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**PAKISTAN ELECTIONS:  
FOUNDATION  
FOR DEMOCRACY**

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**INTERNATIONAL DELEGATION REPORT**

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# INTERNATIONAL DELEGATION TO PAKISTAN ELECTIONS

November 1988

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The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) conducts nonpartisan political development programs overseas. By working with political parties and other institutions, NDI seeks to promote, maintain and strengthen democratic institutions and pluralistic values in new and emerging democracies. NDI has conducted a series of democratic development programs in nearly 30 countries, including Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Chile, Haiti, Nicaragua, Northern Ireland, Pakistan, Panama, the Philippines, Senegal, South Korea, Taiwan and Uruguay.

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements .....	iii
Executive Summary .....	1
Introduction .....	5
<b>Chapters</b>	
1. NDI Activities in Pakistan .....	7
2. The Setting for the Elections .....	13
3. The Legal and Administrative Electoral Framework ...	22
4. The Political Campaign .....	29
5. Voting and Counting .....	35
6. The Results .....	49
7. The Election Aftermath .....	54
8. Reflections .....	56
 <b>Appendices</b>	
I. Members of Previous NDI Pakistan Delegations .....	60
II. Pakistan in Transition: The 1988 Elections Report of Survey Delegation .....	61
III. Delegation Terms of Reference .....	66
IV. Statement of J. Brian Atwood November 14, 1988 .....	69
V. Newspaper coverage following press conference .....	72
VI. International Delegation to Pakistan National Assembly Elections .....	79
VII. Pakistan International Delegation Team Meetings .....	80
VIII. Statement of International Observer Delegation .....	82
IX. Newspaper coverage following elections .....	85
X. Party Symbols Allocated by Election Commission .....	88
XI. Sample ballot and stamp .....	90
XII. Results by party and region .....	91
XIII. Statistical Analysis of Alleged Problem Districts in the Punjab .....	93
XIV. Statistical Analysis of 1985 and 1988 Voter Turnout ...	97

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## *ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS*

This is the report of the 22-member international delegation that observed the November 1988 elections in Pakistan. The report is based on information gathered by five teams that visited the different provinces of Pakistan on November 16 and by a smaller team that remained in Pakistan for the November 19 Provincial Assemblies elections.

The report also describes the historical context for the elections, Pakistan's constitutional framework and the election campaign. A review of events in the month following the elections, including the designation of Benazir Bhutto as prime minister and the election of Ghulam Ishaq Khan as president for a full five-year term, and the delegation's reflections on the significance of the elections for Pakistan and the international community are included in the closing chapters of the report.

The report was prepared under the auspices of the sponsoring organization, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), after consultations with members of the delegation. While these consultations indicate a consensus for the conclusions reached herein, NDI assumes full responsibility for the accuracy of the report.

NDI Senior Consultant Larry Garber drafted the report with the considerable assistance of other delegation members. The first chapters are based on information contained in the NDI Election Survey Delegation Report prepared by Patricia Keefer and Stephen Del Rosso. The team reports, included in Chapter 5 C., were prepared by Lovida Coleman, Thomas Susman, Stephen Del Rosso, Sean Carroll and Thomas Melia.

The statistical analysis of the voter turnout and the impact of the ID card requirement contained in Chapter 6 C. and in Appendices XIII and XIV was prepared by Lee Feldman, president of Global Analysis, Inc.

The Institute thanks all those who participated in the preliminary survey and the election observer missions for their valuable contributions. The overall effort was enhanced by the considerable assistance provided by the office of Pakistan's Secretary of the Senate and by the U.S. missions in Pakistan. Also deserving thanks for their efforts in ensuring the prompt publication of this report are NDI staff Sue Grabowski, Geoffrey Allen and Thomas Williford.

This report adds to the growing body of literature seeking to explain the essential elements of achieving democratic self-rule. NDI believes that the events comprising the Pakistan election process are of great significance to those who seek to promote peaceful democratic change.

*January 1989*

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A 22-member international delegation, organized by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, observed the November 16 National Assembly elections in Pakistan. These elections had been scheduled in July, following the dismissal of the government and the dissolution of the National Assembly by the late President Zia ul-Haq in May 1988. When Senate Chairman Ghulam Ishaq Khan became acting president at the time of Zia's death, he reconfirmed the election date and committed the new government to a peaceful transition.

The elections occurred in a country that has struggled to establish a democratic government since achieving independence in 1947, alternating brief periods of civilian rule with extended periods of military rule. Recent events in the country -- including the death of President Zia, severe floods in the Punjab and continued ethnic violence -- raised questions as to whether the elections would be postponed and, if they occurred, whether they would be conducted in a fair and peaceful manner.

These fears, however, were not realized. The November 16 elections were an historic event for the citizens of Pakistan. They were conducted in a relatively fair and orderly manner, with the *Pakistan People's Party (PPP)* emerging as the leading party, winning 93 of the 215 contested National Assembly seats. The government coalition, meanwhile, won only 55 National Assembly seats and three of its four leading figures lost their respective contests.

Within two weeks of the elections, Acting President Ghulam Ishaq Khan designated *PPP* leader Benazir Bhutto as

Pakistan's new prime minister. Bhutto thereafter obtained an overwhelming vote of confidence from the National Assembly and Ghulam Ishaq Khan was elected for a full term as president. These events -- the pre-election period, the elections itself, and the smooth post-election transition -- bode well for the establishment of a stable democracy in Pakistan.

The following are the delegation's summary conclusions concerning certain specific aspects of the elections process:

1. The actions of Acting President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Army Chief-of-Staff General Mirza Baig, Chief Election Commissioner Syed Nusrat Ali, and the justices of the Supreme Court and their respective colleagues in the government and military, on the Election Commissions and throughout the judicial system contributed to and ensured the integrity of the constitutional and electoral processes.
2. The electoral laws and regulations used in these elections compared favorably with those of democratic countries around the world, and they provided the necessary confidence to ensure the participation of all prospective candidates, and to secure broad respect for the results, among both the contestants and the Pakistan people.
3. The election campaign was conducted in a peaceful manner, with no significant restrictions on the ability of parties and candidates to communicate their respective messages to prospective voters. Although none of the contesting parties were afforded access to the government-controlled television and radio media, the parties used a variety of other means to disseminate their messages. Some candidates, however, were able to obtain access to television and radio by virtue of their positions as government officials.

4. On election day, local election officials generally conducted themselves in accordance with the prescribed laws and regulations, and the few irregularities observed did not appear to be intended to affect the outcome in a partisan manner.
5. Each voter generally was provided an opportunity to cast a secret ballot and did not appear to be subject to direct intimidation in casting his or her ballot.
6. The political parties and independent candidates helped ensure the integrity of the elections by monitoring all phases of the balloting and counting processes.
7. Based on a statistical comparison of the 1985 and 1988 elections results, there is no evidence that the identification (ID) card requirement or the low, even by Pakistan standards, 42 percent turnout, affected any one party disproportionately. Pakistan political leaders and election officials, however, should consider developing appropriate programs to improve the quality of the voter rolls, to ensure the distribution of ID cards to all eligible voters, and to encourage voter participation in future elections.
8. The importance of respecting the constitution and the rule of law are values that must be further inculcated amongst the elite as well as the general population if democracy is to thrive in Pakistan.

Pakistan's political leaders -- those in the current *PPP* government and those representing parties in opposition -- must now work to consolidate democratic government. Institutions that contribute to the resilience of a free society -- such as an accountable government, vibrant political parties, an independent judiciary, a vigilant media, democratic trade unions and a nonpartisan military -- must be nurtured and supported.

The new Pakistan government, led by Prime Minister Bhutto, has vowed to strengthen the nascent democratic system, and in this endeavor she has the support of democrats around the world. Her government, however, faces several immediate challenges that would test the capacity of any new democracy. These include: a difficult economic situation; the war in Afghanistan and its implications for Pakistan; the continuing conflicts with India; the diffusion of power among political parties at the national and provincial levels; the reconciliation of Islamic fundamentalism with secular society; ethnic strife within and between provinces; and a growing drug problem. Notwithstanding these challenges, given the developments of the past few months, there now exists a sense of optimism that these challenges will be met in a constructive manner. Meanwhile, there is much that other countries can learn from the recent Pakistan experience.

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## INTRODUCTION

On November 16, 1988, more than 20 million Pakistanis voted in the country's first party-based elections since 1977. The elections for 215 National Assembly members were conducted in an orderly and peaceful manner. Although no party won a majority of the seats, the *Pakistan People's Party (PPP)*, led by Benazir Bhutto, emerged as the leading party, winning 93 seats. Its chief rival, the *Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI)* -- also known as the *Islamic Democratic Alliance* -- an electoral alliance of nine parties formed in October 1988 -- won 55 seats. Sixty-seven seats were won by candidates representing smaller parties and by independents.

Three days later, on November 19, Pakistanis again went to the polls, this time to elect members of the four Provincial Assemblies. As was the case in the earlier elections, the process was orderly and only minor problems were reported, most of which were resolved or clarified upon close examination. The results, however, were even less clear-cut, since no party received a majority in three of the four provinces.

Within two weeks of the elections, on December 2, Acting President Ghulam Ishaq Khan named Benazir Bhutto as prime minister. On December 12, Ghulam Ishaq Khan was elected president by the electoral college, which is comprised of the National Assembly, Senate and four Provincial Assemblies. The same day, Prime Minister Bhutto obtained a vote of confidence from the National Assembly, with many independents and small parties supporting her.

The November elections, the subsequent formation of a government, and the election of a president are the culmination of a series of significant, recent events, beginning May 29, 1988 with the dismissal of the government by the late President Zia ul-Haq. On August 17, President Zia and several senior military officials died in the crash of their military transport plane. Zia's death was followed by an orderly and constitutional transfer of power, with Ghulam Ishaq Khan, as chairman of the Senate, becoming acting president. Meanwhile, during this period, the Supreme Court emerged as a significant and apparently independent force on the Pakistan political scene, handing down timely decisions in several politically sensitive cases. Catastrophic floods in Punjab Province during September 1988 and ethnic clashes in Sind Province in October provided further backdrop for the elections.

This report seeks to place these events in perspective. The first section of the report discusses NDI's activities in Pakistan since 1986. A brief historical and constitutional overview is followed by sections describing the election process and the election campaign. The fifth section reports the election day observations of the NDI teams that visited the federal capital of Islamabad and the four provincial capitals -- Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar and Quetta -- and their respective environs. Subsequent sections discuss the results and election aftermath, and offer some reflections on the significance of these elections for Pakistan and, more generally, for the international community.

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## *Chapter 1*

### *NDI ACTIVITIES IN PAKISTAN*

In early 1986, a year after the cessation of martial law, NDI was approached by several Pakistanis representing different political perspectives. They urged NDI to develop a program that would support a democratic transition in their country. In response, NDI examined the political developments in Pakistan since independence in 1947. This was followed by three NDI-sponsored fact-finding missions to determine the interest and commitment of the major political actors in Pakistan toward establishing a democratically-elected civilian government. In addition, the viability of political parties and the role that they would play in contesting elections were closely examined. The November 1987 mission, which coincided with the Local Bodies elections, evaluated in particular the administrative procedures used for the conduct of Pakistan elections. (Appendix I contains the names of the participants in these missions.)

As a consequence of the 1987 missions, NDI decided to sponsor a series of seminars that would have permitted Pakistanis to consider the experiences of other countries in charting transitions to democracy. The first seminar was scheduled for September 1988 and would have addressed the role of political parties, the government, the press, the military and the courts in the transition process. However, the seminar was postponed when President Zia ul-Haq dismissed the government and dissolved the National and Provincial Assemblies in May 1988. In July, Zia announced that elections for the National and Provincial Assemblies would be held on November 16 and 19, respectively.

### **A. The October 1988 Survey Mission**

From October 10-18, 1988, a six-member bipartisan delegation visited Pakistan to evaluate the legal and administrative procedures for the November elections to the National and Provincial Assemblies, and to assess the feasibility of an NDI-sponsored international observer delegation for the elections. President Zia's sudden death in August had intensified interest in these elections. The potential significance of the elections increased further following a Supreme Court decision in October declaring unconstitutional the proscription on party-based elections.

The survey team included four regional and electoral experts: Graeme Bannerman, president, Bannerman and Associates, Inc., and former staff director of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Verne Newton, international consultant and former special assistant to the administrator of the Agency for International Development; William Oldaker, partner, Manatt, Phelps, Rothenberg, and Evans, and former counsel to the U.S. Federal Election Commission; and Casimir Yost, executive director, World Affairs Council of Northern California and former professional staff member, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The team was accompanied by NDI Senior Consultant Patricia Keefer and Program Coordinator Stephen Del Rosso.

Following its return from Pakistan, the team prepared an extensive report that was released on November 3, and later served to brief the international observer delegation. The report provided a generally favorable assessment of the legal framework and administrative preparations for the elections. The Executive Summary stated that a "comprehensive framework for procedurally correct elections has been devised" and noted that "irregularities -- such as intimidation of voters, multiple vote casting, last minute movement of polling places, ballot stuffing and fraud during the counting phase -- can be detected by Pakistanis monitoring the process." The report further noted "that most Pakistanis are prepared to accept the results of the elections, regardless of their outcome, assuming they are

conducted in a free and fair manner, and ... that the elections provide an opportunity for democracy in Pakistan to move forward."

In view of these findings, the team concluded that "an international delegation would serve the interests of Pakistan and the community of democratic nations by underscoring the vital role a credible election process can play in bringing about a stable transition to a democratic government." The presence of such a delegation was endorsed by most of the individuals with whom the survey team met. These individuals viewed an observer mission as a demonstration of support for democratic forces in Pakistan at a critical time in the country's history. (Appendix II contains the report's Executive Summary).

The team recommended that some form of invitation or welcome should be secured from the Pakistan government or electoral authorities before NDI proceeded to organize an international delegation. The team also recommended that, given the possibility of violence on election day, NDI obtain assurances from the government that it would provide security for the delegation.

Responding to NDI's interest in organizing an international delegation, some Pakistan government officials expressed concern that the delegation would be perceived as intervening in Pakistan's internal affairs. NDI allayed these fears by assuring the government that it would abide by Pakistan laws, would not interfere in the electoral process and would report, in an objective manner, the perspectives of the Pakistan people on the electoral process to the international community. Nevertheless, as a consequence of the initial official ambivalence over the presence of observer delegations and subsequent bureaucratic delays, NDI did not receive official approval for its plans, nor did the delegates receive their visas, until November 10, the day several delegates were scheduled to depart for Pakistan. However, once approval was received, Pakistan government representatives were very helpful in facilitating the activities of the delegation.

## **B. The International Observer Delegation**

Twenty-two individuals from five countries participated in the delegation. NDI President Brian Atwood and Ruairi Quinn, T.D., a member of the Irish parliament, served as the delegation's co-leaders. The United States component of the delegation was bipartisan and the delegation included nationals of three predominately Moslem countries: Malaysia, Tunisia and Turkey.

Prior to their arrival in Pakistan, the delegates received a briefing book containing the terms of reference for the delegation (Appendix III), the survey team's report and other materials pertaining to the current political situation in Pakistan. Several NDI staff members arrived in Pakistan during the week of November 7 to make arrangements for the delegation.

The program for the delegation began on Sunday, November 13. That morning, Colonel Abdul Qayum, special secretary at the Ministry of Information, briefed the delegation. For lunch, the secretary of the Pakistan Senate hosted the entire delegation. Among those present were several senators and Minister of Justice and Parliamentary Affairs Wasim Sajjad.

On Sunday afternoon, NDI staff and consultants briefed the delegation on recent political developments in Pakistan and on the role of international observers. Two of the delegation's advisors, Peter Galbraith and Robert Hathaway, placed the elections in an historical context and reviewed some of the issues that have confronted Pakistan as a society since its establishment in 1947.

The afternoon concluded with presentations by Dr. Ijaz Gilani, chairman of Gallup Pakistan, and Husain Haqqani, a journalist with the *Far Eastern Economic Review*. Gilani reported that a November 11 nationwide poll of male voters conducted by Gallup Pakistan showed the two leading parties in a close battle, with 31 percent of those polled intending to vote for the *III*, 25 percent for the *PPP*, 28 percent for small parties and independents, and 16 percent still undecided. Haqqani described developments during the preceding month,

noting in particular that, unlike previous elections in Pakistan and in the region, the campaign thus far had seen minimal violence.

United States Ambassador Robert Oakley hosted a dinner for the delegation that evening. The dinner also was attended by the ambassadors from several other countries.

The delegation co-leaders (accompanied by NDI Pakistan project director, Patricia Keefer) met the following morning with Acting President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who presented his perspective on the election process. The delegation leaders were impressed with Ghulam Ishaq Khan's commitment to a democratic Pakistan and his familiarity with the details of the electoral process.

Other delegation members were briefed on the election procedures by Syed Nusrat Ali, chief election commissioner. Justice Nusrat expressed considerable pride in the system he and his colleagues had established, describing in detail the reforms adopted by the Election Commission for the upcoming elections (see Chapter 3 *infra*). He also provided the delegates with credentials authorizing their presence inside the polling areas.

Following these meetings, the delegation leaders met with the domestic and international press. In his opening statement, Brian Atwood explained the delegation's role and reiterated the conclusions of the survey team's report. (Appendix IV contains a copy of the statement.) He and Ruairi Quinn then answered questions from the journalists. (Appendix V contains newspaper coverage of this press conference.)

