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RM-5872-AID/ARPA  
MARCH 1969

SEMINAR ON DEVELOPMENT  
AND SECURITY IN THAILAND: PART II  
DEVELOPMENT-SECURITY INTERACTIONS

Hans Heymann, Jr. , Editor

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PREPARED FOR:  
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
AND THE  
ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY

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PREFACE

This Memorandum is Part II of a two-part conference record, summarizing the discussions of, and reproducing the papers contributed to, a Seminar on the Relationship between Development and Security, with Special Reference to Thailand. Papers presented at the seminar on the insurgency and on research priorities appear in RM-5871-AID/ARPA, Seminar on Development and Security in Thailand: Part I, The Insurgency (U), March 1969 (Confidential). The Seminar was organized by The RAND Corporation under the joint sponsorship of the Agency for International Development (AID) of the Department of State, and the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the Department of Defense. It was held at The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, on November 16-18, 1967.

The idea of the Seminar was originally proposed to AID by its Academic Advisory Council for Thailand (AACT) and strongly seconded by the U.S. AID Mission in Bangkok. The hope was that a confrontation of academic and government views on the nexus between development and security might help to clarify relevant concepts, so that both U.S. research priorities and the focus of U.S. assistance programs in Thailand might be sharpened.

Invited participants in the Seminar, therefore, included knowledgeable government officials both from Bangkok and Washington, as well as area specialists and generalists from the academic community and from RAND. The list of participants is shown on page vii.

In the preparation of this conference record, the most onerous task fell upon Miss Val Laffin who acted as Seminar Rapporteur and who produced a meticulously edited transcript of the proceedings. Substantial assistance in summarizing the discussions was also provided by Mrs. Eleanor Wainstein.

## INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

### SEMINAR FOCUS

The Seminar on Development and Security in Thailand set itself the task of examining four principal problem areas:

(1) The development-security interrelationship. -- The aim was to review the present state of knowledge concerning the effect of economic, social and political change on such security-relevant factors as: (a) susceptibility of the population to political organization and manipulation; (b) adequacy of leadership, administration, governmental authority; (c) demands upon and provision of governmental services, including preservation of law and order; (d) behavior of relevant groups (village youth, civil servants, urban elites, etc.). Examination of these factors was to be aimed at contemporary Thailand and specifically, but not exclusively, at the Northeast. The question posed in short, was: "What can we observe about the consequences of environmental changes such as more education, more population, higher incomes, accelerated governmental activity, and more urban jobs, for key aspects of the body politic?"

(2) The efficacy of the insurrectionary movement. -- The intent was to explore the current and potential capabilities of the insurgent organization as to exploit systematically the inadequacies of and the pressures upon the established authority structure.

(3) The relevance of programs. -- Given the existing tensions within the structure and the insurgents' ability to exploit these tensions, it is important to know whether U.S. AID and Thai government programs are appropriate to the problem.

(4) The most urgent tasks for research. -- It was hoped that the Seminar would pin-point the most pressing researchable questions and thus help in establishing priorities for future research.

### SEMINAR ORGANIZATION

The Seminar was conducted in five successive sessions, each of three hours' duration, and each organized around one of the following five topics:

(1) Development-Security Interactions -- The Conceptual Framework

Underlying assumptions of scholars and policymakers about the development-security relationship. What are the implicit theories or explicit doctrines guiding analysis and policies?

(2) Development-Security Interactions -- Special Features of Thailand

Basic factors of rural society in Thailand (particularly in the Northeast) that might impinge on dissidence. Is the villager "isolated" or "involved?" Is security an individual or a state attribute? What observable impact has development had on either at the village level?

(3) The Insurgency: Development Implications

What do we know and not know about the Communist Terrorists (CT)? Recruitment appeals and "alternatives" offered by the insurgents; their tactics and opportunities in exploiting Thai vulnerabilities. How might "development" reduce or enhance these opportunities?

(4) The Program: Focus and Concept

"Protection and Production" as program objectives; possible alternatives -- for example, explicit political development objectives; scatteration versus concentration; impact versus long-run programs. How do we close the gap between U.S. and Royal Thai Government (RTG) priorities?

(5) Research Approaches and Priorities

Within the vast wasteland of the uncertain and the unknown uncovered in the course of the Seminar, which are the most urgent, most feasible, and most promising issues for research? What techniques may be applicable or appropriate?

Only the first, second, and fourth of the above topics and associated papers are reported on in the present Memorandum. Because of their higher classification, the insurgency and research priorities discussions and associated papers are reproduced in a companion Memorandum, Seminar on Development and Security in Thailand: Part I, The Insurgency (U), RM-5871-AID/ARPA (Confidential).

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## I. SEMINAR SESSIONS

### THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The opening session of the Seminar was devoted to a search for a conceptual framework for development-security interactions. Charles Wolf, Jr., Head of RAND's Economics Department, led off with an appraisal of a number of alternative models of economic and political change, critiquing both the relevance of these several models to the Thailand situation and their adequacy in integrating economic and political factors. He described two basic types of models:

1. Economic growth models: Formal economic growth models are highly sensitive to political factors. These factors powerfully affect the assumptions and parameters of the model. While this fact is sometimes recognized in a general way, its implications are hardly ever examined in any specific way. An example of a politically vulnerable economic model is the Chenery macro-growth model with its three key parameters -- target growth rate, capacity to invest, and marginal savings rate -- all of which are critically dependent on political and policy factors which the model virtually ignores. This is a serious limitation. The formal economic growth model appears to have little operational utility for a situation like that of Thailand.

2. Political change models: Unlike economic growth models, political change models are characterized by a wide variety of both dependent variables -- violence, competitiveness, democracy, revolution, social mobility, institutionalization -- and of independent variables -- income changes, distributional changes, levels of income and distribution, political participation, mobility, literacy, education, and information media. Political change models thus offer a much wider range of observations and measurements than do economic growth models. However, such observations can only be loosely specified, and are thus not susceptible to accurate measurement.

Models of political change may be "optimistic," "pessimistic," or "neutral" in their expectations:

a) "Optimistic" models are those that relate merit variables to merit systems, as for instance: the greater the improvement in the economy (that is, the more the economy is propitiated in terms of conventional measures of economic welfare), the greater will be the level of security. This is an optimistic view of the world.

b) "Pessimistic" models are those in which merit variables are antagonistically related to merit systems. That is, if economic growth is accelerated, employment expanded, income redistributed, and mass participation encouraged, the stability of the system will be upset, violence precipitated, and frictions and hostilities sharpened. Some pessimistic models have a threshold value up to which favorable economic change may have unfavorable political consequences; once this threshold value is exceeded, however, the optimistic model takes over.

c) "Neutral" models are those in which neither pessimistic nor optimistic expectations dominate, but the outcome depends on the balance between competing variables where a normative content is built into each. The neutral model may offer the most promising framework for model development. Such a model might take the form of a large simultaneous equation system involving a balance between: (1) economic growth and modernization, (2) "participation" in the sense of distribution of income and assets and in the sense of political involvement and decisionmaking, and (3) disciplined and discriminating use of coercion. The assumption would be that, if any one of these three components of the system gets out of balance or moves ahead too fast relative to the other two, the system would break up.

Wolf called attention to two kinds of influences or forces that critically alter outcomes that might be predicted by these models.

a) Endogenous forces: One element often crucially left out of political change models is that dealing with the internal adversary, that is, the quality and sophistication of the insurgents' internal organization, its ability to disrupt the system and thus to affect the systemic changes with which models are typically concerned. The environment within which a security/development nexus exists cannot be adequately understood without considering the capability of an adversary in a formal, organizational sense to affect that environment.

b) Exogenous forces: Also neglected in political change models are the external sources of influence, the sources of support from outside the system. These influences affect both insurgent organization and internal variables. For any level of internal variables specified there is some level of external support for disruption of the system and some quality of external support for bolstering the established authority that could bring about results which are the reverse of those predicted. For example, greater magnitude or greater efficiency of external support for an internal insurgent organization could yield results with respect to political stability, security, and political development that are quite different from those inferred by looking only at the internal situation.

There is not only a trade-off between the exogeny and the endogeny on the insurgent side, but there are also trade-offs between the external support provided the insurgents, and that provided the established authority. The latter often works in complex and curious ways; that is, the backwash effect of heavy-handed support directed to authority-building may in fact extinguish or consume the very thing it is trying to build.

Wolf's conclusion was that there is no single, simple, or high-confidence relationship between security and development, that many relationships can be discerned, and that the outcome of their interactions will depend on a balance of forces which include both external as well as internal factors.

In the ensuing discussion, one or two additional observations were made concerning the framework for security/development interactions in Thailand:

1. Targeting in an insurgency: In the early stages of an insurrectionary movement, it was argued the insurgent planner will tend to target the most vulnerable "low performers" in the system, in order to secure at least the passive compliance of the populace, if only in the sense of preserving secrecy and of denying cooperation and information to the established government. In the later stages of insurgent growth, the "high performers" become the targets. The insurgents no longer need to identify with public welfare and social justice, but must now

demonstrate their power and capacity for drastic action. Invincibility is the image to be conveyed rather than concern for welfare.

2. The basic task of the U.S. AID Mission in Thailand, it was suggested, is to influence, through the Thai Government, the individual most vulnerable to the insurgency -- the villager. He must be reached and influenced to become part of Thai society rather than part of the structure that the insurgent is building. However, it is inefficient and, indeed, infeasible, to try to reach him through a large variety of measures. The Mission must focus on key elements of his value system, persuade the villager that these are relevant elements, and concentrate its programs on them. It means taking risks, being selective, and limiting benefit-conferring efforts to the elements selected. Selectivity is necessary, because resources are insufficient to work at all levels at once.

3. There is a real question concerning the extent to which the Thai government shares the U.S. Mission's concern over internal security. In terms of its own resource allocation, the Thai government has consistently demonstrated a far greater interest in economic development. The proportion of its budget devoted to economic and social development purposes has risen steadily, relative to that going to military and police forces. The basic thrust has been toward increasing the GNP, quite possibly on the RTG's unspoken assumption that economic growth will in and of itself best serve Thailand's security needs.

#### SPECIAL FEATURES OF THAILAND

David Wilson, Department of Political Science, University of California at Los Angeles, opened the second session of the Seminar with a brief summary of the main points made in his paper on the security aspects of economic change in Thailand. His observations and several of the more significant points raised in the ensuing discussion are summarized below.

The conceptual notion of Thai society on which AID is operating -- which is at the same time the conventional wisdom on the subject -- is one of a Thai social structure divided into two categories: The

Village and The Government. The thrust of most U.S./RTG efforts is aimed at the supposed interaction between these two categories. There is, however, much more to Thai society than just these two elements. In particular, there is another element in Thai society that is very dynamic and should be more fully considered when devising strategies for Thai security, namely, the non-peasant private sector. This sector comprises the people who live in towns and cities and are engaged in economic relationships with both the peasants and the government, often acting as a kind of middleman between town and countryside. These economic relationships have a social component or a link with the social structure that should be utilized.

The insurgency in Thailand and, for that matter, the U.S. AID program in Thailand are marginal factors when compared with what is going on in Thailand as a whole, and particularly when viewed in relation to the enormous dynamism of the indigenous population. The general thrust of most Thai Government operations is toward economic development, and our AID program, designed very much as a security program, tends to be marginal to the social effort that accompanies the developmental activities taking place.

Our research effort should be directed toward discovering what these institutions are by which people in the countryside make money or have cash wage jobs. There is a great deal of evidence that many in the countryside work for cash, part-time, or full time, but very little is known regarding how this comes about, what the institutions are that link the countryside to the cash economy, and what incentives or opportunities attract them to these activities.

Such research should be undertaken with the security problem in mind. Security here meaning not suppression of insurgents, but of linking the mass of the population to a more satisfactory, more predictable, and therefore more secure social life in the framework of a rapidly changing social and economic system. In mobilizing their "loyalties," as we attempt to do, we might think of loyalty as confidence, say, between the farmer and the buyer, and between the buyer and the government. These links through the middleman include both communication of

information and transfer of credit; they involve a certain amount of trust and therefore are of considerable social significance.

An example of linkages which might be utilized is that of agricultural and technical officers at amphur and changwad levels, who might be encouraged to enter into better relationships with private entrepreneurs in their towns. The latter actually need technical information and may reciprocate for such information by helping the government. There is an established structure of relationships between urban Thailand and rural Thailand in the private sector, and this structure should be utilized and encouraged side by side with that of the government. Michael Moerman's personal experience in the Thai countryside confirms that businessmen are incomparably more effective as agents of agricultural extension than are government officials. In the case of encouraging the use of fertilizer, for example, the entrepreneur will stress the profit motive and set an example by buying the product for himself, whereas government agents have far less success when they try to project fertilizer as a symbol of progress.

Since the Thai are a strongly economically motivated people, it may be well to look at the fact that insurgency for some Thais can be considered as a career opportunity.\* Impact programs as now conceived generally disregard career attractiveness, in the sense of providing employment opportunities to those who are most likely to become insurgents. If we are looking for fairly simple criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of a counterinsurgency program, we might consider the criterion of the number of jobs created, both inside and outside the rural areas, for the rural 20-30 age group most susceptible to insurgent appeals.

Given the attractiveness of economic incentives to the Thai, it is not necessary that the beneficial effects of development be felt immediately. Mere anticipation of improvement has an appeal. People do not reach a conclusion about loyalty on the basis of a dollar today or even on income this year. They see their relationship to a system

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\* See p. 22, below.

in terms of movement and prospects, and in this sense growth has relevance to security.

The appeal of the government must be entirely different from that of the insurgents. The government must deliver on its promises. The government should not stumble into the position of trying to match the insurgent's appeal on his ground, but must have a program of its own, capitalizing on its particular assets. By the same token, the strategy of counterinsurgency should not be a reaction to that of the insurgents, but should be a viable strategy on its own hook.

Counterinsurgency should be distinguished from security. Counterinsurgency, as conventionally conceived, is essentially a police-cum-military problem, and the role of economic action in that is to raise government revenues sufficiently to support the intelligence and suppression activities and to build the protection institutions that are required. You do not protect villagers from people with guns by raising their economic welfare. But economic welfare is relevant to security in a broader sense. By raising incomes and creating job opportunities we may be able to narrow the area where the shooting problem is a political problem and to decrease its potential for expansion. By creating opportunities, people are hooked into dynamic nongovernmental institutions, and are given a stake in society.

Several problems for further research emerged from the discussion: What is the economic significance of the transactions that take place between the rural and urban sectors? What kinds of population movements are taking place and do they reflect large rural-urban income differentials? What kinds of loyalties are generated or destroyed by such movements of goods and services? What kinds of information and propaganda circulate in what ways through what intermediaries? Essentially, what is the relationship between the government and the entrepreneur, and how does this affect the peasant?

#### U.S. PROGRAMS: FOCUS AND CONCEPT

A subsequent session of the conference concentrated on the focus and concept of U.S. aid programs in Thailand. Three conferees presented

their views on the subject. Princeton Lyman, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, led off with the following thesis:

Economic development is the preferred path to achieving security in Thailand for three reasons: a) the process of economic development is taking place, whether we encourage it or not, and if we are really concerned about the political system and security, we must observe the process and use it to its maximum positive effect; b) economic development as an element in a security situation can be used as an entree into all other elements of the situation, because it touches all other elements -- social processes, interactions with government, and so forth; and c) the economic development field is the best and most practical sphere through which the United States can influence social and political questions, because AID has a legitimate and accepted role in this sphere, whereas programs attempting to influence political processes directly would be precedent-breaking and might be regarded as unwelcome intervention.

The security of Thailand does not lie at the periphery of the country, in the Northeast; it lies at the center. In terms of the U.S. interest, the security of Thailand can be measured by the strength of the Thai to resist subversion and maintain stable, effective government. If the center is strong, productive, and powerful and can engage and stimulate the rest of the country, the internal and external enemy can work forever in the Northeast without toppling Thailand. We should take the long-term view in our pursuit of Thai security for as long as our competition with the Communists continues. This means that defeating the insurgency in the Northeast is a relatively insignificant part of the problem.

A strategy for long-range economic development for Thailand requires: a) a new set of priorities involving decisions on what would have long-range effects on the system, and b) concentration on a few key policy areas. If we do not concentrate on a few key areas, we will diffuse our leverage.

If the decision is to accept this strategy, there are three criteria to consider in choosing pivotal areas: a) the extent of the

effect on economic and political development across the society; b) the time required to achieve these effects in relation to U.S. objectives, and c) the feasibility of shifting our policies.

If the thesis is accepted that security lies at the center of Thailand and that the center will stagnate despite over-all growth if the present situation continues, we will have to shift both our priorities and those of the Thai Government. Instead of viewing security in the Northeast as an outside problem, and development in the center as the concern of the center alone, both the United States and the Thai Government must develop a new strategy.

If the thesis is accepted, the entire U.S. effort must be focused on the new strategy in order to have any impact on the Thai. AID, the MAAG chief, the Ambassador, the CIA, et al., must speak with the same voice in emphasizing that economic development is the major element in the security program.

