


Corruption and Reform

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An International Journal

**Special Issue: Limiting Administrative Corruption
in the Democratizing States of Africa**

Proceedings of a Conference held in Washington DC, September 11, 1992

Guest Editor: Robert B. Charlick

Senior Advisor on Governance for the Africa Bureau, USAID

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Dordrecht / Boston / London

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CONTENTS Volume 7 No. 3 1992/93

Special Issue: Limiting Administrative Corruption in the Democratizing States of Africa. Proceedings of a Conference held in Washington DC, September 11, 1992

Guest Editor: Robert B. Charlick

Corruption, Governance and Aid to Africa

Alison P. Rosenberg: Corruption as a policy issue 173

Robert B. Charlick: Corruption in political transition: A governance perspective 177

Theoretical Perspectives on Administrative Corruption

Michael Johnston: 'Micro' and 'macro' possibilities for reform 189

Gerald E. Caiden: From the specific to the general: Reflections on the Sudan 205

Corruption in Africa: Processes and Cases

Larry Diamond, Nigeria's perennial struggle against corruption: Prospects for the third republic 215

Dele Olowu: Roots and remedies of governmental corruption in Africa 227

Sahr John Kpundeh: Prospects in contemporary Sierra Leone 237

Stephen P. Riley: Post-independence anti-corruption strategies and the contemporary effects of democratization 249

Commentary and Discussion

Gerald E. Caiden: Commentary 265

Victor T. Le Vine: Administrative corruption and democratization in Africa: Aspects of the theoretic agenda 271

Roland Homet: Thematic summary of discussions 279

Conclusions

Robert Charlick: Combatting corruption in an era of political liberalization – implications for donor agencies 283

Contributors to this issue 289

Editorial note / Publisher's note 291

Author index / Volume contents 293

Aims and Scope

Corruption and Reform is a multidisciplinary journal with an international group of contributors and readers. It is intended to serve as a lively forum for rigorous scholarly research on political corruption, misconduct and policies for reform, presenting a diverse range of viewpoints and emphasizing an international and comparative perspective.

Corruption and Reform will publish research in a number of areas of interest, including studies of political finance and the role of money in politics, patron-client relations, maladministration, and the effects of such social phenomena as parallel economics and organized crime.

Contributions will be welcomed from political scientists, and from scholars in other disciplines - such as sociology, economics, anthropology and law as well as policy professionals and public servants.

Four copies of articles should be submitted to the editors. Book reviews should be sent to the Book Review Editor.

Corruption and Reform is published three times a year.

Subscription price per volume: US\$ 115.00.

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can generate mutual control mechanisms through the interplay of balance and counterbalance between actors in political life. It can thus (be) an important asset in avoiding huge financial squandering, overambitious projects and all kinds of embezzlements that have ruined [African] countries and disenchanting the people.¹

In many countries, Africans themselves have set their own path toward more open, democratic, accountable systems of governance. Where serious efforts to expand democracy and limit corruption and abuse of power are underway, it is imperative that the donors respond fully and constructively to this window of opportunity before it closes.

However, in order to respond effectively, we need to understand better how and under what circumstances specific forms of democracy (for example, a federalist versus a unitary structure) and specific democratic institutions (for example, the press, the courts, legislatures, etc.) offer the most effective means for limiting corruption.

Situating corruption in context **Best Available Copy**

We do not see corruption as an independent phenomenon. Rather, it is a symptom of the broader problem of poor and unresponsive governance. Corruption flourishes because the costs of corrupt behavior are low. The costs are low due to a lack of information designed to expose corruption to public scrutiny, the absence of meaningful popular involvement in public policy formulation and implementation, and inadequate 'balancing and counterbalancing.' The opportunities for corrupt practices are multiplied in a non-transparent, centrally controlled state where there is little if any accountability.

Under these circumstances, corruption fundamentally compromises democratic governance by rendering discretionary decisionmaking a personal rather than a legal decision; by stifling competition; by assuring that the outcomes of policy will be unresponsive to the broad public; and by ultimately eroding any sense on the part of the public of regime legitimacy.

Goals of the corruption workshops

How exactly to deal with corruption is not easy. Where should one break into this syndrome of governmental processes that are cut off from the people? How best to attack and weaken a systematic, well-implemented culture of corruption — kleptocracy as it was termed in Zaire? How can the resources of a bilateral donor best be mobilized to help address this problem? And what new opportunities and problems for doing so arise as political liberalization and democratization begin?

These are some of the questions we hope these papers will help policy makers, both in Africa and in the developed world, to address. Our goal through this and future workshops is to identify opportunities and find the

strategic means, given our limited resources, to help Africans consolidate the hard-fought progress they have made. This progress toward democratization and good governance must be executed in a manner that will sustain social, economic, and political development.

Note

1. Abdoulaye Niandou Souley. 'Economic Crisis and Democratization in Africa,' paper presented at symposium of Ibadan, June 15--19th, 1992.

USAID, Washington D.C.

Alison P. Rosenberg

Corruption in political transition: A governance perspective

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Abstract. Corruption is best understood as one aspect of a much larger dilemma of democratic and effective governance. People and agencies concerned with African development agree that recent political transitions offer genuine opportunities for positive change. They also raise three major issues: policy pluralism, political accountability, and information openness. All must be addressed directly, both by those involved in the transitions and aid donors who seek to support them. An understanding of the way corruption has increasingly become a way simply to obtain the means of survival can help us understand both the political competition that often gives rise to corruption, and the ways it can undermine potential reforms.

With the end of the Cold War in Africa international donor agencies have begun to say openly what they could previously only privately mutter — that corruption, rent-seeking, or other such euphemisms, is a major impediment to the economic development of many African countries. Perhaps just as important, it is a threat to donor programs as well. Not only are taxpayers and their representatives displaying an increasing impatience with the waste of public resources which systematic administrative corruption entails, private sector actors are decreasingly willing to tolerate the high cost of doing business in societies where the 'informal' transaction costs are so steep. As business interest in Africa falls, even for traditionally African oriented investors like the French, public support for aid will inevitably decline as well.

From a governance perspective, however, corruption is the tail rather than the dog. As the authors of the World Bank's seminal paper on governance correctly perceived, pervasive or systematic corruption is a symptom of poor governance.¹ While corruption is manifest in every society, and in democratic as well as authoritarian regimes, systematic corruption is a deadly sign that a society can no longer effectively manage its resources for public purposes.² In its systemic form, corruption makes the notion of 'public' meaningless. Every resource is privatized — appropriated for private gain at the expense of those members of the public who are supposed to be served by governance. Corruption both feeds on the breakdown or failings of good governance, and it makes the attainment of such governance extremely difficult. By particularizing everything, corruption poisons the relationship of authority between governors and the governed. Rule which is only 'self' serving can hardly be accepted as

legitimate. It can hardly be expected to conform to clear rules of law which would restrict the prerogatives and the gain of the corrupt. It is obviously incompatible with the development of transparency — the subjecting of decisions and the bases of those decisions to the light of public knowledge. It can not be squared with any meaningful form of accountability, other than that of payoff. To get corruption under control is, therefore, not a simple matter. While minor miracles may be possible in particular times and places using astute strategy, and through the determined acts of courageous and honest individuals, in general, managing corruption seems to involve improving governance at least in the governmental sector of a society.

If controlling corruption depends on improving governance, however, how is it likely to be affected by political liberalization and the movement toward democratization in Africa? For some, the linkage seems close. The direction of this linkage, however, is not always evident. Many analysts agree that the fate of liberalization and democratization may well lie with the ability of new regimes to successfully cope with corruption (Klitgaard, forthcoming). Few, however, would contend that liberalization or democratization in and of itself is sufficient to curb systemic corruption. Clearly improved governance and democratization are not identical or necessarily synchronous processes.

The Africa Bureau of A.I.D. has dealt with this issue by promoting a concept it has called 'democratic governance.' While recognizing the distinction between these notions, it argues that A.I.D. should support the development of a combination of aspects of democracy with notions of good governance, favoring the systems in which both are more fully realized. The Africa Bureau's approach to democratization emphasizes accountability through open and competitive choice processes, adherence to a standard of integrity of life which limits the most flagrant abuses of power and the most egregious costs of opposition, and the notion of sharing power in public policy through the recognition of a legitimate role for plural actors. The governance concept it favors focuses on improvements in the effectiveness and responsiveness of the public sector and upon governance patterns which are more open and predictable (based on known and widely accepted rules). It is the hypothesis of the Africa Bureau that efforts to foster 'democratic governance' should help address the problem of systemic corruption. When democratization takes place without improvements in governance, however, corruption may proceed unchecked, or may even intensify.

Possible positive effects of democratization on limiting corruption

The notion of democratic governance suggests a number of ways in which the problem of corruption may be addressed, while clearly acknowledging that democratization need not necessarily reduce corruption. The following should therefore be considered as hypotheses, for which strong inductive arguments

can be made, but which need to be tested continually against the actual experience of African political change.

The most important dimensions of democratization, and the ones we shall explore here, are policy pluralism, political accountability, and information openness.

Policy pluralism and public accountability

As the Africa Bureau of A.I.D. has defined the concept, democratization is not just delegation and representation, but participation, or inclusiveness in the policy process (A.I.D., 1992; Dahl, 1971:4). This notion distinguishes a type of democratization from a purely formal choice process (such as open and competitive national elections). There are a number of aspects of inclusion or power-sharing which might contribute to limiting corruption.

Involvement of more interests

In one sense pluralism represents the creation of a public interest through the inclusion of many private interests. As new actors emerge and successfully claim the right to participate in the policy process, they will naturally use the policy process to defend and further their interests. Actors who previously excluded others and could therefore virtually monopolize the benefits of 'state' resources should find it more and more difficult to appropriate the benefits of governance for their own private interests in the face of these demands. From this point of view, an essential element in curbing the abuse of power by the few is the operation of more inclusive selfishness. Even elements of a winning democratic coalition may serve to check other elements which seek to appropriate too much 'public' benefit to themselves. If any one group is allowed to profit excessively, the entire coalition may be threatened. This is one plausible interpretation of public charges of corruption which have surfaced from within newly elected regimes in Africa, such as has been observed in the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) government in Zambia.

The involvement of more 'honest' interest groups

As more actors are permitted to develop a voice in policy, some may, by the unique character of their definition of self-interest, be 'public minded.' They may have a professional interest in condemning or limiting corruption. Human rights groups, for example, may have to adopt more universalistic standards to justify and further their positions, limiting their discretion to simply helping themselves. Such groups are emerging at a rapid pace throughout Africa, and may become useful allies of anti-corruption policies as 'watch groups' not only for abuses of integrity of life, but for official corruption. There are already aspirations to work with such groups in a network paralleling Amnesty International, currently being called 'Transparency International.' The conjunction of the two issues, however, may make the work of African human

phenomenon, the reliance on national and even regional professional associations, such as accountants and inspectors-general, constitutes a major plank in A.I.D.'s anti-corruption accountability program in Latin America. Without judging its prospects for success on that continent, it is clear that such groups are much less well developed in Africa and cannot be expected to play an analogous role in the near future.

Fostering divided government

The notion of 'checks and balances' is one dear to American political culture. Not the least reason for this, evidenced in detail in the 'Federalist Papers,' is the view that where real power is shared among several branches of government at a given level, opportunities for accountability grow exponentially, and that leaders of no single branch are to be trusted with the 'public good.' This is certainly a notion which is much less widely shared in the political structures and tradition of other Western nations, and has been almost totally ignored in the executive-dominated systems of Africa. But the very existence of separate institutions, representing different constituencies and professional roles, may be worth exploring for its contribution to keeping the process cleaner.

We are only at the beginning of the road of seeing strong and relatively autonomous legislatures and judiciaries in Africa. What little evidence we have, however, from a few newly elected democratic governments and a handful of transitional regimes established by 'National Conferences,' suggests the positive potential role for divided government. In Zambia and Mali, for example, legislatures, even those dominated by a single winning coalition party, have already begun to question executive policy at times, and publicly to call governmental officials to task for reported abuses of authority. This argument is not intended to minimize the potential negative effects of divided government on efficiency and 'national unity,' which may be very costly or even unsustainable in certain environments. But the assumption that divided government is inevitably or on balance bad must be subject to close scrutiny.

Fostering decentralized government

There is a long tradition of arguing that local government with some real powers can serve both to address local interests more fully, and to exercise a check on the operation of higher levels of authority. Again, the positive effect is neither inevitable nor necessarily the dominant one, as local authorities themselves may be personalistic, corrupt, and self-serving. Two key ingredients need to be present for the potential for gain to outweigh potential costs. First, decentralization must involve real delegation of authority, including authority to generate and reserve a portion of local revenues. Second, local authorities themselves must be accountable both to higher levels and to local groups. In addition, abuse of authority and public corruption is less likely to occur if the rules which govern local officials are at least in part defined by local norms,

evinced local support and legitimacy. From this point of view decentralization cannot be given from above. It must itself be created through an interplay of forces and rules. Even this will not guarantee the local actors will be less corrupt than if they were simple clients of more powerful personal rulers higher up in the hierarchy, but the potential, it is argued, is present.

Sharing governance throughout society

It may seem tautological to argue that public corruption can be reduced by reducing the public role in governance, but this proposition is not trivial. Where state institutions control most of the public allocation process, particularly in an environment of centralization, incentives to charge 'rents' for public services are high, since the supply of governance is severely limited. One potential remedy is to increase the supply by decentralizing governance, permitting non-state actors, such as voluntary cooperatives, business associations, professional associations such as water-user associations, religious societies and the like to perform tasks of managing resources and setting standards for the particular and often a local 'public.' Increasing the supply of governance may not only devalue abuse by public officials, but when coupled with mechanisms for linking state and non-state actors through law and electoral power, a set of checks or limits may be established on the abuse of either. While in the formal sector modern African states have shown little propensity to share governance functions, a number of forces may be pushing them in this direction. These include the state's financial incapacity to provide 'services' and the need, therefore, for raising 'user-fees'; pressure from international donors to reduce state bureaucratic salaries; the need to attempt to bring the massive non-formal sectors into relationships with the state which will involve considerable negotiation and incentive; and the growth of voluntary institutions in much of Africa in response to an expanding political space.

Political accountability

Thus far, we have discussed some of the aspects of policy pluralism without explicitly discussing democratic accountability, arguing that broadening participation and inclusiveness alone may help remedy the problem of corruption. Democratic choice processes, however, should intensify the positive return for all of these, by providing a regular, open method for sanctioning or rewarding the few who hold positions of public trust. The more competitive and open that process is, the more likely the official is to be concerned about the costs of privatizing public goods or abusing public authority for personal gain. This is essentially the weakness of anti-corruption measures which ignore the broader political accountability costs. A power-holder may choose to reduce corruption within his or her organization for a number of public or personal reasons. He may employ a principal-agent-client approach to restructuring incentives within his agency, and may follow a very logical and

useful set of prescriptions to reduce abuses of authority; as Judge Plana did in the Philippines (Klitgaard, 1988). But if he himself or the superior who appoints him is not publicly accountable the entire venture rests on moral will or temporary coincidence of self-interest with public interests. With all of its defects, there is no political accountability mechanism more likely to give those hurt by abuse of authority the ability to punish the violator than free elections. The argument, then, is that however good the anti-corruption technique, it will only be as sustainable as the political accountability mechanism in which it is embedded.

Information openness

Access to information about performance of those in authority appears to be the most critical factor in the accountability systems and particularly in making political choice meaningful. As pluralism and inclusiveness grow, much more information on corrupt practices is likely to surface and reach the public through the vehicle of a freer media. Even if some of this information is inaccurate or politically motivated, fear of exposure of questionable practices may keep politicians and civil servants cleaner. It may also encourage the cleaner ones who can use their reputation for honesty in the media to build up their political support. Of course media sources often are themselves sources of politically motivated information, even if they are supposedly 'independent.' The situation of a free and competitive media, however, is infinitely superior to the alternative of a muzzled and limited media in terms of exposing corruption and eventually affecting decisions punish it.

Revelations or accusations of corrupt behavior in the media as societies liberalize and democratize, however, should not be equated with a rising level of corruption. It has only been very recently that the taboo against reporting on corruption in Africa, except by newly installed juntas seeking to justify their own action, has been lifted. An explosion of pent-up information awaits an evaluation by elites, demonstrators, and voters. The biggest danger, however, is that as the media campaign wears on, everyone will become cynical about corruption and despair of holding any public official accountable for this abuse. A responsible media, therefore, might do well to target systemic and highly important cases, rather than focus on the day-to-day irritations of petty and routine corruption.

Information openness is not restricted to the mass media, however. At least as important is the role which sharing of power can have on self-reporting, as one governmental unit must account to another for the use of its resources. This process not only provides incentive for units to police themselves more fully, but becomes the grist for media information forming the basis for political pressure and choice.

To the extent, then, that governance changes involve these three phenomena—greater inclusiveness and participation in policy; greater opportunity for

regular and open political accountability; and more information — public corruption, it is hypothesized, should become more manageable.

Generalization and notes of caution

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Some of what has been suggested above can be understood in another perspective — that of a political scientist who has tried to understand corruption from a cross-cultural developmental and historical point of view. Samuel Huntington has outlined the conditions which have contributed to governmental corruption (Huntington, 1968, summarized in Klitgaard, 1988).

1. Corruption increases in a period of rapid growth and modernization, because of changing values, new sources of wealth and power and the expansion of government. This proposition raises some important issues for Africa. First, few economies in Africa have experienced rapid economic growth since independence. Those which did grow (such as Kenya and Cote d'Ivoire) have not been notably more corrupt than the slow growers, particularly in the phase of rapid growth. Nonetheless, African societies have been transformed to differing degrees by forces of change associated with elements of the modernization syndrome (mass education, urbanization, mass communication, and Westernization, introduced largely through colonial interactions and more recently by a world cultural diffusion). In Africa, these forces have tended to intensify differentiation of wealth and power, mainly through access to the control of the state. And in Africa, despite slow growth, and even structural adjustment constraints, centralized states have continued to expand (Olowu, 1993).

From this point of view, Africa should be less corrupt than much of the rest of the world, for its slow growth. To retard corruption, it might be suggested that the other elements of modernization be slowed down and more fully embedded in locally legitimized values, and that the size and role of the state be reduced.

2. *Lower* levels of corruption have been associated with *higher* levels of social, status, and class stratification. Such stratification systems produce more well-developed and articulated systems of norms and sanctions which reduce the opportunity for and attractions of corrupt behavior. Because Africa has more poorly developed class divisions than the much of the rest of the world, it has experienced a higher degree of corruption.

To an Africanist, this proposition seems highly problematic in many regards. First, status and social distinctions were quite pronounced in many African societies (such as Amharic culture and among the Hausa). Yet such societies exhibited high levels of institutionalized corruption. On the other hand, societies with weakly developed stratification, such as age- and lineage-organized societies, often did develop well articulated norms and

sanctions, and public corruption in some (Ibo society for example) was much less readily accepted.

From this point of view, however, African corruption should diminish with time, as social and economic differentiation intensify, as it is presumed they will with increased privatization and capitalist development. In the shortterm, however, this proposition is not very policy-relevant.

3. Where political opportunities outweigh economic opportunities politics and government will be more corrupt. Again, this proposition is built on a distinction which may not have much meaning in contemporary Africa where leaders have used political position to gain economic opportunities. Nonetheless, it is no doubt true that formal, private sector economic opportunities in Africa have been very limited.

From this point of view, efforts to privatize, invigorate the private sector economy, and reduce the role of the state could contribute to the reduction of political corruption.

4. Where foreign business has been prevalent, governmental corruption has been more severe. This proposition rightly assigns a corrupting role to the potential corruptor as well as to the corruptible politician. But foreign business has not dominated Africa to the same degree that it has in much of the rest of the world, and has played a very small role in a number of African countries where there has simply been little economic interest. If this proposition were correct, corruption should be lowest in these countries, but then class formation should also be low. Despite the inevitable corrupting role of foreign corporate interests in dealing with centralized governments, there does not appear to be a clear relationship for Africa, and therefore the policy implications are very uncertain. Whatever the relationship may be, foreign business interest in Africa appears to be weak and declining, so this factor is likely to have little impact.
5. Political corruption has been more prevalent where political parties have been less well developed. Although in the West political parties have not been considered paragons of virtue, the proposition must be related to the notion of policy pluralism and counter-balance. This proposition promises much for contemporary Africa, where political parties have been weak or non-existent and are only now beginning to develop and deepen their level of institutionalization. Much, however, will depend on the character of these parties and on the political coalitions which they form.

I would add to Huntington's list one more proposition which may be worthy of consideration:

6. Corruption is likely to be more severe where important political actors and their communities perceive that open competition for political power and economic opportunity inadequately assures them of social and physical security.

This proposition may be a development of the state-economic opportunity balance which Huntington has suggested above, but it goes well beyond. First, state office holders seems very unlikely to forego corruption if they see no opportunity to provide basic sustenance for their families through their official salaries, compensations, or through a change of career to the private sector. Downsizing, or civil service reform in such an environment, may merely make the remaining positions that much more desirable, thereby possibly intensifying the corruption to secure and retain them. Furthermore, when a particular group (be it ethnic, religious, professional) which has benefited from control of rents sees little or no alternative mechanism for maintaining its standard of living, it is not very likely to be willing to play by an 'honest' or 'fair' set of rules. This is all the more true when, as is often true in Africa, this group is an ethnic minority, which fears for its physical well-being should it have to leave power in a open competition.

These generalizations point to the needs to go beyond democratization, to broaden the basis of economic opportunity, and to learn to manage group conflict better, as important conditions in lowering the motivations for corruption.

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A concluding note of caution

The above discussion of theory will sober the practitioner who wishes to know what academicians can recommend to help limit public sector corruption in Africa. Much of the theory drawn from historical generalizations does not seem to fit Africa well. What seems to fit is contradicted by another set of variables. The modernization model itself is subject to so much criticism in the African context that it is problematic. But even more important, there are already some sobering lessons for the experiences of newly democratizing African countries which should lead us to understand that the search to improve 'democratic governance,' and consequently to reduce public corruption, will be far from automatic as particular elements of political liberalization and democratization unfold.

Here I will cite only a few propositions which jump out from political development in Africa during the past year. As we get more real-world laboratories of democratization other cases will no doubt be added which will deepen the empirical basis for these propositions, or will force them to be modified.

Political competition with winners taking all

As new groups enter the political process and use democratic means to establish new governments, they may perceive the game as winner-take-all. Two dangers have already emerged from majoritarianism. First, the new winners may now see that they have the same right to exploit the instruments

of power and to extract rents as did the old rulers. This is a danger for the MMD government in Zambia.

This is all the more likely where the new winners fear that their tenure may be short, thus giving them added incentive to get what they can now. In such an environment, corruption, both in campaigning, and once in office, may intensify. The scramble and corruption involved in winning nominations in Ghana and Nigeria make this point.

Win, retain or regain power at any cost

The old guard, having lost in a transition produced by a National Conference, or in a democratic election, may be highly motivated to use whatever means are necessary, including violence and blatant corruption, to win back power. It may respond very similarly when it is confronted with a credible electoral challenge which could remove it from power. This appears to be all the more true where the old guard has been dominated by a vulnerable ethnic minority. The cases of Togo, Congo and Kenya are significant. The case of Niger must be watched closely for this.

Misuse of political accountability procedures

Accountability procedures need not always be used to contain corruption. They can be used to demand it. There is evidence from Nigeria, for example, that in at least a few states elected representatives have threatened to use such accountability methods as impeachment to demand corruption from state administrators.

Notes

1. World Bank. *Managing Development: The Governance Dimension — A Discussion Paper* Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, August 1991, 5–7.
2. This modified definition of governance differs from the Bank's generic definition of governance as 'the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development.' *Op. cit.*, 1. It is a simplification of the normative definition of governance (i.e., good governance) provided by the Africa Bureau of AID in its *Concept of Governance and its Implications for A.I.D.'s Development Assistance Program in Africa*, July, 1992.

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'Micro' and 'macro' possibilities for reform

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Abstract. The connection between corruption and undemocratic politics is a familiar one, but it often seems that more open and decentralized politics would only be more accessible to parties seeking corrupt influence. But democratic politics has significant long-term strengths; a revitalization of civil society can enlist some of the same private interests that might currently engage in corruption, or be targets for extortion, as forces checking the abuse of power. This "macro" approach does not supplant more familiar "micro" reforms; indeed, the latter are essential, for more open politics might mean more corruption in the short run. Democratization and improved public management are both needed if African corruption and its harmful effects are to be controlled.

Introduction

What can be done to aid the process of democratization, and to reduce the levels and damaging consequences of administrative corruption, in developing nations? How are these two goals interrelated? Can international aid donors, many of whom have begun to use political liberalization and anti-corruption policies as aid criteria, help both processes (and avoid creating new problems) by carefully targeting their resources?