Monday afternoon, the delegation divided into five teams. One team remained in Islamabad, while the other teams dispersed to the four provincial capitals -- Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar and Quetta. (Appendix VI contains the team assignments.) On Tuesday, the teams met with local government and election officials, political party leaders and others actively involved in the electoral process. (Appendix VII contains a list of the individuals each team met prior to the

elections.) Some teams also observed the closing rallies of one or more candidates.

Based on discussions immediately prior to the elections, each team developed a plan for observing Wednesday's National Assembly elections at polling sites within the city limits and in rural areas. In addition to observing the voting process, the teams also observed ballot counting at selected polling sites, and visited the headquarters of the different parties as well as the election commissions where the results were tabulated. The election day activities and observations of the five teams are presented in Chapter 5 C.

On the day after the elections, the delegation reconvened in Karachi for a debriefing and the preparation of a consensus statement. The statement congratulated Pakistanis for their successful conduct of the elections. It concluded by noting that "the rule of law and principle of representative democracy have prevailed in a society where it had been previously suspended. There are no real losers in this election because the people have won the right to choose their government." (Appendix VIII contains a copy of the statement.) On succeeding days, the statement was quoted in several Pakistan newspapers (Appendix IX).

The delegates remaining in Pakistan on Friday had an opportunity to meet with PPP leader Benazir Bhutto at her Karachi party headquarters. Bhutto thanked the NDI delegation for being present to observe the elections, and expressed her hope that the transition would proceed in a peaceful manner.

Five NDI staff members remained in Pakistan to observe the November 19 Provincial Assembly elections in Islamabad, Karachi and Peshawar and their surrounding areas. In these cities and in Lahore, on Monday, November 21, follow-up interviews also were conducted with political party leaders, election officials and other political activists.

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## *Chapter 2*

### *THE SETTING FOR THE ELECTIONS*

#### **A. Pakistan Political History**

Pakistan was created in 1947 following the partition of British India. From 1947 until 1971, this predominantly Moslem country consisted of two distinct regions separated by 1,000 miles, East and West Pakistan, each containing about half the country's population, but with the western half as the dominant partner.

The leaders of the new Pakistan were mainly lawyers, with a strong commitment to parliamentary government. However, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the revered founding father of Pakistan, died in September 1948, only 13 months after independence. The instability that followed Jinnah's death brought frequent partisan realignments and cabinet changes in the central government and in the provinces. As a result, the small but effective bureaucracy, in cooperation with the army, assumed increasing responsibility and power.

The task of framing a constitution was entrusted to a Constituent Assembly that was first elected in 1945 and thereafter reconstituted on an ad hoc basis. The government structure was federal in form with the Constituent Assembly and a governor-general at the center, and with provincial assemblies and governors at the regional levels.

Pakistan's first Constitution -- based heavily on the Westminster system and the Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935 -- was enacted by the Constituent Assembly in 1956. It

declared Pakistan to be an Islamic Republic under a strong president. The national parliament was to comprise one house of 300 members equally representing East and West, regardless of population. Ten seats were reserved for women.

In October 1958, the military intervened. President Mirza, supported by Army Chief-of-Staff General Mohammed Ayub Khan and other officers, banned political parties, abrogated the constitution, and placed the country under martial law. General Ayub Khan became chief martial law administrator. Shortly thereafter, he assumed the presidency. Martial law, at first widely hailed as a necessary but temporary measure, ultimately lasted 44 months.

In 1965, after being elected to a five-year term, Ayub Khan involved the country in an unsuccessful and costly war against India for control of Kashmir. By March 1969, intense political agitation against Ayub Khan forced him to resign. Once again, the armed forces commander-in-chief, now General Yahya Khan, imposed martial law, suspended the Constitution and assumed the presidency.

In 1970, the first national elections since independence were held. The winners were Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's *Pakistan People's Party (PPP)*, which achieved a solid majority in West Pakistan, and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's *Awami League*, which swept to victory in the East.

For years, tension between East and West Pakistan had been growing over inequitable distribution of government resources, with the West receiving the larger share. When Bhutto and other West Pakistani political leaders refused to acknowledge the implications of Sheikh Rahman's complete sweep in the East -- Rahman would have become prime minister -- relations deteriorated even further. In March 1971, fighting broke out between East Pakistan militants and federal troops. As a result, millions of refugees poured into India from East Pakistan. In December 1971, India invaded East Pakistan and helped Mujibur Rahman establish the state of Bangladesh.

Within a month, demonstrations brought on by the defeat in the East drove Yahya Khan from office and Ali Bhutto was installed as president. Bhutto's supporters contend that he renewed Pakistan's sense of national purpose and brought the masses into the political processes for the first time. He experimented with "Islamic socialism," which involved the nationalization of some industries, and promoted his supporters in the upper levels of the military. Although Bhutto remained personally popular throughout his tenure, he encountered difficulties as the economy declined. After several years the nation began to divide over ethnic disputes; Bhutto responded with a crackdown on political opponents and on alleged separatists in Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier Province.

Bhutto enhanced the powers of prime minister under the 1973 Constitution -- the third in 25 years. He then assumed that office, and elections were scheduled for 1977. The *PPP* faced nine opposition parties united in the *Pakistan National Alliance (PNA)*. The campaign was marred by violence and by allegations that *PNA* candidates and their supporters were being intimidated by government officials and *PPP* partisans. The official results revealed what appeared to be an overwhelming victory for the *PPP* -- 155 of the 200 seats in the National Assembly were won by its candidates. However, the *PNA* alleged that the *PPP* was guilty of massive fraud. Soon after the elections, violence broke out in Karachi and other cities. Religious parties opposed to the *PPP* also took to the streets, expanding the protest to an attack on all secular parties.

On July 5, 1977, in response to growing chaos, the army removed Bhutto from power, suspended the Constitution and declared martial law. General Zia ul-Haq, who had been appointed chief of army staff by Bhutto earlier in 1977, became chief martial law administrator. In September, Zia ordered Bhutto arrested for conspiring to murder a political opponent. On March 18, 1978, Bhutto was sentenced to death, the prescribed punishment for murder in Pakistan. After the Supreme Court upheld this verdict, and despite international

appeals to Zia that Bhutto's life be spared, he was hanged on April 4, 1979.

Following non-party Local Bodies Elections in the fall of 1979, Zia scheduled national elections for November. However, it is widely believed that because the *PNA* (which Zia sought to make his personal political vehicle) was in disarray, and because he feared a *PPP* victory, Zia postponed the elections. On October 16, 1979, political parties were banned. Subsequently, the *PPP* and nine other center and left-of-center parties formed the *Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD)*. They were united in their demand that Zia leave office, martial law end, new elections be held, and the 1973 Constitution be restored.

In December 1984, Zia scheduled a referendum in which Pakistanis were asked to approve his program of Islamization. With a 65 percent turnout, the official results indicated that 84 percent favored the program. These results, Zia claimed, were more than just an endorsement of Islamization, but constituted a mandate for him to continue in office as president for another five years. Many Pakistanis, however, questioned the accuracy of the reported results and Zia's interpretation of his mandate.

Zia next announced non-party based elections for the National and Provincial Assemblies to be held in February 1985. A *MRD* boycott failed when it was abandoned by many politicians willing to participate by Zia's rules. The administration of these elections was widely viewed to have been relatively free and fair; consequently, the *MRD* fragmented further.

Following the elections, President Zia chose as prime minister Muhammad Khan Junejo, a veteran *Muslim League* politician who had been elected to the National Assembly from Sind Province. In December 1985, martial law was lifted and the country experienced an increasingly open political environment. New legislation legalizing political parties was promulgated soon thereafter.

Prime Minister Junejo's *Muslim League* registered as a party in February 1986. Many National Assembly members

joined the *League* and it became the *de facto* ruling party. By 1987, there were more than 80 registered and unregistered parties. The *PPP*, now led by Bhutto's daughter, Benazir, refused to register with the Election Commission because of what the party said was the potential for harassment of its members, and the prospect for arbitrary or abusive interpretations of provisions in the Political Parties Act of 1962, which prohibited any party from "propagating any opinion or acting in any manner prejudicial to the Islamic ideology, or the sovereignty, integrity, or security of Pakistan."

On November 30, 1987, Local Bodies elections were again held throughout Pakistan. These were the first elections since the lifting of martial law in 1985, and they were conducted on a non-party basis. Approximately 100,000 seats were contested by nearly three times as many candidates. Turnout was estimated at just over 50 percent.

In the months following these elections, a long-simmering dispute between Zia and Junejo became public. Two issues appear to have pushed it to the breaking point. First, in April 1988 a large munitions dump in Rawalpindi exploded and hundreds were killed. As popular outrage grew, Junejo launched an investigation that was opposed by some senior officers in the army.

The second issue concerned the Afghanistan war and the implementation of the Geneva Accords. Eight years of warfare following the Soviet invasion had caused the flight of approximately three million Afghans from their country to northwest Pakistan. Inevitable resentment grew among Pakistanis in this area, causing some to urge that the refugees be repatriated. Zia's commitment to support the *mujahadeen* and Junejo's interest in stabilizing the domestic situation resulted in strategic differences.

On May 29, 1988, citing corruption in the top levels of government, Zia dismissed Junejo and dissolved the National and Provincial Assemblies. In June, Zia announced that *Shariat* (Islamic law) was the supreme law of Pakistan and that all existing and future laws would be vetted by an Islamic Supreme

Court to ensure their compatibility with the tenets of Islam. In July, he set November 16 and 19, 1988 as the dates for new National and Provincial Assemblies elections.

The country appeared headed for a new round of political confrontations when, on August 17, the C-130 aircraft carrying Zia, his top military commanders and U.S. Ambassador Arnold Raphel crashed soon after takeoff near Bahawalpur. Whatever the cause, nothing could have so dramatically altered Pakistan's political landscape. As the country braced for a possible military takeover, General Mirza Aslam Baig, Zia's deputy and the new chief of army staff, endorsed the constitutional succession process, and the chairman of the Senate, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, became acting president, as provided in the Constitution.

Both Acting President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and General Baig quickly affirmed their intentions to proceed with the National Assembly elections on November 16, as previously scheduled. Neither the severe floods that devastated the Punjab Province in mid-September nor violent and fatal clashes between ethnic groups in Sind Province were used by the government as excuses to postpone the elections. At the same time, many Pakistanis remained apprehensive that, as had occurred in the past, some excuse would be found to postpone the elections, even at the very last moment.

## **B. Constitution and Government**

As discussed previously, the current Constitution of Pakistan was adopted in 1973. It was suspended in 1977 by General Zia under the proclamation of martial law. The 1973 Constitution was reinstated with several significant amendments in 1985. These amendments, among other matters, substantially increased the powers of the president to what they had been in previous constitutions; the changes remain the subject of considerable controversy.

The 1973 Constitution establishes a federal form of parliamentary government with a president, a prime minister, and a parliament consisting of two houses. The president appoints the prime minister, and, "with the advice of the prime

minister," the chiefs of the armed forces, judges, and cabinet members. He also can veto bills, although the veto can be overridden by the parliament, and he can dissolve the National Assembly, the lower house, upon the advice of the prime minister. Notwithstanding the president's broad powers under the constitution, it is the prime minister who is responsible for the administration of the government.

The federal parliament consists of the 237-member National Assembly and the 87-member Senate. Senators are elected indirectly by Provincial Assemblies for six-year terms. Two hundred and seven National Assembly members are directly elected from single-member constituencies under a first-past-the-post system. Ten members, representing the various non-Moslem communities, are elected under a nationwide at-large system; and the remaining 20 seats are reserved for women, who are selected by the political parties based on a proportion of each party's representation in the four Provincial Assemblies. With the exception of "money bills," over which the National Assembly has exclusive legislative authority, the Senate maintains the same general legislative powers as the National Assembly.

Under the Constitution, the president chooses as prime minister the National Assembly member "most likely to command the confidence of the majority of the National Assembly." The individual selected must survive a vote of confidence within 60 days of being designated. Within 30 days of National Assembly elections, both houses of the parliament and the Provincial Assemblies convene as an electoral college to elect a president.

Pakistan's four provinces evidence considerable political, ethnic and cultural diversity. The Punjab, which contains over 60 percent of Pakistan's population, traditionally has provided the leadership of the military and the civil service. The Sind, meanwhile, with approximately 25 percent of the population has become Pakistan's most agriculturally rich and economically developed province. Baluchistan -- encompassing more than half of Pakistan's land area -- and the Northwest Frontier are

significantly less populated, have fewer developed resources, and are economically underdeveloped. The four provinces each have a popularly elected assembly from which a federally-appointed governor chooses a chief minister to administer the provincial government.

The country's basic administrative structure has remained virtually unchanged since the pre-independence period, despite the constitutional upheavals, and changes at the national and provincial levels. Provinces are subdivided into regions, districts, and *tahsils* (district subdivisions). They are run by a hierarchy of administrators, such as a division commissioner, a deputy commissioner (or district officer), and a subdivision magistrate, or *tansildar*, at the *tahsil* level -- all responsible to the provincial government.

In addition to providing a framework for the government, the 1973 Constitution recognizes certain fundamental rights. The Supreme Court and other courts play a significant role in protecting these rights. It is testimony to the integrity and independence of most judges that, despite the pressures exerted on the judiciary during the Zia era, including challenges from the military and religious courts, the Supreme Court of Pakistan and the High Courts of the Provinces still are held in relatively high esteem throughout the country.

With the lifting of martial law in 1985, the Supreme Court regained some of its authority to make decisions on controversial and politically significant matters. By the summer of 1988, prior to the death of President Zia, the Court had entered a new, activist phase. This was evident by its decision, in a case brought by PPP leader Benazir Bhutto, declaring unconstitutional that section of the Political Parties Act requiring political parties to register with the government. The Court ruling recognized the fundamental right of the Pakistan people to organize political parties.

On October 3, 1988, the Supreme Court ruled on a PPP petition that the 1976 Representation of the Peoples Act, as amended in 1985, was unconstitutional in so far as it failed to recognize the existence and participation of political parties in

the elections. The Supreme Court ruling opened the way for elections to take place on a party basis with symbols granted to individual political parties and to party coalitions -- an important development in a country with a 26 percent literacy rate.

In a third major decision, the Supreme Court on October 9 affirmed the High Court of the Punjab's decision that the May 29 dissolution of the National Assembly by President Zia was void because it did not comply with the constitutional provisions authorizing dismissal of the National Assembly. Despite reaching this conclusion, the Court stated that it would not order the recall of the National Assembly because it was in the national interest that the November 16 elections take place.

The Court's fourth major decision involved the ID card requirement. It was issued on November 12, four days before the elections, and is discussed in Chapter 4 G.

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### *Chapter 3*

## ***THE LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ELECTORAL FRAMEWORK***

On November 16, Pakistanis selected 215 of the 237 members of the National Assembly for five-year terms. Since candidates in two constituencies died during the campaign, the elections in their respective constituencies were postponed. By-elections are required to be held within 60 days, along with by-elections for seats relinquished by persons winning more than one seat (section E. below).

### **A. Laws Governing the Elections**

For a country that has held relatively few elections, Pakistan has an exceptionally thorough and well-conceived election code. The principal law governing the conduct of elections is the Representation of the Peoples Act of 1976. This act, which draws heavily on the last acts of the British period, lays out in detail the procedures for conducting elections.

Other laws relating to the electoral process include the Political Parties Act of 1962, which has been amended on a number of occasions; the 1974 Delimitation of Constituency Act, which sets forth how constituency boundary lines should be drawn; and the Electoral Rolls Act of 1974, which sets forth the rules for determining voter eligibility.

### **B. The Election Commission**

Pursuant to the 1973 Constitution, national and provincial elections are administered by a three-member federal Election Commission presided over by a chief election commissioner.

This individual must be serving or have served as a judge of the Supreme Court or a provincial High Court. He is assisted by two High Court judges appointed by the president.

The current commission appointed by President Zia includes Chief Election Commissioner Justice S. A. Nusrat, and Justices Mohammed Fafiq Tarar and Abdul Razzak A. Thahim. Justice Nusrat, whose original term expired in the summer of 1988, was reappointed by President Zia on an interim basis.

As set forth in the constitution, the duties of the commission are to "organize and conduct the elections and to make such arrangements as are necessary to ensure that elections are conducted honestly, justly, fairly and in accordance with the law and that corrupt practices are guarded against." Specifically, the commission is authorized to:

- appoint separate Commissions for each province;
- prepare and annually revise the electoral rolls to the National and Provincial Assemblies;
- establish constituency boundaries;
- organize and conduct elections for the National and Provincial Assemblies, the Senate and the President; and
- appoint election tribunals that hear disputes regarding the outcome of the elections.

For the November elections, the Election Commission initiated several important reforms. One reform provided that, unlike previous elections, all election workers down to the local polling station level were employed and supervised by the Election Commission. A second reform vested the commission with extraordinary power to try complaints of "grave illegalities" and, if necessary, to order new elections in any constituency within several weeks of the National Assembly elections; returning officers, responsible for the administration of elections in individual constituencies, also were given the authority to order arrests for election law violations. A third reform increased the role of judicial officials in various aspects of the

electoral process, thus providing a higher level of confidence that elections officials would be neutral. A fourth, more controversial reform, required that ID cards be presented by all voters; Pakistanis are required by law to have these cards, although many persons have never bothered to obtain them.

In addition to the federal Election Commission, there are provincial Election Commissions in each of Pakistan's four provinces. These commissions, staffed by judges appointed by the federal commission, assist the national body in administering the elections at the provincial level.

At the local and district levels, the elections are administered by returning and assistant returning officers, also appointed by the Election Commission from the judiciary. In the past, these positions were filled by civil servants appointed by the president and were suspected of being susceptible to political pressures. Each of the 33,500 polling stations in the recent elections was staffed by a presiding officer appointed by the returning officer, normally from the ranks of local teachers or the government bureaucracy.

