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# DOES MACROECONOMIC POLICY MATTER?

Evidence from  
Developing Countries

Stanley Fischer

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# **Does Macroeconomic Policy Matter?**

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Developing Countries**

**Stanley Fischer**



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## PREFACE

The International Center for Economic Growth is pleased to publish *Does Macroeconomic Policy Matter? Evidence from Developing Countries*, by Stanley Fischer, as the twenty-seventh in our series of Occasional Papers, which features reflections on broad policy issues by noted scholars and policy makers.

New studies of economic growth, Fischer points out in this paper, are generating a great deal of interest in growth, but they pay scant attention to the effects of macroeconomic policy. Yet, he says, policy appears to be key to growth and development. Using economic theory and case studies of Cote d'Ivoire and Chile, Fischer presents evidence that macroeconomic policies do indeed matter for growth, notably through their effects on investment. The new growth theory, he writes, could make an important contribution to our understanding of growth by exploring how investment and other factors actually work to increase economic growth.

A professor of economics at MIT and formerly vice president and chief economist of the World Bank, Fischer has dealt with economic growth issues both in theory and in practice. He has advanced economic theory and improved the use of economic policy instruments. The insights he presents here are valuable both for scholars, as they seek to understand the sources of growth, and for developing country policy makers, as they attempt to use policy tools to restore growth to their countries.

Nicolás Ardito-Barletta  
General Director  
International Center for Economic Growth

Panama City, Panama  
November 1992

## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Stanley Fischer is Killian Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. From 1988 to 1990 he was vice president and chief economist at the World Bank. He is the author of *Indexing, Inflation, and Economic Policy* (MIT Press, 1986), *Lectures in Macroeconomics* (with Olivier Blanchard, MIT Press, 1989), and *Macroeconomics* (with Rudiger Dornbusch, 6th edition, McGraw-Hill, 1993).

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STANLEY FISCHER

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## **Does Macroeconomic Policy Matter? Evidence from Developing Countries**

When Keynes solved 'the great puzzle of Effective Demand', he made it possible for economists once more to study the progress of society in long-run classical terms—with a clear conscience. . . .

—Trevor Swan, "Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation"

For most developing countries in Africa and Latin America, the 1980s are known as the lost decade. For many it was a decade of negative growth. Developing country economic policy in the 1980s focused on structural adjustment, a combination of macroeconomic stabilization measures to restore domestic and external equilibrium and structural changes in policies and institutions designed to make the economy more efficient and flexible, and thereby increase growth.<sup>1</sup>

As the decade progressed and the consequences of macroeconomic disequilibria became clearer, development economists and practitioners increasingly accepted the view that broad macroeconomic stability

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is necessary for sustained growth.<sup>2</sup> For instance, in analyzing growth prospects in countries as diverse as the former Soviet Union, India, Turkey, Cote d'Ivoire, and Brazil, economists must place heavy weight on likely macroeconomic—particularly fiscal—developments.

The 1980s were also the decade in which macroeconomists returned to growth theory and turned to development. The new growth theory, starting with Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988), deals explicitly with development, seeking to account for the apparent nonconvergence of per capita income levels between developing and industrialized countries.<sup>3</sup> A hallmark of much of the new literature is the demonstration that distortions and policy interventions that can be shown to affect the level of income in conventional models can affect the steady-state growth rate in the new models—thereby providing analytical backing for assertions that had routinely been made by development economists. Although existing models, such as the Harrod-Domar model<sup>4</sup> or its multisector fixed coefficient extensions, and the Solow model without the Inada condition,<sup>5</sup> also produce such results, it is clear that the new growth theory is responsible for the recent interest in the determinants of long-run growth among macroeconomists.

The new growth theory has also returned to some of the classic themes of the development literature, among them the roles of technology, international trade, human capital, economies of scale, and the possible need for a coordinated big investment push to break out of a low-income equilibrium.<sup>6</sup>

The empirical work associated with the new growth theory consists largely of cross-country regressions, typically using the Summers-Heston (1988) International Comparisons Project data.<sup>7</sup> Those results have been reviewed and their robustness examined in an extremely useful paper by Levine and Renelt (1992); the strongest results are that increased investment in physical capital, as well as an increase in either the level or the rate of change of human capital, increases the rate of growth.

The new growth theory is production-function driven and primarily concerned with steady states. There has been remarkably little focus on the influence of macroeconomic policies on growth. For instance, it is striking that measures of political stability, but not macroeconomic policy, have been included in new growth theory-based

regressions.<sup>8</sup> Swan's (1956) excuse for concentrating on the long run—that with the help of Keynes we know how to control short-run macroeconomic problems—is less plausible now than it was in the 1950s and 1960s, especially for the developing countries.

The aim of this paper is firmly to establish—or reestablish—that macroeconomic policies matter for economic growth and development. I begin in the section that follows by discussing the relationships between macroeconomic policies and growth. In the next section, I present several types of evidence suggesting that macroeconomic policies do matter for growth—that countries that manage short-run macroeconomic policies better tend to grow faster.<sup>9</sup> I then present and discuss evidence on the mechanisms through which macroeconomic policies matter, examining whether they have any independent influence on growth or whether instead they operate almost entirely by affecting investment. Next I draw on the evidence from major case studies to examine and amplify the conclusions on macroeconomic policy drawn from the previous sections. Conclusions and issues for future research are presented in the final section. In the Appendix, I present regression evidence on which some of the conclusions from this paper are based.

## **Macroeconomic Policies and Growth**

By macroeconomic policies I mean monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policies that help determine the rate of inflation, the budget deficit, and the balance of payments. In particular, I will examine partial correlations between growth and inflation and growth and the budget deficit. I expect that countries that permit high inflation rates and large budget deficits grow more slowly.

The potential links between inflation and growth are discussed and developed in Fischer (1983) and by implication in Fischer and Modigliani (1978). While the Mundell-Tobin effect<sup>10</sup> implies that an increase in expected inflation increases capital accumulation, a variety of other mechanisms produces the opposite correlation. The negative effect of inflation on the efficiency of the exchange mechanism suggests that higher inflation reduces the level of income; by extension

through the new growth theory mechanisms, this interaction would produce a negative correlation between inflation and growth. Similarly, all the costs of inflation detailed in Fischer and Modigliani (1978)—including the impact of inflation on the taxation of capital—would imply a negative association between the level of income and inflation, and through the new growth theory mechanisms, between inflation and growth. This paper also discusses the positive association between the level and variability of the inflation rate and the likely positive association between inflation and uncertainty about future price levels. This uncertainty too is likely to reduce growth.

Probably as important as the above mechanisms is the role of inflation as an indicator of the overall ability of the government to manage the economy. Since there are no good arguments for very high rates of inflation, a government that is producing high inflation is a government that has lost control. Economic growth is likely to be low in such an economy.

This same argument is the main reason to expect a negative association between budget deficits and growth. Governments that run large budget deficits are governments out of control. In addition, in many models budget deficits crowd out private investment.

In the short run, both the inflation rate and the budget deficit are affected by the growth rate. A supply shock will both reduce the growth rate and raise the inflation rate, and given government spending a reduction in growth will increase the deficit. The length of time period in the regressions in this paper is fifteen years. The government can certainly set the inflation rate and the deficit independently of the growth rate over such a long period.

Nonetheless, the possible endogeneity of monetary and fiscal policies must be dealt with. That is done both through economic techniques and through the case studies presented later in this paper.

### **Cross-Sectional Evidence**

The profusion of cross-section regression studies associated with the new growth theory makes it difficult to know what variables are robustly associated with good growth performance. Fortunately, Levine

and Renelt (1990) have now summarized most of those studies and attempted to determine which are the robust relationships.

They list forty cross-sectional growth studies published since 1980.<sup>11</sup> Each study regresses the growth rate over a given period against a variety of variables; well over fifty regressors have been used in these studies (Levine and Renelt 1992). Among the regressors are variables relating to trade and trade policy, exchange rates, fiscal policy, political and social stability and rights, human capital, and macroeconomic policy and outcomes. Early studies tended to focus on trade policy and investment; studies associated with the new growth theory typically include initial real income and some measure of human capital as well as investment.

