, the 1990 population census and SARDEP, Vols I and II. FAIMO beneficiaries assumes that for every 6 employed at least 4 separate families of 5 persons each benefits.

His proposed approach is get expert assistance both for taking on the overall welfare management task and for mobilizing new local NGOs to work on welfare matters. That assistance, he believes, should come from the international private, voluntary agencies. He would start with expanded links to foreign private agencies like BORNE Fonden, the Danish child sponsorship agency, which already aids some 3,000 children and their families on Santo Antão. He specifically noted that he would want no association with ICS (see Chapter I) and its heavy handed, paternalistic approach to international and national NGOs. His plan was to request UNDP assistance in expanding international NGO contacts and for facilitating relations with them.

E. Education

That the municipality should play a larger role in a more decentralized education system was less clear in the thinking of Santa Catarina authorities than it was in Ribeira Grande. Each municipality already participates substantially in school construction and maintenance on an ad hoc basis, sometimes with the voluntary participation of parents.

Santa Catarina was somehow seriously slighted in planning allocations of the recent World Bank credit for school reconstruction (see note 39 above). This, in spite of the fact that only 55% of its schools are in an "acceptable state of repair" according to ministry standards. An emigrant-led group called the Amigos de Santa Catarina has raised some funds to support school reconstruction. Six schools are now under construction by the municipality with the help of parents willing to provide hand labor. Other schools are scheduled for rehabilitation or construction under a jointly funded municipal/ministry plan which the latter has yet to approve. Local teachers and municipal officials are dismayed by the ministry's delay.

The ministry's centralized decision structure impacts daily operations as well. There are no delegated authorities for procurement of even minor supplies for school operations or emergency school repair. The Santa Catarina MINED supervisor, with over 300 teachers in the area, doesn't even have authority to grant an instructor a one-day leave, let alone approve a merited raise or school reassignment. Nor are the schools rooted in the community. In neither Santa Catarina nor Ribeira Grande were there regularly organized parent associations at each school. Involvement of parents and counseling with them is sporadic, largely left to each teacher.

In the view of the council president in Ribeira Grande, until there is a national reform of the system, each municipality should draw up an annual contract with the Ministry of Education that clearly spells out the financial commitment of each side to school repair and construction. That contract could also extend to other areas. In his view local residents councils (*nucleos de poder local*, as the to-be-formed councils there are called) should have a similar contract with the municipality. In time these contracts could provide for local authorities over teacher recruitment and selection, contributions toward teacher housing and pay and other issues of co-management and coproduction at each level. In his view, municipalities should be fully authorized to initiate local vocational education responsive to the realities of the local economy and, as part of his proposed welfare reform, the municipality should oversee/coordinate the growth and management of pre-school centers.

Neither municipality had a plan to reinvigorate literacy education, although it was acknowledged in both localities as a community responsibility. Linking adult literacy education to the schools and the municipal libraries and giving new local citizens councils some role in the system seemed not to have been addressed.

F. Law Enforcement

Both Ribeira Grande (for Santo Antão island) and Santa Catarina (for Santiago, except for Praia) are the seats for a regional police headquarters. Both commands have limited budgets and transportation capacity. They often request that the municipalities help transport officers when they are called to a local crime scene or are asked to attend a public disturbance. These informal arrangements extend, as in Santa Catarina, to a regular provision of municipally paid secretaries at the police headquarters to process fines and fees assessments against municipal ordinances. At the time of this study, a breakdown in these arrangements in Santa Catarina had resulted in the council and full municipal assembly demanding the suspension and replacement of the police commander. (*Voz Dipovo*, May 12, 1992, p.16 see note 37 above). They did not, however, propose the municipalization of the police function as their council president personally proposed. They did, however, ask the central government to authorize the re-creation of the colonial authority of "*cabochefe*". Under the Portuguese administration, such an official oversaw a number of rural villages and urban neighborhoods with power to enforce general law and order and to directly resolve disputes among citizens, acting as an all-in-one rustic social worker, sheriff and justice of the peace. In asking for such an authority, it appears that local officials were as much concerned about the lack of an accessible dispute resolution capacity under the current system as they were for the law enforcement role that this official might perform. The Assembly did not indicate whether the *cabochefe* should be under municipal or central government oversight or how he should be selected.

Police officials in both jurisdictions opposed the notion of municipalization, believing that armed law enforcement was a national function. The council president in Ribeira Grande only wanted municipal police to enforce local ordinances, not to deal with criminal matters. Most lacking there was a resident magistrate. Often a local notable has to be engaged to act as judge in criminal matters requiring incarceration beyond the 24 hour detention limit for police authority alone. In both localities, authorities welcomed the idea of a fast acting local court for small claims and minor disputes.

G. Public Health

The structure and functioning of the health services in the municipalities, more fully described in the detailed studies of these cases, is only summarized here. The doctor at the health center in Ribeira Grande and the head physician at the Santa Catarina hospital saw decentralization as an internal issue within the health ministry. Mainly they wanted to see greater resources, personnel and equipment sent from the general hospitals in Praia and Mindelo to field locations. Both complained the for the lack of X-ray equipment and a local lab technician they had to order that most surgical cases be evacuated to the general hospitals. With a modest "decentralization" by the ministry, they argue, more could be done locally at much less cost and with more timely treatment. Dr. Cabral, in Asomada, felt that a long term plan to achieve improved local health care should include recruitment of candidates for

physician, nurse and technician training from the local community. With the localities financing their training, contracts could be made to guarantee their return to serve. Now, professionals want to stay in urban places both for the amenities and to earn extra from private practice. She also felt that the most appropriate role for municipalities in health care was in disease prevention through environmental sanitation and improvement of the water supply. They should have no direct role in the curative system. In Santa Catarina, Dr. Cabral noted, the municipality had cooperated in the construction of two basic health posts with some citizens contributing labor.

The physicians admitted that no citizen health committees were operating in their municipalities and that the basic health agents were selected by them or their staffs (not selected by the community as ministry policy states). Neither knew how the new municipal councils were going to promote the formation or election of new neighborhood councils and whether or not these councils could serve as health committees or otherwise see to their formation. They did feel that such committees, working with basic health agents, could have great impact in immunization campaigns and in cases of epidemics requiring communal education and action.

Both physicians indicated that the most important volunteers in the system were the many mid-wives who, in fact, delivered most of the babies (78% in Ribeira Grande) and gave most prenatal and early post-partum advice. Most mid-wives have attended a two-day training program, which is offered yearly at the health centers.

H. Municipal Institutional Capacity: A Summary of Findings

In both Santa Catarina and Ribeira Grande, the elected local authorities suffer from the lack of clear guidelines for a decentralization strategy from the central government. Lacking a concrete plan for the transfer of responsibilities, authorities and resources, they are grappling with uncertain options rather than with a working agenda. Rules have not been laid out to provide mutual understanding in each public service, regulatory and resource management area as to which jurisdiction has a mandate separate and distinct from the other. Where a transfer of function is to be made from central to municipal authority, a time table for action needs to be set out and resource issues addressed. The municipality's permissive areas of authority need also to be defined with rules that indicate what its initiatives may imply for relations to the central agencies. Finally, the rules on what may not be done at each level of government - leaving a clear field of action to the other - need to be set forth.

This new set of rules that spells out who must do what, who may do what, and who may not do what is needed to provide the essential framework for negotiating resource issues for program finance and management. In addition, policy must address the means by which citizen participation and coproduction can and will be provided for on the level of each community. What will be the role of citizen groups in managing and supporting the schools and local health-care units - through direct action and through taxation? What will be the

permissive/mandated roles of natural resource users - water-user groups, forest and wood-lot users, fishermen, etc. - in mobilizing themselves for sustainable use regimes and for eligibility for municipal/state cooperation?

1. Santa Catarina

The elected leadership of Santa Catarina has not grasped the national policy of decentralization as an opportunity for systematic institutional change, to shift major authority and responsibility from central to local government. It seems that recent municipal demands for replacements of the local heads of the national police and of the agriculture and social welfare offices are more circumstantial reactions against incumbents than substantive efforts to seek new localized authorities in these areas. Although the policy environment at the national level seems ripe for such local initiative, the sense of risk by local officials, the customary paternalism of the old order, and a lack of active encouragement from the center have conspired against major institutional changes at their hands.

But the needs and opportunities for change are apparent. In both the health and education sectors the lack of citizen organizations to share in the co-production of needed services is noteworthy. There are no citizens committees to share the work to be done with health agents and with school authorities. The poor state of repair of the schools in the municipality could easily be dismissed as due to the neglect of the national government were it not for the fact that there are no active parents' associations in these schools and the accompanying fact that Santa Catarina's revenue performance is so poor. With modest effort municipal income could be greatly improved to meet more local school maintenance and construction costs and to help finance medical equipment and personnel.

Santa Catarina may represent the mind set of most localities in that effective devolution of functional authority will have to be accompanied by a systematically programmed plan of action from the center accompanied by training and a motivational campaign. Although much must be done to improve the municipality's financial administration, most importantly, the means of citizen participation in health, education, natural resources management, etc. needs to be agreed upon between municipal authorities and the local representatives of the central agencies. Neither local nor national authorities interviewed had substantive plans to engage the populace in meaningful local self-help efforts.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ One arresting fact suggests that in Santa Catarina there is at least one very positive dynamic that could be built upon. Ministry of Education data shows that during the past three years Santa Catarina has had the highest participation in adult literacy programs in the country. Per capita it was twice as great in Santa Catarina as in the capital. In 1989 Santa Catarina mobilized 135 volunteers for training as literacy teachers, 30% of the 463 volunteers trained nation-wide that year. They in turn provided the opportunity for the adults in the community. The oft heard local complaint that Santa Catarinans won't make efforts to help themselves is belied by the literacy program data. Rather than reject this achievement as an artifact of the PAICV, current officials could examine how it was done so as to repeat its community energizing methods.

2. *Ribeira Grande*

In contrast to Santa Catarina, the officials of the municipality of Ribeira Grande appear to relish the prospect of substantive decentralization and are seeking the initiative in many areas. The council president is starting to encourage some neighborhoods to elect local community councils, though a general program has not been approved by the Assembly and no specific means for forming community health committees or parent associations for the schools is addressed; he has selected new municipal field agents and has them in training in Mindelo; he is negotiating with the Ministry of Education for specific cost sharing terms on new school construction and wants to extend the terms to cover teacher recruitment and selection and an initiative to form a vocational school; he is negotiating with the central government for the transfer of all authority over local public works, including transfers of personnel and resources and is looking to diversify service production through contracts; he is investigating new cooperative linkages with international NGOs and what might be done to put the local government in charge of all social welfare functions.

Even so, there is much that remains unclear, especially in the minds of local delegates of the national agencies. Moreover, municipal revenue and financial administration lags behind the ambitious planning of the energetic executive.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ An advantage that Ribeira Grande officials have is the carefully drawn regional development plan for the island of Santo Antão (including the municipalities of Paúl and Porto Novo). Completed in 1991, after years of investigation by Dutch-financed expert teams, the plan (Santo Antão Regional Development Plan-SARDEP), Vol. I (1990) and II (1991) is rich with data on the island's history, economy, society, governance and institutional actors. It captures SARDEP's decade of experience with promoting the island's development. The development framework it recommends appears to be accepted by nearly all the new leaders, even though it was prepared during the previous PAICV regime. Yet, Dutch officials as well as newly local leaders recognize that it needs to be discussed and negotiated with citizens to get the commitment needed to make it work. Moreover, its recommendation to set up new structures for intermunicipal cooperation leading to the consolidation of the island's three municipalities into one administration is much disputed. It is not clear that this would achieve greater efficiency simply by combining resources and upgrading jobs. Nor is it clear that local government consolidation is needed in order to prepare for major functional decentralization by national agencies. Consolidating three elected governments into one carries the danger that the new one will be too distant from citizens and in course, will diminish their incentives for service coproduction and grass-roots self-governance.

III. CAPE VERDE'S RURAL COMMUNITIES CASE STUDIES IN THE DYNAMICS OF SURVIVAL AND THE INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNANCE

A. Introduction

To better understand the survival issues facing Cape Verdians and the relationship that decentralization might have to their daily lives, five rural communities were studied in considerable detail. In this chapter an abridgement of each of these studies is presented. For those interested, the fuller case studies are available in the unabridged report that this one is based on. In all of the cases special emphasis is placed on key production systems by which life is wrested from a rugged and unforgiving natural environment by farming, fishing, animal raising, and, where applicable, by other employments. The focus is ever on the human interactions, community traditions and practices for cooperative problem solving, and the rules that shape grass-roots institutions. What is clear from this richly diverse story is that the human prospect in Cape Verde, often constrained by cruelly limited resources, can be improved by building on the real, working local capacities of local people. The term of art for building that capacity, the theme of this study, is decentralization.

B. Lagoa Povoacao on the Planalto Leste (Ribeira Grande Municipality-The Island of Santo Antão)

1. Background and Setting

Lagoa is located on the high, broken plateau (Planalto Leste) that begins behind and south of the cliffs rising steeply from the town of Ribeira Grande. The road up the cliffs is well engineered and paved with cobbled stones. It leads 18 km to Agua des Caldeiras, the community where public services are concentrated. Agua, at 1,300 m altitude, is cool enough to allow afforestation with pines. It is the seat for regional activities of the island-wide Dutch-financed Santa Antão Rural Development Project (SARDEP).⁴⁶ Two km. before Agua, a dirt road forks south. Thirteen km. further is Lagoa, at the heart of the Planalto plateau which falls within Porto Novo and Ribeira Grande municipalities.

Salient facts about the community are: an arid, difficult environment; uncertain rains; limited capacity for collective organization; high dependency on workfront employment in the dry season; moderate out-migration; and limited public services. Ten years of SARDEP activity through FAIMO work-fronts have created an astonishing pattern of soil and water conservation (SWC) devices on the land. In drought years, the water table falls and water must be trucked from distant sources. The people of Lagoa, some 770 inhabitants, live in

⁴⁶ See note 42 above on SARDEP. SARDEP has worked in this area since 1983 doing SCW and forestry with MPAAR, the Forest Service, and other State Agencies.

eight quarters (*zonas*), which constitute small, defined sub-village spatial and social units. Large families with five or more children appear not only common, but until recently, the social ideal. Despite their desperate straits, only about 30% of local families count a member who has emigrated to a situation elsewhere in the islands or abroad.

Lagoans are dry-land, *sequeiro*, farmers only. Holdings average 1,000 m² on which they plant maize and beans, and keep a few livestock: cows and goats for milk and, more rarely, meat, chickens for eggs and meat, and burros for transportation, primarily of water from public cisterns. Rainfall is so uncertain that in many years some farmers can plant no crops. They are extraordinarily dependent on non-farm FAIMO employment to survive.

2. *Collective Action and Governance*

Mutual Assistance: Djunta Mon and Djuda

Environmental uncertainty and risk make it difficult to sustain cooperative work groups over time. Farmers in irrigated areas must work in groups to ensure a reliable water flow. Incentives for group work among Lagoan dry-land farmers are much weaker. Even so, groups, called *Djunta mon*, do organize as quid pro quo labor exchanges, but for restricted periods (e.g., two weeks). They form to support specific, limited tasks: for planting maize and beans, for weeding, and for harvesting. But those who plant together may not harvest together. Ad hoc groups may form as rains fall, when each group member's field is tended in turn.

Djunta mon teams number only four to five people. Fewer than half stay together regularly. Most change members from operation to operation within one season based on the activities that serve them. Since groups are small, people can recall, by activity, the reciprocal obligation of each member. By this strategy farmers maximize their capacity to engage in opportunistic collective action based on ad hoc coalitions of interest. Shirking and free riding is uncommon since the community is small and individual reputations as hard workers and reliable group members determine their getting labor exchanges when they need it.

Djuda, assistance offered without expectation of immediate return, is infrequent. A member of a *djunta mon* group who has a long illness would rarely be helped out with farming tasks by others, since his return labor is unlikely. Typically that family would help itself as best it can. Female-headed households do form an exception to this pattern. Those women capable of working tend to participate in *djuda* exchanges because they have no other way to mobilize labor for special tasks.

Women, who head 18% of households on Santo Antão, tend to be particularly disadvantaged. Unless they have older children who can do heavy labor, these households are excluded from normal *djunta mon* networks, though some women farmers do form *djunta mon* groups among themselves when they have children able to do domestic chores.

Furthermore, while men appear to have access to remittance networks that include extended family, females tend to benefit only from nuclear family ties such as husbands, brothers and sons.

Situational Collective Action and Self-Help

To pursue some activity or to build a structure of public benefit, villagers say that they can mobilize volunteer labor. They feel they can overcome any prospect of free riding: "those of us who are braver will go out, each in our own way, and mobilize those who are 'badly brought up.'" Lagoans do not, however, pool their funds. The 96 Lagoans who currently do get cash income from FAIMO employment have neither communal nor individual savings. They say that they need everything they get to pay for the few survival goods they buy. When they have a party, each guest pays for the food and drink consumed. Neither is there a funeral association. But people do lend or make contributions to a deceased's family needing funds for a wake and burial. It is said that, "the only reason they contribute is because they want people to contribute when they die." This ad hoc system of contributing to funeral costs suggests norms of communal reciprocity.

Local Governance

Under the PAICV, Lagoa had the typical *comissão de moradores* formed by a representative of each of the eight *zonas* in the village. *Zonas* are headed by an informal leader who listens to people's problems, helps resolve disputes, or advises people on how to write or contact an official for help on their problems. The residents' commission disbanded with the fall of the PAICV government. After elections the new Ribeira Grande council president visited Lagoa and organized elections for a new local commission. Some 60 people from three neighborhoods met at the school. They discussed candidate qualifications: their esteem by fellow villagers, their literacy skill and intelligence and how they got along. They then elected six representatives. Many now say these elections weren't valid: many did not know of the meeting; most came from only a few Lagoa neighborhoods. To get new elections, they feel that they must get approval from the Ribeira Grande council president. Unwilling to pay travel costs for a delegation to pose their problem in Ribeira Grande, they await a promised visit from the council president.

They are also awaiting a new municipal administrative agent to be sent from Ribeira Grande; meanwhile they seek services in Ribeira Grande and Porto Novo (municipal lines divide the area) from their old contacts. They say they expect little of the new municipal government. They pay two taxes annually either in Ribeira Grande or Porto Novo: the head tax of 130 CVE and the land tax (*decima*) equal to 10% of rents (paid by owners, not tenants).

Lagoans fight occasionally, mainly over misunderstandings. They only call for the police if disputes get out of hand or appear to threaten grave injury. In case an animal damages crops, its owner pays 100 CVE in fine to the state and the local residents' commission president assesses damages to be paid the crop owner.

3. *FAIMO Workfronts and Welfare*

FAIMO workfronts, associated with SARDEP's regional projects, provide employment to 96 Lagoans. Without this welfare work, most Lagoa families could not survive. Spaces for work open up only when someone migrates or gets a job in one of the towns. Fewer than 100 Lagoan adults are unemployed, but anybody who does not have work elsewhere wants a FAIMO job. People can start at age 16. Some families have two or even three workers in a front. Locals see this as violating of the national policy which allows for one worker per family and as an injustice to families in need who have no one employed. Yet multiple family members working is not viewed as misconduct by those individuals since they are chosen by officials. The lists formerly were established by the local residents' commission based on need. SARDEP and municipal agents then selected the workers from the list.

Without FAIMO work, many Lagoans would starve in years of drought. The current work fronts began in 1960 to build the Ribeira Grande-Porto Novo road. Since 1977 work has concentrated on soil and water conservation and afforestation under the aegis of MPAAR and SARDEP. Soil and water conservation work institutionalizes a sex-based division of labor: women carry rocks to men who construct hillside stone catchments, terraces, dikes and retaining walls. Women generally are paid the low wage rate for hand labor; men, paid as semi-skilled masons, get a higher rate. In afforestation work jobs are shared equally.

