

**PVO-NGO/NRMS  
Analytical Methods  
and Strategic  
Planning  
Workshop**



**November 15-26, 1993  
Madagascar**

**PVO-NGO/NRMS  
(a USAID funded project)  
managed by:  
World Learning Inc., CARE,  
and World Wildlife Fund**

## INTRODUCTION

This document is the final version of a summary of notes taken during the course of a two week workshop in Madagascar between PVO-NGO/NRMS Project representatives from Cameroon, Madagascar, Mali, Uganda, and the United States. These included Mme. Ada Ndesso-Atanga, PVO-NGO/NRMS Coordinator, Cameroon; Dr Enoch Tanjong, Consultant, Cameroon; William Ramaroharinosy, Secretary General/COMODE, Madagascar; Moustapha Soumare, Past President CCA/ONG, Mali; Susan Mubbala, Coordinator, PVO-NGO/NRMS, Uganda; Michael Brown, Project Director, PVO-NGO/NRMS, Washington DC. Significant revisions have been made from the first draft which was circulated to workshop participants subsequent to completion of the workshop in December 1993.

The purpose of the workshop was to collaboratively develop an appropriate strategy and methodology to implement the PVO-NGO/NRMS Phase II Analytical Assessment. This assessment is being funded by USAID/Washington. This workshop was the first step in developing a strategy and methodology, as analysts will be finalizing an actual workplan reflecting a sampling strategy for testing 8 themes, (identified during the workshop and which will be assessed as sub-hypotheses) by mid February 1994.

The objective of the assessment is to determine if the strategy underpinning PVO-NGO/NRMS since its inception is valid. The PVO-NGO/NRMS strategy is based on the overreaching hypothesis that strengthening NGO's institutional and technical capability (also referred to as "capacity") contributes to (or enables) sustainable natural resources management (NRM) in Sub-Saharan Africa. The strategy was "operationalized" through implementation of the eight themes (sub-hypotheses) discussed below, though several of these themes had never been formally stated.

To facilitate this strategic planning and analytical exercise, a 6 day field trip was undertaken to "walk through", or develop on site a global strategy and methodology which would be adapted subsequently at the level of each of the four PVO-NGO/NRMS focal countries. The field visits were not meant to fully assess each of the themes and associated hypotheses but rather, develop a workable methodology for all countries to be assessed.

The field trip took place in Antsirabe, Tsaramody, Fianarantsoa, Isorana, and Ranomafana, all highland areas in central and south central Madagascar. The purpose of the field trip was to use the PVO-NGO/NRMS experience gained through COMODE as a springboard for developing the strategy and methodology for the analytical assessment. The objective thus was not to "evaluate" COMODE and member organization activities in Madagascar in the classic sense. Rather, analysis was made of COMODE and member organization activities as the foundation upon which the assessment strategy and methodology could be developed. This approach proved extremely helpful in concretizing what otherwise would have been fairly theoretical and abstract concepts were they discussed solely at the COMODE office in Antananarivo.

The document, and notes upon which it is based, have the quality of "rawness" which copying straight from flip charts and notebooks inevitably "encourages." This is not meant as an excuse, but rather as a point of information. This is therefore very much a working document primarily for those who attended the workshop. Part of its value, in addition to its use in implementing the assessment, will be historical and comparative once the assessment is completed and the final document prepared.

One editorial note, when [ ] are used, this refers to an editorial comment injected during the course of document preparation, and does not refer to an actual verbalized comment during the workshop. Also, that which is reported unbracketed in the text is not necessarily a word by word repetition of what a person expressed at the workshop, (though it may be). Rather, the text represents what is hopefully an honest reporting of the major statements, concepts, and "dynamics" of the workshop. On a stylistic note, much of the text therefore flows as a dialogue would, albeit with hopefully greater structure and emphasis on main points. In this sense much of the report can be read as a trip report would.

The document presentation style varies between the field trip and the Antananarivo office sessions. Highlighting of field trip discussions is made so that the reader can get a sense of how the field trip helped inform identification of themes, sub-themes and structuring of the proposed activities matrices. A model of the Analytical Framework used (Annex A) and a glossary of acronyms (Annex B) are attached at the end of the document. [Themes are presented in the order that they were approached first in the field trip and secondly in the closing meeting in Antananarivo. This is to remain faithful to the flow of dialogue during the workshop, while at the same time providing editorial input as needed. For this reason the order of themes in the text is not 1, 2, 3, etc.]

For readers who did not attend the workshop, there is hopefully enough structure, contextualization and semantical sense in the document to render meaning. In particular, we hope that Advisory Board members and others familiar with the PVO-NGO/NRMS Analytical Assessment proposal will be able to follow the evolution of ideas from the proposal, through the documentation for the Advisory Board meeting held in Washington in early November, to results of the workshop presented here. In that sense this is very much a "process"/working document. While documents like this one are generally not published, we feel that providing as much insight into the preliminary steps of the strategizing and methodological planning process for undertaking the assessment will prove of interest to readers.

For readers unfamiliar with either PVO-NGO/NRMS or the analytical assessment, it is hoped that this document will offer insight as to how U.S. Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) together with African non-governmental organization (NGO) colleagues are analytically assessing work undertaken collaboratively in NRM over the past four years. Hopefully this will provide colleagues in both the NGO and donor communities working elsewhere with food for thought in approaching NRM activities analytically, and in considering the potential to replicate certain NGO/NRM approaches in other places based on lessons we are learning here. It also should provide transparency into an ongoing process which will culminate in publication of a series of what hopefully will prove to be ever more polished documents.

Despite these caveats, thanks to Brice Andrianomenjanahary for dutiful note taking and assiduous flip chart transcribing under fast moving circumstances. This document would have been difficult to produce otherwise. Many thanks to the entire permanent staff of COMODE for their help in preparing this document. It absolutely could not have been completed in the available time otherwise.

Any faults in the document, all prior caveats aside, remain my own.

Michael Brown  
Washington  
January 4, 1994

## Antananarivo, November 15-17, 1993 At the office of COMODE

The first days of the workshop involved discussion of the objectives, the importance, and the potential strategy to use to accomplish the PVO-NGO/NRMS analytical assessment.

The essence of the assessment as proposed by World Learning, CARE, and World Wildlife Fund, is to examine the validity of the original hypothesis of PVO-NGO/NRMS which contends that in strengthening the capacity of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) technically and institutionally, African environmental degradation in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) will be reduced. [This hypothesis was transformed into the project purpose: to strengthen NGO capacity in NRM.]

PVO-NGO/NRMS was funded to develop feasible NGO approaches to reverse environmental degradation in SSA. While no single organization nor individual can be expected to stop environmental degradation, NGOs have been assumed to be key actors in the drive to reduce environmental degradation in SSA. Since 1989 PVO/NRMS has been involved in strengthening NGO capacity. During that time numerous services in training, technical assistance and information support have been delivered. Most have been considered by project staff and external evaluators to have been "successful", in so far as the services provided were those that were intended to be delivered, and that subjectively a broad range of people believe these to have been "worthwhile" and "effective".

What remains less clear is whether in fact this approach has (1) strengthened NGO capacity which has (2) been leading towards reduced environmental degradation in Sub-Saharan Africa; i.e. are increased capacities translating into improved NRM? If so, based on what indicators? And furthermore, is any increased capacity and improved NRM primarily attributable to the PVO-NGO/NRMS activity, or is it due to multiple factors, with PVO-NGO/NRMS not necessarily being the principal factor in any increased capacity? Each of PVO-NGO/NRMS four focal country programs (Cameroon, Madagascar, Mali and Uganda) has undertaken activities destined to build NGO capacity through training, information support and technical assistance. The next logical step for PVO-NGO/NRMS is to determine whether, in fact, these activities are leading to more effective management of natural resources in each focal country. If this cannot be demonstrated, if the hypothesis relating capacity building to reduced environmental degradation through improved natural resources management cannot be validated, NGO and donor strategies (USAID or otherwise) in NRM in Africa which involve capacity building components will deserve to be reviewed, since on the surface the overall activity has been positively evaluated.

It was clarified during the first days that this kind of assessment should (hopefully) be helpful for many types of organizations, including NGOs, donors and ultimately community based organizations (CBOs). The assessment must be creative, innovative, and to an extent risk taking to accomplish its objectives. The assessment should strive to reach its full potential in terms of what it can contribute to the state of knowledge about the effectiveness of NGO work in NRM in Africa from the perspective of what to do and how to do it. It was reiterated that if the analysis is carried out well, it will likely be both useful and provocative.

It was clearly stated that the **analytical assessment is different from an evaluation**. [The latter is often a mandatory exercise which donors utilize for deciding to maintain or cut project funding, while the former (at least in this case) is meant to answer questions of broader theoretical importance.] Therefore, it is not meant to be a simple listing of all the activities that people at different PVO-NGO/NRMS project levels have undertaken. While obtaining empirical information will be fundamentally important in so far as it will serve as a springboard to answer higher level theoretical questions, **the value of the analysis in each country (and the synthesis overall) will be directly**

correlated to how well we can answer questions pertaining to: what, how, who, when, and ultimately why NRM capacity building activities (should) occur. These questions are of interest to NGOs, donor agencies, national NGO consortiums, as well as local communities. Based on PVO-NGO/NRMS experience, along with other NGOs, the assessment team's tentative conclusions and recommendations to donors and NGOs for strategic planning and programming purposes could be both useful and timely.

To carry out the assessment the following must be considered:

- Determination of the target audience in strategizing and developing an appropriate methodology.
- Assuring optimal objectivity (while it is sometimes hard to distinguish "objective" from "subjective" and assumption from fact, this must nevertheless constantly be strived for during the assessment).

Based on consensus in both the Advisory Board meeting and this planning workshop, the target audience is meant broadly to be any persons or organizations in the NGO, donor and government communities that can benefit from what hopefully will be a high quality analysis. Our aspiration is that the assessment will positively influence donor, government and NGO programming in NRM in the years to come.

#### *Resumé of discussion*

During those first two days, the team managed to identify eight themes [which can be formulated as hypotheses with associated sub-themes and sub-hypotheses that are presented as such in the text subsequently] which are relevant to the assessment in the four PVO-NGO/NRMS focal countries: Cameroon, Madagascar, Mali and Uganda. Those themes are:

- 1- The relationship between the PVO-NGO/NRMS national consortiums and regional chapters (or country working groups or zones) in strengthening NGO capacity leading to improved [sustainable] NRM.*
- 2- The relationship of training programs to improved NGO institutional and technical capacity leading to improved [sustainable] NRM.*
- 3- The relationship between PVO-NGO/NRMS regional programs and improved NGO institutional and technical capacities leading to improved [sustainable] NRM.*
- 4- The relationship between NGO collaboration and improved NGO technical and institutional capacities leading to improved [sustainable] NRM.*
- 5- The relationship between a bottom up approach and improved technical and institutional capacities of NGOs leading to improved [sustainable] NRM .*
- 6- The relationship between prioritizing service-providing NGOs (SPNGOs) in capacity building activities leading to improved [sustainable] NRM.*
- 7- The relationship between information support and lessons learned on the technical and institutional capacities of the NGOs leading to improved [sustainable] NRM.*
- 8- The relationship between technical assistance and improved technical and institutional capacities of NGOs leading to improved [sustainable] NRM.*

[ For organizational purposes in undertaking the assessment, these themes can be put into three groups: (1) Organizational/structural (themes 1 and 4); (2) Quality of Interventions (themes 2,3,7 and 8); and, (3) Philosophy (themes 5 and 6). By grouping themes, it should be possible to gain economies of scale in implementing the assessment; literature reviews, interviews, group discussions can be organized so that multiple themes can be addressed coherently at the same time and place for interviewees/informants.

Each theme is discussed below in terms of issues, indicators of relationship, and methodological considerations.

Most themes benefited from elaboration of another matrix identifying specific issues/sub-themes to assess in order to enable the overarching hypothesis associated with a particular theme to be answered. The second of the two matrices for each theme is therefore, in principle, a logical emanation of the first matrix. While ideally each theme will be addressed in all focal countries, it may prove to be the case that a hierarchy of priorities will need to be established. This prioritization was the preoccupation of the PVO-NGO/NRMS Management Consortium at a subsequent mid-December meeting in Washington.