For a sample of 101 countries over the period 1960–1989, Levine and Renelt (1992) present a basic regression

$$\begin{aligned}
 GYP = & -0.83 - 0.35 \text{ RGDP60} - 0.38 \text{ GN} + 3.17 \text{ SEC} + 17.5 \text{ INV} \\
 & (-0.98) \quad (-2.50) \qquad \qquad (-1.73) \qquad (2.46) \qquad (6.53)
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\bar{R}^2 = 0.46; \quad t\text{-statistics in parentheses} \qquad (1)$$

where *GYP* is the growth rate of real per capita income (from the World Bank data base), *RGDP60* is (Summers-Heston) real income in 1960, *GN* is the rate of population growth, *SEC* is the 1960 rate of secondary school enrollment, and *INV* is the share of investment in gross domestic product (GDP). The robust relationships are those between growth and initial income and between growth and investment.<sup>12</sup>

When Levine and Renelt extend the analysis to include a variety of other variables, they find, first, that several measures of economic policy are related to long-run growth; and second, that the relationship between growth and almost every particular macroeconomic indicator other than the investment ratio is fragile.

The negative coefficient on the initial level of real income provides evidence that countries are tending to converge toward a steady-state level of per capita income; it indicates some type of diminishing returns for the production function expressed in terms of per capita output.<sup>13</sup> The variable *SEC* in equation (1) is included as a proxy for the country's ability to implement technical change; however, the 1960 secondary school enrollment rate must be a very imperfect measure of

a country's ability to implement technical change over the period 1960–1989.

The range of RGDP60 is from 0.21 (\$208) to 7.38 (\$7,380). The implication is that the poorest country in the group would catch up in 142 years if it had the same secondary school enrollment ratio (and other variables in (1)) as the richest country.<sup>14</sup> A country starting at \$1,000 in 1960 would catch up in 90 years, all else being equal. Initial real income and secondary school enrollment would be strongly negatively correlated if social and religious factors did not intervene; probably these two large coefficients between them isolate a particular group of countries—for example, countries where females typically did not receive a secondary education—whose growth experience differs from the average.<sup>15</sup>

The significant divergences in economic performance across countries that underlie regression (1) are summarized in Table 1.<sup>16</sup> The growth rates are for GDP, with countries weighted by their relative GDP measured in dollars in 1980. Over the period since 1960, economic growth has accelerated in Asia while slowing in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA); the slowdown in the 1980s was greater in Latin America than in Africa, even when measured on the basis of the growth of per capita GDP.

The association between growth and investment in Table 1 is broadly positive, across both time and regions. In each region, however, there was a sharp increase in the rate of investment between the first two periods without an increase in the growth rate.<sup>17</sup> Inflation increased between periods in each region, but the increases were much greater in SSA and particularly in Latin America than in Asia; there is a predominantly negative relationship between inflation and growth in Table 1. However, low-growth Africa has generally not had the very high inflation rates of Latin America; in part this is because the fixed exchange rate among the Francophone countries belonging to the franc zone in Africa (CFA zone) has been maintained throughout. The negative relationship between growth and inflation is *prima facie* evidence that the quality of macroeconomic management affects growth. Supporting evidence comes from the apparently negative relationship between growth and the increase in the size of the budget deficit, although here data for SSA are incomplete.

**TABLE 1** Economic Indicators for Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean, 1960–1988 (average annual rate)

	Africa			Asia			Latin America		
	1960–73	1973–80	1980–88	1960–73	1973–80	1980–88	1960–73	1973–80	1980–88
GDP growth rate (%)	4.5	3.2	0.3	5.6	5.7	7.8	6.0	5.1	1.2
Population growth rate (%)	2.6	2.8	3.2	2.4	1.9	1.7	2.7	2.4	2.2
Inflation rate <sup>a</sup> (%)	5.8	14.1	25.7	2.0	6.0	6.9	5.7	24.1	111.2
Budget deficit/GDP (%)	n.a.	n.a.	6.3	n.a.	3.9	3.7	2.4	2.0	5.5
Real exchange rate index <sup>b</sup>	n.a.	82.6	98.6	n.a.	64.7	90.3	n.a.	83.0	91.9
Current account/GDP (%)	-3.6	-3.4	-6.1	-1.7	-1.1	-0.8	-2.6	-3.1	-2.4
Real export growth (%)	7.0	4.4	-1.9	5.2	8.0	13.0	5.4	3.0	5.5
Real investment/real GDP	14.0	21.5	15.6	19.4	26.5	30.1	18.9	23.5	18.6
External debt/exports of goods and services (%)	n.a.	96.6 <sup>c</sup>	365.0 <sup>d</sup>	n.a.	89.8 <sup>c</sup>	98.9 <sup>d</sup>	n.a.	196.2 <sup>c</sup>	316.6 <sup>d</sup>

n.a. = not available.

a. Inflation rate, of GDP deflator, is calculated on a continuous (logarithmic) basis.

b. Increase in exchange rate index indicates devaluation.

c. 1980.

d. 1988.

SOURCE: World Bank.

TABLE 2 Economic Characteristics of Fast- and Slow-Growing Countries, 1960-1989 (percentage)

Characteristic	Fast growers	Slow growers	<i>t</i> -statistic
Investment/GDP	23	17	5.18
Government consumption/GDP	16	12	3.26
Exports/GDP	32	23	2.31
Inflation rate	12.3	31.1	-1.74
Black market exchange rate premium	13.6	57.2	-3.79
Secondary school enrollment (1960)	30	10	5.46
Primary school enrollment (1960)	90	54	6.10

NOTE: Sample consists of 109 countries; fast growers are the 56 countries whose growth rate of per capita income exceeds the mean; slow growers are the remaining 53 countries.

SOURCE: Levine and Renelt (1992:Table 2).

The data suggest, but only weakly, that countries that grow faster do better on the current account of the balance of payments; the weakness of the association derives in part from variations in the tightness of constraints on borrowing. The association between the growth of exports and GDP growth is striking: rapid growth in Asia in the 1980s is associated with an extremely rapid rate of export growth, which can with further disaggregation be tracked down not only to the newly industrialized economies (NIEs), but also to the increase in exports from China during its growth spurt in the 1980s. The relationship between export and GDP growth supports the argument that outward orientation is a route to growth.<sup>18</sup> Each region shows depreciation of the exchange rate in the 1980s relative to the 1970s, but it is striking that the depreciation was greatest in Asia. Nominal devaluations were greater in other regions, but their real impact was not maintained as well as in Asia.

Table 1 is suggestive of the role that macroeconomic factors and policy may play in determining aggregate performance. Further evidence comes from Table 2, reproduced from Levine and Renelt (1992). The black market exchange rate premium is the average premium over the official exchange rate, as measured from Pick's *Currency Yearbook*. The black market premium is an indicator of the extent of trade distortions, capital controls, and expectations of deval-

uation and must be correlated with the degree of overvaluation of the currency.

Dervis and Petri (1987) obtain similar results, based on the growth performance of twenty middle-income developing countries. They show that countries that grow faster than average tend to invest more than average, have smaller current account deficits, have lower shares of government spending, and have more rapid export growth than other countries. The rapid growers did not have particularly small budget deficits, and the extent of their real depreciations and terms of trade changes were average.

Support for the role of macroeconomic factors is also provided by evidence from cross-sectional regressions. Regressing per capita real (Summers-Heston) growth over the period 1970–1985 against the standard new growth theory variables, plus indicators of macroeconomic performance, yields the following:<sup>19</sup>

$$\begin{aligned}
 GY = & 1.38 - 0.52 \text{ RGDP70} + 2.51 \text{ PRIM70} + 11.16 \text{ INV} - 4.75 \text{ INF} \\
 & (1.75) \quad (-5.90) \qquad (2.69) \qquad (3.91) \quad (-2.70) \\
 & + 0.17 \text{ SUR} - 0.33 \text{ DEBT80} - 2.02 \text{ SSA} - 1.98 \text{ LAC} \\
 & (4.34) \quad (-0.79) \qquad (-3.71) \quad (-3.76) \\
 \bar{R}^2 = & 0.60 \quad n = 73 \quad t\text{-statistics in parentheses} \quad (2)
 \end{aligned}$$

where PRIM70 is the enrollment rate for primary school, INF is the average inflation rate over the period 1970–1985, SUR is the ratio of the budget surplus to gross national product (GNP) over the period 1975–1980;<sup>20</sup> DEBT80 is the foreign debt to GNP ratio in 1980; and SSA and LAC are the dummies for sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean, respectively. The sample includes all countries for which data were available.<sup>21</sup>

The rates of investment and inflation, and the budget surplus enter regression (2) significantly. The signs of all variables are as expected. When the continent dummies are excluded,<sup>22</sup> the coefficients on inflation and the debt rise. Recalling that several of the mechanisms relating inflation to growth that were discussed earlier operate by affecting investment, it should be noted that the coefficients on both inflation and investment in equation (2) are statistically significant.