Between five and ten people receive welfare as indigents. Almost all are handicapped or old; women outnumber men on the rolls. Recipients get 500 CVE monthly plus a basic food ration valued at about 300 CVE. It is difficult to survive on that. Yet people rarely leave the list except when they die. The former head of the PAICV residents' commission certifies welfare candidates and distributes their food stuffs and funds. A villager's rueful comment about the welfare rolls reveals the depth of their poverty and dependency on the dole: "*Death is awful, but we've come to like it because it opens up positions on the list.*"

4. *Public Services: Health, Population and Education*

Health and Population

In Lagoa, 78% of babies are born at home attended by unpaid midwives. Birth control is not yet widespread. Women on daily birth control pills get prescriptions from the mobile PMI unit, which visits Lagoa monthly to see women who are interested in family planning, are pregnant, or seek advice on mother-child health. The PMI personnel may refer women to the Ribeira Grande health center for further attention. Some unmarried women go for anticonception injections each three to six months. Many villagers favor fewer children

and claim the Catholic Church also does, so that parents can finance educations to permit their offspring to leave the area for better prospects. It is said, "**Children don't bring in money in the short term; you have to invest in them.**" Women find it difficult to say they want fewer children than they already have. (The norm is five but many have seven and eight). But asked to speculate, they said that if they were "playing God" for their own girls, they might say two or three.

There is no health post in Lagoa; the nearest is 13 km away by foot in Agua das Caldeiras. People say they have to carry the seriously ill on their backs to Agua and thence by truck to the hospitals in Porto Novo and Ribeira Grande. Often they are dead on arrival from the trip. The health agent in Agua, posted out of the Porto Novo center, services all people in the Planalto Leste. The agent has only on-job training in preventive care (some first aid) and is charged to weigh babies, test and treat well water, dispense oral rehydration formula, vitamins and aspirins (no antibiotics) and to refer cases to the health centers in either Porto Novo (16 km from Agua) or in Ribeira Grande (18 km).

Education

Parents want to educate their children. But education, even in the local basic primary school, is a costly burden to these poor families. Yet most make sacrifices to outfit children with books and supplies.⁴⁷ In 1992, for the first time, seven families sent children (six boys and a girl) to upper primary school in town, at considerable cost.⁴⁸ Education is seen as hope: the means to leave a barren and unforgiving environment for a better future, for jobs in town or elsewhere in the islands, or for emigration. Most children gain basic literacy skills at the local four grade primary school but once out they lack reading material to keep up their literacy skill and to continue learning. Parents want the school in Lagoa expanded to include the two upper primary years. They say they would willingly organize labor groups to build the needed rooms.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Residents estimate it costs 400 CVE to outfit a child for the first grade, and 500 CVE for the upper three grades. They say some poorer children refuse to attend school since the others tease them when they lack school materials. Children do share books.

⁴⁸ Parents must find someone with whom to entrust their children. Then pay room and board costs: 3,000-4,000 CVE/month and school materials costs: 3,000 CVE/year. Uniforms cost from 650 -1,000 CVE/year. The 5,000 CVE/month total is utterly impossible for most families who depend on scant farm earnings and low FAIMO wages.

⁴⁹ Villagers interviewed indicated willingness to use social pressure to mobilize labor for two purposes only: constructing expanded schooling facilities, and constructing a health post where they could get real health services.

The school has only four classes. Of the four teachers, three women and one man, only the director has completed secondary school plus a year of teacher training. Classes, roughly equal between boys and girls, average 30 students: 35 in grade one down to 22 in grade four. Attendance can be irregular, at times only two-thirds are present. Bad attenders become repeaters and drop outs. They lack materials adapted to student needs and interests. The basic curriculum includes math, Portuguese, music, physical education and science. Environmental issues are being introduced. The director calls parents to general meetings several times annually. Few attended. Parents and teachers see the MPAAR as the school's "godfather." MPAAR has financed some maintenance though after much delay. The school lunches, cooked on site from PAM stocks, include beans, chicken and rice, meat and fish. To get money for spices and savories, the cook sells some fish or uses her own money. A few parents contribute 10 CVE monthly for these supplements.

Among residents interviewed there is a hunger for information. Interest by many adults in a bookmobile library was such that many said they would willingly pay fines on overdue books. They said that to get regular news and information they would be willing to work out a system, like house to house collecting, to pay for a shared newspaper subscription.

5. *Renewable Resources, Farm Land and Tenure Rules*

Overview

The island of Santo Antão is characterized by a complex and unequal system of land distribution. A few landowners possess relatively large areas; tenants work the land in small fragmented fields. The situation is ancient in origin. Over centuries, droughts have forced small holders to sell farms to finance emigration. These lands have mostly been purchased, not by farmers, but investors: such as shop owners, townspeople, and migrants. Investing in improvements in the land is of little interest unless required to retain ownership rights. Many absentee owners, who leave fields abandoned or to be managed by a relative or tenant, can't be reached to agree to alternative uses or improvements. Relatives managing land for their migrant kin rarely will risk an investment to improve another's property.

Lagoan Pastures and Afforested Areas

Lagoans subsist through rainfed farming and animal husbandry, strongly supplemented by income from FAIMO employment. (Some also receive remittances from migrant kin). Pastures and other reserves are among the areas most affected by primary subsistence activities, technological changes and demographic pressure. As a rule, terrain not under cultivation has either been abandoned or has another use. Areas in dry fields and forests, for example, provide forage, thatching materials, poles and rope for construction, fuelwood and beans. A few of these areas may be abandoned farm plots, but most are simply on too steep a slope or have poor soils or are informally reserved for other ends. Most pastures and afforested areas lie some distance from residence centers. They are usually unfenced, common pool resources: access to them is hard to control and users make separable

(rivalrous) use of products they harvest. Known as *tchadas*, these areas are treated as open access resources. Landowners may have *de jure* rights to them. Increases in population and changing needs put new and different pressures on these lands. Steep, marginal lands once reserved for thatch or pasture may now be used for rainfed agriculture, causing the shallow soils to lose protective grass cover and erosion to accelerate.

Animal husbandry is important as part of household subsistence and for stored wealth. With many men employed in FAIMO, woman and children mostly tend the animals. In recent years many former *tchadas* were afforested. On the Planalto Leste, afforested parcels total 1,600 ha., more than a quarter of the 60 km² SARDEP project area. Tree planting, managed by the Forest Service with SARDEP financing, follows agreements with the landowners by which they receive 15% of the harvest, which can begin anywhere from five to 30 years after planting. Afforestation poses problems for many stockowners. Before tree planting, they could let animals wander freely in the open areas. Now they are told to keep their animals home and stall feed them. Yet many owners still let animals roam, risking fines, since it requires much less labor than cutting and carrying forage. Residents may apply to foresters to cut forage in the afforested parcels. Formal rules prescribe 10% of the harvest for the land owner, 10% for the state, and 80% for area residents. The rules are not strictly applied. In good years a landowner may take 80%. Now, even in drought years, forage appears to meet the demand though use rules are violated and forest guards must protect planted areas against illegal use. Most fines are issued against abusing animal owners.

Lagoa Farm Fields as Economic Goods: Land Tenure Rules

Sequeiro plots in Lagoa range in size but few exceed 1,000 m², as larger areas require investments beyond the means of most tenants. Female heads of households tend smaller plots, reportedly between 500 and 1,000 m². These lands have the attributes of private goods: it is relatively easy to control access; farmers make separable use of crops. Land tenure rules reflect the private good characteristics of farmland.

Landowners enjoy broad *de facto* and *de jure* rights, including the rights of transfer, exclusion, management, and in some cases, use (e.g., trees and tree products). Tenants have rights to land use, but not to trees or other improvements. Their rights to manage the land over the long term are limited. For some afforested areas owners have authorized State management. All *sequeiro* fields in Lagoa are controlled by only three large absentee owners who live in the larger towns of the island. Over two-thirds of Lagoa's tenants are sharecroppers. Since the 1982 Agrarian Reform Law officially banned sharecropping arrangements, those who farm under such contracts are loath to admit they are sharecroppers. Renters agree to make an annual payment, in cash or share of harvest, to have land cultivation rights and the right to freely use all pasturage on the plots. All tenants are, however, forbidden to make improvements or plant trees without specific authorization from the landlord.

Women have restricted access to all principal income sources: land and FAIMO employment (even migrant remittances). Although in large families, women usually inherit land shares equal to other siblings, daughters of smallholders and tenants usually inherit these tenancy contracts only when there is enough land, when male heirs have migrated, or when there are no male heirs. Women who inherit from husbands often find that the labor demands exceed their ability, unless they can tap the labor of older children. In effect, the vast majority of female tenants do not have primary use rights to land.

Landowners: Rights and Obligations

- **The right of exclusion** is the landlord's main sanction to guarantee that tenants pay rents and shares promptly. The Agrarian Reform restricted conditions under which landlords may exclude tenants. Though tenants may be evicted only if they cultivate the land indirectly, e.g. via salaried labor, owners may repossess land if tenants abandon property, emigrate, or are too ill or poor to cultivate or to pay rents or shares.

- **The rural land tax (decima)**, payable annually by owners, is 10% of the imputed rent. This value is reset when a permanent transfer occurs: by sale, sub-division, or inheritance.

- **Rights of transfer:** Landowners control transfers by sale, gift or inheritance. Inheritance is usually equal to male and female heirs, resident or migrants. Resident heirs normally manage land for absent co-inheritors, recording rents paid for later distributions. Often one heir will buy out others when parcels become too small. Owners may sell land subject to the Agrarian Reform rules, most importantly that the occupying tenants must have first opportunity for purchase, if willing and able, at a fair price, before a third party may buy it.

- **Rights to manage** are controlled by owners regardless of the duration of tenants' contracts. They may temporarily transfer management rights for conservation projects to the State. For afforestation, leases grant the State use rights only to plant trees and usually entitle the owner to 15% of the fuelwood and timber harvested. Yet some landlords claim agreements for 20% of the profits from the trees. SWC projects are treated differently depending on whether they are *sequeiro* areas or wastelands of little economic value to owners.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ The State may reverse responsibilities and shares in lease contracts for afforestation projects: owners would manage the forests and the State would be given 15% of the harvest. If a lease price or other contract, in either SWC or forestation, can not be agreed upon with an owner, the State can expropriate by paying an indemnity based on valuations made by the Finance Ministry or by the courts.

6. *Interactions: Organization of Control and Investments*

Strategies adopted by renters, share-croppers and landlords to achieve their ends are shaped by the attributes of:

- the key good, land;
- the community; and
- the rules concerning land and dispute resolution.

Considering Basic Costs and Returns

A landlord or his agent normally sees tenants once annually. After harvest, in January or February, sharecroppers divide the returns in his presence, keeping two-thirds for themselves and giving the owner one-third. Rent is also paid yearly, in cash or products or a mix. Rents run 16,000 to 20,000 CVE per ha. For a tenant working 200 days on FAIMO, rent on an average plot of 1,000 m² would equal +/-5% of annual wages.

Landlords claim that they profit little from rents or shares paid. But owners who work their lands using salaried laborers make even less. Given the variable rainfall, labor costs often exceed returns. Renting or sharecropping, therefore, becomes a low-cost, low-risk endeavor, allowing an owner some certain return while freeing his time for more profitable activities.

Exclusion Sanction as Landlord Leverage

Landowners may buttress their prerogatives by threatening to exclude tenants. Fear of being dispossessed of land moves most tenants to maintain exemplary relations with landlords, even suffering considerable increase in rents before refusing to pay or before taking their case against the owner to court.

Landowners' Strategies to Minimize Fiscal Obligations

Rarely are land subdivisions registered. This adds to the cumulative inaccuracy of the cadastral record. In many cases, owners' actual rents far exceed the imputed value upon which the *decima* is based. Nor do landowners notify the State when improvements have been made. They justify this on the grounds that owners must pay the tax every year regardless of yields or rents paid. However, during drought years, the State normally decreases the tax to allow for decreases in actual rents.

Landowners' Strategies in Organizing Land Sales

When selling land, owners usually calculate values based on anticipated rent over 10-years, about 1,500 CVE per 100 m². But given the marginal value of *sequeiro* lands, owners generally profit little from selling and do so only rarely. Even so, few tenants can afford to

buy and when land is offered in sale it is purchased mostly by migrants or other landholders. During droughts land prices fall and owners hold off selling to await better prices. Occasionally, landlords grant and sell small parcels to tenants for house or cistern construction or to special projects such as to a UNICEF or CARITAS project to improve community water supply.

Landowners' Strategies Concerning Management Rights

To strictly control management rights, landlords either make required improvements or reimburse tenants for any they have made. Thus tenants' cannot use a claim of unreimbursed investments to assert their management rights or improve their tenancy over the land. Although terraces, stone mulching, and creation of vegetative barriers could reduce erosion, farmers rarely make these investments, nor do they maintain such structures once in place. Farmers invest only to make cultivation possible such as by clearing fields or applying organic manure to increase yields. Usually tenants notify owners of needed improvements, such as construction or repairs of terraces. Owners may either hire laborers, or provide materials and allow tenants to do the work. Should tenants contract the work, they must account for workers, their meals and materials. The owner repays costs by a credit to rent or by a fair reduction in his harvest share. Thus no ambiguity remains over whether or not improvements on the land belong to the landlord.

Excepting plants and leaves used as animal forage, landlords own all trees and tree products on the land. Tenants, with no use rights to trees, rarely plant them. They even say that as a matter of dignity they will not take fruit from existing trees even if it is rotting on the branches.

7. *Interaction: Strategies to Control Management Rights*

The most important negotiable right in Lagoa is the right of land management. Owners attempt to retain it; state projects may acquire it in the short run; tenants seek to strengthen their rights of management by gaining landlords' trust.

Though sharecropping is most common in Lagoa, tenants tend to prefer rental contracts. Many feel that in most years rents run less than the value of a third share. Beside, cash rent payment allows tenants to keep all of the harvest under their management for consumption, seed, or sale. Moreover, in drought years rent payment may be forgiven, while sharecroppers must share the harvest regardless. Even so, sharecroppers will rarely dispute the division for fear of losing their access to the land. Owners tend to prefer sharecrop contracts. This allows them to acquire farm products directly rather than from a third party. A major source of tenancy conflict involves owners who attempt to pressure renters into sharecropping. Many owners try to persuade renters who pay in produce in one year to maintain this form of payment permanently. Renters, with little leverage, will often accept an owner's pressure to sharecrop so as to maintain access to land.

Some renters are former sharecroppers who benefitted from the Agrarian Reform to acquire a lease. Most sharecroppers, however, were too afraid or uncertain of their rights to try to change their status. For them, gaining the landlord's trust and good graces appeared to be a more advantageous strategy than risking all by pushing for rental rights. Keeping good long-standing relations with the landlords potentially inspired trust, more autonomy for tenants in harvest division, possible access to no-interest loans of seeds or cash as well as more leverage over land use. Autonomy in harvest division is a much desirable benefit, giving tenants an opportunity to keep a larger share than originally agreed. Those who got rent contracts now feel threatened by rumors that their contracts might be annulled under the new regime. Indeed, the most recent law will give landlords and "forced renters" the option to renegotiate contracts that could return renters to sharecropper status. Feeling so vulnerable now, renters say they will accept the change of status to preserve access to land.

8. *Interactions: Conflicts and Conflict Resolution*

Tenants in Lagoa claim to have very few conflicts with their landlords. Most accept the limits landlords impose to avoid putting their narrow access to land at risk. Yet, conflicts do occur over the amount and form of annual payment for land use and over the value of investments which tenants have made.

Owners also say that their relations with tenants are pacific. Their conflicts are more with the state over afforestation and soil and water conservation projects which limit land use and affect future values. Also they believe that there are no consistent criteria when the State elects to expropriate and that the process of expropriation, in the name of agrarian reform and *posse útil*, is often arbitrary.

State agencies have disputes with owners who agreed to state financed soil and water conservation improvements and then neglect to repair the structures or to use land as agreed. Owners say that production from these fields does not justify the costs to maintain collapsing terraces and other structures. Owners may veto particular interventions, yet there is no clear process or mechanism for them to negotiate with project personnel on equal terms. No contract ensures that landowners will maintain the structures as the project expects. Tenants rarely maintain soil and water conservation structures because of costs and of landlords' restrictive management rights.

The most common state/owner conflicts are over lease rates and payments for land in afforestation projects. Owners receive benefits from afforested lands only in years when wood is harvested. They complain that if it were not in trees, but sharecropped, no matter how meager the returns, they would receive some regular benefit. Therefore owners are increasingly reluctant to lease *sequeiro* lands for this purpose. Options for resolving landowner-state conflicts are numerous, but in general owners are at a distinct disadvantage. Though the parties usually agree after negotiation or mediation, the fact is that lacking an accord, the state can expropriate. That fact and transaction costs involved often lead landlords to avoid arguing over land use issues or to desist before being expropriated.

In conflicts between Lagoa residents and state agencies, the processes are somewhat different. Depending on the dispute, both parties first attempt to resolve the problem simply and locally. Only if this is impossible is the case taken to a higher level. If, for example, a resident's livestock invades the state forest, the owner is asked to pay a fine to the municipality; if he or she refuses, the case is taken to court.

Conflicts between Lagoa residents are usually resolved by dialogue often overseen by the residents' commission.

Conflicts between landowners and tenants are resolved in a similar fashion. If relations between the two parties are amicable, dialogue, and negotiation usually produces agreement. When this fails, the cases are taken to court. Although courts are theoretically impartial and bound by law, owners, with greater resources for legal fees and greater knowledge of the system are at an advantage. Tenants are loath to contest landlords' claims, particularly since losers must pay court fees. The time, costs, and inconveniences also discourage landlords from taking disputes to court, all of which explains the generally "congenial" relations that landlords and tenants profess to have with one another.

9. Outcomes of Land-Holding Strategies

Of the two types of tenancy contracts in Lagoa, **sharecropping may prove the most viable in the long term**; less vulnerable to state-level changes in constitutional rules, it **provides landlords greater incentives to improve holdings, promote higher yields, and reap greater benefits from tenant labor**. While both forms provide tenants access to land, **renting may provide tenants greater benefits as they are stimulated to produce more efficiently in order to increase profit after fixed payments**.

Landlords carefully guard control of land management rights. **This strategy rates low on equity**: owners make the rules, retain firm control over their property, and reap some benefit with minimal inputs. Although many peasants may access land by way of tenancy contracts, holdings and yields tend to be meager. Separating titles to landowners and use rights to tenants assures that use-rights to lands will be widely accessible and inequitably distributed over the centuries.

The efficiency of this tenure system is mixed. The system is inefficient in stimulating tenants to make small scale investments, such as tree planting and stone mulching, because they receive no immediate benefits from them. But it is efficient in stimulating some long-term investments, such as terraces, when landlords reimburse tenants for the work. **Regarding soil and water conservation structures and afforestation, the system is also inefficient since landlords are loath to maintain works that the state has granted freely and from which tenants rather than owners directly benefit**.

10. Perspectives on Improving Tenure Relations

High population levels, small holdings, poor land, uncertain rain, and low yields, suggest that *sequeiro* agriculture in Lagoa is unsustainable, regardless of the tenure system. Even if the state managed the land to improve soil and water conservation, and even if lands were redistributed among tenants, yields are unlikely to meet even basic survival needs. Moreover, history shows that landowners will not easily give up their property rights. Their access to political elites will certainly curtail any legal reform to this end. As a radical change is unlikely, one option would be to create incentives for owners to increase investments in their property. For instance, owners with large holdings might be required to invest a certain amount annually in soil and water conservation structures as a condition of maintaining title. Thus motivated, the owners could pay tenants, in cash or increased harvest shares, to make improvements. Should landowners not comply, the state could take unimproved parcels for resale to the tenants who work them. Such strategies will not overcome the hard constraints to agriculture production, but they might improve conservation, production and equity within Lagoa's rigid tenure system.

C. Ponta do Sol Fisher Community (Ribeira Grande Municipality-The Island of Santo Antão)

1. Introduction

The fisher community of Ponta do Sol, located on the coast some four km from the town of Ribeira Grande, has been adopted as the seat of the Ribeira Grande Municipality. The 2,000 residents are either fishermen and their families or local government personnel. The active fishing community numbers some 160 men.

2. Attributes of the Community and Public Services

Ponta do Sol fishermen describe with pride their ethic of pronounced individualism. They say that no collective organization, such as *djunta-mon* exists and they assert that nobody has succeeded in "organizing us." In fact, further inquiry reveals that though relatively individualistic the community is not structureless and atomized. They work together in crews both on small boats and trawlers. The teams persist as groups for a year at a time on small boats and even longer on the trawlers. Members also help each other in everyday situations; in buying boats, storing fish and in certain emergencies. If a fisherman is injured, his mates may well help support him for as long as a year. Large PAPASA boats (trawlers) have an insurance system financed by monthly deductions from a crewmen's shares in the catch. A fisher cooperative might have fared better but for the unfortunate action of a Belgian NGO which undercut its collective purpose by distributing free boat motors in the community.

