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Political Coalition Breaking and Sustainability of Policy Reform

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This paper examines conceptually the need and potential for coalition breaking in policy reform efforts related to agriculture and the environment. The object is to consider compensation schemes enacted by means of traditional policy tools that can break existing coalitions given the powerful noncompetitive role of strong interest groups such as government bureaucracy and large trading institutions. Choice of the policy mix is considered as a cooperative bargaining problem. A generalization of Nash bargaining is used to endogenize coalition formation and size determination. This framework is then used to examine the potential for an external development agency to induce inclusion of environmental interests in dominant coalitions influencing policy formation. The results offer some potential explanations for observed production below marginal cost by environmentally damaging industries and show that the potential for gaining environmental improvements by strategic use of international aid is a complex issue. The results explain how the marginal payoff to strategic aid may be relatively constant in some countries while, in others, a small increase in strategic aid may achieve a major payoff even though past activities have been unproductive, and in others such activities can be expected to be fruitless even with a major increase in aid. The richness of the results follows from considering alternative possibilities for benefits to various interest groups in the shadow coalitions.

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Political Coalition Breaking and Sustainability of Policy Reform

Executive Summary

Background

Many policies and institutions that have been in place in developing countries for many years have the effect of redistributing welfare in favor of powerful vested interests and constituencies. Policy reform efforts are directed at removing the social inefficiencies arising from these policies and institutions. Accordingly, most welfare improving policy reforms tend to adversely affect some special interest group(s). When powerful interest groups are adversely affected, even the best policy reforms from the public interest perspective are blocked by interest group efforts to influence the political process. Moreover, when welfare improving policies are successfully enacted, their beneficial effects are often partially or wholly mitigated by welfare redistributing policies enacted under ensuing pressure from adversely affected interest groups. These realities imply that a sustainable coalition of interest groups may be necessary to make welfare improving policies politically feasible. Effective policy reform requires considering how new interest groups can be formed and integrated into the policy process so that previously unrepresented or under-represented interests such as environmental concerns are given more appropriate consideration.

Objective and Approach

This paper examines conceptually the need and potential for coalition breaking in policy reform efforts related to agriculture and the environment. The objective is to consider compensation schemes enacted by means of traditional policy tools that can break existing coalitions given the powerful noncompetitive role of strong interest groups such as government bureaucracy and large trading institutions. Choice of the policy mix is considered as a cooperative bargaining problem. A generalization of Nash bargaining is used to endogenize coalition formation and size determination. This framework is then used to examine the potential for an external development agency to induce inclusion of environmental interests in dominant coalitions influencing policy formation.

Results

In many countries, complementary relationships have arisen between government and prominent private firms historically. This paper shows how this behavior explains some observed production below marginal cost. Such agreements raise the government's utility above a noncooperative outcome, but often contribute to poor environmental conditions.

Then that environmental groups can supplant industry in the reigning coalition or in the shadow coalition that determines the bargaining outcome of the reigning coalition by offering compensation in return for specific policy reform. Which outcome prevails depends on the financial resources of the environmental group, the utility it gets from environmental protection, and the contribution of industry to the economy. If external development agencies join forces with internal environmental interests or represent these interests at the bargaining table, then financial resources are more likely to be sufficient.

The results of this paper suggest that the potential for environmental improvements by strategic use of international aid is a complex issue. Marginal analysis may be of little value in identifying the most productive opportunities. In some countries, the marginal payoff of previous activities may continue in future endeavors. In other countries, a small increase in activities may achieve a major payoff even though past activities have been unproductive. In still other countries, unproductive activities can be expected to remain unproductive even with a major increase in effort.

The key in each case is to examine the characteristics of major interactions among government, the private sector, and environmental concerns. Assessment of the marginal improvement that can be purchased with a given increment in strategic aid may be much less important than determining how much strategic aid can cause a coalition or even a shadow coalition to break. Expanding strategic aid beyond these levels may be futile unless credible additional conditions can be imposed. The results demonstrate that increasing external incentives may have limited marginal success in the context of a given coalition but may achieve distinct break-throughs when the reigning coalition is altered.

At any point in time, a development agency faces a portfolio of development opportunities involving many countries. The problem is one of choosing the portfolio with the greatest payoff. Clearly, the success or performance of development activities depends on identifying potential break-throughs and administering levels of incentives precisely to attain those break-throughs.

Political Coalition Breaking and Sustainability of Policy Reform

1. Introduction

Many policies and institutions that have been in place in developing countries for many years have the effect of redistributing welfare in favor of powerful vested interests and constituencies including members of government bureaucracies. Policy reform efforts are directed at removing the social inefficiencies arising from these policies and institutions. Accordingly, most welfare improving policy reforms tend to adversely affect some interest group(s). When powerful interest groups are adversely affected, even the best policy reforms from the public interest perspective are blocked by interest group efforts to influence the political process. Moreover, when welfare improving policies are successfully enacted, their beneficial effects are often partially or wholly mitigated by welfare redistributing policies enacted under ensuing pressure from adversely affected interest groups. These realities imply that schemes to make welfare improving policies politically acceptable and sustainable must consider existing coalitions, what measures are necessary to break existing coalitions, and what policies can make new coalitions feasible and preferred by their members. That is, useful policy reforms must be supported by new sustainable coalitions if they are to be sustainable.