This implies that inflation has effects other than those that operate through investment. For instance, inflation could affect the efficiency of operation of the given factor inputs.

Regression (2) strengthens the argument that macroeconomic indicators are correlated with growth, at least over the period 1970–1985.<sup>23</sup> However, relatively little of the cross-sectional variance in growth rates is accounted for by the macroeconomic variables alone. When only the inflation rate, debt, and the deficit are included, the corrected squared correlation coefficient is only 0.16. When the continent dummies are added, 32 percent of the variance is accounted for.

The external debt to GNP ratio in regression (2) serves as an indicator of the exchange rate overvaluations of the late 1970s. The average black market foreign exchange premium could serve as another such partial indicator. The simple correlation between the average growth rate over the period 1970–1985 and the average black market premium for the same period, for a group of forty countries for which the data are available, is  $-0.24$ . The simple correlation between the premium and investment is  $-0.36$ , and between the premium and the budget surplus is  $-0.34$ .<sup>24</sup> However, the coefficient on the average black market premium is never significant in any regression that includes the other macroeconomic variables, and this applies also to various nonlinear transformations of the premium. Its major effect seems to be to reduce the coefficient on the external debt, but because its inclusion also changes the sample size, not much can be deduced from any such effect. I will return to the role of the black market premium in the next section.

Both the regression evidence presented in this section and the data presented in Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate the existence of suggestive correlations between growth and variables related to macroeconomic policy over periods as long as fifteen years. The evidence supports the view that the quality of macroeconomic management, reflected in these regressions in the inflation rate, the external debt ratio, and the budget surplus, matters for growth.

It would be logical at this point to try to determine precisely which macroeconomic indicators are most robustly associated with growth in the cross-country regressions. However, that exercise is unlikely to be instructive, as the results of Levine and Renelt (1992) show. There

are at least two reasons for this. First, none of the standard indicators—the budget surplus, the current account, the inflation rate, the real exchange rate—is truly exogenous with respect to growth, and there is no effective way of dealing with the exogeneity problem with these data. Second, cross-country regressions such as equation (2) have no clear structural interpretation. While they are very useful ways of summarizing the correlations in the data, and they suggest that countries that manage the macroeconomy well grow faster, they do not explain how.

### **Why Do Macroeconomic Variables Matter?**

Suppose we accept the argument that inflation and other factors related to short-run macroeconomic management affect economic growth. There are two possible routes of influence. First, macroeconomic management may affect the rate of investment, and thus the capital stock.<sup>25</sup> For example, large budget deficits may crowd out physical investment, or high and uncertain inflation may both reduce investment and induce capital flight. Second, macroeconomic factors may affect the efficiency with which factors are used, for instance, by distorting price signals; inflation may reduce the rate of return on physical investment; or inflation may produce distortions that reduce the real wage.

Cross-country investment regressions based on the new growth theory are presented in Barro (1989a,b) and Romer (1989). These regressions generally show that some measure of initial human capital has a positive impact on investment, that political instability has a negative effect, and that investment is higher the lower the relative price of investment goods and the more the price of investment goods diverges from the world level. In addition, government investment appears to be complementary with private investment. The robustness tests by Levine and Renelt (1992) show that none of the relationships in the basic regression equation—which does not include the relative price of investment goods—is robust; the cross-sectional results provide little guidance on the determinants of investment.

In the Appendix, I present regressions relating the share of investment to macroeconomic variables. The single strongest relationship is

that between the share of investment and the growth rate of output, but the direction of causation here is ambiguous. There is a robust negative relationship between inflation and investment. In addition, the black market premium and the relative price of investment goods affect the rate of investment: investment is lower when the black market premium is high and higher in countries where investment goods are relatively less expensive.

The most surprising relationship presented in the Appendix is that investment and the budget deficit are positively associated. This is in the a priori wrong direction, if the surplus is interpreted as a measure of the quality of macroeconomic measurement or if deficits are thought to crowd out investment.<sup>26</sup> I have no clear explanation for this surprising result.

The black market premium can be interpreted both as a measure of expectations of depreciation of the currency (and therefore also of currency overvaluation) and as a crude index of distortions. Expectations of depreciation may affect investment through several channels: first, it is more attractive to hold foreign assets when depreciation is expected;<sup>27</sup> second, economic uncertainty is higher under such conditions; but third, for those who can obtain foreign exchange at the official rate, foreign capital goods are cheap to import. While the first two factors suggest a negative relationship between the black market premium and investment, the third suggests the opposite. To the extent that the black market premium serves as a general index of distortions and therefore of an unsustainable situation, it is likely to be negatively correlated with investment.

The black market premium is strongly negatively correlated with investment but in the previous section did not appear to affect the rate of growth significantly. The explanation would seem to be simple: the black market premium affects the rate of investment directly and thereby the rate of growth indirectly. This means that the black market premium can be interpreted as affecting the rate of investment but not the efficiency of investment.

Unfortunately, this argument does not stand up to further examination. A priori, it is difficult to see why an index of distortions would affect the rate of investment but not the rate of return on investment. More important, there is direct evidence that the black market premium

TABLE 3 Rates of Return on Investment Projects (percentage)

	Public sector	Private sector
Black market premium		
High (>200%)	4.5	11.7 <sup>a</sup>
Medium (20–200%)	8.4	
Low (<20%)	12.2	14.7
Real interest rate		
Negative	8.7	10.9
Positive	12.6	16.0
Inflation rate		
High (>100%)	6.5	13.9 <sup>b</sup>
Medium (20–100%)	7.9	
Low (<20%)	11.2	13.5
Trade price distortions		
High	8.9	9.4
Low	11.7	16.1

a. Covers both high and medium premiums.

b. Covers both high and medium inflation.

NOTE: Rates of return on public sector projects are based on a sample of estimated *ex post* rates of return on 1,400 World Bank projects. Private sector projects are financed by the International Finance Corporation; sample size is 150. All data are preliminary.

SOURCE: Kaufmann (1991).

is correlated with the efficiency of investment. Table 3 presents estimated rates of return on investment projects in developing countries, cross-categorized against measures of distortions and macroeconomic variables including the real interest rate, the black market premium, and the inflation rate.<sup>28</sup>

The interpretation of the role of the black market premium must therefore be left as something of a mystery. It is not clearly associated with the growth rate, except perhaps in extreme cases,<sup>29</sup> but there is direct evidence that it appears to affect the rate of return on investment. Whether these results can be explained by the relationship between the black market premium and other measures of macroeconomic policy or microeconomic distortions remains to be seen.

Although none of the regressions presented in the Appendix provides a fully satisfactory account of the determinants of investment, this evidence, as well as that in Levine and Renelt (1992), again shows

that macroeconomic variables—particularly the black market premium and inflation—affect investment. But because the relationships between investment and macroeconomic indicators, except the black market premium and, to a lesser extent, inflation, are not robust, it is unlikely that further cross-sectional regressions of this type will pin down the transmission mechanism between macroeconomic variables and growth.

Time-series evidence for individual countries may help do so. For the industrialized economies, investment equations generally show investment being affected by the cost of capital and by demand variables. The theoretical literature has emphasized the option value of waiting as a factor that makes investment especially sensitive to uncertainty; effects related to the quantity of credit have also been identified.<sup>30</sup>

The same variables that affect investment in industrialized countries should also affect investment in developing countries.<sup>31</sup> In addition, foreign exchange and credit rationing may be more prevalent in developing countries. Investment equations for developing countries have also paid considerable attention to possible complementarities between public and private sector investment.<sup>32</sup> Rama (1990) summarizes the results of separate investment regressions for thirty-nine developing countries, nineteen of them Latin American. Aggregate demand variables are almost always positively associated with investment, as are measures of the availability of credit; measures of uncertainty or instability are negatively associated with investment. Cost of capital variables usually enter investment equations with the right sign, but are typically not statistically significant. Public investment appears more often as a substitute for private investment than as a complement in the studies he reports, though this result is not typical of the investment literature.

