

CAPACITY BUILDING IN THE GAMBIA: The GARD and EFPA Case Studies

February 1993

Final Report

Presented to:
USAID/Banjul and
The Government of The Gambia



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PREFACE

This final report is submitted to USAID/Banjul and the Government of The Gambia, by a study team funded by the Implementing Policy Change (IPC) project. The report incorporates suggested modifications offered by USAID/Banjul and the GOGB upon their review of an earlier draft.

IPC is a worldwide USAID project that seeks to assist developing country governments to implement policy change through the use of strategic management principles. Management Systems International (MSI) is the prime contractor for the IPC project.

The assignment was conducted during November and early December, 1992. The six-member team included: Anthony Davis -- Team Leader & Institutions/Strategic Management Specialist (Abt Associates); Julie Koenen-Grant -- Human Resource and Strategic Management Specialist (MSI); Samuel Taddesse -- Macro-Economist/Evaluation Specialist (MSI Consultant); Robert Kagbo -- Agriculture Specialist (Abt Consultant); Benjamin Carr -- Economist/Financial Analyst (MSI Local Consultant); and, Kal Juwara -- Management Specialist (Management Development Institute and Local Consultant to MSI).

The team is greatly appreciative of the guidance provided by the Government of The Gambia and by USAID/Banjul. We would also like to thank the various groups contacted in The Gambia and the United States during the conduct of the study for their assistance. Any errors or omissions in the report are the sole responsibility of the study team.

ACRONYMS

ADP	Agricultural Development Project
ANR	Agriculture and Natural Resources project
ARMS	Agricultural Research Management System
CBG	Central Bank of The Gambia
CoP	Chief of Party
CSD	Central Statistics Department
DAR	Department of Agricultural Research
EFPA	Economic and Financial Policy Analyses project
EMCBP	Economic Management Capacity Building Programme
ERP	Economic Recovery Program
FAPE	Financial Analysis and Private Enterprise project
FSR/E	Farming Systems Research and Extension
GARD	Gambia Agricultural Research and Diversification project
GCU	Gambia Cooperative Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GOTG	Government of The Gambia
GPMB	Gambia Produce Marketing Board
HIID	Harvard Institute for International Development
IARC	International Agriculture Research Center
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPC	Implementing Policy Change project
MDI	Management Development Institute
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MFAU	Macroeconomic and Financial Analysis Unit
MFEA	Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs
MFP	Mixed Farming Project
MOA	Ministry of Agriculture
MOFT	Ministry of Finance and Trade
MSI	Management Systems International
NARB	National Agriculture Review Board
NaTCAP	National Technical Cooperation Assessment and Programmes
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIB	National Investment Board
ODA	Oversees Development Authority
PBS	Program Budgeting System
PMO	Personnel Management Office
PSD	Program for Sustained Development
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SSSU	Statistics and Special Studies Unit
ToR	Terms of Reference
UNDP	United Nations Development Program

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I. INTRODUCTION

The Gambia has received substantial technical assistance in the past, often in the form of resident long-term advisors, short-term consultants and various forms of training. While these projects have made a significant contribution to The Gambia's development, it is realized by the Government of The Gambia (GOTG) and donors that such projects could have been more effective in building sustainable human resource and institutional capacity.

Several initiatives are under way in The Gambia to improve the use of technical assistance and build Gambian capacity. Within this context, the PMO has recognized that evaluation of the capacity building performance of specific, recently completed projects would be a key input to the development of GOTG programs.

Correspondingly, the objective of this study was to "identify lessons learned from the GARD and EFPA projects that will lead to more effective and successful sustainable capacity building projects in the future." The primary focus of the study was on the human resources and organizational development components of the two projects. As such, the study does not constitute a traditional evaluation of the entire set of objectives set for each project.

The study was conducted during November and early December 1992. Two exit debriefings were conducted by the team prior to its departure from The Gambia: one for the USAID/Banjul staff and office of the PMO, and the other for other GOGB personnel who were interested in the study's findings. The study was funded by USAID/Banjul via the Implementing Policy Change (IPC) Project. IPC is a worldwide USAID project that seeks to assist developing country governments to implement policy change through the use of strategic management principles. Management Systems International (MSI) is the prime contractor for the IPC project.

II. MAIN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The capacity building effects of the two projects were evaluated in terms of: (i) human resource development; (ii) institution building (organizational structure and systems); and, (iii) the sustainability of the capacity building efforts.

The GARD Project

The human resource development activities under the GARD project were largely successful. The training provided under the GARD project contributed significantly toward building The Gambia's ability to conduct adaptive agricultural research.

- * Most of the trainees sent on overseas long-term training returned to The Gambia and to the MOA. They received training in disciplines that were directly relevant to their jobs

at MOA, and many received promotions and increased job responsibility as a result of their training and subsequent improved job performance.

- * However, the human resource base for conducting agricultural research is very thin. There are certain disciplines in which no one at MOA has training, and in many key fields there is only one person with adequate skills.
- * In addition, there are a number of unproductive employees at DAR, which management is reluctant to let go and who divert scarce resources away from alternative uses such as providing incentive to the productive staff.

Institution building has also been quite successful under GARD, but is still subject to constraints imposed by the civil service personnel system. The sustainability of institutional development gains made under GARD is more questionable.

- * The basic elements for a national agricultural research system are in place and functioning in The Gambia. The strategy employed by the GARD project to strengthen the MOA's research capabilities overall, as opposed to setting up a project office or new, special unit, was sound. The result has been the establishment of a "home" for that function that will continue after the project's completion.
- * However, full management of the annual research-related process exclusively by Gambians will not occur until 1993 -- so it is too early to evaluate Gambian capacity to manage the research system. Some weaknesses are already manifest and cause for some concern: (i) the interdisciplinary task forces have been inactive for many months; (ii) planning for the annual research review event has yet to be started even though the meeting is scheduled for February 1993; (iii) the ability to systematically assess farmer constraints does not exist in DAR; (iv) there is a low level of resources available to maintain and repair research facilities; and, (v) no personnel have been trained to maintain the new soils laboratory's equipment.
- * Another key weakness of the system continues to be the lack of an effective communication and coordination linkage between research and extension.
- * The Program Budgeting System (PBS) was introduced by GARD into all MOA departments. However, despite being a well regarded system, only DAR has fully integrated it into its management system. Without impetus provided from the World Bank, the PBS would have fallen into greater disuse -- reflecting the fact that no high-level Gambian was chosen under GARD to "champion" the PBS.
- * Attracting and retaining qualified personnel into the DAR will continue to be a challenge given present personnel policies and resource levels. The civil service system provides managers with little assistance: (i) pay and grade increases are normally based on tenure and education rather than merit; (ii) financial and non-financial compensation levels are not competitive with NGOs and other private sector entities; (iii) systems through which personnel performance can be appraised are not widely understood or utilized; and, (iv)

managers' ability to fire personnel is quite limited in practice for bureaucratic and cultural reasons. This will significantly affect the quantity and quality of agricultural research being conducted in The Gambia.

- * The immediate challenges in the post-GARD period are to: (i) secure sufficient resources in DAR to retain personnel and to maintain/repair equipment and infrastructure; (ii) ensure that research continues to focus on the key constraints faced by farmers; and, (iii) communicate appropriate research findings to the farming community to enhance adoption rates.

The sustainability of The Gambia's agricultural research capacity and of the gains made under the GARD project is of critical interest now that the project has ended. However, by the same token, it is premature to fully judge sustainability, as the first year of Gambians being completely responsible for agricultural research has just begun. Early indications are that agricultural research capacity was certainly enhanced as a result of GARD, but continuation of such activities in the future at their project-induced levels are not likely and the future role of DAR is in question.

- * The ability of MOA/DAR to meet the key needs of farmers on an on-going basis is limited. Furthermore, the extent to which DAR effectively anticipates and responds to its internal and external environment is moderate.
- * Resources are very limited in DAR for salaries and for the maintenance and repair of equipment and infrastructure. Through improved budgeting systems, the heightened profile of agricultural research and other effects of GARD, DAR management is in a better position to "make their case" for resource allocations. However, limitations imposed by the civil service and public budgeting systems lead some to believe that it would be better to create a new national agricultural research institute that is guided by NARB, and thus, is not directly in the ministerial structure. This would imply an abandonment of DAR, or at least a significant scaling down of its operations. The new institute would benefit from GARD, by employing many of the staff trained under the GARD project who now work at DAR or elsewhere in MOA.
- * Agricultural research has been "put on the map" as a result of GARD activities, and this bodes well for the sustainability of the function. However, it has yet to respond significantly to the needs of farmers at the farm level, nor communicate to the public and policy makers the value of its contribution. The proposed national research institute re-opens the issue of what the exact mission of agricultural research should be, where institutionally it should reside, and how it will be funded.

The EFPA Project

The development of human resources in the EFPA was only partially successful.

- * The project met or exceeded the number of candidates it envisaged training at the masters and bachelors levels, as well as the number of participants of in-country workshops and

seminars. In addition, all of those provided with training overseas returned to The Gambia.

- * However, virtually none of those receiving overseas training returned to the SSSU (the focal unit of the EFPA project) nor to the Ministry of Finance in general. Many of those who did return to the Ministry, stayed there only a short time, and soon left for more attractive jobs outside the civil service.
- * The apparent inability to staff the SSSU or Ministry with personnel trained under the project was due to several factors: (i) the fact that many training candidates originated in organizations outside the Ministry in the first place; (ii) training was not synchronized with job advancement, and candidate selection was somewhat haphazard; (iii) the work environment and compensation levels in the Ministry were not competitive with the parastatal and private sectors; and, (iv) EFPA provided training in skill areas that were also in high demand elsewhere in the economy.
- * Some of the training provided was in disciplines that are not of central importance to the macroeconomic management function. This served to dilute the effectiveness with which project resources were used to achieve the project's objectives.

The institution building aspects of EFPA also met with only limited success. The project was more successful in developing institutional capacity to produce economic and financial statistics and monitor indicators of economic performance, than in creating a unit or capacity to perform economic policy analysis and conduct policy dialogue with donors.

- * The ability to perform economic statistical and monitoring functions was quite good during the project's life, and a number of useful spreadsheets, databases and related systems were developed. In addition, a small group of Gambians were trained at one stage or another to perform these functions.
- * However, the ability to continue these functions in the absence of technical advisors is questionable because: (i) many of the Gambians trained in this function have left the Ministry; and, (ii) the systems were developed in a rather ad hoc fashion -- without first investigating whether the data existed elsewhere in the system, without formalizing data flow processes with other entities in and outside the Ministry, and without a master plan to strengthen other units that handle macro-economic data on whom the Unit would rely for input. As a result, processes for data collection and monitoring systems have not been well institutionalized.
- * After six years of operation, the SSSU effectively does not have any staff who benefitted from EFPA, and the Unit is not able to produce the level of policy analysis produced by the technical advisors. It does not have staff capability for organizing, conducting and disseminating sound macro-economic and financial analyses for national policy review and implementation. With the recent absorption of the SSSU into the new MFAU and the start of the FAPE project with a new contractor, many of the questions asked in the early years of EFPA are being asked again -- for example, how big should the Unit be,

what is the relative role of staff versus expatriate technical advisors, what is its role of the Unit relative to others involved in the macroeconomic management function, etc.

- * There are many reasons why the Unit and consequent building of institutional capacity was unsuccessful. Focusing on one unit almost to the exclusion of other parts of the Ministry, in hindsight, was probably a mistake. The Unit never had a clear mandate or terms of reference. It operated more like a special task force than a formal part of the Ministry's organizational structure, and its relationship with other parts of government were never officially delineated. The staff positions in the Unit were never formalized. An official Gambian head for the Unit was never installed, which had the dual effect of creating the perception that the Unit was run by expatriates, and of diverting the expatriate TAs' effort away from capacity building as they had to focus on issues related to the day-to-day management of the Unit instead.

The sustainability of the capacity building effects of the EFPA project are negligible: (i) none of the staff trained under the project are in the Unit; (ii) the Unit itself basically has ceased to function and has been absorbed into the MFAU, which itself lacks a clear mandate; (iii) the capacity of the Ministry to produce economic statistics and to monitor economic performance has improved but is still heavily reliant on expatriate technical assistance; (iv) the ability of the Ministry to conduct economic policy analysis and conduct policy-level dialogue with donors is minimal; (v) the selection of counterparts to work with TA, and definition of their working "modus operandi" has not been refined; and, (vi) the ability of the Ministry to attract and retain middle- to senior-level staff is no better now than in the early years of EFPA.

III. LESSONS LEARNED

The lessons learned from the evaluation of the GARD and EFPA projects are divided into four parts: (i) strategy and strategic management; (ii) organizational structure and development; (iii) personnel systems; and, (iv) human resource development.

Strategy and Strategic Management

- * Ministries and other government organizations need to be strategically managed and have effective strategic management processes. These need to be dynamic and future oriented, able to anticipate and respond to changes in the external environment, and strive for organizational "fit" with the external environment.
- * Individual units or departments also need to have clear strategies and mandates that are consistent with the overall organization's strategy.
- * "Champions" are important for launching initiatives, but support for the initiative must broaden over time and be carefully managed if the initiative's function is to be institutionalized.

- * Coordination and continuity is needed in donor and government programs to reduce the extent of variability in the external environment faced by government entities.
- * Sustainable resource flows are more likely when resource gaps and priority areas are identified through a strategic planning process.
- * Donor-sponsored programs should avoid funding activities at such a high level that it is difficult for the recipient to maintain such levels of resources when the project ends. A phasing out plan should be developed as part of the project's design.

Organizational Structure and Development

- * The creation of a special unit in a Ministry should be approached advisedly. If it becomes closely associated with a project, and not part of the Ministry, the unit is very likely not to be institutionalized when the project ends.
- * The unit's reporting relationship is key, and depends on the function in question. Policy advice needs direct access at a high level within the organization; whereas, non-policy activities can be easily channelled through the hierarchy.
- * The identification and development of a national to serve as the head of a special unit can be an important factor in sustainability. The unit head should focus on day-to-day management, on building sustainable capacity, and dealing with institutional aspects of the external environment such as the civil service. The expatriates can then focus on providing policy advice and skills transfer.
- * The Permanent Secretary and senior management must be committed to the activity, including full staffing of the unit with appropriate personnel.
- * Every job position should have a clear mandate and description. However, a higher degree of latitude and flexibility should be written into descriptions for the more senior job positions, although accountability must remain high.
- * Creating organizations or entities that overlap or are redundant with other entities that perform similar functions should be avoided. It is often easier to build on the existing base (i.e., established unit) than to create a whole new entity, although there may be less flexibility in staffing.
- * A minimum efficient scale exists for units, so as to leave a critical mass in place while some staff are away on training. This balance needs to be carefully managed. The absolute scale/size will depend on the functions the unit is to perform.

Personnel Systems

- * Staff retention can be enhanced through improved financial and non-financial compensation. Non-financial rewards are a critical area for further study because government will be limited in the extent to which it can provide salary increases, and the

gap with comparable salaries in the parastatal and private sectors is high, often many multiples of what the public sector pays.

- * An improved "motivational environment" will do much to improve retention and staff performance, and is not resource-intensive.
- * Compensation should be linked to objectively evaluated performance and not exclusively to tenure and seniority. Greater accountability is also needed.
- * Parallel management and technical tracks for mid-level government officials will help alleviate "pyramid compression" and "brain drain."
- * Rotational assignments for junior and mid-level staff into related units/organizations, and conducting joint training programs with functionally related organizations can: (a) break down inter-group barriers; (b) leverage resources; (c) increase the efficiency of data flows; and, (d) improve staff retention by making jobs more interesting/challenging.
- * Staff who perform well need to be promoted soon after they return from long-term training, perhaps, initially on a probationary basis. If possible, their new job position should be slated before they start training.
- * The people and skills base need to be developed in a coordinated fashion with the development of systems.

Human Resource Development

- * Training programs for individuals need to be developed, and synchronized with career development paths. The type of training must match the skill sets required in a given job position.
- * There is a hierarchy of skill sets that needs to be explicitly recognized. These range from: (i) basic data entry/manipulation; (ii) analysis of data; to, (iii) policy analysis. Each has a different record of success, and requires different duration/resources for training.
- * Junior staff sent on long-term training are more likely to return to their original unit/department, because they have a better chance of getting promotions and pay raises upon return than more senior staff, and they see that opportunities for further training and career advancement exist.
- * Sectoral ministries are more likely to retain higher level trained staff than functional ministries are. In sectoral ministries, training is more specialized and fewer opportunities for employment exist outside of government.
- * Management skills training for Permanent Secretary and Deputy Permanent Secretary levels are important.

- * The ability to provide policy advice to senior officials and conduct effective capacity building is rarely found in a single person. Different people are usually "process" as opposed to "content" consultants. The process of identifying, evaluating and selecting good "process" consultants is more difficult, however, than it is for content consultants.
- * TAs' terms of reference need to be clear and distinguish between "delivering the goods" and capacity building. TA performance along both dimensions needs to be measurable, and monitored closely. Government should have a central role in both Terms of Reference development and in TA performance monitoring.
- * TA experts should work with a group or groups of locals, not just one counterpart. This will avoid the "all your eggs in one basket" risk, and help a critical mass.
- * If a given unit or department is the focal point of the technical assistance, then the Gambian unit head with his staff should draft the unit's work plan (and unit strategic plan), not expatriate TA. An implication of this is that ideally the organizational entity needs to have its leadership roll filled and be partially staffed before the TA arrives. The Permanent Secretary, however, can act as a surrogate unit head in a transitional period. The unit's work plan needs to be flexible enough to incorporate suggestions provided by the expatriate TA when it arrives.
- * The allocation of project resources, especially the cost of TA relative to what else could have been bought with those resources (for example, degrees and equipment) is an important and visible issue. There are trade-offs between the two, and some limitations on what donors can provide. The project's effectiveness and staff motivation can be directly effected.

IV. NEXT STEPS

The evaluation of the capacity building effects of the GARD and EFPA projects provides implications for selected next steps.

Strategic Management

- * Ministries need to be managed strategically and improve their strategic planning processes. This can only occur over time and requires a high degree of Gambian involvement. However, in the short-term, actions are being taken to redefine organizational structure, new projects and systems are being developed, and staff continue to go on and return from training. In order that these developments occur in a manner consistent with the respective ministries' implicit strategies, an explicit strategy needs to be developed to guide further changes in structure, systems and human resources.
- * A rapid appraisal strategic audit of both Ministries should be conducted as soon as possible -- to ascertain what their current implicit strategy is (if any), to test whether it is consistent with government policy and other aspects of the external environment, to

determine whether the strategy can be supported by available resources, and to assess requisite modifications to the "fit" with the organization.

- * The ministries need to initiate a process by which they become strategically managed over time. This would start with institutionalizing a formal strategic planning process, for which the rapid appraisal above could form an initial input to the first round of planning. Thereafter, other aspects of a strategic management process should be developed and installed.

Civil Service Personnel Systems

Government needs to conduct a comprehensive and critical review of its civil service personnel systems and how they are implemented in practice.

There are many areas for review. Priorities include: (i) financial compensation, including basic pay as well as incentive schemes; (ii) non-financial means for attracting and retaining staff; (iii) the concept of creating parallel management and technical tracks; and, (iv) comprehensive training programs for individuals phased over time, which in turn are synchronized with explicit career development paths.

Lessons for ANR and FAPE

The follow-on projects to GARD and EFPA -- ANR and FAPE, respectively -- have already been designed and the contracts awarded (or are in the process thereof). Nonetheless, it is critical that relevant lessons learned from the evaluations of GARD and EFPA be incorporated into the new projects.

- * ANR and FAPE need to be critically reviewed to identify relevant lessons learned from the evaluation of GARD and EFPA, and then, the lessons need to be incorporated in the execution of the follow-on projects.
- * A system to monitor the capacity building effects of these projects needs to be designed, installed and implemented. Developing appropriate time frames for monitoring and evaluation, and designing and making explicit measurable performance indicators will be keys to success. In addition, injecting sufficient flexibility into project design and implementation to allow "mid-course" refinement or redirection will also be critical.

CHAPTER 1

BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background and Study Objectives

The Gambia has received substantial technical assistance in the past, often in the form of resident long-term advisors, short-term consultants and various forms of training. While these projects have made a significant contribution to The Gambia's development, it is realized by the Government of The Gambia (GOTG) and donors that such projects could have been more effective in building sustainable human resource and institutional capacity.

A number of initiatives are underway in The Gambia to address issues of capacity building and improved use of technical cooperation. The Personnel Management Office (PMO) in the Office of the President, which is responsible for the coordination and management of technical assistance, is the focal point for coordinating these activities. The two main programs being undertaken under the auspices of the PMO are: (i) the National Technical Cooperation Assessment and Programmes (NaTCAP), a process designed to improve the ability of developing country governments to plan and manage technical cooperation; and, (ii) the Economic Management Capacity Building Programme (EMCBP), which is designed to strengthen The Gambia's institutional and staff capability for organizing, conducting and disseminating sound macroeconomic and financial analyses for national policy review and implementation.

Within this context, the PMO has recognized that evaluation of the capacity building performance of specific, recently completed projects would be a key input to the development of GOTG programs aimed at facilitating capacity building. Thus, the objective of this study is to assess the performance of two past USAID-funded projects in The Gambia with respect to institution and capacity building, and to derive lessons learned that will lead to improved planning and development of similar technical assistance projects in the future.

The two projects evaluated are: (i) The Gambia Agricultural Research and Diversification (GARD) project, which focused on capacity building at the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA); and, (ii) the Economic and Financial Policy Analyses (EFPA) project, which focused on capacity building at the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (MFEA). The GARD and EFPA projects lasted seven and eight years, respectively, and both ended in 1992.

The GARD project's stated goal was to achieve food self-reliance in the Gambia. The purpose was to test, generate, adapt and promote the adoption of improved crop and livestock technologies that meet farmers' needs, and expand and diversify the Gambia's agricultural economy. The project's strategy was a two-pronged effort involving: (i) the long-term institutionalization of an effective applied agricultural research system; and, (ii) the development, promotion and adoption by farmers of improved agricultural technologies as early as possible.