One problem where these considerations are crucial is implementation of resource management policy in developing countries. Such activities call for political bargaining and negotiation both inside and outside of government (Honadle and Cooper; Gamman; Wilson and Morren). Many significant domestic policy problems related to agriculture and the environment have strong special interest groups supporting economic growth concerns, consumers, trading organizations, and producers. These interest groups are often sufficiently powerful to block environmental interests related to biodiversity, range management, forestry management, water quality, and soil conservation. For example, environmental restrictions on range land use are

perceived as detrimental by agricultural producers and government officials concerned with economic growth. Resource management restrictions have the effect of transferring income among producer, consumer and environmental groups. Can available policy instruments be used to compensate key interest groups and break the coalitions blocking environmental policies?

The objective of this paper is to examine conceptually the need and potential for coalition breaking in policy reform efforts related to agriculture and the environment. Several preliminary studies have been undertaken along these lines. However, these studies evaluate welfare assuming unrealistic lump sum transfers and assume competitive reactions of individual agents to alternative compensation schemes. The objective here is to consider compensation schemes that can break existing coalitions in the context of possibilities that are institutionally feasible and politically sustainable given the powerful noncompetitive role of strong interest groups. These problems are typified by collective action of strong groups representing, for example, government bureaucracy and trading institutions. A fundamental problem with the adoption of effective policies for environmental preservation in poor developing countries is that most concerns, including high level government officials, see economic growth as a first priority and environmental policies are viewed as counterproductive to that goal at least in the short run. For example, in the literature on sustainable agriculture in Africa, incentives to abuse lands in order to feed growing populations have tended to outweigh those of natural resource management (Falloux and Mukendi; Okigbo).

This paper considers the choice of a policy mix as a cooperative bargaining problem among the various parties. Cooperative bargaining has been a common technique for modeling government action. It has appeared both in the case where the government acts unilaterally but is subject to political pressure from interest groups (Beghin and Karp) and where it acts

multilaterally with other countries, multinational firms, or centrally organized groups within its own border (Chan).

Bargaining among a fixed group of players is typically modeled using a (possibly asymmetric) Nash bargaining solution (NBS), where the chosen actions maximize the product of the utility gains. The possibility that coalitions may form or that the number of players who participate is endogenous has been considered primarily in the context of games to divide a fixed surplus (Hart and Kurz, 1983; Aumann and Myerson, 1988), but, most international development programs involve a joint decision, such as a mix of development projects and fiscal policy variables, the outcome of which has many of the features of a public good. This suggests a game with nontransferable utility.

Cooperative games with more than two (potential) players and nontransferaole utility have been analyzed by Thomson and Lensberg among others (see Thomson and Lensberg, 1989). Allowing the parties in such games to have explicit economic or political roles can be modeled by considering an asymmetric NBS in which solutions are determined by

$$\max_{x} \prod_{i} (u^{i}(x) - \bar{u}^{i})^{\alpha_i}$$

where the u^i are utility functions, x is a vector of choice variables, and the α_i are weights in the interior of a multi-dimensional simplex. This is the unique solution that satisfies individual rationality, invariance with respect to affine transformations of utility, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. Utility gains to one player may be weighted more highly than gains to another player and the chosen levels of the policy instruments will reflect more the preferences of the player with the higher weight. The source of the asymmetry in such models is usually unclear. Also, an explicit coalition formation mechanism has not typically been part of the Nash bargaining approach.

This paper develops an alternative model of policy formation. It explicitly considers the source of power in bargaining games and includes an explicit rule for coalition formation, determination of coalition size and membership and, potentially, for coalition breaking. The model can be contrasted with the asymmetric-political-power model which uses an asymmetric Nash solution with weights reflecting players' political strength (*e.g.*, Beghin and Karp). That model is best seen as one in which a single outsider (the bureaucrat or decision-maker) chooses a policy that affects the set of players. The players may undertake to influence the decision maker and their ability to do so reflects their political power. The model here is one in which players jointly choose and carry out the solution. Players' political power, if present, must be used to persuade not some outside decision-maker but the other players to agree to the actions favorable to them. These considerations are motivated by the fact that government bureaucrats in many countries are major players both in terms of enacting ad hoc policies and receiving associated rents (or bribes). Similar considerations may apply in developed countries where rents are in the form of political contributions.

2. A solution concept for simple games with an essential player

Consider first a general model of a game with n players who must come to a multidimensional decision $x \in X$. Utilities are u^i, defined on X, $i = 1, \ldots, n$. In the absence of an agreement, utility is $\bar{u}^i$. An agent is either a member of the winning coalition or not.[1] Let C be the set of possible coalitions and let X_c, $c \in C$, be the set of feasible decisions when the winning coalition is c. Where x_c is chosen by the winning coalition c, each player

[1]This is known as a *simple game*. A coalition is "an agreement among two or more persons to coordinate their actions" (Ordeshook, p. 302).

i receives utility $u^i(x_c)$. For players who are not members of the winning coalition c, $u^i(x_c)$ represents the highest utility that can be achieved given x_c.

