


the impact of the land to the tiller program in the mekong delta



By
Henry C. Bush
Gordon H. Messegee
Roger V. Russell

CONTROL DATA CORPORATION

DECEMBER 1972

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MAPS

Provinces sampled

3A & 3B

THE RESEARCH DESIGN

Reasons for the Inquiry: The Office of the Associate Director for Land Reform (ADLR) of USAID, the Directorate-General of Land Affairs (DGLA), and the Ministry of Land Reform, Agriculture, Fisheries and Animal Husbandry Development (MLRAF) requested research to try to assess the impact of the Land to the Tiller Program (LTTT).¹

When the Research Was Done: The research was designed during 1971.

All offices concerned approved the research design in August and September 1971. Field work was done from mid-January to mid-June 1972. Behavioral observations were made in 44 villages in 9 provinces before the invasion of South Vietnam by North Vietnam began 29 March 1972. Unstructured interviews of farm families, made in 6 provinces, were completed in Long An province before the invasion but in Go Cong, Dinh Tuong, Vinh Long, Vinh Binh, and Chuong Thien provinces they were done after it began. This is mentioned because the fact of invasion may have affected loyalties to the GVN, though it could hardly affect economic behavior much between 29 March when it began and mid-June when we completed field work.

-
1. Background: Under the Land to the Tiller Law (Law 003/70 26 March 1970), farmers who are tenants, sharecroppers or squatters receive title to the land they farm, up to 3 hectares in MR3 and MR4, up to 1 hectare in MR2 and MR1, free. They must apply for title to the land they till, at the village in which the land is located. Farmers who own rice land or secondary crop land may keep whatever they own and farm, up to 15 hectares. They may also keep it if their parents, spouses, children, or other legal heirs are farming it for them, or if they use hired labor to work it for them, provided they manage it themselves. In addition, those owning family worship land registered before 30 September 1970 may retain up to 5 hectares of it. Former farmers who are in the armed forces or who are refugees and whose farm land is still out of use may retain whatever they own and formerly farmed, up to 15 hectares, for future cultivation when security permits it. But they must declare the land they own and farm or once farmed. Persons or organizations that own rice land or secondary crop land must declare it. That which they do not farm, and which is being farmed by persons other than their family (e.g. tenants, sharecroppers, squatters) is subject to expropriation. Title to it is given to the tenant farmers, squatters, or sharecroppers now farming it, and the owners are paid for it by the Government.

Where the Research Was Done, and Why: The study was done in the delta (including Long An) where the LTTT program is concentrated, where the tenancy problem was greatest, where 77% of SVN's rice is grown, and where 7,159,000, 40% of SVN's population, live. The universe studied is transplant rice crop land. The upper delta floating rice region (An Giang, Chau Doc, Kien-Giang) was excluded as having atypical tenure and farm holding patterns and problems. An Xuyen and southern Kien Giang were excluded because the war to contain the enemy base area in the U Minh is still going on there. Bac Lieu was excluded because it is a major ARVN base and the presence of large ARVN units distorts the rural situation.

The Sample: 9 Provinces: We selected 9 provinces which would give us the various kinds of security, insecurity and recent war history, and geographic characteristics found elsewhere in the delta as a whole. They are:

<u>Province Sampled</u>	<u>Why</u>
Long An	On the traditional enemy lines of communication from the Ho Chi Minh trail to Saigon. Once the enemy's, now and recently GVN's.
Go Cong	Safe, long off the enemy infiltration track.
Dinh Tuong	The same as Long An.
Chuong Thien	Relatively neglected by GVN in the delta war; very insecure.
Vinh Binh	Very neglected by GVN in social and economic infrastructure, very poor; insecure.


<u>Province Sampled</u>	<u>Why</u>
Phong Dinh	Part riverine delta, part southern delta; characterized by particularly harsh landlordism until recently, it includes a major rice market of the delta, Can Tho.
Kien Hoa	An enemy stronghold even today; strong enemy infrastructure, neutralism among farmer population very strong.
Vinh Long	Relatively neglected by GVN in defense, but relatively favored by GVN in infrastructure inputs (e.g. roads). It includes a major rice market of the delta, Vinh Long city.
Kien Tuong	A touch of upper delta; lightly populated, on enemy water routes, a mix of transplanted and floating rice culture.

See maps on pages 3A & 3B.


Another way to show how varied are these provinces is to show their ranking in security compared to all other provinces. CORDS/RAD, February 1972, ranked them as follows in the series of 1-44:

<u>Province</u>	<u>Rank in Security</u>
Long An	19
Go Cong	3
Dinh Tuong	25
Chuong Thien	43
Vinh Binh	37
Phong Dinh	21
Kien Hoa	38
Vinh Long	29
Kien Tuong	10

The Sample 44 Villages, 29 with much LTTT implementation, 15 with zero or almost zero LTTT Implementation: In these 9 provinces, 44 villages were studied. They are listed in Appendix B. 29 were selected because as of 1 January 1972 they had achieved much LTTT implementation; 15 because as of that date, almost two years after the LTTT law had been promulgated, they had as yet achieved nothing in the way of LTTT land transfers.



 Provinces Sampled



THE MEKONG DELTA

////// Provinces Sampled


We included in our sample of 44 villages some in each group (those with "much LTTT implementation" and those with "zero or almost zero LTTT implementation") which are in each of the preponderant HES security ratings: B, C and D.²

The implementation of any major GVN program is usually moving slower in insecure villages than in secure ones. Some of our villages in the group of those with "much LTTT implementation" rated D on the HES security scale had achieved less than some A or B villages not selected. But villages selected had implemented LTTT to a greater degree than had all delta villages, by far, and those selected for each HES security rating were far ahead of delta villages not selected but having the same HES rating. The average percentage of farm tenant population which had applied for and had been approved for titles to the land they were tilling under LTTT, for all delta villages, was 30-% as of 1 January 1972 when the sample was selected. The average for all villages in the sample sub-group chosen for "much LTTT implementation" was 70+% at that time. Graph 1 shows this.

2. For details of what the HES ratings A through E mean in terms of kinds and degrees of security and insecurity see Annex C, "Model Rating Descriptions", of Users' Guide to the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), February, 1970 (CORDS/RAD, MACV)

GRAPH I

VILLAGES HAVING ACHIEVED MUCH LTTT IMPLEMENTATION COMPARED TO ALL DELTA VILLAGES AS OF 1 JANUARY 1972



The differences between villages sampled for "much LTTT implementation" and those sampled for "zero or almost zero LTTT implementation" are shown in Graph 2.

GRAPH 2


VILLAGES SAMPLED IN TERMS OF PERCENTAGES OF TENANT FAMILIES WHOSE APPLICATIONS FOR LAND UNDER LTTT HAD BEEN APPROVED AS OF 1 JANUARY 1972

Page 7

Villages sampled for much LTTT implementation

Approved Applicants for Title to Land as % of Assumed Tenant Population

Percentage of villages




---Average 70+%

Villages sampled for zero or almost zero LTTT implementation

Approved Applicants for Title to Land as % of Assumed Tenant Population

Percentage of villages



In terms of HES security ratings:

Of the 29 villages with much LTTT

1 is A	
17 are B	(62%)
7 are C	(24%)
4 are D	(14%)
<u>29</u>	<u>(100%)</u>

Of the 15 with zero-LTTT

3 are B	(20%)
7 are C	(47%)
5 are D	(33%)
<u>15</u>	<u>(100%)</u>

All 44 villages grow rice as the preponderant crop. All 15 zero-LTTT villages have LTTT distribution goals. Of all 44 villages, historical data indicates that, before LTTT, 50-70% of the rural population were tenant farm families.

The Major Research Tasks and Methods: What We Did:

1. We researched pacification efforts in SVN and land reform efforts in other countries, interviewed Vietnamese and American supposed experts on pacification in RVN, examined their reports and writings, then isolated 106 indicators of progress or regression plausibly related to pacification, politics, and economics and also plausibly causally related to possible effects of reductions of land tenancy by LTTT. We worked out scales for degrees of each of these, then pretested them and ascertained that our indicators did indicate different phenomena, our scales did scale, and that we, American and Vietnamese research persons, agreed on what we saw or found or did not see or find and on the extent thereof, and that we scaled our judgments similarly consistently. The indicators and scales used are given in Appendix A.
2. We, American and Vietnamese research persons, then made behavioral observations in each of the 44 villages. 3 to 5 hamlets were observed in each village. 50-100 or more householders were talked to briefly in each village. We recorded on checklists how each village scaled in terms of 31 indicators of political union or disunion and 75 indicators of economic progress or regression.
3. We then compared the political and economic characteristics of the 29 villages with much LTTT implementation to those of the 15 with zero-LTTT implementation. The quantitative and qualitative differences between the two groups were obvious and striking. It seemed probable that LTTT might be a causal factor in some or many of these striking differences. But what else also was?
4. We then explored historical MACV and CORDS computer data on how it had been in these villages in January 1970 -- before LTTT began.

As those working in South Vietnam and familiar with the HES know, the HES has been endeavoring to measure pacification since 1967 by requiring District Senior Advisors (DSA's) to respond to a great variety of questions every month or every quarter about every hamlet and every village. We selected historical HES data bearing on the politics, economics, and organization of each of the villages in our sample. We selected it for January 1970 and for January 1972. The historical data we drew concerns village administration, politics, economic activity, village public works projects, public health facilities, schools available, existence or nonexistence of village organization for land distribution, and basic infrastructure and resources (roads, waterways, and availability of water.)³

We then compared HES data for January 1972 on the 29 villages with much LTTT implementation to HES data for January 1972 on the 15 villages with zero or almost zero LTTT implementation. We found the two groups differed greatly in matters quite other than LTTT implementation. Those with much LTTT implementation, taken as a group, were better off than those with zero or almost zero LTTT implementation in all major characteristics except that the two groups have about the same access to village government and that "zero LTTT" villages are better off in basics; they have more water and more waterways.

We found the same distinct differences in pacification when we compared HES data on each of the two groups for January 1970. Though almost every village in each of the two groups has progressed up the HES scales indicating degrees of development and pacification since January 1970, the 29 "much LTTT" villages as a group started less handicapped in January 1970 than did the "zero LTTT" villages, in all but water and waterways.

3. The questions used and scaled response sets, are numbers E-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, F-1, 2, 4, L-1, 2, 3, N-1, 2, 3, 4, P-3, 4, R-1, 2, 3, T-5, 6, and Z-1, 2, 3, in "Village Level Quarterly Update," Hamlet Evaluation System Advisor's Handbook, June, 1971 (CORDS/RAD, MACV) pp. E-1--30. Slight changes in the questions during the years 1970-72 can be found by comparing them with those in the Hamlet Evaluation System Handbook, June 1969 (CORDS/RAD, MACV)

Because other factors, handicaps and programs, as we expected, were involved, henceforth in this study we will refer to the group of 29 with "much LTTT implementation" as "dynamic" and to the group of 15 with "zero or almost zero LTTT implementation" as "stagnant". "Stagnant" is used to mean changing very slowly but not static, not unchanging. A comparison of HES data on the 15 stagnant villages in January 1970 and in January 1972 shows they have moved forward in some matters.

When we compare HES data on the 29 dynamic villages (i. e. those with much LTTT implementation) for January 1970 with HES data on the 15 stagnant ones (i. e. those with zero or almost zero LTTT implementation) for January 1972, we find that the dynamic villages were, 2 years ago, about where the stagnant villages are now.

In January 1970 dynamic villages were better off than stagnant villages were two years later in January 1972 in activity of village officials, in access to markets, in organization for land distribution, in percentage of land in use, and in roads. They were worse off than stagnant ones are today in village public works, access to schools, access to medicines and public health facilities, in farm products above subsistence for sale, in water supply, and in waterways. They were the same in access to village government, and in the degree of citizen participation in village affairs. Although no characteristic is equal to any other one in intrinsic importance in village development, nevertheless quantitative comparison is some clue. It shows that among 23 characteristics, dynamic villages, 2 years ago, were better off than stagnant villages are today in 7 characteristics, the same in 6, and worse off in 10.

A comparison was made for the handicap of enemy presence and insecurity.

Dynamic villages which were rated C or D on the HES security scale in January 1970, compared to stagnant villages rated C or D in January 1972, show the same:

that stagnant C or D villages are about where dynamic villages then rated C or D were 2 years ago in most characteristics. Dynamic C or D villages in Jan. 1970 were better off in 8 characteristics, the same in 4, and worse off in 11, than stagnant C or D villages were in January 1972.

We had ascertained by observation the political and economic characteristics of villages which correlate with much LTTT implementation (and with other changes, also). We also had, to the limit of MACV and CORDS historical village data, a reading on how it had been before LTTT in villages which, today, have achieved much LTTT implementation.

5. The Sample Unstructured Interviews of 985 Farm Families

We then interviewed a large randomly selected sample of villagers in 23 of the 29 dynamic villages, all we could get to, for the invasion had begun and had decreased security on access roads. In each village we divided the hamlets between interviewers so that outlying hamlets as well as central ones would be sampled. Each interviewer had a copy of a table of random numbers taken from a standard statistical source. Having entered a hamlet, he glanced at the table, and selected the first number between 1 and 5, then went to that house. If the head of the household was not in, could any one, e.g. the wife or oldest brother or son, speak for him? If not, he went to the house next door. Hamlet houses are usually in rows or double rows along paths, roads, or canals, sometimes in small clusters between paths, fields extending back of the houses. Interviewers followed the obvious row or worked around a cluster clockwise. After an interview, each interviewer then read the next number between 1 and 5 on the table of random numbers, and used it to select the next house. For example, if from the house where he had just completed an interview the next random number on the table read three, he picked the third house beyond his nose in that row of houses, and began again. This protected us against any chance that solicitous hamlet or village officials might attempt to lead interviewers on a guided tour.

Rural Vietnamese are friendly and curious, and there is not much happening in many hamlets much of the time. Sometimes neighbors, friends, or passers-by would join the interview and the discussion. In such cases they were asked their land tenure, and how they earn a living, no more. All interviews were anonymous. Group consensus was recorded, or group differences were recorded where there was no consensus.

985 rural families were interviewed, in 23 villages in Long An, Go Cong, Dinh Tuong, Vinh Long, Vinh Binh and Chuong Thien provinces. Villages in which we interviewed are listed in Appendix D. Wherever possible heads of households were interviewed

Of the 985 farm families interviewed

49% are farm owners who own the land they farm because of LTTT

8% are tenants who have applied for title to the land they farm, under LTTT

15% are tenant farmers. Of these

56% farm worship land exempt from LTTT

27% farm village communal land, then exempt from LTTT but no longer so. (Word that communal land might be distributed had got around, and 30+% of these had already applied to their villages for title.)

9% farm privately owned land subject to LTTT, not yet distributed

3% farm relatives' land and presumably will not apply for title

3% farm church land, exempt from LTTT

1% farm garden land, exempt from LTTT

1% farm land subject to LTTT but prefer tenancy

100%

17% are farmers who owned and farmed their land before LTTT. Of these:

21% purchased their land under RVN's earlier land distribution program (Ordinance 57, 1956).

4% are beneficiaries under LTTT in that they had never been able to pay for land applied for under Ordinance 57, and LTTT eliminated their unpaid debt and gave them clear title.

7% are landless farm laborers

2% are landlords or exlandlords whose land has been transferred to tenants under LTTT

1% are landless skilled persons such as carpenters or shopkeepers

1% are village or hamlet officials or local military who do not farm

100%

This is very close to historical estimates of tenancy and of landlords living in villages. This indicates the random selection process was effective and the sample is very representative of the universe of delta farm families. Because it focuses on villages it does not represent the growing commercial sector of the delta (towns like My Tho and rice markets such as Can Tho and Vinh Long).

As remarked above, the interviewers, 4, 5 or 6 in number, worked singly and divided their efforts among hamlets within each village so that no village or hamlet official could lead them on any guided tour. As remarked above, within each hamlet, farm houses were selected randomly. The interviews were unstructured, with no clue given to any respondent that we were particularly interested in LTTT. The instructions to interviewers are given in Appendix C. Farm family respondents were guided, directed, or coaxed toward the subject of their lives, their hamlet, their village as it is today compared to how it was several years ago. The interviews were skewed only in that the interviewers said it seemed clear to them that things in that hamlet and that village are in general better than they were about 2 years ago. This was so obvious to us from our earlier behavioral observations in those same villages that it seemed a mere statement of fact, not of bias. The purpose of the interviews was to ascertain how many, of a representative sample of farmers, attribute the changes in their villages to LTTT, in what forms they attribute it to LTTT, and to what other causal factors they attribute the changes. The method was to ask them - with no hint of LTTT - why, by what means, in their experience, these differences have come about, in their village, in their hamlet.

The disadvantage of unstructured interviews is that what respondents do not

talk about you do not learn about. You don't ask about that which interests you, you listen. The advantages are that whatever they do talk about they did not talk about just to please you or whoever they assume to be your boss. The big advantage is that it is probably the only way short of long acquaintance, psychoanalysis or marriage that one can get close to reality when he wants to know what is really in other persons' minds.

6. Having ascertained the political and economic differences which correlate (i. e. co-occur) with much-LTTT, and having ascertained to what degree villagers attribute these changes to LTTT among other causal factors (for causes are always multiple) we then cross-validated our findings by shelf-research on all other available in-country data such as PRT reports, HES, TIRS, TFES and other data collection systems of CORDS and MACV, PSG village studies, PAAS reports, PSA and DSA reports, other field reportage, MLRAF, DGLA and NIS statistics, Ministry of Interior statistics on voting behavior, JUSPAO, PSA, and PPA reports on enemy reactions to LTTT, village officials' judgments of political and economic circumstances and trends in their respective villages, and other on-going research on LTTT and political change in RVN such as C. Stuart Callison's doctoral research and tentative findings. To sum up what we did Our focus is on delta villages and on farmers We drew our data from

1. behavioral observations of what farmers are doing, buying and using in a representative sample of 29 dynamic villages and 15 stagnant ones
2. historical HES data on all 44 villages
3. 985 interviews in 23 dynamic villages
4. all other available reports and studies, for cross-validation or invalidation

- 15A

PART ONE

**MAJOR CHANGES IN THE DELTA:
LEADING AND LAGGING VILLAGES**

**"It is all very well to ask
people what they would do,
but you can't really tell
unless they have to dip into
their pockets."**

**(Arthur Seldon, Institute
of Economic Affairs, London)**

CHAPTER II
INCREASED PRODUCTION AND INCREASED CONSUMPTION

When we compare the 29 dynamic delta villages (those which seem to be progressive) to the 15 stagnant ones (which are, in the process of self development, about where the dynamic ones were in early 1970) we find impressive production increases in the former.

Rice yields per hectare are higher in dynamic villages than in stagnant villages. The average yield for single crop rice in dynamic villages is 117 gia/hectare; for 2 crops of rice it is 202 gia/hectare. The average yield for single-crop rice in stagnant villages is 90 gia/hectare, for 2 crops of rice it is 168 gia/hectare.

Rice which yields 2 crops is grown by some in 76% of dynamic villages. It is grown by some in only 31% of stagnant villages. To shift to 2-crop rice is no simple matter of a change of seed, it requires money inputs of increased fertilizer, more water, more control of water, and special care which normally means higher labor costs. The shift to 2-crop rice is evidence of risk-taking entrepreneurial behavior by farmers.

Land in use: Observations, and questions put to village officials, show the following differences:

	<u>In this % of Dynamic Villages</u>	<u>In this % of Stagnant Villages</u>
There are many rice plots out of use	10%	56%
There are almost none or none out of use	62%	6%

Capacity to withhold paddy from the market at harvest time: Farmers in dynamic villages store more rice after harvest than do farmers in stagnant villages. They also deliver more to the rice mill for milling and then shipment to market. See table 1.