Cardoso (1990) presents regressions on panel data for six Latin American countries. Changes in the terms of trade, the growth rate of GDP, and the share of public investment in GDP are all significantly correlated with investment. Public and private investment are positively associated. Other variables that might be expected to affect investment, including a measure of economic instability, the stock of internal government debt, and exchange rate depreciation, do not enter

investment equations significantly. Only the debt-to-exports ratio makes a significant entry in one equation.

Solimano (1989), in a careful study of the determinants of Chilean investment, finds strong evidence that uncertainty or instability—of output, the real exchange rate, and the real interest rate—reduce investment. His evidence also shows a complex relationship between the level of the real exchange rate and investment: an overvalued exchange rate tends to encourage investment, but the higher investment is nonsustainable.<sup>33</sup>

The time-series studies of investment indicate that several variables related to macroeconomic policy affect the rate of investment. Increased stability of output, a higher exchange rate, and low cost of capital increase investment; so does the availability of credit. In several studies, the external debt has a negative impact on investment.<sup>34</sup> The impact of public investment on the overall rate of investment has not been firmly tied down in investment studies. The black market premium reduces investment, as shown in the Appendix. A reduction in the price of investment goods increases the quantity of investment. Thus the bulk of the evidence suggests an important role for macroeconomic policy in determining the rate of investment—even treating the role of income in investment equations with due circumspection.

The new growth theory has focused on the determinants of physical investment, even though the theory frequently relies on the accumulation of human capital to generate endogenous long-run growth. T. Paul Schultz (1988:569) examines the determinants of schooling for an eighty-nine-country sample. The income elasticity of primary school enrollment is 0.31, while that for secondary school is 0.43. The relative price of teachers has a strong negative effect on enrollment. Schultz's estimates show urbanization increasing primary school enrollment but reducing that in secondary school. The teacher-student ratio also increases with income, more so for primary than for secondary school. The positive association between income and school enrollment suggests a feedback effect between growth and its determinants—including macroeconomic policy—and schooling.<sup>35</sup>

It would be interesting as well to examine the policy-related determinants of the efficiency with which human capital operates, and

therefore how much it contributes to output and growth. Schultz (1988: 575) provides estimates of these returns by continent and level of schooling, which generally show the highest returns to primary education, and higher returns in Latin America and Africa than elsewhere. Taken at face value, the latter findings are hard to reconcile with the typically negative coefficients on dummy variables for those regions. Part of the explanation may be that the estimated rates of return are based on data from before the 1980s. Both the puzzling rate of return results and the relationship between the return to human capital and macroeconomic performance must be subjects of further study.

### **Case Studies**

While the cross-sectional results on the determinants of both growth and investment rates suggest that macroeconomic factors have important effects, those results clarify neither the channels of influence nor the precise macroeconomic factors that matter most. Nor do they give any real sense of the macroeconomic policy decisions that must be faced in practice.

An interesting alternative is presented by Scholing and Timmermann (1988), who use a path model in which the growth rate is affected by “inner” (latent) variables—physical capital, human capital, the growth of labor, international competitiveness, and political instability—that are estimated as linear combinations of measurable “outer” variables.<sup>36</sup> Essentially, the approach allows for the creation of an index of, for example, macroeconomic instability. Both the robustness of this approach, which is closely related to the work by Morris and Adelman (1988), and the clarity of the interpretations it provides remain to be seen.<sup>37</sup> But by potentially putting structure on the reasons variables enter a model, it does present one possible way out of the difficulty that a never-ending array of alternative plausible variables can be entered in cross-country regressions.

The case study approach presents another, less formal, method of drawing conclusions about the role of macroeconomic factors. Corden (1990) summarizes the results of a World Bank study of macroeconomic policies, crisis, and growth in seventeen developing

countries, including nine of the twelve developing economies whose 1987 GNP exceeded \$30 billion.<sup>38</sup>

Fifteen of the countries studied by Corden experienced a public spending boom between 1974 and 1981. Only India and Chile did not. While the timing and extent of the spending booms varied across countries, the cause appears to have been either a rapid increase in export receipts or the increased availability of foreign financing. Many of the countries built up their foreign debt rapidly. Growth in the countries with public spending booms was high until the end of the 1970s. For many of them, the investment ratio and growth fell in the 1980s.<sup>39</sup> Corden points to three lessons from the experiences of the boom period: smooth spending relative to income;<sup>40</sup> appraise investments carefully (this advice is offered to creditors as well); and beware of euphoria—be cautious.<sup>41</sup>

Almost all the countries in the sample went into a recession or crisis in the late 1970s or early 1980s; Pakistan is the exception. The macroeconomic story of the 1980s is the story of the policy successes and failures in dealing with the shocks that took place at the turn of the decade. There is no uniform pattern of success: Korea adjusted immediately and hard; Chile and Indonesia adjusted later and hard; Mexico adjusted later yet. Colombia and Thailand adjusted gradually and successfully. Turkey appeared to have adjusted well in the mid-1980s but has still not dealt with its budget deficit and suffers from rising inflation. Other countries in the group are still struggling. The general lesson from these episodes is that growth does not return until the adjustments—especially the fiscal adjustments—are made.<sup>42</sup>

A complex relationship between inflation and growth emerges from the cross-country study. The simple correlation between inflation and growth in the sample in the 1980s is weak, because the three low-growth African countries have low inflation and because high-growth Turkey had high inflation. Brazil during the period until the 1980s (and Israel until 1973) is the main exhibit for the case that high inflation is not inconsistent with high growth; however, there is no case of high growth being consistent for any length of time with triple-digit inflation. Several of the high-growth countries suffered from inflation in excess of 20 percent for a few years during the early 1980s, but the inflation tended to come down quickly. As Corden

argues, it is important that inflationary expectations not become entrenched and that the government's commitment to low inflation be established.

Exchange rate systems among the seventeen countries in the study and over time within the countries vary widely. Periods of overvaluation associated with capital inflows were a common feature of the macroeconomic instability at the turn of the decade. Corden draws the lessons that nominal exchange rates should be adjusted frequently and that noninflationary monetary policy should generally be attained through a commitment to fiscal discipline rather than a nominal exchange rate. He also notes that there have been many instances of ineffective, inflationary, nominal devaluations: nominal devaluations should generally be accompanied by a policy package that includes monetary and fiscal adjustments.

Most of the lessons of the comparative study are completely obvious, but were nonetheless violated not only by government officials but also by supposedly hard-nosed bankers in the late 1970s. Others, for instance the finding that a commitment to a nominal exchange rate target is not usually effective, are less obvious and may also be less certain.<sup>43</sup> To provide examples illustrating the value of the lessons and the political economy issues they raise, I turn to two of the countries examined in the study.<sup>44</sup>

**Cote d'Ivoire.** For the first fifteen years of its independence, until 1975, Cote d'Ivoire was an outstanding performer among developing countries.<sup>45</sup> Output growth averaged 7.7 percent per year, with no major macroeconomic imbalances. As a member of the CFA zone, with a fixed exchange rate against the French franc and its Franco-phone neighbors, it had low inflation throughout the period. Population growth averaged over 4 percent, one quarter of that a result of immigration from lower-income neighbors.

From 1980 to 1989 GDP rose less than 1 percent per year, and per capita GNP fell more than 25 percent. Between 1975 and 1980 the economy was derailed by a massive public investment program, whose fiscal implications were for a time covered by a sharp but temporary improvement in the terms of trade. It has not yet recovered from that and subsequent shocks and policy mistakes.

Some of the developments seen in Table 4 and in Figures 1, 2, and 3 are similar to those that took place in Latin America at the same time. A massive improvement in the terms of trade in 1977, combined with rapidly increasing government spending and borrowing, resulted in a 14 percent increase in GDP in 1978. The currency appreciated as domestic prices rose more rapidly than international prices, while the exchange rate remained fixed—as it has been since 1946. Despite the improvement in the terms of trade and a more than doubling of the dollar value of exports between 1974 and 1980, the current account went into a large deficit. By the end of the decade, the ratio of external debt to GDP was above 50 percent, making the country vulnerable to the real interest rate shock of the early 1980s.