Consider a coalition between agents 1 and 2. If they reach an agreement, then the standard axioms (symmetry with respect to individuals, individual rationality, invariance with respect to affine transformations of utility, and independence of irrelevant alternatives) are invoked to imply that it must be the symmetric Nash solution given by

$$\max_{x \in X_n} [u^1(x) - \bar{u}^1] [u^2(x) - \bar{u}^2].$$

Only outcomes in which all components of the product are nonnegative will be considered. Let x_{12} be a solution to the above problem, if a solution exists. More generally, define x_{ij} as the solution to a symmetric two-player Nash bargaining problem involving players i and j with threat point $(\bar{u}^i, \bar{u}^j)$.

Now give agent 1 the power to choose the bargaining group, *i.e.*, the coalition. He must be part of any coalition and is called an *essential player*. Although the presence of an essential player in the game appears to restrict the generality of the solution concept, it is in fact a characteristic of a large number of bargaining situations, such as between firms and labor unions (the owner of capital is the essential player) or between sovereign governments and their creditors (the government is the essential player). An extension of the solution concept to games with more than one essential player, or no essential player, is clearly desirable but not considered in the present paper.

Conditional on a two-player coalition forming, agent 1 chooses the coalition that provides him with the highest utility. His utility from the two-player bargaining game is

$$u^{1*}_{(2)} = \max_j [u^1(x_{1j})]$$

if $u^1(x_{1j}) \geq \bar{u}^1$ for at least one j. If $u^1(x_{1j}) < \bar{u}^1$ for all j, define $u^{1*}_{(2)}$ arbitrarily with $u^{1*}_{(2)} < \bar{u}^1$.

Next, consider possible three-player coalitions. If a three-player coalition forms, we assume a symmetric three-player game is played, but the relevant threat point depends on the two-player game that would otherwise have been played.[2] Suppose $u^{1*}_{(2)} = u^1(x_{12})$ (that is, the best two-player coalition for player 1 is {1,2}). The outcome x_{12} becomes the threat point for the three-player game. The solution for the three agent game between 1, 2, and 3 is defined as

$$\max_{x \in X_{123}} [u^1(x) - u^1(x_{12})]\,[u^2(x) - u^2(x_{12})]\,[u^3(x) - u^3(x_{12})] \tag{1}$$

if a solution exists. On the other hand, if the best two-player coalition for player 1 is {1,3} then the outcome in that two-player game is the relevant threat point for the three-player game and the solution is

$$\max_{x \in X_{123}} [u^1(x) - u^1(x_{13})]\,[u^2(x) - u^2(x_{13})]\,[u^3(x) - u^3(x_{13})]. \tag{2}$$

Let $u^{1*}_{(3)} = \max[u^1(x_{1jk}) \,|\, j]$ be the utility value to player 1 from the three-player bargaining game when {1,j} is the best two-player coalition for player 1. We call {1,j} the *shadow coalition*. The solution requires $u^1(x_{123}) \geq u^1(x_{1j})$, $u^2(x_{123}) \geq u^2(x_{1j})$, and $u^3(x_{123}) \geq u^3(x_{1j})$. If a solution to this set of inequalities does not exist, then write $u^{1*}_{(3)} < u^{1*}_{(2)}$.

If a four player coalition forms, the solution is the symmetric NBS where the relevant threat point is the best agreement player 1 can obtain in all smaller games. The extension to coalitions of arbitrary size m is straightforward. In words, the proposed solution of an n-player game is the Nash solution of a symmetric bargaining game where the threat point is the vector

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[2]Although the motivation is different, the intuition is similar to Grossman and Hart's (1986) model of vertical integration, in which players' control of decision variables affects their disagreement point in a bargaining game.

of utilities in the best n - 1 player agreement that player 1 can achieve. The final (winning) coalition is of size m such that $u^{1*}_{(m)} \geq u^{1*}_{(j)}$ for all $j < m$. Utility for player i is $u^{i*}_{(m)}$

In many bargaining situations, agents 2 and 3 might consider teaming up to drive a harder bargain with agent 1. In the situation we consider, however, the only threat an agent can make is to leave the game. The threat by players 2 and 3 jointly to leave the game is not credible because they receive only utilities $\overline{u}^2$, $\overline{u}^3$, and then one or both players can be tempted back if $u^2(x_{12}) \geq \overline{u}^2$ or $u^3(x_{13}) \geq \overline{u}^3$. Another possible threat in the three-player game is for player 2 to quit. If $u^{1*}_{(2)} = u^1(x_{12})$, then if player 2 quits the three-player game, player 1 will not remain with player 3 but will quit and join up with player 2. Player 2's utility is $u^2(x_{12})$; this is precisely her threat point for the three-player game.