### **C. Voter Registration**

The 1973 constitution empowers the chief election commissioner to prepare electoral rolls and to revise them annually. Under the constitution, a person is entitled to be enrolled in an electoral area if he or she is:

- a citizen of Pakistan;
- not less than 21 years of age on the first day of January of the year in which enrollment takes place;
- not declared by competent court to be of unsound mind; and
- deemed to be a resident of the electoral area.

Non-Muslims are registered on separate rolls as they can vote only for candidates contesting the minority seats.

The electoral rolls were first prepared in 1974 and 1975 by some 20,000 registration officials conducting house-to-house

surveys. In subsequent years, existing rolls were published in draft and displayed publicly to invite claims, objections, and applications for corrections. The electoral rolls were prepared in this manner between March 1986 and October 1988, and contained some 43 million names, approximately 90 percent of those who are eligible to vote. The final rolls were published one week prior to election day, and were widely distributed to the political parties for use by their polling agents on the days of the elections. However, as the chief election commissioner in Baluchistan noted, despite months of culling and double-checking, the electoral rolls were "still not perfect."

#### **D. The Delimitation Process**

Pursuant to the Delimitation of Constituencies Act of 1974, the Election Commission constructed constituencies, starting from the smallest administrative units as determined by the 1981 census. The formula used to calculate the size of a constituency was one seat per 407,000 citizens for the National Assembly, with a permitted fluctuation of 20 percent. Thus, National Assembly constituencies ranged in population between 320,000 and 490,000.

Preliminary lists of constituencies were published in September to invite objections, with public hearings held to rectify any defects of continuity and compactness. According to the Election Commission and most political leaders, relatively few objections were submitted. The final list of constituencies was published on October 2.

#### **E. Nomination of Candidates**

Candidates for National Assembly seats were required to file nomination papers with the returning officers, accompanied by a 4,000 rupees (approximately \$210.00) deposit, no later than October 10. The returning officers then scrutinized the papers to ensure that the candidate was a citizen of Pakistan, more than 25 years old, had not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, and otherwise met criteria of prescribed religious and moral standards. By October 22, the returning officers completed their review of the nomination papers and

published a final list of candidates. The NDI delegation heard no complaints from prospective candidates who were disqualified during this process.

As is the case in other parliamentary systems based on the British model, a candidate need not be a resident of the constituency in which he or she seeks to compete. Also, a candidate may contest up to five seats simultaneously. The candidate is required to relinquish all but one of the seats he or she wins within 30 days of the elections and the relinquished seats are then filled in by-elections that must be held within 60 days.

Candidates used these provisions of the law to test, and to demonstrate, their popularity in the different regions of the country. Thus, for example, Nawaz Sharif of the *JI* contested four seats, while *PPP* leader Benazir Bhutto contested three. Candidates also could contest seats in the National Assembly and in the Provincial Assembly of the province in which they resided. Ultimately, a candidate who won contests in more than one assembly was required to relinquish all but one of his or her seats.

#### **F. Allocation of Party Symbols**

Following the Supreme Court decision authorizing party-based elections, the Election Commission established regulations for the allocation of party symbols that would appear on the ballot. The Election Commission decided not to award any party the symbol that it had used in past elections. (Appendix X contains the party symbols as allocated by the Election Commission). The *PPP* objected to the decision assigning it a new symbol, an arrow, in place of its highly recognizable and traditional sword, and requested that the president reverse the Election Commission's decision. The president rejected the *PPP* request.

#### **G. The Identification Card Requirement**

No issue proved more controversial than the Election Commission's October 4 decision to require that all prospective voters present their national identification cards to the polling

officials prior to receiving a ballot. Since all Pakistanis are required by law to have ID cards, the commission reasoned that the measure would not disenfranchise many voters and that it would serve as a fraud prevention device; specifically, the measure would prevent bogus voters from casting ballots on behalf of individuals who were listed on the electoral rolls but, for one reason or another, did not appear to vote. Several individuals with whom the delegation spoke, however, contended that the ID card requirement would prevent people from voting, and that this fact outweighed whatever minimal protection against counterfeit voting it provided.

In mid-October, the commission estimated that 93 percent of the electorate had been issued ID cards, although this figure was questioned by many independent observers. Those who did not have ID cards, according to the commission, could obtain them from a designated office of the Ministry of Interior.

To facilitate the process, applications were distributed through post offices. However, a completed application had to be submitted in person at one of several hundred government offices, thus making it particularly difficult for those living in rural areas who lacked transportation to government offices. The delegation also heard allegations that in some areas application forms were available only by bribing local officials.

The *PPP*, while acknowledging the need for polling officials to be satisfied as to a voter's identity, objected to the imposition of the ID card requirement for the November 1988 elections. According to the *PPP*, many people -- particularly women in rural areas -- had never obtained ID cards because they are not necessary for their daily activities, and because it is a burden to acquire the cards. In addition, it was assumed that many people had lost their cards in the floods that swept the Punjab in September.

The *PPP* charged that the requirement unfairly affected its candidates in the elections for two reasons. First, many of those who lacked ID cards lived in rural areas, where the *PPP* believed it had considerable support. Second, the *PPP* alleged that their political opponents were manufacturing bogus cards

and distributing them to their supporters, while presumed *PPP* supporters were finding their applications stalled by the government.

In October 1983, the *PPP* filed a legal action challenging the Election Commission's decision to require use of ID cards, claiming that the decision exceeded the commission's authority and would disenfranchise large numbers of voters. On November 7, the Lahore High Court (Punjab Province) issued an order preventing the commission from implementing its decision. The court held that the commission had acted unconstitutionally in establishing an additional requirement for voting. The Attorney General, representing the government and acting on behalf of the commission, appealed to the Supreme Court, which on November 12, just four days before the elections, issued an order that had the effect of rescinding the Lahore High Court decision. The *PPP* accepted the Supreme Court decision, but urged its supporters who did not have ID cards to be present at the polling sites to ensure that persons with counterfeit ID cards did not vote in their stead.

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## *Chapter 4*

### *THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN*

Despite the controversies surrounding the allocation of party symbols and the use of ID cards, the election campaign proceeded in a remarkably peaceful manner. This chapter describes the parties and alliances that participated in the November elections and offers some general assessments regarding the fairness of the campaign.

#### **A. The Contestants**

Political parties have legally functioned only intermittently since Pakistan became independent. With a few exceptions, they have been based upon alliances among strong local personalities, rather than ideology or program.

The Political Parties Act of 1962 provides the framework governing the legalization and activities of political parties in Pakistan. As noted, the Supreme Court ruled in June 1988 that certain parts of the act as amended were unconstitutional.

Amendments to the act were adopted in 1985. One of the more significant amendments prohibits assembly members from defecting after an election to a party other than the one that designated him or her as a candidate. It was designed to encourage party loyalty and to discourage the type of post-election deals that have characterized Pakistan politics in the past. At the same time, the law seems to permit independents to join parties after the assembly has been elected.

In 1987, there reportedly were more than 80 registered and non-registered parties. In addition, scores of independent

candidates competed for National Assembly seats. In the weeks before the November elections, however, attention focussed principally on: the Pakistan People's Party (*PPP*) and its allies; the *Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI)*, an alliance of several distinct political parties; and two regionally significant parties, the *Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM)* in the Sind and the *Awami National Party (ANP)* in the Northwest Frontier.

### 1. *Pakistan People's Party (PPP)*

The *PPP* is the party created by former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Since 1986, the party has been co-chaired by Bhutto's daughter, Benazir, and by his widow, Nusrat Begum.

Historically, the *PPP's* ideology has been populist in orientation with strong roots among both urban poor and rural elites. In the early 1980's, the party opposed direct support of the Afghan resistance, and supported a non-aligned foreign policy. In recent years, the *PPP* altered its views on Afghanistan. Indeed, during the campaign, the *PPP* indicated that if it won the election, the party would continue support for the Afghan resistance and would not interfere with the military's institutional autonomy.

In the early 1980's, the *PPP* -- under the leadership of Mustafa Jatoi -- joined with other generally left-of-center parties to form -- and to dominate -- the *Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD)*. For several years, the *MRD* was the principal opposition force pressing for elections and for an end to martial law.

During the campaign, Abdul Wali Khan, leader of the *Awami National Party (ANP)* coordinated the *MRD* activities. The *ANP* is a remnant of the pre-independence *Awami National Party*, which advocated Pathan interests and did not support an independent Pakistan, and is now influential only in the Northwest Frontier Province. Most member parties of the *MRD* presented their own candidate lists, with the *PPP* agreeing not to designate candidates in eight constituencies where *MRD* leaders were competing.

## 2. *The Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI)*

The *IJI* formed in October 1988 as an electoral alliance (i.e., not necessarily a political coalition) of nine parties. The *IJI*'s seven-point platform included further Islamization and continued support for the Afghan resistance.

The heart of the *IJI* was the *Pakistan Muslim League (PML)*, one of three factions of the original *Muslim League* that achieved Pakistan independence in 1947. After a succession of splits in the party, *PML* adherents participated in the 1985 non-party-based elections, winning the largest bloc of seats in the National Assembly and forming the core of the government-backed Official Parliamentary Group.

The *PML* was the first to register as a legal party following the 1985 elections and the passage of amendments to the Political Parties Act that same year. In the summer of 1988, Junejo, following his dismissal as prime minister, led a faction of the *PML* that sought to present its own candidate list. The rift between Junejo's faction and one headed by Punjab Chief Minister Nawaz Sharif was mended on October 14, and Junejo was installed as president of the newly united *PML*.

The most important regional party in the *IJI* was the *National People's Party (NPP)* in the Sind headed by Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, a former Sind chief minister and erstwhile *PPP* leader. According to several well-informed Pakistanis, Jatoi -- while a *MRD/PPP* leader -- had been offered the prime ministership at least twice by Zia and would have been offered the post on August 26 had Zia lived.

The *Jamaat-i-Islami (JI)*, a leading religious party, also was a member of the *IJI*. Right-of-center and ultraorthodox, the *Ji* staunchly supported the Afghan resistance. The *Ji* led the movement to topple the government during the Ali Bhutto period.

## 3. *The Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM)*

The *MQM* is a relatively new party that had a surprisingly strong showing in Karachi and Hyderabad in the 1987 Local

Bodies elections. Its influence is limited at present to the urban Sind. Funded by wealthy *Mohajirs* (i.e., Muslims who fled India following partition in 1947), the party is dominated by the young and the poor. One major item on the *MQM's* agenda is the establishment of a quota system that would entitle *Mohajirs* to the benefits of jobs, education, and services commensurate with their numbers in the population.

## **B. The Campaign Period**

Given Pakistan's turbulent political history, the delegation was surprised by the general consensus among Pakistanis that the environment surrounding the election campaign was open and free. Political leaders traveled around the country, large rallies were organized in different constituencies and there were no apparent restrictions on freedom of expression.

Since the lifting of martial law, the human rights situation in the country has gradually improved, despite the continued detention of some individuals convicted by military courts for politically-related offenses. In particular, the reemergence of the judicial system as a protector of individual rights has been welcomed by the legal community and by human rights activists.

This is not to imply that there were no complaints concerning the campaign period. The *PPP*, in particular, persistently raised matters such as the allegedly inappropriate actions taken by the incumbent caretaker governments, including, for example, the discriminatory allocation of rally sites.

### *1. The Caretaker Governments*

Following the dissolution of the government and the National and Provincial Assemblies in May 1988, President Zia reappointed his supporters as chief ministers in Punjab, Baluchistan and Northwest Frontier Provinces and cabinet ministers in the federal government. The chief ministers wield considerable powers in the provinces and, according to the *PPP*, they used these powers to enhance their political interests and those of their allies. In particular, the chief ministers were accused of spending large sums of government funds to promote their

political agendas. The PPP and its supporters criticized Acting President Ghulam Ishaq Khan for not dismissing the caretaker governments or at least those ministers who were running for office. While complaints of an incumbent's unfair advantages are common in many democracies, the charge carried additional weight in Pakistan because of questions as to the legitimacy of Zia's actions -- dismissing the Provincial Assemblies and appointing caretaker governments -- under the constitution.

## 2. The Media

Pakistan boasts one of the most uninhibited print media in the developing world. However, while divergent opinion is freely expressed in newspapers, the government maintains absolute control over Pakistan television and radio as well as the daily *Pakistan Times* and Pakistan's Associated Press service. In these media outlets, government officials are given heavy and uncritical coverage.

Although only 26 percent of the population is literate, Pakistan maintains a large newspaper industry, with many newspapers read aloud, and their contents widely discussed. Approximately 40 daily newspapers and a dozen magazines are published regularly, but only a handful enjoy significant national and regional influence.

Among the English language newspapers, *Dawn*, founded by Mohammed Ali Jinnah and published in Karachi, has the largest circulation, approximately 60,000 daily. The *Pakistan Times* (a National Press Trust paper) and the *Muslim*, both published in Lahore and Islamabad, have circulations of 50,000. The *Nation in Lahore*, the *Frontier Post* in Peshawar and the *Baluchistan Times* in Quetta provide important provincial coverage. The *Herald*, a monthly magazine, is generally considered to provide the most professional, independent writing on political and social affairs.

The circulation of Urdu language papers dwarfs that of English papers. The *Daily Jang* publishes 600,000 copies a day, and the daily *Nawa-i-Waqt* has a circulation of 240,000. *Mashriq*, a distant third, has a circulation of 75,000. While some analysts dismiss the Urdu papers as "tabloids," their circulation

figures alone make them significant influences on public opinion.

During the weeks preceding the November elections, statements and campaign events of all major parties seemed to be covered in the major newspapers. Editorial positions varied, and they frequently appeared to color the presentation of news stories. Purchased advertisements for various parties and candidates, meanwhile, appeared in most of the newspapers.

### C. The Last Days of the Campaign

The major area of controversy up to the day of the elections involved the ID card requirement. Wherever the delegation went, this matter was raised, particularly by PPP supporters. Requiring ID cards, it was suggested, would disenfranchise millions and would create havoc at the polling sites. The conflicting decisions of the Lahore High Court and the Supreme Court, it was feared, would create additional confusion at the polling sites, as polling officials would be unaware of the rules in effect.

Finally, there was the difficulty of distributing ID cards to the many who applied after the Election Commission's October 4 imposition of the requirement, and particularly during the last few days preceding the elections. While officials worked until midnight on November 15 distributing ID cards, there were many disgruntled applicants who waited in line at the appropriate government offices but did not receive their cards in time to vote in the November elections.

Notwithstanding these concerns, and despite the apprehensions felt by many Pakistanis, the campaign closed with large and peaceful rallies organized by the major parties. The PPP focussed its efforts in the Punjab; this effort, according to one Pakistani political analyst, provided the PPP with "the necessary sprint to edge ahead of the IJI at the finishing point." (See Gallup Pakistan, *Pakistan at the Polls* pg. 11 [November 1988].)

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## *Chapter 5*

### *VOTING AND COUNTING*

The first and second part of this chapter describe in general terms the balloting and counting processes. The third part presents the specific observations of the five teams that visited the different regions of the country on November 16, which in honor of the elections was a national holiday.

#### **A. Balloting Procedures**

The polls were scheduled to open at 8 a.m., although at many sites they opened between 15 and 45 minutes late, usually because of the tardy arrival of one or more polling officials. Despite Pakistan's rural character, there were only a few instances where a polling station failed to open because it had not received the requisite election materials, testimony to the efficient organization of the Election Commission.

Approximately 1,500 voters were assigned to each of the more than 33,000 polling stations, segregated by gender wherever possible; there were generally upwards of 150 polling stations in each constituency. A polling station could be divided into no more than four voting tables, which were each administered by an assistant presiding officer and two polling officers. Non-Muslims generally were assigned to separate voting tables. For these elections, according to election officials, there were a total of 113,722 tables operating. Candidates were authorized to designate an agent (pollwatcher) for every table in their constituency.

Before voting began, the empty ballot boxes were opened, shown to the pollwatchers and then sealed with wax. The sealed boxes were placed near the presiding or assistant presiding officers and voting commenced.

Outside most of the polling stations, representatives of the candidates generally were available to assist voters in finding their assigned tables. The representatives would write the registration number on a piece of paper that the voter would present to the polling officials, thus expediting considerably the process inside the polling station. The paper often contained the party's or candidate's symbol.

Only those with ID cards could enter the polling stations, which were guarded by police or armed forces personnel. Upon entering the polling station, the voter presented his or her ID card to the polling officer. After checking the ID card, the polling officer placed a mark in the electoral roll next to the name and number of the voter. There were some problems stemming from discrepancies between the name of the voter, his or her father or his or her address as it appeared on the ID card compared to information on the electoral roll. The presiding officers resolved these inconsistencies, albeit in a non-uniform manner, usually without much controversy.

Once a voter's identity had been established, one polling officer punched a hole on the left side of the ID card and the other officer placed indelible ink on the cuticle or upper joint of the voter's left thumb. Both the card punching and the use of indelible ink were safeguards against multiple voting.

The voter then proceeded to the assistant presiding officer who recorded the electoral roll number on the counterfoil of the ballot. The voter placed a thumbprint on the back of the counterfoil, which was then signed and stamped with an official seal. The voter was then handed the ballot and an inked rubber stamp, with nine square boxes, for marking the ballot (see Appendix XI). The voter entered a screened compartment and stamped the space on the ballot containing the name and symbol of the candidate for whom he or she wished to vote.

Before leaving the compartment, the voter folded the ballot and then, once outside the booth, placed it in the ballot box.