Richard Hough, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, expanded on Lyman's views by saying:

In countries where a broad strategy of development and security was adopted that lent itself to clarification of program options and program choices, it was also possible to adopt conscious political tactics. In these countries, counterinsurgency and rural development programs were developed which have been more or less successful. In turn where a sense of strategy has been neglected or a hodge-podge of reactive programs were adopted in response to the operations of the enemy, success has been marginal or zero.

As examples of actions producing successful results, Hough cited Malaysia, Kenya (during the Mau-Mau rebellion), the Chinese Nationalist campaign in Kiangsi Province in 1934 that precipitated the Long March of the Communists, and Taiwan. The last, Taiwan, is an example of a political strategy remolding the power structures and institutional foundations in rural Taiwan. The purpose was to de-fuse rural unrest and build a long-term presence for the alien mainlander government. The Americans helped, but essentially it was a Nationalist show. The Farmers' Association system spurred development in rural areas and built up an institutional structure at the local level which served both development and political purposes.

On the negative side, the Philippines during the Magsaysay period serves as an example of reform by reactive tactics, which was fragmented and ineffective. There was no long-term framework to combat insurgency, no basic reforms at the center but a plethora of new agencies that did not touch upon the tough problems of a restrictive, traditional regime governing the country. As a result, the long-term development dimension of security was neglected. With no sense of political and economic strategy for the large area, the security-development dimensions in Central Luzon never melded into a fruitful relationship.

Relating these examples to the Thailand case, Hough suggested as positive actions: first, that some means be found to initiate a dialogue upward and downward within the authority structure in Thailand to spur program implementation. Second, if the evidence is as clear as Wilson suggests that the peasant farmer responds to economic incentives, a system of multi-purpose cooperatives on the land such as the Farmers' Association in Taiwan may serve as examples for Thailand. The multi-purpose cooperative should be investigated for the Northeast as an institutional means of getting at some of the economic problems on the farms and for providing a political transmission belt for the central government. Focusing upon the discrete village unit is economically inefficient and of marginal political benefit in terms of expanding popular support for the constituted authority.

Stephen Loftus, Jr., Assistant Director for Research, ARPA, stressed the necessity to have a coherent, long-range AID strategy. This we do not have, and as a result AID programs have been somewhat capricious. In particular:

There is a lack of sufficient detailed, reliable information on the insurgency and the insurgent environment. There is also a lack of reliable data and analysis on the impact of our programs on the village. Thus far our research has yielded little as a basis for programming.

Congressional reluctance to make long-range commitments of AID funds, periodic changes in our AID priorities and personnel, and more

gradual modifications in the Thai view of their problems, contribute to the difficulty of making long-range plans.

While the focus of U.S. programs is on the externally supported insurgency, the emphasis of many Thai is more on traditional security interests, such as border disputes with Burma and Cambodia, maintaining a "modern" military establishment, power-balancing in Bangkok, and so forth.

There is often a lack of constancy or of consensus between the two governments with regard to timing and size of resources to be devoted to the rural countryside. There is reluctance to enter into a longer term commitment to a major program to cope with insurgency. As sporadic insurgent activity breaks out in areas other than the North-east, the Thai structure may shift erratically to focus on the new areas.

In the light of these problems, there is a need for even greater effort toward integration of the diverse programs and activities of the several elements of the U.S. Mission, and a continuing reassessment of U.S. policies there.

In the discussion that followed, several ideas were put forward:

1. The inconstant priorities of the Thai Government in dealing with the insurgency are partly the consequence of the U.S. effort to instill in the Thai a sense of urgency, which sporadically appears to lead to overreactions or ill-considered policies on the part of the Thai Government. U.S. influence should aim at a more steady, sustained effort to strengthen Thai capability to deal with the insurgency with a number of low-emphasis, long-range programs.

2. The thesis that limited objectives and small scale activities on the part of the insurgents add up to a lack of sophistication on their part was questioned. Limitation of objectives may be an indication of early embryonic growth and thus consistent with a sophisticated approach.

3. A lively discussion brought out disagreements on two "diseases" which seem to be afflicting Thailand: the small-scale insurgencies that

beset Thailand on its periphery, and the vulnerability of Thai society and its populace to problems posed by rapid development, inequitable income distribution, and so forth. Are these two separate diseases, or can their symptoms be treated as one? Does one reinforce the other, or will treating one cure both? On these pivotal conference issues the participants remained uncertain and divided. While there was strong affirmation that "insurgent" insecurity and "developmental" insecurity are two separate and distinct issues, requiring different responses and strategies, there was equally clear recognition that the interaction among causes, symptoms, and cures were multifarious and complex.

4. The question of whether the Thai Government can mount an adequate attack on both problems simultaneously also remained unresolved. Although there are resources to do a great deal in the economic sphere, the United States has very limited resources that it can bring to bear in the political sphere. These resources must be used sparingly rather than being dissipated on a large number of high-cost, low-confidence measures.

5. The current research activities of the AID Mission in Thailand are designed to serve particular program needs. For example, in order to focus more sharply on the Mission's efforts in local government, a study is under way to clarify the decisionmaking process, the lines of communication, and the process of project implementation in Thai local administration. To understand better the relationship between provincial urban centers and their agricultural hinterland, a study is being made of the agricultural marketing area of Khon Kaen, an important thriving community in the Northeast that is not dependent for its prosperity on a U.S. base presence. To explore the possibilities and limitations of a Village Security Force, a survey of local security organizations is being conducted in 20 villages of the Northeast. The accomplishments of cooperative organizations, and certain aspects of labor force, agricultural implements, and fertilizer in the Northeast are also being examined. These and similar studies will continue to be pushed.

6. Finally, it is by no means obvious that the research efforts of the past have had a significant payoff. One participant in the Seminar urged that the Mission undertake or sponsor some research on research in Thailand, in order to improve its usefulness. For instance, what happens to Thai research in terms of influencing policy decisions? Who are the Thai clients, and how effectively do we communicate with them? And do we draw Thai scientific talents into the research effort energetically enough? There may be a number of simple ways in which our research efforts in Thailand could be made more relevant to Thai reality.

II. CONTRIBUTED PAPERS

SECURITY IMPACT OF ECONOMIC CHANGE  
or  
"WHY ARE THESE CATS SO RESTLESS?"

David A. Wilson

University of California at Los Angeles

The main points of this paper are that the farmers and rural people of Thailand are not isolated but rather are stimulated by wide-spread influences and are responsive to a variety of needs and opportunities to make cash income; that this situation ties them into a rudimentary national system through labor and commodity markets; and that the character of this system affects the state of security in the country. Recognition of this market system suggests a revision of the conventional view of Thailand's society as made up of two parts -- the government and the villages. If such a revision is acceptable we ought to raise some questions about USOM research and, possibly, programs.

Probably nine out of ten contacts between rural communities and the rest of the country are unofficial. This figure is merely a guess but I think there will be little dispute about the general proposition. Yet conventionally when we consider rural-urban relationships we are inclined to ignore what we can call here the private sector. I do not mean to exaggerate the problem. The power of a simple notion is, however, such that it sometimes obscures reality. The conception of Thai society as made up of two parts is such a simple but powerful notion. Armed with it we examine the relationship between government and village and find it thin, to say the least. We then conclude that there is a dangerous fracture in the society that will permit the entry of fatally subversive forces. The validity of this conclusion is questionable. I suggest we complicate the conception of society to include government, private sector and rural community as three separable components, and then proceed to question the conclusion.

CASH INCOME

There can be little doubt that the society of Thailand is a web of links and connections that comprehends virtually all segments of the population. People's efforts to acquire cash income seem to me a good general area for study of these connections. We know that the economy of rural Thailand is monetized, but only partly. [See 7, 3]\* We know that the need for cash income interacts dynamically with a pattern of subsistence although we have not defined the character of the equations or the value of the parameters. We know, of course, that in order to gain cash income a person must take part in a national system of institutions and thus be more or less linked to the national society.

There is also evidence that in some places the subsistence element of the rural economy is changing. [3] The bedrock of subsistence is rice. On the basis of productivity data as well as scattered observations it is clear that pressure on rice land is increasing. Long [6] is merely one of those who observe that rice cultivation in Northeast Thailand is, on the whole, less than optimal for the situation. Chapman [1] notes that much of the north is barely subsistent or deficit in rice production. Judd says the same. I think we may conclude that this pressure on rice land indicates a rapid increase in the monetary element of the economy and an increase in the need for sources of cash income on the part of rural population.

At the same time, the whole economy is rapidly changing and opportunities for making cash income are being transformed. For example, in the North, forests have declined as a source of income as timber cutting has fallen off and demand for sticklac has disappeared. At the same time, construction has increased demand for labor on roads, in towns, and in quarries. New industries, for example, mining, and new opportunities for cash crops, such as tobacco, have appeared. These transformations, when linked to market opportunities, give us

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\* The Numbers in brackets are keyed to the References on p. 23.

a picture of widespread flow of people and goods around the country in response to an increasing need for cash income.

Our problem is to develop a picture of these flows in order to provide the matrix into which to put our attitude information (USOM/RD). [9] In developing the picture we should attend particularly to block-ages or barriers that frustrate expectations and divert motivation (Kirsch). [5] Somewhere in that complex is the link of development and security.

### SECURITY

Security seems to me to be a matter of lower rather than higher risk of loss in life's course; higher rather than lower predictability of the outcome of life's situations. Therefore, security is a function of the chances one faces of being killed or injured, imprisoned, plundered or otherwise impoverished by cheats, crooks or other delinquents and grafters; a function both of the regularity and magnitude of those chances. A secure society is one in which the chance of accidental damage is low. Social and governmental activities such as defense, protection, monetary policy, weights and measures, public health and sanitation, flood control, road building, and maintenance of power and water all contribute to security. Thus, security is related to capacities to govern (Heymann, et al.; Wilson). [2,10]

The most dramatic threats to security are violent ones. Violence plays an important part in the life of Thailand. Robbery and banditry are ways of making a living and they are sufficiently widespread to make them a common source of fear throughout the country. In the common view they are usually correlated with either poor economic conditions or with the "dry season", that is, periods of hardship and unemployment. Thailand also has its share of organized crime in the usual forms of smuggling, narcotics and vice. The maintenance of these enterprises results in violence -- unknown in amount.

Force and violence are also part of the technique of increasing security. The state, through police and other agencies, utilizes force to decrease the risk of accidental damage to people. We do not know

much about how the government uses force differently in relation to different classes of people but we can assume it as a pattern. At the same time private force and violence are considerable in Thailand. Crime statistics are not available nor, if they were, would I make much of them. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that violence plays a role as a form of private security effort as well as private enforcement of rules. Murder in parts of Thailand is at least twice as common as it is in the United States.

"Insurgency" is a special situation in which violence becomes fused with political organization and aims to influence or replace the existing government. In Thailand the insurrection that is concerning people is planned and encadred from outside the country although the personnel are not foreign. The insurrection presumably hopes to gain a stable foothold from which its political organization can play a significant role in national politics. We do not seem to know very much about the strategy of the Thailand Liberation Movement, although what documentary evidence I have seen over the past three years indicates a strategy of a national-front appeal to all classes to liberate the nation of American imperialism and its lackies.

The rural insurrection of the Phu Phan mountains may be designed as a show of strength to bring about panic, demoralization, and dissension among Thai leaders. It may, on the other hand, be aimed at mobilizing a peasant army to conquer the country. In the middle some notion of developing bargaining counters in a complex political drama may be the strategic conception. My own guess would be that the strategy is experimental and pragmatic with any of the above options still open.

Tactically, the insurrection seems to be little more than bandit terrorism. Physically, the armed bands are small and isolated; they are cut off from any regular supplies and forced to operate in what is probably a food deficit area. They engage in a certain amount of terrorism and more or less forced propaganda meetings in villages. They have recruited a number of youths for training (some of whom quickly defect upon return to Thailand). The biggest unknown is the

iceberg effect. What is beneath the level of observation is anyone's guess -- and everyone does.

This insurrection is a genuine problem. Even though it is small, isolated, and not very effective, it cannot be neglected. (Nor is it being neglected.) It presents certain tactical difficulties. One difficulty is to conduct police work designed to reduce the chances of successful terrorist attacks on the population while, at the same time, seeking out and destroying the existing armed bands. Such straightforward tactical objectives are not easy to attain, but I cannot believe they are not attainable and at reasonable cost. A difficult complication of the tactical problem lies in the need to avoid solutions that might stimulate rather than suppress the progress of the insurrection. The promotion of panic, demoralization, and particularly dissension within the Thai government are not unreasonable objectives for the insurgency.

#### EMPLOYMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

In the literature of research on Thailand, one is struck by the lack of attention to the notion of employment. This lack is characteristic, it seems to me, of general academic literature as well as security-oriented research. Yet employment should be a useful analytical link between the idea of development (particularly economic development) and security (particularly, but not only, rural insurrection).

I am not using employment in any technical sense. Rather, I use the term as a general notion to include the more or less effective use of labor, alternative labor opportunities, and alternative career patterns and opportunities. My interest is closely linked to the increasing monetization of Thailand's economy and the manifest response to opportunities for increasing cash income.

Development is presumably something quite different from security. Development is the growth or increase of something -- resources, income, capacity, opportunity, merit. This growth or increase is quite likely to involve changes in the relationships of people to each other, as well as changes in their conceptions of living, both in terms of their

values or objectives and of the ideas about the appropriate means to attain them. Such changes as they occur will probably affect security in the previously discussed sense and, more importantly, may affect the security of different classes of people in different ways. By that I mean that developmental changes will increase the amount of "accidental" damage happening to some people because other people are doing novel things. At the same time, people employed in new fields may also have less security, that is, more risk, as a condition of increased income or opportunity. Incidentally, in Thailand, no less so than in the United States, developmental change can be destructive to the income and opportunities for some groups.

Very little hard information is available on unemployment in Thailand. One's impression is that there is a substantial amount of unemployment of one kind or another. Casual observation indicates that in spite of substantial increases in economic activity, wage rates have remained quite stable and strikes have been rare and, for the most part, very special cases.

We can assume that in the Thai economy all the various kinds of unemployment exist, that is, underemployment or disguised unemployment, plain unemployment, and the unemployment or underemployment of skills and ambitions. This last category is perhaps the most difficult to analyze but may be the most important in security terms. The unemployment of skills and ambitions may be divided into three sub-categories:

1. Technological unemployment;
2. Educational underemployment; and
3. Structural frustration of ambition.

In an economy as technologically primitive as Thailand's, it is difficult to imagine that technological unemployment would constitute much of a problem. Nevertheless, for some groups of people this may indeed be the case. For example, certain so-called hill peoples of the North have traditionally earned needed cash by a "carrying" trade. These people are losing their work because of roads being built into areas where previously they provided carrier service by foot, pony, or

elephant. For various cultural and legal, as well as technical, reasons these people cannot cope with the problem and now find themselves hard pressed. The problem is marginal, but the security problem begins at the margin.

The second kind of special unemployment problem is educational unemployment. The basic question is whether or not educational investment pays off at all levels. It appears almost certain that such investment pays off at university level, that is to say, university graduates have little difficulty finding work commensurate with their expectations in terms of income and status. Also those who go to school for four years (or less) are probably not frustrated in the expectations developed in school. But a substantial number of people (perhaps 30,000 to 40,000 per year) discontinue their schooling, voluntarily or involuntarily, in upper secondary school. By educational standards, these people could be considered underemployed. On the other hand, they may be the happiest people in the country because the economic systems seems to absorb a large number of skilled and clerical workers created through industry training. In any case, very little seems to be available on the employment opportunities or career patterns of such people.

Finally, within the educated elite there is some problem of what I call underemployment of ambition. This is a psychological problem rather than an economic one and, therefore, even in principle not susceptible to precise measurement. Nevertheless, all unemployment has a psychological dimension so that this difficulty is a matter of degree. The Thai political economy depends to a large extent on conservatism and "corruption" for its cohesion. The system's incentives, therefore, tend to be indifferent to training and skill, which are employed at substantially less than optimum. The degree to which this situation creates a sense of underemployment, frustration and indifference or antagonism to the system is difficult to judge. Nevertheless, such states of mind are created and constitute, at least psychologically, an unemployment problem.

We are aware of the insistent demand for cash income among the rural population of Thailand. We are also aware, although in a less clear way, of the widespread ambition for careers different from that of a mainly subsistence rice farmer. We have a good deal of impressionistic information about migrations -- either temporary or permanent -- in search of work. We know, for example, that many workers everywhere in Thailand come from other parts of the country. Notably, we know that some large proportion of the labor force of Bangkok comes from the Northeast. But it is my impression that very little has been done to investigate the patterns of these migrations. Particularly, we have paid very little attention to the rural person off the farm, working or looking for work in a town or Bangkok.