Schooling

A new six-year primary school is under construction. Meanwhile classes for the four basic years are held in various buildings around the village, in space rented by the Ministry of Education. Children who have finished the four years are said to still be literate ten years later. Few in the older generation apparently are literate.

Public Health

A nurse operates the Ponta do Sol health post. He can prescribe medicines and hospital visits to Ribeira Grande. He has few medicines to give directly and plays no role in local hygiene. People think the facility is out of date and services to be inadequate. Villagers have to go through the Ponta do Sol nurse to get to the regional hospital four km. distant in Ribeira Grande where services are quite good. Most births are at home, attended by unpaid midwives with some training from the regional hospital in Ribeira Grande.

Social Welfare

Many local residents, both men and women, are on indigents welfare for the monthly cash allowance or food or both. A local man keeps the role and handles welfare distribution.

Police

There are three policemen detached to Ponta do Sol. In case of trouble, such as fights among soccer team enthusiasts, villagers call them. The winter months, October-March, bring rough seas and enormous stress on fisher families. Men sit about awaiting a clement day and watching their families get hungrier. Tension sometimes erupts into violence, commonly in wife beatings. In extremis the men take to angry seas at great risk.

Active Fishermen

Since 1970, the active fishers have increased from roughly 50 to 160 due to natural population increases: reportedly no outsiders have ever joined the community as fishermen. Informants say that jobs elsewhere are scarce and that local youths join fishing groups only because they cannot find work in other places.

3. *Fisheries Technical Attributes*

The Santo Antão fisheries, the sole production system of any note within the community, are not particularly rich compared to others in the Cape Verde Islands.⁵¹ Yet Ponta do Sol fishers believe the success of the large-scale foreign trawlers in the area has a negative impact on their harvest. The local fishery involves three groups: two types of fishers and the produce marketers.

Local Trawlers

Twelve-man crews, the elite of the community, operate four ten-meter diesel-driven trawlers with a 30 km off-shore range. Two belong to the Dutch-financed PAPASA Project. The other two belong, respectively, to a returned migrant residing in Mindelo and to a local fisherman. The trawlers purse-seine for mackerel for market and for small bait fish. The net, 30 X 300 meters, is attached to an anchored, unmanned small boat from which it is paid out in a broad circle. The net is tightened from the bottom and then hauled up by hand. Each recovery and resetting operation takes two hours, longer if the catch is substantial with time allowed to empty the net and store the fish. The Ponta do Sol port is too small to accommodate the four trawlers which are anchored offshore. Its row boat serves for anchoring the net end and for crew transport to shore.

Local Small-Boat Fishers

The remaining fishers, roughly 110-120 persons, work in four-person crews on 25-30 boats some six meters long. Most are powered by outboard motors. The coastal fishing grounds includes both pelagic species and lobster. Most sought ocean species are migratory tuna and serra, grouper and the small *dobrada*. The fishing is highly seasonal. In winter months rough seas keep boats in and colder water drives fish away. During summer months, tuna, serra and mackerel are all more abundant. The small, outboard-powered rowboats rely on three fishing techniques:

- chumming to attract large tuna and serra, which are then harpooned. Once a fish is speared, the barbed lance detaches from the pole, carrying the attached line which the fisher pulls in with the catch;
- line fishing, for tuna, serra, grouper and other bottom-feeding fish, with baited hooks; and

⁵¹ Richer fisheries are found off Sao Vicente, San Nicolau, Sal, Boa Vista and Maio. The Sao Vicente fleet, based at Mindelo, has long range boats with on board refrigeration. They almost never fish around Santo Antão, going beyond to more productive waters.

- lobster fishing with traps (pots) attached to marker buoys and anchored in 10 to 30 meters of water.

When outboard motors were introduced about 1970 by returning migrants, the effective fishing radius was increased from about eight nautical miles (19 km) to 20 nautical miles (47 km). Now small boats can reach the western tip of Santo Antão and around the east end of the island to Paul and the south shore. Running at about ten nautical miles per hour (a liter of gas per mile), a round trip to the furthest point takes about four hours.

Foreign High Seas Trawlers

Portuguese, Spanish, Russian and occasionally Japanese fleets working the rich waters off northwest Africa, use high tech operations, sonar and radar to locate fish, and enormous nets to harvest them. Ponta do Sol fishers believe these fleets take enormous numbers of fish, leaving less for them.

Fishmongering and Market Dynamics

Fish catches are delivered at the small harbor. Female fishmongers buy from the fishermen who assert that the women earn more by marketing fish than they do. Fishmongers, who must undergo periodic health exams to get their licenses, are all fishermen's wives. From 30 to 50 women, depending on the size of the day's catch, work just to mid-afternoon since local demand usually exceeds supply. Fishmongers build marketing capital slowly, with most returns going to household expenses and some profit going back into the trade. When fishermen know a big catch is likely to exceed the day's demand, they filet, salt and dry the catch to hold until market demand warrants.

Refrigeration to keep fish fresh is a preferred alternative to salting. However capacity is limited and the small units PAPASA had installed were not functional as this study was made. When they do work, fishermen pay for the freezing service. Trawler crews freeze bait fish when they can. A few townspeople with small family refrigerators will, when they have space, take fishers' excess catch. Most such units freeze fish inadequately, but can keep fish fresh and edible for a few days.

Nature of the Fishery as an Economic Resource

The in-shore fishery of Santo Antão is a common pool resource: access is difficult to control and consumption of catches is separable and competitive. These two characteristics set up the negative dynamic in which competing fishers overfish a dwindling resource. Rules have been introduced to control this danger, but efficacy in preserving the stock is not clear.

4. *Fisheries Rules*

Access Rules

Formal rules treat the Ponta do Sol fishery as a common property resource, open to any competent local fishermen or other Cape Verdian. Controls on access are weak, apparently because they do not need to be stronger. Rules limit access in two ways: skill requirements and nationality requirements.

A local apprenticeship system requires three months to one year training before a person is accepted as a full-fledged fisher. Since local families are the source of recruits, the system may serve to discourage those without real interest, but it does little to limit the growth in the number of fishermen. Though most families want their children to find more lucrative and secure careers, fishing is both a first and last resort option that, from their point of view, must remain open. No formal or working rule prevents an untrained Cape Verdian from fishing in the area, but non-local fishermen rarely work Santo Antão's coast. Formally, any Cape Verdian may fish there. All non-citizens are formally excluded, and are subject to arrest if caught fishing within national waters.

Operational Rules

One basic rule, "first come, first served," is illustrated by local lobster fishers who have no fixed territories. Only the small boats do lobstering. Each carries six to eight lobster traps which are baited and deposited coastwise at 20-meter intervals with a day's set spanning 100 to 140 meters. The first boat to arrive, choosing the best spot, sets its span: the next can continue from there, leaving the required 20-meter space between sets. Should a new boat place traps too close, the crew of the first there can reel in the pots and reset them farther away. This is their only recourse: they may not slash off buoys, cutting the pots loose; otherwise destroy the traps; or impound them. Thus, lobstering territories are always relative, valid only for a single day based on who arrived first.

A corollary to the "first come, first served" rule is that of "reasonable non-interference". It applies to line fishing, chumming with harpoons and lobstering and to net fishing trawlers. If a trawler starts to set a net no other boat can cross the path of their net. Others can lay their nets, but 100 meters "behind" the first boat, where their activities will not interfere with those of the first boat.

A final operational rule makes lobstering illegal during the spawning season, July 5 to September 30. This historic rule is aimed to preserve the lobster stock by protecting reproduction.

Catch Division Rules

On *Small Boats*, catch division rules are simple and clear. The take is divided into six shares. Of these one is allotted to the boat and one to the motor (i.e., the owner gets one-third of the take). The remaining four shares are divided equally among all crew members, whether there be two or twelve. The catch is divided daily before being sold.

On *Trawlers*, rules vary slightly depending on boat ownership. The private vessels adopt the same small-boat rule of one-third for the combined boat and motor share (allocated to the boat's owner, who also owns the net). The other two-thirds are divided equally among crew members. The PAPASA vessels use the same rules for crew share, but boat and motor shares are deposited in a bank account as a capital sinking fund. Withdrawals require two signatures: the captain and a PAPASA representative must co-sign all checks.

Apprentices in both trawlers and small boats get half the shares accorded regular crew. The captain decides when they have accumulated enough skill and experience to merit a full share.

Marketing Rules

Fishmongers must show that they have paid their taxes, as well as passing a health exam, in order to get the health certificate that authorizes them to engage in the fish trade.

Conflict Resolution procedures as described by informants are minimal in the extreme. In keeping with the strong individualism characteristic of the Ponta do Sol community, they identify no one as a local leader capable of resolving all conflicts.

5. Interactions

Within the constraints of their environment the Ponta do Sol community members have worked out various survival strategies including how to access public services as well as fishing and marketing strategies.

Public Services-Minimal Co-production

There is some degree of citizen co-production in the areas of education, health and social welfare arrangements, but less in the area of policing. Parents encourage children to attend the local lower primary school and send some the 4kms to Ribeira Grande by foot to upper primary school. With poor literacy skills, most parents do little to help with home learning. People seek medical aid and advice from the local nurse but do little else to support communal health. The welfare system is run by the state agency with a local volunteer assistant. Law and order service is provided by local police but the low level of crime suggests self-policing in this close community.

Fishing Strategies and Interactions

Interactions among the two groups fishing from Ponta do Sol - crews in small boats and in coastal trawlers - have been summarized above. Conflicts are few and are normally resolved within the minimal rules discussed. Small boats depend on trawlers for the bait they use in their operations. Trawlers fill crew vacancies from experienced small-boat fishers. All local fishermen regret that they can do nothing about foreign high-tech fishing that they fear is reducing the migrant species off their shores.

Monitoring Fishing Rules

Since local fishing rules are minimal, and the nationality rule seems the only formal rule enforced regularly, the fisher community makes little attempt to police local waters. Instead, they monitor each other's behavior, and also report the occasional foreign fishing boat that intrudes into Cape Verdian waters.

Equipment Acquisition Strategies

Ponta do Sol fishermen say that before Dutch aid started the PAPASA project in 1984 they used to acquire the capital to buy a small boat by getting cost-free loans from friends. The loans, once contracted, were paid back a bit at a time. PAPASA has created new options. The project helps the fishers by training people to build boats, to sell and repair imported motors, and to operate the refrigeration plant. PAPASA offers credit through a bank to fishers at seven percent (7%) per year for buying motors and boats constructed by project-trained personnel. PAPASA staff help fishers with loan requests and, when approved, sells them boats. Boat loans are repaid over two or three years.

A Belgian NGO recently distributed motors free to many Ponta do Sol fishermen who had none. This was a horrific blow to the PAPASA credit program. Those who borrowed money to finance a motor feel "cheated" now that others have gotten one free. Those who need to replace worn out equipment are reluctant to take out credit, hoping they too may get lucky with another gift program.

All three of the PAPASA divisions were due to be privatized as the project winds down during 1992. The boat building should continue as an autonomous small enterprises. The refrigeration plant, though much desired by the fishermen, is more problematic.

In addition to the PAPASA production sections, a fishermen's cooperative, COOPESCA, was organized in 1986. At peak it had only 17 members and the number has now fallen to 13. Members jointly own and crew three boats. They also operate a producers' cooperative that imports nets and other sorts of fishing equipment. A consumers' cooperative sells foodstuffs. Problems leading to member fall-off include management difficulties and a theft of funds and foodstuffs in 1991. Also coop prices are higher for fishing materials than in private shops.

6. *Outcomes*

To evaluate outcomes we may look first at the efficiency of the fishery, second at its sustainability and third at equity.

Efficiency and Sustainability

Older Ponta do Sol fishermen make two telling observations:

- catches are smaller now than they were 25 years ago, before the advent of outboard motors; and
- the number of active fishermen has more than tripled from 50 to 160-70.

Locals believe that commercial fleets operating near Cape Verde are reducing fish populations. If this belief is incorrect, then it is most likely that local overfishing explains falling catches. If so, to invest in improving fishing equipment and facilities would lead only to further depletion of the fishery. Better strategies would be to limit access more strictly, to impose closed seasons or to set catch limits so as to restrict catches and allow the local stock to reconstitute itself.

Equity

Current organization of the fishery appears equitable. Limits on access are weak, and nobody except the occasional foreign vessel is refused entry. Fishers evidently consider the current general rule for share divisions equitable and conflict over shares is rare. But, a relatively high score on equity may well involve efficiency losses since more fishers investing more effort with better equipment to take fewer fish is clearly inefficient.

D. Povoado of Mato Baixo and the Production Site of Tabugal (Santa Catarina Municipality-The Island of Santiago)

1. *Introduction: Background and Setting*

Here is summarized the case study of the village of Mato Baixo and its associated irrigated production site at Tabugal in Santa Catarina municipality . The full study examines in detail the attributes of the Mato Baixo community, with attention to the kinds and degrees of organization, and how those arrangements and values create incentives for action. It looks at the three production systems upon which the community depends for much of its subsistence: rainfed agricultural, short transhumance pastoralism and especially irrigated agriculture. For each system, the attributes of the resources and associated technologies are analyzed as economic goods, with emphasis on the incentives they create for different classes of actors. Then the rules regulating access to and use of these resources, and the incentives they create for specific categories of actors, are considered.

Community-wide organizational capability, more evident in Mato Baixo than in Lagoa, is analyzed in terms of mutual assistance (*djunta mon*), water management, public services and community projects. Key public services are examined in terms of access and the degree of coproduction practiced in the community. The tenure system is examined with special consideration for the irrigated areas at Tubugal. The implications of all these factors and the interactions of the key actors are analyzed in terms of decentralization policy issues.

The village of Mato Baixo, located on a high dry mesa some four kilometers northwest of the Santa Catarina municipal capital, Assomada, is an agro-pastoral community practicing both irrigated and rainfed agriculture. Irrigated lands are found in the valley of Tabugal, approximately five kilometers due west of Mato Baixo. The arid, stone-covered rolling hills where the dispersed settlements are situated break into rocky inclines and sharp ravines near Tabugal. A thin river bed fed by springs defines the narrow Tabugal gorge. Here, below the rocky promontories that wall the gorge, Mato Baixo residents walk and climb some 3.5 km to tend rows of terraces and canals that shape the micro-irrigation area.

Mato Baixo residents - 89 families with a total of 528 people - are scattered among eight distinct neighborhoods or *bairros* ranging in size from 12 to 245 inhabitants. Out-migration abroad or to Praia is significant. As a result women outnumber men, making up 54% of the population. Uncompleted houses bear witness to relocations and sporadic migrant investments.

2. *Attributes of the Community: Organizational and Cultural Characteristics*

Mato Baixo households fall into two categories: those better off with access either to irrigated lands or migrant remittances, and poorer ones which rely solely upon rainfed agriculture. Initial impressions suggest residents are highly individualistic. They tend to invest meager earnings or remittances in personal and household amenities and only in activities that benefit them directly.

At the time of the study, residents expressed great uncertainty about what support they could expect from newly installed national and municipal governments and saw little point in trying to organize community-wide endeavors. Nevertheless, observation of the community revealed that people do organize for mutual aid and have recently initiated efforts to accomplish goals of community interest. While formal associations are lacking in the village and among farmers with rainfed lands, farmers with irrigated plots tend to be better organized, with a consumers' cooperative and cane producers' association. These suggest a firm basis for citizen co-production, despite enduring individualistic or family-oriented attitudes and concerns.

Mutual Assistance: Djunta Mon

Residents of Mato Baixo form voluntary *djunta mon* groupings to accomplish *sequeiro* and *regadio* cultivation during peak labor periods. In *sequeiro* cultivation, groupings of about five to 12 farmers *djunta mon* to plant, weed, and harvest rainfed crops. The number varies from group to group and year to year. Once a participant has selected a day for the *djunta mon* group to come to the field, he or she is engaged in a verbal contract to help on the fields of all other participants. Participants who, except for illness, do not work on the day indicated must pay 500 CVE to the host(s) for the day(s) missed. Should a participant refuse to pay, the group can complain to the administrative agent who sends a note to the Court in Assomada. If the participant still refuses to pay, he or she may receive a jail sentence.

Djunta mon groups on rainfed lands vary in size according to the task. Weeding groups tend to be the largest, seeding or harvesting groupings are smaller. Usually, these groupings last only for the task at hand and then disband, under the same pressures of irregular rainfall described for the Ribeira Grande community of Lagoa. But in this small community at least some participants continue to reunite from task to task and year to year.

Voluntary work groups also form to construct roofs. At times called *djunta mon*, they are actually quite different in that all labor is on one person's property and there are no fines for refusing to participate. Although this grouping is based on good will (*boa vontade*), there is an informal, but long-term sanction against nonparticipants: they will receive no help from the host when they need to build or repair their own roof.

Inter-Community Mutual Assistance: Cleaning and Maintenance of Public Water Sources

On occasions when residents become sick from drinking of a water source during the rainy season, regular users of the spring, usually neighbors, unite labor and materials to clean the spring, rather than wait for the state to perform this task.

Catholic Church and Family Planning

Many Mato Baixo residents are regular church goers and the church exerts an important influence on their lives. Because of its popularity it is an important vehicle through which major news and messages can be communicated. Despite church doctrine, many women hold independent views on birth control. Single mothers and wives of emigrants who have already had four or more children are extremely interested in contraception, although at present information and supplies do not meet demand. These women recognize that regardless of the church's views, they alone are responsible for sustaining their children. For them, birth control is a far more humane alternative than the sin of abortion.

Community Cooperation in Summary

Mato Baixo residents prefer to invest only in those community projects that benefit them directly. People without cars or local businesses show little interest in repairing roads. Households without school-aged children show no interest in helping finance a school. Residents assign responsibility for most public services to the state. Nevertheless, *djunta mon* and community project efforts suggest that residents will mobilize resources when they see a likely direct benefit. Traditional mutual assistance, in particular, shows some sophistication in rules and sanctions to members, even when bound only by verbal contracts. The presence of local leaders able to initiate a new, if flawed, project while working within state sanctioned institutions is promising. **Decentralizing governance of local affairs will involve two challenges. The first is to identify accurately interest group priorities for community action and then to correctly assess realistic amounts of time, labor, know-how and materials from these groups. The second is to draw on villagers' experience in collective action in designing institutions to carry out local projects.**

3. Public Services

Water Supply

Mato Baixo's public fountain has been contaminated since 1987, and for years residents have had to buy water from a neighboring village fountain or have had to fetch it from the springs of Tabugal. About half a dozen better off households have cisterns which are refilled by commercial water tankers.

Local Health

The closest health facility is the hospital in Assomada, where residents go only when home remedies, using herbs found in fields or cultivated near homes, don't work. Transportation to Assomada is costly and infrequent, moreover health officials check to see if patients have paid their taxes. Many avoid the clinic fearing discovery of back taxes. Most child births are home deliveries assisted by the village mid-wife. Some do go to hospital, if taxes are paid or if the pregnancy is complicated.

Education

As one of the few avenues for upward mobility, education is very highly valued. But families lament the difficult access to schools, the costs and the hardship of study. The local four year primary school has six teachers with some 40 students per grade. Attendance is erratic and children complain that they do not like the meals provided. A good number of children walk the four km. to upper primary school in Assomada. A privileged few go on to secondary school. Until recently, there was a well attended adult literacy program in Mato Baixo. But the PAICV government neglected to pay rent on the classroom in a private home. For a time afterwards, the instructor continued classes in her home because of the great

_____ was also established in Mato Baixo with two local aids
_____ migrant lent his uncompleted house as a classroom. Parents
_____ for supplies. When the adult literacy classroom closed, the
_____ day care center and was the only furniture in the room. When
_____ confiscated the table, so children now work on the floor.

_____ that parents recommend for education are, in order of priority,
_____ primary school in Assomada, basic furniture for the day care
_____ primary school. However, willingness of parents to give cash or
_____ highly problematic. Some believe the State should match any
_____ say they might be willing to work two to three days on
_____ give money or materials since they have none. The reason for
_____ is that there is no guarantee that all will contribute equally.

_____oping Formal Institutional Arrangements and

_____ administrative authorities" have not yet been appointed.
_____ Commission and the administrative agent continue to be the
_____ communication and intra-village organization. Residents say they
_____ unit. Many believe new local representatives could help to
_____ them "is as yet full of empty promises". Formerly, most
_____ Commission were PAICV party members. Supposedly new local
_____ two-year terms to coordinate community interests and to assist
_____ says that elected agents would better serve local interests.