If a voter's identity was challenged, the presiding officer could require that the voter cast a "challenged" ballot. Such a ballot was not placed in the ballot box and was counted separately from the other ballots. There also was a procedure whereby a voter who claimed that someone had voted in his or her stead could cast a "tendered" ballot, which also was counted separately from the regular ballots. While delegation members observed the use of challenged and tendered ballots, there did not appear to be a suspiciously large number of such instances.

### **B. The Counting Process**

The balloting process continued until 5 p.m. when the polls closed. Once a polling station was cleared, the ballots were counted by the presiding officer with the assistance of the other election officials. Often, only one pollwatcher per party or candidate was permitted to observe the count; this occasioned some controversy as other pollwatchers sought to remain.

After completing the count, the presiding officer prepared a statement of the count that was signed by all the polling officials and the pollwatchers. The delegation did not learn of any instance where a pollwatcher refused to sign the statement due to complaints of miscounting or for any other reason. The presiding officer then transported the statement to the returning officer who consolidated the results from all the polling stations in a given constituency. The party pollwatchers, meanwhile, would transmit their certified copy of the results to the party headquarters.

The returning officer presented the consolidated results to district returning officers. They transmitted the results to the provincial election commissions which, in turn, communicated the results to the federal Election Commission in Islamabad.

Prior to the elections, the Election Commission in Islamabad seemed confident that the results from a majority of constituencies would be available by midnight. However, because returning officers were instructed not to transmit partial

results, it took much longer than expected to collect and to consolidate the complete data. Indeed, when members of the delegation left the federal Election Commission headquarters at approximately 12:30 a.m. results were available from only five constituencies. Nonetheless, several hours later, results were in from 39 constituencies and by the afternoon of the 17th results from virtually all constituencies were available.

As is often the case in such circumstances, the delays were viewed with considerable suspicion by the parties out of power, particularly the *PPP*. The party feared that those aligned with the incumbent regime would prevent results favorable to the *PPP* from being announced. In National Assembly (NA) constituency 94 for example, where Bhutto was a candidate, the *PPP* called a press conference at 2 a.m. to denounce the delays in the reporting of the results and the "disappearance" of 70 *PPP* polling agents. A half hour later, Bhutto's victory in this constituency was announced by the Election Commission in Islamabad. It was later reported that the polling agents had returned to their homes with no indication that they had been physically attacked or harassed. Some in the *PPP* conceded that the agents may have been "influenced" by representatives of opposing parties to stay away.

### C. Observations By Region

Because of the significant regional diversity in Pakistan, the delegation members spent the day and a half before the elections becoming familiar with the local political scene of the country's provinces and in the federal district of Islamabad, and identifying key races and potential trouble spots in their assigned regions.

#### 1. Lahore

Six delegates were assigned to this city, which is the capital of the Punjab, the most populated province in Pakistan. The province was the focus of both *IJI* and *PPP* efforts; both parties organized large rallies in Lahore on successive nights to mark the official end of the campaign. Prior to the election, the team heard complaints from the *PPP* about large sums of misappro-

priated funds that had been spent on behalf of *III* candidates and of the likely rigging of 20 constituencies in the province. There also was considerable concern expressed regarding the ID card requirement and skepticism over the military's willingness to recognize a *PPP* victory.

Based on conversations with various residents of the region, the team decided to pay particularly close attention to NA 94, where Bhutto was a candidate, and NA 95, where Nawaz Sharif was a candidate. In addition to visiting several rural areas outside Lahore, the team decided to observe as many women's polling stations as possible because of concerns expressed that they were more susceptible to intimidation and because the ID card requirement might result in many women being turned away.

On election day, the team divided into three groups. Early in the morning, each group visited a polling station in Lahore city. While no polls opened precisely at 8 a.m., all were ready to process voters within a reasonable time. Later that morning, the groups visited polling stations in Kasur, Sheikhpura and Gujranwala; these were all outside Lahore, and in some cases the polling stations visited were in quite rural areas. That evening, the team observed the closing of the polls in Lahore, visited the party headquarters of the *III* and the *PPP* and spent some time at the Court of Sessions where returning officers were compiling the results from the polling stations in their respective constituencies. By 11 p.m., when the delegation departed, there was not one constituency for which the results from all polling stations had been transmitted, although results were arriving at a steady pace.

In its report to the delegation, the team commented:

- a. The attitude of voters was universally enthusiastic and infused with pride.
- b. The extent of disenfranchisement caused by the ID card requirement could not be determined from election day observations and interviews.

- c. The quality and apparent impartiality of the presiding officers were impressive.
- d. The organization of the different parties, particularly with respect to the assistance provided to voters outside the polling station, played an essential role in ensuring that the process operated smoothly.
- e. There was a spirit of cooperation among the polling agents from the different parties that also helped ensure the smooth operation of the process.
- f. There were problems with the accuracy of the electoral rolls causing, in some instances, an individual to be denied the opportunity to cast his or her ballot.
- g. The counting of the votes at the polling stations was completed quickly and with few controversies.
- h. The slow compilation of the final results was the outstanding flaw in the process, although it did not appear to be the result of attempted rigging and was more likely the consequence of the cumbersome process established for compiling the results.
- i. The allegations of election day improprieties, primarily made by supporters of the *PPP*, could not be verified, although in some instances the allegations appeared implausible and in other instances the team was told that they had been resolved by the election officials.
- j. The "disappearance" of 70 *PPP* polling agents in NA 94 was reported by others in the *PPP* to have resulted from "influence" on the agents by opposing party representatives to leave their posts and not a consequence of

government action. The "disappearances" ultimately did not appear to have affected the results announced by the Election Commission that showed Bhutto winning by slightly more than 9,000 votes.

## 2. Peshawar

A three-member team observed the elections in Peshawar, the capital of the Northwest Frontier Province, and in surrounding rural towns. This province is the current home for a large number of Afghan refugees, who have had considerable impact on the region's economy and social fabric.

In its report to the delegation, the team contrasted the dire predictions made by the political leaders regarding developments on election day with the actual conduct of the elections. The team was told to expect: considerable election day violence perpetrated by party stalwarts and by Afghan or KGB infiltrators; the use of false ID cards by Afghan refugees; significant voting fraud at the women's polling stations; and the use of government vehicles to transport pro-government voters to the polls on election day.

Based on its observations on election day and conversations thereafter, the team concluded that not one of the predictions actually occurred. The absence of any violence on election day was especially notable in the Northwest Frontier Province, where firearms are commonplace, where bombing incidents have become almost everyday occurrences, and where violence represents a traditional method of "conflict resolution." Instead, the voting process was orderly and the prescribed procedures were followed faithfully; polling officials and party agents uniformly responded to queries by the team that there had been "no problems."

The team inquired into the reasons for challenges at most of the 12 polling stations visited and found that a majority related to discrepancies regarding information on the ID cards. There were also allegations of attempted multiple voting at a few women's stations.

One problem noted was the absence of a women's polling station in NA 2. Through agreement of the candidates, it was decided not to establish a women's polling station; when asked the reasons, the party agents commented that they "did not want women to vote."

The team observed ballot counting, where the only recurring problem appeared to be the rubbing of wet ink from the voting stamp next to a second candidate's name when the ballot was folded. Election officials resolved this problem by not counting the ballots.

The team met with both government and political party officials during the evening after the polls closed. The level of satisfaction regarding the smoothness of the voting process was uniformly high. Because of the many rural polling stations in the province, delays in reporting of votes did not appear to be a matter of surprise or of great concern.

### 3. Islamabad/Rawalpindi

Seven delegates were assigned to the federal capital of Islamabad, and Rawalpindi, the much older neighboring city in the Punjab. Islamabad, with a population of approximately 400,000, was established in 1961, and is a planned city of uncongested streets and new government office buildings. It stands in marked contrast to the more bustling and typically urban environment of Rawalpindi. The two cities constitute a national capital area with a population of more than 1.2 million.

Islamabad elected one National Assembly member, while 11 were elected from Rawalpindi and its environs. One of the country's more hotly contested races was in Rawalpindi, where retired General and PPP Secretary-General Tikka Khan was opposed by long-time *Muslim League* politician, Sheikh Rashid.

On election day, the team divided into two groups, visiting approximately 20 polling stations. One of the teams began by observing the vote in Muree, a town in the mountains one hour from Islamabad. Turnout was high in this rural community, and the voting proceeded smoothly at the sites visited.

The other group concentrated on Islamabad and nearby districts in Rawalpindi. A fairly widespread, albeit minor problem, involved the tardiness of polling personnel, which delayed the opening of some polling stations up to one hour. At these stations, however, voting officials allowed polling to proceed beyond 5 p.m. to account for the lost time.

Among the few more serious problems encountered was an allegation by a *PPP* "observer" that a woman voter at a polling site in Rawalpindi had witnessed a polling official give 10 blank ballots to another voter. The team questioned the person who had witnessed the incident and then proceeded to discuss the matter with the presiding officer, who denied any knowledge of the incident but requested that the *PPP* assign an agent to the suspect voting table. Returning later in the afternoon, the team spoke with the *PPP* polling agent who said that she believed the woman who had earlier alleged fraud was "confused" and that she doubted any impropriety had occurred.

At another Rawalpindi polling station, a *PPP* party agent charged that an *III* candidate had been intimidating voters. As in the previous case, the team could find no evidence to corroborate the accusation.

The team reported that, with a few exceptions, the polling at the stations visited was well-managed, orderly and free from any apparent fraud or voter intimidation. Voting at most stations proceeded briskly and without incident, with a majority of voters casting their ballots before noon. The requisite number of election officials was present at most stations, and prescribed procedures appeared to be followed without major deviations. In addition, polling officers appeared knowledgeable of voting procedures and were highly cooperative with the team.

On the evening of November 16, the reunited team visited the Election Commission in Islamabad to observe the consolidation of the vote and the announcement of the results. Chief Election Commissioner Nusrat welcomed the team and explained the vote tallying procedures. After an extended wait, however, only a small proportion of the results were announced. Given the slowness of this process, the team left the commission

shortly after midnight. The following morning the team learned that despite the *PPP*'s success throughout the country, the party's secretary-general, Tikka Khan, had been upset in his bid for a seat from Rawalpindi.

#### 4. Karachi

A five-member team observed the elections in Karachi, the capital of the Sind Province and Pakistan's most populous city. The *PPP* fielded candidates in all but one of the province's 46 National Assembly districts. The *JI* and *JI*-affiliated candidates contested most of the seats, but it was the urban-based *MQM* (concentrated in Karachi and Hyderabad) that provided the greatest challenge to the *PPP* in the province.

On election day, the team divided into two groups and visited polling stations in 11 of Karachi's 13 constituencies. Generally, polling stations opened as scheduled at 8 a.m. While individual voting booths opened a little late, all were operating by 8:45 a.m.

Without exception, the team encountered a voting process that was orderly and efficient. Some voters initially were confused about how to find the voting tables to which they were assigned, or which party symbol represented their choice on the ballot, but these problems were usually handled smoothly by election officials or helpful police officers. Much of this type of confusion was alleviated before voters arrived at the voting stations by volunteers at party-manned "locator tents" -- easily identifiable tables set up outside the polls to direct loyal party voters.

The major parties (*PPP*, *JI*, *MQM*) fielded polling agents at almost all polling stations, but many of the smaller parties and independent candidates did not. The requisite number of election officials were always present. Polling agents and officials repeatedly reported "no problems."

Only two problems of potential significance were encountered by the observers. In two or three cases, indelible ink was applied to the voter before he was properly identified. In one case, the identification card presented was invalid, and in

another the voter was at the wrong table. The voters were worried that they would be unable to vote even if they later presented proper identification at the correct polling table. They were assured, however, by the presiding officers that they would be able to vote, notwithstanding the ink on their thumbs.

In another polling station, the seal on the ballot box was found by a pollwatcher to be broken. Polling officials and agents claimed that the seal had been accidentally broken by a voter casting his vote. At another site, the seal was inappropriately affixed by the presiding officer to two ballot boxes, resulting in the boxes being unsealed for the full voting process. The results in these polling stations, however, did not indicate any misconduct.

Two members of the delegation observed the counting process at the Sind Election Commission from 11 p.m. until 4:45 a.m. Constituency results were slow in reporting until approximately 1:30 a.m. During the following three hours, 50 percent of the constituencies reported. Election officials ascribed the initial delay to the need for consolidation of 100 percent of a constituency's polling stations before results could be transmitted. The Election Commission, in several cases, refused to receive the partial results that some returning officers attempted to transmit.

##### 5. *Quetta*

A three-member team observed the elections in and around Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan. Encompassing the western half of the nation and most of the border areas with Iran and Afghanistan, Baluchistan is the largest and least populated of Pakistan's four provinces. Most of the people are ethnically either Baluch or Pushtun (Pathan), the same groups that form the majority of Afghanistan's population. The terrain is harsh, primarily desert plains or mountains. Many of the people maintain a traditional Islamic, tribal lifestyle; women are rarely seen in public. Several families that have historically controlled the area continue to exercise considerable influence, both formally and informally, and the nationally important political parties do not play a major role here.

Baluchistan elects just 11 of the 207 contested seats in the National Assembly. Because of the great distances encountered in these constituencies, the team concentrated on two constituencies: NA 197, which encompasses Quetta and a wide swath of rural territory; and NA 198, which includes the secondary town of Pishin, an hour's drive north of Quetta.

The team received a pre-election briefing from the commander of the provincial police, who indicated the names and locations of several polling places that had been identified as potential "hot spots." At these polling stations, several additional constables were assigned to the standard contingent of six men and a non-commissioned officer.

On election day, the team visited several of the designated hot spots, both in Quetta and Pishin. The team also made an unannounced visit at mid-day to provincial police headquarters in Quetta, to see what was being reported there. However, no reports of trouble had been registered.

Overall, a total of 13 polling sites were visited, including four in and near Pishin. Two of the Quetta sites were revisited at day's end to watch the counting process.

At all the sites visited, voting generally proceeded according to the prescribed procedures. Polling agents for all the parties and many independents were present throughout the day at all but one of the sites visited. No polling agents were present at a polling station on the outskirts of Pishin. The presiding officer said they had "gone home."

The team observed many instances where the data recorded on official ID cards did not match the information recorded on the voter registration rolls. Typically, a father's name would be incorrectly written on one or the other document. The resulting discrepancy was handled differently at each polling site. In some cases, a voter was allowed to cast his ballot if the presiding officer and/or the polling agents were satisfied that the voter was legitimate and that there was an inadvertent error in the registration roll. At other locations, these voters were denied the chance to vote, even when officials

present personally knew the voter to be eligible. While these discrepancies occurred, the presiding officers did not appear to be ruling in a discriminatory fashion to the advantage or disadvantage of any particular political interest. There were no complaints to this effect by any polling agents.

At one location, in NA 197, a *PPP* supporter complained that the provincial government had requisitioned vehicles owned by *PPP* activists, to thwart their efforts to bring voters to the polls. Yanya Bakhtiar, the *PPP* candidate for the National Assembly in NA 197, presented the same complaint during two meetings with the team before and after the elections. No further information, or additional details, were obtained by the team. Bakhtiar also complained to the team that in the more remote areas of Baluchistan, including NA 197, *III* supporters in the government had made it more difficult for anti-*III* voters to cast their ballots, by changing the locations of polling places, or falsely disqualifying eligible voters on spurious grounds. But no specific complaints, detailing the names of disenfranchised voters or the sites where these acts had allegedly been committed, could be obtained from the *PPP*.

In its report to the delegation, the team offered the following general observations:

- a. The police present at each location, without exception, did not in any manner interfere with the elections. At some locations, they stood off to the side and played no part at all in the proceedings. At other locations, the police were quite active in organizing voters into lines and pacing their entry into the polling site. No army personnel were observed at all on election day.
- b. Polling agents were present everywhere, and were active in reviewing the credentials of arriving voters. There was an air of cordiality that prevailed among polling agents and with the presiding officers. The pre-

siding officers generally managed their stations with dispatch and even-handedness, and on at least two occasions observed by the team they deferred to the wishes of the polling agents on matters not covered by the prescribed rules.

- c. Local election officials and party pollwatchers were almost universally friendly toward the visiting team when it arrived unannounced at each polling site. The pride exhibited in the election system and the willingness of all concerned to abide by the will of the voters was impressive.



*Delegation co-leaders Brian Atwood and Ruairi Quinn meet with Pakistan President Ghulam Ishaq Khan prior to the elections.*



*Pakistan People's Party leader Benazir Bhutto discusses election results with members of NDI delegation (left to right) Patricia Keefer, Joan Baggett, (Bhutto) and Elaine Shocas.*



*Polling officers seal ballot box with candle wax.*



*Thumbprint taken to be placed on ballot counterfoil.*



*Observer Ergun Ozbudun at party-manned "locator tents" set up to direct voters to their assigned tables.*



*Party agents checking voter rolls.*



*Observer Richard Johnson (back left) monitors voter verification process.*



*Vote counting.*

482

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## Chapter 6

### THE RESULTS

This chapter contains a narrative review of the results from both the National Assembly elections and the Provincial Assemblies elections. (Appendix XII presents a breakdown of the results by party and by region.) Also included in this section is a statistical analysis of the results that considers whether there was a pattern of activity designed to materially influence or affect the election outcomes.

#### A. National Assembly

By mid-day Thursday, November 17, the Election Commission had announced the results from virtually all of the 205 contested Moslem constituencies. (The results of the elections for the minority seats, which required a nationwide tabulation, were not announced until Sunday, November 20.) The *PPP* won 93 of these seats, the *III* 55, the *MQM* 13 and small parties and other independents won the remaining 54 seats. *PPP* candidates obtained 39 percent of the total votes cast, while *III* candidates received 32 percent.