The project consisted of five distinct but mutually supportive components: (i) establishment of an Agricultural Research Management System (ARMS); (ii) provision of long- and short-term

training for Gambians in various agricultural disciplines, and improvement of research support systems; (iii) support to on-station research; (iv) institutionalization of on-farm research as the cutting edge of the agricultural research system; and, (v) design of technology promotion activities for farmers at large. The prime contractor for implementation of the project was the University of Wisconsin (Madison).

The stated goal of the EFPA project was the promotion of sound macroeconomic policy decisions, thereby enhancing the development of The Gambia. The purpose was to increase the Ministry of Finance and Trade (the predecessor to MFEA) staff ability to organize, conduct and disseminate sound economic and financial analyses for national policy consideration and implementation.

The expected results from the project were: (i) improved analytical, technical and managerial skills for Ministry of Finance and Trade (MOFT) personnel; (ii) establishment of a system for producing policy studies and efficiently organizing and managing the flow of information for use by decision makers; (iii) completion of selected policy studies for consideration by decision makers to be used as models for MOFT research; and, (iv) increased appreciation by the MOFT and other GOTG decision makers of the cost of non-economic objectives in official policies and the economic ramifications of their policy decisions. The prime contractor for implementation of the EFPA project was the Harvard Institute for International Development, Harvard University.

Two new projects funded by USAID are planned for start-up in 1992 and 1993 that aim to consolidate the capacity-building gains that had been made and improve on areas where the past projects failed to fully achieve their capacity-building objectives. The follow-on project to GARD is the Agriculture and Natural Resources (ANR) program, which will focus mainly on capacity building at the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, but which will involve some continued capacity building at the MOA. The EFPA project is being followed-up by the new Financial Analysis and Private Enterprise (FAPE) project, which will continue assistance to the MFEA as well as provide first-time assistance to the National Investment Board (NIB).

1.2 Study Conduct and Methodology

The study was conducted during November and early December 1992. Prior to departure for The Gambia, members of the team visited the University of Wisconsin at Madison, Virginia State University (an additional contractor for the GARD project), and the Harvard Institute for International Development to review the Contractor's support service system and to interview selected long- and short-term technical advisors who had participated in the project.

Shortly thereafter, the study team spent two and one half weeks in The Gambia to: (i) review basic project documents such as Project Papers, Grant Agreements, project evaluations, audit reports and other project files; and, (ii) interview a broad spectrum of participants involved in the projects including ministry staff and other official personnel, project contractors, extension agents, PVOs and NGOs, selected donors, individual beneficiaries of the projects (such as recipients of degrees), and long-term resident advisors on other projects. Prior to departure from The Gambia, the team presented its findings to various members of the GOTG and to USAID staff.

The study was funded by USAID/Banjul via the Implementing Policy Change (IPC) project. IPC is a worldwide USAID project that assists developing country governments in their implementation of new policy initiatives through the use of strategic management principles. Management Systems International (MSI) is the prime contractor for the IPC project.

The six-member study team included: Anthony Davis -- Team Leader & Institutions/Strategic Management Specialist (Abt Associates); Julie Koenen-Grant -- Human Resource and Strategic Management Specialist (MSI); Samuel Taddesse -- Macro-Economist/Evaluation Specialist (MSI Consultant); Robert Kagbo -- Agriculture Specialist (Abt Consultant); Benjamin Carr -- Economist/Financial Analyst (MSI Local Consultant); and, Kal Juwara -- Management Specialist (Management Development Institute and Local Consultant to MSI).

In order to conduct the study, the team needed to refine key study parameters, adopt operational definitions of certain key terms such as "capacity" and "sustainability", and use selected conceptual frameworks to guide interviews, data collection and analysis. Some of the main study parameters and definitions are as follows.

The objective of the study was to "identify lessons learned from the GARD and EFPA projects that will lead to more effective and successful sustainable capacity building projects in the future." There are three qualifiers that should be kept in mind, however:

- The focus of the study is on the human resources and organizational development components of the two projects. As such, the study does not constitute a traditional evaluation of the entire set of objectives set for each project.
- The objective is to derive lessons learned that may be applicable to capacity building projects in the future. Thus, the goal was not to explicitly evaluate GARD and EFPA with a view to providing guidelines for the design and implementation of their follow-on projects, ANR and FAPE, respectively. However, the expectation is that the lessons learned will be equally applicable to ANR and FAPE as to any other future capacity-building projects.
- The lessons learned emanate from the two specific projects evaluated. Therefore, the extent to which lessons learned are "generic" needs to be judged based on a specific two-project sample. It is clear that the general lessons learned would have been quite different had only one of the two projects been evaluated. Likewise, it is quite possible that if two totally different projects had been chosen for evaluation, a different set of general lessons may have been derived.

Several terms used in the study Terms of Reference require operational definitions. The ones adopted by the study team, in consultation with the PMO, are as follows.

- **Capacity building** is the focal point of the analysis. Capacity building was defined as human resources development and institution building -- where human resources are people embodied with the skill sets that an organization needs to perform its functions, and institution building includes such elements as organizational structure, reporting

relationships, appropriate levels and mix of staff as well as the systems (personnel, information, financial) and processes that lead to the efficient operation of the organization. Furthermore, the definition adopted for capacity building included "Gambianization," the process by which an increasing range of skills are transferred to Gambians, where the end goal is Gambian self-reliance.

- A key element of the evaluation was to determine whether the capacity that was built was **sustainable**. The study uses the terms "sustainability" and "institutionalization" interchangeably. Sustainability has no precise, set definition, but rather: (i) requires qualitative judgement as to what constitutes, and is an indicator of, sustainability; and, (ii) a determination of the degree to which sustainability has been achieved. That is, it is not a matter of whether an organization function is sustainable or not, but the degree to which it is. Nonetheless, key characteristics of sustainability can be defined¹. Programs are more apt to be sustained when managers use them to:
 - (i) address or stimulate a felt need for an activity
 - (ii) adapt to the changing internal and external environment
 - (iii) provide for and secure continuing resources
 - (iv) build support among relevant groups and political elites.

The above study parameters and definitions are applied throughout the report.

1.3 Structure of the Report

This chapter is followed by four other chapters. In Chapter 2, the GARD project is described and evaluated with respect to its capacity building components. In Chapter 3, the EFPA is similarly described and evaluated. Lessons learned in these two projects and selected implications for future capacity building projects are presented in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, selected early next steps are identified. The report also contains several annexes.

¹ "Creating Opportunities for Change: Approaches to Managing Development Programs", Louise G. White, 1987.

CHAPTER 2

EVALUATION OF THE GAMBIA AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH AND DIVERSIFICATION PROJECT

In this chapter, an evaluation of the capacity building aspects of the Gambia Agricultural Research and Diversification (GARD) project is conducted. The chapter begins with a description of the context and rationale for the project. Next, the findings and conclusions of the evaluation, particularly with respect to capacity building, are presented. In addition, progress toward the achievement of the project's overall goals and purpose are reviewed in Annex D.

2.1 Background and Rationale

Agriculture is the primary economic activity in The Gambia, representing 40% of GDP and 80% of employment. Crop production is mainly rainfed and depends on very erratic rainfall that is concentrated in a short period (June - October) of the year. Crop production is dominated by groundnuts, the chief export crop (90% of export revenue), which accounts for nearly 50% of the farmed area. Millet, sorghum, maize and rainfed rice are the main staples and are grown in most parts of the country. Whereas, irrigated and swamp rice are more important in the eastern divisions of the country where saline water intrusion through the Gambia River is less.

Area and production estimates of the main crops suggest that there have been no major changes in land and labor productivity over the years, despite of the increased land area under cultivation. In fact, per capita production in the agricultural sector has declined. Some of the reasons for this decline identified at the time of GARD's inception included:

1. Decreased and unreliable rainfall;
2. Low soil fertility and poor maintenance exacerbated by overgrazing, excessive wood cutting and wild fires;
3. Agricultural development policies and programs that had not provided the combination of incentives and inputs needed to increase agricultural production and productivity; and,
4. Low awareness and limited use of labor-saving technologies, such as animal traction or improved planting techniques.

Recognizing the importance of agriculture and the constraints to increased agricultural production, the GOTG development plans (1981/82-1985/86) placed emphasis on: 1) raising food production so as to improve national nutritional levels and minimize imports; 2) improving the rural areas in order to reduce migration into urban centers; 3) increasing the production of groundnuts so as to raise the level of foreign exchange earnings; and, 4) diversifying food and export crops production.

To achieve these broad objectives, programs were to be enacted that would:

- Improve extension and farmer support programs;
- Improve the performance of agriculture-related institutions, including parastatals such as GPMB;
- Strengthen crop protection and seed production; and,
- Institute a research system with clearly defined and prioritized objectives in line with overall national policies.

Among the projects preceding the GARD Project that The Gambia embarked upon to achieve these objectives were the Jahali and Pacharr irrigation scheme funded by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the Caisse Centrale's adaptive research and extension programs on cotton, the Agricultural Development Projects (ADP I and II) funded by the World Bank, the Soil and Water Management Project, and the Mixed Farming Project (MFP). The latter three had significant elements relating to institutional development and capacity building.

For example, the ADP I and II projects, both World Bank financed, were to improve the agricultural services provided by the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and related institutions by: 1) assisting the GOTG with sectoral reforms; 2) improving the production of rainfed export and food crops; 3) in cooperation with FAO, setting up a coordinating, monitoring, and evaluation unit within the MOA; 4) reinforcing the research capacity of the Sapu station, extension service, and seed multiplication unit; and, 5) strengthening the country's cooperative organization.

The Soil and Water Management project, which was USAID-funded, aimed at assisting the Government of The Gambia in developing institutional capabilities to manage soil and water conservation problems. The Mixed Farming Project (1980-1985), also financed by USAID, focussed on designing and testing improved technologies in maize, forage and animal production. The Mixed Farming Project's focus on a narrow set of technologies, however, led USAID to conclude that the full and systematic consideration of the larger set of policy trade-offs involved in choosing to develop one crop over another had not occurred. It was decided that the follow-on project to the MFP would need to improve the match between policy objectives and economic realities.

It was within the above framework that the Gambian Agricultural Research and Diversification (GARD) project was conceptualized. According to the Project Paper, "AID's strategy thus moved from one of supporting discrete research and production projects (such as the Mixed Farming Project) to a broader support of the small but vital comprehensive research system." GARD was designed to improve extension and farmer support, and institute a research system. The contract for the \$18 million, 5-year project was signed on June 29, 1985, by the University of Wisconsin at Madison, the GOTG and the office of the AID Representative (OAR/Banjul) with an extension possibility to 15 years.

The project design recognized at the time that:

- A medium- to long-term research program that featured clearly defined objectives and was prioritized according to the overall national agricultural development policy, had not been enacted, even though research had been conducted in The Gambia over the years;
- Criteria for priority setting in agriculture should be considered in the context of farmers' constraints;
- The necessary leadership to guide the few trained national researchers in The Gambia had been missing;
- Research is only one of a complex series of inputs, all of which must be present if sustained changes in crop and animal production are to occur;
- It is necessary for researchers to interact more closely with extension service personnel and to foster linkages with NGOs, and national, regional, and international agricultural research centers (IARCs); and,
- True institutional development is achieved when nationals are capable of planning and carrying out programs effectively.

The project's strategy was, therefore, to institute a research system that would produce simple technologies that were extendable to farmers, train Gambians at the B.S and M.S. levels, and provide supporting infrastructure and complementary equipment.

2.2 Project Goal and Purpose

The long-term goal of the GARD project was "to achieve food-self reliance in The Gambia." If successful, the project would be instrumental in increasing the production of food and cash crops. The project's purpose was "to test, generate, adapt and promote the adoption of improved crop and livestock technologies that meet farmers' needs and to expand and diversify The Gambia's agricultural economy." The project's strategy involved a two-pronged effort aimed at:

- The long-term institutionalization of an effective applied agricultural research management program; and,
- The development, promotion and adoption by farmers of improved agricultural technologies as early as possible.

The primary recipient of GARD assistance was to be the agricultural research function of the Ministry of Agriculture's Department of Agriculture Services (DAS). A few years into the project, however, the DAS was divided into two separate departments: the Department of Agriculture Services and the Department of Agricultural Research. (See Figure 2-1 on the following page for an organization chart of the MOA today.) The latter department became the primary recipient of GARD assistance, although other departments within the MOA received

some benefits from GARD, particularly through training and the introduction of the Program Budgeting System.

The project consisted of the following five distinct but mutually supportive components.


1. Establishment of an agricultural research management system (ARMS) that would set agricultural research priorities based on farmers' needs, researchers' recommendations, and GOTG policy objectives.
2. Provision of long- and short-term training for Gambians in different agricultural disciplines, and improvement of research supportive systems, including selected infrastructure.
3. Provision of support to on-station/component research in selected crops, livestock, agroforestry, socio-economics, and water resources.
4. Institutionalization of Farming Systems Research and Extension (FSR/E) into the agricultural research program.
5. Design of technology promotion activities for farmers at large, including training of field workers, monitoring and feedback of results, and financing for specific pilot promotional efforts.

In January of 1991, a two-year extension of the GARD Project was concluded between USAID and The University of Wisconsin. The objective of the contract extension was to both consolidate the gains made through the project and establish a systematic phase-out of project activities. The decision to end the project after seven years was due to two factors: 1) a modification of USAID/Banjul's strategy for the Gambia, and 2) the belief that any further build-up of the MOA's agricultural research operation would not be sustainable.

Indicators of the successful institutionalization of the Agricultural Research Management System were also specified in the contract. Among them were: 1) annual updating of the farmer constraints statement (based on a socio-economic survey of farmers throughout the country); 2) the continuation of the annual ARREV meetings and NARB involvement in the review and approval of planned research; 3) the continuation of the Program Budgeting System; and, 4) the continuation of improvements in research methods and analysis. In addition, the contract extension specified that by the beginning of the final year of the project, "Gambian leadership [would] be responsible for managing the ARMS ... [and the GOTG would be] expected to cover the necessary recurrent costs of the project at that time." These criteria are among those used in this assessment of the GARD Project's success in agricultural research capacity building.

Ministry of Agriculture Organization Chart

Figure 2-1



2.3 Evaluation of Capacity to Conduct Agricultural Research

The terms of reference called for the team to conduct a study with a two-pronged focus: the evaluation of 1) the GARD project's progress toward meeting its objectives, and 2) the environment for capacity building in which the project took place and the degree to which that objective was achieved.

The first required the team to conduct a "general evaluation" of the GARD project to determine progress toward the project's objectives as specified in its logical framework. The results of the "general evaluation" appear as Annex D of this report. The primary emphasis of this study, however, addresses the second question, including: 1) The Gambia's present capacity, structure and systems to conduct agricultural research now that the GARD project is complete; 2) the degree to which the GARD project contributed to that capacity; 3) the sustainability of the gains made; and, 4) the lessons that might be applicable to future capacity-building projects. The remainder of this chapter will address the first three questions. The team's findings and conclusions are summarized in Exhibit 2-2 at the end of this chapter. Lessons learned from the GARD project appear in Chapter 4.

The evaluation was based on interviews with: 1) the project contractors (University of Wisconsin - Madison, Virginia State University); 2) GOTG personnel associated with the GARD project; 3) members of Gambian organizations associated with GARD; 4) recipients of short-term and long-term training from the project; 5) interviews with USAID/Banjul personnel; and on a review of pertinent documents, including the Project Paper, past evaluations and contract amendment.

2.3.1 Focus of Capacity Assessment

Capacity is examined in terms of: 1) human resource development, and 2) organizational structures and systems. Issues that deal with the sustainability of the agricultural research capacity are addressed in the final section of this chapter.

2.3.2 Human Resource Development

2.3.2.1 Findings

■ There exists today a minimal critical mass of personnel qualified to conduct certain types of agricultural research in The Gambia. The research capacity is strongest in the areas of agronomy, soil science and horticulture, and weakest in the areas of pathology, entomology, sociology and seed variety breeding. The achievement of even this minimal base is attributable in large part to the training provided through the GARD project -- one of the project's main objectives was to strengthen the human resource base qualified to conduct agricultural research in The Gambia. This was accomplished through long- and short-term overseas training, in-service training and regional networking.

■ A total of fourteen Gambians earned BS degrees and seven earned MS degrees through GARD. The degree programs financed by the project ranged from agronomy and extension to forestry and animal science. Short-term courses, to which GARD sent 75 attendees, covered such

areas as horticulture, water management, soil testing, crop protection and agricultural research methods. In addition, over one thousand Gambians received in-service training on topics such as program budgeting, specific crop-related topics, and computer usage; and 28 MOA employees participated in international networking events.

■ The project achieved a trainee return rate of 79% to MOA service (provided that the final two long-term overseas trainees return to The Gambia upon the completion of their studies in December 1992). Of the returnees interviewed, virtually all believed that the training they received through GARD was relevant to their job and that they benefitted concretely as a result of gaining new skills, particularly as reflected in pay and grade increases.

■ The resignation of the Director of DAR and the death of the Assistant Director of the Department, both in the last year, have led to the promotions of a number of DAR personnel. Among those promoted are returnees from GARD-financed training. Although these "promotions from within" have established that advancement opportunities exist in the Department, it also means that DAR is currently led by personnel with limited management experience.

■ There is not a direct correlation between training and productivity. Within the Department of Agriculture Research personnel can be found that are trained and motivated, untrained and motivated, trained and unmotivated, and untrained and unmotivated. Although the work environment can contribute to the motivation levels of personnel, a willingness and ability should also exist to release workers who can or will not be productive. According to management at DAR, the present GOTG personnel system, combined with Gambian cultural norms, make it very difficult to release unproductive personnel.

2.3.2.2 Conclusions

■ The training provided under the GARD project has contributed significantly toward building The Gambia's ability to conduct adaptive agricultural research. Despite the expanded human resource base, however, numerous vacancies exist in key research positions within the Ministry of Agriculture's Department of Agriculture Research (DAR), particularly in the fields of entomology, pathology and sociology (fields for which no long-term training was provided under GARD, and only a small amount of short-term training was provided). This significantly affects the number and type of research activities DAR is able to undertake. According to management at DAR, the difficulty in filling the vacant positions is due to a combination of factors:

- lack of qualified candidates
- uncompetitive pay scales for public sector employees
- perceived decline in the status of agriculture sector professions

■ Given the finite resources available for training under GARD and the varying points of view about how many to train and to what level, the training committee for the National Agricultural Research Board (NARB) served as an adequate vehicle for identifying appropriate candidates and prioritizing fields of study for trainees. It should continue playing that role.

■ DAR's record of staff promotion is good. Unfortunately, technically competent personnel who now find themselves in management or supervisory roles have received little or no formal training to equip them with the requisite tools and skills to become more effective managers and leaders.

■ There is reluctance on the part of managers to release unproductive employees. This stems from: 1) their desire to avoid the bureaucratic steps that the process requires; and 2) an aversion to the conflict that such a process might entail. For this reason, "untrained and unmotivated" personnel continue on the DAR payroll. They receive a portion of the resources that might otherwise be applied toward merit increases or bonuses to provide incentive to outstanding personnel.

■ The return rate for trainees under GARD was satisfactory. This is at least partially due to the attention given by DAR to providing career growth positions to returnees. Fifteen of the nineteen individuals who received degrees through the Project returned to MOA service after their training. Of those who did not return to the MOA, two returned to The Gambia but are working for other organizations, one briefly returned to The Gambia, but left shortly thereafter for the U.S. to begin work on his PhD, and one could not return to The Gambia after receiving an organ transplant in the U.S. (the anti-rejection drugs he must now take leave him highly susceptible to malaria).

2.3.3 Structure and Systems to Conduct Agricultural Research

2.3.3.1 Findings

■ The basic elements for a national agricultural research system are in place in The Gambia. As it exists today, Gambia's Agricultural Research Management System (ARMS) features: six interdisciplinary task forces that identify and prioritize research needs; an annual research review event at which task force recommendations are presented and discussed; a National Agricultural Review Board (NARB) that decides on research priorities; and, a small cadre of trained professionals and research facilities within the MOA to carry out the research activities.

■ While the development of The Gambian capacity to manage and implement the national agriculture research system was a key strategy of GARD, full management of the annual process by Gambians will only first occur in 1993 (expatriate technical assistance in managing the process essentially ended mid-1992). At present, the level of activity and effectiveness of the system's components varies considerably. For example:

- The interdisciplinary task forces, which provide the crucial link between extensionists, NGOs, farmers and researchers, have been inactive for many months -- attempts are now being made by DAR, however, to reactivate them;
- Despite enthusiasm for the annual research review event, at the time of the evaluation, DAR had not yet begun making plans for the February 1993 event;

- The NARB has achieved a high level of legitimacy both within and outside The Gambia, this is evidenced by the numerous references to its authority and effectiveness by senior MOA officials, DAR staff and NGOs in The Gambia; and by the fact that the NARB chairman was part of the Gambian delegation recently sent to World Bank meetings in Washington to discuss the follow-on project to ADPII; and,
- The size and skill mix of the present agricultural research staff determines to a great extent the type and number of research activities undertaken -- as a result, farmer constraints will not likely be addressed if they require specific expertise that does not exist in DAR; in addition, there is a low level of resources available for maintenance and repair of the research facilities, and no personnel have been trained to maintain the new soils laboratory's equipment .

■ As past evaluations have also noted, one weak link in the system continues to be communication and coordination between research and extension. This is evidenced by the inactivity of the task force system and the slippage in planning the annual research review meetings. However, the resolve expressed by the two new research-extension liaison officers to improve these linkages is cause for some optimism.

■ The Program Budgeting System (PBS) was introduced to all Ministry of Agriculture departments by the GARD project. To date, only the Department of Agricultural Research has fully integrated PBS into its management system. Through this system all proposed activities are properly costed out, allowing managers to make informed decisions about whether proposed activities are appropriate or affordable. As long as expatriate technical assistance was present in The Gambia to pressure MOA departments for their input into the system, these data were produced by the various departments. When the TA left The Gambia, the departments (except DAR) stopped producing the data (but were able to resume doing so when the expatriate returned to The Gambia for a short consultant). The criticism that PBS does not mesh well with the national budgeting system will soon be overcome when, if as planned, the Ministry of Finance (with World Bank assistance) converts the national system to the PBS.