_____ Administrative Levels

_____ are both passive and skeptical about authorities. Regardless
_____ rarely get answered; most residents simply support
_____ have adopted a "wait and see" attitude toward the new regime.
_____ between residents and authorities is taxes. All adults 18 to 60
_____ development tax (*paga cabeça*) of 70 CVE a year in order to use
_____ municipal services. Though a simple tax enforcement rule, it does
_____ municipal services except in emergencies.

Marketing

Local produce, such as manioc, cane, potatoes, fish and meat, may be peddled house-to-house without a license. Producers or other vendors may also rent a stall at the Assomada market for 100 CVE per day after purchasing a license at 300 CVE per month. Licenses to sell imported goods, such as soap, rice, and sugar are very costly. In the colonial period these were granted easily, but since independence no new licenses have been issued, so old licenses are resold at about 200,000 CVE.

Remarks and Conclusions

Residents of Mato Baixo tend to be passive and skeptical in their relations with outsiders. They base opinions about things political on concrete action and support those who are effective in assisting the community. Even for valued public services, such as education, residents assert they would only contribute two or three days of labor for improvements, since they have no money or materials to give. Yet, in services that respond to popular demand, such as the day care center, residents have proven resourceful in getting help: in this case, an emigrant who lent a vacant house for the center. As elsewhere, residents are reluctant to assume governance authority for public services when they lack the capacity to compel community members to bear their fair share and lack sanctions against freeriders.

5. *The Production Site: Mato Baixo and Tchada Mato Baixo*

Like Lagoans, the farmers of Mato Baixo depend for survival on land not theirs. This has tremendous implications for local political capability, since tenure relationships are key both to production potential and to persistent dependency of the poor majority on a small landed class. Excepting the very few affluent, the families of Mato Baixo have, for generations, had access to farmland only as renters or as sharecroppers. Most residents subsist on rainfed agriculture of maize and beans grown in association between July and August. Some households with use rights and able-bodied males also have access to irrigated plots in the valley of Tabugal where they produce sugar cane, root crops and tree fruits. Most households keep livestock, such as cows, goats, and pigs, that feed in upland pastures and on household vegetable remains. Many households receive some migrant remittances.

Attributes of Rainfed Agricultural Production System

For three months following first rains, all farmers concentrate on cultivating maize and beans in *sequeiro* fields. They remove the stubble from the previous year's harvest and interplant maize with white beans. Some plots also contain cotton plants, used medicinally: the fibre to apply topical medications, and the seeds for abortion and uterine pains. Other plants include tobacco and other curative herbs. Trees found on *sequeiro* plots, planted or volunteer, serve as fixed boundary markers and provide fuelwood, animal forage, food and medicines.

Attributes of Rules Governing Tenure and the Rainfed Agricultural Production System

As in Lagoa, much of the land is owned by a few absentee landlords. The feudal tenure order of small parcels rented or sharecropped out to tenants has changed little since the *morgadio* system of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Since then, changes in tenure revolve around increasing land values: rents have risen and land transactions once made orally now require written legal agreements. All farmers appear to have some *sequeiro* fields, even if they also have use of *regadio* land. Since the elections, with the Agrarian Reform Commission's authorities in flux, many tenants are anxious about their use rights. Some farmers who had paid rents to the Commission for land under dispute or for land owned by emigrants, have been unable to pay rents for months. They fear these delays could become a pretext to divest them of use rights.

The origin of trees on drylands determines which tenure rules apply. Tenants may harvest native trees: to encourage future regrowth, fuelwood trees may be pruned or cut, but never uprooted. Tenants may harvest trees they planted but may only take fruit from a tree planted by a landlord or previous tenant. Pruning these trees is prohibited, as leaves and wood are the landlord's, who may transfer such trees and rights to their fruits to a third party. Trees supplied farmers by the state are supposed to be protected by forest guards and used for fuelwood or forage only by license. Open access, however, seemed to be the working rule.

Attributes of Semi-Transhumant Pastoral Production System

Mato Baixo residents have a variety of livestock including cows, pigs, goats, chickens, or dogs. Pigs and chickens are fed at home, mostly with household or garden remains. Those with larger animals, such as cows, rely mostly on stall feeding with harvest remains and commercial feed in years of shortage. On occasion they do tie them in fields to browse trees or post-harvest remains. In drought years, when virtually all stock is stall fed commercial dry feed at great cost, owners try to quickly sell some animals. Other animal owners use seasonal pasture areas known as *tchadas* or *rotchas* (rocks), which are treated *de facto* as open-access areas including any wild trees there. But the occasional *espinheira*, mango and other fruit trees on *tchadas* belong to the landlord and can be cut or harvested only by them. In dry periods, households with large goat herds take them to remote *tchadas* for morning to evening grazing.

During wet periods animals are tied up or taken to distant *tchadas*, to avoid their eating *sequeiro* crops. Often animals, especially cattle, are entrusted to professional herders. A member of the owner's household takes the animals on a short transhumance, of between 7-10 km., to the rainy season pastures where the herder, for some 500 CVE per owner plus use of the milk, tends the animals. It is said that herders do very well from the seasonal sales of milk and cheese. The herder's fee seals a contract making him, not the owner, responsible for any damage that the animals may cause.

6. *The Production Site: Tabugal*

Attributes of the Tabugal Irrigation System and the Rules

The springs that feed *regadio* land and the Tabugal River have existed since at least the late 19th century. In the past, water was rotated to plots for eight hours once every 15 days. As poor rains in recent years have reduced spring flow, the irrigation cycle has been reduced to only once monthly. Sugar cane, potatoes, manioc, maize, and beans are the major crops. Many farmers post dogs to keep cliff dwelling monkeys from feasting on crops when the farmers are not in their fields.

The 22 ha. of Tabugal's irrigated lands are divided into 150 parcels cultivated by 115 mostly tenant farmers (Rodrigues, et.al., 1982). During the 19th century, the entire valley belonged to a single large *morgado*, from whom most of today's 12 owners inherited their lands (Rodrigues). A few owners are former tenants who bought small plots from landlords years ago; other holders are former tenants who were granted plots expropriated from former landlords as posse util under the Agrarian Reform.

Authorized Users: Except the few working smallholders, landowners do not work their land directly but instead lease it in small parcels. Most tenants rent, but a few sharecrop the land.⁵² As with *sequeiro* lands, tenant contracts on Tabugal *regadio* land tend to be of long duration, in our sample, from 15 years to several generations. Interaction between tenants and landlords is infrequent, mostly when rents or harvest shares are due.⁵³

Regadio farmers pay taxes for land under cane. Landlords self-assess their cane area. Once this is verified for the state by the residents' commission, a cane production license is granted. An assessment may be for a large area, but each tenant producer pays the tax for his or her cane plots. Cane taxes are reportedly about 10 times the 1987 amounts, either due to increased tax rates, to expanded cane production, or to higher assessments. Cane producers consider the tax now to be a strong disincentive to production, claiming that "the state wants us to work, but the more we work, the more we pay". Some have begun, illegally, to mix sugar with the alcohol to stretch production of *aquavit* or *grogó*.

⁵² Until 1967, rents were paid in cash or by three days of labor prestations to the landlord. Increased access to labor was an important incentive for landlords to fragment their holdings among as many tenants as possible (Rodrigues, et.al., 1982).

⁵³ A 1982 survey showed that half the farmers cultivated under 1,000 m²; a third had parcels larger than 1,000 m² but less than 2,000 m². About 3/4 of all farmers cultivated only one parcel. Today 300 m² is considered a large irrigated plot. Annual rents vary: with arid soils commanding the lower and more humid soils the higher rents. Although rents remained more or less stable between 1967 and the 1980's, near the end of the 1980's they began to rise steeply; some tenants say that they now pay almost eight times their former rents.

Rights of Exclusion of tenants and other users are held by landowners who may use this as a strategy to increase rents. Before the legislation that gave tenants a margin of security, landlords employed this strategy often after tenant-made improvements had increased land values. Tabugal farmers recall a 1980 case wherein a tenants lost use rights when he could not prove that his rent was paid when the landlord claimed otherwise.

Rights of Transfer: Both male and female heirs may inherit land titles; tenants' heirs may also inherit use rights. Usually rights to irrigated lands are transferred to resident male offspring who farm for their basic livelihood. Daughters may also inherit if they are in great need and are married and resident in the area, or if there are no other heirs. Transfers have also occurred through sale (Alamada, 1992).

Rights to Manage: In contrast to the Lagoa case, tenants in Tabugal have considerable *de facto* management rights to their lands. Except landowners who live nearby or own cane presses, few owners visit the isolated and inaccessible gorge. Thus tenants have considerable autonomy to manage the steep valley irrigation system, to construct terraces, level plots, open and maintain springs and canals, and plant fruit trees, alone or in *djunta mon* groups. Since owners neither help nor compensate tenants for these efforts, to dispossess tenants would require their compensation for years of cumulative investments. For this reason, tenants feel relatively secure in their use rights though the landlord's title is never in question. Knowing the land is not theirs, tenants feel little incentive to place major stakes in the land. In short, tenants, with limited cash reserves, make investments, largely in labor, needed for medium term profits. For example, a state project, financed by Saudi Arabia, cemented the principal irrigation canal of Tabugal. Tenants will clean the canal because this labor investment ensures they get the water needed for crops. But they will not contribute money to buy materials for major repairs.

Landlord-tenant discord over management rights is most marked in the case of investments in cane presses (*trapiches*), and distilleries (*alambiques*). Cane producers may either pool resources to acquire a group press and distillery or pay another producer to use one he built. In either case, tenant producers build the press but one delayed or missing rent payment can become an easy pretext for the landlord to throw tenants off the land and confiscate the cane press or distillery sitting on it. Tenant exposure to landlord claims was further illustrated by the case of the local adult literacy center. It was built in 1988 at PAICV initiative with Austrian financing on land the state declared unoccupied. Residents contributed labor valued at 200,000 CVE to build the center. When the PAICV lost the election in 1991, the owner of the "unoccupied land" demanded a restored title and rent for the use of the school on it. Supporting the owner's claim, the new MPD regime sent officials to close the school. The people in the area conclude that the PAICV supports adult literacy for the rural poor while the MPD collaborates with landlords.

Organization and Monitoring of Water Rights: Irrigators in Tabugal pay neither for water use nor for pump or spring maintenance. Like all sub-soil water, spring water belongs to the State and though privately used, is considered the state's to maintain. Changes in use rules have only been made by a higher body of collective choice such as when the PAICV regime and owners changed rotation from 15 days to monthly. Many users speak of rules changes: returning to a 15 day cycle or limiting watering times by plot size. But there is no defined collective choice body responsible to turn to for rule changes. Farmers say that users have never tried to unilaterally modify rules. If tried, they say sanctions would be severe, perhaps even death.

Conflicts and Conflict Resolution Processes: Disputes over land and water are, and appear always to have been, numerous in Tabugal and Mato Baixo. Past conflicts among tenants centered around plot border disputes, lands sub-leased to other tenants, and inheritance use rights claims. Now, the most common conflicts are the following (Alamada, 1992):

- between emigrants, who are recent land buyers, and the old renters they seek to evict but refuse to go;
- between renters, who refuse to pay "excessive" rents, and landlords, who seek rents "at the land's true value;"
- between landlords, who want land back to work themselves, and tenants seeking continued use;
- among *regadio* farmers over water distribution abuses (the traditional sanction for abusing irrigation privileges has been to cut off the water higher up the canal); or over alleged favoritism in distribution;
- among well users, over labor and money shares in co-participative well construction and maintenance;
- among owners of pastures, of lands with water resources, and of livestock owners over rents and access rights; and
- among herders, when one group disregards another's precedence in approaching a watering site.

Dispute Resolution is usually local with the assistance of the Residents' Commission. Prior to 1991 elections, most cases not decided there went to the Agrarian Reform Commission. In rent disputes, for instance, compromise between parties would be tried. If it failed a Commission field team would be sent to revalue the property and set a rent. The Commission resolved landlord-sharecropper conflicts by converting sharecroppers into renters (Alamada, 1992). Although a water commission was created, only about 5% of the 1,300 cases taken to it were resolved (Alamada, 1992). While the new regime has formally transferred land disputes to the court system, legislative reforms are needed before pending and future disputes can be heard. In the uncertain transition, tenants are uneasy.

Interactions Resulting from Land and Water Management Strategies show that Tabugal tenants, in contrast to dryland tenants in Lagoa, have considerable autonomy in land management. Under the contracts of long duration, most tenant and landlords interact infrequently, giving tenants considerable *de facto* management rights. Without reimbursement, they perform most all labor investments to keep up the irrigated plots. This, in turn, gives tenants a sense of security. Labor-based improvements, over time, buttress claims to the land as they become too costly for owners to reimburse. But poor tenants don't make cash inputs such as buying materials for canal construction. Since landlords see neither short or long term benefit from making such investments, these improvements are left to other actors, e.g., the state.

Owners have different tactics to increase benefits they derive from their holdings. One common strategy is raise rents under threat to exclude the tenant. The landlord may either get the higher rent, or he may make it so high that tenants cannot pay, thus creating grounds to expel them. When customary rents fall well below the land's true value, some owners refuse rent payments so that in time they can reclaim the land for failure to pay. So it is that from a tenant's perspective, institutional changes seem to favor landlords and to threaten their tenure and use rights, as seen in the recent abolition of the Agrarian Reform Commission, the change of dispute venue to the courts, and the uncertainty over how to make rent payments on disputed lands.

7. *Outcomes and Conclusions*

Outcomes:

Of all of cases studied, the landholding system in Tabugal appears to yield the most efficient production, due, perhaps, to the fact that here more tenants are renters than in any other case, or perhaps due to the isolation of the valley and the resulting autonomy of producers. Although holdings are small and distribution, particularly to women, is very inequitable, tenancy contracts do provide land access to a wide number of producers. The main inefficiency is that cash-poor tenants are unwilling to make capital investments in canal maintenance, relegating this to the state. If the state consistently repairs the water supply, so essential to the production system, the rest of the holding patterns should prove to be relatively sustainable. The greater equity lies in water access rather than land use rights. But declines in spring output are rendering the water distribution system inefficient. There is clear need for water users to organize for collective water management and for enforcement of any new use rules they make. Lacking a rule making and enforcing body, the system of water distribution and Tabugal's economy may not be sustainable.

Conclusions

Within Mato Baixo, demographics exacerbate pressure on the land and tenure patterns exacerbate exposures of the poor majority. Faced with the exposures under the land tenure arrangements that appear nearly endemic in Cape Verde, Mato Baixo residents opt for risk avoidance strategies and revert to an individualism that, in civic terms, would be highly irresponsible were their circumstances less impoverished. However, when villagers can see reasonably certain ways to capture the benefits of their investments, they prove willing to invest (particularly their labor) in joint efforts to improve public services in their community. They correctly interpret the difficulties of organizing for public services as risks, and seek to minimize or avoid them. Comments about their present inability to make binding collective decisions about public problems, implies a sense of the need for more authority at the local level to address these collective problems. They express reasonable concerns about mobilizing resources equitably for local services such as schools and water supply. They realize the temptation to free ride is real.

Even so, Mato Baixo residents accepted a flawed though promising proposal to generate funds to finance local public services. Why? One can only speculate. The issue merits further investigation, particularly as devolution of authority to sub-municipal levels is likely to be a necessary complement of any effective program to nation-wide decentralization.

In the hard-to-reach Tabugal valley, a century old irrigation system, incrementally improved over time by government and by tenants, provides tenant farmers with some degree of security. But landlords still retain strong legal means to exert their controls. Uncertainty among tenants over their tenure has a predictable negative impact on their willingness to invest in improvements. Even so the irrigation system is generally efficient. However, a collective management organization for reordering water use is a pressing and notably missing need. The new technical constraint posed by falling water tables and reduced spring output and flows requires new use rules and sanctions within the system. A positive national and municipal program for inducing decentralized resource management could well aid these producers in overcoming their individualism and using their experience and craft to form the collective decision making means to better deal with their resource use problems.

E. Povoado of Pico Leão, the Farmers and Herders (Praia Municipality-The Island of Santiago)

1. Introduction and Setting

Pico Leão lies at the end of a mountainous dirt road, on the windward side of Santiago island some 24 km. west of Praia, the municipal and national capital. The village is relatively remote, but not isolated. Private truck and van owners in the village provide almost daily transport to Praia through the original Portuguese colonial capital, Cidad Velha (port and seat of the neighboring parish) and then along the coast road to the capital. A round trip costs 400 CVE. From Pico Leão it takes two hours by foot to reach Assomada, capital of the

adjacent municipality of Santa Catarina. Nineteen quarters, or neighborhoods, occupy geographically distinct locations along three ridge lines leading up to one of the highest points on the island. During the short rainy season, water courses down the valleys between these ridges. In the long dry season small springs provide water for drinking and small-scale irrigation.

Village lands are steeply sloping and rugged. Homesteads, as well as the site for the Catholic church, have been laboriously carved out of the hillsides. Soils appear very coarse and infertile. In any case rainfed agricultural there produces little. The few flat areas of rich soils occur in the valleys where irrigation is possible.

The village had some 800 residents in 1985 but now numbers 653 inhabitants divided into 115 families. About fifteen of these family units are female-headed households. The typical family in Pico Leão counts two adults. Most people farm during the rainy season. Many families have migrant members living and working in Europe and the United States.

Villagers wrest a living from the harsh environment by combining two or three production systems: rainfed agriculture on the steep slopes, spring-fed irrigation in creek beds, and stock-raising. Most domestic stock - cattle, pigs, goats and chickens - are stall fed during seven or eight months. Depending on rains and forage, ruminants are taken on short distance transhumance to nearby pastures during four to five months. None of these activities is sufficiently productive to sustain a family for an entire year. FAIMO or other dry season employment, and, for some, remittances from family members abroad make up the difference for survival.

2. *Organizational and Cultural Characteristics*

By comparison with the *povoados* analyzed in Ribeira Grande and Santa Catarina municipalities, Pico Leão has a richer tradition of mutual assistance.⁵⁴ This local institutional capital - a tradition of dealing effectively with local collective problems - suggests a capacity that could be built on for decentralized efforts to improve public services and to govern and manage renewable natural resources.

⁵⁴ It must be remembered that the villages selected for study can in no way be considered representative of other communities in their municipalities. This is relevant in any policy discussion of decentralizing service provision activities and authority to govern and manage renewable resources, insofar as it is important to assume that collective action capability will vary across communities within a single municipality, unless experience or research demonstrates the contrary.

Mutual Assistance: Djunta mon

As elsewhere in Cape Verde, *djunta mon* groups in Pico Leão are small. They average ten persons, are based on friendship, and are formed to help overcome labor bottlenecks in planting, weeding and harvesting crops. Here *djunta mon* groups also join in irrigation tasks and in making grog (sugar cane spirits). In Pico Leão bullocks power the cane presses. The animals' labor is contributed as part of the *djunta mon* tradition rather the owners paying the bullock owners as is common elsewhere. Reciprocity is the underlying principle in *djunta mon*. As groups often persist for years, members develop great solidarity and mutual trust. Sanctioning by withdrawal of reciprocity is seldom required to curb shirking and free-riding among members.

Djunta mon Groups in FAIMO Soil Conservation Work

Djunta mon groups in Pico Leão are the building blocks of the state- and project-financed FAIMO work fronts. The leader of a FAIMO workfront of about 40 persons coordinates activities among three or four *djunta mon* teams in his group. Because *djunta mon* teams have a time-tested structure and social relationships, friction on the job is minimal. From colonial times, the Portuguese used *djunta mon* groups for SWC, roads and other public works. They also encouraged joint house construction by financing the roof if a group would erect a dwelling.

More than one person per family gets paid FAIMO jobs according to informants. Though against government policy which limits FAIMO jobs to one per family, it does reinforce regular *djunta mon* relationships.

Mutual Assistance: Rotational Savings System

A new institutional form was introduced this year based on a "pool" (rotational savings) group a local resident observed in another community: Members of a *djunta mon* FAIMO team pool a fixed amount of their monthly wages. (The pool share varies by group, but ranges from 500 CVE to 2,000 CVE). Each month, the entire pool is given to one group member in rotation. Thus, in turn, all get a considerable lump sum to invest in a capital expenditure, e.g., a house roof, or livestock. Records are carefully kept. If an individual does not contribute on a given pay day, the one who gets the pool that day does not contribute when the non-contributor's turn comes. In some groups, solidarity is so great that members who can will pay the share for a member who can not pay that day.