Table 1

CAPACITY TO WITHHOLD PADDY FROM THE MARKET AT HARVEST TIME

<u>Paddy was seen in:</u>	<u>In this % of Dynamic Villages</u>	<u>In this % of Stagnant Villages</u>
Large volume in mills and warehouses, waiting to be milled, or as milled rice stored.	79%	13%
Enormous containers in houses, usually filling most of the main room of the house.	66%	40%
No surplus paddy was seen anywhere, other than small quantities in households for subsistence.	0%	13%

The difference shown in Table 1 is confirmed by District Senior Advisors' judgments of these villages.⁴

Everything else farmers grow for a living is also evident in greater quantity in dynamic villages than in stagnant villages. See Table 2.

Table 2

SECONDARY CROPS AND PRODUCTION OTHER THAN MAIN CROPS

<u>Secondary Agricultural Product:</u>	<u>In this % of Dynamic Villages</u>	<u>In this % of Stagnant Villages</u>
Are there pigs? Yes, many or some	79%	20%
Are there chickens? Yes, many or some	83%	40%
Are there ducks? Yes, many or some	93%	53%
Are there fishponds? (Household drainage ponds used as open sewers, known as "dung ponds" which always produce some tiny fish, are excluded.) Yes	93%	47%

4. Question: "Was there a surplus of goods or foodstuffs produced in this village for sale outside of the village during the year"? In January 1972 DSA's responded "Yes, large" of 67% of the dynamic villages, but only of 44% of the stagnant villages. (Village Quarterly Update, HES, CORDS/RAD, MACV, January 1972).

<u>Secondary Agricultural Product: (Con't)</u>	<u>In this % of Dynamic Villages</u>	<u>In this % of Stagnant Villages</u>
If there are vegetable plots, do they look well-tended?		
Yes	66%	13%
Do loads of goods seem to be the same kind of goods, or mixed loads with persons carrying very small quantities of goods?		
Most or some loads are all of the same goods.	48%	23%
Most loads are mixed, small quantities of many kinds of things.	14%	83%

Greater production is also evident in most dynamic C and D villages and also rare in most stagnant C and D villages. Whatever moves villagers to improve their lot it is not security alone, and whatever inhibits self-development is not the lack of security alone. See Table 3.

Table 3

SECONDARY CROPS AND PRODUCTION OTHER THAN MAIN CROPS IN C AND D VILLAGES.

<u>Secondary Agricultural Product:</u>	<u>In this % of C Dynamic Villages</u>	<u>In this % of C Stagnant Villages</u>	<u>In this % of D Dynamic Villages</u>	<u>In this % of D Stagnant Villages</u>
Are there pigs?				
Yes, many or some	71%	37%	50%	20%
Are there chickens?				
Yes, many or some	57%	37%	50%	50%
Are there ducks?				
Yes, many or some	71%	62%	100%	60%
Are there fishponds?				
Yes	100%	50%	100%	60%
If there are vegetable plots, do they look well tended?				
Yes	100%	75%	100%	0%

We have shown (on pages 11-12) that about 2 years ago the dynamic villages were where the stagnant villages are now. The above differences in yields and in production may seem unbelievable over so short a period as 2 years to some who have observed and studied the snail-slow pace of agricultural development in many underdeveloped Asian and African countries, but statistics quite aside from our research and findings show the rapid rate at which the great agricultural potential of the Mekong delta is becoming reality. Consider, for example, the rate of increase in the use of miracle rice seed. Miracle rice requires much water and control of water, and heavy capital inputs of labor and fertilizer, but it yields much more rice. In 1970 only about 10% of all rice land in the delta in use was planted in miracle rice. In 1972 26% is, and without doubt the percentage would be even greater had rainfall been average this year instead of less than usual and late.⁵

Consumption: Farmers in dynamic villages are living better than those in stagnant villages. Evidence of what they are doing, buying, building, and using certainly shows this. See table 4.

Table 4

CONSUMER GOODS, SERVICES, AND COMMERCE IN VILLAGES

	<u>In this % of Dynamic Villages</u>	<u>In this % of Stagnant Villages</u>
<u>Shops: many or some</u>		
Are being expanded, refurbished, re-built, painted, or have new fronts	31%	6%
Are new buildings	21%	0%
Are brick or cement buildings	59%	6%
Have floors of cement	59%	12%
Have tile floors	45%	6%
Are tin or matting-walled shacks	32%	68%
<u>Advertising.</u> There are many new signs on village shops or on access roads	10%	0%

5. "Plantings Effected," in "Miracle Rice Production Program for 1972-1973 as of August 25, 1972" (Paddy and Rice Service, Directorate of Agriculture, MLRAF).

Table 4 (Con't)

<u>Retail goods and services for sale in village markets and shops include ⁶</u>	<u>In this % of Dynamic Villages</u>	<u>In this % of Stagnant Villages</u>
Tailoring	66%	37%
Ready-to-wear clothing	35%	19%
Jewelry, watches, and jewelry and watch repair	35%	0%
Motorcycle, Lambretta, or car repair	38%	19%
Gas and oil	26%	0%
Barber shops	62%	37%
Beauty shops and hairdressing for women	14%	6%
Pharmacies (oriental drug shops excluded)	31%	0%
Canned foods	79%	50%
Glasses and sunglasses	31%	0%
Shoes or sandals	48%	19%
Ice cream for sale, or refrigerators in shops	21%	6%
Household furniture	41%	0%
Gas mantle lamps	48%	6%
Photo shops	28%	6%
<u>Play, fun, amusement:</u>		
Sports equipment, games are for sale	62%	19%
Magazines, books, comic books and calendars are for sale	41%	6%
Children's toys are for sale.	79%	12%
Some small children are seen playing with toys	69%	6%
<u>Clothes, jewelry, and other personal objects:</u>		
Most or some men (not in uniform) are wearing clothes which seem new.	66%	0%
Some men wear middle-class shirts and trousers instead of peasant work clothes.	45%	0%
Some men wear bright-colored shirts or sports shirts.	31%	0%
Some or a few men wear leather shoes.	24%	0%
Most or some men wear watches or rings.	90%	19%
A few men carry fountain pens.	90%	6%
A few young men wear "sharp" tailored clothes.	10%	0%

6. In about half of the stagnant villages in which shops or markets sell the goods or services listed stocks are very small or services are irregular.

<u>Clothes, jewelry, and other personal objects: (Cont')</u>	<u>In this % of Dynamic Villages</u>	<u>In this % of Stagnant Villages</u>
Most or some <u>women</u> are wearing clothes which seem new.	21%	0%
Some of the women do <u>not</u> wear peasant work clothes.	31%	0%
Most or some of the women who wear the standard black trousers and blouse, wear blouses in bright colors or of the new semi-transparent fabrics.	52%	6%
A few of the women wear <u>ao dai's</u> .	45%	0%
Some or a few dress their hair and wear hair ornaments	55%	0%
Some wear watches, necklaces, earrings, or rings.	45%	0%
Some <u>young women</u> dress differently from the older women.	83%	19%
Most or some <u>school children</u> are carrying books or school gear.	56%	36%
Some or a few of the <u>small children</u> are wearing clothes which seem new.	76%	12%
<u>Houses:</u>		
Many or some have cement or tile floors.	34%	6%
Many or some have brick, cement, or cement block walls.	38%	19%
Many or some have tin or fibrous cement or tile roofs.	42%	6%
Many or some have doors and windows instead of just openings.	66%	6%
Many or some houses are <u>being</u> repaired, rebuilt, or enlarged.	34%	0%
Cement is used in the immediate area of many or some houses. (e. g. in out-buildings, paddy-drying spaces, posts.)	45%	0%
Many or some houses have furniture, sewing machines, elaborate family altars, mirrors, and wall decorations such as hanging scrolls.	69%	0%
Paths are kept up, maintained	48%	13%

<u>Tombs and the Village Dinh</u>	<u>In this % of Dynamic Villages</u>	<u>In this % of Stagnant Villages</u>
Some tombs have been painted, recemented, the area around them weeded, or otherwise refurbished recently	19%	8%
The village <u>dinh</u> has been refurbished recently. ⁷	63%	0%

As of production, so of consumer habits and choices, the distinction between those villages which are dynamic and those which are stagnant is evident even where insecurity is great, in D villages. See Table 5.

Table 5

CONSUMER GOODS, SERVICES, AND COMMERCE IN D VILLAGES SELECTED ITEMS

	<u>In this % of Dynamic Villages</u>	<u>In this % of Stagnant Villages</u>
<u>Shops many or some</u>		
Are being expanded, refurbished, rebuilt, painted, or have new fronts	25%	0%
Are tin or matting-walled shacks	50%	80%
<u>Retail goods and services for sale in village markets and shops include:</u>		
Tailoring	75%	20%
Gas and oil	50%	0%
Shoes or sandals	75%	20%
Magazines, books, comic books, calendars	25%	0%
Children's toys	25%	0%
<u>Clothes, jewelry, and other personal objects:</u>		
<u>A few men (not in uniform) are wearing clothes which seem new</u>	50%	0%
<u>Houses:</u>		
Cement is used in the immediate area of <u>a few</u> houses (e.g. in outbuildings, paddy drying spaces, posts)	75%	40%

7. Refurbishing of the village dinh (the temple to house the village founders' and ancestors' spirit) may be a poor indicator of villagers' prosperity or poverty because (1) the delta has been so disorganized by war, revolution, and counter-insurgency since at least 1945 that the rare skills required to refurbish the dinh (e.g. carved palindromes, gilded, fixed by tradition, in Chinese characters) may have become very scarce, and (2) CORDS village self-development grants up to but not exceeding 50,000 VN\$ are available to refurbish a dinh, therefore refurbishing may show village eligibility for VSD funds rather than villagers' initiatives and consumer preferences

Churches and sects' temples were excluded because they often obtain their funds from members in organizations which are larger and more scattered than villages.

The striking differences in consumer behavior between the 29 dynamic and the 15 stagnant villages are confirmed in a general way by District Senior Advisors' reports on these villages.⁸

8. Question: "Are manufactured goods such as bicycle tires, kerosene, and aluminum pots for sale at the local markets?" In January 1972 DSA's responded that "Yes, ample quantities" are available in 73% of the dynamic villages, but only in 25% of the stagnant villages. (Village Quarterly Update, HES, CORDS/RAD, MACV, January 1972.)

CHAPTER III

INCREASED INVESTMENTS IN FARMING AND INCREASED DEMAND FOR
AGRICULTURAL CREDIT

In comparing our quantitative judgments of what farmers are buying, doing, and using in 29 dynamic villages to that in 15 stagnant villages we find striking evidence that there are increased investments in farming and services related to farming in the former. These are private investments and differ from community infrastructure such as schools, ditches, and access roads.

Consider agricultural machinery, power tools, fertilizer, insecticide, electricity, and local industries, none of which are needed for subsistence farming. Private industries (crafts such as blacksmithing or weaving excluded) average 5 per village in dynamic villages. They average only 2 per village in stagnant villages. In dynamic villages they include ice plants, vegetable drying, furniture making, sampan and river boat building, cement jar fabrication, and such. In stagnant villages all one finds are rice mills. The quantitative differences are shown in Table 6.

PRIVATE INVESTMENTS RELATED TO FARMING

<u>Kinds</u>	<u>% of Dynamic Villages Having Many or Some</u>	<u>% of Stagnant Villages Having Many or Some</u>	<u>% of Dynamic C Villages Having Many or Some</u>	<u>% of Stagnant C Villages Having Many or Some</u>
Tractors	45%	6%	29%	0%
Rototillers	24%	12%	0%	0%
Threshing machines	14%	0%	14%	0%
Power tools (e. g. saws)	14%	0%	14%	0%
Insecticide sprayers	52%	12%	43%	17%
Fertilizer, for sale or stored	72%	19%	71%	17%
Animal feed, for sale or stored	59%	12%	29%	17%
Private industries	97%	62%	86%	50%
Small private electrical generators	17%	0%	0%	0%
Small private electrical generators, but many, some, or <u>a few</u>	76%	12%		
Some system of <u>limited central electrical power</u> during certain hours	34%	0%		
Construction or repair of buildings other than houses, in process or recently finished	38%	13%		

Consider local transportation to and from villages. See Table 7.

Table 7

TRANSPORTATION OF PERSONS AND GOODS TO AND FROM VILLAGES

<u>By persons:</u>	<u>Means of Transportation Most Used or Next Most Used</u>			
	<u>In this % of Dynamic Villages</u>	<u>In this % of Stagnant Villages</u>	<u>In this % of Dynamic C Villages</u>	<u>In this % of Stagnant C Villages</u>
Motorcycles or 3-wheeled Lambrettas (<u>xe-lam</u>)	69%	19%	57%	33%
<u>For goods</u>				
3-wheeled Lambrettas and trucks	62%	14%	100%	17%
Motorized sampans	66%	62%	86%	66%

Local transportation is a skewed indicator. One must remember that dynamic villages have more roads; stagnant villages have more water and more waterways. The real indicator of greater investment in transportation in dynamic villages than in stagnant ones is the percentage depending most on the sampan motor (which also doubles as a pump to lift water from canals and streams for irrigation.) Given the greater year-round access to adequate water supplies and the greater availability of waterways in stagnant villages, were their self-development similar to that of dynamic villages there would be far more use of sampan motors in the water-rich and water-route-rich stagnant villages than in the water-poor dynamic ones. But there is not.

Motorized vehicles such as Lambrettas and trucks are very expensive in Vietnam because of high import taxes, and their increased use in and between villages may seem to some to have nothing to do with village development. High priced, yes, but not atypical of some of the investments ordinary delta farmers are making on their own recently. For example:

"Case IV...Mr. Nam (a new farm-owner under LTTT) was not present but was working in the field so we held the interview with his wife... She states that she was happy the government had distributed land free of charge. With the additional income she stated that her husband recently purchased a new truck (which was parked in front of the house) that they were using as a second business besides cultivation. She said the truck would soon pay for itself since they were transporting rice to Tan An for the other new owners..."⁹

Loans to farmers Demand for and supply of agricultural credit to individual farmers have increased greatly since the beginning of 1970.

9. "A Case Study Compiled from Interviews Made with Tenant Farmers in Thu Thua District, Huong Tho Phu Village, in Tho Thanh and Binh Anh Hamlets," attachment to "Field Trip Report - Long An Province," Burt English to Director, Development Division, CORDS, MR3, 11Sept. 1972 (CORDS, MR3 and ADLR/USAID files).

Most rural credit is still supplied by relatives, friends, and non-institutional sources. The Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) is the largest institutional lender. The hu1 (or ho) is a very widespread form of credit; nobody knows how widespread. Private rural banks are minor as a source of rural credit as yet. ¹⁰

All ADB loans to farmers are loans against prospects of increased returns (investments) and none are for funerals, marriages, celebrations of the village dinh, and such traditional social occasions for indebtedness. ¹¹ During 1971, compared to 1970, the ADB increased all types of loans to the delta provinces by 62%. Not only has the volume of ADB lending to delta provinces increased, there has been a shift from loans to agribusinesses (such as credit to fertilizer importers, fishery loans, capital assistance to cooperatives) to loans to individual farmers. Further, there has been a shift from what GVN wants, special-purpose loans (e. g. to push rice or to push swine and poultry production) to loans for what the farmer wants to invest in, try, or purchase. Small loans of 50,000 VN\$ or less to individual farmers by the ADB in 1971, compared to 1970, increased 983%. Larger loans to individual farmers by the ADB in 1971, compared to 1970, increased 132%. ¹²

One must discount for inflation (the slow evaporation of value from the piaster itself.) The most reliable measure is that it took about 103 VN\$ in March 1971 to buy what it took about 126 VN\$ to buy in March 1972. ¹³ Even when so discounted the increase in agricultural credit to delta farmers has been very great.

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10. "Review of the Vietnamese Economy in 1971 and the First Quarter of 1972", Joint Economic Office, May 1972, ADEPP/ECON, USAID.
 11. Article 2, Decree No. 27-SL/CN, "Establishing the Agricultural Bank" 31 January 1967
 12. The ADB Reports for 1970 and for 1971. (Available in English in Production Support memos Nos. 22 and 26, dated 10 March 1971 and 10 April 1972, Office of the Associate Director of Food and Agriculture [ADFA] USAID.)
 13. Based on the USAID trial index of retail prices derived from 1968-69 prices as determined by a national consumer survey. See "Review of the Vietnamese Economy in 1971 and the First Quarter of 1972." Cited in note 10.

Some may wonder whether the increase in ADB credit represents GVN policy, an opening of the tap of credit, or represents increased demand by farmers. It represents both. The experts' guess is that ADB credit meets only about 20% of farmers' needs for credit. The rate of loan repayments is clear evidence that ADB personnel are behaving like bankers, not like welfare workers. In 1963--66 ADB's predecessor agency, the National Agricultural Credit Organization (NACO) made loans to farmers and less than 20% were ever repaid. In 1971 the ADB made loans to farmers and more than 90% were repaid on time, and those not repaid (for reasons of crop failure or other special emergency) were extended and did not have to be written off as uncollectable.

Another major source of rural credit is non-institutional, the hui or ho. A hui is a private group of friends, neighbors, work associates, or relatives formed to save money and to lend it at whatever borrowers in the group will pay, usually 2% or 3% per month. We know the amount of money involved in many hui's has increased many times 10-fold. Private hui's totalling as much as 10,000,000 VN\$ are not rare. We know too that in the delta it is estimated that more than half the money borrowed from hui's is now being borrowed for equipment and capital inputs such as pumps, tools, fertilizers, and insecticide.¹⁴

Private rural banks, as remarked above, are as yet a minor factor in rural credit. Nevertheless they too have increased since early 1970 in the delta. 34 are now operating in RVN.¹⁵ During 1971, compared to 1970, they increased their agricultural loans 314%.¹⁶

14. Based on an investigation by V L Elliott for the Institute of Defense Analysis, DOD, Washington for ADEPP, USAID, in 1971, and on private inquiries into delta (particularly Can Tho) hui's by the writers.

15. National Bank of Vietnam, Saigon.

16. "Vietnamese Private Rural Banks", airgram No. 890 to AID/Washington, from USAID, Saigon, 6 April 1972.

PART TWO

THE LAND TO THE TILLER PROGRAM AS A PARTIAL CAUSE OF CHANGES
IN THE DELTA

"Sometimes I recommend that my children and my villagers ought to support the GVN who helps us to better living conditions and democracy. Without LTTT I am hopeless to become a land-owner. I now enjoy to be a landowner before my death! Under the French I do not see tractors, rototillers, or insecticide sprayers which are bought from foreign nations by GVN to help farmers. Everybody is better dressed now than under French and Ho-Chi-Minh." (a new owner under LTTT, in Vinh Long)

Demand for agricultural credit is notably greater in dynamic villages than in stagnant villages. See Graph 3 on the following page. It is clear from Graph 3 that more dynamic villages have more farmer citizens who ask for, qualify for, and get ADB loans than is true of stagnant villages. It is clear that more of them are better credit risks, because the total of money loaned is greater. Presented another way:

Table 8


ADB CREDIT IN DYNAMIC VILLAGES COMPARED TO THAT
IN STAGNANT VILLAGES IN 1971

<u>Extent of Credit:</u>	<u>In this % of Dynamic Villages</u>	<u>In this % of Stagnant Villages</u>
<u>No one</u> has borrowed from ADB.	3%	34%
Some have borrowed from ADB during 1971.	70%	46%
Some may have borrowed from ADB during 1971, but the village has no record nor knowledge of it.	27%	20%
Total	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>


GRAPH 3

ADB LOANS, DURING 1971, IN DYNAMIC VILLAGES COMPARED
TO ADB LOANS, DURING 1971, IN STAGNANT VILLAGES

Dynamic Villages



Stagnant Villages



▨ = No Record or Unknown

CHAPTER IV
THE DELTA OPTS FOR THE PRESENT REGIME

Acceptance of present stability as long-run: Vietnamese have the habit of holding their wealth, small or considerable, in cash, especially if they are doubtful about the near future. (For example, when North Vietnam invaded South Vietnam beginning 29 March this quickly occasioned momentary runs on Saigon banks by depositors.) Nevertheless, in comparing our quantitative judgments of what farmers are buying and doing in 29 dynamic villages to those of 15 stagnant villages, we find that by far more shops are being built or rebuilt in the former, there is far more in shops' inventories, and far wider ranges of goods and services are offered. There is much more motor power (e. g. sampan motors which also serve as pumps, Lambrettas, trucks, motorcycles, electrical motors and small gasoline engines.) There are more small industries in the villages. There is much more agricultural machinery (e. g. rototillers, small tractors, even occasionally threshing machines.) The rototiller and small tractor have largely replaced the water buffalo in dynamic villages, but are used only rarely in stagnant villages. Many more houses have recently been built, or are now being built or replaced by middle-class homes.