To the surprise of many, several of the leading *III* figures were defeated in their constituencies. The list included former Prime Minister Junejo, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, chairman of the *NPP*, and Pir Sahib Pagaro, a leader of the *PML*. The only *III* leadership figure to survive with his electoral reputation at least partially intact was Punjab Chief Minister Nawaz Sharif, who won two of the four seats he contested.

The *PPP* leaders, on the other hand, fared quite well. Bhutto won the three seats she contested, while her mother won

both of the seats she contested. The *PPP* also swept all the seats in the rural Sind, with the *MQM* winning all but two seats in Karachi, plus two seats in Hyderabad, and two seats elsewhere in the Sind Province. Of the 20 seats in the Punjab identified by *PPP* leaders as susceptible to rigging, the *PPP* won four, while nine others were decided by less than 4,000 votes (Appendix XIII provides a statistical analysis of 19 of the alleged problem districts in the Punjab).

The turnout for the election represented only 42 percent of the registered electorate. This figure compares unfavorably with the reported 54 percent turnout for the non-party-based 1985 National Assembly elections and the 62 percent turnout in the 1970 National Assembly elections. While the ID requirement appears to be one reason for the decreased turnout for this election, uncertainty over whether the election would actually take place, Pakistan's low literacy rate, the lack of civic education efforts and weak political party structures also contribute to the relatively low turnout Pakistan has experienced in this and previous elections. However, in the Sind, where parties were relatively well organized, voter turnout was comparable to 1985.

An exit-poll of 3,057 male voters conducted by Gallup Pakistan sought to analyze the voting behavior of Pakistanis in the National Assembly elections. The survey showed that illiterate, low income and younger voters principally accounted for the *PPP*'s edge over the *IJI*. The *IJI*'s chief appeal to voters, according to the survey, was its "Islamic image." The *IJI* was hurt, however, by the participation of independents and smaller parties; those who voted for these parties favored the *IJI* as a second choice by a 4:1 ratio over the *PPP*.

## **B. Provincial Assemblies Elections -- November 19, 1988**

Three days after the National Assembly elections, Pakistanis went to the polls once again, this time to cast ballots for Provincial Assembly members. There was a general expectation that the *PPP* would benefit from its showing in the National Assembly elections. However, once again, the voters of Pakistan confounded the pundits.

The *PPP* obtained an overwhelming majority in Sind Province, but was not the most successful party in any of the other three Provincial Assemblies. In the Punjab, where 240 seats were contested, the *III* won 108, the *PPP* 94 and 38 were divided among small parties and independents. Of the 79 seats contested in the Northwest Frontier Province, the *III* won 28, the *PPP* 22, and small parties and independent won 29 seats. Finally, in Baluchistan, where there were contests for 34 seats, neither the *III* (eight seats) nor the *PPP* (three seats) did particularly well.

### **C. Voter Turnout and Disenfranchisement: A Statistical Analysis**

As noted in earlier sections of this report, the delegation was frequently alerted in pre-election meetings to the possibility that the ID requirement would significantly affect voter turnout. While the delegation acknowledged this premise, it also believed there were sound reasons, from the perspective of ensuring the integrity of the process, for requiring ID cards. Thus, the delegation decided not to question the propriety of the Election Commission's decision to impose the ID requirement, but instead sought to analyze whether the ID requirement, by disenfranchising large numbers of potential voters, had a disproportionate effect on any particular party.

The analysis undertaken compared 1985 and 1988 election results on a district by district basis (Appendix XIV). It was conducted by delegation member Lee Feldman, president of Global Analysis, Inc. The following are Mr. Feldman's conclusions:

1. Comparing district by district, there was no apparent, large scale, statistical deviation from the 1985 turnout except for a few districts, notwithstanding that the voter turnout was lower than expected overall, and significantly lower than the 1985 turnout. Approximately four million fewer votes were cast than would have been cast had the 1988 turnout equalled the 1985 turnout.

2. One exception to the pattern was in the North-west Frontier Province where voter turnout in certain districts was significantly lower than in other districts and more than the nationwide average margin of reduction in turnout. This is possibly the result of the planned disenfranchisement of women voters who were apparently not permitted to vote in several instances.
3. Elsewhere it is unclear if any element of the reduced turnout was the consequence of voter disenfranchisement caused by the ID card requirement. While there were allegations, primarily by *PPP* supporters, that ID cards were not provided to prospective voters in time for the elections, there was no statistical evidence to support this claim, although it is possible (even probable) that some abuses occurred.
4. The Punjab showed a significant reduction (11.5 percent) in turnout as compared to 1985. However, contrary to expectations, there was no discernible additional reduction in turnout in the rural Punjab, which was heavily affected by the September floods. With respect to the constituencies identified by the *PPP* as possibly subject to massive disenfranchisement, analysis of the results does not support the *PPP* claim that it would have won more than perhaps one additional seat had the turnout reached 1985 figures.
5. In the Sind Province, turnout was comparable to 1985. However, in districts where the *MQM* candidate prevailed, in general, turnout was significantly higher than the comparable 1985 figure. This would appear to indicate good organizational skills by the *MQM* candidates.
6. While there was limited disenfranchisement of voters, *there was no significant pattern to the*

*reduced turnout and it appears that the effect was nationwide and not targeted at particular party strongholds.* In most districts, even if the turnout had been the same as 1985 and the uncast votes had been substantially in favor of the losing party (an unreasonable assumption in the absence of purposeful disenfranchisement of a particular candidate's supporters), there would have been no change in the outcome.

7. Additional research on the subject of voter turnout is required to determine why there was a lower turnout than expected for these elections and, more generally, why voter turnout in Pakistan remains relatively low. This information will help election officials and political party leaders develop programs to increase voter turnout in future elections.

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## Chapter 7

### *THE ELECTION AFTERMATH*

In the days immediately following the elections, *PPP* officials, despite winning more seats than expected, complained bitterly that party candidates would have won an additional 20 to 30 seats had there not been fraud, particularly in the rural Punjab. These additional seats would have secured for the party a majority in the National Assembly, thus alleviating fears that it would be deprived an opportunity to form Pakistan's next government. As of the delegation's departure, it was not clear whether the *PPP* would seek to challenge any of the results by petitioning the Election Commission, as set forth in the law.

The week after the elections, party leaders sought to convince the acting president, who had the authority to name the prime minister, that their respective parties could obtain the confidence of the Assembly. After consulting all the parties, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, on December 2, 1988, designated Benazir Bhutto as prime minister, making her the first woman to serve as head of government in a predominately Moslem country. Bhutto quickly appointed her cabinet, retaining Sahabzada Yaqub Khan as foreign minister. She also implemented several decrees. One decree dismissed all convictions handed down by martial law courts, while permitting a second prosecution before civilian courts if the individual was charged with a serious crime. Another decree sought to revoke all laws that discriminated against women.

Under the constitution, Bhutto had 60 days from her designation as prime minister to seek a vote of confidence. On

December 12, she obtained the necessary vote, by a margin of 148 to 55.

That same day, the electoral college -- comprising the National Assembly, the Senate and the Provincial Assemblies - - chose Ghulam Ishaq Khan for a full five-year term as president. With the *PPP* supporting Ghulam Ishaq Khan's candidacy, the vote was 348 to 98. The final task in this electoral process will be the organization of by-elections for those constituencies where elections did not occur due to the death of a candidate or where the victor resigned because he or she chose to represent another district.

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## *Chapter 8*

### *REFLECTIONS*

In conducting peaceful and orderly elections and in initiating a democratic transition, Pakistanis overcame many obstacles. These included a 40-year history of political instability and recurring military coups; the most recent period of martial law and the bitterness that it caused; the controversy surrounding President Zia's Islamization policies; the impact of the Afghan war on Pakistan society; and, of course, the unexpected death of Zia and the military hierarchy in August 1988. The determination and cooperation of many people -- including President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, General Mirza Baig and the armed forces, Chief Election Commissioner Nusrat and his colleagues, the justices of the Supreme Court, and the leaders of the political parties, including the new Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto -- made possible this peaceful transition.

From the delegation's perspective as election observers, the Pakistan experience was instructive in several respects. First, the delegation was apprehensive regarding the likely course of developments. Would Pakistan overcome a tradition of political instability? Would the military remain neutral? Would there be violence surrounding the election process? Would the distrust that had developed during the past decade result in the elections being denounced as fraudulent? Few delegation members, or for that matter Pakistanis with whom the delegation met, expected that the election process would evolve as it did.

Second, despite the recent history of martial law in Pakistan and the concomitant restrictions on political liberties, the election campaign was conducted in an open environment. The

delegation heard few complaints regarding restraints imposed on a candidate's, or for that matter the ordinary citizen's, ability to express his or her views freely on a wide variety of matters.

Third, the delegation could not ignore the fact that the elections were occurring in a Moslem state that has struggled since independence with the issue of how to blend religion and politics. Certainly, the elections demonstrated that large numbers of Pakistanis support the establishment of a democratic society in their country. Bhutto's strong showing in her own constituencies and as the identified leader of the *PPP* also may lead to a reevaluation of certain stereotypes associated with Islamic culture.

Upon assuming office, Prime Minister Bhutto moved quickly to eliminate decrees that discriminated against women, an issue of concern to many human rights activists. The issue of discrimination against religious minorities, however, may prove more troublesome. The Pakistan electoral system, for example, highlights the issue of whether minority interests are best served by providing separate voting rights and voting rolls for the Muslim and non-Muslim electorates. On the one hand, the separate rolls ensures minority representation -- 10 members -- in the National Assembly. On the other hand, it singles out the minority communities, increasing the difficulties involved in their obtaining full civil equality.

This general issue aside, the treatment of the Ahmadis, a dissident Islamic sect, will pose a major challenge to the regime. This group claims that its members have been effectively disenfranchised by a government decision, adopted during the Ali Bhutto regime, to treat them as non-Muslims; this means that Ahmadis are required to vote in the elections for minority seats, something they are not prepared to do. Consequently, they boycotted the 1988 elections.

Fourth, the delegation was impressed with the degree of respect for the judicial system and for the rule of law. Thus, for example, despite *PPP* concerns over the ID card requirement, once the Supreme Court sustained the ID card requirement, the *PPP* quickly and publicly accepted the decision. This respect for

the judiciary should help Pakistan consider, in a non-confrontational manner, the legacy of the martial law period. At the same time, it appears unlikely, given a non-PPP controlled Senate, that there will be revocation of the constitutional amendments adopted in 1985, despite the PPP's contention that they are illegitimate.

Finally, the role that international observers played in the process is worth noting. (There were two additional groups -- a 10-member team sponsored by the South Asian Regional Coordinating Council and a team of three British parliamentarians -- observing the elections). Despite the size of the country, the limited number of observers and the ultimate conduct of the elections, the international observers effect on the overall process was greater than might have been expected.

The decision of high government officials, including President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, to receive formally the delegation and to facilitate their presence signaled a commitment to the conduct of fair and honest elections. Moreover, the presence of the observers was publicized by the Pakistan media and by local Pakistan leaders, thus increasing the stakes for those inclined to manipulate the process. The Pakistan election officials were justifiably proud of the system they had devised for administering elections and therefore welcomed international examination of the process.

In these regards, the Pakistan example demonstrates that to the extent a government is inclined to permit the conduct of free and fair elections, the presence of international observers will redound to its benefit, raise the confidence level of opposition candidates and contribute to a more stable transition after the election.

## **APPENDICES**

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**PAKISTAN IN TRANSITION: THE 1988 ELECTIONS  
REPORT OF SURVEY DELEGATION**

October 10-18, 1988

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

A six-member bipartisan survey team sponsored by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) visited Pakistan October 10-18, 1988. The purpose of the visit was to study the legal and administrative framework in place for the November 16 national elections and to assess the feasibility of sending an international delegation to support the electoral process at the time of the elections.

For the last two years, NDI, at the request of interests within Pakistan, has been developing a project to encourage and assist the transition to a democratically elected civilian government. Based on a series of missions, NDI had concluded that the transition process was impeded by the diminished and inadequate capacity of key institutions to support democratic development. NDI planned a series of seminars to address this problem. The program was postponed when President Zia ul-Haq dismissed the government of Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo and dissolved the National and Provincial Assemblies on May 29.

Thereafter, the President scheduled elections for November 16. Maintaining that free and fair elections were essential to democratic development, NDI explored the possibility of sending a delegation to observe the elections. President Zia was receptive to the idea on the condition that it include Republicans and Democrats from the United States. Benazir Bhutto, leader of the Pakistan People's Party, meanwhile, encouraged the presence of representatives of the international community for the elections.

Following the death of President Zia, the constitutional transfer of power to Senate President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, and a series of decisions by the Supreme Court pertaining to the

elections, it was decided that NDI would send a survey team to study the electoral system and the feasibility of sending a delegation for the November 16 elections. The objectives of this mission were to obtain information about the election laws, the administrative procedures for elections, and the political climate in which the elections would take place.

Of particular interest to NDI were: 1) the electoral code and administrative procedures for the 1988 elections; 2) preparations being made by the Election Commission; 3) the implementation of the electoral code in the pre-election period, particularly the delimitation of electoral districts, the preparation of electoral rolls, and the certification of candidates; 4) the decisions of the Supreme Court relating to the conduct of party-based elections; 5) the overall political climate as it may affect the fairness of the election; and 6) the willingness of the government and the contesting parties to cooperate with an international group in providing access and security at the time of the election.

The survey team visited Islamabad and all four provincial capitals, as well as several rural areas. Meetings were held with a variety of government and non-government officials, including national and provincial election commissioners, provincial chief ministers and governors, leaders of all major political parties, journalists, and representatives of the legal and academic communities.

The survey team's summary conclusions are as follows:

- The processes established by laws and regulations for the conduct of the November elections are impressive and safeguards against manipulation of the vote compare favorably with those of democratic countries around the world. A comprehensive framework for procedurally correct elections has been devised.
- The Election Commission has thus far fulfilled its legal responsibilities in a fair and expeditious manner. Its decisions, specifically those relating

to the delimitation of electoral districts, the assigning of symbols and the certification of candidates, have been accepted by all contesting parties.

- The new activist posture adopted by the Supreme Court has placed it in a position of institutional leadership as Pakistan attempts once again to establish constitutional democracy with a meaningful role for political parties.
- The actual implementation of the written legal and administrative procedures will be the key factor in assessing the fairness of the elections. Given the system in place, irregularities -- such as intimidation of voters, multiple vote casting, last-minute movement of polling places, ballot-stuffing, and fraud during the counting phase -- can be detected by Pakistanis monitoring the process. *Thus, it is our belief that fraudulent practices affecting the margin of victory in any given election district should be difficult to conceal.*
- Specific reforms of past election procedures in Pakistan -- including the appointment of judicial officials as local and district election administrators, the identification of voters, and the far reaching authority given by the government to the federal Election Commission in conducting the elections -- increase the prospects for free and fair elections. In particular, the replacement of the executive branch of government by the judiciary in the administration of the elections has inspired confidence in the process by all participants.
- General Mizar Aslam Baig's guarantee that the military will maintain law and order during the elections and that the army "will leave politics to the politicians" is welcomed and accepted by all parties.

*Appendix II*

- Some political party leaders have expressed concern that officials of the caretaker government are using their incumbency to gain an advantage in the election by spending government funds to promote their own political agenda. This practice is common in democracies, but the charge carries additional weight in Pakistan because the current government lacks the legitimacy of a free election (the President was the constitutionally-designated successor, but the other ministers and provincial leaders were appointed by President Zia after the dissolution of the Junejo government).
- Whether or not the "caretaker" problem is addressed prior to the election, concerns that provincial chief ministers will attempt to rig the elections have been somewhat allayed by the introduction of the judiciary into the process. We believe that safeguards are adequate to detect attempts to compromise the election, and that, while no safeguards provide absolute guarantees, those in place in Pakistan should be a deterrent to those who would attempt to tamper with the system.
- Despite concerns about certain perceived imperfections in the implementation of the electoral system, most political leaders believe that the climate surrounding these elections is favorable. Although violence in the Sind and floods in the Punjab could influence election results, there is a consensus that elections should proceed as scheduled. The survey team recognizes that varying degrees of violence have accompanied previous elections in Pakistan and that if such violence were to erupt on November 16 it would not, *per se*, invalidate the electoral process.

Based on discussions with a broad cross section of political leaders, the delegation believes that most Pakistanis are

prepared to accept the results of the elections, regardless of their outcome, assuming they are conducted in a free and fair manner, and concludes that the elections provide an opportunity for democracy in Pakistan to move forward. An international delegation would serve the interests of Pakistan and the community of democratic nations by underscoring the vital role a credible election process can play in bringing about a stable transition to a democratic government.

To: International Delegation  
From: Brian Atwood, NDI President  
Re: Terms of Reference  
Date: November 5, 1988

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The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) is organizing a 20-member international delegation for the November 1988 elections in Pakistan. While the delegation's primary focus will be on the November 16 National Assembly elections, several members of the delegation also will be in Pakistan for the November 19 Provincial Assembly elections.

The delegation includes political party leaders and election experts from several countries. The delegates from the United States includes members of both the Republican and Democratic parties.

In organizing this delegation, NDI does not presume to supervise the elections or to interfere in Pakistan affairs. Further, NDI recognizes that the judgment regarding the elections will be made by the people. Based on their assessment, Pakistanis will decide whether the elections provide the foundation for establishing a more democratic system of government.

This delegation's modest role is to reflect the consensus of the Pakistanis as they assess the elections process. The delegation's report will bear witness to that evaluation and will inform the international community about the nature of political developments in Pakistan.