This paper offers an exploration of what democratization itself might mean for anti-corruption efforts. It identifies familiar reform approaches or anti-corruption tactics which can be implemented at the 'micro' level, for example, those dealing with administrative procedure or personnel policy. It also suggests it is useful to examine the relationship between democratization and corruption at the 'macro' level, and that by fostering more balanced relationships between public and private interests, state and civil society, it may be possible to target aid and technical assistance in ways that can improve both politics and 'good governance'.

Individual cases of corruption have unique elements, and the nations of Africa embrace immense diversity, making it vital to adapt the anti-corruption measures to specific societies and arrays of political forces. However, recent changes in African politics, in the attitudes and perceptions of donor nations, and in the global economic and political climate make this a particularly appropriate time to think about broad new initiatives against corruption, about

the prospects for more open politics, and about ways of making the two work together. While democratization may create new vulnerabilities to corruption in the short term, over the longer haul it may engage as forces inhibiting corruption some of the same private interests that are now parties to it. This is not to suggest that 'macro' strategies supplant 'micro'-level reforms; indeed, both must be coordinated if they are to stand a chance of lasting success.

The setting

New 'winds of change'?

In any current discussion of political change in Africa there are the twin dangers of assuming that changes toward democracy and away from autocratic rule are fundamental and lasting, and of overstating consistencies among contrasting political scenarios across a most diverse collection of states and societies. Obviously, matters are not so simple.

Since the late 1980s, major changes in over a dozen African nations have brought new leadership to the fore, produced multi-party elections (Benin, Sao Tome, Cape Verde, and Zambia), or have at least led to new promises, sometimes unfulfilled, of open competitive politics (Ghana, Cameroon, Kenya). Nigeria's military government has continued its efforts to create a new party system, in advance of a Third Republic in 1993; and elsewhere (Botswana, Mauritius, Senegal) positive political trends of longer standing have taken deeper root. But the sources and mechanisms of change have been diverse, ranging from orderly elections and 'National Conferences' to civil war and assassination. Moreover, positive trends are reversible, as the 1992 military coup in Sierra Leone, the crisis in Togo, and the largely abortive election in Cameroon, demonstrate (Riley, 1992; Kpundeh and Riley, 1992). Thus, it can be very difficult to identify genuine democratization until well after the fact.

It is also important to remember that when autocratic and corrupt regimes crumble, it is far from clear that the eventual result will be liberal democracy and effective administration. There are many possible outcomes of these basic changes (Riley, 1992), some of them involving immense social dislocation and human suffering.

But there are opportunities as well. The end of the Cold War makes it much less likely that international aid donors will continue to prop up African client regimes for geopolitical reasons alone, or 'wink at' political and administrative abuses by those governments simply because the latter serve ideological purposes. Aid partners have subjected their own priorities, and the effects of those efforts, to searching reassessment. There are also important 'demonstration effects' (Riley, 1992) at work, not only as positive changes in some African states inspire renewed efforts in others, but also growing out of the collapse of the authoritarian regimes of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. Finally — and most urgent — there is a growing sense both in and

outside of Africa that, politically and economically, things simply can no longer continue as they have done over the past three decades. The agonies of Ethiopia and Somalia warn of a grim future for an entire continent, or major segments of it, and are reminders that the crisis is just as much political as it is economic.

Which way in?

Are we talking about combating corruption as a way to aid democratization, or about making politics more democratic as a way of reducing corruption? Not only is it difficult to disentangle these goals in practice; they are extensively interconnected in their essence as well.

The more obvious linkage is that between corruption and *undemocratic* politics. While corruption can sometimes distribute small benefits to a large proportion of the population, and can break through bureaucratic and political stalemates, more often it is a 'regressive' form of influence, benefiting the wealthy and the well-connected while depriving the have-nots of their liberties, political choices, and material resources (Johnston, 1982: Chs. 1, 2, 7). For three decades we have seen corruption offered as justification for coups and one-man, one-party politics in numerous nations in Africa. While we await the results of Nigeria's transition from military rule to a Third Republic in 1993 with much anticipation, it is fair to say that the 'strongman' approach to fighting corruption has produced dismal results. Indeed, often it has led to more corruption, in more disruptive forms (on this last point, see section IV, below).

Democratization — meaning, broadly, movement toward more open and less coercive politics, with meaningful elections and guarantees of civil liberties — is not only a less familiar setting in which to think about corruption and reform; it also adds to the complexity of the problem. When more and more private interests have routine knowledge of and access to government agencies and officials, administrative reforms are put into a new and uncertain setting. Official policies and procedures *may* acquire more legitimacy; but effective private demand for public goods may increase even more rapidly. This will be especially likely when economic conditions are poor, and when democratization is perceived as an uncertain and temporary 'window of opportunity,' as in fact it may be. Democratization may thus exacerbate existing administrative and personnel problems without enhancing government's abilities to deliver on its policy commitments.

On a societal scale, democratization raises the possibility of new 'systems of public order' (Rogow and Lasswell, 1963) — with legitimate and effective standards, both legal *and* social in nature, defining the boundaries of acceptable political action. Such standards — while not internally consistent in every detail — can regulate politics and administration in a way that laws by themselves, or public opinion and culture alone, cannot. But durable systems of public order develop slowly — in Britain the process took 300 years, and in

the United States 200 years has not been enough — and are often formed (and reformed) in the course of intense political competition and conflict, particularly if democratization brings a proliferation of private interests, a freer press, and a less supine citizenry into the arena. As we shall see, 'macro' reform is a long-term proposition, one that entails new ways of thinking about controversy and scandal.

The definitional quagmire

Many promising discussions of corruption get lost in endless debates over definitions of what constitutes corruption. A more fruitful approach is to examine corruption as *an issue in political development*, and to examine some of the groups and conflicts within politics and society that contend over, and continually reshape, its meaning. Here, I will simply treat corruption as the abuse of public office or resources, by officials or by the private parties who seek to influence them, for private benefit — with 'abuse' being identified by legal *or* cultural standards. Although this approach loses some of the apparent precision inherent in defining corruption in legal terms (Nye, 1967; Scott, 1972, Ch. 1), it emphasizes the *perception* or appearance of corruption in a social context, and the ways such perceptions can reinforce or conflict with the law. In the context of rapid political change in Africa legal standards are often in flux or in dispute; thus, the working boundaries of corruption employed here are quite broad.

The micro level: inside administrative corruption

The essence of administrative corruption is the abuse of power and discretion by government officials in their dealings with the public and with each other, and in their management of public goods (tangible and otherwise). But this sort of corruption is not just the individual misconduct of bad, fallible, or grossly underpaid individuals (though this last issue in particular is certainly an important conditioning factor). Administrative corruption follows some familiar patterns — such as bribery (petty and major), extortion, kickbacks, nepotism, variations on patron-client exchanges, and *pantouflage*, and is often linked to basic aspects of agencies' structures, and internal management policies.

Public administration issues

The discipline of public administration offers a number of familiar but worthwhile approaches to dealing with administrative corruption. Improved auditing, recruitment, and training are all worthwhile initiatives. Generating and maintaining *commitment* to such measures, as opposed to simply going through the motions, can be difficult, particularly where salaries and morale

are low (Olowu, 1992), and the legitimacy and effectiveness of the state and its policies are open to doubt. But coupling punishments and crackdowns with positive incentives and rewards for non-corrupt service may be effective even in unpromising situations (Klitgaard, 1988: pp. 80–81).

In the medium term, the independence of the civil service, and its success in maintaining a 'public service ideology' (Jabbara and Dwivedi, 1988), can be critical — not only for its own sake, but also because an independent civil service can become a significant check in its own right upon political officials and private interests. These are familiar anti-corruption policies, but should not be sold short because of that fact; as I will suggest below, in the early stages of democratization the proliferation of private political interests with access to official agencies and decision-makers is likely to outrun the longer-term process of building a 'system of public order', and in such a situation governments that do not emphasize sound, basic aspects of public administration will be in serious trouble.

A more process-oriented approach is known as 'vulnerability analysis' (Beall, Bowers, and Lange, 1986; see also Klitgaard, pp. 84–85.) Here, agencies examine their operating procedures for points at which valuable resources, significant official discretion, and access by private interests converge. One example might be an official who has sole discretion over the granting or withholding (or even just the expediting or delay) of import licenses; another might be a 'third-party provider' or a subcontractor delegated to implement part of a policy — such as delivering social security benefits — who does not keep reliable records. An agency will be most vulnerable to corruption at those points, and it is there that basic anti-corruption efforts (which of course have their own costs, tangible and otherwise) will be most effective. Such efforts might include enhanced audits and quality controls, offering 'bounties' or other incentives to individuals who provide information on abuses, retraining of personnel, rotation of caseloads, and comprehensive 'operational surveys', to name but a few. Unavoidable points of vulnerability may warrant even more aggressive responses, such as highly visible prosecutions or new legislation (Beall, Bowers, and Lange, 1986: pp. 71–83). Vulnerability analysis can be proactive too, pointing out areas where basic operations may be redesigned: perhaps one official should be charged with gathering basic information on license applications, for example, and another charged with making decisions according to pre-set criteria, thus reducing individual discretion.

Principal-agent-client relationships

Another process-oriented perspective conceives of official activities in terms of principal-agent-client (P-A-C) networks (Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Klitgaard, 1988). Robert Klitgaard's very useful book *Controlling Corruption*, upon which this section draws, provides the best exposition of this perspective and its implications for corruption control. The *Principal* is that official or body

charged with the accomplishment of an administrative task, be it customs control, implementing public-welfare policy, or issuing passports. The *Agent* is the bureaucrat or other official who actually carries out the administrative tasks involved in executing a policy. The *Client* — usually a citizen or interest group — is the party seeking the ‘output’, such as a license, a ration book, or a contract to build roads. It is often (but not always) at the level of dealings between agents and clients that administrative corruption occurs, on the initiative of the agent or the client.

This P-A-C system includes a number of relationships (Fig. 1), all of which offer opportunities for either honest or abusive dealings.

The matrix points to several anti-corruption strategies. One of the most important entails a judicious mixture of rewards *and* punishments designed to encourage honest, effective administration and to penalize corruption. Another involves reducing the discretion and power of A over C by making it possible for C to deal with any of several Agents or by making it necessary for A to work with colleagues in administering benefits. Klitgaard adds that Principals can ‘select agents for “honesty” and “capability”’; control the rewards and penalties affecting agents; increase the probability that corruption will be detected; and try to change attitudes toward corruption (these points are developed in much greater detail in Klitgaard, 1988: Ch. 3; see particularly pp. 94–95).

To illustrate, Klitgaard describes the striking successes of a reforming jurist who was placed in charge of the Bureau of Internal Revenue in the Philippines (Klitgaard, 1988: Ch. 2). Administrative strategies ranging from the regular rotation of tax collectors, to holding regular Catholic Masses on agency premises, to publishing the names of dishonest agents in the newspapers produced substantial improvements in administration and revenue collections. These specific steps, of course, would not be effective or appropriate everywhere, and due regard must be given to the rights of individual Agents




Fig. 1. P-A-C system. 1) P selects and controls rewards and penalties affecting A; 2) A supplies or withholds information valuable to P; 3) A can exercise ‘leverage’ over C; 4) C can provide incentives to A; and 5) C can furnish valuable information to P (adapted from Klitgaard, 1988: 73).

and Clients. Still, those charged with agency-level anti-corruption policies have a number of options which they can use to shape functional and social settings within which officials do their work, and to affect the temptations and disincentives to engage in corruption.

Whistleblowers

A final 'micro' issue is the protection of 'whistleblowers' — those who report corruption to their superiors, or if necessary to the news media and others outside the agency. The list of reprisals applied to whistleblowers — dismissal, demotion, 'shunning', physical violence, the destruction of personal and professional reputations — is long and legendary (Miceli, 1992; Glazer, 1989). It is also damaging, for if those who know most about corruption are intimidated, much-needed information and opportunities for reform will be lost.

American attempts to protect whistleblowers through federal or state legislation have not been particularly successful. Such efforts in developing nations might be even less effective, insofar as the real power structure in these countries follows affinity or patron-client lines rather than official tables of organization. Nonetheless, to the extent that whistleblowers can be guaranteed anonymity and real protection, anti-corruption efforts will be more effective; and while the American example is not all that encouraging, a vigorous civil society with a free and critical press and independent professional associations may be able to provide whistleblowers with somewhat greater encouragement and protection than they might receive elsewhere.

'Micro-level' policies and democratization

Trends toward more open politics will affect these micro-level anti-corruption strategies both positively and negatively by changing the environment within which agencies and officials operate. In the short run, the main effect will likely be to increase private interests' access to decision-makers, and to intensify the political and social pressures they can bring to bear upon policy and implementation. This is a good thing in the abstract, for citizen access to government and official responsiveness are important goals of democratization. But where 'access' has typically been a first step toward corrupt influence, where official salaries and morale remain low, and where the private economic sector remains so weak that obtaining favorable official action is still a matter of survival for many private parties, opening up politics is likely to make for more corruption, at least at the outset.

The immediate reason for this is the basic fact of more open access. But democratization of politics is also likely to raise private expectations as to what government (and one's own relatives and friends *in* government) can and should provide. It may also enhance the leverage of political 'brokers': middle-level political figures, both in and outside of government, with elite connections and significant clienteles or followings. These brokers will often seek to

market their access and political assets as commodities, using their political support to pressure elites and tangible incentives to reward their followers (always, of course, keeping a significant share for themselves). Increased access will, in the short run, strengthen these brokers, with more corruption a likely result. Clients may eventually realize they do not need a broker to get access to government, and may become their own advocates, an important part of revitalizing the political forces in civil society. But this transition will take time and, as suggested above, will depend upon the widespread perception that open politics has come to stay, and is not just a passing phase.

Liberalization of society and the economy is also likely to produce more inequality of incomes and wealth, further widening the gap between nominal civil service salaries and the incomes of other able and ambitious individuals. Liberalization of politics and society may also bring ethnic, religious, and other communal identities more to the fore, intensifying the personal obligations officials feel to people of their own backgrounds, and creating rival loyalties to compete with 'public service ideologies'. Finally, more open government may facilitate the 'capture' of some agencies by the very interests and industries they are supposed to regulate, a familiar enough result in the United States and one that may institutionalize corrupt relationships in rapidly changing societies. Thus it may be that more corruption is one of the costs of democratization in the short run; it may defeat or hinder the effectiveness of 'micro' reforms such as those we have considered.

But democratization also offers opportunities at this level: it may give rise to increased morale and a sense among officials that genuine and popular accomplishments are within reach. Private interests that are free to organize, and a citizenry that is more secure in its rights and protections, may be more resistant to the sorts of corruption — such as 'speed money' demands or kickback schemes — that are initiated by officials. More democratic politics may, as time passes, aid in the development of more durable institutional/professional loyalties among civil servants, as alternatives to personal fealties born out of political necessity. This will be more likely to the extent that the independence of the civil service becomes an actual fact, and top political figures or middle-level brokers become more constrained in their power and influence over its day-to-day workings.

Viewed from the micro level, however, the immediate effects of democratization are still likely to be more problematical than hopeful. It is only when we broaden our scope to include the development of a more vigorous and independent civil society, at the macro level, and when we look to the longer term, that we find reasons to think that anti-corruption reforms can become genuinely effective. These prospects are the subject of the section that follows.

The macro level: state and civil society

All of the internal dynamics we have examined are embedded in, and are

shaped by, the wider interrelationships between state and society. The political and economic balance between state and society at any given time is a critical aspect of any reform strategy. Where the groups, interests and organizations of civil society are vigorous, they can serve as links between government and people, check the conduct of officials and of each other, and promote acceptable practices in politics and administration. Indeed, it will often be in their own interest to do so. Where civil society is weak, citizens and private interests are vulnerable to exploitation and, because they lack the political means to insist on their formal rights, often must resort to corruption as a means of relating to government. Finally, where the state is relatively weak, compared to civil society, politics and administration may be 'captured' and become privatized in the worst sense of that term. Each of these scenarios creates its own set of problems and opportunities for reform; they also show how the corruption patterns in many African states differ from those in the American experience, as I will suggest below.

Public-private relations

Whatever the relationship between state and society, officially sanctioned procedures operate at least potentially as 'bottlenecks' between what people want from government and what they actually get (Johnston, 1982: Ch. 2). Government 'outputs' (decisions, licenses, contracts, benefits, sanctions) are valuable. Demand for them usually exceeds supply — the more so in poorer nations, and in those where relatively strong state structures exist alongside ailing private economies. Government is often in a monopoly position: if it denies you a license, you may have nowhere else legitimately to turn. Finally, official procedures are usually time-consuming, uncertain, impersonal, and expensive, whereas paying a bribe or giving in to extortion can speed things up, remove uncertainty, convert a bureaucratic process into a personal transaction, and (in the end) prove less expensive than playing by the rules. Where the state is significantly more powerful than civil society, officials may be more likely to take the initiative in corrupt transactions; where the state is relatively weak or permeable, the impetus for corruption may come more from private interests. In any event, in any government — 'advanced' or developing, left- or right-wing, ambitious or austere — there will always be some incentives for citizens to get around procedural bottlenecks through corruption, and for officials to exploit the power this confers.

Some nations, however, clearly experience more corruption than others, and the most significant *types* of corruption vary from place to place as well. I have suggested elsewhere (Johnston, 1982: Ch. 2) that the types and amounts of corruption to be found in a nation vary in accordance with a number of factors affecting relationships between government and civil society. Those in the list below that are starred suggest opportunities to combat corruption through democratization and increased responsiveness of government; they are

also factors to be considered in judging when and where anti-corruption efforts are likely to be more effective (Table 1).

Briefly stated, where popular attachments to government are stronger, its rules and procedures will enjoy more support, and both public and private miscreants are more likely to be subjected to significant social sanctions. Patterns of access and exclusion are important in that it will be those groups which are excluded from legitimate access to government, and which have relatively specific agendas and significant political resources, that will be among the most likely private partners in corruption. Opening up legitimate paths of access can make bribery less 'necessary' and extortion less possible. A faster and more responsive policy process likewise reduces the need for 'speed money', and opportunities for extortion.

Finally, as Huntington argues, where economic opportunities are relatively plentiful and political opportunities scarce, people may try to buy their way into political power; and where political opportunities are plentiful and economic advantage more difficult, people are more likely to use political power to enrich themselves (Huntington, 1968: p. 66). Thus, economic revival and democratization must take place in a rough balance with one another, or else change in either sector will foster more corruption in the other. This 'balance' is both important and difficult to identify in practice; it will differ in its details from place to place, and the judgments of experienced observers may be needed to assess the situation in any nation. Suffice it for now to say that while African states need rapid economic growth first and foremost to address human needs, they also need to vitalize civil society as a counter-balance to the state, to open up legitimate economic opportunities beyond the sphere of politics, and to end the 'zero-sum' competition over material necessities that so often makes corruption a necessity for survival.

Huntington's injunction is a reminder that if economic growth is not accompanied by wider political access and opportunities, we may simply be

Table 1.

Social and political attachments

- political culture
- social customs and values
- popular attachment to government

Attributes of the policy process

- patterns of access and exclusion
- anti-corruption laws and enforcement
- speed of determination

Economic arrangements

- level of development
 - balance of political and economic opportunities
 - relative size of the public sector
-

trading one mechanism of corruption for another. The 'balance' is needed also *within* the economic and political sectors: a diverse economy is likely to have fewer 'bottlenecks' that can be exploited in monopolistic fashion, while the more competition (and even, to a degree, non-violent conflict) within a political system, the better it will be able to provide political checks upon corruption in the middle to long term.

Distinctions and transitions

Some types of corruption do more to disrupt linkages between state and society than do others. This does not mean that there is a clear-cut category of 'good corruption', but rather that some kinds are less unstable and disintegrative than others. One way to classify different sorts of corruption is by the *scale of the stakes involved*: *routine*, such as ordinary consumer goods, versus *extraordinary*, such as major manipulations of imports or hard currencies; and by the *number of 'suppliers'* of these corrupt stakes (few, or relatively many). Combining these factors produces the following classification (Fig. 2):

Where stakes are small and held in many hands, corruption begins to approximate a market (albeit an illegitimate market); the terms of corrupt exchange are likely to change gradually and reflect a rough kind of *quid-pro-quo* equality. Moreover, market corruption, by the nature of its stakes, is more likely to provide ways for ordinary citizens to meet their basic material needs. They may not like this market, and it may be no substitute for fundamental reform; but it is a more stable and less disruptive kind of corruption than those varieties in which larger stakes (contracts, kickbacks, major foreign-currency dealings) are held in fewer hands. Here, the mass of the citizenry, and many 'counter-elites,' will be shut out of the dealing, a fact that can become a major political issue. At the extreme these more unstable forms of corruption become 'smash and grab' operations in which those in power take as much as they can as quickly as possible, or exploit any and all who seek to influence them.

One implication of this classification is that while widening access to influence and public goods may encourage new corruption, it may also shift the mix of corrupt activities toward more broadly integrative and less disruptive types. This in turn could cushion the effects of the possible 'explosion of interests' — discussed in the section on micro reforms — that might be a consequence of democratization. Illicit markets may satisfy some material needs; and extended patronage organizations, or machine-like parties, may strengthen links between political leadership and society, and give more people a stake in political participation. I hasten to add, however, that these advantages are uncertain and transitional at best.

Longer-term opportunities of democratization

When interested parties are capable of checking the state and each other, and

	Routine	Extraordinary
<i>Many</i>	1. Market Corruption	4. Crisis Corruption
	Integrative Very stable	Disintegrative Very unstable
SUPPLIERS		
	2. Patronage organizations, patron-client networks	3. Cronyism, Nepotism
<i>Few</i>		Internally integrative Externally disintegrative
	Integrative Stable	Somewhat unstable

Fig. 2. Adapted from Johnston, 1986.

when they can settle upon the kinds of official roles and rules they will accept, they are building standards to which they can give commitment on the basis of their own lasting interests. Civic and professional organizations are important to this process, but so too are conventional private interests: the same interests that had previously contributed to corruption, either as instigators or as paying victims, can come to inhibit it as they insist upon less exploitative treatment by officials and/or become more able to monitor and check each other. These are social and political, rather than legal, checks on corruption; and herein lie real, if longer-term, possibilities for combating corruption *and* fostering more democratic politics through the development of a vital and competitive civil society.

This process — the development of a system of public order (Rogow and Lasswell, 1963) — is not a smooth, inevitable flow of 'progress', nor is it driven by moral inspiration. Often the mechanisms are conflict and scandal, the motivations are self-interested, and the setbacks are many. Even in relatively 'advanced' societies, systems of public order and the regulation of corruption are never completely settled, for changing political demands and problems continue to revise the operational balance of advantage. But this sort of disorder need not be a cause of dismay. Change and upheaval and even scandal may be very positive signs, in that official misconduct or illegitimate

private influence becomes controversial only when there are people and groups who oppose it.

The corruption and political problems of many African nations arise from the combination of a strong state and a weak civil society. This is not to say that private life is lacking in vigor; rather, the *organizing* and *linking* mechanisms of civil society — political and social organizations, advocacy groups, strong and competitive political parties — are weak or nonexistent. Social and economic opportunities beyond the reach of the state are relatively scarce; citizens and communities in many places must deal with the state if they are to survive, and must do so on terms set by the politically powerful.

To be sure, there is immense variation across Africa, and any nation will mark a partial exception to the foregoing generalizations (see Rothchild and Chazan, 1988). Moreover, African societies have been 'dichotomized' by colonialism and its heritage in ways that make the civil-society issue distinctive in an African context (Ayoade, 1988). But I would still argue that the corruption and political problems of the African states have more in common with those of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the former Soviet republics, for example, than with those of the United States or of Western Europe (where the strong private interests of civil society are more likely to penetrate and 'privatize' the doings of the state). Many African nations are emerging from situations where a strong state (whatever its proclaimed ideology) has dominated a weak private economy; where there is relatively little political and organizational life in civil society, beyond the reach of the state; where government enjoys only shaky legitimacy, and there is a legacy of one-party politics or cults of personality; where corruption has been not only commonplace, but a *necessity* for personal survival; and where religious and ethnic identities cut across, and often run much deeper than, loyalty to the state and its laws.

The middle- to long-term task in such nations is to build up the institutions and vitality of civil society. This must be done in order to promote the development of countervailing political interests, and to strengthen links between government and people — legitimizing the former while drawing it into more extensive and mutually acceptable interactions with the latter. This is by no means a quick or simple task, and will not produce immediate benefits; it is thus in no way a substitute for the micro-level strategies discussed earlier. The immediate results will be disorderly, particularly as compared to the aftermath of coups or official crackdowns. But democratic politics is inherently disorderly; and after all, the nations of Africa, in seeking to reconcile state and society with each other, are trying to accomplish in two generations what many other nations took centuries to do.