Cote d'Ivoire was also hit very hard by the decline in commodity prices in the early 1980s, with the terms of trade in 1982 at less than half the 1976 level. Public sector investment was cut fast, but government revenues declined along with it, leaving a double-digit budget deficit. Although the appreciation of the dollar in the early 1980s produced a real depreciation of the CFA franc, the current account deficit remained in double digits in that period.

Further public investment cuts and revenue measures reduced the budget deficit after 1984. Together with a temporary improvement in the terms of trade, this led to a turnaround in the current account after 1984. Growth, however, remained slow, failing to keep up with population growth of 4.1 percent. In 1988 and 1989 the terms of trade worsened, government spending rose and revenues fell, and the budget deficit returned to double digits. The currency continued to depreciate slowly in real terms, as tight domestic policy and massive unemployment reduced domestic prices. But the current account deficit worsened, leading to payments arrears and the suspension of debt servicing. Aggregate growth turned negative, while per capita income declined by more than 5 percent a year. Declining incomes and rising unemployment led to political difficulties, and the appointment of a new government in 1990.

One source of Cote d'Ivoire's budget difficulties was a government commitment to fixed CFA franc prices for the main export crops, coffee and cocoa, that by 1989 were nearly double the world level. These prices were cut in the second half of 1989. Civil service salaries

TABLE 4 Macroeconomic Performance, Cote d'Ivoire, 1973–1989

	GDP growth (%)	Investment/GDP (%)	Public sector investment <sup>a</sup> /GDP (%)	Budget deficit/GDP (%)	Current account deficit/GDP (%)	Terms of trade <sup>b</sup> (1984 = 100)	Real exchange rate <sup>c</sup>	External debt <sup>d</sup> /GDP (%)	Inflation <sup>e</sup> (%)
1973–1976	5.9	22.7	13.8	2.9	4.0	100.9	125.9	n.a.	16.5
1977–1980	5.2	28.3	18.1	6.5	11.5	141.9	156.5	55.2	14.5
1981–1983	0.9	23.2	10.7	12.7	13.5	81.3	110.1	124.8	3.5
1984–1987	1.4	11.6	6.3	4.5	1.8	106.5	103.0	130.7	3.0
1988	-1.8	15.2	4.7	8.4	6.2	79.7	110.9	131.5	1.5
1989	-1.3	10.3	3.1	11.3	9.7	68.6	104.3	139.0	-2.0

n.a. = not available.

a. Includes public enterprises.

b. Terms of trade series is from BB, spliced from 1986 to World Bank (1990b).

c. Real exchange rate series is from BB, spliced from 1987 to World Bank (1990b). Increase represents appreciation.


d. Debt ratio is for the last year in the period.

e. Inflation rate is for the GDP deflator.

SOURCES: World Bank (1990b and 1990c); Berthelemy and Bourguignon (1989) (denoted BB).


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FIGURE 1 GDP Growth and Investment in Cote d'Ivoire, 1974-1989



SOURCE: International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics* (Washington, D.C., various years).

FIGURE 2 GDP Growth, Budget Deficit, and Current Account Deficit in Cote d'Ivoire, 1974-1989




SOURCE: World Bank.

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**FIGURE 3** Real Exchange Rate and Terms of Trade in Cote d'Ivoire, 1974–1989
 

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 SOURCE: World Bank (1990c).
 

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are a major budgetary expenditure, amounting to 12 percent of GDP, that has been difficult to cut despite the need to adjust internal prices to the fixed exchange rate.

The exchange rate system is a key issue for Cote d'Ivoire and other countries in the franc zone. The fourteen countries of the zone have had free capital movements within the zone and with France for over forty years, have had relatively low inflation, and until the late 1970s, grew rapidly. For most of its existence, the franc zone has benefited its members, who are reluctant to give it up. Devaluation of the CFA franc against the French franc would be difficult, not only because of the inevitable loss of credibility of the exchange rate commitment, but also because the countries of the zone are overvalued to differing extents.

The new Ivoirian government is committed to pursuing a rigorous adjustment program. It will attempt to restore macroeconomic balance by cutting current government expenditures, including wages, and by reforming the tax system. Cutting current government expenditures is urgent, since the rate of public investment is incompatible with sustained growth. The government also intends to increase the efficiency

of public enterprises, in part through privatization. It will also have to make a variety of regulatory and incentive reforms, using non-exchange rate measures to provide incentives to export.

Cote d'Ivoire provides an example of a country where macroeconomic policies and mistakes, especially the euphoria of 1976–1980, have severely curtailed growth over a sustained period. The decision to stay with the fixed exchange rate has been extremely important and may not be sustainable. The inability of the government to cut current spending, especially civil service salaries, has been an important macroeconomic factor, with roots that lie in the political economy of the country. Of course, macroeconomics is far from being all that matters: the country's growth suffered in the first instance from terms of trade shocks and also suffers from most of the familiar microeconomic distortions and inefficiencies, including inefficient public enterprises.

**Chile.** The story of Chile's economic recovery is worth retelling, for both its negative and its positive lessons.<sup>46</sup> Chile has been through two extremely tough adjustment periods (see Table 5 and Figures 4, 5, and 6). The first came after the military government took power in 1973, confronting an economy in near-total disarray. The government removed price controls, devalued the currency, and moved the budget from a deficit of 30 percent in 1973 to a surplus by 1976. An import liberalization program reduced tariffs to a uniform 10 percent by 1979. Companies and banks that had been nationalized under the Allende government were privatized. The fiscal squeeze, accompanied by a nearly 40 percent decline in the terms of trade between 1974 and 1975, created a massive recession. Partly as a result of monetary tightening, the real interest rate exceeded 60 percent in 1976.<sup>47</sup>

The inflation rate, however, was slow to come down, remaining in triple digits through 1977. Regarding the inflation as largely inertial, particularly because of the budget surplus, the government instituted a preannounced schedule of devaluations at less than the current inflation rate, in the hope of causing expectations to stabilize around the nominal exchange rate anchor. With imports liberalized, foreign competition was expected to have a disinflationary effect, reinforcing the expectations effect of the nominal exchange rate anchor. In June 1979

TABLE 5 Macroeconomic Performance, Chile, 1973–1989

	GDP growth (%)	Investment/ GDP (%)	Public sector investment <sup>a</sup> / GDP (%)	Budget deficit/ GDP (%)	Current account deficit/ GDP (%)	Terms of trade (1980 = 100)	Real exchange rate <sup>b</sup>	External debt <sup>c</sup> / GDP (%)	Inflation <sup>d</sup>
1973	-5.6	7.9	8.4	30.5	2.8	187.2	70.9	n.a.	418.1
1974	1.0	21.2	12.5	5.4	1.9	197.8	74.7	n.a.	694.2
1975	-12.9	13.1	9.2	2.0	6.8	118.5	63.3	n.a.	324.4
1976–1980	7.5	16.8	6.0	-3.1	4.5	114.3	77.4	45.2	97.3
1981	5.5	22.7	5.1	-0.3	14.5	84.3	108.1	50.1	12.2
1982	-14.1	11.3	4.7	3.4	9.5	80.4	99.0	76.7	13.3
1983	-0.7	9.8	4.8	3.3	5.6	87.5	89.1	98.8	26.6
1984–1986	4.8	14.3	6.9	3.0	8.6	79.8	86.6	141.6	22.1
1987–1988	5.6	17.0	6.8	2.0	2.8	86.5	63.3	96.3	21.2
1989	10.0	20.4	n.a.	n.a.	3.6	97.3	62.5	78.3	13.2

n.a. = not available.

a. Includes public enterprises.

b. Increase in real exchange rate index represents appreciation.


c. Debt ratio is for the last year in the period.

d. Inflation rate is for the GDP deflator.

SOURCES: World Bank (1990b and 1990c); Corbo and Solimano (1991); Morgan Guaranty Trust (for real exchange rate).


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FIGURE 4 GDP Growth and Investment in Chile, 1972-1989



SOURCE: World Bank (1990c).