The unemployed person is a potential security risk. I think we must consider that insurrection is an employment opportunity and perhaps a career opportunity. This kind of activity can be analyzed in comparison with alternative employment and career opportunities. Such an analysis, however primitive, will throw some light on incentives for insurrection. We already have some information [4, 5, 8] on conceptions and attitudes toward careers among rural Thai. Some information on defectors from the Communists reflects the attitudes and conceptions of the recruits toward insurgency as a career. Such attitude information if fitted into a matrix of information about alternative employment should indicate problem areas and fruitful directions for development programs designed to increase security.

But in investigating this situation we must take account of the widespread web of connections and the ramifications of changes within it. Commodity market structure and conditions as well as employment opportunities link the security of the Northeast intimately with the rest of the country.

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SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THAILAND'S RURAL AREAS\*

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INTRODUCTION

In attempting to discuss the theme of this seminar in reference to rural Thailand I am faced with having to define "development," "security," and "Thai peasantry." In its root meaning "development" implies the introduction and adoption of changes that result in some permanent improvement in the lives of people living in a particular society. This would seemingly not take us very far, but to offer a more refined definition would probably meet with little agreement. Some people would argue that improvement can only occur in the technological or economic sectors while others would argue, just as vehemently, that development must result in improvements in the basic fabric of a society. In this paper, I shall adopt a heuristic approach and offer what I believe to be the conception of improvement held by Thai peasants. For them improvement means increased opportunity to obtain more material comforts, to obtain higher statuses, and to obtain greater freedom from "suffering" (illness, short life, insufficient food, and so forth).

"Security" implies that the social rules or principles, which every person learns explicitly and implicitly and which enable him to predict, within limits, events that take place within a society, are not threatened, disrupted, or destroyed by an outside source or questioned or rejected by members of the society. External threats to security can be met only by removal of those threats and the re-establishing of the status quo. Internal challenges to security must be met either by convincing the challengers of the value of the social rules being questioned or by offering them new rules to replace those being questioned.

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\*In this paper the author puts forth ideas as stimuli for discussion rather than as a well-documented set of conclusions. Numbers in brackets are keyed to the references on pp. 35-36.

The peasantry of Thailand consists of those rural people of the kingdom whose local social systems are articulated economically, culturally, and politically with the national system. Most of the peasantry of Thailand are speakers of some language belonging to the Thai family, but there are also non-Thai speaking people who must be counted as part of the Thai peasantry (such groups as the Thai-Malay who live in the far southern provinces of the kingdom, the Thai-Khmer who live in the southern part of the Northeast and in the eastern part of the Central Region, and a smattering of Vietnamese, Mon, Burmese, and Chinese rural communities found in various parts of the country). In addition, some members of the groups usually termed "hill tribes" belong to a category which might be termed "emerging peasants." For purposes of this paper, I shall not consider that any people belong in this latter group.\* It must be noted that there is no single model of local social structure which is applicable to all Thai-speaking peasants, much less to all peasants in Thailand. Given this diversity, I could not presume to identify and to treat adequately all of the data on Thai peasants relevant to the topic of this paper. My comments are most applicable to the areas of rural Thailand I know best -- namely, the central part of northeastern Thailand and, to a lesser extent, the Mae Sariang area of northwestern Thailand.

#### TYPES OF INSECURITY AMONG THAI PEASANTS

##### Terrorism

One of the most talked about causes of insecurity and, if one is to believe the newspapers, by far the most prevalent is terrorism. Certainly, fear of and actual experience with terrorist attacks threatens many of the predictable features of rural society. Responses to this type of security threat by the Thai government (with or without United States encouragement) in terms of some development project would be as absurd as they would be futile. What terrorized villagers want

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\* For a recent treatment of the "tribal peoples" in reference to the question of national security, see Reference [3].

is protection from terrorist attacks, not a new well or a new cash crop.

However, although development projects are not an answer to insecurities bred by terrorism, methods used to combat terrorism might be instituted in areas where terrorist activity is present. If the peasantry in such an area is treated as "sympathizers" unless proved otherwise, they are likely to feel alienated even if terrorist activity is successfully suppressed. On the other hand, if those charged with combating terrorism (the district authorities, the police, or the military) convey the impression that they are working to improve the security not only of remote Bangkok or of an abstraction called Thailand but also of the peasants themselves, then they may stimulate in the peasantry a greater willingness to accept development programs.

#### Dissatisfactions with the National Government

Some Thai peasants also experience a sense of insecurity in consequence of the impingements of the national system upon the rural social system. In the first place, if two or more national systems are competing for the loyalties of the peasantry, the consequent uncertainty about which national symbols to choose may lead to insecurities among the peasantry affected. Secondly, the peasantry may feel insecure if demands from the national government threaten, or seem to threaten, local sociocultural patterns.

For the vast majority of the Thai peasantry, the Thai monarchy and the Buddhist order provide such powerful symbols as to almost completely preclude the acceptance of any alternative symbols. [6, 7] Even the Thailand Liberation Movement (alternatively called the Thailand Independence Movement or the Thailand Patriotic Front) has not openly and directly attacked these symbols. In fact, it would be unprofitable for them to do so. Insofar as ultimate loyalty of the Thai peasantry to the existing national system is not in question, problems of insecurity in Thailand can never be comparable to those of Vietnam. To introduce development programs based on the premise that the ultimate loyalties of the majority of Thai peasants must be assured would be misguided at best.

I should note, however, that there are some minority sectors of the Thai peasantry that could possibly be attracted to national symbols other than those provided by the Thai nation. The Thai-Malay and perhaps the Thai-Khmer may be more attracted by the national symbols of Malaysia and Cambodia than by those of Thailand. However, I do not have enough information to speak to this point. In the case of the Thai-Lao (northeastern Thai) there need be no fear in this regard for they definitely see themselves as Thai citizens and not as potential Lao citizens. [6, 7, 15] It is possible that the small number of Shans in Thailand (located primarily in Mae Hong Son Province) may be attracted by the goals of the Shan Independence Movement.\* Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there are the Vietnamese refugees in northeastern Thailand, many of whom continue to be attached much more to Ho Chi Minh than to any Thai national symbol. If it is basic loyalty to the Thai nation that the government is concerned about, it should direct its attention to these groups, not to those whose loyalty is already assured. Some efforts are apparently being made to make the Thai nation more meaningful for the Thai-Malays. In contrast, what I have seen and read about the Vietnamese in northeastern Thailand suggests that the Thai government is making no effort whatsoever to bring about the acceptance of Thai national symbols by the Vietnamese.

Even when ultimate loyalty to the existing Thai national system is not in question, Thai peasants may still feel that there are frictions between themselves and government officials which threaten their security. These frictions may be sufficiently irritating to some peasants to cause them to seek radical means of alleviating them. The two most widely reported causes of frictions between Thai peasants and government officials stem from misuse (in the minds of the peasants) of power by officials, especially the police, and from what we as Westerners usually term "corruption." The peasantry resents the police for their interference with such local practices as slaughtering, liquor

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\* However, interviews that I have had with Shans in Mae Hong Son Province suggest, on the contrary, that Shans living in Thailand identify as Thai citizens.

manufacture, and gambling. On the other hand, they often feel that the police do not protect them against rustling, theft, or even murder. [10, 11] Similarly, peasants also resent the demands for "tea money" (bribes) which many officials make before issuing land deeds, arms or vehicle registrations, permits for opening new land, and so on, and they resent the fact that a substantial sum of money can convince an official to overlook the illegal cutting of a tree, the use, for agricultural purposes, of government land, or even the beclouded circumstances surrounding the death of an individual.\* As Westerners we must beware of concluding that the resentments felt by Thai peasants toward government officials in consequence of malpractice by some officials lead directly to generalized anti-government sentiments. On the contrary, I would suspect that most Thai peasants accept these phenomena as being part of the way the system works. Nonetheless, interviews with some defectors from the "forest army" [1, 2, 16] indicate that a few men have been attracted to the Communist movement because of the belief that if the movement is successful they will be able to strike back at disliked government officials.

Any government program that leads to better relations between officials and peasants can answer the type of insecurity discussed here. Such development programs as Communist Development, Developing Democracy Program, Mobile Development Units, Mobile Information Teams, Accelerated Rural Development, as well as more general efforts to decrease corruption and official malpractice, include as part of their purpose, if not as their main aim, the improving of relations between officials and peasants. Insofar as these programs demonstrate to the peasantry that the government is genuinely interested in bettering the standard of living in the countryside, as they bring peasants into contact with empathic officials, as they provide channels whereby peasants can bypass officials whom they do not trust and/or like, then

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\* The best documentation that I have seen on actual incidents of misuse of power and corruption by government officials and peasant attitudes toward these incidents can be found in a set of reports, prepared under the direction of Dr. Toshio Yatsushiro of the Research Division of USOM/Thailand. (See References 15 through 18.)

these programs can be said to be successful. However, these programs can also add to the frictions between peasants and officials if the officials concerned display (either explicitly or implicitly) a strong dislike for the peasantry, perpetuate the characteristics of corruption and misuse of power, or lack insufficient status to be of any use to villagers in coping with the traditional bureaucracy.\*

One other type of "program" that I believe would help improve relations between officials and peasants is elections. To paraphrase the sentiments expressed to me by a mayor of a northeastern town: if the elected official makes no efforts to respond to the needs and desires of the peasantry, he will reduce his prospects for re-election. I feel that the initial steps that the government has taken toward reinstituting elections in Thailand are certainly to be applauded.

#### Dissatisfactions with Peasant Life

The final type of insecurity among Thai peasants that I wish to discuss is that which arises from dissatisfaction of some peasants with aspects of the social system found in the rural environment. Two groups of peasants stand out in this regard: (1) those whose land holdings (particularly paddy holdings) are insufficient to provide the basic food necessities of the family groups who farm them, and (2) young men between the ages of 20 and 35 who find village life stifling to their ambitions for more material benefits or for higher social statuses.

Because of traditional patterns of land inheritance and more recent patterns of land transfers through cash sales, nearly every peasant village in Thailand has at least a few families who are too land-poor to produce enough rice for their own needs. Traditionally, such families had to choose between two alternative solutions to their plight: (1) migration to other parts of the country where they could homestead virgin land, or (2) dependence upon relatives who produced

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\* For an evaluation of the positive and negative effects of some of the programs directed toward the Northeast area see References 4, 5, and 13.

surplus foodstuffs. More recently, a new alternative has been opened -- namely, work, either as farm laborers or in urban settings, from which sufficient cash income could be obtained to buy the basic necessities. The first solution has been, and continues to be, the most preferred one. For example, in the village of Ban Nong Tuen in Changwat Mahasarakham where I carried out field work, 75 family groups had migrated away between 1935 and 1963 to areas of Udorn and Kalasin provinces, where homesteading is still possible.\* However, population expansion in the rural countryside will soon greatly reduce the possibilities for such homesteading.

There is some evidence to indicate that a few members of the Communist movement in Thailand have joined because they felt that membership in the movement might help to alleviate their poverty. [1, 16] The types of programs that the government might institute to reduce this problem include opening of new areas of land where rice can be grown (through irrigation projects, and so forth), encouragement of birth control among peasants, and, most importantly, expanding the industrial/commercial sector of the economy so that more wage labor jobs are open to the peasantry.

In quite disparate areas of Thailand, I have witnessed a restlessness among young people, particularly young men, who are attracted to different ways of life than that offered to them in the villages. For many such young men, the urban environment -- that is, Bangkok and in some cases Chiang Mai or Vientiane, Laos -- affords them an opportunity to find work in a non-village environment.\*\* Significantly, however, the evidence that I gathered [6] and have seen in other reports, [8, 14] suggests that northeastern villagers, at least, do not usually become permanent members of the urban labor force. Rather, rural society when compared with urban society seems to these young men to provide a more stable and satisfying environment in which to carry out most of their life goals.

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\* For similar reports on migration of this sort see References 9 and 13.

\*\* In the northeastern village of Ban Nong Tuen where I worked, 72

From some of the reports of interviews with Communist defectors, [12, 16] I have obtained the impression that the Communists have played upon the feelings of restlessness among the peasant youth in their recruitment of new members. The Communist movement must appear to some young peasants as providing a deus ex machina whereby they can immediately and unexpectedly obtain a higher, non-rural status. Moreover, the promises of being able to carry arms and to "study abroad" (that is, in Vietnam) must appeal to some of the young men in rural villages. However, as the number of defectors bears witness, a relatively large number of the recruits have been disillusioned by the disparity between the promises, and even the real advantages, of the movement and the hardships of living in the forest. Like the temporary migrants to the city, these defectors have concluded that the peasant way of life is not so bad when compared with the uncertainties of membership in the "forest army."

The preference for village life by the ex-migrant or defector should not be misconstrued to mean that these men no longer find anything wrong with peasant life. Many still do, but they have found the insecurities of the alternative way of life to be greater than those of peasant life. It is possible that if the Communist movement obtained a firmer foothold in Thailand, it might offer a more attractive and "secure" future for the restless young men of the rural areas. It is also possible that alternatives to peasant life can be developed within the existing system which are more attractive for the peasants than the present choice of unskilled labor in the main urban environments.

What type of development projects can be introduced to alleviate the feelings of restlessness among young peasants? To date the answer has been to make rural society a better environment. To some extent rural development may reduce the dissatisfactions of young people with rural life, but in the long run, such development is only a holding operation. Dissatisfaction with rural life can best be met by offering the dissatisfied villagers an alternative way of life which they see as

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percent of the young men between the ages of 20 and 39, or 50 percent of all men over the age of 20, had worked in Bangkok and/or Vientiane.

an improvement over their present one. Long-range development should be predicated on the assumption that large numbers of peasants must be fitted into the non-rural sector of society. However, I do not believe that it is necessary to think in terms of providing more jobs for ex-peasants in Bangkok. On the contrary, both the overcentralized character of Thai society and the difficulties rural migrants find in living in Bangkok suggest that development planning in Thailand should emphasize the creation or expansion of commercial/industrial centers outside of Bangkok. Existing facilities in such fields as kenaf production in the Northeast, tobacco production in the North, and rubber production in the South might provide examples for this kind of development.

#### CONCLUSION

Grievances, dissatisfactions, and unfulfilled desires of the peasantry in Thailand do not constitute, I believe, the basis upon which can be built a mass-supported revolutionary movement dedicated to the overthrow of the present Thai political system. For the most part, the peasantry is committed to working toward improvement, if possible, within the existing system. Why? For one thing, the peasantry, with the exceptions noted above, see themselves as belonging to a national social system whose ultimate referents are the King and the Thai Buddhist Order. For another, most peasants desiring to make a jump from their present status to a higher one see their best chances in working through the existing channels of social mobility -- education, the clergy, employment outside the village, and so on. Finally, most peasants, accustomed as they are to changes coming from above, feel that their best opportunity for improving their standard of living in the rural environment can be accomplished by participating in the various development projects offered by the government.

These generalizations are not meant to define away the existence in parts of Thailand of a revolutionary movement (or, perhaps, movements) employing terrorist tactics. Its existence requires two types of responses from the Thai government: (1) countering (and, ultimately, eliminating) the threat that those in the movement can and do make to villages in certain areas, and (2) preventing people from joining the

movement. The first response, as I have suggested, should involve offering villagers better protection. The second response should be structured in terms of programs that bring about improved relations between peasants and officials, that demonstrate the government's interest in bettering the peasants' standard of living, and that offer some villagers the opportunity of assuming permanent roles in the non-rural sector of the society. Even if the government succeeds in all of these endeavors, I would not be surprised if a well-financed revolutionary movement continued to attract young peasant men who would like to use guns as a way of proving their manhood or who would like to make a "trip abroad," even if it be to Hoa Binh. Nonetheless, I cannot foresee that a revolutionary movement that draws most of its personnel from the Thai peasantry will ever be more than an irritant, rather than a major threat, to the Thai nation.

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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY: DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE

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INTRODUCTION

The set of speeches and documents that make up the doctrine of U.S. response to security situations has come to put great stress on the "non-military" aspects of the problem. The emphasis on the "other war," the "battle for the hearts and minds of the people," and so on, has become deeply enshrined. It has come to be stressed almost as an embarrassing contrast to the difficulties we have experienced in this area.

The doctrine that has developed in this regard, eschewing the more single-minded approach to economic development embodied in conventional aid programs -- just as it has eschewed conventional military defense objectives of military aid programs -- seeks to focus on the broad spectrum of factors that create and strengthen political loyalties and political and social organization -- that complex of factors now usually referred to as political development. Economic development becomes one of the important parts of this scheme, particularly important in security doctrine because it provides the long-term promise of higher standards of living that many of our programs are designed to demonstrate as an important incentive.

But, despite the growing breadth of doctrine and the extensive action effort, the results are disconcerting. Programs in this area continue to be designated by critics and supporters alike as the weakest link in our security efforts in such countries as Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. The military and police programs seem to respond, at least in terms of outward efficiency, to the injection of new concepts, men and material. But with relatively sizable inputs of resources and talent in the other areas -- even with an impressive record of physical accomplishments -- the sinews of political loyalties and organization, the viability of communities, in the target areas still seem elusive. In some cases, they appear to erode under insurgent pressure even as the programs are being applied. And where gains

have been made, the cost, scope, and extent of U.S. involvement have risen steadily over earlier expectations. The ounce of prevention becomes pounds and pounds of treatment.