Mutual Assistance: Ajuda

Ajuda is based more on empathy and charity than on strict reciprocity. Indigents such as widows and old people are given small gifts from time to time by neighbors to help with their minimal survival needs.

Mutual Assistance: Boto

Mutual assistance also takes the form of a funeral insurance association (*boto*) whose purpose is to spread costs of death expenses such as feeding guests at the wake and buying a coffin. The Pico Leão *boto* includes families from three other communities though not all families in the communities belong. On the death of a *boto* family member, association officers are informed and they spread the word to all members. The treasurer goes to the deceased's home and there records each member's 100 CVE payment as it comes in to pay for the wake and later, when a coffin is built, the treasurer assesses each family its share.

Catholic Church

The entire community is Catholic and the majority attends bi-weekly mass at the local church. A priest based in Cidade Velha, the only one in the area, celebrates the mass. He has been responsible for the building, on a mutual assistance basis, of most of the region's churches.

New Local Governance Unit

In 1991, encouraged by the municipal administrative agent, Pico Leão villagers elected a five-person committee to serve as community observers and to help resolve small conflicts. They identify the needy and track welfare recipients.

Efforts to Form a Cooperative

In 1992 an effort to form a local consumers' cooperative had to be shelved when not enough families were able to by the minimum shares need to capitalize the unit.

Summary

This multitude of organizations suggests the community has both a strong need for local institutions and the capacity to make them work. Though imperfect, they enable the community to deal with important production and governance problems, whether as a unified group or through sub-units.

3. *Governmental Levels and Public Services*

Most the public services provided in the community are currently produced by national government agencies. Being relatively remote, Pico Leão receives less in public services than communities nearer Praia. The key local link to government in general is the municipal administrative agent. Because the new agent, appointed in mid-1991, resigned to emigrate to Europe, the vacant post is being filled, voluntarily, by the former agent, now retired. He continues to help residents with paper work required to obtain pensions, access to welfare roles, and official documents; he keeps an eye on distribution of FAIMO jobs and aids the

local governance committee when they confront problems or have to resolve disputes. He voluntarily runs errands for people (paperwork, prescriptions, etc.) twice monthly to Praia. His connections with officials and knowledge of regulations make him particularly valuable to the community.

Police Services

The residents of Pico Leão appear to respect and apply the rule to avoid violence in one's relations with fellow villagers and to observe other rules of reasonable behavior (prohibitions on theft, adultery, etc.). In terms of legal process, minor disputes are handled locally by the residents' commission. Those exceeding local resolution capacities are taken to the Praia police. Before the change of government, formal police services were supplied from Praia. Officers stopped in Pico Leão every two weeks on rounds through the region. Since the new government came to power however, formal policing stopped. Drunkenness is the major cause of occasional local problems. When *grogó* is flowing at baptisms, marriages, and other local celebrations, disputes, as between competing suitors, can rapidly escalate into violence. One youngster killed another with a knife five years ago. If the wounds are not serious, such matters are dealt with locally. Serious matters, such as the killing, end in court.

Education

Pico Leão has only a four-grade basic primary school operating out of a rented house. The 80 some children are taught by four instructors, two men and two women. The school director for five years lives in Belem, two kilometers down the main valley by foot. One instructor is a Pico Leão native and the other two commute from Praia on the weekends.

Books are rare and there is no budget for maintenance of teaching materials.⁵⁵ A small monthly school service fee for every child, paid by parents, is delivered to the National Education Ministry in Praia by the director for deposit in the Ministry's general fund.

Parents appear when the director calls a meeting and labor is made available to maintain the rented building. Villagers last year petitioned the government for their own school building. The MPAAR asked that Pico Leão co-share production costs with volunteering labor if the ministry provided materials. Villagers argued that they could not afford to give up paid FAIMO workdays. The Ministry ended up by agreeing to pay for work on the school. At present the building is nearly completed.

⁵⁵ There are no funds to repaint the blackboard, the major means of written instruction. When queried, the director said it would cost only 100 CVE to paint it. But there is no plan to collect that from parents. Teachers' monthly salaries are very low: 8,000 CVE for a starting instructor, and 12,000 CVE for an experienced director.

Children who successfully complete the four-year course rarely go on to upper primary school out of the community. Most families cannot afford to board a child. Moreover they worry about adequate supervision for their absent children. The director said that in his five years there, only ten students had gone on to upper primary school, although many could have since they did successfully completed the exam at the end of the first four years. Parents say that want the upper primary grades offered in their school and look forward to that happening.

Public Health

A health agent is posted in São João Baptista, about six km. from Pico Leão. In Cidade Velha, 10 km. distant, a nurse and several health agents operate an infirmary. Those sick beyond their competence are sent by private van to the hospital in Praia. Those too sick to travel upright can be evacuated by pickup truck to Praia; this service costs 3,000 CVE.

Public Welfare

Indigent welfare recipients number 14 people. The retired administrative agent receives and delivers their monthly payments of 500 CVE and their basic food rations.

4. Observations and Conclusions

Pico Leão residents demonstrate a greater capacity for collective action than people in Lagoa, Ponto da Sol and Mato Baixo. Pico Leão demonstrates that communities can sometimes surmount obstacles that appear to exist in many Cape Verdean agricultural villages. The community spirit inherent in the *boto* funeral association, in parental involvement in children's schooling, in the rotating savings pool, in *ajuda*, in the local governance committee and dispute resolution procedures and in the willingness of those who control scarce resources such as oxen to contribute their services to further the joint economic good witness existence of precious institutional capital. As we note in the next section on irrigated farming, a comparatively high percentage of local farmers own some of the land they cultivate. The fact that 50% cannot be evicted because **they are landowners** affects community capacity for collective action as does the fact that most Pico Leão residents have access either through ownership or tenancy relationships, to an irrigated plot which buffers them at least marginally against the vagaries of summer rainfall.

5. The Irrigated Production Site: Pico Leão

The 653 inhabitants of Pico Leão are divided into 19 *bairros*, scattered along three adjoining valleys where irrigated farming is practiced. In this community, women predominate, making up some 54% of the population. Subsistence is based on a mix of irrigated and rainfed agriculture, and animal husbandry. Irrigated farming has become increasingly important with the sustained declines in annual rainfall. Because of drought, *sequeiro* cultivation of corn and beans, standard throughout Cape Verde, is hardly practiced in

Pico Leão. Most former *sequeiro* plots, located on hills above the settlements, were acquired for afforestation and SWC schemes, and are now considered "state lands".⁵⁶ For this reason, this case focuses on *regadio* agriculture in Pico Leão and animal husbandry in Chã d'Igreja.

Irrigation Systems and Exploitation Techniques

The irrigation canals of Pico Leão, constructed by hand in 1940, were designed to carry water by gravity flow from three major springs to adjoining hillside plots. Persistent droughts have gradually depleted local aquifers and reduced spring flows. In consequence farmers now irrigate a reduced area between the springs and the valley bottom. Villagers have tried to manage less water more efficiently by building a small dam. A spillway leads water out to the head of the primary canal which runs to field inlets all along its length.

Pico Leão irrigation systems enable farmers to grow a wide variety of root, grain, horticultural and fruit crops. Farmers regularly fertilize their plots using manure from the livestock most families maintain. Water availability figures as the main constraint on productivity. Though there are pests, farmers use no chemical pesticides.

Land Tenure and Water Rotation Rules

In Pico Leão, whether *regadio* or *sequeiro* land, a little over half the area belongs to and is worked by small holders while large landlords lease the remainder to tenants. For decades all the lands belonged to a handful of large landowners. In the mid-1950's, the colonial government bought over half of these lands and resold them to the tenants. Tenancy arrangements are similar to those in Mato Baixo. The working rule calls for sharecroppers to give one-half of the harvest to non-resident landlords with whom they otherwise have little contact. Many sharecroppers must also pay transport fees to dispatch the share of the harvest to the landlords.

Rights of Transfer and Exclusion are also similar to the other cases where male and female heirs of tenants inherit use rights from both mothers and fathers. Large landowners and smallholders both pass land to their heirs. For very small plots, to avoid difficult and impractical division, one heir usually buys out other heirs. Women heirs to *regadio* land usually enjoy only secondary use rights, with brothers or husbands receiving preference. Any freeholder, large or small, may sell land or, under certain conditions, permanently or temporarily exclude others from using the land.

⁵⁶ Normally, farmers pay rent to large landowners and the State for access to *sequeiro* land. In recent years, there has been so little rain that many tenants have been exempt from payment. In contrast, rents for *sequeiro* lands that remain productive despite drought increased by about 20% in 1992.

Rights and Responsibilities for Resources Management are like the Tabugal case. Local producers, be they smallholders, sharecroppers or renters, enjoy some rights to manage the land they work. Large owners usually do not object to tenants building terraces or planting trees on the property. Tenants have use rights to the trees they plant, but can lose these rights if the landlord evicts them from the land. Tenants also have rights to the fruit of trees their landlords have planted, but not to branches or the tree itself.

Organization and Monitoring of Water Rotation: Every farmer has a set day, once every fifteen days, on which he is entitled to irrigation water. The duration of irrigation varies according to plot size: farmers with larger plots may receive 24 hours of water, while those with smaller ones get anywhere from one to 12 hours. The specified irrigation time per plot was established over time by trial and error. This information is passed down within families, as basic knowledge required by all irrigators.

A working rule specifies that residents are only permitted to drink from the spring closest to their house. All users are responsible for maintaining and cleaning the source. In the same way, everyone who uses a common canal is required to help repair it by participating in *djunta mon*-like groups which unite for this purpose for one or two days after the rains, in January.

Land Tenancy and Access: By either freehold or tenancy, most Pico Leão farmers have access to at least one parcel of irrigated land. Many farmers may own and work one or more small plots, while simultaneously working as tenants on other lands. By far the most common tenancy arrangement is sharecropping, although land is rented. Women have the more limited access to irrigated land than men. Locally, it is said that "irrigation is men's work". Men claim that when women inherit *regadio* land, they are unable to do the heavy labor required unless they have able male offspring to do it. (The team did observe one female-managed plot near the irrigated area. A husband had given a plot to his wife. She built her own stone terraces and carried water by head from a spring nearby to irrigate her vegetables.) Most women practice *sequeiro* farming instead. With reduced rainfall, *sequeiro* agriculture is very risky and the female-headed households and the few male-headed households without access to irrigated lands have a particularly difficult time making ends meet.

Irrigating: Annual Cycle and Constraints: The irrigation cycle varies with rains. In years of plentiful rainfall, farmers concentrate on *sequeiro* cultivation in the rainy season and begin irrigated agriculture only in November or December. In drought years, however, *regadio* becomes the sole means of subsistence and irrigated fields are cultivated year round. Farmers see water as their major production constraint. They claim that if they had more water by means of a large reservoir, or through wells and motor-pumps, they could plant anything. They feel frustrated in being unable to enlist assistance from the state to accomplish these tasks.

6. *Water Rotation, Water Supplements and Canal and Terrace Up-Keep*

Every farmer scrupulously respects water rotation rules though there is no one water distribution overseer. Informally irrigators monitor each other's use in this small system. System maintenance, such as cleaning primary canals, is done by all users. Periodically, in their self interest, farmers organize in *djunta mon* groups to repair and maintain it. The combination of short-term pay-off for proper maintenance of structures and low probability of shirkers escaping detection creates a situation in which irrigators willingly participate to maintain their systems.

Tenants have little incentive to make big investments since owners do take back land without paying for improvements. The practice of owners arbitrarily raising rents and evicting tenants after they have made improvements is a common practice in Cape Verde, dating well before the 19th Century (see Carreira, 1982: 28). Though tenants know of laws that would compensate tenants for investments, they feel powerless against the landowner's prerogative to exclude. Thus insecurity creates a disincentive for tenants to make major, productivity-enhancing investments on their land.

7. *Outcomes and Conclusions*

Aside from the restricted access of women to irrigated fields, the Pico Leão tenure system provides more equitable access to land than among other sites studied. The efficiency of landholding strategies is mixed and, with the exception of small holders, appears to be inferior to the Tabugal case. Tenants have few guarantees of security of tenure. Like Tabugal, investments involving cash inputs are usually beyond the means of local tenants, and require sizeable contributions from outside parties. Given scant means to maintain irrigation canals themselves, and the fact that use rights might be revoked after these investments have been made, irrigated agriculture may not be sustainable. Water distribution is fairly equitable: larger plots receive more water and smaller plot less. It is unclear whether or not the system of water distribution is sustainable, given prolonged drought.

The fact that these systems function reliably is a non-trivial accomplishment. Scarce water flowing when it should where it should is a visible indicator of powerful "invisible" institutions such as *djunta mon* operations. It evidences residents' capacity to resolve collective action problems and govern themselves.

8. *The Pastoral System in Pico Leão: the Châ d'Igreja*

Background

In Pico Leão about three-fourths of all families own livestock. Among other things animals produce manure, a major input to the local agricultural production system. Given year-round cultivation of irrigated crops, there is a constant threat that stock will invade *regadio* fields. In practice however this occurs infrequently. During the dry season, families

normally stall feed their animals, tying them near the homestead and carrying fodder to them from the fields. During the rainy season, most stock-owning families take their animals to distant pastures, leaving them under the care of a professional herder. The reasons for this are several. First, this practice helps livestock owners to avoid conflict, since the animals are taken far from cultivated *regadio* and *sequeiro* fields. Secondly, it provides households in pasture-poor areas with access to superior pasture resources found in other zones. Thirdly, engaging a professional herder to mind stock during the growing season frees up household labor to work full time on irrigated agriculture. In short, irrigation farmers and professional herders are engaged in a mutually beneficial exchange: the pastoral system contributes low cost but specialized labor and access to abundant pasture, while farmers with sparser grazing resources reciprocate by providing agricultural labor to herders.

Short transhumance to rainy season pastures is said to have begun early in the colonial period. These alternative herding arrangements and seasonal pastures constitute a pastoral system that is distinct from but complementary to agriculture in Pico Leão, as well as in many other *povoados* of the municipality. Furthermore, herders are unusual among rural producers in Cape Verde in that they follow their own island-wide rules and codes of behavior, employ mutual assistance for distinct tasks, and adopt specific production strategies that take advantage of the types of knowledge, resources, and priorities they possess.

The Pico Leão - Châ d'Igreja Study of Pastoralism:

In a full and detailed case study, the team examined one of the most popular pasture zones among Pico Leão residents at Châ d'Igreja. The study describes the **attributes of the pastoral community**, including herder training and the use of *djunta mon* groupings to accomplish specific tasks. It describes briefly the **attributes of pastures as economic goods** and then addresses the **attributes of rules governing pastoral activities**, with emphasis on property rights to pastoral resources, the stockowner-herder contract underlying rainy season animal transhumance, pasture and herd organization and management, and the stock identification system. The **interactions** that flow from these diverse sources of incentives for behavior are then described and analyzed. These include: herding strategies and cycles, sources of herder income, conflict types and dispute resolution, reactions to afforestation project encroachment on pastoral areas and emergency strategies during periods of drought.

Unlike the other case studies in this chapter, a full abridgement of the case is not given here because of its length and complexity. But, later in this section, in the overall conclusion to the Pico Leão case, major findings on pastoralism are included.

9. *Outcomes of Pastoral Interactions:*

Short transhumance and contracts with professional herders provide farmers in Pico Leão with access to a broad range of pasture resources over a wide area. Livestock managed in this fashion have equal access to the grazing areas and the fact that the system evolved during the colonial period suggests that, under normal conditions, it is relatively sustainable. However grazing areas are declining due to afforestation and droughts. More labor-intensive alternative stock management strategies are being adopted and a new system might have to be devised to limit access to available pasture resources in order to guarantee that they will be preserved. In short, wide and equitable access might have to be sacrificed to insure pasture resources are exploited in an efficient and sustainable fashion.

Encroachment on pasture lands of afforestation projects has exerted serious pressure on grazing resources. Chã d'Igreja herders have been forced to rely on grazing zones without water sources, to seek non-traditional pastures in other areas, and to accompany their animals while they are grazing to guarantee that they do not wander into the forests to be fined. Herders and farmers in Chã d'Igreja have reacted with more aggressive anti-afforestation strategies. The most striking of these was to cut down trees which residents felt brought no benefits to local producers and to refuse to pay the fines assessed. A more conciliatory approach may be adopted when Chã d'Igreja residents call a public meeting with forest officials to discuss their disagreements and investigate possibilities of alternative forms of forest management that might be more beneficial to herders.

10. *Conclusions from Pico Leão for Decentralization in Cape Verde*

Character and Viability of Irrigated Agriculture

Irrigated agriculture in Pico Leão appears productive and resilient. The major constraint is availability of water for irrigation during a period of prolonged drought. Water utilization efficiencies could in principle be improved by lining canals and other innovations, but financing constraints hinder investments. A secondary constraint is transportation difficulties that reduce marketability of high value crops such as vegetables. Could these problems be resolved, improved sales and returns on sales might lift community living standards.

The tenants in Pico Leão are sharecroppers and as such they enjoy less autonomy than the renters in Tabugal. Renters make only those investments required for short term profits fearing that longer term investments may be lost should land use rights be revoked without proper compensation. Pico Leão producers prefer rent contracts because sharecroppers are more subject to manipulation and pressure by landlords on harvest shares. When production is low, landowners threaten to evict or to grant the holding to another "more productive" sharecropper. When areas are left uncultivated, the landowner threatens to give that part to someone else in order to increase profits. Hence, renting appears to be more stable and to provide more opportunities for tenants to increase revenues.

Legally, a landlord must first offer land he would sell to the tenants. Land sale rates are set based on an evaluation of the property made by the Ministry of Finance. Technically an owner should consult interested tenants and offer to work out conditions of sale: payments and deadlines. But the legal provisions don't always work for the tenant. An owner may demand a single payment and set a deadline the tenant can not meet. Tenants can request bank loans at low interest rates with help from the MPAAR, but legal procedures take time and may exceed owner's deadline.⁵⁷ When faced with rigid terms of sale, the tenant can in fact do very little.

A major reform to guarantee tenant farmers long-term use of lands could encourage them to invest more and thus increase production. So could access to low cost credit to finance such improvements. But capacity to control higher yields that would permit loan repayment assumes tenure security and a continuing supply of irrigation water. Both assumptions seem problematic.

Collective Action Potential

Pico Leão residents have a variety of collective action arrangements, both in irrigated agriculture, in community activities, in organization of work fronts, and in provision of public services. Though imperfect, the number and durability of their institutions and their innovations such as the *boto* argue that Pico Leão residents could, with modest external assistance, undertake new forms of collective self-governance or such things as collective credit to finance improvements in irrigation systems.

Viability of Pastoralism in Pico Leão

Technically speaking animal husbandry/pastoralism appears to face a range of constraints in Pico Leão and Châ d'Igreja. These constraints arise from drought - which radically reduces forage production in bad years - and political decisions about allocation of land which now favor afforestation efforts and the provision of paid work through FAIMO. Afforestation projects exert serious pressure on grazing resources. Châ d'Igreja herders have been forced to rely on grazing zones without water sources, to seek non-traditional pastures in other areas, and to accompany their animals while they are grazing to guarantee that they do not wander into the forests to be fined. Herders and farmers in Châ d'Igreja have taken some aggressive action against reforestation such as cutting down trees residents felt brought no real benefits and to refuse to pay the fines assessed.

Châ d'Igreja residents suggest that forests be managed by the community. Use would be coordinated with pastoral interests. If this proposal is approved, residents would grant herders restricted access to the forests and see that future afforestation occur in phases so as to permit the use of pasture resources while trees are planted. When forests are mature

⁵⁷ Given peasants problems with credit, the government is currently considering creating a institute specialized in granting credit to producers in the agriculture and livestock sectors.

enough to be exploited, community residents could manage fodder harvesting and distribution. Without such a decentralized approach to the problem associated with afforestation, the areas upon which Pico Leão stockowners have relied for summer pasturage appear threatened by serious overcrowding and degradation.

Herders bring important "institutional capital" to any discussion of pasture management and governance problems. First, the herders share a number of assumptions (mutual assistance willingly given against reciprocal assistance in time of need; an honor code concerning stock ownership which heightens herders' credibility; and desirability of avoiding overgrazing). Second, herders enjoy mutually productive, cordial relationships with the farmers who rely on them. These assets suggest that they could share in a reliable, sustainable governing order.