The observations of this delegation and other credible sources will form the basis for our conclusions regarding these elections. The delegation, therefore, must attempt to document observations and in all instances to distinguish factual from subjective judgments. To accomplish this task, the delegation

will meet with government and election officials, leaders of the various political parties, and representatives of other institutions that are playing a role in the electoral process.

To gain a national perspective regarding the electoral process, the delegation will divide into teams that will visit Pakistan's four provinces on election day, November 16. The information gathered while in the federal capital of Islamabad, in the four provincial capitals and in surrounding areas will provide a national perspective that will be reflected in the delegation report prepared following the elections.

The delegation will refrain from any public comment that could be construed as influencing the outcome of the November 19 Provincial Assembly elections. NDI requests that the delegates also not make any comments to the media regarding their personal observations of the elections until the Provincial Assembly elections have been completed.

Based on NDI's work in Pakistan during the past two years, and, in particular, based on the findings of the bipartisan survey team that visited Pakistan from October 10-18, 1988, the following are among the issues that appear most relevant for consideration by the delegation.

### **I. The Political Campaign**

- A. Were there any restrictions that prevented political parties from conducting their respective campaigns in any region of the country?
- B. During the campaign, were candidates or voters subjected to intimidation as part of an attempt to influence their vote? What was the government response to such actions?
- C. Was there evidence of illegal campaign practices by any of the participants? How did the authorities respond to these charges?
- D. Did government officials abuse the perquisites of incumbency? What effect did this have on the campaign?

- E. What role did the media play in the campaign? Did the competing parties obtain adequate and relatively equal access to the media? Was the media censored during the campaign?

## **II. Administration of the Elections**

- A. Did the Election Commission and the local electoral officials act in a nonpartisan manner?
- B. Did the safeguards included in the law prove adequate to prevent widespread fraud in the balloting process? Were voters identified in accordance with the procedures established by the Election Commission? Were large numbers of Pakistanis unable to vote because they lacked national identify cards?
- C. Were voters able to cast secret ballots? Was there any intimidation of voters by security forces, local leaders or political parties on election day?
- D. Were the polling agents designated by the political parties permitted access to polling sites and to the counting centers?
- E. Were ballots counted in the manner established by law? Were there suspicious delays in the preparation or release of election returns?

## **III. The Results**

- A. Were the official results reported in accordance with the electoral law?
- B. Did the various Pakistani political parties recognize the results? If not, were challenges filed in accordance with the electoral law?

STATEMENT OF J. BRIAN ATWOOD  
PRESIDENT, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE

ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN

November 14, 1988

It is my privilege to introduce the international delegation that is present in Pakistan this week for Pakistan's National Assembly and Provincial Assembly elections.

The delegates -- who are members of parliament, professors of law and politics, elections experts and political professionals -- come from Turkey, Tunisia, Malaysia, Ireland and the United States. The American members of the delegation represent both the Republican and Democratic parties. A complete list of the delegation is available.

The Honorable Ruairi Quinn, T.D., a minister in the previous government of Ireland, is serving as co-leader of the delegation. I want to express my gratitude to him and to all of the delegates for agreeing to join us in this endeavor.

We are here to demonstrate international support for the democratic transition that is underway here in Pakistan and to report to the international community on the election process that will occur on Wednesday and Saturday of this week.

It is important that the modest role of this international delegation be understood. We do not presume to judge the Pakistan election process; Pakistan is a sovereign and proud nation. We hope to express, by our presence, international support for the democratic aspirations of the Pakistani people. Worldwide attention is focussed on Pakistan this week, and we want to provide a first-hand report on the significant events occurring in this country.

The National Democratic Institute has been studying the Pakistan political system for two years. Four survey missions have visited Pakistan, including, most recently, a six-member team that was here October 10-18. These missions have met

with political party leaders across the spectrum, government officials, the elections commissions at both the federal and provincial level, and independent Pakistan analysts of the political scene.

The most recent mission prepared a comprehensive report, which has been made available to the public. It concluded that a framework for procedurally correct elections has been devised. It is a good system. The written law compares favorably with those of democratic countries around the world. The independence and integrity of the Election Commission and the judiciary contribute significantly to the prospects for free and fair elections. As is true in all countries, however, the implementation on these procedures in the days ahead will be the key to any independent assessment of these elections.

We believe that the safeguards are such that efforts to commit fraud will be detected and will come to the attention of the Pakistan people.

Since arriving in Pakistan, our delegation has met with the Election Commission and several Pakistan political analysts. The Election Commission has provided us with identification cards that will enable our delegates to enter polling sites and observe the proceedings. Neither the commission nor the government has placed any restrictions or conditions on where or when we may visit polling places.

Later today, we will divide into five teams. One will remain in Islamabad, while the others will travel to the provincial capitals: Lahore, Peshawar, Quetta and Karachi. On Tuesday, these teams will meet with political leaders and local elections officials in each area, in preparation for visits to polling sites in the five areas on election day. The delegates will be particularly interested in the observations and impressions of Pakistanis, as they assess the campaign, the procedures on election day, and the results.

The delegation will reassemble on November 17, in Karachi. Several members of the delegation will remain in Pakistan for the Provincial Assembly elections. As soon as

possible after our return home, when we have consolidated our various observations, the delegation will prepare a report that will be published by NDI.

I will conclude by noting that so far we have been favorably impressed by the administrative preparation for the election, and by the apparent free and open nature of the campaign. We have been particularly impressed with the willingness of the courts and the Election Commission to attempt to resolve controversies quickly.

It appears to us now that the determination of Pakistan's next government will rest, as it should, in the hands of persons freely elected by the people of Pakistan. We share their hopes for peaceful elections and for the continued development of a democratic, civil polity in Pakistan.

The Muslim November 13, 1988

## Majority to accept poll results, says NDI report

ISLAMABAD, Nov. 12: A report by the Washington-based National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) says that most Pakistanis are prepared to accept the results of the elections, regardless of their outcome, if they are held in a fair and free manner.

The NDI which has sent four observation missions to Pakistan since April 1987 observed that "varying degrees of violence has accompanied previous elections in Pakistan and if such violence were to erupt on Nov. 16 it would not invalidate the electoral process."

The objective of the NDI missions was to obtain information about the election laws, the administrative procedures for elections, and the political climate in which the elections would take place.

The missions were sent on request from people inside Pakistan and were approved by the late President Ziaul Haq on the condition that Republicans and Democrats from the United States would also be included in the NDI teams. Benazir Bhutto has also welcomed the presence of NDI teams in Pakistan before,

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By ANWAR IQBAL

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during and after the elections to observe the electoral process.

The survey teams visited Islamabad and all the four provincial capitals as well as several rural areas. They met government leaders, politicians, journalists and representatives of the legal and academic communities to assess the process that may lead to the establishment of democracy in the country after eleven years of martial law and controlled democratic systems.

The teams found that the processes established by law and regulations for the conduct of November elections were "impressive" and safeguards against manipulation of the vote counted "favourably with those of democratic countries around the world."

The Election Commission, they observed, has thus far fulfilled its legal responsibilities in a fair and expeditious manner.

The NDI report also mentioned "the new activist posture adopted by the Supreme Court" which has "placed it in a position of institutional leadership as Pakistan

attempts once again to establish constitutional democracy with a meaningful role for political parties."

The survey teams also observed that a mechanism had already been developed to check intimidation of voters, multiple vote casting, last-minute movement of polling places, ballot-stuffing, and defrauding during the counting.

"The replacement of the executive branch of the government by the judiciary in the administration of elections has inspired confidence in the process of all the participants," the report said.

The NDI observed that "General Mirza Aslam Beg's guarantee that the military will maintain law and order during the elections and that the army will leave politics to the politicians is welcomed and accepted by all parties."

Referring to complaints of misuse of power and public funds by the caretaker governments to gain an advantage in the elections, the report says that "this practice is common in democracies."

However, it observes that "the charge carries an additional weight in Pakistan because the current government lacks the legitimacy of a free election."

Dawn November 15, 1988

## NDI team briefed on poll arrangements

ISLAMABAD, Nov 14: A 25-member international delegation, sponsored by the Washington-based National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), is in Pakistan to observe the Nov 16 National Assembly elections.

Addressing a Press conference on Monday, two leaders of the delegation Mr J. Brian Arwood, President of the NDI and Mr Ruairi Quinn, member parliament, Republic of Ireland, said that Pakistan authorities had provided them all facilities to witness the polls.

They told newsmen that they had called on President Ghulam Ishaq Khan on Monday. They said they were deeply impressed by the President's total commitment to hold free and fair elections. The international observers also visited the Election Commission where they were given a detailed briefing on the Election arrangements and procedures.

They praised the system and said the Election Commission had adopted democratic procedures for holding fair and free elections which were an event of worldwide interest, they added.

The NDI delegation leaders described as a very important factor the induction of judicial supervision of the balloting and said the safeguards would help prevent any attempt to commit irregularities, in the elections.

The purpose of the delegation

visit, according to Arwood, is to "underscore the vital role a credible electoral process can play in bringing about a stable democracy."

The delegation was organised in response to a recommendation by a six-person, bi-partisan survey mission that visited Pakistan October 10-18, 1988. In their report, the NDI survey team noted that a comprehensive framework for procedurally correct elections has been devised, but that the actual implementation of the written legal and administrative procedures will be the key factor in assessing the fairness of the elections. The team commended the Election Commission for fulfilling its responsibilities in a fair and expeditious manner.

The delegation, after being briefed by Government officials, representatives of the Election Commission and political party leaders would divide into teams covering Islamabad and the four provincial capitals on election day. The delegates will regroup on Nov 17 to discuss their respective experiences, and several members of the delegation will remain for the Nov 19 Provincial Assembly elections.

The delegation includes political party leaders, election experts and legal scholars from Ireland, Malaysia, Turkey, Tunisia, United Kingdom and United States.

APP

# The New York Times

NEW YORK, TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1988

## PAKISTAN PRAISED ON OPEN CAMPAIGN

### International Observers Say Disruptions and Violence Were Largely Avoided

By BARBARA CROSSETTE

Special to The New York Times

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, Nov. 14 — An international delegation preparing to monitor elections in Pakistan this week said today that it was "favorably impressed" by preparations for the voting and by the openness of the political campaign.

The campaign, which ended tonight, has been remarkably free of violence and disruption. On Wednesday, Pakistanis will choose a National Assembly, the lower house of the national legislature. On Saturday, they will vote for provincial assemblies.

The 18-member international monitoring team, which will visit all the country's provinces, is sponsored by the Washington-based National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, affiliated with the Democratic Party.

Led by the institute's president, J. Brian Atwood, and Ruairi Quinn, a former member of the Irish Parliament, the nonpartisan delegation includes politicians and scholars from Malaysia, Tunisia, Turkey and Britain as well as Democrats and Republicans from the United States.

A separate monitoring team of constitutional experts from India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal said in a statement last week that it "noted with satisfaction the resolve and determination to conduct a free, fair and impartial election."

### Close of Campaigns

Political parties today held their last rallies and motorcades, including a long and exuberant motorized procession of members of the Pakistan People's Party of Benazir Bhutto around Islamabad, the capital.

Ms. Bhutto made a hastily arranged trip to the North West Frontier Province following two days of mixed results in Punjab, the country's most populous province.

On Sunday night, Ms. Bhutto, whose campaign became increasingly disorganized toward the end, kept a loyal crowd of party supporters waiting nearly eight hours on a cold night in Lahore. A rally announced for 8 P.M. had begun to draw a crowd by late afternoon. Ms. Bhutto did not arrive until 3:15 A.M. today, by which time her audience, small by the standards of earlier rallies elsewhere in the country, had dwindled further.

She said that while she might be denied a landslide, she was confident that her party could win a majority.

One of Ms. Bhutto's main rivals, the Punjab's acting Chief Minister, Nawaz Sharif, staged his final rally in Lahore.

On Wednesday, Pakistanis vote to fill 205 National Assembly seats. In two other districts, candidates have died and by-elections will be held later. In addition, 10 seats will go to non-Muslims — predominantly Christians, Hindus, Sikhs and Parsis — who in effect vote as segregated electoral communities. When the National Assembly convenes, it will choose 20 members for seats reserved for women. Women are free, however, to run on general ballots.

The election this week is expected to return the country to its parliamentary system, largely suspended under President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, with political parties in the National Assembly determining who will head the government.

Under the Constitution, the President, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who stepped in as interim head of state after President Zia was killed in a plane crash in August, will officially name a Prime Minister after the composition of the assembly becomes clear.

The National Assembly will in turn elect a President, according to the Constitution, but there are disagreements here over the sequence of choosing the two top officials.

The Pakistan Times, Tuesday, November 15, 1988.

## NDI global team to observe N.A. polls

A 25-member international delegation, sponsored by the Washington-based National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), is in Pakistan to observe the Nov. 16 National Assembly elections.

Addressing a Press conference two leaders of the delegation Mr. J. Brian Atwood, President of the NDI and Mr. Ruairi Quinn, member Parliament Republic of Ireland, said that Pakistan authorities had provided them all facilities to witness the polls.

They told newsmen that they had called on President Ghulam Ishaq Khan on Monday. They said they were deeply impressed by the President's total commitment to hold free and fair elections. The international observers also visited the Election Commission where they were given a detailed briefing on the election arrangements and procedures.

They praised the system and said that the Election Commission had adopted democratic procedures for holding fair and free elections which were an event of world wide interest, they added.

The NDI delegation leaders described as a very important factor the induction of judicial supervision of the balloting and said the safeguards would help prevent any attempt to commit irregularities, in the elections.

The purpose of the delegation visit, according to Atwood, is to "underscore the vital role a credible electoral process can play in bringing about a stable democracy."

The delegation visit is in response to a recommendation by a six-member, bipartisan survey mission that visited Pakistan from Oct. 10 to 18. In their report, the NDI survey team noted that "a comprehensive framework for procedurally correct elections has been devised," but that the "actual implementation of the written

legal and administrative procedures will be the key factor in assessing the fairness of the elections". The team commended the Election Commission for fulfilling its responsibilities in a fair and expected manner.

The delegation after briefing would divide into teams covering Islamabad and the four provincial capitals on election day. The delegates will regroup on Nov. 17 to discuss their respective experiences, and several members of the delegation will stay for Nov. 19 Provincial Assembly elections.

The delegation includes political party leaders, election experts and legal scholars from Ireland, Malaysia, Turkey, Tunisia, United Kingdom and United States.

It is notable that chaired by former Vice President Walter F. Mondale, NDI conducts non-partisan political development programmes overseas. By working with political parties and other institutions, NDI seeks to promote, maintain and strengthen democratic institutions.

During the past two years, NDI has sent four missions to Pakistan to assist the transition to democracy. NDI has also organised international delegations for elections in the Philippines and Haiti, and, most recently, ensured a 55-member international delegation for the Oct. 5 Chilean plebiscite.—APP.

The Muslim November 15, 1988

## 25-member international team to observe Nov. 16 polls

ISLAMABAD, Nov. 14: A 25-member international delegation, sponsored by the Washington-based National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), is in Pakistan to observe the Nov. 16 National Assembly elections.

Addressing a Press conference two leaders of the delegation Mr. J.J. Brian Atwood, President of the NDI and Mr. Ruairi Quinn, member Parliament Republic of Ireland, said that Pakistan authorities had provided them all facilities to witness the polls.

They told newsmen that they had called on President Ghulam Ishaq Khan Monday. They said they were deeply impressed by the President's total commitment to hold free and fair elections. The international observers also visited the Election Commission where they were given a detailed briefing on the election arrangements and procedures.

They praised the system and said the Election Commission had adopted democratic procedures for holding fair and free elections which were an event of World-wide interest, they added.

The NDI delegation leaders described as a very important factor the induction of judicial supervision of the balloting and said the safeguards would help prevent any attempt to commit irregularities in the elections.

The purpose of the delegation's visit, according to Atwood, is to underscore the vital role a credible electoral process can play in bringing about a stable democracy.

The delegation was organised in response to a recommendation by a six-person, bipartisan survey mission that visited Pakistan Oct. 10-18, 1988. In their report, the NDI survey team noted "a comprehensive framework for procedurally correct elections has been devised, but that the "actual implementation of the written legal and administrative procedures will be the key factor in assessing the fairness of the elections." The team commended the election commission for fulfilling its responsibilities fairly and expeditiously.

The delegation after briefings with government officials, representatives of the Election Commission and political party leaders would divide into teams covering Islamabad and the four provincial capitals on election day. The delegates will regroup on Nov. 17 to discuss their respective experiences, and several members of the delegation will remain for the Nov. 19 Provincial Assembly elections.

The delegation includes political party leaders, election experts and legal scholars from Ireland, Malaysia, Turkey, Tunisia, United Kingdom and United States.

It is notable that chaired by former Vice President Walter F Mondale, NDI conducts non-partisan political development programmes overseas, by working with political parties and other institutions, NDI seeks to promote, maintain and strengthen democratic institutions and pluralistic values in new and emerging democracies.

During the past two years, NDI has sent four missions to Pakistan to assist the transition to democracy. NDI has also organised international delegations for elections in the Philippines and Haiti, and most recently, sponsored a 55 member international delegation for the Oct. 5, 1988 Chilean plebiscite.

Pakistan Times November 16, 1988

## Irregularities can be detected Pak election laws highly impressive—NDI report

WASHINGTON, Nov. 15: "The process established by laws and regulations for the conduct of the November elections in Pakistan is highly impressive and compare favourably with those of democratic countries around the world", according to a report released today by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI). The report notes that "irregularities—such as intimidation of voters, multiple vote casting, last-minute movement of polling places, ballot-stuffing and fraud during the counting phase—can be detected by Pakistanis monitoring the process".