Our response to these problems has been to broaden the scope and increase the tempo of our operations -- to do more of the same earlier and faster. But the problem lies in the doctrine that has been developed. Its breadth and comprehension are in fact deceptive, and its direction misleading. The programs remain largely stereotyped responses to what have now become familiar "root causes." The benefits of experience and new research are apparently absorbed into the doctrine but only to emerge as variation in tactics; never, unfortunately, in a re-evaluation of strategy.

#### THE LIMITATIONS OF THE PRESENT DOCTRINE

The current doctrine is circumscribed and limited by three basic elements of our thinking and analysis.

##### Preoccupation with Symptoms

With the focus of attention on the security problem, almost all our analyses and subsequent programs focus on the symptoms of disorder: on the actions and the potential of the insurgents, on the grievances they exploit, on the tactics they use. As one observer has noted, we have no theory of counterinsurgency, only theories of insurgency to which we direct pinpointed responses.

One result is that we neglect the total country. We focus on its weaknesses, but bypass its assets -- which can be entirely different from the weaknesses exploited by the insurgents, indeed they most likely are. We focus on the troubled areas of the country and look only in passing at its strong areas. This may be the weakest possible response. We never really consider instead exploiting the country's assets as a major counterforce. And we do not consider shoring up the core areas of strength as a first priority, not only as a sounder means of protection but in addition as providing the real base for solution of the problems in the weaker areas.

By concentrating on the symptoms, moreover, we are faced with a score of desired end results. We do not focus on the source of those results, that is, where the country's real capabilities lie, and what, therefore, may be its best first step. We set out instead to create an image in the troubled areas of a country that has already solved those basic questions, and has now proceeded to carry out the desirable functions of a modern state. All our conclusions about basic changes in the existing structure derive from this perspective.

### The "Candy Bar" Theory of Counterinsurgency

The focus on symptoms would not be damaging if it led us gradually into an examination of the root problems of state organization, policy and purpose, but our fundamental approach to the problems of security reflects an illusion. We continue to believe that the immediate problem of disaffection, in fact the whole element of political loyalty, can be turned around by the appropriate gesture, by a moment, by a gift so persuasive in its communicative effect that it breaks through the barriers of discontent and alienation. I refer to this as the "candy bar theory" of counterinsurgency, for it reflects a memory indelibly etched on the American mind. We have the vision before us of allied troops liberating Italy and France in 1944, the vision of, at least in one case, a former enemy people streaming into the streets with joyous welcome, garlanding the new forces, and -- symbolizing it all -- the worshipping of the G.I. whose purity of motive and idealism in nature was conveyed by his generous distribution of his ration of chocolate bars and cigarettes to a hungry and grateful populace.

The political, historical and cultural links of the United States with a country like Italy are of course totally missing outside of Europe (and it is worth noting that Allied Forces were bringing entirely new governments in their wake, not shoring up the old ones). But in our encounter with security situations elsewhere, we have sought essentially the same experience and been convinced that with just the right approach -- the right mix of attitude and generosity -- we could turn the same tide. We have gone some ways from simple candy bars, though

Eugene Burdick's Ugly American -- which did so much to perpetuate, or perhaps revive, the myth -- was not far removed. Our subsequent programs bear the same elements. We have looked to bigger and better candy bars: free medical aid, schools, temples, tons of free fertilizer, and even whole new villages. We are not concerned very much with the intrinsic value of the gift. Nor with the basic soundness of the government it represents. We are instead determined to find that right combination, that dramatic gesture that will communicate all in a moment our (and the host government's) good intentions and at which point, the dam will break: the villagers will stream on to the road in grateful welcome, the government representatives will be able to file in quietly and confidently behind to carry on their more mundane if essential tasks. But above all the main security task will be over. It will be a happy movement. Crowds cheering, banners waving; it will be victory. It will be Italy. It will be 1944 -- all over again.

The analogy may seem, indeed is, overdrawn. But the contemporary embodiment of the candy bar theory is the civic action theory of counterinsurgency. Civic action, as it was originally intended, is a very important element in military counterinsurgent operations. It helps offset the unfavorable effects of destructive military action and, in some cases, a whole history of unpopular military actions. It is one element, moreover, in conveying the Government's overall image to the population. But it is not a good overall theory for counterinsurgency.

There is a fundamental difference between the insurgents and the Government. The rebels can, as a clandestine, hunted and furtive group, make an impression -- as can the military whose main mission is something else -- by taking time out to do good works. The rebels are saying in effect, "These are the types of things we would do on a full time basis if we were in power." The Government is in power -- and in some cases has been there a long time. Engaging in hit-and-run good works does not have the same meaning. It may well have the opposite. The Government has to convey a different image, on different grounds.

But the civic action concepts dominate our counterinsurgency doctrine and the programs that flow from it. They have spread over the whole spectrum of Government actions that we support. They became basically candy bar offerings. We are concerned, as a first priority, with the impact on the citizen, and convinced that this is done by a dramatic "People to People" confrontation symbolized by a tangible object of accomplishment. The record of our experience is that this impact is not easily achieved. And the economies of scale suggest that we are embarking on an "impact" effort of such proportions as to involve us in a vast and long-range effort with only this first step in the process of development as an objective. But we are not concerned with the economies of scale. Nor with the failures to date. Because we are convinced that at some early phase there can be a dramatic turning point after which the substance, timing, and scope of the programs themselves become of less importance. Once the breakthrough is achieved, the cumbersome tasks of political and economic organization and development will have far less urgency. They can be done in due time, through more conventional methods. The security objective will, however, have been achieved. And as in Europe, the troops -- political, psychological, and economic -- can largely go home.

#### Failure of the Development Programs to Relate to Security Problems

One reason that security problems have so much stressed the immediate is that those concerned with overall and more fundamental development -- "long-range" programs as they are usually, if misleadingly, distinguished -- have failed to relate these to the direct interests of those concerned with security. Economic development programs, for example, are normally couched in terms of overall economic policies, GNP, savings rates, capital-output ratios, investment gaps and occasionally income (though rarely income distribution). They are rarely related to attitudes and responses, to group dynamics or political repercussions. If one is asked about these effects, the answers are likely to be so vague and idealized as to be mistrusted.

The response of the security-oriented policymaker is likely at best to be, "fine, go ahead. But don't let it interfere with the need

for an immediate impact program on the little farmers." Or more likely it is shoved entirely into the background. With regard to Thailand, a more development-oriented program of U.S. aid strategy was drafted in 1963 and scrapped in Washington because it appeared to bear no relationship to the problems then most concerning policymakers.

As a result of this failure in communications, development theory and security doctrine have drifted far apart. Security programs have become focused on the end results of development. For that reason economic development per se receives high marks in the doctrine. But development strategy is almost totally left out of the doctrine -- for development strategy focuses on different priority targets of action and uses a totally different basis of analysis. It is not only a gap in theory. They are focused on two entirely different ends of the spectrum in many cases. And one is pursued at the expense of the other.

#### LIMITATIONS IN PROGRAMMING

The doctrine is quite important because, if narrow, it produces certain emphases and preconceptions in our programming that are detrimental to a broader and more intelligent view of the processes with which we are dealing. It closes off to us, moreover, more flexible and original means of combatting subversive movements.

Four products of the present doctrine stand out particularly in our programs:

1. Material Emphasis as a Substitute for Policy Change. We continue, despite earnest denials, to emphasize immediate material benefits as the key means to developing political loyalties. The impact programs are designed of course to produce a change in attitude on both the Government and popular side. But the impact itself is tied to evidences of physical accomplishment, and these soon assume principal importance. They do so because they become easier to quantify and measure than changes in attitude. They do so because we feel that material strength is the way to give the Government most quickly the capability to respond to "felt needs," and thus the measure of the Government's responses becomes the volume of physical accomplishments. They do so finally

because we feel that a steady stream of new material benefits provides the best means for the dramatic breakthrough that we are seeking. No wonder that the call for more flexible AID procedures to permit more rapid supply of materials to impact programs ranks as one of the high priority desires of security programmers.

But a man's loyalty to his government is a much more complicated phenomenon. If he is in opposition, he has come to it through a whole complex of processes and decisions which go beyond his material surroundings. If he is uncertain about his government, it is because his total orientation has not been accommodated to, or has been alienated from, the government. And this total orientation stretches out over more than the needs of the present. The normal citizen is concerned even when he does not articulate it, about the long-range expectations from his government and from his surroundings generally.

In economic -- and social -- terms the villager in a low income country wants some assurance that things are moving in the right direction for him, even better for his son, and so on. Short-term windfalls are nice, but they come and go. No one is really loyal to a government for very long because of them. Without a longer term orientation, he could do with or without the government. The total institution has to represent something steady and forward moving to him, much more than just a dramatic showing. Building this element takes time, but not as much time as we think. On the other hand, model villages, free hand-outs, temporary largesse, carry none of this element. They smack of just the opposite -- here today, gone tomorrow. Yet with all our recognition of the limitations on this approach, these became the heart of our program.

2. The Romance of the Rice Roots. All our doctrinal emphasis concentrates on the village level of activities as the heart of our social-economic programs. This is where the insurgent operates; this is where the people-to-people contact is made. We are concerned therefore in fulfilling -- or showing the government's willingness to fulfill -- the people's "felt needs," and thereby to build loyalties from village to government.

This emphasis on satisfying local needs has led to many locally oriented programs which are in their totality diffused and aimless. There are schools here, roads there, pig farms here, temples there. But no one can say in Laos, where this went on for years, and in Thailand, where it is increasingly emphasized, that there is more community direction, more hope, and better national integration overall. And I would hazard a guess that over time the villager feels the same sense of emptiness about it all. Moreover, no one seems to be concerned with how these needs will be filled when the United States stops supplying the cement, tin roofs, and even the skilled labor, or whether indeed that responsibility would not be a damaging and costly one for the recipient government to have to assume. It is the aimlessness of these programs and their lack of relationship to any permanent development program of economic soundness that leads the United States into greater and greater responsibility for funding these programs and on an ever broadening scale.

The problem here is that local initiative may be good to encourage over the long run, but local leaders may be unable to define requirements which in fact fill their long-range needs. They may want a school and a temple, but over time they want many things that are really part of a more permanent increase in resources and in the ability to use them. Following determined, intelligent central government policies, rather than local desires, may prove more effective in achieving these ends. Some of these may be in the form of more permissive rather than more demanding policies, such as agricultural pricing. In the "short run," some of these policies may well not be popular; in the "long run," however, they may build far more loyalty.

3. Distortion of Priorities: The Sense of Panic. Forcing all our program efforts into a narrow security framework tends to create a new atmosphere and a new sense of priorities for the government. One effect is to create an undue sense of panic that is counter-productive: the confidence of the government is shaken instead of bolstered. It becomes defensive, and authoritarian elements rise to the fore in this atmosphere. The crisis justifies their more autocratic

controls, and the increase in policy activity gives them more power. These are the elements, moreover, often more willing and able to act fast in any area. Meanwhile, confidence in less authoritarian control and the benefits of more conventional government programming is weakened. Propaganda emphasis on the need for a more democratic image does not in any way offset the impetus in this direction of stepped-up intelligence activities and policy programs. We never hold back on policy support because the more combat-oriented aspects of the policy operation have run ahead of democratic reform, and this sense of priority is quickly communicated to the government.

Equally damaging is that the sense of panic is communicated to the population. There is a psychological link between the government and a people in which the former's authority, liked or not, is usually taken for granted. This sense of legitimacy is one of the government's most important assets. But it is soon called into question when the government itself acts as if it were "running scared." Mobile teams suddenly appearing in the countryside and warning of the danger, while promising all sorts of new government concern, a sudden spurt of unrelated and isolated projects designed to please -- all these convey the sense of a government in trouble. And the population reacts to a government as to a politician who is "running scared:" with less respect, perhaps a decision to exploit the situation, and with greater attention to the opponent.

The insurgents certainly take on a new aspect. They become more than the latest in a long history of populist bandits. At the least, they are the source of all this sudden government attention and thus worthy of some note. But more, by the government's own declaration, these are the forerunners and representatives of a great outside force. If Bangkok is trembling, the wise peasant had better play his cards at least pretty carefully. In this atmosphere, the question of legitimacy is thrown open, and the competition is on. Nothing could give a small number of insurgents more advantage in entree, respect and image.

The implication here may seem to be that it is wrong to alert the government to the real danger of Communist subversion and to the need

for some pretty quick action on several fronts. That is not what is intended. But there is a certain subtlety and balance of tone needed in the altering that is all too often missing. We began to think in terms of crusades, of sweeping propaganda efforts, bold new program actions. We feel that to be fully effective in time, everything needs to be focused in a security framework. And that framework has, as pointed out, a fairly narrow concept of change. Perhaps most damaging of all, we help convince the government that intelligent national planning is for the time irrelevant, that important economic development policies can be shelved and compensated for by the image of sweeping change, that in sum the total country position is less important than the particular aspect of it that the insurgents have seized upon. These aspects of government once set back are very hard to set in motion again.

4. Confusion of the Short and the Long Run. The emphasis in our security-oriented programs is on short-term impact. We normally find any program over two years in execution to be not directly related with security. Our longer term focus is usually on the expansion of these impact efforts over larger areas. In Thailand, two years was the magic number in 1962 for seeing results (it remained too, mysteriously, in 1963 and afterwards). Yet, as we look back, we find that we have spent many years -- "long-range" periods of years -- on these short-run impact programs. The Mobile Development Units, which were in essence intended as a quick and impact-oriented forerunner of more substantive and comprehensive development efforts, are now five years old and still struggling to perfect their original impact mission.

The point here is not that short run results are not important. It is that we have been in Thailand for five years since the first security-oriented programs were developed (and most likely will be for five or ten more) and yet we never have really attempted to analyze what more substantive and far-reaching reforms could be achieved in that time, reforms that at the end of the period would have far more significant and far-reaching impact than all the impact-oriented programs that in the end touch so few. We continue instead for five,

ten years, trying to make that short-run impact -- insisting that it be done before we concentrate on a more substantive program. We refuse to recognize that impact on any scale is in fact a "long-range" objective. At the end of five years we thus have remarkably little to show in terms of our original objective -- impact. Great opportunities for more substantive achievements meanwhile have been lost.

#### MELDING THE OBJECTIVES OF DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY

The above criticisms of the operating doctrine in security programs are not designed to show that the more conventional programs of economic and social development are a better answer to security problems. That would be as narrow and obtuse a doctrine as its reverse. It is designed to demonstrate that our present doctrine treats economic and social relationships to security, and the capacity to change them, in far too superficial a manner. This leads us to underestimate the breadth and depth of the task. But it also precludes from our thinking some valuable potential responses to security problems which might facilitate our objectives. If we blend, in more meaningful fashion, development and security concepts, we can obtain a more flexible and varied set of tools with which to deal with the security problem.

At present, as has been indicated, a gap has developed between these two. The gap exists primarily because of the limitations of influence, concentration and administrative ability that can be applied to purposely induce a wide variety of change in another society. These are all the more relevant when changes are sought in a reasonably short period of time. Security doctrine puts high priority on administrative action and physical achievement at the local level. At the local level moreover, it eschews priorities. It stresses medical services, schools, roads, increased production and almost any other item or service that is believed to have impact potential. In this situation it is almost impossible to demand also that the Government reexamine some of its fundamental economic principles and make some major institutional reforms, affecting sizable portions of the economy. If security and development are to be more closely blended, a harder selection of priorities will be the first and most difficult task.

Once we broaden our approach to security, however, a variety of new possibilities are open to us for influencing political development. Economic development is not a sole guide to political development. But economic development of real substance and long-run promise can unquestionably be a striking way to promote greater stake in and general loyalty to a government. This would particularly seem the case in Thailand, where economic potential is great and where the core sources of wealth are still well within the orbit of government authority and loyalty. Looking at the country from this viewpoint, several new approaches in Thailand are worth exploring.

#### Longer Time Frame for Analyses and Planning

The Thailand security program of 1962 (for which this author shared some responsibility) is an example of orientation that foreclosed intelligent planning for 1967. We must assume that we will be in Thailand in 1972 and that then, even more than now, permanent substructure in the Thai government capable of carrying forward a meaningful set of its own social and economic development programs will be needed. At present our planning for 1972 is largely confined to the percentage of expenditures for current security oriented programs that the Thai Government will assume. It does not examine the alternative policies for accelerating income, for promoting more industry and for giving the Thai people generally a more permanent stake in the present system. And it does not examine how important these are in comparison to the more impact-oriented efforts of today. It does not suggest what permanent elements of growth might be substituted for the more haphazard crash efforts of today, nor conversely which elements of the present program should continue to receive special subsidies as opposed to others. In essence, we are projecting an image of Thailand in 1972 exactly as it is today except that there will be a wider spread of security programs and a greater percentage of Thai financing of them. That is hardly a happy image. Thailand should be a fundamentally stronger state in 1972, less dependent on impact efforts because its growth and momentum have begun to involve the population in a politically meaningful fashion, and because critical social needs of the countryside are being taken care

of through more permanently integrated indigenous institutions. To help achieve this, we have to set our own policies and priorities in that direction.