FIGURE 5 GDP Growth, Budget Deficit, and Current Account Deficit in Chile, 1972-1989




SOURCE: Corbo and Solimano (1991).

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**FIGURE 6** Real Exchange Rate and Terms of Trade in Chile, 1972–1989
 

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 SOURCE: World Bank (1990c).
 

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the exchange rate was fixed to the dollar. While inflation came down, it did not come down fast enough. As Figure 6 shows, the real exchange rate appreciated rapidly from 1978. The terms of trade began declining after 1979. The current account worsened rapidly, reaching 14.5 percent of GDP in 1981; the external debt increased; and Chile had to adjust once again, even before the debt crisis struck at the end of 1982.

Chile devalued in 1982, helping precipitate a financial crisis for banks and firms that had borrowed abroad. In 1981 and 1982 the domestic real interest rate exceeded 30 percent. The fiscal deficit (including the quasi-fiscal deficit of the central bank) rose to almost 9 percent of GDP in 1982.<sup>48</sup> The cutting off of external lending, the adverse changes in the terms of trade, and the domestic financial crisis resulted in a 14 percent decline in GDP and an increase in the unemployment rate to 33 percent. For a time the government raised tariffs to 55 percent for revenue reasons. A generally tight fiscal policy was accompanied by targeted employment programs.

It took two years for the recovery to begin. Between 1981 and 1986 the government succeeded in producing a real devaluation of

nearly 40 percent. Inflation rose temporarily to more than 30 percent in 1985 but then came down to the low 20 percent range, where it has stayed since. The real interest rate has also declined to near 10 percent. In 1985 the government adopted an adjustment program, which not only privatized, liberalized, and began to cut tariffs again, but also provided targeted assistance to alleviate poverty. The program was designed to diversify exports and make the economy less vulnerable to external shocks, in part by instituting a copper stabilization fund that smoothed government use of funds from copper export revenues. The current account improved as exports boomed, helped in 1988 and 1989 by improving terms of trade. GDP growth increased from 1985 to 1989, reaching a probably unsustainable 10 percent in 1989. By 1987 GDP had returned to its 1981 level and by 1988 unemployment was below 7 percent.

The Chilean experience has been mined for more than its macroeconomic policy lessons. But there is little doubt that macroeconomic policy mistakes, especially in the late 1970s and early 1980s, had enormous effects on Chilean growth during those decades. The attempt to deal with inflation through the exchange rate turned into a disaster, which was amplified by the international debt crisis. The rigorous macroeconomic policies pursued since then provide a stable background against which microeconomic distortions have been effectively removed. The empirical work by Solimano (1989) also suggests that macroeconomic stability has been an essential ingredient in the recovery of investment. The continuing double-digit inflation remains a problem, one which is common to many other countries that have stabilized from very high inflation.

We can also learn lessons by contrasting Chilean experience with those of Argentina and Brazil. Those countries failed to deal with their macroeconomic imbalances during the 1980s, growth has not resumed, and attempts at efficiency-enhancing adjustment programs have for the most part failed, as macroeconomic instability leads to frequent policy reversals.

Figures 1 and 4, for Cote d'Ivoire and Chile respectively, confirm in a time-series context the very strong relationship between growth and the share of investment seen earlier in this paper. This relationship probably reflects not purely the supply-side effect of increased capital

on output, but rather both a supply-side effect and an accelerator effect in which increased demand leads to higher investment.

The restoration of growth in many countries requires an increase in investment. Chile is one of the few non-Asian countries badly hit by the crisis of the early 1980s in which investment has increased significantly and growth has returned. But the recovery of investment requires time, evidence of increased returns to capital, and a period of economic stability. Here too macroeconomic policy matters.

## **Conclusion**

The primary aim of this paper was to establish that a country's macroeconomic policies matter for long-run growth. Provided the inflation rate, external debt, and the government deficit are accepted as macroeconomic policy indicators, both the cross-sectional regressions and the case studies support that contention. The results are less clear about the mechanisms through which macroeconomic policy affects growth, but the case studies and much other evidence suggest a powerful impact on investment. The separate roles of macroeconomic policy variables in the growth regressions imply the existence of other channels, which need further investigation.

It could be argued that the case studies show only that macroeconomic policy affects growth in the short run and that the effects of such policies are transitory. It is difficult to deal with this contention over very long periods. For instance, the rapid growth after World War II can be seen as a period in which the world caught up from the absence of growth in the Great Depression, so that by 1973 the world was back where it would have been had growth proceeded smoothly since 1929. Even so, it would be a mistake to focus exclusively on the very long run. It was only in 1989 that Chilean per capita income recovered its 1970 level. That long period of unnecessarily low income certainly had welfare consequences for many, even if by 2010 Chile were to be back where it would have been.

The new growth theory and the associated empirical work have focused on the structural factors in growth. The empirical work characterizes high-growth countries: for instance, they invest a lot, they

have higher school enrollment, and they are more open. But it has not explored with any care the mechanisms that are central to endogenous growth theory—for instance, whether the process of human capital accumulation bears any similarity to the production functions for human capital typical in that literature. Nor has it yet succeeded in identifying the underlying determinants of investment, though the relative price effect emphasized by De Long and Summers (1990) must be an important part of the story. Identifying the determinants of investment and the other factors contributing to growth will probably require a switch away from simple cross-sectional regressions to time-series studies of individual countries, of the type discussed in this paper.

Solow (1989) discusses the difficulties of integrating short-run macroeconomics with growth theory.<sup>49</sup> There are indeed formidable problems in constructing a tractable theoretical model of this type. But any model that includes a production function and that accounts for the accumulation of factors of production and the efficiency of their use can be used to analyze long-run growth. Each of these elements has been modeled and estimated; they can be brought together to provide a coherent empirical account of growth.

The conclusions of this paper imply that many of the losses of the lost decade could have been avoided had governments pursued more cautious macroeconomic policies in the 1975–1982 period. Developing countries would nonetheless have suffered from slower growth as they adjusted to the sharp changes in world interest rates and terms of trade and the industrial country recession in the early 1980s.

The simplicity of the macroeconomic policy lessons that can be drawn from this paper raises the question of why those lessons are so rarely implemented. Here is the role for political economy, both in recognizing the particular circumstances of individual countries and in seeking to develop more general theories.<sup>50</sup> The theories may contribute understanding, even if they do not suggest how to change policies.

This paper contends that macroeconomic policy matters for growth, but not that only macroeconomic policy matters. Reasonable macroeconomic stability is necessary for sustained growth, but beyond that an appropriate overall economic strategy—including a market and

outward orientation; a strong government role in providing physical and social infrastructure, especially human capital; and a limited government role in other areas—is crucial.

## APPENDIX

The material presented in this Appendix supports some results and conclusions presented in the text, particularly in the first two sections.

### The Cross-Sectional Regressions

There are two standard interpretations of the cross-sectional regressions. First, they can be interpreted as attempts to estimate a time-differenced production function of the general form

$$Y_t = F(A_t, a(\cdot)K_t, b(\cdot)H_t) \quad (\text{A1})$$

where  $A_t$  is an overall efficiency factor, not only including the level of technology, but also, for example, representing the quality of government management of the economy or institutional factors;  $K$  and  $H$  are physical and human capital respectively; and  $a(\cdot)$  and  $b(\cdot)$  are efficiency factors. Except for some initial conditions, the regressions deal with averages of the variables over long periods, treating countries as the population from which the observations are drawn.

Differentiating equation (A1), we can interpret the coefficients in regression (1) in the text:

$$GY = \eta_1 \dot{A}/A + \eta_2 (\dot{a}/a + \dot{K}/K) + \eta_3 (\dot{b}/b + \dot{H}/H) \quad (\text{A2})$$

where  $\eta_i$  is the elasticity with respect to argument  $i$  in equation (A1), and  $GY$  is the growth rate of aggregate output. The coefficient on investment in regression (1) should be related to the average marginal product of capital over the nearly three decades represented by each observation; this coefficient—which is very robust—is typically in the range of 10–20 percent.<sup>51</sup> The negative coefficient on population

growth in regression (1) is (noisily) related to the growth rate of the unaugmented stock of human capital,  $H$ ; if population growth were equal to labor force growth, then the coefficient on labor in an equation for aggregate growth would be 0.62. In any case, regression equation (1) suggests that per capita income grows less rapidly the more rapidly population grows.