■ The present civil service personnel system provides managers with little assistance in their attempts to attract, motivate and retain outstanding personnel. Pay and grade increases are normally based on tenure and education rather than merit; financial and non-financial compensation levels are not competitive with NGOs and other private sector entities; and systems through which personnel performance can be appraised are not widely understood or utilized.

2.3.3.2 Conclusions

■ The Agricultural Research Management System is functioning -- some components better than others. The strongest aspects of the system are the leadership and legitimacy the NARB provides as well as the level of competency developed in the Department of Agricultural Research.

■ Key to the NARB's legitimacy lies in the high caliber of the Gambians selected to lead it, particularly its chairman. The NARB has met with apparent success in building national-level support for agriculture research by persuasively representing those interests in the national and international arena.

■ The strategy employed by the GARD project to strengthen the Ministry of Agriculture's research capabilities, as opposed to setting up a project office for agriculture research, was sound. The result of this has been the establishment of a "home" for that function that will continue after the project's completion.

■ It is important to note that without the externally induced boost from the World Bank, support for the Program Budgeting System (PBS) was languishing and its use would have certainly diminished. This was because no high-level Gambian counterpart was identified who could provide the needed legitimacy and energy for the institutionalization of the PBS. As a result, the moment expatriate leadership for PBS ceased, so too did PBS (except in DAR, because it received the most intense and sustained technical assistance through GARD).

■ Attracting and retaining qualified personnel into the Department of Agriculture Research will continue to be a challenge given present personnel policies and resource levels. This will affect the quantity and quality of agricultural research being conducted in The Gambia.

■ While the basic elements of an agricultural research management system are in place, GOTG's immediate challenge is to maintain and build upon that base. Central to this will be the following:

- **Securing resource flows.** The present level of resources available to DAR is not likely to be sufficient to both retain personnel and maintain/repair the equipment and infrastructure that exist in the department.
- **Ensuring that research continues to focus on the key constraints faced by farmers.** The relevancy of technologies developed can best be determined by measuring farmer adoption rates. Such a monitoring system does not yet exist in the Ministry.
- **Communicating appropriate research findings to the farming community.** The accomplishment of this depends on the ability to generate appropriate research findings and channel them through extension/promotion systems.

2.4 Sustainability of Agricultural Research

Now that GARD is winding down, the sustainability of The Gambia's agricultural research capacity becomes a question of keen interest to the designers, implementors and intended beneficiaries of the GARD project. Indeed, the sustainability of the gains made through the assistance of the GARD project serves as one of the more salient indicators of the project's success or failure.

First, it is important to note that sustainability is a matter of degree. Few projects can be clearly declared as "sustainable" or "unsustainable." Instead, it is more appropriate to place projects on a continuum ranging from less to more sustainable. That placement is based on certain, often qualitative, considerations. In the case of The Gambia's agricultural research capacity, sustainability is examined in terms of its ability to: 1) address the needs of targeted beneficiaries; 2) adapt to the changing internal and external environment; 3) secure resources; and, 4) build support among relevant groups and political elites.

Ability to address Gambian needs. The first question in assessing the sustainability of an activity or program is whether it serves collectively valued purposes or needs. This will be reflected in DAR's ability to 1) identify farmer constraints, 2) develop or adapt appropriate technologies to address those constraints, and finally, 3) monitor and evaluate farmer response to the new technologies. In the case of agricultural research in The Gambia, the issue of interest is whether the system in place adequately addresses the farmer constraints that can be addressed through research (e.g. improved seed varieties, planting techniques, or labor-saving tools).

Identification of constraints. The present research agenda for the Department of Agriculture Research is based largely on a constraints analysis that was produced by GARD-sponsored technical assistance mid-way through the project. Although farmer constraints are not likely to change appreciably from year to year (which would make an annual constraints analysis superfluous), it is reasonable to expect that subsequent constraints analyses will reveal some new constraints or at least a reprioritization of already-identified constraints. Since the first constraints analysis was carried out by contractors, no one presently on staff at DAR has experience in conducting such a study.

Development or adaptation of technologies. In general, DAR has a satisfactory program for adapting and developing technologies. Given the limited resources with which it has to work, its staff is doing well at improvising with what it has. Technologies currently being tested and developed include improved vegetable, rice, groundnut, root crop, and fruit tree varieties. Also being tested and adapted are simple labor-saving tools and devices, such as knives to ease the harvest of rice, a manual rice thresher, a manual rice winnowing device, and water-lifting devices for irrigating vegetable gardens. The soils laboratory at Yundum tests soils to tailor fertilizer recommendations.

Monitoring and evaluation of farmer response to technologies. A monitoring system through which DAR can track technology adoption rates, which is the primary indicator of its ability to address farmers' constraints, is not in place. Thus, as time passes, the existing constraints analysis will become more and more dated and formal means to measure whether and by how much research priorities are off course are not available.

Absent the ability in DAR to conduct the same type of formal farmers' constraints analysis that was performed by GARD technical assistance (and track adoption rates), employing alternative means to gain this critical feedback is key. This could most readily be accomplished by DAR maintaining and developing its formal and informal linkages with farmers and extension workers. The extent to which agriculture researchers are able to accomplish this will determine how successful they are in meeting this criterion for sustainability.

Adaptability to the environment. The Department of Agriculture Research faces significant internal challenges. In the past year, its Director, who had held that position throughout the period of the GARD project, left The Gambia to work for an international organization elsewhere in the region; in addition, DAR's Assistant Director passed away. This has created opportunities for others within the department to step forward and take on management roles -- some have done so very well. If management can be defined as getting things done through others, then management is indeed taking place: on-farm and on-station research trials continue to take place, the soils laboratory is well cared for and functioning, and careful thought is being given to how best scarce resources might be allocated. This situation also means, however, that relatively inexperienced people are in leadership positions at a critical time when the future direction and funding for agricultural research in The Gambia are being determined by individuals outside of DAR and, for that matter, outside of The Gambia. As decisions are made about whether and to what level the GOTG will use World Bank loan funds for the establishment of an agricultural research institute, an immediate challenge to the new managers at DAR, then, is to provide "ground truth" to this process by formulating and communicating solid, useful, and timely recommendations to the decision makers based on their first-hand observations and experiences on the farms and at the research stations.

Securing resources. A particularly vexing challenge to managers is finding resources for their programs. This challenge is especially acute when trying to continue activities begun by a donor project after that project's resources have ceased.

Assessing the sustainability of the resource flows for The Gambia's post-GARD agricultural research activities requires a look at both the short and medium term. For the time being, resources for salaries and the maintenance/repair of department equipment and vehicles are very scarce. The low resource levels and the accompanying low salary levels have contributed to the difficulty DAR is experiencing in attracting personnel to fill research positions. There is concern within the GOTG and NARB that the longer this situation persists, the more likely departmental morale will decline, personnel will begin to leave, and critical equipment will become inoperable -- that is, significant gains made through the GARD project will be erased.

To address this, the GOTG, in consultation with the World Bank, is considering a proposal to finance a national agricultural research institute through its follow-on project to ADPII. It would be staffed by outstanding research personnel from the Ministry of Agriculture's Departments of Research, Livestock Services, and Agriculture Services. The belief held by senior Ministry of Agriculture officials is that so long as the agriculture research function remains bound by the personnel, management and budgeting systems of the civil service, its existence will be in jeopardy. The proposed institute, although financed mostly by the GOTG, would have streamlined decision-making processes and competitive compensation packages comparable to those of private-sector organizations. Like the present research operation, however, the policies and direction of the institute would continue to be guided by the NARB. GOTG officials believe that eventually the institute could become at least partially self supported by charging user fees to the commercial farmers and international or regional organizations that access its services. The evaluation team was not convinced that this is a realistic expectation, however, since there are few commercial farmers in the country today who have the resources or inclination to fund research activities.

Support among relevant groups and political elites. As the above discussion suggests, one noteworthy gain that has been made over the past seven years is the level of support that agricultural research now enjoys. As the chairman of the National Agricultural Research Board stated, "GARD has put agriculture research on the map in The Gambia." It is an encouraging sign that the GOTG is sufficiently committed to continuing and strengthening its research program that it is apparently willing to commit loan funds to the effort now that the USAID grant program has ceased. Support such as this should not be taken for granted, however, for it can be withdrawn as quickly as it is given. The continuation of support will depend on how well agriculture research is able to: 1) define its mission; 2) deliver services of value; and, 3) communicate to the public and to policy makers the value of its contribution.

In the final analysis, the sustainability of The Gambia's agriculture research program depends on how strategically it is managed -- both today and tomorrow. This will require:

- The definition of clear and concrete objectives for the program;
- The identification of the constraints (both internal and external) to achieving those objectives;
- A well-understood strategy for addressing those constraints;
- A plan for implementing the strategy;
- Methods to monitor the implementation process and evaluate the impact of actions taken; and
- A process for fine-tuning or adjusting the strategies when conditions change or if the strategies originally chosen prove to be flawed.

Attention to such a strategic management process means that the key issues associated with sustainability are being addressed. An organization's statement of objectives defines what it is doing, for whom, and to what end. Resource constraints are faced by most every organization; it is strategic managers, however, who develop strategies for acquiring needed resources, or, failing that, plan how best to leverage available resources toward making the most progress toward their objectives. The implementation of effective monitoring and evaluation systems provides the feedback necessary to determine whether actions taken are achieving the planned or desired effects. In short, organizations that are strategically managed are more likely to have sustainable programs because they are objective driven, they factor the internal and external environment into their planning process, and they are flexible enough to make mid-course corrections.

The Gambia Agriculture Research and Diversification (GARD) Project

	CAPACITY-BUILDING COMPONENTS	INSTITUTION BUILDING ACTIVITIES	INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND SUSTAINABILITY ISSUES
<p style="writing-mode: vertical-rl; transform: rotate(180deg);">FINDINGS</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o 14 BS degrees earned (2 female); 7 MS degrees earned (1 female). o 75 short-term trainees, 1,180 in-service trainees. o Of the long-term trainees, 79% have returned (or are scheduled) to return to MOA service. o Training returnees who now hold leadership positions have received little or no formal management training. o Numerous pieces of equipment and infrastructure improvements were provided through GARD, including: computers, books, laboratory equipment, farm equipment, improvements to the soils lab, fuel tanks/pumps. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o The basic elements for a national agriculture research system are in place in The Gambia. o The agriculture research system today consists of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) a small cadre of trained professionals; b) interdisciplinary task forces; c) annual agriculture research review meetings; d) the National Agriculture Research Board (NARB); and e) other basic agriculture research management systems. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o The World Bank's follow-on project to ADPII calls for the establishment of a semi-autonomous national agriculture research institute whose pay scales and personnel policies would not be tied to Gambian civil service regulations. The current proposal is that the MOA's Department of Agriculture Research would be phased out (as would research personnel in other MOA departments), and all qualified research staff would be assigned to the new national institute. o There is some understanding among MOA personnel that the Ministry's overall mission is changing, from its previous role as provider of a wide variety of services to one of facilitator and regulator of the agriculture sector. o There is less clarity about the results of the redefined MOA mission because no systems are in place to monitor and evaluate the implementation.

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CAPACITY-BUILDING COMPONENTS	INSTITUTION BUILDING ACTIVITIES	INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND SUSTAINABILITY ISSUES
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o The training provided under the GARD project made a considerable contribution toward building the Gambian capacity to conduct agriculture research. o The majority of returnees believe their training prepared them for and earned them greater job responsibilities and grade levels. o Despite the contribution GARD made to expanding the human resource base in the MOA, there exists today a minimal critical mass of personnel qualified to conduct research. o An inventory of all job positions in DAR for all areas of activity reveals numerous vacancies. o Managers who are technically competent need management training to equip them with tools and skills to become effective leaders. o DAR is falling behind in the repair and maintenance of much of the equipment provided through GARD, due mainly to a shortage in resources and the inaccessibility of spare parts. It is unlikely that the minimal level of resources that have been appropriated in DAR's '93 budget for the maintenance and repair of equipment and facilities will keep pace with demand. 	<p style="writing-mode: vertical-rl; transform: rotate(180deg); font-weight: bold; font-size: 2em; margin: 0;">Best Available Copy</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o The ARMS is functioning, as evidenced by the on-farm and on-station trials being conducted and the adoption of technologies by Gambian farmers. o While the basic elements for an agriculture research management system are in place, GOTG's ability to maintain and build upon that system is very precarious. <p>Despite the existence of a small cadre of motivated and trained agriculture researchers, the recruitment and retention of qualified personnel remains a chronic issue.</p> <p>The interdisciplinary task forces are just now being reactivated after many months of disuse. At this stage, it will be difficult for them to organize in time to make meaningful input into the upcoming agriculture review process.</p> <p>It is of concern that plans for the upcoming ARREV meetings, scheduled for February '93, have not yet begun. This indicates that these meetings are not fully integrated into the annual planning cycle.</p> <p>The NARB has grown in its legitimacy and stature as the policy-making body for Gambian agriculture research.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o The Program Budgeting System (PBS) introduced through GARD has been completely integrated into the DAR management system. This level of integration has not been achieved in other MOA departments. o While considerable effort to improve the statistical capabilities in MOA's Dept. of Planning have taken place, 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Difficulties in attracting and retaining qualified personnel is and will continue to affect the quantity and quality of agriculture research being conducted in The Gambia given present personnel policies and resource levels. o The process of defining objectives and setting priorities includes o Despite the personnel and resource issues outlined above, a great deal of support exists -- both in and outside the country -- to continue and strengthen The Gambia's agriculture research capability (and ARMS). o The ongoing development, refinement and strengthening of the Gambian ARMS is at an important juncture -- decisions that are soon to be made about its future should bear in mind the intended beneficiaries of the system (the farmers), the linkages between farmers and researchers, and the resource flows and personnel policies that will ensure their continuation.

CHAPTER 3

EVALUATION OF THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ANALYSES PROJECT

In this chapter, the Economic and Financial Policy Analyses (EFPA) project is evaluated, particularly with respect to capacity building. First, the context and rationale for the project is discussed. Secondly, the main components of the project, both inputs and expected outputs, are described. Finally, the results of the evaluation of the project are provided. In Chapter 4, the lessons learned from both the EFPA and GARD projects, are discussed.

3.1 Background

During the late 1970s the Gambian economy began to decline due to a combination of factors, most importantly of which were internal sources of disequilibrium. Large government investments failed to diversify the economy and generate growth. The Government of The Gambia (GOTG) invested heavily in urban-oriented infrastructure and in productive activities for which The Gambia had little comparative advantage. To operate and manage this investment program the GOTG dramatically increased public sector employment. Between 1977 and 1981, the civil service doubled in size and more than ten new parastatal corporations were created. To finance these investments the GOTG borrowed heavily, depleting the reserves of the financial system and accumulating debts. Government pricing policies (an over-valued exchange rate, low producer prices, and subsidies on urban rice consumption) increased imports without encouraging exports. Imports also rose dramatically as a result of both the high import consumption rate of the urban public sector wage earners and the high import component of the investment program. Consequently, by 1981 the GOTG had a severe fiscal imbalance, the nation had a structural trade deficit, and the economy was in decline.

Although the GOTG tried to address its macroeconomic problems with IMF assistance between 1981 and 1984, reform efforts were unsuccessful. Rather than addressing the underlying structural disequilibrium, the GOTG focused on imposing credit and monetary ceilings. In order to realign the economy, the GOTG assembled a Task Force of high-level government officials who, with technical assistance from the World Bank and USAID, drafted an action plan, resulting in the Economic Recovery Program (ERP), a comprehensive program of policy measures to redress the economy's structural imbalances and to return the economy to a sustainable growth path. The ERP became the official government strategy when the Ministry of Finance and Trade (MOFT) began its implementation in June 1985.

3.2 Project Description

In June 1984, USAID authorized the Economic and Financial Analyses (EFPA) project to assist the GOTG in its understanding of its economic problems. The goal of this four-year project was the promotion of sound macro-economic policy decisions, thereby enhancing the development of The Gambia. The project purpose was to increase MOFT staff ability to organize, conduct

and disseminate sound economic and financial analyses for national policy consideration and implementation.

In May 1985, USAID signed a contract with The Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID) to implement the project. The project was budgeted at \$2.44 million. USAID provided \$2 million, while the GOTG contributed \$440,000 to cover the cost of salaries and training support.

The project inputs included: (1) technical assistance -- One long-term Advisor for 3.5 years and short-term consultants for a total of 36 person-months; (2) training -- 8 academic years of long-term training in the U.S. with provision for some in-country training also; (3) commodities -- including computers, training materials, office equipment and a vehicle; and, (4) local support.

The conditions that would indicate that the purpose had been achieved were: (1) the establishment of a statistics and special studies unit (SSSU) capable of conducting analytical studies; and, (2) policy studies carried out and reviewed by decision-makers and incorporated into national policy. This was based on the assumption that the MOFT would retain returned participants through adequate remuneration, professional responsibilities and bonding agreements.

The project outputs were to be: (1) a functioning MOFT special studies unit and, as required, special task forces; (2) trained MOFT staff to run and support the special studies unit; and, (3) policy studies for consideration by decision-makers and use of models for further research. The following performance indicators are specified in the project paper: (a) a special studies unit staffed by returned participants; (b) 13 MOFT staff trained at MA/MBA level in U.S. and 35 to 45 MOFT and other GOTG staff receiving short-term training in U.S., third countries or The Gambia; and, (c) 10 to 13 pre-identified policy studies conducted by short-term consultants in conjunction with MOFT staff. The underlying assumptions for achieving the aforementioned outputs were: (i) MOFT had a sufficient number of adequately trained staff to receive further training, and (ii) MOFT/GOTG commitment to human resource development existed.

An evaluation conducted in February 1987 indicated that the project purpose of influencing policy was being achieved but that the objective to institutionalize that capacity had not. Organizing the SSSU had progressed slowly due to three particular problems encountered by the project. First, the hiring and promotion freeze and a large-scale retrenchment of the civil service accomplished under the GOTG ERP made it difficult to staff adequately the SSSU in the MOFT. Secondly, poor salaries and working conditions and lack of access to decision-makers by host country staff made it difficult to retain trained staff. Thirdly, budgets, training, staff and equipment were inadequate for the data collection and analysis required to formulate policy options.

It was determined that additional time was needed both to recruit and train staff for the establishment of a viable policy unit in the MOFT when the EFPA project ended, and to consolidate the gains and provide time for those who had already been trained, or who were then training overseas, to be fully integrated into the MOFT and its associated organizations. Thus, a three-year extension for the project was approved to allow the MOFT to move beyond the successful implementation of a stabilization phase of the ERP to one of sustainable economic

growth for The Gambia. With the benefit of three years implementation experience, it became evident that more attention should be paid to a post-recovery phase in which institutionalization of the economic policy analyses capacity is effected.

The three-year extension of the EFPA was authorized in June 1988. Implementation of the project continued under direct contract with HIID. The additional funding for the project was budgeted at \$2.95 million. \$2.50 million was from USAID and \$440,000 represented the GOTG's contribution.

According to the project document, the inputs would consist of three full-time technical assistants for 36 person-months each. The positions included: a Project Director; a Project Associate; and, a locally-hired Administrative Assistant. The Project Director would, among other things, and in consultation with the Permanent Secretary, organize the work of the SSSU to ensure that relevant policy issues were analyzed, data developed and findings presented to policy decision-makers in MOFT and elsewhere. The Project Associate would be responsible for working with members of the SSSU to monitor the IMF/World Bank structural adjustment program, to coordinate project-related on-the-job training with the MOFT, and to organize the computerization of the debt reporting systems and other important economic indicators. The Associate would also undertake specific policy studies as appropriate and contribute to the local training effort through the Management Development Institute (MDI). A small quantity of commodities would be procured including additional computers and software, power stabilizers, photocopying equipment, and one automobile.

In addition, the project was to provide 18 academic years of long-term (Master's degree) training and 36 person-months of short-term training in the U.S. and third countries. Short-term training would be furnished in public enterprise management, project appraisal and management, money and banking, and budget processes. Where possible, trainees would be sent for courses in other developing countries. Locally, the Project would continue to offer specialized computer, economics, and statistics training within the Ministry as needed. Other courses would be taught by the project staff in conjunction with the programs of study at the Management Development Institute.

Project outputs remained the same as designed in the original project, except that a new one was added -- an enhanced computer-oriented data and information base on which to base rational and informed economic decisions.

The benchmarks indicative of progress in institutionalizing these activities in the MOFT SSSU were: (a) the hiring, training and placement of staff in the SSSU itself; (b) by the end of the first year of the project extension, Gambian SSSU staff were to be responsible for monitoring GOTG compliance with the IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programs; (c) by the end of the second year of the project extension, Gambian SSSU staff were to be responsible for monitoring GOTG compliance with other multilateral and bilateral donor programs; and, (d) by the end of the third year of the project extension, Gambian SSSU staff were to be conducting most of the special studies done at the Minister's request.

To ensure that the institutionalization process was not hindered, three additional covenants were included in the new project: (1) that GOTG agrees that the MOFT will be authorized to hire the remaining professional staff for the unit by the end of the first year of the project extension; (2) that the GOTG review the position of the SSSU in the organization chart of the MOFT and determine if it should be placed in the office of the Permanent Secretary; and, (3) that the GOTG agrees to apply fully its rules requiring government service from long-term participants trained under the project.

3.3 Evaluation of EFPA's Capacity Building Components

Reviewed and evaluated in this section are the capacity building components of the EFPA project. The evaluation is based on information derived from: (1) the mid-term and semi-final project evaluation reports; (2) interviews with GOTG officials who at one time or other were closely associated with the EFPA project, or are now working on capacity building-related activities; (3) interviews with UNDP, USAID, IMF and ODA funded-expatriate advisors and consultants that have worked, or are working on, capacity building-related activities; (4) interviews with officials of the UNDP, who have from time to time collaborated or worked on EFPA-related activities and who are now assisting the GOTG to embark upon a major capacity-building program; and, (5) interviews with recipients of short- and long-term training from the project. As summarized in Exhibit 3-1 at the end of this chapter, the findings related to human resources development, institution building, and institutionalization/sustainability are reviewed and evaluated as an integral part of the project assistance completion date (PACD) outputs. A fuller discussion of the findings and evaluation of these findings is given below.