These are all high-cost long-run investments. It is evident that farmers in the delta assume that recent years' and present stability will continue in the long-run future. This seems to be evidence of confidence in their government.

Willingness to pay taxes, particularly to pay more taxes, is another sign that the delta, where LTTT has been creating new landowners massively, is with the GVN. We did not inquire into this in our observations in 44 villages, nor did we dare pursue it when taxes were mentioned in our unstructured interviews

in 23 of the 44 villages, for the last impression we wanted any farm family to have of us was that we might be tax collectors. Nevertheless many respondents complained of high VC "tax" squeeze until recently, and many spoke well of GVN low taxes. Many research reports and reports by field personnel from Long An, Ba Xuyen, Chuong Thien, Dinh Tuong, Phong Dinh, Vinh Binh, and Vinh Long show that delta farmers will accept increased GVN taxes willingly, and that special wartime fees such as province export levies and village export fees are producing much revenue and that there is little or no public discontent because of them. ¹⁷

Internal village security and how it hurts the enemy. In the guerrilla and counter-guerrilla situations and circumstances of most all of South Vietnam's Military Regions 3 and 4 (excepting Binh Long, Phuoc Long, and enclaves of enemy power in and radiating out from various enemy base areas such as the U Minh in An Xuyen, southern Kien Giang and southern districts of Chuong Thien) it seems, from interviews, obvious that dynamic villages do better than stagnant villages in matters of internal village security and vigilance. Many, describing changes in their villages over the past 2 years, say such things as,

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17. Of Long An, "Popular Impressions of the Taxation in Can Duoc and Tan Tru Districts, Long An Province," February 1972 (CDC, ADLR file item No. 14)

Of Ba Xuyen, CDD Newsletter No. 28, 26 April 1972 (CDD, CORDS, MACV); and "Summary of Conference of Province Senior Advisors, 25 June 1972" (memo, R. Eney to ADLR, USAID. LR, MR4, CORDS and ADLR, USAID files)

Of Chuong Thien, "Taxation, Economy," Dec. 1971 (CDC, ADLR file item No. 11)

Of Dinh Tuong, "Village Development Program: Taxation, Security, Phoenix Program," Dec. 1971 (same as above, item No. 12)

Of Phong Dinh, "Taxes and Method of Collection," June 1971 (same as above item No. 4)

Of Vinh Binh, "GVN Taxation, Hoa Thuan Village, Chau Thanh District, Vinh Binh Province," Feb 1972 (same as above, item No. 15), PSA's Monthly Report for June, 1972; and "Summary of Conference of Province Senior Advisors, 25 June 1972" (cited above under Ba Xuyen)

Of Vinh Long, "To Examine the Accumulated Capital and General Increase and Decrease of Prosperity of the Agricultural Branch," Nov. 1971 (CDC, ADLR file item No. 9), CDD Newsletter No. 28, 26 April 1972 (cited above under Ba Xuyen), and PSA's Monthly Report for July 1972

"When they see any Viet Cong they tell village officials immediately now... so better security..."

(new owner under LTTT, also farm owner before LTTT, Cambodian, in Vinh Binh)

"Villagers now vigilant. They tell the soldiers in the outposts whenever strangers arrive in the hamlets."

(Landless, Cambodian, minor village official whose wife also sells fish, in Vinh Binh)

LTTT cannot directly increase security. Nor can hamlet schools, or other major GVN development programs. No village, even if all ex-tenants own their land, is likely to stand up, unassisted, to Viet Cong main forces or North Vietnamese army fire power. But internal cooperation and trust re internal security matters, between civilian villagers and local military (the PF and PSDF) seem visibly greater in dynamic villages than in stagnant villages, including those having the same HES security rating.

In our sample of 29 dynamic villages and 15 stagnant villages we found that:

1. Some dynamic villages do not even have curfews*. 21% do not. All stagnant villages do. Of those dynamic villages that do have curfews, some (24%) relax it at the village chief's discretion and permit Lambrettas, trucks, and motorcycles to run in the village at night with lights. No stagnant villages permit this.
2. Few families in dynamic villages have bunkers or trenches in or near their houses, or thick mud walls or halfwalls around their houses. In 83% of such villages we found no such individual protection against fire fights. In 47% of the stagnant villages we found that many or some houses have them. This shows increased confidence by villagers in village military forces.

* Security requirements have been tightened in delta villages since these observations were made between late January and June 1972.

3. There are less checks and guards at village crossroads and bridges in dynamic villages. 46% have none, 50% have only token checks. In stagnant villages there are more. 25% have them at all points, 38% at some, and only 37% have none. There is less use of military barbed wire around military outposts and public buildings in dynamic villages. 96% have none or what they have is largely out of use. In stagnant villages there is more. Only 66% have none or have largely ceased to use what they have. These indicate increased confidence by village military in the villagers.

4. Only 17% of dynamic villages have had roads cut or mined during the first six months of 1972. 56% of stagnant villages have. Road cuts and road mine emplacement, particularly the former, require considerable labor. When the enemy does it he uses local labor. When roads are cut often it means the rural villagers are silent, acquiescent in this enemy activity, whether because they are indifferent or because they are frightened. There is far less of it in dynamic villages.

Villagers who are effective in self-sustaining economic activity to improve their own lot seem to be more actively committed to the GVN than those in stagnant villages.

CHAPTER V

THE BIG SHIFT IN INCOME BECAUSE OF THE LAND TO THE TILLER PROGRAM

As of 30 September 1972, 545,000 hectares of rice land had been distributed in Long An and the provinces of Military Region 4 under LTTT.¹⁸ At 20 gia of paddy per hectare for rent before LTTT, at the current price of paddy in the delta (about 800 VN\$ per gia), this means that 8,719,376,000 VN\$ per year are no longer going to landlords and are now disposable income in the hands of ex-tenants who have become farm owners. At 30 gia per hectare rent before LTTT, new disposable income amounts to 13,079,064,000 VN\$.¹⁹

This large amount of cash is a transfer. Exlandlords no longer receive it. Ex-tenants, now owners of the land they farm, retain it. It is a large transfer of income downward from the few who had much to the many who had little.

Moreover, in the delta those who owned most of the vast lands farmed in tenancy were absentee landlords. Absentee landlords live in cities and towns. That 8.7 billion or 13.1 billion piasters not now being paid in rent is likelier to stay in villages and rural areas now that it stays in the hands of the ex-tenants who have become farm owners.

In addition LTTT has meant a sizeable increase in the amount of cash in the delta. Exlandlords are being compensated. Compensation is at 2 1/2 times the value of the crops.²⁰ As of 30 September 1972 more than 31,000 exlandlords of delta farm land have received cash for 20% of land value, plus 10% interest from the date of the LTTT law, 26 March 1970, for 358,000 hectares.²¹

18. "LTTT Status Report," 30 September 1972 (ADLR, USAID)

19. Rent estimates are plausible guesses. We know about how much rent tenants are paying in this or that part of the delta, but we do not know what percentage of extenants had ceased to have to pay rent years before LTTT (because landlords had been driven out by the Viet Cong or by GVN and U.S. firepower.) A few new owners, 1% or less, continue to pay some rent, usually token rent, to their exlandlords after they have become owners of their farm land, until the exlandlords receive compensation for the land, which may be as long as a year after it was distributed to the extenants.

20. Article 8, Law No 003/70, 26 March 1970.

21. "Status of LTTT Compensation," 30 September 1972 (ADLR, USAID)

The other 80% is paid in bonds cashable in one-year intervals. Quite a few exlandlords have already cashed their first bond. Cash paid to those who have been compensated exceeds the rent they would have received, had they remained landlords during the year or so they had to wait for compensation. Cash paid with the 10% interest from 26 March 1970 equals rent they would have received during the past two years, had they remained landlords. There is no cash loss for exlandlords.

LTTT has meant a large transfer of income downward to the many, and an increase in total cash in the delta.

CHAPTER VI

WHAT FARMERS SAY HAS CHANGED THE DELTA: SECURITY, LTTT,
PROSPERITY, AND BETTER FARMING

As Table 9 on pp. 38-9 shows, it is obvious that, in the minds of the farmers in the delta, security, LTTT, increased prosperity in general, and a number of things which can be grouped together under agricultural technology or better farming are the major causes of changes in their lives, their hamlets, and their villages during the past two or so years. LTTT stands out strongly. LTTT gets credit for more than it possibly could have effected. This is to say that it "turns them on"; it motivates them. Most attribute the changes in their villages to improved security and to LTTT.

The reader is reminded that by farmers we mean:

49%	who now own the land they farm because of LTTT
8%	who have applied for title under LTTT
17%	who owned the land they farmed before LTTT
15%	who are tenant farmers
7%	who are landless farm laborers
2%	who are landlords, or exlandlords because of LTTT
1%	who are landless skilled persons
1%	who are village or hamlet officials or military who do not farm
<u>100%</u>	

The reader is also reminded, again, that we used unstructured interviews (meaning unled, informal, meaning you, the interviewer, listen), that in these what they do not get around to talking about you do not learn about; that they are not required to talk about nor asked about nor focussed upon what you, the interviewer, want to know, and that because you just listen they do not give opinions meant to please you. What they talked about was what was on their minds. Did they, or did some, despite our efforts to ask only about changes during the past several years, perhaps identify some of us with LTTT? We think not, but it might have happened in some interviews that somebody, some lesser hamlet official, wandered in and mentioned it, or that somebody joined a small group of respondents after some had begun talking, asked "What are you talking about?" and was told by some "Nguoi Cay Co Ruong" (LTTT), or "How it was here 2 years ago," or "The price of ba si de" (rice whiskey), or any other conversational focus of that moment in the small cluster of respondents.

Table 9

MAJOR CAUSES OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGES: What Villagers Say Did It
(Most name more than one cause, so percentages total more than 100.)

<u>Things changed in the village and the hamlet because of</u>	<u>Long An</u> N=148 who name 242 causes	<u>Go Cong</u> N=307 who name 635 causes	<u>Dinh Tuong</u> N=150 who name 346 causes	<u>Vinh Long</u> N=181 who name 394 causes	<u>Vinh Binh</u> N=112 who name 318 causes	<u>Chuong Thien</u> N=87 who name 203 causes	<u>All 6 Provinces</u> N=985 who name 2,138 causes	
<u>Security</u>	58%	70%	73%	42%	73%	51%	67%	
Military help, village security, no more Viet Cong terrorism, etc.								62%
No more Viet Cong "tax" squeeze.	7%	5%	9%	3%	0%	0%	5%	
<u>Land to the Tiller</u> land distribution which ends tenancy and ends rent	56%	65%	66%	78%	82%	69%	68%	
<u>Roads</u> , bridges, waterways, and transportation linkage to towns	7%	3%	3%	4%	0%	0%	3%	
<u>Changes in farming methods</u>								
Miracle rice, 2 rice crops, and increased secondary crops	3%	3%	14%	34%	0%	7%	20.5%	
More use of fertilizer and insecticide	2%	5%	6%	5%	11%	7%		10%
Mechanization (tractors, rototillers, etc.)	2%	1%	0%	5%	8%	7%		5%
Improved irrigation (channels, canals, water pumps)	0%	2%	5%	3%	1%	0%		3%
Improved animal husbandry	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	3%	.5%	
<u>Economic causes</u>								
Less poverty everywhere in SVN (increased trade, more jobs, etc.)	12%	22%	21%	13%	38%	46%	32%	
Agricultural credit	1%	5%	9%	9%	9%	11%		7%
Good prices for rice	0%	3%	3%	1%	1%	1%		2%

Table 9 (continued)

<u>Things changed in the village and the hamlet because of (continued)</u>	<u>Long An</u> N=148 who name 242 causes	<u>Go Cong</u> N=307 who name 635 causes	<u>Dinh Tuong</u> N=150 who name 346 causes	<u>Vinh Long</u> N=181 who name 394 causes	<u>Vinh Binh</u> N=112 who name 318 causes	<u>Chuong Thien</u> N=87 who name 203 causes	<u>All 6 Province</u> N=985 who name 2,138 causes
<u>Natural causes</u>							
Good crops and high yields	5%	9%	8%	0%	12%	17%	8%
Good weather and no natural disasters	0%	5%	1%	1%	0%	4%	2%
God	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	.1%
<u>Villagers' Initiatives</u>							
Much hard work and careful spending	9%	3%	9%	0%	11%	2%	5%
Increased unity and community and self-help	0%	1%	1%	5%	24%	7%	5%
<u>Village government's responses to village needs</u>							
Self-development projects	0%	2%	2%	7%	7%	0%	6.6% 3% 2% 1% .5% .1%
Good village and hamlet government, good administration	2%	2%	0%	3%	3%	1%	
More schools	0%	0%	1%	1%	4%	0%	
Instruction in farming methods	0%	0%	0%	3%	0%	0%	
Training in village self-protection	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	
<u>Total</u>	<u>164%</u>	<u>207%</u>	<u>232%</u>	<u>218%</u>	<u>284%</u>	<u>233%</u>	<u>217%</u>

The impact of LTTT on delta farmers may seem astonishing in terms of what we think we know of rural economics, but farmers are not economists; they think in terms of the "here and now," in terms of their own lives. Their strong desire for land ownership and for release from the poverty of tenancy and subsistence farming is not anything recent in Vietnam. In 1967 a survey of "aspirations" of farmers in 576 villages in all of RVN found that in 60% of the villages they wanted "help to increase production" most, and only in 26% did they want "increased security" most.²² In late 1967 in another major survey tenant farmers in the delta (then 50-70% of all farmers in the delta) told interviewers land ownership was a matter of crucial importance five times more often than they mentioned insecurity as a major concern.²³ In September 1972 a sample of 459 persons in the delta (72% of whom are farmers) were asked "What is the most important thing local government has done to improve conditions in the area?" More said LTTT was than named any other GVN program. 3.6 times more said LTTT was the most important GVN program than said "improve security, law and order" was.²⁴ LTTT "turns them on."

New owners under LTTT compared to tenants: See Table 10.

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22. "Summarized Findings of the Rural Survey August-September 1967," Part III of Report No. 1 to the President of the Republic of Vietnam (Joint Development Group, Development and Resources Corp.) pp. 41-55.
23. Roy L. Prosterman, "Land Reform as Foreign Aid," Foreign Policy No. 6, Spring 1972, p. 133.
24. Pacification Attitude Analysis System (rural survey) September, 1972 (Pacification Studies Group, Office of the A C of S, CORDS, MACV) p. 23.

Table 10

MAJOR CAUSES OF CHANGES: What New Owners and Tenants Say Did It
(Many name more than one cause, so percentages total more than 100)

<u>Things changed in the village and the hamlet because of</u>	<u>New Owners (N=483)</u>	<u>Tenants (N=148)²⁵</u>	<u>All Farmers (N=985)</u>
<u>Security</u> (military help, village security, no more VC terrorism, no more VC "tax" squeeze)	74%	68%	67%
<u>LTTT land distribution</u> (which ends tenancy and ends rent)	70%	40%	68%
<u>Roads</u> (also bridges, waterway development or repair, and transportation linkage to towns)	2%	2%	3%
<u>Changes in farming methods</u> (miracle rice, 2 rice crops, increased secondary crops, more use of fertilizer and insecticides, mechanization, improved irrigation, improved animal husbandry)	35%	5%	20%
<u>Economic causes</u> (less poverty everywhere in SVN, increased trade, more jobs, agricultural credit, good prices for rice)	30%	6%	32%
<u>Natural causes</u> (good crops, high yields, good weather, no natural disasters, or God)	10%	8%	10%
<u>Villagers' initiatives</u> (much hard work, careful spending, increased unity and community and self-help)	6%	4%	10%
<u>Village governments' responses to village needs</u> (self-development projects, good village and hamlet government, more schools, instruction in farming methods, training in village self-protection)	5%	7%	7%
Total	232%	140%	217%

25. The reader is reminded that about 8% of these tenants had somehow already got word that most communal land would also be distributed under LTTT and had already applied to their villages for title. Also, it is clear from other research that tenant farmers think of themselves as tenants until they receive title to their land. It is possible that some of these tenants had already applied for title under LTTT but did not mention that they have done so, simply identifying themselves as tenants. In cases where they did so mention, or if they remarked that they till privately owned land (in which case the interviewer would ask), we classify them as "applicants." Persons known to have applied for title are not included as tenants.

Tenant farmers are aware of less changes in their lives, their hamlet, and their village than are new owners. Far more new owners than tenants attribute changes during the past 2 or so years to agricultural techniques and better farming methods, and to economic causes,

New owners, tenants, and awareness of agricultural technology: New owners are aware of more agricultural techniques than are tenants, though they live as neighbors in the same hamlets and villages. See Table 11.

Table 11

AWARENESS OF AGRICULTURAL TECHNIQUES: New Owners and Tenants Compared (Many mentioned more than one technique so percentages total more than 100)

<u>Agricultural techniques attributed to farmers in their hamlet or village</u>	<u>% of New Owners Who Spoke of It</u>	<u>% of Tenant Farmers Who Spoke of It</u>
Use of fertilizer or insecticide or both	83%	56%
Use of farm machines such as tractors or rototillers	72%	49%
Increases in rice yields, use of miracle rice seed, or conversion of rice land to 2-crops	35%	17%
Increases in secondary crops or in fruit or vegetable production	18%	17%
Increases in poultry and animal husbandry	10%	4%
Percentage who mentioned that <u>they themselves</u> use one or several of the above	18%	2%
Total	<u>236%</u>	<u>145%</u>

The unstructured interviews did lead farmers to think about changes in their lives, hamlets and villages during the past 2 or so years in part in terms of things such as the above. They were suggested (See Appendix C, items 2 and 3, p. 107.) But they were mentioned as a conversational lead equally to all farmers interviewed, and the great quantitative differences between what new owners and

tenants spoke of suggest strongly either that the quicker and more enterprising farmers apply for their land under LTTT earlier and the backward and unalert ones hang back, or that LTTT itself stimulates them to greater awareness of agricultural possibilities available to them.

New owners, tenants, and perceptions of life now compared to 2 years ago:

Again we make the point that interviewers knew things have improved in these villages during the past 2 years or so and that this was used as a conversational lead or focus. But it was a lead equally to all farmers interviewed. Yet we find striking differences between how new owners think things have changed, how tenants think they have, and how landless laborers do. See Table 12.

Table 12

MAJOR CHANGES DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS: FOR BETTER OR WORSE?

New Owners, Tenants, and Landless Laborers Compared

<u>Favorable, Unfavorable, or neutral character of their statements about changes in their village, hamlet, lives</u>	<u>% of New Owners Who So Say (N=483)</u>	<u>% of Tenants Who So Say (N=148)</u>	<u>% of Laborers Who So Say (N=79)</u>
Things are better than 2 years ago	89%	56%	49%
Things are no better, or respondent refuses to say, or can think of no changes	9%	13%	8%
Things are as bad off as ever or worse	2%	31%	43%
Total	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

A few examples illustrate these striking differences in how they characterize their lives and others' lives in their hamlet and their village.

New Owners

Tenants

"Bully vice in village no longer existng"

"As widower and tenant I am still too poor"

"Families meet, help each other in any task, lend money to each other, and always discuss farming problems and marketing and crops"

"Rent on pagoda's land unreasonable. If I don't pay them they take the land back,"

"Yield has not increased"

"They work more, exploit more land, even hilly land to which they have to lift or pump water now, because they do not have to pay the landlord for any increases in rice." 26

"She wouldn't say. She seemed wary and fearful." (Interviewer's comment)

"No progress. Land poor. Tenant will die if he works as tenant in this village, the yield is so low. Village very poor, soil poor." 26

26. These two respondents live in the same hamlet.

New Owners

"They're buying quite a bit. I expect a housing construction boom. Almost everybody is building."