#### Viewing Thailand as a Whole

When we look at Thailand over a longer period of time, we find that its strength and viability lies in the strength of the central plains and the capacity of that strength to extend out, incorporate, and perhaps subsidize the more remote areas. Border areas are vulnerable in Thailand. But weakness in the central plains would be the beginning of the end if anything would. Conversely, nothing would frustrate long-term Communist hopes more than to make the center of Thailand -- the core of its strength and wealth -- invulnerable to incursion.

Viewed in this light, the economic policy framework in Thailand becomes of critical importance to our security calculations. For the most significant potential for progress in the central plains lies in a few key economic policy areas -- agricultural pricing and marketing for example. There are other political benefits from progress in these areas too. Liberalizing internal market controls could give a spurt to private initiative and action generally in Thailand with healthy political effects. And the acceleration of overall economic growth would provide the wherewithal for Thailand to subsidize, in more meaningful and long-range fashion, the development of the depressed border areas now being subsidized in irregular hit-and-miss fashion by U.S. and Thai security efforts.

But accomplishing changes of this kind would require a significant shift in our present strategy. These economic policy areas are mentioned only as afterthoughts in our program documents, as they have been for years. We have no real strategy for bringing them about and bend no leverage upon them. To do so would require shifting over real priorities from the present emphasis on the border areas and re-educating the Thai government to a new set of priorities quite different from what we have helped create in the past few years. We might well have to sacrifice some of our present program objectives in the Northeast to bring these

changes about. This seems hard to accept as realistic when we view the security situation of today.

And yet ten years from now we may be bleeding agonizingly over these same reforms just as we bleed over land reform in Vietnam today. Only then they will mean much less, as does land reform in Vietnam today. For when the government is acting out of self-defense, these reforms, just as impact-oriented programs, carry much less force and create much less momentum.

These are the kinds of considerations and the kinds of choices that must be looked at if we are to shape a truly broad and comprehensive security doctrine for Thailand.

#### Concentration of Effort

Based on a total analysis of this kind, we must be prepared to select from the full panoply of programs, fundamental and impact, short and long-range, direct and indirect, those few that will have the most significant effect on the internal strength of the government and on the momentum of political and economic growth and development. As pointed out above, effective emphasis on a few key areas may require sacrifice of some other beneficial programs.

This approach implies taking some risks in deliberately avoiding areas of apparent importance. In Thailand, for example, it may mean bypassing community development, education, and significant levels of health services in depressed areas -- even while the insurgents exploit these -- and concentrating, say, on increasing agricultural income, industrial development and employment in the Northeast, and social mobility for Northerners through greater incorporation into government service. I find the risks of this kind of approach, however, much overrated. One of the curious paradoxes of our present approach is that attention to so many different end results at the same time -- so many different basically demonstration programs -- is more likely to produce the kind of fundamental change in attitude we are seeking over twenty or thirty years than over two or five. Moreover, we would need to be able to hold on for that long, and to continue subsidizing the

programs the whole time. On the other hand, we can begin to build more confidence in the government and more momentum toward internal reform by helping affect success in the next few years in two or three very basic areas. It seems a far more sensible risk, moreover, for the government to focus on its assets -- and no insurgent can reform commodity pricing and thus produce so great a change in the farmer's whole life -- instead of trying to keep up with and match changing and purely exploitative insurgent tactics.

Finally, we risk a costly illusion if we assume change can be induced on a broad front in a few years in any society -- short of a revolution. To bring about a really significant reform in policy and attitude takes devoted and constant attention from the senior officials concerned -- including the American agents of change -- in order to get past the hundred and one obstacles that will be put in its path. If our attention is diffused across a variety of programs, with no real distinction between fundamental change and surface response, very little real change will take place. There will be appearances of change. And there will develop the inevitable tendency under the pressure of events to compensate -- rationalize -- the lack of fundamental change with quantitative accomplishments and further inputs of material assistance.

#### Top-Down Reform

With a few major lines of emphasis in mind, we should be willing more to exploit the advantages of the highly centralized administrative system in Thailand than undermine it. We have unnecessarily downgraded the value of "top-down" reform. Strong centralized authority, rightly motivated, can be both a quicker and more efficient method of change than reliance on developing local initiative. The quickness is an advantage for security purposes. The efficiency can come from substituting for the aimless and diffused locally generated projects having little or no long-range significance to the villager, projects that would make changes of major significance in his life. The emphasis here must be placed on effecting motivation and direction from the top.

Strong central direction, moreover, does not have to be in conflict with administrative efficiency or even decentralization of administrative authority. Nor with proper administration attitudes. In fact, strong priority direction from the top, if the priorities are well chosen, would likely be an aid to improving local administration. A few specific areas of reform -- backed up by central expertise and financial support -- would be easier to react to and carry out than generalized instruction on "winning the hearts of the people," something to which the average administrator is not attuned, cannot measure, and which quickly becomes translated into achieving volume of physical accomplishments. Further, if one is really interested in improving performance in meeting local needs, the knowledge of local administrators that the central Government sets priority on and will promote -- and even bring people back to Bangkok as a reward -- economic achievements in their areas, can act as a more powerful incentive than any ideological appeals or local pressure.

#### SOME BENEFITS OF THE KOREAN EXPERIENCE

The above proposals are suggested primarily as examples of the more flexible and more fundamentally oriented program response that is available to use in meeting security situations. Some of the proposals are drawn from experiences in Korea. Korea is not Thailand, and its problems are not Thai problems. But Korea has achieved an increased amount of political stability in recent years, and most likely a stronger political and psychological base for resisting attempts at subversion and insurgency. The principal component of this achievement has undoubtedly been a concentrated and very basic economic reform and development program. It was one arrived at, moreover, for a variety of political and pragmatic, rather than ideological, reasons. Korea also offers a good example of the difficulty, the time requirement, and the measure of political support needed to put through major reform in social services. Several features of this experience are thus worth noting.

#### Economic Policy and Political Stability

Korean success in achieving breakthroughs in a few key economic areas in 1964-65 -- exports, foreign exchange control, taxation, and

interest rates, with the result of rapidly accelerated growth in 1965-66 -- led to almost immediate changes in the political environment. It provided an unpopular government with the means for creating a genuine national consensus -- that is, around economic modernization -- that overrode previously divisive and opposing forces and won for the Government widespread acceptance. Furthermore, the accent on economic development facilitated the rapprochement of military leadership and key civilian groups, thereby giving the Government a more civilian tone and outlook. Finally, the increased confidence of the Government deriving from its economic successes was a key factor in moving it toward a greater acceptance of more democratic procedures of government.

On the U.S. side, these breakthroughs were facilitated by virtually dropping support for a wide variety of social and economic development programs -- in education, health, industry and agriculture -- and concentrating U.S. effort and leverage on key economic policy reforms. It would have been impossible to achieve that element of concentrated effort if U.S. attention had continued to be diffused over two dozen programs, all good in their own right and many deserving support, but all lacking a central government direction and strength to make anything of them. Korean concentration would have been similarly diffused.

The Korean achievements were not at the expense of security. Of all the developing countries, probably few have developed as efficient and extensive a network of police and intelligence operations as Korea. But these were not emphasized in this period. The tone was one of development, even while intelligence activities continued. And this tone was of critical political importance in Korea.

Tone, moreover, is not imagery. Few governments have had a worse image and less capacity for image-making than the Korean Government in 1963. But few governments probably have succeeded in winning so much acceptance in a few years through the weight of policies and programs. The tone came from the totality of actions and achievements which by 1967 indicated a genuine emphasis on national development and the ability to carry it out.

Top-Down Reform

Korean reforms in the countryside in this period were clearly an example of revolution from the top down. There was a long backlog of community development influence that helped the later extension program in its tone and rapport with the farmers. But the principal achievements -- increases in acreage, scientific applications of fertilizer, and certain improved land-use practices -- were directed from Seoul and carried out through monopoly channels of distribution and control. These set the pattern. In some cases (fertilizer) they caused farmer resentment. But the overall effect on production and farm income has outstripped in political terms the complaints.

Moreover, within this framework of priority emphasis and political centralization, remarkable strides have been made in administrative decentralization. Upland terracing is a national priority, but some 90 percent of the provinces' budgets for terracing projects is planned and administered locally -- a few years ago it was about 10 percent. The priority emphasis has been established and from this local administrators have been able to take their cue and move ahead. Moreover, the province governor in Korea -- not unlike his counterpart in Thailand -- wants to come back to the capital. But he knows his political future rests upon performance with regard to central government priorities. As long as these remain development-oriented in Korea, the incentives of the Governor are pointed in the same direction. Moreover, as the government's priorities move ahead to rural industries or to socially important areas -- for that matter backward to political loyalty, intelligence operations and police control -- the administrative system moves with it.

Housing -- Case Study of Socially Oriented Reform.

The experience in establishing housing finance institutions in Korea offers some valuable insights into the process of promoting social change. Despite the emphasis on aggregate economic policy considerations, the United States remained concerned in Korea with anticipating and helping

to meet rising popular economic and social demands. Like all developing countries, however, Korea could choose from health, sanitation, housing, education, unemployment and a host of others as critical social problems. The one which U.S. advisors felt was badly neglected and deserved a special push was housing. In so choosing, others were deliberately left as the residuals of more general economic effort -- for example, unemployment -- or given only limited special attention. The reason was, as borne out by the experience in housing, that one such major social institutional change that would have to be literally pushed through the Korean political-economic structure would require concentrated effort over a considerable period of time.

The situation in housing policy in Korea was that on one side its small, loyal band of supporters were convinced that the only solution lay in large government outlays; on the other, key government policy-makers felt that such outlays were (rightly) financially out of the question and that housing was in any case not a priority problem. It was a priority problem, however, not because the immediate shortage was a source of social instability but because when it became one in five or ten years there would have to be a Korean institutional framework for responding to it. None existed at that time, and several years would be needed to create one.

The first important U.S. input was a technical solution to the financial impasse: a plan for housing bonds and a savings and loan system. By its very nature this approach precluded an early attack on low-cost housing and concentrated on middle and lower middle income housing. This was felt to be both a politically wise and an economically imperative priority choice. The next input was U.S. pressure and leverage. In the next year and a half, by lobbying with Korean legislators and by several direct interventions by high U.S. officials with Korean ministers, the system was enacted into law. At each step of the way, however, opposing interests attempted and came extremely close to scuttling it -- even though overall commitment to the program had been given by the Korean Government at an early stage. The attempts at scuttling the project were subtle and indirect: ostensibly small changes that would have left an impressive facade of a housing program

without substance. These changes, moreover, took diligence to catch and very laborious explanations to senior officials to be appreciated. It was clear that if, on top of the agreed economic policy areas, the Mission had been busy lobbying for a new health program, better labor standards, and more schools at the same time as housing, the housing program -- and the others -- would have made little real progress. Ten years earlier, the United States had begun a similar housing finance institution. That had slipped quietly into policies totally contrary to the original interest of the founders.

Another important facet of this experience was that the United States did not put in, or offer to put in, any U.S. capital while the program was being developed. General U.S. influence in Korea of course derives from an overall position of aid and security relationships. But there were frequent requests from both the Koreans and AID advisors to have U.S. loans or housing investment guarantees as an "ante." The Mission rejected the requests, first of all, because on the Korean side this was an attempt to shift the responsibility -- indeed the worrying -- for housing in Korea to the United States. Second, there was a similar psychological danger on the U.S. side. Once we began to build "model" or "demonstration" projects, we would begin to feel we had made a "justifiable" start and we would tend to let ourselves concentrate on the visual rather than the substantive accomplishments of our housing program. It never deterred model project advocates in Korea that model housing had been built steadily by one organization or another over ten years without once producing the program for which they were modelling. Demonstration projects of 1,000, 2,000, or 5,000 units are glaring monuments to the enormity of the task, for which real solutions are often not even on the drawing board. Instead, we wanted in Korea an institution that would in a few years have the funds, the capability and the backing to solve the problem of 500,000 units or more over the next ten years. That rested -- and could only rest -- on an institution that fit within the economic framework and ability of Korea and which was primarily directed to Korean sources for its long-term capital. And it would take at least five years to build it.

In the housing program, moreover, the Mission saw an opportunity to provide in a limited but concrete way, substantive involvement for several potentially key urban groups: labor, for whom great concentration on wages would run up against the pressures of unemployment and political discouragement; civil servants, whose salaries were only slowly rising to offset the losses they had suffered in previous periods of inflation; and veterans, whose future political role was at best a question mark. All of these groups had access to funds and at least potential organizational strength, but little substantive or at least positive direction in which to use them. We foresaw all of them, however, being able to play a satisfying role for their members in a housing program. It was proposed to them that they buy or have their members buy housing bonds, and use their concentrated holdings of these bonds to obtain housing projects for their particular groups. All responded quite eagerly to the suggestion.

One last comment needs to be made on the subject of concentration. To concentrate does not mean to pick just one social area and ignore all others. The objective in Korea was to create a spectrum of actions along a broad social front that would develop to fruition at different times as political, economic, and administrative realities permitted. Thus the Mission began on a very low and preliminary level -- indeed as a response to requests for more direct help -- the gradual educating process in the health field, trying to move the health advocates (like their housing counterparts before them) away from dependence on a never realizable deluge of government funds to thinking in terms of the possibility of self-financing programs. This idea, we knew, would take years to develop. In education, after rejecting appeals for entree in a number of specific areas, the Mission focused on the recommendation of a number of Korean intellectuals for a Korean commission on education to reexamine the quality and direction of the already extensive system. For this, it built fires in both low and high places at an intensity somewhere between the very low and generalized efforts in health and the very high pressure action in housing. In sum, the United States sought to blend its support for economic, social and security considerations within a consistent and institutionally sound Korean framework.

CONCLUSION

The weakness of our present security doctrine is that it deals with the range of security problems as a set of particular symptoms, each to be treated specifically and by a special program for that purpose. The programs are based on an injection of material support which -- by its very description as short-term and impact-oriented -- implies the possibility of short-circuiting the political and economic realities and the complexity of political loyalties and development. Yet the real complexity of the problem does not mean that the responses need be plodding and slow in results. The paradox of our present approach is that it is probably the most inefficient, drawn out, and in some cases counter-productive way to achieve the political change we desire.

Economic development that reaches across a broad scale represents one -- but a very major -- tool in the political process. It does not produce, pari passu, political development toward stability and democracy. It could do the opposite. But the Korean case, and the Thailand potential, indicate that far from being automatically contradictory to such political development, economic development policies and programs are available to the political structure as potentially very influential tools for producing these results -- and particularly if selected and promoted with this objective in mind. In developing countries particularly, where pressures for economic modernization are great, they simply cannot be ignored in the political sphere, and for the United States -- for which economic aid represents one of its most significant (and almost unavoidable) tools of foreign policy in these areas -- these possibilities need to be explored and capitalized upon much more than has been done in the past. Often in the past we have tended to assume too easy and direct a connection between economic and political development only to be disillusioned, or -- at the other extreme -- an inherent conflict between political objectives and economic emphasis, leaving us in a quandary in our approach to the aid program.

It would seem that in the developing countries, economic development programs, when successfully implemented and when geared to politically significant groups in the developing structure, could provide more direction and momentum to the political development process than any other single effort. In many countries in Southeast Asia particularly, where economic interest groups are as yet not sharply differentiated and antagonistic, economic momentum represents one of the few unifying themes available in the political arena. Such programs, moreover, require a set of political commitments and priorities that can be of equal and far-reaching significance in their own right in affecting the operations of government, its methods of political control, and its relationship to the population and key private groups within it. In other words, an intelligent economic development program is a political program. It can and should be developed and consciously used, not to substitute for the political process, but to help shape it and give it strength and viability.

But economic growth is not a gimmick. It requires concentrated effort, strong direction, and technical ability. Putting these elements behind a development program thus requires a definite shift of priorities -- political and economic -- in that direction. This has been the difficulty in utilizing economic development in a security situation. Politically sensitive leaders have been reluctant to shift to such priorities in face of immediate challenges from insurgents or subversive forces. Furthermore, there is a belief in a security framework of analysis that one can and should try more to fabricate the end results of economic development in order to produce a desirable political effect in the short run. These policies, however, not only undermine the economic process, but the political process as well. They destroy government confidence, objectivity, and, in many cases, independence. They also underestimate the shorter run results of politically well-chosen developmental programs. Shifting older priorities, especially ones which have been discriminatory to large segments of the population, and taking really significant action in a few key economic areas can communicate more to the population of the intention of government, and offer more real stake to the population in the government over the

course of their lifetime, than likely any program of transitory benefit however flashily painted. Note here again that it is not from the immediate benefits from such actions that this feeling is communicated -- the tangible benefits may well be delayed -- but from the long run expectations that are created by these actions and their relationship in turn to the Government in power. This feeling is communicated, moreover, far more rapidly than we have assumed.