An alternative interpretation starts from the assumption that the economy is tending toward a steady-state income level,  $Y^*$ . The steady-state income level is determined by the rate of saving (or investment), investment in human capital, and the rate of population growth. Thus

$$Y^* = f(\text{INV}, \text{SEC}, \text{GN})$$

Then, given some initial level of income,  $Y_0$ , and some final income level  $Y_\tau$

$$Y_\tau - Y_0 = \phi(Y^* - Y_0) \quad (\text{A3})$$

where  $\phi > 0$  is related to the returns-to-scale properties of the underlying production function with respect to the variable factors. If  $\phi < 1$ , the coefficient on  $Y_0$  in a regression like (1) will be negative, indicating convergence of income levels among economies with the same rates of investment, human capital, and population growth.

Equation (A3) makes clear the role of initial income in equation (1). An interpretation of cross-country regressions based on equation (A2) has the benefit of not requiring that the economy be approaching a steady state—and given the fluctuations seen in growth rates and income levels in many developing countries in the period since 1970, it is hard to take the steady-state interpretation seriously.

### **Dealing with Endogeneity**

As discussed in the second section of the paper, the macroeconomic indicators included in regressions (1) and (2) cannot be regarded as truly exogenous. Instruments are difficult to find; for instance, such

candidates as measures of political instability not only cause but also are caused by inflation. Instrumental variable estimation of equation (2) using as instruments initial GDP and primary enrollment, the frequency of crises and riots, military spending, foreign aid, and the debt in 1980 resulted in a regression in which no coefficient was significantly different from zero. Instrumental variable regression using the above instruments plus the variance of inflation, the frequency of constitutional changes, and government consumption spending, produced results very similar to (2), except that primary education lost its statistical significance.

### Using Panel Data

Cross-sectional regressions such as (2) ignore information that might be available in the time series of data within each country. Running a pooled cross-section time-series regression of the general form of (2) for the period 1972–1985, and including lagged as well as current values of the rates of investment and inflation, we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned}
 GY_{it} = & \text{Year Dummies} - 0.23 \text{RGDP70}_i + 1.40 \text{PRIM70}_i + 36.5 \text{INV}_{it} \\
 & \quad (-2.82) \quad \quad \quad (1.64) \quad \quad \quad (5.53) \\
 & - 3.83 \text{INV}_{i(t-1)} - 19.9 \text{INV}_{i(t-2)} - 3.55 \text{INF}_{it} \\
 & \quad (-0.49) \quad \quad \quad (-4.27) \quad \quad \quad (-3.19) \\
 & + 2.22 \text{INF}_{i(t-1)} - 2.08 \text{DEBT80}_i + 4.30 \text{SUR}_{it} \\
 & \quad (2.55) \quad \quad \quad (-2.26) \quad \quad \quad (1.13) \\
 \bar{R}^2 = & 0.207 \quad n = 1,059 \quad t\text{-statistics in parentheses} \quad (\text{A4})
 \end{aligned}$$

Investment variables retain their strong statistical significance in the pooled regression, which also gives some evidence on the dynamics of the relation between output and investment. The large contemporaneous coefficient, 36.5 percent, must represent primarily the demand effect in which an increase in investment demand causes a more rapid increase in output. The coefficients on the investment rates can also be expressed in the form  $(12.8 \text{INV}_{it} + 23.7 \Delta \text{INV}_{it} + 19.9 \Delta \text{INV}_{i(t-1)})$ , suggesting that increases in the investment ratio have a large temporary

TABLE A1 Cross-Country Investment Regressions

	A5	A6	A7	A8	A9
Constant	0.097 (4.40)	0.077 (3.17)	0.087 (2.96)	0.236 (13.70)	0.214 (9.70)
<i>GY</i>	1.23 (3.19)				
RGDP70	0.012 (4.48)	0.009 (2.98)	0.008 (2.32)		
PRIM70	0.052 (1.72)	0.115 (3.94)	0.118 (3.77)		
INF		-0.174 (3.05)	-0.148 (2.61)	-0.133 (2.33)	-0.075 (1.79)
SUR7580		-0.345 (2.02)	-0.305 (1.69)	-0.174 (0.78)	-0.546 (2.45)
DEBT80		0.013 (0.98)	0.018 (1.30)	0.010 (0.73)	-0.008 (0.59)
BLAV					-0.018 (3.95)
PINV					-0.043 (2.63)
SSA			-0.016 (0.90)	-0.080 (4.65)	
LAC			-0.030 (1.67)	-0.044 (2.14)	
$\bar{R}^2$	0.46	0.44	0.45	0.21	0.21
<i>n</i>	73	73	73	73	40

NOTE: Dependent variable is INV, average share of investment in GNP over the period 1970–1985, in the Summers-Heston data. BLAV is the average black market premium (as a multiple of the official rate) over the period 1970–1985. PINV is the average price of investment goods in the country (relative to the United States) over the period. Other variables are as in equation (2).

SOURCE: Author's estimates.

effect on growth, which can be associated with the demand effect, leaving 12.8 percent as the estimate of the longer-term impact of investment on growth.

### Investment Regressions

Table A1 presents estimates of a number of cross-sectional investment regressions, all for the average share of investment in GNP over the

period 1970–1985. Equation (A5) in Table A1 is both simple and has the highest explanatory power for cross-country variation in investment. There are no clear causal reasons that the initial level of per capita GDP and school enrollment enter the equation. The significant coefficient on the growth rate is consistent with the typical finding that accelerator-type investment functions perform well (Clark 1979). However, as noted in the text, the direction of causation in this equation is difficult to establish.

When the macroeconomic variables are added and the growth rate of output removed, inflation and the budget *surplus* are significantly negatively related to investment. The negative relationship between inflation and the share of investment is robust. Equations (A7) and (A8) suggest important interactions between the initial level of income and primary enrollment, and the sub-Saharan Africa continent dummy. Finally, in equation (A9), we see strongly statistically significant coefficients on the black market premium (BLAV) and the relative price of investment goods; the inclusion of these variables leaves the budget surplus as the other macroeconomic variable that is significant at the 5 percent level, but in the a priori wrong direction, as discussed in the text.

The relationship between the investment share and the black market premium is reasonably robust, in the sense that the coefficient on the black market premium remains large and statistically significant in most permutations of investment equations that are based on the forty-country sample.<sup>52</sup> The coefficients on the other macroeconomic variables are not stable. The coefficient on the debt is typically not significant, and it is frequently (though not significantly) positive, implying that countries that borrowed more in the 1970s generally invested more, all else being equal.

## NOTES

1. See, for instance, the first two reports on adjustment lending by the World Bank (1988, 1990a).

2. See, for instance, Williamson (1990), Fischer and Thomas (1990), and World Bank (1991).

3. While it is a convenient problem on which to deploy the new theories, their aim is more ambitious than to account for nonconvergence, which can in any case be explained in the Solow framework (Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1992).

4. Since a version of this model has been used as the standard model in World Bank country analyses, many development economists had routinely assumed that the saving rate affects the growth rate.

5. For the latter, see Solow (1956), Jones and Manuelli (1990), Raut and Srinivasan (1991).

6. See Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1990), and Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989).

7. For examples, see Barro (1989a,b), Mankiw, D. Romer, and Weil (1992), and P. Romer (1989).

8. Grier and Tullock (1989) include macroeconomic variables in cross-country growth regressions, but their work is not inspired by the new growth theory, taking off rather from an earlier paper by Kormendi and Meguire (1985). Levine and Renelt (1992) also include macroeconomic variables in their growth regressions; so does De Gregorio (1991) in a study of Latin America. A valuable start in analyzing the links between short-run macroeconomic management and growth, and in attempting to draw policy implications from the new growth theory, has been made by Vittorio Corbo and his associates at the World Bank; see, for instance, World Bank (1990a).

9. Because the focus of the paper is on the role of macroeconomic policy, I do not address in any detail questions of alternative development strategies—for example, outward versus inward orientation—that are frequently analyzed using cross-country regressions of the type that are presented in this paper.