Perhaps one aid objective, among others aimed at helping democratization, might be to target nations that seem to be doing the most to foster and protect a lively civil society. It should be worthwhile to compare the number, size, and independence of political parties, trade unions, and interest groups, and to look closely at the stated and *de facto* protections and civil liberties accorded them

(private organizations might be aided directly via nongovernmental organizations, as is being done in some nations at present). It is also worth remembering that civil society includes nonpolitical entities that help to create a public life outside the state. In Spain, for example, the transition to democracy was marked by, among other things, a proliferation of debating societies, social organizations, football clubs, and the like. Such groups may never enter directly into the political arena, much less directly attempt to check the state; but they do foster social participation, a sense of community, and of rights and values beyond the controlling reach of official power.

Democratization and 'macro' strategies

A theoretical discussion such as this one can only outline in broad terms the strengths in democratic politics that may be worthy of our attention. In exploring the connections between more open politics and anti-corruption progress there is no substitute for the experience and judgment of diplomats, aid officials, and scholars deeply familiar with the specific issues and personalities involved in a nation's politics.

Nonetheless, a few general possibilities can be suggested. First, while a shift toward democratic politics will take a long time to build systems of public order, it may more quickly produce a shift toward more integrative forms of corruption (market corruption, patronage), and away from more disintegrative forms such as cronyism and nepotism. *The danger here* is that politics may open up too quickly and chaotically, in that elites and brokers who see their influence rapidly evaporating will tend to take as much as they can, as quickly as they can, and private parties who regard democratization as chaotic and temporary will likewise strike as quickly as they can. Scott (1972) has noted this 'hand-over-fist' pattern in nations where power suddenly becomes fluid and unpredictable. The result may be 'crisis corruption'.

Where, on the other hand, change serves to strengthen private groups and to link elites with citizens on broad, noncommunal bases, these dangers may be reduced, and the vitality of civil society may be nurtured. Even these changes may involve corruption, hopefully of the less disintegrative varieties; political patronage that helps build parties and soften the impact of change in local communities should perhaps be tolerated, even if it involves some formal corruption. The choice, after all, is not between corruption and totally honest politics; the choice is between disruptive corruption that impedes political and economic development, and incidental corruption that does not (Klitgaard, 1988: pp. 26–27).

There will inevitably be controversy, scandal and conflict. How can we distinguish between 'healthy' controversies — those contributing to the process of setting effective limits upon public and private conduct — and less constructive (or simply irrelevant) conflicts? How can we tell whether and where civil society is becoming stronger? I suggest that a careful study of the major political conflicts in a society, and of the interests and issues involved

in them, may identify the promising cases. These are controversies in which the issues at stake are:

- the idea, and extent, of elite accountability;
- the extent and structure of interelite competition;
- the extent and control of mass participation; and
- the reach and effectiveness of market allocations.

Those groups arguing repeatedly and effectively for greater elite accountability, those whose actions enhance the competition among elites and tend to increase mass participation, and those seeking to strengthen open markets at the expense of personalized, or abusively authoritative, means of allocation, may be worth support. Governments that tolerate such demands may be better bets than those that do not. Aid to nations where these processes are underway, and to groups that seem most likely to advance the process, may be a way to maximize the anti-corruption potentialities of democratic change.

Conclusion

None of these ideas offer a sure 'cure' for corruption, or will be easy to implement. They do, however, buttress the notion that the democratization of politics and the reduction of corruption are interconnected, and that achievements in each area can bring progress in the other. Democratic societies may be vulnerable to the excessive privatization of politics, to the 'marketization' of everything, and to gridlock among competing interests — all of which can entail corruption. But a more democratic politics also brings unique strengths, and offers important anti-corruption opportunities, which are no less valuable for being long-term in their logic and effects. Macro- and micro-level approaches must work together, albeit over differing time spans. There will be numerous reversals, and much corruption along the way. But now is a time of emergent opportunities to make progress both on fighting corruption and on fostering more open politics in many African nations.

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From the specific to the general: Reflections on the Sudan

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Abstract. The long reign of the Numayri government in the Sudan was marked by extraordinary levels of corruption and violence. In the end, corruption was one reason for its fall. This case, however, invites more general reflection on the origins and serious consequences of corruption for entire societies, particularly under conditions of severe scarcity and instability. Corruption is both a consequence of human and institutional frailties, and a function of its social setting. While it is impossible to eliminate entirely, it can be contained within acceptable limits if sufficient political will and a solid commitment to the democratic ethos can be created. Doing so, however, requires a long-term commitment to major changes in all aspects of politics and government.

Introduction

Although every country has its own specific forms and patterns of corruption, it is possible to generalize about experiences within a common framework of analysis. In materials prepared for this workshop session, there are three such pieces including a detailed study of the Sudanese experience during the Numayri regime. It lends itself to the broader reflections that are offered in these comments.

Sudan was the first sub-Saharan country to gain independence in the modern era. Since 1956, it has experienced seven regimes, by far the longest being that ruled by Numayri. All have been concerned with two basic questions, first, what to do about Islam, and second, what to do about the South, which has been at war with Khartoum off and on throughout the period.

Sudan is the largest country in Africa, bordering eight other states and is just across the Red Sea from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region. It is one of the poorest countries in the world, being mostly desert. It has not been particularly blessed with natural resources and what it has is bitterly contested. Sudan is one of the most socially unstable countries in the world. It is the meeting place between two great civilizations, the Moslems in the North and the largely Christianized blacks in the South. The cultural clash is extreme, with bitter rivalries and hatreds, discrimination and favoritism, dominance and slavery. Today, the country has one of Africa's most repressive regimes and the people are frightened. Sudan thus has a climate hostile to international investment and

internal savings. Nobody wants in and many of its 25 million people want to get out. Even without corruption, the society would be in very poor shape.

The situation borders on the desperate because of systemic or institutionalized corruption. It is a classic 'soft' state; that is, the governing apparatus is hollow, riddled with self-promoting, self-interested groups that hold little agreement on what is in the general interest. The government is incompetent, inefficient, ineffective, inconsistent and arbitrary. The state siphons off potential wealth into heavy security expenditures, conspicuous consumption, and privatized assets. It is the prime source of corrupt exploitation.

It is very difficult for any individual not to be sucked into this whirlpool. One can be well-meaning, idealistic, patriotic, self-effacing, honest and yet be corrupted by office, opportunity, power, access, influence, standing and adoration. Thus a reform leader can start out as a bitter opponent of a corrupt regime, a protector of the masses, hard working, brave, disciplined, principled and yet within a short time become a hated tyrant, ruthless, savage, cruel, spiteful, vindictive, vain, egotistical, self-interested, rude, exploitative, opulent, even sacrilegious, claiming attributes if not of God then of God's anointed.

Corruption, repression, and decay

If one studies the Numayri regime, which held office between 1969 and 1985, this is exactly what happened to Numayri. He faced 45 coup attempts, roughly three a year, all of which he ruthlessly suppressed. This did not gain him support but only eroded it. Yet Numayri originally came to power to replace an utterly discredited regime, one riddled with corruption, internal bickering, and futile squabbles. Numayri's coup promised to eliminate corruption, liberate the masses from backwardness and subservience, and release their political and economic potential, thereby placing the country on the road of progress and socialism.

How? Numayri aimed to create a one party state based on the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU), which was to concentrate all political and economic authority in the state and its organs. It was to be a dictatorship of the party, although some parts of government were to be decentralized and run locally by cooperatives and similar forms of local self-government. The regime was to rely heavily on foreign borrowing and investment until it got on its feet.

At first, this looked as though it would work. The state was run by competent people. They were talented, devoted, idealistic, self-sacrificing. They eased political restrictions and arranged for more popularly based government. They reorganized state administration to be more efficient and effective. But their efforts were accompanied by runaway inflation, frequent currency devaluations and rescheduled debts. Productivity declined, especially in the major cash crop, cotton. Black markets flourished, strikes broke out, and unrest overtook the country. In 1982, the International Monetary Fund intervened to prevent total chaos but its policies only made things worse. The

regime declared itself an Islamic state and then reversed itself. Things deteriorated even faster. In 1985, the students demonstrated. They were joined by other protest groups; the demonstrations turned violent and then ended up as riots. While Numayri was outside the country renegotiating foreign loans and seeking further relief, the army intervened and staged a coup.

What had gone wrong? For one thing, over-optimistic expectations generated by public leadership collapsed in the disillusionment of unrelieved poverty that was the daily reality of the great mass of the population. For another, it was known that the elite had used the state to enrich itself. Progressively the regime had divorced itself from the mass, erecting a stupendous bureaucratic-authoritarian structure under an inaccessible personal rulership.

Numayri became identified as the state and nation; he dominated everything. He worked long hours and was personally devoted to his public office. But he was ever suspicious of anyone that might oppose him, and as the coup attempts showed he had good reason. At first he worked collegially with practical, simple and like-minded SSU leaders until they became virtual satraps who saw Numayri as their godfather and themselves as his dependents. So within government, there was soon little coordination, collective responsibility, initiative, action, strength, or identification between rulers and ruled.

Meantime, Numayri had become autocratic. He established his sole command over the SSU, the military, and the public service. The SSU became little more than a patronage machine. Numayri staged frequent purges and reorganizations to keep control and prevent any possible rivals from gaining any hold. Performance was woeful.

The Numayri regime came to suffer from the same defects as its predecessor. It was corrupt, incompetent and saturated with internal bickering. It was chronically short of money and it spent less and less on development and modernization. It provided fewer and fewer social services. It grew increasingly alienated from the people. In the end, its main concern was just to hang on, to perpetuate itself, to continue to exploit the spoils of office. To do this it had to rely on coercion and this only eroded its legitimacy and increased opposition.

By the end the Numayri regime had reversed all of its original promises, values, policies and alliances. Nobody had any faith left in it. So it was toppled by a coup which in its own turn promised to restore order, revive national fortunes and end corruption, once again to no lasting effect.

Lessons from the Sudan

So what can be learned from Sudan's experience with the Numayri regime?

- Corruption is not the sole or main cause of a regime's downfall or incompetence, but it is an important contributing factor to destabilization, inefficiency and ineffectiveness, to injustice, discrimination, unfairness and

- grievance, to exploitation, greed, waste, fraud and insensitivity, to cruelty and inhumanity. Corruption is negative development.
- Under conditions of scarcity, uncertainty and instability, public office holders, even those pledged to putting an end to corruption, soon find that because of systemic or institutionalized corruption they cannot clean house just by replacing the players, because the game will sooner or later be played the same way. So they become tempted to join in and exploit the spoils of office to keep their positions, until they too fall by the wayside. Systemic corruption can only be dealt with on a systemic basis and that requires a 'hard' state not a 'soft' state. Instead of building constitutionalism, civic virtue, professionalization of public service and all the other props of a 'hard' and effective state, short-sighted public leaders opt for the softer solutions of cleansing purges, reorganization, cooptation, sharing the spoils and consolidating support by patronage and pork barrel which actually split the population and undermine the general interest.
 - Once corruption penetrates public activity, it acts like a fast moving cancer that will eventually so disease the state and the body politic that there is little capacity left to wage a determined opposition. The regime so afflicted will die. It will not be supported by the great mass of people who do not benefit from corruption but are alienated by it. Anti-corruption campaigns are always popular for this reason, even though they can be mounted by non-democratic as well as democratic forces.
 - Corruption is a political fact of life because of human frailty and organizational imperfections. Technical solutions exist but they are temporary, inadequate, and inoperable without the will and commitment to raise public morality and integrity. This is a taxing and long-term assignment.

The essentials of corruption

Generalizing further, we can see that overcoming administrative corruption depends on three vital elements — a clear distinction between public and private resources, a clear acknowledgement that the use of public resources for purely private gain is unethical, and a clear understanding that office holders who divert public resources for private gain are unworthy of office and that their conduct is shameful. Only with the emergence of the administrative state over the past two hundred years have these elements come together into a standard of public service. It is still not universally accepted or practiced. In its absence, offensive behavior by public officials is still taken for granted: why should anyone assume the burdens and responsibilities of public office unless there are personal advantages and compensating rewards?

Yet long ago, keen observers of the public scene, such as Ibn Khaldun, blamed self-interested behavior for the decay and eventual downfall of all civilizations, even the greatest and most brilliant (Payne, 1975: 145). Today, it has become possible to forge something like a general agreement on a

definition of corruption as 'behavior which deviates from the normal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (family, close private clique), pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence ...' (Nye, 1967: 419). This is as close as we have come to a common understanding of the essence of administrative corruption. And although there are differences as to what specific forms of misconduct constitute corruption, there is broad consensus as to what can be included under its rubric (see Table 1) and what forms of public misbehavior are worthy of condemnation no matter what the circumstances or causes (Caiden, 1988).

Given this consensus, it is possible to submit a series of general propositions about its nature.

- Administrative corruption can be found in all political systems, at every level of government, and in the delivery of all scarce public goods and services. The difference among regimes lies not in its existence but in the extent of its spread and of its acceptance.
- Administrative corruption varies in origin, incidence and importance among different geographical regions, sovereign states, political cultures, economies and administrative arrangements. No two countries are the same, and within the same country there can be wide differences just as there can be among public organizations within the same location.
- Administrative corruption depends on the societal context (including

Table 1. Most commonly recognized forms of official corruption.

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- Non-performance of duties; desertion; parasitism
 - Treason; subversion; illegal foreign transactions; smuggling
 - Kleptocracy; privatization of public funds; larceny and stealing
 - Misappropriation; forgery and embezzlement; padding of accounts; diverted funds; misuse of funds; unaudited revenues; skimming
 - Abuse and misuse of coercive power; intimidation; undeserved pardons and remissions; torture
 - Deceit and fraud; misrepresentation; cheating and swindling
 - Perversion of justice; criminal behavior; false evidence; unlawful detention; frame-ups
 - Bribery and graft; extortion; illegal levies; kickbacks
 - Tampering with elections; vote-rigging; gerrymandering
 - Misuse of inside knowledge and confidential information; falsification of records
 - Unauthorized sale of public offices, loans, monopolies, contracts, licenses and public property
 - Manipulation of regulations, purchases and supplies; bias and favoritism
 - Tax evasion; profiteering
 - Influence-peddling; favor-brokering; conflicts of interest
 - Acceptance of improper gifts and entertainments; 'speed' money; blackmail
 - Protecting maladministration; cover-ups; perjury
 - Black market operations; links with organized crime
 - Cronyism; junkets
 - Misuse of official seals, stationery, residences and perquisites
 - Illegal surveillance; misuse of mails and telecommunications
-

international and transnational influences) in which public power is exercised.

- It is facilitated by unstable polities, uncertain economies, maldistributed wealth, unrepresentative government, monopolistic ambition, factionalism, personalism, rampant materialism, and dependency. It is hindered by their opposites.
 - It favors the haves (over the have-nots), illegal enterprises, underground economies, and organized crime. It penalizes the poor, the honest, and the law-abiding. It widens discrimination and envy.
- Administrative corruption and its effects cannot be measured accurately because the corruption takes so many different forms and because it is so conspiratorial.
- It persists as long as its perpetrators can induce or coerce participation.
 - It feeds on political corruption and vice-versa. The two contaminate one another and are virtually inseparable.
 - It feeds on private sector corruption and vice-versa. All forms of corruption are mutually reinforcing. They are all directed at the exercise of public power, at key decision points, and at discretionary authority.
- Administrative corruption is impossible to eliminate entirely because it is so deeply rooted in self-interest and so contaminating.

Containing corruption

Knowing the nature of the beast should help somewhat in devising a general containment strategy and in making realistic assessments of its prospects for success.

In any containment strategy the objective should be not the elimination of all corruption, however desirable that may be, but the reduction of its harmful effects on development. Many societies have shown not only that have they benefited even temporarily from reducing corruption but that each temporary victory makes it easier to progress the next time round. The aim is to turn corruption from being a way of life into becoming an incidental occurrence that is not systemic or institutionalized but avoidable, risky and shameful.

To achieve any modicum of success, many factors have to come together. The most important are the human requirements. Officeholders in all walks of life have to be unwilling to take advantage of their positions to plunder the administrative state, and willing to impose the same self-restraint on everybody else so that the corrupt and the corrupted are barred from any position of public trust (Caiden, 1992). The general public must be unwilling to tolerate systemic corruption and willing to take action into their own hands if necessary to boycott corrupt organizations, to expose corrupt officeholders where found, and to insist on the elimination of corrupt practices wherever uncovered. Both officeholders and public must have recourse to anti-corruption laws, organizations, and specialists capable of exposing corruption, prosecuting

the corrupt, and devising effective measures to minimize recurrence. These in turn need the backing of independent mass media willing to publicize evidence of corruption without fear or favor. All this is a tall order indeed, especially in Africa as case studies from the Sudan, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone demonstrate.

Corruption can be contained within acceptable limits but for that to persist will require political will, a strong democratic ethos, a social system of separated and countervailing powers, highly prized administrative norms, inculcation of personal honesty and integrity, and effective enforcement of anti-corruption measures. As a significant first step, the issue of corruption has to be openly discussed and studied. Twenty or so years ago gatherings devoted to discussing corruption were rare. Now they are becoming more frequent and regular as the small band of original taboo breakers has expanded its network to include professionals engaged in anti-corruption activities, researchers, and public leaders.

This network now has its own journal published in the Netherlands, which hosted in 1989 the first United Nations interregional seminar on corruption, organized in part by the UNO's Criminal Justice Department, and which made available for the meeting a draft anti-corruption manual that is being readied for worldwide distribution. More countries are associating themselves with Recommendation 8 of the draft UN resolution on international cooperation for crime prevention and criminal justice in the context of development, which reads as follows:

Because the corrupt activities of public officials can destroy the potential effectiveness of all types of governmental programs, hinder development, and victimize individuals and groups, it is of crucial importance that all nations should: a) review the adequacy of their criminal laws, including procedural legislation, in order to respond to all forms of corruption and related actions designed to assist or to facilitate corrupt activities, and should have recourse to sanctions that will ensure an adequate deterrence; b) devise administrative and regulatory mechanisms for the prevention of corrupt practices or the abuse of power; c) adopt procedures for the detection, investigation and conviction of corrupt officials; d) create legal provisions for the forfeiture of funds and property from corrupt practices; and e) adopt economic sanctions against enterprises involved in corruption ...

(United Nations, 1990: 4)

Anyone intent on curbing corruption must identify the major forms that irritate and offend his or her particular society, the conditions that give rise to them, and the key variables that might be manipulable, before devising an appropriate policy for the specific cultural and socio-economic context. Nonetheless, there are certain general objectives that all should pursue, as follows:

- Improving the quality of public leadership and the recruitment and socialization of people worthy of public trust.
- Reducing unwanted and unneeded public regulation.
- Minimizing the monopoly provision of public goods and services and ensuring the public accountability of all providers.
- Revising laws that are vague, anachronistic or contradictory.
- Strengthening open democratic government and government-in-the-sunshine together with administrative due process.
- Increasing the professionalization of public administration.
- Fortifying administrative supervision so that irregularity in the use of time, resources, and position is more readily evident, including such abuses as capital flight, tax and customs evasion, and money laundering.

Only then should the attempt be made to impose specific anti-corruption measures on public organizations. Manuals and guides should be constructed, much along the lines suggested by Robert Klitgaard (1988), the Independent Commission Against Corruption in Hong Kong, and the U.S. Agency for International Development's various *Accountability Initiatives*.

Among the key provisions that seem universally effective are: the adoption and inculcation of public service professional codes of ethics and norms that work to minimize corruption; insistence on regular and competent public accountability mechanisms (inspectors-general, state auditors, legislative committees, open records and accounts, regular reports, judicial review, legal safeguards); and the institutionalization of continuous administrative reform that includes special provision for the outlawing, investigation, and punishing of corrupt practices. Where corruption appears to be ingrained, there may be need for a special Anti-Corruption Commission with exceptional powers to root out offensive practices and hunt down serious offenders. Otherwise, anti-corruption measures may include professional watchdogs to monitor corruption-prone transactions, and restructured relationships that reduce corruption vulnerability by inducing greater competition and constricting personal discretion. The whole edifice ought properly to be backed by democratization and the free flow of information.

Conclusion

The adoption of specific anti-corruption measures needs to be accompanied by a campaign to strengthen the culture of public accountability. Scandals around the globe and in Africa show how inadequate any measures are unless reinforced by a strong internalized culture of public responsibility and answerability. Even in the best of frameworks, things go wrong and individuals are tempted to act in their own self-interest. Strong public accountability mechanisms, backed by inculcated public service ethics and norms, should pick them up before they do too much harm. But even so, the modern admini-

strative state has many gaps that need plugging. Glaring areas of public irresponsibility or non-accountability include unregulated international exchanges, self-governing agencies, rogue regimes, secret activities, collaborative/collusive intergovernmental relations, contracted functions, privileged status, entrepreneurial public management, and over-reliance on self-policing. Until these and other gaps are finally filled, anti-corruption measures will have only an incomplete success.

Administrative corruption is a viral pathology. It is highly contagious, debilitating, and costly to treat. The ingenious and the unscrupulous are always one step ahead. Complete victory in the campaign against it is unlikely but that is no excuse for failing to make a beginning. The cost of defeat is seen all too vividly in the wretchedness of Africa's too many poor and the opulence of its isolated rich, two contrasting worlds that spell disaster for humanity if left uncontested.

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Nigeria's perennial struggle against corruption: Prospects for the third republic

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Abstract. Nigeria's current transition to a Third Republic is one of the most critical and closely-watched processes on the African continent. It is taking place at a time of extensive revelations and rumors of corruption, however, casting doubt over the viability of new leaders, institutions and parties. The military government that has been building republican institutions is itself seriously compromised. There are laws on the books, and investigatory institutions, that could be used against corruption, but these lack critical backing and powers. Meanwhile, incentives to corruption remain strong, intensified by the nation's steep economic decline. A focus on political culture alone is misleading; needed are a serious commitment to official accountability, realistic levels of official pay, and a long-term commitment to more open and competitive politics.

Introduction

As Nigeria wends its way toward its third attempt at democracy in as many decades, it confronts daunting challenges: persistent ethnic and regional tensions, growing religious conflict, shallow political institutions, an assertive military and secret police establishment, a deeply depressed economy, and a cynical and increasingly despairing populace. No problem, however, is more intractable and more threatening to the future of Nigerian democracy than political corruption.

The growth of corruption

It is difficult to establish the facts about corruption in any type of government, and especially a military one. Nigeria has buzzed for years with rumors about the fabulous ill-gotten wealth of senior military and civilian officials in the government of General Ibrahim Babangida. Many officers, both serving and recently retired, have flaunted their new-found riches. As one prominent newsweekly reported:

An earlier version of this paper was published in *Journal of Democracy* 2: 4 (Fall 1991), pp 73-85.

The rumor mill is agog with tales of the 'Arabian mansions' being put up by some serving military officers. Criticisms abound of how military governors have continued to allocate land to themselves and their relations.¹

Corruption today seems rife in every area of government and public service. The 1988 report of the federal auditor general listed numerous cases of unrepaid loans, payments without vouchers, purchases and reimbursements without receipts, and 'huge losses in stock and cash plus gross abuse of official property'.

Abuses of this sort are old news in Nigeria, but there are some novel and ominous aspects to this latest upsurge of corruption. International drug enforcement authorities, including the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, believe that Nigeria has become a leading shipper of narcotics, especially cocaine and heroin. Both international authorities and Nigerian observers believe that the drug trade could not proceed so brazenly without the connivance of highly placed Nigerian officials. In March of 1991, a well-connected Lagos society woman was arrested for attempting to bribe her friend, the chairman of Nigeria's National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), to win the release of arrested drug traffickers. In the ensuing scandal, the chairman was removed on suspicion of corruption, a magazine charged that the NDLEA press officer had bribed judicial correspondents to slant coverage of the story, two TV news anchors were fired for not immediately using the vice-president's statement on the controversy, and police closed the *Lagos Evening News* and arrested 15 of its staffers after it headlined that the woman had used the names of the president and first lady in her effort to bribe the NDLEA boss.²

Another new aspect involves widespread stories of corrupt conduct by the president himself. Never before in Nigeria has the head of state been so widely suspected of extensive personal involvement in corruption. Tales have been circulating for years of Babangida's large cash gifts to military officers, cabinet ministers, traditional rulers, and potentially contentious opponents; of Mercedes Benz cars given to major newspaper editors and directors of state broadcasting corporations; of the president's secret personal investments in banks and companies; of off-the-books oil being lifted offshore by private tankers. While none of these stories has been publicly documented, they have been conveyed by diverse and well placed sources with enough consistency to lend them an air of plausibility. If they are mainly true, they would confirm many Nigerians' suspicions that Babangida is indeed — as the U.S. magazine *Ebony* was falsely rumored to have alleged in 1989, in a hoax that triggered furious and deadly rioting — one of the richest rulers in Africa.³

Concern over top-level corruption exploded anew in 1991 when Britain's *Financial Times* reported that at least \$3 billion of the estimated \$5 billion oil windfall that Nigeria reaped from the Persian Gulf crisis was unaccounted for in Central Bank reports.⁴ Among the drains on revenue, the paper noted the start on construction of a billion-dollar aluminum smelter (contracted to a

German firm); military spending hikes associated with Nigeria's intervention in Liberia; and the recent hosting of the OAU summit in the new capital of Abuja. The report was explosive in part because it implied massive waste and excess, which are typically associated with corruption. Capital costs of the aluminum plant were said by diplomatic sources to be '60—100 percent higher than similar plants elsewhere in the world'. The OAU meeting 'is believed to have cost more than \$150 million', much of it in rush construction projects. Just 'the cost of the Mercedes stretch limousines bought to transport the heads of state exceeded the level of contributions made to the OAU by member countries last year'. The government called the estimates inflated and promptly expelled the *Times* correspondent.