Implications for Decentralization: Capacity for Local Governance

The demonstrated capacity of Pico Leão residents to organize and deal with public problems suggests that they could accept new responsibilities in the area of service provision as well as in renewable resources governance, management, and productivity enhancement. Pico Leão people (and Chã d'Igreja residents as far as pastoral problems are concerned) should be included in any discussions of this nature. They should also be armed with veto power so that they are not forced to accept burdens and arrangements they believe they cannot support. This is particularly relevant where activities affected by land tenure regulations are at issue: inappropriate devolution of authority to the community in areas where local people's exposures under existing law are considerable could lead to failures in the short run simply because many in the community felt unable to accept the implied risks, or because they felt the division of benefits would be inequitable.

Some minimal reforms of land tenure relations appear indispensable for improvements however: Greater security for tenants, both for access to the land and for access to efficient and equitable land disputes resolution, seems necessary. Some guarantees are needed for tenants to take individual or collective risks on investments designed to improve resource system productivity, for example, by lining irrigation canals. They need to know that they will not have their tenure interrupted if they invest and can, therefore, capture a fair share of the benefits from such investments.

The context of population pressure on a limited and shrinking resource base (drought, reduced water flows, spread of afforestation), limited access to fiscal resources, exposures under tenure arrangements, and top-down decision making now focused on employment generation (FAIMO) and environmental protection means the margin for maneuver is limited. But incremental gains are possible. Access to credit on reasonable terms, devolution of more authority to the community to handle its own resource governance and management problems,

technical support for certain public services could all enhance local capacity to improve their lot at the margin. Wanting now is the local-municipal-national dialogue to work at this margin through appropriate and timely decisions to empower the community through decentralization that can work.

F. Povoado of Calheta, Farmers and Herders (Maio Municipality-The Island of Maio)

1. Introduction: Background and Setting

The rural settlement of Calheta is one of twelve rural communities on the sparsely peopled island of Maio. The island resembles Boa Vista and Sal with their almost flat, sandy landscapes rather than the archipelago's volcanically uplifted, mountainous and craggy islands like Santiago, Fogo and Santo Antão. There are only 5,067 people, 1,061 families, living within Maio's 269 km² land area, a few engaged in extracting salt and lime for export to the other islands, but mostly in rugged dryland farming, animal husbandry and fishing. Calheta lies on Maio's northwest coast, about 12 km. from the municipal capital, Vila. The area is flat and sandy with some recently afforested lands, bordering a beautiful calm sea. The southern and eastern horizon of the settlement is marked by a small hillock, Monte Vermelho, roughly 700 feet high, roughly in the island's center.

Calheta is said to be the village with the island's highest rate of emigration abroad. Only households with an emigrant spouse, child or parent count on regular remittances. Until the 1940s the United States was the target for migration; from 1950 onwards, Holland had taken its place.

2. Attributes of the Community: Organizational and Cultural Characteristics

National officials say that Calheta residents are more outspoken and more willing to challenge authority to resolve their problems than are other island people. They are known for taking on government agencies and are quick to mobilize behind local informal leaders to protect their interests. This mentality has brought a number of benefits to the *povoado*. Outside of Vila, Calheta was the first settlement to receive a local health post, telephones, and a local market. Nevertheless, like the other sites studied, residents have problems in organizing to accomplish public works. The needs of their own household are often more pressing. A family heads say that they can not volunteer to help build a road or repair a school when his/her own children are hungry.

Mutual Assistance: Djunta mon, Djuda, Boto, and the Church

Djunta mon in Calheta works essentially as in the other sites studied. Work groups of eight to ten, which form around seasonal activities, last years, as long as relations among members remain good. A participant may back out of a task for illness, or not work on the field of a member who was absent from work on his land. Nevertheless, participants seldom fail to honor their commitment and rarely have to pay the 500 CVE fine for an unexcusable absence. The elderly and emigrants' wives normally do not join *djunta-mon* groups and may, when able, hire others to help on their land. Single mothers (*solteiras*) have particular difficulty in mobilizing *djunta mon* assistance. Most Calheta residents offer *djuda* to fellow residents in need and to help in roof raising or repairs. This assistance is reciprocated as at the other sites studied.

Calheta's funeral association (*boto*), founded in 1986, was initiated by a PAICV party member who came from Praia. Basing the idea on a *boto* seen in Santiago, he with two other youths were able to get 67 families engaged in setting up rules and in making monthly contributions to the association's funeral expense fund. It worked well for five years, but since the treasurer left in 1990, contributions have stopped. Members say this is a temporary problem and they plan to restart *boto* as before.

Though no village collective credit system exists, small no-interest loans (2,000 - 10,000 CVE) are made by several well-known residents to others with reputations for honesty. Groups have formed to get bank loans for productive projects. Individuals divide responsibility for money management and repayments.

The church strongly influences life in Calheta. The church association has monthly meetings at which most villagers contribute 2-10 CVE. The association is outspoken about the evils of birth control.

Local Governance

Until recent elections, Calheta's *comissão de moradores* composed of six men and two women, was, as elsewhere, PAICV controlled. Membership changed with emigration but was always PAICV controlled and had a quite authoritarian president. Residents criticized it, especially for biased selection of welfare recipients favoring friends and relatives of commissioners. The new local governance unit since 1992, still called the *comissão de moradores* (officially it is the local development commission-*comissão de desenvolvimento local*), is composed of three men. They were selected by and from among the "group of twelve" MPD supporters in Cahleta and were officially recognized by the elected Maio municipal council president.

From the outset the new commission has had problems. Many residents believe the commission should be elected by the community. Dissident residents call the "group of twelve," "**the vengeance group.**" They say that it is based on conflict and that it uses its power to punish PAICV supporters. Many residents want a non-partisan commission with members elected based on reputations for honesty, knowledge, and efficiency, not political affiliation. They want a new election. The new commission and the "group of twelve" have found few residents willing to support their decisions. Commissioners complain that the problem is not that the community does not condone their positions but that they lack the kind of sanctioning power such as police support that local colonial agents, the *cabochefes*, once had. It is not clear how long this commission may hold office or how members may be changed. Some say that after a year local MPD leaders will replace those now on the commission.

Meanwhile an alternate group, known as the Integral Group for Local Development (GIPDL), formed in the community. Its 16 members of diverse political affiliations have called for a popular election of community representatives. They drew up 21 concrete development objectives for the community which they sent, with a request for elections, to the municipal president, but as of this study they had received no response.

In spite of leadership contention, most of Cahleta is skeptical about formal bodies. Their experience is that a few individuals effect community decisions and action, whether members of formal commissions or not. One such person is a man of eighty years who has, for thirty years, spearheaded community action on natural resource use and public services.

Summary

Of all the cases studied, Calheta appears to have the greatest potential for community organization and action as reflected in the presence of informal leaders, competition among rival formal governance bodies and the various forms of mutual assistance. As in other places, when formal governance units have not been chosen or approved by residents they prove ineffective in mobilizing citizen action. Households do invest first in those services and activities of direct benefit, but with some stimulus, mobilization often occurs for community organization to address pressing problems.

3. *Administrative Jurisdictions and Public Services*

The island of Maio forms a single municipality, with the capital in Vila plus eleven small *povoacões* of well defined settlements. In the recent election the MPD won an absolute majority against the PAICV, taking the council and a majority of the assembly seats.

Most public services, largely under national agencies, are concentrated in the municipal capital: Vila has the island's only schools beyond the fourth grade, the only clinic with a doctor and a national social services delegate. The clinic is limited. Patients requiring surgery are evacuated to Praia. There is also a health post in Pedro Vaz and a health unit in

Calheta. Among the other services in Vila are: a post office linked to units in Calheta, Barreiro and Pedro Vaz; a delegate to distribute and commercialize goods (EMPA); a Ministry of Finance office to collect taxes and oversee public finances; an MPAAR section in Vila and a German-Belgian financed zootechnic center in Calheta; a few consumers coops under the National Institute of Cooperatives (INC); an Italian-financed artisanal fisheries project; an insurance representative; a section of the National Administration of Ports (NAPOR) and a national travel agency with a delegate of TACV; an official of the Transport Ministry who can issue drivers' licenses despite the absence of a formal transport structure; and soon to be, a branch of the Bank of Cape Verde.

Municipal taxes are the same as those discussed in other cases.

Police Services

Under the last regime, Calheta had its own popular militia and local court (*tribunal da zona*), both comprised of local residents nominated in Vila. Both were abolished by the new regime. Most problems are still resolved locally by members of the new local development commission who can call police in from Vila when needed on a problem to provide order during festivals. Unresolved problems are taken to the court in Vila. Residents say that police usually act appropriately, otherwise, residents say they would take them to court.

Primary Education

Calheta residents say that "with schooling, slavery ends". Parents would send their children beyond the local four year primary school if they could. Many send some to higher grades in Vila. A few go on to finish high school in Praia. The local school, has three classrooms and six teachers for its 173 students in four grades. Of the six teachers, the director lives in Calheta and the other five, from Vila and another town in Maio, commute daily. The director, who has taught in Calheta for 13 years, completed teacher training. The others, schooled in Maio only through sixth grade, don't meet the new standard of three years secondary schooling for primary teachers. As elsewhere in our study, teacher attendance in Cahleta is high with the same sanctions for absences involved. The MINED delegate in Vila is supposed to give close support to the Cahleta school and once monthly should bring in a MINED pedagogic team. The delegate seldom comes and the team visits perhaps each three months.

Classes are held double session morning and afternoon. Though few students miss class repeatedly, some 25% of children do not attend at all, but spend their time in other activities, such as carpentry, fishing, or animal husbandry. The major subjects, as elsewhere, are Portuguese, mathematics, physical education, music, and the physical and social environment of Cape Verde. Classes do have blackboards, books, maps, and charts. Students must buy several books at some 300 CVE each. Children of the same family do share books and materials with each other. Other school supplies can cost 1,000 CVE per student per year. The end of year exam fee is 2.50 CVE. Sometimes the MINED provides some

materials for needy children. Commonly children tear pages from notebooks to provide paper for poorer class mates. Most parents do not attend the meetings that teachers call about three times each year. Teachers do visit some homes or see parents on the street to discuss their children.

Both children and parents like the school provided meals: parents claim that it makes their life much cheaper. Children show much higher energy from the school feeding. Parents are asked to give 5 to 10 CVE monthly to buy seasonings for the food, and soap and water to wash dishes. Some parents give salt or other seasonings as their contributions. Some give nothing.

Now parents with children wishing to continue studies past grade four must send them to Vila. Some board there with relatives or friends which costs about 2,500 CVE monthly. Beginning this year, six or seven children from different families are making the 12km., two-hour walk to Vila, leaving at dawn to get to school on time. Some 20 to 30 Calheta students are attending high school in Praia, a very costly proposition for these poor people at about 5,000 CVE monthly for room and board plus the cost of supplies and uniforms.

A major problem at the Calheta school is that there is no toilet. Original bathrooms were converted to kitchens when the government food program began. Now, children use a road in front or bushes behind to relieve themselves. School books are another major problem. This year, the first grade had no books for the entire year. Residents want a local shop for school books and other materials. Others want better trained teachers, a new table in the school, better supplies and graphics. Teachers say that parents rarely help with school repairs without pay. Most residents feel that the school belongs to the state and should be maintained by it.

Aside from the primary school, for the past three or four years, Calheta has had an adult literacy class and a preschool. A child attends preschool for three to five years and is required to pay 100 ECV per month, while *Promoção Social* furnishes the classroom materials and food.

Public Health

Many Calheta residents consider the health post to be the most important public service, even though the health agent is trained only to treat minor maladies and many residents rely on herbal remedies to treat their ills. A doctor and nurse from Vila do visit weekly. (Residents did complain that consultations are conducted too hastily.) Patients with deep knife wounds, or other serious accidents or illnesses are taken to the Vila clinic by truck for those who can pay (about 1,500 ECV) or by foot, carried on the backs of family members, if they cannot pay. Residents want a permanent nurse at their post, but most say they could not pay even 10 CVE per year toward salary and maintenance. They say that they could give a day of labor to repair or expand the health post but more work time would have to be paid for.

Most babies are delivered at home with volunteer help from one of the two village mid-wives. Both are uncertified, having learned the skill from other mid-wives (now deceased) in the village and from experience. (Each has had 10 children herself). When complications occur beyond their ken, midwives accompany mothers in labor to the hospital in Vila. A PMI/PF agent visits Calheta weekly, usually arriving with the visiting nurse and doctor to monitor pregnant mothers and newborns and to give vaccinations. These visits offer little in family planning. Those wanting contraceptives must go to the hospital in Vila. Few Calheta women use contraceptives. Most who do are *solteiras*, unmarried women, who start contraception only after having six or seven children. A few married mothers use contraceptives to space children. On occasion, a woman will go to Praia to be sterilized. But many women refuse contraceptives because the church opposes it.

Social Services

Welfare recipients run between 20 and 30 persons, most of whom are elderly or handicapped. Their assistance in food and cash is the same as documented elsewhere in the study. A local three-person committee, which meets monthly, distributes food and recommends changes in the list. Young people, temporarily ill, are taken off the list after three months, while the indigent elderly remain permanently on the list. Committee members say they don't know how they were chosen. The president, who handles most of the food distribution, has served for nine years, taking the job on recommendation by a predecessor. All three committee members serve without pay and, when needed, volunteer their homes for work such as food distribution. Members express concern over possible abuses such as in the past when friends and family members of PAICV authorities got on the list. They also say that the welfare food and cash is insufficient to meet the basic needs of the indigent at a time when poverty is increasing. The poor, whether welfare recipients or not, rely more heavily upon *djuda* from friends and neighbors; some give gifts of water or food and others do the laundry for their needy friends.

Public Water Supply

Until the late 1950's, Calheta got drinking water at some 400 hand and machine dug private wells. The wells began to dry up and since 1960, none of the wells in Calheta and only a very few of the deeper wells on the island continue to contain water. Residents associate dry wells and the declining water table with tree planting; the areas where trees were planted first were also the first in which the wells dried up.

From the late 1950's until the early 1980's, the state brought drinking water to Maio villages in mobile water tanks filled at a bore hole in Monte Vermelho. When pumps and the delivery system broke down, and it did often, residents demonstrated against the administration. In the mid-1980s the government delegate to Maio transferred water distribution from the state to MPAAR's integrated development project which was financed by a German NGO. The results were dramatic: pump maintenance and water availability improved dramatically and there have been relatively few problems since. Today water is sold

at Calheta's two public fountains by the liter under supervision from paid attendants. The behavior of these attendants and the maintenance of pumps have been a source of some recent village controversy. Residents argue that greater community management of public water supply might improve this service. They say that to ensure proper pump maintenance, they could pay attendants with half of the money earned from sales, and the other half could be deposited in a bank account to accumulate for repairs. Residents could elect a few members to check that the money was properly divided and deposited according to these rules. The money in the bank account could be used to hire someone, such as the Chief of the Water Network of Maio, to repair the fountains when needed.

Strategies to Improve Public Services and Community Welfare

Villagers tell of two cases that illustrate how they have united to resolve problems: one involved a health risk caused by dying livestock; and another involved water sale abuses.

The first case is from the rainy season of 1980 when forest guards penned up a large number of cows and goats caught in afforested state lands demanding that owners claim them and pay their fines (*coima*). But the caught animals were so many that owners could not pay the fines. The animals stayed corralled until they died. The stench and flies around the dead animals was unbearable. On behalf of villagers concerned about the health hazard, an informal local leader, now 82 years old and "too old to be afraid of anyone or anything," complained to municipal officials, requesting they order that the animals be buried. He offered to pay for an official's transport to Calheta if he was found to be lying. The official was delayed for three days. In the meantime, the guards filled an old well with dead animals and closed it permanently. They buried other remains in shallow graves. When the official did arrive, the animals were no where to be seen. The old man offered to pay to reopen the well to prove his case, but several animals' legs were seen protruding from the ground, thus proving his veracity. The people of Calheta were satisfied when the sanitation official closed the incident and ordered guards to bury the animals properly.

The second case, in 1992, involved an irresponsible water attendant whom the community wanted to sanction for failing to keep regular hours and for neglecting the pump. People asked the same old man to make their case to the MPAAR. He telephoned MPAAR threatening to take the case to the national newspaper or radio if something was not done immediately. MPAAR responded promptly, reprimanding the attendant and putting her under close observation to guarantee that she would not repeat the abuses.

Observations and Conclusions

Calheta shows considerable potential for community management of public services. Poverty makes residents reluctant to contribute more than limited labor and very small cash amounts to school and health unit improvements. But *djuda* to needy friends, contributions to the preschool and the Church, a willingness to walk long distances to complete primary school, and demonstrations against inept public water management suggest that residents have

the resources and will to create, acquire and improve services that they deem important. The population's confrontational approach to problem solving can facilitate co-management of those services, if an effective institutional framework will ensure equal participation of citizens in community efforts and will include the means to monitor and sanction the conduct of both citizens and those put in charge.

4. *Production Systems in Calheta: Fishing, Farming and Livestock*

To reduce risk in the island's harsh environment, Calheta residents combine agriculture, animal husbandry and fishing to provide their meager livelihoods. Following is a brief look at all three of these activities with somewhat more attention to the most important among them: animal husbandry.

Fishing

There are 17 fishing boats in Calheta. The boats and motors were bought with state extended loans, which the owners repay gradually from earnings. The two and three man crews work daily but catches are small and marketing is poorly developed. Families without fishers complain that they have little access to the produce. This is because local women have no *rabidante* (marketing) tradition. Residents claim that only women from other areas are effective fishmongers.⁵⁸ Also, they say the even if there were women interested in selling fish, few residents have refrigerators and the catch has to be sold the same day. Besides, entrepreneurs with transport now buy up the catch as soon as the boats return from sea. Residents say that these dealers should first offer some fish for sale in Calheta before taking it away to other markets.

Agricultural Production

Most fields cultivated by Calheta farmers have the **characteristics of private goods**. In other words, it is relatively easy to exclude people and animals simply by enclosure with a rustic stone fence. Secondly, consumption of the benefits produced by farming is separable and rivalrous. These two characteristics create incentives for farmers to invest in their fields, both to meet their subsistence needs and to recover costs of investments by marketing produce. Reportedly Calheta has the most agricultural property of any village on the island, the average person holding three to four rainfed fields bounded by stone walls that mark private use and that protect holdings from invasion by animals. The most important agricultural activity is rainfed cultivation of beans and corn and, in years of good rains, some cassava, potatoes, carrots, cabbage, beets, lettuce, sweet potatoes, onions, and sugar cane is grown.

⁵⁸ Several years ago, a woman from Praia who lived in Calheta would go to the port to purchase fish from the fishermen, transport it in her car to Calheta, and sell it to the residents.

The working rules of tenure treat farm land as a private good. Claims are established in three ways. First, a resident gets use of a plot by simply enclosing a portion of state-owned land with a stone wall and starting to farm it. Second, one can obtain formal title, with perpetual use and transfer rights to state land by paying a one-time tax, the *aforamento*. Third, by paying a yearly fee to the state, one can get use-rights to plots within the *muro*, an enclosed state-owned farm.

Calheta is different from most other places in Cape Verde in having unclaimed, unutilized land accessible to any resident willing to make the effort. Calheta is also unusual among the other sites studied because most land is held under *de facto usufruct*. In fact, Maio has more land under *posse útil* than any where else in Cape Verde: 89% of *sequeiro* and over 90% of *regadio* (Pedro Vaz only) lands are in *posse útil* as most of Maio is officially state land. Unclaimed areas are subject to *de facto* control, though without state recognition. A few *aforamento* holdings were officially registered in 1927, in the early 1970's just before Independence, and again in 1992. Aside these clearly demarcated private holdings, some residents also cultivate plots in a large, walled-off, state-owned area, known as the *lavrador comun* or *muro* that dates from colonial times. During the rainy season, farmers acquire use rights to distinct plots there by paying a fee to the state. After the harvest, the area becomes an open access, dry-season pasture for livestock.

In sum, the production system, particularly tenure rules, seem both equitable and efficient so long as the supply of land remains adequate. People who need additional land simply privatize a small part of the open access lands surrounding Calheta by enclosing it, and then begin their farming operations. If no one challenges these claims, the procedure is cheap, well understood by other residents, and effective in establishing defined use rights. By these tenure forms, farmers enjoy appreciable security to use, control and manage their land. There is still flexibility, since tracts of unclaimed land, albeit of poorer quality, still exist near Calheta.