3.3.1 Human Resource Development

3.3.1.1 Findings

With respect to human resource development, the objective of the project was to train a core number of staff and equip them with the skills required for gathering, analyzing, and disseminating macro-economic and financial data for sound policy making. The project envisaged: (1) providing MA and MBA level training to 13 Ministry of Finance and Trade (MOFT) staff in the United States; and, (2) providing short-term training to approximately 35 to 45 MOFT staff in the United States, third countries and The Gambia.

■ About 19 Gambians received long-term training in the USA. One of these long-term training participants is still in the USA completing his BA degree in economics. Of those long-term trainees, three have received bachelor degrees and eight have received masters degrees from American universities. Of those earning BA and MA/MBA degrees through EFPA, 36 percent were staff of the Ministry of Finance and Trade.

■ In addition, a total of 56 Gambians have received short-term training through the project. Of these short-term trainees, 50 percent were from the MOFT; of which only 25% were either economists, accountants, or statisticians. The rest of the training participants came from various institutions including line ministries, parastatals and the Central Bank of Gambia (CBG). In

addition, several in-country training programs, including computer programming and application software training, were also conducted for MOFT staff and others.

- At the start of the EFPA project, project personnel identified a few of the individuals to be trained. Over time, however, many of the participants applied directly to USAID and were accepted for training with recommendations either from the Permanent Secretary of MOFT or their respective supervisors.

- With regard to on-the-job training, there was limited advance planning. As a result, the project was not able to nominate suitable Gambian counterparts from other parts of the Ministry and/or the Government to work with the expatriate consultants as soon as they arrived. Thereafter, the Ministry continued to experience difficulty in attracting appropriate staff to the Unit. Where suitable counterparts have been properly trained and instructed, many have left the organization for more attractive positions elsewhere in the public sector, NGOs, or in the private sector.

- In addition to training line staff, the project personnel also conducted specialized short-term seminars and workshops for senior policy-makers and officials in the areas of macro-economic policy impacts, government expenditure budgeting, the Economic Recovery Program (ERP), the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), and the parameters of economic analysis.

3.3.1.2 Conclusions

- Despite the fact that all training participants have returned to The Gambia, the capacity for the SSSU (now subsumed under the MFAU -- Macro economics and Financial Analysis Unit) to carry out policy analysis does not exist. This is partly due to the lack of a detailed training plan for the SSSU and for those closely associated with its work in the Ministry and from outside the Ministry. From a national capacity building point of view, the project was successful in providing training opportunities. However, since the training component of the project was, in practice, not targeted to specifically develop macro-economic and financial policy analysis capacity within the Unit itself, nor within those organizations that closely worked with the Unit, the selection of training participants was rather arbitrary and irrelevant to the specific human resource development objective of the project.

- The project, as designed, did not anticipate providing PhD-level training in economic research and policy analysis. In order for the GOTG to have the capacity to conduct policy dialogue with multilateral and bilateral donors on its own, the project should have considered training a number of PhD-level economists. The considerable amount of short-term training was not complemented by enough targeted long-term training to build a sustainable capacity for macro-economic management.

- The seminars and workshops the SSSU conducted for senior government officials and policy makers were very successful to the extent that they heightened the awareness and understanding of senior government decision-makers on national economic and financial matters. However, the project was only modestly successful in imparting policy analysis and formulation skills to senior and upper-middle level managers. The project was more successful, however, in

generating computer programming and application software (i.e., word processors, spreadsheets, database software, etc.) and statistical analysis skills at the middle and lower manager levels.

3.3.2 Institution Building

Institution building within the EFPA project relates to the development of adequate systems and organized structure for sound economic and financial analysis for national policy consideration and implementation within the former Ministry of Finance and Trade, and the recently restructured Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, line ministries and other relevant agencies. The focal point for institution building was the establishment of a functioning Statistics and Special Studies Unit (SSSU) and its inter-relationship with other entities involved in macro-economic management.

3.3.2.1 Findings

■ EFPA established the Statistics and Special Studies Unit as a semi-autonomous unit reporting to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance and Trade. The Unit was to be staffed by one principal economist, one senior economist, three economists, one cadet economist, one computer specialist, a typist/computer clerk, and a unit head. However, the Unit never had a Gambian officially designated as its head, nor was it ever fully staffed. The HIID Chief of Party became the de facto head of the Unit.

■ During the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) and the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) implementation period, while M. McPherson was the Chief of Party, the Unit enjoyed very high visibility and stature in policy formulation and implementation. At its peak, the SSSU had an acting senior economist who also acted unofficially as the head of the Unit, one economist, a cadet economist, and a computer specialist. Currently, however, the unit effectively has no staff.

■ Upon the restructuring and consolidation of the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Planning, the SSSU was absorbed into the Macro-Economic and Financial Analysis Unit (MFAU) in the recently restructured Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs. The new unit's mandate, responsibilities, organizational structure, staffing level and reporting position have yet to be fully articulated. However, a possible candidate to head the Unit has been identified and may be on-board soon. The AMEX team, which in effect takes over from HIID on the new Financial Analysis and Private Enterprise (FAPE) project, is in the process of fielding its resident advisors, although the reporting relation between the AMEX team and the head of the MFAU has not been determined.

■ The EFPA project has been successful in assisting the MOFT to establish information systems and statistical databases in support of macro-economic data monitoring, many of which are computerized. These include the following.

1. A monthly, quarterly and annual monitoring and reporting system for the GOTG's fiscal, monetary, and structural adjustment policies for the World Bank and IMF reviews.

2. A GOTG expenditure and revenue summary database.
3. A trade database on the basis of which realistic revenue forecasts can be made.
4. An external debt reporting system.
5. A Gross Domestic Product (GDP) estimating spreadsheet for the Central Statistical Department (CSD).
6. Selected tourism statistics.
7. Enhancement of the Central bank's balance of payments statistics generating system.

■ The statistical applications developed by the project improved the overall quality and timeliness of important economic and financial statistics. It appears, however, that these spreadsheets and databases were developed on an ad-hoc manner: (1) without first investigating whether or not the data already existed within the MOFT or other government entities; and, (2) without establishing a master plan to strengthen those units that handle macro-economic statistics. The persons trained on how to use the spreadsheets and databases appear to have left their positions.

■ Because of the strong personalities of both the late Minister of Finance and the original HIID chief-of-party and the manner in which the Unit pursued implementation of some unpopular policy reforms, the Unit itself became associated with the unpopular reforms. This was detrimental to the Unit's long-term viability. Activities of the Unit were deemed threatening and many officials did not lend it the support it needed.

3.3.2.2 Conclusions

■ In so far as institution building is concerned, EFPA has only been partially successful. After six years of operation, the SSSU effectively does not have any staff who benefitted from EFPA and is not able to provide the level of policy analysis that the short- and long-term technical advisors provided in the past. It does not have staff capability for organizing, conducting and disseminating sound macro-economic and financial analyses for national policy review and implementation. The preparation of the Program for Sustained Development (PSD), which highlighted for the Government the organizational and human resources needed to implement the overall program, made it abundantly clear that these resources and capacities were not in place.

■ The institutional capacity to continue producing economic and financial statistics in the absence of technical advisors is minimal.

■ Overall, there was no detailed institution building program. The mandate of the SSSU was never clear, and thus, its function was not institutionalized. Neither the Ministry of Finance and Trade nor the HIID team developed a terms of reference for the Unit. The Unit was not operated

as an integral part of the Ministry of Finance and Trade. The operational relationships, between the SSSU and other departments within the Ministry, were not clearly specified. As a result, established procedures were not followed. Rather, the Unit operated more as a special task force responsible only to the Permanent Secretary and the Minister. The respective roles of technical advice to the Minister and Permanent Secretary versus capacity building were not clearly delineated. Therefore, the degree to which the twin objectives of skills transfer and institution building have been attained have generally been very modest because of the ad-hoc and uncoordinated manner in which the technical assistance was implemented and the rigidity in the civil service system.

3.3.3 Institutionalization/Sustainability

3.3.3.1 Findings

- In so far as human resource development is concerned, a detailed and dynamic training program to train economists to conduct economic research and analysis for sound economic and financial policy making does not exist. An inventory of the skills needed to build a functioning economic research and policy analysis unit has not been developed.
- Trained personnel did not remain in the Unit due to uncondusive working conditions. For example, tasks and job responsibilities and often compensation levels remained the same after training. Graduates of the EFPA training are subject to the rigid promotion criteria of the civil service, which recognizes length of service over demonstrated performance.
- For many skilled Gambians who are at upper-middle management levels, career advancement and training opportunities become more limited within the civil service structure, which eventually leads to a high attrition rate for some of the Ministry's most trained and experienced staff.
- The charters of the MFAU are yet to be delineated and formalized. Under the new structure, the responsibility for gathering, analyzing and disseminating macro-economic and financial data for sound policy making appears diffused among various departments within the Government. This has led to a duplication of effort, which scarce resources of The Gambia can ill afford. Within the MFEA alone there are three other units that handle economic and financial data gathering and analysis (i.e., the CSD, the PBU/ECMU and the RMPPU/PEMU). In addition, there are units within the line ministries, the Office of the President (i.e., the Policy Analysis Unit), the Central Bank of Gambia and the NIB that manage economic and financial information.
- Many of the training participants found the training they received and their improved job performance did not lead to gaining the trust and recognition of senior management. In fact, in some cases, the perception was that senior management felt threatened by recently trained staff. In addition, in some instances, Gambians felt marginalized by their expatriate counterparts even when the Gambian was capable of performing many of the tasks assigned him/her more than adequately, and in some cases better than the expatriate consultants. The amount of time an expatriate consultant spent in training his/her Gambian counterpart depended in large part upon

the expatriate's personality and the inter-personal relationships developed between the Gambian and the expatriate.

■ Some long- and short-term expatriate consultants had exhibited a degree of reluctance and impatience to train Gambian counterparts. Some of these expatriate consultants did not see capacity building and the transferring of skills as an integral part of their terms of reference. Furthermore, expatriate consultants interviewed voiced the opinion that some of the Gambians identified as counterparts and for on-the-job training did not have the motivation nor the prerequisite aptitude to be trained.

3.3.3.2 Conclusions

■ The institutionalization process has been very slow. The once highly visible and powerful SSSU unit has virtually disappeared from the scene. The former staff of the Unit have left the Ministry of Finance and are now in the private sector or elsewhere.

■ In so far as economic management is concerned, the recently restructured Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs is in the same situation MOFT was when the EFPA project was launched seven years ago. The Macro-Economic and Financial Analysis Unit will require the significant addition of national and perhaps expatriate talent to strengthen the macro-economic policy analysis capacity of the Unit.

■ The interfaces and the inter- and intra-office relationships among the key units within the MFEA, CSD, CBG, NIB and line ministries that manage economic and financial statistics need to be clearly defined and strengthened. The procedures for data and information sharing need to be established in order to: (1) avoid redundancy; (2) use the scarce resources of the GOTG more efficiently; and, (3) maintain the integrity and the security of the data being collected and analyzed. The human resource base of these units should be developed in parallel in order to improve the quality of data management and analysis.

■ The success of EFPA in building sustainable capacity would likely have been enhanced had the following occurred.

1. The **GOTG modified regulations and procedures** that hinder the recruitment, staffing and retention of qualified economists and other technicians.
2. The **creation of overlapping and competing organizations or roles was avoided**; and the role and functions of the SSSU/MFAU were clearly defined and understood by the staff of the Unit, by personnel of all collaborating entities within and outside the Ministry, and most importantly, by senior government officials.
3. Within the Unit, each staff member's **job responsibilities were clearly delineated** and published (e.g., for each staff member, upon careful assessment of his/her potential, management established a career path and identified his/her training needs geared training to these career paths, which would carry the benefits of: (a)

avoiding inflated and false expectations; and, (b) motivating employees to do their best).

4. The **GOTG established and implemented performance-based promotions and pay raises** in order to attract and retain the best and the brightest. In addition, capacity may have been enhanced had there been established and negotiated performance standards for each staff member so that job performance could have been objectively assessed. One means of addressing this would have been the establishment of a parallel technical track within the current civil service structure that would have offered flexibility in providing competitive remuneration to senior technical staff.
5. Some resources were directed at **improving the management skills and styles of senior Ministry officials** if capacity building was to be sustained. Managers need to learn to trust and to delegate tasks and responsibilities to their subordinates in order to motivate and build up the skills and expertise of their staff. Ample opportunity and visibility should have been provided in order to motivate and hone the skills of the staff.
6. The capacity-building gains may have been greater had the **capacity-building portion of the expatriate consultants' terms of reference been clearly stated and adhered to**. The advisory role is distinct from the capacity-building responsibility. Clarity in each consultant's terms of reference would allow each expatriate to channel his/her energy to one or the other task.
7. The success in capacity building may have been enhanced had the **expatriate chief of party's role not been viewed as the Head of the Unit**. The chief of party's role should instead have probably been that of provider of technical assistance and advice. If long-term and sustainable capacity is to be developed, the Head of the Unit should be a Gambian who would normally be the one to deal with the Permanent Secretary and the Minister, although occasional direct dealings with the expatriates could take place with the knowledge of the Unit Head.

The Economic and Financial Policy Analysis (EFPA) Project

	HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT	INSTITUTION BUILDING	INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND SUSTAINABILITY
<p>F I N D I N G S</p>	<p>1. The project has funded:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. long-term training for 19 Gambians b. short-term training for 56 Gambians in the US, third countries and The Gambia c. in-country short-term computer training d. specialized seminars for senior government officials on topics related to national economic and financial management <p>2. Only 20 % of the 19 long-term trainees were from MOFT</p> <p>3. 50% of the 56 short-term trainees were from the MOFT of which only 25% were either economists, accountants or statisticians</p> <p>4. Only 60% of the 19 long-term trainees were degree candidates in economics and finance at the MA/MBA level; of these 50% were from the MOFT</p> <p>5. Three members of the SSSU have received long term training and only one was a degree candidate</p>	<p>1. The SSSU was established as an unit reporting jointly to the Minister and the Permanent Secretary of MOFT</p> <p>2. The SSSU was designed to be staffed by 9 Gambians. However, it never was fully staffed nor had a head. The project chief-of-party was the de facto head of the unit.</p> <p>3. With the recent restructuring and consolidation of the MOFT and the Ministry of Planning, the SSSU has been absorbed into the Macro-Economic and Financial Analysis Unit (MFAU) of the new Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (MFEA).</p> <p>4. The MFAU is partially staffed but its terms of reference has not been formalized as yet.</p>	<p>Human Resources Development:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A detailed training program to train economists to conduct economic research and analysis for sound economic and financial policy making does not exist. 2. The amount of time an expatriate consultant spent in training his/her Gambian counterpart depended in a large part upon the expatriate's personality and the inter-personal relationship developed between the two parties. <p>Institution Building:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The mandate and responsibilities of the SSSU were never clearly defined nor formalized within the operational structure of the MOFT. The charters of the MFAU, which replaces the SSSU are yet to be delineated and formalized. 2. Few provisions exist within the civil service system to offer special incentives to retain trained and skilled personnel, particularly at the upper-middle and senior management levels.

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	HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT	INSTITUTION BUILDING	INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND SUSTAINABILITY
E V A L U A T I O N	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Despite the fact that all of the training participants have returned to The Gambia, the human resource capacity for the MFAU to carry out economic and policy analysis does not exist. This is indicative of the fact that the training component of the project was, in practice, not targeted to specifically develop macro-economic and financial policy analysis capacity within the Unit itself and within those organizations that closely worked with the Unit. 2. The selection of training participants was rather arbitrary and irrelevant to the human resources development objective of the project. 3. The project as designed, did not anticipate providing PhD level training to conduct research and policy analysis. As a result, the GOTG does not have either the capacity to formulate and implement sound economic policy nor to conduct policy dialogue with multilateral and bilateral donors on its own. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. During the ERP and SAP implementation period, the SSSU was critical to monitoring IMF program targets. Now, the SSSU/MFAU is effectively non-functional and the former staff have left the Unit and the Ministry. The once highly visible and powerful SSSU has virtually disappeared from the scene. 2. The institutional framework for sound economic analysis and policy formulation does not exist within the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (MFEA). With regard to institutional capacity for economic and policy analysis, the MFEA is in the same position as the former MOFT when the EFPA was first launched. The MFAU will require significant addition of national and perhaps expatriate talent to strengthen the macro-economic policy analysis capacity of the Unit. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The on-going development and retention of human resources was unsuccessful because: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. There are no inventories of essential skills for economic management nor detailed training plans. b. There are no established procedures for the transfer of skills from expatriate consultants to the Gambian counterparts. As a result, the skill transfer was not accomplished according to the project timetable. c. Poor working conditions prevail including low compensation levels, low job satisfaction and an unattractive office environment. <p>The institutionalization of institution building has been very slow due to the following factors.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. The manner in which the Unit pursued implementation of some unpopular policy reforms had gained it notoriety among senior government officials which was effectively detrimental to the Unit's long-term viability; b. Lack of a clearly delineated and formalized mandate and terms of reference; c. Lack of clearly established inter and intra-office relationships and procedures; and d. Lack of an overall strategic plan for the Ministry with regard to the relative role of the SSSU.

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CHAPTER 4

LESSONS LEARNED


The lessons learned through evaluation of the capacity building aspects of the GARD and EFPA projects are presented in this chapter. First, the conceptual framework used to assess lessons learned is described. Second, the lessons learned from the GARD and EFPA projects that will lead to more effective and successful capacity building projects in the future are identified. Selected implications for next steps are presented in Chapter 5.

4.1 Conceptual Framework

In order to guide the evaluations of the GARD and EFPA projects and to extract salient lessons learned, a conceptual framework was developed and applied by the study team (see Exhibit 4-1). In the framework, the four key constituent components of creating and sustaining capacity are broken out, namely: (i) strategy; (ii) organizational structure; (iii) systems; and, (iv) human resources.

- **Strategy** is the process by which an organization defines its mission, goals and objectives, and then pursues a course of action to achieve them.
- **Organizational structure** includes such elements as: (i) the entity's structure in terms of departments, divisions and units; (ii) layers of management; (iii) reporting relationships and spans of control; and, (iv) the level and mix of staffing.
- **Systems** are the processes and operating procedures which add "cohesion" to the organizational structure and allows it to function. There are different types of systems such as:
 - (a) personnel systems, which include compensation systems, the delineation of roles and responsibilities, promotion schemes and career paths, evaluation systems, and management style;
 - (b) information systems, for example computer-based and non-computer based systems for economic monitoring, for tracking managerial and commercial performance, etc.; and,
 - (c) financial systems, which address accounting and financial management functions such as budgeting.
- **Human resources** are the people who embody the skill sets that the organization needs to fulfill its functions, both currently and in the foreseeable future. Generating the skill sets takes many forms including formal degree training, short-term training, on-the-job training, and skills transfer from individuals providing technical cooperation.

STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK



For the organization to efficiently and effectively perform its function, the above four components need to be consistent with each other, with the external environment, and with the available resource base. The process, method and even mind-set with which the above four components must be implemented, if sustainable capacity is to be built, is called "strategic management"². The strategic management approach consists of four main characteristics.

- Strategic management is *oriented toward the future*. It recognizes that the environment will change. It is a long-range orientation, one that tries to anticipate events rather than simply react as they occur. The approach leads managers to ask where their organization wants to be after a certain period, what it will need to get where it wants, how to develop strategies and the means to get there, and, finally, how to manage those strategies to achieve the organization's goals and objectives. It recognizes that the future cannot be controlled, but argues that by anticipating the future, organizations can help to shape and modify the impact of environmental change.
- Strategic management is *external environment driven*. The strategic management approach takes into account several components of the external environment including technology, politics, economics, and the social dimension, and recognizes that each of these can either constrain or facilitate an organization as it seeks to implement its strategy -- i.e., they represent opportunities and threats.
- Strategic management concentrates on assuring *a good "fit" between the environment and the "organization"* (including its mission, objectives, strategies, structures, systems and resources), and attempts to anticipate what will be required to assure continued fit. Change in the external environment means that the organization's function can become outmoded or no longer serve a useful function, or that the available resources will change. The strategic management approach recognizes that to maintain a close fit with the environment, the different elements of the organization will need to be continuously re-assessed and modified as the environment evolves.
- Strategic management is *a continuous, dynamic and iterative process*. It is a process which recognizes the need to be open to changing goals and activities in light of shifting circumstances within the environment. It is a process that requires monitoring and review mechanisms capable of regularly feeding information to managers -- both from below and above. Strategic management and planning are not one-shot, static approaches, but are on-going processes.

As such, strategy is the driving factor which determines, in a dynamic and iterative fashion, the appropriate design of and changes in structure, systems, and human resources -- which are the means for achieving the strategic goals and objectives of the organization, given the resources available. Strategic management is the process and mind-set for managing and implementing strategy.

² Annex H provides further information on strategic management and different approaches to strategic management and planning.

The primary emphasis of this study, consistent with the Terms of Reference, was on organizational structure (Component 2), personnel systems (part of Component 3), and human resource development (Component 4). As such, it constitutes only part of a holistic analysis which would include an explicit evaluation of strategy, other types of systems, and the strategic management process. However, the amount of time and resources available limited the scope of the analysis.

4.2 Lessons Learned

The objective of the study was to "identify lessons learned from the GARD and EFPA projects that will lead to more effective and successful sustainable capacity building projects in the future". However, as stated in the introductory chapter: (i) the lessons learned are specific to the two projects evaluated; and, (ii) the lessons learned are generic, and thus not specifically linked to the two follow-on projects (ANR and FAPE). In addition, the lessons learned should be treated more as observations and impressions which flow from the evaluations, rather than explicit recommendations or a comprehensive set of guidelines.

4.2.1 Strategy and Strategic Management

While strategy and strategic management were not the emphasis of the study, the team's approach emphasizes that strategy is the key driving force and conditioning factor in determining what goals an organization sets for itself and the way in which it then strives to achieve them. Thus, some general observations are made about strategy in this section, but further study of strategic issues is required.

The primary lessons learned related to strategy and strategic management, which are based on the evaluations and the study team's work elsewhere in the world, are as follows.