The sad fact of the Babangida administration is that its lack of concern for accountability — its persecution of press critics, and its refusal to publish the assets declarations of its officials — intensifies suspicions about high-level corruption and thus fuels the already considerable public demand and cynicism over the possibility of realizing much-needed political and economic reforms. Policy specialists increasingly regard corruption as a major reason why the economy has not responded more positively to the World Bank-inspired Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). Corruption continues to drain the country's revenue and developmental potential. Moreover, it is undermining the willingness of ordinary Nigerians to endure the pain of economic adjustment when 'the gentlemen in power' indulge in an 'unrestrained, provocative, and enraging display of wealth by unsubstantiated means'.⁵ Finally, the persistence of corruption has negated whatever potential may have existed to effect changes in the political culture, especially as regards the ethics of and motives for public service. This is likely to have grave consequences for the Third Republic.

Political distortions

The recent resumption of electoral politics in Nigeria shows depressingly little change from the Second Republic. The 1987 voter registration exercise, for example, handed out 72 million certificates, even though Nigeria has no more than 55 million eligible voters. The National Electoral Commission (NEC) concluded that, as in the past, 'there had been multiple registration, the registration of children and of nonexistent people', and other instances of fraud instigated by powerful persons and condoned by registration officials.⁶ Former NEC chairman Eme Awa also revealed threats against electoral officials (most prominently himself), vote rigging, and attempts to sabotage the December 1987 local government elections.

Once again, politics is drowning in money. During 1989, more than a dozen associations competed to be recognized as one of the two political parties to be allowed in the new system. Staggering sums were invested in these efforts by wealthy businessmen and political patrons (including many former

politicians). *Newswatch* estimated the total cost of mounting a thorough drive for party registration at N250 million.⁷ Probably each of the top four parties in NEC's final rankings spent something like this amount — though all for naught, as it turned out, because Babangida rejected all their bids and decided to create the two new parties by fiat.

Money continued to flow profusely as the politicians regrouped into the new parties and wrangled their way through a series of caucuses and conventions. At the two national conventions in July 1990, votes were openly bought and sold; candidates and state-delegation leaders were routinely bribed — all in the presence of high officials in the military regime. When money flows with this abandon in Nigerian politics, electoral fraud is not far behind, as politicians and their supporters feel compelled to capture state power at any price in order to make good on their massive financial investments. The 1990 state conventions and local caucuses of the two parties were also riddled by controversy, and election tribunals have been flooded with petitions claiming irregularities in the December 1990 local government elections and virtually every type and level of election since then. The state gubernatorial elections were hotly disputed, with charges of electoral officials being purchased and manipulated, and a number of primary battles having to be conducted again. And in the first week of August 1992, in the first round of what was to be a six-week rolling presidential primary for each of the two parties, the Nigerian electoral process descended to new levels of fraud and farce (or more appropriately, to the same level that destroyed the credibility of the Second Republic), when native son presidential candidates such as Shehu Musa Yar A'dua in Katsina State and Immanuel Iwuanyanwu in Abia State amassed preposterous vote figures amidst reports that the SDP and NRC state party machines they controlled had literally pulled figures out of thin air.

Even more ominously, political violence has increased, claiming a number of lives, as various factions wrestled in the states for gubernatorial nominations and control of the party branches. While violence and thuggery have generally been contained more effectively than they were in the turbulent 1983 elections, this positive trend has been counterbalanced by the rise of political assassination, claiming a local government chairman in February 1992 and narrowly missing a governor and local government chairman in January and March 1992.

After 30 years, the central question of Nigerian politics remains: Why do politicians — and since 1966, soldiers — want political power so badly that they will do virtually anything to get it? Why does politics become 'warfare, a matter of life and death'?'⁸

Plainly, the stakes of politics are too high. The welfare of too many communities and the fortunes of too many families and groups depend almost entirely on control of the state. Officeholding in Nigeria has come to mean the opportunity for phenomenal illicit gain. Since the flood of oil wealth that began in 1973—1974 washed away virtually all pretense of discretion and restraint, the scramble for irregular personal and group enrichment has become

the bane of every Nigerian government, civilian and military alike. Yet the scale of the dishonesty seems to increase with each successive regime.

For many years now, Nigerians in general have recognized corruption as a central threat to the economic and political future of their country. Regime after regime has inveighed against it. In January of 1991, the newly elected local government officials took office amidst a hail of public warnings from the press, the military, the public, the judiciary, and themselves 'to shun the urge to amass wealth through impious, dubious, and unpatriotic means', and 'to comport [yourselves] in such a way as to retain effectiveness and popular support'.⁹ Nigerian history is littered with the wreckage of governments that uttered and then violated such injunctions.

Words versus deeds

Since the 1950's, Nigeria has suffered from an increasingly profound disjunction between word and deed. It is not that politicians and public servants are unable to grasp the requirements of a democratic political culture. On the contrary, they know full well the norms of democracy, and incant them like a mantra with every new government. But these norms have not sunk deep roots, so that the psychic costs of violating them are negligible. In the years just after independence, it was plausible to attribute this divergence to colonialism's bifurcation of the public realm. On one side was the 'primordial public' of village and ethnic community with its strong traditional strictures against corruption; on the other lay the new 'civic public' — the modern administrative state — an alien and exploitative sphere in which customary norms did not apply.¹⁰ Yet with power now passing to a third post-independence generation, this explanation hardly suffices.

At work is a crude process of class formation. For 40 years, Nigerian officials of every rank have systematically misappropriated public wealth. For 40 years, the gulf has widened between an impoverished general populace and the dominant class. Riven by ethnic, regional, and religious cleavages, by shifting partisan and factional divisions, and by continual civil-military tensions, Nigeria's dominant groups nevertheless constitute a class bound together by a shared taste for extravagant consumption and acquisition financed by access to state power. Indeed, they are best designated a 'political class' precisely because their wealth flows from control over 'relations of power, not production'.¹¹

The dense network of vertical ties joining political patrons to clients largely sustains the system, but with great instability. Both the elite and the masses have split personalities: the politicians want to make democracy work and to get rich doing so, even though their corrupt enrichment will quite likely bring democracy down. The masses, meanwhile, retain their profound cynicism regarding politics, but remain ready to join in the scramble for whatever morsels can be had. Such schizophrenia produces all of the intensity and

passion of mass politics, but with none of the loyalty to democracy that could deter a military coup.

The situation is made even more perilous and unstable by the breathtaking economic descent of Nigeria in recent years. With the devaluation of the naira by roughly 95 percent in the last decade — and by more than half in 1990—1991 alone — and with the continuing widespread deterioration in public services and dearth of economic opportunities for most of the lower (and even middle) classes, access to government wealth has become ever more imperative. As the Third Republic begins, ten years of austerity, depression, structural adjustment and real economic suffering have left a legacy of material and psychological pain, desperation, and explosive frustration that is difficult to convey in words. The urge on the part of politicians and office-holders to grab what one can as quickly as possible before the walls of the constitutional system cave in again will be that much more irresistible. And popular resentment of this brazen self-enrichment, in the midst of so much suffering, will be that much more immediate and profound.

The fragility of democracy in the Third Republic will be accentuated by changes within the Nigerian military that heighten the readiness to launch another coup — notwithstanding President Babangida's flowery entreaties to respect the constitutional system. In large measure because of the President's *real* behavior in office (and that of his senior colleagues), junior officers have come to view a lucrative tour of duty in government as their right, and young people now join the armed forces (or marry into military families) toward this end. They are not willing to be shut out permanently from political power and its huge rewards merely because the president keeps enjoining them to show 'unalloyed loyalty to the constitution and subordination to democratically elected government'.¹² Heightening the danger is the considerable loss of esprit de corps and internal cohesion suffered by the Nigerian military after two decades of intervening in politics.

The 'new breed' in Nigeria — both civilian and military — is a hungry breed. No appeal to values or principles is likely to deter them, any more than it deterred the supposed 'new breed' of politicians in the Second Republic, or the new generation of military politicians that succeeded them.

The root of the problem

The fundamental mistake to date has been the assumption that the problem is rooted in political culture. There *is* an entrenched culture of corruption in Nigeria, but it is not the cause of the problem. Corruption has flourished in Nigeria because of perverse incentives that only structural change can remedy.

The incentive structure in Nigeria offers a low-risk path to easy riches through political corruption, while opportunities to accumulate wealth through real entrepreneurship are limited and chancy. Ethical revolutions and social mobilizations will not change these underlying realities. They will change —

as eventually so will the culture — if opportunities for corrupt gain shrink while its risk rises, and legitimate methods for accumulating wealth expand.

The latter may now be happening, but it is a slow process, retarded by a nasty conundrum: pervasive corruption and the resulting political instability make for a poor investment climate, yet without growing investment in legitimate enterprise, corruption will retain its appeal. Effective implementation of economic reform policies may eventually generate a dynamic capitalist sector outside the state, but Nigerians are unlikely to reinvest at home the \$30 billion or so they have sent abroad unless other, easier avenues of gain are restricted.

Structural adjustment reforms aim to reduce rent-seeking in state office by cutting back on the state's role in the economy. Some of this has already been achieved. Under current conditions, however, there are limits to such adjustment, especially in a country that relies heavily on oil revenues controlled by the state. For the indefinite future, opportunities for Nigerians to enrich themselves in public office will remain extensive.

Nigeria is thus left looking mainly to another avenue of change — increasing the risks and costs of corrupt conduct. The Nigerian Code of Conduct apparatus, first adopted in 1979, holds the key to this approach. It required public officers to declare all their assets at regular intervals to a Code of Conduct Bureau, which was empowered to monitor compliance. The Bureau could then refer charges of misconduct to a quasi-judicial body — the Code of Conduct Tribunal — which had authority to impose serious penalties, including dismissal, seizure of assets, and disqualification from office for ten years. But unless it is enforced by an ably led and properly staffed Bureau and Tribunal, it will have no more impact in the Third Republic than it did in the Second. Under the Second Republic, neither institution functioned as intended because the National Assembly buried their enabling legislation and the President appointed a Bureau Chairman who was never meant to take his job seriously.

Today, the Achilles' heel of those bodies still remains their subservience to partisan politicians. Despite pledges by the Babangida government to reactivate the Bureau and Tribunal prior to the return to elected civilian rule, neither institution has been given the resources and leadership to function properly. When civilian government does in fact become a reality, it is envisioned that the President will name members of these agencies and that the National Assembly will control important aspects of their operation, such as their access to declarations of assets.

In fact the Babangida administration rejected Political Bureau recommendations designed to make the Code of Conduct a more effective instrument of accountability. The first was that assets declarations should 'be published for general public assessment, claims and counterclaims'. The second would have entrusted the appointment of Bureau and Tribunal members to the Council of State rather than the president.¹³ These important recommendations point to some of the contradictions that vex the current transition. Even with the offices it now has in every state, the Conduct Bureau alone cannot thoroughly enforce

the Code of Conduct. Credible enforcement requires the assistance of a vigilant press and public with access to the declarations of assets. Yet as one prominent politician recently confided, that would pose an insoluble dilemma: If the politicians were to lie about their assets, a great many would be discovered, discredited, and removed from office; but if they were to declare them honestly, 'the public's shock at discovering the real extent of their wealth would cause a revolution in this country'.¹⁴

The problem of oversight cannot be solved by giving the present Council of State the power of appointment. Under the current Constitution, as under its predecessor, that body is chaired by the president and includes numerous serving politicians, including all 30 state governors. What is needed is a smaller, more active, and independent body composed mostly of citizens who are not involved in partisan politics. General Obasanjo has proposed that the incumbent president be the only politician on the council (and not its chairman), while all other members be required to relinquish any party memberships or affiliations.¹⁵

Helpful as such constitutional innovations could be in a struggle against corruption, they would not in themselves be sufficient. If the Conduct Bureau is to be an effective monitor of Nigeria's thousands of elected and unelected federal, state, and local officials, it will need a considerably larger staff both at its headquarters in Abuja and in each of the state offices. Justice Patrick C. Akpamgbo, the current chairman of the Conduct Tribunal, has estimated that a comprehensive enforcement effort would require the Bureau to provide each state office and its headquarters with 'nothing less than one hundred professional staff' — meaning university graduates trained in fields like criminology, accounting, and law, and rigorously screened for moral integrity.¹⁶ The Bureau also needs more money, computer technology, and most basically, enhanced legal authority. Under current law, the Bureau lacks the authority to investigate the affairs of public officers and evaluate the veracity of their declarations of assets.¹⁷ Although it began operating in May, 1988, and has referred to the Tribunal scores of officials who have failed to file assets declarations, the Code of Conduct apparatus has yet to punish a single public official for actual corruption. The problem promises to grow even worse in the Third Republic, when the Bureau will have to depend on a partisan attorney general's office to investigate cases of possible misconduct.

The need for accountability with realism

For the Third Republic to witness a significant drop in corruption, the struggle against it really needed to begin, and the institutional arsenal needed to be elaborated and reinforced, during the transition. Not surprisingly, given the massively corrupt character of the administration overseeing the transition, this has not happened, and of course will not happen between now and the handover of power. Indeed, speculation has been rife — and it is reasonable to

assume — that the Babangida administration is acutely concerned to ensure that the civilian government to which it hands over power will not probe its conduct in office. Given the character of the reemergent electoral politics and the probable aspirations and obligations of a new party administration, there seems little chance of that anyway.

What is needed now, what was needed three, five, seven years ago, is quite straightforward: to establish a legacy of accountability, if possible, by trying and punishing officials who breach the Code of Conduct. As Nigeria's prominent weekly *African Concord* observed in a 1990 article listing 'ten ways to end corruption': 'Government should seize property of corrupt public officers, jail them, and let them complete their [prison] terms'.¹⁸ (Other items on the list point to the long-term and multipronged effort that is needed: 'Government should separate the running of the economy from the state'.) The 'revolution in values' must continue, through leadership by example as well as through education. Government institutions at all levels (especially the Code of Conduct bodies) need fiercely honest and vigorous leaders who will brook no abuses on their watch. Forceful and exemplary leadership is especially needed in the office of president, which will set the moral tone for the new administration and the entire country.

Realistically, most of this is not going to happen. There appears little chance that government itself will lead the pursuit of accountability, or even allow it to proceed in a serious manner. The main hope for improvement in the Third Republic must therefore reside in civil society. There, in the spheres of public organizations and the mass media, can be found talented, serious, and patriotic Nigerians who understand the urgent need for reducing corruption and increasing accountability if democracy is to prevail and the country is to progress economically.

This has major implications for strategies of political development assistance to improve accountability. Clearly, the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal could be aided with technical assistance and training. But if there is not the will or political capacity at the top to make use of enhanced resources, these investments are likely to prove marginal at best. A more promising strategy for improvement in Nigeria would be to invest in the training of investigative reporters and the general enhancement of infrastructure and skills in the mass media. In addition, human rights organizations like the Civil Liberties Organization and the Constitutional Rights Project should be encouraged to set up corruption monitoring operations capable of referring credible and documented charges directly to the Code of Conduct Bureau. They should be liberally financed and supported in this regard. The ideal situation would involve the formation of a new citizens' monitoring organization of extraordinary national breadth and dedication — something like the election-monitoring group NAMFREL in the Philippines — that would have as its sole purpose the monitoring of official conduct and exposure of corruption. This would be no easy task, seeing how pervasively the culture of corruption has penetrated Nigerian society. But any effort at social change must start

somewhere, and there is now greater awareness of the broad damage that corruption causes. Finally, measures to enhance the power and autonomy of local government, bringing the whole phenomenon of governance in Nigeria closer to the grassroots, could strengthen the incentive and the ability of ordinary Nigerians to scrutinize and hold accountable the conduct of elected officials.

Realism is also needed in restoring official pay and benefits to respectable levels. Greed aside, many Nigerian officials are drawn to corruption merely in pursuit of economic security. With the drastic devaluation of the naira, retirement benefits and official salaries have become absurd: a junior bank executive may now make more on paper than the president of the country. To help deter corruption, salaries of public officials (particularly senior ones) must increase at least several hundred percent. This could prove politically hazardous for the government at a time when it is trying to hold down wages for fear of inflation and debilitating new deficits. If the people see corruption being vigorously rooted out, however, they may be more inclined to understand the need for higher public pay. Giving the power to determine official salaries to an independent commission could also increase the palatability of needed pay hikes.

Realism is needed not only in the struggle against corruption, but in the larger effort to foster viable democracy in Nigeria. No matter what happens, electoral politics in Nigeria will continue to be turbulent, raucous, and corrupt for many years to come. Democracies do not simply spring into being pure and whole like Athena from the brow of Zeus; they must develop over time. In the world's two oldest democracies, Britain and the United States, the struggle for reform unfolded through more than a century of legal, political, and social ferment. In important respects, that effort continues. No country in the world has a perfect democracy. Reform in Nigeria may not take a century, yet it will surely take a good while. During that time, civil society must mobilize effectively, outside of party politics, to make politicians accountable and elections honest. It must be ready to sustain these efforts for many years. The only hope for building democracy in Nigeria lies in a long, contentious, and incremental process of political reform and civic education — not in another 'mass mobilization', burst of rioting, or military coup.

Notes

1. *This Week*, 2 April 1990, 12.
2. *Newswatch*, 4 March 1991, 8–16; 25 March 1991, 15–19; and 1 April 1991, 25–29.
3. For more on these May 1989 anti-SAP riots, which claimed more than 50 lives, see Larry Diamond, 'Nigeria's Third Quest for Democracy', *Current History* 90 (May 1991): 203.
4. *Financial Times* (London), 25 and 27 June 1991.
5. 'The Unequal Sacrifice', *The Democrat*, 15 October 1988.
6. Eme O. Awa, 'Elections and Electoral Administration in the Transition' (Paper delivered at a conference on 'Democratic Transition and Structural Adjustment in Nigeria', Hoover Institution, Stanford, California, 26–29 August 1990), 16–17.

7. *Newswatch*, 17 July 1989, 16. The naira, worth more than one dollar in the early 1980's, is now equal to about 10 cents U.S.
8. This oft-quoted phrase is drawn from the 1981 presidential address of Claude Ake to the Nigerian Political Science Association, *West Africa*, 25 May 1981, 1162–1173.
9. Sola Akinsiku, 'Local Government Autonomy: A Right Step', *Sunday Punch*, 20 January 1991; the newly elected chairman the Ogbomosho local government council, in a swearing-in speech quoted in *Sunday Punch*, 20 January 1991.
10. Peter Ekeh, 'Colonialism and the Two Publics – A Theoretical Statement', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 17 (January 1975): 91–112.
11. Richard L. Sklar, 'Contradictions in the Nigerian Political System', *Journal of Modern African Studies* 3 (1965): 201–213, and 'The Nature of Class Domination in Africa', *Journal of Modern African Studies* 17 (1979): 531–552. The quote is from the latter article, 537. Use of the term 'political class' is further elaborated in Larry Diamond, *Class, Ethnicity, Democracy in Nigeria* (London: Macmillan; Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1988), 31–41.
12. Address of President Babangida to the Chief of Army Staff Annual Conference, quoted in *Daily Times*, 22 January 1991, 1.
13. *Report of the Political Bureau*, 216 and 219; *Government's Views and Comments on the Findings of the Political Bureau*, 76–77. Neither does the 1989 Constitution fully honor the Political Bureau's concern (expressed at 216) 'that the Code of Conduct Bureau must, as much as possible, be insulated from undue influences and pressures from the National Assembly'.
14. Private interview with a politician currently active in party politics, January 1991.
15. Olusegun Obasanjo, *Constitution for National Integration* (Lagos: Friends Foundation Publishers, 1989), 90–91. Other Nigerians have pondered whether it might be possible to have additional members of the Council nominated from recognized and respected organizations like the Nigerian Bar Association, the Nigerian Medical Association, the Nigeria Labour Congress, the National Association of Nigerian Students, and the National Council of Women's Societies.
16. Interview with Justice Patrick Akpamgbo, 18 January 1991. At that time, the Bureau had at its Abuja headquarters only 17 staff positions (four of which were vacant) in the key division that monitors official conduct, Research and Statistics. Only four of those at work actually examine the declarations of assets (the rest are support staff). Staffing of state offices is even more skeletal. (Interview with the chairman of the Code of Conduct Bureau, Reverend Canon Mohammed, 17 January 1991).
17. The Bureau is only empowered to 'examine' the assets declarations, which is construed to mean a rather cursory review to determine that all the questions are fully answered. Justice Akpamgbo has urged that the Bureau be given explicitly authority to 'investigate'.
18. *African Concord*, 26 March 1990, 34.

Roots and remedies of governmental corruption in Africa

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Abstract. Corruption in African states has many causes, but chief among them is the overcentralization of the state. Despite some early successes, overcentralization has pauperized the public sector and eroded commitment to reform and effective administration. It also fosters intense political struggles, on the part of the few with access to power, to win or maintain control of the state and its resources. Democratization offers important opportunities to improve this situation, so long as it is achieved through genuine decentralization of power. Such changes, however, may not only make the public more aware of the corruption problem, but also further institutionalize it. Anti-corruption measures must be carefully coordinated and based on sound principles of management.

Africa's struggle for liberation from authoritarian governments is underway today in countries as far apart as Guinea, Algeria, Kenya, Benin, Tanzania, Zaire, Nigeria, Ghana, Togo, South Africa, Malawi, and Cote d'Ivoire, not to mention those that have more recently emerged from colonial rule such as Angola and Mozambique. The seriousness of Africa's economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, and efforts directed at resolving the crisis, have led to a reexamination of the political structures that determine economic policy and implementation in African countries. The collapse of a bipolar cold war has further facilitated this process.

One question that remains unanswered, to date, is whether the emergence of democratic governments in Africa constitutes an adequate or appropriate response to several of the problems confronting the continent – poor economic management, declining terms of trade, environmental degradation, political instability and insurrection, and – more important – governmental corruption.

While there is a rich literature on Africa's second wave of liberation or democratization as well as on political and bureaucratic corruption, very little attention has been given to the relationships, if any, between these two phenomena. As I shall show later in this article, the failure of past remedies has been due largely to a poor understanding of the roots and dynamics of corruption in African governmental organizations.

For the past two years, I have been engaged in work on the theme of "Ethics and Accountability in African Public Services", in collaboration with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the African Associa-

tion for Public Administration and Management. I have also participated in a series of discussions sponsored by A.I.D. on "Democracy in Africa", including notably the conference organized by the National Academy of Science in Benin (February, 1992). I shall use this opportunity to reflect on some of the matters raised in these projects and also to draw on my own earlier work.

By democratization, I refer to efforts directed toward making governments more accountable to the people through such means as national conferences, constitutional reviews, top-down transition programs to introduce more popularly-constituted government, and the like. By governmental corruption I mean the use of public resources to serve private or sectional interests, or any other departures from bureaucratic morality and public service norms. A 1992 document on the subject prepared jointly by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the African Association for Public Administration and Management lists the following as "unethical behavior": bribery, corruption, abuse of office, patronage, nepotism, conflict of interest, influence peddling, using of official position for personal pleasure, favors to relatives and friends, divided loyalty, slowness, late-coming, partiality, partisanship, absenteeism, insubordination, misuse of government property, leaking or misusing government information and "engaging in any unsanctioned activity".

There is a distinction to be made between *primary* corruption – the deliberate use of state resources by a minority to maintain its political and economic ascendancy – and *secondary* corruption, the everyday abuse of office for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary interests of public officers or their cronies. (Onoge, 1982.) The merits of this distinction are that it recognizes that governmental corruption is a complex phenomenon and that different types of corruption may require different types of remedial measures. More to the point, it allows me to focus my attention on that segment of the public service which is supposed to be closest to the characteristics of a "legal-rational bureaucracy", described as an "ideal type" by Max Weber.