On the other hand, when one looks at the program that developed in Thailand after 1962 -- when security considerations were becoming paramount -- and which has only in the last year begun to receive a broader focus, one finds that priorities were shifted to the other extreme. Developmental objectives for the country were there, but stated in generalized terms, clearly lacking emphasis and priority in the total U.S. effort. One is struck by the fact that the emphasis in this period was almost entirely on "the sell" and almost not at all on what was being sold. We were concerned with the image of the Thai Government much more than with the reality behind it. We assumed, in essence, that the harder problems of both political and economic development could or would take care of themselves and that the more "quick and obvious" ones were those in which we must make the major effort.

As a result we made almost no effort to fashion independent and challenging responses to the appeals of the insurgents. We helped create an atmosphere, moreover in which Thailand's major assets have often been overlooked and its weaknesses accentuated. We developed programs which seemed to attack every facet of the problem, but which in reality have attacked almost none. And this very paucity of effort served to give us both a false conception and a false sense of security.

Moving back from this position is not easy. There are political and very real bureaucratic problems in shifting the focus of U.S. aid to a more developmental orientation and to one which sees Thailand's security as a nationwide problem rather than only the border areas now under subversive attack. And yet failure to do that will perhaps lead to the disintegration of the center, the transformation of what are now still assets into liabilities. Certainly it will put us and Thailand

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more and more behind on the undertaking of structural economic and political reforms at the center which will take a long time to effect and which create more real dangers to security the longer they are delayed.

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS AND SECURITY:  
LESSONS FROM OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES

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This paper selectively discusses key aspects of the experience that other Asian countries have had with problems of rural development and/or insurgency. The intent is to distill and interpret these aspects so that they bear constructively upon more or less comparable problems in Northeast Thailand today.

Three Asian experiences have been chosen as the basis for the discussion:

1. The Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR) in Taiwan -- its strategy and methods -- particularly during the early years of the prior decade when the Kuomintang objectives of political consolidation and support on the land constituted, for the most part, the broad policy thrust of the economic assistance programs of the JCRR.
2. The Magsaysay era in the Philippines, 1950-1957, when the national government under the leadership of Magsaysay, first as Secretary of Defense and then as President, broke the back of the Hukbalahap insurgency in Central Luzon and launched rural "development" programs addressed to the conditions of peasant alienation and unrest which had fed the insurgency.
3. The Village Cluster Program in Laos, begun in late 1963 and located largely in the lowlands and valleys of Laos, which is the centerpiece of the rural development efforts of the U.S. AID mission in this small, jerry-built country.

An initial and very important qualifier is in order: the examples or "lessons" noted are not viewed by the writer as being relevant to Thailand today in a mechanistic or packaged fashion. They do not reflect pat formulas that can be grandly exported to other country situations. Rather, they are intended to provide fresh leaven and insights which will mix catalytically with a programmatic appraisal of the indigenous variables of security and development in Thailand.

Similarly, the Thai vision -- or visions -- of reality in the Northeast is of central importance. We should be encouraging a uniquely Thai dynamism of innovation and experimentation in dealing with the problems of the Northeast rather than encouraging externally originated "solutions," however applicable they may appear prima facie.

STRATEGIES FOR LINKING SECURITY PROGRAMS AND  
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

A strategic concept without appropriate tactical techniques is only an illusion. Conversely tactical technique without a unifying strategic concept is both dull and wasteful.

(Lt. General Liu Chi-ming, A Strategy of Counter-Subversion, unpublished study, Taipei, 1966.)

If our purpose is to relate or link security programs and economic development programs with any measure of system and coherence, there would appear to be no other alternative but to conceive the two essentially as tactical arms of a broader strategy that facilitates commensurability and coordination and permits evaluation of progress. Otherwise, we lack common factors for judgment and become trapped in the cul-de-sac of comparing apples and oranges.

This strategy in its broadest generality will be political in character and be concerned with problems of popular support for, consensus with, and consolidation of power by the constituted government in the disaffected areas. It is evident that genuine security cannot obtain, or an effective counterinsurgency effort be sustained, without the active political support and intelligence of local organizations and leaders. Similarly, rural economic development efforts will be marginal unless there is a modicum of political viability and participation in the rural communities.

An overall strategy is an instrument to control in some degree the pace, quality, and direction of change. In this sense, general objectives such as improving Thai government official relations with the villager and/or integrating the rural peasantry into the national body-politic are inadequate by themselves. The strategy must be flushed

out and down so that it has the finiteness necessary to guide decision and action. This can only be done by addressing the major economic, political, military, and cultural variables involved, and the chemistry of their interaction, in the actual setting of operations. The variables that are the raw materials of an effective strategy would include, inter alia, the character and intensity of peasant aspirations and needs, forms and extent of social mobility, ethnic composition and loyalties, means of communication, economic development potential and priorities, strategy and tactics of the insurgents, and so on. For example, badly needed economic development activities of different kinds calculated to increase the income of the subsistence farmers in Northeast Thailand and to induce change and self-betterment quite conceivably could magnify the insurgency by their very success. Indeed, strategic attention must be given to the non-economic aspirations of the peasants and their families, particularly the youth, and the channels of mobility and opportunity available for pursuing these aspirations.\*

#### DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY

Focusing on development and security requires a time dimension as well as a substantive strategy. This was pointed out in a speech by Robert S. McNamara:\*\*

We do not always grasp the meaning of the word security.... In a modernizing society, security means development. Security is not military hardware -- though it may include it. Security is not military force -- though it may involve it.... Security is development. Without development, there can be no security. A developing nation that does not in fact develop simply cannot remain secure.

The relevance of the McNamara speech here is not the optimistic cast of his generic identification of security with development. Rather,

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\* See A. Thomas Kirsch, "Development and Mobility Among the Phu Thai of Northeast Thailand," Asian Survey, July 1966, Vol. 6, No. 7, pp. 377-378.

\*\* Speech to American Society of Newspaper Editors, Montreal, Canada, May 18, 1966.

the relevance rests on the point seen by McNamara that the United States and its allies in Southeast Asia court disaster when they define security only in terms of immediate or short-range military (and economic) requirements. Time is a continuum. Short-term, intermediate, and long-term shade into each other. What is done, or not done, in the short term vitally affects options and constraints over the long term.

The time frame of planning and action should indeed be reasonably long-term and development focused -- economically, politically, and socially -- in dealing with insurgency situations, particularly when there is time to mount a strategy addressed to the long-standing, tough problems. This is not to play down the immediate needs for effective security measures, but rather to suggest a more critical and longer range appraisal as to the value and limitations of these measures.

The conditions that underlie the insurgency in the Northeast obviously did not manifest themselves overnight. Similarly, they are not going to disappear overnight, however efficient U.S. supported security programs may become. A broader gauge and longer range U.S. perspective focused upon encouragement and support of Thai programs of politico-social and economic change certainly appears to be called for.

#### THE JOINT COMMISSION ON RURAL RECONSTRUCTION

The JCRR was established in 1948 in Mainland China as one of the implementing organs of the China Aid Act of the same year. The Commission is especially known for two things: the major role it played -- and through it the role United States aid played -- in the remarkable rural-agricultural development of Taiwan over the last 15 years, and its untypical organizational structure which was designed as an instrument for the administration of U.S. economic assistance.

Functionally JCRR is located outside governmental lines of authority, both Chinese and United States, and therefore is able to receive and approve projects directly from rural organizations, public and private. JCRR is not an operating agency. Its staff works through and with public and private agencies at all levels. Recipient organizations solicit JCRR's technical and capital assistance, assume responsibility

for project execution, and match JCRR's financial contribution on an agreed basis.

The structure of JCRR is based upon jointness. It is headed by a bi-national commission, originally composed of three Chinese and two American commissioners appointed by the Presidents of the two countries, and now by two Chinese and one American. The commission exercises its authority through unanimous decisions.

The joint structure of JCRR is in sharp contrast with the more typical counterpart-separate organization aid relation used by the United States in most recipient countries. In Taiwan, JCRR became in practice a component of the host country institutional system through which rural development was planned and executed. In effect, American rural and agricultural expertise was integrated on the line.

#### Felt Needs

It was recently argued that "unless and until program planning is focused directly on the villagers' basic needs and problems...the security impact of the USOM or RTG Rural development efforts on the Northeast peasantry will continue to be severely limited."<sup>\*</sup> Felt need has indeed become a common rubric for identifying the priorities of rural development/security programs. In light of the fact that JCRR pioneered this approach, it would appear useful to look at what felt need meant in the Taiwan setting. This can be done briefly by noting the following major elements of the JCRR interpretation:

- o The felt need approach was grounded in the assumption of the great development potential of the rural masses -- their ethos, intelligence and energy -- if properly tapped and on the imperative that action programs must in fact penetrate to the micro environment of the primary producer.
- o Felt needs can be complex and conflicting. Their articulation must be cultivated and at times they must be reshaped and redirected from above.

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\* Preliminary Report, Impact of USOM-Supported Programs in Changwad Sakon Nakorn, Bangkok, USOM/Thailand, Research Division, April 1967.

- o Felt needs are but one component of a realistic rural development program, being particularly important for the short run in that they provide a framework for choosing village/farmer participation projects which stand to produce rather immediate and tangible results.
- o The felt need approach essentially concerns problems of institutional communication, dialogue and participation from the village unit upward and the central government downward. The approach was never conceived as a short cut to the difficult job of programming development in the different micro-environments of agriculture with their multitude of local decision-makers.

In effect, JCRR saw felt need as a vital though limited tool useful for an array of purposes: popular participation and dialogue (likely first and foremost); project selection; economic and technical intelligence; and building rural support for the Nationalist government. The JCRR experience suggests that, in applying this concept elsewhere, practitioners should be aware of its limitations and difficulties as well as its usefulness.

#### The Transmission Belt

Perhaps the most significant achievement of JCRR was its central role in fashioning an effective institutional transmission belt in Taiwan, which progressively involved the farmer in the tasks of development by carrying downward incentives, innovations and services and by transmitting upward his needs and problems.

The major component of this transmission belt is a flourishing Farmer's Association (FA) network -- township, county, and provincial. The FA system has provided a single structural pattern through which agricultural and rural life in general can be improved.

The FAs provide an example of closing the traditional gap at the local level in Asia between the peasant farmer and public and private institutions crucial to the former's willingness and capacity to become a responsive agent of change within the mainstream of national life.

The FA system appears to be particularly relevant to the development of Amphur Farm Groups in Thailand. Four aspects of the FAs merit special attention in the setting of Thai rural cooperatives.

- a) The simple, multi-purpose structure of the township FA combining all the major services needed by the member farmers in one unit -- as contrasted with the single-purpose cooperative.
- b) The sustained priority given to the training of FA management personnel.
- c) The marked emphasis placed upon developing the vigor and initiative of the village unit of the township FA as the last and decisive link with the primary producers.
- d) The JCRR tactic of increasing popular demand in the countryside for better public services and of intensifying the awareness of of government leadership of the need to provide such improved services.

#### Extension

JCRR saw early the great need for and tremendous pay-off of large and wide-ranging injections of new knowledge into the countryside. A minimum of 60 percent of the income of farmer's associations each year had to be plowed back into extension activities on the land. Taiwan in the 1950s was a hothouse of experimentation with agricultural extension techniques under the leadership of JCRR technicians.

The lesson for Thailand with regard to agricultural education in the Northeast is that effectiveness depends upon a considerable expansion of extension programs, much better penetration, and a willingness to experiment and innovate.

#### Flexibility and Expedition of Program Operations

JCRR functioned through a flexible and free financial and programming authority. The controls exercised by the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) and the U.S. Aid Mission were limited for the most part to review of the budget year program and intermittent post reviews of program performance.

This flexibility was vital during the early period of JCRR's life when the aim was to counter rural unrest and JCRR's initial lack of credibility with the farmers by launching and completing many projects and responding quickly to problems and needs as they arose.

It is unlikely that the semi-autonomous and joint character of the JCRR, which provided the basis for its freewheeling operations and expeditious movement of funds, could be duplicated in Thailand. However, the JCRR experience dramatically illustrates the political and economic fruits that can be reaped from program and funding procedures that facilitate the use of flexible and opportune tactics in situations of unrest and insurgency, present or potential.

#### Political Effects and Strategy

The improved state of political relations between the GRC and the Taiwanese rural population that has evolved over the years is certainly in part the result of the latter's relative prosperity and their participation in the island's economy.

The JCRR experience tends to confirm that development-oriented economic assistance programs are effective in realizing political and social goals.

However, the Commission's piecemeal economic programs and production-oriented tactics were continuously conditioned by interplay with politico-social tactics of various kinds: for example, the emphasis placed upon distributive social justice through land reform and intentionally spreading the fruits of improved technology through the small project technique, and the encouragement of democratic practices in rural organizations at the local level.

The fact is the Nationalists had a reasonably concrete strategy -- or at least an acute sense of strategy -- to guide their policies and actions in rural Taiwan in the 1950s. This strategy included:

- o systematically gutting the power base of the Taiwanese landlord class (on the whole, middle-class farmers with moderate-size land holdings who had provided some of the leadership of the 1947 rebellion);

- o thoroughly enmeshing the American presence in Taiwan with the tasks of rehabilitation and development so that it would take a radical break in U.S. policy to disengage from the Island;
- o politically and economically absorbing the rural masses as limited participants in the new power structure, principally by magnifying the independence of retooled farmer organizations at the expense of local government agencies traditionally dominated by the Taiwanese landed elite, and by stimulating and servicing the drives of commercial agriculture so as to create vested interests on the land in support of stability and constituted authority;
- o a flexible and evolving program of agricultural growth, generalized by JCRR planners as a "strategic pattern of sequenced development." An effective balance was achieved between the requirements of overall sector planning and controls and decentralized participation in and adjustment of subsector plans. Sequenced production targets and productivity goals flowed from aggregate indices and priorities of agricultural growth. Marked attention was given to breaking down the development strategy into economic and technical, institutional and political tactics.

JCRR provided the leadership of a rural development program which served both economic and political purposes in mutually reinforcing fashion. Although the quality of achievement varied from project to project, the strategic conception and tactical techniques were sound and realistic and explain in substantial measure the overall success of the program.

#### THE MAGSAYSAY ERA IN THE PHILIPPINES

The Government Gap: the physical and intellectual void between governing and governed, city and countryside, is the basic factor for the Asians to overcome. The urban elite does not know how to mix or deal with the vast rural population. The villages fear and shun officials. These two societies don't speak to each other.... The rural challenge is Asia's political riddle. (Kenneth T. Young, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, March 1, 1967.)

In 1950, the Hukbalahap movement numbered around 15,000 armed insurgents, supported by a popular base of more or less a half million peasants. Huk military presence and political organization had penetrated deeply throughout large areas of the Central Luzon plain.

By 1955, the Huk threat had been decisively broken by the national government under the leadership of Ramon Magsaysay. Magsaysay aggressively pursued military, political, economic, and psychological tactics which brought devastation to Huk military power, the capture of a good part of the top Huk leadership and, most important, a shredding of the Huk's mass base of peasant support.

After being elected President in 1953, Magsaysay set into motion an array of agrarian programs designed to broaden his attack on the insurgency and particularly to thrust beyond the receding security problem to the conditions of rural discontent, backwardness, and exploitation that had long provided the seedbed for violent dissidence in Central Luzon. Magsaysay saw his role in revolutionary terms: to provide the dynamic leadership necessary to link aspirations of the peasantry with a transfiguring nationalism of unity and development.

The Magsaysay Administration's rural activities, supported by U.S. assistance, were legion. To note a few:

- community development and self-government at the barrio level;
- land resettlement for the landless;
- potable water systems;
- agricultural credit;
- rural school construction; and,
- a host of new agricultural agencies to service the needs and respond to the grievances of the tenant farmers.

By 1957 and the untimely death of the charismatic Magsaysay, a good bit of the elan and drive for change had waned within his Administration. At least there was a growing feeling that programs were going awry, that the major problems were tough and resilient and not responsive to quick and glancing attack.

The Huks were decimated, not destroyed. Capitalizing on the traditional gap between the government and the peasants, which rapidly reopened after 1957, the Huks were able to regroup themselves and consolidate their organization and authority in key areas of Central Luzon. Huk tactics appear to have changed to those of "protracted conflict," involving a combination of limited warfare, political terror and "legal-parliamentary struggle." Today, they are again a force of subversion, administering a shadow government in Central Luzon and commanding the allegiance of a considerable mass of peasants.

Perhaps if Magsaysay had lived, the many government activities of rural reform that he initiated would have matured into effective means of institutional and attitudinal change at the center and the outlying points of the Philippine body-politic. As it was, one of the most significant aspects of the Magsaysay era was how quickly his rural programs fell into confusion and atrophy after his demise, leaving a vacuum of government inaction and peasant disenchantment which the Huks have exploited in their resurgence.