A third possible bargain in the two-player game {1,2} is that player 2 tries to get player 1 to agree not to bring in player 3. If {1,2} is preferred by player 1 to {1,3} then the threat by player 2 to quit if this agreement is abrogated is credible. Therefore the game {1,2,3} must guarantee utility $u^2(x_{12})$ to player 2. If {1,3} is preferred by player 1 over {1,2}, then player 2's threat in {1,2} can be countered simply by offering her $u^2(x_{13})$ in the game {1,2,3}.

Many of the attributes of the proposed solution are shared by the NBS. A solution is guaranteed to exist; there is no cycling of group preferences. The solution has the desirable property that the outcome is independent of the order in which coalitions are given the chance to form (see Aumann and Myerson). Like the NBS, a player's utility does not necessarily increase when X_c expands (Friedman).

There are at least two desirable properties of this solution, however, that distinguish it from the NBS. These are described in Results 1 through 2.

Result 1: Let $n = 3$. Suppose player 1 would prefer a coalition with player 2 over a coalition with player 3. Then a necessary condition for player 3 to be included is $X_{12} \subseteq X_{123}$.

In most models of cooperative public good provision with a variable number of agents, including a (possibly asymmetric) Nash bargaining game, a player is helped by adding to the game players with similar preferences, eve if the possibility set shrinks. In our proposed solution, a similarity of preferences between 1 and 3, for example, is not sufficient for player 3 to be added to the coalition {1,2} if {1,2} is the best two-player coalition for player 1. Player 3 must bring added opportunities. If players 1 and 3 are governments of developing countries, this result implies that they gain nothing from bargaining together with an outside development agency unless this brings expanded opportunities to the negotiating table.

An example where two countries might be included in joint talks is negotiations for development aid and flood control between India and Bangladesh. Let India, the World Bank, and Bangladesh be players 1, 2, 3, respectively. Given the choice between negotiations with Bangladesh and with the World Bank, India would almost surely rather conduct negotiations with the World Bank ($u^{1*}_{(2)} = u^1(x_{12}) > u^1(x_{13})$). India would agree to including Bangladesh in its aid talks only if joint India-Bangladesh water projects are discussed ($X_{12} \subset X_{123}$). The promise of including water projects in the negotiations may not be sufficient, however, to make three-way talks acceptable to India.

Result 2: Let $X_c = X \ \forall \ c$. Let the best two-player game for player 1 be {1,2}. An increase in $\bar{u}^1$ (weakly) raises $u^{1*}_{(m)}$ and lowers $u^{2*}_{(m)}$.

An increase in player 1's reservation utility puts him in a better bargaining position in the {1,2} game and therefore raises $u^1(x_{12})$ and lowers $u^2(x_{12})$. This puts player 1 in a better bargaining position in the three-player game and hence in all subsequent games. Likewise, it puts player 2 in a worse bargaining position in the three-player game and in all subsequent games. That an increase in player 1's reservation utility increases his eventual payoff is natural. It makes sense too that at least one other player should be made worse off because X_c is fixed for all c. Under the proposed solution, it is possible to determine which player this will be; it will be the player who has accrued "extra" bargaining power, above his reservation utility, for the m-player game by being a participant in smaller games. Under the NBS, an increase in $\bar{u}^1$ raises player 1's utility and lowers the utility of at least one other player, but it is impossible to predict which player this is in general.

3. A simple example of interest groups in a developing country

To demonstrate potential application of the solution concept developed in Section 2, consider a simple model of interest groups in a developing country where environmental concerns are externally important but internally of little interest to government. Major interest groups are government bureaucracy, trading institutions, and environmental groups. Suppose interests of other groups such as producer and consumer groups are taken into account in a reduced form sense insofar as they matter to government bureaucrats.

The utility of the government bureaucracy is represented by $u^g = r + \lambda\pi$ where r is government revenue and π represents private interests of producers and consumers. The private interests of producers and consumers may be regarded as the net private balance of trade for a competitive economy with net (restricted) profit function $\pi(p)$ reflecting private economic welfare where p is the price of the aggregate good produced and exported. Alternatively, π may

be regarded as a reduced-form net benefit function for domestic producers and consumers, taking into account problems of hunger that result from tight environmental restrictions and low producer prices when sufficient food production is not induced. In either case, reasonable assumptions include $\pi_p = q > 0$, $\pi_{pp} = q_p > 0$ where q is aggregate supply of the exported good. Government revenue is derived from export taxes with $r = tq$ where t is the ad valorem export tax. Let z(q) be the quantity of an environmental good such as biodiversity, rain forest, or range quality "used up" by production, with $z_q > 0$.

In many countries, major exports are traded by exporting institutions such as marketing boards. In such cases, the officials of the exporting institutions are pseudo-bureaucrats who typically benefit from the margins charged. Alternatively, private exporting institutions may act as middlemen who profit by the trading margin. In either case, the interests of the exporting institution are represented by the utility function $u^x = mq$ which is the profit earned from a per unit margin of m on the exported quantity q. Using a small country assumption, suppose world price is $\bar{p}$ so that domestic price after marketing margins and export taxes is $p = \bar{p} - m - t$.