I. Roots of governmental corruption

1. Ethical standards

Western ethical standards for the public service have generally been adopted in all African countries and in fact have been written into codes of official behavior. In the post-colonial period, however, these codes have been little-observed by African public servants. According to one of Africa's most thoughtful political scientists,

Against these standards, the public service in Africa looks very bad. With minor exceptions..... [the standards] are applied *ad hoc* and, worse yet, discarded altogether according to convenience. (Ake, 1992.)

The reasons have to do with the distinctive evolution of the African state, which was established as an arbitrary power in the colonial period and has remained so since independence. This circumstance is further complicated by the fact that the African state's values are disconnected from indigenous values of communalization. These antipodal values have resulted not only in the alienation of the state from society but in the emergence of parallel institutional structures – the formal, associated with the colonial state, and the informal, associated with indigenous values and actors. (Ekeh, 1975.)

2. *Cultural conditions*

Culture-clash was the earliest explanation of widespread bureaucratic corruption in African countries. Some have suggested that traditional gift-giving or payment of tributes undermines the bureaucratic requirements of meritocracy and impersonality. Others look at kingship traditions to explain the tendency toward absolutist and despotic rule. And there is the view, already cited, that African communal values conflict with Western individualism and impersonality.

Another explanation dwells on the “disconnectedness” between state and society, and the resulting ‘softness’ of the African state. Some even maintain that Africa's prolonged habit of seeking soft options for progress – excessive dependency on outside sources for ideas, capital, and technology – have combined with the internal disconnection of state from society to produce Africa's deep-seated economic crisis. (Balogun, 1992.)

I intend to argue that while all of these explanations are useful in understanding the factors that make people prone to corrupt behavior, they do not explain either why people engage in corruption or why there are variations across the countries of Africa.

For just as differences exist among the regions and nations of the world in the degree of observance or non-observance of public service ethics, there are also differences of degree between various African countries. Generally, countries with multiparty democratic traditions such as the Gambia, Botswana, Namibia, Mauritius, and Zimbabwe tend to display a higher degree of bureaucratic morality than their more authoritarian counterparts. Generally, the more repressive a regime, the more corrupt it has tended to become. One can therefore understand why the level of governmental corruption was high at various times in countries such as Zaire, Nigeria, Zambia, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Guinea. It is useful to note that, generally, the military has tended to aggravate rather than attenuate governmental corruption, in spite of the fact that in almost all cases the existence of governmental corruption has been one of the most important excuses for toppling civil government.

3. *Overcentralization*

This is the most important and universal but least analyzed contributor to

governmental corruption in Africa. African countries entered their respective post-independence eras with a lot of confidence in the power and potency of the central state. As I have argued in collaboration with some colleagues, in spite of some significant early achievements the centralized strategy was a flawed one. Almost everywhere on the continent the results have been the same and have led to:

great blunders in policy and management; inefficient but expanding bureaucracies; extermination or repression of the opposition; forced or voluntary exile of key leaders; mass cynicism and alienation of the people from government; the capturing of 'monopoly rents' by bureaucratic classes which these small economies could not tolerate; and in several cases to civil war or breakdown of social orders. The overall effect has been counterproductive for development: resources have been wasted, lives have been destroyed and, often, existing institutions have decayed. (Wunsch & Olowu, 1990: 296.)

Those decaying institutions have included everything from cooperative and professional associations to independent media and rival political parties. The one-party state has developed in Africa at the expense of a free-standing pluralistic society. Also, that state has tended to centralize its powers in an executive power with few checks or balances from the legislature, the courts, or regional or local governments. The private sector is left to deal with an inflated central political authority, which arrogates to itself many of the decisions that ought properly to be left to the impersonal judgment of a career civil service. Lower level administration was very seriously weakened after independence, compared to the power and resources of senior colonial administrators, resulting in very weak field administration and still less accountability to the people. Finally, at the national level, delegation of authority has become weak or non-existent as Presidents or Cabinet Secretaries have concentrated administration in bureaucracies which they directly control. This has increased the delay in decision making, thus fueling opportunities for corrupt behavior and personalism based on ethnic or religious ties to influence normal governmental transactions.

4. Pauperization of the public service

Not only has the civil service been bastardised by an overcentralized state, but its integrity and autonomy have been severely undercut by salary scales well below a living wage made inevitable by an inefficient and overcentralized state. This is especially pronounced at senior levels, and has led to a "brain drain" of skilled professionals into private-sector and foreign employment. For example, between 1975 and 1983 the wage differential between Permanent Secretaries in Nigeria and Zambia and unskilled government workers in those countries was reduced by nearly 50% (Lindauer, 1986). At the same time a general wage erosion for all public servants has taken place following fiscal crisis and the implementation of structural adjustment measures. Hence, public services have tended to be staffed increasingly with redundant, often illegally

recruited and poorly trained personnel, who have been promoted much too rapidly to help offset low wage levels in rank. What training of public officials has been available has typically failed to incorporate ethical issues.

As a result, civil service productivity is low and declining. Ethical conduct gravitates toward the opportunistic, and includes the improper use of allowances, reduction of working hours (because of the need to keep multiple jobs to sustain minimum living standards), payments to ghost workers, and insistence on bribery to carry out assigned duties – all of which have taken their toll on bureaucratic efficiency.

5. *Weak reform commitment*

Another direct effect of overcentralization is the weak commitment to controlling corruption. Political actors often talk of accountability and integrity but this by itself does not translate into a genuine commitment to detect and penalize unethical behavior. Even when anti-corruption agencies are created, they are usually denied the resources needed to achieve their stated purposes. These include operational and legal autonomy, expert staff, attractive conditions of service, adequate infrastructure, and finance. In many cases the codes of ethics they are asked to enforce have no broad-based popular understanding or support. It is therefore not surprising that most of these agencies have had a limited success.

II. Democratization and corruption

How then can the phenomenon of democratization be expected to affect corruption in Africa? I will offer three propositions, based on my reading of the experience both of the West and of conditions in contemporary Africa.

First, *in the West the emergence of modern public bureaucracies was a reformist response to pre-existing widespread corruption, associated with the transformation of the economy from feudalism and agrarianism to capitalism and industrialization.* Civil service reforms occurred in Europe and in the United States in the 19th century because of these fundamental economic and social transformations, not as a prelude to them. As Weber pointed out, the modern bureaucratic administrative system depended on an economy capable of generating a sustained surplus, pressure for social and economic equality, and the existence of an ethic of service among those recruited into the public bureaucracy. The drive for equality was itself largely a product of the development of democratic beliefs. Thus, in the West, both democratic and capitalist institutions were needed to create the pressures necessary to reform the corruption of pre-industrial bureaucracies.

None of these conditions pertain in much of Africa and Third World where these bureaucratic structures have been transplanted. In Africa, democratization and the ethic of public service were relatively high immediately following in-

Table 1. Growth of personnel and the economy in some selected African countries.

	Personnel size 1975	Personnel size 1978	Annual average % of personnel increase 1975-1983	% annual growth rate of GDP 1975-1983
Ghana	75,000	200,000	15	1.3
Malawi	31,840	50,000	7.9	4.2
Mali	31,840	49,116	5.6	4.1
Nigeria	716,421	1,723,519	15	1.2
Sudan	231,612	261,893	2.6	6.3
Senegal	61,836	80,390	3.7	2.6
Zambia	240,000	280,000	3.3	0.2

Source: Lindauer 1986: 20 and World Bank (1985).

dependence, at least in *de jure* terms, but both rapidly declined afterwards. Meanwhile, previously small public sectors in Africa under colonialism grew dramatically with independence – in the case of Nigeria at 15% per annum between 1975 and 1983 – often greatly outpacing the growth of the economy. (See Table 1). Thus, it should come as no surprise that modern bureaucracies do not function as prescribed. Rather, what is surprising is that they function at all.

Second, *the pressure for democratization in Africa is a result of the continent's fundamental crisis of governance, of which the crisis of governmental corruption is one dimension.* Of course, international agencies became involved in African governance in large part because of the continent's economic crisis, but for indigenous Africans, and lately for international agencies as well, the crisis has mainly been perceived as a failure of politics to create good governance. This governance crisis is now regarded as largely responsible not only for the continent's economic crisis, but for the disorganization of political commitment to anti-corruption activities and institutions. Paradoxically, with both foreign and domestic African pressure now focusing on corruption, the 1990s may end up being the decade in which long-neglected problems of Africa's public services may finally be addressed.

Third, *democratization makes the public more aware of corruption, but may also further institutionalize it.* Under despots and autocrats there has been little opportunity for people to discover the magnitude of corruption. In addition, because so few people have had access to power, the number of corrupt actors has been relatively small. Nigeria presents a good instance of a country where democratization has often been associated with the perception of increasingly widespread corruption, although Nigeria is not alone in this experience. In a more democratic society, it is easier for the media to investigate allegations of corruption and make them public. The electoral process in Nigeria has involved the investment of large amounts of private resources in civilian political competition, raising the expectation of "spoils" of office upon successful election. Finally, where competition among political parties has been stiff, a

higher premium has often been placed on personal loyalty through networks of clients than on performance in managing the public service. To the extent that democracy aspires to fulfill individual and group needs of those previously shut out of the system, it inevitably comes into conflict with the principals of modern bureaucracy, which at least theoretically, respond to needs in an impersonal and universalistic manner.

III. Remedies for governmental corruption

Any remedial plan for tackling the problem of governmental corruption in Africa must deal with the central problem of overcentralization and its effects. It must include the following elements:

1. Decentralization

The concept of non-centralization needs to be broadly articulated and adopted in the relationship between the executive and other formal and informal organizations such as the legislature, the judiciary, state governments in federal systems, trade unions, political parties, universities, the mass media, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations. Current efforts at privatization of parastatal agencies should continue as well as the efforts at strengthening local governments. In particular, there is a need to recognize informal community organizations as the basic units of local governance — by giving them a better opportunity to perform, especially in the rural areas.

2. Civil service restructuring

African public services should be restructured with the following as important areas of emphasis:

- a) Redistribution of civil service personnel from the headquarters to the field.
Use of special incentives to keep senior officers in the field.
- b) Clearer delimitation between the civil service, the political leadership, parastatal agencies, and other levels of government.
- c) Installation of efficient Management Information Systems to keep track of government operations.
- d) Elimination of redundant personnel through programs of phased deployment and early retirement.
- e) Review of salary levels to ensure that wages correspond to the cost of living and, for senior personnel, are competitive with market alternatives. Incorporation of non-monetary allowances as part of the total salary package.
- f) Implementation of merit-based recruitment and performance-oriented appraisal systems.

3. Anti-corruption measures

There may be a need to review the Codes of Ethical Conduct to ensure that they are realistic, comprehensive and up to date. The codes should be adopted only after extensive debate within and outside the public service. Once adopted they should be widely publicized and disseminated.

Intra-governmental mechanisms such as internal audits, offices of Auditors, and Auditors-General should be strengthened to enable them to do more than financial accounting. Such agencies should also be given operational autonomy. In addition, there should be an effective ethical training policy for public officials.

External mechanisms such as ombudsmen, civil service commissions, procurators, and assets declaration agencies should be broadened. These agencies should be made responsible not to the Executive but to the Legislature or other social forces. They should devote a substantial part of their resources to research and popular education on anti-corruption strategies.

4. Research

Research into the whole subject of corruption is long overdue in Africa. What do elites and the mass of the people actually regard as ethical and unethical, and why? What are the most efficacious remedies to governmental corruption? What lessons can African countries learn from one another's experiences? How relevant is comparative non-African experience? What constitutes the most effective strategy for training public officials and the general public on how to prevent and discourage governmental corruption? These and other questions are deserving of rigorous examination.

Conclusion

The most striking and least analyzed factor in Africa's governmental corruption is the highly centralized structure of power in African countries. Other factors no doubt coincide; but this one is uniquely susceptible to being transformed by the continent's fledgling democracy movement. The democratization movements in Africa today offer the best opportunity to reverse this excessive centralization of power, which in turn has led to public perceptions that the state is amoral, to the low level of political commitment to combat corruption, and to the pauperization of public sector organizations. Yet, given the highly fragile nature of African states, decentralization and non-centralization of power may appear unreasonable and imprudent courses of action. This point underscores the need for more focused external assistance to African countries, at least in the short run. Every effort should be made to reduce the role of non-democratic forces such as the military by reducing military assis-

tance to African countries. On the other hand, considerable assistance will be required to achieve the institutional reforms advocated in this paper.

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Prospects in contemporary Sierra Leone

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Abstract. Sierra Leone, one of the world's poorest nations, has endured a pattern of corruption remarkable in its depth and extent. The current military government led by Captain Valentine Strasser, however, is mounting significant anti-corruption efforts; these include major commissions of inquiry, anti-corruption decrees, and efforts to tighten political and social discipline. Some of these measures, such as efforts to censor the press, raise important questions as to the proper limits of anti-corruption policies, and it is also true that the long-term temptations of corruption remain in place. Nonetheless, given the important role of corruption in bringing about Sierra Leone's economic crisis, the military government's efforts deserve close attention.

Introduction

The aim of this paper is to evaluate efforts to reduce administrative corruption during a period of attempted liberalization of a national political system. The emphasis is on assessing the various control strategies proposed by the current military government of Sierra Leone, against the background of past efforts. The paper will also analyze the view that a long-term solution to administrative corruption can and will come about through the creation of more structured and stable administrative systems that are relatively free from patronage and are supervised by independent institutions. This view is currently not so popular with African governments as the quick-fix 'anti-corruption purges' and 'household cleaning methods' traditionally used by military regimes.

Political change in Sierra Leone?

President Joseph Saidu Momoh's regime was ousted April 29, 1992 by middle and junior ranking military officers led by 27 year old Captain Valentine Strasser, who is currently Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). Following the usual practice, several reasons were advanced to justify the military take-over, specifically: the incapacity of Momoh's regime to arrest the deteriorating economic situation, corruption of the President and his ministers, and the indifference of the commanders and the political bosses to

poor conditions, especially the pay arrears of soldiers fighting a rebel war. The latter condition has been suggested by some observers as the most immediate cause of the coup d'etat.

The new military leaders on July 14, 1992 made several changes in the composition and structure of their administration with the intention of giving a civilian look to their regime. Captain Strasser announced on July 14 that the NPRC would become the Supreme Council of State (SCS) with the same designated functions. He also added that the Cabinet would be replaced by the Council of State Secretaries (CSS) and headed by a first state secretary. Each state secretary will be in charge of government departments which will replace the ministries. According to Strasser, the CSS 'will be in charge of day to day administration' and directly accountable to the SCS (FBIS, July 15, 1992). The Council of Secretaries is dominated by civilians while the Supreme Council of State is dominated by the military. Strasser and his deputy, Captain Solomon Musa, have ceased to attend Council of Secretaries' meetings. Captain Strasser claimed that

these changes mark a significant milestone in the process of gradual disengagement of the military in political governance ... It is aimed at civilianizing the administrative machinery of the state.¹

Substantively, the new military regime has promised to reduce corruption in the country and restore discipline among government workers, embarking on a 'house cleaning exercise' comparable to the 'Rawlings Revolution' in Ghana in 1979. It has also committed itself to bring an end to the rebel war and ensure a speedy return to democratic rule through honest multiparty elections. The context for these reforms, however, is an economy that has been in continuous decline, leaving this small nation of approximately four million people as one of the poorest countries in the world (UNDP, 1991). It is also a political system that has been extremely personalized, first around Siaka Stevens (1968-1985), and then around his hand-picked successor Major General Momoh. Even before the official proclamation of the one-party state with the adoption of the constitution of 1978, the late President Stevens used a variety of tactics, including patronage, gradual elimination of the opposition through election-riggings, harassment and even detention of key opposition leaders, to assure the dominance of his own role as 'father of the nation', and of his neo-patrimonial party, the All People's Congress (APC) (Luke and Riley, 1989; Zack, 1985).

Despite this continuity, the prospect of major political change surfaced with the formal reappearance of multiparty politics in October 1991 under President Momoh. Momoh pledged to institute a new constitution in 1992 democratizing the political system and authorizing both presidential and parliamentary elections within the year. Faced with the prospect of elections and the widespread unpopularity of the APC, Momoh delayed the implementation of his reform, hoping to strengthen his party sufficiently to ensure electoral

victory (Kpundeh and Riley, 1992). Still the economy continued to collapse as inflation pushed the price of even staple foods beyond the reach of most people in the country, while corruption and rampant smuggling of gold and diamonds continued unabated.

Corruption in Sierra Leone

My research reveals that administrative corruption in Sierra Leone has been pervasive at all levels of government. Evidence of systemic patterns of corruption in Sierra Leone can be traced back to 1982 when the first major corruption scandal, 'Vouchergate,' was unearthed. Other subsequent scandals such as 'Squandergate' in 1984, and 'Milliongate' in 1987 were subsequently uncovered,² but the government failed to develop strategies that deal with the ongoing pattern of corruption. What seems to have caused this pattern of corruption in Sierra Leone?

Under the one-party regime the whole bureaucratic structure was converted into an instrument of self-advancement and enrichment by top officials. Zack-Williams (1990) maintains that in Sierra Leone the lack of economic and financial discipline pervades the entire social structure, with junior workers demanding a premium ('put for me' as it is referred to by Sierra Leoneans) before performing routine job responsibilities. The revelations of the current commissions of inquiry and the continuous decline of the Sierra Leone economy indicate that corruption in Sierra Leone is a deeply harmful phenomenon and persistent problem.

One can make the argument that there is a linkage between corruption and undemocratic politics in Sierra Leone because widespread corruption and scandals became more frequent after the introduction of one-party government in 1978. This closed the door on internal accountability, as all the institutions that might have served as bases for checks and balances were eliminated. In Sierra Leone under the APC, administrative corruption was inseparable from political corruption. Since politicians were themselves extremely corrupt, plundering the public treasury, they could hardly vigorously punish corrupt administrators (Caiden, 1992). One of these, former Inspector General of Police Bambay Kamara, became so powerful in his own right that citizens began to question whether he or Momoh was running the country. Top civil servants in Sierra Leone under the APC, according to testimonies at the commissions, embezzled government funds with the full knowledge of the politicians. In fact, the patronage system put in place by Siaka Stevens and Joseph Momoh was designed to establish political dominance over civil servants. For example, section 139 (3) of the 1978 constitution decreed that no one could be appointed or continue as a Permanent Secretary 'unless he is a member of the recognized party'. This arrangement made key office holders dependent on state and party favor for recognition and advancement. During

the 24 years of APC rule, accountability was only to the President and his top party officials.

Momoh's administration was also noted for promoting tribalism and nepotism because he appointed his regional comrades to all the top posts in the country. At one point members of his Limba ethnic group held the following positions in his government: Minister of Mines, Minister of Transport and Communication, Minister of State Enterprises, Minister of Party Affairs, Speaker of the House, Inspector General of Police, Managing Director of Sierra Leone Commercial Bank Ltd., Chairman of the Sierra Leone State Lottery, and others (Bangura, 1992). Compounding the effects of patronage has been the extremely low salaries paid to workers, especially civil servants. Low salaries breed corrupt behavior. R.O. Davies, Commissioner of Income Tax in Freetown, is a good case in point. During the summer of 1992 his official income, according to his pay stubs, totaled Le. 13,941.00 per month (approximately \$28 at the current exchange rate). His expenses for the most basic needs, rice to feed his family and public transportation to commute, alone exceeded his salary. This means, of course, that a fairly high level civil servant like Mr. Davies must look for other sources of income with which to feed, house and clothe his family. One can easily imagine to what lengths a junior civil servant must go to make ends meet.

Despite this almost irresistible urge by lower level civil servants to be corrupt, most of the major cases of corruption in Sierra Leone have taken place at substantially higher levels of the administration. The current commission of inquiries reveals that those earning decent salaries, primarily government ministers and top civil servants, have indulged in more corruption than junior workers or private citizens. The lack of leadership discipline is to a large extent responsible for the widespread incidence of corruption in the country.

At one level corruption can be seen as a problem of individuals with excessive ambition or greed. If this were the case then a strategy of throwing out of the 'rotten apples' ought to work. But, when this action has been taken in a few instances against senior government ministers, corruption has persisted. In other words, exposure and prosecution or disciplinary action against corrupt individuals can remove the offender but not eliminate the offense. Corruption has continued unabated in Sierra Leone because the organizational systems and culture have remained unchanged. The circumstances that produced the corruption have let it happen again.

Instead, corruption in Sierra Leone must be understood as both an institutional and systematic problem which fosters the circumstances for corruption to flourish. Among those institutional circumstances is an inefficient auditing system. Almost all governmental departments have an internal audit section, but few audits ever take place. In most cases, departments are only audited years after the actual misappropriations. The income tax department has no computers, and taxes are assessed primarily by manual calculation. Although this department has been in operation since 1943, it does not have

adequate office space, and is assigned only two floors in a building that houses other ministries.

Another institutional factor is the lack of clearly defined roles, functions and duties of most public officials. Ambiguous job responsibilities have allowed top government officials to take up tasks that do not properly belong to them, thereby placing themselves in positions to change and influence matters for their own personal interest. One recent example is the Maritime Freights Levy Fund which was under the control of the Sierra Leone Shipping Company. Because of a lack of clearly defined roles, the minister took over the responsibility of controlling this fund. It was alleged that hundreds of thousands of dollars were misappropriated and embezzled. In fact most top government officials in the country have monopolized their department's budgets and have too much discretion over their subordinates, thus placing them in a good position to engage in corrupt behavior.

The effects of corruption in Sierra Leone, coupled with outright economic and political mismanagement during the APC administrations, have been harmful to society and have practically led to the disintegration of the country's social system. My personal observations confirm the repercussions of corruption. Sierra Leoneans live with bad roads, poor medical facilities, poor schools, falling educational standards, uncompleted public works projects, and poor terms and conditions of services for all workers. Foreign exchange earned from exports is not well repatriated into the country and national assets have been sold or ruined. For example, it has been alleged that several government officials sold the Sierra Leone Chancery Building in New York and split the profits among themselves.

The April 29, 1992 revolution, as it is now called in Sierra Leone, saw the demise of the All Peoples Congress and the single party-state. Since then, the government has been taken over by a military group, which calls itself the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). This new government, led by Captain Strasser, is emphasizing that the end of the APC era must also signal the total dismantling of that old governance system. This includes eradicating corrupt behavior patterns and inaugurating new ways of thinking and conduct, thereby building a new Sierra Leone society.

According to the new Attorney General

the (NPRC) government has embarked on legal measures to effect a major role of the revolution; that is to say ... the eradication of the cesspit of corruption that had pervaded every sector of the society ...

and that while

we do accept that corruption is everywhere in the world, ... in our country, corruption has reached alarming heights and levels thus causing for us tremendous disaster ... It is the intention of the NPRC to reduce corruption to a tolerable level.

Efforts to control corruption

Commissions of inquiry

Corruption of public officials seems to be the rationalization of most *coups d'etat* in Africa, and Sierra Leone is no exception. The new military leaders are committed to 'cleaning house' by expunging both public and private officials who are guilty of embezzling and mismanaging government funds. It has frozen all bank accounts and assets of those who held public office between June 1, 1986 and September 26, 1991. The posts ostensibly affected include ministers, their deputies, parliamentary special assistants, and 'all public servants' — who number more than 70,000.

Three public commissions of inquiry are currently underway, probing into the assets of former top officials. The Justice Beccles-Davies commission of inquiry is to probe the affairs of all persons who were presidents, vice presidents, ministers, ministers of state, and deputy ministers. The Justice Nylander commission is investigating officials who held political support positions, and the Justice Laura Marcus Jones commission of inquiry is examining the officials of parastatal organizations including public corporations, members of the armed forces, and the police force. The scope of these announced inquiries is searching and comprehensive.

The new Attorney General has described these commissions as unique, historic, and different from all others because for the first time in the history of the country the lifestyle of individuals is being investigated. This has produced some striking revelations. For example, it has been persuasively alleged that fugitive ex-president Momoh has about 170 million pounds sterling in just one UK bank, which amounts to more than seven times the annual support level obtained for the entire country from the IMF after years of effort. Another prominent figure in the Momoh administration, Inspector General Kamara, has been shown to have extorted wealth that allowed him to live at an extravagant level far beyond his salary. The commissions revealed that despite his annual salary of Le. 182,250.00 (approximately \$364.50), he spent more than Le. 500,000 (\$1,000) every single day.

The judicial branch of government has also been exposed as an institution where corruption has been prevalent. A network known by every lawyer in the country as the 'Conclave', made up essentially of political judges, has had a wide and improper influence on the dispensation of justice in the country. Decisions on pending cases were made by the Conclave before they were tried, in accordance with party directives issued from the APC.