This prioritization will need to be done first during preparation of the work plan (see Timelines and Work Plan following theme 8 below), and secondly during implementation of the assessment if time and financial resources prove to be constraining. At the least, the three thematic categories identified above will require exploration in each focal country assessment, albeit in less in-depth detail than the methodology presented below would have, should time constraints prove to be too daunting. The depth of this more general exploration will be determined at a later time, only after it is determined that the more in depth treatment of all eight themes with equal weighting proves unfeasible. All issues pertaining to the ideal methodology to be implemented as developed in Madagascar are discussed through the remainder of this document. [The feasibility (or non-feasibility) to undertake the analytical assessment as fully outlined at the Madagascar planning workshop must therefore await preparation of the detailed four focal country workplans. On the basis of those finally proposed, suggested revisions which will implicate the methodology used, and the overall comparability of the data to be gathered and assessed in all four PVO-NGO/NRMS focal countries, will be made. Should it be necessary, advise from Advisory Board members on drawing boundaries to the analytical assessment exercise may be sought.]

During the first three days, the overall context for the assessment along with clarification of how the workshop was meant to proceed was presented. On day three, theme 1 was begun to be explored, with the experience of COMODE and its three zones or chapters serving as the basis for opening meeting discussion. Helping the team of analysts to envision how they would go about analyzing theme 1 in the context of their own country experience was the central element of discussion. Achieving a balance between obtaining information on COMODE and its zones on the one hand, for the purpose of developing a global analytical assessment strategy and methodology on the other, proved at the outset challenging, as it appeared to many that we were inevitably meeting to evaluate COMODE. Using COMODE/Madagascar's experience as a common reference point it became increasingly feasible and relevant over the course of the two week workshop to have COMODE's particulars serve as a springboard for identifying a common strategy and set of assessment themes. Unfortunately more detailed notes on theme 1 are not available as our rapporteur did not begin his work until subsequently.

**Antsirabe, November 18th, 1993**  
**At the office of IREDEC**

**THEME 3: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PVO-NGO/NRMS  
REGIONAL PROGRAM AND INCREASED NGO INSTITUTIONAL AND  
TECHNICAL CAPACITIES LEADING TO IMPROVED NRM.**

The first day of the field trip began with the exploration of theme 3.

A series of questions, addressed mainly to Olivier Ravelomanantsoa of IREDEC, the Malagasy NGO, was asked to find out whether the Regional Program of PVO-NGO/NRMS had positively impacted on the activities of IREDEC in its work with communities in the pastoral sector. This field visit to the IREDEC office and to an actual project site was undertaken to develop a strategy and methodology for approaching the relationship between the project's regional program and capacity building of participating NGOs through the program, leading (potentially) to improved NRM. Had the program impacted on NGO capacity? Is this impact leading to improved NRM? To determine how to approach this for any of PVO-NGO/NRMS regional activities, the example of one member NGO (IREDEC) in COMODE, and its experience in the pastoral sector workshop held in Mali in February 1993 was the test case.

Olivier described how IREDEC became involved in the pastoral sector in Madagascar and talked about how IREDEC approached the sector before attending the workshop. He explained that though there has not yet been any concrete application of the training he received during the pastoral sector workshop in Mali, what he learned from pastoralists and other professionals working in the sector has enabled him and IREDEC to develop new strategies and approaches to the problems between the pastoral and the agricultural population of Tsaramody.

Upon questioning, Olivier noted that the problem between the two ethnic groups in this region is very complicated from the perspective of land tenure. The pastoral people, the Bara, are marginalized to a degree in the region. A census of Bara has not even been taken so that objective assessment of land use and pressures related to pastoral production systems cannot be made. The Merina on the other hand are involved in agriculture and are continuing to extensify their activities into Bara pastoral lands. This may be based on historical patterns of Merina agricultural expansion from the central plateau to increasingly marginal agricultural lands on the plateau's periphery. There is no legislation meanwhile which protects Bara land use on pastoral (or otherwise zoned) lands, such that agricultural peoples are implicitly prioritized in government planning.

IREDEC's initial approach to the Bara and the Merina communities, that they should be dealt with in some respects as an indistinguishable whole, proved to be inappropriate. IREDEC realized after the Mali workshop that each group has its own specificity and interests which requires that they be approached differently. [It is not clear whether a "different" approach implies "separate" or "independent" approaches.] Achieving a balanced approach which on the one hand considers and respects the specificity of pastoral versus agricultural production systems, yet on the other hand approaches the two holistically so that potential complementarities are encouraged rather than discouraged, may be what is ultimately required. This is at the origin of the present "zone approach" which IREDEC is developing in the region of Vakinankaratra.

The Vakinankaratra region is now divided into six zones. Based on the pastoral sector workshop experience of Mali, Olivier and IREDEC concluded that there should be different [hopefully

complementary] strategies for pastoral and agricultural activities promoted by IREDEC. Before the workshop, Olivier and IREDEC tended to categorize rural resource users uniformly. There also may have been a tendency to prioritize agriculture as the priority aspect of rural life. This may have come from IREDEC's "professional bias" toward agriculture, as most IREDEC staff are agricultural or rural development experts. What was most interesting about the session was the fact that IREDEC is clearly rethinking their major assumptions and entire approach to pastoralists and the interface between them and agriculturists (who in this case are themselves somewhat migratory). The key question relating back to attribution, is the extent to which the PVO-NGO/NRMS regional program activity provoked this rethinking.

From the IREDEC office, the group traveled 130 Km to west to Tsaramody. There, it met with the local agricultural population of Merina who interact with Bara. Bara pastoralists were not present at the workshop.

The meeting at Tsaramody had two objectives. The primary objective was to provide a field opportunity to develop a strategy and methodology appropriate to testing the hypothesis underpinning the regional program themes to be analyzed in each of the four PVO-NGO/NRMS focal countries. To achieve this objective, a corollary objective of the meeting at Tsaramody was meant to obtain information from the villagers about the context of interaction between themselves and the pastoral Bara population. It also meant to determine if and how well Tsaramody agriculturists, presumably directly or indirectly, were benefiting from the pastoral sector activities which IREDEC participated in through the PVO-NGO/NRMS regional program. How, if at all has the regional pastoral sector activity under PVO-NGO/NRMS affected the lives of Tsaramody agriculturists in terms of NRM or social welfare? The case was meant to serve as a testing ground for approaching the regional analytical assessment theme. This theme addresses the relation between the PVO/NRMS program and individual NGOs benefiting from the program in each of the four focal countries to determine if the regional program has succeeded in strengthening the capacity of NGOs to work in natural resources management. And from here is there more effective natural resources management due to strengthened NGO technical and institutional capacity? What are the indicators if so? Finally, is this overreaching hypothesis linking strengthened NGO capacities to improved NRM valid, at least from the perspective of the impact of regional program activities or increased capacity and improved NRM? [The regional program itself addressed numerous substantive issues in over 20 African countries, the pastoral sector being but one.]

In response to specific questions about a range of issues attempting to help answer the above, the Tsaramody villagers responded that :

- 1) They know nothing about COMODE.
- 2) IREDEC has considerably helped the community and they trust it.
- 3) They wish that IREDEC's activities in the village will continue despite IREDEC's intention to extend its work to other regions. They agree with the principle that development should be for everybody, and thus there is no reason for them to constrain IREDEC from working with others.
- 4) The villagers did not seem to know of the existence of PVO-NGO/NRMS. Yet, they were in fact aware of its activities since they knew about the workshop attended by Olivier in Mali, and they knew in detail that what was discussed there had direct relevancy to them and their interactions with Bara pastoralists.

In answer to questions regarding their status vis-a-vis the pastoral Bara population, the villagers answered that there has been a great improvement over this past year. The Bara have seemed to

accept the importance [and de facto existence] of Tsaramody's agricultural activities for the Merina people of Tsaramody.

Olivier, the IREDEC representative, explained that no awareness raising campaign has formally been undertaken yet with the Bara. IREDEC was wary to falsely attribute any changes in Bara behavior to their work with them. Nonetheless IREDEC has made it clear to the Bara, as well as the Merina of Tsaramody, that if each party wants their respective land tenure problems addressed (if not solved) with IREDEC's help, there must be an honest attempt to reach a compromise of sorts between the two sides. IREDEC claimed it was prepared to work in collaboration with the communities to attain such a compromise.

The Bara now take part in the "protection" of agricultural production by not willfully damaging agriculturists' crops through allowing their livestock to trample villagers' standing crops. The Tsaramody farmers are, as a result, optimistic about their evolving relationship with the Bara. This despite the fact that the latter have refused to sign any written agreements on land use. [It is not clear what written agreements were proposed, by whom, when and in what context. This requires empirical follow up to determine how if at all, the quality of relation between the pastoral (primarily) and agricultural (primarily) communities of Tsaramody has evolved. The Bara reportedly support the idea that the relation between the two sides should be based on mutual trust.] When asked a question about whether this improvement in the situation is the result of what Olivier has discussed with them after the pastoral sector workshop, the villagers answered that the knowledge they received from Olivier since his returning from Mali has helped considerably.

At this point the key substantive question for the group was: based on our information can this specific regional program activity be attributed to be a causal factor in the improved relation between Merina and Bara in Tsaramody [in what effectively is the agropastoral sector]? If yes, based on what indicators? And how can this be determined? [And if the available information is not sufficient to grant attribution, what more information will be needed to objectively decide either way?]

Discussion followed. Michael Brown noted that he saw a great change in the attitude of Tsaramody villagers since he first time came in 1992. The agricultural people, the Merina, on the one hand, seemed to have changed what appeared at a prior visit to be a somewhat derogatory perception of the Bara. Some had not even wanted to talk about the Bara, save rather reticently or even disdainfully. Now, however, they seem to accept the Bara, and claim to want to fully negotiate with them.

The pastoral people, the Bara, on the other hand, have reportedly also changed their behavior. Now, the Bara supposedly contribute to the agricultural activities of Merina population of Tsaramody by not constraining these activities. The question is again: can we attribute this behavior change on the part of the Bara to the Mali pastoral sector workshop and its impact on IREDEC? If so, to what extent? This is the question which each regional program activity we analyze must answer regardless of the specific activity. Have workshops or trainings directly impacted on behavior changes? Methodologically, we must be able to trace impact from the activity to strengthened NGO capacity and improved natural resources management (and/or increased human welfare).

Based on the information received, it appears that both the NGO in this case and the two "community based organizations (CBOs)" (the Merina and Bara populations of Tsaramody) have either had their capacities strengthened or have been positively impacted. This can be considered as

a potential indicator, though the true impact of the activities of IREDEC on the community of Tsaramody and the Bara will require more subsequent detailed assessment.

Another indicator of impact involves time; at the beginning, IREDEC wanted to be very careful in its handling of the problem between the pastoral and agricultural populations at Tsaramody. Yet after the Mali workshop, IREDEC's strategic approach seems to have changed. Accelerated programming and changes in IREDEC's strategic plan appear to represent preliminary indicators of impact of the regional program activity on increased NGO capacity.

William Ramaroharinosy, Secretary General of COMODE, reiterated concern over potential false attribution, and wondered whether the reason for any change is really due to the impact of the Mali workshop, or due to the trust that the community already had for IREDEC. Could that trust not be an enabling factor? He wondered if the result would have been the same if another organization had been involved.

Michael Brown suggested that enabling factors may significantly contribute to NGO capacity building and improved natural resources management as William suggested. If the Mali workshop has really had an impact on the behavior of the population of Tsaramody, based on empirically verifiable indicators, have other factors also been involved? What has enabled the pastoral sector workshop activity to become successful in increasing IREDEC's capacity? Could the workshop have had the same impact if Tsaramody hadn't had that confidence level in IREDEC? In addition, it was noticed that all the available information on Tsaramody had been from the perspective of IREDEC or from the agricultural people. We don't know how the Bara themselves perceive the situation. What do they think? Has their use of land really changed? This side of the equation—the pastoralists ultimately themselves—obviously requires study in a pastoral sector analysis.

### **Antsirabe, November 19th, 1993 At the office of Nature et Progrès (N & P)**

#### **THEME 2: THE RELATIONSHIP OF TRAINING PROGRAMS TO INCREASED NGO CAPACITY AND IMPROVED NRM.**

The team objective was to develop a strategy and methodology for determining the validity of the theme 2 hypothesis in all four PVO-NGO/NRMS focal countries. Have the various training programs organized by COMODE and attended by Nature et Progrès increased N & P's capacity? Has this really brought about improved natural resources management in N & P's zone of intervention? This question is a major preoccupation in all four PVO-NGO/NRMS focal countries. [The actual matrix for this theme is under the November 24, 1993 chapter below].