The report is based on an October 10 to 18 visit to Pakistan by a six-person bipartisan survey mission. The visit was sponsored by NDI, which has closely monitored political development in Pakistan over the past two years. The survey group met with senior Government and election officials, political party leaders, journalists, representatives of the Bar Association and academics in Islamabad and the four provincial capitals—Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar and Quetta.

"The safeguards in place, the confidence of the contesting parties in the system and the new spirit of liberation greatly impressed the NDI team", said NDI President Brian Atwood. "The real message of this report is that those who would seek to manipulate the election will be swimming against the current in Pakistan", said Atwood. "If political leaders try to cheat, or cry foul when there is no foul, the system will expose them to their fellow citizens", he asserted.

In their report, the mission commends the Election Commission

for fulfilling its responsibilities in a "fair and expeditious manner" and notes that there is a consensus among Pakistanis, including the military and virtually all political party leaders, that the elections should proceed as scheduled.

The mission concluded that "the election provides an opportunity for democracy to move forward in Pakistan".

Chaired by former Vice-President Walter F. Mondale, NDI conducts non-partisan political development programmes overseas. By working with political parties and other institutions, NDI seeks to promote, maintain and strengthen democratic institutions and pluralistic values in new and emerging democracies.

During the past two years, NDI has sent four missions to Pakistan to assist the transition to democracy. NDI has also organised international delegations for elections in the Philippines and Haiti, and, most recently, sponsored a 55-person international delegation for the Oct. 5, 1988 Chilean plebiscite.—P. R.

Frontier Post November 17, 1988

## The Pakistan elections and the world

Today Pakistan appears to be the focus of the attention of the world. An important organisation, based in America, but representing world opinion, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, led by its President, Mr J Brian Atwood is in Pakistan to observe the elections. Mr Atwood said "the attention of the world is focused on Pakistan this week and they wanted to provide a first-hand report on the significant events occurring in this country". A similar delegation consisting of important representatives of SAARC countries is also here to observe the elections. This delegation has the same aim of expressing support for the democratic process restored in Pakistan, they also hope to learn how the election laws and procedures have been framed and how they are being implemented, so that they can shape their own electoral laws which are now under review. The American Ambassador, Mr Oaklev, is taking a keen interest in the elections and was the first foreign diplomatic dignitary to visit the Election Commission office. He asked many searching questions about the arrangements for the polls. Both the Democratic and the Republican parties of America have made arrangements to monitor the polls in Pakistan in addition to the monitoring by the U.S State Department.

Crowds of journalists representing a large number of countries of the world have arrived to send their own reports of the elections. All these foreign observers and journalists have been accorded a great deal of freedom and many facilities to observe whatever aspect of the election they wish to see. The more important delegations have been provided with documents enabling them to visit any polling station they wish to and see for themselves how elections are actually being conducted. They are moving about freely and meeting representatives of all shades of political opinion and gathering all the information they require. Pakistan has made its elections as visible to the world as it is possible for it to do. This fact will inspire confidence in the voters and all the candidates and their supporters. It would also ensure that the election law is fairly and strictly implemented, and the

results will, therefore accepted by all as a true reflection of the opinion of the voters.

The interest of the world is not surprising, even though Pakistan is a small country in the international community. The main reason for this interest is that the democratic process has been aborted so often for so long that it is of the greatest interest to see how Pakistan makes a renewed start towards a mature democratic society. Third World countries like Pakistan have been the nappy hunting grounds of dictators of various kinds. Coups, palace intrigues, military interventions, have been all too frequent, while democracy has been entirely rejected, or modified, and diluted under various names such as 'basic democracy', 'controlled democracy', 'grass roots democracy', 'partyless democracy', etc. If there has been any democratic constitution it has existed in name only, or implemented in such a manner as to be a mockery of democracy. Now that a serious and determined effort is being made to establish a democratic polity in Pakistan, the world at large and countries like ours are keen observers. Our first steps towards a genuine democracy. Older democracies are also observing us both to express support for our endeavours, as well as to assess objectively for themselves how our publicly expressed intentions have been implemented.

Today all the countries of the world are knit together in a complex web of relationships and no country however small can remain isolated, nor can it be ignored by the biggest and most powerful nations. It is true that this web in some cases is a spider's web to trap unwary small insects which are devoured by the spider. The initiation of the democratic process might bring about changes that some of our friends may not relish, and some changes might not please our opponents, rivals or neighbours. The complexion of the next government is of great interest to the world and this is the reason why the world is as keen to observe our elections as the citizens of this country. And we and the whole world will anxiously listen to the official announcements of the results over the TV and Radio.

INTERNATIONAL DELEGATION TO  
PAKISTAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS

November 16, 1988

*Teams*

*Lahore*

Abdulla Ahmad Badawi  
Elizabeth Bagley  
Lovida Coleman  
Larry Garber  
Elliott Kulick  
Robert Wholey

*Islamabad/Rawalpindi*

Brian Atwood  
Lazhar Bouaouni  
Stephen Del Rosso (Staff)  
Lee Feldman  
Richard Johnson  
Andrew Semmel (Advisor)  
Geoffrey Allen (Staff)

*Peshawar*

Mark Braden  
Elaine Shocas  
Thomas Susman

*Karachi*

Sean Carroll (Staff)  
Patricia Keefer  
Ergun Ozbudun  
Ruairi Quinn  
Edward Weidenfeld

*Quetta*

Joan Baggett  
Robert Hathaway (Advisor)  
Thomas Melia (Staff)

## PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL DELEGATION TEAM MEETINGS

November 14-15, 1988

### *Islamabad*

**M. BILAL**

Senior Supreme Court Advocate

**PERVIZ IQBAL CHEEMA**

Chairman, Int'l. Relations Department,  
Q.A. University

**MR. ERABI**

Journalist

**MUSHAHID HUSSAIN**

Former Editor, *The Muslim*

**MALEEHA LODHI**

Editor, *The Muslim*

**M.K. NAQSHBANDI**

Public Relations Chief,  
*Pakistan Muslim League (PML)*  
Central Secretariat

**SA. NUSRAT**

Chief Election Commissioner

**M.Z.K. NIAZI**

Advisor, *Pakistan People's Party (PPP)*

### *Karachi*

**AKHIAQ AHMED**

Journalist, Candidate, PA 82,  
*Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (JI)*

**QADIRUDDIN AHMED**

Governor, Sind Province

**ABDULIAH BALOCH**

General Secretary, *National People's Party (NPP)*

**NASIM HAIDER**

Deputy Secretary General, (NPP)  
Candidate, Provincial Assembly, (JI)

**MUZAFFAR HASHMI**

Candidate, NA 187, *Jamiat-i-Islami (JI)*

**ALTAF HUSSAIN**

Founder, *Mohajir Quami Mahaz (MQM)*

**MAZAR ALI**

Member, Senate of Pakistan

**DARIUS MINWALLA**

Advisor, Benazir Bhutto

**RASHIDA PATEL**

Advocate

**ALHAAJ SHAMIMUDDEN**

President, *JJI*

**ABDUL RAZAK A. THAHIM**

Judge, Sind High Court

**M.H. ZAIDA**

Election Commissioner, Sind Province

### *Lahore*

**CHAUDHRY ABDUL AZIZ**

Election Commissioner, Punjab Province

**RAFTQUE AHMAD**

Vice-Chancellor, Professor of Economics,  
University of the Punjab

**BASHA BAKTIAR**

President, All Pakistan Federation of  
Trade Unions

**MAHBUB UL HAQ**

National Minister of Finance

**CHOUDRY GHULAM HUSSAIN**

Editor, *Siasi Log*

**MALIK SAEED HASSAN**

Barrister-at-Law

**SYED FAROOQ HASSAN**

Attorney-at-Law, Senior Advocate,  
Supreme Court

**MAKHDOOM SAJJAS HUSSEIN**

QUERESHI  
Governor, Punjab Province

**RAO RASHID**  
Campaign Manager, NA 94, *PPP*

**SYED NAWAZISH RAZA**  
Computer Specialist, *PPP*

**NAWAZ SHARIF**  
Chief Minister  
National Assembly Candidate, *JJ*

*Peshawar*

**OMER KHAN AFRIDI**  
Chief Secretary, Civil Secretariat

**AJMAL MALIK**  
Director Information

**MR. BACHA**  
Barrister-at-Law

**FAZLE HAQ**  
National Assembly Candidate, *JJ*  
Chief Minister

**KHIZAR HAYAT**  
Commandant Khyber Rifles, Landi Kotal

**GULISTAN JANJUA**  
Governor, Northwest Frontier Province

**KHALID MANSOOR**  
Home Secretary, Northwest Frontier  
Province

**ABDUR RAHIM**  
Election Commissioner,  
Northwest Frontier Province

**SADAT HUSSAIN**  
Northwest Frontier Province, *IGP*

**SHUAIB-UD-DIN**  
Information Officer, Directorate of  
Information

*Quetta*

**QAMIR ALAM**  
Inspector General of Police

**YAHYA BAKHTIAR**  
Candidate, NA 197,  
*PPP*, Former Attorney General

**SYED FASEIH IQBAL**  
Senator, Editor of *Baluchistan Times*

**ABDUL LATEEF**  
Deputy Chief of Protocol,  
Ministry of Information

**RA. MUJAHID**  
Election Commissioner,  
Baluchistan Province

**MOHAMMED MUSA KHAN (General,  
Ret'd)**  
Governor, Baluchistan Province

*Appendix VIII*STATEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER  
DELEGATION

J. BRIAN ATWOOD

KARACHI, PAKISTAN

November 20, 1988

The international delegation sponsored by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs congratulates the people of Pakistan for a peaceful and thus far, successful electoral process. What happened Wednesday and yesterday at polling places all over the country should be a source of national pride for Pakistan.

Our 22 delegates covered six major cities in each of the nation's provinces for both the elections for the National Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies, although we concentrated on the former. We visited approximately 400 polling places. In addition, prior to the elections as well as on the election days, we talked with representatives of the major political parties, election officials and independent groups monitoring the process. While there were some minor disputes -- indeed, some ongoing challenges may be the subject of adjudication -- our impression is that the Pakistan people believe, based on their experiences, that the process was generally free and fair. They have been afforded an opportunity to express their vote and they have done so.

The delegation attempted to examine any and all allegations of misconduct and we will continue to do so over the next few days.

As we indicated in our pre-election statement, the delegation believed that fraud in the polling and counting phases could be detected if present. Candidates' polling agents were at all the polling places we observed and we understand that they were present throughout the counting phase. We were impressed by the willingness of the party agents to work together

and the cooperation they received from the election officials. They carefully checked voting rolls and were present at the polling places for the counting.

If there are any disputes over counting, we believe that the party representatives should be able to produce results for each ballot box and polling station. This should permit expeditious adjudication of any counting disputes. In addition, we note the independence of the judiciary, as demonstrated during the last few months, heightens our perception that election disputes will be resolved in an acceptable manner.

Although the final turnout percentage is not yet determined, it appears that it will exceed 50 percent. Thus, on the surface, the turnout does not indicate a massive disenfranchisement of voters from a particular party and in no way invalidates the national results. Whether disenfranchisement in a particular constituency was a major factor in the outcome is a matter to be looked into and we will do so.

We also wish to compliment the military and police forces for providing excellent security for the elections. We saw no evidence of intimidation by security forces. On the contrary, we believe that the presence of police and military personnel contributed greatly to a sense that voters could cast their ballots in peaceful conditions.

In summation, we believe the electoral process succeeded in allowing people in Pakistan to express their will. The November 16 and 19 elections, which followed a free and open campaign, represent an historic event. Based on what our delegation witnessed, we believe this should lead to an historic institutionalization of democracy in Pakistan. The president, the judiciary, the election officials, the political parties and the voters all deserve great credit for the success of this event.

We leave Pakistan with confidence that the completion of the process will go as smoothly as the beginning. We have witnessed a spirit of goodwill and compromise that should prevail when the government is formed within the prescribed time. The rule of law and the principle of representative

democracy have prevailed in a society where it had been previously suspended. There are no real losers in this election because the people have won the right to choose their government.

Dawn November 18, 1988

## NDI team lauds fair poll

By Our Staff Reporter

KARACHI, Nov 17: The International delegation sponsored by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs congratulated the people of Pakistan for peaceful and successful electoral process and described it as a source of national pride for Pakistan.

Addressing a Press conference at a local hotel on Thursday afternoon, President of the NDI, Mr J. Brian Atwood said 25 delegates covered six major cities in all the Provinces and visited about 200 polling stations on the polling Day on Wednesday.

The delegates observed that the electoral process experienced by the people of Pakistan was generally free and fair and they expressed their will, Mr Brian said.

He said that the delegates attempted to examine any and all allegations of misconduct and they would continue to do so over the next few days as several members of the delegation would remain for the Provincial Assembly

elections.

The delegates were impressed by the willingness of the party agents to work together and cooperation they received from the election officials, he added.

Mr Brian also complimented the military and police forces for providing excellent security for the elections. "We saw no evidence of intimidation by security forces. On the contrary, we believe that the presence of police and military personnel contributed greatly to a sense that voters could cast their ballots in peaceful conditions," Mr Brian Atwood remarked.

"The November 16 elections, which followed a free and open campaign, represents an historic event, based on this delegation witnessed, we believe this should lead to an institutionalisation of democracy in Pakistan. The President, the judiciary, the Election Commission, the parties and the voters all deserve credit for making this event a success," he concluded.

Dawn November 21, 1988

## **NDI team greets Pakistan**

**Dawn Islamabad Bureau**

ISLAMABAD, Nov. 20: The co-leader of the Washington-based National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) Mr Brian Atwood, has congratulated the people of Pakistan, for a peaceful and, thus, far successful electoral process.

The 25-member NDI delegation covered six major cities in all the four provinces, for both the National and Provincial Assembly elections. They visited 400 polling stations, focussing largely on the National Assembly elections. Prior to the elections and on election day, the NDI delegation talked to representatives of major political parties, election officials and independent groups monitoring the general elections.

In a statement they said: "While there were some minor disputes — indeed some ongoing challenges may be the subject of adjudication — our impression is that the Pakistani people believe, based on their experiences, that the process was generally free and fair. They have been afforded an opportu-

ity to express their vote and they have done so."

In its statement the NDI co-leader said the delegation observed polling agents at all the polling places and they were given to understand that they were present throughout the counting phase. It added: "We were impressed by the willingness of the party agents to work together and the cooperation they received from the election officials. They carefully checked voting rolls and were present at the polling places for the counting."

The statement said that while the final turnout percentage had yet to be determined, it appeared that it would exceed 50 per cent.

In its summation the NDI said the electoral process had enabled the people to express its will.

Congratulating the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the judiciary, the election officials, the political parties and the voters, the NDI said that "what the delegation had witnessed should lead to the historic insitutionalisation of democracy in Pakistan."

The Pakistan Times, Monday, November 21, 1988

## Successful electoral process World delegation greets people of Pakistan

By a Staff Reporter

The international delegation sponsored by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs has congratulated the people of Pakistan for a peaceful and thus far, successful electoral process. What happened on Wednesday and Saturday at polling places all over the country should be a source of national pride for Pakistan. This was stated by J. Brian Atwood, Co-Leader of the International delegation on Sunday.

"Our 25 delegates covered six major cities in each of the provinces for both the elections for the National Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies, although we concentrated on the former. We visited approximately 400 polling places. In addition, prior to the elections as well as on the election days. We talked with representatives of the major political parties, election officials and independent groups monitoring the process. While there were some minor disputes—indeed, some on-going challenges may be the subject of adjudication—our impression is that the Pakistan people believe, based on their experiences, that the process was generally free and fair. They have been afforded an opportunity to express vote and they have done so. The delegation attempted to examine any and all allegations of misconduct and we will continue to do so over the next few days.

As we indicated in our pre-election statement, the delegation believed that fraud in the polling and counting phases could be detected if present. Candidates' polling agents were at all the polling places we observed and we understand that they were present throughout the counting phase. We were impressed by the willingness of the party agents to work together and the co-operation they received from the election officials. They carefully checked voting rolls and were present at the polling places for the counting.

If there are any disputes over counting, we believe that the party representatives should be able to produce results for each ballot box and polling station. This should

permit expeditious adjudication of any counting disputes. In addition, we note the independence of the judiciary, as demonstrated during the last few months, heightens our perception that election disputes will be resolved in an acceptable manner.

Although the final turnout percentage is not yet determined, it appears that it will exceed 50 per cent. Thus, on the surface, the turnout does not indicate a massive disenfranchisement of voters from a particular party and in no way invalidates the national results. Whether disenfranchisement is a major factor in the outcome is a matter to be looked into and we will do so. We also wish to compliment the military and police forces for providing excellent security for the elections. We saw no evidence of intimidation by security forces. On the contrary, we believe that the presence of police and military personnel contributed greatly to a sense that voters could cast their ballots in peaceful conditions.

In summation, we believe the electoral process succeeded in allowing people in Pakistan to express their will. The Nov. 16 and Nov. 19 elections, which followed a free and open campaign represent an historic event. Based on what our delegation witnessed, we believe this should lead to an historic institutionalisation of democracy in Pakistan. The President, the Judiciary, the election officials, the political parties and the voters, all deserve great credit for the success of this event.

He said the member of delegation leave Pakistan with confidence that the completion of the process will go as smoothly as the beginning. "We have witnessed a spirit of goodwill and compromise that should prevail when the government is formed within the proscribed time. The rule of law and the principle of representative democracy have prevailed in a society where it had been previously suspended. There are no real losers in this election because the people have won the right to choose their governments.