These are just some examples of revelations coming out of the current commissions of inquiry. Unlike earlier commissions of inquiry in the 1960's, when many trivial and politically biased pieces of evidence were produced, the 1992 commissions seem to be acting speedily and responsibly, and to have found credible evidence of systemic and systematic corruption.

Although corruption scandals and inquiries are not new in Sierra Leone, it is noteworthy that previous administrations have never seriously devised positive strategies to combat corruption. For example, after an electricity scandal in Sierra Leone in 1974–1975, Siaka Stevens portrayed his regime as one that was rooting out corruption by publicizing the scandal, but did not initiate measures to prevent a reoccurrence. His government was thereafter overwhelmed by continuing corruption scandals in the late 1970's and early 1980's (Riley, 1992). Similarly, President Momoh in 1986 set up and publicized an anti-corruption squad, which proved ineffectual, because it failed to address the systematic and all pervasive nature of the problem.

Decree #6 undertakes to address that omission. Sections 2, 3, and 4 prescribe a punishment for giving and accepting bribes, for soliciting or accepting an advantage and for engaging in corrupt transactions with agents. Section 5 prescribes penalties, including the confiscation of assets, for possession of unexplained property. The remaining sections prescribe sanctions against other designated forms of corruption ranging from bribes to influence the awarding of contracts to buying judges.

The disciplinary strategy

The new military leaders believe a lack of discipline during the administrations of both Presidents Siaka Stevens and Joseph Momoh was responsible for much of the corruption and inefficiency of the civil service. One of the top military officers, Lieutenant Colonel Hakim Gibril, told me in an August 1992 interview:

Indiscipline could be largely said to be responsible for government offices being left empty while civil servants are busy operating private businesses. Henceforth, they have to choose between their public office and their private businesses, and the new buzzwords are 'accountability', 'responsibility' and 'discipline', particularly with civil servants.

The unscheduled visits of senior officials to government ministries, departments and parastatals in order to catch idle civil servants has many Sierra Leoneans jittery and reporting to work on their scheduled times.

The disciplinary campaign has impacted not only civil servants but school children as well. Students who leave their homes for school and drift away to entertainment spots for the rest of the day are caught and drilled by soldiers. The truants and those who are late for school are asked to do odd jobs before proceeding back to class.

The government has issued a public notice warning motorists to desist from the habit of bribing service men and traffic officers at check points. The

announcement insists that anyone caught violating this notice will be arrested and detained along with the service man or police officer.

Assessment of remedial strategies

Although it is premature to evaluate the effectiveness of these measures, my interviews and impressions in the country suggest a real change in attitudes toward corruption, for two principal reasons: public engagement and public intimidation. The new government has been in regular and close contact with the people, letting them know that the revolution will succeed only if the people play a significant part. Also, people have been placed on warning by the no-nonsense attitude of the military officials in enforcing their decrees. Thus, openly bribing people like traffic policemen to perform services, a common feature under the APC administration, has been sharply reduced.

Decree #6 has so far operated as a deterrent to corruption, but it must be pointed out that there is at present no specific system to enforce this decree. There is, indeed, an unfinished quality to the reform program as a whole. The new Attorney General, Arnold Gooding, told me on several occasions that the administration has plans to establish an ongoing independent commission against corruption, to revise salaries, to provide incentives to public workers and to reorganize civil service. All remain to be accomplished.

Some aspects of Decree #6 have probably gone too far. The decree undertakes to censor the press, specifically publications considered to be too 'sensitive', unless authorized by concerned government functionaries. This has alarmed journalists and sent unfavorable signals to the international community. Press freedom and respect for human rights are vital to any society, especially to a society like Sierra Leone that aims to return to competitive politics. Notably, the press can play a vibrant role in awakening the consciousness of citizens and in exposing corruption and other ills.

A similar problem is the violation of civil liberties in the new regime's zeal to clean out corruption. Amnesty International has condemned the military executions of suspected rebels and offenders, without a chance to defend themselves in a court of law or to answer accusations against them. More than 50 former government officials have evidently been held without charge or trial and have been denied access to families and lawyers. These instances suggest that the military officers in Sierra Leone are themselves guilty of abusing their powers and of denying the rights and freedom of individuals. Such behavior again operates at cross-purposes to the reform objectives of the regime, by distancing the rulers from the ruled and by undercutting the perceived legitimacy of the administration.

Furthermore, the young and inexperienced leaders of that administration have now succumbed to enjoyment of some of the same perks and property associated with the APC. As standard bearers of a revolution, it ill suits them to be seen living the lifestyles of the former regime; e.g., the new President

now resides in the luxurious Juba Hill residence of Siaka Stevens, whilst his Deputy, Solomon Musa, has taken over a similar huge property. It may prove difficult to overcome these trappings of luxury when the time arrives for a return to barracks.

As earlier indicated, I submit that a long-term solution to corruption in Sierra Leone can and will come about only with the creation of more structured and stable administrative systems which are relatively free from patronage and supervised by independent institutions. Although this view is currently less popular with African governments (especially military regimes) than 'quick-fix' methods, corruption will not be controlled if the organizational systems remain fundamentally unchanged.

Need for political change

To diminish corruption, the political system created by Siaka Stevens and perpetuated by President Momoh must be overhauled. For example, the nation's constitution must eliminate all vestiges of personal rule such as the intolerable clause that allows the president to nominate between 9 and 12 members of parliament. Also, the civil service must be rescued from its subjection to patronage and restored to effective independence.

Thus, for the current military administration to be successful in controlling corruption, it must establish innovative institutional strategies, departing from the old ways of doing things to complement the moralizing campaign and 'quick-fix' measures currently in place.

The key to success in Sierra Leone is to establish a system that guarantees the rights of the individual and also curtails governmental high-handedness. Corrupt politicians have created numerous problems and the determination of the military leaders to expose them is an important first step. But an effective machinery must be established that allows the people a say in choosing their leaders, and that establishes transparency and accountability. Appropriate institutions based on democratic values need to be created that will contribute to development and improved governance in the country. Perhaps the best transitional contribution the NPRC could make would be to initiate a political education campaign to enlighten Sierra Leoneans about the benefits of multiparty democracy, and to arouse political awareness and social responsibility among the people.

Notes

1. 'Buckling Down to Duty' *African Concord*, August 17, 1992 p. 16.
2. 'Vouchergate' and 'Squandergate' are terms coined by Sierra Leoneans to describe rackets operated in different ministries to divert government payment orders for the benefit of businessmen and government officials.

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Post-independence anti-corruption strategies and the contemporary effects of democratization

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Abstract. Generalizations about corruption as an outgrowth of "African culture" should be made with great care, for the causes of the problem exist at several levels. A focus on leadership, and a sensitivity to the diversity of corrupt practices, are essential to any reform effort. Case-study analysis of incidental, systematic, and systemic corruption, as well as of personal wrongdoing by top political figures, offer a fuller appraisal of the sources of corruption, and of the reasons for its intractability. The current wave of democratization in many African states offers opportunities, and real challenges, to reduce corruption through a combination of internal and external pressures.

Introduction

Extensive comment upon administrative corruption in Africa is not new. In all the countries with which I am concerned, there has been a series of inquiries and corruption scandals stretching back to the colonial period. In addition there has been much academic reflection upon the incidence of corruption, ranging from a 'moralistic' approach to a variety of functionalist analyses. Citizens of the societies, as well as academics with a professional interest, have also reflected on the incidence of corruption, and a number of novels and dramatic treatments also deal with the issue (or set of issues).

The 'Political Culture' Thesis

Within these reflections, one major theme stands out: that there exists within the society concerned a set of values that explain, or legitimate, departures from the European standards and practices established in the colonial and post-colonial civil service. These values have been variously described as gift-giving, reciprocity or patron-clientelism, which in sum are said to amount to a 'political culture' of corruption in West Africa. Three examples of this line of argument can be given, from amongst many others:

1. Ekpo (1979) denies the validity of unicausal explanations, but nevertheless provides a strong statement of the gift-giving point of view:

Corruption in Nigeria ... is in fact a continuation of traditional gift-giving practices ... It becomes quite plausible to suggest that corruption in the country derives its ethical legitimation substantially from the 'recrudescent' tradition of gift-giving.

2. Le Vine (1975) argues that there is a culture of corruption, and a supportive polity, in Ghana. They inform the substantial corruption of Ghanaian political life. The culture of corruption:

embodies certain supportive values, orientations, and expectations that not only affect the scope of corruption but determine its focus (i.e., for example, who should be bribed) and its modus operandi (e.g., how and when a transaction ought to be initiated and how much it should cost).

This culture is also intricately linked with the supportive polity, a series of informal, sociable relationships between family and clan groups, including friendships and 'old boy' networks. The informal polity and the culture of corruption are part of an 'extended process' of political corruption, which surrounds the 'core process' of corrupt officeholders deploying resources contrary to their expected destinations.

3. S.K. Todd (1975), in his discussion of the social values of the Mende (an ethnic group in southern Sierra Leone), argues that they recognize only a:

minimal differentiation between fees, fines, payments, bribes and gifts and that

such gift-exchanges may at one time have formed the basis of Mende social and economic activity.

In addition to identifying a set of historic, corruption-inducing values in the culture of the West African societies concerned, the theorists also point to an incompatibility with civic virtue of the values now present in modern African societies. Leys (1965) asserts that:

it is clear that the (?) new states are very likely to be the scene of a great deal of behavior that will be called corrupt. Neither attitudes nor material conditions in these countries are focused on the support of a single concept of the national interest or of the official purposes of state and local officers and institutions which would promote that interest.

The strength of attachment to the new institutions of the post-colonial 'nation-state' has been demonstrated to be low in many West African societies. Communal or group sentiments are often stronger, and politicians may be judged, not by their adherence to imported colonial values of public office in the new state, but by their capacities to extract resources (for

example, developmental funds) from the political center. If there is a conflict between the indigenous values of patron-clientelism or familial obligations, and the European standards inherited by the new state, then the familial or group loyalties are likely to have a prior, and superior, claim.

These notions may be regarded as describing a 'political culture of corruption' in West Africa, and are subject to the general criticisms that have been directed toward the use of 'cultural' or 'value' explanation in political science. The idea that there are sets of values that legitimate and/or produce corrupt behavior is not confined to studies of West Africa. Gibbons (1976), for example, has attempted to develop the notion of a Canadian political culture of corruption involving a classification of basic approaches. Gibbons justifies a study of the political culture of corruption by claiming that any reform program designed to reduce the influence of money in politics must rest for its success, ultimately, upon a sympathetic political culture. In the West African case, however, the 'political culture' theorists seem rather skeptical about the emergence of any such culture; instead they imply a continuance of administrative corruption based upon a complex, but relatively unchanging, pattern of norms. Even a system of administrative control (such as was envisaged in the Shagari regime in Nigeria, in 1979–1983) is unlikely to be effective unless some 'threshold of acceptance' is breached — and, as has been seen in some West African regimes in the 1970's, a moral revolt against a widely-perceived corrupt leadership takes place.

Placing blame for corruption upon African leadership, as Aluko (1973) does, indicates that there can be more than one level of responsibility for corruption:

If the Society is corrupt, tribalistic, nepotic, extravagant and ridden with violence, it is because its aristocrats — its leaders and rulers and the middle-class — are corrupt, sectionalistic, violent and roguish. The day that leadership destroys the canker-worm within itself, the rank and file of the society will be frightened to indulge in questionable and sharp practices. Therefore, if we want to reform society we must first reform the calibre of the aristocracy.

It would be my argument that the 'political culture' approach to administrative corruption in West Africa tends to overlook such issues, and minimizes the diversity of corrupt behavior and associated 'grey-area' corruption, maladministration and patronage. I now wish to provide some case studies of administrative corruption, and associated phenomena.

Case studies

The use of illustrative case studies is now a widely accepted technique in studies of political corruption. Clarke (1983), Whitehead (1983), and Szeftel

(1982) have all used the case study approach to good effect. I propose to follow a similar method and the case studies chosen are summarized in a simple typology (see Table 1). There are two variables; firstly, a variable which indicates the scale, level or degree of systematization of the corrupt behavior concerned. A distinction is made between incidental, systematic and systemic corruption. A policeman asking for a bribe is an example of incidental corruption. Systematic corruption can be seen in organized corruption in a particular government office or transaction; whereas systemic corruption suffuses all official dealings and has been well described by the Caidens (1977):

A situation where wrong-doing has become the norm, and the standard accepted behavior necessary to accomplish organizational goals according to the notions of public responsibility and trust has become the exception, not the rule. In this situation, corruption has become so regularized and institutionalized that organizational supports back wrong-doing and actually penalize those who live up to the old norms.

The other variable is not a consistent one; instead it is a list of aspects of the cases I wish to highlight in order to promote my theme of the heterogeneity of corrupt behavior and other forms of maladministration.

Incidental corruption

Up-country police

Public order is supposedly guaranteed in Sierra Leone by the operation of a police force and a para-military unit, formed in the 1970's as the Internal Security Unit (ISU). The ISU became a branch of the police, known as the Special Security Division (SSD). The ISU/SSD have their origins in a group of party thugs used to promote the interests of the All People's Congress (APC) party led by the current President, Siaka Stevens. The political links of the ISU/SSD, especially with the 1st Vice President S.I. Koroma, enabled them in the 1980's to maintain a strong position within Sierra Leone society and politics. In addition, their official positions are used for personal gain of an incidental kind.

As a consequence of the various 'states of emergency' imposed in Sierra Leone in the 1980's the police erected a number of road blocks on the up-country roads away from the capital, Freetown. Some road blocks are established without authority as well. In virtually all the cases I have observed, the police extract a small payment from almost all drivers before allowing them to proceed. Not all drivers pay, and not all pay up with good grace. These examples of small scale, petty corruption are very widespread in West Africa, and have been extensively commented upon.

Table 1. Typology of cases.

Scale or level of corruption	Personnel	Strategic group	Related activity	Rewards and functionality	Attempted control methods
Incidental	Up-country police		Tax evasion	Limited; potentially alienating for some	Moral revolution
Systematic		Black market entrepreneurs	Nigerian Cement Scandal	Substantial gains alienating	Inquiries purges
Systemic	Stevens, Sierra Leone Nkrumah, Ghana		Smuggling	Major gains; destabilizing	Prohibitory laws and codes of conduct

Tax evasion

Tax evasion is a similarly widespread activity. In the case of Nigeria, one study has estimated that approximately 80% of Nigerian revenue comes from indirect taxes (compared to 40% in Britain), and that both indirect and direct tax systems are subject to serious tax evasion. Estimates are very difficult in these circumstances, but my impression is that tax evasion — of all kinds — is substantially higher in West Africa than in advanced industrial countries, primarily due to inadequately qualified tax staff and the opportunities for noncompliance in the former (see also Ogbonna, 1977).

Police venality and tax evasion are merely two techniques among many of small-scale fraud and bribery. Functionalist theories of corruption have suggested that small-scale corruption may sometimes perform an integrative role, humanizing and making more flexible otherwise unresponsive systems of bureaucracy. My judgement of this is that it is rarely understood as such by the ordinary consumers of government services. The gains or rewards of such corrupt behavior are typically small (though they may be extensive in company tax evasion), but they are an irritant for the many who are affected by such behavior.

Systematic corruption

This is not as random or individualized as are the cases of incidental corruption I have described above. It can involve large gains, is often associated with popular scandal, and can, therefore, have an alienating effect upon the politically literate public in West African societies. The examples I have chosen have had a significant impact upon the societies concerned.

The Nigerian Cement Scandal

The bare outlines of this story have been summarized in a contemporary account:

In 1975 the Nigerian government ordered over 20 million metric tons (mt) of cement. Sixteen mt was ordered by the Ministry of Defense alone. It was all to be delivered within a year through a port complex capable of handling less than a fourth that amount. The State ordered ten times the volume which the Third Development Plan (1975–1980) estimated should be imported each year. So massive was the cement order that the full export capacity of Europe and the USSR would have failed to fulfill Nigerian demand. (Turner, 1977)

It is very likely indeed that substantial gains were made by the Nigerian public officials and middlemen involved in this huge over-ordering of cement. The generous terms given to the suppliers meant that enormous quantities of cement were rushed to Lagos and to Nigeria's other ports, completely overwhelming the available unloading facilities. As the contracts included a high demurrage fee, the Lagos port was at one time in 1975 full with 360 ships waiting to unload the cement. Turner estimates that Nigeria paid out US \$75 per ton *more* than was necessary and, as Williams points out, the total costs were probably near US \$2 billion, a figure that was about one quarter of Nigeria's total oil revenue earnings in 1975.

The costs and wastage involved contributed to the scandal that shook the Nigerian government in 1975–1976, and led to a corruption purge. But even more attention was directed at the beneficiaries who gained by securing commissions on the contracts awarded. As has been widely noted, commissions on contracts are a familiar aspect of corrupt practice in West Africa (and indeed elsewhere), involving only a small number of people, but enabling them to make substantial personal gains.

Systemic corruption

The case studies I now wish to turn to involve potentially greater numbers of corrupt officials and intermediaries; they also involve entrepreneurial groups that may have a significant position within the political economy of the society concerned.

Export smuggling

Smuggling is illegal but widespread in all the societies with which we are concerned. The boundaries of Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone are highly permeable ones, with limited numbers of customs officials covering large areas. Even where customs officials are present, the ease with which regulations can be contravened, and a possibility of smuggling arises, is well known.

Assessing the magnitude of such smuggling in West Africa is as difficult as assessing the size and significance of corruption as a whole. There are probably two ways of attempting to arrive at a figure: firstly, by a process of 'guesstimating' the size of smuggling or black market operations; and,

secondly, by working from official figures, and trying to fill gaps. The first strategy is attempted by Green (1981).

The substantial rise in illegal coffee exports documented in Green's work appears to be related to the scarcity of foreign exchange in that country. As foreign exchange became less available, the black market entrepreneurs began to purchase more and more coffee on the home market and to smuggle it abroad to Kenya and Tanzania, where it was sold and converted into foreign exchange. As Green's figures indicate, approximately one-third of the coffee crop was smuggled abroad in 1980.

It is possible to argue that the Uganda case is exceptional, being associated with a particularly brutal and anarchic military regime which was ended by Tanzanian military intervention in 1979. In the case of Sierra Leone, however, and on a larger scale, Ghana, it is possible to see similar effects of export smuggling (and its associated corruption) upon the economy and the government's development objectives. I have attempted to assess the effects of this smuggling in the case of Sierra Leone using the second possible strategy of quantifying its significance.

Sierra Leone's economy is dominated by the export of unrefined mineral products and agricultural produce, notably alluvial gem diamonds, iron ore, bauxite, coffee and cocoa. Some of these commodities — diamonds, coffee and cocoa — are easy to smuggle over borders into the neighboring states of Liberia and Guinea. Substantial illicit mining and smuggling of diamonds since the 1950s has had important political and economic effects.

In the period after the delinking of the local currency from sterling in 1978, a deteriorating balance of payments position ensued, such that the Sierra Leone government began to place restrictions upon the supply of foreign exchange for importers. Entrepreneurs operating in the 'parallel economy' were able to escape these restrictions, and continued to smuggle goods out to obtain foreign exchange. The size of this 'parallel market' was estimated at Le. 100.0 ml a year in 1982, whereas the 1982 *official* export earnings were barely sufficient to meet the bill for the import of oil, which amounted to Le. 80 ml. The deficit in the balance of payments rose from Le. 35.5 ml in 1978, to Le. 153.1 ml in 1981, and was estimated to exceed Le. 200 ml in 1982. As a result, the Leone was substantially devalued in December 1982.

Personal corruption

There are also patterns of systemic corruption associated with key political actors. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana is often given as an example of a corrupt senior political figure, and extensive evidence can be cited from numerous commissions established after Nkrumah's downfall when, as Rathbone (1978) suggests:

the spirits of Enquiry stalked the land and self-righteousness as well as political astuteness led to commission after commission of inquiry.

258

The Nkrumah regime underwent a minute investigation of its activities, but one may doubt that the investigators were wholly neutral in their activities. The magnitude of corruption uncovered was small, compared to the less extensively documented corruption in Ghana that took place after Nkrumah's downfall, and it is perhaps not surprising that Nkrumah's reputation was rehabilitated in Ghanaian political life after experience had been gained with successor regimes.

Likewise, the self-enrichment of Ghanaian leaders in the 1960's looks like the work of amateurs when compared to the extensive pattern of systemic corruption that developed in Sierra Leone under the political leadership of President Siaka Stevens and his changing coterie of political supporters.

In his 1970 address to the ruling APC party, Stevens pointed out that:

It is the firm determination of my government to root out this evil (corruption) from our society. Those who are dishonest, who take bribes or put public money in their own pockets, are as guilty of theft from the public as the common thief who breaks into a man's house and steals his possessions.

Yet there was a series of corruption scandals in virtually all sectors of the Sierra Leone administration in the 1970's. President Stevens consolidated his power, reducing political competition and producing a one party state, while at the same time enriching himself through commissions on contracts, diamond dealings and other activities with close associates in the entrepreneurial communities. The magnificence of the President's new home was one indication of the scope of his corruptly acquired wealth.

Attempted control methods

Sierra Leone, like Ghana, has 'anti-corruption' legislation on the books, but this has not proved very effective in curbing corrupt behavior. In fact, the general efficacy of measures introduced into West African governments to curb corrupt behavior can be questioned. They do not have a very good success rate, as the evidence cited previously indicates. There are, broadly, four types of method used to curb or control corruption in West Africa. These are, firstly, prohibitory laws and codes of conduct (and associated regulatory bureaus); secondly, official inquiries and commissions; thirdly, purges; and lastly, attempted 'moral revolutions'.

Such methods ought, in theory, to vary in effectiveness depending upon which type of corruption they address. Inquiries, purges and 'moral revolutions' are more likely to be directed at the incidental and systematic levels of corruption; whereas the potential scope of laws and codes of conduct should be systemic in nature. But none has been effective in practice.

A code of conduct approach was taken during the Shagari years in Nigeria, but proved inadequate to cope with the extensive high-level corruption of that

regime. An extensive purge of corrupt officials — in the civil service, and the universities — was instituted by the Murtala Mohammed regime in 1975–1976. The haste of the process, and occasionally a desire to damage rivals, led to numerous cases of injustice. Apart from a reduction in expenditure upon staff salaries, no measurable improvement in efficiency resulted. In fact the purge may have provoked further corruption by undermining the job security of surviving officials.

Inquiries are not necessarily the best means of curbing corruption, as they operate retrospectively and can often be partisan, designed to smear a previous regime. Nor, perhaps more important, do they tend to improve the accountability of the institution or the individual being investigated.

The most obvious example of a 'moral revolution' is the 'Rawlings Revolution' of 1979. After a period of extensive high-level corruption under the Acheampong/Akuffo military regimes, from 1972–1979, Rawlings gained power in Ghana with widespread popular support. He attempted a 'house cleaning exercise,' to generate a new and immunizing level of political consciousness. Corruption, though widely abhorred, was seen as an 'individualized' process, so what was needed was a purge of the 'Big Men' involved in the higher levels of the previous military government. This resulted in the execution of senior military officers, and a series of administrative actions against categories of individuals thought corrupt or engaging in black market profiteering. No thorough-going 'moral revolution' took place, and the old ways reassured themselves under the ensuing Limann civilian government (1979–1981), leading to a further Rawlings intervention on New Years Eve, 1981.

Measurement techniques

With all the attempted methods of control (and indeed, in all the cases cited), a general problem arises: the measurement of corruption and the availability of evidence.

Eker (1981) points out that 'corruption is, of necessity, a furtive affair, and documentation is therefore exceedingly difficult'. He cites data concerning corruption offenses during one eleven year period, 1967–1977, in Nigeria. On the basis of this evidence, tabulating 'crime known to the police,' the Federal Government argued that crimes relating to corruption were low in significance. But, as Eker argued, such figures probably disguise a considerable number of corruption cases unknown to the police. A very large 'grey area' exists.

The absence of proof of a recognizable kind is therefore a major handicap in attempts to spur reduction of corrupt activities by regulatory means. If, however, corruption is seen primarily as a symptom of maladministration, then its incidence should become more observable once bureaucratic efficiency is improved. An improvement in the operational capacity of the government, increased accountability, and resistance to patronage may not altogether

eliminate corruption. But, they should at least bring about its greater visibility, and assist in attempts at control.

Effects of democratization

The current wave of democratization in African societies has undermined some authoritarian regimes and led to the reappearance of multi-party politics and representative government (Lancaster, 1991; Riley, 1991).