During the meeting the following members of Nature et Progrès were present:

- Jean: Technical manager of the association
- Charles: National Animator
- Stanislas: Newly elected Secretary General of the association
- Linette: Assistant Treasurer
- Charles François Xavier: Treasurer

To reiterate, *this was not a formal evaluation of Nature et Progrès, or of COMODE.*

Before coming to the core of the matter, Jean, the technical manager of Nature et Progrès explained the activities of Nature et Progrès.

Nature et Progrès (N & P) was created in 1989. It is an "umbrella organization" made up of 800 families, 95% of which are peasant farmers attached to different geographically based project zones. The farmers are active members of the NGO. The activities of N & P involve environmental conservation and rural development generally. N & P works most specifically in the agriculture and health sectors. Regarding structure and decision making, the ultimate decisions are the responsibility of the General Assembly of N & P. The technical staff, as well as the national bureau, play the role of project implementors. Jean also explained that N & P has always been involved in natural resources management, even before participating in COMODE and PVO-NGO/NRMS activities. That is the reason why N & P was interested to work with the latter. The NGO is also involved in sustainable agricultural activities in particular on the production side through the utilization of organic fertilizers. N & P works in soil conservation as well as in reforestation. 400 hectares of land in three regions of the central plateau have been reforested the past few years. Next year, N & P will work on 200 more hectares.

Concerning training programs, Jean said that Nature et Progrès has participated in the different training sessions organized by COMODE, including :

- "Mise à Niveau" (Getting everyone to the same level), Antananarivo
- "Qui fait Quoi?" (Who does what?), Antananarivo
- "Gestion de Projet" (Project design), Fianarantsoa
- "PPO1 (Planning by objective), Fianarantsoa
- "PPO2 (Planning by objective), in Fianarantsoa
- "La Budgetisation et Comptabilité" (Budgeting and accounting), Fianarantsoa
- "Formation Technique: technique de riziculture intensive", (Technical Training: intensive rice culture techniques).

The objective for the assessment group was, through N & P's experience, to determine if there was a relation between training and increased capacity in N & P. Yet how, or on the basis of what indicators, can a positive or negative assessment of the impact of training programs on NGO performance in NRM be made?

When asked about the impact of these training programs, Jean answered the trainings and workshops that N & P attended through COMODE helped the association. Nature et Progrès could not have imagined how it would actually benefit from collaboration with an association like COMODE prior to the workshops. They now claim that training programs organized by COMODE have strengthened N & P's capacity. They state that project design training, for example, has strengthened their capacity to prepare project documents. Since this training, they have managed to prepare project documents which are more viable than what they presented before, with "viability" defined as the successful obtaining of donor funding for projects. According to N & P, these successfully funded projects have been developed through a combination of building on pre-existing knowledge coupled to additional training, so that N & P will not attribute all recent success to COMODE/PVO-NGO/NRMS training alone. Three of these project proposals submitted have been funded by: Entraide de Fraternité of Belgium, Association National d'Actions Environnementales (ANAE) of Madagascar, and Catholic Relief Service (CRS). Funding received has been invested in different activities, production of organic fertilizers through fattening of livestock being one case in point.

The relation between COMODE and Nature et Progrès was also discussed. The question was asked : Have you informed COMODE prior to the submission of your project documents to donors? Jean answered that his organization is not obliged to report to COMODE for its private activities, as the latter has no leverage over Nature et Progrès in its internal affairs.

Concerning the training on "Budgeting and Accounting", Jean explained that though the theme of that training focused mainly on the umbrella N & P organization, they have also managed to transmit some of the knowledge gained at the level of the umbrella association to the farmer level through the sessions of grassroots training that they have provided. It was added by the analysts that this type of information knowledge transfer in N & P case may be indicative of spread effect and NGO capacity building. Empirical research at the family/village level is required to determine impact at this level. Is it really "knowledge" that N & P farmers have gained based on assimilated information? This training has enabled the association to get information on budgeting and project accounting. At the family level, some notions of accounting, (not directly involved in budgeting) have also been obtained. Accounting is important for the member families as the money they use for their activities has to be refunded to N & P. This situation obliges families to have a functional notion of accounting.

The danger of using funded projects as a success indicator was raised. Michael Brown remarked that a funded project is not automatically "viable" just because it has been funded. In fact, the activity may or may not in its essence be feasible. So how do we determine if a proposed project is viable [or feasible]? A distinction should thus be made in our initial thinking between a "nicely written" project and a "viable" project. The latter determination requires considerable assessment in itself. "Nicely written proposals" are discernible at the behavioral level. Viability may be determined at both the behavioral level and the biophysical/human welfare level.

In response to the question: "How can you tell that your project proposals are more viable than before?", Jean explained that the viability of their project proposals depended on 3 elements :

- 1) What they received from the COMODE training, in project design and related trainings.
- 2) The experience of the association and its credibility, judged from what it has already accomplished, and what it is capable of accomplishing in the future.
- 3) Its capacity for negotiation.

Jean noted that the viability of a proposal is hard to define, as the donors have their way of conceiving and analyzing project proposals. [Jean is still defining viability as a function of funding]. He noted that an NGO may receive funding if the proposal coincides with the donor's interest.

As an answer to the question of whether (1) Nature et Progrès in project designs are technically viable or not, and (2) if they have become more efficient after receiving training, and finally (3) if the funded projects are in fact proving to be technically viable, Jean said that it is logical that a document should contain technical data which should be very clear to the donors. Weak data, or even the manner of presenting figures can be at the origin of failure to receive funding. This distinction between receipt of project funding and viability was not clearly differentiated by N & P. For N & P funding again seems to imply viability. For the analytical assessments purposes, this cannot be assumed. [Furthermore in project design training, this distinction between funding received and feasible project designs was a major topic covered.]

When asked the questions: "Can you say that the training has strengthened the capacity of the families in N & P, as well as the capacity of the NGO, and in what way can we see that there is a relationship between the training and the natural resources management N & P is undertaking?", Jean said that it is very hard to judge the latter until the results at the farmer level have been evaluated. [Methodologically speaking intermediate indicators may nonetheless be apparent].

It was asked whether N & P thinks that the quality of their proposals is better than before? Jean answered again that the fact that they managed to obtain funding for their project proposals

demonstrates that the training they received has really strengthened their capacity to successfully design projects. Before, the NGO was not able to design a project by itself. [This only partially answers the question.]

When asked the question : "What were your expectations for COMODE and PVO-NGO/NRMS regarding what they would do for N & P when they started to work with you?", and "How many of these expectations have been realized?" [a theme 1 issue], Jean said that they are like a child to COMODE. The latter already knows what N & P needs in the way a parent does his/her family. Nature et Progrès does not have the intention to ask anything of COMODE, as the latter is wise enough to know what to do vis-a-vis N & P. The NGO does not expect anything from anyone. Besides, the decision belongs to the General Assembly of the association which meets every 3 years, so they cannot decide themselves what the NGO itself needs. What they want is to see the creation of a technical unit within COMODE [like the proposed CATF] to provide technical assistance to member NGOs in project design and implementation.

To the question: "Are you much more at ease after the trainings than before?" Jean answered yes. Besides, they have more activities to be implemented.

In summary, a number of topics were covered relevant to theme 3, along with theme 1, the relation between COMODE and NGOs in the regions.

## **Fianarantsoa, November 20, 1993**

Two themes were examined during the meeting in Fianarantsoa :

### **THEME 1: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATIONAL CONSORTIUMS AND REGIONAL CHAPTERS IN STRENGTHENING NGO CAPACITY LEADING TO IMPROVED NPM.**

### **THEME 4: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NGO COLLABORATION AND IMPROVED NGO TECHNICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITIES LEADING TO IMPROVED NRM.**

In the exploration of themes 1 and 4, the team met with representatives of the CEDID/CAPR Consortium which operates in COMODE's southern zone. As an introduction to the discussion on the two themes, the representatives of CEDID (note that nobody from CAPR was present at the beginning of the meeting) were invited to explain their organization and its activities.

CEDID was created in 1976, at the time when Madagascar was embarking on its experience in socialism. At the beginning, CEDID's objective was to undertake studies related to Madagascar's development. It focused on research. The association researched and wrote documents, organized conferences, colloquia and seminars. CEDID also produced reviews for three continents: Africa, Asia and South America. In 1982, the CEDID realized that it had been overly oriented towards planning, with little or no emphasis on implementation. It then changed its orientation to focus more concretely on grassroots development throughout the country. It organized training sessions for projects managers and students. In 1984, CEDID decided to concentrate its efforts on rural development with the philosophy in mind that as long as rural people are not in control over their

destinies, results in development will never be positive. This lesson was drawn from the government-experience in rural development in the 1970s.

In 1989 -1990, CEDID's activities were concentrated in three areas:

- 1) Education: in the field of management, economy, law, French, and English directed to help University students. This activity contributed towards covering of CEDID's operating costs .
- 2) Training: in animation, organization and management in rural development.
- 3) Enterprise Development: for the creation of small and medium-sized enterprises. This focused on training in management, accounting and communication. Concerning this recent orientation, the first part of the program has already begun to be implemented. Unfortunately, political events in Madagascar in 1991 have constrained the evolution of this program.

Women and development was also stated to be part of CEDID's activities.

Concerning CAPR, it was said that it has an apprenticeship center for rural development. The center trains young people from the regions. CAPR apprentices master agricultural techniques which can be adapted to farming situations back in the apprentices' home settings. After receiving training, participants benefit from monitoring support provided by the trainers in the apprentices' villages. CAPR also is involved in research.

Concerning the theme of NGO collaboration, it was stated that the CEDID/CAPR Consortium operates in the joint implementation of rural development programs. The Consortium trains village animators and coordinators within the district of Fianarantsoa II, its main zone of collaboration. The focus is on leadership training. The goal of the training is to enable rural people to take increasing control over their own development. CAPR helps people develop ideas, elaborate these ideas into concrete projects, and manage the projects through all phases of implementation. Contrary to what some organizations do, people who are trained within the context of the CEDID/CAPR Consortium program are villagers. They receive training sessions in the field, not in classrooms. Training is functional. The application of knowledge gained is reinforced through implementation of village level projects. Animators in training contribute to the implementation of the projects. The idea is to help the villagers first identify, then manage their projects. The animators play the role of intermediary between the Consortium and the peasants. They transmit management techniques to the community (fokonolona). The training managers (Consortium) provide their support to the animators. Sometimes, they even directly intervene in key situations. The Consortium thus helps the rural population to initiate and organize themselves. It also informs villagers about different opportunities for assistance.

The team attempted to determine the strength of the collaborative relationship between CEDID/CAPR. It was claimed that the two parties collaborate well, that CEDID/CAPR was like a single NGO [obviously, this is the type of assertion which requires verification at a number of levels]. CEDID/CAPR maintains a management committee which is formed of members from both organizations. This management committee makes decisions on the content of training, project implementation, and other issues related to the Consortium. CEDID is responsible for external relations with donors. The Consortium coordinator implements the program established by the management committee. There is also the general assembly of trained community leaders which interacts with the Consortium periodically.

When asked the question: "How within the CEDID/CAPR Consortium structure does each member maintain its respective organizational identity?", the representatives of the Consortium [CAPR was represented at the meeting by this time] answered that within the Consortium, there is a mutual

respect in the implementation of the respective NGO programs. The conclusion drawn by the analytical assessment team: individual NGO programming, and collaborative programming under a consortium need not be mutually exclusive.

To further help the analytical assessment team understand what makes the CEDID/CAPR Consortium work, a remark was made by CEDID that there is more than the institutional relationship between the two institutions that helps make the consortium work. Personal relationships between the people as individuals also plays a very important role in facilitating collaboration. It was noted by the group that while personality factors are often acknowledged as important, they rarely are systematically assessed.

To illustrate the importance of personal relationship factors, one of the representatives of the Consortium said that it would be impossible for two different NGOs like CEDID/CAPR to work together without prior mutual understanding emanating from individual relationships. Within the context of CAPR/CEDID, members of both parties had already known each other a long time before the creation of the Consortium. Some members of CEDID had been involved in activities of CAPR, and vice-versa. Now, a third party (TEZA) wishes also to join the Consortium, but before coming to an agreement, CEDID/CAPR feels that certain groundwork should be laid. The question for the group was, "How can personality variables be adequately assessed without overstating or understating their importance?" Unfortunately, this point was not systematically pursued during the team's discussions, but should be pursued in each country assessment.