"Life has been more joyful since LTTT" (He mentions the disappearance of gambling in the village and adds that this is good)

Tenants

"I hope the GVN will distribute land to landless farmers so we will have a better life like the others."

"Villagers are less poor than before, but my family has no change because I am a tenant on worship land, continuing to pay rent to landlord. I am very poor."

Landless laborers

"As farm workers we have only enough food. The Government has nothing to help the poorest men such as us."

"Poorest farmers as my family are continuing landless and have just enough for survival. No GVN program helps us. No money to buy fertilizer."

CHAPTER VII

WHAT FARMERS SAY THE LAND TO THE TILLER PROGRAM HAS DONE
OR MADE POSSIBLE

68% of those we interviewed say that LTTT has been one of the causes for the changes in their lives, their hamlet, and their village during the past 2 or so years. We now look into what they say LTTT has done or made possible. See Tables 13 and 14.

(Again we remind readers of the characteristics of unstructured interviews. Because say 3 of 10 say this or that one cannot assume the other 7 do not also think so. One can assume that the 3 of 10 have it on their minds. If 7 of 10 say something else one can assume that something else is more important to them than what they did not mention.)

In terms of what is on the minds of delta farmers, LTTT must be considered quite a success story, Of 985 farm families:

- 7 of 10 say that because of LTTT they are less poor, living better, and buying things.
73% of all new owners under LTTT say so.
- 3+ of 10 say that because of LTTT, now they are owners of the land they farm, they are no longer exploited and they feel free, equals of the others, or that there is more unity, community and friendliness in the hamlet and village (i. e. social equality).
40% of all new owners under LTTT say so. Only 7% of all tenants do.
- 3 of 10 say that because of LTTT farmers fully believe and support the GVN now, that the GVN did what it promised and that the GVN understands what farmers need, or that LTTT defeats Viet Cong propaganda and reduces enemy influence in the village.
39% of all new owners under LTTT say so. Only 17% of all tenants do.
- 1-of 10 (7.4%) say that because of LTTT new owners are better farmers and work harder at farming.
16% of all new owners under LTTT say so. Only 4% of all tenants do.
- 1+ of 20 (6%) say that because of LTTT their life is stable and they are able to help their parents and educate their children.
6% of all new owners under LTTT say so too, but only 1% of all tenants do.

Table 13

THE EFFECTS OF LTTT
(Most ascribe more than one effect to LTTT, so percentages total more than 100.)

	<u>Long An</u> N=148 who ascribe <u>17 effects</u>	<u>Go Cong</u> N=307 who ascribe <u>45 effects</u>	<u>Dinh Tuong</u> N=150 who ascribe <u>167 effects</u>	<u>Vinh Long</u> N=181 who ascribe <u>278 effects</u>	<u>Vinh Binh</u> N=112 who ascribe <u>302 effects</u>	<u>Chuong Thien</u> N=87 who ascribe <u>143 effects</u>	<u>All 6 Provinces</u> N=985 who ascribe <u>1,476 effects</u>
<u>Changes in their lives and villages because of LTTT.</u>							
<u>Equality, No more fear:</u>							
Now we are owners, we have no fear of what the landlord will do. There is no more landlord exploitation. We are free. We are equals now that almost all are owners.	23%	28%	36%	21%	50%	37%	34% 31%
There is more unity, community, and friendliness in the village and hamlet.	3%	3%	4%	3%	7%	0%	
<u>Identification with GVN</u>							
Farmers fully support the Government now. The GVN did what it promised. The GVN understands what farmers need and is really helping us.	14%	19%	12%	19%	28%	23%	30% 18%
LTTT defeats Viet Cong propaganda. It reduces their influence in the village. Because all are owners, Viet Cong can not move freely in the hamlet; there is no Viet Cong terrorism now.	8%	8%	8%	14%	7%	5%	
There is no more Viet Cong "tax" squeeze.	5%	3%	0%	8%	0%	0%	3%

Table 13 (continued)

<u>Changes in their lives and villages because of LTTT (continued)</u>	<u>Long An</u> N=148 who ascribe <u>171 effects</u>	<u>Go Cong</u> N=307 who ascribe <u>415 effects</u>	<u>Dinh Tuong</u> N=150 who ascribe <u>167 effects</u>	<u>Vinh Long</u> N=181 who ascribe <u>278 effects</u>	<u>Vinh Binh</u> N=112 who ascribe <u>302 effects</u>	<u>Chuong Thien</u> N=87 who ascribe <u>143 effects</u>	<u>All 6 Provinces</u> N=985 who ascribe <u>1,476 effects</u>
<u>Beginnings of the Good Life - Consumption</u>							
Now we are owners, we are less poor and miserable, living conditions are better; there are less hardships; we are becoming prosperous.	41%	57%	32%	42%	89%	72%	53%
Life is easier, we are happier, we are able to enjoy life.	4%	5%	4%	16%	69%	19%	72.6% 15%
We can build good houses or repair our houses.	5%	4%	3%	7%	4%	2%	4%
We can buy things now such as radios, sewing machines, furniture, and motorbikes.	0%	0%	0%	1%	4%	0%	.6%
<u>Stability and Family Gains</u>							
Our means of existence is stable now, (e. g. if the rice crop fails we cannot be forced off our land or required to do things because of rent debts.)	0%	0%	0%	12%	0%	0%	2%
We have enough money now to send our children to school. More families now can afford to send their children to higher level schools at district or province. Our children need not suffer, like many of us, from illiteracy.	1%	0%	0%	3%	7%	1%	6% 2%
Now we can easily support our parents and raise our children.	0%	4%	0%	0%	4%	0%	2%

Table 13 (continued)

<u>Changes in their lives and villages because of LTTT (continued)</u>	<u>Long An</u> N=148 who ascribe 171 effects	<u>Go Cong</u> N=307 who ascribe 415 effects	<u>Dinh Tuong</u> N=150 who ascribe 167 effects	<u>Vinh Long</u> N=181 who ascribe 278 effects	<u>Vinh Binh</u> N=112 who ascribe 302 effects	<u>Chuong Thien</u> N=87 who ascribe 143 effects	<u>All 6 Provinces</u> N=985 who ascribe 1,476 effects
<u>Better farming:</u>							
Now we are owners we work harder and longer because we keep all we grow.	5%	3%	6%	0%	0%	1%	3%
We can now change crops, grow 2 crops of rice, increase our garden land, grow fruit, or whatever we think is profitable.	5%	0%	1%	0%	0%	2%	1.8%
More land which was once abandoned is being farmed.	1%	1%	1%	7%	0%	2%	2%
We can now buy fertilizer, and some insecticides, and buy or rent tractors or rototillers to farm land by machine, which is more profitable.	1%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	7.4%
We can now afford to raise more pigs, ducks, and chickens, for ourselves and for sale.	0%	0%	3%	0%	0%	0%	.4%
<u>All effects ascribed to LTTT</u>	<u>116%</u>	<u>135%</u>	<u>111%</u>	<u>153%</u>	<u>269%</u>	<u>164%</u>	<u>150%</u>

Differences between provinces: the poorer the area, the more appeal LTTT has:

Farmers in Vinh Binh and Chuong Thien (certainly the two poorest of the six provinces in which we interviewed) are the ones who, far more than others, credit LTTT with having made them less poor. Also, in these two poorest provinces more farmers say that in their villages farmers all support the GVN because of LTTT. The way the economic pie is divided is what much, perhaps most, of politics is about.

New owners and tenants compared: See Table 14. More new owners ascribe more good effects to LTTT in their villages and hamlets than do tenants. More new owners ascribe widespread farmer support to the GVN because of LTTT than do tenants.

Table 14

THE EFFECTS OF LTTT: New Owners and Tenants Compared (Many ascribe more than one effect to LTTT, so percentages total more than 100)

<u>Changes in their lives and villages because of LTTT</u>	<u>% of New Owners Who Ascribe These Effects</u>	<u>% of Tenants Who Ascribe These Effects</u>	<u>% of All Farmers Who Ascribe These Effects</u>
Equality, no more fear (see Table 13 for details of each category)	40%	7.5%	34%
Identification by farmers with GVN; full support of the Government now	39%	17%	30%
Beginnings of the good life	73%	35%	73%
Stability and family gains	6%	1%	6%
Better farming	16%	4%	7.4%
Total	<u>174%</u>	<u>64.5%</u>	<u>150%</u>

CHAPTER VIII

THE LAND TO THE TILLER PROGRAM AS AN INCENTIVE

Ex-tenants who have become farm owners want to produce more, venture into other crops, risk cash outlays to improve or increase their yields, and work harder and longer. Many say this. As one new owner in Vinh Long put it:

"Thanks to this law I own one hectare of land. We pay more attention to farming and work harder than before. One hectare of land is small for rich people, but for me it is a fortune! I save more money in last year. I intend to use it for rebuilding my house next year. Welcome to Ong Thieu and Nguoi Cay Co Ruong (LTTT)!"

16% of all the new owners we interviewed said that because of LTTT they work harder, change crops, or now use chemicals or machines to increase their yields. 18% of new owners mentioned that they use new agricultural techniques or have ventured into additional types of crops or animal or poultry husbandry; only 2% of tenant farmers do.

Other research, on the economic behavior of new owners under LTTT, in 1 village in Long An, 1 in Dinh Tuong, 1 in Phong Dinh, and 1 in An Giang shows that many new owners say that now, because they own the land they farm, they work more, vary production more and take more risks, invest more in farming, and buy more consumer goods. In the village in Long An 14 of 16 new owners report plans to rebuild their homes this or next year, only 7 of 15 tenants do. The 16 new owners say they plan to buy 13 consumer durables after the next crop; the 15 tenants plan to buy only 4. Their investments in farming during 1971, 1972, or planned for 1973 average 3.6 per new owner, but 3.3 per tenant farmer. In the village in Dinh Tuong 10 of 15 new owners rebuilt their homes or will after the next crop, only 6 of 15 tenants did or will. Six of 15 new owners just bought or will soon buy consumer durables; only 2 of 15 tenants will. Their investments in farming average 2.5 per new owner, but 1.6 per tenant farmer. In the village in Phong Dinh 7 of 16 new owners have rebuilt their homes; 5 of 15 tenants have. Three of 16 new owners have just bought consumer durables; none of 15 tenants have. Their investments in farming average 3.6 per new owner but only 2.3 per tenant.

In the one village in An Giang, of which data has not yet been analyzed and we have only the research workers' impressions, and where LTTT is moving slowly, there are at least "some faint hints that new owners are freer to act" in deciding what to grow, raise, and how, and "new owners are showing visible signs of greater prosperity."

In the three villages studied, one in Long An, one in Dinh Tuong, and one in Phong Dinh, there is a strong incentive effect, incentive to invest more in newly-owned land, and also to consume more.²⁷

Some village officials in Long An, Chuong Thien, Dinh Tuong, and Go Cong, (in villages in which we made behavioral observations prior to interviews) unsolicited by us remarked the strong incentive effects of LTTT. Other inquiries in villages in Chuong Thien report it.²⁸

Still other inquiries, in another village in Long An, show the incentive effect of LTTT upon ex-tenants who have become owners of the land they have been farming all their lives as tenants.²⁹ E g

"Case II. . She was happy that the law had provided her title to her land since she had been a tenant for years and never expected to actually own her land . the 150 gia production was much better than before when she had to ask for loans during poor production years from the landlord she was paying up to 50% rent for the land she was tilling"

"Case III She stated her life in general has improved substantially since she became a new owner . . . She showed us chickens and pigs that were recently purchased with the additional income she has managed to save. . ."

"Case V . Mr. _____ professed to be 'a professional farmer ' He was very proud of the fact that his status had changed and it was apparent in his conversation and direct approach. He stated that he had been a tenant farmer for more than 25 years and did not think he would ever become an owner. . . with the additional income secured from the past harvest his oldest son is now attending a school of higher instruction in Saigon He said this would not have been possible if he were still required to pay rents as before. His only complaint was that the price of fertilizer and insecticide had increased substantially in the past few months"

27. C. Stuart Callison, on-going doctoral research on the economic, social, and political effects of the Land to the Tiller program (Department of Economics, Cornell University, Ithaca, N Y) Findings on the 1 village in Long An are available in Kinh Te, Vol. 2, March 1972 (Journal of the Vietnam Economic Association, University of Can Tho) Data on other villages is available from CDC, ADLR, USAID)

28. "The 'LTTT' Law," 26 Oct 1971 and "Update Evaluation of Long Tri Village," 30 July 1971 (CDC, ADLR, USAID file items nos 7A and 7B)

29. "A Case Study Compiled from Interviews Made with Tenant Farmers in Thu Thua District, Huong Tho Phu Village, in Tho Thanh and Binh An Hamlets" (cited in note 9)

This tendency to feel liberated and to try harder was one of the effects of land ownership on extenant farmers in successful land distributions to tenant farmers in Japan, Taiwan,³⁰ and Bolivia.³¹

Officials of the Agricultural Development Bank in the delta know the incentive effects of land ownership. They consider a farm owner or even an applicant for title under LTTT a better credit risk than they do a tenant farmer.³²

Analogies, false and true: The writers do not assert that LTTT is the only incentive to farmers, but that it is one major causal factor. We do not argue that all poor farmers respond to LTTT. Farmers in MR1 do not, because social taboos and strong landlord power inhibit them. We do not argue that without LTTT or some form of land reform farmers always lack incentives. E. g. in the State of Illinois, in the U. S. A. , central counties are enormously prosperous agriculturally but in southern Illinois farmers are poor and backward, yet neither has had any land reform. Land tenancy has not been a major problem there. Another analogy: After World War II the western European countries moved from economic chaos to production and prosperity in the 1950's. The European Recovery Plan (Marshall Plan) helped them greatly to do this. Japan, however, made it to prosperity and efficiency in the 1950's on its own, without any Marshall Plan. But every serious student of European affairs agrees that the Marshall Plan helped West European countries greatly.

We do say and we have shown that the evidence is overwhelming that LTTT has a considerable incentive effect on delta farmers.

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30. R. P. Dore, Land Reform in Japan, (Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 216-18. Anthony C. Koo, The Role of Land Reform in Economic Development: A Case Study of Taiwan (Praeger, New York, 1968), Chapter 5. M. M. C. Yang, Socio-Economic Results of Land Reform in Taiwan, (East-West Center Press, Honolulu, 1970), *passim*
31. Doreen Warriner, Land Reform in Principle and Practice, (Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 241-8.
32. Based on interviews with ADB representatives in Phong Dinh, An Giang, and Chau Doc (G. Zannos, "LTTT Program in Relation to Rural Credit Program", memo to R. Eney, 29 September 1971, Land Reform Division, CORDS, MR4, and ADLR, USAID files).

CHAPTER IX

THE LAND TO THE TILLER PROGRAM AND EQUALITY· LANDLORDS AND TENANTS WHEN TENANCY WAS FOR LIFE, AND NOW.

It is necessary to recall how it was during the lifetime of most delta farmers. RVN's earlier land distribution (Ordinance 57, 1956) distributed land to only about 125,000 farm households from 1956 to mid-1968. Some of it was infertile. Most of it was insecure.^{33A} The beneficiaries were a small part of the vast population of farmers living in tenancy in the delta. The program did not break the hold of the landlords in the delta. We found that among 985 delta farm families only 17% had managed to become owners of their land before LTTT. Of these only 1 in 4 had received his land under Ordinance 57. Only 1 in 5 had been able to pay for his farm land he was trying to buy under Ordinance 57. I. e. of 985 farm families, only 35 had progressed from tenant to owner from 1956 to 1970 under Ordinance 57. 72% were tenants before LTTT. SVN's delta, Java, and northeast Brazil were the three worst areas of exploited subsistence tenant farmers in the world. The delta peasants' dream was "to own a small plot of land, a draft animal and a rice-thatched house without being in debt for the rest of their lives". Landowners preferred to divide their lands into small farms and lease them to tenants for primitive traditional farming. Landlords were usually the money lenders, at 120% per year. The landlord expected gifts at Tet and Harvest feast. He expected free labor from tenants. And then took 40-70% of the yield.^{33B}

"...The landlord considered the tenant as an inferior member of his extended family....The landlord acted not only as owner and lessor of land, but as an informal administrator, like the chief of a small state. All disputes between tenants were judged first by the landlord. Only if the landlord failed to resolve such a dispute did the parties go to the government---the village council. There was an unwritten code administered by the landlord, it applied first.... The landlord would enforce his own type of discipline, including corporal punishment for the men and detention for the women. Often the guilty party would be beaten...."³⁴

33A. The Vietcong, vol III of Land Reform in Vietnam (Stanford Research Institute to USAID, 1968, 4 volumes; pp. 9-28 and 35, and Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An (University of California Press, 1972) pp. 56-61 and 97-8

33B. Bernard Fall, Political Developments of Vietnam, V -J Day to the Geneva Cease-Fire, (doctoral thesis, Syracuse University, 1955), volume 2, pp. 604-20.

34. Robert L Sansom, The Economics of Insurgency in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam, (M I T. Press, 1970), pp. 18, 29-30

"The pattern of land tenure of the son was that of the father in most cases, Born to a tenant family, one became a tenant farmer. Born to a family which owned the farm land it tilled, one became an owner-operator. The rural family's social and economic mobility, in terms of land ownership, was close to nil from generation to generation prior to the Land to the Tiller Law."³⁵

Some landlords would transfer a hopelessly-indebted tenant to a more fertile plot of land and switch a more efficient tenant who was not in debt to less fertile land. Landlords refused permission to vary farming, change crops, or change methods, and more often the tenant farmers simply did not dare to ask permission.³⁶

It was not unusual for a landlord, when a tenant, because of bad crops or other mishap, could not pay all his rent, to take the tenant's older children to work in the landlord's house as unpaid servants. Sometimes tenants' daughters so indentured became the landowner's concubines. Rural Vietnamese are very protective and conservative in matters concerning women of their family, and fear that this might happen to their children caused shame. This kind of indignity is what a new owner under LTTT, in Vinh Long, meant when he said

"Now the landlord cannot any more hurt me morally upon bad crop and unablenss to pay rent as much as required."

"In rural Vietnam the economic issue of overwhelming significance was land-- the principal means of livelihood. . . . What attracted people to the revolutionary movement was that it represented a new society in which there would be an individual redistribution of values, including power and status. . . . What use, the [Communist] Party cadres would ask, . . . is the fertilizer you have just bought with the government loan, when the landlord takes half the crop? the same groups were still going to be at the bottom. . . ."³⁷

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35. Soldiers and the Land to the Tiller Program in Military Region 4 of Vietnam, (Control Data Corp. to ADLR, USAID, August 1971) Tables 2 and 3 and p. 9.
36. Callison so found in interviews in 1 village in Phong Dinh, (on-going doctoral research. See note 27)
37. Jeffrey Race, "Lessons from Long An", War Comes to Long An (University of California Press, 1972) pp. 165-6, 176.

In late 1967 tenant farmers in the delta told interviewers that land ownership was of crucial importance five times more often than they mentioned insecurity as a crucial matter. 38

How it is: In 23 dynamic villages many, 31% of all farmers, and 40% of all new owners, spoke of freedom from the landlord and from the indignities of his demands, because of LTTT. E. g.

"Thanks to LTTT ... no more landlord domination. All are equal."
(farm owner before LTTT, in Long An)

"LTTT is very helpful for everyone. This is justice and social equality."
(new owner under LTTT, in Go Cong)

"The most influence is, they feel more free when they got land from LTTT ..."
(new owner under LTTT, in Vinh Long)

"We are no longer oppressed by landlords as in previous years"
(new owner, in Long An)

"They were all robbed by the landlords in past time. They had to pay up to 50 gia a hectare to landlords while they harvested only 70 gia a hectare. They were all completely miserable if family was any size at all."
(a businessman and builder, also tenant on worship land raising and marketing vegetables, in Go Cong)

It is evident that LTTT has decreased inequality, and to the vast number once down at the bottom of the heap this is good.