This still-problematic transition, or 'second liberation,' has a number of causes. Amongst those most often cited are the populist protests for change inside African societies, the economic failure of the authoritarian model of development, the consequences of structural adjustment, and the impact of global events (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1992; National Academy of Sciences, 1992; Riley, 1992). A major impetus for change has been the economic, social and moral costs of the administrative corruption involved in the single-party regimes presided over by aging nationalist figures. High levels of administrative corruption have been associated with authoritarian politics in many, but not all, of such regimes. There are a number of notorious examples, such as Zaire (Gould, 1980; MacGaffey, 1988).

A few African states have avoided these high levels of administrative corruption, maintaining relatively honest and efficient bureaucratic systems, and are considered economic 'successes' despite having authoritarian, neo-patrimonial politics (Luke and Riley, 1989). Cote d'Ivoire may be an instance of this (Crook, 1989). It is also the case that there are significant variations in the levels of administrative corruption, and the damage it causes, across Africa (both between African states and also within individual societies, regimes and institutions over time) (Riley, 1983).

The control strategies adopted before 1990 have continued into the current era of pluralization. The signs are that even newly democratizing countries, such as Zambia, are not immune from corruption scandals (*African Analysis*, 24 July 1992; Baylies and Szeftel, 1992; Mills, 1992). Other regimes, such as Museveni's in Uganda, are resisting democratization (defined in competitive election terms) whilst hoping to reduce administrative corruption through institutional means. (For a participant's viewpoint, see Ruzindana, 1992.) Some regimes have liberalized, albeit half-heartedly, but are still beset by widespread administrative corruption, the effects of economic decline and adjustment, and political instability or war. The consequences have included military takeover, with the declared aim of assisting democratization, as in Sierra Leone, or a revival of authoritarianism, as in Togo (Busby, 1992; Kpundeh and Riley, 1992; Lemarchand, 1992).

African democratization in the 1990's thus represents a challenge to reduce administrative corruption using internal and external pressures. Some states already have in place various institutional means to curb corruption, without necessarily the political will to command widespread compliance. The existing means need to be buttressed by a broader pattern of supportive measures

including incentives and effective punishments (Klitgaard, 1988). A series of attempts to raise the 'moral costs' of corruption could be reinforced by aid donor pressure, although the use of political conditionality is not without its problems. Aid donors can help — provided they act in an equitable, open, and sensitive way with explicit objectives stressing honesty and accountability.

Increased training is also needed (for example, in accounting), as is institution-building. Donors could do more to help stimulate the growth of an active and critical 'civil society' in the democratizing societies, so that administrative corruption is exposed to view and subject to censure. And they could encourage a measured increase in public-sector salaries, which are often extremely low and provide an increasingly precarious living as economic decline and currency devaluation have become common features in many African states (Parfitt and Riley, 1989). There is a case to be made for a reduced, more highly paid, merit-based civil service (World Bank, 1989, 1991).

The development of a freer and more open politics in Africa does not necessarily mean that the temptation to reward political supporters with jobs and favors has disappeared. Incoming elites still face pressures to secure political payoffs. Democratizing politics in Africa can also involve substantial political and administrative corruption, for example in Nigeria (Diamond, 1991; Joseph, 1987). The challenge facing many of the newly reformed regimes will be to show how they can use their new powers to good ends without succumbing to such pitfalls.

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The following section contains reactions to the papers presented at both the July 20 and September 11 workshops. *Gerald Caiden*, who could not attend the second workshop, was asked to assure some continuity with the first session by providing his comments on the papers presented on September 11. *Victor Le Vine*, a prominent specialist on African politics and corruption, was invited to the second workshop to provide an analytic synthesis of the works presented. Below, we present virtually verbatim the texts that they prepared.

In addition, there were lively discussions at both workshops, both among the presenters and in the case of the second workshop, between the presenters and the scholars and practitioners attending who did not prepare papers. Because these participants were assured that the discussions would be informal and non-attributable, *Roland Homet* has summarized the comments and issues raised to give a flavor of the discussions without compromising the anonymity of the speakers.

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Commentary

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The papers presented at the workshops and summarized in this volume raise the quality of analysis on the subject of corruption in general and in Africa in particular one notch higher. They are written by long time members of that small band of zealots who launched systematic studies of corruption some twenty years ago. They are all well versed in the research on corruption and they are regarded as among the world's leading authorities. They build on their previous work and go another step further. They seem to appreciate that the world is more willing to listen to them today than it was when they first started to chart what was then virtually unknown territory and when their peers believed that corruption was an unresearchable subject, fraught with methodological difficulties and possible personal risks. They seem also willing to write things that may cause offence in some circles and may bar them from further access in countries where their work is not appreciated by elites guilty of corruption, or conniving to secrete corruption, or turning a blind eye to corruption.

Being experts on corruption, they tend to assume that everyone else knows as much about the subject as they do, so their writing makes many assumptions which they take for granted. For instance, they assume that their readers are familiar with corruption in Africa and how it is practiced there as compared with Japan or Korea or Italy. In the latter cases corruption may be just as prevalent, but it is much better hidden and takes on more sophisticated forms which, to the untrained eye, passes as something else. Administrative corruption in many African states is more open and crude and more obviously accounts for negative development, political instability, economic ruin and social discrimination. The authors of this volume let African leaders condemn their own practices in their own words by just quoting extracts from their speeches, which say everything so much better than do academics who usually express themselves in carefully guarded prose.

The authors of this volume are generally optimistic about the chances of reducing corruption. They seem to believe that growing democratization opens a window of opportunity which should not be muffed. They think that the international community and the United States in particular should assist democratization and offer its help in devising workable strategies to contain

both political and administrative corruption. Exterior pulls and pushes, they argue, can make an impact, particularly in military regimes. They cite the fact that the very threat of withdrawing international assistance from Kenya sparked much internal concern about the need to combat blatant systemic corruption in that country, a threat that echoed throughout the continent. What the Kenya case may reveal is that in a number of African countries narrow access to external resources is a major if not *the* major cause of so much official corruption. If these resources were either cut off altogether or distributed in different, more accessible, ways, elites would be forced to change their ways merely to regain or retain their access. This is something that the international community had been reluctant to consider even now with the breakdown and chaos that prevails in Ethiopia and Somalia, breakdown which could just as easily occur in other 'soft states' in Africa. Obviously, international politics is involved. Before the international community acts, however, it also must be sure that it is free of dirty hands and hypocrisy before insisting on telling others what to do when it itself does something else.

The optimism they express stems from the African realization that corruption is too costly, that it is too regressive, that it exacerbates problems, that it stands in the way of improving the situation. Clearly, it is one of the major problems facing Africa. In some regimes, so well documented for Sierra Leone and Nigeria, it is probably the major problem and the barrier to national progress. Few of the standard African excuses and justifications for corruption now have any credibility. They have been exposed as being legitimizing myths perpetuated largely by exploitative elites. They are no longer tenable and they should not be rationalized away by sycophantic benefactors who themselves benefit either institutionally or personally from the proceeds of corruption. At last it seems that African leaders realize that they can no longer play the same tunes because nobody out there is willing to listen or dance to them any more. The disasters wrought, not by colonialists or nature or the old economic order or displeased gods but by institutionalized corruption virtually alone, can no longer be disguised when full accounts of them appear in mass media all over the globe.

But realization that something has to be done about corruption is far from doing something practical. The problem is where to begin. The papers in this volume all recognize that administrative corruption has to be tackled at two levels simultaneously: one is the macro, institutional or societal level, which is really about tackling political and societal corruption or private-regarding values and behavior. The other is the micro or secondary petty level of corrupt conduct within public administration. An anti-corruption strategy that involves only the organizational level is doomed to failure. It is not worth the paper it is written on because there is no will to enforce it or follow it through; it is a dead letter although it still retains some symbolic content. Improving lax security and deficient training and defective procedures may be worth doing anyway, but they are unlikely to accomplish what is really needed — the reduction of big time corruption. Such exercises are useful and no doubt

rewarding to those sponsoring them, but they do not really get to the heart of the issue.

So many things are faulty that it is difficult to discern which should be tackled first among the following factors:

- the overwhelming dominance of the state and, therefore, the overwhelming dependency of people on the state;
- the over-concentration of power in the state and therefore the dominance of centralized authority exercised by the few, too often purely in their self-interest;
- the pauperization and demoralization of the public sector;
- the absence of civic culture;
- the existence of close kinship networks of influence-wielding;
- the prevalence of corruption-prone norms and ethics in all public life;
- the sheer extent of poverty and the predominance of scarcity;
- the unconcern about or ignoring of corruption by people who could do something about it were they so minded.

This is but a brief list of the authors' concerns. All agree that given the immensity of the task, it will possibly take generations to bring corruption down to manageable, incidental, minor incidences, whatever is done at the micro level. Indeed, with democratization certainly micro level corruption may very well increase over the short run as new rulers feel impelled to reward loyal supporters, grab their fair share of the spoils previously denied, purge public administration of competent professionals and replace them with party hacks, continue the tradition of gift giving, and exploit office as a reward for the hard journey achieving it. One must be patient before results appear. Containing corruption will have to be a long term haul.

Even so, when the actual evidence is presented, one cannot be blamed for despairing, especially about the worst cases. Fortunately, not all African countries are equally corrupt. Indeed, some are quite clean and present models of what is achievable to the rest. The place to start is not with the worst countries which, for the next few generations, may well be a hopeless task. Containing corruption in them may resemble banging one's head against the wall. There are countries which are not so bad but not so good either. They are easier to tackle and possibly tackling the macro level may not need more than a generation. In them, it may not be so difficult to devise anti-corruption laws and install effective corruption machinery. It may not be so hard to insist on institutional reforms and follow through. It may not be so overwhelming to revitalize public administration or change public behavior or to undertake so many of the measures that other countries in Africa have been able to do. Clearly, universal policies have to be reshaped to every individual circumstance. Given good will and technical assistance, this is doable. Thereafter, progress will have to be by trial and error. But nothing succeeds like success and even a few relatively minor successes give hope and spur further efforts.

Progress will not be dramatic but it strengthens the foundations for every new effort.

One still can't ignore the possibility that instead of the good dragging everyone else up, the bad will drag everyone down. So the bad cannot be left alone to rot in their own mess, not in a truly global society where no country is an island. Is there any hope at all? The papers suggest that even in the worst of circumstances, all is not lost. However bleak, there are possibilities and supports — a silver lining in every cloud. As elsewhere, people in Africa are on the move. There seems to be a genuine political awakening among the masses who are more determined than at any time since independence to see the current state of affairs change. They are not so willing to go along with the status quo, with the systems that chain them to deprivation and misery. They are more inclined to take action into their own hands and to make their own arrangements among themselves to improve their lot. Instead of waiting for the state or whomever to provide, they are joining together informally to help one another in all kinds of novel self-help and self-reliance schemes that use their native intelligence, drive and entrepreneurship. They are learning to empower themselves, to overcome suppression and to defy tyranny. They are finding that they can develop without resorting to corruption and joining corrupt institutions.

Elites are also realizing that things cannot continue as they are without trying to prevent the steady drift toward disaster. They are in the best position to know the realities of today's Africa, namely, its increasing marginalization in world affairs, the massive scale of its economic deterioration and disappearing capital formation, the backwardness of its agriculture, its falling real income, its continuing high fertility rates, the poor trickle-down of whatever wealth is being generated, the heavy drain of resources to service its massive debt (which between 1970 and 1990 rose from \$6 billion to \$143 billion and from 15% of the GNP to 105%), the squandering of much of the rest on the military and affluent living style of the rich, the total failure of Africa's own remedy in the non-starter Lagos Plan of Action, and the fact that most people are probably worse off now than they were twenty years ago. Maybe they are now prepared to face such realities and willing to go for practical policies that promise to revitalize economies, reduce political uncertainties and instabilities, and make government more reliable and effective, even if such policies prove to be mistaken or wrong. They have to be optimistic, even idealistic. The alternative is a pessimistic nightmare.

The state will probably remain the chief economic actor, notwithstanding the International Monetary Fund's structural adjustment programs, on the one hand, that seek to dethrone the administrative state, and the encouragement of native entrepreneurship and non-governmental organizations that seek to bypass the state, on the other hand. To some extent the IMF's policies almost guarantee this, despite its intention to the contrary. But its determining role is also boosted by popular demands for universal primary education and health care, human rights protection and advancement, raising the status of under-

privileged and deprived groups, and, to a lesser extent, the realization of the need for environmental protection and a population policy. All of these place the bright, energetic and competent professionals who assist the administrative state in delivering public goods and services, in a much stronger position to resist corruption and enforce professional norms and ethics in public administration. It is to the professional lawyers, military officers, educators, doctors, engineers and administrators that society looks for better public leadership, and through whom international backing from their foreign counterparts makes a difference. These are, after all, the very groups that have been taking the initiative in their countries to combat corruption.

Against all this are the hard facts. Much of Africa is desperately poor and the IMF's policies will impoverish it further. After all, the GNP of Africa south of the Sahara, excluding South Africa, is just about that of Belgium. There will be an even madder scramble for scarcer resources and access to office. Demand will continue to far exceed supply — an obvious structural condition for corruption to thrive. Elites will be in an even better position to exploit and extract. Any perceived democratization threats will be resisted and there will be no niceties in keeping their power over the masses. In too few countries is there a large enough middle class to intervene to tone down the extremism or guarantee pluralism. In any event the civic culture is still too weakly developed to change public behavior appreciably. It is unlikely that democratic empowerment will make many inroads into elite authoritarianism, certainly not without bloody conflict in which all those many groups long alienated from the artificially created states whose legitimacy they have never recognized, will seize their opportunity to break away. The elites will not give up without a fight, and there is no guarantee that should they be replaced, those who succeed them will act any differently once they are in power and in a position to block anti-corruption measures.

The prospect is daunting. Anti-corruption campaigns will not win everywhere. On the contrary, there will be many setbacks and losses. But there will also be successes that might have occurred less speedily or never at all had nothing been done. As with all reforms and new ventures, everything is a gamble. In the case of Africa, the situation is already so perilous that there is very little to lose and so much to gain. Whatever is done to contain corruption is worthwhile doing in itself. The resources spent will be better used than throwing them away on corrupt elites of whatever stripe, for surely that is where too many scarce resources are going today, enhancing the corrupt and adding to their ill-gotten gains.

Administrative corruption and democratization in Africa: Aspects of the theoretic agenda

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Abstract. Opportunities may well exist to limit corruption in Africa through the democratization of politics, but several theoretical issues must be kept in mind as *caveats*. It is not clear what we mean by "limiting" corruption, nor are we certain about the nature and scope of reforms necessary to attain this goal in practice. Distinctions between public and private realms, familiar to Westerners, are much less so in Africa, and make less sense in actual cases. Generalizations about culture likewise must be made with great caution, particularly when we link it to other factors permitting the growth of corruption. Finally, while a vigorous civil society is essential to healthy politics, its components may or may not be present in a given nation, and may or may not already be compromised by corruption.

My purpose in this essay is to address part of the theoretical agenda that goes hand in hand with thinking about administrative corruption and ways of limiting it. In the course of the two workshops on Corruption in Democratizing States of Africa a number of important issues were raised.

Democratization and limiting corruption

The first, and perhaps the least bothersome question, has to do with the two parametrial assumptions of the workshop theme: that the focus is on democratizing states, that is, on those already on the path of/to democracy; and, that while administrative corruption cannot be eliminated, it can be limited in these states.

The operative consensus, with which I agree, is that attempts at limitation are more likely to succeed the further the country is along the democratization path. The more democracy, the more likely that mechanisms will have been put in place to monitor the performance of administrators and bureaucrats, as well as incentives created to 'nourish incorruptness' (Noonan, 1989) and punishments mandated to discourage corrupt practices.

The problem, however, is two-fold: first, there are no guideposts to tell us at what stage or phase in the democratization process attempts at limitation are most likely to succeed (see, for example, the issues of *Africa Demos*, which

offer a list of eight 'Phases of Transition to Democracy'). Second, unless it is possible to wipe the old states clean and control the sequences and pace of reform, as was possible in those countries where national conferences seized power, political change occurs dysrhythmically, out of phase or sequence (Whitaker, 1967). It may well be that a nation can have many of the appurtenances of democracy — elections, representative governments and legislatures, free presses, open debate on vital issues, protected oppositions, etc. — yet have to put up with a sclerotic administrative system, pervasive corrupt practices, and massive resistance to reform, as the case of the Soviet Union since 1985 amply reveals. It may also be that a government with a massive electoral mandate, such as Lee Kwan Yew's People's Action Party (elected in Singapore in 1965), could use that mandate to institute a complete overhaul of the administrative system and sack half the country's bureaucrats. But that is a risky strategy, simply because African bureaucrats, when threatened, have already demonstrated impressive capability to defend themselves by, for example, catalyzing military interventions (Dahomey, Upper Volta); organizing as trade unions or interest aggregates to protect their prerogatives (Ghana, Senegal, Zambia, Dahomey, Togo); or immobilizing a country by strategic strikes or other work actions (Madagascar, Ghana, Sierra Leone, etc).

The point, of course, made by many of the papers, is that there may not be an ineluctable connection between democracy and limiting corruption; that, however, has yet to be nailed down empirically, since all we have now are tendencies and plausible hypotheses. It is also worth remembering that the least corrupt regimes have been run by zealots, religious or otherwise. Were not Calvin's Geneva, Savonarola's Florence (at least until his flock burned him at the stake), and Mao's China (during, say, the PRC's first ten years) the very models of rectitude and righteousness in all things? Democracies they were emphatically not.

Further, it is not clear what is meant by 'limiting' corruption, nor do the papers help clarify the matter. I assume it means managing, controlling, perhaps even reducing the incidence of corrupt practices and behaviors, something (presumably) that could be done without a complete overhaul of an affected administrative system. For example, assuming an appropriate context (the right 'phase'?), sacking incompetent or (known) corrupt personnel, or enforcing existing regulations and codes of conduct, or giving (presumably honest) supervisors greater authority to hire and fire (as Klitgaard suggests), might well serve to 'limit' the incidence of corruption. But limitations may also imply, as Olowu, Kpundeh, and Diamond argue for Sierra Leone and Nigeria, respectively, that thoroughgoing, widespread reform is necessary. I don't disagree with them insofar as their comments apply to Nigeria and Sierra Leone, but my point is that the several papers fail to distinguish between the requirements and consequences of various modes of limitation and reform: *where* (in the system), and *when* (the timing), and *how* (by what means), and

how much (the extent) will affect not only the probabilities of the exercise's success, but also, quite possibly, how well democratization itself proceeds.

The policy implications of this point need to be underlined: 'limitation', however defined, will require intervention in the administrative system. How radical that intervention should be depends on the health of the system, that is, its ability to perform its assigned functions, on how extensive and/or pathological the levels and frequency of corrupt activity, and on what other systemic changes may be necessary to support 'limitation' and reform. On the last point: it may be, for example, that only replacing the regime in power can offer hope of 'limitation' (clearly the case in Klitgaard's Equatorial Guinea). Possibly, only correlative reform of the judiciary, or easing the military out of politics, or changing the tax system, or eliminating prebendary pasturages such as tax farms and parasitic parastatals, will make any sort of 'limitation' possible.

The public-private dichotomy

A second theoretical issue, raised by both Olowu and Johnston, is the validity of the public-private dichotomy, a working assumption of nearly all analysts of political-bureaucratic corruption. We all carry, unavoidably, our own private domain with us wherever we go, and if we are administrators/bureaucrats/officials, we also bring it into the 'public' domain. Thus, unavoidably, we tend to ignore the fact that distinction is itself poorly defined or blurred in practice. The larger theoretical question is whether we have mistakenly reified for Africa a set of roles defined in Weberian — and European — terms. Do we judge the actions and behaviors of African bureaucrats in accordance with an ideal type originally developed in a socio-political context almost completely alien to the African? Granted, the structures, the rules, the job descriptions, the institutions pertaining to public service in Africa are almost universally a reflection of the Weberian model, but are they also so in practice, in the behavior of African rulers, bureaucrats, and administrators?

The Zairean regime of Mobutu Sese Seko has, in fact, deliberately blurred, if not almost obliterated, the distinction between private and public goods; Mobutu has long treated Zaire as 'his' property, and by urging his officials to steal 'intelligently, in a nice way', (Mobutu's own words¹) he encouraged them to think likewise (Péan 1988, 139—166; Gould 1980). In other countries such as Gabon, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, and Equatorial Guinea (Klitgaard 1990), where administrative corruption has become more or less banal, routine, or even institutionalized, the Weberian legal-rational bureaucrat — as a model — has practically disappeared. The neo-patrimonial regime, common through Africa (Le Vine 1980), operates on the assumption that political goods are redistributed along the dominant networks of patronage and obligation, and that official duty requires such facilitation, rules and laws to the contrary notwithstanding.

Under such circumstances, the 'bureaucrat' may well be an office-holder, but one who operates on what could well be called 'counter-Weberian' principles: he/she is likely to be: a) intensely partisan, owing his/her job to the group on top; b) non-careerist, in office so long as his/her patrons remain in power; c) paid as much for his/her loyalty to and status in the system as for competence or expertise; and d) distributing the resources of his office so as to favor 'his' group and, if necessary, disadvantage others. Would the idea of 'administrative corruption' (as we normally understand it), much less 'limiting' it, have any meaning for such as an official?

Culture and corruption

The papers all agree, explicitly or implicitly, that administrative corruption is not 'caused' by culture. Nor, for that matter, is it 'caused' by the political culture. The unanswered question, however, is whether there is a relationship between the two. Observation suggests that there must be: those involved in corrupt practices demonstrate behavior grounded in values which, *prima facie*, could not simply be derived situationally. A single instance, perhaps; where administrative corruption is widespread, the intuitive conclusion is that those involved share generalized norms, and that suggests a cultural base.

I submit that administrative corruption can become *part* of a political culture to the extent that corrupt practices become standard operating procedure, part of the pattern of expectations that inform the political behavior of actors in the political system. What is created in such a situation, I have argued elsewhere (Le Vine, 1975), is a 'culture of political corruption' in which corrupt practices are not only banal, but the norm in everyday political intercourse. John Waterbury (1973) offered a defining example: Morocco, where corruption became, to use Waterbury's terms, both planned and endemic.

The question, therefore, becomes not whether corruption is 'caused' by any (political) culture, but what is there in a given political culture that provides fertile ground for its growth. I assume that given other conditions such as a general scarcity of political resources plus a high degree of competition for them, and/or political system dominated or monopolized by one political class, those with preferential access to political goods and power will seek out aspects of the political culture that they can manipulate to facilitate corrupt practices. And if that political culture (for example) includes traditions of gift-giving to people in authority or demonstrates a preference for patrimonial political arrangements, or validates clientelistic relationships (more often than not a feature of patrimonialism), or generalizes a hierarchized status system, or values highly such behaviors as competitiveness and loyalty to one's kinship or ethnic group, then the normative space exists into which official corruption can expand, or even find justification.

This is not the place to provide detailed evidence for these propositions; I suggest that the literature already does so. A few citations from what is in fact a considerable body of such studies will suffice to make the point; my study of Ghana (Le Vine, 1975) offers examples of the connections between traditions of gift-giving and modern official corruption; the intimate relationships between corruption and clientelism and patrimonialism are explored by Joseph (1987) for Nigeria, and Gould (1980) and Schatzberg (1988) for Zaire.

It remains to ask how a culture of political corruption comes into being, once a connection between corruption and the political culture had established itself. Again, using the cases of Morocco, Nigeria, Ghana, Zaire, and Sierra Leone as prime examples, it appears that a combination of factors operate to bring it about. The regime itself may sanction the development: it is hard to imagine that Mobutu's injunction to 'steal a little ... in a nice way' would not have encouraged his officials to new heights of rapacity. Or, the opportunity costs of corrupt practices can diminish as half-hearted and/or ineffective control measures provide incentives for the growth of corrupt networks, or cynical leaders offer emulative examples of unrestrained self-aggrandizement. Above all, there appears to be a sort of 'band-wagon' effect at work; if everyone else is doing it, why should I be denied my share of the booty? (When that happens, the honest official may not only be at a disadvantage relative to his peers, but may in fact be penalized for his probity. I cite several instances of that phenomenon in my Ghana study.) At any event, it remains that a culture of political corruption takes some time to form, but given a fertile political-cultural field, appropriate incentives for administrators/officials, and a relative absence of official and unofficial restraints on corrupt behavior, its development can usually be safely predicted.

Corruption and civil society

The discussions during the second workshop dwelt at some length on the suggestion that civil society in Africa might provide alternative, fruitful points of input for donors seeking to advance democratization, particularly in countries where aid channeled through state structures was likely to be diverted or misappropriated by corrupt officials. The idea is intriguing, particularly in light of the fact that donors have faced in the past, and still face, the uncomfortable problem of trying to ensure that aid goes to those who need it or is used for the purposes for which it was intended.