It is difficult to resist the conclusion that Magsaysay's programs were a cosmetic job, however dramatic their initial impact. The economic and social activities that he triggered appear in retrospect to have been superficial in character. They were loaded with idealism and popular exhortation, but essentially were marginal to the long run, knotty problems of closing the political gap between an estranged peasant society and an increasingly urban-based governing elite of landed and commercial-manufacturing interests. Certain failings that stand out explain in some part the lack of staying power of Magsaysay's efforts and also suggest lessons for other Asian countries coping with comparable problems:

- The almost complete lack of an operational strategy for the economic and political development of the Central Luzon plain.
- The overwhelming priority given to crash programs and tactics that, notwithstanding the intent of agrarian reform and development, sharply distorted the security-development equation in favor of the former.

- The misplaced emphasis upon the too small barrio as the primary unit of development.
- A national community development program, similar to that of the Indian government, that stressed the cultural goals of peasant assimilation and cooperation without addressing the problem of rural productivity goals. In this sense, the Philippine approach has been in sharp contrast with that pursued by the JCRR.
- Centralization of rural assistance programs in the President's office while neglecting the delegating of development functions to regional and provincial levels.

#### THE VILLAGE CLUSTER PROGRAM IN LAOS

The primary instrument of rural development in Laos today is the U.S.-supported Village Cluster Program. The aim of this program, launched in late 1963, was to consolidate RLG-U.S. rural projects in strategic areas so as to achieve better control and follow-up and to produce a greater impact.

There are at present 14 clusters, including the Sedone Valley Development Program in the South, that encompasses all of Wapikhanthong Province and portions of Sedone and Saravane Provinces. The clusters range in size from around 20 to 190 villages, with an approximate spread in population of 5,000 to 43,000.

The individual cluster programs initially stress social infrastructure projects, such as schools, dispensaries, and wells. However, there also has been considerable support for small-scale agricultural development activities such as irrigation systems, demonstration plots, and the establishment of local markets. It is likely that production-oriented projects will grow in importance in the near future, given the major role planned for the clusters in the ambitious RLG-U.S. rice production program.

The cluster program was conceived as a means of meshing village development and security needs so as to serve the broader objectives of consolidating RLG political control and enhancing its image in

strategic rural areas of Laos. The approach was to motivate the villagers to acquire a greater stake in their own security principally through encouraging them to participate in RLG-supported self-help projects.

No doubt there have been discrepancies between the conception and reality of the cluster program. In particular, the village security dimension (for example, organization and training of village self-defense forces and establishment of early warning intelligence nets) has lagged or not got off the ground at all in many of the clusters. However, the program has not been without its project successes on the social and economic side. Its development efforts in a number of rural areas have prompted the extension of conventional security by the RLG armed forces.

The cluster program is relevant not only because of its strategic conception but also because of the advantages it offers for rural development activities. This is being recognized more and more by perceptive American officials in the field. The point is that by broadening the unit of planning and operations to a geographical area larger than separate villages, new possibilities and options are opened up on the development side.

One of the major shortcomings of traditional community development programs is that the individual village is simply not a viable development unit because of its size and the limited number of things that can be done with economic efficiency within its confines. The cluster concept, on the other hand, stimulates more imaginative and expansive approaches to local area development problems in such fields as marketing, processing, water utilization, transportation and farm credit.

This is not to argue that the cluster model in Laos is necessarily applicable to Northeast Thailand, but the economies of scale and area practiced in the Lao case certainly should merit consideration if development is to be construed as part of the long-range answer to local security problems.

RELEVANCE OF U.S. ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS  
TO LOCAL SECURITY IN THAILAND

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INTRODUCTION

Since the advent of the Kennedy Administration, the United States has become increasingly concerned with the problems of development and security in critical areas of the non-Communist world. Khrushchev's call for "wars of national liberation," coupled with recurring crises in Laos, Cuba, Vietnam, and the Congo and the decline of French and British power in the Afro-Asian world, caused the Kennedy Administration to move urgently toward the formulation of a new strategy of foreign aid, both military and economic. It also led to a major reassessment of the role of our own military forces and those of our principal allies in light of newly interpreted Soviet foreign policy aims and tactics.

In the case of Thailand, which in the Dulles era was accorded relatively privileged treatment as a key member of the SEATO, the first Kennedy-appointed Ambassador, Kenneth T. Young, did his utmost to tailor the U.S. aid effort to conform with the new U.S. approach to the problems of development and security in Southeast Asia.

However, due mainly to the forces of tradition, various cultural lags, and prior aid commitments, his success was limited to relatively minor skirmishes in the major battles over the contents and levels of aid programs, for example, temporary Military Aid Program (MAP) support for new Mobile Development Units in the Northeast.

His successor, Graham Martin, was able to obtain significantly greater Washington attention to the problem of subversive insurgency. However, the major part of aid resources continued to go to purposes bearing little or no direct relationship to the "objective" situation facing local administrators or the average Thai villager in the lesser developed regions of Thailand.

Our preoccupation with recurring crises in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, plus traditional Thai demands for more modern forces and

priority given to development of economic sectors promising significant returns on new investment left but few crumbs for areas such as the Northeast or for programs aimed at curtailing the growing subversion in the countryside.

With respect to the nature of the current threat to the Royal Thailand Government (RTG), there is growing consensus among senior-level U.S. and Thai officials that the key to the suppression of the Communist Terrorists (CT) lies in the ability of the RTG to provide greater security and to improve economic conditions in the villages. An increasing number of officials have concluded that extraordinary attention must be given to the contested areas of the Northeast, where a third of the nation exists in a relative socio-political vacuum.

Accepting the thesis that the ability of the RTG to fill this vacuum in this significant area of the Kingdom is crucial to long-term U.S. interests in Southeast Asia, I submit that it is important to examine the general scope and impact of current and contemplated U.S. aid efforts designed to produce positive effects on political-military events in the Northeast. As Abraham Lincoln said in his famous "House Divided" speech, "if we could first know where we are and whither we are tending, we could better judge what to do and how to do it."

Consistent with the way in which our Mission categorizes U.S. aid programs, I have divided our assistance efforts in Thailand in the following manner:

1. U.S. AID (USOM) programs;
2. Military Assistance Programs (MAP);
3. U.S. Information Service (USIS); and,
4. Other U.S. assistance efforts.

#### U.S. AID (USOM)

Current USOM plans are based almost exclusively upon one basic, overriding objective -- to assist the RTG to combat successfully the communist insurgency in the rural areas, particularly in the Northeast.

USOM regards this requirement as basic for two primary reasons -- the communist insurgency is an immediate and growing danger to Thai society, stability, and development, and, secondly, the insurgent threat is concentrated in the villages of the Northeast.

USOM feels that the main need is to get the Thai to extend the progress achieved in the central plains and certain urban areas, such as Bangkok, to the previously neglected areas of the Northeast. The key words underlying USOM's assistance strategy in this area are protection and production in those rural areas of relative economic privation and governmental weakness or neglect.

Fundamental to the USOM approach to the problem is the conviction that through selective U.S. assistance and the promises of follow-on aid, senior Thai officials can be prevailed upon to bring about a social and economic revolution in the countryside, that is, to get the villagers in remote areas to work more effectively toward the solution of their most pressing socio-economic problems in a political framework conducive to resistance to, or suppression of, communist subversive insurgency.

#### Protection

It is current USOM doctrine that no other effort to develop rural areas can succeed unless villagers are afforded adequate protection. People cannot be expected to cooperate with government representatives if they live in fear of dire consequences or are under the de facto control of CT shadow government.

In recognition of the importance of providing a greater degree of protection to remote villages, USOM has in Fiscal Year 1967 spent nearly \$18 million, 35 percent of the total program, in support of the Thai National Police Department and related activities, such as radio communications for the villages. Additional programmed support will assist in the expansion of the police department by another 12,000 men -- a 30 percent increase by the end of Fiscal Year 1968.

New weapons and equipment have also been provided or programmed for the police. Equipment is concentrated in two areas -- communications for

counterinsurgency activities and mobility, air as well as ground, in order to improve materially the ability of the police to respond promptly and exploit opportunities. Plans stipulate that "reaction forces" should be able to reach threatened villages in less than one hour, and that border control units will also be materially strengthened. These plans involve a 100 percent increase in the strength of the Provincial Police and the Border Patrol Police by 1972. (From 60,000-120,000 in the case of the Provincial Police.)

Plans are also being made for training and equipping a large number of village defense units in selected areas, and for new police units with the mission of supporting village based security forces. USOM officials believe that the village security force must be part of the village, composed of men who will be so identified, willing to protect their own homes and thoroughly familiar with local terrain. They also envisage these cadres as active in community development work, given proper training and motivation.

A comprehensive list of projects in this program category can be found in the addenda, p. 97.

### Production

The basic hypothesis underlying this category of efforts is that it is necessary to thwart the CT promises of a better life by offering a set of real or realizable alternatives to the villagers of the Northeast. USOM views its main mission as helping the RTG to pose a more attractive set of goals and the means of convincing the villagers that they are attainable. USOM program rationale emphasizes that results must be real and timely if this strategy is to succeed.

Over the past several years USOM's support in this area has concentrated on the Accelerated Rural Development (ARD) program of the RTG. This program at present affects 18 provinces, all but three of which are in the Northeast. Equipment, training and other support for ARD totalled more than \$14 million in FY 1967 -- over 28 percent of the total USOM program that year.

In addition to creating necessary infrastructure in the Northeast, such as roads and better water resources at the village level, ARD is designed to stimulate more local initiative and greater responsiveness to priority village requirements by other RTG agencies.

It is generally accepted that ARD resources have considerably strengthened the ability of the governor and other key local officials to carry out their counterinsurgency plans and programs, both in terms of actual resources made available by Bangkok and by effecting the necessary coordination among the many RTG agencies active in the hinterlands.

USOM is also providing material support to the National Security Command's Mobile Development Units (MDU's). These units, composed of select personnel from several civilian and military agencies of the RTG, are deployed in sensitive security areas of the Kingdom with the mission of improving the basic infrastructure and local attitudes through construction, vocational training, and work with the youth.

Assistance is also being given to Mobile Medical Teams in rural areas, and support for the malaria eradication program is being continued.

A program has also been initiated to meet the transportation needs of local officials so that they can discharge their responsibilities more effectively and contact more villagers.

USOM officials believe that greater assistance in the field of agriculture is of fundamental importance in view of the agrarian nature of the society in the Northeast. Better research, extension work, improved credit and farmer's cooperatives, improved communications, and greater availability of necessary fertilizers and pesticides are all regarded as essential elements of an ambitious program designed to double the cash income of farmers in the Northeast by 1972.

A great deal of attention is also being given to improving water supplies in the villages -- a fundamental problem for all forms of life during a major part of the year. The ultimate goal is a year-round source of water in every village, and USOM proposes to assist in this through the provision of materiel and technical advice.

USOM's major quantitative targets in rural development over the next 5-10 years are listed in the addenda, p. 97.

In addition to these security and development projects, USOM management gives high priority to the development of greater human talents, skills and energy -- both in villages and in public service. Program focus is on village youth, providing better education and improving prospects for a better life, and on improving rural administration -- technical as well as administrative. A key to the success of this program is to induce senior Bangkok officials of the need to take whatever steps are necessary to persuade more talented and highly motivated public servants to serve in the Northeast.

In the area of village youth, USOM has supported the deployment of seven mobile trades training units. Eleven more are to be created next year. USOM also supports the work of the Community Development Department and the Developing Democracy Program of the Department of Local Administration -- MOI. The objective of both these Thai programs is to train local leaders in the management of local affairs and the use of external assistance. USOM also hopes to find ways and means of stimulating the interest of the private sector -- entrepreneurs -- in economic opportunities in rural areas of the Northeast.

From the above summary description one can see that the proposed rural development program places about equal emphasis on "protection and production." While it might be possible for USOM to alter this ratio radically in one direction or another, current doctrine calls for strong and equal assistance to both kinds of programs. This is justified not only by the way in which the Thai have organized their counterinsurgency effort -- emphasis on civil-police activities -- but because of Congressional sentiments in the face of apparent Thai solvency and affluence in many sectors. It is also calculated more or less to match Thai efforts in the Northeast, in financial terms, (approximately \$50 million per year for each side) in order to obtain the requisite leverage in crucial areas of decisionmaking regarding resource allocation, administration, and overall counterinsurgency strategy.

Key USOM officials recognize the need for better and more complete data on critical sectors of the Northeast's environment. Although they are convinced of the need to concentrate more resources in the Northeast, they and their Thai counterparts are not clear on how much or what kinds, or about how Northeast requirements fit into national developmental plans for the entire economic sector.

#### MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS (MAP)

The level of Military Assistance to Thailand has increased substantially over the past several years. There are two principal causes for this: the crises in Laos and our efforts to obtain more significant third-country involvement in Vietnam.

One of the primary objectives of the MAP for Thailand is to enhance the ability of the armed forces to deal with subversive insurgency and infiltration from alien territories. However, the bulk of the regular Thai armed forces remain committed to missions relevant to SEATO plans or conventional warfare rather than being committed to internal security missions aimed at suppressing the C.

Out of the four active Royal Thai Army Divisions, only some six battalions plus some supporting units are committed to counterinsurgency operations in the Northeast. However, the Army is engaged in many military activities in support of the Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC) and provincial para-military forces assigned to the governors in critical Northeast provinces.

Among these functions are:

1. Royal Thai Army provision of weapons and training to the Volunteer Defense Corps;
2. Civic action, psychological warfare, and intelligence gathering by several Royal Thai Army Special Operations Center units in the Northeast;
3. Over 100 Special Forces Teams committed to suppression Commands under the control of the Governor -- Civil Police Military;
4. Detailing Army officers to serve as special assistants to amphur chiefs and governors in the Northeast; and,

5. Providing new radios to select village security units.

While most of the support for these units and activities comes from RTG resources, many of them were trained and equipped by MAC-THAI and many receive follow-on support, such as POL, training equipment, and so forth.

The Royal Thai Air Force has also organized several Special Air Commando troop-transport units for employment against the subversives, and the Royal Thai Navy may assume an active role on the Mekong. These units also receive MAP support in one form or another.

One cannot say at this moment how great or what kind of an impact the larger MAP effort will have in rural areas. However, it is fairly clear that the Thai armed forces cannot help but benefit from more training, their experiences in Vietnam, and from new equipment for units earmarked for internal security.

It must be said, however, that only a relatively minor fraction of the current MAP program can be traced to the situation in remote areas of the Northeast. This is due not only to Vietnam and traditional SEATO-type commitments, but to the basic decision of the RTG to treat the insurgency as a civil-police matter rather than as a military problem.

If the insurgency enters a new phase marked by more intensive military action, we can assume that the Royal Thai Army will play a much stronger role in the countryside and have a greater voice in the planning and implementation of counterinsurgency strategy. But for the present, it appears that there will be only a modest increase in the role of MAP-supported units assigned to suppression operations in the Northeast.

In summary, U.S. assistance programs under this category can, at most, affect only indirectly the situation at the village level, except for those few critical areas in which Army units are deployed. No direct U.S. aid or involvement is perceptible in view of rigorous policy injunctions against any direct participation by U.S. personnel in counterinsurgency operations. However, most of the six battalion

equivalents of regular RTG military units assigned to suppression operations under CSOC are equipped and partially supported by the MAP, and many of the officers and men have received training of some sort under the MAP.

Although one cannot predict the extent or nature of future involvement of the regular armed forces in the countryside, there are a number of indications that they may play a more active role, particularly in those areas judged to be most infested with armed insurgents or in need of protection.

### U.S. INFORMATION SERVICE (USIS) PROGRAMS

#### Background Information

USIS stipulates three major objectives in Thailand:

1. Explain and win support for programs and activities designed to strengthen the security, development, independence, and unity of Thailand.
2. Explain and help counter the stepped-up Communist threat to Thailand.
3. Maintain the strengthen Thai confidence in the United States as a strong, reliable, and cooperative ally.

Generally speaking, USIS - Thailand engages in two types of activities. The first is the traditional USIS operation characterized by the operation of libraries, binational centers, cultural exchanges, and so on. These activities, concentrated in Bangkok and a few provincial capitals, constitute a minor part of the USIS effort. The second activity area, more directly related to USIS objectives, constitutes most of the USIS effort in Thailand. This effort has an up-country, rural orientation and is focused primarily on the North-east, North, and South. Programs in this area are implemented in cooperation with, and are attributed to, various RTG elements at all administrative levels. Program materials deal primarily with security and development themes.

## Field Operations

USIS Thailand has 13 Branch Posts in the countryside. Each is directed by a Branch Public Affairs Officer (BPAO), who is engaged in the following types of program efforts:

### 1. Military Affairs

BPAO's provide advice concerning local customs and conditions to U.S. military commanders. They also encourage and guide Civic Action and Troop-Community Relations programs.