Environmental interests are represented by the utility function $u^e = y + v(q) - b$ where y is wealth/income of the environmental group and b is a payment made to the developing country government (possibly to bureaucrats) to induce environmental preservation, sometimes labeled a bribe. A reasonable assumption is $y - b \geq 0$. Disutility from environmental destruction is $v(q) \equiv v(z(q))$ with $v_q < 0$. With the addition of the bribe payment, the utility of government becomes $u^g = tq + \lambda\pi + b$. The environmental group may be either an external interest such as a development agency of a developed government or a local in-country group. The external group can intervene by supplementing the income of the environmental group or the "bribe" payment to government as an additional incentive to protect global aspects of the

environment. The objective of external intervention would be to discourage environmentally damaging production activity by raising export taxes.

Consider first the noncooperative Nash equilibrium which corresponds to the case where no coalitions form. In this case, trading institutions maximize utility by choosing the margin m to satisfy first order condition

$$u_m^x = q - mq_p = 0 \tag{3}$$

which yields $m = q/q_p > 0$.

The government bureaucracy maximizes utility by choosing the export tax rate to satisfy

$$u_t^g = q - tq_p - \lambda q = 0$$

which yields $t = (1 - \lambda)q/q_p$ and thus price level $p = p_0 \equiv \bar{p} - (2 - \lambda)q/q_p$. If the government values its revenues more highly than private profits at the margin, this tax rate is positive. This is typical of developing countries which tend to tax exports as compared to developed countries which tend to subsidize exports.

Now consider the impact of cooperation between x and g. The symmetric NBS satisfies

$$\max_{m,t} \Delta_0^g \Delta_0^x \tag{4}$$

where, in general, $\Delta_0^i = u^i - \bar{u}_0^i$ and $\bar{u}_0^i$ is the utility of group i in the noncooperative case, $i = g, x, e$. First-order conditions are

$$-(tq_p + \lambda q)\Delta_0^x + (q - mq_p)\Delta_0^g = 0 \tag{5}$$

$$(q - tq_p - \lambda q)\Delta_0^x - mq_p\Delta_0^g = 0 \tag{6}$$

which have solution $t + m = (1 - \lambda)q/q_p$ so that price becomes $p = p_{gx} \equiv \bar{p} - (1 - \lambda)q/q_p$. Substituting into the latter condition further reveals $\Delta_0^x = \Delta_0^g$. This result demonstrates that the coalition will reduce the export tax plus marketing margin so that domestic price rises, which induces more production. This results in greater welfare for private producers and consumers whose benefits are represented in π.

In this case as well as the no collusion case, the environmental group has no influence and thus maximizes its utility by setting $b = 0$. Without environmental policies, cooperation between g and x results in heavier environmental degradation than no cooperation. Thus, breaking this coalition would be important for environmental interests even if no further bargains between the environmental group and government occur.

4. Export taxes and environmental policy

To analyze the role of environmental groups, consider the outcome when the government deals with, and only with, the environmental group. An agreement satisfies

$$\max_{t,b} \Delta_0^g \Delta_0^e. \tag{7}$$

In this case, the exporting institution is assumed to choose m noncooperatively as in (3) with solution $m = q/q_p$. Two possible outcomes occur depending on whether the income constraint of the environmental group, $y - b \geq 0$, is binding. If the constraint is not binding, then first order conditions are

$$(q - tq_p - \lambda q)\Delta_0^e - v_q q_p \Delta_0^g = 0 \tag{8}$$

$$\Delta_0^e - \Delta_0^g = 0 \tag{9}$$

which have solution $t = (1 - \lambda)(q/q_p) - v_q$ and $p = p_{ge} = \bar{p} - (2 - \lambda)q/q_p + v_q$. If the constraint is binding, then only the condition in (8) applies along with $y = h$ which yields

$$t = \frac{(v - \bar{u}_0^e)(1 - \lambda)q/q_p - v_q(\lambda\pi + y - \bar{u}_0^g)}{v + v_q q - \bar{u}_0^e} \tag{10}$$

where the latter equality follows from $p = \bar{p} - m - t$ and $m = q/q_p$.

Solutions to (8) and (9) are parameterized by m and the solution to (3) is parameterized by t. The outcome for the nonbinding-constraint case is the simultaneous solution to the system of equations (3), (8), and (9). Clearly, $t + m$ in the government-environmental coalition (denoted $t_{ge} + m_{ge}$) is larger than in the non-cooperative solution (denoted $t_0 + m_0$) in which case $t + m$ is larger than in the government-trader coalition (denoted $t_{gx} + m_{gx}$). Thus, price and production among the three cases have the inverse ordering, $p_{ge} < p_0 < p_{gx}$ and $q_{ge} < q_0 < q_{gx}$. While more difficult to show, this relationship also holds in the income constrained case as well.