The political significance: It is also good for prospects of rural democracy and decreased insurrection. Political scientists conclude that equality is one of the things that most revolutions and insurrections are about and for. Sociologists conclude that those down at the bottom of the social strata in any community are suspicious of authority (of police, clergymen, teachers, public officials), that they believe politics is to exploit the poor and that they lack self confidence. Psychologists conclude that when persons feel powerless with respect to public affairs they are cynical about political democracy and that, conversely, "feelings of efficacy and sense of gaining relative power with respect to public affairs produce idealism about political democracy."³⁹

38. Prosterman, cited in note 23.

39. See for example Bernard Berelson and Gary A. Steiner, Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings (Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964) pp. 489-90, and Charles C. Moskos and W. Bell, "Attitudes towards Democracy," in Attitudes (Penguin Modern Psychology Series, Penguin Books, 1966) p. 69.

Economists increasingly conclude that if a nation or region somehow reduces inequality between strata or classes, then it has created a major condition necessary for self-sustaining economic development. Regression analyses of statistics of 75 series of political and social indicators, from 133 countries, show that inequality of land distribution among farmers correlates with lack of economic development.⁴⁰

It is evident that LTTT has decreased inequality and that to the vast majority of tenants who have become owners this is good. It is also evident that the possibilities and political and economic changes this implies are changes desired by the Republic of South Vietnam and by its ally, the U.S.A.

40. Bruce M. Russett, Hayward R. Alker Jr., Karl W. Deutsch, and Harold D. Lasswell, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (Yale University Press, 1964) pp. 1-12 on the great extent of the data, p. 292 for the conclusion cited above.

CHAPTER X

THE LAND TO THE TILLER PROGRAM AND FARMERS' IDENTIFICATION WITH THE GVN AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT.

Of the 985 rural families we interviewed, most commented favorably on the changes in their lives, their hamlets, and their villages during the past two or so years. But far more new owners under LTTT than tenants or landless laborers do. (See Table 12.) Many also show that they, and according to them most farmers in their village and hamlet, identify strongly with their government and with their local government. Many do so for reasons other than LTTT ---e.g. because of improved security. Most (62-68%) speak of improved security and LTTT as the major changes which have improved their lives, and the GVN gets credit for both. (See Table 9.) More new owners under LTTT than tenants credit both as having made life much better for them. (See Table 10.) One finds strong identification with the central government and with the President in what they say. Comments like these are numerous.

"Thanks to LTTT the President's picture is everywhere here. He has helped people and is to be admired. Thanks to LTTT ---the Government is smart, no landlord domination, all equal, all happy. No Viet Cong observed. All side with GVN completely."

(a farmer who owned his land before LTTT, in Long An)

"We poor farmers, we never have enough money to buy land. Now thanks to this law, I own some land for farming. We are happy and all are encouraged to farm the land. Welcome this law and Mr. Thieu very much!"

(a new owner under LTTT in Dinh Tuong)

"We are less poor thanks to LTTT. Thanks to LTTT we are now enjoying an easier life, no longer have to pay rent to landlords... We are grateful to the Government and of course we are all for the Government completely."

(a new owner under LTTT, in Vinh Binh)

Village chiefs in various villages in all of the 6 provinces in which we interviewed also mentioned strong citizen support for the GVN because of LTTT. (We were then in their villages for other purposes: to observe what farm

families buy and do and use, but the village chiefs did know that we were trying to assess the effects of LTTT, which may have prompted some of them to give us favorable remarks.) Nevertheless, in 11 of 23 dynamic villages, they volunteered, unasked by us, such comments as. "Some refuse to pay Viet Cong taxes now. They are very grateful for LTTT" (in Long An). Or "The village is solidly pro-GVN because of LTTT and other programs. It was Viet Cong in 1969" (in Vinh Long).

We also know that villagers identify with GVN national government because of LTTT from other research. Research on the economic effects of LTTT, in 1 village in Long An, 1 in Dinh Tuong, 1 in Phong Dinh, and 1 in An Giang, shows this in Long An, Dinh Tuong, and Phong Dinh, though not in An Giang. In a preliminary report on Khanh Hau village, in Long An, the researcher writes:

"...the program does seem to have stirred many Khanh Hau farmers, especially those who are gaining from land distribution and those who think they might gain, into attending more village meetings than before and participating more willingly in village projects. They are eager to keep up with what is going on. Several people told us that resident landlords are attending more meetings than before, too, also eager to keep up with events and to learn possible strategies for keeping more of their land .

There seems to be a new belief in Khanh Hau that someone in Saigon is on the side of the poor farmer and that some government programs are beginning to work in their favor, and the LTTT program appears to deserve much of the credit for this...." 41

In contrast, in 15 stagnant villages---which were also "zero or almost zero LTTT" villages (see Graph 2)--- no village official mentioned that anybody in his village was for the GVN. Or for that matter for anybody or anything else. The following are notes by us, typical of those we made in stagnant villages. (In addition to using our 31 indicators of political union or disunion and 75 indicators of economic progress or regression, we also logged "possibly unique" characteristics of each village).

41. Calliso , cited in note 27

In Phong Dinh

"The main village hamlet is a subsistence-living hole. The poor here are the worst we've seen in SVN. Village council chairman seems old fuddy duddy, does not do anything. DSA confirms this judgment. No LTTT. No VLR, vague about why not."

"LTTT zero. Most people don't want to apply because of fear of VC retaliation. No roads, canals only. No school, no development, no tractors, no agricultural equipment, no ADB loans, no anything."

In Vinh Binh

"Village officials a lazy do-nothing lot. Slovenliness and poverty visible in every house. Elders suggest mindless static life there. No growth or signs of achievement anywhere. No secondary crop land. Have VLR but village headquarters says they are not urging LTTT. (230 applications for land received since October 1971, but village has not yet acted on one -- this is March 1972.) Village officials do not do much. 40% of children allegedly not being sent to school, parents too poor, they say. Have 7 PF platoons sitting around, rate C on HES, and seem safe enough."

There is also increased identification, by local officials, with the villagers, because of LTTT. The writers do not argue that mere transfer of land titles achieves togetherness or democracy between officialdom and rural citizens. But it is a quantitatively verified fact that LTTT motivates delta farmers as few other GVN programs do. It also apparently motivates some officials because it so appeals to their constituents, as the following shows -

"... the team has interviewed 20 village and district officials in 4 districts. Their general opinion was in favor of this program (LTTT). The reason was this has helped enhance their prestige among the majority of the people in the village and district for which they're responsible. They felt that this was a good opportunity for them to gain the people's confidence and support in the next election. Some of them stated that personally they're all right as far as their living condition was concerned, but most of their close relatives and neighbors are poor farmers who are undoubtedly in favor of the land allocation program..."⁴²

Relations between local officials and local military and the villagers are less authoritarian, more personal and democratic in dynamic villages.

42. "Phung Hoang Program/Government Official Attitudes Toward Land Allocation Program/Peoples' Attitude Toward Village Officials and PF's", 10-28 March 1971 (CDC ADLR file item no. 2) (underlined by us)

The following show how it was, and still is in some villages, between local officials and the military, and the rural citizens.

"... people in those three villages are afraid of the officials' arrivals at their houses, because they admit that when the hamlet chief came they would be forced to labor work..."⁴³

"All PSDF soldiers here are rulers. They do whatever they want to..."⁴⁴

The following comments to us in interviews show how it is and is becoming in dynamic villages.

"They are happy to see the village chief and ARVN soldiers come to visit villagers frequently."

(tenant, My Yen village in Long An)

"ARVN soldiers and village officials are more kind toward the people, not as before. The people have more freedom than before."

(new owner under LTTT, Thanh Cong village in Go Cong)

"Soldiers here treat them like friends. Soldiers in my native place (he is a refugee) treated them like enemy."

(farm owner before LTTT, refugee, Hoa Tinh village in Dinh Trong)

Another distinction between dynamic and stagnant villages which both shows identification and makes for identification between those who benefit from LTTT implementation and the Government is the visible word. Farmers do not read much (though another recent sign of farmer identification with GVN is that, since the invasion of SVN by North Vietnam, 29 March, it is reported that one often sees, in the delta, one farmer with a newspaper reading to a small group.) Few Saigon newspapers reach the villages. The word is spread verbally, and somewhat in the form of painted slogans. See Table 15.

43. "Research on the carrying out of the Village Development Projects and Land to the Tiller Law", 24 November 1971 (same source as above, item no. 10)

44. "Survey on the knowledge and attitudes of people toward the authorities in their localities - Dinh Tuong Province", 18 October 1971 (same as above, item no. 8)

Table 15

SLOGANS IN SUPPORT OF THE GVN IN DELTA VILLAGES

<u>Type of slogan</u>	<u>In this % of Dynamic Villages</u>	<u>In this % of Stagnant Villages</u>
"Are there slogans in favor of the LTTT program seen anywhere?"		
Yes, many, or some	38%	0%
"Are there any other slogans or national symbols seen anywhere?"		
Yes, some	52%	12%

The omnipresent information bulletin boards (which apparently nobody reads, in town or country) were excluded from the above. We refer to painted or otherwise locally made slogans. Such signs are usually at the initiative of the hamlet chief rather than the individual citizen. Nevertheless unlike slogans for other programs those celebrating LTTT sometimes are quite elaborate. In one village we found a small monument (a large concrete slab) to LTTT. These suggest that some officials, particularly hamlet officials, know that LTTT is a good thing to push and to commemorate.

Village and hamlet government officials are more representative of the people they govern because of LTTT. We do not mean that there are more elections, or that the organization of village and hamlet procedures has changed, or that local elections are more democratic. We mean that in most delta villages farming is the main or sole activity of almost all families; therefore land tenure is a major concern of most citizens. One's land tenure in a village or hamlet obviously affects and in considerable part shapes one's self-interests, biases, and responsiveness to events, disputes, or problems. Because of LTTT village and

hamlet officials are more representative, in land tenure, of the villagers they govern than they were before LTTT.⁴⁵ See Table 16.

Table 16

LAND OWNERSHIP AND TENANCY AMONG VILLAGE AND HAMLET OFFICIALS AND THEIR CONSTITUENTS, IN THE DELTA, BEFORE AND AFTER LTTT.⁴⁶

<u>Land Tenure</u>	<u>Officials in 1970</u>	<u>Villagers in 1970</u>	<u>Officials in 23 dynamic vil- lages in 1972</u>	<u>Villagers in 23 dynamic villages in 1972</u>
Farm owners (owners before LTTT, owners because of LTTT, and applicants for title under LTTT)	23%	16%	67%	75%
Tenant farmers	27%	60-70%	7%	15%
Landless, not farming	40%	-	26%	1%
Landless; laborers	-	10-20%	-	7%
Landlords or ex-landlords	<u>10%</u>	<u>4-5%</u>	<u>0%</u>	<u>2%</u>
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

The big changes are that farmers who own the land they farm are now preponderant in village and hamlet government and among those who are governed, and that tenant farmers are no longer greatly underrepresented.

45. We find that a large percentage of village and hamlet officials found in our random sample are new owner-farmers under LTTT and we know that before LTTT a high percentage were tenants or not farming. We infer many made application for title early in the LTTT process. Callison, (cited, note 27) reports that in interviews some new owners said that, realizing they are now preponderant among farmers, they used 1971 village elections to vote out non-farmer officials and vote in their own type. Ministry of Interior statistics on village elections do show a high percentage of turnover (defeat of incumbents) in village and hamlet elections in late 1970 and 1971.

46. "Officials in 1970" is taken from Land Ownership and Tenancy Among Village and Hamlet Officials in the Delta (Control Data Corporation to ADLR, USAID, March 1970, p. 28), N=697 from Long An and 4 delta provinces.

"Villagers in 1970" is derived from Land Reform in Vietnam (Stanford Research Institute to USAID, 1968, 4 volumes).

"Officials in 1972" consists of 54 village and hamlet officials, 50 of whom were interviewed in our random sample of 985 village families in 6 provinces and 4 of whom happened to mention their land tenure or that they do not own land or farm, in our behavioral observations in 44 villages in 7 provinces.

"Villagers in 1972" is our random sample of 985 farm families minus 50 whose family heads are village or hamlet officials.

Unity, sociability, camaraderie, and community in villages: There is more community and mutual trust in dynamic villages than in stagnant ones. See Table 17.

Table 17

COMMUNITY AND MUTUAL TRUST IN DELTA VILLAGES

<u>Evidence Observed:</u>	<u>In this % of Dynamic Villages</u>	<u>In this % of Stagnant Villages</u>
Are they friendly, sociable, talking freely to each other? Yes, most or many are	83%	53%
Are they friendly and helpful to us visitors? Yes, most or many are	79%	53%
Are they silent, wary, passing each other without greetings or talk? Does it seem there are almost no small groups talking and gossiping? Yes, most or many are	7%	25%
Do women seem friendly to each other? Do they talk freely to men? Yes, most or many do	59%	27%
Re transients, do most of them seem at ease? Do villagers talk to them? Or are they silent, unsociable, wary? Most seem at ease. Villagers talk to them	80%	27%

30% of all farmers we interviewed spoke of this new mutual trust among villagers. Examples:

"...women are especially sympathetic to each other now, to give mutual aid or help others living in the same hamlet."
(a new owner under LTTT, in Vinh Long)

"If somebody gets fish he will cook it and invite some others to come and drink rice whiskey and eat fish."
(a new owner, in Vinh Long)

"Whenever a family in the hamlet has some wedding, funeral, or house construction we often come over to help them willingly. We're in closer relationship in all social work now."
(a new owner, in Chuong Thien)

The reader may recall that in interviews we suggested increased unity as one of the changes in villages and hamlets during the past several years. Nevertheless, that LTTT among other causal factors makes for intra-village and intra-hamlet unity is suggested by the fact that 36% of all new owners spoke of it; only 26% of all tenants did.

LTTT and the enemy: We know that LTTT is hurting the enemy. We know it from their propaganda. For example

"to destroy our peasants' dream which was realized through the victorious August Revolution puppet Thieu rigged up his 'Land to the Tiller' law to legalize his grabbing of our peasants' ricefields and make them again live miserable lives as tenant farmers..."

(Liberation Radio, clandestine, in Vietnamese to South Vietnam, 11 October 1971) 47

We know it too, from local enemy reactions in Kien Tuong, Long An, Hau Nghia, Kien Hoa, Bac Lieu, Dinh Tuong, Chuong Thien, and Vinh Binh provinces.⁴⁸ No doubt an exhaustive search in the vast detailed records of the Counter-Intelligence Center of MACV would reveal many others. We know it, too, because the enemy seems to target LTTT village land registrars more often than he does other local officials.⁴⁹

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47. Principal Reports from Communist Radio Sources (JUSPAO), 14 October 71.
48. E.g. in Kien Tuong a Viet Cong rallier states his former comrades considered Tri Phap village lost to the Viet Cong cause because of the impact of LTTT ("Analysis of MR4 PPA reports for April 1971", Trends and Analysis, JUSPAO) In Long An the Viet Cong in Thu Thua District on 25 Feb. 1971, publicized a notice to all farmers that land transfers under LTTT were forbidden (Report to Province Chief on captured document No. 1505/TKLA/IM/2K, Long An Sector, 20 April 1971) In Binh Phuoc District of Long An 75% of villagers say LTTT neutralizes Communist propaganda that they had distributed land, ("The Implementation of the Land to the Tiller Law in Long An Province", CDC, ADLR file item no. 13) In Hau Nghia the Viet Cong have been telling farm owners not to declare their land - i.e. file Form A under LTTT - (Farmers Who Own Their Land and the Land to the Tiller Program, Control Data Corp, to ADLR, USAID, May 1971). pp. 17-18. In Kien Hoa the Viet Cong are making strong propaganda against LTTT to discourage farmers from applying (report by the Province Senior Advisor, Report of PSA conference at Can Tho 28 March 1972, Land Reform Division, CORDS, MR 4). In Bac Lieu in some villages the Viet Cong have distributed leaflets threatening those who apply for LTTT titles ("Bac Lieu" 10 December 1970, CDC, ADLR, file item no. 1) In Dinh Tuong some dare not apply for title because they fear Viet Cong retribution, ("The Villagers' Attitude and Knowledge, Relative to their Government" 27 May 1971, CDC, ADLR file item #3.) In Chuong Thien the enemy spreads anti-LTTT propaganda in some villages ("The LTTT Law" 26 October 1971, CDC, ADLR file item no. 6). In southern Chuong Thien, where, since the invasion of SVN by North Vietnam 29 March and the necessity to shift ARVN units north, Viet Cong military unit strength is very great, qualified observers say that even with military strength, the enemy knows that LTTT is very popular and does not dare collect and destroy LTTT land titles (Richard Burke, former Project Development Officer, Chuong Thien, to ADLR 6 October 1972).
49. "LTTT Implementation, Land Disputes, and Land Out of Use, as reported by the HES Village Quarterly Update, 31 Dec. 1971," Bush to Melville 2 March 1972 (ADLR, USAID files) p. 3.

We also know LTTT is hurting the enemy because many persons whom we interviewed say so. Many contrast what the GVN has done in land distribution to what the Viet Cong promised and did. E. g.

"... the GVN land distribution is more realistic than the VC land reform policy. They (the VC) only promised with empty words, while the GVN bought land from landlords to distribute free to landless farmers... the GVN is truly gaining popular support through the LTTT."
(new owner under LTTT, in Dinh Tuong)

"... we still have to continue paying taxes and charges to the Viet Cong to be safe. But frankly we now do want to fully support the GVN because the LTTT is effectively helping us to improve better our daily life... Politically the LTTT is obviously defeating the VC. Before the VC promised to give land to us, but indeed nothing has been received, while the GVN is doing realistically what it promised us under the LTTT law."
(farm owner before LTTT, whose youngest son was VC, but has since rallied to GVN and is now helping his father farm, in Vinh Long)

It follows from other people's behavior, too, aside from evidence from the delta. Analyses of all available and reliable statistics (statistics of 75 series of political and social indicators, from 133 countries) indicate that an increase in land distribution which reduces inequality of holdings of farm land "appears... to be a potent pacifier... a one-point (out of 100) decrement in the land Gini index has the effect of decreasing domestic violence by 3%... There would appear to be much truth in the common beliefs about land inequality and democratic instability. The distribution of wealth may be more relevant politically and theoretically than its level." 50

We have shown that new owners, compared to tenants, identify more with the Government. They identify more with their local government officials and their hamlet and village neighbors. They perceive, more than tenants,

50. Russett and others (cited in note 40), See pages 237-8 for an explanation of the Gini index (the higher the index the greater the inequality of farm land), and pp.320-1 for the above quotation. The "common beliefs about land inequality and instability"---the hypothesis tested---are "that above-average inequality (of distribution of agricultural land) promotes above-average social and political discord or, conversely, that substantial equality means the existence of a large and relatively prosperous middle class which will support the existing political system." (p. 320)

greater prospects of agricultural change and increased incomes for themselves in the future. More of them than tenants perceive life now as better than two years ago. They seem to have more to lose than tenants and to think they have more to lose to the enemy. They seem to be more committed to the political status quo.

Political implications: delta farmer conservatism: Political activity and major patterns of political demands, as long as there has been a Republic of South Vietnam, have been those of urban cliques and of the military; province-capital cliques, Saigon-based, Hue-based and Danang-based Buddhist leaders, urban student groups, and urban-based veterans' groups. The massive pro-regime appreciation and support created in the delta in part by the Land to the Tiller program suggests a latent probable shift of support from city to country, from urban intelligentsia to rural leaders. Such farmer support is likely to be conservative. It is everywhere else.

"No group is more conservative than a landowning peasantry. . . . Land reform carried out by revolution or by other means thus turns the peasantry into a fundamentally conservative social force. . . ." 51

51. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Dimensions of Land Reform (pamphlet, AID, Washington, June 1970), pp. 375-6. R.P. Dore, Land Reform in Japan, (Oxford University Press, 1959), finds the same in Japan. M.M.C. Yang, in Socio-Economic Results of Land Reform in Taiwan, (East-West Center Press, Honolulu, 1970), finds the same in Taiwan.