The Pastoral System and Exploitation Techniques

Pastures used by Calheta residents have the characteristics of common pool resources or goods. Except for those enclosed as farm fields, none are delimited. Exclusion is difficult. Consumption of forage is separable and rivalrous, particularly in bad drought years when stockowners compete for scarce grass. Most pastures are too far away to be a convenient source of grasses to cut for stall-feeding and being too distant to police, have the attributes of open access resources. Water supply is an important consideration in pasture selection and purchasing water for stabled animals is expensive.

Rules Governing Animal Ownership and Pasture Use

Livestock owners have the right to harvest dairy products, to use the animals for traction and transport, and to kill the animals for household consumption, but not to sell the meat locally. Livestock owners have the right to transfer their animals by inheritance, gift, loan and sale. Calheta livestock owners respect an unspoken code that prohibits them from undercutting each other when selling livestock. Officially, livestock can only be slaughtered for sale in Vila. The *magarefe* must pay a tax (*rubação*) by head slaughtered or by weight to the municipality. Households lacking labor to herd their animals may transfer management rights for a period to a caretaker or friend. The caretaker is granted rights to all the milk produced during the period. When cattle are under long-term care, the owner may also pay and/or give the herder rights to 50% of all offspring or to half their sale price. As in Santiago, Maio livestock owners have a system of stock markings known and respected by all. Professional herding, however, is not as common in Maio as it is in Santiago.

Farmers consider their bounded rainfed fields to be private property year round; in rainy season these lands are used for crops, in the dry season for grazing animals. The farmer has the right to exclude other farmers and livestock: intruding animals are subject to fines but farmers who fail to maintain wall enclosures are not entitled to damages. Owners of trespassing animals pay fines as well as damages (*perca*) for the produce destroyed in private fields. The state-owned *muro*, since Independence, has become an open access grazing area in the dry season. Those with rainy-season rights may not forbid grazing when fields are not being farmed. Pasture areas having the attributes of open access goods are treated as such at law. Any user is free to do what he wants, where he wants, when and how he wants. This creates incentives for use as soon as anyone sees value in doing so.

Codes require that all trees in public places be pruned with special implements and that free licenses must be obtained before harvesting wood. Violators risk fines. Residents may freely harvest fuelwood from trees on their own rainfed plots or from trees planted near their houses. Rule-based incentives concerning trees in public places work to discourage consumption. These rules may be appropriate in Maio as they motivate residents to produce and manage trees for woodstocks in areas they control.

Stockowners' Strategies

Residents consider livestock and especially goats to be "the branch of life," that allows them to survive from year to year. Locals estimate that the goat population has fallen by two thirds since 1958. This decline is said to result from the increasing frequency of droughts, particularly the occurrence of successive multi-year ones. Nonetheless, all families in Calheta have some goats and many have cows as well. An average household may have eight to ten cows and some 40 goats. Most households rely heavily for cash incomes on animal products: milk, cheese and butter production of which diminishes drastically in drought years.

Livestock owners negotiate animal sales with *magarefes* (small entrepreneur butchers). Two *magarefes* come weekly to Calheta to purchase an animal each, walking cows back to Vila, and transporting goats or pigs by car. *Magarefes* pay the municipal slaughter tax and sell the meat at about 15% profit.

Since most of the island's pasture areas have the attributes of open access resources, each stock owner has a strong incentive to increase his/her herd as much as possible, so as to capture as much of the forage value as possible. When drought strikes the island the surfeit of animals can no longer be supported, forage prices rise, livestock prices fall, and owners experience severe losses. During the rainfed farming period, August to December, animals may be stall fed in walled corrals so as to keep them from crops or neighboring forests. Some farmers produce pasture grasses for sale. Many cut or pull grasses in open areas. Animals may be taken away from rainfed fields to pasture zones some 8 kms. distant. They are left there for two to eight days and return on their own to the owner's household. From January to July, children take the animals to feed by day on the post-harvest remains of rainfed fields.

When these pastures are exhausted, the animals are taken on a short transhumance to pasture zones in hilly areas. Trees also afford some forage. The preferred tree for pastoralists is *Acacia martins*⁵⁹ (*Parkinsonia aculeata*) which stays green even when there is no rain, with leaves for fodder year round and edible seed pods in season. *Acacia americana* (*Prosopis juliflora*) is not liked. Its bitter seed pods (*fava*) can be used as fodder only when mixed with large quantities of green fodder or pasture grass. Animals refuse to eat other parts of the tree. It is also believed to consume excessive amounts of water. Calheta residents feel that *Parkinsonia aculeata* is a much more appropriate tree to plant, because it takes less water, provides fodder from leaves and seed pods, gives fuelwood and shade.

When put in pasture zones during the rainy or dry seasons, animals are left on their own for days and return to their owner's homes only when they need water. As in Pico Leão, Calheta each livestock owner has a unique mark for his animals, making it difficult for animals to be lost or stolen. By honor code among owners, strays are always returned to their owners.

Pressures on Pastoral Production: Afforestation and Drought

Officials claim that pasture is so abundant on the island that pasture shortages are virtually impossible. However Calheta residents say that pasture areas are under severe pressure from afforestation and drought. MPAAR sees afforestation as an objective need in Maio; it provides vegetal cover, pasture resources, fuelwood, and charcoal stocks, and provides incomes through project employment. Officials claim that water levels and pasture areas have **not** decreased, as residents claim, as a result of afforestation. Officials say that

⁵⁹ The tree was called *acacia martins* after Martins Santos, the governor of Cape Verde at the time when the seeds were first distributed.

technical studies made before trees are planted would have detected negative impacts. Nevertheless, MPAAR, engineers, and members of coops are currently discussing the problems with afforestation and ways of creating new pastures.

One branch of the forest service, the zootechnic center, is based in Calheta. The center consists of a protected forest into which the entry of animals and people is prohibited, and a pound for animals captured on the premises. Between the months of October and November, residents are permitted to collect fodder from the center for storage and household consumption, but not sale. Calheta residents rarely do so. During the other months of the year, the Center also sells fodder. People who harvest fodder or fuelwood incorrectly or who enter the forest to cut these products without authorization are fined, although the chief forest guard claims that no one has ever been caught for this crime. Much more common are fines levied on livestock owners when their animals are caught in the forest.

Livestock owners are displeased with the afforestation project for several reasons. First, livestock owners disapprove of the choice of trees that the project has made. Calheta pastoralists claim that there would have been no problems if *Parkinsonia aculeata* were used in all the afforestation projects. *Prosopis juliflora*, on the other hand, is believed to consume a lot of water and to be responsible for the drying of the wells. Apparently, the forest near Calheta was once planted with 100 *P. aculeata* trees, but these dried up and died, when *P. juliflora* was planted. Secondly, trees are planted so close together the sun cannot penetrate the canopy, and grasses cannot grow between them.⁶⁰ The density of planting is also said to dry up the wells. Thirdly, many of the afforestation projects were concentrated in areas that had been prime pasture land. Residents are also dissatisfied with the forest service because on occasion, forest officials engage in nepotism, giving preference to friends and family.

In the 1991 drought livestock owners had to buy commercial feed for their animals. Commercial feed presents a number of problems. First many owners do not have the cash to buy enough to sustain their animals. That means selling thinner animals at drought prices to get money. The market has been particularly bad and livestock owners hold the state responsible. Secondly, expensive commercial feed can not be eaten without being mixed with pasture grasses. When these grasses are available, they too are expensive and extremely sought after in drought years since without fresh grass, the commercial feed is useless.

⁶⁰ Foresters design the plantations to achieve precisely this technical outcome. Their goal is to spare growing trees the competition for water with other plants, e.g., grasses. Tight spacing tends to create a dense canopy quickly, thus eliminating the need, otherwise pressing, to hire people to weed out competing grasses. The conflicts between foresters' and pastoralists' goals is patent. The interesting question is whether negotiations might lead to outcomes more satisfactory to all parties, e.g., wider spacings between tree rows, or dense bands of trees interspaced with grassed strips.

Conflicts and Their Resolution

Aside from conflicts involving animals that have invaded state forests, most conflicts in Calheta involve animals that have damaged crops. Most livestock owners also farm and know that animals should not invade others lands. They are not averse to paying fines; without them, they say, crops would be ruined, animals would be killed, and community conflicts would abound. But livestock owners argue that farmers bear equal responsibility to maintain walls around fields. Fines, they say, are in order only when a wall, in good repair, exists.

Under the PAICV, most local conflicts were resolved through the *tribunal da zona* with members chosen by the Ministry of Justice, the PAICV and the municipal attorney. Today, minor disputes (involving 2,500 ECV or less) are resolved by the local development commission. While damages are paid to the injured party, the commission also collects fines. Livestock theft cases however, often exceed the competence of the commission, e.g., the value of a pig is about 7,000 ECV. Cases of livestock theft and fights involving weapons do require the intervention of the police from Vila. If unresolved with them, the cases are transferred to the municipal magistrate or for further referral to Praia's courts.

In a highly centralized regime many problems simply cannot be resolved at the local level because no one there has the authority to make a decision. Calheta residents have been able to rely on their elderly leader to help resolve conflicts with state institutions involving higher authority as was illustrated above and further in the two cases that follow.

The first case involves a forest guard at the zootechnic center who abused his position at the state forest. In 1992, with pastures in the Calheta area depleted by drought, hungry livestock increasingly trespassed into state forest reserves; fines were abundant. The local MPAAR chief abolished the *coima* for the rest of the dry season, but still prohibited residents from using the forest as a pasture area. The chief guard decided to put his only cow and one of his father's to forage in the forest, even though he knew that guards were subject to fine for such violations. The two animals became beautiful and fat, while other Calheta animals without pasture began to sicken and die. People became angry, seeing this as a gross inequity by the salaried chief guard, who could afford to purchase fodder, while poor villagers could not. Residents asked the guard to remove the animals. He refused, claiming privilege of office. The outraged citizens protested by purposefully letting over 100 cows into the forests. The guards captured the cows and fined the owners. But the owners refused to pay. Their octogenarian spokesman carried their complaint to MPAAR. The MPAAR chief reprimanded the guard, apologized formally for the guard's behavior, and returned livestock to their owners, excusing them from all fines. The guard has since shown great remorse for his actions and no longer takes his animal to pasture in the forest.

The second case was unresolved at the time of this study in June 1992. Earlier in the year livestock owners realized that to survive the drought they had to sell some stock to get cash to buy commercial rations, pasture grasses, and water. They asked their 82-year-old leader to plea for government help, given the unfavorable market. He asked the Prime Minister, during a visit to Maio, for the government to buy the animals *en masse*. In spite of the PM's promise to help, there was no action by mid-May. The livestockmen's spokesman then asked the Municipal Council President to intervene and he promised to get the new MPAAR head to buy 50 animals. By June, as this study was done, no action had been taken and the livestock raisers were restless. They believe that prompt government action to buy their stock would have served the public interest. Where the rest of a hungry country needs meat, their animals were about to die. Calheta livestock owners feel their government is inept and has no interest in their needs.

5. *Outcomes of Pastoral Interactions and Conclusions*

The basic component of Calheta animal husbandry is the use of labor saving strategies: the most junior household members tend herds and surveillance is minimal at distant pastures. This approach is less labor intensive than collecting grasses to stall feed the stock. Labor-poor households compensate when they lack child stock-minders by loaning animals to others under a short term transfer of management rights which makes the exchange equally beneficial to both parties. Additionally, Calheta husbandry depends upon cooperation among pastoralists: a code of honor about respecting animal markings and the return of strays as well as the rule of not undercutting each other on sale prices underscore that cooperation. Yet the outcomes of pastoral interactions are far from promising. Quite rationally, livestock owners exploit open-access pastures, making no improvements. Some harvest grasses by uprooting rather than cutting, a destructive and unsustainable practice. Combined with droughts the practices contribute to declining pastoral resources, suggesting that the strategies are neither efficient nor sustainable. Add to this the impact of afforestation encroachments on pasture lands and the sustainability and efficiency of Calheta animal husbandry in its current form is even more questionable. In short, wide and equitable access to pasture resources and low labor investments in Calheta animal husbandry may have been functional in the past but appear to be increasingly inefficient and unsustainable.

The strategies to improve public services and community welfare appear to be efficient. However the community has depended on an elder's courage to mobilize group action, to get the attention of higher authorities and to propose needed remedies. More sustainable community institutional forms of community action remain to develop.

Conclusions

The future of pastoralism in Calheta would appear to require four things:

- most importantly, improved institutional controls on pasture access;
- participatory planning for afforestation to take account of pastoralists' interests and while meeting other needs;
- greater investments of labor by livestock owners in proper grass harvesting and conserving pastures; and,
- more extensive technical training and support from MPAAR.

Before new open areas are afforested, systems of compatible tree care and animal pasturing should be developed. The national agencies should examine ways to devolve authority over management of Maio forests and pastures areas to the communities that use them to achieve two ends: First, it should motivate local users as the legitimate managers in their own affairs. Second, it should create a local capacity to resist ill-conceived projects (wrong tree species, wrongly placed, too exclusionary, water competitive) that could leave people worse off than before. Local review of proposed projects should reduce the egregious waste of resources that often occurs when technicians neglect local realities in their plans. It should assure the state and the donors that supposed beneficiaries will really benefit.⁶¹

The striking ability of Calheta residents to cooperate to resolve problems of common concern may be explained by their security of land tenure. So far, they have felt considerable tenure security to use, control and manage lands held under *de facto usufruct*. Elsewhere in our study where security of tenure was lacking so was community initiative and readiness to confront abuse or neglect by authorities. Given these facts, Calheta might be an ideal test case for community management of pastures, forests (and possibly also public water supply). A body formed by resource users could set access fees and fines tailored to their use patterns and experience. The question to be tested is whether officials might assist the community to take those decisions needed to form such a body to set new rules and sanctions for local management. Certainly such a solution would decrease costs of financing the system to the national or municipal government and would likely prove to be more sustainable.⁶²

⁶¹ Since pastoralists strongly prefer *P. aculeata* to *P. juliflora*, afforestation projects should examine possibilities of planting more. Trees should be spaced to promote growth of grasses. Properly managed new forest zones could become multi-resource, multi-purpose grazing reserves. The community with MPAAR help could seek better techniques to harvest and store pasture grasses, as well tree products usable as fodder. They could also find a means for livestock owners to rapidly and conveniently sell animals in drought emergencies.

⁶² Livestock owners suggested that a first step might be to control and restrict access to forest and grazing areas by requiring payment of an access fee. These fees, properly set and modified by a community body, could be used to finance local improvements. Under local management, pasture resources might be more lasting, with users (now also managers) encouraged to harvest and conserve grazing resources in a more sustainable fashion. With fees (and increased fines for invading the community-managed forests), owners might well invest more labor in stall feeding their animals.

IV. CONCLUSIONS OF THE STUDY AND THE ACTION AGENDA

A. Decentralization in Principle

The theme of democratic decentralization and popular participation is not new in Cape Verde's political rhetoric. The new regime, however, has committed itself to an action program to implement serious changes in governance and power sharing in the new context of economic liberalization and multi-party democracy. The national government's rationale for devolving authority to municipal governments is to improve public problem solving capacity throughout the Cape Verde Islands. Decentralization - devolution of decision-making authority, fiscal authority to implement decisions, and legal authority to resolve disputes at the lowest level possible in the society - can make a marked difference in the lives of Cape Verde's citizens.

Yet public discussion of decentralization so far has failed to focus on the *povoados* and other sub-municipal, village level units of citizen governance. It is here that many general community problems or specific sectoral problems such as watershed management, fisheries, access to farm and pasture lands and to water, primary education, public health and other resource and public service problems need the institutional means for collective action. In the cases reviewed in this study there is abundant evidence of the need for local authority to manage community affairs and clear evidence that institutions of group action, mutual aid, and resource management do exist for building upon. Without effective governance units at the local level, it is unlikely that more authority at the municipal level will do much to improve the quality of public services and the productivity of natural resource systems.

The first condition necessary for democratic decentralization has been fulfilled. Centrally-appointed authorities have been replaced by popularly elected local officials. Local elections, for the first time in the republic's history, were held in December 1991. Starting with the first day of 1992, all of Cape Verde's 14 municipalities were in the hands of competitively, freely and openly selected citizen councils and legislative assemblies.

The second condition necessary, however, has not been fulfilled, as our two municipal case studies demonstrate. The Central Authorities and the elected local authorities have not met to arrive at the new repartition of power that will translate principle into substance. This requires a new set of rules that clearly state an adjustment in the spheres of competence for each level of governance. The adjustments cannot be taken all at once. They should be incrementally and selectively applied, based on the size, conditions and competencies of the municipalities and their particularities and on the development of new options for citizens to create limited-purpose special district governments. New rules must be formulated that clarify what each level of authority **must do, must not do, and may do**. Without such clarity in the rule structure citizens cannot hold a specific set of

elected authorities responsible, nor can they know which level of authority should be approached for problem resolution.⁶³

The third condition necessary follows from the second. To go beyond ballot box participation to direct citizen engagement in co-production of public goods and services, in governance and management of renewable natural resources, and in the creative process of local problem solving, citizens must know:

- what will NOT be done unless they do it;
- what means they are permitted to use to do the job; and
- the rules of engagement.⁶⁴

Without such rules, the tradition of state-centric paternalism will prevail. Having been socialized to believe that the all-knowing state is responsible, people understandably conclude that they are not. To become responsible, civic norms and instruction must be changed.⁶⁵ The new order will require a mutual understanding regarding the spheres of action in which

⁶³ Local cynics argue that failure to act on this necessary condition is a calculated political and bureaucratic maneuver. By failing to define the spheres of responsibility, with only a "may do" rule on the table - politicians at each level can blame the others for that which does not happen. Members of the bureaucracy can defend their continued exercise of tutelary authority because "must do" and "must not do" rules are not in place to circumscribe their actions and mandate authority for action to other levels.

⁶⁴ For example, if citizens want a public water fountain, they must know what is required to get that fountain. If it is **completely up to them**, they must know that. Then, they must know the steps to follow to meet their objectives. For example:

- first they must form a local special district (or alternatively an association of water users) all of whom agree to the purpose of the institution;
- second they must know that it is they who must mobilize a minimum of resources to construct the fountain; and
- third they must agree to a regime of resource governance with authority to make rules regulating access, setting fees for use, and fixing other conditions.

If the municipal government is to be responsible, that must be equally clear as well as the rules under which it must proceed and the shared roles of the national government agencies if there is such a share. The same rules - mutually understood - must be clear in each area where the co-production of public goods and services will NOW fall under the new rules of "decentralization," and local self-management.

⁶⁵ In the past the working rule said, "If you want a public water fountain, you complain to the state (or the state's agent - the UNICEF/Ministry of Agriculture Project) and then you wait for the state to act - it is out of your hands."

the national government and/or local authority **MUST ACT** (mandated functions), **MUST NOT ACT** (functions reserved to others) **OR MAY ACT** (discretionary authority) and the conditions in which the people themselves must, must not and may act.

B. Decentralization in Action

Once the basic rules are in place, the means for implementation must be provided by another set of associated decisions, preferably shaped concurrently and in consonance with the first. **(It must be clear that rule-making is a continuous process by which the several actors learn what works for them and what does not - adjusting the rules through the dynamics of democracy as they learn, adjust, and relearn.)** These implementation rules require a realistic calculation of the means necessary to act upon them as well as incentives and disincentives (especially transaction costs) for acting on them.

1. The Necessary Means

As the spheres of responsibility are defined among levels of government and non-governmental organizations, **control over resources must go to the jurisdiction or organization responsible to act in each domain.** The list of governments and jurisdictions will eventually include not only national, municipal and local (*povoado*) "general purpose" governments but also local special districts created by citizens specifically for such purposes as watershed management, irrigation, sanitation, welfare distribution, etc. It would be useful now to provide enabling legislation that lays out the ways citizens can form such limited purpose governments, and to distinguish their scopes of action from those of non-governmental organizations and voluntary citizen associations. The last two are nonetheless encouraged to play their roles in mobilizing civic responsibility and social action.