In the case where all three groups are involved in negotiations, the agreement must satisfy

$$\max_{t,m,b} \Delta^g \Delta^x \Delta^e \tag{11}$$

where $\Delta^i = u^i - \bar{u}^i$. Disagreement utilities depend on the shadow coalition and are given by

$$\bar{u}^i = \begin{cases} \bar{u}_{gx}^i \text{ if } \bar{u}_{gx}^g > \bar{u}_{ge}^g \\ \bar{u}_{ge}^i \text{ if } \bar{u}_{gx}^g < \bar{u}_{ge}^g, \end{cases} \qquad i = g, x, e,$$

where $\bar{u}_{gx}^i$ and $\bar{u}_{ge}^i$ represent the optimal utility level of group i under the {g, x} and {g, e} coalitions, respectively.

For this problem, one can verify that the three-player coalition will always form. That is, starting from starting from any two-player outcome, there exists a policy triplet {m, t, b} that makes all parties better off.[3] By total differentiation of utilities, a solution to the three-player game exists if dt, dm, and db satisfy

$$du^g = (q - tq_p - \lambda q)\, dt - (tq_p + \lambda q)\, dm + db > 0 \tag{12}$$

$$du^x = -mq_p\, dt + (q - mq_p)\, dm > 0 \tag{13}$$

$$du^e = -v_q q_p(dt + dm) - db > 0. \tag{14}$$

Starting from {g, x}, (6) implies $q - tq_p - \lambda q > 0$ and (5) implies $q - mq_p > 0$, and (5) and (6) together imply $(tq_p + \lambda q)/(q - tq_p - \lambda q) = (q - mq_p)/(mq_p)$. Thus, (13) implies $(q - tq_p - \lambda q)\, dt - (tq_p + \lambda q)\, dm < 0$ which together with (12) implies $db > 0$. This in turn implies $dt + dm > 0$ in (14). Any $dt > 0$, $dm > 0$, and $db > 0$ suffices provided that $-v_q q_p(dt + dm) > db > -(q - tq_p - \lambda q)\, dt + (tq_p - \lambda q)\, dm > 0$, which is clearly possible.

Similarly, starting from {g, e}, if income is not constraining, (3) implies that $dt < 0$ from (13) and (8)-(9) imply $q - tq_p - \lambda q = v_q q_p < 0$ so that adding (12) and (14) yields $-qdm > 0$ and $dm < 0$. Thus, from (12) and (14), any $dt < 0$, $dm < 0$, and $db < 0$ suffices provided $-v_q q_p(dt + dm) > db > -v_q q_p(dt + dm) + q\, dm$ which is clearly possible. Alternatively, if income is constraining in {g, e}, then $v - \bar{u}_0^e > 0$ and $tq + \lambda\pi + y - \bar{u}_0^g > 0$ which implies that $q - tq_p - \lambda q < 0$ so the same proof follows.

These results show that the three-player coalition will improve the environment over the two-player case if {g,x} is the shadow coalition ($dt + dm > 0$ cause p and q to fall). This is

[3]There exist other, reasonable economic models in which three-way cooperation is not valuable; in other words, a two-player coalition is winning.

accomplished by the environmental group paying a positive bribe as compensation. On the other hand, the three-player coalition leads to more environmental degradation compared to the two-player case if {g,e} is the shadow coalition (dt, dm < 0 cause p and q to rise). The environmental group is compensated by reducing the amount of the bribe (db < 0).

Given that a three-player coalition will always occur, relevant questions are, what do the agreements look like, and how are they affected by the shadow coalition?

5. Cooperation and the social optimum

An interesting question is how behavior with full cooperation, the three-player outcome, differs from the outcome that maximizes the sum of benefits over all groups, also known as the Egalitarian solution. (Note that the sum of compensating and equivalent variations for this problem are unambiguously equal to $\Delta^g + \Delta^x + \Delta^e$.) To examine this relationship, consider first order conditions for the three-player solution in (11) when the income constraint is not binding,

$$(q - tq_p - \lambda q)\,\Delta^x\,\Delta^e - mq_p\,\Delta^g\,\Delta^e - v_q q_p\,\Delta^g\,\Delta^x = 0 \tag{15}$$

$$-(tq_p + \lambda q)\,\Delta^x\,\Delta^e + (q - mq_p)\,\Delta^g\,\Delta^e - v_q q_p\,\Delta^g\,\Delta^x = 0 \tag{16}$$

$$\Delta^x\,\Delta^e - \Delta^g\,\Delta^x = 0. \tag{17}$$

From (17) $\Delta^e = \Delta^g$ which from (15) and (16) implies $t + m = (1 - \lambda)(q/q_p) - v_q$ and $p = p_{gxe} = \bar{p} - (1 - \lambda)q/q_p + v_q$. Clearly, $p_{ge} < p_{gxe} < p_{gx}$ and thus $q_{ge} < q_{gxe} < q_{gx}$. Furthermore, if government assigns a weight $\lambda = 1$ to the private interests of producers and consumers, then this outcome is equivalent to classical social welfare maximization where the marginal social benefit of production, $\bar{p}$, is equal to marginal private cost, p, plus the marginal "external" cost,

$-v_q$. If $\lambda < 1$, then production is below the social optimum consistent with exploitation of private producers and consumers. In either case, bargaining plays the role of determining t, m, and b to divide the social welfare pie among the three players where pricing and production are fixed (at the social optimum if $\lambda = 1$). Thus, if income is not constraining, then bargaining and bribery by external agencies has no effect on prices, production, and environmental degradation even though it may influence income distribution.