**PARTY SYMBOLS ALLOCATED  
BY THE ELECTION COMMISSION  
FOR THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS**

<i>Pakistan Awami Ittehad</i>	Tractor
<i>Pakistan People's Party</i>	Arrow
<i>Movement for the Restoration of Democracy</i>	Railway Engine
<i>Awami National Party</i>	Lantern
<i>Islami Jamhoori Ittehad</i>	Bicycle
<i>Pakistan Democratic Party</i>	Umbrella
<i>Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam</i>	Book
<i>Pakistan Muslim League (Malik Qasim Group)</i>	Chair
<i>Pakistan Milli Awami Ittehad (Pushtoon Khaw)</i>	Tree
<i>Pakistan Insaaf Party</i>	Lamp
<i>Progressive People's Party</i>	Knife
<i>Pakistan National Party</i>	Axe
<i>Hazara Front (Mehaz-e-Hazara)</i>	Walking Stick
<i>Wattan Party</i>	Wheel

<i>National Peoples Party</i> (Khar Group)	Candle
<i>Pakistan Muslim League</i> (Qaiyum Group)	Scooter
<i>Tehreek-e-Inqalab-e-Islam</i>	Helicopter
<i>Pakistan Muslim League</i> (Forward Block)	Inkpot with Pen
<i>Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam</i> (Darkhasti Group)	Ladder
<i>Pakistan Qaumi Labour Party</i>	Whistle
<i>National Muslim League</i> (Muhasba Group)	Spade
<i>Pakistan Qaumi Mahaz-e-Azadi</i>	Bulb
<i>Jamaat-e-Ahle-Sunnat</i>	Turban
<i>Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Fiqah-e-Jafria</i>	Takhti
<i>National Democratic Party</i>	Flower Vase
<i>Awami National Party</i> (Ainee Group)	Tonga
<i>Pakistan National Democratic Alliance</i>	Bus
<i>Baluchistan National Alliance</i>	Saw
<i>Punjabi Pukhtoon Ittehad</i>	Rickshaw
<i>Muslim Solidarity Movement</i>	Bridge

Appendix XI

SAMPLE BALLOT

MA-104 KARACHI-II  
SERIAL

دھاری سنگھ  
فرقان احمد  
امتیاز صفدر  
رحمت علی  
ریاض احمد  
سلیم شیخ  
عزیز علی  
محمد اشرف

MA-104 KARACHI-II



امیر خان



امتیاز صفدر



رحمت علی



ریاض احمد



سلیم شیخ



عزیز علی




فرقان احمد



محمد اشرف

SAMPLE  
STAMP



RESULTS BY PARTY AND REGION  
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

## Party position

	Total Seats	PPP	IJI	JUI (F)	JUI (D)	ANP	BNA	PAI	PDP	NPP (K)	Independents
Punjab	115	52	45	—	—	—	—	3	1	1	12
Sind	46	31	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	15
NWFP	26	8	8	3	1	2	—	—	—	—	3
Baluchistan	11	1	2	4	—	—	2	—	—	—	2
Islamabad	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
FATA	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8
TOTAL	207	93	55	7	1	2	2	3	1	1	40

NOTE: Elections in two constituencies postponed owing to the death of two candidates.

Source: HERALD 1988

RESULTS BY PARTY AND REGION  
PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLIES

Party positions

	Punjab	Sind	NWFP	Baluchistan	Total
IJI	108	1	29	8	146
PPP	94	67	21	3	185
IND	32	5	15	7	59
ANP	—	—	12	—	12
MQM	—	26	—	—	26
JUI(F)	1	—	2	11	14
BNA	—	—	—	6	6
PDP	2	—	—	—	2
PAI	2	—	—	—	2
PNP	—	—	—	2	2
PKMI	—	—	—	2	2
PPI	—	1	—	—	1
NPP(K)	1	—	—	—	1
WATAN	—	—	—	1	1
TOTAL	240	100	79●	40	459

●Elections postponed in one constituency because of the death of a candidate.

Source: HERALD 1988

### STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF ALLEGED PROBLEM DISTRICTS IN THE PUNJAB

With respect to 19 districts in the Punjab, an analysis was undertaken to determine if voter turnout might have affected the election results in districts that the *PPP* had identified as likely targets of deliberate disenfranchisement. The methodology follows.

In those identified districts where the 1988 turnout was lower than the 1985 turnout, the number of possible additional voters was computed assuming that the 1988 turnout had equalled the 1985 turnout. This number is called "Delta" or "D." The formula is:

$$D = RV*(L - T)$$

where:

RV = 1988 Registered Voters

L = 1985 turnout

T = 1988 turnout

The victory margin (number of votes that the winning party had over the next highest losing party) was computed. This number is called "Margin" or "M."

A value, "P," was computed that represents the percentage of the hypothetical Delta voters who would have had to vote for the losing party in order for the losing party to have won. The formula then is:

$$P = \{(M - 1)/D + 1\}/2$$

An example is Punjab National Assembly district 144. The 1985 turnout was 54.31 percent. The 1988 turnout was 43.17 percent. As a result, 1988 had fewer votes cast as a percentage of registered voters. There were 260,132 registered voters. Thus, the 1988 votes cast equalled 113,299.

The *PPP* received 33.79 percent of the votes cast equal to 37,945 votes. The *IJI* received 32.88 percent or 36,924 votes. As a result, the *PPP* won by a margin of 1,021 votes over the *IJI*.

If the 1988 turnout had equalled the 1985 turnout, what percentage of these hypothesized voters would have had to vote for the *IJI* for the *IJI* to have won?

$$\begin{aligned} M &= 1,021 \text{ votes} \\ RV &= 260,132 \text{ voters} \\ L &= 54.31 \% \text{ or } .5431 \\ T &= 43.17 \% \text{ or } .4317 \\ D &= 260,132 * (.5431 - .4317) = 28,979 \text{ votes} \\ P &= \{[(1,021 + 1)/28,979] + 1\}/2 \\ P &= 0.518 \text{ or } 52 \% \dots \text{this equals } 52 \% \text{ of } 28,979 \text{ or } \\ & 15,011 \text{ votes} \end{aligned}$$

*Thus:*

the *IJI* vote would become  $15,011 + 36,924 = 51,935$  votes,

and

the *PPP* vote would become  $(28,979 - 15,011) + 37,945 = 51,913$  votes.

(The numbers are actually closer, but due to round-off error, it appears that the *IJI* is now winning by a margin of 22 votes.)

To summarize, had the 1988 turnout equalled the 1985 turnout, 52 percent of the additional voters would have had to vote for the *IJI* if the *IJI* was to win.

This methodology is used to analyze each of the "problem" districts.

## Conclusion

In most cases, the values for P were inordinately high (61 percent to 92 percent) to find any effect from low voter turnout in the Punjab. See the following chart for a full list and details. (In two districts, NA 53 and NA 86, the data available was insufficient to make a proper analysis at this time.) There were five districts, however, where the turnouts were low and the margins sufficiently small such that a relatively low value for P could indicate that a change in turnout could have affected the outcome. These districts are:

NA 80	P = 54%	Winner: <i>IJI</i>
NA 135	P = 50%	Winner: <i>IND</i>
NA 144	P = 52%	Winner: <i>PPP</i>
NA 146	P = 51%	Winner: <i>IJI</i>
NA 150	P = 50%	Winner: <i>IJI</i>

ANALYSIS OF 19 DISTRICTS IDENTIFIED BY PPP  
BEFORE THE ELECTION AS SUSCEPTIBLE TO FRAUD

$$2P = \{(M + 1)/[RV(L - T)]\} + 1$$

NA	1985 percent	1988 percent	Victory Margin	Victory percent	P percent	Other (PPP) percent
46	55.14	43.41	1,534 (Two IND)		53	8.97
50	57.14	50.69	23,384 (IJJ)	53.88	> 100	35.84
*53	62.44	39.38	19,689 (PAI)	49.24	69	8.46
72	58.51	55.27	15,038 (IJJ)	55.27	> 100	42.77
78	66.03	48.28	24,585 (IJJ)	49.46	80	27.34
80	64.71	50.16	3,449 (IJJ)	48.68	54	46.44
81	32.07	52.19	8,540 (IJJ)	51.83	NA	46.15
84	47.38	34.81	3,235 (IJJ)	39.04	59	35.33
85	40.73	52.53	19,021 (IJJ)	55.25	NA	37.69
*86	37.32	49.69		-		
87	32.52	50.92	1,174 (PPP)	41.65	NA	40.72 (IJJ)
88	62.74	43.40	25,050 (IJJ)	44.57	92	19.68 (JUP)
95	63.58	45.50	13,436 (IJJ)	55.85	69	40.87
108	61.55	43.88	15,709 (IJJ)	56.34	70	39.98
116	47.80	38.32	4,697 (PPP)	51.22 (PPP)	61 (IJJ)	45.93
135	59.76	41.28	376 (IND)	27.57	50	27.17
144	54.31	43.17	1,021 (PPP)	33.79	52	32.88 (IJJ)
146	63.41	49.23	594 (IJJ)	44.61	51	44.16
150	63.12	44.67	503 (IJJ)	37.18	50	36.78

\*Poor data

## STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF 1985 AND 1988 VOTER TURNOUT

This analysis of the election results represents an attempt to discern any pattern of activity that might have materially influenced or affected the election outcomes. Specifically investigated are the following:

- Identification of any statistically significant variation from the 1985 turnout, especially with respect to certain districts;
- Identification of any activities that might have led to the systematic disenfranchisement of large numbers of voters as an attempt to prejudice the outcome against any particular party, and deliberate or accidental disenfranchisement of voters without respect to party affiliation;
- Evaluation of the use of ID cards on voter turnout;
- Evaluation of the interplay between overall (nationwide) turnout and turnout in specific districts; and
- Investigation of specific allegations with respect to the prejudicial administration of the voter rolls or issuance of ID cards which represented an attempt (successful or not) to influence the election results.

### **A. Methodology**

Data on voter registration and actual votes cast from each district were gathered. The percentage of eligible voters to votes cast was computed for each district. These were compared to 1985 data made available by the Election Commission. The standard deviation ( $\sigma$ ) was computed for 1985 and 1988. This value represents the variance in voter turnout from the national mean for each district such that 95 percent of all districts would fall within this variance range. Any district with a turnout percentage greater or less than the value for

sigma is considered "unusual;" the degree of unusualness is determined by the size of sigma.

For example, if the national voter turnout equalled 50 percent of the registered voters, and the sigma equalled 10, then 95 percent of all districts should have turnouts that fall within the range of 40 percent to 60 percent. Any districts with turnouts of greater than 60 percent or less than 40 percent would be unusual, the extent of the unusualness would be determined by the size of the sigma. The sigma of 20 for a given district is significantly more unusual than a district with a sigma of 15.

The turnout and sigma values for each 1988 district were compared to the values for that same district in 1985. A subsequent analysis grouped districts as follows:

- Districts with a 1988 variance from the mean turnout greater than 1.5 sigma. (Within this group, all districts that had an approximately equivalent sigma in 1985 were eliminated. This was done to normalize districts that historically demonstrated unusual (high or low) voting turnouts.)
- Districts with a 1988 variance twice the 1985 sigma. (These are districts where a significant shift in voter turnout occurred from the 1985 elections.)
- Districts that had been identified, in various meetings, as being sources of potential problems.

These groupings were then studied to ascertain if any pattern of activity emerged. Such patterns could include any indication that districts with the most unusual voting data were:

- predominantly rural, or urban;
- predominantly the stronghold of one party;
- in regions where the availability of ID cards were identified as a potential problem (we would expect significantly lower turnouts if voters did not have ID card, but were on the registration rolls); or

- geographically and demographically similar to adjacent districts that did not exhibit unusual behavior.

Overall, the quality of the data provided was reasonable for the resolution of the analysis performed. However, some of the data was somewhat questionable as there were significant deviations between reporting sources, there were numerous arithmetic errors in the 1988 compilations, and there were certain logical irregularities not worth noting individually (i.e., variance in the number of registered voters from the 1985 registration that are inexplicable).

**B. The Results**

	<u>1988</u>	<u>1985</u>
Registered voters (56.99% of population)	48,016,730	32,537,133
Votes Cast	20,940,096	16,886,724
Voter turnout (mean)	43.61%	61.90%
Standard deviation (sigma)	11.05	11.50
95% normative distribution for turnout in individual districts should fall between:	32.56 and 54.66%	39.50 and 63.40%

**C. General Comments**

Voter turnout in 1985 was significantly higher (61.90 percent) than 1988 (43.61 percent). The standard deviation (sigma) from the mean voter turnout in both 1985 and 1988 were approximately equivalent (11.50 and 11.05 respectively). As a result of the difference in the mean and similarity of the sigmas, individual districts would be expected to behave in a manner similar to their behavior in 1985, albeit with a slightly lower turnout percent, i.e., a district that had a low turnout in 1985 would likely have a slightly lower turnout in 1988. Of course, individual campaigns could cause a variance in any single district, but overall 1988 behavior was expected to closely mimic

1985 behavior overall. Districts reflecting a significant difference from their 1985 behavior, and a significant difference from their expected 1988 behavior (sigma) would be a cause for some concern. Furthermore, as mentioned previously, if this behavior followed a pattern, this would be an indication of some unusual activity.

### Districts in Question

*Northwest Frontier Province* 1985 turnout = 39 percent or -1.12 sigma deviation from national mean; expected 1988 turnout of approximately 31.23 percent; actual turnout was 37.12 percent.

NA 04 (Peshawar) 1985 turnout -2 sigma (less than mean), but had a 1988 turnout +2 sigma (greater than 1988 mean). This represents an increase in turnout of 132 percent. Other adjacent districts behaved in a manner similar to each other and similar to 1985. This district was previously identified as a potential problem district by Dr. Pervez Iqbal Cheema, chairman of the International Relations Dept. at Q.A.University. *ANP* won by a narrow margin of 84 votes.

NA 09 (Kohat) 1985 turnout within variance, but had 1988 turnout of -2.32 sigma representing a decrease from 1985 of 36 percent. This district was also identified as a potential problem by Cheema. The *IJI* won by a margin of 24.87 percent over the next highest candidate (*PAA*) and 25.15 percent over the *PPP* candidate.

NA 12 (Abott Abad) 1988 turnout within variance, but had a reduction from 1985 of -1.31 sigma or 14.5 percent (twice the projected reduction). The *IJI* won by a margin of 24.87 percent over the next highest candidate (*PAA*) and 25.15 percent over the *PPP* candidate.

NA 14 (Manserra) 1988 turnout within variance, but had a reduction from 1985 turnout of -1.95 sigma or 21.58 percent. This district had a close election between seven candidates with the *IJI* winning by a margin of 46 votes.

NA 17 (Kohistan) 1988 turnout of -2.89 sigma (very unusual). This district had a 1985 turnout of -1.69 sigma. The difference between 1985 and 1988 is equal to a 21 percent decrease in turnout. The *III* candidate won by a margin of 1,742 votes. This district was identified by Cheema as a possible problem.

NA 19 (Bannu) 1988 turnout of -1.36 sigma, but had a decrease from 1985 of -2.25 sigma. *JUI* candidate won by a significant margin.

NA 20 (Bannu) 1988 turnout within variance, but had a decrease from 1985 of -2.15 sigma. Margin of victory for *III* candidate was 12.15 percent.

*Punjab* 1985 turnout = 58 percent or +.53 sigma deviation from national mean. Expected 1988 turnout of approximately 49.47 percent; actual turnout was 46.19 percent, slightly lower than expected. Based on the comparison there were no districts with significant statistical deviation. However, there were several districts where voter turnout was slightly less than expected. The *PPP* had made statements that there was concern about possible wide-scale disenfranchisement of rural voters due to loss of ID cards during the floods. However, in those few instances where turnout was marginally lower, no significant pattern materially affecting the *PPP* could be discerned. In fact, the *PPP* won most of the districts in question (even though some margins were very close).

*Sind* 1985 turnout = 44 percent or -0.69 sigma deviation from national mean; expected 1988 turnout of approximately 35.99 percent; 1988 turnout was higher than expected at 43.54 percent, probably the result of good organizational work by the *PPP* and the *MQM*.

NA 184 (Karachi Central) 1988 turnout was an extremely high +1.75 sigma. The difference from 1985 when turnout was very low is an even greater +3.54 sigma. This was a close election where the margin of victory for the *PPP* candidate was 303 votes of 120,721 cast (.25 percent of the votes cast). The high turnout in a close election could be the result of good campaign work to

mobilize voters, but it could also represent ballot stuffing where voters on the rolls who did not vote have a ballot cast (stuffed) for them in favor of one party or the other to influence the outcome. While this district is clearly unusual, voting safeguards presumably in place at the polling stations make it unlikely that significant ballot box stuffing occurred although even a small discrepancy would have influenced the outcome. Several adjacent districts show similar behavior (e.g., Karachi NA 186, NA 187, and NA 188 were differences from the 1985 turnout where in the +3.0 sigma range although these districts had large victory margins: all for *MQM* candidates won by large margins in districts where voter turnout was unusually high. Where *PPP* candidates won, the voter turnout was normal.

*Baluchistan* 1985 turnout = 36 percent or -1.38 sigma deviation from national mean; expected 1988 turnout of approximately 28.33 percent; 1988 turnout was slightly lower than expected at 24.96 percent.

NA 200 (Zhob) 1988 turnout was extremely low (-2.70 sigma) and was -4.20 sigma lower than 1985 turnout.

NA 201, 202 - Same as NA 200

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