It was noted that CEDID has collaborated in three consortiums; one within COMODE, the two others outside COMODE:

- 1) With TIAKO, for the realization of a second bulletin of COMODE. There was minimal integration of the members in the consortium. The collaboration between technicians was not good. Their conclusion: collaboration does not happen automatically. It requires a number of preliminary or preparatory factors. This did not occur in the collaboration between CEDID and TIAKO.
- 2) A second example of unfruitful collaboration involved the participation of CEDID in the Regional Symposium on the Development of the Region of Fianarantsoa. The problem there was that the two parties could not understand each other.
- 3) Only in the third case, with the Consortium CEDID/CAPR, did consortium collaboration work.

The facilitation role which COMODE played in catalyzing an already existing level of mutual trust between the two parties was identified as a key enabling factor for the Consortium. The bond which exists between CAPR and CEDID is both philosophical and technical. It is the fruit of negotiation between the two parties before the union. It was cited that the collaboration is like what happens in a marriage: ideas and techniques were not in themselves enough to make it happen. It needed preparation and mutual understanding of the two parties. Human relationships played an important role in the realization of the union.

What needs to be done subsequently is to determine what factors in fact enabled "the marriage" to work, by looking specifically into the nature of CEDID and CAPR's collaboration prior to the Consortium.

**Remarks:**

Technical collaboration which is based on valid theoretical concepts, but not accompanied with effective personal relationships, will likely not be enough to sustain NGO collaboration. This requires consideration in all cases of successful or failed collaboration. If it turns out that personal relations do ultimately prove crucial in NGO collaboration, analysis should be made into what can be done in a capacity building project to promote personal relations which help enable collaboration.

There are the two subtle elements to analyze regarding collaboration:

- the concept of human relationships, which is rarely overtly considered in development literature, but which is likely in most if not all instances to be fundamental and,
- honesty and transparency which may prove to be key enabling factors in facilitating NGO collaboration.

It was noted that the fact that two persons know each other does not mean that transparency exists between them. However personal relationships may facilitate communication and in turn, transparency. This is an empirical question to be determined in each situation. Yet the existence of transparency is probably not sufficient in itself to foster effective communication. The question is then: "What minimum of transparency is needed to allow a relationship to develop and improve? What is the minimum of information needed to say that there is transparency in NGO collaboration or not? What else is needed to enable collaboration to occur and flourish? Can we even speak of "collaboration" without transparency? Finally, what are indicators of transparency?"

Possible indicators include :

- Equal access to information. The fact that information flows does not mean that everybody has assimilated this information equally well.
- Broad based participation in decision making. A decision presupposes that there has been an evaluation and understanding of the implications of a particular course of action. Have decisions been broad based? Has information flow been transparent to facilitate this?

A question for the analytical team to analyze, for example, is whether what we are doing now indicates transparency in design of a strategy and methodology for our assessment? Is this approach transparent ?

To this question Susan Mubbala commented: There appears to a degree to be transparency in what we are doing now. We come from different countries. We have not known each other too well beforehand. We have not known the reality which really exists in each country. Now, we are revealing some parts of this reality to each other. However, one rarely "really" knows the truth in any given situation. There always might be somebody who has a "hidden agenda" [and is manipulating "truth"]. This can de stabilize the situation. Another question is: How can we, and particularly Michael Brown, know that this assessment is representative of what really is in our respective countries?

In response to this, it was said that the strategy and methodology employed should allow the analysts to determine what really exists in each country. The challenge is: What among that which a person or organization has said actually reflects reality? Conversely, what has not been said that is relevant, that can reveal relationship and causality within the component parts of a particular theme?

In regard to this, there are also two other points which were cited :

- What somebody believes s/he "knows" might not reflect the reality of a particular situation. The strategy and methodology we employ should consider both qualitative/subjective, quantitative/objective, and qualitative/objective variables. Different tools should be employed to determine what "really" is there, what "really" has happened.
- There will always be some things that cannot be determined whether one is an "insider" or an "outsider" to a situation. It also is not necessarily the case that an insider's assessment is more valid than outsider. Much depends on the tools used by each, along with the confidence level which each can build with a given population.

For example, insiders are sometimes "blinded" by the obvious. Outsiders, if they know how to ask questions, and know what questions to ask, can learn a tremendous amount about what may initially be totally unfamiliar situations. So the question is: Do we in the assessment team have the methodological tools to profoundly analyze our eight themes and associated hypotheses to verify or falsify that which we perceive as potentially true or not? How far can we take our analysis? Can we separate fact from assumption so as to properly assess causes and effects? Reaching analytical reality requires different skills and the right tools to get there.

To these questions CEDID/CAPR responded that there is no fixed recipe to say beforehand what the indicators are for a given situation, and to say that what a person has said reflects on the reality or not. The indicator for "truth" is the determination of whether a linkage in fact exists between actions and words. Verbal answers do not necessarily signify much. A Betsileo interlocutor might say yes to the question about a certain situation without being really convinced. This may be done out of respect. For this reason, verbal information must be checked and cross validated.

In counterpoint to this, it was suggested that what people say should not be neglected, because words may reflect on real acts, commitments and realities. What people say and think if generally reflective of their thoughts should be given great importance. In any analysis words may reflect ideas on collective decisions or "solemn" declarations of something. The word Fanina means solidarity in Betsileo dialect. If and when people refer to Fanina, (or its equivalent in other cultural settings) there should be a means to prove if Fanina is really functional. The biggest challenge of this assessment is to go as far as we can to explore all possible influences on NRM behavior (or its absence), sociocultural influences included. We must determine how far we need to go in order to reach significant understanding. We should not be satisfied with analyzing what exists on the surface but rather, we should attempt to go beneath it. Assumptions we have about what we think exists should be distinguished from facts. In this assessment, we must strive to determine if indicators exist to support what people contend is true. These indicators may be verbal or conceptual and/or they may be physically empirical.

For instance, the role which traditional structures like the Fanina play must be considered from the perspective of enabling (or constraining) capacity building actions leading to NRM. Do traditional structures play a role and if so, how? Do these structures enable or constrain decision making and action? It is not sufficient to assume that because a traditional structure exists that it will necessarily facilitate NRM. In the case of Fanina, one can conclude that there are ways of potentially explaining local commitment (or lack thereof) to a certain approach. A certain traditional mechanism may play a key role in constraining development, as well as enabling it. So, how do institutions like Fanina "interact" with administrative structures in place at local levels (i.e., in Madagascar the Fivondronana or District). How does this articulation enable or constrain NGO collaboration and NGO/CBO collaboration?

To answer these questions, the quality of the data brought to bear in our analysis will clearly be important. How were [will] data [be] collected? Were sampling techniques biased or not? Data collection techniques themselves should be tested in the field. We must constantly consider how we collect data, what data we collect, the veracity of the data and how we synthesize all this to determine the validity of each of the 8 themes and associated hypotheses we are addressing.

Returning to theme 1 and the relationship between the national consortium and the regions, the case of COMODE/Southern Zone was explored.

To the question: "Is there an effective relationship between COMODE and Southern Zone?", it was answered that, of course, the relationship is a bit complicated because of logistical factors. In answer to the question: "If COMODE did not exist, would the Consortium?", it was said that it is hard to say. Perhaps there would be no collaboration between CAPR and CEDID. The idea to actually work together had been suggested by COMODE.

When asked if the existence of the Consortium can be ascribed to the existence of COMODE, it was answered that the work has been done by the Consortium, but that COMODE has helped catalyze the Consortium.

The question was posed: "Did your respective prior experiences encourage you to collaborate in the field of rural development? Was that a necessary predetermining factor?" As an answer, it was said that this had indeed played an important role in the creation of the consortium.

As for the impact of this collaboration on achieving something concrete, it was said that each party has its strengths and weaknesses. CAPR is strong technically. It has proven techniques and technologies. Their problem is, however, that they do not have much time to provide the necessary follow up on the ground. CEDID, however has available personnel on the ground to oversee implementation. Besides, the strength of CEDID is also its sense of organization and management.

The following are flip chart notes from the session.

### **FACTORS TO IDENTIFY ENABLING NGO COLLABORATION TO BE INITIATED**

*To what extent do the following variables contribute to NGO collaboration?*

- Structural organization
- Personality factors: Friendship
  - Institutional and Personal levels
- Philosophy
  - Rural development from the base
  - "Top down pedagogical"

- Field
  - Experience
  - Competence
- Approach
- Political consideration
- Complementarity in programming
- Religious factors
  - Education
- Culture/ Ethnicity
- Financial consideration
- Transparency (confidence)

At this point the distinction between "initiating" and "sustaining" an activity areas was broached. To the question: "According to you, what are the necessary conditions to better sustain collaboration?", a representative of the Consortium CEDID/CAPR answered that an overarching structure should preferably be present in order to avoid chaos. That is why the role which COMODE has played has been enabling. Note that in the case of CEDID/CAPR, the theme of NGO collaboration had been the priority, whereas the specific approach of leadership training which was the substantive area of collaboration was identified once the collaboration had been established. Collaboration was both the priority and enabled identification of the subsequent content of the leadership training.

The team at this point began to consider the necessity to work through a national organization like COMODE if NGO capacity building is the objective. We [the analytical team] do not yet know with certainty if the result of the structural relationship between COMODE and its regional zones was positive or not. This still needs to be verified.

Four other important themes which had been identified in Antananarivo during the previous days were now discussed. The four additional themes had been identified in Antananarivo during the first three days of deliberation. These were:

- Theme 5: The relationship between a bottom up approach to capacity building and NRM, and improved NGO performance.
- Theme 6: The relationship between strengthening Service Providing NGOs as a priority vis-a-vis community based organizations (CBOs) in NRM.
- Theme 7: The relationship between information support/lessons learned and improved NGO performance in NRM.
- Theme 8: The relationship between technical assistance and increased NGO capacity in NRM.

To better contextualize all eight themes a general discussion ensued. Several other contextual issues requiring addressing were also raised as prerequisites in the assessment:

- The historical context regarding the evolution of NGOs in civil society, particularly in relation to governance.

- In the natural resources sector, what is an NGO? Is an NGO a service providing organization? Is it any organization with non lucrative, non-profit objectives that works in NRM? Or should there be greater specificity?

Some remarks were also made on the way the assessment is being carried out:

- In developing a strategy, are we primarily focusing on conceptual versus empirical things?

In response, it was said that both conceptual and empirical, experientially verifiable indicators are fundamental.

Some discussions were held that afternoon around the new themes which had been broached in Antananarivo the previous days:

Concerning the theme on "Strengthening Service Providing NGOs", the problem evoked was that the definition of an NGO remained unclear. It was noted that there are NGOs who do little on the ground, but rather spend their time "thinking" (studying) rather than "acting" (on the ground implementing). Here, we are preparing a distinction between service providing NGOs who render services to CBOs, and CBOs themselves. This distinction is itself being proposed by COMODE's Legal Unit (Cellule Juridique) in its proposal for revised NGO legislation in Madagascar.

*The analysis of this issue of NGO versus CBO status should be a key element in the assessment, particularly regarding our strategic approach.*

Discussion ensued over theme 7: "Information Support/ Lessons learned". It was said that we really do not know the effect of information diffused to NGOs and increased NGO capacity. We assume it is important, but we really don't know. A strategy must be created which enables us to test the impact of the information we diffuse on people/groups receiving the information. Is the information diffused actually assimilated? The criteria of assimilation offers a possible means of defining knowledge.

*Questions to consider here include*

- Does information in fact become knowledge?
- Is this knowledge used to initiate action on the ground?
- Is behavior changed (appropriately and feasibly) as evidenced by activity indicators?
- Is this behavior leading to changes on the biophysical level?
- What indicators (intermediate or final) allow us to conclude whether information support leads to strengthened capacity and improved natural resources management?
- is there any increasing level of sophistication in knowledge, behavior and approach as information is processed and new activities are initiated?
- We just assume that providing information is important, that in some way it is "good" to do and is "effective". But just how effective is it?

[The Analytical Framework Annex A to this document addresses this issue.]

## Fianarantsooa II, November 21, 1993

### **THEME 4: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NGO COLLABORATION AND IMPROVED NGO TECHNICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITIES LEADING TO IMPROVED NRM.**

Exploration of the CEDID/CAPR Consortium was continued.

This theme is meant to test the hypothesis that NGO collaboration leads to strengthened NGO capacity and NRM in turn.

Three project sites of the CEDID/CAPR Consortium were visited in Fianarantsooa II; Isody, Nasandratrony and Isorana. While grassroots leadership training has been the focus in all three cases, concretization of training (the actual capacities strengthened) has had different NRM implications in each community, particularly regarding sustainability issues.