- Ministries and organizations need to be managed strategically and have effective strategic planning processes. Strategies should be future oriented, and there needs to be an organizational "fit" with the external environment. The process must also anticipate and respond to changes in the external environment.
 - On the whole, the two Ministries evaluated are not strategically managed and have yet to develop a formal strategic planning process. Where a strategic plan does exist, it is usually static, top-down driven, and largely ignores the external environment. Processes for monitoring performance against the strategy are largely non-existent or rarely implemented. The organization's strategy is not widely known and not communicated down the organization.
 - The MOA has a more explicit strategy, of which some of senior management is cognizant. However, it is neither dynamic nor very sensitive to changes in the external environment. The MFEA appears to hardly have a strategy at all, has no formal strategic planning process that is applied in practice, and few members of management can articulate what their organization's strategy or "raison d'être."

- A clear mandate and strategy for a given unit/department/division, which "fits" with an overall organization strategy and mission, is needed.
 - Often special units or individual departments define for themselves and then adopt a strategy and set of functions which are inconsistent with the Ministry's overall function. This leads to isolation of the unit or to it being "projectized" -- both of which will limit its sustainability. This was the case of the SSSU in the EFPA project.

- Leadership and the influence of organizational units need to be well institutionalized. High-level "champions" are important catalysts to launching activities, however, this base of support should be broadened as quickly as possible to mitigate: (a) the strong role of personality; and, (b) the vacuum that is created when a single individual leaves.
 - The EFPA project was highly visible and performed well in a crisis management mode in its early years, during the ERP era. Its success was partly due to the personalities and strong convictions of the Minister and Chief of Party at the time. However, the style of these individuals (and the pressures of crisis management) meant that few others were involved in the process and little capacity was built. When the CoP departed and the Minister died, a huge capacity vacuum was left.
 - The GARD project did not have the strong, individual champions that characterized EFPA, but did have general support among a wider group of individuals. As a result, it never gained the national visibility or prominence of EFPA, but did retain some capacity, albeit "thin", at the completion of the project and upon departure of its initial architects.

- Coordination and continuity is needed in donor and government programs to reduce unnecessary changes in the external environment.
 - A key to strategic management is anticipating changes in the external environment. However, while the environment is largely an uncontrollable factor, some efforts can be made to either reduce the degree of change or to enhance its predictability. This can be facilitated by donors and Government better coordinating activities and increasing continuity between activities.
 - Some members of MFEA indicated that it was difficult to build capacity and an effective organization over time in an environment which perhaps changed unnecessarily often -- the Ministry needed to respond to the needs of EFPA and ERP in the early years, then the requirements of ARP were imposed, and then only a few years later it needed to respond to the new imperatives embodied in EMCBP.

- Sustainable flows of resources are more likely when resource gaps and priority areas are identified through a strategic planning process.

- When donor-supported projects are completed, a key for the Ministries is to obtain an appropriate level of resources to continue with activities initiated in the project. Although strategic planning cannot make resources materialize, the process can ensure that the Ministry is able to make more robust and persuasive arguments for the allocation of resources because priority programs and their appropriate levels of resources have been identified.
 - Projects often create unrealistically high expectations for the amount of resources needed and/or allocate the resources in a biased fashion amongst alternative uses (for example, more on training, less on equipment). A process needs to be institutionalized which allows the Ministry to develop a strategy and identify the appropriate level and allocation of resources.
 - MOA, through the existence of a strategic plan and PBS, has some of the elements in place to argue coherently for resource allocations. MFEA has relatively few.
- Donor-sponsored programs should avoid building organizations or systems to the level that they are difficult or impossible for the host country to maintain after the project ends. A phase-out plan should be developed as a part of the project design.
- The GARD project, as originally designed, was to create a high-level agricultural research capacity. Mid-way through the project, the wisdom of creating a large, resource-intensive organization that the GOTG could not sustain at project completion was examined. This, in part, led to the decision to cut short the project and instead dedicate the two-year contract-extension period to consolidating the gains that were made during the first five years of the project.
 - A related issue is the optimal duration of a capacity-building project. GARD, at its inception, was designed to be a 15-year project. Fifteen years is a realistic amount of time to dedicate to an effort in order to fully institutionalize systems, procedures and attitudes. However, given the nature of USAID program strategy development, it was unrealistic to expect the project to be operational that full period. Unfortunately, both the contractor and the GOTG had built high expectations that GARD would be funded for 15 years. An alternative to ending the project after seven years that may have allowed for greater institutionalization would have been to extend the project's consolidation and phase-out period over several years.

4.2.2 Organizational Structure and Development

This section focuses on the strategy of creating a project-specific unit or a unit closely associated with a project. This issue is raised because special units or departments are the level and form of interaction often taken by donor-funded projects. There are many other aspects of structure that affect the sustainability of an organization, but these are outside the scope of this study.

- The Permanent Secretary and senior management must be committed to the activity, particularly in assigning appropriate personnel to serve as counterparts and core staff.
 - The SSSU experienced difficulty in having appropriate staff assigned to it. Some persons interviewed felt this was in part a result, ironically, of the high visibility of the Unit, as well as the sensitive issues it was to address, and the perception that it was expatriate-run. This had the effect of causing some staff to question whether joining such a unit was in their best career interest.
 - Similarly, the MOA's failure to assign a high-level counterpart to manage the implementation of the PBS placed that activity in jeopardy. As a result, the PBS was treated as an expatriate priority by all MOA departments (except DAR) and not as an integral part of the Ministry's budgeting and management system.

- Every job position should have a clear mandate and description. A higher degree of latitude and flexibility should be written into descriptions for the more senior job positions, although accountability must remain high.
 - There were no clear job descriptions for staff in the SSSU under the EFPA project. This led to some confusion with regard to relative roles and responsibilities, as well as limiting the degree to which staff were formally recognized as assuming more responsibility upon return from long-term training.
 - Some GARD-related staff had clearer definitions of their job responsibilities, although these were not always committed to in writing. Job satisfaction and staff retention was higher than under EFPA, and staff felt they received appropriate, formal recognition in terms of a more responsible/senior position upon return from overseas training.

- Creating organizations or units that overlap or are redundant with other entities that perform similar functions should be avoided. It is often easier to build on the existing base (i.e., established unit) than to create a whole new entity, although there may be less flexibility in staffing.
 - The SSSU's role relative to other providers of economic information such as CSD and the Central Bank was never clearly defined. The project identified its own need for certain types of data, and tended to create it without sufficient thought given to where else in the system such data could be found or constructed. Furthermore, such redundancy overly stretches the limited resources and staff qualified to provide and analyze such data.
 - Although the MOA's extension capabilities were viewed as weak, the decision to have DAR rather than the Department of Agriculture Services (the department responsible for agriculture extension) promote agriculture technologies created tensions between the two departments and undermined DAS's extension role. At

- The creation of special units should be approached advisedly, and only with careful consideration of the organizational and political context in which they would operate. The creation of a special unit in a Ministry that becomes closely associated with a project will often mean that the unit is likely not to be institutionalized when the project ends. The unit will either disappear, or exist but cease to perform fully its functions. However, when a given unit is closely aligned with a project, efforts should be made to generate and maintain an identity for the unit which is separate from the project's.
 - EFPA focused its efforts on a given unit, and the two were seen as synonymous. When the project ended, the unit, in effect, ceased to function.
 - A special unit was not created as a focal point of the GARD project, instead more broadly the research department of MOA was strengthened. As a result, some of the capacity for agricultural research that was created by the project remains in the MOA even after the project ended.

- A unit's reporting relationship is key, and depends on the function in question. Policy advice needs direct access at a high level within the organization; whereas, non-policy activities can be more easily channelled through the hierarchy.
 - EFPA was successful in providing policy advice to senior government officials, to whom the project contractors had direct and regular access. However, by not distinguishing between the project's policy advisory role and its objective to create an economic monitoring role (particularly in the late ERP and early PSD years), monitoring, which was only seen as a project activity, failed to be institutionalized.

- The identification or development of a national to serve as the manager of a special unit can be an important factor in sustainability. This manager would focus on day-to-day management, building sustainable capacity, and dealing with institutional aspects of the external environment such as the civil service. The effectiveness of expatriates, then, in providing policy advice and skills transfer would not be "diluted" by their assuming, in addition, a role in the day-to-day management of the unit.
 - The lack of a unit head for the SSSU under the EFPA project, meant that the Chief of Part became the de facto head, and was therefore unable to spend sufficient time on skills transfer. This limited the project's capacity-building impact. In addition, the Unit was never fully staffed, and arguably less than appropriate staff were assigned to the unit.
 - By way of contrast, the GARD project contractors worked primarily through the Director of Agriculture Services and the Chairman of the NARB. This reinforced the idea that Gambians were in charge of the country's agriculture research program, and allowed the contractor to focus more attention on providing technical assistance.

the conclusion of GARD, all promotion activities by DAR ceased and have reverted back to DAS.

- A minimum scale exists for units to function efficiently and effectively. It is therefore important to leave a critical mass in place while some are away on training, or, perhaps, to temporarily fill the vacancies with technical assistance. This balance needs to be carefully managed. The absolute scale/size will depend on the functions the unit is to perform. Staggering of training may be one mechanism to ensure that sufficient key resources remain to perform the entity's function, and so that an overly heavy reliance on expatriate assistance is not generated in the staff's absence.

4.2.3 Personnel Systems

In this section, lessons learned with regard to personnel systems are presented. Financial and information systems, although important, were outside the study scope of work.

The attraction, development and retention of qualified personnel is at the core of any capacity-building program. The evaluations of the two projects suggest that there is much that could be done to improve attraction and retention through reform of the civil service and related systems, such as merit pay, performance evaluations, and career path development. In addition, training was seen as a major incentive for individuals to join and stay in public service. Many of the lessons learned in this area are mutually dependent on each other, if personnel systems reforms are to have the desired effect on attraction and retention.

- Staff retention can be enhanced through improved financial and non-financial compensation and rewards. Financial compensation include increased pay, allowances, and/or project/task-specific honorarium. Non-financial rewards take on many forms including training, physical office quality, and increased recognition.
 - Non-financial rewards are a critical area for further study because government is limited in the extent to which it can provide salary increases, and the gap between civil service salaries and comparable salaries in the parastatal and private sectors is high, often many multiples of what the public sector pays. Thus, the public sector is unlikely ever to be competitive purely on the basis of compensation.
- An improved "motivational environment" will do much to improve retention and staff performance, and is not resource intensive.
 - Factors for improvement include clearer and better job responsibilities, improved management style, increased delegation to competent staff, performance recognition, and "excellence" awards such a "employee of the month" or "outstanding economist or researcher of the year."
- Compensation should be linked to objectively evaluated performance and not exclusively to tenure. Greater accountability is also needed.

- In both projects, staff felt that compensation was not sufficiently linked to job performance. This was particularly the sentiment of those who received higher-level degree training and were nearing the upper levels of the grade-based pay scale.
- As the professionalism of Ministries takes place, a higher number of technically competent candidates will compete for a relatively few senior positions. This will cause a "pyramid compression" at the top of the organization and may force those who are not selected for these positions to seek opportunities elsewhere.
 - The creation of parallel management and technical tracks for mid-level government officials may be one means of alleviating this "pyramid compression" and "brain drain." Such a system, which would offer advancement opportunities for both technical and administrative personnel, may not be as subject to the "unevenness" with which a scarcity allowance or project bonus scheme might be implemented.
 - Particularly under the EFPA project, senior staff left the Ministry because they saw little chance for advancement and increased compensation beyond a certain grade. This is a critical issue, because it is this group of senior staff that add the most value to the organization and are critical to its success.
 - While less employment opportunities exist outside the MOA for senior technical staff, their motivation and job performance may also have been enhanced through parallel career tracks.
- Rotational assignments for junior and mid-level staff into related units/organizations, and conducting joint training programs with functionally related organizations will: (a) break down inter-group barriers; (b) leverage resources; and, (c) improve staff retention by making jobs more interesting/challenging.
 - This is particularly pertinent to staff involved in jobs related to economic data collection and monitoring -- given that there is some uniformity in the skills level of staff who might participate in such a program, and that these groups have often "competed" in the past.
- Staff who perform their jobs well need to be promoted soon after they return from long-term training, perhaps, initially on a probationary basis. If possible, their new job position should be slated before they start training.
 - Trainees under the GARD project were generally content with promotions and increased responsibility received when they returned from overseas training, or soon thereafter. In contrast, many degree trainees from MFEA/MOFT felt they received very limited formal recognition for their academic achievements in terms of compensation or job duties.

- The people and skills base need to be developed in a coordinated fashion with the development of systems, or at a minimum, they should follow a step-function pattern, i.e., raise the skills base a level and then implement systems/programs to test those skills, and then raise the skill level higher and improve programs again.
 - Expatriate consultants are often charged with developing new systems, such as budgeting (GARD) or economic monitoring (EFPA) systems. If they develop these systems in isolation without counterpart participation, and/or if counterpart skills in computers, math and relevant fields are not developed in a timely fashion, then the chances for the system to be run by Gambians will be limited, as will the chances of the systems becoming institutionalized.

4.2.4 Human Resource Development

4.2.4.1 Training

Both the GARD and EFPA projects placed a heavy emphasis on training. The lessons learned focus on overseas long-term training and on the role of expatriate technical assistance in providing on-the-job counterpart training. This emphasis is adopted because it is in these areas that donor projects can provide distinctive assistance (due to the resource intensity and the link with home-country educational institutions), whereas in-country and various forms of short-term training relatively could be more easily undertaken using domestic resources.

- Training programs for individuals need to be developed, and synchronized with organizational objectives and career development paths that support these objectives. The type of training must match the skill sets required in a given job position, as well as the anticipated skill requirements of the organization as it evolves.
 - GARD matched reasonably well the type of training received to the needs of the specific jobs at MOA. EFPA tended to train a diverse group of people in a range of disciplines that were often not related to their jobs at MFEA or in some cases, not even related to economic management.
 - The phasing of training over time in harmony with career paths was not explicit in either project.
- There is a hierarchy of skill sets that needs to be explicitly recognized. These range from: (i) basic data entry/manipulation; (ii) analysis of data; to, (iii) policy analysis. Each has a different success record vis a vis training and suggests different optimal levels of duration and resources for training.
 - EFPA successfully trained and retained staff in Category 1. It had some success in training staff in Category 2, but experienced difficulty in retaining them for very long. It had only limited success in training a few people in Category 3 skills, and was unable to retain any of them.

- It can be speculated that Category 1 trainees had greater job satisfaction within the Ministry (many got "big" promotions soon after their return) and perceived that their best career path for the medium term was in the Ministry. Category 2 trainees received training in highly marketable skills and were soon attracted away from the Ministry. Category 3 trainees, of which there were very few, did not stay long in the Ministry because either they were not given an adequate chance (in their view) to use their policy skills on the job, they received little recognition for their real or potential contribution, or they had opportunities to apply their skills elsewhere.
- Junior staff sent on long-term training are more likely to return to their original unit/department, because they have a better chance of getting promotions and pay raises upon return than more senior staff, and see that opportunities for further training and career advancement exist.
 - There is a much higher return rate of staff in the Trade Statistics Unit who received overseas training than those in the SSSU (now the MFAU), for example. The Trade Statistics staff were generally quite junior when sent on training (many were at Grade 2), and were promoted to Grade 6 or 7 upon or soon after they returned. Most indicated they were content to stay with the Unit because: (i) they were using their recently acquired skills; (ii) they felt they "owed" it to the organization for having sent them on training; and, (iii) they perceived there would be further opportunity for training within the Ministry which they would be unlikely to get in the private sector.
- Sectoral ministries are more likely to retain higher level trained staff than functional ministries. In sectoral ministries, training is more specialized and fewer opportunities for employment exist outside of government.
 - Most senior staff who are in, or were in, the MFEA felt that there were ample opportunities for comparable or better employment outside the Ministry. Whereas MOA staff saw limited comparable opportunities for them outside MOA.
- Management skills training for Permanent Secretary and Deputy Permanent Secretary levels are important.
 - These are essentially the senior management positions in the Ministries. Improved senior management skills will contribute to the attraction and retention of staff by improving the work environment for staff. It will also help to enhance the sustainability of the institutional and resource aspects of capacity building projects, by improving these managers' application of strategic management techniques. Key skills for improvement include delegation, mentoring, strategic planning, and management style.

- Within a system of parallel career tracks, such management skills training would only be offered to PSs and DPSs on the management track, and resources permitting, to the departmental level of Ministries.

4.2.4.2 Role of Expatriate TA

Both the GARD and EFPA projects' long-term resident technical experts were charged with tasks related both to capacity building as well as to specific, substantive tasks, such as providing policy advice or building information or accounting systems. There is a delicate balance between the "supplementing" and "supplanting" role of the technical experts. It needs to be managed carefully.

- The ability to provide policy advice to senior officials and conduct effective capacity building is rarely found in a single person. Different people are usually "process" as opposed to "content" consultants. The process of identifying, evaluating and selecting good "process" consultants is more difficult, however, than it is for content consultants.
 - TA's Terms of Reference needs to be clear and distinguish between "delivering the goods" versus building local capacity to do so. TA performance along both dimensions needs to be measurable, and monitored closely. Government should have a central role in terms of reference development, TA selection, and in TA performance monitoring.
 - TA experts should work with a group or groups of locals, not just one counterpart, such as the Minister or Department Director. This will avoid the "all your eggs in one basket" risk, and lead to the building of critical mass.
 - If a given unit or department is the focal point of the technical assistance, the unit manager, with his or her staff, should draft the unit's work plan (and unit strategic plan), not expatriate TA. An implication of this is that ideally the organizational entity needs to have a Head and be partially staffed before the TA arrives. The Permanent Secretary, however, can act as a surrogate unit head in a transition period. The unit's work plan needs to be flexible enough to incorporate suggestions provided by the expatriate TA when it arrives.
 - The allocation of project resources, especially the cost of TA relative to what else could have been bought with those resources (for example, degrees, equipment, and per diems) is an important and visible issue. There are clearly trade-offs between the two, and value in each mode of assistance. The project's effectiveness and staff motivation can be directly effected by the handling of this issue.
- This was a particular issue in the GARD project, where MOA staff was acutely aware of what it cost to pay resident or short-term TA, and perceived that at the margin some of these resources might be better spent on other budget items such as equipment, up-country per diems, or more long-term training. The contribution of technical assistance to the development of DAR's capacity was not visibly perceived as substantial, contrary to the expectations of the contractor and USAID.

This is probably more a reflection of the weakness in the expatriates' "public relations" skills than the quality of the TA provided.

CHAPTER 5

NEXT STEPS

The lessons learned through an ex-post evaluation of two, past capacity building projects provide implications for selected next steps. In this chapter, next steps in the following areas are identified in broad terms: (i) initiation of strategic planning and management processes; (ii) evaluation of requisite reforms in civil service personnel systems; and, (iii) steps to enhance the capacity-building impact of the ANR and FAPE projects.

5.1 Strategic Management

As highlighted in Chapter 4, it makes little sense to conduct capacity-building projects in a "strategy vacuum." The overall objectives, strategy and core functions of a ministry need to be made explicit, and then used to guide capacity building project design and implementation. The Agriculture, Natural Resource and Finance ministries start from a low base in terms of ability to conduct strategic planning and they lack an orientation towards strategic management. At a minimum, the following two actions should be undertaken to improve strategic management at the ministries.

5.1.1 Rapid Appraisal Strategic Audit

Strategic management is a process and mentality that can only be developed over time, and a process that needs a high degree of Gambian involvement. However, in the short term, actions are being taken to redefine organizational structure (for example, the MFAU in the MFEA and the creation of a new Agricultural Research Institute), new projects and systems are being developed, and staff continue to go on and return from training. In order that these developments occur in a manner that is consistent with the respective ministries' implicit strategies, an explicit strategy needs to be developed that will guide future changes in structure, systems and human resources.

A **rapid appraisal strategic audit** of the ministries should be conducted as soon as possible to ascertain their current implicit strategies (if any), to test whether the strategies are consistent with government policy and other aspects of the external environment, to determine whether the strategies can be supported by available resources, and to assess the "fit" with the organization. This study should be conducted by a combination of expatriate management consultants, Gambian management consultants and Ministry counterparts. The result of the audit -- a "Strategy Policy Statement" -- would then be disseminated throughout the Ministry in question and other relevant government and private sector entities.

This could be accomplished over the course of several months through a series of focused interviews, strategy brainstorming sessions, and strategic workshops to 1) formalize a mission statement and related goals; 2) derive common assumptions regarding the external environment; 3) define key issues confronting the ministry, and, 4) develop a strategic policy statement.

5.1.2 Strategic Management Process Initiation

The ministries need to **initiate a process by which they become strategically managed**. This would start with institutionalizing a formal strategic planning process, for which the rapid appraisal above could form an initial input to the first round of planning. Thereafter, other aspects a strategic management process should be developed and installed (see Annex H). This process could take several years, but should be undertaken largely by Gambians, with some facilitation from expatriate experts. The degree of expatriate involvement should diminish rapidly over time. These activities would be coordinated with the training of senior management in management skills.

5.2 Civil Service Personnel Systems

Government needs to conduct a comprehensive and critical review of its civil service personnel systems and how they are implemented in practice. There are many areas for review. Priorities include the following.

- Compensation needs to be reviewed, including the feasibility of introducing scarcity allowances, honoraria and other benefits.
- Perhaps more important and feasible is the identification and implementation of non-financial means of attracting and retaining staff. Job descriptions need to be formalized and adhered to in all ministries. The performance evaluation system needs to be executed more regularly and with a greater degree of objectivity injected into the system.
- The concept of creating parallel management and technical tracks should be evaluated.
- Finally, training programs for individuals need to be defined, and in turn dynamically synchronized with organizational objectives and career development paths.

5.3 Lessons for ANR and FAPE

The follow-on projects to GARD and EFPA -- ANR and FAPE, respectively -- have already been designed and the contracts awarded, in the case of FAPE, or will soon be awarded. It is clearly a priority for USAID/Banjul to ensure that relevant lessons learned from the evaluations of GARD and EFPA are incorporated into the new projects.

5.3.1 Enhanced Capacity-Building Impact

The project design and implementation environment for the ANR and FAPE projects need to be critically reviewed to identify relevant lessons from the GARD and EFPA evaluation. These lessons should be incorporated into the execution of the follow-on projects. The first step is to identify which lessons are relevant. This requires both a knowledge of the lessons learned from

GARD and EFPA and a familiarity with the design of FAPE and ANR, and their early implementation record, where applicable.