When decisions are reached to devolve authority, such as making a municipal government responsible for all road maintenance in its jurisdictions, then the technical personnel of the Ministry of Public Works, and either the equipment they employed and the operational resources they used to effect the tasks must also be transferred or, if they are not, a way of providing them must be permitted.⁶⁶ Local *povoado* and special district

⁶⁶ Using road maintenance or other public services as an example, it could be mutually decided that the transfer of technical people, equipment and budgets was not possible but still municipal governments should be made responsible in this domain. In lieu of the resource transfer it could be decided that a new local taxing authority (or user fee schedule) would be created - for example, the ability to increase the rate of the local property tax. The municipalities in this example will in any case **provide** the service. Provision involves deciding what sort of maintenance will be supplied, how often and where, how it will be paid for, how performance will be monitored and evaluated, and how maintenance will be **produced**. Each municipal government then has several options by which to produce road maintenance. It can *produce* the service directly by hiring personnel and buying equipment to do the job. It can arrange to **produce** road maintenance by contracting with national government agencies or with other municipal governments, e.g., on Santo Antão, Paul could contract for road maintenance services with Ribeira Grande. The municipality could also decide to **produce** road maintenance services by putting the jobs out to private contract. If one of the objectives of "decentralization" is to stimulate

governments must also have adequate authorities to carry out their functions. If, for example, citizens are to be responsible for maintaining local roads and paths, they must be vested with authority to mobilize or obtain resources to carry out those activities, as well as to make regulations about maintenance schedules, etc. If users are to manage a forested area for firewood and forage off-take, then the special district government they create must be able to set and enforce user fees, access rules, and penalties.⁶⁷ They must also have financing authority.

2. *Mobilizing Resources and Land Tenure Issues*

Land tenure arrangements can be expected to exert profound influence on possibilities for sustainable and productive devolution of authority to local governments. The case studies of agricultural and agro-pastoral communities suggest that in many, many rural areas of Cape Verde people exist on the edge or little above the survival level. Rural people have been encouraged to deal with the state as the source of all ideas, resources and help. They look to the state for employment, for welfare and for services, e.g., water supply, without which they would quite simply have to emigrate or die.

Devolving authority to municipalities and village communities can only lead to more productive outcomes if people in those jurisdictions are willing and able to function as citizens. As citizens confronting problems they must seek ways to improve governance and management of public services and natural resources. To do that, they must operate as autonomous human beings, responsible in great part for their own futures.

Activities require resources. It is not enough, in a system of decentralized, democratic governance, to simply transfer funds from the national government to lower-level jurisdictions. Local programs under such centralized financing arrangements remain hostage to central interests and concerns. Money given can be taken away. On the other hand, if municipalities are authorized to exploit their own tax bases, set their own rates within some specified limits, manage their own funds, and make their own investment decisions, they gain some capacity to develop autonomous policies and programs that reflect local interests and concerns as their starting point.

private capacity and a growing local public economy, then the latter will be the preferred option. A municipality might decide to adopt a combination of these **production** options, e.g., contract with village groups for routine pothole filling, purchase a grader for periodic laterite road surface profiling, and deal with both private sector and national agencies for bridge building and construction or repair of cobble stone sections.

⁶⁷ Limited purpose, special district governments formed by citizens, for example to manage a forested area, must be able to make choices on how they wish to carry out that management. They can decide to directly manage this resource by means of rules for sharing tasks among themselves; they could hire a manager-caretaker-guard; or alternatively they could contract out for the service to a private individual or firm.

Co-financing systems would be appropriate here. These would operate on the principle that local communities and municipalities can obtain matching funds from the national government (or municipal government, in the case of *povoado*) when they mobilize their own resources to cover a negotiated or fixed percentage of the overall cost of the activity. Redistributive formulae can be adjusted to reflect local and regional variations in capacity to mobilize resources. The basic principle should discourage gifts - 100% grants - from governments at higher levels to governments at lower levels.

This approach could be expected to produce three results. First, local citizens, as taxpayers would influence tax rates through social pressure and elections. Citizens and their elected representatives would gain considerably more authority both in setting local priorities and in deciding how to achieve them. Second, relationships with officials of overlapping governments would to some extent be modified. Negotiation - because local communities would have something to offer - would replace supplication. This might well extend to allowing local communities to veto state- or donor-proposed development activities that could not be modified to take account of local interests, e.g., in maintaining pasture systems. Third, local initiative would be strengthened as communities began seeking least cost, most efficient ways of achieving desired services.

However, none of these developments are likely to occur without some modification of land tenure arrangements. In each of the rural communities studied, people engage in many forms of mutual assistance. Practices such as *djunta mon* and the funeral *boto* and savings associations amount to a considerable fund of local institutional capital. But that capital will remain very limited in scope and impact - it cannot grow and strengthen communities - if it has no autonomous local source of resources upon which to build in carrying out local activities.

Land tenure arrangements, as documented in the studied communities, are designed to achieve two ends. First, they ensure that landowners capture the lion's share of returns to almost all investments in improving productivity of land, irrigation systems, etc. Second, tenure arrangements retain tenants and share croppers in a perpetual state of exposure to eviction for failure to honor the terms of the land access agreement. Landlords can raise rents more or less at will. The tenants' time-honored strategy to avoid eviction is to meet terms of the land access arrangement scrupulously by making payments on time, avoiding unauthorized investments, and otherwise reducing occasions for conflict with the landlord to a minimum. But decentralized, democratically-governed local jurisdictions depend for their success and sustainability on citizens' willingness to exercise independent judgment and follow through on their convictions. If such a strategy is too costly, because it might antagonize landlords and thus involves the risk of eviction, then prospects for development of working local systems of democratic governance in Cape Verde are dim indeed. In the study of Calheta on Maio, we saw where relative security of tenure emboldened citizens to confront problems and seek solutions.

3. *The Resolution of Conflicts*

The Cape Verde formal judicial system frequently fails to provide litigants timely, fair and reasonable cost resolution of conflicts. The "justice sector" is unspecialized: the same courts hear civil, criminal and administrative law cases. The current case backlog is substantial, in most courts running to two years or more. There are no localized municipal or citizen's "courts" for resolving land title and land use disputes, water and other natural resource access issues. Current local citizen "commissions" have little or very vague powers and many have no standing with the community. No separate "ombudsman" mechanisms exist through which citizens can file complaints against fiscal and administrative authorities.

This environment feeds a sense of frustration and resignation or encourages recourse to the "patron" - an established authority, often an administrative officer. It reinforces paternalistic structures.⁶⁸ As new jurisdictional domains are defined, interjurisdictional disputes will arise. As local jurisdictions, limited purpose special districts and citizen associations take responsibility for local governance matters, conflicts will have to be resolved. It is important therefore that, as domains of governance and management responsibility are defined, corresponding conflict resolution mechanisms are created - as much as possible through bodies formed by citizens or responsible to them.

C. **Setting Priorities: A Calendar for Action**

Implementing public policy is notoriously slow in Cape Verde. An oft cited example is the agrarian reform. On the agenda from the beginning of independence in 1975, the reform was discussed during the first eight years of the new republic, and some piecemeal legislation was enacted. The government conducted extensive consultations with all sectors of society. A comprehensive law was finally adopted in 1982 - a compendium of 62 pages. Its subsequent implementation was undertaken with new rounds of negotiation and consultation. Many argue that it was talked to death and that the intended reform has never taken place.⁶⁹ In Cape Verde there is seldom a deficit of excellent ideas. But moving from concept and commitment to action is another matter.

⁶⁸ On May 9, 1992 the Municipal Assembly in Santa Catarina resolved that the colonial-era office of *Cabocheife* should be reinstated throughout that jurisdiction. The reason cited was the lack of local authority available to the people. The resort to an all purpose, highly paternalistic figure from the past apparently responded to the felt need for access to a conflict resolution mechanism. Lacking experience with more "democratic" alternatives, it is understandable that an elected assembly would select a known means to resolve this problem. On the other hand, it is the responsibility of the new democratic leadership to engage the new authorities in a dialogue that will broaden their knowledge of options.

⁶⁹ See Foy, pp 48-50 and 73; and João Pereira Silva, A Remoção Das Estruturas Agrárias de Cabo Verde (Mindelo: Grafica do Mindelo, 1981), passim.

If decentralization is to become reality, rigor and discipline will have to be built into the program. The sectors of public activity which are to be repartitioned must be agreed upon, division of responsibilities clearly made, and a reasonable calendar for implementation set. The program will have to be incremental and sequential. It must incorporate learning by doing, but it requires certain discipline.

1. **Deciding on the sectors:** public works, education, social welfare, police, health, water, land, pastures, irrigation systems and other natural resources are all candidates. In some, authority can be devolved totally to lower-level governments, e.g., local irrigation systems. In many others, it is far more appropriate to think in terms of a division of authority in light of the scale, complexity and cost of the task(s) involved. This observation leads directly to the next point.
2. **Setting the boundaries of authority in each sector:** who MUST, who MUST NOT, and who MAY do what in each sector will have to be clarified.
3. **Differentiating among the municipalities and allowing for the creation of general-purpose local governments and limited -purpose special district governments:** distinctions will have to be made based on scale of operations and on capacity building to determine which governments can assume which sectoral authorities and in what time frame, with what resource transfers and/or central support and assistance.
4. **Setting a realistic calendar:** a time table will have to be set for implementation, sector by sector, municipality by municipality and with allowance for a local process of public choice especially where the option for creating special district governments is involved.
5. **Policing the process:** an independent "authority" for Decentralização and Desburocratização, charged to hold officials to the calendar and to the rules and to resolve jurisdictional conflicts, and armed with appropriate recourse in case of non-compliance, will be indispensable to ensure implementation.
6. **Building in lower-level conflict resolution mechanisms:** dispute settlement mechanisms related to conflicts within the sectors will have to be organized and sustained.
7. **Scheduling periodic working meetings:** regular meetings will have to be organized among key actors to evaluate progress, share experiences on administrative innovation, and to formulate rule modifications based on that experience.

D. Conclusion

Two unavoidable conclusions follow from the materials and analysis presented in this report. They concern devolving authority to resolve problems from higher to lower levels of government, and the necessity of addressing land tenure issues in most islands of the archipelago.

First, although the Government of Cape Verde has clearly and repeatedly stated that it favors substantive decentralization of government functions, it does not have a plan of action. There is confusion among authorities at the national and local levels as well as among the citizens themselves as to what decentralization means. The question is whether or not the policy will be made reality. Without the leadership to shape a coherent action program to implement the process of decentralization, it will remain but a pious goal with neither form nor substance.

Second, it is important to be realistic about potentials for - and limitations on - citizenship and local governance when people lack security of tenure and have little or no capacity, under existing tenure rules, to capture gains from investments they finance on borrowed land. Some sort of legislated limit on the extent to which landlords can raise rents would appear to be a necessary condition for participatory, democratic governance in rural areas in Cape Verde. Unless rural people can increase their incomes over time, they will be unable to finance their share of the burden of exercising local democratic governance, provision of services and governance and management of renewable natural resources.

APPENDIX A: BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abreu, A. Trigo de. 1985. "Família e trabalho numa comunidade camponesa de Cabo Verde." in Revista Internacional de Estudos Africanos, Nº. 3: 85-106.
- Alamada, Celestino dos Santos. 1992. "Letter to ARD Team from the President of the Municipality of Santa Catarina on Land Tenure and Disputes in the Municipality." Assomada, 27 May.
- Anon. 1992. "Santa Catarina: Assembleia Municipal faz recomendações ao Governo," Voz Dipovo, Nº 1236, 12 May. p. 16.
- Carreira, Antonio. 1982. The People of the Cape Verde Islands: exploitation and Emigration. London and Hamden, CT: C. Hurst and Co., and Archon Books.
- CILSS/OECD-Club du Sahel. 1990. "Etude sur l'amélioration des cultures irriguées au Cap-Vert." Rapport de Synthèse. Paris, France.
- _____. 1990. "Rapport Final de la Rencontre Nationale sur la Gestion des Terroirs au Cap-Vert." São Jorge, Cap-Vert, 3-5 octobre.
- Dede-Esi Amanor. 1992. in Africa South of the Sahara. 21st ed. pp 323-325.
- Direcção Geral de Estatística. 1990. Segundo Recenseamento Geral da População e Habitação. Praia (Unpublished data).
- Finan, Timothy J. and John Belknap. 1984. Characteristics of Santiago Agriculture: 1984 Report on Survey of Santiago Agriculture Food Crops Research Project. Univ. of Arizona and Univ. of Wisconsin. USAID/Univ. of Arizona Contract # AFR-0011-C-00-4002-00.
- Foy, Colm. 1988. Cape Verde: Politics, Economics and Society. (Marxist Regime Series) London and New York: Pinter Publishers. 199 pp.
- Furtado, Claudio A. 1988. "A transformação das estruturas agrárias numa sociedade em mudança: Santiago de Cabo-Verde." Thesis, São Paulo,
- Haagsma, Ben. 1990. Erosion and Conservation on Santo Antão: No shortcuts to Simple Answers. Working doc. Nº 2. Santo Antão: Ministério de Desenvolvimento Rural. Santo Antão Rural Development Project.

- International Monetary Fund. 1990. 1990 Staff Report August 6.
- _____. Cape Verde - Staff Report on the Interim Article IV Consultation Discussions. August 8
- _____. 1991. Aide-Memoire, September 30.
- Legrain, D.G. and M. Cap. 1980. "Nutrition and Health for Children in Cape Verde." in African Environment, Vol. 4, ºs 14-16. Dakar: ENDA.
- Margarido, Alfredo. 1968. "L'Archipel du Cap-Vert: perspectives politques." in Revue Française d'Etudes Politiques Africaines, 25: 52-83.
- MDRP, Centro de Investigação, Estudos, e Plano. 1990. Recenseamento Agrícola, 1988. Vol. 1, Dados Globais. Praia: MDRP.
- MDRP, Direcção Geral da Pecuária. 1990. Relatório de Actividades Exercício. 1989. Praia: MDRP.
- MDRP, Gabinete da Reforma Agrária. 1990. Relação dos titulos de posse util ja distribuidos por zona e concelho ao nivel nacional, de 1983 a fim de agosto 1990. Praia: MDRP.
- MDRP, Gabinete de Estudos e Planeamento. 1990. Recenseamento Agrícola 1988, vol. 1: dados globais. Praia: MDRP, January.
- Medina, João B. 1992. Relação dos proprietários que entregaram os seus terrenos para C.S.A., Planalto Leste. Extensionist, June.
- Monteiro, Felix. 1954. "A Decadência da Ilha de Santo Antão." in Cabo Verde, vol. V.
- Moran, Emilio F. 1982. "The Evolution of Cape Verde's Agriculture." in African Economic History, Nº 11: 63-86.
- PAIGC. 1976. Programa do PAIGC. Bissau: Edições Unidade e Luta.
- Pelissier, R., M. Smith-Morris, et al. 1992. "Cape Verde." in Africa South of the Sahara, London: Europa.
- Quinto, Marilyn. 1984. Some Effects of Emigration and Remittances on the Lives of Rural Women in Selected Areas of the Cape Verde Islands. Final Report to Consortium for International Development/Women In Development. Grant Recipient, CID/WID.

- Reij, Chris. 1990. "Document de Travail : Bilan et perspectives de la conservation des eaux et du sol au Cap Vert." Amsterdam: Center for Development Cooperation Services, Université Libre.
- Republica de Cabo Verde. 1989. "Decreto no. 62/89: Regula as actividades referentes a restauração e conservaçô do coberto florestal." Boletim Oficial, suplemento, Nº 36.
- _____. 1989. "Decreto no. 63/89: Estabelece a base da legislaçô relativa aos animais e à pecuária." Boletim Oficial, suplemento, Nº 36.
- _____. 1991. "Decreto-Lei no. 98/91: Declara qu é da competência dos Tribunais Judiciais o conhecimento das questões atinentes a arrendamento rural, parceria, usufruto e comodato que tenham por objecto prédios rústicos ou suas parcelas." Boletim Oficial, Nº 34.
- Rodrigues, Eliseu, Gilles de Mirbeck and Gottfried Stockinger. 1982. Os Trabalhadores e a Questão Agrária: Um Estudo do Caso. Praia: MDR, October.
- SARDEP. 1990. Santo Antão Regional Development Plan. Vol. I.
- _____. 1991. Santo Antão Regional Development Plan. Vol. II.
- Secretaria de Estado da Administracao Interna. 1991. Legislacao Autarquica - I. Praia, October.
- Smith-Morris, Miles. "Cape Verde - Recent History," in Africa South of the Sahara, 21st ed. London: Europa Publications, 1992. pp. 321-323.
- USAID. 1992? "Social Soundness Analysis." in WARD Project Paper.
- Zee, J.J. van der, J.H. de Vos, C.H. de Pater. 1982. Rural Development Eastern Upper Catchments (Planalto Leste). Project Proposal.

APPENDIX B: INTERVIEWS

Jacinto Abreu Dos Santos	Council President (Mayor), Municipality of Praia
Dr. Eurico Monteiro	Minister of Justice
Antonio Gualberto do Rosario	Minister of Fisheries, Agriculture and Rural Extension (MPAAR)
Alfredo Gonçalves Teixeira	Deputy Minister of Public Administration and Parliamentary Affairs
Captain Abailardo Monteiro Barbosa Amado	Commandant General of Police, Cape Verde
Dr. Julio Barros Andrade	Director General of Health, Cape Verde
Sra. Luisa Ribeira	Director of the Instituto Caboverdiano de Solidaridade (ICS)
Maria Clara Marquis Rodriguez	MINED regional inspector, Praia/ Assomada
Roland A. Anhorn	Coordinator, Swiss Cooperation Mission, Cape Verde
John W. Jones	General Development Officer, U.S. Agency for International Development, Cape Verde
Thomas C. Luche	Representative, U.S. Agency for International Development, Cape Verde
Pierre Etienne Ly	Resident Representative, UNDP and Resident Coordinator, UN Agencies, Cape Verde
da Veiga Family	Women residents Mato Baixo
Isodoro Oliveiro "Lino"	Tabugal farmer, from Ribeiro Manuel
Armindo Varella	Ex-administrative agent. <i>Freguesia</i> São João Baptista: informal leader, Pico Leão
Boa Ventura Freira	Irrigation farmer, Pico Leão
Joaquim Ribeiro de Brito	Irrigation farmer, Pico Leão

Manuel Coelho Mendonça	Irrigation farmer, Pico Leão
Sra. Maria das Dores Marais	Ministry of Education; Director of Studies and Planning
Felizberto da Veiga	Min. of Industry and Energy, Praia
Madalena Fortes	Director of the Leeward Island Social Welfare Regional Office
Jorge Mauricio Santos	Council President (Mayor), Ribeira Grande
Aidea Pires	Head, Social Welfare, Ribeira Grande
Professor Inicio Rodriguez	MINED's delegate, Ribeira Grande
Lt. Amolio Arougo Teodoro	Police Commander, Santo Antão
Dr. Cailo Neves	Ministry of Health delegate and head of regional hospital, Ribeira Grande
Maria José Monteiro	Landowner in Lagoa Area, Ribeira Grande, Santo Antão
Maria da Dores Gomes	Municipal attorney, Ponta do Sol, Santo Antão
Leo A. Schoof	Project Manager, Santo Antão Rural Development Project (SARDEP)
Celestino dos Santos Alamada	Council President (Mayor), Municipality of Santa Catarina
Lt. Jose Manuel da Veiga	Acting Commander, regional chief of Criminal Investigations
Dr. Jamela Cabral	Ministry of Health delegate, Santa Catarina, and head of regional hospital, Assomada
Olivio Mendes de Brito	MINED's delegate, Santa Catarina
Domingo Rocha	Chief herder, Cha d'Igreja, SJ. Baptista
Olivio Pereira Rocha	Junior herder, Cha d'Igreja, SJ. Baptista
Silvino Gomes Almeida	Junior herder, Cha d'Igreja, SJ. Baptista

Orlando António dos Santos	Former government delegate to Maio, Director of Administrative Services, Secretaria d'Estado de Administração Interna
Lucio Spencer Lopes dos Santos	Architect
Arlindo de Vaz Silva	Calheta resident, technician in cooperative organizations, INC
Manuel Jovino	Vila technician in cooperative organization, INC
Joao Ribeiro Rosa (Joao Franco)	elder and informal leader, Calheta
Maximo da Silva	social services official, former member of tribunal de zona, member of local development committee, Calheta
Dionesia Oliveira Martins	Calheta mid-wife
José Almeida	Calheta emigrant to Holland
Maria do Sameiro	Teacher and Director, Calheta primary school
Antonio Fernandes Mendes	Chief Forest Guard, Calheta
Inez da Silva	Chief Water seller, Calheta
José Martins Almeida	Former member of Comissao de Moradores, Calheta, 1988-92
Orlando Antonio dos Santos	Former Government delegate to Maio 1981-85, Director of Administrative Services, Ministry of Internal Administration