### **ISODY**

The reason of the visit to Isody [the cover of this document is an illustration of the workshop] was to address the theme of NGO collaboration: to what extent has the NGO collaboration strengthened NGO capacity, through training programs and TA, which contributes to the capacity of local communities to better manage natural resources? The CEDID/CAPR collaboration on leadership training was the model used to develop a strategic approach and methodology for this theme (which would hopefully) be relevant for all PVO-NGO/NRMS focal countries.

During the visit the team had the opportunity to exchange views with the local population to determine its views on the Consortium efforts and its fruits. The first question asked was:

Q: "After the training what did you do?"

In response, the animators (themselves trained through CEDID/CAPR leadership training) organized an awareness raising campaign to mobilize rural development activities. They organized two general assemblies during which they decided to undertake a dam project. This decision was made because the community depends on agricultural production. 30 hectares of land is available but is not currently irrigated, so that the full agricultural potential of the communities is not being met. This condition has existed since the First Republic of the 1960s, but the government has yet to satisfactorily address it. After leadership training, tasks were identified and assigned. The community undertook the rehabilitation of the canals, the hauling of building materials, and their transport.

Remark: There are three interesting aspects to this case to ponder:

1) After the leadership training, will the community be able to sustain productive activities? Do they have a village structure in place? To ensure this, has the community strengthened its capacity through the Consortium of CEDID/CAPR? We must analyze if they have developed institutional capacity to be more self-sufficient now than prior to the training.

2) Regarding biophysical indicators the following may be considered: Are production activities sustainable from an NRM standpoint? Or is capacity building, which in this case has led to improved productive capacity, also led to improved NRM?

3) [Is what CEDID/CAPR does a viable Malagasy version of Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA)?]

Regarding institutional aspects of the community training activity, several questions were posed:

Q: "Why did you request the assistance of the Consortium?" [Did they really request assistance or did they respond to an opportunity presented and marketed by CEDID/CAPR?]

Q: "Now that you have realized the dam project, what's next on your agenda?" [Having an agenda may indicate some form of institutional capacity, particularly if agenda items are appropriate and feasible] .

Villagers claimed that the irrigation problem is more or less solved, yet other problems related to agriculture remain. Improved seeds and fertilizer are in short supply, and the community also does not have sufficient livestock to practice organic farming.

Q: "Has CEDID/CAPR strengthened village capacity so that these other tasks can be [sustainably] addressed?" Any increased capacity would be an intermediate indicator of potential sustainability. This intermediate indicator itself must be broken down into sub-indicators which demonstrate increased capacity.

There is some indication of village level capacity in that they are able to identify problems. Nonetheless, they do not yet seem to know how to solve them themselves. They appear to still be largely dependent on outside technical expertise to resolve technical planning problems. [Which may be inevitable, regardless of their training.] Still it must be determined if the community has the ability to formulate plans to solve their priority problems, i.e. does the community know what resources are available (or needed) to address certain needs?). The community apparently already knows how to organize itself (though it requires clarification as to what extent). They appear to know how to determine their needs. But the question regarding this theme is whether the village structure is stronger and more capable than before to undertake both production level, as well as natural resource management activities.

On an empirical level, the question was asked whether the institution which is in place had been there before the Consortium's existence or after? The response was that it came about after the Consortium. [Is it build upon or associated to any traditional institution which may influence its long-term institutional sustainability? Here it may not always be the case that building upon pre existing "traditional" institutions is advantageous, though this is often assumed to be true. Traditional institutions in many countries may be capable of maintaining the status quo which may disproportionately benefit elite groups at the expense of women or lower castes. This is not necessarily suggested to be the case at Isody.]

Capacity beyond the level of institutional structure must be assessed.

## NASANDRATRONY

The next community visited was Nasandratriony where leadership training was conducted. The community of Nasandratriony has received technical training in improved seed processing and crop production. Some questions were asked concerning the training.

Q: "How was the training done? Had it involved all the members of the village, or some individuals only?"

Q: "Why was the choice was made to focus on agriculture?"

Q: "How effective has the training received been?"

Nasandratriony villagers answered that the training was held for a group of persons who agreed on the time table as a function of their availability. Agriculture was the focus because food security was expressed as a fundamental concern. Agriculture, especially the off-season crops (like potatoes, beans, maize, etc.), are essential during emergency situations. Nasandratriony villagers felt that the trainings had been productive. Before the training, 10 milk tins of bean seed would produce 15 milk tins of crop. Now, for the same quantity of seeds sown one can harvest up to 60 milk tins. Before, for 10 kilos of potatoes you could get approximately the same quantity or even less. Now, for the same quantity, you may get up to 40 kilos. [It is doubtful that we are actually referring to 15 "tins" of bean crop yielded, but rather "tins" are used as an example referring to another measure].

This type of information opens up a whole other area for analytical inquiry.

The case appears somewhat different from the one in Iavonomby. Instead of institutional strengthening, people seem to have benefited most from technical training. How if at all could this kind of training have an impact on natural resources management? Can intensifying agricultural production lead to improved natural resources management? On what scale has intensification occurred? Is intensification actually inadvertently bringing about more pressure on the natural resources in Nasandratriony? The assumption is that it is decreasing pressure, but this is not self evident. This requires empirical verification.

Q: "After the training, did the participants apply what they have learned on pieces of land that they have always used, or have they extended production into other areas?" (A potential indicator of information, knowledge, and behavior changes). Also, this is a potential indicator of whether agricultural production is appropriate from a NRM perspective, based on biophysical indicators such as type of land cultivated, type of agricultural practices, etc.

The answer was that there has been an extension of cultivation onto previously uncultivated lands. The community has set up conditions for use of improved seeds as follows:

- One can get seeds from the seed banks for ploughed land only.
- Only selected seeds can be turned to the granary after production.
- Each individual must contribute financially to the management of the seeds bank.
- Anyone who has not paid for the seeds that they have borrowed from the granary can be sued.

To determine if institutional sustainability was being promoted, the question was asked about future plans for agriculture and NRM activities.

The response was that there were plans for the breeding of milk cows. People have begun to plant grasses to serve as fodder for the milk cows.

Q: "What justifies the change from agriculture to livestock?"

The reason villagers offered is that cows not only provide milk, but the manure obtained is very helpful in support of agricultural production. It is also important to diversify production as agriculture fluctuates according to the season and the climatic conditions. And finally, the income from livestock raising is promising; for one milk cow, one can get up to 100,000 fmg per cow at time of sale.

An indicator at both the behavioral and biophysical levels in this case involves activity diversification. After the training, does the community actually have the capacity to diversify from one activity to another? Does it have the technical capacity to sustain diverse activities? Should there always be a linkage between these activities? What indicators do we now have for biophysical as well as behavioral impacts? Will it have the institutional capacity to see that innovations can be replaced on a broader community scale?

## ISORANA

The visit to Isorana actually involved farmers from 4 villages. Each village had its own respective project. The focus of the discussions was on decision making processes and whether the four communities organized out of Isorana have increased their insitutional capacities via the leadership training they have undertaken. How decisions were made, the role of CAPR/CEDID, the implications of the relationship between Isorana and CAPR/CEDID in Isorana's developing sustainable institutional capacity, were all issues explored. Two of the Isorana villages have water supply projects, one a road construction project, and the last one is involved in agricultural activities following the training.

It was asked:

Q: "Why was water delivery prioritized in Andibe?"

A representative from the village of Andibe answered that there is epidemic malaria in the region. Physicians had concluded that the problem comes from the local water supply the population drinks.

Q: "What kind of trainings had Andibe received from the Consortium?"

It was answered:

- Awareness raising
- Project design

- Project management
- Self-evaluation

Self-evaluation was defined as the attempt to find out why, in the case of road construction, the first portion of road was completed whereas the second portion was not. The work was supposed to last between May and November 1993. Because of unavailability of local labor, they could not finish the work on time.

Q: "Was feasibility analysis part of any of the trainings in project design?" If yes this could be an indicator of potential sustainability.

It also was asked why people in this community decided to become involved in a program that appears potentially to not be feasible? Did they (and do they still) lack diagnostic skills? The question is then: Are the skills that the community received from the Consortium enough now to enable the community to make good decisions? For the moment it appears unclear. This requires further analysis.

To determine the quality of decisions it was asked if the community has also determined in advance the details of what it wants to accomplish. In response they said that yes, a calendar of future activities had been established. They have even determined the division of labor for future activities.

The assessment team felt that while it appears that the villagers are doing their best, what they have gotten from the Consortium is not enough to meet their institutional needs. Yet the skills they get should enable them to begin to analyze things more coherently. So the question to follow up on is: Is this type of strategy CEDID/CAPR employs enough to build community capacity and engender NRM?

The community was asked what they perceive of their potential institutional sustainability. They responded that the training they received from the Consortium has motivated them to become independent. They believe that they can in the future manage to undertake other projects without outside technical assistance. [What are the indicators that this may or may not be true?]

Discussion turned to Tarantsoa. One representative of the community of Tanantsoa, the village which was implementing an agricultural project, explained that at the beginning, the community wanted to plant grapes for wine making. But after the consultation with the technical assistant from the Consortium, they switched to wheat.

The PVO-NGO/NRMS analytical assessment team asked the community members whether they had themselves identified their priorities, and whether they had believed that they would benefit from growing grapes. Why in fact had they switched from grapes to wheat? Was this really the community's decision, or were they "guided" by collaborating NGOs? [On the basis of what indicators was this the "right" decision?]

It was determined that the priority for the village is income generation. This accounts for the choice of wheat cultivation which offers favorable results in the short term. [This however does not explain why they changed their minds. At the outset they had identified viticulture as their priority, knowing full well that grapes require a number of years before yielding financial benefits.]

The assessment team remarked that people in this community claim to prioritize objectives according to their needs. Yet, who actually decides how the priorities should be defined? This is a key question in addressing the "bottom up" theme, as well as the NGO collaboration and technical assistance themes, three of the eight analytical themes to be addressed in this assessment.

On a participatory methodological level, it was asked how people determine their priorities given the multitude of needs expressed. Will it ever be possible to satisfy these needs? **Unless feasibility analysis is coupled to needs assessment, it is unlikely that the approach will be feasible.** This will be true for needs identified through leadership training, a la CEDID/CAPR, or participatory rural appraisal (PRA). [Needs assessments can be potentially "dangerous" if expectation levels are unrealistically poised, as is arguably too often the case.]

The problem with the needs assessment is that this list of needs and priorities may be established, but the necessary materials or financing to meet these needs might not be available. Feasibility to implement an activity is not just a function of people themselves identifying their needs. Is that which is identified actually feasible to accomplish from the perspective of financing and project design?

### *Discussion Session*

A discussion session took place at the Catholic mission in Isorana. This was the beginning of the team's attempt to synthesize its findings on questions of strategic approach and methodology to the overall assessment and is summarized below.

## **I. STRATEGIC APPROACH**

The following issues were discussed and put onto flip charts:

A. Are the themes/areas we have identified the ones which will enable us to validate or negate the hypothesis driving PVO-NGO/NRMS: strengthening NGO capacities leads to reduced environmental degradation through improved NRM.

B. Should anything else be added to the assessment agenda?

C. What should be included in the analytical assessment besides fieldwork?

The following was proposed:

### 1. Literature review/contextualization

a. What? Why? To what depth should the review be taken?

### 2. Historical context

a. Society, culture

b. NGO Evolution

c. Democratization and governance issues

d. National political environment

e. Other institutional activity i.e.: Association National pour la Gestion des Aires Protégées (ANGAP), Office National de l'Environnement (ONE). Association Nationale des Activités Environnementale (ANAE), National Environment Secretariat (NES), National Environment Action Plan (NEAPS/PAE) , Plan National pour la Lutte Contre la Désertification), Africa 2000, Tropical Forest Action Plan (TFAP).

[Identification of the boundaries appropriate to contextualize the NGO/NRM experience in each country will require very careful consideration as this is one area that risks becoming a Pandora's box with no visible exit.]

## **II. METHODOLOGY ISSUES**

### **A. What are the issues?**

1. Methodology to employ
2. Amount of time to employ per theme
3. The sample area/strategy
4. Approaching the target group on:
  - a. Conceptual/intangible issues
  - b. Tangible issues (physically verifiable)

### **B. What methods have we already identified?**

1. Analytical Framework (see Annex A) for:
  - a. Determining factors to enable:

**Initiating NGO collaboration ----->Strengthening capacity -----> NRM**

**Sustaining NGO collaboration -----> Strengthening capacity -----> NRM**

[The factors above were identified in Fianarantsoa as distinct issues requiring analysis.]