Nonetheless, it is already evident that many of the lessons learned are relevant. For example: (i) exercise caution in the design of special units for specific projects; (ii) avoid having expatriates in line management positions; (iii) ensure that the Ministry's strategic plan determines the priorities and structure of the organization; (iv) use training plans to ensure that both organizational priorities and weaknesses are systematically addressed through training; and, (v) ensure that technical assistance contractors work regularly with one or more counterparts.

After gaining agreement on which of the lessons learned are relevant to the follow-on projects, the next step is to develop a process by which the lessons learned are incorporated into the new projects, recognizing that at least one of the projects has already started. This analysis could be conducted jointly by PMO, USAID/Banjul and the respective ministries.

5.3.2 Capacity Building Monitoring System

The considerable time, energy and resources required to build capacity means that the achievement by Gambians of high-level objectives, such as the performance of economic analysis or generation of research, may be deferred until a project's "out years." But this is an effort well spent if sustainability is the ultimate objective.

There is often considerable incentive for project contractors to "do the job" rather than increase local capacity to do so, especially when concrete and immediate results are needed -- local capacity may be years in the making, and the next project evaluation is 22 months away. To increase the sustainability of project activities, however, the incentives must be structured such that they support capacity-building objectives. For example, stringent capacity-development objectives might be appropriate during a project's early years, while more modest "output" objectives would be in place at that time. As the project progresses and capacity is developed, emphasis on "outputs" would increase.

To that end, a system to monitor the capacity-building effects of projects needs to be designed, installed and implemented. Developing appropriate time frames for monitoring and evaluation, and designing and making explicit measurable performance indicators will be keys to success. In addition, injecting sufficient flexibility into project design and implementation to allow "mid-course" refinement or redirection will be critical.

Flexible monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems that explicitly recognize and measure capacity-building progress, need to be developed or refined for the ANR and FAPE projects. Specialists in M&E systems, working closely with PMO, USAID/Banjul and the respective ministries, should be retained in the near future to develop/refine the respective projects' M&E systems.

ANNEXES

SCOPE OF WORK

If technical assistance is to be more effective in institution and capacity building, and given the recognized fact that technical assistance in the Gambia has not been very successful in the past in this respect, then we need to learn more about what it takes to have a successful institution building project. Through this assessment the GOTG and USAID/Banjul hope to develop improved operational approaches to organizational development that will improve the planning and development of its future technical assistance activities.

I. Background

Two Mission projects are ending in 1992: The Gambia Agricultural Research and Diversification (GARD) project, which focused on capacity building at the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), and the Economic and Financial Analyses (EFPA) project, which focused on capacity building at the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (MFEA). Many of the capacity building activities will be incorporated in new projects. In the case of GARD, the new Agriculture and Natural Resources (ANR) Program will focus mainly on capacity building at the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, but it will involve some continued capacity building at the MOA. For EFPA, the new Financial and Private Enterprise Development (FAPE) Program will continue assistance to the MFEA with an almost identical Scope of Work as under EFPA. It is desired that these new projects build on the lessons learned from their predecessors and contribute effectively to organizational development.

A. GARD

The GARD Project is a seven-year project which was signed on June 29, 1985 by the Government Of The Gambia (GOTG) and the Office of the AID Representative (OAR/Banjul). A five-year contract was signed with the University of Wisconsin (Madison) in January 1986 to implement the project.

The stated goal of the project was to achieve food self-reliance in the Gambia and the purpose is to test, generate, adapt and promote the adoption of improved crop and livestock technologies that meet farmers' needs and expand and diversify the Gambia's agricultural economy. The project's strategy was a two-pronged effort involving: (1) the long-term institutionalization of an effective applied agricultural research system; and (2) the development, promotion and adoption by farmers of improved agricultural technologies as early as possible.

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The project consists of five distinct but mutually supportive components as modified in the Contract Extension of August 1990 and is listed as follows:

- a) Establishment of an Agricultural Research Management System (ARMS) which will set agricultural research priorities in the light of farmers' needs, researchers' recommendations, and GOTG policy objectives; it will enforce these priorities through procedures by which programs will be designed, reviewed and funded.
- b) Provision of long- and short-term training for Gambians in various agricultural disciplines and improvement of research support systems, including selected infrastructural improvements, which will complement investments planned by other projects, notably the IBRD's ADP II.
- c) Support to on-station component research in crops, livestock, agroforestry, socioeconomics and water resources.
- d) Institutionalization of on-farm research as the cutting edge of the agricultural research system, including linkages to extension, NGOs and the private sector. Indicators of institutionalization shall include a functioning Farmer Innovation Technology Testing (FITT) program and production of annual Farmer Constraints Statement.
- e) Design of technology promotion activities for farmers at large, including training of field workers, monitoring and feedback of results and finance for specific pilot promotional efforts.

An external evaluation of the project was conducted during October-December 1988. This was followed by a performance audit by the Regional Inspector General's Office of Audit (RIG/A) from November 6, 1989 through January 12, 1990. Both the mid-term evaluation and the audit report recommended documenting and codifying the agricultural research system, putting more emphasis on promotional campaigns, and establishing stronger linkage between research and extension services.

The contract with the University of Wisconsin was extended for 18 months on August 9, 1990 with a revised scope of work providing some specific directions for GARD Project activities in the areas of Agricultural Research Management Systems (ARMS), Provision of Training, Provision of Advisory Services, Provision of Commodity Services, On-farm and Networking Research, Promotional Campaigns and Collaborative Research Contracts. Recommendations contained in the evaluation and the audit were used as guidelines in preparing the SOW for the contract extension of the University of Wisconsin Contract.

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B. EFPA

The EFPA Project is an eight-year project which was signed on June 28, 1984. A 4-year contract was signed with the Harvard Institute for International Development in May 1985 to implement the project. The contract was extended several times and will end in August 1992.

The stated goal of the project was the promotion of sound macroeconomic policy decisions, thereby enhancing the development of The Gambia. The purpose was to increase Ministry of Finance and Trade (predecessor to MFEA) staff ability to organize, conduct and disseminate sound economic and financial analyses for national policy consideration and implementation. Expected results from the project were:

- a) Improved analytical, technical and managerial skills for MOFT personnel;
- b) An organized system would be in place for producing policy studies and efficiently organizing and managing the flow of information for use by decision makers;
- c) Policy studies would be completed for consideration by decision makers and used as models for MOFT research;
- d) The MOFT and other GOTG decision makers would have a greater appreciation of the cost of non-economic objectives in official policies and the economic ramifications of their policy decisions.

Two evaluations were carried out by AID/W and REDSO/WCA personnel (March 1987 and June 1990). Both evaluations concluded that the project was successful in promoting sound economic policies and both concluded that there was success in institutional development, but there were problems in institution building. The 1987 evaluation stated, "The project has been successful in promoting long-term institutional development, but the environment (the Civil Service) in which the project must operate is not conducive to its success."

II. OBJECTIVE

The goal of providing services under this contract is to improve institution building in The Gambia in the areas of human resource and organizational development. Institution building is essential to the successful analysis, formulation and implementation of agriculture and economic policy reform. The specific objective is to identify problems and constraints in transferring the skills, procedures, and technology required for analysis and sustained implementation of policies in the two Ministries.

III. STATEMENT OF WORK

The contractor will work closely with personnel from the Personnel Management Office (PMO) of the Government Of The Gambia which is responsible for the coordination and management of technical assistance. It is the goal of the PMO to improve the effective utilization of technical assistance in the country with the express purpose of institution and capacity building.

For the GARD project, the assessment will focus on the two major objectives - the institutionalization of an effective applied agricultural research system and the development, promotion and the adoption by farmers of improved agricultural technologies - and on the three major players in implementation - contractor, Ministry of Agriculture, and USAID. For the EFPA project, the assessment will focus on the objective of increasing the ability of MOFT staff to organize, conduct and disseminate sound economic and financial analyses for national policy consideration and implementation. Included in the assessment will be an evaluation of the design of the projects and the role and performance of contractor personnel as operational experts, advisers, and trainers. Equally important will be an organizational analysis and diagnostic of management in the appropriate implementing or supporting institutions with a view to assessing institutional strengths and weaknesses in accepting, supporting, and absorbing the transfer of technology. Also included will be an assessment of training - overseas, including both long-term and short-term; and in-country, including both on-the-job and workshops. In the performance of the above SOW, the following specific questions will be addressed.

1. To what extent were the project objectives achieved? If not fully achieved, what were the reasons? (Problems in design, assumptions, implementation, timing, funding, training, etc.?)
2. Are there easily identifiable areas of success and areas of failure? Were there any underlying reasons (systemic, organizational, or otherwise) that explain why there were successes/failures in some areas and not in others?
3. For organizational development:
 - a. Does each Ministry have a well defined and understood long-range program (a vision and a corresponding strategic plan)?
 - b. Is each Ministry able to effectively implement its programs and deliver services?
 - c. Is each Ministry well organized to carry out its functions?
 - d. To what extent are roles and responsibilities within each Ministry clear?

- e. Is each Ministry adequately staffed?
 - f. Are the staff adequately trained? Are they able to put their skills to good use?
 - g. Are Ministry staff adequately compensated?
 - h. How effective is each Ministry in mobilizing resources?
 - i. Is the leadership (top management) effective? Are they well respected?
 - j. Is there adequate communication between the offices? Is conflict well managed?
 - k. Is decision-making within each Ministry delegated to the appropriate level?
 - l. How motivated are staff to carry out their functions?
 - m. Has each Ministry developed effective linkages with other Ministries or organizations?
 - n. Are the practices and procedures needed for the effective operation of each Ministry well understood?
4. What are the lessons that the GOTG and USAID can learn from the experience of these projects that will lead to more effective and successful institution and capacity building projects in the future?
5. What relationship can be discerned between the policy objectives of each project and the achievement of its capacity building objectives?
- a. To what extent was the project's implicit capacity-building program geared directly towards achieving the stipulated policy objectives?
 - b. In light of project experience (or lack of it) in using the project and policy objectives to frame capacity-building efforts, can any conclusions be reached as to the utility of such a framework for institution-and capacity building?
6. What are the dynamics of policy ownership and leadership in respect to the two policy areas which these two projects support?
- a. To what extent does the success of these projects seem to depend on "ownership" and leadership in policy decisions by: 1) the GOTG organizations which have

responsibility for policy adoption and implementation; and by 2) USAID and contract personnel which support policy change and implementation? What evidence is there for the conclusion reached?

b. If a relationship is evident between project success and policy "ownership" and leadership, describe what circumstances or what strategies and actions by GOTG, USAID or contractor personnel affected the "ownership" question.

c. What "lessons learned" in respect to these questions does the experience of these project provide for future collaboration in Gambia and for work in other countries?

IV. REPORTS AND DELIVERABLES

Prior to departure from The Gambia, the team leader will deliver four copies of a draft report to OAR/Banjul and the GOTG for review and comment. A meeting between the assessment team, USAID/Banjul and GOTG representatives will be held thereafter to discuss the findings and recommendations. The contractor will produce and submit to USAID/Banjul, in form and substance satisfactory to USAID, within 30 days of the team's departure from Banjul, four copies of the final written report taking into account the comments and suggestions of the GOTG/AID review.

2 copies of each report shall be delivered to the AID Project Officer,
R&D/EID

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Gambia Agricultural Research and Diversification Project

PROJECT PURPOSE: To test, generate, adapt and promote the adoption of improved crop and livestock technologies that meet farmers' needs and expand and diversify The Gambia's agricultural economy.

PROJECT OUTPUTS	PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	FINDINGS	EVALUATION	LESSONS LEARNED
1. Appropriate agric. technologies generated, tested, adapted, and promoted through ARMS.	a) on-farm trials on test plots being conducted (including adaptations) b) technologies promoted c) technologies adopted	a) on-farm rice trials are in process (involving female rice farmers, research and extension personnel) b) the following technologies have been promoted: sheep fattening, seed dressing, new varieties (rice, maize, millet, sorghum), and row planting of rice promoted, animal traction for rice farmers (women) c) wide acceptance/adoption of sheep fattening technology reported; rice and millet program (RAMP) reported adoption of new varieties in North Bank; no follow-up at DAR to determine adoption rates of other technologies	a) trial site visited was well conducted and relevant to local rice farmers' needs b) it is expected that the research-promotion link will be strengthened now that both senior research-extension liaison officers have returned from training and have been assigned to DAR and DAS c) site visit revealed adoption of manual rice row seeding technique and of improved varieties; no staff or resources allocated to monitor/measure adoption rates of technologies promoted through GARD -- this capacity needs to be developed either in DAR or in DAS or jointly	An agricultural research management system that features feedback and participation from the end users of technology can provide appropriate and useful technologies to farmers. Farmers will readily adopt new technologies once their relevance has been proven to them. The ability to formally (or at least informally) measure adoption rates of technology is an important management function of an ARMS.

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PROJECT OUTPUTS	PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	FINDINGS	EVALUATION	LESSONS LEARNED
2. Farmer constraints and research priorities identified.	a) farmer constraints statement updated annually b) national agric. sample survey is conducted annually and published	a) constraints analysis conducted 2 years ago through GARD; no new study scheduled. b) TBD (Ken Johm)	Conducting a constraints every year is probably superfluous, although this should be done periodically; DAR currently has no positions for executing systematic constraints analyses; however, if proper linkages are established and maintained with farmers and extensionists, this information is obtainable on an informal or indicative basis and should feed into the planning process	Farmer constraints can and should be identified/updated through proper research-extension-farmer linkages
3. Priority research programs planned.	a) Farmers Innovation & Tech Testing (FITT) Program continues b) annual ARREV meetings take place c) ARREV proceedings published d) NARB continues to play lead role in research planning	a) not in operation b) successful meetings held in Feb. '92; plans for Feb. '93 meetings have not yet begun c) 1990 and 1991 ARREV meeting proceedings have not been published, but are reportedly almost ready to go to press d) role of NARB expected to expand with creation of nat'l research inst.	a) no active leadership/resources allocated for the FITT program per se b) whether and how well the upcoming meetings occur (for the first time w/o GARD assistance) will be a key indicator of the institutionalization of the ARMS c) the delay in publishing ARREV proceedings is due to resources/ personnel being allocated to other priorities	Prioritization of research program depends on: 1) proper identification of constraints (through linkages with farmers and extension); and 2) a multi-disciplinary team approach to address those constraints involving scientists, administrators, and policy makers.

PROJECT PURPOSE: To test, generate, adapt and promote the adoption of improved crop and livestock technologies that meet farmers' needs and expand and diversify The Gambia's agricultural economy.

PROJECT OUTPUTS	PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	FINDINGS	EVALUATION	LESSONS LEARNED
4. Adequate and timely research budgets prepared.	a) continued use of Program Budgeting System (PBS) by all MOA departments	a) PBS completely integrated into MOA Department of Ag Research's mgmt system; personnel in other MOA depts. have been trained in PBS, but are not using it to a great extent at this time	PBS is scheduled to receive a boost to its legitimacy/relevancy through an upcoming IBRD program that will install PBS in the Min. of Finance; without this, the use of the system would have languished because no high-level "champion" for it existed.	For a new system to have a lasting and growing effect, high-level support and/or responsibility for that system must be present in the recipient country.
5. Adequate research implementation and reporting systems used.	a) research task forces prepare program plans b) annual research review meetings occur (adequate representation, research results reviewed, new program planned) c) NARB reviews ARREV-proposed programs and approves next year's national research program d) collaboration between national, regional and int'l research institutions takes place e) annual research report published	a) program task forces not currently operating b) '92 ARREV meetings took place (w/ GARD assistance); Feb.'93 meetings to be planned w/o GARD involvement c) NARB continues to play lead role in setting ag research agenda d) numerous national, regional and international networking activities took place over past year (thru GARD) e) in process	a) DAR acting director & RELO sent memo in early Nov.'92 to directors of ag. svcs., livestock, and forestry as well as directors of NGOs in Gambia to reactivate task forces for the 93/94 season and to solicit representatives for each of six task forces (cereals, grain legumes, cropping systems, horticulture, ag engineering, and promotions) b) plans have not begun for upcoming ARREV meetings c) role of NARB to be strengthened if national research inst. is established, as planned d) DAR continues to maintain strong and productive linkages with WARDA, IITA, SAFGRAD and other organizations	The involvement and support of many actors at various levels can contribute to the institutionalization of an agric. research program that has a broad base of support within and outside gov't.

PROJECT PURPOSE: To test, generate, adapt and promote the adoption of improved crop and livestock technologies that meet farmers' needs and expand and diversify The Gambia's agricultural economy.

PROJECT OUTPUTS	PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	FINDINGS	EVALUATION	LESSONS LEARNED
6. Future maintenance of capital equipment planned.	a) DAR develops and implements a capital equipment plan	staff on DAR payroll assigned to maintenance/repair of computers, vehicles, farm equipment; line item in '93 DAR budget for equipment repair; resources are allocated for repairs of equip., as needed; no maintenance contracts budgeted; few spare parts available	despite the existence of a line item in the DAR budget for maintenance and repair of equipment, it is unlikely that resources for maintenance will keep pace with demand because current allocations are not doing so and the 1993 budget is only a small increment more than the 1992 budget.	The availability and resources for spare parts and maintenance of equipment remains an important factor and key concern in the full sustainability of project impacts
7. MOA staff (and staff of other appropriate Ministries) trained to conduct research and extension activities.	a) 14 participants trained (9 MS and 5 BS) b) MOA identifies and makes provisions for future training priorities	a) under GARD project: 14 BS degrees earned (2 female); 7 MS degrees earned (1 female); 75 short-term trainees; 1,180 in-service trainees, 28 networking participants; of 19 total long-term trainees, 15 (or 79%) have returned or are scheduled to return to MOA service. b) future DAR training priorities outlined for upcoming IBRD project.	Training provided under the GARD project is one of its primary successes; virtually all returnees interviewed stated that their training prepared them for and earned them greater job responsibilities/grades upon their return to The Gambia.	Training is an important element in capacity building provided that the training received is relevant or appropriate, and there are appropriate job opportunities and incentives available for returnees

PROJECT PURPOSE: To test, generate, adapt and promote the adoption of improved crop and livestock technologies that meet farmers' needs and expand and diversify The Gambia's agricultural economy.

PROJECT OUTPUTS	PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	FINDINGS	EVALUATION	LESSONS LEARNED
8. Coverage of recurrent costs of ARMS planned by GOTG.	a) GOTG financial contribution sustains former GARD activities	nearly all positions in DAR previously funded by GARD have been eliminated or combined with other DAR positions; however, attempts have been made in '93 DAR budget/personnel allocation to continue most GARD-initiated program areas, albeit in an abbreviated or scaled-down fashion (programs, training, equipment replacement)	DAR's management response to its high objectives/low resource base has generally been to scale back the scope and depth of most of its activities and maintain a minimal level of service; the soils lab is not yet affected by this condition and has instituted a user-fee system for private use of its services; likewise the Sapu research station charges for overnight use of its guest house.	A reduction in resources after a project ceases is a given -- this is where the challenge to the recipient organization's management in resource mobilization/rationalization becomes key

PROJECT PURPOSE: To test, generate, adapt and promote the adoption of improved crop and livestock technologies that meet farmers' needs and expand and diversify The Gambia's agricultural economy.

PROJECT OUTPUTS	PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	FINDINGS	EVALUATION	LESSONS LEARNED
<p>IN ADDITION TO THE PROJECT-SPECIFIED OUTPUTS OUTLINED ON THE PRECEEDING PAGES, THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO USED TO EVALUATE AGRICULTURE RESEARCH CAPACITY</p>				
<p>1. The overall objectives of the organization and strategy for achieving them are identified and widely known within the organization.</p>	<p>a) ongoing strategic planning process is in place whereby objectives, constraints, and the external environment can be assessed, where strategies can be selected, and where implementation can be planned, executed, and monitored</p> <p>b) decisions are based on "fit" with strategic plan</p>	<p>a) there is some awareness within the MOA that the Ministry's mission is changing from its role as <u>provider</u> of certain services to one of <u>facilitator</u> and <u>regulator</u></p> <p>b) although MOA has begun to define priority activities/roles for itself, structural and personnel decisions are still based on externally generated recommendations or outdated personnel practices, rather than on MOA's defined strategic mission.</p>	<p>There is little recognition that the process of defining objectives and refining strategies is ongoing and iterative; Gambian participation in the development of MOA's strategic mission has been minimal and there is little understanding among MOA personnel at mid and lower levels as to where they fit into overall GOTG priorities.</p>	<p>Strategic plans must be developed by nationals, perhaps with assistance by outsiders, to build the ownership and commitment that will make their full and sustained implementation possible.</p>

PROJECT PURPOSE: To test, generate, adapt and promote the adoption of improved crop and livestock technologies that meet farmers' needs and expand and diversify The Gambia's agricultural economy.

PROJECT OUTPUTS	PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	FINDINGS	EVALUATION	LESSONS LEARNED
<p>2. Personnel policies and procedures in place to sustain agriculture research capacity.</p>	<p>a) merit-based (performance-based) promotions and pay raises established and implemented b) staff training needs matched with career path c) career path for key staff members established and implemented d) staff job responsibilities clearly delineated and identified e) night allowances paid for overnight work upcountry f) non-financial incentive system in place</p>	<p>a) no systematic measures of job performance in place; promotions primarily based on tenure and credentials; b) trainees generally returned to their fields of specialization with increased responsibility and grade level; c) some demonstrated cases of career path planning and implementation; d) job responsibilities generally delineated and identified, particularly in depts. for research/extension; e) MOA research personnel paid night allowances; extension personnel not paid night allowances as of June '92; f) research facilities in Yundum provide above average work environment; limited number of vehicles available; on the job achievement awards presented in DAS.</p>	<p>Promotions that are based mainly on tenure rather than merit, combined with the difficulty to remove non-productive staff has created an environment where there are few incentives for personnel to strive for excellence; this also means that resources that could be spent on merit increases for outstanding personnel are spent maintaining marginal employees.</p>	

PROJECT PURPOSE: To test, generate, adapt and promote the adoption of improved crop and livestock technologies that meet farmers' needs and expand and diversify The Gambia's agricultural economy.