CHAPTER XI
COMPLAINTS, NEEDS, PROBLEMS AND GRIEVANCES
RE THE GVN AND LTTT

One can judge how the government is doing politically in the delta from what its rural citizens complain about. In unstructured interviews people, perhaps Vietnamese more than many peoples, tell you their troubles. And politics, by definition, is who gets what and why, and who pushes who around. Table 18 shows what is bothering farmers in Long An, Go Cong, Dinh Tuong, Vinh Long, Vinh Binh and Chuong Thien.

In Table 18.

Economic problems are complaints about prices. The overwhelmingly preponderant one is that the prices of fertilizer and insecticide are so high they cannot afford enough of them.

Basic agricultural handicaps are mainly that their village or hamlet does not have enough land. Others are that they need help to clear more land, need help to fix the irrigation dam, have poor soil, or salt water intrusion, etc.

Technical problems are that they do not know how to use insecticide, that their livestock die for want of vaccines, and such.

Insecurity hazards complain of occasional mines or booby traps in some fields, or of VC intrusion and VC "tax" squeeze.

Technical or administrative complaints against GVN re LTTT or agriculture, which particularly interest us, are regrets that the program does nothing for the landless, grievances about the administration of LTTT (e.g. by an applicant that he applied long ago but has not received title; e.g. by exlandlords that they have not been compensated yet) or about agricultural policies other than LTTT (e.g. that ADB loans are slow or inadequate.)

Table 18

COMPLAINTS, NEEDS, PROBLEMS, GRIEVANCES
(Some had more than one problem, so percentages sometimes total more than 100.)

<u>Complaints, needs, problems, grievances, by type (see text for details)</u>	<u>Long An</u> N=148 who had 152 problems	<u>Go Cong</u> N=307 who had 131 problems	<u>Dinh Tuong</u> N=150 who had 112 problems	<u>Vinh Long</u> N=181 who had 160 problems	<u>Vinh Binh</u> N=112 who had 176 problems	<u>Chuong Thien</u> N=87 who had 137 problems	<u>All 6 Provinc</u> N=985 who had 868 problems
Economic problems	35%	11%	26%	35%	69%	72%	33%
Basic agricultural handicaps	10%	5%	17%	18%	23%	22%	14%
Technical problems	14%	8%	5%	4%	6%	17%	9%
Insecurity hazards	16%	.3%	1%	16%	0%	31%	8%
Technical or administrative complaints against GVN <u>re LTTT or agriculture</u>	20%	14%	23%	13%	59%	15%	21%
Complaints of abuse of authority by officials	2%	2%	2%	1%	0%	0%	1%
Worries that the ex-landlord might return and take back the land, complaints that the ex-landlord still hounds them for token rents or back taxes, or fear of what might happen if they had the courage to apply for title	6%	1.7%	1%	1%	0%	0%	2%
Total	<u>103%</u>	<u>42%</u>	<u>75%</u>	<u>88%</u>	<u>157%</u>	<u>157%</u>	<u>88%</u>

A note on each province's grievances re LTTT:

1. In Long An 13% of those 20% are complaints about the "bad fit" of LTTT, that it leaves some out (e. g. by tenants on worship land who do not see why they should pay rent forever, exlandlords who say they lost by LTTT, landless laborers who say they got nothing) 7+% are administrative grievances (e. g. by exlandlords that they have not been compensated yet and by tenants who applied long ago and have not yet received titles,)
2. In Go Con; 9% of those 14% are complaints by those left out of LTTT (the landless and tenants on land, particularly worship land, exempt from LTTT). 4% are administrative grievances (by exlandlords that they have not yet been compensated, by applicants that their title has not yet been received or that their title has an error in it.) 1% complain that ADB loans are too hard to get and too small when one does get them.
3. In Dinh Tuon; 17% of those 23% are about the "bad fit" of LTTT to the landless and those farming land in tenancy which is exempt from the program, and some from relocated refugees that although they have received title where they now farm they eventually want to return and receive title to land in their native village 4% are administrative grievances (that compensation is slow.) 2% complain that ADB loans are slow or inadequate, that more miracle rice seed should be available, or that insecticides are not of good quality.
4. In Vinh Long 3% of those 13% are complaints that LTTT excludes the landless and those farming worship land in tenancy. 8% are administrative grievances and most are complaints that they applied long ago but have not yet received title. 2% are that ADB loans are slow or inadequate.
5. In Vinh Binh 58% complain that LTTT does nothing for the many landless! Vinh Binh is 60+% Cambodian, and our sample there was 73% Cambodian. They are poor 69% complain of high prices. When, as in LTTT, they do receive help from the GVN, more seem grateful than seems true of ethnic Vietnamese, as Table 13 shows And when, as in our interviews, somebody is listening, they tell you of their poverty and of the many landless. Vietnamese Cambodians tend to be more community-minded and less individualistic than ethnic Vietnamese.

That LTTT does nothing for many landless is their only complaint about LTTT. There is only one administrative grievance, about failure of the Land Court to act.

6. In Chuong Thien 14% are complaints that LTTT leaves out many (the landless, families of war dead, disabled veterans, and tenants paying rent on worship land.) A few object that the law extends to Viet Cong and ex-Viet Cong families. One is an administrative grievance, by a farmer who applied years ago but still has not received his title.

Re complaints about LTTT in all provinces:

1. Complaints that LTTT does nothing for some (the landless, and those who are tenants on worship land) are the only quantitatively significant grumble. 15% of all farm families interviewed murmur that somehow some land should be found for the landless. 27% of such complaints are made by tenants and the landless (N= 148 and 79, respectively); 40% of all landless laborers so complain.

2. Complaints about how LTTT functions

- a. 18 of 19 exlandlords want their compensation money and have not yet received it. This is 95% of all in-village exlandlords, but only 2% of all farmers.
- b. 12 of 79 applicants for title applied long ago but complain that they still have not yet received title. This is 15% of all applicants but only 1% of all farmers.
- c. 7 complain of title issued by mistake, then recalled, or of errors in their title, usually in the size of the plot. This is only .7% of all farmers. Two complain of landlord coercion (crop seized, eviction.) This is nil.

3. Miscellaneous worries, pre-or post-LTTT, 19 in all---2% of all respondents

- a. 12 new owners still pay rent or token rent to exlandlords or complain that exlandlords hound them to pay back taxes. This is 2.5% of all new owners.
- b. Tenants who are unwilling to apply for title, for sentimental reasons or because they are afraid of what might happen, are only 2 of 148.

4. Complaints of abuse of authority by somebody in some offices, 8 in all ---.8% of all farmers Each is unique Two allege corruption. One expressed doubt that the land he farms is really worship land and therefore exempt from LTTT Net assertions of injustice are only 5. Examples

"Brother died and funeral expenses too much. Borrowed from neighbor, couldn't pay back, so had to let him farm the land Then LTTT, damn, so neighbor declared he had farmed that land for 30 years, so officials gave him title. Chief of village got money. Now he is in jail since last month "

(in Long An)

"One landowner falsely back-dated his land as worship land and so registered it with connivance of PLAS, so his land may not be expropriated and distributed. No way from village records to disprove it. It is back-dated to 1958 and in 1958 there was no village government here. The village was under Viet Cong control until 1970."

(in Dinh Tuong)

We interviewed in "dynamic" villages. But a survey of records of grievances in 72 delta villages, and examination of the grievance records of the Directorate-General of Land Affairs and of all grievances reported through other known channels such as the Tenant Farmers' Union of the Vietnamese Labor Federation and through CORDS and ADLR, USAID channels, and of review of Land Court verdicts by the National Land Reform Council,⁵² indicate that (1) about

52. "Grievances and Disputes under LTTT," research by the DGLA, Keith Sherper, and Henry C. Bush, still on-going, ADLR, USAID.

half of all disputes are settled, apparently satisfactorily, at the village level, (2) false registry of land as worship land, by landlords, to avoid distribution to tenants under LTTT, is a high percentage of all complaints, but is concentrated in the floating rice area of An Giang and Chau Doc, and (3) coercion of tenants by landlords (threats, evictions, collection of back rents or back taxes, etc) is a less high percentage of complaints but about 12-18% of all of them. The significant point is that in a program to distribute 1,000,000 hectares, which has already distributed 800,000 involving 678,000 tenant applicant families and perhaps 70,000 landlords and exlandlords, complaints from all delta sources total only somewhere in the 700-1,100 range. This is less than .2% of all applicants and less than 1.5% of all landlords or exlandlords.

In the delta, with the exception of floating rice area LTTT is a relatively grievance-free program. The assertion continues to be made by some that of course those who do complain about LTTT are "just the tip of the iceberg." But if they do not complain in any significant number to neighbors, or hamlet chiefs, or village officials, or the Village Land Registrar, or various Province Land Affairs Services personnel who pop into villages regularly, or Vietnamese newspaper reporters eager for the slightest hint of injustice, or the Land Courts, or any of the considerable number of central government officials and legislators who have received some complaints of the most diverse sorts from all provinces and from all kinds of plaintiffs (landlords, tenants, title holders, Province officials, village officials) or to interviewers when assured of anonymity, one may ask: "What iceberg? What is the evidence?"

What delta farmers do complain about: Mainly they complain about the high price of fertilizer and insecticides.⁵³ New owners complain about this more

53. Other field reports verify this. (E.g. Ernest J. Nesius, AD/ADFA/Agr. Econ/Sup, USAID, memo "Trip to MR4 Aug. 30 and 31," 2 Sept. 1972)

than tenants do. 39% of all new owners do, and 30% of all owners before LTTT do, but only 15% of all tenants do. This, like much other evidence shown earlier in this report, suggests that owners are more achievement-oriented and more market-oriented than are tenants.

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PART THREE

TRENDS AND PROBABILITIES

CHAPTER XII

WHAT FARMERS WANT: THE PROBABLE IMPACT OF LTTT ON
FARMERS' VALUES

What do delta farmers want? Books and articles are written and speeches are made about 2,000 years of allegedly unchanged Vietnamese values, but anyone who has seen and talked to many delta farmers cannot avoid the conclusion that they seem middle-class and capitalistic. In 1985 unstructured interviews certain widely-held values were identifiable. They are shown in Table 19.

Table 19

VALUES IDENTIFIED IN INTERVIEWS

<u>Values</u>	<u>% of All Values Identified (N=103)</u>
People, no matter how poor, must educate their children. We want our children to have a better life than we had. Family and children are the most important things in life. ⁵⁴	57%
We must work hard. There is no time for fun or play; play is for children. If we work more we will prosper.	24%
We must save our money and stay out of debt. ⁵⁴	9%
By a few who are refugees we prefer our native village and want to return there.	5%
The "old days" were better, Landlord; tenant relations worked better, everybody used to know his place. The younger generation is no good.	3%
The central government should help us with this and that.	1%
Conspicuous consumption; we must buy things or build new houses because all the others are buying things or building new houses.	1%
Total	<u>100%</u>

54. Also found by Callison of farmers in Long An, Dinh Tuong, and Phong Dinh. See note 27.

90% of these values emphasize self-discipline, individual achievement, austerity, hard work and thrift and the acquisition and use of more knowledge. These are not unlike the values of the Iowa farmer who "grow more corn to feed more hogs in order to make more money to buy more land to grow more corn to feed more hogs." Traditional Vietnamese (allegedly Confucian) values emphasize status and harmony. They suppress individual initiative and social and technological changes. They require patterns of behavior, rituals and rites to demonstrate and reaffirm differences of status between superiors and inferiors.⁵⁵ They were characteristic of former Vietnamese elites and they seem to be still held widely among ordinary people in coastal Central Vietnam, but they seem to have been eroded by time, war, and their irrelevance to present circumstances, in the delta.

The values invoked by the delta farmers are those characteristic of the middle class. These values and what they make possible have been described elsewhere by many qualified persons, from Max Weber to Amitai Etzioni. They are the values which were held by most and which served well in developing western Europe, the U.S.A., and Japan. They have been on the wane everywhere since about 1914, but they continued to be a large part of the internal scale of what matters most to most persons--in western Europe until the 1930's, in the U.S.A. until the new and varied forms of hedonism ("doing one's thing" instead of doing the job, "buy now, pay later", play now, work maybe later) replaced them for many as recently as the 1950's, and in Japan they are still the internal gyroscope of most persons in 1972.⁵⁶

55. For the social, political, and organizational effects of these values, see John T. McCalister and Paul Mus, The Vietnamese and Their Revolution, (Harper and Row, 1970), pp 78-106, Nghiem Dang, Vietnam Politics and Administration (East-West Center Press, Honolulu, 1966), pp 52-59 and Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics, (MIT Press, 1968).

56. These assertions about these values in terms of other value clusters and what they stimulate or inhibit can be found in more lucid and detailed form in Amitai Etzioni, "The Search for Political Meaning", (The Center Magazine, March/April, 1972, available at CDC, ADLR, USAID, among other sources)

Consider the circumstances of delta farmers during these past several years and presumably in the near future:

1. the values described just above
2. effective demand for increased agricultural technology (E. g. threshing is still overwhelmingly wastefully done by hand labor, but threshing machines are cost-effective: they need them, they know about them but have barely begun to use them; they are available, and they have the money to buy them. E. g. tractors and rototillers, which quite recently have largely replaced the less efficient water buffalo except in wet soils).
3. the increase in social status and equality inherent in moving upward from tenant to farm owner, and incentive therein to "try harder".
4. the excellent market for their crops. (From March 1971 to March 1972 the price of everything rose about 22%, but the price of rice rose 55%).⁵⁷

Consider the above mix. Now assume:

1. that the ARVN will continue to defeat NVN armed forces
2. that the U.S.A. will somehow continue to fund certain otherwise disorganizing gaps in the external payments of RVN
3. that the special internal costs of repelling the invasion by North Vietnam will not cause major economic disorganization

These are plausible assumptions. (If however any one of them is not realized in the future it is quite likely the trends in delta farmer behavior and performance will be reversed and delta farmers will be reduced again to subsistence farming. Agriculture requires continuity.)

57. USAID trial index of retail prices. Cited in note 10.

If the preceding assumptions are correct, the forecast for the delta is increased small-capitalist entrepreneurship, increased general prosperity, increased local capital formation, and increased technical progress in agriculture. Many economists, from Joseph Schumpeter to the latest studies of Japan's economic "miracle", describe this combination as the key to sustained economic growth. 58

And many observers of societies' social barriers and taboos to growth note that nothing erodes traditional habits of status and inequality like the leveling effects of major shifts in income. Permit a perhaps far-fetched analogy:

Britain in the 1970's:

"... a funny thing happened to Britain's immemorial class structure on its way through the 1950's. A New Class arrived, and it did not want to join. There had never been quite this problem before. New groups would form, and England would absorb them into its Establishment with the sleek and economical efficiency of a boa constrictor digesting a potentially troublesome goat. But not this time. Because this new group just doesn't want to know the taboos of the game. ... Nowadays a television satirist gets paid for satirizing the prime minister five times what the prime minister gets for being the prime minister.... A newspaper science correspondent gets paid more than six government scientists.... 59

The SVN delta in the 1970's

A farmer, to a District Chief, in late 1971: "You know, I make more money than you do."

Given the favorable circumstances, LTTT has probably helped shift delta farmers' values. The shift is widespread, the change is to middle-class values, and in terms of prospects for economic and social equality and peaceful change, it is good.

58. E. g. Ryutaro Komiya, Postwar Economic Growth in Japan (University of California Press, 1966).

59. Anthony Haden-Guest, "Introduction", Birds of Britain, (Macmillan, 1967), pp. 2-3.

CHAPTER XIII

STAGNANT VILLAGES· HOW TO GET THEM MOVING?

Of the 15 stagnant villages we worked in·

7 of 15 (47%) returned to their original site (RTV'd), some in 1970, some in 1971, or GVN control was re-established as recently as 1971.

Of the 29 dynamic villages we worked in, 5 of 29 (17%) had.

13 of 15 (87%) have (or until very recently had) village officials who are indifferent, inactive, incompetent, or very recently chosen, or village land registrars who are, or both, or have no village land registrar.

Of the 29 dynamic villages, only 2 of 29 (7%) have.

10 of 15 (67%) have major insecurity problems which they say inhibit pacification, including LTTT.

Of the 29 dynamic villages, 10 of 29 (34%) have major insecurity problems, but they manage.

4 of 15 (27%) are geographically isolated from Province and District.

Of the 29 dynamic villages, 7 of 29 (24%) are geographically isolated.

2 of 15 (13%) have major agricultural handicaps (acute need for irrigation, severe water shortage, infertile fields, major soil acidity or salinity, or rice insect plague during the past two years).

Of the 29 dynamic villages, 7 of 29 (24%) have such major agricultural handicaps.

When we separate the 15 stagnant villages into:

10 which are B or C on the HES scale of security/insecurity
5 which are D

we find that of those which are D, 2 of 5 returned to their original site some time in the past two years and are also insecure; 4 of 5 have incompetent or indifferent local officials or no village land registrar or both, and are also very insecure. In one which RTV'd recently and is very insecure but has competent and vigorous local officials and a competent village land registrar LTTT did begin about six months ago.

Of those 10 stagnant villages which are B or C in HES security ratings (safe enough for LTTT implementation judging from the fact that LTTT is being implemented in almost all B or C villages in the delta) 4 of 10 (40%) returned to their original site some time in the past two years, 4 of 10 (40%) are geographically isolated, 5 of 10 (50%) assert they have major insecurity problems which inhibit pacification programs, including LTTT, but 9 of 10 have indifferent, inactive, local officials or village land registrars, or both, or have no village land registrar.

Insecurity beyond a certain degree obviously precludes field identification of farm land or even use of much of it. Tillers huddle on temporary subsistence plots near the village office and the access road or water route and refuse to move out to their former fields, or make an arrangement with the enemy to plant and later to harvest and share with them.

Villages which have RTV'd in 1970 or since with rare exceptions have been requiring about 2 years to get in motion toward self-development. Even though the original site may now be secure many farmers have scattered to adjacent villages, some have migrated further. Word is passed by word of mouth, not by radio or official announcement heard by all or even most. Farming is an annual or at least seasonal activity; it takes time for them to harvest their present crop, wind up their affairs, return, build a temporary shack on the old site, and put in a crop. Newcomers who take the risk of being first may have their shacks burned by local security forces who are not sure they are not Viet Cong sympathizers or land-grabbing squatters. It takes time to find and notify the original farmers who have priority, and wait for them to return. Then and only then may newcomers (squatters) be permitted in to farm abandoned land. Otherwise disputes would probably be endless. One crop after that and only then does the village chief at the earliest begin accepting applications for LTTT.

Villages which are geographically isolated (those far out on poor roads or mere paths, or on shallow canals, or border villages on excellent water routes just across from another province but isolated from their own District and Province headquarters) are at the bottom of District and Province organizations in priority. They are ignored, unless vigorous and competent village and hamlet officials and an active and competent village land registrar exist there. Villages which are isolated seem to have the poorest officials and the poorest village land registrars. Village and hamlet officials there seem static, indifferent. VLR's are reluctant to go there and probably the least useful ones are normally assigned there. Village and hamlet officials assert the fields are too insecure, that there are mines or booby traps in the fields though people are farming them, or that the people have no interest in LTTT, or that District has not yet told them to begin LTTT. A major inhibiting factor is the local officials' inactivity and sometimes bias against LTTT. E.g.

"One village chief. hit the desk and claimed aloud... 'As long as I am village chief no land can be distributed' in my locality ' Another sent a man at night telling tenants to come get back their applications . "60

There are signs, in mid-and late 1972, that, because the GVN, from the Ministry down to the District, has begun a drive to speed distribution of land to tenant tillers, LTTT is now reaching many stagnant villages. The focus and the pressure have been put on the village recently, because a village which is isolated and has village officials who wish to do nothing will remain, an enclave of backwardness, indifference, resources of manpower and food to the enemy, indefinitely, and a drain on GVN's military and paramilitary manpower and equipment.