2. Is this framework applicable to any of the other themes/areas/domains?

### **C. Division of labor:**

1. Analysts (4 countries)
2. Project Director -----> (Action plan)
3. Others: consultants

D. Timing:

1. Outlining
2. In-depth/detailed action plan/literature review
3. Interviewing (institutions, projects, PVO-NGO/NRMS)
4. Field research

E. Analysis:

1. How should differences in perception, (the appreciation of the analyst vis a vis others) be addressed?
  - a. Need to assume a philosophical position that states that differences of opinion will be straight out and coherently acknowledged.
2. Need to go deeper to explain reason for similarities and/or differences in opinion:
  - a. Political/cultural/social
  - b. Gender/age related

**III. WHAT QUESTIONS NEED TO BE ASKED?**

A. What needs to be done for each kind of activity?

1. State country specific situation which describes the relation (if any) between the national/central institution and the periphery, i.e. the chapters or zones.
2. Develop country specific action plans to determine the relationship in terms of:
  - a. Cost estimate (Budget)
  - b. Strengths/Weaknesses in the relationship
    - i. Causes of strengths and weaknesses
  - c. Separation of subjective/objective information and assumptions and beliefs to explain relationship

B. How will action plans be implemented? [This is more fully discussed below.]

1. Interviews (Use methodology of analysis)/ Content/Analysis:

a. Strategy

- i. Capture representativity of range of potential interviewees (The full range of interviewees should be representative).
- ii. Understand social/geographical breadth of groups needing to be assessed before undertaking the assessment

-Determination of instruments or tools to use to assess

b. Techniques

- i. State sampling assumptions
  - ii. State statistical significance of results obtained (if quantifiable)
  - iii. What is feasible as a function of what is necessary?
2. Literature Review of relevant correspondence/project documents.
  3. Statutes of NGOs and their relation with central/national consortium.

**Antananarivo, November 24, 1993**  
**At the office of COMODE**

The meeting started with a report of the conversations between Moustapha Soumare, Michael Brown, Enoh Tanjong, and William Ramaroharinosy which were held in the car during the trip back to Antananarivo from Fianarantsoa. While informal, the discussion was provocative.

During the conversations, many topics were addressed including:

- Is there a relationship between the eight themes that have been identified?
- Is there a "systematic" relationship between them?
- Is there feedback in a positive or negative sense for each theme?
- Is the PVO-NGO/NRMS approach analyzable as a system?
- Is the [systemic] relationship between these themes similar in each country?

A main task of the team is to try to figure out if a systemic relationship exists in each country for the eight themes, and then across countries. We must devise a way to determine if and how a system exists and works.

An issue raised during this trip was also if success, failure, or stagnation of a PVO-NGO/NRMS project activity or national program is identified (at the sub-regional, national, or international level (PVO/NRMS)), is it related to "contextual" factors? There might be constraining or enabling factors which are crucial to answering the hypothesis posed by each theme. For instance, how much can cultural, social differentiating factors (class, caste, ethnicity), political factors, personality or chance factors explain the validity (or lack thereof) of a particular theme. For instance in the case of NGO collaboration, how much does the lack of solidarity between a national consortium and its regional chapters or zones account for the lack of efficient NGO collaborative relationships?

It was also suggested that three sub-themes ("sub-theme" and associated sub-hypotheses here refer to addressing a theme on a geographic basis within a country which may also give the theme a particular "twist" or emphasis, or refers to a particular thematic slant) and three treatments ("treatment" here refers to the number of times the theme/hypothesis is tested) for each sub-theme would be appropriate to make in the assessment. The reasoning is that the greater the number of treatments, the more likely that credible information will be obtained. This number would ideally be applied for each theme. [Whether this will prove in practice feasible to implement will, as discussed above, require serious thinking in each focal country planning exercise.]

The methodology and strategy to use should enable the team to first identify similarities and differences within countries for each theme and sub-theme. At the end of the assessment there should be a comparison "between" zones within a country and across countries, so that (1) country specific assessments can be drawn (2) assessment across countries can be made to draw conclusions about the validity of a given theme for Sub-Saharan Africa generally.

Indicators for each sub theme should also be identified. There are three categories of indicators (see Annex A):

- Cognitive indicators
- Behavioral indicators
- Biophysical indicators

If we want to assess impact, we have to be very conscientious to assess all these categories of indicators, with emphasis placed on *flow between or across the categories (along with any feedback)*. (This will be further described below).

Cognitive indicators are discernible at the level of thought and potentially, knowledge: measurement of awareness, information assimilated (knowledge) and attitudes. Hopefully (if not necessarily), there will be a "flow" or movement from cognitive levels to behavioral levels, and then hopefully to the biophysical level for any given theme and any given beneficiaries. To assess flow, the team must distinguish between facts, opinions, and feelings. i.e. is flow really occurring based on empirically verifiable indicators, impressions (perhaps shared), or just gut level feelings or assumptions (which may be intuitively correct but are not verifiable).

On a substantive level, a question was asked about the difference between opinion and feeling. [As scientific knowledge progresses however, what once was considered to be fact may in a decade be obsolete. The status of the atom comprised of protons, neutrons and electrons thought "factually" to be the smallest fundamental particle (with electrons being the smallest ) has over time been modified. Quarks or neutrinos are now thought to be more "fundamental", so that yesterday's fact is now obsolete. At one point facts, in principle, are empirically verifiable and thus are "objectively verifiable."]

Opinions may or may not be based on objective reality. Feelings are subjective, and are the least likely to necessarily be empirically verifiable. The important point is that the distinction be made between facts, opinions, and feeling, and that analysts are aware of the differences so that in analysis they can properly weigh the credibility of different information received.

For instance, take the case of anti-erosion technologies and improved soil fertility. Can apparent improvements to soil fertility in particular cases be attributed to any soil conservation technologies employed? Perhaps organic or inorganic fertilizers are responsible. Perhaps we do not have data to empirically verify that a given technology is responsible for what is perceived to be an improvement. If a number of people strongly believe in the correlation, we may be dealing with a well founded opinion. Where there is considerable uncertainty, coupled nonetheless to a gut-level feeling or assumption that something is true, this may be a belief.

As analysts, the team should be able to make a distinction between objectively and subjectively verifiable information. An analyst should also be able to identify if s/he is subjective or objective about her/his methods of assessment during the course of analyzing a given situation. This even includes selecting a sampling strategy, and the specific sites/individuals to sample. Personal biases must always be recognized (if possible) and accounted for.

We ultimately want to be able to determine the strength or weakness of the relationship studied in each theme, and to do so, we must be as objective as we possible can be. At this point the group meeting in Antananarivo focused on systematically approaching the strategy and methodology for assessing the 8 themes.

## **THEME 2: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRAINING PROGRAMS TO IMPROVED NGO INSTITUTIONAL AND TECHNICAL CAPACITY AND SUSTAINABLE NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.**

The table below is meant to be purely indicative of how tables and relationships can be structured at their most basic. This table could represent the end product of theme 2. [Such tables could be developed as end products once all data has been collected and analyzed.]

### **MADAGASCAR**

<b>Types</b>	<b>Zone Nord</b>	<b>Zone Centre</b>	<b>Zone Sud</b>
Project design	+	+	-
Agro-forestry	0	0	-
Financial management	+	+	+

(+ = positive relation; - = no relation; 0 = no measurable relation)

--Tools to use to determine this relationship:

- Interviews: individuals--->traditional and secular--->men/women  
group--->traditional and secular (NGO)--->men/women
- Questionnaires
- Observations

We have to determine whom to interview so that the information obtained and the analysis reflects the gamut of social and cultural variation relative to the target group assessed.

A methodological question: How do we determine whether to designate: minus (-), plus (+), or zero (0) for assessing the strength of relationship? This is not as easy a question as a (-), (+) or (0) may appear.

Below are potential specific indicators which would enable each country analyst to assess the impact (+), (0), (-) of the training programs on the capacity of the NGO and improved (potentially sustainable) natural resource management. Others can no doubt be added in time. [This list of indicators was useful in developing the Analytical Framework presented under theme 3 and in Annex A.]

*Project Design*

*Potential Indicators*

Positive (+)	Negative (-)	Neutral (0)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Original training objectives met</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• People exhibit unproductive behavior reversals</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No change</li> </ul>
<p><u>Performance Criteria</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Quality of project design improving: feasibility analysis is fundamental tool in project design; options for different courses of action are identified, etc.</li> <li>• Empirically determinable that projects are meeting objectives</li> </ul>	<p><u>Performance Criteria</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increases noted in arguably inappropriate practices/technologies (slash and burn agriculture, poaching, indiscriminate burning, etc.)</li> <li>• In anything we try to do, we get the opposite result from that intended</li> </ul>	<p><u>Performance Criteria</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No perceptible impact</li> <li>• No measurable sustainability</li> </ul>
<p><u>Sustainability</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sustainability and Multiplier effects noted</li> </ul>	<p><u>Sustainability</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No sustainability</li> </ul>	<p><u>Sustainability</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What was beginning positive becomes negative leading to zero</li> </ul>
<p><u>Behavior</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased social solidarity indicating social feasibility</li> </ul>	<p><u>Behavior</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• increased apparently inappropriate NRM behaviors (eg: slash and burn)</li> </ul>	<p><u>Behavior</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• imperceptible social impacts</li> </ul>

*Sustainability*

Throughout, the issue of sustainability in terms of maintaining appropriate and feasible activities which contribute to NRM must be assessed. Sustainability must be approached from a technical, institutional, and financial perspective.

In addition we must determine if there are any contextual variables that enable or constrain the relationship between capacity building through training programs and improved NRM. Are they social, political, personal, cultural (i.e. In Madagascar, the fihavanana (friendship or blood relation ties), fanina (solidarity in Betsileo dialect), havana (a friend, ally), fombandrazana (customs) will all impact on whether the relationship will be either (+), (-), or (0)).

### THEME 3: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE REGIONAL PROGRAM ACTIVITIES ORGANIZED BY PVO/NRMS, INCREASED NGO CAPACITIES, AND IMPROVED NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT.

A number of activities of generic interests across wide areas of Sub-Saharan Africa have been promoted by PVO-NGO/NRMS. The intention was for these activities to be both innovative and to have a multiplier effect in countries which provided participants for the different activities. This is true for both PVO-NGO/NRMS focal countries, as well as other countries. Unlike other themes where several sub-themes and associated sub-hypotheses could be identified, regional program activities were usually limited to one case per focal country, save when the focal country hosted the activity, thus restricting the number of potential sub-themes.

The following Regional Program activities have been tentatively identified for focus in the assessment: Pastoral Sector Activities (PVO-NGO/NRMS), Buffer Zone Management (PVO-NGO/NRMS), Sustainable Agriculture workshop (Winrock) , Kengo NRM Training, Southern Africa Community-Based Conservation (WWF). Of these, the Pastoral Sector assessment and workshop, the Buffer Zone Management workshop, and Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) have involved participation from all four PVO-NGO/NRMS focal countries.

#### *Issues/Sub-themes to be evaluated*

Types	Cameroon	Madagascar	Mali	Uganda
<b>Buffer Zone Management</b>	Korup National Park	Amber Mountain	Gourma Elephant Reserve	Country wide
<b>Pastoral Sector Workshop</b>	Dry Savannah Zone	Southern Zone	Country wide	Nyabashozi (S.W.)
<b>PRA</b>	Bafui	Andasibe (and elsewhere)	evolving in conjunction with PVO co financing project	Tororo/ Nyabashozi

Indicators relate to cognitive, behavioral and biophysical/human welfare values. The indicators identified for theme 2 above, along with indicators from the Analytical Framework (see below) will be relevant for the regional program thematic activities as well.

The attempt to develop an even more explicit *analytical framework for different categories of indicators is made below. It assumes that cognitive activities precede behavioral activities, which precede in return any biophysical or human welfare level impacts.* It is possible (if not necessary) for "transformations" to occur at times within a single category, before crossing over to the next category. While flow will normally be from cognitive to behavioral to biophysical/human welfare, it is likely that feedback in the opposite direction will occur. The framework provides the basis to identify what indicator to look for in terms of content and process. Arrows (-->) refer to potential directional flow that is hypothesized between categories. This flow, together with any feedback, must be empirically verified under this framework it is hypothesized as potentially relevant.

**ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK**  
Categories of indicators

COGNITIVE	BEHAVIORAL	BIOPHYSICAL/HUMAN WELFARE	
		COGNITIVE or MEASURABLE	Quantitative
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Information disseminated</li> <li>• Information received</li> </ul> <p>-----&gt;</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased use of functional skills:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Project proposal</li> <li>- Attending international trainings</li> <li>- Writing documents -----&gt;</li> <li>- Letters to editor, etc</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• People note environmental trends and impacts as a function of information received</li> </ul>	<p align="center">TO BE DETERMINED</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Knowledge: do people understand the issues?</li> <li>• Has the information been assimilated ?</li> </ul> <p>-----&gt;</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Appropriate action taken:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Projects: Soil and water conservation, BZM,PRA etc.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Advocacy:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- policy</li> <li>- lobbying (government)</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>-----&gt;</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• people note biophysical change and/or human welfare (can we attribute any biophysical change to behavioral, or cognitive change, which in turn were results of any or all of the eight themes?)</li> <li>• People note improved human welfare by citing:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- less disease</li> <li>- less hunger</li> <li>- less environmental depletion</li> <li>- more literacy</li> <li>- more awareness</li> <li>- reduced conflict</li> <li>- more security (land tenure, economic)</li> <li>- increased economic welfare</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<p align="center">TO BE DETERMINED</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is the information appropriately acted upon ?</li> </ul> <p>-----&gt;</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Changes in strategic approach:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- NGO's niche</li> <li>- comparative advantage realized</li> <li>- testing methodology (working with new techniques, for example:</li> </ul> </li> <li>• PRA with CBOs</li> <li>• improved tavy (slash and burn agriculture)</li> <li>• NGO/CBO collaboration</li> </ul> <p>-----&gt;</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• people note biophysical change and/or human welfare (can we attribute any biophysical change to behavioral, or cognitive change, which in turn were results of any or all of the eight themes or approach? )</li> <li>• People note improved human welfare by citing:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- less disease</li> <li>- less hunger</li> <li>- less environmental depletion</li> <li>- more literacy</li> <li>- more awareness</li> <li>- reduced conflict</li> <li>- more security (land tenure, economic)</li> <li>- increased economic welfare</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<p align="center">TO BE DETERMINED</p>

This framework can be utilized for all eight themes.

**THEME 4: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NGO COLLABORATION AND INCREASED INSTITUTIONAL AND TECHNICAL NGO CAPACITIES LEADING TO IMPROVED [SUSTAINABLE] NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT.**

At this point in the meeting a more systematic approach evolved to identifying types of issues to assess and sub themes based on geographic or programmatic criteria.

*Issues/Sub-themes to be assessed*

Types of collaboration assessed	Cameroon	Madagascar	Mali	Uganda
• <i>Within/across regions</i>	-Dry Savannah -Dense -Forest -Highlands	-North -Center -South	-North -Center -South	-South -North -East
• <i>Around technical themes</i>	-CARE/USAID -UNDP -PVO/NRMS- Africa 2000	-CEDID/CAPR -FIKRIFAMA/ ASE -TIAKO/CEDID	-AFRICA/ GRAT -CCA/ONG -CARE/MALI -CCA/ONG -PNLC	-MUKUJA/ Red Cross -NEAP (PAE) AFRICA 2000
• <i>Management Structure</i>	-World Learning/ CARE/WWF	-Executive Bureau of COMODE	-Comite de Gesuon/ CATF	-UWTPM/ UFA/ World Learning/ PVO/DENIVA

**I. Within/across regions, chapters or zones:**

**A. Actions to take:**

1. documentation review

- a. interviewing to assess qualitatively how and why collaboration works or does not work, if it promotes increased capacity, and if it leads to improved NRM.

**B. Indicators:**

1. Are NGOs demanding or asking to adhere to zone?
2. Frequency and quality of contact
3. Increase in on the ground activities

**C. Methodology:**

1. documents
2. interviews

**II. Technical theme indicators:**

**A. Indicators**

1. major new technical initiatives started (donor funding)
2. technical or methodological questions asked and answered
3. products measurable spin-off/spread effects
4. See Analytical Framework (Annex A)

**B. Methodology :**

1. Interviews

**III. Management consortium indicators should specifically consider:**

- A. indicators: see Analytical Framework (Annex A)

**THEME 5: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BOTTOM UP APPROACHES, INCREASED TECHNICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL NGO CAPACITIES, AND IMPROVED NRM**

The following identifies issues of relevance which were first identified on flip charts prior to creating a matrix for the themes and sub-themes. The subsequent matrix follows this flip chart of issues, indicators and methodological considerations.

Issues	Indicators	Methodology
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Empowering country institutional structures</li> <li>- Targeting CBOs as a priority</li> <li>• Empowering zones</li> <li>• Empowering NGOs/CBOs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased lobbying</li> <li>• Increased advocacy activities</li> <li>• Inclusiveness (membership)</li> <li>• Increased advocacy</li> <li>• Increased solidarity (fihavanana, women and men)</li> <li>• Broad-based participation (across class, gender)</li> <li>• Program, plan implemented</li> <li>• Funding provided</li> <li>• Communication between levels (CBOs, NGOs, Government, Donors)</li> <li>• Newspapers, radios, TV, official workshops</li> <li>• Breadth of communication: bush-&gt; capital -&gt; DC</li> <li>• Volume and type of correspondence</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gender participation effect</li> <li>• Interviewing group (NGO, Government, Donors)</li> <li>• Honesty (+or-)</li> <li>• Flexibility/ adaptation</li> <li>• Conflict resolution</li> </ul>

*Issues/Sub-themes to be assessed*

Types of themes and sub themes	Cameroon	Madagascar	Mali	Uganda
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Empowering country structures</li> <li>-Process issues:</li> <li>-Behavior issues:</li> <li>-Field Program</li> <li>-Cognitive:</li> <li>-Policy/advocacy</li> </ul>	----->	----->	----->	----->
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Empowering zones</li> <li>-Process/Behavior issues:</li> <li>Field Program</li> <li>-Cognitive: Policy/advocacy</li> </ul>	----->	----->	----->	----->
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Empowering NGOs/CBOs</li> <li>-Process issues: Field Program</li> <li>-Cognitive: Policy/advocacy</li> </ul>	----->	----->	----->	----->

**Antananarivo, November 25, 1993  
At the office of COMODE**

This day's meeting was a continuation of what was started during the previous meeting.

**THEME 6: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRIORITIZING SERVICE PROVIDING NGOS (SPNGOs), LEADING TO INCREASED NGO CAPACITY, AND IMPROVED NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT.**

In PVO-NGO/NRMS the strategy has been to prioritize capability (or capacity) building activities among service providing NGOs, versus working directly with community based organizations in NRM. To be tested is the hypothesis which states that in prioritizing SPNGOs, NGO capacities are strengthened therefore leading to improved NRM. The matrix (which was not developed for this theme) will use the same three issues identified here as its sub-themes.

Issues	Indicators	Methodology
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Relationship between SPNGOs and CBOs</li> <li>•Relationship between SPNGOs, Donors, and Government</li> <li>-where do assumptions come in</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Frequency of contact (before and after)</li> <li>• Quality of contact: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Information sharing</li> <li>-Decision making for planning</li> <li>-Implementation</li> <li>-Monitoring and evaluation</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assumptions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Underlying methods should be started</li> <li>-Same as in theme 5</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

Issues (cont.)	Indicators (cont.)	Methodology (cont.)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Relationship between SPNGOs themselves</li> <li>–definition of SPNGO</li> <li>–SPNGO means what?</li> <li>–Why the prioritization?</li> <li>–Where are SPNGOs located in continuum of NGOs?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Activities: by sector with similar consideration to natural resources management <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>–sustainability</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Spread effect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>–Neighboring countries</li> <li>–CBO level, NGO, donors</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Spread of methodology or technology</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gender participation/ effect</li> <li>• Honesty (+or-)</li> <li>• Flexibility/ adaptation</li> <li>• Conflict resolution</li> </ul>

### THEME 7: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INFORMATION SUPPORT AND LESSONS LEARNED ON THE TECHNICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITIES OF THE NGOS AND IMPROVED NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

The following outlines issues, indicators and methodological points relevant to this theme. In a subsequent matrix we identify the actual sub-themes which may be tested in each of the four countries.

Issues	Indicators	Methodology
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Look at structure (dissemination of information) + contents + effects of information support and lessons learned</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How information is transmitted?: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>–TV (local satellite)</li> <li>–Newsletter (local language, lingua franca)</li> <li>–Radio</li> <li>–Word of mouth</li> <li>–Computer</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Determine quality of the content of information</li> <li>• Implement the analytical framework (see theme 2)</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Kinds of activities:-----&gt;</li> <li>–Information on management</li> <li>–Technical issues (development and management)</li> <li>-----&gt;</li> <li>–Political issues</li> <li>–Advertising</li> <li>–Entertainment (cartoons, theater)</li> <li>–News events</li> <li>–Personal stories</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Special publications: financial economy/ PRA; BZM; ICDP; Pastoral sector</li> <li>• What information is transmitted?</li> <li>• Quality</li> <li>• Quantity</li> <li>• Target group(s)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gender participation/ effect</li> <li>• Honesty (+ or -)</li> <li>• Flexibility/ adaptation</li> <li>• Conflict resolution</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Quality of information content (eg: tavy, slash and burn, gender, decentralization; is the quality of information correct?)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Depth of information</li> <li>• Sources</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Literature reviews</li> <li>• Export</li> </ul>

Newsletter, special publications, and other media will be tested for validating or negating the hypothesis

**Issues/Sub-themes to be assessed**

<b>Types of information support</b>	<b>Cameroon</b>	<b>Madagascar</b>	<b>Mali</b>	<b>Uganda</b>
Newsletter	X	X		X
Special publications		Project design Cadre juridique	Project design Improved Sahelian Journalism	Project design PRA Buffer Zone
Other media: Church sermons, TV, radio, popular theater	Newspaper	Newspaper		Newspaper

In terms of indicators, refer to the analytical framework presented under theme 3 (see above).  
[Consider how this framework can be utilized for each of the eight themes.]

Three levels of indicators may be considered.

Level 1: Information (knowledge)

Level 2: Planning to act (intermediate indicator)

Level 3: Act completed (final verifiable indicator)

**THEME 8: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE (TA) AND IMPROVED TECHNICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITIES OF NGOS LEADING TO IMPROVED NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT.**

The same approach used in previous themes to develop a matrix of sub-themes to be tested was used in theme 8, after identifying issues, indicators and methodological approaches.

<b>Issues</b>	<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Methodology</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How to distinguish technical assistance from training as a theme?</li> <li>– Activities:</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Frequency of communication</li> <li>• Kinds of activities</li> <li>• Visits (attention given)</li> <li>• Correspondence (quantity and quality)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• One on one dialogue:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>–Management consortium opinion</li> <li>–CLA opinion</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

Issues (cont.)	Indicators (cont.)	Methodology (cont.)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How is technical assistance structured or delivered?</li> <li>• What is its content?</li> <li>• Relationship between:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PVO/NRMS(DC)/CLA- NGOs</li> <li>• PVO-NRMS/COUNTRY LEVEL/ZONES</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Field visits and effects on program implementation</li> <li>• Length of the visits</li> <li>• quality of reports: technical acceptability</li> <li>• Problems: technical, financial, personality, political, budgetary</li> <li>• proposals (number, quality, feasibility)</li> <li>• Number of proposals received and funded</li> <li>• Monitoring and evaluation:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-positive</li> <li>-negative</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Same as in the previous themes               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Gender participation/ effect</li> <li>-Honesty (+ or -)</li> <li>-Flexibility/ adaptation</li> <li>-Conflict resolution</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

*Issues/Sub-themes to be addressed*

Types	Cameroon	Madagascar	Mali	Uganda
PVO/NRMS/USA to country program  <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Project design</li> <li>• Proposal writing</li> <li>• Financial management and accounting</li> </ul>				
	----->	----->	----->	----->
	----->	----->	----->	----->
	----->	----->	----->	----->
Country program w: Zones/ Chapters/ Regions/ Individual NGOs	Project design and proposal writing	Project design and proposal writing	Project design and proposal writing	Proposal writing
	Information consultation	----->	----->	----->
	Monitoring and evaluation	----->	----->	----->
CLA to country working group	Financial	----->	----->	----->
	Administration and logistics	----->	----->	----->
	Programming	----->	----->	----->

## *Assumptions, Hypotheses and Methodological Points*

### *Assumptions and Hypotheses*

[Some very general remarks about assumptions and hypotheses may be useful to reconsider.]