PROJECT OUTPUTS	PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	FINDINGS	EVALUATION	LESSONS LEARNED
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3. ARMS adequately equipped to generate, test, adapt, and promote adoption of technologies.

a) # of personnel/ vacancies in departments
 b) quality of personnel
 c) distribution of researchers by commodity and/or by discipline
 d) equipment provided
 e) infrastructure/facilities provided

a) numerous vacancies in key positions across all program areas of DAR
 b) a small number of highly trained and dedicated personnel; many committed, yet untrained personnel; a small number of uncommitted, non-contributing personnel
 c) current strengths in DAR research capacity (personnel) are in agronomy, soil science and horticulture; weaknesses are in pathology, sociology, entomology, and specialized breeding
 d) numerous pieces of equipment provided under GARD, including, vehicles, soils lab equip., seed processing equip., cereals thresher, groundnut presser, reference books, computers still function
 e) Sapu station houses, fuel tanks/pumps, labs provided

a) an inventory of all job positions in DAR for all areas of activity reveals that the recruitment and retention of qualified personnel is a chronic issue that is and will continue to affect the quantity and quality of ag research being conducted in The Gambia

 d) DAR reports difficulty in keeping up with repairs of equipment, particularly some of the older vehicles, tiller, reaper, fertilizer distributors

1. The development of an effective research capability in The Gambia can have a direct and positive impact on farmers.

 2. This capacity can be built provided proper leadership, coordination and commitment are present in the GOTG, donor, contractor.

 3. The sustainability of GARD-initiated programs depends on the GOTG's ability to provide adequate incentives, personnel policies and support for dedicated and committed personnel.

Annex E

Survey Responses of Gambians Trained at BS and MS Level by GARD Project

TRAINEE	UNIT/PROGRAM PRIOR TO TRAINING	UNIT/PROGRAM AFTER TRAINING	GRADE PRIOR TO TRAINING	GRADE AFTER TRAINING	ADDED RESPONSIBILITY AFTER TRAINING	RELEVANCY OF TRAINING TO CURRENT JOB
Noaha kujabi	Budget unit	Budget & Personnel unit	5	8	Yes; Exec. Officer personnel & finance	Quite relevant
Nyada Y. Baldeh	FAO Fertilizer project/Agric.	Agric. Research	7/8	9	Yes; RELO	B.S. & M.S. Quite relevant; More exposure; Added writing skills.. research/extension papers
Babou Jobe	Rice agronomy	Cropping Systems (Soil Fertility)	6	8	Yes; Research Officer in charge of soil Fertility	Quite relevant B.S. in Soil Science
Kemoring Trawally	Farming Systems Program	Grain Legumes & Oilseeds Program	5	8	Yes; proposed to head grain legumes & oilseed program; Ag. Leader	Quite relevant B.S. in agronomy

TRAINEE	UNIT/PROGRAM PRIOR TO TRAINING	UNIT/ PROGRAM AFTER TRAINING	GRADE PRIOR TO TRAINING	GRADE AFTER TRAINING	ADDED RESPONSIBILITY AFTER TRAINING	RELEVANCY OF TRAINING TO CURRENT JOB
Sheriff Sima	DAC-MID South Extension	DAS/ACU	7	8 & then 10	Yes;RELO Head ACU In-service training; editorial; Film presentation; Graphics; Radio programs	B.S. & M.S. Quite relevant; some courses selected to need by GARD
Essa Drammeh	Rice Research Program	Rice Research Program	6	7	Yes;plan/ conduct/ analyze trial results (both natl & intl.); report writing	Diploma in Agriculture; Quite relevant
Musa Mbenga	DAR/Upland Cereals	DAR Directorate; Sapu Station administration	8	10	Yes; Prog. Leader; Asst. Dir.; Stn. Mgr.	M.S. Quite relevant; Plt. Breeding; Agronomy; Statistics & Exptl. design

Economic and Financial Policy Analysis Project

PROJECT PURPOSE: To increase Ministry of Finance and Trade (MOFT) staff ability to organize, conduct, and disseminate sound economic and financial analysis for national policy consideration and implementation.

PROJECT OUTPUTS	PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	FINDINGS	EVALUATION	LESSONS LEARNED														
<p>1. Functioning MOFT special studies unit and, as required special task force.</p>	<p>1.1 Statistics and Special Studies Unit (SSSU) staffed by returned participants.</p>	<p>1.1.1 The SSSU was established as a semi-autonomous unit reporting directly to the Permanent Secretary of MOFT</p> <p>1.1.2 The SSSU was designed to be staffed by 9 Gambians:</p> <table data-bbox="840 795 1197 1055"> <tr> <td>Head of Unit</td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Principal Economist</td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Senior Economist</td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Economists</td> <td>3</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Cadet Economist</td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Computer Specialist</td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Typist/Computer Clerk</td> <td>1</td> </tr> </table> <p>1.1.3 Effectively, the SSSU currently has no staff.</p> <p>1.1.4 As a result of the recent restructuring and consolidation of the MOFT and the Ministry of Planning, the SSSU has been absorbed into the Macro-Economic and Financial Analysis Unit (MFAU) which also is not staffed as yet.</p>	Head of Unit	1	Principal Economist	1	Senior Economist	1	Economists	3	Cadet Economist	1	Computer Specialist	1	Typist/Computer Clerk	1	<p>During the ERP and SAP implementation period, the SSSU was critical to monitoring IMF program targets. Now, the SSSU/MFAU is effectively non-functional and the former staff has left the Unit and the Ministry. As a result:</p> <ol data-bbox="1249 763 1659 1266" style="list-style-type: none"> The institutional framework for sound economic analysis and policy formulation does not exist within the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (MFEA). With regard to human resources base for economic and policy analysis, the MFEA is in the same position as the former MOFT when the EFPA was first launched. 	<p>A functioning economic research and policy analysis unit cannot be institutionalized and sustained unless the following conditions are met.</p> <ol data-bbox="1690 617 2068 1477" style="list-style-type: none"> The Unit is structured as an integral part of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs with a clear mandate and terms of reference. The Unit has quick access to data and information managed by organizations within the MFEA and other governmental entities through clearly established procedures for data transfer and sharing. There is a commitment from the government to appropriately staff the Unit and the Unit has a clear mandate and authority to offer competitive remuneration vis-a-vis the private sector in order to attract and retain qualified personnel.
Head of Unit	1																	
Principal Economist	1																	
Senior Economist	1																	
Economists	3																	
Cadet Economist	1																	
Computer Specialist	1																	
Typist/Computer Clerk	1																	

PROJECT PURPOSE: To increase Ministry of Finance and Trade (MOFT) staff ability to organize, conduct, and disseminate sound economic and financial analysis for national policy consideration and implementation.

PROJECT OUTPUTS	PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	FINDINGS	EVALUATION	LESSONS LEARNED
<p>2. Trained MOFT staff to run and support special studies unit</p>	<p>2.1 13 MOFT staff trained at MA, MBA level in the US.</p> <p>2.2 35 to 40 MOFT and other GOTG staff receive short-term training in US, third countries or The Gambia.</p>	<p>2.1.1 A total of 19 Gambians have received long-term training in the US. Of these, 15 % and 40 % have received BA and MA/MBA degrees, respectively. Three people from the SSSU have received long-term training and only one is a degree candidate. Of the long-term trainees, only 20 % are from the Ministry of Finance and Trade (MOFT).</p> <p>2.2.1 A total of 56 Gambians have received short-term training. Of these only 50% are from the MOFT.</p> <p>2.2.2 Project personnel have conducted short-term courses for Senior Government Officials on various topic of interest related to national economic and financial policy making.</p>	<p>1. Despite the fact that all of the training participants have returned to The Gambia, the human resource capacity for the MFAU to carry out economic and policy analysis does not exist. This is indicative of the fact that, the training component of the project was, in practice, not targeted to specifically develop macro-economic and financial policy analysis capacity within the Unit itself and within those organizations that closely worked with the Unit. The selection of training participants was rather arbitrary and irrelevant to the human resources development objective of the project. Furthermore, the project as designed, did not anticipate providing PhD level training to conduct research and policy analysis. As a result, the GOTG does not have either the capacity to formulate and implement sound</p>	<p>While there are various ways of upgrading personnel skills, successful development of human resource capacity for sound macro-economic and financial analysis and policy formulation requires:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Developing a master plan of essential skills required for operating a high caliber macro-economic policy analysis unit. 2. For each employee in the Unit developing a long-term career path on the basis of the employees' demonstrated skills and career objectives. 3. For each employee, based on the master plan of skills and the potentials of the employee, develop a detailed training program geared to his/her career path. 4. If skills are to be transferred from expatriate experts, the transfer of skills should be made an integral component of the expatriate's terms of reference.

PROJECT PURPOSE: To increase Ministry of Finance and Trade (MOFT) staff ability to organize, conduct, and disseminate sound economic and financial analysis for national policy consideration and implementation.

PROJECT OUTPUTS	PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	FINDINGS	EVALUATION	LESSONS LEARNED
		<p>2.2.3 The project has also funded an in-country computer programming and software application training for the MOFT staff.</p>	<p>economic policy nor to conduct policy dialogue with multilateral and bilateral donors on its own.</p> <p>2. Seminars and workshops conducted for senior policy makers were, however, successful in raising the awareness and understanding of these officials in national economic and financial matters.</p>	<p>A process and time table for the transfer of skills should be established and adhered to. A specific hour or day should be scheduled for the training and exchange of views between the expatriate and the trainee. Staff should be trained in skills directly related to their current job functions. This will enhance the extent to which trainees will retain the skills they are taught.</p> <p>5. In order to motivate and accelerate the acquisition of skills, job performance-standards and appropriate rewards and incentives should be established and implemented. Performance based rewards and promotions will enhance employee retention.</p> <p>6. While the principal person is away for long-term training, the expatriate consultant should train a Gambian understudy to fill the void and/or fill the void on a temporary basis and only as a stop-gap measure.</p>

PROJECT PURPOSE: To increase Ministry of Finance and Trade (MOFT) staff ability to organize, conduct, and disseminate sound economic and financial analysis for national policy consideration and implementation.

PROJECT OUTPUTS	PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	FINDINGS	EVALUATION	LESSONS LEARNED
<p>3. Policy studies for consideration by decision-makers and use as models for further research.</p>	<p>3.1 10 to 13 pre-identified policy studies conducted by short-term consultants in conjunction with MOFT staff.</p>	<p>3.1.1 The Acting Head of the SSSU participated actively in the technical and policy discussions with the staff of the Fund and the Bank during their visit to The Gambia. The head of the unit worked closely with the HIID advisors in these exercises.</p> <p>3.1.2 The computer analyst and other members of the staff played a key role in the collection of fiscal data and the development of basic framework for economic monitoring.</p> <p>3.1.3 Several policy studies (i.e., 12 policy papers) were conducted and prepared by the HIID advisors with some participation from staff economists of the Unit.</p>	<p>Currently, the SSSU/MFAU staff has no capacity or trained Gambians to generate policy research papers, nor to update the studies developed by the HIID advisors.</p>	<p>The capacity to conduct economic research and develop policy papers requires a lot of experience. This experience can be partially developed by:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Providing continued support and opportunity to Gambian researchers: (a) to present and review their studies and research results with peers and senior management; and, (b) to present the study results at regional and international conferences. 2. Requiring long-term expatriate consultants to collaborate and co-author research studies on topics relevant to The Gambia, with Gambian researchers. This process will accelerate the transfer of research know-how. This research collaboration should be a clear element of the consultants terms of reference which should be monitored and measured.

PROJECT PURPOSE: To increase Ministry of Finance and Trade (MOFT) staff ability to organize, conduct, and disseminate sound economic and financial analysis for national policy consideration and implementation.

PROJECT OUTPUTS	PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	FINDINGS	EVALUATION	LESSONS LEARNED
				<ol style="list-style-type: none">3. Drawing Gambian policy analyst from the pool of senior civil service staff on a dual technical-management career track system in order to enhance the retention of skilled personnel.4. Training a cadre of economist at the PhD level.

ANNEX G

CAPACITY-BUILDING PROGRAMS IN THE GAMBIA

A basic overview of capacity building programs in The Gambia and the context in which they occurred is presented in this Annex.

D.1 Background and Introduction

Prior to 1985, The Gambia faced an economic and financial crisis. Its origins were primarily due to the drought; overdependence on the export of groundnuts and declines in groundnut prices on the world market; a high demand for imported consumables by a rapidly growing urban population; and, a large import component in general government and development expenditure. Other exogenous factors which contributed to the crisis situation included the high price of oil and high interest rates. The situation was exacerbated by overemployment and inadequate management practices in the public sector, both in the civil service and in parastatal/public enterprises.

In order to turn the economy around, the Government of The Gambia (GOTG) with the assistance of the World Bank, the IMF and other multilateral and bilateral donors, embarked on the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) in 1985.

The goal of the ERP was to:

- open the Gambian economy to market forces
- liberalize the foreign exchange system
- reduce the fiscal deficit
- reduce the size of the public service, and
- stimulate private sector growth and development.

Between fiscal years, 1985/86 and 1989/90 the GOTG implemented various action plans towards the achievement of these objectives. The program was considered a success. The main achievements included greater private sector development and participation in the economy, a liberalized and stabilized foreign exchange system, increased government revenue accompanied by reduced expenditures, and a reduced and more efficient public service. These reforms led to a budget surplus and an economy that grew on average at 4.5% annually.

As a follow-up to the ERP, in 1990, Government introduced the Program for Sustained Development (PSD). The PSD is geared toward continuation and consolidation of the achievements obtained under the ERP and expansion of the policy in other areas of the economy. The main objectives of the PSD are to:

- Achieve a long-run expansion of the productive capacity of the economy that will support a significant improvement in the living standards of the people.

- Avoid the financial policies that would burden future generations with unproductive debt.
- Protect the productive and recreative capacity of the environment
- Distribute development benefits equitably.

Some of the key underlying elements of this program include continued reliance on market forces and the promotion of private sector development. It also includes the maintenance of a smaller and more efficient civil service charged with: (1) regulatory functions; and, (2) facilitating the private sector in productive activities.

Within the context of these economic development frameworks, the GOTG undertook a number of initiatives aimed specifically at capacity building. These include: (i) The Administrative Reform Programme; (ii) NaTCAP; and, (iii) the Economic Management Capacity Building Programme. Each is reviewed below.

D.2 Administrative Reform Program

The Administrative Reform Program (ARP) was launched in 1987 under the rubric of the ERP with the objective of reducing the size of the Government sector in order to improve the quality of the public service and strengthen national economic management.

In order to achieve this objective the government took a number of socially and politically sensitive measures. These were: 1) retrenchment of the civil service; 2) reorganization of certain ministries and departments; and, 3) restructuring and reform of the public enterprise sector.

The permanent establishment of the Civil Service, which rose from 4,000 to 10,700 between 1975 and 1985, was reduced by 900 civil servants who were retrenched during the ERP period. In addition, some 2,900 non-permanent employees were retrenched out of 5,000 temporary workers, which amounted to an annual savings of approximately \$2.5 million. Also, 800 vacant posts were established and a moratorium was placed on the creation of any new posts during the implementation of the ERP, 1985/86 - 1989/90.

Other measures undertaken under ARP were the reorganization or restructuring of some key ministries and departments. For example, the former Ministry of Finance and Trade and the former Ministry of Economic Planning and Industrial Development were reconstituted. A new ministry was formed, combining Finance and Economic Planning from the previous two ministries. Similarly, a new Ministry of Trade, Industry and Employment was created -- subsuming Trade from the old Ministry of Finance, Industrial Development from the former Ministry of Economic Planning, and Employment from the former Ministry of Health, Labor and Social Welfare. Another example was the reorganization of the Ministry of Agriculture, which involved the abolition of the Department of Crop Protection (CDs) and the separation of the Department of Agriculture into the Departments of Agricultural Services (DAS) and Agricultural Research (DAR). Furthermore, commercially oriented activities, which were carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture, were privatized. These included: tractor ploughing; maintenance and

repair of MOA vehicles; purchase, storage and supply of fuel and spare parts; construction, repair and maintenance of MOA buildings and furniture; and, management of a feedmill and a hatchery.

A third, significant example of the achievement of the reorganization effort of the ARP was the establishment of a more dynamic Personnel Management Office (PMO), which replaced the former Establishment office.

ODA consultants, in collaboration with the Secretary General of the Office of the President, the PMO and other senior civil servants, were able to rationally upgrade about 2,700 posts, downgrade 870 posts, compress the 21-pay grade structure into 12, and submit a 107% pay increase across the board to the cabinet for approval.

The parastatal or public enterprise sector was substantially reformed not only by way of retrenchment of some workers but also by restructuring. Many of these organizations signed performance contracts with government. Certain shares in some of them were sold to the private sector and some were completely privatized, for example the National Trading Corporation (NTC).

As a result of the ARP, a more systematic Annual Staff Report (ASP) was put in place, which enables the job holder to participate in the appraisal process. Furthermore, the PMO now has a systematic training/human resource development policy in place which has the objective of improving the quality and quantity of training available to its employees. The policy includes:

- regular training needs assessment and prioritizing training needs
- building up the capacity of local training institutions
- ensuring that overseas training fits within the Government priorities.

In the implementation of the training policy, the Permanent Secretary (PMO) is responsible for both government- and donor-sponsored training activities, both in-country and overseas. In this regard, The Gambia's Management Development Institute (MDI) is mandated with the training of civil servants on a short-term basis in financial management and accounting, general management and public administration, and project management. However, as government policies changed, the mandate of MDI has broadened to train public servants in additional areas such as policy analysis and macroeconomic management. The MDI is also now involved in training the staffs of NGOs and private sector organizations.

The Gambia Technical Training Institute (GTTI) is engaged in technical training, e.g. carpentry, masonry, engineering, secretarial and computer training, etc. The Gambia College is involved in teacher, public health and nursing, and agricultural extension worker training.

The main constraint in human resource development in The Gambia is that there is no degree-awarding institution in the country. Neither the MDI, nor the GTTI or the Gambia College offer university educations. The main issue therefore, is how to build The Gambia's human resource capacity within this context.

D.3 National Technical Cooperation Assessment Programme (NaTCAP)

The NaTCAP is a systematic process designed to achieve the efficient and effective "utilization and management of Technical Cooperation." NaTCAP emerged under the ERP and is considered part of the Administrative Reform Program (ARP).

The objectives of the NaTCAP are to:

- Systematically review the effectiveness of Technical Cooperation (TC) and to program the priority technical cooperation needs of The Gambia
- Assist with the development of The Gambia's human resource capacity and related institutions.

The rationale for the NaTCAP process include:

- Maintaining a consistent TC policy within the wider government policy framework, e.g. the PSD.
- To efficiently and effectively utilize TC resources with the aim of capacity and institution building toward self reliance for sustained development.

The office of one of the Deputy Permanent Secretaries at the PMO is responsible for coordinating the NaTCAP exercise. The Deputy Permanent Secretary functions as a one-man unit and reports to the Permanent Secretary, PMO. Outside of the PMO, an advisory committee exists that is comprised by the Permanent Secretary PMO (as chairman) and other members, including the Permanent Secretaries, Office of the President, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, and the NaTCAP coordinators (as Secretary).

Since the inception of the NaTCAP process in 1989/90, a number of achievements have been made. These include:

- A NaTCAP coordinating Unit and Advisory Committee were established
- UNDP's Banjul Office provided the GOTG with DCAS software with which baseline data was generated for the recent Development Cooperation Report (DCR)
- An outline of GOTG TC database requirements has been developed
- A Technical Cooperation Policy Framework Paper (TCPFP) was presented and adopted at the Donor's Conference held in Geneva in December 1990
- Technical Cooperation Program (TCP) for Environment and Natural Resources, and Private Sector Development are being drafted in collaboration with Ministry of Natural Resources and NIB, respectively.

- The NaTCAP coordinator participates in Project and Program review meetings on an ad hoc basis
- Gradually, a module on management of TC is being institutionalized in project management courses organized at the MDI.
- At the request of the NaTCAP Unit in collaboration with the USAID, a team of consultants evaluated the impacts of the EFPA and GARD Projects (the subjects of this current report).

NaTCAP, which serves to increase the effectiveness and efficiency with which TC is used, is an important complement to the Economic Management Capacity Building Programme (EMCBP), which aims to build sustained capacity for economic management.

D.4 The Economic Management Capacity Building Programme (EMCBP)

The Economic Management Capacity Building Programme (EMCBP) was designed in 1992 with the overall objective to "promote sound economic policy decisions to enhance the development of The Gambia's human resources." The rationale for this program is to respond to the "priority tasks" identified within the PSD. With this in mind, the EMCBP is designed to:

- "create a capacity for policy analysis and coordination
- link effective policy analysis with public policy making
- generate reliable economic information
- facilitate the effective and timely implementation of policy measures, and
- closely monitor the performance of the economic and financial management programs"

EMCBP addresses seven macro-economic management functions. These include:

- (1) the macro-economic and financial information function, which must serve the priority requirements of the six remaining functions;
- (2) the strategy planning function, which determines the long- and short-term economic policy objectives of the country and organizes the division of responsibilities between the main policy institutions;
- (3) the public expenditure budgeting and monitoring function, which provides the discipline of controlled and cost-effective public sector management;
- (4) the investment planning and project implementation function, which provides the discipline of controlled and cost-effective public sector management;

- (5) the external resource mobilization function, which includes aid coordination and debt management, and plays an important role in a country where external aid flows still account for close to 50 percent of total public expenditures;
- (6) the private sector development function, which requires not only a stimulating macro-economic incentive environment, but the institutional and attitudinal changes that are essential to generate an appropriate supply response to market signals; and
- (7) the human resource and social development function (health and education), which is now re-emerging as a critically important component of The Gambian policy objectives.

The program is scheduled over a 12-year period, but will be broken into three 4-year phases. Phase one is fully funded and was just recently initiated.

For ease of operationalizing the tasks envisaged under the EMCBP, the program will be characterized by four principal features: (i) long-term in perspective; (ii) evolving in nature; (iii) national in character; and, (iv) both flexible and functional in approach.