6. Dependence of outcomes on the shadow coalition in poor countries

A more interesting case in the context of developing countries is where the income constraint of environmental groups is binding. In this case, the bargaining solution for the three-player case satisfies (15), (16), and $y = b$. While this case is more difficult to treat analytically, a simple example can serve to illustrate important principles. Suppose $\lambda = 0$, $\pi = p^2/2$, $v = -q$, and $\bar{p} = 3$. This choice normalizes parameters so that price and production as well as the utility of both government and the exporter are 1 in the no collusion case. It also sets the marginal environmental damage equal to 1, which is one-third of the world value of production, so that utility of the environmental group is $y - 1$.

An understanding of the three-player outcome requires determining the appropriate threat point from the two-player game. Table 1 shows values of t, m, and p that occur in the (best) two-player game. Using the results of sections 3 and 4, the two-player results can be determined as a function of income of the environmental group as in Table 1. The interesting result in Table 1 is that when income is below some level y_0, {g,x} will be the shadow coalition, since the environmental group does not have sufficient economic resources to "break" it. It could not pay the government a sufficient amount to induce cooperation with the environmental group instead of the exporter. At intermediate income levels ($y_0 < y < y_1$), the environmental group

could offer a sufficient bribe to break the government-exporter coalition, thus {g,e} is the appropriate shadow coalition. At higher income levels ($y > y_1$), {g,e} is still the shadow coalition, but the income constraint is not biding.

Note that $\bar{p}/2 = p(y_0) > (\bar{p} - 1)/3 = p(y_1)$ so the price/production/environmental-damage response to income of the environmental group is continuous and non-increasing in environmental group income. Similarly, government utility is continuous and non-decreasing. The utility of the exporter is non-increasing and the utility of the environmental group is strictly increasing, but both have a distinct point of discontinuity at the income level y_0 where the government-exporter coalition is broken.

The implications of these two-player outcomes are important because they form the threat points for the three-player negotiations. That is, as the $\bar{u}^i$ in (11) change, the outcome of the three-player negotiation changes. For the case where income is constraining, this also makes price, production, and environmental damage a function of the income of the environmental group. To demonstrate this dependence, Table 2 gives the numerical results where $\bar{p} = 3$, first for the shadow, two-player coalition and then for the resulting three-player coalition. The income levels represent the end-points of income ranges that correspond to each shadow coalition regime.

These results demonstrate that a distinct discontinuity with respect to income occurs in the three-player solution in the case of all variables except government utility. Most notably, at the income level $y_0 = .0039$ where the shadow coalition switches from {g,x} to {g,e}, the export tax increases by about 80 percent which induces environmentally damaging production to decline by about 50 percent. At this point, the exporter's utility also drops by about 43 percent and the environmental group's utility improves dramatically.

7. Impacts of external intervention

We now turn to the implications of the above results for international development agencies or, in general, for external sovereign governments that wish to influence a more desirable environmental outcome in developing countries. Two interpretations are possible: the environmental group of this paper may represent the external agency directly or, more interestingly, the external agency can consider grants in aid that relax the income constraint of the environmental group or, equivalently, compensate developing country government for taking steps to improve the environment.

The result of most interest in Table 2 is the response of production or environmental damage to the income level of the environmental group. If an international development agency adopts a policy of supplementing the income level of the environmental group, then this response function may describe the response of transboundary environmental damage to strategic international aid. The result in Table 2 is that environmental damage declines continuously at a small rate in response to y up to an income level y_0. At the income level where the shadow coalition changes, a large and discrete decline occurs. This result is in sharp contrast to traditional competitive analyses where continuous responses are suggested throughout.

Above y_0, environmental damage is not reduced by an increase in y. Instead, the environmental group keeps the additional income, and may even extract a payment from the government ($b < 0$). The environmental group is able to do this because its high income gives it a good bargaining position, and allows it to convince the government to strike a hard bargain with traders that reduces the marketing margin. The government's utility is then improved by increasing the output tax. Environmental damage is unchanged.

From the standpoint of an international development agency seeking environmental improvement, this is an undesirable development, since the grant in aid is essentially used to line

the pockets of the environmental group rather than employed in productive investments. One possibility suggested by the last section of Table 2 is the imposition of a condition whereby the environmental group cannot accept a (reverse) bribe. While enforcement and credibility of such a condition requires additional considerations, the results in the last section of Table 2 show that increasing y now leads to lower environmental damage, though at a decreasing rate.

8. Concluding comments

The interesting opportunities suggested by this paper are where intervention by an external agency can cause an existing (shadow) coalition to be broken and replaced with another. In particular, the case of interest is where an environmental group is not a member of an existing (shadow) coalition but can be with external incentives or intervention.