### 2. Rural and Remote Area Information Programs

These programs emphasize joint U.S./RTG efforts in critical areas, Northeast, North, and South. They include the following:

a. Mobile Information Team (MIT) operations are designed to bring together the people of rural Thailand and their Amphoe and Changwat officials. An MIT is composed of a team leader, provincial officials, and a USIS group (usually composed of the BPAO, an Information Assistant, and a Multi-Media Unit Operator).

b. U.S./RTG Multi-Media Unit Operations which are, in effect, small-scale MIT's.

c. USIS Branch Post Officers and Thai employees average between 500 and 600 nights a month in village-level operations in cooperation with Thai officials. The role of the Thai official is to furnish inspiration and material support; that of USIS, to furnish propaganda material and, in some instances, transportation.

### 3. Support of RTG Special Groups

USIS supports a number of special RTG units in security and development efforts, primarily with media materials. Among the more important organizations supported are:

- a. Mobile Development Units;
- b. Special Operations Centers;
- c. Border Patrol Police;
- d. ARD Programs;

- e. Public Relations Department;
- f. Community Development Department.

### Information

#### 1. Radio

The major USIS radio effort in the Northeast is in support of the 50KW (station 909) National Security Command station at Sakon Nakhon. USIS provides a senior American program advisor and four assistants, all of whom are fluent in Northeast Thai dialect.

Major USIS programming, almost all of which is directed to the villager and is available to all stations 5 days a week, includes:

- a. A 30-minute daily radio drama with an anti-communist theme;
- b. A 30-minute daily radio drama with pro-development theme.
- c. A 30-minute daily radio drama with a pro-security theme.
- d. A 30-minute daily disc-jockey show, featuring music and commentary on the above three themes.
- e. A 45-minute daily mohlam show, with the same three themes "sandwiched" between songs.
- f. Several short daily programs produced by teams of field reporters in the northeast in support of basic themes.

USIS radio support goes to 60 stations, including the Sakon Nakhon 50KW. The Australian-built Korat and Khon Kaen 50KW's, for example, use USIS-organized material for approximately 80 percent of their programming.

Because the villager is the target for all these programs, most production is in Northeast Thai dialect.

#### 2. Publications

A theme packet on national security, development, or the communist threat is published monthly. Each packet consists of a pamphlet, a poster, and leaflet.

In addition, each month there is an anti-communist poster and a leaflet.

Seripharb Magazine is primarily devoted to security and development stories in Thailand.

Cartoon books in support of feature type motion pictures (see below).

### 3. Motion Pictures

a. Two full length, color, lip-synchronized sound, dramatic films are produced in the Northeast each year. These represent the core of the village motion picture program. Themes are anti-communism, security, and development.

b. Tactical films (10 to 20 minutes each) are produced to support local USIS programs. Seventeen have been produced this year and range from a Meo defector to a governor pushing a local low-interest loan program.

c. A news magazine (10 minutes) as a format for short security and development stories.

d. Documentaries (Mobile Development Unit's Mitrapharb, the U.S. President and the King, the Prime Minister speaks to remote villagers, and a color King's newsreel).

### 4. Distribution

USIS publications are distributed throughout much of Thailand. The amount of distribution varies according to the needs of each region.

### 5. General Assistance

USIS is engaged in support of a number of specific Thai operational and training programs. One full-time officer, for example, is assigned to CSOC in an advisory capacity for psychological operations. Another officer works closely with the Nai Amphur Academy in an effort to introduce psychological operations concepts into as many subjects in the curriculum as possible.

OTHER U.S. ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

Several other U.S.-sponsored aid efforts designed to improve the security situation in the countryside are worthy of note:

1. There is a major U.S.-RTG effort to consolidate various and sundry local security units now extant in the Northeast (for example, People's Action Teams, Village Security Officers, Police, Volunteer Defense Corps, and Village Protection Units) into a more coherent and effective Village Security Force. The United States is contemplating support for this new organization by assisting in its training and providing certain weapons and logistical support.

2. At present, the Embassy is supporting several RTG pilot projects in several of the "hotter" areas of the Northeast. Most of these programs, such as the Peoples' Assistance Team, are administered by the Department of Local Administration of the Ministry of Interior and receive training and logistic support from the United States.

Many of these programs are experimental in nature, and, like the Developing Democracy and Census Aspiration programs, are designed primarily as political action and intelligence teams rather than as military forces per se.

3. U.S. assistance is also being provided to key links in the CSOC chain of command.

4. The Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, through its project "AGILE," is assisting the RTG in coping with the problem of insurgency. Several substantial R&D projects, particularly the Rural Security Systems Program, which involves interested Thai agencies, are underway to assist the RTG in areas of command and control and border security. The emphasis is on assisting the Thai to improve their data gathering and analysis of data on villages in remote areas and to test a surveillance system on the Mekong River along the Laos border. Assistance in the development of an effective psychological operations program for CSOC is also being given.

In summary, it is fair to say that there are no major RTG counter-insurgency programs in effect or planned that do not receive some kind of U.S. assistance -- be it in the form of materiel, training, or advice. However, it should also be noted that the major fraction or all of the total effort is Thai inspired, supported, and administered. In most cases, the U.S. contribution is at best marginal, although many would argue that in some areas it is decisive.

SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS AND IMPRESSIONS

It is very difficult to measure the effects of U.S. aid supporting RTG counterinsurgency programs in the Northeast. One of the basic reasons for this is the dearth of data or reliable contemporary analyses on life and times in remote areas of the Kingdom. However, on the basis of recent field research under the direction of the USOM Research Division and several surveys by individual researchers under ARPA auspices, I believe that one may venture the following tentative findings regarding the impact of U.S. aid programs in certain areas of the Northeast:

o Generally, the impact of recent U.S.-supported RTG efforts to improve the local security environment by good works, better government, deployment of para-military units, and so forth is at best marginal. There are simply not enough men or resources yet involved in programs aimed at village problems to make a positive impression on more than a minor fraction of the population exposed to the CT. General appreciation of the role of U.S. programs seems generally to end at the amphoe level -- it does not penetrate into the villages unless they happen to be in close proximity to a major Accelerated Rural Development (ARD) project. A recent USOM Research Division report states that "our program areas appear to have done comparatively little to get villagers to recognize government interest in their needs, problems and opinions." However, it must be recognized that the basic objective of USOM projects at the rice-roots to stimulate greater RTG interest in the villages and to get the villages to mobilize their latent energies in the solution of basic village

problems is recent in origin and may be slow to take root at the village level.

o In the province of Sakon Nakhon, a priority target area for USOM-supported RTG programs, contact between officials and villagers is apparently little better than in provinces not judged so critical. Amphoe officials in Sakon Nakhon recognize and generally support the policy of their ministries to give high priority to greater contact with villagers. However, inadequate transportation, the uncertainties of per diem, lack of initiative on the part of many officials, and traditional suspicion and resistance to outside authority tend to depreciate significantly the political impact and effectiveness of aid programs -- no matter how well conceived or advised upon by U.S. officials.

o USOM researchers found no consistent correlation between respondents' statements with regard to living conditions and their views on security. In some areas the evidence tended to show that a higher proportion of those who stated that conditions were improving also stated that they were less secure. In other amphoes, there appeared to be a positive correlation between effective Mobile Development Units and ARD efforts and basic attitudes towards the RTG and security. The research team concluded that there is little or no correlation with regard to nationality, age, education, sex, occupation, fear of the CT, or the presence of USOM-supported programs. However, they did find some positive correlation between awareness of government interest and a higher sense of security -- attributed mainly to the presence of "government force."

o There is an abundance of testimony to the basic loyalty felt by the vast majority of villagers to King and country. However, these positive images are mitigated by regionalism, widespread bitterness toward the Government's failure to fulfill many promises of reform, and to provide security against bandits or the CT.

o Many villagers and provincial officials are particularly concerned about the ability of the CT to roam seemingly at will and of the government's inability to protect remote villages against the CT

or organized groups of outlaws. However, with a few exceptions, such as in Amphoe Kutbak in Sakon Nakhon, the majority of villagers interviewed appeared to be more than willing to cooperate fully with the government to achieve a better existence and to secure the village from the threat posed by bands of CT in the jungles if the government would provide the needed resources and an enlightened administration. Recent case histories of several areas favored by especially wise and energetic local officials, endowed with appropriate powers and adequate resources, indicate clearly that the security problem in the wilds of the Northeast is not as grave as many think.

o On the other hand, there is a great deal of evidence that the connection between development projects, even those that correspond to felt village needs such as a better well or small dams, and the willingness of the villagers to cooperate with the CT is at best tenuous. One can make a case for the contrary proposition, to wit, that U.S.-supported RTG efforts to counter CT agit-prop efforts through ARD and related projects are in the main unproductive and could in the long run be counter-productive. Much depends upon whether the RTG is able and willing to follow through on promises made and upon the quality and personality of local officials in critical areas.

o The fear of some researchers that interaction between the RTG and the CT in the Northeast, with the U.S. presence mixed in, is basically destabilizing, should not be taken lightly. For example, it could create a dangerous tide of rising expectations. This clearly indicates the need for timely follow-through actions, if the CT are to be discredited or pre-empted.

o Notwithstanding the nature and level of the RTG's economic aid efforts or what we do, it is probably true that in the final analysis the side for which the villager casts his vote depends mainly on the ability of the government to provide physical security. Military strength in itself may be misused or abused, but the absence of confidence in the ability of the RTG to deal effectively with armed bands of insurgents seems to dominate decisively any combination of positive factors, such as better schools, roads, good local government, and so on.

SOME BASIC QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

Although as a nation we have had a great deal of experience and some success in the planning and execution of foreign assistance programs since 1945, our record in the underdeveloped regions of the world is less than heroic. There are a number of reasons for this, such as Congressional constraints, changing aid philosophies and administrations, political upheavals in the target areas, and the need to adjust to certain Communist tactics. Yet in Thailand we have a comparatively ideal setting for a success story. The vast majority of the people are relatively prosperous, by Asian standards, and loyal to the King and other traditional Thai institutions, such as Buddhism. Although there are certain ethnic groups in the Northeast who are either disaffected or particularly vulnerable to those who sow discontent and rebellion, we have in Thailand a patient who appears to enjoy relatively good health and who is willing to cooperate with his doctors in the treatment of an incipient case of political cancer in certain areas of his body politic. In the words of the Governor of Ubon, U.S. aid efforts are like medicine on a wound: its effectiveness is dependent on its timely application, in correct amounts.

The basic issue seems to be not whether but how we can best assist this relatively prosperous ally in its efforts to fill the so-called vacuum in the Northeast with a positive governmental presence and markedly higher standards of living. For, as we have witnessed so painfully and at such great cost in Vietnam, the introduction of substantial amounts of commodity and technical assistance will not in itself lead to better administration in the countryside or to greater loyalty to the central government on the part of villagers. We would be ignoring the lessons of the past if we followed an aid strategy in Thailand that overemphasized commodity aid and technical assistance -- no matter how relevant it might be to the basic village requirements for water, roads, and so forth -- while neglecting such critical factors as the quality and number of local administrators or the psychology of village youth and the basic reasons for the success of the CT in recruiting or obtaining other forms of support from villagers in certain areas.

One cannot safely assume that improved living conditions will automatically reduce the likelihood of villagers supporting the CT. Reactions against the presence and acts of foreigners, the spirit of adventure, family ties, or the promise of an even better life may prove to be more powerful medicine than what we are getting the RTG to dispense in the Northeast.

None of this is said in support of those who argue that we should end all assistance to the RTG in the counterinsurgency area. Rather, it is a plea for a reassessment of how we plan and administer our multiple aid efforts in Thailand and what basic prerequisites we feel are necessary for the RTG to meet if it is to use this aid effectively in the pursuit of agreed objectives. For example, we have in Thailand at least three U.S. agencies administering military assistance of one kind or another, and several are active in the political-psychological area. On the Thai side, there is an equal melange of agencies concerned with security and development at the village level. While there may be general consensus on the importance of extending more positive governmental rule in remote areas, there seems to be a confusing array of separate approaches to how this can best be done and by whom.

Given the inescapable problem of conflicting agency concepts and bureaucratic rivalries on both sides, plus the intimate nature of the relationship between the governed and the governors in the countryside, one is tempted to recommend that the United States simply donate a line of credit for a fixed amount of commodities and technical assistance that the RTG judges to be critical to their priority counterinsurgency programs. The particulars of an approved authorization could be negotiated between the Ambassador and the Prime Minister, or his chosen alternate, but administration at the local level would be left clearly in the hands of designated Thai authority.

This may not be the best alternative and it would probably be unacceptable to the Congress, but it would place responsibility for the counterinsurgency effort more definitively in Thai hands, thus avoiding the many disadvantages of greater U.S. involvement in what

is basically a matter of internal security. For example, it would go far toward nullifying CT propaganda against the "U.S. takeover;" moreover, it would give the United States, through the Ambassador, greater bargaining power in obtaining RTG agreement to carry out those reforms or programs which we regard as most crucial to the success of the counterinsurgency effort.

Alternatively, we could focus more of our efforts in the area of "institution building," improving the system of education, getting better and more qualified teachers, technicians and administrators out into the countryside, and so on. It may be that U.S. assistance in these areas would produce much more lasting and positive benefits than equal expenditures on "impact" programs.

There are many considerations against this strategy. The depth of our involvement in the security of Southeast Asia, particularly the presence of large numbers of military forces in the Northeast, make it imperative for us to have a full appreciation of the situation at the village level. Moreover, in order to know what kind of reforms the RTG should undertake, we should know what is happening in the countryside. The main sources of detailed, pertinent data on the situation in the sensitive areas of the Northeast are our advisors, USOM, JUSMAG, and others. Consequently, a decision to disengage from the way we are now doing business would not be without some risks.

In the final analysis, however, internal security is essentially a Thai problem, and we should be unwilling to go further than offering aid or advice when requested and when it is clearly necessary to get the Thai to shift priorities or reinforce an ongoing effort. Such an approach would, I think, be most consistent with what I regard as our fundamental, long-range objectives in Thailand -- the preservation of the freedom and integrity of a Thai government both responsible and responsive to the basic needs and aspirations of the Thai people.

ADDENDA

I. Projects in Protection Segments of USOM Program

1. A static protection unit in every ARD village by 1972.
2. An adequate reaction force of 8 to 150 police or paramilitary and/or military personnel, as required, available to every ARD village within 40 minutes by 1972.
3. Two radios (police and civil) in each ARD village by 1972.
4. An adequately manned tambol police station in every ARD tambol by 1972 (average of 20 men per station).
5. 100 percent personnel increase of the Provincial and Border Patrol Police by 1972.
6. RTG funding by 1972 for one-half of all police equipment required from abroad -- full RTG funding by 1977.

II. USOM Major Quantitative Targets in Rural Development  
Over the Next 5 to 10 Years

- Double Northeast farmer income in five years (mid-1972).
- Develop projects in half of the Northeast villages by 1972 and at least one project in every Northeast village by 1977.
- Build all-weather roads to every ARD amphur by 1972 and to every tambol by 1977.
- Construct service tracks to or within five kilometers of every ARD village by 1972 and to all ARD villages themselves by 1977.
- Train 8,000 ARD equipment operators, mechanics, and technicians by mid-1972.
- Provide Developing Democracy Programs in every ARD tambol and Village Leader training in every ARD village at least once within five years.
- Train 4,500 rural health personnel for the ARD area within five years.
- Drill 6,300 wells in five years and four times as many by 1977.
- Provide educational facilities for every child in the ARD area through seventh grade by 1972 and through secondary school by 1977.
- Supply 10 million textbooks for village primary schools in five years.
- Eradicate malaria by 1972.
- Establish training units in every ARD amphur.
- Provide jeeps for all technical ministry professional personnel in the ARD areas and assure RTG facilities and budget for their continued operation.
- Set up a 500,000 baht fund for each amphur development committee.

- Show information films regularly in each village.
- Secure RTG funding of one-half of imported ARD equipment by 1972 and for all of it by 1977.

III. USIS and USOM-Funded Counterinsurgency-Related Programs

<u>USIS Programs</u>	<u>Responsible RTG Ministry</u>
Distribution	
Experimental Exchange	
Field Operations	
Film Production	
Publications and Exhibits	
Radio	
Television	
<u>ARD Programs</u>	
Engineering	Prime Minister
Planning and Coordination	Prime Minister
Special Projects	Prime Minister
Thai Training for ARD	Education
Village Wells	National Development
<u>Other Programs</u>	
Agribusiness -- Checchi Contract	Prime Minister
Agribusiness -- Farmer Group Support	Prime Minister
Agricultural Economics	Agriculture
Civil Police Administration	Interior
Community Development	Interior
Comprehensive Rural Health	Public Health
Farm Credit	National Development
50KW Radio Transmitter	Defense
Improvement of Agricultural Land	National Development
Local Government Administration	Interior
Malaria Eradication	Public Health
Mobile Development Units	Defense
Northeast Agricultural Center	Agriculture
Potable Water	Public Health
Rural Education	Education
Rural Electrification	National Development
Village Radio Project	Interior
Village Security Officers	Interior