As an example of what can be done consider one stagnant village, in Long An - it is isolated, but we were able to walk in and out numerous times. It has long been B on the PES scale. They had 3 village land registrars who knew nothing and did nothing. They had just been assigned their fourth when we were last there. Finally a qualified LTTT representative was assigned, pressure was put on by Province, and LTTT applications approved by that village as a percentage of tenant families, as of 1 September 1972 (a mere 5 months after we did field work there) now exceed the average approved by 11 delta villages.

60. "Kien Hoa Field Trip," 23 August 1971 (Land Reform Division, MR4, CORDS, and ADLR, USAID files)

The Ministry of Land Reform, Agriculture, Fisheries and Animal Husbandry's drive to speed land distribution under Land to the Tiller has, in the past 5 months, succeeded in stimulating some LTTT implementation in 9 of the 15 stagnant villages we sampled. The average percentage of assumed tenant population which has applied for and been approved for title to farm land, (or has received title) for all delta villages and for Long An, as of 1 Sept. 1972, was 57%. The average for the 15 stagnant villages as of 1 Sept. 1972 is only 22%. But when we did research there, a mere 5 months ago before the MLRAF's big land distribution effort, it was close to zero. Stagnant villages can be pushed into getting with the GVN's major programs. See Graph 4.

GRAPH 4

VILLAGES WHICH, JAN. 1, 1972, HAD ZERO LTTT IMPLEMENTATION:
 PROGRESS IN LTTT AS OF OCTOBER 1, 1972 AS RESULT OF MLRAF
 DISTRIBUTION DRIVE



The power of numbers: One other characteristic of some stagnant villages seems to inhibit LTTT implementation. It was rare in our sample (only in 3 of 15 villages). It is that families farming in tenancy on rice land may be less than predominant. In all villages in our sample, rice is a major crop. But in three villages, though rice is a major crop, other crops and rural livelihoods not subject to LTTT (e. g. coconut culture for copra, fruit trees, and fishing) are also major ones. In these cases farm families tied to tenancy on rice land seem to lack the power of numbers to compel village officials to action on LTTT. If (as is true in all three cases in our sample of 15) village officials are also indifferent, inefficient, inactive, then re LTTT they apparently can get away with inaction. Where most farm families want something like LTTT which they have a legal right to and GVN support for, they get it. Where few want something to which local officials are indifferent, they may not get it because those who want it are few. The inference from this is that in villages in MR3 in which many combine farming with urban jobs and commercial activities, and in coastal villages of Central Vietnam where tenants are by far a smaller percentage of the rural population than they were in the delta before LTTT, LTTT will probably continue to move slower than in the delta. It will require much more GVN (Province and District) prodding of village officials, much more command push.

LTTT as a means to national unity: It is having had to relocate (RTV) during the past year or two, insecurity, incompetent, indifferent or biased local officials, plus geographic isolation from District and Province, plus an indifferent or incompetent village land registrar or minus a village land registrar, that inhibits LTTT implementation and apparently all other major GVN programs in villages. Stagnant villages are where dynamic villages were 2 years ago. RF and PF troop support,

command emphasis by the Province Chief and District Chief, pressure on or replacement of indifferent, incompetent or biased village officials, and adequate technical support (a qualified village land registrar) by the Province Land Affairs Services can bring stagnant villages within the social, economic, and political orbit of the nation. Within a year or even a crop season they can become part of the thriving economy of the delta, adopt less backward farming techniques, begin using higher yield rice seeds, and begin producing more for and buying more from the SVN economy.

LTTT is a major partial cause in the pattern of pacification and a great incentive. It gives impoverished subsistence farmers something they want very much: ownership of the land they have farmed all their lives in tenancy. It reduces mindless tradition-bound intra-village patterns of inequality and status. It stimulates large numbers of persons to help themselves in productive ways which make for national solidarity and long-run political stability.

PART FOUR

CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER XIV

CONCLUSIONS

1. LTTT has caused a big shift in income in the delta downward, from the few who had much to the many who had little. LTTT has also caused an increase in the total cash in the delta.
2. Most delta farmers credit the major improvements in their lives, their neighbors' lives, their hamlets, and their villages during the past several years to security and LTTT. Many also attribute them to prosperity in SVN as a whole, and better farming. LTTT appeals greatly to farmers and it gets credit for more than it could possibly have effected.
3. New owners under LTTT, compared to tenants, credit far more of the changes during the past two or so years to LTTT, to changes in farming methods, and to general prosperity. New owners talk more about new agricultural techniques and better farming methods. They use more of them. They are aware of more changes in their own and their neighbors' lives and in their hamlet and village. They give the Government credit for more of these changes. LTTT makes it possible for extenants who have become owners of the land they farm to prosper. It seems to provide new owners with an incentive to risk more, invest more in farming, produce more, and work harder than do tenants. They also buy more consumer goods than do tenants.
4. In poorer provinces, compared to more prosperous provinces, more farmers and more new owners credit LTTT with having made them less poor. More farmers and more new owners there seem to support and identify with the Government, both central and local, because of LTTT.

5. LTTT has greatly reduced inequality among villagers. It seems to have largely eliminated the traditional sense of inferiority of lifetime tenant farmers. This new sense of equality, of having the superior landlord off one's back, should decrease disaffection and reduce revolutionary potential in the delta.
6. LTTT seems to be a factor in changes of values among delta farmers. They are behaving in terms of middle-class motivations and they invoke middle-class values. These value changes should help stimulate self-induced sustained economic development.
7. LTTT seems to be a major causal factor creating political support for and identification with national Government. Land ownership is so greatly desired by delta tenant farmers that LTTT seems to offer an important choice and to diminish farmer neutralism and indifference to the Government. Other countries' and other peoples' experience with the effects of successful land distributions which reduce inequality, similar to LTTT, suggests that this is conservative political support, for the regime and the political status quo. In villages in which LTTT has been implemented to a high degree and in which most tenants are now owners of the land they had farmed in tenancy all their lives, LTTT also seems to help create unity and mutual trust among farmers, local officials and local military and paramilitary persons.
8. In villages conspicuous for their dynamism in many respects and for the fact that LTTT has reached most tenants and made them farm owners, villagers' cooperation against the enemy (on the local village scene) is visibly greater. Many, including former beneficiaries of enemy land distributions, contrast the enemy's land distributions to LTTT by the GVN-- always very favorably to the GVN. Many say that the LTTT program has

reduced enemy influence in their hamlet and village. In many villages land has been distributed and title granted under LTTT to ex-Viet Cong families or to ex-Viet Cong returnees (hoi chanh). In contrast, villages in which LTTT has not yet begun or has just begun recently, and which are stagnant, seem to require large numbers of PF and sometimes RF troops to garrison and protect them. This suggests that military security on the ground plus LTTT makes for less enemy threat and influence in the village, and then reduced military support is possible.

9. The impact of LTTT in villages in which it has been implemented to a great degree, compared to its absence in villages in which, after 2 years of the program, LTTT has not yet begun or has just begun recently, is pronounced. Where there is a high degree of LTTT implementation there are also increased investments in farming, increased farmer entrepreneurship and increased tendency to adapt crops to the market, increased consumption of goods, a more optimistic view of life, and community and mutual trust among families within villages and between citizens and local officials, local military and local paramilitary persons. Delta villages in which LTTT has not yet begun or has just begun recently (2 years late) are largely those which have had to relocate for security and only in 1970 or 1971 have returned to their original site (RTV'd), or those which are still very insecure, or those which have indifferent or incompetent local officials or officials biased against the LTTT program or which have no village land registrar or have one who knows nothing about LTTT, or which are geographically isolated from District and Province government. Such villages are enclaves of isolation and backwardness, and almost no major GVN programs seem to be moving and accomplishing anything much in them.
10. LTTT has stimulated the unskilled landless (farm laborers) and a high percentage of those tenants who are farming land registered as entailed worship land (exempt from LTTT) to complain that they are still landless or poor because in permanent tenancy and that LTTT does nothing for them. This is sizeable number, about 10-15% of all delta farm families.

11. Disfunctions and malfunctions of the LTTT program in implementation seem to be in the 6-8% range---strikingly few for so massive a program. Most complaints by tenants are of false registry of farm land as worship land, or of landlord coercion and landlord refusal to accept the LTTT law. These seem to be geographically concentrated in the floating rice area of the upper delta. Most complaints by exlandlords are that they have not yet received compensation from the GVN for lands transferred to extenants. Less than 1% complain that officials have abused their authority in LTTT implementation. The LTTT program seems strikingly grievance-free, except for the 10-15% of landless and tenants farming on worship land whose complaint is that it does nothing for them.

LTTT is a major success in pacification of the delta. LTTT land distribution procedures are relatively simple and sensible (You farm it? In tenancy? You have for how long? The village knows you, verifies what you say, and approves? We estimate the hectarage, we issue you a title, record it permanently, and you are now owner of the land. We will pay the ex-landlords.) They work.

12. LTTT is creating increased demand for agricultural technology. The MLRAF can anticipate increased demands for agricultural technical services and extension services. LTTT is stimulating delta farmers to produce more. The Ministries of Finance and Interior can anticipate increased tax revenues and decreased need for village budget subsidies in the delta. The Saigon business community can anticipate increased markets among delta farmers for middle-class goods (e. g. household furnishings, lumber, cement and other construction materials.) The

Ministry of Education and the numerous private schools in Saigon can anticipate increased enrollments of farmers' sons and daughters in secondary schools. The delta will be increasingly linked to the Saigon and national economy.

In sum, the Land to the Tiller program is a splendid means to pacification. It creates equality among farmers and abolishes lifelong tendencies of tenant farmers to think of their lives as static, hopeless, poverty-ridden and of themselves as inferiors. It stimulates them to greater production and more investments in farming. It is helping change their values to those of the middle-class. It is helping turn a once-disaffected, politically neutral mass of potential and sometimes actual revolutionaries (formerly providing rice, information, labor, and military manpower to the enemy) into middle-class farmers in support of the regime.

APPENDIX A

INDICATORS OF POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC PROGRESS OR REGRESSION

I. Political Indicators

A. Normal behavior, camaraderie, sociability, friendliness

1. Adults

Q1 Are they friendly, sociable, talking freely to each other?

- a. Yes, most
- b. Yes, many
- c. Yes, some
- d. Only a few
- e. No, none

Q2 Are they friendly and helpful to us visitors?

- a. Yes, most
- b. Yes, many
- c. Yes, some
- d. Yes, a few are
- e. No, none are

Q3 Are they rather silent, wary, passing each other without greetings or talk? Does it seem to you that there are almost no small groups talking, gossiping?

- a. Yes, most
- b. Yes, many
- c. Yes, some
- d. A few are
- e. No, none are

2. Men

Q4 Are there men who are not in uniform?

- a. Yes, most
- b. Yes, many
- c. Yes, some
- d. A few
- e. No, none or almost none

Q5 Are most of the men old? Extremely old?

- a. Yes, most
- b. Yes, many
- c. Yes, some
- d. A few are
- e. No, none are

3. Women

Q6 Do some drive motorcycles?

- a. Yes
- b. No

APPENDIX A (continued)

- Q7 Do they seem friendly to each other, do they talk freely to men?
- Yes, most
 - Yes, many
 - Yes, some
 - Only a few

4. Children

- Q8 Are there children in the market place and the main streets?
- Yes, many
 - Yes, some
 - Only a few
 - No, none
- Q9 Are there boys age 10 to 14 or so?
- Yes, many
 - Yes, some
 - Only a few
 - No, none
- Q10 If there are boys age 10 to 14 or so, which of the following describes them?
- They seem wary of us and silent.
 - They, or some of them, follow us.
 - They seem bratty.
 - They seem generally friendly.
 - They ignore us.

5. Transients

- Q11
- Most of them seem at ease. Villagers talk to them.
 - Many of them seem silent, unsociable, wary.

B. Facilities, things, goods, for fun and play

- Q12 Are any games and fun going on? Are adults seen playing cards or other games?
- Yes, many
 - Yes, some
 - No, none
- Q13 Are things on sale or in use which are for fun and play? (Write down the kinds of things seen.)
- Yes, many
 - Yes, some
 - Yes, a few
 - No, none

APPENDIX A (continued)

C. Identification with the GVN

1. Use of the village headquarters office and immediate environs, during normal village office hours

- Q14 Are there persons (other than clerks and officials) in the village office?
- Yes, many
 - Yes, some
 - Yes, a few
 - Almost no one

- Q15 How do villagers (i. e. citizens) behave to the village clerks and officials?
- They seem servile, timid.
 - They seem very polite, unusually polite, more polite than to other ordinary citizens.
 - They seem normally self-possessed and they seem neither timid nor frightened.
 - They seem friendly to the village clerks and officials.
 - Other. Write in _____

- Q16 How do village clerks and officials behave to village citizens? (Write "S" for some, "M" for many, or "A" for all or almost all, after the response.)
- They seem proud, bossy, authoritative, somewhat like a sergeant commanding soldiers.
 - They seem friendly and helpful, willing to explain and listen.

2. Use of national symbols in the village

- Q17 Is the national flag (in cloth, not painted) seen flying on any buildings other than the military base, the village headquarters, and the school? (What kinds of offices or buildings fly the national flag? Write in.)
- Yes, on some
 - Yes, on a few
 - No, on none

- Q18 Are pictures of the President seen anywhere?
- Yes, many
 - Yes, some
 - Yes, a few
 - No, none

- Q19 Are slogans in favor of the Land to the Tiller program seen anywhere? (If so, where? On what kinds of buildings or in what kinds of places? Write in.)
- Yes, many
 - Yes, some
 - Yes, a few
 - No, none

- Q20 Are there any other slogans or national symbols seen anywhere? (If so, write down what they are.)
- Yes, some
 - Yes, a few
 - No, none

APPENDIX A (continued)

D. Security

- Q21 Is there a curfew? (ASK) If so, from what hour to what hour?
 a. Yes
 b. No
 From _____ to _____ hours.
- Q22 Where is there a curfew? (ASK)
 a. Everywhere in the village
 b. In some hamlets, but not in the main village hamlet
 c. On the main road
 d. Other
- Q23 Do trucks, lambrettas, motorcycles, etc. run at night?
 a. Yes
 b. No
 Not from _____ to _____ hours.
- Q24 Is there military barbed wire?
 a. Yes, around many buildings
 b. Yes, around some buildings
 c. Some, but largely out of use
 d. No, not much
- Q25 Are there new sand bags, bunkers, or trenches, in or near houses?
 a. Yes, many houses
 b. Yes, some houses
 c. Yes, a few
 d. No, none or almost none
- Q26 Are there new thick mud walls or half-walls on sides of or around houses?
 a. Yes, many
 b. Yes, some
 c. Yes, a few
 d. No, none
- Q27 Are there guards and checks at village crossroads and bridges?
 a. Yes, at all or most
 b. Yes, at some
 c. No
- Q28 Do the PF and PSDF in the village seem alert, wary? OR relaxed, socializing, some of them unarmed?
 a. Alert, wary
 b. Relaxed, socializing, some unarmed
- Q29 Does the village have a Village Commissioner for Land Reform and Agriculture? (ASK) Does the village have a Village Land Registrar? (ASK) If so, ask either of them Do the farmers assist them when they go to the fields to identify land?
 a. Yes, they assist them
 b. A few do
 c. Only rarely, exceptionally, do the farmers offer to assist them.
 d. No, they do not help them.

APPENDIX A (continued)

- Q30 Are roads cut (mined, interdicted by the enemy) from time to time?
(ASK)
- a. Yes
 - b. No
- Q31 If yes, above, within the last half-year?
- a. Yes
 - b. No

II. Economic Indicators

A. Commerce and trade

- 1.
- Q32 Are there small mobile shops along the access roads and the main roads near the village?
- a. Yes, many
 - b. Yes, some
 - c. Yes, a few
 - d. No, none
- 2.
- Q33 The market. Check any which are true.
- a. There is a market building.
 - b. It is roofed.
 - c. It has a cement floor.
 - d. There are individual market stalls for vendors.
 - e. The market has grown beyond and around the main market building.
 - f. It is open every day.
 - g. It is a general market selling the same things every day.
 - h. All sales seem to be paid for in cash. No barter.
- Q34 Are there hamlet markets or only one village market? (ASK)
- a. Yes
 - b. No
- 3.
- Q35 Shops. Check any which are true of any shops. (Write "S" if some, or "M" if many after each response checked.)
- a. Shops are being renovated, expanded, refurbished, reconstructed, painted, or have new fronts.
 - b. Shops are new buildings.
 - c. Shop buildings are tin or matting-walled shacks.
 - d. Shops are brick or cement buildings.
 - e. Shops are multi-storey.
 - f. Shop floors are earth.
 - g. Shop floors are cement.
 - h. Shop floors are tile.

APPENDIX A (continued)

4. Goods and services for sale

Q36 Check any that you see.

- a. Dried fish
- b. Packaged noodles
- c. Eggs
- d. Chicken
- e. Pork
- f. Beef
- g. Sugar
- h. Vietnamese cigarettes
- i. General stores
- j. Plastic or aluminum pots and pans for households
- k. Tailor services
- l. Seamstress services
- m. Cloth
- n. Ready to wear clothing
- o. Jewelers and watch repair services
- p. Motorcycle, car, or lambretta repair services (garages)
- q. Gas stations
- r. Barber shops
- s. Beauty shops (hairdressing for women)
- t. Pharmacies
- u. Restaurants, cafes
- v. Canned foods
- w. Black market goods
- x. Soft drinks
- y. Beer, whiskey, wines
- z. Ice (being sold, carried, or being used)
- aa. Glasses and sunglasses
- bb. Shoes
- cc. Ice cream freezers, ice cream shops, or refrigerators in shops
- dd. Street stalls or restaurants selling sausage or meat sandwiches
- ee. Household furniture
- ff. Gas mantle lamps
- gg. Photo shops

Q37 Do restaurants, cafes and eating stalls have many customers?

- a. Yes, many
- b. Yes, some
- c. Few
- d. Almost none

Q38 Play, fun, amusement. Check any that you see.

- a. Phonograph records, phonographs, tape recorders
- b. Sports equipment, games
- c. Radios, TV, and repair
- d. Magazines, books, calendars
- e. Bars
- f. Cameras
- g. Toys
- h. Other. Write in: _____

APPENDIX A (continued)

5. Traffic

Q39 How do most persons who seem to be coming to and going from the village travel? If more than one is used, check more than one. Put a "1" after the most used, and a "2" after the next most used method of travel.

- a. Foot
- b. Bicycle
- c. Motorcycle
- d. Lambretta
- e. Bus
- f. Motorized sampan
- g. River boat
- h. Xe loi

Q40 How are goods moved to and from the village? If more than one is used, check more than one. Put a "1" after the most used, and a "2" after the next most used method of transport.

- a. By hand
- b. Hand cart
- c. Animal drawn carts or wagons
- d. Motorized carts
- e. Lambrettas
- f. Trucks
- g. Motorized sampans
- h. River boats

Q41 Do loads of goods seem to be the same kinds of goods, or mixed loads with persons carrying very small quantities of goods?

- a. Most loads are of the same goods.
- b. Some loads are of the same goods.
- c. Some are mixed.
- d. Most loads are mixed - many kinds of things.

B. Consumption

1. ClothesMen not in uniform

Q42 Are their clothes new, or old, worn, shabby?

- a. Most are almost new.
- b. Some are almost new.
- c. A few are almost new.
- d. Most all or all are old, worn.

Q43 Do they wear peasant work clothes or ordinary middle-class shirts and trousers?

- a. Most wear peasant work clothes.
- b. Some wear peasant work clothes.
- c. Most wear ordinary middle-class shirts and trousers or pajamas.
- d. Almost all wear ordinary middle-class shirts and trousers or pajamas.