Now even if one grants the general proposition that aid can be more effectively used if it can bypass distribution through official, usually corrupt, channels, questions still remain about the efficacy of the alternatives, and about the political and other costs (to the donor or the target state, or both) that such a strategy might entail. Consequently the theoretical issues that arise from the proposition do need some ventilation: what is this civil society, and what is it

about civil society that might permit more effective assistance to the democratization effort?

At the outset it should be stipulated that the term 'civil society' is not to be understood here exclusively in its Gramscian sense — that is, part of society organized in dynamic opposition to the state (see Boggs, 1984 and Bayart, 1986, 111–118) — but as an associational stratum intermediate to the state and its institutions and agents, and the primary kinship and ethnic configurations of society (Schmitter 1991, Woods 1992). The stress is on civil society's *intermediate* position, which also defines its role; through it emanates from the larger society, it functions both to give organized expression to the private, unofficial domain, and provide linkage (if needed) to the domain of the state. In more concrete terms, this is in large part the aggregate of the grassroots associations to which Pradervand devoted his 1989 book, plus such organizations as professional associations, informal cooperatives, churches, cultural societies, mutual-aid groups, market women's societies, tontines, and the like. But why channel aid through them or to them?

For two main reasons; that insofar as they are the product of society, they are capable of creating political resources as well as informal channels of redistribution for them, and because to the extent they are autonomous of the state, they can operate outside its corrupt channels and, presumably, process resources more effectively. The point is that civil society is attractive to donors precisely because its components, by maintaining their autonomy of action, can avoid, bypass, or outwit the state, and in so doing (if the system is democratizing), put pressure on it to enact reform². If the aim of donors is to assist the growth of democratic norms and institutions, and if the managers of the state (and their minions) resist, then it makes sense to push the state *from below* through civil society. In the final analysis, the value of civil society lies in its ability to create (more or less) autonomous nexuses of loyalty, value, and ultimately, political action. Key elements of civil society harnessed in the service of democratization could, *ceteris paribus*, give that process great additional impetus.

Such a strategy is based on three conditions antecedent: first, that those components of civil society most likely, by their activities, to have significant impact on the state are in fact present; second, that they do have relative freedom of action vis à vis the state; and third, that those who run and/or manage them are not themselves tainted by the virus of corruption. The first two conditions are self-evident; the third needs additional comment because it is itself based on the further assumption that (for example) NGOs are likely to be operated democratically, and therefore will subject their leaders and managers to stricter standards of accountability than those to which the institutions of the state are subject. This is not an unreasonable assumption, and it turns out to be generally true in practice. However, to raise the point — with its implicit caveat — does nothing to derogate from the value of the strategy itself.

A final word about civil society. The tragic examples of Somalia and Liberia attest to the fact that a vigorous civil society is as indispensable to the

health of the political domain, as it is to society as a whole. During its 120 years in power (1860–1980), Liberia's True Whig party managed to penetrate to the country's grassroots, effectively penetrating and largely coopting virtually all sectors of civil society. When President Tolbert, and with him, the True Whig Party, were overthrown, associational life in Liberia literally collapsed as well, opening the door to anarchy and civil war. And in Somalia, besides the traditional clan structures of elders and cognate families, after independence relatively little civil society was ever created between the clans and the state; such private associations and groups as did function tended to be linked either to particular clans or associated with the institutions of the state. When Siad Barre and his state fell to the warlords and feuding clans, the few civil associations still functioning disintegrated as well. So, left to their own bloody devices, the war lords and clan elders proceeded to make the country into a slaughterhouse. And in Sudan, the strategy of the regime led by Hassan al-Turabi appears to be to force the Islamization of the rest of the country, deliberately destroying the remaining civil society in the south, and starving to death or slaughtering en masse those unwilling to submit.

In the foregoing I have focussed on what seemed to me to have been the most important of these issues. In the course of the discussions other theoretical issues were raised: among others, the efficacy of various modes of corruption control; the extent to which donors could or should influence efforts at bureaucratic reform; what would be a tolerable level of corruption (given some success in the efforts at control); the role of ideology in attempts to control corruption; the efficacy of various programs of 'civic education' in corruption control; and the relationship of so-called 'second economies' both to democratization and corruption control. That I have not discussed the latter in no way detracts from their significance. Clearly, all the participants could agree that controlling administrative corruption would be a daunting, complex task, even granting the possibility of official or other interventions in systems already democratic or in the process of undergoing their 'second', democratizing revolution. And that an increasing number are joining those ranks every year offers hope both to Africans and friends of Africa.

Notes

1. 'Si Vous désirez voler, volez un peu et intelligemment, d'une jolie manière. Si vous volez tant que vous deveniez riche un une seule nuit, on vous attrapera ...' (If you want to steal, steal a little and do so intelligently, in a nice way. If you steal so that you become rich overnight, you'll be caught ...) From a speech by Mobutu delivered on May 20, 1976, quoted by Pierre Péan in his *L'Argent noir* (1988).
2. 'Autonomous' does not mean 'independent'. Schmitter (1991) rightly argues that civil society does not exist without the state. I would amend his proposition to suggest that some of the *components* of civil society can exist outside the state: when the state itself becomes non-functional, and if civil society is vigorous and dynamic, some of its elements can not only take over functions of governance, but as in the Soviet Union, become the basis of part of the new political system.

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Thematic summary of discussions

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Levels of corruption. There was vigorous exchange among participants about whether high-level or bureaucratic corruption is the more serious concern. Some maintained that the top one percent of African officialdom is making off with the lion's share of the booty, so that this loss needs to be staunched first in order to be able to attend to the lesser drains at lower political levels.

In this view, petty administrative corruption — crossing a civil servant's palm in order to secure a permit — may have to be accepted for now as a cost of doing business. Others strongly disagreed. The problem with lower-level corruption, as they saw it, is that it grows and becomes routinized. It constitutes a slow but deadly hemorrhage. Which of the two levels to attack first may depend on the 'purchase' that one has. In some cases it may be easier to attack lower-level corruption first, though this is not proven.

Types of corruption. Political or high-level corruption, many participants thought, interacts with bureaucratic corruption; the two feed on each other. The same is also true of public and private corruption. The whole idea of public vs. private is somewhat blurry in Africa. It is an imported, European idea which has yet to grow native roots.

Comparison with the West. Participants asked themselves why administrative corruption should be taken so much more seriously as regards Africa than it is in relation to the industrialized democracies of the West. One answer was that when resources are scarce, corruption seems more obvious and offensive. Another was that African corruption is often 'unproductive corruption': the bribe is given or the favor is extended, but the project is still not completed.

Surveys taken in Sierra Leone show that 80 percent of the public thinks routine stealing from the government is acceptable behavior. There is an adversary relation between state and society that is acted out beneath the surface rather than overtly. Several participants warned, all the same, against too facile an attribution of this behavior to African 'political culture'.

Within many African countries, participants said, there is below the level of leadership a strong and earnest desire to push for change in the direction of democratization and reform.

Democracy and corruption. Openness was widely seen as the key to accountability and resulting control of corruption. Regimes that educate their citizens in the concept of citizenship have the best chance of sustaining accountability. Also helpful for this purpose is the achievement of sustained decentralization.

But democracy alone, some participants declared, is not necessarily more resistant to temptation than concentrated one-party government, if all involved in the new form of governance are still eager for corruption.

Also, others maintained, stability of administration is needed along with the transition to pluralism. 'Anarchy,' as one participant put it, 'may be more dangerous than corruption'. Reform is not a one-dimensional proposition.

Corruption and economic development. The state of the economy is an important determinant of the degree and spread of administrative corruption. When political opportunities outweigh economic opportunities, participants agreed, there will be more corruption.

Some put their emphasis on the need for a rising middle class, oriented to seeing corruption as something that works against its interests. Others stressed the contribution that an expanding private sector can make, by creating alternative wealth and power centers.

Corruption feeds on poverty, most present agreed, and can be checked by plenty — if it is well dispersed.

Remedies — toward a civil society. An autonomous and interactive civil society both demands and supplies better governance, which can lead to control of corruption. This requires encouraging the media, civic groups, and educated people at the community level to take a lead in demanding more accountability.

Some participants observed, however, that the civil society can also set up obstacles to political change, at least in the short term. You cannot rely simply on the emergence of that society, to the exclusion of reform of the state itself.

Others asserted that the strengthening of civic groups can help in the process of reform by creating political resources to challenge and outwit the state.

The civil society, some argued, is not a necessary antagonist to the state. One can envision a positive, reciprocally supportive relationship that would nurture the concept of *citizenship* — not now very strong in Africa. This is needed to lay the foundation for a stable democracy in the longer run.

A civil society can be a training ground for noncorrupt behavior. It can teach the distinction between *civic* (interactive) and *communal* (appropriative) conduct, which causes so much confusion today.

Donor controls/conditionality. Some participants thought that the most effective contribution outside funders (like USAID, and the World Bank) could make would be to condition their assistance on adoption of effective anti-

corruption measures by their African partners. Others agreed, but suggested this would have to be a long-term proposition, with training in accountability and investigative methods coupled with education for the literate in the moral costs of corruption. This could take three to five years to get off the ground, particularly as the criteria for so-called 'conditionality' are not well understood or established.

There was another view of this subject, which is that the threat of withholding all aid has been more persuasive, at least in some countries, than anything else.

But anti-corruption can be seen, at least in the first instance, as a goal rather than a condition. It should, some believe, be among the governance reforms that donors request, but they should be wise and flexible in the application of their demands.

For example, most foreign aid focuses on basic needs like health care, and not governance reform. Better health practices can help build a civil society. Should it properly be made subject, some asked, to an anti-corruption cutoff condition?

Also, some pointed out, it can look hypocritical for a donor country whose own government is riddled with highly publicized corruption to act 'superior' in its foreign aid transactions.

Some said it does not help African countries very much simply to apply conditions. It would be better in this view to work with those countries to establish standards and practices; otherwise you are just administering punishment. An effective course might be to assist local governments and NGO's to develop their own anti-corruption programs.

The international business sector is now making its own contribution to this effort, by joining with governments and African NGO's to form something called 'Transparency International'. It will have an anti-corruption Code of Conduct, approved by its own members, which are intended to come from a broad array of Western countries. It is seeking a nucleus of African governments to subscribe to the Code. Monitoring assistance and support will be provided as part of this enterprise.

As presently envisaged, observance of the Code will be a precondition to receiving foreign assistance, which could put as much as \$20 billion now going to Africa at risk. Some, however, are hoping that Transparency International will remain a technical assistance agency, and not become an instrument of conditionality.

Anti-corruption strategies. In general, the remedial strategy must be to open up African governance systems to more accountability. For some participants, this means to democratize; but others pointed out that democracy in its formative stages can invite more corruption. Even the routinization of electoral change, as in Mexico, is not proof against systemic corruption.

Some participants would put the corrective emphasis on research, to understand better the causes and cures of corruption.

Others favor the establishment and strengthening of anti-corruption codes and commissions. But there are those who argue that these are mainly surface efforts, and that there is need for a more deeply rooted approach to the governance system as a whole.

There is support for privatization as a remedy, reducing the government's role in the economy and society. Others assert that this does not clear up the issues of fairness or human rights, for which you still have to deal directly with the state.

Other ideas are to depoliticize the military, and to broaden the concept of 'development' so that it includes governance reform along with economic vitalization.

There are technical aspects of governance reform that several participants argued are relatively easy to deal with and should command attention. A lot of the corruption in Africa could be cleaned up, they said, by improving management. It is vital, in this view, to improve the performance of governments so as to help them maintain legitimacy and avoid successive overthrows.

Others pointed out that there is a political fervor for reform in many African countries which can serve as an engine for progress against corruption. But it is also the case that a lot of remedial action at present is backward-looking and self-protective. The 'new brooms' that emerge periodically to take power in African countries sweep away the sins of their predecessors without touching their own.

So there is a need, most agreed, to attack the problem systematically, on as many fronts as possible. The people of Africa themselves have to be brought to decide to get rid of corruption, for both economic and political reasons, as was done in Korea.

As a starting point, all concurred, we must break down the taboo against talking about corruption. It would be helpful for this purpose to have fuller reporting in U.S. foreign service and media channels about the pervasiveness and disabling effect of corruption in Africa.

The Latin American parallel. AID has had success in Latin America working with NGO's, sometimes across state boundaries. In Venezuela, for example, an accomplished Argentine NGO has been enlisted to assist in developing a local anti-corruption program. What the Latin American Bureau has learned from its experience is:

- If we heighten people's awareness of corruption, they will want to do something to curtail it.
- When they do, outside assistance can be effective, often through NGO's.
- When citizens' groups — particularly those composed of professionals like lawyers and accountants — are mobilized against corruption, they can move the state to go further than it might wish to do.
- It is still difficult to succeed if government resolutely opposes.

Some participants raised the question whether this sort of activism might not prove destabilizing at least in the short term. The Bureau's assumption has been the opposite, that a government can be brought to protect its own tenure in office by taking actions demanded of it to restore its credibility and legitimacy.

But would such a strategy be effective in Africa? Some thought that African society was very different from Latin America; it has weaker and less autonomous professional groups. This makes the case once again for giving priority in Africa to building a stronger civil society.

Combatting corruption in an era of political liberalization — implications for donor agencies

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Abstract. Corruption is a major concern for most governments and other organizations involved in aid to African nations, and current trends toward more open politics in those nations may offer real opportunities to link aid to anti-corruption measures in new and effective ways. But corruption is linked to other problems such as types and rates of economic growth, and to the intrinsic difficulties of supporting democratic governance. The participants at these conferences have offered governmental, public-sector reform, civil society, and mass-culture approaches to reform. Each has considerable merit, but the likely success of each varies sharply depending upon which of the basic problems of governance we wish to address.

At the outset of these workshops, *Alison Rosenberg*, speaking for the Africa Bureau of A.I.D., charged the participants with helping bilateral donors, like A.I.D., understand how they could best contribute to the process of limiting and controlling public sector corruption in Africa in the light of the political changes unfolding on that continent. She asked them to help the Africa Bureau develop a strategic approach to this problem.

These papers have not provided unambiguous guidance or a level of consensus on the most critical paths and entry points sufficient to develop an overall anti-corruption strategy. What they tell us very clearly is that there is and probably can be no single or simple formula for donors or for African reformers and democrats. This, they suggest, is true because retrospective and historical evidence largely from other eras and continents is of limited use in the contemporary African situation. As *Victor Le Vine* and *Dele Olowu* point out, there is no ineluctable connection between modernization in general, or democratization in particular, and the limitation of corruption. Nor is there a universal sequence or single syndrome which adequately describes where all African countries are located on the path to better and more open governance, or even how far along the path they must be in order to realize gains in this area. Moreover, the position of donors like A.I.D. varies widely from one country to another. Evidence of the past year confirms that the national settings themselves are highly dynamic as leaders of both the old guard and the reform movements learn from the experiences of other countries and constantly adjust their strategies and tactics, and as the donors are also forced to learn from the unique situations each case entails.

There is wide agreement in these papers, pointedly noted by *Michael Johnston* and *Gerald Caiden*, that corruption must be addressed both at the macro level of institutions and society and at the micro-level of individual behavior. There is less agreement, however, about whether one should or can deal first with systemic corruption or petty corruption. On the one hand, experts can design useful tactics in the war against public sector corruption. On the other, there is significant reason to question whether tactical approaches can go very far or be sustained without the broader evolution of the political and even the economic system. In the absence of agreement on these fundamental issues, it is difficult to fashion a strategic approach. Rather, there appears to be little more than a menu of options. However understandable the individual menu entries may be, guidance as to combinations or sequence remains elusive.

In fact, the corruption problem appears to be part of the broader issue of supporting democratic governance. The constraints to a strategic approach in anti-corruption initiatives may be another reflection of our uncertainty about how best to support democratic transitions which not only involve change in the rules of the game, but which produce more competent and effective governance both in the state and in the broader society as a whole. At our present state of knowledge, the best we can do is to carefully analyze specific domestic and international conditions playing out in the transition process, and determine which of the observable options has the most potential for promoting governance reform, with the conviction that this should indirectly help address corruption as well.

Closely related is still a third set of relationships linking democratic governance reforms to rates or patterns of economic growth. In Africa there are powerful reasons for thinking that the casual linkages between two may go in both directions (i.e., governance reforms seem vital to producing growth, particularly market-oriented growth in which the private sector plays a larger and more dynamic role; and growth and private sector development seem critical to sustaining improvements in democratic governance). Neither the theory nor the empirical evidence based on African experience of these linkages is complete, however.

Like it or not, we are in a domain of substantial uncertainty, complicated by the differential stages of economic and political transition found in different African countries today. One approach to dealing with such uncertainty strategically is to determine which options on the menu offer the broadest benefits for all three goals (economic development, democratic governance, and reduced public corruption), rather like a broad-spectrum antibiotic.

The options for action most widely discussed at the conferences can broadly be divided into four categories:

- The Governmental Approach — essentially strengthening power-sharing and interest representation in autonomous governmental institutions (such as independent legislatures and judiciaries, and regional and local governments):

- The Public Sector Reform Approach — improving performance of the public sector by altering incentives and motivations (higher civil service salaries, more internal institutional checks of corruption, such as inspectors general, or tighter procurement processes; more external checks such as better control of donor funding);
- The Civil Society Approach — strengthening such non-governmental actors as the independent media, professional associations, and independent business associations, and encouraging them to investigate, monitor and demand limits to public corruption;
- The Mass Culture Approach — strengthening the ‘public’ demand for honest and good governance through mass education.

Table 1 shows a preliminary assessment of the probability that a given approach will help address each of the three goals. In this table + = most probably and ? = most problematical. This portrayal needs much more discussion, and requires much refinement. What it suggests in the shortterm, however, is that the bulk of donor efforts in this area should be focused on civil society approaches because they are potentially the ‘broadest spectrum’ medicine. Quite obviously, it cannot simply be assumed that all civil society and private sector institutions will contribute to all of these goals in every country. A careful assessment must be conducted to understand more fully how people or groups are likely to behave in pursuit of perceived self-interest. And a case can also quite obviously be made for adding elements from each of the other approaches, looking carefully at how combinations of actions can simultaneously assure better results for several or for all three goals, and how potential negative relationships to specific goals can be minimized.

Table 1. Anti-corruption policy options.

	Democratic governance	Economic governance	Reduced public sector corruption
Governmental power sharing	+	?	+
Public sector reform	?	?	+
Civil society and private sector approach	+	+	+
Mass culture attitude formation	?	?	+

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Editorial note

Beginning with our next issue, *Corruption and Reform* will be published in a new format, one which will enable us to continue our mission of publishing the latest research on political corruption, political finance and related topics, but for a significantly larger and more diverse readership.

As from mid-1993, *Corruption and Reform* will be merged with *Crime, Law, and Social Change*. *Crime, Law, and Social Change* will publish eight times per year, two of which will be issues of *Corruption and Reform*. *Corruption and Reform* will maintain a distinct identity, both in the presentation of these issues and in the editorial process; issues will be assembled by the current editorial team, and our topics of major emphasis will remain very much as they have been over the past seven years. Our readership will more than quadruple, however, and our base of potential authors and reviewers will expand as well. We will also have the opportunity to explore more fully; the connections between issues of political corruption and political finance, on the one hand, and the research on crime and enforcement of the law that *Crime, Law, and Social Change* has been publishing. We also look forward to a good working relationship with Professor Alan Block of Pennsylvania State University, Editor-in-chief of *Crime, Law, and Social Change*.

Over the past seven years we have enjoyed the active support and helpful critical insights of a loyal group of authors, readers and referees far too numerous to named here. We look forward to continuing these relationships, and to beginning new ones as we draw upon the work of, and present our issues of *Corruption and Reform* to, a wider scholarly community.

We will of course be happy to answer any questions about the new working arrangements. As in the past, manuscripts, notes and books for review should be sent to editorial team at the addresses listed below.

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PUBLISHER'S NOTE

Given the large overlap in readership and in the subject areas published, the editors of the journal *Crime, Law and Social Change* and the journal *Corruption and Reform* have decided to join forces. As from 1993 *Corruption and Reform* will be incorporated in *Crime, Law and Social Change*. It is hoped that this merger will further facilitate communication between the two groups of readers and authors.

Customers who used to subscribe to both journals will only receive a bill for *Crime, Law and Social Change*. Customers subscribing to *Corruption and Reform* who do not wish to prolong their subscription after the merger should inform us.

As from 1993, each of the two volumes will comprise four issues instead of three. Two issues per year will appear as special issues devoted to corruption and reform.

CONTENTS Volume 7 1992

Volume 7 No. 1

Michael M. Atkinson and Maureen Mancuso: Edicts and etiquette: Regulating conflict of interest in Congress and the House of Commons	1
David Murphy: The Stalker Affair	19
Walter Little: Political corruption in Latin America	41
Mark Findlay and Andrew Stewart: Implementing corruption prevention strategies through codes of conduct	67
Review essay	
Robert G. Kaufman: <i>The Power Game</i> reconsidered: Politics in Washington during the Reagan era and beyond	87

Volume 7 No. 2

Selected papers presented at the 5th International Anti-Corruption Conference, held in Amsterdam, The Netherlands, on 8-12 March, 1992

Articles

Emile W. Kolthoff: Looking into the future: The control of corruption in a perspective of growing internationalization	105
John A. Gardiner: Defining corruption	111
Lode van Outrive: The administration as an amplifier of corruption	125
Ronald Goldstock: Organized crime and corruption	137
Jan Tinbergen: Social integrity in a new world order	147
Book reviews	153

Volume 7 No. 3

Special issue: Limiting Administrative Corruption in the Democratizing States of Africa. Proceedings of a Conference held in Washington DC, September 11, 1992

Guest Editor: Robert B. Charlick

Corruption, Governance and Aid to Africa

Alison P. Rosenberg: Corruption as a policy issue 173

Robert B. Charlick: Corruption in political transition: A governance perspective 177

Theoretical Perspectives on Administrative Corruption

Michael Jonston: 'Micro' and 'macro' possibilities for reform 189

Gerald E. Caiden: From the specific to the general: Reflections on the Sudan 205

Corruption in Africa: Processes and Cases

Larry Diamond, Nigeria's perennial struggle against corruption: Prospects for the third republic 215

Dele Olowu: Roots and remedies of governmental corruption in Africa 227

Sahr John Kpundeh: Prospects in contemporary Sierra Leone 237

Stephen P. Riley: Post-independence anti-corruption strategies and the contemporary effects of democratization 249

Commentary and Discussion

Gerald E. Caiden: Commentary 265

Victor T. Le Vine: Administrative corruption and democratization in Africa: Aspects of the theoretic agenda 271

Roland Homet: Thematic summary of discussions 279

Conclusions

Robert Charlick: Combatting corruption in an era of political liberalization – implications for donor agencies 283

Contributors to this volume 104, 171, 289
 Editorial note / Publisher's note 291
 Author index / Volume contents 293

Author index Volume 7 1992

Atkinson, M.M. 1

Caiden, G.E. 205, 265
Charlick, R. 177, 283

Diamond, L. 215

Findlay, M. 67

Gardiner, J.A. 111
Goldstock, R. 137

Homet, R. 279

Jonston, M. 189

Kaufman, R.G. 87
Kolthoff, E.W. 105

Kpundeh, S.J. 237

Le Vine, V.T. 271
Little, W. 41

Mancuso, M. 1
Murphy, D. 19

Olowu, D. 227

Rosenberg, A.P. 173

Stephen P. Riley, S.P. 249
Stewart, A. 67

Tinbergen, J. 147

van Outrive, L. 125

Corruption and Reform

An International Journal

Subscription Information

As from 1993 *Corruption and Reform* is incorporated in *Crime, Law and Social Change*. *Crime, Law and Social Change* appears in eight issues per year, and two of these issues will be devoted to *Corruption and Reform*.

Volumes 19 and 20 (4 issues each) will be published in 1993. Subscription price per volume Dfl. 297.00/US\$186.00 (including postage and handling). Concessionary rates for individual use are available upon request. Payment can be made by bank draft, personal cheque, credit card, international money order, or Unesco coupons.

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Aims and Scope

Corruption and Reform is a multidisciplinary journal with an international group of contributors and readers. It is intended to serve as a lively forum for rigorous scholarly research on political corruption, misconduct and policies for reform, presenting a diverse range of viewpoints and emphasizing an international and comparative perspective.

Corruption and Reform will publish research in a number of areas of interest, including studies of political finance and the role of money in politics, patron-client relations, maladministration, and the effects of such social phenomena as parallel economies and organized crime. Contributions will be welcomed from political scientists, and from scholars in other disciplines - such as sociology, economics, anthropology and law as well as policy professionals and public servants.

Corruption and Reform is indexed/abstracted in *Criminal Justice Abstracts*.

References and Notes

References and notes should be numbered consecutively, typed doubled spaced at the end of the article on separate pages, and in the text referred to by superscript numbers. Some examples to follow:

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