The institutions involved in the implementation of the first phase (four years) of the program are:

- The macro-economic policy institutions which comprise the PAU of the Office of the President, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (MFEA) and the Central Bank of The Gambia (CBG)
- The central implementing agencies are the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Employment (TIE) and the National Investment Board (NIB)
- The line ministries will be involved in sectoral policy design and project management capacity building. These are the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), Ministry of Works and Communications (MWC), Ministry of Education (MOE), and the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MHSW).
- The staff support agencies are the Personnel Management Office (PMO) and the Management Development Institute (MDI). PMO will provide program coordination and management advisory services, and MDI will provide training.

In September 1992, a Program Manager was appointed and a Program Support Unit was established at the PMO. The PAU of the Office of the President was assigned the responsibility of the Secretariat of the Interagency Steering Committee (IASC), which is chaired by the Secretary General and head of the Civil Service.

The formation of various functional and inter-agency task forces has been proposed to work on specific tasks.

As training is one of the main building blocks for capacity building and institutional development, it features prominently in the EMCBP. In this regard four different types of training are planned under the EMCBP. These are:

- long-term overseas training (both undergraduate and post-graduate studies) will be provided to Gambians in accordance with priority areas identified in the program
- short-term training overseas for specific individuals in highly specialized skills will be offered
- MDI will run economic management courses, i.e. an introductory program for young graduates and an on-going training program for mid-level professionals (in collaboration with IDEP, MDI will introduce a module on economic management in the PMO-sponsored Management Development Program for professionals)
- skills transfer from Technical Assistance personnel, team work and job rotation are seriously considered as important factors to on-the-job training.

Technical Notes

A publication of USAID's Implementing Policy Change Project

No. 1

October 1991

Strategic Planning and Strategic Management: What are they and how are they different?

By Benjamin L. Crosby

"We are tackling 20-year problems with five-year plans staffed with two-year personnel funded by one-year appropriations."

Harlan Cleveland

Why Strategic Management?

This quotation sums up why today's public sector decision-makers must plan and manage strategically. In the developing world as much as the industrialized nations, the increasingly rapid nature of change as well as a greater openness in the political and economic environments requires a different set of perspectives from that needed during more stable times. When a certain degree of equilibrium existed in the LDCs (as during the 1960s and 70s, with constant positive economic growth, low debt, manageable budgets, and relative political stability), managers could concentrate almost exclusively on the internal dimensions of their organizations and assume a constancy in the external environment. Forward calculations were simple, inputs were predictable, and planning was mostly an arithmetic exercise. Now, systems are much more open, LDCs are characterized by increasingly unstable politics and negative economic growth, budgets are constantly revised, inputs are thoroughly unpredictable, and planning in the traditional sense is no longer possible.

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Despite the need for strategic planning and management, there is a certain degree of confusion regarding these terms. Purposefully or inadvertently, the two terms are often used interchangeably— which then leads to confusion regarding the appropriate usage of each. As shall be pointed out in this note, the distinction between strategic planning and strategic management rests primarily on where one ends the process or the emphasis one puts on particular parts of the process. As might be inferred, strategic planning places more emphasis on the development of the strategic plan and often "assumes" implementation. Strategic management specifically includes and emphasizes implementation. This, of course, does not mean that the planning element is any less important, rather, implementation is regarded as just as important. In the literature, there is little interest in this distinction, however, and quite often, when the term strategic planning is used, it also includes the "management" components of implementation. Likewise, when strategic management is used, it also implies the "planning" components as well.

Contributing to the confusion is the overlap between the two concepts. In practice, it is certainly possible to develop a strategic plan without giving much thought to the actual management of that plan. However, it is probably impossible to manage an organization strategically without having developed a strategic plan. Moreover, both strategic planning and management are iterative processes, so managers will be continuously involved in cycles of strategic planning as they manage policy implementation.

Further contributing to the confusion is that strategic planning and management are more than a set of managerial tools. They constitute a mind-set, an approach to looking at the changes in the internal and external environment that confront the manager. Using planning and management tools strategically, then, involves essentially a way of thinking, a mental framework or approach, as well as a set of analytic tools. For strategic management to be effectively used the manager must develop a strategic mentality or outlook. The problem for the consultant is how to help the manager acquire that mentality.

The Strategic Approach:

The strategic approach or mentality consists of four main elements:

- First, the strategic approach is oriented toward the future. It recognizes that the environment will change. It is a long range orientation, one that tries to anticipate events rather than simply react as they occur. The approach leads the manager to ask where his/her organization wants to be after a certain period, what it will need to get where it wants, and how to develop strategies and the means to get there, and finally, how to manage those strategies to achieve the organization's goals and objectives. It recognizes that the future cannot be controlled, but argues that by anticipating the future, organizations can help to shape and modify the impact of environmental change.
- Second, the strategic approach has an external emphasis. It takes into account several components of the external environment, including technology, politics, economics and the social dimension. Strategic thinking recognizes that each of these can either constrain or facilitate an organization as it seeks to implement policy. Politics will determine the policies that are to be implemented, economics will determine the organization's level of resources, and social factors might well determine who the organization's beneficiaries will be. In particular, strategic thinking recognizes and emphatically takes into account politics and the exercise of political authority. Managers are not free to do anything they decide. Managers must be

sensitive to the needs of and respond to demands of constituents over whom they have little or no control. Among those constituents, political actors are perhaps the most important.

- Third, the strategic approach concentrates on assuring a good fit between the environment and the organization (including its mission and objectives, strategies, structures, and resources) and attempts to anticipate what will be required to assure continued fit. Under conditions of rapid political, economic and social change, strategies can quickly become outmoded or no longer serve useful purposes; or the resources traditionally required by the organization to produce its goods and services may suddenly become unavailable. The strategic approach recognizes that to maintain a close fit with the environment, the different elements of the organization will need to be continuously re-assessed and modified as the environment evolves.
- Finally, the strategic approach is a process. It is continuous and recognizes the need to be open to changing goals and activities in light of shifting circumstances within the environment. It is a process that requires monitoring and review mechanisms capable of feeding information to managers continuously. Strategic management or planning are not one-shot approaches, they are ongoing.

When all taken together, these attitudes and behaviors are really a way of approaching or thinking about how to manage or how to implement policy change. Strategic management (or planning) is not something that can be applied only once and then forgotten about or ignored. In that sense it is more than a tool; it is a mental framework.

The Strategic Management Process:

What does a strategic management process look like? The approach described below is suggested as a guide:

1. Agreement on and initiation of the strategic management process.

IPC Technical Notes is a publication of the United States Agency for International Development's Implementing Policy Change Project, which is managed by the Agency's Bureau of Research and Development, Office of Economic & Institutional Development.

The project's contractor team consists of Management Systems International (prime contractor); the International Development Management Center at the University of Maryland; Abt Associates Inc.; and Development Alternatives. The IPC Project Office is located at MSI, 600 Water Street, SW; Washington, D.C. 20024. Telephone: (202) 484-7170; fax: (202) 488-0754.

2. Identification and clarification of the organization's mission, objectives, and current strategies.
3. Identification of the organization's internal strengths and weaknesses.
4. Assessment of the threats and opportunities from the external environment.
5. Identification of key constituents/ stakeholders and their expectations.
6. Identification of the key strategic issues confronting the organization.
7. Design/analysis/selection of strategy alternatives and options to manage issues identified in step 6.
8. Implementation of strategy.
9. Monitoring and review of the strategy's performance.

There is much similarity in the approach described here and that of others (see Appendix One for a description of three). If one were to stop after Step number 7, the process would be simply a strategic planning exercise. Frequently, this is exactly where the process does stop, especially when management and the strategic planning functions have been de-linked. This occurs when there is no attempt to develop a strategic mentality among line management; instead, the organization attempts to set up a special department, division, or "guru" for strategic planning rather than integrate the functions into normal line management. Without the expressed linkage it is often difficult for the line manager to see the value of the strategic plan, and there will therefore be less interest and incentive in strategically managing. In contrast, if the strategic approach is employed, or the organization is imbued with a strategic mentality, then strategic planning will be done as part of the course of normal (strategic) management functions.

Step One: Agreement on the process. The first step in the strategic management process is to get agreement—not only to carry out the process but also to get agreement on how and when and by whom it will be carried out. Since the strategic management process is not a one-shot exercise, commitment to the longhaul is vital: without commitment, the exercise will be sterile and likely regarded as a waste of time.

Who should be included in the strategic management process? At least three different types of individuals should be considered for inclusion: the organization's top decision-makers and those officials who will have direct responsibility in implementation of policy; those who have a major stake in the outcome of the policy, whether from within or outside the organization, whether supportive or oppositional, clients or resource suppliers; and those with specialized knowledge that can add to the analysis of the policy to be decided or implemented. Although relatively broad involvement in the process should be encouraged, care must be taken that such groups not be expanded to the point of incapacity to make agile decisions.

How should the process be initiated? First, agreement to carry out and commitment to the process of strategic management must be obtained from one or more of the organization's key decisionmakers. Once such agreement and commitment is accomplished, then decisions about what should be considered and who should be involved can be addressed. If issues are complex and there is a need to involve a relatively wide spectrum of actors and stakeholders, then workshops might be considered. If the issues are less complex or fewer actors need to be involved, then direct consultations or small group arrangements might prove more efficient.

Step Two: Identification and clarification of the organization's mission, objectives and current strategies. Once an organization has agreed to engage in a strategic process, the first task is to determine what and where the organization is. What are the needs that the organization attempts to satisfy, whose needs are they, and what is the value of satisfying those needs? All too often organizations develop a service or a product and then fail to periodically examine whether or not that product actually satisfies a demand or whether satisfaction of that demand actually matters. Who are the people that compose the organization, what are their values, and what needs does the organization satisfy for them? (In resource-poor environments, agencies that satisfy only marginal or peripheral demands are vulnerable to budget cuts, abolishment, or absorption by other organizations.) What are the objectives of the organization and how well do they mesh with the needs and demands of clients, stakeholders and constituents? What strategies does the organization employ to achieve the objectives it has set for itself? Is the organization being asked to make fundamental changes in what it does, or in the kinds of clients it benefits? If so, what are those changes?

At this point, Louise White, whose framework is incorporated in the IPC project paper, argues that the policy in question should be examined with respect to its compatibility with the organization's mission, objectives and strategy. To accomplish this it is necessary to state the objectives of the policy, the nature of the service or activity intended, the benefits to be produced and the beneficiaries, and describe the complexity of the policy. (White, 1989.)

Clarification of the mission, objectives, and strategies is fundamental to initiation of the strategic process. It amounts to a statement of where the organization is, what it does and how it goes about its business. It should also help clarify which policies or demands can be facilitated by the organization and which will be impeded.

Step Three: Identification of the organization's internal strengths and weaknesses. One way to examine these is to look at the organization's resource base (skill base, capital or financial resources, etc.) Does the organization have the wherewithal to achieve its stated objectives or to put into motion its strategies? What are the levels of internal resources possessed by the organization? How available are they?

Analysis of resources by itself is not sufficient, the organization must also look at its task performance. What tasks does it do well, which does it not? This will give a better idea of how the organization's resources are organized and how effectively those resources are put to use. An organization may well have excellent research skills, but if its primary tasks are in service delivery, then such skills may be more a weakness than a strength. However, one should not automatically make the assumption that since idle capacity exists, it should be dispensed with. Such skills may well be quite useful if the organization should need to make changes in order to be more compatible with its environment.

In addition to skills and resources, other elements of the internal organization need to be examined: what is the nature of the organizational climate (are there cleavages, are they conflictive?), how adaptable are the participants (would they readily take on new tasks, how long have they been doing the same thing?), what is the nature and flexibility of the organizational structure (is it rigid, have significant changes been made in the past, and what has been the reaction?), is there an informal structure (how does it work and is it more cogent than the formal structure?), what is the nature of the

incentive structure (is it designed to encourage innovative behavior, can it recruit and maintain a sufficiently high level of personnel?)? Which elements facilitate and which impede performance of the organization's tasks and which might facilitate or impede organizational change?

Step Four: Assessment of threats and opportunities in the external environment. While there is frequently a tendency on the part of managers to focus on the internal dimensions of the organization, policy change and the often volatile nature of politics in countries undergoing major policy changes requires conscious exploration of the environment outside the organization.

Political, economic, social, and technological changes will influence the direction and shape of an organization's policies and objectives. What are the major trends that can be detected in each of these areas that will have some bearing on the activities of the organization? How might macro-economic measures being instituted affect the financial resources of the organization? What is the nature of political support for the policy under consideration? How politically stable is the current regime? Is policy leadership about to change? Will key officials within the cabinet be changed and what will that mean to the development and implementation of the proposed policy change? To what extent have the government's primary political coalitions begun to change? Does this signify impending changes in policy priorities? How effective is the political opposition? What role do international forces or actors play in the determination of policy? To what extent has the social composition of the organization's primary clientele group changed? Has it outgrown the resources of the organization? Have its needs changed over the years?

An important factor in the organization's external environment is its bureaucratic and institutional setting. Is the organization autonomous? Or is it linked to a ministry, or must it coordinate its actions with other entities and what is the nature of those mechanisms? Are other organizations involved in the same activity, what are their roles? Are there incentives for cooperation?

Step Five: Identification of key constituents and stakeholders, their expectations and resources. The expectations and demands of constituents are key ingredients for decisions about what an organization will do and how it goes about carrying out its tasks. Stakeholders or constituents are those who have a direct

interest in and are capable of influencing in some measure the outcomes or actions of the organization. Stakeholders provide the primary base of political support for the organization, and in a significant way are its *raison d'être*. A rather wide range of actors might be included: competitors, beneficiaries, directors, employees, political parties, consumers, international donors, etc. What do these particular groups want from the organization? Are they satisfied with the current array of services and level of performance? Are their interests shifting? In which direction? And if so, will the organization be able to react favorably?

In examining the interests of stakeholders, a cautionary note is in order. There can be a temptation to try to consider every actor who might have some interest or influence in the organization. That temptation ought to be avoided and the analyst should take care to assure that only those that can have a realistic and reasonably significant impact are considered in the stakeholder analysis.

Step Six: Identification of key strategic issues. The information generated by the preceding steps should identify a set of fundamental questions or key problems regarding the fit of the organization with its environment. These problems might concern the organization's mission, its products or services, its clients, financing mechanisms, management, or relationship to certain stakeholders. Strategic issues are the principal problems that must be dealt with effectively or the organization can expect undesirable results. The effective treatment of strategic issues can signify fundamental change in how the organization goes about its business. Such issues may generate conflict within the organization since their resolution will produce winners and losers both internally and externally. The organization must be prepared to deal with that conflict.

In identifying strategic issues or problems, care must be taken in specifying exactly what the problem or issue is, why it is a problem for the organization, and the organizational consequences of inaction. All too often insufficient attention is given to problem identification resulting in misallocated resources and lost opportunities. It is also important to determine whether or not the organization can do anything about the problem—if not, it is not an issue. Managers must also recognize that it will be impossible to tackle all issues at once; therefore, problems should be identified according to short-, medium- or long-run importance

and the urgency of action needed. Managers will find that energy expended in problem and issue identification and clarification will have payoffs in the development of strategies for their treatment.

Step Seven: Design, analysis, and selection of strategy alternatives and options to manage issues identified in Step 6. Once issues and problems have been identified, strategies to solve those problems need to be identified. Generally, more than one option for dealing with the problem will be identified; then options must be examined for their comparative viability, feasibility, and desirability. Can the strategy work from a practical as well as theoretical stance? Is the organization capable of carrying out the strategy? Is the strategy acceptable to those carrying it out and those to whom it is directed? Does the organization have the human and material resources, does it have the know-how necessary, and is the appropriate organizational structure available for implementing the strategy? Will the strategy accomplish what the manager wants and benefit those intended? Can the strategy be sustained, and can it adapt to the projected changes in the environment? Is flexibility built into the strategy? Can the necessary resource base be sustained over the life of the strategy?

Desirability has to do with the fit of organizational and environmental values and objectives with the strategy. Is the strategy compatible with the implementing institution's mission or its fundamental objectives, and/or with the mission and objectives of collaborating organizations? Is the strategy targeted to the most appropriate beneficiaries? Is it compatible with the legal and bureaucratic setting? How well will the strategy adjust to forecast trends—in the medium and in the long term? How will key stakeholders be affected, how compatible is the strategy with their values and expectations?

Step Eight: Implementation of the strategy.

Implementation of a strategy is not an automatic process; there are two major parts to the process. The first step is the development of an action plan, which is a statement of what, who, when, and how the actions necessary to carry out the strategy will be done. Performance goals and objectives will also be specified. Much of the information needed to develop the action plan will have been generated in Step Seven.

The second part of implementation consists of actions aimed at marshalling and applying resources. In the context of policy change these actions may consist of

(but are not limited to), changes in organizational structures, shifts and reclassification of personnel, the establishment of new routines, tasks, and procedures; installation of new incentive systems; retooling production for new products or services; marketing of new services or creation of demand among new beneficiaries or consumers; development of new financing mechanisms; organizing coalitions to maintain political, budgetary, and beneficiary support; and developing collaborative mechanisms with cooperating organizations. It should be noted that the managers' task is more than just the internal operation of his organization, they must also manage its fit with the environment.

Step Nine: Monitoring and review of performance. Strategic management assumes continual change. Therefore mechanisms must be developed for monitoring

and analyzing the performance of the organization with respect to achieving the goals and objectives set in the action plan. As the environment undergoes changes, as ministers change, elections occur, or budgets go up or down, priorities will also change. Resource flows may be uneven. All of these elements can alter performance, priorities, and the desirability of certain policies. If the organization wants to maintain a good "fit" with the environment, it must first be able to track these changes in order to adjust.

The monitoring process should be continuous, regular, and capable of feeding into the decision-making process. The manager should develop control mechanisms to gauge the efficiency of resources used and impact mechanisms to gauge the effectiveness of its actions. Finally, it is vital that the monitoring process be timely and usable.

APPENDIX

Different Approaches to Strategic Planning and Management

Much attention in the literature has been devoted to strategic management and strategic planning—but with most emphasis on the private sector. Nevertheless, in the last several years, there has been a growing interest and literature (eg., Ring and Perry, 1985, and Samuel Paul, 1983) on applications in the public sector. Three recent approaches are briefly described in this appendix.

Two recent books on strategic planning and strategic public management illustrate the overlap between the two concepts. Each develops a strategic "process" consisting of several steps. Drawing on Nutt and Backoff (1987), Bozeman and Straussman (1990) outline six steps for putting strategic management to work. These steps amount to a basic framework for strategic management:

1. **Dealing with history:** an analysis of the history of the organization, its mission and its mandate.
2. **Stock Taking:** an evaluation of the organization's current internal financial, organizational, and human resources.

3. **Evaluating Issues:** identification of the significant issues that will affect the performance or capacity of the organization.
4. **Developing Strategies:** development of strategic alternatives to respond to and manage the issues identified.
5. **Assessing Feasibility:** evaluation of the capacity of the organization to carry out the strategic alternative within the context.
6. **Implementation:** the actual carrying out of the strategy selected.

It is easy to recognize several parallels between Bozeman and Straussman and the eight-step process for strategic planning laid out by John Bryson (1988):

1. Initiating and agreeing on a strategic planning process.
2. Identifying organizational mandates.
3. Clarifying organization mission and values.

4. Assessing the external environment: opportunities and threats.
5. Assessing the internal environment: strengths and weaknesses.
6. Identifying the strategic issues facing an organization.
7. Formulating strategies to manage the issues.
8. Establishing an effective organizational vision for the future.

Louise White (1989) establishes a slightly shorter but similar strategic process:

Step 1. Agree on a process for developing an implementation strategy.

Step 2. Map or assess the situation (this includes analysis of the external and internal environments, the content of the policy, and stakeholder expectations and resources).

Step 3. Identify the strategic issues.

Step 4. Design an implementation strategy.

Step 5. Design a process for monitoring results and making ongoing adjustments.

Where do these "processes" differ? It is really only at the ends of each process? Bryson concludes with the formulation of strategies and the establishment of an effective organizational vision for the future: Bozeman and Straussman conclude the process with implementation of the strategies formulated. Planners in Bryson's model, are not directly responsible for the implementation of what they have planned, except insofar as those same persons also will be tasked with implementation (not all organizations can readily separate the planning and management functions.) But in all fairness, Bryson is adamant in insisting that the alternatives developed to cope with strategic issues be both workable and acceptable. Assuring that could well be considered tantamount to implementation.

White, on the other hand, goes further than either of the other two. Whereas Bozeman and Straussman end with "implementation," White concludes her model of strategic management with suggestions for the development of mechanisms for monitoring to feed the ongoing process of adjustment and corrections. This

last step is a vital one, and deserves emphasis. The LDCs undergoing adjustment tend to be characterized by environmental volatility—to assume that a single strategy is not subject to either revision or modification (and often rather extreme revision or modification) would be shortsighted. Therefore, mechanisms to monitor the organization's continuing fit with the environment as well as progress toward objectives are critical.

Another difference lies in each's treatment of the external environment. White and Bryson put considerable specific emphasis on the environment in the steps they describe as part of the strategic process. Bozeman and Straussman certainly recognize the importance of the external environment as can be seen in the following excerpts from their work:

One purpose of strategic management is to mediate between the organization and the environment.

Public management necessarily requires attention to the organization's environment because the influence of external political authority emanates from the environment. For this reason, effective public management requires attention to strategy . . . an external perspective emphasizing not adapting to the environment but anticipating and shaping of environmental change. Strategic public management adds an additional ingredient: strategic thinking must be cognizant of the exercise of political authority.

However, unlike either White or Bryson, Bozeman and Straussman do not describe a specific step for analysis of the external environment within their recommended framework. Analysis of the environment is left as an implicit task. The danger of this approach is that such analysis might simply be overlooked as being too hard to do or as being too tenuous to add anything. Given the impact of the environment on public organizations, explicit and direct analysis is imperative.

Not surprisingly, the fact that both approaches employ the term "strategic" gives the two a great deal in common. Strategy, or the strategic outlook signifies a forward looking mentality. Strategy does not concern the past except for the lessons and input that can be extracted from past experience. Strategy concerns the future, and to the extent that the future is unknown, the greater its uncertainty. Tasks that concern the very short run are generally not grist for the strategic mill. The further the horizon of time involved in the task, the greater the level of uncertainty. Inasmuch as strategy involves the future, and particularly the mid-to long-run future, uncertainty then becomes a part of the strategic