There is a subtle difference between an assumption and an hypothesis. An assumption is something that is supposed. Unlike an hypothesis, one does not necessarily try to assess an assumption's validity, though in fact this may be well worth attempting.

An hypothesis on the other hand is an assumption that is made especially in order to test its logical or empirical consequences (New Webster dictionary definition).

Assumptions are usually unstated and are often accepted at face value; i.e. one often confuses what one "assumes" to be true for what one "knows" to be true.

As mentioned, it is possible for an assumption to be tested as an hypothesis. In this case an assumption can become an hypothesis. Until the point however that one identifies an assumption (stated or unstated), and then actually tests its empirical (or logical) truth, it remains just an assumption.

A question and challenge for the assessment team in the four countries is: Can we identify the major assumptions that have informed the approach we have taken in our work? How far can we demonstrate that the major and minor assumptions (and articulated hypotheses) we have adopted are valid or not in terms of facilitating our work?

### *Methodological Points*

[In both the Advisory Board meeting and the Madagascar workshop the issue of experimental controls was raised. While certain situations in which experimental controls in a comparative "side by side approach" were identified in Madagascar, there was agreement that "before/after" types of comparisons would likely offer more realistic and fruitful comparisons to draw conclusions about attribution and impact.

If we take the example of Nature et Progrès cited above, we should make an assessment on how N & P's institutional and technical capacities were before and after the trainings it has received from COMODE. It would not do much good from an explanatory purpose to compare the capacity of N & P to other NGOs which have not followed any of those trainings. Such a comparison would be unlikely to tell us too much since the two situations are likely to be largely incomparable due to numerous **intervening variables**. Intervening variables include other capacity building activities (and experiences in general) which can in no way be attributed (to PVC-NGO/NRMS in this case). We should also find out if there are constraining or enabling factors which have prevented the training from accomplishing its objectives, or conversely have helped in the success of the training.]

The following are some diverse considerations, each of which could be extrapolated on given more time.

Methodologically, in the assessment we must consistently cross-check different information and opinions received. The information should not come from one source only, and we should be as objective as possible in assessing the credibility of the information. Do we or don't we have confidence in it, and why? We should state whatever our sampling assumptions are which enable us to collect the information we get from different sources. As a rule, we should not try to "maximize" information, but rather try and "optimize", given our data needs and resource (financial, human) constraints. The methodology we use should enable us to optimize the ground we need to cover. Samples around particular sub-themes/hypotheses should not necessarily be taken at random, as randomness will likely not lead to greater objectivity or understanding. We should instead purposively choose people who know something, and not just choose anybody. Our strategy should thus not be random, but selective and purposive so that the range of diverse experience and view points we have encountered is accounted for in it. In implementing the actual methodology out in the field, we have to explain to people why they are chosen to participate. We need to be clear in explaining our assessment objectives and methodology as well as our assumptions. We must be able to effectively "market" why transparency and participation are important to participants (and non participants) alike.

In our assessment, we are ultimately limited by :

- our research questions
- the time we have
- the money we have

The aggregation of the information we receive is also very important, because individual opinions may be based on subjective or objective perceptions. We have to evaluate how much weight to give to information based on whether opinions are based on empirical facts or on yet assumptions or beliefs. As analysts, we have a lot of power to judge the quality of the information we get; we must be as astute in our judgments as we possibly can be.

The following section deals with timeline and workplan issues to be addressed in the next two months.

#### **TIMELINES and WORK PLAN:**

**Q: *How should time be optimally and feasibly divided across 8 themes in each country assessed?***

##### **1. TIMELINE:**

- November 15, 1993 to November 14, 1994: Project life

Two Phases :

- 1) Data collection
- 2) Analysis/Report writing phase

- January 30, 1994: deadline)

Feedback on glossary of terms

- February 15, 1994: deadline

Workplan

## 2. WORK PLAN:

- It was agreed that each country would submit a draft workplan by February 15, 1993.
- In proposing a work plan in each of the four countries, each analyst must ask questions concerning (A) what, (B) who, (C) when, (D) how and (E) where activities must be addressed.

### A. What?: In each country

#### 1) Basic literature review :

- PVO/NGO/NRMS related literature
- Key USAID/ARTS/FARA documents
- NRM/NGO related literature

2) Further clarify sampling strategy and specific sample sites and target groups for each of the themes under investigation in outline form.

3) Identification of potential problem areas in implementing the assessment with potential solutions. (i.e. the feasibility of the methodology presented here).

4) Identification of techniques to be used in the assessment of each theme (ie: interviewing, document analysis).

5) Reports (on monthly basis: forward and backward in time).

### B. Who?:

1) Identify nature of collaborative approach headed by chief analyst (the kind and degree of collaboration will in each country depend on the theme).

2) Outside consultants (included as needed).

### C. When?:

Timelines:	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Glossary of terms		-----											
Detailed work plan		-----											
Data collection/													
Sampling by themes:													
Theme 1													
Theme 2 etc.	"	"	"		-----								
Activity Reporting	"	"	"		-----								

**Remarks:**

- Each country should have its own deadlines.
- Actual analytical assessment reporting : monthly progress reporting; quarterly

**D. How?:** Presentation of substantive data collected and "packaged".

Budgetary issues should be projected in the plan as function of what is available from PVO-NGO/NRMS.

- Financial resources:
  - Transfer of funds from PVO-NGO/NRMS to focal countries
  - Country Leading Agency (existing structure) manages
  - Contingencies
  - Logistical considerations
- Materials:
  - Secretarial and administrative support
  - Equipment
  - Logistics
  - Continues as before activity

In preparing a country specific budget based on assessment needs and available funds, the possibility for using existing assessment funds to leverage other funding should be pursued where opportune and potentially required.

**E- Where?:**

- To be determined in each country. The sampling strategy depends on where specifically within each country activities will be undertaken. [Time did not permit for activities to be undertaken in Senegal and Kenya to discuss be discussed with the workshop participants.]

### Closing of Workshop

To close the workshop, participants took turns in expressing their respective impressions of how the workshop went.

**Michael Brown** expressed his satisfaction with what the team had accomplished during the prior two weeks. He also addressed his thanks to COMODE which had provided the team with what had been the necessary "groundtruthing context" for the realization of the assessment, in addition to excellent logistical support and hospitality. He also said that he would determine if funds from the Collaborative Analytical and Dissemination Activities (CADA) of Phase II could be used towards the end of the project towards a potential collaborative analytical activity suggested by the assessment participants (in about a year and eight months). CADA funds could perhaps be used to convene a review meeting to permit the four focal country analysts (as well as perhaps as these responsible for undertaking any PVO-NGO/NRMS related analysis in Senegal and Kenya) to have a chance to collaboratively review and provide feedback on the final document which will be prepared under the Project Director's supervision in Washington. [The management Consortium subsequently agreed that this activity would be worth pursuing.]

**Ada Ndesso Atanga** in turn also thanked all the participants who have been very active and cooperative. She addressed particular thanks to Mr. Michael Brown, who had allowed her to join the team in addition to Enoh Tanjong, the principal Cameroonian Analyst. The full participation of team members had helped in promoting creativity. She promised to transmit what she had learned during these two weeks to her fellow Cameroonians. She also thanked COMODE, which had been very hospitable. Ada said she hoped that the future workshops could be even more collaborative and fully participatory than this workshop had been.

**Moustapha Soumare** said also that he was very happy for having joined this assessment workshop so that PVO-NGO/NRMS in Mali, through the CCA/ONG, was guaranteed representation. It had enabled him to make friends among the Malagasy, and the fact that he arrived late had not prevented his full participation in the deliberation so that he did not feel like an outsider. The discussions as well as the field trips which had been organized had been very fruitful. To end his speech, he thanked everybody.

**William Ramaroharinosy** said that the work that the team had done during these two weeks would go along way to help everyone undertake the assessment in her/his respective country. He also thanked the visitors for not having hesitated to come to Madagascar.

**Enoh Tanjong**, said that he had been involved with PVO-NGO/NRMS since its inception in Cameroon. He explained that he had been a consultant for 7 years. He remarked that he had really learnt a lot during these two weeks. He hoped that would continue through his association with this assessment.

Finally, **Susan Mubbala** said that the work that the team had undertaken during these two weeks had been very fruitful. She also thanked to the team members, especially COMODE which had provided wonderful hospitality to the visitors.

# ANNEX A

## ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK Categories of indicators

COGNITIVE	BEHAVIORAL	BIOPHYSICAL/HUMAN WELFARE	
		COGNITIVE or MEASURABLE	
		Qualitative	Quantitative
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Information disseminated</li> <li>• Information received</li> </ul> <p style="text-align: right;">→</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased use of functional skills:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Project proposal</li> <li>- Attending international trainings</li> <li>- Writing documents →</li> <li>- Letters to editor, etc</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• People note environmental trends and impacts as a function of information received</li> </ul>	TO BE DETERMINED
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Knowledge: do people understand the issues?</li> <li>• Has the information been assimilated ?</li> </ul> <p style="text-align: right;">→</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Appropriate action taken:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Projects: Soil and water conservation, BZM, PRA etc..</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Advocacy:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- policy</li> <li>- lobbying (government)</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p style="text-align: right;">→</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• people note biophysical change and/or human welfare (can we attribute any biophysical change to behavioral, or cognitive change, which in turn were results of any or all of the eight themes?)</li> <li>• People note improved human welfare by citing:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- less disease</li> <li>- less hunger</li> <li>- less environmental depletion</li> <li>- more literacy</li> <li>- more awareness</li> <li>- reduced conflict</li> <li>- more security (land tenure, economic)</li> <li>- increased economic welfare</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	TO BE DETERMINED
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is the information appropriately acted upon ?</li> </ul> <p style="text-align: right;">→</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Changes in strategic approach:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- NGO's niche</li> <li>- comparative advantage realized</li> <li>- testing methodology (working with new techniques, for example:                   <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PRA with CBOs</li> <li>• improved tavy (slash and burn agriculture)</li> <li>• NGO/CBO collaboration</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p style="text-align: right;">→</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• people note biophysical change and/or human welfare (can we attribute any biophysical change to behavioral, or cognitive change, which in turn were results of any or all of the eight themes or approach? )</li> <li>• People note improved human welfare by citing:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- less disease</li> <li>- less hunger</li> <li>- less environmental depletion</li> <li>- more literacy</li> <li>- more awareness</li> <li>- reduced conflict</li> <li>- more security (land tenure, economic)</li> <li>- increased economic welfare</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	TO BE DETERMINED

## ANNEX B

### GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

ANAE	Association National d'Actions Environnementales (Madagascar)
ANGAP	Association National pour la Gestion des Aires Protégées (Madagascar)
ARTS/FARA	Office of Analysis, Research and Technical Support, Division of Food, Agriculture, Resources and Analysis.
ASE	Association pour la Sauvegarde de la Nature (Madagascar)
BZM	Buffer zone management
CADA	Collaborative analytical and dissemination activities
CAPR	Centre Artisanal de Promotion Rurale (Madagascar)
CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Inc.
CATF	Cellule d'Appui Technique et Financier
CBO	Community based organization
CCA/ONG	Comité de Coordination des Actions des ONG au Mali
CEDID	Centre (Groupe) d'Etudes de Documentation et de Formation sur le Développement (Madagascar)
CLA	Country Lead Agency
COMODE	Conseil Malgache des ONG pour le Développement et l'Environnement (Madagascar)
CWG	Country Working Group
FIKRIFAMA	Fikambanan'ny tantsaha Arindra Hamokatra (Madagascar)
GRAT	Groupe de Recherche et d'Appui en Technologies
ICDP	Integrated Conservation and Development Project
IREDEC	Institut de Recherche et Application de Méthodes de Développement Communautaire (Madagascar)
NEAP	National Environmental Plan
NES	National Environment Secretariat (Uganda)
NGO	Non-governmental organization
N & P	Nature et Progrès
NRM	Natural resources management
NRMS	Natural resources management supports (project)
ONE	Office National de l'Environnement (Madagascar)
PNLCD	Plan National Pour la Lutte Contre la Désertification (Mali)
PRA	Participatory rural appraisal
PPO	Planning by objective (ZOOB in German)
PVO	Private voluntary organization
SPNGO	Service providing NGO
TEZA	Organisation Malagasy pour Education de Parents (Madagascar)
TFAP	Tropical Forestry Action Plan
TIAKO	Tontolo Iainana Koloy (Madagascar)
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WWF	World Wildlife Fund (U.S.)