In many countries, complementary relationships have arisen between government and prominent private firms historically. This paper shows how this behavior explains some observed marginal production below cost. Such agreements raise the government's utility above a noncooperative outcome, but often contribute to poor environmental conditions. Environmental groups or development agencies have an interest in improving environmental conditions and can do so by offering a lump sum payment in return for a specific policy reform.

This paper considers the possibility that environmental groups can supplant industry in the reigning coalition or in the shadow coalition that determines the bargaining outcome of the reigning coalition. Which outcome prevails depends on the financial resources of the environmental group, the utility it gets from environmental protection, and the contribution of industry to the economy. If external development agencies join forces with internal environmental interests or represent these interests at the bargaining table, then financial resources are more likely to be sufficient.

The results of this paper suggest that the potential for environmental improvements by strategic use of international aid is a complex issue. Marginal analysis may be of little value in identifying the most productive opportunities. In some countries, the marginal payoff of previous activities may continue in future endeavors. In other countries, a small increase in activities may achieve a major payoff even though past activities have been unproductive. In still other countries, unproductive activities can be expected to remain unproductive even with a major increase in effort.

The key in each case is to examine the characteristics of major interactions among government, the private sector, and environmental concerns. Assessment of the marginal improvement that can be purchased with a given increment in strategic aid may be much less important than determining how much strategic aid can cause a coalition or even a shadow coalition to break. Expanding strategic aid beyond these levels may be futile unless credible additional conditions can be imposed. The results here demonstrate that increasing external incentives may have limited marginal success in the context of a given coalition but may achieve distinct break-throughs when the reigning coalition is altered.

At any point in time, a development agency faces a portfolio of development opportunities involving many countries. The problem is one of choosing the portfolio with the greatest payoff. Clearly, the success or performance of development activities depends on identifying potential break-throughs and administering levels of incentives precisely to attain those break-throughs.

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Table 1. Price, production, and utility in the two-player coalition case.

Variable	Income Level[a]		
	$y < y_0$	$y_0 < y < y_1$	$y > y_1$
Coalition	{g, x}	{g, e} with $y = b$	{g, e} with $y > b$
t	$\bar{p}/4$	$\bar{p} - 2p(y)$	$(\bar{p} + 2)/3$
m	$\bar{p}/4$	$p(y)$	$(\bar{p} - 1)/3$
$p = q$	$\bar{p}/2$	$p(y)$	$(\bar{p} - 1)/3$
u^g	$\bar{p}^2/8$	$\bar{p}p(y) - 2p^2(y) + y$	$(2\bar{p}^2 + \bar{p} + 1)/18$
u^x	$\bar{p}^2/8$	$p^2(y)$	$(\bar{p}^2 - 2\bar{p} + 1)/9$
u^e	$y - \bar{p}/2$	$-p(y)$	$y - (5\bar{p} - 1)/18$

[a] Note that $p(y) = .3(\bar{p} - y) - .3(\bar{p}^2 + 18y + 180 \quad - 81y^2)^{.5}$, $y_1 = (5 - \bar{p})/18$, and y_0 is defined by $\bar{p}^2/8 = \bar{p}p(y) - 2p^2(y) + y$. Also note that $y_1 > y_0$ is assured by $\bar{p} < 4.8284$; otherwise, the {g,x} coalition is the shadow coalition for all income levels.

Table 2. Price, production, and utility and the shadow coalition.

Variable	Shadow Two-Player Coalition				
	{g, x}		{g, e} with y = b		{g, e} with y > b
Two-Player Outcome					
y	.0000	.0039	.0039	.1111	>.1111
t	.7500	.7500	1.4121	1.6667	1.6667
m	.7500	.7500	.7939	.6667	.6667
p = q	1.5000	1.5000	.7939	.6667	.6667
u^g	1.1250	1.1250	1.1250	1.2222	1.2222
u^x	1.1250	1.1250	.6303	.4444	.4444
u^e	-1.5000	-1.4961	-.7939	-.6667	y - .7777
b	.0000	.0000	.0039	.1111	.1111
Three-Player Outcome					
y	.0000	.0039	.0039	.1111	>.1111
t	.7500	.7519	1.3555	1.5185	1.5185
m	.7500	.7519	.6445	.4815	.4815
p = q	1.5000	1.4961	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000
u^g	1.1250	1.1288	1.1392	1.2593	1.2593
u^x	1.1250	1.1250	.6445	.4815	.4815
u^e	-1.5000	-1.4961	-.7798	-.6296	y -.7407
b	.0000	.0039	-.2164	-.2593	-.2593
Three-Player Outcome Constrained by b ≥ 0					
y	.0000	.0039	.0039	.1111	>.1111
t	.7500	.7519	1.4121	1.6508	1.6318
m	.7500	.7519	.7901	.5714	.6083
p = q	1.5000	1.4961	.7978	.7778	.7600
u^g	1.1250	1.1288	1.1266	1.2840	1.2401
u^x	1.1250	1.1250	.6303	.4444	.4623
u^e	-1.5000	-1.4961	-.7939	-.6667	y -.7600