APPENDIX A (continued)

- Q44 If most or some wear ordinary middle-class shirts and trousers, do many or some wear bright-colored shirts, or printed patterns, or sport shirts?
- Most
 - Some
 - A few
 - No, none or almost none
- Q45 Shoes. Do they go barefoot? Wear work sandals? Leather shoes? If more than one is true, check more than one.
- Most go barefoot or wear work sandals or wooden shoes.
 - A few wear leather shoes.
 - Some wear leather shoes.
 - Many wear leather shoes.
- Q46 Do they wear watches? Rings?
- Most
 - Some
 - A few
 - No, none
- Q47 Do they carry pens?
- Some
 - A few
 - No, none
- Q48 Do any men (especially young men) wear sharp tailored shirts and trousers?
- Some
 - A few
 - No, none
- Women (Pay particular attention to women selling things, to women buying things at the market, or in shops, and to women on buses or lam-brettas coming or going.)
- Q49 Are their clothes new, or old, worn, shabby?
- Most are almost new.
 - Some are almost new.
 - A few are almost new.
 - Most all are old, worn, shabby.
- Q50 Do they wear peasant work clothes?
- Most do
 - Some do
 - Almost none or none do
- Q51 Of those who wear black pants and a blouse, are their blouses in bright colors, or printed patterns, or of the new manufactured semi-transparent fabrics?
- Most are
 - Some are
 - Almost none or none are

APPENDIX A (continued)

- Q52 Do some wear ao dai's?
- Some
 - A few
 - Almost none or none
- Q53 Do some wear western dresses, or western styles of trousers and blouses?
- Some
 - Few
 - Almost none or none
- Q54 Do some dress their hair, wear hair ornaments?
- Some
 - A few
 - Almost none or none
- Q55 Do some wear sunglasses?
- Some
 - A few
 - Almost none or none
 - Not sunny when we were there.
- Q56 Do some use cosmetics?
- Some
 - A few
 - Almost none or none
- Q57 Do some wear wristwatches, necklaces, earrings, rings?
- Some
 - A few
 - Almost none or none
- Q58 Are there many young women? If so, do they seem to be dressed differently from most of the older women?
- Yes, most
 - Yes, some
 - No, almost none or none

Children

- Q59 Do the small children seem sick?
- Many
 - Some
 - A few
 - No, almost none or none
- Q60 Are their clothes new, or old, worn, shabby or misfits made for adults?
- Most are new.
 - Some are new.
 - A few are new.
 - Most are old, worn, shabby, misfits.

APPENDIX A (continued)

- Q61 Do the small children play with toys?
- Some
 - A few
 - Almost none or none

If the children you see are students

- Q62 Are they carrying books, or school equipment?
- Most
 - Some
 - A few
 - Almost none or none

- Q63 Are they dressed in school uniforms?
- Most
 - Some
 - A few
 - Almost none or none

2. Tombs

- Q64 Are tombs shabby, or have some been painted, white-washed, patched, recemented, weeded, and kept up recently?
- Some have been
 - A few have been
 - Almost none or none

3. The village shrine or temple

- Q65 Is the shrine shabby, or has it been rebuilt, added to, repainted, or redecorated recently?
- It has been refurbished recently.
 - It has not been refurbished lately, but it is not shabby or neglected, in need of repair.
 - It is shabby, neglected, in need of repair.

4. Houses (If more than one is true, put a "1" after the type most often seen, a "2" after the type next most often seen.)

- Q66 Floors. Are they -
- Earth
 - Woodboard
 - Cement
 - Floor tile

- Q67 Walls. Are they -
- Woven matting
 - Brick or cement, cement blocks
 - Painted

- Q68 Roofs. Are they -
- Thatch
 - Tin or fibrous cement sheets
 - Roof tile

APPENDIX A (continued)

- Q69 Doors and windows. Are they -
- Just openings
 - Door and window frames
 - Painted
- Q70 Home construction and repair. Do you see houses which have recently been or are now being repaired, added to, or rebuilt, or new houses being built?
- Yes, many
 - Yes, some
 - Yes, a few
 - No, none
- Q71 Cement. Is cement used in the immediate area of the house? (e.g. cement paths, cement out-buildings, cement posts)
- Yes, in many houses
 - Yes, in some
 - Yes, in few
 - No, in almost none or none
- Q72 House furnishings. (Insofar as they can be seen from outside the house.) (i. e. hardwood beds, radios, altars, cabinets, chairs, tables, sewing machines, mirrors, city manufactured metal furniture, rugs, wall decorations such as pictures or hanging scrolls, TV antenna)
- Many houses have such furnishings.
 - Some houses have such furnishings.
 - A few houses have such furnishings.
 - Almost no or no houses have such furnishings.
 - Houses seem barren other than for occasional chairs, tables, and floor mats, and simple cooking utensils.
 - Impossible to judge
- Q73 Neatness, slovenliness. Is the house and the area immediately around it (the yard) generally neat and well-kept, or slovenly? Is the garden, (vegetable or flowers) well-kept, if there is one.
- Most houses are neat and well-kept.
 - Some are neat and well-kept.
 - A few are neat and well-kept.
 - Most or almost all are slovenly, not cared for, not well-kept.
5. Newspapers, magazines, comic books, school books, other books, other things to read
- Q74 Are the above things seen for sale in shops and on stands? Are they seen in use (carried, owned) by persons?
- Yes, many such things
 - Yes, some such things
 - Yes, a few such things
 - No, almost nothing to read anywhere

APPENDIX A (continued)

6. Electricity

Q75 Are any large generators or small generators, or light wires leading into houses, etc. seen?

- a. Yes, many
- b. Yes, some
- c. Yes, a few
- d. No, none

Q76 If the village has central electrical power, write in the hours it provides electricity.

From _____ to _____ hours

C. Construction, Investment, Industries (other than farming)

1. Construction

Q77 Is construction, rebuilding, and repair of buildings, other than houses going on?

- a. Yes, many buildings
- b. Yes, some
- c. Yes, a few
- d. None

Q78 What is the price of cement per bag?

Q79 What is the price of lumber per linear meter?

2. Industries

Q80 Are there small industries such as brick making, tile making, metal work, small rice mills, furniture making, ice plant, soft drink bottling plant, pottery kilns, etc.? (Do not count handicrafts such as weaving or making pots for family use.)

- a. Yes, several
- b. No, none seen

Write in kinds: _____

3. Advertising

Q81 Is there any? If so, on the access roads to and from the village? If there are shops in the village have they (like Saigon shops) recently increased their signs and advertising? If signs, are they new, newly painted? Are paper printed handbills posted on walls and buildings advertising things?

- a. Yes, many such forms of advertising.
- b. Nothing much on the access roads, but many signs and many new signs on village shops.
- c. Nothing much that seems recent, newly painted, anywhere in the

APPENDIX A (continued)

D. Public Facilities

1.

Q82 School buildings. Check any which are true.

- a. It is shabby, run down.
- b. It was painted recently.
- c. It is large.
- d. It is new.
- e. It was repaired, refurbished recently.
- f. There are some classrooms which look newer than others.
- g. There is a school playground.
- h. There is equipment for play in the school playground.
- i. The school and grounds seem well-kept.

Q83 If it is possible to look into classrooms during classes, or see students at the school, are most of them boys, or are about half of them girls?

Write down the percentage which seem to be girls: _____

Q84 Have enrollments in primary school increased during the past two years? (ASK, at the school, if possible.)

Write down the absolute numbers.

From about _____ about two years ago

To about _____ now.

Q85 Is there a high school in the village? (ASK, if possible.)

- a. Yes
- b. No

2.

Q86 Roads in the village. Check any which are true.

- a. They are full of muddy holes.
- b. They are levelled - no holes.
- c. They were gravel or asphalt surfaced once, but need repair badly.
- d. They are gravel or asphalt surfaced and are kept-up (maintained).

Q87 Roads and bridges from village to main route. Check any which are true.

- a. They exist, but the route is incomplete (broken).
- b. They are full of muddy holes.
- c. They are levelled - no holes.
- d. They were gravel or asphalt-surfaced once, but need repair badly.
- e. They are gravel or asphalt-surfaced and are kept-up (maintained).
- f. Linkage between village and main route is complete.

3.

Q88 Paths. Check any which are true.

- a. They are not kept-up.
- b. They are kept-up (maintained).
- c. They are paved.

APPENDIX A (continued)

4.
Q89 Water. Check any which are true.
- There is a water tower.
 - Water is trucked into the village.
 - Water is carried by hand or on animals.
 - You see pumps, individual wells, or public pipes.
 - Ponds
 - River, canal

E. Agriculture

1. Crops

- Q90 What is the rice yield per hectare now? If several crops, what is the total yield per hectare?

Write it in: _____

- Q91 What is the village sales price for paddy? (ASK)

Write it in (in gia or in kilograms) _____

- Q92 Are there fields left uncultivated?
- Many
 - Some
 - A few
 - Almost none, or none

Animals and poultry

- Q93 Are there pigs?
- Many
 - Some
 - A few
 - None
- Q94 Are there chickens (penned or foraging loose)?
- Many (Penned -- Foraging)
 - Some (Penned -- Foraging)
 - A few (Penned -- Foraging)
 - Almost none, or none
- Q95 Are there ducks?
- Many
 - Some
 - A few
 - None

Vegetable plots

- Q96 Are vegetable plots large, or scattered household plantings for family use only?
- Large
 - Scattered
 - Both

APPENDIX A (continued)

- Q97 Do they look well tended?
 a. Yes
 b. No
- Q98 If there are fruit trees, are they orchards or individual trees for family use only?
 a. Orchards
 b. Individual trees
 c. Both
- Q99 Are there fishponds?
 a. Yes
 b. No

2. Agricultural machines and equipment

- Q100 Do you see any of the following? (Check those you see. If you see many, write "M" after the item. If you see some, write "S" after the item. If you see only a few, write "F" after the item. If none, do not check.) Whether you see them for sale, or owned, or being used, check in any case.
- a. Pumps
 b. Tractors
 c. Rototillers
 d. Threshers
 e. Power tools (e. g. hand saws, power saws)
 f. Insecticide sprayers
 g. Fertilizer (for sale, stored, or in use)
 h. Animal feed (for sale, stored, or being used)
 i. Other. Write in kinds. _____

Storage facilities for crops

- Q101 If you see rice or paddy stored, how is it stored? (Check more than one if several are seen.)
- a. In large jars
 b. In bundles still on the stalk
 c. In sacks
 d. In warehouses at rice mills
 e. In plastic sacks
 f. In enormous containers filling main room of house

Irrigation

- Q102 If you see irrigation channels, (other than large canals) are they -- (Check more than one if several are seen.)
- a. Well kept-up
 b. Generally run down and neglected
 c. New, recently built

APPENDIX A (continued)

3. Labor

Q103 Do you see children working?

- a. Many
- b. Some
- c. A few
- d. Almost none, or none

Q104 What is the price for a man's work (farm work) for a day?

Write in the price per day for farm labor: _____

Q105 What is the price for a skilled workman for a day?

Write it in: _____

Q106 Is "voluntary labor" (i. e. corvee) --
(ASK any village official.)

- a. Used by the village government to get things done.
- b. The village pays for labor it uses.
- c. Other. Write it in: _____

F. Other

Q107 If persons (villagers, officials, or others in any village) talk to you, try to remember the general subjects they talked about, and write them down.

Subjects discussed or mentioned by Vietnamese villagers: _____

APPENDIX B

VILLAGES IN WHICH BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATIONS WERE MADE

<u>Province</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Village</u>
Chuong Thien	Duc Long	Hoa An
		Ngoc Hoa
		Vinh Thuan Dong
		Vinh Tuong
		V1 Thuy
	Kien Hung Long My	Vinh Hoa Hung
		Long Binh
		Long Tri
		Thuan Hung
Dinh Tuong	Ben Tranh	Hoa Tinh
		Tan Ly Dong
	Cho Gao Giao Duc	Trun Hoa
		Tan Thuan Binh My Loi
Go Cong	Hoa Binh Hoa Dong	Binh Long
		Binh Phu Dong
	Hoa Lac Hoa Tan	Vinh Vien
		Binh An
		Thanh Cong
Kien Hoa	Don Nhon Giong Trom Ham Long Mo Cay Truc Giang	Phuoc My Trung
		Tan Hao
		Phu Duc
		Tan Binh
		Huu Dinh Quoi Son
Kien Tuong	Kien Binh	Nhon Hoa
Long An	Ben Luc	My Yen
	Binh Phuoc	Thanh Ha
		Hiep Thanh
		Vinh Cong
Phong Dinh	Can Duc Rach Kien	Tan Chanh
		Long Cang
Phong Dinh	Phung Hiep	Hiep Hung
		Tan Phuoc Hung
Vinh Binh	Cang Long	Dai Phuoc
		Duc My
	Cau Ngang Chau Thanh	Nhi Long
		Hiep My
		Song Loc Thanh My
Vinh Long	Cho Lach Minh Duc	Dong Phu
		Hoa Tinh
	Vung Liem	Tan Long Hoi Hieu Phung

APPENDIX C

INSTRUCTIONS TO INTERVIEWERS FOR UNSTRUCTURED INTERVIEWS

Before you begin work in the village, check the list of "Individual (Possibly Unique) Characteristics" for that village.

Of each village, write down: the name of the Province, District and Village
the date
your (the interviewer's) name

Of each interview, write down

1. whether the person interviewed is male, female, head of household, or a group. If a group, write down the number of persons whose opinions you obtained. Whenever possible, interview men rather than women. Whenever possible, interview heads of households.

If you can get several persons involved in an interview (a group interview) please do so. This encourages open discussion.

2. Ask whether the person interviewed is a farmer or not. If not, write down what he does for a living. Most will be members of farm families. Do not interview children, students, or teachers.
3. If the person interviewed is a farmer or farm-laborer, ask whether he is a tenant farmer, or a farm owner (i. e. owner-operator). If he is a farm owner, ask him how he acquired his land.

Identify yourself. Tell them that you and your colleagues are doing research in some villages in the delta for the government or for the Americans, or for both, and that their village has been selected.

Assure them you do not need to or want to know their name (s), or I. D. card number (s) because whatever they tell you will not be identified as by them, to anyone.

Tell them you are interested in how it was, for them, for their friends and neighbors, in this village about 2 years ago. About the beginning of 1970.

Tell them you have been in this village before, and it is your impression that, compared to about 2 or 3 years ago:

1. people seem more cheerful, more friendly, more relaxed, more sociable. More persons and more children seem to enjoy themselves. (What do they think, and what do they think their friends think?)
2. security is better. There are less troops, less Viet Cong actions. (What do they think, and what do they think their friends think?)
3. Families seem to be returning to village. (What do they think, and what do they think their friends think?)
4. people seem better dressed, and life somehow seems better than it used to. (What do they think, and what do they think their friends think?)

APPENDIX C (continued)

and that . . .

1. crops seem better. (What do they think, and what do they think their friends think?)
2. More farmers use fertilizer and insecticide and animal feed than 2 years ago. (What do they think, and what do they think their friends think?)
3. Some farmers use agricultural equipment (tractors, rototillers, sampan motors, pumps, insecticide sprayers). (What do they think, and what do they think their friends think?)
4. Some seem to be repairing or rebuilding their houses. (What do they think, and what do they think their friends think?)
5. More goods seem to be on sale in the market. (What do they think, and what do they think their friends think?)
6. More seem to be raising chickens and ducks and pigs than before (about 2 years ago). (What do they think, and what do they think their friends think?)
7. More are sending their children to school now. Less children seem to be working than before. (What do they think, and what do they think their friends think?)

NOTE As you know, we have already found that most all of the above characteristics are very much true of most of the villages in which you will be interviewing. And if you consult the list of "Individual (Possibly Unique) Characteristics" for the village in which you will be interviewing, you will learn of any exceptional circumstances.

You need not mention all of the above. Some will do. The sole purpose in doing so is to get them to think about and tell you about how it is now in their lives, their hamlet, and their village compared to how it was about two years ago.

Then when they are focused upon how it is now compared to how it was about two years ago, THIS IS WHEN THE INTERVIEW BEGINS. Ask them why? How is this? How did these changes come about? What do they think explains these changes?

They may mention such things as better security, that the Viet Cong are weaker, good roads, Land to the Tiller, etc.

DO NOT, REPEAT DO NOT SUGGEST ANY ANSWERS.
DO NOT, REPEAT DO NOT MENTION LTTT (OR ANY OTHER POSSIBLE EXPLANATION).

IF they mention any cause or reasons why things are changed, then you can ask questions about the cause or reason or reasons they have just mentioned, to try to get details. AND WRITE DOWN THE DETAILS OF THESE RESPONSES. DO NOT TRUST TO YOUR MEMORY

Remember if they mention any causes or reasons why things are changed, then probe for details of what it means to them, their family, their friends, their neighbors, their hamlet, their village.

Listen Do not be impatient. Take as much time in each interview as you need.

APPENDIX D

VILLAGES IN WHICH FARM FAMILIES WERE INTERVIEWED

<u>Province</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Village</u>
Chuong Thien	Duc Long	Vinh Tuong V1 Thuy
Dinh Tuong	Ben Tranh Cho Gao	Hoa Tinh Tan Ly Dong Trung Hoa Tan Thuan Binh
Go Cong	Hoa Binh Hoa Dong Hoa Lac Hoa Tan	Binh Long Binh Phu Dong Vinh Vien Binh An Thanh Cong
Long An	Ben Luc Binh Phuoc Rach Kien	My Yen Thanh Ha Hiep Thanh Vinh Cong Long Cang
Vinh Binh	Chau Thanh	Luong Hoa Song Loc Thanh My
Vinh Long	Cho Lach Minh Duc Vung Liem	Dong Phu Hoa Tinh Tan Long Hoi Hieu Phung

APPENDIX E

ACRONYMS USED IN REPORT

ADB	Agricultural Development Bank of South Vietnam
ADEPP	Office of the Associate Director for Economic Planning and Policy, USAID, Vietnam
ADEPP/ECON	Joint Economic Office, ADEPP, USAID
ADFA	Office of the Associate Director for Food and Agriculture, USAID, Vietnam
ADLR	Office of the Associate Director for Land Reform, USAID, Vietnam
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
CDC	Control Data Corporation research group, ADLR, USAID
CDD	Office of the Associate Director for Community Development, CORDS, MACV
CORDS	Civil Operations and Rural Development Support, MACV
DGLA	Directorate General of Land Affairs, Vietnam
DOD	Department of Defense, U.S.A.
DSA	District Senior Advisor, CORDS, MACV
GVN	Government of Vietnam
HES	Hamlet Evaluation System, CORDS/RAD
JUSPAO	Joint U. S. Public Affairs Office, Vietnam
LOC	Lines of Communication (V. C.)
LR	Land Reform
LTTT	Land to the Tiller program
MACV	Military Assistance Command Vietnam
MLRAF	Ministry of Land Reform, Agriculture, Fisheries, and Animal Husbandry Development, Vietnam
MR	Military Region
NIS	National Institute of Statistics, Vietnam
NVN	North Vietnam
PAAS	Pacification Attitude Analysis System, CORDS/RAD
PF	Popular Forces of South Vietnam
PLAS	Province Land Affairs Service of South Vietnam

APPENDIX E (continued)

PPA	Province Psyops Analysis Reports, JUSPAO
PRT	Province Pacification Research Team, CORDS, MACV
PSA	Province Senior Advisor, CORDS, MACV
PSDF	Peoples' Self Defense Forces of South Vietnam
PSG	Pacification Studies Group, CORDS, MACV
RAD	Research and Analysis Directorate, CORDS, MACV
RDC	Rural Development Cadre of South Vietnam
RF	Regional Forces of South Vietnam
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
RTV	Return to Village program of the GVN
SVN	South Vietnam
TFES	Territorial Forces Evaluation System, CORDS/RAD
TIRS	Terrorist Incident Reporting System, CORDS/RAD
USAID	U. S. Agency for International Development, Vietnam
VC	Viet Cong
VLR	Village Land Registrar
VLRAC	Village Land Reform and Agriculture Commissioner
VSD	Village Self Development program of the GVN and CORDS, MACV