10. As noted in Fischer (1988), the mechanisms producing the Mundell and Tobin effects actually differ, though both imply that an increase in expected inflation increases capital accumulation.

11. Their list is necessarily incomplete; in particular, it does not include the comparative cross-country analysis by Morris and Adelman (1988), which is based on work dating back to the 1960s. Several other earlier cross-country studies are listed by

Chenery (Chenery, Robinson, and Syrquin 1986:27). Reynolds (1986:101) also presents a cross-sectional growth regression, despite his general preference for time-series studies.

12. De Long and Summers (1990) present evidence that growth is linked primarily to the share of manufacturing investment in GNP.

13. Romer (1989) argues that measurement error in initial income will bias its coefficient to be negative (since positive measurement error in RGDP60 reduces the level of the dependent variable); he also presents some evidence suggesting this problem may be present.

14. This calculation assumes a growth rate difference of 2.5 percent per year and does not present the confidence interval around the estimate.

15. Levine and Renelt (1992:Table 1) show that the secondary school enrollment ratio becomes insignificant if an Africa dummy is included. De Gregorio (1991) finds that school enrollment (primary or secondary) is insignificant in growth regressions for Latin America alone.

16. The similarities of experiences across countries within regions call for explanations; among them must be the common influence of particular industrial country trading partners (such as Japan in Asia and the United States for Latin America), similarities of historical experiences, and learning from neighbors. There are also, of course, real differences among countries within a region. For instance, the development strategies and growth performance of Kenya and Tanzania, or Korea and India, differ greatly.

17. The inverse of ICOR (incremental capital-output ratio) is frequently used as a measure of the efficiency of investment, but because of depreciation is seriously biased for this purpose. Conventionally measured ICOR is  $(I/Y)/(\Delta Y/Y)$ . "True" ICOR, designated ICOR\*, is equal to  $(\Delta K/Y)/(\Delta Y/Y)$ . Let  $\delta$  be the rate of depreciation, and  $g = \Delta Y/Y$  the growth rate. Then  $ICOR = ICOR* + (\delta/g)(K/Y)$ . Measured ICOR exceeds ICOR\* by an amount that is inversely related to the rate of growth. Accordingly, the inverse of measured ICOR tends to be higher the more rapid the growth rate. This argument would have to be modified to take account of the nonhomogeneity of capital.

18. Although there is much evidence that outward orientation is positively associated with growth, as noted above, I will not pursue that relationship in this paper.

19. The period was chosen in a trade-off between the length of period and number of macroeconomic variables that could be included in the regression.

20. The period is chosen to increase the number of countries included in the sample. I have also run similar regressions for the period 1974–1989, using Levine and Renelt's (1992) data, provided by Ross Levine. No major differences in conclusions emerge using the Levine-Renelt data.

21. It can be argued that the developing countries are sufficiently and systematically different from the industrial countries and that the latter should be excluded from the regressions. Although it is easy to agree with this view at the extremes, it is hard to know where to draw the line, and I therefore worked mostly with all countries for which there were data. For some regressions (not reported here), I excluded all countries that in 1970 had an income level above Italy's; if anything, this gave stronger results with respect to macroeconomic variables, particularly the debt.

22. Continent dummies enter most growth equations significantly. Lance Taylor

has suggested that the negative coefficients for Africa and Latin America may reflect their particularly adverse terms of trade shocks in the 1980s.

23. Regressions in Dervis and Petri (1987) show that the macroeconomic variables are less significant in cross-country regressions for the period 1960–1973 than subsequently. As suggested by the discussant of that paper, Arnold Harberger, this may be a result of their smaller variability in the earlier period.

24. The premium is available for sixty-seven countries for the period 1970–1985, but there are only forty countries for which the variables in equation (2) plus the premium are all available. The weakness of the simple correlation between growth and the black market premium may be a result of the wide range of the premium, from zero to an average of 717 percent (for Nicaragua). The premium is high for African countries, excluding those in the CFA zone, and for Latin America. Nicaragua aside, the highest premia, frequently exceeding 100 percent, are found in North and sub-Saharan Africa.

25. Short-term macroeconomic management will also affect the number of employed but is less likely to affect the rate of growth of population over long periods.

26. Sweder van Wijnbergen has suggested that the negative coefficient on the budget surplus may reflect the role of government investment, which increases the overall rate of investment but decreases the budget surplus. The coefficient on the surplus is reduced when the dependent variable becomes private rather than aggregate investment, but it does not become positive.

27. This assumes domestic interest rates have not adjusted, which is implied by the presence of a black market premium.

28. The data are from Kaufmann (1991). Kaufmann's preliminary regressions suggest that the black market premium is the main macroeconomic variable that affects project rates of return. This presumably means that it is the best summary indicator of macroeconomic distortions.

29. The qualifier is based on results reported in Chapter 2 of the 1991 *World Development Report*. In that study rates of total factor productivity growth for sixty-eight countries are regressed against several variables, including the black market premium, which is interpreted as a measure of macroeconomic instability. The authors find that total factor productivity growth is significantly lower for countries for which the lagged black market premium exceeded 500 percent, but that total factor productivity growth was otherwise unaffected by the premium.

30. On irreversible investment and the value of waiting, see Bernanke (1983) and Pindyck (1988). On finance and investment, see, for example, Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988).

31. Serven and Solimano (1989) survey theories and evidence on investment, particularly with respect to the implications for developing countries.

32. This issue is also examined by Barro (1989a), who finds that private investment is higher the higher government investment is.

33. The complexity of this relationship may account for the weak relationship between the exchange rate and investment found in Cardoso's study.

34. Schmidt-Hebbel and Mueller (1990) found the debt-to-GNP ratio has a significant impact on investment in Morocco; they treat the debt as an indicator of macroeconomic uncertainty.

35. Although the regressions in the previous section show the *level* of enrollment as affecting growth, as noted there, other regressions in the literature, as well as the production function (3), suggest that the increase in enrollment should affect growth.

36. The analysis allows for degrees of latency, with some latent variables being affected by other latent variables.

37. For example, Scholing and Timmermann include the rate of inflation as an output variable determining international competitiveness; in this paper it has been taken as an indicator of macroeconomic performance.

38. Corden discusses Korea, which was not in the original study, and omits discussion of Argentina, which was. The larger developing economies included in the World Bank study are Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Turkey. Egypt, Korea, and Venezuela are the remaining three. (China is excluded because the study was confined to nonsocialist economies.)

39. Corden states that there is a negative cross-country correlation between investment booms in 1974–1980 and growth from 1982 on.

40. Corden expresses this advice in different language. It has to be recognized though that commodity exporters in the late 1970s, especially oil exporters, were in good company in believing the good times were forever.

41. Among the euphoric cases mentioned by Corden, Cote d'Ivoire, which is examined below, raised public sector investment from 11 percent of GNP to 21 percent in the four years following 1974.

42. Corden does not specify the conclusions on the timing of adjustment that should be drawn from the study; the conclusion in the text is consistent with the examples he presents.

43. Reynolds (1986:5) notes, "There are hardly any general statements to which one cannot find exceptions in one country or another"—a conclusion that becomes harder to dispute the more often one tries to draw general lessons.

44. Dervis and Petri (1987) examine the macroeconomics of two of the more successful developing countries, Korea and Turkey, pointing to the dangers raised by Turkey's inability to deal with its fiscal deficit.

45. This account draws on World Bank (1990b) and Berthelemy and Bourguignon (1989).

46. In this section, I draw on Douglas (1989), Corbo and Solimano (1991), and World Bank (1990b).

47. Corbo and Solimano (1991) examine the controversy over the stance of monetary policy in 1975, concluding that monetary policy was restrictive.

48. See Corbo and Solimano (1991) for an estimate of the total deficit. The total deficit peaked at 9.8 percent of GDP in 1985; there was a surplus by 1987. The data shown in Table 5 and Figure 5 do not include the quasi-fiscal deficit.

49. See also Orphanides and Solow (1990). The same point is made in the development context by Arida and Taylor (1989).

50. See, for example, Alesina and Drazen (1989).

51. However, the investment coefficient falls to 6 percent in some regressions in Barro (1989b) that also include measures of political instability.

52. Solimano (1989) finds, using quarterly data from 1977 through 1987, that the black market premium is strongly negatively associated with investment in Chile.

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